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JOURNAL OF INDIAN HISTORY

Editorial

WITH this issue the *Journal of Indian History* enters on its tenth volume. The journal has managed successfully to tide over the difficulties incidental to this early stage of its existence, and has maintained the high standard that it had set before itself as a journal devoted to historical research. This is testified to by a competent judge, who has been at the pains to read some of the more recent issues of the journal carefully through, and states it as his opinion :

'I can assure you that I have far more than glanced through it. I have read it with the care and attention it deserves. I think you keep up a wonderfully high standard.'

It cannot yet be said to have achieved financial success, however, and the Editor hopes that it will meet with a much larger support than it actually does from those interested in the progress of Studies in Indian History at the Universities, and among the people generally. The study of Indian History which the journal has undertaken to promote is best done, and that in a permanent form by a rise in the number subscribing for it and contributing to it. In both branches of its work fresh accession would be quite welcome, and the Editor hopes that the assistance will be forthcoming.

The first issue of the new volume has delayed much beyond its due date owing to adverse circumstances, which could not very well have been avoided. Proofs that had to be sent great distances delayed owing to inconveniences to the authors, and the passing of the press under a new management also contributed somewhat towards this. It is hoped that the further issues of the journal will appear in time and such mishaps avoided for the future.

The Prince of Wales Museum Inscription of Jayakeśi III, the Kadamba King of Goa

BY

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THIS inscription is one of the several that are lying in the Gallery of Inscriptions in the Prince of Wales Museum of Western India, Bombay. So far as I could ascertain, they are all unedited. I record here my gratitude to the authorities of the Museum for their generous permission to me to publish them all.

The stone on which the following record is engraved is five feet tall and three feet wide. It bears at the top the usual symbolism of the Kadamba family, viz., a *linga* in the middle and a worshipper and a resting *Nandi* on the left side. The Kanarese script used here belongs to the 12th century A.D. It is perfectly clear except where the surface is indented.

The inscription in question belongs to the twelfth regnal year of Jayakeśi III, a Kadamba king who ruled from Goa for about 25 years from 1187-88 A.D. So the date of this record would be 1200 A.D., and it precedes by three years the earliest grant so far known of this Jayakeśi. The name of the king is spelt variously here—Jayakeśi, Jekesi, Vira Jayakeśi, Vijaya-kesi. He is, as a vassal under the Chālukya Emperor Tribhuvanamalladeva, said to have governed Banavāsi, Konkan 900, Halasige 12,000. His capital was Goa. The district of Halasige, of which there is a poetic description, has retained its name even now, and the Eleya Pūrvalli, E—Pūrvadavalli, or E—Purbballi of the grant is, no doubt, the modern Hubli. Three other places are mentioned; Navilūr, Chaugāum, and Upukel. The grant states that at the expense of the Kuriba Seniga tribe a school was built inside the temple of Senigeśvara and a piece of land was given to the God by the 200 mahājanas of Eleya Pūrvalli.

TEXT

(There are places in the text where the meaning is not clear. They have been marked with an asterisk.)

Svasti

1. Namas-tunga śira (h) śchum (ga) bi chandra chammara chā (ra) ve | traye[ōkyanagarārambha (m) mūlastambhāya sambhave ||
2. Nitya svatantra* sa (?) drisoh pra + yō + lo + rgnānārṇava kārāpām-ya mantrāksharāpām
3. lōpi (?) chetasvarūpam sadāśivam tam praṇamāmi mūrdhni || Śivāya namah ||
4. Svasti samastabhuvanāśraya Śrī Prithvivallabham mahārājā-dhirājam paramēśvaram paramabhaṭṭarakam
5. Satyāśrayakuṭatīlakam Chālukyārjunanum Chālukyakantḥi-ravanum Chālukyābha [ra] ṇanum
6. Sōmavana (?) mukhatīlakanum Śrī—ja Tribhuvanamalladevara Vijaya rāja (m) muttarō (ttarā)
7. bhividdhi pravarddhamānamāchandrarka tārambaram sukha samkathā vinō (va) dadim rājyam gai
8. yuttamire || Tata pādapadmōpajīvi || Svasti samadhigatapanchamahāśabda mahāmaṇḍaḥesvaram Banavāsipu
9. ravarādhiśvaram Śrī Kādambabhujabala Vira Jayakesidevarasaru Konkan Ombhainūruvam dushtanigraba śishta.
10. pratipālanadim Halasige hannichehāsira sahitavāldarasugaiyuttam Goveya nelevīdinolu sukha
11. sankathā vinōdadim rājyam gaiyuttamire || Śrī rāmōrukuchadvayastvagita chanchatkunkumōdghrishta sa
12. premālam [kri] ta vaksha (?) kshyasukham kshīrābdhimadhyōdatastōmāśeśa susikarākshata lasatśrī mastakam
13. Keśavam bhūmīśam Jayakesidevangīgishṭa samsiddhiya || Śrī Kādamba kuṭābdhichandra
14. namaḥachchālukya dauhitrajam lōkabyāpi [ta] kīrti kāntanabhitakshmā pālāsāmrājyaśrīsvikāram śa
15. raṇāga (ga) tārthijanatāsantāna Manvādiśāstrākāmksyārthachārītranembudu jagam Jekesiḥhū
16. pālana || *Pa — — da — rtthipraka — kke kalpakuja (?) vāma — ntavam banda — Harirājam śaraṇendavamgabhayadim
17. kāvam mahīpālabbhāsūratejam Jayakesidevanenipam Bhūlōka-dolu varṇyanīśvarapādāmbujābbringanigale (?) sevam kā —

18. dam Kādamba bhūpālakam || vara Gangājalachandrachūdanaga-jarddhāngasrujatpālanōttararūpam Śivanīśanādyanabhavam
19. Śrī Saptakōtīśanam stiravārādhisi nīchcha nīchcha varavam Jekēśi bhūpālanādaradi kaikoṭutippanembudu jagam māhē
20. śvarōrvīś(v)ana || Intu pogarttevaḍeda Jekēśi devanālva Halasigenāḍa byāvarṇanamenten [da] de || vrittagaḍā ||
21. Halasigenāḍu nāḍe sogayippudu bhūvalayake śōbheyam tale-deleva || pūgiphaḷa māmara kōmaḷa mātuḷanga vā —
22. jālaruha śaṇḍa maṇḍita taṭākāsunnirjhara vāridhāreyim puḷina-menippudūrggaḷa bahirvana Vāsavanandanāspada ||
23. Nagaragrāma sukheḍa kharvaḍamahāmānyāgrahārangaḷim bag-edallalli * sabā (?) subā (?chā) śitamomattadūrggaḷolu rāgaḍim naga —
24. vālokipa hāḍuvāḍuvavarim śringāravāranganōjjugadindippudu sārsvkālavadarim raiyam tadurvīṭaḷa ||
25. Tīligoḷanondanondi pariyuttirālā parinīranunḍu kattalipele-va || pūgiphaḷa bāle rasōtkara vīle tengu māduphaḷam kariyikshu
26. danḍa kaḷado(?)tkara bhāradinoppi tōrutam beḷedu tadurvī-tajjanake māḍe basantamanāvakālamu || Intī negattegam
27. pogarttegām neleyāgirda Halasigenāḍoḷage Eleya Purvvaḷḷiya byāvarṇanamentendaḍe || Sasivaranondu tōn
28. taḍolu pūgiphaḷangaḷa bhāradinda ondesegoragirdudonde-ḍeyoḷondeḍeyolu turugirda gompalim sasina menippudom
29. [de] ḍeyoḷondeḍeyolu kone kempanāgi nālu desegesedippu-dondeḍeyolonde hālugoneyindaloppam
30. gū (?) Oledalevaḷḷiyāmaradināmarakoyyane kayya nīdi katta-lise tadandhakāraḍoḷagāvaranoyyane sōnke sōn —
31. ki mattalevavarila vāyuvāḍadimḍulihāgire tōntakāra bandele-yane koyidu * jarevamagāgaḷe māppudanai —
32. de māḍuva || Erehaḷu haraḷu tōntada bariyolu kāluveyanumba gaddegālindam pirid-Eleya Pūrvvaḷḷiya
33. dhareyellam beḷasu kaḷasaviṭṭantirku || varaśāstrārthaviśāra-darssakaḷa vedānika sampannaruttara tarkka prameya pramā —
34. nareredarggānandadindīvoḍam surabhūjōpamargaḷint—Eleya Pūrvvaḷḷi dvijaśreshṭharam piridimnūrvvaranagaḷum po
35. gaḷugum bhūlokavidvajjanā || Svasti yamaniyamasvādhyaya-dhyāna * dhā pāvaṇā (adhyāṇa) nanushṭhānaparāyaṇar vidita
36. vedārthavidyāpāragarssatkarmaniratarum saptasōma samsvā (?) vabhrītāvagāhana pavitrīkri —

37. taśarīrarum dvātrimśatsameyāgraga(m) [nya] rum ekavākya-rum dushtanigraha śiṣṭapratipālanarum
38. Śrī Mūrtti Nārāyaṇa devara labdhavaraprasādāsāḍitarumappa śrīmadanādiyagrahāram E —
39. leya Pūrvvadavaḷḷiyūroḍeya pramukha mahajanangalinnūrvva-rum saviṭṭhaṇaḍalu mahāsabheyāgirddu Chaugāmveya
40. Navilūra Kurumba Senigarū * ro (?) khyavāsameya saroham-gaḷa kaiyyalu (?) appaneyam konḍu ā Senigesvaradevara āgabhōga rangabhōga
41. kke chaitrapavitrika koṭṭa kramamentendaḍe || Svasti Kaliyu-ga samvatsaram 4288 sandandādiyāgi Śrī Kādambabhujabāḷa
42. Vijayakeśideva varśāḍa 12 neya kāḷāyukta samvatsarada Puśya ba || Ādityavāra Uttarāyaṇa samkramaṇa
43. dandu Śrīmadāśeśa mahājanagaḷu koṭṭa keyya sthaḷa Unukella dāriya paḍuvalu Bra + [hmārga] ⁽¹⁾ puriya keyintenkala
44. sarvvanamasya sarva bādḥāparihāravāgi koṭṭu mattarentu devara paḷiyippattāru kaiya nīḷa yippattondu kaiya agalaḍoḷage
45. maṭha maneyāgi māḍidaḍam sarva bādheparihāravāgi mahā-janagaḷu koṭṭaru || Ā Kuriba Senigakuḷavarṇanamanen—
46. daḍe || Kuribitiga* panchaputtigavariteyoleḷem puttī Kuriba Senigarembi terana kulavāgi lōkada nere māmā (he?) śvarareuippa hesaram paḍeda
47. ru || Jagadoḷagelliyum Kuriba Senigaremba kulōttamarssadā bageyudu dharmma jīrṇa Śivagehada māṭa samasta vistaram migi—
48. lene kīrttiyampaḍeyuttam Śivadharmmamamanāvakālamum bagegoṭutipparendu paratarssameyāḍigaleḷe kīrttiparu || Antu kīrttisi ||
49. Mige sāhitya samasta śāstra vishaya byāpāraḍolu pēḷḍaḍem Bhṛigumindatyadhirkkaḷāsurige vinnāgaḷolu vīraḍolu hage sim—
50. hakkidirāge tāgi kolvarpāva (m)na [Na] vilānvayarmigilīn-toppe Kuriba Senigaridēm lōkakke vikhyātarō || Antenise ||
51. kanda || Navilūru Kuriba Senigaravarelam mukhyavāgi Chaugāveyavar tavatavage banduḍam—rmo—vadimḍi keyya
52. haḍedu devarggittaru | Dīnānātharu bāḷvene kāninana terade kuḍuvarahitarvvaralabhimānamane sūregombar-mānisa Navilū [ra]

* These two letters inside the brackets are engraved all by themselves at the bottom of the inscription. The preceding plus mark puts them in place.

53. [Ku]riba Seniga nivaha || Ī dharmmamanāvadara nirpōdhi-
gaḷim kādavargge sukhampada sūsādhita meniku vaḷipanigo

54. —narakābdhiyoḷage gaḷagaḷaniḷivaru || Svadattām paradattām
vā yō hareti vasundharā | Śashtivarśśa sahasrāṇi viśṭāyām jāyate
krimi ||

TRANSLATION

Lines

1-3. Well, Salutation to that Śambhu who is beautiful on account
of the fan-like moon kissing the head aloft; to the pillar of commence-
ment of the city of the Trilōkas. I salute God Sadāśiva who is ever
free, who is the very essence of those hymns and letters which are the
ocean of learning. A bow to Śiva.

4-7. While Tribhuvanamalla Chālukya (with the usual titles) was
ruling the kingdom of the world, his dependant.

8-11. Vira Jayakeśi-deva, the strong arm of the Kadambas, the
lord of the city of Banavāsi, the obtainer of the five great musical
instruments, the great maṇḍalesvara, was ruling in happiness from
his capital Goa, the Konkana district 900 and Halasige 12,000, putting
down the wicked and protecting the virtuous.

11-13. May God Keśava who is immensely happy on account of
having Lakshmi by his side and grant all the wishes of king
Jayakeśi.

13-15. The world calls this king Jekesi, a moon to the ocean the
Kadamba family, the great-grandson of the pure Chālukyas, and his
fame known all over the world, one who has acquired the kingdom of
enemy kings, with a host of needy people seeking the shelter of his
generosity, and one who has in life accomplished the ideal of the
sacred sciences like that of Manu.

16-18. He extends protection to him who approaches
the King with the cry 'O King, protect me!' Ardently devoted to
the worship of Śiva is this King of the Kadambas.

18-20. The world says of him that he constantly worships Śrī
Saptakoṭīśvara who is the First Cause, Beginningless, who has
the Daughter of the Mountain by his side, and Gangā and the
moon on his head, and he obtains from Him boons both high
and low.

20. To describe Halasige nāḍ which is glorious and ruled by
Jekesi.

21-23. The whole land of Halasige sparkles, an ornament of
the entire world, and can, with its leaves and creepers, areca palms,
mango trees, citron trees, ponds adorned with vast clusters of lotuses,
streams and torrents, sandy banks and parks outside towns, be
compared to the Nandana garden of Indra.

23-24. That part of the earth is wealthy and beautiful for having
been replete with cities and villages, hamlets and market-towns; with
people in the towns always laughing and sightseeing, singing and
playing; and with beautiful and well-adorned courtesans.

25-26. A stream lost itself in the limpid waters of a pool and
flowed on; feeding on its water grew, heavy with fruits and leaves
hiding the sky, creepers, banana plants, betel plants, cocoanut palm,
citron, sugarcane, and so on; with all these, that part of the earth
had produced, for its inhabitants, perennial spring.

27. To describe Eleya Purbbaḷli in this Halasigenāḍ which was
the home of so much plenitude and prosperity.

27-29. In a garden an areca palm inclined to a side from the
weight of its fruits; here others looked level (with the ground) on
account of the fruits crammed on them; there, a tree had shot its
tendrils out in all directions; elsewhere tender bunches of pods deck-
ed other trees.

30-32. The leafy creeper had spread from tree to tree and spread
darkness; one lost his way and reached the enclosure. Hearing his
cry for help, carried afar by the wind, the gardener came, cut down
the leaves and in a derisive attitude led him out.

32-33. With arable land, plots of castor plants, canals on one
side, and rice fields, the whole place, the great Eleya Purvadavaḷli
looks like a crown of light.

33-35. May the scholars the world over always praise the cele-
brated two hundred Brahmins of Eleya Purvaḷli who are well-versed in
the sacred sciences, masters of the several Vedas, experts in the
arguments of logic, comparable in their generosity to the celestial tree.

35-41. Well, the two hundred Mahājanas of the ancient Eleya
Purdavavalli who adhere to the pious practice of self-control,
discipline, etc., devoted to learning and its practical application, always
occupied with the six karmas, whose body is purified by the bath
taken at the conclusion of the (?) seven Soma sacrifices, who are, the
devout followers of the 32,000 conventions, men carrying out their

promises, punishers of evil and protectors of the good, and who have secured the grace of Śrī Moorty Nārāyaṇa, met in conclave in Savithāṇa, sent for the Kurumba Senigas of Navilūr in Chaugaum, and with their consent made a grant to God Senigeśvara for various services (āgabhōga, rangabhōga, chaitrapavitra). Its details are:

41-45. On the occasion of the summer solstice on Sunday, the eleventh day of the dark fortnight of Pushya of Kālayukti Kaliyuga 4288, the twelfth year of Kadamba Vijayakēśi's reign, all the Mahājanas granted free of all imposts, a piece of land to the west of the road to Uṇukel and south of (?) Brahmārgapuri, and eight mattars, and a construction for school measuring twenty-six hands long and twenty-one hands broad, within the precincts of the temple.

To describe the tribe of these Kuriba Senigas:

46. Born, of a mother who was a Kuribiti by caste, of basket-makers, these Kuriba Senigas came to be known in the world by the name of Nere-māmā—(he?) śvaras.

47-48. All over the world these Kuriba Senigas of that noble race have restored Śiva temples in all their details; they have contemplated charity and the sacred creed of Śiva always; they have shone by the adoption of the celebrated conventions.

49-50. Why describe all this with the flourish of language and the sciences? How famous in the world are these Kuriba Senigas of the pure Navilūr family who kill enemies with bravery and skill and who surpass Bhrigu?

51. All these Kuriba Senigas of Navilūr chiefly, and other people of Chaugaum came of their own accord and gave away to the God whatever they could give with a generous hand.

52. These Kuriba Senigas of Navilūr are the refuge of the needy, and they rob enemies of all their pride.

53-55. To those who protect this grant will easily accrue wealth and happiness. But those who destroy it descend to hell.

Usual imprecations.

EDITOR'S NOTE

This record is dated Sunday, 11th of the dark fortnight of the month Paushya of the year Kālayukti, Kaliyuga 4288, 12th year of Vijayakēśi's reign—Kaliyuga 4288 is year Plavanga, Kālayukti being year of Kali 4299, the 12th year as Indians count it from Plavanga.

This provides the third instance of the error of 13 years which, according to Fleet, was a Telugu practice of counting the cycle of Jupiter beginning from the year 13th of the cycle, the year Pramādi. The two other instances noted by Fleet are Halsi Copper-plates of Siddhārti=Kali 4288, and the Kittoor inscription of Durmati=Kali 4289 (*J. Bo. Br. R. A. S.*, IX, 264). According to this record Kali 4288 is the 12th year of Jayakēśi. Jayakēśi then began to rule in Kali 4277. His father was ruling, according to Fleet, in 4275. He must have been succeeded by Jayakēśi in 4276 or 77. The grant was made in Makara Sankrānti which fell on Saturday, Bahula 10, both for Plavanga and for Kālayukta, according to Swamikkannu Pillai's *Ephemeris*, vol. iii.

The Historical Material in the Private Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai (1736—1761)

BY

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IX

I. DUPLEIX'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH NASIR JANG

Nasir Jang halted at Valudavur after his triumph where he received Murtaza Ali Khan of Vellore to whom he gave Arcot. Mir Asad was made the Diwan of the Nawab; and both agreed to pay the Nizam an annual tribute of 50 lakhs for the subah.¹ Wandiwash was to be given over to Mir Asad who suggested that if, Pondicherry were blockaded, Chanda Sahib and Muzaffar Jang's mother who were there, would have to be given up and most of the sepoys would desert from the French side. Major Lawrence who was in Nasir Jang's camp is said to have written letters to Dupleix and D'Auteuil that he would arrange to effect a peace between the French and Nasir Jang. The Diarist's view was that the English could not remove from the mind of Nasir Jang his fear of the French, and as they could not attack Pondicherry directly and Nasir Jang insisted that he should not return without effecting something, 'they might have offered to make peace between us and him and have written to you.'² Nasir Jang was advised by his nobles like Sayyad Lashkar Khan and Sayyad Sharif Khan that the besieging of Pondicherry would prove a very arduous task and the English would not fight them as there was peace between them; they were of the opinion that the subah of Arcot should be given to Muzaffar Jang and peace should be made with the French; otherwise

Chanda Sahib would return with European aid and renew the struggle for the Nawabship of Arcot. This was all the more effective as Murari Rao, Sanoji Nimbalkar, Chandra Sen and other Maratha sardars in the Nizam's camp were preparing to depart. In reply to communications received from Nasir Jang and Shah Nawaz Khan Dupleix sent ambassadors, including two of his Council, Mm. du Basset and Delarche.¹ Shah Nawaz Khan sympathized with the French; but apparently he was not able to persuade his master who demanded the surrender of Chanda Sahib and declined to give him the subah of Arcot. The envoys returned to Pondicherry with a letter from Shah Nawaz Khan explaining the situation, to which a veiled threat of war was sent as a reply. In fact, the envoys said that Shah Nawaz Khan and his Peshkar, Ramdas Pandit, told them secretly that if they departed without hesitation, marched again with troops and fell upon Nasir Jang's camp-guards by night, he would arrange to get Arcot for Chanda Sahib and restore his territory to Muzaffar Jang.²

¹ Orme states that the first letter of Dupleix to Nasir Jang was not replied to by that prince; but Dupleix made use of this pretext to continue the correspondence. The Diarist wrote for April 15th, that Dupleix observed to him that although six letters had been sent to the Nizam with the usual compliments, no reply had been received, the cause being that the letters were not couched in proper form. The letters from Nasir Jang and Shah Nawaz Khan were only received two days later.

One of the two French envoys spoke Persian with tolerable fluency. Du Basset had gone on an embassy to Nizam-ul-Mulk at Trichinopoly in 1743; according to their original instructions, they were to demand the restoration of Adoni for Muzaffar Jang, while Arcot might be given to Chanda Sahib or to the 'young prince', i.e., the younger son of Safdar Ali who was then residing at Wandewash. Dupleix himself subsequently wrote to the envoys that Arcot was to go to Muzaffar Jang, and later turned and agreed that Muzaffar Jang might be kept in prison, provided Adoni was given to his family. Thus 'M. Cultru concludes with reason that Dupleix still had no policy except that of hiring his troops to the highest bidder'. 'With such ill-defined aims, the ambassadors could accomplish little beyond getting a general idea of the parties into which the court was divided. They also seem to have sought relations with the Pathan Nawabs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savanur, who were already discontented at their prolonged detention in the south'. (Dodwell's *Dupleix and Clive*, pp. 48-9).

Also Martineau's *Dupleix et l'Inde Française*, (1749-54), p. 122

² According to Orme (who, however, says that the French deputies remained in the Nizam's camp for 8 days) Dupleix obtained the real advantages intended from their visit, a knowledge of Nasir Jang's strength and of the state of parties at his court. He continues:—'Suspicious were entertained of the clandestine conduct of the French deputies, and Major Lawrence was informed that some design was carrying on in the camp against the Subah (Nasir Jang) in which Shanawaze Khan, the prime minister, was the principal agent. The latter part

¹ The Diarist tells us that Nawab Sadat-ullah Khan used to pay 12 lakhs a year; Anwar-ud-din agreed to pay 24 lakhs; and Mahfuz Khan 28 lakhs of rupees.

² Entry for April 12, 1750, p. 36 of vol. vii of the *Diary*.
The letter of the English and the reply of Dupleix are given in Martineau's *Dupleix et l'Inde Française* (1749-54), p. 121.

The French attacked Nasir Jang's camp on the night of the 27th April, killed and wounded nearly 1,000 of the enemy as well as a large number of horse and cattle. A detachment under M. de La Touche as the captain of the attacking party, was sent out by D'Auteuil who had taken the command again and he took by surprise one of the quarters of the camp and penetrated more than a mile.¹

II. INTRIGUES AND FACTIONS IN NASIR JANG'S CAMP

Ramdas Pandit is stated by the Diarist to have offered terms of peace by which Trichinopoly was to be given to Chanda Sahib, as well as a *mansab* of 5,000 horse, a *jaghir* in the Arcot subah and permission to seize and plunder Tanjore.² It was also stated that Muhammad Ali had been promised Arcot and that the English had agreed to help him on receiving a *cowle* for the Poonamalle and a part of Devanampatnam country as *inam*. In the *darbar* of the Nizam, when the consent of the nobles was asked for the appointment of Muhammad Ali to the subah of Arcot, Shah Nawaz Khan³ said that the subah should be given to Chanda Sahib who deserved favour. Sayyad Lashkar Khan said that he would very willingly consent to Muhammad Ali's appointment; but as the French were opposed to him, he thought it inadvisable. Muhammad Ali openly quarrelled with Sayyad Lashkar Khan for his remarks; and Nasir Jang dissolved the assembly without giving the dress of honour to Muhammad Ali. Dupleix was also told that Murari Rao wanted to make friends with him and believed that Nasir Jang had a wholesome fear of the French. This quieted the apprehension entertained at Pondicherry that Murari Rao would be given the right of *chauth* over the Arcot subah on condition of his staying in the country, as was reported.

of the report was not true; and the first could not be proved; however, the major, at an audience endeavoured to acquaint Nasir Jang with what he had heard. . . , vol. i, (4th edition, p. 145).

¹ It was the first of 'a score of such night-attacks made by both French and English, almost all of which were equally successful'.

² Purport of a letter written by the Pandit and brought by Chanda Sahib to the Governor (p. 89 of Vol. vii of the *Diary*). Ramdas Pandit was a partisan of Chanda Sahib and strove hard in his interest.

³ Shah Nawaz Khan was always ill-disposed towards Anwar-ud-din and was opposed to his appointment to the subah of Arcot. MS. of Buran-ud-din's *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi*, Book I, translated by M. H. Nainar (of the Madras University). The Khan continued his enmity towards the son,

Muzaffar Jang's captivity did not seem to have been harsh; and he contrived easily to maintain correspondence with his mother, Dupleix and others at Pondicherry. He entreated Dupleix to send his mother to him; but the latter refused to depart saying it would be unseemly to depart without repaying the Governor what she owed him.¹ She was hoping that if her debt was paid before Nasir Jang left the country, there would be a good chance of her son being released and treated well.

News meanwhile arrived that the English under Captain Cope took leave of Nasir Jang and departed for Fort St. David owing to the expected arrival of Portuguese ships,² which was strongly rumoured. Nasir Jang is said to have given an interview to Muzaffar Jang and to have relaxed the severity of his confinement, possibly as a result of the letter that the latter's mother wrote to him. On May 3rd, the Nizam held a *darbar* before marching at which besides Sayyad Lashkar Khan Shah Nawaz Khan, Sayyad Sharif Khan and his other diwans, were also present Nawab Abdul Nabi Khan of Cudapah, Himayat Bahadur Khan of Kurnool and other nobles. They all advised him to forgive Muzaffar Jang; while Jamil Beg Khan, the subhadar of Berar, advised the Nizam to conciliate the French and win them over to his side; and Sayyad Lashkar Khan and others offered the same advice as to Muzaffar Jang.³ Nasir Jang began his return march north; and the Diarist records that on May 5, he heard that Cope and Lawrence went to Nasir Jang's camp when he was about to commence

¹ Muzaffar Jang's mother was the half-sister of Nasir Jang and his elder brother Ghazi-ud-din Khan who were the sons of Nizam-ul-Mulk's second wife. The latter's first wife was the daughter of a Pathan noble; and Muzaffar Jang's mother was her daughter. Nizam-ul-Mulk had six sons. There was no truth in the scandal recorded by the Diarist that Nasir Jang was the son of Nizam-ul-Mulk by a low woman.

² 'The despatch of ships from Goa for the recovery of San Thomé was expected as a result of Dupleix's intrigues with Goa. But there is no reason to suppose that the English feared at this time any Portuguese interference'. Dodwell in his note on p. 102 of *Diary*, vol. vii.—See the writer's notes on the English Occupation of San Thomé by Boscawen, the letter of the Fort St. David Council to the Company justifying their action, the Portuguese Viceroy's letter of remonstrance to the English at Fort St. David, the latter's reply to him, May 4, 1750—the last two being quoted by Love in his *Vestiges of Old Madras*, vol. ii, pp. 400—1. The English possibly expected about this time a reply from the Portuguese Government at Goa (*Journal of Indian History*, vol. ix, pp. 341-45.)

³ Haji Fazil Khan, the steward of Muzaffar Jang's household, related these happenings as he had seen them, to Dupleix. (Diarist's entry for May 4, 1750).

his march, with the request that the Poonamallee, Mylapore and Devanampatnam countries should be given as an *inam* to the English, in return for their services; but they had to return unsuccessfully;¹ and Nasir Jang is said to have torn the letter of Lawrence, praised the services of the French to Muzaffar Jang and dismissed the English envoys with scant ceremony; and M. de La Touche also said he heard that the English had departed in great displeasure.² The French

¹ Dodwell says that the English ambassadors to Nasir Jang wrote on April 14, that a party was forming among the Nizam's ministers influencing him against them, at the instigation of the French; and they 'seem to intimate in their discourse that they hold the assistance we have given them in very little esteem.' On May 2, the ambassadors wrote, 'yesterday we got Nasir Jang's consent to our demands according to our former advices, and had our agreement reduced into writing in order for his signing it, that the *phirmaund* might be made out, but it is not yet perfected, and this day, his whole army has marched about six miles from us towards Arcot.' (Taken from the Orme MSS, India, volume ix, pp. 2175-7, containing the proceedings of the English embassy composed of Stringer Lawrence and Foss Westcott and accompanied by Captain Dalton, from March 24 to May 5, 1750). These contain letters from Dupleix to Lawrence and from the French Governor to Nasir Jang, asking him to reconcile himself to Muzaffar Jang.

The Fort St. David despatch to the Company, dated October 24, 1750, abstracted by Dodwell in *The Madras Despatches, 1744-55*, (pp. 112-8), says that Nasir Jang remained at Valudavur for about a month and then moved to Arcot; he desired the English to accompany him; but Lawrence etc., insisted on first receiving grants of the Poonamallee country, to which demand Nasir Jang returned no answer; and the English troops were recalled and reached Fort St. David, (April 22, May 3).

² The reception of the English by Nasir Jang was warm at first; a week after their arrival, they complained they had good reason to suspect that the French were tampering with some of the countries 'Indeed their services had not been such as to merit any considerable reward. They had proffered unwelcome military advice; they had refused to pursue the French in their flight; they had informed Nasir Jang that they could not enter the French bounds. Moreover, they were accompanied by a native agent, who, though long employed by the English, made no scruple about betraying their plans and letters to the French. On April 20, they refused to co-operate in an attack on Wandewash, unless their demands were granted. Again, they refused to join Nasir Jang in an expedition to raise tribute in Tanjore. On May 1, although Nasir Jang had agreed to their requests, 'this day the whole army had marched six miles from us towards Arcot.' So the ambassadors and their troops marched back to Fort St. David.' (Dodwell, p. 50).

Orme says of the English embassy as follows:—

'Meanwhile Major Lawrence . . . solicited Nasir Jang to confirm the grant, which Mahomed Ally, now esteemed Nabob of Arcot, had made to the East India Company, of a territory near Madras, in return for the assistance of their troops. He had often promised to comply with this request; but his minister, Shah Nawaz Khan, regarded such accession as inconsistent with the majesty of the Mogul empire, and prevented the *phirmaund* or patent, from being issued from his

hoisted their flag at Bahur; and they heard that Nasir Jang was perfectly willing that Tanjore and Trichinopoly be given to Chanda Sahib along with a *mansab* jaghir, but the latter would not agree and wanted Arcot as well, though he was persuaded to yield for the present and to seize Arcot as soon as Nasir Jang should have recrossed the Krishna. Chanda Sahib knew that Dupleix would not consent to a settlement, if Arcot were not given, and replied accordingly; he contrived that his demands should be made known to Nasir Jang, knowing that the chances of a settlement would be indefinitely prolonged, unless Shah Nawaz Khan and Ramdas Pandit were definitely won over to his side.

Nasir Jang's order that the French factory at Masulipatam should be captured, was carried out by the subahdar of that place. The soldiers in the factory at Yanam defended themselves, but had to yield. These factories were seized in order to compel Dupleix to better terms. But Dupleix was not daunted; he sent troops to capture the fort at Valudavur; but as it was too strong to be taken by Indian troops alone without European reinforcements, he resolved to wait till Nasir Jang should have passed Arcot; there was also trouble with the sepoys (see below) who refused to act without their pay; and for the time the troops returned to Villianallur. He had ambitions that he could easily send by sea munitions to Yanam and Masulipatam, from which they could be easily carried to Hyderabad and Aurangabad.¹

office. Wearied with prevarication, Major Lawrence insisted on a peremptory answer, on which he was assured that he should be immediately satisfied, provided he would march with the battalion to Arcot . . . He did not think it prudent to comply with this proposal, lest the French and Chunda Saheb should take advantage of his absence and invade the English territory. He therefore endeavoured to divert the Soubah from this purpose, by representing that it would give the enemy an opportunity of recruiting their forces and recommencing hostilities; whereas by remaining near Pondicherry he might, by cutting off their communications with the country, reduce them to such distresses as would oblige them to accept of peace on his own terms. This reasoning producing no effect, the major returned with his battalion to Fort. St. David; . . . (Vol. i, *Fourth Edition*, pp. 145-6).

¹ Dupleix contrived to have the following conveyed to Nasir Jang secretly:— 'Tell him secretly, that, if Masulipatam and the country be given to me, I will help Nasir Jang with all he needs to conquer the country as far as Delhi. I will send 4,000 soldiers to smite his enemies.'; also 'I will send munitions of war from here to Masulipatam and Yanam whence they can be easily carried to Hyderabad and Aurangabad; we of Pondicherry will conquer all who disobey

Conflicting news reached Pondicherry from Nasir Jang's camp. Shah Nawaz Khan wrote on May 11th that he would be remaining at Arcot for four months, and, if in the meantime Chanda Sahib gave satisfaction, the Arcot subah would be given to him, while Trichinopoly and a *mansab* jaghir for Tanjore would be granted immediately. Dupleix insisted that the places mortgaged to the French by Chanda Sahib should be restored to their possession till the money was paid; and the French factories in the Northern Sarkars should not be interfered with. He even offered to guarantee that Muzaffar Jang did not draw the sword against his uncle, as the latter feared he might do, if he were released and joined the French as was very likely.¹ Nasir Jang, it was reported, could not easily make up his mind; and it was also believed that Muhammad Ali Khan had been given Arcot and he had sent for 500 sepoys from the English as an escort and arranged to pay five lakhs of rupees to Nasir Jang and had sent for the amount from Trichinopoly.² A letter received by Jayaram Pandit at Pondicherry informed that Muhammad Ali was given the subah of Arcot and a dress of honour on the 11th May, i.e. on the night of the fifth of Jamādi-ul-Ākhir. Delay ensued in the matter of the proposal to release Muzaffar Jang and invest him with authority, as Nasir Jang feared danger for himself through such a contingency.³ Nasir Jang

him, and I will help him with all he needs to fulfil his desires.'—pp. 147 and 148—*Diary*, of the Vol. I. This offer was made in reply to the letter containing terms of settlement with Chanda Sahib received by Shah Nawaz Khan.

¹ Abdul Nabi Khan of Cuddapah urged Nasir Jang to release his nephew and give him his own country and Arcot, and then he would keep the French quiet and live at peace. Otherwise, he said, that if Muzaffar Jang should be carried away a prisoner, Nasir Jang should, for the sake of effecting perfect security, conquer the French, capture their fort, imprison Chanda Sahib and recover Muzaffar Jang's family who were at Pondicherry. The other nobles also advised Nasir Jang to the same effect; but one or two poisoned his mind with the fear, that, if Muzaffar Jang were released, he would win over the nobles and the army and bring about great trouble to Nasir Jang himself. (Entry for May 12, 1750).

² Dodwell points out that in a consultation held at Fort St. David on April 30, May 11, Flayer reported that Muhammad Ali had been appointed Nawab and desired that the sepoys in his service in the bounds of Fort St. David be sent over to him; and that, in consequence, it was resolved to advance their arrears amounting to 14,000 rupees and send them out. (Note on p. 154 of the *Diary*, vol. vii.)

³ Shah Nawaz Khan, Khazi Dayem and Moro Pandit are on Nasir Jang's side . . . all tell him that if Muzaffar Jang were released, he would seize and imprison both him and themselves, that Saiyid Lashkar Khan, the mansabdars, jamadars and others would choose Muzaffar Jang as their leader, seize the

continued to stay on for some days near Wandiwash, negotiating for the payment of a big sum of money to himself from Taqi Sahib who held the place, and was a son-in-law of Dost Ali. Once a storm of wind and rain beat down his tents; and in the confusion that ensued, a false rumour arose that Muzaffar Jang had escaped. The division of the Nizam's camp into the two parties respectively supporting the causes of Nasir Jang and his nephew, is seen more and more clearly in the entries of the Diarist. The latter's partisans like Sayyad Lashkar Khan, Jamil Beg Khan and the Nawabs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savanur are said to have resolved to overthrow Nasir Jang with their troops and to send Muzaffar Jang under a strong guard to Pondicherry for the sake of safety. Ramdas Pandit,¹ whom Grant-Duff calls 'the traitor Ramdass' was secretly in favour of Muzaffar Jang's elevation, pretended to seek Nasir Jang's interest alone and at the same time did all in his power to encourage Sayyad Lashkar Khan and Muzaffar Jang's party, communicating to them all that passed with Nasir Jang. It was only Shah Nawaz Khan and his adherents that were opposed to Muzaffar Jang; all the others wished Nasir Jang to be overthrown.² Dupleix even suggested that Muzaffar Jang might escape to Pondicherry by way of Alambarai where he would post some soldiers with boats and sloops, and from which he might go in a few hours to Kunimedu, Covelong or Pondicherry, whichever way the road should be clear, and arranged for some money being sent to him in pagodas as they would be easier to carry. The plot against Nasir Jang was expected to bear fruit in 15 or 20 days.

Meanwhile information was received that Shah Nawaz Khan had arranged that Trichinopoly and Tanjore should be leased out to Chanda Sahib, after being made over to Dupleix who could occupy them and then lease them to his protégé. Arcot was to be under

country. . . . That is why Nasir Jang has abandoned the idea of releasing Muzaffar Jang, now fearing that he will become an enemy and seek his death'—pp. 177-8 of vol. vii of the *Diary*.

¹ 'The fall of Nasir Jang was wrought by the intrigues of M. Dupleix. He gained a Brahmin, named Ramdas, a native of Sicacole, in the confidence of Nasir Jang, and through him raised seditions in the army, which Dupleix called into operation by an attack on the camp.' *History of the Mahrattas*—4th ed. Chap. xviii—Vol. I, pp. 525-6.

² Diarist's entry for May 22nd, 1750—p. 183 of vol. vii.

Shah Nawaz Khan; and if Chanda Sahib should act for four or five months as he desired, and should pay the tribute due for Trichinopoly according to agreement, then he would receive Arcot. The amount owing to Dupleix from Muzaffar Jang should be paid by Chanda Sahib in return for the grant of Trichinopoly to him; and Muzaffar Jang's bond should be returned and his family sent away to him. Dupleix was assured by the envoy that the Mughals had made up their minds to seize Tanjore and grant it out; and though he expressed a fear that the Raja of Tanjore would apply to the English and the Dutch for help and promise them territory as against any French attack, still he was told that Shah Nawaz Khan desired to become the captor of the Tanjore fort, though the French should actually conquer it. Finally Dupleix agreed to be content with the grant of lands round Karikal equal to the cost of the expedition which would have to be sent to conquer Tanjore and to give an account of the total cost thereof¹. Dupleix was further told that Muhammad Ali was hard pressed for money and unable to pay at once all the amount due for the Arcot subah; and his brother, Mahfuz Khan (who had been made prisoner at Ambur, subsequently released by promising to pay Muzaffar Jang 11 lakhs for the Trichinopoly country and had later joined Nasir Jang's camp) was greatly depressed by the scant attention paid to him and threatened to turn *faqir* and go on a pilgrimage to Mecca². Sayyad Lashkar Khan, Sayyad Sharif Khan and others now departed with their contingents; while the Pathan Nawabs also sent their troops in advance; thus Nasir Jang could not stay long and must soon depart. He agreed to appoint Taqi Sahib of Wandiwash as the Diwan of Muhammad Ali, after which he proceeded to Arcot. Taqi Sahib also agreed to make Muhammad Ali Khan of Polur (Chanda Sahib's brother) swear to be friends with his namesake and gave plenty of trouble to Chanda Sahib's wife who was at Wandiwash and whom he now turned out of the fort.

¹ Conversation between Dupleix and Jayaram Pandit in the presence of Chanda Sahib and the Diarist, according to the latter's entry for May 26th.

² Shortly before Anwar-ud-din's death, Mahfuz Khan had been appointed as the deputy of his father at Arcot, by the diplomacy of his partisan Raja Sampat Rai. He had joined his father, before the struggle at Ambur (Burhan-ud-din's *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi*—Bk. I.)

III. THE EMPLOYMENT OF SEPOYS BY THE FRENCH

In the month of May when Dupleix presented medals to Abdul Rahman and Shaikh Hasan with commissions for them as captains of the sepoy and the Diarist entered this fact in his account, he gave an account of the origin of the sepoy in the French service, which is deemed by Dodwell to be a generally accurate account. In 1740, when war was threatened between England and France sepoy were first entertained; but it was not Dupleix that entertained them, as the Diarist says of the enlistment of Shaikh Hasan and others. 'They were first employed at Mahe in the war with Boyanore, 1739-40, when Dupleix was still at Chandernagore. Early in 1742 Dumas ordered three companies of them over to the Coromandel coast to assist in defending Karikal against the Tanjoreans. 'Two companies were sent back in 1743 and broke; but others again were obtained in 1746 at the request of La Bourdonnais, who had seen them in action at Mahe in 1741. It is interesting to note that whereas the English soon appointed European drill-sergeants and a European adjutant to their Sepoy-Corps, Dupleix left the command and discipline entirely in Indian hands, except when sepoy were co-operating with European troops.'¹ Ranga Pillai gives Dupleix the entire credit of the enlisting of sepoy. He says: 'Dupleix entertained in his service, Shaikh Hasan, Abdul Rahman and others who had formerly served in the troubles at Mahe on the coast of Malabar. After these troubles were over, Shaikh Hasan, Bikkann Khan, etc., came here with 200 sepoy. A year later Bikkann Khan and 100 sepoy were sent back; and Shaikh Hasan with his 100 sepoy was invited to stay. He did not receive enough even to buy *conjee* . . . but news came of war being declared between England and France (September, 1744). Thereon Shaikh Hasan was summoned and directed to invite his elder brother (Abdul Rahman) (who was out of service in Malabar) with 500 or 600 sepoy. Abdul Rahman came accordingly. When . . . Dupleix seized Madras . . . Abdul Rahman and his brother seized palanquins, elephants, horses, etc., . . . and the Governor permitted all to keep their booty . . .

¹ Dodwell's note on the Diarist's account, in p. 168 of the *Diary*, vol. vii.

'The raising of actual native regiments was first undertaken by the French, and it was due to the coming struggle for mastery in Southern India, that we owe the first conception of a regular native army.' McMunn in *The Armies of India*, p. 4.

When the English were attacked at Fort St. David and they attacked the French at Pondicherry, he brought some men under the pretence of enlisting them as sepoy. . . . He made more money on the expedition against Anwar-ud-din Khan by telling Chanda Sahib that he had raised 2,000 horsemen and sepoy. . . . Ranga Pillai is angry that he should have had a free hand in making so much money by plunder, and thinks that he cared very little for his commission as captain from Europe or his present or medals and looked to the getting of a high mansab for himself from the Mughals. Another detail that the Diarist supplied was that the sepoy still wore their traditional clothing of coats, trousers and turbans and their native commandants supplied them with it.¹

Shaikh Hasan and Abdur Rahman had frequently to suffer from the insubordination and mutinous spirit of the sepoy. The latter were usually in considerable arrears of pay. When Shaikh Hasan took Tiruvadi fort from its *killedar* in June, the sepoy actually refused to march without their pay. After the fort was captured, it was with great difficulty that they could be restrained from plundering; Shaikh Hasan told Dupleix, according to the Diarist, that the sepoy abused him so violently that he feared for his life, and they declared that if they were not allowed to give back their muskets and be dismissed, they would become afraid for their lives and then kill their captain.²

IV. FRENCH CAPTURE OF MASULIPATAM

On the first of June a sloop was despatched from Pondicherry to recover the Yanam factory which had been abandoned by its chief, Lenoir, on the approach of Khaja Namatullah Khan; but the Diarist thought that it was intended to procure the release of M. Coquet, chief of the factory at Masulipatam. Nasir Jang gave orders that the two French factories of Yanam and Masulipatam should be seized; the factories were easily taken possession of by Khaja Namatullah Khan, the subhadar of Ellore and Rajahunndry about whom mention has

¹ Diarist's entry for June 1, 1750, p. 219—of vol. vii of the *Diary*.

² Pages 265-66 of vol. vii of the *Diary*. Dodwell remarks that such mutinous episodes, due mainly to their pay being in arrears, were by no means uncommon among the French sepoy. 'The murder of Dewan Raghunath Das, a little later in the Deccan, shows that Shaikh Hasan's fears were not wholly imaginary. Bussy himself was at one time in apprehension for his life.'—*Ibid.*, footnote 1.

been already made. He advanced on Yanam with 2,000 foot and 200 horse; and Lenoir, the chief of that factory had the trees surrounding it to be cut down and the ground levelled. Dupleix had tried in the course of his secret negotiations with Shah Nawaz Khan that Nasir Jang should direct that the French factories should not be interfered with and give a written order to that effect. Lenoir abandoned the Yanam factory, even before it was attacked by the enemy; he took shelter in one of the islands at the mouth of the river, situated to the north-east, where the French had taken refuge during the late Mahratta invasion. At Masulipatam two French factors were taken prisoners and M. Coquet, the chief of the French factory, was asked to pay 15,000 pagodas. Lenoir retired to the island with all the goods, men and a few guns¹. Presently the Yanam factory was recovered; and Masulipatam was captured later. Dupleix knew of the defenceless condition of Masulipatam² and resolved to take it by assault, regarding it as an acquisition essential for the realization of his future views.

On July 9, 1750, two large vessels with a boat were despatched with 200 soldiers, 150 sepoy and 10 *topasses* under the command of M. de La Tour with mortars, cannon and other equipment to attack and capture Masulipatam; and a lakh of rupees was also sent in order to provide the factories with goods. The vessels arrived before Masulipatam on July 11th, and took possession of the fort without 'the least opposition', while the Mughals attempted 'to blockade the place, but quickly desisted.' The French landed in the night and took the town with very little loss; they kept possession of it and immediately began to put it into a better position of defence. The

¹ According to *Orme* (vol. i, p. 146), 'Nasir Jang's officers proceeded without violence, plundered nothing and sealed up what they took possession of. The detriment sustained was not considerable.' 'The French repeatedly declared that the English from the neighbouring factory of Ingeram had helped the Moghuls to take Yanam. Even M. Cultru makes the same assertion. However the English correspondence cited above (Fort St. David Letters received 1750) shows that they had no hand in it.' (Dodwell—*Dupleix and Clive*—Note 1 on p. 51). Dodwell says that, despite Nasir Jang's orders, only the four walls of the Yanam factory were left standing.

² According to the Diarist, the amaldars of Masulipatam trembled and said they had behaved foolishly when they extracted money from the French factory and feared that the French would come and burn and destroy the whole country; while the merchants feared that the town would never regain its old prosperity (entry for 5th June, 1750—p. 231 of vol. vii of the *Diary*.)

Mussalman authorities declared that they lodged the French prisoners well and treated them respectfully; and so they were not to be blamed for obeying the orders of their master, Nasir Jang. All the inhabitants were allowed to return; and the sepoys and Europeans were warned that they would be severely punished for any theft or plunder; and the Diarist notes with evident satisfaction that 'all those who fled from the town have returned, including even the Dutch and their families.'¹ Nasir Jang was sorely troubled by the loss of Masulipatam, where the French did not allow even the Dutch to fly their flag, though they did not in any manner interfere with the Dutch trade.² The Dutch Council at Negapatam protested that their factory site was given to them by the Mughal emperor, and they had his orders for flying their flag and hence the French ought not to have pulled it down. Dupleix replied that their contention held good so long as the port was in Mughal possession; but as the French had captured it, and 'as both flags cannot fly there, we have ordered theirs to be pulled down and that they can hoist their flag there only when they produce the orders of the King of France.' On October 22nd, the Diarist recorded that he heard that, owing to orders from Negapatam, the Dutch factory people at Masulipatam had sent all their goods by ship to Kothapatnam and Cocanada on the New Moon day; and as such a day was unlucky, a tempest arose and two Dutch ships sank with their cargoes of goods and money. The abandonment of the Dutch factory was intended as 'a protest against the action of the French in refusing to allow the Dutch flag to fly there.'³

V—FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Dupleix was frequently advised and persuaded himself into believing that for fear of him, Nasir Jang hesitated to entrust the subah

¹ Diarist's entry for July 25th, 1750—p. 325 of the *Diary*, vol. vii.

² Dupleix added, as Dodwell says, in his letter to Masulipatam; 'Nous pensons que, si vous aviez, voulu joindre vos sollicitations à celles des principaux marchands de Masulipatam pour la délivrance des Srs. Coquet et Lasalle, nous ne nous fussions point trouvés dans le cas de nous emparer de cette ville.'

³ The Dutch indeed landed a party of soldiers, a few weeks after the French captured the place, but were easily compelled to withdraw them. 'They seem to have displayed a political ineptitude similar to that which ruined their expedition to Bengal (1759).' After the English secured possession of the place they ceded their factory which was then in a very ruinous condition and all their rights along with it.

of Arcot to Muhammad Ali and nobody dared to accept the job. He resolved to tie *toranams*, as a mark of French occupation in the regions of Tiruvidi, Panruti and Villupuram and to get the mortgage amounts due to him from Mudāmiah, the faujdar of Chidambaram, who held the place from Abdul Nabi Khan of Cuddapah. Mudāmiah removed his goods and property to Devikottai, under the protection of the English; and Dupleix was advised by Ranga Pillai to send a few soldiers and sepoys with a couple of mortars in order to coerce him for the amount due. Mudāmiah complained that Muhammad Ali's men were demanding payment and protested that he would wait for instructions about the Chidambaram mortgage from Nawab Abdul Nabi Khan. Ranga Pillai and Dupleix distrusted Mudāmiah's professions and sent dragoons and sepoys against him; thereupon he fled to Devikottai with a number of people from Chidambaram. The French troops pursued him and his men agreed to remain in the fort and promised to pay a part of the amount in ready money and the balance in a few days. Evidently, he wished 'to be able to allege compulsion in case the other side called him to an account for the payments he made.' He negotiated with the Diarist for time in which to sell grain enough to pay 50,000 rupees and was told to give sow-car's bonds for the balance due.

After reaching Arcot where he stayed for some days, he was told by Muhammad Ali that he could manage the *subah* if he were allowed to maintain 10,000 horse and receive all the collections, but not otherwise; he had not the help of the English to oppose the French and meet them in battle, as Nasir Jang had refused to grant them the Poonamalle and Devanampatnam countries and Mylapore as *inam* and they had departed in consequence. The Diarist reported to Dupleix on June 11, 1750, that when Muzaffar Jang was imprisoned in the Arcot fort, he attempted to take his life by tying a cloth round his neck, but was prevented from doing so by Nasir Jang's guards; thereupon he was comforted by Shah Nawaz Khan, under instructions from Nasir Jang, with a promise of 'the kingdom he desired and a dress of honour'. Nasir Jang desired that the Pathan Nawabs who were anxious to depart should stay with him till he also started. Taqi Sahib of Wandiwash was afraid of the French and now desired that the proposal regarding Chanda Sahib should be carried out successfully although till lately, he was hostile to Chanda Sahib. Dupleix

was told that if the French should capture the fort of Valudavur, matters would be hastened by Nasir Jang towards a settlement; while Chanda Sahib was desirous that French troops should occupy the countries of Villupuram and Tiruvidi as well as Porto Novo in order that Nasir Jang might be frightened into granting him terms.

Conflicting counsels prevailed at Arcot. It was reported that Muzaffar Jang promised to bring round Chanda Sahib and fetch him to Arcot and that Mahfuz Khan advised Muhammad Ali that the French would kill whoever became *Subahdar* and would conquer the country.¹ Villupuram and Tiruvidi were occupied by French sepoys. Chanda Sahib was advised by his brother, Muhammad Ali Khan of Polur to beware of going to Arcot for an interview, even though he should be promised safety by means of an oath on the *Quran*. It was also learnt that Shah Nawaz Khan himself was preparing to to set out for Pondicherry to pacify Dupleix and Chanda Sahib and to take Muzaffar Jang's mother, wife and children. The capture of Tiruvidi frightened the Mussalmans at Chidambaram into compliance. Shah Nawaz Khan himself is reported to have secretly written to Dupleix, that if he should seize the fort of Valudavur, he would obtain what he desired through the very efforts of his enemies. The Pathan Nawabs, Abdul Nabi Khan, Himayat Bahadur Khan and Abdul Majid Khan refused to pay their *peshkash* to Nasir Jang on the ground that they had not paid any even to his father and would pay him none now, their lands were plundered by the *poligars* and the Nizam was responsible for the cost of their maintaining troops to chastise them. Nasir Jang became angry; and the Nawabs absented themselves from the *darbar*. A collision occurred between Nasir Jang's people and their followers, and Shah Nawaz Khan had to intervene to make peace.² There were also troubles between the Peshwa and Nasir Jang; and the former had sent word to the latter urging him to return. As if these troubles were not enough, Muzaffar Jang made a second effort to escape from his prison-room; and Nasir Jang had to put new and vigilant guards over him and took away from him the liberty of receiving visits and sending messages.

¹ Entry for June 13th—pp. 252-3 of the *Diary*, vol. vii.

² The Diarist, after recording these items of news, wrote:—'The Arcot people and other *killedars* who expected much are discontented. All Nasir Jang's old friends have become his enemies. . . His commands are disregarded and he cannot prosper. . .'

In the beginning of July it was rumoured at Pondicherry that a number of nobles of the Nizam had resolved to release Muzaffar Jang, establish him as the *subhadar* of the Deccan and seize or slay Nasir Jang; and Muzaffar Jang's attempted escape, noted above, was in reality done with their connivance; and when it failed, the latter took all the blame on himself and pretended madness. Chanda Sahib advised that agents should be employed to arrange matters secretly with the Pathan Nawabs for the deposition of Nasir Jang. Letters were written cautiously by Dupleix, to Chanda Sahib's men at the Nizam's camp couched in general terms;¹ and the messengers were given specific instructions to arrange an interview between the discontented nobles and the Pathan Nawabs.

VI. THE ENGLISH JOIN MUHAMMAD ALI

While thus Dupleix was taking advantage of the situation in Nasir Jang's camp, Muhammad Ali wrote to the English Governor Floyer, saying that the French were fortifying themselves in Tiruvidi, and declaring that a *sanad* granting Poonamalle to the English had been drawn out and lodged with a substantial merchant at Arcot and would be delivered to them when Muhammad Ali should become the Nawab, in September, after Nasir Jang should depart; he also sent a copy of the *sanad*, along with a bill of exchange for Rs. 20,000 to defray the expenses of the troops for two months in lieu of the Poonamalle revenues for that period.² As the French were preparing both openly and insiduously to make Chanda Sahib Nawab, Captain Cope was sent out with a body of 600 men and a field-train on June 30th, and joined the Nawab who had marched down from Arcot with a body of horse a little to the west of Tiruvidi.³

¹ 'So also you seek to remove evil from the country, and accomplish all that you undertake. I will therefore grant you all that you desire as soon as I hear that the matter has been settled.'—p. 304 of vol. vii of the *Diary*.

² *The Madras Despatches* (1744-55), p. 114.

³ The Diarist wrote that Major Lawrence who was acting as Governor at Fort St. David, had recalled Cope; but Muhammad Ali told Cope who was about to start that he had only come down in reliance on English help; and that if they now departed under the pretext that a new Governor had been appointed, he would be unable to fulfil his promises to Nasir Jang. Both he and Cope wrote to Lawrence for further orders. Entry for July 18, 1750, p. 31-4 of vol. vii of the *Diary*. Later the Diarist entered for July 26th, that Mr. Lawrence had refused help before reinforcements arrived to guard Fort St. David and declared that he could do nothing of himself without orders. (p. 327).

Muhammad Ali Khan later advanced to Tirupapuliyur, near Fort St. David, with his brother, Abdul Wahab Khan, his brother-in-law, Khair-ud-din Khan, Dewan Muhammad Abrar, Bade Sahib son of Hussain Tahir and other *jemadars*. He had about 4,600 horsemen, 4,000 peons and about 500 matchlock men of his own; while Cope had 700 Europeans, 13 field-pieces and about 2,300 sepoy and peons, besides a large number of horsemen etc. of the Nizam according to the information of the Diarist.¹ 500 horsemen were sent in the direction of Porto Novo and Chidambaram. It was feared that the English might go as far as Gingee. There was an engagement near Tiruvidi on the bank of the river on August 1st, between Muhammad Ali's troops and the French, the English also taking part in the fight.² In the end the English, after some cannonading, were compelled to withdraw. The situation thus dragged on, till Cope was recalled to Fort St. David, in the end of the month, 'as the French would not and we could not attack.' Muhammad Ali had written to Nasir Jang that the countries promised to the English before, should now be offered to them, though, in June itself, he wrote that a *sanad* had been made out for them. Thus the situation about the middle of August was very unsatisfactory for the English; and Dupleix pushed on with his efforts, and brought things to the crisis at Nasir Jang's camp ending in his assassination.

¹ Muhammad Ali procured the assistance of 600 Englishmen under Cope; while the French troops consisted of 500 Europeans under La Tarche, their best officer. According to Orme, the English ordered a body of 400 Europeans and 1,500 sepoy to take the field and the Nawab marched with an army of 20,000 men, of which more than one-half were the troops of Nasir Jang.

² According to Orme there was a skirmish which lasted till night (31st July) when the detachment was recalled. The next day Cope persuaded the Nawab to march against Tiruvidi fort in order to draw the French from their strongly pitched camp. The Nawab asked his troops, under the advice of Cope, to scale the walls, but they refused to undertake so perilous an attempt. The army marched back the next morning (2nd Aug.) towards the French encampment and formed for battle within gunshot of their entrenchments. The French commander sent a messenger to ask the reason why the English came so near their posts; Cope replied that the English were acting as allies to the Nawab and would accompany him into all parts of his dominions and assist him against all his enemies. In the struggle which ensued, the French, being in their entrenchment, suffered less than the Nawab and the English (pp. 148-9 of vol. i).

Peshwa Raghunāth Rāu's Agents in England

By

HARIHAR DAS

THE mission of the Peshwa Raghunāth Rao's agents to the Directors of the East India Company in London, is well known to students of Indian history, and there is, therefore, no need to expatiate on the circumstances which induced them to come to England.¹ There are several references to documents concerning the Peshwa and his agents in the 'Catalogue of the Home Miscellaneous Series of the India Office Records', compiled by the late Mr. Samuel Charles Hill. The students of the East India Company's records are under a deep debt of gratitude to Mr. Hill, not only for this thorough and valuable work, but also for his other contributions to modern Indian history. In volume 153 of the Home Miscellaneous Series, are contained two letters regarding the Peshwa's agents and their business with the Directors of the East India Company. The first letter is from the Earl of Hillsborough to Raghunāth Rāo, and the second from Sir Stanier Porten to Peter Mitchell, of the Company. The letters are copied *verbatim* :—

ST. JAMES'S,
31st July, 1781.

TO RAGOBATH ROW.

ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,

I should think myself very unworthy of the honor you have done me by your letter, if I omitted to express to you in writing the high sense I entertain of it. It is for this Reason that I deliver this letter to the three Persons you have sent into this kingdom. The King, my Royal master, having long since delegated the care of East India Affairs for this country, to the East India Company, those Persons were immediately referred to the Principal Directors of that Company,

¹ For further references to the Peshwa's agents, see the present writer's articles on 'The Early Indian Visitors to England', in the *Calcutta Review* (October 1924; January 1925 and April 1928); and also an article on 'Expiation for Foreign Travel' in *The Young Men of India* for September, 1930.

to hold Conference with them upon such matters as they had in charge from you, and I understand they have conferred with the Principal Directors accordingly.

I recommend you, Illustrious Sir, to the constant care and Protection of Almighty God, and am with great respect,

Your etc.,
HILLSBOROUGH.

ST. JAMES'S,
31st July, 1781.

PETER MITCHELL, ESQ.

SIR,

In answer to the letter you favoured me with of the 26th instant I am directed by the Earl of Hillsborough to acquaint you for the information of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East India Company that His Lordship has entirely dispatched Mr. Udny and the Agents from Ragobah and that they can have no further occasion to see His Lordship or be detained a day longer on his account.

SIR STANIER PORTEN.

The Historical Origin of the Distinction between Svārthanumana and Parārthanumana

BY

DR. SAILSWAR SEN
(Annamalai University)

IN his article ¹ 'Rapports entre la théorie bouddhique et l'enseignement des autres écoles philosophiques de l'Inde', Stcherbatskoi maintains that the distinction between 'inference for oneself' (*svārthanumāna*) and 'inference for others' (*parārthanumāna*) had its origin in the Buddhist logic. His theory is accepted by Keith who, in his *Indian Logic and Atomism* says—

'A further ² important innovation is the appearance of the distinction, wholly unknown to Gautama and Kapāda, of the process of inference for oneself (*svanīścītārtha*) and for another (*parārtha*). The distinction is one which is accepted by the syncretist school, though not adopted by commentators like Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra, who remain faithful to the texts they explain.'

* * * *

'Yet ³ a further proof of the dependence of Praśastapāda on Dignāga may be derived from the fact that the distinction of reasoning for oneself and reasoning for another, which gives syllogism, is present in Dignāga and is expressly stated by Dharmōttara in his commentary on Dharmakīrti to have been introduced by him, and to stand in relation to his theory of the function of language in knowledge. . . . Praśastapāda's debt to Dignāga in this regard is clear, despite his slight change in terminology, which may legitimately be attributed to a desire to conceal his borrowing, for he retains in practice, if not in theory, verbal testimony as a means of proof, while adopting the principle of distinction between reasoning

¹ Le Muséon (N. S., Vol. V., 1904.)

² pp. 94-95.

³ pp. 106-108.

for oneself and reasoning for another, which in truth rests on the fact that verbal testimony is no true means of proof at all.'

