






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THE
NINETEENTH
CENTURY

AND AFTER

XIX-  -XX



A MONTHLY REVIEW

FOUNDED BY JAMES KNOWLES

VOL. CXII

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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCLXV—JULY 1932

OTTAWA: 1894 AND 1932

IN 1894, on the invitation of the Canadian Government, representatives of what were then the self-governing Colonies assembled at Ottawa to consider ways of promoting trade within the Empire. This was the sequel of the Jubilee gathering in 1887, where the general question of the political and economic future of the Empire had been revived with enthusiasm after the long stagnation and, in England, public apathy since the repeal of the Corn Laws and the old system of Colonial Preference. From the meeting at Ottawa arose, in turn, the Empire Conferences in London in 1902 and 1907, and the decision that similar meetings should be held periodically. But no other meeting had ever been called to consider trade relations specially until recently Mr. Bennett issued his invitation; and it would be fitting if the movement which was launched by the first Conference at Ottawa should be brought to successful fruition by the second, after thirty-eight long years during which the Government of Canada has never wavered in faith or effort. Much has happened meanwhile; and to appreciate justly either the importance or the

prospects of the coming Conference it is necessary to have some regard to the past.

According to plan, the coming Conference should be purely economic in scope, excluding any political questions. Nevertheless, as we shall see, vital questions of political principle are inherent in the economic problems, and the latter cannot in practice be decided without involving the former, whether openly or by implication. In particular, there is the fundamental question whether Preference should be regarded as a privilege appertaining to the common allegiance to the Crown. To-day it seems to be taken for granted that the Irish Free State, for example, cannot repudiate allegiance without forfeiting its claim to Preference. But let us remember how recently, and after how much disputation, this doctrine has been established, if so it is. In 1894 the British Government, unwilling even to discuss the suggestion, was represented only by a delegate (Lord Jersey) who would nowadays be called an 'observer,' being instructed to take no part in the proceedings beyond giving information if desired. Britain's settled policy for many years had been to make no fiscal distinction between the self-governing Colonies and foreign countries, nor demand any Colonial favours for her own trade. So faithfully had she carried out this principle that under certain of her trade treaties, though the Colonies might in some cases give a tariff preference to each other, they could not extend it to the Mother Country even if they wished. In fact, the policy of Free Trade had become the policy of non-discrimination, or of treating the Empire and foreign countries alike; and the Colonial statesmen had to begin by asserting the contrary doctrine, that such discrimination ought to be made. The lead was given by the Chairman, Mackenzie Bowell, Canadian Minister of Trade, ably supported by the late Senator Foster, then Minister of Finance, who so nearly lived to witness in ripe old age the triumph of the movement. The following extract from the Chairman's address will serve to indicate how clearly the main requirements of the new policy were already envisaged at Ottawa, and also (in the italicised sentences) into what a strange position, as viewed by her children, the Mother Country had drifted:

A large portion of the above trade [of India and the Colonies] is with foreign Powers, which, by a judicious adjustment of tariffs, might be diverted into British channels; this is therefore deserving of the earnest and careful consideration of all who have the general consolidation of the Empire at heart.

The accomplishment of this great object could, I humbly submit, be attained by each Colony retaining perfect autonomy as regards its tariff rates, whether on a basis of Free Trade or Protection, with the one sole restriction that on all articles on which duties are charged, uniform preferential rates on direct importations shall be accorded to all members of

a confederation to be founded for that purpose, and to the Mother Country should she desire to form part of such confederation, as against the rest of the world.

To accomplish this the Imperial Government should be respectfully called upon to terminate all existing treaties to the contrary, at the earliest date possible. This being attained, a joint commission might be appointed to form a nomenclature of tariffs so as to insure uniformity of practice in respect to assessments of duties as well as classifications for statistical purposes.

Pertinent to this proposition is cable connexion not only with Australia, but with all the Colonies which form part of this tariff union—and it is to be hoped that all of Her Majesty's possessions will in due time be incorporated therein—all on a basis of direct British or Colonial control, and touching at or on British territory only.

Correlative to the subject of cable communications, and none the less important, is that of the increased postal facilities which the line of swift communication already inaugurated [Vancouver-Sydney steamship service] and those in contemplation will provide. . . .

For the time being, therefore, the Colonies were to concentrate their efforts on trade 'confederation' between themselves, with the hope that Britain would be induced to join some day. But among the resolutions passed was one asserting the new doctrine. It concluded:

That this Conference records its belief in the advisability of a customs arrangement between Great Britain and her Colonies by which trade within the Empire may be placed upon a more favourable footing than that which is carried on with foreign countries.

At the meeting convened by Joseph Chamberlain in 1902, the new doctrine was again embodied in a resolution which urged that, both in the Colonies and in the United Kingdom, Empire products should receive preferential treatment 'either by exemption from or reduction of duties now or hereafter imposed.' When the same resolution was repeated in 1907 the British Government formally dissented, in so far as the wording might imply, 'that it is necessary or expedient to alter the fiscal system of the United Kingdom,' which already included revenue duties on sugar, tea, coffee, and wine, applicable to all countries alike. In the words of the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, winding up the debate, they were asked to consider 'whether we shall treat the foreigners and the Colonies as it were differently, and that, we conceive, we are not able to do.' Again, therefore, the principle at issue was not that of Protection or Free Trade, so much as that of discrimination between the Empire as such and foreign countries. This attitude persisted until 1917, when Britain at last accepted the doctrine of the 1902 resolution; and now we find the National Government, with all the zeal of a convert, refusing even to start 'conversations' with foreign countries until after the Ottawa Con-

ference. But in the meantime the doctrine so tardily abandoned by Britain has been unexpectedly revived by two Dominions. In 1928 South Africa signed a treaty with Germany, promising to the latter equal treatment with the Britannic countries in connexion with any future trade arrangements. And now we have seen Mr. de Valera—who always refers to Britain as a 'foreign' Power—assuming that the case for reciprocal Preference rests simply upon the economics of mutual advantage and has nothing to do with the common allegiance, which he wishes to renounce. Lately the separatism of the South African Government seems to have weakened. But, having regard to these recent circumstances, the fundamental question can hardly be ignored at Ottawa.

In the course of the pre-war discussions various points arose as to the methods of tariff Preference, some of which have still to be settled before the movement can go much further. The original idea was that there should be a uniform rate of some kind, covering the trade as a whole. The modified proposal, that under any existing duties in any of the countries some measure of preference should be automatically given, was evidently designed to make it easier for Britain to come into line, and in the end it had that effect. But by most of the overseas statesmen, including the Liberal Ministers in Canada who introduced the first preferential tariff, this automatic or uncovenanted Preference was always regarded as a first stage only, a recognition of principle, which was to be followed by negotiation and definite trade agreements. In other words, the privilege of status was to be augmented by contract. The argument was, and remains, that the uncovenanted Preference can never be more than partially effective, because it is too rough and ready in its application to the various classes of goods, and always lacking the stability necessary for confidence, because any change of Government in any country may mean a radical alteration of tariff policy. Trade treaties, as with foreign countries, are therefore advocated.

But there is no getting away from the fact that any negotiation must be a long and difficult business, as inter-Dominion examples have already shown. If the idea is to frame a single agreement between Britain and the Dominions collectively, the diversity of interests is very formidable. If, on the other hand, there is to be a set of separate agreements, between Britain and the Dominions severally, the reaction of one upon another has to be provided for. Would it be proper for Britain to grant varying degrees of Preference to different Dominions, as some of them have done between themselves, according to the reciprocal favours offered by each? Or, should there be a Commonwealth 'most-favoured-nation' clause, so that all should enjoy the best terms obtained by any? This would avoid the invidiousness of

differentiation, but would involve the same difficulties which confront the other idea. Although there has been much busy preparation for the technical work of the Conference in all the capitals, this preliminary question of method apparently remains.

Among difficulties which, on the other hand, have diminished is British hostility to the efforts of the Dominions to build up their own secondary industries behind tariff 'walls.' Nor have the trade returns ever given much support to the complaint that Preference is valueless when it takes the form of raising the 'wall' higher against the foreigner instead of lowering it for the Empire. It is now recognised that Protection is a legitimate policy for all alike—however absurd it may seem for small populations which lack a sufficient home market—subject only to the proviso that none ought to foster any industry for which the local conditions are plainly unfavourable. This was, in fact, Joseph Chamberlain's original idea, giving his opponents their excuse to warn the Colonies against the 'schedule of forbidden industries' with which, they insinuated, he meant to shackle their development. To-day the same idea seems more generally acceptable. Concurrently, however, with the establishment of manufactures in the Dominions there has been the movement in the older countries towards 'rationalisation,' suggesting that it should be possible for British and Dominion industries to co-operate rather than compete, each concentrating on some special line or class of goods, for which it would be allowed to have a clear field. Already the interests concerned have been getting together with a view to the Conference. But in many quarters private agreements 'in restraint of trade' are still looked upon with much distrust. Another plan is for British firms to establish branch factories overseas; and in this direction, at any rate, something has already been achieved.

Corresponding formerly to the British feeling that the Colonies ought not to tax British manufactures was the Colonial feeling that Britain ought to tax foreign produce, but not theirs. This was always Laurier's tacit assumption. But it was obviously an illogical position for the Dominion protectionists, and they did not try to sustain it. In 1907 Deakin, addressing his British colleagues, declared:

of course our proposal is made, admitting that first of all you should consider your own production and your own people, and impose whatever duties you think fit in regard to them. Only after that should you undertake to go further, and enter upon the question of Preference.

In 1923, by which time the British farmers had at length achieved their National Farmers' Union and were making themselves heard, Mr. Bruce emphatically admitted that of course they ought to have the first advantage in the home market as they

claimed. But there is a growing tendency among students of the problem to regard preferential tariffs as providing the moral stimulus, together with the necessary framework, or bulwark, for voluntary co-operation between organisations of British and Dominion producers to meet the requirements of the consuming populations. On such terms Free Trade within the Empire should not be an impossible ideal, especially if, as appears, the differences between British and Dominion costs of production or standards of living are tending to diminish. At any rate, it offers more promise than the recent attempts of the Canadian wheat growers and New Zealand dairy farmers to stabilise prices by sectional action, which not only failed in their object but provoked ill-will.

An argument of which much was heard in the earlier discussions is that there are other ways than tariff Preference of promoting trade within the Empire, especially improvement of communications, systematic migration, and scientific research. These 'other ways' have been favoured by free-traders as an alternative to the tariff policy, but also by protectionists as ancillary measures, of which the practical value would depend upon assurance of markets for the goods to be produced. That the latter view now prevails is indicated by the restricted programme of the coming Conference. In the present state of markets and budgets, with thousands of emigrants actually coming back, and so much shipping idle, there is little scope for secondary measures. To-day the subject which comes next to Preference is Currency, to which the Canadian Government have promised special attention.

In one vital matter the dead hand of the past lies heavily on the present. From the beginning it has been plain that effective Preference for the Dominions postulates a tariff in Britain on imported food; and for thirty years the British democracy has been educated—quite as much by Conservative boggling as by Liberal or Labour denunciation—to believe that any such tariff would mean a serious hardship to the poor. Recent experience has demonstrated the truth that when supply exceeds demand the incidence of import duties is on the producer, so that the importing State obtains a revenue without any cost to the consumer.¹ Unfortunately this experience was not yet available

¹ 'Food prices were lower on the average of 1930 by no less than 10 per cent.' (Mr. Hore-Belisha, Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, March 11, 1932). 'Ever since the tariffs were introduced the continuous fall in the cost of living had not ceased. It had gone on just the same as if they had imposed no tariffs at all; and the clear and obvious deduction from that was, taking the tariffs as a whole, it was the foreigner who paid the duty, not the working classes. He made this contribution to our expenses in return for the opportunity we gave him of selling in our markets' (Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, April 23, 1932).

to the country when the National Government had to frame measures for balancing the Budget. Although as much as £25,000,000 might have been raised by moderate preferential duties on competitive food imports alone, they could not bring themselves to propose duties on wheat or meat (including bacon), which together would contribute the larger part. And in regard to the other items, especially dairy produce—an industry capable of rapid expansion both here and overseas—they sacrificed revenue by postponing the operation of the general tariff in respect of Empire products until November 15. Thus a very large amount of revenue, which could not possibly be raised with less harm to industry or to consumers by any other means, was sacrificed to the old political bogey. Since something had to be done at once to meet the outcry of the farmers against the unfairness of protecting manufacturers but not agriculture, the wheat quota was devised—a clumsy expedient of doubtful value to the producer, but sure expense to the taxpayer.

It is easier to understand than to applaud the action of the Government in this matter, which so vitally affects the prospects at Ottawa. Had they been free from the political incubus of the past, they might have extended the 10 per cent. general tariff to all wheat and meat, while allowing a rebate of, say, one-fifth in favour of Empire produce. They could then have offered at Ottawa to negotiate a further reduction of the preferential tariff to perhaps one-half, making it 5 per cent. only. Further than that we could hardly go without jeopardising the indispensable revenue, which must tend to disappear in proportion as the Dominions displace the foreigner in this market. Supposing the Dominions could not meet us to our satisfaction by a corresponding reduction of their own tariffs, at any rate there could have been no question of putting them in a worse position than they hold to-day. But having decided that we do not need duties on wheat or meat for domestic purposes, the Government cannot now propose such duties solely in order to give Preference, unless they can obtain a much larger *quid pro quo* than appears at all possible. What they have to avoid is the invidious cry, which some of them formerly did so much to spread, that the arrangement would be a 'sacrifice' of the poor in this country to the greedy Dominions.

