

Another weak point in American banking lies in the geographical system. As it is not permissible for the Federal Banks to have branches, a host of small independent banks are scattered throughout the Union. Obviously the operation of any one of these banks is confined more or less to its own district. Thus the tendency is to confine finance to the particular commodity which is grown in that district, be it wheat or cotton, so that a setback in that product jeopardises the existence of the bank whose slender capital, unsupported by a substantial parent bank, is liable to be rapidly exhausted. Boom prices tripled land values since the war, and the slump has since shed the surplus value, leaving the banks seriously short of collateral against the substantial advances made to land owners. Between lower land values and commodities sold under cost, and in some cases, as in cotton and wheat for example, artificially sustained in value by the finance operations of the Federal Reserve Board, many banks find themselves in a tight corner with unrealisable assets and little prospect of liquidating the position until a substantial improvement takes place in commodity prices. Unfortunately everything has conspired to a steady rise in the commodity value of gold; in other words commodities have depreciated in the absence of gold to cover currency issues, until debtors have found it more and more difficult to meet obligations assumed on a gold basis. The catastrophic fall has reduced most of the producers of the world to a state of insolvency as the direct result of a gold standard made unworkable by the monopolising of gold by two creditor countries.


The redemption of a debt now demands double the weight of any given article, and places the producer in the invidious position of being quite unable to redeem his promises. Unstable currency has wrecked agriculture and industry and disorganised the credit markets of the world. An unsound monetary policy, in bondage to gold, has taken its full vengeance and has left Britain no option but to suspend the gold standard, which must eventually be succeeded by a monetary system capable of functioning in good times or bad. If we eliminate the gravest defects of a crude system, we remove the cause of such severe fluctuations in money commodity values as have brought the world to its present pass, and we should be able to give the producer a fair deal.

It has been shown how American currency policy has evolved by sundry changes, forced upon Government by necessity. This has left a legacy which causes confusion in the mind of the uninitiated and certainly does not contribute to sound currency. There are five types of currency in the United States, and this constitutes the weak spot in their monetary system. In addition to national bank notes, greenbacks and gold and silver certificates,

the Federal Reserve system makes bills available for rediscount, and this operation may take the form of the issue of Federal Reserve Notes, thus duplicating an already automatic currency and making for inflation. If the Federal Reserve system is accepted as a true central bank it should account for the whole issue, on a scientific principle, to the United States, constituting a national currency which is uniform in type and covers the whole Union. Such a consolidation of currency would strengthen immeasurably the whole financial structure and would enable the Federal Reserve Board to secure complete control of the monetary policy, thus permitting them to issue or withdraw currency according to trade requirements. But it must be obvious that a monetary system mainly founded upon a 100 per cent. gold cover can with difficulty stem the tide of such adverse currents as have been running of late, and that a broader basis is essential if stability is to be attained.

There may be other factors within the American banking system which are not generally known and which may explain what appears to be an anomaly in sound practice. But there can be little doubt that a system which calls for such an uneconomic use of gold as cover is extravagant, and not only stands arraigned in the United States itself, but precludes the extended use of gold as a standard by countries less favourably placed. Therefore the necessity arises for Britain to take a lead in the adoption of a monetary standard which will be free from the disabilities inherent in gold, whose supply is inadequate to fulfil its function as a world standard. Apart from this there is not sufficient gold in the world to allow for an expansion of currency in the United States such as will undoubtedly be required when trade revives. Moreover, forces are at work which can scarcely fail to reduce drastically the enormous deposits of gold acquired by America in recent years, at the expense of other countries. Sooner or later it will be found necessary to adopt a scientific monetary standard, broader in basis than gold or gold and silver, and if, as we confidently hope, Britain should courageously give a lead in this direction, it would be a first step towards the evolution of a new type of world currency, as superior to gold as gold was to cowries.

ALFRED WIGGLESWORTH.



FRANCE AND THE ARTS.

AT the time of Richelieu an effort was made in France to throw off foreign influences, and from then onwards, with one notable exception, the arts have been synonymous with France; so that even those foreigners who from time to time have settled in Paris, or elsewhere in the country, have been classified with the French artists and have become a part of the nation. France has for several hundreds of years believed fervently in two things: (a) in national and intensive culture from the soil to the mind; (b) in protection. It is therefore as a self-contained and self-sufficient nation that she comes before us with her arts. What she takes from other countries she nationalises, and she makes French every influence to which she may open her mind. Yet at the same time she is open-minded, in a sense; for example, her Salons in modern times accept works from foreigners. Since the 'forties, at any rate, she has been the centre of art-education; and most great artists have put in some time in the Paris schools. French art has, therefore, been a world influence in more ways than one. The custom of taking the "fashions" from Paris dates from the time of Louis XIV, and even to-day this holds good in all the arts.

Nevertheless French arts are now going through a very critical period of change and experiment: to understand this period it is well to look back four or five hundred years and then see our own period in its right perspective. In the Middle Ages the arts were definitely European, since Catholic Europe had one philosophy, one system of society and one trend of thought; the arts served either the Church or Royalty and the aristocratic class. Craftsmen and artists were trained and employed by their various guilds and, with superficial differences of climate and available materials, the arts of that long epoch were very much the same in style. What brought about the great change, the differentiation in national character, the breaking away from old tradition, the adventuring upon new and national styles?

In France the change was at first due largely to politics. It is, indeed, characteristic of France that, ever since the time of Richelieu, politics have always had a great deal to do with her culture. Under his influence and domination there came into force a new attitude to life; from serving the Church men were encouraged to serve the State and a new patriotism was born of the religious factions of his day. "Our country first" might have been his cry, and the contending religious parties were made to put the State first in their acts and thoughts. At the same time, Richelieu threw the searchlight of his patronage upon men of outstanding talents, especially in the domain of literature; he not only made

much of Corneille, but he established a Royal Printing Press and even went so far as to organise the French language. That such efforts to produce a national culture have their drawbacks is evident from the fact that a man like Descartes could not breathe the atmosphere of Paris and found freedom for the independence of his personal thought in Holland. But this did not deter the Cardinal from founding what has ever since been the official policy of France. It is, of course, well known that Richelieu established the French Academy of Literature in 1635, though in 1622 he encouraged Rubens to visit Paris, where he was much employed; and about this time the Italian Players under Martinelli, the King of Mirth, were imported to amuse the court. Known now as the *Commedia dell'Arte* this troupe brought to Paris not only the beginnings of modern comedy upon which Molière was brought up, but also the beginnings of opera, ballet-dancing and fireworks; indeed the Boulevard des Italiens is named after them; they preceded French comedy, and they laid the foundations from which, under Louis XIV, arose the *Comédie Française*.

The very definite French style in the arts, however, started under François I and, especially in architecture, his reign and that of Henri IV are the glorious predecessors of the Louis periods. In 1604 the Palais Royal was built; the great architect of the ensuing time was François Mansart (1598-1666), the father of French architecture and ancestor of J. H. Mansard (1645-1708), as well as of J. H. Mansard de Jouy, SS. Gabriel and his son de Cotte. Mansart designed the Château de Maisons (1642-5) which marks the beginning of the Louis XIV style. He was a man of independent spirit and threw up his work on the Church of the Val de Grâce when it was only ten feet above the ground. This work was taken on and completed by Le Mercier and it has been a model for numbers of later churches in many countries. Mansart also made a design for the completion of the Louvre, but Colbert stipulated certain conditions in regard to the contract which annoyed Mansart and, disliking the obvious disadvantage to an artist of State service under such an autocrat, he withdrew and the Minister sent for Bertini to carry on in his place. The great work of his descendant, J. Hardouin-Mansard, was the completion of the Palace of Versailles, but he had previously designed a château at Cluny for Madame de Montespan and had worked under Bruant on the Hôtel Vendôme; he also built the Church of the Invalides, the Grand Trianon, the Palace Chapel at Versailles and the Nôtre Dame, likewise at Versailles, as well as the famous Pont Royal in Paris. Contemporary with Sir Christopher Wren, he is one of the outstanding men in the history of architecture. Perrault and Girardon were other important builders of the period,

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which may be summed up as the period of Watteau, for it is of him we immediately think when we think of Louis XIV.

Before coming to the efflorescence of this era, however, we must step back again to the time of François I and of Henri IV. The Middle Ages had left a wonderful body of fine craftsmen and the guilds still continued their organisation of marvellously skilled workers. A strong political effort had started under Sully to rid France of foreign influences, though, with the Medicis still in power, through Catherine Queen of France and her successor Marie de Medici, this was by no means easy to effect. History is sometimes curiously written; for example, before me as I write lies a well-known History of France whose author says of Richelieu: "The Cardinal's natural taste for splendour also no doubt called artists round him; yet their works are mostly of second-rate quality, their names often obscure, they belonged to an age of artistic decadence." This of a time that nourished Nicholas Poussin (1594-1665), who with Claude Lorrain (1600-1682), originated landscape-painting and greatly influenced Constable, Richard Wilson, Turner and Gainsborough, as well as innumerable French artists right down to the last decade! Claude Lorrain was the first to go direct to nature and he is said to be the initiator of pure landscape painting. Jacques Callot (1592-1635) the famous etcher, Abraham Bosse (1605-78), the brothers Le Nain, as well as the great gardener Le Nôtre and the painter Le Brun were all of this "decadent" time! While beautiful furniture, silks and tapestries were being made throughout France. When Colbert, under Louis XIV, took on the cloak dropped by Richelieu and Sully (to whom France owes her textile industries), he set about organising the arts of France on a grand scale, and found everything ready to his hand.

The whole period of Louis XIV, by which the arts of France are generally, or should one say popularly, known, was merely a carrying on of what had gone before; indeed, strange though it may sound, the arts of France to the present day are just a carrying on. Ever renewing, always experimenting, inventing and re-designing to suit the needs of each generation, there is no hiatus in the family tree of French arts; for these are a part of France's national life, part, a very large part indeed, of her national trade, and always fostered by the State. Colbert found old-established tapestry works around Paris; these he gathered under the name of one of them into a Royal manufactory, known as the Gobelins factory, and the painter, Le Brun, was put in charge; similarly, he took over in the name of the King factories of other kinds, all, though with modern designs, contributing to the revenue of France to-day.

Watteau, who mirrors the court life of his time, is the culmina-

tion of a type of art that started with Poussin. In his way one of the greatest painters who ever lived, his subject matter may be thought trivial, but his painting is that of a true Master. His colour defies description; in its rhythmic lyrical beauty, its delicacy and elegance it has never been surpassed. After a period of neglect his works are once again highly valued and are to-day almost priceless. The Wallace Collection is fortunate in owning two perfect examples, among others; and a very beautiful specimen may be seen at Dulwich. Watteau was not a Frenchman either by birth or family, but he is identified with French art at its finest period and is the father of all that came afterwards until the tremendous break with tradition caused by the French Revolution. He was the master of Lancret, who with Fragonard led the *petits maîtres* of the eighteenth century, at a period which was perhaps more important in sculpture than in painting.

Puget (1620-94) was the first of a long line of fine sculptors; Girardon and Coysevox are also names associated with the time of Louis XIV; Coustou, Bouchardon, Falconet and Clodion shine forth from the eighteenth century, in the first half of which Houdon (1740-1828) was born. In style Houdon stands as an eighteenth-century sculptor, but he surpassed all others in his marvellous delineation of character—his busts of Voltaire and Molière, to name only two of his world-famous portraits, are among the most noble examples of sculptured portraits since Greek times. The elegance, grace, delicacy, fragrance and superlative workmanship of the arts in France up to the Revolution may be seen in the furniture of the three Louis periods, outstanding names being those of Boulle and of Reissner who established a tradition still carried on in the École Boulle in Paris, even though the intricate work of their styles is now out of fashion.

After the tremendous wave of the Louis XIV period decline was inevitable, and the historian who wrote of the decadence of French arts under Richelieu mistook his period by a hundred years or so, for it was the influence of Madame de Pompadour which brought about the demand, before which painters and other artists fell, for the extreme triviality that ended in weakness such as may be seen in the delicious works of J. B. Pater. All depth, such as we find in Watteau, went out of painting and all design became frivolous; colour and drawing became merely pretty and with Boucher (1703-70) decadence set in, Houdon standing almost alone as a noble exception. The architecture of the eighteenth century in France is, however, a thing apart and remains an important example of the building art. From 1697 until the Battle of Blenheim in 1704 France dominated Europe; but after this defeat the influence of England made itself felt. The visit of Voltaire to

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
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England (1726-9), was the first step towards the breaking up of the old régime in France. It is well-known that the tremendous effect of the political liberties he found here laid the basis for writings that led to the Revolution; while, in 1749, J. J. Rousseau with his essay *Discours sur les Arts et Sciences* started a movement which still resounds throughout the world and has not yet run its full course. With him began "the cult of the noble savage" (possibly originated by Diderot), the influence of which may be seen in the whole trend of modern art in our own time. Towards the end of the eighteenth century Turner and Constable exerted the strongest influence on painting in France; Delacroix, having seen the latter's work, with its natural colour, was so impressed that he repainted his own picture *The Massacre of Scio* and in so doing earned for himself the name of a revolutionary painter. From this time onwards two branches of art took the platform and, side by side with the official art—which still goes on—-independent art developed.

From the chaos of the Revolution emerged Louis David (1748-1825), a classic type of the true Academician; and the way in which France returned the compliment of English influence is seen in the fact that the leader of our Pre-Raphaelite movement, Ford Madox Brown, studied with a pupil of David! The outstanding sculptors of this period were, besides Houdon, Rude (1784-1855) and Barye (1796-1875); the architects especially identified with the style of the Empire were Fontaine and Percier. Many contending influences were now at work: the beginning of the age of machinery, the growing strength of the sciences, the first iron bridges, the strong classic-Roman element that sprang from the political ideas of the Revolution, the campaigns of Napoleon. But still the main trend of the arts was classical, and Ingres is the typical painter of Napoleon's court; under Napoleon all the crafts and industries which had been thrown out of gear by the Revolution revived; and a new vitality took hold of the old manufactories, so that the Empire style marks the last great period of Official art in the history of France, until in 1925, at the International Exhibition of Decorative Arts in Paris a new style, which we know as modern art, was officially put forward and has since set the fashion in all the arts for the entire world.

Fragonard, David, Prud'hon, Isabey, Ingres, Corot and Delacroix, with Houdon, Rude and Barye, ran their course into the nineteenth century, but the independence which began with Delacroix went on. The group known as the "Réfusés" included Daumier, Theodore Rousseau (their first leader), J. F. Millet, Daubigny, Courbet and Manet, and, with Degas, Sisley, Renoir, Pissarro and Monet, were dubbed the "Impressionists" because they sought to give to the beholder an impression such as nature gave to them,

rather than any longer to continue to attempt photographic realism. Scientific experiments with colour greatly influenced their technique and from their time onwards the whole method of painting changed. Impressionism, officially recognised by France in 1863 at the famous Salon des Réfusés, was not well received in England and it was not until the present century that we became familiar with and influenced by it. The recently opened French galleries at the "Tate" contain the best examples obtainable at so late a date: it remains for the forthcoming French Exhibition at Burlington House, January to March 1932, to put this movement before us in its full strength. Its followers are now among the accepted masters of French art, Rodin being the best-known sculptor of the group.

There followed a generation of artists who carried independence to its logical extreme, known as the Post-Impressionists, they concentrated upon pattern and design and in so doing went a long way towards that almost total elimination of perspective which is now fashionable. Of this group, of course, Cézanne and Gauguin are the recognised leaders. They differ greatly, Cézanne being more concerned with emotion, Gauguin more concerned with Rousseau's return to the noble savage; the one is a master of form, the other of design and colour. The emotion expressed by Gauguin is that of primitive humanity, while Cézanne threw upon canvas a more atmospheric feeling. Cézanne led logically to Picasso and Cubism; by the side of whom Matisse and the Fauves carried on a revolt against Impressionism. Picasso has had the greater influence; the result of his experiments is seen on every side: in architecture, in all the industrial arts and in what is known as the style of our own day. This style is, however, largely the result of modern conditions of life; buildings, for example, are influenced by the design of aeroplanes as also by new materials such as concrete and by the necessity for labour-saving methods. People are no longer willing to wait nine years while a piece of furniture is made for them, as a King waited for a desk by Reisener. Speed has its effect in the life of the arts, which have reached so critical a period in their history that a noted French writer is found asking whether, indeed, they will continue to exist at all, except as a hand-maid to architecture, or a servant to industry. Whether the world is to be completely mechanised, or whether the spirit will seek in the arts release from such mechanisation, is not decided; yet upon this decision the future of the arts in France, as everywhere else, depends.

Artists are in essence, as Professor Joad has put it, the purveyors of ideas, and the ideas of the revolutionaries were sooner or later—as he says—bound to permeate the artists. France, for centuries

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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

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THE INDIAN ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE.

WITH what object was the Indian Conference ever convened? and what results has it achieved? These are questions we may well ask ourselves at the close of the second meeting, and while preparations are being made for concluding its labours in India. For the answer to the first question we must go back some years—even a century. During the war, in response to the immediate, spontaneous, and generous way in which India had come forward and thrown in her lot with the Empire, the British Government had made a specific Declaration—commonly known as the Montagu Declaration of 1917—that the goal of British policy in India was responsible self-government. But this was no sudden impulse: it had a long background to it. The pressure of war may have forced Government to define its ultimate aim, and may have hastened the public declaration of that aim. But Government was in truth only putting into precise phraseology what the British had been, though only half consciously, working towards for a century past.

It was not in consonance with the spirit of the British people that they should exercise permanent domination over so cultured a people as the Indians. Sorely against their will a British trading company had been forced by the chaos which followed the break-up of the Moghul Empire, and by the presence of competing Dutch and French companies, to enter the political arena, to engage in military enterprises which drained the Company's resources, and to establish and maintain order. But for more than a hundred years the British had been associating Indians with them in the administration in increasing numbers and had been raising them to higher and higher positions in the Executive. And for seventy years they had been going a step further: they had been admitting Indians—and in increasing numbers—into the Legislative Councils, Central and Provincial; and they had been giving these Indian legislators increased powers in framing the laws of their own country, in criticising the acts of Government and especially the Budget. Lastly, they had admitted the elective principle and allowed an increasing number of these Indian legislators to be

the leader and indeed the arbiter of taste and fashion was, in this revolt from the very Academies she had been the first to found, the first to feel the pulse of public movement towards reforms that are still a matter of political contest. It is impossible to return to the atmosphere exhaled in France before the Revolution; an effort in this direction during the Second Empire resulted in what we echoed in our Mid-Victorian arts, but the hand of the craftsman had lost its cunning and the attempt to revive the Louis periods in furniture and other industries marked the only period of really bad taste France has known. Machinery had intervened; time became more important than perfection.

If we look at the painting and sculpture of France to-day, and at the design of every sort, we cannot fail to be struck by the fact that its very versatility and facileness, masterly though it often is, is impregnated by labour-saving, time-saving methods. The Cubist movement, however, though still rather new to us, is really twenty-five years old; since 1925 it has been evident that it cannot last much longer. It is becoming *vieux jeu*. The attempt to return to Ingres has failed; and what the art of to-morrow is to be Paris has not yet decided. Various movements are on foot, a revolt again Cubism not least among them, notably in the group calling itself the New Independents. The tendency is still towards an art of feeling as against an art of intellect; in fact sensation is more to the fore than feeling; but mankind cannot forever feed on sensation and a return to reality may be expected when political ideas settle down. Elie Faure prophesies the end of individualism and the return to an art which, like that of the Middle Ages, shall be impersonal, collective, communal and, soon, anonymous, while Le Corbusier thinks it will be architectural in conception.

But meanwhile we may realise that every manifestation of the human mind, even when, as with Picasso and the modernists, it appears to be divorced from all reality, is nevertheless real, in so far that it is an expression of a section of mankind at a given time; and though the historians of the future may sum up this period in art, led as it is by France, as a period of artistic decadence, nevertheless it is real to us, it seems to be the art of our generation. The academic art which runs alongside it—and the Salon in Paris is crowded every year with specimens of this—has no importance for our argument, since it is always an echo of the past. In the time of Louis XIV the Academy was the expression of the period; but since the French Revolution this has ceased to be the case. A generation is now growing up to whom the leaders of the "modern" movement may well seem as old-fashioned as Ingres seemed to Cézanne.

AMELIA DEFRIES.

CAN THE IDEA OF PROVIDENCE BE MAINTAINED?

THE idea of Providence is one that tends to droop and fade in the intellectual climate of the present day. Indeed it shares this fate with the wider conception of which it forms part, that of a Moral Order of the world. But these two far-reaching conceptions cannot both be discussed within the limits of a single paper. So I set out from the assumption that some form of Purpose, some degree of Moral Order, has been traced in the world, and especially in the human sphere which alone we know directly. It is here assumed that our race could not have gained the summits to which it has already attained, either in knowledge or in practice—perhaps could not have come into being at all—unless there had been some favouring trend in the general course of things; and that this influence cannot be unconscious, but can best be conceived by us as a directing Mind. To hold this faith is a great venture into the unknown; yet it has been unhesitatingly taken by most of the great religions of the world. But does it involve the idea of Providence, of a particular care for the well-being of such finite beings as we are? Or does theism become a more credible creed when it is lightened of this other doctrine which has been so commonly linked with it? In other words, is a stoic form of theism, which asks for no special divine tendance and care of the individual life, easier to harmonise with what we know of nature than the traditional Christian belief that "not one of them is forgotten"?

It is not with such a thorough-going stoicism as that of Mr. Bertrand Russell's earlier writings that we are here concerned; but rather with the rendering of theistic belief which looks for no interference with the course of natural law, since natural law is rightly regarded as in itself divine. Various currents of thought may contribute to swell the stream of this quasi-stoic theism. There is the idea which appears again and again in ethics, that the human will can rise superior to all outward circumstances, even the most untoward and baffling, and that its true nature and dignity only appear in the stress of conflict. There is the endeavour after an utter disinterestedness in religion, which finds its classic expression in Spinoza's saying that he who truly loves God ought not to expect God to love him in return. To the one type of thinker the idea of Providence seems needless, to the other, unworthy; and both are fortified by the tendency of much recent thought to divide the world of experience into two sections, an inner, in which the Spirit shows its freedom and finds its God,

elected by their own countrymen, instead of being nominated by Government. Advance was therefore being steadily made in the direction of Indian self-government. There was clearly no intention to establish a permanent British autocratic domination. There was equally no sign of working towards a time when India would send representatives to the Parliament in London—as representatives from Pondicherry are sent to Paris. The tendency was not towards centralisation on the capital of the Empire, but towards self-government of the parts, as elsewhere in the British Empire. So the announcement in 1917 that the goal of British policy was responsible self-government within the Empire was only describing in set words what had been the obvious end of British action in India for a century past.

But the goal was to be reached by stages. And the British were to be the judges as to the fitness of Indians for each forward step. And here was the rub—and still is. For India was bursting with a new-found sense of nationality. Nationality, self-determination, was in the air. During and since the war every country in the world had been feeling it in an intensified degree. And probably never before in their history had Indians felt so strong a sentiment for India as a whole. For seldom before had India ever been a whole. Even without Burma it has a population of over three hundred millions. And they are of the most varied races and religions and do not even speak the same language. The Hindu majority is divided into numerous castes which will not take food or marry with one another. And there is the great cleavage between the eighty million Moslems and the Hindu majority. Nothing less like a nation could be imagined. Yet India for nearly a century has been at least a political unity. All Indians have acknowledged allegiance to one sovereign. One system of administration and one law has run through at least all British India. And, in spite of their many differences, Indians of all races and religions have been coming to possess a strong fellow-feeling. Whatever might be their race or their creed, they have felt themselves Indian. And very obviously they have been Indians in contradistinction to their rulers. The British both by making India a political unity, and also by serving as a foil against which Indians contrast themselves, have greatly assisted the process of nationalising India. So now a passion for India was sweeping through the land. Villagers as well as townsmen, the illiterate as well as the educated, and women as well as men were feeling the call of India. And no longer would they be satisfied with any leisurely advance towards self-government. They wanted to govern themselves at once. And the more impetuous of them wanted "complete independence" here and now.

Hence it was that when the British Parliament in its majestic way sent out a Royal Commission solemnly to process round India and report on the progress she had been making since the first instalment of reforms had been introduced in 1919 in accordance with the Montagu Declaration, there was a howl of indignation. In all innocence Parliament had made an egregious blunder. In the old days of the East India Company a Committee of Parliament had reported every ten years on the progress of India. And in the India Act of 1919 the same idea had been revived, but in the form of a Royal Commission proceeding to India itself and not merely sitting in London as formerly. It was meant well enough. But the fact of a Commission composed only of members of the British Parliament coming out to India, calling Indians up as witnesses only as to the future of their country, roused them to the highest pitch of indignation. They wanted their own say and a real say in determining their own destiny.

However, in spite of Indian indignation, the Commission undeviatingly pursued its Royal way and at the end of two and a half years reported on the progress of India during the ten years under review. It was a masterly report. And for the first time the British public and the world public seem to have grasped the elementary factors of the Indian situation, such as both the immensity and the complexity of the problem due to the number and variety of the population and the antagonisms between the different sections, and further, the present incapacity of the people to defend themselves against outside aggression. But masterly and informing as the Simon Commission report was it dealt only with British India—with that part of India which is directly administered by the British. It had no authority to deal with that other part of India, which may be called Indian India, comprising about a third of the area and a quarter of the population—which is still ruled by its own rulers, the great Princes and the lesser Chiefs. Yet it was hard to deal with British India satisfactorily without regard to India as a whole. There were many questions such as defence, customs, railways, etc., which concerned India as a whole—All-India questions. The Chairman of the Commission therefore suggested to the Prime Minister in October 1929 that "some sort of a conference" should be set up after the Commission report had been received and that in this conference the British Government should meet both representatives of British India and representatives of the Indian States for the purpose of seeking the greatest possible measure of agreement on the final proposals for any further steps towards self-government which the Government would eventually have to lay before

and an outer, wholly controlled by natural law. This type of thought finds a place for Providence; but it is that of inner direction, not the control of outward circumstance to meet the exigencies of human life.

Thus the ethical ideal of fortitude and the scientific ideal of a disinterested outlook on the world, undeflected by personal or social aims and hopes, reinforce one another. Nature is looked on, not perhaps as purposeless, but as related to man's higher good only in a general sense, as the sphere of his discipline, the school in which he learns hardness and endurance. In Kant's phrase, she is at best a stepmother; and he must look *within* for the experience of a Father's interest and love, if he is to find these at all. As far as the outward world is concerned, the physical and economic environment, we reach what might be termed a "sink-or-swim" point of view. Man is thrown out into a medium which will support him, but only if he speedily masters its secrets of resistance, and uses them to save himself by unceasing effort. This view of the pitiless character of the outer world, and of the complete severance between the cosmic and the ethical order, ran through much of the thinking of the later nineteenth century. It received memorable expression in Huxley's Romanes Lecture, where the argument led up to the "audacious proposal, to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm and to set man to subdue nature to his higher ends."

This attempt to divide the world as we know it into two spheres, governed in wholly different ways, has something in common with an earlier, more naïve, distinction between great affairs, of which the gods had a care, and small things which they left to chance or fate. But reflective thought soon abandoned this position; and Plato in his last work showed clearly the folly of supposing that the divine care could extend to the great things of life and not also to the small. (*Laws*, 901 ff.) It is, indeed, inevitable that we should give up the attempt to divide the great things from the small within the individual human life. Where can we trace a dividing line? Who knows what apparently trifling chance may deflect a whole life-history, nay, many life-histories? For, if one life is changed in direction, others must feel the effect to a distance that we cannot reckon. It does not, indeed, need the modern doctrine of relativity to teach this lesson. The simplest reflection proves it; or even the experience which comes to many of us when we are compelled to procure a first pair of spectacles, and are surprised to find how the passage of the years has insensibly altered the scale and definition of our field of vision. Our estimates of magnitude are for our practical use only; and, if there is divine governance

anywhere, it must penetrate to that which to us is least, as well as enfold the vast spaces of the universe.

There is no great and no small
To the Soul that maketh all:
And where it cometh, all things are;
And it cometh everywhere.

If we turn back to the other distinction noted above, that between the inner and the outer, we find that it is subtler, and has a greater measure of truth; yet here also a similar difficulty confronts us. Again, where are we to draw a dividing line?

In the spheres of feeling and will, psychology recognises the same interplay and interdependence of outer and inner as in that of knowledge. Dr. Cairns has recently pointed this out, and concludes that "it is really impossible to cut the unity of the world into clearly divided halves in this way, to assign the world of physical nature to the sway of the causal nexus, and the psychical and spiritual world to autonomy and the Divine Spirit. Neither religion nor science can long consent to a truce so hollow, indeed it has long been visibly breaking up before our eyes."*

This becomes increasingly evident when we consider the idea of Providence in its wider, social and historical bearings. The "sink-or-swim" view may so far interpret the experiences of the individual as to assure him of the inner support of the Divine Spirit through the most extreme pressure of outward circumstance. He may believe that all these things are for his good, and that they will bring him a greater moral and spiritual gain the harder they are to bear. But this is to fall back on the ascetic view of life, which looks on solitary discipline as the end of experience, and forgets that life is social. In the family, the community, the nation, the world of nations, it is patent nonsense to say that the moral results are the same whatever external events take place. In social life the inward cannot be developed or displayed apart from the outward. The idea of a Kingdom of God becomes impossible to hold if He has no control over the wider, objective happenings of history.

Thus the sharp distinction between inner and outer, and the attempt to restrict the divine activity to the inner sphere, share the same fate as the naïve theory that great events are controlled by Providence, while lesser events are left to chance. But if this standpoint cannot be maintained, we come back to the idea of a constant Providence, since apart from it the belief in God is unintelligible. The idea has its own difficulties, moral as well as intellectual; but on the intellectual side at least they are less than those of a divided universe. For, if there is a Purpose greater

* *The Faith that Rebels*, p. 38.

Parliament. The Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, after consultation with Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, quickly saw that this would afford a means of bringing Indian and British opinion together. He decided, therefore, to accept the suggestion. Hence the Round Table Conference as it came into being a year later. For the future, Conference was to take the place of Commission. Indians, instead of appearing as witnesses, were to meet British legislators on equal terms round the same table and together discuss the future of their own country. And they were to meet at the same table not only representatives of the Government of the day, then a Labour Government, but representatives of the other two parties of the State as well.

And what has been the result, the result of the two meetings of the Conference, the first in 1930 and the second in 1931? This at least: a temporary easing of the situation in India and a remarkable change of opinion in Great Britain. Before the Conference met, Mr. Gandhi's non-co-operation, non-violence, civil disobedience and boycotting campaign was in full swing. The Indian National Congress was setting itself up as a "parallel government." It was holding the established Government up to opprobrium. It was defying its laws. It was instigating citizens to refuse to pay taxes. And when Indian delegates sailed from India to take part in the Conference they were treated as traitors, they were socially spurned, and black flags were waved as they left the shores of their country. This attitude has not been substantially and permanently changed. But at any rate the situation in India was eased for the moment. Moderate Indian opinion was won over. It was possible to come to an agreement with Mr. Gandhi to suspend the non-violent, non-co-operative, civil disobedience and boycott campaign, and to get the National Congress to accept the invitation which had been extended to them to send a representative to the Conference. But while there was this so far satisfactory though not very substantial change in the Indian attitude, there was a very marked change in British public opinion.

Up to the time of the publication of the Simon Commission report and the public sessions of the Round Table Conference, it cannot be said that the British public had really comprehended what they had been committed to in India. The Montagu Declaration of 1917 had been made in the midst of the war, when the public mind was directed elsewhere. Even in 1919, when it was embodied in an Act of Parliament, it did not arouse much attention outside Parliament. The public had never thoroughly endorsed it, understood its full implications or taken it to heart. The meaning of it had not yet soaked into the public mind. In

a general way the public felt that, as long as Great Britain was responsible for the government of India, internal order must be maintained, the frontier properly defended, the country efficiently administered, British investments secured, and British trade kept unhampered. There was no desire to keep India in permanent subjection and every desire to do the fair and right thing by India. But when the Simon Commission recommended that the next step forward should be autonomy in the Provinces but practically no change at the centre, they were prepared to accept that as about the limit of the next step forward. The 1917 Declaration had always contemplated a gradual development of self-governing institutions. And a grant of full self-government in the Provinces, while the British Parliament remained responsible for the Central Government, was as far as British public opinion was prepared to go.

Now, by the decisive vote of 369 to 43, the House of Commons accepts the Prime Minister's statement, backed by the whole Cabinet of the present National Government, that the British Government intends to pursue unswervingly a plan for placing responsibility for the Government of India upon the Central as well as the Provincial Legislature. During a period of transition, while the transfer of responsibility from the British to the Indian Legislature was being effected, there would be safeguards for the defence of India, for the conduct of external affairs, for the observance of certain financial obligations, and for the protection of the rights and liberties of minorities. But the great main principle of responsibility at the centre as well as in the provinces was accepted by Government and emphatically endorsed by even the predominantly Conservative House of Commons. Further, the plain issue was put straight to members whether we should leisurely proceed towards the goal of responsible self-government with a reserve in the back of our mind that the longer we took on the way the better, or whether we should look upon the fitting of India to govern herself as the greatest piece of Imperial statesmanship upon which we have ever been engaged and put our whole hearts into the task with the intention of seeing it through with the least possible delay. And upon that issue, put to it by a Labour Prime Minister, the Liberal Sir John Simon, and the Conservative Mr. Baldwin, the House pronounced decisively in favour of energetic action. And though the House of Lords was more measured in its approval, Mr. Baldwin was probably right when he said that if a referendum could be made to the country public opinion would support the Government.

What has brought about this change? The Simon Commission having hesitated to recommend transferring responsibility at the

than man's in the world at all, it cannot be excluded from any part of that world. It must extend to the small as to the great, to the inner as to the outer, to the evil as to the good. In the words of the Book of Wisdom, it must "reach from one end to another mightily."

But if all this be true, have we not so generalised the idea of Providence as to rob it of all its specific value? May it not finally fade away into the bare conception of an immanent divine presence, pervading the whole universe? This may indeed happen; but only if we fail to mark the limits of the previous argument. To say that no region of experience is outside the scope of the divine action does not mean that God acts in the same way in all, or that His working may not be more clearly discerned at some levels of experience than at others. Though there is no sharp and absolute line between small and great, outer and inner, "the just and the unjust," there are still relative distinctions which we are bound to draw in each case. The witness of men and women of deep religious experience is undoubtedly that, while the divine guidance and care are all-pervasive, they can be more clearly seen at the great turning-points of life and in its more inward experiences than in what is trivial and external, and that a certain responsiveness is the condition of their being perceived. "The unjust" are not, according to Jesus' teaching, shut out from the action of Providence, but they are often unable to recognise and answer to it.

But at this point we pass from these general considerations to a more concrete question—*Is the Idea of Providence borne out by Experience?* The argument on the negative side is here most formidable, and it were in the last degree foolish to minimise it. The unspeakable littleness and frailty of man's existence when viewed in its stupendous setting in the physical universe; the way in which human lives by the million are swept hither and thither by wars, migrations and the tidal waves of the economic world; the degree to which life is ruled by influences which appear to be the merest play of chance—such are the three great waves, to borrow Plato's metaphor, which threaten wholly to submerge the faith that God cares for and protects human lives. But against them we must set the fact that men and women of widely varying creed, in different ages and circumstances, have been profoundly convinced that their lives were indeed directed and guarded in a way of which their own powers afforded no explanation.

It is impossible to illustrate this conviction adequately here; but two instances of it may be quoted from the ancient world, and two from the field of action in recent days. One of the deepest

thinkers among the Psalmists of Israel thus described what he knew of the divine care, "Thou knowest me sitting or rising, my very thoughts thou readest from afar; . . . thou art on every side, behind me and before, laying thy hand on me."* Plato agreed with Xenophon in describing Socrates as relying implicitly on guidance from the unseen, a guidance which he found clearly, though not exclusively, in the experience of his "divine sign."† Thus the practical conclusion of the *Republic* is expressed in the words, "We may gather this regarding the just man, that, even if he fall into poverty or illness or any other state accounted to be evil, these things will work out some true good for him, either in this life or after death. Certainly the gods cannot fail in their care of one who resolves with his whole heart to become just, and by the pursuit of virtue to attain as much as a man may of the divine likeness."‡

The other instances are of a different character. Sir Ernest Shackleton concluded with the following words his account of his perilous crossing of the ice-bound mountains of South Georgia, when he and two companions had strained every power to secure help for their comrades left on Elephant Island, "When I look back at those days I do not doubt that Providence guided us, not only across those snow-fields, but also across the stormy white sea. . . . I know that during that long march of thirty-six hours over the unnamed mountains and glaciers of South Georgia, it often seemed to me that we were four, not three. And Worsley and Crean had the same idea."§ This was in 1916. Two years later eight British officers escaped from the Turkish prison camp of Yozgad in central Asia Minor, and after amazing adventures and great hardships reached Cyprus in safety. The two members of the party who tell the story end on the same note as Shackleton: "To us the hand of Providence was manifest in our escape, and we see in it an answer to prayer. Our way, of course, might have been made smoother, but perhaps in that case we should not have learnt the same lessons of dependence upon God."§ Such testimonies might be multiplied many times, both from other stories of perilous adventure, and from those of more tranquil life; but it is enough to note that they do not come always, or indeed most often, from those to whom fortune has made the way smooth. Faith has not so much spurned adversity as found in it "sweet uses," unsuspected before. It has found that sorrow as well as joy was needed to bring out the hidden potencies of life.

* Ps. cxxxix, 2, 5 (tr. Moffatt). † *Rep.* 613 A., Cf. *Apol.*, 31, 41.

‡ *South* (abridged edition), ch. XIV.

§ Johnston and Yearsley, *Four-fifty Miles to Freedom*, final paragraph. Cf. an incident in Sven Hedin's travels, quoted by Stephenson, *Divine Providence in the Light of Personality*, p. 129 f.

centre from England to India, what has made Government and Parliament now accept that stupendous change? Undoubtedly the statesmanlike attitude of the Indians themselves. The Simon Commission had envisaged an eventual Federation of British India and Indian India. And at the very outset of the Conference the Princes announced their willingness to come into such a Federation. That announcement completely changed the situation. A stabilising element was introduced. A central Legislature with a number of its members accustomed to governing Indians in an Indian way would inspire confidence. The statement by Indian rulers commenced the process of change. And this was followed by remarkable speeches from the representatives of British India—especially by a powerful, lucid and most persuasive speech from Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. This great Indian lawyer allowed that during the period of transition they must be prepared for certain anomalies, and certain subjects, such as the Army and foreign policy, must be dealt with by the Viceroy. And as regards Finance, he would have a clause acknowledging in the most explicit terms India's liability to pay her debts and the interest on the debts. But he pleaded eloquently that with these safeguards and reservations during the transition period the Central Government of India should be answerable for its conduct and for its decisions to the Central Indian Legislature. At present, he argued, the Government of India owed no responsibility to the Indian Legislature, and in consequence, instead of being strong, was terribly weak. It had no backing in the Legislature, or in the country. It had not been able to deal with the question of law and order successfully, but had to have resort to the extraordinary powers of the Governor-General. And Sapru contended that only if the Legislature knew that it was going to be responsible for its decisions, could it acquire a sense of responsibility and show greater moderation in dealing with the actual problems of government.

Lord Reading's speech in reply proved the turning point of the Conference. The Princes' declaration of their intention to join in a Federal Constitution for All-India had, he said, created a new situation. And now provided such adequate safeguards and reservations were introduced as would enable the government of India to be carried on with reasonable security to all interests, and that the new constitution was fairly workable, he would wish to give effect to the views of the British Indian delegation and go the full length of making the Central Executive responsible to the Central Legislature. He believed that the conferment of responsibility would beget responsibility in those to whom it was entrusted. Thus was the corner turned. All-India Federation

with responsibility at the centre (with certain safeguards and reservations during the transitional period) was accepted by the Labour Government of the day and has now been re-affirmed by the National Government. This has been the main result of the Conference.

But in working out the detail of this vast plan at the second session held this autumn, many difficulties came into prominence, more especially the Hindu-Moslem problem. Inside the Conference and outside, formally and informally, publicly and privately, efforts were made to get a settlement of this intractable problem. But the Conference was adjourned without any settlement being reached. And as this main problem was unsettled and the Moslems refused to discuss the Federal structure till it was, no great progress could be made with Constitution building. But the methods of Conference are not to be abandoned. The two sessions of the Conference have at least enabled Indian and British statesmen to know each other. The British now know the Indian mind, what India wants, and what are the main problems to be solved. And the work of co-operation is to continue. Committees of the Conference, under the chairmanship of British public men, are to continue the work in India. In especial, a Committee of Consultation is to be set up which, through the Viceroy, will keep in touch with the British Government and which will have as one of its principal objects the provision of security for minorities of all creeds and classes in order that the principle of majority government will not be employed to their moral or material disadvantage. Then there will be a Committee to consider a revision of the franchise and another on finance. And eventually the Conference will meet again for a final review of the whole scheme.

Thus far has the Conference got. It has effected a vast change in public opinion in England. It has won support from the Princes and in the main from moderate opinion in India. But the support of the Indian National Congress it has not won. And herein lies trouble ahead. And by one of those tragic mishaps which dog our progress in India, terrorism has burst out anew in Bengal and a severe Ordinance to suppress it has been promulgated. And for the Congress this is of far more concern than all the deliberation of the Conference, or the solemn statement of the Government or the debate in Parliament. So civil disobedience and no-rent campaigns are again being planned, and cries for "complete independence" are again heard. And behind all is the fact that Mr. Gandhi envisages a very different India of the future from what British statesmen have in mind. Mr. Gandhi views India through the eyes of the villagers. He estimates what kind of government

We shall undoubtedly cast away a great part of the content of religion, as it is known not by theory but in experience, if we say that this varied witness to a divine care, patient, tireless, individual, is merely due to the subjective imagination. Subjective, of course, in one sense it must always be. The belief that God has been at work in history cannot be demonstrated: the facts that support it can only be pointed out, and the judgments of other men left free to draw their own conclusions in their own time and way. Still less can a man pass on ready-made to his friend the conviction that his own life has not been left to chance, but has been guided to ends that were still unforeseen even in its mid-course: he can only record that conviction, and perhaps add the poet's advice, "Look in thy heart, and write!"

It is the conviction of the religious man that Providence works through, and is seen in, the most various events. Joy, success, disappointment, accident, may all enter at different times into that complex process, the shaping of a single character. Regarding the last Dr. Temple has well said, "The crucial problem of human life is to acquire detachment from the present and to become rooted in the Eternal. In the education necessary for this, no influence is so powerful as the discipline of accident. . . . 'Accident,' speaking broadly, is one of the most effective forces for the spiritualising of men."* Yet joy is also needful if the spirit is to expand and to take its good news to others. While one psalmist sang, "It is good for me that I have been afflicted, that I might learn thy statutes," another found his inspiration in recounting all God's benefits (Ps. cxix, 71, ciii, 1-5); and the two strains of gratitude often mingle in the same life-experience. "Of course," Dr. Temple continues, "this argument is peculiarly irritating to the atheist or agnostic. The Christian finds confirmation of his faith whatever happens. If he has earthly happiness, he turns to God with thanksgiving; if he has earthly sorrow, he turns with renewed eagerness to the Eternal Love, and gives thanks for what impelled him thither once more. In all things that happen he finds God, not because he traces the eternal purpose to an infinite number of 'particular providences,' but because he has learned how to make all temporal experience direct his attention to its eternal background."† To the purely logical thinker this appears an apologetic game played with loaded dice. It is a case of "Heads I win, tails you lose"; for whichever side of the coin turns up is claimed as the best—nay, the only right side at some special turning-point in the Christian's life.

Yet this is not all. We have not merely come back to another

* *Christus Veritas*, p. 197.
† *Op. cit.*, p. 198.

form of the "sink-or-swim" theory, which calls the divine to aid the human power in changing every fatality into a blessing, or transmuting the dross of life, in whatever form chance sends it, into gold. For the conviction that "God works all things together for good to those who love Him"* implies that the outward events of life do not come simply by chance; that they are in some sense adapted to the needs of the man who experiences them; and that not least when they appear in the guise of misfortune. The distinction, subtle at first sight, but very far-reaching, between the Stoic and the Christian view is just this—that to the former all outward happenings are in themselves indifferent, and all equally the material for the exercise of the good will; while in the Christian view circumstances are never random nor indifferent. Providence is seen in the events themselves, not only in their transformation to the uses of the spirit. There are few more apt expressions of this thought than Browning's familiar stanza:

He fixed thee 'mid this dance
Of plastic circumstance,
This Present, thou, forsooth, wouldst fain arrest:
Machinery just meant
To give thy soul its bent,
Try thee and turn thee forth, sufficiently impressed.

To the detached onlooker this undoubtedly appears a most arbitrary interpretation of life. But if we think not abstractly, but in the concrete terms of our own lives, we may well ask if we can even begin to make sense of them in any other way. If the universe is indifferent, stoicism is the most practical as well as the noblest creed; but if in any real sense man is "organic to the world"† and related to its inmost purpose, then the outward setting of his life and its physical origins cannot be neutral or meaningless. The outward and apparently trivial must have a true significance. There must be a real articulation between man and the events that shape his life.

We have already argued this from the theoretic side; but on the practical side the truth is equally clear. On how small decisions do great and determining events constantly turn! The chairman of an appointments committee, suddenly called on to give his casting vote between two candidates of apparently equal merit, the examiner hesitating whether to give 49 or 51 per cent. to a doubtful paper, all whose decisions involve the success or failure of their fellows, must recognise how intangible are the psychological factors which finally determine the decision. If they are

* Rom. viii, 28 (R. V. marg.).

† I borrow the phrase from Professor Pringle-Pattison's *Gifford Lectures* (*The Idea of God*, Lect. vi.).

they can afford to pay for. He comes to the conclusion that the present type of government with its huge expenditure (amounting to half the revenue) on the army is more than the villagers can afford. He would, therefore, drastically cut down military expenditure. In order to do this he would have the Provincial Governments very strong in comparison with the Central Government, and allow the latter only the very minimum for defence. And he would at once have complete control over the purse and the army. Further, as the present debt of India was run up by a too extravagant Government, he would have it carefully scrutinised and he hints that what will not bear his scrutiny should be the liability of the British Government.

Tough indeed is the problem before us. It is the hardest we have ever had to face. For upon us depends the tranquillity of Asia. A failure in India would mean all Asia in turmoil, and trouble for French, Dutch, and Americans as well as ourselves. But we now have our mind made up and our purpose set. We know the gravity of the problem. And we know that it requires the finest delicacy as well as firm determination, long persistency, high courage and invincible goodwill. To the methods of non-co-operation we will oppose our traditional British method of "work with." And in place of suspiciously looking between lines for some hidden evil meaning, in the manner of Mr. Gandhi, we will rejoicingly accept the broad fact that, however misguided we may think a number of its actions, the Indian National Congress is animated in the main by zeal for the good of India. We may indeed go further. We may very justly recognise this zeal as a holy zeal. We may recognise that its patriotism is at bottom inspired by deep religious fervour—that the moving spirits of the Congress movement from the earliest days have drawn their inspiration from that Divine Source from whence great Indians for thousands of years have renewed their strength. And we may have faith that as our own action in helping Indians to achieve self-government derives its impulse from the same deep Source, it is in the long run bound to succeed.

Then, not so many years hence, we may see an India, mistress of her own fate, profiting we may hope by our experience and our help, but governing herself in accordance with her own culture and her own character, and, if still within the Empire, within it as we would only deign to have any nation within it, of her own free choice and her own free will and accord.

FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.

FRANCE AND THE WORLD.

PERHAPS there is still time to describe France as the most powerful and fortunate country in the world; but there is no time to be lost. The difficulties which have overwhelmed other countries are beginning to menace France, and no sooner were the French gratified by foreign envy and recognition of their financial and political supremacy, than they began to realise that they were not immune. Encirclement was the old word heard in Germany, and isolation is a word which begins to have an ominous ring in French ears.

In his recent book *Is God a Frenchman? (Gott in Frankreich)* Dr. Sieburg, though he is occasionally unfair, remarks that France thinks herself the cosmos, or at least holds that civilisation should conform to the manners and customs native to France. She asks Europe to consent to live on French terms. She seeks to protect herself against the future with the shield of the peace treaties. She ignores the signs of the times, which indicate a new world order based on the co-operation of the nations on horizontal lines. The French tradition of a thousand years cannot be broken without resistance. Personally, though I find the criticism suggestive, I cannot accept it literally. For which nation has yet shown itself in practice to be favourable to the inevitable world order based on co-operation? Certainly not Germany, which is intensely Nationalist. Hardly would one venture to say Great Britain, after the negation of economic co-operation implied in protectionism. Not the United States, which indulges in a pleasant ideology, but does not move, except under compulsion, in the matter of international indebtedness.

France, like every other country, speaks with two voices. One voice she reserves for the eloquent speeches of the tribune. The other she employs in the practical business of diplomacy. Yet, somehow, France has contrived to be edged into a position which is in opposition to that of other countries. Italy, Germany, Great Britain, the United States and Germany have all, more or less, openly declared for some sort of revision of treaties, whereas France stands for the *status quo*. There is a definite danger that the same unanimity of opinion of the Great Powers is against France in the discussions on disarmament. The contradiction is more apparent than real, for, in all that concerns their own interests, the other Great Powers are just as obstinate as France, and regard their humanitarian sentiments and political precepts as articles of exportation. The difference really lies in French circumstances. By disarmament is meant, as the French see it, the reduction of the French army; and France does not believe she can afford to

conscientious, they will sometimes tremble at the implications for other lives. Again, a decision, apparently turning on the merest chance or the whim of a moment, may cause a traveller to choose one steamer rather than another; and his choice may lead to shipwreck or safety—one hotel rather than another, and he may thus form one of those friendships which transform a life. Or a factor as trifling may lead to the greatest choice of all, that of a life-partner, which results in the founding of a home, and the transmission to the distant future of a strain of character due to the confluence of two hitherto separated lives. These things are determined, from the objective view of the outside observer, by trifles light as air. Are they therefore governed by chance? Or by a Providence which is ever-present, though we can only at times recognise its working? It is the old riddle, the old alternative: "either gods or atoms." Either all things are controlled to good ends, so far as men are willing to accept this control; or all things depend on the play of unintelligent forces. There seems to be no resting-place for the mind half-way.

But what, it may still be asked, of those great tracts of human life and history where progress is absent, justice is hard to find, oppression and misery are dominant? Is any trace of a kind Providence to be found in these? We are here brought up against the ultimate riddle in one of its most perplexing forms: why is evil so often stronger than good, and why does human freedom so often show itself in deeds of cruelty rather than of helpfulness? No answer can be attempted here, save this. As far as the idea of Providence is concerned, it must be harmonised with, perhaps limited by, that of Freewill. As the human will, fortified by divine Grace, can transmute seeming evil into good within the bounds of the individual life; so it is called to co-operate in the tasks of Providence. Man does in fact become a providence to man. Whatever shaping, directing power may be exercised by God through the forces of nature, no theist can have any doubt as to the part which may be played by human spirits as God's fellow-workmen in helping others. But if these fail to respond, what then? Is Providence frustrated? Or, when one instrument fails, are there always other instruments at hand to complete the work of education and redemption? We have no certain knowledge. The world and society seem to bear clear marks of frequent frustration. But we do not see the whole, and there are two things certain. If there be a Providence, it is not limited to any one type of instrument, though its work is largely done through human brains, wills and hands; and those who seek to take part in the tasks of the divine Kingdom constantly feel that they are not working alone.

G. F. BARBOUR.

MINORITIES AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE.

AT a time when interest has been centred in Aristide Briand's propositions for bringing about a United Europe, it becomes necessary to face a question the unsolved state of which constitutes the greatest impediment to the realisation of his ideas. Above all we must never lose sight of the fact that, in spite of the war undertaken for the liberation of oppressed nationalities, more than thirty million people belonging to many races are living as so-called minorities, not in their own states, but as collective units among strangers, and it is here that the danger of the Continental problem lies. What is more, many are apt to forget that these units are not confined to the vanquished peoples alone, whose territory with its inhabitants has been taken over, but comprise, over and above, members of the victorious nations. Germans, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Jugoslavs, Danes, Bulgarians, Swedes, Russians, Greeks and others have to-day, beside their compatriots living within their own boundaries, organised groups who live as minorities in neighbouring countries under alien sovereignty. Thus, beside the great number of Germans as minorities (approximately ten millions) there are five Polish minorities, the Poles in Germany, in Lithuania, in Czechoslovakia, in Latvia and Roumania, some of whom can be counted by hundreds of thousands. The simple reason for this state of affairs is the fact that, as a consequence of the distribution of races in Central and East Europe, the ideal of a definite solution of the nationality problem by means of a "just" revision of boundaries—every people in a state of its own—is absolutely impracticable. By a revision of certain boundaries much injustice might be repaired, but the minority problem can never be solved in this manner. On these lines we face a geographical deadlock which can neither be ignored nor overcome.

What is the result of this state of affairs? First and foremost, if the ruling peoples deny to the minorities living among them the possibility of developing their nationality and culture, they thereby violate their most sacred rights; the question of humanity arises, the question how to assure to the groups concerned protection for the exercise of their cultural convictions, just as in former times religious communities were protected in their creeds. But beside the question of humanity there is another of far-reaching practical importance. In what way does the suppression of the nationality and culture of minorities in one country react upon that country's relations to the states from which the minorities

reduce the French army. By the obliteration of reparations is meant, after accounts have been balanced, the extinction of the surplus that mainly belongs to France. By the revision of treaties is meant sacrifices, political and territorial, that peculiarly, if not exclusively, would be at the expense of France and her allies who have built up the existing European system.

France may be right or wrong in her politico-philosophical conceptions, but it should never be forgotten that the advice which is being given to France costs nothing except its utterance (I speak broadly) to the advisers, and in many cases its acceptance by France would be of immediate, tangible and calculable advantage to the advisers, and of vital disadvantage to the advisee. In short, most of the modern movements of political thought, in the particular shape they have taken, seem to be directed against France. France has become aware that she is the object of most of the reformist preaching; and anybody who has the smallest acquaintance with French psychology can safely predict that this convergence of fire on France will cause her to harden her heart.

It begins to look to the French as though there is a conspiracy against them—that pacifism has an anti-French form; that disarmament is an Italo-Germanic plot, supported by Great Britain and the United States, to reduce France to the common continental standard; that a drastic readjustment of world finances would be an attack on France's moral and material rights; that even economic freedom, loudly advocated, resolves itself into an inconsistent attack on French exports. A certain little audience knows my own views, perpetually repeated since 1919, on all these matters; they are by no means in conformity with those of the French, though this is not the place, even if I had the space, to express them again even summarily; but I have always considered that it is essential to understand, and to state, the French views with perfect frankness, at the risk of shocking those well-intentioned politicians and peaceworkers who defeat their own ends by producing the impression that even the organisation of peace is an ingenious method of diplomatic warfare to be waged on France. Of course, it cannot be denied that France too, in her own interest, or supposed interest, has brandished the weapon of verbal peace to preserve her own position. I once wrote an article to urge that, after the signing of the Kellogg Pact, what the world chiefly needed was another pact to outlaw peace as an instrument of national policy.

I venture once more to affirm that the tactics which consist in indicting France as an international culprit, stiff-necked and isolated in a benevolent world which has forgotten the arts of diplomacy because diplomacy has now become public and melodramatic, are mistaken, and, what is more, suspect. There is an

admirable illustration in a recent private, though international, disarmament congress which was broken up in confusion in Paris. That some of the promoters were themselves French, and had some semi-official backing, does not invalidate my contention. Nor would I for a moment impugn the sincerity of the participants, who came from Italy, Spain, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. The congress was intended to forward a cause that most of us have at heart—and I not least. But it was overlooked that national susceptibilities in all countries are still strong, and that propaganda should begin at home. Carried to other countries, it is apt to look like propaganda against those other countries. It takes on a political aspect, instead of the aspect of an agreed manifestation. It arouses controversy, when persuasion is needed. To the French that congress seemed to be designed—which was far from the case—to engage foreigners in a matter which divides political opinion in France, and to place them in an attitude of antagonism to the official French memorandum on disarmament. The counter-manifestations could have been foreseen, and were, indeed, foreseen by the counsellors of the Archbishop of Paris. Instead of doing good, therefore, the congress did infinite harm. It may be properly said that the counter-manifestants were relatively few, and represent only one section of French opinion; but it may be replied, with equal propriety, that on the whole those counter-manifestants command considerable French sympathy, and even if they command much less it is a pity to give them an opportunity of stirring up popular feeling against foreign pressure on French policy.

Moreover, it must be observed that, with whatever legal or logical justification, Germany is lessening the prospects of an agreement by announcing that the failure of the Disarmament Conference will release her from the treaty obligations; while the success of the Conference would not be complete in German eyes unless the disparity between French and German armaments, on paper, practically disappeared. In either event—whether Germany is allowed to become as strong as France, or whether France is compelled to descend to the military level of Germany—the chances of war will, argue the French, be increased; and Germany, though peace be preserved, will be the principal beneficiary in Europe of disarmament. It is not my business, I say again, to refute the French case; it is my business simply to state it. And I do not think it can be stated too strongly that France has not overcome her apprehension of Germany's revealing herself in the future as a potential enemy, and believes that French weakness spells war. That is the fact which we have to face, and blinking at it will not remove the primary difficulty of the French dilemma; international aid positively guaranteed against a reversal of the European

originally emerged, and how does it affect the mutual feelings between peoples and countries?

In order to see clearly it is essential to keep in mind the fact that since the war a great quickening of the consciousness of the solidarity of peoples in all their groups, even beyond the limits of states, has come about on the Continent. As a striking example the Yugoslav-Italian relations may serve, these having become particularly strained in consequence of the destruction of the Yugoslav minority in Italy. It even finds expression in the fact that several European peoples contribute directly or indirectly to the culture of the institutions of their minorities beyond their borders, mostly by means of state subvention. This is equally the case where Germans, Poles, Danes, Czechs, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Yugoslavs and so forth are concerned. That being so it is self-evident that, considering such undeniable solidarity over and above the range of the state, every attempt at suppression, oppression or annihilation of a minority reacts spontaneously to the widest extent upon the whole nation concerned. Just as pricks and wounds in the most distant members of our body demand a response, no matter how strong our self-restraint may be, in the same way a racial community must react upon abuse of any of its parts. That is to say, there will sooner or later either be a rupture, or, what is more often the case, an inward reaction sets in, engendering feelings of revenge and retaliation. Thus an atmosphere of tension arises poisoning the relations of neighbouring states, just as had happened in 1914 when the world war became imminent. Such an atmosphere can be felt in ever increasing saltness in several parts of Europe also to-day.

Summing up the above, the writer, supported by ten years' experience as delegate of various European minorities, also of those whose parent peoples are ranged against each other, can definitely assert that there is no people in Europe to-day who can ignore with equanimity the fate of its members living as a minority beyond its political boundaries. This is just as true of the feelings of the Germans for their minority, especially in South Tyrol, as of the Poles for their minorities in their many ramifications, the Greeks with respect to the Dodecanese occupied by Italy, the Roumanians and their brethren in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the Danes and their congeners in German Schleswig, the Hungarians and their compatriots in adjacent states, the Yugoslavs and the Slovenes in Italy and Austria, the Bulgarians and their brethren in Greece and Yugoslav Macedonia.

It is inevitable that the oppression of minorities in various countries in these circumstances to-day tends more and more to

endanger the peace of the Continent, and to prevent adjacent nations from unifying their economic relations and creating a united Europe. The necessity of action to adjust the minority problem was clearly recognised during the peace negotiations in Paris, and thus measures were taken for the protection of minorities, which, though guaranteed by the League of Nations, are unfortunately inoperative. Their weakness lies in the first place in the fact that they apply to minorities in some of the European States and not to others. To correct such inequality Professor Gilbert Murray proposed a motion, accepted at the third meeting of the League of Nations, exhorting the states not bound by minority protection clauses to recognise the obligation of the same. Now for the first time a moral norm was created, by the help of which the discrepancy should be overcome. The course of events shows, however, that such moral obligations have not been fulfilled, and members of the League who were not legally bound by these clauses openly proceeded to denationalise their minorities. Such procedure must jeopardise the prestige of the League, and, what is worse still, it induces the peoples that are so bound to look upon the said clauses, not as acts of a general application of justice, but as acts of coercion laid upon them. It is only natural, therefore, that the peoples concerned, even the most advanced circles among them, should harbour psychological resentment against their observance.

The drawback of the present system lies in the fact that its action is confined to the receipt of complaint and lacks a constructive method of dealing with the problem so as to prevent complaint, and encourage direct understanding between minorities and majorities. These must come to recognise that they themselves and their states have the greatest interest in the solution of the minority problem. A concrete case, that of Esthonia, the home of the writer, will make his view clear. About ten years ago the recently constituted state of Esthonia was in a difficult predicament, the minorities living under its rule showing open animosity. An unjust agrarian reform had fallen heavily upon the German-Balts. At that time, contrary to all expectation, a small circle of German-Balts, mostly belonging to the younger generation, determined to come to an understanding with the Esthonian majority on the basis of a cultural autonomy. In spite of many fears and warnings they succeeded in their object. Esthonia has thereby been the first European state to achieve an adjustment of the nationality question that guarantees the full liberty of minorities in their cultural development. All cultural institutions, especially schools, are in their own hands under the control of the state.

political and military situation, or national reliance on measures of self-defence.

What M. Briand meant by his policy at the Quai d'Orsay may be open to discussion; for he may not have meant all that was attributed to him by his followers and admirers, and in any event he was subjected to controls in the execution of his policy, if not in the expression of it. But what is meant by Briandism is hardly in doubt. M. Briand may be taken as a symbol of the more simplified thing called Briandism. I leave out all reference to persons and define Briandism as a systematically friendly interpretation of the purpose of foreign countries, accompanied by concessions which should provoke gratitude, promote amicable relations, and lead to reconciliation and co-operation. Now there is no doubt that while the underlying French policy may have deviated from this system, there was generated in France, as well as in other countries, a large and lively sentiment of Briandism. In estimating French forces, Briandism certainly should not be left out of the reckoning. It exists. It exists in a formidable degree. It has on its side a vast quantity of organised opinion—that is to say, party opinion as well as associational opinion. It is a weighty element in French politics. That element is permanent. It must not be supposed that France can rightly be described alternately as Nationalist or as Briandist. All Frenchmen are, first and last, pacifist, because any other policy for France comports the risk of suicide. To sum it up in a popular phrase, France has nothing to win and everything to lose by a departure from pacifism. But there is a deep division between those who would pay almost any price for pacifism, and those who would pay less, or little, for pacifism.

On the whole, Briandism is a fair weather policy. In foul weather it becomes less effective. Now a good many things have happened during the past year to involve Briandism in the foulest of weathers. First I would mention—though it is not the first in time, and is a consequence rather than a cause—the defeat of M. Briand for the Presidency of the Republic. The personal side does not, for the moment, interest me; I write of it only in its influence on Briandism, and that was great. But M. Briand's defeat was, in its turn, to be ascribed to the sharp decline of Briandism, when the Hitlerites triumphed in the German elections immediately after the evacuation of Rhineland. For the ordinary Frenchman, as well as for the political Frenchman, this was a proof that Briandism had failed, and that some redress of French policy was necessary.

At the same time the proposals, which had never much substance, for the construction of the United States of Europe, were utilised against France; the French idea had been to fix Europe as it is, but the German and Italian idea was to reconstruct the individual

states of Europe before they constructed the United States of Europe. Demands for the destruction of treaties in the name of justice were voluble and vociferous. Austria and Germany alarmed France by endeavouring to form an economic union. Central European countries grew restive. Members of the "Little Entente" turned towards Hungary, which turned towards Italy, and other countries turned towards Germany. Poland herself, the ally of France, was extremely discontented with French policy, which for a moment seemed prepared to sacrifice Poland on the altar of peace. These things, and others which could easily be added—and, at a later date, the inability of the League of Nations to solve the Manchurian problem dramatically, instantaneously, and finally—helped to determine a strong current against anything that savoured of Briandism.

The worst shock of all was, perhaps, the Hoover moratorium. First, the manner in which it was proposed was incredibly tactless. It was one of the worst examples of what I have called dramatic diplomacy. Only in a secondary sense is the United States interested in Germany, yet the United States, without real consultation, told Europe what it should do about Germany, and made it impossible for Europe to do more than say yes or no—and to say no would have been disastrous. France was indignant at the assumption that she did not count, and had merely to do the bidding of America. Already an anti-American feeling had been developing, as was apparent when Georges Duhamel's diatribe, *Visions de la Vie Future*, was received with an explosion of praise. Now the French resented what they considered to be dictatorial interference with their affairs, and the whole of American ideology slumped and suffered.

In substance, too, France did not accept without serious qualification the view that is taken widely in England, as well as in America, of the origins of the world crisis. Put diagrammatically, the Anglo-American thesis is—at least so the French believe—that reparations are the disturbing element in European relations. Austria was ruined, Central Europe was ruined, Germany was ruined, and both Great Britain and the United States were, in different measures, affected by the impending bankruptcy of Germany due to reparations. In short, the world was in its present state because France maliciously and obstinately sought to recover sums solemnly promised by both Germany and her own Allies.

This may appear to be an excessively simplified statement, but in the process of passing from one country to another economic and political statements are always simplified. To the French the argument was preposterous. Had not Germany freely accepted the Young Plan? Had not France, on the universal assurance that

It may be of interest to hear more about the principles of the Esthonian Autonomy Law. As mentioned before, its functions are confined exclusively to matters of culture. The minority elects annually a cultural council, so to speak, a cultural parliament answerable to the president. The state—or the communities as the case may be—consigns an adequate part of its cultural expenditure to the cultural authorities of the minority; but beyond that, and this is very important, the cultural administration has the right to tax the members of the autonomy and thus to balance the minority budget. All this has stood the test in these last years remarkably well. The result is the absolute opposite to what had been prophesied. The autonomy has not created “a state within the state,” an estrangement between minority and majority races, but on the contrary has led to growing mutual appreciation and co-operation to which both parties bear witness to-day. There can be no doubt that the present state of Esthonia can rely upon a willing support of its minority just as securely as upon that of its majority. This edifying result of the wise course pursued by Esthonia is a lesson to all European states in a similar position. The Esthonian example shows that the sympathy of a minority satisfied by consideration of its equitable demands concerning national cultural life can be won in a full degree. It proves that granting national rights does not encourage aggression against the state, but on the contrary allays it, so that in course of time the regulation of boundaries, where necessary, may be approached with good will on both sides.

The example of Esthonia has caused the minorities in several European states to combine for the achievement of their cultural aspirations by peaceful measures, and to hold a congress at Geneva every year. They wish to support each other and bring about by means of co-operation the psychological reversion to their parent peoples; in some cases they have already succeeded, as in the Prussian school regulation in respect of Polish and Danish minorities. But beyond that, they hope to induce the League of Nations to adopt a positive line of action, instead of retaining a purely negative function as recipient of current petitions. The first step in the direction indicated should be to institute a permanent Minority Commission attached to the League, the function of which would be the elucidation and treatment of the problem from all aspects to the satisfaction of the equitable claims of all parties. A true estimate of the character of the nationalities concerned, their historical development, geographical distribution, social propensities, religion, jurisprudence and economic capacity would each call for expert investigation attested by statistical material, and require careful

co-ordination in their mutual relationship. Furthermore, it would be very important that public opinion in countries not directly concerned with the problem should lend its support more than it has hitherto thought fit to do. In this respect we must gratefully acknowledge the initiative taken by the English League of Nations Union, especially by Lord Dickinson and Sir Walter Napier, thanks to which the permanent minority commission of the Brussels World Union of the League of Nations has become an important factor in the discussion of many minority questions in a spirit of conciliation.

It would be especially important if the Press of the countries not directly concerned in the problem, particularly in England, would devote more attention to the question of minorities as a very weighty item in the problem of European peace. The apprehension that the handling of this question must lead to taking sides is not justified. The whole work of the Nationality Congress and the League of Nations Union proves that these questions can be treated quite objectively in a tone that need hurt no one's susceptibilities. It is often desirable to give moral support to a government ready to settle its minority problem against resistance from within. In such cases the Press of countries not directly concerned can contribute to a very great extent to a conciliatory solution of the problem.

EWALD AMMENDE.

this plan was final and definitive, faithfully released Rhineland? Would not all have been well had not the German people chosen immediately to vote for Hitler? Had not this demonstration of a revolutionary and bellicose sentiment in Germany frightened the creditors of Germany, and provoked a fresh flight from the mark? The violent anti-Semitism of Hitler had in particular alarmed Jewish financiers. Yet Hitler was not an accidental phenomenon. The Brüning Cabinet was responsible for the move towards the *Anschluss* which set Europe in commotion, and even the Social Democrats made very much the same demands, in the domain of foreign policy, as the Nazis. In point of fact Germany had paid since 1924 ten milliard marks in round figures, and had borrowed from abroad 25 milliards. It is true that these figures seem to show the folly of reparations, but the French preferred to draw the lesson that the effect of the transference of reparation payments is comparatively small when one considers the total movement of capital in the world caused by purely political reasons. It is hardly necessary for me to point out to English readers that while it is true, as the French say, that German economies are chiefly political, the conclusion should surely be that the policy of reparations, if not the economy of reparations, stands condemned, and the policy of reparations is not primarily Germanic.

With the conviction of Germany's bad faith which caused exasperation, there went a recognition of France's relative financial strength which caused pride. Here were all the European nations, including Great Britain, plunged in the deepest gloom, and there was the United States perplexed at the continuance of the crisis. As for France, she was riding safely in an ark on the waters which were submerging the rest of the world. The first result of the relegation of M. Briand to the background as a sort of Under-Secretary to the League of Nations, and the virtual control of foreign affairs by M. Laval, was a sudden rise in French prestige. The United States discovered France. They saw that, without France, without the willing support of France, nothing could be done to save Europe from a financial *débâcle* which would involve America. France felt she could afford to act with independence. She asserted her rights as a first-class nation. Obviously, however, a first-class nation has responsibilities as well as privileges; it has not only rights, but duties; with power goes opportunity. The keys of the world's problems were in French hands.

So, for a while, it seemed; and the Washington voyage of M. Laval placed France (to use an Americanism) on the top of the world. But the position of M. Laval was difficult. He did not escape criticism. At first it was thought excellent that, not only had he given nothing away, but he had greatly enhanced French

credit. On reflection, however, it was seen that negative results were not enough. There really was a world crisis, and France could not merely say "No" at Paris, London, Berlin and Washington. You cannot stand contentedly on the *status quo* when a torrent, rushing from the mountain, is sweeping away everything around you. But what was he to do? It is necessary to understand the character of M. Laval. He has, paradoxically, built up his reputation on a careful concealment of his ability; by temperament he is a man who would arrive inconspicuously; he would antagonise none and placate all. If I may be allowed to express myself in an epigram that must not be taken too literally, his Parliamentary strength consisted in appearing to be Nobody who would do Nothing; and his Parliamentary weakness might declare itself were he to reveal himself as Somebody who intends to do Something.

It is easy to do nothing when nothing needs to be done; but it is beginning to be seen that, in present circumstances, there is nothing so hard as to do nothing. Logically, France is entitled to say that unconditional payments are unconditional; that conditional payments from Germany depend on the important condition of American demands on Europe; that reparations constitute a first claim on Germany, and Germany's private obligations cannot be given preference; and that final and definitive settlements should be final and definitive. There is no flaw to be found in this reasoning; it errs rather on the side of obviousness and banality. Given the premises of the Versailles Treaty and the Young Plan, the French case is mathematically clear. Unhappily, mathematics, and even morality, have nothing to do with political and economic expediency. The problem is whether, in practice, the payment of international debts, reparational or reimbursable, is possible, or in what measure it is possible, without the gravest perturbations, political, economic and social.

No sooner had French supremacy been realised than it began to be questioned. How could France hope to save herself in a collapsing world? The gold in the Banque de France had been much more than doubled in three years since the stabilisation of the franc. Could this be true? Was the progress real? Gold, heavy as it is, has swift wings. It had flown to France for safety, but it could fly away again at the slightest alarm. French commerce was showing an unfavourable balance. For the first ten months of the year there was a deficit of over ten milliards, and with the decline of touring it was certain that invisible exports did not make up the difference. French credits abroad had been reduced with declining currencies and the general abandonment of the gold standard. The budget estimates were not reassuring; and with the general elections fixed for next May, the Deputies would be

ON POLISHING WINDOWS—AND OTHER MATTERS.

WHEN primitive man first discovered himself a thinking animal, he cast about him for some device which would enable his fellow thinking animals to look into his own mind and him to look into their minds. After the first crude experiments, he evolved those series of agreed, but localised codes of spoken and written signs which have come to be known as languages, and the written word was found to be peculiarly adapted for use as a permanent transparency. When these panes were first constructed they were clear, even though they provided but a limited inlook. But time has dulled this brightness and the dust and dirt of continual use has, in many instances, obscured the panes so that they have become sadly in need of the furbisher.

Thus it happens that our windows must needs be cleaned and, since demand begets supply, there arose in due time a great army of commentators, annotators, and editors, to ply the trade of window polishing. Their labours are indeed valuable and helpful if confined within proper limits, especially where old and very dirty windows are concerned, but there is something in the very nature of window polishing which breeds a tireless and tiresome enthusiasm. Clean windows are, of course, very desirable, but we can do without the continual presence of the charlady, and we are not particularly pleased if she follows us from room to room with her paraphernalia. Some commentators on and editors of old books are very like a too conscientious drudge of this kind. They rub away as though they would cause the very glass itself to vanish by mere attrition. We stumble over their mops and pails, and they themselves jostle us and tread on our toes until we can hardly get to a window at all to see the view. It is a relief, sometimes, to curse our industrious polishers and to bid them take both themselves and their implements away. That is why some of us prefer to buy, say, an English classic in a very cheap edition so priced that the publisher can afford neither to hire a commentator nor an editor or, at most, only very tame ones.

Moreover, we can with advantage do much of our polishing for ourselves with the help of a little mental effort assisted by a little advice from an expert. Ruskin once published a treatise on window polishing, though he miscalled it *Sesame and Lilies*. He is a very irritating and dictatorial man, but he did know how to wield the leather, and we might do worse than watch him at his task in order to pick up a few hints. See him at work, for instance, at a small portion of a window glazed by Milton. By the time he has done the panes are very bright indeed. One of his rules is to read word by

word, syllable by syllable. Though no author who ever lived is worth the labour of reading in this way, unless fate has condemned you to get your living by proof-reading, yet there is something in this advice. In the case of some very significant words, their yield of meaning is increased tenfold if we separate their components and put in a mental hyphen between their syllables. It has been pointed out *ad nauseam*, for example (but the sickness is cleansing), that "education" means "e-ducation," and there is certainly a gain if we, with Carlyle, mentally pronounce "mistake" as "miss-take." What hidden symbolism, too, comes to light when Thoreau, by a simple deletion of the final "l" of "animal," rebukes the dead lore of the anatomical zoologist! And if we see "translator" as "trans-lator," we at once get his function, which is that of a ferryman.

Every window has two surfaces. We apologise to the reader for drawing his attention to a fact so obvious, but there is a reason. For those windows we call books are, in one important respect, different from the products of the glazier's art and mystery. We can only clean books from one side, and not all the industry of the amateur or professional cleanser can do more than wipe away the exhalations of the ages and generations. That is to say books can only be cleaned as regards the surface presented to us, which is the outside surface in relation to the writer. Unless the original artificer has taken care to clean the inside himself, not all the toil of all the generations of the sons of Adam can restore the transparency. A good workman will choose his best glass, frame it with care, and once for all clarify his own side of it.

There are some very old-fashioned windows which require the services of a very humble practitioner of the cleansing art, viz. the glossary compiler. We cannot very well do without his aid and, to do him justice, he is the least insistent and tiresome of his tiresome profession, for he hides his cloths and leathers in a cupboard at the back of the book, and we need not invoke his aid unless we so desire. It is our own fault if the sweep of the cleaner's arm comes too often within the range of our vision and interrupts the view. We ought to be ashamed of the mental laziness which makes him so necessary to us. Why, say, read Chaucer at all if we are too indolent to learn his not very difficult language? Every Greek knew the language of Homer, and was the difference between the Greek of Homer and Attic Greek less than that between modern English and Chaucer? There is nothing that breaks the pleasure of reading a book into smaller pieces than the necessity for continual reference to a glossary or dictionary. And apart altogether from ²skill in dialect, an unknown word occurring in harmonious verse often reveals its meaning by a kind of inner necessity. We

reluctant to take drastic measures in retrenchment or taxation. The absence of unemployment in France has been dwelt upon complacently; but it was never true, and unemployment and partial employment now exist on a large scale. France cannot be exempt from the disabilities of other nations.

Moreover, the direct consequences of the British adoption or contemplated adoption of tariffs, quotas, prohibitions, and the rest of the devices for restricting imports, are already felt in France. Everybody preaches political internationalism, and everybody practises economic nationalism. Successive conferences have declared themselves in favour of the suppression of tariff barriers, and have laid down that the free circulation of goods is one of the secrets of economic health. But, in fact, each country, by commercial regulations, surtaxes and rigid rules for currency dealings, is doing its best to stop international trade, and were they to succeed they would produce a situation in which every country would live on itself and by itself. The fatal blow to economic common sense was delivered by England. "Buy British!" was answered by "*Achetez Français!*"; and the equivalent of these two words is repeated in every language. The French were extremely disappointed at the British polite refusal to negotiate at present. They are touched. If there is to be a tariff struggle they will be seriously injured. The ark which floated so calmly on the face of the waters will spring a leak.

Generally, it is apprehended that the year which is opening will be decisive. Gold and armies and claims and *status quo* and negations will not serve. The future is not to nations which can boast of their independence, but to nations which realise in time that interdependence is not a foolish word drawn from the ideological vocabulary, but is a sheer hard necessity of the modern world. In disarmament, in tariffs, in reparations and debts, international arrangements are urgent. The alternatives are: catastrophe or solidarity. It is not only to France that this recommendation should be addressed; it is not particularly to France. The smallest knowledge of French psychology should bid us beware of trying to isolate France, of hectoring France, of preaching at France, when the whole world in its behaviour is apparently insane; but it is indeed to be trusted that in the coming year there will be a general appreciation of the vital necessity of relinquishing purely national and antagonistic policies in favour of an international co-operation, in conformity with the recognised needs of the case; and it is incredible, if the right approach is made with skill and sincerity, that France will refuse to play her part in the restoration of a sick world to peace and prosperity.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

PROTECTION ON TRIAL: THE ABNORMAL IMPORTS ACT.

FOR the first time since Gladstone's Budget of 1860, incorporating Cobden's Commercial Treaty with France, was placed on the statute book, a large part of our external trade has been subjected to high protective and discriminating duties. It is true that the Abnormal Importations Act, by which this fiscal revolution has been brought about, is only to last for six months; but six months is quite a long enough period to upset trade and to provide the country with that bitter experience of Protection which the consequences, or inconsequences, of the General Election made inevitable. Much might be said about the way in which the fiscal revolution has been engineered, about the pressure which has been exerted by the Protectionists in Parliament upon a Prime Minister who is anxious to preserve the national character of his administration, or about the choice of a prominent Free Trader to be the instrument of this amazing departure, not only from the fiscal traditions of the country, but from all the rules and safeguards of fiscal procedure and constitutional finance. It is called the Abnormal Imports Act; but the Act is much more abnormal than the imports.

Before describing and criticising briefly the taxes that have been imposed and levied upon foreign goods, we may pause for a moment to recall one or two of the considerations which have induced Liberal Members of the National Government to remain and share the responsibility for what is being done. They joined the Government for very good reasons. They were forced into a General Election against their will; but they could not relinquish their task and ally themselves with a Labour Party obstinately bent upon Import and Export Boards, Wheat Quotas, and a profligate handling of unemployment, which would have destroyed all hopes of either balancing the Budget or stabilising the currency. It is true that, at the last moment, in an agonised desire for Liberal votes, the Labour Party simulated a sudden passion for Free Trade; but the real opinions of most of their leaders were too well known; and since the election, Mr. William Graham, their chief authority on fiscal matters, has indicated his readiness to assist in the preparation of a general, protective, scientific tariff! Moreover, Liberals relied on the pledges of the Prime Minister and Mr. Baldwin, and on the general understanding that the National Government was in no way pledged to any special methods of dealing with the currency or with the adverse balance of payments. A full and impartial examination was promised, and

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have only to read straight on, and allow ourselves to float passively upon the melodic river of the song, and almost we may burn our glossaries.

From commentator and annotator to memoir-writer and biographer is no far cry, for these last build glass-houses into which they force their victims so that every action, nay, every thought, may be observed. It is customary to place the undress memoir or biographical sketch of an author at the beginning of his collected works, but have the advantages attaching to a reversal of this plan been sufficiently considered? The desire to read about an author ought properly to follow reading him, and not the other way about. Times are changing, no doubt, and fewer now know an author than know of him. Still, it would be worth trying the experiment of placing the works first and the Life last. Then, too, there is a point of honour involved. There ought to exist among those who have been initiated into the works of an author a kind of freemasonry which says to the novice: "We will not impart our secrets to you without your due preparation nor without proof of your worthiness." To place a critical memoir in the front of the book is to defeat this design by acquainting the raw candidate with the arcana without probation and training, whereas, if the memoir is placed at the end of the book, direction is drawn first to the author's work itself as a preparation for the reception of any secrets which the expert may have in his possession. The change suggested has advantages, also, in the case of men of genius who, like Dryden, have attained greater success in the art of writing than in the art of living. "Mr. Bayes" was not a very great man, but he was a most melodious singer. If in the collected editions his works were placed before his memoir, the reader need not then quaff the more doubtful brew unless he feels "so disposed."

This leads us to a much larger problem than that of the place to be assigned to a memoir. Might it not be preferable altogether to dispense with biography where the man of imagination is concerned as distinguished from the man of action? The man of action cannot complain if his every deed is hunted down by the biographical sleuth, he challenges it—but the man of imagination ought to be judged by his recorded thoughts. Or, if it has to be admitted that the desire to know something about a man of genius is legitimate, it is still open for consideration whether it might not be best to confine the biography or memoir to an account of the mind-history of the man and the relation of his thought to the thought of his own and succeeding ages. There is something repulsive appertaining to a Day of Judgment inquisition into an author's private life, especially where the *De Mortuis* rule is too

flagrantly disregarded. Some biographers can only be classed as self-convicted ghouls. Are we really the worse off because we know practically nothing of the private lives of Plato and Shakespeare? Is there any pressing need that we should "see Shelley plain?" Is it of importance that we should know that Keats had the erotic tendencies common to adolescent youth? The better part of a great man lives on in his works and, recognising this, some have planned, as Plato seems to have done, the obliteration of their histories. Why attempt, as it were, the profane task of trying to make a man's body immortal? "His ashes in a peaceful urn shall rest." But there is no security for the man of imagination while the dreadful industry of memorialists and biographers continues unchecked and unabated. Many an author, had he known the future, might have exclaimed with Spenser:

Ah, dearest God, me graunt, I dead be not defoul'd!

Though it is possible to cite instances where a man, as was said of Epicurus, "lived better than he spake," yet more commonly it is found that, of his two phases of being, Man eloquent is capable of attaining greater heights than Man agent. Even in the happiest of instances the biographer with the muck-rake can always scratch up some incident which had better have been left in the dust-bin. Nothing could make pleasanter reading than the simple story of Sir Thomas Browne's innocent and felicitous domestic life, but even his fair fame would have been fairer still had he not made it impossible to allow his resolution: "At my death, I mean to take a total adieu of the world, not caring for a monument, history, or epitaph." Of course the biographer, in preserving the incident of the witches, is here blameless, for Browne's evidence, which appeared to turn the scale of conviction, was a public act and could not be hid. In Dryden's case, too, even though it had been possible to save him from his biographers, it would have been impossible to save him from himself. Those are very fortunate when, as happens with Spenser, almost the only biographical material extant is to be found in the body of an author's works. "His poems shall be our one great authority."* The memorialist can here do no wrong. He writes under licence. His pen is so nearly innocent that he is assured of an ungrudging *te absolvo*. Even happier is the matter when a writer is his own biographer. In reading an autobiography we experience a pleasing sensation as of conversing with a living man, but the older type of biography rarely succeeds in allowing us to forget the man is dead, while some of our modern brighter biographies make us doubt whether he was ever alive, except as a fiction in the writer's brain.

* Mr. J. W. Hales in the Globe Edition of Spenser.

the Liberal Members of the Cabinet made it clear that they were not committed in advance to any form of Protection.

For myself, I have never disputed their sincerity. Whatever they may think about the fairness with which they have been treated, or the wisdom of the policy adopted, they are entitled to take up the position that the new duties are strictly temporary, that an impartial examination of the whole tariff problem will be undertaken before the Budget, that the results may convert their Conservative colleagues to Free Trade opinions, and that in any case a little time must be given to enable the country to judge, from the present working model of Protection, whether Free Traders have been right or wrong about the rise in prices and other evil consequences which they have always foretold. If, in fact, there is no rise in prices, if the foreigner meekly pays the duties, if imports decline and exports expand, if British shipping begins to prosper, then Liberal Ministers may announce their conversion to Protection. Meanwhile it is to be observed that, since the new Protective duties were imposed, unemployment has again begun to increase, while the prices of most British industrial securities on the London Stock Exchange, instead of rising, have actually fallen.

Abnormality is the key-note of Mr. Runciman's justification. The situation, he says in effect, was so alarming that we had to act very rapidly to check abnormally large imports which were upsetting still further the already adverse balance of our trade, and turning the exchanges with gold standard countries against sterling. I confess I am not much impressed by the statistics given out by the Board of Trade. One large item, potatoes, was due to an unusually short and bad crop in this country. In other cases, no doubt, intelligent merchants had forestalled the tariff which they thought was coming; and this partly explains why the rise in prices was not immediately passed on by our shopkeepers in the case of all the articles in Mr. Runciman's lists.* Two things, however, are certain, unless experience and science are vain. All the articles that pay the 50 per cent. duty will eventually cost English purchasers 50 per cent. more than they would have had to pay if the duty had not been imposed. Secondly, the volume of imports will be reduced, and the volume of British exports will be reduced proportionately because the foreign countries, whose customers we are, are also our customers. The less we buy from them, the less they are able to buy from us. That is elementary common sense. But there is also the possibility or probability, already in some cases realised and in others threatened, of retaliation. The French, for instance, can reduce by official restrictions, at some loss to themselves, their purchases of British

* Another explanation is that some retail prices were excessively high.

coal, while we reduce by almost prohibitive customs duties, at a considerable sacrifice of health and comfort, our purchases of French fruit and vegetables.

At first, perhaps, the effect of these new taxes, imposed and varied at their discretion by the Ministers of Trade and Agriculture, may diminish imports a little more than exports. But everyone who knows anything about the subject is aware that the crisis, which has caused the depreciation of sterling, is due, not to any important change in the proportion of our visible exports to our visible imports, but to losses that we have suffered in the invisible items—especially shipping services and income from investments—which make up the trade balance. In regard to these, there can be no dispute that the operations of Mr. Runciman and Sir John Gilmour will be prejudicial. British shipping must rely for its profits just as much upon imports as upon exports. Unloading gives as much employment at the docks as loading. Similarly, the prohibitive taxes imposed upon large quantities of German and Austrian goods will make it much more difficult for those already distressed countries to pay interest on the enormous sums of money lent them by British investors and banks and financiers. In addition, therefore, to the crushing losses inflicted on selected British traders, the Government will be held responsible in part for any further contraction that may take place in our foreign dividends. If a wheat quota is applied to the detriment of Argentina, there is no knowing what depreciation may follow in Argentine securities.

Let us now glance rapidly over the first two orders issued by Mr. Runciman under the Abnormal Importations Act; and let us assume, as I think we may, that he and his officials have done the best they could in the circumstances to satisfy the Protectionist Ramp with the least possible injury to British interests in the widest sense. If their first selections cause much mischief, how much more may be expected from later selections, or from the general selective and discriminatory tariff, for which the Birmingham tariff reformers are pressing with all the forces at their disposal? The first list begins with pottery for domestic use imported chiefly from Germany and France. That will raise the cost of living appreciably in every poor household. You cannot drink without cups, or eat without plates; nor can you well do without knives, spoons and forks (which are also taxed) for your meals. Fifty per cent. duties are also levied on sanitary ware, and tiles for the hearth, and on domestic glassware—chiefly from Germany, Holland, France, Czecho-Slovakia and Belgium. These again are on necessities, and must raise the cost of living, and must also be prejudicial to health. Then there are the taxes on

If in such an autobiography an author chooses to make the world his father confessor there is nothing more to be said. But the inequity of our times will not heed even the most pitiful of pleas for reticence. How much better it would have been for Coleridge if only such material had been used as was available in the fragmentary personalia of the *Biographia Literaria* and elsewhere, for even the most sympathetically written sketch of S. T. C. makes painful reading if the ordinary rules are followed. "The truth is," says Mr. H. D. Traill, "that all Coleridge's references to himself in his later years are shrouded in a double obscurity." Would that it had been possible to heed this pathetic hint! Yet a critic of the last century has this curious passage: "The near relatives of the poet . . . content themselves, as was natural, with this simple record of facts. It was enough for them to note that, for whatever reason, the 'clear mounting flame' of his earlier poetry had ceased to rise. But later biographers, untrammelled by the family tie, have had to inquire into and account for this change without fear or favour."* Why?

The whole blame for this state of affairs must not be placed upon biographers as a class: the public nose for stench must be offered its accustomed effluvia, and biographers have to live—at least they would say so. This is rank heresy, of course, but heresy will out, and fortunately the world has now been made comparatively safe for heretics. Else we would recant fast enough. No opinion is worth martyrdom. But we are inclined to think that a writer's memory should be "left in charge of his genius." It is our "conceit," as an old-time writer would have expressed it, that a grateful and affectionate world should confer, as the best and highest reward in its power, The Freedom of Oblivion upon the personality of deceased genius: should say to the Manes: "To rest wholly in peace is your due. Therefore, with the dust that is sprinkled on your bier shall the poppy be mingled. Incurious, we piously receive the legacy of thought bequeathed by you to us and, of your mortal remains, take an eternal farewell."

The first law of our literary Utopia then would forbid that too busy research into the privacy of the dead which mars so many modern memoirs. A further decree of this literary land of Nowhere would make illegal the separate publication of a memoir or biography, and would allow only that it be bound up at the end of any edition of the author's collected works, or of any separate work of his. A third law, or perhaps an additional section, would protect both writer and reader against the unlicensed activities of the commentator and annotator and would confine the industry of these gentlemen within prescribed limits. The writer of a

* Canon Ainger: *Lectures and Essays*, Vol. II, p. 104.

"running commentary" would be delivered over to the state cheirotomist and punished by the loss of his pen hand. Thus might we hope to "get the commentators out of one's head and taste the true flavour."* A special clause would guard a work of imagination against improper usage—especially its employment as a grindstone upon which to sharpen the grammatical or critical wits of the immature student. Nor would it be suffered that a masterpiece of literature should undergo the indignity of being "got up" for an examination. Other laws, in addition, would doubtless be necessary, but these three should suffice for the foundation of a Magna Charta to be granted to the confraternity of genius.

E. W. ADAMS.

* Thoreau.

razors and scissors, and many kinds of tools: carpenters' and joiners' and engineers' tools are specified as well as saws and files and axes. These come mainly from Germany and the United States. House cleaning is to be made more costly by taxes on electrical vacuum cleaners; but these will probably come in from Canada under the provision which exempts British Empire products, though Canada has recently imposed additional taxation on British products.

Our old system of Protection was logical in that it imposed prohibition, or taxes, upon exports of machinery, lest foreigners should use British machinery for competing with British manufacturers. But besides including foreign tools in his list of taxed imports, Mr. Runciman has inserted typewriters, which are essential to almost every kind of business. Nearly all the best come from the United States, and the price of these has already begun to rise. Here is an obvious impediment to the efficiency of business which must add to the cost of production. Perhaps Mr. Runciman's belief, or hope, that this high protective tariff, which he has imposed ostensibly for purposes quite other than Protection, will not raise the cost of living, may be based upon the fact that its duration is restricted to six months, and that the stock of articles taxed will last for that period if consumers are economical. If recent importations had been really enormous in comparison with corresponding months in recent years, this assumption might have been valid. But from inquiries made at a number of shops, I am convinced that the rise has already begun, or will begin very soon.

There are some misguided people, even in the Liberal Party, who seem to think that Free Trade principles are not seriously violated, so long as what they call "the people's food" is not taxed. This view might be correct, or nearly correct, if applied to a tribe of primitive barbarians in the tropics, who require neither houses, furniture nor clothing. Even they would be hit by the duties on knives, hatchets and other weapons—though boomerangs and arrows have so far not been included. But as we have not yet been reduced to these conditions, we may as well proceed on the assumption that even the poorest of the poor must spend something on clothing; and I submit that many people will suffer from the 50 per cent. duties that have already been laid on blankets, rugs, carpets, shawls, stockings, handkerchiefs, men's suits, overcoats, mantles, etc. The old word to "clam" or "clim"—one of the commonest words in Yorkshire and Lancashire during the good old days of Protection which culminated in the Hungry Forties of last century—included starvation through cold as well as through hunger. A shivering, half-frozen wretch without a coat or a shawl is a pitiable object, even if he or she has enough bread to eat.

But the new taxes I have summarised do not exhaust the list. Bread is still free. So are meat and bacon and butter. But the Minister of Agriculture has followed the Minister of Trade by introducing so-called emergency customs duties on fruit and vegetables. It is true that he has described his new list of taxable goods as mainly luxuries; but these luxuries include potatoes, turnips, cabbages and tomatoes! Now, next to bread, potatoes are probably the most important element in the fare of the poorest people, while turnips and cabbages are the cheapest vegetables. I wonder if Sir John Gilmour and his colleagues would care to contemplate for themselves a diet which excluded all these "luxurious" foods covering the range from potatoes to asparagus? It is true that the duties are only to be imposed upon vegetables from foreign countries—largely from France, the Canary Isles and Holland; and they are supposed to be intended especially to exclude early potatoes and early vegetables, which are imported when, owing to the misfortunes of our climate, a domestic supply is not available. That, I should have thought, would make things all the worse for the consuming public and for the fruiterers and greengrocers, whose shops will be more or less empty in the early spring, when they ought to be doing a thriving trade. I should not care to be in Sir John Gilmour's shoes with all the glory and responsibility of a Cabinet Minister, when his discretionary taxes take effect. May we not safely predict a considerable uproar? I doubt if, even in this House of Commons, there will be very much satisfaction when the powers, which it has so ignorantly and credulously entrusted to heaven-sent Ministers and celestial Departments, begin to operate in high prices and scarcity on the comforts and necessities of life.

For my part, with all respect to the Civil Service, I deny altogether its competence to regulate trade, and to decide for the community what articles should be scarce and what should be plentiful, what should be raised in price, or what should be allowed to enter the country freely. Let me take an example from the recent proceedings in Parliament. Mr. Runciman seems to have been informed that 50 per cent. duties could safely be imposed without detriment to shopkeepers and merchants on packing and wrapping paper, tissue paper, vegetable parchment and grease-proof paper, of which several million tons are imported annually from Scandinavia, Germany and the Low Countries. He must have forgotten the Safeguarding inquiries into this class of imports, which resulted in a small, hesitating and tentative proposal to impose some comparatively small duties, which have since lapsed. In the House of Commons on Friday, December 4th, Mr. Runciman was troubled about articles which are the raw

A WALKING TOUR ON FROZEN RIVERS.

IT was not only the call of silent places in frost-bound lands that made us three British women start upon a walk of 1,300 miles in Northern Alberta. We had the practical desire of finding out whether winter travel there would be possible, since Canadian housewives in those colder latitudes are supposed to live indoors from autumn till spring.

From Edmonton we took the train as far as it went to the little town of Peace River Crossing where we met our guide, the French-Canadian mailman, Louis Bourassa. He wore a green Hudson Bay Company blanket-coat, was six feet two in height, well built and dark as an Indian. After a dubious survey of us his eyes lighted on our heavy boots. He gave a sigh of relief and said, "I guess we'll tug it out." It was the first week in December. No snow had fallen and the river was not yet frozen over. The only possible methods of getting along were either on foot or by sleigh, and, after the first fifty miles, the only possible route would be the river, as the country was covered by heavy bush and wind-felled trees a yard in depth. We had many warnings of the trials before us—frost-bite, starvation, falling through the ice, the deep snow. Lastly, the police advised us to carry revolvers or at any rate a flask of pepper, but, as I have been in many wild countries and have never needed a revolver, we took neither.

Our first night was spent comfortably in a farm. On the second, after walking I forget how many miles, we were snug and warm listening to yarns in a wayside store, until the snow began to fall. A fierce wind blew, raising even the corners of our heavy sleeping-bags in a room that had no door. Through the open-work walls we could see and be seen by Indians, half-breeds, a German, and a Chinese, lying on the floor of the adjoining part, so we hastily put out our light and slept till morning.

Joyfully we unpacked our skis, while Louis converted his carts into sledges, and so we travelled for that day and many others. The first place we reached, Notekewin, was interesting because during the previous summer a road had been made there and four months later a school, many homesteads and stores had grown up around. After a meal served by Indian squaws, we climbed a ladder to our barn-like bedroom with its huge piles of blankets, harness, buckets, hardware of all sorts, and a few beds in odd corners. Here all through the early hours of the morning came Indian men and women from a local dance, falling into bed just as they were. In this remote hamlet where there are only very few white men, a young British girl works alone as a doctor, riding for miles through bush-country to visit Cree Indians and half-breed patients

with whom she cannot speak. Another night we spent in a homestead where the cabin was only about ten feet by twelve in size. There was no hesitation whatever about putting us up—and free of charge—though five children slept in bunks round the walls, the farmer and his wife in a bed, and we (with a whole side of raw moose!) were on the floor. To our surprise, these people owned a good Hereford cow.

Louis had engaged as guide an old Indian called Sam who could only communicate with us by waving his hand and shouting "Huh! Huh!" (Yes). He had just appeared as Indians do: one moment there was no one about and then a picturesque figure draped in fringed moose-hide coat, scarlet chaps (the legs only of over-trousers), and bear-skin gloves, was trotting along in front of us. To get his Christmas mail through to the isolated people up north, who had had their last letters by boat in September, Louis wanted to go overland to Keg river. Sam knew all this country well and, slashing down fir trees with incredible speed, he led us about twenty miles into the bush. But we found the sledges got smashed on tree-stumps and, when at last the temperature ran down to 52° below zero Fahr., Louis gave up and decided to return to the Notekewin, or Battle river.

The ice was not yet solid. Occasionally we put a leg through or one of the horses fell in and had to be dragged out by the rest of the team. It was very cold. The high banks shut out the sun. If we stopped for a five minutes rest, one of us had to keep her hands warm enough to strike a match, while the other two got wood and built a fire. We found our leather boots quite impossible because the insides became coated with ice and that made frost-bite a danger. Skis are uncomfortable without boots, so we had to abandon them too and take to moccasins over four pairs of woollen socks, which made delightful footgear. When our feet did get in the water, we used the dry snow quickly as blotting-paper to mop up the wet and then it did not even penetrate the moccasins. Moose were numerous but rarely seen on account of their acute hearing, but once, when we were stalking along, a huge ugly nose suddenly appeared ahead of us. He came on with a slow loping trot, broadside on, at about 200 yards distance, and went up the bank into the bush—a perfect shot, had we had guns with us.

We next joined the Peace river, where the views were grand beyond words. It is a most beautiful stream, about a mile wide with many islands covered with high spruce firs and brilliant willow scrub. We crossed on the rough ice, which is safer than the treacherous, smooth, snow-covered ice that may be only an inch thick underneath; but it is hard work stumbling over slabs and blocks broken by the force of the wind and the strong current of

materials of certain industries. One of these was grease-proof paper. But he was informed that the making of grease-proof paper had been increased during the last fortnight, and that British grease-proof paper is "as good as any imported into this country." Assuming this to be true, was it a reason for adding 50 per cent. to the cost of brown paper or grease-proof paper or any other paper? But a correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, Mr. W. S. Holbrook, of Newcastle-on-Tyne, writes:

Mr. Runciman did not mention, apparently, that the British grease-proof is already more than the foreign cost plus duty, or that there was only one machine in the whole of the British Isles making the quality described as "grease-proof." I have not the figures at hand, but for every ton of grease-proof made here there must be thousands of tons imported on which the 50 per cent. duty is collected.

Mr. Runciman's statement that the British grease-proof is as good as any imported into this country is not true, although the British quality is quite a serviceable sheet.

Our argument might be developed to almost any length on lines familiar to all who understand the ramifications and complexities of British commerce. We all know that the finished products of one industry are the raw materials of another; but for the moment Free Traders must be content to wait and see, until the mischiefs which they have foreseen and predicted become common knowledge through common experience.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

THE JUGOSLAV DICTATORSHIP.

I

IT is just three years since King Alexander of Yugoslavia proclaimed his dictatorship, scorning any of the various methods of camouflage adopted by his fellow dictators in Europe, and courageously, if rashly, assuming the entire responsibility. The new regime has passed through three distinct phases. In the first instance the King himself and his supporters emphasised its temporary character and their resolve to return to lawful methods at the earliest possible date: but already by the summer of 1929 the *mot d'ordre* had been given out that a considerable time must elapse before the virus of party discord could be ejected from the body politic. On October 3rd, 1929, then, a new Royal Decree was issued, substituting the name of Yugoslavia for the clumsy title of "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes," and dividing it into nine provinces artificially named and still more artificially delimited. In this second phase the King and General Zhivkovitch were "digging their toes in," and this was emphasised by the Royal Manifesto of July 4th, 1930, declaring the old historic provinces on the one hand, and the old political parties on the other, to have disappeared for ever. But the prospects of settling down to a prolonged period of arbitrary rule were seriously interfered with by the world economic crisis, and by the spring of 1931 it had become obvious that some modifications must be introduced into the regime, if the deep-seated internal discontent and the no less definite misgivings of foreign opinion were to be allayed. Something was already in contemplation when the Spanish Revolution led to a postponement, it being very plausibly argued that immediate concessions would be interpreted as a sign of weakness or panic. But on September 3rd, 1931, yet another Royal Decree proclaimed the accomplishment of the main task of the dictatorship and the decision to revert to a constitutional regime.

The first announcement was received with relief by the friends of Yugoslavia, but their hopes were very speedily dashed, when the actual text of the new laws became available. It is the purpose of the present article to analyse the main features of this so-called "constitution" and to show that in almost every particular it is a very crude and amateur parody of the principles of political liberty. Before considering its main provisions, however, it is necessary to point out the very vital fact that the apparent restoration of "political liberties" (under sections 4-32) is rendered nugatory by the clause upholding all existing laws unless and until the new Parliament shall decide to revoke or alter them. The full significance of this emerges when it is realised that at present

have only to read straight on, and allow ourselves to float passively upon the melodic river of the song, and almost we may burn our glossaries.

From commentator and annotator to memoir-writer and biographer is no far cry, for these last build glass-houses into which they force their victims so that every action, nay, every thought, may be observed. It is customary to place the undress memoir or biographical sketch of an author at the beginning of his collected works, but have the advantages attaching to a reversal of this plan been sufficiently considered? The desire to read about an author ought properly to follow reading him, and not the other way about. Times are changing, no doubt, and fewer now know an author than know of him. Still, it would be worth trying the experiment of placing the works first and the Life last. Then, too, there is a point of honour involved. There ought to exist among those who have been initiated into the works of an author a kind of freemasonry which says to the novice: "We will not impart our secrets to you without your due preparation nor without proof of your worthiness." To place a critical memoir in the front of the book is to defeat this design by acquainting the raw candidate with the arcana without probation and training, whereas, if the memoir is placed at the end of the book, direction is drawn first to the author's work itself as a preparation for the reception of any secrets which the expert may have in his possession. The change suggested has advantages, also, in the case of men of genius who, like Dryden, have attained greater success in the art of writing than in the art of living. "Mr. Bayes" was not a very great man, but he was a most melodious singer. If in the collected editions his works were placed before his memoir, the reader need not then quaff the more doubtful brew unless he feels "so disposed."

This leads us to a much larger problem than that of the place to be assigned to a memoir. Might it not be preferable altogether to dispense with biography where the man of imagination is concerned as distinguished from the man of action? The man of action cannot complain if his every deed is hunted down by the biographical sleuth, he challenges it—but the man of imagination ought to be judged by his recorded thoughts. Or, if it has to be admitted that the desire to know something about a man of genius is legitimate, it is still open for consideration whether it might not be best to confine the biography or memoir to an account of the mind-history of the man and the relation of his thought to the thought of his own and succeeding ages. There is something repulsive appertaining to a Day of Judgment inquisition into an author's private life, especially where the *De Mortuis* rule is too

flagrantly disregarded. Some biographers can only be classed as self-convicted ghouls. Are we really the worse off because we know practically nothing of the private lives of Plato and Shakespeare? Is there any pressing need that we should "see Shelley plain?" Is it of importance that we should know that Keats had the erotic tendencies common to adolescent youth? The better part of a great man lives on in his works and, recognising this, some have planned, as Plato seems to have done, the obliteration of their histories. Why attempt, as it were, the profane task of trying to make a man's body immortal? "His ashes in a peaceful urn shall rest." But there is no security for the man of imagination while the dreadful industry of memorialists and biographers continues unchecked and unabated. Many an author, had he known the future, might have exclaimed with Spenser:

Ah, dearest God, me graunt, I dead be not defoul'd!

Though it is possible to cite instances where a man, as was said of Epicurus, "lived better than he spake," yet more commonly it is found that, of his two phases of being, Man eloquent is capable of attaining greater heights than Man agent. Even in the happiest of instances the biographer with the muck-rake can always scratch up some incident which had better have been left in the dust-bin. Nothing could make pleasanter reading than the simple story of Sir Thomas Browne's innocent and felicitous domestic life, but even his fair fame would have been fairer still had he not made it impossible to allow his resolution: "At my death, I mean to take a total adieu of the world, not caring for a monument, history, or epitaph." Of course the biographer, in preserving the incident of the witches, is here blameless, for Browne's evidence, which appeared to turn the scale of conviction, was a public act and could not be hid. In Dryden's case, too, even though it had been possible to save him from his biographers, it would have been impossible to save him from himself. Those are very fortunate when, as happens with Spenser, almost the only biographical material extant is to be found in the body of an author's works. "His poems shall be our one great authority."* The memorialist can here do no wrong. He writes under licence. His pen is so nearly innocent that he is assured of an ungrudging *te absolvo*. Even happier is the matter when a writer is his own biographer. In reading an autobiography we experience a pleasing sensation as of conversing with a living man, but the older type of biography rarely succeeds in allowing us to forget the man is dead, while some of our modern brighter biographies make us doubt whether he was ever alive, except as a fiction in the writer's brain.

* Mr. J. W. Hales in the Globe Edition of Spenser.

there is no liberty whatever of speech, writing, association and assembly; that the Press is completely muzzled, that all the old political parties, without exception, have been declared illegal and suppressed, and their leaders subjected to permanent espionage and frequent threats, and that there is virtually no restraint upon the activities of the police. In one word, Yugoslavia has become a Police State, which governs by the suppression of all opinion and the intimidation of its opponents.

So grave an assertion requires proof, and I propose to prove it by the briefest possible catalogue of some of the worst incidents of the dictatorship, as a necessary background to our study of the constitution and its authors.

1. The Ratchitch Trial of May 1929. It is notorious that the deliberate aim of Punisha Ratchitch was to terrorise the Opposition by shooting down the Croat leaders and at the same time to discredit parliamentary government by choosing the floor of the House for his outrage, and that for weeks beforehand certain organs of the then Premier (the nominee and favourite of the King) had threatened Stephen Raditch with just such a fate. Yet a dictatorship which had the Press entirely in its hands tolerated day by day the fullest Press reports of speeches devoted to the glorification of the murderer and abuse of the Croats and allowed Ratchitch specially favoured treatment in his prison.

2. All Croatia has marvelled at the contrast between the lenient sentence of twenty years on this wanton murderer not only of her trusted leaders, but of the parliamentary system, and the fierce sentences passed upon so many opponents of the Government. Specially striking was the sentence of death passed upon two young Croats, Soldin and Hranilovitch, arrested for complicity in the murder of the Croat journalist Toni Schlegel (believed to be one of the King's advisers in making the *coup d'état*). They were convicted on weak circumstantial evidence which public opinion rejects, and were admittedly not the actual murderers, who are known to have escaped across the frontier.

3. A still deeper impression of the two unequal measures meted out to supporters and opponents of the regime was created by the murder of Professor Shufflay, on February 18th, 1931, on the streets of Zagreb, and the failure of the police to bring his murderers to justice. Shufflay, who was perhaps the most eminent authority on Albanian history, and politically belonged to the extreme right wing of the Croat autonomists, had been under constant police supervision, but by what is regarded as no mere accident, both detectives and gendarmes had absented themselves for the first time on the evening when he was set upon and murdered; and the story is widely believed in Zagreb, and has been

published in Berlin in an impossibly concrete form by the Croat *émigrés*, to the effect that the outrage was planned between the Zagreb police and General Belimarkovitch, then Commandant of the Zagreb garrison.

4. Needlèss to say, there is no proof for this allegation, nor the means of obtaining it. But it is necessary to add that it is in no way surprising that such things should be believed of the Zagreb police and its chief, Mr. Bedekovitch (not a Serb, be it noted in passing, but a Croat who was already high up in the Croatian police under the old Hungarian regime), in view of the horrid revelations of the Matchek Trial in the summer of 1930. The facts regarding the torture of Bernarditch, Yelashitch, Begitch and others in prison were published at the time in the European Press and never refuted: and the fact that the charges against Matchek broke down and made his release inevitable, only served to emphasise still further the dictatorship's failure either to redress the wrongs inflicted on innocent men or to punish or even reprimand, still less remove, the guilty officials.

5. At about the same time the bastinadoing of Hilde Reiter, a German woman journalist from the Banat, by the police of Veliki Betchkerek, provided fresh proof that such methods are not confined to one place.

6. This case attained some notoriety, because it was reported by the Press of Germany. But little or nothing has been heard of a whole series of outrages committed in the prisons of Zagreb, Sarayevo, Osijek and elsewhere, against Croat nationalists, Macedonians or Communists (genuine or so-called, for this is a convenient label for many whose only crime is detestation of a reactionary and oppressive regime). Beating and torture are frequently employed, men have sometimes been thrown out of an upper window of a prison and then declared to have committed suicide: and I know of at least one case of a prisoner losing his reason. Even more sinister were the cases of the attempt on the life of Mr. Svetozar Pribitchevitch in the Esplanade Hotel in Zagreb in May 1929 (in which the same gendarmes were concerned as had "found" the bodies of two murdered Communists on the frontier; the facts which transpired at their abduction were laid before me two years ago by a very reputable and trustworthy Yugoslav advocate): and similar incidents could be quoted. Of "Communist" trials which I have grounds for believing resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice, it must suffice to quote the twelve victims sentenced at Sarayevo in March 1930 to a total of thirty-one years and the twenty others sentenced about the same time at Osijek to a total of eighty-seven years, without the public being allowed any information as to the charges against them or the

A WALKING TOUR ON FROZEN RIVERS.

IT was not only the call of silent places in frost-bound lands that made us three British women start upon a walk of 1,300 miles in Northern Alberta. We had the practical desire of finding out whether winter travel there would be possible, since Canadian housewives in those colder latitudes are supposed to live indoors from autumn till spring.

From Edmonton we took the train as far as it went to the little town of Peace River Crossing where we met our guide, the French-Canadian mailman, Louis Bourassa. He wore a green Hudson Bay Company blanket-coat, was six feet two in height, well built and dark as an Indian. After a dubious survey of us his eyes lighted on our heavy boots. He gave a sigh of relief and said, "I guess we'll tug it out." It was the first week in December. No snow had fallen and the river was not yet frozen over. The only possible methods of getting along were either on foot or by sleigh, and, after the first fifty miles, the only possible route would be the river, as the country was covered by heavy bush and wind-felled trees a yard in depth. We had many warnings of the trials before us—frost-bite, starvation, falling through the ice, the deep snow. Lastly, the police advised us to carry revolvers or at any rate a flask of pepper, but, as I have been in many wild countries and have never needed a revolver, we took neither.

Our first night was spent comfortably in a farm. On the second, after walking I forget how many miles, we were snug and warm listening to yarns in a wayside store, until the snow began to fall. A fierce wind blew, raising even the corners of our heavy sleeping-bags in a room that had no door. Through the open-work walls we could see and be seen by Indians, half-breeds, a German, and a Chinese, lying on the floor of the adjoining part, so we hastily put out our light and slept till morning.

Joyfully we unpacked our skis, while Louis converted his carts into sledges, and so we travelled for that day and many others. The first place we reached, Notekewin, was interesting because during the previous summer a road had been made there and four months later a school, many homesteads and stores had grown up around. After a meal served by Indian squaws, we climbed a ladder to our barn-like bedroom with its huge piles of blankets, harness, buckets, hardware of all sorts, and a few beds in odd corners. Here all through the early hours of the morning came Indian men and women from a local dance, falling into bed just as they were. In this remote hamlet where there are only very few white men, a young British girl works alone as a doctor, riding for miles through bush-country to visit Cree Indians and half-breed patients

with whom she cannot speak. Another night we spent in a homestead where the cabin was only about ten feet by twelve in size. There was no hesitation whatever about putting us up—and free of charge—though five children slept in bunks round the walls, the farmer and his wife in a bed, and we (with a whole side of raw moose!) were on the floor. To our surprise, these people owned a good Hereford cow.

Louis had engaged as guide an old Indian called Sam who could only communicate with us by waving his hand and shouting "Huh! Huh!" (Yes). He had just appeared as Indians do: one moment there was no one about and then a picturesque figure draped in fringed moose-hide coat, scarlet chaps (the legs only of over-trousers), and bear-skin gloves, was trotting along in front of us. To get his Christmas mail through to the isolated people up north, who had had their last letters by boat in September, Louis wanted to go overland to Keg river. Sam knew all this country well and, slashing down fir trees with incredible speed, he led us about twenty miles into the bush. But we found the sledges got smashed on tree-stumps and, when at last the temperature ran down to 52° below zero Fahr., Louis gave up and decided to return to the Notekewin, or Battle river.

The ice was not yet solid. Occasionally we put a leg through or one of the horses fell in and had to be dragged out by the rest of the team. It was very cold. The high banks shut out the sun. If we stopped for a five minutes rest, one of us had to keep her hands warm enough to strike a match, while the other two got wood and built a fire. We found our leather boots quite impossible because the insides became coated with ice and that made frost-bite a danger. Skis are uncomfortable without boots, so we had to abandon them too and take to moccasins over four pairs of woollen socks, which made delightful footgear. When our feet did get in the water, we used the dry snow quickly as blotting-paper to mop up the wet and then it did not even penetrate the moccasins. Moose were numerous but rarely seen on account of their acute hearing, but once, when we were stalking along, a huge ugly nose suddenly appeared ahead of us. He came on with a slow loping trot, broadside on, at about 200 yards distance, and went up the bank into the bush—a perfect shot, had we had guns with us.

We next joined the Peace river, where the views were grand beyond words. It is a most beautiful stream, about a mile wide with many islands covered with high spruce firs and brilliant willow scrub. We crossed on the rough ice, which is safer than the treacherous, smooth, snow-covered ice that may be only an inch thick underneath; but it is hard work stumbling over slabs and blocks broken by the force of the wind and the strong current of

victims themselves being allowed a proper defence.* It is hardly necessary to add that in Macedonia, where the official terror is especially gross, there are constant cases of shooting or disappearance which the Press is never allowed to report.

7. To show that these methods have in no way been modified by the restoration of "constitutional government," it will suffice to quote the trial in December 1931 of fifteen adherents of the Croat Peasant Party. The chief of these, Dr. Dragutin Toth, a former municipal councillor of Zagreb, has been severely mishandled in prison; a second, Joseph Poropat, was found dead in the courtyard of the Zagreb Prison; a third, Martin Nagy, "hanged himself" in a cell; a fourth, Horvatovitch, has been transferred to a lunatic asylum. In other words Dr. Bedekovitch continues his regime with the approval of King Alexander and General Zhivkovitch.

In a word, the dictatorship controls the courts and employs them quite ruthlessly to terrorise the population and paralyse all opposition: and by this time no one can pretend that it is the work of hidden or irresponsible forces. On the contrary, these methods have the deliberate sanction of the King and his Premier, and it is they whom the nation will one day hold responsible. The Yugoslavs themselves are tightly muzzled, the regime has rid itself one by one of the few correspondents of independent character who could endure the stifling political atmosphere, and the foreign diplomatic corps has lent itself slavishly to this process of suppression. It therefore remains for the friends of Yugoslavia abroad to speak out all the more clearly.

II

It is only in the light of the above facts that the reader can estimate the value of a constitution which enacts the inviolability of the person, of the domicile and of religion, of association and assembly and of free expression in word, writing, and picture, but grants them with the proviso "except in cases provided by the law" and "within the limits of the law," and then maintains until further notice all the various dictatorial decrees suspending the political liberties enjoyed under the old constitution of 1921. In one special case—association—a new law has already been promulgated, which makes the formation of any new society dependent on the permission of the Minister of the Interior. Meanwhile the

* Fuller particulars of these and similar incidents (with some very revolting photographs) will be found in a brochure entitled *Diktatur in Jugoslawien* (Berlin, Bund *Freier Balkan*), preface by M. Henri Barbusse. Many of its statements are tendentious and exaggerated, but its statistics (pp. 41 and 71-6) and documents (e.g. pp. 27-34) are accurate.

independence of the bench has been undermined and the powers of the police remain as unrestricted as ever.

The new Parliament is to consist of two Houses, not one. This revival of a Senate, though contrary to Serbian political tradition (the old Serbian Senate was associated with the worst Obrenovitch period), has excellent precedents in the two allied countries of Roumania and Czechoslovakia. But its composition is much more open to criticism. Half its members are to be nominated directly by the Crown, while the other half are elected by the Banal Councils, and as the members of these latter are all either the holders of official positions or in their turn nominated either by the Crown or its nominee the Ban, it is simply farcical to talk of a senatorial "election" at all. The Senate, then, is to be an instrument of royal power, destined to check any attempt of the Lower House to assert itself. There is not in Europe any other such example of royal control.

The Skupshtina continues to be elected by universal suffrage, as yet according to the unreformed registers, which from the first did not correspond with the movement of population since 1912. But the ballot is entirely abolished, and henceforth there is open voting before an electoral commission. It is unnecessary to emphasise what infinite powers of intimidation over the official class on the one hand and over the peasant masses on the other, are thus placed in the hands of the Government.

A further far-reaching restriction on free parliamentary development is the provision which upholds the veto imposed by the dictatorship upon the formation of parties on a regional, racial or denominational basis. A party, before it can present itself at all to the electors, must obtain the sanction of a central commission in Belgrade, and this sanction is dependent upon its being able to put up a list of candidates for every one of the three hundred constituencies, with two hundred and sixty signatures of electors in each attached. What does this mean in practice? It means that all the old party organisations are deliberately made impossible—Serb Radicals, Croat Peasants, Slovene Clericals, Bosnian Moslems alike, because their very *raison d'être* was the defence of specific and legitimate interests, and again the Social Democrats, because there are many districts in Yugoslavia where a peasant would endanger his whole existence by standing up openly for a Socialist candidate. Let anyone with any knowledge of Macedonia estimate the prospects of obtaining two hundred and sixty signatures against the Government (i.e. against the gendarme, the mayor and the local commandant!) in a Macedonian constituency!

• Add to this certain complicated provisions which allow the winning party at the polls to augment its total still further, and we

the river, which lie frozen, piled up on end, like the *séracs* of a glacier on a smaller scale. Another trial is ice with no water underneath, as we found when we came crashing through, twisting our feet and ankles painfully.

We were now in the country of the Cree (Algonquin) Indians, a tribe descended from warriors and producing a strong race of half and quarter breeds—many of the best trappers. Some of them still hold firmly the remains of their religious rites, and, when a tribe breaks camp, they fast for a whole day and spend another in thanksgiving—to the sun for giving them warmth, to the trees for their shelter, to the river or lake for its water. We crossed a portage, i.e. a short trail overland where in summer boats are carried to avoid rapids or save distance, and, after a tramp up a steep hill, whence we could see a vast panorama of snow—a magnificent white valley with bush and prairie country spread out before us—we descended to Carcajou. Here at night we found some of the ranchers deep in study. Many Canadians have adopted the rationalist opinions of Joseph McCabe and speak of his books with appreciation. They were also interested in Nietzsche and Freud.

Whenever there was a trapper's cabin anywhere near, Louis always found an excuse for calling. He "mothered" all these trappers and feared lest any man living alone might be ill or, more probably, that the loneliness might be "getting under his skin." Then he would persuade him to go "outside" with him, i.e. go back to a place where there was company and amusement. The loneliness of the trapper's life is appalling and often has a bad effect on his nerves. A little fancied injury may be magnified into enormous proportions and has sometimes ended in murder. Two men can seldom live there alone together for long. The times when fur is scarce are specially bad for them, as they just lie in their bunks doing nothing except getting up to eat. One man who came to our sleighs for his mail looked as though he had just come through some terrible illness. Among the many trappers in this part, I saw only two whose wives lived with them. One of these women told us we were the first white women she had spoken with for two years, but she was happy and very cheerful. She had a fine stock of bottled wild fruits and home-grown vegetables, and had made her log-shack pretty with needlework. We had dinner one day in an empty cabin, whose owner had developed religious mania and had committed suicide by freezing to death on the river. It is easy to die in those lands, and life is of little value—unless the owner values it himself.

This was Louis Bourassa's last season, for in future the mail was to go by air, and we wondered what would happen to the sick and lonely—the men who have lost the initiative to get themselves

back into civilisation; and, like an answer, one trapper wrote in a letter to me, "Yes, we shall hear the aeroplanes going over our heads, but it won't be the same thing as listening for the sleigh-bells and voices coming to us on the river." Now, however, we hear that the old mail-sleigh is to be revived for the air route was not satisfactory. In view of all this, we wonder, too, why more women are not willing to face the rigours of these Northern regions when their help is so obviously needed.

For the next thirty miles we followed an overland trail. At each homestead Louis would shout and the teamsters crack their whips, and then the whole household would tumble out in wild excitement to get their Christmas mail. To picture Fort Vermilion, which we had at last reached, one might imagine a Swiss winter resort ironed out flat. There were men in scarlet coats and women in striped white blanket wraps with gorgeous embroidery in wool and beads. Dog-teams, gay with beads, cockades and bells, were racing to and fro over the snow-covered river. The air was filled with the shouts of the dog-mushers and the laughter of Indian children. Over the bush behind, the winter sun hung low; on either side of it were the brilliant iridescent "sun-dogs" or mock suns. Mail-time means drink-time, and white men, breeds, and Indians were all celebrating their Christmas with marvellous dancing and revelry. Here we learned to use snow-shoes and to enjoy a run with dog-teams. The dogs were bred from the timber-wolf and varied a good deal in their natures: some mischievously loved to turn the toboggan over, while others were fierce, even savage, and did serious damage. We soon found it was unsafe to give to horse or dog the pats and caresses we bestow on them at home.

At Fort Vermilion there is a small experimental station for agriculture, where an old rancher, Mr. Robert Jones, known everywhere as "Uncle Robert," has made a great success of his crops, especially wheat, which showed a weight of 61.2 to the bushel for "Reward" and 61.0 for "Red Fife." He and Mr. Sheridan Lawrence are helping the country and the new settlers in every possible way. Nearby stands a derelict mill on the riverside. How long it will be before it is in regular use again, no one can say. It represents one of the urgent problems of this region. Foxes or Wheat? That is the crux in a land whose population, originally entirely trappers, is now increasingly recruited by a steady flow of settlers from further South.

The missionary and his wife who were going north to Little Red River now offered to take our sleeping-bags and grub-box on their sleigh if we cared to walk the fifty miles. We accepted gladly and made camp together. For the first ten miles the trail was well beaten by those who had come to fetch their mail and our friends

have a system which cannot possibly be described as either "electoral" or "representative" in any real sense of the words, and which combines and exaggerates most of the worst features of both the pre-war and the post-war franchises of Hungary and Roumania, which hitherto had held a record. Every precaution has been taken to prevent a real Opposition from penetrating into Parliament: yet, lest by some miracle the Parliament thus "elected" should develop some faint mind of its own, the further precaution has been taken of hurrying out a Decree-Law revising the Standing Orders of the House in an illiberal sense, and it is expressly laid down that this cannot be again modified without the royal sanction.

In addition to the two Houses an Economic Council has been created, as a "legislative body in economic and social questions," to which apparently certain matters normally dealt with by Parliament are to be transferred. This, if worked out on broad impartial lines, might have most salutary results in "depoliticising" finance and economics. But its composition and the method of its election have not yet been announced, and there is not much hope if they are left to the framers of the parliamentary franchise.

It remains to consider the further powers of the Crown, which are more extensive than in any European country: (1) The King reserves the right to conclude treaties with foreign Powers, though ratification by Parliament is required. The calculation is that he will be able to keep the control over all negotiations and over foreign policy generally, and will always secure a majority in a packed and subservient House. (2) He has the unrestricted right to nominate and dismiss the Premier and all Ministers, collectively or individually. Thus real ministerial responsibility is in no way restored. (3) He, of course, retains his control over the army and military appointments. (4) He nominates the Bans of the nine provinces and through them controls the provincial councils and administration. (5) His Civil List remains untouched, while official salaries are cut down and a special Decree-Law, recently rushed out to forestall possible criticism, places all the functionaries and menials of the royal palaces in the category of state officials, paid by the state.

III

Such being the new constitution, it is not surprising that the Opposition should have decided to boycott the "elections." Abstention is always a dubious weapon: its adoption by the Croat leader Raditch in 1920 was a fatal blunder, without which the centralist constitution could not have been passed. But to-day

it is difficult to see what other tactics the Opposition could have chosen, unless to adopt a frankly revolutionary programme, which is contrary to their whole principles: and at the same time it is quite a different thing for one party to abstain and thereby leave the field free for its adversaries, as did Raditch in 1920, and for all the parties without exception to combine in abstention and thereby to reduce the proceedings of the Government to an ugly farce. What else could they have done? Their parties were proscribed: where they began to collect signatures, their adherents were arrested or browbeaten by the gendarmerie. Their leaders were kept under the closest supervision and often not allowed even to communicate with each other. They were not allowed to publish their views, either as individuals or collectively, and action was taken against them for daring to circulate a typewritten manifesto. Public sanction for meetings was only accorded to Government candidates. Some idea of the lengths to which the regime was prepared to go may be gathered from the case of Mr. Trifunovitch, one of the foremost leaders of the Serbian Radical Party, a distinguished ex-Minister of Education, whom the police deported from his native town of Uzhitse immediately on arrival at the station, without being allowed to visit his house or former constituents, and who at a later date was pelted with rotten eggs by police agents in Zagreb (their names are perfectly well known: I am not dealing in suppositions), because he tried to visit the Croat leader Dr. Matchek.

And this raises one of the gravest of all the many issues raised by this odious regime. It has constantly been argued by its apologists—in days when its action had not yet altogether belied its promises and pledges—that the dictatorship was rendered necessary by the utter failure of the rival parties to reach agreement, especially on the vital Croat question: and no one would attempt to defend the party dissensions of the post-war period. On the other hand the King has failed in these three years to create a national party of his own: his tactics have unfortunately consisted in eliminating the elder statesmen and the men of independent judgment and position and meanwhile detaching from the old parties such individuals as are ready to play the courtier or the instrument of royal power. It is not suggested that none of the men who joined him are men of character. On the contrary, some really able and entirely honourable men—it will suffice to mention MM. Marinkovitch and Kumanudi for the Democrats and MM. Shverlyuga and Mazhuranitch for the Croats—responded to the original appeal for their patriotic collaboration, and it is only gradually that they and other colleagues became compromised and unable either to steer the ship of state into safe channels or to retreat from a false position.

could go at a fast pace with their pair of trotting cayuses; but later on the Peace river we found a frozen horse-track very uncomfortable for the moccasined foot. Women are rare visitors in these parts, and it amused us to see the wary, puzzled expression that greeted us as we drew near some shanty rapidly change to warm welcome when it became clear who these figures in ski-ing suits were. We received invariably such hospitality as I have never met in any other country. Even when food was scarce, we were given of the best. Who, at home, would leave their house to strangers and go out into a cold shack?

Our walk was to be a tough one. Fast and strong blew the wind from the north, driving snow through buttonholes and ear-flaps, into throat and lungs. Ice clung to our fur caps and wool clothing, covering our eyes and encircling our necks and faces. Every step in the deep snow was an effort, as we fought against the blast, and at every bend of the river we hoped for relief, but always it seemed to blow dead against us. At midday we sighted an Indian cabin and away went all our prejudices against dirt. We entered the log-shack and found the Jinglebells family lying around on the floor in filthy rags—starved-looking girls, one of them with a newborn baby, an old grannie crouching by the stove smoking her pipe, and the mother busy making up a fire with logs. We had no common language, but they quickly gave us a box and a square of oilcloth as seats to rest upon. They were so kind—and so indescribably dirty. When we started again the wind was getting stronger, the drifts were deeper, and the cold was more intense. Our pace grew slower and slower till I wondered if we should manage to make the next ten miles to an empty shack near the Vermilion Falls.

We arrived at last, frost-bitten but otherwise undamaged. The log hut seemed like a glorious hotel, and the hard mud floor might have been a beautiful Turkey carpet. I was conscious only of the joy of warmth, the music of the rapids, the wind in the trees, the smell of the burning spruce and balsam, and the coming of tea and bannock.

There were only nine more miles to cover next morning and the sun was shining again. We followed the trail of an Indian dog-team—rather unwisely, as sometimes we had to crawl on hands and knees under the snow-hung branches; but we soon emerged on to the river below the Falls and came at a swinging pace into the village of Little Red River. We visited the two fur-trading posts, the Hudson's Bay and Revillon Frères, and were shown exquisite skins—red fox, cross, and silver fox. It was amusing to grade them and to compare our valuation with the traders'.

This was the end of our journey down the Peace River and next day we started the long trail back, for we had to change our plans

and approach our goal by a different route. It was still bitterly cold and I wondered if we should have been warmer if we had been wearing some of the furs we had just seen, but I felt no desire to possess them. I had heard too many trappers' tales. So much has been said of the cruelty of the fur-trade that we had been prepared to witness many terrible sights, and of course we did. All I can say here, however, is that personally I rarely met a trapper who was more cruel than the hardness of his life would naturally make him. Some of these men were doing their best to use poison-bait in order to bring the trapped animals to a rapid end. It is true that thousands of animals die a slow and painful death in the steel traps, as do thousands of rats in this country. Poison-bait is a dubious blessing after all, because it is dangerous for dogs, as it is apt to be carried about to great distances by carrion-feeding birds.

All the same, homesteading would be impossible unless wolves, foxes, weasels, and lynx were kept down by trapping, though I can see no reason for trapping the harmless squirrel except the demand for his skin. The remedy for that lies mainly with the women who wear it, and I fail to understand how people who love the cheery little animals in parks can wear squirrel fur. Colonisation is mainly started in these remote lands by the trapper. He moves forward into wild uninhabited country—ever farther and farther afield—and makes trails, which he keeps open, going back and forward with the trading of his furs and to get his own supplies. Next comes the enterprising homesteader and then a settlement.

Mr. Michael Mason in his book *Prairie Forests* says "the great difficulty in the development of the prairie provinces is that the women, unless born under just such conditions, get to hate the isolated life of the homestead and make their men dissatisfied." Apparently he thinks that women prevent the colonisation of a perfect country—a country which the men who live there cannot praise too highly. We had read his book, and the conditions for women in this belt of land between 55° and 60° latitude, where the temperature in winter sinks to about 60° Fahr. below zero, interested us greatly. What were the problems they would have to face? The reason there were so few women in these parts seemed to us to be a natural fear—fear of unknown difficulties. Mr. Mason suggests domestic inconveniences such as want of water and means of cleanliness and also boredom. I think, however, that their thoughts are more likely to be centred on deeper problems, like childbirth and anxiety about the care of their families later, if illness came to their homes. I did come across some terrible cases—more than one of puerperal fever ending in delirium and death of the mother, which meant that the father was left with the

Nothing, however, is more remarkable than the fact that whenever the men whose disunion the King adduces as a pretext for arbitrary rule try hard to get together and reach a common programme, every obstacle is placed in their path. For three years all the most eminent opposition leaders have been under constant police supervision, their houses watched, their telephones tapped, their correspondence tampered with, passports refused, mutual intercourse curtailed to such an extent that funerals are almost their only means of meeting!

None the less the worst obstacles have been overcome, and to-day the leaders of five of the principal groups—MM. Stanoyevitch and Trifunovitch for the Radicals, Mr. Davidovitch for the Democrats, Mr. Spaho for the Moslems, Dr. Koroshets for the Slovene Clericals, Mr. Yovan M. Yovanovitch for the Agrarians—are agreed on the main lines of internal policy, and have offered such terms to MM. Matchek and Pribitchevitch of the Croat-Democratic Bloc as could probably soon be adjusted if formal negotiation once became possible.* In other words, the sham Constitution is rapidly rallying the whole country in opposition to the Royal dictator and his nominees, and while monarchical theory is still upheld, the republican current is growing by leaps and bounds. Not the least ominous sign of change is the serious and prolonged rioting of the students of Belgrade University who, while shouting "Long Live the King" as a wise precaution, demonstrated openly against General Zhivkovitch and his regime and against France for supporting it. According to *Le Populaire*, the organ of M. Léon Blum and the French Socialist Party—whose editor, M. Rosenfeld, has a personal knowledge of Yugoslavia dating from the war, and, incidentally, a knowledge of the *coulisses* of the Salonica trial of 1917, in which the present Premier helped to pull the strings—the cry of "*À bas la France*" has been heard with increasing frequency on the streets of Belgrade during the last few months. Indeed it is an open secret that even official Paris is distinctly nervous and annoyed at the Dictator's failure to follow its moderating advice.

The plain fact is that we are getting back to the old Obrenovitch era of 1902-3, and by an irony of fate we have a King who bears the same name as the unhappy Alexander and a Premier who had a minor share in the final conspiracy. It is a real tragedy that King Alexander, whose fine war record is well known and who possesses many of the qualities which go to the making of a great king, should have ventured into a blind alley from which it is now increasingly difficult for him to escape. Unhappily he has inherited the autocratic leanings of his maternal grandfather, King Nicholas of Montenegro, rather than the democratic sentiments of his own father King Peter: and in

recent years his appetite for personal government, his distrust of popular institutions have kept pace with a growing inability to brook criticism and a tendency to cold-shoulder politicians of outspoken or independent character. He has assumed a task which might prove too much even for a Joseph II, and he and his entourage not merely live in an age less favourable than Joseph's for monarchical rule, but have shown a surprising lack of constructive power. The new Constitution is not only objectionable; it is amateur to the last degree, and we are left wondering at the mentality of those who could suppose that it could possibly impress European opinion for one moment. Either the political intelligence of its framers must be mediocre, or they must be really quite indifferent to outside opinion, and this is difficult to believe in view of the urgent need for foreign loans to keep the regime from foundering.

In conclusion, two points require special emphasis. Firstly, it is an entire misconception, perpetuated by certain interested foreign propaganda, to suppose that the present regime is a Pan-Serb conspiracy against Croat rights. The dispute between Belgrade and Zagreb is of course a very important factor in the situation, and one of the first tasks of a free regime will be to do justice to Croatia. But the Serbs have no less ground than the Croats for dissatisfaction with the present regime: for it is a direct denial of all those somewhat primitive, but none the less genuine, strivings after democratic government, which have characterised them in the century and a quarter since their uprising against the Turks. And if the dictatorship is overthrown, it will be at the hands of the Serbs.

Secondly—and this is fundamental—though this is a crisis of the state itself, and though the issue is nothing less than the actual form which the state is to assume—monarchy or republic, constitutional or personal government, centralism or federalism—there is no question of Yugoslavia breaking up. Yugoslav unity rests upon solid foundations and is a European necessity: it is likely to emerge from the present crisis stronger than ever, and with a new hope of real reconciliation with its Bulgarian kinsmen.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

charge of, perhaps, a couple of infants. The remedy for this state of things could be found if either women maternity-nurses or women doctors were available, of such a sporting type that they would enjoy the hardships of winter travel, would be willing to sleep in open-air camps, and brave any weather in which a man could venture out. This would be a fine profession for any woman to take up, and I am certain she could do it. I have already referred to one young British girl who is actually doing it now. The life for the housewife is far more dreary than it is for men, who have hunting and trapping with all sorts of excitements and adventures besides the planning of their exploits. She has to stay at home, busy always with an unceasing round of washing, cooking, and chores; but this she would stand happily, were she given some security for the times of illness and childbirth.

In our travels I never heard one word that I might not expect to hear in any company. We were with the men when sleds were overturned or cracked in the heavy timber, when horses broke through the ice or failed to drag the loads up the steep banks of the Peace River. One huge black horse had to be hobbled before being harnessed, as he would kick and bite, but I never saw a man hit him except a light lash if he slacked in harness. Fine fellows these men were, for the most part, with endless patience and determination. Of course, as in all places, there were higher and lower types, but the kindness and fortitude of those we came across impressed me as remarkable. I thought that at last I had met Christians in the real spirit of the word. They would give their last mite to do a kindness to anyone who needed it. There is in this primitive life, which develops such high qualities both of strength and gentleness, another power—that of alluring and, sometimes, of satisfying the most restless and adventurous souls. It was that which Robert Service felt so deeply and expressed so clearly in his well-known lines:

The winter! The brightness that binds you,
The white land locked tight as a drum,
The cold fear that follows and finds you,
The silence that bludgeons you dumb.
The snows that are older than history,
The woods where the weird shadows slant;
The stillness, the moonlight, the mystery,
I've bade 'em good-bye—but I can't.

It's the great, big, broad land 'way up yonder,
It's the forests where silence has lease;
It's the beauty that fills me with wonder,
It's the stillness that fills me with peace.

MARY E. POWELL.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS. CONFERENCE PRELIMINARIES.

(I) FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN.

IT was not till the beginning of December that one began to recognise the lines on which the world "diplomacy" was being driven into action after its prolonged stagnation. To many people it came as a spectacular revelation that one of the contributing causes of the world depression, or at any rate a contributing cause of its persistence and intensity, had been the lack of an untrammelled British Government. A minority Socialist Government kept in office by a small Liberal Party had many effects at home and abroad; one of the effects abroad was that it did not help the world back to economic and financial confidence. Recent history likewise proved that no other country could take the traditional place of Great Britain in economics and finance when Great Britain was incapacitated. The change immediately wrought by the British election of October 1931 is one of the clear things in contemporary history. It affected the diplomatic as well as the economic principle of British policy, and created a new situation in the world at large.

The story tells itself. With a characteristic lack of outward excitement the new British Government proceeded to act upon the new principles. Few Continental politicians, diplomatists or commentators, unless they have lived twenty years in London, are able to understand the motives which produce action in Great Britain or to recognise the moment of a new departure in policy. They recognise it only when the slow fulfilment has manifested itself. The resultant indignation produced upon the said Continental opinion in comparable circumstances of past history has found relief in the comfortable slogan "perfidie Albion," a slogan which, however, is almost perversely wide of the mark. British foreign policy is normally so far from being perfidious that it takes a generation of disillusion and a first-class catastrophe to break any particular trend. The trend now apparently ended is that of sensitiveness to French interests as the main motive of British policy. It began in 1903. It persisted through the Great War, in which British troops fought under a French command until France was satisfied. It persisted for thirteen years after the war, in the teeth of sundry argument against it. It made Great Britain yield to France in the successive treaty series of reparation settlements (the Versailles, the Dawes, the Young) the bulk of German payments in cash and in kind, the while Great Britain advanced to Germany the cash wherewith she paid them. It made Great Britain remit the bulk of

SPAIN FORGING AHEAD.

THE ordinary foreign observer whose mental luggage labelled Spain consists of a few ready-made articles acquired from the history books or the newspapers may well be amazed at the changes embodied in the new Spanish Constitution. A country whose Monarchist sentiment was proverbial and whose allegiance to the Roman Catholic religion was taken for granted abroad as the paramount fact of the national life has, in the space of a few months, expelled and outlawed a King and eliminated the Church as a political factor. Women have acquired equal rights with men in respect of the franchise (the voting age being fixed at twenty-three), and divorce by mutual agreement of the parties or, subject to certain conditions, at the request of either is now the law of the land. And all this has been done, amid the acclamation of a majority of Spaniards, by those humdrum democratic processes of Parliamentary debate and majority voting which one had almost come to believe deserved the scorn of our latter-day authoritarians. What is more, a Republican Government, elected mainly as a protest against many years of arbitrary rule on the part of King or Dictator, has itself had no difficulty in obtaining from the Cortes approval of an emergency law for the Defence of the State more rigorous and more thoroughgoing than any that a Government under the Monarchy ever ventured to introduce. By this means—the measure was adopted shortly after the Cortes had voted the fundamental Article 24 defining the relations of Church and State—a period of calm was assured for the Deputies to hammer out the remainder of the Constitution, and the way was cleared for the election of a President of the Republic and of a Chamber more faithfully reflecting party differences.

Greatly daring, Señor Azaña, the Prime Minister, who enjoys immense prestige because of the way in which he has bent the Army to the Republican will, has actually attempted, under cover of these emergency powers, to reform the Civil Service. Suddenly at the end of October he gave notice of a decree reducing personnel by fifty per cent., introducing a regulation working week of thirty-nine hours and requiring regular attendance. A subsidiary measure was passed prohibiting the holding of certain offices and posts at the same time. There was to be ample compensation for those who were to be "axed" (eighty centimos for every peseta of salary), as in the case of the disarmament measures, but imagine the consternation among the many black-coated who held official posts as sinecures while they attended to a variety of other occupations! For your Spaniard, especially the ill-paid official class, has

always been a pluralist. And then, to cap everything, the right of Civil Servants to form themselves into a professional association was refused.

Certain mitigations, in practice, of this draconian severity are to be expected, but the rule stands. It is by such constructive radicalism as this that "the new Spain" must be judged, not by the solemn indictment of ex-King Alfonso and his condemnation without a trial which has bulked so large in the news over here. One would say that Señor Azaña and his Government are determined to convince the ordinary non-political middle-class Spaniard that Republicanism, contrary to the traditional view, is not synonymous with anarchy. I prefer to liken the Provisional Government in Spain charged with the prodigious task of re-orientation to other contemporary examples of "constitutional dictatorship" in Germany and elsewhere. As Professor Alfred Zimmern maintained recently in a lecture at Manchester College, Oxford, the hoary antithesis between "order" and "liberty" has to be seen to-day in a new light. The younger generation in every country (and the whole point about "the new Spain" is that its leaders are still comparatively young men), however progressive its sympathies, is foremost in calling for "governments that will govern" and for planning and control in the place of *laissez-faire* and licence, while many of their elders are still thinking exclusively in terms of "philosophies of liberty." What does this prove? Simply that freedom is a thing of the spirit independent of the externals of governmental machinery. Not to *be* free but to *feel* free is the essential postulate of our twentieth-century civilisation. And by that test the Spanish nation as a whole has at last come into its own.

Which is to say that you cannot judge the developments of the past few months in Spain by the accepted "liberal" criteria. The change is bigger and deeper than most foreign commentators are prepared to admit. Not unfairly did Señor Fernando de los Rios assert during the preliminary discussion of the Constitution as a whole:

Spain is called upon to give a lead to the rest of Europe by a Constitution that shall embody both power and liberty. Experience in America and Europe has shown that wherever the private economic forces are strong personal liberty is restricted, only when the economic forces are controlled and directed by the State will a true condition of liberty be possible for the individual.

The doctrine is pure Laski, and it happens that the men at the head of the new Spain have sufficient intellectual power and force of character to practise what they preach. For that reason, now

the French debt owed to Great Britain. It had the cumulative effect of draining the financial resources of Great Britain and of establishing France on an eminence of national wealth so great as to constitute the dominant diplomatic force in Europe. It persisted for a decade in spite of the fact, continuously demonstrated, that French power, thus derived, was curiously insensitive to British interests. "Perfide"? It came to pass, as many foresaw, that the pound was driven from gold. That event, in the tacit but immediate judgment of the country at large (as illustrated by the election), was the signal for some drastic new thinking. Among its other results it ended (so one must assume) a diplomatic epoch that had lasted twenty-eight years.

Yet neither French nor German opinion recognised the change till several weeks after it began to operate. In Berlin and in Paris alike it was tacitly assumed that the result of the British election in the international field would be nil; that London would continue, as before, to look on while the world toppled. The deep, silent gloom of German opinion—waiting as it were till French policy, the undisputed, undisturbed master, witnessed and helped to produce the final crash in Germany and thus cleared the path for an epoch of German bolshevism or of German Hitlerism—that gloom was unaffected by the news from London. News from London had no interest for German opinion. For a generation British foreign policy, through every kind of emergency, even those where British interests seemed clearly to demand a different policy, had ultimately acquiesced with a better or a worse grace in what French policy advocated. The pictorial notion of Great Britain standing for a generation with her hat off to France was crude, but essentially fair. A large element in German gloom was the belief in the non-existence of British influence as an original force. By a like error French opinion, after as before the British election, pursued its course of world dominance, content to watch from the security of its hoard of gold and its abundance of armaments the *coup de grâce* that would soon descend upon Germany, and thus remove for at least a generation the haunting fear of German power that had been the motive of French destructiveness. To criticise France would be as intelligent as to criticise a terrified stag escaped from the maw of a leopard: but the terrified stag itself is a dangerous animal. The philosophic puzzle is as hard in the international as in every other sphere, human or animal. Maybe it is the suffering that is good. In the jungle they all suffer at each other's claws or teeth. In international affairs the like truth seems to apply. Germany a generation ago isolated herself and prepared her own undoing. France now isolates herself. Fear does the damage both in diplomacy and

in the jungle; and no agency seems able to prevent it. It looks as if some fatal predisposition makes of all life a combat; as if creation and destruction were corollary to each other. A generation hence France may be the hunted and Germany the hunter. In the miraculous alternative they may be the co-hunters of somebody else.

There is, however, something new to record in the present phase of Western European relationship. Curiously, the hints given by Whitehall soon after the formation of the new British Government were lost upon M. Flandin. Speaking at the Guildhall Banquet on November 9th, Mr. MacDonald said: "We have two great problems to solve, and I can assure you that my colleagues and I mean to solve them . . . the nation should balance its budget . . . the nation must balance its trade." A little later, in the same speech, he added a third: ". . . our currency problem was created by the conditions of the world outside. . . ." When M. Flandin was in London on November 29th (as will be related below) he appeared to be unprepared for what Sir John Simon, Mr. Runciman and Mr. Neville Chamberlain told him, although it followed logically from what Mr. MacDonald had said three weeks before. Nor was Mr. MacDonald's Guildhall speech the only guide to what was coming. The King's Speech (November 10th) contained the three key-phrases "balancing the national budget . . . confidence in our national stability . . . favourable balance of trade." Next Mr. Baldwin in the House of Commons (November 13th) stated: "We have to rely upon ourselves in these matters . . . the situation to-day, as far as the pound is concerned, depends and rests on the good faith of this country, and the faith of the world in the determination of the Government to go on on the path on which they have started, and not to rest until they have restored the balance of trade, secured the balanced budget, and brought the country into a position where its currency can be safely and securely stabilised." What could be clearer? The same speaker in the same speech further elaborated his points as "necessary conditions" before the pound could be stabilised. Mr. Neville Chamberlain, in answer to a question in the House of Commons on November 17th, said it all again. Yet M. Flandin had not grasped that the Government had any precise conditions for stabilisation.

Concurrently the Government made known its view about German reparation and its kindred problems. On November 9th Mr. MacDonald said: "No time has to be lost. A series of piecemeal and ephemeral compromises of a purely temporary nature will not meet the circumstances. A comprehensive and permanent settlement is now required." Mr. Baldwin, on November 13th, gave the

that the lesson is being brought home to all of us, a distracted and well-nigh desperate humanity cannot do better than pay attention to what is happening in Spain. The problem is first and last political: to organise the State so that it may be adequate for the new phase of the history of the Spanish people. It is necessary to say this because a good deal of uninformed criticism regarding the harsh treatment of the religious orders is, on that showing, wide of the mark.

Two books that have recently appeared in England give the clue to much that is puzzling in Spain's revolution. The first,* a sketch of the last hundred and twenty years of Spanish history, reveals the persistency with which the people of the towns have striven to burst the shackles of mediævalism. As Mr. McCabe dryly remarks: "It was not in England considered an impressive argument against Reform that the peasants did not desire it." So far from being the ephemeral achievement of a minority of "intellectuals" out of touch with the ordinary impulses of "the man in the street," the extirpation of absolutist rule and the dis-establishment of the Church represent the culmination of a century of Liberalism. Four times during the nineteenth century the religious orders were suppressed or their property confiscated, and always the Church lent itself to political reaction in the shape of the Bourbon monarchy to recover its wealth and power. For that "political" mistake it is now paying the penalty. The other book† is that masterly discussion of the genesis of the democratic idea which Mr. Leonard Woolf has initiated in his monster-study

Behind the political façade which was all that the outsider could see of contemporary Spain there had been going on for years a psychological shift which was bound sooner or later to be reflected in a new political matrix. The first shock to the nervous system was the Cuban disaster of 1898, the loss of Spain's last remaining colony, and it is quite right to date from that event the country's spiritual and economic resurgence. But some time had to elapse before the seed which was sown then could come to harvest. It needed another severe shock to the system for the new "communal psychology" to acquire form and substance. General Primo de Rivera, who typified the old world from which the nation was, dimly and semi-consciously, seeking to shake herself free, was all unwittingly the instrument of this historical process. Exactly as in eighteenth-century France, "the people" clung tenaciously to the idea that the Monarchy which was the fount of all power and

* *Spain in Revolt 1814-1931*. By Joseph McCabe. John Lane. 6s.
† *After the Deluge*. Vol. I. By Leonard Woolf. Hogarth Press. 15s.

blessings should be the instrument of transformation. It was only when each successive Bourbon showed himself unworthy of such hopes—Mr. McCabe's book reminds us incidentally that every one of Spain's sovereigns since the beginning of the nineteenth century, except Alfonso XII, who died before he was thirty, was sent packing by an exasperated nation—that a mature popular judgment was pronounced for the Republic. And the delay, in this case, has been most salutary. Full credit must be given to the wise, temperate and cultured leaders of Spain's revolution—affording the nearest approach so far to that government by historians for which Mr. Woolf goes bail—but the fact remains that they would not have been able to dismantle the old eighteenth-century State and erect in its place an efficient modern State unless the people as a whole were ready. Once again the percentage of illiteracy is shown to be a poor measure of a nation's common sense and intelligence.

The radical transformation which is now under way has to have—if Spain is to be true to herself—three main objects: to provide for an unimpeded flow of the nation's bloodstream through the arteries of local autonomy; to introduce such measures of social justice: land reform, monetary control and administrative equity, as may remove the discontents that everywhere invite the attention of Moscow; and, most urgent of all, to establish on firm foundations the "lay" State without doing violence to any activity of the spirit. In the light of this programme, what are the facts?

The Constituent Cortes that was elected at the end of June may be said to have run true to form. It was made up of some 130 Socialists, a slightly smaller number of Republicans of various shades, and a small group of Catholics and Regionalists. Not a single deputy was elected on the Alfonsist ticket—the Restoration issue simply does not arise—nor was there any Communist representation. If the new Spanish Constitution, on paper, leans rather more to the Left than prudence would seem to counsel, the fault lies with those conservative circles which made it a point of honour to boycott the elections when they realised that the cause of Monarchy was irretrievably lost. Faced by a Parliament in which the Socialists were a majority and which reflected unmistakably a nation's resolve to consummate the breach with the old order, the Prime Minister, Señor Alcalá Zamora, made haste to bury the draft constitution that had been elaborated by a committee of lawyers headed by Señor Angel Ossorio y Gallardo, Conservative Democrat—and Monarchist by conviction though sharing the common determination to have done with the House

further key thus: "London has been largely instrumental in financing Germany during the past ten years, thereby enabling her to carry on her international trade and to pay her reparations. These financial advances were not speculative, but represented the best type of security known to the market, and it is clear that the security for these obligations must not be endangered by political debts."

The only two points in the various London statements that made any initial impression on French opinion were those that postulated a permanent as distinct from another temporary reparation settlement and a safeguarding of the security of private as distinct from political German debt. In the French Chamber on November 26th, M. Laval, with the habitual confidence of French political dogma, thought to reject the London theses. "We will not accept," he said, "any new arrangement for reparation except for the period of general economic depression. . . . We will accept no reduction of what is due to us except in such measure as equivalent reductions (i.e. of the Inter-Allied Debt) are granted to us. . . . We will not consent to any priority of private debts over reparation."

The implication of that statement was a broadside Franco-British disagreement on two important issues, namely that of a temporary or a permanent reparation settlement and that of priority for the commercial or the reparation debt. In the matter of the debt the claim that political reparation should take precedence over the commercial debt was neither strictly logical nor businesslike; and a more immediate question was how Germany could be enabled to pay either. As a point, not of argument nor of precedence in obligation, but of simple finance, there would be no sense in conceding to political reparation a precedence over commercial debt. Reparation debt could not be paid unless Germany's credit were maintained. Her credit could not be maintained unless the service of the commercial debt were discharged.

Moreover, the *Stillhalte* arrangement for the commercial debts comes to an end in February next, and the moratorium for the reparation debt not till July; if any question of precedence should arise it could be settled *ex cathedra* on February 29th. If on that date the commercial creditors were to refuse an extension of the *Stillhalte*, the full capacity of Germany would automatically be hypothecated and there would be nothing left for France; but there would be no more sense in that proceeding than in the French.

Those, however, who best understand the methods of French diplomacy attached less importance to M. Laval's statement of November 26th than to the visit paid by M. Flandin to London two

days later. M. Flandin arrived at Victoria station at 9 o'clock on Saturday morning (November 28th), entered a waiting car and drove to the country for a day's shooting. In spite of M. Flandin's gun the informed people were aware that his arrival was part of a deliberate political plan. It was the second step in that plan. The first had been the establishment by the French Government (November 14th) of a prophylactic special tariff of 15 per cent. against British goods, a bargaining pawn posed in anticipation of other events. M. Flandin came to London to do the bargaining, that is to offer a remission of the 15 per cent. in return for a Franco-British commercial treaty giving special concessions to France. His further object was to urge the British Government quickly to stabilise the pound and to return to the gold standard, that object being suggested by the heavy loss sustained by the Bank of France in its holdings of sterling. The circumstantial pleasantry of his visit added a little innocent gaiety to what was otherwise an unprofitable week-end. The French Embassy in London proclaimed on November 28th that it knew nothing of M. Flandin's visit, except that he had come privately to see English friends, of whom he had many. The Foreign Office in London on that same day protested that they knew nothing about the matter. One can sympathise with M. Flandin's desire to achieve his object *in camera* before dilating on it in public. He duly dined with Sir John Simon, Mr. Neville Chamberlain and Mr. Runciman at the Metropole Hotel in London on Sunday, November 29th, having taken absurd precautions to keep secret the very name of the restaurant at which the talk was talked. The full pleasantry emerged on Monday, November 30th. It being a matter of obvious propriety that the official spokesmen should no longer be enjoined to pretend that M. Flandin had come to England merely to shoot game and to water rose-trees, when everybody knew precisely what other objects he had come for, it was decided by Whitehall to give out the official information that the statesmen had discussed "tariffs and the general European situation." Concurrently M. Flandin was telling the French Press that "tariffs had not been discussed." They who play at being mysterious should surely compare notes with each other.

Within a week the precise nature of what happened at the Metropole dinner became publicly known. M. Flandin announced the French intention of sending a commercial delegation to London on the following Monday (December 7th) under the possible command of the Minister of Commerce, M. Rollin himself. That was the third step in the French plan above referred to.

In answer to his plea that sterling forthwith be stabilised and restored to gold, he was informed by Sir John Simon, Mr. Chamber-

of Bourbon—and to instruct a Parliamentary Committee to produce an alternative draft. He also made an attempt, which was unavailing, to persuade the Cortes of the necessity to elect there and then a President of the Republic. For though the Provisional Government was now confirmed by a popular vote it still remained as unconstitutional and devoid of legal authority as any of its predecessors in the past eight years. And the antecedents of its members made it at least doubtful whether it would be able to take the strain of constitution-building.

In undertaking to stick together until the Constituent Cortes had done its job, indeed, the Alcalá Zamora Government had set itself an impossible task. The Prime Minister himself, and the able Home Minister, Miguel Maura, were both ex-Monarchists and practising Catholics, while two at least of their colleagues were famous for their unrelenting hostility to the Church. That in itself, it is important for us to realise, was no bar, since all were united in demanding a liberal and progressive policy in harmony with popular feeling. The divergence of views, within the conception of Liberalism, was seen in the relative value attached to the individual and the State respectively. This is an aspect of the Spanish situation which is of more than local significance. For the speeches made by Spain's political leaders in the debates on the Church question and the new structure of the State have been, as it were, a mirror reflecting the older traditional Liberalism and the new, the two leading, it was clear, to diametrically opposed results.

Six months to the day from its inception the first Government of the Spanish Republic broke up, but not before Señor Alcalá Zamora had made a gallant and partially successful attempt to abate his fellow-countrymen's anti-clerical zeal. Article 24 of the Constitution in its original form provided not merely for the disestablishment of the Church, which was a foregone conclusion, but also for expulsion of all the religious orders and confiscation of their property. It was in fact pure sectarianism taken over from France. And there was the strange spectacle of groups of Spanish women distributing leaflets and bills outside the Chamber not to the honour and glory of Catholic Spain, but inciting the Deputies to the most radical measures of Church expropriation.

The case for disestablishment was presented in eminently fair and reasonable terms by Señor Fernando de los Rios. Recognising that "our spiritual life is saturated with religious emotion," he argued that the effect of separation of Church and State would actually be a spiritual strengthening; and there are many knowing the retrograde condition of Roman Catholicism in Spain who would

agree with him. The special budget *del Culto y Clero*, from which some thirty-five thousand persons were drawing benefit, had since 1861, the year of the Concordat, paid out the sum of three thousand million pesetas, which was about three times the amount of principal and interest that "the Church" could with any justice claim by way of indemnity for previous spoliation. On that score, therefore, there could be no objection, and it was only right that henceforth churches and convents should be endowed and maintained by the faithful. The Government, he explained, did not propose to make an abrupt break, the usual subsidy should be "progressively abandoned" over a period of two years, to date from the complementary Statute on Church and State which was to be passed following upon the statement of principles in the Constitution. (In the event the Government has approved a 50 per cent. reduction of all endowments straightaway and has ceased to appoint to benefices as they fall vacant.) This speech enhanced the already considerable reputation of the Minister of Justice, a free-thinker who had earned the respect even of the Vatican in the prolonged negotiations that preceded the resignation of Cardinal Segura, the Primate. But it did not avail to stem the flood of recrimination. Anti-clerical bigotry was the dominant tone in the Chamber, encouraged by ugly manifestations that were reported from many a town and village. Señor Alcalá Zamora made an eloquent plea for a "formula of peace," but he was listened to in stony silence. Whereupon it became known that he and his fellow-Catholic, Señor Miguel Maura, intended to resign that night, since they could not be a party to such an infringement of freedom of conscience as was proposed in the text of the draft. There was, of course, no established procedure for replacing the Provisional Government, so that it looked as if the authority of the Cortes was to be fatally impaired.

It was at this juncture that Señor Azaña, the Minister of War, rose to speak. He insisted that the question at issue was not a religious one at all, they had only to recognise that henceforth the Church should be a private association like any other under the ægis of the State but enjoying no special protection, while with regard to the religious orders the need was for not an emotional but a realist policy. "Spain," he declared with a brutal frankness, "has ceased to be a Catholic country." There were the same reasons for such an assertion, he went on to argue, in the present year of grace as there had been for the title of Catholic Spain in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. At that time the social mould was indubitably Catholic, though there were a number of free-thinkers who were considered beyond the pale and whose

lain and Mr. Runciman that sterling would not be stabilised or restored to gold until the following three conditions had been fulfilled, namely: (1) Until the British trade balance had been restored; (2) until the reparation problem had been settled on a permanent basis; (3) until a guarantee had been given by the Bank of France that in the future gold would not be misused as an instrument against the stability of the pound, if and when restored to a gold basis.

To intelligent British students of affairs there was nothing new or surprising in such a statement of conditions. To M. Flandin it was apparently both new and surprising, for the reason that on the one hand, he had not paid attention to what had been said in London since November 9th, and on the other hand, had not yet shed the habit of assuming that British Governments would react in accordance with the French expectation.

While M. Flandin was in London the pound depreciated heavily in terms of francs. That was not surprising. During the past three years at every point in Franco-British relations where it was the French object to encourage Great Britain to do some particular thing, the French banks have sold sterling heavily in London. The most remarkable example was the first Hague Conference (August 1929) about the Young Plan. On the present occasion the French sale of sterling had no political effect, because the British Government had made up its mind to face a depreciation of the pound, and had decided on a policy towards France which was to be carried through whatever the consequences.

During the following week the House of Commons witnessed an impressive illustration of the change in British foreign policy. On Tuesday, December 1st, Mr. Runciman was asked "whether he would give an assurance that no preference would be granted to any foreign country until after the Imperial Conference." His laconic answer was, "Yes, Sir, I can give that assurance." On the following day Major Colville (Parliamentary Secretary to the Overseas Trade Department) made the fuller statement in answer to a similar question: "I can assure the House that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will enter into no engagements with foreign countries which would be likely to prejudice either the objects of the Abnormal Importations (Customs Duties) Act or any future arrangements with the rest of the Empire." On Friday, December 4th, Mr. Runciman made one of the most outspoken speeches on the subject of France that has been heard in the House of Commons on any diplomatic subject since the war. He first rebutted the current French pretension that the 15 per cent. duty was a reprisal against the British tariffs. The French decree, he said, was published on November 14th, and, he was informed, had

received the official sanction before that date, whereas the earliest date on which the Government in this country announced its policy was November 16th. He then made this blunt statement: "The Government were naturally amazed to find that under the French decree we were not receiving most-favoured-nation treatment, for although there is no most-favoured-nation clause in existing treaties, we have throughout no less than two generations received such treatment." Representations made to the French Government on that subject had not yet, he said, been answered. He went on to outline what may perhaps be called a diplomatic protectionist policy. Referring to the "increasing circle of tariffs" which shut out British goods, he declared that "the Government has found every appeal made to them [i.e. to the countries which shut out British goods and which had signed, but not honoured, the Geneva resolutions about tariffs] to be in vain. We have found our protests met with exactly the same reply that I make this afternoon, namely that the internal interests of the particular country must be the first consideration. We are finding that the method of persuasion is useless, and we are making no progress. I wish it to be clearly understood abroad, as well as at home, that if we are to be hit as we have recently been hit by the French decree we cannot ignore the action taken."

On the same day, speaking at the annual dinner of the Newport (Mon.) Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Chamberlain was equally outspoken on what may be called the diplomatic aspect of the pound: "I see no reason why depreciation of the value in sterling should be substantial or prolonged, but this I must say—that in my judgment there is one thing which would do more than anything else to remove this feeling of nervousness and anxiety which is now spread so widely over the world, and that would be a satisfactory settlement of reparation—a settlement, that is, which could restore confidence in the financial stability of Germany and of her capacity to meet her commercial obligations. I hope that at that international conference which will probably take place to consider this subject in the early part of next year, and in which the British Government will take its part, I hope such a settlement may be found. In the meantime let us not forget that a great part of the world looks up to this country to show cool heads and steady nerves."

The immediate practical effect of the Colville-Runciman-Chamberlain statements was that the French trade delegation decided not to come to London on Monday, December 7th. Instead, on Saturday, December 5th, M. Rollin made a public statement, in the course of which he declared: "If things remain as they are our trade balance will show a deficit of several hundred

conscience was trampled upon. To-day the position was reversed, there were millions of Catholics in Spain, but, all the same, the dominant tone and the trend of Spanish culture was no longer religious in the Catholic sense. (It is interesting to recall that some fifteen years ago a Catholic paper, the *Correo español*, estimated that only one and a half million men were still practising Catholics, though five or six times as many women.) That being so, Señor Azaña went on, as a realist he could not admit that children should be taught in the schools according to doctrines which were at odds with the conditions of modern life, it was as if professors of science should continue to give instruction in pre-Copernican astronomy! Therefore, though the charge might be made that the freedom of the Christian conscience was being violated, it was absolutely essential that the prohibition of ecclesiastics from engaging in industry and trade should also be extended to teaching. No realist, on the other hand, he continued, could favour a wholesale exclusion of religious communities; monks and nuns wedded to the contemplative life or occupied in the confection of sweetmeats were hardly fair game for anti-clerical sharpshooters. He would have no compunction, however, in suppressing any association, religious or otherwise, likely to endanger the safety and stability of the State. The criterion, he did not mind admitting, must be *temerosidad* (apprehensiveness)—in other words not so much whether any specific religious order was subversive to the Republic as whether it was generally feared and believed to be so. Indeed, the visitor to Spain who moves in any but the most devout circles cannot but be struck by the fierce resentment that is reserved for the powerful and very wealthy Jesuit community. (The Jesuits are said to own one-third of the country's wealth and to possess business interests totalling some sixty million pounds.)

The foreigner is not in a position to say whether this casting of the Jesuits for the rôle of the villain of the piece is entirely justified. At any rate, Señor Azaña's "realism" expressed exactly what a majority of the Chamber felt to be necessary. A new formula was put forward providing for strict control of the religious orders but the expulsion only of any that took temporal vows other than the ordinary oath of allegiance to the State (by inference the Jesuits) or was a menace to the security of the State, and, despite determined resistance from the small Catholic group, the modified Article 24 was passed by the Cortes. Señor Azaña, though belonging to only a minor group in the Chamber, had marked himself out as the man of the hour, and when the senior Minister, Señor Lerroux, handed in the resignation of the whole

Government to the President of the Chamber, the latter at once called upon Señor Azaña to take the helm. Foreign observers were duly impressed by this instant solution of the Spanish Republic's first Ministerial crisis.

I have dwelt at some length on the "Church and State" debate because it is by far the most significant episode under the new régime. And the decision with regard to the Jesuits is not likely to be reversed. By consenting to stand as President of the Republic, Señor Alcalá Zamora has already gone back on his intention of leading the Progressive party in a movement for reforming the Constitution in this particular, and although Señor Maura is sticking to his guns, pointing out that the State cannot possibly find the funds for education of the 1,200,000 children that hitherto have been taught by ecclesiastics, the apathy of the conservative classes is such that he will not make much headway. Where their property is likely to be affected, on the other hand, he may succeed in arousing a formidable Opposition to the Left tendency of the first Cortes.

It is true that the Constitution bears the imprint of Socialist thought. It includes a provision that natural sources of wealth belong to the nation, that public services may be nationalised and the State may intervene in the working and organisation of industry, where the interests of the national economy require it. As long as they were able to insert the thin end of the wedge with this principle of "socialisation," however—which indeed is accepted to-day by large numbers of Liberals—the Socialist leaders are not anxious for power. It says much for their high level of culture, and control over the rank and file, that they should refuse to hold office as soon as the Constitution and accompanying Statutes are voted, and be content to continue their work of educating opinion, constituting, as it were, a reserve of strength for the young Republic. Their attitude is that the industrial and economic backwardness of the country imperatively demands a phase of development through bourgeois capitalism.

There is, of course, also the question of expediency. As the sporadic disturbances during the summer made clear, the Republic has only served to accentuate the bitter rivalry for the allegiance of the masses between the (Socialist) General Union of Workers and Syndicalism *redivivus*, with its headquarters in Catalonia. The wilder and more anarchical elements of the latter had no difficulty in exploiting the economic distress in Andalusia, made more acute by the drought, not with any particular object in view but as a means of holding the new régime to ransom and weakening the Union's position in the eyes of the workers. The

million francs, making a comparison only between the two metropolitan countries. . . . It has been stated that the British Government does not propose to alter its tariffs before the Imperial Conference in July. It would be to the general interest, however, to change the present state of affairs as soon as possible. If it continues, it will do irreparable damage to our agriculture and industry, to which we cannot remain indifferent. That is why we immediately suggested negotiations, convinced that the economic relations between our two great countries ought in their common interest to be established on a basis of equity and reciprocity. These negotiations, carried on in the friendly spirit of which we gave a proof quite recently, could not fail to remove any misunderstandings that may exist and lead to an agreement which we earnestly desire."

During the following week the exact nature of the losses suffered by the Bank of France as a result of sterling depreciation was indirectly disclosed in the French Chamber. The Bank's holding of sterling was given at £62,000,000. Since September 21st, therefore, when sterling went off gold, the paper loss amounted to some Francs 2,500,000,000. Now the total subscribed capital and reserves of the Bank of France amount only to Francs 481,000,000. If, therefore, its sterling balances were transferred to Paris, that is if the loss were realised, the Bank of France would be bankrupt. The French Government decided to help the Bank to dress its window, and promptly in the second week of December introduced a Bill whereby it would give to the Bank a bond equal to the amount of the losses, the bond to be later exchanged for negotiable bonds of the sinking fund administration. Now in bad times, as in Shakespearian tragedy, humour has its uses. The sterling balances of the Bank of France have been the regular weapon used to damage sterling in the supposed interests of French diplomacy. The weapon has succeeded to such an extent that sterling has been driven from gold, but the weapon is thereby revealed as a boomerang, likely to do more damage (witness M. Rollin), in the return than in the outward flight. But the real humour of the situation is to be found in the preamble of the 15 per cent. anti-British tariff of November 14th. The specific purpose of that impost is there represented as compensation for losses resulting from depreciated currency. On the pure ground of logic, sterling is not a depreciated currency so far as France is concerned. The franc being depreciated in terms of gold by 80 per cent. and the pound on the same criterion by some 30 per cent., a net depreciation is established of 50 per cent., not on the British, but on the French side of the Channel. Pure logic may not be amusing from any point of view; but a certain innocent recreation may in present circum-

stances be derived from a re-reading of the "Correspondence respecting the Position of British Holders of French Rentes issued in the United Kingdom in 1915-18" (British White Paper, France No. 1, 1931, Cmd. 3779. See THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, March 1931, pp. 373-9). One does not know, because history does not tell, what precisely Mr. Chamberlain said to M. Flandin in the Hotel Metropole on November 29th; but, if he had been in a jolly mood, he could have quoted, *mutatis quibusdam mutandis*, the letter of the French Government of January 17th, 1931, to the British Government: ". . . Now the determination both of the financial policy of a State, so long as that policy is not disputed on grounds of law, and of any measure of equity which it may be considered proper to take in connection with that policy, is entirely a matter for the State in question. . . . The Government of the Republic need not repeat that they regret the losses suffered by those of the British bondholders who were original subscribers to the French loans and had no idea of speculation. They feel themselves, however, in no way responsible for these losses. The state of affairs, from which the French bondholders suffer as well as the British bondholders, is due to general causes, before which the whole French nation, much against its will, has had finally to bow."

The interest attaching to the extent to which Great Britain has "remitted" war debt is academic, perhaps morbid; for the effects will remain with us for ever, and nothing will diminish them. Yet the public concern about such things (which in 1925, when it might have frightened Mr. Churchill from his acquiescence in the Caillaux and Volpi pretensions, could not be excited) cannot now be allayed, when it is powerless to do any good. On November 19th a question in the House of Commons extorted from Mr. Chamberlain the melancholy epitaph to the Balfour principle. He stated that the total amount of the payments to the United States Government on account of the British War debt to date was £326,200,000, and the total amount received by this country on account of Allied War debts to date £71,275,000.

Less striking, because stated in a severely technical way, was the further reflection drawn from Mr. Chamberlain by a question in the House on December 3rd. "The agreements," he said, "for the funding of the Italian and French War debts were signed on January 27th, 1926, and July 16th, 1926, respectively. The net amounts of the Italian and French War debts as at the date of funding were £560,000,000 and £600,000,000 respectively. The detailed terms of the settlements are given in Command Papers 2380 and 2692 of 1926. The sums advanced to France and Italy were, of course, borrowed by the British Government and constitute part of our War debt. The average cost of borrowing during the

Syndicalists are in a particularly strong position owing to their part in placing Colonel Macià in power as the spokesman of an independent Catalan Republic. When the question of the control of labour and employment came up in the Cortes the Socialist claim that this was essentially a matter for the Central Government was met by a firm *non possumus* on the part of the Catalan Deputies, and the deadlock was only resolved by a happy intervention of Señor Alcalá Zamora with the suggestion that though the legislation on labour matters must be uniform throughout the country, its application might well be left to the autonomous regions.

For "autonomous regions" there are to be, some day, somehow, with Catalonia naturally leading the way, and the fact that the door has been left open for this essentially Spanish development away from the French model of a unitary State is perhaps the most gratifying feature of the new régime. Everyone predicted a grim struggle between partisans of the unitary and of the federal State structure, such as was a powerful factor in the disintegration of Spain's First Republic. But although there are bound to be minor problems in this connection, moderation and common sense have strikingly prevailed, in Catalonia no less than in the Cortes. "The Spanish Republic is an integral State of federative tendencies"—so runs the formula of definition in Chapter I of the Constitution, and it exactly fits the situation. Catalonia alone is ripe for any real measure of autonomy, and there is no question but that her Statute will be approved in Madrid without much trouble. The other Regions on the other hand, Galicia, Basque Provinces, Andalusia, and possibly the Eastern districts, Valencia, etc., will be given time to develop a robust natural constitution suitable to be reflected in a charter of regional autonomy. The mere fact that it is possible to write an article about Spain to-day without setting "the Catalan problem" in the foreground is a measure of the magical transformation that has taken place in the Republic's first nine months of life.

While in most countries at the present time men's energies are being consumed in a negative and vain national effort to repair the havoc wrought by nationalism, in Spain they are making history. It is easy enough to make the criticism that they are straying too far along the path of reaction from the old order. Señor Estelrich, a Catalan Deputy and one of the most cultivated of leading Spaniards, has formulated the obvious criticism in saying, as he did the other day: "We must have done with abstract language and the prejudices of dead history, we are still slaves of the theological mentality applied to politics, clinging to myths

like 'national sovereignty,' *raison d'état*, etc." But since the majority of people in every country are victims of the same "theological mentality," there is no warrant for us to sit in our glass houses and throw stones. With this reservation, namely that the fetish of the State is receiving perhaps an exaggerated deference, I should be disposed to endorse the judgment expressed by Mr. Sisley Huddleston after a visit to Spain in July, that "Spain is the one bright spot in Europe." Students of the political process can see there growing up under their eyes the framework of a modern constitution which is something more than a simulacrum of democracy. Let us hope that the example will not be lost and that it may dispel once and for all any idea that intellectual ability and personal integrity are necessarily disadvantages in a politician.

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

December 5th.

War was over 5 per cent.; and on this basis the funding agreements represent a remission of 62 per cent. of the French War debt and 66 per cent. of the Italian War debt, and the British taxpayer has been left to bear an equivalent proportion of the charge involved by these War borrowings."

In terms of income-tax the service of that block of War loan raised in this country to lend to France will cost the British taxpayer 7d. in the pound in income-tax for ever (for the capital liability remains with the British Government, and although a conversion operation on a substantial scale might pass some of it on to unborn generations thousands of years hence, redemption would only shift the present burden to another part of present shoulders). By the French funding agreement the French taxpayer undertook to pay between 2d. and 2½d. in the pound of that burden. Moreover, on the one hand it is reasonably certain that the British Government will never default in the payment of the interest on "War Fives." It is perhaps not so certain that the French Government will continue for two generations to transmit to London the one-third part of the burden accepted by France. Even at this moment the nations are being driven to a general cancellation of all political debts. If that should happen it would have many good effects, but it would not relieve the British taxpayer from any part of his present burden.

What is more exciting is the continuing story of the French sterling balances in London. Popular opinion, even the opinion of the House of Commons, is so ignorant in these matters that on December 10th Mr. Chamberlain quite solemnly made this statement: "There no doubt have been withdrawals from this country of balances held by foreign holders. I should like to say in this connection that, although I have seen rumours or statements to the contrary, those withdrawals have not been made either by the French Government or by the Bank of France. They have, on the contrary, left their balances here undisturbed. . . ."

Of course. It could not be otherwise. The fact that it could not be otherwise is one of the pleasant freaks of the fatal dispensation. Over a number of years the diplomatic use of the French sterling balances had taken the technical form of selling them in exchange for francs, with the resultant depression of the pound below gold export point to France, and the steady drain of gold from London to Paris. It was a short-sighted exercise of power on the part of France. The bottomless long suffering of the City of London was taken too much for granted. On September 21st, without any preliminary squeal, without warning, London slid off gold. In the resultant universal surprise, discomfort and apprehension, the precise effect on the French sterling balances

was overlooked. Those balances were left undisturbed in London for the simple reason that the alternative was their realisation at a capital loss of at least 25 per cent. And what then? Assuming that the Bank of France were to be saved from formal bankruptcy by the French Government, the proceeds of the sterling realisation could not any longer be used to drain gold from London. They could be used only for investment. The London bank rate went up to 6 per cent. on the very day of the divorce from gold (September 21st). The obvious alternative field for investment was the New York short market, but the conditions there were measured by the fact that the Federal Reserve bank rate was only 1½ per cent. In other words, the only alternative the Bank of France had to leaving its sterling balances in London was to realise them at a loss of at least 25 per cent. (which would essentially cripple the Bank of France, even though its Government might artificially save it from bankruptcy) and to reinvest the proceeds at less than 1 per cent. on the diminished capital instead of at more than 4 per cent. on the undiminished nominal capital. Naturally, therefore, the French balances were not removed from London.

It has been observed in more than one field of diplomatic controversy since the war that when French diplomacy has recognised its cause to be hopeless it has performed a lightning *volte-face* and taken the lead in a very opposite cause. Although, therefore, up to the time when these lines were written French diplomacy showed no sign of weakening in its insistence upon all the hopeless causes, item, the destruction of Germany, item (inconsistently) the exaction of political reparation from Germany, item, the progressive increase in French armaments and the sabotage of the disarmament conference, yet the possibility was alive in the minds of experienced students that the almost accomplished fact of French isolation in the world might induce another *volte-face*, with the result that at the eleventh hour MM. Laval and Flandin might emerge in the rôle of saviours of Germany and pioneers of world disarmament.

On December 2nd Mr. MacDonald announced in the House of Commons that the British Delegation to the disarmament conference would have as its chief members: himself, Sir John Simon, Mr. J. H. Thomas, the Secretaries of State for War and Air (Lord Hailsham and Lord Londonderry), and the First Lord of the Admiralty (Sir B. Eyres Monsell). A strong delegation, indicative of the radical importance attached to the conference by the British Government. Indeed the general lines of the Government's policy for the two conferences due to meet early in the New Year (the two being regarded as aspects of one single enterprise) could be

EGYPT: CRISIS AND CAPITULATIONS.

ALTHOUGH Egypt is a country of great natural wealth, with a remarkable recuperative power, she is suffering very severely from the effects of the world economic crisis; and is being further dragged down by the privileges to foreigners arising out of the Capitulations, which hang like a millstone round her neck. The fact, however, that the Egyptians are at present confronted with a serious economic crisis of their own may prove to be to their advantage; for it seems that, in these days, crisis is an essential preliminary to salutary action. But one may well ask whether there is any advantage to be gained by letting the Egyptians shiver on the brink of national disaster before taking the necessary action to relieve them of unnecessary burdens—relics of the Middle Ages—which are entirely unjustified under the conditions prevailing in Egypt of the twentieth century, and have long been the greatest obstacle to Egyptian progress.

The present slump in Egyptian cotton, due to over-production, the reaction of the prevailing world depression on the cotton markets of India, Russia and China, and the formidable increase in this year's American cotton crop, has created a serious situation for all sections of the Egyptian people. Not only are proprietors and peasants suffering severely from the low prices obtained for Egypt's main source of wealth, but lack of money in the country is also hitting merchants and traders, and has become a matter of serious embarrassment to the Egyptian Government. Also, as the cotton slump is accompanied by a consequent fall in the value of land, the situation is doubly serious for both Government and people. With the fall in cotton prices, land values fell from £.E.200 per acre to £.E.60-70, and those who had borrowed from the banks were unable to pay their instalments and interest. It has been customary to advance up to one-half of the value of land, but with land values reduced by more than one-half the banks have been selling at a loss while proprietors have been losing heavily. As this economic evil rapidly assumed large proportions, the time soon arrived when Government intervention became necessary. Nahas Pasha used half the nation's reserve capital to buy up a vast supply of cotton at higher than market price. The result of this foolish policy was merely to depress still further the price of cotton, and at the same time seriously to compromise the prospects of the national budget; and, as these wholesale purchases were made at a time when the cotton was in the hands of speculators, there was no benefit whatever to the *fellahin* who were the chief sufferers.

The Government of Sidky Pasha, on the other hand, is wisely

attempting to mitigate the cotton as well as the land problem by the formation of a new Agricultural Bank with two million pounds capital, half subscribed by the Government and half by the banks and other similar institutions. The object of this new bank is to meet such financial and agricultural needs as cannot at present be satisfied by the financial institutions already existing in the country. The bank supplies agricultural credits, and deals chiefly with advances for cultivation and crops; advances on the crops themselves; the sale of seed and manure to cultivators; and long-term loans for the purchase of agricultural machinery and live stock, and for the improvement of agricultural land by the construction of canals and drains. In all but exceptional cases such loans are limited to small proprietors, groups of small proprietors or co-operative societies, in order to encourage their formation and development; but the most important feature of this policy is the measures taken to prevent the dispossession of proprietors. In order to meet this threatening calamity, Sidky Pasha has entrusted the Agricultural Bank with the task of watching all developments in land transactions and, where necessary, to intervene on behalf of the proprietors. For this purpose the Government have allocated about £.E.2,000,000 from the General Reserve, so that the Bank may in special cases take the place of creditors who threaten the maintenance of ownership in the hands of the cultivators. By this means the banks are safeguarded, while the proprietors are enabled to wait for a rise in cotton and land values. But, in order to safeguard the Government and the Agricultural Bank from possible heavy losses arising out of this generous policy, the greatest care has to be exercised in selecting cases for intervention, while the value of land for cultivation and the integrity of proprietors call for serious investigation.

As result of the foregoing situation the question of balancing the Budget is again causing serious anxiety to the Prime Minister. Last year Sidky Pasha succeeded in showing a small surplus by means of a skilfully devised economy campaign penetrating into every corner of the Government service together with an increase in the import duties. Fortunately, the increase in the customs revenue has been maintained (estimated this year at 14 millions compared with 13 millions last year), due chiefly to the restoration of purchases from abroad after the lull caused by large purchases in anticipation of the increased duties. But this is a comparatively small proportion of the revenue required; and unless Sidky Pasha is to rely on indirect taxation and economy of expenditure for the balancing of the 1932-3 Budget, it looks as if the present economic distress will necessitate some radical change in the fiscal

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summarised thus: (1) the reparation settlement must be final and permanent; (2) the service of the commercial debt cannot be jeopardised by any absurd paper arrangement for the priority of the political debt; (3) there must be a satisfactory international currency agreement such as will enable the ^{world} to return to gold without a repetition of the danger that drove it ^{out} ^{under-} ^{taking} on the part of the Central Banks that gold reserves ^{will} be limited to an amount which will not interfere with the exchange function of gold; (4) there must be an honest, categorical and businesslike international agreement for the drastic and immediate reduction of all armaments, on land, on the sea and in the air, not as a result of any further compacts for "security," but as an end in itself and as an incidental means to such security.

(2) GERMANY.

The German contribution to the conference preliminaries was the direct result of the stranglehold of the German crisis at home. The only formal opportunity available to the Government for calling attention to the relation of the crisis with its external liabilities was to apply for the convocation by the Bank for International Settlements of the Special Advisory Committee provided for in the "Young" Plan signed at The Hague on January 20th, 1930. Certain prolonged consultations had taken place between Berlin and Paris, ostensibly for the purpose of discovering the correct procedure for Germany to adopt. There was no practical virtue in those consultations, for France at no point showed any inclination to approve of Germany's going beyond the juridical framework of the Plan, the point of the Plan's provision being that the Special Advisory Committee is expressly forbidden to deal with the "non-postponable" annuities, most of which go to France. The application to Basle was duly made on November 20th. Two days later the German debtor banks suggested to the creditor banks in New York, London, Paris and eight other capitals that negotiations begin in Berlin as soon as possible about what was to happen after the *Stillhalte* agreement came to an end on February 29th. Those creditor banks had informally agreed in advance to extend the *Stillhalte* after February 29th; in other words, had renounced what they knew they could not get; but it was necessary to arrive at some formal understanding, and to decide the length of the extension.

The text of the German memorandum invoking the Young Plan reached Basle on November 20th, and was communicated on that day to the various governments concerned. In it the German

Government made a survey of the precedent circumstances. "As early," it said, "as the beginning of June of this year the German Government had arrived at the conclusion that, in spite of the most rigorous reductions of State expenditure and repeated increases in the burden of taxation, they would be unable to continue the payment of the annuities of the New Plan. The economic and financial situation of Germany was most seriously endangered already at that date. The German Government had therefore decided to draw the necessary consequences from this situation." It then recapitulated the events that followed Mr. Hoover's moratorium proposal on June 21st, submitting that the main purposes of that proposal, the recapture of confidence and the averting of the danger of universal collapse, had not been achieved. "For this reason the British Government in July took the initiative of calling the London Conference. The recommendations of the Conference resulted in the prolongation of the rediscount credit granted to the Reichsbank, in the so-called Basle Standstill Agreement, and in the report of the Basle Committee of Experts nominated by the Bank for International Settlements." It then recalled the fact that the London Conference had been essentially "preparatory" in quality and that the Basle Expert Committee [the "Wiggin" Committee] had urged the governments to "lose no time in taking the necessary steps for bringing about such conditions as will allow financial transactions which will bring to Germany, and thereby to the world, the sorely-needed assistance." After explaining that the situation in Germany had since that time "reached a state of extreme tension" the Note continued: "Under the New Plan this application is conditional on a declaration of the German Government to the effect 'that they have come to the conclusion in good faith that Germany's exchange and economic life might be seriously endangered by the transfer in part or in full of the postponable portion of the annuities.' In making this declaration the German Government feel bound to state that a declaration in these terms does not in effect do justice to the actual position. Since the New Plan was conceived the economic and financial situation of the world, particularly in Germany, has been fundamentally altered by an unparalleled crisis. As the New Plan confers upon the Special Advisory Committee the task of considering the position from all points of view, the Committee must examine the problem as a whole, and with regard to all its contributory causes, and, in doing so, must particularly consider the fact that the question of Germany's private indebtedness has to be settled in due time, before the end of February next, by an agreement to be concluded between the foreign creditors and the German debtors."

conditions of Egypt. Increased revenue from direct taxation is impossible, as the only taxes of this nature are the land tax and the house tax, payable by Egyptians and foreigners alike, and the former has already reached a rate which cannot be increased without seriously affecting the country's primary source of wealth. Any other form of direct taxation, such as income tax, is still out of the question owing to the Capitulations by which no direct tax can be imposed on foreigners without the consent of all the Capitulatory Powers. Indeed, the liability of foreigners to pay even the taxes above mentioned was only approved by all the Powers after three years' protracted negotiations.

At present foreigners in Egypt pay the customs dues, house and land taxes, and the municipal dues in Alexandria; but the foreigners in question are neither landowners, nor do they often invest their money in land or house property. The consequence is that most foreigners pay no taxes at all except the customs dues; and the great merchants, bankers, heads of industry and wealthy shareholders pay nothing to the Egyptian Treasury although they share all the advantages of the administration. It is no exaggeration to say that it is possible for a foreign resident in Egypt to be a wealthy man all his life and to die a millionaire, and yet neither during his life nor at his death to contribute one single piastre towards the administration whose protection has safeguarded his wealth for him and his heirs. Hence the revenues of the Egyptian Government are derived, apart from the customs dues, mainly from the land tax, which means that it is chiefly the *fellah* who is paying for the upkeep of the state. It has constantly been urged that fiscal reform should be introduced, whereby some form of revenue tax could be established and paid by Egyptians and foreigners alike, so that the land tax could be reduced at least for the smaller proprietors; but the introduction of such a tax on foreigners would involve negotiation with eleven Powers, and the dissent of one of them, with or without reason, would be quite sufficient to wreck the whole project. Yet in view of the present economic distress in the country, and the consequent difficulty in finding means to balance the forthcoming Budget, it looks as if the Egyptian Government will be compelled to seek negotiations with the Powers for a direct tax on the foreign communities, which form by far the greater part of the commercial and industrial population. Although these communities have greatly contributed to the progress and prosperity of Egypt, there is no justifiable reason why they should not also contribute to the financial security of the country which has provided them with the opportunity and means of accumulating wealth. Meanwhile economy and indirect taxation are the only means at present

available for balancing the Budget. Sidky Pasha can be relied upon from the economy standpoint, while he has already taken measures to impose duties on foreign flour, fruit, vegetables and sugar which, besides being sources of revenue, are to some extent compensating the *fellahin* for their losses in cotton. The area of land under water-melon is twice what it was last year, a stimulus has been given to wheat growing as a substitute for cotton, and the duty on foreign sugar has brought prosperity to the *fellahin* of Upper Egypt as well as to tens of thousands of workers in the sugar factories. But as long as the Egyptian Government is crippled in its powers of taxation by privileges to foreigners, which in justice limits the extent to which Egyptians can be taxed, the country is not in a position adequately to deal with the formidable situation with which it is confronted. The Egyptians have patiently borne this burden of injustice long beyond the time when these privileges became obsolete and unjustifiable; but now the critical hour has struck when the effects of the world economic crisis demand that relief should be applied without delay, so that Egypt may enjoy the freedom of other independent nations to overcome her economic difficulties by the ordinary recognised fiscal methods. What would have been the position of Mr. (now Lord) Snowden in September last, if he had been forced to balance his Emergency Budget without resorting to direct taxation?

Egypt is to-day the only remaining country in the world to be hampered by such restrictive bonds. Japan, Turkey,* Persia, China, Siam and other countries which once laboured under similar disadvantages have all been relieved of their burdens. There was even a time during the Middle Ages when foreigners in England enjoyed privileges of trade, as well as immunity from taxation and from the local law of the land. When, however, England further developed her national sense and began to resent such interference, the Livery Companies and the merchant adventurers of the Chartered Companies gradually assumed the responsibility for trade in succession to the privileged Hanseatic merchants and Lombard bankers. During the fourteenth century there was a strong feeling in this country against foreigners, who were under the special protection of the Crown and enjoyed such privileges as to enable them to conduct almost the entire foreign trade of the country, and such is the position in Egypt to-day.

The Capitulations are derived from charters of immunity granted in ancient times by the Turkish Sultans to the subjects of Christian Powers established in or trading with the Ottoman

* Turkey renounced the Capitulations at the outbreak of the Great War; but in Egypt, which then ceased to form part of the Ottoman Empire, these privileges continued.

last is likely to be relieved by the discovery that a British Government has again risen as a factor in diplomacy. Herr Hitler himself sees that point, and is engaged in a race with international common sense for the capture of German support. His ally is M. Flandin, although M. Flandin seems not yet to have suspected so obvious, but ironic, a fact. One of the incidental objects of the New Year conferences will be the salvation of Dr. Brüning for Germany. The French belief, sincere as it is in the minds of many Frenchmen, that Germany is exaggerating her difficulties in a blackmailing spirit, does not stand the test of the facts.

The "Fourth Emergency Decree of the President of the Reich for securing the national economy and finances and preserving the public peace," signed by President von Hindenburg on December 8th, was as drastic a national imposition as one's imagination could encompass. Such things result from extreme necessity. The decree still further reduced prices, railway freights, wages, official salaries, interest rates on mortgages and the like. Post-war German mortgages have been so much in request, as a result of financial stringency, that a usual interest rate has been as high as 12 per cent. This winter, when the interest could not be paid, the mortgagee has found the security itself almost valueless, for the property could not be sold. The decree further increased the turnover tax, the last remaining reservoir of revenue. At the same time it threw down the gauntlet to the extremists of both ends, by prohibiting the wearing of political uniforms or badges and the carrying of arms. That decree was Dr. Brüning's last resource for carrying Germany through the critical two and a half months ahead.

The Basle organisation lost no time in acting on the German application. The Advisory Committee met in that town on December 7th, being constituted thus: Great Britain, Sir Walter Layton; Germany, Dr. Melchior; France, M. Rist, of the Bank of France; United States, Mr. Stewart; Belgium, M. Francqui; Italy, Prof. Benaduce; Japan, Mr. Tanaka.

Little purpose would be served by attempting to indicate the detail of its investigation into Germany's financial position and her ability to resume reparation payment. The essential facts of the matter had been investigated and reported on *ad nauseam*. The interesting and substantial purpose was to prepare the way for the meeting of the international financial conference, the urgent need being that it finish its own labours soon so that the conference could meet early in the New Year.

December 14th, 1931.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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A GHOST STORY.

THE news that Canon Snatchett had been appointed Dean of Wiltchester created great interest both at Oxford and in the diocese. His ripe scholarship was respected in the elder university and his great humanity had for years been known in Wiltchester. He was duly feasted in his college hall and amused the dons with his stories of Wiltchester cathedral and indeed of the Bishop himself. He was warmly welcomed by the Canons of Wiltchester and was entertained by the Bishop, who asked down all sorts of people to meet the man who represented all the humanities. Among them was an old friend, Mr. Geoffrey Leader, a barrister of great repute, a mediæval historian as well as lawyer, a judge of old wine as well as of old causes. Geoffrey Leader was, so to speak, young except in the harmless guile of his profession, and his youthfulness, as indeed the youthfulness and grace of his wife, had long attracted Dr. Snatchett, who believed that youth and beauty are the things that matter most in a sad world. The Bishop's dinner was given in the Christmas season and the Dean had asked Geoffrey and his wife to stay on with Mrs. Snatchett and himself for a few days in the Christmas vacation. They had gladly accepted. There was an air of mingled sanctity and mystery about the Dean's house which attracted this pleasant couple.

At the episcopal dinner one thing happened that led to a whole heap of other things. The Bishop, despite his great earnestness

Empire, including Egypt. At that time no Christian could enter Moslem territory without special permission, which could only be granted for a few months; and if anyone holding such a permit overstayed the allotted time, he lost his nationality and became a local subject liable to all taxes. Private international law did not then exist in the Ottoman Empire, foreign law was unknown, and no state took any legal account of foreigners. Hence the privileges of the early Capitulations were essential to commerce, and were certainly beneficial to those who granted them as well as to the foreign merchants. The more important of these privileges were the right to enter and leave Ottoman territory; to reside or travel therein and freely to conduct business without incurring liability to taxation other than customs dues; the free exercise of religion; and the right of a foreign resident or traveller to be subject to the laws of his own country. A logical outcome of these privileges was the appointment of foreign consuls, whose powers were gradually extended as small bands of traders developed into large resident communities enjoying almost complete immunity from local justice, legislation and taxation, and practically constituting states within a state. Then, as the power of the Ottoman Empire grew weaker and that of the Christian Powers became stronger, these privileges developed into rights, and in Egypt they were exploited to suit the convenience of unscrupulous foreigners and to safeguard the deeds of criminal Europeans. Whereas the Capitulations were originally intended to protect the interests of the European communities against the despotic power of Oriental rule, they eventually became a ready means by which foreign governments could interfere with Egyptian administration, and by which criminals could escape the attentions of the Egyptian police. If these relics of a bygone age served a useful purpose before Mehemet Ali became the founder of Modern Egypt, they have since steadily decreased in utility and increased in their capacity to obstruct the prosperity and progress of the Egyptian people.

Although immunity from taxation is the feature of the Capitulations with which this article is chiefly concerned, there are others which equally well disclose the nature of these privileges, and of the almost unbelievable way in which they have been, and still are, exploited. The Egyptian Government must obtain the consent of all the Capitulatory Powers before promulgating legislation applicable to foreigners; and there are certain offences, such as the adulteration of foodstuffs so as to make them injurious, which are punishable by three or four years' hard labour if committed by Egyptians, but which are only regarded as simple contraventions, punishable by a fine of £.E.1 or seven days'

imprisonment, if committed by foreigners. In the case of criminal offences, foreigners are subject only to the jurisdiction of Consular Courts, which apply their own national laws. As each of these Courts has its own code, its own procedure, and its own laws of evidence, there is little consistency in the justice administered, giving rise to outrageous scandals. About three years ago a Cairo merchant was murdered at his home, in one of the most fashionable quarters of the capital. Three ruffians, one Egyptian and two foreigners, were found guilty of this crime. Three distinct inquiries were conducted, one by the Egyptian police and the Egyptian Parquet, the second by the Italian Consular Court, and the third by the Greek Consular Court, at each of which witnesses were heard. Then additional inquiries were conducted by the legal authorities in Athens and Rome respectively. As a result of all this, the Egyptian, who was not the chief offender, was condemned to death and hanged less than six months after the crime had been committed. The other two men, who were tried in Egypt by their Consular Courts and finally appealed, one to Athens and the other to Rome, only got penal servitude; and this miscarriage of justice caused great resentment throughout Egypt. Another injustice lies in foreign immunity from police action. The Egyptian police cannot violate the domicile of a foreigner except in the presence of a delegate of his Consul, which leads to grave abuses.* Among the foreign communities in large towns like Alexandria, there are always a number of natives who succeed in acquiring the same rights of protection as those enjoyed by genuine residents of foreign nationality, and amongst these are to be found undesirable Levantines who use the Capitulations to defeat the law of the land and to escape punishment. They lend their foreign names to their Egyptian collaborators, who also shelter themselves behind privileges to which they have no possible right, so that opium dens, brothels, and kindred institutions often thrive with impunity, not only under foreign management, but even to the profit of Egyptians themselves. And when police action is taken, the formalities are so many and the time taken to comply with them is so long that the delinquents have "cleared" long before the Consular procession arrives.

But one of the gravest abuses of the capitulatory privileges lies in the fact that foreign criminals are not only tried in special courts but are imprisoned in special departments of the prisons, where they enjoy much greater comfort than their Egyptian fellow-prisoners, regardless of the fact that in many cases these delinquents belong to races considerably less civilised than the people of Egypt. If these foreign prisoners were British, French,

* The same applies to foreign ships in Egyptian ports.

in matters of education and social reform, had serene gifts in the choice of excellent wines, superb glass and porcelain and amazing stories. His ghost stories attracted Dr. Snatchett in a curious way. The old gentleman, during a recital of some story by the bachelor Bishop, would hold a priceless wineglass half full of 1847 port—almost the last of it in the land—at a dangerous angle over the polished mahogany table and would thrust his face forward to drink in the Bishop's words. Geoffrey Leader and the other guests were so attracted by his earnest attention that the story itself in some cases was obscured. That night the Bishop told the well-known story of the recovered half-crown, a story that he had told times without number to many of the Common Rooms in both Universities. On a certain December evening when he was first appointed to the diocese he went in his car to visit a very lonely rectory. He did not know the way exactly and he was relieved to see in the distance a great house brilliantly lit up where he could inquire. He drove up, called at the house, was graciously received by a superb butler who gave the necessary information and the Bishop in return gave the butler the necessary half-crown. The Bishop paid his visit to the rectory and returned. The next day he related the incident to a friend, who was very startled. There is no such house, he explained, it was burned down years ago. The Bishop laughed and suggested that they should revisit the house. His friend was right. It was a wreck, dropping to pieces. On the front door step the Bishop found his half-crown. The whole party shuddered at the story, but Dr. Snatchett, at last finishing his glass of port, said, with an inimitable shrug of the shoulders, "Yes, I know the house, I know the butler. It was what is called an unlucky house. The butler poisoned the whole staff (including the gardeners) and burned down the house. The owner and his family were away at the time. I remember the butler well. A magnificent looking fellow, a man of action with grey whiskers and a beak of a nose." "Yes," said the Bishop, "so he appeared to me. Did he escape?" "Yes and no," said the Dean; "he is seen sometimes." "I certainly saw him," said the Bishop, "but he didn't take my half-crown. What did you mean by saying that King's Hollow was an unlucky house?" "Well," said the Dean meditatively, placing his renewed glass against the light and admiring the colour of the wine that was garnered before the Year of Revolutions, "it is a long story which I will tell you when you join my dinner party on New Year's Eve. But I don't mind telling you now that it was a very good thing that King's Hollow was burnt down. It had done a lot of harm in its time, it and its infernal butler." "But I thought it was a very old house," said Geoffrey. "So it was, but it always, had

the same butler, Miles Crow, since it was built in the reign of James I." "What do you mean?" said Geoffrey Leader. "He is out of a job at the moment," said the Dean grimly, "Would you like to employ him? An excellent butler, but one that Wiltchester would be glad to get rid of." So the party adjourned full of thought and disliking Miles Crow intensely.

* * * *

Somewhat late on a frosty afternoon the Bishop and Geoffrey Leader went for a long walk with, among other things, the intention of visiting the site of King's Hollow. The lawyer paid little attention to the grim hints of the Dean or the suggestion that Miles the butler was still in being. Indeed, he doubted the story of the wholesale murder as narrated by Dr. Snatchett. It was obviously not first-hand, and the Dean as a witness lacked credibility and even plausibility. Geoffrey was fond of the Dean, who had been a Don in his college when he was in residence and was in fact his godfather, but he regarded him as "a rum bird," and was always in doubt whether he was taking his friends in or whether he was taking himself in. On the other hand the evidence of the Bishop was simple and straightforward. He had no doubt that King's Hollow was inhabited at that time, and he certainly found his half-crown which he had given to a veritable butler. The only point in common between the Dean and the Bishop was in the fact that when the Dean described the butler the Bishop at once recognised the man. The barrister, in talking to the Bishop on their walk, cross-examined him keenly on this point and the witness had no doubt at all. The Dean had described the clothes, the manner, the appearance and the facial characteristics of the butler, and the Bishop was absolutely certain of the identity. "How could I be mistaken?" he said simply. "There was a blaze of light from the front door. The butler was a remarkable-looking man. I was engaged in conversation with him for some minutes and he walked down to the car and directed us. A most courteous, pleasant and unmistakable man." "But perhaps all butlers have the same note, the same general appearance when they are talking to an exalted person. He knew that you were a Bishop?" "Certainly. He called me 'my lord,' and said that he had had the privilege of meeting my predecessor, who, by the way, died very suddenly out walking in this direction." "Was there any specific personal distinction between this butler and other exalted butlers?" "Yes, there was. He had a curious birthmark, something it was impossible not to see. It was on his forehead; a dull reddish mark like a dagger."

Italian or Greek, this inequality of treatment might be understandable, but when those in question are often Algerians, Senegalese, Maltese, Tripolitans or Somalis, all enjoying the privileges of British, French or Italian subjects, it is difficult to find words strong enough to describe the injustice and harm done. Although but a meagre account of the evils of the capitulatory régime in Egypt, the foregoing examples show some of the results of the system to which the taxation privilege belongs, and strengthen the arguments in favour of radical modification with a view to total abolition in due course.