Keith's contention that the distinction had its origin in the Buddhist logic thus rests on three principal assumptions, viz.—

(1) That the authorship of the distinction is expressly attributed to Dignāga in Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*.

(2) That Dignāga flourished before Praśastapāda who borrowed the distinction, among other ideas, from the Buddhist logician.

(3) That the distinction was unknown to Kāpāda and Gautama, nor was it adopted by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra. (It should be noted that no mention is made of Vātsyāyana either by Keith or by Stcherbatskoi.)

In support of the first assumption Keith refers to pp. 46-47 in Peterson's edition of *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, though Dignāga's name occurs nowhere in those pages. Most probably the words *samprati* and *ācārya* in the following two passages misled him into thinking that 'inference for others' was an innovation introduced by the Buddhist school, and that the original author of this innovation was Ācārya Dignāga.

(1) *Nanu ca samyag jñānātmakam anumānam uktam; tat kimarthaṃ samprati vacanātmakam anumānam ucyate.*

(2) *Tataḥ pratipādakam śabdān avaśyaṃ vaktavyaṃ darśayann anumānaśabdeno'ktavān ācārya iti paramārthaḥ.*

The word *samprati* in the first passage which contains a *pūrvapakṣa* does not, however, necessarily indicate that 'inference for others' (which is verbal in character as distinguished from 'inference for oneself' which is a purely mental operation) is an innovation lately introduced by the Buddhist school. The *pūrvapakṣin* is very often a fictitious person who is credited with statements that have no historical foundation. As for the word *ācārya* in the second passage, we fail to understand why it should refer to Dignāga, and not to Dharmakīrti, the author of *Nyāyabindu*. Besides, Dharmottara's authority as a historical source is of very little weight in this connection, as he flourished more than three centuries after Dignāga.

As against the second assumption, we would note that analogies between Dignāga and Praśastapāda do not necessarily prove that the former flourished before the latter. Further, Dignāga's priority cannot be adduced as an argument for Praśastapāda's indebtedness to the

Buddhist logician, at least so far as the distinction between 'inference for oneself' and 'inference for others' is concerned; for the distinction is present, as we shall shew, in the Sūtras of Gautama and in the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, though we must admit that it is not clearly traceable in the Sūtras of Kāpāda.

That the distinction was not unknown to Gautama can not be better proved than by quoting the following passages from Keith's *Indian Logic and Atomism*, which are hardly reconcilable with the theory he maintains—

'The origin ¹ of the syllogistic form can then be recognized as arising from the effort to expound a proposition to another: the proposition is stated; the reason for it is asked; the ground is given; its validity is called in question; an example familiar and therefore cogent is adduced; and the similarity of the subject to the example is emphasized, and the conclusion is finally drawn.'

* * * *

'The inference ² for another is definitely identified (by Praśastapāda) with the five-member syllogism, which in Gautama forms a category, and is not classified formally as a means of proof ³, though inference itself is so classed.'

We fail to understand how, in the face of the above statements, it is possible for Keith to maintain without being inconsistent that the distinction was unknown to Gautama.

Apart from being a non-verbal mental operation, 'inference for oneself' differs from 'inference for others' in another important respect, viz., that it is a mode of discovery, and not a mode of proof or demonstration. It is true that the terms 'inference for oneself' and 'inference for others' occur nowhere in the N. S. But it may be pointed out that what is known as 'inference for oneself' in later logic is simply called 'inference' by Gautama, who never uses this term in the sense of proof or demonstration. In N. S. I., 1, 5, inference is distinguished into three varieties, viz., *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*. A similar distinction is found in Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya,

¹ pp. 87-88.

² p. 95.

³ *Pramāṇa* should be translated as 'means of true knowledge', and not as 'means of proof'.

though there we have only two varieties, and not three¹, viz., *dr̥ṣṭa* (*pūrvavat*) and *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa*. At the end of this discussion on the *dr̥ṣṭa* and *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa* inference, Praśastapāda observes: 'Such² is inference for the sake of one's own certainty.' That inference as defined in N. S. I. 1. 5. corresponds to Praśastapāda's *svanīścītārthānumāna* is also confirmed by the similarity of Vātsyāyana's description of the genesis of inference in his Bhāṣya on that Sūtra to Praśastapāda's description of the genesis of *svanīścītārthānumāna*. In explaining the significance of the word *tatpūrvakam* in N. S. I. 1. 5. Vātsyāyana says:—

'Tatpūrvakam:³ By this [it is] meant [that there must be previous] perception of the connection of the sign and the signate, and [subsequent] perception of the sign. [It is also] meant [that there must be] remembrance of the sign consequent on [the previous] perception of the sign and the signate [as] connected [together]. By means of remembrance and [subsequent] perception of the sign an unperceived object is inferred.'

The above account is in all essentials similar to Praśastapāda's which is as follows:—

'From⁴ the perception, unassailed by doubt, [of the presence] of smoke [in a hill] and from the remembrance of the association [of smoke and fire],—subsequent to these [processes] the certainty [of the presence] of fire [in the hill] arises [in the mind] of one to whom the concurrence [of smoke and fire] is well-known.'

¹ Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya (with Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī—Benares Sanskrit Series), pp. 304–307. But we practically meet with *śeṣavad anumāna*, in the proof that P. gives of the existence of Ātman in pp. 130–31: *Parīṣeṣād ātmakāryatvāt*. In his Kiraṇāvalī U. explains it thus: *Parīṣeṣyāt prasaktapratīṣedhe'nyatrāprasamgāt śiṣyamānatvāt ātmakāryatvāt*.—Cf. Vātsyāyana's explanation of *śeṣavad anumāna* in his Bhāṣya on N. S. I. 1. 5: *Śeṣavan nāma parīṣeṣaḥ; sa ca prasaktapratīṣedhe'nyatrāprasamgāt śiṣyamāne sampratyayaḥ*. In V. S. II. 1. 27 Kaṇāda says: *Parīṣeṣāt lingam ākāśasya*. In his Upaskāra, Śaṅkara Miśra explains it thus: *Atrāpi śabdāḥ kvacid āśrito guṇatvāt rūpādivad iti sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭād aṣṭadravyātirikṭadravyasiddhiḥ*. From this it appears that *parīṣeṣānumāna* is considered by Śaṅkara Miśra to be a form of *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa*.—Cf. Faddegon's *Vaiśeṣika System*, p. 172, and pp. 312–13.

² *Etat svanīścītārtham anumānam*.

³ *Tatpūrvakam ityanena lingalinginoh sambandhadarśanam lingadarśanañcābhisambadhyate. Lingalinginoh sambaddhaya darśanena lingasmrtir abhisambadhyate. Smṛtyā lingadarśanena cūpratyakṣor'rho'numīyate*.

⁴ *Prasiddhasamayāsandigdhadhūmadarśanāt sāhacaryānusmaranāt tadantaram agnyadhyavasāyo bhavati*.

DISTINCTION SVARTHANUMANA PARARTHANUMANA 33

That the term 'inference' is used by Gautama in the sense of 'inference for oneself' is also evident from the following passage in Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on N. S. II. 1. 45, where analogy is distinguished from inference by being described as *parārtha*.

'[Analogy¹ is different from inference], because this [man], who has learned the analogy [from another man] and has seen a *go*, understands the usage of the name-word *gavaya*, when he sees an object similar to a *go*. But inference is not like this. Moreover, analogy is for the sake of others, because it is employed, by one to whom both [the *go* and the *gavaya*] are well-known, for the sake of him to whom the subject of comparison is not well-known.'

In contrast with Gautama's inference stands his category of 'member' (*avayava*) representing the process of 'inference for others' which consists in proving or demonstrating a proposition to a second person in the form of a five-member syllogism. Apart from the fact that the terms *sādhya* in N. S. I. 1. 33. and *sādhana* in N. S. I. 1. 34. are explained by Vātsyāyana as *prajñāpanīya* and *prajñāpana* respectively, the function of the 'members' is expressly stated by Uddyotakara in his Vārttika on N. S. I. 1. 33 to be communication of knowledge to others. To quote from the Vārttika—

'[Should² you ask]: But why are 'question' etc. not 'members'? [We would reply]: Because [question, etc.] do not communicate knowledge to others. 'Members' are those which, [being] significant each with a meaning not conveyed by the rest, attain the status of members of a sentence, [and] communicate knowledge to others'.

The 'members' arranged in their proper order and considered as a whole are called *nyāya*. Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattvacintāmani* says: 'And that "inference for others" is to be performed by means of *nyāya*'³. The use of the term *nyāya* in this technical sense is not,

¹ *Yadā hyayaṁ upayukto'pamāno godarśi gavā samānārtham paśyati, tadāyam gavaya ityasya sañjāśabdasya vyavasthām pratipadyate. Na caivam anumānam iti. Parārthānūcōpamānam. Yasya hyupameyam aprasiddham tadārtham prasiddhobhayena kriyati iti*.

² *Katham punar jijnāsādayo'vayavā na bhavanti; parāpratipādakatvāt. Parāpratipādakā yā itaretarāpratīyitenārthenārthavanto vākyāṅgalām upayānti te'vayavāḥ*.

³ *Tac cānumānam parārtham nyāyasādhyaṁ*.

however, unknown to Vātsyāyana, as is evident from the following passage in his Bhāṣya on N.S.I.1.¹

'The proposition, etc. [constitute] the five members of that whole expression-series through which the proof of the probandum attains completion. They are called 'members' in relation to the whole. In them [is to be found] the combination of the four means of true knowledge. The proposition is *āgama*; the probans is inference; the example is perception; the application is analogy whilst the conclusion shews the efficiency of the combination of all the four means of true knowledge for the attainment of a common end. This is what is called the *nyāya par excellence*. By means of this discussion, wrangling and cavilling take place.'

Though Keith's contention that the distinction was not adopted by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra cannot bear examination in view of our findings stated above, yet we would invite a reference to the following passage in Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyalīkā* on N.S.V.2.3., where the term 'inference for others' actually occurs—

'In "inference² for others" the merits and demerits belonging to a sentence are discussed, and not an object that is unconnected with the sentence'.

In the passage we quoted from Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on N.S.I.1.1. we were told that in a *nyāya* the four means of true knowledge converged. The question therefore arises: How are we to reconcile this statement with our contention that Gautama's five-member *nyāya* represents 'inference for others'? Before we attempt to answer it, we would quote the following passage from Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on N.S.I.1.39, where he gives a reasoned statement of the remarks contained in his Bhāṣya on N.S.I.1.1.—

'The [four] means³ of true knowledge, converging in a sentence [composed of] all the members, establish a fact by virtue of [their] inter-relation. To explain [their] convergence: the proposition is

¹ Sādhaniyārthasya yāvati śabdasaṃmūhe siddhiḥ parisaṃnāpyate tasya pañcāvayavaḥ pratijñādayaḥ saṃmūhaṃ āpekṣyāvayava ucyante. Teṣu pramāṇasamavāyah. Āgamaḥ pratijñā; hetuḥ anumānam; udāharāṇaṃ pratyakṣam; upamānam upanayaḥ; sarveṣāṃ ekārthasamavāye sāmānyāpradarśanaṃ nigamanam iti. So'yaṃ paramo nyāya iti. Etena vādajalpavilambāḥ pravartante.

² Parārthanumāne ca vacanagatā gupadoṣā vicāryante na tu vacanānāpekṣam vastu.

³ Atayavasamudāye ca vākye sambhūyekaḥ tarābhisambandhāt pramāṇānyartham sādhananti. Sambhavas tāvat: Śabdarīṣayā pratijñā, āptopadeśasya

about a fact derived from *śabda*, because of [the necessity of] re-examining the instructive words of authority by perception and inference, and because of the want of self-dependence in one who is not a *ṛsi* [in having access to such a fact]. The probans is inference, because of [the arising of] the knowledge [that a particular object is the probans] after one has observed [its concomitance with the signate in the example].¹ This very [point] has been explained in the commentary on 'the example'. The example is about a fact derived from perception, because of [the necessity of] establishing the unperceived by the perceived. The application is analogy, because of [the necessity of] summing up with 'So'. . . . The conclusion shews the efficiency of all [the four means of true knowledge] in establishing the same fact.

'The proposition is *āgama*' means that the subject-matter of X's proposition is a fact derived from *āgama* by X, but not by Y to whom X proposes to prove it by *nyāya*. Though X's proposition is a statement of what he has learned from *āgama*, yet it can not be accepted as *āgama* by Y, because it is assumed that X is not a *ṛsi*. Had it been accepted as *āgama* by Y, it would not have been necessary for X to prove it to Y by *nyāya*. To quote from Uddyotakara's Vārttika on N. S. I. 1. 1.—

'[Pūrvapakṣin]:

[It is] ² not right [to say that] the proposition is *āgama*, because *āgama*, [being itself a means of true knowledge], has the capacity of establishing a truth [independently of any other means of true knowledge], whilst the subject-matter of the proposition is [something which is yet] to be established.

[Uttarapakṣin]:

[There is] no fault [in saying that] the proposition is *āgama*, because that which is derived from *āgama* has to be demonstrated.

pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ pratisandhānāt, anyeṣā svāntaryānupapattēh. Anumānam hetuḥ, udāharāṇe saṃdrśya pratipattēh; taccodāharāṇabhāṣye vyākhyātam. Pratyakṣaviśayam udāharāṇam, dṛṣṭenadr̥ṣṭasiddheḥ. Upamānam upanayaḥ, tat̥hetyupasaṃhārāt. . . . Sarveṣāṃ ekārthapratipattau sāmānyāpradarśanam nigamanam iti.

¹ Cf. Vacaspati: Udāharāṇe dṛṣṭāntadharminī sādhyasādhanaṇyoh pralībandham sādṛśyaṃ samyag dṛṣṭvā līngasya pratīlēh.

² Āgamaḥ pratijñēti na yuktaṃ, āgamasyatattvavyavacchedakatvāt, pratijñārthasya ca pratipadyatvāt. Āgamādhigatasya pratipadyatvāt āgamaḥ pratijñēti na doṣaḥ. Ya evārtha āgamenādhigatas tameva parasmā 'caṣṭa ityāgamaḥ pratijñētyucyate.

One states [in the proposition] for the sake of others the same fact as has been derived [by one] from *āgama*. So it is said that the proposition is *āgama*.

But the question arises: Is the subject-matter of X's proposition always a fact derived from *āgama*? Propositions like: 'The Ātman exists' have *āgama* for their original source, no doubt. But what about propositions like: 'The hill has fire'? For an answer to this question we would refer to the following passage in Vācaspati's *Tātparyatīkā* on N. S. I. 1. 1.—

'This Śāstra' functions for the purpose of establishing the Ātman and other knowables. It treats of *nyāya*, because it is indispensable for that [purpose]. It treats of only that which directly establishes the Ātman and other knowables, or that which establishes the trustworthiness of *āgama* which [again] establishes those [knowables]. The proposition, which is the first member of that special *nyāya* is about a fact belonging to *āgama*. It has [such a fact] for its subject-matter directly, or [if it is the proposition of a *nyāya*] which establishes the trustworthiness of *āgama*, [it has an *āgama*-fact for its subject-matter] indirectly. Hence the proposition is *āgama*. The reason for using *āgama* in a figurative meaning [consists in] this: *nyāya* is promoted by the message of truth [in the shape of] *āgama*, and [thereby] it becomes purposeful, because the knowledge of truths contained in *āgama* being acknowledged as the cause of [the attainment of] the *summum bonum*. Hence though the proposition in every *nyāya* is not an *āgama*, [yet the statement that the proposition is *āgama*] is to be regarded [as true] from the point of view of a genuine *nyāya*. And also, it is to be understood that by reference to *āgama*, [the possibility of] a proposition being about an imaginary something is excluded.'

Thus, whilst conformably to the principal purpose of syllogistic reasoning, which consists in producing knowledge conducive to the

¹ *Ātmādiḥ prameyapratipādanoddeśena hi śāstram elat pravṛttam. Tannāntarīyakatayā nyāyam vyutpādayat. Tameva vyutpādayed yaścālmādeḥ prameyasya sākṣānniścāyakośaḥ talpratipādakāgamaprāmāṇyāniścāyako vā. Tasya ca nyāyaviśeṣasyādyo 'vayavah pratijñā āgamarthaviśayā sākṣādviśayā' gamaprāmāṇyapratipādakasya ca paramparayā. Tasmād āgamaḥ pratijñā. Āgamopacārasya prayojanam idaṃ padārthasambādenā gamenānugṛhyate nyāyah saprayojanaśca bhavatyāgamārthajñānasya niḥśreyasahetubhāvena nirūḍhatvāt. Tasmād vadyapi na nyāyamātravartinī pratijñā gamas tathāpi prakṛtanyāyābhiprāyeṇa draṣṭavyam. Tathā cāgamānusandhānena pratijñāyāḥ kalpitaviśayatvam api nirākṛtam veditavyam.*

attainment of the *summum bonum*, the proposition should be about scriptural truths; empirical facts like 'The hill has fire', are not excluded from its scope. Though such facts are not known from *āgama*, yet they are not unworthy of being demonstrated by syllogistic reasoning on the ground that, unlike imaginary objects, they do not come in conflict with *āgama*.

We have already pointed out that according to Vātsyāyana, 'inference for oneself' involves three steps, viz.,

(1) Previous apprehension of the concomitance of the sign with the signate (*lingalingisambandhadarsana* = *prathamalingadarsana*).¹

(2) Subsequent apprehension of the sign (*dvitīyalīngadarsana*).¹

(3) Remembrance of the sign as previously apprehended in concomitance with the signate (*lingasmṛti*).

In later logic, a fourth step, viz., consideration of the sign (*lingaparāmarśa* = *trītiyalīngadarsana*) was added.

In a *nyāya* the *prathama lingadarsana* finds expression in the third, the *dvitīya lingadarsana* in the second, and the *trītiya lingadarsana* in the fourth member. The *dvitīya lingadarsana* is called by Vātsyāyana inference, or the means of inferential knowledge (*anumitīkaraṇa*). 'The probans is inference' therefore means that the *dvitīya lingadarsana* which finds expression in the probantial statement², is the means of inferential knowledge. The following passage may be quoted from Vācaspati's *Tātparyatīkā* on N.S.I. 1. 31. in further elucidation of the point.

'The second³ apprehension of the sign is the probans, but it is not inference, because of the third apprehension of the sign, which forms the subject matter of the application, being such.⁴ Hence he says:

¹ Cf. *Tātparyatīkā* on I-1-i; *Sambandhagrahaṇasamaye lingadarsanam prathamam, tadapekṣayā lingadarsanam sādhyadharmiṇi dvitīyam.*

² Cf. N.S. I. 1.34: *Udāharasādharmyāt sādhyasāadhanam hetuḥ. Vātsyāyana interprets sādhanam as sādhanatāvacanam.*

³ *Dvītiyam lingadarsanam hetur na ca tad anumānam, trītiyasyopāyaviśayasya lingadarsanasya tathābhāvād ityātā'āha: Udāharāṇa iti. Udāharāṇe dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi sādhyasāadhanayoḥ pratibandham sādṛśyam samyagdṛṣṭvā lingasya pratīteḥ. Etad uktam bhavati: Yadyapi trayāṇām api lingadarsanānām sasmṛtīnām anumānatvam, tathāpi tadekadeśa madhyame'pi lingadarsane samudayopacārād anumānavyapadeśa iti.*

⁴ Cf. *Nvāyavārtika* on N.S.I. 1:5: *Eke tāvad varāṇyanti lingalingisambandhasmṛtir anumānam iti. Itarair lingalingisambandhadarsanādibhir anumṛhyamāṇā. Apare tu manyante lingaparāmarśo 'numanam iti. Vayam tu paśyāmaḥ: Sarvaṃ anumānam anumites tannāntarīyakatvāt. Pradhānopasarianatavivakṣayām lingaparāmarśa iti nyāyam.*

'In the example etc'. [*Udāharanāc samīdṛṣṭya pratīteḥ*] means 'because of [the arising of the second] apprehension of the sign after one has well observed the similarity [in respect of] the concomitance of the probans and the probandum in the example, [i.e.] in that which possesses the essential characteristics of a familiar instance. This is [what is] said: though all the three apprehensions of the sign along with the remembrance [of the sign] partake of the essential characteristic of inference, yet the intermediate apprehension of the sign, which is but one of the steps of that [inferential process] is given the designation of inference by the figurative application of [the notion of] the whole [to a part].'

'The example is perception' means that it is about a fact derived from perception.

By analogy Vātsyāyana means in his Bhāṣya on N.S.I. 1. a statement, e.g., 'As is a *go*, so is a *gavaya*', whereby X makes known to Y an unfamiliar object by comparing it to a familiar object. Now, in the application only the second half of such a statement occurs, the first half occurring in the example. Therefore the statement that the application is analogy, should be regarded as a figurative one, in which part has been used for the whole.¹

To sum up, *nyāya* is chiefly concerned with the demonstration of scriptural truths. It consists of five steps. In the *pratijñā* which is figuratively called *āgama*, X states a truth he has learned from *āgama*. The *pratijñā* is followed by the statement of a *hetu* which is figuratively called *anumāna* or *anumitīkaraṇa*. The *hetu* is then strengthened by

(i) an *udāharana* or the statement of a *dṛṣṭānta* which is a *pratyakṣaviśaya* for both X, and the person spoken to, Y, and in which both X and Y have perceived the connection of the *hetu* with the *sādhya*, and

(ii) the *upanaya* or the statement emphasizing the similarity, by means of the word 'So', of the case under demonstration to the case cited as an illustration.

¹ Uddyotakāra's interpretation is somewhat different, though he says that the application has been called analogy figuratively. The term *upamānā* is used in various senses in Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya. For a full discussion of the subject, see Dr. S. Sen's paper on 'Upamānā in Ancient Indian Logic', which was read at the Fifth Indian Philosophical Congress,

Finally, in the *nigamana* the *pratijñā* is shewn to follow as a necessary consequence.

In a *nyāya* the principal part is played by the *hetu*, to which the *udāharana* and the *upanaya* serve as auxiliaries. And as the *hetu* is called the *anumitīkaraṇa*, the knowledge produced by a *nyāya* must be inferential in nature. That this is so is also evident from the use of the word 'Therefore' in the *nigamana* or the conclusion. In this connection reference may be invited to N.S. II. 1.48', and also to Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya² thereon, where it is stated that the *upasaṃhāra* 'Tathā' (which stands in contrast with 'Tasmāt') is met with in analogy, but not in inference.

¹ Tathetyupasaṃhārād upamānasiddher navīṣeṣaḥ.

² Tatheti samānadharmopasaṃhārād upamānaṃ siddhyati, nānumānam.

(To be continued)

Mir Qasim's Intrigues against Mir Jafar Nawab of Bengal

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THE accidental death¹ of Miran was the signal for an endless intrigue. Mir Qasim could now safely proceed with his scheme of effecting a revolution at Murshidabad. The distracted condition of the Nawab's affairs was just the opportunity that he needed. His intrigues against the Nawab are too significant to be overlooked. The part he played in the deposition of Mir Jafar has not been correctly estimated. On a closer examination of the evidence, it will be found that it was he, and not Mr. Holwell or Mr. Vansittart, who first conceived the idea of a revolution, and realized its practicability. It was he who suggested and arranged every detail of the scheme. Mr. Vansittart merely played the game of Mir Qasim.

It is interesting to note that he proceeded against Mir Jafar in almost the same way as Mir Jafar had done against Siraj-ud-daulah. The only material difference in his case was that he had no control over the Nawab's army. Although this was a serious handicap, he did not allow himself to be deterred by this. He could, at any rate, resort to diplomacy and intrigue. He availed himself of the discontent that prevailed in the army against the Nawab, and seduced it to a

¹ Miran was killed by lightning, but foul play was suspected. Mir Qasim was accused of having got his rival assassinated. Even Burke, while addressing the House of Lords during the impeachment of Warren Hastings, spoke with his usual rhetoric, 'My Lords, thus was the Gordian knot cut. The prince dies by this flash of lightning. There were at that time, it seems, in Calcutta a wicked sceptical set of people who, somehow or other, believed that human agency was concerned in this.' (*Vide Speeches of the Managers and Counsel in the trial of Warren Hastings*, edited by E. A. Bond, Vol. I, p. 60). There is a footnote in Burke's *MS*—'Many believed at that time . . . that the Nawab had been murdered by some emissaries of Cossim Ali Khan'. It must be admitted, however, that there is no direct evidence to prove Mir Qasim's complicity in any such affair. Jean Law, a contemporary and a shrewd observer, disbelieved the story of Miran's accidental death and thought he had been murdered (*vide* his 'Memoire' edited by Martineau, Paris, p. 452.)

great extent. A mutiny of the troops at Murshidabad had given him an excellent opportunity of earning their good-will by promptly paying up from his own pocket a part of the arrears due to them.¹ He employed his friend Ali Ibrahim Khan for winning over the Nawab's officers, ministers and other prominent nobles.² Two of the most prominent Hindu officials, who had played no small part in the late revolution of 1757 were again in the forefront of the discontented party.³ One of them, Rai Durlabh, was soon won over. The other, Raj Ballabh too supported the cause of Mir Qasim. The Seths⁴ who had played an important part in the overthrow of Siraj-ud-daulah also wished for a change in the government, and agreed to support the cause of Mir Qasim.

Sure of his ground at Murshidabad, he turned to the English for help. The revolution of 1757 had taught him a valuable lesson. He therefore cultivated the friendship of the Company's officials at Kasimbazar.⁵ He won the good opinion of Mr. Hastings, the Resident at Murshidabad. To crown all, he even secured the good-will of Clive who recommended him for the post held by Ram Narain at Patna.⁶ After Clive's departure, Mir Qasim with characteristic shrewdness won the support of Mr. Holwell, and wrote⁷ to him frequently about his desires. Being assured of the latter's friendship, he paid a visit to him sometime during the last week of February, 1760.⁸ The real object of this visit can not be exactly ascertained, but what is significant is this that soon afterwards, Mr. Holwell openly espoused the claim of Mir Qasim to the office held by Miran, and requested Col. Caillaud to support the cause of his candidate. How far Mir Qasim's diplomacy

¹ *The Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, Alld-Univ: *MS*. p. 733.

² *The Khulasat-ul-Tawarikh* of Kalyan Singh.

(*J.B.O.R.S.*, Vol. V, p. 346.)

³ *The Seir*, Vol. II, p. 375.

⁴ Vansittart's Narrative (Vol. I, p. 43).

⁵ Fort William, August 18, Select Committee Report.

⁶ Press list of Records. Series I, p. 7.

⁷ Reference to a letter from Warren Hastings, dated Morad Bagh, July 18, 1760.

⁸ *The Seir*, Vol. II, pp. 376 and 381. (Translation—Calcutta Edition.)

⁹ Fort William: Select Committee Proceedings, July 18, 1760.

¹⁰ *The Riyaz-us-Salat*, (Translation, p. 385). *The Seir*, Vol. II, p. 383.

¹¹ *The Khulasat—J.B.O.R.S.*, Vol. V, p. 315.

¹² Holwell's 'Reputation of a letter.'

¹³ Holwell's 'Address to the Proprietors of East India Stock.'

¹⁴ Holwell's 'Letter to Caillaud' February 24, 1760, (*vide Tracts*, p. 27).

had succeeded can be best judged from Mr. Holwell's letter to Col. Caillaud, dated May 5, 1760, wherein he wrote: 'I shall receive as a favour your interesting yourself in behalf of Cossim Aly Khan'.

The immediate issue was the problem in regard to the respective rights to future succession of Mir Qasim, and Mir Sidoo, the illegitimate son of Miran. Col. Caillaud and Mr. Amyatt were in favour of the latter², but Mr. Holwell and the Select Committee at Calcutta pressed the claims of Mir Qasim. Both Mr. Holwell and Mr. Hastings were persuaded by Mir Qasim to request the Nawab to appoint him as his successor. The Nawab thus replied to Mr. Holwell³, 'you acquaint me that he (Qasim Ali) is a noble, good, and brave man. Mr. Hastings also has wrote me to the same purpose, and has desired me to let him succeed my son. This rejoiced me much, because I was sensible he is highly deserving of my favour and friendship. I have no friends dearer to me than himself and family, but the Colonel has wrote me a letter . . . you will then be able to judge what motive has induced me to prefer the Chota Nawab's son'. Mr. Hastings, however, wrote to the Select Committee, arguing at length in favour of Mir Qasim's⁴ claims.

In all his intrigues against the Nawab, Mir Qasim could count upon the unfailing help of Mr. Holwell owing to the latter's inveterate hatred and piqué against Mir Jafar⁵. Apart from personal reasons, Mr. Holwell was convinced that Mir Jafar had completely failed as a ruler, and that his misrule would lead to the ruin of the Company's affairs in Bengal⁶. In addition, he framed specific charges against the Nawab of faithlessness, and actual treason⁷. That he gave up his original scheme⁸ of securing the *Subadari* for the Company from the Emperor was due to the successful intrigue of Mir Qasim. The latter also won over the two Armenian merchants, Khoja Gregory and Khoja Petruse who had been the agents of the English in their negotiations against

¹ Holwell's Address, p. 56.

² Vansittart's Narrative, I, pp. 41 and 68.

³ Imperial Records Office, Abs. P.L.R. 1759-65, p. 24.

⁴ Gleig's *Memoirs of Warren Hastings*, vol. I, p. 89.

⁵ First Report, 1772, p. 161, and Caillaud's letter to a friend, *Orme's Mss.* (India, xii, ff. 32, 39, etc.)

⁶ Holwell's Address—p. 10.

⁷ Holwell's 'Memorial.'

.. 'Refutation of a letter.'

.. 'Important Facts'.

⁸ Holwell's Address, pp. 59, 60, 63.

Siraj-ud-daulah, and employed them as his confidential agents in his secret negotiations with the Select Committee at Calcutta¹. The only thing which worried him was the Nawab's prejudice against himself² and so he secretly prepared for an open rebellion as the last alternative³ especially when he saw that the Nawab entrusted the affairs of the Government to a Persian adventurer, Mirza Daud⁴. Matters were in this state when Mr. Vansittart arrived as the permanent Governor of Fort William. Mir Qasim decided to go to Calcutta⁵ to win over the new Governor with the help of Mr. Holwell.

Mir Qasim now simply needed a good pretext to go down to Calcutta. In his very first letter to Mr. Vansittart he expressed the desire for an interview.⁶ Besides writing frequently⁷ to the governor, he wrote more freely to Mr. Holwell⁸. Mr. Vansittart was at last induced to invite Mir Qasim on some convenient plea.⁹ One was suggested by Mir Qasim himself¹⁰, and this was finally approved¹¹. It was the question of adjusting the operations of the next campaign against the Shahzadah, and finally settling the accounts of the assigned lands¹². Mir Jafar who had already begun to suspect the designs of his son-in-law, proved unwilling to let him go to Calcutta¹³. Pressed by the Governor, he had to yield. In the meantime, Mir Qasim had deputed Khoja Gregory on a confidential mission to Calcutta¹⁴. He personally set out from Murshidabad early in September, and reached Calcutta on the 15th of September¹⁵. No sooner had he arrived at Calcutta than he requested the Governor to grant him a private interview¹⁶. The meeting took place on the night of September 15.¹⁷

¹ Abs. P. L. R. 1759-65 pp. 2 and 19.

² *The Khulasat* (J. B. O. R. S., Vol. V, p. 344) and (*The Seir*, Vol. II, p. 375).

³ *The Seir*, Vol. II, p. 382.

⁴ Vansittart's Narrative, Vol. I, p. 42.

⁵ J. B. O. R. S., Vol. V, p. 346.

⁶ Abs. P. L. R. 1759-65, p. 45.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 2.

⁸ Holwell's Address, p. 88.

⁹ Abs. P. L. I. 1759-65, p. 7.

¹⁰ Holwell's Address, p. 89.

¹¹ Abs. P. L. R. 1759-65, p. 37.

¹² *Ibid*, and Vansittart's Narrative, I, p. 43.

¹³ *The Seir*, II, p. 375, J. B. O. R. S., Vol. V, p. 346.

¹⁴ Abs. P. L. R., 1759-65, p. 2.

¹⁵ Abs. P. L. I. 1759-65, p. 7.

¹⁶ Abs. P. L. R., 1759-65, p. 2.

¹⁷ Select Committee Proceedings, Sept. 16, 1760.

During the interview, Mir Qasim expressed his apprehension of Col. Caillaud's designs, and referred to the latter as his enemy.*¹ Mr. Vansittart assured him of his sympathy. Mir Qasim thereupon adroitly declared his desire to obtain the management of the Nawab's affairs to which Mr. Vansittart did not object.*² Mir Qasim subsequently suggested that he would relieve the financial distress of the Company by making territorial assignments, if he were entrusted with the control of the administration. He warned the Governor that the Nawab would surely oppose his elevation, and emphasized the need of coercing the Nawab and his ministers. In other words, Mir Qasim asked for military help, and ultimately convinced Mr. Vansittart of the supreme necessity of a radical change in the Nawab's government.

The success of Mir Qasim's diplomacy was due to a combination of circumstances. The treasury at Calcutta was exhausted, and the normal expenses of the settlement could not be provided for.*³ The monthly subsidy of the Nawab was considerably in arrears. No remittances were expected from England, and the investments had been stopped. The cost of the upkeep of the Bengal army was far more than the allotted revenues.*⁴ There was no prospect of peace in Behar owing to the presence of the Shahzadah. To make matters worse, the Nawab was demanding the return of the assigned districts.*⁵ The company was now also engaged in a decisive struggle with the French in the south, and the presidencies of Bombay and Madras depended on supplies from Bengal. The consequence was that the Council at Calcutta had to borrow heavily to meet the expenses.*⁶ Mr. Vansittart was thus hard-pressed for want of money.⁷ He was not sure of the Nawab's payments, he did not know how to provide funds for Madras*⁸. The select committee resolved, 'It becomes necessary to secure to the company such an income as will bear them clear of charges, and bring in besides a supply for the

*¹ Holwell's Address, p. 89.

*² Vansittart's Narrative, I, p. 96.

*³ *Ibid*, p. 36.

*⁴ Select Committee Proceedings, Sept. 11, 1760.
Second Report of the Committee of Secrecy.

*⁵ Abs. P. L. R. 1759-65, p. 27.

*⁶ 'A Letter to the Proprietors' By Henry Vansittart, p. 12.

*⁷ 'Vindication of Mr. Holwell by his friends,' p. 74.

*⁸ Select Committee Proceedings, August 7th, 1760.

emergencies of their other settlements, and for providing cargoes for loading home their ships.*¹. The immediate problem was how to secure such an income! Mr. Vansittart had appealed to the Nawab for the grant of the *Foujedarship* of Sylhet and Chittagong;*² and for the cession of Burdwan and Krishnanagar*³ but in vain. The governor expostulated fruitlessly as the Nawab was obdurate*⁴. Foiled in his attempt to win over the Nawab, he considered the expedient of negotiating with the Shahzadah. This policy had originally been advocated by Mr. Holwell*,⁵ but Mr. Vansittart, unlike Mr. Holwell, was opposed to the idea of a revolution in Bengal. The select committee finally resolved,*⁶ 'That the entering into an alliance with the Shahzadah is a necessary and expedient measure.' Thus it is evident that neither Mr. Vansittart, nor the select committee had up to September 15, 1760, any desire for bringing about a revolution at Murshidabad. On the contrary, Mr. Vansittart had set his face against any such step. Mir Qasim saw the plight of the Calcutta Government, and determined to exploit it for his own benefit. He held out a helping hand to the Governor, and the latter without correctly grasping the situation at Murshidabad, merely played into his hands. He seems to have thought in the beginning that Mir Qasim meant to have for the present the *Diwani* alone, and so readily fell in with the latter's proposal.⁷ He did not realize at the outset that Mir Qasim really aimed at the *Subadari* also. In the meantime, Rai Durlabh approved⁸ of the promotion of Mir Qasim to the *Diwani* when he was consulted by the Select Committee. Khoja Petrusse now acted as the intermediary between Mir Qasim, and the Select Committee.⁹

After some meetings with the Governor, Mir Qasim had a private interview with Mr. Holwell on September 25.¹⁰ It was on this

*¹ Select Committee Proceedings, 11th September, 1760.

*² Abs. P. L. I. 1759-65, p. 36.

*³ Letter from Mr. Vansittart to Col. Caillaud, Aug. 4, 1760.

*⁴ Letter from Mr. Sykes, Sept. 16, 1760.

and Abs. P. L. I. 1759-65, p. 37.

*⁵ Holwell's 'Interesting Events' Part I, p. 183.

*⁶ Select Committee Proceedings, Sept. 15, 1760.

⁷ First Report, pp. 230-31.

* Select Committee Proceedings—September 16, 1760.

* Vansittart's 'Letter to the Proprietors', p. 142.

¹⁰ Holwell's *Tracts*—Address, p. 90:

'He discovered his views were more extensive than had been imagined.'

occasion that he formally discussed his real objects and plans. In fact, Mr. Holwell was not even prepared for such views as were now expressed by the latter. He thus sums up the latter's views: 'He urged the repeated treacherous conduct of the *Suba* and the late young Nabob to the English, expatiated on their cruelties and murders, and the universal abhorrence of the people against the *Suba* and his house; dwelt much on his personal ingratitude to himself; in his two attempts which he had made on his life at the instigation of the late young Nabob; exclaimed against the secret negotiation he had carried on with the Shahzadah and the Dutch, closing this introduction with saying that the *Suba* was incapable of government; that no faith or trust could be put in him.' In short, Mir Qasim made out a strong case against the Nawab.¹ Mr. Holwell's account of this interview further shows that Mir Qasim even proposed the assassination of the old Nawab.² This idea was dropped at the instance of Mr. Holwell himself.³ That Mir Qasim suggested the murder of the Nawab shows how unscrupulous he was. When he found Mr. Holwell horrified by his inhuman proposal, he expressed his profound disappointment and declared that the latter 'was not so much his friend as he had hoped and expected.'⁴

This account could not obviously have been concocted by Mr. Holwell, as the latter was his friend and advocate. He had no reason for defaming him falsely. Mr. Holwell, however, contradicted himself in a roundabout manner subsequently only to defend his protégé⁵ and to vindicate the revolution of 1760. Even then he used ambiguous language, and merely refuted a fresh charge levelled against Mir Qasim. Certain gentlemen of the Calcutta Council sent a memorial⁶ in 1762 in which they alleged that after his accession to the *masnad*, Mir Qasim attempted to murder Mir Jafar. Mr. Holwell denied that Mr. Qasim could do anything of that kind during his occupation of the palace at Murshidabad. He should not therefore be taken to mean that even the aforesaid proposal had not been made at Calcutta.

¹ Kalyan Singh corroborates the statement of Mr. Holwell. (Vide *J.B.O.R.S.*, Vol. V, p. 346).

² Holwell's Address, p. 90, and Scrafton's Observations, p. 26.

³ Holwell's *Tracts*, p. 91.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Holwell's Refutation (*Tracts*, p. 114).

⁶ First Report.

Sir George Forrest is mistaken when he observes¹, 'Holwell in a Refutation of a Letter denied that the proposal was ever made.'

After the preliminaries were over, there was a discussion on the articles of a secret treaty to be concluded between Mir Qasim and the company. A study of the main terms of the treaty shows that the former secured all the advantages that he wanted. Besides, what is more significant, he also succeeded in his consistent opposition to the proposed alliance with the Shahzadah. Thus, Mir Qasim completely upset the plans of the Select Committee, and obliged the latter to play the part chalked out by himself. On the night of the 27th September, the treaty agreed upon was duly signed by Mir Qasim and the Select Committee. Mir Qasim then offered to reward the Select Committee for their good will, but Mr. Vansittart gracefully declined the proffered bribe for the present.²

Mir Qasim's intrigues were now crowned with success. He had deliberately betrayed the trust reposed in him by the Nawab, as he had no right to conclude a secret treaty which meant the virtual deposition of the Nawab. The latter recently wrote to the governor expressing his intention of bestowing a sardarship on his son-in-law³; little did he anticipate that Mir Qasim was returning from Calcutta recognized as the *de facto* Nawab of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa.

¹ Forrest's *Life of Lord Clive*, Vol. II, p. 212.

It must be understood that Mr. Holwell did not 'actually' contradict his original statement in his 'Address'. His 'Refutation of a Letter' was published as a supplement to his 'Address'. He could easily have suppressed the passage in question from his Address if he had so intended. Even in his Refutation occurs this significant sentence, 'Supposing this charge to be really true surely it will bear some explanation when the provocation is considered'. Did Mr. Holwell intend to slur over the guilt of his hero?

² Holwell's *Tracts*, p. 120.

First Report, p. 161.

³ Abs. P.L.R., 1759-65, p. 27.

Reviews

'A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LIFE—VOL. I
THE COMING OF THE WHITE MAN 1492-1848

BY

H. J. PRIESTLEY

*Professor of American History in the University of California,
New York*

[The Macmillan Company, 1929—pp. xx and 411]

THIS is the first volume of a History of American Life, planned in 12 volumes under an able Board of Editors and treats of the Spanish, Dutch and French settling in the middle zone of North America that has contributed its own quota to the fabric of American life. The more characteristic and permanent results of transplanted Latin cultures are found not so much in the history of the United States as in that of New France and New Spain where the white man first settled in the New World. The world has not fully grasped the fundamental differences that underlay the founding of Anglo-Saxon and Latin America, as was pointed out by Ernest Gruening in his recent book on *Mexico and Her Heritage*. For long the culture of the Anglo-Saxon colonies seemed a puny thing beside that of old Mexico, as well in physical wealth as in intellectual effort and achievement. Thus the book shows that New Spain had run through an entire cycle of artistic, literary and other development before its northern Anglo-Saxon neighbour had scarcely ever made a beginning. This difference was not wholly due to more than a century of priority of time, but was caused by the operation of deeper factors.

Mr. Maurice Law in his book *The American People*, published more than twenty years ago, has remarked that 'America and the Americans were an undiscovered country and an unknown people and each literary Columbus returned to feed the imagination with a newer . . . tale'. The account of Mr. Priestley is certainly new to

many readers in the Eastern Hemisphere, and informing and thought-provoking as well. He describes, initially, how the first Spanish settlers brought with them all that they had of practical civilization, while the land was just ripe for what they had to offer. Missionary zeal for conversion was one of the most important forces of expansion, and the use of the mission by the Crown as an active, but subsidiary agent of subjugation, is one of the outstanding features of the Spanish Colonial System. The author is at special pains to show that the defence of the border was the characteristic motive of expansion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries along the whole frontier line from California to St. Augustine, and that, because of this progress, was held up completely or allowed to proceed only at a very slow pace. The farther north the Spanish settlements went, the fiercer was the native Indian fighter who was not prepared for the social transition to a sedentary life and other consequences of Spanish settlement.

New Mexico, now in U. S. A., projected northwards several hundred miles beyond the early Spanish settlements. In the seventeenth century it lay at the outermost fringe of the white man's civilization and was peopled by a handful of Indians, half-breeds and mulattoes led by a few civilians, missionaries and soldiers. The disappointment of its colonization led to Spain's turning to fairer valleys in the East, and, faltering on account of exhaustion, finally resigned them to the English and the French. The New Mexican settlement was the last notable Spanish expansion before their eighteenth century defensive thrust that added the northern Pacific coast. On the east, expansion into Texas and Florida was undertaken as a measure against foreign aggression and heresy. The writer points out emphatically that the social and political organization that Spain planted within the present bounds of U. S. A., in Florida, Texas and California, was of a transitional and frontier type, and a feeble reflection of the Greater Spain of which the Conquistadores were vaguely conscious. The type of life developed in Old Mexico, with its survival of the Indian masses, and all the social, political and economic implications of that factor, gives a far more correct perspective reflecting Spanish achievement. Thus 'without the survival of Indian blood and tradition, the growth of New Spain would have been quite unlike what it came to be; so, too, the

life of the Mexican nation and its relations with the United States'.

The question of Spanish attitude towards the Indians is a large and complicated one, and the forcing of Christianity on them was a sharp crisis with a sequel of long-drawn-out tragedy and an abundance of trouble for the Spaniards themselves. Yet, according to the Spaniard, his faith was his most important contribution and his most unselfish gift to his new charges. 'The faith was his most generous gift, the transfusion of his blood was his most lavish compliment.' These two were respectively expected to create 'unity of blood' and 'identity of body' which were the basic concepts on which the institutions of society were to rest. Needless to state, the actual results were far removed from the expected ideal.

The book tries to remove the false impression that Spanish life brought few of the amenities of civilization. The prejudice of the English due to religious feud and commercial competition has been largely responsible for this impression. The Americans have nourished the English tradition and strengthened it with the many unpleasant memories of their political and military contact with the Mexicans—a feature illustrated in their attitude towards the recent Mexican revolution, and not merely due to the original distinction between Anglo-America and Hispano-America. The pageant of the culture of New Spain, so belittled in the American mind, was however confined only to the towns and was little reflected in the rural parts and frontier regions. The Spanish colonial population was comparatively immobile, largely due to restricted immigration, the liberal importation of negro-slaves and to the evil effect of the land-system which was in turn due to climate, topography and social organization.

The French builders of Louisiana and Canada pursued somewhat different methods. The French traded with the Indians on equal terms, which, however, was bound to vanish in course of time; and the absolutist ideal of the French government gave Canada an evolution and finally a fixity of form strikingly similar to that of New Spain. The French occupation of the lower reaches of the Mississippi was brought within the imperial purview by La Salle only under an impulse from New France, Louisiana and Illinois had their own peculiar characteristics; while the wild French trappers and woodsmen

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of the interior have left their impress upon Wisconsin society. There is no deep meaning in Dutch effort in America; and Dutch role in the colonial epoch was peculiarly that of a commercial career. There was no large transmission of higher forms of culture through them. The book is a carefully-prepared account of the new British influences, cultural and institutional, that have helped in the formation of American life.

'WARREN HASTINGS AND PHILIP FRANCIS'

BY

SOPHIA WEITZMAN, Ph.D.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

RAMSAY MUIR

[Manchester University Historical Series No. LVI—Manchester University Press, 1929—pp. xxx and 400]

THE controversy between Warren Hastings and Philip Francis had momentous consequences both in Britain and in India, alike on contemporary events and on the later policy pursued by the British Government in Indian affairs. English classical literature at the close of the eighteenth century was 'saturated with party-politics', and according to Sir Henry Maine, this would have been a less serious fact 'if, at this epoch, one chief topic of the great writers and rhetoricians, of Burke and Sheridan, of Fox and Francis, had not been India itself'. The 'excessive dryness and severity of style' of James Mill which produced an impression of accuracy and labour which a study of all available original materials does 'not always confirm' was fortified by the rhetoric of Macaulay who accepted Mill as an authority deserving the fullest confidence. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen was the first writer to deviate from the beaten track and apply 'robust, careful and dispassionate criticism' to this period of history; and he dispelled one of the imaginary crimes of Hastings, *viz*, the judicial murder of Nanda Kumar. Sir John Strachey took up another thread of the tangled skein, and in his work on the Rohilla war, endeavoured to show that the crime of selling the services of the British army for exterminating the Rohillas, is also largely unfounded. Sir G. W. Forrest has brought out the story of Hastings' administration as

revealed by the letters and the narratives, the dissents and the discussions of the chief actors. The latest apologist for Hastings, Mr. P. E. Roberts, maintains the surging tide of Hastings' worship and semi-deification which has been steadily flowing for more than half a century; he declares that the impeachment was a calamitous mistake, and before it had gone far, had developed into something like a cruel wrong. Sydney Grier, Sir Charles Lawson and others, not to speak of Malleson and Lyall, form the main links in the chain of Hastings' champions; and Sophia Weitzman and Miss Monckton-Jones have come, the latter with an able account of the constructive work of Hastings as the Governor of Bengal, and the former with this book under review on the very complex and controversial conflict between the Governor-General and his bitterest foe.

Miss Weitzman has consulted and utilized some hitherto-unutilized manuscript sources like the Robinson collection, the East India part of which has not been classified by the Historical Manuscripts Commission, and contains an invaluable wealth of documents. Robinson was Secretary of the Treasury in the ministry of Lord North and until 1784, his private dwelling served 'with The India House, as a sanctum for the India papers among others'. The Hastings MSS. in the British Museum, the numerous volumes of the Francis MSS. in the India Office Library and the letters and papers of Richard Johnson, assistant to Middleton, are among the more important of the manuscript treasures of the period. The immensity of the sources is, according to Professor Muir, one of the greatest obstacles in the way of the student; the records of the Company at home are exceeded in volume by the consultations and other records of the Indian governments; and both have been heavily supplemented by the growing accumulation of the private or semi-private correspondence of the leading actors, brought to light frequently.

Out of an examination of this mass of evidence, Miss Weitzman concludes that Francis was a much worse man than he has been pictured by many previous writers. Even his biographer, Merivale, was forced to the conclusion that he was 'a political adventurer who was utterly unscrupulous in the use of means' and whose 'sincerity, even when he was sincere, was apt to assume the form of the most ignoble rancour'; while 'no ties of friendship or party or connection seem to have restrained his virulence'. Sir James Stephen held that

this severe condemnation was justified; and now Miss Weitzman condemns him as a failure both as administrator and statesman. She analyses the deeper principles at issue in the controversy between Hastings and Francis, and shows that while the contest was, to a large extent, a war of petty personalities, it was backed by real differences of opinion on policy, Francis holding opinions on internal administration, justice, revenue and foreign policy, that were diametrically opposed to those of Hastings. He was convinced that the English dominion in India was an evil, self-interested growth, and advocated non-intervention. Till 1780, when the climax of their quarrel was reached in the duel, Francis utilized to the fullest possible extent his biting pen and his influence with the home administration to damage his rival, and, if possible, to step into his shoes. After he reached England, he continued his vengeful endeavour and easily captured a party among the Directors, the managers of the two Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry then instituted, and functioning against Hastings and the press generally. The India Bills of Fox were animated by Francis and adopted the administrative system sketched out by him; and Pitt's Bill adopted, in its essentials, 'the findings of the Secret and Select Committees, couched in the very words of Francis', frequently denunciations, and incorporated the political and revenue systems he advocated.' He was the power behind Hastings' impeachment and was painted in contemporary caricatures as the prompter behind the scenes; while Burke never hesitated to acknowledge his indebtedness to Francis. The acquittal of Hastings was deemed by him to be his own condemnation. 'Hastings has been impeached and I have been condemned', he violently declared. The book maintains a very high level of treatment and points out the capacity and skill of constructive statesmanship that Francis had. It rightly declares that Francis, though beaten in the conflict both in India and in England, still contrived to snatch a portion of the laurels. 'Immortalized by Burke and his brilliant contemporaries, his philippics became a part of the legacy of the Whig tradition . . . And once pronounced, his false verdict has been accepted by posterity which knows Hastings only as a great but unscrupulous statesman.' The treatment on the whole sustains the anti-Francis note, but does not err on the side exaggeration of Hastings' merits.

C. S. S.

'THE NABOBS OF MADRAS'

BY

HENRY DODWELL

[Williams and Norgate, London, 1926—p. 263.]

MR. DODWELL has written a very pleasant readable, and withal, a true, picture of the old-time Nabobs as they lived, in the Southern Presidency in the eighteenth century, their comparatively brief and very chequered lives. The Nabob became a target for literary slander and ridicule, and a by-word of political corruption and backstairs influence. From Burke and Sheridan downwards, every one had his fling at the Indian Nabob who became more and more unpopular as the century advanced; but, in spite of their social pretensions and lack of real culture, these old-time Anglo-Indians were possessed of a tough moral fibre, a spirit of self-reliance, gift of command and love of adventure, and generally speaking were not much worse than other people of their age and grade. Professor Dodwell pictures the voyage out to India of the cadets, the crowded and tedious passage, the sighting of the Coromandel, and the strange method of landing across the rough surf on the back of a wet fisherman, and go on the Sea-Gate of *Fort St. George*, which served as the Apollo Bunder of that age. Life in the Presidency was interesting enough from our point of view; but the European population was heterogeneous and supplemented by gems of Spanish or Portuguese extraction, Armenians and domiciled, pure and half-caste Portuguese, all of whom have left their impress upon the city. Methods of making money were easy enough both for the Company's servant and for the private adventurer; and the strange careers of Paul Benfield and the Hollands who were 'Nabobs in the bad and popular sense of the word' are declared by the author, to be exceptions, and we are cautioned against mistaking them for fair samples of the Company's servants.

'The average was not very different from the rest of the generation at home and achieved neither the enormities of Holland, nor the fortunes of Benfield.'

The chapter on the origin and development of the Madras Army which came to be an efficient fighting force under Major Lawrence who has been called 'the Father of the Army' gives us many illustrative anecdotes and accomplishments as well as numerous instances of

discontent and sedition and even occasional mutiny. The growth of the class of free merchants indicated the rise of a numerous and comprehensive population including all the Europeans who were not servants of the company or officers of the Army. While in the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Governor and Members of Council were the chief merchants, at the end of it, the control of trade had really passed from the covenanted servant to the free merchant; while regular firms had grown up in the place of loosely associated individual merchants. Along with them came the lawyers, a good specimen of whom is furnished by Stephen Popham, an Irish M. P., whose name has come to be inseparably associated with the development of Madras.

Mr. Dodwell gives in his inimitable manner the stages of the development of the suburban country-houses, and the expansion of the settlement by the inclusion of the Choultry Plain and other vast stretches. Comforts were few, though beverages were many, and indeed water was used as little as possible. Exotic customs, ill-judged gaiety of clothes, big houses and innumerable servants ensured 'a reputation for tasteless and exorbitant expense'. One is glad to read that the Nabobs were 'familiar with some great and not a little good literature.' Thus 'on many bookshelves you would find Shakespeare and Milton, Swift and Pope; the essayists from the *Tatler* to the *Rambler*; minor poets like Pomfret and Akenside. For Classical History they had Rollin, Plutarch and Gibbon; for English History, Mrs. Macaulay, Hume and Smollett; for the history of their predecessors in India, the judicious Orme, the laborious Cambridge, the moral Raynal besides the lively pamphlets of Holwell and Scrafton. Officers carry with them on campaigns, *Tom Jones*, *Don Quixote* or *Gil Blas*. . . Temple and Clarendon, Camden's *Britannia* and Montaigne's *Essays*, Spenser, Johnson and Raleigh, all appear. Every now and then we strike a wider range of reading—Boileau, Moliere and Montesquieu in French, Camoens in Portuguese, Ariosto, Tasso, Machiavelli, and Guicciardini in Italian.' Printing presses and news sheets were fairly active; racing and hunting developed into organized pastimes, and there was no lack of duels, quarrels and court-martials. The picture that we have in this book of old Madras, its life and activity is valuable alike to the historian and the lay reader; and a full bibliography at the end of the sources of information further enhances its value.

C.S.S.

THE CHRISTIAN TASK IN INDIA

BY

VARIOUS WRITERS

EDITED BY

THE REV. JOHN MACKENZIE

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

THE MOST REV. THE BISHOP OF CALCUTTA

[Macmillan & Co, Ltd., 1929—pp. xvii and 297—price 7/6.]

THE need for a fresh and vital orientation of Christian attitude is more urgent now than a few years ago, and the separableness of a truly Christian life from the holding of correct beliefs, is coming to be held as more and more possible. As the Metropolitan of Calcutta forcibly points out in his introduction, the most urgent need of Christian workers at the moment is to present the Christian religion far more as a way of life and to demonstrate, as forcibly as can be done, that the spirit of Christ is the spirit of service in the diverse fields which poverty of many kinds affords in this as in other countries. 'The demand for education, healing and uplift has given ample scope for presenting in a practical way the ideals of the Christian life and the secret of its power.' The book is a collection of essays on the different aspects of Christian activity going on in the country, written by expert workers in the field. In the opening chapter Mr. S. K. Datta points out the danger of the Christian cause suffering, as it has suffered, from being identified as the ruler's religion and of being thrust aside as the symbol of the foreign governing race by the forces of developing nationalism. Christianity has also been challenged on her failure to live up to her own teaching and on the erection of distinct quasi-caste barriers in Western countries. Above all, true Christianity has got to assert its separation from industrialization and possession of economic power, and from the consequent association with secular views of life. Mr. Datta rightly stresses on the extreme importance of a readjustment of the educational ideas and technique of missionary bodies who could meet the present situation most vitally in their educational activities.

As regards the attitude of the Indian *intelligentsia*, Mr. J. C. Winslow will conclude, though one may well differ from that conclusion, that there is a widespread acceptance of the main principles of Christ's teachings, particularly of his ethical teaching. Moral standards of conduct are basically, and in their fundamentals, similar in all the principal religions of the world; and ideas about the brotherhood of man are not peculiar to any one religion. Again, when it is claimed that the educated Hindu feels no difficulty in interpreting Hinduism for himself in a way that does not conflict with Christian teaching, it seems to be something like stretching a point. It is true that some think that to be baptized into the Christian Church is not simply breaking with one's religious heritage, but also with one's whole social and cultural inheritance also. Professor Radhakrishnan maintains in his *Hindu view of Life* (pp. 71-4) that the doctrine of *Karma* when rightly viewed, does not conflict with the reality of freedom which is the basis of all ethical values, and that there is room for repentance and consequent forgiveness in this scheme. This is taken up by Dr. Winslow to imply 'a *rapprochement* to Christianity from the side of Hinduism which no thoughtful Christian can do otherwise than heartily welcome'; but it may be regarded justly as taking too much for granted. The writer is on firm ground when he urges the Indian Christian community to make impossible the reproach of denationalization by becoming as truly Indian in its life and outlook as the other great communities of the land. From the Bishop of Dornakal who tries to prove that the social and national problems of Mother India are solved most effectively where the religion of Christ has had a chance, we have the statement that only in the village can the Church become truly self-supporting, self-propagating and self-governing.

Alice Van Doren points out how India may show to the world a new type of womanhood, offspring of the union between the spirit of Jesus Christ and the inherited spiritual culture of the East as in Pandita Ramabhai who was a true *Bhakta* of the Cross. She pays particular attention to the needs of the rural woman and stresses on the necessity of avoiding the danger of Europeanization. Dr. John Mackenzie cautions Christians and others against depreciating the value of the educational missionary, simply on the ground that he does not lead directly to the making of converts. Christian educational institutions are exercising an enormous influence, intellectual, moral and spiritual,

over the lives of their students and are helping to break down racial and national barriers, amongst other services that they do; and the writer stresses on the quickening of spirit fostered by these institutions which has led to a multitude of social service activities. Thus, the spiritual results of higher missionary educational work are deep and potent and should not be lightly undervalued. Dr. N. Macnicol yearns for 'the appearance of groups of Indian Christians who shall be able, by a careful and sympathetic study of their Christian faith in the light of their Indian heritage, to plant the universal message of Christ deep in the soil of the Indian soul.'

The ministry of healing has been regarded as an essential part of Christian teaching; and the service thus rendered is a natural and vital expression of the spirit of Christ; the co-operation of this branch with others of Mission activity should be stressed; and in its own sphere, preventive medicine and medical research should be pushed forward. An ambitious chapter of the book under review is devoted to a consideration of the causes of the appalling poverty of the country and believes in the wholesale efficacy of the application of the doctrine of Jesus Christ as the prime mover who can touch the springs of life and bring prosperity and happiness. We are told that the Gospel of Jesus is as wide as the needs of men spiritually, socially, industrially, politically and economically. The attitude of the Christian movement towards the shaping of public opinion in matters of social reform has got to rest on forces which it is difficult to determine and evaluate; but that Christ alone can serve as a universal panacea for all ills of Indian society, and that India's public moral problems will not discover their solutions in orthodox Hinduism, are both the result charge of a narrow outlook and lack of proper perspective.

Mr. A. Davies, in his contribution to the book, declares that the missions are beginning to understand that they have gone to India not merely to give, but also to receive, to learn as well as to teach. The efforts of Indian indigenous Christians are detailed in a separate chapter and shown to have a definite and important place in the Christian movement. The case for missionary co-operation and the union of separated Christian bodies is put on the ground that Christian unity in life and practice is necessary for the worthy presentation of the Gospel. This co-operation is most needed in public questions, in the joint maintenance of different pieces of work, and in the shaping of

thought and experience. In the last chapter but one on the *Church of Christ in India* stress is laid on the fact that the nationalist movement has made the Church less exotic, and enabled it to have a really indigenous, cultural and economic background. The Bishop of Bombay explains the operating tendencies towards unity, and prefers that organic union should be aimed at rather than federal union. The different contributions are thought-provoking and give the thinking reader a great deal of matter for acute reflection and cogitation.

C. S. S.

'STUDIES IN TAMIL LITERATURE AND HISTORY'

BY

V. R. RAMACHANDRA DIKSHITAR, M.A.,

Lecturer in Indian History—University of Madras, 1930. Luzac.

'THOSE who are interested in the study of Tamil literature are bound to feel thankful to Mr. V. R. R. Dikshitar for the publication of his studies.' As stated in the preface, the author has collected his 'stray writings together with the results of his further studies on the subject.' The book consists of seven chapters on the Sangam, some Sangam poets, some Tamil mystics, Tiruvalluvar, Administrative institutions, the art of War, and Social life in the Tamil land. Each of these is divided into several sections and hence the reader can perceive at a glance what the author is going to speak about—a great convenience indeed in these days of stress and strain when lay readers have too many things to occupy them and hence too little attention to spare for the utterances of the research-worker. Again, the topics chosen for examination are all of them interesting, each in its own way; and thus the different portions of the book will appeal to different classes of readers.