In the course of the debates on the tariff resolutions and the Budget, Ministers repeatedly explained that the exclusion of wheat and meat was due to their intense anxiety about the cost of living; and clearly the suspension of the 10 per cent. tariff on Dominion imports was inspired by the same caution. But when addressing themselves to the Empire they have affected a different motive—as though conscious of having thrown away most of the bargaining power which we ought to derive from our enormous

importations of food. Thus Mr. Neville Chamberlain, arguing that it might be worth our while to sacrifice to some extent the primary objects of revenue and reduction of imports if thereby we could obtain further advantages in the Dominion markets, has remarked:

Since until we meet the Dominions we shall not be in a position to estimate the advantages and disadvantages on either side, and since we desire to mark at every stage our wish to approach this Conference in the true spirit of Imperial unity and harmony, we have decided that so far as the Dominions are concerned—and in this we include India and Southern Rhodesia also—neither the general nor the additional duties shall become operative before the Ottawa Conference has been concluded. After the Conference its results can be embodied in whatever modification of these duties may have been agreed upon. I am confident that the decision of His Majesty's Government will be welcomed by the Dominions in the same spirit in which it was made (House of Commons, February 4, 1932).

So the discreet Chancellor took credit to the 'true spirit of Imperial unity and harmony' for an extravagant preliminary concession to the Dominions which was really due to a mistaken estimate of domestic exigencies. Later he had occasion to procure an amendment of the Bill, in order to meet the position that would arise 'if and when after the Ottawa Conference some duties were applicable to some goods coming from the Dominions. They had to contemplate that there might be some goods coming from the Dominions, some of which would be free, some subject to reduced duty, and some subject to the full 10 per cent.'

His colleague, Mr. Thomas, the Secretary for the Dominions, has all along been clumsier, hardly disguising the feeling that if the Dominions did not play up they should be made to suffer. He has bidden them remember the 'sacrifices' Britain will have to make—which is an echo from the past—and has urged that all should approach the Conference in no haggling temper, but with the aim of giving rather than getting. 'The British Government had put all the cards on the table, and done all they could to encourage, help and foster the Imperial spirit. It was now up to the Dominions to respond.'

Mr. Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade, who prides himself on being essentially a man of business, is less apt to bang the Imperial drum. Replying in the House to somebody's argument that negotiation should precede, not follow, any new tariff, he pointed out that the general tariff would not prevent negotiation either with foreign countries or with the Dominions:

There is no reason why we should despair of the Dominions giving us a *quid pro quo* until we have heard their case. We have ranged ourselves quite definitely on the side, not of high tariffs, but of low tariffs. How are

you going to negotiate if you do not negotiate with duties which are already imposed. It is said that if you travel about Europe now you will find indications in some quarters of a desire to reduce duties because they are a little afraid of our tariff. It has been called in some quarters the tariff *in terrorem*. That means they are afraid of a tariff which has not yet been imposed. How are you therefore going to negotiate with them if you do not impose tariffs? . . . If the attitude is all bluff, and nothing is intended to be done, may not the bluff be called? I prefer as a negotiator of long experience to say, 'Here is a schedule of duties which means business. Lower your tariffs and we will lower ours.' I admit [*? submit*] that this is not a tariff *in terrorem* but a tariff in being (*The Times*, February 10, 1932).

With all respect to Mr. Runciman, there are features which do make it a tariff *in terrorem*. In effect, there is suspended a big stick for recalcitrant foreign countries, in the shape of a 100 per cent. surtax; and a comparatively little stick for recalcitrant Dominions in the shape of 10 per cent. after November 15; but the principle is the same, and it is known as retaliation—surely the very antithesis of the 'true spirit.' So the Government will be faced with this dilemma at Ottawa. Either they must obtain from the Dominions such a reduction of duties on British imports as would justify to the British public a continuation after November 15 of the provisional exemption here, or else they must retaliate by proceeding to levy duties on Dominion products which at present enjoy free entry. In the latter event, what would be the public effect of so paradoxical an outcome of this eagerly awaited Conference?

Let us now consider the probable reaction of Dominion Ministers to the British policy for Ottawa. It would not be surprising if the appeal to the 'true spirit' left them somewhat cold, seeing that, *qua* fiscal policy, they were giving practical proof of this spirit for twenty years before Britain began to show it. They might reckon that their one-sided preferences through all those years have given them a good claim to the benefit of continued exemption under Britain's new tariff, without being called upon to pay further for it. Nor will it have escaped them that a purely domestic reason for the exemption has been confessed by British Ministers, suggesting that the threat to withdraw it may be 'bluff' after all. In any case, it must be difficult for the Dominions to lower their tariffs substantially at a time when they, like Britain herself, are under the necessity of restricting imports for the sake of balancing budgets. On the other hand, the organised farmers in most of the Dominions, and Canada especially, have always resisted high protection, and Governments have sought to conciliate them by the compromise policy of reducing duties on British manufactures. At any rate, the Ministerial response of the leading Dominions to the British

appeal has been to applaud heartily the suggestion that there should be no haggling. But if they feel unable to give Britain what she wants, will Britain act on her own maxim and give without getting? What would Mr. Runciman's answer be?

We have now taken note of certain difficulties confronting the Conference, which are partly inherent in the nature of the business and partly the legacy of bygone politics in Britain. The position is that the British Ministers are going to Ottawa without any duties in actual operation which they might offer to reduce; unable, therefore, to extend the existing Preference in the British market except by raising the level of the present tariff as against the foreigner, or else by imposing new duties which, in their judgment hitherto, we do not need for any domestic purpose, but threatening to retaliate against the Dominions by proceeding to levy those existing duties which are now in suspense, unless the Dominions adequately 'respond.' It is not clear whether they still think of a 'wheat quota' for the Dominions as an alternative lever for persuading some of them to lower their tariffs; though at an early stage Mr. Thomas said they intended to bring this plan forward at Ottawa, and suggestions have been made that meat, for example, might be similarly dealt with. In Canada there has been much discussion about the quota. There the general opinion seems to be that any such scheme would be very difficult to operate, and, unless accompanied by a guaranteed price (implying a tax on us), of very doubtful value to Canada, since the foreign wheat excluded from Britain would be driven to neutral markets where the Dominions would still have to sell their large remaining surplus. It can be argued, no doubt, that the demand for a minimum price could not be met by any reasonable tariff. But the fact remains that a tariff preference in the British market is what farmers throughout the Empire, and not least in Britain, have set their hearts upon. If it failed to secure a remunerative price, it would at any rate be 'making the foreigner pay.'

Such being the circumstances, one can hardly expect immediate results in the shape of definite trade agreements for submission to the various Parliaments. More probably the Conference will disperse with the present uncovenanted preferences left intact, to await some further effort. Incidentally, this may remind us that the mutual preference now existing between Britain and the Irish Free State does not necessarily depend upon that negotiation which the British Government has declined to undertake. In any case, the criterion of the success or failure of the Conference should not really be sought in such agreements. Experience already shows that, even if they were made, they would need constant revision owing to the unstable and rapidly changing

conditions of the present world. A truer criterion will be the decision or refusal to establish a permanent committee, for the purpose of continuing systematically the effort to extend and stabilise the arrangements of mutual preference, by recommending to any of the Governments concerned such modifications as may from time to time seem desirable. With the object of preserving elasticity in an enacted tariff, while 'keeping it out of politics,' permanent advisory boards have already been set up in various parts of the Commonwealth.

As we have seen, the establishment of a joint commission was actually suggested by the Canadian spokesman at the first Ottawa meeting, though with only the temporary function of standardising the nomenclature of tariffs—an elementary requirement which has never yet been fully met. In connexion with subsequent Imperial Conferences, the creation of some kind of economic advisory council was repeatedly suggested, particularly by British free-traders. Consequently the proposal became suspect to Dominion statesmen as an attempt to sidetrack Preference. Some, especially Laurier, further suspected it of being the opening move in an attempt to recentralise the political control of the Empire. But after the Statute of Westminster such apprehensions must surely be obsolete. Mutual Preference at last is an agreed policy, and now the common concern is to leave nothing undone to make it a complete success. Clearly this cannot be achieved by means of intermittent conferences, preceded by 'preparation' in departmental offices thousands of miles apart, and only to be co-ordinated by 'consultation' through High Commissioners in London as a temporary addition to their normal responsibilities. Some kind of permanent organisation has been jointly advocated by the Federation of British Industries and the Trade Union Congress, each recognising the need from its own point of view. If the coming Conference decides to have it, we may expect that the committee will be based genuinely upon the principle of equality, implying that it will be responsible in fact as well as in name to the Governments collectively. To secure that object the essential is that the committee should be jointly financed, instead of depending, like the existing 'Imperial Economic Committee,' upon the British Treasury. As a model, the organisation of the Imperial War Graves Commission already illustrates the right principle.

Of late the hope has often been uttered that the Ottawa Conference should 'give a lead' to the distracted world. The British Prime Minister interpreted this feeling in his broadcast message on Empire Day, when he said:

At Ottawa I believe we can lay the foundations of an economic policy which will be mutually helpful to members of the Commonwealth, but

which will not be paralysing to general world commerce. We can create freer trade conditions over a vast area of the world.

As the message suggests, the idea is that besides reducing tariff barriers within the Empire the Conference should pave the way—whether by force of example, or of Britain's new bargaining power—for a general reduction of foreign tariffs also.

It has long been the fashion in certain circles to decry the notion of a 'self-contained' Empire, or an 'exclusive' trade system; especially since Britain, with her unique dependence upon world trade, has gone over to Protection. But the history of the Preference movement gives no countenance to the fear alluded to. Canada, leading the way, had no sooner differentiated her tariff in favour of the Empire than she enacted an 'intermediate' scale of duties—intermediate between the 'general' and the 'preferential' scales—as a definite basis of negotiation with foreign countries, and proceeded to use it with such effect that already her export trade is among the largest in the world. One may regret that the National Government have not chosen this more amicable method, of an intermediate tariff 'in being,' instead of the surtax *in terrorem*, which does not so obviously suggest 'freer trade conditions.' Here again we may detect the malign influence of the old party controversy in Britain, during which the idea of 'retaliation' as an instrument for breaking down foreign tariff walls was persuasively presented to free-traders, some of whom are now seen to have taken it very much to heart.

But the opportunity for Ottawa to give a lead has another aspect, which has nothing to do with the immediate lowering of tariffs. Reverting to the original resolutions, which implied that Preference should be regarded as an attribute of Britannic status, let us further consider this proposition in relation to the necessities of the world to-day. Everywhere the need is realised of more stability, both political and economic, than present institutions seem to afford. The League of Nations, which has so bitterly disappointed its keenest advocates, represents an attempt to organise peace and justice between States upon the basis of a common contract, the terms being contained in the Covenant. Into this organisation the Britannic States have been drawn as separate units. But at the same time they have retained their own organisation for peace and justice between themselves, which is not based on any contract, but on a common status, which is now defined in the preamble to the recent Statute of Westminster. The status is that of 'common allegiance to the Crown,' by virtue of which their individual citizens are all British subjects. The Oath prescribed by the Constitution Act of the Irish Free State refers to this feature as 'community of citizenship,' which may be

rather a misleading expression. What are popularly regarded as rights of 'citizenship,' such as franchise for elections, or the benefit of social services, are matters within the sole control of the individual State. But underlying all these locally varying privileges are the uniform rights and duties of British subjecthood, which flow from the allegiance to the Crown both of the State and of its citizens individually.

At present the recognised rights and duties of British subjecthood are confined to matters which are not apt to awaken the interest of the ordinary citizen; unless he marries a foreign wife, when difficulties about property may arise, or travels abroad, when, if maltreated, he can get the nearest British consul to set the Crown in motion for his protection, or unless the Crown goes to war. In the latter contingency, the State to which he belongs becomes automatically 'belligerent.' If it decides to take an active part, its belligerence is 'active'; otherwise the belligerence is only 'passive,' which, however, involves the duty of refusing support of any kind to the Crown's enemy, and of accepting liability to be attacked. What the State cannot do is to be 'neutral,' which means treating both sides alike, as by refusing harbour to the Crown's forces.

It is these war-time liabilities that have provoked controversy at different times, in South Africa and Ireland especially, about the advantage or otherwise of remaining in the Commonwealth. But nowadays, in theory at least, none of the Britannic States, since they are members of the League of Nations, can go to war except under the ægis of Geneva, which would equally preclude 'neutrality.' However that may be, we may recognise in our existing Commonwealth a league of nations whose members—in striking contrast to the other League—have become temperamentally incapable of war with each other, therefore do not arm against each other, and have long been accustomed to submit their public disputes to judicial decision. Surely the common status which has already produced these excellent results not only ought to be preserved, but might well be extended to include the right of preferential treatment in all the markets of the Commonwealth for goods produced within the Commonwealth. So the value of the common allegiance would be brought home to all classes of British subjects in the most constant and vital of their pursuits—that of livelihood—fortifying the foundation on which their league of peace and justice has been established by tradition.

Contract stands for liberty, since it implies freedom to sign or not to sign, and to withdraw on due notice given. Status stands for stability, since to renounce it is revolution, whether peaceful or otherwise. Contract favours the strong, especially in the field

of commercial bargaining; status equalises the weak with the strong. What the world now desiderates is not more liberty, having seen 'nationalism run mad' since the war, but more stability with due protection for the weak. Thus the time seems ripe for this further stage of the Britannic experiment. Hitherto 'tariff wars' within the Empire have not been wholly unknown—something of the kind lately occurred, for example, between Canada and New Zealand—and we have heard the hint of 'the full 10 per cent.' if the Dominions do not 'respond' at Ottawa. But on the new principle, if Ottawa sees fit to confirm it, no Britannic State could henceforth subject the goods of another to any import duty which did not allow some margin of preference over foreign goods in competition. What the margin should be is of secondary importance. It might be left optional to each Government, or a minimum rate might be agreed upon—say 10 per cent. off the general duty, as Mr. Bennett himself once suggested. But the main thing is that the margin should henceforth be applicable to all import duties, and inalienable. Thus the Britannic system might be definitely established on the lines conceived by the pioneers at Ottawa in 1894. Founded on status, and to that extent secured to all, Preference could be amplified by contract, which would be optional and subject to revisions. So may Ottawa in 1932 complete its work of 1894; and so may the Britannic Commonwealth, true to its genius, exemplify to the world a just and practical compromise between liberty and stability in the economic field of international relations.

RICHARD JEBB.