Initiative in this matter must lie with the British Government, which has already recognised "that the capitulatory régime now existing in Egypt is no longer in accordance with the spirit of the times and with the present state of Egypt." In a Note addressed to the Egyptian Prime Minister by the British Foreign Secretary in August 1929, Mr. Henderson used the following words: "I recognise that the conditions in which the Capitulations are at present applied as regards the power of the Egyptian Government to legislate for or to impose taxation on foreigners are no longer consistent with modern conditions." These sentiments were expressed in and in connection with proposals for an Anglo-Egyptian settlement, but one may well ask whether, in view of the grave economic difficulties in Egypt to-day, it is necessary to wait for the conclusion of a treaty before giving effect to this principle of policy, at any rate in so far as the application of Egyptian legislation, including fiscal legislation to foreigners, is concerned. Proposals on this subject have already been drafted by Mr. Henderson, and it only remains for Sir John Simon to confirm or amend them, in collaboration with the Egyptian Government, before approaching the Capitulatory Powers.* It may be argued that the time taken to obtain the consent of the Powers will be so long that this should not be relied upon as a means of balancing the 1932-3 Budget. The only answer to this argument is that the sooner Egypt is relieved of this taxation anomaly the sooner will she overcome her economic difficulties; and, if time is necessary to obtain the consent of the Powers, there is all the more reason for treating the matter as urgent. The British Government would, by such action taken now, prepare the way for future treaty negotiations in favourable circumstances; and would have the support of the leading and more far-sighted foreign residents in Egypt, who realise that these privileges are not only unnecessary but actually contrary to their true interests.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

* Egypt No. 1 (1929). Cmd. 3376.

VIA APPIA ANTICA.

"I AM so sorry you have dressed," said the Roman lady with whom we were dining. "I rang up to tell you not to, but they said you had dressed already, so there was nothing more to be done." With admirable tact the Roman manservant in the house where I was a guest, knowing that I had gone up early to change, had refrained from delivering the telephone message, for fear that I might put myself to the trouble of changing back again; so here I was at 8.30 in black tails and white tie sitting down to dinner in the middle of Rome, a stone's throw from the Tiber and five minutes' walk from the Corso. For my own part I was pleased to find myself sitting at this hour in these clothes in this place; because I hoped before dawn to find myself in other clothes with the breadth of the Campagna between Rome and me. For I was not going to waste my last night in Rome. I was going to walk out of the city into the wide world along the Via Appia Antica.

What had put this notion into my head? The attractions of the Via Appia were various, and mostly sentimental. The strongest and most sheerly sentimental of them all was the trivial fact that I had once made this selfsame pilgrimage nearly twenty years before, when I was little more than half my present age. On my first visit to Rome, it was the first thing that I had done; and my present visit would seem somehow incomplete if I came and went without repeating the experience. I remembered vividly how from the dome of St. Peter's I had looked across the Campagna to the Alban Hills, and had seen the Via Appia mounting their shoulder to disappear over the sky-line. From that instant I could not rest until I had measured the distance with my own feet. In my impetuous youth I descended from the dome and took the road straight away. By evening I was at Nemi, hungry and thirsty and footsore but feeling well rewarded for my pains. I was not and am not ashamed of this sentimentality, for the Via Appia is a fit subject for sentiment, if ever there was one. It stirs one's feelings by its mere lay-out; it is the ideal of what a Roman road should be: it runs as straight as a die. And then one's mind's eye calls up, one after another, the figures of legend and history whose feet have followed that undeviating line—some going out from Rome to make the destinies of the world, others coming up to Rome from the ends of the earth, to find their own destinies there, and perhaps to make new destinies for Rome herself which would have astonished the men who built the Roman roads and governed the Roman Empire.

From Rome along this road there had gone forth army after army and conqueror after conqueror. The first stretch that one

Geoffrey thought swiftly. The Dean had not mentioned the birthmark. They had now arrived at the house, a scene of horrible desolation as the dusk was falling. A figure was wandering among the ruined buildings, and as the last gleam of the winter sun was flashing into broken windows they recognised that the wanderer was the Dean. The barrister seized his opportunity, and hurrying forward over the broken ground hailed him and engaged him in conversation while the Bishop was reinvestigating the front door. "I want you to describe once again butler Miles." The old man at once went into particulars which might have indicated any upstanding butler and Geoffrey told him so. He did not choose, however, to lead him further, and the Dean thought for a moment. "I don't see how any other description will be of avail. He had, of course, no hat, and apart from the fact that he had the Mark of Cain on his forehead I don't know that I can identify him further." "What do you mean by the Mark of Cain?" "I mean a birthmark like a dagger, a red, horrid mark." "Ah well," said Geoffrey, "let us join the Bishop."

It was nearly dark, but the Dean, producing an enormous electric torch, flashed a light which illuminated the whole of the approach to the house, the scene of the famous interview. "Apparently," said the Dean quite quietly, "this creature, or monster, or devil, still haunts the site of his misdoings." "What do you mean?" said Geoffrey. The answer was the even step of a man coming up the short drive to the house. He greeted the visitors with a serene and courteous voice, remarking on the severe coldness of the night. "Quite like old times, my lord," he said, "quite like old times when the village children were admitted by the late Lord Linslade to slide on the great pond. Good night, my lord; gentlemen, good night." There was no doubt of the voice; that the Bishop identified, but the Dean was clumsy with his torch and the gracious dim figure passed into the house. The trio without a word hurried back. When in the city the Dean gave an exclamation: the Linslade peerage died out in 1746 after the Rebellion. The pond was filled in 1744 after an accident on the ice which involved the deaths of many village children. The facts are in the history of Wiltchester, well known, too well known. Geoffrey Leader was beginning to think that there are more things in heaven and earth than Science and the Bar had accounted for. He told his wife of the adventure in a rather shamefaced manner.

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The dinner at the Dean's house was, however, not overcast by the adventure. Geoffrey, on thinking it over, had all sorts of

explanations, while Mrs. Leader laughed at the whole thing in her cheery way. The Bishop dismissed the subject from his mind as a series of baffling coincidences. The Dean took it as an inevitable and unpleasant thing but as one of the things that are always happening and also dismissed the subject. Mrs. Snatchett laughed at the whole affair and said that it was one of her husband's playthings. The only person who did not dismiss it from his mind was Geoffrey Leader. It was like a law case that had come to a deadlock because the court suddenly found that it was unable to entertain the suit and that special legislation was needed. But what body could legislate? Certainly not the King in Parliament. He tried to dismiss the case from his mind, but in fact he hovered round it like an insoluble mathematical problem. He remembered that Fermat, the famous French lawyer and mathematician, had set such a problem and said that he had solved it. He began to think that Time was not a reality, that Space was not a reality, that the only realities were Goodness and Badness, and that the Bishop of Cloyne was right after all, that the doctrines of Dr. Berkeley were the only true doctrines. He told this to the Bishop of Wiltchester before dinner and that worthy dignitary laughed. "I am inclined to agree with Berkeley, but what I say is that, whether it be true or not, Browning is right, 'Meantime we have our earth here.' You know, none better, that all the great English poets from Cædmon to Browning have taken the world as the conflict place between Good and Evil. The battle for goodness is still going on and perhaps the only meaning of butler Miles is to illustrate the theme." And he laughed again, since he was delighted to see the lawyer baffled. He was a good lawyer, but he relied upon logic too much. A full judgment contains many other elements. The Bishop told him so and Geoffrey sighed.

It was a small dinner party and all the guests stayed when the Dean explained or rather narrated the misfortunes of King's Hollow. He narrated a series of mysterious ill events, from the very building of the house (when ten men were killed) in the days when monopolies had made men rich, to the time of the burning. It was a gruesome story. Every successive tenant except the last—a rich American who was out of the house when the fire happened—had come to some horrible misfortune. The axe, disease (swift and terrible), bankruptcy—beginning with the South Sea Bubble—sudden death, disgrace, madness had all in turn, and turn and turn about, afflicted the owners of the property. The Dean said that the butler had always been the same butler, and, though everyone except the Bishop and the lawyer laughed, he insisted on the point. The creature's venom against all human

can see from the Dome of St. Peter's calls up the parochial wars of the early Republic. But the gazer knows well that, as soon as he mounts that shoulder of the Alban Hills, he will see a further section of the road running on, as straight as ever, towards another horizon. He will see it breasting its way across the Pomptine marshes and turning the corner of the Volscean Mountains at Terracina, to sweep on from the Tyrrhene Sea to the Adriatic and from the Adriatic to the Dardanelles and from the Dardanelles to Syria, until the waters of the Euphrates and the arrows of the Parthians bring the legions to a halt at last.

And then there were those unearthly conquerors who trod, from Syria to Rome, the road which Gallio and his contemptuous countrymen had made for them: Paul treading the Appia under escort to appeal to Cæsar and to preach to the Roman people and to meet his death outside the walls; and Peter, coming first to spy out the land, and then returning that momentous second time to die in Rome and so to become her presiding genius thereafter—a greater than Cæsar, a greater than Romulus. Peter's character comes out so clearly in the Gospels that in his case it would be difficult for legend to strike a false note; and certainly the legend of *Quo Vadis?* rings true. The shrine with the two Latin words over the door still marks the legendary spot on the Appia where the Prince of the Apostles, striving once again to escape his destiny, met his Lord and asked his question and turned back, just in time, to redeem in Rome the failure for which he had once wept so bitterly in Jerusalem at cock-crow. . . .

Could that be rain? The scirocco had been blowing for the last two days, yet they told me that in this season it could hardly bring rain any longer. Was I to be cheated out of my pilgrimage on this last night? Had the cloud-blanket, rising from African seas, blotted out the full moon for which I had been waiting? No, it was a false alarm; it was nothing but the three fountains playing down there in the courtyard. As we came out from the dining-room on to the terrace, the moonlight flooded over us and we saw the spray from the fountains glistening and shimmering far below. In an hour my own feet would be on the Via Appia again, after all. . . .

At midnight I jumped down from the tram—the *Circolare Destra*—as it paused at the foot of the San Gregorio steps, and took the turning for the Porta San Sebastiano. I confess to a slight anticipatory nervousness; for this thoroughfare, which must have been the Edgware Road and Kilburn High Street of Ancient Rome at the time when Caracalla built his stupendous public baths, runs through the most beautiful and most desolate quarter of the modern city: a region of gardens and vineyards, which

make an oasis of green among the tenements, when one looks out southward nowadays from the Villa Celimontana. I hoped that none of my fellow-passengers on the tram had divined my intentions when I jumped down, and had decided to follow me. I found myself looking back over my shoulder as the road turned a corner and ran on between high walls, which threw deep shadows in weird contrast to the brilliant moonlight. But no, I was the only traveller on the road at this time of night; and indeed I knew at the time, in the back of my mind, that I had no cause for alarm; for during the last day or two I had taken the precaution of mentioning my intended nocturnal journey casually to several old inhabitants of the city, and none of them had warned me of danger. "Be sure to take your passport," they had said, "or you may be turned back by the police"; but none of them had suggested that I might meet undesirable characters on the way. This was good presumptive evidence that times had changed since the not very remote age when the Campagna was given over to brigands whose numbers were only kept down by the paucity of rash and rich travellers and by the multitude of malarial mosquitoes. As a matter of fact, I encountered neither brigand nor gendarme from first to last, and had no occasion either to explain my identity with my passport or to defend my purse with my walking-stick.

And now the well-remembered landmarks were flitting past me in the moonlight, like shadows in a dream. That vault on the left was the tomb of the Scipios; and here I am marching between the barbicans that flank the city-gate; and now, as I tramp under the railway-bridge, I leave the last wrack of the workaday world behind and pass out along the magic road into the world of memory and legend. As I sight *Quo Vadis?* Church I half expect a supernatural challenge and feel it strange to be passed unheeded by a squad of belated bicyclists pedalling Romeward in the moonlit night. And here, beyond the turning to the Catacombs, is the tomb of Cecilia Metella topping the rise ahead; and here the lamp-posts come to an end, and here the macadam. I am walking softly now in the dust of a country lane. Dust rising from my footsteps in the small hours, to be irradiated by the moonlight in the air: where was it that I walked once before in some such luminous pillar of cloud? That was not in a plain but in a valley—a hollow sinister defile, with a Greek army retreating in column of route from a battlefield of which the Turks remained masters. But here, on the Campagna to-night, the dusty moonlit air is smelling not of gunpowder and sweat but of the new-mown hay which lies on the green edges of the track and on the surrounding Campagna, which seems to stretch away and away.

kind was (said the Dean) amazing. He had slain the village children, he had slain his fellow servants, he had slain his masters and their children. There are such creatures in the world. Iago was one. Geoffrey, though remembering the Bishop's dictum about the English poets, took courage at this story. A run of bad luck, he said, is a quite possible thing. Any gambler knows that these runs of good or bad luck take place, though the odds against them are almost infinite—and as to the butler (he said, with less courage) I believe he is an invention of our own minds. Moreover, he said, if there is a house with a run of bad luck there may be a house in the city or near the city with a run of good luck. If we can find such a house and if we can induce butler Miles Crow to enter it, well the problem is solved, since he would disappear. Geoffrey having said his say, smiled gloomily.

To the astonishment of all present, the Dean said solemnly: "There is such a house, but it is on the other side of the city. It is a far older house than King's Hollow and far smaller. It is called Queen's Haven. I have the records of this house here. I thought Geoffrey would follow his foolish logical methods." The Bishop was inclined to mock, but was deterred from this by the seriousness of the Dean, who quaffed his wine with added pleasure. He said instead, "Queen's Haven is the place which I and my friends have recently turned into a block of flats for the poorest people, tiny flats but quite a good housing scheme. The people there are certainly very happy though very poor. It reminds me, we are always thinking of India in these days, of a Hindoo Joint-Family, a mutual self-help society. The Poor Law doesn't run there, so to speak. The City Clerk told me only yesterday that it has had an appreciable saving on the rates. I am looking out for a caretaker to live in the little lodge gate." "Well, why don't you employ Miles?" said Geoffrey, who had a score to make against the Dean. The Dean, however, was full of the past. "It is an amazing thing, but that house has always been lucky. When the plague visited the city in 1349 the occupants without exception escaped," and he rolled forth a stream of good fortune, age after age, and finished with the Bishop's Housing Scheme. Geoffrey said coldly "that was one more instance of the gambler's run of luck. There is nothing in it, and there is nothing in the ill-luck of King's Hollow." Everybody except the Dean seemed to agree and the Dean said acidly, "Geoffrey, my son, what would you think if I called your career, amazingly successful as it has been, and your marriage a run of luck?" Mrs. Leader indignantly answered, "He's done all himself, and as to our marriage it was my business and not Geoffrey's." Everybody laughed because of the colour of her

happy face. The intervention restored the mirth of the party, but suddenly another interruption occurred of a more serious kind.

In the Dean's dinner parties there was no retirement of the ladies, and the whole party were enjoying good talk and good Christmas fruits and wine. The men and women (some of them) had begun to smoke, when a maid entered and whispered to Mrs. Snatchett. She told the Dean that the Head Verger wanted to speak to him. That very serious man would not have interrupted a dinner, especially one where the Bishop was present, unless some urgent thing had happened. The Dean looked puzzled. What could it be? Had the Head Verger discovered at last the Bones of the Founder? Had the roof of the Lady Chapel collapsed? Was the wife of old Canon Misery dead at last? He could not tell, and excused himself for a moment. After a silent interval, when Geoffrey found himself smiling at his wife, the Dean re-entered. The Head Verger had brought into the house a man—Dr. Snatchett choked hysterically—a man who was more than anxious to see the Bishop, a man named Miles Crow, a man that seemed to answer the description. The Dean had seen him at the hall-door, and the Dean, an almost unexampled fact, lit a huge cigar and choked again. Curious glances were interchanged among the company, and certainly Mrs. Leader and Mrs. Snatchett had grown unexpectedly pale, while Geoffrey had assumed his best court manner. The only person who was unperturbed was the Bishop. "If you do not mind, Mrs. Snatchett, I should like to interview the visitor in this room and among the present company. Can he be shown up?"

The Head Verger himself accompanied the man, a middle-aged agricultural labourer, who, despite his worn clothes and muddied gaiters, was very recognisable before he spoke, his old cap in hand. He seemed accustomed to company and was not at all flurried. Despite the fact that he was past middle age his was an upright almost lissom figure of magnificent proportions and his face though weather-beaten had a certain nobility about it. His whole manner betokened freedom from fear accompanied by the suitable respect which the assembled company merited. He bowed in a manner that was worthy of a Court of Kings. Geoffrey Leader thought with a groan how inelegantly he bowed to the Court of Appeal. The Head Verger caught the Bishop's eye and said, "I myself am responsible for this intrusion, my lord. Mr. Crow has a very reasonable request to make." Geoffrey eyed the man as he had, hundreds of times, eyed an adverse witness. The witness looked through the learned counsel and half-smiled in faint, respectful recognition. He then drew his left hand across his fine forehead, clear of any birthmark, as the lawyer noted

And now the scene changes again as we enter "the zone of the tombs." Great shapeless cones of brick and rubble rise out of the dust-haze one after another. In two parallel rows they flank the Appia as far as I can see ahead. Their marble casings have been removed long ago by the spoilers; but here and there the modern archaeologist's belated piety has recovered and re-erected the torso of a rubble-buried marble statue. So, once more, here and there a sepulture is guarded by the graven image of its occupant. How weirdly the marble figures gleam in the moonlight—headless and armless, yet not without some interplay of light and shadow on the folds of their well-worn drapery. Are they disconsolate—these hard-boiled Roman tax-farmers and contractors—to find, on seeing the light again after some fifteen hundred years, that the traffic from Antioch and Byzantium no longer passes their way? Do they take it amiss that the monuments which they had planted on this choice frontage, with "money no object," now strike not a spark of interest in the imagination of the yokel who drives his hay-waggon between their crowded ranks? Or are they rather relieved that their modern double does not frequent the Appia Antica in his motor-car in order to jeer at their dilapidated splendours, as they, in their day, used to jeer, no doubt, at the ruins of Carthage and Corinth? Great Cæsar, has one of them actually caught up with the times? For strains of jazz music fall on my ears from somewhere ahead, and there, under that portly statue of a Roman wholesale pork butcher, stands parked the car from which the gramophone record is blaring out. The illusion persists for a moment, so well do the statue and the motor-car and the gramophone accord with one another; so incongruous are they, each and all, with the light of the moon and the scent of the hay.

As the horrid music dies away and the staring headlights grow dim, my feet suddenly strike a hard surface. They have struck the Roman basalt paving, deep-grooved by Roman ruts, which in this secluded section of the Appia has never been removed or "made over." On this surface that blessed car cannot follow me, no, not even if it is in truth a ghostly counterfeit of tin chassis and rubber tyre. The way is barred for it by a magic barrier—by the swathes of hay that here break, one beyond the other, across the basalt pavement, like waves lapping over a boulder-floored beach. As the swathes deepen the paving-stones are finally submerged and lost. Shall I be lost too and benighted on this last stage of my journey? For an hour past the light has been failing as the moon has been sinking lower. But, at the moment when the moon touches the horizon on my right, the first glimmer of dawn shows above Frascati in the opposite quarter of the sky;

and at the same instant the voice of the countryside changes. The chorus of the frogs stops dead, and the chorus of the larks succeeds it. In this enchanted atmosphere, I seem to be immune from footsoreness or fatigue as I race the sunrise up the slopes of the extinct volcano whose crater now holds the Alban Lake. The race is won and the journey over when I stand on the western lip of the brim, below the dome of Castel Gandolfo, and watch the sun burst into the open sky above the peak of Monte Cavo, unchecked in his course by the arduous leap which he has just made over the Appennines. . . .

As I sat crumpled up in the first morning tram that would take me back to Rome from Albano, I observed that the wilderness which I had crossed the night before was all desecrated in broad daylight by the works of Man. Between the villa-residences of Frascati and the tenements that now mask the Lateran, the face of the Campagna is disfigured to-day by airports and wireless-stations and racecourses. What meant these diurnal portents of vulgar blatant life which had been invisible in the moonlight? Did they signify that History moves in some vast Hindu cycle? Would this sordid modern world turn to dust like the sordid ancient world and, turning, leave an unearthly beauty behind it, a beauty like the rainbow-hued discolorations with which Time has redeemed the cheapness of that prosaic Roman commercial glassware? Would the hay-swathes one day re-bury the Great North Road and a new Faith issue from catacombs beneath the ruins of Hendon and Barnet? "Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness." But my mind recoiled from the mental vistas that opened here before it. I had seen and thought enough for a night and a day. When the tram came to a standstill at its Roman terminus, I only knew that I was tired at last.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE.

with imperturbable face, and addressed the Bishop in unhurried, mellow, unmistakable tones.

"I have ventured to disturb, my lord, this New Year feast on a very small errand so far as you are concerned, but a vital one to me. I was afraid that the post at Queen's Haven, the post of lodge keeper, might be filled to-morrow, and I am anxious to fill it myself. The Head Verger is acquainted with me and the change in my circumstances. For some long time I was the butler at King's Hollow, and on the destruction of that unhappy house I had to seek other employment. I served as a private through the four years of the war, and though I was practically always in the front trenches and would have been glad of death I escaped without a wound, oftentimes when all my comrades were smitten down. After the war I sought agricultural work, a sad, disappointed being, and now I crave this post. I shall be useful, my lord, in menial work, and I think I shall uphold the tradition of Queen's Haven as amply as in my former employment at King's Hollow, but more joyfully. My burden has departed." The pathos in the voice was unmistakable. It was as if the sins of King's Hollow were sins that he had had to punish, as if he were a distributor of justice which falls like rain on the just and the unjust. Geoffrey said not a word. Some witnesses are to be left alone.

The Bishop swiftly ended the scene. "You are just the man that I have been looking for," he said. "The Head Verger will bring you along to-morrow morning at ten. Do you know Queen's Haven?" "Indeed, my lord, I know it well; have always known it." Then he bowed again: "Good-night, my lord; Mr. Dean, ladies and gentlemen, good-night." Then he added, "The New Year is at hand." He was gone, but the Bishop left the table and went after him. He was back in a moment and in answer to Geoffrey's look he said lightly, "I have given him the half-crown. What was it you said, Mr. Dean? Ah yes, I think the Bones of the Founder may be recovered." Then they all drank to the coming New Year.

J. E. G. DE M.

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WAR AND PEACE.*

Mr. E. L. Woodward has followed up his remarkable work *Three Studies in European Conservatism* by another volume dealing with the century that he knows so well. He offers us three substantial dissertations, based upon lectures delivered at Oxford to history students. The first and longest, which examines the forces that have made for peace or war between Waterloo and

* *War and Peace in Europe, 1815-1870, and other Essays.* Constable. 74s.

Sedan, exhibits anew the author's wide learning, humane spirit and capacity for thoughtful generalisation. The peace that followed the downfall of Napoleon was mainly a peace of exhaustion, and rested on the shakiest foundations. The Treaties of Vienna were as perishable as most settlements produced by arms; nationalism was growing into the most explosive factor in the modern world; and the contrast between the orderly internal life of states and their anarchic relations to one another became ever more pronounced. The forces making for war, as we know to our cost, proved stronger than the factors making for peace. Mr. Woodward surveys the latter in two very interesting chapters dealing with such themes as International Law, arbitration, peace societies, international socialism, foreign investments, and the Christian Churches. A new vision was springing up—"belief in a great human society which should have forsworn war as politically unnecessary, economically unprofitable, and morally abhorrent. This revolt of men against the inexorableness of their destiny has a magnificence which may blind us, and silence for a moment the doubt whether we are witnesses not of an achievement but a gesture, an assertion and not a command. We cannot be sure that the forces which made us have not set us in a mould of circumstance too firmly compact; we do not know whether we can reshape our minds, remake the paths, and change the responses of our nerves to suit a world we have devised in imagination." Reading through this fine essay we are struck by the strength and variety of the influences, political, economic and psychological, that made for war or peace in the nineteenth century. Perhaps Mr. Woodward may one day apply his philosophic mind to a similar balancing of tendencies in our distracted post-war world.

The second essay, entitled "Historical Material and Historical Certainty," provides a mass of information which will be of value to the student, and ends with a chapter on "Historians of the Nineteenth Century" which any cultivated reader may enjoy. The third, entitled "French History and French Memoirs, 1815-1850," opens with an outline of French history during these years, which he illuminated in his masterly study of Guizot in his previous book. Napoleon, he assures us, was the last of his kind. "The government of the world is beyond the control of one man. The domination of another Napoleon is as unlikely as the success of another Jenghis Khan. The area of modern culture exceeds the reach of a single conqueror." This, however, is merely a deliverance from a single danger. "Destruction may come to us through an accumulation of little faults, a disregard of the old wisdom that men, not walls, make the city." The statesmen of the generation between the two Napoleons were well-meaning, but short-

WOMEN AND THE SERVICE OF THE EMPIRE.

I

WHEN we stand back from familiar things, and see them with fresh eyes, *sub specie novitatis*, we are apt to experience a surprise—and then to learn a lesson. One of the familiar things in the life of most of us is that an Englishwoman should go overseas with her husband, to Ceylon or Trinidad or British Guiana, to Bagdad or Singapore or Hong Kong, to share his life and to be by his side in his work. It is a familiar thing; but when you think of it, it is a thing for wonder and admiration. She pays a heavy price. Children are born: the time comes for the children to “go home”; and then she either follows the children and loses her husband, or stays with her husband and loses her children. But she pays the price quietly; and we take the payment for granted. That is one side of the matter; and it has its sadness. But there is also another; and that has its sadness too. It is the Englishwoman living overseas with her husband who is one of the barriers—subtly, unconsciously, but all the more powerfully—to ready understanding and easy sympathy between the Englishmen who work abroad and the people of the land in which they work.

The fault lies with the man rather than with the woman. Englishmen, more than Frenchmen or Spaniards or Italians, have a strong sense of something which they call “race.” Race is a sadly abused word, which is only safe when it is used by an anthropologist—and not even always then. But we are prone to use it: we cherish an ideal of race purity; we hold to an ideal of uncontaminated whiteness. We do not always keep our faith, but we keep it tolerably well; and there is wisdom and moral prudence about it if we keep it as a control on ourselves. But we extend it; and we make it a sort of control on our women-folk. Starting with an idea of chivalry, which is not necessarily the highest tribute to them, we desire to keep them fenced and protected: we want them to live the English life, with all its amenities and sanctities, apart from the outer world. Here again there is wisdom and practical sense—if the thing is done within measure. Tropical climates are not temperate climates; and the position of women in the life of the East cannot be the position of women in the life of the West. But an *enclave* of English social life and secluded English womanhood may be an exotic thing; and if conservatories are useful for plants, they are not necessarily useful for human beings.

On the top of this comes the action of the Englishwomen themselves. Women have a gift for creating “society,” with its

gatherings, its rules, its round of activities, its codes. The active genius of Englishwomen has been busy in this way. Wherever they have settled, they have organised a whole system of social life, partly for themselves, but mainly for the leisure hours of their men. Mr. Rudyard Kipling has described it: the pens of many writers have been busy upon it. To adorn a life of exile (if indeed it be exile, for that is the question) is an inevitable impulse; and it would be absurd to cast stones at an impulse which has its sad side as well as its gay. But the more the impulse works, the more it accentuates the tendency towards an *enclave*. The development of social life is also the development of social distinctions. Women, who are the great creators of social etiquette, may also be the creators of social barriers. Their society-forming instinct, operating under conditions and within limits largely fixed by men, may be a danger as well as a grace.

It would be absurd to contend that work must engulf life. No man can do his best work unless he has a quiet garden into which he can retreat for rest and recreation. A wife, in the very passion of her devotion, is anxious to make such a garden for her husband. But a communal garden—and a communal garden with rails round it—is conspicuous. And a conspicuous “Society,” even in its own country, is not an asset to social peace. It is a grave question whether we ought to export it with us when we go abroad. “Society” is always a little unnatural; and when it is exported, it becomes a little more unnatural, even for ourselves. Playing our social parts under other skies, we may play them a little hectically. If we become a little more unnatural, even for ourselves, we may seem entirely unnatural to others.

In day-dreams one may imagine an Indian service (but the problem is not only Indian) on the model of the old Templars or Hospitallers—a company under a vow, living a monastic life. That is beyond the compass of human nature; and it might be inhuman. In day-dreams, again, one may imagine a competitive selection of the women who can go abroad into the Empire, as one has a competitive selection of the men; or at any rate one may dream of a year’s probationary training for the women, corresponding to the men’s probation. That, again, is a foolish dream; for natural selection will have its own way, and a wife who duplicates her husband, or is made to imitate his training and interests, may be the worse wife. There is no heroic (or rather, sham-heroic) remedy to be found in the shape of some new sort of institution. Sparta is with us; and we must simply adorn Sparta. As Aristotle says when he criticises Plato’s heroic remedies, the real way of improvement is to leave institutions alone, and to get “the right philosophy and customs” to work.

sighted; and Guizot, the greatest of them, ignored the rights and interests of the Fourth Estate. He was punished by the revolution of 1848, which in turn smoothed the path for the Second Empire. The second and final chapter analyses the most celebrated French memoirs of the period—Chateaubriand, Guizot, Tocqueville, Pasquier, Barante, Molé, Villèle, Talleyrand. The value of such literature was overestimated till the rise of Ranke and his school, and we must be careful nowadays not to underestimate its worth. "Memoirs are not self-sufficing as historical authorities, but they give the style and feeling of a period. They are works of art or at least of artifice; but there is about them a vividness of experience transcending, in some measure, the facts recorded or the judgments or opinions expressed by the writers." Mr. Woodward is a thinker as well as a scholar, and his essays are as full of lessons as of learning.

G. P. G.

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NOSTER HORATIUS.*

Professor A. F. Murison, K.C., is famous as a master of Roman Law and as a classical scholar and it is pleasant to think that in his retirement he should have given to the world a rendering in English verse of the entire works of the great poet, the friend of Virgil and of Augustus, whom Benzo, Bishop of Alba, called in the eleventh century *Noster Horatius*. The West has always loved Horace, and that gracious poet has always been specially beloved in the British Isles. The oldest extant manuscript that we have, the Codex Bernensis, is written in an Irish hand, and Dr. Sandys tells us that it "has Celtic glosses here and there in the margin." He reminds us that

it was in the lands watered by the Rhine, the Mosel and the Meuse (within the limits corresponding to the mediæval Lotharingia) that Horace was best appreciated; and the same is true of other Latin poets. Thus it was apparently in the region immediately surrounding the ancient Court of Aachen, that the influence of the revival of learning under Charles the Great lasted longest.

It must be remembered that Charlemagne owed very much to Alcuin of York, perhaps the greatest scholar of the eighth century, who under the name of Flaccus was the chief student in that age of the works of Horace. He especially studied the *Odes* and *Epodes*, the *Satires* and the *Epistles*. The Horatian lyrics were not popular in the Middle Ages, but Alcuin the Englishman knew all great poetry when he saw it. Ireland and

* *Horace rendered in English Verse.* By Alexander Falconer Murison. Longmans. 12s. 6d. net.

England were the first to appreciate Horace, and now we have, in these late days, a Scot of Scotland translating in excellent English verse with "Celtic glosses here and there" the whole of the extant poems: the four books of the *Odes*, the Secular Hymn, the *Epodes*, the two books of the *Satires*, the two books of the *Epistles* and the *Art of Poetry*. Professor Murison's volume covers 430 pages in pleasant type and will make excellent reading both for classical scholars and for those who, perforce, have to be contented with the tongue which Shakespeare used. The only criticism of the *format* of the book is that it would have been instructive to have had the Latin text side by side with the English version.

It is difficult from such a lengthy book to make any extracts that give any idea of its substantial merits. Professor Murison is a student of modern literature as well as a classical scholar, and he knows well the literary fitness of things. He writes in a prefatory note:

I have endeavoured to adhere to the text as closely as idiom and the exigencies of verse permit. The difficulties and disadvantages of such restriction are obvious, and no one can be more familiar with them than a translator in verse. Being inevitable, they are to be faced frankly, not to be airily circumvented; even the laudable desire to make a pretty poem must be subordinated to the primary duty of saying what Horace says and not saying what Horace does not say. True, there are many peculiarities of idiom, collocations of words, strokes of poetical finesse, and so forth, that apparently cannot be reproduced in English with adequate effect, and so far Horace "cannot be translated." In such cases the translator must do as he may, but he cannot reasonably be expected to work miracles.

For one poet to render the writings of another poet in poetry of a different language is indeed a miracle that has been occasionally effected, though not very often. Swinburne has achieved this in his translations from the French of Villon, and perhaps in certain Greek odes; Browning has done it in *Balaustion*, but despite innumerable attempts, apparently no one has achieved absolutely poetical equivalents in the case of Quintus Horatius Flaccus. The most that can be said is that many "a pretty poem" has been composed on the basis of an Horatian theme. That is not Professor Murison's goal. His object is to reproduce in English verse the actual Horatian text. The third Ode of the first book gives the translator a chance of sharing with Horace his astonishment at human daring.

Encased in stubborn oak and triple-brass
Was breast of him that foremost dared
Adventure in his fragile bark to pass
Out on the cruel sea, nor feared

It is this matter of "philosophy and customs" which Miss Freya Stark discusses in the pages which follow. We discussed the matter together in an Italian hill-town last autumn; and she has set down, in the light of her experiences in the East, the thoughts which have come to her mind. I subscribe readily and entirely to what she says. I am sure that women will readily embrace a new "philosophy," and gladly alter old "customs," if we men will only cease from our masculine refrain:

There are some things
Which are not done.

It is the habit, and the pride, of the English wife at home to do social work (in another sense of the word "social") during the working-day of her husband. Such work counts more, for thousands of wives, than any sort of social round. There is nothing high-brow or goody-goody about such work. Any woman with an active mind and a warm heart must necessarily wish to be about some real and genuine business of activity. Indeed it is already on record that such work is afoot in the East. It will go further—if only men will drop some masculine taboos, and cease to regard women as either coquettes "for hours of rest" or nurses for those sad occasions when "anguish wrings the brow." Woman is the companion and fellow-worker rather than the coquette or the nurse, though she will always remain the nurse (and perhaps the coquette) whenever and wherever there is need. She has an instinct for social work as well as the social round; and provided that social work is not allowed to become merely one of the fashions of the social round, and has no touch or taint of patronage, it will be a genuine liberation of the gifts and capacities of the Englishwoman serving the Empire abroad. Nor will it only be her liberation. It will be a new and singularly effective way of conciliation and sympathy between the English stock and the native peoples. When women understand one another, the battle is won, and the way is easy for men.

ERNEST BARKER.

II

When Disraeli discovered the British Empire, it was so large and strong and unassailable that it overshadowed the acquiescent world with no effort of its own, with no tightening of the muscles as it were—self-conscious indeed, but with the careless, assured absence of organisation that came from its security. This static prosperity is no more. The ideas that underlay it have altered, and outward forms, following in their clumsy dangerous way, are

altering also. The whole thing moves, like a stream of lava rolling slowly under its half-coagulated crust: the heaving, wrinkled surface threatens at any moment to crack and break: our experts surround it anxiously: put up here a dyke, there smooth away an obstacle: watch where the crust appears most thin and agitated: in fact do all they can. That it should move—that at any rate it does so—is now obvious to all: to keep it from doing so destructively is our concern.

Meanwhile the process, disturbing our easy tenure, makes us revise our tools and methods; and we are gradually co-ordinating them into something like a homogeneous machine to carry out policies which are becoming ever more centralised and unified. The strain, we feel, has only begun, and we shall need increasingly whatever strength is in us, not to repress in the old Imperial way, but to control and so to say absorb the new situations as they arise. Our chief instrument is, we believe, as good as any in the world, and better than most: it is the human element which we draft into our Services and which continues to do its work with a philosophy all its own, depressed but not crushed by democratic politics, and bearing with experienced equanimity kicks both foreign and domestic.

But we are becoming very slowly and reluctantly aware that modern empire must be organised on a broader basis than that of small specialised groups, however efficient. Trade and industry, education, journalism and religion are being consciously used by other nations as instruments of government or penetration. We have a prejudice against such policies, and feel about them rather like the Italian *condottieri* when the French armies interrupted their gentlemanly warfare with business-like massacre. But we are being forced by the circumstances themselves. Willingly or unwillingly we find that imperial policy, like a good stroke at tennis, requires the whole impetus of the body behind it. And we know that if we are still to lead in the world, we shall soon need every resource that we can muster.

In this connection we have one asset which is unique to our race. This is the British woman. No other has had quite the same training or developed quite the same qualities. She has been formed by a discipline, now centuries old, of hardship abroad or separation at home, which has combined with a Puritan tradition of self-control to weave as it were a steel thread into the very fibres of her character. After nearly three hundred years of such training in all quarters of the globe, it is now taken as a matter of course that our women can bear danger and responsibility, discomfort of climate and loneliness, almost as well as their menfolk. We take it for granted. But when we

The gusty south-west wind, so keen to wage
 Fierce battle with the northern breeze,
 Nor yet the rain-stars, nor the south wind's rage,
 Which rules the Adriatic seas.

The presumption of man in facing elemental forces is a theme which Homer (and therefore Horace, the student of Homer) shares with the great English poets from Cædmon to Whitman. The same is true of the perennial anxieties of the statesman which the famous fourteenth Ode of the first book gives us. Professor Murison catches the poetry of the original

O Ship, fresh waves will bear you back to sea.
 Ah me! What is't you do? Push on,
 Make for the harbour. Do you not perceive
 The oars along the side are gone?

Then again in the ninth Ode of the second book, deprecating the excessive grief of Valgius, the wide range of poetry is reflected:

The rain, my friend, it rains not every day
 Upon the draggled fields, nor ply
 For ever gusty squalls the Caspian sea,
 Nor on Armenian uplands lie
 Through all the months the torpid icy masses,
 Nor always Boreas strains and heaves,
 The groves of oak that crown Garganus' heights,
 Or ash-trees widowed of their leaves.

The mournful heights and deeps of grief as conceived by Horace are here adequately reflected.

The translation of "Non omnis moriar" (the thirtieth Ode of the third book) is a fine poem and finely represents in stirring English verse the great poet's eternal monument:

I've raised a monument outlasting bronze
 O'ertopping pyramids of kings of old,
 Which neither wearing rain nor tearing winds
 Shall e'er demolish, nor the years untold
 Successive rolling, nor the flight of ages.
 Not all of me shall die. . . .

It is nearly 1,940 years since Horace died, and his prophecy of his own immortality is assured. It is only possible here and now to garner some few of these translations dealing with the *Odes*. The *Epodes*, the *Satires* in fitting rhyming ten-foot verses, the *Epistles* (especially Book II with Horace's defence of the poetic genius of his own time), and the renowned *Art of Poetry* will charm many readers, while the famous Hymn written to celebrate the Secular Games revived by Augustus in 17 B.C., is marked by a special ease of diction. Professor Murison's daring attempt to make Horace "ours" will not be forgotten.

J. E. G. DE M.

STUDIES IN MODERN HISTORY.*

A perusal of Dr. G. P. Gooch's new book entitled *Studies of Modern History* can only emphasise the view that his earlier books (and perhaps especially the *History of Modern Europe 1878-1919*) made plain, that he is, at the root of things, a master of method, method that controls a knowledge of ascertained facts in modern history that very few European historians possess. It is indeed useless to be a master of method unless there is a perfectly judicial outlook on facts, and there is perhaps a restricted use unless the scope of the inquiry into facts is commensurate with the range of method. Sir Henry Maine was a master of method, but the facts that he worked from were extremely limited and he could not carry his superb juridical comparative method to legitimate conclusions outside the Aryan field or indeed into some phases in that field. Dr. Gooch, secure in his judgment of evidence by his vast range of study from the year 1500 to the present day, gives his method, both comparative and direct, full play and arrives at judgments, even if here and there this or that historical student ventures to doubt them, which are based on strict logic, on large determinations of character, unbiased realism, and amazingly generous estimates of men and policies with whom and with which the trend of his historical thought might not seem at first sight to have any sympathy.

Dr. Gooch's new book exhibits these traits and methods in abundant measure. He has collected into one volume ten essays which reveal a range of reading which must almost make the lonely student tremble. For instance, in the three essays entitled respectively "The Study of the French Revolution," "The Political Background of Goethe's Life" and "Germany's Debt to the French Revolution," the vast list of French and German authorities is exhaustively grouped with a decision and method that not only leaves nothing wanting but places the revolutionary period on a new basis and not alone for English students. Dr. Gooch, moreover, illustrates his method by exact studies of great or essential personalities and he makes those personalities at the same time illustrate the direct realism of his method. The *Study of the French Revolution* is in effect a Source-Book as well as a conclusive study. Even to-day many English and American readers take Thomas Carlyle's historical drama on the French Revolution as a piece of pure historical writing. They should compare it with the facts as set forth in this latest study of the subject by a pure historian. Though Dr. Gooch is primarily a realist, in this essay he demonstrates the working of

* *Studies in Modern History*. By G. P. Gooch. Longmans. 10s. net.
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glance at the colonies of other races we notice how comparatively few women of this type they contain. Those that there are, are almost entirely confined to towns, and to climates where conditions resemble the European: and, above all, the average time of their residence is short. In Latin countries the civil servant usually waits to marry till he can exchange his foreign service for a post at home: good positions are frequently sacrificed because the wife cannot bear a long separation from her own relatives; and the thought of sending the children home to be educated while the mother stays abroad would hardly be entertained. When we look upon these conditions we realise that the Englishwoman is quite a peculiar factor in the Empire.

With all this, it is depressing to notice that our unpopularity in foreign lands appears to coincide with her appearance. It comes about quite naturally, and is not altogether her fault. Perhaps it is nobody's fault: it might indeed be argued to be a result of domestic virtues. The explanation appears to be that our men, when still in their solitary condition, homeless, clubless, in a strange land, surrounded by no social palisade, naturally mingle with the people they live among, and become known and liked. They are usually our best men, too, selected by some special interest, knowledge or adventurous spirit, to go where the path is yet little trodden. They almost always find a welcome. Wherever they have been, they have spread our influence and enhanced our prestige, so that it becomes quite astonishing to compare their accounts with the depressing atmosphere which now surrounds British communities living in the self-same milieu which was once so kind. Nor is it a change which has been slow of accomplishment, for it has visibly happened in many places during our lifetime.

To ascribe it to Eve entirely would be as summary as *Genesis* and very absurd. Eve by herself does not, as a matter of fact, do any harm. If she lives in some place so remote that there are not enough British Eves to form a society, she can give as good and sometimes even better imperial service than her menfolk, especially in the East, where none but she has free entry into the homes. The harm is done when she is so numerous that she can make a little world of her own. It is a pleasant little world. The damage is made possible, as I say, by our domestic virtues. It is so pleasant that it gradually absorbs all but the men's business hours. Incongruous elements are excluded. We make a miniature National Home for the British, and we all know the potential mischief of National Homes! After this we may take it as an axiom that no amount of administrative justice will turn anyone who is socially snubbed into a friend. This point has,

of course, been brought forward very often; and the reply is made that intercourse with other races is so difficult, and holds so many disadvantages, that things are better as they are. I have not experience enough to enter into such a question. I am prepared to believe that it is so easy to say or do the wrong thing abroad that unless one has a full sense of the responsibility, it may be better to say and do nothing at all. This is not my point, however. My plea is not that our women should necessarily mix more with the people they happen to be among, but that they should study to *know* something more about them.

It seems absurd that while the men in all our Services are being constantly instructed and admonished to study the language, customs and susceptibilities of the races they have to deal with, their wives can and do make as many *faux pas* as they like: if they do not, it is entirely due to their own merit and initiative, not to any force of public opinion behind them. Being a democratic nation, unprovided with the fashionable Dictator, we cannot very well supply our service man with the wife we consider appropriate, nor even insist that the lady should undergo a suitable examination before the engagement is announced in the *Morning Post*. The matter is not one to be imposed, and if we were up against any real reluctance or incapacity, there would be little use in saying anything about it: we should have to resign ourselves, as we do to an indifferent housemaid who has married our excellent gardener. But this is not the case at all. A great number of the women scattered over the Empire would like to know more of the conditions around them: if they realised that such knowledge could make them really more useful to their country, the majority would be willing to take some trouble about it: they are held back by a silly fashion and no more.

I had an opportunity to test the matter last winter, when I was spending my time in one of the cities of the East. As I was poor, and also busy with a study of the language, I settled myself in the house of a native shoemaker and his wife. I did this quite innocently, and only discovered after some little while that it was considered peculiar: in fact it is not usually done. My own friends and family were much amused when they heard about it, and warned me that I should be an outcast, an absolute pariah, among British officialdom. The intolerance, narrowmindedness, and stupidity of the average official's wife were impressed upon me. I was prepared for the worst. I found, however, that these strictures were really rather unfair. After a little natural hesitation, not surprising in the circumstances, the slandered ladies were perfectly charming and showed an admirable independence in being nice to me. I was not of the flock. I was outside the

idealism, but it is a very different idealism from that imagined by the Sage of Chelsea. The picture of Robespierre illustrates the difference. For the humble student of modern history the material relating to the Revolution is confusing in the extreme. The present writer many years ago was preparing a study of Mirabeau and he abandoned it at a late stage because Sir John Seeley told him that much of the apparently helpful material dealing with that great man were forgeries. That is a small example of the difficulties which Dr. Gooch in a large measure has swept away.

The essay on "The Political Background of Goethe's Life" shows a new side to the great seer's moral activities. "He was temperamentally unfitted to scale the heights and plumb the depths of the Revolution; yet he never shared the delusion that it was merely the outpouring of human wickedness or that it could be suppressed by the sword alone." Goethe's greatness was fully realised by Napoleon. Dr. Gooch tells us that on October 2nd at the Erfurt Congress of 1808 "the two greatest men in the world met face to face. When the poet entered the room, Napoleon—as a rule the least impressionable of men—exclaimed: 'Vous êtes un homme!' . . . Goethe was treated throughout as an equal, and on his leaving the room the Emperor ejaculated: 'Voilà un homme!'" Goethe received the Cross of the newly-founded Legion of Honour and Napoleon was his hero to the end. Goethe declined to hate the French, and he said after 1815:

How could I, to whom culture and barbarism are alone of importance, hate a nation which is among the most cultivated on earth, and to which I owe so great a part of my own possessions? There is a stage when national hatred vanishes altogether, and where one stands to a certain extent above the nations, and feels the weal or woe of a neighbouring people as if it were one's own.

If only Germany had thought on these lines after 1870, if France had thought this after 1919, the world might be very different now. Goethe's standard of moral thought is the only thing that can save modern civilisation. This essay on Goethe strikes the noblest note of our time. Germany indeed profited by the events of the Revolution and the Napoleonic era: "the signal for its deliverance from the thralldom of mediæval institutions and antiquated ideas was sounded by the tocsin which rang out in 1789."

That tocsin eventually led to the German Federation and to Bismarck himself. Dr. Gooch prefaces his study of Bismarck by an acute analysis of the German theories of the State, theories

which, in the case at any rate of Hegel, it is very difficult for a modern jurist to accept. But at any rate the cycle of theories led to a theoretical recognition of the work of the individual in many quarters, though it may be thought with truth that Bismarck embodied once again Hobbes' Leviathan. Dr. Gooch perhaps does not take that view. He says bluntly that "Bismarck, like Napoleon, was a ruthless destroyer; but unlike the Emperor, he was even greater as an architect." The present writer ventures to question that view, though the truth of the respective views cannot be tested till Bismarck, like Napoleon, has retreated into the perspective of history. Bismarck had time to build. He had not all the nations of Europe on his back. Yet

vast and splendid as was his intellect, the vision of a new international order resting on a partnership of contented self-governing national units was beyond his ken. The main task of the twentieth century as it emerges from the shattering ordeal of the war is the organisation of a shrinking world. To the shaping of the human spirit for that supreme adventure Bismarck contributed nothing either by example or precept. He was content to work for his country alone and was satisfied with his rapturous applause.

That was not Goethe's way, that was not Napoleon's way. If France and England could have united in 1802 in a permanent Peace of Amiens, fifty years of reaction and the Year of Revolutions would not have been necessary, and the basis of the work of reconstructing Europe would have been undertaken while the anvil was hot and the greatest administrative mind that the world has known would have been ready for his work. Napoleon did immortal things even with the burdens that lay upon him. He, like Bismarck, entirely reconstructed the nation of his adoption and he did one great international deed: the framing of his great code, the code that, after a century and a quarter, finds its echoes all over the world. He himself counted those achievements higher than his series of victories. He was an architect who could have worked on the very lines upon which Goethe thought, the lines that Dr. Gooch especially admires. He had the capacity for choosing great men to help him. He was never jealous of their powers. Great as Bismarck was he deliberately chose Baron von Holstein, the *âme damnée* of modern Germany, as his helper. Dr. Gooch's elaborate essay on that strange man throws great light not only on the period of Bismarck but on all the foreign and even domestic policies of Germany up to 1914, though Holstein himself died in 1909. Napoleon would not have tolerated Holstein for a moment. Yet this study in personalities with which Dr. Gooch's book opens strikes the note of the whole book,

enclosure, browsing the flowers and thorns of Experience in a contented and apparently reprehensible solitude. Remembering the "group-psychology" of which we hear so much now, I was not surprised by sidelong glances from some among the virtuous but less imaginative matrons.

What did surprise me was to discover how many of these ladies, whom the highbrow considers to be completely taken up by bridge, would have liked to join me and nibble at the Herb of Understanding outside the official railings. To look into the world about you is after all a natural human craving. Why should the British official's wife, alone of her species, be deprived of so innocent a pastime? She deprives herself, you will say very justly. There is nobody in the world, not even her husband, who would really object to her studying whatever she likes in the life that goes on around her. It is merely just "not done."

Consider the force of such a taboo. A young bride comes out, full of ardour and good intentions, with a grammar of whatever the local language may be ready in her suitcase, and the firm resolve to learn and know as much as possible of the life of the people among whom her husband's work is to lie. If she joins him in some remote district far from her own kind, she carries out the project and becomes a useful member of the Empire. But if she finds herself in a British community of any size at all, only a quite unusual amount of character and perseverance will enable her to do so. She will have very many social calls; the business of running a house will be found to take up more time and to be more difficult than at home; and the drudgery inseparable from the learning of anything new also needs real enthusiasm to make her face it. She would, however, overcome all these natural inherent obstacles if this were expected of her, if she were smiled upon by the general approval, and if she felt that she was making a really useful effort for the good of our British name. But not at all. Unless she is very careful, she will be considered eccentric and incomprehensible and—strangest of all—she may even run the risk of being thought unpatriotic. Small wonder that after a year or two her good intentions have vanished like smoke, leaving only a faint regret behind. This is deplorable because there is really no reason for it. It is a mere fashion which even those who impose it would no longer justify in so many words. It is in fact theoretically exploded. But this does not prevent it from continuing in practice, and perhaps it may do so for a very long time. And meanwhile time is precious.

We are no longer in a position to neglect the instruments we possess: far less those human instruments which are capable of doing harm as well as good. Next to our officials themselves,

their wives are perhaps the greatest asset we have; within their own community—and they have rarely been asked to think of anything beyond that—they show continuously, and as a matter of course, the sterling stuff they are made of. If we raised the standard one degree so as to embrace a wider horizon, not in action, but in point of view, most of them would welcome and be found equal to the change.

What might be accomplished in a positive way is beyond the scope of this article; nor do I wish to be accused of "feminism" or any "ism" at all. All I plead is that we should be encouraged to devote some time and energy to the study of not doing harm. It is a modest ambition, but not so very easy. It postulates a knowledge of what other people think and say. In all the world there is a right and a wrong way of saying things, unfortunately not everywhere the same. The London manner in Timbuctoo is often very unsatisfactory. Our men are taught with great care to study the Timbuctoo manner if that is where they happen to be sent. Our women may do so if they like, but it is not a fashionable thing to do. I think it would be to the interest of the Empire if we made it as fashionable as possible.

FREYA STARK.

the method of the whole work, the comparative study of personalities leading to the broad issues which have controlled the destinies of many aspects of the modern world.

* * *

J. E. G. DE M.

THE RELIGION OF MAN.*

These Hibbert Lectures by Dr. Rabindranath Tagore, delivered at Manchester College, Oxford, in May 1930, have now been published in an enlarged form. In these lectures Dr. Tagore enunciates his views on human life in its relation to the Divine, and his ideas concerning the nature and being of God. Apparently man is the only created being known to us who has conceived the idea of God, and this conception has placed him on a higher level, since that conception runs through all races and nations of the earth, from the lowest depths of heathendom to the highest mystical conception of a creative super-Being dwelling spiritually within His creation. It is this religious experience, or as the Quaker would term it, "the Inner Light," that Dr. Tagore strives to bring before his readers. To quote from his preface:

In the present volume I offer the evidence of my own personal life brought into a definite form. To some of my readers this will supply matter of psychological interest, but to others I hope it will carry with it its own ideal value important for such a subject as religion.

It is a difficult task for the Western mind to criticise, or even to review a work that is written from an Eastern point of view. Yet the main theme which had been growing in the thoughts of Dr. Tagore from youth upwards, that the religion of man is "a religious experience and not merely a philosophical subject," is found in Christianity—whose birthplace is Eastern. The flesh—*material*—profiteth nothing: "the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." Dr. Tagore says that he writes as a poet. He has established his title to the name. Yet, indeed, all are poets, even though mute and inglorious, who harbour within themselves a spiritual sense or vision which illuminates their experiences, or consciousness; these silent poets have not Dr. Tagore's gift of expression which so charms his readers, but their insight may be poetic and thus show forth the spiritual in their daily lives. To these unconscious poets this Eastern poet gives, very often, needed outward expression. The selfless life which blossoms with the beauty of holiness, as Dr. Tagore says elsewhere, "The renunciation of the individual self

* *The Religion of Man*. By Rabindranath Tagore. George Allen & Unwin.
7s. 6d. net.

for the sake of the supreme soul . . . is not in the negation of self, but in the dedication of it." And that dedication means unity, and spiritual union. This aspiration towards unity is not far behind St. Paul's phrase: "Till we come in the unity of the faith . . . to a perfect man." Man as man demands a sonship with the Creator. St. Paul reminded his Greek hearers "We are also His offspring." It is this unity with its Creator which the created claims.

The religion of man, according to Dr. Tagore, is apart from mind and cannot be attained by it. Yet surely mind is one of the component parts of man's individuality by which the material or temporal grasps the spiritual. It is the full mind which differentiates man from the lower animal creation. The animal rejoices in the light and warmth of the sun, and all the gifts of nature, as we term them, but, as far as we know, they do not lead him up consciously to God, though instinct is a very precious thing and plays its part in both man and the lesser creations from which man sprang. To be spiritually-minded is the quest of the Christian as of the Hindoo mystic, and by it rests the hope of ultimate harmony. The author of these most interesting lectures strives to lead the student to the contemplation of man's humanity and man's religion, whether it be as a visionary, or artist, or music-maker:

We are the music-makers,
We are the dreamers of dreams.

These aspects are treated in the various chapters from the poet's angle, and express his deepest thoughts on life and his attitude towards it.

The appendices are very interesting, especially at a time when our relations with India are being freshly thought out. Dr. Tagore ends his lectures on an optimistic note, believing that "some great voice is waiting to be heard which will usher in the sacred light of truth in the dark hours of politics, the voice that will proclaim that 'God is over all . . . the beginning and end of all things.'" The idea of unity is the key-note of this work, and the author in a closing sentence says, "For myself, I feel proud whenever I find that the best in the world have their fundamental agreement." He feels strongly that "Rampant individualism is against what is truly human—that is to say spiritual; it belongs to the primitive poverty of the animal life, it is the confinement of a cramped spirit of restricted consciousness." "An internal truth of unity" is Dr. Tagore's objective, and he declares "that faith in the perfect builds the path for the perfect." India needs that note to-day.

S. DE M.

THE DOLLAR AND ITS INFLUENCE ON TRADE.

THE world is at a loss to know why the United States of America, for years the buttress of prosperity, should, in spite of their phenomenal success, which has resulted in monopolising half the world's gold supply, have suddenly been plunged into a maelstrom of depression more searching, more devastating, than any experienced in past time, either in America or elsewhere. They had escaped the ravages of war and had, indeed, profited largely by three years of neutrality which filled their coffers with money and encouraged rapid expansion of industries. Undoubtedly the causes of the slump are deep and not easy to analyse, but few can doubt that the monetary machine has functioned so badly that it has not been possible to prevent a disintegration of the economic system, accompanied by a downward movement in the value of land, property and commodities, which has clipped the wings of every capitalist, large and small, and has brought great suffering to men of small means. Indeed, no fact in the economic history of the world is more arresting than this sudden transition of the United States of America from the position of a debtor to that of a creditor nation. Fostered by exorbitant war profits, within four years her industries underwent vast expansion which brought the country into the front rank of exporters. In the meanwhile re-equipment of plant and harmonious relations between capital and labour consolidated industry and buttressed it against attack from foreign competitors, whose strength had been sapped by the war. High wages coincided with low production costs, fostering a vast output which scattered riches amongst all ranks of the population and created a spending power in excess of that of any country in the world. While Europe paused to take breath on the conclusion of hostilities, America went ahead by leaps and bounds and accumulated capital on a scale beyond the dreams of avarice. To many it appeared that a new era had arisen; that America stood on a pedestal quite apart from the ruck of humanity; in short, it was thought that nothing could ever disturb this halcyon dream. A new doctrine was promulgated to the effect that the higher the wages and the greater one's personal expenditure, the greater would be the general prosperity. Saving was scorned, indeed it was redundant, since a widespread system of credit facilitated the acquisition of both necessities and luxuries by a vast extension of the hire purchase system which actually anticipated future demand and filled to overflowing the order books of every factory within the Union.

A favourable settlement of war debts attracted to New York the

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steady flow of gold which depleted the treasuries of Europe, and this constituted a basis for extended credits for American industry. Finally a sum of £1,000 million worth of gold was deposited within the deep vaults of New York banks. To sterilise this gigantic excess and prevent inflation caused deep concern to the Federal Reserve Board, and their efforts met with some success, but although prices were kept within bounds, it is now apparent that the top-heavy credit position prevented the natural fall—which was due through improved methods of production—of the prices of commodities not only in America but throughout the world. Since the American buying power was almost illimitable, it controlled the markets, and to their lag may be attributed the catastrophic fall which has undermined industry and agriculture since the collapse of the artificial régime and the breakdown of world credits. On the one hand a tower of gold and superabundant credit, on the other side of the picture penury and scarcity of credit and a clogged demand for manufactures through the closing of American ports to foreign goods by an insurmountable tariff wall.

The situation is parallel to that of the great barriers which dam back the flood waters of the Nile, releasing them later for the irrigation of Lower Egypt. But in this case the engineers kept the sluices closed and continued to add to the height of the wall until the irresistible flow of water broke through, carrying everything before it. As the financial and industrial world is constituted to-day it is impossible to maintain unequal distribution of gold, currency or credit; for the same law which makes water find its level, operates to like degree in the case of money, tending to spread it by variations of discount rate and other factors, capital flowing where it can secure best terms, which naturally is where it is scarce.

The Federal Reserve Board tried to direct surplus capital into foreign investment and recommended the banks to invest abroad. Inexperienced in such transactions, much capital was placed in Germany and in second-class South American securities, and was subsequently frozen, lost or greatly reduced, thus discouraging further ventures. Capital thereafter was retained at home and, being thrown on a glutted market, gravitated to the Stock Exchange, encouraging a boom which raised prices of industrial stocks to a dizzy height. Easy and quick profits made it remunerative to borrow even on exorbitant terms, high enough to attract considerable capital even from impoverished Europe, thus adding weight to an overloaded monetary market. The crash was as sudden as it was severe, falling like a fury in November 1929, crushing out one after the other the speculative investors, begin-

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Mr. R. S. Garnett's translation with an introduction of Alexandre Dumas' work entitled "On Board the *Emma*: Adventures with Garibaldi's 'Thousand' in Sicily" by an oversight has not been noticed in these pages, but it is not too late to draw attention to its abundant merits. The king of romancers, Dumas, for once is telling a true story of which he and Garibaldi are the joint centre. The author of *Monte Cristo* and *Les Trois Mousquetaires* which appeared in 1844-5 fifteen years later sailed in his Liverpool-built yacht, the *Emma*, to join Garibaldi and his Thousand in Sicily. He had known Garibaldi in South America and loved him, but the mysterious appearance of the *Emma* "with a band of joyous young men and a charming young lady attired as a midshipman, has been often misunderstood." Yet in fact Dumas loved Garibaldi and the cause of Italian Unity. Mr. Garnett possesses the manuscript of the "diary" which Dumas kept. It was published in part in an English version in 1861, but the half was not told. The whole of the work is now before the reader, Dumas at his best, and even the present generation know what that means.

The second volume of Prince Bülow's *Memoirs*† covers the years 1903-1909, and is the most important and interesting of the four; for it embraces the first Morocco crisis, the Russo-Japanese war, the Bosnian crises, the early stages of the naval rivalry with England, and the *Daily Telegraph* interview. A full account of this volume appeared in these pages in February 1931, shortly after the publication of the original. A considerable literature already exists on the Bülow Memoirs, for the work swarms with mistakes and mis-statements, and many of the actors whom the Prince attacks have very naturally hit back. Despite, however, the regrettable tone of the author's references to his colleagues and critics, and despite his unalloyed satisfaction with his own performances, Bülow's apologia will be read for generations. The present instalment ends with his fall in 1909, and the detailed account of the *Daily Telegraph* crisis is as exciting as any novel. If Bülow cannot be described as a great statesman, he was at any rate a great story-teller.

Mahatma Gandhi at Work† is a further volume of Mr. Gandhi's autobiography, edited by Mr. C. F. Andrews. The earlier volume, *Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story*, dealt with his early life and his work on behalf of the Indian workers in South Africa. The new volume is a continuation of the account and is concerned chiefly with Mr. Gandhi's passive resistance campaign in the Transvaal. Mr. Andrews has also added chapters "which complete the picture of his dietetic and fasting experiments, together with certain personal idiosyncrasies that go to make up his complex character." There can be no doubt that Mr. Gandhi's character is very difficult for most people to understand. He is a politician as well as a Mahatma; but in this volume and in *Mr. Gandhi: the Man*‡ by Mrs. M. W. Polak he

* Ernest Benn. 21s. net.
† Putnam. 25s.

‡ (1) *Mahatma Gandhi at Work*. Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d. net.
(2) *Mr. Gandhi: the Man*. Allen & Unwin. 5s. net cloth, 3s. 6d. net paper.

appears chiefly as a Mahatma. The latter volume is an interesting account of Mrs. Polak's personal friendship with Mr. Gandhi in South Africa. Many of the anecdotes deserve attention in helping to understand the Mahatma's character. Mr. C. F. Andrews in a Foreword writes: "It would be impossible to find a better foil to set off the peculiar temperament of Mr. Gandhi. With a strong imagination of her own, she is yet critical and stands upon solid fact where he soars into the sky. Though an idealist herself, she seeks by rare common sense and penetrating insight to test his theories and check what she regards as his extravagances." It is fair to add that in this book the doubts and questions of Mrs. Polak usually result in a vindication of Mr. Gandhi's views.

* * *

Miss Eleanor Farjeon has done *The Canterbury Tales* into charming prose, and Christmas time is the time to read them, illustrated as they are by Mr. W. Russell Flint's entrancing pictures.* That is the excuse for a late notice of this most admirable gift-book. Miss Farjeon's aim is that Chaucer should be read by those who would be baffled by fourteenth-century English "and so would miss for ever something of the fun, the beauty, the wisdom, the humanity, and the romance, in which he stands among our poets second only to Shakespeare." The perfection of the *Knight's Tale* is followed by the wonderful series which concludes with the perfection of the *Parson's Tale*, in which occurs that vision of heaven "where there is neither hunger, nor thirst, nor cold, but every soul is replenished with the sight of the perfect knowledge of God." It is a wonderful series and Miss Farjeon's noble prose makes it live in our modern eyes.

* * *

Dr. Podach's *The Madness of Nietzsche*† aroused widespread interest in Germany on its appearance, and in its English dress it will be welcomed by students of one of the most original and influential thinkers of the nineteenth century. The story of the collapse is so sad that it might seem almost indelicate to reveal all its details; but Nietzsche belongs to history, and, like other celebrities, must pay the penalty of his fame. Dr. Podach, who has been working at his theme for years, has collected a mass of fresh material not only on the mental breakdown itself but on some of the emotional experiences which preceded it. We are interested to learn of his hopeless love for the gifted girl Lou Salome in the early 'eighties, in whom he hoped to find a pupil and a helpmate; and the Nietzsche family is here presented in a new and surprising light. His mother and sister, indeed, instead of being a comfort to the lonely man, appear to have been thorns in the flesh. The pages on Cosima Wagner also throw new light on a remarkable woman. Other well-known figures cross the stage, such as Burckhardt, Strindberg and Brandes. The book forms a valuable addition to the mass of explanatory and controversial literature that has grown up round a great but tormented soul.

* *Tales from Chaucer: The Canterbury Tales done into prose*. The Medici Society. 7s. 6d. net.

† Putnam. 7s. 6d.

ning with the weakest and ranging higher until not even the banks themselves were immune. A shakeout which was expected to last a few months has continued for two years and is not yet at an end. Since it started it is estimated that £20,000 million has been written off the value of stocks and shares in the United States, and some thousands of banks have closed their doors, while unemployment is on a vast scale.

It is opportune at this moment to examine the capacity of the banks to stand the strain, and to try to ascertain what influence upon the situation they may have had. Have they relieved the tension or have they accentuated the trouble? Upon a correct answer to these questions depends a true diagnosis of the American banking system, and its functioning for good or ill in the finance and development of industry and commerce. We must turn our attention to 1907, for at that date, as the result of a severe commercial depression resulting in a crash, the banking system was remodelled and the Federal Reserve Banks came into being in 1913. What new feature did these introduce, and why have they not responded fully to the needs of a critical situation such as that through which the United States are now passing?

It calls for no deep research to find that a system which has completely failed to control the supply of currency and credit in such a way as to keep going industry and agriculture, is lacking in some element which makes for stability. But to ascertain what this element may be calls for patient investigation amongst a sea of complicated regulations pertaining to a currency system which has grown, not as a result of some far-seeing, deep-laid scheme, but as an empirical evolution moulded by the exigencies of the changing conditions imposed by a rapid development of the vast resources of the country, under the stimulus of a rare energy, and great organising ability. No one can deny that mechanical developments in industry and agriculture have greatly surpassed the growth of the mechanism of the banking and currency sections. Indeed the plight of the world to-day may be attributed directly to the clogging of the credit machine through a lack of understanding of its function in relation to output, and through American misunderstanding of the working of international banking. To double production, without expanding correspondingly the means of distributing the products, was bound to lead to a check, and caused the inevitable fall in the price of commodities commensurate with the deficiency of currency and credit based upon gold reserves. The absorption by the speculative market of New York during 1928-9 of vast sums, pulled up industry with a jerk by starving it of credits. A cancerous growth of ill-placed credits supplanted a healthy organisation of commercial credits.

What part did the U.S.A. banking system play in the precipitation of this crisis? The pages of Dr. W. A. Shaw's masterly work *The Theory and Principles of Central Banking* contain a sound analysis of the currency system of the U.S.A. The author argues that the Federal Reserve system, although the boldest and most comprehensive attempt at central banking, "falls far short of being complete as a federated system or ideal as a centralised system." Britain comes nearest to a watertight system by the rigid control of her central bank, which has the sole responsibility of the issue of currency, and a control of the monetary policy of the country; but in the United States the banking system is mainly geographical, twelve districts each possessing its own capital reserve bank. But herein lies the snag. Membership is not compulsory save for the National Banks, and as a result half the banks of the United States have chosen to stand completely outside the Federal system. Furthermore, the twelve Federal Banks are not themselves united, represented and controlled by one common central head bank. It is true that these banks are subject to the control of the Federal Board, partly political, partly expert; but their discount policy, which is the pith and core of the central bank concept, remains completely outside this control. Does not this amply explain the phenomena which have puzzled wise heads on this side, and why thousands of banks should have failed during the last two years, completely undermining public confidence and leading to the hoarding of paper money and gold? The system provides a certain elasticity of currency issue as the twelve central reserve banks are permitted to rediscount for their constituent or member bank commercial bills, and in its turn the Federal Reserve Board again rediscounts the paper by issuing Federal Reserve notes against it, thus constituting additional currency. "Theoretically the currency of the United States contracts or expands with the ebb and flow of business, but unfortunately the extra commercial paper, called into existence, already functions as currency and by issuing Federal Reserve notes in addition they duplicate the marginal elasticity quantum; in other words, they directly inflate the currency issue. But commercial bills are not always confined to genuine trade acceptances and may be the product of stock exchange speculation. During the gamble of 1928-9 this constituted a formidable inflationary element which contributed to the exaggerated rise in the price of stocks and shares, many of these reaching five times or more their nominal value." Dr. Shaw suggests that to reform this would appear essential; that the discount rate should be made compulsory in all its constituents and it must cease to dilute currency by the inflationary method mentioned above.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Cambridge men and students of philosophy will welcome the charming little memoir of McTaggart by his lifelong friend Mr. Lowes Dickinson.* Full justice is done to his rare personality and his eccentric ways, his friendships and his philosophy. For a generation he was the outstanding thinker of the younger University, as was Bradley of the older. He found salvation in early life in Hegel, and remained a faithful disciple to the end. The idealism which reigned in the academic world when McTaggart was forming his opinions has been challenged from several quarters, and other currents now flow through the lecture-rooms. But it will be long before his three volumes on Hegel and *The Nature of Existence* lose their interest for seekers after truth.

* * *

In "Education for Life: a Danish Pioneer"† we have an interesting account of N. F. S. Grundvig, the famous educational writer and reformer and the founder of the Danish Folk High School movement. The author, Mrs. Noelle Davies, writes: "If my book succeeds in encouraging others to visit the High Schools . . . and thus obtain a better understanding of Grundvig's ideas and their influence in practical life than they could ever get through books, I shall be satisfied." This book should draw visitors to those remarkable schools.

* * *

The purpose of the "Handbook of Classical Mythology" by Mr. George Howse and Mr. E. A. Harter‡ is to supply in a convenient and compact form the essential information about the characters of Greek and Roman mythology. In order to show the English pronunciation each name is divided into syllables and accented. There are articles on the more important deities and heroes and references are made to the many famous works of literature and to many works of art, ancient and modern, that deal with these characters of the ancient world.

* * *

In his foreword to this extensive "Elian Miscellany, a Charles Lamb Anthology"§ Mr. S. M. Rich tells the reader that an attempt has been made for the first time to gather within the pages of a single volume a representative miscellany of interest "to the Elian" from well-known as well as obscure sources. The collection is delightful and will widen the ever-growing interest in the work and life of Charles Lamb. The book can be recommended both to lovers of that gentle man and fruitful thinker and to those who would make the acquaintance of one of the finest natures in the nineteenth century.

* Cambridge University Press. 6s.

† Williams & Norgate. 7s. 6d.

‡ George Allen & Unwin. 6s. net.

§ Herbert Josephs. 6s. net.

THE
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

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THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE.

IN the January number of this REVIEW, Sir Francis Young-husband summarised the results of last year's Round Table Conference. Since that article appeared the situation in India has developed so rapidly that there is need for carrying the story of events a little further and for attempting yet another analysis of the political crisis.

When Mr. Gandhi reached India he found the leaders of the Congress entirely unaffected by the atmosphere of mutual confidence that had prevailed in London; he found, on the contrary, that his followers were impatient to renew revolutionary activity and that they had already laid their plans for organising Civil Disobedience and a No-Rent Campaign. As a politician, Mr. Gandhi has always suffered from his inability to come to a decision, and on this occasion he attempted an impossible compromise between two opposite policies: he asked the Viceroy for an interview with a view to a peaceful accommodation, but, at the same time, threatened a renewal of Civil Disobedience, if his proposals were not accepted. The Government of India refused to obey Mr. Gandhi's dictation and acted with an energy to which they have long been strangers; they extended the repressive Ordinances, proclaimed the Working Committee of Congress an unlawful association, and placed its leaders, including Mr. Gandhi himself, under arrest. In addition, Lord Willingdon's Government issued a statement in which they put squarely before the Indian people the case against the Congress and then proceeded to show in temperate language that the maintenance of law and order was an indispensable condition of political progress. The arguments of the Government are unanswerable; disorder is not only a present calamity, but a threat to the very existence of the future constitution; it is, therefore, the duty of the present Government, as the official statement says, "to hand over to the new order a working administration and to resist with all their might forces which would create a state of anarchy and chaos."

It is well that these true words should have been spoken and vigorously enforced. Will they carry conviction to the great mass

Another weak point in American banking lies in the geographical system. As it is not permissible for the Federal Banks to have branches, a host of small independent banks are scattered throughout the Union. Obviously the operation of any one of these banks is confined more or less to its own district. Thus the tendency is to confine finance to the particular commodity which is grown in that district, be it wheat or cotton, so that a setback in that product jeopardises the existence of the bank whose slender capital, unsupported by a substantial parent bank, is liable to be rapidly exhausted. Boom prices tripled land values since the war, and the slump has since shed the surplus value, leaving the banks seriously short of collateral against the substantial advances made to land owners. Between lower land values and commodities sold under cost, and in some cases, as in cotton and wheat for example, artificially sustained in value by the finance operations of the Federal Reserve Board, many banks find themselves in a tight corner with unrealisable assets and little prospect of liquidating the position until a substantial improvement takes place in commodity prices. Unfortunately everything has conspired to a steady rise in the commodity value of gold; in other words commodities have depreciated in the absence of gold to cover currency issues, until debtors have found it more and more difficult to meet obligations assumed on a gold basis. The catastrophic fall has reduced most of the producers of the world to a state of insolvency as the direct result of a gold standard made unworkable by the monopolising of gold by two creditor countries.

The redemption of a debt now demands double the weight of any given article, and places the producer in the invidious position of being quite unable to redeem his promises. Unstable currency has wrecked agriculture and industry and disorganised the credit markets of the world. An unsound monetary policy, in bondage to gold, has taken its full vengeance and has left Britain no option but to suspend the gold standard, which must eventually be succeeded by a monetary system capable of functioning in good times or bad. If we eliminate the gravest defects of a crude system, we remove the cause of such severe fluctuations in money commodity values as have brought the world to its present pass, and we should be able to give the producer a fair deal.

It has been shown how American currency policy has evolved by sundry changes, forced upon Government by necessity. This has left a legacy which causes confusion in the mind of the uninitiated and certainly does not contribute to sound currency. There are five types of currency in the United States, and this constitutes the weak spot in their monetary system. In addition to national bank notes, greenbacks and gold and silver certificates,

the Federal Reserve system makes bills available for rediscount, and this operation may take the form of the issue of Federal Reserve Notes, thus duplicating an already automatic currency and making for inflation. If the Federal Reserve system is accepted as a true central bank it should account for the whole issue, on a scientific principle, to the United States, constituting a national currency which is uniform in type and covers the whole Union. Such a consolidation of currency would strengthen immeasurably the whole financial structure and would enable the Federal Reserve Board to secure complete control of the monetary policy, thus permitting them to issue or withdraw currency according to trade requirements. But it must be obvious that a monetary system mainly founded upon a 100 per cent. gold cover can with difficulty stem the tide of such adverse currents as have been running of late, and that a broader basis is essential if stability is to be attained.

There may be other factors within the American banking system which are not generally known and which may explain what appears to be an anomaly in sound practice. But there can be little doubt that a system which calls for such an uneconomic use of gold as cover is extravagant, and not only stands arraigned in the United States itself, but precludes the extended use of gold as a standard by countries less favourably placed. Therefore the necessity arises for Britain to take a lead in the adoption of a monetary standard which will be free from the disabilities inherent in gold, whose supply is inadequate to fulfil its function as a world standard. Apart from this there is not sufficient gold in the world to allow for an expansion of currency in the United States such as will undoubtedly be required when trade revives. Moreover, forces are at work which can scarcely fail to reduce drastically the enormous deposits of gold acquired by America in recent years, at the expense of other countries. Sooner or later it will be found necessary to adopt a scientific monetary standard, broader in basis than gold or gold and silver, and if, as we confidently hope, Britain should courageously give a lead in this direction, it would be a first step towards the evolution of a new type of world currency, as superior to gold as gold was to cowries.

ALFRED WIGGLESWORTH.

nothing to prevent Indians from being appointed Governors of Provinces as soon as vacancies occur. As a matter of fact one Indian has already held such a post substantively and others have officiated for short periods. The situation as regards the Viceroy's Executive Council is equally unfettered by legislative restriction. The Council as at present constituted consists of seven members (including the Commander-in-Chief); if this number is retained I should like not less than four but preferably five to be Indians. The number of the Members of Council is not, however, limited by Statute and there would be considerable advantage in raising the number to nine of whom, in my view, six should be Indians. It is here worth while to consider what the Simon Report has to say about the Governor-General's Council. The Statutory Commissioners did not indeed recommend the extension of responsibility to the Central Government but they had a helpful habit of looking to the future and preparing the way for constitutional evolution. They saw that this Council would develop into the Cabinet of a Parliamentary Government and they dropped several hints and suggestions which might with advantage be developed now. Their first proposal is that the Governor-General should choose his own Council, which is common sense that must commend itself to every one. Their next suggestion is the creation of an additional member to hold the position of Leader of the Federal Assembly. This obviously gives an opportunity for appointing another Indian to the Council but it is recommended by the Commission on general grounds. The words of the Report are: "We think it very desirable that there should be included in the Governor-General's Council a Member not overburdened with departmental work whose primary function should be to 'lead the House.' . . . Nothing is more remarkable to an English Member of Parliament who has had the opportunity of watching the Legislative Assembly than the fact that a heavily burdened permanent official who is the head of the Home Department is also expected to discharge in the Legislature the duty of being the principal Government spokesman and of guiding the course of business so far as it falls to Government to do so. It is very much as though the permanent head of one of the principal departments in Whitehall should also undertake the Parliamentary functions of the First Lord of the Treasury."

Besides the Leader of the Federal Assembly there is obviously need for yet another member in the Viceroy's Council and that on grounds of administrative efficiency and not for the political purpose of finding places for Indians. The Statutory Commission's Report gives a short summary of the work the different members are now expected to get through; here is a list of the

responsibilities heaped upon one of them. "The Education, Health and Lands Department is also concerned with such subjects as local government, agriculture, forests, famine relief, etc., so far as these subjects touch central administration and responsibility, and in addition deals with questions concerning the position of Indians in other parts of the Empire." Seeing that the mastery of three such gigantic subjects as Education, Health and Lands would alone overtax the capacity of a super-man the enumeration of the Member's ancillary duties must be a piece of gentle irony. There is clearly work enough before the Governor-General's Council to keep another member actively employed. Another less important amendment may be mentioned here. The Viceroy's Council will shortly become the Cabinet of a Parliamentary Government; appointments to it will therefore be made for political reasons and not in accordance with the rules governing permanent Civil Servants. One such rule now prevalent is that an individual should not ordinarily hold the same appointment for more than one term, i.e. for five years. This of course is quite contrary to the practice of Democracy which employs its statesmen, like M. Briand, over and over again up to the last hour that health permits them to serve their country. The democratic practice should from now onwards be applied to Indian Members of Council; it would be a wise anticipation of the future needs of India to appoint such tried statesmen as Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru to a second or third term of office in order to provide the future Parliament of India with a nucleus of men who had had a wide experience of the working of the administrative machine.

There is, as it seems to me, a great deal to be said in favour of the immediate appointment of Indians to the highest positions in the government of their own country; it is a policy to which we are already pledged and which must certainly be put into force with the coming of the new Government of India Act. Nothing is gained by delay. Those of my countrymen who dislike and distrust the whole policy to which we are pledged may exclaim that I am advocating surrender before we have come to the last ditch. That from their point of view is undoubtedly true, but I would urge that the collaboration of Indians with the old régime, even when it is expiring, is the best chance that now remains of handing on to the Ministers of the new constitution the methods and ideals which English officers have built into the framework of Indian administration. I admit without reservation that the impending changes are tantamount to a revolution; the vice of all revolutionary governments is their eagerness to make a clean break with the past, and it is this clean break which I am most anxious to avoid. The best chance of avoiding it that

I can see lies in the formation among Indians of a group of Elder Statesmen in whom the enthusiasm for change will be tempered by the experience of office.

I turn now to a consideration of the second item in our political programme, the transformation of an autocracy into a popular government. I have already indicated my alarm at the frantic haste with which it is proposed to bring about this momentous change. My hope is that if India's distrust of England's sincerity were appeased there would not then be the same desire as now exists to carry through this revolution at headlong speed. It is, I fear, no longer possible to avoid it. The politically minded in India certainly desire that the government should be "modernised." They protest even now, as Major Atlee said in the House of Commons, that they do not want to exchange a white oligarchy for a brown oligarchy; but there would not be the same passion for political change as there is behind the demand for national freedom; there would not, therefore, be the same impatience at the care and deliberation that ought certainly to be devoted to the framing of a federal constitution. It is mere petulance to deny that the great problems are still unsolved. The Round Table Conference has achieved much; both the Indian and British delegates displayed great qualities of statesmanship, but they failed to define the conditions under which the Princes will join the Federation and the manner in which the rights of minorities will be protected. It is mere verbiage to talk of safeguards unless we know what force there is to support these safeguards and in whose hands that force shall reside. I confess that I am quite at a loss to understand how the safeguards which Sir Samuel Hoare enumerated in the House of Commons are to be reconciled with the Central Government's responsibility to an elected chamber. I am not arguing that these problems are insoluble, but I do contend that much time and much patience will be needed for their solution. This is not only because these questions are intrinsically difficult but because they cannot be settled until some aspects of public opinion have been sensibly modified. Statesmanship has not only to find a right solution but to win over to that solution great blocks of humanity; that is a process which necessarily takes a great deal of time, but it is quite as important as the right solution. H.H. the Aga Khan and the other Moslem delegates to the Round Table Conference were quite right in refusing to agree to a compromise upon the Minorities question, because no compromise reached in London would have been honoured in India. A true leader is not one who strikes a bargain without consulting his followers but one who first satisfies himself that a certain course is wise and then

sets to work to convince his followers of its wisdom. When the rank and file Moslems and Hindus in India can be brought so near to a settlement as their representatives reached in London one of the obstacles to Indian autonomy will have been cleared away, but that result cannot be achieved in a hurry. Another question of great practical importance was almost untouched at the Round Table Conference. Provincial autonomy can hardly hope to succeed without a liberal readjustment of provincial frontiers, but the rearrangement of administrative areas demands patient examination on the ground and invariably takes a long time.

To sum up: I entirely sympathise with the demand of Indians to be masters in their own house and I wish to see them put into that position without delay under the terms of the existing constitution. On the other hand, the erection of a popular government upon a society which is neither national nor democratic, in the Western sense of those words, is a very hazardous and difficult task. Much hard thinking in the study and much propaganda among the people still remain to be done; unless the foundations of the new constitution for India are well and truly laid the whole fabric will quickly collapse. To put contentious questions, unsolved or badly solved, into the body of the constitution is to foredoom India to disaster. The Fathers of the American constitution burked the question of slavery and it cost the lives of a million men in a later generation to make good their omission.

THEODORE MORISON.

THE WORLD CRISIS AND THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE.

THE causes of the world crisis go back to the world war; for the war has made the nations more fearful and suspicious of one another than ever before; while war debts (including reparations) have intensified and aggravated the disunion of the world when its only hope of reviving prosperity lay in international co-operation. War debts (including reparations) are due in the main from Germany as the chief debtor, to the United States and France as the chief creditors. But for President Hoover's moratorium, most of the war debts and reparations payable in 1931-2 would have consisted of the sum of £83,000,000 (gold) flowing from Germany in the form of reparations, passing through France, Italy, Belgium and other countries which intercept £34,000,000, until at last £49,000,000 reaches the United States in the form of war debts. Part of this stream flows through Great Britain, but none of it stays there. But France retains £20,000,000, Italy £2,000,000, Belgium £3,500,000, and other countries £6,500,000. Such is the greater part of one year's instalment of a total debt exceeding in amount all the monetary gold of the world.

Because of international fear and suspicion, many countries have been trying since the war to become economically self-sufficient. They are anxious to depend as little as possible on other countries, in case another war might cut off indispensable supplies. Their policy of "economic nationalism" has led to high and variable tariffs—seven thousand more miles of tariff walls in Europe since the war. Behind these barriers new food stuffs have been grown and new industries developed without regard to the existence of sufficient supplies elsewhere. In this way the world's productive capacity has, for the moment, increased more rapidly than happens in normal times. There has followed an over-supply of certain commodities. When, for example, new regions of Europe are put under wheat, despite the fact that the normal expansion of the wheat-growing area of Canada would have sufficed to supply Europe's growing needs, a glut of wheat in North America is the inevitable consequence. Over-supply lowers prices and causes unemployment in the industries whose products can no longer be exported. This unemployment reduces consumption of other commodities, and so the unemployment spreads from one industry to another. The North American farmer who cannot sell his wheat, even at a very low price, cannot buy new tractors or continue to pay the instalments due on those he has already purchased. The manufacture of tractors, and of motor-cars, is

therefore curtailed; and the men who are thrown out of employment spend less money, so that the unemployment spreads to the textile and other industries. The value of industrial securities thus rapidly declines; and, in fact, the losses on the New York Stock Exchange during one month ending in the middle of November 1929 equalled the British National Debt—£7,000,000,000.

Faced by such colossal losses, and having regard to the political instability of Europe as shown by the unwillingness seriously to reduce expenditure upon armaments, it is no wonder that American investors ceased to send their money to Europe, and particularly to Germany. Since the collapse of the German currency in 1922, more than £800,000,000 (gold) had been invested in or lent to Germany, mainly by the United States and Great Britain. When the inflow of American money ceased, a large amount of German labour became unemployed, and this unemployment tended to spread to every country which had business relations with Germany. Moreover Germany, whose reparation payments had hitherto been made out of incoming investments and loans, had now to pay in goods or services or gold. Since tariffs put obstacles in the way of the free movement of goods, most of the payments had to be made in gold; and this led to the accumulation of gold in the United States and in France. By the summer of 1931 these two countries had acquired two-thirds of the world's monetary gold.

The consequent shortage of gold meant an increase in the value of gold in terms of other commodities, or a decrease in the value of these commodities in terms of gold. This world-wide fall in prices caused further unemployment, since no one wants to manufacture for profit goods which will cost more to produce than the price they will command when completed six months or more after the raw material has been bought and paid for. Thus unemployment increased until, in the spring of 1931, there were more than twenty million unemployed throughout the world. If the fall in prices and the consequent unemployment had, as is usual, brought down the average level of wages, the demand for currency would have become less and the amount of gold kept in the central banks might have been reduced. In fact, however, no such fall in wages took place. The demand for currency did not decrease, and as gold continued to flow to America and France, one country after another was forced off the gold standard. In so far as foreign creditors foresaw this result, their panic made it swift and sure. The assistance of the League of Nations must now be sought to solve the very difficult problem of stabilising world prices, perhaps by the adoption of a new monetary policy in place of the gold standard.

But, as we have seen, the present crisis is mainly due to international distrust on the one hand and to war debts (including reparations) on the other. There is no way out of our troubles unless these causes are removed. Nothing would do more to restore international confidence than the success of the first World Disarmament Conference when it meets this month. And the principal creditor country is not likely to agree to the cancellation of war debts until she realises that it would cost her less than she could gain from an all-round reduction in the scale of expenditure upon armaments. For both these reasons it is essential, if the financial and economic crisis is to be safely passed and is not to recur, that the Disarmament Conference should bring about a real reduction in the armies, navies and air forces of the world. By "Disarmament" I mean the reduction and limitation of national armaments by international agreement. I do not mean disarmament by example, or one-sided disarmament. Nor do I imply that a total disappearance of armaments is likely, or even desirable.

One other matter we must get clear at the outset: What are armaments for? Before 1914 the answer was easy. It is implicit in Canning's phrase—"Each one for himself, and God for us all"—which marked the return of Europe to "international anarchy" after Castlereagh's premature attempt at organising peace. Each State had then to provide for its own security by the greatest armaments it could afford. When, for example, Prussia proposed, in the middle of last century, to seize the Danish provinces of Schleswig and Holstein, the old King (afterwards Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse) observed that he had no right to make an unprovoked attack on Denmark. Bismarck's answer was "It has always been the tradition of the House of Hohenzollern to extend its territories." And the duchies became part of Prussia. For England the answer to the question: "What use are armaments?" was particularly easy. For more than one hundred years after Trafalgar, Britain enjoyed unchallenged naval supremacy, easily maintained because of her unrivalled position in finance and industry. Britannia ruled the waves, policed the seas, abolished the slave trade and put down piracy. Behind the sure shield of the Royal Navy, British merchantmen came and went in safety, while the future Dominions of the expanding and developing British Empire learned to live their own lives free and unafraid. But it is not every country that can be stronger than all the rest. The policy of Europe written in letters of gold on the Austro-Hungarian War Office in Vienna was "*Si vis pacem, para bellum*." They prepared for war and in 1914 war came. The war set fifty-nine million men fighting. It also set many men

thinking for the first time about international problems. As they pondered over world affairs they realised that in the last hundred years civilised mankind had become a single society. On the economic plane the unity was an accomplished fact.

The World Society exists. We are members of it, whether we like it or not. Two-thirds of us in Great Britain are only able to maintain our present standard of life because of our fellow members of the world society overseas. If Great Britain were cut off from the rest of the world, two-thirds of the population of this island would have to disappear, or else our standard of life would have to be reduced to that of Indian coolies. We are Englishmen, citizens of the United Kingdom, citizens of the British Empire; but we are also members of a still larger society. And since there is a world society, there must be some kind of world government, to foster its interests and protect them when they come into conflict with private interests whether of individuals or of nations. Such thoughts as these were in men's minds when, at last, the war came to an end. Superbly phrased and stubbornly pressed by President Wilson, they formed the basis of the opening chapter of the treaties of peace. The Covenant of the League of Nations is the first World Constitution.

When I speak of a world government I do not of course imply the suppression of national or federal governments. The citizen of Northern Ireland has a government in Belfast which is supreme for certain purposes; he has another government at Westminster; and then there is the Imperial Conference, which has some resemblance to a government of the British Empire. The French-speaking citizen of Quebec has a government in Quebec with exclusive powers for that province; he has a national government in Ottawa; and again the Imperial Conference. Once more, the Dutch-speaking citizen of the Transvaal has, in addition to a Provincial Council with delegated powers in Pretoria, a national government in Cape Town; and again there is the Imperial Conference. For British citizens in different parts of the Empire already accustomed to two or three Governments, which do not get in one another's way but co-operate with and supplement one another, it is not difficult to understand the need for a third or fourth government which will strengthen and support all the rest and fill in the interstices between them, doing for the nations what they all want to do but cannot accomplish separately.

Sir Henry Maine said long ago that "The first business of a Government is to maintain order within the community which it pretends to govern." The first business of the League of Nations is to maintain order in the world. It could not hope to do that without the help, or at least the acquiescence, of the

United States. It is therefore well to remember the words spoken by the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate soon after the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact: "It is inconceivable that America would stand idly by in the event of a gross breach of a multilateral treaty to which she is a party." The events of last autumn, when the United States were represented on the League's Council at Geneva for the purpose of preventing an outbreak of war in Manchuria,* show that Senator Borah was not speaking beyond the book. But how is the League to maintain world order? Article 11 of the Covenant provides that "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." How different might have been the fate of Denmark in 1864 if Prussia's threat of war had been treated as a matter of concern to all Europe!

The Covenant is reinforced by the Briand-Kellogg Pact which binds more than sixty States not to use war as an instrument of national policy and never to seek a settlement of their disputes except by pacific means. There are also the Locarno Treaties guaranteeing the western frontier of Germany, the Optional Clause binding most of the Great Powers to submit their legal disputes to the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the General Act binding many nations, including our own, to submit political disputes also to arbitration. These and other instruments are the public law of the world, or of an important part of the world, to-day. Under this modern international law, the principal permissible uses of national armaments are

- (1) to maintain internal order and to police frontiers†; and
- (2) to co-operate in maintaining world order.‡

Everybody knows the difference between a police regulation which is unsupported by public opinion and a police regulation with public opinion behind it. The answer to the question: "How

* It is true that, in this instance, the League did not succeed in preventing Japan from having recourse to armed force, or from making successful use of it as an instrument of her national policy. But that success may be short-lived. The end is not yet: and when it comes Japan may regret that she used her sword to cut the Manchurian knot instead of asking the League to unravel it.

† A further note on this subject is appended: see pp. 153-4.

‡ This is the only permitted use of the armies of Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

† Including, of course, the preservation of territorial integrity and existing political independence against external aggression. The Lord Mayor of London, speaking in the Guildhall on March 24th, 1931, stated that the forces of the Crown now exist "for defence and for joint action with other League Members against any Power which has the criminal folly to break its Covenant and to start a war."

much armaments are needed to maintain world order?" depends upon how far public opinion supports the Covenant and the other treaties which bind the nations not to resort to war. In this matter, as in so much else, the nations of the British Commonwealth have shown the way to the States Members of the League of Nations. H.R.H. the Prince of Wales lately said of the nations of our Commonwealth:

They have solved the problem of Disarmament among themselves, for the question of making war against one another has been relegated to the scrap heap. Differences are settled not by resort to arms . . . but by friendly meetings and conversations round a table. . . .

Surely civilisation has by now reached a point at which we can believe that these facts have some meaning. If one-fourth of the human race can thus prove the practicability of a true League of united but independent nations, is it mere idealism to hope that the remaining three-fourths will be able to tread the same path?

It is important to realise the vital part played by public opinion in determining what armaments are necessary to maintain world order. So long as the nations accept the principle of "pooled security"—the defence of each by the strength of all—the position is one of stable equilibrium. Should any nation then build an unexpected cruiser, the other nations are grateful for this unforeseen contribution to world security, and regard it as a reason why each of them should build less. And the volume of armaments tends to go down. On the other hand, when nations are relying on their own armaments for their security the position is one of unstable equilibrium. Then the building of an unexpected cruiser by some one nation makes several others wonder whether it may not be aimed at them, and they all want to be on the safe side by building additional ships of their own. And the volume of armaments tends to go up. Indeed, if only one powerful nation prefers to rely for its security upon its own unaided armaments, while all the rest accept the principle of "pooled security," that one nation will tend to increase its armaments until the others, becoming suspicious, increase theirs also; and competition leads to war. The danger thus arising from excessive or unlimited armaments anywhere in the world is the reason for the first operative Article of the Covenant, which provides for the reduction and limitation of national armaments by international agreement. That Article has now been in force for nearly twelve years. Yet the reduction of armaments has not gone very far, if indeed there has been any reduction at all except in the case of the "vanquished" countries. Here are the official figures for all the Great Powers: they are taken from the *Economist* for July 18th, 1931, and they show the

expenditure on armaments (effective services only, without pensions) in millions of gold pounds, both before the war and in the year 1930.

	Average 1909-13	1930	Percentage increase since 1909-13 Average per cent.
Great Britain ...	64	95.0	48
France ...	60	94.0	57
Germany ...	70	35.1	-50 (decrease)
Italy ...	25	53.6	114
Russia* ...	76	118.9	56
United States of America	61.7	145.4	135
Japan† ...	19.7	48.0	143
Total, Great Powers ...	376.4	590.0	57

It will be seen that, apart from Germany, the actual expenditure by Great Britain has increased in a smaller proportion than that of any other Great Power. While it is quite true that a golden sovereign would buy far less in 1930 than during the five years before the war, these figures give very little support for the view that armaments—even British armaments—are materially less today than they were at a time of bitter competition when Europe was divided into hostile camps. In the case of Germany, the reduction of armaments is substantial. Her army, which was the greatest in the world, has been reduced to one hundred thousand men. Her navy is not permitted to include any ships of over ten thousand tons. She may not possess tanks or heavy artillery, and she is allowed no military aeroplanes whatever. But before Germany accepted the treaty which involved these restrictions, the German delegation made the following observations upon the military, naval and air clauses:

Germany is prepared to agree to the basic idea of the army, navy and air regulations . . . provided that this is a beginning of a general reduction of armaments.

It was to this observation that M. Clemenceau, in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers, made the answer which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald has said should be displayed on every hoarding in Britain in order to remind the British people of their pledge:

The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first step towards the reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war, and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote.

* With pensions.

† Average 1910-14

Not much has yet been done to carry out this pledge. It is true that the Naval Conferences at Washington and London have limited the greatest navies in the world, and have thus prevented the cost of armaments from rising far above the present figures. But those figures are sufficiently alarming. The world is spending on armaments to-day no less than £2,000,000 a day, and this country's share is more than £200 a minute. Moreover, there is the danger of excessive and unlimited armaments.

It is in these circumstances, and after preparatory work by the League of Nations extending over many years, that the first World Disarmament Conference is going to meet on February 2nd, 1932. Not only the States Members of the League, but the United States of America, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and other non-Member States have helped to prepare for this Conference and intend to take part in it. Is it going to succeed?

The conditions of success are fast becoming clear. In the first place, France has stated, in a communication sent to the League in July 1931, that in order that the limitation of armaments may be carried into effect, "the principle of common action must supersede in the minds of the nations that of individual defence." There is here no necessary question of any new guarantee of security. But France has plainly told the other nations that, if she is further to reduce her own armaments, she must be able to rely upon them loyally and effectively to carry out all their pledges given in the Covenant.

Some years ago the British Government found it necessary to state that, owing to the risk of conflict with the United States, it was doubtful how far this country could fulfil some of its pledges under the Covenant. Since that time there have been great changes in the attitude of American public opinion and of the American administration towards the constructive organisation of peace and the prevention of war. There is now no longer any serious risk of America's armed assistance to a State which resorts to war in breach of its treaty obligations. The time has come for the British Government to make it unmistakably clear to foreign States that we accept the principle of common action and are prepared, in strict accordance with our pledges under the Covenant, to co-operate with the rest of the League in taking "any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." Let us not, however, imagine that France alone will benefit from "pooled security," or that Britain alone will pay into the pool what other nations will take out. We are often told that the British Navy does not now possess sufficient light cruisers and destroyers to protect our trade routes and to guarantee our essential food supplies and raw materials. But apply the principle

of "pooled security"—the defence of each by the strength of all—and freedom of navigation is at once assured. In this matter, as in so much else, world interests are British interests.

The success of the forthcoming Conference depends on Germany as much as on France. Although Germany has been a Member of the League of Nations since 1926, the German people have, as yet, very little use for the League. The League does not seem to them to deal justly. Unless this Conference brings about a real reduction in the armies, navies and air forces of the "victorious" Powers, and begins to effect equality between their armaments and those of Germany, there is a real danger that Germany may leave the League. Such an event would shake the League to its foundations, and imperil the future of our civilisation. But if the Conference can bring about an all-round reduction of armaments by 25 per cent., measured in money, within five years and if, as part of this reduction, it can remove some of the inequalities regarding particular weapons of warfare—ships of over ten thousand tons, heavy artillery, tanks, military aeroplanes—then there is reason to believe that Germany will be content to wait for another and still another conference, six and twelve years hence, to complete the reductions necessary to scale all armaments down to the German level.

It is possible, however, that the German delegation to the Disarmament Conference may be compelled, by the pressure of German public opinion, to raise the question of the revision of treaties. Now the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact, the Locarno Treaties, the Optional Clause and the General Act all deal with the peaceful settlement of international disputes. But they do not provide—except in a very general way in Article 19 of the Covenant—for the particular case, the exceedingly important case, of disputes where the cause of conflict is the alleged injustice of existing legal rights. And yet it is plain that, as the years go by, a treaty, however just it may have been in its inception, must become, in parts, out of date, inapplicable and unjust. There must be effective machinery for dealing with this case; and it may be necessary for the British to say at the Disarmament Conference that we are prepared to advise the reconsideration of certain aspects of the Treaty of Versailles and other Treaties, with a view to the revision of parts which may have become out of date and unjust. Observe in this connection that "the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect of all treaty obligations" are binding upon all States Members of the League. This double duty requires that treaties, in so far as they have become inapplicable or seem to constitute obstacles to international goodwill, should be reconsidered and modified; and, in so far as other means to this end

are lacking, Article 19 of the Covenant should be made practically effective.

These, then, are the conditions for the success of the Conference. It must make a real reduction of armaments all round; it must begin to give equality to Germany; it must give security to France; and it may have to make it clear that we look to the League to provide justice as well as to stop war. But the British Government can only go so far as it believes the British people is prepared to go. The obvious moral for all who can influence our nation is to prepare public opinion to support the Government in any steps it may take, in co-operation with the other countries at the Conference, to bring about a reduction and limitation of the armies, navies and air forces of the world.

We have to change men's minds. A change of mind, a *μετάνοια*, is still the first step on the way to be saved. St. Paul and his friends were once accused of trying to turn the world upside down. We have to turn it the right way up. We want to remove those preconceptions—of ourselves as a chosen people, of people other than ourselves as "foreigners" and "lesser breeds without the law"—from which the most dangerous conclusions flow with a fatal ease. We have to make people realise that any attempt to make the United Kingdom or the British Empire live its own life and not bother about the foreigner simply means dismemberment of the world's body. It is as if the way out of our present troubles—financial, economic and political—were a great secret. Men see, but they do not perceive; they hear, but they do not understand. And yet the answer is simple enough. We members of the Great Society of civilised mankind must all pull together for our world instead of pulling in opposite directions for rival States and rival parties.

MAXWELL GARNETT.

APPENDIX

A NOTE ON THE FIGHTING IN MANCHURIA.

(1) The Council's immediate duty—to prevent further fighting; to secure the retirement of the Japanese troops within the railway zone; and to see that the ultimate settlement of the dispute is not dictated at the sword's point—must be kept separate and distinct from the problem of effecting later a just and peaceful settlement of all the issues in dispute between Japan and China.

(2) Had it not been for the League of Nations, the Far East would have suffered from "the limitless calamities of war"; Japan would be dictating the terms of peace to China, and would thereafter be in legal possession of Manchuria; China could only boycott Japanese

goods at the risk of further punishment from Japan; and the Great Powers of the West would, no doubt, as on similar occasions in the past, be quarrelling among themselves instead of acting together (however feebly) to maintain peace.

(3) On the other hand, the League's Council might have shown more firmness, strength and courage in maintaining the League's authority. No doubt scarcity of evidence of public support for the League had its effect upon the Council's proceedings, and an even greater effect upon the influence which the Council exercised upon Japan.

(4) Japan, according to the jurists, has managed to avoid breaking the law, except perhaps the second Article of the Pact of Paris. Japan's use of armed force did not constitute a "resort to war," and therefore the sanctions under Article 16 of the Covenant were not automatically applicable. On the other hand, it was within the power of China at any moment to transform Japan's use of armed force into a "resort to war" within the meaning of Article 16 by withdrawing her Ambassador from Tokio and by declaring the existence of a state of war between China and Japan. Such a declaration would have a retro-active effect so that it would be Japan who had resorted to war in disregard of her Covenants under Article 12, 13 or 15. China has throughout been most anxious to avoid putting Japan in the position of having broken the Covenant by resorting to war.

(5) As the matter now stands, and owing to the existence of the League, Manchuria does not belong to Japan; China is free to continue her economic pressure upon Japan; and the presence of the League's Commission in Manchuria is bound to be awkward for Japan unless she brings her soldiers back to the railway zone within a reasonable period.

(6) These events in Manchuria and around the League's Council table have provided the League and its supporters with a sharp lesson: to break the Covenant in the spirit and yet to fulfil it in the letter must cease to be possible. What then must be done to

make the spirit correspond with the letter of the Covenant? And, far more urgent and important, what must be done to create for the support of the Covenant, both in letter and spirit, a better educated and organised public opinion?

THE DECLINE OF CAPITALISM IN GERMANY.

I

THE fact that the political and economic deadlock in Germany synchronises with a world-wide depression and that the two crises have many features in common will not blind the intelligent observer to the striking peculiarities of the German situation. The difference between the two crises may be approximately defined as follows: that, whereas in the rest of the world a return to normality will be found to be the solution, in Germany such a solution is utterly unthinkable. The German crisis indeed constitutes not the interruption, but the end of yesterday's normality; it is the conclusion of one epoch and the beginning of another. All Germany is, as it were, committed to, and in expectation of, a change; and many Germans believe that the change has actually taken place and that the only thing lacking is the consciousness of it.

The disruption of the bourgeois parties, the growth of Communism, the dramatic electoral triumphs of the National Socialists, the radicalisation of opinion on both Right and Left, are all outward signs of the revolt of the middle classes, and proclaim the emergence of a new spirit in Germany. But the change is deeper than these indications would suggest. The essential difference between the German and the world crisis is this, that whereas the latter, however severe, is a crisis which is not repugnant to capitalism, the former is one which seems to threaten its very existence. The outside world is more and more getting accustomed to the idea that the financial collapse of Germany is imminent and that the country is on the verge of bankruptcy. They fail to perceive that the collapse when it comes will be more catastrophic than this, involving the complete downfall of the capitalist system.

That the situation in Germany has entered on a revolutionary stage cannot escape the notice of anyone who studies the plain economic facts. The growth of unemployment, the decline of production, the increase of bankruptcy and insolvency and the closing down of big factories and works are all eloquent signs of the dissolution of the existing order. Moreover, the shock of this economic decline has been accentuated by the disclosure of a marked degeneration of commercial morality. Never in the history of capitalism have there been scandals so numerous, so blatant, so criminal, involving such colossal sums of money and implicating so many seemingly solid institutions and individuals, industrialists, bankers and politicians. "So flagrant and widespread is the corruption

that German newspapers now devote a regular column to the chronicling of the country's financial scandals; while the business of the German courts is congested by the incessant trials of bank directors, business managers and speculators, who have come to grief through the wildest kind of speculation. The bank crisis of the summer of 1931 was largely due to the outcome of such speculation. In many cases bank managers were found to be using their short-term credits as well as their deposits for long-term investments and sheer speculation.

These sets of facts are enough to prove the crumbling character of German capitalism. But the desperate efforts which the ministers are making to shore up the structure are probably even more significant. The emergency legislation of the Reich and of the Prussian Government furnish in themselves the clearest indication of the profundity of the crisis. Many of the provisions of these decrees outline measures which, though tentative and mere expedients, are more sweeping and revolutionary in character than any socialist Government, outside Russia, has so far attempted to introduce. But in the latest of these decrees—"the Fourth Emergency Decree for the Safeguarding of National Economy and Finance and for the Protection of Internal Peace," issued on December 8th, Dr. Brüning has foresworn half measures and has boldly infringed some of the basic features of the capitalist system.

It must not be assumed, however, that in violating the sanctity of contracts and in decreeing the reduction of prices, Dr. Brüning and his advisers have conceived any deliberate intention of betraying the capitalist cause. On the contrary, it is well known that up to the last moment the Chancellor refused to entertain the idea of interfering with the rate of interest. The idea of a compulsory conversion of interest was first launched in November last at the meetings of the Advisory Economic Council. Rumours of the idea aroused such a storm of protest in the press that Dr. Brüning publicly denounced them (in a speech at Mainz on November 13th) as the products of sensationalism, and solemnly declared that the Government would not even consider "such dangerous and abominable measures." Yet, at the very time that he was thus reassuring public opinion, the Prussian Government proclaimed a moratorium for all debts incurred by the landlords and farmers of East Germany, a decree permeated by the very spirit which the Chancellor had denounced.

That these classes are in a desperate position as a result of the fall in agricultural prices and are heavily in debt is well known. The Prussian Government has for years been attempting to relieve their position, partly by subventions, that is at the direct expense of the taxpayer, partly at his indirect expense, that is by raising

the prices of agricultural produce and by imposing high protective tariffs. But the relief afforded by the moratorium is obviously of a very different character, given as it is entirely at the expense of the creditors. The "*Ost-hilfe*" constitutes nothing less than a kind of compulsory and State-protected bankruptcy of the landowning classes. It violates both the principle and the practice of the capitalist system; and the only defence which the minister responsible for the working of the moratorium, Herr Schlange-Schoeningen, can make for it is a declaration of its inevitability. "The authors of the emergency decree," he remarks in one of his speeches, "have been accused of violating the principle of private property and of destroying the sense of right. This is not the time for concerning oneself with the finesse of juridical dogma. The nation's right to live forbids, to-day more than ever, the light-hearted play with the contents of the phrase '*fiat justitia, pereat mundus*.' Who has the right to-day to preach the absolute inviolability and sanctity of private property? . . . I can only recognise to-day one right and one duty, the salvation of the people. To ensure this many rights and many privileges too will have to be sacrificed."

In another speech, which was broadcast, Herr Schlange-Schoeningen waxes even more downright. "The emergency decree of November 17th, 1931," he declared, "has been described as an anti-capitalist and revolutionary measure. I ask: What does revolutionary mean to-day? Are we not living in the biggest chronic revolution of all time? . . . Besides it is necessary to answer the basic question: What is the country's primary interest, money as the medium of exchange, or production as the creator of value? Valuable as money and credit may be to the national economy, I for one unhesitatingly declare that I assign the first place to production. It is on production that the nation's foundations rest." This plea of necessity—the plea of the tyrant and of the revolutionary—must have had considerable weight with Dr. Brüning himself, who obviously was quite sincere in denouncing the report that the Government was contemplating a compulsory conversion of interest, and accepted the idea only because in the last resort he found it to be inevitable.

II

The object which the Chancellor indeed had in view in issuing this decree is best expressed in the popular German phrase "to make Germany a cheaper country"—that is to enable her to produce cheaper. This urge towards cheaper production and the development of the export trade has been

for years the dominating aim of Germany. The tremendous work of overhauling and rationalising German industries that was carried through so assiduously in the post-War period, and to pay for which thousands of millions of marks were rashly borrowed abroad, was largely dictated by the country's determination to increase her exports to the utmost possible extent. The fulfilment of the reparation clauses of the Versailles Treaty depended on this, and, although the burden involved in such fulfilment was palpably too onerous, it was borne with a certain resignation because it at once stimulated and justified the utmost efforts to increase and so to cheapen production. Now in retrospect it is fair to say that the Young Plan was accepted in Germany in something of an optimistic spirit. The working-off of the country's obligations was envisaged in the atmosphere of an ever-expanding volume of world trade, of which Germany would take her due share. This prospect proved a mirage. World trade, instead of expanding, contracted. In 1930 it was 18 per cent. lower than in 1929; while in 1931 it was 28 per cent. lower than in 1930. German trade, too, shared in this decline. Compared with other leading countries Germany perhaps did not do so badly. Considered indeed as a proportion of world trade, Germany's share became even slightly bigger. But her *volume* of trade declined over 30 per cent. In 1929 her imports per head of the population amounted to 17.5 Reich marks. In 1931 they fell to 7.4. In 1929 her exports per head of the population amounted to 17.6 Reich marks. In 1931 they fell to 11.6. These figures, registering as they did a striking decline, were at once recognised as danger signals. The whole conception of her ability to pay reparations was based on Germany's deep belief in the possibility of an assured and indeed unlimited expansion of the export trade. The realisation that this conception was ill-founded came as a great shock to the German people, who, however, were persuaded by their economists and business men that the decline was not organic and permanent, but susceptible of alleviation. Diagnosing that the cause was the increased competition of other industrial countries and their high protective tariffs, these advisers engaged in a furious propaganda in favour of a cutting-down of costs. This demand for a reduction in wages became especially insistent and almost hysterical when this country abandoned the Gold Standard and thereby obtained incidentally a premium on her exports.

Whether German industrialists really believed that cuts in wages would stimulate exports or whether they seized upon the international situation as a mere pretext for delivering a long-desired attack on the workers' standard of living is immaterial to the issue. It is sufficient to say that during October and November of last

year the propaganda for cutting wages became so clamant and irrepressible that the only question left to be settled was how to effect these cuts and how drastic to make them. Dr. Brüning was clearly in favour of some sort of reduction of wages; but like the statesman he is he made an attempt to secure this reduction by the consent of the workers. He firmly opposed the industrialists demand for the abrogation of trade union rights, especially those relating to collective bargaining ("tariffs"); but he was equally firm in declaring that the highest national interests required that wages should come down.

The point to realise is that Dr. Brüning's policy was not to cut wages in the confident expectation that the economic life of the nation would automatically adjust itself to this new standard, but to secure such an adjustment by an active intervention in economic conditions. As I have already declared he wanted not only a reduction in the cost of production, but in the cost of living. He wanted, in fact, to square the circle. He wanted an all-round "cheaper Germany." In his search for this queer sort of Utopia—the reduction of wages and salaries without a corresponding reduction of the purchasing power of the people, the Chancellor found himself caught in a chain of inexorable logic which compelled him in the end to violate some of the most fundamental principles of the existing economic order. To compensate the workers for the cuts in their wages, prices had to be forced down. Goods, rents, railway fares, tramway fares, all had to come down. It was comparatively easy to make a cut in transport prices; but the reduction of rents created a very difficult and delicate problem. German houseowners were notoriously in no position to sustain this loss; while the Government, which only two months before had been compelled to reduce the property tax 50 per cent., had no means by which it could alleviate the houseowners' plight. A deadlock arose. To make houseowners shoulder the loss they would incur by a 10 per cent. reduction of rent was out of the question; and yet without such a reduction the whole scheme of a "painless" cut in wages broke down. Some way of compensating houseowners had to be discovered. Some victim had to be found. And a victim was found in the mortgage-holder, who was summarily deprived of half his gains. Such a reduction of interest (from 12 to 6 per cent.) was obviously a most flagrant attack on the foundations of capitalism; and it may be presumed, especially in view of his previous protestations, that Dr. Brüning sanctioned it not without a good deal of heart-burning. But necessity knows no law; and since the German Chancellor's sole hope of saving his country depended on his ability to equip her for the production of the biggest possible exportable surplus, he could recognise no other

guiding principle than the necessity of lowering costs. Dr. Brüning's decree of December 8th, 1931, will be eventually recognised as one of the landmarks in German history. It established in the most dramatic fashion the principle of State interference with economic relations.

III

The main purpose of the famous decree, the strengthening of Germany's position in the world market, was defeated even before it was promulgated. The fresh decline in the volume of exports which began in November obviously could not be arrested by the decree. But the figures for December reveal a still further decline, and the prospects for 1932 are, so the experts say, definitely discouraging. It has dawned at last on German consciousness that the sanguine hopes of a fabulously extensive export trade are unattainable and that this is so not because Germany is a dear country—this, of course, is a pure fallacy—but because the whole conception of production solely for export and for the working off of a whole generation's obligations is radically Utopian and false. The myth of a renaissance of Germany through unlimited exports has now been finally exploded.

When the Germans protest to-day that they cannot pay reparations they thereby confess that the whole of their post-War activities has been misdirected. They are bound to admit this; for ever since the signing of the Versailles Treaty these activities have been based on the grotesque idea that the country could attain prosperity by working like coolies ("Sich-emporarbeiten") in order to swamp the world markets. It is quite obvious that public opinion outside Germany is not yet fully prepared to envisage the reparations problem in its proper light. Consequently the German default is not likely to be judged dispassionately. Germany will be regarded as the villain of the piece, whereas she is herself as much the victim as the villain. The economic consequence of reparations was to make Germany the workshop and the storehouse of the world. Germany entered a vigorous protest against being placed in this situation "of economic servitude." But she eventually resigned herself to it and took full advantage of it, with the result that she now owes Europe and America nearly 30,000 million marks, the greater part of which has been spent in reconditioning her industry for the accomplishment of an absolutely Sisyphean task. Now that the task has had to be finally abandoned she is confronted once more with the invidious necessity of overhauling her economic life from top to bottom, no longer with the intention of swamping the world markets with her

goods but with a view to raising the standard of living of her own people.

As a sheer piece of statecraft, Dr. Brüning's decree of December 8th was a stroke of genius. It took the wind out of the sails of the extreme parties by borrowing items from their respective programmes. The Social Democrats, the bourgeois parties, the National Socialists all damned it for some of its provisions, but applauded it for others. The one provision that came in for most attack and for most praise was the reduction of the rate of interest. The gravamen of bourgeois criticism of this provision was that it struck a fatal blow at the foundations of capitalism. "The capitalist economic order," declared Dr. Gustav Stolper, the editor of *Der Deutsche Volkswirt*, "is based on the free operation of price and of interest. When these two categories have fallen into the direct dictation of the State, German capitalism has ceased to exist."

The fact that this infringement is merely provisional and is described as emergency legislation does little to diminish its intrinsic importance. Long after the decree of December 8 has been forgotten its effects will be felt in Germany. With the issue of this decree the principle of State interference with economic relations has been asserted and established with the utmost emphasis and has been accepted as a welcome relief by millions of destitute Germans. There can be no doubt that the German middle classes are enthusiastic in their approval of this new economic dictatorship and that its promulgation has immensely strengthened Dr. Brüning's political position in the country. It is plain, however, that the Chancellor cannot afford to rest on his laurels. The famous decree is only the first step towards some kind of State Capitalism, the vogue for which promises to be increasingly popular in Germany. The electoral successes of the National Socialists are due largely to their opposition to Liberal theories of *laissez-faire* and to their readiness to support a bold programme of State Capitalism. Dr. Brüning cannot afford to exclude them from his reckoning.

Political thought in Germany, however, is still amorphous and has yet to crystallise itself. The frontiers separating parties are vague and unmapped; and it is extremely difficult to define not only the difference between parties, but the principles on which one or another is united. Learned economists declare indeed that German capitalism is but a pseudo-capitalism. Certainly to an English or a French observer many of the political phenomena of Germany must seem strangely unreal. German Communism is probably only a pseudo-Communism; just as the Socialism of the National Socialists is an obvious fiction. The Nazis have got all the appa-

tus of a political party; but a political party they most decidedly are not. They represent not even a movement; what they stand for is a certain mood. Their strength is derived from their ability to reflect and to express the despair aroused by the crumbling of the existing economic order. They represent the aspirations towards State assistance of a middle class which is being pressed down to the economic level of the proletariat, but still clings desperately to its old social and cultural standards. This class feels that its only chance of survival is to secure the protection of the State, and that is why ideas of State Capitalism are so popular in Germany to-day, and why there is such an impatient and such a revolutionary tension in the country. The middle classes must either sink to the level of the masses or help that party to power which promises them salvation.

January 14th, 1932.

MICHAEL FARBMAN.

THE DEADLOCK IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

ADVERSITY has a certain educative effect, and it is at last becoming almost a commonplace to assert that the best hope of a *détente* in the European situation lies in direct agreement between Paris and Berlin, even though the active co-operation of London and other capitals is also obviously essential. But what is true of the major problems of European policy, is no less true of central and south-eastern Europe. The deadlock between Paris and Berlin has its parallel in the Danubian countries, where the last thirteen years have been marked by real economic anarchy. Much admirable constructive work has been done inside the framework of the individual states: specially notable has been the progress of Czechoslovakia under the enlightened and uninterrupted guidance of MM. Masaryk and Beneš. But the solitary example of inter-state co-operation, the Little Entente, though it has performed a most valuable and necessary task, has followed negative rather than positive lines. Its mere existence has averted dangerous upheavals and assured the *status quo*: and its two primary aims—to prevent the restoration of the effete Habsburg dynasty and to resist any movement for frontier revision—have lost none of their cogency to-day. But it has none the less failed in two directions, for it has neither solved the vexed question of minorities nor that of economic barriers.

In 1918 the nations of the old Habsburg Monarchy, perhaps inevitably in such circumstances, placed independence and self-government higher than economic interests: but in so doing they set at defiance certain common interests in the economic and social sphere which acute political differences had temporarily obscured. The great problem which has faced them for these thirteen years has been to devise some means of restoring severed economic ties without thereby sacrificing the essence of independence. But instead of this they have piled the Ossa of tariffs and prohibitions upon the Pelion of frontier restrictions and the mutual confiscation of books and periodicals; with the result that each nation tends to live in a watertight compartment of its own, unduly self-centred and ignorant of neighbouring cultures. Rival political propagandas, sometimes, alas, encouraged by ill-considered campaigns from the outside, accentuate these tendencies still further, and the vicious circle continues, in which economic agreements are thwarted by political resentments, and political agreements by economic disputes. It has required an economic world crisis of unequalled severity to bring home, at least to the more thoughtful sections of public opinion in these countries, the vital

need for economic co-operation if complete disaster is to be averted.

The idea of some kind of regrouping on economic lines, between all or some of the states of the defunct Dual Monarchy, has been constantly put forward since the war and has taken many forms. It has generally aroused acute alarm on one side or the other, owing to the incautious use of such words as "federation" or "confederation": even "league" or "union" is too precise and too ambitious, and indeed a new word is needed to express the minimum, not the maximum, of what is practicable—some rather vague word such as "groupement," which might gradually acquire a significance of its own. Obviously none of the new states, neither victors nor vanquished, desires a reconstitution of the old Habsburg Monarchy, and some are prone to suspect legitimist or reactionary intrigue in the background—not without reason in view of certain quite recent happenings. Moreover it is always easier to break down than to build up again, and it is not quite clear where co-operation should begin. Obviously negotiations between all the five principal states would be apt to end in chaos, and yet for two to act alone might arouse suspicion on the part of the others. Which, then, of the various possible combinations should be attempted first? An economic union between the three states of the Little Entente would at once acquire a sharp point against Hungary and Austria and increase political friction; a similar union between Austria and Hungary would for obvious geographical reasons be regarded as a wedge directed toward splitting up the Little Entente; while either project would perpetuate the grouping between enemy and vanquished states, and the suggestion for union between all three would simply alarm public opinion in Czechoslovakia and be regarded as an attempt to separate her from her allies. Again, an agreement between Hungary and Roumania alone, or between Roumania and Yugoslavia alone, would present less obvious advantages, since in each case it would be between two states which are predominantly agrarian and therefore do not stand in such need of each other's products.

From all this the conclusion follows that the most promising line of approach is between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and that the moment is ripe for an understanding between the two countries. At first sight this may seem paradoxical and even absurd: for it is notorious that there has been repeated friction between them, that Magyar resentment against Trianon has concentrated itself above all upon the Czechs, and that there has been a specially marked contrast between the oligarchic Hungarian régime and the democratic tendencies of Masaryk, Beneš and their entire nation. It is, however, also true that the lot of the

Magyar minority in Slovakia, though not yet all that it should be, is distinctly more favourable than that of the Magyars in Transylvania, and infinitely more so than that of the Magyar or other minorities in Yugoslavia. In one respect this very fact contributed to the friction, since informed opinion at Budapest was inclined to assume that the failure of Roumania and Yugoslavia to solve the question of minorities would in the end react in favour of Hungary, whereas it was fully aware of the remarkable work of transformation and emancipation which was rapidly freeing Slovakia from all possibility of a relapse to Magyar rule. Moreover Czechoslovakia by her relatively successful solution of the land question was not merely undermining the power of the Magyar aristocracy in Slovakia, but creating a precedent for land reform in unreformed Hungary and making any return to pre-war conditions impossible. She was at one and the same time the chief obstacle to Habsburg restoration and to territorial revision.

All these factors have, however, been driven into the background by the acute dangers of the economic situation. Despite alarmist rumours in the Left Press of Paris, Habsburg restoration is not an immediate issue, not merely because the funds of the legitimists are drying up, but because those on whom Hungary depends for financial assistance make the abandonment of such adventures a condition *sine qua non*, and above all because the peasant masses want bread and work, not a coronation and a luxurious court. Certain revisionist "die-hards" may continue to clamour for territorial changes, but the plain man knows that such clamour only increases the paralysis of trade and agriculture from which the peoples on both sides of these frontiers are suffering, and that the real need is not to change the existing frontiers once more and so produce fresh friction and uncertainty, but to deprive those frontiers, to the utmost limit possible, of their present character as economic and cultural barriers.

In the last two months it has been openly declared by the Hungarian Premier, Count Károlyi, and such economic experts as Mr. Teleszky, that Hungary, unless she can increase her exports to neighbouring states, will be forced to reduce the area under cultivation and to industrialise herself. Czechoslovakia, on her side, as a strongly industrial state, has a vital interest in increasing her exports and would be committing an act of folly in leaving a near neighbour to plunge into an industrial career, when she herself can supply so many of that neighbour's requirements. The crowning folly of this year of crisis in central Europe has been the rupture of commercial relations between Budapest and Prague—a rupture for which both sides must bear the blame. It is only natural that all the influence of economic experts at

Geneva and Basel should have been brought to bear to end this scandal: but it is no longer possible to revert to mere normal intercourse, and emergency measures for economic co-operation are now urgently needed. Count Bethlen declared last May Hungary's readiness to enter into closer economic relations with any neighbour who would not try to exploit them for national ends: and M. Beneš has quite recently held out a hand to Hungary. Here is a unique opportunity for statesmanship, and the time at our disposal is all too short.

Meanwhile it is clear that to insist upon either the formal renunciation of revisionist aims by Hungary or upon the acceptance of the revisionist principle by the Succession States as a preliminary basis of discussion, is simply another way of declining all discussion. What is necessary in the first instance is to leave these thorny questions resolutely on one side and to concentrate upon the problem: how best to co-operate for the restoration of economic prosperity in the whole Danubian area. Even a limited economic agreement would have an astonishing effect upon the whole political atmosphere, and would be the first step towards a wider movement between Prague and Vienna, between Vienna and Belgrade, between Bucarest and Budapest.

Sheer necessity is bringing these considerations home even to the most conservatively minded statesmen of the Danubian area. While on the one hand the obstructive tactics of certain sections of the Czech Agrarian party are viewed with growing disquiet by public opinion in Prague, men like Dr. Gratz and Baron Sztérényi, the former Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, have openly declared themselves in favour of a Hungaro-Czechoslovak understanding, while of course making clear that they have not abandoned their old political aspirations—for indeed such a declaration would mean instant political suicide. The veteran Count Apponyi also admits the imperative logic of events, and a former Secretary of State, Professor Hantos, while equally avoiding pronouncements in the delicate field of politics, is organising a campaign in favour of a Danubian economic union, definitely planned on such lines as shall not be inimical to the legitimate interests of Germany. In a word, it is more and more recognised that, for obvious geographical reasons, the relations of Prague and Budapest are the keystone of the arch, just as much as the relations of Paris and Berlin in the major problem of European co-operation. Though there are very wide differences of opinion as to the best remedies for the present precarious state of Europe, it is generally agreed that some steps must be taken to reduce economic barriers and trade restrictions and to promote international co-operation on rational lines. An exclusive nationalism

has penetrated into economics and laid its numbing hand upon commerce and finance, until in some parts of Europe it is no exaggeration to say that there is a return to methods of primitive barter between the nations.

There is, however, another direction in which exaggerated nationalism is an obstacle to normal development in Europe, and even to the vital issue of disarmament—namely, what was called before the war "the question of nationalities" and is now called "the question of minorities." During the Great War many of us argued that satisfied nationalism was the only sound basis upon which an international settlement could rest, and when the peace treaties revealed the fact that exact ethnographic frontiers were unattainable, it was hoped that by special treaties and guarantees signed by the individual States most concerned, the full rights of these minorities could be secured, and that the spectacle of a ruling race devoting all its resources and ingenuity to the assimilation of weaker subject races would become very largely a thing of the past.

Unhappily this has not been the case. From first to last many of the minority treaties have remained a dead letter or have been violated in many important directions, while certain Powers which are not bound internationally, but which began by freely promising full rights to their own minorities, have subsequently repudiated their pledges and now withhold the very elements of liberty. The "under-dogs" of yesterday have in some cases become the "upper-dogs" of to-day, while in other cases a nation in its blind fanaticism applies to one of its neighbours those very methods of repression to which some of its own compatriots are being subjected by another neighbour. In Europe to-day (exclusive of Soviet Russia, where the problem follows different lines) there are in round figures and according to official statistics (which certainly often err by understatement) at least 30,000,000 people, in fifteen different states, in the position of minorities.* Not all, but very many of these minorities are in considerable, sometimes in grave national danger, and look across the frontier (sometimes a frontier recently formed against their will) to kinsmen of their own blood, and dream of revision. Some of the victors in the late war are afraid to disarm owing to the alleged desire of their neighbours to recover lost territory. (Last November Mr. Marinkovitch, the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, a well-known figure in Geneva, publicly expressed his conviction that unless his country remained strongly armed her neighbours would fall

* Many students of the question would estimate the figure at 40,000,000 as a minimum: I content myself with a figure which no one can challenge: it is quite bad enough. See table on following page.

A ROUGH TABLE OF THE MAIN EUROPEAN MINORITIES
(Exclusive of Russia, Finland, Greece, Turkey, and Albania)

State and Date of Census	Total Population of Country	NATIONALITY OF MINORITIES								Total Minority Population
		German	Russian	Jewish	White Rus.	Polish	Lithuanian	Estonian	Ukrainian	Others
I. NORTHERN GROUP										
Estonia (1922)	1,107,059	18,319	91,109	4,566	—	—	—	—	—	22,358 ¹
Latvia (1930)	1,900,045	69,855	201,778	94,388	36,029	59,374	25,885	7,708 Lett 14,883 Czech	—	8,566
Lithuania (1923)	2,028,971	29,231	50,460	153,743	4,421	65,599	—	—	—	1,592
Poland (1921)	27,176,717	1,059,194	56,239	2,110,448	1,060,237	—	68,667	30,628	3,898,431	78,634
II. CENTRAL GROUP										
Denmark	3,267,831	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Germany (1925)	62,410,619	40,000 ²	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Czechoslovakia (1921) ⁴	13,374,364	3,123,568	13,974	180,855	745,431	356,314	649,308 ^{5a}	30,382 ⁶	—	127,165 ⁹
Austria (1923)	6,534,481	—	—	—	—	—	Jugoslav	—	—	11,897
Hungary (1920)	7,980,143	551,211	23,760	—	25,071	—	88,154	98,703 ¹¹	—	47,943
III. S.E. GROUP										
Jugoslavia (1921) ⁴	11,894,911	505,790	—	—	467,658	231,068	Albanian	Czechoslov ¹²	1,500	31,644
Roumania ⁵	18,024,269	713,564	174,293	778,094	1,463,373	351,328	Jugoslav	—	176,479 ⁹	220,200
Bulgaria (1926)	5,478,741	—	19,590	41,563	—	—	52,570	—	Ukrainian	404,104
IV. SOUTHERN GROUP										
Italy (1921)	—	—	400,193 ³	—	—	—	Jugoslav	—	Catalan	—
Spain (1920)	21,959,086	—	—	—	—	—	389,219 ¹⁴	—	Basque	Others
							—	1,000,000	4,169,004	110,372 ¹⁵
										5,169,004
										28,994,088

¹Includes 7,850 Swedes. ²Approximate. ³No separate Jewish nationality in Census rubrics. ⁴Macedonian Slavs (not less than 700,000) are reckoned as Jugoslavs and not entered separately. ⁵Racial statistics of Winkler, the official figures of Census of 1930 not yet available. ⁶Returned as bilingual (i.e. German and one of the following: Polish, Mazurian, Wendish, Lithuanian, Danish. ⁷Slovak. ⁸Includes 7,494 Danes. ⁹i.e. Ukrainian, Slovak, etc. ¹⁰Entered separately as Slovenes, Croats, Bunjevci, Sokei, Serbs. ¹¹Of these only 5,000 Czechs. ¹²Of these only 5,000 Czechs. ¹³Of these, 8,335 in pre-war Italy. ¹⁴Of these, 258,944 Slovenes and 92,800 Croats in Venezia Giulia and 37,475 Slovenes in pre-war Italy. ¹⁵Speaking French and Greek.

upon her and wrest territory from her, in other words, he admitted that Jugoslavia had failed to solve her question of minorities.) The vanquished on their side demand territorial revision, to repair the alleged injustices of the peace treaties, and a seeming deadlock has been reached. Sentimental opinion in the west or in America, realising that the position of these minorities is often lamentable, has sometimes jumped to the rash conclusion that the true solution for Europe's woes lies in a revision of frontiers. Senator Borah is an admirable example of this essentially honest, well-intentioned, but none the less superficial and misleading opinion.

Such critics cannot be too often reminded of two fundamental factors in the situation:

(1) That in many of the most hotly contested districts of Europe—on the Polish-German and Russo-Polish frontiers, in Hungary and in Macedonia—no human ingenuity can ever hope to draw purely ethnographical frontiers, and that therefore, even if the frontiers could again be changed, either by agreement, or as is more probable by universal war, important racial minorities would still remain on the wrong side of all these frontiers;

and (2) that the treaties of 1918-20, despite many blemishes, have definitely improved the status of most of the nationalities of Europe; that nine races formerly entirely under foreign rule (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, Letts, Lithuanians, Ests and Finns) now have national States of their own, and that no nationality, with the single unhappy and very important exception of the Ukrainians, is to-day entirely under foreign rule: in a word, that except on the Polish-Russian frontier Europe is to-day faced no longer by major issues in this question of nationalities, involving the life and death of whole races, but rather with a problem of gathering up ragged edges and completing a task already more than half finished. Solve the problem of equal rights for all nationalities, and you have achieved peace between Slav and Teuton on the Elbe and the Vistula, between Slav and Latin on the Adriatic, between Slav and Magyar in the great Danubian plain, between Slav and Slav in Macedonia. But ignore this problem or evade it, and you will suddenly find it emerging in a crude form during the discussion of disarmament between the nations. If on the one side there are Powers which are not ready to disarm without first obtaining the necessary "sanctions," on the other side there are Powers which are not ready to renounce their hope of overthrowing or at least modifying the *status quo*, until they have "real guarantees" (this was the abstract phrase which made a concrete agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria in 1913 and 1914 impossible) that their kinsmen beyond the frontiers will not be denationalised.

Is there then no alternative to revision? and must the deadlock continue? Most emphatically not. If we can diagnose the malady, it should be possible to find a remedy. The fact is that on the one hand many of the minority treaties have not been made effective, the machinery for their control at Geneva has proved inadequate, and till recently healthy publicity has been evaded. On the other hand, certain minorities have pursued very foolish tactics, advancing impossible claims and accusations whose falsity could often be demonstrated, and even when they kept their irredentist leanings within the strict limits of the law, they were all too negative in their attitude towards the States of which they were citizens. The book recently published by the Congress of Nationalities, under the careful editorship of Dr. Ammende (*Die Nationalitäten in den Staaten Europas*) is a first sign that moderation, accuracy and realism are winning the day and that claims will remain within the bounds of the possible.

Such agitations for revision as that inaugurated some years ago by Lord Rothermere can only do infinite harm: and in actual fact the only result has been to strengthen the illusions on the one side and to make the other side less conciliatory both towards its neighbours and towards its own minorities. It would be easy to prove by detailed statistics that in each of the cases to which revisionist agitation is directed the only serious alternatives are mere rectification of frontiers (which would affect perhaps one-quarter or one-fifth of the populations concerned and would therefore produce great confusion and unsettlement, but no definitive solution) or a reversion to the pre-war frontiers (which would of course be resisted to the death and could only be achieved through a general war). Moreover the problem has in these thirteen years been complicated by growing differences in land tenure and social legislation: indeed there are cases where national feeling and social or economic interests point in opposite directions.

The revisionist agitation has two main underlying motives. With those of the older generation who have learnt nothing, that motive is "revanche": these are the irreconcilables. But with the great majority of men there is the genuine fear for the fate of their co-nationals on the wrong side of a frontier—a fear only too often based on the knowledge that here and there the underdogs of yesterday are applying to their former masters the methods from which they themselves formerly suffered. The only way to take the sting out of revisionist agitation is to prove that fear to be groundless, by putting an end to "assimilationist" policy, and by not merely enforcing the existing minority treaties, but by extending them to the maximum compatible with the safety and smooth administration of the state. It is essential that the

public law of Europe should recognise a clear distinction between the very different conceptions of "nationality" and "citizenship" and ensure that a man's nationality and language shall be as sacred and inviolable as his religion has already become in every European state save Russia. In the sixteenth century the principle of "*cuius regio, eius religio*" drenched Europe in blood. In the twentieth century the same principle, under a thin camouflage, has been applied by more than one state to its national minorities, and until this is stopped, unrest will continue. Means must be found to save the individual citizen from the necessity of choosing between his allegiance to the state and his allegiance to his own nationality: the two must be allowed to subsist side by side, and on equal terms. The true solution lies in the direction of such Charters of cultural autonomy as have been granted to the minorities of Estonia, and again of such gestures as the recent foundation of a Magyar Academy in Slovakia. If once this principle could be made universal, frontiers would speedily lose a great deal of their importance, and the way would be opened for fuller cultural intercourse, for those economic agreements which are determined (to a far greater extent than the economists care to admit) by *political* likes and dislikes, and for that drastic reduction of armaments which is so necessary a preliminary to the restoration of Europe's shaken financial and moral credit.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BELGIAN CULTURE.*

TWENTY years ago the title of this lecture would have caused some astonishment among a London audience. Educated people knew that Belgium existed as a national entity, created in 1830 by a council of the Great Powers sitting in London; but few realised that this apparently new country was really of old origin and possessed distinct political, economic, artistic and intellectual traditions—in short, what we may call in the broadest sense of the term a national culture.

The attitude of the Belgians during the War and the energy displayed by them during the period of reconstruction have done a great deal to remove such misconceptions. It is generally agreed to-day that a people which possesses sufficient strength to pass through such an ordeal, without losing any of its vital qualities, must be linked together by a bond of union which no artificial political structure of recent origin can possibly achieve. Nevertheless, a few thoughtful critics are still puzzled by the paradoxical aspect of the Belgian problem. The concept of nationality is closely connected in our minds with that of language unity, and Belgium is divided between two peoples talking and writing two different languages. It is also associated with the existence of geographical frontiers and, apart from the coast-line in the north-west, the country possesses scarcely any natural boundaries. Further, the origins of Belgian nationality are blurred by the fact that for three centuries the Belgian provinces were administered by foreign princes and were considered first as Spanish and later as Austrian and French possessions. To make confusion worse confounded, the very word "*Belgique*" is of modern origin, and is mainly used in the eighteenth century as an adjective—*les provinces belgiques*—while the designation "*Bourgogne*," prevalent in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and emphasising the connection with France, is completely misleading. Judged by ordinary superficial standards, a country so clearly divided should never have existed; it would receive short shrift at the hands of some theoreticians who wish to reconstruct the world on more sensible lines. But the fact that Belgian culture seems to challenge certain linguistic, geographical or historical conceptions does not justify us in ignoring its various manifestations, and it is to a few of these manifestations that I should like to draw your attention to-day.

Foreign observers generally agree that one of the most charac-

* Inaugural Lecture delivered at the London School of Economics on October 29th, 1931 (Chair of Belgian Studies).

teristic features of the modern Belgian Constitution is the power conferred on the local authorities, and more particularly on the burgomaster and on his council. The first magistrate of a Belgian city remains to-day the supreme chief of the police force and enjoys more power and prestige than his colleagues in more centralised countries. Such prerogatives were not conferred on him by a caprice of the National Congress which drafted the Constitution in 1830. Its members were no doubt anxious to extend to Belgium all the progressive institutions established by the English, French and American democracies, but they were at the same time careful not to wound local feelings based on long-standing traditions. The origin of these feelings, which have been described as the "love of the clock-tower," can be traced as far back as the Middle Ages, when the country was divided into a number of principalities, only loosely connected on the one side with the Kingdom of France, and on the other with the German Empire. These principalities were gradually drawn together until the Dukes of Burgundy succeeded in bringing under their rule, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, all the territories extending from the Zuider Zee to the Somme, and later known as the Netherlands. This work of unification was completed by Philip the Good, who fully deserved the title of "Founder of Belgium," *Conditor Belgii*, given to him by the humanist Justus Lipsius two centuries later.

Though nominally a vassal of the French king for the Dukedom of Burgundy, Philip the Good was really an independent sovereign who might, according to his own words, "have been king had he willed it," that is to say, had he consented to pay homage to the Emperor. In all internal and external affairs, and more particularly with regard to his alliance with England during the Hundred Years War, he pursued the interests not of France but of the Netherlands, which were by far the wealthiest part of his possessions. The "Great Duke of the West," as he was called, played in the Netherlands in the fifteenth century a part similar to that which Louis XI played in France and Henry VII in England during the same period. He succeeded in consolidating a centralised state as the legists of the Renaissance conceived it, a state possessing a distinct life apart from the people and above them; and established a few central institutions, such as the States-General, on which the delegates represented the various principalities. The Dukes of Burgundy were nevertheless obliged to take into account the resistance, not so much of the feudal lords, as of the powerful communes, such as Ghent, Bruges and Liège, which had grown stronger in the Netherlands than in any other part of Western Europe. The

result was not complete unity as in France and England, but a kind of compromise : that is to say, the superimposition of central institutions on local institutions. As Dukes of Burgundy, the sovereigns of the Netherlands controlled foreign affairs, foreign trade and, to a certain extent, the States-General ; but as Counts of Flanders, Dukes of Brabant, Counts of Hainault, etc., they bound themselves to respect the liberties and privileges of each town and principality belonging to the Burgundian confederation. These privileges were confirmed and strengthened in the *Grand Privilège* granted by Mary of Burgundy after the death of Charles the Bold, which for three centuries was considered as the sacred charter of Belgian liberties.

There is no feature of Belgian culture which is more characteristic than the jealous preservation, throughout modern history, of this spirit of local independence. It asserted itself again and again after the Netherlands had fallen into the power of the Hapsburg dynasty, under Maximilian, Philip the Handsome and Charles V. It was one of the main causes of the revolution against Spain, which brought about the separation between the Northern and the Southern Netherlands at the end of the sixteenth century. It remained rampant throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and provoked a series of riots against the Spanish and Austrian administrations, notably in Brussels, Antwerp and Louvain. It looks as if national life, when no longer able to assert itself in affairs of State, had recoiled upon itself and sought refuge behind the walls of every city, and as if the people, too weak to resist foreign interference in national questions, clung tenaciously to the most trifling local liberties granted to them centuries before by their national princes.

The case of the Brussels riots of 1699 is particularly typical. At the close of the War of the League of Augsburg, Maréchal de Villeroi subjected Brussels to a bombardment which lasted two days and two nights and destroyed nearly 4,000 buildings. Among the wreckage was found an old document belonging to the archives of one of the corporations which mentioned certain privileges granted many years before to the Brussels guilds. These privileges were not important and their non observance could not seriously affect the workers' interests. Nevertheless, the precious document was reprinted in pamphlet form and the people urged the Elector Maximilian, who acted as Governor for the King of Spain, to grant them what they considered their indisputable ancestral rights. Maximilian who had never heard of these rights before, was reluctant to comply, and riots followed which were of course repressed. The governor must have wondered how a people which could stand patiently

the privations and sufferings entailed by fifty years of devastating wars, could be so deeply stirred by the chance discovery of an obsolete document.

This was not the only occasion when the attitude of the Belgians puzzled their sovereigns and governors. The so-called *brabançonne* revolution of 1789 was no doubt determined by the news of the taking of the Bastille, but its causes and character were very different from those of the French Revolution. Broadly speaking, the movement was a violent reaction against certain administrative measures taken by Joseph II, which might have been beneficial to the country, but which ruthlessly suppressed long-cherished local liberties. While the French revolutionaries looked towards the future, the Belgian revolutionaries looked towards the past, and the amazed emperor, who had lost their loyalty, was to a certain extent justified when he wrote to his French friend Comte de Ségur : "A general madness seems to seize all peoples ; those of Brabant, for instance, have revolted because I wanted to give them what your own nation clamours for."

There are no more misleading expressions than those of "Spanish Netherlands" or "Austrian Netherlands," which are frequently applied to the Belgian provinces during the latter part of the seventeenth and during the eighteenth century. The country was never conquered and annexed by Spain or Austria as it was by France from 1792 to 1815 ; it was never a Spanish or Austrian province, but was merely attached to Spain and to Austria by dynastic ties similar to those connecting England and Scotland. We are thus led to consider another characteristic aspect of Belgian modern institutions and the part played by the sovereign in the nation's political life. Throughout the sixteenth century and the first part of the seventeenth, the people clung to the Burgundian tradition and showed themselves ready to adopt the rule of their national princes, as long as this rule did not ignore the essential interests of the country. This explains the popularity of Mary of Burgundy, of Philip the Handsome, before he became King of Spain, and of Charles of Luxemburg, before he became Emperor of Germany. It is only when Maximilian, Charles V, and more particularly Philip II, ignored Belgian interests and subordinated their policy in the Netherlands to their Spanish or Imperial interests, that discontent broke out. In 1579 the provinces which had combined to form the Confederation of Arras demanded that the administration of the Netherlands should no longer be entrusted to Governors appointed by the Kings of Spain, but to a prince of royal and legitimate blood ; and when at last this demand was granted, and Archduchess Isabella shared

with Archduke Albert the sovereignty of the country, the enthusiasm of the people knew no bounds. In spite of the fact that the new régime was incapable of fulfilling all expectations, it was nevertheless associated with a remarkable economic and artistic revival.

It is true that, after the death of Isabella, Belgium became once more a mere dependency, first of the Spanish branch, later of the Austrian branch, of the Hapsburg dynasty, but the monarchical feeling remained so deeply rooted that when, in 1830, the National Congress had to come to a decision with regard to the future form of government, constitutional monarchy won the day by 140 votes to 13. This majority is the more remarkable that some prominent leaders of the revolution were convinced republicans. The Congress's decision was no doubt influenced by the conditions prevailing at the time in Europe, but it was also determined by a desire to maintain a long-standing and respected tradition. The members of the Congress felt that the republican form of government was foreign to the country's spirit. They attributed most of the evils which had befallen Belgium under the Spanish and Austrian administration, not so much to the faults of the "Old Régime," as to the fact that the sovereigns, instead of residing in the country and living in close touch with their Belgian subjects, had delegated their power to others. These feelings are eloquently expressed in an address delivered to King Leopold I, on New Year's Day, 1839:

"Belgium has always suffered from want of national unity and of a native monarchy," declared Baron de Gerlache. "The country had no Belgian king when, by the Treaty of Westphalia, the Scheldt was closed and her trade ruined. She had no Belgian king when, in the course of the seventeenth century, five or six treaties were concluded with Holland and France, which were bought each time by some strips of territory torn from her land. The country had no Belgian king," he concluded, "when she was turned successively into a Spanish, an Austrian, a French and a Dutch province; when, in short, her princes or her masters bartered her for their own selfish interests."

These views, couched in the romantic style of the period, are not perhaps in strict accordance with historical facts, but they reflect nevertheless a popular belief which reveals itself again and again in the chequered course of Belgium's destiny and which is at the root of the loyalty of the Belgian people for their princes. The power of the executive in Belgium to-day is no longer what it was in the Netherlands in the fifteenth century, but the sovereign is still considered as the defender of the country's independence and the surest protector of her constitution. I need not add that

these expectations have been more than fulfilled by the present dynasty.

If we turn our attention from political institutions to economics, we are faced with fresh evidence of the power of tradition and of the influence exerted by the past on contemporary life. Belgium must necessarily strike a superficial observer as an eminently modern country. She is highly industrialised and, like Great Britain, depends largely on her export trade. She possesses the densest railway system in Europe, one of the busiest ports on the Continent and a vast colony, the natural wealth of which has only begun to be appreciated. But this modern activity is merely the development, under new conditions, of an age-long activity displayed in this small corner of Europe by the Flemish and Walloon population. It is interesting to notice for instance that in this same fifteenth century, during which the Dukes of Burgundy laid the solid foundations of Belgian nationality, almost all the modern features of Belgian economy are already apparent. It is the time when Antwerp inherited the prosperity of Bruges as the banking centre and the great port of transit of Northern Europe, when the linen industry succeeded in Flanders to the cloth industry ruined by English competition, when the first coal-pits were sunk in the region of Liège and when coal, for the first time, was exported abroad.

The proportions are completely altered to-day, and it would be foolish to compare the old industrial equipment with the new, but we nevertheless find in the ancient Flemish and Brabançon handlooms the origin of the mills in Ghent; in the ancient Meuse smithies, that of the iron and steel industries of Charleroi and Liège; and above all, in the ancient port of Antwerp, that of the great metropolis of to-day. As an economic unity the country was already constituted five centuries ago, and the natural waterways which did so much to link Walloon industry to Flemish trade and to weld the various provinces into one nation were already utilised. This fact is made still more evident if we allow agriculture its due share of attention. In his most valuable book on modern Belgium: *Land and Labour, Lessons from Belgium*, Mr. Seeböhm Rowntree deals mainly with the agricultural problem, and what he said in 1911 remains substantially true to-day. He insists on the high rate of production of Belgian farms—the highest in Europe—and attributes it to the system of land tenure, so different from that prevailing in England. He further points out that the division of the land and the large number of small holdings was not due in Belgium, as in other countries, to the sale of confiscated lands following the French Revolution, but to circumstances dating from a much earlier period. M. Pirenne,

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in his monumental *Histoire de Belgique* confirms these conclusions and draws attention to the fact that as early as the thirteenth century, feudal lords and monasteries enlisted the services of a large number of serfs to reclaim the marshes and the moors which covered their estates, and rewarded their labour with the grant of small farms.

If we remember that agricultural production remained throughout modern history, and in spite of the successive wars which ravaged the "battlefield of Europe," the mainstay of Belgian economic life, we shall have no difficulty in understanding why the Belgian peasant possesses such remarkable recuperative powers. Periods of reconstruction succeeded periods of devastation in every century. What was done in West Flanders ten years ago had been done five times before. While political events paralysed industry and ruined trade for two centuries, they were never able to interfere for long with the labour of the Flemish and Walloon farmers. The rich and powerful peasant co-operative societies of to-day, such as the *Boerenbond*, are carrying on traditions which were already solidly established before the name of Belgium had even been heard.

The same continuity cannot be traced in architecture, art and literature. This sensitive aspect of social activity was even more deeply influenced than trade by the fluctuations of the country's fortunes. It reacted surprisingly well under the influence of native princes or whenever the independent life of the nation asserted itself; but it fell into rapid decadence when this life became paralysed by adverse political circumstances. I will illustrate this point with a few examples taken from the civic architecture of Brussels. You remember no doubt the fifteenth-century town-hall which expresses so well the luxury prevailing at the court of the Dukes of Burgundy and the local pride which the Belgian cities succeeded in preserving under their rule. This great building is surrounded on the Grand'Place by a group of seventeenth-century houses with gilt façades in the picturesque late Renaissance style known as Baroque. Compare with this historic market-place the correct and uninspired square of houses surrounding the Place Royale and the Parc in the upper part of the town, erected in the eighteenth century according to the plans of the French architect Guimard and the Viennese architect Zim-mer, and you will be able to appreciate how much Belgium suffered intellectually and artistically from the eclipse of her national personality during this period. Though she produced masterpieces of exceptional value during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and some remarkable work during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Belgium does not possess what might be called

a genuine classical style of architecture, corresponding to the Louis XV and Louis XVI styles in France, or to the Queen Anne and Georgian styles in England. Anxious as one may be to avoid hasty generalisations, it is impossible not to be struck by the fact that artistic efflorescence coincides with national independence, and sterility or scant production with political effacement. It is equally significant that out of the seven hundred-odd pictures shown at the Exhibition of Flemish and Belgian Art which was held at Burlington House in 1927, ranging from the beginning of the fifteenth century to the end of the nineteenth, there were only about half-a-dozen works belonging to the eighteenth century.

If we wished to characterise this school of painting, comparing it with other European schools and more particularly with the Italian, we should be inclined to emphasise at the same time its mystical and realistic qualities. While the fifteenth-century Madonnas and Saints appear to us like heavenly visions far removed from this world, the Donors kneeling at their feet, or the lords and ladies appearing in neighbouring portraits are described with merciless realism and the most scrupulous accuracy. The process of idealisation which allows Botticelli and other fifteenth-century Italian painters to give their Christian and pagan characters such graceful features, is practically absent in the Netherlands.

After the partial eclipse lasting from the end of the seventeenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth, we witness a remarkable artistic and literary revival, coinciding with the national emancipation of 1830. Henri Leys, Henri de Braekeleer and Hippolyte Boulenger began to paint towards 1840; the Flemish novels of Henri Conscience were written at that time, whilst the first great master of Belgian literature of French expression, De Coster, the author of *Ulenspiegel*, began to write about ten years later. The literary movement distinguishes itself from similar movements in other European countries by precisely the same association of realism and mysticism, so apparent in the Flemish paintings of the early and later Renaissance; we are struck by the same richness of colouring, the same contrast between a deep religious aspiration on the one hand, and a healthy sensuousness and a somewhat crude description of nature and man on the other. It might indeed be contended that most of the Belgian literature of the nineteenth century is founded on mediæval and renaissance tradition. It is particularly strong on the side of poetry and legendary drama, while its weakness lies in psychological novels and comedies. It is, in many instances, powerful and sincere but it is also rugged and crude. It flies from one extreme of human nature to the other and lacks that dainty sense of propor-

tion and intellectual balance which many English and French writers, even among the Romanticists, inherited from the Classicists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

I have only been able to outline a few features of Belgian culture. The survey is far from complete; I have not even alluded to the development of religious life, which did so much to weld into one nation the two peoples settled on Belgian soil. But I hope that I have said enough to show that these various political, economic, artistic and literary aspects of social activity belong to the same nation, and that the whole picture "hangs together." There seems at first sight no relationship between the exceptional powers conferred on a Belgian burgomaster and the delight taken by Belgian story-tellers in the description of pageants and kermesses—or between the intensive methods of production adopted by Belgian farmers and the lack of great classical architecture in Belgian towns. These various aspects of social life are nevertheless closely linked together, for the first two are associated with the mediæval love of the "clock tower" and the power of local tradition, and the two others with the political decadence of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which provoked an artistic and commercial decline and compelled the people to concentrate their activity on the land. Such reflections will help us to realise that the character of this strange Belgian people, divided and united, democratic and monarchic, conservative and progressive, realistic and religious, possesses certain qualities which deserve the interest and sympathy of the student.

EMILE CAMMAERTS.

THE UNITED STATES LEADS THE WORLD.

IN one field the predominance of the United States remains unchallenged. John Haynes Holmes, the great New York preacher, recently said, "America is the most lawless country on the face of the globe." Statistics, indeed, prove that in the simple matter of murder she leads the world, and has done so for two decades. Never, perhaps, in all the annals of mankind has there been so callow a disregard for human life as exists to-day in many large American cities. The reader thinks of Chicago, but its criminal record is far from the worst, although it is pre-eminently successful in getting the most publicity. Recent crime statistics indicate that Chicago is slowly improving, whereas New York, Detroit and Memphis are growing worse. Memphis still retains her proud place as the most murderous spot on earth. In 1929 she had 668 murders per million, an increase of 10 per cent. over the previous year. Verily the casualties of peace are heavier here than those of war. Chicago's rate was only 127, a fall of 30 per cent., while New York showed a rate of 71, an increase of 25 per cent. The homicide rate in the United States for 1929 was 105, which was twenty-one times that of Great Britain, nine times that of Canada, five times that of Austria and nearly three times that of Italy. It has increased, moreover, 350 per cent. in ten years. The record in criminal law administration appears even worse. In the past five years, three hundred and fifty persons in Chicago were taken "for a ride." For these crimes a half-dozen were tried, and not one was sentenced to death. Murder would seem to be one of the safe occupations in Chicago. There are said to be 10,000 criminals at large in Chicago, and 30,000 in New York, where 25,000 "speakeasies" exist contrary to law. The Wickersham report on prohibition and crimes mentioned one notorious New York resort by name. The next day the police closed it!

A few years ago a group of Chicago "racketeers" exterminated at one fell swoop seven members of a rival gang with machine guns. Months later, a reporter (whose relations with the underworld have since made his name notorious) was murdered. On the heels of this, a Detroit radio announcer (later discovered to be a "racketeer") was "put on the spot" for broadcasting information about its criminals. The murder of Arnold Rothstein in New York was never solved, because the police feared the consequent revelations. Despite their great circumspection, however, the public learned sufficient to link this man with the dregs of the underworld and the police. A Chicago gangster kept an account

book which fell into the hands of the police when he was done to death. This book showed disbursements to the local police and £10,000 to the campaign fund of Mayor Thompson in 1927.

Under such conditions it is not to be marvelled at that such sinister figures as Al Capone and Jack Diamond make their appearance. The former's career serves to prove that truth is stranger than fiction. He is, indeed, almost a portent. Long known as a "public enemy," he has pursued his career of crime for five years with perfect impunity. His traffic in liquor, drugs, gambling and brothels is supposed to have brought him £14,000,000, of which he paid £6,000,000 for protection. He is the acknowledged chief of the "racketeers" employing seven hundred gangsters, of whom 20 per cent. are aliens and 30 per cent. paroled convicts. He is said to have cost Chicago nearly £30,000,000 a year. Nevertheless, neither the city police nor the state authorities found any cause to move against these enterprising persons. It was left for the Federal Government to proceed against them for their failure to pay taxes on income earned in a business clearly illegal and criminal. Capone pleaded guilty and the court gave him a month to settle up his business affairs. At the end of that time the judge allowed him to change his plea to "not guilty" and he went to trial in the usual way. Rare consideration indeed for a man reputed to be responsible for the deaths of fifty people. Experts calculate that the crime wave is costing Americans each year two to three billion pounds, which goes into the pockets of the worst criminal element the world has ever seen, an element, indeed, that kills innocent citizens with less compunction than the average person shoots a mad dog.

To account for the prevalence of violent crimes in America is far from easy. Due in part to the influence of the frontier where human life has been held cheap, murder has always been common. The country has been settled by the aggressive and discontented. In the earliest days the colonists advanced their frontiers only through killing aborigines. The United States was scarcely free from England until Shay's Rebellion and the Whisky Insurrection occurred. Two thousand murders characterised the period of the Gold Rush in California, five hundred in one year, with not more than five legal executions. While the Civil War was in progress, Quantrell and his band playfully shot down one hundred and forty people in the streets of Lawrence, Kansas. In the South-land they have for two-thirds of a century systematically violated the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution, and "Lynch Law" still raises its ugly head, naked and unashamed.

The mores of the frontier have been carried over into the twentieth century. Except for a few of the older cities, the United

States is still socially in a transition stage: she has ceased to belong to the frontier without becoming urban-minded. The bulk of the people in the towns take little interest in Government except on election day. The small-town newspaper, presumably the guardian of the public interest, is far more concerned with business, social life and sport, than with politics, unless, perchance, it is in league with the town's political boss. Crusading editors of the type of Horace Greeley no longer abound, and the passing of the *New York World* marks, perhaps, the end of that great phase of American journalism. Instead of attempting to develop an intelligent public opinion, the press entertains its readers by exploiting the sensational. A great lecture may receive a paragraph, while a man who sits eighty-seven hours on the top of a pole gets a column, and a brutal murderer half a page, sometimes accompanied by pictures of the beast. The responsibility of the fourth estate for the prevalence of crime is great, particularly for juvenile delinquency. To the immature or weak-minded the yellow journals and the cinema even succeed in making vice and crime attractive. Yet some agencies for the prevention of crime urge "more and better crime news." What they may mean by "better" is problematical, but many newspapers could not devote "more" space to crime, except at the expense of advertisements.

Our great industrial system, by diverting the attention of able, fearless men from government to business, is in part responsible for the growth of crime. America's unprecedented prosperity blinded its better citizens to the enormous cost and appalling inefficiency of local government, especially in the larger cities, where the carnival of crime reigns supreme. The influence of the World War in increasing crime in America has been much exaggerated, for the opposite result is apparent in Britain, France or Germany, whose people certainly suffered far more from it. The war, however, did speed up the production of lethal weapons and teach two million youth how to use them efficiently in a land where one buys machine guns almost as readily as postage stamps. These weapons, together with bombs and smoke screens, have all been skilfully utilised by high-powered criminals. The speedy automobile, in particular, has proved a great boon to them. And what of the future with the airplane?

Prohibition is frequently mentioned as a major cause for America's predominance in crime. Yet she has had local option for two-thirds of a century in certain areas, with but few violent crimes. Even the half-hearted attempt to enforce prohibition has brought about a collapse of local government. Local administration has always been inefficient in the United States, and frequently corrupt. Bentham's demand for trained experts in government has

never been accepted and scarcely heard of in the rural communities of the South and West, where the expert is suspect. Professor Laski justly complains because the American college graduate ignores politics as a career. Without political influence he would be foolish to consider it, as professional politicians loathe educated men with liberal ideas. Prohibition has only served to display the inadequacy of the local government to meet the exigencies of an industrial, twentieth-century civilisation.

The murder rate is highest in Southern cities, where the majority of the population is coloured. The policy of unrestricted immigration is another factor that has contributed heavily to the orgy of crime, for the "racketeers" are mainly Italians and Poles, frequently defended by cunning lawyers of foreign persuasion. The process of assimilation has been little helped by the public schools in the slums, where the teaching of practical citizenship begins and ends with saluting the flag. In the crowded cities old world parents have lost control over their progeny, particularly the boys, who are taught in school the creed of personal self-expression, which carries by implication the idea that no one should be required to do anything distasteful. In attempting to make education painless in the United States, educational administrators have almost succeeded in making it useless, at least for character training. Even the universities are accused of being a compromise between a country club and an athletic carnival. The religion of the children of immigrants also tends to disappear, with the result that when parents, schools and churches provide no restraining influence, the youth follows the line of least resistance. In him has been inculcated the fundamental doctrine of his gang that the only crime consists in getting caught.

Nothing startles the Englishman more than the lawlessness of American youth. This indictment applies not only to the children of wealthy families (for it has always applied to them), but to the lower and middle classes as well. While moral standards are being questioned as never before, the home, the school and the church are losing their grip on boys and girls during their most impressionable years. Nannery belonged to a youthful gang of seven. Two of these killed each other, one committed suicide in prison, another was killed attempting to escape; a fifth is still at Sing Sing, and a sixth enlisted in the Foreign Legion. Nannery himself was recently captured. His car contained a sawed-off shotgun, an automatic pistol and two revolvers. Nannery himself carried two revolvers and a tear-gas pistol. This walking arsenal is almost typical of the lawless youth, who are filling American prisons, or would fill them if the police did their duty. The Illinois Crime Survey showed that 64 per cent. of the boys and

57 per cent. of the girls brought before the juvenile courts of Chicago had foreign-born fathers.

Without a doubt, however, the greatest cause for the crime wave in America is the appalling breakdown of criminal justice. The inefficiency of the police, especially in the rural areas, surpasses belief. All too frequently they are corrupt, but usually they are simply incapable. Chosen through personal and political favouritism, they have, in the smaller cities, little or no training for their task, and their mental equipment is shockingly low. They are, even if honest, no match for the shrewd criminals with whom they must match their wits. A city of half a million recently introduced a civil service examination for policemen. These tests were made as elementary as possible. Yet only 10 per cent. of the candidates passed, even with the most liberal marking! Sheriffs and other executive officers in local areas have approximately the same training and intellectual outlook. Two such officers started for jail with two dangerous criminals. All four disappeared. Weeks later, the bodies of the sheriffs were found in a brush heap. Despite their handcuffs, the prisoners overpowered the officers, killed them and escaped.

Once apprehended, a dangerous criminal immediately calls in his lawyer. The legal profession in the United States is on a very low plane. There is no such distinction between solicitor and barrister as in England; the ordinary lawyer is both, and frequently in small towns a real estate agent besides. No criminal can be so notorious that he cannot find some able lawyer anxious to defend him. Clarence Darrow recently became the counsel of one of the most sinister figures in all American history, a man who was for a brief time the unscrupulous political boss of a considerable area in the middle and south west, and is now serving a life sentence for murder. Shrewd lawyers not only secure the release of their clients on bail, but by making use of various legal technicalities gain delay after delay, until the public has lost all interest in the case or the more important witnesses have disappeared. The prosecutor, often young and untrained, uses this office as a stepping-stone in law or politics. However efficient he may be, he is not likely to exert himself unduly against the defence lawyer, who is usually a prominent member of the bar and may be of great help to him in his professional advancement. Usually, however, the prosecutor is no match for the lawyer for the defence, who profits greatly by the prosecutor's ignorance or inefficiency. Frequently he secures the dismissal of the case against his client on the slightest technicality. A nefarious Chicago gangster was brought before the court twenty-eight times in ten years, and each time was let off without trial. Regardless of the seriousness of the crime or the bad character of

the defendant, bonding companies stand ready to furnish enormous bail, although at a price that staggers belief. Bankers also place their services at the disposal of notorious gangsters without asking embarrassing questions. Ralph Capone boasted that he had accounts in his bank under five different names. Neither he nor his brother could carry on their nefarious activities six months without banking facilities.

After numerous and long delays, incomprehensible to the layman, the accused comes to trial. A jury must first be secured, which frequently takes days, occasionally weeks. Disregarding entirely the oath which must be taken by the jurymen, both the defence and the prosecutor insist upon securing a jury ignorant of all the facts in the case, a custom which some English writers aptly refer to as "knocking the brains out of the jury." Challenges may be used for the most frivolous pretexts, and in serious crimes without any pretext whatever. If a case is really important, it is very difficult to secure twelve persons who have neither heard of the case nor made up their minds about it. Intelligent folk, moreover, shun jury duty as they do the plague, for their treatment during the trial is often so outrageous that a man from Mars might well wonder whether the defendant or the jury was on trial. The jury is often a splendid illustration of arrested mental development. Recently a most disgusting murder case ended in a verdict of manslaughter, carrying with it imprisonment from one to ten years. Ten of the twelve jurymen immediately announced that they had voted for manslaughter under the impression that it carried the death penalty. What hope is there for justice, when it is in the hands of a jury of morons?

Judges in the United States, both Federal and State, from the highest to the lowest are selected for political reasons. The President appoints Federal judges, but the nominations rest with the Senators in the districts concerned. Even in filling vacancies on the Supreme Bench, the President must study the candidate's political affiliations and the geographical area from which he should be drawn. In most states judges are elected, and for relatively short terms. Their pay, moreover, is so small that most men seeking such positions look upon them only as stepping-stones in the legal profession. One and all, they are inclined to be highly responsive to public criticism, ever fearful of damaging their political futures. Even in the states where the judges are appointed, conditions are frequently no better. The corruption among the New York City judges has of late become notorious. Appointed by Tammany Hall, they are little better than political henchmen. Yet Supreme Court judges there are paid £5,000 a year for a period of fourteen years. Tammany cynically boasts that she has the best judges money

can buy. The recent, unsavoury history of Crater, Silberman, and Norris indicates that judges there are even worse than in the days of Tweed. The recent dismissal of several Tammany judges for malfeasance in office indicates that conditions are much worse than in the days of Boss Tweed. And the Seaberry investigations now under way suggest that there is much worse to come.

The judge has no such authority in carrying on a trial as in England. In state and local courts he is inclined to fear the skilful defence lawyer who utilises every legal trick to prolong the trial and lessen the punishment. Even after the conviction, he may secure a stay of sentence or appeal the case on the slightest technicality. Mr. Albert Fall, Senator, and later a member of the Harding Cabinet, was finally convicted two years ago for a crime committed seven years earlier, and sentenced to imprisonment. Only recently has he entered the prison of his choice, after exhausting every legal means to obtain a respite or a pardon on the plea of ill-health. The trial of Harry Daugherty, his colleague, was another solemn, judicial farce, that may readily occur to mind. On the other hand, Saccho and Vanzetti have been executed, and Mooney and Billings are still serving time for crimes which many legal experts are convinced they never committed.

The worst feature in criminal law, however, is unquestionably the unscrupulousness of criminal lawyers. Admission to the bar is comparatively easy in all American states. With the proper coaching a man with only scant legal knowledge (and little else) can pass the necessary examinations. In far too many cases even the successful candidates are practically illiterate. One state constitution expressly forbids any qualifications for admission to the bar. A man once admitted to practice is unlikely to suffer disbarment. Although the number of tricky lawyers is legion, few are ever brought to task. Ambulance chasers and "fee-splitters" flourish as the green bay tree. The defence lawyer is often as bad as the criminal he defends. Occasionally at least he is an accomplice both before and after the fact in securing witnesses who will swear to anything he desires, as punishment for perjury is very rare indeed, though the crime itself is rampant. In such circumstances alibis are readily provided for those who need them. The counsel always knows, moreover, that if he steps beyond the pale, another of his own type will defend him.

With police, prosecutors, juries, judges, and lawyers such as they are, it is little short of a miracle that the ends of justice are served so frequently as they are, for these men are aided and abetted in their work by a sickly, mawkish sentimentality on the part of the public. A county treasurer stole £20,000 from the funds entrusted to him. His friends and neighbours defended

him by saying that he was a fine, public-spirited citizen who was always good to his family. It is superfluous to suggest that almost anyone could be good to his family with other people's money. Even should the convicted person be sent to prison, friends with political influence secure a parole or even a pardon before he has scarcely begun to serve his sentence. It is notorious that well-known criminals of the most dangerous sort are released, and the public is none the wiser until they are caught red-handed once more.

Is there no relief in sight? Not until the American people are willing to divorce the administration of justice from politics. As long as the police, the prosecutors and the judges are a part of the spoils system, just so long will such a state of things continue. Until some steps are taken to destroy the influence of the political boss in selecting officers of the law, all other suggestions at reform will prove futile. Once this principle is accepted, however, the United States may hope for efficient police, who will not only apprehend criminals, but prevent crime. Prosecutors may then be selected for merit, and adequately rewarded by a liberal salary so that they may look upon such positions as in themselves worthy, rather than as a stepping-stone to something better. Then, too, will come judges of high character who will put unscrupulous lawyers in their place. All this can come, however, only with the thorough awakening of public conscience. That is going to be difficult, for Americans have been quiescent so long in their period of great prosperity, waiting for the legal profession (which dominates legislatures as nowhere else in the world)* to reform criminal law. Some of the finest legal minds to-day are anxious for revolutionary changes in procedure, but they are as voices crying in the wilderness compared to the great unleavened mass of lawyers who are abundantly satisfied with things as they are. With even a slight simplification of the procedure in civil and criminal cases the United States could dispense with half her lawyers. The average citizen, therefore, need not expect the legal profession to commit *hara-kiri*. Neither should he anticipate at first too much from a population whose economic smugness has been satisfied with such men as Walker and Thompson for mayors of large cities.

Since the days of Edmund Burke, lawyers have been a power in America. They are to-day so entrenched in business and as the protectors of Big Business that it will require a popular revolution to cause them to consider seriously reforms that are

* Less than 15 per cent. of the House of Commons are members of the legal profession, while more than 60 per cent. of the American House of Representatives are lawyers.

absolutely indispensable. This move must, therefore, come from the people themselves, certainly not from the lawyers, who are inherently conservative. They bitterly opposed the reform of criminal law in England a century ago and they oppose to-day any considerable change in America. Educating public sentiment into a respect for law must begin in the home. Parents must not only preach it, but practise it as well, for there are intimations that in some instances youths will become wild imitating their parents. The schools, with parental backing, could do much that they have hitherto failed to do, especially when they have been drawn off from their legitimate task of training youth into an exploitation of the theories of behaviourism and Freudianism. The Church also could do far more in solving this problem of problems than it has hitherto done. Its time would be far better employed thus than in quarrelling over minute questions of doctrine, or in questioning the bearing of Darwinism upon the description of creation as set forth in the book of Genesis hundreds of years ago. Perhaps the serious economic depression may give American citizens sufficient leisure for a thorough heart-searching, and lead them to a deeper sense of civic responsibility. Once thoroughly aroused the public conscience may, in the name of social justice, force a complete overhauling of criminal procedure.

In so brief a summary, the shortcomings of American criminal procedure have necessarily been over-emphasised. After all, miscarriages of justice affect directly a comparatively small part of the people. Except in the largest cities the number of criminals is never large, and the proportion of citizens paying tribute to "racketeers" negligible. Even in Memphis or Chicago the average person goes peacefully on his way, undisturbed by gang warfare. Despite the spoils system, there are large numbers of able, unselfish lawyers, judges and prosecutors, who are working manfully to safeguard the ends of justice; despite legal technicalities and subnormal juries, substantial justice is rendered in a large percentage of trials.

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THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN JAPAN.

COMMUNISM in China is an Eastern thing with a Western name—a mixture of peasants' war and the brigandage engendered by mass poverty and government impotence. In Japan it is a genuine modern growth, born of industrialism, nurtured on Marxian economics, avowing loyalty to the Third International and preaching a dictatorship of the proletariat. Mr. T. Nosaka, a Japanese Communist, dates the beginning of Communism in Japan from the Russian revolution which "awakened the masses from their long sleep." The date need not be disputed though Communism in Japan, as in Europe, had a pre-natal history. What the Russian revolution did was to separate the left wing from an old amorphous movement which had been slowly growing since the first Socialist Society was founded (soon to die) in 1882, and give it a name and a policy. After 1922 Syndicalism and Anarchism disappeared, *spurlos versenkt*, and the Socialist movement divided into two camps, Parliamentary Labourism and Communism.

Seeds from Russia's red harvest could not have failed to blow over Japan's garden wall; but the Third International, then busy extending the Communist movement to the Far East, did not trust to the wind of the spirit alone. In 1921 the Baku Congress of Nations of the Orient, presided over by Zinoviev, organised the Communist movement in Asia. Japan was not represented. In 1921 a Chinese emissary of Comintern, equipped with funds, visited Japan and invited a number of left wing Socialists to attend the next conference of the Third International in Moscow. They went; they saw; they were converted. In 1923 the Japanese Communist Party ("J.K.P.") was founded, but the arrest of the leaders in May of the same year halted its activities before they had well begun. Three months later the movement disappeared in the ashes of the great earthquake and was not heard of again until 1925, when it was revived at the instigation of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Third International, then ruling the roost at Shanghai. Japan had just enfranchised ten million propertyless voters, and Comintern saw opportunities in the coming election in which the "toiling masses" would for the first time take part. In 1926 "J.K.P." was reinforced by Japanese students from the Lenin University at Moscow and its organisation was overhauled. A political programme with local colour was prepared, a central executive committee appointed and regional committees were set up. "Cells" were planted in factories, in trade unions and in the new Labour groups which were coming together for the election. A Communist sheet *Akahata* (The Red Flag) was mimeographed

and secretly circulated among the reliable who, if its circulation is a guide, did not exceed four hundred. The Communist Party, an illegal organisation, could not appear in the open, so its agents permeated the unions and the leftward Labour groups. The results were encouraging. While the number of convinced Marxians cannot have been great, hundreds of hot-headed young Labour politicians were influenced. The Labour-Farmer Party on the extreme left came under Communist control, according to the police. It nominated eleven candidates, found their deposits of £100 each and paid their expenses—a suspicious feat, as it seemed to the watchful Home Office, for a small party of penniless men. From all parts of the country "red" activity was reported. Under cover of a snowstorm of election literature thousands of Communist tracts were distributed. The nature of their propaganda varied from mild radicalism to full-blooded revolution. Beginners were wooed with innocuous handbills on "The Right to Strike," "An Eight-hour Day for All," "State Relief for the Unemployed." For those who wanted stronger meat there were "Parliament without an Emperor," "Confiscate the Property of Emperor and Capitalists," and "Dictatorship of Workers and Farmers."

A Seiyukai Cabinet of conservative-nationalist complexion was in power presided over by General Takaka. Ministers were startled by the extent of Communist propaganda, surprised and shocked by the vulgarity of certain references to the Imperial family. Counter-measures were elaborated. On the night of March 15th, 1928, the police of 34 prefectures raided the homes of hundreds of people suspected of Communist sympathies and detained for examination in the police stations more than a thousand persons. The Government dissolved the Farmer-Labour Party but permitted it to reorganise later. Two of its members who had been elected to Parliament were allowed to retain their seats. The legal weapon against revolutionary agitation, the Peace Preservation Act of 1925, was amended to provide that members of any organisation aiming at the "alteration of the foundation of the State as laid down in the constitution, might be punished with death, or with life imprisonment or with imprisonment for not less than five years." Of the thousand or more persons detained, 484 were prosecuted; 280 of these are now serving sentences and 166 still await their trial; 18 were acquitted; 20 dismissed.

The movement had suffered a resounding blow, but it rallied. More Japanese graduates were sent from Moscow to replace the lost leaders and some of those at home who had slipped through the police net showed no lack of determination. In the winter of 1928-29 "J.K.P." was resuscitated and the propaganda begun anew. But the authorities had not been asleep. After the alarming

discoveries of the election the special branch of the police which deals with subversive movements was reorganised and strengthened, and subsequent events proved that it possessed a remarkable inner knowledge of Communist activities. As the result of fresh raids in 1929 and 1930, 895 more persons were sent for trial out of a much larger number examined. During a considerable part of this period "J.K.P." leaders had been "on the run" and the party was not functioning. Now virtually all of the known leaders are under arrest and the trials, including those of some moving spirits who have been in prison since the first raid, have begun. Communism has once more been suppressed and the police are confident that any recrudescence will be promptly detected.

The party organisation being thus broken up, the authorities are concerning themselves with methods of checking an alarming growth of Communism among students. Of the 1,422 persons arrested, 463 were graduates or students of higher schools, colleges and universities. Of 173 persons sent for trial after the 1930 Tokyo raids, 93 had received university education. Tokyo Imperial University headed the list with 31 of its members indicted; and almost every seat of higher learning in the capital contributed its quota. Some of the younger professors have been arrested and others forced to resign. One arrested student is the heir of a viscount, one the son of a general, two are sons of a university president. Many were released without prosecution, but leniency did not prevent fresh ebullitions. On May Day this year 35 Tokyo students were locked up for participating in the minor disorders proper to the occasion. The provincial universities are as deeply infected as those of the capital. Kyoto, that ancient and beautiful city, is a hotbed of student Communism. In the round-up of 1928 some 32 student Socialist societies were ordered to dissolve.

This aspect of "dangerous thoughts" gives the authorities greater concern than any other. The Minister of Justice has declared that the possibility of students one day taking the lead in Communist activity is a source of danger to the State. A vision of the universities furnishing leaders to the proletariat has appeared to some of the students. "'Forward among the masses' was our motto," writes one of them, "as it had been that of the young Russian intellectuals in the nineteenth century." It is an outmoded motto in modern Communist doctrine, and the rules of "J.K.P." now provide that only "workers" may be admitted to membership. So, at least, a Communist student informs me, but a visit to the Tokyo court where the Communist trials are now proceeding would show that the rule has been applied with some

flexibility. Communism in Japan is not rich enough to reject recruits from any source. The movement has drawn its best leaders from the intelligentsia. And while students may be ineligible for membership of "J.K.P." they have given it much needed help. The Tokyo *Nichi Nichi* reports that after the police had broken up the Communist organisation the collection of funds became very difficult and the leaders were reduced to the direst poverty. A young Communist hit on the idea of making collections in the universities, with the result that a monthly income of about £200 was obtained. The sum may be exaggerated but the leaders who were last arrested were not in want of money.

This picture of the universities honeycombed with Communism is at first sight very disquieting. But student Communism, as the authorities begin to realise, is not the true Communism of Comintern but a sympathetic growth which has been stimulated by unwise methods of repression. Marxist doctrines have been enveloped in prohibitions. Professors of economics suspected of sympathy with them have been compelled to resign. Students have been given the idea that Communist economics are a social high explosive and it is not surprising that eager spirits have formed circles for their study. As the prohibition of alcohol has made drinking fashionable in some American universities, the frowns of the authorities have made Marx fashionable in Japan, and the term "Marx-boy" has come into vogue to describe not so much the serious young Socialist as his imitators who would be in the mode. The methods of the police in dealing with student Communists have been the opposite of those which would be thought effective in England. Sakae Osugi's* description of himself as a "prison-made man" can be applied to most of the students who have graduated from intellectual curiosity about Marxism to the active propagation of Communism. A little knowledge of police methods shows how the hardening process which makes amateurs into revolutionaries is done. Anyone suspected of Communist sympathies may be taken to the police station for examination, and detained, regardless of the spirit of the law, till the police are satisfied that he has nothing more to reveal. The "third degree" is employed, subject to the single restriction that physical marks which might be shown to a judge are avoided. The word torture is not too strong for some of the methods said to be employed with recalcitrant prisoners while they are in the hands of police officers of low rank. Stories of the brutal treatment of students in police stations circulate through every high school and university in the country. Young men whose interest in Marxism would be quickly

* Osugi was a well-known anarchist who was strangled by an officer in the disturbances which followed the earthquake and fire of 1923.

appeared hear those stories and are drawn by indignation and sympathy into the often puerile "red" societies which the police so vigilantly hunt down.

Severity having failed, other methods are now being tried. Conferences of the faculties with legal and administrative officials are continually discussing means of directing students' thoughts into safer channels. The difficulty of obtaining employment after graduation is believed to be a cause of discontent, so employment agencies are being established at the universities. The study of Marxism is not prohibited, but students are to be guided by their professors instead of forming debating clubs of their own. When students engage in suspicious activities they are to be cautioned instead of taken to the police station for the "third degree." On the day that this is written the vernacular press announces that 24 students of the Law College of Tokyo Imperial University have been suspended for a year and one has been expelled in consequence of the actions of a club to which they belonged. The students protest that they only tried to get an obnoxious restaurant removed from the University precincts, but the professors who investigated the case would hardly have imposed a public penalty for so small a cause. At all events, the matter was handled by the University and not by the police, and that indicates a sensible change. It may be more successful than the other and can hardly be less. The judicial authorities for two years past have been urging the necessity of distinguishing between student Communism and the Communist Party, and in 1930 and 1931, 367 arrested students were dismissed by the judges without trial.

Despite the unquestionable vitality of student Communism, it can hardly be called an organic part of the Communist movement, and wiser handling by the authorities should lead to its natural decline. Student life in Japan is free from the heady movements which afflict the universities of Egypt, India and China. The Japanese student is generally a practical person who seeks in education the means of a successful career. Next to his studies his chief interest is sport. "Dictatorship of the proletariat" is not the social ideal of a man who expects his degree to open the way to a distinguished or at least a comfortable career. It is true that the authorities are in a dilemma; they cannot easily administer a policy which professes to grant intellectual freedom for the study of Marx's ideas and at the same time prohibits all efforts at putting those ideas in practice. Yet a change of method, even if the golden mean between liberty and repression is hard to find, will make revolt less alluring to young minds. As the Japanese are efficient administrators, it is reasonable to expect that the errors of the past few years will be rectified, and when that is done student

Communism will shrink to dimensions as unalarming as those of the general Communist movement.

The reader has now a picture of the Communist movement in Japan before him. The statistical test—1,422 prosecutions in four years—suggests as a first impression that it cannot, with any pretence to sober description, be called "a vast revolutionary conspiracy." And while, in a question like this, one is conscious that the *imponderabilia* may be more important than the statistics, scrutiny of the facts behind the figures confirms that first impression. The arrests were not a single haul of persons simultaneously engaged in a seditious enterprise, but the successive reaping of four harvests of Communist propaganda. The offence for which those hundreds of persons have been tried is the propagation of Communism. Plots against persons or against property have not been discovered. The words of the statute are very broad. It is a crime to belong to a society which seeks to subvert the fundamental principles of the constitution or repudiates the system of private property. A judgment of the Appeal Court has just affirmed that anyone who knowingly assists the members of such an organisation is equally guilty with them. The police in their reports of later raids have announced the arrest of a number of "sympathisers," sympathy having in some cases taken the form of contributions to the funds. The wide definition enables the police to subject to rigorous and prolonged examination virtually any person whom they suspect. The provision of the law which forbids the detention beyond a limited period of persons not charged with a definite offence is defeated by moving the prisoners from one police station to another or by liberating and rearresting them. The meshes of the police net are close. It is extremely difficult to obtain sight of Communist leaflets, simply because people are afraid to have them in their possession. On occasions such as May Day the police have no scruples about stopping likely looking persons in the street and searching them.

One naturally asks why there should be so much cry about so little wool. The answer is that the offence is new and therefore alarming, and it is peculiarly hateful to the authorities and to the conservative instincts of the race. The Japanese are the least Oriental, in mentality, of the Asian peoples, but they reverence discipline and are accustomed to be ruled. The police are the instruments of an authority which pervades every department of life; they attend all political meetings, and do not hesitate to stop any speaker whose sentiments seem to go beyond their narrow bounds of political propriety. If some Japanese visitors to England admire the freedom of speech of Hyde Park, there are more who deplore the laxity which tolerates it, and few who would

be content to see similar freedoms introduced to Japan. They are probably right, for the Japanese people are impressionable, and their religious life shows that charlatans easily obtain a following. Public life is plagued with societies of super-patriots ready for every kind of reactionary activity from breaking strikes to planting bombs in Ministers' doorways. They are a survival of old Japan, too deeply ramified to be easily extirpated, and in any case it is more convenient to authority to turn a blind eye on the ultra-loyal than on the disloyal. But the risk that freedom of agitation might call up opposing hosts of Communists is one from which Governments shrink. It is natural therefore that the police should exercise minute supervision over politically suspicious speech or action, and not surprising that a movement which proclaims its faith in the Russian revolution should be relentlessly hunted down. The indifference which a British Government could display is no criterion in Japan.

The efficiency of police repression brings its own penalties. Unquestionably some of the Communist leaders now on trial have been hardened by police severities. Severity suggests fear and creates the impression that Communism is truly dangerous and thus attracts those who are dissatisfied and desire change. But all such considerations only throw into stronger relief the failure of Communism to make progress since its introduction to Japan ten years ago. Making full allowance for the fervour of the Communists and the persistency with which they stick to their cause, they are too few and their influence is too limited to make them a danger to the State. The circumstances which gave them their opportunity in Russia are absent from Japan. The government is strong and efficient, and though it is less completely under the influence of public opinion than that of England, quadrennial parliaments and manhood suffrage ensure that unpopular Ministries can be dismissed and that policy does in the main command the support of the people. Before the enactment of manhood suffrage in 1925 Japanese labour saw little hope of achieving its ends by constitutional means and might have been accessible to Communist propaganda. The grant of a vote to every labourer and the spectacle of Labour forming a Government in conservative and monarchical England brought the trade unions into the parliamentary school. A constitutional Labour party is developing in Japan on British lines, and this party, though still immature and schism-ridden, seems likely to draw to it both the growing trade unions and the intellectual "liberals" of the cities and universities. Parliamentary Labour is a barrier which Communism can hardly hope to scale in a country like Japan where education is universal, order enforced and respected, and the masses, poor, no

doubt, but strongly self-respecting, are quite capable of self-help both by strikes and by the vote. It would be foolish to pretend that the new factory proletariat which modern industry has created is not discontented, but its members are enrolling in trade unions and not in the Communist party.

In the long run the character of a people determines which way it will turn when it finds itself at the cross-roads. The Japanese national character is the product of the family system, and is saturated with ideas of loyalty, discipline and responsibility. The man in the street is consequently impelled to the right rather than the left, and the Fascist idea, embodied in the Young Men's Associations with their two and a half million active members, is incomparably more congenial to the Japanese mind than the idea of revolt and subversion preached by the Communists.

A Judge of the Supreme Court who has tried many Communists thus sums up his views :

Though Communism has for the time being been suppressed we cannot overlook the fact that there is a strong tendency in that direction on the part of some people. . . . They are tired of the hard lot of the workers, oppressed by the greed of those who profit at their expense, and disquieted by disclosures of corruption among officials whose unscrupulous dealings with wealth have fostered an unprecedented feeling of distrust of the upper classes. The increasing number of university graduates who are unable to find employment aggravates the situation. Those unemployed intellectuals find the road to radicalism very inviting and, pushed by despair and shattered ideals, they travel swiftly towards Communism and anarchism. As might be expected, the literature of the time reflects those tendencies and tends to feed the desire of young idealists to learn about the condition of the proletariat and to do something to improve their miserable lot. We cannot pick up a current magazine without finding it filled with works of this kind. There is no doubt that the public in general has no sympathy with extreme ideas which aim to establish a proletarian dictatorship. Most people know that change can only come gradually if it is to be lasting, but everyone knows that changes must come, and reactionaries who try to retard progress and hamper freedom may lead this growing nation into paths which are more dangerous than their own shortsighted vision can perceive. What the result of this struggle between the longing for freedom and justice and the desire to preserve the old order will be only the future can tell."

The writer may be permitted to add his own belief, supported by such acts as the grant of manhood suffrage and the recent Government bill giving legal status to trade unions, that the Japanese authorities are not unaware of the value of timely concession nor blind to the need of reforms.

HUGH BYAS.

TEACHING THE BLIND TO MODEL.

THIS globe is a very tiny place. When a daring soul in Paris—or was it New York? I really do not know the origin of the revolutionary innovation—let us say New York then—first used mother-of-pearl enamel on her finger-nails, all self-respecting women in the centres of the civilised world were made aware of the fact inside a very few days, and could act accordingly. When Suzanne Lenglen turned milliner a breathless universe knew it the selfsame day. When Jack Diamond was shot, cables and wireless kept five continents posted as to the exact stages of his sufferings, and new clues to the assassins. This globe is a huge place. Many shiploads of grain were being burned in the Argentine and the Middle West, at the same time that thousands were dying of starvation in China. Fine and stirring books that might give joy to millions remain unknown except to a circle of a few hundred. Deeds of courage, of sacrifice, of loving-kindness and public-spirit are done every day, deeds worthy to be bruited abroad; but none hear of them. Are these the tritest of commonplaces? They are. But one should sometimes have the courage to pronounce them.

Little post-war Austria, with its harrowing need and agonising distress, and its great surplus of creative intelligentsia—half of its denizens live in the cities—seems to be teeming with new ideas and experiments and full-fledged reforms in the provinces of education, arts and crafts, medicine, housing, civil engineering. Some of the achievements in the sphere of the activity, school, housing and architecture generally, and surgery, have become pretty well known lately, at least in the circles interested. Others have remained absolutely obscure, perhaps because the persons responsible have neither push nor personal ambition, resting content in quietly pursuing the work for its own sake. The following is an attempt to represent such an experiment: teaching the blind to model in the true sense of the word. In the writer's judgment it is a momentous one, though naturally limited to a small circle. Yet surely every effort to enrich the lives of the blind, who have been almost entirely cut off from the enjoyment of the fine arts, deserves the profound interest of both the general public and the experts. Readers familiar with institutes for the blind will tell me that modelling has long been a feature in these schools. That is so, but with a vast difference.

When Haüy, the immemorial founder of the first institute for the blind, inspired by Diderot's treatise on the subject, began to train and educate blind children, he made the mistake of laying the chief stress on oral teaching; and his successors, above all

the remarkable educator of the blind in Vienna, Klein, continued in this path. The hand, the only substitute the blind have for the eye, was woefully neglected. That was more than a hundred years ago, however, and the bad effects of this lop-sided training, on the one hand an acquisition of empty, merely verbal knowledge, a ready juggling with words without real live conceptions behind them, and on the other a dangerous development of fancy at the cost of common sense, were found out comparatively soon. Then came the great development of modern psychology which investigated all the possibilities of the sense of touch, and showed that perceptions coming from several different channels, such as the senses of smell, taste, hearing, and touch, could merge into a so-called "complication," that is a uniform conception built up by simultaneous associations, and far more valuable than a simple perception, not only because of its strength, but also because it can be recalled by any one of the components apart from the rest. Thus when a blind child comes to know a walnut, say, by hearing it clatter to the floor, then picks it up, feels the shell, breaks it, smells and finally eats the kernel, he will from now on know a nut by any of its characteristics, of smell, of taste, of form (in its various essentials) and of sound, even when only one of them is brought to his knowledge.

When all this was recognised, the educators of the blind began to concentrate their energies on developing and training the sense of touch, especially the hand, and this part of the training is actually tending to claim a certain supremacy. Modelling in wax and clay was soon introduced as an aid, but the lessons in this subject had one aim only: the training of the sense of touch, so that it should perceive delicate differences in temperature, in texture, in form and dimension. The pupils were given large relief models in plaster and other materials of subjects known to them in nature, such as flowers, leaves, fruit, and they were made to copy them as exactly as possible. The teaching was generally limited to the two highest forms, that is to boys and girls from sixteen and upwards.

What Professor Loewenfeld, a young Vienna painter and teacher at the Vienna Institute for the Jewish Blind, has been doing for six years, is a very different matter. For the little children he has found a means of indulging their restless urge for activity, so far denied an appropriate outlet. For while normal children will draw, paint, paste, and work in sand and clay, without any instruction or even impulse from without, the blind child has only blocks and suchlike, more or less fixed and unmouldable elements of his play, that do not even remotely reach the possibilities offered by a scrap of paper and a pencil to the imagination

of the seeing child. And when we hear that nine-tenths of his impressions come to man through the eye, one-tenth only through the medium of the other four senses together, we can faintly imagine how thwarted and incomplete the life of the blind must necessarily be. We are apt to forget this, because the blind, *when we see them*, are so cheerful and content. They are happiest in company, but wretched enough, with dark squalls of passion passing over them, when alone. This in direct contrast to the deaf, who feel their disability most in company, and can be quite happy alone with a book, or with nature. These comments, of course, apply chiefly to those who have been born blind, or, what comes to the same thing, have lost their sight at an early age. They form over one-third of the blind in Europe, in the Orient still more. People who have lost their sight late in life, such as, for instance, the victims of war, are in a different class. Not only have they had the advantage of normal training of their faculties, but they have at their disposal an inexhaustible fund of memories, sometimes as good as reality, or better.

For adolescents Loewenfeld's teaching means much more than an outlet for creative impulses; it has enabled them for the first time to indulge in self-expression other than written or oral outpourings of the soul. It is true that for the average normals there are no more than the same opportunities as, theoretically, exist for the blind. But we must remember that in fact these opportunities are far more limited, because the blind cannot form friendships and other unions with the ease of people moving freely in normal human companionship, and because to write what they can read again is a most complicated—and costly—affair. Furthermore, the blind are so hampered, so completely thrown on their inner resources, that their life of emotion and dream is far stronger and stormier than that of the normal, and involves a far greater need of an outlet. In practice, the teaching seems simple enough, though even the layman can see that it needs an understanding soul, and sound training not only in the actual subject, but also in psychology, as well as a good all-round cultural equipment.

The lowest class consists of children from seven to ten years of age. The first difficulty to be overcome is that of the material. While normals love nothing so much as dabbling in mud and the like, the blind abhor the feel of the slippery, cold clay, and prefer wax, a material not so well suited to the purpose. Once this dislike is overcome, however, the interest and eagerness of the children is intense. They work in couples, the chief advantage being that each is obliged to feel what the other is doing, not merely to attend to his own work. The subjects are taken from

life mostly, great care being observed to avoid such as are not accurately known to the children. But the lessons are also meant to illustrate and strengthen the conceptions gained in the course of the regular curriculum, especially as an aid to geography, natural history, and so on. Thus the children form little landscapes known to them, a public park with a Beethoven memorial in it where they sometimes take their walks, for instance; they make carts and horses, dogs and cats; a boy from the country models a cow with a sucking calf; and the day I watched them a great and exciting experiment was being made: a steamboat was the subject, though only four of the dozen children had actually been on a real steamboat. The risk attending such imperfectly realised subjects is obvious from what I said above: the blind are ready to juggle with superficial conceptions, as they do with empty words; they tend, naturally, either to overrate or to minimise their powers, and such tasks as involve the use of much imagination may bring deep disappointment. However, on this occasion the experiment was made, because the children who had had the glorious experience of a sail on the Danube had so graphically described it to the others. They had also constructed a boat in the garden with the aid of an overturned table, some boards and sticks and ropes, and had played at boat for days. Consequently one might suppose the children knew enough about the subject to risk the experiment, especially as they had also handled small models. It proved a great success. I do not think that normal children could on the average produce anything like what those blind children did, unaided except by occasional explanations and directions. One ship was only just recognisable as such; it was made by the smallest boy and the clumsiest girl of the class. All the others were marvellous, one so delicately finished that at first sight it might have been taken for a wooden model; another had artistic value, being "seen" as a whole and modelled accordingly.

The teacher gave actual help only twice—it was not demanded oftener—but had to explain divers points of a technical nature, and to restrain the eagerness for unlimited detail. Thus one little boy begged to have the engine explained, and strenuously insisted on putting one in. His wish could not be fulfilled, for the reasons given above. All the children executed cabins and inner arrangements, even furniture, most carefully, though they covered them up with the decks afterwards. It was pathetic to see how they still found another last touch, another improvement, after the bell had sounded. They worked so absorbedly that they grudged even the short break for tea, and had to be forced to go and drink it.

This delight in the work partly explains the good results. Two

other important points that instantly leap to the observer's eye are the infinitely closer concentration and far better training of the hand that these children already possess, as compared to normals. It is easy to understand about the concentration when we remember that most of the irritating diversions we have to suffer have their source in sight. Thus normal children at work or at play have their attention diverted quite independently of their volition by gestures or grimaces the others make, by the waving of a branch or the passing of a bird outside the window. One great difference between the sense of sight and that of touch is that the latter is limited to a small space circumscribed by the person's reach, and in a different sense by his will: the child need only feel and grope when he wants to, and except in the rare event of something bumping against him he is never disturbed by outside impressions of this kind. The diverting influences of sound are also greater with the normals, strange as this may seem. For though the blind are very sensitive of hearing, they never turn towards the source of the sound, as normals do—there is no object for them in turning. Thus they go on with the work in hand even while listening intently. They never stop modelling, for instance, when the teacher speaks to them. The better training of the sense of touch needs no comment. So far Professor Loewenfeld and I were at one as regards the explanations for the almost miraculous results achieved. I suggested another, however, to which he would not agree, and yet I venture to offer it here for what it is worth, since there is no control test to be found in psychological literature which has not yet dealt with this novel method. I imagine that the direct relation of perception and reproduction has some part in this success. In other words: the seeing child perceives the object through one set of nerves (the sense of sight) and reproduces it by another, the sense of touch, only controlled by the sense of sight, while the blind child uses one and the same set of nerves in perceiving and reproducing.

Another point of interest is the saddening fact that on the whole the æsthetic pleasure which the children receive is very slight. It seems that Helen Keller's delight in feeling a beautiful face, and other instances pointing to an æsthetic value in the sense of touch, are exceptions. It is only gifted individuals among the blind who can feel pure æsthetic pleasure (if there is such a thing) by the sense of touch. With most of these children the joy of creating, and of following their instincts of activity, are the primary and almost sole components of the delight they take in the modelling class.

The older boys and girls form the human face and figure, and if what I said above as to the way the blind work and the pre-

dominance of emotional elements is taken into account, one can understand the powerful impression made on the spectator by these statuettes and heads and masks. They are all formed with the longing to pour out the creator's soul; they strike one in the same way as modern expressionist work. As the modern sculptor of certain schools arbitrarily and of deliberate purpose treats the proportions of the body with sovereign contempt, concentrating all his energy and ability on reproducing the emotions he is charged with, so the blind young people of Loewenfeld's class naïvely, and *because* of their defect, work in the same way. Still, if the proportions are sometimes faulty, on the whole the details are nothing short of miraculous. There is the nude figure of a tired girl, every line of the slack body expressing exhaustion, the muscles of the back executed with amazing realism and delicacy; or a workman's hand, lifesize, that might well inspire a poet, an old man telling stories to a child, where the poignantly eager, thirsty expression of the listener is painfully characteristic of the blind. Watching them at work one notices that the faces they model almost always show a certain resemblance to their own, which is not to be wondered at, as, of course, their own face and form is all they can come to know really intimately. They work very quickly, perhaps also because the control of the eye, the comparison between model and creation, does not take place. Three of the gifted pupils, a girl and two lads of eighteen, formed a very creditable face mask each in the course of less than an hour. One represented a smiling, contented child, another a perplexed thinker, the third a boy angrily sticking out his tongue, quite a diabolical bit of malice. I talked to the artists privately, and in different words they all corroborated what Loewenfeld had told me—that they work with such passionate delight chiefly because this activity offers the means of self-expression.

PAULA ARNOLD.

IDEALISM IN CLASSICAL LITERATURE.

A PART from certain metaphysical meanings which do not immediately concern us here, idealism as a quality of human beings seems to mean an optimistic state of mind in which men are prepared to sacrifice themselves for some good aim or purpose which they have before them, and on this definition, I imagine, almost any brand of idealist would agree. But as the practical application of the definition would probably reveal differences of opinion, I will anticipate a later conclusion by dividing idealists into two groups and attempting to illustrate what they are. These two groups are the classical idealists and the romantic idealists and correspond accordingly, as their titles indicate, to two very well-known and important human outlooks, the impression of which, whether in politics or in literature, is stamped very clearly on the pages of history. As I intend to use these words in a very exact and perhaps narrow sense I will first endeavour to explain within what limits I mean them to be used.

By classical I wish to indicate a conception of human life (or attitude towards it) which has behind it a tradition of several thousand years and which is mirrored pre-eminently, although by no means exclusively, in the tragic drama of Greece and Western Europe. This conception, moreover, contains something in it central to human experience and does not vary with the ages. It represents man not in a state of peace, but of conflict, and as struggling in this conflict against opposing forces, whether these be the forces of nature, or a hostile environment, or a man's own divided will, or the will of other men. It portrays man as a creature of will partly conditioned and partly free, but emphasises to such an extent his freedom, that his nobility seems to rest upon this freedom itself. It shows him, lastly, in a state of collapse or fall, tragic ruin as the phrase goes, and thereby suffering a catastrophe which, however strong his will, nothing he can do can avert. Above all—and this point is of the utmost importance—the ruin of the tragic hero is not brought about merely by some error or sin on the part of the hero, by weakness of will or by the *hubris* or overweeningness of the Greeks, or even by the overwhelming strength of the adverse powers, but also by something else which lies deeper than these and which is nothing less than the tragic structure of the universe itself.

The truth of this may be seen by a brief examination of any tragic drama worthy of the name which the world has ever produced. It is because of this underlying structure that we find it so difficult, when analysing with care the action of a tragedy,

to apportion the "blame" or "guilt" of the catastrophe between the various personages and forces who seem to bring it about. We may consider, for example, the *Antigone* of Sophocles, a play in which at first sight the catastrophe is attributable to the conflict between Antigone and the King, Antigone because she insists upon burying her brother and the King because he insists that she shall not do so. This conflict of will leads to the death of Antigone and of the King's son Hemon, and to the bitter remorse of the King himself, a feature which usually leads to his assumption of the major portion of the blame for the entire catastrophe. Yet if we examine further we shall see that the catastrophe is far from being attributable only to the action of the King, and that the series of events does not really justify the laying of the blame at his door. The truth is rather that each person in the play according to his convictions acted as he ought to act, and that for some reason which does not lie solely in the totality of action, the outcome of it all was the catastrophe we have seen. We cannot help feeling, indeed, that we ourselves might easily find ourselves in a similar dilemma, thus realising that since the days of Sophocles the world has not changed very much.