Scholars know that the subjects chosen by the author for his 'studies' are so vast that each one of his chapters must be developed into a volume as big as the present book if they are to be treated adequately. Some of them are still controversial in nature. The existence of the Sangam is an instance in point—yet Mr. Dikshitar has stated Mr. P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar's opinion and answered the arguments. *Apropos* of that, he has also attempted to establish a

connection between Pliny's reference to the transfer of the Pāṇḍyan capital from Korkai to Madura and the Śilappadikāram reference to the incident of the sea swallowing a portion of Pāṇḍyan territory. The explanation is not unacceptable. The account of the extant Sangam works is brief but not meagre. The six sections dealing with Nakkīrar, Kapilar, Paraṇar, Avvaiyār, Iṅgō-Aḍigaḷ and Śāttanār, which make up the second chapter are as satisfactory biographical sketches as they can be expected to be in our present state of ignorance. The Sangam poems and the half-believable Purāṇas have been carefully examined for the purpose. The religion of Iṅgō-Aḍigaḷ and of Śēraṇ Śenguttuvan has been analysed utilizing the views of the late Kanakasabhai Pillai and the learned Pandit Swaminathier. In discussing the date of the poet, the vexed question of the Sangam date crops up; but the author avoids dogmatizing and rests content with the remark, 'It is reasonable to assume that these two epics belong to the epoch of the Sangam.' When the author takes up for examination the Buddhistic philosophy of Śāttanār, he says, 'It is in this connection that the poem is invaluable;' but he does not say much more than that and is probably right in caring for the feelings of the reader by avoiding the technicalities which led Dr. S. K. Aiyangar and Prof. S. Kuppaswami Sastri to different conclusions.

The author is at his best in Chapter IV. There he is in his own element; his fairly sound knowledge of Sanskrit helps him considerably in making the really good comparisons between the parallel passages of the Kural and the several Sanskrit works like the Gīta Mānava Dharma Śāstra, Kāmandaki, the Artha Śāstrā etc. The next chapter on administrative institutions runs over nine sections and bears on the face of it every evidence of a thorough-going and searching study of the originals. In tracing the evolution of kingship in the pre-historic period, Mr. Dikshitar pitches upon the words *Kō* and *Kōṇ* which are applied both to kings and cow-herds, and argues that 'the origin of the dynasty of the Pāṇḍyan kings can probably be traced to the headship of the Āyar tribe.' This inference is of doubtful validity; for it is generally 'war that begets the king' and not the peaceful pursuit of cattle-tending. But this does not seriously affect the author's general conclusions. When he passes on to the qualifications of the king, the minister and the members of the Council, in the epoch of the Tirukkural, he has naturally to draw his

inferences from the Kural itself (which has, in this particular, very much in common with the Artha Śāstra) and one may perhaps have a doubt as to whether the Kural represented the ideal or the actual state of affairs. The same remark applies to the character of the kingship, the conduct of princes, abdication, etc., dealt with in the succeeding section relating to the epoch of the epics. But the student of the *Ideals of Ancient South Indian Polity* has ample material in these and the subsequent sections of the chapter which cover many important subjects such as taxation, administration of justice, and village institutions. These sections of the book are very valuable for the comparison instituted between South Indian Polity and the ancient Hindu Polity of North India.

Chapter VI is certainly pleasant reading and will be much appreciated by those who are eager to know something of the martial qualities of the ancient Tamils and the manner in which they conducted their wars. The author has utilized the Sangam works for this purpose with exceptional skill and patience. The concluding chapter provides plentiful information about town-life and village-life, marriages and dances, festivals and superstitions. He is right when he says that he has given a 'picture' of the chief features of Tamil Social life, at least such of those pleasing aspects which would afford rich food for thought to the antiquarian.

The author has done his task well and deserves our congratulations.

The book is beautifully printed; and considering the enormous cost of such publications, the price is only reasonable.

C. V. N.

INDIAN PRINCES UNDER BRITISH PROTECTION

BY

P. L. CHUDGAR, BAR-AT-LAW.

[Williams & Norgate Ltd., London 1929].

THE problem of the Indian States has three aspects. In its purely internal aspect the administration concerned and the paramount power whatever that term may connote are responsible. In most economic questions of all India importance these States have interests in common

with those of British India. As regards foreign policy and international action, British India as well as the Indian States have to act through the British Government in England. In all the three aspects internal, British Indian and international the question has assumed much practical importance at the present moment when the readjustment of the Indian constitution on progressive lines is being attempted.

Mr. Chudgar's study of the question is both exhaustive and informing. He approaches the subject from the point of view of a citizen of the Indian State and the discussion assumes that modern democratic standards are those upon which judgments ought to be arrived at regarding the soundness and justice of the various institutions and methods in these states. This is the keynote of the book. For years together these states have been governed according to medieval notions by rulers who have been brought up upon principles akin to divine right; and the peoples of these states have also retained the awe and veneration with which divine monarchies have been looked upon. Only advanced education and contact with virile foreign democratic institutions could create a population which would render the continuation of the present autocracy unfashionable if not impossible. There, as Mr. Chudgar points out, the princes and their administrations lay themselves open to the charge of deliberately failing to provide facilities, financial and otherwise, for the educational advance of their peoples. But let us bear in mind, in justice to the princes whose peculiar environment and upbringing entitle them to our sympathy, that they could not of their own motion embark upon a progressive educational policy and for obvious reasons. The charge ought properly to be laid at the door of the British Overseer. The paramount power had undertaken responsibility for the maintenance of internal order in the States. The first condition of order in any civilised State is an informed citizenship, citizenship informed of its rights as well as of its duties. The paramount power has done nothing even by way of moral persuasion to induce these princes to undertake popular educational schemes to implement this condition. They have been winking at a policy which permitted of colossal expenditure, amounting often to over 50% of the revenues, on the personal requirements of the Ruler, while on education and public health, the proportion spent would be an unbelievable jest. The

maintenance of internal order is a formula which has been in practice interpreted to cover only the maintenance of the supremacy of the Ruler and not the progress and contentment of the subject.

The facts brought together and the conclusions derived by Mr. Chudgar are sufficient to show that the policy of the various authorities towards the people of the Indian States must alter radically. The subject of the Indian State is more like the slave in the city-state or in Rome than the citizen of a modern State. He toils that the Princes may enjoy. A reawakened mass conscience must put a stop to this unjust state of affairs.

The introduction of the progressive policy is a problem bristling with difficulties. On the one hand efficiency of the administration has to be severely maintained. On the other, that efficiency must be in furtherance of the legitimate rights of the people themselves. This is the usual problem of democratising a people mostly ignorant of and unaccustomed to the exercise of their rights. The sudden creation of democratic institutions without the creation of a competent electorate capable of choosing wisely, will be a sad mistake. The first thing to do is to have compulsory universal education immediately. All else will follow. Money must be found anyhow for this.

Mr. Chudgar discusses various other interesting questions, the most important of them being the political relations between these States and British India in future. The Round Table Conference is attempting to evolve a scheme by which this relation would become a constitutional one. The scheme has immense difficulties and, to be sure, the optimism of its promoters is a little bewildering to those who are familiar with the principles and history of federations. If a workable scheme were evolved it would be a triumph of statesmanship and political imagination. Failing that the problem will yet remain as to how the crown in its English right, the British Indian democracy, and the various Indian States would be related and reconciled to each other. Mr. Chudgar has not tackled this aspect of the question.

In the words of Mr. J. C. Wedgewood in the arresting preface, this book needed writing.

N. D. V.

'HISTORY OF ORISSA, VOLUME I'

BY

R. D. BANERJI

[R. Chatterjee, Calcutta]

IN this work, the talented author, the late Mr. R. D. Banerji, attempts for the first time, on a comprehensive scale and in the light of material some of which was only recently made available, the History of Orissa from the earliest times down to the period of the introduction of British rule. It is apparently intended to be completed in two volumes, of which the volume before us takes us from the beginning of Kalinga History to the period of Muhammadan conquest under Akbar. Even so, it is a pretty long period of varied interest, and the copiousness of the material available varying also from almost no material to a very considerable volume of it. Mr. Banerji takes us through this varied history with the care and caution expected of a scholar of his standing. Dealing with the topography, the peoples and the pre-historic antiquities, he passes rapidly through the references to the country in ancient Indian literature, and then goes on to the first historically important chapter, 'Orissa under the Nandas and the Mauryas.' This chapter and the next one Kharavela are interesting, and the account presented by Banerji is quite worthy of him as the joint author of the *Hathigumpha* inscription published in the Behar and Orissa Research Society through the energetic enterprise of Mr. K. P. Jayaswal. Then we enter a dark period, the period of Kalinga expansion overseas, and the position of the Kalingas up to the age of Harsha. Two chapters are taken up with 'the Sailodbhavas of Orissa', the contemporaries of Harshavardhana, and the chapter following deals with Orissa as described by the Chinese traveller Hiuen T'sang. Then follow three chapters bearing on the dynasties of whom comparatively little is known, and what little of information is available is sorted out, analysed and presented by Mr. Banerji with care. Naturally, these would be rather uninteresting to the general reader. That is matter, for which no author could be held responsible. Then he enters on more interesting ground when he comes to discuss the Somavamśa kings of Kosala and the early Gangas. Mr. Banerji fixes the Ganga era his own way, and takes it a few centuries earlier

than the others. Then follow three interesting chapters upon 'the history of the Eastern Gangas' beginning with Vajrahasta and coming on to Narasimha IV. Then follow three chapters upon the more interesting period of Orissa history beginning with the foundation of the empire under the usurper, Kapilendra, who extended the power of Orissa from the frontiers of Bengal, almost the line of the Ganges, far down into South India along the coast. The account given in these chapters is about as full as, in the present circumstances of historical research in Orissan history, would make it possible, Mr. Banerji makes an effort to present his account clearly and with critical ability.

Here as elsewhere in the critical part of his work, the late Mr. Banerji shows an unfortunate feature, too often associated with him of not always taking care to understand the position of those whom he criticizes, nor to make his criticism really acceptable even when he happens to be reasonable. Numbers of instances like that could be quoted where, with something like a supercilious flaunt of care, he points to small errors in others, but oftentimes falling into more serious ones himself. It is not our business here merely to pick holes in a difficult work done with a considerable amount of ability and care, and therefore we do not propose noting down all the small errors. But we must draw attention to where he takes it upon himself to criticize other positions without taking adequate care that the position that he has taken is not open to almost the same, if not more adverse criticism. We have noticed it in his *History of Orissa* published in the *Indian Antiquary*, and we find it repeated, perhaps in more detail, in this history. With reference to Kapilendra and Purushotama Gajapati and their achievements against the empire of Vijayanagar, he begins with the statement 'a considerable amount of misunderstanding exists amongst scholars, especially those who hailed from South India about the true nature of the conquest of Kapileswara in the Tamil Country.' Here the whole question is that during the period of rule of Kapileswara Gajapati, which extended from 1435 to 1469 how far Orissan conquests actually extended in the south, and what was the nature of the conquests. It would take too long to discuss the position, and a review note is not the place for the whole discussion. The late Mr. Banerji takes hold of a few inscriptions in the Tamil country dated in the years 1470-71 and referring to the previous

conquest of Kapileswara Gajapati of that region. They do not refer to the specific details of it, but refer to the times of disturbances owing to the incursion of the Oḍḍiyan, which Mr. Banerji mistakes for a special Tamil designation, but Oḍḍiyar is the regular Tamil form for the inhabitant of Oḍḍra or Oḍḍa. Unfortunately Kapilendra's period of power corresponds to the rise to importance of Saluva Narasimha, whose inscriptions are found in abundance all over the Tamil country, and who is exhibited as gradually raising himself to importance from his ancestral patrimony at Narayanavaram in the Chittoor District, of the Madras Presidency, *not in the Mysore State*, as Mr. Banerji notes. He gradually imposed his authority over all the Tamil districts in the centre, extending westwards into Mysore to as far as Naga-mangala, and gradually advancing northwards till he could place himself in great force on the banks of the Godavari when later Sultan Muhammad III of the Bahmani kingdom found it difficult to dislodge him from the position that he had taken on the banks of the great river near Rajahmundry. Here Mr. Banerji takes it upon himself to assume that his interpretation of the Tamil inscriptions and their significance as being of superior historical value, to what is contained in a Sanskrit classic composed in the court of Narasimha himself and dedicated to him. Nobody would urge that a poem that was dedicated to a ruler, and written ostensibly for his patronage, would contain undressed truth. But when it is stated that these poems utter falsehoods, one may well demur. But when these poems get confirmed by material, such as the inscriptions to which Mr. Banerji would attach the highest value, the presumption that other statements may contain truth does not border on simple credulity. The coast region and the central block of Vijayanagar territory had passed under the chief Saluva Narasimha so far that European travellers at that period got to call the whole empire of Vijayanagar Narasinga. This is evidence of the position of authority of the Saluva chief, Narasimha. Because Kapileswara made conquests in the south, and even planted garrisons in certain places of his southern conquests—that so far only in the Nellore country—is not an indication that he brought all his conquests under his own rule, and this applies with greater force to the Tamil districts, where some of the inscriptions refer to him and even are referable to him by name and authority. During the period in question, conquests and reconquests have been the order of the

day. The empire of Vijayanagar in the south, the Bahmani kingdom in the middle and the empire of Orissa in the north-east were facing each other, looking out each one for an opportunity to extend its authority or deal a crushing blow to the enemy as opportunity offered. From the nature of the position, therefore, wars could not have been as decisive as the Great War and the League of Nations that immediately followed to settle frontiers once for all, and make an honest effort to avoid war for the future. The period of the rise of Kapileswara corresponded to the period of weakness and disturbance in the Bahmani kingdom, and the personal unpopularity of a particular ruler in Vijayanagar, and gave the opportunity for Kapileswara to extend his authority southwards. As soon as things bettered in the one place as in the other, it would naturally provoke a reaction, and the rise of Saluva Narasimha to power exhibits that reaction on the side of Vijayanagar and the rise of Nizam-ul-Mulk Bahri exhibits it in respect of the Bahmani kingdom.

It would take a good deal more by way of regular proofs before Mr. Banerji's conclusions could be accepted that Sanskrit *kāvya*s are worthless as historical evidence, and his own interpretation of inscriptions and even Muhammadan historians such as Firishta and Saiyad Ali are beyond question, correct. For one thing, he casts aside the detail contained in the drama *Gangadasa Pratapavilasam*. Banerji here does not notice that the statement there is that the attack upon Vijayanagar was made by the Bahmani Sultan and the ruler of Orissa jointly, when the great Devaraya II died and was succeeded by his son Malikarjuna. That must have reference to the period 1449-51. Why should this be impossible? He has given absolutely no reason beyond his own opinion. Similarly he forgets, when he makes a comparison between the accounts of Firishta and of the Burhan-i-Ma'asir regarding the period immediately after the death of Kapileswara and before the accession of Purushotama that the two historians may be describing two different events. The responsibility lies upon him to prove first of all that the two authors describe the same incident in their history. Neither of the authors pretends to have written an exhaustive history, or a strict diary. They were both of them alike historians who worked at a later period from material available to them, and, as Banerji himself admits elsewhere, 'one sometimes mentions incidents which the other fails to, but for reasons

which perhaps we may not understand.' In those circumstances, the possibilities are that Firishta is describing what took place in more detail, and describes that the succession of Purushotama was not quite peaceful, and therefore he is not describing the later war with which the Burhan-i-Ma'asir actually deals in the passage quoted. In another connection, he is similarly carried off his feet where he tries to transform Vinukonda into Penugonda and wishes to give to Kapileswara the governorship of the region dominated by Penugonda. This is absolutely unwarranted, as there is no reference to Penugonda in the Munur inscriptions, from which he quotes on page 297. Penugonda was in the interior, and at the time was under the rule of the empire over which Virūpāksha was ruling. The region along the East coast and the region to the south of Penugonda were places where the imperial authority had grown weaker, and the authority of Saluva Narasimha was getting gradually accepted. Saluva Narasimha and his agent Narasa were both of them active in this region, and in course of years they gradually became masters of the whole of the south leaving the central block of territory with the part extending to the West coast under the direct rule of the emperor Virūpāksha. Kapileswara's efforts have all been to extend his authority along the region of the coast, and, where the inscription also says that he established two governorships under his authority in Kondavidu and Vinukonda, it refers to the region near the Krishna delta. He had not advanced farther south as yet.

We need not labour the point further than to point out that Banerji's interpretation of these inscriptions leaves a good deal to be desired. In this part, at any rate, his account will gain in clarity if he took a little more care to arrange the historical events more chronologically, and kept his prejudices against the South Indian scholars a little more subdued. He quotes the Cambridge History as against us. But one chapter of the Cambridge History of 32 pages compressing into it a history of 600 years is not the place where a detailed discussion of these could be made. Mr. Banerji does not show that he knows the little book, *A Little Known Chapter of Vijayanagar History*, which gives a detailed account of the rise of Saluva Narasimha to power, and which contains a detailed discussion of these very points. It is a pity that Mr. Banerji is no more, and we have had to point out these, not in any spirit of want of charity, but in

the interests of historical truth, as it does not really matter, and ought not to, either to the late Mr. Banerji or to us whether it was Kapileswara Gajapati or Saluva Narasimha that had the better of it in their struggle. What is really to the point is what indeed is the correct position warranted by the historical material before us including in them Firishta, Saiyid Ali, Mediæval Sanskrit poets, held in such contempt by Banerji, and the invaluable inscriptions which have to carry such a heavy burden of Mr. Banerji's own interpretation put upon them all alike, and a conclusion that does not satisfy these fairly, cannot be accepted as valid or final. If it cannot be final for the present, we shall have to wait upon the future to make us wiser. Before we conclude the review, we feel bound to invite attention to two other points of some importance. We sincerely regret that Mr. Banerji is no more, but feel that we should, none the less, draw attention to these, while we should have been delighted had he lived to consider the position. The first is a serious error of statement, possibly, merely due to confusion of names. It occurs on page 323, and in another place it is repeated, that it was Narasa Nāyaka's will and testament to his son that he left the fort of Udayagiri in particular in the possession of the rulers of Kalinga. We do not recollect having heard of any such testament. The testament to which prominent attention is drawn by the Portuguese chronicle of Nunis, is the dissatisfaction felt by Saluva Narasinga on his death-bed. He pointed out to his general Narasa Nāyaka three important frontier fortresses he was not able to take, and exhorted the general that he might complete what Narasinga himself was unable to do before his death.

The other one is a theory, rather elaborately expounded by the late Mr. Banerji that the acceptance of Vaishnavism of the Chaitanya school by Prataparudra of Orissa was probably responsible for the deterioration of the military character of the inhabitants of Orissa and therefore of the decay of the Orissan empire within a decade of the acceptance of Vaishnavism by Prataparudra. We do not wish to be dogmatic in regard to the matter one way or the other. We know nothing in the Vaishnavism of Chaitanya differing very materially from the Vaishnavism of others, except the possibility of the exaggeration of a feature or two. In any case, the theory of the late Mr. Banerji is incomplete, as he does not appear to have taken into account that Saluva Narasimha, who was the first to oppose the

extension of Orissa in the south, was a Vaishnava. So was Krishnadevaraya, who defeated Prataparudra even before he accepted Vaishnavism, and carried the Vijayanagar arms victoriously, at any rate, as far north as Simmachalam in the Vizagapatam District—very much more of a Vaishnava than Saluva Narasinha—and if his work *Amuktamalyada* is evidence, he was fairly a devotee of Vishnu without any antagonism as such against other religions. Both Rama and Tirumala, who for years maintained the power of Vijayanagar against the Sultans of the Bahmani kingdom were Vaishnavas of almost the same persuasion as the great Krishnadevaraya. If Vaishnavism had such a tendency, even the Vaishnavism of Chaitanya—this apparent incompatibility requires explanation. We shall not be controverting the position. Our wish is merely to point out that it is possible for one to theorise on much too slender evidence.

‘BULLETIN OF THE MADRAS MUSEUM’

[Edited by the Superintendent]

WE welcome the revival of the Madras Museum Bulletins that used to be issued in the days when Mr. Thurston was the Superintendent of the Museum and which had suspended publication for a number of years since. We have had two such sent to us. The first is an Archæological Bulletin of the Buddhist Sculptures from a *stupa* at Goli in the Guntur District. We shall make a detailed notice of it later. The second is the bulletin under notice, the Adichanallur skulls, a study by S. Zuckerman of the University of London, and Research Anatomist to the Zoological Society, with notes by Professor George Elliot Smith, F.R.S. This refers to two skulls discovered in the excavations conducted by Mr. Rea, the Archæologist of the Madras Presidency and noticed by Mr. Thurston so long ago as 1909. Two of these have been examined recently and it is they that form the subject of this bulletin. Without getting into any details for which reference may be made to the very interesting and carefully written bulletin of twenty pages, we may content ourselves with the general conclusions derivable therefrom.

The examination of the skulls seems to show that, from the mere cranial measurements, the two examples subjected to measurements and examination, may be regarded as possessed of distinct characteristics justifying the labelling of these two distinctly. The first one is

Australian and the second one Dravidian. Of course, this would naturally raise the question whether Australian and Dravidian are two distinct ethnic varieties, and whether we have evidence justifying this division; and that is examined in the portion that follows. The difficulty of classifying the so-called Dravidian population of India into Dravidian and pre-Dravidian is explained. While the general position is tenable that the pre-Dravidian population of India and the Australian may be related to each other, the Dravidian being an invading population from the north-west, the Austroid characteristics of the Australian of to-day raises difficulties towards confirming this classification. From a mere cranial examination, the two types represented by the two skulls of Adichanallur stand clear. But whether a cranial measurement constitutes irrefutable evidence of race is open to doubt. The distinction Kolarian and Dravidian is shown to be more or less philological and not ethnical, and it is pointed out on an elaborate examination of the researches carried on by Turner that the elaborate cranial examination of the peoples of the Deccan does not support a specific pre-Dravidian stock to which belonged the Australians, the jungle tribes of Southern India and the Veddahs of Ceylon. It is pointed out that this may however be due to racial mixture. But the two Adichanallur skulls seem nevertheless to support the notion that the aboriginal inhabitants of Southern India were in many respects similar to the Australians of to-day, and this conclusion seems to lend justification to a pre-Dravidian aboriginal stock consisting of the jungle tribes of Southern India, the Australians, the Sakai of the Malaya Peninsula and the Veddahs of Ceylon. The same evidence is not conclusive in regard to the fact that the present Australian native is a result of a cross between the Australian and invading Indians. The indications are rather against such a possibility. But so far as the Deccan itself is concerned, the association of a Dravidian skull and that of an Australian in Adichanallur shows that the Adichanallur remains must be referable to the Dravidian period, whatever that be. There is perhaps evidence to support that primitive man made his way to Australia from Asia, probably from India. Such a hypothesis would explain the occurrence of similar peoples in Ceylon, the Malaya Peninsula and the East Indian Archipelago, all of them describable by the comprehensive term pre-Dravidian. The Talgai and the

Wadjak skull remains give definite evidence that the original inhabitants of Australia were of a more primitive type than the present-day Australians. That would mean that the Australoid skulls of Adichanallur No. I of the Bulletin is by no means the most primitive type of Southern India. Possibly he had a predecessor like the Australian, of a race assimilable to the Talgai race. The bulletin is excellently printed and the illustrations are all that could be desired.

'SOME PROBLEMS OF VIJAYANAGARA HISTORY

BY

DR. C. NARAYANA RAO, M.A., L.T., PH.D.

(Reprinted from the Ceded Districts College Magazine.)

In this article the author makes a survey of the recent publications on the Vijayanagara History, with special reference to its origin. He examines Prof. Father Heras' Hoysala theory and takes it to be incorrect. The arguments adduced are not however convincing. The author also discusses the theory whether Vidyaranya was the founder of Vijayanagara, and criticizes the views of Prof. Heras who has rejected the connection of Vidyaranya with the foundation of Vijayanagara.

BEGINNINGS OF VIJAYANAGARA HISTORY

BY

REV. H. HERAS, S.J., M.A.

(Published by the Indian Historical Research Institute, Bombay, 1929).

THIS monograph by the Rev. Father Heras, the author of the *Ara-vidu dynasty of Vijayanagar*, is a valuable addition to the historical studies connected with Vijayanagar kingdom. The book contains the two lectures delivered by Prof. Heras under the auspices of the Mysore University. The titles of the two lectures are 'the Foundation of the city of Vijayanagar' and 'the Origin of the Sangama Dynasty.' The learned author discusses in the first lecture the legends centering around the foundation of the city and incidentally examines the story of Vidyaranya's connection with the foundation

of Vijayanagara. He then makes a critical study of the accounts of both Ferishta and Nuniz, and concludes rightly, as historians of Vijayanagara History have maintained, that the foundation was by the Hoysalas to avert the Musalman invasions at the north of the Empire.

The second lecture turns on the first dynasty of Vijayanagara kings, well known as the Sangama dynasty. Fr. Heras examines the question who was Sangama and who were his ancestors. The purpose of this study is to find a solution as to the Kannada or Telugu origin of the Vijayanagar empire. The author succeeds in reinforcing the theory of Kannada origin.

But his views regarding of the fabrication of the story of Vidyaranya by the ascetics of the Sringeri mutt and incidentally his views regarding the philosophy of these ascetics (pp. 33-35) may not find general acceptance.

LOYAL INDIA

BY

PERCY H. DUMBELL

[Constable & Co., London.]

THIS is a work which attempts to give on the basis of authoritative documents at the India Office, a survey of the British administration during the seventy years from 1858 to 1928. The author, an official of the India Office, who was on the staff of the late Lord Morley as Secretary of State, has selected the documents bearing on the question and has arranged them in a number of chapters under separate headings. His idea in writing this book is 'to proclaim his conviction that here, in a reversion to the councils of that temper (that of Morley) and to the orderly procedure then adopted, is to be found if anywhere, the safe line of advance towards the establishment of a true and lasting commonwealth'. He calls for co-operation between the Indians and the English in this great work, and feels that if he did not do what lay in his power to bring this about, he would not have done his duty by India. In order to set India on her path of progress for the future, he believes what is required is first, a knowledge of the native Indian theory of government in ancient and modern times; then

a series of historical documents of the British Royal House incorporating the rights and liberties of the princes and peoples of India, and then a clear understanding of the existing constitution of India and of the various stages of its growth. He starts with the conviction that the normal Hindu state is a monarchy, notwithstanding the fact that it was not autocratic in character. He says that the European ideal of national government where the whole community has a determining voice is foreign to Hindu modes of thought. Without attempting to controvert him, we may say this is not as foreign as is implied by this definite statement and the difficulties of introducing that kind of a notion is not quite as great as he makes it out to be. It might prove that a mere copy of the Western notions of democracy in practice may not be what would succeed in India. But there could be no doubt that if the Hindu government of India should be understood properly, the democratic principle as an ideal working out in actual practice had never been quite so foreign to the governmental organization of India as a whole. It is hardly necessary to point out that circumstances have a great deal changed and what proved a success in the centuries before the establishment of the Muhammadan empire in India might cease to be of application to the present times in detail. But the principle underlying and guiding governments would still be largely capable of application.

In regard to the other two parts, the work gives the well-known documents—the Royal Charters—first of all, and traces in another part the growth of the British administration by giving *in extenso* the various important documents, which introduced changes in the administration from time to time. Apart from these sections therefore the author has added a chapter on the Services, one chapter on education consisting of an important chapter of the Sadler Committee Report. There are two other valuable chapters, the first relating to Indian policy in respect of Indian States, and the second on the relations between India and the British Empire. Then a chapter is devoted to India and the late War with an appendix containing an appreciation of Lord Morley, printed from the Civil Service opinion. It is an interesting and authoritative work, which deserves well of all serious students of Indian Constitution at this time when a earnest effort is being made to set India on a progressive path towards self-determination.

MUGHAL RULE IN INDIA

BY

THE LATE S. M. EDWARDES, C.S.I., C.V.O.

and

H. L. O. GARRET

(Oxford University Press)

THIS is a handbook of about 370 pages devoted to a study of Mughal rule in India and begins with Babur the Conqueror, who laid the foundations of Mughal power in the country, and carries the history forward down to the decline of the Mughal Empire, or at least to the beginnings of it with the death of Aurangzeb. It may be said to be practically a history of the Great Mughals and does not take into it the decline and fall of the empire. It is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the history of the period under the different reigns, covering more or less 150 pages of the work. The second part is devoted to the general topics, such as the Mughal administration, the economic and social features of the Mughal age, Mughal architecture and the arts, followed in conclusion by a chapter tracing the causes of the decline of the Mughal power. These topics are treated with a brevity and lucidity which makes the work a really valuable book for the use of students of Indian History preparing for the Honours courses and the competitive examinations. It would serve admirably as a reading book for those students, and thus fills the want of a suitable handbook of Indian History for such students for a part of the whole subject. We welcome it as a contribution to this much-desired end.

THE CALIPHS AND THEIR NON-MUSLIM SUBJECTS

BY

PROFESSOR A. S. TRITTON, MUSLIM UNIVERSITY, ALIGARH

(Oxford University Press)

THE Caliphs and their non-Muslim subjects is of considerable importance in general history, and its importance is certainly not less at the present time, when the most engaging topic of the hour is the reformed constitution of the Government of India. As the author

himself explains in a sub-title, the work constitutes a critical examination of what is generally taken to be the covenant of 'Umar, the second Caliph, on the particular topic. Professor Tritton deals with his subject with the perspicacity we have learned to associate with him, and examines, on the most authoritative evidence of Islamic literature, what the covenant of 'Umar is taken to be, whether such a covenant existed, what the law based on the covenant or otherwise, happened to be and how far and in what particular respects practice differed from the pedantic statements of law. As far as we could see, he has dealt with his sources exhaustively, and indicates, that among the authorities, there seems to have been no idea of a covenant of 'Umar during the first century of the Caliphate, and during the second century it begins to come in and about the year 200 of the Hejira it had become a settled notion with Islamic writers. He then examines in detail the most accepted text of the covenant under various heads, such as government services, the position of churches and monasteries, the treatment of churches, etc. He says that there is no uniformity of practice such as would follow if a single document like that of the covenant of 'Umar had held the field, and proved the authority for the successors of the author of the covenant. Practice varied from time to time, and had been considerably modified by the personal character of the Caliphs for the time being. It is a very interesting study and would pay perusal for those who might seriously wish to study the character of what Islamic administration was in the best days of its power.

In Memoriam

SIR RICHARD CARNAC TEMPLE, BT., C.B., C.I.E., F.B.A.,
F.S.A., ETC.

THE death of Sir R. C. Temple on the 3rd of March last removes one of the greatest names in the field of Oriental Research. Temple was born in India in Allahabad on the 15th of October 1850 when his father, Sir Richard Temple, Bart, G.C.S.I., was serving there as a junior member of the service. Educated at Harrow and Trinity Hall, Cambridge, he joined the Royal Scots Fusiliers and arrived in India in 1871 when his father had reached the position of member for Finance of the Governor-General's Council. After a few years he joined the Bengal Staff Corps and served with the 38th Dogras and the 1st Gurkhas. He went on active service in the Second Afghan War, and had the distinction of receiving a medal and being mentioned in despatches. Thereafter he was transferred to civil employ and became a Cantonment Magistrate in the Punjab. When the Third Burmese War broke out in 1885, he was transferred to Burma and occupied various places both military and civil. He served as Assistant Commissioner, Cantonment Magistrate, and Deputy Commissioner in various places in Burma, and became finally the official President of the Rangoon Municipality and Port Commissioner in 1891. In addition to these offices on the civil side he raised and commanded the Upper Burma Volunteer Rifles, the Rangoon Naval Volunteers, the Volunteer Engineers and the Rangoon Port Defence Volunteers. He occupied the position of Honorary Lieut.-Colonel of some of these, his substantial military rank being still that of a Major of the Indian Army. These services earned for him a C.I.E., and secured him the post of the Chief Commissioner of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Superintendent of Port Blair. While still holding this office, he succeeded to the baronetcy on the death of his father in 1902. He retired from service in 1904 and resided for some years in his ancestral home 'the Nash', in Worcestershire, which had been the home of the family for two centuries.

From 1905 onwards he used the freedom from public service to purpose, by editing many works, which required wide culture, vast learning and a high degree of critical acumen, assisted in this work by an able and energetic collaborator in Miss L. M. Anstey, associated with him for thirty-two years. He was a member of most of the learned societies interested in India and the East. He was an Honorary Vice-President of the Royal Asiatic Society, a member of the Royal Geographical Society, the Hakluyt Society, the Royal Anthropological Society, the Bengal Asiatic Society and many other societies in England and elsewhere. He was one of fifty Fellows of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. He was a Fellow of the British Academy and of the British Society of Antiquaries. He was also an Honorary Fellow of his own college, Trinity Hall. He occupied the position of Chairman of the Standing Committee of Baronetage for fifteen years. He presided over the Anthropological Section of the British Association in 1913 when he delivered his presidential address on the Administrative Value of Anthropology. In 1928, he presided over the Jubilee Congress of the Folklore Society when he delivered a presidential address on Mystery and the Mental Atmosphere.

During his life, particularly the latter part of it, he rendered valuable public service in connection with the Territorial Army Association, of which he was Chairman from 1908 to 1921. He was associated with the St. John Ambulance Association, of which he was created Bailiff, Grand Cross, in 1927. During the Great War, he worked as a member of the Joint War Committee of the St. John Ambulance Association, and of the British Red Cross. He was awarded a C.B. for services in connection with these. He was also associated with other philanthropic efforts of which the Homes of Rest for Nurses associated with the name of Edith Cavell and the British Hospital for Mothers and Babies in the building of which he was largely instrumental, deserve mention. He had now reached the proverbial three score and ten, and the work that he had to do began to tell upon him, as his eyesight became seriously affected and other ailments associated with age supervened. He therefore had to divide his time between England and places like Switzerland and the Continent, and latterly he had to try several places on the Continent in turn, such as Montreux, Wiesbaden and Territet. He was in residence in the last pleasant resort close to the Lake of Geneva

where he breathed his last. He was seriously ill last year when he was almost given up, but his native strength asserted itself and he pulled through. He had so far recovered that he resumed work. When he actually died he was not even ill. He died with papers actually in hand quite suddenly, death being caused by a clot on the brain.

During the long span of sixty years of active work since he came to India as a subaltern in 1871, the variety and the volume of work that he did would constitute a big bibliography. He practically began work of a literary character when after the Second Afghan War, he was turned to civil employ. The first of his publications is the *Legend of the Punjab* in three volumes, and much that was written in the Punjab Notes and Queries, to which he contributed largely, and *Wide Awake Stories* in collaboration with Mrs. F. A. Steel connected with Punjab and Kashmir in particular. His interest in the Punjab and Kashmir was sustained for over forty years when in 1924 he published a versified translation of Lalla, the Prophetess, a woman Saiva Ascetic of Kashmir. Apart from the excellence of the translation, and its attractive character in its versified form, he contributed a masterly introduction which gives evidence of his wide interest and vast study. To the period of his employment in Burma belong the *Thirty Seven Nats*, a phase of spirit worship prevailing in Burma. Later on he published, in collaboration with Dr. Burnell, the *Devil Worship of the Tuluvas*. Later still he issued a report on the Census, and memoranda on the forests and the hills of the Andamans and Nicobars. Besides these he published a grammar of the Andamanese and Nicobarese languages and wrote accounts of these islands both for the *Imperial Gazetteer* and the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Since his retirement, he published many volumes for the Hakluyt Society, the Indian Records Series and other series with valuable introductions and annotations. Some of these are *The Countries round the Bay of Bengal* by Tomas Bowrey, a *Journal of Peter Mundy* in four volumes, the *Bowrey Papers*, the first volume alone, the journals of *Streynsham Master*, two volumes, *Drake's World Encompassed*, the *Itinerary of Ludovico Varthema*, the *Tragedy of the Worcester*, and later on a *New Light on the Mysterious Tragedy of the Worcester*. He also contributed in the course of his illness, *The Life of John Olafsson* for the Hakluyt Society in two volumes. He also edited his father's work,

Journals kept in Hyderabad, Kashmir, Sikkim and Nepal in two volumes very early in his career as a literary man. To the later period belong the *Cult of the Peacock Angel* dealing with the heretical sect called Yazidis so late as 1908. Almost at the ebb of his life he found time in the intervals of illness to classify and arrange the voluminous material collected by him on the Muslim sects intended to be his *magnum opus* in five volumes. We had the pleasure of receiving a letter from him expounding the character of the work and sending a syllabus of one of the volumes of the projected publication, which exhibited the comprehensiveness and the systematic analysis of the material that he was able to collect. We note with pleasure that, notwithstanding the expression of diffidence at finding a publisher, that the first volume of this work is actually in type.

Temple's name is known more widely in association with the *Indian Antiquary*. He began to contribute to the *Indian Antiquary* in 1879 while the founder James Burgess, was still editing it. He was a continuous contributor ever since to the columns of the journal and his writings continue and may go on for a considerable length of time yet. When Burgess retired in 1884, the late Dr. J. F. Fleet and Sir Richard Temple took it over from him on their joint responsibility. When Dr. Fleet retired in 1892, Temple became the sole editor and proprietor till in 1924 when, having regard to his age, he formed the Indian Antiquary Limited and got into an agreement with the Royal Anthropological Institute, which assumed the responsibility for the journal from 1st January 1925. Temple's contributions began with volume viii and the current volume is volume lx of the journal. The late Sir Richard Temple was a man of indefatigable industry, who enjoyed his work. His range of knowledge and his intense interest were so wide as to cover almost every branch of Oriental Research. Without claiming to be an expert, he had a vast amount of very good work in the large number of branches constituting oriental research as a whole. He was one of those who insisted on sounder principles of viewing Indian history, life and culture as a whole, the neglect of which principle has been responsible for unfortunate results in certain cases. One special feature of his character which ought to be noted is his readiness to encourage those with talent for this kind of work, and to take a great amount of trouble to put these in the way. His suggestion for the improvement of one of my own articles to the *Indian*

Antiquary was how I came to know him twenty-five years ago, and that acquaintance, without personal knowledge, ripened into what may well be defined as friendship of long years, and during the last eight years, I have been associated with him in the editing of the *Indian Antiquary*. The loss to the *Indian Antiquary* and the loss to Oriental Research alike are great; my own personal loss is not less. He was one of those who was quite ready to tender useful advice in difficulties and showed a sympathy, not met with too often. It would be doing nothing but discharging a duty to offer my sympathies to the bereaved Lady Temple and the family.

EDITOR.

Select Contents of Oriental Journal

Epigraphia Indica

VOL. XIX, PART VII

July, 1928—

- N. LAKSHMINARAYAN RAO, M.A.: 'Jura Prasasti of Krishna III.
N. C. MEHTA, I.C.S.: 'Bhadavana Grant of Govinda Chandra-
deva of Kanuj.'

The Indian Antiquary

January, 1931—

- R. R. HALDER: 'Chitor and its Sieges.'
C. E. A. W. OLDHAM: 'Sidi Ali Shelebi in India, 1554-1556.'
J. C. GHOSH: 'Where was Tarkkari?'

February, 1931—

- Rev. Fr. H. HERAS: 'The Prison of the Emperor Sadasiva Raya.'
SIR GEORGE A. GRIERSON: 'On the modern Indo-Aryan vernacu-
lars.'
Sir R. C. TEMPLE: 'Scraps of Tibeto-Burman Folklore.'

March, 1931—

- R. V. JAHAGIRDAR: 'A note on the Ten Plays of Bhasa: re-
examines the age and the authorship of the plays by the evidence
provided by the number and characteristics of the ślokas or
verses in anuṣṭup metre.
Miss L. D. GREENE: 'Nature study in the Sanskrit drama
"Sakuntala."'
B. BANNERJEA: 'Possible origin of the Caste system in India.'
Three principal hypotheses examined: occupational basis,
somatological basis and Totemic basis of the division with caste.
REV. H. HOSTEN: 'Is S. Thome in civitate Iothabis?'

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London

January, 1931—

- O. G. VON WESENDONK: 'The Kalavāda and the Zervanite
system.'
A. E. ROBINSON: 'The Mahmal of the Moslem Pilgrimage.'

SELECT CONTENTS OF ORIENTAL JOURNALS 83

Rev. Fr. H. HERAS: 'Krishnadevaraya's conquest of Rachol.
Father Heras does not accept the identification of Rachol with
Raichur as explained by Sewell, but would identify it with the
fort of Rachol in Salsette.'

Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik

BAND 8. HEFT I. 1901

- A. VENKATASUBBIAH: 'Devamārga.'
VON FRZ. JOS. MEIER: 'Der Archaismus in der space des
Bhāgavata Purana nūt besonderes Bernicksichtig ungder verbal
flexion examines the archaism in the language of the Bhagavata
Purana in a lengthy contribution with numerous illustrations.'
H. JACOBI: 'Aber das alter des Yogaśāstra, a learned discussion
of the age of Patanjali and Vasubandhu.'
J. C. TAVADIA: 'Pahlavi passages on Fate and Freewill.'

Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal

(Numismatic Number)

VOL. XXV, 1929, No. 2

- H. E. STAPLETON: 'A find of 182 silver coins of kings of the
Husainī and Sūri Dynasties from Raipara, Thāna Dohar, District
Decca, Eastern Bengal.'
K. G. KUNDANGAR: 'Andhra coins in the Lord Irwin Agricul-
tural Museum, Kolhapur.'
V. D. B. TARAPOREVALA: 'Aurangzeb's Rupee of Dārus-sur ūri.
Burhanpūr.'
C. R. SINGHAL: 'Coins of Nasir Shah of Gujarat.'
M. F. C. MASTRI: 'Some Rare Ghaznavid coins.'
S. H. HODIVALA: 'Akbarpūr-Tanda and Akbarpūr.'

Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society

October, 1930—

- S. SOMASUNDRA DESIKAR: 'Identification of Sopatma and
Phrounion of the Greek writers.'
DHYAN CHANDRA: 'Hindus as Pioneers of World Civilization.'

*Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society**October, 1930—*

PROF. G. JOUVEAN DUBREUIL: 'Amaravati, from A.D. 100 to 700.'

R. SUBBA RAO: 'Gautamīputra Satakarni.'

*Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society**September–December, 1930—*

K. P. JAYASWAL: 'Problems of Saka-satavahana History.'

R. C. ROY: 'Aboriginal village organization in India.'

NARAYANA TRIPATHI: 'Two Sulki plates.'

*Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society**December, 1930—*

SIR J. J. MODI: 'Rustam Manock and the Persian Qisseh.'

DR. GANGANATH JHA: 'Kumarila and Vedanta.'

DR. PALHAH: 'On the date of Śakatāyana-Chintamani.'

S. K. BELVALKAR: 'An authentic' but unpublished work of Sankarā Cārya: 'Sankara's commentary on Aitareya Aranyaka II and III.'

K. S. VAKIL: 'Education in Bombay (1804–1929).'

PROF. EZEKIEL: 'The position of women in Rabbinical Literature.'

K. G. KUNDANGAR: 'Development of the Kannada Drama.'

SIR J. C. BOSE: 'Mechanism of Life.'

MRS. NORA GOFFIN: 'European social life in Bombay 1804–1929.'

The Round Table*Summary of articles in the December issue*

'WHERE is Europe going?' This is the first question dealt with in the December issue. The attention of the British Empire has been lately absorbed in the Imperial and Indian Round Table Conferences. People both in Great Britain and elsewhere are, in any case, too full of their domestic woes to pay much attention at the moment to political troubles abroad; but it is evident from the Round Table article that there is room for grave anxiety. Europe, in fact, is at a parting of the ways, and, as the writer puts it, there are two conflicting tendencies, one leading back to the old pre-War balance of power, and the other to international co-operation for peace. The reader will form his own opinion after reading the writer's survey, which covers all the potential storm centres and brings out the hopeful as well as the gloomy side of the picture, as to which tendency is likely to prevail.

The second article, *The United States: the Slump*, makes it clear that other people have their troubles besides ourselves. But, while there are factors which militate against the rapid recovery which the optimists at first looked for, the writer is by no means blind to the hopeful side. A concluding section shows how the hard times are hitting the President, and the party in power, as well as trade.

An *Imperial Conference* usually heads the Round Table contents bill. This time it comes third. But, although, as the writer shows, a great deal of useful work has been done, the main issue with which the article is more particularly concerned, which involved a conflict between the British tradition of free trade and the economic nationalism of the Dominions, the problem of Imperial economic co-operation, has had to be postponed till next year, when there will be another Conference at Ottawa to consider it.

The fourth article is *England in the Great Depression*. The writer explains why the decline in prices hits her worse than other countries. There is, however, it would appear, a hard core to the British problem derived from maladjustment as long ago as 1924, and

represented by the first million of unemployed, which cannot be put down to the world slump. It demands a special explanation and special treatment. Both are suggested.

The fifth article, *India: Conference or Intransigence*, takes us from the hopeful atmosphere of the London Round Table Conference back to the troubled Indian scene, where the largest group, the Congress party, has continued the civil disobedience campaign, hostile to the idea of Conference. Even here, however, there are hopeful signs.

From India we pass to *Russian Realities*, an extraordinarily suggestive picture of life in a provincial Russian town, subject to all the exigencies of the Five Years Plan.

The Crown and the Dominions follows, a penetrating analysis of one of the most interesting sides of the constitutional aspect of the Imperial Conference's task, and it, in turn, is followed by *An Immigrant's Impression* of Canada which possibly throws more light upon the Imperial question than any direct examination of either constitutional or economic problems.

Africa from the South comes next, a timely account, in view of the appointment by Parliament of a Joint Committee to examine the East African question, of the way in which East Africa, indeed tropical African problems generally, are beginning to affect opinion in South Africa.

The Great Britain article brings out the way in which events are reacting upon the different parties, and the usual contributions from Ireland and the Dominions follow. The former, besides other things, describes the attitude of the Irish Free State to M. Briand's idea of a 'United States of Europe', and, among the Dominion articles, the section on public finance from Australia will attract most attention. The issue winds up with an abstract of the official Report of the Imperial Conference.

Summary of Articles in the March issue.

The first article in the March issue of the ROUND TABLE is *India—Constitution of Chaos*. That, since the Round Table Conference, is, the writer points out, the choice before Indians, for the Conference and the leaders of all three British parties are agreed that the maximum possible of responsibility should be transferred to Indian

shoulders. There will, of course, be reservations to cover the period of transition. They are shown to be as necessary in the interest of India as of Great Britain—and it is up to the people of India to agree among themselves upon a workable constitution. That is a condition precedent. But, though the difficulties in their way, which are discussed in detail as well as the various ways of meeting them, are great, the obstacles to Indian progress can no longer be put down to this country.

The second article, *Russian Realities*, is a continuation of the vivid picture of real life under Bolshevik rule given in the December issue. It takes us to a typical Russian village in the grip of the Five Years Plan. One sees, as one reads, the strong as well as the weak points of the agricultural side of that plan, and what the peasant feels about the collective farms. The article certainly makes it easier to understand Bolshevik mentality.

The third article is *The United States in the Great Depression*, an impressive study of the causes of the American slump, especially the part played by the machine, the monster which is fast becoming our master.

China—a Brighter Outlook comes as a relief. The gloom is at all events beginning to lift in one quarter of the globe, and the importance for our trade, if a country with over 400 million inhabitants really settles down after more than a decade of civil war, cannot easily be overestimated. The writer believes that there is ground for tempered optimism.

The next subject is a different one. The recent Prayer-book controversy brought the relations between Church and State in England, national institutions both of them, into the limelight. The fifth article in the ROUND TABLE is on *Church and State in France*, where there is a national State and an international Church with claims to which it is difficult to set a limit. There has been, the writer shows, conflict broken by temporary understandings all through French history—conflict which, at first temporal, as time went on assumed a spiritual, almost a religious, character. The war, in which both bishops and priests earned golden opinions, helped to bring about reconciliation; but there were many other factors which must be realized by anyone who wishes to understand French political life.

The next article is on *The Unrest on the Indian Frontier* last summer. The understanding between the Pathan and the Congress party seemed to be a case of the lion lying down with the lamb, and all sorts of reasons for such an unnatural alliance were suggested, Bolshevik propaganda among others. Causes as well as events are dealt with in this article.

The next article is on the debated question of the recent separation of the posts of Governor-General and High Commissioner in South Africa, and some reasons are given which, in spite of critical letters from ex-Governors-General, suggest that there were good reasons for the change.

Next come the usual articles from Ireland and Great Britain. The strong financial position of the Free State to-day is brought out in the former, and the latter describes Mr. Lloyd George's understanding with Labour, now apparently cemented by the Prime Minister's public acceptance of his national development programme, which, following as it did upon Mr. Snowden's warning about the need for the strictest economy, puzzled the political world. There is also a section on the coal and cotton stoppages.

Among the Dominion contributions the account of the economic difficulties of Australia will probably have pride of place, but there is also an excellent article from South Africa on the question of secession, upon which his party expected General Hertzog to secure a definite pronouncement at the Imperial Conference, and, in view of the character of the Russian Five Years Plan, the section on wheat from Canada has an interest of its own.

OUR EXCHANGES

1. *The Annals of the Bhandarkar Research Institute*, Deccan Gymkhana P.O., Poona.
2. *Bharat Itihasa Samshodaka Mandala*, Poona City.
3. *Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise D'Extreme-Orient*, Hanoi.
4. *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, London University, London, Longmans, Green & Co., London.
5. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, London Institution, Finsbury Circus, London.
6. *Calcutta Review*, 3, Senate House, Calcutta.
7. *Hindustan Review*, Patna Junction, E.I.Ry.
8. *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 96, Amherst St., Calcutta.
9. *Journal Asiatique*, Librairie Orientaliste, Paul Geuthner, Paris.
10. *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Patna.
11. *Journal of Oriental Research*, Managing Editor, 'The Ashrama', Luz, Mylapore.
12. *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Bombay.
13. *Journal of the Kern Institute*, Leiden, Holland.
14. *Journal of the Bombay Historical Society*, Exchange Building, Sprott Road, Bombay.
15. *Muslim Review*, 3, Government Place, Calcutta.
16. *Nagari Pracharini Sabha*, Benares.
17. *The Political Science Quarterly*, Kent Hall, Columbia University, New York.
18. *Quarterly Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society*, Andhra Historical Society, Rajahmundry.
19. *Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society*, Daly Hall, Cenotaph Road, Bangalore.
20. *The Yale Review*, Washington, U.S.A.
21. *Yoga-Mimansa, Kun'javana*, Lonavla, Bombay.
22. *The Modern Review*, 91, Upper Circular Road, Calcutta.
23. *The Vedic Magazine and Gurukula Samachar*, Gurudatta Bhavana, Lahore.

24. *The Ceylon Journal of Science*, Office of the Archaeological Survey, Anuradhapura (Ceylon).
25. *The Historical Studies*, Accession Department, University Library, University of California, Berkeley, California.
26. *The Indian Review*, Esplanade, Madras.
27. *The Servant of India*, Servant of India Society, Poona City.
28. *The Shrine of Wisdom, Aahlu*, 6 Hermon Hill, London, E. 11.
29. *The Telugu Academy Journal*, Cocanada.
30. *The Mysore University Journal*, Mysore University, Mysore.
31. *The People*, 2 Court Street, Post Box 116, Lahore.
32. *The Young Men of India*, The Thottam, Salem.
33. *The Gaekwad's Oriental Series*, Oriental Institute, Baroda.
34. The Superintendent, Government Museum, Madras.
35. *Social Science Abstracts*, 611, Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York City.
36. 'Tarikh' *Kotlah Akbar Jah*, Hyderabad (Deccan).
37. The Superintendent of Archaeology, Gwalior State, Gwalior.
38. Verlag Der Asia Major, Leipzig C1, Scherlstr, 2.
39. *The Indian Literary Review*, D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co., 190, Hornby Road, Fort, Bombay.

DACCA UNIVERSITY SUPPLEMENT

The Arab Invasion of India

By

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Ramna, Dacca

INTRODUCTION

THE Muhammadan conquest of India is one of those epoch-making events which have left a permanent impress on subsequent ages. It may be regarded as the most important episode in the history of India since the Aryan invasion, as it has radically changed the entire aspect of Indian history such as no other event has yet done or is likely to do in future. No apology is therefore needed for an attempt to reconstruct the history of this all-important episode.

At first sight such an attempt may appear superfluous. For, thanks to the historical instinct of the Muhammadans, we possess contemporary or nearly contemporary records of their military expeditions and most of these are now available to general readers. But two considerations have impelled me to undertake the task, and these may be explained at the very outset.

In the first place, these chronicles refer to isolated chapters of that great episode, and, to have a correct perspective view of the whole, it is necessary to link them together in a continuous narrative.

Secondly, all these chronicles represent only one side of the picture. The victors are painted by themselves, and naturally their deeds loom large in these pages. Great caution and circumspection are, therefore, necessary in utilizing the data supplied by them. Besides, no serious student of history should be prepared to accept an one-sided version of the struggle recorded by one of the combatants, and must try to check the narrative by means of accounts given by the other side. The absence of Hindu chronicles has made this wholesome checking

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impossible in the present instance and the evidence of Muhammadan historians, unchecked by other means, has gained currency as history.

The lack of Hindu evidence is, however, not as complete as is generally supposed. The archæological discoveries of the last hundred years have placed at our disposal a number of valuable data which at least help us in checking and correctly interpreting many of the episodes of this tragic drama. Time has, therefore, come for a critical study of the Muhammadan chronicles with the help of such Indian documents as are available to us, and such an attempt is made in the following pages.

The Muhammadan conquest of India may naturally be divided into three phases—according to the sources from which the invasions had proceeded, viz., Arabia, Ghazni and Ghor. It will be convenient to subject each of them to a separate review before we attempt to draw a general picture of the whole.¹ But in order to have an accurate idea of the first phase of the Muhammadan conquest, we must have a clear notion of the western border-land of India on the eve of Muhammadan invasion.

CHAPTER I

THE WESTERN BORDER-LAND OF INDIA ON THE EVE OF THE ARAB INVASION

The spirit of martial energy which the Prophet had infused into the Arabian people produced remarkable results. At the time of the death of the Prophet, in A.D. 632, His sovereignty did not extend beyond the Arabian peninsula. Within six years, Syria and Egypt were subdued by His successors. Northern Africa was conquered between A.D. 647 and 709 and Spain was subjugated by A.D. 713. Within a century of the death of the Prophet, the Muhammadans had advanced to the heart of France when their further progress was checked by the victory of Charles Martel between Tours and Poitiers in A.D. 732.

The Muhammadans attained equally brilliant success in the east. The mighty Persian Empire was laid low at the battle of Cadesia in A.D. 636, and within 8 years the whole of Persia as far east as Herat

¹ This article deals only with the first phase. The second and third phases will be similarly dealt with in future.

was annexed to the growing empire of the Arabs. By A.D. 650 its northern frontier was advanced to the Oxus and all the countries between that river and the Hindu Kush mountains were included in it.¹

These events which were destined to change the face of the world do not seem to have created any great stir in India and the Far East. The Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsang who was proceeding at leisure along the Trans-Hindu Kush regions in A.D. 643 does not refer to any Arab conquest in his note of the political situation of the surrounding country. He writes an account of Persia under the old régime in blissful ignorance of the great catastrophe which had overwhelmed that ancient empire during the last decade. But while nearing the Oxus river he probably heard something of the political cataclysm that had overtaken these regions—for we find him suddenly giving up the old route which he had resolved to follow, and instead of proceeding through Balkh and Samarkhand he took an easterly route *via* Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan.²

But although Hiuen Tsang had not probably heard of the Arab Empire, he has left a very interesting account of the countries bordering upon it in the east. Various speculations have been made by scholars regarding the political condition of these countries and the races to which their people belonged at this time, but we cannot probably have a better guide in this respect than the Chinese pilgrim who passed through those countries.

It appears from the accounts left by Hiuen Tsang that the western border-land of India was dominated at that time by three powerful Hindu kingdoms,—the kingdom of Kāpiśi in the north, that of Sindhu or Sind in the south, and the kingdom of Tsao-Kuta or Tsao-li between the two.

¹ Cf. *Muir-Caliphate*, Chapters 1-51, for details.

² On the eve of Hiuen Tsang's departure from India Harshavardhana addressed him as follows:—

'I know not by what route you propose to return. If you select the southern sea-route then I will send official attendants to accompany you.'

The pilgrim replied that the king of Kau-Chang whom he visited on his way to India had prayed him to visit him on his return journey. He then continued 'My heart is unable to forego this duty; I will therefore return by the northern Road'. (*Beal-Life of Hiuen Tsang*, p. 188). This naturally leads to the inference that there must have been some special reasons which ultimately induced Hiuen Tsang to give up the old route which passed *via* Kau-Chang.

I. The kingdom of Kāpiśī lay to the east of Bamian. According to Hiuen Tsang the king of this country, who was a Kshatriya by caste, ruled over ten neighbouring countries. Among these the pilgrim specifically refers to four states, viz., Lan-po (Lamghan), Na-ka-lo-ho (Jalalabad), Gāndhāra (Peshwar) and Fa-la-na (Bannu) as directly under the king of Kāpiśī. The question now arises as to the other five countries which were subject to Kāpiśī, for the Chinese pilgrim clearly refers to ten states, apparently including Kāpiśī, over which the power of the king of that country extended. It is only natural to suppose that the countries adjacent to Kāpiśī and which are not specifically referred to as subject to any other kingdom, were possibly included within this category. Following, apparently, this line of argument, Cunningham¹ reckons 'the whole of Afghanistan, from Bamian and Kandahar on the west to Bolan pass on the south, in which Hiuen Tsang places ten separate states or districts, as subject to Kāpiśī.

It is not necessary for our present purpose to discuss the merits of Cunningham's theory or to enter into the vexed question of the identification of these ten states. It is sufficient to note here that according to the description left by Hiuen Tsang, Kāpiśī must be regarded as a very powerful state. As regards the extent of this kingdom, we can only have an approximate idea from the location of the four states specifically referred to as subject to Kāpiśī.

The following details, gathered from Watters' translation of Hiuen Tsang's account, with notes, may be taken as the basis of our discussion.

The pilgrim left Bamian, and then 'going east from this, entered the snow mountains, crossed a black range and reached Kapishih'.² This country was above 4000 li in circuit. Hiuen Tsang, before proceeding further in his narrative of journey, gives a long account of India. This indicates, as Watters so justly remarks, that 'our pilgrim has now reached the territory which he, like others, before and after him, calls India'.³

'From Kapis the pilgrim continued his journey, going east above 600 li through a very mountainous region; then crossing a black range

¹ Cunningham—*Ancient Geography*, pp. 19-20.

² Watters, vol. i, p. 122.

³ *Ibid*, p. 180.

he entered the north of India and arrived in the Lan-po (Lampa) country.'

'Lan-po is supposed to represent the old Sanskrit Lampāka and the district has been identified with the modern Laghman.' This country was above 1,000 li in circuit and had recently become a dependency of Kāpiśī.¹

'The pilgrim proceeded from Lampa south-east, above 100 li, crossing a high mountain and a large river, and reached the Na-Kie (Ka)-lo-ho country.' The life of Hiuen Tsang represents him as going south instead of south-east.

'Na-ka-lo-ho had no king but was a province of Kāpiśī. It was above 600 li from east to west and 250 or 260 li from north to south.'

It is generally agreed that this country is represented by the modern district called Nungnehar and thus included the present district of Jalalabad, the valley of the Kabul river from Darunta on the west to Mirza Kheyl on the east, and according to Mr. Simpson, 'it might reach from about Jugduluck to the Khyber'.²

The pilgrim next proceeded south-east to Kan-to-lo (Gāndhāra country). 'This country was above 1,000 li from east to west and above 800 li north to south reaching on the east to the Sin-tu (Sindhu) river. The capital was Pu-lu-sha-pu-lo (Purushapura=Peshawar) and the country was subject to Kapis'.³

Now from what has been said above, it is quite clear that the kingdom of Kāpiśī, together with its subject states, extended from the frontiers of Bamian on the west to the river Indus on the east. Considering the fact that the two states Kāpiśī and Lan-po have to be placed between Bamian and Jalalabad we must regard the whole of the Kabul valley as comprised within the jurisdiction of Kāpiśī. As the kingdom of Kāpiśī itself was four thousand li in circuit, evidently the whole of Kafiristan also must have been included in it.

To the south of Gāndhāra lay Fa-la-na. According to Hiuen Tsang the country was over 4,000 li in circuit and was subject to Kāpiśī.⁴

¹ Watters, pp. 180-1. Kāpiśī is the correct form though Watters and other writers render it in various other ways (e.g. kapis, kapishik, etc.).

² Watters, pp. 182-5.

³ *Ibid*, pp. 198-9.

⁴ *Ibid*, vol. ii, p. 262.

There is no doubt that Fa-la-na corresponds to Varnnu, the name of a country in Pāṇini, and it has to be identified with the mountainous regions to the west of the Indus round the present Bannu district.¹

Thus the kingdom of Kāpiśi extended, roughly speaking, from Hindu Kush mountains to the Bannu district, and included the famous cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Peshawar.

It may be urged against this view that Cunningham has identified the kingdom called by Hiuen Tsang Fu-li-shih-sa-t'ang-na with the Kabul district.² Apart from the fact that this identification has not been accepted by others, there are insuperable objections to it. Without going into a detailed examination of the question, it will suffice here to state that between Fan-yen-na and Na-ko-lo-ho of Hiuen Tsang, which all authorities agree in identifying respectively with the Bamian and the Jalalabad district, the pilgrim locates two kingdoms, Kāpiśi and Lan-po, the former above 4,000 li (800 miles) and the latter above 1,000 li (200 miles) in circuit. It is, therefore, impossible to identify the Fu-li-shih-sa-t'ang-na, which was 2000 li (400 miles) from east to west, and 1,000 li (200 miles) from north to south with the Kabul district.

There is an indirect evidence to show that Kabul was included in Kāpiśi. The Chinese traveller Ou-Kóng who visited Afghanistan in A.D. 753 states that the eastern capital of Ki-pin was in Gāndhāra.³ As Watters has pointed out, the Kāpiśi of Hiuen Tsang denotes the same country as Ki-pin,⁴ and the inclusion of Gāndhāra in Kipin corroborates this view. Now Ou-Kóng says that the reigning king of Gāndhāra, and therefore of Ki-pin, was a descendant of Kanishka.⁵ On the other hand Alberuni refers to the Shāhiya rulers of Kabul as descendants of Kanishka.⁶ It is therefore reasonable to hold that the kingdom of Kāpiśi or Ki-pin denotes the Shāhiya territory and included Kabul.

¹ Watters, pp. 262-3; Stein—*Report of Arch. Survey* in N. W. F. Province, Peshawar, 1905, p. 5. Mr. S. N. Majumdar's note on p. 679 of his edition of Cunningham's *Ancient Geography*.

² Watters, vol. ii, p. 267.

³ *Journal Asiatique*, 1895, p. 349.

⁴ Watters, vol. i, p. 123. The same view is expressed by Cordier (*La Chine*, vol. i, p. 24) and Sten Konow (*Ep. Indica*, vol. xiv, p. 292).