OTTAWA AND AGRICULTURE

THE Government of the United States has recently signified its readiness to attend a world conference with a view to stabilising prices, and, in view of the fact that the economy of every country or any two countries is so wrapt up in the general world situation, it will be well to consider the general position before coming to the specific subject of this article. Since 1927 the economists at Geneva have made it clear that not only must prices be stabilised, if we are ever to return to the normal, but that with regard to agricultural products somehow the prices must reach a higher level before they are stabilised. Though all industries have been affected by abnormally low prices, land products have been so affected to a far greater extent than any other. If a conference, such as is proposed, is to be effective, all the economic factors which have a bearing on the problem should come within its purview. For instance, how come to sound conclusions if the question of reparations and war debts are not to be discussed? How come to sound conclusions if the leading American economists are entirely unable to make the mass of American voters understand even the most elementary economic facts?

Even more important than the question of reparations is the monetary question. Money, as we all know, is simply a token; but at the same time it is also a measure. How stabilise prices if the 'foot rule' has a widely varying number of inches, caused by the differences in exchange between the various nations? Logically, it would seem that the first essential is to get a common measure. The National Government, during the last election, made a strong point of this; there was to be a conference on international currency. This has not yet taken place. Presumably the question will be thoroughly discussed at Ottawa; but the point is, will the international situation be discussed or only the question of currency within the British Empire? If the latter, the whole international problem will be delayed. Yet delay at the present juncture may well prove fatal; many people feel that the world is on the verge of a greater economic collapse than it has yet experienced. Really, to the man in the street, a solution of the international currency question seems the most

pressing need of all, since without such a solution the foundation for economic peace cannot be laid. The fact is that we are in the throes of an economic world war which is financially more disastrous than the Great War. The consideration of currency from the Imperial point of view alone is not sufficiently all-embracing, and even for a satisfactory solution within the Empire the moment is not a propitious one; it is only necessary to consider the present position of Australia and the attitude of South Africa to realise this.

If, however, the basis of discussion were widened and an attempt made to bring into the currency pact all nations that should naturally trade upon the sterling basis, great results might be achieved. There is little doubt that the Argentine, and practically the whole of South America, belong naturally and economically to the sterling group, as does also Scandinavia, and would gladly see Great Britain take the initiative. The economic crisis through which the States of South America are passing is very largely due to the fact that many of them have been anchored to the gold dollar instead of to sterling. The reason for this is that most of the recent loans to the Governments of South American States are American loans; while the bulk of the capital for railways and other industrial development is English. The amount of English capital in the Argentine, and indeed in other South American States, vastly exceeds the amount of American capital. In the Argentine alone the amount of English capital exceeds our total investments in Australia. This is a fact which is becoming more and more widely realised, and is leading to the view that, economically, the Argentine should be counted as part of the British Empire.

The writer has recently returned from a visit to the Argentine, and he was greatly impressed there with the general pro-British attitude; there is little doubt that the Argentine would welcome closer relations with this country. Leading Argentinos expressed the view that England should without delay make the suggestion that the sterling basis be accepted by all countries that would benefit economically. Many in this country view the proposal with favour, and suggest that it would be a very good thing if the Argentine were to take the initiative. But, clearly, action must rest with England, and presumably it is the pending Ottawa Conference which causes such action to be delayed—also the fact that it is not yet altogether clear at what figure the pound sterling should be stabilised.

From certain points of view the position of the Argentine *vis-à-vis* to England is unique; we depend upon her for an essential proportion of our beef supply in a way that we depend upon no other single nation in respect of a main commodity. Accord-

ing to Grondona, there is at present a trade balance of some £57,000,000 sterling against us. It is clearly desirable that this adverse balance should be removed. But how can this be done? The Argentine might buy more from us, but in her present economic crisis the Argentine cannot buy more from anybody. However, it should be possible for her to switch over some of her purchases from the United States to this country, and there is very sound reason for her to adopt such a course. In general terms the United States will buy no agricultural products from the Argentine, while Great Britain constitutes her best market. Secondly, we might buy less from the Argentine—for example, at least an extra £10,000,000 worth of beef could, with advantage, be produced at home; this point will be dealt with later. The people of the Argentine are anxious to buy British, but often it is difficult for them to do so; here we come up against the old grievance against English salesmanship. Though my visit to the Argentine was brief, I came across several cases of orders lost to Britain owing to inefficient salesmanship. Even at the British Exhibition at Buenos Aires, which, admittedly, was splendidly staged, I heard of would-be purchasers unable to ascertain prices and particulars in regard to machinery which they saw on the stands and which would have met their requirements. Traveling through the country, on several occasions I met people who wished to deal with British firms; but the conditions of sale were not as favourable as those of German and American firms dealing in the same commodities. Foreign firms, it was said, kept more goods in stock than English firms, also that the latter were disinclined to pledge themselves in regard to date of delivery. It is true that in a hurried visit there is danger of bad cases like these making an undue impression on one's mind, and that one does not realise the general improvement that may be taking place. But this criticism of British salesmanship is very general, and the writer has come across it in so many oversea countries that, although there is reason to believe greater attention is now being paid to this question, there can be little doubt that it still exercises a disadvantageous effect upon the volume of British products sold overseas.

It has just been stated that England is the Argentine's best customer, and takes the bulk of her agricultural exports. We are therefore so essential to the Argentine that our position is very strong. If the necessary measures were taken, we could rationalise our Anglo-Argentine trade—more easily, perhaps, than our trade with any other country. There need be no question of taking advantage of our position to ride rough-shod over the interests of Argentina—a policy that never pays. Rather it is a case for friendly arrangement, beneficial to both countries. An admirably

staged British Exhibition has been held in Buenos Aires recently ; unfortunately not at a very favourable moment, since the world crisis was becoming more and more acute. We have sent out commissions to the Argentine which have produced excellent reports, but it may be questioned how widely such reports are read in the Argentine, or how completely they are understood.

However that may be, the time has come for a conference to deal with details. The approach should be economic rather than political ; the conference would necessarily be convened by the respective Governments, and there would have to be governmental supervision and guidance ; but the main discussion should be on the basis of the economic interests involved. The more nearly it could approach a conference between organised collective-producer-sellers and organised buyers, the more effective it would be. Also it would definitely pay us to have regard to the interests of the primary producer in the Argentine and to protect him against exploitation. This on the general principle that the producer, in whatever country, from whom we draw supplies must receive a remunerative price for his produce. Otherwise there will be a grave danger of production in main commodities being so seriously upset that conditions unfavourable to the consumer might arise. At the present moment the producers of many main commodities are earning but a bare existence ; this is far from a healthy state of affairs and cannot continue indefinitely. The Argentine is a new country ; the producers are not yet highly organised, and it might well be advisable for us to assist them in securing the needed degree of organisation. This is only a suggestion ; but the writer was greatly impressed with the evident desire amongst Argentinos for co-operation with the English.

To turn again to general considerations. We are the largest purchasers of primary products in the world. This gives us a very great power which, up till now, has not been made full use of. We can place our orders where we wish ; we can contract with this or that country for the supply of beef, or wheat, or any other commodity ; and it is the purchaser rather than the producer who could and should take the lead in bringing order into the international exchange of commodities. One of the fundamental needs is for the organisation of the sources of supply, and it is the buyer rather than the seller who can best secure this organisation. We have departed from our old system of Free Trade because we found that haphazard methods in international exchange no longer met modern requirements. We have talked of control of imports, of quantitative control ; but, in fact, we are using tariffs as the one means of effecting this control, and there is a danger of protection being imposed for protection's sake. It were sounder to devise an effective control (using tariffs when advisable)

which would, on the one hand, lead to the organisation of the sources of supply and, on the other, help to lower excessive tariffs in other countries. It may be that the economists who advise the Government may think that control of volume (quantitative control) is advisable, yet perhaps fear that it would prove difficult to create and might lead to chaos. But surely chaos already reigns supreme and something more than the mere imposition of tariffs must be faced. Control should be tried, in the first instance, in the case of one or two commodities which would be easiest to control, and then extended as results warrant.

The introduction of the quota system implies that tariffs cannot meet the case of all commodities ; further, it implies a certain degree of quantitative control. But there is danger in dealing with the problem piecemeal ; rather, a careful review of the whole problem is necessary in order to decide to what range of commodities tariffs *cum* preference can be applied effectively, to what range of commodities control of volume, with or without tariffs and with or without preference, is essential. These are all points for discussion at Ottawa, not only as they affect inter-Empire trade, but as they affect exchange between England and foreign countries. And nothing that transpires at Ottawa should be allowed to tie our hands in subsequent dealings with foreign nations. It is noteworthy that the importance of a good international understanding is stressed to-day more than ever before, and yet we see in practice the most exaggerated economic nationalism. World economic peace cannot be secured unless this economic nationalism is somehow broken down. Whether it is broken down or becomes still more accentuated will depend largely upon the outcome of the Conference at Ottawa.

At the last meeting of the British Association both General Smuts and Sir John Russell expressed the view that resort to some form of contract system was essential ; and from the point of view of the English agricultural producer, unless there is control of volume he is not going to benefit greatly from any tariff that the Government can impose. For instance, even a heavy tariff on imported condensed skimmed milk would do little good ; the price is so low that even with a considerable increase it would still be purchased. From the health point of view it is not good food ; and if we are to develop the processing of our surplus milk, effective control of imported milk products is essential. In some ways it would have been better to use the word 'contract' instead of 'quota' ; the terms are really almost synonymous ; but the word 'contract' implies an ordinary business transaction and is therefore preferable ; while the word 'quota' implies something more fixed and inelastic and seems to involve a complicated machinery and range of conditions. The foreigner, not

only in the Argentine, but in such exporting countries as Denmark, takes kindly to the idea of quota or contract. For instance, there is a large over-production of pigs in Denmark; countless litters have been destroyed during the past few months. The Danes realise that it would be to the mutual advantage of England and Denmark to come to some understanding in regard to volume; that England should produce more pigs and Denmark fewer. At the present moment pig products are coming in from countries where production is carried on under anything but ideal conditions, and where wages are abnormally low. Under a system of organised contracts, with the necessary degree of supervision, contracts would not be placed in such countries; we would deal only with countries that could supply us with products of good quality, produced under reasonable conditions. Again, in the case of butter, butter must be dealt with in conjunction with margarine. It would be to the national advantage to limit the importation of margarine: a great difference between butter and margarine is that the former contains the essential vitamins while the latter does not. Further, butter produced in summer contains more vitamins than winter butter; therefore some understanding between England, Denmark, and New Zealand is indicated to the end that we should receive the maximum amount of summer-produced butter.

To touch for a moment on another main commodity—wheat. No matter what is done in regard to the monetary system internationally, so long as the amount of wheat exported from Russia remains an unknown quantity, it will be impossible to stabilise the price of wheat. This was the conclusion arrived at by the Imperial Economic Committee, in their recently published report on 'The Wheat Situation.' Under an organised contract system we would place our orders first within the Empire, secondly in the Argentine, and there would be little room for any contracts with Russia at all. Even from the Russian point of view, this would be a good thing, since, if there were no hope of a large export of wheat, more wheat would perforce become available for their own more or less starving millions. In regard to timber—a land product perhaps second only to wheat in the economy of Canada—while it is clearly our duty to the Empire to contract as largely as possible for soft woods with Canada, it must be remembered that for certain purposes the less distant supply of Scandinavian wood is preferable. In hard woods a large increase in home production is possible. This constitutes yet a further argument in favour of regularised contracts, with a result that few, or at all events fewer, contracts would be placed with Russia. It is not suggested that any organised boycott of Russia should be established, but that we should deal with those nations with

which it is easy to deal on the assumption that they will keep to their side of the bargain. We have been at special pains to arrange large trade credits for Russia; nevertheless the results can hardly be deemed satisfactory. In 1931 our imports from Russia amounted to £32,000,000 sterling, while Russian imports from England only reached £7,000,000 sterling.

To return to the question of beef. This is a product which must be considered in conjunction with the imports of mutton and lamb, in order to devise a sound working policy. During the past year or so the large imports of mutton and lamb have seriously affected, not only the price of sheep in this country, but the price of cattle as well—a further argument in favour of control of volume. The latest official figures show that of all the beef consumed in this country 48 per cent. is home-grown, 11 per cent. comes from our Dominions, and 41 per cent. comes from the Argentine. If we had proper organisation in collecting bullocks, in slaughtering and in making full use of all by-products, and in the subsequent distribution of beef, there is no doubt that we could produce a great deal more beef in this country; a few decades ago we did so. The organisation advocated above, at a conservative estimate, should mean an increase of £3 per beast to the producer; but such organisation, to be effective, would necessarily have to be coupled with some quantitative arrangement with the Argentine.

Let us consider for a moment the position of the Dominions in regard to beef. If the idea prevails at Ottawa that the Empire can be self-supporting in regard to good quality beef, a very serious mistake will be made. What are the facts? The Argentine is a wonderful grass country; in general terms one hectare, or two and a half acres, of grassland will support one beast, without any concentrated food, all the year round; further, there is an area of some 10,000,000 acres under lucerne, on which the bullocks are finished off during the last six months; then they are ready for the English market at two years and six months or two years and eight months. Nowhere in the Empire does there exist field feeding which can show anything like this result. In Africa it requires from ten to thirty acres of grassland to support a beast, and the beast takes about six years to mature. Australia is very much in the same position, and there is no doubt that most African and Australian beef is definitely inferior in quality to that from the Argentine. New discoveries in refrigeration may enable chilled instead of, as at present, frozen beef to be brought from Australia; but this will not affect the chief consideration—that of the quality of the beef. In process of time better grasses may be introduced. For instance, if the woolly finger grass becomes widespread in South Africa, it will make a great difference both

to the quality and rapidity of maturity of bullocks ; but it will be many years before any large results can be achieved. New Zealand has some wonderful grass ; but the best grass is used chiefly for dairying, and the other grassland is admirable for sheep. Canada, in general terms, has to resort to winter feeding. So that it comes back to this : that the main sources of supply are, and for years to come must be, the Argentine and our own home production. Can there be any doubt of the need of an understanding with regard to volume between England and the Argentine ? The large increase in the area of grassland in England has led to an autumn glut of grass-fed bullocks ; this is rendered still more serious by the unregulated entry of beef from the Argentine. Under properly organised control of imports much could be done to time the arrival of supplies so as to avoid home glut periods. A curious feature that has become accentuated since the war is that a comparatively small surplus supply dumped on the market upsets prices to a degree entirely unwarranted by the amount of the surplus.