The obvious example, and the one which is intimately related to that of Antigone, is the case of the conscientious objector in conflict with the law of the state which would make him do things against his principles. To this conflict, as many people would admit, there is really no solution this side of eternity, and because there is no solution there is a mystery in tragedy which is of strange fascination. It is, of course, often argued rather loosely that the root of tragic ruin, like that of most human catastrophes, lies in overweeningness on the part of the hero, lack of restraint in some direction, failure to attain the happy mean of human endeavour. This is partly true, but there is also something beyond and above it. Just before the final ruin, there is what is called the point of highest tension, when opposing forces are very nearly balanced and it is hard to tell who wins and who loses, a point which is itself on the highest level a most intense form of *mean*. But there is equilibrium for a moment only. Under the strain something gives way on one side or the other, collapse of the hero ensues, and there arises the curious feeling of inevitability often felt in tragedy, the feeling that this was by no means to be avoided and that it has a meaning and a high meaning of its own. In a similar manner it would not be difficult to quote from the *Julius Cæsar* of Shakespeare and its somewhat complicated plot, in which the representatives of two opposing political parties, both to a greater or less extent convinced of the justice of their cause, come to blows and by fair means or

foul do each other to death, while the world stands holding its breath. If we wish to take a drama on a more private and individual plane the *Hamlet* of the same author will furnish us with ample material. In this play the blame is largely but not entirely with the King. It is also due to the peculiar character of Hamlet, to the incidents of chance, to the unforeseen ways of the elements, and the outcome of all these causes is that at the end not only the arch-culprit the King is dead, but also a number of men who have little to do with the course of the action, so fragile is the connection between the tragic event and the guilt of individual men. Whence it follows that if the famous dictum of Schiller "*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*" [world history is world judgment] has any kernel of truth in it, it must be sought in another quarter than the guilt or *humartya* (error) of the victims of tragic events.

As a crowning example of the sort of thing I mean, I should like to bring forward, with some hesitancy, the death of Christ, the event which exemplifies most deeply in the minds of many people the tragic structure of the world. For in this event not one single individual, not Caiaphas, not Pilate, not even Judas himself can be rightly deemed evil in his actions, and the element which I have tried to isolate in tragedy is rendered most clear by the very nature and course of the action. For the death of Christ was predestined since the beginning of the world, yet the action of it and the men who bring it about give all the impression of freedom, seem to act as freely indeed as any human beings have ever acted. And Christ Himself, Who, we are told, knew that which was to happen, is human enough to quail for a moment before it and to ask that it should not be. If of course we really believed that the actions were predestined—and there is no doubt that we feel them to be—this movement on the part of the victim would have no meaning and would completely lose its tragic effect. The truth seems to be rather that we believe both in the predestination and in the freedom, and that the part of the tragic event which the actions of the victims do not explain is to be laid at the door of this predestination, something over, beyond and behind their freedom but by no means doing away with it. Now it is precisely in this synthesis of opposites—wherein the hero is felt to be doomed *a priori*, and yet is felt to remain free—that the marvellous effect and inner truth of great literature would seem to lie. Owing to its concentration of form and structure this is seen most clearly in tragedy but it can equally be seen in great epic poetry and in all the forms of high art. The heroes of the Trojan War all have prophecies of death ringing in their ears, and are even told on occasion the hour and

circumstance, as for example on the occasion when Hector prophesies to Achilles that he also will perish

ἡματι τῷ ὅτε κέν δε Πάρις καὶ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων
ἔσθλόν' ἔόντ' ὀλέσωσιν ἐνὶ Σκαιῇσι πύλῃσιν.

but are in no wise deterred from doing what their will urges them to do. The doom of the Nibelungs, in the German epic of the Middle Ages, is foretold to them before they cross the Danube, but the foreknowledge does not in the slightest degree prevent us from feeling that the slaughter in the house of Attila, the deaths of Hagen, Kriemhilda and Gunther, were brought on them by their own rage and by the folly of their actions.

The conclusion which I wish to draw for the benefit of my theme is that here precisely we find the classical idealism of which I have spoken, and briefly it is this. The classical idealist realises that the world presents to its human beings something which is terrible and even ghastly, but which at the same time is both noble and inspiring. The story of Christ is a terrible story, yet a magnificent and beautiful one, and its moral is, or rather its central truth is, that behind the supreme terror God is concealed, God Himself Who made all this, Who knows what it is like and Who because of this knowledge was not unwilling to subject Himself to the same necessity to which His creatures, by the very fact of their existence, were subjected. On a lower plane, but one which is lower only in degree, tragedy reveals the same truth, a truth which, like God, is constant and unchanging. The tragic view of life promises no better to-morrow and no happiness for man, if by happiness is meant a world in which there is no pity and fear. It has nothing to do with the recent belief in progress and indeed directly contradicts it. On the other hand it gives supreme value to the present and teaches, like Montaigne, that "*si vous avez vécu un jour vous avez tout vu. Il n'y a point d'autre lumière ni d'autre nuit.*" And as for that resurrection of Christ which is the promise of religion to man, that too is an element of tragedy. For in truth the tragic hero never dies. By the death of the hero man does not succumb, but lives on imperishably, with all the fullness of life. Life is great because of the death of Hamlet, because of the doom of Achilles, because of the fate of the Nibelungs, even as in supreme measure it is rendered noble by the death of Christ. For in these events something is given which pays the ransom of the world and without which the world would never be. This is the idealism of Christ, of Hamlet, of Job, of Antigone, the first fruits and the glory of mankind.

The other main type of idealism, that of the romantic kind,

has always existed and probably always will, but has come into particular prominence during the last two centuries owing to its connection with what is called the idea of progress. In essence romantic idealism seeks its ideal, not so much like the classical in the very midst of the general unpleasantness of the world, as in something "apart from" the world, "over against" it, too often attained by avoiding and glossing over the real, instead of facing it and triumphing over it. For this reason the romantic ideal lacks the centrality of the classical and has in particular no central human figure such as the tragic hero who does not change from age to age. On the contrary, in so far as the romantic attitude emphasises the emotions and passions of men and makes tragedy depend on passion alone, the romantic hero tends to become a projection of some particular human mentality, so that instead of the objective type of the past we have a number of subjective conceptions, the Byronic, the Faustian, the Musset type, and many others which defy classification and present, not so much what is central in man, as what is eccentric. The hero tends to be an expression of some dominating passion or desire, and as the principle of human will and human freedom is neglected, the hero becomes a puppet determined entirely by his own passion and desire. He ends in ruin no less than the tragic hero, but where the ruin of the tragic hero was set off and transfigured by the will which rose above it, the end of the romantic hero often presents a spectacle at best of histrionic or sensational pose, at worst of human degradation, neither of which is capable, except to a minor degree, of arousing the tragic feeling.

Furthermore it is characteristic of the romantic hero that he has as his aim or purpose something which is *a priori* unattainable, such as the desire of the early Faust to solve the mystery of the world, or of the Byronic hero to stand outside the universe as an outcast of a superior kind. It is because such an ideal is an ideal of temperament rather than of will that it fails to produce artistic effect, and frequently ends in utter disillusionment or cynicism on the part of the hero. This is true of Byron and it is true of Faust, as long as in Part I of the drama of that name he remains a temperamental hero. But in the second case we must allow for the genius of Goethe which changed Faust in the same play from a man of feeling into a man of will who, like a true tragic hero, acts by opposing his will to his emotions. In the Gretchen tragedy at the end of Part I, Faust rises to a level with the greatest tragic heroes and in his famous remark "*der Menschheit ganzer Jammer faszt mich an*" expresses, no less than they, the view we have presented in these pages. To this may be added

the remark of Mephistopheles in the same final scene: "Wilt thou grasp the thunder?—We have come to the point where human wit breaks down," indicating in inspired words precisely the point of tragic intensity which is the half transcendental and quasi-religious source of the tragic dilemma.

Now in the case of the romantic hero the inevitability which should be present in the catastrophe is replaced by a kind of factitious destiny or fate produced by his own uncontrolled passion, a typical example of which may be seen in the *Hernani* of Victor Hugo, when the verse tells us

*"Je suis une force qui va
Agent aveugle et sourd des puissances funèbres."*

Now it is typical of temperaments which are given free rein that they are usually idealistic when they begin to expand but bitter and severe when expansion ceases to give them pleasure, and their last cry is a cry of despair. This is perhaps why the early Romantics of 1770 descant like Rousseau on the beauty of the universe, while their successors of 1820 were apt like Leopardi to regard the world as "muck," or to lament like De Musset, that

*"Le seul bien qui me reste au monde
Est d'avoir quelque fois pleuré."*

But it is the faculty of seeing "glory" in the "muck" which is the unique value of real tragedy, a dualism which reflects the dualism of the world. There has always been "muck" (even the Greeks knew there was) and there always will be, but the world remains magnificent all the same.

It is also not surprising that the romantic movement began about 1800 and thus occupies a position on the crest of the first wave of a belief in progress to which allusion has already been made. The roots of this belief lie in the general movement of philosophy since the Renaissance, particularly in the Cartesian philosophy of rationalism and the materialistic sensualism which began with Francis Bacon and was carried on by Locke and Hume. The two main principles of Descartes, the belief in the power of the human reason to solve all problems and the belief in constancy of the laws of nature were linked up later with the Baconian principle of harnessing nature to the service of mankind, with the result of producing a human mentality almost unique in the history of human thought. Together these two streams of thought—and to them others might of course be added—produced a general belief that the world could be made into a better place for men and that, in short, to-morrow might be better than to-day. This belief is itself opposed to what we call the classical view of life, and although it is true in certain

ways it is not true in the deepest sense. We may add that the movement has culminated in two enormous catastrophes, one being the Napoleonic War and the other the Great War; and each in turn has borne the aspect of romantic enthusiasm followed by the deep wave of pessimism. This connection between romanticism and the belief in progress is fairly obvious, but there is another one which for our argument is even more important. It is that the same belief in material and intellectual progress has led to a belief that art might likewise be improved, and this belief shines out most clearly in the romantic determination to go one better than the tradition which had preceded it for two thousand years. One better than the pseudo-classical tradition of the eighteenth century romanticism certainly did go, but it failed and seemingly must fail to reach the height which real classicism has achieved in the past, the classicism of Sophocles, of Dante, of Goethe. In its turn it has been superseded, or perhaps rather remoulded into various "isms," realism, naturalism, expressionism, each of which lays stress, not on the classical central human figure, but on some eccentric element in human nature, and nature which is not always human. The last phase seems almost to have been reached in the art of the Bolsheviks among whom the mass-man, collectively considered, is held to represent what is finest in humanity. They are also the most fervent believers in the doctrine of a better to-morrow which, with the unreal idealism of the romantics, they are setting forth to create.

True idealism would seem to be that which faces the central facts of life and which places its hope not in to-morrow and in a better future yet to come, but in to-day and in whatever to-day the world may provide. Quite apart from all schools and all definite traditions, there has been a series of writers who represent this point of view and who therefore may be called classical idealists in the sense we have given to the word. Such, for example, is Montaigne, who in spite of his scepticism did at least believe in this one thing and wrote a book about it which survives to this day. In the heat of the French wars of religion he refused to be bigoted or to quarrel with his Protestant neighbours and calmly pointed out, very sensibly, that death comes to all men and that it is the quality, not the length, of life that matters. Re-echoing the Stoics he tells us in beautiful words "*Sortez de ce monde comme vous y êtes entré. Le même passage, que vous fîtes de la mort à la vie, sans passion et sans frayeur, refaites-le de la vie à la mort. . . . Allez-vous-en satisfait.*" And the reason why he convinces, even to-day, is that the life he discusses, like that of the tragic hero, has the elements of universal life in it. Like the hero again he promises no better to-morrow,

nor a happy to-day, but holds that life is worth living even so.

Not unlike Montaigne in this respect, but with a much stronger religious strain is our own Sir Thomas Browne, whose marvellous cadences reflect no less than those of Montaigne "that diuturnity is a dream and a folly of expectation." But like the Greeks also he has that tone of genuine regret that he must "take leave of the sun in his canicular days," a regret which is a real regret and in no wise hostile to the true *joie de vivre*. He too regards man as a small thing in the universe, but remembers also that "there is surely a piece of divinity in us, something which is older than the elements and owes no homage unto the sun." Lastly we will quote from Goethe, the most modern of poets and greatest of latter-day humanists. He began by portraying a Faust whose aim was to embrace infinity and ended by giving us another whose protest was "*was braucht er in die Ewigkeit zu schweifen?*" [why must he wander in infinity?]. And the famous *salto mortale* into the transcendental, in the mystical chorus at the end of Faust: "*Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis*" [all things transitory are but a symbol] with its denial of material progress, no less than the words *Alles Drängen, alles Ringen, ist ewig Ruh in Gott dem Herrn* [all striving, all conflict is eternal peace in God the Lord], do but re-echo the ancient idealism in its relation to the modern gospel of action. But the relation of man's deed to the eternal, from Job to Faust, remains ever the same.

The key to the whole situation would seem to lie in the time-worn theory of human dualism expressed by Sir Thomas Browne in the lines quoted above. There is a fatality in man and yet a freedom also, corresponding to the dualism we noted as being present in the tragic dilemma. There is a centre which is fixed as well as a circumference of fluctuation, and it is the centre around which the mass revolves which is the important factor. It is to the credit of ancient and mediæval thinkers that they placed all emphasis on the centre and their idealism in a belief in it, rather than on a temporal shift in the flux, in a to-morrow which in very truth never comes. The flux is by no means to be despised, and the great idealists do not despise it, but even as Plato told us years ago, it is not this which is the real, and no lasting bliss can be drawn from it. True happiness is not found by despising yesterday, nor by hoping in to-morrow, but by facing to-day. *Il n'y a point d'autre lumière ni d'autre nuit. . . .*

Perhaps the truth is that the ancient philosophers realised that the world will never be a comfortable place to live in and that idealism must face this fact. There is no reason to suppose, if a study of the writings of the period is anything to go by, that the ancient Hebrews were either less happy or more happy than

ourselves. Indeed if any contrast were possible it would seem that they were more happy because they believed in something, and it is the people who believe in something who are finally happy. The quality of happiness then depends on the quality of the belief, low if it is the immediate reality about us, high if it is the greater reality beyond. But above all it is not a belief in to-morrow but in to-day, a belief that to-day also has its transcendental side, however terrible to-day must be. Last of all that terror is the gate to the eternal and the road to the eternal lies through it. This King Lear found, Œdipus, and Faust himself.

F. McEACHRAN.

CONTINENTAL PROTESTANTISM IN THE WORLD CRISIS.

WHAT is European Protestantism? Is it a mere geographical notion? Is it an abstract idea? Is it a concrete reality? At any rate we cannot speak of Continental Protestantism as of an organised body or of a federation of Churches. It is in the first place a growing religious consciousness, a new feeling of mutual responsibility, a vision of a common need and destiny, the certitude that we shall live or perish together. These are spiritual values. They have been given to us in a time of common distress. In a time of need the Church as well as individual Christians had to learn again that God sits in darkness, that suffering is a price which we have to pay for spiritual life, that those who follow the Master have to follow Him to Golgotha. This applies especially to the Continental Churches because European Protestantism is in great danger and is bleeding from many wounds. Few Continental Churches are able to escape these experiences. Even the Churches in neutral lands such as Switzerland, Holland, Scandinavia have their share in the common suffering and although we are still now divided by racial and confessional barriers, our conditions form a bond between us all. A common spiritual heritage, a common tragic destiny and the common will to face it in the spirit of our Master are of the essence of Continental Protestantism, which includes nearly 100 larger or smaller Protestant Churches in twenty-three countries with seventy millions of members, belonging mostly to the two great types of Continental reformation: the Lutheran and the Reformed communions.

Continental Protestantism as a whole can be considered as a desperately struggling army, a great Protestant block in central and northern Europe, with a number of pioneer churches in the East, and also a few nearly abandoned or forgotten small scattered parish churches in isolated regions in Yugoslavia, Poland, Spain and Italy. Continental Protestantism is, therefore, in the first instance, in an attitude of defence. Our Churches would like to apply their whole strength to constructive work, but they have to defend their life and existence not only against an avalanche of hostile circumstances, but against a wilfully planned attack from the enemies of Christianity. Having recently returned from a journey through all the Balkan countries and visited within the last two years the larger part of our Churches, it has been possible for me to get first-hand and inside knowledge. The first problem in fifteen troubled countries is how at a time of universal poverty of States and peoples the Churches are to raise and maintain their regular budget. With

the world crisis this has become a fresh difficulty which some of the Churches had overcome during the later years. The general economic depression is again weighing so heavily upon them that some of them are near bankruptcy and ruin.

The problem of unemployment has its repercussion not only on public life, but also on religious conditions. The army of unemployed, about five millions in Germany alone, are more and more subjected to the anti-religious influence of communism and bolshevism. The psychology of despair opens the way to atheism and all aggressive anti-religious propaganda. It may be merely boastful talk heard in these circles that the time will come when the Wartburg and the Cathedral of Cologne will be centres of anti-Christian propaganda. Yet such a saying is characteristic of the kind of danger to which the Churches in their spiritual life as well as in their social and economic structure are exposed. I heard a few months ago in Sofia a most powerful propaganda speech from the radio station of Moscow. The Continent lies under a heavy fire of bolshevist ideas, provocative programmes, revolutionary and anti-religious pronouncements, while a radio station from central Europe, which I heard at the same time, spoke in an uncomprehending, harmless way of the discovery of a theft, the changing weather and local elections. The world evidently has not yet realised what a fire is already burning in the roof of the house in which we are living. The unemployment problem is particularly dangerous where congregations consist mostly of working-class people; in large German cities and in certain Czechoslovakian parishes the percentage of workers may be as much as 95. In the parish of Steyr in Austria nearly the whole congregation became unemployed when the factory in that place was closed.

The economic situation of the middle class is one of the most burning problems for the Churches. They were the real support of church activity. This middle class, especially in Germany, is at the present moment hanging like a glacier over an abyss. And constantly members of this class are slipping into the proletariat or are committing suicide, especially in Germany and Austria. This is not only a sociological process of great importance, an alteration of the social structure of the people, but also a danger to the inner spiritual life of this whole class in which religious feeling seemed hitherto to have its deepest roots. The Churches feel the repercussion of this structural alteration in increased refusals to pay the church taxes. It is not always a growing religious indifference which is responsible for it, but the impossibility of meeting any other expenses besides those which are strictly necessary for the maintenance of life. It is obvious that not only have the official church taxes been diminished, but also free efforts under such a

strain are weakening. The loss of economic equilibrium is all the more evident in the Churches as many of them had lost all capital during and after the world war. Some were compelled to invest at least a part of their capital in war loans. That capital is lost. Another part was lost at the time of the inflation and the other part, in Roumania for example, Yugoslavia and the Baltic countries, with the agrarian reform to which we shall come back later. In Germany this loss of church capital amounts to nearly 90 per cent. of the former capital. In Latvia, Lithuania and Poland not only has the whole capital been lost, but churches have been destroyed; in Poland alone more than 100 chapels and other buildings. In countries where the churches possessed land, the agrarian reform left them only a small part of their former property; in Latvia, for instance, only one-sixth of their former possessions. The inflation and the depreciation of the currency meant a further loss of funds which were either entirely destroyed or reduced to half or a tenth of their former value.

The actual economic depression is therefore catastrophic for some of these churches, so that their position is again very similar to that in the terrible years of 1920 to 1923. This is not only the case in industrial, but also in agrarian countries. It is so serious, for instance, in the Transylvanian churches that they are confronted with complete ruin. A few months ago I talked with the leaders of these churches at special meetings arranged in Bucarest, Hermannstadt, and Cluj. The situation is particularly serious for the pastors who receive a large part of their salaries not in cash, but in kind, in natural products such as wine and wood and wheat. There are many parish cellars in Transylvania filled with wine representing a large part of the income of the parish. The wine is excellent and would be sold in western countries for three or four shillings a litre, but it can be sold there for eight or nine pence. Nor can wheat or wood be sold, because Russian dumping is felt in all these countries. The people have enough to live on, but to have to buy a pair of shoes for a pastor's family is a misfortune and the education of children, especially when they have to be sent to a town, means ruin and disaster. A congregation in Roumania, Yugoslavia or Hungary may be able to preserve from starvation the pastor, but if the roof of the church has to be repaired it means despair and would involve impossible debts. The Consistory of the Evangelical Church in Transylvania wrote in a circular letter dated November 27th, 1930, as follows: The treasury of our Church is nearly empty. We can accomplish our financial obligations only in part or with great difficulty. We have to face a turning point in our destiny. A Church with a quarter of a million souls, with 271 primary schools, 9 higher schools and 3 seminaries, with 250 parishes, is actually faced with

bankruptcy and ruin, unless world Protestantism pays attention to the situation. For 700 years this ancient people has lived there. They maintained their language, and since the Reformation they had to defend their Church against the attacks of the Turks and Tartars. A deep discouragement is now penetrating all classes because they can no longer hold out. The position is very similar in the Hungarian Reformed Church of Transylvania. The present budget has reckoned for the giving up of forty parishes.

The agrarian reform which was meant to be of great social advantage has proved to be an openly admitted failure. Even members of the Roumanian Government admit that production has decreased in quantity and in quality since agrarian reform was introduced. This situation has proved frightful not only for the pastors and their families, but most of all for the old pastors and their widows. Travelling in these countries from France to Poland and Russia one is really ashamed to have a sufficient income when one sees what hundreds and thousands of pastors and their families, old pastors and their widows have to live on. Innumerable pastors in various countries have to live with their families on an average monthly income of £4 to £5 and less, which is entirely insufficient even in countries with a lower exchange.

As certain expenses are, for many churches, unavoidable, such as the most urgent repairs, they are heavily in debt. The Missionary Church of Belgium suffers under a deficit of nearly half a million Belgian francs. The Evangelical Church in Czechoslovakia has eight million crowns of debt. Innumerable parishes and institutions in Hungary and Italy do not know how to get rid of debt. These debts are all the more serious because of the high interest which has to be paid. Generally speaking, 7 to 8 per cent. interest is considered very low. In the answers to the questionnaire I sent round before preparing this article, the interest paid varied between 10 and 15 per cent. Germany, Austria, Latvia and Lithuania speak of 8 to 10 per cent. The Churches in Yugoslavia speak of 11 to 18 per cent. A pastor who introduced deaconess work into a certain part of Poland a few years ago had to pay even 26 per cent. which, of course, is ruinous. The conditions for students are deplorable in several of the countries. I know many who have to live on £2 to £4 a month and have to find work or suffer hunger if they wish to complete their studies. Others leave them uncompleted.

Apart from this struggle for existence we must, however, consider the constructive efforts the Churches are making to develop their activity. They are faced with the following tasks:

(1) The recruitment of the future leaders of the Churches. The Churches especially in the East of Europe are making great efforts to give a better education to their future clergy, both by improving

and increasing the staffs of teachers in their faculties, and by sending qualified students to other countries, such as Germany, Switzerland, France, Holland, Scotland, where they learn not only to know the church life of other countries, but are also initiated into all kinds of church activities.

(2) Another constructive effort of a great number of Churches is, for the first time in their history, to introduce all kinds of social and welfare work into their church activity. Quite a number of Eastern Churches are building up what may be called the social philanthropic work of the Church, especially deaconess work, youth work, charitable institutions for old and sick people, educational institutions. The introduction of deaconess work into one of these Eastern parishes means much more than a nurse for the sick. It is an extremely valuable help in evangelisation and in the raising of the moral standard of a congregation. It is a matter of the greatest joy to see how the Christian women of the East are discovering new tasks in this respect. A single woman in Transylvania, Miss Mary Pilder, Cluj, built up last year an evangelical women's society with more than 25,000 members which has already been of great blessing to the religious and moral life of their Church.

For these Churches in the East of Europe the maintenance of an evangelical school is indispensable, if parents do not wish to subject their children either to an entirely irreligious education or to the influence of non-evangelical education and propaganda. The new school reforms and agrarian reforms in the Eastern countries are a very severe menace to the evangelical school. There are congregations which prefer to bleed white so to speak before giving up their school. The growing influence of irreligious and anti-religious propaganda makes it necessary for the evangelical Church to watch very closely the education of the children and the maintenance of religious institutions, hospitals and all kinds of homes. Other Churches, like that of the Bohemian Brethren, are confronted with the huge task of building chapels for the growing new parishes and of preparing their leaders. The Church of the Czechoslovak Brethren built nearly fifty new chapels and churches last year by an effort which means the greatest sacrifice for people belonging mostly to the working class. It is a task far beyond their strength.

The evangelisation of France and Belgium is a similar problem. France counts among its forty millions, according to Roman Catholic sources, not more than about eleven millions who are practising Roman Catholics. There are one million of French Protestants. What about the remaining twenty-eight millions of French people attached neither to the Roman Catholic nor to the Protestant religion?

We must here consider what methods the Churches are using

to raise their budgets. Certain Churches are getting larger or smaller contributions from the State. While some States are acknowledging in this way former obligations, and especially duties following from the secularising of church property in earlier centuries, others are certainly not acknowledging these obligations to a satisfactory extent. The State's contribution, especially in Eastern States, is not only ridiculously small, but it is not paid regularly. Other States like Austria pay a share to the Church which, for instance, amounted to nearly half a million of Swiss francs in 1930. Latvia received about 120,000 Swiss francs for the reconstruction of destroyed churches and for central administration. Lithuania receives a contribution from the State for the central administration of the Consistory only. In certain places the payment of a grant depends very much on the political party which happens to be in power. In Czechoslovakia the Church receives one franc per member towards the pastors' salaries and pensions. In Poland the State pays 150 francs for each pastor because he exercises also civil functions. In Yugoslavia the German Evangelical Church received last year a total subvention of 72,000 francs for administration, scholarships, salaries and pensions. The Reformed Church received at the same time about 34,000 francs. This shows that in some cases the grant or contribution of the State is so small that in fact the Churches have to raise the largest part of their expenses by their own efforts. In the Evangelical Churches of the East of Europe the parishes have land property which has been greatly reduced by the agrarian reform. In Latvia, for instance, the Church lost five-sixths of her property and is not allowed to have more than 50 hectares per parish. So that the Churches have to raise the largest part of their budget by taxation and free collections.

In most of the Churches we find a great need for loans. During the war and after, it was not possible to make the necessary repairs. Since then a number of institutions of all kinds have had to be built, such as homes, schools, manses, etc. The need for capital is so great everywhere that the banks take interest at a percentage which is much too high for sound administration. We have seen above that interest rates varying from 10 to 18 per cent. are the rule in the Eastern part of Europe. Of course no bank would consider a church or a manse sufficient security for such loans. On the other hand, many Churches in Eastern Europe have land property which could be offered as security. There are also institutions such as schools, whose income offers considerable security for loans. A case in point would be the Evangelical School at Zagreb. And it might happen that in certain States like Estonia, Hungary and Roumania, national banks would offer a guarantee with

certain provisions, of course, if foreign capital were invested in the country. This urgent need has compelled the European Central Bureau to study the question of loans. We first thought of American capital. American banks have for instance granted a loan of two and a half million dollars to the Central Organisation of the German Inner Mission. In order to have the advice of experts we founded a Bankers' Committee in Switzerland composed of five of our most distinguished Protestant bankers. They advised us not to take loans from America, but to build up a Credit Association based on shares. This plan has been worked out by our bankers and has been approved by the Swiss authorities. It has also been recommended by several large assemblies, such as the Assembly of the Swiss Church Federation, the Protestant Conference at Basle, the Presbyterian Assembly of England. It is understood that this association is to be built up on a business basis although its ultimate purpose is Christian Stewardship. Quotas have been underwritten by Switzerland, Germany, France, the Evangelical Church of Poland, the Reformed Church of Hungary and a group of Italian Protestants. A Dutch and a Scotch Committee are also trying to raise their quota. A capital of 600,000 Swiss francs, nearly £25,000, has been raised so far.

This is evidently a new method of aiding Protestant Churches with a constructive programme, but a new situation needs new financial methods. The Roman Catholic Church has not been afraid to start a tremendous constructive programme by loans to the amount of more than four million pounds. A long list of Roman Catholic parishes in many parts of the Continent shows that loans of between twenty and a million florins were granted to others.

In considering the kind of financial aid Continental Protestantism needs at the present moment, it is clear that :

(1) A certain number of Continental Churches and Protestant Institutions will require, for a long time to come, gifts from abroad because they are too weak to fulfil their task with their own means.

(2) Better organisation of the efforts which the various Churches make themselves in view of improving the economic structure of the whole Church is necessary. The Freewill Offering System and other modern financial methods may here come in as a welcome contribution of such experience as has been useful and effective in many countries.

(3) But the third kind of aid needed by Continental Protestantism, especially for its larger constructive programme, is to be able to borrow at reasonable interest. Given the financial uncertainty of the present world situation, it would be unwise to start

an enterprise on the basis of bonds, but it seems surely possible to have a modern aid society on the basis of free subscriptions or shares, a system which would combine business interest with a philanthropic point of view, for a common Protestant effort of solidarity. Continental Protestantism needs a kind of international Christian Red Cross, prepared for sound and business-like help wherever it is needed; a sort of financial lifeboat ready to start whenever danger is discovered.

President Hoover suggested to the American people that by helping Europe they would be wise creditors in their own interest and good neighbours. Can the appeal to be good neighbours mean more than the appeal to be brothers in the spirit of Christ? Will international solidarity on a secular basis become effective whilst Christian solidarity remains mere words or handshaking at international conferences? Our aid system has been dominated up to the present day by the idea of alms, which was the financial method of the mediæval Church. The present situation compels us to apply more modern ways; it means new financial methods and fundamental social reform. We are confronted to-day with quite other dangers than that of reducing our religious and social work or even with the bankruptcy of the Churches. We are approaching more and more the final battle between the spirit of this world and the spirit of Christ. Modern paganism, communism, materialism and atheism are our most cruel and irreconcilable enemies. We can surely not fight them with money and capital investments, but only with the spirit and the faith and hope which Christ has visibly stirred up again in a time of need, not only in those who are carrying the cross on their own shoulders, but in the minds of the larger assemblies whose watchwords are stewardship and solidarity. The Protestant Churches have learned in recent years the wisdom of doing together what no Church could do alone, a wisdom which is quite familiar to the Roman Catholic Church. This becomes effective when we consider ourselves not as masters of our own destiny, of our own fortune and capital, but as servants of a greater Master and as trustees for the spiritual and secular gifts with which the Lord of the earth has entrusted us. I do not believe that the wisdom of financial methods and of our own moral and religious efforts will save the world. But I do believe that the spirit of mutual responsibility, of service and solidarity is awakening in Christian hearts that mysterious saving and constructive power which the Lord may give us for saving what is worthy to be saved, and for building up what may be a realisation of God's will on this earth.

ADOLF KELLER.

RUSSIA 1931.

S LIGHTLY over four hundred years ago Sir Thomas More wrote a book about an imaginary island off the north coast of South America where an ideal community lived. To-day the name of that island has become a byword for an impossible state of perfection in society and the term "Utopian" has come to be synonymous with an "idle visionary" or a "fanciful dreamer." It is a strange coincidence that the one country in the world to-day that may be compared with Utopia should be the one that during the last decade we have come to consider as the home of mis-government, where the people are driven against their will by a horde of uneducated revolutionaries. Those who have read "Utopia" will remember the resemblances. The positions of the towns in Utopia, for example, like those of the new towns in the Soviet Union, were planned to bear a definite relation one to another. Hours of work, too, were shorter in Utopia than in other countries, because everyone, including the women and the aristocracy, did their share of the work, and the usual superstratum of idle rich was missing. In Russia, likewise, they worked a seven-hour day until it was found that the tsarist régime had left them so far behind the industrialised countries that it was imperative that they should work longer hours in order to make up the leeway, and it is certain that when the machines are once moving, and doing man's work for him, the outcome will be shorter hours, and not that other dreadful alternative that we have accepted—armies of unemployed workers who have been ousted from their jobs by the machines. Both in Utopia and in Russia the workers, when they are "free from the labour of their own occupations," are encouraged "to bestow the time well and thriftily upon some other science, as shall please them"; the children are cared for and educated by specially trained and competent nurses, and the people eat their meals communally, and escape the waste and drudgery of individual cooking.

Although I find this comparison amusing and interesting and above all a most effective antidote to the biased conception that so many people, fed with misrepresentations as they are by the Riga correspondents of the Conservative Yellow Press, bring to all things Russian, I should be the last to claim that life in Russia to-day is at all an Utopian one. The standard of living of everyone is much lower than the standards of corresponding classes of society in England. Housing conditions, transport facilities, clothes, and above all the food, are much poorer than those enjoyed in England. But the people are accustomed to living hard, and if living to-day is not much happier than it was under the Tsars, the present situa-

tion is not without its compensations. To people who can, and who trouble to think, the theory of Communism and the actual working of the Five-Year Plan provide adequate justification for present hardships. They feel that they are working to establish an ideal Socialist state, and that they themselves and their children will reap the benefit of their labour and present privation. And especially they feel that they are their own masters and are no longer exploited by a Capitalist.

They take their difficulties stoically and pass them off with a good deal of humour. There is the typical and well-known story, which I heard in several topical versions in different parts of Russia, of the man who boarded a Moscow tramcar wearing only a belt. "Here," said the outraged conductor, "you can't get on my car like that." "But," said the man, "I come from Minsk." "What's Minsk got to do with it?" asked the conductor. "Well," answered the man, "you see in Minsk we've completed the Five-Year Plan in two and a half years." Another similar story, which I quote because it further illustrates the mood in which many Russians look upon their difficulties to-day, is about a man who met a friend of his hurrying towards the Moscow river. "Where are you off to?" he asked, "I'm going to drown myself" answered the friend, "the Five-Year Plan is too terrible; there is no more food, no more clothes, no more vodka." "But," said the first, "you may as well stick it out till the Plan is finished, and do your bit. Things are so bad now that they can't go worse." "Oh, can't they," replied his friend, moving off, "there will be no more water in the river by then."

Propaganda is largely responsible for the hold the government has upon the people; propaganda is everywhere in Russia, and much of it is very persuasive. One evening in the Park of Culture and Rest in Moscow we came upon a large group of people learning community singing. They were led and instructed by a young girl, and her verve and enthusiasm affected us as it did the Russians. The results were excellent, and soon the whole crowd, numbering three or four hundred, were singing lustily. The tune was an old one, but the words were new, and they were very different from the ones we have come to expect in England; it was nothing about "the blue-eyed babies from Alabama," that the Russians sang, but of "the wars that are past and the battles that are ended, and of the prosperity and peace of Socialist construction that lie ahead." Now in cold blood it seems an incongruous community song, but there was nothing incongruous about it that night in the Moscow park. The people were singing really seriously and hopefully, and, little though we understood what they were singing, we were moved by their sincerity. In the Shooting Galleries in the Park one aims

at the symbol of the Pound Sterling or of the Dollar on the stomachs of delightfully fantastic financiers, and, if one hits them, a Soviet Worker springs up in triumph in the financier's place; in the same way Austen Chamberlain is replaced by Stalin, and Briand by Litvinoff. One Sunday morning as we were sailing down the Volga an agitation shock brigade came on board. It was composed of six young men who were voluntarily spending their holidays travelling up and down the Volga; they were giving dramatic performances on the boats and in the villages in order to preach the news of the victories of the Five-Year Plan, and of the failures and difficulties of the Capitalist world. They were also propagating the Third Decisive Year Loan, which is being raised to provide capital for new industrial enterprises. These six young men were fine types: clean shaven, with high cheek bones, and healthy, they have an infectious enthusiasm for the Plan. They are the type upon which the success of Communism depends, and they are worthy of it. Of this particular half-dozen, one was a university student and another a professor from Moscow, a third was a doctor, and with him a chemist. The two remaining were artisans. They gave their entertainment in the saloon of the ship, which was packed with passengers and crew. Before it began the leader was careful to explain that they were all amateurs, and that therefore any technical failings on their part must be forgiven. The programme consisted of twelve items, including many songs, and it was given with the same gusto and sincere energy that we had already met in the Park of Culture and Rest in Moscow. I will just indicate what one or two of the items were like. One of the shock brigaders, for example, made a speech which was a reproduction of a famous one by Lenin entitled, "From Horse to Tractor." Then they brought a large map of the Soviet Union and pointed out the places where large industrial enterprises are growing, and spoke of the successes and failures of the Five-Year Plan. Following this there was a dialogue on Anarchy versus Order. One of the actors narrated the story of capitalist failure, of strikes, unemployed, banking failures and so on. The other answered him with an account of the achievements of Socialist construction speaking of the success of economic planning, etc. One other item propagated airships. The Soviet Union needed airships, said one marionette; two others dressed, one as a priest, the other as a kulak, opposed him. Again, we were impressed by the sincerity and enthusiasm of the Communists.

One evening whilst we were in Moscow we went to a theatre in the Park of Culture and Rest. It was packed with people, and the piece was called "The West is Nerve-racking." It deals with a Russian engineer who has a nervous breakdown and has to go

to a sanatorium in Germany for treatment. In the first act he sees him in a railway train, en route for Berlin. When they get to Poland two passengers get into the compartment, an officer and a priest, and the audience was continually laughing at their absurdities. I could not, of course, understand what they said, but it was obvious that it was propaganda against Poland, militarism and priestdom. In the second act the hero was in a night club in Berlin. He is nearly thrown out because he is not in evening dress and only orders a cup of coffee. The *habitués* were fantastic, although not entirely unknown types of idle rich. The funniest thing of the evening was one of the turns in the cabaret in which six Russians entered the night club to perform a Cossack dance. They represented a common Western European notion of what a Russian looks like, they had long beards, Russian boots, and coats down to the ankles. The audience, which probably did not contain a single beard, saw the joke and rocked away. The comrade next to me was beside himself, he jabbed me vigorously in the ribs and gabbled excitedly and unfortunately completely unintelligibly. During the cabaret there was a symbolic braying of a wolf and two half-starved unemployed broke in and made a demonstration: they were turned out and roughly handled by four policemen at the orders of the proprietor. In the end the Russian engineer was so worked up that he could stay in Germany no longer and took a train right back to Moscow. In the cinema, too, the Russian Government has found a powerful educative medium, in the same way that our Broadcasting Corporation is an educative medium, and it is making excellent use of it.

I cannot speak with the same enthusiasm of the Russian Press. No matter how necessary it is for the successful establishment of a Socialist state that the people should only hear one side of the question, I believe that ultimately the repression of freedom of thought and expression will be harmful. Russian newspapers are full of criticism of the detailed working of the Five-Year Plan, but they never print any outside news that is advantageous to the Capitalist nations, or any criticism of what is known as the "general line" of the Communist Party. No Russian with whom I spoke, provided that he had not travelled outside Russia, would believe for a moment that it is possible for the workers outside the Soviet Union to be as well-off as those inside. I mean well-off in terms of welfare, not of wealth. When I tried to tell anyone about the Bournville welfare work, for example, I was met by blank incredulity. On the other hand the papers are excellently informed concerning the "failures" of the Capitalist system. Every Russian brings the exact unemployment figures of the rest of the world into any argument about the relative merits of the two systems

and triumphantly concludes that there is not a single able-bodied unemployed man in the whole of the Soviet Union. The *Daily Worker* is the only English newspaper obtainable publicly in Moscow, and although the heads of the Government themselves read the *Observer* and *The Times*, they do not permit anyone else to do so. When we entered Russia the only things that were confiscated at the Customs were copies of the *Daily Express* and the *Evening Standard*.

The most unique, and certainly the most laughable, propaganda I saw was near Leningrad. We were driving out to see one of the Tsar's country palaces, and on the way passed a large detachment of the Red Army, marching solemnly along carrying spades and forks instead of rifles. They were headed by a brass band and by men carrying banners bearing the words: "We are a Shock-Brigade going to dig up potatoes in order to speed up the Five-Year Plan. Complete the Five-Year Plan in Four Years!"

The Russian is being awakened out of his traditional complacency by the working of Communism, and especially by the tempo of the Five-Year Plan. Work in Russia occupies somewhat the same position as that enjoyed by sport in England. The newspapers are full of statistics of the work completed under the Plan and the various factories in different categories are in competition to see which of them can achieve the greatest percentage of their allotted plan. Thus if Stalingrad manages to turn out a hundred tractors a day, instead of the eighty according to schedule, whilst Kharkov only produces sixty out of the planned eighty, the whole of Russia knows about it and acclaims Stalingrad with the same enthusiasm that in England the people lavish upon the winners of the Association Football Cup. Kharkov, on the other hand, suffers the same disgrace as a club which is relegated from the first to the second division. This aspect of work in Russia, if we could be sure that it will last, is an effective answer to those who say that we cannot get the best out of a man without a money incentive. It must be said that this system results in increases of quantity, and decreases in quality. Whilst I was in Russia I heard of another stimulant that is used in one group of factories. There each week the factory with the lowest monthly average of work in comparison with the plan is presented with a large wooden camel made out of three-ply wood. This "Order of the Camel" has to remain in the factory until some other is lower still in the averages. Workers in Russia can win two orders, which act as further stimulants, and which command as great respect there as the V.C. or the D.S.O. in England. They are the "Order of Lenin" and the "Order of the Red Banner," and they are given to

workers or organisers who have distinguished themselves in the furtherance of the Five-Year Plan.

Strange and often rather ridiculous though these means and methods seem to us, the Five-Year Plan is nevertheless anything but a stunt. The actual figures of the Plan have been well known for some time now, and, although sometimes exaggerated, they yet give a fair impression of the upheaval that is taking place. Over all Russia there are evidences of this huge national effort. New buildings are being erected everywhere, at present they are mostly just completed, with the whitewash and dirt still on the window-panes, and the drains still being laid. Streets are being re-paved, especially in Moscow, where it is intended that by the end of the Plan every street will have been re-laid. One evening in Moscow we were returning to our hotel about midnight when we came across a large crowd of people watching a gang of men removing the old tram track. The men were hauling energetically, as if they were in the final of a tug of war, and the crowd yelled their encouragement. When the track at last came away a great cheer went up. Here again a comparison between sport in England and work in Russia was inevitable.

It is hard to describe the appearance of the people convincingly. For one thing there is nothing startling about them, and the predominating colour is a drab grey. The men wear coarse serge suits, or, often, a white cotton smock drawn in at the waist by a belt. The women usually wear cotton dresses, and have cotton shawls over their heads. The people are practically all dressed in the same quality of clothing, but many of them are obviously of a higher type of intelligence than others. Their faces are usually tanned and clean shaven; they rarely smile, but this, I think, is as much due to the natural build of their faces as to the long years of poverty they have been through. The women brighten themselves with cosmetics, often applied with more energy than discretion. They glide quietly and quickly through the streets, and seem to be always on the move. The streets are always crowded, and the tramcars, although the service might seem adequate, are everlastingly filled to overflowing, and I was never, during the many times I travelled on them, able to get a seat. It is typical of two things Russian, their love of a long word, and their energy and cocksureness, that they should publish a statement saying that by the end of the Plan they "intend to liquidate strap-hanging." The railway stations and trains are equally full.

One of the pleasantest sensations I experienced whilst in Russia was the feeling that I was a member of a classless society. It was really delightful to get away for once from the bent-kneed, open-palmed servility of English and Continental hotels. Perhaps one

was not waited upon with quite the same attention, but the service as a whole was adequate. In the hotels when the porter had carried the bags to one's room, he liked to shake hands, and was not above accepting a cigarette, although he would not touch any money. It was enjoyable after the furtive tip and dissatisfied frown of which I have had so much experience. Equality did not end there, for when we were setting off from Moscow for Nijni-Novgorod, to give an illustration, I was standing on the platform slightly hot and bothered, unsure which was my compartment, and how I should get my bags there. An officer of the Red Army, corresponding, perhaps, to an English major, seeing my confusion came up to me, took the bags, boarded the train, found the compartment, arranged the things on the rack and, after shaking hands with me, said simply, "Good-bye, comrade," and disappeared. Imagine an English major in similar circumstances.

The most delightful evening of the tour was one we spent in the Park of Culture and Rest at Moscow. I have already mentioned the community singing that we heard there, and the theatre where we saw "The West is Nerve-racking" was also in this park. When we first entered we were inclined to be sceptical, and to call it the glorified Russian version of a pleasure beach. We soon found that we were mistaken. There were swings and roundabouts and a big pleasure wheel there, but there were also places which gave what might reasonably be called cultural entertainment. The nearest approach I know was the British Empire Exhibition. There was a large display of products out of every corner of the Soviet Union, which numbers of people were examining attentively, there were reading rooms, bookshops, propaganda posters, a zoo, sports of all kinds—climbing greasy poles, balancing tests, skittles, bowls, jumping, handball, football and so on. Finally, at the end of the Park, we came to a huge performance of country dancing. Imagine an area about the size of a football ground, surrounded by two rows of dancers, perhaps eight or nine hundred people in all, and then beyond about two thousand spectators. On a raised stand at one side is a large orchestra, and there also is a leader who directs the dancing by means of loud speakers. Inside the ring Young Pioneers—the Russian scouts and guides—show how the dances should be done with a gusto and delight that is infectious. The band plays Schubert's "Marche Militaire," the dance is a simple, enjoyable one, and everyone enters into the spirit of the thing. No one tries to make a fool of himself, and there is absolutely no vulgarity of any sort. Of course we joined in, and for half an hour I could have watched, if I had not been so occupied with enjoying myself, the unique spectacle of twenty-nine British scientists, many of them staid

Harley Street specialists, and convinced Conservatives, dancing delightedly arm in arm with members of the world's first proletarian dictatorship.

The scientists and doctors who were with the party were impressed, with certain exceptions, with the scientific work and with the hospitals they saw. For my part I was impressed with the enthusiasm of the Communists. There are less than two million of them in Russia and their ideals may be mistaken, but the energy and sincerity they put into the effort to translate their aspirations into facts is most inspiring, and augurs well for the future of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

E. K. WRIGHT.

A NEGLECTED PASTIME.

IT is curious that the coming of the aeroplane should have undermined the popularity of the balloon. There seems to be no good reason for this. The invention of steam power might just as well have ruined the vogue of the sailing yacht, yet it has not done so. There is an analogy between ballooning and sailing, for ballooning, like sailing, has the good qualities of its defects. In an age of speed and frantic hustle there is a charm in not knowing exactly where you are going or what time you will get there; and this is always the case in ballooning. The hour and place of arrival can only be guessed at; a balloon is no vehicle for a business man in a hurry. To the leisurely traveller, however, who takes pleasure in contemplation it affords many agreeable contrasts with the ordinary means of locomotion. Instead of the thrill of speed he experiences the ecstasy of immobility, for the rôles of the traveller and the scenery are transposed; to the traveller in a balloon the sensation of immobility is absolute, while the landscape floats noiselessly past.

There is indeed no sensation comparable with ballooning, unless it be running before the wind in a sailing vessel; yet how prosaic is this bustling motion compared with the soundless progress of a balloon. Judged by ballooning standards the aeroplane, battling laboriously against the pull of gravitation, is a wretchedly noisy nerve-racking piece of machinery. In a balloon, even at hurricane speed, no breath of wind is felt. At the most, if the wind changes suddenly a faint breeze may be noticed for a moment. If an aeronaut were so insanely reckless as to risk a gas explosion by lighting a match, the flame would burn without a flicker in the windless air, for the balloon is always moving with the exact speed of the wind, which is consequently never perceptible. The rise and fall are, as a rule, as little to be noticed by the passenger as the speed and direction of the journey. A fall of ominous rapidity will be signalled only by a light breeze coming up from below. This possibility of misjudging speed and direction may have significance during a journey, and did in fact produce a sensational situation during the journey which is now described. Yet there is no reason why ballooning should be more dangerous than sailing, and there is certainly much less for the beginner to learn. My own adventures were almost entirely due to inexperience; an expert would certainly have made a much less erratic descent.

This balloon voyage started at Easter from Paris at the hour of sunset. There were two of us in the car, and we carried as much ballast as we thought our gas-bag could lift. Ballast is to the balloonist like money to the traveller, the more he has the further

he can go. Hoping to stay up all night and determined to go as far as possible, we carried as much sand as we could. As we climbed in the men who were to start us gathered round, lifting off the weights attached to the outside of the basket and testing our buoyancy by half letting go. Then, as they completely relaxed their grip of the basket, we gently left the ground, hardly realising it, so quietly did we drift into the air, while our helpers became midgets far below and the great living map of Paris began to expand under our feet. The basket rocked when we shifted our positions, but otherwise hung sedately in space like a bubble floating in a calm tide. Only careful observation of the landscape assured us that we were moving and that our direction was towards the east. The expanse of Paris and of the open country beyond was increasing rapidly, an indication that we were rising fast. In this tranquil manner had we abandoned the earth.

The stillness of the air enveloping us and the vastness of the panorama opening beneath us produced in combination a strange impression. They reminded me of a show in London in my childhood: the panorama of the Battle of Waterloo. The spectator at this show came up through the floor of a circular platform and found himself in the centre of a panoramic painting of the field of Waterloo; a realistically painted dome of sky was above, and the whole produced a curious effect of spaciousness and airlessness combined with theatrical unreality. The panorama from the balloon now gave me the same peculiar impression. It did not last, however, for the reality of the world below soon reasserted itself, as the continuous mingled sound of children shouting and dogs barking mounted to us through the still air. At half-past six we observed we were crossing the Seine in a south-easterly direction. From now onwards the journey divided itself into three phases: firstly impenetrable darkness lasting until midnight, secondly a period of moonlight, and thirdly, beginning at dawn, came the final stage, the voyage at great heights above the clouds.

During the first hours of darkness the chief source of our anxiety was the continually alternating expansion and contraction of the gas. This was due to the instability of the temperature before night had finally asserted itself, and caused a constant up and down movement of the balloon, our altitude varying between several hundreds and several thousands of feet. In our efforts to combat this rise and fall we found by sunset that we had already spent six of our precious sacks of sand. The temperature was round about 36 degrees Fahrenheit, but secure from any sensation of wind we did not feel cold. Before ten o'clock two more sacks had to be sacrificed, and this caused us some disquiet, for we knew that we should need ballast with the coming of daylight, which was

expected to carry us up to an immense height owing to the sun's power of expanding the gas. For this reason a big reserve of sand was desirable, for when the gas shrank again we should need it for saving us from too swift a fall. Circumstances were to show that our anxiety was justified.

Although we had started with a clear sky, the weather was now cloudy and night came on with profound darkness. There was no prospect of a moon before midnight and I bitterly regretted that I had omitted to provide myself with a more efficient electric torch, our one feeble instrument having collapsed about ten o'clock. Before it had quite flickered out a reading of the barometer showed that we had risen at one time to 10,000 feet, although now we were almost level with the tree-tops. Such an altitude in thick darkness was dangerously low, and again more sand had to be thrown out. At once we rose and were drifting blindly on through the inky void when a sinister vision appeared, throwing us into consternation and upsetting every guess we had been making at what was our position on the map. Dim in the darkness but surely unmistakable there appeared below and ahead of us an immense sheet of water stretching away till it was lost in the night. We strained our eyes peering into the empty blackness, and as we did so there came up a sighing sound from the dark gulf at our feet. Surely that sound could be only one thing: the murmur of the sea on the beach? We tried furiously to think out the situation and to imagine what could have happened. Since the failure of our torch we had been unable to take any bearings. Was it conceivable that we were over the sea? Such uncertainty may seem ridiculous, but it must be remembered that when travelling in a balloon several thousand feet above the earth one cannot tell whether one is becalmed or travelling at the speed of an express train, except by very carefully watching the ground. For a hideous minute or two it seemed credible that we had got into an air current that had hurried us to the coast with the speed of a whirlwind in a direction contrary to that of our departure and that we were now actually at sea. In any case there was nothing to be done. If we were indeed over the sea we must keep on travelling over it until daylight. The utter darkness added to our sense of helplessness. I had never before felt myself immersed in such a blind void. Even a blizzard on an Alpine snowfield allows one the comfort of contact with the ground. Here we were completely cut off from all connection with the solid world. Fortunately our consternation was soon over; it became clear to us after a few minutes that the water-like expanse was only a lake of mist, and the murmur of waves merely the sound of the wind in a great forest of fir trees over which we happened to be passing. We were still travelling after all

on the same course as when we started, and great was our relief.

For some time after this we moved on over dim mysterious country, that might in the darkness have been either sea or land. At one moment, when the darkness seemed a little less profound, we pulled the valve and came down nearer to the ground, hoping to see something and to let our guide-rope trail. The guide-rope is a most useful form of self-regulating ballast; when coming down too fast the speed of the descent is automatically checked by the guide-rope as it trails on the ground. A reverse action prevents too sudden a rise. On this occasion, however, the guide-rope failed in its purpose, becoming entangled in the tree-tops. We accordingly threw out some ballast and as we rose the wind tore us free; with a crashing of broken branches we returned to safer levels above. At last, half an hour after midnight, the moon rose and we found that we were slowly crossing a country of moors and forests. There was no longer any temptation to sleep. During the hours of darkness anxiety had kept us alert; from now on the great spectacle of moon-lit heaven and earth kept us breathless with the splendours that it unrolled.

With the more equable temperature of night our height remained the same, a few hundred feet above the tree-tops, with our guide-rope just hanging clear of them. Unceasingly as we sailed across the moon-lit forest the nightingales accompanied us with their song. Before very long the cuckoos were awake as well. Once we crossed an electrically lit mill beside a roaring river. Otherwise nothing but the songs of nightingales and cuckoos broke the stillness until, as we passed over a sleeping village, we heard the church clock strike two. And so the night wore on. An hour before dawn we surmised that we were passing over vineyards. A few handfuls of sand thrown out increased our elevation; we sailed over more forest to some high uninhabited moors.

The first signs of dawn appeared soon after three, as we came over a high road with a drowsy peasant plodding along it. My companion leaned out over the edge of the basket and without raising his voice asked the man where we were. He gazed up speechless for a moment as our gigantic shadow stole softly across the moon, then his answer came "Bar-sur-Aube." We were still in highland country and apparently making for a gap or pass south of a steep-wooded summit in a bare range of hills. Some sand, parsimoniously sprinkled, just enabled us to skim the tree-tops as we floated out through the pass into the broad valley of the Aube. Far below, at the foot of the range which we had just crossed, lay the town of Bar-sur-Aube with its clocks striking four. It was quite light now and we were about a thousand feet above the river. The sound of weirs, cocks crowing and blackbirds sing-

ing reached us. Some miles up the river lay a lake of morning mist as like a sheet of water as any African mirage. My thermometer showed 38 degrees Fahrenheit as we sailed out into the sunrise at the same majestic, hasteless speed; roads bordered with poplars appeared, then more highlands. We crossed an old farmhouse with a courtyard; its silence showed that the occupants were still asleep. Beyond was a wood full of song-birds, jays and woodpeckers. We were intent on the gradually widening view when suddenly our guide-rope crashed into the tree-tops, bringing the balloon up short with a series of violent jerks. For a moment it seemed not improbable that we should stick in a tree; and we devoutly hoped that the rigging of our aged craft would withstand these strains and wrenches. To our good fortune the rope forced itself free, and thus we drifted serenely on until at 4.50 the rim of the rising sun made its first appearance, lighting up the countless white may-trees in the woods underneath us.

The third and most critical phase of the journey was now approaching. We knew that when the lifting-power of the sun's rays exerted its influence upon the gas, our rise would be prodigious. The process was already beginning, and we rose steadily, but at a gradually increasing rate, until soon we were breaking through a thin layer of clouds. Beyond these we came into another world, the billowy surface of the clouds beneath us shutting out the earth and throwing up a scorching glare like the heat reflected from fresh snow. White cumulus peaks of fantastic shapes shone out in radiant glory above darker cloud masses which the sun had not yet reached. A few moments more and we were so high that the noise of a passing train and faint chimes from a village church were the only sounds that could still be heard. A curious sight now to be seen was the rose-tinted shadow of our balloon encircled by a halo which appeared on the cloud-floor under us and followed in our wake. It is a phenomenon sometimes known as the spectre of the Brocken. Through ever-rarer gaps in the clouds we caught glimpses of the earthly landscape looking singularly lovely in the glowing colours of the dawn.

But it was time that we gave thought to our direction, for since we had left Bar-sur-Aube the earth had been hidden under a sea of cloud; consequently we had only the vaguest idea of our course. Through an opportune temporary break we now detected snow lying among pine forests, and from all sides there rose the faint humming roar of mountain streams. It seemed probable that we were crossing the Vosges and that the Alps lay ahead of us. The barometer told us we were rising fast, and soon after six I observed that we had reached an altitude of 10,000 feet. On the sea of cloud the dull red spectre of the balloon was still swimming per-

sistently after us; we were travelling slowly as before, moving, it seemed, at the same rate and in the same direction as the cloud floor. This made it a difficult matter to calculate pace or position. By half-past six our height was 11,000 feet and it was cold in spite of the scorching sun; some soup in a bottle was frozen. The earth was by this time completely invisible. Nevertheless a change in the cloud formation was taking place; gradually we approached a big break in the main mass which now began to disintegrate like a polar ice-field, and for a few minutes we sailed over a wide blue gulf in the depths of which tiny towns gleamed. Here and there were pastures of brilliant emerald, with trees the size of pins' heads and a spider's web of roads stretching far and wide. On the other side of the gulf began another great continent of massive white cumulus with a long coast-like edge resembling realistically the cliffs of an iceberg.

At about eight o'clock when the glass indicated 13,000 feet and while we were rising slowly over the new cloud-continent, we noticed for the first time that the height was making us breathless. None the less we were hungry and devoured our provisions ravenously. Since dawn the rising and falling of the balloon had continued according to the variations of temperature caused by the clouds. Some of the falls were difficult to check, and we had been spending more ballast than we liked. Through a temporary thinning in the layer of cloud we were able to make out that the hills underneath seemed to be increasing in size and becoming more continuous, but this was all that we could learn of the world that we were cut off from; it was once more completely hidden from view. For hundreds of miles nothing was to be seen but clouds, huge castles and mountains of them, dazzling our eyes and scorching our faces with the intense glory of their reflected sunlight. Meanwhile we rose to 16,000 feet and both of us suffered from violent palpitations and breathlessness. The discomfort was more acute than when climbing at much greater altitudes in the Himalaya; we panted as if we had been running a race.

The question now before us was: had we enough ballast to justify us in attempting to cross the full extent of the Alps? My companion, who was as ignorant of ballooning as I was, chose this moment to inform me that he had been cautioned about pulling the gas valve at any great height, since our balloon was so old and presumably unsound, that it might become difficult to stop the impetus of too prolonged a fall. We also had to consider that in coming down from a great height a big reserve of ballast is in any case necessary in order to control the descent. Although we were aware of this fact, we did not appreciate it sufficiently, as events were to prove. However, while we were arguing the point, the

balloon was continuing to rise and the vast masses of towering cumulus were becoming more and more magnificent. We seemed to be no longer playing any part in the world, but to be traversing the deserts of space in some strange orbit decreed by a capricious and inscrutable fate. We were still discussing what to do when a startling revelation took place; just as we reached a height of 18,000 feet a division appeared in the far horizon of the clouds, and through the opening we beheld the dazzling chain of Mont Blanc. The great summit itself was wrapped in a characteristic "*tourmente*," the snow-flurry known and dreaded locally as a sure sign of bad weather.

A decision was now urgent, for the idea of drifting over the Alps in bad weather in an old balloon with insufficient ballast was disturbing, to say the least of it. Unless we descended without delay we should find ourselves hanging over a boundless chaos of peaks with little chance of choosing a safe landing-place. I was in favour of attempting to hit off a solitary gap in the cloud-floor, through which at this moment one could discern open country suitable for a landing. My companion, however, still questioned the prudence of pulling the gas-valve, and in the meantime our upward movement was continuing. My arguments at last prevailed, and a tentative pull or two at the valve-rope started us headlong down with rapidly increasing speed. Hurriedly we threw out ballast, and unfortunately more than was necessary, for, to our dismay, the balloon began rising once more. Further to add to our anxiety the gap in the clouds had closed up; below us was an unbroken veil through which we should have to plunge without any knowledge of the ground beneath, but in the lamentable certainty that the ensuing condensation of the gas would greatly accelerate the speed of our fall. While we were facing this situation we distinctly heard the dull roar that rises from a big city as the sound came up to us through the clouds. If our choice lay between landing in a large town or coming down in the Alps in bad weather, the first alternative seemed preferable. So the valve was again pulled and this time the fall began in earnest. As the momentum increased a breeze blew up in our faces, a danger signal indicating too fast a fall.

Almost immediately we plunged into the sea of cloud; a few snow-flakes flew past us, but we could see nothing else in the dense fog that surrounded us. The extravagant speed of our fall was now so obvious that there was no need to gauge it by the usual method of dropping paper out of the car and observing its relative movement; we were hard at work emptying bags of sand over the side; and while helping in this I was also hastily preparing a basket of bottles and provisions to throw overboard as soon as the sand had been

used up. Telescopes and cameras we would not sacrifice, but crammed them into a wicker locker for safety when the moment of the crash should arrive. Meanwhile the sand flew up in our faces, for we were overtaking the ballast which we had thrown out.

Our fall through the clouds cannot have lasted more than a few seconds and now we were again in sight of earth. The big city that we had dreaded falling into was nowhere to be seen; we had providentially avoided it. But there was little time to realise the situation; we were falling at a very great pace towards some fields ringed round with wooded hills. For an instant I was able to observe one of many fields looking like a square in a tiny chess-board; the next moment it had increased to a prodigious size, and was rushing up to meet us with bewildering speed. The last of our sand-bags was flung out bodily, unemptied, and almost at the same instant we struck the ground with a crash. As we clung to the rigging in a shower of sand the balloon rolled over on its side and began to drag across the field, but a strong pull at the rip-valve brought the basket immediately to rest. Several men ran up, and after trying French on them in vain we discovered that we were in Switzerland near Bettingen, about six miles from Bâle. We had fallen in a field admirably adapted to balloonists, at a perfectly safe distance from the city. If our barometers and cameras were broken we ourselves were unhurt. The hour was ten o'clock in the morning and a clouded grey sky gave no hint of all the glories above it. So ended our balloon voyage; it had been a continuously enthralling adventure lasting sixteen hours.

As we puffed homeward in the noisy, dirty, jolting train, my thoughts went back to our outward-bound journey through the sky, a journey in which we seemed to have been wafted to our unforeseen destination by enchantment rather than by the caprices of the winds. Throughout the voyage we had experienced the sensation of profound immersion and absorption in the beauty of earth and sky, as if the traveller and the world travelled in were together part of a single harmonious whole. It is this strange and rare experience which above all others gives an incomparable glamour to ballooning.

C. F. MEADE.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

REPARATION, DEBTS AND THE CRISIS.

(I) THE PREVALENT DESPAIR.

TWO odd aspects of the concern manifested in the first half of January about the prospects of the Lausanne reparation conference caused some little merriment of spirit among those who still retained the faculty of seeing obvious things. The first oddity was that the payment of reparation and international political debt, which *ex hypothesi* was the source of the mischief, had totally ceased, yet few people seemed to appreciate the inevitable consequences of that fact. The second was that the politicians, in their combined effect internationally, were behaving, as they always have and no doubt always will, in such a manner that if salvation depended upon them, there could be no hope of salvation whatever, yet it was obvious that salvation did not depend upon them, nor could be prevented by them.

This matter of the world crisis alarms those people, and they are legion, whose memory is not vivid nor detailed enough to remind them of what they themselves felt in the last crisis they experienced. How many people can recall, with even slight realism, what they themselves were thinking in 1920 about the crisis then upon them? Even 1928 is almost forgotten by distinguished economists who are now writing at top speed about a crisis which derived from 1928, and whose very continuity with 1928 has not yet been broken. On nearly every side the present crisis (which the French deliciously call a "crise de confiance") is regarded as something unusual, abnormal, unprecedented, hopeless. In 1928 on nearly every side the boom then raging was regarded as an impregnable, never-ending blessing of our time. They who had no fear in 1928 have no hope in 1932. They have the faculty of being wrong every time: but they are a necessary part of the human machinery of ups and downs, booms and slumps, without which the gay spirit of adventure in the level-headed remainder would die from the lack of opportunity.

In January 1932 the spectacle presented to one who looked upon the world as a whole was that of an apparently inextricable mess. The "Wiggin" report of August last and the Basle report of December had as much effect upon diplomatic action as the bleating of a lamb might have upon a volcano. The Hoover moratorium of July 1931 was baulked of its full purpose by the French politicians, who did not understand that purpose. The projected Lausanne conference of January 1932 was crippled in advance by the United States politicians, who cold-shouldered it, therein dis-

playing the remarkable impartiality of men who at one moment become the pioneers of a good cause and immediately turn to wrecking it when they see a chance of its being fulfilled. Trade was stagnant, markets idle. The two victors of the Great War, France and the United States, insisted upon a future resumption of tribute from the two vanquished Powers, Germany and Great Britain, who could not pay, were not paying and obviously would not pay again. Japan was in occupation of Manchuria, not knowing what to do next. China, the titular sovereign of Manchuria, was, and had been for twenty years, without any sovereign government convincing enough to substantiate any titular claim whatsoever. No single budget in the world (except perhaps the Czechoslovak and the British) had the faintest chance of balancing in the immediate future. Every major currency in the world had abandoned gold as its yardstick except the German (where the yardstick was fictitious) on the one hand, and the American and the French on the other (where the amassed gold, the cause of the abandonment above referred to, was thereby rendered valueless except in the event of war). The incidental paradox was such that whereas Germany was in the position of a bankrupt debtor to Great Britain, the mark had to be bought at a heavy premium by the pound. A disarmament conference was due to meet on February 2nd at Geneva, at which no fewer than sixty-four nations, including all the great Powers, were to be represented, but at which nobody in his heart expected that much business would be done.

A gloomy as well as a mad world: but the world is normally mad, if only cyclically gloomy. The Great War lasted for four and a half years. Ten million men were killed, many times more were maimed. After it the nations (except Germany, who was not allowed to) armed to a greater extent than ever before, and are now spending between them the rollicking sum of £1,000 a minute on armaments, and at a time when none of them can balance their budgets.

What then was the basis on which, in January 1932, the optimists based their optimism? Not the mystic, spiritual optimists who believe in the divinity that shapes our ends no matter what wars and politics we pursue (albeit such mystics are eminently practical in this matter); but the business men and the financiers? An examination of their faith bears upon the work of the Lausanne and Geneva conferences.

(2) THE BASIS OF HOPE.

It is a case in which the "general practitioner" (as it were) is a better guide than the specialist. During the past three years

the experts, mainly economic and monetary, have produced an enormous dossier of work, largely tending to lecture the politicians and the diplomatists on their past shortcomings and on their future duty. The diplomatist often has no understanding of economics. The economist has often no understanding of pure finance. One can read through the five volumes issued periodically since September 1930 by the Gold Delegation of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations and not read a single authority enshrined therein who seems to have any suspicion of the part played by pure finance in the origin of the present crisis. Sir Henry Strakosch, for example, has contributed to it valuable essays on the gold standard and on the economic consequences of changes in the value of gold. His work for Geneva, it must be conceded, was based mostly upon an experience falling before 1928; but as if to show that it would not have made much difference if he had written in the light of his further experience, he more recently wrote a Memorandum entitled "The Crisis," published as a supplement to the *Economist* on January 9th, 1932, in which his great gifts of exposition in the economic and monetary field were again displayed, but in which he ignored the part played by pure finance in the matters of which he wrote. We have, in short, heard a vast amount, both from the detached economists and from the official economists investigating the crisis at Basle and elsewhere, about gold, price levels, commodities, debts, reparation, trade stagnation. The 1922-8 course of economic progress, based largely upon the prescriptions of the League of Nations, upon the League's material help to such lame pupils as Austria and Hungary, and upon the general adoption of the gold standard, is a familiar story.

Then began the new story, suddenly, in 1929. In the Memorandum above referred to Sir Henry Strakosch merely prefaces a masterly survey of the subsequent deflationary process by stating colourlessly that at the beginning of 1929 an "abnormal" movement set in, not attempting to explain why. What was the cause, and was it abnormal? Is it not the case that the stock market inflation of 1928, especially in New York, was quite normally followed by a process of deflation? One could quote the speeches of distinguished financiers, delivered before the end of 1928, in which such deflation was predicted. The raising of the British bank rate on February 7th, 1929, was clearly the beginning of the process. Once started, it led to economic difficulty on normal lines (for financial reactions normally precede economic reactions); but in this case, as Sir Henry shows with his admirable sureness of touch, the desperate factor was the effect upon the debtor countries. That obviously is the unprecedented factor in

the present crisis. Every crisis is unlike every former crisis in its particular manifestation, but, so far, every crisis has been alike in the general truth that collapse has brought its own remedy. In the present case the particular difficulty is the unpractical burden of international political debt, the absurdity of which is a matter of common recognition, and the full enormity of which the two Basle reports have established. What then is the solution produced (as normally) by itself? Surely it is the fact that at this moment no payment whatever is being made on account of those debts. Few realistic people imagine that such payment will ever be resumed.

The fact that the payment has stopped is bound to have its effects in loosening the deadlock. It probably matters as little in the present case as it mattered in former cases, what the politicians may do or not do. The politicians, by reason partly of their responsibility to ignorant, vulgar passions in their respective countries, seldom do constructive work: but many people, on the evidence of past experience, believe that the normal courses of financial and economic inflation and deflation fulfil themselves independently of political influences. What they therefore feel is that just as the raising of the British bank rate in February 1929 was the beginning of the deflation (although it took nearly a year to show itself), so the Hoover moratorium will be proved to have been the beginning of the inevitable opposite movement, though in its turn the effect did not at once show itself.

(3) GOLD AND THE DEBTS.

The enormity of the debt burden was illumined when the deflation began in 1929. Up till then the four chief countries playing the game of international political debt payments—the United States, France, Germany and Great Britain—had in some measure become entangled, and the course of the game was confused. The United States (one of the receiver Powers) had lent money to Germany (one of the tribute-paying Powers) to enable her to pay. On the eve of the present crisis she stopped lending money to Germany for that or for any other purpose. Thereupon Great Britain (who had also regularly lent money to Germany so that Germany could pay tribute to France) became the sole lender to Germany to provide for the continuance of those payments. It is one of the abiding qualities of the British character that defeat is unknown, because never recognised. In the present instance the essential situation was that the defeated Germany paid tribute to France and the defeated Great Britain paid tribute to the United States. So far was Great Britain from recognising the general

contour of things that in 1929, in addition to paying her own tribute to the United States, she started providing the sole means whereby Germany paid her tribute to France. In the new situation thus created a one-way stream of money passed from Great Britain to the United States, involving the sale of sterling and the buying of dollars. Hence the new gold flow to New York. In Europe sterling was being changed in large quantities into marks in the process of British lending to Germany, and marks were being changed into francs in the course of the resultant German payment to France. That involved a constant selling of sterling, a self-neutralising buying and selling of marks, and a constant buying of francs. Hence the gold flow to Paris. It was not in the least "abnormal." It was the normal, inevitable, predictable effect of a clear concatenation of forces, revolving round the central function of general dupe performed by Great Britain.

(4) THE EPITAPH OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL DEBT PAYMENT.

Inasmuch as all payment of international political war debt ceased in July 1931 and is not likely to be resumed, except in a radically modified form, some historical interest attaches to the completed record of the actual cash payments transferred up to the time of the Hoover moratorium. For the purpose of comparison the figures given below are all reduced to sterling. For simplicity they are confined to the case of the four chief Powers which have participated as payers or as receivers in those transactions.

(a) *Germany*. Although the capital figures of the reparation liability imposed upon Germany by the successive treaty instruments since 1919 have little more than academic interest—the practical figures being those of the annuity payments actually made—yet they have considerable interest as showing the process of deflation through which the unpractical Allied politicians of 1919 have been driven by the hard facts. The capital liability contemplated by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 was the monstrous sum of £11,379,000,000. (The sum was not fixed, but is calculable from the 1921 figure. See below.) The imagination recoils before such a figure. If one calculates the number of minutes that have elapsed since the birth of Christ and multiplies that number by twelve, one gets roughly the number of pounds sterling that the Allied politicians of 1919 really thought they could make Germany pay. The still, small voices of the few sensible people then extant immediately pointed to the absurdity of any such expectation, with the result that within two years a drop of nearly 50 per cent. had taken place in Allied political

expectations. It had been left for the Reparation Commission to fix the definitive sum. On May 5th, 1921, that sum was fixed at £6,600,000,000, representing a 58 per cent. "remission" of the 1919 "claim." It was not surprising even in 1921 that the reduced sum immediately proved itself to be unpractical. The German Government duly paid the first instalment, on September 1st, 1921, whereafter the whole matter of subsequent payments became the subject of never-ending reparation conferences, culminating in the "Dawes" conference of 1924. The capital figure of German reparation having been proved an unprofitable exercise of arithmetic on the part of the Allied financial experts, no attempt was made in the Dawes Plan to fix a new capital sum. Instead, Germany was requested simply to pay a series of prescribed annuities. By comparing the size of the Dawes annuities with those of the annuities resulting from the 1921 "settlement" one arrives at the estimate that the Dawes Plan virtually reduced the German capital liability by two-thirds, that is, to some £2,200,000,000. The Dawes Plan was duly succeeded in its turn by the "New Plan" (the popularly called "Young Plan" of 1929, brought into operation in 1930). Again the capital sum of reparation liability was left undefined, but, assessed on the theoretic capital value of the new annuities, it came to a little less than the Dawes figure, say to £2,000,000,000. The four capital landmarks in the process of reparation deflation therefore were: 1919, £11,379,000,000; 1921, £6,600,000,000; 1924, £2,200,000,000; 1929; £2,000,000,000.

As for the more practical figures of the annuities prescribed, we find a corresponding deflation. In 1921 Germany was asked to pay £100,000,000 a year, and in addition an amount equal to 26 per cent. of the value of German exports. On the basis of German exports of 1921 the full annuity demanded was something between £150,000,000 and £162,500,000. By the Dawes Plan, it being by then recognised that such annuities could not be paid, it was laid down that Germany should pay a first series of four transitional annuities leading up to a payment of the full "standard" annuity in the fifth year. The figures were: 1924-5, £50,000,000; 1925-6, £61,000,000; 1926-7, £60,000,000; 1927-8, £87,000,000; 1928-9 (standard year), £125,000,000. Next the Young Plan substituted a long series of annuities ranging from 1929 to 1988, beginning with £82,000,000 in 1930-1 (I give the first full annuity period, the actual first period being a half-year from September 1929 to March 1930), rising in 1966 to £117,000,000, and ending in 1988 with £45,000,000. It was a projected sixty years' dream, destined to be broken after the first full year.

Still more illuminating, however, was the evolution of the method prescribed for German payment. It was the illusion

of 1919 that Germany could pay £11,379,000,000 out of her own money. That illusion was still operative on the smaller scale in 1921, when the annuities then fixed were demanded wholly out of German resources. By the time of the Dawes Plan the disillusion had gone nearly full circle, for it was therein decreed that most of the new annuities should be paid out of the proceeds of loans raised by the German Government abroad, the rest out of German internal resources, namely out of the profits of the German railways. The Young Plan revealed the fact that by 1929 the disillusion had gone more than full circle, for it was therein provided that the annuities should be paid wholly out of the proceeds of foreign loans, and in addition it was arranged that Germany should be given a further loan for her own internal use.

The sum of the matter is that up to the time of the Hoover moratorium Germany had paid an aggregate total of £646,100,000 in reparation. That is the figure of the Reparation Commission. The German Government claims to have paid £2,800,000,000, but there has been wide controversy about the arithmetic. That government accepts for such purposes as may be served thereby the figure arrived at by the American Institute of Economics, which is £1,900,000,000, but which in its turn is rejected by British official opinion and is three times larger than the figure of the Reparation Commission.

(b) *Great Britain.* The position of Great Britain has been that of both creditor and debtor in the post-war debt transactions. Exact full figures are hard to establish for one's own satisfaction, harder to prove. The following cardinal figures, however, may be taken as reliable. The United States loans to the United Kingdom, funded as at December 15th, 1922 (including interest to that date), amounted to £958,330,000 (\$4,600,000,000, the exchange being taken at \$4.8 to the £). That was the debt incurred by Great Britain after the entry of the United States into the war. In the same period, that is from March 31st, 1917, the United Kingdom lent to her European allies, including accrued and unpaid interest to December 31st, 1922, the sum of £936,255,000. The capital position, therefore, in inter-Allied post-1917 debts, is that Britain borrowed nearly £1,000,000,000 from the United States, and lent nearly £1,000,000,000 to Europe. The total repayment made by Great Britain to the United States on account of the capital debt, up to the time of the Hoover moratorium, amounted to £326,200,000. The total repayment received by Great Britain for her European debtors (on account of all the European debts to her) up to the time of the Hoover moratorium amounted to £71,300,000. (The two last figures were

given by Mr. Neville Chamberlain in the House of Commons on November 19th, 1931, but he gave the second figure wrongly as £71,275,000.) They reveal a net loss to Great Britain on inter-Allied post-1917 transactions of £254,900,000. In the matter of reparation Great Britain received from Germany up to the time of the Hoover moratorium a total sum of £121,000,000, and an additional £200,000 from non-German reparation. The net loss to Great Britain is £133,700,000. Moreover, the above figures refer only to the actual transfer of cash on account of funded debts. They leave out of account the vast amount of unfunded debt, many times greater than the funded debt, which remains as a dead loss for ever, and which will have to be paid for eternally by British taxpayers.

(c) *France.* The total sum received by France from German reparation up to the time of the Hoover moratorium was £273,600,000 and from non-German reparation £700,000. The total payment she made to the United States and Great Britain together on account of inter-Allied debt up to the same time was £111,000,000. The balance in her favour therefore is £163,300,000.

(d) *The United States.* The United States has received up to the time of the Hoover moratorium a total amount of £451,100,000 from Great Britain, France, Germany, etc., on account of her war credits. Of that total £326,200,000 has been paid by Great Britain, and £40,833,000 by France, £16,700,000 by Germany and £67,367,000 by other European debtors.

(e) *The salient figures.* It therefore emerges that, so far as actual transfers of cash have taken place since the war on account of reparation and debts, the United States on balance has received £451,100,000, and France £163,300,000. Great Britain on balance has paid £133,700,000, and Germany £646,000,000. It must be remembered, however, that although those figures fairly represent the real position as it has affected the United States, France and Germany, the position of Great Britain is not fairly represented thereby because in her case there remains the large amount of unfunded debt. An impressive statement was made on that subject by Sir Walter Layton at a public dinner on January 13th. He said (*Times* report, January 14th): "If all the reparations and debts were wiped out there was some £1,600,000,000 of our national debt still remaining on this country in respect of money which was raised here and loaned to the Allies, and [on which] we had got to go on paying interest until one of these days the bonds were repaid out of the taxes of this country. The internal debt remained. Germany would be left with only £500,000,000 of internal debt. That was £8 a head. France would be left with approximately £2,300,000,000 of debt, which was £56 a head;

Great Britain would be left with £6,600,000,000 of internal debt, £150 a head; and the United States with an internal debt of £3,200,000,000 or £27 a head."

The Lausanne Conference has a chance of closing what Signor Mussolini described as "the tragic ledger of the war."

(5) THE UNITED STATES AND LAUSANNE.

Up to the middle of December 1931 little evidence came from the United States of what the official attitude would be to the impending reparation conference. Mr. Hoover was clearly involved in the sort of personal crisis that assailed Mr. MacDonald last August. He had made a bold throw last June, which had been defeated of its major purpose by the lack of a strong British Government and by the obstruction of France. He had since been subjected by M. Laval to a virtual imposition of silence and inaction, M. Laval's visit to Washington and the depressing official statement recording its result taking place (October 25th) just before the British election altered the British factor in international affairs (see CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, December 1931, pp. 780-2). No doubt the ignorance of what that election was to produce contributed to Mr. Hoover's passivity. True, he made admirable speeches, calculated to coach his countrymen into a proper frame of mind for far-sighted American action in the international field, and gave full play, in that context, to the domestic argument: 6,000,000 unemployed, stagnant business and a prospective budget deficit of at least \$2,000,000,000. So far, however, as action was concerned, the United States, with apparently deliberate intention, kept in the background. On November 18th, Mr. Stimson in a public statement said: ". . . we are not in any way participating in the European negotiations." Mr. Hoover himself adopted a somewhat negative tone in his messages to Congress some three weeks later. In his first (December 8th) he made this reference to foreign affairs: "In many countries political instability, excessive armaments, debts, Governmental expenditures, and taxes have resulted in revolutions, in unbalanced budgets and monetary collapse and financial panics; in the dumping of goods upon world markets and in diminished consumption of commodities. . . . As our difficulties in the past year have plainly originated in a large degree from these sources, any effort to bring about our own recuperation has dictated the necessity of co-operation by us with other nations in a reasonable effort to restore world confidence and economic stability."

He therein adopted a somewhat defensive tone in his reference

to the part played by the Government in the moratorium against political debts then operative, and the part played by the American banks in the also operative *Stillhalte* arrangement with Germany in the matter of private debts. It was obvious from those sentences that Mr. Hoover aspired to do something sensible, but did not feel strong enough to press his countrymen. His third message (December 10th) was specifically devoted to the foreign field. In it he reviewed the course of events since he proposed the moratorium in June, dwelt on the advisability of the moratorium being ratified before December 15th (when the next half-yearly payments would fall due) and gave a lead, somewhat half-hearted as before, but substantially sound, in these sentences. "As we approach the New Year it is clear that a number of Governments indebted to us will be unable to meet further payments to us in full, pending recovery in their economic life. It is useless to blind ourselves to an obvious fact. Therefore, it will be necessary in some cases to make still further temporary adjustments." He therefore recommended "the re-creation of the World War Foreign Debt Commission, with authority to examine such problems as may arise in connection with these debts during the present economic emergency, and to report to Congress its conclusions and recommendations." In urging the prompt ratification of the war debts moratorium he submitted this wholesome doctrine: "I am suggesting to the American people that they be wise creditors in their own interest and be good neighbours." But as if to show that he himself hardly faced the logic of his own doctrine he immediately incorporated in his Message this curious passage: "I do not approve, even in any remote sense, of the cancellation of debts to the United States. World confidence would not be enhanced by any such action. Reparations are a wholly European problem with which we have no relations. As the basis of the settlement of debts due to the United States was the capacity of the debtor to pay, we should be consistent with our own policies if we take into account the abnormal situation now existing in the world . . . while this action has no bearing on the land armaments conference in February, we trust that by this evidence of our desire to assist we shall have contributed to the goodwill which is so necessary for a solution of this major problem."

As if to emphasise the faulty connection between his own doctrine and his own policy, Mr. Hoover at the very time when he was delivering his Message to Congress received an official intimation from the French Government that in its view there could be no remission of German reparation debt without a corresponding remission of other war debts.

The three thousand miles of ocean that separate the United

States from Europe have a symbolic as well as a physical value. It explains why Mr. John Garner, of Texas, Democrat, who had been elected Speaker of the House of Representatives in the seventy-second session of Congress, which began on December 7th, could say what he did say from the Chair on December 10th. Referring to Mr. Hoover's plea for a ratification of the moratorium before December 15th he protested that ratification could not take place by that date because "we certainly will not pass on such an important piece of legislation before we have some information on it."

That event, the fact that on December 10th, 1931, the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives could plead lack of information about a state of affairs throughout the world which had induced the President of his own country six months before to propose a general moratorium against debt payments, is the very type of political ineptitude that makes of politics from one end of the world to the other an abiding barrier to commerce and ordered progress. Moreover, it was the Hoover proposal that led to the London Seven-Power Conference of July; it was that conference that led to the appointment by the Bank for International Settlements of a committee of Central Bank representatives, chairmaned by Mr. Wiggin, a citizen of the United States. That committee issued its report as long ago as last August. Its report contained a grave warning to the governments of the world about the disastrous effect upon "peaceful economic progress" of the prevalent system of international political debts, which involved the transfer of large sums from debtor to creditor countries, while at the same time those creditor countries were putting obstacles in the way of the free movement of goods. The "Wiggin" Committee—for by that American name the committee was known—issued its report four months before Mr. Garner from the Chair of the House of Representatives protested his lack of information.

On December 11th the Congress opposition to Mr. Hoover's proposal for the re-creation of the War Debts Commission, with its implied purpose of further adjustment in war debt payments, was vigorously championed by Senator Borah. That opposition, however, on that same day (December 11th) led to a salutary declaration from Mr. Mellon, who showed himself to be well aware of the essential facts of the situation. "It is the duty," he said, "of those in authority to deal with realities, and there is no escaping the fact that some of our debtors cannot meet in full the payments due to us until there has been a substantial measure of economic recovery. . . . Take the case of Great Britain, our best customer, which even in the depression year

of 1930 took \$678 million worth of American agricultural and industrial products. The economic and financial changes of the past year have immensely increased the burden of her payments to us. . . . All debts to Great Britain from foreign governments, except reparation payments—which are not being collected at all this year and are not likely to be collected in full next year—are payable in sterling, but her debt to us is payable in gold dollars . . . with the pound at par the British Treasury needs £32,800,000 in order to pay us \$159,500,000. With sterling at the rate at which it was sold on December 10th it would take £48,100,000, or an increase of £15,300,000, or 47 per cent. In other words, the burden on the British tax-payers would be increased by almost half. When the British settlement was made, it was estimated at its present value at $4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. interest, and was 80 per cent. of the total amount due prior to the funding. If the amount to be raised in pounds sterling to meet obligations to the United States in dollars is increased by 47 per cent. it becomes apparent that from the standpoint of the British tax-payer he is asked to meet, not the obligation as established by our Debt Commission, but an amount considerably in excess of such obligation."

The Republicans launched a campaign in Congress in support of the President's proposal. It was, however, a foregone conclusion that the moratorium could not be ratified before December 15th, and it therefore became necessary for the United States Treasury (December 12th) to announce that the foreign governments concerned would be informed that their failure to pay the debt instalments due on December 15th would not be regarded as "irregular."

The Bill to ratify the Hoover moratorium was duly passed by the House of Representatives on December 18th, the majority being 317 votes to 100. It was passed, however, with an amendment that had been adopted by the Ways and Means Committee of the House the day before. That amendment destroyed all chance of the Lausanne conference attempting any serious solution of the full debt problem, for it placed on record the refusal of the United States to entertain any proposal for the reduction of debts owed to herself. "It is hereby expressly declared" (so ran the reservation) "to be against the policy of Congress that any indebtedness by foreign countries to the United States should be in any manner cancelled or reduced, and nothing in this joint resolution for ratification of the Hoover moratorium shall be construed as indicating a contrary policy or an implication to give favourable consideration at any time to a change in the policy hereby declared." On December 22nd the Senate in its turn ratified the moratorium by 69 votes to 12, modified as it was by

the reservation of the House. The moratorium was signed on December 23rd, and Congress adjourned till January 4th. When it reassembled a story circulated in the corridors of the Capitol that Mr. Hoover had recently said to a visitor: "The last ten days have been the blackest in my memory." The story may not be literally true, but it is truly descriptive of the actual case. Mr. Hoover has made two conspicuously good gestures in his term of office. The first was his invitation to Mr. MacDonald to visit him at his camp on the headwaters of the Rapidan, in Virginia (October 1929), to discuss naval disarmament. The second was his debts proposal of June 1931. Both gestures were well timed, and on any principle of fair reward for good work should have led to lasting good for his generation. But it appears that the eternal muddle of the political field is too great to allow any individual enterprise, no matter how skilfully or resolutely carried out, to achieve its purpose. Mr. Wilson's attempt to help in cleaning up the European chaos after the war was thwarted by the muddled reactions of his own Congress; and now that the European chaos is proved to be also America's chaos, Mr. Hoover is thwarted in his turn by that same Congress. It is little wonder that after December 23rd last his public statements had so pianissimo a ring that they are hardly worth quoting.

(6) THE BASLE REPORT.

The Young Plan Advisory Committee, appointed by the Bank for International Settlements in response to the German application (see CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, January 1932, pp. 112 *et seq.*), did its work with a dispatch which contrasted sharply with the dilatory practices of the various governments. Its members were experts, not politicians. They met for the first time on December 7th at Basle, held their first full session on December 8th, worked in continuous session till December 23rd, and published their report before Christmas.

Their report, it is true, was calculated merely to force an open door. Everybody knew by heart enough of the relevant facts about Germany and about the general situation in the world to stand in need of no further conviction or enlightenment, but the technique of the Young Plan had to be carried out. Moreover, the politicians of the world were again thereby reminded of a duty which they had been told was urgent by the Wiggin Committee of last August: a warning which they had duly proceeded to ignore, after their manner. The first sentence of the Basle report resumed a weary tale: "The circumstances in which we have been called together are so well known that no lengthy recapitulation of events

is necessary." The committee proceeded, however, to recapitulate those events in a terse, preliminary chapter in which every word burnt itself into the reader's mind with an overwhelming effect of urgency. It gave shortly the main facts, alarmingly grave, about Germany's foreign debt, her trade balance, balance of payments, the position of the Reichsbank, of production and employment, the budget, the German railways. Chapter two traced the development of the present crisis in the case of Germany, chapter three outlined the special measures taken by Germany to meet that crisis (the culminating emergency decree of December 8th, 1931, being described as a measure "without parallel in modern legislation"), and chapter four stated that committee's "conclusions." Five annexes supplied the detailed documentary evidence upon which the preceding chapters were based. Chapter four was compressed within the compass of a thousand words. It began by stating simply that Germany could not transfer the conditional part of the annuity in the year following the present moratorium. It drew "the attention of the governments to the unprecedented gravity of the crisis." (It might as profitably have drawn the attention of the said governments to the sun, the moon and the stars.) It referred to the "growing financial paralysis of the world." It allowed itself one short digression, thus: "The Committee appointed by the Bank for International Settlements, on the invitation of the London Conference, after describing this situation in its Report of August 18th, 1931, sounded a most emphatic note of warning, urging that if disasters were to be avoided before the period of postponement of credits recommended by that Conference expires on February 29th, 1932, immediate steps must be taken by the governments. But events did not wait. . . . Unemployment has increased; stock exchanges remain closed, economic activity continues with difficulty at a very low ebb in the face of restricted credit, rigid control of the exchanges and paralysing restrictions on international trade. Slowly the effects of shrinking economic activity are making themselves felt in one country after another."

The practical recommendation to action by the governments was contained in the five short "considerations" submitted at the end of the chapter: "The first is that transfers from one country to another on a scale so large as to upset the balance of payments can only accentuate the present chaos. It should also be borne in mind that the release of a debtor country from a burden of payments which it is unable to bear may merely have the effect of transferring that burden to a creditor country which, in its character as a debtor, it, in its turn, may be unable to bear. Again, the adjustment of all inter-governmental debts (reparations and other war debts) to the existing troubled situation of the

world—and this adjustment should take place without delay if new disasters are to be avoided—is the only lasting step capable of re-establishing confidence, which is the very condition of economic stability and real peace. Finally, although the German Government is energetically defending the stability of its currency, steps are necessary to secure that these measures shall have a permanent effect. The European Governments during recent years have made great efforts towards re-establishing the stability of currencies after the disasters of the war and post-war inflation. The destruction of this work would mean an extremely disquieting setback, which would be heavy with consequences. The maintenance of the stability of the German currency, as of the currency of any debtor nation, may be placed in the greatest peril if the confidence of investors is lost."

The remarkable part of those considerations was the linking of reparation with other war debts, and the fact that although the terms of the committee's reference precluded the giving of any advice about the unconditional annuities of the Young Plan, the committee did contrive by ingenious drafting to convey that neither the unconditional nor the conditional annuities could be paid after next July. The final sentence of the chapter could have been accurately anticipated in advance by any private schoolboy: "We appeal (it ran) to the governments on whom the responsibility for action rests to permit of no delay in coming to decisions which will bring an amelioration of this grave crisis which weighs so heavily on all alike."

(7) ITS EFFECT UPON THE GOVERNMENTS.

Now what was the effect of that appeal upon the governments of the chief Powers concerned? The report was issued before Christmas. By the time these lines were written (January 15th), that is, after a lapse of more than three weeks, the British, French, German, Italian, Czechoslovak, Belgian, Polish, Greek, Portuguese, Roumanian and Yugoslav Governments had done three things: (1) they had agreed that Lausanne should be the place of the conference (agreement reached January 2nd); (2) they had agreed that the conference should meet on January 25th (agreement reached January 12th); (3) they had been forced to the conclusion that in view of the French Ministerial crisis which developed in the evening of January 12th, it was doubtful if, after all, the conference could meet on January 25th.

Let it be conceded that the above-recorded achievement was not the fault of the British Government. On Christmas Eve Mr. MacDonald stated that the conference ought to meet "without a day's unnecessary delay," that the British Government was ready

to meet "at once," and he was reported to have driven home his point by the exclamation: "For God's sake let us meet at once." It was the British Government that took the initiative (December 30th) in circularising the other ten governments with a proposal that Lausanne and January 18th should be the place and the date of the conference. Nine of those governments within twenty-four hours accepted the proposal, but the tenth government (the French) accepted it "provisionally" (the qualification being grounded upon the possibility that the exigencies of parliamentary convenience in Paris might make it impossible for a French delegation to go to Lausanne by January 18th). A ministerial crisis began to develop in Paris of such a dimension that on January 9th the British Government proposed that the date of the conference be postponed till the 25th. The proposal was unanimously accepted. In the evening of January 12th, however, M. Laval and his Cabinet resigned, one of the incidental consequences thereof being that, as this paper was written, it could not be forecast with confidence when exactly the conference would meet.

In spite, however, of the apparent inaction of the governments, political forces were at work below the surface. Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, of the British Treasury, paid a further visit to Paris to discuss with officials of the French Treasury the possibility of a convergence of French and British views upon the business in hand. It was felt in Whitehall that the resolution of the United States Congress above referred to made impossible the full, final and comprehensive settlement that Mr. MacDonald had publicly advocated on November 9th last. "No time," he had said, "has to be lost. A series of piecemeal and ephemeral compromises of a purely temporary nature will not meet the circumstances. A comprehensive and permanent settlement is now required." A modification of that policy being now imposed by the action of the United States, it was understood that the British Government was concentrating on the possibility of keeping open the avenue to a full settlement for exploration as soon as American opinion gave the opportunity. On January 9th some excitement was caused by a public statement made by Dr. Brüning to the effect that Germany could not pay reparation, and would demand at Lausanne a realistic, final settlement on that basis. The fact that excitement could be caused by the statement of a fact already known to everybody seems to suggest that depression does not make the world grow older.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

January 15th, 1932.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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GLADSTONE AS FINANCIER AND ECONOMIST.*

During the last year or two the fame of Gladstone has been rapidly recovering from the temporary obscurity caused by the cult of his dazzling rival. The official biography of Disraeli and the clever sketch by André Maurois brought him once again into vogue, and it became the fashion to dismiss Gladstone as *vieux jeu*. The tide has now turned, thanks to Lord Gladstone's *Thirty Years After*, Mrs. Drew's diaries, and the delightful recollections of Lord Rendel and Lord Kilbracken. Mr. Hirst's impressive monograph will carry the process of rehabilitation still further. Our problems to-day are naturally more complex and therefore more difficult than those of the Victorian age, but there is still much to be learned from our greatest master of finance. No one can speak with such authority on the subject as Mr. Hirst, who helped Lord Morley in the preparation of the famous biography, and who has given unremitting study for over thirty years to the subject on which he writes. His book is intended for the public as well as for the economist and the historian, and it may be truly described as a tract for the times.

The author has used the vast material now available in the

* *Gladstone as Financier and Economist*. By F. W. Hirst. Benn. 15s.

British Museum and a good deal of fresh evidence from private sources. The sketch of Sir John Gladstone in the first chapter is a valuable addition to our knowledge, and the Personal Recollections of his father by his only surviving son are full of interesting glimpses. The early chapters are dominated by the majestic figure of Peel, whom Mr. Hirst admires almost as much as his hero used to do. "If we take four names—Adam Smith, Cobden, Peel and Gladstone—we may say that they formed (with a host of valuable auxiliaries) a combination of originality, courage and character, more powerful in the sphere of public economy and finance than any great nation has ever possessed. It is to this unique combination that England mainly owed her emergence from misery, poverty, stagnation and discontent to social progress, rapid industrial expansion and widespread prosperity." The whole volume breathes the conviction that more can be done by good and had finance to foster or to damage the national welfare than in any other way. After the great simplifications of the tariff in Peel's ministry we are introduced to the Railway Act of 1844 and Gladstone's colonial policy. Far from being hostile or indifferent to our mighty heritage, "Gladstone gloried in the greatness and prosperity of a free empire, or rather of a free Commonwealth of Nations."

The chapters on the budgets of the 'fifties and 'sixties reveal a unique combination of sound principles and hard work. Gladstone was not only the greatest Member of Parliament in our history but also the greatest worker among all our servants of the State, for he worked quicker than anyone of whom we have record. His supremacy among Chancellors of the Exchequer, declares Mr. Hirst, is as undisputed as that of Adam Smith among economists. While the world applauded the Budget speeches with their bold schemes and their compelling eloquence, only colleagues and subordinates were aware of his unsleeping vigilance as the guardian of the national purse. "His net swept over the whole field. Nothing was too trifling to escape criticism, nothing so great in the way of wasteful expenditure, whatever the influences behind it, to blunt his axe or to daunt his courage." Well may our author lament the absence of such driving force, such piercing vision, such lofty sense of responsibility in the latest tangled decades of our history. Mr. Hirst cares less than most people for what is called social reform, and sometimes appears to think rather of the price than of the value of the article. But such differences of opinion in no way diminish the cogency of his plea for economy at home and the maximum of liberty in our commercial intercourse with the nations of the world.

G. P. G.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY.*

Sociological and historical explanation has long been dominated by concepts and methods borrowed from biology. The notions of evolution, of the struggle for existence and natural selection, have frequently been applied to the relations between social groups, such as nations or races, on the assumption that the forces which account for the phenomena observable in the life of plants and animals will be found to operate also in human life and history. Thus the culture and institutions of peoples are interpreted as the expression of inborn, racial qualities, and the differences between them are ascribed to hereditary variations in their endowment or capacity. Again, since the inborn qualities of a stock are relatively permanent, any changes that occur in the history of a people are attributed to the sporadic occurrence of specially endowed individuals or geniuses, who are then regarded as "mutations" in the biological sense. Biological interpretations of progress are also involved in the whole movement of Eugenics, since, as commonly interpreted, it rests on the assumption that progress depends on the alteration or improvement of racial type rather than on the modification of institutions. Despite the importance which is thus widely assigned to biological factors, the assumptions underlying their use in sociology have rarely been subjected to systematic treatment or critical scrutiny. This is the task that Mr. Spiller has set himself, and in performing it, he has made an important contribution to social theory. While accepting and building upon the general theory of evolution, he seeks to show that the earlier evolutionists were too eager to bring out the similarities between man and his animal ancestors, and were thus led to overlook the equally important divergences between them. There is one fundamental difference between them which is of such far-reaching importance as to justify us in regarding man as constituting a separate kingdom in the world of life. This, Mr. Spiller urges, is to be found in man's capacity to learn freely from others. So far, students of comparative psychology remain doubtful whether even the animals nearest to man in intelligence—the higher apes—are capable of learning "by imitation." It is clear that even if they should be proved to possess this faculty at all, they can only do so to a very limited degree. Man, on the other hand, is capable of extending his own powers indefinitely by utilising the experience of others. Animals, as Mr. Spiller puts it, are individuo-psychic while man is specio-psychic, his achievement being the result of cumulative and collective effort throughout the ages. While animals, moreover, cannot hand over to their

* *The Origin and Nature of Man.* By G. Spiller. Williams & Norgate.

descendants any of the results of their own experience, and can only transmit their own qualities through the mechanism of biological inheritance, man can affect future generations by what may be called the social heritage, the body of tools, instruments, institutions, art and science, which constitutes human culture. The gap between man and the rest of the animal world is thus very great. Yet this does not involve any real breach of continuity in evolution. For the intelligence of the higher apes is so highly advanced, as recent psychology has shown, that only a moderate mental advance beyond them, sufficient namely to enable the individual to learn freely from the experience of others, needs to be assumed, in order to render intelligible the evolution of human intelligence.

Social theory must start, Mr. Spiller urges, from this fundamental difference between man and other animals. The explanation of human culture must be sought in those elements of human nature which are specific of, or peculiar to, man, and not in those which he possesses in common with the rest of the animal world. Any appeal to sub-human instincts, after the fashion of much recent social psychology, must of necessity fail. Culture must be explained in terms of culture. Above all, we cannot account for the variations in cultural level or for the general trends of social evolution in terms of inborn biological differences or variations. Cultural change is orderly and cumulative, while mutations are sporadic and haphazard. The rate of changes in civilisation, sometimes very rapid and sometimes very slow, is not in harmony with what is known of the rate of biological change. The gigantic transformations that can be effected in the social life and organisation of peoples, in a comparatively short period, and the rate at which peoples of very different levels of culture can be made to approximate to a common standard, suggest very strongly that the factors determining social change are independent of the factors determining racial change or alteration in germinal structure. Mr. Spiller goes so far as to say that all mental differences are primarily explicable on a non-biological basis by reference to cultural causes. He does not, of course, deny all originality to individuals, since it is clear that the advantage of learning freely from others would be nil if no individual were ever capable of contributing anything fresh. His point is rather that what the individual—even the genius—contributes is comparatively slight in comparison with the prodigious rôle played by cumulative and co-operative effort. Possibly Mr. Spiller goes too far in minimising inborn differences. But in the main, his argument does not really depend upon a denial of hereditary variations but rather upon their complete failure to account for cultural variations. Cultural development is

thus different in character from organic development and marks a new and critical departure in the evolution of animate nature.

On the basis of his general theory Mr. Spiller formulates in the second part of his work, what he conceives to be the principal laws of human development, and he shows their compatibility with the requirements of a humanitarian ethics. He is a great believer in the possibility of progress by the increasing substitution of rational for arbitrary methods of social control and guidance. Many will doubt whether sociology is yet in the position to lay down strictly scientific "laws" of social evolution and may be inclined to regard Mr. Spiller's conclusions as too optimistic. But all must be impressed by the ability and learning with which he has worked out his main thesis and will recognise its value as a contribution to modern sociology.

MORRIS GINSBERG.

* * *

LATE MEDIEVAL LONDON ENGLISH.*

Professor R. W. Chambers and Miss Marjorie Daunt have edited in the most thorough and exhaustive way, with explanatory footnotes, seventy-five documents of "London" English written between the years 1384 and 1425. Miss Daunt gives in addition elaborate "Notes" on the texts and an invaluable glossary, while Miss M. M. Weale supplies a very useful descriptive list of English manuscripts in the Public Record Office of London representing the bulk of the documents in that repository written in English up to the end of the year 1425. It is not proposed substantially here to try and extend the list of specimens of "London" English between these dates, but it may be that the Coroners' Rolls may add to the information as to the plain talk of London people a century after Chaucer's death, while it is tempting to suggest that the English writings of Walter Hilton as transcribed at Sheen in the period might yield some other valuable examples.

Professor Chambers and Miss Daunt have undertaken a necessary task, a fresh step in the direction of what was recognised as standard English in the later Middle Ages. They say indeed that "what is wanted is a collection of all the official documents in the English tongue, from the time of the Conqueror to that of Henry VI. Such a *corpus* would not be excessively bulky; the present editors have been making some collections towards it." It is indeed remarkable, as these learned editors say, that "for the period immediately after Chaucer, no attempt has yet been

* *A Book of London English, 1384-1425*. Edited by R. W. Chambers and Marjorie Daunt, with an Appendix on English Documents in the Record Office by M. M. Weale. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 15s. net.

made to collect and publish the documents upon which all grammatical theorising must be based. Not only have the documents not been collected: many have never been printed at all." They are indeed curiously scanty when it is realised that in the time of Chaucer and Langland "we find plentiful documents written in English by Londoners." As a consequence the editors rejoice in printing for the first time "the appeal of Thomas Usk against John of Northampton"—an interesting footnote to history as indeed is most of the material used in this book—which was undoubtedly written by an inner Londoner in the year 1384. The sparsity of material is shown by the work of Lorenz Morsbach, who has endeavoured to construct a grammar of London English during this period from fourteen documents only. The present editors give sixty-one documents not used by him. Full tribute is, however, paid, and it is due, for Morsbach's pioneer work at the Record Office. Professor Chambers and Miss Daunt have gone also to other sources and especially the Guildhall, the Books of the Brewers and Grocers, and Somerset House.

The problem before the editors and indeed before all workers on London English is to find out what was genuine London speech. Some cynical critics may even say that there was no specifically London speech, but Professor Chambers and Miss Daunt have no doubt at all on that matter. They admit that what they call provincialisms may and do in fact in various cases creep in, but that London speech in fact existed as a separate dialect (if it is not too dangerous to use that term) in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century. Yet one of the difficulties that strike the non-specialist mind must be, what is the meaning of the term "London." London itself in the late fourteenth century was a very restricted area. It must not be confused with Kent across the river, though there was a time, as Ptolemy makes clear, when London belonged to Kent. Yet the Kentish dialects—for there were several—were not only clearly distinct from the speech spoken in London but in some cases, as near to London as Tonbridge, a dialect was spoken—and indeed is spoken now—that was and is difficult to understand. The settlement of the Court at Greenwich and Eltham no doubt extended the London dialect a few miles south of the river, but it was Court speech and not the speech of the common people.

Again Essex must be ruled out. The hissing "s" of Essex was not part of the London dialect. Is Middlesex included in "London"? How far up the River Thames was the dialect spoken? Some way, no doubt, since the Londoners using the upper river were far more numerous than those who habitually used the lower river. These indeed included seamen from all

the English and many continental ports who may be ruled out as contributing to the London speech though they doubtless added many words to that dialect. The upper river is another matter and it may well be that "London" included the upper reaches as far as Richmond and Sheen or even Oxford. That is the importance of the English versions of Walter Hilton's contemporary work.

We seem thrown back, for one important aspect of London speech in the period of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, to one or possibly two sources which these editors have not touched and possibly nobody can touch—the speech of the schoolboy and the law student. The *Epistolæ Academicæ Oxon.* contain some English letters and they may relate to London, but they begin with the year 1421 and go on to 1509. Wiclif's *Wicket* is contemporaneous, but it is not likely that it reproduces the London dialect though that famous tract against transubstantiation made very popular reading. But the name of Wiclif raises the question of school-children. The point is this. Up to the Black Death of 1349 all teaching in the grammar schools was in Anglo-Norman. John de Trevisa, Wiclif and Richard Pencriche were at Oxford together about 1367, Pencriche being a Merton man, and John Cornwall was a teacher of grammar at Oxford in connection with Merton College in 1347. Trevisa was destined to translate and edit Higden's *Polychronicon* between 1385 and 1387, and in that work he says that after the First Death in 1349 children who had been formerly taught in Anglo-Norman were thenceforward taught in English. Trevisa says:

This manere was moche i-used to for firste deth [or to fore the firste moreyn], and is siththe sumdel i-chaunged: for John [Sir Johan] Cornwaile, a maister of grammer, chaunged the lore in gramer scole and construccoun of Frensche in to Englishe; and Richard Penecriche lerned the manere techynge of hym and of othere men of Pencrich; so that now, the yere of oure Lorde, a thowsand three hundred and fourscore and fyve, and of the Secounde Richard after the Conquest nyne, in alle the gramere scoles of Engeland, children leuth Frensche and construeth and lerneth an Englishe, and haueth therby auantage on oon side and disauantage in another side; their auantage is, that they lerneth her gramer in lasse tyme than children were i-woned to doo; disauantage is that now children of gramer scole conneth na more Frensche than can her lift heele, and that is harme for them and they schulle passe the see and trauaille in straunge landes and in many other places. Also gentil men haueth now moche i-left for to teche here children Frensche.

These passages from Trevisa are exactly within the period of time (1384-1425) chosen by Professor Chambers and Miss Daunt and the tongue is the Oxford tongue which, on the argument of river

access, may well have been, at any rate, closely allied to the London tongue. But the point is the value of the evidence of the schools themselves. The Staffordshire Penkridge school seems to have been the first grammar school to start teaching in English. It was even then a considerable and very ancient school. Moreover, after the Black Death, as Mr. A. F. Leach points out, at least twenty-five grammar schools were founded between 1363 and 1400. In 1393 the only London schools officially recognised were St. Paul's School, the School of the Arches and St. Martin's School, but we must take also into account Westminster School and the School of St. Saviour's, Southwark. Now the petition to the Crown of 1393 signed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of London, the Dean of the Free Chapel of St. Martin the Grand and the Chancellor of the Church of St. Paul's, London, on the subject of these schools comes midway within the period chosen by Professor Chambers and Miss Daunt. It is reported in 3 *Rot. Parl.*, p. 324, and throws some light upon London English as well as the educational system of London. The Parliamentary records apparently have not been drawn upon by either Lorenz Morsbach or the present editors. The records of the schools mentioned ought to throw further light upon London English, since by the year 1385 Anglo-Norman had been abolished in the schools. The Inns of Court presumably will not help, since Anglo-Norman was the tongue spoken there for at least two centuries after 1425. The petition addressed to Henry VI in 1447 by the Rectors of All Hallows, St. Andrew's, Holborn, St. Peter's, Cornhill, and Colchirche on the subject of grammar schools is twenty-two years beyond 1425, but it, in fact, is an excellent example of London English of the period (5 *Rot. Parl.* 137). The text is printed on pp. 48-9 of *State Intervention in English Education*, an early effort by the present writer published in 1902 by the Cambridge University Press. The petition seems to have the exact prose phrasing of the London period 1384-1425. Further information might be obtained from certain Latin-English vocabularies of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. These comments are in no way a criticism of the able book edited by Professor Chambers and Miss Daunt, but are an attempt to throw new light, in a humble way, on a very difficult problem. J. E. G. DE M.

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THE STORMSWEPT ROOF OF ASIA.*

There is a great charm in this book of travel and adventure written by Dr. Emil Trinkler and translated from the German by

* *The Stormswept Roof of Asia*. By Emil Trinkler. Seeley, Service & Co. 21s. net.

B. K. Featherstone, a record of travel "By Yak, Camel, and Sheep Caravan in Tibet, Chinese Turkestan, and over the Kara-Koram." An unknown land sparsely inhabited has a fascination for the searcher after some new thing: a world unspoiled by civilisation, almost raw, one might say, except for the accretion of ages, and here and there clothed with the vegetation which the kindly winds had blown from other quarters.

The author started from Antwerp in April 1927 and for a year and a half he and his friend Signor de Terra journeyed in these little-known lands. Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, was the starting-point of the expedition; there they met their travelling companion Herr Bosslard who had gone ahead of them into Kashmir, making preliminary arrangements since February. Here they engaged their chief servants. Everything had to be thought of, provisions, clothes, and equipment of all kinds, scientific and photographic, and lastly the packing, no mean consideration of time and trouble. They hired pack-ponies and porters whose pay was fortunately fixed by the Indian Government. The cook, Habiba, and the boy, Abdul, proved most efficient throughout the journey. The little dog Kurrum must not be forgotten. The travellers left Srinagar on May 22nd taking with them another boy, a young Ladakhi who spoke fluent English. Each pony could be loaded up to 140 lbs. weight; thirty ponies were enlisted and thus the journey began. The country through which the travellers passed was magnificent, along the banks of the Sind river, and the aromatic air of the pines, reminiscent of Alpine scenes, rejoiced their hearts to the full, since they knew that after crossing the Zoji La trees and woods would be left behind for many a day.

Arriving at Baltal on May 27th they found deep snow on the first high pass, and the crossing was accomplished with difficulty, as the sides were almost perpendicular, sloping down to a deep ravine opening into the main valley. From Srinagar to Leh the Government has inaugurated a regular postal service which is maintained by runners. On arrival at Mechoi late at night, and finding the caravans with all baggage were still behind, they passed the night as best they could in a primitive hut with the snow falling heavily outside. The morning light revealed the great Himalayan peaks standing out against the vivid blue sky. As the snow melted the mountain-side was carpeted in parts with the blue gentian and many coloured primulas.

Dr. Trinkler gives a wonderful description of the Himalaya mountains, so vividly told that one seems easily to make acquaintance with that region and with the famous monasteries built on most precipitous heights. All through the journey scientific investigations were being carried on, and notes taken of the rocks

and strata, all of which helped to tell the tale of the dream-land through which they were travelling. The Rest-houses from Srinagar to Leh number fifteen, and for a trifling sum shelter and sometimes food can be obtained. The author throughout this book, as he travels from place to place, country to country, intersperses his narrative with accounts of the customs and the religious ceremonies of the peoples with whom he came in contact, dancing, and devil dancing since the eviction of evil spirits is generally part of the ritual, and, in fact, all ritual is symbolic. The religious use of colour is significant. An instance is painting horses *red* which indicates sinbearing, and sending them forth loose. This is, in essence, similar to the scapegoat of the Hebrews. The comparative study of primitive religions is advanced by such facts.

The earlier expedition of Sir Aurel Stein often helped the travellers. Dr. Trinkler continually came across some landmark of his forerunner, and never fails to note the fact or to use his maps. To follow our author and the various members of his expedition through Chinese Turkestan, over the Kara-Koram, and back to civilisation through India must be left to the fascinated reader. The mountains climbed, the passes crossed, the deserts traversed, the thirst suffered, the heat and cold endured, and all the adventures and "most disastrous chances" conquered and made light of, are written for all to read in this book of wonder travel.

S. DE M.

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RURAL BRITAIN BY NIGHT.*

Mr. A. R. Thompson is to be congratulated on his book, *Nature by Night*, in which he deals with the wild nocturnal creatures of the British Isles. Our woods and hedges, the banks and streams, all teem with life; with creatures desperately busy carrying out their part in nature's scheme of work. Some of them work by day, some by night, and others at any time during the twenty-four hours. There are many day naturalists, and Mr. Thompson considers that there might be more night workers. "It is at least as interesting, and when a man spends his day in earning his living, a tendency to specialise in the wild life of the hours of darkness enables him to preserve continuity in his observations." Mr. Thompson himself is an entomologist, but he is always ready to observe other forms of life if he has the good luck to discover them, and, in fact, he illustrates this charming work by over one hundred photographs from his own camera. To obtain intimate knowledge of wild creatures from watching

* Ivor Nicholson & Watson Ltd. 12s. 6d. net.

them in their haunts is intensely interesting work, apart from its obvious value to naturalists. It is work involving endless patience for limbs as well as mind, but the sight, perhaps, of a badger and her cubs at play will more than repay the hours of tiring waiting. Nature is full of odd ways; there are so many happenings which seem the contrary of common sense and logic. Why do rabbits live in the same earth as badgers, though perhaps not using the same chambers? A rabbit fleeing from a stoat is in a state of hopeless terror; but "a female rabbit, with young to defend, will turn on a stoat and leap over it, giving it in passing, a thwack with its powerful hind-legs"; and the stoat generally leaves at once. A buck rabbit with a kick from its hind-legs can really hurt a tom cat; "but that same buck rabbit would probably succumb to the first stoat which got on to its trail."

Mr. Thompson's fascinating accounts and photographs of the lives and habits of the badgers, the fox, the otter, the stoat, the rodents, the hedgehog, and the night-birds, to mention only some of his subjects, make the reader anxious to go and look for them himself at once. We all know that life, busy as our own, is abundant everywhere, but we seldom really realise it until the naturalist has pointed it out. Country people particularly would be expected to be animal lovers, they certainly must have more general knowledge of wild creatures than townspeople; yet they can always persuade themselves that the hunted as well as the hunters enjoy the run.

It is interesting to find that

human beings were not the inventors of anæsthetics. Glow-worms had an anæsthetic perfected and in use ages before. The favourite food of the glow-worm is a certain species of small snail, and to obtain a meal, the glow-worm approaches a suitable snail and very gently taps it with its mandibles which are grooved and bent backwards into a minute hook. . . . The whole process is so insignificant that it is hard to believe it can have any effect upon the snail. Yet in a minute or two it renders the mollusc unconscious and entirely insensible to pain. . . . Death may be administered in the feeding process, but there is no doubt that the snail is only rendered unconscious in the first instance. Fabre shows that it is quite insensible to the prick of a needle, but that in a day or two, it can be revived into an active snail apparently none the worse for its adventure.

This is an instance of the amazing processes that we find in the detailed examination of nature even in our familiar woods. Mr. Thompson's book has many examples of strange or apparently strange behaviour of the creatures he examines. Why do insects

find "light so irresistible"? It has been suggested that they are afraid of shadows, as indeed Man himself is. Why does the corncrake, a notable night-bird, never fly on British land? It has to fly great distances to reach us. Perhaps it does not fly in the nesting season. The shrew, like the bat, has so shrill a note that some people cannot hear it. Differences of note are doubtless a form of protection. Bats are curious creatures which belong to an order of their own, the sole survivor of some prehistoric development which failed. They are useful, as are hedgehogs, moles and shrews, as insect destroyers. Much of what Mr. Thompson writes makes the reader aware of the perfect balance of nature, even from the point of view of Man, though the habits of foxes and the danger of rats seem to show that Man in his destructive habits is a necessary part of the natural scheme.

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DISARMAMENT.*

As the World Disarmament Conference draws nearer, attention becomes more and more focussed upon the League of Nations. After years of work, the Preparatory Commission has issued a skeleton report on the ways and means of disarmament; and it will be for the full Conference to decide the extent of any limitations on the manufacture of arms. The measure of its success will be determined largely by the character of public support. It is, therefore, especially valuable that an anthology of representative opinions on the need for peace and disarmament should be published at the present time. *From World Understanding to World Peace* is the title of this collection secured by Madame Hélène Claparède-Spir. She has collected the opinions of public men and women in Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the United States. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that Japanese and Russian opinions have been omitted, as well as some of the smaller non-European States. In the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations the lesser Powers collectively maintain a majority of votes.

In the Preface to this volume, Professor Gilbert Murray remarks that "all Europe is speaking peace, and apparently longing for peace; yet it is full of armaments and economic strife, and, from time to time, outbursts of national passion." He declares that this "longing for peace" is perfectly sincere, but that there is a

* (1) *From World Understanding to World Peace*. Williams & Norgate. 6s. 6d. net.

(2) *The Geneva Experiment*. Oxford University Press. 5s. net

terrible lack of connection between the desire of the world and the means of realising it.

The old creaking machinery of national Parliaments, national elections, national newspapers, still remains in force everywhere, and the widespread sentiment which enters the machine as a desire for peace and goodwill too often comes out at the other end as a demand for national security by means of armaments or for prosperity by wrecking a neighbour's trade.

It is the clash between nationalism and the international spirit. "The civilised world is really one society" and needs the direction of one government. This diagnosis is substantially followed by Professor W. E. Rappard in *The Geneva Experiment*. "National sovereignty inevitably leads to international war, and thereby to universal suicide." The danger of war is in proportion to the lack of sovereignty in the League of Nations. In a critical analysis Professor Rappard first considers the League from the viewpoint of its founders. They compromised between the ideal of the super-state and the recognition of national sovereignty. "Their main quest was for peace, but they consciously repudiated the logically necessary means for the achievement of that purpose, that is, the subordination of national independence to the collective will of the international community." Moreover (as Professor Rappard admits), the subsequent history of the League shows that the idea of internationalism has become more and more subordinated to the reality of the national state. Though national opinion has become more international in its outlook, it does not follow that the days of the national state are numbered. Sympathy and consideration do not necessarily involve the cession of sovereignty. The great mass of people still prefer the rule of national governments. Hence the League of Nations has not been accepted as an international sovereign. "When we look over this whole field of the League's activity we may . . . note the contrast between its success as a promoter of voluntary co-operation between the nations and its impotence in presence of defiant national sovereignties." The recent policy of Japan is exemplary of this position. Professor Rappard says, "The fundamental fact is that peace cannot be guaranteed to and against sovereign states by an unsovereign league. Only if the League were endowed with that kind of sovereignty to which all states, and particularly the great Powers, still pretend to-day could it enforce peace." This is no doubt true, but it does not follow that League sovereignty is the only guarantee of peace. Moreover, it is fortunate that this is so, because what Professor Gilbert Murray calls "the main remediable fault in the world at present" has certainly no remedy in practical politics at

the present time. National feeling is too strong and deep rooted to tolerate the direct forfeiture of any sovereign power.

Yet international sympathy and co-operation, promoted through the League, along with the growing recognition that nations are dependent upon each other for their own prosperity, will lead necessarily to renunciation of war as an instrument of policy. When the victor suffers in the same degree as the vanquished, the right to make war can hardly be considered a function of sovereignty. Conversely submission to the rules of international law hardly implies any resignation of sovereignty. It defines and segregates competing sovereign powers. An adverse judgment in a Court of Law does far less damage to a sovereign authority than the waging of a successful war. Expediency has become the stoutest economic argument against war.

This growing recognition of the interdependence of nations and hence the futility of war will gradually promote greater international confidence. Then will come the time when the longing for disarmament will become compatible with national defence. Then, perhaps, the League of Nations will emerge from a standing conference and become the centre of a World Federation. In the words of Professor Rappard, "as yet a useful but humble clearing house of international relations," the League will "become what the impatient reformer seeks for in vain in Geneva to-day: a temple of lasting peace built on the foundations of secure justice." On the other hand mutual appreciation and understanding between nations may obviate the need for any super-imposed authority. A world alliance of the nature of the British Commonwealth of Nations will be as great a security for peace as any other system of world federation.

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THE ENGLISH MARRIAGE SYSTEM.*

This book on the formalities of marriage was first published in 1920 but much vital legislation has been passed since that date, and a reissue of a most valuable volume is the necessary result. The author, Mr. Arthur S. May, is the Surrogate of Ecclesiastical Courts in Doctors' Commons and has vast experience not only of the Law of Marriage, but of the ignorance of those who aspire to the state of Holy Matrimony. In 1920 he came to the sad and almost embittered conclusion "that many people know as little about getting married as Londoners do of the inside of Westminster Abbey, and that someone ought to make an attempt to give them the necessary information." So Mr. May undertook the dreary task.

* *Marriage in Church, Chapel and Register Office: A Practical Handbook*. Longmans. 3s. 6d. net.

The English law as regards age, mental and physical capacity, condition and relationship and the consent of the parties has first to be considered since "these constitute the essentials of a valid marriage," while the formalities of marriage, such as the consent of parent or guardian and the rules relating to residence, place, time and manner of the ceremony are important, since the marriage is sometimes invalidated by non-observance. All the details of the Common and Statute Law are given. At Common Law the age of consent was fourteen for the man and twelve for the woman. This rule has now been altered by the Age of Marriage Act, 1929, which enacts that *for the future* marriages between persons either of whom is under the age of sixteen shall be void. The judges of the High Court who go on circuit are not all satisfied with the change of the Law, and Mr. Justice McCardie at the Leeds Assizes last spring expressed the view that power should be given to magistrates to allow marriage in a proper case before the age of sixteen. The Old Common Law, in fact, met actual cases.

It is well to state other changes in the Law since 1920 as described by Mr. May. By Lord Hardwicke's Act of 1753 the father's consent to the marriage of a minor became necessary. This simple rule has been revolutionised by the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925. The infant who aspires to matrimony is now in a difficult position. If both parents are living together both parents must consent; if they are divorced or separated the parent having the custody must consent, and both parents if each has the custody of the infant for part of the year. If one parent has been deserted by the other the parent who has been deserted must consent. If both parents have been deprived of the custody then the person to whom the custody has been given by the Court must consent. If one parent is dead and there is no other guardian then the surviving parent must consent, but if a guardian has been appointed by the deceased parent then the consent is required of the surviving parent and the guardian if acting jointly, or the surviving parent or the guardian if the parent or the guardian is the sole guardian of the infant. When both parents are dead the guardian or guardians appointed by the deceased parents or by the Court must consent. These difficulties have not yet been appreciated by the writers of melodrama, and in the circumstances of the various possibilities it would be as well for minors not to marry at all. In the case of an illegitimate child the mother must consent if she is alive, unless she has been deprived of the custody of the child, when her place is taken by the person to whom the custody has been given by the Court. If the mother is dead then the guardian appointed by her must consent. In all necessary cases there is a latitude allowed to the superintendent registrar.

Recent legislation has created other changes. For instance, the Adoption of Children Act, 1926, vests the rights of the actual parents in the adopter or adopters while the Legitimacy Act of the same year involves change by the change of status of the infant. The statutory permission to marry a deceased wife's sister given in 1907 has been extended to a deceased husband's brother by an Act of 1921, and to the deceased wife's niece and aunt and the deceased husband's nephew and uncle by an Act of 1931. The Act of 1931 does not apply to Northern Ireland. Important questions under the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, in accordance with Orders in Council of 1913 and 1925 are also dealt with in the Appendix. The Marriage Measure, 1930, gives some facilities to members of the Church of England. Certain variations in the Church of England Marriage Service are now allowed. An important change in regard to marriage under a superintendent registrar's licence came into force by Regulations on December 31st, 1926. "It is no longer possible to qualify for marriage in a particular district by one of the parties going there for a day." The details of this change should be carefully examined. It is to be noted that banns cannot be lawfully published by diocesan lay readers. An opinion by Sir Alfred Kempe, given in 1918 and 1920, seems to be conclusive on this very much disputed point.

In his Appendix, Mr. May raises a question of the first importance:

If dossiers on continental lines were kept at Somerset House, and extracts from them were required upon every application for marriage, the crime of bigamy, which now bulks largely in our courts, would almost vanish. There were only eight convictions in France in 1921. Also, incidentally, the parental veto would become a real obstacle to hasty marriage.

The reform suggested is a perfectly simple one and would stop untold misery. It is astounding that it has not been adopted before, and it should be brought forward in Parliament without any more delay.

J. E. G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Of the need of a book on Pierre Bayle there can be no doubt: of the adequacy with which Professor Robinson has supplied this need* there can be just as little doubt. The appendices on the writings of this seminal thinker, the related works appearing in his lifetime, the pointed criticisms before 1789 and those after that well-chosen date—all these are given with a fullness of the *apparatus criticus* that leaves nothing to be desired. This is always the first part of a volume

* *Bayle the Sceptic*. By Howard Robinson. Columbia University Press.

to which we turn, as it serves at once to exhibit the fitness or the unfitness of the author for the task he has taken in hand. The author reveals not only the thinker but also the man, a character of high quality and singular attractiveness. For the sake of his views he underwent the bitter pains of exile, at the same time reflecting that "the comforts of a benefice or the dignity of a mitre" in Paris were not to be compared with the "private state of exile, indigence, and freedom" in Rotterdam. A highly suggestive chapter examines the attitude of Bayle towards the movement for toleration, and the share taken by Locke in this matter is related to that of the author Professor Robinson admires. Like so many advocates of toleration, Bayle himself became the victim of intolerance, and a pathetic chapter traces his sufferings, which of course were as much mental as physical. The *Historical and Critical Dictionary* receives careful attention, and the real nature of an epoch-making work is ably set forth. Yet it was the loss of his professorial post that rendered it possible. His treatment of the Bible in general and of the problem of the miraculous demands the careful survey that Professor Robinson accords. The Church to-day can see in him, as it also sees in Voltaire, men who really befriended her, for they assisted her in getting rid of the many impurities that disfigured her throughout the eighteenth century. The work that Joseph Butler and John Wesley accomplished in England they accomplished in France, though inevitably in a far rougher manner. We too can say, *Écrasez l'infâme*, and by *l'infâme* we mean much that Bayle was forced to denounce. This book concludes with an illuminating account of the influence of Bayle which takes full view of the activities of a many-sided man.

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The interesting little book entitled *The Man in the Making and Studies in Literature** by Mr. F. G. Phillips, of the Sydney Grammar School (who is also president of the New South Wales Teachers' Guild), consists of articles and literary appreciations written for the *Australian Teacher*, the organ of the Guild. Mr. H. S. Dettman, headmaster of the Sydney Grammar School, writes in his Foreword that "this book is a pleasing proof that a man may teach boys for his daily bread over a period of thirty years and still retain his freshness, enthusiasms, his curiosity, his judgment and, in every sense of the word, his humanity." The studies in literature are full of interest. Mr. Phillips suggests that in Keat's famous poem *La Belle Dame Sans Merci* *La Belle Dame* represents consumption—tuberculosis—the malady that ended the great poet's brief life. This ingenious surmise is contrary to the poet's own statement. The essays on the poetry of Mary Webb, Francis Thompson and Mr. Masfield lend a modern note to the volume.

* * *

World Peace and Armaments† by Mr. A. J. Jacobs is an interesting exposition of the author's views on international peace and of his contention that a policy of mutual protection between the various nations can be the only basis of future stability. He considers the principles by which individuals secure order and safety among them-

* Sydney and Melbourne Publishing Company Ltd.

† Hutchinson. 5s. net.

selves. Members of a community cannot stand aside and allow individual disputes to be violently decided and crime to remain unchecked; "the inevitable result would be anarchy and the total disappearance of civilisation." The maintenance of peace and justice is only attained by the participation of the whole community in the condemnation of disorder. But "the practice of nations has been entirely at variance with the principle of mutual protection to which individuals owe the security of life and property which they enjoy." Mr. Jacobs logically condemns the doctrine of national neutrality. "Any nation has been allowed to attack another without hindrance from the general body. They have recognised no responsibility for each other's safety because, among other reasons, an outbreak of war has not seriously affected non-belligerent nations in the past." It is, indeed, true that the nations are to-day more inter-dependent than ever before. The present economic crisis is clearly evidence of this. But if a nation cannot remain neutral to-day, which way will it act? Co-operation with one country will mean enmity with another. In its desire to do what is right, a nation may well work for disruption. International co-operation demands impartial supervision. While Mr. Jacobs' proposition that mutual protection is the great modern need is sound, it must presuppose some guiding hand, just as in a community of individuals order receives the direction of a government. Necessity may force the nations closer together, but permanent peace demands the authority of some international tribunal.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

"The Grey Squirrel; the introduction and spread of the American Grey Squirrel in the British Isles, its habits, food, and relations with the native fauna of the country,"* by Mr. A. D. Middleton is intended to give an unprejudiced account of this squirrel to naturalists, foresters, agriculturists, and others. The grey squirrel was introduced into this country early in the last century and increased in numbers and range until the end of 1930, when an amazing decrease in numbers owing to various causes set in. This, however, was of short duration, for in August 1931 "ample evidence has been obtained to show that the grey squirrel population is rapidly recovering . . . and there now appears to be little doubt grey squirrels will continue to increase in numbers and extend their range into suitable localities throughout the British Isles." The sudden decrease is mysterious but not unexampled. Apparently cycles of increase and decrease are not unusual in the animal kingdom. The introduction of this squirrel has resulted in a menace to agriculture, to our forests and fruit-farms. Mr. Middleton has written a valuable and extremely interesting book on a subject upon which he is a leading authority and it should be very widely read.

Dr. James Bonar in his valuable volume entitled "Theories of Population from Raleigh to Arthur Young"† deals with Raleigh,

* Sidgwick and Jackson. 4s. 6d. net.

† George Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d. net.

Harrington, Graunt and Petty, Halley, Güssmilch, Hume, Price and Arthur Young (who died in 1820), thus covering the various theories of population that occupied the minds of thinkers for more than two centuries. Sir Walter Raleigh was not surprised to find that neither Spain nor England was depopulated either by wars or colonies. Raleigh left most things to nature provided there was a strong government which gave nature the chance to recuperate. In that sense there were the germs of a sound political economy. Harrington lived in stirring times when strong men like Cromwell appeared and he held that there should be a balance of property in land, and leadership coupled with an electoral system of married people with children. So Dr. Bonar goes through the list of thinkers English and continental. Montesquieu and Güssmilch thought that "population needed direct encouragement." Price believed that the repeal of the Corn Laws would double the people. Young hated theory and stood against the theories of Richard Price.

* * *

Mr. Arthur Redford's book entitled "The Economic History of England (1760-1860)"* is a very useful treatise for beginners and indeed for all who wish to revise a very difficult subject. Mr. Redford writes in his preface: "In seventy thousand words I have tried to tell the plain truth about the most controversial century in the economic history of England; and in doing this I have tried to avoid controversy." The work is, in the main outlines, based on modern authoritative writings, but the author has also gone to original sources in compiling this able account of the Growth of Industrialism from 1760 to 1815 and the Age of Reforms 1815-60. He very properly repudiates the idea that in 1760 a vital change was first apparent. In fact it was a year when the process of change was apparent to all.

* * *

Mr. Ernest Pickering in his work entitled "A Brief Survey of English Literature from its Beginnings to the Present Day, with chapters on the Irish Literary Movement and American Literature"† gives the student a notable little book of real critical value which has the special merit of drawing the reader to the English classical texts of the great writers. He rightly asserts at the opening of his work that apart from the ancient literatures of Greece and Rome "English literature is the oldest, and probably the richest, literature in the Western world." Mr. Pickering has a singularly well-stored mind and his book is the fruit of a period when, being a Professor of English in Japan, his mind turned to English literature as England's "greatest contribution both to her own children and to the world." The work is not intended to compete with Professor Saintsbury's famous book but it is a worthy introduction to it with much original thought and it includes some account and estimate of twentieth-century authors.

* Longmans. 3s. 6d. net.

† George G. Harrap and Company Ltd. 2s. 6d.

Miss Alice Pearson in her interesting little book "How to See Well"* divides it into three parts. The first deals with bad habits of seeing and provides exercises showing how to help and preserve the eyesight. Part II is on mental strain and its various causes, and, by means of selections of poems, and meditations from Browning, Wilberforce and other writers, shows the reader how to regain the peace of mind so indispensable to bodily health. The third part urges the necessity of a reformed vegetarian diet, an ideal that few book-readers will adopt. They will plead that their teeth are intended for some use of non-vegetarian food.

* * *

An interesting example of the type of books that are being prepared for the new junior secondary schools is Mr. F. Davenport's volume entitled "Binding Crafts for the Senior School"† a continuation of his earlier work for junior schools. The exercises "form part of a graduated scheme which ends in the making and binding of books." They lead up to a famous and definite craft and the work may be done in the ordinary class-room. Handicraft, indeed, has a great place in education and stands beside the art of drawing. Mr. A. F. Collins, the Inspector of Handicraft and Science in the City of Birmingham, who writes a foreword to Mr. Davenport's book, says very rightly that there is no need to-day "to justify the inclusion in the curriculum of this type of work, for its value as an educational instrument is now admitted on all sides." There is indeed, as he says, still a wide field for experiment and further development and Mr. Davenport's volume is a step in advance.

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Attention should be drawn to the publication of the catalogue entitled "Exhibition of French Art 1200-1900"‡ to the famous Exhibition which is open at the Royal Academy till March 5th. The work is much more than a mere catalogue. It gives the history of each work of art, a description of the work and a list of the literary writings dealing with it. The catalogue contains also a list of the lectures which are being given on French Art at the British Academy, the Victoria and Albert Museum and University College, Gower Street. The last includes a lecture on February 8th by Dr. Tancréd Borenius on "The Artistic Relations between France and England through the Ages." The catalogue includes also a delightful Introduction in French by M. Paul Léon and in English—on French Art and England—by Mr. W. G. Constable, the general editor of the catalogue. The preparation of this wonderful compilation has fallen mostly on the shoulders of Mr. Trenchard Cox.

* James Clarke and Co., 9, Essex Street, W.C.2. 1s. 6d. net.
† Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons Ltd. 5s. net.
‡ Royal Academy of Arts, London. 1s. 6d.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

MARCH, 1932

THE CABINET AGREEMENT TO DIFFER.

THE newspapers of January 23rd announced that three Liberal Ministers and one Labour Minister differed from the majority of their colleagues on the steps to be taken to redress the adverse balance of trade by means of import duties; the sequel, however, would not be their resignation of office, but the grant to them of liberty to express by speech and vote their divergent views. This apparent departure from precedent was naturally assailed by critics who, agreeing in nothing else, were in accord in detesting the system of National Government. Mr. Lansbury and Sir Stafford Cripps, *par nobile fratrum*, wandering ever nearer the quicksand of revolutionary socialism, both gibbeted the new departure as a farce; Mr. Amery and Sir Henry Page Croft, incensed at the lost opportunity for forming a purely Protectionist administration, regarded it as unworkable and grotesque. Apart from these, some Liberals of note were perturbed at such ineffectual disagreement on what they considered the most vital of all issues, and at such a sacrifice of the basic principles of Cabinet Government. On the other hand, a solid body of moderate Conservative opinion declined to admit the existence of a constitutional outrage; and a similar attitude was taken by many representative Liberals and their organisations. On the whole it became clear that a somewhat startling novelty was approved in many quarters and condoned in others.

The situation has to be reviewed in two aspects, distinct, but not disconnected. First, there is the departure from our constitutional practice; secondly, the nature of the subject that has compelled that departure. For our present purpose the former is the more exigent. A Liberal is tempted to ask: "Are there any circumstances in which Liberal Ministers can continue to form part of a Government by which one of the main articles of the Liberal creed is being steadily set at naught? It was known from the first that the so-called National Government might sooner or later touch breaking-point. Has not that point been reached?" The answer given by precedent is helpful, but it is not complete. It is true that in the uneasy years that followed the accession of King George IV, such crucial questions as Parliamentary Reform and Catholic Emancipation were left open; it is true that such incompatible figures as Lord Hartington and Mr. Joseph Chamberlain (in his "ransom" days), Mr. W. H. Smith and Lord Randolph Churchill, were caged together in the "happy families" of their

respective Cabinets. But though these from time to time on a platform blasphemed the cherished faith of a colleague, it was done without licence, and the Prime Minister of the day was generally called on to administer soothing syrup.

So that it must be concluded that there is no real precedent for the existing situation. But equally there is no precedent for the existing Government; and if the National Government, representing every party except revolutionary Socialism, is worth preserving, it is unreasonable to neglect its preservation for fear of employing a new political method. Those who condemn the present compromise must reflect on what would have happened if it had not been brought about. The resignation of Sir Herbert Samuel, Sir Donald Maclean, and Sir Archibald Sinclair would have been a simple matter: their places could have been filled by men of adequate Parliamentary experience, as could that of Lord Snowden, if it were decided to replace him. It would have been for the Prime Minister to decide whether he would remain at the head of a Government whose title of National had worn rather thin; or whether an administration whose prime policy must be the conception of a permanent system of Protection, would not be more fitly conducted by the Conservative leader. Whether Mr. MacDonald resigned or stayed, it is evident that a considerable part of the Government's financial programme would be steadily though fruitlessly fought by a concentrated Opposition, led by the retiring Ministers, and not improbably reinforced from time to time by some of the younger Conservative members who have little liking for undiluted Protection. It may be argued that the grant of free speech to the dissentients will have some such result as it is; but there is surely a marked gulf between the occasional expression of differing views and the systematic effort to defeat a measure in detail. It must also be recognised that the Government proposals by no means represent the full Conservative programme; and if Mr. MacDonald found it necessary to retire, it must be assumed that they would be considerably strengthened by an accelerated application of high duties without the ceremony of much inquiry.

But this is by no means all. The return to a Party system means a return to systematic opposition in the customary sense. That is, to put it simply, that every Government proposal is not examined with a determination to agree wherever possible, but with a desire to discover its defects, in the hope of removing or diminishing them, not without incidental satisfaction at the Government's shortcomings. A most salutary system in ordinary times, to which some day we may return. But at the General Election the country as a whole discarded it, and preferred the experiment of government by the co-operation of parties, not by the victory of one party or the coalition of more than one. Is that co-operation made

impossible by the present difference about import duties? Those who considered the imposition of such duties the most vital of all current issues would say that it is. Others, without minimising the importance of the fiscal issue, would hold that other problems, such as the condition of India, affairs in the Far East, disarmament, reparations, war debts and the gold question loom as large as any in the prevailing obscurity. That may be so, says the concentrated Free-Trader, but there is nothing to prevent the Opposition from supporting the Government on any question. No doubt everybody knows that none of the three Liberal Ministers, or Lord Snowden, would embark on any factious line of dissent from the policy of the Government; indeed, we have been told that on these matters unanimity prevails within the Cabinet. But it is the business of oppositions to oppose. Points for criticism emerge: members of the minority who have not seen the difficulties from within the Cabinet may find it necessary to damn some official with faint praise, or openly indict him. An ill-tempered debate may follow, and in other countries the impression of a great nation facing a sea of troubles with a single mind would be finally obliterated. And apart from this, are the partisans of prompt resignation content to see the great questions of external affairs and of international finance, to say nothing of our domestic problems of housing and transport, examined without the skilled help and large outlook of these Ministers? If some great principle were really at stake this would have to be faced without demur; but has the occasion arrived? The position must be closely examined from a Free-Trade standpoint. It is idle to dispute that at the late election an overwhelming majority of voters, confronted with a national emergency, sanctioned and even demanded immediate inquiry into our system of trade, including the possibility of taxing imported goods, if such should be found necessary in order to restrict our payments abroad. After the election the National Government was formed on this basis, and in addition to the existing duties which must be held as violating the canons of strict Free Trade, the McKenna duties, as they are called, the safeguarding duties, and the "key-industry" duties, two measures of temporary operation were passed with great promptitude, the Abnormal Importations Act, and the Horticulture Products Act. These Acts became law with the concurrence of all the Liberal Ministers in the Cabinet, and of Lord Snowden. It is, therefore, hardly accurate to speak of two definitely opposed camps within the Cabinet. In 1886, and again in 1893, the line between Home-Rulers and Unionists was clearly enough drawn. There were many shades of tint on either side of the line; but the convictions of those who demanded some sort of a central Parliament in Dublin, and of those who would have none at any price, could be roughly classed as green or orange in colour. When Mr.

Joseph Chamberlain started his Tariff Reform campaign in 1903 the issue was again simpler than it is now. It was scarcely disputed that the common necessities of life would be made dearer, though it was thought that this disadvantage would be swamped in the rising tide of national prosperity. But the voters were asked to consent to a gamble with their cheap food, and they emphatically declined. Now, on the other hand, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer put it in the House of Commons on February 4th: "We have throughout devoted our particular and serious attention to the avoidance of anything that might entail a serious rise in the cost of living. After careful calculations, checked over and over again by competent observers, we have satisfied ourselves that there is no danger of anything of the kind in our proposals." With this object, meat remains untaxed, while British wheat, and probably bacon, will be sustained by an obligatory quota. Mr. Neville Chamberlain would doubtless contend that the 10 per cent. *ad valorem* duty, which strikes such articles of common consumption as rice, butter, cheese, eggs, condensed milk, lard, margarine, canned and dried fruits, will not cause a serious rise in the cost of living. Perhaps not, but this particular tax must operate to the discomfort of many of the poorest families in the country. The proposed 10 per cent. tax may, in fact, be taken as making the division between the two schools of thought as they exist to-day. The one school welcomes free imports, subject to such restrictions and limitations as may be imposed from time to time, primarily, though not exclusively, for revenue purposes. Many members of that school are prepared, at this difficult moment, to carry such restrictions to formidable lengths, and to admit that political and social necessities may justify the maintenance of some industries which might perish under a system of unrestricted importation, if their maintenance is proved to be for the general advantage. The opposite school would hamper the import of anything that can possibly be produced at home, subject to such exceptions as are forced on us by our crowded population and our meagre production of foodstuffs.

But the 10 per cent. duty marks another line of division. It is necessary to revert once more to the General Election, and the field on which the victory was won. Speaking at Thornley in County Durham on January 29th, the Prime Minister, after pointing out that a tariff must be so devised as not to raise the cost of living, or of production, declared that his Government had "not a mandate for tariffs . . . a mandate to study our bad balance of trade, to adopt remedies after they are studied."

On the same day two Protectionist leaders, Sir Henry Page Croft and Mr. Amery, spoke at Skegness and at the Pattenmakers' banquet in London respectively. Sir Henry advocated "the policy

for which a specific mandate was given at the General Election," thus directly contradicting Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. Mr. Amery observed that "the real issue before the country was the abandonment of a principle which we adopted nearly ninety years ago, which we had tested to the very dregs, and which now as a nation we ought to terminate."

That is to say that a general system of Protection is to be imposed on the country without further ado, on the strength of the votes cast at the General Election. It may be pointed out in passing that Mr. Amery's chronology, with its "nearly ninety years ago," shows how he has escaped the vulgar error of many Tariff Reformers who ascribe our Free-Trade system exclusively to Mr. Cobden and the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. Cobden, they triumphantly point out, believed that the whole world would soon be converted to Free Trade. He was utterly wrong, which shows that his whole system was wrong. But Cobden's crusade, in those years, was fought against the Corn Laws, and them alone: Sir Robert Peel did not think that other countries would adopt Free Trade, and cared little whether they did or not. After he formed his administration of 1841—that included seven names on the list of Prime Ministers, and five on that of Viceroys of India—he set himself to make gaps in the Protective hedge. In the great Budget of 1842 769 articles were subjected to reduced duties; in that of 1845 the duties on corn and sugar were untouched, but 522 other duties were completely repealed. It is the work of Peel, not of Cobden, that is being undone by the proposals of 1932.

The preceding paragraphs point to what may prove to be the principal duelling-ground of the two schools. Are the forthcoming measures the fierce prescriptions for a critical illness, which may include poisonous drugs in large measure, or are they a steady continuous treatment of diet and exercise, indefinitely altering the whole scheme of the national life? The universal 10 per cent. duty may not entirely suppress the bargaining power to be exercised against high tariff nations which, in the altered circumstances of to-day, seems to be an infinitely more hopeful expedient than it could have been in 1903. At that time it was treated as a subsidiary advantage, under the name of retaliation, and did not fill a great place on the stage. *Pro tanto* the general *ad valorem* duty will attenuate it.

Such being the political circumstances, and such the subject of difference, it is impossible to deny the three Liberal Ministers a verdict of approval and assent. To state the case once more on grounds which are not lower because they are not heroic, if it be the case that the country does not want a Government that simply presents the irrefutable truths of orthodox Free Trade and leaves the situation to work itself out by the reorganisation

of industries, are not the dangers of a plunge into a system of tariffs likely to be reduced by the continual warning of Liberal Ministers, and will not the country gain thereby? Does anybody believe that the Government Bill foreshadowed in the debate of the 4th of February would have been presented in its existing shape had a Conservative Government been in power? The reception given to it by the right-wing Conservatives in that debate shows the sort of pressure that they would have applied to their own Front Bench—and who can say that it would have failed? As it is, some of the Conservatives of the centre, who are by no means rabid Protectionists, will be able to exert an influence which would have been trifling had their party been in power.

Lastly, in estimating the service rendered by the Three who did not bow down at the sound of the cornet, flute, harp, and all kinds of musick, and who escaped with their coats, their hosen and their hats unsinged, it is worth while to touch on the attitude of the Labour Party towards Free Trade. Let nobody imagine that Socialism as such can feel any enmity to Protection. Individual members of the Labour Party are Free-Traders, but that is partly because they survive from the days when Trades Unionists were the left wing of Liberalism, partly from dread of Food Taxes and of the exploitation of the workers by capitalistic employers profiting by import duties. But from the days of Bastiat the kinship of Protection with Socialism was a commonplace of controversy. And surely not without reason: a system of government controlling all the operations of finance, of domestic production, and the sale of commodities, can hardly leave the importation of goods from abroad to be a matter of individual concern. And it is not to be conceived that an import board would always avoid imposing a duty in order to keep alive some threatened industry of national importance. We may go further, and say that it is only by the constant interference with the liberty and initiative of individuals which the Socialist Party must practise that some of the risks of a Protective régime could be avoided. There is the danger of inordinate profits accruing to the most fortunate representatives of an industry of which the weaker members are artificially kept going; there is the danger, vividly pictured to many of us by American friends, of pressure exercised by powerful political interests. Advisory Commissions, it may be feared, cannot really control such abuses, though in a Socialist State they might not exist. Some moderate Conservatives may well pause, and ask whither they are being led. Liberals may find, one of these days, that they are fighting on two fronts; and they will not forget to thank the staunch leaders of the party who have been content to deal with facts as they have had to face them.

CREWE.

CHINA, JAPAN AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

AN article in a periodical on the present Far Eastern situation needs to find a narrow course between two opposite dangers. On the one hand the present conflict has its origin in the long and intricate history of Manchuria, and the tangled relationships and Treaty rights of China, Japan and the Western Powers. This is a theme for a book and not an article. On the other hand current events now move at such a pace that any account of them is out of date in a week. They need a daily newspaper to describe them. The present article is limited to a single aspect of the problem, the method and procedure which are being, and should be adopted, in dealing with the dispute and the main principles upon which any settlement should be negotiated.

For the discussion of this question only a few preliminary remarks are necessary upon past and current events. Manchuria is Chinese both legally and in population. China's sovereignty is confirmed in the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, in which all the signatory Powers, who include the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Japan, undertake to respect it. The population is overwhelmingly Chinese, of whom there are nearly thirty millions as compared with about two hundred thousand Japanese. On the other hand, Japan has Treaty rights over certain areas, which include the right to have troops in a defined railway zone. Her investments and interests in Manchuria are very great. More than that, Manchuria is an economic hinterland which is essential to Japan's existence. Japan is therefore vitally interested in the Manchurian régime being such as to assure both order and economic access. The military action in Manchuria and the large measure of public support it has since received in Japan are doubtless the result of her economic position. Her large population, increasing by a million a year, can only live with the aid of external trade. The world depression, the general increase in trade barriers, and in particular the higher Chinese tariff, have been a triple blow; and have caused a dangerous mood of desperation.

Japanese troops left the railway zone on September 18th, and rapidly spread over Manchuria; they have subsequently taken military action at Shanghai. Apart from more general grounds of dispute, a railway outrage is alleged as the occasion of the first action; and organised Chinese boycott of Japanese goods as the occasion of the second. China appealed to the League of Nations in September, and the Council has since been dealing with the dispute. Mr. Stimson at once indicated America's willingness to

co-ordinate her action with that of the League, and in October an American observer attended the Council. The influence of the Powers, however, whether exerted through the League or otherwise, has been hesitant and vacillating; and the extent of their effective co-operation has varied from time to time. They did not, in fact, succeed in restraining Japan's action in Manchuria, or in preventing her from proceeding to action at Shanghai, or even so far in stopping actual hostilities.

Apart from the specific provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty, the rights and duties of the different countries depend upon two general Treaties, the Covenant of the League of Nations, to which all the countries mainly interested are parties except the United States of America and Russia, and the Pact of Paris (known as the Kellogg Pact) which binds both these two and all the rest.

The Covenant gives the right to intervene in any conflict threatening peace; and under certain conditions imposes the obligation to do so on appeal by a party to the dispute. One difficulty, indeed, must be recognised. The provisions of the Covenant and its normal machinery and procedure are designed to deal with disputes between two Governments, each sovereign, and assumed to be in control of its own territory; whereas it is, of course, a cardinal fact in the whole Chinese problem that no Government has effective control of the whole of China. This must affect the method and character of any settlement; but the procedure and powers of the League are elastic, and this difficulty neither disqualifies the League from action nor renders it impotent.

The Kellogg Pact, with the advantage of a more inclusive membership, has no collective machinery at its disposal and its practical efficiency depends therefore upon the co-ordination of the action of those of its signatories who are not members of the League with those who are. Its cardinal principle is that all who have signed it abjure war "as an instrument of national policy."

Everyone realises that it is dangerously misleading to speak or think of China as if it were an entity with a single will. It is, however, important to realise that such a conception of Japan is also misleading. Though in recent months the mood of desperation, and the national war fever that always attends an outbreak of hostilities, have suppressed dissent and given a semblance of unity, there have long been two diametrically opposed Japans. There is the Japan of those who look to peaceful development based upon good relations with the outside world, including China; and the Japan of the military party which looks to an imperialist policy based upon military strength. The first has on the whole in recent years found its expression in the civil government. But the civil government is not constitutionally supreme. The heads

of the fighting services are not under the orders of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet; they are directly responsible to the Emperor. We mistake the situation if we think of Japan as a single person planning an act of aggression secretly and seizing his moment skilfully; or of the Ministry in power in September as giving effect to a policy which they had planned under the concealment of professions of friendship and goodwill.

It is essential to realise just what is involved—and what is not involved—in these Treaties being respected and vindicated. At this stage signatories of the Covenant and Kellogg Pact are concerned as such in three things, and three only. The first is that hostilities should cease; the second, that territory illegally occupied should be evacuated at such time and under such conditions as may be practicable, having regard to the necessity of maintaining order and preventing the dangers of rioting and massacre; the third, that the settlement of the underlying disputes, whatever it may be, should be by a procedure which prevents it being dictated at the sword's point.

To insist upon these three things is surely both the right and the duty of those who are bound by the collective Treaties, if these treaties are to have any real validity. The first, the cessation of hostilities, needs no comment. The second is a little more difficult. The continued occupation of Manchuria by Japan would obviously be inconsistent with her undertaking in the Nine-Power Treaty; and all the signatories of the Covenant are pledged to "respect and preserve, as against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence" of all member states. This does not necessarily mean that a state is guaranteed against invasion, but it does mean that it is promised that the *status quo ante* shall be restored. Clearly Japan must evacuate if the Covenant pledge is to be observed. On this point, I think, the Council went both too far and not far enough. It was, I think, a mistake to include a specific date for evacuation in the October resolution. Whether or not there was any justification for the original occupation, the immediate withdrawal of the troops might have led to the murder of Japanese subjects. It would have been better to prescribe withdrawal at such time and under such conditions as would be compatible with due safeguards against this danger. But in that case, and for other reasons also, the immediate presence of persons representing the League was desirable. A Commission composed of neutral persons already in the East (at Shanghai, Tokyo or Peking) should have been appointed; and it should have been among their terms of reference to advise as to the conditions of evacuation. A Commission, such as that presided over by Lord Lytton, drawn from distant continents,

may be very suitable for dealing with the deeper underlying factors of the Manchurian problem, but it was obviously unsuitable for helping in the immediate crisis.

As regards the third point, it is surely obvious that "direct negotiations" between Japan and China in the midst of military operations would mean a dictated settlement impossible to reconcile with the pledge to abstain from war "as an instrument of national policy." If that pledge is to be kept there are two alternatives; one, that the dispute should be dealt with at an early date, through or with the aid of an international body, such as the Lytton Commission; the other that it should be postponed for a considerable time, till the two parties can engage in direct negotiations on equal terms and not under military pressure.

To urge so much is not to imply any view as to the merits of the original dispute. It is both common sense and established League doctrine, that when a dispute leads to actual or imminent hostilities, conditions of peace must first be re-established before the dispute can be properly dealt with. Very great harm was done during the Manchurian stage of the trouble by a confusion, in this country and elsewhere, between the underlying differences of China and Japan, in which either China or Japan, or in part one and in part the other, may have just grievances, and the actual procedure of Japan in enforcing her claim, on which no similar doubt can be entertained.

I wish to urge that, in this situation, there is only one policy which is consistent with either our honour or our interests, namely that we should concentrate our efforts on securing concerted world action, through the League and in co-operation with America, to insist upon the observance of the Treaty obligations. It is not enough for communications to pass, by cable or by telephone, between four Foreign Offices—though that is, of course, necessary as a preliminary and an accompaniment to other action—and for joint proposals to be then made in the name of four Powers. Such a procedure, by itself, does not sufficiently ensure any one of the countries participating in the proposals against being left to bear an undue share of the consequences. Nor does it give as much authority as formal action through a world organ. It is vital that in the exercise of pressure which Japan might regard as unfriendly, each participating country including America should share equally the responsibility at every stage and be inescapably involved in the consequences, and that these countries should be as numerous as possible. Much the best way to secure this is that at each stage action should be formally and publicly endorsed by the League Members through the League Council and simultaneously by declarations on behalf of the American Government.

This, of course, does not replace the private communications that have been taking place. But it is an indispensable complement to them. And there are obvious advantages in making Geneva the real centre of negotiations, especially now that there are responsible representatives of all countries present there for the Disarmament Conference. It is sometimes forgotten that cable and transatlantic telephone facilities are just as available at Geneva as in London.

But still less would it be a satisfactory procedure to "refer the matter to the League," to allow discussions to take place at Geneva on a world basis, while communications of a more realistic character, unco-ordinated with the Geneva discussions, take place between a few Foreign Offices. It is constantly urged as a reason for acting outside Geneva that the discussions of the League are unreal and take little account of actual facts, forces and politics. The actual fact is, of course, that discussions at Geneva are just as real or unreal as the Governments make them. The League is only a mechanism through which the Governments negotiate on the basis of certain principles, and through a procedure which is adaptable to every case. If Governments conduct their own negotiations elsewhere and leave their representatives at Geneva uninstructed, it is not the League which has failed, but the Governments which have failed to use it. This observation is, of course, a comment on the earlier negotiations rather than those of February.

Co-operation with America is of course absolutely essential in such a case as the present one. But it is a delusion to think that this is made more difficult (if there is an honest attempt to avoid difficulties) by the use of the League machinery. The message of Mr. Stimson in September, and the presence of an American observer at the Council Meetings in October, both indicate that co-operation between League Members through their own Council and America or a Kellogg Pact signatory is practicable.

It is very rare that so many different considerations and so many different, and often conflicting, interests, all point to the same conclusion as in the present instance. Let us recall the main results which it is to the general advantage, and especially to the advantage of this country, to secure. The first object is obviously to stop the hostilities. Except as the result of a decisive defeat of one of the disputants, with the natural consequences of an imposed peace dictated by a dominant Power, this can only be by means of external influence. No single country is strong enough to exert this influence, for Japan is locally the strongest power. Co-operation is therefore essential. But every representation or action may, if not completely successful, involve further measures which might conceivably lead to a declaration of war

by the country against which they were applied. This danger would be a real one if the country taking the measures were isolated. As already argued, much the best way of avoiding the risk of a "breakaway" is the formal registration of each step with the aid of the League machinery.

It is, in the next place, desirable that when the dispute is over our relations should be the best possible with both China and Japan. As regards China it is obvious that the action now proposed would be the best; for, of the alternatives, isolated action on our part in her defence is impossible; and inaction is to betray her in breach of our cognisances under the Covenant. As regards Japan, our inaction, apart from its other objections, would expose us, not indeed to her hostility, but to her contempt, which might ultimately be even more dangerous. Joint action prevents any differential odium attaching to us and at the same time secures respect.

We have next to consider the position of our Dominions. A weak compliance with Japanese aggression would obviously cause the greatest anxiety in both Canada and Australia. If America showed greater determination than ourselves the reactions on the relations between Canada and ourselves on the one hand and America on the other might be very serious. And if Japan is allowed to do whatever she will, and left with an uncontrolled dominance in the East, what will be the effect upon Australian problems? If we do not feel strong enough to take part in effective combined pressure now, what will be our position in a few years' time, if, for example, Japan demands free entry for Japanese colonists into Australia? We should in that event (if concerted action fails in the present case) have little or no chance of combined world action; our only choice would be to resist alone or to comply. The same consequences may be anticipated as regards the whole of our position in the East, including India. If the world, which obviously desires to restrain Japan, fails to do so, what prestige in the East will remain to us, or indeed to the Western Powers generally? And without prestige what are the prospects of maintaining our Eastern position or interests for any substantial time?

Beyond all these immediate issues lies the problem of the Government of China. It is obvious that the continuance of chaos and disorder in a country which comprises about one-fifth of the world's population must involve both loss and danger to the world as a whole. If China is left to the mercy of a more strongly organised military power, by which her territory is occupied and her action dictated, while the rest of the world stands by in breach of their Treaty pledges, what must be the consequence? The smouldering rage of the Chinese is likely to lead to a dragging and wasting war, and then a lasting embitterment expressing itself

in the boycott of Japanese goods and occasional outbursts of violence. The task of establishing a national government capable of maintaining order, already one of great difficulty, must become impossible. The chances of foreign aid in the work of the reconstruction will be destroyed, because China will feel that if she has been attacked by one country, she has been betrayed by the rest. On the other hand a common defence of China in accordance with the Treaties is the best possible preface to joint reconstructive work. It is more and more evident that China needs external assistance in her task. At the same time any isolated or disproportionate intervention by a single country is fraught with great dangers. Joint action in dealing with the crisis would establish the two vital conditions of external assistance. It would establish the proper relations between the external countries; it would win the trust of the Chinese people. The way would be open for the full and effective use of the League's reconstructive machinery.

Lastly, much more is at stake than the present issue in China and Japan, or the other interests directly involved in it. The whole collective system for the maintenance of peace, of which the Covenant of the League of Nations is the main foundation and the Locarno Treaties and the Kellogg Pact are two principal pillars, has now come to its hour of fate. This is the first time that a first-class issue between two great Powers has arisen since the post-war system has been established. If it fails now there is little ground for confidence that it will ever succeed. It is true that there are special difficulties, but there are also unusually favourable factors, which are scarcely likely to recur. The efficiency of the system in any serious issue between great countries obviously depends upon the Covenant and Kellogg Pact working as a single instrument; upon an effective co-operation between America and European Powers. In this particular case America has a strong national interest in Japan being restrained, and restrained by collective action. In what other case is this enormous advantage likely to recur? In this instance all the interests involved in maintaining the prestige of Great Britain and the Western Powers in the East are concerned to see that Japan is not left in a position of unquestioned dominance, free to do what she will. In what other instance is it likely that those who are concerned in these interests would have so strong an inducement to support the collective system? In this case all who are concerned to maintain the British Empire, to retain our relations with the Dominions and to defend our colonial possessions, have a similar interest. When is this likely to recur?

I find it difficult to believe that with all these advantages, if the collective system now fails, any country will retain confidence that

it will be effective in another serious issue. But if this system fails there is, and can be, nothing except a reversion to the competitive national armaments, which is the only alternative, and which will inevitably lead in time to another war. Neither this nor any other Disarmament Conference can succeed if there is no confidence in security being guaranteed by the collective treaties. Just so far as each country ceases to believe that the engagements of Covenant and Kellogg Pact will be operative, it will extend its military preparations up to the limit of the taxpayers' capacity and endurance. The collective system, which has and can have no other foundation than confidence in the observance of their engagements by those who have accepted them, is the only means of arresting this disastrous and fatal procession of events from impoverishment at the beginning to war at the end. And if our present system fails we can hardly hope to build again at least in our generation. For we have nothing to build with if the confidence in the observance of engagements has been destroyed.

It may be, of course, that the policy here advocated will fail; that American co-operation will not be forthcoming. In that event there may be nothing but to stand impotent while the military party in power in Japan proceeds with whatever may be their ambitions; to refuse recognition of any resulting settlement and to wait until either the conditions for collective action may be more favourable or Japanese embarrassments may offer another opportunity. That may prove, after all, to be the only practicable course in the end; but it is obviously both discreditable and dangerous. Clearly every possible effort should first be made to secure American co-operation and concerted world action.

Nothing in this article must be taken as advocating that if American co-operation should prove impossible, either Great Britain alone, or even Great Britain with other League members, should risk war at this moment with Japan. The possible consequences are very grave. I believe that concerted action with America would, at the Manchurian stage of the dispute, most certainly have stopped further aggression. I believe that even at this stage the risk of a Japanese declaration of war against the whole world, including America, would be small and ought to be taken in preference to the alternative. But I am not saying that the risk should be taken, if America should refuse co-operation and should so accept the moral responsibility for the collapse of the collective system. I am urging that she ought to be asked.

It may be that when these lines appear, British policy will be directed whole-heartedly to securing American co-operation and world action on the lines here proposed; or it may have been so directed and have failed in its action. It may, therefore, be said

that this article is imputing a blame which is undeserved. That may be true for the future. But, at the time I write, it is difficult to maintain that British policy has been consistently devoted to securing American co-operation in the defence of the collective Treaties. One piece of evidence is sufficient.

On January 7th the American Government sent a Note to Japan, China, Great Britain and the other signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty which *inter alia* said that the American Government "does not intend to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties." On January 9th the Foreign Office issued the following communiqué:

His Majesty's Government stand by the policy of the open door for international trade in Manchuria, which was guaranteed by the Nine-Power Treaty at Washington.

Since the recent events in Manchuria, the Japanese representatives at the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva stated on October 13th that Japan was the champion in Manchuria of the principle of equal opportunity and the open door for the economic activities of all nations. Further, on December 28th, the Japanese Prime Minister stated that Japan would adhere to the open door policy, and would welcome participation and co-operation in Manchurian enterprise.

In view of these statements His Majesty's Government have not considered it necessary to address any formal Note to the Japanese Government on the lines of the American Government's Note, but the Japanese Ambassador in London has been requested to obtain confirmation of these assurances from his Government.

I do not know what, if any, secret official communications may have intervened between the Note and the communiqué. I do not, for my present argument, need to know. For no secret communications can justify a published declaration if it is not justified by known and public facts. It is in the light of public facts that it is, and must be, read. And so read, what was bound to be its effect? It was a declaration of British policy, at a very critical moment in our history, on a very grave issue. It was a declaration to Japan, who obviously wished to know whether the world, and in particular America and Great Britain, were going to co-operate in insisting on an observance of the collective Treaties; to the American people who wished to know whether we should act cordially with them in this object in which America had just taken a notable initiative; and to all countries anxious to know what our attitude really was towards the general collective peace system. What must the communiqué have conveyed to all of these? It emphasised (as the American Note had done) the commercial principle of equal opportunity and of the

"open door." It was silent upon everything else. It abstained from any reference to the Pact of Paris, on the observance of which America had just insisted, and made no reference to either the Japanese or our own obligations under the Covenant of the League. Was it not bound to be read in Japan, in America and in the world as a whole as an indication that, so long as we received assurances about the "open door" we were (to put it mildly) not actively trying to secure effective American and concerted world action in defence of the collective Treaties for the maintenance of peace?

It may be that the communiqué does injustice to the real British attitude as compared with the American. Then it was the more unskilful—and not less disastrous in its consequences. It may be that collective action will now be impracticable, will fail, or will entail grave consequences. But those who have advocated it from the beginning cannot be responsible for its tardy or unskilful application. It would certainly, if it could have been secured, have succeeded earlier. It may be practicable now. Even if it is impracticable for the moment a further opportunity may occur in the near future.

To urge the policy advocated in this article is not to express an unfriendly attitude to Japan. We are friends with both Japan and China. It is of the essence of the collective Treaties that we should be friends with none except as we are friends with all, and that we should oppose any country which resorts to war in breach of its engagements. It is not "Japan," but only the present act of aggression, that we must condemn. Nor does this policy indicate an absence of sympathy with Japan's underlying difficulties. It is essential that, when the present hostilities are past, Japan should be definitely and permanently assured of the access to Manchurian resources which is essential to her existence. It may well be, indeed, that if the world did stop Japan from proceeding further with a military adventure in China, it would save her from the worst disaster in her history and would restore to power those best qualified to control her destinies wisely.

ARTHUR SALTER.

February 19th.

DISARMAMENT: THE FIRST ROUND.

THE most impressive international gathering the world has ever seen, assembled to discuss practical disarmament, has faced the problem squarely instead of evading it. Foreign Minister after Foreign Minister has taken the platform and instead of eulogising disarmament in the abstract and recommending it in the concrete for every country except his own, has said plainly and unequivocally, with the authority of his Cabinet behind him, what limitations his Government is prepared to accept, indeed to welcome, in respect of its own national forces. And, since this is only the first round, most Governments may be expected, in the interests of accord, to go a little further in the end than they have gone in the beginning.

On the other hand sharp disillusion may follow this early promise. It is only when detailed proposals are being hammered out in committee that the real testing-time will come. The optimism that prevails at the moment is, paradoxically, the fruit of pessimism. Nothing could have looked blacker than the prospects of the conference when it met at the beginning of February. The international atmosphere generally, the reparations differences, the conflict in the Far East—everything conspired to dictate a postponement which every Government secretly desired, but no Government would take the responsibility of proposing. But that very sense of depression produced in conference delegates generally the conviction that at any cost the disaster of a Disarmament Conference failure must be avoided, and in the actual spokesmen of the delegations in particular a prudence in utterance that enabled several dangerous corners to be turned without a murmur of discord. Dr. Brüning succeeded in stating the German position with a firmness that satisfied his own Press and a moderation that mollified the French. Mr. Hugh Gibson, who was expected to say nothing and say it very politely said a great deal and said it very attractively. Signor Grandi, with the critical eyes of France upon him, modified that country's disapprobation, if he did not quite dispel it, by his studied tribute to certain provisions in the French proposals. And rows of delegates who had silently resolved that their restraint should be equal even to tolerating forty minutes of M. Litvinoff's fantasies found themselves sitting back to listen with growing interest to one of the most reasonable and most closely reasoned speeches of the whole discussion.

So the first round ended, for though at the moment of writing there are still many secondary speeches to be delivered, all the Great Powers have declared themselves, and disarmament has always been recognised to depend on the Great Powers mainly.

In any case the secondary speeches so far heard have struck no discordant note. On certain fundamental questions the Conference is broadly of one mind and the outlines of a Disarmament Treaty can already be seen emerging. It will include the complete prohibition of certain essentially aggressive weapons, the budgetary limitation of military expenditure (using military in the wide sense, to embrace all arms) and the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission to supervise the execution of the treaty—and perhaps discharge other duties more important.

That is a distinctly encouraging prospect, but it is still, of course, an unrealised prospect, and between its conception and its realisation a great gulf lies. The treaty in view must be signed by all the principal Powers represented at the Conference or it will be signed by none of them. The abstention of a few minor States will make no difference, but no Power of any consequence will accept limitations and reductions unless they apply equally to every other Power of similar status. And though, as I have said, the whole trend of the Conference discussions points unmistakably to certain definite conclusions there is hardly one of those conclusions of which it can be said that every State that matters accepts it without reserve. Britain and the United States would abolish the submarine unconditionally. Italy would abolish it on conditions. France and Spain would limit its size, but each in a different way. Japan would only limit the method of its employment. And so on. All tend in the same direction, but a great deal of delicate steering will be needed if they are all to be brought into the same harbour.

Much might be said about the Geneva discussions, particularly about their quality. Speaking of so uniformly high an order has never been heard at any Geneva Assembly or Conference, a fact the more worth emphasising because there is no subject on which it is easier to talk empty and estimable nothings than disarmament. But the main point, after all, is the sequel to the discussions. The shortest way to sum the situation up is to say that the task of the next few weeks will be to reconcile the Italian proposals at one end of the scale with the French at the other. It is rather unfortunate, incidentally, that these two nations should even appear to be pitted against one another, for the rivalry between them is keen enough already. But though Signor Grandi's proposals are practically identical with the contents of the Buda-Pesth resolution of the Federation of League of Nations Associations presented unofficially to the Conference by Lord Cecil, and with the general aims of the German delegation, the Italian Foreign Minister laid his plan before the Conference in a speech of such clarity and vigour that the far-reaching project he sponsored will inevitably

remain associated with his name. And if I have described his plan as standing at one end of the scale and the French at the other that does not mean at all that Signor Grandi is trying to achieve disarmament and M. Tardieu to evade it. In some respects the French plan is more drastic than the Italian. It is the method rather than the aim that is different, and the difference is sharp enough to make it difficult for a conference that might be ready to travel a long way in Signor Grandi's direction to carry the French with it.

The Italian plan is an unqualified declaration for the total abolition of those distinctively aggressive weapons forbidden to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. If, therefore, it were adopted it would go far towards wiping out that inequality of treatment of which the Germans justly complain, and which, as Count Apponyi of Hungary put it, creates two classes of members in the same League. Signor Grandi would abolish simultaneously—not, be it noted, the one without the other—submarines and battleships; heavy artillery and tanks and all military aviation; while civil aviation would be internationalised and there would be absolute prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare and the wanton bombardment of civil populations.

That programme demands examination. Within its limits—it does not, of course, touch such questions as budgetary limitation or the reduction of personnel—it represents the zenith of possible achievement. What prospect is there that any substantial part of it will, in fact, be achieved? A word first on the so-called humanisation of warfare, the renunciation of certain weapons or certain methods in a war which itself must involve a breach of undertakings like the Kellogg Pact. If the preparation of poison-gas equipment, not merely its employment in war, is to be prohibited the step may be worth taking, though any such prohibition could be secretly evaded without difficulty. But, in the main, the Spanish Foreign Minister was right when he observed that it was not chemical war, or aerial war, or bacteriological war that the Conference was out to abolish; what it was out to abolish was war itself. Therein lies the patent weakness of the Japanese proposal to retain the submarine, but lay severe restrictions on its use. There were severe enough restrictions on the use of submarines in 1914. By 1918 the restrictions were as dead as the tens of thousands of human victims lawless submarine warfare had made.

Let it be assumed, as it reasonably may be, that most States would accept all or the greater part of the Grandi plan. The danger is that at almost every point there may be some important State—not always the same State—that will dissent. Measure, for example, the British attitude against the Italian. Signor Grandi

is for abolishing submarines and battleships together. Italy will only forgo the advantage the submarine gives her in narrow seas like the Adriatic or the Straits of Messina if she is free from the menace of the battleships against which she rightly or wrongly conceives the submarine to be a protection. Great Britain (and the United States) condemns the submarine unreservedly, but the utmost reduction the Admiralty has so far countenanced is from 35,000 tons maximum to 25,000, in spite of the arguments of Sir Herbert Richmond and his school. On land Signor Grandi abolishes heavy artillery and tanks. Sir John Simon in his Geneva speech advocated a reduction, unspecified, in the calibre of heavy guns, but the War Office will certainly not part with tanks without a struggle. Regarding the air the British spokesman was completely silent. In other quarters the Grandi proposal for the abolition of all military aeroplanes and the internationalisation of civil aviation has gained support so extensive that it seems certain that the main features of it will be adopted.

The British programme, as unfolded by Sir John Simon, was Great Britain's first word. It cannot be believed that it is its last, for it represents proposals far more limited and hesitant than those of Italy or France or even the United States. But it shows how much ground has to be covered before the Grandi proposals can be secure of adoption in even a modified form. That could be shown a good deal more clearly still if the speeches of the chief delegates of other Powers were analysed one by one. But it will serve the purpose sufficiently to turn for a moment to the French project. The trouble here, as has been indicated, is not that M. Tardieu was less adventurous than Signor Grandi, but that his method is so different from the Italian that the two will not be easily reconciled. Take aggressive weapons—capital ships, heavy guns, submarines. Both Italy and France recognise that they call for special restrictions, but while Italy would scrap the lot France would allow States to retain them on condition they were put up at the disposal of the League of Nations if ever the League needed them for action against a covenant-breaker under Article XVI. Take aviation. Both countries would internationalise civil aviation. In respect of military aeroplanes, Italy would scrap them; France would hand over all heavy bombers to the League lock, stock and barrel, but leave the less powerful machines in the hands of the States, provided the League were given a perpetual lien on them.

There are differences of some importance there, but they are nothing compared with those emerging if the French plan and not the Italian is taken as the basis of comparison. For the French propose two radical departures, the surrender of all heavy bombing

planes to the League of Nations to form the nucleus of a League air force, and the endowment of the League with both an international police force to prevent war and an international punitive force to repress war. The constituent units of these forces are not, like the bombing planes, to be put once for all in the hands of the League, to be stationed where, and commanded as, the League chooses. They are to consist of specific units of each national army and navy and air force, definitely earmarked for the League's use, open to inspection at any moment by members of the League's Permanent Disarmament Commission or some other embryo general staff created for the purpose, and remaining at the League's disposal at all times without further discussion or negotiation. What is more, while the Italian proposals constitute a disarmament plan pure and simple, unlimited by political conditions of any kind, the whole French project depends on the general acceptance by all States of a particular conception, the French conception, of the duties and functions of the League.

Now it is perfectly easy to take the line that France is simply suggesting something which happens to suit her particular purposes, just as it is perfectly easy to demonstrate that Great Britain's disarmament proposals are simply designed to secure the abolition of a weapon specially dangerous to her, the submarine, nothing being said about the abolition of other weapons in which she happens to be well equipped, for example, tanks. But the assiduous ascription of discreditable motives is not the shortest of all roads to the creation of a good understanding between nations, or to the success of a Disarmament Conference. There may, indeed, be something to be said for assuming France to be sincere before resorting to the perhaps more attractive exercise of assuming her to be insincere.

There is no particular difficulty about that. France is concerned about security. So is Great Britain where maritime communications are concerned, but what is a vice in the former case is commonly regarded as a virtue in the latter. So is the Covenant of the League of Nations, for its opening sentence declares the purpose of the League of Nations to be "to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security"—to achieve it, not merely to talk about it. France's present contention is that the right way to preserve peace is to transfer force gradually from national control, where it can be used for purely selfish and ambitious ends, to international control, where it will be used to prevent the violation of world peace. It is possible to contest that thesis on both practical and theoretical grounds. On the other hand it is a thesis for which a reasonable case can quite clearly be made. This country would be a strange place to-day

if force had not been removed centuries ago from the hands of warring barons and centralised in the hands first of King and then of Parliament. The French may be wrong, but there is no ground for condemning them without a hearing.

As to details, take first the air. France would give all heavy bombers to the League. It would be better to abolish them altogether, but if it is a choice between leaving such instruments of death in the hands of France herself and of Italy and other countries and putting them in the safer hands of the League there are some superficial reasons at any rate for preferring the latter course. And that the Power with the strongest air fleet in the world should make that proposal seems sufficiently noteworthy. France's further proposal for the internationalisation of civil aviation has already met with wide support at Geneva, and no open opposition. The idea that other offensive weapons, such as big ships, heavy guns and large submarines should only be retained by nations willing to put them at the League's disposal on demand is an unsatisfactory half-measure. It would be far better to condemn such weapons altogether, as Italy and many other States desire. Then there is the International Police Force to prevent war, by temporarily policing a frontier between two mutually menacing States, or occupying a contested area while its fate was being decided juridically. If the League had to take action of that kind rapidly, and such action usually needs to be rapid, it would undoubtedly add to its efficiency considerably if it knew that France had a couple of regiments at Nancy, Britain two or three cruisers at Plymouth or Sheerness, Italy a squadron of aeroplanes somewhere in Lombardy, on which it could call immediately without further bargain or negotiation, not for fighting but for keeping the peace. It is unfortunate for purposes of illustration that recent disputes in which the right to do that might have been particularly useful concerned theatres so distant—Manchuria and the Bolivia-Paraguay frontier—that, in fact, the right could hardly have been exercised. But those examples serve to suggest the possibilities inherent in the French proposal none the less. For the further proposal of a skeleton punitive force to repress war there seems, on the face of it, less to be said, but the French should be given, as no doubt they will be given, the opportunity of unfolding their argument on that point to an audience tolerant enough not to close its mind hermetically in advance.

But there remain, of course, France's political conditions. They amount to nothing much more or less than a definite assurance that the League Covenant will be worked as a piece of effective machinery for the preservation not of the King's peace, but

of the world's peace. M. Tardieu said explicitly at Geneva that he based himself on the Covenant and asked for no new agreements. France herself wants to make the most of the Covenant and she holds that some other countries have resolved firmly to make the least of it. Quite a number of Frenchmen read English, and when important British newspapers reiterate about once a week that Great Britain will never act as the Covenant contemplates except where her own interests are involved—meaning, of course, her immediate material interests, for no account is ever taken in this connection of Britain's supreme interest in world peace—France feels it necessary to ask what a country that signed and ratified the Covenant deliberately does understand by its Covenant obligations. There is, of course, no ground for addressing that question to Great Britain exclusively, but self-examination may be more profitable for us in the first instance than the consideration of other people's intentions.

The French plan has not been laid before the Disarmament Conference as something that must be taken or left as a whole. If it had to be the prospect would be depressing, for while France is unlikely to sign a convention which ignores it there are features in it which certainly will not command universal acceptance. Discussions of the whole disarmament problem are now in progress on the basis of the Preparatory Commission's draft convention, a method which France approves as unreservedly as Great Britain. In the course of that process it will have to be decided stage by stage—in connection with air, in connection with naval reduction, in connection with the larger political issues—how much of the French idea can be incorporated into the final conclusions. Certainly not all of it will be. But equally certainly much of it can be, and without any transformation of the League into that spectral super-State so often condemned and so rarely (if, indeed, ever) defined. The assimilation of the French proposals to, say, the Italian, is going to be one of the most delicate and important of all the tasks of the Conference. There are, of course, other difficulties to face besides that, chief among them the policy of Japan, whose disarmament proposals are so far more meagre than those of any other Great Power. But if the spirit which animated the Conference in its first week of serious work persists sufficient accommodation should be possible for a disarmament treaty of moderate scope, but of very real value, to emerge in due time.

H. WILSON HARRIS.

THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM.*

IT is with feelings of pride touched with melancholy that I accept your invitation to deliver this address in commemoration of my friend Aneurin Williams. He belonged to a type of public man which is becoming rarer every day in this country, and has never been common anywhere. A member of a privileged class, with all the advantages of wealth, leisure, and intellectual culture, as well as freedom from oppression, he approached public problems with the aim of spreading those advantages everywhere and with no fear of any loss to himself or his class which might be involved in the process. He happened to be a Liberal Member of Parliament; but in no party sense he was essentially Liberal in thought and feeling, and most of the causes to which he devoted himself were outside the realm of party. Co-partnership, woman suffrage, garden cities, at home; in foreign policy the relief of Armenia and the formation of the League of Nations, are causes of which some have failed, some have succeeded with results very different from what their supporters hoped, others are gaining ground day by day, but all are united by a common quality. They are expressions of what is roughly called the spirit of Brotherhood: the habit of mind which sees other human beings as comrades to be persuaded and co-operated with, not opponents to be crushed, and which cannot accept victory at the price of fraud or oppression. His death left many good causes bereft of a devoted servant. In the happy phrase of a writer in the *Nation*: "He ground many axes in his time but never his own."

One of those axes was the reform of our electoral system. Almost immediately after his entry to Parliament in 1910 he succeeded in carrying a resolution in favour of Proportional Representation; and in 1917 he sat with Earl Grey on the Speaker's Conference and convinced his colleagues of the necessity of the reform. The Report recommended the adoption of P.R. for Parliamentary boroughs though not for counties, where the size of the constituencies, it was considered, would be unmanageable. (This was before the invention of Broadcasting.) The subsequent history of that recommendation makes a curious commentary on the mental processes of the party politician. Of course P.R. has had its consistent friends and its consistent opponents, who have every right to their opinion. But it is a little disillusioning to find that each party changes its mind on the subject not merely according to its party interest—which is perhaps defensible—but according to such an extremely short view of its party interest. The Liberals when in a majority were very doubtful about the

reform, when reduced to a small minority they became practically unanimous in favour of it. The Labour Party, while still a minority, used to have it as a regular plank of their programme, but changed violently when they became a Government and saw that P.R. would prevent the annihilation of the Liberals. The Conservative Party, while seeing that the present system involves a probability and indeed a certainty sooner or later of putting in office a Revolutionary Government, prefers to gamble on its own luck and not think of the future. That has been the state of affairs hitherto, but I doubt whether it can continue. The arguments for P.R. which in 1917 were strong enough to convert the Speaker's Conference seem to me to have gained in strength to an almost irresistible degree through changes in the condition of Great Britain and of the world. In both there is an increased variety of opinion, increased danger of revolution and increased need of stability in international affairs.

In nation after nation Parliamentary Government has failed to maintain itself. Abroad one constantly hears talk of the *crise du parlementarisme*, and at home of the merits of a dictatorship. I think such judgments are superficial. Not one of the non-parliamentary dictatorships makes even an appearance of success, except Italy; and not many of those who know Italian economic and intellectual conditions would say that the appearance was quite to be trusted. Of the other dictatorships, Greece and Spain have already repented of their experiment; conditions in Yugoslavia and Poland approach from time to time to a reign of terror; and there is no non-parliamentary country which can be said to be envied by its neighbours. Also it is worth noticing that Parliamentary Government has never been overthrown in any nation where it had strong roots and could command honest administration. It has in varying degrees collapsed in Turkey, Roumania, Poland, Yugoslavia, and some places recently emancipated from Russian despotism; but it would surely be surprising if these nations suddenly found themselves capable of running a machine which has always demanded a rather high standard of political character, intelligence and technique. It takes many generations to accustom the electors to trust their representatives and the representatives to deserve such trust; to train individuals or parties to listen to argument and to submit with a decent grace when fairly outvoted. Parliamentary Government is certainly a difficult system to work; but when once it is well rooted it does seem to be, with all its faults, the best yet discovered by man. If one looks through Europe at the present time for the nations which, however troubled they may be by the financial crisis, are on the whole preserving a fair level of effective government and

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social stability, one would name a list consisting entirely of the old parliamentary countries: Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden. Some people might add Italy, but the addition would be contested. Some would add Czechoslovakia, where the conditions are peculiar; one cannot quite add Germany, in spite of the excellent qualities of its recent governments, because it is constantly threatened by revolution and indeed has only been preserved so far by a miracle—or by P.R.

Consequently I do not in the least feel disposed to recommend for Great Britain the abandonment of the parliamentary system. Indeed I would suggest to our fascists and dictator-mongers that despotism also needs some preliminary training before it can be practised successfully. It may be easy enough to run a despotism in Russia, where you have a people accustomed for centuries to sheep-like obedience. But in Great Britain, I should not envy a Dictator.

However, if we are to keep the parliamentary system, there are certain requisite conditions. First, of course, there must be in the people the parliamentary habit of mind, a general respect for parliament and interest in public affairs. A generation ago we should have said confidently that Great Britain possessed these qualifications, and on the whole I should say so now, though with less confidence. To take the popular newspapers as a test, one would say not merely that the tone of the political articles was often very low in point of intelligence, but that nine-tenths of the space and emphasis are devoted to sport, betting, crime, gossip, and sexualities, not to serious public questions. This may or may not be a real sign that the British people has lost its famous political instincts; I am inclined to think it denotes merely a temporary dislocation of interest. The average man turns away from politics and reads about football matches and speed records and divorces and quack inventions not because he has really lost interest in serious things, but because politics to-day are so discouraging and depressing—little more than so many spirited or dispirited struggles to make the best of innumerable bad jobs. But I cannot help thinking, in agreement with Mr. Lippmann, that the average commercial newspaper proprietor underrates the character and intelligence of his public. The great increase in the reading of serious books, and even of poetry, the fact that the works of Jeans and Eddington and Wells's *Outline of History* should be "best-sellers," as well as the patient interest shown by large audiences in serious political arguments which would have seemed too dull for the platforms of the last generation, are proofs sufficient that we are still a serious and public-spirited people, and not incapable of running parliamentary institutions. The first elementary condition is satisfied.

But the system of voting also must satisfy at least three conditions. It must be fair—not, of course, ideally fair, but roughly and decently fair; it must be stable, and not subject to violent oscillations; and it must give the more thoughtful elements of the population a fair chance of being represented in parliament. By all these tests the present system fails. It is not fair. In the election of 1924 the Conservatives with roughly eight million votes won 415 seats, the Liberals with three millions won 42: that is, roughly, a million Conservatives could obtain over fifty seats; a million Liberals could obtain only fourteen. In 1929, on the other hand, the Conservatives with 8,600,000 obtained 260, the Labour Party with less votes—8,300,000—obtained more seats—288. The unfortunate Liberals with five and a half million got fifty-nine. In that election therefore a million Labour men could get 34 seats, a million Liberals eleven. One Labour man had the voting power of three Liberals. In 1931 the whole situation was so fantastic that it is difficult to apply the ordinary party names. But, taking on the one hand the Ministerialists, and on the other hand the Labour opposition, 14 million Ministerialists obtained just under five hundred seats, nearly seven million Labour men—that is nearly half the same number of voters—obtained less than one-tenth the number of seats—46. Here a million Ministerialists get 34 seats, a million Labour voters get seven.

Now as things stand it is impossible to guess what the result of this great disproportion may be, because the Ministerialists went to the country with no clear programme except to defeat the Labour Party. The result may be a revolution to the Right, such as Lord Beaverbrook desires; involving permanent protective tariffs, the destruction of the League of Nations, and the re-establishment of a militant imperialism and Heaven knows what besides; or it may be the sort of policy, entirely non-revolutionary, that commends itself to Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Baldwin. We cannot say whether there will be a revolution to the Right or no. But supposing the election had gone the other way, and every million of Labour voters had obtained 34 seats, while a million Conservatives had only seven, and that consequently Labour came back to power with a majority—an utterly factitious and undeserved majority—of 400 seats, would not that quite certainly mean a revolution to the Left?

You may say that such a violent swing of the pendulum is out of the question. I do not feel so sure. Suppose that the present Government had bad luck; suppose our tariffs produced complete cessation of international trade, involving great distress at home; suppose the winter produced a Bolshevik revolution in

Germany, and an invasion of that country by France; suppose, owing to our inability to pay our war-debts, the American Government seized our securities; suppose an outbreak of civil war in India or some further disastrous consequences from Japan's aggression in the Far East; it would only want a moderate dose of such misfortunes, in addition to the ordinary swing of the pendulum, to bring us near to an anti-Tory panic as strong as the anti-Labour panic of 1931. But no such extreme hypothesis is necessary. It does not need a Labour majority of 400, nor 300, nor 200; any strong Socialist majority, even if it represented a minority of the country, would be enough to bring about at least a determined effort towards revolution. I do not pronounce any opinion whether such a revolution would be right or wrong, nor yet whether an orgy of extreme nationalism and Imperialism would be worse or better; I only appeal to all reasonable citizens to agree in Heaven's name that we ought not to be plunged into revolutions unless the country really wishes it.

Thus we must recognise that the present representative system is not fair: the majority in the House of Commons does not represent the real majority of the people.

Next, the system should be stable. That is to say, it should on the whole ensure that, when gusts of passion or terror sweep the country, Parliament should not be more violently affected than the people as a whole, but, if possible, less violently. With P.R. there would doubtless have been a Conservative majority in the famous Khaki election of the Boer War, in the Coupon Election of 1919, the Red Letter Election of 1924, and the hitherto unnamed election of 1931; and quite rightly so. But there would not have been a complete submergence of all liberal or moderate opinion, nor yet a general annihilation of those public men who dared to oppose the flood. Such men are of the very greatest value in Parliament. But under the present system they are apt to be defeated and turned out of public life just when they are wanted most. The stabilising power of Proportional Representation has seldom been better illustrated than by the recent experience of Germany—though the case of Ireland has been perhaps equally impressive. From the time of Stresemann onwards there has been in Germany a growing movement of passionate discontent, due partly to economic distress, partly to a sense of never-ceasing injustice in political matters and the continued failure of the victorious Powers to fulfil their obligations in respect of Disarmament, partly to the psychological disturbances produced by military defeat in a people accustomed to a somewhat arrogant superiority. With our electoral system there would probably have been first a Nationalist Government, with a programme of treaty-rejection

and re-armament; then, when that form of madness led to catastrophe, a Communist Government and civil war. As it is the discontent has grown and grown, but there has been no revolution: and if there comes in course of time a nationalist majority and a change of Government, the defeated parties will still be present in sufficient strength to prevent chaos.

The third requisite seems to me almost equally important. At present, I believe, it is rather difficult for any thinking person to get the sort of representative he really desires. For my own part—and I see that Lord Snowden has had exactly the same experience—during some forty years of strong interest in politics, I have never yet been represented in Parliament by a member in whom I had confidence or whom I should have dreamed of choosing as a political leader or guide. I do not think that this is accidental. It is a natural result of the system. At present, for example, this country, like most others, is suffering from a severe economic and financial crisis. You would have thought, in such a situation, that it would naturally call to a share in the government or at least to a place in parliament, the best economists that could be found. But has that been done? I am told there has hardly ever been a House in which so many members were entirely ignorant of even the elements of economics. You will say that I want the country to be governed by Professors. Not at all—though the only country which has tried that experiment, Czechoslovakia, has done remarkably well! But I do very emphatically believe that, when the welfare of the nation depends on financial and economic action, parliament should be able to hear the advice and criticism of those who have made a disinterested study of finance and economics. Those who have made interested studies will be there in abundance; people who know exactly how a tariff may be framed so as to help their own business or injure a rival. But the disinterested student does not command enough votes.

There is an old saying of the Duke of Wellington which is generally quoted as an example of his extreme Toryism. He said of the system of "rotten boroughs" that it was so useful to the country, and yet so clearly had not come about by any human contrivance, that "it almost seemed to him an emanation of some Higher Mind." After all, the Duke was not a fool. He meant that by means of the rotten boroughs people of brains and originality could be introduced into Parliament, provided, of course, that they could win the approval of a patron. No one will defend the rotten boroughs now; but the one good thing which they sometimes did achieve, the election of people like Edmund Burke, can easily be brought about by the adoption of

P.R. without any of the attendant disadvantages. In a constituency which returned five or more members there would almost certainly be a sufficient number of really intelligent electors who, whatever their party, would like to vote for a good economist or, say, an expert on foreign affairs; and enough ordinary electors who, after satisfying their party feelings by their first and second preferences, would be willing to cast one of their remaining votes for a man who, whatever his defects from a party standpoint, knew more than most people about the subjects on which the country would have to take action.

I have laid stress on the usefulness of the expert, and on the unfair way in which the present system is weighted against him. But it is weighted almost as heavily against the moderate or reasonable candidate. No doubt I am prejudiced: prejudiced in favour of Liberalism, of which I see too little, in favour of Education of which I see too much. You will allow for those prejudices. But I cannot help remembering a particular election which I believe to be fairly typical. There were three candidates, as usual. A rather uneducated but wealthy Protectionist; an equally uneducated but not wealthy Trade Unionist; a rather well educated Liberal, who also seemed to my prejudiced eye rather intelligent; all three perfectly decent and respectable people.

The first move in the game was for the Tories to accuse the Trade Unionist of being a Bolshevik and having fomented the General Strike. Then the Tory candidate's wife explained with tears in her eyes that in Russia—a country about which she did not seem well informed—the marriage tie was abolished and that the women of the constituency, if they voted for the Trade Unionist, would vote for throwing all women an indiscriminate prey to the lust of the Reds. Result: a wave of wild determination to keep that villain out of the House at all costs. But meantime the Labour Party were successfully explaining to sympathetic audiences that the Tory not only wished to raise prices and to reduce wages, but that he was also longing to deluge India in blood and to start another Great War in Europe. Result: a violent wish to keep *that* villain out. No doubt there were also promises made on both sides; but fear and hatred are stronger emotions than their opposites, and without doubt the main motive with the mass of voters was to vote as hard as possible against what they feared and hated, not to choose carefully what they thought best. Many thousands of people would have preferred to be represented by the Liberal, but they were told that he had no chance and that, if they voted for him, they would be wasting their votes and letting in the object of their terror. So they voted in droves for a candidate of whom they disapproved in the hope of keeping out

the one whom they dreaded. Under P.R. they could have chosen the one in whom they really believed.

It is worth noticing, before we pass on, that of these three disadvantages of the present system which would be remedied by P.R., the first would be partly helped by the Alternative Vote, the second and third not improved at all. With the Alternative Vote, the electors would less often be represented by the candidate whom they hated most of all, so that the House would be rather less a caricature of the nation than at present. On the other hand, the instability would be much the same as now, and so would the difficulty of choosing the representative whom you really want. I greatly hope that, when the time for decision comes, Parliament will not be led astray either by the Alternative Vote, or by those various substitutes for P.R. which depend on artificial devices for giving party organisations control over the lists. The French and other European electoral systems have all been vitiated by arrangements of this kind.

Among the objections to P.R. a large number are merely due to misunderstanding or ignorance; for example, those which are based on the supposed difficulty of the average elector in knowing how to add up the votes. Of course he has not got to add up the votes—a business which is done by skilled persons; he has only to vote, which is quite easy. Or again, those which are based on a misunderstanding of the figures at the Oxford University election and elsewhere. The arrangement at Oxford gave just a faint chance to a candidate who was not an official Conservative, whereas, without P.R. he would have had no chance whatever. But of course the effect of P.R. is not great unless the constituency is rather larger, so as to return five or at least three members. Before the invention of wireless there was a serious difficulty about these large constituencies. It seemed impossible for a candidate adequately to make himself known to his electors. But broadcasting has solved that problem.

Of the practical objections there are two which seem to me to be worth consideration. The first is that felt by many Radicals and probably also by many Whigs. It is that the traditional and successful British system is to have two parties and no more. By the spirit of the British Constitution, as Mr. Gilbert puts it, "Every little boy or gal that comes into this world alive, is either a little Liberal or else a little Conservative." If we go on, they argue, middle parties will disappear, and a liberalised Conservative Party will be left, confronting a party consisting of Radicals and Socialists, and politics will be normal again; one party will have a homogeneous majority, whereas if we adopt P.R. three parties will certainly remain and a larger number may

easily come into being. Well, I want more parties to come into being. If you tell me I must vote either for a Tory or for a Socialist, I am not content. I may, in practice, find myself in practical agreement on most immediate questions with many people in both those parties, but that generally means that the people in question are not good party men. I have no objection to the increase of Socialism: indeed I think it both probable and desirable. Fifty years ago any large amount of centralised state management would not have worked because the state had nothing like enough knowledge at its disposal. But all through the nineteenth century there has been a rapid increase of the knowledge at the disposal of the Government. In *Bleak House* there is a vivid description of a London slum called Tom-All-Alone's. When Dickens wrote no government official knew about Tom-All-Alone's: its sanitation, its inhabitants, its children, its diseases, and, for the most part, its crimes, were all a *terra incognita*. Now its drains are inspected, its water supply is guaranteed, its children are identified and sent to school and medically inspected. An official at Whitehall can tell you, with a little notice, the condition of the teeth or the eyes of any one of them. Obviously, therefore, Whitehall is now in a position to make decisions and rules about Tom-All-Alone's with knowledge and a good prospect of doing it well. I believe that the growth of theoretic Socialism has largely come about through this perfectly sound line of reasoning. But of course the fighting force of the Labour Party is only to a small degree dependent on theoretic Socialism. It goes for Socialism partly because it is disappointed in the results of political freedom; partly because it is disposed to accept despotic government if it can be sure that the despotism is exercised by or on behalf of the labouring class. Thus Socialism is a confused whole; and I do not see how a mere division of parties into Socialist and anti-Socialist can possibly cover the ground. And that, with universal suffrage, should always be possible.

If, again, I try for a moment to distinguish between the way I naturally look at political questions and that followed by my Conservative friends, I should say it was a difference not of kind, but of degree. I, while attaching importance to custom and instinct, believe greatly in using the critical intellect and conscience, and recognising frankly that some of the things we are in the habit of doing or feeling are mistaken and some actually wrong. I want to make a constant effort to criticise and improve. They, while not entirely objecting to the introduction of a certain leaven of reasoning and of conscientious scruples, point out with great force that experience is a much better guide than logic, that the most successful political societies have not been those which

contained numbers of brilliant thinkers, but those in which tradition and habit have been strong, in which there have been fairly clear limits as to what is done and what is not done, and where every official knows how another will behave in a given crisis. If enlightenment and the acceptance of new ideas are in themselves desirable, it must be remembered that on the whole there are many more wrong new ideas than right ones, and that what is called enlightenment does not always deserve the name. Let us make sure of preserving our civilisation before we alter it.

That is all true; I fully admit the Conservative case, though personally I do not feel there is any danger of the mass of mankind thinking too acutely or moving too fast or questioning too severely their customary ways and pleasures. But here again I do not feel that the difference between Conservative and anti-Conservative adequately covers the ground. There are far more differences than that.

Conservative versus Liberal, Individualist versus Socialist, Upper-dog versus Under-dog, Nationalist versus Internationalist, Protectionist versus Free Trader: to say nothing of people specially interested in the Navy, in Education, in Prison Reform, or Divorce Reform or the Rights of Women, or P.R. or Co-partnership—all such have real principles to express, and ought to have means of expression. Sometimes one antithesis, sometimes another will be specially prominent. The advantages for practical purposes of coming together and holding together in one great party are so clear and strong that I do not greatly fear the formation of a large number of absolutely independent groups. The groups will be mostly inside the larger parties, but the groups ought to have a fair means of expression. It was not satisfactory that Sir John Gorst could not get into Parliament to work for Educational Reform unless he first satisfied the Tory Whips, or that T. W. Russell could not work for Irish Land Reform except by first swallowing Home Rule, which he hated. I think that Lord Cecil—if he were not otherwise suitably provided for—ought without question to be able to get into the House of Commons as a representative of those who put the League of Nations first, or extremely high, among their political views, without having first to satisfy the Tory Whips or the Labour Whips or even the more amiable but less influential Liberal Whips, that he agrees with the whole of their policy. Political cohesiveness is a great quality; it is one of the very greatest. Lack of cohesiveness is a fatal fault and is the curse of almost all progressive parties. But I am inclined to think that cohesiveness will actually be rather increased than diminished by the admission of greater freedom. An iron party discipline is useful for fighting purposes.

It is appropriate to small opposition parties who cannot get a hearing, like the Parnellites, or the Labour Party under Keir Hardie. But it certainly does not make for sweetness and light, nor yet for sincerity. A party never does consist of persons who think exactly alike on all political subjects: why should it pretend to do so? A party consists of a number of people who are in sufficient general agreement together, and general disagreement from rival bodies, to enable them to act together in harmony. The same in a different degree is true of a Cabinet. I confess that I rather welcome Sir H. Samuel's statement that he and his three colleagues who dissent from the Government's tariff proposals will, on the one hand, stay in the Government, and on the other hand state freely the grounds of their dissent—provided of course that they really feel sufficient broad grounds of agreement and co-operation with the rest of the Government to outweigh that one very serious difference. It is all a question of degree and proportion; but, whichever way the balance inclines, I think that a reasonable amount of freedom and frankness helps more towards effective co-operation than would any apparent unity of front based upon coercion or humbug.

I suppose that at one time the two-party hypothesis worked. Now, however, with the increase of the electorate and the immense diversity of issues that are before the world, both social and international, we have to provide for the representation of more than two schools of thought. We had better make up our minds to it, and then we shall quarrel less.

There is one further objection to Proportional Representation which at one time weighed with me a good deal. It is this. One of the most obvious and most serious defects about the modern democratic form of government is its incapacity for clear decisive and continuous action. In private life, when an able man at the head of a business decides on a change of policy, or on the starting of a new enterprise, he forms his plan, draws the necessary consequences, makes the necessary preparations and acts more or less consistently. It is notorious how far most, or perhaps all, democratic governments fall short of this ideal. They are beset by the need of prevarication, of compromise, of not pressing home a point that might rouse sleeping difficulties, of not drawing, or at least not mentioning, consequences which may have escaped the opposition's notice. Can you imagine, for example, a body of individuals who had signed a contract behaving as the Governments of the world are behaving about some points connected with the League of Nations? They have all agreed that they will not use poison gas; yet they are all making elaborate preparations for using it, accompanied by extremely cruel experiments.

They have all agreed that in certain circumstances they will "immediately" apply a joint boycott or blockade against a war-maker. Yet, when they were asked by the Secretariat whether they had taken any steps to consider possible plans for putting such a boycott or blockade into effect, it appeared that only two out of fifty-five had done so. They have made full arrangements for doing the thing they have promised not to do, but no arrangements at all for the thing they are pledged to do! That is democracy, it is said. And the more perfect your democratic system of representation, the greater will be the total of confusion and untrustworthiness.

The objection is plausible, but I think there is a conclusive answer. In the first place, the argument proves too much; it would condemn not merely P.R. but the whole idea of democracy. If you want at all costs to get a decisive majority in parliament whatever the feeling of the country may be, then surely you should do the thing properly. Have a system like that of fascist Italy, in which you first secure that one party—and that your own party—has a majority and then multiply that majority out of all recognition. Do not have a system like ours which may not give you a majority at all, which may give a majority in Parliament to a minority of the electors, and which is specially calculated at every general election to upset the policy of the last government.

But furthermore, I believe that the psychology implied in this argument is wrong. A parliament elected under P.R. would feel much more confident that it expressed the real feeling of the country and that consequently there was no serious danger of its policy being reversed at the next General Election. It might be modified: if the balance was close it might be turned the other way. But there would not be the same paralysing fear that there is now of a wholesale reversal. Thus policy would be more continuous and consistent.

I think we have learned a good deal from the working of the unanimity rule in the Committees of the League of Nations. I do not of course mean that there ought to be such a rule in the House of Commons; but the League Committees have shown how a minority, when it knows that it is not simply to be voted down, tends to become reasonable, and not to act as a pure opposition. Under P.R. the forces of pure opposition will be smaller, while those of unattached criticism will be greater, which ought surely to be a more healthy state of things. These are all minor points, and my suggestions are mere conjecture, if not mere prophecy. What seems to me beyond conjecture is the utter impropriety

of deliberately propping up a system as dangerous as ours has now become.