⁵ *Journal Asiatique*, 1895, p. 356.

⁶ Sachau—*Alberuni*, Ch. XLIX, vol. ii, p. 13.

Assuming the identity of Ki-pin and Kāpiśi, which seems to rest on quite satisfactory grounds, it is interesting to note the close alliance between this kingdom and the Chinese court. During the period between 619 and 750 no less than six embassies were sent from Ki-pin to China.¹ The Chinese historians sometimes even regard Ki-pin as a vassal state of the Chinese empire,² but this need not indicate anything more than an alliance between two states of unequal power. This alliance was apparently sought as a protection against the menace of Arab conquest. It is also interesting to note that the fear of Arab invasion forced the kingdom of Udyāna to come under the protection of Ki-pin and this incorporation took place before 745 A.D., when the king of Ki-pin took the title of king of Ki-pin and Udyāna.³ Udyāna comprised the present districts of Swāt, Panjkora, Bijāwar, and Bunir.⁴ With this addition Ki-pin or Kāpiśi, or the Shāhiya kingdom of Kabul, as we may call it on the authority of later texts comprised the whole of the trans-Indus districts, to the south of Hindu Kush mountains, Chitral and Gilgit.

II. The kingdom of Sind adjoined Bannu, the southern-most part of the territories of the king of Kāpiśi. It comprised at least four states, viz., Sind proper, A-tien-po-chih-lo, Pi-to-shih-lo and A-fan-tu. It is difficult to locate definitely any of these states, but the four together certainly comprised the entire valley of the lower Indus to the south of the point where that river is joined by its five tributaries, its northern boundary being formed by the kingdoms of Multan on the left and Bannu on the right side of the Indus.

Immediately to the west of Sindhu lay the kingdom of Lang-kie-lo which roughly corresponded to modern Makrán and Kirmán. According to Hiuen Tsang, it was subject to the kingdom of Persia which lay immediately to the west. The town of Ho-mo, identified with Ormuz, was on the border of the two countries.

To the north of Lang-kie-lo, and west of Bannu lay the kingdom of Ki-kiang-na (Kekkāna) (corresponding to Kíkánán or Al-Kíkán of Arabic history). It had no chief ruler but was divided among a number of independent clans.

¹ *Journal Asiatique*, 1895, p. 376.

² *Ibid*; also Cordier—*La Chine*, vol. i, p. 454.

³ *Journal Asiatique*, 1895, p. 348 f. n. 3.

⁴ Watters, vol. i, p. 226.

As we shall see later on, according to Chach-nāma, Multan, Lang-kie-lo and Ki-kiang-na were all dependencies of Sind. Hiuen Tsang does not seem to have personally visited Sind and hence his information was not very accurate. We must remember also that according to Chach-nāma sometimes these outlying provinces declared independence, as for example shortly after the accession of Chach in A.D. 622. Hiuen Tsang's account may refer to such a period. But the categorical and detailed statements in Chach-nāma, would certainly entitle us to include all these territories in Sind.

III. Beyond the territories mentioned above, and between the kingdoms of Sind on the south, Fa-la-na (Bannu) and Ki-kiang-na (Kekkāna) on the east and south-east, and Kāpiśi with its tributaries on the north, Hiuen Tsang locates a vast kingdom called Tsao-ku-ta or Tsao-li. This may be identified with the country which is referred to by Arab geographers as Zabul or Zabulistan, and comprised the upper valley of the Helmund river, and a large extent of territory both to the east as well as to the west of it. Numismatic evidence shows that some powerful rulers flourished in this region in the seventh century A.D. They used the old title Shāhi, and one of them, Shāhi Tigin, calls himself lord of 'India and Persia' or more properly of 'Takan and Khurāsān'. Another, Śrī Vasudeva, calls himself king of Zaulistan and Multan. The coins of these two kings contain legends both in Indian and Pahlavi characters, and from a comparison with the coins of Khusru Parvez of Persia, Shāhi Tigin may be placed at the beginning and Vasudeva in the middle of the seventh century A.D. Coins of several other kings, some of them containing the word Zaulistan, have been found in the Indus valley, and although it is not possible to construct a detailed history, there is hardly any doubt that a separate kingdom flourished there with a long line of powerful kings. The province of Khurāsān formed a bone of contention between this kingdom and Persia, and it formed something like a buffer state between Indian dominions proper and the Persian empire.¹ Hiuen Tsang also describes the kingdom as above 7000 li in circuit.

¹ I am indebted to Dr. H. C. Roy Chaudhury for the suggestion that Tsao-Kuta may be the same as Zabulistan. The variant form Tsao-li may be easily taken as equivalent to Zauli. For Tsao-Ku-ta or Tsao-li cf. Watters, vol. ii, p. 265. For a detailed account of the coins, cf. Cunningham—'Coins of the Indo-Scythians.'

For a detailed geographical account of Zabulistan, cf. Chap. III, f.n. 9.

Hiuen Tsang has fortunately left us some account of the races of people that inhabited these kingdoms and their culture.

The king of Kāpiśi was an Indian, Kshatriya by caste, but the language and literature of the people bore affinity to those of the Turks. Their culture and civilization were not of a very high order though both Buddhism and Brahmanism flourished.¹ Lamghan, Udyāna, Na-ko-lo-ho, Gāndhāra and Bannu were mainly Indian in language, literature and religion.² The language of Tsao-ku-ta or Tsao-li seems to have been somewhat different and the religion of the people was a mixture of animism, Buddhism and Brahmanism.³

The kingdom of Sind and its three dependencies were Indian in language and culture, and very nearly the same was true of Lang-kie-lo which bordered on Persia. The pilgrim says about this country 'The letters are much the same as those of India: their language is a little different . . . There are some hundred saṅghārāmas . . . (and) several hundred Deva temples'.⁴

In the biography of Hiuen Tsang also we are told 'From this (Lang-kie-lo), going north-west we come to the country of Po-la-see which is not within the boundaries of India'.⁵ This also implies that in the opinion of the pilgrim, Lang-kie-lo was included within the boundaries of India.

Judged by the test of language and culture, the western boundary of India, as described by Hiuen Tsang, may thus be roughly delineated by an imaginary line drawn from Kandahar to Kabul and then extended north-east right up to the Hindu Kush, and south-west along the boundaries of Baluchistan to the sea-coast. That part of the hilly country in the north which lies between this line and the Hindu Kush mountains was still politically a part of India being ruled with other Indian states by an Indian chief who originally dwelt at Ohind on the Indus. But the population had a strong admixture of Turkish element, due no doubt to the invasions of the Śakas, Kushānas and Hūnas. The chief who ruled over Kāpiśi in the time

¹ Watters, vol. i, p. 123.

² Hiuen Tsang treats them definitely as belonging to India and does not refer to any difference in language.

³ Watters, vol. ii, p. 264.

⁴ Beal, vol. ii, p. 277.

⁵ Beal—*Life of Hiuen Tsang*, 150.

of Hiuen Tsang was traditionally believed to be descended from the Kushānas, and if this is true, the fact that Hiuen Tsang refers to him as Kshatriya furnishes a striking evidence of the absorption of the foreign elements in the Hindu society.

Thus the natural boundary of India to the north-west, viz. the Hindu Kush mountains still remained the political and cultural boundary although an Indianized Turkish element was introduced therein by the Śakas, Hūnas and the Kushānas. In the south-west also, the territory corresponding to modern Baluchistan which, as we have seen above, formed politically a part of India, was Indian in language and culture.¹

As to the general character of the hilly tribes in the border-land of civilized areas things have not probably changed much since Hiuen Tsang's day except that they now profess Islamic faith instead of Buddhism. The following description of Hiuen Tsang about the people on the western border of Sind might perhaps be applied to many other groups of people in the same region.

'Among the low marshes near the Sin-tu (Indus) for above 1,000 li were settled some myriads of families of ferocious disposition who made the taking of life their occupation, and supported themselves by rearing cattle; they had no social distinctions and no government; they shaved off their hair and wore the Bhikkhu garb, looking like Bhikkhus yet living in the world; they were bigoted in their narrow views and reviled the "Great Vehicle". According to local accounts the ancestors of this people were originally cruel and wicked, and were converted by a compassionate *arhat* who received them into the Buddhist communion; they therefore ceased to take life, shaved their heads and assumed the dress of Buddhist mendicants; in the course of time, however, the descendants of these men had gone back to their old ways but they still remained outwardly Bhikshus.'²

Thus, about the time of the rise of Islamic power, three kingdoms which may be roughly described as Kabul (Kāpīsi), Zabul, and Sind formed the western boundary of India, which extended up to Makrán and Khurásán. This view about the western border-land of India is also confirmed by early Muhammadan writers. Thus Al-Mas'ūdī

¹ This conclusion is corroborated by Balādhuri as will appear in the course of our narrative.

² Watters—vol. ii, pp. 252-253.

(A.D. 10th cent.) refers to Kandahar as part of Sind¹ while Al-Balādhuri refers to Kish, which is to the south-west of Kandahar, as belonging to the land of al-Hind.² Al-Mas'ūdī further says that India extends on the side of the mountains to Khurásán.³ Thus both these writers regard the region round Kabul and Kandahar as part of India. 'In a map of the 10th century A.D. given in the "Kitābu-l Masālik wa-l Mamālik" of Ibn Haukal the Hirmand is styled "the river of Hind and Sind".' It also states that Kabul is a Province of Hind.⁴

Alberuni refers to the boundaries of India in the following lines: 'In the western frontier mountains of India there live various tribes of the Afghans, and extend up to the neighbourhood of the Sindh Valley. . . The coast of India begins with Tiz, the capital of Makrán. . .'⁵ In his account of the towns of India, Alberuni includes both Kabul and Ghazna.⁶ The Arab Geographers generally refer to Kandahar as belonging to India or on the Indian frontier.⁷

CHAPTER II

SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EARLY ARAB RAIDS

In spite of the abundance of historical texts regarding the early history of Islam, authentic references to early Muhammadan raids on India are surprisingly few. The only historical work which professes to give a connected account of the various expeditions is that of Al-Balādhuri.⁸ It chronicles the main incidents without always giving

¹ Elliot—History of India, vol. i, p. 22. ² vol. ii, p. 143. ³ vol. i, p. 20.

⁴ Raverty—Notes on Afghanistan, p. 64.

⁵ Chap. XVIII, vol. i, p. 208.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁷ Le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, p. 347.

⁸ The full title of the book is 'Kitāb Futūḥ al-Bulḍān' and the full name of the author is 'Ahmad ibn Yahya ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.' A critical account of the author is given in the Introduction to the first volume of the English translation of the work by Dr. Philip Khuri Hitti (Columbia University, 1916). The Indian conquests are narrated in the second volume of English Translation by Dr. Francis Clark Murgotten. Elliot translated extracts from this work and gave some account of previous notices of it in his *History of India* (1867) vol. i, p. 113 ff. I have followed Murgotten's Translation. All references to Balādhuri should be understood to refer to this book. Mr. Fida Ali Khan, Head of the Department of Persian in the Dacca University, kindly revised this English translation and suggested some changes which I have incorporated.

precise dates or details, but the approximate dates of most of them can be ascertained from the context.

The other original historical texts can merely be used for supplementing or checking Al-Baládhuri's account. Among these may be mentioned At-Tabari and Khulasat-ul-Akbar. The former has been utilized by Weil in his 'Geschichte des Chalifen (Mannheim 1846-50)' and all relevant passages from the latter have been quoted by Major David Price in his valuable work 'Chronological retrospect (or Memoirs of the Principal events of Muhammadan history from the death of the Arabian legislator to the accession of the Emperor Akbar' published in 1811.¹

In addition to these there are various other modern works² on the early history of Islam, but they hardly contain any new information about the Muhammadan raids on India. This evidently shows that not much of historical importance regarding this episode has been discovered among the many Arabic and Persian works that have since come to light. For the history of the Muhammadan conquest of Sind, however, we possess a detailed account in Chach-náma.³ This is a Persian translation of an old Arabic history of the conquest of Sind by the Arabs. The Persian translation was made about A.D. 1216 by Ali Kúfí, who got the original Arabic manuscript from the Kazi of Alor, a member of the same Sakifí tribe to which belonged

¹ In addition to the three original texts named above, stray references occur in other original historical texts of later date, such as e.g. *Tarikh-i-Guzidá*. The conquest of Sind is, of course, referred to in many later works.

² The following books deserve special notice :—

1. J. Welhausen ... *Das Arabische Reich. Und sein Sturz* (Berlin, 1902).
2. G. Van Vloten ... *Recherches Sur la domination. Arabe* (Amsterdam, 1894).
3. A. Müller ... *Der Islam im Morgen und Abendland.* (2 vols.) Berlin, 1885.
4. Sedillot ... *Histoires des Arabes.* (2 vols.) 2nd Edition, Paris, 1877.
5. Muir ... *Annals of the Early Caliphate, from original sources.* (Smith and Elder 1883).
6. Elliot ... *The History of India.* (Vols. I, II.)

³ I have used the English translation of the work by Mirza Kalichbeg Fredunbeg (Karachi, 1900)—but the important passages quoted in this paper have been carefully compared with the original text (with the help of the copy of the Manuscript in the possession of the Asiatic Society of Bengal) by my friend Dr. Muhammad Sahidulla.

the famous Muhammad ibn Kásim, the conqueror of Sind. This circumstance no doubt explains the fact as stated by the Kazi, 'that an account of this conquest (of Sind) had been written in the Arabic language by his ancestors in a manuscript which had been handed down as a heritage from one to another to his time'.

Although there is no means to determine the time when the original Arabic history was written, its importance as the earliest detailed account of the kingdom of Sind and its conquest by the Arabs cannot be over-estimated. Leaving aside the usual parables, maxims, verses and romantic stories, the book contains a kernel of historical facts which are substantially corroborated by more authentic historical texts such as those of Al-Baládhuri. The data supplied by it must, no doubt, be accepted with great caution, but they may be used as auxiliary evidence, specially when they are not inherently improbable in themselves nor contradictory to known historical facts.

The Arab conquest of Sind is also described in some detail in two later works viz., (1) *Tárikhu-s Sind* by Mir Muhammad M'asúm (also called *Tárikh-i M'asúmi*) composed in A.D. 1600¹ and (2) *Tuhfatu-l Kirá'm* by Alí Sher Káni which was completed in A.D. 1767-8 or a few years later.²

Both these works merely give a summary of Chach-náma in describing the Arab conquest of Sind. But on some important dates and details they give a different version from the existing text of Chach-náma. It will be shown later that some of these dates are more reliable than those found in the present text of Chach-náma which are obviously wrong.

CHAPTER III

RAIDS AGAINST KÁBUL AND ZÁBULISTÁN

The first shock of Muhammadan invasions was equally felt by the three great border kingdoms of Kábul, Zábul and Sind. For the sake of clear understanding we shall discuss the topic under two heads: (1) Raids against Kábul and Zábulistán, and (2) Expeditions against Sind.

The incidents in connection with the first are mainly to be gathered from the accounts of Al-Baládhuri occasionally supplemented by other

¹ Elliot—i, pp. 212 ff.

² Elliot—i, pp. 327 ff.

sources. The following bald summary of events may be offered as the result of a careful perusal of all available authorities.

In the year A.H. 28 or 29 (A.D. 649-50) 'Abdalláh ibn 'Ámir¹ a young enterprising military chief was appointed governor of Al-Basrah by the Caliph Uthman. 'Abdalláh made some conquest in the land of Fars (a province in the south-east of Persia), raided Khurásán and advanced up to the Oxus. (pp 159 ff).² While proceeding from Fars to Khurásán, in the year 30, he deputed one of his lieutenants ar-Rabí on to Sijistán (p. 141). Ar-Rabí made various conquests in the neighbourhood of Zarah Lake and ultimately besieged Zaranj which capitulated on terms. Ar-Rabí remained at Zaranj (p. 143) for two years and was then succeeded by 'Abd-ar-Rahmán ibn-Samurah as the governor of Sijistán. The new governor is said to have established his rule over every thing between 'Zaranj and Kishsh of the land of al-Hind, and over that part of the region of the road of ar-Rukkhaj which is between it and the province of ad-Dáwar' (p. 143).

This is the first mention of India in the narrative of Muslim conquests as given by al-Baládhuri and as such the passage requires careful scrutiny. It is apparent, as already noted above, that Kishsh was regarded as the first city on the frontier of India by the writer of the passage.

Fortunately, the topography of the locality is fairly well-known and the identification of the places mentioned is not a difficult task. Le Strange has made a critical geographical study of these in the Lands of Eastern Caliphate³ and his conclusions, so far as they relate to the subject under discussion, may be summed up below.

'The broad valley, down which the Helmund flows from the mountains of Hindu Kush to Bust, still bears the name, Zamín-Dáwar, the Persian form, of which the Arabic equivalent is "*Ard-ad-Dawar*" "the Land of the Gates".⁴

'Half-way along the remaining course of the Helmund, from *Bust* to *Zaranj*, stands the town of Rúdbár, the *Ar-Rúdhbár* of Baládhuri;

¹ I have not thought it necessary to repeat the long titles of the Arab chiefs as given by Baládhuri, but have merely given the first part.

² The page references within brackets are to Murgotten's translation of Baládhuri, vol. ii.

³ Le Strange—*The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, Cambridge, 1905.

⁴ p. 345.

and near this Ar-Rúdhbár was *Kishsh* which appears to be the place called Káj, or Kuhich, at the present day.¹

'The *Rukkhaj district*, occupying the country round about Kandahar, lay to the eastward of Bust along the banks of the streams now known as the Tarnak and the Argandáb.²

Thus the Arabian force advanced towards India along the Helmund river and came into conflict with the Indians near modern Rúdbár on the frontier between modern Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Their first triumphal career led them as far as Bust. Three marches above Bust lay the mountain of Az-zur containing a temple. Ibn-Samurah, says al-Baládhuri, went into the temple of the Zur (apparently Surya=Sun) an idol of gold with two rubies for eyes, and cut off a hand and took out the rubies. But the gold and jewels were returned by him, saying to the astonished governor of the place: 'I only wanted to show you, that it had no power to harm or help (p. 144).' But the progress of Islamic forces seems to have stopped here, apparently due to disturbances in the head-quarter during the Caliphate of Uthman. An amicable agreement was entered into with Bust and Zábulistán, but its terms are not specified (p. 144). 'Abd-ar-Rahmán ibn-Samurah then retired to Zaranj. He had shortly to leave Sijistán placing it in charge of Umair, but the people of Zaranj, expelled Umair, and closed the town (p. 144). Thus the Muslims lost almost all that they had gained.

When the next Caliph 'Ali had consolidated his position, he made renewed efforts to re-establish the power of Islam in Sijistán, and succeeded in recapturing Zaranj (p. 145). When Mu-áwiyah became Caliph 'Abd-ar-Rahmán ibn-Samurah was appointed as the governor of Sijistán and with this began a fresh triumphal career of the Islamic forces.

'Abd-ar-Rahmán raided the country, whose people had apostatized, and subdued it either by force, or by making treaties with its people, advancing as far as Kábul. This city was ably defended, and the Arabs laid siege to it. After a few months a breach was made in the city wall by means of stones thrown by *manjaniks*. Then the Arabs attacked the city at night, but though they fought the whole night, they could not overcome the defence. At day-break, the defenders

¹ p. 344.

² p. 346.

made a brave sortie. Unfortunately an elephant that was killed at the battle fell just at the gate from which they issued, so that they could not close it and the Muslims entered the city by force. A treaty was concluded—on what terms we do not know—but it was shortly broken and Kábul had to be conquered a second time (pp. 146–47).¹

From Kábul the conqueror proceeded against Zábulistán.² By this term, the Arabs meant particularly the country around Ghazni though

¹ Raverty gives a somewhat different account of this conquest of Kábul on p. 62 of '*Notes on Afghanistan and part of Baluchistan*'. He writes:

In 43 A.H. (A.D. 663–64), the Arabs invaded the territory of Kábul, under 'Abd-ur-Rahmán, son of Sumrah, who was the lieutenant of Abd-ullah, son of Amír, governor of Khurásán. He marched from Sijistán after capturing the capital of that country. Kábul Sháh, at that period, was known by the title or name of Arij; but this appears to be an Arabic word, and signifies lameness from birth. He moved out, with his forces to meet the Musalmán invaders, and after a severe battle, retired within the walls of Kábul, and did not sally out again. Abd-ur-Rahmán continued before it for a full year, after which, his army having suffered great hardship and fatigues, the place was taken. The fighting men were put to the sword, and the women and children were made captives. The Kábul Sháh was also taken, and his head was ordered to be struck off, but he was spared on his agreeing to become a convert to Islám. He was then received into favour, a tribute was fixed, and the Musalmáns retired'.

Raverty does not indicate his source of information about this detailed campaign, but it is evidently based on *Turjuma-i-futuhát* of Ahmad bin Asmi Kufi, quoted by Dowson (Elliot, vol. ii, p. 414 f. n. 1). It is not certain whether the account refers to the first or the second conquest of Kábul. The latter seems more probable.

In connection with the Muslim conquest of Kábul, Baládhuri makes a very interesting statement which deserves more than a passing notice—'Abd-ur-Rahmán', says he, 'took with him to al-Basrah, slaves captured at Kábul, and they built him a mosque in his castle there after the Kábul style of building' (p. 147). The fact that one of the earliest mosques to be built at an important centre of Islam was modelled after Kabuli style of building, is full of importance for the history of the origin of Saracenic style. But this topic being only of secondary importance in the present discussion, cannot be treated any further here.

² Both Elliot and Raverty, and following them, other scholars, have accepted the view that both Kábul and Zábul denoted one and the same kingdom under Ratbil. This erroneous conception has confused their entire account of the Muhammadan raids in Sijistán and Kábul. A careful perusal of Baládhuri leaves no doubt that Zábulistán was clearly distinguished from Kábul. Thus, describing the victories of 'Abd-ur-Rahmán, he mentions separately the conquest of Kábul and Zábulistán (p. 147). Then describing the subsequent discomfiture of the Muslim army, the same author says: 'Then Kábul Sháh assembled a force to oppose the Muslims and drove out all of them that were in Kábul. And Ratbil came and gained control of Dhábulistán (or Zábulistán) and ar-Rukhkhaj as far as Bust'. (p. 147). Again, Baládhuri clearly distinguishes the two when he says that Ratbil sent to him ('Ubaidallah) asking for peace for his own country and the land of Kábul (p. 148). Again, it is said with reference to al-Mamun that he

it was applied vaguely to denote the whole of the great mountainous district of the upper waters of the Helmund and the Kandahar rivers. As already noted before, 'Abd-ur-Rahmán, during the first period of his governorship, had entered into an agreement with this country. But the inhabitants had broken it and now attacked the Arabs. They were, however, defeated (p. 147).

'Abd-ur-Rahmán was superseded by ar-Rabí ibn-Ziyád, and died in the year 50 A.H. (A.D. 670).

The removal of 'Abd-ur-Rahmán emboldened the chiefs of Kabul and Zabulistan to throw off the Muslim yoke. The king of Kabul 'drove out all the Muslims from Kábul'¹, and Ratbil² (apparently a title of the kings of Zábulistán, by which they are referred to in Arab History) came and gained control of Zábulistán and ár-Rukhkhaj as far as Bust. 'Ar-Rabí, the Arab governor, attacked him at Bust, put him to flight, and pursued him until he reached ar-Rukhkhaj. After attacking him in ar-Rukhkhaj, ar-Rabí continued to advance and subdued the city of ad-Dáwar.' Ubaidallah who succeeded 'Ar-Rabí as governor of Sijistán continued the campaign and reached Razan

collected double the tribute from Ratbil, but he subdued Kábul whose king promised obedience.'

No reasonable doubt can thus be entertained that the two formed separate kingdoms. They often formed an alliance against their common foe, the Muslims, and this no doubt explains their long resistance to the powerful arms of Islam. It may be noted here that Raverty admits that Kabul and Zabul are distinct places and should not be confused with each other (*Notes on Afghanistan*, p. 61).

As to the geographical position of Zabulistan we can have no better guide than Le Strange whose conclusion is based upon accounts of early Muslim writers. According to him 'The highlands of the Kandahar country, along the upper waters of the Helmund, were known as Zabulistan' (p. 334). Le Strange further remarks:

'As we have seen, the whole of the great mountainous district of the upper waters of the Helmund and the Kandahar rivers was known to the Arabs as Zábulistán, a term of vague application, but one which more particularly denoted the country round Ghaznah. On the other hand, Kábulistán was the Kábul country, lying more to the north on the frontiers of Bamiyan' (p. 349).

¹ Mr. Fida Ali Khan translates the passage: 'sallied forth with all those [i.e. all his available army] from Kabul.'

² The name Ratbil has numerous variants. Elliot observes: 'Nevertheless there is no certainty as to the proper mode of spelling the name. The various readings of the European authors who have noticed him, show how little the orthography is settled. Ockley calls him 'Zentil'; Weil, 'Zenbil'; Reinaud, 'Ratbyl' and 'Zenbyl'. Wilson, 'Rateil, Ratpeil, Ratbul, Rantal, Zantil—variations easily accounted for by the nature of the Persian letters'. E. Thomas, 'Ratpíl', Price, 'Reteil', 'Ratteil', or 'Ratpeil'. (Vol. II, p. 417.)

when Ratbil concluded with him a treaty of peace for his own country and the land of Kábul. As regards the terms we are simply told that the peace was established on the payment of 1 million *dirhams*.¹

But the peace was short-lived. Towards the end of the reign of Caliph Yezid (64 A.H. = A.D. 683) Kábul revolted once more and imprisoned Abu-'Ubaidah ibn-Ziyád. Yazíd ibn-Ziyád, the governor of Sijistán, proceeded against Kábul and a great battle took place at Junzah. But the Muslim army was completely routed. The governor himself and some distinguished members of the aristocracy lay dead on the field and the rest fled. Abu-'Ubaidah had to be ransomed for 500,000 dirhams.

Ratbil fomented and aided rebellions in the Arab domain of Sijistán where the people expelled the Arab governor. 'Ratbil soon declared war against the Arabs' and apparently proceeded nearly as far as Zarah lake, for we are told that the new governor 'was compelled to stop in the city of Zaranj.' But Ratbil was killed and his soldiers were put to rout (A.D. 685).²

¹ Baládhurí (p. 210) refers to a border raid in 44 A.H. by Al-Muhallab in course of which he passed through Bannah and Al-Ahwar, towns between Multan and Kábul, and reached al-Kikán. Bannah seems to be the same as Bannu and Al-Ahwar was probably a neighbouring town. As regards the result of the raid, Baládhurí simply says that 'the enemy met and attacked him and his followers'. Evidently Muhallab did not achieve any success.

Ferishta, as usual, gives an exaggerated account and takes Muhallab to Multan. Elliot goes one step further and identifies Al-Ahwar with Lahore. These presumptions are absolutely without any basis and may be dismissed as incredible. It may be doubted whether the city of Lahore existed at that time, at least under the present name. The objective of Muhallab's raid was al-Kikán, and both Multan and Lahore were far away from the route. Elliot (Vol. II, p. 415) gives some details of 'Abd-ar-Rahmán's campaign against Kábul, apparently on the authority of Baládhurí. But the text translated by Murgotten does not give these details.

² Elliot apparently refers to this episode (vol. ii, p. 416) when he says:—

'In 64 A.H. = 683-4 A.D., 'Abdu-l-'Aziz, the governor of Sistán, declared war against the king of Kábul and in the combat which took place, that king was defeated and killed. The war continued under his successor and he was compelled to submit to the payment of tribute, but whenever opportunity offered, renewed efforts were made by the Kábulis to recover their lost independence'.

But Elliot confuses it with the campaign of 64 A.H. Besides, this campaign of 'Abdu-l-'Aziz was directed not against Kábul but against Ratbil, king of Sijistán. As noted above, in f.n. 2, on page 16 the presumption that Kábul and Zábúl formed one kingdom under Ratbil, has vitiated the account of Elliot.

The passage is translated as follows by Murgotten: 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'was compelled to stop in the city Zaranj because Ratbil was at war with him' (p. 149). The passage is translated differently by Mr. Fida Ali Khan. According to him it means 'he was allowed to enter the city and attacked Ratbil'.

The war was, however, continued by Ratbil II, the son and successor of the late chief. He did not oppose the advance of the Muhammadans till they penetrated deep into his country. Then he blocked the mountain paths and passes, and forced the Muhammadan general 'Abdalláh to conclude a treaty on easy terms.¹ The Caliph 'Abd-al-Malik however, disapproved of the treaty and dismissed 'Abdalláh (p. 150).

Shortly after Al-Hajjáj became governor of Irak (A.D. 695), his general 'Ubaidalláh made an attempt to subdue Kábul. Here, too, his enemy blocked the mountain path and Ratbil soon joined them. 'Ubaidalláh was ready to extricate himself from this difficult position by offering easy terms to his opponents, but Shuraih ibn-Háni al-Háarithi dissuaded him from this course, saying 'Fear Allah and fight this people, for if thou doest what thou art about to do, thou wilt weaken Islam on this frontier'. So 'a battle ensued and Shuraih made a charge, but was killed. The army fought their way out, although hard pressed, and made their way along the desert of Bust. Many of the men perished of thirst and hunger, and 'Ubaidalláh died of grief for what he had brought upon his men and the fate that had overtaken them.' (p. 151).

It was a veritable disaster for the Muslim forces and its subsequent effect convulsed the whole Islamic world. Al-Baládhuri briefly passes over this unfortunate episode. But other sources give more details. It appears that the Muslim forces were allowed to retire only on the payment of a humiliating ransom.² To avenge the

¹ According to this treaty, 'Abdalláh agreed, on payment of 300,000 dirhams, not to raid in future the kingdom of Ratbil. It was in the nature of a *Chauth* exacted by the Mahrattas, in later ages.

² Cf. for example the passage from *Tārīkh-i-Alfi*, quoted by Elliot (vol. ii, p. 416): 'Ranbal, retiring before his assailant, detached troops to their rear and blocking up the defiles, entirely intercepted their retreat, and in this situation exposed to the danger of perishing by famine, 'Abdulla was compelled to purchase the liberation of himself and followers for a ransom of seven hundred thousand dirhams'.

Raverty evidently follows the same authority and adds to the above extract:

It is said that, when his ('Ubaidullah's) wearied and half-starved troops reached Musalman ground and their own people brought forth food and relieved their necessities, many eat their fill and fell down dead immediately after'. (Raverty—*Notes on Afghanistan*, p. 62). Raverty gives the name as 'Ubaidullah—which agrees with that of Baládhuri. Elliot spells it as Abdulla. Both give 79 A.H. (698-99 A.D.) as the date of the event.. Cf. (Price, vol. i, p. 454) the account of Khullassut-ul-Akbar, which substantially agrees with the above.

affront an army was raised, named the 'peacock army', so splendidly was it equipped at the cost of a heavy war-cess on Al-Basra and Al-Kufa. The command was placed in the hands of 'Abd-ar-Rahmán ibn-Muhammad ibn-al-Ash'ath who marched against Ratbil in 80 A.H. (A.D. 699) put him to flight and ravaged his land. The commander, mindful of the recent reverses, wanted to proceed cautiously; but Al-Hajjáj, upbraiding him with faint-heartedness, peremptorily bade him fight on, and when the commander expostulated with him, threatened his supersession. The army, as well as its commander, strongly resented the action. 'Abd-ar-Rahmán made favourable terms with Ratbil, and declaring war both against Al-Hajjáj and the Caliph, marched on Al-Irák, and captured Al-Basra. The rebellion having assumed serious proportions, the Caliph took alarm and offered terms to the rebels. 'Abd-ar-Rahmán was inclined to accept the offer, which included supersession of Al-Hajjáj, but the rebel army rejected it. At last a great battle was fought in 82 A.H. (A.D. 701-702) and 'Abd-ar-Rahmán was signally defeated by Al-Hajjáj. Pursued by the latter 'Abd-ar-Rahmán was again beaten on the Persian border and took refuge with Ratbil, who a year or two afterwards sent his head to Al-Hajjáj.¹ He is said to have died or committed suicide.

¹ Elliot vol. ii, p. 416. Price, (vol. i, pp. 455-463). On the authority of Khulassat-ul-Akbar. *Muir-Caliphate*, p. 336. Strangely enough, Baládhúr passes over the whole episode though he refers to the rebellion of 'Abd-ar-Rahmán, and his tragic end.

Raverty gives interesting details, but, as usual, does not indicate his authority. He says that 'Abd-ur-Rahmán, after prolonged fight with Hajjáj, was compelled to fly in 81 A.H. (700-1 A.D.) and took shelter within the walls of Bust, which was held by one of his own subordinates named 'Iyáz. Raverty then continues:

'He ('Iyáz) seized and imprisoned 'Abd-ur-Rahmán and proposed to send him to Hajjáj. Zantbil (i.e. Ratbil) immediately on hearing of this marched his force to Bust and infested it on all sides and threatened 'Iyáz and all within the place with impalement if a hair of the head of 'Abd-ur-Rahmán should be injured, and that he would never leave the place until he should be released. This had the desired effect, and he was set at liberty, and took refuge with Zantbil (Ratan-pal?). Hajjáj sometime after sent an agent to that ruler making him very advantageous offers and requiring him to give up 'Abd-ur-Rahmán, which he did, along with eighteen of his kinsmen, in the year 82 A.H. (701-2 A.D.), but on the road back, 'Abd-ur-Rahmán succeeded in throwing himself from the flat roof of a building in which they had alighted to rest, and dragged the agent with him. Both perished' (Raverty op. cit., p. 63).

This episode, if true, throws interesting light on the powers and magnanimity of Ratbil.

According to Al-Baládhuri, Ratbil betrayed him from fear of Al-Hajjáj, because the latter had written a threatening letter. Thereupon 'Abd-ar-Rahmán threw himself from the top of a cliff (p. 151).

Ratbil did not fail to take full advantage of the internal split in the Muslim world,¹ and concluded a favourable treaty with al-Hajjáj. The latter agreed not to make war upon him for 7 (or 9) years on condition of an annual subsidy in kind. This arrangement continued till the death of Al-Hajjáj (A.D. 714) inspite of occasional disputes over the value of the goods paid as subsidy in which Ratbil always scored against his enemy (p. 152).

When, in the Caliphate of Sulaimán, Yazíd became governor of Irák in 96 A.H. (A.D. 715) and his brother Mudrik, governor of Sijistán, Ratbil refused to pay any tribute at all. He was evidently encouraged by the confusion which prevailed in the Muslim world during the last days of the Umayyids. For more than forty years, the Muhammadans could not exact anything from him. (pp. 152-3).

It was not till the establishment of the Abbassids, that the Muhammadans could renew their offensive. During the Caliphate of Al-Mansúr (A.D. 754-775), Kandahar was conquered (p. 231) and the Muhammadan governor of Sijistán again demanded tribute from Ratbil (apparently Ratbil III or IV). The latter sent some camels, tents and slaves, reckoning each at double its value. The governor Ma'n became angry and declared war against Ratbil. He overran ar-Rukhkhaj and secured many captives, but Ratbil was far from being subdued.² For we are told that during the next three Caliphates, the Muslim officers collected tribute from Ratbil of Sijistán 'as well as they could', (or, according to a different rendering,

¹ We learn from Tabari that in the year 90 A.H. (A.D. 709) Ratbil agreed to aid the Maliks of Balkh, Marw-ar-Rúd, Tál-Kán, Fáryáb, and the Gúzgánán against Katibah, son of Musallam-ul-Bahili (Raverty, op. cit., p. 63; Price, Vol. I, p. 469).

² Baládhuri says (p. 154) that after the campaign, Mawand, the lieutenant of Ratbil, asked for safe-conduct in order to be taken to the Commander of the Believers. Ma'n granted it sending him to Baghdad with 5,000 soldiers, and Al-Mansúr treated him generously, 'pensioning him and his chieftains', (or according to the translation of Mr. Fida Ali Khan 'fixing an allowance for him and appointing him a military commander').

It is possible that some understanding was arrived at regarding the payment of tribute in future.

'according to their strength or weakness') which certainly does not mean much.¹

When the Caliph al-Ma'mūn (A.D. 813-833) visited Khurāsān, Ratbil paid double tribute to him, but was evidently left unmolested. Al-Ma'mūn, however, sent an army against Kābul, probably the Shahi ruler of Kābul, who submitted to taxation and acknowledged obedience. Balādhuri further says that the king of Kābul professed Islam and promised obedience, but he apparently regained independence and apostatized almost immediately after.²

Next we hear of the conquest of Kābul and Zābulistan by Ya'kūb, son of Lais about A.D. 870. The king of Kābul was made a prisoner while the king of Zābulistan was killed and its inhabitants forced to embrace Islam. Henceforth, Zābulistan ceased to belong to India, either politically or culturally, but Kābul recovered its independence and remained, as before, a part of India from both political and cultural point of view till the time of the Turkish Sultans of Ghazni.³

We may now sum up the results of these early Muhammadan raids. During the period of 50 years that elapsed since the first raid in 28 A.H. (A.D. 649) we may distinguish three periods of alternate success and failure. The first period of 7 years ended with the Caliphate of Uthman (A.D. 656). In spite of a promising beginning, the Islamic forces achieved very little during this period. During the second period, renewed efforts were made by the Caliphs 'Ali and Mu-āwiya, and, thanks to the brilliant skill and energy of 'Abd-ar-

¹ Balādhuri, p. 155. Price refers to an expedition against Kabul in 107 A.H. (A.D. 725-6) during the Caliphate of Hisham (Vol. I, p. 567). Raverty refers to two expeditions against Kabul, in 152 A.H. (A.D. 769) and 170 A.H. (A.D. 786-7). But none of these achieved any substantial results. Possibly, Kabul fortified its position by an alliance with China and Kashmir. That the Arabs could not make any impression in Afghanistan about this time also follows from the itinerary of Oukong (*Journal Asiatique*, 1895, part II, pp. 348 ff. pp. 381 ff.

² Balādhuri, pp. 155, 203.

As to the king of Kābul's accepting Islam and promising obedience, the Arab accounts repeat it too often to be taken seriously. It seems that the Islamic creed and political subordination sat very lightly upon that ruler and he always took the earliest opportunity to throw off the yoke and apostatize. There are good grounds to believe that that was also the case on this occasion. In any case we find again an independent Hindu ruler in Kābul at later times.

³ Raverty, op. cit., p. 63; Elliot, Vol. II, p. 419.

Rahmān ibn-Samurah, Islamic forces obtained notable successes against the rulers of Kābul and Zābulistan. The removal and death of 'Abd-ar-Rahmān in 50 A.H. (670 A.D.) ushered in the third period of nearly 30 years in which the Islamic arms sustained serious reverses, both in Kābul and Zābulistan, which had their repercussion on the whole Muslim world. The fruitless efforts of half a century (A.D. 649-700) convinced the Arabs that the conquest of these territories was beyond their power. Henceforth they were glad to leave them alone and merely sought to impose some sort of suzerainty upon them. But even this was with difficulty maintained for a very brief period (A.D. 700-14). For the next century and a half, Kābul and Zābul maintained their authority practically unimpaired. The Abbassid Caliphs, no doubt, occasionally exacted some tributes from them, but with the exception of this and occasional raids, Kābul and Zābul were left undisturbed till the former was conquered by Ya'kūb, son of Lais, in A.D. 870.

CHAPTER IV.

THE KINGDOM OF SIND ON THE EVE OF THE MUHAMMADAN CONQUEST

Although the three border-kingdoms of Kābul, Zābul and Sind had all to bear the brunt of the first Muhammadan invasion, the wars with Sind were more prolonged and led to more permanent results. And of the kingdom of Sind alone it is possible to give some detailed account for the period immediately preceding the Muhammadan raids. For this we are indebted to the well-known work *Chach-nāma* already referred to above. The *Chach-nāma* begins with an account of king Sahiras, son of Sahasi Rai. His dominions are said to have 'extended on the east to the boundary of Kashmir, on the west to Makrān, on the south to the coast of the sea and Debal, and on the north to the mountains of Kurdan and Kikānān'.¹ The central part of these

¹ In the *Tārīkh-i-M'asūmī* and the *Tuhfatul Kirā'm*, the boundaries given are as follows: 'On the east, Kashmir and Kanauj; on the west, Makran, Debal (Lahore in M'asūmīs) and the sea-shore of Oman; on the north, Kandhār, Sistān, the Suleiman mountains and the Kikānān Hills; and on the south, the sea-port of Surat.' (Ch^o. p. 11 f.n.).

territories was under the immediate charge of the king with his capital at Alor and the rest was divided into four provinces, each under a governor,¹ with headquarters respectively at Bahmanábád, Siwistán, Iskandah and Multan. The king, however, lost his life in a fight with the king of Nimruz, a province of Persia, who had invaded his territory and entered Kirmán. According to *Tuhtatu-l-Kirām*, the battle took place near Kich.

Rai Sâhasi II,² son of Sahiras, then ascended the throne and ruled over the entire kingdom. During his reign, a poor Brâhmana named Chach,³ gradually rose to power and high office, and after his master's death, secured the throne for himself. He married the widowed queen and had two sons by her, *viz.*, Daharsiah and Dâhar, and a daughter Bái.

The provincial governors at first refused to acknowledge the suzerainty of the usurper. Chach marched in person against Iskandah and Multan and subdued them. He then proceeded further up to the hills of Kashmir and definitely fixed the frontier between the two kingdoms. Chach next proceeded against the governors of Siwistán and Bahmanábád and subdued them.⁴

¹ In Ch° (p. 25) the four governors are referred to as four tributary rulers and it appears that their status was much higher than that of an ordinary governor. The ruler of Multan, Bachchera, e.g. was a near relation of Sâhasi (p. 27). The governor of Siwistán is called a king and a son of a king (p. 31-2). He conspires against king of Sind (39-40).

² Not much information is given of the dynasty which ended with Rai Sâhasi II. It is said (Ch°, p. 20-21) that Maharat, king of Chitor, was the brother of Rai Sâhasi, and on the death of the latter, he marched towards Alor with an army and sent the following message to Chach:

'I am the rightful heir to this kingdom, and this country is the property of my fathers and grandfathers. It is but right that I should have for my own my brother's heritage.'

King Maharat was, however, defeated and killed by Chach.

According to *Tuhtatu-l-Kirām*, this event took place in 1 A.H., and the dynasty overthrown by Chach ruled for 137 years (A.D. 485-622). It consisted of the following kings: Dewaij, Sâhiras I, Sâhasi I, Sâhiras II, Sâhasi II, each being the son of his predecessor.

In Chach-nâma, Sâhiras' father, the senior Rai Sâhasi i.e. Sâhasi I, is said to be son of Dewaij (p. 25). Apparently, there is some confusion about the genealogy. But there is no justification for Cunningham's assumption that 'Diwaij II was the father of Sâhiras (or Siharas)'. (Later Indo-Scythians, p. 105.)

³ For a discussion of the various forms of the name and the caste to which he belonged, cf. Elliot, Vol. I, pp. 409 ff.

⁴ See Appendix Geographical Note A, for full details.

Having thus settled affairs at home, Chach wanted to take advantage of the confusion in the Persian kingdom to extend his territory in that direction. He passed through and subdued a portion of Makrán, and fixed the western limits of his kingdom at a stream that separated Kirmán from Makrán. Then Chach marched towards Kandábil and its people agreed to pay an annual tribute.¹

Chach died at Alor after a reign of 40 years,² and was succeeded by his brother Chandar who ruled for 7 years. The death of Chandar was followed by an internal split. Dâhar, the younger son of Chach, sat on the throne at Alor, while Duráj, son of Chandar, established himself at Bahmanábád. But Daharsiah, the elder son of Chach, ousted Duráj after a year and occupied Bahmanábád.³ For the next 30 years, the kingdom was divided between the brothers Dâhar and Daharsiah with headquarters respectively at Alor and Bahmanábád. Then, after Daharsiah's death, the united kingdom came into the possession of Dâhar.⁴ Eight years after this event Dâhar's kingdom was attacked by the neighbouring king of Ramal but Dâhar easily repulsed him.⁵

The dates of these kings may be ascertained from several data supplied by Chach-nâma and *Tuhtatu-l-Kirām*. According to the latter, Chach ascended the throne in the year of the Hijrî, *i.e.*, A.D. 622. This is, however, in conflict with the statement in Chach-nâma that Chach had already been 35 years on the throne when, in 11 A.H. in the Caliphate of Umar, Mughaira led an expedition to Debal. The year 11 is evidently a mistake, as Umar had not succeeded to the Caliphate till 13 A.H. The expedition, referred to in Chach-nâma, took place, according to al-Balâdhuri, about 15 A.H. Even assuming this date to be true, Chach's accession falls about A.D. 602. Now the mistake in Hijrî date for Umar, too palpably absurd in a history written by a Muhammadan, and similar other wrong Hijrî dates in the book suggest some mistake in the reading or writing of figures in original copies or transcriptions of the Text of Chach-nâma. Besides, the data for the reign-periods of the kings as given in Chach-nâma, lend support

¹ See Appendix, Geographical Note A, for full details.

² Ch°, p. 39.

³ Ch°, p. 42.

⁴ Ch°, p. 54.

⁵ Ch°, p. 55. In the *Tuhtatu-l-Kirām*, the invader is said to be Ramalrai, king of Kanauj, and not king of Ramal.

to the date as given in *Tufat-ul-Kirām*. According to this theory we can arrange the dates as follows:—

Chach	...	...	40 years	...	A.D. 622-662
Chandar	...	...	7 years	...	„ 662-669
Dáhar } Duráj }	...	...	1 year	...	„ 669-670
Dáhar } Daharsiah }	...	...	30 years (p. 54)	...	„ 670- 700
Dáhar	...	...	8 years + x	,	700-708 + x

Chach-náma continues the story of Dáhar down to the invasion of the king of Ramal, and then begins his account of the Muslim invasion of Sind. Now the invasion by the king of Ramal took place in the eighth year after Daharsiah's death, (i.e., in A.D. 708) and this brings us to the epoch of the great fight between Dáhar and the Arabs. Thus the theory accepted above, is quite in accordance with the detailed account furnished in Chach-náma.¹

The Chach-náma represents Sind as a great and powerful kingdom, extending up to the borders of Kashmir and Kanauj on the north and east and to those of Kirmán in the west. The details scattered in the book, such as the names of towns under different governors, journeys of kings and their victorious expeditions, all corroborate this general picture. Al-Baládhuri states that al-Kikán (modern Kelat) is part of the land of As-Sind where it borders on Khurásán.¹²

It must be noted, however, that the solidarity of the kingdom was destroyed in the seventh century A.D. by several incidents.

¹ Elliot's Chronology (Vol. I, pp. 406, 412-414) is somewhat different. He finds inconsistency in *Tuhfat-ul-Kirām*'s statements, because while it gives 92 years as the total period of duration, the sumtotal of the reign-periods of the three kings, as given in it, only comes up to 81. Hence Elliot places the accession of Chach in 10 A.H. But the detailed accounts of the reign of the different kings, as given above on the authority of Chach-náma, really makes the total duration of the dynasty one of 90 years, if we assume Dáhar's death to have taken place in 712 A.D. The 90 solar years of India would correspond very nearly to 92 years of a Muhammadan writer. The real mistake of *Tuhfat-ul-Kirām* was perhaps the reign-period of 33 years which is assigned to Dáhar, whereas according to Chach-náma, he ruled for nearly 43 years. For the first 31 years of this period, he ruled only over a part of Sind, and it was only after Daharsiah's death that he came to be the sole ruler of the country.

¹² Baládhuri p. 210. For Kikán see App. Geographical Note A.

First, the usurpation of Chach. It was preceded by the murder of all the nobles of the Court who opposed him and followed by the rebellion of the provincial governors. Though these were quelled with difficulty, Chach sowed the seeds of discontent which overwhelmed his son at no distant date. We shall see later on how important officials of state deserted the son of Chach and joined his Muslim enemy. This might have been inspired in no small degree by their loyalty to the old dynasty which was so basely betrayed by Chach. As a matter of fact, we find that immediately after the death of Chach, one of his governors made a secret plot with the kings of Kashmir and Kanauj with a view to seize the kingdom for himself, and the hostile armies approached the very walls of the capital city.¹

Secondly, the virtual division of the kingdom after the death of Chandar must have weakened the resources of the kingdom by constant conflicts between Alor and Bahmanábád. This internal dissension lasted for more than 30 years, and it was during this period that the Muhammadans were knocking at the gates of Sind.

Thirdly, the kings of Sind were hostile to, and not infrequently at war with, the neighbouring kingdoms of Kashmir, Kanauj and Ramal. Almost at the very moment when Muhammad ibn-Kásim was marching towards Sind, king Dáhar was fighting with the king of Ramal.

Fourthly, the existence of powerful Buddhist monks who wielded great political authority as rulers of districts or owners of strongholds, was a positive danger to the Bráhmanical state.² Many of these

¹ Ch°—pp. 39 ff. Another governor, when attacked by Chach applied for assistance to the king of Kanauj (Ch°, p. 33).

² Various references to the Samanis or Buddhist monks are scattered throughout Ch°. Thus when Chach proceeded against the governor of Bahmanábád, the latter, himself a Buddhist, sought the help of Samani Budhgui or Budhrakhu (i.e. Buddhagupta or Buddharakshita). Ch° says: 'When Chach had come to know that Agham (the governor) and his son had compact with the Samani and that it was owing to his sorcery, enchantments, magic and counsels, that the war had been prolonged for a year, he had sworn: 'If I succeed in taking this fort, I shall seize the Samani, take off his skin, give it to low-caste people to cover drums with it and to beat them till it was torn to pieces' (Ch°, pp. 33-34).

Again, the town of Armanbil was 'in the hands of a Buddhist Samani descended from the agents of Rái Sahiras, king of Hind. . . . In course of time, however, he had thrown off his yoke and had become his opponent' (Ch°, p. 38).

Even the important fortress of Nerun (Haidarabad) was in charge of a Buddhist Samani named Bhandarkan who basely betrayed his master to the

Buddhists surrendered their state or strongholds to the Islamic invaders and made alliance with them.

Thus, inspite of the large extent and vast resources of the kingdom of Sind, the internal situation was not quite favourable to a sustained opposition to determined invaders.

CHAPTER V.

THE MUHAMMADAN CONQUEST OF SIND

The early Arab raids were directed against the coast-land of India. From their secure base at Oman, an army was sent across to Tanah. i.e., Thana, near Bombay about 15 A.H. (A.D. 637). Similar expeditions were sent against Barwas or Broach and to the gulf of Ad-Daibul, i.e. Debal. Al-Balādhuri records a Muslim victory at Debal, but is silent about the results of the other two raids. On the other hand, according to Chach-nāma, the Muslims were defeated and their leader was killed by the governor of Chach at the battle of Debal.¹ It may be safely concluded that the Muslim arms did not

Muslims even before the Muslim forces achieved any victory (Ch°, p. 72). He is reported to have said to Muhammad ibn-Kāsim: 'I myself and all my men are subjects of the Khalifah, and we hold this place subject to the command and in accordance with the terms of the letter of Hajjāj. In fact we owe our permanent position to his help and patronage and encouragement.' There was a secret compact between him and Hajjāj, and he opened the gates of Nerun when Muhammad had besieged it in vain and was in great straits (Ch°, p. 91).

The Buddhist community at Siwistān, another strongly fortified town, forced the ruler to surrender it to the Muslim army, saying: 'We people are a priestly class. According to our faith, fighting and slaughtering are not allowable. We will never be in favour of shedding blood' . . . (Ch°, p. 93.)

The same unpatriotic and treacherous spirit was shown by the Buddhists of other places (Ch°, pp. 105, 173).

¹ Ch° (pp. 57-58) places this event shortly before the murder of Umar but gives the date as 11 A.H. This seems to be a mistake for 21 A.H. Similarly on p. 37 Ch° refers to some events in Persia in 2 A.H. whereas the right date seems to be 12 A.H. These two dates are either due to misreading of original figures or counted from the death of Muhammad—for it is difficult to believe that a Muhammadan author would give 11 A.H. as the date for an expedition undertaken during the Caliphate of Umar, as the latter succeeded to the Caliphate only in 13 A.H. Similarly Ch° gives wrong dates for the beginning of the Caliphate of Ali (p. 38) and Mu-āwiyah (p. 61).

The statement in Ch° that Chach had ruled for 35 years when this expedition took place, cannot be correct. This is not only in conflict with the statement in

gain any appreciable success in any of these raids which were all undertaken during the Caliphate of Umar (A.D. 634-43).

The defeat at Debal must have taken by surprise the Caliph Umar whose arms were victorious in distant parts of the world. Having failed to approach Sind from the sea-coast on the south, he sent an army to Makrán and Kirmán with a view to attack the western frontier of the kingdom, but like a true statesman, he at the same time asked the governor of Irák to send him detailed information about the country. The governor reported that the king of Sind was very powerful and by no means willing to submit to the Muhammadans. Thereupon all ideas of sending further expeditions against that country were abandoned.¹

The failure of the previous raids induced the next ruler Uthmán to attempt an invasion of Sind by land. He sent his agents to collect information about the country, but their reports were unfavourable. So Uthmán too gave up the enterprise.²

During the next Caliphate, that of 'Ali, a great expedition was sent against India (38-39 A.H.). The Muslim army, which included a

the *Tuhfatu-l-kirām* that Chach ascended the throne in 1 A.H. but is also irreconcilable with the general statements in Ch° on the basis of which the genealogical table of Chach and his successors has been drawn above on p. 26.

It may be noted here that Ch° does not mention the naval raids against Thana or Broach which are mentioned by Balādhuri (p. 209).

¹ The statement that Umar sent an expedition to Makrán and Kirmán is based on the authority of Chach-nāma (pp. 58 ff.) But it is clear from the context that the expedition was recalled before it could achieve any success. Al-Balādhuri ignores this expedition altogether. Later authorities refer to the success of Muslim arms in this expedition. According to Ta'ríkh-i-Guzída, the Muslims conquered on this occasion not only Makrán and Kirmán but also Sijistán, although the ruler of Sind helped the Chief of Makrán (p. 181). Hasan-bin-Muhammad Shiraji, referring to the same incidents, adds that the ruler of Makrán, called Zambil, who was also king of Sind, was killed. Habibu-s Siyar (Price—Vol. I., p. 138) and Tabari also refer to this expedition. These authorities, however, give different names for the leaders of this expedition, and a perusal of Al-Balādhuri, our earliest authority, leaves no doubt that the whole thing was a confused echo of certain incidents which happened at a later period. Al-Balādhuri, for example narrates many incidents described by these authorities, but refer them to a later period. Further, Makrán and Sijistán were conquered by the Muslim forces at a much later date.

Elliot seems to have accepted the later authorities (vol. i., pp. 417-8) which are in conflict with the statement, accepted by him (Ibid, p. 421) that at a later period the governor of Basra sent his agent 'to explore Sijistán and Makrán as well as the countries bordering on the valley of the Indus.'

² Balādhuri, pp. 209-10; Ch°, pp. 59-60. The two accounts agree very closely.

large number of nobles and chiefs, advanced, without serious opposition, up to Al-Kíkán or Kíkánán which was a part of Sind. The people of this country (which corresponds to the mountainous regions in Baluchistan round Kelat) made a brave stand and routed the Muslim army. The leader of the Muslim host 'was killed together with all but a few of his followers' (42 A.H. = A.D. 663.). This is the version of Al-Baládhuri. The Chach-náma, on the other hand, relates, that the Muslims obtained a victory at Kíkánán, but turned back on hearing of the murder of 'Ali. This seems to be only a thin pretext for hiding the defeat and disgrace, and the version of Baládhuri seems to be confirmed by later events. Besides, the version in Chach-náma is based on the authority of Amir, son of Hárís, son of Abdul Kais, while, according to Baládhuri, Hárís was himself the leader of the expedition. The son of the defeated leader naturally suppressed the inconvenient details.¹

Henceforth Kíkánán became the chief objective of the Muslim expeditions, and during the Caliphate of Mu'áwiyah (41-60 A.H.), several attempts were made to subdue this outlying frontier post of the kingdom of Sind. The first expedition was led by Al-Muhallab in the year 44 (A.D. 665.) He advanced against Kíkán from the side of Kábul in the north, but did not achieve any conspicuous success.² The second expedition led by 'Abdallah, in spite of initial successes, ended in a disaster, and the routed Mussalman army fled to Makrán.³ Sinán, the leader of the next expedition, 'proceeded to the frontier and conquered Makrán. He established a garrison there and made it his headquarters.'⁴ The Muslim forces were apparently unable to

¹ Baládhuri (p. 210). Ch° (p. 60) gives the date as 80 which is evidently a slip or misreading for 40. For, immediately before, it refers to the year 38 A.H. It is, however, wrong in stating that the Caliphate of 'Ali began towards the end of that year. As a matter of fact 'Ali became Caliph in 35 A.H. 38 A.H. is the date of the expedition (cf. Elliot, vol. i, p. 422).

² This is omitted in Ch°. Curiously enough, here again, Ch° puts 41 A.H., the date of the first Indian expedition under Mu'áwiyah, as the date of the beginning of his Caliphate (*see* f.n. 1 of Chapter III, p. 18).

³ Baládhuri (p. 211); Ch° (p. 62) gives more details of the disaster. Both authorities refer to the curious anecdote of a pregnant woman by way of illustrating the hospitality of the leader of the expedition. Baládhuri refers to some initial success of the Islamic army but this is omitted in Ch°. This expedition probably took place in 46 A.H. (Weil-Geschichte, vol. I, p. 291).

⁴ Baládhuri (p. 212). Apparently there is some confusion about this incident. Baládhuri refers to a tradition according to which Makrán was conquered by

proceed any further. Hence Sinán was replaced by Rashid who proceeded from Makrán and led a successful raid against Kíkánán. But later, while raiding the Mid (i.e., Meds), he was defeated and killed.¹ He was succeeded by Sinán who led another expedition against Kíkánán. He proceeded up to the district of Budhia in Kíkánán but the people there rose against him and killed him.² The next expedition was led by Al-Mundhir (Munzir in Chach-náma). He raided al-Búkán and al-Kíkán and conquered Kuşdár, which, although previously conquered by Sinán, had rebelled against the Muslims. But al-Mundhir died at Kuşdár. The command was then taken over by ibn-Harri who subdued Kuşdár and fought a fierce and successful campaign there, acquiring much booty.³ But Kíkán was far from being subdued. For more than twenty years, the Muslim forces had concentrated their efforts upon the conquest of this frontier of Sind, but failed to achieve any lasting results. The only notable success of the Muslims in this direction was the conquest of Makrán.

During the next twenty-five years, the kingdom of Sind obtained respite from the repeated Muslim aggressions on its frontier. But with the appointment of Al-Hajjáj as governor of Irák, things assumed a new turn. After putting down some internal feuds, he appointed

Hakim ibn Jabalah al-Abdi. Ch° (p. 63) refers to Sinán as having succeeded Abdulla, but does not refer to his conquest of Makrán. It, however, says that Ahnaf, son of Kaish, who was selected for the holy wars in Hind remained at Makrán for two years.

¹ Baládhuri (p. 212). Ch° (p. 64) gives more details of this expedition. It says that Rashid returned after a year from Kíkánán, and, 'travelling via Sistán, he came to the mountains of Mauzar and Bharj. The natives of this mountainous country mustered about 50,000 men strong to stop him on his way. A bloody battle ensued and Rashid fell a martyr'.

² Ch° (p. 65). Baládhuri (p. 212) refers to Sinán's succession in command, but is silent about his expedition to Kíkán and death. Ch° quotes a memorial verse relating to the martyrdom of Sinán. For the position of Budhia, cf. App. A.

³ Baládhuri (pp. 213-14); Ch° (p. 66) says that Munzir died of illness at Burabi, and does not give any details of his success. Nor does it refer to ibn-Harri's campaign. Ibn-Harri seems to have conquered al-Búkán. Baládhuri refers to a memorial verse to that effect and adds: 'The inhabitants of al-Búkán to-day are Muslims al-Barmaki built a city there which he named al-Baida (the white). This was in the Caliphate of al-Mutasin-billah'.

Elliot thinks that Munzir referred to in Ch° is a different person from Munzir referred to by Baládhuri (vol. i, 425).

Mujjā'ah as governor of Makrān. Mujjā'ah made some raids and conquered portions of Kandābīl (modern Gandava). On his death, a year later, Muhammad ibn-Hārūn was appointed governor of Makrān during the Caliphate of Walīd.¹

About this time² the king of Ceylon³ sent to Al-Hajjāj some women who were born in his country as Muslims, their fathers, who were merchants, having died. He wanted to court favour with Al-Hajjāj by sending them back.⁴ But the ship in which they were sailing was captured by the pirates of Debal.⁵ Al-Hajjāj thereupon wrote to Dāhar, King of Sind, to set the women free, but Dāhar pleaded inability, saying 'I have no control over the pirates who captured them.' Hajjāj regarded this as the *causūs belli* against Sind and determined to make renewed effort on a large scale for conquering a country which had so long defied the arms of Islam. The Caliph was at first unwilling to sanction the risky expedition, but ultimately gave his consent at the importunities of Hajjāj. Hajjāj thereupon sent 'Ubaidallāh to raid Debal but he was defeated and killed.⁶ Then a second expedition was sent by way of sea from Oman, under Budail (called Bazīl in Ch°). Budail got reinforcements from Muhammad ibn-Hārūn and marched towards Debal. Dāhar, on hearing the news, sent a force under his son Jaisimha to protect

¹ Balādhuri (p. 215), Ch° (p. 69) gives 85 A.H. as the date for the conquest of Kandail (i.e. Kandābīl of Balādhuri).

² No definite date is given either by Balādhuri (p. 215) or in Ch° (p. 69). The latter, however, states, before relating this incident, that Muhammad Hārūn was appointed governor about 85 A.H. and ruled for five years. This would place the event in or shortly after 91 A.H. (= 709 A.D.). This is in full agreement with the general statement in Ch°, on the strength of which the chronological table of the kings has been drawn up above on p. 26. It will be seen that Ch° relates events up to 708 A.D. and then begins his accounts of the Muslim expedition which took place the following year. cf. f.n. 1 on page 37 below.

³ Balādhuri says 'island of Rubies' (p. 215). Ch° says 'Sarandeb' (p. 69).