As has been stated, the beef supply must be considered in conjunction with supply of mutton and lamb ; in the latter the Empire can be self-supporting. But if an excessive amount of Empire mutton and lamb be imported it will ruin not only the English sheep grower, but the beef producer as well, and no tariff can be imposed on Empire mutton and lamb. If this argument is correct, it becomes evident that to impose, as a result of the Ottawa Conference, a 10 per cent. tariff on Argentine beef will not be of great assistance to the English livestock farmer. True, it will bring in a certain amount of revenue, and presumably it will not injure the packing houses and middlemen.

It is submitted that the arguments set in the last few pages confirm the need for investigation into, and control of, the sources of supply, as advocated earlier in the article. If the importance of this problem be recognised and dealt with on broad lines at Ottawa, we may see a great advance in organisation in the exchange of commodities which will be of much assistance, not only to producers in this country, but to producers throughout the world. At the present moment producers are working in the dark as never before : they do not know where they stand, since uncertainty reigns supreme. Neither the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome nor the committees at Geneva give the producer the information he needs ; excellent reports are written, but they fail to get through to the farmer. If, however, some form of contract system be adopted by this country, then other countries that produce our supplies will get the information needed in clear and businesslike terms. The result will be beneficial to the consumer as well as to the producer ; under properly organised

marketing conditions profiteering is rendered more difficult, and it should become possible to reduce the spread between wholesale and retail prices. It has been suggested that any contract system would lead to the formation of rings against the buyer, but at the first sign of such action notice could be given that the contracts, or a proportion of them, would be transferred to other sources of supply. In the present state of over-production in main commodities, and with the transport facilities now available, there would be little fear of short supplies. Further, once the contract system were in working order, it would be possible to encourage new lines of production in the Dominions and Colonies. For example, Californian barley possesses certain qualities that make it essential in the manufacture of certain types of beer. The Empire at the moment can provide no substitute for this barley. But it has been discovered that Australian barley, grown in certain parts of South Africa, can replace Californian barley. It should, then, be possible to place a contract in that Dominion for a definite quantity of this barley.

At the last Imperial Conference the principle was laid down that each State of the Commonwealth should, in the first place, safeguard and foster the interests of its own producers ; in the second place, consider the interests of producers within the Empire ; and in the third place, deal with foreign nations in order of merit. Applying this principle to this country, it means that every effort should be made to increase production from the soil, and to impose the degree of control of imports necessary to enable our cultivators to produce without a loss. It is evident that the degree of control would be variable, not fixed ; it would be highest in commodities in which we are entirely self-supporting, and it would be directed to check dumping of surplus products from other countries. Control would deal severely with subsidised commodities or commodities produced under conditions of sweated labour. Next would come control as applied to products in which we could become self-supporting ; some sort of sliding scale is indicated, control tightening as the ' self-supporting ' goal is approached. In regard to these two categories we should primarily consider the interests of our home producers ; and the Dominion representatives at Ottawa should realise that, to reach our objective, control of volume would have to be applied to produce from the Dominions, and that subsidised commodities would be firmly dealt with whether they came from the Dominions or from foreign countries.

For the welfare of this country it is essential that the land should yield its economic (using the word in the widest sense) maximum, and give employment to the greatest possible number of workers ; that subsidiary industries and processing should be

developed to the fullest extent. It is only in this way that the largest possible exchange between agricultural products and urban manufactured goods can take place *within the confines of the country*. With the organisation of the sources of supply that this control (coupled with the contract system) could bring about it would be possible to increase home-grown products and at the same time to enlarge our purchases from the Dominions and Colonies. There are a wide range of commodities in which we are neither self-supporting nor potentially self-supporting. It is here that the switch-over in our purchases from other countries to the Dominions could be made; but, in all frankness, let it be said that there should be a corresponding switch-over in orders for manufactured goods from foreign countries to the Mother Country on the part of the Dominions. Any attempt artificially to create new industries is bound to fail in the long run; the suitability of the product to the country, or of the country to the product, should be the test. Vast areas of the Empire are still uncultivated, or at best only half-cultivated, and the great diversity of the Empire makes 'complementary' development possible to a degree not yet attempted.

To the unbiassed mind it must be apparent that the time is not ripe for the Governments of the Commonwealth to proclaim Free Trade within the Empire, and that several important countries in the Commonwealth have no intention of making any such declaration. The fact is that to approach this question from the political end is wrong. Rather should it be approached from the economic standpoint; if commodity be taken by commodity, and a mutually beneficial understanding be arrived at, if, further, the development of new sources of supply within the Empire be carefully considered, we shall find that we can go a long way towards achieving the ideal of 'the Empire as an economic unit.'

CHRISTOPHER TURNOR.

WHITHER GERMANY?

Where a Bismarck failed, neither a Schleicher nor a Strasser are likely to succeed.

HERR JOOS at the Centre Party meeting, June 8, 1932.

THE Hoover year is over, the Reichstag is dissolved, Prussia still lacks a legitimate Administration, there is a new Chancellor of whom nothing good is known. That Germany is bankrupt in the ordinary sense of the word has ceased to be interesting; that she is bankrupt both of men and measures the Emergency Decree of June 15 seems to proclaim. Hope has succeeded hope until no hope is left. Perhaps Europe may yet help from Lausanne, or the world aid rehabilitation through the Economic Conference. As far as it is possible to distinguish between the breakdown from within and the breakdown from without, I shall confine myself to the first of these two.

The Weimar Constitution of 1919 was a zealous and an ingenious attempt to provide Germany with a perfect blend of federal with individual liberty. Whether it could have worked well in happier circumstances has, since 1929, become merely an academic question. Two German characteristics, which it is impossible to deny, must always have stood in the way. On the one hand, the Germans are lamentably 'centrifugalist,' by which I mean an elaborate sort of factiousness causing a perpetual breaking up and reorientation of political groups. On the other hand—old war slogans apart—the Germans are militarily minded. Perhaps it is true to say that the one follows from the other; without the artificial devices we associate with soldiers they seem, for the best and for the worst reasons, to fall out. I do not wish to raise the spectre of militarism; I mean simply that these people have a taste for uniforms, for organised gestures and for plans of campaign, a taste which is conspicuous in the fact that the professed enemies of a soldiers' Germany must themselves organise their Iron fronts and Red armies. It is amusing to find that the '*freiwillige Arbeitsdienst Leute*'—unemployed who, if they like, are now sent in batches to make roads or work on the land in return for their keep—insist on marching to and from their work in military formation. This taste is combined with a

musical inclination and a profound craving for open-air life, both indisputable characteristics of the Germans as a whole. A civilian contempt for soldiers is clearly rarer than in France or England. The Hohenzollern tradition partially explains this, blurring as it did the distinction between military and civil service to the State. But it must also be borne in mind that a large part of the population in Germany has only been urbanised for half a century or less. The mass of the English urban population had had a far longer period of adaptation before it was called upon to face the problems of twentieth-century life, while the Frenchman, if he lives in a town at all, is likely to have centuries of town life behind him. The problem of the inadequately urbanised peasant is a difficult one in much of eastern Europe; in Germany it accentuates the tendencies I have described—it is a psychological, rather than an immediate, circumstance. I believe it to be important also in explaining the anti-Jew ramp. The Jews are hated in Germany because they are essentially urban, and think and feel in urban terms; in money, not land; in intellectual paradox, not in hot emotional terms. The English and the Dutch are themselves too urban or commercial to be outraged by Semitism in the same way.

The Weimar Constitution is denounced by its more childish adversaries as a piece of Jewish trickery; it certainly assumes a mentality in the citizen which is more likely to be found among the Jewish intellectuals who ornament the German universities than in the mass of the German people. It still shows a surprising elasticity; by this, and by the fear of being denounced as unconstitutional by one's enemies, it may even recognisably survive. But since the death of Gustav Stresemann, and the Wall Street crash in 1929, the Weimar Constitution has served chiefly to give voice to a clamour for its own destruction. To some extent it expressed the aspirations of 1848, but essentially it was the expression of the Social Democratic Party, which, despite all the obstacles authority could provide, had conquered a third of the electorate by 1912, and inherited the direction of the State in 1918 when its old directors vanished. Like all political movements in Germany, Social Democracy could never achieve an absolute majority. In the spring of 1928, however, the result of the general election was not unfavourable. The American collapse in 1929 not only ended a period of prosperity, but coincided with the disastrous death of a man who, ideologically hostile to the Socialists, yet directed their foreign policy in the spirit of conciliation for which they stood, and with a happy ability. With Stresemann and prosperity vanished the vitality of Weimarism and conciliation. Here was the first bankruptcy.

Since 1929 the foreign policy of Germany has become what

Mr. Knickerbocker calls defiant; defiance has hastened economic decline and economic decline has stimulated defiance. It would be interesting to know more exactly than will probably ever be possible how far this process has been conscious and how far subconscious. The method of Heinrich Brüning was now attempted at home and abroad—a very elaborate compromise by which it was hoped more successfully to achieve a greater semblance of national unity. Both the Versailles Treaty and the Weimar Constitution were to be bent, not broken. Brüning became Chancellor in March 1930, relying upon the coalition between his own Centre Party and the Social Democrats, a coalition which under his leadership now inclined rather less to the Left. With the Reichstag election of September 1930 the National Socialist or Nazi Party increased from twelve to 107 members; these, with the Nationalists on the Right and the Communists on the Left, demanded with growing insistence the tearing up of the charter of Weimar and the entombment of parliamentary democracy. The growing disunion and factiousness of the Reichstag incited Brüning, by an adroit, if sometimes questionable, use of the famous article 48, to transform Weimarism into a type of plebiscitary dictatorship not very far removed from the policy of a Cromwell or Napoleon III. This involved the rapid adjournment of the Reichstag, as soon as a vote of confidence had been obtained, for as long as the Constitution allowed, and administrative legislation by emergency decree which the President's acquiescence and article 48 made possible. An alliance between Marxists and Catholics, which, in the name of democracy, ruled by proclamation, was naturally subject to the ruthless ridicule of its increasing enemies. The Customs Union fiasco seemed to condemn Brüning's foreign policy as well. The credit catastrophes of the summer of 1931 and the financial enmity of France combined with the collapse of industry to magnify the governmental task. Still the Hoover moratorium was arranged, and the winter of 1931-2 bound closer, with the cement of adversity, the elements represented in Brüning's Cabinet. The Centre Party, it should be remembered, is less and less the party of the Catholic aristocracy and more and more the party of the Christian trades unions, and Brüning had learnt the lessons which these bodies could teach him with regard to social problems. His heroic directness, his chaste personality, and his diplomatic success at Chequers and Paris compelled not only a widespread admiration, but the esteem of the old general who had in 1925 been elected President of this polyglot State. Hindenburg, with little but the successful career of a Hohenzollern's commander behind him, was personally associated with the German Nationalist Party which wished to restore a pre-war

state of affairs. Yet in the spring of 1932, when a new Presidential election fell due, he was willing to stand as the candidate of the big *bloc* of Moderate Republican groups associated with the Chancellor. The essential aim of the Hindenburg campaign, so zealously upheld by Brüning, was to preserve some continuity in the Government rather than to add the evils of revolution to those of the world crisis. The incompetent leadership of the Communist Party reduced opposition from the Left and increased it from the Right, but Hindenburg was re-elected with an absolute majority after a second ballot; while Adolf Hitler obtained well over 13,000,000 Nazi votes, well over 19,000,000 were given to Hindenburg. After this unexpected crystallisation of a common-sense *bloc*, notably reinforced from the south and west of Germany, one breathed a sigh of relief and looked forward with a little hope to Brüning's representation of Germany at the Lausanne Conference. Never was hope more forlorn.

The brown uniforms of the Nazi movement had satisfied the military appetite which had long gone unsatisfied in post-war Germany; within the ranks of Hitler's following one could feel the joys of belonging to a great pseudo-military organisation, one could gratify a taste for organised picnics, and find within the medley of principles proclaimed by the leaders at least one or two which satisfied; one could hate the Jews or resent one's unemployment. The rigidly conservative landowners of the east smiled upon this semi-revolutionary movement because it seemed on the one hand to supply discipline, on the other to reassert the bucolic virtues of rustic life; they rejoiced at this shadow of the imperial army—for the old regimental units were used. The Brown army's allegiance to the Republican State was at best equivocal; it intimidated at home and alarmed abroad. Brüning and his Defence and Home Minister, General Gröener, decided to use Hindenburg's electoral triumph to suppress Hitler's storm detachments. The President became uneasy; he felt this to be a tyrannical outrage to the 'national will'; as far as such a thing exists he was probably right. He took a Whitsuntide holiday in East Prussia; with the phrases of his Junker neighbours in his ears he was confronted with a proposal from the Chancellor for something like the expropriation of the most bankrupt estates in eastern Germany for purposes of unemployed colonisation. Hindenburg is a man of unquestioned integrity. He had seemed, moreover, to be able, at the national behest, to make political obeisance from the Right to the Left—a gesture rare in history. But now when Brüning asked straight out for an expression of confidence, the President withheld it. Brüning was in fact scolded as a bad Bolshevik for the most constructive attempt yet made to tackle the problem of providing work by a method which would

simultaneously strengthen the eastern frontier of Germany. It may be that Brüningism had already failed on May 5 when Professor Warmbold resigned from the Cabinet. Not only the Junkers but also 'big business' had frowned upon the pious Chancellor's supposed Leninism. Warmbold represents the great I.G. Farben-Industrie concern (which still makes profits) and the industrial magnate point of view: the State should subsidise the magnate and leave the employment problem thence to settle itself, but the State should not come between employer and employed. Brüning in his turn had been declared bankrupt. The Brüning way, like the Stresemann way, had failed; there remained the Schleicher and the Strasser methods.