John Bright in a certain difficult situation said he put his trust in "Justice, the worker of miracles." Democracy is based on a general expectation that the average citizen, when not exasperated by a sense of injustice, will vote with a fair amount of conscientiousness and common sense; it is when he thinks he is being cheated that he turns nasty. It seems to me pretty clear that, though of course various economic, ethical and psychological considerations are far more important factors in a nation's political success than the details of the voting system, we must, if Parliamentary Government is to continue, do our best to satisfy the voter's sense of fair play. We want a system which will give an assurance to the average citizen that he will have a chance of voting for a representative whom he really approves, and that, if outvoted, he will be outvoted by a real majority of his fellow-countrymen and not a lucky or ingenious minority; an assurance to serious students of politics that there may be a place for them in public life, even if they are not expert vote-catchers; an assurance to those entering Parliament that, if they do well and are trusted by their parties, they will have a fair prospect of continuous work and not be suddenly flung into the street at the height of their powers by the chances of a trick election; an assurance to the nation as a whole that its course will be fairly steady and not a perpetual zig-zag, and above all that it will not be plunged into violent and revolutionary adventures except by its own genuine will.

GILBERT MURRAY.

THE CRISIS IN THE DANUBIAN STATES.

SOME months ago the Central European capitals were toured by Sir Clive Morrison-Bell, who was exhibiting a simple representation of the fiscal folly of Europe—more especially of those little States which he visited. This was a map-model of this continent, in which the tariff walls separating each country from its neighbours were represented by bricks. One saw at a glance how brick after brick had been added since the war, until some States looked like gloomy lift-shafts, which the fresh winds of inter-State commerce could hardly reach. It would be interesting if this enthusiast for fiscal sanity could go on tour with his model again. If he did so, he would have to roof in several of his lift-shaft countries with the financial restrictions which have completed the process of stifling the interchange of products. Hungary would be practically sealed up already, Austria but little better, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria more than half roofed in, Czechoslovakia with the rafters already in position, and Rumania awaiting only the word "go" to seclude herself financially from the rest of the world in the same way.

The expression "financial restrictions" is a very loose one with which to describe what is being done in a greater or less degree now in these Danubian countries. There are, of course, "financial restrictions" in Great Britain—one would rather say that there is a "supervision" of financial transactions. This is obviously an inevitable measure for a non-gold-standard country with a managed currency. It bears little or no relation to the "financial dictatorship" invented during the war in Germany, applied for years in Soviet Russia, and now blindly adopted by a number of other nervous or panic-stricken States, haunted by memories of post-war inflation and of the nightmare days of unlimited depreciation. The situation which has been created is quite grotesque. Little Hungary is bankrupt, thanks to reckless over-borrowing and the spendthrift policy of Count Bethlen's government. But she is "on the gold standard." Although she has declared a moratorium, the pengő remains "stable," while the currency of mighty Britain has "fallen." The "paper pound" fetches in Budapest to-day some 18 pengős instead of the normal 27. That is to say, this is what the Hungarian National Bank, by virtue of its "financial dictatorship," declares that it must fetch—this is all that any bank is allowed to pay for it. But the Hungarian merchant who wants sterling to pay for his imports is forbidden to buy it except through the National Bank, which has practically none to give him, as almost all the foreign currency which can be scraped together is seized by the

State to pay such of its foreign debts as it has not already declared itself unable to pay. He is, anyhow, unable to import fresh goods without a licence from the National Bank, which it is naturally almost impossible to obtain. In addition he is often unable to pay for those which he has already imported.

To such an extent do the finance ukases (of Hungary and Austria especially) destroy the rights of private property that one of Austria's leading merchants, Kommerzialrat Julius Meinl, the "Coffee King of Central Europe," has described them in a warning pamphlet just issued under the title of *Sieg der Vernunft oder Katastrophe** as "the first and most important step towards State Socialism, the Russian form of which is called Bolshevism." The financial dictatorship simply inverts many of the rules of ordinary commercial decency—one might say even of common honesty. To pay one's debts to the foreign supplier, for example, is no longer an everyday virtue, but a crime. So it is to take up credits offered abroad, to remit money abroad to poverty-stricken relations or charitable objects, to cash a cheque at one's bank and take the proceeds abroad wherewith to pay travelling and holiday expenses. Your bank has accepted from you dollars or you have paid sterling to your insurance company for years on a policy payable in sterling. Both bank and insurance company not only may but must break their written contract and repay you only in the national currency, given them at a fictitious value fixed by the National Bank for your property (foreign exchange) which that Bank seized overnight without so much as a by-your-leave. You may be a London merchant who, trusting in the ordinary laws of commercial and financial morality, has paid in sterling to a bank in Vienna or Budapest. If so, you have lost it, and the fact that you do not live in Austria does not help you at all. You have a useless balance of schillings or pengös in the foreign bank, which you are not allowed to take abroad or to spend on re-purchasing your vanished sterling. For a time a way out was found by paying a small commission to find British firms anxious to pay in Vienna for goods already in Great Britain, and getting them to employ for the purpose the "frozen" schilling balances in Vienna of other British firms, but the latest Austrian currency regulation under discussion at the moment of writing seeks to make this illegal also. The British merchant living in Vienna or Budapest has actually to surrender his sterling balance lying in London to the Austrian (or Hungarian) National Bank—an enforced "flight from the pound."

The general effect is not such as should encourage other

* *The Danger of Foreign Exchange Restrictions*. By Julius Meinl. (Obtainable from Jones and Evans, Booksellers, 77, Queen Street, E.C.)

countries to bury their heads in the sand of the artificial maintenance of parity. In Germany the first idea of these restrictions in war time, with their accompanying measures of price control, was to lull the public into a false sense of security—into an unfounded belief in the strength of the mark and in the existence of sufficient supplies, prices remaining "stable." That is the kind of expedient which works only once in a century. Newspapers may not publish in these countries anything tending to depreciate public confidence in the national currency, but that is of no avail. Public confidence in the Hungarian pengö, for example, is practically non-existent in Hungary, and the Austrian is only a little more satisfied with the stability of schillings. "That is real money," one can hear anywhere in Hungary where a sound foreign currency is produced; there is a secret (and criminal) quotation for the dollar in Budapest which is just double the official rate.

Why, it may be asked, are no protests made by Britain and other countries whose trade with the "financial dictatorship" countries has been brought to an almost complete standstill? The answer is that what is death to the trader and manufacturer is fun to the investor and banker. Trade and industry in these countries are being bled of foreign exchange primarily to enable the State to pay interest on its foreign loans without exhausting its stock of foreign "gold-standard" bills and currencies on which the note-issue is chiefly based. There are even representatives of the League of Nations Financial Committee—that is to say in the last resort, of the great foreign financial houses—sitting in Budapest and Vienna to see, not only that every economy is observed by the State, but that every available penny of foreign currency is secured for the foreign investor—which means that the foreign exporter cannot sell to these countries because he cannot get paid. It is, in fact, just another round in the long battle between the bankers and the manufacturers.

Professor Friedmann, Administrator Delegate of one of the big Budapest banks, has just written an interesting article blaming the banks, above all the Bank of England, for the present position. He charges it with giving Hungary and the other "defeated" countries too much money. The Bank, he said, by means of its own and borrowed funds, from 1924 on provided these countries through the League with generous credits on which, instead of, as heretofore, on gold, their new currencies were based. The financiers encouraged these countries to obtain short-term loans, even when these were obviously for the purpose of settling an unfavourable balance of payments. But this purely financial solution disregarded economics; with the credits each little Danubian State tried to build up artificial industries behind high

tariff walls. Over-production was bred by the artificial boom in the victor countries until the supply of credits was exhausted or these were immobilised.

The question of public confidence has a great deal to do with these measures. Great Britain, whose population, thanks to its appreciation of the strength and resources of the Empire, is largely unperturbed when sterling depreciates by more than 20 per cent., can afford to let sterling find its natural level through the operation of the law of supply and demand. The populations of Austria and of Hungary, however, have no such confidence. They know the national resources to be small. They have never forgotten the horrors of inflation and depreciation after the war, brought about by the indefatigability of the national note-printing presses. They know that they were given new stable currencies only thanks to powerful foreign backing. Any attempt to let their currencies find their own level, their Governments fear, would mean that at the first signs of a drop an uncontrollable panic would set in, the consequence of which would be not merely national but international disaster. Austrian business men disagree, pointing out that there is no comparison between the concealed, limited inflation due to the National Bank having discounted so many bills of the insolvent Credit Anstalt that the cover for the circulation has largely disappeared, and the aimless, unlimited inflation after the war. In point of fact, the creditor nations would be bound to give support to the currencies of these debtor nations, but that support might prove expensive. So the expedient of artificial parity has been chosen—the schilling and the pengö do not “fall” while sterling does, because the two former have been withdrawn by these restrictions from the international money market and deleted from the foreign exchange quotations. They do not “fall”—but they have ceased to have any value abroad. Ultimately the exports of these countries will be throttled like the imports, since goods have to be paid for by goods. In addition Austria has lost most of her valuable tourist traffic, her most profitable post-war industry, partly because of the restrictions similar to her own imposed by other countries on their nationals spending money abroad and partly by the natural reluctance of the foreign tourist to accept in Austria an artificial rate of exchange for his currency. The value of sterling—that is to say, the price which the Austrian would pay to get hold of it were he permitted to—is certainly not far, if anything, below the par value of 34, but all that the Austrian National Bank will allow the English tourist to receive is some 23 or 24 schillings. So far as Austria is concerned, he is thus able to reinforce his patriotism with his natural antipathy to being “done”—and stay at home.

Although their nationals are subject to very similar restrictions, the financial position of Austria is very different from that of Hungary. The latter, as an agricultural and normally self-supporting country, is actually in a much worse financial position than her largely industrial neighbour, despite Austria's hundreds of smokeless smoke-stacks and factories kept idle by the loss of their inland markets on the dissolution of the Monarchy. For Hungary's inferior position two causes may be assigned: the world slump in wheat and other grain prices, meaning for Hungary a wild soaring (in “wheat-value”) of the prices of the industrial imports she needs, and over-borrowing. The total foreign indebtedness of this small agricultural country of 35,900 square miles and eight million inhabitants amounts to no less than 4,094,000,000 pengös, or £142,000,000 at par. The foreign indebtedness of Austria (32,360 square miles and a population of 6,500,000) is only some £83,000,000. Hungary's foreign debts are made up of 1,629,000,000 pengös State debts, and 2,465,000,000 pengös long, medium and short-term debts of public bodies, banks and general commercial debts. Of the total, 2,604,000,000 pengös are long-term and 1,490,000,000 pengös medium and short-term debts.

Making all allowance for the hardships inflicted on Hungary by the Peace Treaties in the shape of uneconomic frontiers and the burden of unemployable administrative officials thrown on her hands by the liberation of non-Magyar areas which she used to administer, there is no question but that Count Bethlen's administration must bear a big share of the blame for her present plight. It is obvious that no country of her limited size and natural resources (she has neither the minerals nor water-power to enable her to develop her industries to any great extent) could properly support such a load of foreign debt as this. Yet municipal borrowing supplemented, under Count Bethlen, that of the State, and Government guarantees were readily furnished. Glib-tongued British agents of the Hungarian Government (they are strangely silent nowadays) were active in London financial and newspaper circles keeping up the flow of British (and of American) money into Hungary. Many of the investors in these loans are hard hit by the recently proclaimed Hungarian moratorium; the League Loans and the Caisse Commune are so far exempt, but reliable Hungarian financial opinion believes that a reduction of interest rates on these also will prove inevitable before long. British investors in other loans are protesting against the above exemptions from the moratorium. The gigantic sums spent for years on military purposes, open or camouflaged, on irredentist propaganda all over the globe, and on fostering the *revanche* idea have done a good deal to bring about the present calamity. “The

Hungarian difficulties," says the League of Nations Report, have been aggravated by a scale of expenditure in recent years in excess of revenue, by excessive and often unproductive foreign borrowing and by insufficient credit control." To-day Hungary is repentant, and under Count Karolyi, who is stiffened by the presence in Budapest of the representative of the League of Nations Financial Committee, very strenuous efforts are being made to pay everything possible. This new spirit both needs encouragement and deserves recognition, for it will still be some time before the ruling feudal classes and the higher bureaucracy can accept the modest scale of national living wherewith Hungary's post-war position demands that she should content herself.

The Austrian crisis preceded and precipitated the Hungarian, but it is less severe. It may sound hard to insist, as the League has been doing, on economies and yet more economies in a country so hard hit as is Austria. This country, however, unlike Hungary, has not succeeded in over-borrowing, and should continue to meet all her liabilities if she is kept up to scratch. Yet her task can clearly be no light one. Her average annual adverse balance of trade is some £30 million. This has been partly covered by such "invisible exports" as shares in foreign concerns, banking, transport and educational services and tourist traffic. Her "international trade and services" amount to about 30 per cent. of the whole trade of the country. But every year she has had a deficit of about 10 to 12 million pounds on her balance of payments, which has been regularly covered by short and long-term credits, and further by the sale of Austrian interests abroad (in countries formerly belonging to the Monarchy). Yet her foreign indebtedness has increased all the time, until she has now to pay some £12,300,000 annually for interest and amortisation on account of foreign loans.

During this same period Austria's exports have been falling owing to the building up behind tariff walls of artificially encouraged industries in the territories which she used to supply and to her home consumption diminishing as economy necessitated cut after cut in salaries and pensions, and unemployment increased. Banks became deeply and more deeply involved in decaying industrial concerns. Rather than admit failure, they quietly amalgamated with apparently sounder banks; these in turn were dragged down by the "frozen credits" of the hopeless "concerns" taken over. The State finances became involved, as in the case of the Postsparkasse to the rescue of which the State came two years ago, or, in the last case, of the Credit Anstalt collapse of last summer, when the State found itself forced to guarantee the whole of that institution's foreign debts in order to persuade the British and

American creditors not to withdraw their short-term credits. Had they done so, it may be said, it would have wrecked not only the Credit Anstalt but the Austrian State finances. The National Bank cover in gold and foreign exchange for Austria's note issue dropped from 81.97 per cent. at the end of September 1930 to 28.1 per cent. last October, to 26.5 per cent. at the end of November and to 24 per cent. at the beginning of January. As a result, the Austrian National Bank has just had to notify certain foreign creditors for short and middle-term loans to Austrian banks (other than the Credit Anstalt) that it can no longer supply the foreign exchange required for the payment to them of amortisation on their credits. These payments were fixed only a few months ago; some 20 per cent. quarterly was to be paid on account of interest and amortisation; from now on interest only will be paid. The amount involved, some £2,000,000, is small compared with Austria's foreign indebtedness, but the action taken shows that the foreign currency control system is proving less successful than was expected.

There has, of course, been no deliberate inflation in Austria, and the Chancellor has given frequent and emphatic assurances that in no circumstances will this ever be resorted to. An unsatisfactory feature of the National Bank statements to-day, however, is the increase of advances to the Credit Anstalt. The National Bank is, of course, prohibited from lending money to the Government, but lending money to the insolvent Credit Anstalt on bills backed by the Government seems to be something like the same thing. This institution is still the Achilles heel of Austrian finance.

The continuation of the old system of borrowing abroad to meet the deficiency on the balance of payments has been brought to a standstill by the world economic crisis, and Austria is faced with the necessity of the most rigid economy in public and private finance. Statistics of imports and consumption of necessities show that the people are already feeling the pinch. Austria can cover her national requirements in respect of potatoes and rye, but has to import 50 per cent. of her wheat. She is checking the import of meat (with consequent increasing prices) by an Act which limits the number of imported beasts which may be sent to the various markets. Her currency restrictions, of course, act as a general import prohibition which can be tightened or relaxed for various products at the will of the Government by the simple process of regulating the sparse allotment of foreign currency available for importers. Actual import restrictions are now under consideration.

January was a critical month for Austria on account of the large foreign payments then due. She was still hoping that France would come to her aid with a small part of the loan which she expected

in August in return for the renunciation of the plan for a customs union with Germany on which she had set such high hopes. Now she limits her ambitions to the receipt of a credit of 60 million schillings which the French are said to have expressed their willingness to grant through the Bank of International Settlements in December, but which was not made available on the ground that her position was "not sufficiently critical" to warrant it. When Hungary declared her transfer moratorium, it was suggested in some quarters in Austria that if she pointed out how close she was to following Hungary's example, the B.I.S. and the French might change their attitude. The general desire is, however, to avoid at all costs either suggesting or declaring such a moratorium. For a desperate effort to placate France, Dr. Schober has just been forced out of the Cabinet.

I have just returned to Vienna from a round tour of Budapest and Prague. To encounter the life and bustle of the latter city after the ominous stillness of Budapest and the comparative stagnation of Vienna is to feel that one has left the "crisis area" altogether. It is an impression which, unfortunately, it will not long be possible to receive in Prague, for, with the financial disasters of her neighbours, Czechoslovakia is losing all her principal markets — Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia. These were her principal customers and suppliers: together with Great Britain, her next best customer; about one-half of her exports to Britain will be lost owing to tariffs and sterling depreciation; they accounted for 57 per cent. of her foreign trade last year. To-day Germany, by far her biggest customer and supplier, has to restrict foreign imports to a minimum. Austria and Hungary cannot even get the foreign exchange to pay for past imports; Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia are better off, but still badly affected; Yugoslavia has already travelled a great deal of the road towards full currency restrictions. "As long as our neighbours were financed by foreign credits," the Premier, M. Udrzal, remarked while I was in Prague, "we got on all right, but now that these have ceased, we find ourselves paying for imports in cash but getting no cash payments for our exports to these neighbours—in short, it is the beginning of financial anæmia."

Czechoslovakia's State finances are in a healthy condition, but, like Austria and Hungary, she suffered during the past critical summer from the storm of short-term creditors eager to see their money back. Director Kutchera, of the National Bank, told me that she repaid the whole of the 70,000,000 crowns called for; 30,000,000 she was not even asked to repay, and some short-term money has even begun to flow back from abroad. She has already started to employ such currency restrictions as she has in order

to restrict luxury imports. To prevent the drain of foreign exchange which had set in to Vienna and Budapest, she has been compelled to subject imports and exports to licence, authorising the National Bank to take over all foreign exchange reaching the country, but at the normal rate, not as in Vienna and Budapest at a "gold" rate fixed by the National Bank of each country because the national currencies have been withdrawn from international money markets. Czechoslovakia has already had to reduce her Budget by 7 per cent. and it is *via factis* to be reduced another 7 per cent. by the Government.

The influence of the crisis on Rumania has been marked by a number of bank failures, notably by that of the famous banking house of Marmarosch, Blank and Co., three months ago; but so far, although the economic situation has for over a year been deplorable and great distress prevails among the peasantry, the country has escaped dictatorship by finance ukases. In Yugoslavia there was a general run on the banks some months ago, and restrictions on withdrawals were imposed. Then currency reprisals were instituted against Hungary and Austria to prevent the regulations of these countries producing "financial anæmia" in Yugoslavia. Now these have been extended into general defensive currency restrictions. The situation in Bulgaria is similar, and it has already been found necessary there, as in Yugoslavia, to refuse the allotment of foreign exchange for a long string of articles classified as "luxuries."

No one could claim for this fungoid growth of financial dictatorship, which inevitably spreads from one country to another as the poorer begin by its operation to drain their neighbours of foreign currency, that it is anything but a temporary expedient. It is directed so to restrict imports as to produce a "favourable balance of trade" in default of foreign credits for each country which adopts it. If it went on long enough, the countries which held out longest against financial isolation would find themselves engaged in producing "favourable balances" for the rest of the world—a warm-hearted procedure which would naturally burden these last stalwarts with gigantic adverse balances. No one, however, ventures to look as far ahead as that; for the moment each drowning man clutches at this spar and hopes it will bear the additional weight. In Austria and in Hungary, financial circles talk gloomily of at least two years of this sort of thing lying ahead. By such time isolation will have forced back their standard of living and culture a couple of centuries.

Nothing much is being done at present—nothing much can be done—to alleviate matters. A system of "clearing agreements" is being devised. Such agreements are already in force between, for example, Austria on the one hand and Switzerland, Hungary

and Greece on the other; Austria is negotiating further such treaties. They are clumsy affairs and are not proving successful. To free merchants from the necessity of procuring foreign exchange to pay for imports it is arranged that Swiss debtors of Austria shall pay francs into the Swiss National Bank instead of to the Austrian exporter; the Austrian importer pays schillings into the Austrian National Bank. The two National Banks keep one another informed of the payments, and each pays its own exporter in the inland currency received from the importer. The idea is to keep imports and exports to each country about equal—a difficult matter to arrange to the satisfaction of traders. And if it saves Austria from having to sacrifice foreign exchange to pay for imports, it prevents her, of course, from acquiring foreign exchange wherewith to pay interest on foreign loans for exports to exactly the same amount.

The only constructive idea for improvement is that of "Danube Co-operation." I discussed it in Prague with Dr. Benes and other leading statesmen, financiers and business men. Owing to mutual distrust it seems unlikely that it will come to anything. France supports it because she is obsessed with the idea of preventing the German-Austrians from ever uniting with the Germans of the Reich. Germany, where plans for a customs union with Austria were wrecked this summer by French hostility, is naturally strongly opposed to the idea, the more so as it would put up fresh barriers between herself and such important markets as Czechoslovakia, Austria, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Italy is violently opposed to the creation of a big economic unit to replace the Habsburg Monarchy, to be created under French patronage. Austrian and Hungarian Clerical opinion supports an economic union of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary because it believes that together they could swamp the Czech elements and prepare the way for a Habsburg restoration. Czechoslovakia will hear nothing of this limited but close union, but supports the idea of "economic co-operation" (without customs union and with no political angle) between the Little Entente, Austria and Hungary. Czechoslovakia and Austria would gain the economic advantage of big markets for their industrial products, but the feeble industries of the agrarian States, especially Hungary, would suffer. Hungary and Austria are apprehensive of this ultimately resulting in political control by the Little Entente elements, despite Czech disclaimers. There is no sign of the Danubian States being able to find their own way out of the gloomy forest of financial despotism; on the contrary, they can only wander still further into its depths. Rescue can come only from outside.

G. E. R. GEDYE.

GOETHE AFTER A CENTURY.

A HUNDRED years ago, in the little city of Weimar, Goethe at eighty-two was waiting for the spring. He had lived for fifty-six years in that raw Thuringian climate, but though he had suffered more than one serious illness, the vigour of his constitution had always carried him through. There had, indeed, till lately, appeared to be no reason why he should not, like his own Faust, attain the full century.

He could look back on a wonderful vista of years and strange vicissitudes of fortune. For long he had spent much of his time in a contemplation of his own life, which had come to attain for him objective significance. Autobiography bulks large among his writings, and it was mainly the product of his later decades. For twenty years now he had been occupied with that attempt to show the eternal verities behind the shifting phenomena of his own life to which he gave the title *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Poetry and Truth. It was not to be a mere mixture of fact and fiction, but a work conceived in the spirit of the words he puts in the mouth of the Lord in the Heavenly Prologue of *Faust*:

Und was in schwankender Erscheinung schwebt,
Befestiget mit dauernden Gedanken.

That great work was unfortunately only a fragment, and hence the sub-title: *From my Life*. Yet if it covered only the first twenty-six of his eighty-two years, they were the years most crowded with change and stir and movement—Goethe's entrancing youth. His thoughts in his old age had gone back to the time of his arrival in Weimar more than half a century ago, and farther back still, to his Frankfurt life and conditions of existence which formed a striking contrast to the ceremonious dignity of these later years. He saw himself living as a small child in an old house, a picturesque timbered sixteenth-century building, which is familiar to us from his loving description of it, but of which no actual representation survives to-day.

His grandmother, Cornelia, was still alive; it was in fact her house and her married son and his family were her lodgers. He knew quite well that inn, standing in the chief street of the town, the Zeil, where she had lived with her husband, the farrier's son from the little town of Artern on the Unstrut, thirty miles due north of this Weimar where he was now writing. He saw himself and his sister, Cornelia, dressed as youthful shepherd and shepherdess in that rococo family group by Seekatz, along with his father and mother, and the four departed sisters and brothers as naked cherubs in the background. He had lately been reading

with astonishment a description of the first railway in England, and contrasted it with the time when he first left home. The long journey to Leipzig had then been such an event that he did not, like a modern undergraduate, come home at the end of the term, but stayed there for his whole triennium. Most lovingly he dwelt on that spring of 1770 when he arrived as a youth of twenty in Strassburg, and the world was born again for him. Significant above all was the meeting with Herder, which, hanging as it did upon a double chance, might well encourage him in the teleological conception of the ordering of his existence. He thought of Friederike Brion, too, and enshrined that most poignant experience of his early days in a fragrant setting that has made of it for the German people the most famous, indeed the typical story of youth and spring-time and love.

With the return from Strassburg on his twenty-second birthday began the days of true Storm and Stress, the turbulent, tumultuous activities of those last Frankfurt years, when, as the author of *Götz* and *Werther*, he was for once in his life only the leader and the popular idol of his countrymen. He saw again the famous men who came with him to the house in the Grosse Hirschgraben. Once again in memory he passed up the fine staircase and over the spacious landings—the pride of his father's heart—to that attic-room where some of the most purely spontaneous creations of his genius took shape. So he brought the story down to the time of another fateful meeting—this time with a grand-nephew of Frederick the Great, the eighteen-year-old son of the lately widowed Duchess Anna Amalia of Saxe-Weimar. He had an invitation to go to Weimar, then a sleepy little residence of 6,000 inhabitants, with city walls and gates intact, a big village straggling at the doors of a castle, which occupied a third of its space. After sundry mishaps and much against his father's wishes, he had in the end gone there, and he, the lawyer from Frankfurt, who for all the recent upward movement of the family did not really belong even to the patricians of the town, had by the sheer magic of his personality captured the court and made himself indispensable. And now he had been living here for more than fifty-six years. He had, it is true, gone on many excursions and journeys and visits, had been three times in Switzerland and spent nearly two years in Italy. He even regarded himself as something of a traveller. "*Wo bin ich nicht überall gewesen*" he said to Eckermann in 1823, but he had never been even in Paris, to say nothing of London, and only once, many years before, in 1778, for a very short time in Berlin.

It was already six years now since Weimar had celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of his arrival, and the Duke had posted in all

public places in Weimar a proclamation in which he declared it to be one of the highest ornaments of his reign to have secured Goethe permanently for his state. And earlier in the same year, at the jubilee of the accession of Carl August, Goethe had stood beside the Duke to receive the acclamations of the assembled populace. Dignities and honours had been showered upon him; men from all lands had made the pilgrimage to Weimar to pay their homage to the patriarch of European letters. He had indeed raised high "the pyramid of his existence." He had been for sixty years the most famous writer among all German-speaking peoples, for more than half that time the leading man of letters of the world. And now a few months ago he had completed his life-work, *Faust*, and sealed up the manuscript as a token of finality. One is almost tempted to say that it was the thread that bound him to life, for he declared to Eckermann that he could now look upon the rest of his life as a pure gift, and it was a matter of indifference what he might further do.

Yet for all this fulfilment his life had grown very solitary in these last years. *Über Gräber vorwärts!* Wieland, Herder, Schiller were long departed, his mother and Anna Amalia had died in the early years of the century, Frau von Stein in 1827, Carl August in 1828, and, most overwhelming loss of all, his only son August in 1830 in Rome. He was left with a family circle comprising his daughter-in-law Ottilie, who had drawn nearer to him since August's death, and his three grand-children, Walter, Wolfgang and Alma, together with a few trusty friends. Since his last birthday his health had been very good, though from November he did not leave the house. It was a dull, rainy winter, but mild for Thüringen; in March there was already a promise of spring. On the 13th and 14th of March he went for his usual drives again—the last he ever took. On the 15th he was suffering from a severe chill, and had to keep his bed. Then there was an improvement, and it looked as though his fine constitution were once more going to prevail. He grew daily stronger, and took interest in his surroundings again. But in the night of Monday, the 19th March, he had a serious relapse. Yet even then, and to the last, Goethe appears to have had no thought that his end was so near. On March 22nd he asked the date, and when told replied: "Spring has begun then, and I shall get well all the quicker." He sat in the well-known arm-chair, which had only lately been added to the meagre furniture of his bedroom, attended by his secretary, John, and his man-servant Friedrich, while Ottilie was at his side. "Come, dear daughter, give me your hand," he said, and then—his last words: "Pray open the shutters and let in more light." Then he grew unconscious, the hand with which he had

been tracing letters in the air sank, and at half-past eleven on that Thursday morning he ceased to breathe.

So Goethe passed away a hundred years ago, in the fullness of years and honours, leaving behind him a stupendous accomplishment as the fruit of his unceasing labours throughout a very full span of human life. His many-sidedness has often been emphasised; he was not only a poet, but also among other things an artist, a man of science, and a statesman. Yet whatever he may have done in those fields it is in the written word that his enduring importance lies. His "Works" are a library in themselves; in the standard Weimar edition they comprise 132 volumes. Of all that vast output how much really lives to-day? After all the changes through which Goethe's fame and popularity have passed, which are the works generally known and read to-day, and not by the Goethe enthusiasts and the professional scholars alone? How far has Goethe, for his nation and the world, joined the "classics" who are taken for granted rather than enjoyed?

Among his writings are two "great" works, great in the sense of mere bulk, on both of which he was engaged throughout the major part of his life, *Wilhelm Meister* and *Faust*. *Wilhelm Meister* was for a time placed beside or even above *Faust*. For the Romantics it was an incomparable book of life, and its influence is written large in the subsequent history of the German novel, from Novalis' *Ofterdingen* to Jean Paul's *Titan*, Mörike's *Maler Nolten* and Keller's *Grüner Heinrich*. Yet in spite of that it has ceased to appeal to the modern taste. It has a diffuseness and want of homogeneity which, though it did not repel the Romantics, tends to tire the modern reader; it employs an old and somewhat clumsy machinery. It lacks the conciseness, the dramatic and psychological interest of the *Wahlverwandtschaften* by which it was followed, and is less original than *Werther's Leiden* by which it was preceded. Its interest is rather historical and critical to-day.

Among his narrative works we have, too, *Hermann und Dorothea*, which is perhaps the most complete reflection of Goethe's truly classic period. It also has a long line of descendants, extending with Hauptmann's *Anna* down to the present day. Nowhere do we recognise more clearly the plastic eye of the artist Goethe in these post-Italian years, and its familiarity is due in no small measure to the inspiration which painters drew from its visual imagery. For Germans at any rate it is, and will probably always remain, an essential part of their poetic landscape. Of the dramatic works of Goethe's youth, *Götz* and *Egmont* are still very much alive to-day; they are known to all German schoolchildren, and are often acted by them, even in the larger primary schools.

Iphigenie, with its lofty humanitarian idealism, and *Tasso* will always be prized, the latter, apart from its pure poetic worth, for its mellow picture of an ideal court, which is, in the transparency of its relation to Weimar, a splendid and undying monument to that court, as Goethe half knew it and half would have it be. In *Tasso*, too, one finds a ripe poetic sententiousness, which makes whole passages priceless as strings of precious stones.

And here we come to the heart of the matter. Apart from his purely lyric gift of which we shall speak presently, Goethe is best known to-day, and most alive, as the author of that amazing wealth of maxims and apophthegms, wise saws and sayings, in prose and in verse, which are scattered up and down the vast panorama of his work—that "Wisdom of Goethe" which, for those who have not the time to explore for themselves, has been garnered in many tongues. That part of Goethe appears to run no risk of falling into oblivion, but to grow steadily more and more alive; to be only now receiving the true estimate of its worth. In this connection one has to mention again, if from a fresh aspect, that sometimes prosy, but very profound work of Goethe's old age, *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, which in this country particularly has always enjoyed great favour, even though with us rather as a story than as a repository of Goethe's practical wisdom.

Of Goethe's "poems," by which is meant the lyrics, ballads and other short verses, there are not far short of a thousand; and of these a not insignificant number have become the common property of the whole world. Like Heine after him, he possessed in the highest degree the supreme gift of the lyrical poet, the gift of song, the music of speech. His poems have suggested countless settings to great composers, and been carried far and wide on the wings of their melodies. As has been truly said, he sang his way into the heart of the German people. Except Shakespeare no poet has stirred so many composers; among them are counted Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Schumann, Mendelssohn, Brahms. Schubert has set more than eighty of his songs. To give only a few of the more notable instances, *Erkönig*, *Der König in Thule*, *Heidenröslein* have each some fifty settings, Mignon's song, *Kennst du das Land*, more than seventy, and *Wandrers Nachtlied* (*Der du von dem Himmel bist*) nearly a hundred and twenty. And there is a long list of other songs with ten, twenty, thirty or more compositions to their credit.

Yet when all is said and done, there is one work that outtops them all. For the world at large that knows nothing or little of German literature Goethe is the author of *Faust*. And this is as it should be, for *Faust*, left uncompleted till the end, as though by intent or a higher dispensation, was the mirror of Goethe's

soul in youth, maturity and age. What *Faust* gained thereby in fullness it lost to be sure in artistic unity and certainly in dramatic effect, though the latter consideration is of little weight, for the virtues of *Faust*, as of Goethe's dramas generally, are not specifically dramatic virtues. Its universal appeal is due to the fact that it combines those two supreme excellencies of Goethe, his sententious wisdom and his lyric fire—the poet and the teacher in one. In it the highest flights of poetry are associated with countless lines which have become household words for their philosophy.

Here is found that lesson which Goethe never wearied of teaching: that not error, or wrong-doing, is the deadly sin, but sloth and stagnation. God himself did not create a static world, but all is in a state of creation. Not the thing created (*das Gewordene*) is the highest, but the state of creation itself (*das Werdende*), and Goethe ever and again contrasts those two terms. Eckermann quotes him as saying as late as February 13th, 1829: "The God-head is active in the living, and not in the dead; it is present in the evolving (*Werdende*) and changing, but not in the thing created (*Gewordene*) and at rest." Which, with due allowances, is strangely like the scientific doctrine to be found in Jeans' *Mysterious Universe*: "We find it impossible to think of the solar system as a finished product, the same to-day as when it came from the hand of its maker; we can only think of it as something continually changing and evolving, working out its own future from its past."

The opposite of our world, with its mixture of good and evil, of faith and doubt, would be a settled world, which required no effort, no inquiry, no struggle—all that to which the right kind of scepticism drives us on. The spirit of demoniac inquiry necessary for re-birth and re-creation is represented in Goethe's allegory by Mephistopheles, and God has no fear of it for his servant Faust. Better scepticism than dead dogma. This striving and search for truth is on the contrary the highest thing in man; so long as it endures he cannot be lost:

Wer immer strebend sich bemüht
Den können wir erlösen.

We can never attain to a *state* of victory over life, we must ever be conquering life afresh:

Das ist der Weisheit letzter Schluss:
Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben,
Der täglich sie erobern muss.

Yet though Goethe in the final version of his *Faust* came to deal profoundly with the great problems of human life, the religion

of the Faust-like type of modern man, for whom creed and dogma alone no longer suffice, that would not in itself make it one of the greatest works of the world's literature. Excellence of moral sentiments and philosophic depth cannot of themselves make a great work of art. The greatness of *Faust* lies in the fact that these fundamental interests of humanity are put before us, not as cold abstractions, but personified in the figures of an imaginative world glowing with life and actuality, in a work full of the richest poetic beauties, and as diversified and incommensurable as life itself. As with Shakespeare, we have sensuous pulsating life, in a poem of which not the general design alone, but the texture of every part is itself a wonder and a delight.

If then much in those 132 volumes has paid its toll to the passing years, much remains alive. If our account is right, it was given to Goethe to create many types of enduring vitality for his people—the representative love-story, the representative autobiography, the representative novel, the representative verse-epic, and incomparably the greatest single work of German literature. There can be no shadow of doubt about his being the representative German writer. He is the national poet in a fuller sense than could be claimed for a single poet of any other nation. He is also the universal German man, the mirror and symbol of his time. He undertook the stupendous heroic task of gathering together in his hands all the threads of his age. He was the last great encyclopædic, in the best sense of the word the last great dilettante. The more one learns of him, the more one is amazed at the sheer size, the bulk, the magnitude of the man. When one studies him on the spot, in Weimar, one comes almost to feel with bewilderment that here not one man but half a dozen Goethes must have been at work.

And for all that he was no mere book-worm, no pale philosopher lost in abstractions, with eyes turned inward and blinded to the sensuous delights of the world around him. He has been so overlaid by all kinds of philosophical interpretations that we are apt to forget the living personality, the man of flesh and blood. He was gifted with a wonderful bodily vigour and a commanding physical presence. A whole gallery of portraits has preserved his features for us, and we have eloquent descriptions of his beauty in youth, his handsome presence during his early and later middle years, and his dignity even in extreme old age. This combination of mental and physical traits constituted the rounded personality of Goethe throughout his life, from the early days when a spectator, seeing him in the part of Orestes in the production of his *Iphigenie* in 1779, declared that they all thought they

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beheld a veritable Apollo, and had never seen such a union of physical and intellectual beauty.

Goethe is the great optimist of the modern world; even his famous *Entsagung* is no pessimistic renunciation, but a calm acceptance of things as they are and a making the best of them. The legend of the "Olympian" Goethe of his final years has been shattered, it is true. There is a tendency to dwell too much on the sorrows and trials of the end of his life, but in drawing this gloomy picture we must not overlook the courage which Goethe's philosophy gave him to bear them, and the pleasure which his "acceptance" enabled him to take in the blessings that were left to him. He had no patience with the whiners and repiners, with those who hugged their morbid sorrows. All those who want comfortable, easy dogma, pretty-pretty sentiment and a facile optimism must go elsewhere, for they will not find what they want with Goethe. But all those who are willing to face the bare facts of life, to renounce, that is to accept life as it is, and yet hope for some comfort, can come to Goethe, and he will give them a new faith and a new courage. They will find in him, not the summariser of past wisdom, the distiller and synthesiser of past religions and philosophies, but the prophet of a new age, the great modern master of the art of living. For his lack of "otherworldliness" Goethe has been called the great pagan. He was certainly a pious citizen of this world, who loved this dear earth of ours, and his fellow mortals with all their imperfections, as his wonderful mother had done before him. "Why should one not enjoy life on God's beautiful earth; that would be base ingratitude for all the blessings He has shown me"; so that mother expressed a philosophical attitude to life akin to his—even if in somewhat different words, as Gretchen said of Faust's confession of faith.

In celebrating now the memory of Goethe after all these years, our thoughts turn back instinctively at the end to that little city of Weimar where he spent the greater part of his life. It has a wealth of interest to-day astounding for a town so small, and it is surrounded by places, Tiefurt, Belvedere, Ettersburg and many others, that Goethe has immortalised for us. Goethe's house on the Frauenplan is now the National Goethe Museum, and both it and the new building erected to display his scientific and other collections possess a never-failing attraction for all lovers of Goethe. But when all has been seen, there remains as the most impressive place of all that Spartan workroom, whose utter simplicity is in striking contrast to the treasures he had gathered about him, where Goethe lived his real personal life, and the tiny bedroom, that a maidservant would scorn to-day, in

which he died. It was, for all its joys and pleasures, a hard stern life that Goethe lived, and whatever his place may be among the immortals, that he was an honest workman none can deny. One is always tempted to quote Goethe to explain Goethe, and the last words here shall be his own—our translation of those lines of his which Carlyle, Scott, Wordsworth and other English admirers chose for the seal they sent him on his last birthday, and which can so fitly be applied to him who wrote them:

Even as a star,
Without haste,
And without rest,
Turn each on the task
He doeth best.

H. G. ATKINS.

ERRATUM.

Professor Seton-Watson asks us to insert the following correction: In the statistical table appended to my article "The Deadlock in Central Europe," the German minority in Italy is erroneously given as 400,195. The correct figure is 208,170.

THE PATRICK LEGEND.

THE celebration of the fifteen-hundredth anniversary of the coming of St. Patrick to Ireland on his mission, if we accept the best authenticated date (432) of that event, is being heralded by books expressive of the most diverse views as to the personality and work of the Apostle of Ireland. According to one recent writer we are altogether wrong in celebrating the anniversary this year, for, in fact, St. Patrick lived in the second, not in the fifth century. It is not many years since a well-known scholar asserted that St. Patrick was only Palladius under another name; and we have books contending on the one hand that he came with the full authority of Pope Leo I, after having resigned his bishopric of Armagh and appealed to him to reinstate him in his abandoned dignity; and on the other hand we have arguments to prove that the native Celtic Church, with all its peculiarities, derived direct from St. Patrick. Amid such contrary views, what are we to believe? What sort of a St. Patrick will be left to us when these celebrations are over? The Patrick legend, which began to receive its accretions not long after his death, is growing still, and one set of strange assumptions is scarcely laid to rest before another crop is ready to start up.

Yet it is safe to say that there is no prominent figure of his period in these islands of whom we know so much. For we know him as we know St. Paul, by his own writings which, though they in no sense set out to give an autobiography, throw many sidelights on his origin and career. What is far more important, they let us into the secret workings of his mind and spirit. Just as we learn more of Newman by his *Apologia pro Vita sua* than from the work of any biographer, so we get nearest to the personality of the Apostle of Ireland in the tender and touching documents that on two critical occasions dropped from his pen; once to appeal from the judgment of men to the judgment of God as to his mission in Ireland when detractors in high places had thrown doubt upon its success and authority; once to plead for the liberation of some women converts carried off into slavery of the worst kind by a prince of Strathclyde.

The period when St. Patrick lived, from the close of the fourth to the middle of the fifth centuries (for the most certain dates are for his birth 389, for his consecration as bishop and mission in Ireland 432, and for his death 461) is one of the gloomiest in British history. Britain was, in the words of Gildas, "groaning in amazement under the cruelty of two foreign nations, the Scots (Irish) from the north-west and the Picts from the north." Ships

from the North of Ireland were bringing across armies to join with the Picts of Caledonia to drive the Britons southwards, and in despair the Britons had abandoned their cities and the protection of the Roman Wall, and were "being pursued with unrelenting cruelty, and butchered like sheep." At the date of Patrick's birth the Roman legions still retained their hold on Britain, from which they did not finally withdraw till about 410-18, when the lad had grown to manhood. The Roman organisation, though it was gradually breaking up over large parts of the country with the recall of the troops and officers for the defence of Rome, had not been dislodged from the Northern province, and the civil administration went on as regularly as the incessant incursions permitted. In the startling events which followed—the revolt of the barbarians, the invasions of Italy by Alaric and Radagaisus, and the flight of the Emperor Honorius—the young Patrick would feel an almost personal interest, for he was born and brought up in the Roman atmosphere, and was proud of his "free birth" and "noble rank" as the son of a British-Roman decurion; the highest sacrifice he was in after life to be called upon to make was when he "sold his noble rank for the profit of others, becoming a slave in Christ to a foreign nation (the Irish) for the unspeakable glory of the eternal life which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."

The strangest doctrines as to the birthplace of St. Patrick have been put forth from time to time, but it is clear that the main authority on the question must be the writings of the saint himself. His own testimony is explicit. In his *Confession* he frequently mentions the land of his birth. He writes, "And again, after a few years, I was in Britain with my kindred, who received me as a son and in good faith besought me that at all events now, after the great tribulations I had undergone, I would not depart from them anywhither." Elsewhere he speaks of proceeding to Britain, "and glad and ready I was to do so, as to my fatherland and kindred." The earliest Life of the saint, that by Muirchu, is still more explicit. It opens thus: "Patrick, who was also called Sucat, was of the British race and born in Britain." These passages have been transferred to Brittany in Gaul by many writers from the time of Keating onward; but it is impossible that they could refer to that country, which up to the middle of the sixth century at least, bore no other name than Armorica, and only adopted the name of Brittany after the flight of the Britons before the Saxons, when large numbers of persecuted Welsh and Cornishmen passed overseas and settled on the opposite coasts. For more than a hundred years after Patrick's birth this exodus had hardly begun. It ought to have been a good omen for the future relations

between the two countries that Ireland, with her hosts of native saints, chose as her Patron Saint a native of Britain.

The exact place where Patrick was born is, and will probably always remain, uncertain. Muirchu, following the *Confession*, calls it Bannavem Thaburinde or Taberniæ, and says that it was "not far distant from our sea" (i.e. the Irish Channel), which is a clear indication that it was somewhere on the western sea-coasts of Britain. Very early Irish writers identify it with Ail-Cluaide, "the Rock of Clyde," or Dumbarton. It is so identified in a very ancient note on the name "Nemthur" in the hymn *Genair Patraicc*; and also in the contemporary hymn written by St. Secundinus, Patrick's pupil and friend, in praise of his patron, where it is said "Now Patrick, of the Britons of Ail-Cluaide was his origin." The attempts to set aside these indications in favour of other places have not been very successful. The very probable identification of Coroticus or Ceredig, to whose soldiers Patrick made the appeal to spare his Christian women converts, with a prince who ruled under the Romans of Strathclyde, and whose capital was Alcluith or Ail-Cluaide, the district in which the family of Patrick dwelt, supports the ancient tradition.

The chief facts that we learn from St. Patrick himself about his early life are that he was the son of a deacon of noble rank who was also a decurion or civil officer under the Roman administration, and the owner of a small farm in the neighbourhood of his home, on which the boy was brought up. That his father was a man of some means is shown by the mention of the men-servants and maid-servants of whom the marauders made havoc when they attacked the farm and took him captive to Ireland. The combination of offices held by Calpurnius, his father, though it seems strange to us, was not uncommon under the later system of Roman administration. The duties of an Imperial decurion were so onerous that those holding the office often fell heavily into debt. They were responsible for the collection of taxes in their districts, as well as for the upkeep of the roads and other civic liabilities. If there was a deficit they were bound to make it up; frequently they entered the army or the church to escape from their obligations to the state. If Patrick's father and grandfather were men of this type it is likely enough that religious teaching took but a secondary place in the family, and it is easy to understand that, though born into an outwardly Christian household, the boy grew up without education and "in ignorance of the true God." It was probably during one of the raids in the time of Niall of the Nine Hostages that he was captured on his father's farm and carried off into slavery. His own account in his *Confession*, written in old age

when his work was nearly done, is our safest guide to a knowledge of this critical event. It opens thus:

I, Patrick, the sinner, am the most illiterate and the least of all the faithful, and contemptible in the eyes of very many. My father was Calpurnius, a deacon, one of the sons of Potitus, a presbyter, who belonged to the village of Bannavem Taberniæ. Now he had a small farm near by, where I was taken captive. I was then about sixteen years of age. I knew not the true God; and I went into captivity with many thousands of persons to Ireland, according to our deserts, because we departed away from God, and kept not His commandments, and were not obedient to our priests who used to admonish us for our salvation. And the Lord poured upon us the fury of His anger and scattered us among the heathen, even to the ends of the earth, where now my littleness may be seen amongst men of another nation.

Thus, humbly and simply, opens the testimony of the man whose work was to leave so deep an impress on the nation to whom he first came as a slave.

An early and almost universal tradition places the scene of Patrick's captivity with a pagan farmer in County Antrim. Here, as he tells us,

tending flocks was my daily occupation; and constantly I used to pray in the daytime. Love of God and the fear of Him increased more and more, and faith grew and the spirit was moved, so that in one day I would say as many as a hundred prayers and at night nearly as many. . . . Before daybreak I used to be roused to prayer, in snow, in frost, in rain, and I felt no hurt . . . as I now see, because the spirit was fervent within me.

Muirchu, his earliest biographer, tells us that the name of his master was Miliuc and that his house lay on the southern slopes of Slieve Mis, or Slemish, County Antrim. Later in life, when returning from Gaul, Patrick's first act was to make his way north, carrying in his hand the price of his release from service. But the pagan, hearing that his old slave was coming to see him to endeavour to persuade him "to adopt a religion which he disliked," and fearing that his former slave "would lord it over him," gathered all his property round him, and set fire to the house in which he lived as chief. Patrick, coming full of a gracious purpose, was so stupefied at the sight of the blazing pyre that he was rendered speechless for two or three hours.

St. Patrick's career was a varied one. After his escape from Miliuc he was taken on board a ship by heathen men carrying in their cargo a number of hounds, probably the already famous Irish wolf-hounds, which even then were considered meet gifts for princes. He landed after a stormy passage in some wild region, possibly in Gaul, which was being wasted by the invasions of the

Goths. He seems again to have fallen into captivity; later, he apparently visited his kindred in Britain, who "received him as a son," and besought him, after the great tribulations he had undergone, not to depart from them again. But Patrick was haunted by visions of "a man coming from Ireland with countless letters," who gave him one, entitled "The Voice of the Irish"; and as he read he thought he heard the voice of them who lived beside the wood of Foclut, which is nigh unto the Western Sea, crying with one mouth, "We beseech thee, holy youth, to come once more and walk among us." All this we learn from scattered paragraphs in his own writings.

The vision determined Patrick's future life. But for the events of his middle life we must turn to Muirchu and Tirechán, his two early biographers. The latter, who appears to be enlarging on Patrick's own words, speaks of seven years spent by the future missionary in journeyings through Gaul and Italy and in the islands of the Tyrrhene Sea; and he adds, on the authority of Bishop Ultan of Ardraccan in Meath, who died in 657 and from whom he derived much of his information, that he stayed for thirty years in one of these islands, Aralanensis or Lérins, studying in its famous monastery and preparing for his mission. Muirchu says nothing about Lérins, but makes him sit at the feet of Germanus at Auxerre. These statements come from later sources, but they are consistent with Patrick's earnestly expressed wish in later life "to go as far as Gaul to visit the brethren and to behold the face of the saints of my Lord. God knoweth I used to desire it exceedingly." He is said to have received consecration in Gaul, either at the hands of Germanus or from a bishop of Auxerre named Amator, who died in 418. Whether his further desire "to visit the Apostolic See," mentioned by Muirchu, was ever carried out is unknown. Certainly it was long postponed while he lingered in Gaul for education. But a note ascribed to Tirechán and an entry in the Annals of Ulster which are the existing evidence for a later visit during the pontificate of Leo the Great, bear all the marks of a genuine tradition.

Patrick was no longer young when he left Gaul; Muirchu speaks of him as "the venerable traveller," and he himself says that he "was nearly worn out" when he returned to Ireland. But the fervour of his soul carried him through nearly thirty years of work in that country, work which left its impress on large portions of Ireland, especially in the north and west. He says that he baptised many thousands and ordained clergy everywhere, not demanding from any "even the price of my shoe"; "sons and daughters of Scotie (Irish) chieftains becoming monks and virgins of Christ." On Munster his preaching seems to have made less impression; and

a late life of St. Declan, an early Waterford saint, points to jealousy among the little Christian churches in the south on the appearance of St. Patrick among them. His task was a hard one. He was plundered and bound in irons by a chief "who eagerly desired to kill" him; he faced the king of Tara surrounded by his hosts of Druids; he had to grieve over the raids of Coroticus or Ceredig, who had carried off his Christian women converts while the anointing oil of their baptism was "still fragrant on their foreheads"; he was in daily danger from the plots of enemies and the insults of unbelievers. But far more than all these, he was wounded to the very soul by the slanders put out about him by one in authority who had once been "his dearest friend," and by the doubts spread abroad as to the validity of his orders and mission. It was this which wrung from him the pathetic document, so precious to all Irishmen, calling upon God to witness to the wonderful results of his preaching in a land to which he believed himself to have been sent by the direct command of God, and in which he beheld the power of God working together with him.

If we ask what doctrine St. Patrick taught to his converts, we find it in the very remarkable profession of faith or creed near the opening of his *Confession*. In its dignity and simplicity it forms a remarkable contrast to the Creeds accepted by the Church of the fourth and fifth centuries, which were drawn up to controvert some of the forms of heresy against which the Church of these centuries was contending. Nor does it deal with the details of the human life of Christ which form the basis of more primitive creeds. It stands on a higher plane.

"Because there is no other God," it begins, "nor was there ever any in times past, nor shall there be hereafter, except God the Father unbegotten, . . . Almighty as we say; and His Son Jesus Christ, whom we affirm verily to have always existed with the Father before the creation of the world . . . after the manner of a spiritual existence, begotten ineffably before the beginning of all things. And by Him were made things visible and invisible. He was made man; and having overcome death, He was received into heaven to the Father. . . . And He shed on us abundantly the Holy Ghost, the gift and earnest of immortality, Who makes those who believe and obey to become children of God the Father and joint-heirs with Christ, Whom we confess and adore as one God in the Trinity of the Holy Name."

If, as scholars have discerned, there are likenesses between this Creed and a Commentary on the Apocalypse by one Victorinus of Upper Pannonia, martyred in the Diocletian persecution, it can only mean that it is modelled on some form of Creed otherwise unknown to us. It becomes therefore of importance in the history of the Church.

There is a beautiful legend of the instruction given by the Saint to some early primitive minds, which no doubt contains an element of truth, although it takes the form of a fairy tale. Some maidens, princesses, were come out one morning to bathe in a fountain in Roscommon before the rising of the sun when they found Patrick with his bishops seated beside the spring. They were at a loss to know who they were, and they judged them to be fairy men or to be earth gods, or perhaps an apparition.

And the girls said to them, "Where are ye? and whence are ye?" But Patrick said, "It were better for you to confess the true God, our God, than to ask questions about our race." The elder girl said, "Who is God? And where is God? Of what nature is God? And where is His dwelling? Has your God sons and daughters, gold and silver? Does He live for ever? Is He beautiful? Had His son many foster-fathers? Are His daughters dear and beautiful to the men of this world? Is He in heaven or earth? in the sea? in rivers? in the mountains? in valleys? Give us knowledge of Him. How is He to be seen? How is He to be loved? How is He found? Is it in youth, is it in old age, that He is found?"

Then St. Patrick . . . answered and said, "As for our God, He is the God of all men; the God of heaven and earth, of the sun and moon, of the lofty mountains and the lowly valleys. . . . He inspires all things; He quickens all things; He transcends all things; He sustains all things; . . . He hath a Son, co-eternal and co-equal with Himself. The Son is not younger than the Father, nor the Father older than the Son; and the Holy Spirit breathes in them; Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not divided . . ." etc.

Here, as elsewhere, the doctrine of the equality of the three Persons in the Trinity is the fundamental base of Patrick's teaching.

On such simple foundations as these the future structure of the Patrick legend was gradually built up. Over two hundred years later we have the earliest existing attempts to jot down memoranda relating to the acts of the Saint, and a quarter of a century later still, Muirchu (c. 699) takes in hand to write a connected *Life*. He feels as one who brings "the infantile rowing-boat" of his feeble brain into "the most dangerous and deep ocean of this sacred story," hedged about as the story is "with conflicting opinions and the very many surmises of very many persons." With the aid of wandering traditions and Biblical parallels, he fills in the scant outline provided by Patrick's own writings.

But the aspirations of the see of Armagh were rising; its claims to wide jurisdiction and equivalent support demanded more extended biographies of the Apostle of Ireland to support its pretensions to priority. They came abundantly. Irish *Lives*, *Notes* and *Memoirs* by Tirechán, and following him the voluminous *Tripartite Life*, describe in detail journeys of Patrick through

Meath, Ulster and Connaught, the latter itinerary being especially detailed, because it was the homeland of Tirechán's kin. The tone and character of the traditions are changing; St. Patrick appears no longer as the humble missionary; he is the all-powerful worker of miracles, the man who converses with angels, the future judge of all the Irish at the last day. Those who dispute his authority are flung into the air or swallowed by the earth. Others are blinded or lamed at his word; he curses those who oppose him; he calls down fire from heaven upon them; he even threatens the Almighty Himself if He does not respond to all his demands. Perpetual and frivolous marvels attend his every step. We are led farther and farther away from the Patrick of the *Confession*. An old tale, found in Tirechán's Memoir, tells us that on Croagh-Patrick, where St. Patrick is said to have fasted forty days and forty nights, the saints of Ireland in the form of mighty birds, crowded about him, "so that he could not discern the face of the sky or earth or sea." "For God had said to all the saints of Ireland: Go up, O ye saints, above the mountain which is higher than all the mountains towards the setting of the sun." It is of this Patrick that pilgrims in their thousands think as they annually climb the slopes of Croagh-Patrick to make their devotions on its summit. It is on this Patrick that the penitents of Loch Derg in Donegal call, as they make their "rounds" upon their knees, in the place where in the middle ages men from all countries of Europe believed they underwent, fasting and in their solitary cells, the pains of hell and purgatory.

The vagaries of tradition and the debasing touch of mediæval hagiologists are familiar to all of us, yet there is something startling in this transformation of the writer of the *Confession* and the *Letter*, of the famous *Lorica* or *Breastplate* and the beautiful *Blessing to Munster* into a strident, vengeful, and cursing demi-god. Could it be that the very different attributes of some earlier pagan Patrick have been transferred to him, just as the legends of a pagan Brigit, goddess of fire and of poetry, have become inextricably intertwined with the name of her Christian namesake? Can it be that the mysterious "Old Patrick" (Sen Patraicc) who finds a place as a predecessor of our Saint in several lists of Bishops of Armagh, whose name is associated with Glastonbury, and without whose companionship St. Patrick could not go to heaven, may have preserved a faint reminiscence of this earlier Patrick? Something of a tradition of a warlike Patrick remains in his first name, Sucat or Sucatus, explained in an ancient note to mean *Deus Belli*, *vel Fortis Belli*; and the site he chose for the seat of his Archbishopric was none other than Ardd Mache or Armagh, "the High Place of Macha,"

the War-goddess of the Gael. But, much as he desired it, Patrick did not die there. He died at Saul (*Sabhall* "a Barn") the first and humblest of his foundations, and for twelve days "night did not come down and wrap the earth with dusky wings." There at Saul his body lay, and must still lie, in spite of the rival claims of Armagh to possess it. But in later days the royal seat of Downpatrick put in its claim, and to-day a great block of granite, bearing the single word "Patricc," recently deposited, keeps up the legend that it is there that the bones of Ireland's first Apostle rest. It is there that they will be revered on March 17th in this year of pilgrimage, at the spot where wild oxen laid down his bier. To complete the legend, it is believed that St. Brigit and St. Colmcille repose beside him.

ELEANOR HULL.

THE LORE OF TO-DAY AND THE RELIGION OF TO-MORROW.

AS in the case of earlier remarkable expansions of man's knowledge, it is inevitable that the revolutionary scientific discoveries of the present century will ultimately exert a profound influence upon religion. However gradual this may be, it will be none the less penetrative; its protraction may indeed render it in the end all the more thorough and permanent. The principal facts have now become too familiar to need any detailed citation; and we may also disregard the contention of the Freudian school that all religion, simply as such, is merely a steadily vanishing illusion. On the contrary, the story of half a million years fully endorses that psychological reading of humanity which discerns religious emotion, in Professor Julian Huxley's words, as "a natural product of man's nature." It is quite true that recent research finds its most fitting expression in purely intellectual terms—often, in fact, in mathematical formulas and equations intelligible only to the trained mind of the specialist; and this aspect of the situation threatens to become more and more prominent as time goes on. But serious though this difficulty undeniably is, it will probably furnish its own remedy; and in any case it is quite impossible, in the long run, to sever man's intellectual progress from his emotional reactions. For personality is essentially an irrefragable unity, wherein knowledge, feeling and will incessantly interact and influence each other.

This psychological principle is unfortunately much too often ignored; and it bears closely upon an analogous misconception that has been rather widely adopted, probably because it seems to promise a final solution of the "conflict between religion and science." This misconception lies in separating these two spheres more or less drastically from one another, while at the same time recognising that each has its unquestioned value within its proper limits and on its own basis. This standpoint, in my opinion, enjoys the powerful support of Sir Stanley Eddington and Dr. Needham; but it involves the impossible attempt to confine knowledge more or less within a watertight compartment, thus overlooking the fact that it must slowly permeate and reorganise the whole of experience, and above all in the end its religious elements. I fully agree, as both these writers strenuously maintain, that to confuse the scientific attitude with the religious approach is indefensible, or even to combine them in any too simple and easy way. Nevertheless it is equally vital to realise that all important scientific results, once they become firmly established, themselves constitute

the foundation from which further conclusions, of yet higher significance, quite logically arise.

It is obvious that all such wider implications are far more questionable than the basis of fact to which they appeal; and this, in its turn, is often taken to justify the divorce of the scientific and religious realms from each other. But it is by no means religion alone that is concerned, since philosophy and even much pure science are similarly involved. For many philosophic principles, themselves no less dubious than religious contentions, claim the same type of support from modern science. All scientific hypotheses and theories, again, are equally tentative in their early stages, equally liable to substantial modification or even rejection. In every case alike, therefore, we find one governing tendency operating—that is the irresistible urge of the human mind to expand its purely intellectual conquests in every direction, sometimes rapidly and surely, at other times haltingly and doubtfully, but always unceasingly and indomitably. Not even art remains excluded from this spiritual advance; and it may be extremely significant that some physicists anticipate the early retardation, if not even the permanent cessation of further important discoveries, owing to technical difficulties that are becoming increasingly formidable.

What, then, in the light of these general considerations, is the most justifiable interpretation of the new astronomical space-time scale of the physical universe most vividly expressed perhaps in Sir James Jeans' description of "our home in space" as "a millionth part of a grain of sand out of all the sea sand in the world"? Undeniably the first impression is what he justly describes as "terrifying." For not thus to react surely implies a mentality that is inhuman even if it is superhuman. Now this overwhelming "first impression" is frequently taken to be fully confirmed by the Principle of Relativity, so that man's existence and destiny are once for all reduced to almost absolute nullity. But all such arguments rest on a radical misunderstanding of Relativity. For the basis of this Principle is that any standard whatever may be selected as our criterion, provided, of course, that it suits the governing conditions and is consistently adhered to and applied. Now this means that we are in no sense compelled to regard the "grain of sand" scale as our sole basis of comparison, impressive though it is in certain highly important respects. With equal justice we may, if we choose, proceed to the opposite extreme and compare, not our earth, but the entire galaxy to a sand grain, as contrasted with the appalling depths of outer space with their thousands of "island universes." Science itself, of course, unhesitatingly adopts this plastic method and employs impartially

either the light-year of six million million miles, or the almost infinitesimal micron, as best suits the circumstances of the given problem; while for many purposes the commonplace mile or foot still remains the most useful standard of measurement.

Quite similarly, therefore, we may logically retain the familiar landmarks of human experience in preference to those which reduce man to a virtual nonentity from the very outset; and in so doing we can be no more accused of anthropomorphism than the scientist who expresses his results in yards or ounces. For once again Relativity as such justifies all standards without imposing its final seal on any single one, while the term itself implies an absoluteness of some kind or other, apart from which it becomes meaningless. And when, despite its drastic reduction by the modern astronomical scale, we revert to the older viewpoint from which the solar system regains its undeniable vastness and marvel, we immediately obtain not the dwarfing of man to practical nothingness, but on the contrary an incalculably deepened impression of the incomparable splendour of the physical universe in its wondrous entirety.

It is precisely in this respect that we must recall the impossibility of severing "man's intellectual progress from his emotional reactions." These, simply because they are reactions, and from the very nature of the situation, demand time to reach their full development and definite expression. If we may compare cold reason to the frozen glacier, emotion becomes the irresistible torrent which must await its gradual thawing; and at the moment it is the purely intellectual or scientific aspect of the new knowledge that is steadily being absorbed by human mentality. But in due time it is inevitable that man's feelings shall be equally powerfully stirred. His indestructible sense of awe will be aroused anew, only purged from sheer terror by the cool illumination of intelligence, and intensified by the clear light which this casts over the whole of his experience; and awe of this rare type is inseparable from a religion of some kind or another.

So much for man as, himself a physico-mental creature, he surveys with ever keener vision the overwhelming dimensions of the material universe. But the very fact that he is such a spectator establishes afresh the paradox of Pascal that, however insignificant his body and earthly abode, his mind enjoys a far higher status that releases it once for all from the strangling fetters of the space-time criterion. For thus to comprehend and to assay man's environment is to transcend it; and the measure of this transcendence is given at once by the vastness of the environment itself. Here another of Huxley's conclusions may be cited: "the capacity of the human mind and soul for enlargement, enrich-

ment, and development is virtually unlimited."* But this plainly involves the complete inversion of the widely accepted idea of human insignificance, since the farther the almost fathomless confines of the material world are extended, so much the higher becomes the level of the transcending mind, and so much the more significant the emotional reaction that must ultimately follow the intellectual advance.

But important though the existence of this reaction obviously is, its character is still more crucial; and unhappily it is too often forgotten that the positive quality of every emotion depends on the object towards which it is directed. Now however marvellous and vast the physical world may be, still it is unquestionably of a lower order than the mind that comprehends it. As Huxley expresses this, "developed human personality is, in a strictly scientific sense, the highest product of evolution, the highest organisation of which we have knowledge."† It follows at once that it is impossible for man to commune with Nature, if we use the term in its proper and literal meaning, as with a reality that is on the same level as himself. He can appear to do this only by unconsciously personifying Nature, by instinctively attributing to Nature qualities analogous to his own. Primitive man does this crudely and directly in his mythologies; but civilised man does this precisely the same, only in a far more indirect and refined manner. This can be readily seen if we divest Nature of her attributes of form, colour and beauty, and then regard the material world as nothing more than the whirling concourse of electrons which physics deals with. To do this is certainly very difficult; but the better we succeed the more impossible does communion with Nature become in its usual sense. In slightly more technical terms, man's emotional reactions, and with these his religious attitude, towards a completely impersonal Nature must be of a totally different kind from what they are towards Nature as somehow or other personified. "We cannot worship what is no richer in quality than our own self; we can only worship that which is already all, and more than all, we mean when we speak of ourselves as living, intelligent, moral, and personal."‡

But it is an old question—What right has man thus to personify either Nature, or the universe as a whole? Is this ever more than a concealed anthropomorphism? As regards this crucial issue Sir James Jeans' recent suggestions acquire capital importance: "the universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine . . . appears to have been designed by a pure

mathematician . . . the Great Architect begins to appear as a pure mathematician . . . we are beginning to suspect that we ought to hail Mind as the creator and governor of the realm of matter."* Their author advances these conclusions as merely tentative; but it is clear that they fully agree with Huxley's description of rational consciousness as "virtually unlimited" in its potential capacities, and as the "highest organisation" we know. Both writers, it is instructive to note, base their positions not on philosophic, but on strictly scientific grounds. Personally (as I have argued elsewhere) I should regard Jeans' principle of a creative intelligence as by no means merely tentative, but as the perfectly logical corollary of modern scientific facts.

Creation as such, however, necessarily involves far more than pure thought or pure intelligence, no matter how perfect these may be; it implies dynamic activity inseparable from will, on a scale commensurable with the space-time dimensions of the created world. In other words, a pure intelligence is an abstraction which does not actually exist; what alone really exists and functions is a Mind which fuses intelligence with will and both with emotion, even while it must also possess other attributes quite inexpressible in human terms and therefore incomprehensible. If we are anew charged with anthropomorphism, then it is of the highest conceivable order, to which both Huxley and Jeans are irrevocably committed by their own arguments. But this is, after all, not the essential issue; we are now concerned with the fundamentally different mode of reaction which these conceptions, once they become widely realised, must arouse in human emotion, as contrasted with those responsive to any type of impersonal universe. No longer is man terrified, but in the highest and deepest sense awed, and not by a stupendous creation alone, but by its creator; not solely by a universe which resembles a thought, but also by the thinker who (to repeat) can be no pure intelligence, but must also possess a mighty dynamic will.

But is such profound awe consistent with any close and real communion? Confronted with such transcendent attributes, is not man reduced to nothingness precisely as when dwarfed by space-time immensities? Certainly at first sight he must be; and religion has always insisted on this. On the other hand, recent science yields extremely suggestive indications in the opposite direction. For in penetrating to those infinitesimal structures which constitute radiation and matter, physics everywhere discovers an intricacy and delicacy which baffle man's best intellectual devices. Exactly as the material universe taken in its entirety implies a transcendent creator, so each molecule and atom, each

* *The Mysterious Universe*, Chapter V.

* *Science, Religion and Humanity*, p. 79.

† *Ibid.*, p. 68.

‡ Professor A. R. Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, Vol. I, p. 159.

electron and sub-electron demands the same origin for its complete explanation. Now throughout the limited scope of human experience no relevant detail is too trivial to escape the attention of a great artist or a great thinker; indifference and carelessness are the marks of petty minds. When applied to reality, then, unimportance and insignificance are simply the outcome of man's purblind and narrow vision. Awed though man must ever be by creation and creator, he may nevertheless realise that by his creator's standards he is no more insignificant, no more forgotten nor neglected, than are electron and atom. Like these, man too has his unique place and function within the whole; unlike them, on the other hand, he shares, no matter to how slight a degree, in the reason and will, the feeling and purpose that are enjoyed in their transcendent perfection by Deity alone. Thus the primal awe is transformed into direct communion with the highest; and so the lore of to-day is pregnant with influence upon the religion of to-morrow.

J. E. TURNER.

FROM PANARABISM TO PANISLAMISM.

THE end of the world war found the peoples of Arabia, which for the purpose of this article shall include all Arabic-speaking populations in ex-Ottoman territories, utterly unprepared for radical changes in their political status. It is true that for some considerable time before the outbreak of the war repeated attempts were made by the Arabs of Syria, Palestine and, in part, Mesopotamia, for the attainment of a large measure of autonomy under the Ottoman régime, an autonomy which, it was hoped, would ultimately amount to complete severance from the oppressive ægis of the Turks. And when in 1908 the Turkish Union and Progress Party deposed Sultan Abd El Hamid, and a general franchise to the then newly constituted Turkish Parliament was declared, intensive propaganda was conducted in Arab provinces for the election of Arab Deputies to the Chamber of Constantinople, with a view to their representing Arab as distinct from general Ottoman interests. The year 1908 might therefore be taken as the starting point of Arab dissatisfaction with Turkish rule. In a sense, that year marks the rebirth of a nationalistic conception in Arab communities which until then was latent or non-existent. The Arabs felt that the "Sick Man" was all too sick to govern them efficiently and pressed for self-government. The, at first, peaceful propaganda which was initiated with constitutional means was followed by less constitutional means and by attempts at complete political severance. Those attempts, however, had a negative rather than a positive objective. They aimed not so much at the creation of an Arab, least of all a Pan-Arab state, as at getting rid of the Turks, and accepting any European suzerainty that presented itself. French, English, even German protection satisfied the nationalists of the day, so long as Turkish rule came to an end. Jemal Pasha, the Turkish Commander of the Fourth Army Corps and Minister of Marine during the war, discovered amongst the confiscated papers of the British and French Consulates at Beirut a number of secret and cipher communications which definitely implicated many Syrian notables, both Moslem and Christian, in acts of treason, as a result of which all those distinguished leaders who until then were *persona grata* with the Turkish authorities were hanged in broad daylight in the streets of Beirut.

The Turks could not, however, be indifferent to, nor unmindful of, the ever-growing demand for autonomy. They were aware that it was the beginning of a genuine Arab nationalism to which they had to yield sooner or later. They therefore began to move, albeit slowly, in the direction of the grant of a measure of self-govern-

ment, first in the shape of the formation of the so-called "Administrative Councils" (Mejlis Idara), and when that step proved unacceptable they took to a complete overhauling of the administrative machine by the appointment of Arabs to Senior Executive positions, until by 1914 the Vilayets Law (i.e. the law governing the administration of administrative districts) was so thoroughly amended as to grant the widest possible measure of self-government to Arab territories. Under the amended law those provinces were to all intents and purposes to enjoy a measure of "Home Rule," and, save for the common allegiance to the Sultan-Caliph, and for their association in external affairs and similar matters of major policy, they were to be self-governed.

That policy of political concessions suffered a setback with the outbreak of the war. The Turkish overlordship was tightened and the Arabs found themselves constrained to join the ranks of the Ottoman Army and fight the "common" enemy, the Allies. This roused and brought to the fore their suppressed hostility to all that was Turkish, while the tempting offers of British gold, and the equally tempting if vague and ambiguous pledges of Arab independence did the rest. The "Revolt in the Desert," which is now the common legacy of civilisation, was in substance a spontaneous reaction to Turkish oppression which grew more and more intolerable.

But the exact purport of the promises made by His Majesty's Government to the Arabs, through General McMahon, the Commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Forces in those days, will never be known so long as the Hussein-McMahon correspondence has not been made public. That correspondence remains unrevealed in the archives of the Foreign Office, with the result that a crop of dubious correspondence has found currency as to its exact contents. There are many points which will remain mysterious: What were the countries that were to benefit from the proffered independence? Could those to whom the promises were made properly speak on behalf of the resuscitated Arab communities? Did they have a mandate from them, and was there any constitutional body to give such a mandate? All these questions are puzzling, but the last question may very definitely be answered in the negative. The princes of the Hashimite dynasty, the aged and very wealthy Sheriff Hussein, and his sons Abdullah, Feisal and Ali could at best speak for their own Hedjaz, although the invasion in 1926 by Wahhabi troops of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina proved that even the Hedjaz was by no means unanimous in its submission to Hashimite authority. Moreover, the Kingdoms of Assir and Yemen, the Sultanates of Oman and Hadramaut, South-East and South-West of the Peninsula, to say nothing of the many

petty chieftains who since time immemorial submitted to no constitutional authority, could hardly be included in any such concordat. All those Arab kingdoms and principalities had for some time past enjoyed a distinct political status, entering into covenants, collecting taxes, recruiting troops, all their own, and the very idea of an All-Arab federation was anathema to them.

There remain the rather more civilised Arab communities in Syria, Palestine, and Irak, as well as Transjordan. These could hardly reconcile themselves to the idea of being dominated by "princes of the Bedu and kings of the desert." Palestine was, moreover, in an altogether separate category in that the Balfour Declaration issued on November 2nd, 1917, just about the time at which the alleged promises in support of an Arab confederation were made, undertook to view with favour the establishment of a Jewish National Home, under certain stipulations the interpretation of which still engages the best political minds. Paradoxical as it may seem it was these very schisms and dissensions amongst Arab communities which gave them the impetus to strive towards that Arab federation. And on the morrow of the armistice Arabs of all Middle Eastern countries saw before them extraordinarily rosy vistas of a united kingdom stretching from the "Euphrates to the Nile" and bound together by the scions of the prophetic dynasty. There was not a little in these dreams of the oriental tendency to exaggeration, yet in fairness to the Arabs it must be said that they were equally due to Allied propaganda, responsible and irresponsible. But before long the eyes of all Arabs were opened to the harder political realities. For apart altogether from the fact that more than one declaration of the Allies was self-contradictory in terms, the Arabs were all novices in the domain of European diplomacy. They had only to turn one leaf of the war book to see before them a very different picture, and the delusion gave food for thought to the more irreconcilable Arab chauvinists. A glance at the post-armistice map of the East would suffice to bear this out. Syria became French under a High Commissioner of the French Republic and a French administrative staff with a not inconsiderable number of French Colonial, mostly Senegalese, troops. Palestine fell to the British Mandate with its provisions for the establishment of a Jewish National Home, also under a British High Commissioner and a fair number of British administrative officers in most executive positions. Irak, too, was under a British Mandate, governed by a national government under King Feisal, who was advised by a British High Commissioner and a small number of British advisers. Transjordan was also under British Mandate, though without the Jewish National Home provisions, and was governed by the regent Emir Abdullah, who was also advised by

the chief British representative, a representative of the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan.

It is not within the scope of this paper to enter more fully into the political status of these mandated territories in the past decade or so. The very voluminous literature written on the subject from all angles would, however, convince any unbiased observer that while the, largely Arab, population of these territories had a case and some legitimate grievances against both the Mandatories and their method of administration, there is very little to be said in favour of a sweeping abolition of the Mandate principle. All mandatory administrations have had their fluctuations, their successes and their failures, and some even committed major and unfortunate blunders. But by and large they have done well by their wards, and have maintained peace in one of the most sensitive centres of the world with tremendous potentialities for international mischief. They have contributed to the enhancement of the standard of living of the indigenous populations, have established new nets of education, have decreased the mortality figures and, most important of all, they have succeeded in warding off the Bedouin invasion into the countries of the Near East, a perennial spectre haunting the welfare both of these countries and of others beyond. A plethora of evidence could be adduced in support of these remarks, which would explain why the Arabs of those territories suffered a bitter delusion and why their dream for a Pan-Arab confederation became a utopian chauvinist slogan. What is more, the territories of the Arabian peninsula proper were torn asunder by their traditional feuds, and it required a very strong hand to bind them together by treaties and covenants which restrained them from invading one another's territories. The treaty of Bahra signed by the late Sir Gilbert Clayton on behalf of His Majesty's Government, with Sultan Ibn Saud, was an important landmark in the regulation of international relations of the many principalities of the peninsula of Arabia.

A good deal of diplomatic history, official correspondence and memoranda, proceedings of official missions, etc., was written before that epoch-making treaty was signed between Ibn Saud and the British Government. It was the Conference which was held in Cairo and in Jerusalem in 1921, and which was presided over by Mr. Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, which regulated for the first time the relations between the British Government and the various Arab kingdoms as well as their mutual relations between themselves. The Conference also determined the financial allocations to be made by His Majesty's Government to the various rulers of Arabia; although these grants have since undergone considerable fluctuations, they may never-

theless be said to remain the basis whereby these relations have continued to be regulated. Both ex-King Hussein and Sultan Ibn Saud were allowed £100,000 each per annum, while the Idrissi and Fahdad Bey, Chief of the Gaunaza tribe, were given £12,000 and 240,000 rupees respectively. Ibn Saud was bidden to abide by the three following conditions: He was to refrain from: (1) armed action against Irak, (2) armed action against Kuwait, and (3) armed action against the Hedjaz. More numerous and perhaps more difficult were the conditions put to Hussein. For the grant to him of the subsidy was made conditional upon: (1) His ratifying the treaty of Versailles and his signing and ratifying the Turkish treaty; (2) his recognising and respecting British treaties with Ibn Saud and refraining from all aggression against him; (3) his improving pilgrimage conditions with special reference to public safety, sanitation and the protection of the rights of the pilgrims, also the improvement of the water supply and hospital service in Jeddah; (4) his recognising the rights of British subjects in Jeddah; (5) his accepting a British Consul and Agent in Jeddah and, if necessary, a British Moslem Agent there; (6) his preventing the Holy Places from becoming a focus of anti-British or Panislamic intrigue; (7) his preventing the Sheriffian family from taking anti-British action and, in particular, his restraining his followers and tribes from all manifestations against the British and Allied governments.

It will be seen that the conditions put to Ibn Saud are very lenient as compared with the rigid injunctions put to Hussein, and perhaps this would afford a clue to Hussein's subsequent downfall. For when Sir Austen Chamberlain as Foreign Secretary invited Hussein to abdicate the throne, and when the British and other governments recognised Ibn Saud as King of the United Kingdom of Hedjaz and Nejd, and as such he remains to this day, it was common knowledge that the Sheriffian dynasty no more commanded the support and confidence of Islam. To be sure, the King, then Imam, of the Yemen, still wields considerable authority in the south and south-west of Arabia, and in that capacity has signed treaties with Italy and his fellow chieftains of Arabia. But the predominant authority of Ibn Saud remains unchallenged. He, the puritan Wahhabi leader, was of course opposed to reforms in Islam, yet for all his opposition to any departure from the strict tenets of Islamic faith, he did perhaps more than any other to modernise completely the country and its machinery of government. He reorganised the pilgrimage movement and introduced order in the system of taxation; enforced a code of justice the like of which the desert had never seen, and his administration of justice was excellently adapted to the archaic laws of the Bedu,

and restrained the raiding tribes from continuing the barbaric practice of raiding for raiding's sake. In Ibn Saud the shattered dream of the Arabian races of a glorious Pan-Arab Federation found some compensation; although it was not the real article which, they had hoped, would come after the armistice, it went a long way towards meeting the desiderata of the less truculent elements. From the Arabs' point of view it was the next best thing to an Arab federation.

The next best thing, but not their ultimate objective. The existence of one independent Arab state in the heart of Arabia fell short of Arab nationalism, and broke to pieces the myth that all Arabs were persistent and unanimous in their demand for a large and independent united kingdom. But the ideal remained as a weapon wherewith the malcontents of Syria beat the French Government (and in the recent outbreaks at the end of December in Damascus, Hama and Aleppo in connection with the election to the Syrian Parliament, the royalists made no secret of the fact that essentially their programme embodied a Pan-Arab Federation); it was a weapon in the hands of the Iraqi nationalists who clamoured for separation from British authority in any form, while the Arab nationalists used it as a powerful instrument in their propaganda against both the British and the Zionists in Palestine. It remained as a catchword of chauvinistic Arab nationalism, but one that has outlived its usefulness as a party programme, and the Arabs of the Near East found a suitable substitute in another equally aggressive programme: Panislamism.

As an idea Panislam may perhaps claim seniority over the relatively recent growth of a Pan-Arabic federation. It had its roots in the early 'nineties of the last century when Turkish politicians strove to spread Turkish influence through the faith, and the fact that the Sultan, the Turkish Sovereign, was recognised constitutionally and internationally as Caliph of the Moslems, lent support to the belief in its materialisation. Those were the days of Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism and Pan-every manner of political combination. There was no reason therefore why the Moslem peoples should not be brought together by some sort of pseudo-political link. But the Turks, who were the first to proclaim the new movement, were the first to abandon it. With the decline of religion in Turkey, and the secularisation movement so forcibly carried through by Mustapha Kemal, Panislamism, so far as Turkey and the Turks were concerned, may be said to have died a natural death. It disappeared from Turkey, but was revived in other countries. The sixty million Moslems of India clung to it as their last shibboleth in the event of the Indian nationalists failing them. The brothers Mohammad and Shefket

Ali were by far the most prominent advocates of the idea. When Mohammad Ali, a respected Moslem leader in India, died in London, the Mufti of Jerusalem, the religious head of Palestinian Moslems, asked for the interment of his remains in Jerusalem near the Mosque of Omar, thereby, as he asserted repeatedly, cementing more closely the attachment of Indian Moslems to the Holy Places in Palestine. The burial in Jerusalem of Mohammad Ali created a new Moslem shrine, a "Weli" of no mean import. Mohammad's brother Shefket made no secret of his desire to establish a Moslem University in Jerusalem "from the waters of which all devout Moslem students should drink for ever."

The beginnings of the renewed Panislamic campaign may therefore be traced to those days in the spring of 1930, when Maulana Shefket Ali made a triumphal tour through Palestine advocating a greater attachment to the tenets of the faith, a closer association of all believers, irrespective of race or colour, the elimination of occidental modes of life and western dogmas, and a pseudo-Gandhian fidelity to eastern attire and frugal ways of life. But even the fathers of the new movement could hardly be so naïve as to believe in its full materialisation. Their movement was of course too chauvinistic and one-sided and took as little account of the hard, imponderable, political realities as it took of the spirit of the age. For Islam, or rather the great body of people professing it, is not to-day in the same position in which it stood years ago. It has advanced with the times and made substantial strides towards a saner and more realistic view of life. There has been a regular and systematic, if by no means vocal, reform movement in Islam, which adhered to evolutionary processes of transformation, and discarded abrupt revolutionary methods both in dogma and in life. Its professors have advocated the elimination from the faith of obsolete elements, while maintaining intact those major tenets which have made the religion of Islam a great power for good in the backward regions of Arabia and in other parts of the world. Those elements of the faith which have not outlived their usefulness and subsidiary accumulations of tradition not affecting fundamentals were retained. Reformers, of whom the distinguished writer and scholar Dr. Taha Hussein, an editor of the eminent liberal newspaper of Cairo, *Siassa*, is a representative exponent (although he has never identified himself officially with that movement) differ from the more radical reformers of the Mustapha Kemal school in Turkey, in that they strive to fuse Moslem ideology with occidental thought, while the observance of a considerable number of Moslem practices is to them a matter of secondary import.

There is one very important group common to both schools,

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and indeed to most progressive Moslems in other parts of the world, and their number and prestige is constantly on the increase. They have no faith in a fictitious association of Moslem peoples for the furtherance of aggressive Moslem propaganda. Their Panislamism, if they possess any, is directed towards the enhancement of Moslem cultural values, the spread of education, the advancement of knowledge and civilisation in the more obscure Moslem communities. For the rest, they make no secret of the fact that they owe allegiance to one country, and one only—that to which they belong. They look with scepticism if not with misgiving upon the main centres of Panislamic propaganda in India, where local political factors have made it into a power to reckon with in the campaign for and against the British Raj, and they would not allow themselves to be dragged into this fight which is of no concern to them. For all its impracticability the movement had sufficiently crystallised, towards the end of 1931, to bring together to Jerusalem delegates from various Moslem communities in Asia and Africa to the All-Moslem Conference which met for about two weeks in December 1931. The initiative was, of course, taken by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin Al Husseini, while Maulana Shefket Ali, and Sir Mohammad Ikbal, the distinguished Indian scholar, lent the Conference the glamour of the international prestige that goes with their names. The convocation of the Congress did not proceed without difficulty, and it was with a view to placating Egyptian opposition, and not only official opposition, that the Mufti proceeded to Egypt about a month before the Conference was due to open. As a result of that mission a number of unnecessary and vexatious items, notably the one dealing with the restoration of the Caliphate, were excluded from the agenda. The authorities of the eminent Moslem College, Azhar, moreover insisted upon the exclusion from the agenda of any discussion relating to the establishment of a Moslem University which might give the impression that it was to rival their august institution, and they carried their point. Diplomatic pressure brought to bear by the Consuls of France and Italy in Jerusalem succeeded, though only formally, in removing from the agenda anything relating to the methods of administration of their respective countries in Moslem communities, with the result that the campaign against Zionism, and the establishment of a secular Moslem University and similar minor subjects constituted the bulk of the agenda, discussed at great length in a Conference attended by some 150 delegates from all parts of the world for over a period of a fortnight.

That the Conference was not representative of world-Moslem interests goes without saying. Apart from the fact that there were very few figures commanding international respect, it is not with-

out importance to say that all independent Moslem governments have held aloof, that some have adopted a hostile neutrality, while others, like Turkey, have openly and frankly opposed it from the start. There was the usual talk in such gatherings and much dissatisfaction was aired against Zionists and against European governments with colonisation interests in Africa, so much so that, in deference to the diplomatic intervention of the Italian Government, the Government of Palestine had to announce that they had deported one of the delegates, Azam Bey, to Egypt for having attacked a friendly Power on Palestinian soil. Shefket Ali did of course join in the chorus of disapprobation of western methods, but although his speeches were anything but moderate it is safe to assume that his attendance, as well as that of delegates with greater international experience and *savoir faire*, checked a good deal of irresponsible demagogue propaganda. Viewed from this angle the Conference, as the consummation of Panislamic propaganda which has been going on for years, may yet prove of some benefit in that the Moslem fanatics among them who are very hostile to any reform smacking of western civilisation may have realised that there are imponderable forces at play in international affairs which they can ill afford to ignore.

JOSIAH EDWARDS.

THE ARREST AND TRIAL OF JESUS OF NAZARETH.

THE story of the events by which Our Lord was brought to the Cross is one of the most familiar in literature, and yet, as many sermons show, the tale told by the Evangelists is often seriously misunderstood. We have two accounts of the events that occurred in Jerusalem in the Passover-week of the year A.D. 29 (or 30), namely that which is found in St. Mark's Gospel and which is closely followed by the authors of the first and third Gospels, and that found in the fourth Gospel, which differs from the former, first in placing the cleansing of the Temple almost at the beginning, instead of at the end, of Our Lord's Ministry (John ii, 13 seq.), secondly in making no mention of the institution of the Eucharist, and thirdly in placing the Crucifixion of Our Lord not on the Friday but on the Thursday of that Passover-week (John xiii, 1; xviii, 28; and xix, 14).

The question which of these two accounts is the correct one has led to prolonged discussions, but as the Apostle John, if he wrote the Fourth Gospel at all, did not write it before A.D. 90, while St. Mark almost certainly wrote his Gospel about A.D. 65, and not only was St. Mark's account regarded as authentic when the first and third Gospels were written, but the Crucifixion of Our Lord has been commemorated on Good Friday from a very early date (*Ency. Brit.*, art. "Easter"), I follow in this discussion the story that is told by the Synoptic writers. They tell their moving story in the simplest language, but if a modern reader wishes to understand fully the causes and the meaning of the events that they relate, he must enlarge the field of his enquiry, and he must try to answer at least these four questions:

Why did the Jewish authorities wish to put Our Lord to death at all? Why did they fear so much to arrest Him in public? Why did they hold two conferences about Him without actually inflicting any punishment upon Him? and what charge did they, in fact, make against Him, when they finally brought Him before Pilate?

To answer the first of these questions fully would require a volume, but the essential fact to grasp is that the Jewish nation and Church were in Our Lord's time in continual danger, retaining such independence as they still had only by sufferance from the Romans and by a compromise which was liable to break down at any moment. Judæa was a small district and it can hardly have held more than a quarter of a million Jews, while, if the Jewish nation was then half as large as it is now, not less than eight million Jews were scattered through the whole of the then known world; yet every Jew, as the name implies, felt that he

was very closely connected with Judæa. It was the land that had first been promised to his ancestors in Palestine; the Temple at Jerusalem was the only sanctuary at which the holiest rites of his religion could be celebrated; and Judaism meant ultimately to all Jews the faith and practice of Judæa; while the authority of the High Priest and the Sanhedrin was recognised in every synagogue throughout the world.

Since A.D. 7, however, when Archelaus had been deposed, the Romans had taken over the rule of this district, leaving only the civil government in the hands of the High Priest and the Sanhedrin. The Roman Governor, who was directly responsible to the Roman Emperor, had troops at his disposal; he controlled the foreign policy of the country, and his court was the final court of appeal in legal cases of all kinds; while—a point of great importance—he alone had power to inflict the punishment of death. The High Priest, governing with the help of the Sanhedrin, administered the Jewish law. The mass of the people accepted the teaching of the Pharisees, who sought to observe the whole of the Jewish law, in all its minutiae and in all the acts of their daily life; but as the Pharisees held that Deut. xvii, 15, forbade Jews to submit to the control of a foreign power in any way, the High Priest, who was appointed by the Governor, was always a Sadducee, that is, one who regarded as binding only the law that is actually found in the Pentateuch, and who interpreted that law somewhat less austere than the Pharisees did. It was a very artificial system that was liable to break down at any time, while, if it had broken down, the Romans would certainly have taken the government of the country entirely into their own hands.

Our Lord's teaching, however, was a very real menace to the Jewish Church, as it was then constituted, for, while to the Jews the final court of appeal in all religious matters was authority, to Our Lord, as His use of parables shows, the final court was the judgment and conscience of the individual; and He did in fact criticise the teaching and practice of the Jewish rulers very severely. Then, since the hope of deliverance from Rome was the one idea that was common to all forms of the Messiah-hope, a Messianic movement, however the Messiah might define or limit His own purpose, necessarily implied hostility to Rome, and Pilate would certainly have called Caiaphas to account if he had allowed a movement of that kind to gather force. John vi, 15, "they" (i.e. the people) "were about to come and take Him by force to make Him King" is a very significant passage in this connection. Briefly, the new movement in Galilee was a very real danger to the Jewish Church and its rulers, and Our Lord's actions in Jerusalem brought matters to a head.

As for the second of the questions that I have mentioned above, though Josephus's statement (*Wars*, Bk. 6, ch. 9, sect. 3) that one year more than 2½ million Jews kept the Passover at Jerusalem is incredible, it seems necessary to suppose that an enormous number of pilgrims flocked to that city every year to keep the Passover, and as the courts of Herod's Temple could hold 200,000 persons (Edersheim, *The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, Vol. I, p. 243) there were probably sometimes in those courts during the Passover week tens of thousands of Jews, all inspired with the fiercest religious fervour. At the same time in the Castle of Antonia, the gate of which opened directly into the Temple courts, Roman soldiers were always on guard (cf. Acts xxi, 30 seq.) and riots arising in the Temple courts had more than once ended in terrible bloodshed.

The answers to the two other questions that I have mentioned will be more intelligible if I consider the questions together, for neither of the trials of Our Lord has any real meaning apart from the other. The key to the understanding of what follows is the fact that the High Priest and the Sanhedrin were not at this time allowed to put anyone to death. The point has been disputed, and probably Mr. Taylor Innes (*The Trial of Jesus Christ*, p. 76) is right when he argues that the actual position at this time was that, though the Sanhedrin were in fact prevented by the Romans from sentencing anyone to death, they still claimed the right to do so under Jewish law. There is, however, no real doubt as to their practice at this time, for Josephus states in *The Wars* (Bk. 2, ch. 8, section 1, Whiston's translation) that the first Procurator of Judæa "had the power of life and death put in his hands by Cæsar"; in John xviii, 31, the Jewish leaders are represented as saying "we have no power to put anyone to death"; and Dr. Edersheim, whose authority on a point of this kind is very great, concludes after a full discussion of the question "It is admitted on all hands that forty years before the destruction of the Temple the Sanhedrin ceased to pronounce capital sentences" (*op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 556). Such, then, was the political position in Palestine when Our Lord made His last journey to Jerusalem, and the following is the account that the first three Evangelists give of what happened while He was there.

On the Sunday, which we commemorate yearly as Palm Sunday, Our Lord, having passed through Jericho, drew near to Jerusalem, and just before He came within sight of the city, the enthusiasm of those who had accompanied Him burst out in a demonstration, in which He was undoubtedly acclaimed at least by some of those who were present as the Messiah. Yet the accounts in the Gospels show that he was so acclaimed only by those pilgrims, no doubt

mostly Galilæans, who had accompanied Him in the last stage of His journey, while to the far larger number of the Jews, who were already in Jerusalem, He was in all probability either quite unknown or known only as a teacher of unauthorised and dangerous doctrine. There is no reason at all to suppose that any of those who acclaimed Him on that Sunday clamoured for His condemnation on the following Friday. On the next day, Monday according to our reckoning, Our Lord deliberately challenged His opponents by driving the money-changers and others from the outer court of the Temple; for the former exercised their calling by permission of the chief priests, and the revenues of the Temple benefited by the charges which they made for handing out the Maccabean coins, which could only be obtained through them but which alone might be presented at the Temple, in exchange for Roman or foreign money; while the latter provided victims that had been officially certified as being fit to be offered in sacrifice. According to one passage in St. Mark (xi, 18) even on that Monday "the chief priests sought how they might destroy Him." Then on the Tuesday He remained in the Temple courts all day, answering opponents, suggesting in parables that God was about to reject the Jewish people, and, according to St. Matthew, finally uttering against the "Scribes and Pharisees" the most scathing denunciations. Further, the saying of His, which is reported in John ii, 19, "Destroy this Temple" seems to have been misunderstood and misrepresented in a very grievous manner. So on the Wednesday (Mark xiv, 1; Matt. xxvi, 1 seq.) the Jewish authorities definitely determined to bring about His death in one way or another.

They found themselves then in a considerable difficulty, for Pilate alone could condemn to death, and it was unlikely that he would execute anyone for what was only an offence under Jewish law; at the same time, if the leading members of the Sanhedrin had taken no action except to indict Our Lord before Pilate for having committed an offence against the Roman State, they would, no doubt, have been regarded as traitors from one end to the other of the Jewish world, for all orthodox Jews hoped for deliverance from Rome. The chief priests, therefore, could only venture to accuse Our Lord before Pilate after they had somehow discredited Him with the majority of the pilgrims who were then in Jerusalem; and the tortuous proceedings by which they at last secured His execution were due to the fact that, if they were to carry out their purpose without injuring their own cause, they had first to show that large portion of the Jewish people, which was then in the city, that Our Lord was a criminal under Jewish law, and then to convince Pilate that He was also a criminal under Roman law. The niceties of Jewish law, together

with the uncertainty whether Pilate would condemn the accused to death, obliged Caiaphas to make some very elaborate arrangements.

On Wednesday Our Lord did not enter Jerusalem, but on Thursday evening, according to our reckoning of time, He celebrated the Passover with His disciples, and instituted that which we call the Eucharist or the Lord's Supper in connection with that feast. The treachery of unhappy Judas, who, no doubt, thought that he was betraying his Master only for stripes and imprisonment, enabled Caiaphas to arrest Our Lord quietly and at a fixed time, and He was brought, apparently about midnight, before a meeting of prominent Jews (Edersheim, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 557) specially convened in the High Priest's palace. St. Peter ventured into its entrance-hall.

It is necessary to comment on the proceedings that followed somewhat fully. The Jewish rules of procedure in all cases in which the charge was a capital one were strict (Ed. *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 556 seq.), for a "Trial for Life" (it is important to note the expression in the *Talmud*) could not be begun in the night-time, nor could a sentence of death be pronounced on the same day as the case was heard, and it could then be pronounced only in the regular meeting-place of the Sanhedrin. There is, of course, no question that Caiaphas disregarded these rules in what is commonly called the "First Trial" of Our Lord, and many writers have blamed him severely for having disregarded them. But as those who gathered in his palace had no power to impose the penalty of death and did not in fact do so, Dr. Edersheim's argument that the first examination of Our Lord neither was nor can have been a "Trial for Life" seems quite a conclusive one.

The facts, however, will be clearer if I set out in order the story that is told in the two Gospels, the first and third, in which there are the fullest accounts of the proceedings under review. The meeting in Caiaphas' palace first considered several charges that were brought against Our Lord, but when no serious offence was proved against Him, the High Priest obtained from Him the avowal that He claimed to be "the Son of God"—it seems probable that he had from the beginning intended to obtain this avowal before witnesses of unimpeachable character. Thereupon Caiaphas testified in the prescribed manner that blasphemy had been spoken, and the Sanhedrists who were present assented, voting (by word of mouth and successively from the youngest to the oldest) "he is a man of death" (Innes, *Trial of Jesus Christ*, p. 55). St. Matthew and St. Mark render this phrase "he is liable to death" (R.V. marginal reading, Matt. xxvi, 66, and Mark xiv, 64); and the vote clearly meant that Our Lord had incurred the penalty of

death by stoning under the law contained in Leviticus xxiv, 16. But the meeting then dispersed; had they pronounced any sentence, they must by Jewish law have sentenced Our Lord to death by stoning, and it is quite clear from the Gospels that no such sentence was ever pronounced upon Him.

I should add that I believe the account, which is given in the Synoptic Gospels of the "First Trial" of Our Lord, to be substantially a true one, but at the same time, as it is unlikely that the members of the Sanhedrin debated in public, I believe it to be the official account of the proceedings which Caiaphas circulated in his palace and the courts of the Temple as soon as the proceedings terminated. I venture to make this last suggestion because it seems to me clear that the person who collected at his palace in the dead of night at least* 23 members of the Sanhedrin as well as at least two witnesses for every charge that might be brought against Our Lord, was also responsible for the gathering of the crowd at the Prætorium a few hours later. The Temple courts were thrown open to worshippers on this particular night at midnight; a crowd hostile to the accused might be necessary to overawe Pilate, and, since a crowd does not shout in unison except by previous arrangement, someone with influence must have instigated that general cry in favour of Barabbas, which finally secured the condemnation of Our Lord.

Caiaphas, however, did not officially take any executive action at all until the sun rose and a "Trial for Life" could properly be held (Matt. xxvii, 1; Mark xv, 1). Then he summoned a second meeting of Sanhedrists, which, though it is mentioned so briefly in the Gospels, was at least as formal a meeting as the earlier one (*New Commentary*, N. Test., p. 113) and at which, though no account was published of its proceedings, the decision was evidently made to accuse Jesus before Pilate on a new and different charge. The first meeting of the Sanhedrists was technically only an examination of Our Lord; in their second meeting Caiaphas observed the rule that a "Trial for Life" must begin in the day-time, but the two rules relating to the pronouncing of sentence were not applicable to this particular case. Soon after sunrise, then, on Friday the Jewish leaders brought Our Lord before Pilate.

It is not easy to follow the account given in any of the Gospels of the final trial of Our Lord, and it would be strange if it were otherwise, for His disciples had just passed through a terrible ordeal, and only those who stood nearest to Pilate's tribunal can

* Twenty-three members constituted a quorum of the Sanhedrin and twenty-three judges were required in any trial on a capital charge (Innes *op. cit.*, pp. 31 and 50).

possibly have heard all that was said in the course of the proceedings. At the same time as no Jew could enter the house of a Gentile during the Feast of Unleavened Bread (Ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 566), any report of what took place inside the Prætorium that reached the author of the fourth Gospel, can only have reached him in an indirect manner. We have, therefore, very imperfect information about what really was said and done in the most fateful of all the trials recorded in history. Apparently, however, Caiaphas at first made the general charge that Our Lord was politically a dangerous person (Luke xxiii, 2), but knowing that he could now rely on Jewish public opinion he soon definitely accused Him of having claimed the title of "King of the Jews." Pilate, the various narratives suggest, realising that Our Lord had not headed or even encouraged any movement for Jewish independence, wished even then to dismiss the case. But the minimum expected from a Messiah was deliverance from the rule of Rome, and, as I have said, any Messianic movement necessarily implied hostility to Rome. Technically, therefore, the final charge against Our Lord was that He had committed an offence that came under the Roman law of *Majestas læsa*, a term which is commonly shortened to *majestas* and translated as "treason"; according to Mr. Innes (*op. cit.*, p. 85) Ulpian's definition of the term was "any offence against the Roman people or their safety." When this charge was pressed insistently, the Procurator, as the law which he had to administer stood, could not possibly avoid convicting the accused and condemning Him to death. Though so much is doubtful about this trial, yet the chief fact about it is absolutely certain, for that Our Lord was finally condemned under the law of *majestas* is shown conclusively by the grimly ironical inscription which Pilate, according to all the Evangelists, caused to be placed upon Our Lord's Cross.

The questions that I have been discussing have, of course, no bearing on theological or religious doctrines, for Christian beliefs are valid or not valid independently of the conduct of Caiaphas and Pilate. But Christians too often blame those two persons without duly considering the problems with which they were confronted. While Christ's Crucifixion must always remain the greatest tragedy in History, one of the greater tragedies is the animosity against Jews that Christians have shown so often and sometimes so cruelly through the ages. The second tragedy, like the first, has, I believe, been largely the result of imperfect knowledge and of misunderstanding.

J. A. FORT.

THE INFLUENCE OF FORESTS ON RAINFALL, EROSION AND INUNDATION.

ONE of the questions which has for long been a subject of discussion and argument amongst foresters, and in a smaller degree meteorologists, is the question of the influence of forests on rainfall and other precipitations; to which may be added the aftermath of forest destruction, erosion and inundations. So far as Europe is concerned it is well known that the devastation of large areas of forest in Spain, Italy, Sicily, Greece and Macedonia has resulted in a great deterioration of climate over considerable tracts, as a result of erosion and denudation, by which the hillsides now so often consist of bare exposed rock, covered in depressions with a scanty thin herbage layer; whilst in the valleys the valuable agricultural land of olden times is buried deep beneath tons of rubble and rock masses. Where the lower lands have received some natural protection against the latter calamity the crops have suffered from the loss of moisture and from sterilisation of the soil, due to the destruction of the forests.

When these facts began to make themselves felt some of the more advanced States in mediæval times gave attention to this matter, and in some cases steps were taken to check the evil. In France and Germany special laws for the protection and extension of the forests, and the protection of agricultural lands by means of the forest, had long been in operation, and similar laws existed from an early date in the Italian States. So far back as 1475 the subject attracted the attention of the famous Venetian Council of Ten, by which a law was passed on January 7th of that year regulating in great detail the clearance of the forests on *terra firma*. The mountain forests especially were protected by judicious and careful regulations which were renewed from time to time down to the very year of the extinction of the old republics. Tuscany and the Pontifical Governments were equally provident.

Investigations into the past history of India, so blended with legendary lore, have established the fact that the great devastation of forests which took place following the Aryan invasion of India (*circa* 2,000 B.C.) had a considerable influence upon the climate with a consequent decrease of moisture in certain parts of the country, following a rise in temperature. The effect on the climate was gradual, imperceptible in all probability at any one period on any large area, but cumulative during the long period of nearly 4,000 years. That in the time when India was covered with forests the climate was a more equable one is indisputable. Fa-Hian, the great Chinese traveller in India in the fourth century A.D., says in describing the country that its temperature was neither cold nor hot.

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No traveller could so describe it nowadays, nor would any Englishman have so described it a century and a half ago!

The chief questions which have roused the attention of the British Forester in our Empire Forests (until recently, mainly in India) are concerned with the following vital problems: in how far the destruction of forests in catchment areas and on the sides of hills and mountains in the drier parts of tropical countries affect (1) the level of the water in the large rivers, a matter of the first importance when the rivers are utilised for irrigation or power works; (2) the decrease in the local water supplies and in local precipitations, of so great importance to the cultivator; and (3) erosions, avalanches and inundations, with the appalling destruction they cause in the fertile valleys and towns and cities at the foot of the hills and out in the plains.

Until quite recently the chief evidence in the British Empire as to the results of excessive destruction of forests on climate, etc., has been collected in India. Throughout the past century, since, in fact, interest in the value of the forests of India was roused, a discussion upon the relation of the forests to the climate and the water supplies has been proceeding. It is now well recognised that the heavy fellings and destruction of the great Malabar Teak forests in the Western Ghâts of the Madras Presidency during the first three decades of the past century, and the uncontrolled felling elsewhere, both in this Presidency and in that of Bombay, resulted in excessive erosion and denudation; they caused the silting up of rivers and the formation of bars across the mouths of many small harbours of both the east and west coasts of Madras and on the west coast of Bombay Presidency, many of these small ports being rendered useless by the middle of last century.

The evil effects of unchecked shifting cultivation in the forests of these Presidencies had also been noted. Later still the effect of indiscriminate grants of forest areas to planters for the growth of such crops as tea, coffee, etc., began to be called in question. For instance, in the neighbouring island of Ceylon much land was granted for these purposes, under a régime totally ignorant of the effects of forest upon climate and of other facts of first importance to the well-being of the country and the maintenance of its future prosperity. A few examples of historical value may be quoted to indicate the invariable after-effects of ignorant grants of forest land made with the mistakenly meritorious object of "opening and developing" the country and increasing its wealth. Such ideas, administratively sound from the one viewpoint, are extremely dangerous in tropical countries, without the knowledge and scientific attainments necessary to ensure a wide vision of the problem as a whole; combined with a realisation of the possible results of the

removal of a certain belt, or the larger part of a belt, of virgin forest upon the future development of the country as a whole.

In Ceylon the forests may be roughly classified into three main zones, with sub-zones in each. The first zone comprises the Mountain forests above 4,000 feet, extending over an area of some 4,000 square miles. In the past large areas of this forest zone have been alienated for the formation of tea and coffee plantations. Shifting cultivation also has been rife, unchecked and uncontrolled. Nowadays no further alienation is permitted without special sanction. But successive Governors and their advisers during the last sixty and more years have, until quite recently, entirely failed to understand the problem. In the middle, or Wet Forest Zone, in the part of it known as the Endemic sub-zone, the finest forests of the country are situated, including magnificent specimens of the genera *Dipterocarpus*, *Shorea*, *Hopea*, *Balanocarpus*, etc. These forests have been heavily cut into by alienations of land for the formation of plantations of rubber, tea, cinnamon and cocoanuts. Within limits this opening out of forest areas for development and growth of more valuable crops is entirely justifiable. But in Ceylon (and elsewhere in our Empire) it has been carried out with neither discrimination nor vision. The development of the rapid prosperity of a country has been thought to justify any amount of forest destruction. In Ceylon this destruction of forest for the growth of crops has been carried out in the past in a haphazard manner and has been followed by erosion on a great scale, with silting up of rivers and periodic flooding of the low country and destruction of arable land and property. Many of the areas occupied by planters have been subsequently deserted and such areas, formerly occupied, cultivated and looked after, have become subject to wash-outs, all the good soil being removed during heavy rains; they then become covered with useless shrubs, grass and bamboos—a growth similar in fact to the aftermath of shifting cultivation.

It would, however, be a mistake to consider, and the opinion has been strongly held in some quarters both by forest officers and more credibly by the civil officers, that it is only the areas of heavy forests which may have an influence on climate, erosion and their after results. India affords many illustrations of the reverse. In hot dry situations a scrub forest, often contemptuously called a "jungle wood forest" or "firewood" or "fuel and grazing" area, may have as beneficial effects on the local countryside as the heaviest of the great timber forests. Two well authenticated cases in India may be quoted, that of Ajmir-Merwara where, under a mistaken policy, the scrub forests on the low hills were apportioned out to the villagers. Within twenty years the whole of the "jungle" had been cut off the hills. Severe erosion had taken

place, grazing areas had diminished as also water supplies, and appalling mortality was suffered in this region during the great famine of 1868-9.

The second instance is better known. In fact, it is the classical example of a mistaken and ignorant leniency, dealing with unknown or little understood forces in nature, which results in defeating the very object aimed at and produces widespread and perhaps permanent damage. The case alluded to is the well known Hosiarpur Chos in the Punjab. It merits the closest study, for there are several tracts of country in different portions of the British Empire where similar results may ensue so long as the quite mistaken idea holds the field in some circles that the forest officer's work must of necessity only deal with timber forests; and that areas of scrub forests and grazing lands may not, given certain conditions, require equally expert management. The tract of the Punjab in question is situated in the lower Siwaliks, a long, low range of sandy hills forming the northern boundary of a fertile tract of country. In former times these hills were covered with a low stunted brushwood, with scattered trees, a type of forest growth common to other parts of India. The population was scanty and the scrub was valueless. Under the settled conditions brought about by the British Government, population increased and a demand for the produce of even scrub forests arose. Under a mistaken idea of benefiting the villagers the land and scrub forests were parcelled out and made over to the existing villages. A generation later (about 1877) the whole of the forest had disappeared and serious erosion and floods were annually sending tons of boulders and debris on to the fertile tracts below. Cultivation had decreased by 12 per cent. In 1897 the Financial Commissioner wrote: "During the last ten to twelve years, on account of the Chos (sandy torrents) in Hosiarpur and Jullundur, 16,650 acres of land have lost their productive power, while 23,260 acres in addition have been damaged." Twelve thousand rupees of land revenue had been remitted by Government, who also lost three times this sum by reduction in rent rolls, whilst the people lost 20 lakhs of rupees in the market value of their lands. Serious damage had also been done to bridges and on road and railway by floods.

During the last few years the question of the influence of forests on rainfall, erosion, etc., from its widest viewpoint, has entered a more promising phase. Several papers have been published and from the titles of these it will be perceived that British investigators are playing an important part in certain regions of the Empire. In connection with the general controversy as to forests and rainfall two papers representing the opposite opinions held in this matter were published in 1927: *Forests and Water in the Light of*

Scientific Investigation, by R. Zon of the United States Department of Agriculture, and *The Influence of Forests on Rainfall and Run Off*, read by Dr. C. E. P. Brooks before the Royal Meteorological Society. The first of these emphasises the influence of forests on rainfall; whilst Brooks attaches less importance to it. These papers are both in their way of considerable value, but they suffer from the defects that have overshadowed this inquiry for many decades. The statements made are based on the opinions of the authors, and are unsupported by proofs obtained in the field. It may be admitted that such proofs are not easily obtainable. It will, however, be conceded that certain statements with reference to the results of unchecked forest destruction, whether heavy timber forest or scrub forest on the sides of hills, are established in the papers which have been recently published on the subject of the denudation in the Punjab Himalaya. In 1929 a paper by Mr. B. O. Coventry, of the Indian Forest Service, was published entitled *Denudation of the Punjab Hills*. Previous to this Mr. L. B. Holland of the Indian Forest Service was specially deputed to make a tour of inspection in the outer hills of the Punjab in 1927 and 1928, the object of the tour being to study the results of unchecked forest destruction and excessive grazing. His Report, *Denudation and Erosion in the Lower Hills of the Punjab* appeared in 1928. As an outcome of these reports, it is interesting and significant that, at the Punjab Engineering Congress which met in Lahore in 1930, a paper was read by Messrs. H. M. Glover (Conservator of Forests) and L. B. Holland entitled *Erosion in the Punjab Himalaya and its probable effect on Water Supplies*.

The importance of the investigations thus carried out establishing the serious effects both on erosion, on water supplies, and even, if to a lesser extent, on climate is undeniable. So also is the contention that the present position is due to the appalling destruction by over-cutting, lopping of trees, and so forth, which takes place in the areas of forest not under the complete control of the Forest Department, combined with the grazing of herds of animals far in excess of the capabilities of the region. The papers would take too long to deal with in this article. That they merit careful consideration is obvious from the fact that the Holland-Glover paper attracted the serious attention of the Irrigation Engineers at the Punjab Congress. The great irrigation canals of the Punjab plains depend upon the conservation of the water supplies mainly provided by Himalayan snow water, but also dependent to a considerable extent on the forest belt occupying the outer mountain ridges of the chain. It was realised that denudation of the outer hills had reached in some parts a dangerous position. The question of building dams to check erosion, the engineers' defence for many centuries, was debated

as against the more rational and stable method of afforestation. Both must be costly, but afforestation would, when established, stop further erosion; whereas dams are always liable to bursts and unafforested water-courses on steep hillsides cause further erosion and widening. The chief point of importance in the meeting was the fact that in India the engineer is at length sitting down with the forester in an attempt to tackle one of the most serious problems of tropical countries.

In connection with the devastating results of inundations a paper by MM. Delville, Inspector-General of Forests in Belgium, and Delève, an Inspector of Forests, entitled *Les Forêts et les Inondations*, was recently published in *Matériaux pour l'Étude des Calamités* (No. 23, No. III, 1930) which is issued by the *Société de Géographie de Genève* under the auspices of the Committee of the International Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies. The interest of the Red Cross Societies in this matter is connected with the resultant deaths, disease and destruction caused by severe inundations and the consequent calls for relief that follow. Belgium has suffered from severe inundations since the War owing to the heavy fellings undertaken in Belgian forests during the War. Many are aware that inundations have increased in America, India, Africa and in parts of Europe in later years. In the United States it is put at 18 per cent. in the past twelve years, attributable to disafforestation. Practical experiments are being undertaken on the subject of "Run off" from forested and bare areas both in the United States and in Switzerland; whilst the Japanese are engaged in large afforestation schemes in Korea mainly for climatic reasons.

The Belgian Forest officers as a result of their survey of the position, chiefly from the viewpoint of checking inundations, have recommended the carrying out of the following schemes of amelioration: 1°. *Par une série de mesures destinées à conserver et à renforcer l'état boisé sur les collines et sur tous les plateaux élevés dont beaucoup sont encore dénudés.* 2°. *Par des travaux spéciaux de nature à ralentir la vitesse de l'eau sur tous les ruisseaux à pente rapide, à allure torrentielle.*

The last paper to be referred to is a Kenya Forest Department pamphlet which appeared in 1929 entitled *The Influence of Forests on Climate and Water Supply in Kenya* by J. W. Nicholson (of the I.F. Service and acting as Forest Adviser to the Governments of Kenya and Uganda), and A. Walter, Director, British East African Meteorological Service. This paper, based upon field investigations undertaken in the forests by Mr. Nicholson, concentrates chiefly on Climate and Water Supplies and thus forms a fitting complement to the other forest problems, chiefly concerned

with erosion and inundations. It sums up in an informative manner the present position of the controversy on Forests and Rainfall. The points advanced by Zon on the one hand and by Brooks on the other are summarised, their practical value is deduced and an analysis is made of the generalisations on either side which are unsupported by scientific proof, generalisations of the kind which have overshadowed this inquiry for a century. This is not to say that the work of these two scientists is not fully appreciated and drawn upon in the Nicholson-Water paper. The latter, however, marks a distinct step in advance. Practical contributions, even if tentative, are made on the subject of the possible effects of (a) destruction of forests, (b) afforestation of bare areas, on the climate and especially the rainfall in Kenya and Uganda. Conclusions are arrived at as to the effect, e.g. of occult precipitation on the total annual rainfall and the effects of "instability rain." Under the first head it is stated "that in favourable circumstances mountain forests in East Africa can induce occult precipitation (fog or dew) up to at least 25 per cent. of the total annual rainfall." Even more interesting are the conclusions on the subject of so-called "instability rain."

The type of rainfall designated as "instability rain" is often a matter of the greatest importance in the tropics. It has been the subject of much discussion and has been held by some to have no connection with the presence of forests. But the arguments both for and against have been mostly of the academic type. Dr. Brooks describes this type of rainfall as follows: "It is due to the warming up of the surface layer of air to a point at which it is potentially higher than the air above it. The potentially light air begins to rise, at first in thin threads which produce scattered cumulus cloud; and finally, if the process continues far enough, in thicker columns which cause cumulo-nimbus clouds with rain and perhaps thunder and hail. The potential density of the air depends mainly on its temperature and partly on its humidity." Nicholson supplements this description. "In East Africa," he says, "instability rain falls on still afternoons usually after bright sunny mornings. It is frequently accompanied by thunder and is always very local in its distribution. In some parts of Uganda to lessen the contingency of crops failing, the natives cultivate two shambas some miles apart from one another. Unfortunately the European cannot copy this practice, but where the instability rain is the prevailing form of rainfall he can select a long-shaped in preference to a square-shaped farm."

It would appear that in spite of the views held by some meteorological experts on this subject the Kenya authors as a result of their investigations have advanced good evidence for their present

conclusion that "wherever meteorological conditions in East Africa are favourable to the production of instability rain the possibility and quantity of such rain is greatly increased by the presence of forests." In connection with the so-called "Christmas rains" in parts of India, which have, of course, no connection with the monsoon, practical investigations into this matter of instability rain should be fraught with possibilities.

Limits of space preclude a more detailed consideration of this Kenya paper though the authors record some interesting and suggestive remarks on wind and its general connection with a consideration of the subject. There can be little doubt, however, that these several papers are a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the complicated question of forests, climate, erosion and inundation, and their reactions the one upon the other. In India their careful study by the Forest officer and, even more important, by those responsible for the Government of the Provinces should prove of infinite future value. And outside India, in Africa and the Malay States—in fact in the whole of the tropical parts of the Empire—this question is yearly assuming a greater importance and demanding the closest attention and study.

E. P. STEBBING.

FEAR IN WILD ANIMALS.

IN any investigation of the problem of fear in wild animals it must be borne in mind that the key to the fundamental difference between fear in ourselves and in all other animals lies in the development of the human imagination. Much of our fear is in anticipation or retrospect, while in animals fear is almost entirely confined to the emergencies of the moment. Probably it is the overlooking of this vital point that causes so many people to believe that wild creatures spend the greater part of their lives fearing and avoiding dangers.

A country walk affords us an introduction to one aspect of this subject, for we notice that the creatures of the wild flee at our approach and we often assume that they flee in terror before us. This assumption involves another, for if animals run or fly away from us because they are afraid, the fleeing is presumably a rational act. Though at first sight nothing could seem more natural than this, the alternative view, that the majority of animals flee "instinctively" and not because we inspire them with fear, has actually more to be said in its favour. This does not reduce animals to automata, though it does assume that at a sudden alarm they panic "without thinking." How much fear accompanies an instinctive act such as this remains, of course, an open question, varying probably on every occasion and with different individuals. If, however, it can be shown that an animal in fleeing from us is acting instinctively and not with conscious purpose, it is at least obvious that fear need not enter into the question and quite certain that the popular view—that fear is the dynamic element—is wholly inaccurate.

Generally speaking, an animal reacts to something strange or unusual in one of two ways. It may draw near to investigate, urged by curiosity, or it may turn back, impelled to flee "instinctively" from that which is unknown. From the fact that animals on uninhabited islands rarely visited by man show little inclination to run away and much to indulge their curiosity at our appearance, it seems probable that at one time the creatures of the wild approached all things strange with a lively curiosity, instead of avoiding everything unusual as is now generally the case. As Frances Pitt remarks, man has put a premium on curiosity, killed off the most inquisitive of each species and instituted a régime under which only the shyest can survive. To-day even young animals in inhabited countries run away first and indulge their curiosity afterwards.

Why do we say "flee instinctively"? In some cases it is much more reasonable to suppose that an animal makes off at our

approach because experience has taught it that man is dangerous than it is to suppose that its flight is instinctive. When, however, we see an insect, young fish or newly born mammal behaving in the same way in similar circumstances, we realise that experience need not enter into the matter at all. When a young fish darts away from a shadow, or a young chick follows the first large moving object that comes its way, we cannot but suppose that we are here dealing with actions as definitely pre-arranged and unconscious as the movement of the fins in the fish or the placing by the chick of one leg before the other. In the one case we say that there is an instinct to follow the first large moving object seen, and observe that as a result the mother has at first little difficulty in keeping her brood close to her. In the other we say that the reaction to a large moving object or even to a passing shadow is flight, and observe that in this way the inexperienced young fish are removed from the dangerous proximity of cannibalistic relatives. Both reactions to moving objects may work side by side. Of a domestic lamb Hudson writes: "Its next important instinct (after suckling), which comes into play from the moment it can stand on its feet, impels it to follow after any object receding from it, and, on the other hand, to run from anything approaching it. If the dam turns round and approaches it, even from a very short distance, it will start back and run from her in fear, and will not understand her voice when she bleats to it. At the same time it will confidently follow after a man, horse, dog or any other animal moving from it. . . . This blundering instinct is quickly laid aside when the lamb has learned to distinguish its dam from other objects, and its dam's voice from other sounds."

Actions which in adult animals may well be the outcome of reason and experience are of necessity ascribed in the newly born to an instinct to do the right thing at the right moment, for we cannot conceive that at so early a stage either factor enters into the situation. The nature and origin of the innumerable activities which we call "instinctive" is a mystery. The only positive value of a term so all-embracing and difficult to define lies in the fact that it divides responses into those that are the outcome of conscious effort and those, which we call instinctive, which seem in no way to depend on the conscious recognition of a situation. It is with this aspect alone that we are here concerned in our inquiry into the emotions of a fleeing animal. If at birth an animal instinctively (according to our use of the word) runs away from large moving objects, how can we say, when as an adult it flees at our approach, that it is now acting wholly on the dictates of reason and experience, or fear? Undoubtedly in a much persecuted species the instinct to flee would be strengthened and even supplanted by fear

and an intelligent understanding of the situation, just as, in a relatively unmolested species such as the lizard on a roadside bank, it is often suppressed as useless and a nuisance.

In the average case of an adult animal is there evidence to show that fleeing is the outcome of an instinctive reaction to a sudden movement or alarm rather than to reason and experience? The most conclusive answer to this is to be obtained by observing the ways of tame and domesticated animals whose experience of man has taught them to regard him much as one of themselves. A dog, whose whole experience of indoor life has taught it that there is nothing to fear, will yet leap up on the defensive when accidentally touched with the foot as it lies asleep on the hearth. If experience had had any say in the matter, the dog would have had no reason to jump. The same nervous reflex in the domestic pigeon is at once translated into flight, so that if we appear suddenly round a corner, the bird flutters ten feet or more into the air before it can help itself. At about that height it recognises the cause of its alarm and flies down to our feet to be fed. Had it been a wild bird it would have risen even more quickly, probably without seeing that from which it had flown. One more instance of instinctive flight will suffice. In her *Animal Mind* Frances Pitt writes: "The otter is naturally a shy and wary beast, but my pet otters, having been associated with people from their earliest days, are quite domesticated; yet any sudden or unexpected incident will make them behave like wild animals. For instance, I have seen Moses, the old female, busy fishing when I have appeared unexpectedly on the bank above her, and she has instantly dived and hidden under the bushes, only to come out again and rush to me at the sound of my voice. Had she been a wild otter, you would have said she fled at the sight of a human being, but, knowing her, one was aware that the order of the impressions on her mind must have been something like this: something there—fright—dive—come up and look round—only 'the Missus!'"

The fact that an animal enters the world with a specific "pattern of reactions," ranging from the simplest reflex to the most complicated instinct, is well known. Thus equipped, it acts at certain critical moments of its career in the manner best calculated to obtain the survival of its species. Enough has, perhaps, been said to suggest that among an animal's heritage of predetermined responses is usually to be found one which safeguards its owner on the sudden appearance of any large or unusual object. Having then come to the conclusion that to flee at man's approach is for an animal but the exercise of a healthy instinct (except, indeed, when the latter has been supplanted by

intelligence), we have still to face our original question: Do animals flee in terror before us? which we now realise can mean only: Is their fear very great even though their fleeing is instinctive? Undoubtedly the answer to this is in the negative. Much support is given to our answer by an examination of the conflicting accounts regarding animals hunted by man for pleasure. Of these the fox will probably provide more people with opportunities of criticising what we have to say than any other animal.

The humanitarian will probably read no further when we say that we believe that in certain circumstances a fox shows signs of taking an almost personal interest in the antics of the hounds which are following his trail. He will say: "Is it really necessary to deal with that fatuous argument—the argument of minds that are either wholly dishonest or ignobly unintelligent—that the fox is 'vermin,' and that he enjoys the run? Surely it has only to be stated to glare at one in all its farcical absurdity." Yet read this account of an eye-witness, one of several in the books of W. J. Long. "Presently came the fox, the hunted beast, and my first glimpse of him was reassuring. He was moving easily, confidently, his beautiful fur fluffed out as if each individual hair were alive, his great brush floating like a plume behind him. There was no sign of terror, no evidence of haste in his graceful action. Though he could run like a red streak, as I well knew, . . . he was now trotting leisurely on his way, stopping often to listen or to sniff the air, while far behind him the heavy-footed hounds were wailing their hearts out over a tangled trail. So Eleemos came to the water and ran lightly beside it, heading downstream, taking in the possibilities of the situation with cunning glances of his bright eyes. The water was low; above it showed the heads of many rocks, from which the sun had melted all the snow, leaving dry spots that would hold no scent. Suddenly a beautiful jump landed Eleemos on a flat rock well out from shore; without losing momentum he turned and went flying upstream, leaping from rock to rock, till he was twenty yards above where he had approached the water, and a broad stretch called halt to his rush. Again without losing speed, he whirled to my side, leapt ashore, flashed up through the woods, and scrambled to the top of a ledge, where he could overlook his trail. When I saw him stretch himself comfortably in the sunshine, as if for a nap, and when, as the hounds came pounding into sight, he lifted his head to cock his ears and wrinkle his eyebrows at the lunatic beasts that were yelling up and down a peaceful world, trying to find out where or how he had crossed the stream—well, then and there I put imagination aside, and

concluded that perhaps the fox was getting more fun out of the chase than any of the dogs."

On the other hand, according to Mortimer Batten, "many a good fox who has fooled and baffled the hounds and given them a glorious run has won his freedom only at the cost of his constitutional fitness. Emerging at length from his sanctuary, after a rest of many hours, he is no longer the wonderful running-machine that he was when the hounds took up his scent, but he is now a broken creature—lungs gone, heart gone, merely a physical wreck. And, again, many an exhausted fox, seeking shelter in a wet drain, lies there till, sick and chilled, and his vitality becoming low, he falls a victim to the fatal red mange, the scourge of the fox kind. In the mountains of the north, where the rugged nature of the country does not permit of fox-hunting, red mange is quite uncommon among the foxes, simply because they are never run to exhaustion. The enormous distance a fox will cover in a single day, leading the hounds at full cry for hours on end, tells its own story. His powers of endurance may be marvellous, but after all he is only flesh and blood, and when, at the end of hours of running, he sets out with pounding heart and panting breath for quite new country—away over the hills in a last mighty and supreme effort—we know that the end must be near. How one's heart goes out to the fox—dragging on and on with foes on every side, seen at every open gate, shouted at and turned aside, and always with that awful death-like 'music' at his heels."

Taking both statements as accurate, how can we explain the difference? Is it that one describes the early stages of a fox-hunt in Canada, the other the not infrequent finale in England? Naturally this explanation is the first that comes to mind, yet it avoids the fundamental difference from the point of view of our inquiry. This is to be found only in the mind of the hunted animal. In the first case, though running before hounds and making full use of its experience and intelligence to make good its escape, the fox has not yet lost confidence. Here then is fleeing, probably in this case wholly intelligent, without fear. Fear comes later when, through over-confidence in its own powers (unless indeed this is merely an insufficient realisation of the danger it is courting), or on finding its retreat "stopped," the hunted creature first learns that escape is no longer possible. That fear may not enter into the situation for a considerable period (or at least that it may be intermittent) is suggested by the fact that when hunted a fox will often not avail itself of an immediate opportunity of escape, perhaps because at the moment

it thinks that it can reach some distant stronghold more to its liking without any difficulty.

The fox, of all animals in England, is likely to learn early in life that its impulse to flee from anything strange or unusual is a good one, and one moreover that it will have to strengthen or supersede by intelligence and experience. Yet in this much persecuted species we find little evidence of fear, much less of terror, when the animal is running for its life with every hope of escape. It is only, as we have suggested, when this hope vanishes that real mental distress begins. If a hunted fox shows little distress so long as it does not know that escape is impossible, how can we doubt that, when in the country animals flee at our approach, practically no fear enters their minds? It is their nature to flee without thinking from the unknown, and as there can rarely be a doubt of their ability to escape, it is not likely that fear is normally present. We have no reason to believe that the carrying out of an instinctive activity is in any way distressing to a natural creature. It is the inability to obey its natural desires that distresses or terrifies.

G. B. GOOCH.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

DIPLOMACY AND THE DEBTS.

THE humour of the Lausanne conference that did not take place and of the disarmament conference that began with a proposal that the League of Nations be armed would have passed almost unnoticed by those who are familiar with the works of diplomacy, had it not been for the particular circumstance that both reparations and armaments were matters of apparently urgent concern. They were matters that seemed to afford an easy opportunity of useful diplomatic enterprise.

The mere chronology of the Lausanne episode makes a curious tale. The economic break-down of Central Europe under the burden of debt, manifesting itself first in Austria, next in Germany, and then extending indiscriminately over the world, took place in the spring of 1931. The Hoover moratorium, conceived as an emergency expedient to gain time wherein the world's diplomacy might devise measures to save the world from still worse disasters, began its twelve-months' course on July 1st, 1931. A Seven-Power conference met in London during that same month to consider what such measures should be. It failed to agree upon any measure. The only result of the conference was that the Bank for International Settlements was invited "to set up without delay a committee of representatives nominated by the Governors of the Central Banks interested, to inquire into the immediate further credit needs of Germany, and to study the possibilities of converting a portion of the short-term credits into long-term credits." That committee met and issued its report (the "Wiggin" report) in August 1931. It warned the Governments of the world that disaster would be the inevitable consequence of their failure to rectify the existing system of international political debt payments, which involved the transfer of large sums from debtor to creditor countries, the while those creditor countries refused to accept payment in the only form in which payment could be made, namely in goods. The Governments took no action upon that warning. On September 21st one part of the disaster that had been predicted duly manifested itself in the fall of sterling from gold. The Governments continued not to take action. Meanwhile, the bankers, as representing the non-political creditors of Germany, had promptly arranged a six-months' "standstill" agreement which would expire on February 29th, 1932.

On November 20th, no action having yet been taken by the Governments, the German Government invoked the suspension clauses of the Young Plan on the formal ground that the transfer

of the conditional annuities could not be made after June 30th, 1932. The Bank for International Settlements at once convened the special Advisory Committee (the "Layton" committee) to make the inquiry prescribed by the Plan. The prescribed inquiry was made. The report was published on Christmas Eve, 1931. It reproduced the substance of the "Wiggin" report in a now chronic form. "We appeal," it ended, "to the Governments on whom the responsibility for action rests to permit of no delay in coming to decisions which will bring an amelioration of this grave crisis which weighs so heavily on all alike."

The Governments at last proceeded to act. But what did they do? By January 2nd they had agreed that the conference should meet at Lausanne. By January 12th they had agreed that it should meet on January 25th. They then proceeded to bicker and squabble. They bickered and squabbled to such effect that they decided that it would be no good holding the conference at all. The conference was cancelled.

A month passed. On February 13th an official statement was issued, thus:

"The Governments of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, after having taken note of the Basle experts' report, are agreed to recommend to the other Governments concerned the adjournment of the Lausanne Conference to the month of June. The object of the Conference will be to agree on a lasting settlement of the questions raised in the report of the Basle experts and on the measures necessary to solve the other economic and financial difficulties which are responsible for, and may prolong, the present world crisis. This decision has been reached by the above Governments in the hope that it will ease the international situation."

In other words it was agreed simply to hold a conference in June. Inasmuch as the Hoover moratorium year would expire on June 30th, and the German Government had invoked the suspension clauses of the Young Plan, and the Advisory Committee had upheld the German contention, it was unavoidable that a conference be held before June 30th. The two expert committees above referred to had put all their emphasis upon the urgent, grave necessity of political action without delay. By deciding to hold a conference in June, the Governments decided to act, not with the minimum, but with the maximum delay; in other words to carry out the experts' prescription, in the manner of Father William, upside down.

Is it surprising that mature students of affairs do not ever expect anything useful to be done by diplomatic means? It probably is not of much consequence that the world's chief states-

men thus publicly and spectacularly paraded their failure to take timely action in an emergency clearly demanding timely action. The world will right itself, but not by the service of politicians. The really amusing thing to the dispassionate spectator is not the failure of the politicians—although that in itself is odd enough to be amusing when one considers the circumstances—but the fact that they are invested with a sort of spurious prestige in the eyes of the ordinary humble citizens, men and women, who are their victims. Diplomatic commentators, whose business it is to interpret to the humble citizens aforesaid, the divagations of high diplomacy (save the mark!) speak, as it were, with bated breath and write with a sense of delicate responsibility about these things. There are such commentators who are given large spaces in British daily newspapers urging British opinion not to be uncharitable about the French politicians, to be exceedingly careful not to offend the susceptibilities of those politicians, to try and understand and sympathise with "the French point of view," to remember that we can never be happy or get anything done except as the result of a glorious mixture of Anglo-French political harmony. If one laughs, it is as though one laughed in church or at a funeral.

The interesting element in this eternal comedy is that, on the cumulative and clear evidence of history, the world's diplomatists have seldom done anything except add muddle to muddle. It is not their fault. Let any earnest business man try to make the world disarm in concert with French, Polish, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, Turkish politicians. Let him try to abolish the proved mischief of international debts by convincing an American congressman and a French deputy at one and the same time. It is the old problem of mass mentality. It is unlikely in the nature of things that vast masses of people, belonging to different classes, educated differently, belonging to different nations, speaking different languages, brought up to different ideas and standards of what is white and what is black: it is unlikely that "world opinion" will ever be moulded into any channel whatsoever. But why should one not laugh when, for instance, somebody proposes to arm the League of Nations in the supposed interests of disarmament? If that somebody be hurt, will it really impede any good cause, granted that neither he nor any other diplomatist is likely to advance any good cause? There seems to be little to lose. There might be something to gain by pricking the pomposity with which the diplomatists concoct their usual hash. The really philosophic people are not disturbed by the never ending story of diplomatic failure. The world wags in spite of it.

There is in the meantime some limited interest attaching to

the formulated views of the chief Governments concerned in the matter of political international indebtedness. The British Government finds itself, not only in this, but in many contemporary questions, on the side of the angels in permanent splendour. That Government's view was expressed by Mr. Neville Chamberlain in the House of Commons on February 2nd. "The policy," he said, "of his Majesty's Government is that a comprehensive and permanent settlement of the reparation question must be reached as soon as possible. We believe, as successive Governments of this country have believed in the past, that this aim could best be realised by means of a general cancellation of reparations and war debts. As soon as the report of the Basle experts was received at Christmas we urged the necessity for the Governments to come together immediately to conclude a permanent settlement of the reparation question on the basis of a frank recognition of the facts established in the unanimous report of the experts. But it became apparent that the present juncture was not favourable for a settlement on such a basis. We accordingly expressed our willingness to agree to the postponement of the Inter-Governmental Conference till May or June, when we hoped that conditions might be more favourable for a permanent settlement. We also suggested that some provisional arrangement should be made covering the year commencing July 1st next, in case the Conference could not be concluded before June 30th, when the Hoover moratorium will expire. . . . The legal obligations of Germany are laid down by The Hague Agreements and cannot be altered or annulled by the unilateral action of Germany. That is clear; indeed, so far as I am aware, it has never been contested in any quarter. But it is equally clear, from the Report of the Basle Committee, that Germany is not in a position to resume the fulfilment of these obligations and that consequently when the creditor Governments come to consider future arrangements that fact will assuredly have to be taken into account."

The view of the French Government was expressed by M. Laval on the morrow of his reconstituted Ministry's taking office. The circumstances of the January crisis in Paris are of no international interest except that they were the occasion of the elimination from French politics of the best politician in France, M. Briand. M. Laval resigned on January 12th. He formed a new Cabinet on the following day, himself taking M. Briand's portfolio of Foreign Affairs, M. Tardieu becoming Minister of War and M. Flandin remaining at the Ministry of Finance. On January 22nd a long debate took place in the Chamber on the new Government's policy, which received a vote of confidence by a majority of 51 (312 against 261).

In the debate M. Laval expressed the Government's policy on reparation in the following terms (*Times* report): "France would not abandon the principle of reparations. . . . France would not allow a single one of the bonds she held to be repudiated. The experts at Basle had reported in favour of a moratorium going beyond that provided for by the Plan. But they had also declared that Germany would again enjoy prosperity at some future time, and thereby they had persuaded the French Government to reject the idea of the definitive cancellation of reparations. The experts had observed also that some adjustment was necessary, since excessive transfers might aggravate the position and precipitate chaos. France would not consent to a reduction of what was due to her except in so far as a parallel reduction was accorded her in respect of her debts. In no event would she consent to any reduction of the unconditional annuity. Germany had undertaken to respect the engagements to which she had appended her signature, and these engagements would not be submitted to revision with a view to a new plan. . . ."

While, therefore, Great Britain advocated, France rejected, cancellation. France expressed a willingness to consider a reduction of reparation only on condition that the United States were willing, *pari passu*, to reduce the French debt. And this is what the United States Government thought upon the matter: "It is hereby expressly declared to be against the policy of Congress that any indebtedness by foreign countries to the United States should be in any manner cancelled or reduced." (Text of Moratorium Bill, approved by House of Representatives, December 17th, 1931.)

The deadlock thus appeared to be complete. London wanted to cancel all debts. Paris would reduce one debt if another were reduced. Washington refused to reduce that other debt. Italy agreed with the British policy and wanted in the words ascribed to Signor Mussolini "to wipe clean the tragic ledger of the war." Dr. Brüning simply affirmed Germany's inability to pay. In a public statement issued on January 9th he said: "It is perfectly clear that Germany's condition makes the continuance of political payments impossible. It is equally clear that every attempt to maintain the system of political payments must lead to calamity, involving not only Germany but the whole world. This state of affairs leaves the German Government no choice of policy. They cannot do otherwise at the forthcoming conference than make a statement of existing conditions and appeal to the other participating Governments to take account of these conditions and to refrain from seeking solution in compromises which are no longer practicable."

So much for the political debts. Concurrently the creditor bankers were negotiating with the debtor bankers in Berlin an

arrangement which was to be put into operation on the expiry of the "standstill" agreement on February 29. That agreement (the *Stillhalteabkommen*) was a severely businesslike arrangement between creditor bankers and debtor bankers (the credits extended by foreign commercial firms being excluded from the scope of the agreement) wherein the community of interests between the two sides was recognised. The exact machinery set up is too technical and too elaborate to be explained in this place, but its object was to temper the wind to the shorn lamb, by arranging that short-term balances should be released only with the approval of the German debtors. Its underlying object was to enable Germany to recover from financial collapse. The duration of the agreement was determined by the hope that the Governments would do their part in the rescue work within six months. That no doubt seemed a safe enough estimate at the time to the minds of men who were in the habit of dealing with business affairs in a businesslike way, and who therefore innocently expected the politicians, when faced with a matter of business, also to be businesslike. But the politicians, as we have seen, were not businesslike.

By the end of 1931 it became clear to the bankers that a reparation settlement could not be expected before the end of February, and they therefore set themselves the weary task of enunciating a temporising device such as would prolong the existing arrangement beyond February 29th till such time as the politicians might contrive to do something on their side. The new agreement was duly reached by the end of the third week in January and the text was published during the following week. Again the details of the scheme are too technical for explanation here. The *Stillhalte* was extended for twelve more months. The length of the extension perhaps implied a revised estimate of the political prospect. The underlying principle of the new agreement was the foreign creditors' faith in the soundness of the German commercial and banking enterprises to which the short-term credits had been advanced, provided only the economic and financial structure of the world at large could survive the inactivity of the politicians. Germany's chance of recuperation was stated to depend upon "positive action by Governments and peoples in the sphere of international co-operation," and the key-note of such co-operation was given in the following passage of the report: "The all-important thing is to restore the basis of credit. It is obvious that a settlement of Germany's international payments, which are now under discussion between the Governments, is a vital element in this problem, as indeed are the inter-Allied debts, which are in intimate economic connection with them. But these questions, though they profoundly affect private credit, cannot be solved by bankers. The Committee

can only repeat that they endorse all that has been said by both Basle Committees on these problems. . . . The present extreme crisis must bring home to all peoples of the world the fact that all countries grow poor together. The obverse is true. All countries grow rich together. A lightening of burdens and a greater freedom of trade, enriching one country, will enrich all."

On the initialling of the agreement the German Minister of Finance wrote to Mr. Wiggin, Chairman of the Foreign Bankers' Committee, to inform him that a Foreign Debts Committee was to be created with the object, among others, of exercising "its influence toward the adoption of a uniform policy in the treatment of foreign debts." In his answer Mr. Wiggin wrote: "In view of the existing exchange difficulties, no immediate cash repayments of the short-term banking credits are provided for in the new Agreement. For this reason the Foreign Bank Creditors assume that no capital repayments of other creditors will take place save such as are deemed by the new 'Ausschuss für Auslandsschulden' to be absolutely essential for the maintenance of German credit. They take it that this is, in fact, what you mean in your letter by the 'uniform policy in the treatment of foreign debts,' and it is on this assumption that they would welcome it."

Two healthy factors in the general depression became known towards the end of January. On January 25th the Bank of England announced that it would complete the repayment on maturity, that is on February 1st, of the balance of the credits that it had received at the end of July from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and from the Bank of France, and that the repayment would not necessitate any reduction of the Bank's gold reserve. The original credits in dollars and in francs had been the equivalent of £50,000,000, of which £20,000,000 was repaid on maturity at the end of October. That repayment was effected, as to its greater part, by the shipping of £15,000,000 in gold. The balance of the credits, namely £30,000,000, was then renewed by New York and Paris for three more months. It was duly repaid on February 1st, although its repayment, as a result of the fall of sterling in terms of dollars and francs, cost the Bank much more than £30,000,000. The fact that the transaction was carried through without loss of gold was universally recognised as an indication of the inherent strength of the Bank of England, and had an immediately comforting effect throughout the world.

The other factor, which was tacitly hailed as something almost equally comforting, was the increasingly bad news about the economic position in France. It would help the world back to confidence and to a renewal of commercial enterprise if French influence, monetary and economic, could be mobilised on the side

of such renewal. One of the unfortunate elements in the prevailing depression has been the fact that France, an almost self-supporting country, has further enjoyed the budgetary satisfaction of having virtually repudiated her debts, of having received most of the cash from German reparation, and of having accumulated a large part of the world's gold. She has not been impressed by the collective appeals of American, British, German, Italian financiers for common action against a common misfortune. Indeed, it demonstrably was not, as yet, a common misfortune, for it did not affect French prosperity, and French opinion did not look ahead. What foresight failed to achieve is now being achieved by the event itself. At the end of January 1932 the French coal industry was rapidly decreasing its output, the warm weather helping the good cause; the Roubaix wool-combers had reduced their output by 60 per cent.; textile spinners in many cases were faced with the necessity of closing down; wage reductions had begun generally to be made; the luxury trades (the backbone of French economic life) had been badly hit by the British measures of self-defence against the effects of French short-sightedness; a budget deficit was in sight; and the huge gold reserves were being revealed as the impotent mass of metal they essentially were when the greater part of the world had been driven off gold. Such facts gave one instance of the general truth that the world wags and rights itself in spite of political obstruction.

Let not the tender people imagine that by quoting economic facts one is "attacking" France. Universal distress produces its own remedy. In this case it was not universal until it also involved France. One cannot be either "pro" French or "anti" French; for we are all in the same boat.

FROM MANCHURIA TO SHANGHAI.

The chronicle of Sino-Japanese disturbances which was given in THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for December 1931 (pp. 783-92) ended at the point where severe fighting broke out at the Nonni River in the first week of November. The subsequent developments resolved themselves into four distinct phases, namely (1) the completion of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, (2) the effect thereof upon the foreign Powers; (3) the transference of the scene of disturbance from Manchuria to Shanghai, and (4) the action thereupon taken by the Powers.

(1) *The Occupation of Manchuria.*

At the beginning of November the army of General Ma was the only remaining Chinese force in Manchuria. The Nonni bridges

fighting had the virtual effect in the military sense of placing Manchuria at the disposal of Japan. Mukden and Kirin had already been occupied. Tsitsihar was now the only capital of the three Eastern provinces that was still controlled by the Chinese. On November 14th it became known that General Honjo had received instructions from Tokyo to the effect that he should give General Ma ten days in which to withdraw his forces from the Nonni bridges to Tsitsihar. On November 17th General Ma was reported to have accepted the Honjo terms. Tokyo at the same time announced that General Honjo had been forbidden to take offensive action even if the Ma withdrawal had not been effected by November 25th, and that the Japanese forces had nearly all been evacuated from Mukden and Kirin. On November 18th the Japanese War Office announced that General Ma had launched an attack with 26,000 men. The battle was soon over, and as a result, the Japanese troops at once occupied Anganchi, and entered Tsitsihar on the following day. On December 18th the Japanese Foreign Office announced that its policy was not to allow any Chinese troops to remain in Manchuria. Five days later it became known that Chang Hsueh-liang had promised the Japanese Legation in Peking that his troops would be withdrawn from Chinchow. Chinchow was the last remaining strategic point that had not been taken over by the Japanese troops. It was entered and occupied on January 2nd. By that action Japan completed her military *mainmise* over Manchuria.

The next practical question therefore was: what was she going to do about it? On December 28th the Japanese Prime Minister had announced in a statement he made to the Press that "Japan would not accept Manchuria, even as a gift, owing to the enormous expenditure that would be needed to defend its extensive frontiers"; that she would respect the principle of the "open door" and would welcome foreign participation in the development of Manchuria as soon as normal conditions could be restored. All that was clear was that the military phase was over, and that diplomacy in one form or another would have to take the next step.

(2) *The Powers and Manchuria.*

In the December CONTEMPORARY REVIEW it was recorded that the Council of the League on October 24th had failed to reach an agreed resolution about the evacuation of Manchuria by the Japanese troops. The resolution was defeated by the single dissentient vote of Japan. On October 26th, however, there emerged the possibility that an accommodation might be reached between the Chinese and the Japanese points of view; for on that day Dr. Sze informed M. Briand that China recognised herself to be bound by "scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations," and on

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the same day an official Japanese Note for the first time enumerated the "five fundamental principles" of Japanese policy, the fifth of which stipulated "respect for the treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria." On the face of the matter China offered what Japan demanded. A special meeting of the Council began in Paris on November 16th with the apparently simple object of satisfying the fifth Japanese point by means of the Sze declaration. On November 18th the Japanese and Chinese delegates were summoned before the Council. The one was asked to state what exactly Japan wanted in respect of the fifth point, and the other to state what exactly differed therein from his own principle of respect for treaties. The League was now working on more businesslike lines than those upon which it had started. It was clearly wise to concentrate upon the treaty basis and to keep both parties to the point.

On paper it could be argued that the two parties now had nothing much to quarrel about. When, however, their representatives met before the Council they proceeded to discover much to quarrel about. Dr. Sze's discovery was that no Chinese Government could consent to negotiate with Japan about the fifth point under the pressure of military occupation, and he demanded a Japanese evacuation as the precedent condition of further diplomatic business. He even hinted at the possibility of Nanking's invoking "other articles of the Covenant" (i.e. 15 and 16). That old bogey, however, had by now lost some of its terror, for the impetuous Geneva enthusiasts who had stampeded themselves into demanding an economic boycott of Japan and a world-wide war upon Japan in the supposed interests of world-wide peace, had in some measure calmed down and had become more inclined to reconcile their works with their faith. The Japanese representative, for his part, had little difficulty in discovering a Japanese snag. He merely made use to that end of a Note received from the Japanese Government on November 19th to the effect that Tokyo could not accept any undertaking "of the hostile Kuomintang Government of Nanking as security for its [Japan's] nationals or to guarantee order." In truth there was something to be said for such a contention; but Japan would have strengthened her prestige if she had shown more willingness to help the League in its now realistic attempt to find a solution of the problem.

It was therefore found impossible in practice to reconcile the Chinese offer of respect for treaties with the Japanese claim of respect for treaties. On November 20th one small step forward appeared to be taken when it became known that both China and Japan had agreed to the sending of a League commission of inquiry to Manchuria. Even that agreement, however, became a little

ragged in the following five days. China on second thoughts saw the danger that a League inquiry might merely waste time and enable Japan to consolidate her position in Manchuria. Japan wanted to enlarge the inquiry to embrace the whole of China—an alarming prospect—and balked the Council's incidental purpose of curbing the Japanese military activities in Manchuria, by protesting that there were 30,000 Chinese troops at Chinchow. On November 26th the Council decided to invite those representatives of the Powers who happened to be in Manchuria to suggest a scheme for the delimitation of a provisional neutral zone in Manchuria.

There followed a fortnight of inextricably muddled controversy about the neutral zone. The successive stages through which the controversy passed would take many pages to record, nor are they worth recording. On December 9th the Council did contrive to adopt a unanimous resolution, which M. Briand characterised as an important and, he hoped, a decisive step towards the settlement of the dispute. The two essential parts of that resolution were paragraphs (1) and (5), thus: "The Council (1) reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30th, 1931, by which the two parties declare that they are solemnly bound. It therefore calls upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution, so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone may be effected as speedily as possible under the conditions set forth in the said resolution"; and "(5) Without prejudice to the carrying out of the above-mentioned measures, desiring, in view of the special circumstances of the case, to contribute towards the final and fundamental solution by the two Governments of the questions at issue between them, decides to appoint a Commission of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstances which affect the international relations and threaten to destroy peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends."

The Commission was duly elected, and Lord Lytton was elected to be its chairman; but it did not leave for the Far East before the incomparably more serious phase of the Sino-Japanese quarrel had developed at Shanghai.

Throughout the period when the trouble was confined to Manchuria the British Government maintained that attitude of restraint and of suspended judgment which had been the keynote of Sir John Simon's statement in the House of Commons on November 25th. He then made it clear that in the view of his Government the best hope of a settlement lay in the exercise of patience at Geneva, in the cultivation of Sino-Japanese understand-

ing, and in the avoidance of provocative talk about applying Acts 15 and 16 of the Covenant.

The United States Government had remained in close consultation with the League of Nations from the beginning of the emergency. When at the beginning of 1932 the purely military element in the Manchurian problem appeared to be an accomplished fact, the United States Government decided to put on record its considered view of the diplomatic problem that remained to be solved. On January 7th it was announced in Washington that Mr. Stimson had addressed to Tokyo and to Nanking an identical Note to inform them that the United States "cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto*, nor does it intend to recognise any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments or their agents which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty or independence or territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or their international policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open-Door policy. The United States does not intend to recognise any situation or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties."

The treaty stipulations to which Mr. Stimson referred were those of the Nine-Power Treaty signed in Washington on February 6th, 1922, by the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal. The relevant part of that treaty was Article I, which read thus: "(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; (2) to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government; (3) to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; (4) to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states."

(3) *The Disturbance at Shanghai.*

The origin of the unpleasant situation that developed in Shanghai at the beginning of the year is to be traced to the bad blood that had been cultivated during the previous year over the events in Manchuria. The really damaging weapon that China used

against Japan was a boycott of Japanese goods in China proper, a boycott that was resolutely carried out, and was supported by a striking unanimity and depth of feeling among all the Chinese people. The boycott took effect chiefly in Shanghai, not only because Shanghai was the chief port through which Sino-Japanese trade was conducted, but because it was itself the biggest industrial centre.

Feeling grew to such an intensity that it almost inevitably manifested itself in physical outrage. On January 19th a Chinese mob in the north of Shanghai attacked and seriously injured five Japanese monks, one of whom died of his injuries within a week. On January 20th a Japanese mob, in retaliation, set fire to a Chinese towel factory in Chapei (the Chinese quarter to the north of the International Settlement) and a pitched battle resulted between them and the Chinese police. Two men were killed. On January 21st the commander of the Japanese fleet in Chinese waters, Rear-Admiral Shiosawa, issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the Chinese authorities in Shanghai, demanding a formal apology from the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, the arrest of the persons who had attacked the monks, the payment of compensation to the monks, and the dissolution of all the anti-Japanese organisations. If satisfaction were not given, punitive action was threatened by the fleet. On the same day Japanese marines and warships were ordered to Shanghai. The Japanese naval and consular authorities on January 22nd assured the Chairman of the Council of the International Settlement that the Japanese action did not affect the Settlement, and that no troops would be moved into the Settlement except after consultation with the Council. On January 24th the Chinese authorities in Shanghai were further warned by the Japanese naval authorities that unless the demands of January 21st were satisfied, the Chinese Municipal Buildings, the headquarters of the Kuomintang, the Kiangnan Arsenal and other buildings in Greater Shanghai would be occupied. On January 26th Admiral Shiosawa demanded and obtained the suppression of the Kuomintang paper in Shanghai, the *Republican Daily News*, which had published certain accounts of the rioting which were distasteful to him. On that day the Mayor of Shanghai informed the Japanese Consul-General that he would fulfil the January 21st demands if he were given till January 30th to do so. The Japanese answer, given the following day, was that if the demands were not complied with by 6 p.m. on January 28th, the occupation of the city of Shanghai would begin. The Mayor thereupon ordered the immediate suppression of all the anti-Japanese boycott associations and appealed to the Chinese population for co-operation in satisfying

the Japanese demands. That same day Japanese air force reinforcements arrived at Shanghai.

The precise chronology of the events of January 28th is clearly of importance to an understanding of relative culpability in what next took place. Although the ultimatum was not due to expire till 6 p.m. that day, the Japanese Admiral at 7.30 a.m. gave to the authorities of the International Settlement a twenty-four hours' warning of his intention to take action against the Chinese. At noon the Municipal Council declared a state of emergency, to take effect as from 4 p.m. At 1 p.m. the Mayor of Shanghai announced his decision to concede the Japanese demands. That announcement, therefore, was made five hours before the expiry of the time limit. The next event seemed to clinch the correctitude of the Chinese behaviour, even on the Japanese criteria, for at 9 p.m. the Japanese Consul declared the Chinese compliance to be satisfactory, and he accepted it as such. Yet at 10 p.m. the Japanese Admiral by proclamation announced his intention of landing marines to protect the Japanese nationals and to rid Shanghai of disorderly Chinese troops. Japanese marines were, in fact, landed at midnight. They advanced through the International Settlement in an attempt to occupy Chapei, but were vigorously resisted by the Chinese forces. The fighting lasted well into the night, and Chapei was not occupied till the early hours. Concurrently the Japanese warships engaged the Woosung forts below Shanghai, at the junction of the Whangpoo and Yangtse rivers. The forts were silenced and dismantled. During the day the International Settlement Defence Force had been mobilised and posted on the boundaries of the Settlement. It was stated that the Japanese Admiral's action had been precipitated by the concentration on the western side of the Settlement of large Chinese forces belonging to the Cantonese 19th Army from Kiangsi, the total number of massed Chinese forces being alleged to be 30,000, among them a large element of bandits and ruffians who had been imported into Chapei by the Chinese police. At 4.25 a.m. on January 29th Japanese aeroplanes began to bomb Chapei and the Shanghai-Nanking railway. Many casualties were inflicted upon the Chinese population and the greater part of Chapei was set on fire.

The British and United States Consul-Generals on January 31st held a conference with the Japanese Admiral, the Japanese Consul, the Commander of the Chinese garrison and the Mayor of Shanghai, and tried to arrange an armistice on the basis that the Japanese forces should withdraw within the Settlement, that the Chinese forces should withdraw to the west of the railway, that foreign troops should patrol the space between the Japanese troops and the railway, and that the Chinese police should be responsible

for order between the railway and the Chinese front. The seat of the Chinese Government was on that day removed from Nanking to Loyang. It was on the following day (February 1st) that Anglo-American diplomacy began more formally to intervene. It began in unpromising circumstances. Although the proposed truce had been accepted by both sides, it had little effect upon either of them. Within a few days a fierce battle was raging for the possession of Chapei, and Japanese warships were shelling Nanking.

(4) *Anglo-American Diplomatic Intervention.*

On February 1st the British and American Ambassadors in Tokyo formally protested against the Japanese violation of the neutrality of the International Settlement. On February 2nd Sir John Simon made a full statement in the House of Commons. He expressed His Majesty's Government's "grave concern," outlined the naval and military measures that had been taken by that Government as a precautionary measure, involving the movement of troops and of warships to Shanghai, and then declared: "... instructions were sent to His Majesty's representatives at Tokyo and Nanking to deliver this morning to those Governments the following proposals, and press strongly for their acceptance, indicating that they are being simultaneously urged upon the other party. These proposals have been concerted with the United States Government, and the French and Italian Governments are being asked to act similarly. I have since received information that these Governments have acted in the sense desired. These proposals are: (1) Cessation of all acts of violence on both sides forthwith on the following terms: (2) No further mobilisation or preparation whatever for further hostilities; (3) Withdrawal of both Japanese and Chinese combatants from all points of mutual contact in the Shanghai area; (4) Protection of the International Settlement by the establishment of neutral zones to divide the combatants. These zones to be policed by neutrals; the arrangements to be set up by the Consular authorities on the spot; (5) Upon acceptance of these conditions prompt advances to be made in negotiation to settle all outstanding controversies between the two nations in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the resolution of the League of Nations of December 9th without prior demand or reservations and with the aid of neutral observers or participants."

On February 3rd China unreservedly accepted those proposals. Japan on February 4th accepted the third and the fourth points, conditionally accepted the first, and rejected the second and fifth. As this paper was written there was as yet little evidence that Japan was impressed by Anglo-American intervention.

The events above recorded seemed clearly to indicate that Japan

had put herself definitely in the wrong. Such are the vagaries of human standards that the Power upon whose goodwill and statesmanship must largely depend a decent settlement in the Far East—for little hope is to be derived from any influence that may emanate from the vast chaos that is China—has lightly, but perhaps only temporarily, abandoned her title to be considered as a pacific or constructive force. There was some excuse for what she did in Manchuria, none for what she did in Shanghai. The arrogance of the attack upon indisputably Chinese territory and the folly of the provocation given to the important foreign interests centred in Shanghai are thrown into still greater relief by the fact that no conceivable Japanese purpose can thereby be served. It is clearly nonsensical to imagine that Japan can entertain any notion of annexation or of military conquest on the grand scale. As well attempt to annex the Pacific Ocean as to annex "China." Moreover, if any smaller annexation were contemplated, Japan's adversaries would not be China, but the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and five other Powers. The simple, and probably true, explanation of what Japan has done at Shanghai is that a Japanese Admiral, having a fleet at his disposal, and having for his guidance in the use thereof a singularly irresponsible mind, proceeded to hurl live shells, to drop bombs and to engage his marines on land for no conceivable purpose whatsoever. Could there be any more striking illustration of the truth: *si vis bellum, para bellum*? A commonplace truth, perhaps, hardly needing to be stated. Yet at the very moment when a Japanese Admiral at Shanghai was hurtling shells for no other reason than that he had the shells on board to hurtle, the chief delegate of the French Government at the Geneva Disarmament Conference was solemnly proposing that the peace of the world be secured, not by the abolition of armaments, but by the placing of armaments at the disposal of the League of Nations itself. The world, in its politics, is mad, always has been and probably always will be. Human conduct, if it is to be saved from madness, needs a lodestar for its guidance. The healthy individual is guided in his private conduct by the lodestar of a religion, professed or subconscious, which makes him follow a recognisable ideal, the Christian ideal, for example. In his politics and diplomacy, by contrast, he acts almost exclusively from a motive of mixed intellect and emotion, and his ship has no rudder. The ugly German word *Realpolitik* is fairly descriptive of the result. It looks as if decency of feeling is something individualistic, and that it is lost in a crowd, whether the crowd be bent upon diplomacy or upon other forms of mass activity.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

February 15th, 1932.

No. 366.

March, 1932.

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THE CONCEPT OF VALUE.*

Philosophy is being rewritten in terms of the Concept of Value and it was time that we should have a comprehensive treatment of Ethics from this point of view. This is what Dr. Hartmann has given us in the book, the first part of which is contained in the present volume of the English translation. The author occupies the leading Chair of Philosophy in the University of Berlin, lately vacated by Troeltsch, but is as yet little known to English readers. Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* was finished to the sound of Napoleon's cannon at Jena; Hartmann's *Ethics*, we are told in the translator's Preface, was begun in the trenches on the Eastern Front, where the author was fighting in the winter of 1916-17, and where he found inspiration for his analysis of human values in the results he saw all around him of the insensate blindness of the nations of Europe to all that these meant.

The volume before us gives the key-note of the whole under the title of *The Structure of the Ethical Phenomenon*. Starting from the questions which Kant declared were the subject-matter

* *Ethics*. By Nicolai Hartmann, Professor of Philosophy, University of Berlin, translated by Stanton Coit. Preface by J. H. Muirhead. Vol. I. *Moral Phenomena*. Library of Philosophy. Allen & Unwin. 343 pp. 12s. 6d. net.

of modern Philosophy (What can we know? What ought we to do? What may we hope for?) it shows that the second of these opens out into another: What is valuable in the world and in human life? What therefore is to be sought after by us in order that through understanding, appreciation and consequent conduct we may be men in the full meaning of the word? This involves a preliminary criticism of "false methods of philosophical ethics," including Utilitarian and Kantian. The Utilitarians are wrong in resolving morality into the pursuit of merely happiness values to which moral values are only the means. Kant was wrong in finding the source of the "ought" and the moral values for which it stands in the "reason," instead of in the claim which the values that lie all about us in the real world make upon us as the mediators between the eternal order these represent and the temporal order of the actually existent. Dr. Hartmann's doctrine is idealistic, but the ideas to which appeal is made are not anything merely in the mind of man, whether as a sensitive organism or as legislative over the natural desires through the power of reason, but (as they were to Plato) constituent elements in the real world. Realism and Idealism in a word make a false antithesis. The only true Idealism is that which keeps its eye fixed on the great realities; the only true Realism that which recognises the features of reality in that which still is in great part an ideal—something which "ought to be" rather than as yet anywhere is.

The Second Part, which will shortly follow in a separate volume, is devoted to showing that all values form a complex, as yet imperfectly known system, the fuller revelation of which is the aim of civilisation. In the hierarchy which this system represents each level is shown to rest upon that which is below it, but to be independent of the higher of which it is the basis, and thus to have an earlier though not a higher claim than the latter. The restatement of the Aristotelian scheme of the virtues and the exposition of their conflicting claims in what the author calls the "antinomy of the virtues" seem to the present writer one of the most original and valuable parts of the whole book.

The Third Part will deal with the eternal problem of the Freedom of the Will. It aims at showing that the actual world, like the values that are inherent in it, forms a hierarchical system each level of which, while completely determined by its own law, is the base of another which transcends it. While based upon a physical order completely determined by the law of cause and effect organic life brings with it its own law of determination by ends. Similarly, while human life depends on physiological and psychological processes shared by it with the animals, it brings

with it the power of being determined by ideas, among them the idea of the right, and therewith the sense of responsibility for the choice of one or another as the motive of action. It thus proclaims itself as above all causal and even teleological determination, in other words is free or self-determined.

The English student who has felt the pull in the deeper thought of our time back to the great classical and particularly to the Platonic tradition in contrast either to naturalism or a half-hearted intuitionism, or again to a merely logical idealism, will find himself at home in the atmosphere of this book, however difficult he may find the detailed expositions into which German *Gründlichkeit* in some places carries the author. While much has been done in this country and in America to re-orient the study of Ethics to a general philosophy of value, nothing hitherto so far as I know approaches Dr. Hartmann's work in range and thoroughness.

It has been fortunate in having for its translator Dr. Stanton Coit, who, in addition to a lifelong acquaintance with contemporary ethical literature, has the advantage of having devoted himself for some years past to the study of a book which has seemed to him more than any other to have "told him his dream" of what Ethics both in theory and practice ought to be.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

* * *

THE EASTERN FRONT.

In his new volume, *The World Crisis: the Eastern Front*,* Mr. Winston Churchill deals with a theatre of the Great War too often neglected by the average Englishman. Though the war was won in France and Flanders, it certainly began in Central Europe. For many years the composite Empire of Austria-Hungary had viewed with increasing alarm the pretensions of Serbia to unite all the Southern Slavs. "The sentiment and tradition of all the Southern Slavs turned towards Serbia as to a magnet, and through Serbia far back across the ages to the once great Serb empire of Stephan Dushan. To revivify those glories and re-unite the lands and peoples now sundered, became the persisting ambition of the Serbian people." From the viewpoint of the Austrian the overthrow of Serbia was the only alternative to the disruption of the Empire.

Mr. Churchill deals briefly with this growth of antagonism against Serbia as exemplified in the annexation of Bosnia in 1908,

* Thornton Butterworth Ltd. 30s. net.

the Balkan Wars and finally the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand. It seems clear that Austria intended the crime of Sarajevo to be the excuse for a Serbian war. It may be doubted whether she anticipated a general European struggle, though she distinctly provided the occasion for arousing the hatred of Germany and France.

Even if Germany and France had never been rivals and enemies, or if England had not been estranged by Germany, the fountain-heads of wrath in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Balkan States would sooner or later have overflowed in a deluge of war. Without these eastern sources of trouble, the mighty western Powers might have long dwelt in the sunshine of peace and progress. It was the fatal confluence of two powerful separate and self-moving sets of antagonisms that alone rendered possible the supreme catastrophe; and it was the course of events in the east that fixed the fatal hour.

Fear of Russia prevented Austria from acting alone against Serbia, and it was not until Germany promised to defend her against Russian interference that Austria delivered her ultimatum. The Kaiser knew full well the implications of such a guarantee. War with Russia meant war with her ally France. There is evidence that the Kaiser went a step farther and encouraged an Austrian war against Serbia. "The Serbians must be disposed of and that right soon," wrote the Kaiser in a marginal note. He continually urged on the Austrian Emperor to take some definite step towards war; Germany seemed bent on the humiliation of Russia and France, either under threat of war or by war itself. Mr. Churchill says:

Of course he hoped it would not come to war. Austria would punish Serbia, and be once more indebted to Germany. France and England, in fear of war or love of peace, or from moral or material unpreparedness, would persuade Russia to stand aside; and Russia, convinced at last of the worthlessness of their friendship or alliance, would abandon the Triple Entente. The Central Empires would tower up, united and triumphant, over a bloodless field.

However that may be, when Russia opposed the violation of Serbia, Germany in no way worked for peace. Instead the Kaiser at once made Russian mobilisation a ground for war. "Germany declared war upon Russia. Germany summoned France to repudiate the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance, and hand over to German keeping her key fortresses as gages of faithful neutrality. Germany declared war with France." She had no immediate quarrel with France and it is significant that in order to create a state of war the German Ambassador

was deliberately ordered to demand guarantees of neutrality which were impossible of acceptance.

Mr. Churchill devotes the main part of his work to the actual campaigns, beginning with the Battle of Lemberg, and ending with the defeat of Russia and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1917. The conditions of warfare were very different from those in the West.

Here was war in all its old unlimited hazard but on an unexampled scale. No endless succession of trench lines, range upon range, fortified with every device or carefully studied for eventual defence. . . . It was the same fierce, primordial game multiplied fifty-fold and with whole ponderous armies instead of mobile brigades as counters. . . . here it was "catch-as-catch-can" as in the wars of Marlborough, Frederick and Napoleon.

Only the railway enabled the rapid movement and concentration of troops impossible a century before. On the Eastern Front battles were won by swift manœuvres. The Russian armies were ponderous and slow. Hoping to win by sheer weight of numbers, they pushed steadily forward in huge waves. Against the Austrian army such tactics might be successful. The Russian victory at Lemberg was ultimately due to sheer force of numbers. In East Prussia, however, the German army under Hindenburg and Ludendorff had won a decisive victory at Tannenberg. By a series of brilliant movements the Russians were surrounded and 120,000 prisoners captured by the far smaller German army. Throughout the campaigns it became increasingly clear that the mere weight of Russian numbers could have little success against the superior tactics and discipline of the Germans. In two years, the Russian attacks on East Prussia and Austria had been repulsed and Russian Poland had been lost. In addition the armies of the Central Powers had overrun first Serbia and then Roumania, and had obtained the alliance of Bulgaria and Turkey. Finally in 1917 the Russian Revolution ensured German hegemony in the Balkans.

The armies on the whole of the Eastern Front were thus set free to assist in the German offensive of 1918 in France and Flanders. The superiority of the Allies, however, in the West, had become more and more apparent, and it was only a question of time before the Central Powers were finally defeated. Mr. Churchill has written a striking narrative of the events in the East, from a completely impartial standpoint. Unlike military text-books, his book is eminently readable. It enables the ordinary individual to appreciate the importance of the Eastern Front in the Great War.

JEREMY BENTHAM.*

It is very useful to have in a perfected form Jeremy Bentham's *Theory of Legislation* which Etienne Dumont published in French in 1802 and Robert Hildreth, an American jurist, translated into English in 1864. The work was Bentham's in all but form, he corrected Dumont's proof-sheets with meticulous care and, as the latest editor, Mr. C. K. Ogden, says, it would be possible to-day to reconstruct the famous work from the materials left by Bentham. In fact, however, no one should be so foolish as to try to perform that feat since in Dumont there was a man who understood Bentham and understood his ways of thinking and not only translated his work into logical and lucid French, but also translated, for everybody, the mind of one of the greatest juridical thinkers that the world has known. Hildreth's English translation is familiar to all English thinkers on jurisprudence and most serious students of law and it has stood the test of almost seventy years of examination. There were some slight flaws which Mr. Ogden has mended and he has given as an appendix under the name of "Notes" some forty closely printed pages

chiefly to indicate such points in the text as have usually been emphasised, or unduly neglected, in subsequent controversy, and especially such as are amplified elsewhere in Bentham's Works; to provide the student with references to the more important literature of the subject, partly in relation to psychology; and incidentally, if possible, to render more circumspect such eminent authorities as allow themselves the privilege of quoting Bentham out of his context, from memory or at second hand. A few personal and historical digressions have been included, to make the atmosphere less oppressive.

Some of the historical notes are especially important as well as amusing:

At the age of eighty (1827: *Works*, Vol. X, p. 582) Bentham went so far as to say "utility was an unfortunately chosen word. The idea it gives is a vague one. Dumont insists on retaining the word. He is bigoted, old and indisposed to adopt what is new, even though it should be better."

It is important to find Bentham himself disclaiming the word "utility," though it is another instance of his ingratitude to his editor. He treated Dumont like a beast of burden whom he was entitled to thrash and to lay upon him all the faults as well as all the work. The Principle of Utility in its final form "states the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question,

* *The Theory of Legislation*. By Jeremy Bentham. Edited, with an Introduction and Notes, by C. K. Ogden. Kegan Paul, 7s. 6d. net.

as being the right and proper, and the only right and proper and universally desirable, end of human action." The Principle of Utility extended in Bentham's mind to all fields. "Experience and the test of experience is for him 'the foundation of all our knowledge, and of all our reasoning—the sole guide of our conduct, the sole base of our security.' Nor would he have allowed that knowledge could have any value except in virtue of its actual or possible bearing on conduct and happiness." This is an important "Note" since we see in it that psychology which it may be is Bentham's final gift to the world, a psychology of which his jurisprudential efforts were only a relatively minor part. It comes strangely to-day when physicists are struggling with the theory of probabilities which, if we are to survive morally and intellectually, must be fitted into a new psychology of happiness.

The "Notes" include a very judicious summary of Bentham's views about lawyers, and Mr. Ogden says rightly that Bentham's attack on "legal fictions"

must be interpreted in relation to his whole theory of fictional entities, which equally arose from a deep-rooted mistrust of all forms of falsification. It has been the subject of much bitter comment from those who regard such fictions as an essential means of legal progress, and the controversy is far from being at an end. In the wider field of fictions generated by language it is, of course, not true to say that they are "notoriously false"; indeed their elusive and insidious nature is what renders them so dangerous. This distinction is fully recognised by Bentham in its proper place (*Works*, Vol. XIII, pp. 119 and 331); and the relevant material for an understanding of his highly original analysis will be found in *op. cit.* *Bentham's Theory of Fictions* in this Library. See also the notes to pp. 3 and 291.

On the vexed question of fictions it must be remembered that it is not only "language" that is in question, but mathematical methods. The mathematician frequently, and rightly, uses fictional methods to arrive at a solution of a problem, and in the field of applied law—judgment—does not represent only logic, but methods of analysis which can be compared with the mental processes which the mathematician and the physicist use. Logic and straightforward processes are incapable of solving some problems. It is interesting to turn to the Note on Bentham's attitude to economics. "Bentham said of himself, 'I was the spiritual father of Mill, and Mill was the spiritual father of Ricardo; so that Ricardo was my spiritual grandson. I was often *tête-à-tête* with Ricardo.' Nevertheless, 'in Ricardo's book on Rent, there is a want of logic. He confounded *cost* with *value*.' This is precisely the criticism of Ricardo made by modern economics." But, after all, the problems of the mathematics of economics cannot be solved only by logic.

The present writer, in his address on "A Century of Jurisprudence," included in the volume of *Centenary Addresses*,* delivered in 1927 on the occasion of the centenary of University College, London, ventured to say that :

Bentham was the spiritual force behind the men and women who founded University College, but when he died in 1832, ripe in years and confident in his cause, none of the results of his labours had become apparent. The moment that his body was dead his spirit became irresistible. The Legislature was, in that very year, reformed. In that decade the old uneconomic Poor Law was swept away, and the whole system of the law relating to the dealings with land revised. His contributions to the Jurisprudence of this country may be said to form the social history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A student studying English Law in University College a century hence will see the Platonic master mind of Jeremy Bentham operating in every direction.

He stood for the reform of the representative system in Parliament; he demanded municipal reform; he prayed for the mitigation of the terrible criminal law, for the abolition of transportation, for the improvement of prisons. He clamoured for the removal of defects in the jury system, pleaded for the abolition of grand juries, but indicated his belief that the proper Court of Appeal is a jury. He demanded the abolition of imprisonment for debt, the sweeping away of the usury laws, the reform of the law of evidence, the repeal of religious tests. He demanded the reform of the Poor Law, the training of pauper children, the establishment of a national system of education. He suggested an extension of the idea of Savings Banks and Friendly Societies, cheap postage without the object of national profit coupled with post office money orders. He insisted on a complete and uniform Register of Births, Marriages and Deaths, a code for merchant shipping, full Census returns, the circulation of Parliamentary papers, the protection of inventors. He demanded local Courts, uniform and scientific methods of drafting Acts of Parliament, a general register of real estate, of deeds and all transactions, and last, but certainly not least, the passing of public health legislation. . . . People, good honest people, considered that Bentham must be a maniac, or at the best an idealist, a Platonist, a visionary who trod the clouds, an opium eater, who in the filthy den of his dirty world dreamt of God in His Heaven.

Such a summary Mr. Ogden may approve but it may be said by some persons that this man's work is ended when, a century after, all the more obvious goals of his jurisprudential activities have been achieved or are on the road to achievement in all the civilised countries in the world. But Jeremy Bentham was anxious to conquer not only the objective, but the subjective world, he was anxious to give happiness not only by the machinery and operation of the outward law, but happiness through the inward forces of every indi-

* University of London Press.

vidual. He believed that this was possible by creating a right state of mind in every person. That was, in a phrase, his psychology of life. Yet he did not desire to replace religion by psychology, but rather to supplement it. He knew the force of religion in human life. He must have realised that as one of the facts which cannot be altered. He was anxious for all to have freedom of religious thought. He was intent on making a perfect world of happiness here and now, for man as man. His theories did not impinge on the world to come.

J. E. G. DE M.

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THE COTTON INDUSTRY IN THE FAR EAST.*

This is a study of the Cotton Industry in the Far East which originated as a result of the Ratan Tata Research Studentship at the London School of Economics. The book was not written until 1930, after a nine months' visit to Japan, and the statistics contained in it are not later than the beginning of 1930. As a result almost the worst period of the cotton industry as it affects Lancashire is not described. Cotton exports to India and China have fallen off considerably since January 1930, and although some recovery may be expected there is no likelihood that the Far Eastern markets will ever be fully recovered, owing to the fact that India and Japan compete successfully with Lancashire in the production of the cheaper kinds of cotton cloth such as are used by the Chinese and Indian peasantry. Miss Utley refers to the fact that the British Economic Mission to the Far East were not allowed to visit any of the cotton mills owned by the Japan Cotton Spinners Association, and one of the difficulties of getting accurate information results from this unwillingness to allow investigators inside the factories.

Labour conditions in the cotton mills of Japan have been indescribably bad in the past, and although in some of the larger mills conditions have greatly improved it must nevertheless be admitted that there are many factories in which the wastage of human life, especially amongst the girl workers, is very great. The evil of indentured labour, the inadequate food, the unhealthy dormitories (for the girls sleep in the factories) have made it more difficult to recruit labour in the villages, so that the cotton spinners have now been compelled to give better food, to raise wages, to shorten hours and to increase the amenities of factory life. Nevertheless, if it be true, according to a police investigation made in Tokio, that 70 per cent. of the unlicensed prostitutes in the suburbs of the city were

* *Lancashire and the Far East*. By Freda Utley. Allen & Unwin. 16s. net.

formerly factory girls, it is obvious that there is still room for great improvement.

The first chapter deals with the position of Lancashire, the enormous profits made before and during the war, the post-war boom profits, the rapid accumulation of capital, the huge prices paid for practically obsolete mills and then the slump which has put out of action scores of mills. All this is accurately described, with the conclusion that the tendency of development now in the cotton industry is towards greater mechanisation, and perhaps less skilled labour, in order to make competition with the Far East at all possible. In Japan 80 per cent. of the labour in the cotton industry is female as against 62 per cent. in Lancashire.

There is an important chapter on the position of India in relation to Lancashire and a careful examination of the reasons for the poverty of the Indian people, poverty which the agrarian crisis has now intensified. Although Britain's principal competitor in the cotton industry is Japan, yet the development of the Indian mills has been such that they now supply over 40 per cent. of India's consumption. The author takes the socialist view that, under present conditions, the market cannot expand to keep pace with the world's productive capacity, since the wage earners and the peasants form the mass of consumers and receive a decreasing share of the total income.

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ART IN THE LIFE OF MANKIND.*

Professor Allen W. Seaby is responsible for Vol. IV of this series on "Art in the Life of Mankind," dealing with *Roman Art and its Influence* from the earliest times onwards. The author says truly in his preface, "it is difficult to know where to stop." Art in its development assimilates what has gone before, and owes much to its predecessor. Art for art's sake is a misnomer, though the subjectivity of art is an undoubted fact. Art plays its part in the life of mankind and cannot be separated from it. Man is a complex trinity, composed of body, soul (or mind) and spirit. Food for the physical is insufficient for the life of mankind. "Man shall not live by bread alone." Life and life "more abundantly," which Christ promised to His followers, consists in the development of its several parts. The creative faculty, which appertains to mind or soul, must act its part. It is inherent, and all art is an act of creation and not merely of imitation. Imitation has its use and its limits, but it is not creative. Carlyle once wrote "Create, Create," and he realised that the output of the mind

* *Art in the Life of Mankind*. Vol. IV, *Roman Art and its Influence*. By Allen W. Seaby. B. T. Batsford Ltd., London. 5s. net.

should be creative. It is the same with the spirit. "I have food that ye know not of, My meat is to do the will of the Father," spirit working with spirit. Art viewed thus becomes a fundamental element in the life of mankind.

It is most interesting to trace the evolution of art, and also its starting-point. When was it not? may be asked. From the earliest records of man it has played its part, and not alone for man's physical needs. Creation began in the mind or will of the Creator, "the Lord God . . . made every plant of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field before it grew," and the creative faculty in man in one sense is the same since the artist sees his work complete before the pen, the pencil, the brush or the chisel is at work. That creative faculty is the same to-day as it was in prehistoric times. Stone upon stone the altars were raised for sacrifice, while the commemoration of the dead was the motive power which resulted in works of art in sepulchre or urn. Ornament or beauty was the natural expression of the soul. The Bible teems with examples of beauty. The Temple itself, and the lily-work on the pillars, are an instance. "Then were the pillars finished." From age to age art grew in loveliness. Professor Seaby traces its rise and fall with the tribes or nations which gave it birth; first, the Stone Age, followed by the Bronze and Iron Ages, Etruscan and, above all, Roman art; both Republican and Imperial (even in Roman Britain), Early Christian and Byzantine art, Sasanian and Coptic creations and those of the so-called Dark Ages. A goodly compendium of the arts is gathered together here with most admirable illustrations drawn from extant remains, some long hidden in darkness.

The story of the Etruscans as here told is most illuminating, and one may say tragic. The Etruscans were Rome's first teachers, far surpassing in art their conquerors. Southern Etruria was crushed by Rome before 300 B.C. The vases and other works of the Etruscans still remaining show the degree of their civilisation. Tuscia (from which modern Tuscany takes her name) gave to Rome, in some measure, not only a tradition of art but laws, customs and superstitions. But the point must be made that the Romans were an Aryan people and the Etruscans were probably another race altogether. The influence of the Etruscans upon the Romans must not be unduly stressed.

Rome by her conquest of Syracuse and Corinth imbibed Hellenistic art, "and opened her eyes to the possibilities of civic art," and "the first century B.C. saw an intensity of building akin to that of Athens after the Persian War. Yet the Etruscans not only built tombs, but also temples, great walls, gateways and aqueducts." Painting was also amongst their achievements and

reveals Ionic and Greek influence. "The Etruscans indeed are puzzling from whatever side they are studied, their origin, their writings, their customs and their art all present great difficulties to the inquirer. They were clever, adaptable craftsmen who knew how to borrow from the art of the nations they traded with, Phœnician, Egyptian and Greek." It was formerly held that the Etruscans invented the arch, but later discoveries show that this method of construction goes as far back as the early Sumerian period. The influence of Etruscan on Roman art and on all that Roman art in its many forms has meant to the world must be taken into serious account. It may be that Etruscan blood ran in the veins of some of the great Tuscans of the Renaissance.

S. DE M.

* * *

THE YEAR BOOK OF EDUCATION.*

The editor-in-chief of this valuable Year Book of Education, which extends to over a thousand closely printed pages, is Lord Eustace Percy, who, as a former President of the Board of Education, has necessarily much official knowledge. He is helped by many anonymous education officials and by many other student educationists such as Dr. P. B. Ballard, Sir Percy Nunn, Mr. F. B. Malim and other well-known head masters, Mr. Frank Roscoe, Mr. Walter N. Barnes (the principal of the West Ham School of Art), Sir Daniel Hall (who treats of the vastly important subject of technical education for agriculture). Scotland and Northern Ireland are dealt with by experts, while the English Universities receive useful exposition, though Oxford or Cambridge experts are not retained. Sir Percy Nunn naturally writes upon the training of teachers.

Useful information is afforded in relation to grant-aided secondary schools, the independent private and preparatory schools, secondary schools for girls, junior housewifery schools, works schools, evening and part-time day courses in technical schools and colleges as well as full-time courses. A wide field is covered and physical education is not forgotten. The separate articles, of course, express the views of experts, but they also presumably express the views of the editor-in-chief, Lord Eustace Percy, who himself deals with many subjects, including an introductory note on the English Education Act of 1921, on the Board of Education, on the English and Welsh school system, religious syllabuses and mentally defective children.

* *The Year Book of Education*, 1932. Editor-in-Chief, Lord Eustace Percy. With a Foreword by the President of the Board of Education. Evans Brothers Limited, Montague House, Russell Square, W.C.2. 35s. net.

Part II of the comprehensive book has articles on the different educational systems that are at work in the British Commonwealth of Nations, while Part III deals, from the pen of specialists, with education in France, Germany, Italy, the United States of America, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Russia (technical education), the Argentine, China, Turkey and Egypt. Useful statistical tables complete a book that should see later editions. Sir Donald Maclean, the President of the Board of Education, who writes the Foreword, says that Lord Eustace as President "familiarised himself with our educational system down to the last detail," and that his subsequent work entitled *Education at the Cross-roads* was full of "arresting ideas." In this book, Sir Donald goes on,

he and his collaborators have succeeded in producing an encyclopædia of readily accessible information, which will be of great value, convenience and interest to everyone concerned with public education. The opinions expressed and the deductions and speculations made will no doubt excite comment and discussion. In saying this, I intend no criticism of the value of the volume; on the contrary, much of its value may well lie in the fact that its aim is not only to help all interested in public education to a fuller knowledge of the present position, but also to challenge them to closer thinking as to our future needs.

From the point of view of the secondary and public school master a challenge will at once go out with regard to the statement by Lord Eustace Percy that England

is beginning to realise that, after sixty years of intensive work in building up a system of popular education, her peculiar speciality lies no longer so much in her cherished grammar schools, whose successes in the training of character are being equalled and whose intellectual standards have long been surpassed by other nations, but in the excellence of her elementary teaching.

This is a serious statement to make, since after all the head master of one of the despised grammar schools might reply that while Lord Eustace Percy may have known in his official capacity all about state-aided education he is not in a position to judge the comparative merits of higher secondary and university education. The only tests are the tests applied by foreign scholars and the fruits of renown in pure scholarship, pure and applied mathematics and physics, history and philosophy. Foreign scholars are very emphatic about the merits of our advanced secondary and university education and Professor Einstein and other leaders in Continental and American thought are glad to join our university staffs, while there is a great demand for English University

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teachers in America. Dogmatic statements of this sort will not please the pioneers in the new primary and junior secondary schools since, when it is considered that a certain percentage from these schools reach the highest rank in the universities, the attack on English secondary education must be resented. A Year Book would be wise to keep clear of personal opinions which are not founded upon absolutely ascertained facts.

Lord Eustace Percy discerns "at least a tendency to emancipate secondary schools from too complete a dependence on the universities." If that is a real tendency in English education it is a very bad tendency. The university and the university colleges are the natural goal of an educational system. This is shown by the fact that the technical colleges are ever desirous of becoming a part of this or that university. That is the right tendency. Any other drift of policy would in the long run divide the nation into two parts: the university man or woman and the non-university man or woman, each despising the other. A new phase of class-dislike would emerge if Lord Eustace Percy's prophecy is a fact. The First Schools Examination has naturally been dovetailed into university matriculation, since that is the goal that English-speaking people desire for their sons and daughters. The value of a university degree is ever more and more appreciated as the standard of that degree rises.

Lord Eustace Percy admits that "for the last thirty years, if not longer, the elementary school system has been steadily developing from a series of 'standards' housed in a certain type of school-building into a vast federation of school communities after the spiritual model of the grammar schools." Could anything be better? That is the proper ideal, but, says the editor-in-chief, "we are paying for the obvious advantages of the great educational tradition by the relative expensiveness of our education, the relative difficulty of introducing educational reforms, and a certain blurring of the outline of our intellectual standards." The answer is that good education under good conditions with properly paid teachers must always be relatively expensive, while there is in fact no difficulty in introducing educational reforms and there is no blurring of our intellectual standards. Lord Eustace Percy has challenged the very roots of our educational system, as he has every right to do, but not in a Year Book which by its very name is not the place for partisan or political opinions. But these criticisms are no criticism of the Year Book in its capacity as a Year Book. It is a very useful summary of a large part of our educational system and the comparative method, given by the material from overseas, should be fruitful of good results.

J. E. G. DE M.

FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE.*

The English edition of Miss I. Cooper Willis's biography of Florence Nightingale should meet with the same success that it has received in America. In the meantime, between the appearance of the two editions, an official biography has been published, yet, although it contains some new material, Miss Cooper Willis has not found it necessary to alter any of her own book. In fact, it emphasises her own impressions of Florence Nightingale's very real difficulties in her fight for independence. She must always have had a strong will but there can be no doubt that her early struggles did much to form the determination and concentrated will-power of later years. The amazing work she organised and carried out in the Crimea under almost impossible circumstances when she was little more than thirty shows the abilities of a woman older than her generation. Yet this cannot be put down altogether to the broad education she had had, since her sister had received the same and was not filled with longing for a life of service. The Crimean War gave Florence Nightingale a unique opportunity to display her gifts and her theories, but it is not universally realised that this was her public starting-point, and not her life work.

She is thought of as "the Lady with the Lamp," a romantic figure touched with sentiment. In fact, she was a woman who, having proved from the battlefield the necessity for trained nurses and for hospital sanitation, was determined to introduce them into civil and military life in England. She returned from the Crimea a national heroine to everyone except herself; but she recognised her new power and she never let it sleep in quarters where it was of use. To be a war heroine on the spot, however, was an easier matter than to be the saviour of hospitals, barracks, and the sick at home in times of peace. Lethargy and indifference continually faced her; but they had the effect of increasing her determination, with the result that her faithful supporters knew little rest until her plans were adopted. Her return from the Crimea had been finally celebrated by the institution of the "Nightingale Fund" which she was asked to use for the establishment and control of a Training School for Nurses. In answer to this invitation she wrote:

Exposed as I am to be misinterpreted and misunderstood, in a field of action in which the work is new, complicated and distant from many who sit in judgment upon it—it is indeed an abiding support to have such sympathy and such appreciation brought home to me in the midst of labour and difficulties all but overpowering.

* Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d. net.

It was a long cry from the nursing nuns and Sisters of Charity in earlier centuries to the nurses of mid-nineteenth-century England.

In Miss Stanley's *Hospitals and Sisterhoods* a number of replies from doctors in answer to questions as to nurses in various institutions are quoted: "I inquired from Dr. X, says one of these, about the character of the nurses, and he says they always engage them without any character, as no respectable person would undertake so disagreeable an office. He says the duties they have to perform are most unpleasant, and it is little wonder that many of them drink, as they require something to keep up the stimulus."

It was this attitude that made the work of reform particularly difficult, and probably Florence Nightingale's positive craving for statistics helped to break it down. For instance, she discovered soon after her return that the mortality figures in barracks between the ages of twenty and thirty-five were nearly twice that of the civil rate. In some cases it was far worse: "In St. Pancras, the civil death rate was 2.2 per thousand; in the barracks of the Second Life Guards it was 10.4 per thousand. In Kensington, the civil rate was 3.3; the rate in the Knightsbridge Barracks was 17.5." Hospitals, too, seemed to have been in an amazing condition; sanitation, ventilation and equipment were bad, and there were regular "hospital" diseases which were recognised as unavoidable and made going into one a risky business.

There was one aspect of Florence Nightingale's work in which she did not stand out above her generation. She had always been a rich woman; her work was her hobby, she had never had to consider it in connection with her livelihood. She looked upon it as a sacred calling, and not a profession, with the result that she could not see the necessity for a Nurses Registration Act which would protect the nurses from competition with ignorant and unsuitable women. Miss Cooper Willis has written a really interesting book which shows the mind of the period that Florence Nightingale had to contend with.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

If *Peace and Disarmament*,* by Leon Blum, were the voice of the France of to-morrow, the outlook for the world would be much brighter than it is. The leader of the Socialist Party, to borrow M. Briand's phrase, speaks European. An incisive Foreword by Mr. Robert Dell argues that France is in the grip of a financial and military oligarchy, to whose tune the politicians of the Centre and the Right obediently dance. Be that as it may, it is refreshing to read these vigorous and sensible articles which first appeared in *Le*

* Cape. 7s. 6d.

Populaire, the organ of the party. For the current philosophy of "Security, Arbitration, Disarmament," our author wisely substitutes "Security through Arbitration and Disarmament." Throughout the book he keeps up a running fight with the leaders of the Right, and asserts that the triumph of Socialist parties in every country is the only ultimate guarantee of peace. Till that happy but distant consummation he is eager to diminish the danger to peace involved in capitalist and nationalist states. The Peace treaties, for instance, are not sacrosanct. "When people try to lock the door for ever against any attempt to correct and straighten out the present situation, they enclose present-day Europe in a boiler which sooner or later will explode. Again, if Germany is to be made to respect her treaty obligations, France also must progressively disarm and induce the rest of Europe to do likewise. The world is against all those who, having accepted a principle, are now trying to escape from its practical consequences. If this goes on we shall reach the same disastrous position as seven years ago at the time of the Ruhr. We then lost the friendship of the world, and that is something which no one can afford to lose." M. Blum is equally severe on the proposal dear to so many French statesmen for a League army. All this is axiomatic to most British readers in 1932 but paradoxical to most of his countrymen. It is a disaster that the French Socialists refuse to co-operate with the Radicals, and thereby doom their country to be governed and Europe to be half ruined by the unteachable Right. M. Blum is a curious combination of realist and doctrinaire. "Socialism alone can destroy the old instincts and cure humanity of all her old psychoses." A similar claim is commonly made for Christianity. But is the former likely to work the miracle which nearly two thousand years of the latter have dismally failed to achieve? Human nature is very much older than parties and creeds, and no one has yet discovered how to separate the dross from the gold.

* * *

Whatever else is read on the great issue of Protection versus Free Trade, *Tariffs: the case examined*,* by a Committee of Economists under the chairmanship of Sir William Beveridge, must be read too. The Free Trader will rejoice at this masterly confirmation of his faith, and the Protectionist will be put on his mettle to answer the arguments if he can. It is a book by experts for the general reader, or as we ought to say nowadays for the citizen; and though it requires careful reading, no preliminary training in economics is needed to understand it. The Preface, signed by Sir William Beveridge, Sir Walter Layton, Professors Bowley, Gregory and Lionel Robbins, and four other scholars, concludes with two emphatic sentences which summarise the character and the result of their enterprise. "We have surveyed once more, in the light of to-day, the well-trodden fields of this ancient controversy. After that survey we should all think it a disaster if the policy of Free Trade, which has served Britain so well materially, as through her it has served as an inspiration to all who in any land have worked for good understanding among nations, were to-day to be sacrificed to ignorance or panic or jealousy or specious calculations of a moment's gain." Readers who have no time for the whole book should master the first chapter and

* Longmans. 7s. 6d.

the last. The former traces the course of ideas and events from 1903 to 1931, and argues that in a changing world "the dependence of Britain upon overseas trade for prosperity is the governing factor of the situation. Any policy which neglects it can only lead to disaster." The latter, by the editor himself, reviews the case in a closely-reasoned argument, and concludes that tariffs are no remedy for our present difficulties. Now that economics have become politics, we should read, mark, learn and inwardly digest what our leading economists have to say.

* * *

*Slovakia Then and Now** should call attention to the interesting little people whom the fortunes of the world war transferred from the heavy yoke of the Magyars to the milder rule of the Czechs. The richly illustrated volume is edited by Professor Seton-Watson, to whom the Slovaks rightly look as their chief friend and interpreter in Western Europe. The editor's Introduction, the longest and far the most important contribution, should be diligently studied by all who desire to understand the politics of the Danubian States. Having championed the Slovak cause before the war, he criticised the unwise policy of centralisation pursued by the statesmen of Prague in a little volume entitled *The New Slovaks*, published in 1924. The situation greatly improved with the new provincial system introduced in 1927. "Czechoslovakia," declares Dr. Seton-Watson, "has achieved a greater measure of consolidation and is nearer to normal conditions than any other state which owes its origin to the revolutionary upheaval of 1918." This statement he proceeds to support by a survey of the political, economic and cultural development of the country as a whole before he passes to his immediate subject. He reminds us that the new masters had to build from the foundations, since the Slovaks were deplorably neglected by Budapest. No Slovak who remembers the Magyar yoke desires to return to it, and our author sharply condemns the revisionist campaign of Lord Rothermere. He admits that the problem of satisfying the Slovaks is the acid test of Czech statesmanship and has not yet been completely solved. But his Introduction breathes a robust confidence that the situation is rapidly improving and that the right path has been found. It would be a pity if the reader were to halt after mastering Dr. Seton-Watson's summary, for there is much to be learned from each of the twenty-five chapters furnished by Slovaks themselves. Every one who knows anything of this little people is aware of the importance in their lives of religion and art; and both themes are authoritatively handled by a series of specialists.

* * *

In the volume entitled *London and the Advancement of Science*† issued by the British Association for the Advancement of Science on the occasion of its centenary meeting in London last year, we have an Introductory Survey by Dr. Allan Ferguson (who tells us something of Geoffrey Chaucer's efforts on behalf of science and chiefly astronomical science and something of Henry Billingsley, Dr. John Dee, Gilbert, William Harvey, Francis Bacon, Christopher

* Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.

† British Association, Burlington House, Piccadilly, W.1. 3s. 6d.

Wren, John Hill the botanist, Henry Cavendish and W. H. Wollaston) and Essays on the learned societies of London, education in London, the Royal Observatory, Greenwich, Kew Gardens and the John Innes Institution, the development of medicine in London, the Museums of London and an account of the London makers of scientific instruments. It is a very interesting volume. The account of the learned societies begins with the foundation of the Royal Society in 1660. The majority of the societies formed before 1831 were for the study of pure science, though some were concerned with technical or applied science. Mr. T. L. Humberstone gives a very useful account of Education in London from the earliest times, though his remark that London did not exist in Cæsar's times is doubtful, since Ptolemy mentions the tribal town which belonged to Kent. Certainly London can claim "to be a pioneer in women's education." Sir Frank Heath in writing on "Government and Scientific Research" gives a valuable account that is not easily available elsewhere. The book, indeed, answers a very useful purpose, since many Londoners do not realise the part that has long been played by their Metropolis in the scientific work of England, the Empire and the world.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

M. Pierre Viénot's little book "Is Germany Finished?"* is a penetrating analysis of the ferment of ideas in the country to which all eyes are now turned. The author lived in Berlin and other cities for six years, and he writes with greater understanding than one usually finds in a Frenchman. Everybody knows that Germany is in the throes of an economic and political crisis, but M. Viénot explains that the confusion is psychological as well. "Germany is without order because the middle class is crumbling. The spectator is struck by the confusion of German life, and seeks in vain for coherence." There are many Germanies, with no unifying principle to amalgamate them. The chaos is moral as well as intellectual. "We have no idea in France of the moral upheaval caused by the defeat and the revolution in Germany." While France emerged from the fiery ordeal in all essentials unchanged, her neighbour is drifting on uncharted seas. This striking little book closes with an appeal to the author's fellow-countrymen not to be afraid of Germany but to help and co-operate.

* * *

The first series of "Tales of all Countries"† by Anthony Trollope (republished originally from Harper's New York Magazine and Cassell's Family Paper) has now been published in the World's Classics Series. The stories deal with many lands and many types of people; generally the Anglo-Saxon in varying mood and clime. The collection was first published in volume form in 1861, and the freshness of Trollope's work to-day is in itself a perfect tribute to his skill. The humour of his characters and incidents is unending, and this little volume will make a delightful travelling companion.

* Faber & Faber. 5s.

† Oxford University Press. 2s. net.

The fifth edition of Mr. F. S. Marvin's "The Living Past: A Sketch of Western Progress,"* contains certain alterations and revisions. The last part of chapter eleven has been re-written, so as "to indicate briefly the trend of recent events and to remove expressions of feeling only appropriate at the termination of the war." The good book-lists on each chapter in the Appendix have been revised. Such bibliographies are invaluable to students, but they would be more so if compilers would make a point of adding the date to each work; although the addition of the publisher is a step in the right direction.

* * *

Mr. Hugh Walpole's second novel of the Herries family, "Judith Paris,"† is the story of the orphan daughter of Rogue Herries and his gipsy wife. The book is an independent work, but "the four books are seen together in my mind as a piece of gaily tinted tapestry, worked in English colours." No writer knows better than Mr. Walpole how to write of everyday events, of the tiny details that mean so much, and turn a tale into active life. Yet sometimes there can be too much detail resulting in an openness which, while it may appeal to certain schools of thought, dims the work for literary purists. There are occasions, even in the eighteenth century, when the phrase "to call a spade a spade," needs modifying.

* * *

"Mothercraft":‡ this admirable little handbook, which now appears in its sixth edition, has been written by a group of well-known child specialists, medical mostly, but also psychological and social, for the use of doctors and nurses, health visitors, parents. In addition to earlier chapters on heredity, expectant motherhood by Lady Barrett, care and feeding of the infant and small child by Dr. Eric Pritchard, nursery hygiene, clothing, there have been added Maternal Mortality by Dame Louise McIlroy, Habit Formation and Play by Dr. Alice Hutchison and Dr. Jane Reaney, and new work on lactation and weaning, Common Ailments by Dr. Jean Smith, Care of Skin, Eyes, etc., the Nervous Child, Sunlight, and finally The Law Relating to Maternity and Child Welfare. The whole book is the last word—for the moment—on matters concerning the health and welfare of mothers and infants, and has taken over a year to prepare.

In his Introduction to this edition Dr. G. F. Still says: "There is a remark somewhere in Plato that 'of all animals the most difficult to manage is a child,' and yet since the world began there seems to have been little or no attempt to teach her who has most to do with the early management of this particular animal—at any rate while it is still in the animalcule stage—the right and proper way to tend her offspring . . ." It is high time that every girl as part of her education should be required to learn the essentials of mothercraft, those simple methods and precautions for lack of which many a mother has unwittingly wrought harm and suffering, sometimes even lifelong handicap, to her child.

* Oxford University Press, 5s. 6d. net.

† Macmillan, 7os. 6d. net.

‡ Carnegie House, 117, Piccadilly, W., 4s. 6d.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1932.

THE NEW PROBLEM IN ECONOMICS.

NOW that the pressure upon men's minds of the crisis which confronted us last summer is beginning to be relaxed, serious observers of social movements are trying to take stock of the whole situation rather with a view to permanent restoration of credit and prosperity than with a view to the avoidance of imminent disaster. In that enterprise many may legitimately take a share who are by no means experts in Political Economy, and whose claim to any attention which they may receive is based on a general concern for social welfare and the principles affecting it rather than on any specialist study of its particular aspects. Perhaps there is, at present, a peculiar contribution to be made by those whose main interest in any proposal is to ask how it squares with the principles of Christianity.

Last autumn the country pronounced a very clear and emphatic verdict upon the issue then immediately before it; and confusion may be avoided if I state at the outset that I completely share the opinion of the country as so expressed. But I share it, as I suppose we all do, with a very deep regret at the necessity for reducing unemployment benefit and curtailing the social services. No Christian, it seems to me, can acquiesce light-heartedly in an action which deliberately increases the burden that rests on the poorest members of the community. And when we turn to the social services and the way in which it was inevitable that they should first of all be reduced, if they were to be reduced at all, we must make full acknowledgment of the fact that the greatest breach in the social fellowship of our nation at the present time is that of educational inequality; we cannot hope to have that kind of social fellowship which must be the Christian's goal—as I understand matters—until it is true that every child born into the community genuinely has the fullest opportunity for the development of whatever faculties God has given to him. Goodwill can only carry us, after all, a little way in the creation of fellowship between those whose mental capacities have been developed in utterly different degrees. There is nothing which cuts so deep into the unity of the fellowship we most desire as the inequalities of educational opportunity.