⁴ Balādhuri (pp. 215-16). Ch° (p. 69) refers to presents, including pearls and jewels, both for Hajjāj and the Caliph. It also refers to a number of Muslim women 'who went to visit the Kaaba and the capital city of the Caliphs'. Balādhuri refers only to one ship but Ch° refers to a small fleet of boats. Both Balādhuri and Ch° refer to the miraculous legend 'that the captive women cried out 'O Hajjāj', and Hajjāj replied 'Here am I'.

⁵ According to Ch° (p. 70) the robbers belonged to the tribe of Nagamroh. Balādhuri says they were 'Meds'.

⁶ Balādhuri (p. 216). Ch° does not refer to this.

Debal. A pitched battle ensued, which lasted the whole day. At the end the Muslim army was routed and Budail was killed.¹

Al-Hajjāj then made elaborate preparations for the invasion of Sind, after obtaining necessary permission from the Caliph Walīd.² He appointed his nephew and son-in-law Muhammad ibn-Kāsim as commander of the expedition and provided him with soldiers, arms and ammunitions on a most lavish scale. He asked for and obtained from the Caliph the services of 6,000 Syrian soldiers fully armed. Siege materials were sent by boats, and elaborate and detailed plans were made by Hajjāj himself to ensure the success of the campaign. Muhammad ibn-Kāsim was instructed to put himself in constant communication with Hajjāj and never to take any important measures without his consent.³

Muhammad halted at Shiraz to collect his forces⁴ and then advanced by slow stages to Makrān. After staying there for some days he advanced and conquered Kannazbur and Armail.⁵ Then he

¹ Balādhuri (p. 216) is very brief, Ch° (p. 71) gives interesting details. Bazīl 'sailing by the sea of Ammán (i.e. Oman) arrived at the fortified town of Nerūn. Being reinforced there by the large army sent from Makrān by its governor Muhammad ibn-Hārūn, he marched towards Debal. Nerun is probably a mistake for some other port; for Nerun is further inland than Debal. Of course, it is just possible that Budail sailed up a mouth of the Indus other than that on which Debal was situated, and having thus reached Nerun, marched to Debal. But it is extremely unlikely, for no veteran soldier would sail up with his army to the interior leaving strong and important sea-ports unconquered in his rear.

² Ch° (pp. 71, 73) more than once refers to Hajjāj seeking permission of the Caliph in order to declare a religious war against Hind and Sind. The Caliph is said to have been at first unwilling to take this step, but was prevailed upon to agree to it on account of the importunity of Hajjāj and on his promising to repay double the amount spent for the war. Ch° quotes some letters passing between Hajjāj and the Caliph in this connection—but their genuineness is doubtful. But the unwillingness of the Caliph Abd-el-Malek to subject the Muslims to perils of a distant expedition are referred to by Arab writers (cf. Weil-Geschichte der Chalifen, vol. i, p. 504 f.n.).

³ From this point the account in Ch° is very detailed. It quotes many letters passing between Hajjāj and Muhammad. The latter seems to have referred every matter to Hajjāj, who may almost be said to have directed the whole campaign from a distance. This is also corroborated by Balādhuri, (p. 218).

⁴ According to Ch° (p. 77) Muhammad was joined at Shiraz by 6,000 horsemen, 6,000 camelmen, 3,000 loading camels and large number of coats of mail sent by Hajjāj.

⁵ 72 A.H., the date given in Ch° for this event, is certainly a mistake, as the Caliphate of Al-Walīd extends from 86 to 96 A.H.; 72 is probably a mistake for 92, the date given in the Tārīkhi Māsūmī.

⁶ Balādhuri (p. 217). Ch° (p. 77) writes *Armanbelah* for Armail, both being apparently different forms of the same name, but makes no reference to Kannazbur.

proceeded to Debal and made an entrenched camp. The siege materials reached him by way of sea and he made preparations for taking the fort. Catapults were taken out and fixed. There was a great Buddhist temple in the city with a high flag-staff over a dome. A curious story is told in *Chach-nāma* in connection with this flag-staff. A Brāhmaṇa, we are told, came to Muhammad and said 'We have learnt from our science of the stars that the country of Sind will be conquered by the army of Islam. . . . But as long as that standard of the temple stands in its place, it is impossible for you to take the fort'. Then Muhammad asked his chief engineer to remove the standard by throwing stones from the Catapult, and the standard was broken in no time. Balādhuri relates this incident, but makes no mention of the prophecy of the Brāhmaṇa. The destruction of the standard demoralized the besieged and the town was taken by assault. No quarter was given, and for 3 days the inhabitants were ruthlessly slaughtered by the victorious foe.¹

Muhammad then sent the battering-rams, etc. by boats and himself advanced to Nerun. Its Buddhist priests had already entered into a treasonable correspondence with Hajjāj and now openly received Muhammad and supplied him with provisions.² Muhammad then advanced to Siwistān (Sehwan) and conquered many cities without any serious opposition. The only resistance which he met with was from the city of Siwistān.³ Here, too, the Buddhist party welcomed the Arabs and entered into a compact with them against their own governor. The Buddhist sections of other towns were actuated to do the same, partly on account of their aversion to slaughter and bloodshed, and partly due to their belief in the prophetic saying of the sacred

¹ The date 73 given in *Ch°* (p. 79) for the conquest of Debal, is evidently a mistake for 93. The *Ch°* quotes several letters passing between Dāhar and Muhammad but their genuineness may be doubted. Balādhuri says (p. 218) that after the capture of Debal, Muhammad marked out a quarter for the Muslims, built a mosque and settled 4,000 colonists there. For the identification of Debal, see Geographical Note A, Appendix.

² Cf. *Ch°*, pp. 72 and 89 ff. A Samani, probably a Buddhist, was the governor of Nerun (which is represented now by modern Haidarabad). He not only surrendered Nerun but actively helped Muhammad in the subsequent campaign. Balādhuri calls the place al-Birun (p. 219, but cf. Elliot, vol. i, p. 121 f.n.) and says that its inhabitants had sent two Buddhist monks to al-Hajjāj and had made a treaty with him.

³ This is called Maoj, 30 leagues from Nerun (*Ch°*, p. 93) and also 'the fort of Siwistan' (p. 95). Balādhuri calls it Sahban (p. 219). Maoj was apparently a suburb of Siwistan, modern Sehwan.

books about the conquest of India by Islamic force.¹ Muhammad pursued the ruler of Siwistān as far as Sisam, in Budhiah, and then returned to Nerun, and occupied the city.²

Some leading chiefs of the country now tendered homage to Muhammad and he took by assault the fortified town of Ishbhā.³ Then he proceeded to the country of Raor and Jitor and reached the western bank of the Indus. He now entered into alliance with an important chief called Mokah son of Basāyeh who basely deserted Dāhar on receiving the district of Jortah and the whole province of Bet,⁴ and promised to supply Muhammad with boats for crossing the Indus.

Muhammad then encamped on the bank of the Indus. But before he could cross the river news reached him that Chandram Hālah who some time ago had been the ruler of Siwistan, had caused a revolt, taken possession of the fort and driven away the Arab soldiers. Muhammad sent one of his lieutenants who reduced Siwistan and returned with 4,000 warlike Jats from the place.⁵

¹ *Ch°* (p. 105). Balādhuri (p. 219) cf. Chap. iv, f.n. 14.

² *Ch°* here reproduces some of the incidents which took place at the time of the first conquest of Nerun (cf. p. 91 and 104). It is possible, though not very likely, that the incidents might have been repeated.

³ *Ch°* (p. 105) places it in the year 93 A.H.

⁴ It is difficult to follow *Ch°* at this point. Muhammad writes to Hajjāj from Nerun (pp. 99-100): 'There is one of the tributary rulers under Dāhar, who is the owner of the fortified town of Bet, to the east of the Mehrān, on the bank of a rivulet in an island of the gulf of Khānbehāt and is called Basāmi Rāsal. All the chief officers and noblemen of Rai Dāhar as well as most of the princes of Hind and Sind are under his influence. This prince has been advising and inducing everyone of these great men and nobles to submit to us. They have now great confidence in us and have sent us humble messages promising to be loyal to us.' Next we are told that when Muhammad proceeded from Ishbhā to Raor he was joined by Jāsen, the ruler of Bet. Then suddenly we are introduced to Mokah, son of Basāyeh, a tributary chief and a relation of Dāhar, and Muhammad secured his alliance by cession of Jortah and Bet and granting other honours, and Mokah on his part promised to collect and supply boats to enable Muhammad to cross the Indus, (pp. 104-8).

It is difficult to explain what became of Basāmi Rāsal and Jāsen, both described as rulers of Bet, and why Mokah assumed such an importance in the eyes of Muhammad.

⁵ *Ch°* (pp. 116-7), Balādhuri seems to refer to this episode as the conquest of 'Sadusan' (p. 219). Apparently, he uses the two names 'Sahban' and 'Sadusan' to denote the same place 'Siwistan,' also called Sewan, without probably knowing it himself. Balādhuri is silent about the incidents that took place during the period between the conquest of Siwistan and the suppression of revolt in that place.

Dáhar, with his army, also encamped on the opposite bank of the Indus¹ and his son Jaisimha joined him with a large number of men and instruments of war in boats by the small river of Kotak. Muhammad ibn-Kásim was also reinforced by 2,000 select horse sent by Hajjáj. But he halted on the bank of the river for nearly two months, whereupon Hajjáj reprimanded him and urged him to cross the river and fight with Dáhar. Muhammad, in obedience to Hajjáj's command, made preparations to cross the river. He came to the country of Sakrah, in the district of Jhim, posted a strong garrison at the island of Bet and crossed near it without much difficulty by means of a bridge of boats.²

Muhammad, having crossed to the eastern bank of the Indus, made himself master of the fort of Bet and then proceeded towards Raor. He soon arrived at Jitor and occupied the bank of a lake between Jitor and Raor.³ Dáhar despatched his son Jaisimha to oppose Muhammad, but his army was routed and Jaisimha fled to Dáhar, who was encamped to the east of the lake.

¹ The identification of the place where the two armies were encamped on the opposite banks of the Indus, has been discussed in Appendix B.

² Muhammad crossed the river without any loss. According to Al-Bakádhuri this was due to the help of a neighbouring king, Rasil, the king of Kassah (probably the same as Mokah) who allowed a bridge to be built near his territory. The Chach-náma, on the other hand, suggests that Dáhar deliberately allowed Muhammad to cross the river when the latter offered him the alternative of either crossing the river unopposed, or allowing Muhammad to do the same. An Arab chieftain in the service of Dáhar gave him good advice viz. to oppose the crossing of the Indus by the enemy and to harass them and intercept their supply of provisions by means of guerilla warfare. Dáhar was convinced of the soundness of this advice, but still gallantly offered the passage of the river to Muhammad, saying, 'lest it be imagined by him that we are in perplexity and have become very weak and powerless' (pp. 108-111). Such mediæval chivalry was completely out of place in fighting with a stubborn and determined enemy. But, all the same, Dáhar, according to Ch^o (p. 125), sent the brother of Mokah whom he appointed the governor of Bet, to oppose Muhammad's passage. 'Muhammad, therefore, ordered all the boats to be linked together in a line along the western bank to the length corresponding to the breadth of the river at that place . . . then moving the whole block of boats, keeping one end of it fixed at the crossing-point and turning the other, the head boat was made to touch the opposite point on the eastern bank.' The Arab soldiers now landed from the boats and made vigorous assaults. Dáhar's soldiers fled and were pushed up to the fort of Jhim (Ch^o 125).

It may be noted here that according to Táríkh Māsūmí, Muhammad crossed at Talla in order to go to Alor.

³ Ch^o—pp. 126 ff.

The brother of Moka, whom Dáhar had appointed governor of Bet in place of the latter, now joined Muhammad. By the help and advice of the two renegade brothers, Muhammad crossed the lake that lay between his and Dáhar's army and encamped at Jitor on the stream of Doharah whence he could command both the front and rear of Dáhar's army and cut off its supply. Dáhar then went to the fort of Raor and having left his baggage and retinue, took up a position about a league from the Arab army.

Here a pitched battle took place between the two armies. The Chachnáma has described it in detail.¹ In spite of desertion and

¹ The details of the battle are taken from Ch^o, pp. 133 ff. Baládhuri's account is very brief.

The date of the defeat and death of Dáhar at the hands of Muhammad ibn-Kásim is variously given. Chach-náma (p. 137) gives the date as 93 A.H. (= A.D. 712.). Tuhfat-ul-Kirám places the event on the 11th day of Ramzan (16th June A.D. 712) (Ch^o, p. 137 f.n.). Baládhuri does not mention any date, but Tabari gives the following chronology. 'In the year 90 Muhammad ibn-Kásim killed the king of Sind. In the year 94 he conquered India and in the year 95 he conquered further India with the exception of Kiráj and Alimandel (f. 188. Translated by Weil in Geschichteder Chalifen. p. 506 f.n. 1.) The interval of 4 years, between the death of Dáhar and the conquest of India by Muhammad ibn-Kásim is difficult to explain, and it may be suspected that 90 is a misreading for 93.

According to both Abul Fida and Abul Faraj, the conquest of India took place in 94, while ibn Kutaiba places it in 93 (Elliot, p. 436). I do not know on what authority A. Müller gives the date as 89 A.H. (Der Islam in Morgen Und Abendland, pp. 412-13).

On the whole it would, I think, be safer to take 93 A.H. (A.D. 712) as the date of the battle.

The piracy at Debal which was regarded as *causus belli* by Hajjáj must have taken place a few years before this. No definite date is given for this event in Chach-náma but there are some details which enable us to arrive at an approximate date. We are told (p. 69) that Muhammad Hárún was sent to Hindustan (apparently the border-land of Makrán) after 86 A.H. when Walíd became Caliph, and spent five years in fighting with Alafis and other enemies. As the incident about piracy is placed after this, it cannot be dated before 91 A.H. On the other hand, this date cannot be pushed any further, for between this date and the year 93, the date of the expedition of Muhammad ibn-Kásim, we have to place the negotiations between Hajjáj and Dáhar and two unsuccessful expeditions sent by Hajjáj, permission for which had to be secured, with difficulty and after some delay, from the unwilling Caliph.

According to Táríkh-Māsūmí, Muhammad ibn-i-Kásim started on his Indian expedition in 92 A.H. (Ch^o, p. 75 f.n.). This would make the date 91 very doubtful, if not impossible. On the other hand, a statement by Abul Fida would induce us to push back this date very considerably. This passage, quoted by Weil (Geschichte der Chalifen, p. 504 f.n. 1) may be summed up as follows: 'Hajjáj, therefore, requested Abdul Malik to send an army to India but he declined to subject the Muslims to perils of a distant land. When Walíd succeeded, he granted the

treachery, Dáhar fought with valour, and on the second day the Muslim army was nearly routed. 'Thus the infidels made a rush on the Arabs from all sides, and fought so steadily and bravely that the army of Islam became irresolute, and their lines were broken up in great confusion. It was generally believed that the Arabs were defeated and put to flight and men were struck dumb and overawed.'¹

Muhammad rallied his men by evoking the name of the great and glorious God, and the renegade chiefs of Sind came to his aid. The battle was renewed. 'Dáhar drove his elephant upon the army of Islam. Muhammad ibn-Kásim then ordered his naphtha-flingers to shoot their naphtha, and one of these men threw a naphtha arrow at the litter of Dáhar on the elephant and the litter immediately caught fire.' The elephant thereupon madly plunged into water. Although Dáhar got back on shore, he became the target of Muslim archers, and an arrow struck him at his heart. He slowly dismounted from the elephant when an Arab swordsman cut off his head.

As usual, the death of the king was followed by a complete rout of the army, and the survivors took refuge in the fort of Raor. Jaisinha, the son of Dáhar, now retreated to the strong fort of Bahmanábád while the widowed queen was left to defend Raor. The queen put up a brave resistance, and when conditions became hopeless, burnt herself along with other ladies to escape the infamy of falling into the hands of the Muslims. Raor fell into the hands of Muhammad ibn-Kásim.

Muhammad now marched towards Bahmanábád. On the way he had to spend nearly four months for capturing two fortified towns called Bahrór and Dahlelah. Jaisinha also made elaborate preparations, but he suffered a serious loss by the desertion of the old Wazir to Muhammad. Jaisinha strongly fortified Alor, the capital, and Bahmanábád, and himself moved with an army to harass the enemy and cut off its supplies. Muhammad ibn-Kásim besieged Bahmanábád. 'Every day the besieged came out and offered battle and fierce fight continued from morning till evening.' In this way they fought for six months. When Muhammad ibn-Kásim despaired of taking the fort his mind became full of anxiety. But here again treachery played its

request of Hajjáj.' According to this, the piracy must have taken place sometime before 86 A.H. the date of the death of Abdul Malik. This would place the piracy 6 or 7 years before the expedition of Muhammad ibn-Kásim—a very reasonable period to account for all that happened during the interval.

¹ Ch°, p. 142.

part and some leading citizens entered into a secret covenant with Muhammad and betrayed the fort.¹ Muhammad subdued several other places and then proceeded to the capital city Alor, which was in charge of Fofi, son of Dáhar. After some fighting, the residents of the city wanted to make peace with Muhammad, whereupon Fofi withdrew from the city and joined his brothers Jaisinha and Wakiah at a place called Nazwalah Sandal in Jitor. Alor submitted to the conqueror.²

After conquering the strongholds of Bábiah, Gholkonda and Sakkah, Muhammad proceeded to Multan. Here a brave resistance was offered by Kundrai and Bachchra. Fighting continued for two months and Muhammad was unable to make a breach in the walls. Here, again, treachery played its part. A traitor pointed out to Muhammad the source of water-supply for the town. Muhammad cut it off and the besieged were obliged to surrender.³

The conquest of Multan was the last great achievement of Muhammad, although he followed it up by other minor conquests. He conquered al-Kíraj, subdued al-Bailamán and made peace with the people of Surast. The death of Hajjáj in 714 A.D. and that of Caliph Walíd, the year following, brought in evil days for him. The next Caliph Sulaimán was a great enemy of Hajjáj and wreaked his vengeance on the members of his family. Muhammad ibn-Kásim was recalled to Irák where, with certain other adherents of Hajjáj, he was put to torture and died.⁴

¹ Ch°, pp. 156-171. Baládhuri, p. 221.

The date of the capture of Bahmanábád is given as 93 in the Text of Ch°—but is evidently a mistake for 94 (p. 159 f.n.).

² Ch°, pp. 175-181. Baládhuri (p. 221) names Baghrur, Sawandrai and Basmad as having been conquered by Muhammad between Bahmanábád and Alor. Ch° names Musthal, Bharowar, the lands of the Sammahs, Luhanahs and Sahtahs. Alor fell in 94 A.H. This is implied in Ch° and expressly stated in 'Tuhfatul Kirám' (Ch°, p. 177 f.n.).

³ Baládhuri (p. 222) only refers to the conquest of Sikkah and Multan. Ch° (pp. 187-192) gives fuller details. Cunningham has argued against the probability that Multan could have been forced to surrender from want of water (Anc. Geo., p. 275).

⁴ Muir—*The Caliphate* (New Edition), p. 354. According to Baládhuri Muhammad returned from Multan to Alor on hearing of Hajjáj's death, and then conquered Al-Kíraj. He also sent force against Al-Bailamán, which submitted, and made peace with the Mids of Surast. (For identification, cf. App. B).

As soon as Sulaimán became Caliph, he sent Yazid to Sind. Yazid put Muhammad in chains and tortured him to death. According to Ch°, Muhammad did not return from his expedition to the north.

According to Chach-nāma Muhammad had proceeded from Multan to the frontiers of Kashmir, and at the same time sent an expedition against Kanauj. But before any material success was obtained, the fatal order of the Caliph condemning Muhammad to a barbarous death stopped all further proceedings.¹

The Indian kings did not fail to take advantage of this internal commotion among the Muslims, and re-occupied their kingdoms. Dāhar's son Jaisimha re-occupied Bahmanābād. The Caliph sent Habib to subdue Sind. He conquered Alor and made some minor conquests.²

The next Caliph Umar II (A.D. 717-720), himself a man of austere religious devotion, wrote to the kings of Sind, inviting them to become Muslims and be subject to him, agreeing to let them continue on their thrones and have the same privileges and obligations as the Muslims. Many kings, including Jaisimha, son of Dāhar, accepted Islam and adopted Arab names. Thus the province of Sind became independent again, and Kandābīl or Gandava is referred to as 'on the remotest frontiers of the Arab Empire'.³

During the Caliphate of Hishām (A.D. 724-743) Junaid was appointed the governor of Sind. A quarrel soon broke out between him and Jaisimha, the son of Dāhar. Jaisimha apostatized and declared war against Junaid, but was defeated in a naval engagement in the lake of Sarki and taken prisoner.⁴

Junaid then conquered al-Kiraj and sent expeditions to the interior of the country. He sent lieutenants against Marmad or Mirmad, al-Mandal, Dahnaj and Barwas. He also sent an army to Uzain and

¹ Ch^o relates the story how two virgin daughters of Dāhar, who were sent as prisoners to Caliph Walid, brought about the death of Muhammad ibn-Kāsim by falsely accusing him of having outraged them before sending them to the Caliph. The story seems to be palpably absurd. The Caliph who ordered the death of Muhammad was not Walid but his successor Sulaimān, and his barbarous treatment of Muhammad and other partisans of Hajjāj can be easily explained by the strained relation between the two.

² As the accounts in Ch^o do not proceed beyond the death of Muhammad ibn-Kāsim, our sole authority for the account that follows, unless otherwise stated, is Balādhuri (pp. 225 ff.). The name of Dāhar's son is written as Hullishah, but cf. Balādhuri, vol. ii. p. 225 f.n. 1 and Elliot, vol. i. p. 124 f.n. 2.

³ Elliot, vol. i. p. 440.

⁴ The original expression is *Balīḥatū'sh-Sharqiy*. Haig takes it to mean 'the eastern inland sea' that is, the sea that once permanently covered and that still periodically covers the Ran of Kachchh ('Indus Delta country,' p. 65).

the land of Al-Malibah. They waged a war with Uzain, raided Bahrimad and set fire to its suburbs. Al-Junaid himself conquered al-Bailamān and al-Jurz.¹

Among the places named, Marmad may be safely identified with Maru-Māra corresponding to Jaisalmer and part of Jodhpur. Barwas is undoubtedly Broach, and Al-Mandal probably denotes Mandor. Jurz was the Arabic corruption of Gurjara and Al-Bailamān probably refers to the circle of states referred to in Ghaṭiyālā inscription of Kakkuka as Vallamaṇḍala. Uzain and Maliba no doubt refer to Ujjain and Mālava, i.e., the eastern and western Malwa.

The Nausari plates of the Gujarat Chālukya Pulakeśirāja, dated A. D. 738, refer to Arab expeditions in course of which they defeated the kings of the Saindhavas, the Kachchhellas, Saurāshṭra, the Chāvotakas, the Mauryas and the Gurjaras. There can be hardly any doubt that these expeditions refer to those undertaken by Junaid or his lieutenants. We learn from Nausari plates that Pulakeśirāja defeated the Arabs, while the Gwalior inscription of Bhoja tells us that the Pratihāra king Nāgabhaṭa defeated the powerful forces of a *Mlechchha* king. As the dates of both these events fall within a decade of A. D. 724 it confirms and explains the statement of Al-Balādhuri that 'in the days of Tamīm (the successor of Junaid) the Muslims withdrew from the land of Al-Hind, and abandoned their headquarters and they have not returned so far as that since'.² Unfortunately the fragmentary nature of Indian evidence does not supply us detailed information of the course of events which compelled the Muslim forces, after the first flush of their success, to take shelter behind the Indus. Whether the result was due to the combined efforts of Indian chiefs including the Pratihāra king Nāgabhaṭa, and the Chālukya king Pulakeśirāja, or to isolated victories obtained by them, we do not know; but there is no doubt that henceforth the Muslim suzerainty stopped short at the right bank of the Indus. This is confirmed by the following statement of Al-Balādhuri.

¹ These conquests of Junaid have been partly discussed in my monograph on the Gurjara-Pratihāras (*Journal of the Department of Letters*, Calcutta University, vol. x. pp. 20 ff.) The two paragraphs that follow are merely summaries of that discussion. For further discussion on the identity of the kingdoms named cf. App. B.

² Balādhuri, (p. 228).

'Afterwards, while al-Hakam ibn-'Awānah al-Kalbi was ruler, the people of Al-Hind apostatized with the exception of the inhabitants of Kassah. A place of refuge to which the Muslims might flee was not to be found, so he built on the further side of the lake (al-Buhairah), where it borders on Al-Hind, a city which he named al-Mahfūṭhah, establishing it as a place of refuge for them where they would be secure, and making it a capital. ¹

Later on, continues al-Balādhuri, al-Hakam 'built on this side of the lake a city which he called al-Manṣūrah. It is where the governors reside to-day'. ²

Al-Hakam fought and scored some successes, but was killed. Afterwards, the governors 'kept fighting the enemy and seizing whatever came into their hands, and subduing places in the neighbourhood whose inhabitants rebelled'. ³

Thus the period of confusion in the Islamic state during the last years of the Umayyids also witnessed the decline of Islamic power in India.

With the establishment of the Abbāssids, a fresh effort was made to extend the power of Islam. Al-Manṣūr (A. D. 754-775) appointed Ḥishām ibn-'Amr-at-Taghlibi, governor of Sind. 'He conquered Kashmir, obtaining many prisoners and slaves. He conquered al-Multan and cleared out a faction of Arabs which was in Kandābīl. He went to al-Kunduhār with the fleet, and conquered it, throwing down the Budd (i.e. a temple) and building a mosque in its place. ⁴

It is difficult to imagine that Kashmir, then at the height of its power, was conquered in any sense of the term. At the utmost it can only mean some successful frontier raids. On the other hand it has been inferred by Levi and Chavannes from some statements in the *Rājataranginī* that Lalitāditya Mukṭāpīḍa (C. A. D. 733-769) thrice defeated

¹ Balādhuri, (pp. 228-229).

² *Ibid*, p. 229.

³ *Ibid*, p. 229.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 231. Al-Kunduhār is Kandahar (Le Strange, p. 347). For other identifications cf. Elliot vol. i, p. 445. But it is difficult to understand how Kandahar could be approached by a fleet. The Abbassid governors had to fight with Arab factions, evidently partisans of the Umayyids, both in Kandābīl and on the bank of the Indus, for Balādhuri tells us (p. 230) that Mūsa routed the army of Manṣūr ibn-Jamhūr al-Kalbi, somewhere near the Indus, and the latter fled towards the desert and perished of thirst. As to Kandahar, the place was evidently taken from the Indians, first, because no Arab faction is referred to, and secondly, because the destruction of a Hindu temple and building of a new mosque in its place, are signs of a new conquest.

a ruling chief of the Arabs. The fact that we do not hear of any further Arab invasion of Kashmir seems to confirm the view that Lalitāditya effectively checked the aggression of the Arabs in that quarter. ¹

The reconquest of Multan shows that the Arabs had lost the whole of northern Sind during the period of confusion.

In the next Caliphate, that of al-Mahdī, a naval expedition was sent against India under Ar-Rabī ibn-Ṣubh al-Fakīh, but it was a failure. Ar-Rabī died and was buried in one of the islands in the year 160. ² During the Caliphate of Hārūn-al-Rashid, his governor of Sind is said to have conquered a few places in western Sind.

The Abbassids do not seem to have gained much success in their Indian expeditions, nor were they able to consolidate the Muslim conquests in Sind. Imrān ibn-Mūsa, the governor under Caliph Mutasim-billāh (A. D. 833-842), 'made an expedition against the Kikānites, who are Zutt, fighting and defeating them, and building a city which he called al-Baiḍa', where he established his army'. This shows that the hardy Jāṭhs of Kikānān, who defied the Muslim arms as early as the year 42 A. H. (A. D. 662), were far from being subdued yet. Further, we hear of frequent conflicts with Jāṭhs and Meds in the neighbourhood of Alor, the capital of Sind. Sometimes the Muslim army met with serious disaster. Thus they captured a place called Sindan during the Caliphate of al-Ma'mun, and sent later on, from this base, a naval expedition with 70 ships of war. The fleet conquered Fāli and returned to Sindan. The Hindus of Sindan, however, rose against its ruler and killed and crucified him. They became masters of the city but 'left its mosque for the Muslims to assemble in and pray for the Caliph'. ³

With the decline of the Abbassid power, the Muslim governor of Sind became virtually independent. In 257 A. H. (A. D. 871) the

¹ *Rājataranginī*—Ch. IV. v 167. Levi and Chavannes infer from this verse that Lalitāditya thrice defeated the Arab chief, the word *Mummuni* in this verse being taken by them as equivalent to 'Amir-al-Mumenim' the title of the Caliph (*Journal Asiatique* 1895, Part II p. 350 f.n. 1). Stein, however, does not accept this view (cf. his remarks on his English translation of this verse).

² Balādhuri, p. 96.

³ Balādhuri, pp. 231-233

The identity of Sindan is doubtful. According to Raṣhīd Uddīn it was between Broach and Supara, and nearer to the latter (Elliot Vol. I, p. 66; cf. also *Ibid*, p. 402).

Caliph practically handed over the province to the famous Suffarid leader Ya'kub ibn-Lais. Upon the latter's death, the Muslim territories in Sind were divided between two independent chiefs, those of Mansúra (near Bahmanábád) and Multan. None of these ever attained to great power, and both had to live in constant dread of their Indian neighbours.

CHAPTER VI

RETROSPECT

If we pass in review the main incidents narrated above in connection with the early Muslim raids on the western border-lands of India, we can have a better perspective view of the history of three centuries of Arab efforts for the conquest of India. The first thing that strikes us is the persistent effort of the Arabs to conquer India, and their wonderful organization, backed by superior knowledge and statesmanship. Since the days of the Second Caliph Umar, the conquest of Hind and Sind loomed large in the eyes of successive Caliphs and their eastern governors, and they set about their task with a method and determination so rarely to be met with among other nations of that age.

It is well-known that only four routes are open to a hostile army operating against India from the west. One way is by the sea, and the other three lie, roughly speaking, through Khyber Pass, Bolan Pass and the Makrán coast. It cannot be regarded as a mere coincidence that, from the very beginning, we find the Arabs endeavouring to penetrate into India through every one of these routes. The early naval raids against Thana, Broach and Debal, and subsequent raids in the same direction, mark their vain efforts to reach India by sea. Of the land-routes, the Khyber Pass was guarded by Kabul and Zabul while the Bolan Pass was guarded by the brave Jāths of al-Kikàn or Kikànàn. The long-drawn struggles of the Arabs with these powers, which we have narrated above, mark their steady but fruitless endeavours to enter India through the two great passes. The hardy mountaineers of these regions, backed by the natural strength of their hilly country, offered a stubborn resistance to the conquerors of the world, and though often defeated, ever refused to yield. Unfortunately we have no independent evidence of the brave and heroic fights they

put up for more than two hundred years, and our knowledge is entirely derived from the picture as painted by the hands of the victors. But even from the records of Muhammadan writers we can have some idea of the wonderful skill and energy which they displayed against enormous odds, and the crushing and humiliating defeats which they not unoften inflicted upon the army of Islam. If India had her history, the heroic deeds of these brave peoples, who defended her gates against Islam for two centuries, would probably have ere long received the recognition they so eminently deserve.

When all the three routes failed, the Muhammadans attempted the fourth one through Makrán coast. Makrán was then dependent on the ruler of Sind, and he must have undoubtedly opposed a resistance to the Muslims in that region. The Muhammadan historians have dimly preserved the reminiscence of this, though details are lacking.¹ Here, again, the early efforts of the Arabs did not prove very successful, but ultimately Muhammad ibn-Kásim forced his way through it to the heart of Sind.

We may pause for a moment to consider why the Arabs succeeded in this route, while they failed in the other three. In the absence of fuller knowledge of details, it is not possible to give a complete and satisfactory answer to this question, but several points seem to suggest themselves on a perusal of the scanty material that we possess.

In the first place, the equipment of the army of Muhammad ibn-Kásim was made on a lavish scale and forces were requisitioned even from distant Syria.² Hajjáj, the energetic governor, had staked his reputation upon this one expedition³ and personally looked to the smallest details. His master-mind directed the whole operation from a distance; and he found in Muhammad ibn-Kásim a faithful, honest, able and obedient lieutenant. The value of this factor can be easily judged when we contrast this expedition with that sent against Zabulistan under 'Abd-ar-Rahmán about 13 years before. That expedition too, was splendidly equipped, but the personal differences between Hajjáj and 'Abd-ar-Rahmán led to a veritable disaster.

¹ Cf. Ch. V, f.n. 2.

² For details of Kásim's army cf. Elliot, Vol. I, (p. 434 ff.)

³ Cf. Ch. V, f.n. 18.

But while the army of Islam had had all the advantages, the kingdom of Sind was labouring at this moment under some peculiar disadvantages which have been stated above.¹ While these had undermined the strength of the kingdom, the personality of the king and the treachery and superstitions of the people were no less important factors in bringing about the downfall of the state. King Dāhar was not lacking in courage or bravery, but his statesmanship and military skill were of a very inferior type. Muhammad ibn-Kāsim had chosen the Makrān route and was obliged to send his heavy luggage, particularly the siege materials, by way of sea. It is impossible to explain why Dāhar did not make any efforts to engage the Muslim fleet before it reached Debal. The Muhammadans were not a strong sea-power, and the very fact that they dared send their heavy war-equipment by way of sea shows that they did not regard the naval strength of Dāhar as of much importance. Yet precisely it was here that Dāhar showed a lamentable lack of insight. He could not possibly be unaware of the constant and determined endeavours of the Muslim forces to invade his kingdom. He knew that the enemy could choose either the route through Bolan Pass or the Makrān coast and although an invasion by sea alone was not likely, the sea-power was an important factor for an army marching through Makrān. For, that army would have to depend upon a fleet for carrying its heavy siege materials, and even apart from that consideration, an enemy fleet cruising along the coast would make the position of the invading army sufficiently precarious. Thus the command over sea was essential for the success of an invading army marching through Makrān.

All these facts should have been obvious to the king of Sind, but although he evidently put forth great efforts to guard the Bolan Pass through Kīkān², he did not seem to have taken any precaution to guard against the invasion by Makrān. He seems to have hardly any navy. He confessed to Hajjāj that he could not control the pirates near the coast of Debal, and we do not hear of any opposition being given to the Muhammadan navy, either in the course of its journey by sea to Debal

¹ See Ch. IV, pp. 23 ff.

² As Kīkān was, at least nominally, included in the kingdom of Sind, it may be presumed that the king of Sind was aiding the people of Kīkān in their brave defence.

or in the course of its sailing up the Indus to Nerun. The absence of a navy in a state which possesses an extensive sea-coast exposed to enemy raids is almost incredible. It can only be accounted for by the fact that for nearly 30 years, from 670 to 700 A.D., Dāhar was not in possession of the southern part of Sind and it came into his possession only about 10 years before the expedition of Muhammad ibn-Kāsim. While Dāhar was busy fighting with the Muslims near his frontiers at Kīkānān, the rival king Daharsiah was probably making a friendly gesture to the Arabs against their common enemy. In any case the subsequent events show that the southern parts of Sind were favourably inclined to the Arabs. Both Nerun and Siwistan, the two main strongholds of Sind in the south, opened their gates to Muhammad ibn-Kāsim without any resistance, and the details given in Chach-nāma certainly indicate that an alliance already existed between the leading people of Nerun and the Muslim power.¹ In addition to rivalry between the kings Dāhar and Daharsiah, religious differences also helped to further the split between the north and the south. The latter was the stronghold of the Buddhists and, for reasons stated above, the Buddhists fraternized with the Muhammadans, instead of rallying to their king and defending their country.²

This unpatriotic character of the Buddhists is, no doubt, partly due to their aversion to war and bloodshed insisted upon by their religious creed, but it is also partly due to the international character which was associated with the religion from an early date. The spread of Buddhism outside the frontiers of India, gave it a catholic character and the ideal of universal religious fraternity transcended that of a nation or country. That is at least the most favourable interpretation we can give of their desertion and treachery.

But even if the absence of the navy may be explained, it is difficult to account for the way in which Dāhar allowed the Muslim army to cross unopposed the mighty river Sind. Chach-nāma has preserved a story which ascribes it to the mediæval gallantry on the part of

¹ Chach-nāma states (p. 72) that the Buddhist governor of Nerun sent his confidential agents to Hajjāj and entered into an agreement with him, even before Muhammad ibn-Kāsim set out on his expedition.

² Cf. Ch. IV, f.n. 14; cf. also the speech attributed to the Buddhist priests of Siwistan in Ch^o, p. 93.

Dáhar but we can only describe it as an incredible folly.¹ According to Chach-náma, an Arab chieftain advised Dáhar to oppose the crossing of the river and to harass the enemy and intercept their supply of provisions by means of guerilla warfare.² Whether this be true or not, the course suggested was one which should have commended itself to any one possessing an ordinary degree of military skill. The position of Muhammad ibn-Kásim was a difficult one. With the mighty river in front and the hostile hilly country behind, he could have easily been harassed, in the way suggested, for any length of time. But Dáhar failed to take advantage of his strategic position. Compare this with the skill with which the kings of Kabul and Zabul fully utilized the natural advantages of their hilly country by luring the enemy into inextricable situations amid the hills, and we shall find adequate reason for the failure of one and the success of the other against the Muslims.

To the inexplicable want of strategy on the part of Dáhar, and the treachery of the Buddhists of the south, we must add the base betrayal of the chief officials and grandees of Sind to account for its ruler's ignominious end. All important chiefs and officials seem to have deserted his cause. This is partly accounted for by the superstitious idea prevailing among the people that according to the Hindu Śāstras (sacred books) the country was destined to fall into the hands of the Muhammadans, and it was therefore useless to fight.³ But the attitude of the chiefs was perhaps also due to personal feelings against the son of the usurper who had driven out the old royal family.

All these causes, and perhaps others which we do not know, account for the fall of Sind. The conquest of Sind should not,

¹ Cf. Ch. V. f.n. 31.

² *Ibid.*

³ When Muhammad was besieging Debal, 'a Brahmin came forth from the garrison, and cried for mercy. He said 'We have learnt from our science of the stars that the country of Sind will be conquered by the army of Islam and the infidels will be put to flight' (Ch°, p. 81). Again, the chief of Budhiah told Muhammad ibn-Kásim; 'our astrologers and interpreters of dreams have found out by means of the astronomical science, and have openly given out, that this whole country will fall into the hands of the army of Islam' (Ch°, p. 97). Mokah, son of Basáyeh, deserted his master and joined Muhammad ibn-Kásim because 'the sages and philosophers of Hind, who are the original residents of this country, have found from their books of antiquity, by the use of their astrolabe and their astrology, that this empire will be conquered by an army of Islam' . . . (Ch°, p. 107).

therefore, be regarded as indicating in a general way the superiority of the Muslims over the Indians, from a military point of view. This is further borne out by the fact that the conquest of Sind was the first and the last great achievement of the Arabs in India. Junaid, no doubt, was triumphant for a time over the petty states in the neighbourhood of Sind, but as soon as he came into conflict with the powerful states like those of the Pratihāras and the Chālukyas, the spell of his success was broken. Even the greater part of Sind was lost in a short time. Ultimately, after three centuries of unremittent efforts, we find the Arab dominion confined to the two petty states of Mansura and Multan.

The Arab penetration into India and Europe presents some striking parallels. The Arabs got a footing in a corner of Europe through the conquest of Spain, almost about the same time that they obtained a similar hold on India by the conquest of Sind, treachery playing no small part in either case. In both cases they started from the base, thus secured, to make further conquests and enter into the very hearts of Europe and India. For a time they seemed to carry everything. But Charles Martel saved Europe by the famous victory at Poitiers, and about the same time the Arabs received a similar check in India, in the hands of Nāgabhaṭa and Pulakeśi. But neither history nor tradition has preserved the name and fame of these Charles Martels of India. Only the study of archæology in recent times has rescued from oblivion the names of the two heroes to whom belongs the credit of saving India from the hands of the Arabs. The check in both cases proved effective. The Arabs occupied Spain, but had to give up the ambition of conquering Europe. In India the Arabs continued to occupy the valley of the Indus, but their attempts to penetrate further inland proved abortive. Even on the Indus their position was a precarious one and the hardy trans-Indus tribes like the Jāṭhs of Kíkánán were far from being thoroughly subdued.

The decline of the Arab supremacy in India, after the short but brilliant successes of Muhammad ibn-Kásim and Junaid must be attributed to two main causes, viz., the internal condition of the Muslim empire in the last days of the Umayyids, and the alertness and strength of Indian States. The conquest of Sind made the Indians realize the gravity of their danger, and fortunately there were powerful kings who had enough military strength to inflict crushing defeats upon the

foreigners. Reference has been made to the Pratihara king Nāgabhaṭa, Chalukya king Pulakeśiraja and the king of Kaśmir, Lalitāditya, who all defeated the Muslims. The extent to which the Indians realized the nature of this danger appears from the fact that sometime between A.D. 713 and 741 a king of Central India, (most probably king Yaśovarman of Kanauj, which, as we have seen above, was threatened by Muhammad ibn-Kāsim), sent an ambassador to the Chinese emperor with a view to make a common cause against the growing menace of Islamic power.¹

The Arabs scored their early successes against one great border kingdom when the mainland had hardly realized the importance of the rise of the new power. But in the second quarter of the eighth century A. D. the latter became alive to the danger and proved fully equal to meet them. Even the establishment of the strong Abbassid power could not materially alter the situation. For about the same time arose two great powers, the Pālas and the Pratihāras which were able to defend their country against the aggressive Islamic power. King Dharmapāla is said in Khālimpur plates to have compelled the Yavana king to acknowledge his suzerainty,² and the term *Yavana* can, at this period, refer only to some Muslim power. The Pratihara king Nagabhata II, who flourished early in the ninth century A.D. and was a contemporary of the great Caliphs, Hārūn Ar-Rashid and Al-Māmūn, is described in the Gwalior inscription as having defeated the kings of Sind and captured the strongholds of the Turushkas.³ Here, again,

¹ Muhammad ibn-Kāsim sent a message to Rai Harchandar Jahshal, king of Kanauj, asking him to submit (Ch^o, p. 192).

Jahsal may be Arabic corruption of Yaso (varman) who, we know, was ruling in Kanauj at the time. For the embassy to China cf. Sylvain Lévi—*Le Nepal*—Vol. II, pp. 174–175.

² *Ep. Indica*, Vol. IV, pp. 243 ff. Dharmapāla, according to verse 12 held at Kanauj an assembly of his vassal chiefs, viz. kings of Bhoja, Matsya Madra Kuru, Yadu, *Yavana*, Avanti, Gandhara and Kira. As he conquered the states in western and Central Punjab (Gandhara and Madra) and also Malwa and probably Kathiawar Peninsula (Avanti, Yadu) he might have approached the *Yavana* (Muslim) territory either from the north or from the west.

³ *Ep. Indica*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 99 ff. In verse 8 we are told that the king of Sindhu submitted to Nāgabhaṭa. Again in verse 11 Nāgabhaṭa is said to have forcibly seized the hill-forts of the Turushka king. The reference in both cases, and at least in the latter, seems to be to the Muslim ruler of Sind. The reference to Turushka may be explained by the fact that sometime the governors of Sind came from Tukharistan (cf. Balādhuri, p. 230).

the reference is undoubtedly to the Muslim power in Sind. This evidence from Indian side is fully corroborated by the significant fact that Muslim chroniclers do not record any successful Indian campaign since the days of Junaid.¹

We have got a picture of the Muslim power in India at the middle of the tenth century A.D. from the pen of Mas'ūdī.² At that time the Islamic power was confined to the two principalities of Multan and Mansūra. The latter extended, roughly speaking, from the sea to Alor where the former commenced. None of these seems to have been a very powerful state. As regards Multan we are told that one army of the Pratihāra emperor of Kanauj was engaged in fighting with its Muslim ruler. The latter, however, found his security, not so much in his own military strength as in the religious superstitions of the Hindus, for Multan possessed the famous idol which was venerated all over India. 'When the unbelievers' says Al-Mas'ūdī, 'march against Multan, and the faithful do not feel themselves strong enough to oppose them, they threaten to break their idol, and their enemies immediately withdraw'. Similar statement is made by Iṣṭākhri who adds that otherwise the Indians would have destroyed Multan.³

The position of the kingdom of Mansūra, according to Mas'ūdī, was equally unsafe. 'It was constantly at war with a nation called the Meds, who are a race of Sind, and also with other races on the frontiers of Sind.'⁴

Besides the two principalities of Mansūra and Multan in the Indus valley there were other Muslim principalities in the west beyond the Indus, such as Turan and Kushdar, corresponding to old Kikānān, Makrān, and Mushki on the border of Kirmān. Thus even after efforts of 300 years the Arabs were unable to get much beyond the western trans-Indus frontiers of India. When we remember their wonderful

¹ The Dholpur Inscription (Z.D.M.G., Vol. xl, pp. 39 ff.), dated 898 V. S. (A.D. 842) states that powerful Mlechchha rulers on the river Chambal made obeisance to (*Pranātā Sevāni Kurvantī*) the Chāhamāna king 'Chanda Mahāsena. If the 'Mlechchha' denote the Muslim, we have another interesting evidence of the breakdown of the Muslim power in the first half of the ninth century A.D. in consequence of the rise of powerful Hindu ruling dynasties.

² Elliot, Vol. I, pp. 23–24.

³ *Ibid*, p. 28.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 24.

military success in other parts of Asia and Africa, the comparatively insignificant results they achieved in India certainly stand out as a marked contrast. The cause of this, however, does not lie in the religious and social peculiarities of India as old historians like Elphinstone vainly attempted to establish. The cause lies undoubtedly in the superior military strength and state-organization of the Indians as compared with most other nations of the time. However incredible this might appear in the light of subsequent events, this is the plain verdict of history.

APPENDIX

GEOGRAPHICAL NOTE

A. THE TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF THE

KINGDOM OF SIND

THE extent of the kingdom of Sind in the reign of king Sahiras, son of King Sâhasi Rai, is described in Chach-nâma, Târikh-i-M'asûmi and Tuhfat-ul-Kirâm (Ch° p. 11 f.n.). From these it would appear that the kingdom at that time included the modern province of that name together with a large portion of the Punjab and Baluchistan. The Târikh-i-M'asûmi and the Tuhfat-ul-Kirâm, no doubt, bring its southern limit up to the port of Surat, but there is no authority for it in Chach-nâma and it does not seem likely.

The kingdoms of Kashmir and Kanauj formed its northern and north-eastern boundary; but these must have included a portion of northern and eastern Punjab. On the west and north-west the boundary must have been variable and can not be exactly defined. But it seems to have included Makrân and the hills of Kîkânân, the region round Bolan Pass.

The central portion of this kingdom was under the direct sway of the king with his capital at Alor. The rest was divided into four provinces, with headquarters respectively at Bahmanâbâd, Siwistân, Iskandah and Multan. These governors were more like feudatory princes, and not unoften rebelled against the royal authority. They seem to have all rebelled against Chach when he usurped the throne, and he had to undertake a prolonged and tedious campaign against all the four provinces in order to establish his authority over them. From details of this campaign as given in Chach-nâma, we get a fairly accurate idea of the nature and extent of the kingdom of Sind, shortly before the invasion of the Arabs.

We proceed to discuss the four provinces mentioned above, separately, beginning from the north.

I. The division of Iskandah with 'Bâbiah, Sawârah, Jajhôr and Dhanôd as its chief places'. (p. 12).

As this division was subdued by Chach before he proceeded to Multan, it must be located between Alor and that place.

Bâbiah was the first stronghold in this division which was conquered by Chach (p. 26). Bâbiah is also written as Pâya, Bâhiya, Pâhiya etc., in different manuscripts. [Cunningham has suggested its identification with Bhatia (*Anc. Geogr.* (p. 294) and this is very plausible in view of the fact that apparently the same place is elsewhere named Batia in Ch° (p. 156). But Raverty denies this and takes Bhatia in the sense of the city of the Bhatti tribe (*J. A. S. B.* 1892, p. 247, f.n.). According to Alberuni, Bhati was midway between Aror and Multan]. Ch° places Bâbiah on the southern bank of the river Bias which then flowed as a separate river to the south and east of Multan (Cunningham, p. 271). It may be safely identified with 'Pabiyah-Puberwalla' on the maps about 29 miles to the eastward of Uchch (Raverty *J. A. S. B.* 1892, pp. 388-9).

From Bâbiah Chach proceeded to Iskandah, the chief city (p. 27). This name is also written as Askalanda (Elliot I, p. 138) and various other ways. Cunningham identified it with Uchch, which was also supposed to be the site of Alexandria

(pp. 277 ff). But Raverty has shown good grounds for rejecting this (*J. A. S. B.*, 1892, pp. 251-2, f.n.).

Among the other places Sawārah may be identified with Seorai, the strong fort, which was captured by Husen Shah Arghun on his way from Bhakar to Multan. Cunningham identifies it with the village of Sirwahi, 96 miles below Uchch and 85 miles above Alor (*Anc. Geo.*, p. 292).

Jajhōr and Dhanōd cannot be identified at present.

II. The Multan division which comes next was a fairly extensive one. Chach first captured the fort of Sikkah, opposite Multan, towards the east, and then Multan itself fell into his hands. Sikkah, according to Cunningham, 'must have been somewhat near the present Māri Sital which is on the bank of the old bed of the Ravi, 2½ miles to the east of Multan' (*Anc. Geog.*, pp. 273-4). Chach then proceeded forward. 'The governors of Brahmapūr, Karur and Ashahar paid their homage to him and from these places he came to the borders of Kih (Kumba) and Kashmir'. He gradually reached the fort of Shakalhar higher up the town of Kih, which is said to be the boundary of Kashmir.

Of these places, Karur is a well-known city situated on the southern bank of the old Bias river, 50 miles to the south-east of Multan, and 20 miles to the north-east of Bahawalpur (*Cun. Anc. Geog.*, p. 277).

The town of Shakalhar I would identify with the famous ancient town of Sākala, represented by modern Sialkot. Ch° says that it was the boundary of Kashmir. According to Hiuen Tsang, Sākala was the capital of Cheh-Ka, which lay immediately to the south of the dominions of Kashmir. It is further to be noted that Hiuen Tsang does not refer to any kings of Cheh-Ka and the neighbouring states in the eastern Punjab though he has referred to the political status of the countries which he describes immediately before and after them. Hiuen Tsang visited these countries during the reign of Chach and the statement of Ch° therefore finds an indirect support in his account.

The town of Ashahar may be identified with Asarur in the Gujran-wala district, the extensive ruins of which are described by Cunningham (*Anc. Geo.*, p. 219).

Brahmapura may be identified with Brahmapura (modern Brahmaur), the ancient capital of Chamba. It is situated on the river Budhil, the southern affluent of the Ravi (*Ann. Report Arch. Survey*) 1902-3, pp. 265, 269). It may be noted in passing that as Brahmapura ceased to be the capital when Ch° was written, a reference to it is an evidence of the genuineness of the account.

It would thus appear that the Multan division included nearly the whole of Eastern and Southern Punjab, and the dominions of Chach in this direction touched the frontiers of Kashmir. It is said in Ch° that Chach planted trees on the boundary of Kashmir upon the banks of a stream called the Panj Mahiyat (or Panj Nahiyat) which is close to the hills of Kashmir (pp. 30, 192).

III. The third division had its headquarters at Siwistan. Its principal places were Ludhia (or Budhiah or Budhpur) and Chingān (or Jankan) and it included the hills of Rojhān up to the boundary of Makrān (p. 11). [Haig writes Jangal in place of Chingān and identifies it with Jhangar, 13 miles west of Sewan (*Indus Delta country*, p. 57 f.n. 79)].

This division corresponded roughly to modern Baluchistan. When Chach proceeded to restore his authority over it he crossed the Indus and advanced towards Budhiah. Its ruler is said to have had his capital at Kākārāj which is called by the natives Siwis (Ch°, pp. 30 ff.). For a proper understanding of the geography of this region, we may quote the following from Le Strange:—

'On the north-eastern frontiers of Makrān and close to the Indian border, the Arab geographers describe two districts; namely Tūrān, of which the capital was

Kuṣḍār and Budaha to the north of this, of which the capital was Kandābīl (p. 331).

'To the north of these districts was Bālis or Wālishtān with the towns of Sībī and Mastanj (p. 332). The capital city according to Iṣṭakhri was Sībī, spelt Sīvī or Siwah (p. 347).'

'Kandābīl has been identified with present Gandava lying south of Sībī and east of Kelat (p. 332)'.

Budhiah of Ch° is no doubt the same as Budaha, and this principality seems to have included the district of Bālis or Wālishtān. The capital Kākārāja or Siwis is no doubt the same as modern Sībī, north of Kandābīl (Gandava).

From Sībī Chach marched to Siwistan, the headquarter of the division. Siwistan can be easily identified with Sehwan, situated on a lofty isolated rock, near a large lake in the vicinity of the Lakki Hills (*Cun. Anc. Geo.*, p. 304).

As has been said above, this division reached up to Makrān and Chach proceeded in course of his campaign to its furthest limit.

First he proceeded towards Armanbel. This is the same as Armabīl. To quote again from Le Strange:—

'Armabīl and Kanbalī were two important towns, on or near the coast, about half-way between Tiz (a sea-port, and capital of Makrān) and Daybul (Daibal) at the Indus mouth. Iṣṭakhri describes these as cities of considerable size, lying two days' march apart, and one of them was situated half a league distant from the sea. Their people were rich traders who had dealings chiefly with India' (p. 330). 'The ruins of Armabīl are probably at Lus Bela and those of Kanbalī at Khayrakot' (p. 330 f. n.).

From Armanbel, Chach proceeded to the district of Makrān (p. 38). When he went beyond the steep declivity and the hills of Makrān, he found himself in the division of Bakr. There was an ancient fort in that town called Kanbar (or Kang, or Kanarpur or Kinarpur). Kanbar may be identified with Kannazbur in Makrān which is frequently written as Kannajbur (Le Strange, p. 329, f.n. 2).

From this Chach proceeded towards Kirmān and encamped on a small stream running between Kirmān and Makrān. Certain date trees on that stream were fixed as the boundary between Kirmān and his own dominions. It is difficult to fix this line. In the mediæval period the boundary line between Kirmān and Makrān ran to the east of Banpur near Fahraz, and Chach's dominions may be said to extend to its neighbourhood.

'From there Chach returned to Armanbel, and passing through the district of Tūrān, he came into the desert and no one dared to fight with him till he arrived at Kandāīl (or Kandhābel), otherwise called Kandhār.' (p. 39). The identification of these places has been discussed above on the authority of Le Strange.

IV. The Fourth Division, with Brāhmanābād as its headquarters, included the southern part of the kingdom up to the sea-coast. The famous city of Brāhmanābād was 'situated in the hitherto deserted plains which stretch away to the east of the Indus, eight miles south-east of the railway station of Shahdadpur, and forty-three miles north-east of Haidarabad'. (Cousens—*Antiquities of Sind*, p. 48; for a detailed account of the topography of the locality, and the results of recent archaeological excavations, cf. pp. 48-71). Brāhmanābād is now spelt as Bahmanābād on the strength of a legend that it was founded by a Persian king Bahman, but its truth may be doubted.

According to Ch° the governorship of Brāhmanābād included 'the fort of Nerun and Debal, Luhānah, Lākhab, Sammah and the river.' (p. 11). The identification of the first two is discussed in Appendix B. Luhānah, Lākhab and Sammah were three tribes, and apparently they gave their names to the districts in which they settled.

V. The Central Division, directly under the king, with headquarter at the capital city of Alor, included Kurdán, Kíkánán and Barhamas. Alor, also spelt as Aror, Al Rur and in various other ways, is now represented by a small village of the same name about five miles south by east of Rohri (For topography, cf. Cousens—*Antiquities of Sind*, pp. 76-79). Kurdán and Barhamas cannot be identified.

But Kíkánán, which is referred to in Baládhuri as al-Kíkán played an important part in history. Le Strange identifies it with modern Kelat (p. 332). There is no doubt that Ki-Kiang-na mentioned by Hiuen Tsang (Beal, vol. ii, p. 282) is to be identified with Kíkán, all being variants of the Sanskrit Kekkāna. Hiuen Tsang places this region to the west of Fa-la-na, about 350 miles south-east of Tsao-Kuta, the capital of which has been located at or near Ghazni. The position of Ki-Kiang-na would therefore very well correspond with a region 'in the vicinity of Pishin and Quetta' as Cunningham supposed, in spite of the criticism of Watters (vol. ii, p. 262). Kíkán may thus be located in the hilly region containing the Bolan Pass.

Baládhuri says: 'al-Kíkán is part of the land of as-Sind where it borders on Khurásán.' As Le Strange has observed, Khurásán at that time included all the Muslim provinces east of the Great Desert, as far as Sijistán (p. 382). Kíkán would thus be located in the hilly region to the east of the Helmund and Kandahar rivers, and this agrees well with the identification proposed above, viz. the hilly region round the Bolan Pass.

B. THE EXPEDITION OF MUHAMMAD IBN-KÁSİM

Muhammad Kásim marched from Shiraz (p. 76) to Makrán. He then proceeded via Kannajbúr to Armanbel. The identification of these two places has been discussed above. It seems that he followed the route described in detail by Ibn Khurdádbih, which starting from Fahraj, in Kirmán, on the border of the great desert, led by 14 stages to Fannazbúr or Kannajbúr, the then capital of Makrán. (Le Strange, p. 332).

From Armanbel, Muhammad followed the road along the coast to Debal, where he expected to be joined by the force under Hazim and Mughaira, and the boats carrying the siege materials.

The identification of the famous sea-port of Debal is still a matter of dispute. Formerly it used to be identified with Thaṭṭah, but Raverty ably refuted this view by quoting several passages from old writers wherein Debal is distinguished from Thaṭṭah (*J. A. S. B.* 1892, p. 317 f.n. 315). Since then Mr. Cousens has reaffirmed the identification with slight modifications. 'There was', he says, 'Dewal proper, the city that the Arabs assaulted, and, later, as the state of the river necessitated, a port nearer the mouth, to serve the city This port became known as Bandar Dewal (port of Dewal) as the Tuh fatu-l-Kirám calls it Later writers, losing sight of the connection of Dewal with Thaṭṭah, thus came to speak of Dewal Bandar as Dewal only.' (Op. cit., p. 124). This view has been supported by Oldham (*Ind. Ant.*, 1931, p. 20).

Thus, according to Cousens, Debal, at the time of Muhammad ibn-Kásim, occupied the site of Thaṭṭah, but later on, as the mouth of the river advanced further south, the name was transferred to the port that served the city. This is undoubtedly a good hypothesis, but does not carry immediate conviction, and so the question must be regarded as open. Cunningham places Debal on the western bank of the Baghár river, below the junction of the southern branch of the Ghára, about 5 miles to the north of Lari Bandar (Cunn. *Anc. Geo.*, p. 342). According to Raverty, the town was about 15 miles from Thaṭṭah and stood near to the shrine

of Pír Patho, or a little further to the south-west, at the foot of the Makkahí hills and near the Bhágar branch of the Indus which was in those days a great stream (*J.A.S.B.* 1892, p. 322 f.n. V. Smith—*Early Hist. Ind.*, p. 104).

According to Haig, Debal is now represented by the ruins at Kakaṛ Bukēra, 20 miles south-west of Thaṭṭah (*Indus Delta Country*, pp. 44. ff. where other views on the subject are discussed).

According to *Sind Gazetteer* (1919), the most probable site of the seaport of Debal seems to be Bhambor. The following account of the place is taken from the *Gazetteer of the Province of Sind*, B volume I (1919), p. 53.

'Bhambor is the local name of a mound of ruins on a low rocky elevation situated on the north bank of the Gharo creek 3½ miles westwards from the village of Gharo in the Taluka of Mirpur Sakro . . . The remains of a fort, with walls and bastions, are distinctly traceable, and from among the heaps of broken bricks, and old coins have been frequently picked up after a fall of rain . . . As the Gharo creek is the most westerly channel of the Indus, it is probably the oldest . . . This also gives an air of probability to the hypothesis that Bhambor, and not Thaṭṭah, nor any of the other places that have been suggested was the great Hindu town known as Debal.' Raverty, of course, says that the identification of Bhambor with Debal is wholly out of the question (op. cit., p. 322) but I do not see any adequate reason for this sweeping assertion in his elaborate note. But the objections urged by Cousens (op. cit., p. 80) are most cogent. The writer in the *Gazetteer* himself admits that 'there is not room on the site for a town of any size and no direction in which it could have extended.' This seems to be a vital objection, for according to Ch° Debal must have been a town of considerable area.

From Debal, Muhammad proceeded to Nerun which is represented by modern Haidarabad. It was situated on a hill which is now called Ganja, 1½ miles long, and 700 yards broad with a height of 80 ft. (Cun. *Anc. Geo.*, pp. 320-22).

From Nerun, Muhammad advanced to the fort of Siwistan or Sehwan (cf. Haig, *Indus Delta country*, pp. 54-55), and its ruler fled to Sisam, on the bank of the Kanba, the residence of the ruler of Budhia. After Siwistan fell, Muhammad proceeded to Sisam. The place cannot be definitely located, but Haig thinks Sisam may be identified with Shah Hasan, a place at the western end of Manchhar lake (Haig, op. cit., p. 58). Kanba is apparently the Kumbh river (*J.A.S.B.* 1892, p. 470-Map; but Haig takes it to be the Manchchaur lake, op. cit., p. 58).

Muhammad returned to Nerun. From this place he began his great campaign against the king of Sind. Proceeding along the western bank of the Indus, he passed through the countries known as Raor and Jitor and encamped on a site opposite Dáhar's army. We further learn that he crossed the river near Sakrah, opposite the fort of Bet, the ruler of which had already gone over to him, and that the passage was facilitated by posting strong garrison at the island of Bet.