At this point it becomes necessary to examine another aspect of the German problem which is now adding complexity to perplexity. The Germans are centrifugal in two ways. One has been already indicated—a general tendency to break up into factions. Most inconveniently this is largely irrelevant to their geographical centrifugalism, the separatism which survives in the virility of a Saxon or Thuringian or Bavarian sentiment. The Weimar Constitution had bravely attempted to palliate the effects of this historic legacy, by lessening State rights in general, and by destroying the privileges which Prussia had enjoyed since 1871 in particular. But the attempt to give exactly the same treatment to Prussia—which embraces at least three-fifths of the Reich, and the most important three-fifths at that—and, say, Anhalt, has created a rather ludicrous situation, and really involves an absurd amount of overlapping in administration. In particular it is anomalous that order in the key city of all Germany, Berlin, should depend upon the Prussian Ministry of the Interior rather than the Reich. On April 24, 1932, elections were held for a number of State Diets, including that of Prussia. In each case, Bavaria only excepted, the Nazi Party scored highest but never achieved an absolute majority. Prior to this a similar result had occurred in other States; since April the Nazis have attained an absolute majority in Mecklenburg and Oldenburgh. In Prussia the Nazis won 162 seats to ninety-three Social Democrats and sixty-seven Catholics. The Premiers of the States must be elected by their Diets, and it was voted *ad hoc*, before the Prussian Diet was dissolved, that the Prussian Premier, like most of the others, should in future require an absolute majority to elect him. As the Centre has pretty consistently refused to combine with the Nazis for this purpose, it seems never possible to elect a State Premier who can then proceed to form a State Ministry. This is really rather absurd. All that usually happens is that the old Government carries on indefinitely with an unruly Diet over which a Nazi member presides. This has been felt by

more responsible politicians, and perhaps by Hitler too, to have the advantage of keeping the Nazis out of office. But Prussia is too important for this farce to be played out. The 162 Nazis clamour for office, the 160 Social Democrats and Catholics resist and resist, and there are fifty-seven Communists to complicate the matter. The suggestion was therefore made that the Reich Government should appoint a Reich commissioner to rule Prussia. It is so difficult always to distinguish clearly in one's mind between Prussia and the Reich that this emergency measure, legitimate according to the Constitution, it is true, does not immediately strike the onlooker as extremely Centralist, but feeling against it has been effectual and is now increasing.

It is clear that by the emergency decree method and the Reich commissioner plan Brüning increased the executive power of the Reich Government. When he resigned, he did so, not because, as the Constitution indicates, the loss of the Reichstag's confidence compelled it, but because he had lost the President's confidence. Thus the Weimar Constitution has been so queerly distorted as to expand the power of the Chancellor of the Reich while increasing his dependence upon the President's approval. The President, that is to say, now presides as completely over Germany as the Hohenzollern emperors formerly did, and there are no kings now in Bavaria and Württemberg to resist him. It has been interesting to see the independence which, as a matter of fact, the Premiers of the southern States have been showing since Brüning's fall. Only the Bavarian, unfortunately, represents a majority government, and the majority of Dr. Held's Bavarian People's Party alone over the Nazis in the Bavarian Diet in which there are forty-five Bavarian People's Party members, forty-three Nazis, and twenty Social Democrats, is exactly two.

From the Defence Ministry Germany's generals have been watching the democratic experiment with disdain and impatience. General von Schleicher, distinguished by his brilliance as an organiser and his charm as a person, and unhampered by scruples, decided to use the weapon Brüning had forged to break Brüning. If Brüning's way had failed, why not Schleicher's—the soldier's way? Let the 'national will'—the President, the Junkers, the Nazis—be placated and the Brown army liberated, but in such a way as to give the Defence Ministry a hold over it. If the Defence Ministry could direct, not only the small but technically perfect, professional Reichswehr, but also the Nazi troops, and perhaps the Socialist Reichsbanner and even the 'Arbeitsdienst' people too, the authority of the State could be concentrated in Schleicher's hands. 'Big business' would echo the applause of Junkers and Nazis, for it would be clear that trade union nonsense about wages

and arbitration, and the jealousy shown at Weimar for working-class rights, could henceforth be ignored. As far as one can tell, this was the Schleicher plan, but there was one mistake near the beginning; Brüning was to have remained until after Lausanne, where his European reputation might have been useful at the time, while he could subsequently have been blamed for disappointing results. The aged Hindenburg, however, is no mere puppet, nor would his integrity knowingly countenance an intrigue of this kind. Brüning asked straight out for an assurance of confidence from the President, and resigned immediately on failing to obtain it.

Hindenburg now appointed a Cabinet which consisted almost entirely of Conservative aristocrats of the pre-war official type with Schleicher as Defence Minister. As a group these men could only be associated with the Nationalist Party, whose candidates had been impressively defeated in all recent elections. As a political coup their appointment was reminiscent of Macmahon's famous attempt of the 'Seize Mai.' But as destroyers of Brüning, and as liberators of the Brown troops, the Nazis were willing to tolerate them, and some sort of understanding was arranged—the so-called Hitler-Schleicher pact—by which Prussia was to be handed over to the Nazis in return for their acquiescence in the Reich for the time. The Cabinet was declared to be one of national concentration—a group of party-free experts—which should restore the spiritual self-respect of Germany after the Marxian contamination poor Catholic Brüning had brought. Any combination of the parties of the Right requires Catholic support to feel secure; it was therefore ordained that an obscure Catholic aristocrat, von Papen, a personal friend of the President's, should be Chancellor. This was Schleicher's second mistake. The Centre denounced the betrayal of Brüning as unforgivable; though von Papen largely owns the Catholic newspaper *Germania*, it disowns him. The Catholics may waver later, but that the supposed restorers of the Christian State cannot yet command their respect is a little grotesque. The suspicion shown by the southern States for the arbitrarily imposed von Papen Government is of course associated with Catholic hostility as well as with the Reich commissioner question. The President played out his royal rôle by dissolving the Reichstag on June 4; article 25 in the Constitution could be interpreted to sanction this decision. On July 31 the nation is to register the change in its views since September 1930. It is said that Schleicher intends that he and the majority of his colleagues shall retain office in all circumstances. But the Constitution seems to require a Reichstag vote of confidence in the Chancellor, and it is clear that Hindenburg will not break his oath of fealty to the Constitution.

As foreign policy consisted chiefly in sending the chief Ministers to Lausanne, the economic situation at home became incontestably the most important problem for the new Government to tackle. The decline of industry had been going steadily on; the spring decrease in unemployment in 1932 was only about half the decrease in 1931. The Brüning policy of adhering to a nominal gold standard and forcing down salaries and wages by decree was the most negative and deplorable part of all his work. It is true that the idea of abandoning the gold standard evokes in Germany a nightmare vision of inflation, but that is not to say that a great statesman could not find a way of exorcising this hysteria. The von Papen Government immediately abjured any attempt to deal with it by denouncing all currency experiments. The new Chancellor, however, in his curious denunciations of the surely inevitable collectivisation of the German State, countenanced the unthinking abusers of Brüning's 'tyranny,' and rashly implied a lightening of the taxation. The Brüning Cabinet, with Stegerwald at the Ministry of Labour, had shown no lack of vigour and courage in tackling the appalling problem of unemployment. Working hours had been shortened on the one hand; on the other, relief had been carefully organised in three main categories, while voluntary '*Arbeitsdienst*'—including by the end of April ¹ 135 actual settlements—had been arranged. By April 30 over 60,000 people had been occupied by this method. Further plans for settling men on confiscated bankrupt estates in the east had led to the breach with Hindenburg, and Brüning's resignation brought about an unhappy delay in the whole administration, for the effect of which the hostile Press unblushingly blames him.

On June 15 a new emergency decree, to deal with taxation and unemployment, was published. The German for emergency decree is '*Notverordnung*,' and the *Berliner Tageblatt* announced the measure, not inaptly, as '*Verordnete Not*' (decreed distress). The huge burden of taxation has been definitely increased and the sums to be spent on relief drastically reduced. No relief work plans accompanied the decree, though clearly some of the Brüning-Stegerwald programme holds good. Unemployment insurance, sternly reduced by 23 per cent., will in future be paid only for six weeks instead of twenty; after this period a severe means test will be imposed and further payments, admittedly on a lower scale, but not so heavily reduced by this decree, will conditionally follow. This means that of the roughly 5,500,000 registered unemployed about 60 per cent. will be receiving relief at the rate of about 13 marks a week for a single adult, and about 40 per cent. at the rate of about 11 marks a week. The 5,500,000

¹ May figures not yet available.

figure of course gives an inadequate idea of the real amount of unemployment. The only qualification to be made is that most prices have continued to fall since the last dole cut in July 1931; the emergency decree of December reduced rents, salaries, etc., but did not touch unemployment pay. Still, when all is said and done, this is negative finance and can only further the economic paralysis of Germany. Schleicher has declared himself bankrupt in advance.

At about the time Hindenburg was signing the new emergency decree on June 14, Gregor Strasser celebrated the new permission his party has received to broadcast in favour of the National Socialists. If Stresemann, Brüning, Schleicher have failed—while each failure intensifies the problem—what is to be hoped from the Nazis, who will pretty certainly be the largest single party in the next Reichstag? Strasser is reputed to be the constructive statesman among the Hitlerites; though he has not followed his brother Otto into the little camp of the 'Black Front' (i.e., non-Muscovite, or, should one say, national, Communists), he stands far to the Left. His speech in the Reichstag on May 10 seemed really to get down to the economic problem; he advocated a vigorous extension of the eastern settlement policy, the introduction of compulsory '*Arbeitsdienst*' and a wholesale programme of public works, for 'Work makes Capital,' he declared, 'not Capital Work.' His attack upon international finance was interestingly akin to that of young Douglas-Scheme enthusiasts in England; national planning is to free Germany, like the Soviet, from the bankers' 'hidden hand.' In some rather mysterious fashion beer is to replace gold in national finance. In the speech which Strasser broadcast one had looked for some definition and elaboration of these plans; instead came nothing but the well-known Hitler phrases about the spiritual needs of the epoch and the elevation of the pure German spirit. The only importance that could be attached to Strasser's utterances lay in his declaration that to-day his party is revolutionary, and that only the National Socialists themselves can carry out the programme they support. It looks as if they will make Schleicher's task more difficult than he had hoped. The release of the Brown troops does not seem to have consoled them for the delay in their accession to power in Prussia. The Nazi Right Wing is clearly hysterical and helpless; now the Left Wing Nazis seem also to have declared their bankruptcy in advance, and through the mouth of their own young hopeful. The mere keeping together of so large and heterogeneous a mass in anything but opposition is clearly out of the question.

An attempt is being made at the moment to refound a National Liberal Party by the union of the defeated Right Centre parties,

but they seem to be arriving at no agreement. It is difficult, in watching a failure of this kind, not to conjecture as to how gravely the Weimar adoption of proportional representation facilitated the centrifugal impulses in German politics. There remain two strangely remote expedients for desolate Germany to attempt. Almost suddenly the restoration of the monarchy has become at any rate a topic of conversation and a theme in advertisement. Advertisers should be good psychologists, and when cigarettes are advertised with '*ancien régime*' illustrations it should not be ignored. But beyond that, in a public statement recently, Herr von Gayl, the new Minister of the Interior and one of the most respected of the von Papen Cabinet, declared that he would not deny his conviction that monarchy was the most suitable form of government for a State placed in the centre of Europe, though the question was for the moment unimportant. The foreign Press has of course over-emphasised the monarchist theme, but the notion seems an agreeable one to the numbers of people who feel that any change must be one for the better. There would of course be endless difficulties in attempting a restoration, apart from the claims of the Republic to the loyalty of its own officials. The federal problem would be aggravated. Worst of all, there is no suitable pretender; the favourite name is that of the ex-Crown Prince's eldest son.

Almost as suddenly as the monarchic idea has revived, the conception of a Communist Germany seems to have receded into a distant background, and to speak of 'Germany—Fascist or Soviet?' already seems anachronistic. The German Communists have bad leaders—little organisation, no money, no arms; they have assumed an arrogant Muscovitism in their relations with the Social Democrats, while Moscow itself has shown willingness to offer no more substantial help than dictation. In recent elections they have lost many votes to Hitler, probably only for a time. In Prussia they polled 3,141,500 votes in the Reichstag election of September 1930, 3,280,100 on a heavier poll in the first Presidential ballot on March 13, 1932, and only 2,819,602 in the Diet election on April 24. So violent has been the Muscovitism of the Communist Party that when a group of young Left Wing Social Democrats became exasperated by their leaders and seceded earlier this year, instead of joining the Communists they formed a new and independent Socialist Workers' Party (the S.A.P.). The Communists nevertheless have the advantage of an admirably coherent doctrine; armed with something like Nazi organisation, they might have proved invincible. The political occurrences of last month, moreover, combined with the terrible hardships inflicted by the new emergency decree, are almost bound to cause a working-class consolidation, and advances

have already been made, astonishingly enough, from the Communist leaders to the Social Democrats. Leipart, the president of the German T.U.C., is showing suspicion of this volteface, and the Communist Press is not yet relaxing the violence of its hostility to the Social Democrats and the trade unions. Still, the Social Democrats themselves are busy revising their programme and their propaganda, and are almost certain to become more revolutionary. The powers of resistance of German working men have often proved tremendous; here if anywhere Germans have shown an almost dogged unity of front. Perhaps the far future must be theirs, when some practical synthesis emerges from adversity.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

ENGLAND'S FIFTY YEARS IN EGYPT

FIFTY years have passed since the forts of Alexandria succumbed to the bombardment of the guns of the British fleet. The Arabi uprising was born of several causes. Among them largely figured the disorderly state of Egyptian finances. Ismail Pasha had abdicated on June 28, 1879. His successor was his son, Tewfik Pasha. The new Khedive found himself in an impossible position between two jealous parties. On his right were the menacing figures of Evelyn Baring and de Blignières, representatives of the joint Anglo-French control of Egyptian moneys. On his left a council of Ministers jealous of British and French interference. For a time Baring and de Blignières had matters their own way. They regarded themselves, not without reason, as receivers in bankruptcy, granting or withdrawing approval to every measure discussed by the Council of Ministers. The labours of the control slowly bore fruit. It succeeded in reducing the rate of interest upon the Public Debt, in framing a budget which represented, with some accuracy, revenue and expenditure and in abolishing a number of petty and vexatious taxes. These reforms eventually led to the Law of Liquidation of July 1880, whereby Egypt, compounding with her creditors, reserved for her administrative expenses a share of the national revenue. But meanwhile Egypt was becoming restless. This Anglo-French interference, however beneficial it may have been, was unpalatable to the Egyptian people. Such popular disapproval may, perhaps, not have been of any real significance if the army had not been 'the first victim' of these reforms.