If all this is true how can it be right that we should have taken

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the steps which we have taken? Here, at any rate, there is little room for disagreement among those who share the convictions which prevailed at the General Election. It is because if public credit were shaken the people who would suffer most of all would be the poorest. It is because only by these very reductions, and especially by the reductions in unemployment benefit, was it possible for public credit to be saved. Why so? Because in view of the problem about which I shall say more later, we found ourselves in a situation where unemployment benefit was, and to some extent is, not only an increasing but a quite incalculable liability; and when credit is insecure obviously nothing is so serious as an incalculable liability. The first thing necessary in the interest of the poorest classes themselves was to secure a hold upon that situation so that we might know at least more fully where we stood in the matter of our liability for unemployment—and not only that we might know it ourselves, but that the possible investors of funds from foreign countries equally might know it. Therefore this seemed to most people, as to me, to be one of those instances where it is not a sophistry but the plain truth to say that it was necessary to reduce it, and that, too, in the interest of the poorest classes themselves lest they should suffer something worse still.

That I believe to be a very prevailing opinion, but I resort to it with great anxiety because I recognise that in the nineteenth century every possible reform or advance was resisted precisely on the ground that it would spell ruin to those whom it was intended to benefit. No one who has studied the social history of the nineteenth century can easily adopt that argument; but in this instance it was a valid argument, and I am persuaded that unless this check had been put upon that expenditure and at that point, the chance of saving credit was so remote that its collapse might be regarded as certain.

The primary thing was to stabilise credit. To some extent that has been done. For the moment I think we may say that to all appearance it has been done. There is now a certain danger lest we should sit down and suppose there are no more problems to be faced, or that we can safely leave the facing of them to those who were returned to power with such an astonishing manifestation of public confidence. But that really is not true. What is needed is that we should consider the root causes of the situation in which we find ourselves. First of all, we should inquire why it is that unemployment is so desperately bad a feature in the social situation. Those who have inherited a considerable amount of wealth do not generally regard unemployment as an unmixed curse—at least, so I judge by observation of their conduct. And they have some warrant in high authority, which represents labour not

primarily as a great blessing to mankind, but as a curse upon mankind due to the Fall. Now we are very liable to speak of unemployment as bad, either because it is a burden on industry, which has to support a number of people who are not contributing to it—and, of course, that is bad—or else simply out of sympathy for those who find themselves in the unfortunate position of being unable to secure work. But I want to suggest that we shall not be thinking of it rightly until we have gone further than that. I think the main principle stands out most clearly if we consider what is likely to be, and what we know from our observation most commonly is, the effect of this situation upon those who as they leave school and go out into the world cannot find employment for themselves. That is the most tragic point of all. It creates a sense that they are not wanted; and that has one or other of two extraordinarily bad results. One is with the weaker natures—a tendency towards superficial levity, a sense that nothing matters. They are content to take the dole when they can get it, and in general to live a happy-go-lucky life on what they can pick up; not happy to do this but acquiescing in it and supposing there is nothing better. With the more serious and earnest natures it produces an intense bitterness. Bitterness is never right, but such bitterness is surely very pardonable in a young man who is conscious of having some qualifications to serve the community, and to make for himself and those dependent on him a decent home, and yet finds no niche for himself in the society of which he is a member. That young man is bound to be very deeply embittered against society as organised to-day; and that is not only unwholesome for society, but desperately bad for him. If we, as Christians, are most concerned about the promotion of the highest possible character for our citizens, it is on this ground we shall be most eager to see this problem solved.

It is important in what order we consider these propositions. It is quite true that unemployment is a burden on industry, and that it deserves sympathy. It is also quite true that the situation is one tending to demoralisation. If we think first of the one mentioned first, or even of the one mentioned second, then to some extent we are acquiescing in the evil influence represented by the third, because we are failing to recognise and to give full scope to the sacred personalities of multitudes of our fellow-citizens. There is in a system which condemns people to unwilling unemployment a real affront to their personalities. As such they feel it, sometimes putting it in different words, sometimes in a dumb, inarticulate manner. Somehow, in the moral interests of the nation even more than the economic, the problem of unemployment must be cured. I cannot offer a cure, but only some reflections as we ponder the question.

What is the problem? It is not a problem of scarcity, but a problem of excessive abundance. That is a new, an entirely new and most bewildering, feature of this problem. It is primarily a selling problem. It is not that the goods are not there and cannot be produced. They are there; and they have been produced; but they cannot be sold. There are no purchasers. So the question is not first how we can employ more men to over-stock the market still further, but how we can distribute purchasing-power so that there is and will be more effective demand. We are told that this is a world problem, and very truly. We know what has happened in the great corn-growing districts of Canada and South America. We know that food that was wanted in other parts of the world was burned—although the ships were waiting to carry it—because the purchasing-power was not there.

I was taught some political economy at Oxford, including certain propositions concerning money. What is perfectly plain is that money is not what they told me it was. I am not at all sure that I know what it is; but it is not that; because they told me it was a pure medium of exchange, and that its whole existence consisted in facilitating exchange. It is quite true that its whole value consists in facilitating exchange. It is no use if you cannot exchange it. You cannot eat it. Its value consists in its ability to be exchanged, and hitherto we have found that our monetary system will facilitate exchange when there are in existence goods to be exchanged. All through the nineteenth century the assumption was—and it could safely be assumed at that time—that more production would create new purchasing-power to make it profitable; because the world was an expanding market, new needs were springing up in all parts of it, and the market constantly was demanding more. For the moment, at least, that has stopped; and it is not clear that it is only for the moment. I suppose there will be the swing of the pendulum back towards the greater adjustment of purchasing-power to production, but, so far as I can understand the situation, which is not very far, the pendulum will not swing back in that way sufficiently far to occupy the position in which it was thirty years ago. And when it swings again the other way it will be towards a worse dislocation than we are in at present; because the traditional view on which we have all been acting leads repeatedly to more and more production, all in competition with other countries, so that prices have to be constantly reduced, which is a great benefit to the buyer, until it reaches the point at which it is no longer profitable to the producer to produce. That is where we have got to, and that is the problem which we have got to solve.

Two things appear to me clear. The first is that the problem must be solved internationally. I do not mean by setting up some

super-State to regulate the affairs of national States, but by really mutual agreement among the nations which have begun, though only tardily, to recognise that they have become partners in a great common enterprise rather than rivals. The great Christian principle that "we are members one of another" is finding illustration on a new plane—the international plane; it is not easy to persuade nations, especially those with advantages over their neighbours, but it is true, that we are all bound up together in a degree which has not been the case until recently. That is a fact; and unless we recognise the fact and act upon it we shall act upon a false basis, and land ourselves in one catastrophe after another.

The cause of the new difficulty is the immense advance in technical skill and application of scientific processes to production. We all know that in industry to-day one man can produce what would once have employed twenty men or more. The new appliances are called labour-saving machinery. All through the nineteenth century, with rapidly expanding markets, it could be assumed that the results of the economy so effected could be invested and that the market would sufficiently expand to absorb the additional product. It is no longer true that demand expands at the same pace as production. In the system under which we have lived it has been inevitable that labour-saving machinery should be used not directly to save labour but to save labourers. We have gone on the supposition that labour is a commodity to be sold in the market like any other commodity and therefore to be sold as dear as the seller can sell and to be bought as cheap as the buyer can buy. But labour is different from every other commodity, because it is inseparable from the labourer. When a man sells me a pair of shoes he can do it without affecting his mind or body in any way. But in selling his labour he is selling not only his body but his mind. You are getting out of the range of commodity into personality. But it is not possible to give much recognition to that in the system under which we have been living.

The trouble is that currency, or money, has been bound up with production, as a result of the great advance of the nineteenth century, instead of being bound up with the capacity to produce. If you make that change in your mind, the result will be that you want money to be available for members of the community in relation to its capacity to produce; but if this is done you must effect some combination with the existing tradition; because if you made that change pure and simple the result would be you would have a policy of the kind generally called inflation, a debased or deteriorated currency. The aim of the new school of economic thought is to create demand by distribution of such purchasing-power as will set all the nation's productive plant working. But,

if it were distributed irrespective of the share taken in actual production, most people would take no share, and production would cease just as much as now when purchasing-power is not available. But it remains true that in large measure people are thinking only of producing and not of any effort to increase or distribute purchasing power. After all, some of our home industries have continued to flourish just because the unemployed have had some money to buy goods and so made a demand upon them. The dole has partly saved the home market. What we must keep in our minds is that, if only you can get a good market, the market sets the process of production going. The consumer is really the pivot of the situation; but the problem of production has been so acute that our attention has been fastened on that. Now there are a number of people at this moment trying with very great thoroughness to work out what effects such a transformation would have upon our economic system. It is desirable that the public should more widely and carefully follow that line of inquiry. I do not imagine that any of those who are following it have thought it through to the end or have any recommendation upon which we could act now or upon which it would be reasonable to act until by other means the nation has rescued itself from the present immediate crisis. But even when that is done we shall merely pass from one crisis to another more acute than the last unless something along these lines is attempted.

Moreover, this way of approaching the matter is really more consonant with Christian principles than most approaches, because it begins with people instead of beginning with things. We are rather fond of saying that "things are in the saddle and ride mankind," and having thus quoted some ingenious person's epigram we think we have summed up the matter and we leave things to go on riding men. There is no value in things except as they are of use to man. Once the system has got on the top of us so that we have no longer the freedom left for men to choose their manner of conducting it and the course which seems to them to have most claim to their allegiance, we are living on a sub-human level. It is because this way of dealing with the question starts from consideration of citizens, whether employed or not, as an essential factor in the welfare of the community, that I think it is fundamentally Christian. The plea is that we should think first not of making production profitable but of making produce marketable. If the details of such a scheme fall outside the area of Christianity its principles do not. For we are being most truly Christian if we start dealing, not with goods but with men, and seek to provide for them the richest possible human life in the closest possible human fellowship.

WILLIAM EBOR :

THE NEW PROTECTION.

THE National Government, it will be generally admitted, was called into power to face a grave financial crisis. Expenditure, both national and local, had increased so alarmingly as to impose a heavy burden upon industry and to impair the credit of the country. The immediate task was to enforce economy, and our rulers might perhaps have been expected to concentrate their efforts on that problem, on which they were understood to be agreed. Instead of that they have decided, with the evident approval of a large majority of the House of Commons, to press to the front a problem on which the Cabinet is sharply divided, and to reverse, with little warning or examination, the commercial principles on which our prosperity has for many years been built. The proposal is to raise additional revenue by indirect taxation—scarcely a step towards economy even if the income-tax be correspondingly reduced—and to levy import duties against many friendly nations whose products for three-quarters of a century we have admitted free. The pretext put forward, in all good faith, is that our exports are diminishing so rapidly that we shall drift to ruin if we do not promptly check the flow of imports and so contrive to "balance trade."

It is submitted that this theory involves some confusion of thought. To balance the Budget is a necessity which cannot be doubted. That object can be attained either by raising more revenue or by cutting down expenditure; and of those two alternatives the Government seems at present to prefer the first. So far as the new taxes help to strengthen our finances, they can of course be justified apart from any ulterior motive they may have. And there is, no doubt, force in the argument that, when direct taxation has reached the height which it has now reached in this country, it is legitimate to resort to indirect taxation, wasteful as it must be, in order to distribute more widely the burdens which the nation has to bear. To balance the Budget is essential to restore confidence and maintain sterling, and for those purposes no other action is of equal use. But it is a wholly different proposition that the Government should undertake to balance trade. Indeed the idea that statesmen can intervene successfully to adjust and remedy trade variations, and to secure in some unexplained manner a favourable balance for their own country, seems, though still liable to recur to business men in moments of commercial weakness, to be little more than an illusion dating from days when economic laws were not well understood.

A favourable trade balance, a continuing excess of exports over

imports, in the case of all nations is obviously impossible. An unfavourable balance for a prolonged period is equally impossible in the case of a country no longer based on gold: it automatically adjusts itself. And a trade balance imperilled by imports from foreign countries, and yet apparently unaffected by imports from our Dominions, is a phenomenon more incomprehensible still. Our alleged unfavourable balance in February was not due, if we accept the Chancellor of the Exchequer's figures, to any serious increase of imported merchandise, in spite of the talk about dumping which we hear. The increase in the unfavourable balance there was comparatively small: our imports of merchandise remained "practically stationary": it was our exports of merchandise which had substantially declined. The large balance against us is attributed to a failure of "invisible" exports, the yield from investments abroad, the receipts from shipping and banking, the profits of international trade. But, while Protection may check imports of merchandise, a decrease in these invisible exports is a thing which no tariff can possibly redress. Free Traders, anxious to support a National Government threatened by financial panic, were reluctant to criticise what purported to be a temporary measure, the Government's first hasty effort to check imports by abnormal legislation, though the necessity for that legislation has never been adequately proved. But if pleas of balancing trade and sustaining sterling are to be used as pretexts for establishing a general tariff, on which a permanent system of high Protection can be based, they cannot acquiesce any longer in a policy which offers no prospect of restoring our finances, but which, by abandoning our Free Trade system, may involve the most serious consequences for Great Britain.

Can it be said that this is a fortunate moment for altering the character and diverting the currents of our trade? It is admittedly a moment of widespread commercial distress. There is the deep-rooted and enduring trouble caused by payments of reparations and war debts. There are the currency restrictions imposed by a large number of nations. There are the scarcity of gold and the fall in prices produced by the demand for gold payments. And there is the steady piling up of tariffs in Europe, in America and in our Dominions. These causes have produced in many quarters a depression akin to despair, a readiness to try any new experiment, however ill-considered or unsound. But can it be supposed that any of these difficulties will be lessened by our suddenly imposing fresh obstacles to free exchange? We are told that tariffs give the power to bargain and retaliate. But we already enjoy in almost every country the advantage of most-favoured-nation treatment. Are we to renounce the positive benefit of our

commercial treaties for the precarious possibilities of tariff wars? Experience gives little support to the theory that retaliation leads to a reduction of tariffs. The partial withdrawal of the recent French surtax on coal lends no support to that illusion; for it was withdrawn simply because it proved very unpopular with those French interests which depend on cheap coal from the United Kingdom. And when it comes to bargaining, if our powers in that respect are limited beforehand by pledges given to business interests not only in this country but in the Dominions, very little freedom will remain for us to carry through successful deals abroad.

It is difficult, looking at the world around us, to find grounds for the theory that tariffs bring prosperity in their train. We have no lack of experiments in that direction. "One of the first signs of this distress in world trade," says Mr. Chamberlain, "is the extraordinary growth of trade restrictions. There is hardly any device, ranging from surtaxes to quotas, which has not been applied by one country or another." And yet, according to the same authority, we are suffering from "a truly deplorable condition of world trade." Does it look as if the remedy was for us to impose tariff-restrictions too? The United States have the highest tariffs in the world. Yet *The Times* reminded us in January last that their unemployed numbered between six and ten millions, that their bank deposits had shrunk by over 2,000 million dollars in three months, that their financial deficit of 900 million dollars last year would be more than doubled this year, and that heavy borrowings and heavy increases in taxation were "inescapable" in that country. Australia has the highest tariffs in the British Empire and for years past has been raising them against British goods. Yet her highly protected industries are paralysed. Her unemployed number almost one-third of her industrial population: the official trade union figure is just over 30 per cent. Her agricultural interests, crippled by taxes on their requirements, are demanding State subsidies: Western Australia even threatens to break away. And Protectionist finance has brought the Commonwealth to the verge of ruin. Central Europe, with its thousands of miles of new tariff barriers, tells the same story of impoverishment and trial. And these three striking examples do not stand alone. Can it really be that tariffs are the best road to salvation? Can it be wise to ignore the results which they produce? And can we fail to contrast with the Protectionist elysium the prosperity which under a system of freedom we have enjoyed for seventy years, and which now, in a time of extraordinary stress, aggravated by our own reckless expenditure, has left us still financially the strongest of the

nations, and the best able to overcome our difficulties if only the politicians would not interfere?

Ministers recommend their policy as "a great experiment"—as if opportunities of studying the effects of Protection had never been offered to this country before. The truth of course is that history is full of these unsuccessful experiments, of nation after nation vainly trying to make itself self-supporting, independently of its special needs and characteristics, shutting its frontiers, restricting its commerce, building up barrier after barrier against its natural customers, partly from jealous nationalism, partly from economic ignorance, partly from a desire to avoid direct taxation, while each sentiment is in turn exploited by the agricultural or business interests whose purposes Protection serves. The really serious thing about the attitude of Ministers and their supporters is that they do not seem to realise that any argument is required, or that it is desirable before plunging into their experiment to attempt to make sure of the results it may involve. "The whole scheme can be adjusted later," says one. They could not consult economists, says another. The economists could not agree with each other—might not even agree with them. The "practical business man" must act, when panic overtakes him: he has no time to argue or to think. And yet economic laws have an obstinate way of asserting their importance, with consequences often highly inconvenient to the business man who tries to pass them by.

It is profitless now to argue whether at the last election the country as a whole was invited to vote for Protection or not. It is clear that many votes were given for tariffs and that the Protectionists are overwhelmingly strong in the House of Commons. It is equally clear that many votes were given on other grounds for candidates like Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Thomas, till then regarded as Free Traders, and for candidates like Sir Herbert Samuel and Sir Donald Maclean, who were compelled to fight their battles largely on Free Trade. But few will deny that, when the issue has been put expressly to the country, the verdict since 1903 has been repeatedly and decisively against Protection. When Mr. Joseph Chamberlain propounded his scheme, it was riddled by arguments which remain unanswered. But little attempt has been made since the election to weigh or balance those arguments again: Ministers, unhappily, have been too much occupied in their endeavours to balance trade. Men who have professed themselves Free Traders for a lifetime are suddenly found echoing, without explanation, the familiar nostrums of Tariff Reform. And yet it is a startling thing to revolutionise, without serious argument or examination, the fiscal system which Gladstone and his successors regarded as the mainstay of our commerce, as

the foundation of our maritime ascendancy, of our international position, of our banking and financial power. No one has told us more simply or strongly than Mr. Runciman "that Britain's foreign trade is the very essence of our being, and that freedom is the solid basis on which it has been built." Peel and Gladstone, Bright and Cobden did not stand alone in their convictions. They had at least as much practical experience as most men of business, and possibly a deeper insight into the principles of government and trade. Disraeli surrendered to this opinion. Lord Salisbury accepted it. Hartington, Goschen, Hicks-Beach, Asquith—how many leaders of weight and experience on either side of politics ever seriously doubted it, until Mr. Joseph Chamberlain rushed into Protection and carried so many weaker spirits in his train? We cannot, it is true, be governed for ever by the opinions of our fathers. But it is no comfort to revert to the opinions of our great-grandfathers instead. At least it would be well to spare time to consider the deep and rich experience we are scrapping, the ominous possibilities of the experiment so light-heartedly proposed.

No one will deny that the conditions of trade have altered largely, or that the competition of other nations has become far more serious, during the last fifty years. But the economic principles underlying those conditions have not altered, and the only wise policy is to leave our traders to adjust their methods to them, as in the long run they and they only can. When we look into the details of the new Protection offered us—only the beginnings are as yet revealed—it is clear that its authors have little fresh or refreshing advice to give. Their plans are already involved in some confusion. Not one of the difficulties which wrecked Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's scheme has been met. Direct bread-taxes are to be avoided, for electioneering reasons. But the quota system reproduces, while imperfectly disguising, all the evils of bread taxation. We are to have a tax on flour, which somehow will not make bread dearer. We are to have arrangements, very elaborate arrangements, that will satisfy our millers and our farmers, provide fresh markets and profits for Colonial dealers, and compensate everyone for the losses incurred, always excepting the British buyer of bread or the British payer of taxes, from whose pocket in one shape or another the compensation required must come. It may be sufficient to quote one Protectionist organ on this plan.

It seems not improbable that the expenses of administration will be relatively heavy. The machinery to be set up is extremely complicated. There are to be all sorts of commissions, boards, committees, corporations and the rest of it,

and an elaborate system of certificates and records of sale. But the net result is that a levy of 3s. is to be raised on every sack of flour, which represents as nearly as possible a halfpenny on the 4 lb. loaf.

We may soon find ourselves wishing for the simpler methods of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, who at least had the courage and the candour to tell the public what he meant to do.

But bread taxes, maladroitly camouflaged, are only the beginning of the programme. There are to be taxes on other kinds of food. There are to be taxes on raw materials—and that at a moment when it is essential to reduce the costs of production in this country if we are to hold our own and to keep our markets in a competitive world. And the odd thing is that these new taxes on production are expected to stimulate our exports, the falling off in which is one of the chief causes of complaint. Were the whole thing a comedy, instead of a grim tragedy bordering in some aspects upon farce, one could laugh at the absurdities which have already emerged. There has been something like a little crisis over maize. There has been something like a Cabinet crisis over meat. There have been awkward questions about sisal and hemp. There has been uneasiness in regard to newsprint—"one of those cases," said the Chancellor of the Exchequer—there will be plenty more—"where other considerations came in besides the economic one." There has been some protest about the favour shown to shipbuilding. Already from the very beginning the battle of interests has begun. "I know," one American Senator is reported to have said when the latest tariff was enacted in the United States—"I know it's a big steal, but I'm going to help my people steal while the stealing is good." Mr. Runciman at any rate has no illusions as to what the battle of interests which accompanies Protection means. An old friend may venture to quote a passage in which he spoke very frankly on this subject less than eighteen months ago.

I said that a good many people had turned over to Protection because they are dispirited and almost in despair. That mental attitude is one of the most serious troubles that we have to meet at the present time. Believe me, it is so widespread that everyone is apt to be affected by it, directly or indirectly. That feeling of depression must be lifted from the minds of our people if they are once more to be victorious in the region of commerce. How are you to do it? The Protectionist says you can cheer them up by telling them that they will have the support of a tariff. Our view is that we can cheer them up by telling them that if they depend upon their resources no obstacle shall be put in the way of their trade. Those are the two alternatives. But if you direct the minds of our great manufacturers and our iron-masters to Parliament for assistance;

if they are taught to turn to the elections, and particularly to the by-elections, for the means by which they are to secure support; if they are to imagine that it is to be in the lobbies of the House of Commons, and in the Committee Rooms upstairs, and in the refreshment rooms downstairs, that the tariffs of this country are going to be made, and that they must look there for renewed prosperity, then I say you will demoralise industry and commerce. If there were no other reason in the world for believing in Free Trade as a wholesome political system, it is the preservation of the purity of our Parliamentary life.

What can the "great experiment" do, putting it at its highest? It can check the import into this country of foreign merchandise, foreign raw materials and foreign food. It can antagonise some of our best customers. It can block the flow and diminish the volume of our international trade. It can give some stimulus to protected industries in our home market, which may increase their profits and enable them to increase their staffs. And it is possible that these protected industries may be able to exact such prices from the home consumer, as to make it worth their while to increase their exports, nominally, by dumping them, if they can find a market, at unremunerative prices abroad. But the great experiment can do little or nothing to give fresh life to some of the greatest industries we have. It can hardly hope to find new markets for our cotton or our coal. It cannot fail to depress our shipping; already a proposal to subsidise our shipping out of the taxes has been heard. It cannot fail to diminish our foreign trade and all its incidental profits. It cannot fail, by contracting trade, to diminish the total volume of employment for our people: it is significant that a substantial increase of unemployment followed the Abnormal Importations Act. Above all, it cannot fail to raise prices and to increase the cost of living here. Foolish statements on that subject should be nailed down at once. If Protection did not raise prices nobody would want it and its main object would not be attained. Indeed some advocates of tariffs say forcibly and freely that they desire them as a means of lowering wages indirectly, because wages in some industries are higher than those industries can bear. The weak spot in the argument is that a rise in prices inevitably results in demands for higher wages still.

One grave aspect of the scheme remains, and promises to be a melancholy business, the conference ahead at Ottawa. Did we live in the world of Lord Beaverbrook's ideals, the picture of our Dominions exchanging their great natural products freely for our manufactured goods is one in which even Mr. Cobden could rejoice. Unhappily, we live in a world where the Governments of the Dominions are bent upon Protection for themselves, and

have for many years bolstered up their trade and revenue by imposing ever heavier duties upon British goods.* There is not a shadow of reason for supposing that this attitude has been or can be changed. It is not true that Canada or Australia is pining for British immigrants or willing to make it easy for them to settle there. Assisted emigration from the Mother Country has been deliberately checked. And not all Mr. Thomas's persuasive eloquence will alter Colonial opinion on points which they at present think vital to their interests. But there is a real danger that British Ministers, in their wish to make some sort of Imperial gesture and to justify their surrender to Protection, may, in their present mood of contempt for economics, commit themselves to rash and hasty bargains seriously prejudicial to the interests of our people. If that danger took shape, it would be the worst blow which could be struck at the good understanding which hitherto has bound our Dominions to us, chiefly because they and we alike were free.

Much more might be said. Much will be said in the troubled months before us, when the process of building up the new duties higher and higher, the irresistible object of Protection, begins. The well-known character and ability of the three members of the Tariff Committee cannot prevent our realising the policy they are appointed to pursue. It does not seem possible that convinced Free Traders can long remain members of an Administration whose new departure every pledge given to their followers compels them to condemn. Light-hearted as the great experiment seems, it is impossible to find anything in the Government's proposals likely to restore prosperity, to diminish unemployment, to lessen the anxieties or solve the problems of a tariff-ridden world. And it must be sorrowfully admitted that there is nothing in them in the least likely to reduce taxation, to relieve the burdens or to check the impoverishment of our people. It is only too clear that the new Protection involves, and must increasingly embody, the fallacies and failures which have so often proved disastrous in the old.

CHARLES MALLET.

* The last modifications in the Australian tariff do not make it necessary to modify this statement.

THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON LICENSING.

THE Royal Commission on Licensing, under the Chairmanship of Lord Amulree, has reported after hearing 189 witnesses and sitting for two years. What are now the chances of temperance legislation? It is not easy to answer, as no one knows what the temperance policy of the National Government or of the Liberal and Labour Parties may be as a result of these recommendations. The Conservative attitude has probably changed least. But some time must elapse before party policy as such adapts itself to the new situation. One thing, however, is certain; the policies of all organisations, whether Temperance or Trade, must be affected by Lord Amulree's findings. Without attempting then to prophesy what attitude parties may take up when controversy begins, let me estimate the future prospects of the various pre-Commission policies and also examine the recommendations of the Commission, not necessarily as they appeal to me on merit, but according to their chances of reaching the Statute Book.

I shall divide them into two groups. Take first the series which must appeal to the ordinary man as reasonable and consequently should not encounter violent Parliamentary opposition, except, of course, from the vested interests associated with the pursuit of dividends and sometimes with squalid trading conditions. The Commission recommend the creation of two new types of licences, a hotel and a restaurant licence, the former to be granted to "premises suited for the reception of guests and travellers desirous of dwelling or sleeping therein, and in which the annual receipts from the sale of intoxicants for the preceding five years do not exceed 50 per cent. of the total receipts of the business." Most people will agree with the Commission that "the majority of hotels in this country are out of date, the accommodation is unattractive and the catering primitive," and that probably the hotel industry has been cramped by being treated in nearly all respects on the same basis as public-houses under the Licensing Laws. The other type of licence suggested is for premises which, in addition to being structurally adapted for use as restaurants, are places where the annual receipts from the sale of intoxicants for the preceding five years have not exceeded 60 per cent. of the total receipts.

On the question of hours during which the sale of intoxicants is permissible the Commission recommend a uniform evening closing hour of 10 p.m., justices having the discretionary power to fix it at 9 p.m. in winter in rural districts. In hotels and restaurants the ordering of liquor with meals should be permitted up to midnight in the Metropolis and 11 p.m. in the Provinces with an extra half hour for its consumption. Travellers should be allowed

to finish intoxicants ordered with a late middle-day meal without being unreasonably interfered with by the afternoon closing hour.

One of the most important and urgent recommendations of the Commission is that dealing with clubs. All clubs where intoxicants are supplied are to be registered annually, i.e. the right to retail drink to members and their guests should be renewable yearly. The authority granting these renewals would be a committee selected by the whole body of justices in county boroughs, and elsewhere by quarter sessions. The Commission lay down the following conditions as essential for clubs: (a) the premises to be satisfactory; (b) the manager to be of good character; (c) the club to be a *bona fide* association, i.e. to have some *bona fide* social purpose other than the consumption of liquor; (d) a genuine membership of at least fifty; (e) absence of any tie or understanding amounting to a tie with any brewery; (f) control by members over the supply of drink. It is further recommended that suitable police officers acting on the written authority, given expressly for each occasion, by a Chief Constable should have a right of entry; that the supply by clubs for consumption off the premises should be made illegal; and that clubs should normally comply with the local closing hours subject to such limited exceptions as golf or other athletic clubs whose "active life normally ends with the onset of darkness," or clubs where food is supplied. In the latter case the privileges proposed for hotels and restaurants should be granted. These recommendations for clubs are the almost unanimous judgment of the Commission; brewers and licensed victuallers have long demanded legislation on these lines. The abuses rampant under the present law are set out in the Report and show how urgently necessary are the proposed reforms.

Within this same category of useful and substantially unanimous recommendations come those dealing with medicated wines and anonymous medical testimonials. The Commission point out that there is a "very large range of proprietary fluids in which, although there are small percentages of medicine, beef extract and the like, alcohol predominates, amounting in some cases to 20 per cent. of absolute alcohol, roughly the amount contained in port." They propose that in future "a list of spirits or wines which are sufficiently medicated to be incapable of use other than as a medicine or for medicinal purposes, e.g. ipecacuanha wine, should be prepared and that it should be lawful to sell only these as medicated wines." All other wines should be sold subject to the usual conditions governing the uncammouflaged intoxicants. Anonymous medical testimonials should be made illegal. In support of this, the recommendation of the Select Committee on Patent Medicines of 1914 is quoted.

Another sensible and important proposal is that for dealing with new housing areas. The Commission suggest informative polls, which should not be necessarily determinative, but which should guide the justices in deciding whether or not to grant licences for the new district. The alternative plan favoured to-day by the liquor trade of surrendering derelict licences in congested areas to secure the grant of a lucrative licence in a new suburb is rightly condemned by the Commission, who hold—as has just been indicated—that the inhabitants in the garden villages and cities of to-day should have a voice in settling the licensing arrangements of their neighbourhoods. The Commission accordingly recommend the general abolition of "Removals." A serviceable proposal is that for the abolition of monopoly value of new licences. There are several objections to the present practice, not the least important being that large breweries with capital resources have an undesirable advantage over such competitors as Trust Companies or private individuals, in obtaining new licences.

Lastly, in this category come two sets of proposals, the purport of which has not been grasped by many reformers, namely, those for improving public-houses and those governing the admission of children on licensed premises. In many licensed premises the first essential elements of any house, e.g. roominess, air, light and sanitation, are to-day conspicuously lacking. Proper living accommodation for the licensee and his family is now frequently not provided. "Dirty cellars, pipes and filters, unsatisfactory facilities for or methods of washing glasses, and the indefensible practice of re-using beer left in glasses by customers" are to be found in some public-houses. All of the recommendations for putting right these scandals are public health matters and urgent. The Commission further desire that proper seating accommodation and food be provided. They report that "the ruling motive of the brewer, who is the owner of the vast majority of existing public-houses, must necessarily be promotion of the sale of the goods in which he is chiefly interested; and it would be unnatural to expect the trade as a whole, left to itself, to lead public opinion in the matter of the conversion of the public-house into a place where the sale of intoxicants is to take a secondary position." The Justices' authority and power should be increased so as to enable them "to direct any form of alteration or improvement in licensed premises which they may judge to be necessary." The Commissioners believe that "games, music and the like have a definite value as distractions from the mere business of drinking."

So much for public-house improvement. Now take the proposals about children. By the Children Act of 1908 the holder of a licence

is prohibited from allowing any child under fourteen to be in the bar of licensed premises. But this prohibition extends only to the bar, and to parts of the premises exclusively or mainly used for the sale and supply of intoxicants. Children can be, and in fact often are now, anywhere on licensed premises other than the bar. There are actually to-day so-called children's rooms in some public-houses which leave much to be desired and where the conditions are anything but harmless. The Commission recommend that the parts of licensed premises to which children are admitted shall be specifically certified as suitable by the justices and duly inspected. They emphasise the fact that justices should have power to withdraw or modify any concession granted. The Commission are not bringing children into public-houses as they have been accused of doing, but recognising the fact that they are there now in unsatisfactory circumstances. They try to remedy this. As regards older children they indicate that the prohibition governing the sale to young persons under eighteen on licensed premises should be extended to clubs and, in fact, that no person under eighteen should be allowed to be a member of a club where drink is sold. Although the Commission obviously can make no recommendation for dealing with the habit, they state emphatically that they were impressed by the weight of evidence submitted indicating the growth of the cocktail habit among young persons of both sexes.

Collectively the above recommendations, if passed, would mark very substantial progress. Most readers who have obtained their impressions of the Licensing Commission from stunt newspapers or writers with bees in their bonnets where drink is concerned may be surprised to find this mass of useful, sensible suggestions.

Though the Commission do not recommend altering the composition or status of licensing justices, they nevertheless have felt the necessity of recommending a central supervisory National Commission to try and standardise practice as between areas and to supervise the execution of the recommendations submitted in the Report. Whilst the Royal Commissioners bear testimony to the sound work of Licensing Justices, they frankly recognise the need for an advancement in the standard of Licensing Administration in some areas, and of a quickening of activity in Licensing Districts in general. The work of the proposed National Commission would also be related to the reduction of licences, the initiation of schemes of public ownership, etc. (One of the brewer-members of the Commission who signed the report indicated that, in his opinion, this work of supervision should be in the hands of the Home Office, but he did not dissociate himself from the view that increased supervision was required.)

So much for proposals which ought to be considered by all citizens as so reasonable as to get through Parliament without much trouble whatever the colour of the Government. Let me now turn to more controversial proposals which undoubtedly would be fought in Parliament and, therefore, could hardly be expected to reach the Statute Book so rapidly. The Commission came to the almost unanimous conclusion that there were in the country an excessive number of licensed premises, and that, in many areas, something like 15 per cent., or one-seventh ought to be closed down. This means that in the country, as a whole, there may be from 15,000 to 25,000 redundant houses. This might seem an excessive estimate were it not that the late Lord Birkenhead, no enemy of the Licensed Trade, indicated in a debate in the House of Lords that he thought considerably more than 10,000 licences could be done away with. The Commission point out that the compensation machinery of the 1904 (Balfour) Act has proved quite inadequate. They suggest that the money required for compensating the owners of the licences which are to be abolished should be obtained by trebling the existing levy. Undoubtedly this proposal will be resisted by many sections of the Trade.

The recommendation for another experiment in public ownership will be opposed in Parliament. Although the Commission did not feel able at this moment, because of the financial conditions of the country, to recommend National State Purchase, a clear majority attached their signatures to the statement that public ownership was "theoretically sound" and that "experience in Carlisle had gone far to show it to be sound in practice also." This being so they advised a "further test" of public ownership. Two Parliamentary difficulties will be encountered. The fight will begin when a Bill proposing that a National Commission be empowered to initiate inquiry and formulate schemes for the extension of public ownership comes before Parliament. If this gets through, the fight will be continued when a definite scheme is submitted to Parliament for the "further test."

I have so far only touched upon matters of legislation, and the ordinary member of the public who has neither time nor inclination will want to know, and is entitled to know, what view the Commission took upon the general state of sobriety of the nation. The Commission affirmed that our increased sobriety had been accompanied by a general decrease in the consumption of intoxicants. The causes are various, and include counter-attractions such as cinemas, wireless, allotments, gardens, playing-fields, travel facilities, better housing, progressive development of education and of public health, and so forth. It is recognised also that increased sobriety has been brought about by the restriction of

hours and higher prices of liquor. This improvement, they point out, is likely to continue, subject to "the maintenance of the present restrictions," and the further legislative changes proposed. Members of Parliament who are now clamouring for a reduction of the Beer Duty should make a note of this and of the further fact that the Commission stated "that the benefits to be derived from the diminution of the present excessive expenditure on drink would progressively compensate for any loss on taxation yield from that source."

In a chapter entitled "The Drink Problem of To-day," the Commission emphasise the authoritative value of the official volume, *Alcohol: its Action on the Human Organism*. They indicate that alcohol, being almost entirely narcotic in its action, induces a feeling of self-confidence, and while dulling the faculties of self-criticism and self-control may lead progressively to incautious and disordered behaviour. They bring out the fact that according to the best opinion "the use of intoxicants as an aid to work, whether physical or mental, is regarded as physiologically unsound, and the performance of the finer kinds of work, including driving of a motor-car or the piloting of an aeroplane, may be temporarily impaired by even moderate doses"; and further that "alcohol is definitely not a specific cure for any disease nor has it any prophylactic (i.e. preventative) value." They accept the evidence as to the influence of immoderate drinking in the aggravation of poverty, neglect of children, matrimonial trouble, prostitution and certain forms of crime (though opinions may differ as to degree); they feel that industry must still stand to gain by a further reduction in consumption of intoxicants, and they emphatically declare that in "too many cases amounts are being spent on intoxicating liquor which cannot be afforded if the necessities of life, including proper food and clothing for the children and a sufficient amount in rent to secure proper living accommodation, are to be supplied in adequate measure." The Commission recommend that the facts about alcohol contained in the Board of Education *Handbook of Suggestions on Health Education*, and the syllabus entitled *The Hygiene of Food and Drink*, should be generally used, because "every child ought to receive specific and systematic instruction as to the properties of alcohol" and they consider it "of no less importance that instruction on the subject should be given in teachers' training colleges and in schools for older children."

In a special chapter they warn us of the nature of the "elaborate defensive organisation" developed by the Trade. They find grounds for criticism in certain of the forms of activity which characterise the organisations, e.g. pressure brought upon M.P's.

and members of town councils and other local authorities during their candidature and term of office. They indicate the existence of a number of societies conducting propagandist work on behalf of the Trade bearing titles calculated to conceal the true facts, including one apparently largely subsidised from Trade funds which fights for the drink interest during elections. Another society whose title is equally misleading concerns itself with the organisation of subsidised Press correspondence designed to procure a steady flow of communications apparently from disinterested members of the public. The Commission "consider this kind of organisation most objectionable" and favour, *inter alia*, some system of compulsory registration involving the publication of all sources of revenue.

The Commission recognise the existence of an advanced national and temperance sentiment in Wales, and advise the creation of a separate National Licensing Commission for Wales and Monmouthshire. They further recommend that national informative polls should be held at a future date in the Principality.

In view of the limited recommendations for extending public ownership under the State, attention should be directed to the minority note and proposals of Mrs. E. D. (now Lady) Simon. In the Report there is evidence of our inability to solve the drink problem so long as private interest in drink exists. The liberty of the Press is one of the most vital necessities in a democracy. Under competitive private ownership to-day some £800,000 are spent in advertising liquor in newspapers. Although some papers would be uninfluenced by any thought of their balance-sheets, yet others are "likely to shape their policy so as, at least, to give no offence to an industry which supplies them with much advertisement revenue." The Commission devote a whole chapter to liquor advertisements which are pro-drink propaganda. They estimate the annual expenditure of the Trade on this as well over £2,000,000, and state that the advertisements often "contain statements with palpable scientific untruths," that they "definitely increase the amount of intoxicants consumed," and that many are "designed to attract the rising generation." Altogether they "cause some alarm" and yet cannot be checked under the present system of commercial ownership. As I read this my mind recalled what I found last summer in Russia, where private ownership in drink has been abolished. There the hoardings and papers are free from our incentives and lures to drink and the Government conducts a continuous anti-drink propaganda.

Lady Simon outlines a scheme for handing over the drink trade to semi-public regional corporations. The scheme is not unlike that in the London Passenger Transport Bill. It provides for the

compulsory acquisition of the Trade, the payment of compensation in licensing stock, the establishment of a sinking fund calculated to amortise the outlay in about thirty years (which should be easy, as the capital cost of Carlisle was paid for in less than eleven years). These corporations would have regional monopolies, and be under separate boards aided by advisory committees. The scheme is advocated by Lady Simon on the ground that no Treasury guarantee is required and no citizen need feel himself directly concerned in the sale of intoxicants as might be the case with public ownership.

As the Commission do not recommend Prohibition, State Purchase, Sunday Closing, Local Veto or the "Oxford" triple option Bill, these remedies are unlikely to make much future headway, even though their respective champions will abandon them with reluctance. Yet the very omission of these policies from the Commission's Report must make the ordinary person realise that the recommendations put forward by the Commission are moderate and reasonable.

ASTOR.

ARISTIDE BRIAND.

SINCE Louis-Philippe was dethroned in 1848, and the short-lived Second Republic was founded, only two men have held the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs in France for a long continuous period. One was Théophile Delcassé, who was at the Quai d'Orsay for exactly seven years, from April 1898 to April 1905, and the other was Aristide Briand, who did not quite complete his seventh successive year, of which three months were wanting when he retired last January, after the Laval Government had resigned and was reconstructed without him. However, before this continuous stretch Briand had already twice been Foreign Minister, for a year and a half in 1915 and 1916 and for a year in 1921, and before he was ever directly responsible for foreign affairs he had twice been Prime Minister, for a year and a half from July 1909 and for a few months in 1913; he was also Prime Minister—which Delcassé never was—during six of the nine years and more which he spent in all as Foreign Minister. Consequently he had a far longer real responsibility for the foreign affairs of his country than any Minister of the Third Republic.

Yet it must be remembered that for nearly half of his concentrated and very active parliamentary life of thirty years—he only began it when he was forty—Aristide Briand was far more closely concerned with home affairs than with foreign, and with party manoeuvres than with international politics. This fact and the other fact that he was a self-made and largely self-educated man, who picked up his knowledge of men and things by the use of his marvellous intuition as he went along, and built up a mastery and a skill which were based rather upon experience of humanity than upon the study of ideas, will help to explain the special quality of his view of international questions, much of its strength and perhaps some of its weakness.

At the same time, it would be easy to exaggerate the defects of his opportunism. An opportunist he undoubtedly was, but that was largely because he was a realist. He was interested in things if he thought he could get them done, and although he talked towards the end of his life of taking up the pilgrim's staff, there was nothing further from his temperament than the idea of going out into the wilderness. It must not necessarily be concluded, however, that he lacked purpose or discipline or character. He worked intuitively. He was a "man of conversation," as he described himself. Even when he was making a speech, he was watching and listening as keenly as he was speaking. His tentacles were out all the time, and his tactile sensibility was always at work. He used his charm, his wit, his gaiety, his power of cajolery to the full,

but that does not prove that he did not use them with an intention which had an idea behind it. He was always seeking the line of least resistance, but that does not prove that he did not know what he wanted. He was fond of saying "*nous verrons*," and sometimes showed an exaggerated belief in the probability of Time arranging things in a way that would suit him, if not exactly in the way he had planned them—if ever he was so unwise as to commit himself to a plan; but that did not prove that he had no object. "Poincaré knows everything and understands nothing. Briand knows nothing and understands everything" was what Clemenceau said of him; but he was not limited to the understanding of things. His dislike for brutal measures, for exasperating his opponents, for provoking unnecessary enmities, and his constant preference for coming to terms if terms could be found, were, no doubt, at first a matter of temperament, but had become a method of action, just as his apparent indolence and nonchalance had been developed into a system of protective armour, from which he was able occasionally to emerge suddenly and pronounce the word or phrase which clinched his point with unexpected effect. No doubt he was really indolent in a way. No doubt it was true that it was difficult for his secretaries to get him to break his conversation in order to sign a letter, and still more difficult to get him to read one before he signed it, and no doubt his willingness to allow the details of a plan to be drafted by other hands sometimes resulted in some of his projects, such as his last one, that of the United States of Europe, being presented by the Quai d'Orsay in a form which was more definitely a consolidation of the French policy of alliances and military guarantees than he intended. That does not prove, however, that he did not retain a firm hold on the essentials of his scheme, or even that those essentials did not very closely resemble that consolidation of French alliances which it was so impolitic to reveal as its purpose at that early stage.

When Aristide Briand's foreign policy is viewed in the perspective of history, it will perhaps be seen that there was more method in his opportunism than might at first appear, and that as Foreign Minister of France he served the interests of France more deliberately and perhaps more successfully than many of his countrymen and some people in other countries have recently been willing to believe. In his speech at Briand's funeral, André Tardieu recalled that during the last seven years, when the dead statesman was at the Quai d'Orsay, his policy was always supported by the Chamber, even though the parliamentary majority changed through different party complexions during that time; and although the inference which the listener, and especially the voter at the forthcoming elections, was intended to draw—that the present

Government is as devoted to the cause of European peace and conciliation as was Briand—is not necessarily justified, there is no doubt that if the policy which the Chamber supported had not represented what France in general, and the governing classes in particular, believed to be in conformity with French interests, it would not have obtained that support. Briand has often been blamed by the parties of the Left in France and by advocates of international co-operation all over Europe, for clinging to office when there were indications that the Chamber or the Government to which he belonged was not ready to go as far as he, for swallowing the two affronts, the rejection of the policy of Franco-German *rapprochement* which grew out of the Thoiry conversation with Stresemann in September 1926, and the refusal to ratify the Anglo-Franco-Italian naval agreement of February 1931. But Briand was always a realist. He was never out for a principle at all costs. He was ready to take what he could get, and perhaps he was not so far wrong in believing that he could serve the cause of peace better by remaining in the Government than by resigning. Besides, though he wished to serve the cause of peace and international co-operation, his never-abandoned intention—and, after all, his duty—was in no circumstances to place it before the interests of France. When this is remembered, many of his acts which may appear inconsistent with his peace policy can be explained, and some of his defeats at home may not have been without their utility as negotiating counters abroad. It may be true that his policy has failed—at least for the time being—as far as Europe in general is concerned, and that the state of things is worse than when he became Foreign Minister seven years ago. It is by no means the same with regard to the relative position of France.

To conclude, therefore, that Briand was cynically pursuing a policy of the aggrandisement of France under cover of an ideal of European peace would, however, be entirely unfair. He did really care for peace. Conciliation, compromise, arrangement were in his nature, and all the Governments which he formed were coalitions of Centre groups. André Tardieu, in his funeral oration, was quite justified in saying that the pacification which he brought into the heated religious atmosphere of the Separation Laws before the war was repeated in his international action afterwards. Indeed, in his later years international peace became for him an ideal which really inspired him. It became so partly because his very human sensitiveness recoiled from the horrors of war, partly because the same sensitiveness caused him to react to the universal feeling for peace which undoubtedly exists in the common people of France, and partly because he had the kind of imagination which

enabled him to look ahead as a very practical and very realistic statesman.

As he grew older, he was perhaps not disinclined to accept the part of the apostle of peace and to allow the legend of himself as a sort of missionary or even an impractical and Utopian visionary to grow up. In reality he was nothing of the kind, and he even defended himself against the accusation of being anything of the kind. He believed in European co-operation because he was convinced that it was practicable. "If I were ten years younger I could make the United States of Europe," he said recently. "Why should I be called a visionary? Are people who always want to use force called visionaries? And yet their system is not such an unqualified success. Why should those who want to avoid the shedding of blood be called visionaries?" He claimed that he had never ceased to be a practical man: that he was practical in 1913, when he saw the war that was coming and prepared the return to the three years' military service: when, in the same year, he sent Delcassé as ambassador to Petrograd for a few months to persuade Russia to make the necessary preparations: when, three years earlier, he not only prevented the railway strike leading to anarchy by mobilising the railwaymen, but, by organising that mobilisation, made its repetition possible on the outbreak of war: when, during the war, he defended the idea of the Salonika expedition against both Clemenceau and Delcassé (who were for once in agreement) and relieved the main front: when, after the peace, in March 1921, he gave the order for the occupation of Düsseldorf, was prepared, if necessary, to occupy the Ruhr and made his speech about "taking Germany by the collar." He did these things at these times, he said, because he realised that they were necessary. It was also because he considered it to be necessary for France to have a sufficient military force, "if only in order to make her plea for coming to an understanding plainly heard," that he had never failed to support the war estimates in the several Governments to which he had belonged until his retirement at the beginning of this year. "And they call me a visionary," he concluded.

His imaginative capacity for looking ahead and anticipating future conditions was shown more than once during his war Ministry. The Sykes-Picot agreement for the partition of Turkey, which was to give France Syria, Cilicia and Mosul, was promoted by him. It was he who, as early as 1916, threw out feelers for reaching an inter-allied understanding about reparations, war costs and indemnities. It was he who opened the tentative Laenken negotiations with Austria, which were continued by Ribot but abruptly broken off by Clemenceau, with his cry of "*Je fais la guerre.*"

Briand was not yet very pro-British, either at this time or after-

wards, when he criticised Clemenceau for having consented, in the Versailles Treaty, to a peace which had sacrificed French interests to those of Great Britain. Nor was he at all pro-German; for the essence of the Laenken negotiations was to use Catholic Austria and the Catholic Church as a means to dissolve the union between the Protestant Germany of the North and the Catholic Germany of the South, which had been cemented after the war of 1870. It was, no doubt, as much the opposition of Great Britain as that of the anti-Catholic part of France which led to their collapse. The collapse in any case did much to lead to the fall of the Briand Government, to the advent of Clemenceau and to the fact that Briand, negotiator of genius, had no part in the making of the peace.

What led to the evolution of the Briand of 1916 to the Briand of Washington and Cannes, and eventually to the Briand of Locarno and Thoiry? To some extent home politics, no doubt. He criticised the peace partly because it was Clemenceau's peace. When he was called back to power by Millerand in 1921, he began by adopting the "hand on the collar" policy towards Germany, because he had a very nationalist Chamber behind him. However, he soon saw very clearly that if anything were to be realised—and remember, he was always a realist—it could only be by co-operation with Great Britain. This was where his action differed from that of Poincaré, who succeeded him. The order for the occupation of Düsseldorf was given in agreement with the Government of Mr. Lloyd George. He realised that abroad it was essential to secure British co-operation—even more essential than to placate his nationalist Chamber at home. He succeeded in retaining the former, at Washington, by accepting a reduced naval strength for France—after having set out for Washington in the confident hope of separating the United States and Great Britain—but only just saved his parliamentary existence by his final speech in defence of the French land armaments. He was prepared to come to terms with Great Britain once more at Cannes, and to accept from the British Government a ten years' military guarantee in return for concessions on the Reparations question; but the guarantee was denounced by Poincaré as humiliating, and Briand recognised that feeling in the Chamber was so definitely against him that he resigned, and left the way open to the Poincaré policy, which eventually ended in the occupation of the Ruhr. Meanwhile, however, he had negotiated the treaty with Poland, thus developing the Little Entente, of which the foundations had been laid by Millerand in 1920.

The evolution of Briand through Franco-British to Franco-German co-operation was resumed after the election of 1924 had

returned a majority of the parties of the Left, and had definitely expressed the disapproval of the country for the Poincaré policy. Herriot, who was at the Quai d'Orsay immediately after the election, gave him a lead, and when Painlevé offered him the post of Foreign Minister once more, he entered the Locarno Conference, and brought off what was indeed the crowning act of his career in foreign politics, the Locarno agreements—once more in close co-operation with Great Britain.

Locarno was the highest point, for soon afterwards the financial crisis in France caused the Chamber, which had been elected in opposition to Poincaré, to turn to him in panic, and as he was given a definite personal majority in the election of 1928 Poincaré was able to exercise over Briand a control from which the latter never liberated himself. The Kellogg Pact was in appearance magnificent, but the French acceptance of it was surrounded by such conditions as to make it almost meaningless, and there is little doubt that the initial advances were made by Briand in the hope of creating what would virtually have been a Franco-American alliance.

If Locarno was the climax of the Briand foreign policy in the sense that it was his most definite achievement, both for French interests and for European concord, and if it was the happiest expression of the principle that French interests could best be served by advancing closely in step with Great Britain, Briand himself was unfortunately not consistent in his adherence to this principle, though he appears to have discovered it in 1921 and to have followed it not only in regard to the Düsseldorf occupation, but at the end of the Washington Naval Conference and at Cannes, as well as at Locarno. When he broke away from it, the reason may have been at first that the Chamber elected in 1919, which is what he had behind him until he was thrown out after the Cannes Conference in January 1922, was violently nationalist, and he was obliged sometimes to play up to its prejudices. It may have been that in spite of his curious temperamental similarity with Mr. Lloyd George, he felt—as French opinion certainly felt—that he was dealing with a statesman less sympathetic to France than his successor, Sir Austen Chamberlain. It may have been that his instinct for bargaining prompted him to make a move to the Right in order to have the negotiating power to make favourable terms for a move to the Left. It may have been that the personal influence of Loucheur, whose industry, mental agility and readiness with figures impressed him as he grew older, tempted him to think that political success, as well as a profitable business arrangement, could be achieved by coming to terms with Germany, and also with other nations, without taking Great Britain into account.

In any case, we have the Wiesbaden agreement for deliveries in kind between Loucheur and Rathenau, which, largely owing to British opposition, was not submitted to the ratification of the Chamber; we had the Angora Treaty with Turkey, which estranged Great Britain, and we have the attempt to separate Britain from the United States at Washington. Even when Briand returned to the Quai d'Orsay in 1925, with a far less chauvinist Chamber at his back, and the Locarno Treaties were negotiated with Sir Austen Chamberlain and Stresemann, the tendency to act independently of Great Britain was not entirely abandoned; and we have the attempt to give Poland a position in the League of Nations as important as that of Germany, and generally to make the League Council a permanent instrument of French diplomacy, as well as the attempt to get the United States into a French alliance by the original form of the outlawry of war proposal.

It must be remembered, however, that between Cannes and Locarno there had been two years of Poincaré, and of opposition to what was believed to be the British policy of ensuring the hegemony of Europe through an Anglo-Franco-German understanding, side by side with the hegemony of Asia through an Anglo-Japanese-American understanding; and it must be remembered that with the return of Poincaré to power in 1926 that opposition regained the ascendancy, even though Briand remained at the Quai d'Orsay. It is only now that the advantages of a working understanding with Great Britain are once more being recognised by those who had supported Poincaré.

Meanwhile, Briand tried to turn the difficulty by his plan for the United States of Europe; but he allowed it too crudely to become another device for consolidating the French system of European alliances. He said towards the end of his life that his most bitter disappointment had been the springing upon him, by Brüning, of the Austro-German Customs Union proposal, after all the goodwill he had shown in trying to conciliate Germany. He was really broken by the return of Poincaré to power in 1926 and the virtual impossibility of developing the spirit of the Locarno Agreement.

Locarno remains the climax of the Briand foreign policy.

PHILIP CARR.

THE GENERAL ELECTION IN THE IRISH FREE STATE.

WRITING some months ago in this REVIEW I surveyed the position of Mr. Cosgrave's Ministry in view of the coming elections, and gave my reasons for hoping that their tenure of office, though already exceeding that of any other democratic Government in Europe, might be again prolonged. The event has belied my hopes; but the reasons then given still appear sound, and are in one respect justified beyond anything I could have anticipated. It was not to be supposed that ten years could pass—least of all ten years following a revolution—without a piling up of petty, but cherished, grievances; and I confess to having underrated the extent to which this was likely to obscure greater issues. Nor did I perhaps make enough allowance for the addition to the register of thousands of young men and women to whom the miseries of the Black and Tan régime and of the later Civil War are merely a faint memory of stirring events, in which they doubtless regret not to have had a part, just as there are other young folk who feel that fate has cheated them because they had not reached military age before the armistice was proclaimed in November 1918. To such as these the late Government's record in the vital matter of the re-establishment of public order and private security meant nothing, unless it were the substitution of something known to be humdrum for something imagined to be heroic.

One other thing I did not foresee; but here subsequent events, far from falsifying, have most strikingly confirmed what to some of my readers may well have seemed a fantastic theory. Among the factors favourable to Mr. Cosgrave's Ministry I laid some stress upon this: that my fellow countrymen, unlike the English, have no instinctive horror of arbitrary government. If, I said, we had in the past resisted British coercion Acts, it was perhaps not so much that they were coercive as that they were British. At the time I had in mind chiefly certain tendencies in administration, such as the cavalier dismissal of various local bodies by the Department of Local Government. But not long after the article appeared, the Executive Council introduced, and carried through both Houses, between three o'clock on a Thursday and dinner-time on the Saturday following, a measure so wide in its scope, so novel in its procedure, so invasive of personal liberty as understood in Great Britain, that no Chief Secretary, even in the worst days of the Land League, would ever have dared to present it to the House of Commons. By the Constitution Amendment (No. 17) Act 1932 (commonly known as the Public Safety Act) there was

established a special tribunal composed of five officers of the Free State Army, to which—subject to the proviso mentioned below—is given sole jurisdiction in respect of membership of illegal associations, illegal drilling, and other seditious practices. The tribunal is expressly empowered to inflict such penalties, including death, as it may think fit; and though sentences may be reviewed by the Executive Council itself, its proceedings are not questionable by any court. Further, the Act was deliberately framed not as an emergency measure, but as an integral part of the Constitution, subject only to this limitation that the clauses which embody its operative provisions remain in suspense until invoked by Order in Council.

It might well be supposed that such a measure as this would have encountered furious opposition in Parliament and awakened the fiercest resentment in the constituencies. In actual fact the resistance offered in the Dáil was less vehement and gave the impression of being more half-hearted than that which milder Bills had previously encountered; while outside, if one heard any criticism of the Government's action it was not that it was excessive, but that it was belated. During the weeks which elapsed between the passing of the Act and the Dissolution evidence steadily accumulated of a movement of opinion decidedly favourable to Mr. Cosgrave's Party. And, having myself just come through a contested election, I can truthfully say that at no meeting at which I was present was a single hostile question or comment directed to the provisions or to the working of the Act. On the contrary, there was no surer way of raising a cheer than to remind one's hearers that, thanks to it, they were free to vote for whom they pleased without fear of the gun-bully. Seeing that all my meetings, with three exceptions, were held in the open air, on fair days or after mass on Sundays, and that, consequently, my audiences were necessarily composed of people of various political views, this experience may fairly be considered of weight. If, as seems likely enough, Mr. de Valera's Government repeals the Act, it will certainly not be because a majority of the electors desire such repeal.

I only wish the decision between the two chief parties could have been confined to this single issue, and that dissolution could have followed immediately upon the passing of the Act. Quiet people, ever with us a large majority, had been gravely alarmed by the notorious recrudescence of illegal drilling, the too evident break-down of the jury system in criminal cases, by recent murders of police officers and witnesses, and, above all, by a sinister development new in Irish politics: the fusion of communistic with republican propaganda and the rapid spread of the joint movement among

the young people both in town and country. Even if the result of the election is thought to indicate some preference for Republic as against Free State—and politicians are always apt to exaggerate the place occupied by constitutional issues in the popular mind—it is quite certain that very few indeed desire a republic of the type established in Russia or such as seems to be fast establishing itself in Spain. But short as was the interval between the passing of the Act and the Dissolution, it was long enough to enable the scepticism that jostles credulity in the Irish character to reassert itself. Many of those least favourably known to the police fled the country immediately; and the Military Tribunal has, in the main, had to deal with minor offenders who have in general been either released or awarded mild sentences on undertaking to desist from seditious activities. (And, by the way, nothing showed so clearly the success of the Act than that such undertakings so often took the place of defiant refusals to “recognise the Court.”)

And so people began to think this peril less grave than they had supposed and that they could safely follow the natural inclination to see what a new Executive Council could do to produce that millennium which every opposition is free to promise and every elector, however often he has been disappointed, always vaguely imagines to be attainable. Here, at any rate, Fianna Fáil held all the court cards—if I may allow myself so pleasantly inappropriate a simile—and Mr. Cosgrave has himself confessed that his rival was able to outbid him utterly. One strong suit indeed—or what I, at least, took to be a strong suit—Cumann-na-n-Gaedhael possessed. Whatever be the effect upon Great Britain itself of the new fiscal policy, there is no doubt whatever that it must be greatly advantageous to the Irish farmer, so long (and so long only) as the Free State remains a Dominion. Ninety per cent. of our exports, including all but a tiny fraction of our agricultural surplus, goes straight into the English market. There we have hitherto found the struggle to maintain ourselves against the rest of the world growing each year fiercer. Like the White Queen we had to run as hard as we could to stay where we were; nor should we have been able to do so but for the pains taken by our Department of Agriculture to improve the quality of our exports. But now, quite unexpectedly, we are presented with a 10 per cent. preference over several of our most formidable competitors in respect of many of our chief exports; and though meat (live and dead) is for a moment excluded, we may naturally hope for much greater benefits, if only we play our cards tolerably well in London and Ottawa.

I confess I am quite at a loss to say why a development touching so closely the interests of the mass of our people should have attracted so little notice and exercised—so far as I could judge—

so little influence over the suffrages of the electorate. I can only suppose that the idea was too novel to be quickly grasped or perhaps even credited; and that we who spoke of it failed to drive home our argument in terms generally intelligible by a people whose economic grasp is far inferior to its general intelligence. Some influence, I suppose, this argument must have had; for I noticed that as the election campaign proceeded, Mr. de Valera was at some pains to explain that he was not unaware of the value of the British market, nor altogether averse from negotiating an interchange of goods between the two countries. All he now desires, it would appear, is that Great Britain should take more of our produce, so that we may enjoy a favourable balance of trade—a desire which he seems to share with every other politician in Europe. 'Tis a consummation devoutly to be wished that every country should simultaneously sell more goods to any other than it receives from that other. That is what I understand by the millennium; and since it plainly involves the abolition of all mathematics (and even the simplest and dullest arithmetic) I can imagine nothing more delightful, more especially as Mr. de Valera is himself a learned mathematician. Meanwhile Mr. de Valera's assurances are doubly welcome; for their own sake and because they show that their author is not quite so loftily indifferent to workaday realities as one has sometimes thought him.

I very much doubt, on the other hand, if Fianna Fáil was much more successful in arousing popular enthusiasm for a fresh assault on the Treaty Settlement. The Oath of Fidelity to the Constitution and to the King as Head of the Associated Nations of the Commonwealth, the “assimilation” of the Governor-General's status “to that of a President of the Republic” (whatever that may portend) are not matters that greatly move the man in the street or the man in the fields. When, as happened more than once, I was present at meetings of the Opposition, it seemed that speakers and hearers both turned with relief to themes at once more domestic and more exciting. The misdeeds of the Land Commission; the salaries paid to the higher State officials; the extravagance (or when it suited) the meanness of the Government; the ascendancy of the Freemasons; the retention of Land Annuities; above all the promise given on a hundred platforms and spread abroad by thousands of posters, to “end unemployment”—these were the things that counted.

One can easily understand why this should be. Amid all the changes, political, social and economic, of the past fifty years, one characteristic of Ireland remains unaltered, the passion of the countryman for land and yet more land. Especially strong is this passion in the congested districts of the Gaeltacht, where economic

holdings (defined roughly as of or over £10 P.L. Valuation) are few and far between. Let the Land Commission work never so hard—and it never has worked so hard as during the past few years—at the task, ancillary to Land Purchase, of dividing up demesne and other relatively large areas, it is almost inevitable that in every estate there should be left numbers of unsatisfied claimants. If compulsory migration were practicable, if every farm of 100 acres or so were sub-divided, if all the grass of the midlands were brought under the plough and if all these things could be done without (as is only too probable) diminishing, rather than increasing, the agricultural wealth of the country and general prosperity, then, indeed, everyone might have, for a generation or so, a sufficient portion. Without these heroic measures, the brutal fact is that there is not enough land to go round.

The outcry against official salaries again is intelligible, if not intelligent. Imagine the effect upon a "mountainy man" in Donegal or Connemara, living on three or four acres of arable land and a bit of stony grazing and finding it hard enough to scrape together the thousand pence or so required each half-year to meet land annuity and rates, when he learns that in Dublin wicked Free State Ministers and pampered Civil Servants draw yearly salaries of £1,000 or more! It is useless to tell such a man—I have tried, and I know—that the State, if it is to be decently served, must offer its servants something like the equivalent of the profits made by able men in business or the learned professions. He will merely suspect you of yourself making part of a conspiracy to rob the poor.

Almost equally serviceable for belabouring the Government was the discovery of a confidential circular soliciting subscriptions in aid of Cumann-na-n-Gaedhael. The signatories were, for the most part, ex-Unionists and Protestants; some of them may, for all I know, be Freemasons; all of them in the eyes of our super-Patriots are reactionaries. It is said, I know not whether accurately, that some £40,000 was thus collected. "Here," cried Fianna Fáil triumphantly, "is proof of what we have always asserted, that Mr. Cosgrave is in the hands of the enemies of Irish Freedom. He who pays the piper calls the tune." The fact that all these men had since the Treaty in one way or another shown their loyal acquiescence in the new Order was sedulously hidden from the electorate. Call a man a "Freemason" (a term that in Ireland conveys a meaning diametrically opposed to that which it bears in Latin countries and signifies an adherent, not of Republicanism, but of Imperialism) and you have effectually damned him—and, incidentally, anyone whom you can associate with him—in the eyes of great numbers of people. It is right to add, at the same time, that although the word is often

used as the equivalent of "Protestant," the implied reproach is political, not sectarian.

So much for Fianna Fáil in criticism of the late Government. Even more effective were the promises made on its own behalf. Of these two were everywhere in the forefront of Republican propaganda: the Retention of Land Annuities and the Ending of Unemployment. Hitherto, so Mr. de Valera has informed America in a message broadcast on March 3rd, the monies collected yearly in respect of Land Purchase transactions prior to the Treaty have been paid over to the British Treasury by a pro-British Executive Council "without justification." These payments "must now stop." The declaration, though not going beyond what he and his followers have been saying for years past, assumes a new importance in view of his election as President of the Executive Council. The argument that supports it is partly legal, partly political. On its legal side it amounts, briefly, to this. The Government of Ireland Act 1920 assigned the revenues arising from Land Annuities as from the "appointed day" to the Governments of Northern and Southern Ireland. Northern Ireland unquestionably enjoys its share of such revenue. The Act of 1920 (so the argument continues) was in force at the date of the transfer of Powers under the Treaty. The Free State is the direct successor of the "Government of Southern Ireland." Therefore, it also is entitled to retain the annuities arising in its area. Further, by what is known as the Boundary Settlement the Free State was specifically released from all liability for the "Public Debt" of the United Kingdom. The interest due to holders of Irish Land Stock issued prior to the Treaty is part of such Public Debt. Therefore, even if the first contention were disproved, the Free State has now no duty whatever either to the British Exchequer or to the stockholders. It is for the taxpayers of the United Kingdom (i.e. of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) to see that the latter are not defrauded. This view is supported by legal "opinions" given by several eminent members of the Irish Bar. On the other hand, the late Attorney-General and other counsel not less learned than the first have, in a document recently published, traversed these opinions point by point, and declared them to be without substance. There for the moment the matter rests, so far as the legal aspect is concerned. Of its moral bearing upon the larger issue of national honour and public faith, I prefer not to treat, however much an Irish taxpayer may be attracted by the political argument: that the transfer to England of these annuities, together with pensions payable to ex-officials of the old régime now resident in Great Britain, constitute a drain on our resources relatively not less serious than that involved in British payments to the United States. But there is

another aspect of this matter about which a good deal is likely to be heard in the near future. What exactly does "retention" of Land Annuities mean?; and who precisely is to profit by such retention? Hitherto Fianna Fáil, like any other Opposition, has been able to avoid giving plain answers to such questions. Are the Annuities to be collected as hitherto and used, partly to complete the de-rating of agricultural land, partly to finance those grandiose schemes of industrial development of which I shall have a word to say presently? Or are they to be abolished and, as Mr. de Valera himself has suggested, is the farmer to pay instead a land-tax for "the privilege" of occupying land? Or does retention mean that the occupier is to enjoy a freehold farm here and now, without making further payments of any kind whatsoever? The first may be taken to be the official view of Fianna Fáil; the second the favourite plan of its Leader; the third that to which thousands of people who voted for Republican candidates undoubtedly look forward. This last is also one of the objects of Saor Éire, the semi-Communist organisation which has backed Mr. de Valera in this contest, and the founder of which, Mr. Peadar O'Donnell (author of *The Islanders* and other well-known novels), was, if I mistake not, the man who first raised this whole question of the Annuities, and raised it in this particular shape. Yet nothing is more certain than that if this demand were granted the landless men already spoken of would demand to know by what right existing occupiers were by them singled out for State largesse. I see no way out of the dilemma. Either the expectations aroused by Fianna Fáil are doomed to disappointment, or we are on the eve of a Land War more general and, probably, more savage than that of the 'eighties.

Much the same might be said of the promise to "end unemployment." This can be achieved, said Mr. de Valera in the same message, "if we give to our own people the work we are at present giving to strangers." In other words we are in for a period of high protective duties on all, or nearly all, our imports. As a preliminary the Tariff Commission, which has hitherto held the balance pretty fairly between trades and consumer, is to be abolished; and the Executive Council itself is to be the sole judge of what duties shall be imposed and at what rates. Mr. de Valera has even committed himself to the astonishing dictum that, if with the aid of the highest possible tariffs private enterprise proves insufficient, the State itself is to undertake running the industries. In other words, if the manufacturer is still unable to produce any particular goods in the Free State except at a loss greater than the tariff will cover, then the taxpayer is to be asked to shoulder the burthen!

The scheme appears to comprise all the worst features of indivi-

dualism and socialism; and here again disappointment lies, quite certainly, before those who had believed that, with the passing of Mr. Cosgrave, work would be found for all. No doubt employment of a kind can always be given, if one is content to carry on business at a loss. But how far can a country proceed on these lines without financial disaster? Unfortunately the Labour Party in the Dáil can hardly be expected to place any check on this part of Fianna Fáil's programme; for much more definitely than their English fellows are they committed to High Protection, and even more naïvely do they imagine that the State—even the little Free State—has a bottomless purse.

The Labour Party will, I think, on the other hand, probably be both eager and able to prevent Republican zealots from completely wrecking our relations with Great Britain and the Commonwealth generally. Mr. Norton, its new chairman, has already let it be known that Labour is "not particularly interested" in Mr. de Valera's political enterprises, and that such support as it gives will be strictly conditioned by the practical working of Fianna Fáil's economic policy. "It will be the duty of Labour," so says Senator O'Farrell, probably the ablest member of the group, "to ensure that tar barrels and big drums are not given as a substitute for flowery promises." Labour may be the more encouraged to take this stand because the electors, whatever else they did, certainly gave no one any mandate to destroy the Treaty settlement. Though Fianna Fáil emerges the largest party in the new Dáil, an examination of the first preferences cast shows an actual (if not very large) majority in favour of supporters of the Treaty, whether Labour, Farmer, Independent or Cumann-na-n-Gaedhael. On the whole, opinion, despite the factors adverse to Mr. Cosgrave's Ministry, has remained remarkably steady ever since 1922, and though one cannot pretend that there has not on this occasion been a swing in favour of Fianna Fáil, supporters of Proportional Representation may justly claim that this system has once more saved the Free State from that absurd and dangerous exaggeration of a passing mood which is one of the notes of the present British electoral system.

HUGH A. LAW.

HINDENBURG.

A CHARACTER SKETCH.

TWENTY years ago Paul von Beneckendorf und Hindenburg, then General commanding the army corps in Magdeburg, requested to be placed on the retired list on account of his age, which was sixty-four. He lived in retirement in Hanover for just over two years till the outbreak of the World War, when he at once offered for active service once more. And thenceforward his career, which for sixty-six years had been no different from that of many another highly placed Prussian officer, became unique. His offer of service was accepted by telegram; there was a midnight meeting with Ludendorff on the railway station at Hanover; and the two men left together to join the threatened army in East Prussia and win the victory of Tannenberg, which was to make Hindenburg's name into a legend and a symbol of security and defence. Whatever the actual foundation in fact of the popular Hindenburg legend may be (for his share of the credit in the victory of Tannenberg is disputed), his career since the war has shown that the instinct which chose him as a popular hero was essentially sound. Almost alone of the men of his training and generation he has remained unswervingly true to the soldierly creed of duty in which he was brought up. He sprang from the older generation of Prussians, before the period of imperialistic, boastful expansion typified by the Emperor William II, a generation which was modest in its manner, simple in its ways and loyal to its tradition.

The contrast between the old Prussian spirit represented by Hindenburg and the new Prussianism of which William II was the flagrant example is nowhere better seen than in the actions of the two men at the close of the war: William's precipitate flight to save his skin, and Hindenburg's dogged devotion to his hungry, ragged, demoralised army, which he conducted (one cannot in the circumstances say "led") back to the capital already in revolt against all that he held most sacred. He now once more tendered his resignation, this time to the first President of the German Republic, and retired again at the age of seventy-two to spend his old age in peace.

Six years later he came out of retirement in response to an appeal addressed to him by thousands of his old friends who still belonged in their hearts to the old régime, and put himself once more at his country's service. Of the thirty million votes cast at that election Hindenburg polled 14,660,000, Marx 13,750,000 and the Communist, Thälmann, less than 2,000,000. Hindenburg owed his victory to the fact that in Saxony the labour voters, who are

largely atheist, chose to abstain rather than vote for the Catholic Marx; while East of the Elbe the Liberal Protestant middle class refused to obey party orders to vote for Marx, preferring the Protestant Hindenburg. He came into office as the Nationalist representative, and the whole of Europe groaned. To-day he stands as a non-party candidate at the written request of 3½ million Germans as a guarantee against civil war at home and an earnest of sober policy abroad.

What are the qualities of this man whose career has been so remarkable? What was there in the character of the young lieutenant of twenty-three who, as delegate of his regiment, had witnessed the proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles in 1871, to cause him half a century later to be chosen in his country's hour of need as President of the Republic which succeeded that Empire? If we study his portrait carefully we can see that he is certainly not one of those "intellectuals" in whom mind predominates over soul and body, destroying the harmony of all three. Nor is the man portrayed there just an ordinary company officer, but one who passed through the Military Academy of the Prussian General Staff, a school with very exacting standards. He is, in fact, the perfect example of duty united to common sense.

His family history suggests why he has proved so different from many others in the same class of society. It is interesting to note that in his family, as in that of Bismarck, members of two classes which till then had not intermarried were united in his parents. The fathers of both Hindenburg and Bismarck came of a long line of noble and landed families with histories reaching back to earlier times than that of the Hohenzollern whom they served. But the mothers of both these men came from the middle class. Bismarck's mother was the daughter of a civil servant, Hindenburg's was the daughter of a doctor. It may well be that in these two cases the exceptional character was the result of a mingling of two types of culture.

It is not suggested that Hindenburg and Bismarck are identical or even similar characters. Apart from the different periods in which they lived—in his prime Bismarck was a revolutionary, while Hindenburg was always a conservative—Bismarck's character was unbalanced and ambitious, oppressive because of inner uncertainty, while Hindenburg's is a well-balanced character; he is sure of himself and scrupulously fair to others. Bismarck was certainly the more gifted statesman; Hindenburg's virtue lies precisely in his quality of personifying sound common sense.

A few anecdotes can best illustrate this quality in him. He was recently told of an advocate of capital punishment who had been converted to bitter opposition by seeing an execution; Hindenburg

remarked: "I suppose he hasn't seen a murder yet," a remark as free from cynicism as it is from sentimentality. Another story shows his unswerving loyalty: the leaders of the Stahlhelm association of which he is honorary president asked for an interview shortly before the election; they hate Brüning, who has Hindenburg's confidence, and hoped to win an assurance that in exchange for their support he would, if re-elected, dismiss Brüning and appoint a Chancellor more after their own hearts. Hindenburg greeted them with the words: "I am delighted to see you here, gentlemen, but you cannot do political business with me personally."

At the age of eighty-four he drafts his own proclamations to the nation. Three different drafts of the public proclamation of his candidature were prepared and submitted to him; he threw them all into the waste-paper basket and instead wrote with his own hand the characteristic words, at once proud and modest, which we quote at the end of this essay. The speech on his term of office which he broadcast shortly before the election was composed by himself; and he insisted, in spite of the opposition of his advisers, on allowing his opponents the same opportunities as himself for broadcasting their election addresses.

Many people must have asked themselves how a man, even of Hindenburg's powerful physique, has been able to remain so vigorous in mind and body long after the age when most men retire from active life altogether. The secret of his continued energy, as of his remarkable balance, is his ability to rest and sleep. During the war, when he was visiting the different zones of operations he would take his seat in the train, say smilingly to his entourage: "Now, gentlemen, I am going to think about the Service," and immediately go fast asleep, only to wake a few minutes before the train arrived. The night before the battle of Tannenberg some of his senior officers drew his attention to certain points of danger. Hindenburg only said: "I think the plans have been well prepared; let us take a night's rest." On the evening of the presidential election day in 1925 he went to bed early without waiting for the wireless news of the result; it was only next morning he learned that he had been elected President.

The most striking quality of the man who occupies the highest office in the German Republic is his independence of judgment and action. He has the untroubled assurance of the disciplined soldier whose only allegiance is to duty. When he appears on any public occasion his utter lack of self-consciousness is remarkable; the fact that thousands are watching him seems to have not the slightest effect on him; he gives the impression that he would act no differently in the privacy of his own study. His independence of

judgment and action makes him a type very rare in German politics to-day. The generation of leading politicians grew up under a system which allowed them no hope of ever holding office and responsibility. After the Revolution they were suddenly faced with tasks far more exacting than any they could have dreamed of in their youth. It is no mere chance that even a man of such exceptional gifts as Brüning does not grapple with the problems before him on the strength of his own responsibility, but feels himself the servant of the President, as his last speech before the Reichstag revealed with astonishing clearness. His political action rests not on his confidence in himself, but on his confidence in his chief. Because the quality of assurance and independent action is so rare among German politicians at the present time, Hindenburg seems to stand as the fixed pole round which political manifestations revolve.

But he is not merely the necessary complement of the politicians of this transition generation; he personifies and guarantees at the same time the change from the party government of the Weimar constitution to a form of government above party and dependent on the whole community. In 1925 he was put up as candidate by the parties of the right to oppose Marx, the candidate of the Weimar coalition. But although his sympathies were and are with the Right, though Labour distrusted and opposed him fiercely as representative of the old régime, his impartiality in office (he appointed the Socialist, Hermann Müller, Chancellor after the election of 1928) has placed him far above party. This year he is not put up by any one party, but by a nameless, unorganised mass of $3\frac{1}{2}$ million voters who, in the course of a fortnight, signed the list of names opened at the various newspaper offices: a most impressive method of nomination not provided for in the Weimar constitution. He stands as the representative of the nation, not of any party.

Till the advent of the Brüning Government Hindenburg was a shadowy symbol of national unity; it is the changes which have come about in party grouping that have made him the nation's representative. Up to now he has been the unifying link in a welter of party divisions which is becoming insupportable to the nation at large. It is now threatened with extinction by the Hitlerites who would substitute the domination of one party so as to suppress all others. In the face of this danger Hindenburg is a guarantee that party government will not change to government by one party on the Bolshevik or Fascist model, but will develop into a new conception of State and Government. "Vote for a man, not a party" is the slogan chosen for him. Even in the most unlikely event of his defeat it seems possible that the unifying

tendency would prove so powerful and the influences opposing the supremacy of any one party so strong that even the leader of the National Socialists, if elected President, would inevitably become more impartial in his exercise of that office and would tend to break loose from the influence of his own party.

No greater contrast to Hindenburg could be imagined than his rival candidate Hitler. Hitler has never been an officer; he has not the training in responsibility, in self-confidence, nor in loyalty to duty, which have been the dominating influences in Hindenburg's life. The difference between the two was well put by Hindenburg himself in the course of a visit to East Prussia. Among the crowd waiting to greet him at the railway station were a group of Hitlerites who interrupted the proceedings with shouts of "*Deutschland erwache!*" The President's reply was prompt and crushing: "Germany is governed by men, not by young hooligans."

For eighty-four years Hindenburg has been true to the Prussian tradition which for centuries has made a god of duty; to his forbears and for most of his life to himself, duty and personal devotion to the King were one and the same. The remarkable thing is that, almost alone of his generation, he had the large-mindedness to translate his ideal of loyalty to his personally loved monarch into loyalty to his whole nation, even under a Republican Government. The inheritance of faithful service of generations of von Hindenburgs holds firm, and his last word to his countrymen on the eve of the poll is:

Even if I am defeated at the election, I shall at least not have to reproach myself with having deserted my post of my own free will in time of trouble.

A BERLIN CORRESPONDENT.

March 11th, 1932.

PERSONALITY IN PHILOSOPHY.

ORDINARY people of common sense imagine that they have neither need of nor use for Philosophy. Men of Science, so long as their concern is confined within the limits of their own special fields of research, are impatient with Philosophy. The abstract nature of its generalisations, its conflicting systems with their fundamental disagreements, the changes of thought which make past systems of Philosophy obsolete either in whole or in part, are all held to sustain the charge that Philosophy is not only useless, but that its pursuit is a pathetic and even wanton waste of intellectual energy. This judgment is only mitigated when men of Science, escaping from departmental boundaries, venture upon speculative thought, either to give an account of physical phenomena as a whole, or to represent them in their relativity to the human observer. When they embark upon this latter enterprise they enter, perhaps unconsciously, upon the realm of Philosophy, with the result that their own difficulties in reaching either finality or agreement make them more tolerant both of the aims and of the difficulties of philosophers, whose concern carries them beyond the range even of speculative physicists in order to represent the All of Reality as a consistent and coherent Whole.

A short time ago an eminent physicist expressed to me his wish that philosophers would draw up a list of propositions in which they are unanimously agreed. It is needless, and would perhaps be hazardous, to express an opinion upon the possibility or the fruitfulness of such an attempt. It is necessary, however, to point out that any such list, however important its particular propositions might be, would not, in itself, constitute a philosophy. The task of Philosophy is to give a reasonable and reasoned description and explanation of Reality as a *Whole*. For it system is essential. In one respect, therefore, Philosophy is akin to Poetry, namely that it is, by its very nature, a *Poiesis*—a creation that gives adequate expression to a Vision. It differs, however, from Poetry in this essential, that whereas Poetry embodies this Vision in the forms of the Imagination, Philosophy essays to give a constructive account of Reality as a unity precisely articulated by Thought, in which every constituent part of its manifoldness has its significance, both for itself and for the Whole. When the immensity of this task is appreciated and when the inevitable limitations of finite thinkers are recognised, the existence of divergent, and even conflicting, systems of Philosophy may well be treated as, for the time being, an advantageous disadvantage, and not as discrediting either the ultimate aim, or the provisional

achievements of Philosophy as a characteristic activity of the human spirit.

Both Science and Philosophy have this in common that each attempts a "thinking together," which distinguishes their endeavour from the unorganised outlook, not only of ordinary men, but even of scientific men and philosophers in their ordinary moods and moments. It is in the subject-matter and the range of this "thinking together" that Science and Philosophy differ. Human consciousness awakes to and by the experience of a world by which it is environed and conditioned. It grows as this awareness of its world grows, and as the world of which it becomes aware extends by stages, till it reaches out in the end by the growth of this awareness to what is for practical purposes infinity. Awareness, as consciousness develops, is accompanied by apprehension, adjustment, and control. Yet the entire process of human development depends upon and unfolds the difference in unity, the unity in difference, of the Subject-Object—of the Self and its World, of Mankind and the external Universe.

This primary relationship is fundamental throughout the whole of human life. The two sides of it condition one another from first to last. The particular sciences fall into classes according as they occupy themselves with "thinking together" in respect either of the subjective consciousness, of the objective world, or of the practical consequences of the relationship between the two. For example, Psychology concentrates upon the subjective, the physical Sciences upon the objective, History, Economics, Anthropology, etc., upon the consequences of the relationship—though it should be borne in mind that this concentration can never properly be entirely regardless of the conditioning circumstance; namely the Subject-Object, the main distinction in which is generally treated as that of Mind and Matter. But whereas the main attention of the special Sciences falls upon one side or the other of this Difference in Unity, the concern of Philosophy is with the Relationship itself, with the Unity in Difference of the Subject-Object, what it means in itself and what it reveals of the Nature of the Reality, which thus discloses itself in and to Man. The difficulties and dangers involved in this concern explain the differences between the philosophical systems, and the consequence that new philosophies are always arising, at all events whenever and wherever spiritual activity is highest, in order to correct, to complete, or to transform the systems of the past. This unending endeavour has two causes. It is due, in the first place, to the inadequacy of even the most comprehensive human Mind to do equal justice to all the complex features of Reality, as they are disclosed to any particular age. It is due, secondly, to the

fact that human knowledge, though small at the best, is ceaselessly growing throughout the entire range of experience. The effort of Philosophy to present Reality to Thought as an articulated Whole must, therefore, entail constant revision so as to take account of, and indeed to absorb, new knowledge, not in its particularity, but in its significance within the Unity of the Whole.

Three specific causes of philosophic differences and unsatisfactory exhibitions of one-sidedness have been, in view of these limiting conditions, inevitable.

1. First of all, there is the danger of over-simplification. The aim of Philosophy is to exhibit and explain the Unity in Difference of the Subject-Object, from its primary and narrowest appearance at the outset of individual consciousness to its utmost reaches when it stretches out to the Universe as known to or as conceived by the Sciences. In pursuing this task of unification Philosophy must treat the widest generalisations of all the Sciences as the raw material for its supreme and all-embracing generalisation. In doing so, furthermore, Philosophy must concentrate its attention upon the All as a Whole that is *knowable and usable* by percipient Personality, with the rational, affective, and practical activities that are evoked by the Subject-Object relationship. Moreover, the world that is thus presented to consciousness is *in process*. It is an order that changes without ceasing to be orderly, so that its systematic changes manifest themselves as an evolution. The unifying principle or principles of Philosophy must, therefore, not be static but energetic: they must account for the Universe by explaining its genesis, its evolution and its meaning. And, finally, Philosophy can only discharge this task by making full use of all the characteristic forms of human activity, which are furnished to Man by the Universe itself as the conditions of his terrestrial existence and as the means by which alone the Universe is interpretable and progressively useful to Man in securing and in fulfilling the possibilities of personal life.

In view of the immense complexity of the task, can it be matter of wonder that one-sided systems of Philosophy have arisen, or that even the most comprehensive of them fail to give final satisfaction? All explanation seeks simplification and the danger of effecting simplification either by ignoring or by belittling certain elements of the problem is obvious. In Philosophy systems of abstract Idealism on the one hand, and of abstract Materialism on the other, are monuments of such one-sided attempts at unification, while mediating systems between these extremes must, in the nature of the case, be open to criticism, prolonged discussion, and amendment.

2. In the next place it should be observed that in modern times the Sciences have themselves increased the difficulties of Philosophy. Distinctions that are departmentally useful have been treated as separations that are fundamentally real. In particular, the concurrent growth of intellectual interest in the material world with the advance of Mathematics and the physical Sciences led to the enclosure of the Material world as calculable and measurable, so that it was treated as a self-contained Whole. Hence what should have been treated as provisionally useful for Science was taken over as ontologically real by Philosophy. Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, treated Extension and Thought as parallel but unrelated realms only to be artificially unified by having recourse to the Perfect Being—God—as the Sovereign originator of both. Spinoza, in turn, accepted the problem as set forth by Descartes and introduced the barren and equally artificial conception of underlying Substance for that of over-ruling Deity. Leibnitz assumed a "pre-established harmony" to bring together these independent and mutually exclusive realms of Reality. When a merely useful distinction has been hardened into an unbridgeable separation all attempts at unification must needs be artificial and impermanent.

3. Just as in recent Physics "the frame of reference" of the observer is taken account of, so in Philosophy regard must be had to the predominant interest of the particular thinker in estimating his philosophy. A thinker can only have a vision of the Universe as it presents itself to his own eyes, however educated and informed his eyes may be. He can only articulate his vision by the use of his own powers of reflection and reasoning, however disciplined these may be. In other words, it is Personality that accounts for Philosophy. For example, Kant, great as was his intellectual interest as manifested in his metaphysics, was above all a Moralist in his concern. In articulating his vision of the Universe as a Whole, he therefore carried over all the ultimate problems to be solved by what he termed the Practical, and not by the Pure, Reason. In Schleiermacher religious feeling was predominant, and his philosophy may be properly treated as Æsthetic. The absorbing interest of Hegel was intellectual, and accordingly he made the Logic of the Notion the keystone and the organising principle of his magnificently abstract and yet all-embracing system.

All these considerations show that Philosophy must be judged from the standpoint, not merely of Science, but of Poetry, that systems of Philosophy cast at least as much light on human personalities, in their various individual manifestations, as they do upon the Reality they seek to interpret. The mystery of the

Universe must be solved ultimately, if ever, by means of the prophetic insight of Personalities in ever completer apprehension of and response to the perfect and encompassing Reality in which they live, and move, and have their being.

From the point of view thus reached it becomes opportune and indeed essential to call attention to the remarkable book which Dr. John Oman has recently published, entitled *The Natural and the Supernatural*.* It presents a truly great Religious Philosophy, stretching out far beyond the limits of an ordinary Philosophy of Religion to embrace a reasoned account of Reality as a Whole. It is a work of profound and many-sided learning, of careful exposition; above all, of high originality. Its range includes the entire sphere of spiritual interest, endeavour and achievement. The author touches upon no subject that he does not illuminate by the catholicity of his outlook and the pregnant acuteness of his criticism. The book commands the serious attention of all thinkers, whether philosophical, scientific, or theological.

It is possible that the title may put off, at the outset, some of those who should give it careful consideration. They will, at first, be inclined to suppose that it is only a fresh attempt to define the Natural and the Supernatural as two separate realms, and on this basis, to show how they are related to and impinge upon one another at special points of human experience and at particular epochs of human history. In fact, no suspicion could be wider from the mark. For Dr. Oman the two elements are deeply interfused throughout human consciousness and throughout the entire structure and evolution of the Universe. The Natural and the Supernatural, while distinguished, form an organic Whole, in which each conditions the other in a vital spiritual relationship. Only as the nature and the significance of this relationship are adequately apprehended, it is contended, can the meaning of Reality be satisfactorily explained.

The Natural is, for Dr. Oman, the sphere of universal order, which presents itself to experience as necessary, that is, as fixing the conditioning environment which is essential to the genesis and development of life and consciousness. Yet the Natural is relative and indeed subservient to the higher interests that are being realised, by its means, in the spiritual experience of Mankind. It is universal and pervasive, quantitative, observable and measurable. Due account must be taken of it and of all its features, not only by the Sciences, but in the interests of the Supernatural itself.

The Supernatural, on the other hand, manifests itself in the

* *The Natural and the Supernatural*. By John Oman. Cambridge University Press. 18s. net.

direct sense or feeling of the "holy," and it is valued as "of absolute worth," demanding the subordination, and if needs be the surrender of the relative Values of natural existence. It is imperative in its authority, yet only by its means is man enabled to stand upon his feet in presence of the Natural Universe, by which he is environed. He reaches out to the Supernatural under the conditioning of the Natural, and thereby achieves the fulfilment and satisfaction of his personality. Hence the Supernatural is qualitative; it is the realm of the highest Values—the True, the Beautiful, and the Good—the home of that spiritual freedom by which alone can these Values be apprehended and appreciated, revered and obeyed, and resolutely pursued. "For practical purposes, the distinction between the Natural and the Supernatural is between comparative Value and absolute" (p. 69). Man is made, or unmade, by his attitude towards, his response to, the Supernatural as it reveals itself to his awareness and apprehension for decisive choice, or for rejection and neglect. The Supernatural is the abiding and eternal, the Natural is evanescent. Above all it must be recognised that it is Reality which manifests itself to us in the sense of the "holy," that is, of absolute and authoritative Value; in all that the Supernatural comes to mean for those who surrender themselves to it and venture upon it. In short, it is God who therein is revealing Himself to Man. True Monotheism "is not a mere affirming that God is one, but is the assurance that the world is all God's by reconciliation to his meaning in it and his purpose beyond it" (p. 447). By venturing upon the Supernatural men attain to eternal life, not as an award meted out to their deeds, but as the fulfilment and satisfaction of their being.

The theme, thus briefly and imperfectly summarised, is expounded in three parts, dealing successively with Knowing and Knowledge, Necessity and Freedom, the Evanescent and the Eternal. It is impossible to give a detailed account of the luminous and comprehensive treatment that each of these receives. For the immediate purpose of this article, only three selections can be made.

1. The conclusions reached in regard to Knowing and Knowledge are specially important. They open the way and strike the key-note of all that follows. "Four types of Knowledge are to be distinguished. These we may call awareness, apprehension, comprehension, explanation" (p. 120). The range of awareness and apprehension is far more extensive than that of comprehension and explanation, within which latter Science has its specific task. The consequence of the inevitable limitation of human intellect is that the conclusions of Science are never adequate to the world of which men are aware; that its generalisa-

tions, while legitimate and serviceable, are gained by an abstraction that, of necessity, involves omission. Science excludes that it may explain. "The true gain of comprehending and explaining is not for perceiving our environment, but for using it" (p. 121).

2. In the light of the governing view of the Natural and the Supernatural—and, therefore, of the dominance of Meaning for consciousness—Dr. Oman enunciates four problems by its dealing with which the theory of Evolution must be tested.

1. It must explain organisation in its due place in the whole long history of progress. A theory of evolution ought to be an account of it in its place along with all else.

2. It must recognise life's characteristic way of dealing with environment, which is by meaning, not by impact.

3. It must show, not only how progress in life is enlargement of Meaning, but how it is increasingly Meaning for the living creature itself.

4. If it ascribe the evolution to the environment it must be to an environment of a quality to produce all that has evolved. —(p. 261.)

3. In dealing with "the Personal" as including Mind and Will and Feeling and as concerned with the pursuit of the ideal within the real—Dr. Oman asserts that "this standing on the ground of what is and reaching out from what is to what ought to be is only possible for a person, and is in the measure in which he is independent; but this presupposes a Universe which responds to such independence and is only really known by it, which means that it also is in some true sense personal" (pp. 339, 340). In this statement Dr. Oman presents the result of his inquiry, which is intended, not to furnish a theology, but "to lay a foundation for a theology" (p. 98). He leads up to this conclusion, however, by remarking that "all ideals, it has been maintained, are mere aspects of what Wordsworth calls love. But nothing in either the Natural or the Supernatural can be won from the mere idea of love, for the very good reason that love, if it is anything more than liking, is only a short name for the necessity and freedom of all our ideal relations. We only truly possess what in this sense we love" (p. 339).

At this point the main theme of this Article must be resumed. The view that Personality must needs govern Philosophy has been justified by Dr. Oman's showing of the way in which the Natural and the Supernatural, in their combination, are the making of all man's experience, with its religious quest, its rational and practical activities; above all, with the spiritual task and trial through which his right use of the evanescent and his heritage in the eternal must be achieved. Yet this very emphasis upon Personality, upon "the concrete individual" as the Subject of Religion, Reason and Feeling should lead to a larger statement

of the nature of Love and to an ampler recognition of its meaning, both for Religion and for Philosophy, than Dr. Oman appears to concede to it. Philosophical thinkers are afraid to take account of Love, not so much because it suggests "liking," as because it stands to them for mere feeling, for subjectivity, and even for sentimentality. If this were all its true connotation it might well be suspect. A more adequate comprehension of its meaning should be accepted than is contained even in Dr. Oman's admission that it may stand for "the necessity and freedom of all our ideal relations."

Plato comes nearer to the truth when he gives primacy to "the Idea of the Good" and Wordsworth when he declares that "life" is "energy of love." In truth Love properly stands for all that Dr. Oman includes in man's reaching out to God's Meaning in the world and His purpose beyond it. It stands for the susceptibility by which man becomes aware of and the energy by which he pursues what Dr. Oman treats as the Supernatural in the Natural, for the apprehension and satisfying attainment of the absolute Value revealing itself to him as True, Beautiful, and Good. It is, therefore, the activity of the whole Personality in its unity of thought, feeling, and will: in its pursuit of the ideal as real. Love appreciates and explores Reality as the source and sphere, the home and instrument of the Values by which Man comes to the fulfilment of his manhood in communion with the Whole. It effects the "reconciliation" with it, of which Dr. Oman speaks. It seeks to make the Reality, with which it is thus reconciled, its own as the ground and object of man's aspiration, the end of his being. It seeks to unify the All in the Highest. With Love the creative energy of evolution that has risen to become the Life-urge, passes beyond the Natural to become spiritual and to constitute the spiritual realm of the highest Values as the eternal dwelling place of Man, the home of his fellowship with his fellows, with the world, and with God. Love seeks to permeate and exalt, to purify and harmonise all the interests and activities which go to constitute Personality by bringing them into conformity and co-operation with a spiritual and universal purpose in which Evolution is being fulfilled and justified. It is by Love, as thus understood, that man comes, not only to presuppose, but to realise "a Universe that responds" to his independence, and to discover, not only that it is "in some true sense personal," but that it reveals the one true and perfect Personality, God. The only means by which Philosophy can eventually secure agreement is by the complete recognition and comprehension of Personality, Divine and human. For Philosophy, as for Religion, the master-truth should be that "God is Love."

I. SCOTT LIDGETT.

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING AND LAND VALUES.*

LOCAL AUTHORITIES have since 1909 been empowered by the Town Planning Acts to secure the beneficial application of foresight and good planning to the land in their area, however numerous the ownerships, on lines which the more enlightened owners of extensive estates had occasionally been able to adopt. Changes in the conditions of life, particularly the increasing adoption of the motor-car, have necessarily modified the methods of planning. No longer can the planner work outwards from the surroundings of the house, merely limiting the density, laying out a few roads and open spaces, and allocating certain areas for dwellings, shops, or industries, on the assumption that the whole area of his scheme must be regarded as potential building land.

The task must now be approached from the other end; for the broader question of distribution has become of paramount importance. The welfare of the people, the efficiency of industry and commerce, the economy of local administration, all increasingly depend on a better distribution of industry and population being secured by planning. It is one symptom of the change that the prevention of sporadic building, the preservation of rural amenities, and the protection of highways from unsuitable ribbon development, are now among the most vocal of the demands made upon the planner. His concern can no longer be limited to planning in detail an area all of which is building land; he must consider how best to limit and define the areas of that potential building land; and how to distribute them on a reserved green background of open land.

The planning of land development on behalf of the public, whether in town or country, is not opposed to the owners' interests. Indeed, it may enable many owners to enjoy benefits only obtainable if their individual parcels of land are developed as part of a larger whole. Planning by the Local Authority removes the restrictions which the arbitrary boundaries of private estates impose on the designs of individual owners; enables wider and often more valuable schemes of development to be adopted; and at the same time defines the sphere within which each owner can usefully and freely exercise his private enterprise and judgment.

In so far as increase in the advantages and attractions of living and working on the planned areas results, there should, according to accepted economic teaching, be an increase of total land value.

* The main portion of a paper read at the Economics Section of the British Association, September 1931.

There is certain to be some redistribution of the prospective values which were based on expectations formed in the absence of a general plan. Planning implies regulating and rearranging the uses of land, and changing the conditions under which it may be developed. Sites which might have been sold for shops may be reserved for residences; others which were available for dwellings may be earmarked for parks or playing fields; in such cases the expectation of increment would be diminished. On the other hand, good residential sites may be protected from the threatened erection on adjacent land of objectionable buildings or industries; roads may be planned leading to estates which are otherwise not readily accessible; or the conveniences and services may be arranged which will constitute a specially efficient industrial area; in these cases the expectation of value may be considerably enhanced. The application of the further proposal made to allocate certain areas for building development, and to reserve other areas from such use, either permanently or for a period, will increase the expectation of building increment on the former lands and extinguish it or postpone it on the latter. This must involve a further redistribution of prospective values.

The introduction of the system of planning land on behalf of the public, and the extension of powers to purchase land compulsorily for public purposes, have considerably modified the position in regard to land values and increment. The difficulty of inducing large owners to part with land whenever and wherever it may be wanted for development by private enterprise has greatly diminished. Indeed, the need which is now most felt is to preserve large areas of land from sporadic development. This was illustrated by the unpopularity of the recently proposed land values tax among all who are interested in good land development. The extent to which the reasonableness of some tax on realised increment was recognised in the same quarters equally illustrated the growing appreciation of the degree to which land values are merely the capitalised expectation of future increment, to be realised through building development or re-development.

Whether such increment is or is not realised will depend on certain conditions. Many of these are, in turn, dependent on public or private action, or abstention from action. Naturally, there has been much discussion as to the degree to which absolute property rights can attach to such expectations, so as to give a legitimate claim to compensation if the prospect is diminished in value by some new public activity such as planning. If a claim by the owner to be compensated for diminution of prospective increment is acknowledged, a like claim on behalf of the public for any improvement or betterment due to their action must equally be regarded

as reasonable. The rapid break-up of large estates has assisted the recognition of a claim by the public to some share in an increment largely dependent on public activities. The need for the public to take over the duties of planning and controlling land development and the preservation of amenities has become more evident. The responsibility for that work constituted no small part of the owner's equitable title to the full enjoyment of increment value; and this change has weakened his claim.

Land may be said to derive value from two sources; one is the capitalised revenue derivable from its present use; the other is the expectation that within a reasonable period a use yielding a higher revenue or price will become available. In the case of undeveloped land, its sale or lease for building purposes represents the most important of such prospects. In the case of land already built upon, it is the possibility of re-development for some more intensive use or remunerative purpose. Where private property prevails there is generally no question as to the full property rights of the individual in the former or realised value. There is, however, some difference as regards the latter or prospective value. The extent to which one owner can claim against another for injury to his prospect of increment varies, and is generally small. Serious damage is constantly being done to good residential estates by adjacent owners who permit development inimical to the value of such land. New railways, by encouraging development in fresh areas, have greatly discouraged it in others. Similar changes in prospect of increment follow from the provision by Local Authorities of services, parks, and other conveniences or attractions, in one place and not in another. Many other public and private activities affect the prospective values of land which nevertheless are accepted by owners and do not give rise to claims either for compensation or betterment.

The position in regard to the effect of town planning on values is, however, assumed to be different. Owners have generally expected compensation to be due in cases where planning is likely to affect the prospective value of their land injuriously; while they have been prone to regard any improvement of value due to planning as a windfall to which they were entitled. In the Town Planning Act of 1909 this attitude was so far recognised as to give to owners a claim for compensation for injurious affection of 100 per cent., while imposing on them a liability for betterment of only 50 per cent. In the Bill at present before Parliament it is now proposed to increase the betterment to 75 per cent. In the 1909 Act, however, rights in prospective increment were otherwise limited, for it was enacted that property should not be deemed to be injuriously affected by reasonable provisions inserted to secure the

amenity of the area, prescribing the space about buildings, limiting the number of buildings to be erected, or prescribing the height or character of buildings. This provision excluded claims for compensation in regard to many zoning and other regulations which may cause considerable changes in values based on prospective increment.

In America a somewhat similar restriction of claims arises from the general police powers in the constitution. Under these powers planning schemes may restrain owners from doing anything on their land which would be injurious to the health, safety, or morals of the community. Decisions of the American Courts have been steadily extending the applicability of this power to planning and zoning regulations; thus recognising that their protection is becoming increasingly necessary to modern urban communities, and confirming the limitation of ownership in values which are prospective.

The question of present property rights in a future prospect of increased value rests in fact on expediency rather than on principle. Public authorities cannot afford to assume the duty of planning land development in the public interest, if the owners are to have a general claim for compensation in cases where their expectation of future increment value is diminished thereby, while the planning authority has no effective means of recovering the amount from those whose land is improved in value, to at least an equivalent extent. Owners of land clearly have no theoretical title to a possible future value which depends on the continuance of a haphazard development which is contrary to the best interests of the community. The fact that the expectation has been allowed to grow up, and that many financial commitments have been based on the probable continuance of the conditions which gave rise to it, may be a sufficient ground in expediency for saving the individuals as far as possible from serious loss through the re-distribution of prospects caused by planning. To the extent, however, to which it is recognised that owners may expect protection from loss, it must equally be recognised that other owners can have no grievance if the complementary gains are not reaped by them, but taken by the authority to balance the losses. Either the owners must accept the change of policy in the adoption of planning, and its resulting changes in prospective values, as one of the risks incidental to private ownership; in which case the losses and gains must be equally left to the individual owners; or they must recognise that a liability on the planning authority to bear the losses implies an equal claim to balance them by reaping the gains. There can hardly be a doubt that expediency for the public as well as for the owners recommends the second course. It

is clearly better, when a re-distribution of prospective values results from a public activity like planning, that the gains should be used to balance the losses, producing the minimum disturbance of individual expectations instead of the maximum.

The recognition of this general principle of balancing gains against losses as the only fair and practicable method for carrying out effective town and country planning schemes, has been growing rapidly, not only among those who advocate and practise planning, but also among owners of land and their advisers. Indeed, it may almost be said that discussion has passed to the means for giving effect to the general principle. A method is sought which will be simple in working, yet reasonably fair in results, alike to the individual owners and to the public. A reasonable solution of this problem is perhaps the most urgent requirement to make planning effective in securing those conditions necessary to the social well-being. One of the main difficulties in solving this problem arises from the fact that an injurious affection to any land caused by planning is more readily located and proved than an improvement in value. The injury affects the particular land of a certain owner; the benefit, though it may be equally certain, is often more general in character and may be distributed over a number of possible beneficiaries. This applies specially to the reservation of land for open spaces. Perhaps a definite example will best illustrate the position.

To satisfy the urgent needs of the population of London for playing fields, there are required at the present moment many thousand acres of land. To take convenient round numbers, assume that an effort were made by the planning authority to secure a portion of these playing fields, say 10,000 acres; and that they could be secured at prices ranging from £200-£400 per acre, giving an average of £300 over the whole. It is safe to assume that the revenue obtainable from those fields for present use, if capitalised, would yield less than £100 per acre. Again taking round figures for convenience, it appears that to secure those playing fields the planning authority must expend £3,000,000. Of that sum £1,000,000 might represent compensation to the owners for the capitalised value of the revenue which they have been receiving from the land, £2,000,000 would represent compensation for the fact that their prospect of increment, through using the land for building purposes, had been disappointed. It is worth while to see what happens to this prospect of building increment, for which £2,000,000 must be paid. Clearly the Authority does not acquire it; for they are purchasing the land to keep permanently as open fields. Nor have they destroyed the prospect; because the same number of houses, shops, factories,

etc., will be required and built to serve the population in either case. Evidently the prospect, valued at £2,000,000, must be transferred from the acquired playing fields to the adjacent land available for building use. If the whole of the land round London were in one ownership, the owner could afford to provide the playing fields at the price of £1,000,000, the capitalised value of his revenue from the lands; because he would secure all the building increment available, equally whether he provided the fields or not. It would be unreasonable for him to be paid £2,000,000 compensation for a building prospect on part of his land, merely because it was transferred to some other part, there to be realised by him a second time. The difficulty of the problem is due to the many ownerships. The example illustrates the magnitude of the obstacle which is presented to the planner seeking to allocate land to those purposes which will best serve the public welfare. It illustrates how the injurious affection is more readily located and assessed than the betterment on the surrounding lands. The example also illustrates how the value of land is based on the two main considerations already referred to:

(a) on the revenue derivable from its use for agriculture or similar available present use;

(b) on the prospect that increased revenue, or an enhanced price, may be obtainable from some future use, generally for building. The value due to revenue (a) is readily ascertainable, and presents little difficulty. Where the requirements of planning are met merely by reserving land from building, and the free use otherwise is left to the owner, that value is not affected. Where land is wanted for public enjoyment, that value must of course be paid by the public. It is as regards prospective value (b), however, that difficulties arise; both because the value is speculative, and because neither the reservation of the land from building, nor its enjoyment as an open space, cancels the building operations on the prospect of which that value mainly depends, but merely transfers them to other land.

Increase of prospective value under (b) may be due to any of the following reasons connected with planning: (1) Increased intensity of urban development or building use; (2) reduced amount of land available or accessible for prior development; (3) local improvements adding to the attractiveness of particular lands. Of these causes No. 1 is the most general, tending to increase the value of land in urban centres. As the value of urban land rises, the values due to building prospect spread outward over wide areas. Where private ownership of land is fully recognised, this increment when realised is the property of the owners; and it is not this increment with which this paper and town planners as such

are chiefly concerned. The question whether the public should or should not share in this increment is a separate one. Town planners are concerned to secure the good development of the land, and it is only when any particular form of taxation to secure a public share of increment seems likely to influence the character of development, that they become intimately concerned with the matter.

Reason No. 2, however, is of vital interest to planners. Any circumstance which limits the supply of land available for development must improve the prospect of building increment being reaped from the remaining lands. The value of this prospect is the estimated present worth of the probability which there is of securing the increment. The true value of the prospect removed from the reserved lands must represent the betterment distributed over adjacent lands. Exactly how distributed is a different question.

As regards Clause No. 3, local improvement of amenity or convenience resulting from planning, which adds to the pleasure or profit to be derived from building on certain lands or near certain towns, must add to the value of the building prospect on the areas affected. A road giving more convenient access to land, an open space affording more attractive prospect, are examples of this. To the extent that the improvement enables the landowner to obtain a higher price from the same purchasers who would have bought in any case, there will be a positive increase of total increment due to this improvement. To the extent that the improvement gives priority of development at the same price, the gain made by the owner of the favoured land may be wholly or partly at the expense of some other owners whose land would have been chosen but for the creation of the new attraction. This cause of increased value is distinct from No. 2. It depends on different circumstances. Curiously enough it has been recognised as a valid ground for betterment, more readily than No. 2 and without any balancing claim for compensation being sought. This third kind of improvement, No. 3, usually due to some public expenditure, is important to the administrative authorities, and is of interest to planners. The latter, however, being concerned to apportion the use of land and to reserve adequate areas from building use, are mainly interested in No. 2. Where land is reserved from building use in the interests of good planning, the fairness of the principle that those owners who gain by such reservation should recoup those who lose can hardly be questioned; there remains the problem of apportioning fairly the contribution according to benefit. Where land values are recorded separately from the value of buildings for purposes of taxation, as in America, the distribution of benefits can be more accurately followed and assessed than is the case in

this country. Here the land is included with the building and the valuation for rating is based on the revenue derivable from their joint use.

It is not a valid objection to betterment that the exact incidence of benefit cannot be ascertained. That is also true in regard to injurious affection, the exact damage can seldom be known; it is, however, estimated, and there is no reason why betterment should not also be estimated, and perhaps with equal accuracy when the practice of estimating it becomes general. Owners and their advisers may reasonably be asked to consider the main alternative methods which are available for dealing with this matter.

In the Town and Country Planning Bill as approved by the House of Commons Committee, the method of assessing within the area of any scheme the compensation and the betterment as they affect the individual ownerships of land, is the one which was further developed. If this remains the only method available, planning authorities must increasingly strive to secure for the public purse, in respect to any redistribution of building prospect, a betterment equivalent to the compensation which they may have to pay. It is possible, however, that greater simplicity could be secured with a sufficient approximation to fairness, by some form of general assessment levied on all realised increment, which would create a fund from which compensation could be paid to individuals whose land is depreciated in value or reserved from building use. In that case, this might prove a more convenient method to adopt.

Until the form of the tax on land values embodied in the recent Act was decided upon, town planners had been hoping that the problem might have been partly solved as part of that proposal. Had the tax taken the form of a levy on realised increment, a proportion of the proceeds might have been definitely earmarked as a fund for compensating those owners whose prospect of increment was definitely disappointed through the reservation of land from building use in planning schemes. Quite apart from its use to solve this question of redistribution: if the public are to take by taxation a share in the increased values of land, town planners would have preferred a levy on the increment, as and when realised, instead of a continuing tax on prospective values. The reason for this preference is that planners find greater difficulty in preserving adequate areas of land from building use than in securing the necessary land for building operations. The tax on unrealised values tends to bring open land near a town into the building market, and to consolidate too much the built-up area. A tax on realised increment is free from this objection.*

* The valuation for land tax having been abandoned an opportunity to revise the basis has again arisen.

The exemption of certain classes of recreation grounds from the tax, and the facilities which were introduced into the Finance and the Town and Country Planning Bill, enabling owners by co-operation with the local authorities to maintain open lands free from the tax, have certainly reduced the danger or will do so if and when the Town and Country Planning Bill is passed. It was feared that the tax would lead to the loss of existing open spaces and amenity areas, without providing any means for the planning authority to acquire these lands or to reserve them from building use. Until an effective method is available by which planning authorities can acquire for open space, or maintain free from building use, all the land which is desirable to serve the needs of the increasing populations in urban centres, and can do so without an unfair expense falling on them, planners must regard with fear and disfavour any tax or other proposals which tend to weaken the various motives which do in the meantime preserve open land adjacent to towns.

It is the main thesis of this paper to suggest that such methods can be found; that all the desirable open spaces can be secured or reserved from building, without injury to the owners as a class, and without throwing any undue burden on the public authority. This contention is based on the fact that no destruction of probable or possible building increment is or need be involved; but merely a redistribution, under which the expectation of increment value which is reduced or extinguished on some land, will be at least equalled by the increased expectation which will thereby be conferred on other land.

The art of planning town and country to provide a convenient and fitting background for the life of the people is dependent on many sciences; its connection with economics is one of growing intimacy; and those mainly concerned with planning are confidently looking to the economists to help in the solution of many problems, but particularly those to do with the better distribution of population and industry and the preservation of adequate open spaces for the health, convenience and enjoyment of urban populations.

RAYMOND UNWIN.

WILL THE DEMOCRATS RE-ELECT PRESIDENT HOOVER?

NINE months before the American presidential election on November 8th next, the campaign is already under way. The open season for presidential preference primaries begins in February and does not close until May. These elections, which take place in nineteen of the forty-eight states, choose delegates to the presidential nominating conventions. In some of the states the candidates for the presidential nominations must enter their names, and the voters affiliated with the party express their preferences as between the different aspirants. In other states the candidates are not voted for directly. Panels of delegates pledged to support particular candidates seek election. Well in advance of the formal nominations, therefore, there is, in certain states, some (but not much) consultation of the rank and file of the parties. There are at least faint indications of the popular support which candidates enjoy. In the states which do not have primaries, the delegates are chosen in varying ways by the party organisations and may or may not receive instructions.

These preliminary skirmishes continue until June. Late in this month the national nominating conventions are held and the country is treated to what is perhaps the most remarkable political spectacle of modern times. It was said that the French Senate was "without precedent in our history, without analogy in any free country, without connection with any doctrine true or false, and without attachment to any principle." That is a not inapt description of an American presidential nominating convention. Representation is on the basis of population and the vote cast for the party candidates in the preceding election. More than a thousand delegates, some instructed and some uninstructed, largely unknown to each other, and with no agreement on any programme, come together to nominate candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency. When this is done a platform is drafted and approved and is handed to the candidates, who then learn the phrasing and emphasis of the principles which the party expects them to espouse.

Six weeks or so are taken up with the overhauling and perfecting of the national party machines. The candidates choose their managers and lay their plans. They may bring to the leadership of the party organisations friends who have hitherto taken no part in politics. Then come the speeches of acceptance and for nearly three months the country is in the throes of a disguised civil war, which is extremely expensive. Exact costs are difficult to calculate, for representatives and senators and

various state and local officials are voted for simultaneously with the presidential candidates. But in 1928 the expenditures on behalf of Hoover were over \$9,500,000. The Smith organisation spent something more than \$7,000,000. With a total popular vote of 36,500,000, the expenses per vote are much heavier than in any other country. This year, owing to the depression, the amounts spent will be greatly reduced. Nevertheless, every engine of publicity which modern civilisation or lack of civilisation affords will be used to the utmost. Pamphlets, newspapers, billboards, public meetings, the radio, the cinema, buttons, badges, banners, parades—the country will be surfeited with politics before election day arrives. Most political observers seem to think that presidential elections are "frozen" by September and that only some unexpected and spectacular development can change the result. While the campaign is on, attempts are made to forecast the outcome. Magazines and newspapers spend huge sums to ascertain from their readers their preferences. "Straw votes" attract almost as much attention as do the electoral manoeuvres.

Election over on November 8th, there will be a month's breathing space. Then in December the Congress elected in November 1930 will hold a session which will come to an end on March 4th. Meanwhile the Electoral College which has been chosen on November 8th will have met and will have formally designated the President. Presidential electors are legally free to vote as they please. Actually they vote as their states have instructed them to vote, and it is thus possible (although unusual) for the President to be designated by a majority of the Electoral College without his presidential electors having received a majority of the total popular vote. Inaugurated on March the fourth, the new President is at last in office four months after the people have designated him. He may hold a special session of the Congress which was chosen at the same time as he was, but if the ordinary session is waited for, the Congress will not meet until the following December. At best the new President and Congress can begin to function in March 1933, more than a year after the campaign began.*

* In 1916 Woodrow Wilson planned that, if he were not re-elected he would arrange for Mr. Charles Evans Hughes, the Republican candidate, to come into office immediately after the November election day and not wait until March 4th. President Wilson proposed to accomplish this by asking for the resignation of his Secretary of State and appointing Mr. Hughes to that office. Then President Wilson and the Vice-President, Mr. Thomas R. Marshall, would resign and under the presidential succession act, Mr. Hughes, as Secretary of State, would become President and would not have to wait until March 4th for his formal inauguration. The reason why this course was contemplated was the delicate international situation. President Wilson knew that if he were defeated in November 1916 any notes which the American Government sent to Germany anent the submarine warfare (or even to Great Britain on the restrictions being imposed on trade with neutrals) would not be regarded as having much authority.

In contrast with British electoral arrangements, the tedium and delays of the American system seem shocking indeed. The House of Commons was dissolved on October 7th last; nominations were made on October 16th; the polling was on October 27th, and the new House of Commons met on November 3rd. There are immense advantages in such celerity. It may be that some English voters now doubt the wisdom of their decisions on October 27th; but the fact that the American voter can make up his mind in so leisurely a fashion affords no guarantee that he will have no regrets. The long drawn out character of the American presidential campaign does not enable the electorate to be intelligent, and the most harmful disturbance of the political scales arises from the fact that, until November 8th, every public man in the United States will speak and act in the shadow of the slowly approaching election. Measures which should be espoused on their merits will be postponed because their electoral repercussions may be unfavourable. Other measures which are unwise will be hinted at because they may attract votes. Candidates will hesitate to commit themselves. We shall have a moratorium on clear thinking and bold action. Witness the tergiversations on the inter-allied debts. Perhaps in an ideal commonwealth such "playing of politics" might not be practised. It is the usual game in all modern democracies, but since the game does not advance the public weal the innings should be as few as possible. In the United States they could hardly be more numerous.

With the American presidential match in progress for so many innings forecasts of the result are hazardous. They are more hazardous than when political contests are decided upon quickly and are finished rapidly. Factors now present may vanish. Unanticipated factors may enter. The political weather may change. The contestants may weaken or become more expert. All that the political analyst can do, therefore, is to describe the situation as it now appears, weigh the chances of the contestants, and suggest the developments which, as they occur, may reverse these chances. At the moment the general nature of the situation and the most important development which seems possible are suggested in the title of this article—"Will the Democrats Re-elect President Hoover?"

For agreement is now general that the stage is set for a Republican defeat next November. Clear indication of this was given in the elections of November 1930 when Republican majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives were wiped out. Seven million votes which had been cast in 1928 for Republican candidates shifted to the Democratic party. During the last fifteen months half a dozen by-elections have been heavily

anti-Republican. For this swing of opinion the depression is in large measure responsible. Even if the unexpected should happen and improvement should begin, its effects will not be discernible by next November. Millions will still be unemployed. Banks will still be closed. Businesses will still be failing. A large vote against the party which has been in power during these troubles is therefore inevitable. In addition there is no gainsaying the fact that Mr. Hoover has not been a popular President. Much was expected of him. His own campaign speeches and the arguments of his principal advocates made him something of a miracle man. Standing for election at a time when Coolidge prosperity was at its height, he was pictured as the man who could continue that prosperity and abolish poverty. The contrast between promise and performance is so great that there is an inevitable loss of popularity.

Again, President Hoover is not a regular Republican. His service during the war pitchforked him into prominence. In 1920 he was uncertain as to whether he was a Republican or a Democrat, and there was a considerable movement in the Democratic party to nominate him as President Wilson's successor. He announced, however, that he was a Republican and became Secretary of Commerce in President Harding's cabinet. He is thus an outsider so far as the Republican organisation is concerned. Now outsiders in American politics have been able to dominate party organisations, but they have done so only by continuing to be outsiders and not by attempting to beat the political manipulators at their own game. President Wilson, for example, bothered but little about the details of party organisation and strategy. He stuck to his job as President, captured the imagination of the country, and the politicians could do nothing but support him. President Hoover, on the other hand, has tried to outsmart the men in the Republican organisation and he has fallen between two stools: the country has got the impression that his first thought has been of renomination and re-election, and in his manoeuvres he has not been able to master the Tadpoles and Tapers. Those gentlemen can be bested only by statesmanship. As the late Senator Dwight Morrow once remarked, President Hoover's chance of re-election was to stop thinking about it.

If the United States had a parliamentary system of government Mr. Hoover would not now be in office. The congressional elections of last November would have served as an effective vote of lack of confidence. Even without these elections it is possible that a deflection of his own party supporters in Congress would have brought about new party leadership. But he will, nevertheless, be renominated. There will be no enthusiasm and some

guerilla warfare in the convention, but there will be no formidable opposition. Even an ex-President like Theodore Roosevelt, with a tremendous personal following, could not keep Mr. Taft from being renominated in 1912. For, by virtue of his appointive powers, a President controls so many of the state delegations to the nominating convention that he can ensure his own choice. The uncontrolled sections of the party would doubtless like to renominate ex-President Coolidge or put forward someone else who is untarred by failure. But to do so would be a confession that the party had made a mistake. Hence the renomination is certain. Nevertheless, the electoral cards seem to be stacked against Mr. Hoover. His one chance of success in November, it seems to me, can come only from the Democratic party. If the Democratic convention in June is a peaceful gathering and puts forward an appealing candidate with no obvious handicaps, there should again be a Democratic administration in Washington. It is, however, by no means certain that the Democratic convention will do this. Indeed the present indications are that there will be such a battle in the convention that the nomination will lose in value and that the presidential race will be on more even terms than the temper of the country would now seem to indicate.

The Democratic party is encouraged to such dissension by a rule which requires a two-thirds vote for the nomination. The Republicans nominate by a majority vote. With a number of favourite sons always in the field and receiving the votes of their state delegations, a candidature must be rather well agreed upon in advance for a two-thirds majority to be secured on one of the early ballots. So long as two-thirds do not centre on one man, hope continues to spring eternal in the breasts of obscure candidates that if it appears that no prominent contender for the nomination can be successful the lightning may strike in an unanticipated quarter. The convention in desperation may turn to a favourite son, who started with no more than the support of his own state delegation. The two-thirds rule is just a century old. It was first used in 1832, when Andrew Jackson was the presidential candidate for a second term, to nominate Martin Van Buren for the Vice-Presidency. Curiously enough, in 1844, Van Buren after having served one term as President (1837-41), mustered a majority of the delegates in the nominating convention but was unable to secure two-thirds. James K. Polk was nominated.

The rule has been important in certain recent conventions. It makes Democratic nominations far more difficult than are Republican ones and always invites dissension. In 1912 the

convention battle was long drawn out. There were several major contenders for the nomination. Champ Clark, then Speaker of the House of Representatives, had a majority of the delegates, and since, in previous conventions, candidates achieving a majority had frequently been able to secure the two-thirds, it was thought that he would be the nominee. But the opposition remained firm for 46 ballots and in the end Woodrow Wilson was chosen. The resulting rifts in the party made little difference, for the 1912 election was handed to the Democrats on a silver platter. The Taft-Roosevelt split in the Republican party would have permitted any Democrat to be successful. Mr. Wilson was renominated by acclamation in 1916. Again in 1920 there was a contest which lasted for 44 ballots, but the issues were not drawn so sharply that the party was divided.

The 1924 convention effectively ruined the fair chance that the Democrats had of being successful. Disclosures of the corruption of the Harding administration had just been made. Prospects seemed bright. But the 1924 convention balloted 103 times before John W. Davis was nominated. The convention was divided into two bitter major factions headed by Mr. William G. McAdoo and Governor Alfred E. Smith. The antagonism was sectional—south and west against north and east; on religious lines—Protestants against Catholics, and on the prohibition issue—drys against wets. The differences in the party were so acute and the disgust of the country at the performance was so great that Mr. Davis's nomination was well-nigh worthless. By 1928 Governor Smith was so far in the lead for the nomination that the convention of that year was a perfunctory matter, but the cleavage of 1924 still continued, and Governor Smith lost several states in the South, always the stronghold of the Democratic party. The question now is whether the experience of the 1924 convention will be repeated. If it is, Governor Smith will again be one of the principal protagonists and the issues will be much the same as in 1924.

At the moment his successor as Governor of New York—Franklin D. Roosevelt—is the outstanding candidate for the nomination. He will enter the convention with close upon a majority of the delegates. Perhaps an equal number of delegates will prefer another candidate to Governor Roosevelt, but they will not be organised to throw their support to anyone else. Thus the strategy will be to choke Governor Roosevelt off as Champ Clark was choked off in 1912. Who will be the beneficiary of this strategy if it is successful? Governor Smith hopes to be. If this is not possible, perhaps the convention will turn to someone who is not now an active contender for the nomination—for example,

Newton D. Baker, Secretary for War in President Wilson's cabinet, or the choice may ultimately fall on one of the favourite sons. As usual these are numerous: from Maryland, Governor Albert C. Ritchie; from Missouri, former Senator James A. Reed; from Texas, Congressman John N. Garner, now Speaker of the House of Representatives; from Virginia, ex-Governor Harry F. Byrd (the brother of Admiral Byrd, the explorer); and from Arkansas, Senator Joseph T. Robinson, the vice-presidential candidate in 1928. These favourite sons will stay in the field as long as possible, each hoping that he will have the reversionary rights to the nomination if it is denied Governor Roosevelt. But the danger of all this is that the dissensions of 1924 will be repeated and that a nomination will not be made until after a fight has again disrupted the party. In the process also, the country, having listened over the radio to the internal brawls of the Democratic convention, may be persuaded, as in 1924, that the party should not be trusted.

The divisions in the convention will not be based on differences in political principles. These are slight indeed. Mr. Baker is an outspoken advocate of American entrance into the League of Nations. But the other candidates agree with him in their hearts, even though they do not say so publicly. In this they are wise. American association with the League will be facilitated if it is not agitated and is permitted to come naturally in respect of the handling of successive problems. On prohibition there are differences: Messrs. Garner and Robinson are supposed to be dry, some of the other candidates are damp in varying degrees, and Smith and Ritchie are out-and-out wets. An attempt will be made to subordinate the liquor issue, but it may not be successful. On the tariff, armaments, agricultural policy and taxation there are no cleavages. In respect of measures to deal with the depression Governor Smith is more specific than his fellow candidates. He desires a large federal bond issue for public works—a considerable measure of controlled inflation. The other candidates have not yet declared themselves on this matter. Little is being said by anyone about the inter-allied debts.

In short, there will be no serious dispute over the vague generalisations which will be put in the party platform. The fight in the convention will be on personal rather than on doctrinal grounds. But the danger is, as I have said, that the issues will become broader: that south and west, supporting Governor Roosevelt, will be arrayed against the north and east behind Governor Smith; and that cleavages similar to the Catholic-Protestant, wet-dry ones of 1924 will again be brought about. If these cleavages can be avoided almost any Democratic candidate

would have an excellent chance of election against President Hoover.

Political satire has never had much vogue in the United States. But the most successful musical comedy now running in New York—it is called *Of Thee I Sing*—is political satire of the first order. Irreverent to the Presidency, to the Supreme Court, and to the "pepul," the show is in the manner of that intelligent and mordant political fooling of which the French are masters. In a presidential campaign a party chooses its slogan: "Put Love in the White House." The candidate proposes to his beautiful *inamorata* in each of the 48 states and promises that the wedding will take place on inauguration day. Could any electorate be cold to such a romance? I suspect that this year's candidates for the American Presidency wish that they might have as simple a platform. Instead of talking about the depression and inflation, tariffs and international trade, debts and reparations, agriculture and taxes, they could discuss Love. The chief hope for Mr. Hoover, as I have suggested, is that there will be no Love apparent in the Democratic nominating convention.

LINDSAY ROGERS.

New York, January 21st, 1932.

THE NATIVE QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA.

ONE returns from South Africa full of admiration for its magnificence and its promise, full also of gratitude and kindly feelings for its inhabitants, their cheerfulness and vivacity, their pride and contentment in the land of their choice, their invariable and overflowing hospitality. But on the great topics which exercise one's mind and on which decisions have constantly to be taken, consciously or unconsciously, there is a much less decided impression. The future of the country, its mineral, manufacturing and agricultural resources, its relation to the Empire, to other parts of Africa or further East, above all its attitude to the great black majority of the population, on all these and similar questions one hears so many and conflicting views, and finds so much to support any of them, that it is exceedingly difficult to come to a general conclusion or forecast the future. The future no doubt will look after itself. Yet we all feel an increasing desire to know how it is going and sometimes an impulse or even a duty to bend it in one direction rather than another. The future of the black natives in South Africa is one of these intriguing questions, a matter of the most general and passionate interest, a practical problem on which something has to be done, and a signal, in some ways a unique, example to the rest of the world.

The fundamental facts and the most general conclusions from them, are happily clear enough. The difficulties begin in the detailed applications, in the evils inseparable from widespread changes in the social life of more primitive people in contact with Western industrialism, and in the fears and prejudices engendered by race. The fundamental and undisputed facts are, on the one hand, the presence of a large majority of black, less educated and less advanced peoples, similar in race and general characteristics, though divided into many and often hostile tribes and, on the other, a minority in the same country of white, more educated and competent men, who have acquired by conquest or purchase four-fifths of the land and by their industrial system most of the wealth and the means of production. There is no question of either of these main sections of the population leaving the country. All of them are there to stay. Hence it would seem that the main problem, embracing all others, is how to arrange matters between them so that the most active, productive and generally happy co-operation may result. These are the three fundamental facts; they need perhaps one or two notes in explanation.

On the first point—the ratio of population—there is unfortunately no recent accurate information. The Union Government at the last census, for reasons of economy, excluded the natives, so that it is impossible to say whether the popular idea that blacks are multiplying more rapidly than whites is true or not. The last census in which they were included and other local information seem to indicate that they are not. The fact that the Government should have thought it possible to leave out of the national enumeration the larger part of the nation must raise doubts as to how far they have progressed in solving the main problem of co-operation. Can it be that they do not yet regard the black native section as an essential part of the South African nation?

On the second point—the just preponderance of the white minority—there should be no doubt in the mind of anyone, as there certainly is not in the minds of the black majority. However we may judge the facts of the past, whatever may be the strength or depth of the present unrest and resentment, of which one sees little and hears various accounts, there can be no doubt that, on the whole and very solidly, the native population acquiesces in the possession and dominance established by the whites. How could it be otherwise? The white man, in spite of internal quarrelling and occasional outbursts of inter-white war, has always in face of the majority maintained his racial unity, and, united, his superior wealth, knowledge and power of organisation make him irresistible. Whatever the future may bring forth, it can hardly throw up a successful violent revolution from below. Such transformation as may take place will be gradual and peaceful, and everyone must wish that it will be by general consent and for the good and advancement of all.

Great changes have already taken place and, from the nature of the social forces engaged and their relative strength and development at the time of contact, it has followed that the majority has been far more affected than the small intruding body of whites. The black majority, since the whites appeared, have been compressed in the areas in which they may live as their own, they have been brought from a state of chronic and often savage and destructive warfare into a state of almost unbroken peace, they are being steadily drawn from their old subsistence economy into a social condition largely determined by wages and trade, and, above all, they are being intellectually transformed by a pervasive civilisation of which gold is the standard and science the guide. These things cannot be done without grave disturbance, and it might perhaps be held that the earlier state with all its evils was on the whole to be preferred by those who knew it. But in

this respect the natives of South Africa are only one example of a world-wide process. The world was bound to be thus pervaded and knit up by the results of science. The case of the Bantus differs, and in some ways is more painful than the average, owing to the special circumstances of their country, its attraction and accessibility to the white traveller and settler, its wide and undeveloped veldt, its stores of diamonds and gold. These features led the white settlers onward during the nineteenth century, until at the present time they own 80 per cent. of the land of the Union, leaving only 20 per cent. for the black population of which the numbers are probably about in the inverse ratio: i.e. the blacks are, roughly speaking, to the whites as four to one and the land they own as one to four. No doubt it would be idle now to go into all the history of this great displacement and wrong to attempt to reverse it as a whole. But the facts should be faced and, above all, the frequent case in which the transfer of land has been held to be on legal title by the whites, when the original transaction was carried out by some trifling present, entitling the givers to the use but not the absolute possession of the soil. We know that the land has to be more productively used than it was in the old tribal days, but the method of its acquisition by the whites must be held by any fair-minded man to create a strong moral claim for generosity and consideration in treating its former occupants. The bargain, as described by the old native wag, cannot be accepted as the last word in the settlement of this account: "At first we had the land and the white man had the Bible. Now we have the Bible and the white man has the land."

The results of this displacement of the native population are many and various; it is one of the greatest factors in their recent social change. The first and most obvious result is a far greater crowding in the native territories than in the areas owned by Europeans. Whereas the density of the population over the Union as a whole is 14.64 per square mile, in the native territories it approaches 60. And to this numerical fact of the closer packing must be added the economic factor that the native cultivator, through his primitive methods and his want of training and apparatus, is accustomed to make only about a sixth out of his land that the European farmer can make. Steps are being taken, as we shall see, to remedy this backwardness; but it will be a lengthy process and meanwhile other means are in use, and have long been in use, to make up the insufficiency of native resources. Seventy per cent. of the adult native males have at some time or other earned wages on the mines and a large proportion in all native areas go out regularly for half the year to some wage-earning occupation.

The need to do this is increased by the universal poll-tax, once called the "hut-tax," which is levied on every "apparently adult" person, an adult being defined as a person of eighteen years or more. This is a level £1 a head, and owing to irregular methods—the omission of the census is a case—it is often collected with difficulty and probably from persons not liable to pay. In 1930 the sum collected exceeded the estimate by £43,000. To earn these sums and to buy the extra food needed and any articles required beyond the products of his plot or fields, the native peasant betakes himself to the mines or town, and works for wages. The evils resulting from this divided life are clear enough, but they have now become ingrained in the social order of the country and cannot be removed by any legislative enactment or any single line of social reform. Their cure, if cure there be, will be the work of time and come about by many changes of different kinds. Such signs of cure as may be visible, we will notice later; but it is necessary at starting to mark down the evils and difficulties that have arisen. Two of them are capital; the third is accidental and more remediable.

As the bulk of the adult males leave their homes and land for long periods on wage-earning trips, the care of the stock and the cultivation of the soil are left far too much in the hands of the women and children and the necessary improvements are neglected. So far from improvements indeed, in many cases the state of land and herds becomes steadily worse and debt is often incurred and accumulated in the absence of the main support of the family. Meanwhile the adult wage-earner is competing in mine or town location with the white—often the "poor white"—labourer, and the fact that he has his rural living to fall back upon enables him to accept a lower wage. This competition of two standards of living, complicated by the subsidiary living in the country, is the gravest of the industrial problems of South Africa. Added to this, though not of insuperable difficulty, is the question of the decent and moral living of the men when they are separated from their families. There have been gross evils; but the towns and mines are now awake to them and much is being done in this direction. It was the brightest side of the native question to see the interest taken and the vigorous work done everywhere to make the life of the town dwellers more civilised.

There are much talk and many books nowadays in South Africa on "segregation," "possessory" or otherwise, and segregation is a strong element in General Hertzog's native policy. But segregation, though it may be applicable to questions of territory or of local politics, is plainly not the supreme principle to which all dealings with native questions can be subordinated. For

everywhere the two races are already in juxtaposition, the blacks in service in houses, farms, factories or mines owned by the whites, the whites as administrators, missionaries or traders in territories assigned to the blacks. It would be quite impossible for any government, however segregationist, to relegate the two races into separate spheres either of industry or of general politics, and in the modern world the latter is more and more bound up with the former. But unity or common interests in these matters do not involve living indiscriminately together, still less the intermixture of blood which in the past gave rise to the "Cape Coloured" who now account for some half a million of the total population. The present-day feeling on both sides is strongly against any form of union in this sense, and in favour of preserving all that is best and most interesting in the traditions of any race or tribe. To preserve good differences on a broad common basis of justice and humanity is the problem in its most general terms, and when one criticises a measure such as the Colour Bar Act of 1926 it is not because it recognises a difference between black and white but because it rests irrelevant disabilities upon it and because, being bad economics, it is bound in the end to be harmful to all parties. On this point one may accept with a qualification the summary of the position given by Mr. Jan Hofmeyr in his recent book on South Africa: "Racial and social segregation based on the acceptance of the facts of difference, alongside of equality of economic opportunity, is no impossible ideal." The qualification would be that "social segregation" should not exclude the presence together of persons of any race and colour at meetings, services, lectures where the subject under discussion is of common interest. It was surprising to find how rare this was.

We may then assume, as South Africa assumes in its daily life, that segregation of the races in any absolute form is not practical politics. Black and white are living side by side, and the white do not deny their responsibility. How then are they dealing with the various practical problems that arise in connection with the black majority: the provision of more land, their place in industry, their housing, sanitation and education? The first question can be shortly answered. A Native Land Act of 1913 which by disallowing farming "on shares," led to the displacement of a large number of native squatters, was accompanied by a promise to find additional land for natives. This has not yet been done, although a commission has sat on the question and many proposals have been made; and purchase of land by natives is only allowed by special permission of the Government. In the native territories themselves fresh individual holdings are being gradually created, and land may pass from hand to hand.

But in view of the great disproportion of numbers and land which we noted before, this provision cannot be considered sufficient.

In industry the attempt is being made to restrict the native to certain forms of work by the Colour Bar Act, but the operations of this Act are by no means universal, and a general extension of native labour is taking place with a certain rise in wages. The upward movement of natives in this sphere is impeded by the very natural anxiety on the part of the whites to find employment for their own poorer brethren. The "Poor White" problem is actually a far more live political issue than any question connected with the natives. For instance, in spite of the fact that the railways have recently been running at a loss to the State, black labour has been displaced in order to find work for "poor whites" without regard to their relative efficiency. Such action is, of course, only possible in concerns which have public resources to make good their loss.

The wages of black labourers and servants have risen but slightly since the war, but they have risen probably most in domestic service. Johannesburg, which shows its accustomed zeal in dealing with its native question, calculates that the average monthly wage of a native breadwinner is £4 2s. 6d. This is short of what is needed for the monthly budget of a family of five, which is put at just over £7, without clothing. Hence, when the man is living with his family in the town, the wife has to augment the family income by charring, etc., sometimes by the sale of illicit drink. The man living in a compound alone is better off, for he is housed and well fed and is able to save the greater part of his earnings for the family at home. This no doubt weighs with the authorities in their policy of checking the provision of married quarters for the workers on mines. But it tends to perpetuate the evils which we saw to be incident to the divided life. The whole perplexing situation seems to point to the need of careful, even paternal, organisation on the part of the employers and the authorities, allowing married quarters for those who need them and giving only short term employment to those who are needed for rural work.

Signs of such paternal care are by no means wanting, either in the territories or in the towns. In the former the Resident Magistrates continue the good old tradition of friendly relations and peaceful guidance and especially in the Transkei are developing an excellent new technique of native self-government. Where could one find a better example of intimate knowledge of the native mind than in the charming study of the *Cattle Thief* by Mr. Frank Brownlee, one of these Transkei Magistrates, third in descent from an English family associated for nearly a hundred

years with the Xosa tribes? To the Transkei, with its Bunga or Native Assembly, and its Agricultural Colleges, we will return anon, but it is pleasing to notice the spread of a similar spirit in the town committees and officials who have to deal with the natives encamped among them. All large towns have now a Joint Council of Europeans and natives to discuss matters of common interest. This is of course purely voluntary, but there are by its side committees for managing the native locations, with a Commissioner as their executive officer. And General Smuts before going out of office in 1924 established a permanent department of Native Affairs to advise the Prime Minister. The local Commissioner for Native Locations in such a town as Johannesburg has the population of practically a large town mainly under his own control. There he has 96,000 people divided into five locations, a population quite independent of the 200,000 housed on the mines. In the Johannesburg locations the greater part of the houses have been put up by European labour out of a municipal loan. But in one of the five locations the native inhabitants have been allowed to build for themselves, a plan which is the rule in Bloemfontein, the model town for location work. There 24,000 natives are housed in 3,320 houses on 900 acres and practically all belong to their residents and have been built by them. Material up to the value of £75 is issued to each builder, and this is repayable in 10s. monthly payments. No one is allowed to build a house until he has been continuously for two years in the district, but the prospect is so attractive that on the average 500 natives per month come seeking work in Bloemfontein, and they are allowed six days to look round for it at the discretion of the Manager of Native Administration. Those once established pay 6s. 6d. a month for all expenses of administration, health and sanitation. There are 30 churches in the location and 2,000 children at various schools for which they pay a small fee. The Bunga system of the Transkei appears in the native council elected from the twelve wards of the location, with three members nominated by the City Council. It is advisory merely, but serves to keep up the friendly happy spirit of the place and increase its popularity.

These two cases—Johannesburg and Bloemfontein—are no doubt among the best in the country, but something of the same sort is being done everywhere. At Grahamstown, where the location is less good, it was delightful to see the weekly visit of the European ladies with their doctor to the Native Infant Welfare Centre where mothers bring their babies, have them weighed and receive advice as to treatment. Such sights as this are a welcome proof of the new spirit towards the black natives of the Union which has become

manifest among the Europeans in the last few years. Most hopeful of all is the fact that the younger part of the European population—such people as the students at the universities—are beginning to interest themselves keenly in the question and are asking what is to be the future of the educated Bantu, for educated they undoubtedly will be, in spite of the grudging assistance of the Government and the social and official obstacles which at present surround them.

A very small proportion—say a quarter—of the young Bantu population, is at present under instruction in school, although there is free and compulsory elementary education for the whites. And as only a still smaller proportion of the native tax—about a fifth—is allotted to native education, it is not surprising to find that in nearly all cases the native school child has to pay fees. Their schools are for the most part run by church and missionary bodies who find themselves obliged to supplement their resources by taking such fees as they can. At Healdtown, for instance, the Wesleyan missionary institution situated not far from the more famous Lovedale and the recent Fort Hare, the students coming for training as teachers are found quite ready to pay the £50 for the two or three years' course. At the end of it they can begin as teachers to earn some £60 a year, so that the parents regard it rightly as a fair investment. But there is far more than mere investment in the native desire for education. There is a passion to learn and determination to rise.

The whole question of native education bristles with rival ideas, prejudices and difficulties. They are a different people, with traditions of their own; hence there must be what is often called an "African education" for the native. They must not be educated to compete with white labour; hence they should have as little as possible technical education or, in the minds of many, as little as possible of any education at all. They cannot for social reasons mix with white students at the universities; hence they must have separate institutions of university rank, of which Fort Hare is the first example. On the other side of the picture, it is found that the native child, given an equal chance, is quick to learn and does not show any special disability. He is rather smart with his hands, if he has a sufficient motive to work or is properly supervised, and his aptitude for language and above all for music is high. Hence, say the native leaders and their friends among the whites, why should the black population not have as good and complete an education according to their capacity as the white? Is there anything in colour which assigns intellectual or any other sort of development to one kind of man and not to another?

South Africa is the most interesting place in the world to work at these problems, for black and white forces are there firmly arrayed face to face, it is on one of the greatest highroads of civilisation and under the ægis of the greatest colonising power in history. There is no need for alarm, but there is every reason for a forward glance and for hastening the pace. Three lines of educational advance lie open and on all of them much can and should be done at the earliest moment. The first is elementary education of a practical kind; the second, agricultural education, in which very promising beginnings have been made; the third, most backward and perhaps most urgent, simple medical training, with a suitable college or colleges and a recognised diploma qualifying for service.

For all these purposes money is needed, and it would seem fair that of the two millions paid by natives as a personal tax more than a fifth should be paid over for their own ends. All should be paid; and if this act of simple justice were carried out, native medical service and more adequate provision for elementary schools would be possible. But men are even more needed than money. How far this is true—and wonders may be effected by a gifted and devoted man—is well shown in the account which has lately appeared of Mr. McKee's work at Moga in the Punjab. Here a man who had thoroughly trained himself and was full of missionary and executive power, was able in the course of four or five years to build up a village school and institution which trained and transformed the youth of a whole district. They learned to love and to improve all the necessary operations of the country, building, farming, account-keeping, dispensing, besides doing the ordinary school work in a quarter of the time taken by the average boy. When one reads his story, simply and persuasively told in *New Schools for Young Indians*,* one's thoughts go out to the thousands of places especially in India and South Africa where the same work is waiting to be done.

At a higher level in the educational scale South Africa has entered lately on a promising career in agricultural training for natives. Here again, as in self-government, the Transkei leads the way. The Transkei has since 1895 been building up steadily a system of District and General Councils which last year (1931) was completed by the coming together in one annual meeting of the Transkei and Pondoland General Councils at Umtata. This body is consultative in form, but in practice serves the purposes of self-government, for when the members, who consist of leading natives with their resident magistrates, are agreed about any

* *New Schools for Young Indians*. By W. J. McKee. Milford & Co., for the North Carolina Press.

practicable matter concerning themselves, their decision is likely to be followed by the executive government. Anyhow, the effect has been most beneficial in the great north-eastern region of the Cape Colony which remains mainly inhabited by Bantu tribes. The Council raises a small income by a hut-tax of ten shillings a head which is expended on objects affecting the agriculture and education of the natives. Roads, bridges, dipping-tanks, fences and hospitals all receive grants and, last but not least, from this source agricultural training in colleges and demonstration farms is being spread throughout the country.

Tsolo, the first of these colleges, is in the midst of the Transkei. There is already another at Teko and at Flagstaff and the Transvaal and Orange Free State are following suit. The use of such places is clearly shown by the appreciation of the public. Tsolo had last year two hundred applicants for its sixty places and the students return after a three years' course to be sent out into the districts as demonstrators. The fee of £10 a year seems absurdly small, but one learns that students live mainly on the produce of the farm itself, mealies, pumpkins, fruit and an occasional fowl. All of these form part of their training, with, of course, cattle and a certain amount of forestry. Butter they can make, but cheese, as in Bechuanaland, still remains beyond the capacity of the native cultivator.

Here then is a bright spot and its brightness shines out the more conspicuously by its power to spread. What the Transkei and Tsolo have shown can be done gradually for agricultural education, must be done for health and sanitation. In each case one must expect jealousy, if not direct opposition, from the rival interests or professions already in the field. A dangerous thing, say the doctors, to admit a medical qualification of lower standing than the full degree. Yet something of this sort is essential if the present scandalous ill-health of the native population is to be remedied. It is impossible, except in the rarest cases, for a native to obtain the full medical training in the established schools in South Africa or in Europe. To look to this source, or to an adequate supply of European doctors, is to postpone reform till the Greek Calends. But to institute a Licentiate in Medicine for men or women, acting under supervision in native territories or locations, is perfectly feasible. It is the best, if not the only, means of meeting the case, and it would have the added advantage of providing another outlet and goal for native education. To be able, when trained, to serve his fellows of the same race in their most vital need, would be both a noble and a practicable ideal for the capable and ambitious native. Experience shows that he will rise to it, if those in command of his material resources will allow him the necessary support.

The social picture which South Africa leaves on the mind of the visitor is by no means black. The natives, though suffering from many disabilities and needing help in many ways for an advance rightly to be claimed by them and entirely wholesome for the whites, are perfectly loyal and, on the whole, contented with their lot. The revolutionary element is insignificant, nor do they claim the political freedom or equality which the Indians have learnt from Western education. It is for us to lead the way, and South Africa is now unique in the world as a place where the British, united with a kindred white race, may show that leadership with perfect safety and the best example to mankind. In other places—India, China, Japan—the contact of colour and of civilisations holds many dangers for the future. In South Africa the land is wide and tempers are still calm. Let us make a real gesture of goodwill in a time of peace.

F. S. MARVIN.

JOSEPH HAYDN.*

HAYDN'S position in the history of music is clearly defined. He is the creator of the symphony, the quartet and the sonata in the modern sense. For all these he introduced a new system of resolving the subjects into their ingredients, the motives, and further developing them; besides, he enriched the severely contrapuntal style of orchestral music by the spirit of folk melody on which his inventiveness, his harmonic grace, was based; and for the symphony, before him a negligible form of composition, a sort of rich man's hobby, he invented an entirely original and much more complex orchestration, thus giving a different colouring and new tone-effects in addition to the new elements of melody and motive-work. Technicalities are beyond my cognisance, and my interest is centred mainly in the man; thus I conclude these preliminaries by readily admitting that other composers have surpassed Haydn in depth and breadth, but that for him must be claimed a humorous grace, a warm glow of feeling, a sweet and thoughtful serenity, crystalline clearness, and perfect freedom of style, which have not their like in such combination, so that a work of Haydn's is unmistakably stamped as such and enjoyed by all sorts and conditions of men, which perhaps can be said of only one other composer: Mozart.

Haydn the man is less easily defined. Even his nationality is doubtful, though he would have smiled his gently ironical smile to hear it. He considered himself a German, and as far back as we are able to look into his antecedents, his people spoke German only. Still there is no question but that the name points to a Slav origin, and in these days of racial discrimination Teutons, Slavs, Magyars, and quite lately even Gipsies have claimed him for their own! His personality is no less discussed, and I wish there were space to make this sketch a sort of vindication; for I consider that the view so often taken of him, in spite of his careful biographer's† somewhat half-hearted attempt to the contrary, as of a rather servile flunkey and a grasping and scrimping philistine, is most undeserved. I believe I know how this tradition arose: out of the very obvious contrast with Beethoven, almost the only man with whom Haydn did not get on. Because the Beethoven tradition, with some reason, regarded its hero as a heaven-storming revolutionary, poetic justice seemed to demand that his foil, gentle "Papa Haydn," should be the reverse in everything. The idea naturally persists in these days, when from the height of our democratic pinnacle we look with pitying contempt

* Born April 1st, 1732.

† Pohl.

at an artist styling himself a nobleman's "servant." But there is no getting round the fact that in those days writers and composers had to seek a patron's protection, or starve. Even Lessing, that shining example of the first upright and independent writer of the time, had to do it in the end. In England things had advanced by Haydn's time, and indeed Haydn was noticeably more stiff-backed after his first stay there; which is not saying that he was servile before. But in Austria the late eighteenth century regarded musicians as on a par with lackeys, more or less. In fact they were lackeys often enough, and there was nothing strange in an advertisement such as one in the *Wiener Zeitung* in 1789, where "a valet with a good knowledge of the violin, able to play the most difficult accompaniments to piano sonatas" was wanted. Haydn had a different temperament from Beethoven: he never flew into a passion, just as he never laughed uproariously; but his dignified restraint does not mean that he ever brooked impertinence from his princely patron or anybody. He had his proper pride, even as a starving boy, and "knew his place" in the best sense of the word. The very fact that he laid stress on his peasant origin and saw to it that none forgot it, goes to show this.

Haydn's life was an uneventful one, though not devoid of romantic touches. He was the son of a village smith and wheelwright, living in a place aptly called Rohrau, that is "Reed-meadow," in a swampy part of what was then Western Hungary, to-day Burgenland. It is less than sixty miles from Vienna. At the age of six the boy was taken from his cleanly and peaceful home, where the parents and their numerous brood used to sing folk-songs of an evening, to study music with a cousin, a school-master in the neighbouring town of Hainburg on the Danube. Here he was "kept like a little pig," as he avers, and got more blows than bread, but it was not for long: the Imperial conductor, Reutter, happened to pass through the place in his search for choristers, and hearing Haydn's weak but charming voice—he was then eight years old—he engaged him forthwith for the Boys' Choir of St. Stephen's, an ancient and very famous institution, existing to this day. There was promise of sound musical instruction for the choristers, but Reutter took his duties very lightly, and beyond the choir practice and some playing of the violin and clavichord the children were taught almost nothing. For the rest, the ten years spent in the beautiful city, with the mysterious and glamorous cathedral close by, and occasional visits to the Imperial Court and other grand houses where the boys were required to perform, must have had a great influence on the mind of the cottage child. When the boy's voice broke, however, Reutter did not scruple to throw him out into the streets in the literal

sense of the word. Haydn was then eighteen, but he must have been somewhat childish, if we may guess from his pranks and the fact that he had composed nothing worth preserving as yet. Indeed, his whole development is the very reverse of precocious. In any case he had been used to having his meals set before him regularly without thought or care on his part, and to have his life ordered to the last detail—and now he found himself without a crust and without a penny, without a roof over his head, without a sound training in his profession, and without friends or relations he could turn to. In this desperate plight he wandered the streets all through the bleak November night, and in the morning was picked up, not by one of the noble lords or ladies at whose houses he had sung, but by a poor fellow craftsman, one Spangler, who was living in a miserable attic with his wife and new-born child. With him Haydn found shelter, food and advice; and he never forgot this, helping Spangler's children later when he was in a position to do so. Haydn's grateful nature is one of his most lovable traits; his queer last will, with its countless bequests to people who ages ago had been of some trifling service to him, bears witness to it.

The next ten years went to prove his mettle. He worked assiduously at filling the gaps in his musical education; miserable and squalid as his life was he did casual work of all kinds: part-writing, copying, singing (he had a good tenor after adolescence) and playing and, most hated of all, giving lessons. Even at that time he disliked teaching, and when more than forty years later Beethoven was his pupil, he infuriated that exacting young man by his slackness and negligence—strange to think of Haydn as negligent, but it is a fact that he was so as a teacher! Beethoven made no bones about telling his master what he thought of him, and Haydn, who by then had become a very great man indeed, was offended at the younger man's outspokenness. He retorted by henceforth calling the high-and-mighty young genius the "Grand Mogul," and they were never on pleasant personal terms again. Which did not prevent them from thinking most highly of each other's work, and voicing their appreciation.

The man whom Haydn was most indebted to at this period of his career was a foul-mouthed and hot-tempered old singer and composer, the Italian Porpora, a sort of musical pope in the Vienna of those days. Haydn served him as accompanist and even as valet, and in return got a sound grounding in theory. He also learned to speak Italian fluently. His first compositions were now written, a mass, a comic opera that has been lost, and a quartet. Haydn's love of fun and his contented nature, together with his capacity for hard work, qualities that he retained all through his

life, helped him to bear these sordid years. The decade closed with a catastrophe and a piece of great good luck : Haydn married, and was engaged as conductor by Prince Paul Esterhazy, a Hungarian magnate. With him and his successor he remained for the next thirty years of his life.

His odd marriage is unexplained, unless we can account for it by his exaggerated sense of gratitude. He was in love with a barber's daughter, a pretty and ethereal child, whose father had been good to him in his need. But the girl would not listen to his suit, in fact she later took the veil. At the father's suggestion Haydn married the elder sister instead, a plain old maid of thirty-two, four years his senior. She proved unable to bear children—an ever-gnawing pain to him—and a vixen and spendthrift to boot. She was, besides, utterly indifferent to her husband's genius, even to his fame, and made his life a burden by petty malice, using his manuscripts for curl-papers, for instance. Haydn was pretty vocal in his complaints of her, calling her blood-curdling names to his friends, and saying that she did not care whether he earned money by cobbling or by composing, so long as she got it to throw away. Of love there seems to have been no vestige on either side from the very beginning, which is strange, for Haydn, in spite of his plainness—he was stocky, very brown of skin and badly pockmarked, though with fine grey eyes and always carefully dressed—was a great favourite with the ladies and even inspired passion long after he had grown middle-aged. He remarked with some complacency that this gift usually went with musical talent!

If his marriage was a misfortune, his appointment to Eisenstadt, not far from his birthplace, where Prince Esterhazy resided, was undoubtedly an excellent thing, and not only from the standpoint of the struggling young musician. He had the absolute disposal of an excellent orchestra and a good choir. He had a carefree life and the constant inspiration and criticism of an understanding Prince (Nicolas followed his brother Paul), without serious difficulties and without distraction, so that all that was original in him was called out. There was the other side of the medal, of course : lack of the amenities of city life, a certain irksomeness and constraint in the constant demand upon his services and, above all, the lack of musical stimulation from outside, with general loneliness of spirit. For the Prince had built a wonderful palace for himself, an oasis in the swamps by the Neusiedler Lake, and so enjoyed his stay there that he extended it further and further every year, curtailing the time in Eisenstadt which at least was a little town, and especially the yearly visit to Vienna, in a manner most inconsiderate, even cruel, to his court. For in Esterhaz, as the place was called, the musicians were all penned up in one

house, and there was an atmosphere of irritability and fractiousness among them that sorely tried Haydn, a strict disciplinarian and at the same time a good soul if ever there was one. His services included that of peacemaker among his songful crowd, and a hard time he must have had of it! It was when the Prince had exhausted the patience of them all by another undue prolongation of the summer residence, that Haydn composed the "Farewell Symphony," where the musicians one by one blow out their candle and leave—a delicate hint of a possible strike which had the wished-for result.

Haydn's first great love affair—he had three of moment, to the best of our knowledge, of which only one seems to have been platonic—began in Eisenstadt twenty years after his advent there. Again we notice that Haydn was not precocious in any sense! She was a nineteen-year-old singer, Luigia Polzelli, a pretty dark Italian, and there is reason to think that at first she returned the elderly master's passion. Her husband was a horrible old man, and the two martyrs quite naïvely made up their minds to hope for the demise of their respective spouses and then get married. How Haydn reconciled his repeated unfaithfulness to his wife with his undoubtedly sincere and earnest piety, remains something of a mystery. We never hear of anything like scruples. Possibly he excused himself to his conscience not only on the ground of the insufferableness of his wedded wife, but also because of the artistic temperament. He dearly loved Luigia's children, of whom the younger is sometimes supposed to be his own; he provided for them, and was heartbroken at the death of the elder, a good and talented youth. After their intimacy had lasted for a decade, Haydn's ardour cooled, either because Luigia showed herself extremely grasping, which in view of Haydn's great generosity she really had no occasion to be, or because Haydn had found another muse. He provided for her and continued to exchange letters with her until she married again in 1800.

Haydn's new friendship for Frau von Genzinger, a charming and cultured woman, soon changed into passionate love; but he reined in his feelings sharply, and thus their attractive relations lasted for life. Whether Frau von Genzinger felt more for him than romantic worship—he was her senior by eighteen years—can never be known, as her later letters to him are not extant. She was happily married to a worthy and well-to-do Vienna physician, had five children, and an assured position in society; it was a very different atmosphere from that of the bohemian *ménage* of the second-rate little opera singer. Haydn's letters to Frau von Genzinger, carefully treasured by her, make charming reading, in spite of the fact that they are often concerned with food and drink.

They show the man as he was, sunny, generous, conscientious and painstaking, fond of a joke and of a good meal, a faithful and devoted friend, full of humility no less than manliness. A naïve pride in his money-making capacities—a surprise to himself that overtook him in England—does not detract from the pleasing impression made by the letters.

We have now arrived, with 1790, at the turning-point of Haydn's career—late as everything in his life. The old Prince died leaving Haydn generously provided for, and his son, who took no interest in music, disbanded orchestra, choir and opera. Haydn flew to Vienna, his Mecca, and was settling down for the full enjoyment of the musical season, both in Frau von Genzinger's house and in the opera, where he was looking forward to hearing his beloved young friend Mozart's new work, when Salomon, a violinist and impresario who seven years ago had already invited him to come to London, broke in upon his peace and made such alluring offers to him that Haydn let himself be carried off. Mozart tried to dissuade him: "You are too old, Daddy, you don't know the wicked world, and you don't understand the language!" But, after a tearful parting, he went, and he had no reason to regret it. During his stay in England he composed his best work so far, the great symphonies, he earned what for him were fabulous sums of money, and was made much of by everybody, society with the King and Queen no less than the musical public. Furthermore, he was so much inspired by this and the second stay in London three years later, that he now wrote the two great oratorios which are, if not his best, at least his most popular work: the "Creation" and the "Seasons," conceived in England, inspired by English poetry, but actually composed in Vienna. He was getting on for seventy when he wrote them, surely an astounding feat. But then he had been having an affair with a lively widow of uncertain age in London, a wealthy and charming woman who loved him to distraction, as her letters, carefully copied by him, prove without a doubt.

He lived very cosily in Vienna now, having sent his shrew off to the country, where she tried to get rid of her gout and eventually died in 1800. She had wanted to buy a house "for her to live in after his demise," as she had tactfully written to him when he was in England. He now occupied it himself, lionised and petted by the Viennese, especially the young ladies. After his amazing achievements at the beginning of the century, old age suddenly set in, and he spent his last years without creative effort, clear in mind, but feeble. He died quite peacefully, though cannon roared around him during Napoleon's taking of Vienna in 1809.

PAULA ARNOLD.

THE CHRISTIAN WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL.

IN September 1928 M. Albert Thomas, Director of the League of Nations International Labour Office, took part in the fourth Congress of the International Federation of Christian Workmen's Associations. In his speech delivered at the meeting on September 28th, M. Thomas was careful to emphasise the importance of the work of the Christian International and after praising the sincerely democratic spirit which inspired the organisation he wound up his discourse with the following words:

In order to rouse all the working-class forces, to draw all the labouring masses into this organisation which is free, autonomous, which is a trade organisation, to guide them to the fully self-governing mind which united action involves, we shall need all the beliefs, the individual faiths, to be strengthened and to act, associating the idea of union in the hearts of men who differ in their political and religious aspirations, with all that appears to them to be their objective, with all that raises them towards a better human life, towards a higher civilisation. With this thought in mind I express the wish that the association may fully develop its principles.

To many politicians this was a veritable revelation. It needed the participation of M. Thomas in the Christian Workmen's International Congress and his very sympathetic and cordial declaration to make the existence of the organisation known and to realise the importance of the rôle which it plays amongst the working classes. It is nearly always just those social movements which are deepest and most serious which escape the attention of the statesman, nay even of the scholar, until they suddenly reveal their true importance when a social struggle or the pronouncement of someone in authority draws upon them the eye of the publicist and the sociologist.

The social injustice created by modern industrialisation, the sufferings, the aspirations and the revolts of the proletariat drove Catholics to the study of the social question. All who on account of their office or of their political work were called upon to maintain regular relations with the labouring masses realised that if it was desired to prevent the workers from renouncing their traditional faiths and from joining the Communist movements, it would be necessary to consider their economic position and protect them from capitalist exploitation. Thus from 1850 to 1890 there arose in Germany, and spread to Belgium, France and Switzerland, a school of "Social Catholics" whose programme was the re-establishment of Christian justice in modern society. In the surveys of the "Social Catholics" of that period, and

in their actions, certain *lacunæ*, certain hesitations, a strange mixture of reality and chimera are noticeable, which are difficult to explain apart from the guarded attitude maintained by Catholics towards modern representative institutions in most of the European States. Except in Belgium they had taken no part in the establishment of these institutions; they had, therefore, no confidence in their stability and they imagined the reform of modern society only as a return to the guilds of the Middle Ages, under the patronage of the Church and of an *élite* of laymen faithful to the Christian tradition. In conformity with these principles, the early organisations founded by the "Social Catholics" (the people's banks and the associations of German peasants, the French workmen's clubs) were in reality no more than benevolent institutions, under the control of the clergy in virtue of their strictly confessional character, and directed by philanthropists who consecrated their activities and their wealth to the "protection" of the workers and to the preservation of religious tradition amongst the working classes.

But the ideas and formulæ of the "Social Catholics" of the old school could not satisfy the new generation, who towards the end of the nineteenth century took into their own hands the direction of Christian economic and social action in the various countries of western Europe. The younger men, the "Christian Democrats," considered that if they were effectually to combat socialism, the democratic institutions of contemporary society must be loyally accepted, and the movement for the redemption of the working class and the development of its trade union organisations must be supported. Leo XIII in his encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (May 15th, 1891) justified these theories of the "Christian Democrats" who proposed to re-establish equilibrium between capital and labour, by openly supporting the federal movement of the working classes. From that day the word of the Pontiff granted civic rights to syndicalism in the Catholic world.

But the special conditions prevailing in the various countries prevented the trade union movement from asserting itself in all parts along the same lines and from developing in an international framework. In Germany and in Holland the Christian trade organisations grew gradually and methodically. The Centre party in Germany and the Catholic party in the Netherlands favoured their activity and in exchange the unions brought the support of their solidly disciplined masses to the Catholic political organisation. Yet the activity of the Christian unions was hindered by differences which arose on the question of the relationship between the Catholic trade organisations and those which proclaimed the principles of the Protestant tradition. It was not

until 1906 that the Holy See, taking into consideration the "peculiar circumstances of the several dioceses and provinces of Germany," authorised the Catholic workmen's unions to establish regular relations with the Protestant unions. In Belgium, in spite of the opposition of the Conservatives, who held the reins of power in national politics, and in spite of the powerful socialist organisations which in fact monopolised the representation of the working classes, the Christian unions were able to assert themselves in the industrial world and to organise nearly all the agricultural workers of the country. In France the defeat of Leo XIII's attempt to rally all Catholics to republican institutions (1892), and the political and religious struggles which followed the Dreyfus affair (1900-10), the anti-democratic tendencies of many Catholics and the individualist spirit of the nation, for long prevented Christian syndicalism from achieving any serious progress.

It was in Italy that the social policy of Leo XIII attained the most rapid and notable results. The Catholics who since 1870 had taken no direct part in the political life of their country, seized with enthusiasm the opportunity offered to them by the encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. The trade unions formed and directed by the younger clergy and by a numerous and select body of active laymen were soon able to thwart the action of the socialist leagues. In certain provinces of Southern Italy and of Sicily, a *conquest* of the working-class masses on the part of Christian democrats was witnessed. But after 1900, owing to the many difficulties in home politics and to the opposition between conservatives and democrats, the Christian unions were constrained to defend their positions previously gained without being able either to strengthen their influence amongst the masses of the workers or to adopt forms of centralised organisation such as are required for syndicalist activity.

It has been necessary to insist on the characteristics of syndicalism in the various European countries, because it is precisely in these special conditions that the cause is to be found of the check to all attempts made before the war to give the work of the Christian workmen's organisations their proper value in the international field. Indeed it was impossible even to conceive of a Christian Workers' International as long as certain countries had no national federations and whilst the arrangement concluded in 1906 in Germany between the Catholic and the Protestant unions had not become general. It was not until after the war that all these difficulties were overcome. Towards the close of 1917 the new political situation created by the war enabled the Italian confederation of workers to be founded and this was

destined to centralise the Christian trade-union movement of the peninsula. At the beginning of 1919 the various trade organisations in France reached an understanding which some months later (November 2nd, 1919) resulted in the formation of the French Confederation of Christian workmen. Meanwhile in Holland and in Switzerland the agreement between the federations of Catholic and of Protestant trade unions was established. So that it became possible to envisage the formation of a Christian Labour International, without which the trade union activities in the different countries could have no hope of opposing the influence of the Moscow Communist International or of the Amsterdam (Social Democrat) International Workers' Federation.

A meeting of delegates from the unions of Belgium, Poland, Italy, Spain and France took place in Paris from March 16th to 19th, 1919. At the same time representatives of the Christian unions of Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Holland were meeting at Lucerne. Fortunately the two groups arrived at an understanding and in a meeting held at Rotterdam on February 20th, 1920, they decided to call a congress of all the Christian unions of Europe. In that congress, which took place at The Hague on June 15th to 19th, 1920, representatives of the Confederations of Christian unions of Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland and Spain participated on behalf of a probable total of three and a half million workers. At the close of the congress the International Federation of Christian trade unions became a reality. The central secretariat was entrusted to the Dutch organisations and the office was set up at Utrecht. The aims and objects of the International Federation of Christian unions are the result of a statute agreed by the Congress at The Hague, modified and improved by the following congresses, and of the "Economic Programme" adopted by the Congress at Innsbrück (June 21st-23rd, 1922). "The International Federation of Christian trade unions invokes and is inspired by the doctrine of Christian principle" which it considers "the foundation on which economic and social organisation should be based." The realisation of justice and of Christian charity; the defence of human personality, these are the objects which it sets before it. "Economic and social organisation," proclaimed the Congress of Innsbrück, "has as its aim human personality." In conformity with this idea the Christian International "rejects the unlimited individualism of economic liberalism," as well as the errors of socialism and communism, and declares that "the obedience due to the State is not the annihilation of personality the renunciation of liberty." It recognises the right of private property but at the same time it requires the fulfilment of "social

duty" on the part of the property owner. Finally it declares that "Christian principles applied to economic life require the co-ordination of all forces, that is to say of individuals, classes, peoples in a spirit of loyalty, solidarity and charity."

In conformity with these leading ideas, the Christian Syndicalist International proposes "to give moral and material support to its affiliated organisations and to secure their mutual collaboration." As in its statute it had declared its intention of "defending the interests of the workers in the social and economic domain," in the programme adopted by the Congress of Innsbrück it defined its claims in relation to the legal protection of workmen, the limitation of hours of work, and the rôle of the State and of the trade organisations in the drawing-up and application of social laws. But it is the fundamental principle of its "wages policy" which characterises the specific attitude of the Christian Syndicalist International towards labour problems. Accepting neither the economic tradition of liberalism which recognises all the consequences of the free play of supply and demand, nor the Marxist theory which looks upon labour as the sole source of all economic values, the Christian International has laid down this idea of the "just wage" on which the system of the Christian social school is founded. In combining economic factors and moral elements, it declares that the worker has a right to a minimum salary "which permits of his providing for his maintenance in a way conformable with the requirements of human dignity, to feed and educate a family." Consistent with its conception of the rights of human personality, it adds that in addition the worker has a right to a "plus salary" such as "shall reward his diligence, his aptitude, his special capabilities and shall compensate him for the dangers and risks involved in his calling."

Whilst the Christian Syndicalist International has always entertained an openly hostile attitude to the Communist International of Moscow, it has many times endeavoured to arrive at an understanding with the Social Democrat International, with the object of co-ordinating their respective efforts to achieve common objects in the domain of social legislation and for the defence of the fundamental rights of the working classes. One early attempt, made in 1927, failed owing to the attitude of the leaders of the Social Democrat International who, in priding themselves on the fact that their organisation was the strongest, claimed to monopolise the representation of the working classes. In 1928 the Secretariats of the two Internationals were able to lay the basis of a "pact of alliance"; but the opposition of certain federations affiliated to the Social Democrat International

prevented the complete realisation of this plan. At the present moment, although there is no official understanding between the two organisations, a *modus vivendi* accepted by the respective central organs permits of collaboration at the heart of the councils and committees of the League of Nations and of the International Labour Office.

All syndicalist federations which adopt Christian principles can be admitted as members of the International. Thus at the centre of the Christian International there are represented the Dutch Catholic workers of the *Roomsche-Katholiek Werkliedenverbond*, as well as their Protestant compatriots of the *Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond*; the Swiss evangelical workers as well as their Catholic compatriots of the *Christlich-nationaler Gewerkschaftsbund*. With respect to Germany there is one single confederation—the *Gesamtverband der Christlichen Gewerkschaften*—which represents the Catholic workmen and those belonging to other Christian communities. The experience of ten years of common action, so far from provoking friction or rivalry amongst the members of the different confessions, has proved that the spirit of tolerance and the practice of liberty promote a realisation of true Christian solidarity. In order to enable constant collaboration between organisations of differing religious conceptions, a very wide autonomy has been allowed amongst the confederations belonging to the Christian Syndicalist International. As always happens when methods of persuasion are substituted for methods of compulsion, the recognition of autonomy in the national confederations has resulted in strengthening the spirit of solidarity and of discipline. The Christian International cannot possibly take decisions with the rapidity sometimes characteristic of the action of the Social Democrat International. Slower than its rival in its movements, it has shown more coherence and a truly remarkable consistency. Once a resolution has been accepted by the appropriate bodies, its complete application by all the associated confederations can be relied on.

The solidity of its framework sufficiently explains the fact that the Christian Workers' International exerts at the centre of the International Labour Organisation a much greater influence than the number of its members would warrant. The agencies of the League of Nations, as soon as they had made contact with the Christian trade unions, realised how valuable was the support offered them by an organisation which in virtue of openly rejecting collectivist doctrines did not provoke the hostility of the more moderate elements of democracy, and which by its continuity of action was able to bring first-class co-operation to the work of the international regulation of labour. In this manner the Christian

International won its "rights of citizenship" in the heart of the world organisation of labour. The socialist trade unions which before the war in all countries of the Continent were opposed in the name of "proletarian unity" to the judicial recognition of Christian organisations, had finally to adapt themselves to collaboration with the representatives of the Christian International in all the institutions connected with the League of Nations.

Founded after thirty years of steady building up of the syndicalist movement in the different countries of Europe, the Christian International was "born grown-up." At the date of its foundation it had three and a half million members. But two years later a movement of disaffiliation of trade unions set in which followed the period of the apparent extension of labour organisations dating from the end of the world war. This situation drove the leaders of the Christian International to take up defensive tactics, to attend to the strengthening of the framework of the affiliated organisations, to give up all hope for the moment of a rapid increase of the forces of their unions. Meantime in Italy the application of "corporation laws" by which the privilege of judicial recognition was conferred only on those unions joining the fascist party, destroyed the Christian organisations of the peninsula. The following figures demonstrate more effectively than theoretic considerations the influence exerted on the development of Christian organisations by the "syndicalist crisis" which, after 1922, ran through all the European countries.

MEMBERS OF UNIONS AFFILIATED TO THE CHRISTIAN INTERNATIONAL

		1922		1928		1930
Germany	...	1,888,956	...	1,329,602	...	1,279,543
Austria	...	78,561	...	76,000	...	105,000
Belgium	...	200,202	...	155,079	...	181,047
Spain	...	42,319	...	40,000	...	40,000
France	...	129,000	...	101,565	...	102,000
Hungary	...	113,855	...	52,110	...	52,100
Italy	...	1,052,694	...	—	...	—
Luxemburg	...	500	...	2,291	...	2,682
Netherlands	...	225,193	...	183,086	...	209,676
Poland	...	—	...	20,000	...	20,000
Switzerland	...	14,959	...	24,326	...	27,000
Czechoslovakia	...	13,250	...	88,802	...	89,104
Yugoslavia	...	—	...	—	...	4,569
Total	...	3,759,489	...	2,072,861	...	2,112,721

As will be seen from the above table, in the Anglo-Saxon countries there are no organisations affiliated to the Christian Workers' International. The leaders of that organisation have not even

succeeded in obtaining the affiliation of unions openly religious, such as the unions affiliated to the Federation of Catholic Workers in Canada. At first sight this might appear inexplicable to those acquainted with the idealism of most of the leaders of the trades unions in Anglo-Saxon countries. But if one considers the real position of a trade organisation in England or in the Dominions, one is driven to the conclusion that it is in the Anglo-Saxon spirit, profoundly idealist and with a respect for liberty of conscience, that will be found the reasons for this apparently inexplicable fact. On the Continent Christian syndicalism has been the logical and necessary consequence of the anti-clerical and anti-religious attitude of the socialist workers' organisations. Continental socialism has aspired to create a sort of new religion founded on the philosophical speculations and on the economic ideas of its leaders; it has looked upon trade unions as so many means at the disposal of a party attempting to replace the political class which resulted from the bourgeois revolutions of the nineteenth century. This attitude of continental socialism caused the division of the working class on the political field just as it did on the religious field. The Christian workers of the Continent, of whom the socialist trade unions demanded a renunciation of their religious ideas in exchange for the economic guidance they offered them, had to seek amongst other organisations some protection which implied no abjurations either explicit or implicit. But the dogmatism and the anti-religious tendencies of continental socialism were hardly conceivable in the Anglo-Saxon countries. It follows that workmen who were believers had no need to break "proletarian unity" in order to preserve intact their political independence and their religious liberty. They all joined trade unions, and their unions affiliated to the Social Democrat International because at the time when they resolved to depart from their "splendid isolation" there were no other international labour organisations. Up to the present anti-religious currents have not succeeded in imposing their sectarianism on the trade unions; but there is no excluding the probability that communist propaganda, working in a distinctly materialistic sense, will confront the Anglo-Saxon workers with the same problems that the working classes of the Continent have solved by constituting the Christian Workers' International.

The study of the origins of the Christian trade union movement and the examination of its present organisation show that the Christian Workers' International is a reality and very much alive. The attitude which it has adopted on the subject of the two great problems of contemporary trade-unionism: the rationalisation of industry and trade union liberty, show that it is destined to play

a rôle in the future of first-class importance. With regard to the problems raised by the rationalising of industry the Christian International no longer adheres to worn-out formulas of State intervention, nor does it confine its activities to vain deprecation of authority or of capitalist egoism. M. Serrarens, general secretary of the International, in his report presented to the Congress of Munich in 1928 has no hesitation in defining the claims of the Christian workers.

"Rationalisation," he said, "involves new problems of protection for the workers. It will not be enough for the trade unions to take part in studying the general problems of the regulation of economic life. If they are effectively to safeguard their interests, both collective and individual, they must be able to intervene at certain points of the technical development of enterprises."

Thus in carrying out the programme of the Christian trade unionists industrial reforms should be accompanied by a vast social reform aimed at establishing the economic basis of the future democracy of Labour.

In treating the freedom of trade unions neither as a privilege conceded by the State, nor as a result of the balance of opposing social forces, but as a logical consequence of the modern idea of individual liberty, the Christian Workers' International has taken up a position against all the currents which, according to their conception of the State or to serve the interests of political parties, deny either in law or in fact the principle of trade-union liberty. To describe this attitude it is only necessary to quote from the report presented to the Congress at Munich the passages which refer to the Italian situation.

"The workers," we read, "have no possibility down there of organising themselves as Christian workers, as they have no right to express their will or to do what they wish."

"We cannot," it goes on, "recognise the species of masquerade which boasts of being a trade union movement. And even if this thing has still five years, ten or twenty years to continue, we shall await the day when the Italian workers will have won back their liberty and will create for themselves according to their free judgment the organisations of their choice."

Never has the Social Democrat International ventured to formulate so definite or so disparaging a judgment as this passed by the Christian International on a régime which does not admit the principle of trade-union liberty!

FRANCESCO LUIGI FERRARI.

SHEPHERDS OF THE FELS.

THE shepherd has always been a man apart: his hours in the wilderness compel introspection and lead to broad-minded patience. Usually he is not a sociable man in the sense that he seeks entertainment in a crowd, but he is hospitable. I have met with complaint because I passed within two miles of the cottage among the fells without calling in for a meal "and a crack." There is always food in these places; the people put forward their simple best, and I have often seen smoke begin to ascend from the newly lighted fire when the wanderer was noticed on the pass-track a mile away. They are sharp-sighted folk, and a caller is never forgotten, even to his trick of walking and shutting a gate.

The shepherd of the fells is an intense person when you begin to know him. "The loneliness gets 'em up there," say the low-country farmers at the village smithy, and they touch a significant forehead. I have found abnormal men among the fells, but they have been keepers, not shepherds. On a Durham moor there was change of ownership, and one distant cottage was abandoned. A year later it was found that the keeper had not left; he was managing to live on the produce of the croft around the cottage with perhaps some help from the birds of the moor. He and his family flatly declined to leave the place and to venture into strange quarters. The new owner was a man of sense; he paid wages for the year's service and kept the man in employment.

A shepherd must be born to the task, and be able to develop his knowledge with every passing year. There is always something to learn even about the grass on one's walk. Every year the good grass varies, and it is the shepherd's task to see that every member of his flock has sufficient space to graze fully and comfortably. A whole hillside of a square mile may have to be disturbed and shaken out afresh because the streams of feeding sheep have for some reason crowded at one point. The shepherd must measure out the meat so that there is some fresh grass in the bogs in winter, plenty of range in summer, and some feed on the dry buttresses where in autumn he will keep the drafts for the fair and for the pasturage down by the sea. The shepherd has to depend on his eye for measurement, but the success of his plans comes in spring when the ewes drop their lambs. A shepherd of small skill or little luck can easily lose the profits of a year if mothers and wee ones succumb to weakness because of the shortage of feed in spring.

I have known all sorts of fellside shepherds: some are grim, slow-speaking lads, who go through the day's work with a mere whistle now and then to a collie moving sheep a mile away. It is a tribute

to training that a dog once settled to a job will continue until the order is changed. The flock started on the far horizon of the moor will be brought down to the shepherd's foot unless a different word is given. And then to a mere waft of sound the dog is off again, to repeat its job if needed. I have sat with a Northumbrian lad who had his three dogs at work, and for ten minutes at a time he had no need to give orders. I have watched, from the side of a Westmorland shepherd, party after party of sheep drift over the edge of a slope. "Old Meg's gathering them on the top," which was more or less level, and she did not need the command of her master for such an everyday evolution. There's a good story of such a dog. The shepherd was asked about the top of a peak on his ground: "Nay, I don't rightly know; I've never been up on t'top—but t'dog has." The man worked from the lower slope and would have no need to climb higher unless his collie gave signal or "whinged" that something was amiss. A dog, eager on sheep, is not always certain to "give mouth" or to show uneasiness when, say, a person is lying on the mountain top, either asleep or dead.

Nowadays change is abroad on the mountains and the existence of the shepherd seems to be threatened. The great moors which are also the water-bearing estates for great cities and towns, are cautiously stocked lest some dead creature should fall into the bogs or streams. And farms are drowned out beneath the reservoirs, and never replaced. Elsewhere, the head of sheep is comparatively low, and many remote cottages have fallen into ruin. The task of looking over the sheep in such places is often left to a worker who motors up the rough lane with a small car or combination for his dogs, and makes a quick muster and examination of the ground. "Here am I," said one of these men on a Lake-country pass, "going up to the sheep at twelve noon; my father would have been out at four in the morning, and every sheep would have passed again and again through his hands. Slow and careful of the sheep he was, but there's neither time nor call for such work to-day." That some sheep walks continue to exist under slack conditions is true, but the statement as to care is hardly correct. Sheep are still valuable creatures on the farm, and there is a limit beyond which they cannot be neglected. Some collies become so accustomed to motoring that they will even mount the pillion behind their master, and ride up the roughest track so certain of balance that nothing short of the fall of the machine will dislodge them.

In time gone by, the shepherds and flockmasters belonged to families which from time immemorial had settled in the place. The shepherds inherited their posts by the male line, and their

names in the parish registers go on without a break. As a rule the flockmaster followed the same way, but now and again the marriage of a daughter took the farm to some other name. It was rare indeed that the family was entirely uprooted, for other members of the clan and name rallied and prevented what they regarded as the disgrace of an ancient place passing into "foreign" hands. Yet all the time the flockmasters might only be tenants of a manorial lord, though they stuck to many freedoms and privileges. The Lowthers of Cumberland were lucky in marriage, and their sheep farms came through the various heiresses. Hartsop, Patterdale, is an example of this. It was not, however, until a century and a half ago that there was real displacement of the yeomen flockmasters of our fells. After the war which ended in the defeat of Napoleon, there were years of low prices for wool, and the inheritors of small estates gradually had to lose them through mortgages to meet family claims. Thus the old ownership went, and some men remained as ordinary tenants of the acres they had formerly owned.

Thinking over the movements of one shepherd family: the father remained strong and active long after his son was of age to take a wife, and was able to manage the old farm. The son therefore struck out into the world, took a job in the next Northumbrian dale and settled there. A great water scheme wiped out most of the holding so that its sheep-flock was amalgamated with another. The shepherd with his wife and young children went over into Cumberland, to a cot nine miles from the nearest road. "How shall I get there?" asked the lad in charge of the furniture cart. "Go forward as long as thou can see the horse's lugs (ears) over the bog. The house is away beyond that," he was roughly told. The children had their first education from a schoolmaster who lived at their cottage in turn with three other equally remote places. The schoolmaster was rather a character: though he had only one hand, he could fashion to play a violin, and he was more at home teaching the children to dance than at their work with books. The mother of the little flock welcomed the next move for it brought the children within three miles of a school. To be sure, it was a league of wet and winding moorland track with one rickety footbridge and three fords which were passed dryshod by the aid of stepping-stones. From mid-October to March there was no travel to school, and lessons were taken at home. Seven years in Westmorland prepared for a move back into Northumberland to a farm—the first in the family sequence which had neighbours (not more than three) passing its doors and within a mile of a fair track. Then back to Coquetdale where the grown-up family gradually dispersed, the lads to work other

flocks about the Cheviot and the lasses to cots and farms among the same fells. This is a much-travelled family for the shepherd-craft. Often a man stays the whole time in one service.

The shepherd who is blessed with content can usually make a fair amount every year besides his flock wage. His wife, if she is able at dairy and among poultry, can also add to the store. I was told by one wife that in the previous summer she had banked nearly £70 from her butter and eggs, and profits she made from teas for casual wanderers who came to the lonely door. In a previous summer her receipts were about £50, and the money was being accumulated with a view to stocking a small farm on their own account. Indeed, they have had several farms since, moving up and up until they have a "hall" with some hundreds of acres, stocked and equipped in proper manner. The shepherd of the fells has a dependable wage for the half-year, but he expects to make more on the bonuses obtained for a successful lambing season, and on a share in the price obtained for wool and mutton from his ground. Usually he cannot add increment to the flock for there already is a stabilised balance between grass and sheep. The shepherd has usually the grazing of a couple of hardy cows, and the use of a pony, while poultry for the most part picks up its own living on the moors. An infield grows oats for meal and poultry food, and there is the usual vegetable patch which, in a windswept situation a thousand feet above the sea, can only grow the rougher crops. The grass round the farm is mown as hay for the wintering of sheep, and there is peat from the bogs for the fire.

Indeed, if it were not for the work, the life of a shepherd would compare favourably with most others. He is governed only by general orders from the flockmaster, and for months on end must work out his own details. It is only after lambing time, at the shearing, and again when the drafts for sale or sending out to winter quarters are handled, that any account is taken. Some flockmasters have miles of country with shepherds working in different dales, and hardly ever seeing each other. In these days, every shepherd aspires to become a tenant on his own account. Unless he can inherit stock and a lease, however, there is little opening among the fells. The area suitable for use is already allotted, and the tendency is to cut out the smaller even of the great farms. The sheep rights or "gaits" on the commons are being bought up, usually by parties who are more interested in coveys of grouse than in flocks, so that the number of shepherds in such parishes is gradually being reduced. There is little outlook in the northern counties of England at any rate for men who desire to get on and a large number still emigrate

to Canada, New Zealand and Australia where sheep-farming is carried on to a tremendous extent. In Wales the same tendency prevails: the number of hired shepherds is distinctly fewer at every census. In Scotland the sheep problem is on different lines: on many estates grouse and sheep, or deer and sheep, are kept side by side, but constantly there are instances where the shooting tenant becomes inimical to the flock, and in such cases it is easy to buy out the less valuable industry. The dropping-out of deer forests in some counties may mean area available for a fresh flock. The planting of great zones with larch and other timber, however, is a check against the resumption of land by sheep. The nibblers could hardly be let loose among small trees, and large "sticks" growing in commercial crowds are sufficient to stop light even from the moss.

I knew one shepherd who began work among the Lake Country fells and went east to the Pennine moors. He always had the reputation of being a shrewd handler of dogs and sheep, and as a youth he became known from the Border to Central Wales. He could train his working dogs to such nicety that few orders passed on the ordinary day's work. The creature was soon able to sense the precise job and learnt how to manage it without interference. I believe he was in my first cub-catching expedition on Bow Fell. The fox is merely vermin among the fells and the depredations among lambs are really serious. Therefore the hand of every man is against the fox, and death is the reward of its crimes. There was a careful stalk to the hole where Mother Fox had her nursery, and the cubs had their playground before the door. At sunrise the cubs ran out, and then a fox-slaying terrier was let loose. The vixen rushed out and gave battle to the dog. The dale lads were keen to catch the cubs alive, for they had a better price in that condition than when dead. That shepherd has changed but little: there is a frost of silver at the temples and his face is leaner and browner than it was; his slow habit of speech, his quiet but effective way of handling a dog remain the same. He can handle not only his own collie but those of other men—and it is not often that they will work for any but their owner and his family. The shepherd of the fells who cannot train his own collie loses much of the savour of his calling; a ready-made animal works all right, but there's no satisfaction in the work. A collie has a wonderful memory; and often tricks, which have once been indulged from inadvertence or carelessness, turn up again and again for years. In a half-trained dog such tricks accumulate, and such an animal becomes a rebel. That's the end of its usefulness.

The collie of the fells is as carefully bred as any prize ox, but

style and fashion do not come into the business. The dogs are bred to work and that merit alone is taken into regard in their pedigrees. To endure the hard work of gathering sheep on the fells in all weathers, a collie must be sound of physique and vigorous in action. The general conduct of a collie's fore-elders is often eagerly canvassed—and an outbreak of sheep-worrying is punished not only by the extinction of the villain, but by an ill-name accruing to the entire strain. There are various types of collies, but mostly they fall into the classes of rough-coateds, which are preferred on the northern moors, and smooths, which are most often seen in the Pennine. The Welsh shepherds are inclined to use the Scottish type rather than the old useful animal which was kept by their fathers. The size of a collie counts for little, but "strength of the eye" is important. The most stubborn sheep must be quelled at a glance from those bold eyes, and not by hard driving and bolting. A really good dog worked by a capable shepherd makes the movement of all sheep look easy. It is the weak dog which fails to hold the wild creatures and has them scattered over a mile of country.

The sheep of the northern fells vary considerably: in some districts the flock is Cheviot, fast-bolting, but fairly amenable to quiet action; in others the blackfaced or mountain breed is to be seen, small and hardy and with coarser wool than the former; elsewhere there are Swaledales with their fine faces and powerful gallops; Lonks which are difficult to turn once they decide to take a track; and Herdwicks which live all summer among the rocky peaks. In addition to these are many cross-breeds and some local races with characteristics which the shepherd must recognise in handling, not only at close quarters but in distributing among the grass to feed. Overcrowded sheep will starve if their predicament is not noticed and remedied. Usually there is some sign of restlessness which attracts the eye of the "looking" shepherd. Not only are there many varieties of sheep, but each flock has its own trials: there is the creature which dominates and butts any neighbour off the best parts of grass; the shy one which will allow itself to be driven away and which may wander among the entire flock and out over the moor in search of grass and peace. For the most part sheep are cut to the same type, and that gives the shepherd a chance of easier work.

There are occasions when the shepherd gets more excitement than he wishes. In spring the vixen fox will raid the lambs, and all sorts of plots are used to get her "put down"; there may be wild chases by a rabble of dogs, but that is only part of the campaign which ends in the death of the fox. Then in summer a sheep may scramble high among the ridges and become cragfast.

The sheep-rope is brought out, and sometimes a man has to be lowered a big distance in order to tie a life-line to the wanderer. It is not easy work, for the sheep always seem to choose places where the rock above and around is very crumbly and where the rope dislodges large and dangerous fragments. It would not be so bad if some sheep did not make a trick of becoming cragfast; to rescue the same sheep from starvation in three successive weeks is a test of the shepherd's temper. Usually he takes care that the collie drives the animal to some grass miles away from the rocks. There are times when carrion crows pick out the eyes of weak sheep, and when ravens come down to the still living lambs, but the gun is easily used on the latter of these birds. Maggot-season is terribly hard, for a sheep in whose skin the pests are hatching will wander away into the hidden coves and perhaps be eaten almost to death before it can be discovered. A good collie is worth much to the shepherd at such times for it will range the crags and patches of grass thoroughly, finding sheep in places invisible from either above or below. These are hard times, but the passing of the season usually ends them in a week or two. A storm may blow, with snow and rain in succession, right through the lambing time, and beat out the lives of ewes and their offspring. Drought, as in the present spring, may reign over the hills and the rills may fail. Usually the night dew of the mountains is enough to keep sheep from thirst, but a succession of dry nights means that the sheep, weakened by privation, have to be gathered and driven slowly across some bog where the herbage has still some moisture. In snowtime there is real peril that both shepherd and flock may be "overblown" and perish. Through it all, the shepherds of the fells remain faithful to their charges. They become a part of the routine of the flock, and the autumn drafting of lambs and sheep which must go to the seaside pasturage makes them sad men for a day or two. The hills seem to be comparatively silent when a large part of the flock has been withdrawn, and the higher ground is left abandoned to winter and to storm.

W. T. PALMER.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE FORCES OF RECOVERY.

(1) *The New Portents.*

CERTAIN new tendencies seem to suggest that, partly as a result of diplomatic action, partly in spite of diplomatic inaction, the world has started to move out of the deadlock that has paralysed its economic life for three years. One of those tendencies is seen in Central Europe, where the five Danubian countries have been driven to work for a regional recovery on lines so business-like that they seem likely to encourage the great Powers, if not positively to help, at any rate willingly to acquiesce in a certain incidental sacrifice of their own immediately preferential rights. Secondly, there is discernible an improved Franco-British diplomatic relationship. Thirdly, and most important, Great Britain is going ahead in her own way, without too much reference to the susceptibilities of other Powers, acting upon the principle that when you're in a mess, the practical thing to do is to get out of it. History shows (whether one takes pride in the fact or not) that Great Britain economically and financially has always had to lead the way. Since 1918, during the twelve years when the quixotic and impractical British politicians of the war and post-war period crippled British initiative and created the opportunity for initiative in New York and in Paris, the further lesson has emerged that neither New York nor Paris has had the machinery or the temperament to assume London's rôle as leader. In spite of all the handicap, and in sheer default of a lead from New York and Paris, London has in fact resumed the initiative. The story of that event is both curious and illuminating.

In passing, it is cheerful to notice that not all people forget the abiding principles of human nature in such times as those through which we have passed since the beginning of 1929. Speaking at the annual meeting of the Scottish Northern Investment Trust Limited, held in Aberdeen (the home of even more wisdom than the world suspects) on March 8th last, the Chairman said: "I do not think we should be too depressed as to the future. I came across some remarks recently, made by the greatest in the land last century, when things were going as badly as they are with us just now: 'There is scarcely anything around us but ruin and despair' (Wm. Pitt, 1800); 'I dare not marry—the future is too dark and uncertain' (Wm. Wilberforce, shortly after); 'I believe everything is tending to a convulsion' (Lord Grey, 1819); 'I have only one desire—to play the part of Mary Antoinette with bravery in the revolution that is coming' (Queen Adelaide, 1831); 'In industry, commerce and agriculture there is no hope' (Disraeli, 1849);

'I thank God I shall be spared the consummation of ruin that is gathering about us' (Duke of Wellington, 1851); 'Nothing can save the British Empire from shipwreck' (Lord Shaftesbury, 1868). Those people were all wrong, and no doubt our pessimists will be all wrong again."

(2) *The Better Anglo-French Feeling.*

"La France entière s'est réjouie de l'accord récemment conclu, pour la préparation de la conférence de Lausanne, par M. Pierre Laval, avec le gouvernement britannique. Elle aspire à une entente générale avec ce noble pays. Voulant toutes deux la paix par le droit, la France et la Grande-Bretagne constituent, quand elles sont d'accord, la plus forte caution de l'une et de l'autre. Et ceci dicte leur devoir."

Even before February 23rd, when M. André Tardieu spoke those words, it had become apparent that those who make opinion in Paris had been impressed by the change that had taken place in British opinion. Those who have become acclimatised to the heavy atmosphere of normal diplomacy, find something refreshing in the effect wrought in France by the British awakening of October 1931. M. Jacques Bardoux, for instance, wrote a long article in the *Temps* of March 6th in which, if one reads between the lines, that effect is neatly illustrated. His way was to diagnose a feeling of friendliness and even of gratitude towards France among the British people. He quoted Lord Tyrrell in support of his diagnosis. "Peu d'heures" (he wrote) "après le jour néfaste de septembre 1931, que le peuple anglais a déjà et va davantage réparer, Lord Tyrrell vint exprimer à la France, qui avait été fidèle à elle-même—à des habitudes de cordialité et à des traditions de franchise—la gratitude de son pays."

It is the excellent business of ambassadors to say things like that. In this case the interesting thing was the use made of Lord Tyrrell's diplomacy by the French commentators, for those commentators proceeded to demonstrate that France now really wanted British friendship. Therein we were given still another example of that aspect of adversity to which the Shakespearian "sweet" is eternally applicable. M. Bardoux in his eagerness even went to the length of castigating those British people who, as he seemed oddly to imagine, were incorrigibly ill-disposed towards France, and he took some pains to convince his readers that the British critics of French policy were an unimportant and bad-tempered band of people.

Now the really enlightening thing in M. Bardoux's article was that it typified the prevailing reactions of the Paris opinion-makers. One always expects French thought to be subtle. He and his

colleagues probably knew that they were out of date in thus castigating the British critics of French policy. Before October 1931 there were serious people in Great Britain who did criticise the Paris politicians, diplomatists and financiers; for the wood was thick, one could see no way out of it, and France, who could, would not lead the way out. Since October 1931, however, an important change has taken place. The old, fatuous, mischievous "Entente Cordiale" has been laughed off the stage, and Great Britain has started doing things on sound lines, such as will ultimately serve the true interests both of France and of Great Britain. British opinion in the last five months has had no time and no occasion to feel bitter about the French contribution to world affairs. It has been absorbed in its new-found power to seek its own salvation untrammelled by any sense of diplomatic commitment to a stupid fetish. There is no longer any anti-French feeling in Great Britain. In present circumstances one might as relevantly be anti-Phœnician as anti-French. The Entente with France being at last relegated to the past, a nightmarish past, there is no further cause for worry about the effects of that Entente. "This noble country" is free and happy, and abundantly well-disposed towards France and every other country in the world.

M. Bardoux no doubt well understood the new situation, even though he wrote about it, subtly, as if he did not. The "general entente" of M. Tardieu's aspiration is a happy expression because it harmonises with the clear intentions of the present British Government, which is to bury the past and to work for international harmony on the most general scale. On that scale Germany, France and Great Britain are equal in friendship. So far as the British Government is concerned, that principle of diplomatic action is already in action. If France loyally and sincerely adopts it, the friendly feelings of the British people towards France are likely to fulfil M. Tardieu's desire.

(3) *Britannia Rediviva.*

On March 2nd Mr. Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons that a further amount of last summer's credits were about to be repaid forthwith. That announcement, coming as it did as the climax of a spectacular series of illustrations of the resurgent financial soundness of Great Britain, made a deep impression throughout the world, and was largely responsible, first, for a renewed wave of world-wide confidence in British credit, next for a world-wide ripple of confidence in everything.

Some confusion appears to persist in the minds of non-financial people about the exact differentiation between the two series of

credits granted last summer to Great Britain. The facts are these :

(a) The bank credits.—On August 1st, 1931, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York placed at the disposal of the Bank of England the equivalent in dollars of £25,000,000. The Bank of France placed at its disposal the like amount in francs. The period was for three months in each case.

On maturity at the end of October the Bank of England repaid £20,000,000 of the total £50,000,000 in equal parts of £10,000,000 each to New York and to Paris. The repayment was effected as to its greater part by the shipping of £15,000,000 in gold. The remaining £30,000,000 were renewed by New York and Paris for another three months. On the further maturity (February 1st, 1932) the balance was duly repaid. The repayment did not this time involve any reduction of the Bank's gold reserves.

(b) The Treasury credits.—On August 28th, 1931, an American group undertook, if called on, to take up British Government Dollar Treasury Bills to a maximum of \$200,000,000. It was called upon in full. On March 4th, 1932, \$150,000,000 out of the \$200,000,000 was repaid, whereby the credit was reduced roughly from £40,000,000 to £10,000,000.

Also on August 28th, 1931, a group of French bankers promised a maximum credit of 5,000,000,000 francs, partly in French bank credit, partly by an issue of British Franc Bills to the French public. Of that amount one-half (2,500,000,000 francs) was called upon in the form of bank credit.

On March 4th, 1932, 1,600,000,000 francs of the bank credit were repaid, the liability being thus reduced from, roughly, £20,000,000 to £7,000,000. The other half of the full credit, namely 2,500,000,000 francs (say £20,000,000) was issued in the form of Treasury Bills to French holders, who cannot be forced to accept repayment before August 28th next.

(4) *Danubian Economics.*

Ever since the proposed Austro-German customs union of a year ago was abandoned, the politicians of the Danubian countries have been exploring alternative methods of loosening the deadlock in their trade and of unfreezing their finance. The Austro-German scheme failed for the dual reason that France felt uneasy about its political potentialities and the Little Entente countries felt uneasy about both its political and its economic potentialities : on the one hand it could hardly be expected that those countries which owed their very existence to the peace treaties would lightly or calmly contemplate what they regarded (wrongly) as a threat to the fundamentals of those treaties, and on the other hand it was perhaps natural that in their desire for escape from present economic

distress they should be unwilling to mortgage their economic future to an overwhelmingly greater Power. This latter consideration operated particularly in the case of Czechoslovakia, who since the war has built up a remarkable export trade far beyond the bounds of Central Europe. It will probably be shown to have been a short-sighted view ; and the time will no doubt come at no distant date when the proved statesmanship of Prague will recognise the inevitability and the wisdom of extending their regional economic schemes to include German participation. The other four Danubian countries take only a small percentage of the Czechoslovakian export trade.

It happens that the distribution of the Czechoslovak foreign trade has been a matter of cardinal importance in the Danubian negotiations. The following tables illustrate the main point.

1. PERCENTAGE OF CZECHOSLOVAK EXPORTS TO THE DANUBIAN COUNTRIES :

	1928	1929	1930	1931
To Austria	14.71	15.01	13.96	13.66
„ Yugoslavia	4.47	5.58	8.78	6.33
„ Hungary	6.92	6.38	5.74	2.2
„ Rumania	4.10	3.77	3.41	2.59

2. PERCENTAGE OF CZECHOSLOVAK IMPORTS FROM THE DANUBIAN COUNTRIES :

	1928	1929	1930	1931
From Austria	7.52	7.77	7.70	7.18
„ Yugoslavia	2.35	1.70	2.79	3.26
„ Hungary	4.42	4.84	5.86	1.14
„ Rumania	2.80	2.37	3.58	4.80

3. PERCENTAGE OF CZECHOSLOVAK EXPORTS TO GREAT BRITAIN :

	1928	1929	1930	1931
	6.69	6.95	7.84	10.32

4. PERCENTAGE OF CZECHOSLOVAK IMPORTS FROM GREAT BRITAIN :

	1928	1929	1930	1931
	4.32	4.06	3.68	3.62

5. PERCENTAGE OF CZECHOSLOVAK EXPORTS TO U.S.A. :

	1928	1929	1930	1931
	5.51	7.21	5.60	6.12

6. PERCENTAGE OF CZECHOSLOVAK IMPORTS FROM U.S.A. :

	1928	1929	1930	1931
	5.98	5.44	5.00	4.10

It is clear why Czechoslovakia in her first impulse is on the alert against the possibility of her trade organisation being swamped either by conditional help from any great Power or by the participation of any great Power in the Danubian trade itself. It happens that Prague had to take all the initiative in this matter, for Czechoslovakia is the only sound country financially and economically in Danubian Europe; and Prague made it a condition that any scheme for improving the general conditions of the five Danubian countries must be independent of any great Power, whether Germany, France, Italy or Great Britain. On the other hand, any help that might be given to Hungary or Austria by any great Power was welcomed by Prague, provided no political conditions were attached to it. To understand the Czechoslovak attitude in this matter, it is necessary to remember that her initial "hands off!" was addressed impartially to France, Germany and Italy. Time will show how far that initial exclusiveness, based upon a fear which is probably unsound, will be modified so far as its economic implications are concerned.