After Muhammad had crossed over to the eastern side, only a lake stood between him and Dáhar's army. As soon as Muhammad crossed this lake, Dáhar went to the fort of Raor, and having left his baggage and retinue, took up position in front of the Arab army. There the great decisive battle was fought. The line of advance followed by Muhammad from the time he left Nerun till the decisive battle was fought, cannot be properly understood in the absence of definite identification of any of the places mentioned above. It is obvious that there was an island (Bet) in the river Indus opposite Sakrah where Muhammad crossed it, and that the fort of Raor could not be very far from the landing place of the Muhammadan army on the eastern side of the Indus. But views diverge very widely regarding the location of these places. Haig places Raor in Lower

Sind 'about 80 miles from Brāhmanābad and 70 miles to the south-east of Haidarabad, on the far side of the delta from Debal' (op. cit., pp. 63-4). But this position, which would place Raor almost on the Ran or sea-shore is hardly acceptable in view of the physical condition of the country (cf. Cousens-*Antiquities of Sind*, p. 23 f.n. 1). Raverty places Raor within ten miles of Brāhmanābad. But his mistaken identity of Nerun, which he places about eighteen miles south of Haidarabad, deprives his identification of other places in the neighbourhood of much real value (cf. Raverty's long note on this subject in *J.A.S.B.* 1892, pp. 231-44 f.n. 183-189).

I am inclined to place Sakrah at or near modern Sukkur, and to identify the island of Bet with the rocky island of Bhakar or Bakhar, which is such an important landmark in the topography of that part of modern Sind. Raor would then be naturally identified with Rohri.

After I had arrived at this conclusion by a study of the details given in Ch°, I came across the following remarks of Cousens.

'In connection with Muhammad's movements, up and down the west bank, to find a suitable crossing, he is at one time, within the district of Jhim, and this name may possibly be perpetuated in Jhim Pir, the name of the tomb upon the islet in the river opposite Rohri. Indeed, we might almost have identified the Bet of our story with the island of Bakhar, did we not know for certain that the river did not flow in that bed in those days, and Bakhar is also known as Bet'. (op. cit., p. 23 f.n. 2.)

The difficulties of identifying the old courses of the rivers in Sind with absolute precision are such that nobody is justified in making any dogmatic assertion as to whether a river did or did not pass by a place at any particular time. Raverty has discussed the problem in a long and masterly paper (*The Mihrān of Sind and its tributaries, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1892, pp. 155-508). He has traced the courses of the two rivers Indus and Hakra at different periods, and his discussion includes not only the main beds of these rivers but also the various channels through which their water found its way to sea from time to time. But although Raverty's work is the most painstaking, nobody would possibly pretend that all or even most of his conclusions can be readily accepted. His wrong identification of Nerun, on which he greatly relied in fixing the courses of the rivers, certainly vitiates many of his arguments and conclusions.

According to Raverty, the river Sindhu was a tributary, along with the other rivers of the Punjab, of the Hakra which having all united into one great river at the *Dosh-i-ab* formed the Mihrān of Sind. 'Lower down than this point of junction,' says he, 'it sent off a branch to the westwards which passed Aror, the ancient capital of Sind, on the east.' (p. 316).

But whether this view be true or not, according to Ch° the Muhammadan army coming from south and west had to cross the Mihrān before reaching Aror. Therefore the Mihrān of Ch° cannot mean the river which is in the view of Raverty, as that was to the east of Aror. Hence Raverty has postulated the existence of another river the Kumbh, which branched off from the Indus near Ghyarispur, and following a westerly course passed to the east of Sehwan. According to the sketch-map of Raverty, this river passed quite close to Rohri at the time of the Arab conquest (*See Map facing, p. 470--Plate VI.*). Whether this river was the Mihran, or mistaken as such by the author of Ch°, is immaterial for our present discussion. The fact remains, that the river which Muhammad ibn-Kāsim had to cross in order to reach Aror, did pass quite close to Rohri. Raverty, of course, places this river at a little distance, about 10 miles from Rohri, but no data have been put forward to show that we have any reason to precisely fix it where Raverty has put it and not a few miles to the east of his line. On the whole

therefore, while the ever-shifting course of the rivers of Sind, must make any identification at best a hypothetical one, there is nothing in the proposed identification of the island of Bet with Bhakar, and Raor with Rohri, which may be regarded as *prima facie* impossible. Haig, who studied the course of the rivers of Sind very thoroughly, believes that as early as Alexander's time a channel passed through Rohri-Bakhar gap, its bed becoming in later times, the channel of the main river.

The traditional legend which accounts for the shifting of the river from Alor to Rohri, may be based upon an actual change of the river-course, but it is obviously impossible to fix the time of the change by an attempt to find out the date of the legendary king Dilu Rai (Cousens, op. cit., pp. 143-149) or otherwise (Haig, op. cit., pp. 133-4).

It may be mentioned here that Cousens has placed the fort of Raor, 'some twenty to twenty-five miles to the west or west-by-south of Alor, just below Kingri' (*Ibid*, p. 23, p. 24. f.n. 1).

Certain passages in Ch° indicate that the place where the Muslim army crossed the river was not very far from Alor. Thus while Muhammad ibn-Kāsim was encamped on the other side of the Mihrān, ready to cross the river, Bhandwir Samani came to Dāhar and said: 'O King . . . you are amusing yourself with the games of chess and dice while the Arab army has already arrived and alighted by your capital' (Ch°, pp. 121-122).

This shows that the point where Muhammad crossed the river may be in the neighbourhood of Rohri or Kingri but cannot be placed very far to the south as proposed by Raverty and Haig.

This view is strengthened by the accounts of Mir M'asūm. According to this writer, Muhammad, after the fall of Sehwan, rejected the advice given him to attack Bahmanābād first, and instead, marched direct to Alor, and killed Dāhar in an engagement near the city. Mir M'asūm has here confused Raor with Aror, but as the two places were quite close and their names resemble each other, the mistake is easily explained. But Mir M'asūm definitely states that from Siwistan, Muhammad did not march towards Bahmanābād but towards Aror. This is also corroborated by the fact that after Bahmanābād fell, Muhammad marched towards Aror and Bagrur, although the last-named place was first mentioned with Raor. Raverty's attempt to explain it away is not convincing (op. cit., pp. 237, 241-44).

The question naturally arises why Muhammad, after defeating Dāhar's army near Raor, proceeded towards Bahmanābād without first attempting the conquest of Alor which was quite close by. The reason seems to be that the main army had followed Dāhar's son Jaisimha to Bahmanābād, and so instead of wasting time by prolonged siege of Alor, Muhammad wanted to beat the hostile army before it could gather strength.

After the defeat and death of Dāhar in an open engagement near Raor, the Sindhians avoided pitched battles and defended the strong fortified towns of the kingdom such as Raor, Bahrur, Dahlelah, Bahmanābād and Alor. Bahrur and Dahlelah cannot be identified with certainty, but they were on the way from Rori to Bahmanābād. Dahlelah may be the same as Darbela referred to by Raverty (*J. A. S. B.*, 1892, p. 317).

After the fall of Alor, Muhammad proceeded towards the north. He conquered successively Bābiah, Gholconda, Sikkah and Multan. Gholconda cannot be identified, but the position of the other three has been discussed above.

Al-Balādhuri records several other expeditions of Muhammad after his return from Multan. The places named are al-Bailamān, Surast and al-Kiraj. It appears that Muhammad personally went to Kiraj, and sent forces against the other two.

Later on, Junaid raided Kīraj, which had broken the covenant, and sent his lieutenants against Mirmad (or Marmad—Elliot, vol. i, p. 126) al-Mandal, Dahnaj, Barwas, Uzain and al-Malibah. The identification of most of these places has been suggested in the text (p. 41). Surast is evidently Surāshṭra and Dahnaj cannot be identified.

As to Kīraj against which both Muhammad and Junaid marched in person, it is evidently the same as Kuriy mentioned in Ch° (p. 181 ff.), for Balādhuri gives the name of the king of Kīraj as Duhar while in Ch° the king of Kuriy is written as Drohar.

Kīraj may be identified with Kira of Indian literature, which according to *Bṛihat Saṃhitā* belongs to the North-East division of India.

The details given in Ch° enable us to locate more definitely the site of ancient Kira. Ch° tells the romantic story how Jaisia, the son of Dāhar, the deceased king of Sind, was at first given shelter by Drohar, the king of Kuriy, but was afterwards driven away by the machinations of Drohar's sister whose immoral proposals he refused with scorn. It is related that having learnt of the plot to murder him, Jaisia left Kuriy and 'journeyed on, till he arrived at Jālandhar in the land of Kashmir.'

Thus this country should be placed in the neighbourhood of Jālandhara. Now two inscriptions from Baijnath give the name of that place as Kiragrāma, and refer to its rulers as subordinate vassals of the lord of Jālandhara. Burgess supplies the following note about the place. 'Kiragrāma or Baijnath is a small town in the east of the Kangra district about thirty miles east of Kot Kangra, in latitude 32° 3' N. and longitude 76° 41' E. The number of old temples about the village point to its having been in early times a place of some note.'

The identity of the name and its proximity to Jālandhara naturally point to Kiragrāma or Baijnath and the surrounding tracts as the ancient Kira country, referred to by the Arabs as al-Kīraj or al-Kuriy.

Journal of Indian History

Pieter Van Den Broeke at Surat (1620-29)

BY

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Writing in this *Journal* (May, 1923) on the Dutch sources for the history of India in the seventeenth century, I mentioned that the published *Voyages* of Pieter van den Broeke (or Broecke) told us very little of his nine years' residence in Surat, and conjectured that his diary might have been greatly curtailed in print-

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regularly; he left some incidents half-told, and began others in the middle; sometimes he would record trivial matters at length, at others he would omit all mention of occurrences of real importance; and his diary must be taken for what it is, the hurried jottings of a busy man, certainly not written for publication, though extracts from it were to be published later on, but recording whatever happened to have struck him, and remained in his memory. A verbal translation of the whole would be tedious to readers, and in the account which follows I have attempted to follow the general lines adopted by Sir William Foster in *The English Factories in India*, mentioning every fact and every name, which is recorded in the diary, but translating only those entries which appear to deserve it as throwing a definite light on the economic or social life of the period, or on the individuality of the writer. The portions translated are marked by inverted commas, while square brackets are used for interpolations.

A few words may be said about the writer of the diary. Pieter van den Broeke, who was born in Antwerp on 25th February, 1585, is one of the outstanding figures in the early history of the Dutch East India Company, which he served from the year 1613

onwards. His first experience of India was in 1617, when he was sent to establish a factory at Surat. His ship was wrecked at the entrance to the Gulf of Cambay, but the crew and goods were saved, and the factory was duly constituted and placed in charge of two factors, one of whom was P. G. van Ravesteyn. Van den Broeke himself marched to Masulipatam in order to return to Java, where he played a prominent part in the operations which resulted in the establishment of the Dutch capital of Batavia.

The Surat factory continued to operate during the next three years, but it was hampered by want of capital and other causes; and the commercial success of the Dutch on this side of India dates from 1620, when van den Broeke himself was posted to Surat, not as a mere factor, but as 'Commander and Director', with the charge of the Company's interests in Arabia and Persia, as well as in the north and west of India. Supplies of capital were at the same time increased largely, and the Dutch had obtained a predominant position in the trade of the Arabian Sea by the year 1629, when, after two extensions of his appointment at Surat, and sixteen years' service in the East, van den Broeke started for Batavia on his way to Holland. After some years at home during which he brought out the record of his voyages (printed at Amsterdam and Haarlem in 1634), he returned to the East, and died at Malacca, during the siege in December, 1640, at the age of 55.

In preparing this account of his diary I have felt some difficulty in deciding the question of annotation. The text is so discursive and allusive that to explain everything at length is practically out of the question, while the bulk of the notes would be mere reproductions from the *English Factories in India*, a series which must be available in every decent library used by Indian students. It has seemed best on the whole merely to give references to this series, and to other works which are within the reach of students, while the notes are confined to explaining matters which cannot be elucidated in this way. The best method of approaching the diary is to read the Introductions to the first three volumes of *English Factories*, (cited below as E. F.), which give a connected account of what happened at Surat during this period¹; while the following general notes will make the diary more intelligible.

The affairs of the Dutch Company in the East were managed by the Governor-General in Council at Batavia. Members of the

1. When the word *passim* is used in these references, readers should consult the Index of the volumes cited.

Council or others sent to inspect outlying factories were usually styled 'Commissary'. The factories were grouped in regions under 'Directors' or 'Commanders', but the latter designation was also applied to the chief officer of a fleet or single ship. A factory was usually in charge of a 'senior factor', with a staff of 'factors', 'junior factors', and 'assistants'; sometimes 'boys' are mentioned, and the designation is accurate, for the diary records the death of a 'boy' of 15, but I have not found evidence to show precisely how they were employed. Merchant vessels were ordinarily 'commanded' by a factor or higher officer, while the 'master' was in charge of the navigation.

'Ships' means sea-going merchant vessels, ranging at this period from about 300 to 1000 tons; they were of course armed, and on occasion were employed for fighting, but their ordinary business was transport. 'Pinnace' means a sea-going vessel, smaller and lighter than a 'ship': 'carrack' denotes the large ships employed by the Portuguese in their trade with Europe. 'Galleons' were the large warships used by the Portuguese, which could be rowed as well as sailed. 'Frigates' or 'foists' were quite small vessels, ranging about 50 tons, which also could be rowed as well as sailed, and were used mainly in the coasting-trade; occasionally, however, they were sent on sea voyages, and they could be equipped for fighting—the Portuguese in particular using them for offence, either in separate flotillas or as adjuncts to the galleons.

Indian shipping was varied. There were great ships of over 1,000 tons for the pilgrim-traffic to the Red Sea; these were usually named, I believe, though I am not sure, that names were practically confined to this class. 'King's ship' meant a ship for the Red Sea or elsewhere sent out by the Mogul Emperor; 'Prince's ship' meant a similar venture of Prince Khurram or Shāh Jahān; but 'Prince's flag' meant the flag of the Prince of Orange, which was carried by the ships of the Dutch Company. Ordinary ships of 200 or up to about 300 tons, plied from Gujarāt to other parts, while along the coast frigates or foists were used, together with a variety of smaller craft, 'sampans' 'prows' 'tonys', etc., etc. The expression 'Moor', i.e., Moslem ships was in common use to denote Indian, as distinct from European, shipping, the chief Indian owners at Surat being Moslems.

The primary objects of the Dutch factory at Surat were to buy (1) the various types of cotton goods saleable in Java and beyond, (2) indigo and plain calico for the European market. To finance this trade, they imported whatever could be sold, chiefly spices, which, as readers of the *Ain-i-Akbari* know, were used very largely in the kitchens of the Moslems in the North; but

most of their funds had to be imported in the form of silver coins, which were taken to the mints at Surat and Ahmadābād, to be recoined as rupees. The coins imported were chiefly the Spanish reals-of-eight, worth about two rupees. The Dutch kept their accounts in guilders (of twenty stivers), and reckoned the guilder as 5/6 rupee. The Dutch unit of weight was the Holland pound, equal to 1.09 lb. avoirdupois. The local unit was the Gujarāt maund of about 33lb, 20 of which made a *bahār* or candy.

Ships of large size could be brought up the Tapti to the town of Surat, but there was a dangerous bar at the mouth of the river which could be crossed only under certain conditions of weather and tide, and the Dutch ordinarily used the anchorage called 'Swally hole', which the English had developed, near the river-mouth; goods could be taken thence to Surat by water, but this was often dangerous owing to the presence of hostile Portuguese frigates, or the pirate-craft from the Malabar Coast, and as a rule the road between Surat and Swally was used for transport.

In comparing the diary with the English records, it is important to bear in mind that the dates in the former are new style, and consequently 10 days ahead of the old-style dates given in the latter. I have shown every date given in the diary, so that readers will have no difficulty in recognising its incompleteness as a record of occurrences; I hope they will also be able to recognise the informality of the style in the translated portions, which are meant to be absolutely literal. The language is colloquial throughout, and obsolete colloquialisms present many pitfalls to the translator; in cases of doubt regarding the exact meaning I have received most generous help from Professor P. Geyl, Litt. D., of the University of London, but the responsibility for the accuracy of the version is mine, not his. Some few passages are so obscure as to be practically untranslatable; in these cases I have indicated merely the general sense.

THE DIARY

Van den Broeke sailed from Java for Surat on the *Wapen van [Arms of] Zeeland*, which, after calling at Aden and Socotra, sighted the Indian coast near Damān on 28th September, 1620. On 1st October, while coasting northwards, two *sampans* were met, one of which was engaged to conduct the ship's boat, carrying the factor Johan van der Dussen, to give news to Surat of their arrival. During the night the tide fell and the ship went

aground, but was refloated without injury on the rising tide. On 3rd, the boat returned, bringing the outgoing President, Pieter Gielisz. van Ravensteyn; and on the 4th, van den Broeke landed and assumed charge as 'Commander and Director'.

On 20th November, the *Wapen van Zeeland* was despatched for Batavia. The same evening, two English ships, *London* and *Roebuck*, under Captain Andrew Shilling, anchored in the roadstead; two other ships, *Hart* and *Eagle*, had gone to Persia. The late arrival of the English caused general surprise, but they gave out that they had gone too far south, and had first seen land off Dabhol.

On 6th December senior factors Wouter Heuten and Sebolt Wonderar, with junior factor Francisco Pelsert, assistant Daniel van der Bruggen, boy Marcus Elderssen, and also a barber named Marten, arrived overland from Masulipatam, where they had been sent by the Governor-General on the ship *New Zeeland*. On 10th a junior factor (not named) was promoted to be factor, and sent to take charge of the factory which had been established at Cambay for the purchase of cotton goods. The rest of the month was spent in getting cotton goods ready for Java.

1621.

January. "On 4th, I went to Broach to see if I could get any reduction in the toll on the spices which it had been decided to send to Agra with the senior factor Wouter Heuten, seeing that they could go by another,¹ though not a shorter, road. When I arrived, the Nawab Himmat Khān² had gone to Sarod; wherefore decided to go to him there, where arrived on 5th, just as the fort was taken. The Governor gave me a most friendly welcome. On 6th, I went with the Governor's brother to look at the fort, which was already dismantled. This fort belonged to a blackguard of a Rājput, who had wrought great oppression on travelling merchants, who had to cross the Cambay river just at that spot; now he was a prisoner. After I had received some courtesies from the Governor, I took a friendly leave of him. He gave me a fine Rājput horse; and on the same day I returned in the company of his brother, with sixty horse, to Broach, where I arrived on the morning of the 8th'. On 9th, left Broach after having put the factory in good order. On 20th, I sent senior factor

1. I.e., up the Tapti valley to Burhānpur.

2. Governor of Broach: see *EF. i. passim*. Sarod lies on the south bank of the Mahi, on what was then the road from Broach to Cambay.

Wouter Heuten to be head of the factory now established at Agra, with a caravan laden with cloves, nutmegs, mace, benzoin, and other goods; I gave him Junior factor Francisco Pelsert³ with these assistants—Willem Jacopssen, Gerret Verdelft, Daniel van der Bruggen, Cornelis Arentssen, barber Marten Ordtmans, with a boatman, and two boys, Marcus Elderssen and Jan Pepper.

February. 'On 7th, our frigate the *Good Fortune* came from Gandivi⁴ to lie off Surat, to the disgust of the English, because they had never been able to arrange to buy any vessels from the native, and now we were the first. On 10th, arrived in the roadstead from Ormuz the four English ships which had had a smart fight⁵ with four Portuguese galleons, of which Ruy Freire was captain. The English captain Andrew Shilling, was killed. They brought as they said, but one could place no reliance on them, 500 bales of silk from Persia; each bale weighs about 180 Holland pounds'. On 14th, there was much excitement in Surat over a case of Sapphic passion. On 27th, Jan Symonssen Storm of Rotterdam, who came out on the *Golden Lion*, arrived with the Pole⁶ from Māndū, after two months' leave. 'I had pardoned the blackguard for having deserted to the enemy from Fort Pulicat. On 29th, towards evening, Jan Symonssen Storm fell overboard and was drowned when he was returning, drunk, from the *Good Fortune*. The body came to the surface next day, and I had it properly buried'.

March. 'On 16th, after lying for a long time off the custom-house flying the Prince's flag, to the disgust of the English and of some Moslems, the frigate *Good Fortune* was sent to Swally to sail with the English ships to Batavia. This is the first frigate that Hollander or Englishman has ever sent from here. On 22nd, I went to Swally to despatch the *Good Fortune*. The English invited me to a meal on their ships. I went on board the *London*, on which Robbert Bly [Richard Blyth] was now captain in place of Andrew Shilling, killed off Ormuz; the others were *Hart*, *Roe-buck* and *Eagle*. According to their custom, they showed me great seeming friendship. The same day the English arrested the two Gujarāt ships⁷ which were ready to sail in the name of

3. Pelsaert subsequently wrote a report of his experiences, a translation of which, by Professor Geyl and myself, was published as *Jahangir's India*, Cambridge, 1925.

4. On the coast, midway between Surat and Damān.

5. See *EF.* i. 220, etc.

6. Probably John Baptista, an independent merchant (*EF.* i. 291, 314).

7. An account of these reprisals will be found in the Introduction to *EF.* i.

the Prince [Khurram], one for Mocha and the other for Jidda; this caused great amazement among the Moslem merchants of the town. On 25th, received news that the English caravan, though it had a *kaul* or pass, had been robbed and plundered⁸ by Mansūr Khān, a Portuguese renegade, commander of 5,000 horse in the army of Malik Ambar, the Deccan King [*sic*]. Coming from Agra this caravan, of 356 camels with 300 bales of Biāna indigo and 410 packs of valuable cotton goods from Bengal, had for a long time accompanied our caravan, which I would not allow to come here in such a dangerous war because I had no ships here to carry the goods which was lucky for us: otherwise we should have risked our caravan also, which the English before they started were very anxious should come along with them, but God Almighty then preserved us. On 30th, the chief men of the town requested me to go on board the English ships on their behalf, and speak for them as best I could. I went in the evening, but, before I got on board, the English, fortunately for me, had already released the ship [*s*]. The said ships sailed the same evening; in the one which was for Mocha I sent Johan van der Dussen to the senior factor Harman van Gil in Mocha.'

April. On 17th, the frigate *Good Fortune* sailed for Batavia in company with the English *Eagle*. The three other English ships sailed for Mocha, to winter in the Red Sea, because it was too late in the season for the voyage home; 'but I am convinced it was more for their private trade than for other reasons.' They also put forward the pretext of hoping to capture the ships of Chaul.⁹ On 18th, Sultān Kurram's ship arrived from Achin after a voyage of two months and 17 days, bringing 300 *bahārs* of pepper, with money and other goods of less importance; the ship brought one of the King of Achin's officers with 150,000 reals-of-eight to be invested in gold for him.

May. On 5th, senior factor Adrian Willemsen Gøree, with the assistants Adam Classen and Marten Fredricksx, arrived from Māndū, having without orders left the caravan there in charge of two 'Japponders'.¹⁰ On 12th, the Prince's ship mentioned above sailed for Achin with a valuable cargo of Gujarāt cotton

8. See *EF.* i. 315 ff. The description of Malik Ambar as King is an obvious slip; further on he is described correctly as the King's General.

9. In order to enforce their claim against Ahmadnagar for the destruction of the caravan.

10. At this time the Dutch employed Japanese soldiers in some of their fortresses in the Further East, and it is possible that some of them had been sent as guards for the party going to Agra.

goods; this was very surprising since it was thought to be too late in the season. On 31st, I sent the factor Gøree to Gandivi, with five Dutchmen and 13 peons, 'to protect the foists [I had] purchased, which the Portuguese of Damān had planned to come and burn'.

June. On 5th, 'it began to rain dust, so that the rains were near at hand'. On 17th, the rains opened with a hurricane. On 25th, went with Mir Jān Muhammad, brother of the Governor of Broach, to hunt buck with leopards. On 26th, saw a snake with a head at each end.¹¹ *Note.* There is in the Deccan army with Malik Ambar, General of the King Nizāmshāh, a woman, (who was born in Rānder, a fishing village about half a league from Surat), who can make gold from copper by means of a certain plant with an exceedingly strong smell, which kills the person who smells it when it has been prepared. 'The gold is exceedingly fine, but if it is melted three times, it turns into copper again. When the said Malik was satisfied of this, he gave his daughter to the woman's son, and afterwards let her bring *schondio*,¹² which is the usual payment among such folk'.

July. On 16th, 'got news that the Portuguese of Damān, Bassain and Tārapur were arming strongly in order to come and burn our foists at Gandivi as soon as the wheather should be favourable; immediately sent there eight more Dutchmen and 20 peons, with three guns'. On 18th, 'since the rumour continued that the Portuguese were arming strongly, and further that they would certainly start at the new moon, sent senior factor Sebolt Wonderar, with 50 lascars from Rānder, to bring the foists here'. On 23rd, 'Sebolt Wonderar brought the two frigates Mocha and Surat from Gandivi in safety before the custom house here (thank God!); they were now out of all danger from the Portuguese. I sent the two frigates to Rānder, so as to be out of sight of the people at Surat, because the Moslems and English grumbled so much about them.'

September. On 12th, the season began to change, with fine weather and a northerly wind. On 27th, about midnight, the 'elephant' [last storm of the season] came with a strong wind, lasting more than half an hour.

11. Probably *Eryx Johnii*, the blunt-tailed snake which is manipulated by professional snake-charmers so as to appear two-headed.

12. This word, which appears below as *Sonidido* and *schondido*, has not been recognised by any of the authorities consulted; it appears from the context to denote some customary payment made at marriages in this part of the country

October. On 1st, six ships from England, commanded by John Weddell,¹³ arrived in Swally. One of them was a Portuguese prize with 60 Portuguese and more than 100 natives, from Mozambique for Goa; the English valued it at more than £ 6,000 sterling, reckoning only the ivory and wax, and not counting the gold and amber, which were as usual distributed among the principal men. [The prize is stated to have been of 14 last, or 28 tons, burden; but this must be an error, as she was in fact over 200 tons, and perhaps the figure should be 140]. On 20th, the *Samson* arrived from Mocha, having left there the *Wesp*, to follow eight days later. The *Samson*, on which were Johan van der Burch, factor, and Tjerk Isbrantssen, master, had taken the following prizes, after having left Mocha peaceably, and given free passes to all the Moslem ships—an incredible act by which they have brought such dishonour and disgrace on our valiant Batavians and Honourable Company and country that it will be talked of for more than a hundred years'. First, a small vessel from cutch near Sind; it yielded 10 bales of *rūnās* [Indian madder] and other booty of little value, and was then destroyed pirate-fashion. Second, a ship of Cannanore, from which they took 2,000 ducats in cash and four women without their husbands ('which was exceedingly cruel'), and then allowed to proceed on her voyage. The third belonged to Dīū, and had sailed from Helick in Ethiopia, just opposite Mocha; some ivory, uncoined gold, and other goods were hastily taken out because the ship was sinking; they understood that more than 150 pounds of gold remained in her. Both the other two belonged to Dabhol,¹⁴ the *Ibrāhimshāh*, and the *Toccoly*; most of the people were landed on the coast of Arabia, and about 100 brought to Surat. After taking out most of the cash and goods, these two vessels were sent direct to Batavia. 'In short, they have behaved not like honourable merchants, but like pirates, and worse than sea-robbers; and, by giving false passes, have blackened the honest name and fame of the Dutch, who have been regarded as upright people throughout the whole world—besides taking bribes from the Moslems before they would give them these passes! In the evening I went on board, and in council found it good and advisable to liberate all these people, giving to each a gold ducat and a half-real for expenses, because they had been robbed and plundered so bare and naked by our people. This taking of the ships

13. For Weddell's fleet, see *EF.* i. *passim*.

14. Dabhol, near Ratnagiri, then belonged to Bljāpur. I cannot guess what Toccoly represents, unless it be for Taqi Ali.

has raised no small clamour throughout the country, and brought our nation into no small dishonour and disgrace, to the injury of the Company's business.¹⁵ The English exulted not a little over this, and vomited every possible villainy against us. That brute, President Kerridge, in the public bazaar, presumed to write to Prince Khurram¹⁶ at Burhānpur that he had warned him about us long ago, and did it not appear as he had said, that we were not merchants like the English, but mere pirates and sea-robbers.'

November. On 3rd, the English fleet arrived from Cape Ras-al-hadd, where it had wintered, having failed to reach Mocha. They had sailed by Dabhol, in order to capture some ships in reprisal for the seizure of their caravan, but had secured only one vessel belonging to Chaul. On 15th, Prince Sultān Khurram's ship arrived from Mocha. 'The English had taken out the captain, or *nākhudā*, and the clerk, and forced them to declare what money or goods belonging to Malik Ambar's people were on board. They found 7,000 reals and 3,300 gold ducats, which they took out, and allowed the captain and clerk to return'—a very injudicious proceeding. On 30th, a Portuguese *armada* [fleet] of about 80 vessels passed Swally on the way to Cambay, 'where-upon our men of the *Samson* rashly sent against them two prows, each with eight men, without my knowledge or orders. Senior factor Sebolt Wonderar went in one, and Johan van der Burch in the other, each with seven men. The wind fell as they [*? approached*] the fleet, and they were surrounded by the strong Portuguese frigates, which were better rowed than our vessels. One of these was captured, having on board factor Johan van der Burch, assistant Egbert Hellinch, boatswain's mate Harman Symonssen, master's mate Andries Gerretsen Alkmaer and seamen Ben Willemssen, Elbert Thomassen, and Jan Willemssen; the other was in great danger, being pursued by the frigates until within range of the ship's guns'.

December. On 3rd, nine English ships sailed for Persia; the *Hart* and *Roebuck* sailed for England with Mr. Kerridge, lately President here, on board. Sent the *Samson* with them to cruise for some days; the English wanted her to accompany them to

15. This passage is of historical interest as showing the first impression made on van den Broeke by this action of the *Samson*. See the Introduction to EF. i. for a concise account of the rivalry between Dutch and English at this time.

16. Then Viceroy of the Deccan province. The text is obscure, and may possibly be intended to mean 'had the face to say that he would write'.

Persia but this could not be arranged. On 23rd, the *Samson* returned to the roadstead, having parted from the English seven days before. On 25th, Anne, the slave of senior factor Sebolt Wonderar, and the child of Jadegar the Armenian, were baptised, the child being named Cattrina; I was a witness, and godfather. May God Almighty allow both of them to grow up in His fear!'

1622.

February. (no entry for January). On 4th, the lading of of the *Samson* was completed; senior factor Adrien Willemssen Goeree was on board. On 6th, she was ordered to lie for four days at the mouth of the river alongside of the Prince's ship for Mocha; and on 10th, she sailed for Batavia with cargo worth 102,000 guilders. The same day I started with eight Dutchmen on horseback to inspect the factories at Broach, Ahmadābād and Cambay. On 11th, 'I reached Broach, a famous *baniyan* market-town, where large quantities of *bāftas*¹ and other cotton goods are made annually. The English also have a factory here, where they buy most of their cotton goods for the South,² England, Mocha, and Persia. The town is 22 kos, or 12 Holland leagues, from Surat; it is walled, and situated on a high hill. The Governor is my great friend, Himmat Khān, a Mogul, commanding 3,000 horse. I went to visit him, and he showed me so much respect as to astonish the English and everyone else'. On 13th, started for Baroda, and halted at a village named [blank in MS] 14 kos from Broach. On 14th, starting before sunrise reached Baroda, a very populous market-town, walled, and governed by a commander of 2000 horse. Formerly the English had a factory here,³ 'but this is now forbidden by the Surat people, because most of the goods made here are suitable for Mocha and the Red Sea, and are bought by the Surat merchants and despatched by the King's or Prince's ships.' On 15th, left Baroda, and halted in a village named [blank in MS] 12 kos distant. On 16th, marched 18 kos, and reached Mahmūdābād, the former capital of Gujarāt, now utterly ruined by the Moguls. On 17th, reached Ahmadābād, a great and famous city, surrounded by high walls, 40 kos from Baroda, and 10 kos from Mahmudabad; I lodged in an old stable in the Armenian *sarai*. The Governor is a Mogul, Nawāb Rustam Khān, commanding 5,000 horse, who rules the whole

1. The trade-name for the plain calico of Gujarāt.

2. 'The South' denotes Java, and the markets served by it.

3. See the Introduction to EF. i. for the dispute regarding the Red Sea trade, which was eventually reserved for the local merchants.

country on behalf of Prince Sultān Khurram.⁴ On 20th, I visited Sarkhej, about three kos from Ahmadābād, where the best indigo in all Gujarāt is manufactured. There is an exceedingly fine burying-place of the former Kings of Gujarāt, with many palaces and pleasure houses built in the vicinity. On 22nd, having seen all the gardens and other sights, I decided to leave for Cambay. The English have a factory at Ahmadābād, and do a magnificent trade, selling their reals, and buying indigo and cotton goods. On 23rd, started for Cambay. On the march Gerret Verdelft, an assistant, was thrown from his horse: I jumped off the cart to catch it, but was kicked in the mouth, and lost nine teeth. [The printed text adds that this reminded him that at Surat a sooth-sayer had warned him that his journey would be unlucky]. Halted in a village 14 kos from Ahmadābād. On 24th, I reached Cambay, 30 kos from Ahmadābād. Ordered various goods against the arrival of the ships.

March. On 3rd, I left Cambay, 'crossing the dangerous and famous great river,⁵ which at spring tide rises and falls five fathoms. The water comes with the rising tide from the sea, with a noise and fury like that of the bore of Rouen in France. Owing to the channels the ride is seven kos, but it [the river] is not two kos wide. There is great danger to life if the right time is not taken to cross; I understand that from 100 to 200 persons or more are drowned every year. In the evening with great difficulty we reached Jāmbusar,⁶ where the indigo *de mato* is made; it is called *singilli* in Hindustan, and is considered to be the worst in all India. Cambay lies on the river Indus,⁷ well populated with the *baniyan* nation, and containing fine houses and remarkable buildings. A mighty trade is done in cotton goods. Two or three times a year the Portuguese come to trade with foists and other light craft; they bring much ivory, China goods (which come to Goa from Macao), spices and other goods from the South and Patani. At present [Cambay] belongs⁸ to Asaf

4. Prince Khurram was Viceroy of Gujarāt as well as the Deccan province.

5. The Mahi. The comparison is with the Seine, on which Rouen is situated.

6. In Broach district. *De mato* in Portuguese means 'of the jungle', i.e., wild; and *singilli* is probably for 'jungly'. See *EF.* i. 64, and *passim*, for the inferiority of the local indigo.

7. This mistake as to the course of the Indus runs frequently in the literature of the period; see, e.g., *The Embassy of Sir T. Roe*, p. 91, where it is corrected.

8. i.e., it was his *jāglr* or assignment.

Khān, brother of Nurmahal, the King's concubine [sic] and is ruled by a Governor who commands 1,000 horse. The English used to have a factory here, but now there was nobody. Saw a hospital for animals'. On 4th, on reaching Broach I heard that the *Wesp* had arrived off Surat, and resolved to return immediately. On 6th, reached Surat. Our caravan from Agra arrived shortly afterwards. Found the factor Van der Dussen, who had come on the *Wesp*. On 7th, went on board the *Wesp*. At the entrance to the Red Sea she had captured a Chaul ship, with 7050 ducats and 8600 reals, 'which came in exceedingly handy for us'. Off Dofar she had captured a Portuguese ship bound for Goa, the crew of 120 having fled; the booty was seven horses, some lacquer desks and boxes from Sind; the ship was fired.

On 8th, three English vessels, the *Lion*, the pinnace *Rose*, and the sloop *Dick* [really, *Richard*] arrived. 'They brought as prisoners the Portuguese commandant Dom Ruy Freire, with 10 or 12 of his chief officers, who had surrendered on the capture of the fort at the watering-place.⁹ The English were asked to help the Persians, who had laid siege to this fort with more than 12,000 men; they promptly brought six guns into position, and seeing this, the Portuguese, who hitherto, though in want of everything, had not feared the might of the Persians, immediately opened negotiations, and surrendered the place, on condition that all the Christians should go to the English, and all the Moslems to the Moslems, who forthwith massacred the lot without mercy. The English sent the Portuguese soldiers, 300 men, into the fort at Ormuz, causing great surprise; they brought Ruy Freire here, having promised in the terms of surrender to land him on the Surat coast within 40 days. The four other English ships, with two Portuguese prizes, remained at Ormuz to help the Persians in the capture of the fort and city'.

On 9th, 'received news that at Burhānpur, on the 2nd, Sultān Khurram had personally strangled his elder brother named Sultān Khusraw with a cord,¹⁰ no one else being present'. [I omit a description of dynastic affairs, which is obviously not authoritative]. 'All the people of the country lamented sore over the death of this Prince, for he was a soldier, and good-

9. See the Introduction to *EF.* ii. for a connected account of the operations at Ormuz.

10. See Mr. Beni Prasad's *History of Jahāngīr*, p. 336, for a review of the evidence on this question. The description of Khurram as 'an ignorant man' cannot be accepted in the ordinary sense of the words; possibly something heard in conversation was misunderstood.

natured, while Prince Sultān Khurram is a severe and ignorant man'.

On 16th, nine or ten Malabar vessels arrived; hitherto they had never come so late in the season. On 25th, very late in the season, a Surat ship left for Mocha. On 21st, I went on board the *Wesp*, which, though it was somewhat late in the season, I intended to despatch, along with the frigate *Surat*, 'During the night Captain Ruy Freire, with two of his officers, escaped by boat from the English ship *Lion* owing to careless watch, which brought the English no great honour'.

April. On 2nd, returned to Surat, and on 3rd, the *Wesp* and *Surat* sailed for Batavia. On 7th, the English ships *Lion*, *Rose*, and *Dick* [*Richard*] sailed for Mocha. On 26th, the Gujarāt ship returned from Achin, after what was said to be a very profitable voyage. Cargo: much tin from Perak, some pepper, small quantities of nutmegs, cloves, benzoin, camphor, etc. The ship left Achin on 11th February, making the voyage two months and 15 days. On 27th, arrived a *tauri* of Cihiri¹¹ [in text, *Catsini* in margin], which had gone there last year with a pass from me: came in 35 days, coasting nearly all the way. On 29th, the *Tocoly* [*ante*] reached Dīū from Mocha. Merchants of Ahmadābād, Cambay and Surat had in her more than 900,000 rupees in cash; the share of Dīū merchants was thought to be still larger, so that the total was more than 2,800,000 guilders [in margin, 2,500,000 rupees].

May. On 25th, the King of Castini's ship arrived after a voyage of 19 days. 'She brought us the mournful news that our people in Mocha were in great trouble owing to the capture of Moslem ships by the *Samson* and *Wesp*; they also said that two Dutch ships were cruising off the island of Babelmandel.' On 31st, it rained for a short time.

June. On 23rd, heard that 17 *tauris* coming from Goa had been lost off Dabhol.

July. On 19th, 'to my great surprise three drops of blood fell from my nose as I was coming from Anthonny's!'

August. On 16th, in Surat five men were beheaded for theft, and a woman was buried alive up to the waist and then stoned to death, for receiving the stolen property. On 22nd, a *baniyan's* ship arrived from Hodeida in the Red Sea.

September. On 10th, our pinnace *Surat* arrived from the Red Sea, and brought news [not given] of our people in Mocha, where she had left the *Wapen van Zeeland* and the *Noordt*

11. *Tauri*, a small vessel. Cihiri is probably Shehr, on the coast of Arabia.

[*North*] *Holland*. On 21st, the English *Dick* [*Richard*] arrived from Mocha. In the evening the *Salamati* of Surat also arrived from Mocha with more than 800 persons, and over 200,000 ducats in gold and silver, but little cargo. On 27th, Surat merchants despatched to Achin a ship with a valuable cargo of cotton goods. On 29th, the English *Lion* arrived from Mocha.

October. On 1st, two 'ships of defence', *Wapen van Zeeland* and *North Holland*, arrived from the Red Sea.¹² I at once went to Swally, but could not get on board owing to the weather. On 4th, the four English ships commanded by John Weddell arrived from Ormuz; and, before they had anchored, the *Good Fortune* and *South Holland* arrived with Admiral Jacob Dedel, thus uniting the four 'ships of defence'. Being still unable to get on board, returned to Swally for the night. Heard that the English and Persians had taken Ormuz; and that, after losing the pinnace *Hardt* in the river [blank in MS], Admiral Dedel with these two ships, and the English *Exchange*, *Anne* and *Diamond*, had found four carracks and one galleon coming from Portugal with the Viceroy on board, and had driven one ashore, while two others had been burnt after reaching Mozambique. On 10th, the monsoon began to change; 'the natives said the rains had not lasted so long for many years'. On 13th, three English ships, *Blessing*, *Discovery* and *Reformation*, arrived from England under Captain Hall. On 14th, 'while I was on board, a Hindu woman burnt herself alive with her husband's corpse in the village of [?] Solparre,¹³ about two kos from Surat, six or eight Dutchmen from the factory being present. The corpse was laid on straw and other fuel near the river; the woman went very bravely and of her own free will to sit beside it, and allowed a straw hut to be built over her. This being done, she took a lighted candle in her hand and began to pray. The bystanders, who were mostly brāhmans, began to make such an outcry that nobody could hear the laments of the woman, who had now set fire to the hut with the candle: in short, she was forthwith burnt to ashes'. On 25th, Admiral Dedel sailed with the *Good Fortune*, *Wapen van Holland* and *South Holland*, leaving the *North Holland* to take in goods for Batavia.

November. On 1st, a Gujarāt ship arrived richly laden, from Jidda. On 3rd, the English ships of defence, *Exchange*, *Anne* and

12. The Treaty of Defence, made in 1619, provided for the maintenance by the Dutch and English of a joint 'fleet of defence'; see *EF. ii, passim*, for its activities. Jacob Dedel was Admiral; Humphrey Fitzherbert, the first Vice-Admiral, died, and was succeeded by Michael Green.

13. This may represent Phūlpāra, a village N. E. of Surat.

Diamond, arrived; one Green was in command in place of the deceased Vice-Admiral. On 6th, Admiral Dedel returned to harbour.

December. On 2nd, after all the goods for Batavia had been put on board the *North Holland*, Admiral Dedel sailed with the fleet of defence to lie off Goa; the fleet included four Dutch and three English ships, but the *Diamond* stayed behind to take in water and fuel. On 17th, the pinnaces *Heusden* and *Wesp*, commanded by Francois Lemmens, arrived from Batavia with cash and goods. On 18th, I went on board to make arrangements, and on 19th came ashore. The same day four English ships and a pinnace left for Ormuz with freight-goods. On 24th, sent the *Wesp* and *Mocha* to Admiral Dedel to communicate the Governor-General's letters [presumably received by the *Heusden*].

(To be continued.)

Half a Century of the Maratha Navy

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BY

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INTRODUCTION.

The Konkan coast measures some two hundred miles from Bombay to Goa. It is this narrow strip of land open to the sea that made the Maratha navy possible and shaped the history of the Maratha sea power.

The first requisite of sea power is the sea. But access to the sea alone does not necessarily lead to the growth of a fighting fleet. Without convenient ports and harbours, without a sea-faring population and without a steady supply of ship-building material, a country cannot aspire to maritime ascendancy even though its sea board may be fairly extensive. Luckily for the Marathas the western coast of their native province was to a greater or lesser extent blessed with each of these three requisites. The physical features of this coast as well as the common characteristics of its people were fully reflected in the brief history of the Maratha Navy.

Viewed from the sea, the coast presents an apparently unbroken line of hills. Some times the massive boulders rise abruptly from the surging water, sometimes a thin line of sandy beach intervenes between the towering rocks and buffeting ocean. Had appearances been true there would be no naval basis for the Maratha seamen and their maritime projects would have been nipped in the bud; but in reality the rocky rampart is frequently broken by estuaries and creeks, and the small islets in the near neighbourhood easily admit of fortification. About twelve miles from Bombay lie the twin islands of Khanderi and Underi; the former, held by a Maratha garrison, and the latter, in the possession of the Sidis of Janjira, commanded the entrance of the Bombay harbour. Seven miles to the south stood the famous naval station of Alibag at the mouth of a tidal creek named after the village of Sakhar on its southern shores. Further south we come across the more considerable Roha creek where the Kundalika falls into the sea. It forms the northern boundary of the remnant of *Habshan*, the land of the *Habshis* or *Abyssinians*. On the right bank of the Kundalika is the

famous stronghold of Chaul or Revadanda, which in the days of its prosperity could boast of a commodious harbour and provided a safe retreat for the Portuguese fleet. The Habshi state is divided into two unequal halves by the gulf and creek of Rajpuri. The creek penetrates far into the mainland and at its very entrance we find the fortified island of Janjira. "Five or six miles inside of the island, crafts of not more than four feet draught can sail at all times. Further inland it is navigable at high tide only". The creeks and estuaries with their naval strongholds multiply as we proceed further south along the coast of the modern district of Ratnagiri. On the south shore of the estuary of the Savitri river stands Bankot or Fort Victoria. Then follow the well-known stronghold of Suvarnadurg at the head of a small natural bay, Dabhol on the northern and Anjanvel on the southern banks of the Vashishthi, Jaygad on the creek formed by the Shastri, Ratnagiri on the Bhatiya, Purangad at the mouth of the Muchukundi, and Jaytapur at the entrance of the Rajapur river. One hundred and seventy miles from Bombay, where the Vaghotan river disembogues into the sea, stands Vijaydrug or Gheria, the Griem of the Portuguese writers, which earned for its strength and impregnability a reputation comparable to that of Gibraltar alone. Devgad with its land locked harbour was far less important; but Malavan or Sindhudurg, Melondim as the Portuguese preferred to call it after the neighbouring mart of Maland, once formed the naval arsenal of the great Shivaji. Here an image of the Maratha hero still receives worship from the descendants of his faithful crew. In the eighteenth century it became known to the trading nations of Europe as the home of the formidable Malavan pirates. The only other port that deserves mention in this connection is Vengurla where the Dutch had a trading settlement. Here came their fighting fleet for provision and fuel when occasions arose. The port is closed during the South-west monsoon but is not always judged safe even in the fair season.

These ports and harbours, creeks and estuaries, gulfs and bays played a part in the naval history of the Marathas more important than is at first sight suspected. Strong by nature and fortified by man, the strongholds suffered from one irreparable disadvantage. The havens were in most cases shallow and the estuaries did not always afford a safe riding to vessels of heavy draught at low tide. The Maratha admirals based their tactics on this feature as well as another peculiarity of their coast. We learn from Grose that "the land and sea breezes on this coast, blow alternately in the twenty-four hours, and divide the day; so that vessels sailing along the coast are obliged to keep in sight of land, as the land winds do not

reach more than forty miles out to sea."¹ The Maratha fleet therefore crept along the coast and sought safety in the familiar shoals in the face of an adversary of greater burden. Nor had the vagaries of land and sea breeze an insuperable difficulty for the Maratha sea man. When a calm befell or the wind was unfavourable the sailing ship was towed in the desired direction by numerous rowing crafts which formed a considerable proportion of the fleet.

If the peculiarities of the coast dictated the naval tactics of the Maratha it is no wonder that they should influence the personnel of the fleet as well. The maritime districts do not form an integral part of Maharashtra. They are cut off from the main land of the Deccan by a steep mountain wall and are accessible only through a small number of narrow passes. The coast had a seafaring population from the earliest times and the Portuguese commerce suffered not a little from the pirates of Sangameshwar. But the inhabitants of the main land could not claim any familiarity with the sea and the naval service had for them but little attraction. Shivaji had to depend on the Koli and Bhandari recruits for manning his fleet, but they were by no means sufficiently numerous. A glance at the map will show that the maritime districts are not very extensive in area. In proportion to their length their breadth is very inconsiderable, never exceeding sixty miles and sometimes no more than thirty. While the land near the sea is exceptionally fertile a large area consists of nothing but basalt and laterite rocks. The population could not therefore be very considerable at any time. Of them the sailors formed an insignificant fraction. According to the Census of 1872, the fishers and sailors formed but 3.29 per cent of the Hindus in Ratnagiri; in Kolaba their numerical strength was slightly superior, forming 4.60 per cent. of the entire Hindu population. Figures for the period under survey are not available but it may be safely assumed that the change in government has not adversely affected the numerical strength of the sea-farers of the Konkan. The Mahomedans supplied a larger number of recruits for the navy. The Daldis were fishermen by profession; the Konkani Muslims were probably descended from Arab immigrants and the sea had no dread for them. No wonder that the large majority of Shivaji's admirals were Muslims by faith, and even when a naval tradition had been created by the Marathas the Muhammadans continued to occupy positions of trust and responsibility in their navy. If the main land of Maharashtra had an easy access to and uninterrupted communication with the

1. Grose, *A Voyage to the East Indies* Vol. II, p. 213.

Arabian sea things might have conceivably been different and the navy might draw a considerable number of Maratha recruits. As it is the personnel of the fleet remained mainly non-Maratha in character and foreigners of all nationalities were eagerly employed because a sufficient number of native experts was not available. But for the isolation of the Konkan coast the Maratha navy might have been a national institution like the Maratha army.

The hamlets of Konkan were deficient in sea-faring people, but the forests of Kolaba and Ratnagiri, Janjira and Savantwari yielded excellent timber and that in plenty. Teak is found in all the twelve blocks of Kolaba forest. It is plentiful in the Habshan hills, though those of Ratnagiri are not of good quality. Teak-made ships were expensive, it is true, but both Grose and Stavorinus testify to their durability. The Dutch Admiral was of opinion that an Indian ship made of teak wood could "navigate the seas for a hundred years together." We learn from the same authority that the natives of Western India "have a peculiar way of preserving their ships' bottom, by occasionally rubbing into them an oil which they call wood-oil, which the planks imbibe, and it serves greatly to nourish and keep them from decay."

The Marathas never came into possession of the entire Konkan coast. They had been rather late in the field and were forestalled by others. No less than six rival powers contended for supremacy in this region. At one time the Portuguese fleet dominated the whole coast from their naval stations at Bassein, Chaul and Goa. Their ascendancy was visibly on the wane and they had more enemies than friends. Bombay once belonged to the Portuguese crown but was presented to Charles II as part of the dowry of his queen. The King had no use for the unhealthy island and it passed into the possession of the East India Company. The transfer however had not been effected with good grace on the part of Portuguese Government of India and bitter feelings survived on both sides. Besides the English and the Portuguese, the only non-Maratha power on the coast was the Sidi of Janjira. When the Abyssinian sailors first rose to power we do not know. Early in the 17th century they held the island and a good slice of the coast on behalf of the Sultan of Ahmadnagar. After the Mughul conquest of that kingdom the territories held by the Sidis passed under the jurisdiction of Bijapur but this change did not adversely affect the quasi-independent position of the Abyssinian admiral. When Shivaji turned his arms against the chiefs of Janjira and reduced the major part of their principality on the main land they readily transferred their allegiance to the Emperor of Delhi and subsequently became the admirals of the Imperial fleet. The Sidis succeeded in

recovering part of their lost ground while Shivaji was still alive. During the turmoil that followed the capture and death of Sambaji they again became the most predominant power in Konkan and when Shahu ascended his grand-father's throne the Sidis held Raigad, the seat of Shivaji's government. The dissension in the royal house considerably weakened the Maratha power, but by the second decade of the eighteenth century the credit of the Maratha navy was restored by Kanhoji Angria who had by that time become the chief commander of the Maratha fleet. The naval stronghold of Malwan was held by a partisan of Kolhapur. The seamen of Malwan co-operated with Angria on rare occasions and usually consulted their own interests in forming their plans and formulating their policy. The chief of Savantwari, otherwise styled the Sardesai of Kudal, was closely connected with the Maratha royal family and bore the same surname as Shivaji. His branch however rose to prominence much earlier, and although he was constrained from time to time to acknowledge the suzerainty of Satara or Kolhapur, he ruled over his principality with sovereign authority. He had a fleet of his own and like his neighbours he also tried to exercise his rights of sovereignty over the sea in the customary way of the coast. The most important port in his State was Vingurla, and as the Dutch had a factory there they also became involved in the naval rivalries of this area. To the trading nations of Europe the chief of Savantwari was known as Khem Savant, after the most distinguished ruler of the State and his followers were called Khemsavants as the sailors of Kolaba and Gheria were called Angrias and those of Sindhudurg, the Malwans.

All the naval powers of the Konkan coast expected merchant men of all nationalities to purchase their passport unless they were exempted from such an obligation by express treaty terms. Any failure in this respect was severely punished and the defaulting ship was liable to confiscation with its cargo. The custom prevailed in the Malabar coast, though in a slightly different form as early as the days of Ibn Batuta.² The Portuguese in the heyday of their maritime suzerainty compelled all nations to procure their passport before their vessels could venture into Indian waters. The Maratha admirals emulated this example and advanced similar claims when they felt themselves strong enough to enforce their traditional right

2. Gibb, *Ibn Batuta, Travels in Asia and Africa*, p. 233 "It is a custom of theirs that every ship that passes by town must needs anchor at it and give a present to the ruler. This they call the "right of bandar". If any one omits to do this, they sail out in pursuit of him, bring him into the port by force, double the tax on him, and prevent him from proceeding on his journey for as long as they wish".

and the maritime struggles of the first half of the eighteenth century centred round this peculiar practice in which the sovereignty of the sea was supposed to find a suitable expression.

LECTURE II.

KANHOJI ANGRIA.

1698-1729.

Shivaji was not a sailor but he was the first general of his race to perceive the importance of sea power. The Maratha navy was still in its infancy when its great founder died but it was destined to survive the disasters that befell the Maratha arms on the main land. The two decades that intervene between the death of Shivaji and the rise of Kanhoji do not constitute a total blank in the naval history of Maharashtra, and although the Marathi chronicles seldom throw any light on their exploits, we get an occasional glimpse of the fleet and its leaders. We learn from a letter addressed by Francisco da Tavora, the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa, to Sambhaji on the 28th July, 1682, that the Maratha fleet often harassed the Portuguese merchant men while engaged in their peaceful pursuits. Shortly after Rajaram's flight to Jinji a Maratha vessel circumnavigated Cape Comorin and safely conveyed the ladies of the royal family to their new abode in the Madras Presidency. The details of this voyage have unfortunately not been preserved but it may be fairly assumed that the Maratha sea men considered the high way of the sea perfectly safe while the route overland was deemed dangerous. Nor were they content with a policy of least resistance, for Dom Pedro Antonio de Noronha, Conde de Villa Verde, complained in 1695 in his letter to the newly appointed Maratha Governor of Konkan, that though Ramachandra Pandit, the regent, professed nothing but friendship for the Portuguese, he permitted his gallivats to infest their territorial water and make prizes of their trading crafts. The Maratha admirals were not however always unfriendly to their neighbours of Goa, as seven years later Bhavanji Mohite, Subhedar of Sindhudrug, received a letter of thanks for restoring a captured Manchua to its Portuguese owner, and in 1705 a similar epistle was addressed to Daud Khan, Sarnobat of Shivaji II's fleet in acknowledgement of the kindness the Portuguese men-of-war had received from him in

the ports of Kanara. Why this Muslim admiral held a military title we do not know but it is strangely reminiscent of Robert Blake's designation of "General of the Sea."

In the opening years of the eighteenth century the numerical strength of the Maratha fleet must have been inconsiderable. But it had scoured the sea for four decades and could boast of a creditable record which had been sadly wanting in the fifties of the preceding century. The Marathas in Shivaji's day had no naval tradition, but his sons had employed at least half a dozen able Captains of their own race in the fleet and one of these Kanhoji Angria accomplished what Shivaji had attempted in vain. For three decades Kanhoji dominated the entire Konkan coast and his fleet became a terror to the trading nations of the west. Feared by his foes, respected by his friends, Kanhoji raised the maritime prestige of his people to a pinnacle never before attained and never surpassed.

Of his early career we hardly know anything. His father Tukoji Sankhpal, according to the official account of the family, served under Shivaji and was posted at the naval station of Suvarnadurg. It is here that his famous son must have spent his early years and served his first apprenticeship in the navy which he was destined to command. The wild stories of his Arabian parentage or Abyssinian origin may be dismissed as utterly baseless. Equally unfounded was the Portuguese myth that he had once aspired to the hand of Shivaji's widow. Nor does it seem likely that he had ever been an inhabitant of the Portuguese island of Versova though the story comes from no less a personage than Conde de Ericeira. In view of his future greatness Kanhoji was a man of humble origin, for his father held no higher rank than that of a commander of two hundred. But it seems improbable that Kanhoji at any stage in his career was reduced to common servitude and earned his living as a menial in the Hindu houses of his native place. He earned his first laurels at Suvarnadurg, if the official account is to be credited. The stronghold was severely assailed by a strong force of the Sidi and Achloji Mohite, the Maratha commander was contemplating capitulation when Kanhoji took matters in his own hand, led a forlorn cause, and saved the place. His daring and resourcefulness soon brought Kanhoji to the notice of his sovereign and he gradually rose to be the second in command of the Maratha fleet. In 1698 he was appointed Chief Admiral by Rajaram and within ten years his fleet became so formidable that a Portuguese writer compared him with the famous Barbarossa, justly dreaded as the scourge of the Mediterranean.

With his head-quarters at Kolaba, Kanhoji was in the happy position to command and control the high road of sea-borne trade that literally passed by his door. With Bombay, Bassein and Surat on the north, and Chaul, Janjira and Goa on the south, the Kolaba fleet could keep a vigilant eye on all vessels sailing from the north to the south and *vice versa* while the intermediate ports offered safe asylums in case of emergency and danger. From the very beginning of his career Kanhoji was resolved to exercise the sovereignty of the sea, as it was then understood, and make prizes of all vessels unprovided with his pass, irrespective of their nationality. His fleet, if Conde de Ericeira was correctly informed, consisted at first of eight or ten gallivats only, but his prowess was soon rewarded with rich spoils and his neighbours copiously, though involuntarily, contributed to his coffers. With increasing wealth Kanhoji found little difficulty in augmenting his fleet but the very process involved hostilities with his neighbours among whom the English and the Portuguese were the most prosperous and powerful. The Sidi of Janjira was the avowed enemy of his king and therefore his legitimate prey.

Of the two European nations the English were to suffer first. The cause of their early dissension with Angria still remains obscure though it may be safely surmised that Kanhoji wanted them to buy his pass. In 1702 a Calicut boat with six Englishmen fell into his hands. It was useless to protest, for Kanhoji was not the man to be easily intimidated. In 1704 'Mr. Reynolds was deputed to find him and tell him that he could not be permitted searching, molesting, or seizing vessels in Bombay waters.' But his expostulations had no effect and Kanhoji charged the English with bad faith and threatened 'to seize their boats wherever he could find them.' He was as good as his word and three years later attacked an English man-of-war which was destroyed after a short encounter. In 1710 he boldly attacked another English ship in the very neighbourhood of Bombay. Though he was defeated on this occasion his naval supremacy remained unshaken. In 1712 he captured the Governor of Bombay's yacht the *Samuel and Mary*, and an English ketch from Karwar the *Anne*. Next year he was constrained to compose his differences with the English, not because he was particularly afraid of them, but because he had too many nuts in the fire and was prepared to forego some in order to save the rest. Kanhoji was not merely a sailor, he was also a diplomat of uncommon ability.

With the Portuguese he was at peace at the beginning. He wanted a market for his prizes and the Portuguese government

were prepared to accommodate him while he found suitable customers in the merchants of Chaul, as appears from a letter of the Viceroy Caetano de Mello de Castro, dated the 8th November 1703. We do not know how Kanhoji appreciated this concession but amicable relations apparently did not endure long. From a letter of the Viceroy to His Majesty the King of Portugal, dated the 11th December, 1708, we learn that the Portuguese State was still engaged in a war with Kanhoji Angria. He had indeed repeatedly sued for peace but the Viceroy paid no heed to his friendly advances as he had beheaded in cold blood all the captives he had taken in two Portuguese manchuas. His villages in the neighbourhood of Chaul were harassed and a Captain I. C. Mor, Antonio Cardim Froes, had particularly distinguished himself in this campaign (Monções F. 3. pl. 11). When exactly the war commenced and why, we do not precisely know although we may reasonably surmise that Portuguese refusal to acknowledge Kanhoji's claims in the sea must have provided the *causus belli*. The manchuas, mentioned above, it may be pointed out, were not trading vessels but fighting ships of the northern fleet. The date of this naval action is yet unknown but from a contemporary Portuguese manuscript we learn that of the two manchuas one was burnt and the other captured by Kanhoji. Of the twenty-seven prisoners all, except one, were put to the sword. The captain saved his life by paying a big ransom of 12,000 xerafins or Rs. 6,000. This was not the first time that Kanhoji had measured his strength with the Portuguese. His first victims were trading vessels with rich cargo but shortly before his engagement with the manchuas, mentioned above, he had captured a Portuguese Pal of war which was going from Chaul to Bassein. The Pal must have provided a very rich booty, for among its passengers was the retiring governor of Chaul. At this period Kanhoji's fleet consisted of six Pals carrying sixteen to eighteen pieces of artillery and thirty gallivats specially equipped for war.

Heavily as they had suffered from the depredations of Angria's fleet, the Portuguese still omitted to provide their merchant fleet with suitable convoys. At one time they were the foremost maritime power in India but they could not safely bank on their past credit for ever. A shrewd observer like Kanhoji could not but notice the steady decline of Portuguese ascendancy in the east, and in 1712 he dealt a stunning blow at the commerce of Goa. The merchant fleet of the North sailed under the convoy of two frigates only under the command of Dom Luis da Costa, the nephew of the Viceroy. Angria fell upon this fleet and went straight for the flag ship which was

promptly disabled. The second frigate succeeded in running away to Goa with a few parangues but more than forty of these boats fell into Kanhoji's hands. The merchants and private citizens of Goa had largely invested their capital in this fleet and its loss was a calamity of unprecedented magnitude. This achievement added so much to Kanhoji's power and prestige that Luiz de Mello, General of the North, permitted his brother to procure Angria's passes for his trading ships.

Another blow of this magnitude would mean the utter ruin of the Portuguese power in India and the next Viceroy wisely provided for a stronger convoy. In 1713 the merchant fleet sailed under the protection of three frigates, four pals, two manchuas and a pinnace (pataxo). But nothing daunted, Angria hovered about with four pals and six gallivats. As two of the convoying pals kept much behind the rest to protect a slow going vessel the Maratha fleet found an opportunity of engaging one of them and a running battle was fought for two days and nights before they withdrew.