Officers of fellahin origin [writes Elgood] complained that while they were placed upon half-pay, their superiors of Circassian descent escaped this misfortune. The rank and file also murmured. Their pay was frequently in arrears, and their labour employed on the Khedivial estates. Dissatisfaction grew. . . . At this point Arabi stepped into the history of Egypt.¹

As the months passed a union of political parties came into being of which the army, the most powerful element of the

¹ *The Transit of Egypt*, by Lieut.-Colonel P. G. Elgood (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1928), p. 67.

combination, took the leadership. Arabi and his associates became bent upon destroying the authority of the Khedive. It was a challenge that Her Majesty's Government could not pass in silence. Having made up their minds that the tranquillity of Egypt depended upon maintaining the Khedive upon the throne, they refused to watch his complete effacement. Egypt had legitimate grievances. But revolution could not bring about their reform, and to Great Britain a peaceful Egypt had become a vital necessity. Her communications with the East depended upon the integrity of the Suez Canal, and she could not permit a domestic dispute to threaten them. But, reluctant to depart from the ideals that governed their policy, Her Majesty's Government hesitated to take any irrevocable step. France was sounded upon the propriety of inviting Turkey to restore order and was also invited to take joint action with Great Britain. Downing Street appealed to Italy to co-operate with England in maintaining law and order. Bismarck was given a like opportunity. But the Continent turned a deaf ear to such appeals and left England to play a lone hand. She did so. The bombardment of the forts of Alexandria was the first step taken by her in her campaign to restore tranquillity as the strong right arm of the Khedive.

Tactically the attack had been premature. Troops were not at hand. So desirous was England to dissipate any impression that ulterior motives had actuated the shelling of the forts that British marines were not landed in Alexandria until thirty-six hours after the entry of American bluejackets into that city. It was not until July 25 that the first brigade of Wolseley's force reached Alexandria. Wolseley himself did not land until August 12. Arabi was then at Kafr el Dawar, a few miles south of Alexandria. Rumour credited the Egyptian with intention of blocking the Suez Canal. The British commander could take no chances. On August 18 the expeditionary force disembarked at Ismailia. On September 13 a decisive battle was fought, Arabi defeated and the authority of the Khedive re-established under the ægis of Great Britain. Within a few days before the semi-centenary of this epoch-making event, primarily provoked by the disorderly state of Egyptian finances, one of the leading Cairo Arabic papers carried an editorial article which contains the following sentences:

According to the statistical statement published in 'Al Mokattam' three days ago, receipts of the Egyptian Government exceeded expenditure by £1,817,000 in the period from May 1931 until the end of March 1932, i.e. in eleven months of the financial year that ended on April 30 last. It can rightly and safely be said that there is no country in the world to-day which could reach such a very satisfactory result in its budget.

Even Great Britain's budget showed an excess of receipts over expenditure amounting to less than £300,000, despite the great efforts made and the appreciable decrease in salaries of all public servants without exception, and despite the larger amount of money paid in advance by taxpayers to the Exchequer. It may be argued that the position of the State's budget does not necessarily indicate the exact financial position of the country. This is true. But it should be remarked that Egypt's trade balance is also satisfactory. For although the total figures of exports and imports are less than usual, the total amount of exports exceeds that of imports.

It may not be amiss to inquire into the mechanics of the rule which has brought about such remarkable results. This achievement was the direct consequence of the establishment and of the maintenance of law and order. But what is meant by restoring order? One learns from Viscount Milner's *England in Egypt* that:

It meant reforming the Egyptian administration root and branch. Nay, it meant more. For what was the good of recasting the system, if it were left to be worked by officials of the old type, animated by the old spirit? 'Men, not measures,' is a good watch-word anywhere, but to no country is it more profoundly applicable than to Egypt. Our task, therefore, included something more than new principles and new methods. It ultimately involved new men. It involved the education of the people to know, and therefore to expect, orderly and honest government—the education of a body of rulers capable of supplying it.

When 1882 disappeared beyond the horizon, England was in absolute possession of Egypt. The *de facto* Government had been defeated on the battlefield. The *de jure* Government was a phantom. There was, for the moment, no authority but that of the British Army, no law but the fiat of London. It was obvious that this condition could not continue. The Gladstone Cabinet, which was then in office, eschewed the very suggestion of annexation. The proclamation of a Protectorate, permanent or temporary, was discarded. A solution was finally evolved which Her Majesty's Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, set forth in a memorable despatch addressed to the Great Powers on January 3, 1883:

Although for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquillity, Her Majesty's Government are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it. In the meantime, the position in which Her Majesty's Government are placed towards His Highness imposes upon them the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress.¹

This means that on January 3, 1883, the world was informed that the establishment of an order of things possessing 'the

¹ Milner, *England in Egypt*, p. 26.

elements of stability and progress' was made the watchword of the British in Egypt. But while the army of occupation thus sojourned in the Land of the Lotus all official decrees continued to be issued in the name of His Highness the Khedive. The archives of the realm show that he was the sovereign. He had his Ministers and all decrees and laws bear their signatures. If the archæologist of A.D. 5932 compiles the history of Egypt during the period of the British occupation from such evidence as is available to the Egyptologist of to-day, the student of the future will never know that England had ever occupied Egypt. Shortly after the induction of Sir Evelyn Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer) into office as Her Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary and Consul-General at Cairo, that diplomatist found occasion to persuade Downing Street to tell him how England contemplated making Egyptian Ministers respect that 'advice' to which Lord Granville had referred in his epoch-making despatch. An Egyptian army under General Hicks had been destroyed at El Obeid. London deemed the abandonment of the Sudan imperative. Chérif Pasha, the grandfather of the present Queen of Egypt, was then Prime Minister. He categorically refused to concur in any such policy. He made it clear that he would resign rather than do so. Baring doubted whether he could find an Egyptian Minister who would agree to any such unpopular programme. He telegraphed London that:

No amount of argument or persuasion will make the present Ministry adopt the policy of abandonment. The only way in which it can be carried out is to inform the Khedive that Her Majesty's Government insist on its adoption. . . . If, therefore, it is forced on the Egyptians, Her Majesty's Government must be prepared to face the possible contingency of appointing English Ministers temporarily.²

This telegram received an official answer and a further confidential message for use should occasion require. This unofficial reply, dated January 4, 1884, reads as follows:

It is essential that in important questions affecting the administration and safety of Egypt, the advice of Her Majesty's Government should be followed as long as the provisional occupation continues. Ministers and Governors must carry out this advice or forfeit their offices. The appointment of English Ministers would be most objectionable, but it will no doubt be possible to find Egyptians who will execute the Khedive's orders under English advice. The Cabinet will give you full support.³

It is true that England has not always insisted with this amount of energy on the acceptance of her advice, even in important matters.

² *Modern Egypt*, by the Earl of Cromer (American edition, 1908), vol. i., p. 381.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 382.

Moreover, [says Milner] there has never been any understanding between Great Britain and Egypt, or even any clear idea in the minds of British statesmen themselves, as to the limits within which our right of giving authoritative advice should be exercised. The same matter has been treated by us at one time as within the sphere of our influence and at another time as without it. Certain unlucky questions seem to be permanently half in and half out.*

It is, nevertheless, a fact that, until the termination of that 'provisional occupation' of Egypt referred to in Lord Granville's letter, the principle which it enunciated remained the corner-stone of British policy in Egypt. When this 'provisional occupation' was, in December 1914, converted into a Protectorate, the same North Star dominated the firmament. And when Egypt became independent 'with reservations' in February 1922, no declaration was made putting an end to the old tradition.

Charles George Gordon was sent to Khartum to carry out the policy to which the Khedive was committed. That heroic soldier met his death on January 26, 1885. The establishment of the southern frontier of Egypt at Wady Halfa was the consequence of this tragic event. But England was determined that the Sudan should be redeemed from barbarism. As long as the headwaters of the Nile remained under the control of Mahdism the safety of Egypt was imperilled. Without the Nile, Egypt would be a desert. Lord Cromer was adamant. He insisted that the land entrusted to his overlordship should blossom like a rose. He therefore grit his teeth and fought relentlessly to regain the Country of the Blacks. He fought, however, with the arms of statesmanship. He saw that until the finances of Egypt had been put into shape no Egyptian army could be created that would be capable of defeating the Khalifa. He grasped the salient fact that until the irrigation system of Egypt had been improved and extended and an adequate dam built at Asswan, the money could not be raised to equip and maintain a proper fighting machine. And he realised that until virile and honest native courts had been established and a healthy administration of public affairs brought into being, the economic system of Egypt would rest upon quicksand. He, therefore, had the prescience and the nerve to mark time in the Sudan while he built on bedrock at Cairo. Year after year the great pro-consul toiled, bringing order out of chaos, confidence out of pessimism, and wealth out of want. One of his earlier major achievements was a series of arrangements made in 1885 and known as the London Convention. That accord became the organic law of Egyptian finance. The system established by it, though not without faults, was a great improvement on the Law of Liquidation. It made possible the financial salvation of the country.

* Milner, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

But even if the London Convention gave Baring a chance to steer the bark of Egyptian finance, 'the great business of Egypt during the years 1885, 1886 and 1887 was,' as Sir Auckland Colvin put it, 'to make the two ends meet and to have a balance of surplus revenue to throw in the latter year to the international wolves.'* And while Her Majesty's Consul-General was straining every nerve to save a piastre here, there and everywhere, and at the same time maintain administrative efficiency, France and Turkey were pestering England to get out of Egypt. In order to try and arrive at some understanding with the Sultan on this thorny question, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was sent to Constantinople in January 1887. Lord Salisbury was then Foreign Secretary. His instructions to his emissary constitute a landmark in British policy in Egypt no less important than the already quoted despatch of Lord Granville dated January 3, 1883. It is, therefore, well to have Lord Salisbury's exact words before one's eyes. They bear the date of January 15, 1887, and read :

The Sultan is pressing the Government of Great Britain to name a date for the evacuation of Egypt, and in that demand he is avowedly encouraged by one, or perhaps two, of the European Powers. Her Majesty's Government have every desire to give him satisfaction upon this point, but they cannot fix even a distant date for evacuation, until they are able to make provision for securing beyond that date the external and internal peace of Egypt. . . . It is highly desirable that no soldier belonging to any foreign nation should remain upon the soil of Egypt, except when it may be necessary to make use of the land-passage from one sea to another. Her Majesty's Government would willingly agree that such a stipulation should, whenever the evacuation had taken place, apply to English as much as to any other troops ; but it will be necessary to restrict this provision, as far as England is concerned, to periods of tranquillity. England, if she spontaneously and willingly evacuates the country, must retain a treaty-right of intervention if at any time either internal peace or external security should be seriously threatened. There is no danger that a privilege so costly in its character will be used unless the circumstances imperatively demand it.

Looking back at the matter across the span of years, the demand that, having restored order and laid the foundations of stable government in Egypt, Great Britain should have a recognised right of defending these works of her creation was certainly not an unreasonable one. An agreement entered into between Sir Henry Drummond Wolff and the Sublime Porte on May 22, 1887, recognised this principle. It set forth that :

(1) British troops were to be withdrawn from Egypt at the end of three years, unless at that date the appearance of external or internal danger should necessitate the postponement of the

* *The Making of Modern Egypt*, by Sir Auckland Colvin (London : Seeley & Co., Ltd., 1906), p. 133.

evacuation, in which case they were to be withdrawn as soon as the danger had disappeared ;

(2) Two years after their evacuation the general supervision exercised by Great Britain over the Egyptian army was to cease ;

(3) Thenceforth Egypt was to enjoy 'territorial immunity,' and on the ratification of the Convention the Powers were to be invited to recognise and guarantee the inviolability of Egyptian territory.⁷

There were further provisions, but these three draw a general picture of the Convention. It was still-born. The Sultan refused to ratify it. Lord Salisbury put the blame for this decision upon the French. In a letter to Lord Lyons, dated July 20, 1887, the English Prime Minister, after categorically accusing Paris of having 'destroyed the Convention at Constantinople' and of having put other difficulties in England's path, added: 'Can you wonder that there is, to my eyes, a silver lining even to the great black cloud of a Franco-German war?'⁸

Baring's knowledge of how Lord Salisbury reacted to Egypt's needs, and his conviction that the Conservative Party was apt to remain at the helm of British affairs for some years, encouraged him in facing the interminable difficulties of his daily task. Kitchener and Garstin fought for every piastre that he could economise. The Sirdar wanted it to make his army worthy of the responsibility which was bound to fall to its lot sooner or later. The civilian clamoured for it in order to add to the agricultural wealth of Egypt. Lord Cromer, to call him by the title which his merits won for him in 1892, almost invariably decided in favour of the latter. But, suddenly, what Dicey calls an arrangement between France and Abyssinia 'to raise the French flag on the banks of the White Nile,'⁹ caused immediate orders to be given to Kitchener to attack the Khalifa. There was something dramatic about the suddenness of these instructions. The fact that the Sirdar was ready speaks volumes for his efficiency and for Cromer's genius for administration.

Seldom has so important a decision been taken in such haste [writes Lord Kitchener's official biographer]. To the authorities in Egypt it came as a bolt out of the blue when on March 13, 1896, a Reuter's telegram in *The Times*, dated from Cairo but given to that journal from Downing Street, announced that the Government had decided to expedite a force to the reconquest of the Dongola province.¹⁰

⁷ Milner, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

⁸ *The Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury*, by his daughter, Lady Gwendolen Cecil (Hodder & Stoughton, 1932), vol. iv., p. 49.

⁹ *The Story of the Khedivate*, by Edward Dicey (London: Rivington's, 1902), p. 474.

¹⁰ *The Life of Lord Kitchener*, by Sir George Arthur (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.), 1920, vol. i., p. 187.