Although Czechoslovakia's foreign trade, as to its greater part, goes further afield than Central Europe, the trade of the other four Danubian countries is such that it constitutes a clear unit, capable of development without much reference to the outside world. The *Central European Observer* (March 11th) put the point thus: "Austrian exports and imports to and from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania are more important than her trade with Germany, which tops the list of countries having economic relations with her. Similarly Hungary sells and buys more to and from her four neighbours, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, than elsewhere. If we carry the picture further and consider the balance of payment of all the countries concerned we discover a similar phenomenon and find that they are bound together with bonds both old and new. It is understood that all the countries would refuse, both individually and collectively, any suggestion of a political association or union. Such a course of action is out of place altogether. On broad lines the co-operation suggested would take the form of a preferential system applied to the countries concerned in their mutual trade, without the states lying outside the sphere in question interfering with the respective arrangements made to that effect. That is why Czechoslovakia insists that any such step should not be taken without the cognizance or consent of the principal European Powers, Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain. If the idea is to bear fruit and contribute to the re-establishment of mutual trust it must not be directed against anybody. On the contrary it must produce a better feeling all round. Economically it is a

sound proposition, if worked out with due regard to the particular interests concerned. It would help the five countries on the Danube referred to and it would also help the countries standing out of it because by improving the Central European economic situation it would increase its buying capacity both internally and in respect of the big industrial countries outside."

The present phase of the Danubian negotiations was ushered in by Dr. Benesh last December, when he gave an interview to a Hungarian paper, the *Pesti Napló*, in which he appealed for an economic understanding between Czechoslovakia and Hungary as a means of escape from the stagnation that had followed the economic and financial collapse. So complete was that stagnation that trade was conducted on the basis of primitive barter, all the machinery of credit and of payment in cash having broken down as a result of the exchange restrictions. Dr. Benesh made the point that although Czechoslovakia was less critically affected by the economic and financial emergency than the other Danubian countries, yet she took the view that the Central European countries could improve their position only by their own united efforts, and added that the proved economic interdependence of all the Danubian countries was the best hope and guarantee of a happier future in Central Europe.

Dr. Benesh's interview, which was published on Christmas Day, had the desired effect of forcing the hand of official Budapest. Count Bethlen made a non-committal, but not hostile, statement about it; the parliamentary opposition welcomed the Benesh gesture without running the risk of denunciation as traitors; such Conservatives as Count Apponyi, Baron Szterenyi and Dr. Coratz tentatively played with the idea. French influence at once began to encourage Hungarian opinion to forget diplomacy and to think only of economics: not only because French diplomacy itself had nothing to fear, but also because France happened to have lent some small amount of money to Hungary and was not uninterested in Hungarian financial recovery. M. Flandin in the Chamber on November 27th gave the figure of French loans to Hungary at 354,000,000 francs, a small sum, but sums always appear smaller to the borrower than to the lender when they cannot be repaid. The new Hungarian Finance Minister, Baron Frederick Korányi, on December 18th, bravely announced his Government's intention of "holding the pengő front in all circumstances," and immediately went on to announce that a transfer moratorium would be put into operation for twelve months in the matter of both public and private foreign debts. In one sense the Hungarian Government was only doing frankly and openly what no fewer than twenty-three other governments have already done

in effect. In those twenty-three countries the restrictions against the purchase of foreign exchange have precisely the effect of a transfer moratorium.

Before the end of 1930 there had been more than one indication that the more enterprising people in Central Europe were alive to the necessity of some form of concerted action. On November 3rd a conference of banking experts met in Prague to consider methods of removing the barriers against the transfer of exchange. It was attended by bankers from Czechoslovakia, Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania. The fact that they could do no more than issue a statement (November 6th) recording their view that the difficulty was essentially one of credit and confidence, was of less importance than the fact that they did meet and did thus tacitly acknowledge that they were all in the same boat. Wisdom starts from such beginnings.

At Sofia on December 10th an agricultural conference was held at which the Ministers of Agriculture of Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland and official delegates of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary considered methods of reducing agricultural costs through improved organisation, long-term credits and permanent markets. The conference continued the exploratory work that had been started at Warsaw in August 1930. The mere fact that such exploration was in progress was one of the symptoms of incipient rescue work in Central Europe.

At the beginning of March it became known that M. Tardieu had developed so keen an interest in the project of a Danubian economic association that he submitted a memorandum on the subject to the British and the Italian Foreign Offices, but not, it appears, to the German Foreign Office, although Germany was one of the interested countries.

Sir John Simon took the opportunity, when passing through Paris on March 12th, to discuss the matter with M. Tardieu. By that time the project had reached the stage where it was necessary for the four great Powers to take the next step by deciding whether they were willing to abandon their claims for most-favoured-nation treatment, whether in short they could convince themselves of the sound business value of sacrificing a preferential share in trade that had dwindled to nearly nothing, in order to reap the indirect benefit of a prosperous Central Europe. The alternative and better possibility was that the Danubian countries might consider some method of embracing the interests of those great Powers by an extension in some form of the scheme they were discussing.

GENEVA AND SHANGHAI.

The chronicle of the Far Eastern fighting and of its diplomatic repercussion was carried in last month's *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW* up to the time of the Anglo-American diplomatic intervention at the beginning of February. Thereafter the main interest of the matter consisted in the part played by Geneva; for it became obvious that the Japanese Government's real problem was to evacuate Shanghai without loss of face, and that in some degree it was prevented from doing so precisely because Geneva was attempting to dictate it into doing so. The events of February and of the first half of March are an interesting example of the diplomatic harm that is done when the prestige of important organisations becomes engaged in mutually incompatible lines of conduct. Geneva's prestige unfortunately became engaged in forcing Japan to evacuate Shanghai. Japan's prestige became engaged in resisting Geneva's pressure. Yet it was clear that there was no conflict in the immediate goal. Had it not been that Geneva last autumn had attempted a bold frontal restraint of Japan, Japan would no doubt have evacuated Shanghai long ago. It is a commonplace paradox that the most earnest idealists often do more harm than the worldly cynics who realise the practical value of the truism that the least said, soonest mended, and who place more faith in tact than in righteous indignation. How closely that truism is illustrated in the recent Far Eastern events emerges from the simple statement of those events. In the following passages the chronicle speaks for itself.

(1) *The Salient Facts.*

Before the seriousness of what was destined to take place can be appreciated it is necessary to remember the peculiar circumstances of Shanghai itself. The International Settlement stretches for eight miles along the north bank of the river, and has an average depth of one mile. It is a large territory. It is occupied pell-mell by Americans, British, Italians, Japanese and Chinese, there being no territorial division between them. Although there is a large Chinese population inside the Settlement, the distinguishing feature of the Settlement is its foreign residents. The vast Chinese population of Shanghai lives outside the Settlement.

Before January 18th, when the violent phase of the disturbance began, there had been carried on for many months a bitter and thorough Chinese boycott of Japanese goods, the result partly of what had taken place in Manchuria. The boycott was dictated by such an intensity of Chinese feeling that any trader who was discovered to be engaged in the handling of Japanese goods was

severely punished. The result was an absolutely complete boycott of Japanese goods. In so charged an atmosphere it was nearly inevitable that something would happen to cause an explosion. That something did happen on January 18th, when five Japanese nationals were attacked in the Chinese suburb, Chapei. Two days later the inevitable counter-attack took place. On January 20th fifty Japanese youths armed themselves with clubs and knives, made for the spot where the five Japanese had been attacked, set fire to a Chinese factory and came into violent conflict with the Chinese police. On that same day the Japanese Consul-General presented certain demands to the Chinese Mayor of Greater Shanghai (see CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, March, p. 385). A day later, on January 21st, the Japanese admiral commanding the Japanese ships in the river, began to excite himself and announced his intention of "protecting" his nationals unless the Chinese Mayor gave a satisfactory answer to the Consul's demands. Tokyo in its turn becoming excited, reinforcements of ships, shells and men were sent to Shanghai. On January 27th the Japanese Consul demanded a satisfactory answer to his original demands by 6 p.m. of the following day.

The municipal council of the International Settlement now declared a state of emergency, and defence troops were posted to their stations. They were posted for the most part along the boundary of the Settlement, but it happened—and this was unfortunate—that for adequate defence it was necessary for a line of defence to be deployed outside the Settlement and into the Japanese town. A chain of four events then took place in rapid succession; and the full trouble had begun. The four events were that the Chinese Mayor accepted the Japanese demands; the Japanese admiral, being more interested in firing practice than in diplomacy, refused to accept the Chinese acceptance; the municipal council decided that the emergency was not ended and that the defending troops must be maintained in position; and the Japanese marines were landed.

Japanese prestige now became engaged in a stupid adventure. The League of Nations had already appointed the Lytton Commission with the consent of Japan and China, and the commission was already on its way to the Far East, its object being to investigate the general field of Sino-Japanese conflict. The four great Powers mainly interested in Shanghai, namely the United States, France, Italy and Great Britain, on February 2nd made proposals to the Japanese Government (CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, March, p. 387). China accepted those proposals, Japan virtually rejected them. On February 17th the League of Nations sent a unanimous appeal to the Japanese Government, but that Government showed that it was not thereby impressed. The striking diplomatic situa-

tion was thereby established that a virtual war was in progress between two members of the League of Nations, both of them members of the League Council, and both of them signatories of the 1928 "Kellogg" Pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy.

The facts of the situation were as blunt as they could be. A matter of further interest is the "reaction" of Geneva and London.

(2) *The Part Played by Geneva.*

As one looks back, it appears that there were three stages in the League's "reaction" to the events in the Far East. The first was the easy bravery of the autumn, when the enthusiasts, braver than they were wise, talked of Japan as a test case and propagated the view that unless the League could contrive to subdue Japan in the present case it might as well abandon all its pretensions, and, like an insolvent bank, close its doors. The more mature and cautious exponents of League philosophy took the line that a "failure" of the League in this particular case would have no relevance whatsoever to the question of its continuance as an organisation. The League is bound to fail, time after time. Its justification is that it may slowly build up a better tradition in international affairs. But the impatient enthusiasts aforesaid had it all their way in the first instance, and they began talking about applying Articles 15 and 16. Thereupon mistake was added to mistake.

The second stage was reached when the Chinese representative at Geneva took the enthusiasts at their word and himself began talking about Article 15. To the political philosopher an important issue was thereby raised, and was destined to be further clarified by what followed. The issue was whether the League could hope ever to achieve pacific ends by other than pacific means. It is probably a commonplace experience in private life that in dealing with difficult persons one may sometimes fail to achieve one's end if one rigidly uses only goodwill as an instrument, but that one always fails if one attempts any form of hostile coercion. If those at Geneva whose views carried weight in Japan had last autumn concentrated upon conciliation and goodwill in their attitude to Japan, they might, it is true, have failed to prevent the Shanghai complication; but it is at least arguable that the alternative method of threatening collective war, physical and economic, was bound by the very nature of things to fail from the outset. The Council itself in its official statements never contemplated any action under Articles 15 and 16, but in these matters, as experience amply teaches, the unofficial statements of private individuals, reproduced in Japanese papers, have greater influence than official notes.

The third stage was reached on February 12th, when the Secretariat of the League had to circulate to the Council a letter from Dr. Yen, the Chinese delegate, in which he invoked paragraph 9 of Article 15 and demanded that the Council refer the Sino-Japanese dispute to the Assembly. Now in delicate matters the Assembly is a bad servant. Everybody, wise and unwise, has a voice, and emotion is more potent than statesmanship. The psychology of the die-hard back-bencher reveals itself almost as much in the League Assembly as in any national parliament, and the back-bencher die-hard's main ambition in life is to hit somebody. At Geneva we witnessed the unbusinesslike spectacle of the representatives of small nations demanding a form of virtual war against Japan in which they themselves could not take part, and in which the great Powers, of course, would not take part. "The Chinese Government" (so ran a passage in Dr. Yen's Note), "is constrained hereby to request that the said dispute be referred to the Assembly. If, however, it should be the pleasure and intention of the Council to refer the said dispute at its own initiative to the Assembly, or, in virtue of the general powers vested in it, to summon the Assembly for consideration of the dispute, the Chinese Government will then be prepared to withdraw the request on its part."

That request was embarrassing to the Council; but pending a decision on the question of procedure thus raised, the Council continued patiently to attempt to dissuade the Japanese Government by pacific means from its warlike policy. It met on February 16th, without the presence of the Japanese or the Chinese representatives and drew up an "urgent appeal" to Japan, which was dispatched that same evening. This was the first occasion on which the Council had addressed an appeal to only one party in the dispute. The cardinal passages in the appeal were the following: "... The twelve members of the Council are far from disregarding the grievances advanced by Japan, and throughout all these months have given her the full confidence which they owed to an associate of long standing who had ever been punctilious in fulfilment of all her obligations and duties as a member of the Community of Nations. They cannot but regret, however, that she has not found it possible to make full use of the methods of peaceful settlement provided in the Covenant; and recall once again the solemn undertaking of the Pact of Paris that a solution of international disputes shall never be sought by other than peaceful means. They cannot but recognise that, from the beginning of the conflict which is taking place on her territory, China has put her case in the hands of the League and agreed to accept its proposals for a peaceful settlement. The twelve members of the Council recall the terms of Article 10 of the Covenant, by which

all members of the League have undertaken to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. It is their friendly right to direct attention to this provision, particularly as it appears to them to follow that no invasion of territorial integrity, and no change in the political independence of any member of the League, brought about in disregard of this Article, ought to be recognised as valid and effectual by members of the League of Nations. Japan has an incalculable responsibility before the public opinion of the world to be just and restrained in her relations with China."

The Japanese answer, published on February 24th, amounted simply to a repudiation of every premise on which the League's appeal had been based. It expressed the surprise of the Japanese Government that the appeal should have been addressed to Japan and not to China, since China was the aggressive party. It stated that Article 10 of the Covenant did not arise, seeing that Japan had no territorial or political ambitions in China; that Japan did not consider China to be an "organised people" within the meaning of the Covenant; that Japan had no desire for war, and that if the League could succeed in inducing China to adopt a pacific attitude towards Japan the resultant delight would nowhere more sincerely be felt than in Japan.

Little apparent good therefore was done by the League's appeal of February 16th. On February 29th, however, a proposal of M. Paul-Boncour's seemed to promise better results, for the Japanese delegate, Mr. Sato, in his personal view approved it and promised to urge his Government's acceptance of it. The proposal was that an international conference should be convened at Shanghai, to be attended by representatives from Japan and China, to attempt a settlement on the twin basis that Japan had no territorial ambitions in China and that the foreign interests in Shanghai must be safeguarded in a manner satisfactory to those interests. Sir John Simon supported the proposal, as did the representatives of France and Germany. The proposal itself had been inspired by the news, conveyed to the Council the day before, that Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, the British Commander-in-Chief of the China Station, had succeeded in arranging "in principle" a Sino-Japanese armistice. The admiral had invited the Chinese Chief of Staff of the Nineteenth Army, General Wang, and the Japanese admiral commanding at Shanghai, Admiral Namura, to a conference on board his flagship, H.M.S. *Kent*. The conference lasted two hours and a half, and resulted in a provisional agreement that the Japanese and Chinese forces should simultaneously withdraw from the Shanghai front.

The promise was belied; for while the Japanese admiral and the

Japanese Government were considering the armistice proposals that went out from Shanghai and from Geneva, the Japanese army in Shanghai was preparing, and three days later launched, an offensive.

The set-back thus given to the hopes of peace was not the occasion of unmixed gloom. It happened that on February 27th the Japanese representatives at Shanghai and at Geneva had announced that the Japanese Government would stop the Shanghai war if and when the Chinese forces were withdrawn to the distance of twelve and a half miles which had been originally demanded in the ultimatum delivered by the Japanese to the Chinese general on February 16th. The Chinese general had ignored that ultimatum. That was the reason why the Japanese army was preparing its offensive while the peace talks were in progress at Geneva and on board *H.M.S. Kent*. The offensive was duly launched on the morning of March 2nd: but when the Japanese troops were sent over the top to inflict the desired crushing defeat on the Chinese troops, lo! there were no Chinese troops on whom to inflict the defeat. The Chinese forces had been surreptitiously withdrawn to the twelve and a half miles limit that had originally been demanded. It is easy to imagine the scene: the preliminary bombardment of empty country, the handing round of the rum tot at dawn to screw up the nerves of the Japanese troops to battle pitch, the shrieks of military exultation as the troops scrambled over the top, and rushed over no man's land to pound the enemy that wasn't there.

Even the demoralising influence of Western civilisation cannot wholly suppress the native charm and common sense of the Chinese people. Before the influence of Europe made itself felt in Chinese warfare, the unending civil war in China, although it did much damage economically and politically, did little damage to human life. It used to be one of the conventions of the Chinese civil war that when two opposing armies came near enough to each other to make a fight unavoidable, a quick and instinctive summing-up of the prospects was carried out by the opposing troops, and the troops who found themselves on the side that was likely to lose walked over to the other side and the issue was decided; or, alternatively, if the prospect of settled pay on one side was likely to hold for a longer period ahead than on the other, the troops of the latter would similarly walk over and join the forces of their recent enemy. A few years ago, however, certain fools in China, who had been educated at European universities, became imbued with such notions as heroism in the fighting line and with up-to-date notions about the technique of war. The result was a modernisation of Chinese armies, coached by German and other Western "experts." There had been the two distinct traditions: on the one hand, the Chinese

tradition, in which war could be tolerated so long as it was not taken too far, and did not involve bloodshed; on the other hand, the horrible European tradition, in which all humour, all decency, all common sense had been flattened dead, and in which we witnessed the recurrent spectacle of serried masses of good men being butchered by the million, and their fellows at home thinking it a fine thing that they be thus butchered. And that Western civilisation, so divorced had it become from a true perception of realities, sent out its missionaries to the East to teach the theory of a Christian religion which, in practice, was less operative in Europe than in darkest China.

The League Assembly duly met on March 3rd. The main interest of what it did lay in the speeches of those who represented the smaller Powers, and whose main point was that the League of Nations must do something vigorous to suppress the warlike activity of Japan. Logically their counsel was that the League should organise a form of collective war, economic or physical, or both, against Japan: an absurd request.

(3) *The British Attitude.*

The policy of the British Government in face of the Far Eastern emergency has been refreshingly sane since the beginning. It has had a restraining influence at Geneva. The full statement made by Sir John Simon in the House of Commons on February 22nd was so good and made such good reading that it would deserve to be quoted in full, if space permitted. He analysed the British policy under three heads. Under the first, "The British Government will direct the full influence of Britain, in conjunction with other Powers, whether they are members of the League or not, to support the moral authority of the League of Nations." As a commentary on the fact that the League of Nations had not been able to prevent the outbreak of fighting in this case, he observed: "... let us recognise that the League is the organised expression of the public opinion of the world. . . . Japan and China both remain members of the League. Representatives speaking in their names are at present at the Council table, and if we show ourselves devoted to the principles of the League the time may soon come, notwithstanding the wreckage of our hopes, when the normal authority of the League will be seen to exercise its influence on the side of peace."

Under the second head he emphasised the British Government's desire to promote a direct understanding between Japan and China. He said no word about organised pressure upon Japan. What he did say was this: "Britain has, from the beginning of this unhappy controversy between China and Japan, shown herself

ready to tender her good offices, whether in combination with other members of the League or whether in association with the United States or in any other way which is most practicable. Our Minister, Sir Miles Lampson, our Consul-General (Mr. Brennan), and our Ambassador at Tokyo (Sir Francis Lindley) have all exerted themselves to the utmost, and we stand ready at the first moment which offers itself as a useful and practical occasion to serve the cause of peace and help in any arrangement which may put an end to this horrible conflict between two nations, with both of whom Britain remains in friendly relations."

Thirdly he explained the British Government's own particular responsibility to British interests, a responsibility which happens fully to harmonise with the general lines of British policy. "... there is no part of the world (he said) in which it can be said with more complete truth than in the Far East that British interests are summed up in the two words 'peace' and 'trade'. . . . We believe ourselves to have made the most complete arrangements to have secured the safety of lives and property in the International Settlement. I deplore the incidents which have occurred, and while we have made it plain to the two parties that we reserve our rights, we look to them to continue their efforts to avoid injury to innocent neutrals in every way possible. But that, far from exhausting the full extent of our duty, the duty of all—the British Government, its representatives in Geneva, and of the whole House—is, above all things, to use our influence in the best way to get the fighting stopped and the bloodshed ended."

He added a footnote of excellent doctrine on the question of what should be the function of the League of Nations in this matter: "I am quite aware that in some quarters a desire is naturally felt to discuss other aspects of the matter, apportioning the blame, or what should be done next. But I must point out what is the real nature of the duty which the League has been called upon to discharge. This dispute has been brought before it—first before the Council and now before the Assembly—and the duty of the League is to collect as rapidly as possible all the information and to hear both sides. It would be quite improper for anybody to attempt to pronounce a partial or interim judgment in a matter where everything depends on the report which will have to be made by the League being recognised on both sides as proceeding from a complete sense of impartiality."

March 15th, 1932.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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MARLOWE'S *FAUSTUS*.*

Professor R. H. Case's edition of "The Works and Life of Christopher Marlowe" is enriched by Professor F. S. Boas' very careful editing of the immortal *Doctor Faustus*. Dr. Boas gives the play with modernised spelling and punctuation and bases the text upon the 1616 quarto, despite the fact that the additions are not, probably, from Marlowe's pen, since the readings are, in the opinion of this distinguished scholar, preferable.

I have sought to show that not all of the story appealed to him, and that presumably he had from the first a collaborator, Samuel Rowley or another. Thus *Doctor Faustus* may be looked on both as a revelation of Marlowe's genius, in some of its highest aspects, and also, especially in the 1616 version, as the Elizabethan theatre's link in the chain which stretches from the German *Volksbuch* of 1587 to Goethe's *Faust*.

Dr. Boas makes it clear enough that Marlowe for his story had recourse to the free English 1592 version of the German *Historia von D. Johann Fausten* by "P. F." Who was "P. F."? Dr. Boas says that there is "nothing to support R. Rohde's suggestion in his otherwise valuable *Das englische Faustbuch und Marlowe's Tragödie* (1910) that the translator is John Dee." It seems, *pace* this editor, a valuable suggestion, since the famous Dr. Dee lived till 1608, was at Cambridge (where he was an original Fellow of Trinity College) and was famous then as a mathematician. He might quite well have brought the German story home after his

* *The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus*. Edited by Frederick S. Boas. With three illustrations. Methuen. 8s. 6d. net.

extensive foreign travels. Marlowe was a much younger Cambridge man it is true, and was from Corpus Christi College and took his M.A. as late as 1587, but they were both Cambridge men and both were interested in the Black Arts. Rohde's suggestion is, of course, a guess, but a very shrewd one, since the initials "P. F." are uncertain and appear in some later editions as "P. R." and "P. K."

However this may be, the 1592 date of the play can be accepted on internal evidence and is in the same year as the English version of the 1587 German *Historia*. Thomas Bushell in 1604 brought out the black-letter quarto edition, of which one single copy survives (in the Bodleian). This was practically reproduced in 1609 and 1611. Then John Wright in 1616 published another edition which seemingly was based on another manuscript altogether and was considerably longer. The sole surviving copy of this is in the British Museum. Wright published new editions of this text in his quartos of 1619 (the only surviving copy is in America), 1620, 1624 (copies are in the British Museum) and 1631 (copies are in the Bodleian, Faculty of Advocates and Huntington Libraries). The quarto of 1663 also survives in three copies (two in the British Museum and one in South Kensington). This version, though apparently not based on the 1616 edition, has one great value, since the editor "added Act divisions II, III and V, which must therefore conform to an early stage-tradition." Dr. Boas discusses the modern editions of the play from C. W. Dilke's edition of 1814 to Professor C. F. Tucker Brooke's 1910 edition for the Clarendon Press of Marlowe's works. Professor Brooke based his text on the 1604 edition. Dr. Boas has re-examined the relationship of the 1604 and 1616 texts with the result that "the present edition reverts in two respects, though with important modifications, to the earlier nineteenth-century tradition. It divides the play not only into Scenes, but into Acts with Scenic sub-divisions, and it is based mainly on the 1616 quarto." Sir Adolphus Ward, the historian of the Faustus legend, was the first to adopt a Scenic arrangement, with the result that the play has no unified life. This was not like Marlowe, and there is much to be said for a division into Acts—suggested by the 1663 edition and tradition—and the consequent unification of the whole play. The prose scenes in the 1616 edition seem to have a real significance and were probably from Rowley's hand. Dr. Boas suggests that

Marlowe wrote the first two Acts to the end of II ii substantially as they appear in the 1616 quarto, though the episode of the Seven Sins is doubtful. From his pen also are the Chorus and Scene i, ll. 1-54, of Act III in the 1616 version;

Act IV, Scene iia in the 1604 version, which is close to the *English Faust Book*; Act IV, Scene vii, ll. 1-36, in the 1616 version, which also keeps close to the *Faust Book*; and Act V, substantially as it appears in the 1604 quarto. There was probably associated with Marlowe from the first another dramatist, either Samuel Rowley or one fond of similar *clichés*, who wrote the prose comic scenes in Acts II to IV, as they are found in the 1616 quarto.

Dr. Boas thinks that the 1604 quarto was printed from a prompt-copy of a revival of the play, while the 1616 quarto represents a manuscript which was not a duplicate of that used in the 1604 quarto but one closer to the original form of the play and especially in the prose scenes.

The recognition that each of these texts (whatever their imperfections) has independent authority should help to modify the traditional view that much of Marlowe's own work in *Doctor Faustus* has been lost or corrupted beyond recognition. Thus the 1604 quarto, if its readings are otherwise often inferior, has been free from the Censor's mutilation; and if it cuts ruthlessly the Chorus to Act III, it preserves alone, though wrongly placed, the Chorus to Act IV. Marlowe may, of course, have used material from the *English Faust Book* of which there is no trace remaining in either version of the play, but there is no evident *lacuna*, nor, in my opinion, anything that suggests a vital omission.

Dr. Boas admits, of course, some evident corruptions, but he is quite firm on the point that the shortness of the play (apart from the additions) is no proof of a vital omission in Marlowe's original text. It is a very technical question of textual criticism, but there can be no doubt that Dr. Boas makes out a remarkably strong case for his view. We have, too, to think of Marlowe "not as an artist concentrating upon full and deliberate achievement but as one who was prodigal of his genius when the mood and the occasion served." But Marlowe was a scholar and a careful one, and treated his sources with remarkable respect, and this is true in his treatment of the material in the *English Faust Book*. He deliberately chose aspects of the book that appealed to him as a classical scholar of intellectual power and a lover of beauty.

Both "points" are illumined by the dramatist's finest and most moving art. It is the singular glory of the University of Wittenberg to have furnished to the Elizabethan stage the two students whose tragical histories have ever since held the world captive. Hamlet is reluctantly torn from the academic routine by the shock of external events. Faustus turns his back upon it from an overmastering internal impulse. And as in Hamlet men have found something of special affinity with Shakespeare, so, as has been seen, does the situation of Faustus at the beginning of the play reproduce in a measure that of

Marlowe himself. There is the poignant ring of a personal disillusionment as he weighs the recognised studies, one by one, in the balance and finds them wanting, and abandons them for the intoxicating thrill of necromantic power. And though the material is drawn from the *English Faust Book* it is the questing spirit of the youthful Marlowe that transfigures it and gives the almost unbearably wistful note to the dialogues between Faustus and Mephistopheles concerning Lucifer and Hell, that come before and after the soul-struggle when he signs the irreparable bond. From the medley of higher and lower elements in his source Marlowe's genius has here shaped a spiritual Hell and a Lucifer, a fallen angel, once "most dearly lov'd of God"—a tender touch that we miss in Milton's more majestically sculptured Satan. . . . Had Marlowe lived to-day there would have been no more ardent disciple of Sir Arthur Eddington and Sir James Jeans, these modern expositors of "divine astrology" in his own University. But in the true spirit of the Renaissance the quest for truth with him could not be divorced from the quest for beauty . . . in final proof that Helen is the type of beauty that knows nothing of time and transcends sex, she is hailed as brighter than Jupiter, and more lovely than the monarch of the sky. So that when Faustus cries, "None but thou shalt be my paramour," we think of her as his mate in a super-sensual sphere. . . . It is just because Marlowe's Faustus has not spent his allotted span "in all voluptuousness," but is in his essential nature a thinker and an artist driven step by step to his doom, that the closing scene has such a poignancy.

This long quotation from Dr. Boas' Introduction to Faustus is necessary, since it at last brings out in the fullest force the fact that Christopher Marlowe, young though he was, was not a child only but a late leader of the spirit of the European Renaissance. In a sense he and Shakespeare stand alone. Faustus and Hamlet stand alone as the exponents of that divine discontent which makes the sixteenth-century Renaissance one with the second Renaissance which began with Goethe and Wordsworth and had as its counterpart to Marlowe Shelley, and as its counterpart to Shakespeare Browning.

Faustus dismisses Physic ("the end of physic is our body's health"), Law (Gains and Justinian), which "aims at nothing but external truth," and even Divinity and resolves to turn for the solution of things to the "metaphysics of magicians." Then the Good Angel cries, "Oh Faustus, lay that damned book aside," while the Bad Angel insists

Go forward, Faustus, in that famous art
Wherein all Nature's treasure is contained:
Be thou on earth as Jove is in the sky,
Lord and Commander of these elements.

The tragedy is in few words perfectly set. The first scenes with Mephistopheles, the fallen angel infinitely sad at that absence

of the presence of God which makes his eternal Hell, expose the infinite desires of a mortal man who repels almost all opportunities of repentance. The scenes in the Papal Court and in the Imperial Court are illustrations of the superb downward path illustrated by fear but also by hope that the path could be ended:

Tush, Christ did call the thief upon the Cross.

In the fatal Fifth Act, when Helen, the incarnation of all the human sense of beauty, appears, an Old Man offers Faustus his last chance, with extraordinary dramatic fitness, and the Scholar almost accepts the cleansing offer for his inward soul. Mephistopheles indeed despairs:

His faith is great; I cannot touch his soul;
But what I may afflict his body with
I will attempt, which is but little worth.

Then the vision appears:

Was this the face that launch'd a thousand ships,
And burned the topless towers of Ilium?

O, thou art fairer than the evening's air
Clad in the beauty of a thousand stars.

The superb second scene follows in the Scholar's Study when the forces of Hell, led by Lucifer himself, come to claim the soul while his brother Scholars pray not without hope for Faustus. Was Faustus finally lost? It is true that he is carried off by Mephistopheles, but it is also true that he repented, that the Devil confessed "I cannot touch his soul," and that he died in the presence of God, the angry God whom the Devil could not see. There is just a doubt, an intentional dramatic doubt, which learned commentators would be wise to appreciate since it adds to the fearful force of the closing lines.

Yet for Christ's sake, whose blood has ransom'd me,
Impose some end to my incessant pain.

J. E. G. DE M.

* * *

PROFESSOR PRIBRAM'S LECTURES.*

The Ford Lectures delivered in Oxford in 1927 by Professor Pribram have at length appeared in an attractive volume of 150 pages entitled *England and the International Policy of the Great Powers, 1871-1914*. Short though it is the book deserves a warm welcome, for it is the work of a master who combines unrivalled knowledge of the sources with very exceptional impartiality. The distinguished historian who gave us *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary* some years ago has enriched his pages with extracts from

* The Clarendon Press. 10s. 6d.

the State Archives in Vienna covering the entire period of his survey, and in this respect he has added to our knowledge. The chief importance of the book, however, is to be found in the fact that it shows "how British foreign policy appears to an unbiased Continental historian." It will be a source of satisfaction to English readers that his verdict is, on the whole, decidedly favourable. Our statesmen, he declares, held firmly to our traditional policy—the balance of power, supremacy at sea, and the saving of Belgium from control by the strongest Continental Power. Our fears of the growing German fleet, and our naval and diplomatic preparations for a possible and even probable conflict, were not unreasonable. For though the German Government at no time desired to attack us, German policy was changeable, clumsy and rash.

Indeed, the book is a severe condemnation of Germany's short-sighted policy, all the more impressive from its moderation of tone. Its worst and costliest error was the rejection of "the outstretched hand of England" at the turn of the century. Though an alliance in the usual sense was never officially offered, the statesmen of Berlin

cannot be excused for declining the proposals of agreement on single questions which would have tended to strengthen the mutual confidence of the two nations. By their rigid insistence upon the principle of all or nothing, they missed the opportunity to enter into a union which would have proved of advantage to Germany and perhaps beneficial to the entire world.

The loss of this golden moment was bad enough, and the naval challenge that followed was worse. No Continental historian of our time has more thoroughly understood the tradition of our policy and the instincts of an island people. And no book presents a more authoritative explanation to German and Austrian readers why we made up our quarrels with France and Russia and finally entered the war on their side. The translation is excellent, and the reader's only complaint is that the paragraphs are often much too long.

* * *

THE MEANING OF CIVILISATION.*

The Evolution of Man from the lower creation to the highest levels must always be an entrancing study, and Mr. C. E. M. Joad's method of approach has many merits. Somewhat in the way that Mrs. Markham taught history in the middle of the nineteenth century Mr. Joad arrives at his conclusions by reversing her process. Mrs. Markham introduced the child as the questioner, Mr. Joad tries to elicit from the child Lucy her views as to the

* *The Story of Civilisation*. By C. E. M. Joad. "How and Why" Series. Edited by Gerald Bullett. A. and C. Black. 2s. 6d. net.

meaning of civilisation, and it is upon this introductory talk that the book is written.

The author holds that it is quite easy to say what is not civilisation, but much more difficult to express what it is. In thinking the subject out, not taking it for granted, as is the habit with all things to which we have grown accustomed, it seems to have resolved itself into the following answer. Civilisation is the outcome of the development of the inquisitive section of the brain; the section which is never content with things as they are, as Walter Savage Landor says in his *Imaginary Conversations* between Newton and Barrow: "Newton, 'I am never quite satisfied'; Barrow, 'Those who are quite satisfied sit still and do nothing; those who are not quite satisfied are the sole benefactors of the world.'" Again, as the author shows, this faculty of observation is the source from whence all invention flows. It is the fact of invention, not the thing invented, which is the parent of civilisation. Real knowledge, beauty, art, things that never die, are a joy for ever, and the race finds them in the greatest abundance in the most civilised.

To follow Mr. Joad's method of question and answer: How was it that great civilisations arose? It is comparatively easy to understand their upgrowth and even their fall, but it is not so easy to contemplate their decline. Was it due to the deterioration of a certain racial concentration, or was it nature's way of expansion by a gradual decentralisation which broke up the boundaries of their culture, a culture that had lowered their power of resistance by luxury, idleness and sumptuous living, and caused them to fall an easy prey to barbarians who had begun to partake of that culture? That is the story, in part, of Greece, and in whole of Rome. It is a story of gain and loss, and regain. Only now are we realising to what heights the civilisations of the past had risen. Exploration, excavation and the late acquisition of the knowledge of ancient script and of tongues like Sanscrit have taught us much as to this ebb and flow.

A new era of civilisation has arisen in the twentieth century. Slavery was the means whereby the nations of the past lived and reared their palaces, temples, aqueducts and bridges. To-day, as Mr. Joad shows, the slaves have changed places. We are the slaves of the machine, and our use of mechanism depends upon our service. Mechanism has become the force of our age, providing for every want and also giving to man the leisure to enjoy things beautiful and useful. The true use of that leisure is the point which Mr. Joad labours. The modern Post Office announces that "The telephone makes life easier." Is ease the *summum bonum*

of our civilisation? This little book, even a child's book, must give us pause.

The mental development of our time which has brought science into our homes, must press us on to higher things over our dead selves, things more difficult and not more easy. The hope for the future on which Mr. Joad relies, is not in the sharing of money, or the redistribution of wealth, but in right over might, in good government (which means righteous laws, justice and education and all the knowledge which follows in its train); and that peace which at present passeth knowledge. The wish is father to the thought and the thought to action, and so looking ahead civilisation may at length realise that offensive war can never be but a backward step retarding the progress of the nations in the uncivilised and deadly effort to assert their supremacy.

S. DE M.

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ISABELLA OF SPAIN.*

Isabella the Catholic is an ideal subject for a romantic biography; and Mr. Walsh has performed his task, on the whole, admirably. The style of the work is a little over-florid: it is not entirely free from mistakes of detail: and the colours are laid on somewhat too garishly. But, generally, it is well written, it is unquestionably vivid, and it conveys a living picture of its central figure and her times. In one respect, however, the author has gone too far.

There was no need for the consistent vilification of all the non-Christian elements in the population of the Peninsula in the fifteenth century. The picture painted of the Moors, as a mob of dusky ruffians, is very far removed from the historical facts as they are known, notwithstanding the heroic attempt of Torquemada to blot out all relics of their culture. In his treatment of the Jews, similarly, Mr. Walsh oversteps the bounds of restraint. There is no outrage of which he considers them and their *converso* brethren incapable: and he actually stigmatises them with responsibility for ritual outrages which have never before been seriously alleged, in England, during the course of the present generation at least. He takes it for granted that they were in the habit of "torturing" the Host: overlooking the fact that such a practice presupposes a degree of belief in the supernatural nature of the consecrated elements which would have been self-contradictory in them (it must be remembered that the mediæval conception of a Jew was that of a deliberate miscreant rather than, simply, a blind unbeliever). What is worse, he repeats, without proper examination, the allegations of child-murder for ritual

* *Isabella of Spain*. By W. T. Walsh. Sheed and Ward. 15s.

purposes, which have caused such untold horrors to the Jewish people. In one instance, he repeats uncritically the words of an old chronicler, of typical bigotry. In another—the famous case of *El Santo Niño de La Guardia*—he goes into the question more thoroughly, and decides that there was no question as to the guilt of the Jews or (by implication) as to the justice of the Edict of Expulsion of 1492 with which the whole body was visited as punishment. No English court of law, however, would have brought in a verdict of guilty on the evidence. The confessions were elicited by torture: the name and identity of the pretended victim remained unknown: no witness could be found who had seen him: and no trace of the body was ever discovered. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the pretended "martyr" (whose cult continues in Spain even to-day, though it was never officially recognised by the Catholic Church), never in fact existed at all.

C. R.

* * *

THE RISORGIMENTO.*

Sir John Marriott has given a new *format* to his deservedly successful book *The Makers of Modern Italy* originally published as long ago as 1889. It was very popular both in Italy and England: "That youthful adventure was rewarded with a measure of success entirely unanticipated by the author." Yet in 1889 the *Risorgimento* had not run its full course. Though Italy was at last united by the efforts of four very great, but very different, men, Mazzini, Cavour, Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel, and the entry into Rome of June 2nd, 1871, was the signal of the entry into the European family of another Great Power, yet, as Sir John Marriott says, the unity was palpably superficial. Italy was still the land of cities unready (as India is unready) for the Western democratic representation of all its parts; its peasantry was illiterate; it, as a nation, was poor and the land was ill-connected by railroads or even roads; taxation was heavy, competent officials were hard to find and (worst of all) administration was corrupt. Italy's colonial policy (about the time when this book first appeared) was disastrous, Socialism or rather Communism had reared in all parts of the land its grim serpentine head and the peril was not crushed until the political triumph of Benito Mussolini in August 1922. But in the meantime her brilliant share in the Great War on the side of the Entente had enabled Italy to complete her frontiers, and the Peninsula was secure to ensure her own social salvation. Whatever else may be

* *The Makers of Modern Italy: Napoleon—Mussolini*. By Sir J. A. R. Marriott. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 10s. net.

said of the Fascist régime, Sir John Marriott says with balanced judgment :

It is certain that in less than a decade the whole face of the country has been transformed to the evident advantage of the sojourner, and presumably of the permanent inhabitants. Order and discipline have been restored; squalor has been replaced by decency; cleanliness and a reasonable standard of sanitation prevail where previously there was filth and disease; means of transport, whether by road or rail, have been improved out of all recognition; new buildings of imposing design adorn the cities; new domestic dwellings attest by their profusion the higher standard of comfort attained by the lower and middle classes; notwithstanding an immense development in the hydro-electric industry, the consumption of coal is said to have increased by 50 per cent.; there is no "dole," yet unemployment, until the advent of the world-blizzard, did not exist; peace is enforced in industry, and agriculture has benefited by improved methods and the development of the means of transit. But have not all these advantages been attained at the price of that which is more precious than rubies, the enjoyment of liberty, personal and political? The answer to that question depends on the definition of "liberty." "Liberty," said Mussolini, echoing Mazzini, "is not a right but a duty." Parliamentary democracy—and all that the phrase implies to an Englishman—has unquestionably been superseded by a dictatorship; the Press is muzzled; Parliament has been reduced to the position of a debating society, without the power to legislate, and has no control whatever over the Executive; the new electoral methods seem (at any rate to an Englishman, so far as he can comprehend them) a mere travesty of representative government. Despite many elaborate devices, all real power is concentrated in the Fascist Grand Council and its President. All this may be admitted, without establishing any conclusive indictment against the Fascist régime. Fascism derives from a curious blend of Imperialism, Nationalism, and Syndicalism. . . . we must await results. Meanwhile, Englishmen who are disposed to pronounce hasty judgment will do well to recall the history of their own political evolution.

This dispassionate estimate, scrupulously fair to every side of the present stage of the *Risorgimento*, must make the student of the history of politics, and not only in Italy, think. There is one aspect of the change that Sir John Marriott has not dealt with fully—the juridical aspect; but even apart from that and taking into account the new relationship of the Church and State, an achievement of which Augustus or Napoleon would have been proud, events show that Signor Mussolini is a statesman of a very high order, operating in regions that are not twentieth century but sixteenth century regions—as the author points out—from our English point of view. Presumably, Signor Mussolini knows the stage of development which his own countrymen have reached. In the

spirit of Mazzini and even of Cavour, and still more of Garibaldi, the present régime in Italy would be pure and wrongful dictatorship. Yet, it is fair to ask, could any one of them, given a united Italy such as existed, say in 1889, have done better? The answer is not doubtful. They must have failed. Sir John Marriott makes clear that though they were immortal pioneers they could not have faced the post-war situation that Signor Mussolini, himself a wounded war-veteran, as much a tiger in actual battle as Garibaldi himself, faced successfully so far as the prestige of Italy, a great nation among great nations, is concerned. A great nation in a fierce crisis is somewhat like the white-hot iron on the anvil. All history shows that it is dictatorship that wields the hammer and the iron on the anvil suffers, for a while. England herself suffered under the Tudors, France under Napoleon. It is all very well to sing, as Swinburne sang in the *Halt Before Rome* (in September 1867) :

. . . a name with her children to be
From Calabrian to Adrian Sea
Famous in cities made free
That ring to the roar of the lion
Proclaiming republican Rome.

The fact was that a group of cities did not make a nation and democracy in Italy had not reached the stage that the English-trained Cavour thought. Democracy has to be trained; Man, acclaimed in the *Songs Before Sunrise*, has to be educated and moulded. Whether Signor Mussolini's way, whether Napoleon's way, whether the Cæsarean way is right or wrong it is hard for a foreigner to tell.

Napoleon created a united Italy and he did it not only by force, but by the introduction of the system of law which had and has been so successful in France. He found that there were efforts for legal reform at work in the Italy that he had conquered. The States of the Church had been slowly co-ordinating the Canon Law with something better. The Grand Duke Peter Leopold of Tuscany introduced, in 1786, a reform of the Criminal Law. The next year Joseph II of Lombardy followed suit. In the new Kingdom of Italy created by Napoleon, consisting of Venetia, Lombardy, Modena, Romagna and the Marches, Romagnosi, the great jurist, began at Milan to formulate a reformed Code, but he was stopped, and on December 6th, 1810, the French Penal Code was introduced; the work of Romagnosi, however, remained as a guide to future efforts. King Joseph in Naples promulgated in 1808 a criminal code of his own, but under Murat the French Code of 1810 was substituted. After the fall of Napoleon the Austrian Penal Code was promulgated in the Lombard and Venetian provinces. The Two Sicilies

had a Criminal Code from 1819. In Tuscany the Legislation of 1786 was revived. Some efforts were even made in the States of the Church and Pius IX was in favour of reform. In 1827 a new compilation of laws, civil and criminal, was drafted for Sardinia and a new Criminal Code came into force in 1848. In 1859 Victor Emmanuel II published his new Penal Code. A scientific Italian movement was at work in the region of law from 1829. In 1865 a code was adopted for the whole kingdom except Tuscany which preserved her own old code. In 1890 a new Penal Code came into force and was supplemented in 1913 by a New Code of Criminal Procedure. Last year a new and excellent Penal Code, the fruit of Signor Mussolini's direct efforts, incorporating what is best in the whole scientific movement, came into being for the Kingdom of Italy. In a future edition of Sir John Marriott's delightful and instructive work it might be possible to incorporate some account of the evolution of law, and especially criminal law, in Italy from the year 1786 or a little earlier. It would explain various points in the narrative and would show that Napoleon and Signor Mussolini were alike sure that a great system of law and procedure is necessary to the advancement of a great nation. The growth of law in Italy is, indeed, an important part in the whole *Risorgimento* movement.

J. E. G. DE M.

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EDUCATION FOR EMPIRE SETTLEMENT.*

Dr. Alexander Scholes, a young Australian student of education, educated at Melbourne University, has written a thesis on Education for Empire Settlement based on close historical study and direct observation in Great Britain and in the course of a journey back to Australia by way of Canada and New Zealand. This thesis has been approved by the University of Edinburgh for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, and is published as the sixth of the series of Royal Empire Society Imperial Studies edited by Professor A. P. Newton. The earlier Studies are purely historical, dealing with the political unrest in Upper Canada from 1815 to 1836, the British West Africa Settlement from 1750 to 1821, the British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, British Policy and Canada from 1774 to 1791, and Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction in the seventeenth century. Dr. Scholes deals with the history of juvenile migration for the purposes of Empire settlement, but his motive

* Royal Empire Society Imperial Studies No. 6. *Education for Empire Settlement: A Study of Juvenile Migration.* By Alex. G. Scholes. Longmans. 7s. 6d. net.

is to set a present-day educational and imperial problem in an historical background. He, as Dr. M. J. Rendall, the Chairman of the Imperial Studies Committee, tells us, is one of a group of young scholars of thirty years or under, who are attacking these imperial problems. The result is that in all these theses the student gets not only a modern point of view, but one that is presented with enthusiasm by those who have no *arrière pensées* and are looking forward to participating in the work of Imperial or Dominion Government.

Dr. Scholes' *Study on Education for Empire Settlement* is based on the most careful historical investigation of the story of juvenile delinquents in England in the early nineteenth century, a terrible record of infamous mismanagement which applied the system of transportation to children as well as adults. By 1836 the very worst was over and the famous Parkhurst Prison was started for boys sentenced to transportation. The idea was to give a course of reformatory training consisting of a sound general education with training in a trade and agriculture. In the ten years from 1842 to 1852 nearly 1,500 boys were transported after training. A report from the Governor of Van Diemen's Land in 1847 said :

They appear from close scrutiny to be not only exceedingly well trained, both as regards habits and industry, and of uniformly respectful demeanour, but the greatest pains, it must be evident, must have been taken in their moral and mental culture. Of their conduct in this colony I cannot speak too highly, and in private service it has likewise, as far as I can learn, been most satisfactory.

These were the types of children and adolescents who, in England, had been condemned to moral destruction in the prisons or had been executed for trivial offences or sentenced, as pauper children, to practical slavery in the Northern mills. At the present day we have not fully learnt the lesson that a whole century and a half of brutal treatment of children ought to have taught us. To-day there are not less than 500,000 children of the ages between fourteen and sixteen years in England and Wales who have left school and are not protected in any way from the evils of industrial work. Their hours are not limited, the character of their employment is not controlled, the carrying of disastrously heavy weights (such as sacks of coal) is not forbidden. The "Cry of the Children" is still with us.

Dr. Scholes gives the picture in 1832 and traces in eloquent detail the work of the reformatories and the industrial schools and the efforts of famous philanthropic societies to aid the cause of emigration, and especially to Canada. The work of Dr. Barnardo will be always remembered as will that of Mrs. Close in aiding, under the best conditions, the migration of Poor Law children at the beginning of this century and the birth of a new and very successful

movement under the auspices of that distinguished Rhodes scholar, Mr. Kingsley Fairbridge.

Before the War

The outlook on emigration, not only of juveniles, but of all classes, was becoming more imperial. The main aim was no longer to get rid of the surplus population of the Mother Country; it was to bring about a more economic distribution of the whole population of the Empire. Attempts were being made to keep emigrants in the Empire. Whereas from 1891 to 1900 only 28 per cent. of British emigrants had gone to the Dominions, in the next decade the percentage had risen to 63 per cent., and in 1913 it was as high as 78 per cent. And this change had been brought about without direct State assistance for emigration. . . . A Bill embodying the measures recommended by the two conferences [of the Prime Ministers] was introduced into Parliament, and, passing almost without opposition, became law on the 21st May, 1922, as the Empire Settlement Act, 1922. It empowered the Secretary of State to co-operate with any British Dominion, or with any public or private body throughout the Empire, in assisting the settlement overseas of suitable persons. . . . Thus in a few years the policy of the State with regard to emigration had changed from non-participation to active assistance.

Under that Act 24,496 juvenile boys and 3,533 juvenile girls, unaccompanied by relatives, have been enabled to migrate to Australia, Canada and New Zealand in the five years ending in 1927. No less than twenty-six societies for social service participate in this vitally important work: the distribution of highly-trained types of young people throughout the Dominions. Dr. Scholes gives full information as to the reception and the chances of the migrants in the great Dominions.

In the third part of his able book he sets forth the social aspects of juvenile migration with special reference to education. He discusses the relation of migration to Great Britain's unemployment problem; its value to the Dominions; the physical and mental standards required for successful migration, and, finally, indicates "the part which the schools of Great Britain might play in preparing young settlers for oversea life." The various points are dealt with in scientific detail. He presses the needed point that the tendency for men to outnumber women in migration "which causes an uneconomic surplus of women in Great Britain, causes in the newer parts of the Empire a lack of female population and seriously hinders their development." The excess of males over females in Western Canada and in all Australia is very heavy. The Dominions could absorb annually several thousand British secondary school girls provided that they are properly trained at school and willing to act as home-helpers in the home and in the farms. Perhaps Dr. Scholes does not fully realise the work that is being done in the

schools in England and Wales to give the children a rural bias. The statistics of the Board of Education do not fully reflect what is being done both in class work and in the efforts of the Scouting Movement and the School Journey Movement. The fact of unemployment in the Dominions at present scares many possible migrants, but better days are at hand and the scientific distribution of population in the Empire will have a new chance.

J. E. G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

The Republic of Latvia was first proclaimed on November 18th, 1918. Less than two months later, on January 2nd, 1919, Riga, the capital, was captured by the troops of Soviet Russia; and for five months this Baltic town underwent the experiment of Bolshevism. In a book entitled *The City of the Red Plague** M. George Popoff gives an account of the revolution and of his own personal experiences in Riga during this period. As a young man of twenty-three and a student at Riga University, M. Popoff belonged to a prominent bourgeois family. During the period of Soviet occupation, he went continually in fear of arrest and execution. It is a principle of Communism to abolish the middle classes, and in Riga the Bolsheviks endeavoured to pursue this policy by ruthless persecution and bloodshed. The author graphically describes a reign of terror which, first directed against the bourgeois, carried with it ruin and starvation to the poorest of the poor. The net result of an experiment which began with the promise to establish "a heaven on earth . . . ended with 5,000 people murdered, 6,500 dead of starvation, 6,000 in prison, 20,000 in the Dvina concentration camp; in all, some 30,000 persons deprived of their liberty. To this should be added millions upon millions of material damage through devastation, plunder and robbery." M. Popoff has written this extremely graphic account as a warning to Western Europe against the practical application of Communist doctrines. The author does not intend to "advocate or condemn any particular social order. Least of all is it directed against Socialism as such." But, whatever the intention, it is clear that this book provides strong anti-Soviet propaganda. The experiment of Bolshevism in Latvia, where "the conditions of life more nearly resembled those of Western Europe than those of Russia," caused a total collapse of economic life. It is well to keep in mind during the world economic depression that Bolshevism provides no adequate substitute. M. Popoff's book is recommended by the Book Society.

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The Scottish Investment Trust Companies,† by Mr. George Glasgow, is a companion volume to *The English Investment Trust Companies* by the same author, which appeared in 1930. Like its predecessor it is mainly composed of interesting statistical tables,

* Allen & Unwin. 10s. net.

† Eyre & Spottiswoode. 50s. net.

which give all available information relating to the capitalisation, inner reserves, earning power, dividends, bonus issues and market quotations of the Scottish investment trusts, classified as Pre-Baring, Pre-War and Post-War companies. The tables are preceded by ten chapters which to many readers will be the most interesting part of the book on account of the interest of the matter they contain. The author justly attributes the success of the Scottish trust company movement to the native shrewdness and hard work of the managements, and gives some remarkable examples of the enrichment which must have accrued to many trust company stock-holders who had the acumen to choose the right companies and to stick to their holdings over a period of years. Perhaps the most interesting feature of the present volume is the bringing out of points on which Scottish practice differs from English. A common feature in the capital structure of Scottish trusts, which is seldom met with in England, is the short-dated terminable debenture. Another point of difference is that the Scottish companies do not publish and never have published any list of investments, with one solitary exception. The author has some shrewd observations on this subject. Amongst other things he says, "Probably 95 per cent. of proprietors do not look at published lists. The remainder probably are as wise after as before, or, alternatively, are spurred into doing something which they later repent." In the opinion of many trust company managements this puts the position in a nutshell. The classification of the portfolio from the geographic, generic and denominational points of view is also generally omitted, but the much more important figure of the surplus or depreciation on the investments is usually given. The two chapters "On the spreading of Risks" and "On Security" make excellent reading. "Great Britain, subjected to . . . the full cost of a remarkably irresponsible form of Socialist practice indulged in competitively by the politicians of each party when in office, discovered that, in effect, she had been following the Russian example of killing the goose that lays the golden eggs." And again, "Just as there is no such thing as unearned income, so there is no such thing as unearned security." High-priests of Democracy please note.

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A Manual of Children's Libraries,* by Mr. W. C. Berwick Sayers, Chief Librarian of the Croydon Public Libraries, is the third volume of the Library Association Series of Library Manuals. In the United States of America the importance of Children's Libraries has been recognised for forty years, but in this country the work is of comparatively recent growth. It is not generally realised that a true interest in books must be cultivated; the interest may be there in the first place, but in order to be of use it must be trained. Library work with children is a vocation; it requires infinite patience and love and knowledge of children as well as of books. The librarian must understand their interests and be ready to promote any scheme which will increase the value of the library. The following resolution was passed by the Library Association in 1917: "The creation in the child of intellectual interests, which is furthered by a love of books, is an urgent national need; while it is the business of this

* Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d. net.

School to foster the desire to know, it is the business of the library to give adequate opportunity for the satisfaction of this desire; library work with children ought to be the basis of all other library work; reading rooms should be provided in all public libraries, where children may read books in attractive surroundings, with the sympathetic and tactful help of trained children's librarians; but such provision will be largely futile except under the conditions which experience has shown to be essential to success." Since that date much has been done, and the movement grows in importance each year. These libraries are particularly valuable in the winter months and do much to lessen the time spent playing in wet and dirty streets; in fact they become (with their many activities) the children's club. The growth of these libraries will do much towards improvement in subject and style of popular fiction, and further an interest in books of more serious character. Mr. Sayers' valuable book is written with the authority of experience and should be of real interest to all who work with children.

* * *

Emil Ludwig's *Gifts of Life** opens with the statement that the book is a retrospect, not a self-portrait. It is both, for the writer paints himself vividly on every page. How could it be otherwise? Not only is he intensely alive, but he is in love with life—with the things of the mind, the things of the eye, and the things of the senses. The English edition has been wisely abridged, and the first half of the story might with advantage have received further cuts. But we are glad to make acquaintance with his father, the celebrated Breslau oculist, and there is a spice of romance in the elopement which led up to a happy and inspiring marriage. It is with his brief sojourn in London as correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt* on the eve of the war that the wider interest of the narrative begins. We are introduced to Lichnowsky, Bülow, Metternich, to Talaat in Constantinople, to Harden and Rathenau (the most brilliant portraits in his gallery) at the time of the Revolution, to Haldane and Grey, Asquith and Lloyd George after the war, to the formidable Poincaré in Paris, to Briand in Geneva, to Masaryk in Prague, to Edison in America. He possesses a rare capacity for making them all live, for he is no less interested in their faces and personal characteristics than in their words and deeds. Readers of his best-sellers will be interested to learn of his direct method of approach—the intense study of portraits and photographs, the preference of a man's own letters, table-talk and speeches to the descriptions of others. Emil Ludwig was over forty when his volumes on Goethe carried his name beyond the frontiers of his country, and for the next ten years he scored at every hit of the ball. The story ends with his fiftieth year, and it will be interesting to watch how this gifted man will employ his later years. His alert mind and observant eyes, at any rate, will never grow old.

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Poland 1914-1931,† by Robert Machray, supplies an admirable record of the fortunes of the Poles and their country during and after the cataclysm which caused her resurrection. It is a story of incessant

* G. P. Putnam's Sons. 21s.

† Allen & Unwin. 15s.

ups and downs, of crises and quarrels, but, seen in broad perspective, above all a story of growth. The author, whose previous volume on *The Little Entente* revealed his thoroughness and knowledge, is a sympathetic but not uncritical narrator of the rebirth of a nation. He frankly confesses that the average Pole suffers from "an excess of individualism," and indeed the ceaseless changes of Ministries induce a feeling of weariness and almost of disgust. The hero of the book is Pilsudski, whose sturdy figure forms the frontispiece and whose romantic career supplies such unity as it possesses. We see him before the war as the leader of the party of independence, with Dmowski and the pro-Russians on the other side of the fence. We see him joining Austria against Russia, and find him in the later stages of the conflict in a German prison. Having helped to build the state, he rendered a further supreme service by defeating the Bolsheviks before the gates of Warsaw in 1920, in what Lord D'Abernon has called the Sixteenth Decisive Battle of the World. It is well that the case for the national leader should be so cogently stated, and indeed it would be impossible to exaggerate his services up to this point. Many readers, however, will feel that Mr. Machray deals much too leniently with the seizure of Vilna and with the *coup d'état* of 1926, in which his hero shed without scruple the blood of his countrymen in the streets of the capital. The balance-sheet is still incomplete, for the Marshal remains in the centre of the stage. When the time comes for a final judgment this volume will furnish evidence which deserves to be carefully weighed. After entering a caveat against the eulogies of the later phases of a memorable career, the reviewer has nothing but praise for the careful summary of every aspect of the national life. This gifted people has now the opportunity of showing how far it is able to govern itself with credit and success, and how far it can content the racial minorities who reluctantly find themselves within the boundaries of the new state. Those who most warmly welcomed the rebirth of Poland are precisely those who most deeply regret any disappointment of their hopes of ordered liberty and complete equality of rights.

* * *

Professor Salvemini, as all the world knows, is a victim and a critic of the Fascist Dictatorship, indefatigable with tongue and pen in tearing aside the veil from the régime which has made him an exile and robbed his country of its freedom. *Mussolini Diplomat** traces the evolution of Italian diplomacy from the march on Rome in 1922 to the Disarmament Conference of 1932. "Impartiality is a dream," writes the distinguished historian, "probité a duty." This duty he fulfils by supplying references for every statement and every quotation, and indeed the volume is of value as a collection of material quite apart from the opinions of the author. Though every chapter in this extraordinary story is interesting, readers will turn with peculiar eagerness to the later years, when the quarrel with France set the nerves of Europe on edge, when the *rapprochement* with the defeated Powers began, and when the note was changed from angry menaces to the dove-like accents of peace. The latter, so sudden and so unexpected, is explained as a move in the duel with France. The rival of Italy in the Mediterranean is

* Bernard Grasset, Paris. 15 francs.

to be weakened either by the reduction of her armaments or by securing for the vanquished states the liberty to arm—"her vassals Hungary and Bulgaria, and her possible allies Germany and a Fascist Austria." In either event Mussolini would be in a position to renew his policy of "intrigues, provocations and threats." He adds that while the Duce and Signor Grandi are urging reduction of armaments, members of the party continue to beat the war drum which the Government has for the time put aside. "I wager that no one is less anxious to pass from words to action," writes our author, who sees in the roarings of the lion nothing but bluff. Yet he feels that the creation of so much of what we in England call hot air involves a certain danger, and as a good democrat he laments that the entire control of the policy of a great country should be in the hands of a single temperamental individual.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

The first six volumes of Sir Ernest Benn's new enterprise,* "Benn's Ninepenny Novels, leaders of Modern Fiction," have now been published. They are as follows: (1) "The Next Generation," by J. D. Beresford, (2) "Incredible Tale," by Naomi Royde-Smith, (3) "Love is a Flame," by Mrs. Belloc Lowndes, (4) "The Broom Squires," by Eden Phillpotts, (5) "The Single Heart," by Storm Jameson, (6) "Leap Before You Look," by Alec Waugh. This series will be an interesting experiment, for it will prove the possibilities of publishing first-class work in the best manner at a minimum price. The books are exceedingly well got up; clear type, reasonable margins, stout paper covers with a dignified design, and the size is suitable for the coat-pocket or handbag. Sir Ernest Benn evidently intends to persuade the public to buy books once more; the stories are new, and as paper covers are unsuitable for circulating libraries, these novels will have to be bought to be read. An important feature of the books is their length, which is half that of the usual novel. It is thought that there are many writers who will find this length more suitable; their work is too long for the short story and yet is not long enough for the usual seven-and-sixpenny size novel. This series will be particularly useful to travellers, and may well vie with the story magazines.

* * *

"The Peace Year Book"† for 1932, which is compiled by the National Peace Council, is a useful volume of peace propaganda. It has been designed "to serve as a book of reference for Peace workers at home and abroad concerning the Peace movement throughout the world; and to provide in a concise form reliable information on the major questions of Peace and War of the day." Mr. W. Arnold Forster has written an interesting article reviewing the international situation in 1931. Other articles are devoted to a number of specific questions, as for example the Manchurian Crisis and the Hoover Moratorium. A large portion of the volume is devoted to the activities of the

* Benn Limited. 9d.

† National Peace Council. 1s. 6d.

various Peace organisations at home and abroad. Mr. Arthur Henderson has written a Foreword to a special section on the Disarmament Conference. This section deals cursorily with the progress of disarmament since the war, the report of the Preparatory Commission and preparations for the Conference itself, and the relative armaments position of the Great Powers. In a number of Appendices a large variety of figures and statistics on armament expenditure are set out. The success of the Disarmament Conference must ultimately depend upon the measure of active public support. "Governments will only make the armament reductions that are required," writes Mr. Henderson, "if their peoples are ready to follow them along the path of peace. Now is that time for organised public opinion to give the lead. I wish the National Peace Council 'god-speed' in the splendid work it has begun."

In "The World Crisis 1911-1918" Mr. Winston Churchill has prepared an abridged and revised edition of his four earlier volumes on the World Crisis which deal with the events leading up to the Great War and the conduct of the war itself. Since these volumes were written during the ten years after the war, new knowledge has come to light and the whole catastrophe is falling into a fuller and more real perspective. "I have profited," Mr. Churchill writes in his Preface, "by the new knowledge wherever possible." The story of Lord Fisher's resignation has been recast and "I have given a much fuller account of the great opening battles in France based upon a study of the latest trustworthy information," including a new chapter on the Battle of the Marne. Mr. Churchill, however, has found no ground for altering his personal opinions upon the chief problems. "In the main . . . I have found myself unable to alter the critical judgments which I formed upon the many aspects of the naval, military and political conduct of the war." On the whole this compendious volume will receive the same support and the same criticism as has been directed to the earlier volumes. But it has the great advantage of being a clear and continuous narrative, "pruned of a mass of technical detail," and of small matters with only a contemporary importance. Mr. Churchill describes this combined edition as "a contribution to history strung upon a fairly strong thread of personal reminiscence." To the historian of the future the value of this book will probably lie more in the reminiscences of the author than as an historical record. The future historian will be able to weigh the true values and separate the chaff from the wheat in a manner impossible to any contemporary writer.

* Thornton Butterworth. 21s. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

MAY, 1932

PROTECTION AND THE BUDGET.

THE financial year has closed with a surplus of £364,000, and Lord Snowden claims the result as a final convincing illustration of the outstanding merits of a free trading system of finance and taxation. Mr. Snowden was the authority responsible for the framework of the Budget, and for many of its provisions, and though some of the taxation imposed, for instance on beer and stamps, has not come up to the estimates level for reasons which might have been foreseen, and though the surplus is a million pounds below the final revised Budget calculation, yet Lord Snowden is justly entitled to be proud of the result. There is certainly one portion of that Budget which he did not foresee at the time of its original drafting—and that is the revenue derived from punitive or commercial, as distinct from revenue, tariffs. Since the yield from them is for this past financial year a mere trifling proportion of the total Revenue, their existence does not invalidate Lord Snowden's contention. The great bulk of the £770 millions raised from the forty-four millions of English and Scotch people has been found by the old sources of supply. Income-tax and Surtax yield £360 millions; Death Duties £65 millions; Excise £120 millions; and Customs £136 millions. For the previous year, 1930-1, the corresponding revenues were Customs £121 millions; Excise £124 millions; Death Duties £82 millions; and Income-tax with Surtax £320 millions—out of a total of receipts of £776 millions.

Before I write anything further on the *system* of finance, let me draw attention to these figures, which show startling decreases in power to respond to pressure of expenditure. In 1930-1 twelve months' yield of Income-tax and Super-tax was in round figures £320 millions. In 1931-2 fifteen months produced £364 millions: yield in the same proportion ought to have produced £50 millions more. Death Duties yielded £20 millions less in 1931-2 than in 1930-1. Excise is down by £3 millions, and Stamps, which were estimated in March 1930 to produce £27 millions, only yielded £20 millions in 1930-1, and further dropped to a yield of £17 millions during 1931-2. Customs, it is true, have risen from £121 millions to £136 millions, partly due to higher rates, partly to anticipatory entries, partly to new duties. The last, the most important, and the most serious of this series of figures, is that of total net expenditure. In 1930-1, the issues from the Exchequer were, apart from sinking fund, £732 millions. In 1931-2 the total issues, apart from sinking

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fund, were £738 millions. In other words, during a period of unparalleled financial stringency restriction, and commercial collapse and insolvency, public expenditure has risen by £6 millions, while actual receipts from intensive taxation of the public have fallen off by £5 millions. Redemption of debt has decreased from £66 millions in 1930 to £32 millions during 1931-2. Lord Snowden as an author of the late Budget may be satisfied with its achievements—as a servant of the public and a trustee of its welfare he must stand aghast at its vicinity to a general collapse. There has been no “Economy,” or economies made by the Government of the necessary size or character. Savings here or reductions there have been, so far as the past Budget is concerned, offset by continuance of extravagances or increases elsewhere. Just as Mr. Churchill’s budgets were characteristically disfigured and financially disgraced by raids on capital assets for revenue disbursements, so this last budget is only balanced and its face-saving surplus is only secured by a final raid (almost to be applauded for its moderation) on the last capital asset the Government can touch.

It is under such conditions that one portion of the Cabinet, with zealous enthusiasm if their public utterances are any guide to their opinions, have embarked on a policy of financing the expenditure of the country on the basis of tariffs imposed at a comparatively low rate on the largest possible number of articles. Supplementary charges on other goods are imposed at a very high rate mainly with a view to preventing competition by foreign production with British manufacturers and increasing employment of British labour. Another portion of the Cabinet, notably Mr. Runciman and Sir John Simon, with apparently some of their Conservative colleagues, seem to acquiesce with reluctance and doubt in this departure for the restriction of imports, while yet a third portion, the Liberals and Lord Snowden, openly disavow their responsibility for the tariff proposals and their disbelief in the efficacy of such remedies either for our own difficulties or for those of other nations. The end, and not the means, being of importance, if the Government can carry on reasonably and really economically I should be content.

Free Traders like myself may take some slight comfort from the fact that inside fullest knowledge of the condition and prospects of British trade has not compelled the last-named Ministers, who are not the least able of the minds in the Cabinet, to abandon their opinions as to the folly of adding yet another protectionist system to those already at work. Personally I attach great importance to the speeches of Sir H. Samuel in the Commons and Lord Snowden in the Lords in defence of free trade. They have been, of course, consistent advocates of that theory of National Finance, but their

public record goes to show that each of them is strong enough and wise enough to abandon tradition and practice when the welfare and safety of the State demands a change. While some of the tariff anger at Sir H. Samuel’s remarks was due to the vigour of his pronouncement, much more was caused by the strength of the arguments which have not been, as they could not be, answered. Notwithstanding my own agreement with their views, and all that experience and knowledge can point to in the past, or foresight can suggest for the future, the fact remains, I am sure, that the electors have made up their minds to give a moderate tariff system a fair trial. Many signs point to such a conclusion.

It cannot be denied that the country is in a bad way. Labour, and even at the last election there were five million Labour voters, is not going to admit that Labour extravagance or finance has anything to do with our sudden collapse. Labour support for tariffs is, therefore, while not official, neither inconsiderable nor inactive.

After eighty years of prosperity the hardships of the “Hungry Forties” are forgotten, and the unemployment of the present day is ascribed to the policy of the present day, and any port is welcome in a storm. The extreme protectionists are, either by the policy or by the doubts of Conservative leaders, kept in the background. Prices have not noticeably or generally gone up. Some articles even of common use or consumption have declined in price, notably flour and eggs. That they would have declined further, but for the tariffs, can be but a conjecture in the public estimation. The fall is a fact in the mouth of protectionists. Though we discounted as far as possible the claim to post-election support for import duties, there were numbers of Liberals who voted for a general tariff experiment, and who are quite ready to see it actually made in the trade to which they themselves belong. It is the old story of the Grimsby fisherman who was a free trader in everything but herrings. For such and similar reasons the public are, so far as I can find out, prepared to give the tariff proposals a trial trip, to see how far goods are kept out by tariffs and make room for home-made articles, and thus how far employment, lessening distress and idleness, is found anew. As to how many foreign industries transfer manufacture to this country there is considerable curiosity and some expectation. Alternatively, there are not a few free traders whose opinions and action will change permanently if revenue sufficient to lower the income-tax can be obtained from tariffs imposed on foreign goods, and will not object if their introduction serves the double purpose of lightening their own direct taxation, and of providing them with commodities cheaper than the home market can provide. Such motives inspire quite a number of persons to hold their hands before condemning the policy of the Government,

and prevent the re-start, on anything like the scale of 1904-5, of Mr. Asquith's campaign against the tariff reformers.

There are, moreover, certain new factors on either side which call for fresh consideration. One of these, on which great stress was laid by Mr. Baldwin in a speech at Worcester on April 2nd, is the number of the smaller post-war European States, each with its complex, varying, and restrictive tariff. Incidentally, he went out of his way to dilate on the temporary and experimental character of the British proposals, and elaborated the reminder that what one Parliament did the next could undo. The vast and unprofitable increase of European custom barriers since the war is no new theme, it has been the commonplace of free trade pamphlets and economic speakers ever since the Brussels Conference. It is well that part of the arguments should have pierced Mr. Baldwin's mind. Apparently only part has done so, for his remedy is to unite the separate small entities into one *Zollverein*, not for the purpose of removing or lowering their custom duties, but only in order to simplify any such negotiations as may become necessary with them. But our object being the sale of British goods, no reason is given why it should be easier to penetrate the frontiers of, say, France or Brazil, than of Bulgaria or Esthonia. The United States is evidence to the contrary. The successive ridges of tariffs to be encountered in crossing Europe are a source of delay and expense, but they are not necessarily so fatal to international commerce as one single barrier if the latter is only high enough. It is well, as Mr. Baldwin says, if over a large area of Europe there should be greater freedom of trade. The formation of three or four great economic confederations, say Scandinavian, Germanic, Danubian or Gallic, each bent on cutting the other's throat, would not bring relief to the present situation. Indeed, each would be more self-dependent and self-contained, financially and economically, than any of its component units, so the struggle for what was thought to be a victory might be even more prolonged, more envenomed and more disastrous than at present.

Another consideration which has come into being since people last considered tariff reform, is the bankrupt condition of nearly every Government, European or American. The difficult task of balancing budgets swollen by past extravagance, and of meeting the heavy taxation imposed therefor, creates a psychological condition in which the individual in his triple capacity of elector, taxpayer and purchaser falls an easy victim to that unreflecting patriotism which bids him buy British or Italian or Hungarian as the case may be. With great dexterity, and no doubt in perfect good faith for the most part, the believers in high tariffs have enlisted in their service the nationalistic egotism which since the war has

blown like a tornado across Europe. This sentiment, arising during the time when Poles, Serbs, and Bohemians were subject races, has developed into a self-sufficing ambition with the grant of independence, and commercial hostility is reckoned as the hall-mark of political freedom. The bad example they set and copied has ended so obviously in their own ruin and in the embarrassment of their larger neighbours, that one would have expected their fate to be a signal of danger to even the most convinced of protectionists in this country. That it has not been such, in the case of so balanced a mind as Mr. Baldwin's, is plain from his own words. He contemplated rather the concentration than the abolition of tariffs. Yet the Four-Power Conference lately sitting makes clear how high tariffs have enhanced bad feeling, have prevented the newer States from utilising the experience, the organisation, and the skilled direction of the former Empires, and thus, for each in turn, have caused the loss of the markets they once possessed in common. The tension thus in being has clouded further the atmosphere of Reparations, and caused the egregious folly of an insistence on their payment, or at least on their continued recognition. The necessity of providing payment for these in gold, since the high tariffs of the two creditor countries prevent the payments in goods, has led to difficulties of transfers, these to restrictions of exchange, and so to quotas. The vicious circle has become complete, and to my mind the most vicious part of it is the last.

Who is the Government or person concerned with the reintroduction of the quota system into trade or finance, I do not know. Anything more restrictive of initiative, industry, invention, or foresight I cannot imagine. Nor where it is used wholly, as in France, and partially, as in Germany, as an offensive weapon in the armoury of protection, is it easy to find an effective reply in the working of free trade. Sometimes the home trade is shut down by express prohibition, but since Geneva agreements render this difficult, percentage reservation has taken its place. Neither advantage of design, quality of material, price, convenience of purchase, or terms of credit, the usual weapons of competitive trade, are of any avail. Good and bad, cheap or dear, essential or luxury are alike automatically excluded under a quota system. A variation of the system has recently been tried in Germany. The individual merchant is restricted in his purchases of foreign goods to percentages of his orders eighteen months previously. He is confined not merely to a defined proportion of total previous goods and credits, but the proportion of each different kind is fixed too. There may be a falling off in demand for a particular article, but the merchant may not make up the deficiency in his total business by other purchases. His clients must go without. But while such

a system in the first instance limits and may destroy ultimately an import trade, it must have a corresponding effect on export trade. No remedy has been suggested for such an attack on trade generally, and the world is further menaced by its adoption here in Great Britain. I confess the purpose and action of such a movement affect me profoundly, and for the moment I see no reply save that which may be attempted by retaliatory measures. Such might be passive or active, might take the form of refusing to find credit, or to participate in a stand-still arrangement or loan guarantee. Such passive pressure is only applicable in the case of a country already in difficulties, to those whose sales and purchases are not of much moment in our total trade figures. Other nations of importance, frightened of losing gold cover, have forbidden purchase of exchange. So because their nationals are forbidden to remit gold or sterling here, our nationals practically are forbidden by such foreign Government to make, e.g., locomotives or boots in this country. Enactments of this nature put completely in the shade such protective duties as the 10 per cent. on which Mr. Chamberlain poured scorn last year, but humbly puts up with at the present, or even as the 15 per cent. which would have satisfied Mr. Keynes' views in February 1931.

The fact is that nearly every person prominent in public life who is in any way responsible for the conduct of industry or Government has modified his views in one way or the other. We Liberal Free Traders are apt, I think, to devote too much thought and criticism to those of our fellows who have consented to adopt or sponsor a budget dependent in considerable measure upon the yield of an immense number of import duties. But we overlook that Conservatives, who a year ago were declaring that "whatever else they were going to do, it would not be anything so crude or feeble as a 10 per cent. tariff all round" have proposed, defended and enacted precisely such a tariff. Moreover, while the Chancellor of the Exchequer told his constituents that this Budget signified the permanent adoption of a protectionist system, the leader of his Party went out of his way, as I pointed out earlier in this article, to reiterate and emphasise Mr. Runciman's statement in the House of Commons that no legislation was permanent, but depended like the House itself upon the changing views of the electors. Mr. Baldwin not merely did not bang the door, he deliberately pushed it ajar and it will be our fault if we do not push it still further open. We do not know the reasons for Mr. Baldwin's attitude. Were they merely a recollection of his failure in 1923, or because he had noted and understood the rush for the "Free List," and digested the correspondence reaching the Board of Trade to which Lord Snowden referred the other day? Whatever his reasons, his speech was significant in its reservations and should not be forgotten.

Immense importance attaches to the Ottawa Conference. Every nerve will be strained by the British tariff reformers to make a series of bargains with the Dominions such as will tie us economically to them for long years to come. It does not follow that the wish can be father to the action—it may well be found unprofitable, impracticable, and impolitic. We have always contended that European and other foreign trade was in the aggregate more important to England than Imperial trade, whatever might be the per head consumption of the Empire, and that to offend our larger customers for the sake of our smaller ones might be found to be a course as eventually repugnant to our traders as it is at once to our common sense. Or again, it being notorious to anyone acquainted with sentiment in the Dominions that manufacturers there are determined to keep their home markets for their own exploitation, it might be discovered quite early in the proceedings that the openings in the Dominions in extension of present trade to be made by agreement are so small and likely to be so temporary that they could not by any process of bargaining be made equivalents for the barriers to be erected in other directions. It is at least clear that not again can there be a "schedule of forbidden industries," nor, as discussion proceeds and differences harden, will anyone be surprised if it is found impolitic to link up our trade too closely with the Dominions. Sentiment when applied to the making of even profitable business is not easily invoked, but sentiment can be very volatile, and easily becomes explosive, when business goes wrong. It is not difficult to imagine, in especially the case of Canada, that a trade bound by treaty to the Empire, and more particularly to Great Britain, might so develop as to enable an effective cry to be raised that Canadian interests were being sacrificed to imperial ones. Some recent pronouncements of the Conservative Government at Ottawa give more than colour to such a happening. Risks must, of course, be taken in the building of Empires or in their maintenance, but they need not be created, and quite apart from the difficulty in getting satisfactory conditions from other Governments, which all tariff-using countries have always experienced, it does not seem adroit to offer to Europe and the United States the broken meat of the banquet at Ottawa. These Imperial Conferences are held to be necessary. They will, in all probability, be held for a generation to come whether necessary or not. What of material value they have given to this country, few persons could tell us, and it is material bargains which are to be made at Ottawa. Let us hope that sentimental values will not later on be found to have been involved. It is this latter contingency of which I believe most Liberals are most afraid. There are very few links between the Dominions themselves either of sentiment, of resources, or of

requirements. Inter-Dominion treaties, conventions they would have been called, have not been easily made or kept. To be on "correct" terms with some Continental or American nation makes life for our Foreign Office exceedingly unpleasant at times. To be on "correct" terms with one of the Dominions because, in the course of many weeks of bargaining some other one of them had made or received better terms than their fellows is not an impossible event, though we may hope it to be exceptional.

In this new departure of tariff-mongering I see many perils to the volume, the character, the extent, and the value of our trade. How can banking and shipping, the invisible exports, be expanded by the contraction of the visible imports? How can preferences to and from thirty millions of White British subjects compensate for duties levied by 30 disgruntled foreign Governments, representing 300 million other White consumers? If some advantage can be gained from India will it not be lost to China? There is not space to develop the very important detailed figures involved in these questions. They cover two-fifths of our overseas trade. Much will depend on the personalities of our negotiators. Are they masters or slaves of their respective theories of fiscal governance? Is Mr. Baldwin in earnest when he speaks of experiments; is he open to conviction and reason? Is Mr. Chamberlain so wedded to paternal teaching that no experience of new phenomena can induce him to change "permanent" to "temporary" if the facts obviously demand it? Can Mr. Runciman be so steadfast in opposition to anything but emergency duties, as quite recent expressions of opinion lead one to hope he can be? Is Mr. Thomas going at Ottawa to insist on the "curse of tariffs"? If these tendencies are realised at Ottawa, free traders need not be seriously alarmed. Neither they any more than tariff advocates can escape the logic and pressure of facts. The tariffs of to-day are not the tariffs of yesterday. The epigram of "splendid isolation" if ever justified is completely out of date. No nation can or does to-day live in isolation. The examples of Australia and the United States of America, the two largest self-governing units, show us conditions of poverty and unemployment unexampled. If in a world of nations so interdependent Governments are permitted to create barriers obstructing and destroying commerce essential to their own continued existence, I do not see how we can escape being drawn into the hurly-burly. But if, as I believe, common sense, buttressed by the experience of the last two years, prevails at Lausanne and Ottawa we should emerge, after a brief but alarming tossing, into the broader and calmer waters of an ocean whose ships will all, if only from necessity, be flying the common flag of Free Exchange.

April 14th, 1932.

CHARLES E. HOBHOUSE.

THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS: SECOND PHASE.

SINCE Sir Arthur Salter's survey of "China, Japan and the League of Nations" was published in March, the Far Eastern crisis has continued to develop. The outstanding events have been the cessation, on March 3rd, of the fighting at Shanghai between the Japanese naval and military expeditionary force and the Chinese Nineteenth (Cantonese) Army, which had begun on January 28th; the opening, on March 3rd, of the special session of the Assembly of the League of Nations, which had been called at China's request under the procedure of Article 15 of the Covenant; the formal installation of the new Japanese-made sham Government of Manchuria at Changchun on March 9th; and the publication of the letter which was addressed on February 24th by Mr. Stimson, the Secretary of State at Washington, to Mr. Borah, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. In general the pace and violence of the action has been less vehement since March than before it; but, even so, it is no use attempting in this compass to give anything like a comprehensive account of the course of events. Perhaps the most illuminating way to approach this second phase of the crisis will be to dwell a little upon each of the four salient points that have just been mentioned.

The cessation of fighting at Shanghai is wholly to the good. Men, women and children are no longer being killed, nor houses and property destroyed; and to this extent the mind of "The Great Society"—in which Europe and the Far East and America are all members one of another nowadays—is relieved, though of course our inability to prevent this outrage upon civilisation from occurring at all still weighs upon our consciences and puts us out of countenance at the spectacle of our barbarous backwardness in the sphere of international relations. Still, the fighting at Shanghai has ceased; and although there is no apparent prospect of a local settlement or even of a local armistice, there is also happily little likelihood that the fighting will break out again. The Japanese are evidently anxious not to be drawn into pursuing the Chinese into infinity, on an ever-expanding front, over a *terrain*, intersected by canals and waterlogged by rice-fields, which lends itself to an army on the defensive and is particularly awkward for the movement of tanks and heavy guns. The Japanese have now withdrawn a substantial part of their naval flotilla and their land forces. On the other side, the Chinese are hardly likely to attempt a counter-offensive against the remaining Japanese forces, now that these have dug themselves in.

Thus a continued truce, *de facto*, on the Shanghai front appears to be fairly well assured; but this, though much, is all that can be said, and in other respects the local outlook at Shanghai is rather gloomy. The fact is that the active military operations have passed over into a passive contest in endurance. By sitting in Shanghai, the Japanese are preventing the lucrative Chinese public revenues, which accrue automatically in this great treaty-port, from reaching the Chinese National Government at Nanking. By keeping up the anti-Japanese boycott, the Chinese are killing Japan's China trade: and this is the most important item in the foreign trade of Japan, next to her trade with the United States. And, finally, both the local combatants in this truceless economic war of attrition are working together to kill the business of the foreign mercantile community in Shanghai.

It is not so much that Shanghai is physically insulated from its hinterland by the war-zone; for, though the Shanghai-Nanking Railway is cut by the stagnant Sino-Japanese military front, the Shanghai-Hangchow Railway and the far more important water-route up the Yangtse still remain open. The really deadly blow that has been dealt to the prosperity of Shanghai by Admiral Shiozawa's exploit and its consequences is the breaking of the spell of Shanghai's magic security. Ever since the foreign settlements at Shanghai came into existence—and they have existed now for nearly a century—they have been islands of security in an ocean of Chinese unrest. And since the outbreak of the current Chinese Revolution in 1911, which has made the insecurity of China acute and chronic, the value of the security of the settlements at Shanghai has steadily appreciated by contrast. Latterly, the tendency for all the wealth of China to flow for safety into the charmed circle of the French and the International Settlement has become almost embarrassing. But the charm has been broken by the Japanese coup of January 28th last, which has shattered the security of Shanghai at one stroke by violating the wisely and carefully guarded neutrality of the International Settlement, on which that security rested. One of the Powers interested in the Settlement has committed the unforgivable sin of using the territory of the Settlement as a base for offensive military operations directed against Chinese forces standing on territory under Chinese administration. The abnormal privilege, which the interested foreign Powers have enjoyed, of landing their armed forces in the settlements rests on use and wont and not on treaty-right. The tacit "gentleman's agreement" was that this privilege should be used for no other purpose than to maintain the security of the settlements, and to protect their neutrality, in the common interest. The gross abuse of this prescriptive privilege by the

Japanese is bound to revenge itself not only on the Japanese themselves but on all the rest of us. We have not begun to see the ultimate consequences of this act of criminal irresponsibility. But it is evident that the whole status of Shanghai has been thrown into the melting-pot.

As for Mr. Stimson's letter of February 24th, it is undoubtedly the most important State paper that the present Far Eastern crisis has yet evoked. It has been strongly approved by almost all currents of American public opinion; its language is obviously long pondered and carefully chosen; and, the more closely its meaning is studied, the more formidable does it appear. The gist of this considered statement of American policy can be summed up in three points. First, the United States puts on record its opinion that Japan has been guilty of clear breaches of treaty in doing what she has done. She has broken the Washington Nine-Power Treaty for preserving the integrity of China, and she has broken the Kellogg Pact. In the second place, the United States Government gives notice in advance that it is not going to recognise any changes in the *status quo* that may be imposed locally, in violation of the treaties, by the use of force. In the third place, Mr. Stimson lays down the doctrine that the treaties concluded at Washington are interdependent. Each of them was accepted by the signatories on the understanding that all the other treaties in this set of treaties were being concluded simultaneously. The Washington treaties all stand or fall together.

The sting of Mr. Stimson's letter lies in this third point, which is mentioned almost casually. When we consider the first two points by themselves, our first thought will be to pronounce them moderate to the point of inanity. Declare the treaties broken? Well, the treaty-breaker holds the prize of his misdoing. The breach is a *fait accompli*. Refuse recognition? Well, the *fait accompli* stands. Japan has completed her military occupation of Manchuria; she has overthrown the previous genuinely autonomous Chinese régime and has installed in its place a sham "independent" Government of Manchuria which is simply Japan's puppet. And now, with this free hand that she has taken for herself by force, Japan is going straight ahead with her long-cherished local ambitions. She is getting the whole land and life and wealth of Manchuria into her grip. Refusal to recognise somebody else's act does not in itself prevent that action from being carried on.

No, "not in itself"; but here comes the third point, with its sting. For why is it that Japan, at this moment, is able *de facto* to do what she likes in the Far East in defiance of the rest of the world? The rest of the world for this purpose means in practice the other two Oceanic Naval Powers: the British Empire

and the United States. And why are these two Great Powers incapable, at present, of meeting force by force and even, apparently, of restraining force by pressure? Because the economic depression paralyses them? That cannot be the answer, for Japan likewise is suffering from the same world-wide depression at least as severely; and her present economic difficulties, so far from preventing her from taking action, are evidently the most powerful of the stimuli that have combined to impel Japan into her present course. No, Japan is mistress, now, in Far Eastern waters in virtue of one of the provisions of the Washington treaties, under which the signatories bound themselves not to build new fortifications, and not to construct new naval bases, within a specified zone.

The effect of this provision was to leave Japan navally and militarily dominant in her own islands and the adjoining seas, while prohibiting the United States from fortifying Guam and the Philippines and the British Empire from fortifying Hong Kong. So long as this treaty stands, the British Empire cannot lawfully construct a naval base any closer to Japan—or to China—than Singapore, or the United States any closer than Hawaii. But this treaty does not stand alone. It is part and parcel of the Washington Treaty System. It is the *quid pro quo* which the two English-speaking Powers gave to Japan in exchange for Japan's agreement to accept a lower ratio than theirs in capital ships and to sign the Nine-Power Treaty for safeguarding the integrity of China. The essence of the contract was that the United States and the British Empire should accept a strategic position in which they would be unable to attack Japan (and therefore unable to protect China against Japan), on the understanding that Japan accepted a ratio of naval inferiority which would make her incapable, on her part, of attacking the English-speaking Powers, and at the same time gave her word of honour not to attack China. That was a statesmanlike contract: the kind of contract that ought to have had a long life if all the contracting parties had played fair. But Japan has not played fair. She has abused the local naval and military supremacy in the Far East which the Washington Treaty System only gave to Japan on the clear understanding that this advantage was to be used for defence and not for offence. In violating the Nine-Power Treaty, Japan has done, on a larger scale, the same thing that she has done in violating the tacit "gentleman's agreement" about the use of foreign troops in the foreign settlements at Shanghai. Here, again, Japan is likely to pay the penalty for her breach of faith; and, here again, the rest of us are likely to suffer from the consequences of her misdemeanour.

For the sting in the Stimson letter turns out, on inspection, to be very long and very keen; and it will be all the more deadly by the time it is used because it is not at all likely to be used in a hurry. The American people certainly does not want a great war with Japan over China; and when Mr. Stimson's letter was approved by American public opinion, the approval was inspired in large measure by a sense of relief at seeing an immediate (though perhaps rather mild) danger of war definitely ruled out. This large body (it may have been the majority) of American opinion approved the official doctrine of non-recognition as a dignified alternative to a policy of diplomatic or economic pressure which might have provoked Japan into retaliating by some rash warlike act in the nature of Admiral Shiozawa's coup at Shanghai. "Thank goodness," said the American public when it read the text of Mr. Stimson's letter, "the Administration is not going to expose us to that risk after all. The Stimson letter assures us 'peace with honour.'" Probably that was, and is, the prevailing view because it is the short view, and long views are seldom taken by people in the mass. But there are certainly some observers in the United States who take a longer view of the Stimson letter and therefore take the letter very seriously.

America has virtually pronounced that the Washington Treaty System has been voided by Japan's violation of certain essential provisions in an arrangement which was concluded as an indivisible whole. Will the Americans now hold themselves free to ignore other elements in the arrangement which are of concern to Japan? Certainly they will not take any such free hand for themselves immediately. Indeed, Mr. Stimson himself has stated in his letter, in terms, that Japan's action, "far from indicating the advisability of any modification" of the treaties, has "tended to bring home the vital importance of their faithful observance." Yes, but a faithful observance of treaties, in forbidding one to take more than one's treaty rights, does not make it incumbent to take less; and, in the all-important matter of naval limitation, the United States has been deliberately taking less than her treaty rights so far. She has refrained from building up to her treaty strength; and the first positive reaction in the United States to Japan's Far Eastern adventure has been to put the weight of public opinion behind a programme of building up to full treaty strength which has hitherto been the lone quest of "the Big Navy Group."

The execution of this programme would involve no breach of treaty whatsoever on America's part; and, in the circumstances, it can only be regarded as a fair and reasonable precaution to take. Nevertheless, it would be a dynamic act, for its effect would be

to restart, within the framework of the treaties, an actual competition in naval armaments. And how long would the treaty framework really stand the strain if this dynamic movement once started? If the United States does, lawfully and openly, build up to treaty strength, will not Japan be tempted unlawfully and surreptitiously to build beyond it? And then there is the rock of non-recognition ahead.

If Japan is to harvest the illicit gains of her lawless action in Manchuria, she is surely bound to proclaim to the world sooner or later: "Japan has recognised Mr. P'u's new Government of Manchukuo; and Japan has made a treaty or treaties with the said Mr. P'u providing this, that and the other. We call upon the other States of the world and their nationals, on their lawful occasions in Manchuria, to recognise these new arrangements and to act in accordance with them." If and when Japan makes some such notification as this, how will the American doctrine of non-recognition work out in practice? Will American consular authorities and American private citizens in Manchuria be instructed by the State Department at Washington not to recognise Mr. P'u's flag or obey his regulations or pay him taxes or acquiesce in the special privileges which he will have granted in Manchuria to the Japanese Government and its nationals? If non-recognition does not mean this, it really means nothing. And if it does mean this, will the Japanese then place their armed forces at Mr. P'u's disposal in order to assist him in exacting a proper respect for his sovereign authority from Uncle Sam? And if there are Japanese-American "incidents" in Manchuria or in other parts of the Far East where the Americans and the Japanese cross each other's paths (e.g. at Shanghai), where will it end? Will not the Americans then decide to fortify Guam and the Philippines, with naval bases and all? And by this stage we are confronting the spectre of the next world war: a naval war in the Western Pacific and a land war in China; a war with America and Japan for the protagonists, with China for the stakes, with Canada, Australia and New Zealand for America's allies, and with the United Kingdom sitting, as a bereaved neutral, in Ultima Thule.

These speculations may be alarming, but they are surely not fantastic; for the destructive effects of Japan's action have been extraordinarily far-reaching. As Sir Arthur Salter wrote in *THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW* in March, "the whole collective system for the maintenance of peace, of which the Covenant of the League of Nations is the main foundation and the Locarno treaties and the Kellogg Pact are two principal pillars, has now come to its hour of fate." But a collapse of the post-war "collective

system" of international order—if this immense disaster were to come upon us—would not be followed by a return to the pre-war kind of international anarchy. The old anarchy was not completely intolerable and was therefore chronic. But this is no longer a possible permanent state of affairs in a world which has been knit up into a unity by economic links and which has intensified the destructive effects of war by its many inventions. The alternative to "the collective system" now is not "Each for himself and God for us all"—not even with the rider "Let the Devil take the hindmost." The only alternative now is "the knock-out blow."

If the sixty or seventy fully self-governing states that at present exist in the world cannot manage to keep the peace by agreement and co-operation, then the world is condemned to a series of devastating general wars which—unlike the "temperate contests" of Edward Gibbon's day—can only end in the imposition of peace upon an exhausted world by some sole surviving conqueror. This is the path on which, if things turn out at their worst, Japan's behaviour may prove to have launched us. The Japanese General who gave the word to occupy Mukden on September 18th last may unwittingly have cast his country for the rôle of Carthage; the American statesman who drafted the Stimson letter may—consciously or unconsciously—have cast his country for the rôle of Rome.

All this is more quickly and more clearly manifest to instructed opinion in the small countries of the world (and they are the vast majority) than it is to those of us whose countries are "Great Powers" that still flatter themselves on being able to ride any storm. This relative clarity of vision in the small countries explains the temper which was displayed by the Assembly of the League of Nations when it met in special session on March 3rd. In effect, the Assembly passed a vote of censure upon the Council—or, rather, upon the Great Powers which dominate the Council—for having allowed the collective system of security to go by default.

The resolution which the Assembly passed unanimously (i.e. with the two interested parties, and these alone, not opposing but simply abstaining) does four things. First of all, it reaffirms, explicitly and in detail, all the relevant provisions of the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact, as well as the previous resolutions of the Assembly itself and of the Council. In the second place it deliberately takes its stand on the same ground as Mr. Stimson by declaring that it is incumbent upon the members of the League not to recognise any situation, treaty or arrangement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant, and by laying

down that it is contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the settlement of the dispute should be brought about under stress of military pressure. In the third place, it insists that China's reference of the dispute to the League under Article 15 of the Covenant covers Manchuria as well as Shanghai. Fourthly, the resolution sets up a committee of nineteen members (i.e. the twelve Council members other than the two disputants, together with six other members chosen by secret ballot, and the President), which is to act on the Assembly's behalf while the Assembly is in recess—it has taken care not to dissolve—and which is to submit a first report not later than May 1st.

At the moment of writing, the effective factors in the situation may perhaps be summed up as follows. The watching committee of the Assembly is in being; the Lytton Commission of Inquiry, having visited Tokyo and Shanghai and Nanking, is *en route* for Manchuria; a Chinese movement of armed resistance to the Japanese military occupation is gathering strength in the Manchurian countryside; and Japan has been told by Mr. Stimson that she will have to reckon with America in some fashion not yet defined at some date not yet stated.

The issue raised by the Far Eastern crisis is tremendous. It is nothing less than the choice between salvaging the collective system or relapsing into an anarchy of competitive armaments and rival alliances which will assuredly spell the doom of "The Great Society."

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE.

THE FRENCH SCHEMES FOR DANUBIAN EUROPE.

"WE are trying," the special correspondent of the Budapest newspaper *Az Est* reports Mr. Ramsay MacDonald as saying to him on the day of the break-down of the London Conference; "to do what Colonel Roosevelt once described as the most difficult thing in the world: to remake from a dish of scrambled eggs two complete eggs." Turning with the same question of "What now?" to M. Tardieu, the special correspondent says that he received the cynical reply: "We will watch the revivifying stream of gold flowing from Germany into Austria and Hungary." Both answers are thought-provoking as well as typical of the attitude of the respective countries represented by the two statesmen.

It would be difficult for anyone to resist the contention that the dissolution of the economic territory of the Monarchy in 1918 was anything but disastrous to the newly-formed Danubian States. The Powers indeed recognised the dangers to a very limited extent by drawing up Article 222 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which left open the possibility of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary uniting in a special preference system for a period of five years from the entry into force of the Treaty. Had these Powers then availed themselves of this provision, there is little doubt but that the economic framework of the old Monarchy would have been saved. But racial antagonisms and political intrigues were far too strong, and it remained a dead letter. There were other efforts to prevent the economic "Balkanisation" of Central Europe. Mr. Lloyd George in April 1919 urged that the Austrian Republic should conclude a series of preference treaties with her neighbours, but he was overruled. In 1921 and 1923 attempts were made by the States concerned to effect some economic *rapprochement*, but were prevented by Italy. Numerous pious resolutions of the League have urged Austria's neighbours to increase the little Republic's prospects of life by a lowering of the tariff barriers against her manufactures, without success. The prologue to the London Conference—the Schober-Curtius scheme for an Austro-German Customs Union last year, and its subsequent development into a scheme for the formation of an industrial *bloc* and a complementary agrarian *bloc* in Central Europe with a series of preferential agreements to enable each *bloc* to absorb the surplus of the other—was an effort at self-help resulting automatically from the failure of the League or of the Powers to do anything for Austria. In addition, despite the air of injured innocence assumed in Vienna and Berlin when the suggestion was made, it was certainly designed

to pave the way for the political union of the Germans of Austria with the Germans of the Reich, which both desire. By a majority of one—a majority chiefly made up of representatives of the smaller and distant countries—South American Republics, for instance—against those of the greater Powers, France succeeded in obtaining an adverse verdict from the Hague Court. Austria and Germany were compelled at Geneva to renounce the plan. The situation of Central Europe grew rapidly worse, and on February 16th last the Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Buresch, made his appeal to the Powers to secure economic elbow-room for Austria. Somebody—it is said, “economic experts” of the League—managed to father on Great Britain an illegitimate French infant which France had abandoned years ago—the Danubian Customs Union scheme. France gazed with mild astonishment at the unexpected reappearance of this long-forgotten child, and all the Danubian States who were asked to adopt it promptly declined without many thanks. France then produced a later-born and more presentable offspring in the shape of the “Tardieu Plan,” and asked the Four-Power Conference to confer a blessing upon it. Germany and Italy have unhesitatingly pronounced it to be a useless weakling, better out of the world than in it, and have produced a robust infant of their own which France condemned at sight.

There is about the idea of a Danubian Customs Union an air of engaging simplicity which must inevitably appeal to those who have not by residence or close study acquainted themselves with the extremely complicated nature of the problems of the States of Central and South-Eastern Europe. There is a popular idea that by reuniting Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia to-day one could at one stroke undo the mistakes of 1918 and re-create the “self-contained economic unit” of the old Habsburg Monarchy. It is an illusion. In my new book, *Heirs to the Habsburgs*, which is appearing this month, I have tried to make evident some of the countless difficulties, economic, political and racial, in the way of a reconstruction of Central Europe. In it I have pointed out that this “economic unit” which Habsburg loyalists like to think of as something created from the beginning of time by Divine Providence only became such in comparatively recent years. Until the eighteenth century the Habsburg domains were a network of customs frontiers, not unlike that in Central Europe to-day. Until the middle of the last century Hungary remained outside the Habsburg customs union and the Emperor collected duties on Hungary’s exports of grain and cattle to other parts of his domains, in view of the flat refusal of the Hungarian feudal nobility to pay taxes. Right up till the war the Emperor feared industrialisation and restricted it in

any way he could, so that the happy state of affairs in which the industrial products of German-Austria and Bohemia were exchanged for the agrarian produce of the south-eastern and central areas was a purely artificial one. It suits French policy, intent as it is on creating under French auspices a Central European *bloc* which shall not only seal the fate of the *Anschluss* but bar Germany’s development in Eastern Europe, to depict the re-creation (as far as possible) of the “economic unit” of the Habsburgs as the first step to the restoration of health to the distressed States, but to my mind it is an idea which we must treat as altogether secondary.

Firstly, with or without Bulgaria, the area referred to nowadays as the territory of the “Danubian States” is totally different from that of the Habsburg Monarchy. Bulgaria’s plight is already so serious that her exclusion from the proposed combination would spell final disaster. Galicia is not included, the kingdoms of Serbia, Montenegro and Old Rumania are. The barriers to industrialisation were removed fourteen years ago and the whole situation has changed in consequence. There has been not merely a natural development following the removal of restrictions. France, in supporting the creation of the States of the Little Entente, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, desired to have a chain of independent countries barring Germany’s path in the Balkans. The independence aimed at was independence in war-time, and in consequence these countries have been developing at top speed for fourteen years the vital industries which enable a country to keep its armies clothed, shod and fed as well as armed in time of war—industries upon which the civil population is also dependent if the country is to hold out. Apart from these, other “hothouse” industries have been forced to develop under the shelter of tariff walls, as Sir Clive Morrison Bell’s little book *Tariff Walls* graphically shows. It is not necessary to lose time over condemning the obvious folly and wastefulness of this from a European standpoint. Unfortunately it has happened, and millions are invested in new factories and plant in every one of these countries—for the Little Entente bonds have always been of a temporary nature, and none of the three partners wishes to be dependent on the other for any supplies which it can manage to produce itself. Embittered Hungary, with the same patronage from Italy which the Little Entente has from France, has been even more feverishly pursuing a similar policy. Far from seeking to keep old ties alive, the former Habsburg peoples have sought to obliterate them and to develop new connections which would push further away any risk of the old bonds being renewed.

The psychological factor must not be neglected. There is deep distrust of one another among these peoples who for centuries tried to live amicably together and failed. There is the fear that too close economic ties would be followed by political ties. There is among all except Hungary the fear that ultimately a Habsburg restoration might be attempted if something like the old Habsburg territory were united economically. Prague, capital of the strongest State (financially), fears the magnetic attraction of Vienna making weak Austria the centre of the new combination. No doubt the Hohenzollern and Karageorgevitch dynasties in Rumania and Yugoslavia are none too anxious to see anything like the old Habsburg unit take shape (even in the economic field) where they rule to-day. "Vested interests," financial, commercial and dynastic, are supported by the great army of political leaders, deputies, diplomats, civil servants and soldiers to whom self-interest suggests opposition to anything even remotely savouring of decreased independence for their countries. Deplorable, certainly, from a European standpoint again, but very human and very difficult to overcome. Economic *rapprochement* between the Danubian States is obviously desirable, despite all the foregoing, which is directed against the idea that salvation can or should be sought in a Danubian customs union. Such absurdities as the purchase by Hungary of expensive Bavarian salt (which has subsequently to be doctored with iodine) rather than continue to buy as formerly salt from mines now just across the Rumanian frontier; the Czech interference with the 500-years-old practice of the Ruthenian peasants of making their way down the Theiss in spring on timber rafts which they sold, then labouring in the Hungarian harvest fields, returning in the autumn to their desolate mountains with grain as part wages on which they lived through the winter; and many similar economic stupidities perpetrated in the cause of politics must certainly be swept away. Anything which can be done to arrest the growth of hothouse industries by inter-State preferences obviously should be done. There is room for a considerable amelioration of the situation of all these countries if their interchange of products can be facilitated, but it must be clearly realised that "industrial" Austria and Czechoslovakia (in point of fact they each have a valuable and growing agrarian production) are not and cannot be made the saviours of "agrarian" Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary, all with growing industries of their own. The wider markets of Germany and Italy are indispensable.

The importance of Germany both as market and supplier to the five—with Bulgaria, six—"Danubian" States may be gathered from the following, the latest available export and import figures. That France has only the smallest legitimate economic interest

in the countries whose future she is now attempting to delimitate, will be seen from the final column.

Country.	Percentage of total exports taken by Germany.	Percentage of total exports taken by France.
Austria	18.4	2.5
Czechoslovakia	26.8	1.3
Hungary	11.7	0.9
Rumania	8.6	3.6
Yugoslavia	12.1	3.8
Bulgaria	27.9	3.6

Country.	Percentage of total imports coming from Germany.	Percentage of total imports coming from France.
Austria	20.0	2.5
Czechoslovakia	36.6	4.2
Hungary	19.5	2.7
Rumania	22.3	7.7
Yugoslavia	13.6	4.5
Bulgaria	21.2	7.7

Surely these figures show that the salvation of the Danubian States must be sought primarily in facilitating the exchange of goods between them and their best customer and supplier, Germany? Still more striking are the figures, if we turn to the original German conception of last year, of an industrial *bloc* (including Germany) trading with a complementary agrarian *bloc*:

Country.	Percentage of total exports going to:		
	Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia.	Italy.	France.
Hungary	63.4	3.5	0.9
Yugoslavia	39.0	26.0	3.8
Rumania	37.0	6.7	3.6
Bulgaria	45.5	11.0	5.6

Country.	Percentage of imports coming from:		
	Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia.	Italy.	France.
Hungary	58.5	4.0	2.7
Yugoslavia	48.8	12.0	4.5
Rumania	49.8	8.7	7.7
Bulgaria	40.0	15.2	7.7

Only 1.4 per cent. of the total French exports went to, only 1.6 per cent. of the total French imports came from, the Danubian countries. The corresponding figures for Germany are 12.9 and 8.2, and for Italy 9.3 and 8.6. To no individual country does Germany export as much, the next being Great Britain, who takes 9.8 per cent. of her exports, and only from the United States (14.4 per cent.) does she import more. Regarding the exportable surplus

of the agrarian Danubian States, it is calculated that for grain of all kinds this amounts to 48 million meterzentners; Austria's and Czechoslovakia's requirements from abroad are put at 17 million meterzentners; Austria, Czechoslovakia and Germany together, it is estimated, could absorb 87 million meterzentners—double the exportable surplus of the agrarian Danubian States, while France could only take 13 million, and that only supposing she were to cease importing corn from her own overseas possessions. It is difficult to understand how anyone can maintain that France's interest in Central Europe can be economic.

Apart from the obvious (and unhappy) political interest which she has in creating a Middle Europe which shall look to her for leadership, she has a considerable financial interest in the prosperity of the States of the Little Entente. French bankers have lent big sums to them which have been largely devoted to arming and equipping their armies and their industries to meet a war. No doubt it is correct to say that these loans were not made on a sound economic basis, but that does not mean that France can be indifferent to the economic position of the borrowers. No doubt political influence was brought to bear on the French banks to secure the granting of these loans, but what was originally "political money" has become to-day "commercial money." These loans were not made by the French Treasury, and as the condition of Central Europe grows steadily more critical, the bankers are doubtless bringing in their turn influence to bear on the French Government to see that their investments are not lost. Whether, therefore, France is really able to be as indifferent to the plight of Central Europe as the remark attributed by the *Az Est* correspondent to M. Tardieu would suggest is open to doubt.

That Great Britain cannot afford indifference is too well known to need much emphasis. For years less and less attention was paid in London to the Central European States. There was a general impression, it seems, that, like little Victorian children, they should not be heard; they were too inclined to get themselves talked about with their external and internal political quarrels and their requests for loans. Thinking still in terms of pre-war Balkan States, many people failed altogether to realise the size and strength of new Rumania and Yugoslavia in comparison with pre-war Rumania and Serbia. They overlooked the fact that millions of British money invested here—coming in the last resort from the saving citizen's pocket—were not in gilt-edged securities, but in loans to countries on whose progress and problems the investor would have done well to keep a careful eye. While France, Germany and Italy paid the closest attention to affairs on the Danube, and spent much energy and money in propaganda,

political, commercial and cultural, in these States, Great Britain, after lending money, became disinterested. To digress for a moment to the question of cultural propaganda, it is often sad to notice how much goodwill towards Great Britain in these countries is being neglected. In the Balkan States recently under the Turks, the memory of British sympathies in the early days of struggle is still vivid; every opportunity of developing any kind of contact with Britain is eagerly sought. Czechoslovakia's admiration is lavished more directly on American institutions; but here, too, British ideals are respected. In Austria and Hungary there is a passion for things British amounting almost to mania, despite war memories, but it is slowly dying down. France, however, has her Government-subsidised cultural institutes all over Central Europe and is succeeding in creating artificially an appreciation of her culture which was offered to Great Britain unasked. On the financial side the awakening has come suddenly; continued indifference to the fate of these countries, it is realised (and marked by the holding of the ill-fated conference in London) would result in heavy British losses.

The financial side is all-important to Great Britain, and of importance to France, whose main interest here is political. Strange as it may sound, for the hard-pressed Danubian States it is to-day of small importance. Austria and Hungary, who have long been caricatured—in Austria at least by Austrians as often as by anyone else—as international mendicants going hat in hand to Geneva every year to beg for loans, are making it very clear that they do not ask for credits except to tide them over momentary perils. Hungary, in fact, declared on the break-down of the London Conference that she did not intend to take up a new loan even if offered. One of the prime causes of her difficulties to-day is over-borrowing, as I indicated in an article in the *MARCH CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*. In Austria, indignation is expressed not at any neglect of her plight, but at its alleged exaggeration by France. The sentence in a recent issue of the *Temps*, "Austria was on the verge of collapse when her Government appealed for immediate financial help," is described here as a "deliberate falsehood." It is pointed out that the appeal of Chancellor Dr. Buresch to the Powers contains no word of "financial" help being required. France, it is declared, in her Press and through her influence in the Financial Committee of the League of Nations (whose report also stressed the financial side of Austria's needs) is endeavouring to divert study of the problems of the Danubian States from the economic to the financial side. The desirability of an immediate credit for Austria, it is claimed, is just as much a need of the Western Powers and the United States as her own, since such

credit would be used to enable her to continue paying interest on her foreign loans, and to avoid a moratorium. For herself Austria requires measures which will enable her to reduce her huge passive balance of trade and balance of payments, and to increase her rapidly dwindling stock of foreign exchange.

Despite this brave talk, it is clear that neither Austria nor Hungary can hold out very much longer, and that a loan would not help Hungary, while for Austria it would be a very temporary relief from which her creditors would derive more benefit than she herself. She fears that French credit policy aims at her political subjection and at imposing fresh restrictions against union of any kind with Germany. Opinion in Austria was solid with that in Germany in opposing the Tardieu scheme for the Four-Power Conference to be followed by a conference confined to the five Danubian States, because Austria felt that her position was too weak to enable her to stand up to Czechoslovakia; for the same reason, Czechoslovakia in the end was solid with France in insisting upon it, although at first she hesitated. Really there was no single Danubian State which was enthusiastic over the Tardieu Plan as presented, although there was universal satisfaction that a plan of any sort had been drawn up and that the Great Powers had at last recognised the urgent plight of the Danubian States. Disappointing as are the circumstances in which the London Conference came to an end, there is no despair in these countries to-day, for at last it seems that they are sure of international energies being concentrated on their rescue. All hopes have now to be centred on Geneva, but it is still not possible to give any new message from the distressed damsels of the Danube to their would-be rescuers. It seems useless to plead again after London for the elimination of political intrigue and for an atmosphere of international trust, especially between France and Germany. Yet until France can be brought to recognise that, after the industry of her Czechoslovak friends has been protected from undue German competition, she must recognise Germany's predominant and entirely legitimate economic interest in the Danubian countries and theirs in her, there will be no hope of any lasting settlement in Central and South-Eastern Europe. As to the *Anschluss*, I think it is the convinced opinion of the majority of neutral observers out here that, little as the Austrians may enjoy it when it comes, France is playing the rôle of King Canute in forbidding it—and unnecessarily, since it can help Germany in no other way but in the proper development of those Balkan interests which it may be permissible for Europe to regulate but which cannot possibly be suppressed.

G. E. R. GEDYE.

A GLIMPSE OF JUSTICE IN AFRICA.

THE debate in the House of Lords on March 23rd arising out of the Report of the recent Joint Select Committee of Parliament on "Closer Union in East Africa," was remarkable both for a very important speech by Lord Lugard, the British Representative on the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations and our best informed living authority on African questions, and for a significant announcement made on behalf of the Government offering prospects of redress for at least some of the grievances long felt and injustices endured by native peoples of Africa, through British dealings with their occupied lands, under cover of Imperial development policy and Imperial jurisprudence conveniently adapted thereto. The Select Committee spoke of "the nervousness among the native populations as regards the land question," which had impressed them in the evidence given before them and recommended that "a full and authoritative inquiry should be undertaken immediately into the needs of the native populations, present and prospective, with respect to land with or without the reserves held either on tribal or individual tenure."

Lord Stanhope informed the House of Lords that the Government is about to appoint a Commission to examine the questions connected with the land in Kenya. He read out the terms of reference. They direct inquiry into the needs referred to by the Select Committee and the desirability and practicability of setting aside further areas of land, in addition to those already reserved, for the present or future occupancy of tribal or de-tribalised natives. So far the reference falls within the scope of the principle which has since 1898 been accepted in Southern Rhodesia, and was subsequently prescribed for Kenya, that adequate reserves shall be made for the exclusive occupancy and use of natives. After thirty years of delay and much controversy, the Southern Rhodesia Government accomplished in 1928 the definition of what have been accepted as adequate native reserves in that territory. And they are withholding, for the present, from alienation either to white men or natives a further large area of "Government Land" to provide for the needs of either natives or Europeans as population increases. In Kenya the position is different. Certain areas have been defined for native reserves and placed in trust for native use under the control of a Government Board. It has also been laid down that Europeans are to have a privileged position in regard to the acquisition of land in what are called the Highlands. The precise extent or exclusiveness of this privilege appears, however, from the contradictory views which have been expressed by official authorities, not

to be very clearly defined or understood. Much land has already been alienated to Europeans in the Highlands, and some elsewhere, and there are still large areas of less desirable lands outside of the European holdings and established native reserves, which are classed as "Crown Lands" and are, or should be, available for the expansion of either community. Many natives live by sufferance on these lands. But it has already become manifest that the native reserves lately defined are insufficient for the present, and certainly so for the prospective needs of the tribal natives inhabiting them, besides affording no room for the many detribalised natives or for non-detribalised natives who have been deprived of their own land. At the same time some fixity of land rights is demanded for natives left outside the reserves, whether resident on "Crown Lands" or on lands which have been sold to Europeans. That, in Kenya, was the situation to which the Joint Select Committee referred as demanding immediate attention. It is envisaged by that part of the reference to the proposed Commission which I have summarised and by the further question referred to them as to what constitutes the "Highlands." That reference should also determine whether natives are to be completely excluded from owning lands in that area, where many were formerly settled and must continue still to reside.

So far the reference to the proposed Commission appears to meet comprehensively the disquieting situation which has developed on the basis of the judicial and administrative principles hitherto acted upon in Kenya. But the specially significant and most satisfactory feature in the terms of reference is that it is proposed, for the first time in British Imperial policy since 1898, to concede that natives of South Eastern African territories may have themselves some admissible rights of property in the lands of their birth. Legal rights they have been declared to have none, and no customary or equitable rights have been recognised as entitled to be regarded. But now the Commissioners are "to determine the nature and extent of claims asserted by natives over land alienated to non-natives and to make recommendations for the adequate settlement of such claims, whether by legalisation or otherwise" . . . and "to examine claims asserted by natives over land not yet alienated, and to make recommendations for the adequate settlement of such claims."

To most Englishmen it might still appear nothing remarkable that a British Government should propose to consider the claims of natives in regard to such matters as those envisaged by these references, although they might be puzzled to understand why, under a British Protectorate and a British Trusteeship, claims of the character indicated should have been allowed by the local

Administration and the Colonial Office to arise and to accumulate to such an extent that they cannot be dealt with by the ordinary Courts of the Colony. The reason has several times been mentioned in this REVIEW.* A respectful, but penetratingly ironical description of the whole structure of paradoxical jurisprudence which enshrines our dealings with native land rights in this part of Africa, was made by Lord Lugard in the debate. He summed up

"The claim of the European powers to confiscate or extinguish native rights and to take 'possession or entire control of the land' is presumably based on the right of conquest or alternatively upon what *The Times* calls 'protective processes' and which I may perhaps be allowed to call 'potential conquest'—namely, assumption of sovereignty by virtue of ability to suppress by superior force anyone who objects to the assumption."

That—"the interest of the stronger"—is precisely the definition of Justice argued by the Sophist Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic*. Doubtless, also, it is that of Signor Al Capone and his associate gangsters. In brief, the legal position is that British Imperialism has, through a series of acts announced as undertaken for the benevolent protection of natives, appropriated to itself the whole of whatever property in land the natives possessed when these acts were performed, is entitled by its self-made law to dispose of such property as it may deem most expedient, and has, in disposing of it, been primarily guided by the interests not of the natives but of Europeans who wanted the land.

"The Law," said Lord Lugard, "as it exists has been laid down in these decisions of the Privy Council, the highest and final authority in the Empire. The larger question remains: do the Law and practice conform to the intentions and desires of the British democracy? Should a trustee be able to extinguish the rights of his ward without compensation, with the object, through a Protectorate, of peaceably extending the British Dominions? If we may judge from declarations made from time to time by the Government of the day in White Papers, and by members of every party in Parliament, including members of the present Government, and from the public Press, it is very doubtful whether it does."

And he pressed, as both Mr. Ormsby Gore's Commission of 1924 and Sir Hilton Young's Commission of 1928 have previously pressed, for "some definite and clear exposition of British policy and of the principles to which His Majesty's Government desire to give effect in Africa." That demand has yet to be satisfied;

* See, e.g., "Are we going to act justly in Africa?" THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, August 1920.

but it is good to be able to recognise that the instructions to the proposed Commission do at any rate, at long last, appear to be turning a corner in the right direction.

The point at which the wrong turning was markedly taken in British Cabinet policy was when an Order in Council was made, in 1898, altering the terms of the Charter originally granted to the British South Africa Company. That Charter had stipulated "careful regard shall always be had to the customs and laws of the class or tribe or nation, especially in this respect to the holding, possession, transfer and disposition of land and succession thereto." The British South Africa Company, from the outset of its proceedings in Matabeleland, entirely ignored this injunction and claimed and exercised unqualified rights of ownership in fee simple of all land in the country. When, by one of the transparent mysteries of political iniquity, the Chartered Company were honourably instated in full possession of Matabeleland, notwithstanding the scandalous circumstances in which the territory had been occupied by their agents, the British Government quietly abandoned their theory (which Lord Lugard thinks the British democracy has not yet abandoned) that the natives had some positive rights in their own land. The 1898 Order in Council considerably prescribed that "the Company shall from time to time 'assign' to the natives inhabiting Southern Rhodesia land sufficient for their occupation, whether as tribes or portions of tribes, and suitable for their agricultural and pastoral requirements." This was interpreted solely as a direction to establish "reserves" into which the natives were to be penned, and, if they were found residing on land desirable for white settlement, were to be required to remove themselves. If they did not do so and remained on their own properties whether on "alienated" lands or on "Crown Lands" they were required to pay rent—10s. to 40s. a year for each man and 10s. for each man's wife in excess of one—besides their Hut Tax.

The Privy Council in 1918 pronounced that Matabeleland had been conquered on behalf of the British Crown, and that all the land of its natives, whether Matabeles, Mashonas or other tribals, had thus been forfeited to the King and was his absolute property. The extinction of natives' rights in Swaziland was declared by Lord Haldane in virtue of another principle of International Law. The application of the same claim in those parts of the East African Protectorate now known as Kenya Colony was slightly different in the matter of juristical argument, but precisely the same in its practical content, as in Southern Rhodesia. But the Government of Kenya improved on Rhodesian practice. What happened there was described, in the aspect in which it appears to the natives themselves, by their representatives, both to the Ormsby Gore

Commission of 1924 and to the Joint Select Committee. The accredited Kenya native witnesses told the Committee:

"The native reserves are insufficient and more land should be added thereto, because the land originally belonged to the natives. The British Government did not fight the natives and occupy the land as the result of conquest. But they made treaties with the natives to protect them and take care of them and their properties. So the Government had no right to sell their land without their consent. . . . Land was sold to Europeans while natives were still residing on it. These native residents are now called 'squatters' and must work for present European owners, otherwise they would be driven away from their own lands. It is a fact that many natives are roaming about without a place to live in. For some land which is held by the Government and not sold to settlers, like Yatta Plains, natives grazing cattle on it are charged fees. We do not think that it is right for the Government to charge grazing fees for the use of such land by natives, as it belongs to them. Such lands should be restored to natives. We also ask that forest land should be returned to natives, because it is their property. . . . The lands of natives of (ten clans named) were taken from them by the Government and sold to Europeans without leaving them any land for their use. These natives made repeated complaints to the Government about it, but they were told to keep quiet. . . . A number of the actual clans who were land-owning families had their land alienated over their heads, with them on the land, and eventually pressure was brought to bear to make them leave it. That is why they have had to go away far from their own country as squatters. . . . It is not that they have only just begun to realise and feel how much they are oppressed, because they have always felt so, but they have not been given opportunities in the past to express their feelings. They have been thinking about all this but have had to keep silent."

Official and other European Kenya witnesses confirm this evidence. The agricultural Census of 1930 reported 110,000 landless adult male natives as thus quartered on European estates. Lord Lugard quoted that 133,000 detribalised natives are now registered as established on such estates. Lord Passfield spoke of "150,000 to 250,000 so-called squatters on the alienated white lands." Most of these men have families. Property in land is the essential basis of African family life.

During the settlement of Southern Rhodesia the principles which Lord Lugard considers congenial to British feeling and consistent with the declarations of Parliament still retained some influence in moderating the Afrikaner policy for dealing with natives of which General Hertzog has been conspicuous in recent years as the protagonist. In Rhodesia natives whose lands were sold were either provided with lands elsewhere in reserves and transferred to them (a process by no means devoid of hardship) or were allowed to be tenants on their ancestral holdings (a consideration described by

Lord Lugard as "of vital importance to Africans"), although on payment of unjustifiable rent. But in Kenya the policy of the South African Native Land Bills was applied in a completely untempered form and European settlers were forbidden to accept squatters as tenants or to allow them to remain on their properties except as statute labourers under obligation, enforceable by fine or imprisonment, to work for the occupier 180 days in each year. The Kenya Government did not concern itself to assign alternative lands to these natives in the reserves. Nor could they have done so, because in the first place there was not room for them and, in the second, the system of native land law makes it impossible for outsiders in most cases to acquire landed property even if they have the means to pay for it. For nearly thirty years the question of the land needs of natives in Kenya has been either obstinately ignored or officially handled with the most childish ignorance; so that the facts of the situation have been repeatedly misrepresented to the Colonial Office with the result that misleading replies about it have been given in Parliament. The episode of the Joint Select Committee and the fact that within the last three years two really intelligent and conscientious reports have at length been drawn up by qualified and unprejudiced investigators on the native land systems of Kavirondo and Kikuyu have rendered it impossible any longer to ignore the character of the dealings of the Government with the natives for whom it has been declared trustee, or indeed, it may be hoped, any longer to evade the challenge addressed by Lord Lugard to British standards of equity.

Mr. MacDonald's Government has made a straightforward and creditable beginning in the required direction in the instructions to the promised Commission. These constitute the first official acknowledgment since 1898 that natives of South Eastern Africa can be regarded as having judiciable rights in their own lands. Within their own communities such rights are well established by Native Law. Such Law should form the basis for a system of rights authoritative in the courts of the Colony. Meanwhile, these instructions are a definite and salutary recognition that claims exist which demand adequate settlement. Their principle is far-reaching. African races are quite familiar with the Thrasymachean definition of Justice and are accustomed to have to submit to it. But they also share with other humanity that puzzling Socratic conviction that Justice is a thing having a different kind of reality, and "they have been thinking about all this," and will continue to think. Lord Lugard is convinced that "if this question is neglected or ignored now, you will have occasion—as South Africa has—to regret it in the future."

Unquestionably we shall. But why not be ashamed of it now?

OLIVIER.

THE WORLD CRISIS.

SO much has been written on the present economic crisis that we must have got over it long ago, had wise counsels and good advice been of any use. Yet the crisis continues its course and only one thing appears to be certain: world politics in the widest sense of the word is bound to be governed by the depression we are passing through, for the next ten or twenty years. No country will be free in its political decisions and actions as long as the menace of bankruptcy looms over the greater part of the world. It is an ill wind that blows no one any good, and in a way the interdependence of all nations in their financial troubles must undoubtedly react on the international situation in a pacific sense. On the other hand the increasing poverty all round is bound to foster revolutionary movements and until the tide turns again, by some sort of recovery in trade and industry, no stability can be looked for in any country.

Personally I belong to those who look upon the World Crisis as a direct result of the World War, not so much on account of the loss of life and wealth which the war brought to all as on account of a total disruption in the financial relations of all countries and the loss of balance in the ratio of production and consumption. Exceptional circumstances called for exceptional measures during the war and created a vast increase of production in most of the industries. The methods of rationalisation in the saving of time and manual labour were improved upon after the armistice. Large quantities of foodstuffs, raw materials and finished articles were required to replenish empty warehouses and granaries. Every household replaced its shrunken property. Lavish credits on the part of the United States helped impoverished Europe. A system of reborrowing of reparation payments came into use, it created a fictitious superstructure of industrial and agricultural prosperity in the debtor countries. Investments were continually increased out of capital or new loans, while behind all this rational methods in industry were diminishing the demand for manual labour, and socialistic experiments upset the budgets of all governments, who saw no other way to maintain themselves than by raising taxation to a degree which definitely excluded the formation of new capital.

Inflation of money is not the only form this malady can assume. From the point of view of stable conditions the inflation of wages, as it was practised in America and also in England in order to improve consumption on the home market, was equally dangerous. Worst of all, however, was the inflation of credits all over the world and the increasing indebtedness of governments, munici-

polities and private enterprises which it entailed. I have been told that industries in Germany were positively forced—by the Banks that controlled them—to take up loans which they did not require and to increase their investments, in order that more money might be employed to bear a high rate of interest. Loans were pumped into Central Europe after the war as air is pumped into a pneumatic tyre; and at last the tyre has burst and we find ourselves face to face with a new reality of things. The picture which presents itself to us is a very curious one: a vast and very efficient machinery has been created for enormously improved methods of production and distribution. Only a strong revival of prosperity and world marketing on the largest scale could, however, create the demand on the part of the consumer which alone would justify the output for which this machinery is intended.

The world's progress since the armistice was signed may be likened to an organism whose bones and sinews have outgrown its vital activity. The skeleton has become too powerful, and flesh and blood are wanting to assure its life. Soviet Russia—the Five-Year Plan is after all nothing more than an effort to come into line with the United States on the plane of production—may serve as a crude example of a form of development which can be traced in different stages of completion in the economic and political life of all countries. The structure of government, bureaucracy, social relief, mass production, trades unions, tractors and machines of all sorts have grown to excess and are becoming a load too heavy for the exhausted world to bear. Napoleon is said to have predicted that Europe would either be Russian or American before 100 years were over. He did not realise what Soviet Russia would be. Had he done so, the new impression would probably have confirmed this view, but would also have shown him that the difference between Russia and America is slowly losing its deeper shades. Much can be classed under the same heading in the two countries. Big business is the main driving power and a progressive tendency towards the mechanisation of life is the important feature in their existence. Soviet Russia has acted with greater brutality and has therefore advanced further in a stage of evolution which does away with individual freedom and converts men into assets of potential labour-power, to be increased or diminished in accordance with a mechanical scheme of life. Maeterlinck's book on the life of the Termite Ants is a very important symbol of what Bolshevism may lead us to.

America, and more particularly Europe, have not progressed as far on the same way. The old order of things still acts as a brake against revolutionary changes. And yet for how long? The

ruin of the middle classes in Central Europe and the hopeless bankruptcy of agriculture, industry and governments in these countries, do not leave much hope for a conservative revival. A large group in Germany are ready to disavow big business and world trade altogether, and accept the present disruption of world markets as a permanent change. There is, of course, no doubt that bankruptcy on the one side and the hoarding of gold on the other are splitting up the world into groups who see no other way out of their difficulties than to close their doors to all outside trade and try to become self-supporting units. An evolution in this sense would mean the return to a primitive system of barter and exchange of goods. World trade would practically cease to exist. This is not to be wished for and would in the long run entail the same consequences as unbridled development of the opposite extreme, the mechanisation of life in accordance with Bolshevik principles.

In a small booklet published last autumn in Austria,* I tried to put forward a solution of the problem as to how our present line of industrial and economic development might be maintained without grave dangers accruing from it to humanity. My proposals suggest a separation of universal trade from the inner life of individual countries. A division of labour might thus be reached between the new and old order of things. I want to see the organisation of world trade, the methodical production and distribution of all goods universally wanted, relegated to a different plane of man's existence from that in which he is to fulfil his destiny as an individual. Some imagination is needed to realise a change in this direction. At present we are bound by nationalism and find it very difficult to consider the possibility that parts of our existence might be separated from the condition of appertaining to one country or nation.

And yet it should be possible for two active forces to live side by side, the one promoting the world's progress by universal commerce and industry, while the second would be safeguarding the individual right of all countries to protect their citizens' labour, to defend them from aggression and increase their prosperity. In my concept an International League or Chartered Company with sovereign rights might be formed by all countries for the handling of the world's trade. All governments would belong to it, also all large trade corporations, transport companies and industries now working for international commerce. The League might become the centre of all international trusts and cartels. Its organisation could be increased or cut down according to the

* *Weltenwende*. By Alexander Hoyos. Verlag Jung Oesterreich, Wien XVIII, Gymnasiums-gasse 40.

economic situation of the world. It is not possible to formulate concrete proposals with regard to its scope of action and the goods it should be given a trade monopoly for. It appears to me that a beginning might be made with grain, coal, metals, rubber, cotton and oil. Differences would have to be considered in the treatment of the various classes of goods. It might prove profitable to pool all interests in some of them, whereas the League might only act as a centre of distribution for the others. The League's action should never be extended to home markets but be restricted to the interchange of goods from one country to another, while every country would retain perfect freedom with regard to imports and exports, whose quantity and quality it would reduce or increase according to its own wants. This would automatically bring about a restriction of international trade to the actual requirements of the countries interested in it.

From a theoretical point of view Free Trade all round would undoubtedly be the best solution, as rationalising methods would then govern all trade, and production would be limited to actual demand. From a practical point of view, however, the disappearance of all tariffs and customs would ruin Europe and destroy innumerable existences. The proposal made lately that a universal monopoly for wheat should be given to Canada, the States and the Argentine, would do away with all peasant holdings in Europe very shortly. Rationalisation and simplification very often have a deadly effect on man's life. In Russia peasant life is now being uprooted on a large scale, thanks to the introduction of rationalistic methods of production.

The International League which I propose would not be in a position to influence the inner life of the countries joining it. Every year the members would examine their position and decide what they could export or import for the next twelve months. The figures would be given to the League's head office at Geneva, and there a one-year or a five-years' plan for the increase or curtailment of production would be made. Provision for unexpected demands would of course be necessary, and reserves up to a certain amount would have to be secured. At the present day large unsaleable stocks of wheat, rubber or oil form an unorganised reserve of this sort, their unrestricted growth, however, is a load on the market and a hindrance to any improvement of prices. Were they limited to a necessary reserve, and were production reduced after reaching this quantity further depressions on the market might be avoided.

I look upon the present economic crisis as the gravest danger that European civilisation or culture has been exposed to since

Christianity laid its foundation. Only very decisive measures can save the world from ruin.

The elements that up to now have been the foundation of our political, cultural and economic life, have been in large measure swept away. Monarchy is disappearing; the upper classes and particularly the intellectual strata of humanity are losing their influence. The New Class that is replacing them believes no more in cultural values, but puts its faith in machinery and a mechanical ordering of our existence. The Bolsheviks may be considered as an advanced type of the new primitive man who is growing up in all countries. Freed from the past, unhindered by tradition, these people believe in the unlimited possibilities of mechanical progress, in records against time and distance and in organisation. The super-capitalism they are aiming at must in time lead us to a world running automatically, in which the soul of man, and all that he has valued so far, has no more reason. A turning back from this line of progress, to which quite 90 per cent. of the growing generation all over the world are bound, is impossible. It should, however, be possible to deviate its course, to let it run on to territory where it need no longer so trenchantly affect the inner life of countries and individuals as it does now. That is the principle which underlies this proposal for a system of World Unity in economic matters, coupled with a strongly developed and individualistic order of self-government, independence and freedom for all nations.

It is interesting to consider the changes which a new international order of this sort would bring about. A great deal of what is now the fundamental support of nationalism and its dangers would fall away automatically if commercial rivalry on the world's markets were replaced by a combine, in which every nation would have its share, and which would regulate production and distribution in accordance with actual demand. No large armies or fleets would be wanted, when once the freedom of the seas became a necessary adjunct to the pooling of all interests in the world's trade. Sea transport could always be carried on under the international flag of the Trade League and the belligerent's right of search of merchant vessels in war time would soon become obsolete.

Decentralisation of power and government would probably be one of the most fruitful consequences of our system. The conception of great world powers and their concomitant rivalry and struggle for supremacy would change, if every country were assured of a share in the world's trade, and the granting of home rule offered greater possibilities for the prosperity and cultural progress of smaller bodies. Also colonial problems would find

a more equitable solution than they can at the present day. Many countries whose national pride bears the domination of a foreign race ever more reluctantly would submit willingly to the rules and regulations of a world League, in which they would be given the same rights and advantages as all other nations.

Decentralisation of this sort would do much to counteract the dangers of Bolshevism, international socialistic movements and also large capitalistic forms of business which are now menacing the world. A less aggressive spirit against traditional values, above all against religious belief, would prevail as soon as that part of life which chiefly concerns the modern mind—bent on technical progress and nothing else—was allowed to run its course and was guided only in such direction that it could no longer endanger the freedom and individual existence of mankind.

I quite realise that my proposals are nothing more than an introduction to a new line of thought and action, and also that they must be developed and improved upon before they can definitely become an element of the world's progress. It is only by a very efficient counterbalance to the world of super-capitalism growing up around us that we can hope to be saved from the mechanisation of our life, from tyranny such as the world has never known and from cultural death.

ALEXANDER HOYOS.

RECOLLECTIONS OF SIR GEORGE TREVELYAN.

NO form of prose literature is more to my taste than biography. I devour biographies, autobiographies, and biographical essays of all lengths and sizes, from Tacitus' *Life of Agricola* to Lockhart's *Scott*, or from the vignettes of Hazlitt and Bagehot to Moore's *Byron*, Trevelyan's *Macaulay* and Morley's *Gladstone*. It is enough for me that they be well written, and about some person of our own or past times who excites one's interest. If the book or essay happens to describe a contemporary, whom we have known and admired, the pleasure is naturally enhanced; for it brings back in retrospect some of the happiest moments in our own lives.

George Macaulay Trevelyan's *Memoir* of his father, fulfilling as it does all these conditions, has given me more enjoyment than any similar composition that I have read in recent years. It is equally attractive in matter, form and style. It tells the story of an eager and high-minded politician, of a fine scholar, a brilliant man of letters, whose name and fame are inscribed imperishably on the roll of great English writers by his *Early History of Charles James Fox* and his *Life of Macaulay*. No one who knew Sir George Trevelyan can doubt that this *Memoir* conveys not only a well-drawn outline of his life and writings, but also an authentic impress, lively and veracious, of his character and tastes and friendships. The piety of a son is happily blended with "the freedom of history."

My only complaint is on the score of size. There are but one hundred and fifty-three pages of large type, and less than twenty of excerpts from letters, against the seven hundred and twenty closely-printed pages of Macaulay's *Life*. Again, of the hundred and fifty-three pages, the first sixty only bring us to the end of Trevelyan's Cambridge career; and of the remainder only a very small fraction is concerned with the thirty years that he spent in the House of Commons as an active and public-spirited private Member, or as a Minister of the Crown. Some day, perhaps, we shall have a more adequate account of his political campaigns—he was a fine platform speaker—of his contributions to Reform, and of his work as an administrator. In any case, I would plead for a larger selection from his letters in some future edition of the book.

It is difficult for a son to paint the portrait of a father. There must be lights and shades; and art or truth may require what piety and affection would conceal. Nevertheless, Professor Trevelyan has succeeded. And he has succeeded because, like his father, he has the artistic as well as the historic sense.

George Otto Trevelyan was born, like his friends Morley and Bryce, in 1838—six years after the Reform Bill, and eight years before the Repeal of the Corn Laws. Bred in a public atmosphere of Free Trade and national economy, he inherited the fearless and impetuous spirit of Sir Charles Trevelyan, his father; learning in his boyhood to admire the devotion to duty, the scrupulous vigilance over public money, and the zeal for administrative reform, which marked the career of that great civil servant in India and afterwards at the Treasury. From his uncle, Macaulay, he imbibed a passion for literature, and especially for the classics. At Harrow and Trinity, Cambridge, he read hard and shone with exceptional brilliance in a brilliant group of scholars. At both he made lifelong friends.

Touching religion, we are told that the battle for sectarian equality interested him far more than theological controversies. Harrow, Cambridge, Macaulay, his father, John Bright, Montagu Butler, and later on James Bryce, all played their part in the formation of his opinions. He had the genius of friendship, and he enjoyed also intimate political associations and correspondences with men like Harcourt, Spencer, Morley, Rosebery and President Roosevelt. Nothing in this *Memoir* is better than the story of Cambridge and Trinity, which began for Trevelyan in October, 1857. We are told that "all his life long he felt towards Trinity as an Athenian towards Athens." At Trinity he made close friendships with the Sidgwicks, Edward Bowen, Henry Jackson, Jebb and Sir George Young. Calverley and Shilleto (his coach) were famous Cambridge scholars of the time, and Macaulay was as keenly interested in all that went on as if he were an undergraduate. I remember well a story Sir George once told me about Calverley's *Carmen Saeculare*, which must have come out in 1857 or 1858. At the end of the term, he brought this brilliant Latin farrago, or satura, to Macaulay at Holly Lodge. When they came to the lines warning freshmen against Bacon's manillas:

O fumose puer, nimium ne crede Baconi:
Manillas vocat; hoc praetexit nomine caules,

Macaulay stopped him and said: "No Roman would have said 'manillas'; he would have said 'manillanos'—the cheroots from Manilla." Sir George mentioned this to me in proof of the fine Latinity which Macaulay kept bright and polished to the end.

Trevelyan's relations with Shilleto are described in several amusing pages. The famous coach took in good part even the ribaldry of "the Cambridge Dionysia." He might well be proud of a scholar whose talents were entertaining the whole University. From that time onwards the great writers of Greece and Rome were Trevelyan's constant companions. Right down to his extreme old

age he was reading and re-reading them with perpetual delight. At eighty-eight (in July 1926) he wrote to me: "I am now finishing Suetonius for the fourth time this century. He grows on me every time. I love his allusions to the oral testimony of his father and grandfather and their contemporaries. And I have again finished Thucydides, and gone straight on to the *Hellenica*. But Xenophon is not Thucydides. I never felt more certain of any literary position than that Thucydides wrote the eighth book, and had not time to touch it up, and (happily enough) not to add any speeches." His son says: "He seemed to us [his children] to be for ever reading the Greek dramatists, Thucydides and Livy. And he brought to the perusal of Cicero's letters the same affectionate intimacy with the personalities of that great period of history which he felt for the not wholly dissimilar aristocrats and politicians whose social life he has pictured in the *Early History of Charles James Fox*."

A visit to India, when the memories of the Indian Mutiny were still fresh, produced *Competition Wallah* and *Cawnpore*, which will always be literary landmarks of Anglo-Indian society and conditions in that stirring time. He was then only twenty-six or twenty-seven. On his return, London society opened its doors to him. Great Whig houses welcomed him not merely for his talents and conversation, but because he was also in their sense an aristocrat by birth and inherited wealth. What helped to turn him into a political Radical was no doubt the admiration he conceived for John Bright, with whom he sat through the exciting debates of 1866. This combination of society Whig and political Radical comes out in the last and most brilliant of his poetical effusions: *Ladies in Parliament*, from which there are quotations on pages 69 and 74. To these I may add another passage which I have always admired. It has all the vigour and fire of *Ivry* or the *Armada*. He is describing the defeat of the Liberal Reform Bill of 1866, by a combination of Conservatives with the Whig seceders or Adullamites. At first their army seemed strong, bold and united:

But in the pageant all is bright, and, till the shock we feel,
We learn not what is burnished tin, and what is tempered steel.
When comes the push of charging ranks, when spear and buckler
clash,

Then snaps the shaft of treacherous fir, then holds the trusty
ash.

And well the fatal truth we knew when sounds of lawless fight
In baleful concert down the line came pealing from our right,
Which in the hour of sorest need upon our centre fell,
Where march the good old houses still that love the people well.
As to and fro our battle swayed in terror, doubt, and shame,
Like wolves among the huddled flock the Tory vanguard came.

A moment yet with shivered blade, torn scarf, and pennon reft
Imperial Gladstone turned to bay amidst our farthest left,
Where, shoulder tight to shoulder set, fought on in sullen pride
The veterans staunch who drink the streams of Tyne, and Wear,
and Clyde.

My own recollections of Sir George Trevelyan begin just before the Boer War, when I became a fairly frequent guest at his London house in Grosvenor Crescent, and at his country homes in Warwickshire and Northumberland. Wallington, Sir George's Northumbrian home, is finely described in the *Memoir*. My first visit to it was in the autumn of 1897, when I was emerging from Oxford. My host was very kind to me, and seemed to enjoy taking me round the garden and the grounds. I have a note about his talk on that occasion, which ran on politics and literature. I took an opportunity of asking him what he thought of Matthew Arnold. He knew Arnold well, and liked him on the whole, describing him as "the only egotist I ever knew who was really good company."

The Welcombe Estate, where Sir George and Lady Trevelyan lived in the winter months, is close to Stratford-on-Avon. My memories of Welcombe are as pleasant as my memories of Wallington. On the first night of my first visit (February 8th, 1908) I wrote home to my father: "This is classic ground; for Shakespeare owned the tithes of the Welcombe estate and bought some freeholds round about here in 1604." The footpath to Welcombe must have been the prettiest walk out of Stratford, except the one by the banks of the Avon, and Shakespeare as a boy almost certainly wandered frequently over these lands. The house ("the too vast mansion" of the *Memoir*) struck me as very fine, but far too large. They told me it had forty bedrooms, and the one wing which they used seemed enormous. On the first afternoon of my visit, the author of *Garibaldi* took me a walk to Cropton Hall, one of the seats of the Gunpowder Plot Conspiracy; and in the evening Sir George conversed on many subjects. He was then working on the later volumes of his *American Revolution*, and preparing a final edition of his *Life of Macaulay*. He told me how, soon after the publication of Macaulay's *Life*, he was put up for the Athenæum Club, and was in some risk of being blackballed, his chief offence being the active part he had taken in bringing about the abolition of Army Purchase. There was a tragedy in connection with this ballot. Walter Bagchiot, to ensure his young friend's election, had stayed all day at the Club. The weather was cold; he took a late train to his home at Langport, and on the journey caught a chill which proved fatal. This ended Sir Trevelyan's first interest in the *Economist*, and brought him to dis-

cuss with me the policy I was then pursuing in the editorial chair. He was as anxious as I was that Campbell-Bannerman's Government should carry out its pledges of economy, especially in armaments; for the military and naval estimates had been swollen by the Boer War. He attributed the hesitation and indecision of the Cabinet on this subject to the Prime Minister's character. "C. B.," he said, "is very shrewd and loyal, but has never had the capacity to command, and is always willing to take responsibility for things he disapproves of." This threw light upon the continuance of bloated armaments and our disappointing policy at The Hague.

Next morning, Sir George took me all round the place, and told me much about the history of the estate. One of the few things known about Shakespeare is that he said to somebody who went up to London from Stratford to take evidence about enclosures: "I could not bear to see Welcombe enclosed." On the same occasion, I think, Shakespeare spoke of a two-mile hedge, which runs across the estate past a field called Salisbury Piece to a dingle. My host showed me the hedge and the Piece and the dingle. Another treasured possession on the estate is the barn of the farmhouse where Shakespeare's grandfather lived.

At this time, Sir George was full of literary work. Besides his *American Revolution*, he was making some interesting additions to the *Life of Macaulay*, and asked me whether I thought he should put his little pamphlet on Macaulay's marginal notes into an appendix. I said I thought it far too good for an appendix, and urged him to make it a chapter. Afterwards he consulted Morley on the point, who agreed with me, and Sir George then acted on this advice.

During this visit he talked a good deal about the Greek lyric poets, particularly Simonides and Tyrtaeus, of whom he was especially fond. One of his Homeric stories is worth repeating. A Cambridge scholar (Jebb, I think) had once remarked to Sir George that the finest of all Homeric lines is that describing the fall of the Charioteer:

κείτο μέγας μεγαλοκτὶ λελασμένος ἵπποσυνάων

Sir George repeated this to Mr. Gladstone, but added that it was one of the stock lines of Homer, which frequently followed the fall of a small knight or charioteer in battle. Mr. Gladstone said quickly: "No, I think not—it only appears once." On looking it up, Sir George found that Mr. Gladstone was right.

In one of these talks, Sir George branched off into reminiscences of London society in mid-Victorian days. He admitted to having been a very fashionable young man in the sixties when he visited

most of the great houses, and knew most of the great hostesses—the Duchess of Cleveland, Lady Margaret Beaumont and others. He sometimes stayed with the Lord Rothschild of that time at Mentmore, where he met, among others, Bernal Osborne. His two personal cronies in Parliament at first were Sir Wilfred Lawson and Edward Leatham—a brother-in-law of John Bright, who was member for Huddersfield. Leatham, who lived some time at Whitley Beaumont, was a splendid host and a brilliant speaker, but he spoilt his success by over-elaboration, and ended by committing all his speeches to memory.

August of the same year found me at Wallington. I wrote :

Sir George is far better in health and spirits than when I was last here about eight years ago. He works three hours every day (9-12) writing, and (I should think) reads about three more. He has been much interested in J. E. Cairnes' book on the Slave Power which I lent him. His talk is (naturally) much about the eighteenth century and especially the American War. He is very eager with proofs that the war was unpopular in England. One is that so many of our generals refused to serve.

I asked them at dinner one night who they thought was the man in the last 150 years whose reputation had fallen most short of his merits and deserts. I said I had a man in mind. Sir G. T. after ransacking his memory a minute or two gave it up, and I suggested Sir James Mackintosh. "Well," he said, "I don't agree with you; but Macaulay did. He had an immense admiration for Mackintosh, and until his own history had made such a success he had an almost morbid fear that he might prove a second Mackintosh—a failure, that is to say, in the world's eye."

The author's share from first to last of the history was £85,000! Macaulay was very generous and gave huge tips. Everything he had was good and he paid top prices as he was no bargainer. His wine cellar, which he left to Sir George, contained a hundred dozen of 1848 Lafitte. M. was an extraordinary walker as things went then. He would walk to Greenwich for dinner and then walk back. He liked to spend a few weeks every year on the Continent, taking, as he said, the language of the country with him. He read German, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese fluently.

Sir George admires John Morley's life of Gladstone immensely. "By far his greatest book." He won't hear of the Frenchmen, Diderot, etc., being preferred. He knew it would be a success, but it surprised his anticipations. He read it in two months at the rate of thirty pages a day, and said it revealed to him the whole difference between an Oxford and a Cambridge man. Macaulay could not possibly have led Gladstone's life, and he, Trevelyan, could not possibly have written it.

He thinks his own life of Macaulay gained by being written under pressure.

In the autumn I crossed the Atlantic for the first time. Just before starting I received a letter from Sir George in reply to one of mine. I must have touched upon the problem of investments, in which Sir George, like his uncle, Macaulay,* always took a keen interest. It may serve as an example of his epistolary style :

Wallington, September 1st, 1908.

Dear Hirst,

I am greatly interested in hearing that you are going to America, and we both look forward to you and Mrs. Hirst coming to Welcombe any time after the New Year, and telling us all about it. I have *not* got Macaulay's *Lessing*. I *have* his Paul Louis Courier—a kindred soul to Lessing, under sore disadvantages—and have two paragraphs about him in the last chapter. The book comes out, I think, in October: and I shall duly send you a copy, as "the only begetter" of the sixteenth chapter. Prussian Fours are a remarkable stock. If only Frederic, or his father, were keeping an eye on their Treasury! As an old man, who is investing for heirs, I am not sure that I would not prefer L. & N.W.R. Preference at 112. There is this about American Railways that, when they have fallen to a certain point, they begin to go up; and nothing else seems (to) do anything except go down. Bless you for what you say about the *Lays of Rome*. I am coming to London for a day or two early in October, to speak at the Book dinner on the 9th.

Yours very sincerely,

G. O. TREVELYAN.

Soon after my return from New York the promised invitation to Welcombe arrived! and I transcribe a few notes written at the time (January 16th, 1909):

I got here in time for lunch, and we have been down to Stratford. Sir George showed me church and school and the Shakespeare houses with great zest.

His favourite answer to the Baconians is the chancel, with the original bust and verses, and the fact that the best space in the church is occupied by tombstones of the Shakespeare family.

Macaulay, he says, had a tremendous admiration for Shelley at a time when no Shelley cult existed.

He told a story about Wordsworth and Macaulay. Some professed Wordsworthians having upbraided him for his lack of appreciation of their idol, Macaulay began to inquire, and found that he was the only one in the company who had read *The Excursion*!

Sir George has had lots of corrections† of Macaulay's *Life*, mostly quite small; one from a clergyman in Jamaica, who points out that "Queen's College," Cambridge, should be "Queens' College," Cambridge. It has been there from the

* Macaulay, he once told me, never made a bad investment.

† He has made them already in a second edition which he thinks is very nearly absolutely correct.

first, and Sir G. never knew that there were two queens to the foundation.

Sir George is now going through Plato's dialogues. He read thirteen pages this morning "with his feet in the fender." He uses Macaulay's edition with Macaulay's appreciations written in at the end of each.

Welcombe is 6,000 acres and Wallington 12,000. Sir George loves talking about his investments. He removed a big holding from Illinois on hearing that Harriman had got control, and put it into Hill Lines—Northern Pacific and another.

Towards the end of September 1909, I again visited Wallington. Among the guests was Sir Stewart Bailey, who had been in India during the mutiny. Accordingly the table talk ran largely on Indian subjects from Clive to Morley, who was just then completing his *Reforms*. But Sir George found time to discuss "the People's Budget" and the Dreadnoughts. He disliked the naval outburst as much as I did. Ignorance of naval affairs among statesmen, he declared, had cost the country twenty millions a year. The Lloyd George budget would take a large slice from his income. But he accepted it philosophically, telling me with a smile that Lady Trevelyan and his three sons shared the enthusiasm it had roused in the radical wing of the Liberal Party. We had a delightful talk in the library about Macaulay's books, and he read aloud to me the first part of Pompey's dream in Lucan's *Pharsalia*, to mark the music and melody of those splendid lines.

A letter from Lord Morley congratulating his son on the first *Garibaldi* volume had given Sir George immense pleasure. Morley's letters, he said, are unique. "Every one of them has an air of distinction. There is an effort, just enough, but not too much, to lift it out of the natural and the commonplace." There are other records and letters from which I had intended to quote; but I have nearly reached the limit of my space.

During my last visit to Wallington before the war, in September 1913, I wrote: "Wallington as beautiful and Sir George as delightful as ever. He has been showing me the garden. Keith's sweet peas are marvellous." Some time before this I had written to him about Ticknor's *Life*. He had devoured it. "For two or three months," he said, "I could talk of little else than Ticknor."

He complimented me on the *Economist*—from which he said he seldom differed. We little thought of what was to happen to economy less than a year later in a catastrophe which swept away all our foundations, justified all our fears, and destroyed all hope of national prosperity and international peace. With this I may part for the present from a fine scholar, a writer of genius, a fascinating talker, a great Liberal of the old school, and a staunch friend.

F. W. HIRST.

THE STRUGGLE FOR SECURITY.

ON a Sunday in summer the cafés of the little town of Verdun are crowded with tourists with wet, mud-splashed boots. They have been led through a mile or two of the damp underground passages in the fantastic citadel where, throughout the war, thousands of men lived like insects which seldom peer out of their burrows at the light of day. The tourists remember one of Verdun's claims to notoriety—in 1916 it saw the most terrible fighting that has ever been known between the French and the Germans, and that is saying a good deal since in the last thousand years the Franco-German struggle for "security" has brought the two peoples into conflict in most of the European wars, about which we Anglo-Saxons read vague details in our school history books. The tourists forget Verdun's other claim—in 843 it saw the signature of a treaty to put an end once and for all to wars between the French and the Germans, or rather, between the Western and the Eastern Franks, for it is by that treaty that France and Germany were given their national existences. "That's that," said the delegates to themselves, as they went back contentedly to their castles. It is not easy to argue convincingly with a cynic as you scramble among the ruins of the colossal concrete forts to the East of Verdun, built to protect the descendants of the Western Franks from the descendants of their Eastern brethren.

The Versailles Peace has not succeeded where those forts failed. Almost every political crisis which has arisen since its signature has been due, directly or indirectly, to French anxiety lest Germany should become too strong. Even such questions as reparations and disarmament are political, however much we may pretend they are technical—if Germany pays no more reparations she may become dangerously rich; if she is free to re-arm she may become dangerously strong. So the clauses of the Treaty are once more to be strengthened by steel and concrete. In the seventeenth century Vauban, the greatest of military engineers, built a magnificent system of fortifications for the eastern frontier of France, and now, after a war to end war, enormous credits are voted by the Chamber of Deputies in Paris for a new system to resist all the new engines of destruction with which science can help man to commit suicide.

What are the roots of this Franco-German mistrust? How can we dig them out and destroy them? Or must they, every so often, lead to secret treaties and alliances, to competition in armaments, to the waging of war until one country or the other is so weakened that it is compelled to accept the other's terms, however harsh

they may be? After all, there is so little racial difference between the Germans of the Rhineland and the Frenchmen of Lorraine. There is no strategic frontier to divide them, as there is between Germany and Bohemia, Austria and Italy, France and Spain. We have heard often enough that the only safe frontier for France is the Rhine, but a river is a division only between primitive peoples. No man, however keen his power of observation, could discover striking differences between the little towns on the right and left banks of the Rhine—each has its cherry orchards, its vineyards and its ruined castle towering above it, and there's not, as the saying goes, a pin to choose between them. There are, perhaps, only seventy-five miles of natural frontier between the two countries—the upper reaches of the river with the Black Forest on the east and the Vosges Mountains on the west. The early Franco-German struggles were not between rival races, but between rival kings. Even as late as the fifteenth century the students of the Sorbonne University were grouped in "nations" which bore very little relation to national frontiers. Englishmen and Germans worked with Frenchmen from the north; Italians with Frenchmen from the south.

And then the bacillus of "security" became active. France must extend her frontiers to the Rhine. From Richelieu to Foch politicians and generals have been obsessed by the idea. Admittedly it would look better on the map, for a river always finishes off a frontier nicely, but it is strategy rather than æsthetic geography that the Frenchman has in mind. Despite the development of aviation and the knowledge that in another war one bombing plane could do more damage by its distribution of "blistering" gas than a brigade of infantry, the Rhine frontier has become synonymous, in the minds of many Frenchmen, with "security." Every country occasionally loses its head, runs amok for one cause or another, and at recurrent periods the passion for "security" robs the French of their sense of proportion. That passion drove Louis XIV to undo most of the good work done by Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, who had destroyed, by the Treaty of Westphalia, all the hopes of the Hapsburgs. He proceeded, far more thoroughly than most figures in history, to live up to his motto, for it was *seul contre tous*. His greed lost him his allies, and in the absence of allies he lost as much power by the Treaty of Utrecht as Austria had done by the Treaty of Westphalia sixty-five years before.

That same desire for "security" had much to do with the achievements of Napoleon. For him the Left Bank of the Rhine was not enough: he must have the Right Bank as well, and he established the Confederation of the Rhine which grouped under

his control all the little princelings whose boorish imitations of the Court of Versailles had made them a laughing-stock during the second half of the eighteenth century. And the Right Bank was not enough, so he proceeded to defeat Prussia at the Battle of Jena and Austria at the battle of Wagram. But even this was not enough: Russia might still threaten French security, so that he had to carry out his disastrous march to Moscow, and, later, the British threat led to that final defeat at Waterloo.

Why all these scraps of history? Because history has so often repeated itself that nobody who would hint at the future can avoid a hurried review of the past. Everything that has happened since the war of 1914-18 has happened before it. We have already seen how Marshal Foch had his predecessors in demanding a frontier along the Rhine, and the rigid policy of a patriot like Poincaré has endangered the sympathies of the allies of France just as did the policy of that other patriot, Louis XIV, before him. The Treaty of Versailles did not give France all she demanded in the way of territory, so the Government encouraged Separatist movements in the Rhineland, even in Bavaria, just as did this same Louis and, after him, Napoleon. It was Napoleon's attack on Prussia which led to the growth of an acutely Nationalist feeling in Germany, and few Frenchmen would deny to-day that their post-war policy, however justified it may have been, has encouraged the violent nationalism of the "Nazis." Was the last war, then, with its ten millions of dead, merely one more turn of the wheel which brings us into battle at stated periods of human development with the same mathematical certainty as the passage of some comet across the field of our vision?

To answer that question we have to analyse the French demand for "security." To a great extent, of course, it is due to the fear of war—the fathers of men who fought in the defence of French soil between 1914 and 1918 fought for the same purpose and over the same ground in 1870 and 1871. But since the invasion of Gaul by Julius Cæsar the inhabitants of France have been at least as fond of fighting as other people, and yet their anxiety about safety has been much more insistent. It is all summed up in one phrase of Napoleon's—"The real strength of the Republic of France must in future lie in preventing any idea which does not belong to it from raising its head." In other words, the country whose revolution has been the main incentive to economic and political progress for well over a century has itself become the most conservative country on earth. Once we realise that, we realise the causes of the Franco-German rivalry; Germany loves change and France loathes it.

This was less obvious before the war when politics confused the

issue. France had been defeated in 1870 and, being a proud nation, a desire for revenge supplemented an unsatisfied thirst for security. Lorraine and part of Alsace were French in feeling and must become French in fact. And the material development of Germany menaced a dislocation of the economic balance of power, just as the relative success of the Russian Five-Year Plan has contributed to the dislocation of to-day. Few people then appreciated the underlying spiritual rivalry—in France there was only a middle class composed of individuals with little civic sense; in Germany middle-class individualism was being crushed by the military caste, by the trade unions and by the capitalists. Germany was proud of her municipal baths, her discipline and her schools; France was proud of her food, her wines and the freedom of her citizens. In the one country the individual was nothing; in the other he was everything, and in each he looked upon himself as a pioneer of civilisation.

Since the war this contrast has become patent to all. How else could one explain the French thesis that a treaty is sacred and should stand untouched, despite the passage of time? How else could one explain some of the architectural or literary atrocities perpetrated in Germany in order to be in the vanguard of progress? It is natural enough for the French to build their fortresses, for the early development of their civilisation was frequently menaced by invasions of the "barbarians" from the East. It may be argued that while Germany was ruled by a monarch as fond of military trappings as Wilhelm II, she was as dangerous to France as France had been to Germany under Louis XIV. But it would be probably still more reasonable to look upon her as a danger now that she has escaped from the strait-jacket of militarism, for she is opposed to everything which France upholds.

Never, perhaps, was the conflict of ideas between France and Germany greater than to-day. Germany is spendthrift, for the period of inflation and the constant danger of its return have wiped out the desire to save, which is perhaps the most characteristic feature of France. She shows no respect for the strict bourgeois respectability which, despite Montmartre and the Latin Quarter, is so deeply rooted in French minds. The development of her social legislation is such that, to quote an able French writer, Pierre Viénot,* "the (German) worker regards the freedom to escape individually from his class by education or thrift as an illusion . . . he wants to make individuals equal by equalising the classes." Most dangerous of all, in French eyes, Germany has studied the Russian experiment closely and with no great fear—five million voters supported the Communist at the first ballot for the

* *Is Germany Finished?* By Pierre Viénot. Faber & Faber. 5s.

Presidential Election in March, and the rank and file of the "Nazis" are much nearer to the ruthlessness of Bolshevism than they are to the policy of the capitalists who finance them.

One cannot put back the clock. Pursers on transatlantic liners do it, it is true, in order to confirm scientists and schoolboys in their belief that the world goes round, but even they are not able to make yesterday succeed to-day. We must go forward, and this elementary fact weighs the balance down heavily on the side of Germany. The world will not remain in awed immobility lest a gust of fresh air should destroy French civilisation. Much that is good and beautiful must go, in the same way as the dignified houses of the seventeenth century have gone to make room for the concrete business palaces of to-day. But the coming generations will prefer life to death. It is not a mere matter of chance that the countries which desire change, such as Italy and Germany, are governed by young men, and those that dislike it, such as Great Britain and France, by old ones. There are, of course, exceptions, but it is safe to suggest that the two politicians whose influence had most weight in France during the last five years were Raymond Poincaré, born in 1860, and the late Aristide Briand, born in 1862, while their opposite numbers in Germany were Heinrich Brüning, born in 1885, Adolf Hitler, born in 1889, and the late Gustav Stresemann, born in 1878. As against this a certain respect for honesty compels one to add that Tardieu, the French Premier, is fifty-six, while Hindenburg, the President of the German Republic, is eighty-four, but the generalisation is not less accurate than most generalisations. The tendency in Germany to let young men control affairs is roughly as strong as the opposite tendency in France.

There is one other factor of the greatest importance which strengthens the German hand. It is—or it seems to be—in the political interests of France to maintain all those clauses of the Versailles Treaty which give her power to keep Germany in subjection, but it is in the economic interests of the rest of the world to modify most of those clauses as rapidly as possible. We are learning, in a very bitter school, that we can no longer afford to "play politics." Politics poisons the atmosphere and kills trade, but without trade we ourselves perish, so that politics must go! In other words, the longer it takes the Frenchman to change his conception of security and his method of obtaining it, the more difficult it becomes even for the warmest friends of France to stand by her without starving.

It has become a matter of secondary importance whether France or Germany has justice on her side—probably they both have. In the reparations controversy France may argue that Germany

is potentially very rich, since she has borrowed more money from the United States than she has paid out to her ex-enemies. Germany may argue that she has paid France more money in reparations than France has spent on restoring her devastated lands—a statement the truth of which is open to dispute. Or again, in the disarmament controversy, France may argue that she dare not reduce her army while Great Britain and the United States refuse to give her more detailed guarantees of protection than the former gave by the Locarno Treaty and they both gave by the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact. Germany may argue that she was only disarmed after the Versailles Conference as a preliminary to a general disarmament which has not been carried out. But these arguments are academic. They merely distract attention from the real issue, which is this. Is the Versailles Treaty to be modified sufficiently rapidly to satisfy 65,000,000 Germans or sufficiently slowly to give a feeling of security to their 40,000,000 French neighbours? Or can a happy mean be found which will leave both countries only moderately discontented? Germany cannot be kept too poor to fight, for the continued payment of reparations adds to the one-way stream of gold and goods which harms the victors as much as the vanquished. Germany cannot be kept too disarmed to fight, for France could only stop her by a renewed occupation of the Ruhr. Besides no reasonable being believes that the world can continue to pay over £900,000,000 a year on armaments which so obviously do not spell security. Sooner or later people will draw the obvious conclusions from the fact that Great Britain, France and Germany, who increased their armaments expenditure by almost 70 per cent. between 1908 and 1913, were involved in the following year in the worst war in history. Unless Paris and Berlin can agree we shall soon be helpless spectators in a race between world bankruptcy and world war. And it will be of very little importance to us which wins, for the one would be as disastrous as the other.

Of course it is a gloomy outlook, and we gain nothing by pretending that it is not. But there are favourable factors. Every month of delay drives thousands of middle-class Germans into the ranks of revolution, but it also gives thousands of Frenchmen, whose fathers thought only of politics, an interest in economics. Perhaps there will be enough of the latter to save the former from any suicidal act. Every month brings more people to realise that the developments of science, of aviation, of the radio lessen the importance of geographical frontiers, so that the Rhine should conjure up before men's minds only a beautiful river flowing through beautiful country, and no longer a barrier of hatred between two highly civilised races. Every month more power in

France and in Germany passes into the hands of younger men who saw enough of the last war to prefer more sensible methods of settling international disputes.

The other day I watched a clown trying in vain to perform a complicated trick with a bicycle. After his tenth failure he turned with an apologetic smile to the audience. "Where there's no hope," he said, "there's no hurry." Presumably the converse of this truth is equally true. The amicable solution of the problems of reparations, armaments, and general economic recovery must depend upon the speed with which influence can be taken out of the hands of those who believe in old-fashioned but tangible forms of "security" such as the changing of frontiers or the occupation of land with alien inhabitants. For security is not a game of political poker but a state of mind which has little, and will have less, to do with the facts of geography.

VERNON BARTLETT.

NATIONAL FINANCE AND THE DEPRESSION OF TRADE.

OPPOSITION to the present Government has hitherto been mainly directed to the hardships inflicted on various sections of the community, notably to the "economies" in unemployed benefits. This is not to be wondered at. The sufferings of the unfortunate class compelled to face the problem of living on still straiter means must arouse the sympathy of every man and woman in the country. People, too, of greater but still modest means are faced for the first time with the need to find money to pay income-tax, or if in slightly easier circumstances by enormously increased demands.

There is, however, another equally important aspect of the question. Even if we believe the changes made by Mr. MacDonald's Cabinet fairly fulfil his promise to exact "equality of sacrifice" from all classes, is his the right way to meet the crisis? Or is it rather calculated to perpetuate and extend the evils out of which the crisis itself arose? If the latter, we have clearly nothing for which to thank the Government, which has at best purchased for us a temporary respite from our difficulties at the cost of a complete surrender to the forces of reaction. Mr. MacDonald gained nothing for Labour; Sir Herbert Samuel got little for Liberalism; Sir Henry Page Croft everything for Protection.

In the fiscal year 1913-14 the amount brought under survey of the Inland Revenue Department for purposes of income-tax was £951 millions; in 1920-1 this had increased to £2,661 millions. This amount was no doubt swollen by the high prices and good trade of the first post-war years. These excess profits no longer being available, there was a sharp drop next year, and a smaller one when, in 1923-4, incomes from the Irish Free State were no longer included. After this they tended to increase until the American collapse of 1929. Even when the full weight of income-tax, super-tax and death duties is deducted, there was still an enormous increase in the share the income-tax paying classes received out of the national dividend as compared with what they received in pre-war days.

The following tables will throw light on what was happening. The reader will notice that, though our principal industries were making very much smaller profits and often losing heavily, the amounts surveyed on the whole increased; while year by year the amounts charged with estate duty grew greater, *ergo* the dead weight of interest on government debt, on mortgages, debentures and bankers' advances was becoming more burdensome than ever, especially in a time of falling prices. No doubt the general collapse in world trade since 1929 has caused very heavy losses

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to these relatively sheltered sources of income; but that was sure to happen some day—after less well protected people had been ruined.

		* Amounts surveyed for Income-Tax. ooo omitted.		Amounts charged for Estate Duties. ooo omitted.
1920-1	...	£2,661,182	...	£391,346
1921-2	...	2,462,178	...	419,835
1922-3	...	2,353,184	...	431,198
1923-4	...	2,303,308	...	441,896
1924-5	...	2,400,725	...	461,135
1925-6	...	2,336,890	...	456,390
1926-7	...	2,337,044	...	466,487
1927-8	...	2,416,232	...	511,070

* From 1923-4 the figures do not include those of the Irish Free State.

At the same time wages suffered an appalling reduction falling by ten and a half millions weekly during the years 1921, 1922 and 1923. Since then they have continued relatively steady at the reduced figures, with on the whole a tendency to decline.

Two processes are revealed by these figures, one a reduction in the wages of labour and the profits of the working capitalist and the holders of ordinary shares, and the other a steady increase in the proportion of the national income in money and still more, owing to the fall in prices in purchasing power, in that of the receivers of fixed incomes. Labour suffered first, having to submit to enormous reductions from 1921 to 1923, so that even the fall in prices would leave for Labour no net advantage, especially as, even then, we had a million unemployed receiving only the insurance benefits. But the active capitalist lost also, in spite of having to pay lower wages. That, in itself, of course, meant less demand for his produce and constant strife with his employees, culminating in the general strike and colliery lockout in 1926. In looking for help to wage reductions, however, the working capitalist was aiming at the wrong target. That which was squeezing the life-blood of British industry was the dead hand of the usurer taking a toll three times as great as before the war from the active agents of production.

I am convinced that this enormous tribute for past loans cannot be paid, and that the continued attempt to do so can only result in the collapse of industry. In so far as the financial problems resulting from the war can be dealt with apart from a general agreement among the nations, a way must be found to reduce the amount of it to something like pre-war level. Our policy of deflation has erred in one direction as fatally as the corresponding inflation policy of France, Italy and Germany. At the close of the war all the European belligerents at least were faced with the

fact that they had borrowed far more money than they had any prospect of repaying. At the same time their currencies, being no longer artificially "pegged," were over-valued. They had been compelled to pay exorbitant prices for munitions during the war, and had borrowed vast sums from their own people and their allies in what, but for the pegging aforesaid, would have been heavily depreciated currencies. They met the position in two ways, the one cruel to the national creditor, the other grossly unfair to the nation itself. The Continental countries continued to inflate their currencies till the franc, the lira and the mark were worth only minute fractions of their nominal values; Great Britain, determined to enable the pound to "look the dollar in the face," deflated till the pound rose to its pre-war position on the exchange, incidentally raising the burden of interest on the debt by 50 per cent. Both courses were unjust, especially the former; both were economically mischievous, especially the latter. The true course to pursue was to stabilise each currency as quickly as possible on the basis of the then existing rate of exchange.

Now no conceivable way of dealing with the matter short of leaving it alone and doing nothing could be worse than the Continental method of inflation. It was, however cruel and unjust, at least more realistic, more in accord with the necessities of the case than our method, which was that of doing nothing until the pound could be gradually worked up to its old par value again. Inflation meant cruel injustice to lenders, but it did get rid of the debt; the nations went through the bankruptcy court and got their discharge. We, not perceiving that the debt burden must prove intolerable, made no attempt to find out a more humane way of reducing it and deflated, with disastrous consequences to employment and the profits of creative enterprises. A great opportunity was lost when, at the close of the war, the pound was not stabilised at its then value. Mr. J. M. Keynes has quoted for us the verdict of Ricardo when, after the revolutionary wars, a similar problem faced us. The paper pound then was at a discount, I think of about 10 per cent. Had it been greater, Ricardo admitted that he would have advised devaluation; but, as it was, he thought the change not worth while. It was clearly very much greater at the close of the Great War, and should, in common fairness to the taxpaying public, have been stabilised as quickly as possible, the national creditors receiving interest only on the real value of what they had lent during the war, with some fair consideration for possible holders of pre-war debt. The Coalition Government, then in office, however, was talking nonsense about "making Germany pay," and was not at all likely to adopt such a measure. The opportunity was accordingly lost.

Nevertheless there were many people seriously anxious about the position of the country. The Labour Party and many Liberals favoured a Capital Levy as a means of reducing the burden, and Lord, then Mr., Arnold and a member of the House of Commons, moved a resolution in Parliament in its favour. The motion was seconded by Sir Donald Maclean, the Liberal Leader in the House, so that we may conclude that the levy policy was then accepted by both the Labour and Free Liberal parties. I did not regard the proposal with absolute confidence, as I feared that such a levy could not be carried far enough to meet the appalling situation. But at any rate it would have done something, while it seemed at least to prove that the two parties realised that there was a terrible situation to be met, and one that required extraordinary measures. Briefly the country could not pay in perpetuity such an enormous tribute to the dead hand of the bondholders, and could only strangle its industry by attempting to do so.

Encouraged perhaps by the support given by Sir Donald Maclean, the Labour Party fought the General Election of 1923 mainly on two issues—Free Trade and the Capital Levy. This was the opportunity for the Liberals. They promptly dropped any advocacy of the Levy and fought the election on two negatives, as against the Tories "No Protection" and as against Labour "No Capital Levy." The result was a victory, not for them, but for their no policy; for a House was elected which would neither adopt the false remedy of tariffs nor attempt to tackle the problem of the debt. Then the Labour Party did a thing of the wisdom of which I was very doubtful at the time, and in view of what has happened since I am convinced was a blunder. The Tories had then the largest number of members of any party in the House. It was within the power of the Liberal and Labour Parties by combining to turn Mr. Baldwin's Party out whenever they attempted to do any mischief. Mr. Baldwin, however, unwisely as I think, was anxious to retain office, and govern the country with a minority government. The Liberal Party, though the smallest in numbers, clearly represented best the vote of the country which had provided a majority against either the Labour or the Tory programme. Labour had only to sit fast and keep a tight hold on their opponents, and it would not have been very long before they would have been returned to real power. Meantime they would have been at least as effective in opposition as in office, with the Damocles Sword of defeat by a combination of their rivals hung over their heads. The question of the debt could not permanently be shelved; either for the Capital Levy or for some other effective method of dealing with it the country would

ere long be ripe, and the crisis of last autumn would have been avoided or dealt with in a more effective manner.

The progressive parties thenceforth dropped the Capital Levy, and the second great opportunity to reduce the national burden was lost. Meantime, the workers suffered a heavy reduction of money wages which need not have taken place had the pound been devalued at the outset, and have now, it is to be feared, to face a further reduction through higher prices in their real wages. They have made their "sacrifice" for the nation twice over. Vast numbers of them also are unemployed, and will suffer still further from no fault of their own in reduction of insurance benefits. Thus the main safety valve against collapse will be choked and matters made worse than ever.

I have called the unemployment benefits the main safety valve against collapse. Of course, it is a very unsatisfactory one. The problem of excessive unemployment is closely related to the other problem of the debt. Capitalism, even before the war, could never for long succeed in distributing in any effective manner the wealth which the community produced, still less the far greater wealth which science, engineering and chemistry had rendered possible with proper organisation. Hence we had the "trade cycle" with periods of comparative prosperity varied by others of depression and widespread unemployment. This was in itself a condemnation of the system under modern conditions when man's powers for producing wealth were rapidly increasing. The needs of mankind and its power to supply them are no less in bad times than in good, while our power to produce wealth is no less. It is a tragic failure, then, that any one willing to work should ever be unable to get work so long as anyone goes short of necessary or useful things. Mr. John Hobson has explained over and over again during the last forty years the reason for this failure, and as far as I know no one has hitherto made any serious attempt to answer his arguments. When some competent economist does so, it will be interesting to hear what he makes of his case.

When any sale is made or any wages are paid no loss of purchasing power occurs. The seller or the wage-receiver obtains exactly the same purchasing power as the buyer or employer surrenders. The chief economic consequence of a sale is that the seller is encouraged to reproduce the article, having found a market for it; if he cannot sell, he will stop producing. But if he keeps the money in his pocket or fails to make quick use of it either to produce more wealth or to buy something of use to himself, the money he receives will have no more effect than if it did not exist, until he finds a new investment for it. If he invests

his money in an already established industry the question of whether any good comes out of the matter will depend on what the former holder of the shares he has bought does with the money in his turn. Simple non-use of money, however, is not creative; money "saved" and kept in a stocking or deposited anywhere where it is not used, is not "saved" at all in a social sense. Social saving consists in the addition of useful plant and stock needed to provide for a real or prospective consumption demand either for private or public needs; saving beyond what can be employed in this way is waste.

There is no danger that the limit of really useful saving will be exceeded by those who have to work for their living or whose dependence on rent and interest is only for a moderate standard of life. Wasteful savings occur only when incomes from investments come in automatically in excess of, not only the wants, but the extravagances of the recipients, or when, as in the case of war profiteers, increased profits during a temporary boom in trade come in too fast to be absorbed by the adoption of changed conditions of life. By rendering this form of excess saving possible, every trade boom tends to negate itself and bring on collapse and depression because production is in excess of consumption. Stocks are being built up and new plant is laid down in view of the existing prosperity, while the demand for articles of consumption lags behind. It cannot be too clearly understood that the rapid and continued increase in the spending of the masses, especially in an age like this when the powers of production increase so rapidly, is the essential condition of prosperity. The purchases of the ultimate consumer are the magnet that draws to itself all stages of production, including the investments of all savings, that are socially useful.

Now the way adopted by the National Government to meet the crisis of last autumn was a continuation of the fatal policy of the last thirteen years. Ever since the Industrial Revolution there has been a continual tendency for production to outrun consumption. From the days of the Luddite machine-breakers to the "rationalisers" of to-day a principle of "ca' canny" has prevailed, not only or chiefly among working men but with landowners withholding land for building sites, firms combining to maintain prices by restriction of output, governments "economising" on needed public works. Each of these is understandable enough under the conditions existing—the slow expansion of consumption demand. What the Government has done is, first to obtain by far the larger part of the needed increase of revenue from those poor or moderately off who are compelled to spend most or all of their earnings, and then, by reducing unemployed

benefits and the salaries of public servants, still further restricting demand. That way madness lies. The industrial machine is clogged and there can be no increase at the entrances until the outlet, consumption, has been enlarged. Matters would have been very much worse than they are had it not been for the "dole" acting as an emergency exit, which has perhaps saved us from anarchy. The salaries of public servants and expenditure on public works in like manner gave similar relief. Lord Snowden, by his "economies," has rendered the relief these gave less adequate than ever. The spending powers of the middle classes have been curtailed by his reduction of the allowances on income-tax, when much more money would have been raised, and from the right quarters, if the standard rate had been raised to 6s., and the abatements extended, so that incomes under four figures would have been charged no more than before. The increase in the super-tax should have been carried much further and steeply graduated so as to supply the place of the capital levy now discarded. Such a method of dealing with the crisis would have caused little fall off in consumption and given industry the best chance to recover.

Strangely enough the National Government itself has authorised a capital levy, though in the worst possible form. By going off the gold standard the practical burden of the debt has been reduced by about a third. But this has not been attained by any wise system of graduation to prevent real hardship. The poorest fund-holder or owner of war savings certificates loses proportionately as much as those to whom the reduction brings no hardship; while the workers for wages or salaries will be compelled still further to reduce their purchases. The National Government was mainly formed to prevent this, and Mr. MacDonald made a very foolish and mischievous speech on the subject. Then the standard collapsed and we were told it was a great gain. Labour men may well feel grateful that their party was not in office when this happened. What would have been said about it then?

So the National Government came into existence carrying with it the two Cabinet Ministers most responsible for the financial methods actually pursued by its predecessors. Since then we have been told over and over again that it was the Labour Government's incompetence that caused the crisis. It was in reality the consequence of the policy of all governments since the peace, the consequence of not following out the line taken by the Labour Party up to 1923.

BROUGHAM VILLIERS.

ADVENTURES AMONG VILLAGES.

MY desultory expeditions among groups of Cotswold villages this winter were, quite by accident, determined by a signpost, or rather by a pair of them. The first stands on the plateau after the very steep climb up from Withington towards Chedworth. It is the opulent owner of five blades: to Cirencester, to Chedworth, Foss Cross and Bibury, to Northleach (bridle road), to Compton and Hazleton and to Colesbourne (bridle road). If a signpost be oldish, of timber and planted in grass far from its successful relations, the metal exhibitionists of the speedways, it is the station appointed for rest and a bite. There was a sense of liberation in settling down under five wands summoning up so generous a width of wold, under five fingers that pointed the way to change, to respite, to something different from the here and now.

Indeed, I love a good old signpost—the one that points from the old Fosse Way to Broadwell, "1 mile, 7 furlongs"; the ancient at the top of Campden Hill, set strongly up in the seventeenth century, and the one that stands on the shapeless lump of Crickley Long Barrow, not far from Northleach. Hither I made my way, though it seems queer to make a pilgrimage to a signpost. But it is true to life wherein we pursue ends that are invariably beginnings. Nowhere is there an end and perhaps death itself is only the tallest of signposts whose directions are indecipherable. The Crickley signpost possesses no fewer than six arms to set you moving among the uplands: to Eastington, to Northleach, to Cheltenham, to Calcot, to Bibury and to Coln St. Denys. The breadth of the scene the blades bade me attend is foreshortened by the beech-belt which ramparts the Chedworth Woods, but in long barrow days it must have been on a scale scarcely less spacious than the sky itself. And there is nothing like a signpost to give you the journey sense, it is an open book of travels with none of their verbosity and irrelevance. It is a monument of concise brevity, and yet how every blade sharpens the enterprise of the stranger and the recollections of the familiar! You get the Darien feel by an old signpost, and when it stands on a barrow there is another and invisible finger pointing down long vistas of the past. A signpost is an earnest of change, an incentive to purpose, a prelude to adventure, a turnstone to the varieties of this manifold world. To-morrow to fresh woods and pastures new—what greater eloquence could its terse signatures deliver?

It was these signposts that led me to a more thorough exploration of Cotswold villages than I had yet attempted. These villages

can be definitely grouped according to districts stamping them with a certain specific rank, to be detected if not interpreted among all the individual differences between one village and another. There are the Chipping Campden group, Ebrington, Ilmington, Broad Campden and others more minor; the Swells and the Slaughters; the northern wold group composed of Snowhill, Hinchwick, Condicote, Cutsdean and Ford, and the more southerly wold-constellation of Notgrove-Hampnett-Turkdean. One such group lies to the east of the Stow-Burford highway and in the region of the southward-flowing Evenlode, with Gloucestershire on its western bank and Oxfordshire on its eastern. It is curious to note how these villages are failing to live up to their Cotswold heritage. Agricultural depression, if a main, is only a contributory cause, for the truer Cotswold country to the west, just as agriculturally stagnant and economically heavy-laden, yet avoids compromising with the shoddy and the makeshift, as the villages on the heights above and in the valley of the Evenlode (especially when you cross it) do not. They don't think twice about putting up red-brick walls, slate roofs and tin barns or even more ogre-like contraptions of corrugated iron supported on iron props. These villages make an unsavoury blend of mechanised modernism and decay. The two ugly sisters meet one arm-in-arm, but the Cinderella of the authentic Cotswold cot is unobtrusive indeed.

Yet the churches of Icomb, Idbury, Westcote and Bledington, which is a marked exception in beauty, are all very fine Cotswold, with traces of Oxfordshire influence. Icomb Church must at one time have been an inspired thirteenth-century building. But in 1820 they stuck a new tower on the nave, a very abode of Moloch, so morose, so uncouth, so diabolically ugly is it. Bledington Church is an imposing affair for so sequestered a village grouped casually about its green, graced with stream and wooden bridge. It is much more elaborate than the usual Cotswold church, nor has the hand of the restorer bestowed upon it worse than ruin. Sanctus bell-cote, timbered oak-porch and pews and rood-loft stairs, grotesques, Norman font and actually some feet of original stained glass in windows like celestial flowers, remain. What could have induced those diligent fetich-worshippers, so busy at Icomb, to have spared Bledington and the Norman door at Idbury which on its little hill looks out upon the softer Cotswold plateau to the east?

On clear days you can see much further than that, indeed from Chipping Norton to the north-east as far as the Berkshire Downs beyond the Vale of the White Horse. At Icomb Place above the village, where there is a camp as at Idbury and a tower almost as incongruous as Broadway Tower, the boundary of Gloucestershire

and Worcestershire, that county of odd and disjointed limbs, runs through the middle of the fireplace in the tower, so that, as they say, "you can boil your kettle in Gloucestershire and drink your tea in Worcestershire." That is just it; in all these villages you are conscious of the indeterminacy of a borderland. It is a land that can't make up its mind between Cotswold and off it, and makes the worst in trying to get the best of both worlds. Some human beings make a highly successful job of swinging between two worlds and false to both. But a countryside conceals the ravages of such a mentality less satisfactorily; and just as the landscape is wanting in individual power, so the villages lack the cohesion of a single harmonious identity. Dislocation between the old style and the new has been the nemesis by decay of failing to speak the magic words, "to thine own self be true. . . ."

Rissington Bros and the Barringtons, on the other hand, are perfectly normal type-villages of the North Cotswolds. Wyck, Little and Great Rissingtons all lie direct south of Stow-on-the-Wold and on the western slope of the great ridge which, shaped like the more archaic type of Palæolithic hand-axes, gradually broadens from its blunt nose near Stow until it reaches the eastward bend of the Windrush to Burford. This ridge is the watershed between the Windrush and Evenlode Valleys, and yet the villages along its western slope, one behind the other in the order named and followed by Great and Little Barringtons due west of Burford, are practically immune from the disintegrating influences eating into the vitals of the villages that lie between the ridge and the Evenlode or beyond the river. The Rissingtons and Barringtons all defer in the structure of their houses to the way the Cotswold stone likes to be treated, and preserve their integrity in a setting of woodland and pasture nicely adjusted to the adventure of the valley up the hillside and the softening of the slope as it reaches down to the valley. Though the Rissingtons are but a few wing-beats as the crow flies between the Fosse Way and the highroad between Stow and Burford, they are remote from self-advertisement and all show the same loving care of the old masons upon their least dwellings. The road into Wyck Rissington from the north runs through the middle of the village green, which wears a traditional air from its groups of tall elms and the wide disposition of its houses. As an easy placid composition of an English village, this framework is ideally spaced and adapted to the lower slope, while the lofty semicircle of the wolds keeps a proportionate distance away. The church possesses an example of the "ball-flower" ornament peculiar to the Decorated Period and rarely represented among Cotswold churches, while there are other memoranda of its architectural graces any well-stocked ecclesiastical library could shower

upon you. But the cardinal virtue of Wyck Rissington Church to my less knowledgeable mind are the massive but very dumpish tower and the wide-winged roof, planing half-way down and then outwards to within six feet of the ground. Tower and roof are precisely of the breadth and solidity to match that broad-margined road, the wide-skirted green and the roomy spacing between the houses.

To reach Little Rissington takes a stiff climb through sunken lanes up to Wyck Beacon, eight hundred feet up. It lies higher on the slope of the ridge and within a shallow bowl, while the houses, in contradistinction to those of Wyck Rissington, are huddled together along so curly a road that you can no more see all round it than you can an enigmatic human. The wolds, kind but aloof, stand high away from the little church across the meadows of the Windrush, as the church itself stands high and away from the village across a causeway choked with tall ferns. It is a mixed grill of a church, Norman, Early English, Decorated and Perpendicular, with a ketchup of Victorian addition in the shape of a revolting octagonal pillar supporting the tower. Though Cotswold churches nearly all belong to the same flock, yet in the very humblest of them there is always some variation from type, some speciality of local preference to distinguish one from another. Here it was a bell-cote with which less than ten others are blest. But what I liked best was the oddling baby tower which hardly poked up above the roof of the nave. And this tower was as much in character with the clustered, reticent, almost secretive effect of Little Rissington as the tower of Wyck Rissington Church with its village.

Great Rissington also lies on mid-slope, but resembles Wyck Rissington in a tendency to gather its houses round the edge of its wider saucer and having more room to spread inwards from it. It is a somewhat casual and formless village as Wyck Rissington is not, nor so scrupulous in shunning the jerry-builder. Seeking the church I lost myself among its random ways and doubted whether its charms could compensate the saddened mind from contemplating Victorian ideas of how to patch up an old building—when I found it. I did not linger, especially as the manor house did not allow the church off the lead. Yet Great Rissington is as individually distinct from its brethren as their total group-effect is from other Cotswold groupings, for a Cotswold village belongs to itself no less than to its own locality and to Cotswold, three loyalties in one.

A little to the west, about half-way between the Little and Great Rissingtons, the river Dickler, flowing south from the Swells, joins the Windrush which with these magnified waters becomes

prophetic of Thames and, abandoning brookhood, turns east a few miles further south and, more and more conscious of its rise in the world, flows between Great and Little Barringtons before washing the feet of Burford. "At Barrington shall English bounty stand," wrote Pope, but he meant Barrington Park and what he should have meant was Great Barrington Village, broad-set amidst its riverine scene, a more matronly village than any of the Rissingtons and appropriately so because the ridge has receded and fat water-meadows are its frame. Yet it is true Cotswold, in spite of a dull church with little more than a Norman chancel arch to sweeten the sight. What willingness to please, what fruitfulness to the designing hand of man resides in a stone that has made alike and so unlike a Great Barrington and a Condicote, bare among the wolds! Little Barrington rests on the opposite bank of the Windrush which has quite forgotten that further north it could only by custom and courtesy be spelt with a capital "W" as it now rolls its riverine waters towards Burford. The village in its deep moist green pocket is the most disorderly in composition of all five and yet the most endearing in its vagrom Gothic grace. But for the vile litter of deal-boarded pews, pulpit and the like, the little church, watching rather quizzically the so superior Windrush below, would be almost perfect. Its treasures go on and on with its embattled toy tower, bell-cote on the east gable of the long nave, Norman carved tympanum, south doorway and nave arcade, its ancient glass and traces of mural paintings. To descend by seven steps into a church so comely is like reading a fine sonnet for the first time.

These Rissingtons and Barringtons are but average villages of North Cotswold and this was not the first time I had visited them. But the last was the best, since to be saying good-bye makes you anxious to miss nothing. And all true experience of the beauty of the external world seems to be a process in three parts. When first you travel Cotswold, its wolds and vales and streams and villages bring the impact of first love, a lyrical delight. Follows the middle period when you begin to understand the lay and structure of the land, to find things that you expect, the period of recognition and more familiarity, and perhaps then you become a little used to what you see. But after that comes the last phase and the last love of all, when intimacy reveals newnesses unexpected, freshnesses unexplored, graces undivulged and this is the love that is both last and lasts, for its fountains are inexhaustible.

Between the irregular triangle of Cirencester, Burford and Fairford is another group of villages as distinctive as any and with a particular lustre of its own. I reached them by following the

I drifted over the Coln and on a chain stretched across it sat a kingfisher. It seemed to me a perfect thing that this almost legendary river, sown with so many flowers of fashioned stone along its miles of crooking storied banks, should be the home of a bird that is becoming legendary indeed and whose form is clothed in an iridescence that the colours of the old stained glass in windows by its course alone can match. Soon I left the Coln and met the Leach, flowing south from Northleach. On its opposite banks Eastleach Turville and Eastleach St. Martin face and straggle into one another. Their churches look straight across at each other over a stream thwarted in summer time by its own wealth of flowering mimulus and an old unparapeted stone bridge laid with gigantic monolithic slabs. The St. Martin has the best position, lifted between the river and a grandiose barn and looking over a luxuriant river pleasance which seemed the archetype of what all such scenes should be. Its Norman porch, bell-cote and squat tower with wide-spread steeple had made it the pixylike spirit of that Spenserian

Yet the country itself is even more foreign to the Cotswold character than the land east of the Evenlode. When you turn east at Ready Token along Akeman Street from Coln St. Aldwyn, you leave forthright Cotswold behind. When you leave the Eastleaches to continue eastward, the landscape goes dead commonplace, as though it had suddenly lost its spirit, its individuality, its real true quintessential self. It becomes just mass-country, like a man or woman who deserts his or her distinctive colour of being and joins the mass-mind. At Witney, a few miles further on, you might be a million miles from Cotswold. How singular then that this group of villages, in brilliant contrast with those beyond the Evenlode, should not merely have preserved their Cotswold authenticity, but carried the traditional style of so localised an inspiration to its zenith! It is the only district in the whole of the Cotswolds whose villages, so blessedly Cotswold, are not the self-conscious expression of the Cotswold land.

H. J. MASSINGHAM.

TRANSYLVANIA TO-DAY.

ONE of the most interesting parts of Europe is the province of Transylvania, which until the end of the war belonged to Hungary and is now a part of Rumania. According to the latest investigations, made in 1923, the Rumanians number 58 per cent. of the population, the Hungarians 24 per cent. and the Germans (who are descendants of colonists introduced, centuries ago, by wise Hungarian rulers) 10 per cent. And, lest it be thought that a Rumanian preponderance could only occur if the census be taken by Rumanians, one may remark that the authoritative ethnographical map made by the German savant H. Kiepert in 1878 showed that Transylvania possessed a large Rumanian majority.

Of course the favoured nations used to be the Hungarians and, to a minor degree, the Germans. For the large Rumanian population it was not easy to make any progress; they were kept back by every means in the power of the ruling class. For example, they had three lycées for the whole of Transylvania, whereas now the Hungarians have, in the department of Cluj (Kolozsvár) alone three lycées for youths and three others for girls, supported by the State. There is not much fault to be found with the way in which Rumanians treat the young folk of their minorities in Transylvania. I happened to stay for some time near the village of Zabala, which is in the department of Trei-Scaune, one of the three Szekler departments, where the majority of the inhabitants are Hungarians. At the village school of Zabala I found five Hungarian and only two Rumanian masters, and in the third class the pupils are taught the various subjects first in Hungarian and afterwards in Rumanian. Their religious instruction is attended to by the respective priests, who come to the school on certain days; the Hungarians are Protestants (mostly) and Roman Catholics, the Rumanians being Orthodox. This reminds me that the Orthodox priest, a very sympathetic young man, is also a member of the rural council and, as the majority of the members are Hungarians, all transactions are carried out in the Hungarian language. It would be profitable to compare this school of Zabala with a pre-war school in a Rumanian district. One would not find that the Hungarian authorities were very solicitous in providing Rumanian teachers.

Wherever one goes one finds that the Rumanians are far from avenging themselves for the centuries of oppression. They are scrupulous in observing the law and in not taking advantage of the fact that it is they who now have the power behind them. A humorous case can be seen at the large village of Huedin, which

lies on the main line between Cluj and Oradea-mare. It has 6,000 inhabitants, of whom 600 are Rumanians, most of the rest being Hungarians. It is the centre of a large agricultural district, embracing some sixty communes; and there are many who would like, when they come into Huedin to the market, to see conditions more nearly approaching those of Western Europe. At present the streets of Huedin are unpaved, so that they are as a rule a morass of mud or a wilderness of dust. Huedin elects its own councillors, all of whom are Hungarians. If the place were to be promoted to the rank of a town, then four *ex-officio* gentlemen would be called to the council, namely the two priests (Orthodox and Greek-Catholic), the doctor and the veterinary surgeon. Of these the first three are Rumanians; and although the sixteen elected members would continue to be Hungarians, yet they are so much opposed even to having three Rumanians to assist in the local deliberations that they prefer to have Huedin remain a village, with a purely Hungarian council. A short time ago the mayor caused a small piece of footpath to be paved. At once the Hungarians became excited. This, they thought, was the thin end of the wedge, it was the beginning of their Huedin being turned into a town. They declared that the buffaloes—in those parts the principal beast of burden—would be frightened of the electric light and that they would slip about on the pavement. It happens that the Greek-Catholic priest is a young man who has studied in Paris and Germany. He is travelling round the sixty communes that encircle Huedin; and if he can get up a petition to the Government to convert Huedin into a town it may be that the selfish and narrow Hungarians there will be overruled.

Straws show how the wind is blowing. Take the village of Domoş, whose 450 inhabitants consist of 350 Hungarians and 100 Rumanians. In Hungarian times the school had only Hungarian teachers. Now there are two teachers, both paid by the State, the Rumanian functioning in the morning and the Hungarian in the afternoon. Only those Hungarians who desire to do so attend the Rumanian instruction, and as a matter of fact 2 per cent. of them avail themselves of this opportunity. In the village of Sfăraş, the 600 inhabitants are equally divided between the two nationalities. In Hungarian times all the villagers had to help to build the school, which they naturally thought was thus the property of the village. But after the war the Protestant Hungarian Church said that it belonged to them; and as the Rumanian inhabitants are of a pacific nature they contented themselves with a house that they hired, and they left the school to the Hungarians. Now the Rumanians are building themselves a school, because when, after

ten years, they asked whether their children might be taught in the old school of an afternoon the Hungarians would not allow it.

The Catholic priests of Transylvania are Hungarians. They tell you that it would be far better if the schools were confessional, that is to say if they were under the Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Churches. They will hear nothing of the general movement to do away with Church control of education—so long ago as 1906 the Hungarian Protestant Bishop, George Bartok, said that "people who have an idea of science will never allow our academies and lycées to be at the free disposal of Church authorities. Neither have our primary schools any need of the Church tutelage." Nowadays if you ask the average Hungarian clergyman what difference it makes if a boy learns his geography in a Church or in a State school, he replies rather vaguely that the whole atmosphere is different. Of course, their object is to keep control over the children.

The reader will scarcely believe it, but down to the middle of the last century one could not simply betake oneself to a Transylvanian town and live there. If you were a noble you were all right—the nobles were Hungarians. If you were any other Hungarian you were likewise all right. The Germans had certain ancient privileges, to which they clung with their wonted tenacity. But if a Rumanian wanted to transfer himself to some town, that was quite another matter. It even happened that if he persisted the authorities (not the mob) would smash or burn up his house. There was recently in the office of Under-Secretary of State at Bucharest a most intelligent young man, Dr. Viorel Tilea, who won golden opinions in London when he was here a year or two before to help conclude the commercial treaty between Great Britain and Rumania. He is a native of Transylvania and his mother's family were involved in a celebrated and very prolonged law-suit, because they desired to live in a certain Transylvanian town.

The Rumanians are returning good for evil: many Hungarians are in the State service, as doctors in hospitals or in poor-law institutions or as railway engineers. The Rumanian Government has passed a Pension Law in favour of the former Hungarian officials who (instigated from Budapest) refused to take the oath of allegiance in 1919 and 1920. They would be suffering hardship if the Rumanians were not so humane. It may here be noted that this was a feather in the cap of the late ruling party, the National Peasants. Objection was made by the Liberal Party; but the National Peasants insisted on carrying through this Measure. Under the so-called Liberal Government of the Bratianus, as Dr. Tilea pointed out in a lecture which he delivered before the League of Nations at Geneva, 77 per cent. of the population of Rumania

(i.e. the National Peasant Party) had to suffer a great deal, so that if the minorities complained of their treatment at that time it was not only they who had just cause. Now at last the elections, parliamentary and local, have been honestly conducted. And what is the consequence? In Transylvania before 1930 there were 200 Hungarian town councillors, whereas now there are 341; in the department to which we have referred, Trei-Scaune, there were 4 Rumanians, now there is none, while the Hungarians have increased from 19 to 29. Comparisons are odious, but are the Slovaks in Hungary in an equally happy position?

Were we to talk of the Slovaks—some 200,000—in Hungary, with no schools in their language and with no deputies to represent them, we would be digressing. But it may be of interest to mention a monthly review, the *Glasul Minorităților* (*La Voix des Minorités*) which is published at Lugoj in the Rumanian Banat and is edited by Dr. Elemér Jakabffy, a Hungarian. The articles appear, for the most part, in German or French and their constant theme is the woes of the various minorities, more especially such of them as live in the States of the Little Entente, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. There is also an occasional article which is a song of praise to Hungary, as, for example, one in the July number of 1930, which reproduces the remarks of a German deputy and of the Prime Minister in the Budapest Parliament, the object of which article is to show how liberal and broad-minded is the Hungarian régime. But the *Glasul Minorităților*, though it appears on Rumanian territory, is nothing if not critical of the Rumanian Government and of the manner in which it treats the minorities. I venture to say that there are many countries in Europe where such a Review, under foreign editorship and with continual attacks upon the Government and upon its Allies, would not be permitted. Or am I speaking as a disappointed man?—when I offered Dr. Jakabffy an article on the Slovaks in Hungary, who have, it seems to me, as much right to publicity as any other minority in Central or South-Eastern Europe, he treated my offer with silent contempt, at any rate with silence.

Straws show how the wind is blowing. As I motored with the Prefect of Cluj from that town towards the village of Nikula, which I desired to visit as it is there that the religious paintings on glass are produced (or were, until these brilliantly coloured, not to say meretricious Austrian lithographs drove them almost completely out of the field), we passed a large Crucifix by the side of the road, which was an arrangement, very obvious at a glance, of red, green and white, the Hungarian national colours. I should like to know what would have happened to the Rumanians if they had allowed themselves such a demonstration in the old days. As

a matter of fact an English lady whom I met at Cluj told me she had seen—before the war—some Rumanian village girls who came in with Rumanian colours in their hair. The police straightway cut their hair off.

Reference has been made to the National Peasant Party as compared with the Liberals. Now that the latter have lost by death the two Bratianus, who ruled the Party with a rod of iron, it may be that it will, under the more enlightened leadership of M. Duca, become liberal not only in name. But everyone agrees in Rumania, whether they be of the National Peasant Party or not, that the last General Election but one was the first to be honestly carried out. The bad old methods will return no more. As an example of their badness we may consider the case of Dr. Vaida-Voevod, a most amusing medical man who became a Transylvanian deputy in Budapest and, after the war, successively Foreign Minister, Prime Minister and Home Secretary of Greater Rumania. It may be asked how it came about that he, a member of the National Peasant Party, held office soon after the war and yet the elections were not what they should have been. But whenever another party, such as that of General Averescu, steered the ship of State it was by the gracious permission of the Bratianus, who "made" the elections. And when Dr. Vaida-Voevod entered a Coalition Government he also had nothing to do with the electoral methods. Not before 1928 was the National Peasant Party in a position to appeal independently to the electorate.

Dr. Vaida-Voevod's sense of humour was severely strained when he returned from London, whither he had gone in the year 1920, as Prime Minister, only to find that, being removed from that post, he was confronted by soldiers with bayonets when he wished to enter his constituency and make some political speeches. He had obtained the province of Bessarabia while he was negotiating in London with Mr. Lloyd George; and, of course, he telegraphed that fact to King Ferdinand. He sent to His Majesty two long telegrams and another one, in cypher, to the Bucharest Foreign Office. None of these arrived at their destination. Ion Bratianu had his agents everywhere.

When the National Peasant Party assumed office in 1928, Dr. Vaida-Voevod became Minister of the Interior. As such he had to attend to the numerous pamphlets which preceded the return of the present King. Some of them were against him, others were in his favour. The National Peasant Party, like the large majority of the Rumanian people, wished to have Carol back in the country, especially after the death of the eminent lawyer who really was the Regency. For Prince Nicholas served with reluctance, and Miron Cristea, the Patriarch, while a most charming man—I spent

with him a memorable week-end, mostly in his rose-garden, when he was Bishop of Caransebes—possessed only ecclesiastical experience. Affairs were going so haltingly that, if Carol had not returned, the army—it is now known—would have taken charge of the situation. But the pamphlets had to be suppressed. Those that were against the Prince were suppressed without a moment's delay; in the case of the others an hour or two was often allowed to intervene. All these pamphlets were, of course, brought to the Minister of the Interior, who found that those favourable to the Prince, though well-intentioned, were not very well written. So what did he do? He wrote one himself. It was printed one night by three men in whom their employer had perfect confidence and, early the next morning, was distributed to the troops as they came out of barracks. Dr. Vaida-Voevod summoned the Chief of Police and showed him a copy. Could he not say who had written it or where it had been printed? At all events let it be instantly suppressed. This was reported by the Minister at the subsequent meeting of the Cabinet.

I have alluded to these points in Dr. Vaida-Voevod's career, because the humour and forbearance of such a man is a very valuable asset in Transylvania. If the girl who answers the telephone speaks with a Hungarian accent he is in the habit of continuing the conversation in that language. One cannot expect that every Rumanian in Transylvania will behave with as much sagacity as Dr. Vaida-Voevod. But he is much esteemed by his compatriots and his example is not in vain.