The Portuguese were indeed in a very sad plight. The rising power of Angria had rendered their naval stations extremely insecure. Chaul depended mainly on imported provision and Chaul was within striking distance of Kolaba. It was, therefore, urgently needed that they should take some effective measures to remedy this growing evil and they naturally suggested to their fellow sufferers of Bombay that a joint expedition should be made against the common enemy. Governor Aislabie, however, preferred peaceful negotiations to an expensive war, and Angria was in an accommodating mood, for the Portuguese were not the only enemy he had to deal with.

In 1713 there were two claimants to the Maratha throne and the Maratha nobles were divided in their allegiance. When Rajaram died, his nephew Shahu was a prisoner in the Mughul camp and he was quietly succeeded by his minor son Shivaji II. Shivaji II was a boy of undeveloped intellect but his mother Tārā Bai was a masterful lady of unbounded energy and unlimited ambition. When Shahu returned home in 1707 Tārā Bai refused to acknowledge his claims and prepared to fight for her son's rights to the bitter end. During the stormy days of Rajaram feudalism had been unwisely revived, and Shahu and Tārā Bai now vied with each other to purchase the support of the feudal chiefs. The officers of the army and navy were no longer the paid servants of the State and they seldom lost any opportunity of self-aggrandisement, particularly when their selfish interests could be reconciled with the cause of their king. In the civil

war that ensued Kanhoji enlisted himself on Tārā Bai's side but he was for all practical purposes an independent ruler. As early as 1704 the English of Bombay described him as a "Rebel independent of the Rajah Sivajee". Unlike Shivaji's admirals he took no order from his nominal suzerain, nor were his activities confined to the sea. He maintained a strong force on the land and captured many fortresses from Shahu's partisans. In 1713 Shahu sent his Peshwa Eahiro Pant Pingle against Kanhoji, but Angria defeated his Brahman adversary and took him prisoner. In the same year Shahu sent Balaji Vishwanath to retrieve his lost position on the western coast. Balaji tried conciliation and converted a formidable foe into a steadfast friend. Kanhoji offered allegiance to Shahu, relinquished his conquests in land and obtained in return twenty six strongholds, big and small on the sea coast. He was formally appointed by his new sovereign to the office of Chief Admiral which he already held, and his new acquisition of Khanderi or Keneri enabled him to control the entrance to Bombay harbour. Some of the strongholds granted to him on this occasion were still held by the Sidi but it appears that the Janjira Chief also came to terms with him after a brief contest. Thus when the Portuguese Viceroy decided to blockade him in his stronghold of Kolaba, Kanhoji had settled his differences with the English of Bombay. Early next year he concluded a lasting peace with Shahu of Satara. In 1715 his long war with the Sidi was brought to an honourable conclusion. In 1710 he had created a fresh enemy in the Dutch by capturing a sloop of theirs, but they were not in a position to cause him much annoyance.

In 1713 Kanhoji had given the Portuguese a fresh offence by attacking one of their frigates conveying provision and reinforcement to Chaul. For some time past Angria had been openly boasting that he could reduce Chaul and Karanja whenever he liked and the Viceroy Vasco Ferandes Ceasar de Menedes at last sent a strong fleet of five pals, eight gallivats and two manchuas against Kolaba. One of the most distinguished Portuguese officers of this time, Antonio Cardim Froes, was appointed to lead the expedition. He blockaded the harbour but lack of a land force prevented him from attempting a complete siege. From October to December the Portuguese fleet lay before Kolaba but it could not make any impression on the enemy. At last Froes had to withdraw to face a fresh danger that threatened the trading ships of his country. An Arab fleet had appeared before Surat and had already captured a Portuguese ship from China. Angria's stronghold was very well provided with munitions of war but the Viceroy complained to the Emperor of Delhi that

Angria might have been totally annihilated if the Sidis had invaded his territories by land when the Portuguese blockaded his headquarters by sea.

It was useless to invoke the Emperor's aid against Kanhoji; it was futile to inform the Mughul ruler that Angria's triumph meant the ruin of Surat. He was too far off and too weak to be of any real use. The Sidi either would not or could not do anything to check the growing ascendancy of Angria. But the Viceroy found a willing ally in Sambhaji of Kolhapur. To him Kanhoji was a traitor and rebel who deserved condign punishment. Accordingly a treaty was concluded between the two states with a view to the reduction of Angria's strongholds. The Portuguese fleet undertook to co-operate with the army and navy of Kolhapur, they offered to supply Sambhaji with munitions of war if necessary, an alliance was concluded, the treaty was signed and ratified in March 1716 but apparently nothing further was accomplished. Sambhaji was no match for the Barborossa of Konkan. Next year a new Viceroy, the far famed Conde de Ericeira, arrived at Goa and he tells us that Kanhoji offered no insult to the Portuguese State during his term of office except once when four of Angria's vessels were defeated by two Portuguese men-of-war near Anjdiva. But we have reason to believe that while Kanhoji refrained from molesting Portuguese men-of-war on the high sea the fishermen and trading people of Chaul and Bassein dared not launch their boats without his permit and preferred to pay him a regular tribute rather than incur his displeasure. For the time being Kanhoji had no war to wage; in 1715 he had concluded a treaty with the Sidi of Janjira and in 1718 he considered himself so secure as to undertake a journey to Jejuri where he made his homage and paid his allegiance to Shahu. But appearances were deceptive and the very same year witnessed the beginning of a war between the English of Bombay and the Lord of Kolaba that was destined to last for thirty-eight long years.

The lengthy war was preceded by a bitter controversy, and insinuations of bad faith were freely exchanged. In February 1713 Kanhoji had voluntarily sought peace with the English and offered to restore the vessels he had captured if an Englishman of credit was sent to Kolaba. The treaty concluded on that occasion was in force until war broke out in 1718. The terms were quite unambiguous and had been carefully worded to safeguard the interests of the two contracting parties. The English demanded that Kanhoji should restore all that he had taken "that belonged to the Company and our people". That he should not

on any pretence whatever "meddle with any English ships or with the ships belonging to the merchants who live under the protection of the English as Madras, Bengal, or any other Factories or colonies belonging to the English whatsoever." They further demanded that ships coming to or going from Bombay should enjoy immunity from Angria's fleet irrespective of their nationality while within sight of the harbour of Bombay, and lest there should be any misunderstanding about the neutral area it was clearly specified that the space between Mahim Stakes and Khanderi was meant. The English subjects were to be permitted to trade freely in Kanhoji's ports on the payment of the usual customs and he was moreover expected to afford them protection against the vessels of Shivaji Raja and Shahu Raja. The English on their part promised not to permit ships or vessels of other nations to wear their colours and to throw open their ports to the subjects of Angria. Kanhoji was prepared to accept these terms and proposed a few additional articles. Of the six articles suggested by Kanhoji three were roundly rejected but the remaining three demand our attention. As the English were anxious to secure the freedom of the sea for their ships so was Kanhoji eager to exercise in his master's name but in his own interest the sovereignty of the sea. The major part of his revenue was derived from this source and he could not therefore afford to forego these profitable claims. It is on this account that he wanted a clear understanding from the English, whose flags he henceforth undertook to respect, that their protection would not be extended to vessels other than their own even if they might be bound for Bombay or leaving that port. The English replied that they would convoy such ships out of the sight of their port; this area having been clearly defined in the third article proposed by them, the natural assumption is that Angria might deal with such boats as he pleased once they were beyond the specified limit. Secondly, Angria had a large number of aliens in his service and apparently he was not in a position to man his fleet with his own nationals alone. He therefore suggested that "Mariners, inhabitants of your island, that shall desire to serve me of their own free will leaving their families on the island shall not be hindered by you, and also those who, having served here and come to their houses, have been detained by you and have given security; I desire you to discharge their securities, and that those persons may be free." To this request the Bombay Council replied that they would not hinder "mariners inhabitants of Bombay that of their own free will will serve" Angria, and expected reciprocity in the matter. They also agreed to permit Angria's Grabs and Galli-

vats to come to and leave Bombay without any impediment. But the Bombay Government definitely refused to sell him powder and shot, and to allot him any place for manufacturing munitions. As regards his suggestion of mutual support and co-operation in times of need, the English preferred to retain their freedom to act as they thought fit. Angria's messenger later informed that his master was prepared to accept the first proposals of the English but he desired that these articles should be formally incorporated in an agreement, confirmed by the seal of the Company and delivered to the Chief of Kolaba by an Englishman of credit. The English did not think very highly of Kanhoji's trustworthiness and suspected treachery. The Governor and Council were therefore unwilling to ask any of the Company's servants to put his neck inside the wolfe's jaws, but Lt. Mackintosh volunteered to go to Kolaba in consideration of a gratuity of one-thousand rupees. The treaty was then drawn in English and the country language, and Lt. Mackintosh left for Kanhoji's headquarters, and on the 22nd of February he returned with the *Anne* ketch and the prisoners. Kanhoji promised to restore the yacht and the Company's goods before long. From subsequent correspondence it appears that the yacht was returned without its mast and rigging. The peace was concluded, it must be admitted, with wonderful expedition and as Kanhoji's good faith had all along been under suspicion the treaty or agreement was very carefully worded. For three years Kanhoji did nothing in contravention of his undertaking but the mast and the rigging and the cargo of the captured boats remained a fruitful source of future dissention.

Aislabie's successor Charles Boone arrived at Bombay on the 26th December, 1715. He was a man of masterful spirit and was not likely to tolerate any serious omission on the part of Kanhoji. Angria also had some grievances, real or fictitious, against his new friends and his formal letters of compliment were soon succeeded by those of complaints wherein he alluded to "ill usage in return of the good offices he had done, and boasted of his success. The Governor answered (that) if he kept the articles of the treaty, it would be well: if he had just cause to complain, it should be remedied . . . that the English never boasted of their performances, but let their actions do it." What ill usage Kanhoji had received from his neighbours of Bombay and what good services he had rendered them during the short interval of three years between the conclusion of the treaty in February 1713 and Boone's assumption of office in December, 1715, must remain a matter of conjecture for the time being.

But apparently a storm was brewing; that it did not break out earlier was due to Boone's unpreparedness. Early in 1716 he informed his masters that "some outstanding claims would be pressed upon Kanhoji when the English were in a good posture to oppose him; till then keep fair, but must not be too supple." This indicates the policy that Boone pursued for the next three years. He was busily engaged in equipping a fleet to challenge Kanhoji's supremacy in the sea, he protested whenever Bombay received any offence from Angria but did not seek armed redress until he was fully prepared for a prolonged contest.

(To be continued.)

Policy and Character of Mir Casim

BY

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Mir Casim, son of Mir Razi Khan and grandson of Imtiaz Khan, was of Persian origin.¹ His father was a Mansabdar under the Mogul Emperor, and possessed a jagir in Bengal, where he passed his days with comfort. Mir Casim married Fatema Begum, a daughter of Mir Jafar, and received some valuable articles and a large amount of money as dowry.

Early Career Alivardi also paid him two hundred (?) rupees per month from his own treasury, but during his time and in that of his grandson Sirajuddowla, Mir Casim's social position was not very high; he was a mere courtier in the Nawab's Court. He appropriated a box of valuable jewellery belonging to Sirajuddowla's Begum Lutfunnisa, while both the latter were running away from Murshidabad. This helped him greatly to better his fortune and to maintain some cavalry and infantry. During Mir Jafar's first Governorship, he was appointed as the Faujdar of Rungpur and Purniah.² He was a man of parts and possessed a good knowledge of astrology and mathematics.³

His firm administration of these two places, and his other abilities soon created a name for him, and the English Governor thought him to be the proper man for remedying the evils of Mir Jafar's misgovernment of Bengal. Accordingly, after deposing Mir Jafar the English Governor and his party placed him on the masnad of Bengal on the 27th October, 1760.⁴ Like Henry VII of England, who had gathered lessons from the Lancastrians as well as the Yorkists, Mir Casim had learnt some lessons from the regimes of Sirajuddowla and Mir Jafar.⁵ Sirajuddowla's rule had taught him that the native Zemindars must be placed under

proper control and that he must be careful to watch their movements; and the Government of Mir Jafar had clearly demonstrated to him that the strength and life of his government would depend on the improvement of the economic condition of the state and on the proper reorganization of the military department. Mir Casim's policy was formed from these points of view, and he acted accordingly just after his accession.

When Mir Jafar was deposed, there was in his treasury "of ready money only forty or fifty thousand rupees, and about the value of three lacs in gold and silver plate."⁶ Keeniram, Moonilal and Checon, the principal advisers of Mir Jafar, declared that the balances due from them were trifling. But the

His measures for the economic improvement of the State.

situation demanded a well-stocked treasury, because the troops were mutinous for the non-payment of their arrears of pay and the Company had not yet received the whole amount promised to them by Mir Jafar. Within a week or two after his accession Mir Casim satisfied the troops by promising to pay off their arrears in instalments.⁷ To the Company he made over the districts of Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong in lieu of the money that had been promised to them and for the expenses of their troops, and pawned some of his jewels with the members of the Council in Calcutta.⁸ It is

6. Extract of a letter from Mr. Vansittart and Colonel Caillaud, dated, Moradbag, 24th Oct. 1760, Narrative, Vol. I, pp. 139-140; Khulāsat-ut-Tawārikh, p. 93 (a).

7. Khulāsat-ut-Tawārikh, p. 92 (b).

8. Ibid, 93a; Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 391; Calendar of Persian Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 45. The sanad for the cession of Burdwan runs in the following official language:—

"To the Zemindars, Canoongoes, Talookdars, Tenants, Husbandmen and Chief villagers of the Pergunnah of Burdwan, etc., The Zemindaree of the Rajah Tilluck Chand, in the districts of the Subah of Bengal, be it known that whereas divers wicked people have traitorously stretched forth their hands to plunder the subjects, and waste the royal dominions for this reason the said Pergunnah, etc, is granted to the English Company in part disbursement of their expenses, and the monthly maintenance of five hundred European horse, two thousand European foot, and eight thousand sepoys, which are to be entertained for the protection of the royal dominions. Let the above officers quietly and contentedly attend and pay to the persons appointed by the English Company the stated revenues and implicitly submit in all things to their authority, and the office of the Collectors of the English Company is as follows:—

They shall continue the Zemindars and Tenants in their places, regularly collect the revenues of the lands, and deliver them in monthly for the

1. Khulāsa-ut-Tawārikh, p. 76b.

2. Ibid, p. 88a.

3. Ibid.

4. For details, vide, Original papers relating to the disturbances in Bengal, etc., vol. II.

5. Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 432.

found in the Second report of the Select Committee⁹ that he also paid the following sums to the Members:—

to Mr. Vansittart as Governor and President of the Select Committee, Rs. 500,000; to Mr. Holwell, Rs. 270,000; to Mr. Sumner, Rs. 255,000; to Mr. McGuire, Rs. 255,000; to Colonel Cailland Rs. 200,000; to Mr. Culling Smith, Rs. 134,000; to Captain Yorke, Rs. 134,000.

Thus having satisfied the Company and the troops to some extent, Mir Casim proceeded to strengthen the financial resources of his government. At first he detected various cases of embezzlements on the part of the old officers and 'Muttaseddees'¹⁰ and compelled them to render satisfactory accounts of their offices.¹¹ In this work he was assisted by some old officers "whom he took care to soothe into compliance, by taking them into his favour." He appointed as clerks in the treasury some of the old 'Muttaseddees' of Ali Vardi's time, and employed many of his faithful attendants as Nazirs, Controllers and Supervisors in several offices.¹² One of his most trustworthy friends, named Ali Ibrahim Khan, who possessed a fair talent of "discovering intuitively the decisive knot of the most intricate accounts, was proposed chiefly to the military examination, and to the business of ascertaining the real arrears due to the troops."¹³ He appointed Sitaram, an old 'Muttaseddee' and accountant of the time of Ali Vardi, an auditor of the Dewani and an accountant in that department of the treasury from which pensions and other allowances were disbursed. Mir Munshi, who was his own Secretary and on whom he conferred the title of Hafiz Irsar Khan, was also entrusted with the task of auditing certain accounts and of determining

payment of the expenses of the Company, and the pay of the above-mentioned forces, that they may be always ready cheerfully and vigorously to promote the affairs of the King. Let this be punctually observed. Dated the 14 of the month Rubbeulawul 1st sun answering to the 1st of the month of Cartic 1176, Bengali style". Proceedings, November 17, 1760.

Sunnuds for the cession of Chittagong and Midnapur were also similarly worded.

⁹ p. 20; First Report, pp. 33-34; Carraccioli, *Life of Clive*, Vol. ii, p. 195.

¹⁰ Verelst explains "Muttaseddee" as "a general name for all officers employed in taking the accounts of Government, or any person of consequence". [The modern form is *Mutsaddi*, holder of a comparatively small charge or minor office—Editor].

¹¹ *Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh*, pp. 92b-93b; *Seir-ul-mutakherin*, Vol. II, p. 388.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Seir-ul-mutakherin*, Vol. II, p. 388.

the net expenses of the state.¹⁴ He then formed a budget of the income and expenses of his government, abolished the expenses on luxury, and curtailed many other unnecessary expenses, as for example, the expenses on the managerie department.¹⁵ He converted the gold and silver articles in the Taziakhana into coins amounting to several lacs, and stopped the expenses for making Tazias.¹⁶ During his stay at Patna he called Ramnarain, the Deputy Governor of that place, to account for "the quantum of the revenues he had hitherto received during his long administration, and the sum total of the expenditures he had made; the monies charged in the books, as paid to the Djaghiry-holders (jaigir-holders) of the Emperor's Court, and the Nawab's, and the receipts and vouchers of those disbursements; the sums charged as paid to the troops, with a comparative statement of the reviews made, and of the number of horses marked on the thigh, and borne on the books. Vouchers and regular accounts of all these he required of him in the auditing hall, in the presence of a large number of Ramnarain's own officers, and heads of office, with whom he had formed a large circle round the Governor's person."^{16a} Ramnarain submitted to the Nawab's orders but he had already sent away some account books with his own men. They were, however, caught hold of by Mir Casim's people, one Sunder Singh being the first to fall within their clutches. He was put in confinement, and as he was found guilty of embezzlements in the army accounts, Jaigir-holders' accounts and in the receipts of the public income, his house was surrounded and 7 lacs in cash and many other effects were taken therefrom. But some of his effects were concealed in the houses of his cashiers Gangavishnu and Mansaram Sahu, rich bankers of Patna. So Mir Casim compelled these two men to pay vast sums of money, and similarly realised a considerable amount from Muralidhar, the head spy of Ramnarain, as well as from Mohammed Issac, the Kotwal or Police Inspector^{16b} who had misappro-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 389; *Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh*, pp. 92b-93b.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*; "... he curtailed his expenses ... for instance the ram office, the nightingale office, the antelope office, and some others, all belonging to the menagerie department. Of all that multitude of animals, he kept only a few of each species, and made the rest over to the Zemindars of the provinces on their paying a certain price, which his treasury received from their agents". *Seir*, Vol. II, p. 391.

¹⁶ *Muzaffarnamah*, p. 154b; *Ryaz-us-salatin*, p. 385.

^{16a} *Seir*, Vol. II, pp. 417-419.

^{16b} *Ibid.*; *Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh*, pp. 103b-105b.

priated much from the Government fund. He confiscated the effects of Chunilal and Munilal and realised vast sums from them.¹⁷ So far Mir Casim followed a policy of "prudence and economy."^{17a}

But in certain points he carried his measures too far. It is said that he extorted money from some of the old relatives and dependants of Ali Vardi and Mir Jafar as well as from those public women who had been lavishly paid by Miran and Mir Jafar, and credited the amount thus realised in the state treasury.¹⁸ He extorted what he could from one Amanullah, who used to place inkstands before Nawab Ali Vardi, and from Mir Muksud Ali, who was the Superintendent of Ali Vardi's elephant-house.¹⁹ Some of his revenue measures were somewhat strict and arbitrary. Francis writes:—"His principle is said to have been that whatever the Ryots paid should be the property of Government; thereby totally excluding all Zemindars. His officers acted accordingly. Their fear of him was so great, both from his skill in accounts and the rigour of his government, that his orders were punctually obeyed; so that partly from the direct produce of the lands, and partly by fines and confiscations it is believed that for two years, he drew almost double the ancient revenue from the coun-

17. Seir, Vol. II, p. 391; Khulāsat-ut-Tawārik, pp. 392b-393b. In this respect and in his treatment of the Zemindars, as we shall find later, the policy of Mir Casim might be well compared with that of Henry VII of England. As Henry's policy of squeezing out money from the nobles, with the help of his agents Empson and Dudley, had served to fill his treasury at the expense of the nobles, so this policy of Mir Casim enabled him to strengthen his financial resources and at the same time to curb the power of the wicked counsellors of Mir Jafar.

The situations at their accession on the thrones of their respective kingdoms were also somewhat similar. Henry VII was welcomed as the saviour of England from the evils of the Lancastrian and Yorkist misrule; and similarly Mir Casim was placed on the Masnad of Bengal to restore order and peace in the country which had been distracted as a result of Mir Jafar's misgovernment. But their ultimate fates were quite different. Henry was able to lay the strong foundations of the Tudor Monarchy, while Mir Casim's aims were completely frustrated. The former had the united support of the people of England behind him, while Mir Casim had to rule a country where such a support could never be expected.

17a. Vansittart's Narrative, Vol. I, pp. 138-140.

18. Ibid. Jagat Sing, a famous 'Mutaseddie' of Ali Vardi's time, prepared a list of his valuables and property and presented it to Mir Casim. The latter was highly pleased at this, and returned to Jagat Sing his property and jewels taking only a portion of it.

19. Muzāffarnāmah, p. 154 (b).

try."²⁰ It is stated in the Fourth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1773, ²¹ that in 1760 Mir Casim "laid an additional tax of 1½ annas or 3/32 parts of the original crown rents and estimated this addition at Sicca Rupees, 4,50,164-2-9, which being added to the former revenue of 1,32,82,960-2-17-1 made the whole of these revenues in his time amount to 1,37,33,124-5-6-1 or £1,792,172 sterling". He also took possession of all such local collections as Khajiri-jama (Khadge jama), which had been hitherto concealed, "for the benefit of the provincial treasury, and the increment so obtained for the Nawab was spoken of as Kifayat (corruptly Keffyet) or profit" ²².

Mir Casim paid equal attention to the reorganisation of the military department. He placed the Armenian Gurgin Khan, brother of Khajwa Madar, in charge of this department, and ordered him to organise it after the European fashion.²³ He admitted English sepoy and their officers into his service and "made a vast quantity of firelocks or artillery".²⁴ He arranged for manufacturing guns and flint-muskets at Monghyr.²⁵ Shaik Saiyad Ali, an inhabitant of Lucknow, was given the post of (paymaster) and, after his death, his son Muhammad Ali and his nephews Farhat Ali and Barkat Ali were also appointed paymasters to four or five

20. Minutes, etc., p. 23.

21. p. 3, quoted in Firminger's Introduction to the Fifth Report, p. CXV.

22. Ibid, p. XI

Kifayat-i-sair: "the profit derived by bringing to account concealed exactions in custom duties, etc."

Kifayat-i-faujdari: "increased assessment on the frontier lands held by the military governor levied by them, at first for their own benefit, but brought to the credit of the Government by Kasim Ali Khan". Wilson: Glossary of Revenue Terms.

23. Khulāsat-ut-Tawārikh, p. 92b, Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 389.

24. Reflections on the Present Commotions in Bengal, pp. 9-10 (Imperial Library, Calcutta).

25. Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 421. Haji Mustafa, the translator of the Seir-ul-mutakherin, makes the following remarks regarding this manufacture of guns at Monghyr:—"The European reader may possibly hear with surprise, that those firelocks manufactured at Monghyr, proved better than the best Tower-Proofs, sent to India for the Company's use; and such was the opinion which the English Officers gave them, when they made the comparison by order of the Council of Calcutta. Their flints were of Radjemahl (Rajmahal) agates, and their metal more mellow. And even to-day, 1786, Colonel Martin, a Frenchman, who has greatly distinguished himself these twenty-two years in the English service, has, at Lucknow, a manufactory where he makes pistols and fusils better, both as to

thousand horse.²⁶ Besides these, he had other officers, whether natives or foreigners, each of whom was appointed in some particular branch. Mohammad Taki Khan, who was appointed as the Faujdar of Birbhum, "with orders to raise men, but to discipline only such as might prove able-bodied and serviceable", discharged his duties satisfactorily.²⁷

lock and barrel, than the best arms that come from Europe. The comparison had been repeatedly made; and Sir Elijah Impey, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Calcutta, carried to Europe one pair of these pistols". Ibid, footnote. Rennel noticed a great gun at Dacca, of which the dimensions were:—

	Feet.	Inches.
"Diameter at Muzzle.	3	1
Do. Breech.	3	
Do. of the Trunnions		11½
Do. of the Bore.	1	
Weight of gun	lbs.	Tons.
Do. of shot	61673	or 279
	474	

(Rennel's Journals, p. 124).

The following particulars are given about this gun in Rennel's 'Memoir of the Map of Hindustan', p. 61:—"It was made of hammered iron, it being an immense tube formed of 14 bors, with rings of 2 or 3 inches wide driven over them, and hammered down into a smooth surface; so that its appearance was equal to that of the best executed piece of brass ordnance, although its proportions were faulty

Whole length. 22ft. 10½ inches.

Diameter at the Breech 3 " 3 "

Diameter four feet

from muzzle. 2 " 10 "

Diameter of the

muzzle. 2 " 2½ "

Diameter of the

Bore. 1 " 3¼ "

The gun contained 234,413 cubic inches of wrought iron and consequently weighed 64,814 pounds avoirdupois, or about the weight of eleven 32 pounders. Weight of an iron shot for the gun 465 pounds."

"There is another big gun at Murshidabad, the dimensions of which are nearly the same as those of the one now at Dacca. An inscription in this states that it was made in the reign of Shah Jahan and governorship of Islam Khan (circa 1637) at Jahanginagar (Dacca) by Janaranjan blacksmith". Cal. Review, Vol. XCIV, p. 339.

²⁶ Khulāsāt-ut-Tawārik, p. 92b; Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 390.

²⁷ Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 421. The author of this work writes that Muhammad Taki was a more useful and trustworthy commander than Gurgin Khan, and remarks that "his conduct and name has been inscribed on the leaves of the historical page". But its translator writes in the footnote that Gurgin Khan "was as much a man of genius, as Mahmed-Taki-

Mir Casim thus secured for himself a well-filled treasury and a strongly reorganised army, the two essential requisites for a strong executive, especially in those days of disorder and mutual distrust. His third measure, that is, the suppression of the refractory Zemindars, was also a part of his general policy of strengthening his position as the ruler of Bengal. He first turned his attention against Kummanand, the Zemindar of Myhutty paragana, who was possessed of "many goods and effects." He sent his men to bring him to the capital, but the latter fled away from his territory.^{27a} He next proceeded against Asad-Zaman-Khan, the Zemindar of Birbhum, for the latter had become very powerful and had refused to comply with the Nawab's demand for some additional rent.²⁸ He had moreover entered into an alliance with the Raja of Burdwan and both of them had the bad intentions of rising against the Nawab as well as the Company.²⁹ The Nawab started from his capital in the month of December 1760, and encamped at Boudgram (about 20 miles from Murshidabad), from which place he despatched Khuja Muhammadi Khan, Major Yorke and Gurgin Khan to chastise the Birbhum Zemindar. On their approach Assad-Zaman requested his father Badi-us-zaman to govern the country, and himself came forward to meet them with four or five thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry, which he posted at Karidha, two miles north of Suri, and from which place he sent detachments to all the difficult passes of the country.³⁰ For some time the Nawab's soldiers could not make any headway against the Birbhum Raja's troops.³¹ But they were soon helped by Captain White, who had already marched towards Burdwan

qhan, but with more knowledge. It was he who trained and disciplined the Nawab's cavalry, infantry and artillery, in the English manner; and if half-trained, as were those troops, a simple detachment of them fought and defeated as numerous as those that won the battle of Plassey. What would he not have done, had he had already of two years more, to train them thoroughly."

^{27a} Mir Casim's letter to the Company, November 1760, Long, p. 238.

²⁸ Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 394; Khulāsāt-ut-Tawārikh, p. 94a.

²⁹ Mir Casim's letter to the Company, November 1760, Long, pp. 238-

239.

³⁰ Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 395, Muzaffar-namah, 155a. The author of the Seir-ul-mutakherin had then gone to Boudgram with instructions from Mr. Hay, Chief of the English Factory at Patna, and Major Carnac, Commander-in-Chief of the English, to represent to Mir Casim the state of affairs in Bihar and to request him for proceeding thither.

³¹ Ibid.

in order to chastise its revolted Raja³². With a few companies of Telingas and other soldiers, Captain White attacked Assad-Zaman from his rear in such a way that all the Birbhum soldiers dispersed in various directions³³. Some of them fell dead on the field and Assad-Zaman fled away quickly from Nagore towards the hills.³⁴ Major Yorke and the Nawab's soldiers proceeded to Nagore and took possession of it.

The Zemindars of Bihar were more powerful and turbulent. So, after settling his affairs at Patna with Shah Alam and Ramnarayan, Mir Casim proceeded to suppress these Zemindars. One day he issued an order summoning the more important of them to attend his court. Buniad Sing and Fateh Sing (Raja of Buncary) obeyed his order, but were imprisoned as soon as they reached Patna³⁵. Kamgar Khan, the Zemindar of Tirhut, did not pay heed to his summons and, from fear of chastisement for his attachment to the Emperor and for his non-payment of the Government dues, retired with his troops into the Ramgur hills. Pahalwan Sing and other Zemindars of Sahabad (Bhojpuria Zemindars) also stood on their defence³⁶.

The Nawab, thereupon, sent his nephew Ali Khan and Asad-ullah-Khan, son of Mir Hossein Khan, to subdue Kamgar Khan and himself proceeded to Shahseram³⁷ at the head of a large army. He had already sent there Roshan Ali Khan, the Paymaster of Miran, and Somru, the German adventurer, to warn and chastise the Bhojpur Zemindars. On his approach Pahalwan Sing and some other Zemindars of Shahabad crossed over to the other side of the Ganges, and settled in the territories of Nawab Shuja-ud-dowla and of Bulwant Sing, Zemindar of Benares. The Nawab took possession of their territories, placed his own collectors in each Zemindary, killed some of those who were most turbulent

³². Mir Casim's letter to the Company, November, 1760; Public proceedings, 24 November, 1761.

³³. Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 396.

³⁴. "The 28th of Jemed-ul-awal I received intelligence that the Beerboon Zemindar through the apprehension he was under of our troops had fled from his house at Nagore and gone with the utmost expedition to the hills. Major York with the troops is arrived successful at Nagore."

Mir Casim's letter to the Company, January 1761, Long, p. 249; Calendar of Persian Correspondence, Vol. I p. 53.

³⁵. Muzaffarnāmāh, p. 161b; Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 423 Khulāsat-ut-Tawārikh, p. 104a-105a.

³⁶. Ibid.

³⁷. Ibid; Muzaffarnāmāh, pp. 163a-163b. The author of the Seir-ul-mutakherin was at that time at Patna.

and dangerous, and gathered every information regarding the families of those Zemindars and other inhabitants of the cities through his head-spy Suk Lal and his assistants³⁸.

The Nawab then proceeded to visit the fortress of Rhotas, accompanied by the father and the younger brother of the author of the Seir-ul-mutakherin. From Rhotas he came back to Sah-

seram and put Sahamal, the Deputy Governor of Rhotas, under confinement. He then appointed Mir Mahdi Khan, a nephew of Assad-ullah-Khan's, to command in the districts of Sahaseram

and Chainpur with some Zemindars in Seress and Cotombah. Shah Mahommed Akbar Khan, a man of Lucknow and a famous commander, was ordered to help Mir Mehdi Khan and to "keep a watchful eye on the machinations of the fugitive Zemindars, and especially on Pahlavan Sing, a man that might endanger the tranquility of the whole country." Sumro was placed at Buxar with three or four regiments of Telingas, and some pieces of canon. Mir Roshen Ali was kept at Bhojpur with his whole brigade of cavalry and infantry³⁹. On his return to Patna the Nawab put Raja Rajbullabh, the Deputy Governor of that place, under confinement and sent some men to confiscate his property at Dacca.

Raja Nobet Ray was then appointed the Deputy Governor of Patna.⁴⁰ It is stated in the Muzaffarnāmāh⁴¹ that, during his stay at

Monghyr, the Nabob summoned Raja Krishnadas, son of Raja Rajbullabh, Raja Nityananda, son of Royroyan Umed Ram, Raja Krishnachandra of Nadiya and Muzaffar Ali, Zemindar of Kharagpur, from their respective countries and harrassed them in various ways. The Zemindar of Betiah, who had become rather unruly, was also brought under submission⁴².

Thus, with the above measures, Mir Casim destroyed the evil elements, which had greatly discredited Mir Jafar's administration, and established a strong and efficient Government. Vansittart has given the following estimate of his administration:—

³⁸. Ibid. The author of the Muzaffarnamah, who is all along biased against Mir Casim, notes that the Nawab laid waste the whole of Shahabad with cruelty and oppression in such a way that many people died of starvation and some sold their own sons for a seer of rice. It is not certain how far he is true in this statement.

³⁹. Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 430.

⁴⁰. Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 431; Khulāsat-ut Tawārikh, p. 105a; Muzaffarnāmāh, p. 166b.

⁴¹. p. 166b.

⁴². Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 437.

"He discharged the Company's debt and the heavy arrears of his army, retrenched the expense of his court, which had consumed the income of his predecessors and secured his own authority over the country by reducing the power of the Zemindars, who were before continual disturbers of the peace of the province"^{42a}

Nature of Mir Casim's Government.

We have it on the authority of Gulam Hossein⁴³ that "in unravelling the intricacies of affairs of Government, and especially the knotty mysteries of finance, in examining and determining private differences; in establishing regular payments for his troops, and for his household; in honouring and rewarding men of merit, and men of learning, in conducting his expenditure, exactly between the extremities of parsimony and prodigality; and in knowing intuitively where he must spend freely, and where with moderation—in all these qualifications—he was an incomparable man indeed, and the most extraordinary Prince of his age". There might be some exaggeration in this statement of Gulam Hossein; but the author of the *Muzāffarnāmāh*⁴⁴ has also remarked that 'Mir Casim's fame and authority had spread over the whole of Bengal. During his time, the wolf and the lamb drank water in one place, the rebels were suppressed and the army was strong and reliable'⁴⁵.

He reserved two days in a week for the administration of justice, when he himself sat as the judge and decided cases most impartially.⁴⁶ The weak were protected against the strong and the poor landholders and tenants, who had been deprived of their hereditary estates and villages, recovered these through the Nawab's help⁴⁷. He was regular in the payment of his troops. He had a great regard for pious and learned men and encouraged them in

^{42a}. Compare an almost similar statement in Hasting's letter to the Governor, dated 26th January, 1762, Gleig's *Memoirs of Warren Hastings*, Vol. II, pp. 113-114.

⁴³. Same as note 42.

⁴⁴. From the author's personal references in the work, it is apparent that he had a special prejudice against Mir Casim, whom he indicts almost in every point. In one place (p. 167b) he says that Mir Casim's district officers had dismissed him from his post in the paragona of Laskapur (?). Moreover he was in intimate terms with Rajbullubh, Jagatseth and others, who had been punished by Mir Casim.

⁴⁵. p. 143b.

⁴⁶. *Seir-ul-mutakherin*, Vol. II, pp. 432-434; *Khulāsāt-ut-Tawārikh*, p. 105 (a).

⁴⁷. *Ibid.*

their work. His commercial policy aimed at securing facilities for the country merchants and protecting the manufacture and industry of his kingdom. He tried to put a stop to the evil practices of the Company's servants and *Gomasthas*, and to stop the abuse of *dustucks* on their part⁴⁸. Thus, as a ruler, Mir Casim was strong, wise and efficient.

But there were two dark spots in his character as a man. His nature was very suspicious, and he was extremely cruel to those whom he did not like⁴⁹. Gulam Hosein writes that "so suspicious a Government soon interrupted all social intercourse; and

people, accustomed to a certain set of acts, and acquaintances and visits, now found themselves under the necessity of abandoning them at

Character.

once, and of living at home altogether". He maintained a large number of spies, whose business it was "to pry into the secrets of every family, and into the actions of every man, whether in the Nawab's service or not".^{49a} During his stay at Shahseram, he put five persons, such as Sitaram, "a minister who transacted a great deal of important business", Shah Sadullah, (Shah Abdulla?) a commander, and three spies of his own Government to death, for their carrying on a treacherous correspondence with the disaffected Zemindars of Behar⁵⁰. Gulam Hosein has noted on the authority of "several persons worthy of credit, that not one of these five persons had committed any such crime as might have deserved death . . . ; that every one of them had fallen a victim to conjecture and suspicion"⁵¹. From what Mr. Hastings wrote from Patna to the Company's Governor in Calcutta on May 4, 1762⁵², it appears that these people were really in a conspiracy with these Zemindars in order to subvert the Nawab's Gov-

⁴⁸. Vide, my chapter on "History of the East India Company's Trade in Bengal, 1740-65," the first of which has been already published in the *Calcutta Review* and the second part is also expected to be published soon in the same journal.

⁴⁹. *Seir-ul-mutakherin*, Vol. II, p. 427; *Khulāsāt-ut-Tawārikh*, p. 115a; *Muzāffarnāmāh*, p. 163b.

^{49a}. *Seir-ul-mutakherin*, Vol. II, p. 428.

⁵⁰. *Muzāffarnāmāh*, p. 164b; *Seir-ul-mutakherin*, Vol. II, p. 428.

⁵¹. *Ibid.*

⁵². "I am informed that the Nabob had intercepted letters from Sitaram, Sheikh Sadolla, and others to Pulwan Sing and other disaffected persons encouraging them in their rebellion by arguments drawn from the disagreements between the Nawab and Mr. Ellis, which they should contrive to draw to such length as to induce the Nabob to quit the province, and

ernment, and that they had been slain with the consent of the whole Durbar. As conspirators against the established Government, these men deserved, no doubt, some sort of punishment; but the fact that they were all at once sentenced to death shows that the Nawab was too suspicious a man to allow any conspirator to live at all. When Gulam Hosein, the petition-bearer, died at Sahseram, his wife and two sons were imprisoned and his house was confiscated⁵³. Khuja Abdul Wafai, a Kashmirian money-lender, who resided at Murshidabad, was tortured and imprisoned, as the Nawab's people had reported to him that he owed several thousand of gold mohurs to Gulam Hosein Arzbegi. One astronomer of the name of Mir Jafar, who had been associated with Wafai in his business, died from fear of losing his effects and honour⁵⁴. Mirza Daud, who had been married to Miran's daughter, took protection in the English Factory at Cassimbazar for fear of losing his life but he was captured by the Nawab's people, who took him to Monghyr where he was kept in confinement⁵⁵. Ali Quli Khan, the Faujdar of Bhagalpur, was imprisoned on the very day when one of his daughters died⁵⁶. Permission for her burial was refused by the Nawab, and she was buried within the compound of her father's house. Under the Nawab's orders, Ali Quli's two sons, Kelb Ali Khan and Haider Ali Khan, were sent into prison and remained there as long as his Government lasted. He found fault with them for having been in the engagement against the Radja (Raja) of Gohrecpur (Gorakhpur), where Mir Abul Hassan Khan who was the son to Turab-ali-Khan, the Nawab's maternal uncle, had been accidentally killed. Another reason of resentment against

then the design was laid to take his life. Sitaram and the *nircarrahs* were confronted with the letters in a large and public Durbar. They all confessed the guilt, and threw themselves upon his mercy; but the whole assembly unanimously declared that they deserved death, and the same instant they were accordingly carried out and executed. Sheik Sadooll being stationed at some distance, the Nabob summoned him to appear before him, but he refused it, and the Nawab detached a party to bring him by force. A fray ensued, and Sheik Sadoolla with some others on both sides, was slain". Hastings letter to the Governor, dated Patna, 4th May, 1762, quoted in Gleig's *Memoir of Hastings*, Vol. i, pp. 111-112.

⁵³. Muzaffarnamah, p. 165a. The author does not state why the Nawab treated Gulam Hosein's family in this manner. We must be careful not to confuse this Golam Hosein with the author of the *Seir-ul-mutakhirin*.

⁵⁴.. Muzaffarnamah, 165b

⁵⁵. Ibid. p. 166a.

⁵⁶. Ibid, 163 a.

them was "their having made a visit to General Coote, on his journey to Azimabad, on the score of their having already commenced an acquaintance with that officer, when he first passed by Bagalpur, in his pursuit of Musher Lass (M. Law)"⁵⁷.

A famous Punjabi archer, named Rahim-ulla Khan, who lived in Bengal with Abdul Rasul Khan, a brother of Dost Muhammad Khan, was cruelly punished by the Nawab who "ordered his nose to be cut off, and himself to be put upon an ass, and carried in that condition all over the town; after which he was to be banished beyond the Keremnassa (Karamnassa)"⁵⁸. The Nawab was offended with him because "he was passionately fond of Sukur-ollah-qhan, alias Aga-baba, son posthumous of Ser-efraz-qhan (Sarfaraz Khan), a young man now under confinement at Djehangirnagar (Dacca) and who was extremely suspected by Mir Cassem-qhan, to whom he now and then sent petitions, requesting a release from his confinement. The man's servant used, together with these petitions, to bring letters to the Nawab's principal Ministers. Rahim-ollah-qhan, meeting the above servant in his way carried him home and gave him a lodging"⁵⁹. One Chintamani Das, who was a native of Bhojpur and who had been appointed by Mir Casim as the "superintendent of the finances of that district," was found guilty of carrying on correspondence with the refractory Zemindars of Behar, who had taken refuge at Gazipur⁶⁰. His punishment was that he was tied to an elephant's foot, and carried round till he breathed his last⁶¹.

When, after the battle of Suti, the wheel of Mir Casim's fortune had taken an adverse course, then, seized with anguish and despair, and being more suspicious of the behaviour of his Indian prisoners, he ordered a massacre of them. All the native historians have given the names of the most important of them and

⁵⁷. *Seir-ul-mutakhirin*, Vol. II, p. 426. The author writes that the "satellites, sent by Radja Radjbullub (Raja Rajbullubh) to fetch those ill-fated brothers, having met me by chance on the road, surrounded by my customary retinue, they mistook me for their prey, and desired me to follow them; and although I expostulated strongly, they answered nothing to the purpose; and I was fain to go whithersoever they thought proper to lead. They carried me to Radja Radj-bullub. This Governor, on hearing my name and family, was confounded; he professed much concern, made an apology and dismissed me. I returned thanks to God and went home". p. 427.

⁵⁸. *Seir-ul-mutakhirin*, Vol. II, pp. 438-440.

⁵⁹. Ibid, Vol. II, p. 439.

⁶⁰. Ibid, pp. 439-441.

⁶¹. Ibid.

have noted that there were many others besides them who were similarly murdered. The important persons were:—Ramnarain, Rajbullubh, with his son Krishnadas, Mir Muhammad Saddiq Khan with his sons, Royroyan Umid Ray with his son Nityananda, the Zemindars of Ticary, Raja Fateh Sing and Raja Buniad Sing, Shah Abdulla, Jagat Seths Mahatab Ray and Surupchand⁶². Ramnarain was drowned in the Ganges near Monghyr with a bag of sand fastened to his neck; perhaps others also were killed in the same manner.

The massacre of the English prisoners at Patna⁶³ is also an instance of his cruel and suspicious disposition. It baffled his own purpose. Instead of striking terror into the minds of the English, it made them more furious, and he could not maintain his ground for a long time.

It is true that these Indian officials and Zemindars were entertaining various designs against Mir Casim⁶⁴, and that their sup-

⁶². Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 492; Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh, p. 115a; Muzaffarnamah, pp. 179a-180a.

Proceedings, October 26, 1763. We should note that there are different versions regarding Jagat Seths' death. According to Khulāsāt-ut-Tawārikh (p. 118a) they were murdered at a village Chandi near Bar; the Muzāffarnāmah (p. 184a) also states that they were killed near Bar; in the proceedings, October 26, 1763, we find "that the Seats (Seths) were put to death near Baur and their bodies not permitted to be burnt". But Haji Mustafa, the translator of the Seir-ul-mutakherin, writes that Jagat Seth Mahatab Ray was drowned at Monghyr "from a tower of the castle. His favourite servant Chuni, desired, supplicated, intreated to be made fast with his good master, or thrown before him, and could not obtain that favour; so that he threw himself at last after his master had, in vain, descended to the lowest supplications to obtain his forbearing. These particulars I know, not only from a general report at that time, but also from a relation of Chuni's, one Baburam, a man of some note, who then lived in Djagatseat's (Jagat-Seth's) palace, and has been ten years in my service." Dr. Anderson, who wrote on the authority of the reports of the native servants, writes at one place of his Diary (Aug. 17) that the Seths were killed at Monghyr, at another place (Sep. 28) that they were alive and at Barh. Major Adams in his letter to the President dated the 18th October writes:—"And the Setts were about the same time put to death near Baur and their bodies were not permitted to be burnt but exposed".

Thus it seems that the version other than that of Haji Mustafa is true, or of the two Seth brothers one might have been killed at Monghyr and the other near Bar.

⁶³. Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, pp. 504-508; Khulāsāt-ut-Tawārikh, pp. 118a-119b; Muzāffarnāmāh, p. 184b-185b.

Wheeler, p. 325; Vansittart's Narrative, Vol. III, p. 396; Diaries of Three Surgeons at Patna, edited by Firminger.

⁶⁴. "And as his mind had been soured by the alteration which he now observed among the grandees of his Court; and the conjecture required

pression might have become a practical necessity for his Government. But death was too heavy a punishment for the offences they were guilty of. They might be well punished in some other way. Thus we see, that, inspite of his various qualities as a ruler, as has been already pointed out, Mir Casim could not rise above the two vices of his age, such as cruelty and suspicion.

During the greater part of the Eighteenth century these were the two most dominating evils among the ruling and aristocratic classes. The history of the scramble for the throne among the sons of Aurangzeb⁶⁵, the behaviour of Murshid Kuli towards the Zemindars, the manner of Sharfaraz Khan's accession to the musnud of Bengal⁶⁶, the treachery of Haji Ahmed, Ali Vardi, Roy Rayan, Jagat Seth against Sarfaraz Khan, the great conspiracy of 1757 against Sirajuddowla, and the relations between Mir Jafar, Roydur-labh, and Ramnarain—all clearly show that the political atmosphere of the age was one of mutual distrust. Mir Casim had been breathing in that atmosphere for sometime before he became the Nawab of Bengal, and his nature was accordingly formed. It is only great men who can rise above the environments of their age. But Mir Casim, was not such. He was only a strong ruler with a firm determination and a sound financial and military genius.

that he should dispose of his prisoners of State, who were in great numbers; he resolved to put all those unfortunate men to death; especially as he had already a variety of suspicions on their account, and they had filled his mind with tormenting anxieties; they were too numerous to be kept under command, and too dangerous to be dismissed."

Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. II, p. 492.

⁶⁵. Seir-ul-mutakherin, Vol. I, Sections I and II, Irvine's Later Maughals, Vol. I, pp. 1-35.

⁶⁶. "Immediately on the decease of his father Serferaz Khan took possession of the government, but notwithstanding his uncontested succession, he was so apprehensive of the intrigues of his enemies, that he would not venture out of the fort to attend the funeral obsequies of his father." Stewart's History of Bengal, p. 493.

The Madras Council and its relations with the Golconda administration under Madanna and Akkanna (1672-1686)

By

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The Editor of this Journal, in the course of a lengthy paper on "Abul Hasan Qutub Shah and His Ministers Madanna and Akkanna", presented to the 10th annual meeting of the Osmania University Historical Society and published in the *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. X; Part II, has explained the significance of Golconda's alliance with Sivaji which was a necessary preliminary to the latter's Karnatic expedition, and also the consequence of the accession of Madanna and Akkanna to dominance at the Sultan's Court. In connection with the latter topic, he indicated the importance of, and the motives underlying, the attitude of the local representatives of Golconda of whom Podili Lingappa was the most important, towards the English. An attempt is made in the following paper, at the suggestion of the Editor, to explain the significance of this attitude, so far as it can be gleaned from a study of the Madras records.

I

Sultan Abu'l Hasan of Golconda (1672-87) began his reign with Sayyad Muza'ffar Khan as his chief Minister, and with Musa Khan, Khan-i-Khanan as the Governor of the Golconda Karnatak, (i.e., all the coast country of the Coromandel roughly to the north of Madras). Musa Khan succeeded Nawab Nēk-nām Khan with whom the Madras Council had arrived at a definite, rather a quasi-definite, agreement as regarded the rent of the Fort and Town of Madras. The Fort St. George Consultation of the 25th April, 1672 (Sir William Langhorn, Governor) declares that "the Nawab Yecknam Cawn being deceased and Mussa Cawn chosen in his place, having sent us a confirmation of the agreement and *phirmaund*, made by and with his predecessor, with promise that he will be no less, nay more, a

friend to us than he was, and that he should look upon the *phirmaund* (farman), etc., as received not from Yecknam Cawn but himself." The Madras Council resolved, in the same consultation, to send presents worth 500 pagodas, in the shape of scarlet cloth, looking glasses and such like, by their Brahman agent Venkatapati, to the new Nawab on his accession to the Government of the Karnatak.

Later in the same year, it was entered in a Council consultation of the 20th October, that the captains and *havalgars* (from Arabic *Hawāla*=charge) in the Moors' camp before San Thomē caused great trouble and poisoned the mind of the Nawab against the English, "the Nawab being inexperienced in these parts" and too apt to give credit to the representations of his men and therefore it was resolved to give small *peshkashes* (*Pers.* *Pesh-kash*=first fruits, fines, taxes) to them, through their chief merchant, the famous—a rather well-known—character, Casa Verona. Similar presents were ordered to be given to the chief officers of the Nawab when they came to visit the English Governor in May, 1673. In March 1674, Sayyad Fatimeah, the Governor of Chingleput and the son of Sayyad Ibrahim who was a good friend of the English Company in his days, was sent for by the Sultan of Golconda, in order that he might marry the daughter of his (Sultan's) Chief Mufti, a person of great influence. The Madras Council thought it fit to make Sayyad Fatimeah a fitting and acceptable present, to the value of 130 pagodas, "to entertain that friendship of so long continuance and which of probability may be of good consequence to their affairs, he having promised to give the king (Sultan) a good account of all passages here to their vindication, from the many aspersions raised by the Dutch and others at the camp." (Consultation of 26th March, 1674). Sometime later, it was deemed necessary by the Council to proceed with great caution in the matter of the confirmation of their *phirmaund* by the Court, as "through the absence of Madanna, the Great Braminny from Golconda, being gone abroad into the country with the King, our Egyb's proceedings do not yet appear to be too far engaged." (Consultation of the 21st November, 1674).

II

Thus by the end of 1674, Madanna had become supreme at the court of Golconda, thus displacing Sayyad Muzaffar Khan as the chief minister. Akkanna took the place of Musa Khan as the Governor of the Karnatak about the same time. In Feb. 1675 (*vide* Consultation of the 10th), the council resolved to send up *pesh-*

*cash*es to their Egyb Venkatapati, to be presented to the Sultan, Madanna, "the great Bramany, who is the great Mogundar and the chiefest person in power, next the King himself," the Nawab Muskmia, Muhammad Ibrahim the new Sarkheil (*Sar-i-khel*=head of the clan, leader), Pulla Pella Yengana, (Polepalli Venkana), the chief Survey Wisse or Comptroller General, Narasa Vittala and others of the great men—as "the King and all the great Crown Officers of this Kingdom of Golconda and Carnataca, having themselves long required that the Honourable Company should *peshcash* them upon his and their new greatness, as a right not to be avoided, and we having deferred it as long as we could with safety on promise to comply with them. . . . and being continually pressed thereunto, with intimation that if we do not give satisfaction to them therein without any longer delay, that we should endanger the displeasure of his Highness and all the afore-said great Officers past recovery, and instead of their assistance (hitherto enjoyed in all these late troubles), be very much obstructed and disturbed on all occasions and pretences . . . and be in the end compelled to do it by force and much greater expense and disadvantage." The Madras Consultation of the 28th September 1675 gives an account of the ruin to the weaving industry and trade caused in divers places by the high-handed oppressions and extortions of the horsemen sent by Madanna and the Sultan, as a result of which many of the Company's merchants and their families were glad to run away amongst the woods and "by great *peshcash*es, save their money and their lives amongst the thieves themselves" and that the "woodmen and watchmen, being abused by Chinnapelle Mirza's extortions, by the King's order, broke out into hostilities against all the neighbouring countries . . . made no less a disorder amongst the weavers who were fain to desert Bijapuri control for shelter. . . ."

III

In February 1676, Pollepalle Venganna, who was in charge of the neighbourhood of Madras, put forward a claim to sell paddy coming from the territory of Golconda, free of custom in Madras, at their own rates, as in their own territories, and to reimpose a *haval*dar saying "the King (Abdullah Kutb Shah. d. 1672) and Nawab (Nēknām Khan) who granted the *cowle* and *phirmaund* are dead and gone, and this King (Abu'l Hasan) not obliged, as if himself had not confirmed it and received the money"; while the Dutch who were not able to get a similar *cowle* for their settlement at Pulicat, did all they could to infringe ours. But even in

the previous year Podili Lingapa, the nephew of Akkanna and Madanna, who was appointed to be the *tarafdar* and Governor of the Poonamalle district, had procured (according to a Consultation entry, dated the 16th and 17th March, 1675) a *phirmaund* and *tasheriff* (Arabic *tashrif*=honouring) from the Sultan to the Madras Governor and Agent, "merely to extort a *pishcash*, as he has from the Dutch at Paliacat, to the value of 800 pagodas." Upon this, the Madras Council resolved to send their chief merchant, Casa Verona, to meet Lingapa at Trivetour (Tiruvot-tiyur) . . . to acquaint him that we cannot accept thereof to the prejudice of the Honourable Company's *cowle* (*paṭṭa*, agreement) and *phirmaund*, which exempts us from having to do with any but the Divan itself, and that the Agent write up presently to our Egyb Vencataputty to prevent misinformation and to get a strict order to the said Tarafdar to observe the said *cowle* and *phirmaund* and *sallabad* (*Sāl+ābād*=permanent charge) in all things representing to his Highness and to Madana, etc., the prejudice which will otherwise ensue to the King's revenue, should they be any ways disturbed."

As Dr. S. K. Aiyangar remarks, with the coming of Podili Lingapa, there was a stiffening in the administration and the relation between the Madras Council and the Tarafdar of Poonamallee became more or less one of continued hostility. From a quotation in Love's *Vestiges of Old Madras* (Vol. I p. 356) we learn more fully about this change of position. An extract from the proceedings of the Madras Council containing what Casa Verona heard from the Sultan's Mazumdar of Armagaon about Lingapa's attitude towards the Madras Council (given on pp. 90-91 of the *Records of Fort St. George—Diary and Consultation Book of 1672-78*), is informing. Podili Lingapa was given a horse and other presents when he paid a visit to the Dutch towns of Pulicat and Sadras and when he carried a *tasheriff* to the English, they would not accept it, nor would (they) invite him to their town, but gave the messenger who carried their *phirmaund* petty gifts. Polepalle Venganna concurred with him that the English were a scornful people and that Nēknām Khan was ill-advised and foolish in letting them away with a paltry rent of 1,200 pagodas per annum. He further urged that Lingapa should keep a *haval*dar in Madras and the *cowle* of Nēknām Khan ended with him and that he would go to the Sultan and prevail on him "to send a Persian to be over Chinnapatnam". The Sultan himself is said to have postponed an order on the matter till his return from Masulipatam towards which he was going and his courtiers advised him to take some definite action in the affair.

IV

The stiffened attitude of the Golconda government coincided with the establishment of Brahman dominance at the court and of Brahman control over the Poonamalle country, and also with the arrival at a sort of understanding between the Golconda government and Shivaji that was the preliminary for the latter's famous Karnatac expedition. It is doubtful, according to Dr. S. K. Aiyangar, whether "the change was brought about as a normal consequence of the change of ministry or had something to do with the agreement between Shivaji and Abu'l Hasan's administration."

The Madras Council was strong in its view that the Brahman dominance in the Golconda government was inconsiderate towards itself and insatiably avaricious. This view is supported by Manucci who gives an instance of the intolerance of Madanna in Golconda (vide p. 31 of Irvine's Translation of the *Storia do Mogor* (Indian Texts Series) Vol. III; and also *Ma'as'ir-i-Alamgiri*, 227; 272.) In December 1676, the Madras Council complained of the Brahman officials of Golconda "who have been studying to do all the prejudices they can and to cavil at the said cowle, labouring to bring this their place (Madras) into the same condition as Paliacat and to force it to receive the King's paddy at his own extorsive rates; as a beginning of evils more to follow. . . ." The Council was anxious to obtain a new royal confirmation of the cowle by the Sultan's own express *phirmaund* (firman) and also a ready access to the throne for its own agent on all occasions of complaints, "whereof", the resolution ran, "we are sensible of a great want since his father's (Abdulla Kutb Shah's—who was the father-in-law of Abu'l Hasan, who was of low origin according to Fryer, but said by others to be descended on his father's side from the Kutb Shahi family itself) decease and Madanna's new greatness". (Vide Manucci's *Storia do Mogor* translation by W. Irvine, Vol. IV p. 444) The same consultation continues that the annual rent due for 1676-77 be sent to the agent of the Madras Council at Golconda, the Bramany Yeana Viraraghava to be paid to Nawab Mirza Muhammad Ibrahim (the Sar-i-Khel) and get good acquittances from him for the past and present, and also to engage the said Nawab to give his protection to the Company's business as against the mischief wrought by Lingapa and his master Polepelli Venganna, who were Madanna's creatures. Podili Lingapa had strengthened his hold over the whole country "hereabout from Armagaon to the borders of (the) Bijapur (Karnatac); he desired to force

the English to purchase only his paddy at exorbitant rates and likewise to extort from them a loan of 10,000 pagodas upon the neighbouring revenues of paddy, "which, formerly being a very sure assignation, as these juggling Brahminys contrive it, is now grown a mere cheat, for by removing the person who took the money, they avoid the obligation, and put folks to seek for their money where they can get it." Nevertheless the English Council resolved in January 1677, a peshcash valued at 30 pagodas, to Lingapa and one of smaller value to the Brahman agent of Akkanna.

V

In May 1677, Sivaji was almost upon them. On the 9th the Council heard that Sivaji, having been entertained in the King of Golconda's service, was in full march upon Gingee with 20,000 horse and 40,000 foot, the vanguard of which had already passed Kālahasti and Tirupati and was expected that night at Conjeevaram. In a consultation of the 14th May, the Council received a letter and messenger from Sivaji requesting some "cordial stones and counter-poisons" and sent him these, along with some broad cloth and a quantity of sandalwood. Sivaji did nothing in the Golconda portion of the Karnatac, in a military sense, and only when he passed into the Gingee territory that was under Bijapur, did he begin serious military operations. The comparative inaction of Sivaji in the neighbourhood of Madras and the consequent immunity that the English Presidency enjoyed were the result of an understanding that had been come to between Sivaji and the Golconda administration, and that was possibly deemed by the astute Madanna as "the best course of action to be adopted in the circumstances, both as against the advancing tide of Mughal aggression, and as the best safeguard for the preservation of what was worth preserving, the Hindu India of the South". Golconda agreed to provide Sivaji with a subsidy of 3,000 huns a day and also with an army of 5,000 men and a park of artillery in which branch of equipment the Maratha invader was weak. In return Sivaji was to give to Golconda such parts of his Karnatac conquests as did not belong to his father Shahji. Thus we can easily comprehend the reason for the vigour and rapidity with which Sivaji overran the Gingee country, which was under Bijapur and drove off Sher Khan Lodi into the forests of Ariyalūr on the banks of the Coleroon.

In June 1677 when Sivaji had just begun the long-drawn siege of Vellore, he wrote to Madras desiring a further supply of

cordials and counterpoisons; and we are informed by the consultation dated 18th June, that his (Sivaji's) power was increasing and he exercised so much power in the country of the Golconda Sultan that he sent all about to receive the King's rents by his own people and was punishing the *havalgars* and other great men of the country at his pleasure.

When in October a letter from Sivaji reached Madras in which he desired the English to supply him with engineers required for the effective prosecution of the siege of Vellore, the Council resolved to send him a civil excuse, saying that the affair was "wholly unfit for us to meddle in it, there being many dangers consequent thereon as well of increasing his (Sivaji's) power as of rendering both Golconda and the Mogull our enemies, all these parts being spread with his spies, and himself and army now come nearer this way, within two days' march of this place (Madras)".

VI

Meanwhile the bickerings between the Sultan's renter for the Poonamallee country and the English Council at Madras over the right of the former to compel the latter to take off his own paddy at his own rates continued. The renter threatened the English in February 1679 that if they forbade Poonamallee corn to be sold in Madras, he would stop wood and all other provisions from coming to them. When a remonstrance on this matter was addressed to Lingapa who had his headquarters at Conjeevaram, he returned answer that there being much of corn at Poonamallee to be sold, and the Sultan's necessity being urgent, he would take off the stop, if the Council would furnish him 7,000 pagodas to supply the want (Consultation of the 11th February, 1678).

Governor Streyneham Master was anxious to get the support of the Muhammadan officers of Golconda; he took care to send the annual town rent due for Madras for 1677-78, to Nawab Muhammad Ibrahim, at Golconda itself and to convince the Nawab that Lingapa's report that the English at Madras were building a great bulwark was false, but that they were only repairing an old ruined bulwark. He also planned to send the chief and Council of Madapollam to procure if possible, from the Sultan during his forthcoming visit to Masulipatam, (1) a *farman* granting the right for the English to coin silver rupees and copper pice at Madras, the said coins to pass current in all the King's dominions; (2) a *farman* granting the exemption of English goods and trade in the Karnatac and adjacent regions from the *junkan* (Sun-

kam = toll) and other customs and duties as they were at Masulipatam; (3) the getting of Verasheroone or Madapollam or both of them settled on the English as rent-free grants, or on a fixed unalterable rent which was to be paid only to the Diwan (*Vide* Consultation of the 23rd May, 1678). The English Council subsequently advised the Madapollam Chief and Council to persuade the Sultan to grant Tiruvottiyūr, Egmore and San Thome in the neighbourhood of Madras, either rent-free or at moderate rents which should not be increased at all in future. They were prepared, in the case of San Thome, which they had been long coveting, to pay 1,300 pagodas per annum, as Casa Verona was then paying for it (Consultation of June 3rd, 1678).