An outstanding proof of the complete administrative and executive effacement of the Khedive during the days of Lord Cromer's ascendancy is found in the fact that the Egyptian army's marching orders had been given in the name of the Khedive before the Consul-General 'remembered that he had not observed the formality of informing the Khedive.' But even if red tape were thus forgotten, practical results were not overlooked. The battle of Omdurman was fought and won on September 2, 1898, and Mahdism crushed. A new chapter was thus opened in the relations between England and Egypt. But before it could be written Great Britain and France came within an inch of war. Fashoda was the danger spot. Bloodshed was averted only by the tact of Lord Kitchener and Colonel Marchand and by the diplomacy of Lord Salisbury and M. Delcassé. The rescue of the Sudan from barbarism required that statesmanship take cognisance of the realities of life. The Khalifa had been defeated by an Anglo-Egyptian army. British units had participated in the campaign. English officers had created and led the Egyptian force. English and Egyptian money had financed the war, but Cromer's brain had made it possible for Cairo to find this gold. England had consolidated the victory won at Omdurman by compelling France to retire from Fashoda. The British and Egyptian flags were, therefore, raised over the Sudan. These symbols bore witness to a juridical status known in law as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium and in fiction as the partnership of Victoria & Abbas.

Lord Cromer insisted that this new relationship should in no way adversely affect Egypt's rights to the waters of the Nile. He had always held that the Sudan was as essential to Egypt as the port of Alexandria. He had urged that the Black Country should be redeemed in order that Egypt's water supply should be safeguarded. He looked upon the Sudan as being nought but a viaduct which conveyed water to Egypt. He would not allow the Khartum authorities to draw a pint of water from the stream except as a favour, and not as a right. 'As the available supply was strictly limited,' writes Sir Murdoch MacDonald, then Adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works, 'an agreement was reached between the Sudan and the Egyptian Governments provisionally fixing the Sudan areas which could draw summer water at 10,000 acres.'¹¹ This constant solicitude of Lord Cromer to buttress Egypt's position is shown by another fact. The Egyptian Treasury, pursuant to an agreement between London and Cairo, budgeted annually £150,000 to pay for the British Army of occupation. This service costs the English War

¹¹ *Nile Control*, by Sir Murdoch MacDonald (Cairo Government Press), vol. i., p. 13.

Office far more than this sum. When, as the years rolled by and the Egyptian finances became sound, England wanted the Khedive to pay the entire expense of maintaining British troops in Egypt, it was argued that they were serving the Egyptian Government and that the beneficiary should foot the bill. Lord Cromer refused to yield to this point of view. He held that the principle behind it would make England, not Egypt, profit by the amelioration of the Khedivial finances. He threatened to resign rather than recede from his position. When in 1904 France and England kissed and made friends, Lord Cromer's task became easier. He concentrated his attention upon internal reforms. He sought to do away with the Capitulations. He worked for Egypt in season and out of season. He retired in 1907. The Great War began in 1914.

Shortly after Turkey had thrown in her lot with the Central Powers England ended the provisional occupation of Egypt and declared that country a British Protectorate. The event appeared to pass almost unnoticed. The Khedivate was abolished. Abbas Hilmi was deposed. The sceptre was taken by Prince Hussein Kamel, who was proclaimed Sultan and addressed, not as '*Altesse*,' but as '*Hautesse*.' But the same men continued to call the tune. During the latter months of the war the Cairo Arabic Press was fairly swamped with official utterances, emanating, in part, from the British military authorities, and attuned to the music of President Wilson's fourteen points. The doctrine of self-determination was proclaimed from the house tops. A resounding board was given to such tenets because the political strategy of the day believed that it was in the interests of Franco-British policy to detach the Arab races from Turkish influence. But this propaganda took root in Egypt. European throats were still hoarse from shouting their alleluias of joy upon Armistice Day when an Egyptian delegation called upon the British High Commissioner, who had replaced the British Consul-General, and talked of self-determination for Egypt. From that day forth Anglo-Egyptian relations became strained. The old Cromerian atmosphere of good-will and the tacit acceptance of conditions which had marked Lord Kitchener's short reign at the British Consulate-General were over. The world had evolved during the war. Egypt was caught in the wake of the changed conditions.

Nothing will here be said in regard to the nerve-trying days which the Armistice brought to Egypt. Suffice it to say that the policy of London was then directed not so much towards abolishing the Capitulations as towards making Great Britain the custodian for the extra-territorial rights of the Powers. The Wafdist leader, Saad Zaghlul Pasha, unequivocally championed the maintenance of the Capitulations. England directed her

diplomatic batteries towards absorbing them and towards making herself the trustee for foreign interests. In the summer of 1921 an official Egyptian delegation, headed by Adly Yeghen Pasha, Prime Minister, went to London and sought to work out a settlement of the questions which separated England and Egypt. His skill and that of Lord Curzon were not equal to the impossible task. They finally agreed to disagree. And on February 28, 1922, the British Government made a unilateral declaration which ran as follows:—

Whereas the relations between His Majesty's Government and Egypt are of vital interest to the British Empire:

The following principles are hereby declared:

1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign state. 2. So soon as the Government of His Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, martial law, as proclaimed on the 2nd November, 1914, shall be withdrawn. 3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt: (a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt; (b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference direct or indirect; (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities; (d) The Sudan.

Pending the conclusion of such agreements the *status quo* in all these matters shall remain intact.

One of the evident effects of this declaration of independence 'with reservations' was the introduction of what was known as 'the Compensation Schemes of 1922.' Under this ruling over 1000 foreign officials, or over half the total employed by the Egyptian Government in permanent posts, left the service of the State. Certain of the adviserships were abolished. The Financial and Judicial Advisers remained, however, in order to carry out the spirit of the reserved points. Many key positions continued to be occupied by Englishmen. The Egyptian sultanate, symbol of the Protectorate, became a kingdom. A royal rescript dated April 19, 1923, enacted a Constitution. Lord Allenby was British High Commissioner at Cairo when these changes were made. The policy which he had in view was shattered by the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, the Sirdar of the Egyptian Army and Governor-General of the Sudan. That dastardly crime took place in the streets of Cairo on November 19, 1924. On November 22 Lord Allenby presented an ultimatum to the Egyptian Government which required that the latter should, among other things: (1) Pay to His Majesty's Government a fine of £500,000; (2) Order, within twenty-four hours, the withdrawal from the

Sudan of all Egyptian officers and the purely Egyptian units of the Egyptian Government; and (3) Notify the competent department that the Sudan Government will increase the area to be irrigated in the Gezira from 300,000 feddans to an unlimited figure as the needs may arise.

This chastisement changed the basic relations between Egypt and the Sudan. It scrapped the Cromerian dogma that the Nile was Egypt's river. It converted that waterway into an appendage of the Sudan. It put fear in the breast of the Egyptians. It made them feel that the Sudan was a menace to Egypt. Sir (then Mr.) Austen Chamberlain saw that such a deduction would be as unfair to Britain as it was unjust to Egypt. He was then His Majesty's Foreign Secretary. According to the trustworthy *Survey of International Affairs*, he 'made a virtual recantation in the House of Commons on the 15th December, 1924. He declared that the intention to starve Egypt by thirst never entered the mind of Lord Allenby nor the minds of His Majesty's Ministers at home.'¹² This was followed by an exchange of letters at Cairo between the Egyptian Prime Minister and Lord Allenby which confirmed what the Foreign Secretary had said and made the obvious indisputable. But Lord Lloyd, who succeeded Lord Allenby, saw that 'free discussion and friendly accommodation' contemplated by the unilateral declaration of February 28, 1922, would be impossible in respect of the Sudan unless a preliminary agreement between London and Cairo had wiped out all question as to the status of the latter's water rights. The High Commissioner thought in terms of cricket. He knew that Nile water was essential to the very existence of Egypt and of no such moment to England. He was desirous of settling the perennial Egyptian question. He felt that the Sudan was the outstanding obstacle in the way of an adjustment. He, therefore, sought for a means which would give concrete expression to the assurance given by the Foreign Secretary on December 15, 1924.

Lord Lloyd, desirous of putting both England and Egypt upon a plane of equality in the discussions contemplated by the unilateral declaration of February 28, 1922, accordingly on May 7, 1929, entered into a Nile Waters Agreement with Muhammad Mahmud Pasha, then Egyptian Prime Minister, in which it is set forth that:

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have already acknowledged the natural and historical rights of Egypt in the waters of the Nile; . . . and regard the safeguarding of those rights as a fundamental principle of British policy.

With this Nile water problem thus adjusted, London felt that the ground was prepared for an Anglo-Egyptian settlement. It

¹² *Survey of International Affairs*, vol. i., 1925, by Toynebee, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

thus came to pass that when Muhammad Mahmud Pasha was in England, in the autumn of 1929, he and Mr. Arthur Henderson, His Britannic Majesty's Foreign Secretary, drew up draft proposals for an agreement between London and Cairo. Muhammad Mahmud Pasha had been succeeded by Mustafa Nahas Pasha before Egyptian and British representatives got together round a green table and sought to give effect to these draft proposals. They appear to have agreed to the general principles touched upon by Messrs. Henderson and Muhammad Mahmud except that they could not find a formula which could give expression to what they wanted to do about the Sudan. The original text which they had before them said that:

1. The military occupation of Egypt by the forces of His Britannic Majesty is terminated.

2. An alliance is established between the High Contracting Parties in consequence of their friendship, their cordial understanding and their good relations.

6. In order to facilitate and secure to His Britannic Majesty the protection of the Suez Canal as an essential means of communication between the different parts of the British Empire, His Majesty the King of Egypt authorises His Britannic Majesty to maintain upon Egyptian territory, in localities to be agreed upon to the East of Longitude 32 degrees E., such forces as His Britannic Majesty considers necessary for that purpose.

The presence of these forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt.

7. His Britannic Majesty recognises that the capitulatory régime now existing in Egypt is no longer in accordance with the spirit of the times and with the present state of Egypt.

13. While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in future modifying the Conventions of 1889, the High Contracting Parties agree that the status of the Sudan shall be that resulting from said Conventions.

The unlucky number 13 was chosen accidentally. It was, nevertheless, too great a load to carry. No verbiage could wipe out its strange fatality. The Sudan wrecked the conference. As has already been said, 'to Great Britain a peaceful Egypt had become [in 1882] a vital necessity. Her communications with the East depended upon the integrity of the Suez Canal, and she could not permit a domestic dispute to threaten them.'¹³ All of this had been accorded in principle by Mustafa Nahas Pasha in 1930. The objective envisaged in 1882 could have been put into the form of wax and parchment, but the Sudan, which carried Gordon to his grave, brought the draft proposals to the waste-

¹³ Elgood, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

paper basket. When London thus held to its point of view, the Sudan was looked upon as being of inestimable value to the cotton interests of the British Empire. A project had been evolved by a financial group known as the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, of which the Governor-General of the Sudan had said in his report for 1925 that :

In my opinion the project is excellent both in conception and execution. Means have been found to associate the native so closely with the undertaking that the personal ties which have always existed between the Government of the Sudan and its inhabitants have remained undisturbed and have, in fact, been strengthened by identity of interest in a venture of mutual profit.¹⁴

In the early winter of 1930 the British public still looked upon the Sudan as being an Eldorado. It considered that as the senior partner of the firm of Victoria & Abbas, which had become George & Fuad, it had a right to hold on to this promised land flowing with milk and honey. The British taxpayer had invested £13,000,000 in this Garden of Eden. This is said because the cost of dams, canalizations, and other works carried out in the Sudan had been financed by three Sudan Government loans issued in five instalments between October 1919 and November 1924. Having backed the Sudan to this extent, and believing that he had made an excellent investment, it is obvious that the British man-in-the-street would not think, in 1930, of letting go any part of his interest in the firm of George & Fuad. Many things have happened since the early months of 1930. It is well to be practical and ask what is the Sudan worth to England in pounds, shillings and pence in July 1932? Sir John Maffey's report, issued under date of May 31, 1931, uses this language :

In 1930 as in 1929 economic events claimed first consideration. The course of events has been disadvantageous and has temporarily shaken the confidence expressed in my report in the financial soundness of the Gezira scheme, with the success of which the prosperity of the Government is so closely bound up.

It was not the drop in the price of cotton which caused the Governor-General of the Sudan to paint so sombre a picture. One suspects that he was guided by the alarming decline in yield per acre.

One understands that British tenacity, science, and money have recently arrested this downward curve and that an improvement for 1931-32 will be recorded. But it is beyond the purview of this paper to push this inquiry any further. The economic

¹⁴ *Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1925* (London: printed and published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926) p. 5.

situation of the Sudan has been touched upon merely because it has a direct bearing upon the present chapter of England's fifty-year sojourn in the Valley of the Nile.

The 'conversations' between Mustafa Nahas Pasha and Mr. Arthur Henderson have shown that the Sudan, and the Sudan alone, prevented those statesmen from settling the Egyptian question. It is felt that more recent data may, perhaps, present the matter in a new aspect. At all events, it is generally believed in Cairo that His Majesty King Fuad is most desirous of obtaining for his country complete independence by means of a treaty of friendship with Great Britain. It is not too much to hope that should London indicate that it is prepared to reopen the 'conversations' which the Sudan wrecked in 1930, the Black Country will no longer prove a stumbling-block to a settlement of the Egyptian question.