Transylvania, despite its mixed population and its change of masters, is by no means in as parlous a condition as some foreign observers would have us believe. An Anglo-American Commission, mainly composed of American clergymen, travelled through Transylvania a few years ago and in 1925 published their investigations in Boston, the book being called: *The Religious Minorities in Transylvania*. Not for a moment would I impeach the good faith of the authors of this book; but they were unfortunately led astray in a number of cases. For instance, it was asserted that at a place called Moldo-Venesti the gendarmes had broken up a dance because the youths of the village had not worked sufficiently on the gendarmes' land. But there can have been no truth in this because the gendarmes of that place do not own the least plot of ground or garden. It may seem ridiculous to refer to an accusation that is five or six years old; yet so many of an equally erroneous nature occurred in that book, and there persists a certain amount of faith in them.

But, as a matter of fact, the Rumanians, Hungarians and Saxons of Transylvania, people who have lived together for so many

centuries, have now achieved the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In the year 1699 the Diet of Transylvania, when the Emperor was considering the condition of his Rumanian subjects, announced: "We are far from having any intention of opposing the orders of His Majesty. Nevertheless, we have decided humbly to beg him not to allow that nation a greater freedom than it has possessed up to the present time, because this would be to our detriment, unhappiness and prejudice. Our forefathers never 'received' that nation and its clergy; and far less did they allow the Rumanians and their clergy to partake of the same liberties as ourselves." The Transylvanian noblemen feared that if the Rumanians were given schools and had some more enlightened leaders they would refuse to support any longer the burden of serfdom.

There is now in Transylvania no nation with any privileges that the others do not share. Government employment is allotted freely to the Hungarians and, though they do not often ask for it, the Saxons. We need go no further than the Prefecture of the capital, Cluj, where out of some eighty employes I believe nearly half are Hungarians, some of them in very prominent posts. The dissatisfied Hungarians are not the peasants, but the landed aristocracy; and it happens that these Hungarian peasants complain to the Rumanian authorities that they have not yet obtained the land to which, under the Law of Agrarian Reform, they are entitled. Some of the landowners move with the times. One admirable lady, for instance, whom I have the pleasure of knowing, the Countess Mikes (sister of Count Bethlen, the Hungarian ex-Premier), has established on her Transylvanian estate a textile industry and has also turned two large buildings into boarding-houses to which the people come for winter-sports or, in the summer, to enjoy the mountains and the forests. It is natural that the Hungarian deputies should be a little intransigent; but more and more they are finding that the wind deserts their sails. Dr. Vaida-Voevod, when he was in the Cabinet, invited them to come to see him. "Gentlemen," he said, "have you any wishes?" Well, they wanted to found a number of musical and social clubs and to be authorised to use the Hungarian colours as their emblem. This had to be referred to Dr. Maniu, at that time the Premier and himself a Transylvanian. On the same day they received this permission. "What else can we do for you?" asked Dr. Vaida-Voevod. "They said there was nothing. 'But have you no complaints against the police?'" he asked. "No," they replied, "we have nothing against them." "And will you not tell me," said Dr. Vaida-Voevod, "what you are saving up for Geneva? You can hardly go, as discontented, to Geneva and go with empty hands."

HENRY BAERLEIN.

HENRY ADAMS.

HENRY ADAMS offers a problem, if not an enigma, of personality. By right of his family and his own marked ability he seemed appointed for political ambitions and achievements. But he barely entered the arena, and preferred to be the curious onlooker. Turning to the past, in some hope that it might illustrate the present and future, he became an historian by chance, as he would assure us, and wearied of his toil as idle unless first he had ascertained the philosophy of history and the secret of social development. Whereupon he felt impelled to make confession: the confession of a lifelong failure in all that he had attempted. And, being a man of modesty and reserve, given moreover to employ the irony of under- and over-statement, he submitted the result to his friends for private consideration, but was not to be satisfied by any help they could afford. The question of literary form troubled him, fastidious. But this malady of perfection, as one might term it, was as nothing compared with the deep, the metaphysical, distress that lurked behind. In making confession he had enlarged his case till it became that of Humanity. We are purposeful creatures, acting as we suppose in an orderly universe. But what if, more and more in our modern days, we have to shape concepts, not of unity, but of multiplicity?

In the United States the Adams family might almost be considered as dynastic. John Adams succeeded Washington; and the sixth President was John Quincy Adams. The Federalist, the whig Republican, and Charles Francis, who notably served his country as Ambassador if not as President, were not only of the Puritanic, New England stock, but, as Bostonians, of the choicest among the chosen, and withal distinguished even from these. Statesmen rather than practical politicians, theirs was a tradition of integrity and a somewhat chill aloofness. "My contentious predecessors," Henry Adams styled them with a certain satisfaction, himself not caring to stoop that he may conquer, nor ill-pleased to regard the majority as ever in the wrong. However, with brothers capable of carrying on the tradition, he designed a path of his own, being a fourth son who may "throw himself away if he likes." In 1858, at the age of twenty, ambitious and diffident, headstrong and self-restrained, hot and cold in calculating the advantages or disadvantages of this or that career, he insisted upon studying Civil Law in a German university, though neither he nor his family "knew what the Civil Law was, or any reason for his studying it." First, indeed, he found that the language must be known, and then was shocked

by the discovery that the German method of research could not profit him; that he might as well have stayed at home and been his own professor, when he had lost all faith in Harvard. But youth was youth, and the opportunity of various observation delightful. What did it matter if, having resisted the temptation to become a "dabbler in metaphysics, poetry, and art," he now postponed the study of law? His life as a wanderer in Europe, the happy months that were ever bringing him new fascinations and no troubles; all that he had learned was so much capital that would "show itself slowly and radically." But, returning to America, he was invited by a disapproving father to act as private secretary during the winter that preluded the Civil War. And when Lincoln had appointed Charles Francis Adams as his Minister to England, again it was quietly intimated to him that, as the one son who could be spared from more serious duties, he was to continue in the same course. And, accordingly, it was his lot to mark the sympathetic belief of London society in the ultimate victory of the Southern States; nurse rancour against the Government of the day; be cheered by the rally of the nation to the cause of the North; and win for himself private friends not a few.

After the war he lingered on in England, reflecting upon the ever-renewed problem of his education. For the law had not diplomacy unfitted him? and for diplomacy did he not already know too much? He wrote articles on currency and finance, studied Darwin, brought Lyell's geology to the notice of Americans. He lingered on, captivated and distressed by the spectacle of English "eccentricity"; doubted Motley's assurance that here was to be found the perfection of human society; feared to become English and mediæval and the mere *dilettante*; wrenched himself away, if only for a new experiment. At home he was soon disputing with a brother about the paths to success. He meant to be unpopular (no very difficult task for an Adams, as he knew); detested and despised the strife of the world; would work, not for power, but his own satisfaction. A little later he was gaily informing an English friend that his tendency more and more was towards journalism and power, when not confessing that he had no power at all and was solely upheld by social position and a sharp tongue. And presently he could no longer away with the inefficiency of the Grant administration; his review of the Session of 1869-70 proved to be his last study in current politics, his "last dying testament as a humble member of the Press." In 1876, however, he was the politician once more, the would-be reformer, organising a new and independent party. But as well wind ropes of sand, or bid the summer cloud be steadfast! He

was left, "sitting amid the ruins." Henceforth political, and above all electioneering, talk was "calculated to make a tortoiseshell cat turn green." Human perfectibility! The thought at once amused and saddened. He had come to the conclusion that office was poison. "Never in his experience had anyone passed unscathed that malarious marsh."

Henry Adams ceased to be an active politician. Later, indeed, for the purposes of a novel, he could draw upon his store of continuous observation. In the protagonist of *Democracy*, love and political corruption are blended. Writing about the book at the time, he declared that actual American politicians were more lurid than any creations of Thackeray or Balzac; and that the subject itself, the great tragic subject, would require a mighty master, an Æschylus, whom we were not likely to see. His own aim, evidently, was a facile and fluent reduction of the theme; and his performance such as a Henry James of the earlier and perspicuous manner would not have disavowed. A novel *à clef*, with living personalities recognisable despite the humorous or ironical touch, no small stir was raised by it at the time. It was the product of happy days in Washington, when John Hay could also produce *The Breadwinners* anonymously, and two of the five united "Hearts" could laughingly assume the credit and blame of each other's workmanship, or suggest comic attribution.

With Henry Adams it was always all or nothing and no compromise. No sooner had he flung political journalism to the winds than a new career offered, and opened out to new disquiet. In 1870, knowing a few historians and no history, knowing enough to be ignorant, he accepted an invitation to lecture at Harvard on mediæval history, and edit the *North American Review*. He could impose the German method, and contradict "every English author, high and low." But method was a minor matter. "In essence incoherent and immoral, history had either to be taught as such—or falsified." He wanted to do neither. He had no theory of development to teach, and could not make the facts fit one. "Barred from philosophy and bored by facts," he wished to teach something not wholly useless, help his students to a career. In the result, he found himself lecturing on Anglo-Saxon law; and appropriated, as a part of the law and heritage, the right to grumble and have grievances. Education should be scientific, not of the eighteenth century and belated. Education should fit the complex conditions of a new society, and be tested by success. But "the failure of the scientific scheme, without money to back it, was flagrant." The successful owed their free hand to marriage. With such a free hand, it would seem,

after seven years of "laborious banishment," he settled down in the Washington he loved, partly to write history and chiefly as convinced that "as far as he had a function in life, it was as a stable-companion to statesmen, whether they liked it or not." His series of historical writings culminated in the voluminous *History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison*, accepted in his own country and here as able and authoritative. But such acceptance was of no more comfort than the approval of his colleagues and pupils at Harvard had been. Engaged in its long composition, he could but admit to himself that History was an *impasse*. Asking questions which had no answer, you ran against the brick wall at the end. Did historians know what they were talking about? Himself, for one, had toiled in vain to find out what he meant. Whatever was right, all that he had ever taught was wrong. As far as he knew he had but three serious readers. He was writing history as though it were serious; and, for relief, was turning to his rose-beds and learning from them what he might.

Another career was closed, and nothing achieved. Dispirited, courageous, he must begin anew. There resulted two inseparably connected books, the *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres* and *The Education of Henry Adams*, privately printed, known, quoted, passing beyond control; two masterpieces, it can confidently be claimed.

With visits to the Chicago Exposition of 1900 and the Cathedral of Chartres, his problems came to assume the symbolic form of the Dynamo and the Virgin. In the gallery of machines he meditated upon the concentration of force; upon the new energies adored by Americans, and controlled by the trusts and banks which moved his impotent wrath. And the Virgin of Chartres, had she not also been dynamical? Wondrous was her power, the power of woman, in the twelfth century. From archaic and Homeric times to the Middle Ages, woman had been busied with illusions and ambitions, with self-sacrifice and good works—or bad. But now, in America, she could at most evoke sentiment, and offer herself as the chief object of social expenditure. No ambitions or illusions or new resources were hers. She had made nothing of her freedom except, increasingly, to rebel against her own maternity; against the *vis inertiae* which is the privilege of women and, mayhap, untried races like the Russian. What was to be her future? He could suggest nothing; could only write a *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*.

By way of the masculine and military abbey of Mont Saint Michel and the Norman arch, of William the Conqueror and the Song of that Roland who in the hour of death remembered

not Alda his betrothed or the Lord Christ but only the warrior's loyalty and prowess, he makes his gradual approach to Chartres and the pointed arch; to Eleanor of Guienne and her descendants, Mary of Champagne and Blanche of Castile; to Gualtier de Coincy and his *Miracles de la Vierge*; to the poetry of courtly love which Chrestien de Troyes was prompted to endite. The literature and the art of the times were inspired by these Queens and their like, by the Queen of Heaven. The ascendancy of woman, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, was secured by her alliance with the Church; and the Virgin was forceful, expressing herself, building the "stately monuments of superstition" on which Gibbon darted a contemptuous look. Bourgeois and peasants were later to grudge the lavish expenditure which the Virgin had induced; but surely no wealth can now bring about such lovely creations. Is it not almost as if the Church had been made by the Woman in protest against man; as if man had overthrown the Church because it was feminine? At all events, woman in those centuries ruled the household and the workshop, cared for economy, supplied intelligence, and dictated taste. Her task it was to tame the crude male and make life more endurable and even sweet, as witness Aucassin, courteous to match his courteous Nicolette; the Marion of Adam de la Halle's pastoral rightly mastering her Robin; the *Roman de la Rose*; the whole feminine ideal which always culminated in the Virgin. "After God, our sole hope!" Thus was she invoked by St. Bernard, by all who suffered they knew not why, and despaired of earthly justice.

Meanwhile the Schoolmen were endeavouring after like ends. Artists, architects in their kind, they sought to substantiate their dream-palaces of cosmic harmony. St. Thomas Aquinas, chiefest architect of them all, conceived this world of ours as an organic unity; fashioned it as a Cathedral for God and man. But the equilibrium of his structure, like that of Beauvais Cathedral, was all too delicate. For all his skill, needs must he fail, even as the modern scientist fails. Both essay lofty generalisations. Both assert or assume an ultimate unity, God, the law of Energy; and are baffled by a world of infinite complexity, not reducible to reason. John of Salisbury concluded that philosophy was best used in the service of Love. St. Bernard, and the mystics of the School of Saint Victor, mistrusted all reason and logic. The first object of St. Francis—and of Francis Bacon—was to humiliate and destroy, as far as might be, the pride of human intellect. And, "until mankind finally settles to a certainty where it means to go, or whether it means to go anywhere,—what its object is, or whether it has an object,—St. Francis may prove to have been its ultimate expression."

But Henry Adams could not leave all at this. The *Chartres*, a study of twelfth-century unity, must have its sequel in the *Education*, a study of twentieth-century multiplicity. The one pressing need, as he felt it, was a dynamical theory of History, a mechanical theory of the universe or multiverse. The lines of history and thought repeat the lines of force. Could he not use the twelfth-thirteenth century, when man had the highest ideas of himself as a unit in a unified universe, as a point from which to measure motion down to his own times? Could he chart the international channel for some fifty years to come; triangulate the future; fix the acceleration of movement in politics, philosophy and physics, finance and force; and express it all in some mathematical formula?

The task, as he feared and found, as he knew in advance, was one in which he could look for no help, and derision at best. What dismayed him, in the new century, was the discovery of new vibrations and radiations, the avalanche of new forces that suddenly had beset humanity. He had set out with the conviction that the problem of "running order through chaos, direction through space, discipline through freedom, unity through multiplicity," had always been, and must always be, the "task of education, as it is the moral of religion, philosophy, science, art, politics, and economy." And he had come to find that, while order is the dream of man, chaos is the law of nature. Nature! the nightmare of forces, anarchic and purposeless, insane. Age after age, man had conceived the universe as a reflection of his own unity, and now had to deal with a multiverse. Recording himself and the world of things as he saw them in the last fifty years of the last century and onwards, Henry Adams no longer cared to use the picturesque charm, the impassioned ethos, of the *Chartres*. He is, now, the mental athlete, fronting defeat, and weary. Multiplicity has become his fixed idea and dread; the constant burden, the refrain from which he cannot refrain. In mock protest, he styles himself the conservative Christian anarchist: Christian as clinging to unity, and anarchist because science cannot conceal its helpless surrender to anarchical forces. Already he had shown that the Schoolmen, the idealists and realists of their time, had vainly laboured to escape the Scylla and Charybdis of pantheism and materialism; and now he shows that science, still professing to guarantee and guard the unity which mankind requires, offers no reconciliation of thought and mechanics. Theirs is a unity unproved, and an order they had themselves disproved. The average American of the future would need to think in contradictions; instead of Kant's four antinomies, the new universe would know no law that could not be proved by

its anti-law. Almost one was driven to ask whether anyone had ever denied or doubted Multiplicity, Diversity, Complexity, Anarchy, Chaos. Order and anarchy are one; the One in the Many is chaos. Henry Adams sat listless, his head in his hands, a philosophic Sindbad who had been irresistibly drawn to shipwreck on the reefs of Force. It did not occur to him that Force might be no more than a mathematical fiction, a sham entity. He did not foresee the present disarray of mechanical theory. He felt that life was becoming altogether too complex. The one need of a tired historian was to confess ignorance. The further education of Henry Adams was to be a Pursuit of Ignorance in Silence. *Seul le silence est grand*, as Alfred de Vigny had proclaimed.

The philosophy and conclusion of the *Education* may seem comfortless, an exhibition of American "nerves" rather than of American optimism. It can be understood that one who long had regarded life as a series of leave-takings and now had parted with his close friends should lay aside his pen. But there is somewhat of perfunctoriness or irony in bidding us remember, now that he has ended his confession of despair and committed himself to "the depths of Hamlet's Shakespearean silence," that the dread forces will continue to act and the mind continue to react. However, in the large body of *Letters* which his friends have collected, the appeal is always possible from Henry Adams to Henry Adams, at least to the date of 1891. In place of a continuous argument with detail selected to unify the effect, we have the man in his vigorous growth, critical of life yet enjoying it, not overcast with painful thought, adequate to the pressure of the moment. But one notices the increasing restlessness, the recourse had to far climes and other scenes. Japan interested him; moved him to laughter in the recollection of a "droll island and people." Writing from the spot, he has not a word to say of the philosophic Buddhism which had attracted his attention, or of that popular goddess Kwannon in whom he had found an Eastern counterpart of the Virgin. It is only in a single passage of three years later that he yields, momentarily, to a desolate nihilism. The next year, in Samoa, he is busy and amused in a study of archaic woman and communistic civilisation. His diary-letter record of a dwindling race will prove of historic value. And if there is failure to appreciate Robert Louis Stevenson—or was it Mrs. Stevenson?—perhaps this may be set down to a certain incompatibility between the correct New Englander and the full-blown Romantic. Already in youth he had hardly known whether to marvel at, or be dismayed by, the portent of an Algernon Charles Swinburne.

For the full inquiry, in default of an *Esther* which he would

not let anyone read for fear of profanation, a document still remains. One of those adopted "nieces" to whom he gave private copies of the *Chartres* and refused the *Education* has added to a handful of letters her tender and reverent memories. It is of interest to learn that his friends, knowing better than himself the gentle heart behind a show of brusqueness, offered him a plastic symbol bearing the inscription: *Henricus Adams Porcupinus Angelicus*. Of more moment is the intimate page or so regarding the crushing loss he sustained in the early death of his wife. Hence, doubtless, the destruction of all diaries and letters previous to 1885; the long gap perceptible in the *Education*; the reference, in the same book, to a monument by St. Gaudens, enigmatical, breathing peace or nihilism, according to the vision brought; the ever-increasing reserve and reticence. And, at the close of the slender volume, there is a difficult, strenuous poem, written between the *Chartres* and the *Education*, in which the editor finds an intended last word and testament.

How exactly is this to be understood? After the death of his wife there is recourse to travel, cessation of historical writing, loneliness, growth of a fixed idea. He knew that the constant need and honour of humanity is to discover unity in multiplicity; and yet he scorned all promise of larger, provisional syntheses. A Goethe, setting the stanzas of *One and All* against those of *Testament*, could allow the world to contradict itself, and himself remain serene amid seeming incompatibles. Others may not reach such acceptance. Henry Adams persisted as the man of a rigid dilemma. With him it was either . . . or, not both . . . and, in whatsoever pair of opposites, potentialities, contradictions, antinomies, call them what you will. Since 1912, the year in which severe illness compelled a cessation of mental and literary activity, much has been put forward in the way of *Weltanschauung*. But would Irrationalism, mathematical neo-Realism, Relativity, or the lore of our new astronomers, have moved him from his fixed idea, his dilemma which had almost ceased to be a dilemma? He required, as humanity requires, that the world shall be intelligible. And now he despaired of intelligibility. With each new discovery, mankind was to find itself subject more and more to blind forces neither to be anticipated nor controlled. He bowed his head in silence. At most we can imagine him, like an Arthur Hugh Clough, hesitating at times, sighing, trusting that somehow Truth abides, bidding himself and others refrain from declaring that the struggle to reach it is of no avail. In the *Prayer to the Virgin of Chartres* he is saying, with that Pascal whom he had studied, that the heart has reasons beyond the reach of reason.

GARNET SMITH.

IS A SECULAR MORALITY POSSIBLE?

THE importance of the query will not be questioned. We are living in a day when the foundations of the earth are out of course. "The acids of modernity" have been at their task of corrosion; they have, according to the best accredited prophets, well-nigh finished it. Supernatural religion—and of course Christianity—is an empty shell. But, alas! with the collapse of supernatural religion which is imminent, another and a more fatal collapse is also threatening. The key-stone of the arch upon which civilisation is built is in process of being dislodged. Morals are involved with religion in the impending ruin. Listen to Walter Lippmann:

The evidences of these greater difficulties lie all about us: in the brave and brilliant atheists who have become very nervous; in the women who have emancipated themselves from the tyranny of fathers, husbands and homes, and with the intermittent but expensive help of a psycho-analyst are now enduring liberty as interior decorators; in the young men and women who are world-weary at twenty-two; in the multitudes who drug themselves with pleasure; in the crowds enfranchised by the blood of heroes who cannot be persuaded to take an interest in their destiny; in the millions, at least free to think without fear of priest or policeman, who have made the moving pictures and the popular newspapers what they are.

They have seen through the religion of nature to which the early romantics turned for consolation. They have heard too much about the brutality of natural selection to feel, as Wordsworth did, that pleasant landscapes are divine. They have seen through the religion of beauty because, for one thing, they are too much oppressed by the ugliness of Main Street. They cannot take refuge in an ivory tower because the modern apartment house, with a radio loud-speaker on the floor above and on the floor below and just across the courtyard, will not permit it. They cannot, like Mazzini, make a religion of patriotism, because they have just been demobilised. They cannot make a religion of science, like the post-Darwinians, because they do not understand modern science. They never learned enough mathematics and physics. They do not like Bernard Shaw's religion of creative evolution because they have read enough to know that Mr. Shaw's biology is literary and evangelical. As for the religion of humanity it is utterly unacceptable to those who have to ride in the subways during the rush hour."

This will perhaps suffice, though it would be easy to call other prophets to witness: Julian Huxley, Earl Russell, C. E. M. Joad, and if, without offence, I may mention a minor prophet in the same context, the Rev. J. C. Hardwick.

At the last Congress of Modern Churchmen, some of the speakers evinced a just appreciation of the posture to which "the acids

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of modernity " have forced us. Dean Inge delivered himself of dicta which I for one accept as axiomatic in any discussion of our question. "A secularised religion has neither savour nor salt." "Scientific humanism substitutes the duty of happiness for the happiness of duty." And, quoting Professor Gardner, "Secularism is the one philosophy with which we can make no terms." If I take these deliverances as axiomatic, I do not propose wholly to shirk the duty of illustrating them.

In the discussion of the possibility of a secular morality, there is ground common to most of those who assert and those who deny the possibility. That common ground is the necessity of morality. Men must honour the imperative of duty, whencesoever they derive it. They must be moral in some fashion, or they will cease to be men. They must be moral or they will cease to be anything on this planet. The brutes have no need of morality properly so-called, except so far as man has induced it in them; the law in their members suffices for them. But man made in God's image, man, who can fling defiance in the face of his Maker, man, who in the course of evolution is learning more and more to look before and after, man is different. He must identify himself with a law which is increasingly disclosed to him and in him.

I am aware that there are writers who do not take this common ground. Théophile Gautier fancied himself of the number and so, I apprehend, do Mr. James Joyce and other novelists of the school. I should do Mr. Joad no great injustice if I ranked him with the iconoclasts who desire to deliver mankind from the tyranny of morality and the vexatious sense of sin. One and all of these writers regard morality as the bane of life, the kill-joy from which they labour to relieve mankind. I have no controversy with these men. It is enough to point out that in every chapter of their writings the inevitableness of morals is implicit, even when morals are derided and the flesh and the devil are acclaimed as supreme. Aristotle reminds us that no man can escape being a philosopher after his manner and kind. Still truer is it that no man can escape being "moral." He is moral even when he is immoral. He is moral when he says to evil—"Be thou my good." He is moralising when he says with Iago:

I will set down the pegs that make that music
As honest as I am.

Men, unable or unwilling to accept the dictates of morality as the behests of a Divine Lawgiver, commonly set out to discover what they call a basis of morals, a substitute for the imperatives which the Lord of all good life has graven for them on tables of stone or on the living tablets of their soul. It is scarcely necessary to run the path along which ethical discussion has moved

encumbered with the monuments of their failures. The ethics of hedonism in their ancient forms need not detain us. They never nurtured duty or goodness, or even rightness, except when they were illegitimately eked out by factors which were borrowed without acknowledgment from nobler doctrines of conduct. The improved system of hedonism known as utilitarianism need detain us no longer. It is specious in its altruism but, practical difficulties of application apart, it achieves its altruistic scope by filching from the morality of duty the rational perception that the happiness of other people is to me of equal value with my own. It fails completely to answer the question: Why should I be moral?

Scientific hedonism as presented by Spencer, and elaborated by Levy-Bruhl and others, is in no better case, but perhaps it should engage our attention for a moment. It postulates that evolution is bearing the race onward and upward to ever more perfect adaptation to its environment, and so to ever growing happiness. Morality consists in accelerating the process, in reflectively seeking to perfect the adjustment of "internal" to "external" relations. Pessimism, such as Guyot's, has already shattered the filmy structure which Spencer reared on this foundation. Evolution is not bearing us to greater happiness. If it appears here and there to do so, there is always the grisly spectre of death to remind us that the span of this life is not long enough for such a being as man. If mankind is sailing to a far-off utopia, it does not appear how a judicious blend of egoism and altruism in us, who must perish long before port is reached, can be enforced or even commended as a necessary equipment for the voyage. Again the imperative of duty is surreptitiously introduced into the premisses of the argument in order to validate the conclusion. Later advocates of "scientific" humanitarianism have improved upon Spencer. They have developed a doctrine not less to our contemporaries; we must repay them by our behaviour to our coevals and also to posterity. Here again the obligation is the thing to be explained. Why must we repay? If personality is but a wavelet on an infinite sea, transient and of no intrinsic value, why should debts be discharged, when it is convenient not to discharge them? For the debts, too, are impermanent.

Ethical idealism takes a higher flight than any of these theories. As expounded by the Cairds and T. H. Green, it does take cognisance of God. It goes on the perception that morality is as Bishop Butler says, "the nature of things." Self-realisation, which is the goal of man's endeavour, is the reproduction in human personalities of the eternal consciousness. The eternal consciousness, the world spirit, seems generally to have the value of God. So far as it has this value, ethical idealism is not a secular morality;

so that we may dismiss it from this inquiry with the observation that it does not very successfully escape the taint of egoism and that it lacks the warm vitality that alone can grip and save.

Among the noteworthy recent attempts to furnish a world which is minded to repudiate supermundane authority with a morality that shall be sufficiently sanctioned, two are outstanding. Both of these attempts seek an initial advantage by postulating the alliance of morality with religion. Neither of the two authors is willing to forgo a benefit which he perceives to be indispensable. Professor Julian Huxley is concerned to formulate a religion without God. A cosmic Deity he would, if I understand him, allow, but not a God who is interested in the behaviour of the denizens of one of the tiniest of asteroids. His effort is of the same family of speculations as Comte's Positivism and Guyot's *Esquisse d'une religion sans sanctions*. I turn to the inadequately conceived but very brilliantly written *Preface to Morals*, with which Mr. Walter Lippmann has captivated the reading world. Mr. Lippmann's book is strong on the critical side, as may be gathered from the extracts which have been quoted. No more eloquent and convincing statement of the disillusion of a generation which can neither believe in a personal God nor content itself with the domination of the flesh has been penned. "The modern world is haunted by a realisation that it is impossible to reconstruct an enduring orthodoxy, and impossible to live well without the satisfactions which an orthodoxy would provide." That is a significant admission, but there are completer admissions to follow, for Mr. Lippmann is utterly candid. "Ethical codes cannot lay claim to unhesitating obedience when they are based on the opinions of a majority, or on the notions of wise men, or on an estimate of what is socially useful." For then "they are felt to be the outcome of human and quite fallible decisions. They are no necessary part of the government of the universe. . . . They are not the commandments of God." "The sanction of a divine morality," Mr. Lippmann proceeds, "is the certainty that it originated with God."

In the present-day *débâcle* of orthodoxy, the "sanction," by which Mr. Lippmann means the imperative, the rightness, of duty, is wanting, and men must needs have recourse to humanism. It is a *pis aller*—any port in a storm—for the teachers of humanism have no credentials. They have to prove their case by the test of mundane experience. "They cannot command. They can only inquire, infer, and persuade. Yet with all its difficulties, it is to a morality of humanism that men must turn." But humanism after all cannot dispense with religion. True, the religion which Mr. Lippmann links with it is a product of his own ingenuity. It is what he calls "high religion."

Nor is this the only *tour de force* to which he invites us. The majority of men are "too young, or too feeble, too dull or too violent, too unstable or too incurious, to have any comprehension whatsoever of anything but the simplest scheme of rewards and punishments." The high religion which is indispensable to a morality that can resist the acids of modernity is for the aristocratic few. For the many the husks that the swine do eat. The doctrine is the precise inversion of Voltaire's famous sally that religion is for the many *pour peur que nous soyons égorgés*. What "high religion" and "modern morality" imply must escape most men who are incapable and unworthy of it, so the world must look for chaos. "The world, however, can endure a good deal of chaos. It always has." Thus we travel by a circuitous route to the conclusion that "modern morality"—morality without sanctions—cannot avail for the healing of nations or save mankind from the abyss. The conclusion is identical with Earl Russell's. Man must go down into the pit but he must go down fighting. He must defy "whatever Gods there be" in this freakish cosmos. But unlike Earl Russell, Mr. Lippmann camouflages the conclusion with a splendour of rhetoric and a glamour of seductive phrase. It is time to leave Mr. Lippmann. If he has failed to make a case for morality with sanctions, morality without God, it does not seem likely that anyone can. We must try to understand why secular morality is foredoomed to failure.

There are in final analysis two ways of regarding the world. The one is to see it as God's world—the other is to see it as a more or less perfect machine and ultimately meaningless. The partisans of the first way investigate the cosmos and conclude:

We find great things are made of little things,
And little things go lessening, till at last,
Comes God behind them.

The others may or may not catch broken visions of God, but they have a hypothesis which permits them to explain these as hallucinations. It is not a difference between twice-born and once-born man, for the twice-born are privileged to see every common bush afire with God, not merely to reach Him by analysis. Those who come to the vision of God and so to discern a meaning in the world are free to account for values. They perceive that Goodness, Beauty, and Truth are enduring and indeed indestructible entities. They are not bemused by magnitudes or by force that reveals itself as physical. Unthinkable stretches of time—a hundred million light years, immeasurable space—impress them, if you will, but they do nothing to shake their apprehension of values as ultimate reals. They may be led, like Kant, to deduce the

existence of God from the existence of values, or *vice versâ*, but the values at least are inexpugnable. Who can effectively gainsay them? Distances, magnitudes we can reason about, values we know, if we know anything. Let us see.

"The harmony of logic," says Dr. Whitehead, "lies upon the universe as an iron necessity." There is no guarantee of knowledge but the universe itself, no sanction of any theory of "the actual constitution of reality." In this constitution of reality, though, is the indispensable factor. You cannot get away from thought; it may not be expelled with a pitchfork or any other implement. Truth, which is the inseparable concern of thought, lays its imperative upon every thinking reed here on this planet and on every being anywhere that has risen to the measure of thought. Of beauty, despite its elusive variations, the same may be said, though beauty, too, has its imperative, which is to court anarchy and to destroy meaning.

What is true of knowledge and beauty is true also of morality. If the imperatives of truth and beauty lay an iron hand upon the universe, it is no less the fact that the *ought* and the *must* of morality are clamped upon it. Morality, to quote Bishop Butler again, "is the nature of things." Reality has "an indelible ethical aspect." If the world order is the basis of logic and the guarantee of truth, it is also the basis and sanction of ethics.

The dictates of the moral consciousness have, then, the same validity as those of truth. Neither can be repudiated without self-stultification. Only a beast or a sinner who is really seeking to depersonalise himself can ignore the imperative of duty. Both imperatives are of "the nature of things." The imperative of duty "is more keenly felt than clearly understood." That is because our emotions, with which duty is more closely enfolded, are of an older growth than pure knowledge in human experience. "But what," it will be asked, "of the infinite variability of moral standards? How explain the inconsistencies and contradictions of ethical deliverances? 'Truth on this side of the river, error on that,' as Pascal said long ago." There is no invincible contradiction in this. The variations arise in the infinite complexity of the circumstances, the endless multiplicity of personalities and situations. Early science was even more confused and inconsistent than early ethics. Even to-day science has not rid itself of inconsistency. Far otherwise. But the imperative of Truth stands unshaken and the imperative of Duty likewise. Some day mankind will have ethics which will approach nearer the status of "scientific," just as some day science will tell an approximately flawless tale. But no science of conduct will ever be *tota, teres atque rotunda* so long as man tenants a fleshly tabernacle.

This consideration brings the conclusion of this essay. The moral end, as Bradley insists, is qualitative perfection. "I take the ideal as perfect and demanding perfection on my side." "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." It needs no narrow scrutiny of experience to perceive the truth of this. Perfection is the only end which morality can set before it. Professor Taylor is, therefore, unquestionably right in his insistence that morality requires an infinite ideal. It would negate itself if it were content with anything less. The witness to this truth is deep set in the experience of all of us. It is written large in the history of nations and civilisations. Morals have worsened as the ideal has been constricted or lowered. From this necessity of an infinite ideal certain inferences follow irrefragably. It follows that the utopias of men's dreams are patterns laid up in heaven; they will never be seen on earth. No conditions that can be realised on earth, where corruption and death reign, could afford a theatre for perfect conduct or perfect happiness.

It follows, too—and this is more closely pertinent to the discussion—that the infinite ideal which is, in "the nature of things," not a mere fancy imposed on them, must have an infinite author. The finite personalities, of the existence and development of whom the ideal is a precondition, must be in relation to the infinite Personality from whom the ideal took its origin; and the relation is of necessity a conscious one, for not otherwise could the ideal be operative. The ideal is dynamic in like manner as the energy which pervades the cosmos is dynamic. "The 'Idea of the good' is not a pale phantom in some remote heaven—but rather a shattering and irresistible power moulding all the forms of Being to its own high ends and purposes."

The imperative of Duty, which is as real as anything that we know, more real than stocks or stones or electrons and bions, if it comes to a comparison, took its origin where other reals took theirs. To essay to construct a system of ethics on a preliminary denial of this is to flout the imperative of Truth. To endeavour to collect from the conventions that men may hope to reach one day the legislative and authoritative dynamic that is needed at the outset to give the conventions any validity is a futile waste of ingenuity. To establish as the law of right what men shall deem convenient is to set them on the road to perdition. Orthodoxy may indeed be perishing, but if it is, it behoves man to discover another orthodoxy with as little loss of time as possible, lest they, too, perish. Morality without God is not morality at all. At best it is methodised convenience.

W. G. EDWARDS REES.

THE STUDY OF THE SEA.

THE WORK OF MARINE BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES.

THE sea covers over two-thirds of the surface of the globe. It is so deep that Mount Everest placed in its greatest depth would be covered by more than 2,000 feet of water. It is the home of an infinitely greater variety of life than is the land. The study of the sea and of the forms of life within it and the factors which control their distribution is to-day called the science of oceanography. It is not one science but many, zoologists and botanists describe the animals and plants and investigate their habits and life-histories. Physiologists investigate the functioning of these organisms. Chemists and physicists study the composition and properties of the sea water. The geographer describes the extent and boundaries of the oceans and seas, and the meteorologist explains the origin of the weather they experience. Finally, even the knowledge of the mathematician and of the astronomer is needed to elucidate the nature of the forces which control respectively the ocean currents and the tides.

By its very nature the sea is much more difficult to examine and study intensively than is the land. Even the surface waters which can be seen and so directly studied frequently change their nature and population owing to the action of currents and tides. The difficulties which face the oceanographer when he seeks to examine the deep waters or the floor of the ocean, where at best only random samples can be taken, will be obvious to all. Such work is literally carried on in the dark. The results of the study of the conditions in the deep seas may well be compared to the knowledge of the earth which would be obtained by visitors from some other planet who were able only to float upon our atmosphere, and so were restricted to the collection of random samples of the atmosphere and of the surface of the earth far beneath them.

But in spite of the difficulties inherent in the subject-matter, the science of oceanography has made substantial strides in the past half-century, and it is already able to point out some of the factors which control the fertility of the sea. The British Navy played a great part in the development of oceanography. Captain Cook's great voyage of discovery in the *Endeavour* in 1768-71 may be regarded as the first of all oceanographical expeditions. Cook took with him a naturalist and made soundings and took temperatures. It became the policy of the Admiralty to send naturalists with their surveying vessels, and it was in this way that Darwin became attached to the *Beagle* and Huxley to the *Rattlesnake*. But in 1872 a much greater enterprise was undertaken. H.M.S. *Challenger* was dispatched from Great Britain with

an exclusively oceanographical programme. She carried a large staff of distinguished men of science, chemists and physicists as well as biologists, under the direction of Sir Wyville Thomson, the Regius Professor of Natural History at Edinburgh. During the following three years the *Challenger* circumnavigated the world. She travelled 69,000 miles and took soundings, temperatures and samples of sea water and of the sea bottom, even in the greatest depths, and made immense collections of the plants and animals from every sea and every region from the surface to the bottom.

When the collections made by the *Challenger* had been examined and the reports prepared, there came into existence for the first time a mass of accurate knowledge about the sea and its inhabitants. It is on the foundation of this knowledge that the modern science of oceanography has been built up. The results of the *Challenger* expedition were so striking that during the following generation almost every maritime nation in Europe and also the United States sent out similar expeditions. As a result the geographical side of oceanography was particularly enriched, while the specimens of animals and plants added materially to knowledge of the population of the sea and its distribution.

The great marine expeditions could survey and sound and collect, but they could not experiment or take long series of observations at the same place. They could chart accurately the seven seas and bring home samples of their inhabitants, but they could not determine the conditions which govern the distribution of marine life or the fertility of the sea. Nor could they discover the mode of life of the diverse creatures which they collected and as promptly preserved, or what their relations were to the other animals or to the sea water which surrounded them. For all these purposes it soon became clear that permanent laboratories would have to be established at suitable places along the sea coast. At these laboratories, where animals could be kept in captivity and observed and experimented upon, and from whence regular samples of water and its contained life could be collected and immediately analysed, biologically as well as chemically, men of science could occupy their entire time investigating the fundamental problems of oceanography.

Actually the establishment of permanent marine biological laboratories proceeded hand in hand with the sending out of the great marine expeditions whose work they now extend. It was in the same year that the *Challenger* sailed that a German scientist of independent means, named Anton Dohrn, began the realisation of years of endeavour when the foundations were laid at Naples on land granted by the Government of the famous Stazione

Zoologica. Every visitor to Naples knows the line of dazzling white stone buildings amongst the palms and cacti of the Villa Nazionale, for the aquarium is one of the recognised "sights" of the city. But few probably of the many who have been fascinated by the grace and colour of the Mediterranean animals which are displayed in the tanks of the aquarium, realise the function of the large series of buildings of which the aquarium occupies so small a portion. They contain innumerable laboratories, a magnificent library, a museum and all the equipment and chemicals needed for modern scientific work. The present building is three times the size of the original one, and during the lifetime of Professor Dohrn, who died and was succeeded by his son, the present Director, in 1909, over one thousand scientists from all parts of the world—from America and Japan as well as from every country in Europe—came to add their share to the accumulation of knowledge about the sea and its inhabitants.

The Stazione Zoologica was but the first of many similar laboratories, few of which, however, have as yet attained its size or importance. At the present day there are about one hundred which dot the coasts of Europe, America, Asia (especially Japan), and the Mediterranean coast of Africa, while the first marine biological laboratory in Australia was founded last year when the laboratory and equipment of the Great Barrier Reef Expedition was handed over to the Government of Queensland for the use of their marine biologists.

These marine laboratories have become so intrinsic a part of the equipment of modern biological research and have played so important a rôle in the development of biology generally, as well as of that of marine biology and oceanography in particular, that it is time that more was known of them. As centres of active research they are in many cases more important than the biological departments of universities. The oldest and the largest marine laboratory in this country is that of the Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom, which is situated at Plymouth. Established in 1888 with a staff consisting of a Director, a Naturalist and a scientific assistant, it is now more than double its original size, possesses a permanent scientific staff of thirteen members and accommodation for some thirty visiting scientists. These come from all parts of the world in ever-increasing numbers. A ninety-foot steam drifter, the *Salpa*, and a twenty-five foot motor-boat are continually in commission collecting material and making observations in the waters of the English Channel.

About the beginning of the century the need for co-ordinating the marine research carried out by the nations whose coasts bordered the North Sea, Baltic and English Channel became so

obvious in view of the great importance of the fisheries in these seas, that an International Council for the Exploration of the Sea was founded. The headquarters of the Council was, and still is, at Copenhagen. The countries which originally participated were Great Britain, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Russia, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, while the United States, France, Finland, Spain and Portugal joined later. After careful discussion the Council allotted certain fields of marine research to each of the participating countries. The work which fell to the share of Great Britain consisted of research into the natural history and fluctuations of the marketable marine fishes in the North Sea, and this involved work on water movements and on the food of fishes. Having no scientific staff of its own, the Government called upon the Marine Biological Association to carry out these researches. Accordingly, an additional laboratory was established at Lowestoft, which was conducted by the Association until 1910. Since the war this laboratory has been refounded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and a large scientific staff appointed, who work entirely on problems directly concerned with commercial fisheries. The work of the Plymouth Laboratory is concerned more with the fundamental factors which control the abundance and distribution of marine life.

In Scotland the Fishery Board has a laboratory at Aberdeen, the functions of which correspond closely to those of the Lowestoft Laboratory. In addition the Scottish Marine Biological Association has a small but important laboratory at Millport on the Island of Cumbrae in the Firth of Clyde. This was founded in 1894 and now possesses a permanent staff of four scientists and accommodation for a number of visiting workers. There are also in Great Britain marine laboratories at Port Erin in the Isle of Man and at Cullercoats, near Newcastle, which belong respectively to the Universities of Liverpool and Durham, while the Ministry of Fisheries has a research laboratory at Conway in North Wales, where work is carried out on the breeding and purification for the market of edible shellfish, mussels and oysters. Each of these laboratories has a permanent staff of three or four qualified scientists.

A detailed list of the marine laboratories of Europe would form a wearisome catalogue, but mention must be made of some of the larger and more important. Beginning in the far north, the Soviet Government are carrying out extensive investigations in the Barents Sea to the north of Russia and one of the richest fishing grounds in the world. This work is based on their marine laboratory on the Murmansk coast. In proportion to its population Norway has done more for marine science than any other nation.

This is due to the fact that she is at once a great seafaring nation and dependent on her fisheries for much of her wealth. She possesses marine laboratories at Trondhjem, a little south of the Arctic circle, another at the mouth of the Bergen Fjord which, with the famous Bergens Museum in the town, has made Bergen one of the greatest centres of oceanographical research in the world, and a smaller one at Drobak near the mouth of the Oslo Fjord. The wealth of the Swedish fisheries is in the Cattegat, where the marine laboratories of Kristineberg and Gothenborg are situated, while the waters which surround Denmark are everywhere so rich in fish that the Danes have a mobile marine laboratory in the form of a research vessel, the headquarters of which are at Copenhagen.

The principal marine laboratory in Germany is ideally situated on the minute island of Heligoland in the midst of the North Sea, which is the fishing ground of Germany, for the waters of the Baltic, where she has a much greater coastline, are too fresh for many fish to flourish in them. Kiel and Hamburg are also both important centres of oceanographical research. Holland has a marine laboratory at the far northern point of the peninsula of North Holland at Helder, and Belgium one at Ostend. The French are fortunate in possessing extensive coasts bordering the English Channel, the Bay of Biscay, and also the Mediterranean. There are no less than sixteen marine laboratories scattered along the coasts of France, from Boulogne at one extremity to Villefranche, on the Riviera, at the other. Most of these are small, the two more important being the laboratories of Roscoff on the north coast of Brittany, and of Banyuls, a few miles from the Spanish frontier, on the Mediterranean.

After Naples the best known of European marine stations, to the traveller as well as to the scientist, is the magnificent Oceanographical Museum and Aquarium at Monaco. This was founded and endowed by the late Prince Albert of Monaco in 1906. The Prince was one of the greatest of oceanographers and made repeated expeditions in his perfectly equipped yachts, first the *Hirondelle*, then the *Princess Alice*, and finally the *Princess Alice II*, which was an ocean-going vessel of 1,420 tons burden and 240 feet long. With these vessels he explored the Mediterranean and the Atlantic from Spitzbergen to the Equator, collecting animals from every depth, and making innumerable physical observations on the character of the sea water in different regions. His most spectacular work was concerned with the discovery of the giant cuttlefish from the great depths of the Mediterranean and Atlantic. These creatures are too swift and powerful ever to be caught in any net, however large, which could be let down into the waters

where they live. But they are preyed upon by the great, toothed sperm whales, and it was by capturing these and examining the contents of their stomachs that the Prince was able to demonstrate the reality of these hitherto almost mythical monsters of the deep seas. The results of the Prince's numerous voyages were published in a series of magnificently printed volumes, and examples of the specimens he collected and the diverse forms of apparatus and collecting gear used in this type of work are displayed in the galleries of the museum. Rising abruptly from the edge of the sea at the furthestmost point of the rocky promontory on which Monaco lies, the museum is the most impressive of all oceanographical institutes and a worthy memorial to a great oceanographer. Since the death of the Prince in 1922 no further deep-sea expeditions have been carried out, but a permanent staff of scientists maintains the museum and aquarium and carries out original research. Apart from the great laboratories at Naples, Italy has marine stations at Messina in Sicily, at Genoa, and at Rovigno on the peninsula of Istria in the Adriatic. Elsewhere in the Mediterranean there are centres of marine research at Alexandria, at Salammbô in Tunis and on the Island of Majorca.

Passing eastward, the Egyptian Government is about to establish a marine laboratory on the shores of the Red Sea, while there are laboratories at Colombo in Ceylon and at Madras which are concerned especially with work on pearl oysters and on commercial fishes respectively. In the midst of the ocean which separates southern India from the Malay Peninsula are the Andaman Islands, where the Indian Government is proposing to found a laboratory. The French have a marine station at Caoda in Indo-China, and the Dutch an important one at Batavia, which is admirably situated for work on corals and other typical inhabitants of tropical seas.

The Japanese have taken to marine science with much enthusiasm and with the added stimulus of the great wealth of their fisheries. Japan has an extensive coastline for her land area and she is bathed by seas which are almost as rich in fish as are the waters of the North Sea. She has, in addition, a great oyster industry, while seaweeds are collected from which agar-agar is manufactured. The Japanese have also solved the problem of inducing pearl oysters to produce pearls to order. All these valuable industries need scientific supervision and control, and this explains the presence of no less than ten marine laboratories or centres of marine research in Japan. The most famous of these is that at Misaki which is the property of the Imperial University of Tokyo, and very important research work has been carried out there.

In the midst of the Pacific between Japan and America are the Hawaiian Islands with their capital Honolulu, where a small marine

laboratory is situated on the shores of the island of Oahu, near to the famous Waikiki beach. It belongs to the University of Hawaii and lies alongside the delightful little aquarium within whose tanks swim tropical fish of every conceivable shape and colour. Hawaii is too far from the equator for its coral reefs to attain any great luxuriance, but many types of coral are abundant and much important work on these remarkable marine builders has been done at this charming laboratory.

The coast of California enjoys a delightful "Mediterranean" climate, and two large and important marine laboratories have been established upon it. The University of California controls the Scripps Institution of Oceanography which is situated at La Jolla about twenty miles from the Mexican frontier. Leland Stanford University possesses a marine station at Pacific Grove, some one hundred miles south of San Francisco. Both of these marine laboratories have large permanent staffs and continuous work is carried out on the conditions in the seas which bathe the coast of California. These conditions are of especial interest because there is a continuous "upwelling" of deep water along this coast, and this deep, cold water, besides being partly responsible for delightful climatic conditions, brings with it a continuous supply of nutrient salts ensuring an abundance of minute marine plants, which constitute everywhere the basic "crops" of the sea. Hosts of sardines feed upon these plants and a great fishery has developed in consequence. Further to the north there is a third laboratory belonging to the University of Washington, in the sheltered waters of Puget Sound. Just over the Canadian frontier lies the marine laboratory of the Biological Board of Canada at Nanaimo on the Island of Vancouver. British Columbia has important fisheries, not only in the sea, for her rivers teem with salmon, and more and more attention is being paid to their scientific investigation and control.

The marine laboratories on the Atlantic coasts of America differ from those on the Pacific in that they are seldom the scene of continuous operations throughout the year. The Canadian station at St. Andrews in New Brunswick and the United States laboratories at Mount Desert Island in Maine, and Wood's Hole in Massachusetts, are frozen up in the winter. In consequence, there is a fever of work in the summer and almost complete stagnation in winter. The marine laboratory at Wood's Hole is the largest, in point of size of buildings and numbers of students and research workers who visit it annually, in the world. But there is no continuous programme of scientific work and the contributions of the laboratory to the science of oceanography have been slight. This state of affairs will fortunately soon be rectified now that the new Institute of Oceanography, provided by the Rockefeller

Foundation, is completed. This Institute will have a large permanent staff engaged on a comprehensive study of the North Atlantic. Now it is completed there are three marine laboratories at Wood's Hole, the third being the laboratory of the United States Bureau of Fisheries.

The Carnegie Institution of Washington, in addition to many other activities, runs a department of marine biological research. It possesses a laboratory on an outlying coral island beyond the southernmost point of Florida, named the Dry Tortugas. This laboratory is open only during the summer months and, although comparatively small, much research of fundamental importance has been done within it. Atlantic coral reefs can also be studied at a laboratory on the Island of Bermuda, away out in the open waters of the Atlantic. This is also an ideal centre for deep-sea investigations, as Dr. W. Beebe has forcibly demonstrated recently by his dramatic descent in a steel "bathysphere" to a depth of a quarter of a mile beneath the surface of the sea. At the present time a new laboratory has just been constructed on the island as a result of the efforts of a Board of Trustees comprising British, American, Bermudan and Canadian members. It is anticipated that this laboratory will eventually link up with the new Oceanographical Institute at Wood's Hole, and in this way the scope of activities of both laboratories will be greatly increased.

This cursory survey of the principal marine laboratories of the world has indicated, if it has done nothing else, how widespread is the desire to study the sea and its inhabitants. Much of the work done has, quite rightly, a direct economic bearing; it aims at the development and control of the various marine industries—from fisheries to the collection of pearl-shell or of *bêche-de-mer*. Other investigations of a more far-reaching character are gradually elucidating the fundamental factors which control the fertility of the sea. The immediate "practical" applications of this work are less apparent to the layman, but its intrinsic value—for knowledge is power no less in dealing with marine problems than elsewhere—is much greater. We are only now beginning to realise the complexity of the problems which await investigation, the eventual solution of which may enable us to farm the products of the sea as we do those of the land, and will certainly enable us to collect these products with greater efficiency and with less damage to the economy of marine life than is the case to-day.

C. M. YONGE.

DARWINISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

IT is just fifty years since Charles Darwin died. Those who hope for a friendship between religion and science should be thankful that he received interment among the great heroes of the nation in Westminster Abbey. This seems the more remarkable in view of the avowed agnosticism of his later years, as he expressed it in a private letter about three years before his death :

In my most extreme fluctuations I have never been an atheist, in the sense of denying the existence of God. I think that generally (and more and more as I grow older), but not always, an agnostic would be the more correct description of my state of mind.*

Canon Liddon, in a sermon three days after Darwin's death, alluded to him with respect and admiration :

Mr. Darwin's greatness is not least conspicuous in the patience and care with which he observed and registered minute single facts, while engaged in arranging groups of facts.

In a prefatory note to this sermon a few days later, after recognising what he called Darwin's "timid theism," Liddon very cautiously avowed his belief in the permissibility to a Christian of the theory of evolution :

If it should ever become certain that the first man had for his mother an anthropomorphous ape, the Church's faith as to man's true place among the creatures of God would remain untouched.

At the same time, he refused to allow any radical modification of the traditional doctrines of man's original innocence and original sin :

The Church can never cease to believe that the first man . . . was robed in supernatural grace, . . . and had a full power of understanding good and evil and of choosing between them; and that by his disobedience he forfeited this grace, and transmitted . . . a nature fatally impoverished and tainted. . . . These truths are of the essence of Christian belief.

In somewhat more cordial vein, as we might expect, are the references to Darwin in the Bishop of Carlisle's sermon at Westminster Abbey on the following Sunday, May 1st, 1882. Taking as his text the words "Complete in Him" (Colossians ii, 10), he made some of the usual sort of observations in funeral sermons and then went on to speak of the appropriateness of the interment in the Abbey. His remarks appear worth quoting at some length :

Let me say in the first place and in general how much I think that the interment of the remains of Mr. Darwin in Westminster Abbey is in accordance with the judgment of the

wisest of his countrymen. It would have been an unfortunate thing if it had been supposed that he himself or those dearest to him recognised an incompatibility between the results of his scientific studies and the solemn committal with prayer and thanksgiving to the ground of that mortal material frame which had done its work. It would have been unfortunate if anything had occurred to give weight and currency to the foolish notion which some have diligently propagated, but for which Mr. Darwin was not responsible, that there is a necessary conflict between a knowledge of Nature and a belief in God. On the other hand, it was a happy thing and one of good augury for our country, of good augury perhaps for the world, that it should be thought suitable to bury the remains of the most conspicuous man of science in this generation with the fullest expression of Christian hope, that no objection should be offered by those who had the power of objection, and that the course so taken should commend itself to the conscience of the country. A distinguished man who was present at the funeral remarked to me that, as he witnessed the ceremony, he felt thankful for his native land. "Had this death," said he, "occurred in France, no priest would have taken part in the funeral; or if he had, no scientific man would have been present." I imagine that there was much of mournful truth in this remark. Thank God that no such remark would be possible as applied to England! God grant that such possibility may never arise!

The preacher then expatiated upon the greatness of Darwin as scientific investigator, while he refrained from committing himself to any definite opinion as to the truth of his theories, prudently leaving it to the future to pronounce the verdict. He passed from this to the praise of Darwin's character: his devotion to his life's work, his modesty, his serenity, his indifference to criticism, his patient observation of Nature, shown particularly in his latest scientific book, on earth-worms :

Who would have thought that the crowning effort of one who had searched all Nature, and had been bold enough to speculate concerning the descent of man, would be a laborious investigation of the habits and the part in the general economy of Nature of the lowliest and nearly the least attractive among the creatures of God?

He next spoke in very general terms of the relation of natural science to religious faith, declaring them to be "*not antagonistic*, but more properly *supplemental* the one to the other." While holding that "such intellects as those which were given to Newton and to Darwin were given for the purpose of being applied to the examination of the Universe," and recognising that it is natural to anyone to "feel uplifted and triumphant and joyous, when he realises the great steps which man has made in comprehending the secrets of this wonderful creation of which he himself is the crown," the bishop insisted on the independent validity of religious

* *Life of Charles Darwin*. By Francis Darwin. Second Edition, p. 55.

truth as embodied in the Apostles' Creed and the Bible. He concluded with a declaration of man's need for knowledge which science cannot afford him, the knowledge which "is only complete in Him whom God has sent into the world in order that knowing Him we may know the Father."

A few years later Mr. Aubrey Moore, in three anonymous articles in *The Guardian*, reviewing *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, gave an enthusiastic welcome to the doctrine of evolution as a support to Christian theology:

As a theory it is infinitely more Christian than the theory of "special creation." For it implies the immanence of God in Nature and the omnipresence of His creative power.

The doctrine of "occasional intervention," he declares, "implies ordinary absence and agrees rather with the old-fashioned deism than with Christian theism." He goes on to deal with the current objections to the Darwinian theory, finding a place in teleology for the struggle for existence, seeing that it conditions natural selection and the survival of the fittest. In reference to the alleged degradation to man in the hypothesis of his animal ancestry, he points out that according to Genesis God formed man of the dust of the ground, and that His method is always to choose "the base things of the world and things which are despised" for higher purposes. He accounts for Darwin's agnosticism by pointing out how his absorption in science caused the atrophy of his artistic sensibilities, implying that he evidently suffered a similar deadening of religious consciousness. Finally, in a postscript, Aubrey Moore dismisses the objection to evolution that it conflicts with the Bible, declaring that Genesis never claimed to be "a prophetic anticipation of nineteenth-century science."

In 1909 the Rectoral Council of the Catholic University of Louvain by a unanimous vote accepted the invitation of the University of Cambridge, to take part in the centenary of Darwin's birth and the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of *The Origin of Species*. In 1921 Canon Dorlodot, who had represented the University of Louvain on that occasion, brought out a little book, which was presently translated into English under the title, *Darwinism and Catholic Thought*. In this he maintained that the theory of natural evolution was agreeable to Catholic doctrine. "The more science progresses," he writes, "the more resounding becomes the voice of Nature proclaiming the glory of its Creator. And among the heralds employed by Nature in order to spread its voice right to the extremities of the globe, I think that it is only right to put Charles Darwin in the first rank, side by side with that other glory of Cambridge, Isaac Newton." The book received the official *nihil obstat* and *imprimatur*.

More recently, among the Anglicans, Dean W. R. Matthews, in his little book, *God and Evolution*, declares himself a whole-hearted believer in the theory of evolution in its latest form:

Emergent evolution invites us to conceive God as creating always—now and in the future. If we frankly accept this conclusion, we shall find ourselves in possession of a nobler and more hopeful view of God. We may have the vision of life, not as the unwinding of a chain, or the reading off of decrees written before the foundation of the world, but as a great adventure of creative will in which we are privileged to co-operate.

We should consider scientific theory and religious belief, not as fixed, but as themselves undergoing evolution. There has been a recent tendency amongst biologists to rely less than did Darwin on the theory of natural selection, or rather to seek for other causes of the progress of life. Darwin's coadjutor, Alfred Russel Wallace, supposed certain supernatural interventions or spiritual influxes, causing life to advance to new stages, notably at the coming of man. In this he foreshadowed the doctrine of "emergent evolution" expounded by Professor Lloyd Morgan, who believes in the appearance in the world of new kinds of being, which were not contained in the precedent conditions. The latter distinguishes three stages in evolution, which he calls "life, mind, spirit," declaring that "spiritual value stands at a higher emergent level than economical, moral, æsthetic, or intellectual values."* This development of the theory of evolution corresponds with the recent development of the doctrine of creation, so that the two may come to seem two aspects of the same process—from God's side and from man's. If I may venture to quote from my own book of twenty years ago:

Creation is a great process of unfolding, of emergence of reality, stage by stage. . . . In its unfolding or emergence into this state of being reality is set to act and develop according to its own inherent laws.†

The theory of evolution seems to demand two most important applications: one practical, the other theoretical. The practical application is that for which Major Leonard Darwin, Charles Darwin's only surviving son, has earnestly contended—namely, eugenics.‡ We are faced with the prospect of rapid racial degeneration, owing to the reversal of natural selection, partly by our humane care for the sickly and subnormal, and partly by the more or less voluntary limitation of births among the more

* *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, p. 291.

† *The Meaning of Christianity*, First Edition, p. 81; Second Edition, p. 55.

‡ Particularly in two books, one long and elaborate, *The Need for Eugenic Reform*, 1926, the other short and simple, *What is Eugenics?* 1928.

intelligent. To counteract this, Major Darwin asks first, for the sterilisation of the feeble-minded, who at present form a considerable proportion of the population and are breeding at an alarming rate, secondly for the reversal of the differential birth rate by the encouragement of the more capable and intelligent to have more children and by some pressure upon the less successful members of the community to have less. Here we see an urgent problem in social ethics, which it would be lamentable folly for the leaders of Christianity to ignore.

The second application is that of connecting the progress of the individual soul with the progress or evolution of the community—the Church or humanity. It is remarkable that the traditional doctrine of a future life in the Jewish faith was, not that of an immediate transference of the righteous to a blissful immortality in Heaven at death, but that of a resurrection of the whole company of the righteous to rejoin the redeemed community at some future period. This doctrine of the resurrection is thought to appear first in Isaiah xxvi, 19 ("Thy dead shall live; my dead bodies shall arise"), and is more definitely asserted in Daniel xii, 2 ("Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake"). It was this belief in a general resurrection which became the orthodox doctrine of Christianity. Now, however incredible such a belief may be to us to-day, with our conspectus of the evolutionary process in its immense past and probably immense future, yet this belief does seem to indicate that the development and spiritual perfecting of the individual is somehow connected with the development and spiritual perfecting of the community. I suggest that a reinterpreted doctrine of the resurrection may be more agreeable to the theory of evolution, than is the belief in a bodiless survival of individual souls in a condition remote from the earthly progress of man mentally, morally and spiritually.

However that may be, it is manifest that the concept of evolution, which Darwin with such wonderful patience verified in the organic sphere, is capable of vast extension among the various departments of existence accessible to human knowledge, not least in the spiritual. We may remind ourselves of the words of One greater than Darwin:

The Kingdom of God is like a grain of mustard seed, which, when it is sown upon the earth, though it be less than all the seeds that are upon the earth, groweth up, and becometh greater than all the herbs, and putteth out great branches.

FREDERICK A. M. SPENCER.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

DIPLOMACY AND THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM.

(1) *The European Element.*

IT is not easy to recognise the broad line of the action now being taken diplomatically to solve the European element in the general problem of world economics, for the line tends to be obscured by the mass of detail and by the confused quarrels of the principals. In spite of those quarrels, however, and, as it were, willy-nilly, the diplomatists are being driven along the path appointed by adversity. The four Powers who met in London from April 6th to 8th paraded to the world their inability at the first attempt to agree on a scheme of Danubian economic co-operation: but the interesting facts were (1) that they did meet in London, that M. Tardieu did come from Paris, Herr von Bülow from Berlin and Signor Grandi from Rome to discuss the problem; (2) that the apparently abortive discussions were informally resumed within three days by the same Powers in Geneva, and (3) that there was ground for believing that incidentally they also talked in an informal manner about reparation, whereby it looked as if the formal postponement of the Lausanne conference to June next could not, and did not, postpone the business of the conference till that month. In other words, the diplomatists were being forced into action without reference to their own dilatory time-table. In its early stages the action was weak, even stupid; but diplomatic action is often weak and stupid.

To appreciate the advance that has been made in the first quarter of 1932 it is necessary to recall the corresponding temper of the first quarter of 1931. Many people forget what happened a year ago. Yet the contrast is interesting, and has a meaning to the minds of those who want to measure progress. A year ago reparation payments were still being transferred across frontiers when every serious person knew that the process undermined an already precarious financial position. M. Franklin-Bouillon could still command a sympathetic audience in Paris when he lightly dismissed the German talk of a moratorium as a "mere pretext" for mischievous diplomacy. By contrast an influential Frenchman of the extreme Right, in April of this year, spoke in private conversation on these lines: "Of course nobody in Paris expects that German reparation will ever again be paid. The position is too bad. It is going to be worse, even in France. At the June conference we shall make a show of opposition to the tearing up of the financial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles: but our real object will be to discourage the German politicians from thinking that they can next tear up the territorial clauses of the treaty."

In the early spring of the present year one had little difficulty in recognising that a more sober spirit influenced the diplomatists. Political passion and prejudice were less active. There was an inclination to accept the truth that the world grows rich, or grows poor, together.

There was, however, an accidental obstacle to quick action. In three out of the five big Powers from whom the initiative had to come, an impending appeal to the electorate had the virtual effect of suspending statesmanship.

In Germany the possibility had to be faced that Herr Hitler might supplant Field-Marshal von Hindenburg in the Presidency. In that event nobody could foretell the international disturbance that might be created, partly because Herr Hitler's appeal was to the German discontent with the Stresemann-Brüning-Hindenburg tradition, partly because the recent history of Brunswick had proved that Herr Hitler either could not or would not restrain his extremist supporters from violence of an abominable kind. The first poll for the Presidency took place on March 13th, the constitutional ruling for that occasion being that in order to be elected a candidate must poll a majority of the total votes. The figures of the voting were: for Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, 18,661,736 votes, for Herr Hitler, 11,338,571; Herr Thälmann (Communist), 4,982,079; Colonel Düsterberg (Nationalist), 2,557,876; Herr Winter, 111,470. The total poll against Field-Marshal von Hindenburg amounted to 18,989,996, or only 328,260 more than his own. He therefore came within 1 per cent. of the poll necessary for outright election. The second election, at which the candidate who simply receives more votes than any other single candidate is chosen President, was fixed for April 10th. Field-Marshal von Hindenburg was then duly elected by 19,359,642 against Herr Hitler's 13,417,460 and Herr Thälmann's 3,706,388. One source of general anxiety was thus removed, the relief being felt all the more deeply because in the renewed election campaign between March 13th and April 10th Herr Hitler and his supporters had indulged in a violent form of electioneering such as betrayed their essential arrogance and lawlessness of spirit.

Even then, however, the anxiety was not wholly removed, for there remained to be decided the Prussian and other State elections, due to be held on April 24th, in preparation for which the Hitlerites proceeded to agitate after their manner, only more so. The chief importance of those elections was due to the fact that by the Constitution the several States are responsible for the police administration. It was obvious that Nazi politics backed by Nazi police was an unpleasant possibility. During the winter

the small State of Brunswick had illustrated what a Nazi administration could be. The government had been in the hands of two men, one a Nationalist and one a Nazi, the latter holding the portfolio of the Interior. The police had been Nazi police. Their methods had been to dash about the country in lorries, rounding up, killing, injuring those who, they thought, had not developed enough enthusiasm for Nazi ideals. In fact three people were killed and more than a hundred badly wounded by the official gangsters. If the Nazis were to capture Prussia, the most important State, they would be able to inflict widespread damage. The cheerful aspect of the matter, however, was that the election of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg to the Presidency served as a guide to the chances of the State elections, and in some measure also decided those chances.

In France the electoral suspense was further protracted. The elections are due to be held on May 1st and May 8th. The campaign was in full swing during the London conversations of April 6th to 8th. M. Tardieu crossed the Channel to see Mr. MacDonald three days before those conversations began, and went back post-haste to France to address election meetings. French elections tend not to make much difference to French diplomacy, but it was natural that MM. Tardieu and Flandin should refrain from bold commitments when they both knew that they might be driven from office a month later. What they said publicly was, moreover, said at least partly to impress, not their British, German and Italian diplomatic colleagues, but their unseen political audience in France.

The worst obstacle, however, was the long-drawn prospect of the American Presidential election. It is obvious that there can be no business-like settlement of the debt problem without American participation in it. It is equally obvious that there cannot be much likelihood of American participation in it till March of next year. So slowly moves the constitutional machinery of the United States: the country whose nationals in other fields, and in the pre-slump days, used to believe in hustle as a national accomplishment. The campaign for the election of Mr. Hoover's successor at the White House is already in progress. The election, however, does not take place till November 8th next. The new President will not be inaugurated till March 4th of next year. In the normal way the new Congress would not meet till December of next year, although a special session could be summoned for next March. While the world sags and cracks under stupid economic and financial burdens which concerted international action could remove, and which cry out urgently for removal, the

United States takes twelve months to change its President, and for that period mostly ignores the rest of the world.

It is therefore in one sense not surprising that the European diplomatists concentrated their initial treatment upon five small Danubian States. The French diplomatists who twelve months ago did all they could to prevent the salvation of Austria by means of an Austro-German customs union, now did all they could to save Austria by a non-German union. By the middle of April the various projects of Danubian economic co-operation had begun to loom so large in European diplomacy that the chronicle of their origins and progress deserves to be written.

(2) *Origin of the Danubian Plan.*

On February 16th the Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Buresch, invited the Ministers of Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy to see him. He explained the latest aspect of Austria's financial and economic difficulty, gave warning that imports would have to be restricted, but announced that Austria would be willing to take part in any scheme of economic collaboration that might be agreed upon to take the place of the opposite practice of competitive economic suicide that in effect was the existing practice. On March 3rd the German Government informed Vienna that it was prepared to help in any way that might prove to be practical. In particular it offered, should the recommendations of the League of Nations Financial Committee not preclude such an offer, to make tariff concessions to Austria. Two days later (March 5th) the French Ambassadors in London, Berlin and Rome presented to the respective governments a memorandum, the so-called "Tardieu" memorandum, outlining a French plan to achieve the object of Danubian economic salvation. As the special session of the League Assembly, called to consider the Sino-Japanese disturbance, began at Geneva on March 3rd, several of the principals concerned in the matter found themselves together: Dr. Beneš, Sir John Simon, M. Tardieu, Signor de Michelis. They exchanged preliminary views about the Tardieu memorandum. On March 17th the German Government handed to the French Ambassador a detailed answer to the Tardieu plan. Dr. Beneš elaborated his views in a speech he delivered to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Czechoslovak Parliament and Senate on March 22nd. Meanwhile the Financial Committee of the League had been investigating the financial position of Austria, Hungary, Greece and Bulgaria. Its report was published on March 24th. The British Government on March 27th invited the Governments of France, Germany and Italy to confer in London early in April to explore the possibility of a four-Power agreement as a pre-

liminary step to inviting the Danubian States to a fuller conference, designed to complete the outline of a scheme. The four-Power conference met in London on April 6th.

(3) *The several policies tentatively outlined by April 6th.*

Before the events of the conference can be appreciated, it is necessary to examine the various plans, views and recommendations that together constituted the material on which the conference had to work. The chief of them were the French, the German and the Czechoslovak. It was obvious in advance that the French and German views of the problem hardly ran on parallel lines. It was equally obvious that the problem could not be solved except with the concurrence of Czechoslovakia, the only solvent State in the Danubian region. The British and Italian views of the problem were not clearly formulated before the conference began. It is known on the authority of Dr. Beneš that Sir John Simon during the early informal discussions that took place in Geneva was disposed to believe that a full formal customs union might serve the Danubian need. He promptly dropped that idea on being assured that Czechoslovakia would never consent to it. There was no further expression of British views until M. Tardieu came to London on April 3rd. Similarly the Italian memorandum of March 8th was non-committal and vague.

(4) *The Tardieu Plan.*

The text of M. Tardieu's memorandum was published in Paris on March 17th. Its proposals were a little vague, although its broad principle was clear. It was based on the hypothesis that Austria and Hungary were not the only distressed countries in the Danubian region. "In all the Danubian area of Europe there is the same phenomenon of contracted credit, the same slowing down of business transactions. While the agricultural States, unable to get rid of their cereals, see their purchasing power diminish, the industrial States find it impossible to sell their products in the countries which form their natural markets." It referred to causes "peculiar to the Danubian countries" which invited immediate remedy, stated that the British Cabinet agreed with the French Cabinet on the need for "the development of closer economic bonds between the [five Danubian] States," and explained that "the French Government considers that the desired result can be obtained by combinations on a preferential basis on which it has no settled doctrine at present, but which seem to it undeniably necessary." A hint of the preponderantly financial concern felt in Paris about the problem was given in the sentence: "As long as lenders have the impression that the cause

of the trouble still exists, the crisis of confidence noted by the Financial Committee will also continue, and with it the danger of a financial collapse, which would have repercussions in the whole of Central Europe. The French Government considers that it is time to bring to this situation comprehensive remedies, which, in view of the known ineffectiveness of isolated measures, can alone be expected to improve the position." A cryptic sentence, the meaning of which did not emerge till the April conference was held, ran thus: "Since economic reorganisation is the essential condition of financial restoration, it is important that no time should be lost, and that the Governments directly concerned should be helped to overcome the various obstacles which may be placed in their path." It placed on record the French view that the five Danubian States should as a first measure reach agreement among themselves: "It is only when the five States in question have come to an agreement that the time will have come to pass on their conclusions to the competent organisations of the League of Nations for their final drafting and for the addition of whatever complementary agreements may be required."

(5) *The German Memorandum.*

The text of the German reply to the French memorandum was handed to the French Ambassador on March 15th, and a summary was published in Berlin on March 16th. The central passage in the summary ran thus: "A market capable of absorbing their products at reasonable prices, however, would not be created by simply linking the Danubian countries. The new economic unit would have also to include the big agricultural importing countries of Europe. Furthermore, an economic association limited to the Danubian countries would mean for struggling German industry a most serious contraction of its markets. The German Government holds that the best solution would be to create an economic area which, in extent and structure, would ensure the disposal within its bounds of the agricultural surpluses of the agrarian States of South-Eastern Europe."

The other main points in the memorandum were these: that the immediate danger was in Austria and Hungary; that immediate assistance to those States should precede an attempt to solve the larger problem by creating a new economic unit; that reason demanded the inclusion of Germany in any such economic formation; that the consultations proposed in the French memorandum should not be restricted to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Jugoslavia, but should be extended to France, Great Britain, Italy and Germany; and that Bulgaria also should participate in the discussions. (The Bulgarian

Government, indeed, on March 16th made the formal request in Paris that it should participate in the projected plan of Danubian co-operation.)

While the major motive of the French memorandum had been financial, the major German motive was equally clearly economic. In one passage of the German memorandum the economic aspect of the problem was elaborated. Austria, it said, could be quickly and effectively helped if the neighbour and other States would give preferential treatment to Austrian exports; the difficulties of Hungary and the other preponderantly agrarian States would be sensibly alleviated if the European grain-importing areas would take their grain surpluses under more favourable conditions; these measures would be fully compatible with the so-called "constructive plan" laid before the European Commission of the League of Nations by the French Government in 1931, which proposed two parallel preferential systems, one of which was to facilitate the marketing of the grain surpluses of the Danubian States, while the other was to provide special economic advantages, with the co-operation of the main importing countries, for the exclusive benefit of Austria.

(6) *The Czechoslovak View before the Conference.*

As is his way, Dr. Beneš on March 22nd gave a full chronicle of the circumstances and a detailed exposition of his Government's policy. He made six unequivocal points, namely (1) that Czechoslovakia was ready to co-operate with the other four States in measures of common economic relief and to use the Tardieu memorandum as an original basis for discussion; (2) that the Czechoslovak Government would consent to no political conditions whatsoever; (3) that it would not for one moment entertain the formation of a customs union between the five States; (4) that complete accord among the three Little Entente States was an indispensable condition of any plan that might be adopted; (5) that the consent and approval of the four great Powers was indispensable to the success of any such scheme, and that failing agreement among the four Powers, Czechoslovakia would not carry the matter further; and (6) that the Czechoslovak Government would give no countenance to any scheme that aimed at or implied political antagonism between Austria and Germany.

(7) *The Three Currents.*

It was possible to diagnose in the mass of material that waited the meeting of the conference in London three distinct currents in the motives at work. France wanted a severely localised five-State system with a main view to financial solvency. Germany

wanted an extended system of preferential treatment with a main view to economic revival. Czechoslovakia, upon whom in the last resort the success of the scheme would depend, was anxious to take part in common rescue, in her own and in the general interest, but could not consent to the implication of the French scheme whereby Czechoslovak liquid assets should be shared among the four insolvent States, and on the other hand was frankly afraid of the implications of the German scheme whereby German competition in the markets of Central and South-Eastern Europe would be harmful to Czechoslovak interests. At the same time Dr. Beneš fully recognised the community of essential interests between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and roundly dissociated himself from any desire to exclude Germany from legitimate benefits or to attempt any Danubian combination of a studiedly non-German complexion. "I should consider as fundamentally wrong" (he said on March 22nd) "any Central-European policy which would endeavour to press Austria into any type of an anti-German political organisation. Besides, that would be both impossible and fallacious. German Austria is too well conscious of her German nationality, and moreover such a conception would not even correspond to our interests. Nor does Czechoslovakia desire any such constellation. It is not in its interests and it wishes to remain with Germany in the most friendly political relationship."

(8) *The MacDonald-Tardieu Consultation.*

The circumstances preceding and attending the visit of M. Tardieu to London at the beginning of April created some confusion in the minds even of those who are expert in the sort of propagandist activity that is normally unloosed when important business is afoot. In the last week of March three rumours appeared with an odd coincidence and persistency in the British and European capitals, all transmitted from Paris. They were (1) that M. Tardieu had been invited to a private conference with Mr. MacDonald in London; (2) that the British answer to the Tardieu memorandum was favourable; (3) that the "British plan" contained a proposal that the five Danubian States should be subjected to financial control by the Bank for International Settlements.

The real interest of those rumours was to show that those officials of the Quai d'Orsay who make a habit of preparing the ground for what their chiefs are about to attempt had lost little of their acumen or vigour. The specific date, March 23rd, was assigned to the alleged "British plan." No one who is acquainted with the habits and accomplishments of the Quai d'Orsay would ever

imagine that such stories could be put about simply for their effect and without reference to the facts. Facts, however, sometimes are, or may become under the stress of enthusiasm, elastic things. In this case there simply was no British plan, nor a British answer to the Tardieu plan. It is true that the French Ambassador in London called at the Foreign Office on March 23rd (as he had called every day thereabouts) to discuss the Tardieu plan, and that the official who received him probably did not remain mute during the interview; probably even said something about the eternal community of Franco-British interests; probably added, in answer to a specific question, that of course Austria and Hungary could not be lent any more money unless there was some guarantee that it would not be devoted to the sort of extravagant uses that had been the fate of former loans. Such was the unwritten and unsubstantial basis upon which rumours (2) and (3) above were no doubt founded. The only formal action that the British Government took in answer to the Tardieu memorandum was to issue an invitation on March 27th to the Governments of France, Germany and Italy to send representatives to a London conference early in April.

As for the MacDonald "invitation" to M. Tardieu, the fact appears to be that M. Tardieu conveyed to Mr. MacDonald a suggestion that it would be a good thing if he came to London a day or two before the four-Power conference opened to exchange preliminary views with Mr. MacDonald, as he had already had the occasion to exchange views with Sir John Simon in Paris: for there was ground for knowing that the French diplomatic quarters were inclined to regard Sir John Simon as more sympathetic to the French point of view than was Mr. MacDonald, an inclination which had little of substance behind it. Mr. MacDonald, of course, conveyed the news to Paris that if M. Tardieu came to London to see him, he would see him. Manœuvres so apparently trivial would not be worth recording were it not that they were destined to have their effect in the four-Power conference itself. They had a still more immediate effect upon the strained nerves of the Wilhelmstrasse, where the concurrent rumour of an Anglo-French agreement for a joint policy at the June reparation conference was given some appearance of being both true and bad for Germany. Such fears, as will emerge from what is given below, were unnecessary.

M. Tardieu arrived at Victoria Station at 5 p.m. on April 3rd. He left St. Pancras for Tilbury at 10 p.m. the following day, having in the meantime displayed astonishing energy and impressed everybody with whom he came into contact as one who was genuinely aware of existing dangers and anxious for remedy.

He conferred with Mr. MacDonald at No. 10 Downing Street from 6 to 7.15 p.m. on April 3rd, and on the following day with Mr. MacDonald, Sir John Simon, Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Runciman at No. 10 from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., with only a luncheon break from 1 to 2.30 p.m. He was accompanied at the discussions by M. Flandin.

After his first talk with M. Tardieu on the evening of April 3rd, Mr. MacDonald, with one eye no doubt upon Germany and Italy, made a statement for publication in which these sentences appeared: "The policy which we are working out is a policy of co-operation with everybody who is aiming at peace and who is willing to put in all his weight behind efforts aimed at peace. . . . This week the four-Power conference is to sit and consider the economic problems of the Danubian States. There are no agreements beforehand. There are no draft proposals beforehand. The Powers which are to be represented at the conference this week are equally free in every way to contribute to whatever the final agreement may be. We want an agreement which will be consistent with the interests and well-being of each nation concerned, and that, and that alone, is the purpose of those who have been promoting the conference."

That evening M. Tardieu said, in the course of a statement also made for publication: "The issues we have to consider constitute European problems. Is there, indeed, to-day a single question which is not European or even universal? The duty of the Governments is to deal with every one of them from the point of view of solidarity. . . . To say nothing of their precious friendship, Great Britain and France are bound by a common responsibility, moral as well as political, arising out of the means at their disposal and of the identic aspirations of their citizens for an era of peace, fair play and work. Such is the spirit in which our meeting has been decided. It will also be, I am sure, the spirit of the conference of the four Powers on Wednesday, as it was yesterday, and shall be to-morrow, the spirit of our collaboration at Geneva, and a little later at Lausanne. Great Britain and France having the same object in view, that is, to ensure normal conditions of life for all nations, we are bound to bring to a successful conclusion what is in our mind."

At the end of the second day's conversations (April 4th) an official British statement was issued in which the important passage was: "The discussion bore chiefly on the economic and financial difficulties with which the Danubian States are faced. The Ministers of the two countries were of opinion that the problems which they examined can be solved only by general agreements of an international character, and that for this purpose close and

cordial collaboration is essential as between the four Powers whose representatives will meet in conference on Wednesday." Mr. MacDonald supplemented that communication with a personal statement in which appeared the sentence: "We recognise the somewhat different angle from which perhaps one or other of the States will approach the problem, but we are quite convinced that an agreement which is comprehensive of all the interests is possible. I hope that one of the big things that will come out of the conference will be the establishment of confidence between the four Powers, so that we can, with the best of goodwill, begin together to tackle the problems which will have to be faced in the course of the summer."

Everything therefore was highly correct. On the evening of April 4th both British and French semi-official spokesmen emphasised the harmony of the day's work. The French commentators used the word "jubilant" to describe their feelings. What was the real basis of the good feeling that was undoubtedly created that day? Inasmuch as the day's business had formally been confined to the question of Danubian economics, on which matter the British spokesmen subjected all they said to the condition that Germany and Italy should concur, the real explanation had to be sought in what took place during the informal intervals. On that subject there was no official information. It was rumoured, and the British cheerfulness lent colour to the rumour, that the British Ministers had for their part been pleased by M. Tardieu's realistic tone about reparation and the Lausanne conference, and that they showed their pleasure throughout the day. It was even rumoured that at the Lausanne conference the French delegation would not ask for the continuance of the "Hoover mechanism" (whereby the unconditional annuity is transmitted to the Bank for International Settlements and then lent back to Germany), but would consent to a clear suspension of German payments for another year. During the course of that second year the opportunity will no doubt arise for serious negotiation with the United States. If the rumours aforesaid were based upon fact (and there was collateral evidence that such was the case) the Lausanne conference this summer should be a more business-like occasion than was the Seven-Power London Conference of last July. It would mean, indeed, that the wheels of adversity grind slowly, but grind exceedingly small.

It was understood that MM. Tardieu and Flandin on April 4th submitted to Mr. MacDonald, Sir John Simon, Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Runciman seven specific proposals for relieving the five Danubian countries, and were so eager in the matter that they suggested, and the suggestion was adopted, that a *procès verbal* be kept of the several proposals and of the British answers thereto.

Subject to the British condition aforesaid agreement in principle was reached on five of the seven points. They were technical points, such as a tentative estimate that the tariffs of the Danubian countries might be mutually reduced by 10 per cent., that if financial help be given to Austria, Hungary and Rumania, it could be given only under strict conditions of financial reform.

(9) *The Four-Power Conference.*

After M. Tardieu's departure from London M. Flandin stayed on to represent France at the Four-Power conference that began at the Foreign Office on the afternoon of April 6th. Mr. MacDonald presided at the conference. It was inevitable, after the Anglo-French elucidation of views that had taken place before the conference opened, that when it opened the Germans and the Italians should expect to do most of the talking. That indeed did happen.

The central figure of the conference was Herr von Bülow, who was making his first essay in diplomacy by conference in a matter of importance. He is the State Secretary of the German Foreign Office, the position which corresponds to that of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London, having succeeded Herr von Schubert two years ago. He is a man of only forty-six, speaks English and French fluently, is liked by most people who meet him, thinks clearly, is scholarly in type and has a way of disarming Frenchmen by the extent to which he appreciates their point of view, even when an impersonal and detached examination of the problem leads him to the conclusion that on the whole the German point of view is perhaps the more reasonable. He is a nephew of the historic Bülow, but entirely unlike him. His former diplomatic experience was gained as Secretary to the German Embassy in Washington. Soon after the war he retired from the service for several years to study the League of Nations, the result of his study being embodied in his book *The League of Nations*, the tone of which is highly critical.

It was an unfortunate conference, which could not be saved from all the appearance of failure even by Mr. MacDonald's skilful chairmanship—the skill of which was the subject of spontaneous tribute by every delegate—nor by his determined optimism. The separate pre-conference consultation between Mr. MacDonald and M. Tardieu, in spite of Mr. MacDonald's studiously correct statements about it, did not help the conference itself, because it led the chroniclers in Germany, France, Italy and even to some degree in Great Britain, to talk about an Anglo-French plan. There was no such thing; but the mistake could not have arisen had M. Tardieu not sought a separate consultation with Mr. MacDonald. An Anglo-

French plan implied almost inevitably an Italo-German plan in the minds of many commentators. It was a false deduction: but it was made. The importance of those circumstances was that when the conference did actually fail to agree on the technical business before it, the disagreement was magnified by the manner of its presentation in the Press of the several countries. The actual failure was not a serious, nor even a surprising result, for the problem was complex, it had not been the purpose of the conference to achieve a common view of it by two days of hurried talk, and everybody knew that the talk would be continued at Geneva.

The work of the conference divided itself into two elements. One was the discussion of the substance of the problem in Central Europe. The other, which was the true purpose of the conference, was to decide upon a procedure for further treatment of the problem. The two elements got mixed. On the first day of the conference, April 6th, Signor Grandi was understood to be so concerned about the question of procedure that he gave it as his view that it was a waste of time to continue four-Power discussions apart from the five Powers upon whom would depend the actual working of any scheme that might be decided upon. None the less he plunged into the discussion of the substantive matter.

Herr von Bülow did most of the talking on April 6th. He made the point that a severely regional 10 per cent. preferential system could not help the Danubian countries, whose real need was for an agricultural market outside the Danubian area. He declared that Germany offered such a market to each of the Danubian States separately on the condition that there should be no preferential system among the five States at all: in other words on the condition that German industrial exports should be able to compete on equal terms with the Czechoslovak exports in Central and South-Eastern Europe. In essence the Bülow plan was to extend the five-country plan to include any other country that might wish to be included. Signor Grandi was understood thereupon to have declared that Italy would either consent to a regional scheme, if Italy be regarded as a Succession State, and therefore qualified to be included in it, or alternatively would agree to the German plan.

The second day of the conference, April 7th, was consumed by a further elaboration of Herr von Bülow's views, to the accompaniment of a stern silence on the part of M. Flandin, and an absurd controversy about the question of procedure: namely whether the next step should be a nine-Power, a four-Power, or a five-Power conference. M. Flandin's view was that the next step should be taken by the five Danubian Powers, sitting by themselves, that is, without the presence of the four big Powers, and that the five and the four should meet together thereafter. Herr von Bülow and

Signor Grandi regarded such a procedure as needlessly elaborate, and were in favour of an immediate nine-Power conference. Mr. MacDonald and his British colleagues merely wanted something to be done, and would have agreed with any proposal agreeable to the other three.

The conference met in the morning of the third day to register its inability to agree on the simple business it had set out to do, which was to send out invitations to Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Rumania and Jugoslavia for a Danubian conference. Obviously the invitation could not be sent in the absence of an agreement among the inviting Powers as to what the five Powers were to be invited to attend. Nor was the question of procedure wholly divorced from the question of principle; for it emerged during the conference that the French delegation had an increasing bias towards the localisation of the plan, an object that would be served if the five countries were to meet by themselves, whereas the German and Italian delegations had an equally strong bias towards an extended plan, an object that would be served by an extended conference.

One clear result of the conference was that the Tardieu plan of March 5th was dead, for it was proved to be equally unacceptable to Germany, Italy and Czechoslovakia. As further construed by M. Flandin between April 6th and 8th, that plan had evidently been designed to mould the five Danubian States into a financial unit with the corollary of a unitary financial control over them: a notion which the competent Czechoslovak spokesmen had heartily rejected in advance. By contrast Herr von Bülow had outlined a scheme, which might indeed be unacceptable to some of the parties, but which at any rate had the merit that it did not involve financial credits. No country could afford financial credits. M. Flandin himself went no further than to hint at a French "guarantee" of credits participated in by other countries, that is, of course, by Great Britain. The French guarantee would be a meaningless ritual: for if Great Britain participated in the credits, British money would be thrown, as it were, into the Danube. The popular distinction made during the progress of the conference that the French concern was a banker's concern for debts that looked like being bad—a perfectly fair concern—whereas the German concern was economic and industrial, rested upon a real divergence of immediate purpose. In private conversation Herr von Bülow explained his plan as a means of splitting the Danubian problem into its two elements, the industrial and the agricultural, whereby different treatment could be given to industrial Czechoslovakia and Austria on the one hand and to agricultural Hungary,

Rumania and Jugoslavia on the other: with the inevitable extension of the industrial scheme to include Bulgaria.

The conference could not be prolonged beyond April 8th for the simple reason that the Powers concerned were due to be represented in Geneva at the resumed disarmament conference three days later (April 11th). Four big Powers therefore solemnly disagreed on the question whether they should next meet five small Powers, and at once dashed away to Geneva, whither at the same time the said five Powers were also dashing, and where, as everybody knew, they would all promptly begin exchanging informal views. The wood in diplomacy is often hidden by the trees.

(10) *A Czechoslovak View after the Conference.*

An essential point of interest attached to the effect upon Czechoslovak official opinion of what had taken place in London. Dr. Beneš had already made it known that if the big four could not agree, Czechoslovakia would regard the project as abandoned; but crisp views of such a kind tend to soften, and nobody believed that the Czechoslovak spokesmen would refuse to discuss the matter further. The most interesting thing they did begin to say was that the Tardieu plan, as elaborated by M. Flandin, was little more attractive to them than the Bülow plan. A Czechoslovak who was competent to interpret the official feeling in Prague put the point bluntly in this way: "If it is the case, as it appears to be, that M. Flandin envisaged global help for the five States with the corollary of a global financial control, then Prague will not touch it, especially as in practice the plan on our side would amount to a method of distributing Czechoslovak assets among the bankrupt States which could not otherwise meet the service of their debts to the French banks. In its turn the Bülow plan would have as its most practical immediate effect the sharing of Czechoslovak markets with Germany: an effect which would become attractive to Czechoslovakia only if it could be proved that there were compensating advantages. As yet there is no such proof. The conversations will inevitably be continued. Czechoslovakia will be ready to contribute her part to any healthy economic scheme in Central Europe, even though the real problem is as much a Central American as a Central European problem."

(11) *The Financial Committee's Report.*

The scene changed from London to Geneva. On April 11th all the interested parties met in Geneva on the occasion of the resumed disarmament conference. It is one of the benefits conferred upon mankind by the League of Nations that it brings the world's politicians face to face at frequent intervals. Being face to face they

tend to behave towards each other with less ferocity and with more good fellowship than they otherwise might. On April 12th, moreover, the special meeting of the Council took place to consider the Financial Committee's report on the finances of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece: Austria, whose banking debts are subject to a *Stillhalte*; Hungary, who has declared a transfer moratorium against most of her foreign debts, public and private; Bulgaria and Greece, who have both declared their inability fully to meet their foreign obligations in foreign currency. The report is a long, detailed, depressing document, which was drawn up at the Financial Committee's session from March 3rd to March 24th, on the basis of thorough investigations that had been made in each of the countries concerned. The most depressing part of it is not the confirmation it gives of the difficulties in which those countries genuinely find themselves, nor the diagnosis it gives for the *nth* time of the general world causes, in particular the fall in prices and the consequent rise in effective obligations, which are the main cause of those difficulties, but the reiterated warning that the continued failure of the world's politicians to remove a basic obstacle to recovery, namely the political debts, continues to make matters worse.

The depression one receives, however, from reading that document does not last. The politicians of the world, in their combined international effect, have hardly ever done constructive work. They have destroyed things, life, trade, property, without end. They will probably continue to be destructive in the future as in the past. But the tide of human affairs ebbs and flows without reference to the politicians. In the present case—and the Financial Committee of the League of Nations curiously makes no reference to the fact—the essential fact surely is that no payment is being made on account of the political debts, nor is likely ever to be renewed? The politicians could never agree, have not yet agreed, to abolish the debts. But the debts have been abolished; they have been abolished by the natural course of things. The politicians, meanwhile, egregiously prepare for a conference, to take place in June, about a problem that in effect no longer exists. It is as though they were to meet in June to decide what to do about the cold weather experienced last winter.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

April 15th, 1932.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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GERMANY UNDER WILLIAM II.*

The second volume of Nowak's remarkable survey of the reign of William II is naturally less dramatic than the first, which described the struggle with the Iron Chancellor; but it is equally interesting and of greater historical importance. The author, as everybody knows, has had free access to the archives at Doorn, and innumerable touches are added to the picture from the recollections of the Kaiser himself. Now that Bülow has shot his bolt it is only fair that we should hear his master's side. Historians are unlikely to accept *en bloc* the version either of the Monarch or his brilliant Chancellor, but their evidence will have to be carefully weighed and compared with that of other actors and witnesses. It may be said at once that Nowak makes out a much better case for the Kaiser than he made for himself in his Memoirs. In these pages he is presented as a fallible but well-meaning man who usually saw the right thing to do, but who on certain critical occasions yielded his better judgment to that of his Ministers. That terrible mistakes were committed by the rulers of Germany during the reign of the last of the Hohenzollerns is now universally admitted, for the pose of injured innocent has long been abandoned. The question to-day is: By whom were they made? Nowak replies that the Kaiser has been most unjustly accused, and that the chief errors were due to his advisers.

* *Germany's Road to Ruin.* By Karl Friedrich Nowak. Putnam. 21s.

The opening chapters describe the Caprivi era, and the second Chancellor receives higher praise than any of the other figures who throng the crowded stage. His unselfishness and simplicity have always been recognised, but Nowak hails him as a statesman of constructive ability, wide vision and excellent judgment. The author of the Army Bill and the commercial treaties, the man who prevented a violent collision with the growing forces of Socialism, has been unjustly depreciated, and these pages will help to redress the balance. Of his colleague, Marschall von Bieberstein, our author, reflecting the sentiments of the Kaiser, has a much lower opinion. The aged Hohenlohe counted for less than any of the other Chancellors, for his strength was ebbing away; and Marschall's foreign policy cannot be described as a success. Whatever may be said for the dropping of Bismarck's secret treaty with Russia, the estrangement of Japan in 1895 and of England in 1896 was a capital error. The Kaiser's version of the Kruger telegram as here set forth makes Marschall the villain of the piece, and depicts the ruler himself as more sinned against than sinning.

The most dramatic portion of the story opens with the appointment of Bülow to the Foreign Office in 1897, and the second half of the volume is a sustained attack on the character and policy of the fourth Chancellor. The elaborate portrait in the fifth chapter is the most brilliant piece of writing in the book. The man who held the reins for twelve eventful years is castigated as selfish, lazy and fundamentally false, disloyal to his master, whom he sometimes kept in ignorance of vital matters, and tragically short-sighted in his handling of foreign affairs. He was a *virtuoso*, we are told, a *poseur*, a *charmeur*, studying his attitude in the looking-glass, the least manly and the least honourable of the Kaiser's Ministers. He dazzled his master, who only learned by degrees the true character of the fascinating flatterer. It is a cruel picture; but nobody will be surprised that, after Bülow's posthumous attack, the Kaiser felt himself entitled to hit sharply back. To those of us who stand far enough away from the spectacle to form a more objective judgment it is clear that neither of the antagonists possessed the statesmanship needed for piloting the ship through the shoals and eddies of a very difficult time.

By far the larger part of the volume is devoted to foreign policy, in which the gravest errors were committed. For a German it must be tragic to contrast the rapid growth of prosperity under William II with the increasing weakness of Germany's international position. Since the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance in 1891 it was vital to retain the goodwill of England, all the more since a hostile England would involve the loss of

Italian support. The Kaiser, we are told again and again, understood this necessity, and greatly preferred England to Russia, whom he never trusted. Though half an Englishman, however, he never understood us, else he could not so grotesquely have misunderstood our Armenian policy, and so blindly have ignored our inevitable reaction to a potential challenge at sea.

The importance of Chamberlain's approaches in 1898, 1899 and 1901 has been estimated in different ways by German historians; but there is general agreement that the handling of the situation by Bülow was singularly inept. That he was afraid of Russian resentment if he made an alliance or an agreement with England was intelligible. Russian friendship, however, was lost already, and attempts to restore it were doomed to failure. Chamberlain was neither Prime Minister nor Foreign Secretary, and therefore could not speak for the Government; but at the close of the century there was undoubtedly a feeling for Germany which the Wilhelmstrasse ought to have turned to better account. The immense influence of Holstein is emphasised throughout this book; but after all he was only a Civil Servant, and neither Kaiser nor Chancellor can shelter himself behind a man whom they could have dismissed at any moment. It is now clear that the Kaiser had less power than we used to believe; yet the responsibility for wrong moves on the chessboard cannot be entirely transferred to his agents. If Bülow was in reality the base and blundering creature depicted in these pages, a man of the Kaiser's intelligence ought surely to have found him out long before 1905, when, we are told, the process of disillusion began.

The closing chapters of the book provide a most vivid account of the spectacular journeys to Tangier and Björko. In both the first and the second Morocco crises William II was far wiser than his Ministers, and it was with the greatest unwillingness that he consented to land in Morocco and make the declaration that Bülow desired. In this instance our author has received information from Kühlmann, the German Chargé in Tangier, as well as from the Imperial traveller. Equally striking is the narrative, based on the Kaiser's own record, of the Björko meeting, where the Tsar breathed fire and fury against England for her conduct in the Japanese war, and where the German visitor was rapturously welcomed as the guardian angel of Russia. At the wish of the Tsar, the promise of mutual assistance was limited to Europe, a modification which provoked Bülow to offer his resignation. The issue is analysed by Nowak, who judges the change to be harmless. The Björko project, as we know, was wrecked by the refusal of France to enter a Russo-German combination; but her opposition, argues our historian, was largely due to the Chancellor's

blundering policy in Morocco. The next volume will be eagerly anticipated; for Nowak writes well, and the new materials make his vindication of William II a work of unusual importance. That it will provoke controversy is inevitable; but it is from such controversies between the principal actors in the drama and their respective champions that a true picture gradually emerges.

G. P. G.

* * *

THE TEACHING OF HISTORY IN SCHOOLS.*

In this report presented by the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation to the International Commission of Intellectual Co-operation at Geneva, in July 1931, we have the first result of the special effort made by the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1930 to acquaint schoolchildren with the existence and the aims of the League. The Assembly entrusted the task to its Commission of Intellectual Co-operation. The International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation at once appointed the sub-committee of experts indicated by the Assembly to collect material for the revision of school books injurious to the spirit of international cordiality. This first phase of the inquiry deals for the most part with history manuals. It has not yet reached the stage of the teaching of geography or modern languages, but the International Commission last July decided to publish this report as forming the necessary basis of the full inquiry.

The information upon which the report is based is gathered from national official documents relating to the question of the supply of school books, from the publications of national associations dealing with this special subject, from current publications of importance, from international organisations working at the pedagogical problem, from official national information regarding the policy governing the choice of school manuals in the public schools. The inquiry deals only with the post-war period since 1919. It is not a new movement. In 1922 the English League of Nations Union communicated to the first session of the International Commission the result of its approaches to the Board of Education on the subject, while before the formation of the International Commission a Japanese association in September 1920

* *Société des Nations. Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle. La Révision des manuels scolaires contenant des passages nuisibles à la compréhension mutuelle des Peuples.* Vuibert, 63, Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris. Francs 18.

suggested the formation of an International Council of Education; in 1921 Professor Gilbert Murray was working on the subject, and in 1925 the League of Nations adopted M. Cesare's resolution dealing with school books. The action of the Assembly of the League in 1930 was the result of pressure from all sides.

The whole subject of school books, and especially history manuals, is of great importance but great difficulty. Historians will recall that in the nineteenth century historical school manuals published in the United States of America reflected biased points of view despite the fact that the relations of Great Britain and the United States had been consistently and officially friendly, with the exception of the war of 1812, since the recognition of Independence. These school books might have done great harm, and in fact delayed that national fraternal cordiality which has marked the last thirty years. In our own times, with the lessons of the world war immediately behind us, there is an urgent need for perfect frankness, perfect absence of bias in school teaching in every country in the world. The aftermath of the greatest catastrophe of which the civilised world has any record is still with us and is affecting to this day every home not only in Europe but in America and throughout the world. Much can be done in the schools of the world for evil or for good. It is possible by biased teaching to prolong indefinitely the agony of the world, to bequeath to another and yet another generation the bitterness which a whole century of political reaction had begotten. On the other hand it is possible by means of school teaching not to obliterate the past but to make the errors of all nations in the past the lesson from which to build a new world, a world in which a common humanism, a common science, a common humanity will make every nation with its special qualities a part of a transcendent whole, worthy of those gifts which God and nature have lavished upon the human race.

The work done on the subject of the revision of school books, so far as the present report is concerned, comprises the efforts made by the League of Nations itself, the replies of fifteen Governments to inquiries as to what action had been officially taken in excluding school books "conceived in a spirit contrary to the reconciliation of nations"—these include Germany, Belgium and Australia—the replies of twenty international associations headed by the Carnegie Trust for International Peace, the replies of national associations, including those of Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and the United States of America. It is interesting to record that the German Association of Professors of History, the American Historical Association, the Historical Association (English) and the Dutch Historical Association have

lent their support to the movement, as have important associations of teachers in secondary schools in many countries including Germany, Belgium, France and Great Britain. Two regional associations—South American and Scandinavian—have also joined the movement. Moreover, and perhaps most important, no less than thirty-six countries have given information on the rules which obtain in those countries as to the supply of school manuals. In Great Britain, according to a letter from the Board of Education dated March 13th, 1931, the choice of school manuals is left to the local education authorities. The Board of Education does not interfere in the choice, but the lists of school books from which the choice is made are in fact prepared by competent persons, while various specialist associations, such as the Historical Association, issue from time to time annotated lists of books for the consideration of their members. On the other hand, in Prussia the school manuals for use in the public secondary schools are minutely examined by the Ministry of Education before being introduced into the schools. In France the choice (subject to certain restrictions) is left with the teachers. In Switzerland the choice of manuals depends upon the policy of the particular canton.

The difficulties with which the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation is faced are not neglected in this important report. Many historians would like to see model school manuals published for use in all schools in the world and even an international manual of history. The difficulty of such an enterprise in the sphere of history need not be stated: literary, scientific, pedagogic. The student of history must go to national sources and read the works of historians of very many countries in order to obtain a judicial and balanced view of the progress of events and the policy of nations and diplomatists and statesmen. But the school child, even to an advanced school age, must rely on books and teachers that give him in brief and in the atmosphere of his own environment the story of the world and necessarily the story of his own times. There are many theories as to the way to teach history, and it must always be remembered that it is the teacher who mainly matters and not the textbook unless the textbook is one "*Contenant des passages nuisibles à la compréhension mutuelle des peuples.*" The history-specialist in the schools inevitably draws on his study of many books whatever textbook is chosen. The boy or girl reads the textbook but reads it in the light of the particular views which his or her teacher holds. This is so inevitable that the question of international textbooks seems to vanish in the far larger question of the training of teachers. The ideal should be that the teacher is the international textbook in person, a man or woman reflecting

judicially all the best information on all the best thought dealing with an historical period with its economic implications.

In the introduction to this very valuable report the learned author or authors touch on the struggle which has already begun on the subject of the perfect historical textbook.

Une application particulière et schématique a été conçue par M. Kawerau qui, avec la collaboration de quelques collègues de l'Association allemande pour une réforme radicale de l'enseignement (iv a 4) a publié des tableaux synoptiques d'histoire.

Various organisations are with him, various historians are against him. What the report does not seem fully to realise is that however excellent are these historical scenes they have to be interpreted by a human teacher and (so far as the present writer is concerned) the whole problem of history teaching is thrown back on the training of that teacher. If that is so the creation of a history textbook which is perfectly judicial is not the real difficulty. It is the human element that matters and the various Ministries of Education throughout the world ought to see that in the universities and training colleges there should be professors and teachers of history noted for their judicial outlook as well as for their learning. The judicial point of view must be handed on in every country if the textbooks and the students of the future are to reflect the highest idealism of the League of Nations.

J. E. G. DE M.

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BONAPARTE IN EGYPT.*

Colonel P. G. Elgood's account of Napoleon Bonaparte's Egyptian Expedition is much more than an account of the actual expedition with its well-known phases. The book is in reality an excellent account in brief of Napoleon's military career until his election as First Consul of the French Republic, the turning-point of his life, despite the failure of the adventure in Egypt. That was in December 1799. It was followed in June by Marengo and all the glories and tragedies of fifteen crowded years. The expedition to Egypt began in June 1798. The Directory was overthrown in November 1799. It was a substantial portion of a period that only lasted for twenty years. Colonel Elgood possesses a brilliant prose style in which never a word is wasted, and he has succeeded in giving an introductory account of the French Revolution which makes Napoleon Bonaparte a natural product of an unnatural period. Artillery officers of capacity were rare in the days when the French were striving to turn Admiral Hood out of

* *Bonaparte's Adventure in Egypt.* By Lieut.-Colonel P. G. Elgood, C.M.G. At the Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d. net.

Toulon, and Salicetti, the deputy for Corsica, "bethought himself of a young compatriot languishing in command of a supply depot at Avignon." He came, saw and conquered, and on December 22nd, 1793, he was gazetted a brigadier-general: "seldom had promotion been more worthily earned." He was only twenty-four, but he was very well read, had a critical mind, no illusions; and, as Toulon proved, military genius. Colonel Elgood gives an excellent brief account of the campaign in Italy. He exhibited "the whole art of war, planned and undertaken with consummate skill and judgment . . . 'that young man,' petulantly remarked a Prussian field-marshal, speaking of Bonaparte, 'is destroying the science of war.' He did no doubt provide Europe with a new conception of it." But the Prussian was right. He destroyed the science of war as it was understood by the great masters of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The next advance was left to the days of Robert Lee. It is true that Bonaparte plundered Italy to supply the financial needs of France, but the plundering was in a sense justified if the campaign at all was justified, and it was justified from the point of view of the Republic since it gave France peace. There was one enemy only, England.

Bonaparte refused to lead the attack on the British coast. There was no adequate fleet and he proposed to attack England through Egypt and, perhaps, eventually India. He finally had his way and the great Egyptian expedition began before Bonaparte had reached his thirtieth year. The famous voyage is described at length. The story of the defeat of the Mamelukes at the battle of the Pyramids and the march on Cairo is told in excellent detail. Then Bonaparte's amazing luck began to turn. Nelson had at last found the French fleet, and the battle of the Nile on August 1st, 1798, cut Bonaparte and his triumphant army off from France. Napoleon at St. Helena threw the blame of the defeat upon Villeneuve, and Colonel Elgood admits that Villeneuve's inaction is difficult to explain. The defeat brought a new coalition of the Powers and only the presence of Bonaparte at the end of 1799 saved the Republic. In the meantime the great commander did not lose heart in Egypt. He crushed the insurrection in Cairo and worked as never before.

The iron nature of Bonaparte is cleared from some reproaches that had been made against his moral character. He was genuinely in love with his wife Josephine and for long resisted all temptation. "Licence did not attract him, sex did not invade his dreams. In Italy he had been proof against temptation." He was treated shamefully by Josephine. It is true that there was one brief *liaison* in Egypt, but after he knew that Josephine was unfaithful. Bonaparte's character is well described and his capacity for forgiveness well put

as a part of a great mind and character. The adventure in Egypt was of the nature of an adventure and nothing more. "Aiming at great results it achieved only the commonplace." But "it is indeed an imperishable memory of his own audacity and of the endurance of his soldiers." His true work began after the Egyptian campaign, but that campaign was a preparation for it.

J. E. G. DE M.

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.

Dr. Edwyn Bevan has written a new volume of the Home University Library entitled *Christianity*.* The book is mainly devoted to the evolution of Christian dogma from the time of Christ until the present day. It is a vast subject, and in the very limited space at his disposal Dr. Bevan has had to content himself with a bare outline. The value of an historical outline is two-fold. It conveys the idea of historical continuity and at the same time encourages the reader to pursue further study and inquiry. Few people have much knowledge of the history of Christianity, although the reality of Christ is far more easily understood through historical contact. The great work of modern scholars in the elucidation of early Christian theology loses its value unless transmitted in some degree to the ordinary individual. Dr. Bevan has accomplished this in large measure. His chapters on the first three centuries are especially interesting. They are the story of the struggle for unity and consolidation. Influenced by Greek and pagan theology Christianity was in continual danger of splitting up into a number of independent and hostile sects. "In the second century when the Church as a whole was new and tentative, a multiplication of little groups following different prophets, without any authoritative centres, might have led to a complete break-up and disappearance of Christianity in the pagan sea." It was the work of the Councils, which followed upon the recognition of the Church by Constantine, to formulate and define the limits of doctrine. Rigidity was the only alternative to disintegration. "When once the Christian Church had in essentials secured a firm consistence, there would be much less danger in the formation of groups which tried new ways in thought and practice."

The Middle Ages are an important epoch in the evolution of Christian thought. In spite of papal claims to temporal power, and in spite of the materialistic nature of the age, the twelfth-century renaissance and the monastic ideal preserved the spiritual continuity. Dr. Bevan devotes only a small chapter to this epoch.

* Thornton Butterworth. 2s. 6d. net.

The mediæval schoolmen, the work of the monasteries, and the efforts of St. Francis of Assisi and Thomas à Kempis deserve greater attention. Dr. Bevan, however, has written an extremely interesting account of the Reformation, the growth of Protestantism, and its relation to the Roman Catholic Church.

Looking back through the nineteen centuries of Church history, Dr. Bevan asks the question, has Christianity failed? "If the claim is made for the Christian society that it embodies a new supernatural life, which would necessarily show itself in a type of conduct above that of ordinary men, the sins and errors and failures which mark the story of the Christian Church might seem to dispose of that claim once for all." But if the Christian views this new life as "something which, in the Purpose of God, prevails only gradually over the crude material of human nature," it is clear that Christianity has not failed. In the light of history Dr. Bevan sums up the position:

In spite of all that is defective in the conduct of those who call themselves Christians, there may be seen in every age the persistent inner life of the great tree which has sprung from the little seed of the Kingdom flowering in lives of a peculiar quality which, in all individual variations, can be called distinctively Christian. And if the periods of general declension have to be noted, what is perhaps the most notable thing in the story is the way in which over and over again some Power working in the Body seems to emerge, to revivify what is dying and restore what is decayed—a power of reparation, coming not from outside, but from within the Body itself, its emergence meaning in one way a new advance, but in another way always a return of the Christian community for fresh inspiration to the original source of its life.

Some knowledge of the evolution of Christian thought and practice, especially in the first centuries, is necessary to a proper understanding of the Christian ideal. Dr. Bevan has satisfied this want in his clear and valuable book.

* * *

ALBERT THE GOOD.*

In this new biography of the Prince Consort Mr. Hector Bolitho gathers much of his material from sources unused in the official biography (written almost fifty years ago). In Coburg and other parts of Germany he discovered new documents (as well as unpublished letters in England) together with a mass of letters (numbering ten volumes) written by the Prince to his brother, Duke Ernst of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha.

This book is in some ways a sad record of his life in England for twenty years. Were it not for his domestic happiness, an

* *Albert the Good*. By Hector Bolitho. Cobden-Sanderson, London. 25s. net.

adoring wife, and children whom he loved devotedly, his position as Prince Consort would have been almost untenable: his very conscientiousness increased his burdens, since he worked late and early for England and for the Queen despite the depreciations of a certain section of the Press and of the public. His was a nature which the English were slow in understanding, with the result that he was often misunderstood. He was for ever striving to do the right thing, politically and privately, often against heavy odds. He doubtless made mistakes, but they were the mistakes of a good man determined to do his duty, as he saw it, never sparing himself, and as events proved, sacrificing his life for what he deemed his lot as the husband of a great Queen, who gave him not only sons and daughters, but a great love in life and also in death. At times, in reading through this record, one feels that the Queen realised that he treated her rather as a charming child, and that the love was somewhat one-sided. Yet had it not been for the strong will with which Victoria was endowed, the Prince might have found life less congenial than it actually was. Where he was concerned she exercised her authority with no mean hand, always to his advantage, and the upholding of his position. The Prince was a highly educated man, of a studious nature, and he felt that he could not obtain from his wife such intellectual companionship as he strove to create in his children and especially in the Princess Royal, who was akin to his own heart. Whether his dictatorship helped her in after years with her own son in her adopted country is a matter of doubt.

The Prince, with all his gifts, both of person and of mind, lacked humour, the salt of life. Perhaps England had taken it out of him. It must be remembered that he was dealing with a people foreign to his nature, and, moreover, he was schooled by Baron Stockmar in a manner that would have caused most men to repudiate such lecturing. Yet Prince Albert was a saint, and saints suffer inwardly often to the detriment of their lighter side. The tuition he received from Stockmar the Prince passed on to his children, or strove to do so, forgetting that he was dealing with other blood than his own, and feeling, as a father, that he could mould his offspring as he would. The Queen was but a girl when he married her, and later years proved her to be an exceptionally clever woman. Was it his influence that, after all, told on her? "Allured to brighter worlds he led the way," and her unexpected loneliness after his death awakened new forces. Responsibility often discovers unknown possibilities, which in the case of Queen Victoria may have been the fruit of Prince Albert's influence.

Mr. Bolitho considers that the main contribution of the Prince

to the story of England's growth was the great advance made in art and its international development. His book lays no special stress on politics, though it would have been an impossible task to ignore the critical times through which the Prince Consort lived. It is, rather, an interesting and refreshing record of a life lived with the noblest intentions, some of which bore fruit. It is well that the qualities which earned for the Prince Consort the title of "Good" should be known and appreciated by a larger public than has hitherto been the case. The love of his brother Ernst and the life in the old home in which they were brought up shines in these pages, and is a tribute to the best Germanic home-life. Mr. Bolitho has succeeded in compiling a noteworthy record of a phase of nineteenth-century family life which, thanks largely to the influence of the Prince Consort, has set the standard of noble social thought for the Royal Family and the whole nation in our own time.

S. DE M.

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THE SOUTH AFRICAN PYGMIES.*

Mr. E. J. Dunn, the author of this valuable account of the Bushman of South Africa and the Stone-age environment that he represents or represented, is a geologist of distinction who formerly acted for the Government of Cape Colony and was later Director of the Geological Survey in the Australian State of Victoria. It is very fortunate that he has been willing to collect his South African anthropological and Stone-age material since there cannot be very many specialists who have any personal records dating back to 1872, the year when Mr. Dunn traversed Bushman land (an area immediately south of the Orange River between Port Nolloth on the west and Hopetown on the east) for the Cape Government. That is sixty years ago. During this trip—he had already seen Bushmen in a visit to Little Namaqualand in 1871—he saw

the last remnant of the yellow, or pure Bushman people, who were living in their own country, and amid their natural surroundings; they were still using their primitive stone, wood and bone implements and their own pottery. Some of these Bushmen were quite wild, and so dangerous that I was provided with an escort of fifteen troopers of the Northern Border Police under Commandant Maxamilian Jackson—a fine body of men under a splendid leader. The sergeant had spent many years among the Bushman people, and spoke their language fluently. He was conversant with their habits and customs, and had an intimate knowledge of their traditions and folk-lore. He acted as interpreter for me, and through him I obtained direct information from the Bushmen themselves as to the uses of their stone and other implements, and the methods employed in making them.

* *The Bushman*. By E. J. Dunn. With Frontispiece and 33 plates. London: Charles Griffin & Company, Limited, 42, Drury Lane, W.C.2. 15s. net.

Mr. Dunn recorded this journey at the time in the *Cape Monthly Magazine* for December 1872 and January 1873. In 1880 he published a paper on "The Stone Implements of South Africa" in *The Transactions of the South African Philosophical Society* (Vol. II, Part I) and in 1886 he exhibited at the Colonial and Indian Exhibition in London more than seven hundred specimens of stone implements that he had collected in South Africa, which were duly catalogued. These have been drawn on to illustrate this book, and are of extraordinary interest, showing Bushman stone implements, pottery, pigments and paintings (as well as non-Bushman stone implements), and are a marvel of technical reproduction. The pigments used by the Bushmen in their remarkable rock drawings were hæmatite (specular iron ore which becomes red when burnt), ochres, natural earths, charcoal and lamp-black. The sap of certain plants was used to make the drawings adhere permanently to the rock surfaces. The colours were mixed on small portable stone palettes. Mr. Dunn says that both the Bushman and the Hottentot "though of negroid origin, differ from other South African people in that their skin is a tawny yellow colour, much the same as that of a Chinaman." There is a far-off affinity between the Bushman and the Hottentot. He says that there was no tribal chief, that the man was the head of an independent family, with one wife. The wives and children were not ill-treated. "The Bushmen were true pygmies. In height (judging from those I saw) the men ranged from about four feet six inches to four feet ten inches, but I had no time to make accurate measurements." There was a marked difference between the Hottentot and the Bushman. The hand of the Bushman was peculiar; "their ear was plain and simian; the nose was short and flat; the eyes were sunk; the face was set and the expression inscrutable." They had unusual powers of vision. Their capacity for endurance was extraordinary. They were a very cheerful people; their dances and love of music, their artistic powers and their folk-lore were remarkable. Their weapon was the bow and arrow and the arrows were poisoned. The homes often consisted of a few small bushes pulled out by the roots and arranged

in a small circle six or eight feet in diameter with an opening at one side for an entrance. To prevent the wind from removing the small bushes, larger brushwood was placed on top to bind the whole together. The wind-break, for that was all it was, had no roof, and was about eighteen inches high. As Bushman land has a warm, dry climate, and as no rain fell sometimes for months together, there was little need for a roof. Loose skins were strewn about the floor in the day time. These were probably used for sleeping on, and as covers at night; but I saw no karosses. Outside the shelter were strewn the family possessions, an empty ostrich egg-shell or two, or the paunch of a freshly killed springbok, both used for carrying water, dishes

made from a section of ox-horn, the carapace of a land tortoise, the breast bone of an ostrich, or portions of ostrich eggshells.

There were bone spoons used for scooping out the flesh of the small wild cucumber, bone awls, stone hammers, honey sticks, quivers, arrows, digging sticks, leather bags—they were skilled tanners. They ate everything they could get: sheep, horseflesh, snakes, lizards, land tortoises, ant's larvæ, birds, honey, springbok and locusts. They were excellent hunters and had many methods with joint action, which shows that it is possible that there was some tribal union despite Mr. Dunn's view. Little or no cloth was worn except for ornament, but sandals were used. They were apparently a very dirty people, probably owing to lack of water. The legends incorporated in the folk-lore are scanty. One tradition was that when the Bushman reached South Africa it was already occupied by an earlier people. There was also the native tradition of antlered deer—a creature that does not exist in Africa—and Mr. Dunn emphasises the point that in the famous Spanish Alta Mira caves there are paintings that "bear a striking resemblance to the Bushman paintings in South Africa and most certainly suggest that the work in both cases was carried out by the same race. Among the subjects depicted at Alta Mira are antlered deer being hunted by what appear to be Bushman people armed with bows and arrows."

Mr. Dunn suggests that the Bushman people formerly dwelt in the south of Europe, landed in North Africa and carried the tradition of the antlered deer to the south. The question of origins is of great importance. The specialised Negro in his modern African form was evolved south of Egypt in historic times. Another race, the Bantu, perhaps the most prolific race in the world, was also evolved in historic tribes from a strange mingling of negritic and proto-Hamitic stock. But the proto-negritic race, prehistoric and in many forms, remains in many parts of Africa, and it so happens that we can trace their pathways from the east and we can reasonably surmise that the negritic variation of mankind was formed under the terrible climatic conditions in which only the strongest survived in a dwarfed state. We can trace this dwarfed race (which is always armed with the poisoned bow) from the Philippine Islands to British New Guinea, from thence to the Malay Peninsula, from thence to the Andaman Islands and perhaps to South India, from thence across Arabia to the African Eastern Coast, to the Central forests, to the outskirts of the forest areas, to the Kalahari desert and to South Africa. It may be that they penetrated Southern Europe and have left their traces in the Spanish caves, but there is no reason to believe that the pygmies came originally from Europe. Antlered deer exist in Asia and the

tradition of these creatures can quite well have been an Asian tradition.

The theory of the origin of the negritic people from south-east Asia does not at all interfere with the value of Mr. Dunn's admirable work, a book which contributes personal observation of one variety of these negritic pygmy tribes and the way of their life. His evidence as to the height of the Bushman is particularly valuable and should be compared with Major Cuthbert Christy's account of the pygmies in the great Central African forests in his wonderful book, *Big Game and Pygmies*, published by Macmillan and Co. in 1924. These pygmies are very small, the men varying from three feet nine inches to four feet three inches, the women being a good deal less in height. They are pot-bellied in the same way as the Bushmen were. In colour they are reddish, much lighter than the tribes on the outskirts of the Great Forest. The latter tribes are taller, but are still pygmies. The forest pygmies live in little groups or family parties of from twelve to fifteen huts. They are armed with bows and lances and are marvellous hunters. They are obviously the same race as the Bushmen and therefore the stock did not vanish with the extinction of the South African variant. The only sign of pictorial art, is, however, personal colour decoration in the marginal tribes, but all the forest and marginal pygmies are fond of dancing and have various musical instruments. Mr. Dunn has performed a most useful work in describing the artistic and musical gifts of the Bushmen, the pygmies who had abandoned forest life. The *Bushwoman* was the main worker in stone. Differences of environment may have developed these gifts both in South Europe and South Africa.

J. E. G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Intimate and up-to-date knowledge of the problems of the post-war world and an enviable gift of popularisation characterise Mr. Wilson Harris' admirable little book on *The Future of Europe*.^{*} Though well aware of the rapidity with which situations change, he finds certain tendencies at work in the life and thought of our distracted Continent which go far to explain the disappointing history of the past few years. Of these the most powerful and the most disastrous is blind nationalism. Politically, as we know, there has been an advance towards a more rational relationship behind sovereign States, but economically there has been a definite and deplorable throw-back. "Europe has swung back, in part deliberately, in part through the play of forces her statesmen are not competent to resist, into an

^{*} Sidgwick & Jackson. 3s. 6d.

economic nationalism from which no State dares to break away, though all of them realise that its end is ruin." Each country, however, waits for the others to move, and meanwhile the position drifts from bad to worse. Nothing is more difficult than to secure the reduction of tariffs, and even a regional Zollverein involves a political intimacy which rarely exists, or which, if it does exist as in the case of Germany and Austria, is not to the taste of neighbouring Powers. To most readers the chapter entitled "The New Europe," which summarises and discusses Delaisi's *Les Deux Europees*, will be the most novel and suggestive portion of the book. The industrial West confronts the agricultural East, and an enhanced purchasing power of the latter would be of immense benefit to both. How is it to be achieved? By substituting international capital at low interest for the devastating activities of the local money-lender. This, however, like other desirable events, must apparently wait till the extremity of suffering compels concerted action. War in Europe, the author assures us, is improbable, so we still have time to amend our ways. The later chapters do something to dispel the pessimism suggested by the earlier parts of the book. Democracy, in the author's belief, is not in the least played out, and there is not much fear of Fascist or Communist tyrannies spreading over Europe. A final chapter entitled "Europe as it might be" discusses some possible changes, such as a modification of the status of the Polish corridor, in a very interesting way. Most of the existing frontiers, however, have probably come to stay. The hope is expressed that with the reduction of tariffs and the considerate treatment of minorities, frontiers will matter far less than they do to-day. Not even Mr. Wilson Harris can forecast the fortunes of Europe a few years ahead. "All that we know is that they will improve or deteriorate in proportion as a sane internationalism triumphs or fails to triumph over the theory and practice of national self-sufficiency."

* * *

Dr. W. Mackay Mackenzie, the author of many Scottish historical works, has given to the student, under the title "The Secret of Flodden with 'the Rout of the Scots,' a translation of the contemporary Italian Poem *La Rotta de Scocesi*,"* a valuable addition to his knowledge of renaissance warfare. *Marmion* Dr. Mackenzie dismisses as great descriptive verse which is, unfortunately, entirely inaccurate. The character of the action known to history as Flodden has been mistaken. The Scottish army were well equipped and not faced by superior numbers. The English indeed were troubled by weather and want of food and had to march before they attacked. The key-note to the action was that the Scottish soldiers fought armed and arrayed in "the manner of the Almayns." King James and his army crossed the Tweed on August 22, 1513, and by August 28th had captured Norham Castle. On September 6th Surrey was in the valley of the Till within six miles of James on Flodden Hill. He pledged himself to fight the Scots on September 9th. James was in an impregnable position, but Surrey turned the hill and the actual action was fought at Branxton. The numbers engaged were possibly 26,000 on each side. The battle began with an artillery duel—of course at close range—and then both armies, forming into

* Edinburgh: Grant and Murray, 126, Princes Street. 5s. net.

four divisions, joined in as many independent conflicts. The Scottish left and the English right neutralised each other. The Scottish centre and right, where the king was, sought out the Earl of Surrey. James was slain quite close to Surrey's position. The fighting began between four and five in the afternoon and continued for not much more than an hour. The decisive weapon was the brown-bill, or English halberd. The failure of the Scottish phalanx ("the manner of the Almayns") gave the English halberd its chance. In close conflict the 18-foot pike was useless as soon as the phalanx formation was shattered. There were many instances of such failure in Continental wars. There was certainly no cowardice. It was one more instance of a formation that was useless against English infantry.

* * *

The collection of short stories and essays which Dr. Dillon has published under the title *Leaves from Life*,* proves once more that truth is stranger than fiction. They are in fact "straightforward narratives of episodes that came under" his "observation in St. Petersburg, Vienna, Budapest, Bucharest, Paris, etc., where" he "represented the *Daily Telegraph*." There is no doubt that he had in that capacity excellent opportunities for hearing unusual things as indeed these tales show. The story of "The Dead Hand" in which a well-known detective was befooled by common thieves; and "Strychnine or Angina Pectoris," which shows the amazing resource of a forger and murderer; and the "Story of a Diamond Necklace," which relates an incredible practical joke, are all particularly good tales. Another good murder story which gives an insight into the workings of an international matrimonial agency is "In Quest of a Bride." Dr. Dillon mingles with these tales of crime several delightful essays on life abroad. For real delight of prose and material the essay entitled "Among the Gipsies in Transylvania" is outstanding. He had the good fortune to go among the gipsies as the guest of one of them during their Easter ceremonies towards the end of the last century. "Transylvania is their happy hunting ground. Here they have lived, suffered, and thriven for wellnigh five hundred years, and it is the nearest approach to a fatherland of which they have any conception. In bands of forty, eighty, a hundred, they flit from village to village, and from common to common in spring, summer, and autumn, eking out a precarious livelihood as tinkers, blacksmiths, musicians, horse-dealers, horse-stealers, harvestmen, and general thieves; and withdrawing in winter to the dark shadow of a 'sun-mountain,' to live in holes in the earth, on little more than air thickened with tobacco-smoke and flavoured with the fat of hares and the fumes of alcohol. . . . My arrival acted as a tocsin, and the place became alive like a disturbed ant-hill. Dirty, dark heaps of rags, which from afar had seemed inequalities of the soil, began first to stir and then to move slowly towards me, . . . then the bowels of the earth commenced to yield up their dwellers, and from caves and burrows, like the Trogodytes of old, men and women emerged into daylight and stood grinning or scowling at me like dusky demons." The stories and essays on Russian life are very interesting, especially as some of them belong to a society which is now no more and seems unlikely to return.

* Dent. 7s. 6d. net.

*The Truth about Reparations and War-Debts** is at once a contribution to history, a political apologia, an exposure of French policy, and a programme for to-day. Mr. Lloyd George depicts himself as a moderate from the first, keeping his sense of economic realities when most of the Allied statesmen and many of the financial experts completely lost their heads. It is a lamentable and indeed disgraceful story of the ravages of war fever among our rulers, who for the most part proved themselves just as ignorant and short-sighted as the man in the street. The main theme of the narrative is the unceasing duel between British and French aims, the former desiring to secure reparations for damage without ruining the debtor, the latter intent above all on completing the destruction of the German foe. Mr. Lloyd George is famous for plain speaking, and he exhibits Poincaré as the embodiment of primitive passions and unreasoning hate, "without humour or good humour," who regarded Germany as a Salvation Army captain regards the devil. He illustrates the struggle by extracts from his discussion of Germany's capacity to pay with Doumer in 1921, in which the French Minister of Finance seemed ignorant of the very elements of the difficulty—and indeed the impossibility—both of raising and transferring the vast sums which he proposed to demand. The sketch of the settlement of our debt to America is scarcely less interesting, and he blames with equal severity the hardness of Mr. Mellon in demanding and the softness of Mr. Baldwin in promising an extravagant sum. The volume ends with a programme of cleaning the slate. All-round cancellation of reparations and inter-allied debts, he argues, would be extremely good business for America and for everyone else, victors and vanquished alike. "A hammer cannot extract blood out of a stone." The neglect of this axiom has brought Europe within sight of revolution and chaos. Mr. Lloyd George has written a very readable and very useful little book. He and some of his Cabinet colleagues were seen at their worst in the election of 1918, a deplorable chapter of history over which he skates very lightly. But when the hot fit was past the British Delegation strove for moderation at Versailles, and without their efforts the Treaty would have been even worse than it is.

* * *

Mr. V. D. Davis has written *A History of Manchester College from its Foundation in Manchester to its Establishment in Oxford*†—covering the period 1786-1889—which forms a substantial footnote to English educational history. As was fitting and, indeed, necessary, the actual history of the College is prefaced with a useful account of the earlier academies from the year 1670, when Richard Frankland, one of the clergy ejected under the Uniformity Acts, opened an academy at Rathmel in the Craven district of Yorkshire, and concludes with some account of the work done by Manchester College at Oxford from 1889 onwards. The growth of the Nonconformist Academy system from 1670 was not substantially interfered with, no doubt because some system of education for children of the more than two thousand clergy who were ejected on St. Bartholomew's Day, 1662, had to be provided, since they were shut out from the grammar schools as well as from Oxford and

* Heinemann. 3s. 6d.

† George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 10s. net.

Cambridge. The harsh Conformity legislation was doubtless a calculated reaction from the revolutionary days when the Puritan ministers dislodged the Church of England clergy all over the country. Both movements showed the height of religious feeling in the seventeenth century. The Toleration Act of 1689 gave some educational relief and the various bodies of Nonconformists—broadly speaking the Presbyterian and the Congregational succession—were able to build up academies which provided teaching of university rank and sent young men into the world trained for law and medicine as well as for religious teaching. One of the most famous of them was the Warrington Academy, which lasted from 1757 to 1786, while the Manchester Academy, which went from Manchester to York, from York back to Manchester, from Manchester to London (in 1855) and finally from London to Oxford, still flourishes. Perhaps the most famous names on the list of Principals of this Unitarian College were James Martineau, Joseph Estlin Carpenter and Lawrence Pearsall Jacks (who died last year).

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

In the series entitled "Landmarks in the History of Education" Mr. David Salmon has edited (with a very pertinent historical introduction dealing with the rather strange lives of Joseph Lancaster, 1778-1838, and Andrew Bell, 1753-1832) "*The Practical Parts of Lancaster's Improvements and Bell's Experiment.*"* The *Improvements* (dealing with the rediscovered usefulness of monitors in schools) was first published in 1803, and in the third edition in 1805 Lancaster "had evolved not only a new kind of teacher but also a new kind of teaching and a new kind of school management." Bell's book *An Experiment in Education* was published in 1797 and recounts his monitorial experiments in Madras as early as 1791 or 1792. Bell's monitors were in addition to assistants, Lancaster's were substitutes for assistants. The book will be welcomed by all educationists as an able contribution to a thorny passage in the history of Education.

* * *

Dr. Helen J. Crump, Assistant Lecturer at University College, Nottingham, has done a very useful piece of work for the Royal Empire Society—in their series of Imperial Studies—by tracing the beginnings of the "Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction in the Seventeenth Century."† The Admirals of England were very important, at any rate from the reign of Edward II—Nicolas Kiriell was admiral of the West and John de Sturmy admiral of the North in 1326—and Miss Crump mentions the reign of Edward III. This was the root of the English Vice-Admiralty system and in the Navigation Act of 1606 and the Piracy Act, 1608, we see that this system was made effective in the colonies. The Admiralty Courts of the Colonies were given power to try piracy cases. The Colonial

* Cambridge: at the University Press. 6s.

† Longmans. 9s. net.

Admiralty Courts of an earlier date have left little official traces of their existence, but Miss Crump has managed to collect much material and specially as to Massachusetts, Virginia, Maryland, Bermuda, Jamaica and other colonies as well as the Vice-Admiralty Courts under the British East India Company. She throws a sidelight on colonial trade, and has produced a really admirable book.

* * *

Professor Émile Cammaerts is to be unreservedly congratulated on his richly illustrated study of Rubens.* How he has learned to write our language with such felicity is a riddle. The narrative flows briskly forward, and he does full justice to every aspect of his theme—the painter, the diplomatist and the man. Rubens is presented to us as one of the greatest, one of the happiest, and one of the best of human beings—a consummate artist, a good citizen, a skilful negotiator, a kind friend, and—what was rare in that age—a man of spotless life. He combined the Renaissance *joie de vivre*, the delight in the colour and in the perfections of the human body, with the seriousness and piety of the Counter-Reformation. Few artists have touched life at so many points and seen so much of the great world of their time. For Rubens spent eight formative years in Italy, and knew the Courts of Paris, London and Madrid. Prosperity came to him, and happiness with his two wives and children. The book is written *con amore* and it will be read with delight.

* * *

Mr. E. F. Daglish's delightful book "How to See Birds"† will be appreciated by all nature lovers whatever their age. At this time of year birds are particularly noticeable; their noisy conversations from shrubbery and tree-top proclaim the winter over, and progress in the making of fresh homes. Spring is a very busy season; marriages are made (and not always without bloodshed), building material must be sought, and, in addition, the daily food has to be found, often in a cold, unyielding world. This is the time when bird-lovers can do so much to help them by placing crumbs, fat, and other food in suitable places. It is a fascinating sight to see over twenty birds feeding on a lawn, ranging in size from a fat wood-pigeon down to a tiny sparrow. The ground, however, is a dangerous place for birds, and their food is better and more kindly placed high up out of reach of cats and dogs. Mr. Daglish gives some excellent advice on foods and bird-tables, drinking pools and nesting boxes. The chapter on Beaks, Feet, and Feathers is particularly interesting, and the illustrations emphasise his points. The table of thirty-two of the commoner garden birds details the appearance, nest, eggs, food, and voice of each, and should be extremely useful for identifying the birds around us. The book is the first volume of The Children's Nature Series, but it is in no sense essentially for children. It may well be considered as an initiation into the study of birds and as such will find its way to library as well as to schoolroom. The Introduction, by Sir J. Arthur Thomson, gives due and full praise to a book as charming in form as it is fresh with love of nature. It is, indeed, as Sir Arthur says, "a joyous study."

* Faber & Faber. 17s.

† Dent. 2s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JUNE, 1932.

THE FIRST PROTECTIONIST BUDGET.

IF Sir Robert Peel's 1842 Budget may be described as the christening of a free trade policy, which was to last (with hardly a relapse) until the Great War, Mr. Neville Chamberlain's 1932 Budget marks something more than the christening of Tariff Reform. It completes, provisionally, the hurried reconstruction of a new protective and preferential edifice, almost as extensive as that which Peel and Gladstone demolished between 1842 and 1860. Peel introduced the income tax in order to liberate British shipping and commerce from the indirect taxes, mainly in the form of customs and excise duties, which had stifled Britain's staple industries and foreign trade in the long years of depression after the Napoleonic wars. A marvellous expansion of our import and export trade followed, and made us long before the end of the nineteenth century by far the greatest and richest commercial nation in the world, with a mercantile marine equal to the fleets of all other countries combined.

Until a week or two before Budget day, it was hoped and confidently expected by the Conservative Party and most of their newspapers that the new revenue derived from tariffs would enable Mr. Chamberlain to lower both the income tax and the beer duty. But instead of budgeting for a handsome surplus, the Chancellor of the Exchequer found himself constrained by an excessively high expenditure and the certainty of a heavy decline in the yields of income tax and super-tax to estimate for an actual deficiency, which he proposed to cover by reimposing the tea duty.

When I went into the Lobby after the Budget Statement, I found a consensus of opinion that no drearier speech had ever expounded a more disappointing Budget to a more disconsolate majority. Most of his Conservative supporters, not yet initiated into the rudiments of finance and ignorant of the elements of political economy, had listened disconsolately at first, until dejection deepened into dismay and disgust. They had got dearer tea without cheaper beer. The scene resembled a funeral rather than a triumph. A few may have recalled—for it was Primrose Day—their great leader's epitaph on Protection. A colleague, it is believed, said to Disraeli a year or two after the repeal of the Corn Laws: "What about Protection?" "It is dead," was

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the reply. "But may we not hope for a resurrection?" "No," he retorted, "it is damned." All the sanguine expectations of income-tax payers, hard hit by reduced dividends or depressed business, who naturally expected substantial relief from the National Government's economies and from the new customs revenue, have been frustrated. Nothing has been given and nothing is promised. They have obtained no remission from the standard rate of five shillings in the pound, though more than £30,000,000 of indirect taxes (representing a far greater burden on consumers) have been added since Mr. Philip Snowden's balancing of the Budget last autumn.

Another complaint against the Chancellor is that he displayed neither imagination nor initiative. He might have appealed to patriotism for a conversion of the War Loan, or indicated that the British Government would take the lead in promoting international currency reform. As for the stabilisation fund, whose professed object is to steady sterling exchanges, it seems highly objectionable because it may involve the Treasury and the Bank of England in risky transactions, and the Exchequer in heavy losses. In the gilt-edged market on the Stock Exchange, a belief was expressed that this rather mysterious fund of 150 millions will be used to facilitate conversion of the War Loan in case a large number of foreign holders demand cash. But of any such intention there was no proof, and the stock markets opened on the morning after the Budget speech with a general decline. Dealers in iron and steel shares were disappointed because the expected protective duty was not promised,* and brewery shares fell because the beer duty was not reduced. India and Ceylon tea shares declined because the Colonial Preference fell short of expectations.

The Stock Exchange is not infallible. But its complete failure to respond to repeated doses of Protection is significant; for a boom in home industrial shares was confidently predicted by our Tariff Reformers and their newspapers. Evidently investors doubt whether protective tariffs will help even the industries that have been clamouring for protection, though they are certain to injure all the trades and professions, including shipping and coal-mining, which have nothing to gain and much to lose by the new policy.

Let me now turn to the Financial Statement. Mr. Chamberlain estimated that his total expenditure for the financial year ending March 31st, 1933, will be 733 millions. To deal with the main items, 276 millions were set aside for interest and management of the National Debt. This reduction from 289 millions is due mainly to prospects of cheap money and lower charges on floating

* It has been granted since, to the dismay of the much more important manufactures which depend for their prosperity and exports upon cheap supplies of foreign iron and steel.

debt. Nothing has been allowed for the next debt payment to America, which will be due in December, unless the Hoover Moratorium is continued. The Defence Services—Army, Navy and Air Force—are estimated to cost 104 millions, which represents a substantial reduction of over five millions on last year. The Civil Service Estimates amounted to 330 millions. In these the chief saving is on the Education Vote, which has been reduced to 52 millions. The cost of collecting the revenue has risen by a million. The total Supply Estimates amount to 529 millions against 520 millions a year ago—an increase of over 9 millions. But in the second October Budget of last year, which stopped the borrowing for Unemployment and Road Fund, Lord Snowden estimated that this would add 70 millions to his first Budget, and that other supplementary expenditure would cost 17 millions. Thus it may be said that, by reducing this prospective increase from 87 millions to 9 millions, the National Government effected economies (mainly in the cost of unemployment) amounting to 78 millions.

Unfortunately, as I pointed out in *The Times* of April 23rd, these economies, though substantial, are totally inadequate. That is what Mr. Chamberlain's Budget proves, though his speech offered no promise or guarantee of further economies, and consequently leaves the country helplessly saddled with a five-shilling income tax, and a total expenditure from rates and taxes of about one thousand millions sterling out of an income which is now estimated at only about three thousand millions sterling! In 1924, the country was certainly better off than it is now, judged by the condition of its investments, foreign trade and employment. But when I compare national expenditure, I find that, though prices have fallen about forty per cent., the estimated expenditure (excluding Sinking Fund) has risen from 682 millions in 1924-5 to 733 millions in 1932-3. But even this is not the worst; for the Sinking Fund has been reduced from 45 to 32½ millions, so that our national expenditure has undergone an addition of 56 millions, together with a reduced Sinking Fund and an increased income tax. It is high time that supporters of the National Government turned their attention to public economy.

On the revenue side, Mr. Chamberlain expects 260 millions from Income Tax—27 millions less than the actual receipts last year, and 66 millions from Surtax, which is 10 millions less. On the other hand, he hopes to get 76 millions from Death Duties, though last year the actual receipts were only 65 millions; and he also hopes for an addition to the Stamp Revenue, which he estimates at 23 millions against a receipt of only 17 millions last year. I am afraid that these estimates are all optimistic, unless, indeed, there is some happy and speedy deliverance from the ever-growing

depression of trade in all parts of the world. If his estimates are realised the total Inland Revenue will amount to 427 millions, and the total Revenue from Customs and Excise to 300 millions, of which 173 millions is supplied by Customs. The actual receipts from Customs last year were 136 millions. The anticipated increase of 37 millions is mainly due of course to the tariffs that have been imposed, partly for protection, partly for revenue, since Mr. Chamberlain took office.

The total tax revenue from all sources was estimated at 729 millions, and the total non-tax revenue at nearly 35 millions, making a total revenue of 764 millions, assuming that there were no changes in taxation. But as the estimate of expenditure (including Sinking Fund) was 766 millions, Mr. Chamberlain was left with a small prospective deficit, and he increased this deficit by giving further preferences on imports of colonial sugar. To meet the deficiency he imposed a duty of fourpence per pound on foreign tea, and twopence per pound on Empire tea, thus balancing his Budget with a total expenditure of £766,004,000, and a total revenue of £766,800,000. This excludes the self-balancing revenue and expenditure of over 59 millions for the Post Office, and nearly 23 millions for the Road Fund.

If I shared the theories of Tariff Reformers, as expounded by Mr. Amery and his school, I should of course anticipate a wonderful expansion of British manufactures, filling the home market with goods to take the place of foreign goods excluded by the new tariffs. How large this market should be is shown by a calculation in the *Economist* of April 30th that, of the free imports from foreign countries of goods wholly or mainly manufactured, 200 millions' worth will be taxed under the new tariff at rates varying from ten to thirty-three and one-third per cent. But this is not all. According to Mr. Amery's theory, the reduction of imports will be accompanied by an expansion of exports, not only to the Colonies and India, but even to foreign countries, because our manufacturers will now be able to run their machinery longer and therefore more economically.

We should all be happy if we could believe that these predictions will be verified, even though the science of political economy, founded by Adam Smith and developed by a distinguished line of successors, would have to be scrapped. But it is useless for me to pretend that I have the faintest belief that any such miracles will take place. Logic, common sense, the experience of the past, and observation of what has been happening in foreign countries, in the self-governing Dominions and in India, all prove to me conclusively that the experiment which the National Government is conducting in imitation of our chief manufacturing and commer-

cial rivals—Germany, France, the United States, and Japan—will end disastrously. For the moment, indeed, the evil consequences of taxing and restricting our foreign trade have been masked, or screened from view, by several special circumstances. In the first place, the abandonment of the gold standard, though regarded at the time as a catastrophe, brought temporary benefits. It made it more easy for our manufacturers to sell abroad, and more difficult for our foreign competitors to sell in the home market. Since then we have had the advantage of fairly steady sterling prices, while gold prices have fallen another sixteen per cent. At the same time the Indian boycott began to be put down by a firmer Government, and the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods further improved Lancashire's exports to the Far East.

The official figures of unemployment, as Mr. Cyril Asquith has pointed out in *The Times*, show that between September 21st, 1931, and November 23rd, 1931, 184,000 more people got to work in Great Britain. This accounts for nine-tenths of the improvement in employment between September and April, and disposes of the claim that this moderate recovery of British trade was due to the imposition of protective tariffs; for the first Tariff Order was not made until November 25th. If, from now onwards—I am writing in the first week of May—there is a progressive decrease of unemployment, Tariff Reformers will have a right to say that their policy has been justified by its earlier results. In that case I shall rejoice as an Englishman; but as a Free Trader I shall be puzzled and bewildered, for to me it is inconceivable that the taxation and artificial restriction of imports can fail to diminish, not only British imports, but also our shipping trade and our exports. In that case, though individual manufacturers may obtain larger profits by exploiting the home market, the total amount of unemployment is bound to be augmented.

To prophesy in the field of politics, economics and finance is indeed dangerous, and never more dangerous than to-day, when Governments all over the world are springing surprise after surprise upon their afflicted and apparently helpless peoples. But for once I am inclined to risk my reputation by predicting that the same year which has seen Protection introduced by a misrepresentative Parliament will see it condemned by public opinion and discredited by the statistics of trade and unemployment. It is just possible, indeed, that the leading Governments of the world may in the next few months recover their senses, and take measures to improve international conditions by introducing monetary reforms, removing restrictions on exchange, and abolishing the practice of imposing quotas on imports, which is even more ruinous than Protection by tariffs. In that case, despite

our own tariffs, British commerce would profit by the resumption of world trade. There is also, I suppose, a faint hope that the Ottawa Conference may reopen some of our lost markets in the Dominions and India, and a still fainter hope that, after the Ottawa Conference, Mr. Runciman may be allowed to fulfil his dream of negotiating reciprocity treaties with foreign countries, which have been stung by our retaliatory tariffs into retaliatory quotas and other devices for reducing our exports to them. That we stand to suffer more than our foreign customers, who have suffered under protective tariffs while we enjoyed free trade, is clear from the official figures showing the value of manufactured exports per head for the four leading countries in 1929. They were :

	£	s.	d.
United Kingdom	12	15	1
Germany (including Reparations) ...	7	10	6
France	6	3	2
United States	5	10	5

But for Reparations, which are unpaid-for exports, the German figures would certainly have been considerably lower.

In a popular broadcast of his Budget on the following evening, the Chancellor of the Exchequer amazed some of his hearers by stating that our new customs duties have been paid by the foreigner. This resurrection of an ancient and apparently inveterate fallacy was explained by the simple fact that sterling prices had not risen. But if the foreigner pays the duties, why should he not have been allowed to pay duties on all the raw materials and foods which have been placed on the free list, and on all the materials which are required for construction and repairs by the shipbuilding industry? The phenomena that obscured Mr. Chamberlain's economic vision and betrayed him into this naïve confession of the Tariff Reformer's faith are surely obvious. In the first place, sterling prices have remained fairly stable because gold prices have fallen about sixteen per cent. in the last few months. In the second place, very large stocks of foreign commodities were bought in anticipation of the tariff, and have not yet been consumed. In the third place, while other markets have been closed, or partially closed, to many kinds of food, and especially to meat and dairy products, the British markets have remained free, or subject only to a low tariff. Consequently, the prices of bacon and eggs have actually fallen in countries which produce them for export, and British consumers have benefited to this extent by the misfortunes of producers.

Mr. Chamberlain's optimistic estimates of revenue may have been based on his enthusiastic faith in the commercial benefits to be derived from the Ottawa Conference. His tariff revenue, indeed,

is suffering severely through the exemption of all colonial and Empire products from the new taxes. If the taxes imposed upon foreign imports had been imposed on imports from other parts of the Empire, the thirty-three millions of new revenue might perhaps have risen to fifty millions or more; and in that case threepence might have been taken off the income tax, or a penny off beer. So far, there has been no response from India or the self-governing Dominions. There appeared in *The Times* of April 13th an account of a fiscal debate in the Canadian House of Commons on the previous day. An ex-Minister, Colonel Ralston, read out a list of imports, including woollen and cotton manufactures, linen, cutlery and carpets, on some of which the duty had been increased to 350 per cent., by the tariff of Lord Beaverbrook's friends—the present Conservative Government of Canada. Colonel Ralston pointed out that the "Canada First" policy has shut out imports, decreased employment, and maintained high prices; and he asked why the Canadian Government, on the eve of the Ottawa Conference, had made no concession to Britain in return for the exemption of Canadian products from our tariff.

When we remember what heavy damage has been inflicted on the export trade of Great Britain in the last two or three years by the tariff and embargo policies of Australia and Canada, and by the raising of the Indian tariff as well as by the boycott, while the trade with low tariff countries, like Holland and the Dutch Colonies, Belgium, and the three Scandinavian countries, has been comparatively well maintained, it is easy to see that we have much to lose, and little to gain, from the Ottawa Conference if the jealous spirit of economic nationalism, which demands a monopoly of British markets while it piles up tariffs and restrictions against British goods, continues to prevail in our self-governing Dominions. We have to remember also that vast amounts of British capital, running into many hundreds of millions, have been invested as freely in foreign countries like Argentina and Brazil as in the British Empire, and that these will be imperilled by a policy of discrimination and commercial exclusion. Our people and their representatives in Parliament must learn commercial arithmetic and a sense of proportion. Hitherto our trade, being free, has followed the most profitable channels. It has followed not the flag, but the price list. It has been guided not by Imperial sentiment, but by the unimpeded enterprise of our business men. So little part does sentiment play in trade that last year, among the self-governing countries of the Empire, Ireland and South Africa displaced Australia and Canada from the head of the list of our customers. We need not depreciate our Empire trade. It is very important. In 1930, before the worst of the slump had

taken place, our exports to all the self-governing Dominions were valued at £140,000,000. But our exports to Europe alone in the same year were valued at £186,000,000.

In any case, let us beware above all things of entering into commercial treaties or agreements, either with the Dominions or with foreign countries, to render permanent any system of tariffs. Such treaties have no moral or constitutional validity. No Parliament can bind a future Parliament to maintain a tax. That is equally true of our own House of Commons and of the Dominion Assemblies. The rights of Parliament as regards the annual Budget are among the most cherished and undoubted rights of our Constitution. A new Parliament cannot be fettered by the dead hand of its predecessor. During a debate in the House of Commons on February 9th, Mr. Baldwin put the case with admirable clearness:

Much of the debate has run on the difference between the permanent and the temporary nature of the tariff. There is no such thing as permanence in politics. Whatever one Parliament does, it is in the power of another Parliament to confirm, to increase, to diminish, or to abolish.

Here we have the true constitutional doctrine, unambiguously expressed by the Leader of the Conservative Party.

Then came Mr. Walter Runciman, who said in the same debate:

The other objection taken to our proposals is that they are permanent. Nothing in this life is permanent. Certainly nothing in our fiscal system is permanent. The yearly Budget comes up for discussion here and for examination in Committee of Ways and Means, and is varied from time to time according to the constitution of the House and the opinion of the electors.

At the end of April the question was considered by a large and representative gathering of delegates at the annual meeting of the National Liberal Federation in Clacton-on-Sea. A very strong Free Trade resolution was put forward, and at my suggestion it was strengthened by the following clause:

and in view of the Ottawa Conference and the danger that this country may find itself committed by commercial treaties with the Dominions to permanent tariffs of a discriminatory character on imports from foreign countries, it [the Council of the National Liberal Federation] gives notice in advance that no such treaty can be permitted to interfere with the constitutional right of Parliament at any time to reduce or remove any such taxes.

Far more than half the overseas trade of the country is transacted with foreign customers, and many foreign tariffs are much lower than those of Australia and Canada. If the interests of business and revenue are sacrificed to Empire sentiment at Ottawa, we shall be even worse off when the Conference is over than we are to-day.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

THE FRENCH ELECTIONS.

THE shadow of a crime hung over the poll. The President had been assassinated. The impression produced by this senseless and abominable outrage was profound. It relegated the elections to the background. M. Herriot, the leader of the Radicals, decided not to address a final appeal to the electorate. The newspapers, for the most part, did not mention the elections on their front pages. A national consultation which, it was agreed, might have incalculable and possibly tremendous effects on French finances, on French foreign policy, on the future of France, on the peace of Europe, appeared to be almost forgotten. It was swallowed up in abhorrence of the attack on M. Doumer, a particularly respected President, of blameless life and venerable age. Political polemics suddenly ceased; there was speculation as to whether the event would influence the voters. On May 1st the first ballot had indicated a slight but unmistakable swing to the Left, and if the electoral cartel of Radicals and Socialists operated on May 8th, it was inevitable that the only parties that are really disciplined and organised would gain, at the expense of the Centre and the Right, which are composed of groups congenitally unable to march in step. But would not the voters be shocked into giving their votes for the so-called parties of order? Since a foreigner was the assailant, would they not belatedly begin to think of foreign affairs?

Nothing has been more surprising than the complete apathy of the electorate to the great international questions which excite so much interest in restricted circles. These restricted circles believe that the masses follow their debates breathlessly, and are mightily concerned about the problems of debts and reparations, of security and disarmament. In fact, the masses are quite indifferent. They want peace, but it would be more accurate to say that they want to be left in peace. It had been thought, for example, that the relative triumph of Hitler in the State elections, and his brilliant failure in the Presidential election, would have aroused the French people. There had been some controversy on the tactical matter of whether the French elections should be held before or after the Prussian elections. The Left politicians had seriously thought that the demonstration of the growth of Hitlerism would damage their chances. The Right had seriously thought that the revelation of Hitler strength would help their cause. They were both wrong. The German lead meant no more to the French people than the collapse of the Labour Government in England, which by this time had been forgotten.

For a long time the publication of the papers of Herr Stresemann

had been anticipated with misgiving, and it is understood that influences were brought to bear to delay the publication. When various notes and documents were printed in France, the nationalist writers drew special attention to the comments of Stresemann, regarded as unkind and scornful, on the Chequers negotiations of 1924, in which M. Herriot played his part in the application of the Dawes Plan (previously accepted by M. Poincaré) and the evacuation of the Ruhr. The opportunity was taken of criticising him for his feebleness in negotiations. The electorate remained unmoved. Then Herr Stresemann's letter to the Crown Prince on the policy of Locarno was flourished as a cynical confession of German aims, and as a proof that M. Briand had been deceived by a much more astute diplomatist. This document, that the politicians represented to be of capital importance, was probably not read by one in ten thousand Frenchmen. It was scarcely printed in the *journaux d'information*. When I was in Geneva I found everybody greatly stirred by M. Tardieu's plan for an international army as a condition of disarmament; and M. Herriot himself considered it necessary to explain that M. Tardieu had merely caught up Radical ideas—that M. Léon Bourgeois had demanded such an army in 1919, that M. Herriot had in substance propounded the same policy in the famous Protocol of Geneva, that M. Henry de Jouvenel had proposed the internationalisation of air forces, that M. Paul-Boncour had worked out some such scheme. It was obviously considered that M. Tardieu's initiative would win votes, unless it was affirmed that he was not the author of this method of obtaining security before proceeding to disarmament. It is to be doubted whether the average Frenchman cared. Nor is he concerned with the issues that will hereafter be discussed at Lausanne; he is tired of this interminable talk about what Germany owes France and what France owes Great Britain and the United States.

In short, despite appearances to the contrary, and despite the agitation of the political leaders of all countries for many months past, foreign affairs leave the average Frenchman cold. He is unquestionably on the side of peace, and all the foolish accusations of militarism directed against the French are utterly beside the mark. Foreign policy as a subject for electoral discussion is singularly out of place even from the vote-catching viewpoint. It has always been so. The long career of M. Delcassé at the Quai d'Orsay, which had such vital consequences for France, was possible because it went almost unperceived. The long career of M. Briand at the Quai d'Orsay was possible because he promised peace, and the average Frenchman was entirely satisfied, without inquiring into the details or ascertaining the efficacy of his conduct

of foreign affairs. All the arguments which purported to show the bankruptcy of Briandism—the increasing boldness of German demands, the undisguised development of German nationalism—were of no avail. All the attempts—some of them made by M. Herriot—to point out the agreement of M. Herriot and M. Tardieu necessarily failed and there remained (abroad as well as in France) only a vague sentiment that M. Herriot must somehow needs be more conciliatory than M. Tardieu, and M. Tardieu more *intransigent* than M. Herriot. In any case, for electoral purposes, it did not seem to matter overmuch. M. Léon Daudet asked, on the day preceding the second ballot, whether the insensate and purely individual act of a Russian refugee, clearly without political significance, would, in arousing French feelings, change the character of the poll; and he concluded that nothing short of a declaration of war or the vertical fall of the franc would have the smallest effect. This may be an exaggeration, but it contains a good deal of truth.

I think it necessary to insist on this aspect of the French elections, which gave a far larger majority to the Radicals and Socialists than had been generally anticipated, because it should convey a moral that politicians who devote their attention to world affairs are apt to neglect. It may be that the conditions are different in other countries—though I do not imagine they are—but in France, at any rate, all that the people requires is to be governed in such manner as to avoid catastrophes and even controversies in the domain of foreign affairs. The statesmen in all countries are ludicrously afraid, in dealing with international problems, of the reactions of the masses. They profess they cannot do this or that, however much they are persuaded of its necessity, on account of public opinion. Public opinion in France is prepared to give them a free hand. Whatever other deduction is drawn from the French election, it should not be taken that the foreign policy of M. Tardieu is condemned—indeed any careful analysis would reveal its essential unity with the policy of M. Briand pursued under the Premierships of M. Poincaré, M. Laval, and M. Tardieu—nor should it be taken as an endorsement of an opposing policy of M. Herriot which in fact does not exist. It constitutes rather (to employ a term which was popularised in England) a “doctor's mandate” to the Foreign Minister whoever he may be. He is to do whatever is necessary in the interest of peace which, for the French, is a synonym of security, and if he does this no questions will be asked. That is not the ground on which the Government will be seriously challenged by the nation.

It would be easy to produce statements by M. Herriot—against

the *Anschluss*, against the Young Plan, against the weakening of French defences, against the revision of treaties, which are just as definite as any statements of M. Tardieu, and sometimes are critical of concessions made by M. Tardieu. But they need not be dwelt upon. Behind M. Herriot are the dynamic forces of Socialism. M. Blum, the Socialist chief, is apparently separated from M. Herriot by a great gulf of doctrines and sympathies. Logically, it is impossible to reconcile Radical and Socialist aims. This is true not only of their ultimate purpose, but of their immediate designs. The observer who judges by the pronouncements of the various leaders would be obliged to say that the Radical and the Socialist attitudes towards disarmament, for example, are entirely different. M. Blum has written powerfully against the official French thesis of security as a preliminary condition of disarmament. He opposes the formula of M. Herriot—Security, Arbitration, Disarmament. He prefers the formula of Security by Arbitration and Disarmament. He regards M. Tardieu's proposal of an international army—of which M. Herriot has claimed the paternity—as fantastic. There is the same divergence of views on reparations, and even on the need of sticking to the treaties and the *status quo*. On the other hand, apart from a certain mysticism on the Radical side, apart from a certain warm eloquence which is excellent on public platforms, it would be difficult to discover the differences in policy of M. Herriot and M. Tardieu. Yet, though one can hardly refrain from these comparisons, it is clear that the influence of the Socialists will be felt, and that, in practice, Radical policy will be more supple than that of the Moderates. M. Herriot is regarded, rightly or wrongly, as less firm than M. Tardieu—to put it politely, he is regarded as malleable.

The paradox of French politics is this alliance of the bourgeois Radical party which, if it insists on its pacifism, equally insists on its patriotism, with the revolutionary and internationalist Socialist party. It is a paradox that requires explanation since, on the surface, it is contrary to all reason. In the first place the Radical party has become the prisoner of its own slogan: "No enemies on the Left." The Left includes the Republican Socialists and the Socialists proper—that is, the French Section of the Workers' Internationale. The Radicals would have to invent, if it did not exist, a Reaction from which they could distinguish themselves; and the Reaction has come to mean not only the Right but the Centre. The fact that a Centre-Right majority has passed in recent years many measures of social reform—one need only mention the Loucheur Housing Law and Social Insurance—cannot be allowed to change the designation of the Centre-Right

as the Reaction. Whenever the Right votes measures of social legislation it is said to have stolen the thunder of the Left for electoral reasons, and it can easily be put in the wrong by demagogic outbidding which it is obliged to refuse. Again, it happens that the only two parties of any weight which are genuinely organised and will obey a *mot d'ordre*, are the Radicals and the Socialists. Thus, electorally, they find it profitable to make a bargain with each other that would be impossible with the other parties or among the other parties. The system of a second ballot favours such bargaining. Radicals and Socialists fight each other as fiercely as they fight other opponents on the first ballot; but where no absolute majority is obtained, as is required by the French electoral law, and a second ballot is called for, they agree to withdraw the less favourably placed candidate, whether he be Radical or Socialist. This electoral compact is not lightly to be shattered when it has produced its results. It tends to a Parliamentary cartel, and a general understanding in manoeuvres both in opposition and in government. In actual fact, the Radicals, who are opportunists, have, since the war, worked far more with the Centre and even with the Right than with the Socialists; but the tendency towards association remains in spite of the facts. It must also be remembered that, though the Radicals are properly described as a bourgeois party, they have no strict tenets as have the Socialists, and under their umbrella all sorts and conditions of opinion take shelter. M. Caillaux, for instance, is unquestionably the superior bourgeois; but other Radicals, whom I will not name, appear to be more Socialist than the Socialists, and stride right over the intermediate party into the Bolshevik camp.

This brief explanation will perhaps sufficiently indicate how, in spite of implacable doctrinal antagonism, a Radical-Socialist combination has come to be perfectly normal. It would not, therefore, be surprising to find the Radicals moving on Socialist lines in the realm of foreign affairs. For if security has consistently been the French demand, the people does not really care how that security is obtained. It prefers, of course, that it should be obtained with the least possible effort. If it simply means signing a few pacts, if it simply means forgoing a few advantages, if it simply means declaring new friendships—why, that way will do as well as any other. M. André Siegfried, who is far and away the most penetrating French writer on French politics, in an admirable chapter of *Tableaux des Partis en France*, deals with the preoccupation of the elector with purely domestic matters. He quotes M. Seignobos: "One may say, without exaggeration, that, until 1914, (political) relations with other countries were confined to professional diplomatists, and into their little circle there

penetrated only the President of the Republic, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, occasionally the Prime Minister. Neither the electors nor the deputies tried to enter; they hardly knew the names of foreign countries. Their foreign policy was summed up in a horror of war, without any thought of the practical means of avoiding it." The debates in the Chamber on foreign affairs to which I have listened have always been extraordinarily devoid of substance. M. Siegfried observes that since the war external problems have forced themselves on the attention of the French, but he doubts whether there has been a real change. "It would seem that the mass of the people, above all the peasants, is unchangeable; to-day, as yesterday, what it demands is peace without discussion and without doctrine, because peace signifies less military service, shorter periods of instruction, fewer fiscal charges for the army, the navy, or colonial expeditions." The politicians, the doctrinaires, the industrialists, and the Catholic Democrats, have more enlightened convictions, often contradictory; and there is a nationalist pole and a pacifist pole. But French foreign policy is limited by these two boundaries: "On one side, a love of peace (which is compatible with an instinctive preference for the least possible effort) and on the other, the elementary consciousness that the security of the frontiers must, willingly or unwillingly, be assured." Left to itself, France would scarcely interest itself in foreign politics.

I have considered it desirable to devote the greater part of my space to the removal of certain misconceptions which preceded and will doubtless follow the French elections. There emerge from what I have written two points: the first is that the conduct of foreign affairs was not the cause of the defeat of M. Tardieu and the Moderates; and the second is that, though logically the consequence of the success of M. Herriot and the Radicals should not be a change in foreign policy, in practice, under the pressure of the Socialists, and indeed by reason of the temperament of M. Herriot, there may be considerable modifications.

The electoral figures seem conclusive. As I write there are still a few results to come in from overseas constituencies, but they have no significance. If one counts the Socialists (129 as against 112 in the old Chamber); the Republican-Socialists (37 as against 32); and the Radicals (157 as against 109) there is a total of 323 seats on the Left. For many purposes one should add the eleven Dissident Communists and Socialist-Communists; and there are also twelve Communists. On the other side—and perhaps not all of them on the other side—are the Radicals by name who do not owe allegiance to the Radical party, the Left Independents, and others who are not inscribed on any party lists

(62 as against 90 in the old Chamber); the Left Republicans, M. Tardieu's own group (72 as against 90); the Popular Democrats (16 as against 19); the Union Républicaine Démocratique of M. Louis Marin (76 as against 90); and the Independents of the Right (33 as against 34). This makes a total of 259. Moreover, the nondescript Radicals who have been included in this total might well vote with the Left proper. Thus if the issue were clear-cut—Left against Centre and Right—there would be a comfortable majority for M. Herriot.

But having put the matter in this simple fashion, it is now my business to show that it is not as simple as all that. We have assumed that Radicals and Socialists can work together. Recalling what I have said earlier about the relations of these two parties, it will be seen that their co-operation for long could never be easy, and it has been rendered more difficult by the unfortunate experiences of 1924 and the present demands of M. Blum. Before the elections, M. Blum called for unconditional disarmament, the extension of social insurance, and the application of the principle of nationalisation. Although M. Herriot was challenged to express himself on these demands, he thought it prudent to ignore them. He likewise thought it prudent to ignore the general question of whether he intended to form another Cartel des Gauches. The experiences of 1924-6, and the final fury of the mob, have no doubt burnt themselves into his memory. The Radicals and the Socialists then collaborated—or rather the Socialists agreed to support the Radical Government without participating in power and without incurring any responsibility. The withdrawal of their support would have brought the Radicals down. Therefore the Radicals were obliged to pursue a policy not displeasing to the Socialists; and Socialist utterances against capitalism and capitalists, however violent and menacing, necessarily compromised the Radicals. During the past few weeks the history of those days has been the subject of bitter polemics. M. Herriot naturally contended that he came into a mortgaged heritage. His adversaries just as naturally contended that he, with his Socialist allies, was alone responsible for the *débâcle* of the franc. It would be superfluous to recount the history here or to take sides; but public opinion at the time undoubtedly blamed M. Herriot, and after the crash of the franc, and the repeated fall of French governments, M. Herriot himself was greatly relieved at the accession of M. Poincaré, and was happy to take a minor place in M. Poincaré's cabinet.

Now no politician who has such recollections would take the risk, if he could help it, of doing anything which might provoke a similar *débâcle*. M. Herriot declared that he would not accept

Socialist support—and Socialist instructions—without Socialist responsibility. But even the participation of the Socialists would not exculpate him if the franc were again to fall. As soon as the possibility of the cartel came into sight, the Bourse was agitated. M. Herriot must have been perplexed by his victory.

The alternative to a Radical-Socialist combination is a Cabinet of Concentration—that is to say, a cabinet in which will be included the nondescript Radicals and the Independent Left, together with representatives of M. Tardieu's party, the Left Republicans. That is the concentration which it was repeatedly sought to effect in the last Chamber. All attempts were unsuccessful because the Moderates insisted on the inclusion of the Right—that is to say, of the Marin group—which had kept it in office after the Radicals had thought fit to withdraw from the majority of M. Poincaré under whom they had served. The Moderate Ministers considered it disloyal to repudiate the Right in favour of the Radicals, and the Radicals now considered it contrary to their principles to work with the Right—though in fact they had done so under the leadership of M. Poincaré. Obviously this dilemma no longer exists—or at least the difficulties are not so acute—in a Chamber in which the Radicals are not subordinate but predominant. It is too early to assert either that the typical cabinet in the present Parliament will be Radical-Socialist, or that it will be Radical-Moderate; but the chances are that, despite the Radical-Socialist electoral alliance, a Radical-Socialist Parliamentary alliance will prove to be unworkable, and at the mercy of any untoward incident. Experienced observers would be inclined to say that M. Herriot and M. Tardieu (whether M. Tardieu personally accepts office or not) will be obliged by circumstances and by the interplay of Parliamentary forces sooner or later to join hands.

For if the conditions which brought about the defeat of M. Tardieu cannot be conjured away by a new government, a cry for national unity will be heard. These conditions will probably become more unfavourable. I have said that foreign policy played little part in these elections; it is necessary to say what did play the most important part. The swing of the pendulum, superior party discipline, a more suitable style of electoral oratory, helped the Radicals and Socialists, but what helped them most was the world crisis which now affects France. The outgoing Chamber not unfairly boasted that France was in far better shape than other countries, with large gold reserves and comparatively little unemployment. But democracies are not to be wooed by comparisons. Whether things are worse in Germany, the United States, and Great Britain, does not concern them. What concerns

the French electors is that they see around them the symptoms of a depression for which they blame the outgoing Government. They see that trade is declining, that there is considerable unemployment, that money is tight, that the cost of living is high, that taxation is oppressive. They are not persuaded that their lot would have been still worse if M. Tardieu's administration had not taken a number of palliative measures. The country realises that it is faced with a deficit on this year's budget. Had M. Tardieu's Ministers imposed fresh taxation on the eve of the elections there would have been a terrible outcry; and the outcry was almost as clamorous at the revelation of a budgetary deficit. But it is one thing to make capital of economic and financial troubles during the elections; and quite another thing to remedy the economic and financial ills when in power. And it is probable that harder times are yet to come. The Radicals are faced with an unenviable task, which has not been improved by the panicky warnings issued by the Moderates against the financial and economic consequences of a Radical-Socialist victory.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

SLAVERY IN ABYSSINIA.

NO more interesting task could fall to one's lot than the mission to Abyssinia, which was entrusted by the Anti-Slavery Society to Lord Polwarth and myself. Our task was to discuss with the Emperor, Haile Sellassie, "King of Kings" and "Conquering Lion of Judah," the question of abolishing slavery. Disembarking at Djibouti, in French Somaliland, at the Southern end of the Red Sea, one starts on a three days' train journey, rising from the flat coastal country with tropical conditions, to a height of 8,000 feet on the Abyssinian plateau, where one finds the most exhilarating climate in the world, high mountain air which, though near the Equator, offers the pleasures of a perfect English summer.

Addis Ababa, the capital, boasts of a modern hotel, in striking contrast to the round wattle huts, with thatched roofs and no windows, which house most of the inhabitants. At the sunset hour smoke filters through their conical tops, as if the houses were on fire. All day the streets are filled with Abyssinians dressed in white breeches and a kind of white shawl, like the toga of the ancient Romans. There is a sufficient length of macadamised road to make it worth while to keep a car. Though a walk in Addis Ababa without spraining your ankle requires heavy shooting boots, and though modern machines are for the most part represented by rifles, some quarters of the town show the influence of the West in the shape of corrugated roofs.

Addis Ababa is without a sanitary system, and the women fetch water from wells. Dogs and hyenas play the part of scavengers; hyenas in particular will, when night falls, clear up a dead donkey which has been left lying in the street. In the market-place the goods are laid on the bare ground. You come on courts of law by the roadside, where the judge—often a passer-by hailed for the purpose—sits sheltered under a canopy of corrugated iron. The court draws large crowds, as if it were a play. At frequent intervals one may see a man wearing a black cape and riding a mule followed by a large number of slaves carrying rifles. This is a feudal chief and his retainers.

It was surprising to find ourselves in a country the uniqueness of which lies in the fact that, though it is Christian, its social life reposes on the institution of slavery. Slavery accords with the absence of conditions associated with what we should call government. The state machinery is more than mediæval; respect for law barely exists, and it has not been found possible to enforce the Emperor's edicts giving the right to freedom in certain cases. In theory they cover nearly all the transitional measures proposed

by the Temporary Slavery Commission of the League of Nations in 1925. These were: (1) children to be born free; (2) ill-treated slaves to be freed; (3) slaves to possess civil rights; (4) owners to have no right of sale; (5) registration to be enforced; (6) right of self-redemption to be granted. The first four he introduced in 1924; he is now instituting the fifth; the last he has up till now rejected, but to balance this refusal he has decreed that on the death of an owner his slaves become free. The execution of the law cannot, however, be taken for granted.

Slaves, who probably comprise about one-fifth of the population, are employed in practically every Abyssinian household, rich and poor. Priests are served by slaves in their households, and so are court officials. The majority of slaves are employed in domestic service, although rich landowners employ slaves on their land. As the Abyssinians generally consider that menial tasks would be lowering to their dignity, slaves undertake the necessary work. Even private soldiers shrink from the performance of menial tasks, and rely on their slaves. Conditions are often easy, and in many cases the slaves are treated as members of the family, favourite slaves even giving orders to hired servants. I came across an instance of a slave-owner who was annoyed with his slaves, because when he left Addis Ababa by train and expected his slaves to bring his luggage to the station, he found that they had hired porters to carry it. It is needless, however, to point out the ever-present possibility of cruelty inherent in the institution of slavery. Chaining the feet close together is the common punishment, but we had proof of unprintable barbarities in some cases. Worse still is the moral degradation of both slave and master.

The evils of slavery are to be seen above all in the trade in slaves, and especially in slave-raiding. In regard, first, to the trade in slaves, the practice is widespread and takes various forms. It naturally cannot be expected that where slavery is condoned it should be thought wrong to transfer a slave from a house where he is not wanted to a house where he is required. Nevertheless concealment is found necessary and the transfer is conducted under the pretext of a gift. Payment is arranged through a series of transferees who may be servants or friends. If the transfer comes to light it may lead to the freedom of the slave. At the Addis Ababa slavery court we witnessed a case in which one woman claimed from another a slave who had been stolen. The stealing was admitted, but the claimant failed on the ground that the slave had been sold since the Edict of 1924, so that both parties failed and the slave was set free.

Another kind of trade is that in slaves who have been recently caught and enslaved, and require to be moved to a district which

they do not know, in case they should escape. It is obvious that where the removal may need a month's journey some system of agency is used which necessitates a professional class of traders. This trade is of two kinds. Firstly it may be one to three or four kidnapped boys or girls who form the caravan, and such transfers occur from North to South, and from South to North, by routes some of which are quite near the capital. Secondly, there is the well-known case of the removal of captured negroes from the South-west and West, intended partly for the coast. These caravans are said to be much reduced in size, but even in recent years Europeans have come by chance upon caravans of considerable number, and lately one of over fifty boys was recorded, the children being in a terrible state of emaciation. Two Europeans whose word can be trusted, in districts not very far from the capital, told me their experience of contact with such caravans of a specially distressing kind. In both cases the caravan passed at night and as it so happened a woman of the caravan was shot in the immediate neighbourhood, presumably because she attempted to attract the attention of passers by. The shots were heard by my informants, and in the morning in each case the remains were found, in one of them nothing but the head having been left by the hyenas.

Slave-raiding takes place chiefly in the western lowlands of Abyssinia inhabited by negro or negroid tribes, who are powerless in face of the raiding parties, composed of Abyssinians. These gentry shoot up the villages at night, when short shrift is given to older men and women, and the young natives of both sexes are carried off. Caravans are made up, and the captives are taken north, travelling by night, either to be disposed of in Abyssinia or to be embarked for Arabia. Slaves with black skins are preferred, because they are more easily tracked down if they escape. The Emperor's edicts have served to make the traffic less open; business is driven from the market-place into the dark corners of the wattle huts. The illiterate natives are unable to read the edicts, which are posted in the villages. Moreover, administration in the lowlands is practically non-existent. The hot and unhealthy climate of these regions is disliked by the Abyssinians, and they make haste to line their pockets by the sale of slaves which they have captured and which they dispose of on the road to Addis Ababa.

Raiding in parts such as Kaffa is reduced because the population is almost exterminated. In other parts taxation is sometimes paid in boys and girls, or children are sold in exchange for rifles. Till the system by which the governors and the soldiers are rewarded is altered, the enslaving of the Shankalla will continue,

and a certain number of governors and chiefs will be involved. The Emperor has removed several governors of the old school, and replaced them with better men; but these men find it difficult to control the local situation, and where slave-raiders are in strong force the governors have not the physical means to break up slave-raiding bands. Supplementary forces sent by the Emperor are easily thwarted (for example, as to the supply of arms) by opposition or by slackness. The Emperor apparently finds it necessary to keep at the capital some of the governors whom he has recently appointed, so that the local authority is weakened because it is represented only by an agent. Such a case is that of the Emperor's son-in-law, Desta Damti, who informed me that the province of Kaffa was prosperous, and that when a case of stealing was reported to him, he ordered the punishment of forty thieves. The denial of trouble by those in authority is a disquieting feature. The subject is closely connected, of course, with the export of slaves by sea for which Ethiopia cannot be held entirely responsible. Opinions differ as to the extent of this trade. Some witnesses hold it to be the bulk of the entire traffic, but we incline to the belief that it is now limited to small though frequent shipments. It is no doubt most difficult to suppress this trade, which utilises secluded harbours and shelters behind coral reefs. British naval activity is apparently not adequate, being thwarted by want of information, of suitable craft, and of access to non-British territorial waters. No captures of slave dhows have been reported since 1922.

The prevalence of sporadic kidnapping is an evil that has not been adequately realised. Confirmation of this view came to light when we visited the primary slave courts. A kidnapper was being tried for the catching of a boy about twelve years old actually in the capital itself. The boy had been removed a day's journey to the north and kept quiet with a gag, which was produced at the open-air court. The boy, who was a Galla and spoke Amharic, was an excellent and voluble witness. The judge pronounced a sentence of ten years and a fine, which would have been impressive if we had not otherwise heard that kidnappers can generally get out of gaol with a bribe. It is stated that the kidnapping of girls often takes place as they go to fetch water or gather fuel. We witnessed a case in which a malignant-looking negroid was charged with kidnapping a full-grown woman. She had been induced on some pretext to leave the village. Very often an offer of work with good pay is used to beguile. At Jem Jem forest a Galla woman had just before our visit been stolen from the village. There seems no reason why kidnapping should not be general as is asserted. It is only with difficulty that our

Consuls manage to detect the movement of caravans, and the detection of kidnapping on a small scale would be more difficult still.

Reform depends on Haile Sellassie, and the opinion of the many European observers we met, even the most sceptical, testifies to the Emperor's sincerity. He appears to possess the mentality which one associates with European political ethics, in a degree which is singular in an Eastern, and still more singular in the ruler of an Eastern state whose traditions are those of violence, disunity and incompetence. He is surrounded by a world which may be compared with the Turkish Empire, or with Persia, as they were a generation ago. It is a strange dispensation that the ruler of such a country should have acquired great enlightenment. Its origin seems to have been the education given by a Catholic Missionary, the Bishop of Harrar, and by the Emperor's father. He has a moral ascendancy over the great Rases, which is remarkable when we consider the dominating position of these men, brought up as kings in their separate kingdoms, and the striking personality of some of them. He is shrewd and calculating, and though not familiar with European life has an understanding of its ideas. This was perhaps illustrated by the fact that he made no attempt to influence us by entertainment or to place us under an obligation, a fact both highly valuable to us and creditable to him. His reforms already accomplished might easily, in the hands of a shallow man, have led to revolt, as in the case of Amanullah. He is an extremely hard worker, keeping his ministers up till midnight and summoning them at five or six in the morning. His philanthropic interests are evident in his extreme concern for hospitals. It is perhaps on this ground that he strongly favours foreign Missions, a fact more remarkable because he has to face a public opinion which is anti-foreign. In spite of this the Emperor indulges in gestures such as the sending of an aeroplane to bring a sick missionary from a distant province to the capital.

His interest in slavery is probably aroused in part by a feeling which is purely humane. We were struck by the fact that he had, after visiting Jerusalem, brought to Addis Ababa a large party of Armenian orphans. These have proved useful, but originally they must have been merely an expense and trouble. As to Education, the chief schools at the capital appear to show as much activity as finance allows, and there is a talk of a University. It is probable that the Emperor is strongly influenced by religious interest. He is fond of ecclesiastical subjects. Considering that the national tradition is Jewish, it is remarkable that, at the opening of the new Parliament, the New Testament alone

was employed. His speech on the same occasion was an admirable moral discourse, condemning particularism and advocating hard work. In his audience room he displays a portrait of Lincoln, and he evidently regards himself as a missionary of the ideas of men whom we regard as great. The Emperor is a godsend in relation to slavery. It cannot be said that he is rejecting any step which should undoubtedly be taken at the moment. If he is only half a progressive, it is remarkable that a man in his position should be as much ahead of his time as he undoubtedly is.

In the course of negotiations with the Emperor and his Ministers, it was evident that no great readiness was shown to go beyond the edicts that have already been issued. Proposals were advanced on behalf of the Emperor; but they were only such as would serve to make the existing decrees more real. They included the establishment of a Slavery Department; the registration of slaves, and the provision of machinery for manumission. Endeavour was made on our side to secure more thorough reforms, including the abolition of the status of slavery, with a time limit for its continuance, so as to liberate all the slaves now living and not merely those born after 1924. The interest shown by British public opinion, and the favour shown to the Anti-Slavery Society, whose goodwill and bona fides have long been respected in Abyssinia, were a great help in overcoming the strong resistance to this proposal. On the eve of our leaving Addis Ababa, a letter from the Emperor was forthcoming laying down a definite term—fifteen to twenty years—for the continuance of slavery, and indicating his view that on account of various causes and of measures which he will introduce, it will be extinct by then.

The situation, however, cannot be regarded as satisfactory except in so far as a step forward has been made. The question remains whether external pressure in the form of intervention by the League, such as the appointment of League Commissioners and so forth, must be regarded as necessary; or whether reform from within can now be expected so that pressure can be delayed.

On the side of delay stand the evidences of progress. One was struck with the fact that the slavery question is one which causes the greatest general anxiety. There is a universal feeling that changes are impending and that as their nature is uncertain the expression of opinion may give offence in high quarters. One concludes that the matter has at all events become of first-class importance. As to changes which have actually taken place, in the capital at all events, the large number of slaves formerly kept by men of importance is being reduced. This is partly due to the use of motor cars, which are becoming more effective as proof

of a man's importance—the purpose hitherto served by a display of slaves. Another important factor is the cost of keeping them in the city, where their food has to be bought in the market. In the country the cost of the grain they consume is never considered, but for chiefs whose wealth consists in land rather than in money town prices are a serious consideration.

Since the Edict of 1924 there has, it is said, been a certain amount of liberation on the death of owners, and of difficulty in recovering slaves who have run away. One of the plantations established by Europeans employs, out of several thousand workers, runaway slaves to the extent of one-fifth of this number. The owners find it too difficult to recover them because in practice they can only claim rendition on the ground, e.g. of theft, and not of their running away alone. The capital punishment of considerable numbers of slave catchers was reported by some witnesses, though others attribute this to the cynical competition of certain governors themselves in the trade, leading them to extinguish competition. The main factor in possible progress is the power of the Emperor, and one notes his increased means of authority derived from the use of aeroplanes and machine-guns, which brought about the defeat of Ras Guksa in 1930. All doubt as to his power over the Rases has been removed. It is certainly remarkable that men who were kings in their own country are now virtually captives at Addis. One of them let fall the remark that he would gladly be in his country to receive us for a future visit, if he could get "permission" to go there.

The telephone and telegraph are extending, and it must be remembered that they alone were sufficient to give the Sultan of Turkey complete autocracy throughout an even larger empire. But the absence of roads does of course lead, if only through delay in sending forces, or recalling governors, to a high degree of virtual independence from authority, and great difficulty, not only in enforcing the execution of orders, but in knowing whether they are executed or not. It is put to the credit of Haile Sellassie that several roads are being built and that some are finished. The road from Dire Dawa to Harrar, and the road to Jimma, which is being built by foreign engineers with American levelling machines, are examples. Road development in the Sudan, where it adjoins the slave-raiding districts of Abyssinia, must lead to commercial development, and it is modern development which kills slavery. Lorries already replace slave labour in some sections of Abyssinia.

An excuse for the slowness of progress is that the depression of the time injures the finances of the country and hampers the economic development which would be a powerful factor in

abolishing slavery. The Finance Minister pathetically remarked, "Let not Europe destroy us because of a temporary inability to pay for reform but allow us to return to normal times, which would enable us to reform." Another excuse for Abyssinian slavery is found by some in the low type of the Shankalla negroes, but this must be ruled out of the argument. The Shankalla are not essentially different from the black tribes of whose education so much has been made in other parts of Africa. The Emperor himself has done something to break down contempt for the negro by creating an entirely Shankalla musical band in the Imperial guard. Moreover, a large proportion of the slaves are not negro or even negroid, but of brown skin and of features often of the fine type of the Galla. Perhaps the greatest of the difficulties which may excuse slow progress is the association of slavery with the current religion. We must remember that Ethiopian Christianity is of a kind which Dean Stanley described as hardly capable of going lower without ceasing to be Christianity. The Church is the upholder of slavery, though the present Archbishop told us he was against it. Further, the influence of the Church is still paramount, and is unaffected by the disintegrating movements which weaken the Churches in other lands. We found, for instance, when on trek in the country, that our own servant was practising a rigid and exhausting fast. Anything, therefore, which contributes to the practice of Church customs is of extreme importance in social life. When, for instance, a man dies masses are ordained for his soul for a prolonged period, and this necessitates the employment of a priest, a sort of domestic chaplain to the family. The maintenance of the priest requires the services of slaves, and to deprive the family of slaves would rouse feelings akin to religious passion.

Finally it may be urged that the Emperor had no real power while Regent, and that on becoming Emperor he required many months to replace obstructive ministers, after which his best official was escorting the Crown Prince in Europe.

If we now turn to the case for pressure, by which I mean the case for steady reform through action by the League, a number of opinions and items of evidence are worth recording. Ethiopian development is too backward to admit of public feeling against slavery, or even against the trading in slaves, which is an inevitable accompaniment of the institution. Therefore liberation can barely come from within. It is more than seven years since the issue of the Emperor's Edict which, if it had been carried out, would have led to the liberation of a vast number of slaves; but very little has been done, for the reason that the Emperor had not the power to enforce the law. When the League, on his

admission to membership, asserted that the condition of effective government was fulfilled, it did so with the tongue in the cheek. The proposals now made by the Emperor deal with machinery for enforcing the laws of 1924, but not with any change in the status of slavery. Yet the punishment of slave catching and slave trading was promised not only in 1924, and by the Emperor Menelik, but even as far back as 1849. In 1875 the British Anti-Slavery Society itself defended Abyssinia because it was believed to be a land of freedom as compared with Egypt. The lenience with which the country has been regarded is so curious as to suggest that if Abyssinia had been a Mahomedan country, criticism would have been markedly more severe. Ethiopian ministers claim to have ended raiding and trading, but the claim cannot be upheld, and the case is made worse rather than better by the fact that the claim is partly based on ignorance. There is an evident fear that inquiry would add to foreign condemnation. The claim is made that the movement of caravans is prevented by the local barriers used for collecting customs, but the claim is absurd when one recalls the ease of avoiding these barriers.

The Emperor's difficulties are evident when we realise that government in the European sense does not exist. In practice the machinery for the prevention of crime is absent, except in or near the capital. The village has its head-man and the district its sub-governor, who is responsible to the governor, but he is an official paid by the right to reward himself through the exaction of labour and by such dues as he can collect, while Governmental force is represented by the class of military man settled throughout the country and owing military service in return for the holding of land. Accordingly, at the place where we first heard of a recent murder, there was no police agent of the State whatever, and this is the usual situation. If a party of slaves is being taken through the country (led of course by armed men), no regular force exists for dealing with the trader. This state of things, which to the Western mind is anarchy, means of course that violence between natives is common, and usually unpunished.

There is no need again to stress the grave evils of slave-raiding and kidnapping and trading, described above. The continuance of these atrocious activities, carried on with little check and in the absence of administration, cries aloud for intervention. It is thought by some that criticism might discourage the Emperor and his few helpers, and also that he might be led to some action which is premature and dangerous. But on the other hand the Emperor is a man of great caution and since 1930 of great power. He has shown, by promising to end slavery in fifteen years, that he is not afraid of rapid action. The argument that because Abyss-

sinians are ignorant of the world and would violently resist reform, they must be given a free hand, cannot govern the situation.

Although the Emperor has not had time to make good his reforms since his latest utterance, it would be a mistake to withhold criticism, or remove the influence of publicity, to which Ethiopians are very sensitive. Especially does the fear of losing position in the League weigh with them. Silence is to be deprecated, because though criticism may seem premature, the League Committee may be of short duration. Encouragement of the Emperor would not be undermined, but assisted, by a criticism which both expresses sympathy with him in his work against opposing forces, and lays the blame on factors which have been till now beyond his control. Probably the Emperor himself would regret a cessation of reasoned criticism. When he is charged by reactionary Ethiopians with being too favourable to foreigners, he needs to be able to point to the necessity of satisfying foreign opinion. The League offers an exceptional weapon because it is a fact that it was the reactionaries and the late Empress who advocated entering the League, so that the advocates of slavery are also the most anxious to retain the League's favour. There is another argument for inducing the maximum speed in the fact that the Arabian slave market, now depressed by world conditions and the impoverishment of Arabian buyers, may recover, so as to increase the export of slaves from Abyssinia. There is a special reason for losing no time in the fact that the Emperor's activity offers an abnormal opportunity. If it were to be relaxed there would be little means of reform, and slavery might remain so long as Abyssinia was an independent state.

Even if cruelty to slaves were uncommon, the moral evil of slavery would remain. Witnesses agree that the slave loses a moral sense. The slaves are reduced to a low, irresponsible type which educators and missionaries find deplorably lacking in self-control, yet they are of a type which in Africa generally has shown educational capacity. While sympathising with the Abyssinians we may well ask what these particular black tribes have done that they alone should be left outside the opportunity for a better life which has in our day been conferred on the African in general. Essentially the difficulties are no greater than those with which Lord Lugard had to contend in West Africa. After all we must remember that it is fifty years since General Gordon declared that the end of African slavery was at hand.

NOEL-BUXTON.

NEW LIGHT ON THE AGADIR CRISIS.

THIS large and satisfying volume of over nine hundred pages covers the years 1907-11.* The subject-matter is Morocco as it influenced the relations of Great Britain, France, Spain and Germany. The number of documents is very large, so that the subject-matter comes out in very great detail. Some facts, hitherto unknown to the public, are brought to light; and there is material for amending the previous judgments of historians, if not for forming new judgments. As in previous volumes, the Editors supply helpful notes, and indeed more liberally in this volume than the others. The Editors do not express themselves on questions of policy; in their notes they merely supply relevant facts and references. The only criticism that a reader may be inclined to make of this volume is that perhaps he could have done with a few less documents. A considerable number of documents largely repeat each other; or again, an incident like that of the bombardment of Casablanca in 1907 is given greater space (twenty pages, twenty-five documents) than is necessary for its understanding.

The first section deals with a subject about which hitherto very little has been known, the efforts made by the British, French and Spanish to negotiate among themselves a security pact covering their insular and maritime possessions in the Mediterranean. The reason for making this agreement was that Great Britain felt some anxiety for the security of Gibraltar, threatened owing to the increasing power and range of modern artillery available for Spain. On the French side (and also on the British) there was anxiety concerning the possible designs of the German Government for obtaining a naval coaling station on the Balearic Islands. Negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish Guarantee Treaty had taken place, ineffectively, in 1898. They were taken up again in 1905, and in May 1907, in an exchange of notes between Great Britain and Spain. These notes were communicated to the other Powers and caused irritation at the German Foreign Office and surprise at the Austrian. Herr von Mühlberg, who was acting head of the German Foreign Office, said that the agreement was being talked of as a new Triple Alliance (that is, Spain and the Anglo-French Entente). Baron Aehrenthal at Vienna said that the agreement must be directed against somebody: "If one closes one's door, it is in order to keep someone out" (pp. 43, 50). Germany's feeling of isolation was increased, and her unfortunate dependence on the Austrian alliance strengthened.

* *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*. Edited by Dr. G. P. Gooch and Dr. Harold Temperley, with the assistance of Dr. Lillian Pearson. Volume VII. *The Agadir Crisis*, 1932.

The German Government was not merely feeling isolated, but encircled; that is to say, it believed that the Entente between Great Britain and France was becoming practically an alliance. The previous Volume III, called *The Testing of the Entente*, has already done much to show how far this belief was justified. The present helps further to make less vague the condition of the Entente, which, it will be remembered, only bound England to afford France diplomatic support, and only over Morocco questions. In May 1907 Great Britain, France and Spain had made the "Mediterranean Agreement" by Exchange of Notes for maintaining the *status quo*, and thereby somewhat alarmed or irritated Germany. M. Cambon thought it worth while asking Sir Edward Grey: "Whether, if Germany brought pressure to bear upon France or Spain in consequence of the Spanish Notes, English support would be forthcoming?" Grey's reply was: "The regions affected by these Notes were very near to Morocco, and I should regard the spirit of the Agreement of 1904 as applying to the provisions of these Notes, and the same support would be forthcoming as we had given in connection with the 1904 Agreement" (No. 50, p. 38). In 1908, during the Casablanca Deserters' Incident, the French Government asked, through Sir Francis Bertie, whether France could count on British support "in resisting the unjustifiable demands of the German Government." The request obviously contemplated, in certain eventualities, military support. Grey minuted on Bertie's dispatch: "The line, if the question becomes acute, will have to be decided by the Cabinet" (November 5th, 1908, p. 118). This reply or comment, which was presumably conveyed to the French Government by Bertie, would not, according to the normal interpretations of diplomatic language, be considered as discouraging.

Two years later Grey was asked in the House of Commons whether there existed any understanding, expressed or implied, in virtue of which Great Britain would be under obligations to France to send troops, in certain eventualities, to assist the operations of the French Army. Grey replied: "The extent of the obligation to which Great Britain was committed was that expressed or implied in the Anglo-French Convention laid before Parliament. There was no other agreement bearing on the subject." M. Cruppi, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, complained to Sir Francis Bertie that Grey's statement was regrettably positive: "He would have preferred that there should have been a suspicion that an understanding did exist for possible eventualities." M. Cruppi "knew what had passed between the Departments of the two Governments, for he had seen the *dossier*." Grey thereupon sent this message to Bertie: "I purposely worded the answer so as not to convey that the engagement of 1904 might not under certain circumstances be

construed to have larger consequences than its strict letter." The letter or dispatch in which Grey made this declaration was marked private, but presumably the statement was only made in order that Bertie should unofficially pass it on to M. Cruppi, and Bertie's next dispatch (No. 207, April 13th, 1911) proves that he did so. Moreover, the persistent and powerful Senior Clerk in the Foreign Office, Mr. E. A. Crowe (afterwards Sir Eyre Crowe, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) minuted on Bertie's report: "The French suggestion that some closer agreement, in whatever form, between England and France, respecting the eventuality of an armed conflict with Germany, is desirable, deserves the most careful consideration."

Closely inspected, the documents make somewhat painful reading. They show the Act of Algeciras, which was based on the principle of the integrity of Morocco, being gradually superseded by a *de facto* French protectorate. This was obvious to every Government, not merely to the German, when France declared her intention of occupying Fez with troops. "We are already skating on very thin ice," wrote Grey to Bertie on June 1st, 1911, "in maintaining that the Act of Algeciras is not affected by all that has happened" (p. 277). Such was the condition of affairs when disorders at Fez, which was outside the French zone, induced the French Government to send a relief expedition; this had actually arrived at Fez on May 21st, 1911. It remained long enough to restore order. By the first days of July it had evacuated Fez. The French expedition to the Moorish capital was an alteration of the *status quo* in Morocco, and was therefore a breach of the Algeciras Act. It looked as if France were determined to establish a Protectorate over Morocco; and, in point of fact, this suspicion was probably justified, although the French Government had frequently disavowed any intention of taking over Morocco as a Protectorate. The German Government acknowledged that its interests in Morocco were only economic, and that France had political interests there; but if France established a Protectorate, she would be sure to take measures to exclude the commerce of other Powers. The German Government was therefore justified in taking steps to secure its rights under the "open door" provisions of the Act of Algeciras. As a kind of public advertisement or notice of this point of view, the sending of the gunboat *Panther* to Agadir (July 1st) was not unreasonable.

At this point, however, German policy deviated on to what seems to be an unwarranted line. Instead of simply demanding that the Act of Algeciras be recognised and enforced, it demanded compensation for itself outside Morocco for France's extension of her rights inside Morocco. As soon as a prospect arose of obtaining a

piece of the French Congo, the German Government simply dropped the Act of Algeciras which had internationalised Morocco; and the fate of Morocco became a matter of a private negotiation between France and Germany.

The French Government does not appear to have taken the German *démarche* at Agadir tragically. France had made a convenient Agreement about Morocco with Germany in 1909, when Germany recognised France's predominant political interests there. Having gone somewhat beyond the intention of this Agreement by the expedition to Fez, the French Government was prepared to make another "deal" with Germany, to give compensation. Sir Edward Grey seems not to have been averse even to Germany obtaining a commercial port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco; Sir Arthur Wilson, First Sea Lord, when consulted by Grey, "regarded it with equanimity" (No. 375, p. 358). But Sir Eyre Crowe, whose anti-German minutes became stronger and stronger, would have none of it. "Germany may now be counted upon to continue her well-tryed policy of blackmailing. For the present France is the victim. . . . Nothing will stop this process except a firm resolve, and the strength, to refuse and, if necessary, to fight over it. This is the real lesson, not only for France, but also for us" (p. 349, July 12th, 1911). A week later he is minuting: "Germany is playing for the highest stakes. If her demands are acceded to either on the Congo or in Morocco, or—what she will, I believe, try for—in both regions, it will mean definitely the subjection of France. . . . This is a trial of strength, if anything. Concession means not loss of interests or loss of prestige. It means defeat, with all its inevitable consequences. The defeat of France is a matter vital to this country. Therefore it will be of little use for His Majesty's Government to consider in detail the particular conditions which might or might not be put up with, before deciding the larger and dominant question whether England is prepared to fight by the side of France if necessary" (p. 372). Will any person *now*, in the light of the experience of the last fifteen years, hold that the issue at stake in 1911 at Agadir would really have been worth a world war? Crowe and some other civilians apparently thought so. The Admiralty, on the other hand, when informed that Germany seemed to be hankering after a port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, "regarded it with equanimity." Which was the better judge—Crowe or Admiral Wilson? Anyhow, Crowe's view won.

At first Grey was only half-persuaded, though he seems to have faced the possibility of war quite steadily. On June 19th he wrote to Bertie, Ambassador at Paris: "His Majesty's Government do not consider it vital to their interests to exclude Germany from getting any foothold in Morocco, provided satisfactory condi-

tions are obtained from her. They cannot therefore make any admission of Germany into Morocco a *casus belli* unconditionally, though they could not suggest it or deal with it except in concert with France, and on conditions satisfactory to France" (p. 376). Next day he wrote: "Great Britain can no doubt turn Germany out of Agadir by force, but we should be able to make a deal with her about it, and it is not worth our while to fight her unless she was unwilling to deal." Another way to get Germany out of Agadir would be "a Conference demanding a strict return to the *status quo* of the Algeciras Act" (p. 382). Obviously Grey felt that neither Morocco nor a slice of the French Congo was worth a world war; and besides, he wrote to Bertie, "if one looks at the map of Africa and considers the large amount coloured British and coloured French," the German desire for something was not wholly unreasonable. Nevertheless, *next day* the war-challenge of Great Britain to Germany went forth.

The circumstances which produced this extraordinary passage in the speech of Mr. Lloyd George at the Mansion House on July 21st are surely without parallel in diplomatic history. The Agadir question was, as far as all the documents show, developing quite normally. Grey had given it as his opinion that Germany had a reasonable claim to call attention to her rights in Morocco or even to her expectations in Africa; he had also said that the question was not worth a war. The Admiralty was quite tranquil. The Foreign Office was in charge of the negotiations and, in spite of Crowe's bellicose minutes, was dealing with the matter calmly and without hurry. Even the French, who were the only people directly threatened, were behaving with complete sang-froid. Suddenly (according to Grey's account), on July 21st, Mr. Lloyd George came over to the Foreign Office and asked if a reply had been received to the communication made to Germany on behalf of the Cabinet on July 4th. This communication, printed in these Documents, was a statement given by Grey in a conversation with Metternich, the German Ambassador; the statement was that the British Government could not be disinterested in regard to Morocco, both on account of its own interests, and of its treaty obligations towards France. The statement did not call for any answer; it was just a declaration of policy. It could not even be formally acknowledged by the German Government, for Grey appears to have sent no Note, but passed on the statement in his conversation with Metternich. There was, therefore, nothing to alarm the Cabinet in the fact that no reply came; and if any members who arranged with Mr. Lloyd George for his intervention were determined to have an answer, it would have been the simplest thing in the world for Grey to ask Count Metternich to come and see him so that an

exchange of views could take place; or the British Ambassador at Berlin could have waited on Kiderlen-Waechter for a verbal communication; or the Foreign Office could have sent a Note to the Wilhelmstrasse with a request for an answer. As a matter of fact, Grey did see Metternich on July 21st, and said that he had no formal communication to make, but Germany must not regard the British Government's silence as implying disinterestedness in the Morocco question. Metternich knew quite well what this meant, but no offence could be taken. Threats directed to a Great Power *never pay*; and even the admonitions, expressed in suave language, which Foreign Offices allow themselves to send to another Government, are always delivered in private. That the Chancellor of the Exchequer should, while the resources of diplomacy had still hardly been tapped, stand up at a great civic banquet and make a declaration which appeared deliberately and publicly to offer war to a Great Power, seems to show chaos in the British policy. Grey's comment in *Twenty-Five Years* is: "The speech was entirely Lloyd George's own idea. I did nothing to instigate it, but I welcomed it"; and "*I consider that there was nothing in the words Germany could fairly resent.*" The particular passage of the speech, stating the price at which peace would be "a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure," is printed on page 391.

The German Government expressed regret, but privately, that the British Government, if it had any wishes to put forward, had not transmitted them through the usual diplomatic channel; and further that such a public declaration on the part of the Chancellor of the Exchequer could not be expected to facilitate the negotiations between Germany and France. Grey could only answer rather weakly that: "It had not been intended by anything that had been said or would be said to embroil Germany's negotiations with France" (p. 399). Surely it ought not to have been necessary for the British Government to defend its *bona fides* in this way. Naturally nobody would intentionally try to spoil peaceful negotiations between two Governments. Jules Cambon at Berlin was "rather aghast at the effect which Mr. Lloyd George's speech has had on the French Colonial Chauvinists" (p. 413). Kiderlen also was justified in pointing out that the speech, which all the world understood to be directed against Germany, made it impossible, for the time being at any rate, for Germany to abate her original demands to France (p. 410, No. 429).

The Franco-German negotiations certainly went on very slowly. It is perfectly clear that the speech of Mr. Lloyd George did not quicken them in the very least; but Germany felt herself now definitely antagonised. Count Metternich said to Sir Arthur Nicolson that "since 1900 Germany had always found England in her way"

(p. 482). Nicolson, naturally, denied this. Great Britain had not altered her policy, but: "since 1900 we had settled our differences with both France and Russia, and the course of events had insensibly led to a fresh grouping of the Powers destined to maintain the equilibrium and peace" (p. 456). The international situation, however, in the late summer of 1911, was serious not merely because the Powers were divided into two groups, but because the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was, as it seems, prepared to fight if the Franco-German negotiations came to a deadlock, and if Germany refused a Conference:

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. Paris, September 8th, 1911: It is essential that before war comes (if it does come) it should be clear that Germany has meant war and has forced it: unless that is so, I could not be sure of what the course of public opinion here would be, and if the Government has to take a decision for war, it must have the strongest possible case to put before Parliament.