The Sultan's *Sar-i-Khel*, Nawab Muhammad Ibrahim, was disposed to be friendly to the English and sent a tasheriff congratulating Governor Master on his accession to his office. The Sultan however was unable to proceed to Masulipatam owing to the oppressive heat and the scarcity of water prevailing on the route. The visit was postponed till after the rainy season of the year should have passed away.

VII

In August, 1678, news was received that a body of Sivaji's horse under the command of Santojee, appeared at Conjeevaram and that it was likely it would proceed further towards Madras and would take Poonamallee castle, that Vellore had surrendered and that Sivaji had now full and quiet possession of all the countries of Gingee and Vellore. The English Council feared that Sivaji would now turn his attention to the Golconda Karnatac. In the beginning of September, Podili Lingappa paid a condolence visit to Casa Verona, on the death of the latter's wife, when he urged that he should be given very valuable presents and a Persian horse by the English, that he had received a new *farman* from the Sultan giving him supreme control over all the Golconda forces in these parts and that Governor Master should not regard himself in any way as his equal. Lingappa's importunate demands were repeated in September when he requisitioned for 10 and got 2 *candies* of gunpowder to be used in subduing the jungle chiefs (*poligars*). Madras had to welcome the *Habshi* general of Bijapur, Abdulla Khan, who surrendered Vellore to Sivaji upon certain conditions, but later thought it safe for himself not to trust to Maratha protection and sought refuge with the English Governor. A letter was received from the English agent at Golconda that Sivaji had ordered his men at Gingee to take a fit opportu-

nity to plunder Madras, Pulicat and Sadraspatam. But the news proved baseless; and it was learnt that the Marathas had retired from the neighbourhood of Gingee towards Mysore whose ruler had been very formidable to the Marathas on his border; this was greatly to the relief of the English, who however, continued to be pestered by Lingappa's demands for presents which extended even to Casa Verona and the Pedda Naik of Madras.

VIII

In the beginning of 1679 the Madras Council became eager to get some good return for their payments and gifts to the Sultan and the great men with him. A letter was written on the 6th February to the Brahman *Egyb* at Golconda, urging him to endeavour to recover something in lieu of the presents given to the Sultan and to Madanna at Masulipatam during their late visit, when the Chief and Council of Masulipatam could not manage their request as was ordered by the Madras Council. The *Egyb* was asked to persuade Madanna and Akkanna to influence the Sultan to grant gratis the towns of San Thome and Egmore to the English Company, "since the English by their ancient, faithful and peaceable demeanour towards and profitableness to the Divan and his country, have not deserved less, but more favours from him than the Dutch or any other nation residing in his Highness's dominions and it is not for the Divan's honour to do so much for one and nothing for the other. . . ." (p. 4 of *Madras Records—Letters from Fort St. George 1679*).

To this, the *Egyb* replied that he had an interview with Madanna, the prime minister, who informed him that the Dutch had given their promised present of 6,000 pagodas, and the English had not given theirs of 3,000 pagodas, and when they should do so, he would then begin negotiations concerning the renting of San Thome and Egmore, and obtain the Sultan's permission therefor (*vide* the minutes of a consultation of the Madras Council on the 17th February, 1679). Troubles continued about Lingappa's demand that paddy from his *taraf* (division) should be sold in the market of Madras at his rate and the allegation that the customs raised by the English had increased, thus justifying a demand for a higher rent. To this, Governor Master made the bold reply—"The market of Madraspatam was free to all people to buy and sell in; but if men were content to sell at 12 *kalam*s (measures) for a pagoda which was now the market price, no man could force them to sell at 10: and if it should please God to make it dearer or cheaper, it was not in the power of man to alter what

God Almighty had decreed. . . ." (p. 18 of the *Madras Diary and Consultation Book 1679-80*). The English Council resolved to resist by force, if necessary, the order made by Lingappa that the citizens of Madras should come and buy only the grain that had been collected at Vepery and Egmore (adjoining the confines of the English settlement) and that no other paddy should be suffered to come into the city.

While this bold face was put up before Lingappa, the Council was anxious to get a *cowle* and *farman* from the Sultan for the places (San Thome, Egmore and Tiruvottiyūr) that they were eager to acquire and instructed their *Egyb* at Golconda that he should "procure the said *phirmaund* (farman) and *coull* (cowl) written very exactly and punctually in all matters and particulars as therein mentioned." They also enclosed a copy of the *farman* that would satisfy them in which they specified by name the six villages dependent on San Thome, the six hamlets belonging to Tiruvottiyūr and the nine villages adjacent to Egmore; and they stipulated that the places should be permanently rented under them and they should have the right to build factories, godowns, etc., in them, to exercise jurisdiction in all causes, both civil and criminal, therein and to be exempt from the former usual customs, *junkan* or other duties.

IX

The higgling over the fixing of the rent for San Thome and its dependent villages was prolonged, as is clearly indicated in the letters to Bramany Viraraghava sent from Madras in the months March to June, 1679. It was feared that the French had a design of securing San Thome for themselves; and Casa Verona instructed Podili Lingappa, before he proceeded to Golconda to settle accounts, to use all possible means to prevent the French coming to that place again. The fruit of this was that Lingappa took possession of San Thome himself on the 17th August, 1679, apparently after his return from Golconda, farming it out of Verona's hands; and the latter endeavoured, in his turn, to wrest San Thomē from Lingappa, as, according to the consultation of the 25th August, he was anxious "to prevent the inconveniences that may accrue to the revenues of this town (Madras) by the stoppage of goods, grain and the calico investment this year".

Lingapa tried hard to improve upon the advantage he had secured and made a "malicious" request to Braminy Akkanna Pantulu to obtain a grant from his Highness for us (the English) to pay him our Town's (Madras') rent merely to encroach

upon us by degrees" (p. 41—*Letters from Fort St. George 1679*). Akkanna was requested not to countenance Lingappa's request for getting the rent of Madras for himself. It continues:—"We hope that your lordship (Akkanna) as a just and upright person under him (the Sultan) will never countenance (*him*) that desires such unjust things as the said Lingappa would persuade you merely to act his ill designs and (malice) he bears towards us." The letter also urged that Verona had a *farman* from the Sultan and a *Rakka* (*Arab. Ruk'a* = letter, note of hand) from Madanna (your worthy brother) and that Akkanna would use all his endeavours to put San Thome again into Verona's hands. Apparently these protestations and appeals to Akkanna had the desired effect; and in October the Brahmin Viraraghava was able to report from Golconda that there was great hope of San Thome being returned to Verona (Consultation; entry for Monday, the 3rd November, 1679). The *Egyb* was congratulated in a letter, dated Fort St. George, 26th November, that "you have done well in preventing granting Lingappa's malicious desire, to obtain our Town's (Madras') rent to be paid unto him, though we are resolved never to yield thereto" and "we have been glad to hear of what you have done in Casa Verona's request to Braminy Madanna and Akkanna concerning San Thome and hope that Lingappa upon arriving at these parts, will not offer to violate their express orders."

X

Casa Verona died on the 28th March, 1680; and certainly the death of one who was a strong champion of the English cause as against the pretensions of the Golconda officials was a serious loss to the Madras Governor and Council. The imposition of a *havaladar* on the town of Madras was attempted in May following on the strength of an order purporting to come from Nawab Muhammad Ibrahim on the ground that "the towne produced more than formerly, and Verona the *Dubass* (*Dubash*) being dead, therefore it should no longer be under the English, but kept under the King's hands and that Futtly Cawn (at Chingleput) should send a *havaladar* to take the government thereof." Master had to send three files of soldiers and bring the pretender of a *havaladar* into the Fort and sent him back after an examination. Nor were the English less cautious on their side than the situation warranted.

The Council resolved at a consultation on the 3rd of June that "the revenue of the Towne may not be known to the Moors

as they desire, it is thought good and ordered that the accounts thereof and especially of the customs upon goods exported and imported by sea shall be only kept in English, and the *Braminys*, *cancoplys*, etc., are not to keep any books or accounts thereof in writing, which the customer is to see observed and act accordingly".

Podili Lingappa was not peculiar in his attitude towards the English alone. He was equally stiff in his demands as against the Dutch; and it may be said of him that "the rights of the question were not altogether all of them on one side, and they got complicated by the steps and counter-steps adopted, and on the whole it cannot be well maintained that Lingappa was doing anything that was not in the interests of the Golconda administration." (Dr. S. K. Aiyangar in *J. I. H.* Vol. X Part II *Abul Hasan Qutub Shah and His Ministers Madanna and Akkanna*). It was reported at Madras towards the end of August 1680, that Lingappa had put a stop to all the Dutch business at Pulicat forbidding their merchants to buy or carry any cloth thither. He followed it up by imposing a similar embargo on Madras from the 1st of September, in the matter of the bringing in of cloth—the prohibition being alleged to be on the ground that the Governor refused to admit the *havaladar* that was sent by the order of the Nawab Muhammad Ibrahim. Lingappa sent word that Verona used to lend him large sums periodically and besides gave him annual presents "which he knew not of whom to have these advantages;" whereupon the Chief Merchants of the Company agreed to send two of their number to Lingappa to treat with him as to the removal of the embargo.

Upon the embargo continuing for some time, the Madras Council resolved to make an application direct to the Golconda court for redress and addressed letters to the Sultan and to Madanna (Consultation of the 13th September, 1680). Lingappa maintained that he did not begin the embargo without orders from his masters and that he would expect from whoever should be the successor to Verona, 2,000 pagodas and loans without interest for his Diwan. The month of September passed without anything being done at Golconda, where Nawab Ibrahim merely put off the *Egyb* of Madras with excuses and delays. What was worse, Lingappa sent orders to stop *chunam* (lime-shell) and brick from coming into Madras (Consultation of the 26th September). It was only in the beginning of November that letters were received from Golconda with *Rukkas* of the Nawab, Madanna

Brahman clerks and the class of non-Brahman accountants.

and Akkanna upon Lingappa, ordering him not to stop goods going into Madras, nor to hinder the business of the English in any manner. Lingappa was forced thus to stop his embargo; but he was in close communication—one might say, collusion—with a number of painters (of the Company's cloth) and other disaffected persons who deserted over from Madras to San Thome and countenanced them in stopping the goods and corn from being brought into town. In spite of Lingappa's orders, the customs-officers of the Golconda government continued to obstruct English trade and to prevent the free entry of cloth and other goods into the settlement. A further offence was alleged by Lingappa when a messenger of his bearing a farman from Golconda was not received by the Governor in proper form, and consequently he had orders from court to stop again goods and provisions coming into the town. He added to this a threat that he would stop all manner of trade and provisions and destroy the town and bring it to the same pass as San Thome (Consultations of the 27th December 1680 and of 3rd January 1681—pp. 87 and 89 of *The Diary and Consultation Book of Fort St. George for 1680-81*). These persistent threats so worked upon the Council that it was resolved on the 6th of January to settle a factory in the Gingee country "which is out of the Golconda dominions, which is a matter of great security to the Company's investments and one of the main reasons why the Dutch keep so many factories upon this coast, which, being divided into several governments, if they be obstructed in their business by one governor, they have another place to friend, and besides this advantage of preventing Lingappa or any other Subahdar of this country from being capable of spoiling all our business when it depends wholly upon their courtesy."

XI

Akkanna, the minister of Golconda planned to go down to the Poonamalle country to settle the disputes outstanding with the Madras Council himself; and Lingappa wrote to say that he had ordered the village of Triplicane (which had already been given to the Company) to be taken over by the *havildar* of San Thome and would bring it under Poonamalle "threatening much what will be done to us upon Akkanna's coming down, who is now on the way." (Entry in the consultation for the 28th February 1681). Fortunately for the English, Akkanna turned back towards Golconda from Tirupati without marching further; and Nawab Muhammad Ibrahim wrote to Madras to say that he had abandoned all thoughts of raising the rent of Madras.

But Lingappa was not to be stopped from his course of action. He reestablished an embargo on provisions etc., going into Madras, forbidding the country people to do so and setting watchmen to stop them. All that Governor Master could do was to assure the people of San Thome, Egmore and other villages that if Lingappa abused them and prevented them from sending in provisions, they might retire into Madras and should be protected there. Lingappa however sent word on the 14th of April, by his Diwan, that he had an order from Akkanna to besiege Madras and Pulicat, because the Governors of these two places would not do as they were ordered by the Diwan of the Sultan and also because no Madras official met Akkanna at Tirupati and of other reasons (minutes of the Council of the 15th and 16th April, 1681).

The embargo continued upon all goods and provisions coming into Madras throughout May. In June the Madras Council resolved (see consultation of the 6th June) to send 2,000 pagodas as a sort of peace-offering to Akkanna, through Nazar Beg (the Sultan's jeweller) who was deemed to have great interest with the minister. Also it was at last resolved that "Podili Lingappa have a present sent to him to the value of pagodas 300, notwithstanding the Egyb at Golconda acquaints Mr. Master our troubles may be composed for pagodas 2,000: there; yet Lingappa being a person that has of late an unlimited power granted him in the countries adjacent to us and judging that of necessity something must be given him whatever is given at court, it was therefore thought convenient to compliment him with this *peshkash*. . . .", and a letter from the Governor was sent by Pedda Venkatadri (one of the Chief Merchants of the Company, who was a friend of the Tarafdar) who also was ordered to have discourse with Lingappa that "we might have a friendly understanding between us" (Consultation of the 20th July, 1681—pp. 39-40 of *Diary and consultation Book 1681*).

XII

On August 1st, the Governor was able to inform the Council that all differences with Lingappa were happily concluded. One peculiar result of this was that the Brahman Viraraghaviah, who was the English Company's Egyb at Golconda, and had been dismissed recently from his place, being replaced by one Gurusvappa, *alias* Henriques Midao, was reentertained in consideration of his former good service, and what is noteworthy, because "we look upon the present Egyb Grua to be a man unfit for that

employ as being given to drink, and so not admitted to manage any affairs with the Bramanys who now govern all (in Golconda)." (Consultation of the 6th of October). Lingappa continued to give pin-pricks to the Madras Council even after the present was resolved upon.

XIII.

Lingappa's relations with the English hinged, on, among other claims, the right to receive the rent from Fort St. George which ought to be paid only through him and that the English Council should have no transactions or correspondence, directly with the Sultan or his ministers. In the *Letters to Fort St. George* for 1682, we find on page 8, a mild request from Lingappa to Governor Gyfford that the rent for the current year, or at least half of it, might be sent up to him. In another letter, received at Fort St. George on the 1st March, he wrote: "their Lordships Madanna and Akkanna have once before sent *tashrif*s to your worship through my hands." The English Company's agent at Golconda, in his letter of the 21st January, informed Gyfford that "Podili Lingappa being a great person in these parts, he would have been something grieved, if the *tashrif*s (to the Governor and Pedda Venkatadri) had not been first sent to him, before they had been conveyed to your Worship's hands; therefore Braminy Akkanna ordered the *tashrif*s to be carried to Lingappa, and there to take one of his people together with the Diwan's *nobut* to come with the *tashrif*s." (p. 16, of *Letters to Fort St. George* for 1682). In spite of the Company's agent's arguments to the contrary, the ministers, Madanna and Akkanna, maintained that Chennapatnam (Madras) and all other affairs of those parts should be of Lingappa's side." The agent however feared that "if we should pay the rent money but one year to Lingappa, he will contrive many ways to bring us into such a labyrinth of troubles that we shall not be able to get out of it." Akkanna himself advised Governor Gyfford that he should "hear Lingappa with credulity in whatsoever business he shall acquaint you about and to get him to write to us when you would have any business to be done here (at headquarters), for the more you oblige Lingappa to write in your behalf, the readier shall we be to favour you." The meaning of this was too plain to be misunderstood and showed how Lingappa had contrived to get all his demands recognised as just and lawful, in the matter of having undisputed and sole authority over the European settlements in his jurisdiction.

XIV

Lingappa's further attempts to strengthen his position need not be here elaborated. One of the features of his administration was to demand and enforce all the payments due to the Golconda Government strictly and stoutly. These covered all presents which had to be given to himself by convention and also to the great men at headquarters. It is this grasping character of the administration that elicited the suggestion conveyed in the Company's Golconda agent's letter of the 3rd March, 1682, viz: "The people in place here now are not like their predecessors, for all the officers are Braminies and when anybody goes to them about business, they immediately open their hands. . . ." Whatever might be said of the grasping avarice of Madanna and Akkanna and Lingappa and other Brahmans in power, there can be no doubt that Golconda's control was stiffened in the Karnatac and even the European settlements in a manner that was not possible in the previous times.

XV

Lingappa soon came to occupy the supreme position in the Golconda Karnatac, analogous to that which was enjoyed by Mir Jumla in one sense and certainly equally good with, or even better than, that of Nawab Nēknām Khan. From the position of the Tarafdar of Poonamalle, he became the Governor of the Karnatac, in succession to Akkanna. His attitude as the champion and defender of Golconda's rights was one of great value; because, as was pointed out by Dr. S. K. Aiyangar, he claimed to have taken the town of Chikkanayakanhalli, in the subah of Sira, probably from the hands of the Marathas, after the death of Sivaji, and thus he vindicated his master's cause even against the Marathas who were strong and, besides, the quondam allies of Golconda. The receipt of presents and even the demanding of them should not be taken as a vice peculiar to Lingappa or the Brahman officials of Golconda. It was a commonly prevalent practice at the time and tainted as much the European settlements and their doings, in the epoch. The promotion of Lingappa to the supreme governorship of the Karnatac was consequent upon the transfer of Akkanna to the *Sar Lashkar's* (lit head of the army) post from which the Sultan dismissed Nawab Muhammad Ibrahim, consequent upon his weakness in losing the town of Basavapatan to the troops of the ruler of Ikkeri. Thus Lingappa got the Government of all the country from the Krishna

river in the north as far as all the Karnatac country, as Nawab Nēknām Khan was formerly ruling (The Egyb's letter dated Golconda 17th May, quoted in p. 39 of *Letters to Fort St. George*, 1682). The English Company was advised to keep an Egyb at Lingappa's head-quarters, as all the Egybs were gone to him. It was also made known by their Golconda agent that the ministry had positively prohibited any direct petition to them being made and ordered that every one should apply first to Lingappa, "for without his consent no request would be heard here (Golconda)." (Letter of the Company's agent, Viraraghavayya, dated 2nd August, 1682).

Lingappa had now the command of all the forces belonging to the Karnatac; and he demanded from the English, the service of 15 gunners to manage his guns. He also arranged for ships to be built on behalf of Akkanna who wrote, on the 28th August, to Gyfford that "your worship may please to look upon Lingappa as myself." Akkanna was at that time practically the dominant factor in the Golconda Government, as the Egyb wrote: "Now Braminy Akkanna is made the chief person who manages the whole affairs of the Kingdom. . . . for whosoever goeth to speak about any business to Madanna, he sends to his Akkanna." (p. 94 of *Letters to Fort St. George*, 1682). Akkanna even told the Company's Egyb that the *Sar Lashkarship* was given to Lingappa. The latter designed "to bring the English as much under his command as the rest of the country people and effectively poisoned the mind of Akkanna against them. He even threatened that he would take measures to extort 60 or 70 thousand pagodas from the English as soon as he should have done with the Mysore people (referring to his capture of Chikkanayakanhalli, as noticed in Viraraghava's letter of October 27th, 1682). In 1685 Lingappa was addressed as his Excellency. He took vigorous measures with an interloper, a Jew named Rodrigez who was given permission to live in Madras and ordered his goods at San Thome not to be released and given to him (Letter dated March 16th, 1685, from the Brahmans Narayanappa and Sangana at Conjeevaram—pp. 61-2, of *Letters to Fort St. George*, 1684-85). He took measures to recover seven pieces of timber that had floated to the shore on the San Thomē coast and that had been seized by the English Governor, and his lieutenants thus threatened Gyfford: "Your Honour knows Lingappa's disposition; so soon as you see the letter, Your Honour may please to send the timbers and goods . . . before Lingappa hath intelligence of it, and then you may live without trouble." (Letter dated 15th July, 1685).

XVI

Lingappa was turned out of his post before the beginning of 1686, and shortly afterwards quitted this world. Governor Elihu yale recorded in the minutes of a consultation, dated 22nd December, 1687 (p. 200 of, the *Diary and Consultation Book*, 1687) that "Lingappa, late Sar Lashkar of this country, having often endeavoured to put a havaladar upon this Town (Madras) and to impose a custom for the diwan, but being unsuccessful therein, he, about three years past orders the building of a *banksall* within a mile of the Fort (at the Great Metta or Periamet) intending there to stop all grain and other goods to pay them Junkan before they would permit them to come into Town, but Lingappa happily leaving this world, before the finishing his ill design on the *banksall* . . . the Governor privately treated with the havaladar of Poonamalle about buying the said building of him." So let us leave the spirit of the strong-willed Lingappa who had been such a source of trouble to Governors Langhorn, Streynsham Master and Gyfford, still continuing to haunt the pages of Governor Yale's proceedings. The tragic end of Akkanna and Madanna which preceded so closely the fall of Golconda and the deposition of Abu'l Hasan by the Great Mughal and which was so little deserved by them, brought the last vigorous flicker of a dying administration to a close in the midst of foreign conquest and the consequent increase in anarchy.

Bombay Historical Congress

1931.

The First Bombay Historical Congress held under the auspices of the Bombay Historical Society proved once more the resources of all kinds that exist in a city like Bombay that is proud of her *biruda* "Urbs prima in Indiis". The time for the Congress was not the best. The world's economic depression in general, and the political situation of India in particular presented a gloomy horizon behind the silhouette of the Congress. Yet a slight observation as soon as one arrived at Bombay disclosed that the Historical Congress was going to be a success. Bombay was turning to History as the leader of *The Times of India*, December 22, put it. The bright and artistic posters, the sumptuous guide programme—illustrated with many pictures; the nice little badge adorned with an old view of the Bombay Castle—the seal of the Bombay Historical Society—and the enthusiasm of Fr. Heras, of Mr. Braz A. Fernandez and of a set of under-secretaries old students of the former—gave a sufficient guarantee of the success of the Congress. And yet the realization surpassed all expectations.

Whoever saw the stream of motor cars entering the University gardens from early 4 o'clock p. m., could rightly guess that the Congress was to be an unprecedented event in the annals of the city of Bombay. The most important and selected people not only of Bombay but even from outside Bombay were there represented: the Right Rev. the Bishop of Bombay, the Hon'ble Sir Govindrao Pradhan, Member of Council, Hon'ble Moulvi Sir Rafiuddin Ahmad, Minister of Education, the Director-General of Archaeology in India, the Government Epigraphist for India, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mirza Ali Akbar Khan and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bomanji J. Wadia of the Bombay High Court, the Superintendent of Archaeology, Western Circle and delegates of the Universities of Delhi, Calcutta, Allahabad, Annamalai, of the Christian College, Madras; Samaldas College, Bhavnagar, Willingdon College, Sangli; Rajaram College, Kolhapur; Surat College, Watson Museum, Satara and many more were there present.

His Excellency the Right Hon'ble Sir Frederick H. Sykes, Governor of Bombay arrived at 5 p. m., sharp. He was received

by Fr. Heras, the President of the Bombay Historical Society at the gate of the Convocation Hall and after introducing the members of the Council of Management of the Society and of the Reception Committee to His Excellency, the latter was led to the dais.

The address of H. E. was short but illuminating. He made a rapid survey of historical research from ancient times:—

"It was with more than ordinary pleasure that I accepted your invitation to open the Congress, because, though the Bombay Historical Society has been flourishing for some time, I believe, I am right in saying that this is the first occasion on which a Historical Congress has been held under its auspices. A century ago, the history of pre-Mahomedan India was a blank. So completely had India forgotten her own past that when, in the middle of the 14th century A. D. the Emperor Firoz Shah removed two of Asoka's pillars to Delhi, not a wise man in the whole of his kingdom could decipher them. The story how the key to these long-buried secrets was wrested from the bosom of the past when James Prinsep found the clue by comparing the bilingual inscriptions on the coins of the Indo-Greek kings, is one of the romances of scholarship. Since then an almost embarrassing stream of inscriptions, copper-plate grants, coins and other relics has poured in, the mass of fresh information had to be sorted out and fitted together like the pieces of a gigantic jigsaw puzzle until at last a more or less perfect picture of the Hindu civilisation of ancient India was reconstructed.

Subsequently explorers and archaeologists have found traces of its influence in the heart of Central Asia on the one hand, and in Java, Sumatra and Indo-China on the other, so that it is now realised that India was in those days a centre from which culture radiated to all parts of Asia. And now our attention is turned to those astonishing discoveries in the Indus Valley, which seem to indicate that the culture of India was itself linked up with the still older civilisations of the Euphrates. For the Mahomedan period, thanks to the excellent histories written by contemporary Mahomedan historians, less spade-work remains to be done, but as regards Maratha history, an enormous quantity of state-papers, letters and similar documents was scattered about the country on the fall of the Maratha empire, the collation and printing of which are still in progress.

In this great work, scholars belonging to this Presidency have taken a leading part in the past. Bhandarkar, Fleet, Pandit Bhagvanlal Indraji, Buhler and Kielhorn, for the ancient pe-

riod, and Grant Duff, Elphinstone, Ranade and Rajwade for the modern period are only a few out of the many illustrious names occurring to the mind in this connection.

It is for you, gentlemen, to continue the task of sifting the never ending stream of historical material in the same high, disinterested spirit as your great predecessors. Ample facilities for research are provided by the excellent school of Historical Research started by Father Heras, which has done so much to stimulate research in Indian History, the Prince of Wales' Museum, the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute and Bharat Itihasa Mandal in Poona, and the Satara Museum, and here I may say that the Government of Bombay has not been unmindful of its obligation in this matter. In spite of financial stringency, the valuable collection of Maratha MSS belonging to the late Rao Bahadur Parasnīs was acquired and housed in a suitable Museum, which is now thrown open to students; and the work of sorting out and publishing the papers in the Poona Daftar, so eagerly awaited by scholars, is making progress at a rapid rate in the hands of Mr. Sardesai and his co-workers.

There is, I think, some tendency, to neglect history for economics in this part of the world. We all realise the importance of economics in these days, but I may call your attention to one fact with regard to History? Our attention is concentrated at this moment on the constitutional changes which are taking place in India. I feel certain we might with advantage pause at times in our ardent gaze into the future to cast our eyes upon the past. Surely we can obtain some help in our efforts to guide the development of this country from a close study of India's past, her culture and her institutions. If this is so, may we not claim that the studies upon which you are engaged have much more than a merely academic importance, and may be a real and valuable contribution to the struggle of the country for political progress. But I must not detain you longer from your work. I wish you every success, and I assure you that I shall follow your deliberations with the keenest interest. With the greatest pleasure I declare this Congress open."

The address of Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, the President of the Congress was as scholarly as it was fascinating. When the copies of the Address were distributed, just before he was elected President, many people looked at the last page of the booklet—it was p. 19—fearing to be forced to stay in that crowded hall, during all the time the address was being read; but even for them time flew as fast as an arrow. One of the most interesting passages of Dr. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, was that, in which

he defended the usefulness of poems and other literary works as sources of history.

The number of members of the Congress was surprisingly high, above 300. Thus, the expedition to Elephanta Island organized by the Executive Committee was a great surprise to all, when they saw a crowd of 200 persons filling up the two decks of a steam launch. The excursion to visit the ruins of Bassein Fort was not so enthusiastically attended, yet a group of nearly 100 persons went through those interesting ruins so ably identified and explained by Mr. Braz A. Fernandes, the General Honorary Secretary of the Society.

The five sections into which the work of the Society was divided were naturally not so well attended, as the members were also divided into five different groups. Yet the aims were perfectly obtained. A number of a very interesting and scholarly papers were submitted and read. It is not necessary to enter into details as they will, I understand, be published in a special Congress Number of the Journal of the Bombay Historical Society.

A special feature of this Congress was the meeting held one of the evenings to discuss two matters of vital importance, the following two resolutions that were then passed revealed the nature of that discussion, the first being moved by Fr. Heras and the other by Dr. Andreas Nell of Kandy:—

1. That the history courses in Indian Universities generally require reform in the opinion of the Bombay Historical Congress and that the attention of the University is invited to the matter of effecting improvements to that direction.

2. That this Congress supports with pleasure the resolution adopted by the Indian Section of the International Congress of Orientalists, Leiden; That the Section of this Congress welcomes with profound satisfaction the announcement that the Government of India proposes to submit a bill in the Autumn Session of the Legislative Assembly for facilitating the participation of Scientific bodies, Indian and Overseas, with the co-operation and under the supervision of the Archaeological Survey, in Archaeological exploration. This section feels that the excellent work of the Archaeological Survey might be further advanced by the co-operation of competent experts belonging to other scientific bodies, both in India and elsewhere; and that in the making of rules for conducting excavations by these bodies proper safeguards be provided against removing the finds out of this country.

It is sincerely hoped that the first Bombay Historical Congress will not be the last. Such meetings are of great importance to encourage research and inspire new prospective historians to join the noble work of studying the great history of our country.

(Communicated)

Obituary

It is with great regret that we record here of the passing away of Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit Haraprasad Śāstri, C.I.E., on the 17th of November last. Born of an orthodox Śāstri family where Brahmanical learning of the orthodox type passed down for centuries, the late Pandit was a typical representative of that class. Born almost eighty years since, he was early initiated as Brahman youths usually are, into the study of Sanskrit; and very early in his life, he was brought into contact with the best of the Pandits that Bengal still had, in orthodox association on occasions of particular ceremonies in influential Brahman families, as we have actually heard from him. That implanted in him the desire for the pursuit of Sanskrit learning. When forced by poverty to be entirely dependent upon others more well-to-do, he struggled on with success, and early became a well-known figure for Sanskrit learning in Bengal. As he himself mentioned, he remembered almost seventy years of Sanskrit learning and Sanskrit learned men, and had as long ago come into contact with Sanskrit manuscripts. He began work in Sanskrit manuscripts as early as 1878 under the inspiration of that great Bengali Savant Dr. Rajendralal Mitra. Since then his studies have lain in various branches of Sanskrit learning, and much more particularly in the search for manuscripts and their cataloguing. He was a man of extraordinary learning, and his knowledge went into detail, which is surprising for the vastness of his learning. His connection with search for manuscripts began in 1891, and since then he examined the manuscript collections of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, continuing the work of Dr. Rajendralal Mitra. He acquired a vast mass of manuscripts for the Government of India, and succeeded in cataloguing them partially. He was twice deputed to Nepal for the acquisition of manuscripts, and he brought a pretty large collection. He assisted Professor Macdonnell of Oxford in the collection of Vedic manuscripts, during his tour in India for the Max Muller Memorial. He was mainly responsible for the purchase and cataloguing of the 7,000 Nepalese manuscripts acquired for the Bodleian Library.

His literary activities were in connection with the Asiatic Society of Bengal, and the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad, and the journals in which he published various articles. He was a Vice-

President of the Asiatic Society. He was elected President of the Indian Oriental Conference, and delivered an address of great learning, conveying a mass of information about Sanskrit manuscripts. He was too ill to be able to read the address, and the pleasant duty fell to us, and the address was appreciated very highly by the vast audience. Our association continued through the two years of this presidency of the Oriental Conference. He was honoured with a C. I. E., and a Mahamahopadhyaya by the Government of India, and the Dacca University did itself honour by conferring the honorary degree of D. Litt. The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland elected him as one of their Honorary members. He was among the first Fellows elected by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, when this elective fellowship was instituted in 1910. By his death, Sanskrit learning in India loses its doyen.

Sir John Marshall on the Indus valley civilisation

Indian Archaeological Survey Report: Publisher, Mr. Arthur Probsthain, London.

AN EPOCH-MAKING WORK.

The long-expected publication on *Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus Civilisation* on which Sir John Marshall, late Director-General of Archaeology in India, was engaged for several years has at last been brought out in three sumptuous and magnificently illustrated volumes by the well-known Oriental Publisher, Mr. Arthur Probsthain. As Sir John points out, this book should, more than any other, serve to dispel the notion that the pre-Aryan peoples of India were altogether on a lower plane of civilisation than their Aryan conquerors. The discoveries made by the Archaeological Department at Mohenjo-Daro in Sind between the years 1922 and 1927, as well as the excavations almost simultaneously carried out at Harappa in the Punjab, exhibit the peoples of the Indus valley in the 4th and 3rd millennia, B. C., in possession of a highly developed culture in which no vestige of Indo-Aryan influence is to be found.

In many respects these discoveries are similar in significance to those made two generations ago by Schliemann and others in Greece and Asia Minor, which proved to be the key to the study of the Mycænan civilisation that was afterwards fused into that of the Aryan Hellenes. "The parallel that Greece presents in this matter, is the more significant, because in Greece, as in India, it was the happy fusion of the southern and northern races and the intermingling of their widely divergent talents that led to the splendid outburst of classic thought and art; and the memory, moreover, of what she owed to her older population, was effaced almost as effectually in Greece as it was in India. To the ancient Greeks the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were as much the beginning of things as the Vedas still are to Indians, many of whom may regard it as little short of impious to look beyond these venerable writings for a possible source of inspiration and knowledge."

THE SIGNIFICANCE AND PLACES OF INDUS CULTURE.

More comprehensive even than its significance and relation to later Indian culture, this newly unearthed Indus culture, brings

out the importance of the role played by paleolithic man in India and his evolution into the later stages of culture. The Indus discoveries present a picture of a people using utensils of stone side by side with those of copper or bronze, but living in large cities and carrying on agriculture and trade, and enjoying a plentiful supply of gold, silver and copper. The people cultivated wheat and barley as well as the date-palm, they domesticated the buffalo and the short-horned bull, beside the sheep, pig, dog, elephant and camel. The cat and probably the horse were unknown to them. They were skilful metal-workers, used tin as an alloy in the making of bronze, and knew to make the bow and arrow, spear, axe, dagger and mace. They had not yet evolved the sword; nor probably did they know the use of defensive armour.

In the arts of ornamentation they painted *encaustic* designs on pottery, occasionally made vessels of copper, bronze or silver and overlay them with gold, of faience, ivory, carnelian and other stones. They had figurines and toys made of terra-cotta, shell and faience, and they employed, in writing, a form of script which was analogous to the other contemporary scripts of Western Asia and the Near East.

Thus the Indus culture might be said to correspond in its general features, with the chalcolithic civilisations of Egypt, Sumer and other countries of Western Asia. It however presents features peculiar to the Indus valley which is its basis. It displayed the use of cotton for textiles which was not extended to the western world until two or three thousand years later. Again "there is nothing that we know of in pre-historic Egypt or Mesopotamia or anywhere else in Western Asia, to compare with the well-built baths and commodious houses of the citizens of Mohenjo-Daro". Also the Indus sites have not yet afforded relics of magnificent temples, palaces and tombs; but they have given plenty of evidence that the ordinary folk lived in commodiously built houses which were provided with wells, bath-rooms and elaborate systems of drainage, thus showing that the ordinary folk enjoyed a great degree of comfort and luxury. Their art and religion have a peculiar character impressed upon them. The engravings of humped and short-horned bulls on their seals are not only vigorous and refined; but show a continuity with that aspect of Hinduism which is bound up with animism and the cult of Siva. Indeed, Sir John Marshall thinks that the most surprising revelation of Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa is the discovery that "Saivism has a history going back to the Chalcolithic Age or perhaps even farther still, and that it thus takes its place as the most ancient living faith in the world."

SOME OF ITS NOTEWORTHY FEATURES.

The architects of Mohenjo-Daro knew well how to construct two and three-storeyed houses according to the usual methods. There are remains of a pillared hall which is conjectured to have been a place of worship and a great bath which is the most imposing of all the ruins. Among conclusions drawn from the study of this Indus civilisation is one by Professor Langdon, who makes out a strong case for deriving the early Brahmi alphabet of India from the Indus script. The language of this script was not Sanskrit; it might possibly have been Dravidic; but as yet there is no definite tangible basis to proceed upon. The skeletal remains point to the presence of four different races in the valley. Stone representations of the phallus have been found at these sites; and they are held to prove conclusively that phallism in India was of pre-Aryan origin. Tree worship also seems to have prevailed; and evidences are available for proving the existence of the Nāga cult. Many of these ideas and cults later manifested themselves in the religion of those who were the descendants and successors of the Vedic Aryans, as the result of the latter's fusion with pre-Aryans.

This Indus civilisation was a part and parcel of the greater civilisation, which, in the Chalcolithic Period, stretched across the broad Afrasian belt. It had spread into the Punjab and as far as the Simla hills on one side. While indissolubly connected with other civilisations by community of ideas and inventions, it is no less individual and national than those of Egypt and Mesopotamia. It is likely that the people of the Gangetic plain and of Central India in that age were possessed of the same degree of culture. Baluchistan was an important cultural centre, dependent on the Indus valley for many of its amenities of life. The Vedic civilisation was neither the progenitor, nor the lineal descendant of this Indus civilisation; very likely it was the later of the two and had an independent development.

C. S. S.

The Failure of Federalism in Australia

BY

A. P. CANAWAY, K. C. (N. S. W.)

Oxford University Press,

Price 15sh.

The federal ideal has been accepted for India. It is to be wondered whether there has been any exhaustive discussion of alternative plans before it was declared that India was to go in for some type of a federal constitution. Such a preliminary discussion would have necessitated a detailed scrutiny of the history and practice of federalism in countries where that system is being worked in its various forms. Whatever transitional confusions may be felt necessary and even inevitable, at least the statesmen of the Round Table have made it plain that India should ultimately have a type of federalism in which we shall intermix with the federal principle, the Parliamentary executive. The great example of such a constitution is the Australian Commonwealth. The Report of the Round Table discussions does not reveal an appreciation of the difficulties which Australia has had to face in consequence of this experiment of hers. This is the more unfortunate as facts and arguments connected with this controversy had been marshalled skilfully and authoritatively in the course of the evidence and Report of the Royal Commission on the Australian Commonwealth Constitution which reported only a few months before the Conference assembled. Competent critics had also published their views which would have been of inestimable value. Mr. A. P. Canaway's study of the Failure of Federalism in the Australian Commonwealth has been before the public for many months; still the Round Tablers have not given evidence of their study of the interesting work, nor have they tackled the difficulties he has so clearly formulated.

But for a certain unnecessary heaviness of style, the book is one which would make a very wide appeal to all students of institutions. Political institutions acquire permanence however faulty their construction, because you always have a large number of people who are averse to change. They shy at experiments and would rather suffer present inconvenience than take the risk of possible future trouble as a result of readjusting the systems under which they live. Conservatives in Australia were at first opposed to Federation. Now they are tooth and nail against Unification. Yet it would appear that the ideal set before the

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small numbers of the Australians when federation was ushered in was that when the numbers grew and the citizenship was consolidated, the progress should be towards closer and yet closer union. Whether it is time to unify the entire Australian territory or merely to take a step in the direction by further strengthening the National Government is a question which it is not easy for outsiders to answer. Mr. Canaway, and the great Labour Party of Australia certainly think that the time is ripe for full Unification. Within the last thirty years, they claim that the states united under a federal scheme have so far developed a national patriotism and have acquired sufficient common interests to justify their abolition and the creation of a perfectly unitary state.

Mr. Canaway urges his arguments with persuasive force. The development of Dominion Status is isolating Australia more and more from the mother-country. It would soon be necessary for her to depend on herself for her defence. Her international relations will have to be framed by herself primarily. If that is so, would not the problems of defence and of external relations be the more easily solved by an Australian government enjoying plenary jurisdiction over every part of the nation and on every subject? In times of war, we hardly know what is a necessary power and what is not. Instead of merely implying a large jurisdiction in the category of defence, an implication which may be resisted at or by the courts, is it not vital to entrust the power to one single government indisputably? It is in the realms of economics and finance which bear also upon the nation's external policy that there is maximum constitutional inconvenience in Australia arising out of her federal system. The regulation of wages and of hours of work, the compensation payable to workmen, the law relating to Trade Unions and similar very important questions are not dealt with by one body on uniform principles. There are several sets of institutional machinery which deal with them differently, often in a manner to conflict with each other. Take again the question of construction of Railways. State Railways are built on varying gauges so as to break the speed and efficiency of the national transport system. There is then the important problem of increasing urbanisation in a country where pastoral arts are the chief source of national wealth. How are you going to keep a sufficient supply of human material for work in the farms in a sparsely populated land as Australia? The control of public lands is a state subject; and except by regulating the use of the vast areas of public land, it would be impossible to deal with this problem of too rapid

and detrimental urbanisation. On the question of Public Loans of the Commonwealth and State governments in Australia, we have heard a good deal recently. In spite of the Agreement between the States and the National Government, we have seen the utter collapse of credit and threatening financial chaos, for which the solution offered by the only constructive statesmen in Australia, the Labour Party, is the immediate and full Unification of the country.

These are aspects of national life which can be assessed and evaluated with reasonable correctness. But there are subtler effects, on popular efficiency and psychology which do not yield to analysis in the same way. Mr. Canaway has done well to deal with this aspect in great detail. The presence of rival sets of jurisdictions, causing divided loyalties and sectional allegiances is the surest source of weakness in any nation. It is a truism that in the modern world, only common interests make for a really national existence. Common language and common racial characteristics have their part; but anyone who studies the laws of naturalisation would know that these are but secondary; what is vital is the unity based on interests. If that is so, the maintenance of artificial divisions based on historical accident among a people who have not merely many overwhelming common interests but who all speak the same language, are in a single geographically compact area, although of continental dimensions, and belong to a substantially identical racial stock, cannot be supported by any valid considerations. It is merely the conservative instinct that opposes a change so salutary. The conservation of efficiency and the fostering of ability as well as sentiment, in fact those ideas and factors which help to build and effectively maintain a nation up to the mark in the acute competition of modern times are all weakened in a land where you are going to maintain these institutions especially when they offer no counter-availing advantages. Nations are not museums, and you can never sustain an institution because it was handed down to you from your father though it is proved beyond doubt that it is a clear misfit and quite useless. In Australia, they have to fight unreasoning conservatism.

The practical difficulties of working a constitution which mixes up the federal and the Parliamentary principles were foreseen even at the time of the initiation of the new constitution. Responsible government, which means that the executive shall stand dismissed if the legislature does not require its continuance and that the executive shall answer for its acts day by day to the Legislature which lays down what those acts shall be, is practi-

cable only with a well-ordered party system. Let us assume that there is full play for such a party system in a federal system. In the National government one party may be dominant and may control policies and administration; in the various state governments different parties may be in power working out contradictory policies. This would be bad enough if there were only two parties in the land; the evil would be absolutely unmanageable if the parties were many as all over the world they are tending to be. No demarcation of functions between the central and state authorities can be so complete that the effect of policy adopted by one will not react upon that of the other; and executives controlled by parties professing different if not opposite ideas of things are to deal with questions of a similar character at the same time. If you take the States themselves, they enjoy the same powers internally and *inter se*. Now, the policy of one state on a state subject dictated by a certain party may be unacceptable to the minority, and the result may conceivably be that the citizens of the minority may even think of migrating to another state where their party is in the ascendant. Laws of Divorce are generally referred to in this connection. This gives rise to a large number of problems which cannot be well reconciled at all. On the other hand the vesting of full authority in one Executive will subject that body to responsibility to a single legislature, and upon all matters of concern to the people, responsibility can be enforced with certainty and speed. Mr. Canaway has discussed this aspect of the problem with great ability and acumen. The vindication of his views is in the proposals now made by the Labour Party for the complete legislative and administrative unification of Australia. Whether that proposal is accepted by the Australian democracy or not, Mr. Canaway has done his people service by calling their attention to the leading aspects of the problem in the manner he has done.

N. D. V.

Reviews

Diñnāga's Pramāna-Samuccaya (Chapter I), with Vrtti, Tīkā and Notes, Edited and Restored into Sanskrit, by H. R. Rangaswami Ayyangar, M.A., Government Oriental Library, Mysore; Mysore University Publication; 1930; pp. xxiv; 110; Price Rs. 3 or 4sh. 6d.

The eminence of Diñnāga in the history of Indian Logic is equalled only by the difficulty of obtaining his books in the language in which he wrote them. A familiarity with some aspects of his teaching has long been established through references in later logicians who controverted his views. The *Nyāya-bindu* and its *tīkā*, polemical works which came at intervals more or less long after Diñnāga, have also been of considerable help. Sometime ago Mr. Randle made a collection of the references to Diñnāga in other works, under the title "*Fragments from Diñnāga*." But anything like a proper knowledge of the master had to come necessarily from Tibetan and Chinese sources, where his works were preserved in translation. The re-rendering of these into Sanskrit, so as to accord with what is known of the works through references elsewhere, is an eminently praiseworthy task Diñnāga's *magnum opus* is undoubtedly the *Pramāna-Samuccaya*, and it is no little credit to the Government and the University of Mysore that they have taken up the task of re-rendering his work into Sanskrit.

The scholar in charge of the work has had the benefit of a sound equipment in Tibetan and Chinese under Professors Viduśekhara Bhattācārya and Tucci. The latter refers as early as 1928 to the work on *Pramāna-Samuccaya* undertaken by his pupil Mr. Rangaswami Iyengar. The result is in every way worthy both of the task and the expectations. We have with us so far only the first chapter, that treating of perception. It considers the definition and the divisions of perception, and closes with the refutation of the definitions of perception offered by Vasubandhu, the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṅkhyas and the Mīmāṃsakas. The Editor's notes bring together the reference in other works, so that the reader may compare them easily with the reconstructed text. We heartily endorse the opinion expressed by Sir B. N. Seal in his Foreword that this work "will help to lay the foundation of an accurate and scientific study of the history of Indian Logic" The book is attractively got up. It is to be hoped that the remaining five chapters will follow soon and at rapid intervals.

S.S.S.

Bhāvaprakāśana of Śāradātānaya ed. with an introduction and indices by Yadugiri Yatirājasvāmī of Melkot and K. S. Ramaswami Sāstri Śirōmani, Oriental Institute Baroda. 1930 Baroda (Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. XLV. pp. 77 plus 410.)

Sanskritists will welcome this scholarly edition of Śāradātānaya's treatise based on four manuscripts and provided with an elaborate introduction and useful indexes. More of the nature of a popular compilation, rather loose in its structure and style, Śāradātānaya's work does not mark any important stage in the development of the doctrine of Rasa or the theory of dramatic construction. But the author provides more or less reliable summaries of so many of his predecessors, and his illustrations contain so many recondite literary allusions and he incorporates in his work so much of the thought of classic writers like Bharata, Dhanañjaya and Ānandavardhana, at times their very words "without an acknowledgement," that this publication of the *Bhāvaprakāśana* may be expected to furnish valuable assistance in researches into the history of Sanskrit literature and criticism. At the end of a careful discussion Pandit Ramaswami Sāstri Śirōmani fixes the date of the composition of the *Bhāvaprakāśana* 'in a period ranging between 1175-1250 A.D.' He also furnishes an Appendix giving the full texts and the sources of passages cited as illustrations by Śāradātānaya; and three indexes of (1) works and authors cited, (2) Important words and (3) verses in the *Bhāvaprakāśana*. Careful proof reading however does not seem to be received by the work. The editors of this book deserve to be congratulated on the soundness of their work.

K.A.N.

The Round Table

Summary of articles in No. 84, September 1931.

One article after another in the September issue of the *Round Table* throws light on some aspect of the sudden crisis which overtook the world and most particularly Europe—last July. The first article, on the political foundation for disarmament, brings out the political discontents on which economic trouble was nourished. But its relevance to the immediate question of financial maladjustment is only one side of the problems that will confront next year's disarmament conference. "Its decisions", runs the article, "will probably determine, not merely whether universal disarmament is practicable or not, but whether the ideals which underlie the League of Nations are to prevail, or whether Europe is going to return to the old system of an armed balance of power, which would be the certain prelude to another world war." The writer points out the only way in which the second of these alternatives can be avoided, and suggests the line which the British Commonwealth should take at the Conference.

The reader is then taken right across the globe to Shanghai, which bids fair to become one of the greatest cities of the world. The problem of its future Government is "the knot at the centre of China's tangled relations with foreign Powers", in the words of Mr. Justice Feetham's Report to the Shanghai Municipal Council, which forms the text of the second article. The western ideas of self-government and of the supremacy of law were never better taught to a people from whose tradition they were absent than in the foreign settlements of China's greatest port. But the path of these settlements has never been a smooth one, and the negotiations with regard to extraterritoriality have brought them to the most critical period in their history. A policy is suggested.

The third article deals directly with the events that led up to the recent crisis. It describes the effect of scientific and industrial development upon the world's economic life, and shows how this economic movement has been contradicted in the realm of politics. "We have constructed a twentieth century economic world which we are still trying to reconcile with eighteenth century political ideas". That is the general background of the slump and of the crisis. Against it, there was set a tendency for production to outrun consumption in the basic commodities of

world trade, and so the article goes on to discuss the problem of output restriction and price control. Trade barriers, monetary disequilibrium and the maldistribution of gold, political difficulties, are weighed as contributory causes; the leading events of the crisis are recalled, and suggestions put forward for a way out.

The fourth article is from an American pen, and describes the political reactions in the United States to the Hoover plan for the postponement of a year's war-debt payments. That leads naturally to an estimate of the chances of the possible candidates at next year's presidential election, and, by way of the tariff problem, to the economic relations of the United States with Soviet Russia and the conception of a planned economy.

The Report of the Macmillan Committee on the relations between finance and industry, which is analysed in the next article, while it proposes, in particular, large changes in the financial mechanism of London, has lessons for the rest of the world too, since no local adjustments can hope to make the international gold standard work satisfactorily or secure an emergence from the present slump. However, as the article points out, that does not excuse Great Britain from facing her own special difficulties. It is significant that the record of events in Great Britain is headed, "the Narrow Way?", since the main problem with which it deals is the choice between economy and a broader road, as presented by the report of the unemployment insurance commission and of the economy committee, and by the recent threat to the stability of the pound sterling. A special section describes the course of wage adjustments in the past few months.

A correspondent in India reports the doubts and difficulties that have darkened the prospect of an orderly settlement of the great constitutional question which is to be faced again this autumn—the uneasy working of the Irwin-Gandhi agreement, the hardening of the Moslem case, the hesitation of the Princes, agrarian discontent and the outbreak of terrorism.

The Irish Free State sends an account of the renewal of armed disturbance and of the efforts of the government to meet it. The intrusion of religion into questions of public appointments and the development of the status of the Free State within the British Commonwealth are other matters of much more than local interest. From Canada comes an account of the parliamentary session, including the amplification of the "Canada First" tariff, and a first-hand description of the condition of the western farmer, suffering at once from low prices and from terrible weather. "Western Canada is at war."

Among the articles from the self-governing Dominions that from Australia will perhaps be read with most interest since it describes the course of events which forced Australia to face a choice not unlike that which confronts the British people, and the alternative which she actually selected. Of outstanding interest in the article from South Africa are the section on the relation between the Dominion and the Privy Council, and the description of attempts to forsake the federal for the unitary form of government. The account from New Zealand of the attempt to meet the economic emergency by means of government economies, relief works and general wage reductions cannot fail at this juncture to interest the British reader.

Summary of articles in the December Number.

The December issue of *The Round Table* is naturally largely devoted to the crisis. Its world-wide character renders any purely national treatment impossible, but can be approached from various points of view. Thus, the first article, "Great Britain and the Financial Earthquake", takes the British aspect. Our peculiar difficulties are examined, though even these cannot be made clear without explaining the whole machinery of international credit before and after the war, and the factors which have combined to throw it out of gear for which purpose it is necessary to take in both the new and the old world, and countries of a widely differing character. But the author does not confine himself to diagnosis he suggests a cure both for the world in general and for Great Britain in particular. He puts forward indeed what the present Government has been given—a mandate to formulate a policy.

The subject of the second article is "The European Problems of the United States," in other words, the world crisis seen from the American angle. History is again invoked—this time to explain American action in Europe. Starting from what he calls the "Paris idea" embodied in the Peace Treaties, the author reviews in succession the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, the lending period which made reparation payments possible for the time being, the German crisis in which this period ended, the Hoover holiday which raised so many hopes, and finally, the Hoover-Laval understanding. Some shrewd comments follow, and a suggestion which might, the writer claims, effectually put people out of conceit with war and help disarmament.

These two articles lead naturally to the wider aspect which the third article "The World and the Crisis," discusses. It

describes the fall of the British currency, but from the international, rather than the national standpoint, though the consequences for British industry and the danger of beneficial effects, and still more of artificial measures designed to improve our balance of trade, being neutralised are not left out of account. The political factors which lie at the root of the economic and financial problem are also dealt with, and the concluding section suggests the conditions which must precede recovery.

The next article has nothing to do with either finance or economics. It is just a plain tale, and its burden is the fortunes of the Protestant religion—a far more important element than is usually supposed—in Soviet Russia. But this simple story brings out in an extraordinarily vivid way the remorseless nature of Soviet methods and the peculiarities of Bolshevik psychology.

The fifth article is "Germany in the Storm". German weakness to-day is the nightmare that German strength used to be before the war. A German collapse would hit every one of us, especially the Americans and ourselves, to whom an immense sum is due from the Germans for the private debts which the French are now claiming should rank after reparations. German trade, moreover, is indispensable for our own recovery. The condition of the debtor must therefore be a subject of general interest. The Round Table article takes us through all the post-war phases of German life—reconstruction, disillusionment, and now the rise of the Nazis, the secret of whose appeal is explained by the writer, as well as the failure of parliamentarism and Dr. Brüning's gallant effort to bring his country through. Its greatest anxiety at the moment is the possibility of British tariffs adding to the loss of trade which it has already incurred through the depreciation of the pound.

Next, we have a chronicle of the events of a critical month of the Manchurian crisis, followed by some reflections by the author, who writes from China, on the behaviour of the parties to the conflict. Then "India and the Round Table Conference" discusses Mr. Gandhi's reasons for so suddenly deciding to come to London, and the reaction in India to the proceedings of the Conference.

The British article describes the General Election, the events which led up to it and the formation of the new Government. One of the most interesting consequences of the defeat of Labour described by the author is a tendency to adopt a new policy. A second section explains some of the effects of the devaluation of the currency on British industry. In the Irish article an illumi-

nating account is given of the recrudescence of political unrest and crime which recalls the old unhappy days just before the creation of the Irish Free State. The consequences of the fall of the pound are also described, and the condition of the balance of Irish trade is dealt with in the usual economic section. Among the contributions from the overseas Dominions the one which will attract most attention is probably the article on "South Africa and the Gold Standard", but the accounts of the way in which New Zealand is meeting her difficulties and of Australia's struggle towards financial rehabilitation recall our own position in so many respects that they are sure to interest British readers. The decision to resume the Imperial Conference at Ottawa next year gives a special importance to all the Dominion articles.

Select Contents from Oriental Journals

The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society: London July, 1931.

An old Imperial 'sanad' relating to Rāisinā or New Delhi by P. V. Bisheshwar Nath Reu.

An Ismailitic work by Nasiruddin Tusi by W. Ivanav.

The latter portion of this contribution is the summary review of the *Raudatu'ttaslim* in the order of its chapters.

Notes on Some Pali words: by E. H. Johnston "most of the words have been chosen for discussion because of their interest for Sanskrit lexicography and other general Indian subjects."

A New Factor in the Problem of Sumerian Origins by S. Langdon.

Two Notes on Indian Head-dress: by C. H. Fābri Ph.D., Leyden.

There are interesting plates illustrative of the head-dress of women in early India.

Where the Rainbow ends: by L. C. Hopkins.

Varuna, god of the sea and the sky: by Jean Przyluski, an attempt to explain the name of the Vedic god Varuna as a development of *baru charu* a non-aryan god of the sea.

Māthara and Paramārthe by S. S. Suryanarayan.

Discovery of the last Phonetic sūtras of Pānini by Raghu Vira. *Epigraphia Indica* January, 1929.

Prakrit Inscriptions from a Buddhist site at Nāgārjunikonda by Professor Vogel.

Nalanda Stone Inscription of the reign of Yaśovarmanadeva by Hirananda Sastri.

The Three Tamil Inscriptions of Lalgudi by K. V. Sumbrahmanya Aiyar.

The Calcutta Review July, 1931.

The League of Nations and India by C. V. Hanumantha Rao. Kingship in Bengal, Behar and Orissa in ancient times by Sarate Ghosh.

The Future Constitution of India by Prof. Pramathanath Bannerjee.

Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society, Bangalore, July, 1931.

Glimpses into the Married Life of the Ancient Tamil people by K. G. Sesha Aiyar.

The importance of this article is enhanced by English renderings of a few lyrics from the Kalittogai.

The Date of Māṇikyavācaka by K. G. Sanker.

The date assigned is towards the close of the seventh century A.D.

The Kadambas of Banavase by V. Raghavendra Rao.

Social Legislation in Ancient South India by C. M. Ramachandra Chettiar.

Keladi Dynasty by S. N. Naraharayya.

Life and work of Kesiraja by Dr. R. Shama Sastri.

The author of Sabdamanidarpana, a well-known work on Kanarese Grammar.

Journal of the *American Oriental Society*, June, 1931.

Columbus and Cathay and the meaning of America to the Orientalist by Berthold Laufer.

The sources and Nature of *Purusa* in the *Purusasūkta* by W. Norman Brown.

The Palmyrene gods at Dura Europos by C. Hopkins.

An examination of the Dura cult.

The Avestan prefix *as* by Hermann Collitz.

Light Out of Ur by Ira M. Price.

Note on the Sanskrit ghostword *Padvinśā* by F. Edgerton.

Note on *Rātha-chidra* by A. K. Coomaraswamy.

Indian Art and Letters, by the India Society, London, Vol. IV. No. 2

Sculpture in Siam by Reginald le May a survey of sculpture in Siam of which no less than nine schools are distinguished.

A newly discovered Illustrated Indian manuscript by O. C. Gangoly.

"The Ms. of the *Vālagopāla* stotra is of 'signal importance for the study of a fascinating branch of Indian painting, and from the Indian point of view, of scarcely less interest than the medieval illustrated mass of the Psalter or the Book of Hours.'"

The Interrelation of Indian and Persian Art by J. V. S. Wilkinson.

A Central Museum of Asiatic Art in London by H. V. Lancaster.

Ibid Vol. V, No. 1.

A new museum of Indian Art at Benares by O. C. Gangoly.

The Poetry of Sir Muhammad Iqbal by Dr. Mulk Raj Anand.

The Royal Commission on National Museums and Galleries.

Extracts from the Report are given.

Journal of the Department of Letters Vol. XXI (Calcutta University) 1931.

Sulika, Cūlika, and Cūlikā-Paiśāci by P. C. Bagchi.

Greek and Hindu methods of Spherical Astronomy by P. C. Sen Gupta.

The paper aims to present a comparative view of the Greek and Hindu methods in spherical astronomy and to bring out the independence of the Hindu astronomers in this subject. It is clear that the Hindu methods are in no way connected with the method of the 'Analemma'.

The position of gold in the Indian currency of the Hindu Period by A. K. Sarkar. An attempt to show that gold was coined and circulated as money in ancient India. The author says that it is quite likely that gold remained the sole standard and that values of silver and copper followed that of gold.

Government and Administrative system of Tipu Sultan by S. C. Sen Gupta.

Śankara on Empirical and Transcendental knowledge by S. K. Mukherjee.

An essay on the nature of empirical knowledge, its limits and defects.

Journal of the Bombay Historical Society, Vol. III No. 2.

A newly discovered Image of Buddha near Goa by Rev.

H. Heras.

Remains of a pre-historic civilisation in the Gangetic Valley by Dr. A. Banerji Sastri.

Rāyabhāga Inscription of Dasimārāsa by Prof. K. G. Kundanagar.

The Marathas in Bengal (1740-1765) by K. K. Datta.

Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.

Vol. XII Pt. II.

Aryan Immigration into Eastern India by D. R. Bhandarkar.

Origin of the Rajputs by N. Roy.

Kumarila's verses attacking the Jain and Buddhist Notions

by Dr. K. B. Pathak.

Foreign Elements in the Hindu Population by J. C. Ghosh.

Chronology of the Pāli canon by Dr. B. C. Law.

The Hindustan Review: Oct-Dec. 1931.

Reviving of the old Life in India by S. R. Das.

The Lore of the Finger-Ring: A study by U. C. Chopra.

Journal Asiatique July-Sep. 1930.

Note on an Eclipse in the time of Aśoka (?) by Robert Fazy.

On some images of Nāgas at Sambōr Prei Kūk, by V. Goloubew.

October—December 1930.

Introduction to Abhidharmahrdaya Śāstra of Dharmatrāta
by Pelliot.

A Greek Text relating to Aśvamedha by Roger Goosens.

Note on Ālambanaparīksā by La Vallee Poussin.

Mesopotamian Element in the Art of India by Dr. C. L. Fabri.



OUR EXCHANGES

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2. *Bharat Itihasa Samshodaka Mandala*, Poona City.
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4. *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, London University, London, Longmans, Green & Co., London.
5. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, London Institution, Finsbury Circus, London.
6. *Calcutta Review*, 3, Senate House, Calcutta.
7. *Hindustan Review*, Patna Junction, E.I.Ry.
8. *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 96, Amherst St., Calcutta.
9. *Journal Asiatique*, Librairie Orientaliste, Paul Geuthner, Paris.
10. *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Patna.
11. *Journal of Oriental Research*, Managing Editor, 'The Ashrama', Luz, Mylapore.
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13. *Journal of the Kern Institute*, Leiden, Holland.
14. *Journal of the Bombay Historical Society*, Exchange Building, Sprott Road, Bombay.
15. *Muslim Review*, 3, Government Place, Calcutta.
16. *Nagari Pracharini Sabha*, Benares.
17. *The Political Science Quarterly*, Columbia University, New York.
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19. *Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society*, Daly Hall, Cenotaph Road, Bangalore.
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21. *Yoga-Mimansa*, Kun'javana, Lonavla, Bombay.
22. *The Modern Review*, 91, Upped Circular Road, Calcutta.
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24. *The Ceylon Journal of Science*, Office of the Archaeological Survey, Anuradhapura (Ceylon).

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