With this object, I stipulated that a Conference should be proposed if the negotiations between France and Germany come to a deadlock. If Germany accepts, war is one remove further off; if she refuses, she appears as the person who prefers war.

The German Government, the responsible organ of a Great Power, naturally took some time to get over the effect of Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech, which obviously made any sort of concession or compromise on the part of Germany very difficult. At last, however, the conversations of Kiderlen-Waechter and Jules Cambon arrived at an agreement which both the German and French Government believed to be such as their public opinion would accept. This agreement was registered in the two well-known Conventions of November 4th, 1911. By one Germany recognised France's right to establish a Protectorate in Morocco (subject to commercial equality). By the other France ceded to Germany a large portion of the French Congo.

The general impression left on the mind of historians and of the interested public by a perusal of the Morocco volumes of the *British Documents* will probably be that in 1905-6 (incident of Tangier and Algeiras) German diplomacy was inclined to be truculent and nervous, but that in 1911 (Agadir) German diplomacy and statesmanship compare favourably with Entente policy; and that the attitude of the British Government accentuated the unfortunate German feeling of isolation. In the following year, however, Sir Edward Grey and Bethmann-Hollweg inaugurated a series of conversations which, though a failure in 1912, led to important agreements in the first six months of 1914, agreements which, but for the Sarajevo tragedy, might have prevented the World War. The volumes of *British Documents* dealing with the years 1912-13 will be eagerly expected.

R. B. MOWAT.

SEEING LIFE WHOLE.

THE history of biology in certain ways resembles the development of a living creature. From vague and indifferent beginnings it has grown through successive periods of differentiation coupled with an increasing measure of integration towards a gradually cohering whole: and like the developing organism in its riper stages, so biology now advancing to a fuller maturity shows plainly the imprint of its past. Materialistic and spiritualistic theories of the Universe have alternated in rhythmical succession down the ages. Both have re-echoed and at times reverberated into all the pathways of human thought. Biology has been deeply impressed by each of these world outlooks. In fact it may be said to have progressed on an undercurrent of opposing ideas, vitalistic and mechanistic. Up to now this has been a decided advantage, since it has tended towards a clarifying of issues peculiarly important in a science which deals with the phenomena of life.

A prevalent form of biomechanism holds that the admittedly abstract concepts of physical science are sufficient for a scientific description of living organisms, and leaves mind out of the picture; thus splitting up biology into a physics and a psychology, and leaving the psychology, as Mr. E. S. Russell remarks, "to the philosopher, together with the difficult or insoluble task of reconciling the two." Opposed to this attitude are various forms of modernised or neo-vitalism. The "methodological" vitalist, whose position is assuredly less difficult philosophically, remembering Plato's injunction that the true lover of science shall be interested in the whole of his subject, finds a large and important residuum of facts clearly outwith the reach of the biomechanists' weapons. He therefore insists that new and distinctively biological concepts be sought which shall so far, at any rate, bring under formulation what is at present beyond the powers or the province of the other. When his colleague and opponent points out that the future may have much in store in the way of perfected biomechanical descriptions, he retorts fairly that assets cannot be made out of possibilities and that the balance sheet of the scientific firm must be made up as its affairs stand at the time.

The comprehensiveness of biology, which seeks to describe the nature, continuance and evolution of living organisms, has been somewhat obscured lately by a post-Darwinian period of differentiation into specialisms as well as by the attractiveness of modern physiology, which began in reaction against a crude vitalism and settled to work using mechanical concepts of proved utility, such as have led to brilliant results in its particular field. Yet

although notable advances have been made in various directions the progress of biology as a whole has been uneven and the front is decidedly irregular. The lag is very noticeable, for example, in ecology—the branch of modern biology which deals with organisms at large in their environment—whose meagre attainments despite the fine example of Darwin himself have already been strained to the full by the increasing demands of economic biologists all over the world, whose significant problems are fundamentally ecological. In contrast, the progress of the last thirty years in cell physics and cell chemistry; in genetics; and in knowledge of the action and interplay of hormones and of the mechanism of nervous control is most impressive. These successes, however, have brought with them the danger of an indifference to or at least a loss of contact with other branches of biology. For example, a London reviewer in 1928 damned with faint praise a since highly recognised work on ecology by Mr. Elton, referring to the subject as “this very easy and rather ancient side of natural history”: a self-revealing criticism. In general the basic principles of biology have in recent years shown a tendency to slip out of sight or become confused owing to a lack of adequate contributions from all sides of the subject. Several years ago Mr. J. T. Cunningham complained that “little connection can be recognised in the expositions of some of the younger and more talented biologists between the views of heredity and evolution which they teach and some of the phenomena on which they have themselves carried out important researches.” Biology in short seems to be in a late phase of one of those so-called transition periods recurrent in every branch of knowledge, from which a science emerges purified afresh. Physical science is in like case. After the discussion on the Evolution of the Universe at the British Association meeting in September last a writer in *Nature* drew attention to the significant fact that the various speakers “not only had no common starting-point, but also made no attempt to find one”; and went on to point out “the urgent need of defining what actually is the basis of modern physical theory.”

Sir J. Arthur Thomson and Sir Patrick Geddes have therefore done a timely service to biology in their recent book *Life: Outlines of General Biology*.^{*} It is an integrative attempt—the only one in this country within recent years—to set the whole biological house in order; and in it keen thinking and a deep appreciation of the grandeur of Life combine to a notable degree. The style and treatment of the book make it possible for the general reader to share

^{*} Williams & Norgate, London, 1931. 2 Vols., pp. 1,552; 202 illustrations; frontispiece; end-papers. 3 gns. net. Since this was written, the regretted death of Sir Patrick Geddes, on April 17th ult., has to be recorded.

with the more biologically-minded its sifting and clear singling out of the fundamental principles of biology, the careful and critical survey of biological achievement and the contributions of the writers towards the straightening out or solution of some of biology's most difficult problems. The book is comprehensive, suggestive and stimulating, and in its treatment of the wider aspects of biology suffused with a deep humanism: a work Aristotelian in range and in spirit.

The perennial question “What is Life?” remains unanswered, “and it is *possible* that the nature of life lies outside the realm of the knowable.” Then comes a timely reminder that a better understanding of life depends on a further knowledge of living creatures, more biological facts. On this commonplace depends the progress of biology, and in order to avoid a false simplicity it is “a comprehensive all-round and intimate view of organisms” that must be sought. We know life only in living organisms, the biologist must therefore seek to envisage *living*. Underlying the views expounded by the authors of *Life* is the most fundamental generalisation biology has reached: that living organisms act on their surroundings and are acted on by them. The organism functions on its environment and the environment functions on the organism, continuously. “In condensed formulation living is an ever changing ratio between *O.f.e.* and *E.f.o.*” This might well be christened the First Law of Animate Nature. After contemplating it in operation for over half a century Professors Thomson and Geddes, the one a firm neo-Darwinian, the other a neo-Lamarckian, have converged to a position of methodological vitalism. “It is a waste of time and wits,” they argue, “to continue to pit against one another the mechanistic and vitalistic descriptions of living creatures, as if one must choose between them.” They differ however from Smuts, who would discard both mechanism and vitalism as mischievous survivals, for they maintain firmly that both are legitimate and *both are necessary for clearness*. Thus methodological vitalism is the only tenable position for the biologist who will face all the facts and endeavour to see life whole.

“Mechanistic descriptions are indispensable, and we owe to the mechanists in particular a deeper understanding of the environmental factor in living (*E—f—o*). But at its best, at present, mechanistic formulation is far from giving us an adequate account of the life of organisms. Vitalistic descriptions are also indispensable, for whether the organism has an entelechy at heart or whether it is one of a long series of ‘syntheses,’ or ‘integrates,’ or ‘wholes,’ its life cannot be adequately described in terms of mechanism. The vitalists have done good service in emphasising the organismal factor in living (*O—f—e*), and also, of course, the

functioning factor, for life is *par excellence* activity. . . . But the scientific inquirer is not fond of 'principles' or 'entelechies,' and he dreads 'vital forces' in disguise." In short, methodological vitalism declares that neo-mechanism does not cover the biological facts. Biology has need, therefore, in order to describe vital phenomena, of its own distinctive concepts which are at present irreducible to chemistry and physics.

Life is *par excellence* activity: so Professors Thomson and Geddes approach their problem by an illustrative exposition of what ecology and physiology have to say. These two divisions of biology deal the one with organisms actually living their lives in Nature, the other with the functioning of the organism as elucidated in the laboratory. Ecology views organisms as active wholes and founds on the patent fact that in Nature living organisms normally exist associated together or linked in varying degree in relationships which may be bodily or psychical, spatial or temporal; relationships which clearly affect their behaviour and may occasion it. There is, in the Darwinian phrase, a web of life. Ecology seeks to trace out the pattern of the web of life. This pattern is ever changing: in fact the one criticism that may be levelled at Darwin's vivid metaphor is that it is too static. In reality there is more of the kaleidoscope. It devolves upon the ecologist to observe the natural reactions of organisms to their changing environments both inorganic and animate, and to note the effects due to environmental factors acting on the organisms with the utmost precision. It may be pointed out in passing that the ecologist, so far from having an easy branch of biology to work at, has a far more difficult task than the specialist in a narrower biological field, thirled to a particular 'ology; since the methods and findings of a dozen specialisms may be drawn upon in sifting the diverse masses of data needful towards ecological ends.

The intricacy of living in Nature has got to be squarely faced. The manifold relations 'twixt organism and environment in the great haunts of life, pelagic, abysmal, littoral, freshwater, terrestrial and aerial, form, therefore, an assemblage of facts of profound importance in a biology which seeks to see life whole. This must be insisted on, as a cardinal point. To omit or ignore what does not lend itself to investigation in a laboratory is a bad habit which biology would do well to be rid of and the sooner the better. For a long time a seeming reluctance to study the living animal at large has militated against a fuller all-round biology and, moreover, has been a leading impediment in the way of supplying the increasing demand for economic biologists both at home and in the colonies. Honours graduates leave their training schools mostly devoid of any ability to undertake field investigations or even take the first steps

in biological research where living animals are concerned. It has been left to the needs of the Empire at large to demonstrate that the usual biological training hitherto available has been singularly ill-contrived. It has only too frequently proved inadequate for productive research in the "new natural history." When due heed is paid, then, to the phenomena embraced by such titles as life histories; adaptation; natural variability; natural selection; sex-behaviour; the quest for food; societary relationships; numbers; distribution; dispersal; migration; natural rhythms; symbiosis, parasitism and other inter-relationships, an immensely fuller idea of life in being is obtained. For the biologist such facts help to envisage living.

When the gains of ecology are placed alongside those of physiology and other laboratory studies of the organism's functioning, against an evolutionary background, it becomes a task for the discerning biologist to sift out from it all the fundamental characteristics of life as evidenced in the living organism. Professors Thomson and Geddes, in essaying this, point first to what may be shortly termed the "regulative" activities of the organism. Organic regulation is shown in the persisting intactness or integrity of organisms despite ceaseless chemical and physical changes in their living substance: in growth—"essentially a regulated increase in the amount of adjustment of living matter": in reproduction or multiplication—discontinuous growth as Haeckel termed it. Organic regulation is seen in an all-round way in development, the progressive attainment of full-grown complexity from relatively undifferentiated simplicity. This is not confined to the familiar production of buds and outgrowths and the drama of the developing egg, but enters into a wide range of organic phenomena: is discernible even in the organism's fundamental self-preservative metabolism, in the self-repair of worn or damaged tissues, the mending of wounds and the regeneration of lost parts.

If it be upheld that to speak of *organic* regulation seems to decide the issue whatever the future of physico-chemical investigation, what answer can be made save that the term is convenient for stating how things are at present, without prejudice to further physiological research? Speaking on the biochemistry of the living cell Professor J. B. S. Haldane said recently: "Even when we know the stages in the oxidation of different substances, and the use to which the energy thus made available is put we shall be faced with the problem of regulation." Professor Haldane, however, showed the physiologist's attitude when he went on to say: "In the living cell the activity of peroxidase or lactic dehydrogenase is doubtless governed by laws as definite as those which govern that of the heart in the living organism, laws which can be stated

both in terms of chemistry and of biological function. The question of whether these two types of explanation can be reconciled, or whether one of them is superfluous will then have to be fought out." The future will show.

Other characteristics of the living organism may be broadly summed up as "behaviouristic" activities. First, the capacity for enregistration in various forms. The living organism's reactions to stimuli are determined "not only by its innate constitution but also by the accumulated experience of the whole and of the parts during the individual lifetime." Somehow or other enregistration of the past is characteristic of life. Past experience racial and individual lives on into the present, enduring in the sense of Bergson's "*durée*." The organism is a historic being. In the words of Jennings, "We know as solidly as we know anything in physiology that the history of an organism does modify it and its actions—in ways not thoroughly understood doubtless, yet none the less real."

This general capacity for enregistration underlies such phenomena as instinctive behaviour (at different levels); tropisms or obligatory movements; engrained rhythms; as well as reflex actions simple and complex. It is perhaps most puzzling when manifested in very simple animals far down the scale: as when in a sea anemone individual tentacles, tested in succession with crab's flesh and faked food in the shape of bits of filter paper, after two to five days come definitely to reject the latter. Secondly, variability. It is a marked characteristic of the living organism to give rise to the distinctively new: to variations small or great, quantitative or qualitative, which run the gauntlet of heredity and natural selection, helped maybe by various forms of isolation. Thus the organism may and does evolve actively. The origination of these variations remains a perplexing difficulty, but it is noteworthy that the organism in its evolution is far from passive: on the contrary the insurgence of life is one of the most striking things in Nature. There is a "quality of irrepressibility and unconquerability" characteristic of living things generally, a doggedness and tenacity to be taken account of in our total conception of life, "as essential to the picture as the semi-permeability of the cell-membrane or any other fundamental fact of life structure." Thirdly, the living organism exhibits behaviour. In considering behaviour, which is in essence a chain of actions adjusted towards a particular result, we must frankly take count of the full range from the highest mammals whose behaviour cannot be described without using psychological terms, down through the various grades to amœbæ and the like. Taken all in all animal behaviour is purposive "and in the higher reaches purposeful." Only the concep-

tion of the organism as a psychophysical being will cover the facts, though particular instances of behaviour may, of course, be apsyche. Even if simple behaviour "seems to be adequately describable in neuromuscular terms it does not follow that the *origin* of the enregistered predispositions can be thus accounted for."

We are thus led to a view of the organism indissociable from a question of fundamental importance to biology. Is mind to be ignored or denied in a scientific description of living Nature, or is it not? Sir Arthur Thomson and Sir Patrick Geddes face the issue fairly, shirking nothing; and they have no hesitation as to the answer. A view of living organisms which leaves out mind is an abstracted or partial one. Whatever it may be labelled it is not a biology. They boldly proclaim "the untenability of a Biology which denies that Mind counts." Some of the keenest thinking and cogent argument in the book are to be found in discussions of the mental aspect of animals. The authors are less concerned with academic arguments on the relation of mind and body than to show that concepts frankly recognising psychical qualities in the organism are indispensable for an adequate description of living creatures, when all the facts are surveyed. While they recognise the value of certain aspects of the work of the behaviourist school, Thomson and Geddes openly join issue with those who hold that mind is to be counted out of animal behaviour. Since no scientific test for mind exists, their argument is analogical, based on systematic observation and experiment, and finally on common sense. With a telling simplicity they conclude "We can only argue that the description of the animal's behaviour in a particular case is not good sense if we leave 'mind' out." That mind does play a part in the natural life of animals is a hypothesis that works and works well. It does not, of course, sanction the elementary error of reading the man into the beast. The study, moreover, of the higher animals at least demands the concept of purposive endeavour, verified consciously in ourselves. That such concepts do not grip in the plant world is not to say that they are irrelevant.

And so, holding firmly to the continuity of evolution they construct their convincing "Inclined plane of animal behaviour," reaching from the simple trial-and-error reactions of protozoa to the exhibition of indubitable intelligence in higher forms. They mediate discerningly, in a biopsychological view of the actions of living creatures, between the extreme behaviourists on the one hand and the extremest anthropomorphists on the other; illustrating from a wide range of facts. The discussions centring round the much-abused word "instinct" contribute greatly to clearness in regard to one of life's subtlest manifestations. Moreover the reflec-

tion that "perhaps the largest fact of Organic Evolution is just the gradually growing freedom of mind" is one of profound importance for biology and philosophy alike.

Both Sir Patrick Geddes and Sir Arthur Thomson have long been known for their active interest in human affairs, especially civic and educational affairs. So it was to be expected that they should extend the outline of biology to include the highest of organisms—man. Man, however, is more than an organism, he is a social person, and the science of societies—a science slowly and rather fitfully developing—is sociology. While man's social distinctiveness cannot be too clearly recognised it has equally to be remembered that humanity is grounded in the pre-human. Thus the relations between biology and sociology are of very great importance. It must be said, regretfully, that hitherto an exact appreciation of them is only too rare on the part of our social reformers, a state of affairs vaguely sensed perhaps by the public at large.

The central position of biology in the scientific "universe of discourse" is an important point. Just as the mathematical and physical sciences are contributory to, but not all sufficient for biology, so biology has its contribution to make to psychology and sociology. The great danger, and there is almost daily evidence of it in the pronouncements of many of our well-meaning but uninstructed counsellors, is that sociological advance may be hampered by "biologisms." Biologisms result from a too easy transference of biological formulae to human social relations: a confusion of thought that treats man's affairs merely as a problem in the natural history of mammals, or betrays itself in the false simplicity which calls mankind a "herd" or a "human hive," forgetting that human society differs deeply from both.

Shortly put, the biological contribution is to lay emphasis initially on the threefold aspect of life; on the organism-function-environment relation already referred to. Secondly, on the need for constantly bearing in mind that the organism, human as well as other, is a unity, a psychophysical unity. The physiological or the psychological aspect may predominate in any particular set of circumstances, but they are never wholly dissociable. In addition biology has much to say on heredity, on variations and on the problems of selection. The biologist is thus in a position to give great help in human affairs, where man must take much more count of his words on many if not most of the big problems of both social and individual living if he is to merit "his self-chosen title of *homo sapiens*," as Dr. Inge has it. There is an applied biology not only for man's comfort, in the way of gain or of well-being, but also towards man's true civilisation.

As particular instances of the value of biological counsel atten-

tion may be drawn to the discussion in the later pages of *Life* of such topics as health, population, war and its ravages, the pros and cons of eugenics and of birth control, sex instruction, and education. The authors make a strong plea for an evolutionary outlook on education. They regard education from a biopsychological viewpoint and submit a valuable constructive criticism. Modern education they see as a dismal though noble failure: "We see millions of young people leaving school and thousands leaving college without any grip of the history of their race, without live knowledge of the world in which they are going to live and without even an elementary realisation of the laws of health and happiness." This is sadly true. Equally telling is the remark that: "It is not a little strange seeing that all education seeks and claims to be 'a preparation for life,' that educationists—parents, teachers and public authorities alike—should so commonly leave the study of Life out of account in their teaching." Happily the value of biological study in school curricula is now being recognised more and more by the best type of headmaster, in English schools at least. A progressive development that contrasts sharply with the meagre part that biology plays in the oft-lauded Scottish school education.

From a general standpoint there is great value in a sufficient understanding of the relations which the various branches of human knowledge bear to one another. Many attempts in the past have been made to map out the general field from Bacon onwards. Those of Comte, Spencer, Bain, Huxley and Pearson come to mind. That such *schemata* have a practical value as aids to clear thinking has been inadequately recognised in science, and Professors Thomson and Geddes are fully aware of this. A desire to show precisely the position of biology in the larger field of science in general leads them to a formulation of the intricate cross-relationships between the mathematical, physical, biological, psychological and sociological sciences in a luminous way which emphasises indirectly the value of the biological approach. Further, a reasoned and logical grouping of the many subdivisions within the realm of biology itself is of great assistance to the younger generation of biologists. Equally in sociology a similar analysis, with summaries in graphic form, which rises adventurously at times to a very *ethica more geometrico demonstrata*, reveals much of profound value not only to the sociologist as such but to all who take part in social developments national or municipal.

The evolutionary biologist has a further contribution to make to sociology and philosophy. In addition to offering biological advice to the sociologist he may essay actively to help him, using

his own tools. Living goes on in the sociological field as in the biological. So for organism—function—environment, may be substituted their human equivalents: *the people: the work: the place*—the “*Famille, Travail, Lieu*” of Le Play. Orientating the vast and multifarious data of sociology: ethnology, history, archæology, economics, geography and more, with reference to these three co-ordinates, is a task for genius, but it discloses relationships which enable the biologically-trained evolutionist to construct an outline of the evolution of humanity, of man as a social organism. A theory of social evolution, integrated with organic evolution into a unified “Theory of Life in Evolution” constitutes a remarkable chapter of *Life*. It is a *tour de force*, rich in luminous ideas; capable of expansion to a volume rather than a chapter, capable too of some clarification in presentment. It is safe to say, however, that it or something like it will form the framework of the sociology of the future.

The question must clearly be faced: Is biology an exact science in the full sense? No, at present it is not. The rejoinder implies nothing derogatory to the status of biology in its present stage of growth; and moreover it is at least an open question as to whether the particular methods which lead to the closed circle of physical science can ever do more than give a partial description of the order of facts with which biology deals. The recent impasse in physics seems to indicate that even there the fixed rules will not after all suffice for the ultimate moves of the game. That what we call “life” does represent a different order of fact is nowadays admitted by all save a few materialistic biomechanists who may be left to carry on in their self-chosen, ostrich-like position. Even now biological concepts are indispensable where the organism as a whole is concerned: concepts which in the future may be further refined, replaced if necessary, or even in some measure reduced to physical terms. If for scientific description chemical embryology can alter the notion of the organism as an historic being, well and good. If further physiological research can give concreteness to the idea of the organism as a psychophysical entity, well and good—for scientific description. Biology will be the gainer, for the distinctively biological will but appear in clearer view. In the meantime the methodological vitalism of Thomson and Geddes offers a fruitful working point for the student of *Life* who strives to see it whole and approaches his subject in the spirit of the greater naturalists.

R. M. NEILL.

THE BEGINNINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATION IN BELGIUM.

THE Belgian Chamber has recently passed, by a very large majority, a Bill on the use in the administration of “the two national languages,” French and Dutch, which means an important step in the emancipation of the Flemish people.

Belgium is inhabited by two races, the Walloons and the Flemings, speaking French and Dutch respectively. (The language of the Flemings is generally called Flemish, but the official description used, for instance, in the new Bill, is “Nederlandsch” or “néerlandais.”) The races do not mingle, but are divided by a clear-cut linguistic boundary running from east to west. The provinces of Hainaut, Namur, Liège, Luxemburg and the Nivelles district of Brabant are Walloon; the provinces of West and East Flanders, Antwerp, Limburg, and the remainder of Brabant are Flemish. There is only one place where there is now a really mixed population, Brussels. The problem was created very largely by the twenty years’ annexation of Belgium to the French Republic and Empire (1794-1814). It was then that the old provincial autonomy was swept away and the whole country subjected to a centralised bureaucratic system which recognised no other language but French; it was then that the leading class of Flanders was gallicised to the extent of using French for all the purposes of intellectual, professional and public life. Flemish, the only language known to the large majority of the Flemish people, sank to the level of a *patois*; its great literary traditions and its connection with the Dutch of Holland were forgotten. The Dutch régime (1814-30), by which the French annexation was followed, did something to reverse this tendency, but not enough, and the Kingdom of Belgium, among the founders of which Walloons predominated, started its career as a French-administered state. Not only the administration, but the law, the army, the higher grades of education ignored Dutch completely. The well-to-do classes in Flanders, the only classes with political power, found themselves happy with that system. The Flemish movement, which sprang up in opposition to it before the thirties were out, was a lower middle-class movement led by intellectuals. Its first important reforms were obtained in the seventies when Dutch was permitted to be used in criminal trials in Flanders at the wish of the prisoner, and in the eighties when Dutch was introduced as the medium of instruction for a few hours per week in secondary schools in Flanders. The advent of manhood suffrage in 1893 led to the renationalisation of local public life in Flanders, but the central bureaucracy, manned very largely by Walloons, even in official

positions in Flanders, resisted all efforts at more drastic reforms. Party loyalty (all Flemish politicians being associated with Walloons in the Catholic, Liberal, or Socialist parties), the influence of the French-educated leading class in Flanders, and the power of the central bureaucracy combined to paralyse the Flemish movement. It was this state of affairs which explains the emergence of Activism under the German occupation during the war. The Activists had to flee, or were imprisoned, when the Germans evacuated Belgium, but their ideas remained as a ferment in post-war Belgium. A Flemish Nationalist Party entered the Belgian Chamber and acted as a spur to the "Flamingant" members of the old parties. The Flemish Nationalists now occupy 11 seats out of a total of 111 seats for the Flemish region, of which 24 are in the Brussels *arrondissement* (there are 184 seats in all, 73 for the Walloon area). The solution advocated by the Flemish Nationalists is self-government for each of the two linguistic areas; a proposal for the revision of the Belgian Constitution in the sense of a Flemish-Walloon federation is at this moment awaiting discussion. The centralised, "Belgicist" system is the enemy to the Flemish Nationalists; to many of their followers, indeed, Belgium is the enemy, and virulent attacks are daily made on the parliamentary group for trying "to patch up Belgium" by means of the proposed federation.

Ever since the war the Flamingant leaders who held aloof from Activism have kept on warning the rulers of Brussels that unless far-reaching reforms were carried through without delay the Flemish people were bound to turn away from them and listen to the prophets of a new, thorough-going Flemish Nationalism. The principal men among these "Belgicist" Flamingants, who tried to work within the old Belgian parties and on the basis of the unitary Belgian Constitution, are M. Van Cauwelaert, the Catholic Burgomaster of Antwerp, and Mr. Huysmans, the Socialist, who some years ago was for a short period Minister of Education. The Belgian Liberal Party, a conservative party in all but name, has become the refuge of the "Fransquillon" privileged class in Flanders. The policy of reform by means of language laws has not been entirely without success. In 1921 M. Van Cauwelaert succeeded in carrying a measure for the "flemification" of the administration in Flanders, which he described at the time as "the greatest victory since 1830" and which, although it left many loopholes for evasion, of which liberal use was made, doubtless did bring about an important change in the century-old habits of officialdom. In 1925 a breach was made in the monopoly which the French language possessed in university education in Belgium: part of the lectures at Ghent were in future to be given

in Dutch; from before the war the Flemish movement had clamoured for a complete "flemification" of the University of Ghent and the compromise arrived at after stormy debates in Chamber and Senate caused it universal disappointment.

The gradual revelation of the impotence of the moderates had its inevitable result. In December 1928 the Flemish Nationalists, at a by-election in Antwerp, ran the candidature of Dr. Borms, one of the leading Activists during the war, who was at that moment still in prison. The reluctance of the anti-Flamingant block to grant an amnesty to Flemish Activists had invested them, and especially Dr. Borms, with a halo in the eyes of thousands of Flemings who had never approved of Activism, and Dr. Borms was elected by an overwhelming majority. He was not allowed to take his seat, but was released soon afterwards. The election of "the arch-traitor" made a profound impression at Brussels, and when after the general election of the following May the number of Flemish Nationalists jumped from six to eleven it was at last realised in leading Belgian circles that Flemish discontent must be cured if the very existence of the Belgian state was not to be endangered. The Jaspar Ministry, of which some Catholic Flamingants were members, gave the most emphatic promises of speedy reform so that the centenary celebrations of 1930 were got over without too many untoward incidents, and as an earnest of concessions to come the University of Ghent was at last completely "flemified." A Bill intended to remedy Flemish grievances in the army, which is, however, far from giving complete satisfaction, was also carried, Bills for the introduction of Dutch into the civil law courts and for the further degallicisation of elementary and secondary education are in preparation, and, as I began by saying, a Bill regulating the use of the languages in the administration has just been passed by the Chamber.

The debate, which was spread over several weeks, shows that enormous changes have taken place in Belgium during the last few years. The Bill was originally framed by the Jaspar Cabinet, but was drastically altered by the "Central Committee" representing various shades of opinion in the Chamber, which, according to Belgian parliamentary custom, reports on Bills before they are publicly discussed; as spokesman for the Central Committee M. Van Cauwelaert was chosen, and as the Renkin Government left the Chamber free it was he who was in charge of the measure. The important, and indeed unprecedented, feature of the debate was the large measure of Walloon support for a reform going far beyond the Bill of 1921 which at the time roused much more violent opposition. The fact is that the Walloons, alarmed by the growing power of the Flemish movement and above all anxious that

the purity of the French culture of their own part of the country should not be tampered with—the large numbers of Flemish working-class people settled in Wallonia might offer an opportunity to a Flemish parliamentary majority minded to attempt this—have discovered that the best way to safeguard themselves is to come to an understanding with the Flemings, over the head of Brussels, on the basis of mutual recognition of the “unilingual” character of both Flanders and Wallonia. The Administrative Statute is based on that principle, while “the Brussels conglomeration” is treated as a third, bilingual, area. This means that the Brussels problem is shelved, and in effect that Brussels is for the time being left to the gallicising régime of the dominant class. That is a very serious danger for Flanders itself, and sooner or later a renationalised Flanders will have to take cognisance of it. The Brussels problem may in a few years’ time wreck the prospects of a peaceful solution of the larger Flemish problem, but I shall not now devote any more attention to it. In the debate on the Administrative Statute an ominous note was struck whenever Brussels was discussed, but in the main the Flemings were content to accept the recognition by the Walloons of the unilingual character of the rest of the Flemish area. The result was a very marked lessening in the tension which used to accompany these language debates in the Belgian Chamber. It will no doubt facilitate the passing of the other reforms which, as mentioned above, are to complete the programme of redress of Flemish grievances.

It was in the Belgian Socialist party that this agreement between Flemings and Walloons was first reached some two years ago. Now most of the Walloon Catholics have also accepted it, and, in addition to a number of Walloon Liberals, it is only the few “Frans-quillon” members for Flemish constituencies (mainly Liberals) and a number of Brusselers who still fight this policy. Its real significance, of course, is that the Walloons—or at least the Walloon Socialists—have abandoned the French-speaking “minorities” in the large Flemish towns outside Brussels. M. Jules Mathieu, who represented the Socialist party on the Central Committee, said in the debate:

Those minorities are an anomaly. They have no social reality. They should not be there. We must not take any account of a minority which boasts of its ignorance of the language of the people among which, and by which, it lives.

Here M. Vandervelde interjected the remark that most of the members of that minority understand Flemish perfectly well, and M. Mathieu went on to quote the figures of the recruits who under the new army law every year choose the language in which they desire to be instructed. Of 6,449 recruits in the province of Ant-

werp 6,265 chose Dutch and 184 French, of 6,458 in the province of East Flanders (capital, Ghent) 6,190 chose Dutch and 268 French. Looking at those figures, said M. Mathieu bluntly, “I think that we used to be told a lot of nonsense about these minorities.”

The support given them by the Walloons constituted a large part of the strength of the denationalised minorities in Flanders for whose convenience the whole intellectual and public life of that region used to be distorted. The way is now clear for very important changes, and the moderate Flamings, who already see Belgium transformed peacefully into a state in which the Dutch-speaking population will enjoy equal rights with the French-speaking, are jubilant. It would be rash to take their self-congratulations at their face value. For one thing, M. Van Cauwelaert dominated the debate with his unrivalled parliamentary skill, but he is apt to overlook that he owes most of his influence to the fear inspired by the growth of Flemish Nationalism. The present successes are at least ten years overdue. It is doubtful whether the nationalist idea can still be eradicated from the minds of young intellectual Flanders. The plant of Flemish self-reliance seems by now sturdy enough to extract nourishment from reforms which might have killed it at an earlier stage of its development. The younger generation of Flemings, who are likely to dominate the political scene in the near future, want to be formally and completely masters in their own house, and it seems to me highly improbable that their desire can be gratified by any number of laws within the framework of the present unitary Constitution of Belgium. Nor can I see any reason to regret this fact from a wider European point of view. What is regrettable, rather, is the rigid insistence of official Belgian opinion—which is very French in this as in so many respects—that no solution on federal lines can possibly be admitted.

It is true that some signs of a weakening of this attitude may be noticed. The Socialists sometimes talk in a vague way of “decentralisation.” A leading Walloon Catholic wrote the other day: “In order to save Belgian unity I think that decentralisation must be carried far and regionalism be accentuated.” This opinion was quoted in the Chamber by one of the extreme “Wallonists,” who are but little behind the Flemish Nationalists in their advocacy of federalism. But these views are abhorrent to all the most influential statesmen of Belgium. In the debate on the Administrative Statute, for instance, both the present Prime Minister, M. Renkin, and his predecessor, M. Jaspar, uttered solemn warnings against the slightest advance in the direction of “administrative separation,” as it must infallibly lead to the break-up of the country. M. Van Cauwelaert and his friends echo these sentiments

—I shall not inquire with what sincerity. In any case the Administrative Statute, which, as we know, is based on the acceptance of the unilingual character of both Flanders and Wallonia, is guaranteed by its author not to infringe the administrative and juridical unity of the country.

There is no real difficulty, as far as that principle is concerned, about the thorough "flemification" of all municipal and provincial administration or of the local branches of the central services in the Flemish region. But a very great difficulty will arise when the central administration has to be reformed. Flemish municipalities and provinces, as well as all state officials in the Flemish region, are required by the new law (as they were by that of 1921) to correspond with Brussels in Dutch. It is admitted on all hands that Flanders has a right to have its affairs treated in the Brussels bureaux without the intervention of translators. In the lower departmental strata some sort of division on a regional basis will henceforth be unavoidable, even though M. Van Cauwelaert—to the indignation, if hardly to the surprise, of the Flemish Nationalists—acquiesced in a Government amendment which took out of the Bill the explicit instruction for this to be done. As for the higher officials, all those who are anxious, or pretend to be anxious, to save the administrative and juridical unity of Belgium, are agreed that these, from the rank of "Director" upwards, must not be doubled. The obvious solution would be to ask of these higher officials a knowledge of both languages. The fact is, however, that while every educated Fleming knows French, the Walloons obstinately refuse to learn Dutch. The agreement between the Flemings and the Walloons, thanks to which the passage of the Bill was assured, included the consent on the part of the Flemings to the Walloon condition that no bilingualism was to be asked of Walloon officials. It must be possible for a Walloon to reach the highest rung of the bureaucratic ladder with a knowledge of French alone. As finally passed by the Chamber the new Statute lays it down that "with a view to securing unity in administrative jurisdiction, to every high official at the head of a service will, if necessary, be added a bilingual official of the same rank or of the rank immediately below him." The relations between a unilingual Walloon Director or Secretary-General and the Flemish assistant who is to enlighten him on the *dossiers* from the Flemish region will no doubt be delicate in the extreme. The arrangement strikes one as highly artificial and difficult to work. By the most zealous supporters of the idea of Belgian unity it was deplored as the thin end of the wedge of separation.

Both M. Renkin and M. Jaspar argued that unity required bilingualism at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy and that the State had a full right to insist that its servants should be bilingual.

The argument was bound to fall on deaf ears with the Flemings, for this was the principle of the law of 1921, which, it is generally conceded, was never carried out as far as the central administration was concerned owing to the sabotage of the Walloon officials whom both M. Jaspar and M. Renkin have failed to compel to respect the law. M. Jaspar emphasised the view that administrative unity is the foundation of the political unity of Belgium; in other words, that a dual country like Belgium can only be kept together by a homogeneous bureaucracy. M. Renkin, the present Prime Minister, said that "all separatism and all federalism would mean an irreparable retrogression, to the detriment of the whole of Belgium; they would mean the prelude to the collapse of the fatherland and to a catastrophe of incalculable consequences to the whole of Europe."

To all these and similar supplications to sacrifice some small part of their linguistic pride on the altar of Belgian unity, the spokesmen of the majority of the Walloons replied with blunt refusals. One of them, concluding from the speeches of M. Renkin and M. Janson, another ex-Minister, that bilingualism was to be required not only of officials, but even of Cabinet Ministers, distressed the President of the Chamber by uttering an unmistakable threat that Wallonia would rather secede and join France than submit to such conditions. In the end the amendment exacting a knowledge of the two languages from all higher officials was supported only by some twenty of the seventy-three members for Walloon constituencies, and by the dozen Fransquillons still representing Flemish constituencies; the vote of the latter, who are regarded by the Flemings as the most dangerous enemies of linguistic reform, is a sufficient indication that further attempts to force bilingualism on the Walloons were not meant sincerely.

The Prime Minister and his predecessor are probably regretting their prophecies of dire disaster now that these have proved incapable of making the majority swerve from its course. In my opinion they were right in detecting the principle of administrative separation in the clauses relating to the central bureaux. M. Vos, the leader of the Flemish Nationalists, congratulated M. Van Cauwelaert ironically—and much to the latter's annoyance—on introducing the Trojan horse into the Belgian citadel. No doubt the bureaucracy will, as any living organism instinctively does, try to defend its traditions, and will be found no more anxious to carry out the new law than they were to observe that of 1921. The great grievance of M. Vos and his friends was that the new Statute no more contains "sanctions" than do any of the Belgian language laws, all of which are notoriously exposed to the ill-will of French-trained and Walloon officials. M. Van Cauwelaert has tried to remedy the lack in this case by the institution of an independent

mixed commission, which will have to watch and report on the execution of the Statute. A great deal of bickering may confidently be expected, and it also appears pretty certain that amendments will be required before long in order to secure to the Flemings that equal treatment at the centre which is now admitted to be their due. If I may venture a further forecast it is that these amendments will be in the direction of further, and more explicit, administrative separation, and that in that sense the present Statute will, indeed, prove the thin end of the wedge.

Whether the Prime Minister and the ex-Prime Minister—not to mention a number of minor prophets—were right in thinking that the break-up of Belgium must inevitably result from any measure of administrative separation is another matter entirely. If the official mind of the country cannot move beyond the position taken up by its most eminent representatives in the debate on the Administrative Statute, one feels inclined to think it must. These warnings and these threats elicited nothing but impatience from the Walloons to whom they were addressed, while the Flemish Nationalists looked gleefully on. Once linguistic groups have woken up to a sense of their national dignity and demand freedom to develop in their own way, attempts to subject them to disabilities or compulsion in the name of a super-national State are bound to end in disaster for that State. But if the State is willing to adapt itself to the development of its constituent nationalities, without making a fetish of particular constitutional arrangements, there is no reason why it should not survive. There is no need yet to take a very gloomy view of Belgium's future. Nothing has been more remarkable than the way in which Belgian politicians have accepted the growth of Flemish power. The thesis of the unilingual character of Flanders, which roused the most violent and passionate opposition only a few years ago, has now become the merest commonplace of Belgian politics. To-day the word federalism is still taboo, and when M. Vos and his friends get an opportunity shortly to introduce their proposal for turning the unitary Constitution into a federal one, no doubt the vials of wrath will be emptied over their heads. It is a comforting thought—and especially because it allows one to hope that we shall after all be spared that European catastrophe of which M. Renkin spoke so eloquently—that, nevertheless, every party in Belgium may be repeating "federalism" in a tone of resignation or even of hope before we are many years older, and, let us trust, before it is too late.

P. GEYL.

PS.—Since the above was written a great quarrel has broken out between the Liberal and the Flemish Catholic supporters of the Renkin Government about the next item on the programme of linguistic reform, the new Elementary and Secondary Education Bill. A crisis has become possible, but a hitch in the policy of "Belgicist" Flamingantism is likely to result in a further strengthening of Flemish Nationalism.

THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM.

EVER since the war Continental Europe has been tending to develop according to the principle of Self-Determination deriving from historical, economic, sociological, and political laws directing the evolution of this or that nation. Countries which have an independent national and cultural tradition of their own (Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, to cite only a few examples) are more ready for the application of this principle, and will develop more quickly than will be the case among peoples who, although they are distinct nationalities, have never had an independent political past and have always formed part of the state by which they have been absorbed. But even there we see cases where these nationalities have acquired independence and achieved satisfactory results, as for instance Latvia and Esthonia.

The first question to which I wish to draw attention is why this law of self-determination should stop at the "artificial" frontier created between Poland and Soviet Russia. For this frontier is by no means a natural ethnographic frontier, as Poland comprises nationalities other than Poles, such as White Russians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians, which peoples have been cut off from their co-nationals living on the other side of this "artificial" frontier. Therefore it is unreasonable to suppose that while the peoples living on one side of this line should be thinking of self-determination in form of national independence, the same people on the Soviet side should be content with things as they are now. In the Ukraine the desire for self-determination is particularly pronounced because this country, under whatever name it has been known during the past centuries, has always had a distinct national tradition of its own, while, say, White Russia, to quote only one instance, although it is a separate nationality has not had an independent historical and political past, for which reason its development along the lines of self-determination must obviously be slower. It is particularly interesting to examine the history, the social characteristics, and the economic structure of the Ukraine, for it is not generally realised in Western Europe that there is every reason to expect that in a not very distant future the Ukraine will break away from the Soviet Union, and that this breaking away will inevitably have the most far-reaching results.

For centuries past the Ukraine, or Kiev State, has lived in a constant struggle for independence and a constant striving for Western culture. Thus Anna, daughter of Yaroslav of Kiev, became Queen of France in the eleventh century, but all connections with the West were forcibly interrupted during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries

when the Kiev State was overrun by Tartar invaders who subjugated the country and turned the Ukrainian Princes into vassals. This oppression only fanned the flame of nationalism, so that some centuries later the Kiev princes and population rose up conjointly with other Russian princes, and threw off the Tartar yoke. But even so the struggle for independence had to continue, as invaders were always being attracted by the immense wealth of the country. So by and by the people formed themselves into a fighting community and developed a class known as the Cossacks, who were continually at war with Tartars on the one side, Poles on the other, and Russians on the north. Thanks to these well-trained bands of Cossacks, who protected the country against outside aggression, a stable and prosperous class of farmer was able to grow up within and cultivate the Black Soil Belt. The farmer-class owned their land and, when the need arose, protected it against invasion together with the regular Cossacks, each Cossack with his own horse and his own arms, the various groups under the command of an Ataman or colonel who, in his turn, stood under the Hetman, a sort of constitutional monarch. Under this yeoman class the country arrived at a state of prosperity and culture unknown in Russia, so that in the eighteenth century there were more primary schools in the Ukraine than in the same territory under the Tsarist régime of the twentieth century.

After the union of the Ukraine with Russia in 1654, the power of Moscow increased and the independent life of the Ukraine gradually diminished. This union had been brought about in consequence of the need to protect the country against Polish aggression. As time went on the autonomy of the Ukraine was more and more curtailed, till finally the Hetmanship was abolished altogether in 1756 and the country was incorporated in the Russian Empire. Hereupon a policy of intense "Russification" was begun by Moscow, but this only tended to strengthen the nationalist aspirations of the people. Many Ukrainians who opposed this régime were obliged to leave the country, and only their descendants, many years later, returned after the Revolution in 1917 in the hope of re-establishing their country in its traditional form under the Hetman Skoropadsky, a descendant of the last independent Hetman who died in 1708.

The outstanding characteristics of the Ukrainian people are first and foremost religion, nationalism, culture, and a sense of private property. Just as their sense of nationality was continually kept awake by their unending struggle for independence, so their sense of religion was intensified by the fact that they, of the Greek Orthodox Church, were bounded on one side by the militant Roman Catholicism of the Poles, and on the other by Mahom-

medans who, when they invaded the country, would begin by destroying all churches. When the Ukraine was incorporated with Russia, all the independent and autonomous rights of the Ukrainian Church were abolished as being the centre of too pronounced a Ukrainian culture, and the Church was put under the jurisdiction of the Tsarist Holy Synod, a political administration which had replaced the Patriarch in the days of Peter the Great. During the short period of independence under the Hetman Skoropadsky the Ukrainian Church once more began to live, only to be suppressed again by the Soviet régime. But this last suppression once more strengthened the Ukrainian desire for religious expression, so that now in the Soviet Ukraine there are some 2,000 priests carrying on religious services in secret with the full support of the entire local population.

Just as religious oppression always had an effect contrary to that aimed at by the authorities, so the Ukrainian feeling of nationality never died down and was on the contrary only strengthened by the Tsarist system of Russification, which even went so far as to forbid the publication of the Bible in the language of the country, a decree which was only altered in 1905 after the first Russian Revolution. The Bolsheviks, on coming to power, and recognising the force of this national feeling, began by acknowledging the right of any nationality to self-determination in accordance with the declaration made by Lenin at the Social-Democratic Congress held in Cracow in 1913. The Soviet Constitution even sets forth in its Paragraph 3 that any nation is free to leave the Union by making a simple declaration. However, on realising how the desire for self-determination was growing the Soviet Government did not cancel this paragraph, but made it ineffective. At first the right to use local languages was also granted; likewise permission for each nationality to have its own territorial army, its own Ministers of Finance and of the Interior. But these rights, except the rights of language, were later cancelled in favour of the system of centralisation now in force. This process of, as it were, "revocation" of the right to self-determination aroused such a storm of nationalist feeling in the Ukraine that it even penetrated the ranks of the Ukrainian Communist Party which refused to obey the decrees of the Stalin Government. As a result of this disobedience 819 Ukrainian Communists were arrested in the autumn of last year by order of the Moscow Soviet Government, and over 300 were exiled to Siberia and other penal settlements. Their places were subsequently taken by Moscow Communists.

While in Northern Russia the land worked by the peasants was not owned by them but by the village commune or *Mir*, the

Ukrainians always owned their land. It was only under Catherine the Great that the Ukrainian peasants were turned into serfs, and even so upon their liberation under the Tsar Alexander II in 1861, their rights to own land were in a manner of speaking restored. They once more lost these rights under the Soviets, who introduced a system of collectivisation, by means of which they turned the Ukrainian landowners into "agricultural proletarians," or workmen on Soviet farms. This system was, of course, so violently opposed by the peasants with their innate sense of ownership that the position of Stalin's officials in that part of the country became more than uncertain. Many thousands of these men were killed by the peasants, and it was only with the help of the Red Terror that Moscow succeeded in preventing a general uprising. Stalin hereupon found himself obliged to make concessions and therefore introduced the milder form of collectivisation known under the name of "Artels," and his latest step, as announced by the Soviet Press not long ago, furnishes a vivid proof both of his fear of peasant risings in the Ukraine and of his knowledge of the growing discontent in the Red Army, 85 per cent. of which is composed of peasants. This latest step of Stalin and his Government has been to introduce a state of affairs similar to the Mir system of pre-war Northern Russia, and thus make the artels appear milder. As usual, the change is being made on the eve of the sowing-season. But even at that the Mir is entirely different from anything that the Ukrainian has ever been accustomed to. The Government has also made the discovery that when the peasants work together on a Collective State Farm they have most undesirable facilities for communicating with each other and so forming an organised opposition to the Soviet officials. Therefore Moscow hopes that by making the peasants divide their time between working on the land temporarily allotted to them, and labouring in "farming brigades" on State farms under the ever-watchful eye of a Soviet supervisor, they will have neither time nor opportunity for discussion, for directly a peasant's "brigade-work" is ended, he must hurry to his temporary allotment and work there.

The fact that Moscow is giving so much time and thought to the subjugation of the Ukraine tells its own tale: it is the richest country in the Union. The population, of which 80 per cent. is of Ukrainian nationality (Russians 9 per cent., Jews 5 per cent., the rest Germans, Tartars, Poles, etc.), is largely rural, and under the Tsarist régime about one-half of the 400,000 square miles of land were owned by peasant farmers. This class of farmers even increased during the Hetman's régime because of the subsidies given to that class by the Hetman Government for

acquiring more landed property and thus becoming well-to-do farmers, the backbone and support of the Government. The agricultural produce of the country consists chiefly of wheat, barley, oats, rye and potatoes, which under the bourgeois systems amounted to 25 million tons per annum; tobacco 600,000 tons; 60 million gallons of 40° potato-alcohol; while 197 sugar factories were supplied by immense beet-plantations and, after catering for local consumption, exported some 700,000 tons of sugar to Russia and one-fifth of that quantity abroad. But in spite of these immense agricultural riches the Soviet plans for requisitioning cereals were largely a failure in the Ukraine because of the peasants' opposition to the system of collectivisation, and in 1931 the Soviet authorities only succeeded in collecting 53 per cent. of the amount due from that country, while in other parts of the Union they managed to receive an average of 86 per cent.

Although the Ukraine is regarded as an agricultural country, its supply of minerals, as well as the industries connected with their production, is by no means negligible. Scientific research has estimated the amount of coal in the country at 4.8 trillion pounds, or sufficient for 150 years, a consumption equal to that of the United States of America to-day. The amount of anthracite equals the amounts available in the rest of Europe, Africa, America and Australia put together. Peat is also present in large quantities and Ukrainian peat is known to be of the same calorific value as wood and considerably cheaper. The country is also rich in iron ore, and up to 1913 the Krivoy-Rog Mines alone produced 6.3 million tons of ore per annum, or 78 per cent. of the output of the entire Empire. As in prehistoric times the Ukraine was the bottom of a sea, it also possesses salt mines of some importance. The salt-area of Brianzevsky is 45 km. long, 35 km. wide, and salt is found to a depth of 40 metres. Manganese is present in large quantities, especially in the Nicopol area, which is known to be of good quality, even though perhaps not quite equal to that produced by the famous Tchiaturi Mine of the Caucasus. The annual output of manganese amounted to 300,000 tons.

When these facts are taken into consideration, it is hardly surprising that Moscow admits that the whole success of the Five Year Plan hinges on the measure of success with which the South of Russia is industrialised and, banking on future trade relations, the Government has spent no small sum on the improvement of the ports of Odessa, Nicolaev, Theodosia, Taganrog, Mariopol, and Novorossisk, so that the export and import possibilities of the Ukraine are favourable in every way. In discussing the Five Year Plan, the official Soviet Directory indeed states that "We can say that in the near and distant future the whole development of the

Soviet Union depends on how far we shall succeed in intensifying and industrialising the south of the Soviet Union—the Ukraine.” But at the same time this official Soviet Directory admits the weakness of its system and that “the essential fault of all Soviet projects in the Ukraine and plans of factories and works lies in the fact that we never care to study, understand, and analyse the historical traditions of the Ukraine.”

Even during the Hetman régime of 1918, when Europe was still in a state of war and trade relations were anything but normal, the Ukraine succeeded in exporting goods to the value of £81,000,000 (sugar, grain, alcohol), and in importing goods valued at £52,000,000 (cloth, leather, naphtha, fish, coffee, manufactured goods, and agricultural machinery). As the Ukraine has always attracted a large amount of foreign capital, a commission was appointed under the Hetman régime in order to settle what proportion of the debts of the Russian Empire were to be allocated to the Ukraine once she regained her complete independence and 25 per cent. was considered to be a just share. For it was found that foreign capital had been invested in the Ukraine itself by Belgium (67,000,000 gold roubles), France (73,000,000) and England (22,000,000), but the downfall of the Hetman allowed no time for these intended payments to be made.

All the facts enumerated in the foregoing show reasons why Western Europe should be interested in the future of a country that is so full of wealth awaiting exploitation and which, given political independence, would prove a valuable customer to other industrial nations. The Ukraine would welcome trade with the West because, in her outlook and aspirations, she has always tended westwards, while all the aims of Russia were centred in the East.

According to English ideas the Ukraine is conservative: it has centuries of tradition behind it, tradition of independence and culture, while Russia is in many respects impregnated with Asiatic ways of thinking, leading to reaction and extremism, international conquest instead of nationalism, atheism instead of religion, communism instead of an innate sense of private property. This can be better understood if one takes into consideration that from the sixteenth century onwards Ukrainian students have travelled to Europe to complete their studies in the great European universities and polytechnics, and have, in many cases, settled and worked in western countries, so that it was largely through their intermediary that European culture came to their country, and it came to stay. It must also be well noted that the majority of these numerous students were the sons of landed gentry as well as of well-to-do farmers, while the representatives sent abroad by Northern Russia were chiefly members of the high aristocracy.

In every detail, as we see here, the characteristics of Russia are the direct antithesis to the Ukraine, which are those of a western nation. In Russia theories are upheld by knout and OGPU, while the Ukraine believes in free progress. The theory of oppression was brought to Russia centuries ago when the Mongols, under Chingis Khan, swept over the country from Asia. They passed through Southern Russia, but they never mixed or inter-married with the people there, only leaving their stamp on the peoples further north. Thus the Ukrainians have remained a pure race.* This Eastern tendency is also proved by the fact that Lenin transferred his capital from a modern and western Petersburg to Moscow which, in its Orientalism, is more in keeping with Great Russian aspirations.

In view of the past history as well as of the geographical situation of the Ukraine, the country could not possibly have other than westward tendencies and aspirations to independence, for on three sides it is surrounded by peoples who have the same ideas. On the one side there is Poland, already independent, while on the others there are the Don Cossacks, Cuban Cossacks, and the peoples of the Caucasus, all of whom have deeply rooted desires for independence, private property, and religious expression, and in all these countries there are weighty economic and geographical factors which force them westwards. They have their agricultural produce, their coal, iron, and naphtha; they have their pipelines linking up Baku with the Black Sea; and above all they have an immense system of rivers, 22,900 kilometres in the Ukraine alone, of which 27 per cent. are navigable and 67 per cent. suitable for rafts, all flowing towards the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, the links with Europe and the West.

In view of all these facts Europe should not close her eyes to the vast possibilities of this country, to its wealth and its standard of culture, nor lose sight of the fact that a people which for centuries has struggled for independence against overwhelming odds will not now give up everything and quietly accept a régime that is in every way inimical to its aims, traditions and aspirations.

VLADIMIR KOROSTOVETZ.

* The average height of a Ukrainian is 1.67 metres; but in the neighbouring countries the average heights are 1.657 metres for the Russian, 1.654 metres for the Pole, and 1.651 metres for the White Russian. In the case of those Ukrainians directly descended from Cossack families the average height is 1.701 metres. In the shape of the skull the Ukrainians also differ from their neighbours, for in their case it is of the Brachycephalic type, while the Dolichocephalic skull is typical of Russians, Poles, and White Russians. The Ukrainian language with its highly developed literature approaches nearer to the Serbo-Croat than to any other Slavonic language. The average Ukrainian peasant has some 3,000 words at his command, while the average peasant of other countries only 300 to 350 words.

THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOCIETY FOR PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.

THIS year 1932 is the Jubilee year of the Society for Psychical Research. In February 1882 it came into existence on the initiative of W. Barrett, Professor of Physics at the Royal College of Science, Dublin, afterwards Sir William Barrett, F.R.S. He was an eager investigator into various forms of psychical phenomena, and became convinced that continuous and serious study ought to be given to the matter. He knew people who were also interested, notably Frederic Myers, Edmund Gurney, and Henry Sidgwick, and these and some others founded the Society.

The Society has always been, and still is, a small one; this is mainly because it is a scientific body, and its methods, slow, thorough, and entirely impartial, do not attract people who have become interested in the emotional, or what one might call the dramatic, aspects of psychical experience which go by the name of Spiritualism. To this day and after fifty years of steady work the Society, as a Society, would not affirm that the survival of bodily death has been demonstrated conclusively, or that communication with spirits has been established, although I think it may be said that many of those most conversant with the work have been convinced by the cumulative effect of the evidence that life does continue after bodily death, and that some communication between the living and the dead has been discovered. In the Society's constitution it is expressly stated, however, that "Membership of this Society does not imply the acceptance of any particular explanation of the phenomena investigated, nor any belief as to the operation in the physical world of forces other than those recognised by physical science." The doors of the Society are therefore opened wide to any opinions, prejudices or predilections.

A survey of the fifty years' work has been compiled by Mrs. Henry Sidgwick, who has acted as Honorary Secretary of the Society since 1907 and only resigned the position at the end of last year. The summary will be published and I have her permission to quote her comment on the above statement:

This has continued to be the Society's attitude throughout its fifty years of life, though it is not, I think, always understood even by members that it is no use asking what does the S.P.R. think about this or that? Individual members or groups of members may and do have views of course, but the one thing either the Society or its Council effectively agree about is, that the questions raised by psychical research are important and investigation is desirable.

This attitude has been most faithfully, and to some people, most exasperatingly preserved. I do not think the attacks on the Society for being slow and sticky, and for refusing to affirm certain conclusions reached by people both inside and outside the membership, are justified. If there is one thing perfectly certain it is that no single event, no single piece of evidence however well attested, is going to convince either a scientific mind, or minds in general, of survival, or of the possibility of communication with the discarnate. It is quite a different thing to undergo a personal experience, or to hear about someone else's; an incident may, for special individual reasons, entirely convince a man that he has actually communicated, say, with his dead wife, but however detailed and veridical and inexplicable on any other hypothesis the communication may be, recounted at even one remove its effect wears off; even the very man himself is apt to re-act against his forced belief; a kind of scepticism intervenes, vague feelings that it is easy to be deluded, that people are credulous, that there has been deception, float into the mind, and in a very short time the momentary effect produced vanishes. Of course this scepticism is harder still—is almost invulnerable—when the story or occurrence is reached merely through a printed account. The mind ignores the implications and dismisses the subject; there is an instinct in most of us which dislikes thinking of what is not understood. The rarer beings who, on the contrary, are stimulated by such a situation are the pioneers and discoverers within the human family.

Convinced spiritualists have built up a complete system by now; they profess to know just what happens at death, just what kind of world we inhabit next, just what guides or helpers are about us. It may well be that some of this psychical speculation represents real knowledge, but that it can be demonstrated in the same manner as a scientific discovery about, shall we say, sound and light waves, is obviously impossible at present. The instrument through which these statements are made, namely the human being, may so easily be the creator and not the transmitter of information. The more we learn about the operations of our own minds the more we have to be on our guard in these matters against imaginative creations, embodying the often unconscious hopes and desires of our nature. The necessity for a strictly scientific standard of evidence was never more urgent than to-day when undoubtedly there is a great increase in strange phenomena, or at least in their recognition and registration. The founders of the Society were determined from the first to investigate without prejudice or foregone opinion. An unknown tract of knowledge lay before them, into which they were adventuring. The great increase of organised spiritualism is partly

due to their success in the mere compilation of cases. There are certain dangers ahead, of which the Society is well aware; an uncritical acceptance of strange developments and an easy credulity produce immature judgments on phenomena which, without necessarily discrediting the phenomena, lead men to follow fireflies instead of illumination. It is as the guardian of a scientific approach to psychical phenomena of all kinds that the Society is of such great value, and those anxious to study the matter would be well advised to join the body which sifts all evidence with a cold and impartial efficiency and is chary of theories and explanations.

In the second year of the Society's existence, it was resolved to bring out a book to be called *Phantasms of the Living* which was to be compiled by Edmund Gurney, Frederic Myers and Frank Podmore. So great was the volume of evidence which poured in upon the compilers that it was not till 1886 that the book was ready. It is a monumental work, not easy to read straight through, being mainly a collection of accounts of phantasms all well attested and carefully classified. The book is for the student rather than the ordinary reader, although the cumulative effect upon the ordinary reader is very great. The Literary Committee which supervised the work used to meet in the Cambridge house of Mr. and Mrs. Henry Sidgwick, and anybody who knew one or other of its three principal members, Henry Sidgwick, Frederic Myers, and Edmund Gurney, can imagine both how interesting and how amusing these sessions must have been. The title *Phantasms of the Living* disarmed much criticism and antagonism, and the scrupulous way in which the collaborators tested the time element, and compared the moment of the appearance of the phantasm with the hour of death, impressed readers, first with their care, and next with their absence of bias in any one direction. Telepathy, or the transference of thought without the aid of the senses, was thought to be the originator of phantasms, joined to the subjective illusion of a figure, and sometimes of a voice. It became apparent that a telepathic impression could occur or at least be consciously recognised some time after an event. There were people who entertained the idea that a phantasm might be the actual projection of a living individual's spirit, and that therefore an appearance after death might afford evidence of survival. I doubt, however, if such an idea was in the minds of the compilers of the book; they were bent on the collection of well-authenticated cases, rather than on the framing of theories to account for them. Mrs. Sidgwick in the survey from which I have already quoted, ventures the cautious conclusion "that between death and apparitions of the dying person a communication exists which is not due to chance alone." This conclusion, I may add, was supported by the Census of Hallucina-

tions undertaken by the Society and the report on it which was published in 1894.

Space does not allow me to give any adequate account of the numerous inquiries undertaken by the Society into psychical phenomena, such as clairvoyance, clairaudience, crystal gazing, thought transference and so on, also into doubtful cases of hauntings, poltergeists, dowsing, many of which may have a natural explanation. Reports on these inquiries and papers on them have been published both in the Society's *Journal*, printed for private circulation, and in its *Proceedings* which are issued in Parts from time to time, and form now a collection of thirty-nine volumes. A fortieth is being compiled. For these many years, records of experiences have been collected and sifted, observations on all kinds of phenomena have been published, and the abundance and variety of the material makes any synthesis extremely complicated. Nevertheless, certain definite advances have been made through the collection of carefully investigated cases and by the original work of a few individuals.

I think it may be said that the existence of telepathy has been demonstrated, if by telepathy is meant the transference of ideas or thoughts from one living mind to another without the assistance of the normal senses. Hardly yet have the implications of this remarkable phenomenon been accepted, or perhaps I should say sufficiently developed. If mind can communicate with mind, without speech or touch or sight, and from any distance, there must be some explanation of how it is done. People talk loosely of hyperaesthesia of the senses, as if it could account for the appearance in England of the phantasm of someone in Australia, or about an analogy with light waves and sound waves, confusing a physical measurable activity which can be set in motion by a light or a sound, with the transmission of an imponderable thought or emotion. Yet thoughts and emotions are undoubtedly transmitted in ways we do not understand.

I am of course only expressing my own opinion when I say that the solution of many perplexities could lie in a clearer understanding of the supernormal powers of the human mind, for these may prove to be the link between ourselves in this life and ourselves in the next stage of life. I have not space to amplify this idea but, broadly speaking, I feel that further effort should be made to discover *what* it is that transmits. How comes it that supernormal perceptions independent of the senses or of time or distance reach consciousness in so many curious and differing ways? If you examine them in turn you will find that clairvoyance, clairaudience, automatic writing, crystal gazing, mental pictures, trance-speech, all exhibit the influence of telepathy; that is to say

what is seen or heard, written or spoken in these strange ways constantly has connection with what has been experienced by another mind, often at a distance. This association is surely significant. Why are the ordinary channels of communication which we use between our sentient bodies not available? Why does some other mechanism have to be set in motion, such as the picture-forming capacity of the mind, or the hallucinations which can somehow, and sometimes, be induced through the senses of sight and hearing, smell, touch and taste; or the inhibition of the usual control of hand and speech, and the substitution for it of some other directing force? It is as if a tide were forcing its way through innumerable creeks, taking advantage of every chance rift in the barrier of the land. The kind of communication which reaches consciousness in these ways is of an infinite variety, and in many instances differs little from the usual communications between people by speech, gesture and writing. But over and over again evidence is given of knowledge beyond the ordinary reach of minds communicating with each other in our well-known ways, knowledge of events or emotions at a distance in time or space, knowledge even of the future. There must surely be some link between this knowledge and the supernormal methods by which it reaches consciousness, some reason why the transmitter has to use devious channels to convey its supernormal knowledge to another mind.

The idea of a mind functioning below consciousness, called by him the subliminal mind, was developed by F. W. H. Myers in a series of papers of great analytic power, which marked a turn of thought. The subliminal or subconscious mind has received much attention from psychologists of great reputation all over the world, but the connection between supernormal knowledge and the supernormal methods of expression has not been sufficiently explored. The lengthy investigations of all the various automatisms and mechanisms undertaken by the Society have had an immense value, and, as I have said, I should like now to see an exhaustive study undertaken of the kind of material which is transmitted, with the object of discovering what part of our being it is that either produces or receives these impressions, and what, if any, intention or motive lies behind their inception.

The Society has experimented with both physical trance and direct voice mediums. One interesting point emerges: there seems to be little development or advance in the study of physical phenomena and the inquiry remains very much where it was fifty years ago. There is a great deal of fraud, and many claimants to supernormal powers have been exposed, but the Society is not in a position to aver that no physical phenomena ever take place; the evidence in some cases is strong. When we come to mental

phenomena the case is quite different, and in fifty years a great quantity of evidence has been collected, which seems first to establish the existence of telepathy between the living, and next to point to its action between the living and the dead. Of course the very demonstration of telepathy between the living vitiates much of what looks like evidence of messages coming from the dead. It is absolutely necessary to attribute every such supposed communication to a telepathic impression from the living, and keeping in mind the latency of impressions to press this explanation even beyond what appears reasonable. The other theory that the dead are not dead in the sense of being extinguished, but live in a different field of existence from which they can sometimes signal to us, is so tremendous in its implications, so opposed also to all the evidences of our senses, that any other possible explanation of the phenomena must be employed until it can be discarded.

One of the most impressive developments in the last twenty years, however, has been what looks like an organised and persistent effort by discarnate minds to get round the inevitable explanation of every communication as being merely another result of telepathy. The scheme apparently is to slip messages past the sentries of consciousness, as it were, so that the element of telepathy from the living can be excluded. This was attempted by keeping the automatists in complete ignorance of the meaning of their messages, the meaning being only decipherable if the various scripts were compared. It was some time before the scheme was discovered, but gradually the resemblances between the script of certain automatists who for the most part did not even know each other's names, and none of whom had seen each other's script, was noticed. In a paper written by Mrs. Sidgwick and published in *Proceedings*, Vol. XXIX (p. 58), she comments:

The evidence from design in any particular case must be judged by the student. I think in some of the published cases it is strong. Granted design, we have to seek the designer. It cannot be the supraliminal (i.e. conscious) intelligence of either automatist since *ex hypothesi* neither of them is aware of the design till it is completed. Nor for a similar reason can it be attributed to some other living person since, so far as can be ascertained, no other living person had any knowledge of what was going on. It is extremely difficult to suppose that the design is an elaborate plot of the subliminal intelligence of either or both automatists acting independently and without any knowledge on the part of the supraliminal consciousness; and the only remaining hypothesis seems to be that the designer is an external intelligence not in the body. It is clear as has often been said before that we have here in any case what may more and more prove a very fruitful line of experiment.

The imagined "plot" of the "subliminal intelligence," it may be added, would postulate an impish desire to mislead and mystify, carried out with a marvellous subtlety and ingenuity. It would seem simpler and more probable to allow the claim of the communicators that they are attempting to demonstrate their continued existence and identity. Mrs. Sidgwick goes on to explain that "the scripts claim that the designers are persons—at first specially Myers and Gurney—who when in the body were interested in us and in the work we are doing, and who are now co-operating with us from the other side of the veil."

Some of these cross correspondences as they are called take the form of literary puzzles supporting the same claim, and they are very appropriate to the supposed communicators. Mrs. Sidgwick finally admits that the general effect upon her mind is "of co-operation with us by former fellow-workers no longer in the body." These words were written in 1917 just fifteen years ago and since that time many notable cross correspondences have been produced and discovered.

As might be expected, there have also been efforts of a different kind. One can imagine that workers on the other side casting about for some new method of eliminating the conscious mind of the medium and preventing its interference, hit upon the notion of directing attention to passages in books. These efforts go by the name of Book Tests and various people have obtained remarkable results. The method seems to be to convey a message for indicated persons, generally through a trance medium, by directing them to a particular page in a book, whose position in a bookcase is carefully described. There are obvious difficulties; books get moved; some books might be too well known, too often thumbed by the receivers of the messages, and so lead to the possibility of the passage having been gathered from his or her mind. But when all is said there are some very striking cases. Then a further development occurred, just as if the group working on the other side realised what might be said about telepathy and familiarity with certain books, and therefore proceeded to give a series of tests about words and sentences in newspapers, some of which had actually not yet been set in position. How this is done we have no idea, why it is done it is easier to imagine, for it seems like another effort to eliminate telepathy from a living mind. A compositor would have to be aware of his page some hours before, and of the exact position an advertisement, for example, would occupy; then some living mind would have to tap his knowledge and present it to an individual as a message, and there are cases where at the time of transmission no type had been set. An

account of these curious efforts can be found in Volumes XX, XXII and XXIII of the *Journal* and repay study.

One of the most interesting features of these and other efforts is the way they are inaugurated, developed, and then left in abeyance apparently at the bidding of some organised direction. It is as if the discarnate group said: "Well that idea has served its turn, now let's arrange something else." I may add, however, that cross correspondences and the arduous work on them have not ceased. It is unfortunate that some of the best and most convincing cases are too private and intimate in nature to admit of publication for some years to come, but the individuals who have had the privilege of studying them are enormously impressed by the evidence they afford of a careful and systematic attempt to establish the identity of those who profess to be the communicators. What further ingenious methods may be evolved no one can say.

The argument for the existence of communication between the living and the dead rests mainly, then, on the various evidences of a coherent and persistent design and direction from unseen influences, apparently with the purpose of demonstrating the continuity of personality. Even physical phenomena, apports, movements of objects without contact, materialisations, direct voices, if and when genuine, are attributed to discarnate personalities, although I hold, as I have already said, that no great advance in knowledge will be gained by these means. The mental phenomena appear to me much more important and capable of further development, possibly on rather different lines. Too much stress has perhaps been laid on evidences of survival and too little on evidences of qualities and powers which transcend the body here and now, and would seem to inaugurate a continuity of existence. Survival might be demonstrable, but the entity which survives the death of the body might be without many of the attributes we connect with personality here; its memory might be dim, its affections extinguished, its morality debased; survival might mean a descent in the scale of being instead of a rise, it might mean the first stage in eventual extinction. Continuity of being is the only survival of which most people are thinking when they speak of the hope of immortality. Continuity, of course, implies that some at least of our attributes and capacities survive the death of the body and are therefore in our possession now: the importance of investigation into the powers of man as we know him, and their occasional extension cannot be exaggerated.

The work of F. W. H. Myers on what he called the Subliminal Mind should be carried on, and research directed to such human faculties as are apparently independent of the bodily senses. It may be that the continuity of life now and hereafter will be demon-

strated and not merely the survival of bodily death. Continuity of life is a greater conception: it may be shown that we already possess some immortal faculties, and that our personalities are greater than we know.

But to return to the Jubilee of the Society for Psychical Research. I feel that a definite stage in the work has been reached, and that a great field for research still lies before it. Support is urgently needed both in money and in voluntary work; surely it will be forthcoming for a scientific body, scrupulously critical and cautious, and engaged upon one of the most important inquiries ever undertaken by man. After fifty years of such work, the position attained is not a negative one—not a mere disclosure of fraud and superstition, and foolish credulity, but a collection of evidence still continuing, which clamours for the serious consideration of trained and scientific minds.

EDITH LYTTTELTON.

A CHINESE EXPERIMENT.

AT Mr. Yen's invitation we went from Peking to Tingsien, 120 miles down the Hankow line, to see the "Experiment" of which he is the head. At Tingsien station we were met by Mr. Ch'i, Mr. Yen's second in command. Twenty minutes' bumping brought us to the gates of the walled city. The fortifications, many centuries old, are immensely massive and strong, and we had to pass a series of four gateways, set at right angles to each other with walled passages between, before getting into the city. Inside there was open country again and we ricksha'd on through the fields for another half-hour till we came at last to the end of a wide street dimly lit by large paper lanterns hung at the top of poles. A line of food-stalls, bright with kerosene lamps, extended down the street, and people were still buying at this late hour of the evening. Almost under the shadow of the big pagoda our ricksha men stopped and, climbing up the steps, we found ourselves at our host's house.

Sitting in a comfortable study, with much of the atmosphere of a don's rooms in college, we listened while Mr. Yen summed up for us the history and plans of the "Tingsien Experiment." "We started," he said, "as a group of young volunteers campaigning against illiteracy. Our object was to spread a smattering of knowledge among the common people of China and for several years we were busy with our 'One Thousand Character' classes in different parts of China. But this was only a beginning and a means to an end; we had in our minds something very much bigger. Call us dreamers, if you like, but what we are aiming at is to raise the level of all the millions of China in every department of life, physical, moral, economic and intellectual.

"Let us look at the elements of the problem. First and foremost poverty, an extreme of poverty hardly to be realised by people from the West. A higher standard of living, in the physical sense, is a first and absolute necessity. But this can only be got with the co-operation of the people; we cannot give it them from outside. Therefore they must be given to start with the grains of education. A man must be able to read and write, if only a few characters, and to make simple calculations before he can take a useful part in any mutual effort. Then, along with economic improvement must come advance on various other planes—health, morals, the sense of citizenship, and not least culture.

"Any scheme to be useful must not only be sound in itself but must be of a sort which will make an appeal to the people. When once it is fairly launched they themselves must carry it on and

develop it. To work out schemes of this sort means close touch with the people combined with 'laboratory' work.

"As an experimental unit we chose a *hsien*. A *hsien*, as you know, is a sub-division of a province, there being about ten in an average-sized province and, all in all, some 2,000 in China. For our purpose it has the advantage of being pretty well self-contained in administration and finance and of having a 'satellite' structure of villages grouped round towns and towns grouped round the city which adapts itself well to a system of gradual extension. Our experiment here will go on for several years, and if it succeeds we shall have given China a model which can be copied and adapted for any part of the country. We are recruited from nearly every one of the eighteen provinces of China and each of us is an expert in some line. Several are men who have given up well-paid professorships or other distinguished posts to throw in their lot here where our funds allow of only a living wage. Some work at headquarters and some out in the field at experimental stations scattered among the villages. To-morrow you shall see both."

Next day we were taken by Mr. Yen across a corner of the city to the old K'ao P'ang which has been given to the "Experiment" by the *hsien* Magistrate. It is a rare example of Sung dynasty architecture with a five-tiered roof beautifully gabled at the ends (the type has survived in some of the older temples of Japan but is almost extinct in China) and was in imperial days the Examination Hall. The main structure has been left practically unaltered; only the windows have been enlarged to let in more light and the interior has been cleared of litter to make room for the country people who crowd in for lectures. The different research departments are grouped round the main building. We started with Mr. Li. With the help of his charts and diagrams we got the "statistical background" on which the Experiment works. The *hsien* itself contains 400,000 people who inhabit some 500 villages and small market towns. The *hsien* city has a population of about 7,000. The density can be judged by the fact that there is about one village to every square mile. The main crop is millet, the staple food of the northern Chinese. The majority of the farm families own their own land in small four to five-acre holdings, often in scattered plots. Their average wealth per head is infinitesimally small, about \$30 a year, which at the present rate of exchange is worth half as many again shillings. The social unit, strongly defined in China, is the "clan" (a group of families sharing the same name), and the family itself. Within the family no fewer than thirty-seven degrees of relationship figure in the charts! Besides

these human statistics there were masses of others concerned with such various things as the number of schools, wells and water-wheels scattered throughout the *hsien*.

From Mr. Li's department we went on to Mr. T'ang's, which is housed in a three-tiered building behind the big hall where, we were told, the Chief Examiner sat in the old days. Mr. T'ang also produced a chart. It had a shaded block of varying thickness and height in the bottom left corner, the rest being blank. "This," he explained, "shows you the population of China and the part of it which is at present receiving any education whatever. The shaded bit reaches, you see, from five to twenty-five, that is from the age when children go to the primary schools to the finishing age for the very few who go to the Universities. The width indicates the percentage at each age, a fraction of 1 per cent. at the top widening out to just under 20 per cent. for the children from five to twelve. What we are aiming at with our Mass Education Movement is to shade in all the part that at present is left blank." "And," he added, "the white strip at the bottom—from birth to the age of five is perhaps the most important of all. Education at that age is all in the hands of the mothers—and of them at present 98 per cent. are illiterate. What chance does that give to the rising generation?"

To fill in the blank on the chart seemed a pretty stupendous proposition, and we asked him about the method. "It begins," Mr. T'ang explained, "with the 'One Thousand Character' classes which are started in the villages and attended by all ages, the courses being mostly arranged to coincide with the slack seasons for agriculture. Our plan concentrates, however, on the young generation from sixteen to twenty, and we aim at getting the whole of the boys and girls between these ages to pass through the schools. There are 70,000 of them in this *hsien*, and at the present rate of progress we hope to have taught them practically all within the next three years. The best of the young men are picked out and given, if they are willing, a further education considerably more thorough. They, it is hoped, will return to their villages, perhaps as village-headmen, and form a foundation for carrying on the educational system." We asked Mr. T'ang how the people took to the classes. "When we came here," he said, "we were taken for missionaries and then for tax collectors and, when these two theories failed, the people decided that we had come to recruit for the armies. It took months to convince them that we had no ulterior motive and to get them to come to our classes, but once the idea took root the people trooped in faster than we could provide for."

From Mr. T'ang we went on to Mr. Yao to hear what is being

stock is being gradually improved by the admixture of foreign strains. At present the pig is the chief beneficiary. The Chinese pig is a lean, bristly fellow, very quick on the legs but a poor producer of bacon. The cross with the Berkshire breed is proving a great success. At the age of nine months the porkers weigh almost exactly twice as much as the native breed. This improvement alone, if extended to all the farms in the *hsien* as it probably will be in time, will by Mr. Fang's calculations bring an increase of a million dollars a year to the farmers' aggregate income. From the pigs we passed to the goats. Their presence on the Farm is a practical example of the correlation which exists between the different departments of the Tingsien Experiment. Mr. Yao of the Health Department, as he had that morning told us, had lately engaged a doctor (a lady doctor by the way) to study the people's dietary and to carry out research in problems of nutrition. She discovered a serious deficiency in the food of the children which could best be supplied by milk. The Chinese hardly ever drink milk, there are no cows on the farms and the farmers could not afford them. Goats, however, are self-supporting animals, and a few to each village—one in every household—would cost practically nothing. So the Farm has introduced them and is gradually getting them adopted by all the farmers round.

When we had finished the round of the Farm we started in a cavalcade of donkeys, bicycles and rickshas for our visit to Niuts'un, a "demonstration village" a few miles distant. We left the city and struck out across country. It was typical North China landscape—a flat cultivated plain stretching to the horizon, only broken by the clumps of trees around villages and graveyards, which multiply so tremendously that at a few miles' radius they merge together into a seeming circle of forest. Out of this woody surrounding, which recedes like a mirage at whatever point you approach it, Niuts'un gradually appeared as we worked our way towards it along a dry watercourse.

In the village the headman met us and took us to visit the local "demonstrators." These were ordinary farmers belonging to the village who had done their "Thousand Characters" and had also received a short course of instruction from the agricultural department in one or another of their various lines of experiment. One was raising hybrid pigs; another had been given a White Leghorn cock and was introducing the strain into his poultry yard, another was the proud possessor *ad interim* of a newly invented locust-destroying machine. Each had been given his animal or his machine subject to certain rules and with the condition attached that he was to act as a "demonstrator" by explaining its habits or workings and the advantages which it has

to the other farmers of his village and the villages round. He is given a tin plate which he puts on the door of his compound inviting all and sundry to go inside and see what is being done. The locust-machine possessor was the first to be visited. He came out into his courtyard, a fine, stalwart typical North China farmer with an honest smiling face, carrying his machine, and proceeded to rehearse for our benefit the little lecture and practical demonstration which he gives to all his neighbours. He was rewarded by having his photograph taken with his much-prized diploma held in front of his stomach.

When we came to the chicken-man he was asked to produce his egg-book. Here was a test of the success of the literacy movement. As a "demonstrator" he is called on to keep a register with a daily record of the performance of each hen, the Farm requiring the data for carrying on their research on the best hybridisations. We examined his book carefully and found every hen neatly described by some distinguishing mark and in the columns below a series of noughts and crosses brought right up to date. Our tour of the village ended with the reading-room and the dispensary. In the first we found a row of small boys busy over their books. Had they been hastily collected when our approaching visit was signalled? Well, I rather suspect so, but at all events they survived the test we gave them by asking each the name of the book he was reading. The dispensary was under the charge of a young student who spends half his day going round the farms to try to improve the sanitary conditions and to instil notions of hygiene, and the other half in looking after the sick. His dispensary was beautifully clean and the walls were adorned with a number of "Tingsien" posters designed to drive home, by the "visual method," the lessons which he is teaching.

To anyone used to the ordinary Chinese village Niuts'un, with its evident readiness to launch into modern improvements, is somewhat of a miracle. Miracles in China usually indicate money somewhere in the background, not that motives here are more sordid than elsewhere, but that in the midst of such grinding poverty money has an incredible driving power. So I put the question to our guide whether the village itself, or anyone in it, was getting a subsidy. "Not a cent," he replied, "beyond the profit from the improvements themselves. Our schemes are based on the principle that, apart from the work of research, they must be self-supporting. Take what you have seen in this village. The man with the litter of hybrid pigs has paid his fee—a small one it is true—for the service of the hog at our Farm. The man who is rearing chickens from the cock which we have given him

the *Anschluss*, against the Young Plan, against the weakening of French defences, against the revision of treaties, which are just as definite as any statements of M. Tardieu, and sometimes are critical of concessions made by M. Tardieu. But they need not be dwelt upon. Behind M. Herriot are the dynamic forces of Socialism. M. Blum, the Socialist chief, is apparently separated from M. Herriot by a great gulf of doctrines and sympathies. Logically, it is impossible to reconcile Radical and Socialist aims. This is true not only of their ultimate purpose, but of their immediate designs. The observer who judges by the pronouncements of the various leaders would be obliged to say that the Radical and the Socialist attitudes towards disarmament, for example, are entirely different. M. Blum has written powerfully against the official French thesis of security as a preliminary condition of disarmament. He opposes the formula of M. Herriot—Security, Arbitration, Disarmament. He prefers the formula of Security by Arbitration and Disarmament. He regards M. Tardieu's proposal of an international army—of which M. Herriot has claimed the paternity—as fantastic. There is the same divergence of views on reparations, and even on the need of sticking to the treaties and the *status quo*. On the other hand, apart from a certain mysticism on the Radical side, apart from a certain warm eloquence which is excellent on public platforms, it would be difficult to discover the differences in policy of M. Herriot and M. Tardieu. Yet, though one can hardly refrain from these comparisons, it is clear that the influence of the Socialists will be felt, and that, in practice, Radical policy will be more supple than that of the Moderates. M. Herriot is regarded, rightly or wrongly, as less firm than M. Tardieu—to put it politely, he is regarded as malleable.

The paradox of French politics is this alliance of the bourgeois Radical party which, if it insists on its pacifism, equally insists on its patriotism, with the revolutionary and internationalist Socialist party. It is a paradox that requires explanation since, on the surface, it is contrary to all reason. In the first place the Radical party has become the prisoner of its own slogan: "No enemies on the Left." The Left includes the Republican Socialists and the Socialists proper—that is, the French Section of the Workers' Internationale. The Radicals would have to invent, if it did not exist, a Reaction from which they could distinguish themselves; and the Reaction has come to mean not only the Right but the Centre. The fact that a Centre-Right majority has passed in recent years many measures of social reform—one need only mention the Loucheur Housing Law and Social Insurance—cannot be allowed to change the designation of the Centre-Right

their actual habits? If, for instance, you find a feud going on in a village, can you do anything about it?" Mr. Ch'en gave a quiet smile. "I can answer your question," he said, "by showing you this photograph. This is a group taken a few weeks ago in the village of Kaochuang. When we started our work there there were two camps in the village. The two leading families, the Wangs and the Yangs, would not speak to each other, and any attempt to start our co-operative schemes was of course quite hopeless. I talked with the heads of the rival families in turn, and little by little I succeeded in showing them how foolish their feud was and how it stood in the way of any progress for the village. At last they agreed and were reconciled as you can see here," and he showed us the group—some eight or ten village elders posing amicably together in front of the village temple. Later in the day I asked a mutual friend, a foreigner, if Mr. Ch'en was a Christian. "I do not think he professes Christianity," was the answer I got, "but after hearing him speak of his work and the way he does it, don't you think that Christ in his place would have put it in much the same way?" No better commentary was possible.

At lunch time we went off to have our meal at the Experimental Farm. It lies inside, and close to, the old city wall. The wall here is so drifted up with sand that it is no more than a high mound streaked with paths which run over the top. Here is material for agricultural experiment right at hand. Why not plant the wall with trees and encircle the city with a wooded belt so as to allay the fierce dust-storms which sweep over the plain every spring? So the wall is being "afforested." The work has only just begun, and no young trees were visible on this particular sector, but the Reformers of Tingsien had already set their mark on the wall behind the farm in the form of a graceful pillared pavilion which stands on the summit, outlined against the sky. Our host, the head of the Experimental Farm, showed us first experiments in crop selection and explained the exhaustive trials which are being made to find the varieties of millet, cotton, fruit trees and so forth which are best adapted to the local climate and soil. Further on we came to a water-wheel being worked by a donkey, of the sort (the wheel I mean!) whose strident music is seldom out of your ears when you go about the country. This was an instance of the work being done in designing improvements in the types of common farm implements. An essential condition of any improved type is that it should cost no more, but even with this limitation many instruments, like the ubiquitous water-wheel, are being substantially bettered.

The work of the Farm extends also to live-stock. The native

has to return twenty eggs laid by selected pullets and taken from trap-nests. A farmer who gets our seed has to return a proportionate quantity of grain from his next harvest. The dispensary is supported by the village itself and, except for the first set, which the Movement supplies gratis, the books in the reading-room have to be bought by the village."

It was an hour after sunset when we re-entered the gates. The great pagoda—some say the highest but one in China—looked spectral in the dusk. Riding up to its base we found ourselves again at Mr. Yen's, where the whole of the headquarters staff had gathered for Sunday supper. Afterwards we gathered in Mr. Yen's study to talk of the work of the Movement.

The village street was again chequered with black shadows on the moonlight when we crept down it at 4.30 on the following morning on our way to catch the bi-weekly Hankow express returning to Peking. That the train was seven hours late and that we had to wait for it till midday was in the normal order of things in this province of China.

G. E. HUBBARD.

THE LAMBETH MEETING AND CHURCH UNITY.

AS the Lower House of the Canterbury Convocation dispersed on Friday, January 22nd, after an anxious and inconclusive discussion on the Bishops' proposals to admit non-Anglicans to Holy Communion, they were met by newspaper placards—"Cabinet Dissensions, Startling Decision." Church and State being one, no doubt the Commons Spiritual dashed eagerly to see what dangers were threatening the "junior branch of the Legislature." When they learnt that the "startling decision" amounted only to Cabinet Ministers being allowed for once to tell the truth about their differences of opinion, not a few of the worried proctors for the clergy will have cried—*O si sic episcopi*.

On most matters ecclesiastical, other than the fundamentals of the Faith, statements about the opinion of a united Episcopate are patently unreal—to use no harder term. Even with regard to the fundamentals, as laid down by the famous Lambeth Quadrilateral (the Creeds, the Scriptures, the Sacraments and the Historic Episcopate), there is general rather than exact unanimity among the Bishops. Their Lordships are chosen by the Crown from all sorts and conditions of Englishmen (not forgetting a strong admixture of Scots, Welsh and Irish) and the way of the Church of England is no narrow sheep-path along which the faithful are herded to salvation. It is a broad ocean-track, with boundaries real though undefined, whereon vessels great or small steer by the same stars to the haven where all would be. They may sail under convoy or alone, but the tug has not yet been invented to which all can tie. Every time an attempt is made to achieve such "unity," the cable parts and the fleet is scattered far and wide. When Stephen Gardiner, defending his King (Henry VIII) against the Pope, defined the Church of England as "that only multitude of people, which, being joined in the profession of Christ, hath grown into one body," he was stating the plain fact written on every page of England's history. English-speaking Christendom is a fleet and not a string of barges.

The attempted application to the Episcopate of the nineteenth-century doctrine concerning Cabinet unity was a direct outcome of the Reform Bill of 1832. To the principle underlying this statute the Bishops of England, whether Whig or Tory, were resolutely opposed. They were quite determined to have no democratic nonsense in the Church, for the government of which a ruling "Commission" was proposed consisting of the Bishops

with an admixture of the principal officers of State. "The alternative," as Blomfield of London, the leader of the episcopal bench, wrote to Peel, "is a Convocation—which we do not want." Sidney Smith's trenchant *Letters to Archdeacon Singleton* emasculated this project by limiting the function of the Ecclesiastical Commission mainly to financial reform. But Blomfield did not abandon his proposal. In 1850 he introduced a Bill into the Lords to abolish the immemorial status of the Sacred Synod (Convocation) as the "supreme court" in matters spiritual. In his speech he laid down the axiom that it is

the inherent and inalienable right of the Bishops of the Church of England to be judges of questions of its doctrines, duly submitted to them.

One of his supporters (Lord Redesdale) urged the House to pass the measure on the ground that "too great liberty to the clergy is injury to the laity," but the Lords distrusted oligarchy (in the Church at any rate) and it was defeated by 84 to 51.

Unofficially Blomfield's plan for reconstituting the Church of England went on. The ritual controversies of the 'sixties and 'seventies enabled Tait to establish the beginnings of the Lambeth Meeting at which to-day the "united mind of the Episcopate" is decided. Many factors have contributed to its development: the increase of the central Common Fund started in 1840 and controlled by the Bishops (who form the overwhelming majority of the Commissioners, among whom the inferior clergy are represented only by three *ex officio* deans); the constitution of a Representative Church Council (now the Church Assembly) in which the anti-clerical lay element could be balanced against the Lower Houses of the Convocations; the prestige derived from the assembly of the decennial Lambeth Conference; the growing divergence between Church and State in the national administration; the general determination to avoid spiritual issues being judged in secular courts. During his long tenure of the primatial see, Tait's chaplain and son-in-law, Davidson, was able to give to the Lambeth Meeting a force and reality which were not wholly dependent on the personal predominance he acquired over his brethren. A new constitutional model for the Church of England came into actual being. Blomfield would recognise (and welcome) the words with which the Bishop of Winchester commended to the Canterbury Upper House the "Regulations" with regard to admitting non-Anglicans to Communion. In justification

He ventured to remind their Lordships that these proposals had not been sprung upon them. Not only were they discussed up and down at the Lambeth Committee, but they were committed to a Committee of Bishops, who thrashed them all out

and presented a report to the Bishops' Meeting, which was substantially the same as what was before them. Therefore, they had been through the sieve of the Bishops' Committee in the Bishops' Meeting. It was at the Bishops' Meeting in January that it was decided that they should be brought before Convocation and formally discussed and adopted. (*Chronicle of Convocation*, June 1931, p. 168.)

Such a statement is, in the words of one of the greatest living authorities on constitutional matters, "quite outrageous." Certainly it must be almost unique in modern constitutional history for "formally discussed and adopted" to be used in such a connection. Yet it is an honest exposition of the legislative position into which the Church has drifted during the last half-century and to which the rejection of the Prayer Book Measures in 1927 and 1928 contributed. The old laws cannot be enforced. Concerning the deviations which may be tolerated as custom there is no unanimity among the Bishops, the inferior clergy or the laity. When we analyse the "united mind of the episcopate," whose proposals the Convocations were asked to endorse, it boils down to the modern reassertion of a weird dogma of the sixteenth-century Holy Roman Empire: *Cujus regio, illius religio*. Each Bishop is to order in his own diocese what he thinks fit; and enforce it if he may, by administrative pressure. Anything more certain to increase confusion and to decrease efficiency can hardly be imagined.

This was not the use for which Davidson shaped the Lambeth Meeting. His mind was dominated by the concept of Law and Order. Bishops were to set an example of submission to the common mind, and that common mind was to be determined constitutionally. Thus the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Disorders, for the appointment and findings of which Davidson was largely responsible, reported in 1906 that

There cannot, in our opinion, be any doubt that the Acts of Uniformity bind Bishops as well as clergymen, and that the law does not recognise any right in a Bishop to override the provisions as to services, rites and ceremonies contained in those Acts.

A Bishops' Meeting to agree on common action according to the law is quite a different thing from one which, as in the procedure indicated in the Bishop of Winchester's disclosure, deals with legislation. The one is a factor necessary for efficiency. The other is "quite outrageous" from every constitutional point of view.

Lord Hugh Cecil put the matter very plainly in the February

number of the *Church Assembly Notes*, the official character of this magazine giving a certain piquancy to his comment:

We hear from time to time of meetings of the Bishops at Lambeth. I trust it is not presumptuous to say that it would seem to be more regular if the Bishops met either in Joint Meetings of the Upper Houses of the Convocations, or as a House of Bishops. The object of a meeting of Bishops is presumably that the episcopate should act corporately; and it would surely be right that that corporate character should be expressed either by their sitting as a Joint Meeting of the Upper Houses of the Convocations or as the House of Bishops. A third institution, called a Meeting of the Bishops, seems a fifth wheel to the coach, or rather a third wheel to the gig, which needs only the two wheels of the Assembly and the Convocations. It is not clear that there is any formal distinction between a meeting of the Bishops and a gathering of some of the Archbishop of Canterbury's friends who happen to be in episcopal orders. Corporate action and a corporate character should surely be expressed by acting in the name of the Convocations or of the House of Bishops.

What the Royal Commission Report (1906) laid down with respect to the legal obligations of Bishops is, incidentally, good canon law. For the Act of Uniformity does nothing more than confirm by statute what had already been enacted by canon in the Convocations. Action taken by a Bishop is divided by canonists into three classes, *juxta*, *contra*, or *praeter jus commune*, the "common law" being that which is established by superior authority, provincial or œcumenical. Some measure of discretion is allowed to the Bishop with regard to regulation *juxta jus commune*, that is to say as to how strictly to enforce the law.* None is allowed *contra jus commune* to dispense from positive enactments. The Bishop is as much bound by the common law as the clergy under him. In particular, dispensation from rites and ceremonies is explicitly forbidden. With regard to matters not defined by direct legislation (*praeter jus commune*) there is a difference of opinion. The better and older tradition is that followed by the English Courts, namely that, where no enactment can be cited to the contrary, the liberty of the subject cannot be restrained. Others hold the continental conception of law as an all-embracing code with specified exceptions: that where no liberty is allowed, none exists. The latter standpoint has never, as far as my knowledge goes, been taken in England until under the Prayer Book Measure of 1927 it was proposed to give the Bishops power to "take order" wherever the common law (as set forth in the rubrics of the Book Deposited) gave no directions. Although a large majority of its members desired that Measure

* It is in accordance with this principle that the Bishop is given power by statute to stop process regarding "Clergy Discipline."

to pass almost on any terms, the Canterbury Lower House showed itself fully alive to the danger involved in the proposals with regard to episcopal "regulations" *praeter jus commune*. Wherever the Book, or the Measure authorising it, conferred such powers, they requested the insertion of the words "with the concurrence of the Convocation." It is significant that in each case the motion to that effect was carried *nem. con.* and without debate. Due importance does not seem to have been attached by the Bishops to the respectful but firm attitude of the Lower House of Convocation. Behind this there is far stronger and deeper feeling among the clergy generally than anyone imagines. For the whole issue between constitutional episcopacy and what the sixteenth century called "prelacy" is at stake. There is probably not a diocese in either province in which a proctor would stand a chance of election, if he openly declared for the Bishops being given power to make or to repeal laws without the concurrence "in whole or in part" of the Lower House of the province. The position of the clergy is that of the Synod of Merton: "We will not have the Laws of England changed," except by proper synodical process.

Between administration and legislation a clear-cut distinction is drawn. As regards the former the clergy are monarchist—absolutist almost. For they know, from their own parochial experience, how impossible it is to direct the work of the Church without authority being able to rely on loyal backing by the faithful. But on the subject of legislation they are constitutionalists to a man. Of all the Churches in Christendom, with the possible exception of some of pre-Chalcedon Separated Churches in the East (Armenian, Syrian, etc.) the Church of England has alone maintained throughout the ages the primitive synodical tradition. It is her most priceless heritage as an institution. In the reordering of world-politics since 1066 the constitutional model of the Church of England has played the same part as during the last two centuries the Bank of England has played in world-trade. She is still the rallying-centre of Christian liberty and on that the future of mankind depends.

The Canterbury Lower House could not have defined its attitude towards the Lambeth Meeting better or more clearly than it did in June 1930, when the Lambeth Meeting laid before Convocation a Resolution embodying the policy which the Bishops proposed to adopt in face of the situation caused by the rejection of the Prayer Book Measure. In this, vaguely but unmistakably, there was a suggestion that their Lordships had the right to legislate, both *praeter jus commune* (by "regulating" where the law of 1661 was silent) and *contra jus commune* (by "permitting"

variations from that law). The Lower House contented itself with noting the administrative action proposed, namely that process for disobedience would be stayed when the offence was one which the Deposited Book proposed to legalise. But in their reply they added significantly the respectful request that any general Regulations for the Province should be submitted for concurrence to the Convocation. This would be in the category of legislation—an alteration of the Common Law of the Province in which their concurrence was a necessary condition. On receiving the reply of the Lower House the Archbishop promised the respectful attention of the Upper, though some of his suffragans did not disguise their distaste for the (perfectly correct) constitutional attitude of the inferior clergy.

From every point of view it is deplorable that the "prelatists" among the Bishops will not face the facts. The Church of England is paralysed by divisions and cross-currents. Its members being English, peace can only be restored by constitutional methods. A man will strain his conscience to obey laws enacted according to law, even if (as Gardiner put the matter to Cranmer in 1547) "they be passed without my knowledge or against my mind." But confront an Englishman with an autocratic decree, whether by Pope or Prelate or King, and every fibre of him is stiffened to resistance. There is grim humour, not unmingled with tragedy, in the fact that Nonconformists are expected to be conciliated by means of the very procedure which forced their forefathers to dissent!

The constitutional issue on which a new and disastrous difference between the two Convocation Houses is threatened must be carefully distinguished from the effect of the legislative action proposed. As regards the latter, opposition to intercommunion by episcopal "discretion" must not be taken to imply hostility to non-episcopal Christendom. Like the present Archbishop of Canterbury, I am the son of a Scottish Presbyterian. Not the least precious among my memories is helping my father (who was paralysed) to an Anglican altar and kneeling by his side—I a confirmed boy and he an unconfirmed man. For he held that to "submit" to confirmation by a Bishop was a tacit admission that the Church of his baptism could not admit him to full membership in the Church of Christ. The parson was breaking the law by receiving him. My father was breaking the law by receiving the Sacrament. But both held (and I agree with them) that the law is sometimes more honoured in the breach than in the observance.

Much, indeed, may be done by what the Easterns call "economy" (*oikonomia*), i.e. by not insisting on too much stiff-

ness in individual cases. But no one to whom the Church, as a human institution, is primarily a Discipline can accept the proposition that the law may be repealed at will by those whose principal trust is to administer it. If the law requires amendment so that confirmation of baptism by a Bishop is no longer to be a necessary preliminary to communion, let this be done by proper synodical act and not at "the discretion of the Diocesan Bishop." Lawbreaking as an act of charity is a venial sin. As a deliberate policy it is without excuse.

Apart from this claim to set aside the Law, the latest Lambeth Meeting decree "brought before Convocation," fails to commend itself mainly from faulty drafting. It is a pity that the Bishops did not call in the assistance of the skill in this direction at the disposal of the Church Assembly. Intentionally or otherwise the wording is vague to the point of obscurity. What meaning can be attached to the description—"a baptised communicant of a church not in communion with our own"? Is baptism "in the Name of God" (as administered by some Protestant bodies) Baptism in the Christian sense? Is a communicant one who merely takes part in a pious and unimportant piece of action-teaching? Is a Church (as the Congregationalists hold) any group of worshippers who care to ordain one of their number as Minister? The answer in every case is, These questions are "in the discretion of the Diocesan Bishop" to decide. *Cujus regio, illius religio* again, with the Prime Minister selecting the prince who is to make the law therein!

Yet quite a small change in the drafting would put the matter right. Suppose the word "church" was limited by adding the words "recognised by the Convocation of the Province." The whole proposal becomes at once Presbyterian, Catholic, and Orthodox, simply because it becomes constitutional. Neither baptism nor communicant status is an individual possession apart from the Body in which it is conferred. Recognise a Church and you recognise every individual member of it. Recognise individuals apart from their Church and you deny the latter's real existence. It will be a matter of surprise if many, especially among the Presbyterians, do not regard the "offer" as not far removed from an insult. For it is based on the tacit assumption that their Churches are on a lower spiritual plane than the Anglican—that individuals can be recognised but not the body to which they belong.

The right method of approach is surely that followed by the Convocations at the same group of sessions this January with regard to the Old Catholics. Here the resolution for the establishment of intercommunion was treated in proper Synodical fashion.

The Upper House approved the terms of an agreement arrived at by a Joint Commission appointed by the two Communions. The Lower House concurred, and an Act of Convocation was recorded. Why cannot the same procedure be followed with regard to Presbyterians, Lutherans, and even with English "Free" Churches? Agreement for mutual recognition with the latter, of course, has special difficulties in connection with overlapping jurisdictions—a problem that does not arise regarding "foreign" Churches. But there is no insuperable obstacle in the way from a constitutional point of view, with which alone we are here concerned. The exclusive headship of the City-Bishop over all the Churches within his *parochia* is not part of the primitive church-order. In most parts of the world it exists only in theory as a relic of the former unity of Christendom as an Empire. In the Levant it has for centuries been little more than a claim on behalf of that Byzantine Imperial system with which the statesmen of Constantinople identified Christendom. Unity of citizenship is no longer accepted anywhere as the basis of religious unity, and for some generations at least English Christians will certainly continue to be organised in more than one *ecclesia*. Whether it will ever be possible (or desirable) for them again to combine under a single hierarchy, the future will show. Meanwhile there is no reason why, in the devotional, as in the social sphere, they should not fight as allies. No such association is possible as long as it exists only "in the discretion of the Diocesan Bishop."

C. E. DOUGLAS.

DOSTOEVSKY.

OF the three great Russian writers; Turgenev, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, to whom the Russian novel owes its popularity abroad, and who have been close contemporaries, Dostoevsky died the earliest, in 1881. With Dostoevsky's death, the golden age of Russian literature in prose and verse finished. It began with Pushkin and Gogol, then continued about sixty to sixty-five years. Having produced giants who gave to the Russian novel and poetry one of the prominent places in the world's literature, it began to decline till at present it has arrived at a point where literature has become an official handmaid of the Bolshevik Government, and novels or poetry are judged not by their intrinsic literary value, but by their usefulness to the "Five-Year Plan," or to any other undertaking of the communistic authorities.

Turgenev survived Dostoevsky only about three years, during which appeared his two tales *Clara Milich*, the *Song of Triumphant Love* and *Prose Poems*. No doubt these have been beautiful things, as one would have expected from the pen of such a master, but they have not been great things like *Fathers and Sons*, *Rudin*, *The Nest of the Nobles*, or the *Memoirs of a Hunter* and others by which Turgenev is chiefly known. Tolstoy survived Dostoevsky for thirty years, but that was just the period during which his name became more associated with his religious and social teachings than with his work as a novelist, and it would be simple idolatry to say that Tolstoy, after 1881, wrote anything which really can be called great or equal to his *War and Peace* or *Anna Karénina*. The tales that he wrote after 1881 were purely propaganda tales, and so was his novel *Resurrection*. A man of such genius could not write bad things even were he inclined to do so, and whatever he wrote in the form of fiction must have been interesting reading; but who would say that such a novel as *Resurrection* or a drama like *The Power of Darkness* could win him the world-wide reputation of a great writer?

Not only did Dostoevsky's contemporaries cease to enrich Russian literature with really great works, but there was a visible decadence in the power of the Russian novel in all the writers of the generation that followed him. The nearest to him chronologically was Chekhov, a charming writer, rich in poetical moods and humour, writing in a lucid and simple prose, with the exception of Gogol and Turgenev of almost unsurpassed beauty, in a free, unacademical style. But it would be exaggerated admiration to compare him with Turgenev or Dostoevsky. Even in his dramas, which are so admired by a certain section of the English *intelligentsia*, he does not achieve such mastership as Gogol or even the grip of Tolstoy.

Interesting and amusing writing does not make a great literary work any more than a beautiful face and a pleasant speech mean a great man or woman. Then, at the beginning of the nineties, there appeared another writer, Gorky, who made something of a splash in literature by his description of the proud vagabond (the *bossiak*). He still continues to write, producing more and more dull works, but I do not think that anyone whose taste is formed on really great writers could stand even in his early writings the banal and almost childish conversation of his heroes, who are pretending to utter their "philosophy of life." Gorky began his literary career with second-rate tales and is finishing it with third-rate ones.

I have given a brief sketch of Russian literature so as to make clear the position that Dostoevsky occupied in it, and can now turn to his works and life and to indicate what gave him his popularity at home and abroad. From his great contemporaries he differed very much alike in his works and life. Tolstoy and Turgenev have never known the penury that Dostoevsky experienced. Although he belonged to the nobility he was not of the old families who for centuries have possessed great estates or occupied high positions in the State. By his ancestry he came of a Lithuanian family who emigrated to the South of Russia, the Ukraine. Through three or four generations of mixed marriages he acquired that feeling of Russian nationality, that penetration into the Russian mentality, that were so conspicuous in his writings, and at the same time his Lithuanian and Ukrainian extraction must have left in his blood and in the cells of his brain traces of the capacity to create the complicated plots that no other Russian writer of a purer Russian extraction had ever attempted. On the contrary, all other Russian writers, especially the best of them, are very poor in inventing incidents and intrigues. Their skill consists in making a novel interesting sometimes without containing any incident. For instance, Chekhov's tales are purely descriptive with very slight anecdotes, if any.

The title of hereditary nobility which Dostoevsky possessed came to him from his father, who was a doctor and head of a military hospital in Moscow, and to whom the title was first granted. He had no other means except his own, which at first consisted of a salary as an officer in the Engineering Corps, to which he was promoted in 1841. In 1844 he gave up his military service and devoted himself entirely to literary work. His first novel *The Poor People* appeared in 1846 and at once won him a name. Belinsky was the best Russian critic not only in his own time, but also the best of all who followed him in Russia, although suffering from the same defects as all Russian critics, namely a

strong political and dogmatic bias. Yet he knew what was good, and in his review of the novel he said: "Many writers will appear during Dostoevsky's career who will be compared with him, but in the end they will be forgotten while he will reach the apogee of his fame." This success so encouraged Dostoevsky that during the next three years he published no less than nine other fairly long tales. But although his literary earnings were large, his expenses seem to have been still greater. Besides being very generous in assisting relatives and friends and even strangers who applied to him, he became in his later years addicted to gambling at the roulette-tables when abroad, and although sometimes he was lucky the money he won went back on new stakes. Gambling was simply a passion or, as his wife wrote, a disease with him; it was certainly not lust for money.

Thus, many of the defects in the form of Dostoevsky's tales and novels can be attributed to his want of money and to the necessity of writing as quickly as possible so as to earn more money. He himself tells us that often the beginning of a novel was already in the printer's hands when its continuation was still in his head and had to be delivered without fail the next day. Even at the end of his life when his income must have been considerable he was still very hard up. In June 1880 he wanted his wife to go with him to Moscow where he was invited to make a speech at the Pushkin celebrations. She also wished to go. She foresaw that his appearance on the platform, on which were Turgenev and other leaders of Russian intellectual life, would prove to be the greatest triumph of her husband's literary career. And so it was; but they found that for both to go would cost fifteen or twenty pounds, which they could not afford, and she stayed at home. It is true that when six months later he died there were seventy-two depositions at his funeral; but his wife and children had to be saved from starvation by a Government pension.

If one looks at the facsimiles appended to some of the Russian editions, one notices that he was not at all negligent in writing, and many passages are crossed out and then rewritten. Then besides writing novels he published from 1861 to 1865 reviews to which he himself regularly contributed articles on politics and literature. In 1873 he edited the *Grazhdanin*, in which, besides various other articles, he used to write on foreign politics. During the years 1876 and 1877 he published his own monthly called the *Writer's Diary*, which, if it had been written more systematically, could be likened to Goethe's *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. Much of its contents are reminiscent of his own past life and of that of his friends, while much consists of imaginative stories. This constant haste in writing so as to earn enough

Interesting and amusing writing does not make a great literary work any more than a beautiful face and a pleasant speech mean a great man or woman. Then, at the beginning of the nineties, there appeared another writer, Gorky, who made something of a splash in literature by his description of the proud vagabond (the *bossiak*). He still continues to write, producing more and more dull works, but I do not think that anyone whose taste is formed on really great writers could stand even in his early writings the banal and almost childish conversation of his heroes, who are pretending to utter their "philosophy of life." Gorky began his literary career with second-rate tales and is finishing it with third-rate ones.

I have given a brief sketch of Russian literature so as to make clear the position that Dostoevsky occupied in it, and can now turn to his works and life and to indicate what gave him his popularity at home and abroad. From his great contemporaries he differed very much alike in his works and life. Tolstoy and Turgenev have never known the penury that Dostoevsky experienced. Although he belonged to the nobility he was not of the old families who for centuries have possessed great estates or occupied high positions in the State. By his ancestry he came of a Lithuanian family who emigrated to the South of Russia, the Ukraine. Through three or four generations of mixed marriages he acquired that feeling of Russian nationality, that penetration into the Russian mentality, that were so conspicuous in his writings, and at the same time his Lithuanian and Ukrainian extraction must have left in his blood and in the cells of his brain traces of the capacity to create the complicated plots that no other Russian writer of a purer Russian extraction had ever attempted. On the contrary, all other Russian writers, especially the best of them, are very poor in inventing incidents and intrigues. Their skill consists in making a novel interesting sometimes without containing any incident. For instance, Chekhov's tales are purely descriptive with very slight anecdotes, if any.

The title of hereditary nobility which Dostoevsky possessed came to him from his father, who was a doctor and head of a military hospital in Moscow, and to whom the title was first granted. He had no other means except his own, which at first consisted of a salary as an officer in the Engineering Corps, to which he was promoted in 1841. In 1841 he gave up his military service and devoted himself entirely to literary work. His first novel *The Poor People* appeared in 1846 and at once won him a name. Belinsky was the best Russian critic not only in his own time, but also the best of all who followed him in Russia, although suffering from the same defects as all Russian critics, namely a

strong political and dogmatic bias. Yet he knew what was good, and in his review of the novel he said: "Many writers will appear during Dostoevsky's career who will be compared with him, but in the end they will be forgotten while he will reach the apogee of his fame." This success so encouraged Dostoevsky that during the next three years he published no less than nine other fairly long tales. But although his literary earnings were large, his expenses seem to have been still greater. Besides being very generous in assisting relatives and friends and even strangers who applied to him, he became in his later years addicted to gambling at the roulette-tables when abroad, and although sometimes he was lucky the money he won went back on new stakes. Gambling was simply a passion or, as his wife wrote, a disease with him; it was certainly not lust for money.

Thus, many of the defects in the form of Dostoevsky's tales and novels can be attributed to his want of money and to the necessity of writing as quickly as possible so as to earn more money. He himself tells us that often the beginning of a novel was already in the printer's hands when its continuation was still in his head and had to be delivered without fail the next day. Even at the end of his life when his income must have been considerable he was still very hard up. In June 1880 he wanted his wife to go with him to Moscow where he was invited to make a speech at the Pushkin celebrations. She also wished to go. She foresaw that his appearance on the platform, on which were Turgenev and other leaders of Russian intellectual life, would prove to be the greatest triumph of her husband's literary career. And so it was; but they found that for both to go would cost fifteen or twenty pounds, which they could not afford, and she stayed at home. It is true that when six months later he died there were seventy-two deputations at his funeral; but his wife and children had to be saved from starvation by a Government pension.

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to keep himself and his family was unknown to Turgenev and Tolstoy, who, besides literary earnings, had enough from the income from their estates, and therefore could give their writings that polish which is not always found in Dostoevsky's works. Another circumstance which must have affected him greatly as a writer was his bad health. Frequent fits of epilepsy must have given to his creative faculties a disposition to fantastic, unreal characters and situations lacking the simplicity and orderliness that are natural to authors with healthy bodies and minds like Goethe or Tolstoy.

There is a third important circumstance in Dostoevsky's life which must be mentioned, although the exact place of its influence on Dostoevsky's works cannot be defined with certainty—the sufferings he underwent at the hands of the Government. In April 1849 he was arrested with twenty-three other persons nominally for conspiracy against the Government, in reality for attending meetings of friends at which political and philosophical questions were discussed. He was kept in the Fortress of Peter and Paul in St. Petersburg for eight months. On December 22nd of the same year he and some of the other "conspirators" were taken to the scaffold to be hanged, but on arrival a reprieve was announced and he was sent for four years to penal servitude in Siberia. He was liberated in 1854, sent to serve as a soldier in Semipalatinsk, where having obtained again the rank of officer he married his first wife, a widow, in 1857, and in 1859 returned to St. Petersburg a free man, discharged from the army. His prison life is described in his *Memoirs from a Dead House*, one of his best books, and some other experiences of his appear in the *Idiot* and in the *Writer's Diary*, as well as in his letters. His experiences were terrible, though his position in penal servitude was not so hard as that of those who belonged to the "lower classes." And yet, one may almost say that, like the hard experiences of Cervantes, they did no harm to his talent; on the contrary, they seemed even to enrich it. In any case his works after returning from Siberia are of much greater artistic value, and his best novel, one of the greatest novels of the nineteenth century, which made his name so popular in the world, *Crime and Punishment*, appeared in 1866.

The difference between his writings before and after the ten years (1849-59) of his Siberian life may be judged by two tales, both dealing with the same eternal subject which no great writer has ever ignored—a husband's jealousy. In 1848 appeared *The Other Man's Wife and the Husband under the Bed*. An extraordinary story. It was really an "extraordinary" story, too flippant and with impossible situations. The theme was treated

from the comical standpoint as the "cocu" is generally treated in a French *vaudeville*. Twenty-one years later he returned to the subject and published *The Eternal Husband*, in which the psychology of the jealous husband, Paul Trusotsky, and his burning desire to cause his rival mental torture are represented in an artistic, natural and original way possible only to great masters of fiction. The punishment invented by the hero Trusotsky is also used by a wife against her husband in one of de Maupassant's tales, *Monsieur Parent*.

Great writers are like precious diamonds, with many facets; but we may point out the principal feature of Dostoevsky's imaginative creations. The idea that seemed always to pursue him, in a small tale or a big novel, was the type of Hamlet, the man who is always undergoing a struggle within himself with his doubts and his utter insignificance. Social questions, women's rights, poverty and riches, the struggle of classes, even vicissitudes of love between the sexes, which usually occupy such a place in novels, were not the subjects by which Dostoevsky was inspired as a novelist. These things interested him merely as incidents, as a setting to a picture, as an ornament, but not as the substance of a novel. It was the struggle going on within the human soul itself, and not outside it, that attracted his genius. Of all his hundreds of characters I can remember only three outstanding figures of a balanced and settled nature enjoying full peace of mind. These are Zosima and Aliosha in *The Brothers Karamazov*, and Prince Myshkin in the *Idiot*. The hero of *Crime and Punishment*, Raskolnikov, was a pure type of those in whom "The native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." Not money, not the lust of murder made him kill the old woman money-lender, but the wish to see whether he "could" do such a thing. He did it but was not satisfied; and again not because he repented of the act itself. His heroes never repent—unlike Tolstoy, who made them commit crimes with the sole purpose of torturing them later with the agony of repentance. In the *Memoirs of a Dead House* Dostoevsky several times positively asserts that he never noticed any feelings of regret among the many murderers with whom he became acquainted in prison. His hero Raskolnikov did not regret the criminal act he committed: what tortured him was his pride. He found that he acted not like a brave man fearing no consequences, but as a regular coward, like a mean murderer who is afraid of being caught, afraid of punishment and of the opinion of his fellow men. The hesitations and doubling of personality following the inner struggles of mind, taking neither the one course nor the other, good or bad, were presented in a rather too extreme form in his early tales, *The*

Double, and *Feeble Heart*. Both characters finish with madness, being tortured by the same cause of pride and irresolution.

The deepest and most violent struggles in a thinking man's mind are always connected with ethical and religious problems, and it is to these points that Dostoevsky's novels are chiefly, if not exclusively, devoted. Outside life, nature, social or domestic habits, in descriptions of which all other, Russian and European, writers abound, are very scanty in Dostoevsky's works. You could not learn even the simplest feature of Russian life from Dostoevsky's novels; you will, however, understand much of the Russian mentality. It is this mentality which he seemed to penetrate more than any other Russian writer, and more than others he revealed it in his novels. It is true that the features are exaggerated, sometimes even distorted. He who was very frank about his works and, for instance, declared that the *Idiot* is so bad that "even the idea of the novel fizzled out," wrote in his *Diary of a Writer* (April 1st, 1876) that an artistic, literary work "must be created in types, in characters." No *nature morte* for him.

What then is the Russian mentality, according to Dostoevsky's novels? It is a mentality of extreme individualism, notwithstanding the temporary aberration of socialism and communism which we witness at present, forced on Russia through extreme violence and terror by a group of persons possessed by the lust for domination over their fellow-men. That is also one of the chief features of Russian mentality so well revealed by Dostoevsky, in *The Village of Stepanchikovo*, in *The Devils*, and in others. His penetration is almost uncanny. This mentality, as revealed by his writings, explains much of the past and the present of Russian life. As publicist and novelist he wrote a good deal on Christianity and the destinies of the Russian nation. And although his Christianity was somewhat of the Byzantine order, and his nationalistic tendencies were rather conservative, there was such breadth and depth in all that he wrote that no one could fail to be impressed by his lofty mind and ardent, humane sentiments. As a writer he was the Carlyle and the Burke of Russia, although of a different style. Some have thought his style monotonous. Personally I do not find it so. But if it is monotonous it has the beauty and majesty of the monotony of a continuous rush of a great waterfall consisting of an incessant flow of original ideas and fervid sentiment.

SEMON RAPOPORT.

PURITANS AND SEA VENTURE.

THE modern distaste for the quaint conventions and the moral rigours of Puritanism endangers the solid foundations of its reputation. Through its virile inspiration the Calvinists of Holland won the dominion of the seas from invincible Spain, the most notable of the French captains were Huguenots, and the triumphant Commonwealth navy was heir to the Puritan tradition of Elizabethan days. The greatest of the Elizabethan seamen, Sir Francis Drake, was of Puritan sympathies, the host of earnest and devout ministers, whom he treated with considerate liberality and gracious hospitality. In the early days of sea venture the noblemen most interested in the promotion of voyages were of decided Puritan sympathies, the Earl of Leicester being as famous for his enthusiasm for sea venture as he was for his protection of the Puritans; when the ecclesiastical authorities frowned upon Puritan professors the post of chaplain in some great man's house was a place of refuge. The merchants who financed the voyages were generally of definite Puritan views, whilst Puritan clergy furnished the chaplains, wrote the narratives, and experimented in the technique of navigation.

England sought for herself a way to the Indies by a north-west passage. Martin Frobisher brought from the north a shipload of black ore when the alchemists promised England an inflow of gold such as had enriched Spain. So the Queen gave her patronage to a second voyage, whilst the merchants of the city were forward with their subscriptions. This was to be a voyage in the Puritan spirit. Divine service was to be reverently performed twice a day, whilst swearing, dicing, card-playing and filthy talk were to be banished from the fleet. After a second failure it was determined to attempt a voyage to the Indies by way of the Cape. Martin Frobisher was the first choice for general, but he resented the precise instructions laid down for the conduct of the voyage, and was wedded to the north-west passage, so Edward Fenton was chosen general in his stead. Frobisher and Carlile refused to have any responsibility for the arrangements of the voyage, but Drake and Hawkins were willing to help. William Hawkins was chosen as Fenton's lieutenant, whilst Luke Ward was named vice-admiral to command the famous *Edward Bonaventura*.

Fenton's voyage began in dissension and ended in disaster, but the detailed accounts we have of his inception and course admirably illustrate the connection between the Puritans and sea venture. After the choice of the captains came the ministers, who were selected with particular care. They were to be members of the fleet council together with the captains and the merchants, whilst the pilots and surgeons were only to be called into consultation when

special advice was needed. The rule concerning divine service, gaming, and vain talk, laid down for Frobisher's earlier voyages, was repeated, together with special instructions to treat the ministers with respect. Fenton was a *protégé* of the Earl of Leicester, and Richard Madox, appointed to the *Leicester* as chaplain, was from the Earl of Leicester's household, an Oxford man and a Puritan. From the moment when we are introduced to him at dinner at the table of Mr. Green—the Earl's table being full—to his final leaving after the failure of the voyage, we are able to follow his adventures in detail. Before setting sail he visited many notable in the history of the adventure; he was guest of Sir Francis Drake, of Mr. Alderman Bourne, of the Muscovy House, "who gave him provision for the voyage and the promise of honourable consideration upon his return" and of old Mr. Towerson. Mr. Towerson had sailed to Guinea when Mary was queen, and entertained the minister with travellers' tales as well as dinner, as of the storks which did devour men. Archbishop Grindall was then at Canterbury. He received Madox most graciously, and anticipated the famous saying of John Wesley by licensing the ship's chaplain to preach to the whole world.

After some days' delay at Southampton the fleet sailed with godly watchwords and devout ceremonial. The admiral signalled "If God be for us" and the consorts replied "Who shall be against us?" The mayor of the town wrote a full account of the setting forth to the Earl of Leicester, telling how "his lordship's chaplain made a godly, eloquent sermon before three hundred who had gathered in the ship, and showed himself to be worthy of such a patron."

The chaplain of the *Edward Bonaventura* was an even more pronounced Puritan than was Madox. John Walker was one of the most charming of the courageous men who sailed on the early voyages. He records how Sir Francis Drake "used me with the greatest friendship, both in instructing me in the voyage and in dealing liberally with me and my fellow preacher, Richard Madox." This contentious voyage furnished abundant opportunity for Walker to win the peacemaker's blessing, and there is a measure of his influence with the seamen in the frequent account of a dispute ending with Walker's intercession prevailing "and all concluded friends."

Before Archbishop Whitgift became a scourge of Puritans and a promoter of dissent Holinshed describes certain exercises as typical of the more earnest:

In many of our archdeaconries we have an exercise lately begun which for the most part is called a prophecy or a conference, and erected only for the examination or trial of the diligence of the clergy in their study of holy Scriptures. How be it that such is the thirsty desire of the people to hear the

Word of God and that they have, as it were, with gracious violence intruded amongst them (but as hearers only) to come by more knowledge through their presence in the same. Herein also two of the younger sort of ministers expound, each after the other, some piece of the Scriptures and when they have spent an hour or a little more between them, then cometh one of the better sort who supplieth the room of a moderator, adding what him thinketh good of his knowledge whereby two hours are commonly spent at this most profitable exercise.

Holinshed, writing in 1583, describes this godly exercise as a novelty. A year earlier Walker had sent a letter to Leicester from Plymouth in which he tells how he has established a conference on board the *Edward Bonaventura*, and that with the full sympathy of the Vice-Admiral, Luke Ward, "our people are wonderfully reformed, we have morning and evening prayers and preaching each Sunday; then we have after-dinner conferences after sermon. The mariner who has never heard a sermon on land is delighted with the godly exercises." The chief contention of the voyage both illustrates the position of the chaplains on board an Elizabethan ship and the spirit of these Puritan preachers. The pilots took the fleet so close to the African coast as to miss the winds favourable to a good passage round the Cape, whilst news is heard of a Spanish fleet guarding the straits of Magellan since the great exploit of Sir Francis Drake. So a fleet council is called to determine upon one of three courses, whether to attempt the Cape way though the favourable season had been missed, to make for the straits of Magellan Spaniards or no, or to take such prizes as might be made and with them return to England. Madox urges that there should be no return home until a further attempt to make the Cape, whilst Walker urges that the bold way is the right way and that the voyage should be prosecuted at all costs. So moved was Walker that he fell on his knees before the Admiral and prayed him to continue the voyage. The ministers were in the minority, and the voyage ends with the ships of the fleet straggling home. The last letter from Walker to Leicester reports the decision to leave the voyage to the Moluccas unperformed, and expresses the opinion that the council were wrong to abandon it.

Walker's journal ends on January 30th, 1583, and on February 5th, "after being weak and sick of the bloody flux he died and was heaved overboard with the salute of a piece for his knell." The sailors of the *Edward Bonaventura* knew that there was another reason for his death; he was heartbroken at the craven decision to return home. Jealousy and mistrust had been too much for good intent, but "the painful preachers," of whom John Banister, the surgeon of the *Leicester*, gives such a good report, had been always for the valiant course, and won the respect of all.

The failure of Weymouth's voyage was laid at the door of the chaplain, John Cartwright, and is another instance of the important part the ministers played. Weymouth sailed to seek a way to China by the north-west passage. The merchants who financed the voyage placed great confidence in the preacher, whom they regarded as being especially fitted for an embassy to China. So he was furnished with stately apparel to open his embassy with dignity. According to the success of the voyage was to be his salary, three pounds a month if successful and but half that if the venture failed. When the voyage failed it was alleged that Cartwright had persuaded the council—and Weymouth—to return, and so angry were the merchants that Cartwright was compelled to return the rich robes given him to impress the Chinese.

The early history of the East India Company furnishes abundant evidence of the influence of Puritanism upon sea venture. In the first Company's voyage Sir James Lancaster had two chaplains, Mr. Thomas Pulleyne and Mr. Levett; Mr. Levett was a *protégé* of the Earl of Pembroke, a Cambridge man and with a good opinion of his own value; though the Governors paid him little more than half the sum he demanded they gave him more than his brother minister. The ministers were not paid at a fixed scale, but according to capacity or repute. Mr. Rogers, a preacher of Deptford, a very honest man and a good teacher though no great scholar, was granted an allowance of £50 per annum. Whilst when Mr. Laker was appointed to the factory at Surat he was granted £100 per annum, "he being an able man well fitted to contend with the Jesuits."

Though the Company took great pains to secure chaplains of good character and repute they had a Puritan regard for preaching and made that a great test. Before appointment to ship or factory the preacher had to deliver a trial sermon before the Governors, who often chose the preacher's text. Mr. Studivant, appointed for the fifth voyage, preached before the Governors from the text "Blessed be the poor in spirit," which text they had chosen. Not content with a trial sermon the Governors often indulged themselves in the Puritan sport of hearing various competitors preach before proceeding to make a selection. Both compliments and complaints show what was expected of the ministers. Of Mr. Studivant, after five years in the service of the Company, it was alleged that "he had a straggling humour, delighted in wine and tobacco, could frame himself to all companies, and so was not fitted for the Company's employment." Another chaplain, Patrick Copeland, won the esteem of both Dutch and the better sort of English in the Indies, but "that worthy preacher often reproved the commanders in his sermons." Some of

them took it ill and complained to the Governors, who on Copeland's return from the Indies after six years examined him as to the matter of his sermons. They were so well satisfied that when appointing ministers for the next voyage the Court resolved that Mr. Copeland should be the first spoken with.

The early venturers to the East had a Puritan regard for the Sunday, which they generally referred to by the typical phrase "the Lord's Day." The Company's rules ordered that on each ship and factory flags should be flown in honour of the day. Each ship sailing east was furnished with new flags, including the flag of St. George, "as anciently used," so that the day might be duly distinguished. With the establishment of a factory in India the Company made further provision for the conduct of worship. The chaplain was furnished with "two organs" and a store of godly books. The books sufficiently indicate the sympathies of the venturers. In a letter of instruction as to ships' libraries we read:

For the better comforte and recreation of the factors resident in the Indies we send the workes of that worthy servant of Christ, Mr. William Perkins, to instruct their myndes and feed their soules with that heavenly foode of God's Word; and the booke of martyrs in two volumes; as also Mr. Hakluyt's *Voyages* to recreate their spirits with variety of history. These workes to be left with the principal factory where we require that they should have especial care to sanctify the Sabbath days and to feede upon those divine bookes for the comfort and instruction of all those that shall be remaining.

The Company had a regard for the good estate of the poor preachers at home. Prosperous voyages were marked by resolutions to show gratitude to God after a seemly fashion, and what better way than by giving alms to poor preachers and so securing a place in their prayers? The fit disposal of the thankofferings was of such importance as to be determined in full Court. In 1614 Governors proposed to relieve the poverty of some of the poor preachers in the town "in order to have their prayers for the good and prosperity of the Company's voyages." When £100 was voted for the disposal according to the Governors' discretion, Mr. Mead, the lecturer of the Rood Church, having a wife and many children, together with three other lecturers, received gifts with a request "to remember the good estate of the Company in their prayers." The following year, with the safe return of the fleet, it was resolved to give one hundred double jacobus to poor ministers as a thankful acknowledgment of God's favour.

One of the most Protestant of the bishops in the troublous times was William Barlow. His son was the William Barlow who wrote *The Navigator's Supply*, and made marked improvements in the hanging of compasses, having discovered the difference between

iron and steel and the proper way of touching the magnetic needle. This book was dedicated to the Earl of Leicester, patron of Puritans. Barlow was a chaplain of Prince Henry, another of whose chaplains, James Cunningham, was nominated preacher on one of the earliest voyages of the Company. Whilst some of the ministers served on board the fleets, taking part in the councils, sharing the risks, and then telling the story, as did Drake's chaplain recount how the world was encompassed, others gathered sailor stories at home. The two greatest narrators of sea venture, Hakluyt and Purchas, were preachers, and impoverished themselves to preserve the adventures of seamen. There were others who were able to join the company of merchant adventurers who took the risk of financing the voyages, men like Mr. Stephen Egerton, who adventured £200, and as a token of respect the Company admitted him to the freedom of the Company "gratis," only minuting their desire for his prayers to God for the prosperity of the Company. The background of the story of the *Mayflower* is the sympathy between sea venturers and the Puritans. Sir William Sandys, the friend of Brewster, was a notable merchant venturer, whilst Sir Thomas Smythe, the first Governor of the East India Company and a great supporter of the Muscovy Company, was another ardent Puritan.

Puritanism had its acrid theological controversies, a precise conduct based on strict conventions, and a worship in which long sermons took chief place. You have not said the last word about Puritanism when you have recorded its accidentals of phrase and accent which put an easy premium upon hypocrisy. The Puritans opened the door into the lands of romance. When poor lecturers prayed for the Company they told part of the story of a great adventure from their pulpits, and their hearers turned to the hundredth Psalm with an enkindling vision of the "Hottentoes" and Indians of whom they had just heard. Such preachers as were fortunate to return found their way to Puritan pulpits, and their long discourses were illumined by tales of sea adventure, whilst the same spirit which made the apprentice of Cheapside break his indentures and stow away stirred the young chaplain to offer his services to the Company.

Puritanism found one of its best outlets in sea venture. The picture of Sir Francis Drake in friendly talk with John Walker, that ardent enthusiast, is fit frontispiece to the story. There is the fellowship of sea captain and Puritan preacher, a tradition which has given us, at least, the finest records of sea adventure any nation possesses, and Puritanism as something more than a religious party—a spirit which made fearless men sail confidently upon doubtful voyages.

GEORGE WALKER.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

A DIPLOMATIC OPPORTUNITY FOR EUROPE.

(1) *The June Meetings.*

IT would be hard for the least imaginative person not to be impressed by the way in which the natural course of events has again given to the European diplomatists a chance of doing something to help the world out of its stagnation. The Lausanne reparation conference will meet on June 16th. The Geneva disarmament conference will then also be sitting. Both the German and the French elections have established in those two countries a firm governmental prospect such as should enable binding decisions to be taken. There is a firm government in Great Britain. The United States has thrown out unmistakable hints of possible collaboration. It looks as if it will be hard for the international politicians who will assemble in Switzerland in the second half of June to miss so easy a chance, backed as it will be by the strongest, clearest need for action, and still further simplified by the fact that the nature of the action needed is known to all concerned.

Yet it would not surprise the experienced observers of political activity if the politicians did indeed contrive to miss even so inviting an opportunity; for it is becoming more and more the view of political philosophers that by the nature of things the politicians cannot ever engage in constructive team-work, that their function in world affairs is necessarily destructive, and that such destructiveness is itself an indispensable condition of human progress. In spite of its apparent paradox such a view seems to be justified by the cumulative experience of history; and it is one of the comforting factors in this transitory life.

The contrary view, whereby constructive good was expected of the politicians, would inevitably produce an acute condition of despair in the minds of such unfortunate people as might still hold it. When one comes to think of it, it is necessary for there to be some permanent organisation of destruction to redress the balance of the over-productive tendency of commercial science. Mr. Ford or Sir William Morris single-handed could either of them easily expand their organisation enough to supply the whole world with motor-cars: but we should all be ruined if commercial prosperity were allowed a free run on such lines. The politicians, who waste most of the national wealth of their several countries, who make wars, who kill trade by tariffs, who disorganise the exchanges and the gold standard by trying to exact unbusinesslike reparation debt, who build armaments and generate fear, are a cruel but a necessary

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check upon the fertility of man's commercial instinct. When, therefore, one is tempted to give way to a feeling of exasperation over the fact that, for instance during the past twelve months, the international politicians have steadily refused to do what the expert financiers and economists have repeatedly urged them to do, and have instead done everything that common sense in its superficial dictate would bid them not do, let it be remembered that the next boom will be made possible only by the present slump, and that the slump would never have happened but for the politicians. A batsman needs a bowler.

If, therefore, one takes it in the right spirit, the chronicle of recent political events in France, Germany, the United States and Great Britain, in their bearing upon the central problem which obsesses the minds of all peoples throughout the world, has a reassuring, not a depressing effect. One sees through it the working of a redemptive factor interesting enough to encourage one's faith in the permanent principle that the bad times beget their own salvation.

Two separate lines are discernible in the process. In Europe there is a gathering to a head of the various bad elements and an indication that they will eliminate themselves. In the United States there is an active tendency to recognise the community of American and European interests and increasing indications that America is ready to go half-way towards meeting Europe for a common advance out of the depression.

In the May CONTEMPORARY an account was given of the origins of the project for improving Danubian trade and of the prompt wrecking of it by the four great Powers in conference. After the London conference dispersed on April 8th those great Powers turned their attention to other matters, and an almost complete diplomatic stillness—*Stillhalte*, as one ironic commentator called it—descended upon Danubian economics. It was broken only by Professor Hantos of Budapest University, who went to Geneva to submit to the representatives of the four great Powers there assembled a new scheme of his own, which he presented as an improvement upon the Tardieu Plan (for details of the Tardieu Plan see CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, May, pp. 649-50). In brief outline Professor Hantos's scheme was that Germany, Poland and Italy should participate with Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia in the Central European economic association; that all tariffs should be abolished on goods passing between those eight countries; that, to avert the otherwise certain financial calamity, a uniform currency should be adopted for the eight countries, that their central banks should be amalgamated and that an "International Equalisation Bank" be formed to co-ordinate

accounts. The interest of that proposal was that it illustrated the hopelessness of attempting to solve economic problems by political agreement. That part of it which suggested an extension of the scheme to include Germany was totally unacceptable to France. That part which suggested a common currency was, of course, unacceptable to Czechoslovakia. Why, from the Czechoslovak point of view, should the assets behind the Czechoslovak crown be distributed among the comparatively worthless currencies of Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia?

The Hantos project was still-born. The Czechoslovak parliament continued to be concerned almost exclusively with the economic problem, in particular inaugurating a special unemployment fund to which industry, trade and agriculture are to contribute; but no further thought was given to organised co-operation between the Danubian States.

(2) *The German and the French Elections.*

The main interest of European politics in April and the first half of May centred in the State elections of Germany, the general election of France, and the prolonged depression in the disarmament conference at Geneva.

The German elections in five of the States, Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Hamburg and Anhalt, took place on April 24th. In spite of the fact that a fortnight earlier Field-Marshal von Hindenburg had been elected to the Presidency by 19,359,642 votes against Herr Hitler's 13,417,460 (see CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, May, p. 646), the political prospect in Germany could not be regarded as settled until it was certain that Herr Hitler's party had also been prevented from obtaining the upper hand in the States. The constitutional arrangement whereby the governments of the States control the police is a source of potential embarrassment to the government of the Reich in the event of the controlling party being the Nazis. Prussia alone holds more than half of the population, and covers two-thirds of the territory, including Berlin, the political heart, and the Ruhr, the industrial heart, of Germany. The five States together cover four-fifths of German territory. The most important result of the voting of April 24th in all five States was that the Nazis failed to win an absolute majority. When one considers the pressing temptation offered to an earnest, excitable, virile and energetic people, such as are the people of Germany, to follow any leader who promises to throw over the tradition of loyalty to the financial and disarmament clauses of the Versailles treaty—a treaty unwisely interpreted by French opinion—it becomes a tribute to the patient and able statesmanship of President von Hindenburg and of Dr. Brüning that they have

been able to prevent a complete landslide to Herr Hitler. On the other hand, the extent of Herr Hitler's success at the polls was big enough to constitute a portent. Under the German system of proportional representation it is not easy for any single party to obtain an absolute majority. The Nazi poll of April 24th was the biggest single-party vote recorded since the revolution. The nature of his success is measured by the fact that in Prussia the number of Nazi seats was increased from 9 to 162, in a Diet of 422 members. The Nazi element in German politics was thereby established as a major force. Herr Hitler himself, commenting the day after the elections on the established fact that the Nazis were now "by far the strongest party in Germany," exuberantly declared: "We shall not rest after this victory, but shall resume without a moment's delay the struggle for the national uprising and the liberation of Germany."

The salient figures of the voting were the following: In Prussia the Nazis won 162 seats (8,008,219 votes); the Socialists 93 seats (4,674,943); the Centre, 67 (3,374,413); the Communists 57 (2,819,602); the Nationalists 31 (1,524,931). The other four parties won only twelve seats between them, viz.: the German People's Party 7 seats (330,807 votes); the State Party (Democrats) 2 (332,441); the Christian Socialists 2 (255,068); and the Hanoverians (Right) 1 seat (63,803).

The practical result was little more than a spectacular demonstration of German feeling, for the Nazis, in combination with the other parties of the Right (the Nationalists, the German People's Party, the Christian Socialists, the Hanoverians) could command only 203 seats out of the 422.

In Bavaria there was an equally impressive gain of Nazi seats from 9 in the old Landtag to 43 in the new, the full house being 128 members; but the leading party was still the Bavarian People's Party with 45 seats over the former 44. The Socialists lost 14 seats and were now reduced to 20. In Württemberg, similarly, the Nazis won 23 seats out of a total of 80, having held only one seat in the old Landtag. In Anhalt they increased their seats from 1 to 15, in Hamburg from 43 to 51.

As yet then there is to be no Nazi dictatorship in Germany; but the Nazis will now constitute the biggest element in a composite German national policy. The most interesting international effect was seen in France, whose own elections were due to be decided on May 1st and May 8th. The most characteristically nationalist opinion in France had already discounted the expected swing to the Right in Germany and contented itself with a somewhat weary attempt to feature the result as a "warning" to the French electorate. The warning, as we shall see, had little effect on that

electorate: which fact is still another illustration of the chastening effect of present adversity.

As always, however, there could be little hope of the elections producing any spectacular change in the political complexion of France. The multiplicity of French parties rules out in advance the possibility of any single ascendant party. An election merely provides the pawns for coalitionist bargaining. Moreover, if there was something, there was not much, for the foreign observer to choose between the Tardieu Nationalists and the Herriot Radicals; and M. Blum's excellent views on disarmament were not unanimously shared by his Socialist followers.

The first poll was held on May 1st. It is the general experience that not more than 200 seats out of the total 615 are, as a rule, decided by the first poll, at which a majority of the votes cast in any given constituency is necessary for election. In this case there were outright decisions in 248 constituencies, but little indication was thereby given of the final result beyond that of a probable swing to the Left. M. Tardieu was elected by 5,671 votes against a combined total of 4,147 for his opponents. M. Herriot was elected by 5,867 against a combined total of 3,884 on the other side. M. Blum was also among the first 248 to be elected. The second ballot, held on May 8th, disclosed a decided swing to the Left. M. Tardieu's government was heavily beaten and M. Herriot as clearly was the victor. M. Tardieu's group, the Left Republicans, won 72 seats against their former 101. M. Herriot's Socialist-Radicals were returned as the biggest group with 157 seats, contrasting with their 109 seats in the old Chamber. Their success exceeded their highest expectations. M. Blum's party, the Socialists, increased the number of their seats from 112 to 129.

German comment, especially that of the Right, affected little interest in the result. Most Germans would agree with the comment of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, to the effect that the theoretic differences between M. Tardieu and M. Herriot meant little in practice. In some degree the experience of the past supports the view that little change in Poincarist French aims has been made by M. Herriot when in office; but, on the other hand, there has been a certain imponderable difference which has had a psychological effect. The year 1924 was one of the least unsatisfactory post-war years in its international aspect, and few impartial observers will deny that it was due to Mr. MacDonald's conduct of the British Foreign Office, seconded by M. Herriot's control of the Quai d'Orsay. The politicians of the Left, in France as in Great Britain, have a way of doing less harm abroad than at home.

It is seldom safe to take for granted the nature of the govern-

ment that results from any French election. At the time when these lines were written the group bargaining in Paris had not begun. It looks likely, however, that for the June opportunity aforesaid the three European protagonists with whom will lie the initiative will be M. Herriot, Dr. Brüning and Mr. MacDonald: a less unpromising trio perhaps than any alternative that could readily be imagined.

The opportunity they will have will be that of reaching an agreement to effect some measure of disarmament and of accepting with a good grace the established fact that the period of post-war transference across frontiers of huge payments on account of international political debt is at an end. The opportunity is improved by certain American tendencies as exemplified in the persons or in the recent statements of Mr. Hoover, Mr. Stimson and Mr. Mellon.

(3) *The Business Done in Disarmament.*

The work that has been done in the matter of disarmament in advance of the June meetings can unfortunately be chronicled in a few words. The conference met as long ago as February 2nd. Before it met the chief Powers concerned had taken the precaution to record in a clear form their detailed feelings on the subject. Mr. MacDonald in the House of Commons on June 29th, 1931, recapitulated what had already been achieved by Great Britain in the actual reduction of armaments since the war (see *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, September 1931, pp. 377-80). He made it a condition of any further limitation of British armaments that it must be accompanied by "a reduction all round." "We," he said, "have gone pretty nearly to the limit of example." It was made clear in the debate that followed his statement that the three parties in the House were agreed on the principles that both the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties enjoined upon the "victor" Powers the obligation to disarm, and that Great Britain could not take part in any further guarantees for "security" such as those aimed at in the Geneva Protocol of 1924.

The French Government, on July 16th, 1931, transmitted to Geneva a full memorandum of its views about disarmament. The memorandum contained the curious plea that the Treaty of Versailles did not enjoin upon the victor Powers the obligation to disarm down to the level of the defeated Powers. It went on to quote figures in support of the pretension that France had already greatly reduced her armaments: a pretension that caused some little surprise in every other country. It ended by making it a condition of further disarmament that some general instrument of "security," in the French sense, be instituted.

The German view simply was that Germany was already disarmed by the treaty, had for twelve years waited in vain for the other Powers to fulfil their obligation in their turn to disarm, and demanded equality in armaments (Count Bernstorff at Geneva, September 15th, 1931).

Italy, as was known from frequent statements made by Signor Grandi, emphasised her postulate of parity with France, and reaffirmed her often repeated offer on that basis to reduce all armaments to any extent whatsoever. She combated the French claim that "security" should precede disarmament.

Czechoslovakia made it known that she was prepared to accept any measure of disarmament commonly put into effect by the Powers.

Poland's case was a first-cousin to the French, demanding that "general disarmament should be sought by means of a preliminary system of guarantees of security" (memorandum of September 17th, 1931).

Russia, through the busy channel of Mr. Litvinov, had often submitted as her case the total immediate suppression of all armaments, but concurrently omitted to give any information about Russian armaments, on which head, rightly or wrongly, many people felt some concern.

The United States gave a full dossier of the actual position in her own armaments, but gave no indication of the policy she would pursue at the conference (memorandum of June 9th, 1931).

Such, in broad outline, was the scanty material on which the pre-conference hopes had to be based. Through much of it there seemed to run the principle that it is the business of a government which takes part in a disarmament conference to secure for itself a maximum, and for all the others a minimum, of armaments.

In the first fortnight of the conference no fewer than nineteen countries submitted full proposals for the consideration of the conference, namely Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Italy, China, Japan, the United States, Poland, Hungary, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Turkey, the Netherlands, Portugal and Russia. It was the French proposal that caused the greatest initial stir. M. Tardieu's proposal was that the League of Nations should be supplied with a force of heavy bombing aeroplanes, and that no individual Power should be allowed to retain such weapons; that long-range artillery batteries and submarines should similarly be placed at the League's disposal; that in short the League of Nations be armed in order to impose peace by force; that arbitration be compulsory,

and that the old will-o'-the-wisp, a definition of "aggression," should again be pursued.

The main principle of the British proposal was the whittling down of armaments bit by bit, beginning with the nastier and more "aggressive" armaments, such as submarines, gas, and poison. That principle was the foundation also of the Italian, American, Chinese, Japanese and Turkish proposals. Poland and Czechoslovakia in the main sympathised with the French plan. The U.S.S.R. agreed with the British proposal as a second best to her own original proposal of total comprehensive immediate disarmament. Germany, from her peculiar position as the only disarmed Power present, grandly and simply demanded "universal, enduring, equal and unreserved disarmament."

Thereafter the conference virtually stood still, in harmony with the general field of diplomacy, for nearly three months. By February 24th other countries had made their proposals: Finland, Estonia, Rumania, Austria, Uruguay, Australia, Bulgaria, Haiti, India, Egypt, Mexico, South Africa, Lithuania, Chile; and the first phase of the conference, the submission of the world's ideas on the subject of disarmament, was thereby completed. Mr. Henderson on that day attempted the heroic task of reviewing the fifty speeches that had been made and of extracting points of possible agreement from them.

The work was then handed over to committees: a general committee, a political committee, a budgetary limitation committee, a land (or military) committee, a naval committee, an air committee. By March 16th the various committees had started their work; and on that day the conference proper adjourned till April 11th.

A slightly more interesting phase of the conference began on its resumption. On April 11th Mr. Gibson launched a proposal that the problem be approached by a "qualitative" method, whereby a distinction should be made in the degree of offensiveness and defensiveness in various armaments. On the argument that security depended upon the restoration of defensive arms to superiority over offensive arms, he proposed the abolition of the main offensive arms, such as heavy guns, tanks and gases. During the following week Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Stimson appeared before the conference for the first time, and an Anglo-Saxon attempt was made to induce the conference to adopt a definite agreement on the "qualitative" method of reducing armaments. As a means thereto Sir John Simon, on April 20th, submitted a resolution of a kindred spirit to the Gibson proposal of April 11th, namely that "without prejudice to other proposals the conference declares its approval of the principle of qualitative

disarmament in the selection of certain classes of destructive weapons with a view to prohibiting by international convention their possession or use by any State." It quickly emerged that such a proposal would not at that stage be accepted. M. Paul-Boncour led the opposition in a speech containing at least one interesting point. France had proposed that the heavy, offensive weapons be placed at the disposal of the League. Great Britain and the United States proposed that they be abolished. If the Anglo-American proposal were adopted, the French proposal could not be further discussed. He therefore objected on the technical ground that the Gibson-Simon proposal came before the conference under "item three" of the agenda, and that "item four" would be the Tardieu proposal. Decisions, he argued, could not be taken on number three without reference to number four. Moreover he contested the principle of "qualitative" disarmament by the argument—this was the interesting contribution he made, and there is something to be said for it—that peace is not served by any attempt to "humanise" war. War, he said, could be prevented; it could never be "humanised." The distinction between having a clean bayonet through one's stomach or having one's head blown off by a clean shell, and on the other hand being suddenly poisoned or drowned by an unseen agency will be regarded by realistic people as a little academic.

A clear division of opinion split the conference. The cause of the disagreement was the fear, frankly expressed in the French Press, that the naval Powers were trying to achieve disarmament at the exclusive "expense" of the land Powers. Sir John Simon, on the simple theory that as you cannot achieve disarmament except by means of agreement, the paramount need was for unanimity, on April 22nd emended his own resolution by the substitution of these words: "The possession or use of which should be absolutely prohibited to all States, or internationalised by means of a general convention." By now proposing that the offensive arms aforesaid be either prohibited or internationalised, he in effect proposed that the solution be sought either by the Gibson-Simon or by the Tardieu plan: a comprehensive compromise of which the simple object could be none other than the gaining of time wherein to explore the possibility of bridging Anglo-Saxon and Continental mentality.

The bridging work was attempted during the following week by the method of private consultation between the principals. M. Tardieu, Dr. Brüning and Signor Grandi returned to their respective capitals during the week-end, April 23rd-25th, Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Stimson determined to stay on in Geneva to think out some method of moving the conference towards

achievement after three months of standstill. As soon as Dr. Brüning returned to Geneva on April 26th (Tuesday) a consultation took place at Mr. Stimson's villa, at which he, Mr. Norman Davis, Mr. MacDonald, Dr. Brüning and Herr von Bülow were the consultants. A message was sent to Signor Grandi in Rome to inform him of what was taking place. M. Tardieu was expected to return to Geneva on the Friday, April 29th. Sir John Simon, who also had returned to London, arrived back in Geneva to take part in the important discussions that were now expected to take place.

The upshot threw a melancholy light on the ways, the accidents, and the difficulties of diplomatic action. On April 27th the waiting politicians in Geneva received news from Paris that M. Tardieu was ill and would not be able to return to Geneva on the Friday (April 29th). Mr. MacDonald therefore decided to return to London on the Saturday (April 30th), Dr. Brüning returned at once to Berlin, and Mr. Stimson decided to leave on the Friday (April 29th). The great five-Power informal meeting that had been arranged for April 29th, to be participated in by the leading political authorities of the five countries, M. Tardieu, Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Stimson, Dr. Brüning and Signor Grandi, simply could not take place. The French newspapers, in particular the *Temps* and the *Journal des Débats*, did not conceal their satisfaction that M. Tardieu was unable to go back to Geneva, for they regarded the projected attempt at a five-Power disarmament agreement as inopportune and unprofitable. It is such manifestations of mass opinion, warped by misguided fear, and blind to long views, that make diplomacy an almost inevitably hopeless instrument of anything but destructive work.

None the less Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Stimson tried to save what they could from the wreck of their hopes. Before leaving Geneva they organised a meeting (April 29th) of such national representatives as were available to see if some public statement could not be issued of a reassuring kind. The men who met for that purpose were Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon for Great Britain; Mr. Stimson, Mr. Hugh Gibson and Mr. Norman Davis for the United States; M. Paul-Boncour and M. Massigli for France; Herr Nadolny for Germany; and Signor Augusto Rosso for Italy. An official statement was thereafter duly issued. It declared that "at a consultation held this afternoon at the Villa Bessière between the chief delegates now at Geneva of the American, British, French, German and Italian Governments, over which Mr. MacDonald presided, it was agreed that it was a matter of urgency that the conversations which have been proceeding with promise of good results between the heads of these

delegations, and which were unavoidably interrupted by the inability of M. Tardieu to return for the time being to Geneva, should be resumed at the earliest possible moment. It is contemplated that this resumption can take place within a fortnight. The exact date will be fixed in a day or two."

According to information that was not made public, but which there was reason to accept as probably true, it appeared that there had been something more substantial than could be seen on the surface in the disappointment felt by Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Stimson over M. Tardieu's inability to return to Geneva. The decision to issue the reassuring statement above quoted was traceable to something really interesting and important that followed the original Brüning-MacDonald-Stimson conversations. Indeed there was ground for the belief that five of the six chief Powers immediately concerned in the problem of disarmament had established a degree of harmony on a particular proposal, but that the harmony could not issue into an agreement only because M. Tardieu was unable to return to Geneva and MM. Paul-Boncour and Massigli felt unable, for that reason and because of the French election, to express a view. The harmony resulted from a definite offer understood to have been made by Dr. Brüning, in the first instance to Mr. Stimson and to Mr. MacDonald, both of whom are understood to have been attracted by it; namely that Germany should bind herself not to increase her present armaments till the time of the second disarmament conference some years hence, on the condition that she was released from certain technical prescriptions of unequal disarmament decreed by the Treaty of Versailles. One of those technical limitations imposed by the treaty is that recruitment for the Reichswehr is conditioned by compulsory service for twelve years. Dr. Brüning's reason for wanting to have that condition waived was the simple one that in practice so long a period with the colours disables a man for civil work. The object of the treaty stipulation was to ensure (after the warning of 1813) that Germany should not create a trained reserve by means of short periods of service. Dr. Brüning, frankly acknowledging that point, met it by that part of his proposal which offered a spontaneous German undertaking not to increase present strength. Its advantage would be that Germany would be rid of an irksome treaty restriction, would at the same time give a definite lead to practical limitation in armaments, and remove all reasonable fear from French minds. Obviously so good a proposal was regarded as business-like. It emerged that it could be made the basis of an immediate understanding so far as Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Italy, and also Russia were concerned. The absence of M. Tardieu

was deplorable; but it is at least within the bounds of probability that he would not for one moment have entertained such a proposal.

(4) *The Reparation "Problem."*

Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Neville Chamberlain and Dr. Brüning have often in the past few months urged the need of a "final" reparation settlement to be achieved at the June conference. The British budget of April 1932 assumed a continuing non-payment of all political war debt after June 30th. Herr Dietrich, the German Finance Minister, went still further on April 22nd, when in an election speech he said that Germany would not be paying reparation after July 1st, and added the comment: "If I, the Finance Minister of the Reich, can now make this statement without fear of international complications, it follows that the situation must be fairly clear even to the statesmen of the other countries."

What is to be the business of the Lausanne Conference? The existing "Hoover moratorium" provides that for the year beginning July 1st, 1931, the political debt payments shall, under certain conditions, be suspended. Mr. Hoover launched his original proposal to that end on June 20th, 1931; but it was not his original proposal that was adopted. The text of the announcement of June 20th, in its essential point, read thus: "The American Government proposes a postponement during one year of all payments on all inter-Governmental debts, reparations, relief debts, both principal and interest, but not including obligations of Governments held by private parties. Subject to confirmation by Congress, the American Government will postpone all payments upon the debts of foreign Governments payable during the fiscal year beginning July 1st next, conditional on a like postponement for one year of all payments on inter-Governmental debts owing to the important creditor Powers."

The world had ten days in which to adopt that proposal. The whole world was ready, even eager, to adopt it, with the single exception of France. Mr. MacDonald announced the unconditional British concurrence on June 22nd; but the French Government drafted a counter-proposal which led to a fortnight's controversy. So inimical to the spirit of the Hoover proposal was the French counter-proposal that on June 24th Mr. Snowden, in the House of Commons, announced that the British Government had decided to act as if the proposal had been adopted, and would not claim any debt payment after June 30th. On June 23rd Signor Mussolini telegraphed to Washington his acceptance of the proposal.

The French Government's counter-proposal was drafted and

delivered to Mr. Stimson in Washington on June 24th: but the text was withheld from publication till after it had been debated in the French Chamber: and that debate was arranged for no earlier a date than June 26th. It duly took place on June 26th and lasted 15½ hours, ending at 6.30 a.m. on June 27th. The practical passages of the long French proposal submitted to the Chamber were these: ". . . France should abstain provisionally during the period of one year from retaining any payments from the Reich. . . . A moral interest of the first order requires that even during the period contemplated by President Hoover the payment of the unconditional annuity should in no way be deferred. . . . The French Government declares itself prepared, under reserve of the approval of Parliament, to place at the disposal of the Bank for International Settlements a sum equivalent to its share for one year of the non-deferrable annuity, with a single exception of the funds necessary for the execution of the remainder of the contracts of the deliveries in kind now proceeding. . . . The funds thus paid over to the Bank for International Settlements can be immediately utilised for the improvement of credit in Germany as well as in the countries of Central Europe, and notably those where the suspension of the execution of the Young Plan for a year might create financial or economic disturbance. It goes without saying that the sums thus employed would become available again on the expiry of the period of one year proposed as the limit of the provisional suspension of the Young Plan. The French Government is likewise of opinion that all necessary precautions must be taken that these sums, as well as those accruing from the alleviation of the Budget of the Reich, following the suspension of the payments of the Young Plan for one year, can be utilised only for economic ends, all danger of financing of dumping being set aside. Finally, it will be opportune to anticipate before the expiry of the period of one year an examination of the measures to be taken by Germany for the resumption of her payments. . . ."

The Chamber approved the Government's policy, but the formula of acceptance had a still further stiffening effect: "The Chamber," it ran, "relies upon the Government to maintain intact the unconditional contract signed in the Hague agreement by all the Powers concerned."

The result was that on Sunday, June 28th, only two days before the Hoover moratorium was designed to begin, there was started in Paris an exasperating and prolonged conference between Mr. Mellon and all the French politicians, of which the chief issue was how soon after June 30th, 1932, the suspended German payment should be repaid to France, together with other long and

complicated matters about the Guarantee Fund of the Young Plan (see CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, August 1931, pp. 146-7). There was an almost uninterrupted telephonic conversation for many days between Mr. Mellon in Paris and Mr. Hoover in Washington. In the early hours of June 30th it looked as if M. Laval would finally refuse to give his consent to the moratorium. During the evening of June 30th the Italian Government announced that from midnight it would act as if the moratorium were operative.

As it was now certain that the United States, Great Britain, Italy and Germany would all act upon the terms of the original Hoover proposal, whether France agreed to it or not, it dawned upon the French politicians that they were likely to lose more by standing out than by coming in: for by coming in they still had a sporting chance of obtaining the agreement of the other Powers to some French emendation of the scheme, the lever to their hand being the desire of those other Powers on psychological grounds to have the payments stopped as a result of international agreement. The Franco-American conference was therefore continued. Mr. Mellon on July 1st—by which time the moratorium, though not agreed on, had taken effect—submitted to MM. Laval and Flandin a new proposal, offering France her repayment within fifteen years. Probably even at that time Mr. Mellon had a shrewd suspicion that any such concessions would in the relentless course of events be robbed of their substance. The Paris talks dragged on. On July 2nd the British Foreign Office so far bowed to the force of the circumstances as to suggest the holding of an international conference, although Mr. Snowden a week before had declared that there was no time for a conference. The inconsistency was no criticism on Mr. Snowden. At 9.30 p.m. on July 3rd Mr. Mellon capitulated to MM. Laval and Flandin, and it was officially announced that "Mr. Mellon confirmed that the American Government had decided to accept the maintenance of the payment by Germany of the unconditional annuity provided by the Young Plan."

French resource, however, was not yet exhausted, nor French desire satisfied. It was not till July 6th that the Hoover moratorium was agreed on. It was agreed on retrospectively to July 1st. The text of the agreement began with a short sentence that "(1) The payment of Government debts will be suspended from July 1st, 1931, until June 30th, 1932," and for the rest contained a series of French reservations and clauses due to French conditions. The most important of them was embodied in Article 2: "The Reich will pay the total of the unconditional annuities, but the French Government agrees, so far as it is concerned, that those payments shall be made by the Reich to the Bank for International Settlements,

which will place them in guaranteed bonds of the German railways."

It was not surprising that the Hoover moratorium boomlet of June 1931 was followed on the world's stock exchanges by the Hoover moratorium slump of July 1931.

It will be the technical business of the Lausanne conference to decide what, if any, new arrangement may be expedient, or, if expedient, possible, in view of the unofficial suspicion generally rampant that there will be some difficulty in practice about the resumption of the payments suspended by the Hoover moratorium. Since July 6th, 1931, it has been known to the world's politicians that the Hoover moratorium was a temporising expedient, of which one object was to give to the politicians twelve long months in which to make more lasting arrangements. They have spent much time in that sense, but the total of their achievement has been to put off to the last fortnight of the twelve months the very attempt to reach an agreement. In one sense, however, the Lausanne conference will be an empty ceremony. If somebody proposes that the moratorium be extended, no payments will be made after July 1st; whether or not anybody makes such a proposal, or any proposal, no payments will be made. There may arise the question whether the "Hoover mechanism" of transference by Germany to Basle of the unconditional French annuities and the re-lending by France to Germany of those annuities, shall be perpetuated. Such a question would conform to the very spirit of pantomime: but there is not likely to be much to choose between the spirit of pantomime and the spirit of Lausanne. Nor would a further exhibition of that sort of disconnected charivari that was performed a year ago be likely to have any practical result, good or bad, in present circumstances.

(5) *The United States and the Real Problem.*

There are those who think that the signal for transition from world slump to world boom may come from some diplomatic achievement as probably as from any other accident. The real diplomatic problem is the joining of European with American influences in an attempt to remove some of the obstacles to world recovery. Clearly, with the best will in the world, there cannot be a long-distance localised European cancellation of reparation debt without reference to the European political debts owed to the United States. So far the two chief difficulties have been the inability of the United States to recognise the European aspect of the problem and the French inability to recognise any aspect of the problem. In the case of France the national characteristic of realism in the face of established fact has already gone far to removing the one diffi-

culty. The combined implications of Mr. Stimson's recent activity in Europe, of Mr. Mellon's assumption of the ambassadorship in London and Senator Borah's pronouncements in Washington have gone far to removing the other.

Mr. Stimson has done much by sympathetic encouragement and argument to foster that spirit of French and German confidence in each other which is the first essential to achievement in disarmament. Mr. Mellon is a financier by training and by long practice, plunged at the top of his form into the whirlpool of diplomacy. He is the principal author on the American side of the American-European debt funding arrangements, and has the scholarly mentality which acknowledges mistakes, not in a defensive spirit, but in a constructive spirit, as a means to better things. He has made enemies in the United States by the frankness with which he has admitted the unfairness of the debt settlements to Great Britain and by his latter-day dogma that a healthy creditor implies a healthy debtor. Senator Borah for many years past has insisted that common sense prevented the United States from relieving her European debtors merely that they might squander the more money on armaments. His logic therein has been impregnable; but he has always refrained from extending his logic to the wider field. Under the influence of the world depression, however, his outlook has widened. Speaking before a crowded Senate on May 5th he postulated the treble achievement of disarmament, a reparation settlement and the restoration of silver to the place it held before 1925 as conditions precedent to world recovery. He did not go to the length of facing the correlation of all the political debts with each other: but he is clearly moving. He made the excellent point, which is not often heard in the United States, that gold debts could not be paid so long as 70 per cent. of the world's monetary gold was held by France and the United States; and he added that the dilemma was completed by the refusal of the United States, through the effect of her tariffs, to accept payment in goods. He then said: "we are up against an impossible situation unless there can be a large supply of money. . . . There must be some relief from this gold mentality. . . . When England was forced off the gold standard last September there were dire prophecies as to what would happen. To-day she is the only bright spot on the horizon. That great nation, which was committed to the gold standard since 1849, is the only nation to-day which seems on the road to recovery."

His disillusion about gold seems to be complete. It is a short step therefrom to general disillusion; and Senator Borah's evolution is as good a symptom as one needs of America's evolution.

May 15th, 1932.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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RECOVERY.*

Sir Arthur Salter's *Recovery* is not only a good book but a good deed. No living Englishman writes with such authority on the supreme problem of our time—the problem of saving civilisation from an economic catastrophe only less terrible than the World War itself. It is written so lucidly that any educated reader can understand it, and so brilliantly that our attention is held from beginning to end. Moreover, we soon become aware that the chief economic adviser of the early years of the League of Nations is not a passionless pundit but a man of warm human feelings. He has already rendered conspicuous service to country after country, and now, at the height of the crisis and in the plenitude of his experience, he addresses himself to the rulers and citizens of the old and the new world. If they reject his counsel they will deserve their doom.

"Thirteen years after the war," writes Sir Arthur, "we seem to be back in the chaos that immediately followed it. The road to real recovery is more tortuous and more arduous than we had thought; but it is not beyond finding and following." Man, he adds, is an adaptable creature, and he will in time beyond question find the solution. We thought we were finding it in the first decade of peace, when the shell-shocked world was being rebuilt at a

* G. Bell. 10s. 6d.

wonderful pace. Then came the terrible relapse in 1929, necessitating a second effort and a wider synthesis. We have left behind us the "self-regulating automatic system" of the nineteenth century, which created so much wealth, but which depended for its success on a combination of factors that has ceased to exist. "The planning system" whither we are feeling our way is not yet in being, and the outlines are only now beginning to appear. Our goal is the combination of planning and regulation with competition and individual enterprise, so adjusted that the abuses of each will be avoided and the benefits of each retained. Like other ideals in an imperfect world it can only be partially realised. But few readers of this stimulating book will contest its analysis of our sickness and our needs. Universal impoverishment in a world glutted with commodities and bursting with productive capacity is a challenge to the mind and will of man which it would be disgraceful not to confront and overcome.

After four introductory chapters on the present situation we pass to Part II, entitled "Economic and Financial Reforms." A masterly, but rather difficult, discussion of the gold problem complains that the sometime constitutional monarch has in the last year or two changed into a capricious despot, harming mankind more than he helps. The way out, we are told, is the increase of gold prices by controlled inflation, followed by the maintenance of stability. The chapter on credit preaches the same gospel of control, above all the control of foreign public loans, which in their reckless profusion have often proved almost equally disastrous to debtor and creditor. The long chapter on reparations judges the short-sighted treaty makers of 1919 with the severity they deserve, and argues that the restoration of the devastated regions of France and Belgium could and should have been undertaken by German labour, as was proposed by the defeated foe. The process would have been rapid and cheap, would have saved the German currency from collapse by avoiding the necessity of transfer, have averted the occupation of the Ruhr, and relieved Europe of the most formidable obstacle to recovery. "Fate or folly ruled otherwise." Complete cancellation of reparations and war debts would be the best solution for the world as a whole; but that is too much to expect, and Sir Arthur sketches a method of reduced payments, varying with the ebb and flow of prosperity. Of tariffs Sir Arthur writes with the same scorn as the majority of trained economists, describing them as "framed for the most part by successive concessions to sectional pressure." And economic nationalism is as disastrous as internal favouritism. The world or even Europe as a free-trade unit is a far-off dream, depending for its realisation on a degree of political unification for which opinion is at present utterly un-

prepared. We can, however, and we must work towards a World Economic Council, co-ordinating national Economic Councils, corresponding to the League of Nations, for only in planning, national and international, can we find salvation and advance. "We have before us only the alternatives of collective leadership, collective control, or chaos."

Part III, entitled "The Political Scene," takes us into a world where most of us are more at home than in the economic maze. Sir Arthur analyses the atmosphere of the different Powers from the standpoint of a good European, while making allowance for countries—France in particular—which find it at present impossible to live at such a high level. There is nothing more impressive in this book than the resounding tribute to Wilson—"the most unshakable will of our age." But for him there would be no League of Nations to-day. "If the world does indeed prevent the recurrence of great wars, it will be to this great act of this great man, more than to any other person or event in history, that it will owe its salvation." None of the trio of Locarno reaches this standard, though Briand and Stresemann receive the homage that is their due. The Locarno Pact, we are told, was the right thing done at the wrong time. "It was Britain's last card, and it was played too soon." The pledge of armed support was given unilaterally, instead of as a contribution to a general settlement which should have included disarmament. "It is impossible to discern any influence from this pledge on the French feeling of insecurity. I know nothing so disappointing in recent history as this fact." Like the Balfour Note, it failed to provoke similar sacrifices and contributions from other quarters, and its healing influence was thereby reduced to a minimum. Thus the anxious years since the return of peace reveal a series of costly errors in the political and economic field, the combined effect of which has been to aggravate the terrible legacy of the war. Never was clear thinking and wise planning more needed than at a time of almost unexampled confusion, and many readers of this persuasive volume will earnestly desire that the author may be called to new and even higher opportunities of national and international service.

G. P. G.

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SANKARA AND MEISTER ECKHART.*

The translators and the publishers have rendered a great service by making Professor Rudolf Otto's book on *Mysticism East and West* available to English readers. The volume is based upon

* *Mysticism East and West*. By Rudolf Otto. Macmillan. 16s. net.

lectures delivered in the winter of 1923-4 at Oberlin College, Ohio, and, as the author says, presupposes the inquiry which he made in his well-known book, *The Idea of the Holy*. Professor Otto brings under consideration the work of the great mystic of the East, Sankara, and that of Meister Eckhart, the mediæval German mystic. The first part of the book exhibits the remarkable conformity between the two systems of metaphysical speculation; the second part exhibits the differences between them. Both these great thinkers belong to the type of intellectual and not emotional mystics. Both, in their fundamental theology, set forth an identical doctrine of the relations between the Godhead and God. For both the Godhead so transcends thought as to be beyond personality, attributes, and even being. For both the Godhead becomes manifest and active in the personal God, who is the creative source of the Universe and the object of primary religious apprehension and experience. Both, therefore, treat the creature as possessing reality only in and for God. Apart from Him, the created world is an illusory and even evil Appearance.

So far both are agreed. The difference between the two, which is exhibited in the second part of the volume, is due to the Christian tradition in which Meister Eckhart was brought up, and in which he sincerely believed. It is clear that the doctrine of the Incarnation must needs to some extent exalt the worth and purpose of the created Universe; in particular that it must bring to the Christian mysticism of Eckhart a moral strain which is entirely absent from that of the Eastern mystic. So far as their common theology is concerned, it is difficult for an outsider to treat the emanation of God from the Godhead and the ultimate absorption of God into the Godhead, as ontologically real. The doctrine appears to be due rather to the flux of human apprehension than to the Divine nature in itself. Religious thought, when touched by aspiration, may pass backwards and forwards between the Idea of Godhead and the Idea of God, practising life in relation to God while aspiring to eternal union with the Godhead. This distinction, however, will be treated by the non-mystic as representing subjective experience and not objective truth. Even in the case of the mysticism of Eckhart this theology must needs imply a measure of spiritual instability and intellectual inconsistency; much more so in the case of Sankara and Eastern mystics as a whole, because in their case it is unqualified by the profound realism of the Christian faith.

This brief notice is inadequate to represent the thoroughness of Professor Otto's exposition. It is, however, sufficient to call the attention of English students to the importance and interest of his work.

J. S. L.

PARADISE REGAINED.*

In these rather slap-dash days it is an excellent idea to return to John Milton's poetry and read him as a classic. Professor Saintsbury has long ago reminded us that Milton came at a period of imminent decline as a result of the laxity of structure into which drama had degenerated:

Just at this time came Milton, a poet with an exquisite ear and extraordinary science of form, great learning in his own and other languages, and a predilection for the special form of non-dramatic blank verse which, managed as he manages it, at once counteracts the effect of the sharp snip-snap couplet and of the wandering, involved labyrinthine stanza. He tightened up the metre without unduly constricting it; he refined the expression without making it jejune. And in particular his need of an extremely varied line to construct his paragraphs and supply the want of rhyme-music, made him, without adopting the sheer abandonment of the late dramatic verse, resort to every artifice of metrical distribution to avoid monotony.

We are, practically speaking, in a period like to that when Milton came to the aid of English poetry in the time when Abraham Cowley ruled the English world. Consequently, it is a pleasure to welcome Mr. E. H. Blakeney's scholarly edition of *Paradise Regained*, an epic which takes its place in the almost unique living and growing continuity of production and thought of the highest standard which was to close with *Samson Agonistes*. It is impossible to compare these various masterpieces, since they represent a growth of personality from the stately splendour of *Comus* to the end:

Samson hath girt himself
Like Samson, and heroically hath finished
A life heroic.

It is well to choose *Paradise Regained* since, while the quality of the poet's work has by no means declined and indeed shows a further growth of spiritual force, the poem itself is less familiar even to the professed student of poetry, and this edition (beautifully produced) which Mr. Blakeney has given us will repay, line by line, study in the light of the learned commentary which the editor has lovingly compiled.

Few nineteenth-century poets will be thought worthy of a commentary. Indeed only one needs it, Robert Browning. Bursting with obscure learning, especially with respect to mediæval Italy, his writings need, in many cases, a commentary to explain the context. Indeed *Sordello* is meaningless without continuous help.

* *Paradise Regained*. By John Milton. Newly edited with an Introduction and Commentary by E. H. Blakeney. London: Eric Partridge Ltd. At the Scholartis Press. 12s. 6d. net.

Browning is a very great poet, but even in the easiest of his long poems, *The Ring and the Book*, there are passages, magnificent passages, that need fuller treatment than is given them in Mr. Birrell's annotated edition. In the case of Milton there is not such obscurity to fight against, but there is much work to be done even in *Paradise Regained*, which consists only of four books and in all 2,070 lines. Mr. Blakeney devotes twenty-two pages of introduction and ninety pages of commentary to this brief poem which, in a sumptuous edition, occupies rather more than sixty-four pages of large type. The Introduction deals (*inter alia*) with various estimates of the poem and of Milton as a poet. The *Ode on the Nativity* appeared in 1629, *Comus* in 1634, *Lycidas* in 1637, the period of *Sonnets* (so admirably dealt with in 1921 by Dr. John S. Smart) is coincident with the poet's famous political career, *Paradise Lost* was begun about 1658 and published in 1667 and Mr. Blakeney assumes that Milton dictated *Paradise Regained* between 1665 and 1667. It went to press in 1670. In the meantime *Samson Agonistes* had been written and finished and was published in 1671. This poem ended Milton's career as a poet. Theological controversy was destined to go on till his death on November 8th, 1674, in his sixty-sixth year.

I, who erewhile the happy garden sung
By one man's disobedience lost, now sing
Recovered Paradise to all mankind,
By one man's firm obedience fully tried
Through all temptation, and the tempter foiled
In all his wiles, defeated and repulsed,
And Eden raised in the waste wilderness.

This is the theme of the continued epic. Here in the First Book is the great scene in the Wilderness when Satan confesses, or rather boasts, to Our Lord :

'Tis true, I am that Spirit unfortunate
Who, leagued with millions more in rash revolt,
Kept not my happy station. . . .
Though I have lost
Much lustre of my native brightness, lost
To be beloved of God, I have not lost
To love, at least contemplate or admire,
What I see excellent in good, or fair,
Or virtuous.

That passage Professor Saintsbury chooses as of special excellence and ranges it with :

the dream of Christ, and the morning scene after it, with its traces of Milton's reading in romance; the second prospect from the mount; the views of Rome and Athens; the storm; and, above all, the final moment on the golden spire of the Temple.

Yet perhaps it is not in passages that Milton's greatness appears so decidedly as in the great achievement and attainment of the general scheme of his poems on the one hand, and the marvellous perfection of the single line and phrase on the other.

This is specially true of *Paradise Regained*. There is infinite pathos in the attitude of Satan to Christ :

The son of God I also am, or was;
And, if I was, I am; relation stands.

Mr. Blakeney's analysis of Milton's blank verse in his Introduction, aided by the Commentary dealing with individual lines, is of the greatest value. He writes :

It is imperative for us to bear in mind that, in Milton's hands, blank verse is not a thing of regular and obvious scansion by common iambs; what gives a perennial freshness and charm to his verse is the art with which he varies his verse; if he never loses his hold upon the norm, he manages to play with it as a great pianist plays with an air, as Gosse aptly notes. Never for two consecutive moments is Milton's blank verse in exactly the same form. . . . Apart from occasional glories of the lines, their superb and subtle embroideries, the cunning manipulation of the vowel sequences, the marshalled movement of the consonants, there is throughout *Paradise Regained* an astringency that is tonic in its effect. His verse here reminds us, from another point of view, of the finest Greek statuary, which, for all its calculated severity, thrills with spiritual emotion. The distinguishing feature of Milton's blank verse is the verse-paragraph; examine any page of it and you will find the poet conveying his meaning not in single lines or couplets but in subtle combinations of verses—the sense “variously drawn out.” This is what helps to give it that peculiar majestic movement, the secret of which few have ever learnt.

Yet what Professor Saintsbury calls “the marvellous perfection of the single line and phrase” must also be taken into full account. An instance is given above in Satan's insistence that he is still the Son of God : “relation stands.” The growing use (as in Shakespeare's later work) of hypermetric lines is to be noted in *Paradise Regained* and even more so in *Samson Agonistes*. Mr. Blakeney specially notes the curious fact that Shakespeare and Milton had a favourite *cæsura* in common, at the end of the third foot. However, for an analysis of all these very important niceties of high art the reader and student must go to Mr. Blakeney's detailed and scholarly Commentary. There he will find the many Greek, Latin and Italian parallels, which undoubtedly were in the poet's mind, as well as other detailed sources as revealed in the editor's very wide reading and in books like Mr. John Bailey's and Professor Raleigh's important essays on Milton.

The student will use this Commentary with the pleasure of wandering through a well-tilled, beautiful garden. Single words (such as the post-classical *incubus* diverted from its classical use to superstitious uses by Augustine and others, or curious words like *debel*, meaning to wear down in war—*debellare*) are given due attention and ample passages (such as the description of Athens in the Fourth Book—"the most splendid episode in the poem") are subject to full comment. The Commentary, indeed, is one of the fullest tributes yet compiled to Milton's vast and splendid learning. Original in the conceptions that he placed for all time in the arcana of poesy he drew on all sources that could illustrate his successive themes. The description and analysis of his sources make up in Mr. Blakeney's Commentary a sweet smelling and lovely garden and the book is one that should be used, not only in the private scholar's home, but in seats of learning, not excluding the sixth forms of the great public schools for boys and girls. Milton should come to the rescue of modern literature and poetry and this could best be done by showing to the schools the fact that in the case of Milton vast learning and infinite patience built up the possibility of the greatest poetry. It is true that John Milton, like William Shakespeare, had a capacity for the significance of metre in its relation to personality which occurs rarely in the history of a nation, but Milton's supreme achievement was one in which pure scholarship played a vital part. Therefore, this Commentary is a book for schools and scholars and should be widely used.

J. E. G. DE M.

THE INNS OF COURT.*

A delightful book on the Inns of Court has been written recently by Colonel R. J. Blackham. In *The Story of the Temple, Gray's and Lincoln's Inns* we are given a short but comprehensive account of the four Honourable Societies. The book begins with an historical sketch of the Knights Templars, their downfall in the fifteenth century, and the coming of the lawyers. The early history of Lincoln's Inn and Gray's Inn is touched on; and their historical associations, traditions, and ancient buildings are briefly mentioned. The greater part of the book, however, is devoted to the two Inns in the Temple. Colonel Blackham writes in a friendly and intimate way, filling the story with anecdotes and imparting to the reader the very atmosphere of the Temple. Several of the most interesting chapters are devoted to an account of the historic buildings. The Temple Church, which is the largest of the five round churches in England, the Elizabethan hall of the Middle Temple

* Sampson Low. 12s. 6d. net.

and the cloisters built by Sir Christopher Wren are only several examples in a place which seethes with history.

Colonel Blackham rightly lays great stress on the close connection between the Temple and literature. In the Middle Temple Hall Queen Elizabeth witnessed the first production of *Twelfth Night*. In the eighteenth century Dr. Johnson lived for a time in the Temple. During this century, indeed, the Temple was a fashionable place for the wits and men of letters, and also for politicians; to mention only a few, Sheridan, Goldsmith, Pope, Gibbon and Burke all spent much of their time within these precincts. Goldsmith is buried north-east of the Temple Church. Charles Lamb was born in Crown Office Row. He loved and wrote much about the Temple. "It is the most elegant spot in the metropolis. What a transition for a countryman visiting London for the first time—the passing from the crowded Strand or Fleet Street, by unexpected avenues, into its magnificent ample squares, its classic green recesses!" Thackeray also lived in Crown Office Row. He makes Lamb Court the scene of some passages in the *History of Pendennis*. Later Dickens made the Temple Courts still more famous in his novels. The Temple Fountain, "the part best beloved by the many novelists and essayists who have written about the Temple . . . is the spot where in *Martin Chuzzlewit* Dickens makes Ruth Pinch meet her lover and her brother. 'Brilliantly the Temple Fountain sparkled in the sun, and laughingly its liquid music played . . . as little Ruth and her companion came towards it.' " Colonel Blackham has much cause for asserting that the Inns of Court are "the great nurseries of lawgivers and cradles of men of letters."

For the sake of completeness, the author describes the old Inns of Chancery and some of the famous taverns near the Temple, notably "The Cock" and "The Devil." He further writes chapters on "the livery of the law" and the life of a modern barrister. Finally, the connection of the Inns of Court with America and Ireland are dealt with. It is interesting to note that five members of the Middle Temple signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776. This comprehensive volume provides a very enjoyable introduction to greater knowledge of the Inns of Court.

FOREIGN ECONOMIC GROWTH.*

The late Professor Lilian Knowles, the eminent economist, had planned and fully lectured upon the subject of the economic

* *Economic Development in the Nineteenth Century: France, Germany, Russia and the United States.* By the late L. C. A. Knowles. George Routledge & Sons Ltd. 12s. 6d. net.

development of the Great Powers during the nineteenth century and had published that part of her able survey relating to Great Britain in a volume entitled *The Industrial and Commercial Revolution in Great Britain during the Nineteenth Century*. She died in 1926, leaving the rest of her lectures on this subject, dealing with France, Germany, Russia and the United States, unpublished. Her intention to publish is shown by the draft preface found among her papers. In part also the volume had been prepared for publication and, fortunately, the Editor, Mr. C. M. Knowles, has been able to correlate and expand the remaining lecture notes (with the help of Dr. Allan McPhee) in a fashion that practically leaves little to be desired. The literary and scientific form of this important book makes it a work that every student of economic history will have no difficulty in studying and should read.

There is indeed no book that attempts the task that is here fulfilled, "the interaction of the Great Powers on each and how far their general development was similar and how far it differed in each country." The whole world, as Professor Knowles said, "became one area for economic purposes after 1870 and economic motives dominated the political situation from that time onwards." That was one of the tragedies of the World War, since in 1914 "world interdependence and exchange" had been "substituted for a national system of economics." After 1870 Europe returned to protection and State regulation. It was not till more than fifty years later that England at last gave up, temporarily at any rate, free trade. Professor Knowles did not live to see the change, but in any event her theme is a pre-war theme. She sees in the period between 1830 and 1870 an intensified nationalism that begot not only *laissez-faire* in industry and commerce but a new Imperialism that looked for markets in Asia, Africa and the Pacific. "A new democratic imperial mercantilism took the place of the national mercantilism of the autocratic monarchs." It was a new world.

It followed inevitably from the very fact of mercantile and industrial competition in the various imperial systems that liberalism and free trade in the Continental countries would give place to State regulation and, as Professor Knowles states, successive wars stimulated these changes. The agricultural changes that she traces in such valuable detail in France, Germany, Russia and the United States played also a great part in the changing world. The creation of personal freedom in Russia and other countries gave a new outlook to farming in the great agricultural areas. In 1910 almost a third of the people of the United States of America were engaged in agriculture. In Germany the total yield of cereals and of potatoes had more than doubled in the thirty

years that ended in 1913, while in France long before these dates the wheat area had increased by fifty per cent. and the yields had doubled. Indeed, between 1820 and 1913 the yield had doubled though the progress had been slower after 1880. As to Russia

before the European War broke out Russia was engaged on the most stupendous agricultural revolution of modern times, and was accomplishing it quite rapidly. The result should have been greatly increased yields, the creation of a new granary for Europe, and a higher level of life for the peasant. . . . Co-operative societies were forming rapidly, as the Russian has a genius for co-operation.

The economic liberty—which Professor Knowles considers was a fruit of the French Revolution—played an even greater part in the Continental Industrial Revolution. At the end of the nineteenth century in France, indeed, the freedom of the workmen was shown more in strikes than in political action, while in Germany after 1871 there was a tremendous growth in industries and manufactures with large protection of the industrial worker by means of social insurance and the trade union movement. Even in Russia in 1906 trades unions became lawful and the industrial development that had begun in the 'eighties was proceeding with vast rapidity until 1914. It was a dramatic process and has left its mark on the history of Western economics. The United States of America had been racing along in the industrial world, and despite a labour movement that did not follow the trade union method but worked on the conservative lines of the American Federation of Labour uniting all skilled crafts, the Nation was able at last to control both railways and trusts and is striving to solve other great problems such as great monopolies and prohibitive tariffs.

Professor Knowles goes on to deal with the revolution wrought by mechanical transport in France, Germany, Russia and the United States of America and deals also with what may be called the imperial expansions of these countries. The French policy of tariff assimilation whereby French goods were to go into the French Colonies without payment of any duty and foreign goods going to the same destination were to pay the French tariff while Colonial goods were to have a preference in the French market, has been moderately successful, though a skilled observer declares that "the external trade of all the French possessions, including Algeria and Tunis, was not one-third as large as the external trade of India," and it is a question whether the policy of assimilation and the spread of French civilisation in this way has paid in the region of economics.

For the last twenty-five years of the nineteenth century (and

for the matter of that, all of the twentieth century up to date) the world with which the author deals has been dominated by the growing influence of the State in every economic field, including social welfare. The continual need for money to pay for these ventures of State intervention has made the income tax universal, and Professor Knowles' comment on the pre-war income tax is very interesting :

In all these countries the income tax has an allowance for dependants, in France a very extensive allowance. The United States [which introduced in 1912 a federal income tax on the English lines] makes no distinction between an earned and an unearned income, but this distinction is made in the German States and in France, the earned income receiving preferential treatment. The income tax, when worked in this way, is a remarkable example of action by the State to redress inequalities of fortune and assist the poorer man with a family to shoulder his burdens.

Another and final point which may be noted is the effect that European immigrants into the United States of America have had on social and economic life. "They had," says Professor Knowles, "no prejudice against government regulation as had the old settlers who had inherited the English tradition. It thus tended to become obscured and make the American people less hostile to Government action in various forms." Various strange amendments to the Constitution illustrate this truth. Perhaps the numerous Italians who return to Italy take the reinforced tradition of State intervention with them.

J. E. G. DE M.

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THE BUCOLICS AND GEORGICS OF VERGIL.*

Professor Murison is incorrigibly diligent. Having just given a grateful world the entire works of Horace in excellent and varied English verse he almost immediately follows this really great effort with an heroic attempt to render the *Bucolics* and *Georgics* of Virgil in English hexameters. Professor Murison, against much modern practice, but in accordance with the older manuscript fragments, spells the name of the poet, Vergil. The Medicean and other complete manuscripts apparently abandoned this spelling for Virgil and there must have been some definite early evidence upon which the change was based. Mr. T. E. Page, in his Edition of Books I-VI of the *Aeneid*, definitely says, "the spelling

* The *Bucolics* and *Georgics* of Virgil Rendered into English Hexameters. By Alexander Falconer Murison. Longmans. 7s. 6d.

Virgilius is wrong; but as an English word it seems pedantic to alter 'Virgil,' established as it is by a long literary tradition." But Continental scholars, such as Zappert and Comparetti, use the term "Virgil" so that it is not only an English tradition. In writing of the St. Denis fragment (in the Vatican) of the second or third century the name "Vergil" is used, but that was before the change took place in the fourth or fifth century. We are told by Gellius that M. Valerius Probus (the grammarian of the first century) in settling the text of Virgil "examined the MS. of the *First Georgic* corrected by Virgil's own hand" (Sandys) and "traces of some of his critical signs survive in the Medicean MS." Therefore it is quite likely that the spelling *Virgil* is to be attributed to Probus.

P. Virgilius Maro was born in 70 B.C. near Mantua, and died at Brindisi in 19 B.C. in his prime. About the year 41 B.C. he became an intimate friend of Octavian (Augustus) and his Minister, Mæcenas, as well as Horace. He had already published his pastoral poems, called songs about herdsmen (the *Bucolics*), known to us by the name of the *Eclogues*. The *Georgics* followed between 37 B.C. and 30 B.C., and represented perhaps the policy of Augustus and of Mæcenas, the direct inspirer of the poem, in its attack on great estates. In the opening of the *Third Georgic* Virgil refers to the writing of the *Aeneid* with Cæsar as its hero. He was known to have this in hand in 27 B.C., and he was hard at work in 23 B.C. He was urged by Augustus to publish the great work but it is said that he was discontented with it and burnt it. Fortunately copies survived and immediately after Virgil's death it was issued by Varius and Tucca. From that time Virgil gradually became an almost legendary figure, his brilliant shadow pervading the Middle Ages. The *Fourth Eclogue* was regarded as a prophecy of the advent of Christ and it was a tradition that St. Paul visited his tomb near Naples.

Roman poetry was derived from Greek models. Nævius, Ennius and Lucretius gradually led to the perfection of Virgil who, though echoing Theocritus in the *Eclogues* and in the *Aeneid* Homer, however, achieved something essentially his own. Professor Murison rightly translates Virgil into English hexameters though he says that the Latin hexameter "is much less willing than the Greek to be reproduced in the English hexameter; and the matter of the *Georgics*, largely intractable in any form of verse, is very often defiant of the English form." Yet, if Virgil chose the Greek form it would be unwise for an English translator to do otherwise. It is true that the hexameter must be filed, and very often it is not, with disastrous results. Professor Murison has polished his work and has endeavoured to make the hexameters "read themselves," that

is to say, flow naturally with the artificiality of the metre—if it is artificial and not a natural wave-sound—hidden in its essential music.

It must suffice in a brief notice to quote a line or two from the famous *Fourth Eclogue* and some lines from the scarcely less famous *Third Georgic*:

Now has come in the last age that the Sibyl of Cumæ predicted:
Now the Grand Cycle of centuries starts on a fresh revolution;
Now is the Maiden returning, returning the reign of Saturnus;
Now from the heavens on high is descending a new generation.
Chaste Lucina, do thou but be gracious at birth of the man-child
Through whom at last shall the iron generation pass out of
existence,

While that the golden shall reign the world over: now reigns
thine Apollo.

It is not wonderful that the Middle Ages hailed this as a prophecy of the death of the Iron Age, the birth of Christ, and the coming of the Golden Age which we still await.

In the *Third Georgic* comes the intimation that the poet is contemplating his *Epic of Rome*:

Cæsar shall stand in the shrine of the centre, the god of the
temple.

I, in his honour, as victor, resplendent in Tyrian purple,
Four-horse chariots a hundred will drive by the river in
triumph.

Greece all will join me, leaving Alpheus and groves of
Molochus,

And will contend with the raw-hide gauntlet and strive in the
foot-race.

Yet before long I will gird me to tell of the hard-foughten
battles

Cæsar has won, and to carry his name and his fame through
as many

Years as is Cæsar removed from the day of the birth of Tithonus.

J. E. G. DE M.

A SCHOOLMASTER LOOKS BACK.*

Some professional books are the very stuff of which history is made and this is specially so in the history of education. Acts of Parliament, Orders in Council, statistics are all very well, but when the life of education is in question we have to go to the

* *Musings of an Old Schoolmaster*. By Thomas Steele, with an Introduction by Sir William Beach Thomas. Oxford University Press. 2s. net.

lives of great head-masters and assistant masters—and in these days and for the last half-century, great head-mistresses and assistant mistresses—and to the pictures which their lives made up. The schools that William Fitzstephen describes in the late twelfth century, the scholastic life that Richard Mulcaster pictures in the Elizabethan Age—the Mulcaster who had for a contemporary Roger Ascham—the life of Dr. Busby of Westminster, the story of the great Etonian teachers and floggers, get very near to the heart of the history of education in this country. A book recently published, Mr. Thomas Steele's "musings" and backward "thinkings," is in the great tradition and links up the school life of to-day with the fierce battling and caning days of some sixty years ago.

An old Bradfield master, Mr. Steele was a Cranleigh School boy and first of all tells the story of Cranleigh with its faults and its magnificent opportunities. His "musings" were originally written for the *Bradfield College Chronicle* between 1928 and 1931:

I had been a Master at Bradfield for over forty years, and I wrote entirely for Bradfield readers; but, when I had finished, many old friends and pupils persuaded me that the musings would appeal to a wider audience, if only because eight years as a boy at Cranleigh, and such a long time as a Master at Bradfield, gave me some claim to be heard. For, in talking of Masters whom I had known, of school fights, punishments, and conventions, of the changes in education in the last century, I hope that very much of what I have written may interest any boy or master, at whatever school he may have been.

Interest is not the word to use. Mr. Steele has got, somehow or another, to the very essence of English school life. It may be his vast experience, his full sense of humanism, his delightful and quiet prose style, his sense of humour, his knowledge of boys, but whatever is the secret of his book there it stands as a living link between the school of to-day and the school not only of yesterday, but of the school that ran back more than three centuries, through the times of Busby to the times of Mulcaster and the revival of learning. His book is not interesting in the conventional sense of that term. It is living, and the valuable part of it is that, despite all the changes of the last fifty years, the schoolboy is ever the same and the stout schoolmaster, the man who makes men, is ever the same, though apparently so different. Fuller's essay on "The Good Schoolmaster" written three hundred years ago shows (as Mr. Steele confesses) that there is really no change and the rod is as necessary to-day as ever it was.

As to teaching Mr. Steele takes the view of a late Eton Master "who wrote that there were two kinds of teachers who have real

influence. 'The one,' he says, 'makes boys work: the other makes them love work.' " That is absolutely true:

The first is to our Modernist scarcely a "teacher" at all: yet two great things he does teach: respect for authority, and respect for work as duty. The other man has enthusiasm, and it is surely as great a gift as that for being obeyed; for without it you will never get the best out of boys. I know, indeed, its drawbacks, but it has one supreme merit—it is catching; and the Master who has it will find even the dull-witted eager to work with him instead of being dragged along.

Mr. Steele is no believer in the non-punishment theory. Boys are wiser than some theorists and know quite well when they deserve punishment and it is well that they should have it and have it meted out in cold justice. It is strange that there should be this theory of non-punishment. No boy who has ever been caned and who knew the justice of his caning has ever held such a theory. Boys do not change: most of them are philistines, but if philistinism can be changed by education it is far more difficult to change priggishness and that is, perhaps, the evil that the future has to face. Yet the boys that fought and fell during the War must leave us hopeful and, as Mr. Steele is ready to vouch, the new boys of to-day, with their ampler opportunities of usefulness, are not likely to let the nation down. Yet priggishness is a thing that housemasters must face in these days. However that may be, all teachers should read this book which is as tender and true to human nature as it is firm and insistent on the great ideals which make growth—that is to say, education—possible.

J. E. G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Count Sforza's *European Dictatorships*,* which has already appeared in several languages, cannot be too widely read, for it is full of knowledge, wisdom and courage. As an ex-Foreign Minister and Ambassador he writes with experience of high office, and he has lived and worked in Asia and America as well as in many of the capitals of Europe. It is refreshing to read such an authoritative exposure of one of the most distressing pathological consequences of the war. "The more I have seen of dictatorships," he writes, "the more I have felt what a terrible moral and material inheritance they will leave behind them." The book opens with a series of chapters on Fascism, the nature of which he illustrates from his own experience. He demolishes once again, like Salvemini before him,

* Allen and Unwin. 8s. 6d.

the baseless legend that Mussolini saved Italy from Bolshevism and anarchy, pointing out that the danger was over before the march on Rome. Though an exile, he writes without bitterness. He does not regard the Duce as a great man, and he is convinced that his dictatorship will some day collapse like a house of cards, as a similar adventure crashed down in Spain. A chapter on the Magyar oligarchy exhibits a class, rather than an individual, as the dictator. King Alexander is presented as a ruler who, when he tore up the Constitution in 1929, was full of initial goodwill. He was, however, the first victim of the new régime, for, like other dictators, he has discovered that he cannot restore normality. "Sometimes a poor dictator is sick of his spies, of his secret police, of his pretended infallibility. He would like to go back to the good tottering blunders of democracy—all blunders with some remedy at hand. But he cannot. He is a victim of the interests, the hatreds, the fears he has created." King Alfonso is treated by the author with the severity he deserves, Pilsudski more leniently, and Mustafa Kamel with a certain sympathy. Count Sforza has written a wholesome and helpful book, inspired by an ineradicable belief in the dignity of human nature, and by a conviction that there is no spiritual substitute for political and intellectual liberty in a civilised community.

* * *

Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler's latest work, *Looking Forward*,* contains thirty-one recent essays and addresses on American and international topics. The distinguished President of Columbia University—philosopher, educationalist, publicist, administrator—speaks with authority on many of the problems of our distracted time. He has seen and heard, read and travelled, thought and written, and here we have once again the expression of his living faith. His belief in ordered liberty remains unshaken despite the violent attacks from the Fascist and the Communist camps. Should liberty fail, he reminds us, there is nothing but compulsion to take its place. Liberty, as he understands it, is not selfish and thoughtless individualism but thoughtful and responsible citizenship. "The free man socially minded is the hope of the world." He summarises his programme in an address entitled "These United States," in which he applies the teaching of Hamilton and Jefferson to the problems of the twentieth century. There is no need to take sides between the two great teachers, he adds, for the contribution of each to the life and thought of America was beyond price. Hamilton's work of building a strong central government, he believes, is now accomplished. To-day we need rather the gospel of Jefferson—the strengthening of local government, the preservation of civil liberty, the development of the individual citizen. Dr. Butler, like all true Liberals, respects quality and personality, and he is at his best in describing the great figures of American history. English readers will particularly welcome his admiring tribute to Lord Balfour, "the first gentleman of his time." Like other men who think highly rather than meanly of human nature, Dr. Butler stoutly refuses to despair of the world.

* Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, London, 1932.

*Ourselves and the Community** is a small book by Mr. E. E. Reynolds intended "to supply a conspectus of political and social organisation, local, central and international. It is particularly intended for the information of those who are within a few years of being included on the register of electors." In the space of two hundred and fifty pages it is impossible to write a complete account of the organs and functions of both local and central government. It must suffice only to describe some of the main principles. In this volume, however, Mr. Reynolds has attempted to include a considerable amount of detail. The natural result is an inadequate account of the fundamental character of English government. In the chapters devoted to the Constitution, for example, the doctrine that a Minister is responsible to Parliament is described and dealt with in two sentences. "A Minister is responsible to Parliament . . . and at any time his actions may be questioned in Parliament, and should definite disapproval be shown he would feel compelled to resign." The overriding convention of the collective responsibility of the Cabinet has received no attention at all. The recent "agreement to differ" provides no adequate reason for this omission. During the last two centuries, this doctrine has played a dominating part; and unless this isolated exception, caused by an emergency, becomes a permanent and general rule, the doctrine of Cabinet responsibility must remain a principal feature of our constitution. Unfortunately in this volume, a number of the more detailed statements are inaccurate or misleading. In the chapter on "The Law," for example, it is stated that "the Assizes are held once a year at least in the principal towns of the counties." In fact the Assizes are held in most cases three times a year. Again we read that "as with Civil cases, there are two higher Courts of Appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal, and the House of Lords." This is only partly true. In the criminal cases the House of Lords can only hear appeals from the Court of Criminal Appeal on points of law, by leave of the Attorney-General. There is no such restriction in civil cases. The most important requirement for an elementary book of this nature is reliability. To obtain this, Mr. Reynolds would do well carefully to revise his work, as the fundamental idea of the volume is good.

Not many scholars can read Pindar with complete ease, and Professor Lionel W. Lyde places a good many lovers of Greek in his debt by his little volume *A Patchwork from Pindar: with an English Translation in Verse*†. He primarily approaches the subject as a geographer—a great geographer (though he has had fifty years as a student of Greek)—and he has grounds for complaint against the existing translations, "so untrue to Pindar's geographical environment that I was quite certain that they did not represent his real meaning, even if they seemed to translate his actual words. . . . to suggest that a great poet was unconscious of, or indifferent to, the atmospheric effects, when all his countrymen were so sensitive to them—and classified them so clearly—would be unpardonable." His Introduction will find many readers among scholars as well as geographers, since its scholarship and its common sense are as

* Cambridge University Press. 5s. net.

† Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 3s. 6d. net.

radiant as the light which he throws on the relationship of Pindar and the beloved Athens. Professor Lyde's translation of Pindar's dithyramb on Athens is indeed one to remember:

O radiant City of the Violet Crown,
O Athens, city of far-flung renown,
The pride of poet's hymn, the stay of Greece,
You little city from the Gods come down!

But to quote adequately would be to quote the whole book, the reader's golden task, so four more immortal lines must suffice:

No sculptor I, that I should carve in stone
Statues to stand on pedestals alone!
On every merchantman, on every sloop
Go with my news, sweet song, to every zone.

Professor Lyde has enjoyed his re-creation of Pindar, but not more than many lazier scholars will enjoy the fruits of his labours.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Mrs. Adler-Hobman's "One who Loved: the Story of Rahel Levin" recalls to life one of the most notable and attractive figures of Germany's Augustan age. Though presented in fictional form, it is a true story from beginning to end, and those who know most of that wonderful time will most admire her art. The central figure of the brilliant Jewess, the cleverest of a group of clever women, stands out in bold relief, masculine in her range of interests and her passion for intellectual independence, feminine in her refinement of feeling and her craving for understanding love. The chief portraits in the gallery of Rahel's distinguished friends are very skilfully drawn, among them Gentz and the Humboldts, the two Olympians Goethe and Beethoven, Mme. de Stael and Heine, Hegel taking snuff and Schleiermacher in his pulpit. Varnhagen von Ense, the young and adoring husband with whom she found peaceful happiness after many storms, appears in a very pleasant light, and it is to his pious labours that we owe most of our knowledge. Mrs. Hobman does not obtrude her learning, and the book is never overweighted with detail; but we feel throughout that we are following the lead of a very competent guide through the intricacies of an eventful epoch.

In the series entitled "Leaders of Philosophy" published by Messrs. Ernest Benn and edited by Professor G. L. Stocks, there has been published already Leibniz, Spinoza and Thomas Aquinas, and now Mr. G. R. G. Mare, of Merton College, Oxford, has given to the student an excellent account of the work and influence of Aristotle. Mr. Mare says in his preface that he has "in the main followed Aristotle's own order of exposition, which is roughly reflected by the order of the treatises in our *Corpus Aristotelicum*."

* Edward Golston Ltd., 25, Museum Street. 6s.

But I have made an important exception by treating the logical doctrines last instead of first. . . . I have felt it necessary in Part I to give an account of Platonism which may seem too detailed and too loosely connected with my main theme. But I do not think that Aristotle can be understood unless Plato is first presented as something more than a mere source of his pupil's philosophy." That is certainly the right course to take in both cases. It is interesting to think how Aristotle's central problem is disturbing our modern physicists. The truth is that the nature of being in the light of relativity has both a physical and a metaphysical significance. Mr. Marc traces the history of Greek philosophy from Thales to Socrates and thence to Plato (whose thought is treated at admirable length) before going on to his set subject, which is very properly concluded by an essay on "the history and influence of Aristotelianism," containing some account of modern Aristotelian studies after dealing with Theophrastus, Alcinus, Aquinas and later mediæval and renaissance work. It should be recorded here that the Master of Balliol is working on Kant, Professor A. S. Ferguson on Plato, the Editor on J. S. Mill, and Mr. S. V. Keeling on Descartes for this very useful series.

"Must the League Fail?" by Miss L. A. Zimmern, is a short but very critical study of the League of Nations to-day. In the recent Manchurian dispute the intervention of the League seemed to some observers futile. "Why has the League machinery worked in such a strange way, so that it ended by producing a result which was the exact opposite of what it was set up to do?" Miss Zimmern's answer is that "properly managed, it could be made to work, and to become a real safeguard for the peace of the world." The most important function of the League is to prevent war and "not to engage in diplomatic activities . . . the prevention of war is one thing and the conduct of Foreign Policy is another. The two do not belong together." The great Powers have captured the League machinery, and Geneva provides the medium for the old unilateral alliances and the expression of an aggressive nationalism. Miss Zimmern suggests as a remedy that the independence of the Secretariat should be obtained by drawing its personnel from the smaller Powers and that the Council "must be the most authoritative body in the world" when called upon to prevent a war. Indeed the Prime Minister of each State should attend in person. "A Council of Prime Ministers would wield an authority out of all proportion to that of a Council composed of Foreign Ministers and diplomats." Many of Miss Zimmern's strictures may be justified, though the weight of her arguments would be increased by more illustrations. It may be argued also that the education of world opinion in the cause of peace is of more importance than a change of personnel at Geneva. If you achieve this fundamental purpose, the rest will follow in its wake.