PIERRE CRABITÈS.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND JAPAN

WHEN the recent Sino-Japanese conflict broke out Soviet Russia maintained a position of quiescence. To any outside observer this quiescence presented a number of puzzling problems. What could have been the motives of the Moscow Government in abandoning all its vital interests in the Far East and letting Japan have a free hand in Manchuria and Mongolia? The interests which Moscow stands to lose in the Far East are immense. For the past decade she has spent much money and energy in pursuing a policy of 'sovietisation' in China and the Far East in general. The success which she has had in China is shown by the fact that out of the 2000 departments of China 300 are already governed by soviets. The territory which is thus governed extends over 300,000 square miles and has a population of 80,000,000. It has a sufficiently well-organised army of 120,000 men, without counting militia units and other forces, which total anything between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 men.¹ The main bulk of this area is situated in the central provinces of China—Hu-peh, Hu-nan, Fukien, Kiang-si and others. In losing her foothold in Manchuria and Mongolia Soviet Russia loses her channels of communication with the sovietised provinces of central China. The reason for this quiescence was the simple fact that Soviet Russia did not consider her military position in the Far East sufficiently secure to engage in warfare with Japan. Of all the belligerent Powers, Japan has been least affected by the burdens of the Great War. In the case of Russia war was followed by revolution. While Moscow had to spend all her energy in consolidating her power at home, in defending the European frontiers of Russia, and in spreading revolutionary propaganda abroad, Japan has been perfecting her large army and has succeeded in making her navy practically the strongest in the Pacific. She has been steadily preparing an invasion of China, with the object of securing a base on the continent of Asia. Such a base gives her the possibility of pursuing her naval policy in the Pacific. Japan depends on the continent for her supplies of food, coal, and iron. Before she can carry on a war of any magnitude

¹ These figures are given by the Kuo-Min Tang Press.

with a foreign Power she has to insure herself against the possibility of a blockade. She is endeavouring to do so by becoming, in fact, a continental Power herself.



While Russia's hands were tied owing to her internal troubles, Japan was preparing her ground in Manchuria. It is interesting to compare the simple railway system, which is Russia's only connecting link with her interests in the Far East (consisting of the Far Eastern fork of the Trans-Siberian Railway, branching out into the Chinese Eastern Railway, which cuts through Manchuria, and the Amur Railway, which skirts the Russo-Manchurian frontier), with the highly developed and intricate system of Manchurian railways which are under Japanese control. By a clever application of the political doctrine of *ju-jitsu*, Japan has succeeded in minimising the importance of the Russian railways. If we take the total amount of goods carried on the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1928-29 (*i.e.*, October 1, 1928, to September 30, 1929) as 100 per cent., the total for 1929-30 amounted to 89 per cent., and the total for 1930-31 amounted to 68 per cent. This fall is due to the competition of the Japanese railways, and is fully reflected in the rise of the Japanese port of Dairen at the expense of the Russian port of Vladivostok.

The rise of the military importance of the ports under Japanese

control has kept pace with their commercial rise. Special attention has been devoted by Japan to the development of the port of Seishin. The significance of this port is enhanced by its geographical position. To the north is Vladivostok, at a distance of only seven hours' journey. To the south lie Gensan and Fusan. Seishin is only three days' sailing from the Japanese ports of Moji and Shimonoseki. Nine years ago this port was in a state of complete desuetude. Three years ago the Japanese Government allotted large sums of money towards its development, and since then dockyards, piers, radio stations, and warehouses have been built. At the same time a railway line which is to connect the port with the main centres in Manchuria has been in process of construction. A distance of only 60 miles to the east of Tunhua remains to be completed. When this is completed the port will be connected through Kirin and Changchun with Harbin and Mukden. The importance of Seishin lies not only in the fact that it constitutes an economic menace to Vladivostok, but that it undermines Vladivostok's military significance. From a strategic point of view it would be an ideal base for the right flank of a Japanese army operating in northern Manchuria.

South of Seishin there are Gensan and the other Korean ports, Dairen, and finally Chinwangtao, in the Gulf of Liao-Tung, which has recently risen in importance. The natural properties of Chinwangtao make it perhaps the finest port in the Yellow Sea. Its development began under the old Chinese Government of Manchuria. At that time it competed with Dairen, and its growth was consequently thwarted by Japan. Now, however, since its inclusion in the new State of Manchu-Kuo, the Japanese attitude towards it has changed, and recently this port has been intensively developed. Chinwangtao is equally important both from the commercial and from the military point of view. Its military significance lies in the fact that it affords a base for the left flank of a Japanese army operating in south-western Manchuria.

These preparations allow a Japanese force in Manchuria great freedom in choosing the directions in which it can carry on its operations in case of an armed conflict with Russia. It can advance to the west in the direction of Trans-Baikalia, falling back on the railway lines Tsitsihar-Hailar-Manchuli and Taonan-Suolon. Another possibility for it is to advance to the east against the Maritime Province and the chief Soviet port in the Pacific, Vladivostok. Such an advance would no doubt be supported by naval sallies, and here the port of Seishin would be of great value to Japan. Finally, there is the possibility of an advance in a northerly direction against Blagovestchensk, on the

Amur, which is situated on the Amur Railway. It is evidently for this purpose that the railway lines which lead from Tsitsihar and Harbin to the north are now being extended to touch the Amur at Aigun. Japan has thus a central position in Manchuria from which she can conduct independent operations against the three military areas of the Soviet Union in the Far East—Trans-Baikalia, the Amur Province, and the Maritime Province. This central position and the lay of her network of railways enable Japan to effect rapid concentrations on any given front and, after a successful operation, to move a force from one front to another. She can also rely on her base at Chinwangtao to counter such Chinese advances from Peking and Kalgan as would probably take place in the event of a Soviet-Japanese conflict. Thus, having full freedom in choosing its objective, the Japanese military command could take the initiative in action.

The position of Soviet Russia is much less secure. In the beginning of this year it seemed almost hopeless. She could only rely on the Amur Railway, as the Chinese Eastern Railway was for all practical purposes in Japanese hands. Even the Amur Railway, however, would fall to Japan at the very outset of a war. Furthermore, the Soviet frontier defences were very weak. Apart from the fact that the political reliability of the Red army was questionable, the Soviets had only six infantry divisions and three cavalry brigades, as well as some tanks, armoured trains, and air units spread over their three military areas. All plans of holding the Maritime and Amur Provinces were given up, and the main bulk of the Soviet forces were to be concentrated in Trans-Baikalia. Even there, however, those forces would depend on the Trans-Siberian Railway for further reinforcements and supplies, and it seemed highly improbable that this railway would be adequate. Its transport capacity was not greater than four pairs of trains in twenty-four hours. The transport of troops from Russia in Europe would take several months. Adequate provision of equipment and munitions would be practically impossible. The great distances and inadequate connexions between the front and the metropolis were a source of weakness to Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. The military position of Soviet Russia was now incomparably worse, and it seemed very unlikely that the Moscow Government would take a step so rash as to engage in a war with Japan.

The policy of Moscow was passive and defensive. The whole position was discussed at a secret conference held on February 6 in the Kremlin under the presidency of Stalin, at which it was decided to avoid war at all costs. After a very stormy session, the Revolutionary War Council of the U.S.S.R. decided not to reinforce the Far Eastern army, and to take all the measures

necessary to avert the possibility of a conflict with Japan. To prevent isolation of Soviet troops by a Japanese advance it was decided to withdraw all the units from the Maritime and the Amur Provinces, leaving the barest minimum to keep order in the district, and to concentrate the main forces in Trans-Baikalia (in the regions to the north-east, the east, and the south of Chita). The alarm of Moscow at her prospects in the Far East was shown by the attitude of the Third Internationale, which, for once, acted in complete accord with the ostensible policy of Soviet diplomacy. Molotoff, acting under personal orders from Stalin, issued secret instructions to the organisations of the Internationale forbidding them to print or broadcast any revolutionary addresses directed against Japan. Foreign Communist parties were ordered to refrain from any manifestations which were likely to impair the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan.

During the past few months, however, many changes have taken place. It is impossible to say whether a Russo-Japanese conflict is imminent or not, but it is beyond doubt that the spirits of Moscow have risen considerably, and that the humble policy has been abandoned. This change is mainly due to the events in Shanghai. It was considered in Moscow that Japan had gone too far, and that she had impaired her international position. At the same time, the position of the U.S.S.R. was improved, inasmuch as it was looked upon as a possible ally by those Powers to whom the hegemony of Japan in China and the Pacific constituted a menace. A foreign diplomat recently returned from Moscow states that American diplomats were frequently seen in the *couloirs* of the Kremlin in the beginning of February, and that the object of their mission was presumably to establish contact with the Soviet Government. There have also been rumours of Litvinoff's conversations with the American representatives at Geneva on the subject of financial assistance to the Soviets. These rumours must be taken for what they are worth. It is beyond doubt, however, that China has to be taken into consideration as a possible ally and that Japan is now beset with difficulties in her Manchurian foothold. All these considerations have caused Moscow to change her military plan.

In spite of the apprehensive nature of the Soviet policy in the Far East, ever since the end of last year every effort has been made by Moscow to repair her weakness on the Manchurian frontier. It may now be said that, though the position of Soviet Russia still leaves much room for improvement, she has succeeded in partially overcoming many of the difficulties which in the beginning of the year made a successful encounter with Japan impossible. Difficulties of transport are still very serious, though

it is no longer true to say that the transport capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway does not exceed four pairs of trains in twenty-four hours. It is felt, however, that neither the Trans-Siberian nor the Amur Railway would be adequate, and every effort has been made to lay in as great a supply of technical equipment in the Far East as possible. Since last December aeroplanes, tanks, fort artillery, technical military equipment, and munitions were sent over in large quantities from Europe. With regard to the actual number of Soviet troops stationed in the Far East, it is beyond doubt that it has been considerably increased, though it is not yet possible to be certain of such figures as have come to us. A probable estimate gives the following figures: In the Maritime Province, four infantry divisions; in the Amur Province, two; in Trans-Baikalia, one can expect that by summer six infantry and two cavalry divisions will be mustered, making in all 130,000 men. With the increase of technical equipment numbers of men are being levied on the spot, and for this purpose the units stationed in the Far East are being extended and filled up. Besides the regular units of the Red army, there have been considerable extensions of the OGPU units, which are stationed on the frontier, the international units, and the regiments of Chinese and Koreans, whose hatred of Japan Soviet Russia intends to exploit.

Side by side with this increase of troops and technical equipment the Soviets have been busy creating a fortified area round Vladivostok, with an auxiliary base in the Bay of Posiet near the Korean frontier. A very prominent part is played here by German officers, assisted by a large staff of trained mechanics sent from Germany. Submarines have been transported in parts from Nikolaev on the Black Sea. These parts are made up in Vladivostok. In April it was believed that from fifteen to twenty submarines had already been launched, and that several more would be launched within a month or so. Old fortifications in Vladivostok have been rebuilt, and it has been decided to create an aeroplane and seaplane base there, as well as in the neighbouring islands of Askold, Russky, and Putiatin. The auxiliary base in the Bay of Posiet has an aerodrome for forty aeroplanes in course of construction, a seaplane station, and a base for ten submarines. This base is intended to check the Japanese in northern Korea, Seishin and Fusan. These preparations have been going on since the end of last year. In the beginning of this year the Soviet Government did not consider that they would be sufficiently far advanced to outweigh the weakness of its position. Since then, however, its attitude has changed, and it has decided to continue the fortifications with increased fervour. The position of the Soviets in the Far East, however, does not entirely depend on

their military strength, and several other important factors have to be taken into consideration.

In the first place, there is China. The possibility of co-operating with China has been seriously borne in mind by the Moscow Government. As I have already mentioned, an area of over 300,000 square miles in China is governed by soviets which have at their disposal both regular and irregular Red military units. Even outside this area Communist propaganda has scarcely met with any active opposition. The main efforts of the Third Internationale have been directed towards securing a hold on the trades unions and the peasantry, and these efforts have had considerable success.² This Chinese Red army has only local importance, and it is not sufficiently well organised to offer any serious assistance to the Soviets as an ally against Japan. In the event of a Soviet-Japanese conflict, however, it is very likely that an agreement would be reached between the Chinese Communists and the Kuo-Min Tang, and that it would be the forces of the latter that would be moved to the Manchu-Mongolian front. This, at any rate, is a juncture which is very seriously considered by Moscow.

The Soviets, moreover, have allies in Manchuria itself, which is infested with bands of Hunhuzes and the so-called 'Old Kirin troops.' These 'bandits' are very numerous, and carry on extensive partisan warfare. Japan has displayed much energy in putting down the Hunhuze bands, and many eminent Old Kirin leaders have made overtures to the new Manchu Government. Some of them have actually entered the service of Manchu-Kuo. The success of Japan, however, should not be overestimated. In the event of an armed conflict between Soviet Russia and Japan, the activities of these 'bandits' would blaze out with increased vigour, and find the support of such elements in Manchuria which are hostile to Japanese influence. Such elements are numerous. Moreover, there are marked indications of very definite relations existing between the partisan bands in Manchuria with Peking on the one hand and Vladivostok on the other. These relations are even kept up by wireless. There are a number of well-established centres of Chinese and Soviet activity, the latter being mainly on the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. A Chinese centre was located in March by the new Kirin authorities at Tunhua. One hundred and fifty men were arrested, among whom were persons of considerable note, such as the president of the Commercial Society, the commander of the garrison and

² The Chinese Red army has played an important part in organising the peasantry. We are told, for instance, that in the western part of Fu-tsiang, Huang-Tung, and Huang-si peasant unions have been organised by the Red army.

a number of officers. Secret instructions from Peking and correspondence with Korean revolutionaries were disclosed. It is noteworthy that the persons arrested had up till then passed for supporters of the new Manchu-Kuo Government.

Another factor which must be considered is the part played by Mongolia in the Far Eastern policy of the Soviets. Mongolia is the eastern (or rather the central) link which connects the Soviet Union with the provinces of central China. After the fall of Baron Ungern-Sternberg in 1921, Soviet influence began gradually to penetrate into Mongolia, and in 1924 the country was reorganised on the lines of a soviet republic. The 'Young Mongol Party' was formed, which was in fact a Mongol Communist party. The administration of the princes was replaced by elected committees which were in the hands of local Communists and Communists sent from Moscow. A Mongol Red army was formed, with the active participation of that well-known figure Borodin. Soviet staff officers were specially sent from Moscow. According to some data this army is designed to consist of seven cavalry and two infantry divisions, but there is reason to believe that these figures are somewhat exaggerated. The base of military communication between Soviet Russia and Mongolia is Verkhneudinsk. Last year a policy of collectivisation was launched in Mongolia. Small cattle farms were abolished, and large cattle farms were converted into regional collective farms. The object of this policy was to abolish nomadism, and to bring the population under more effective control. Measures were also adopted to curtail private trading enterprise. This policy has caused much discontent and ferment among the population.

The economic interests of Japan in Mongolia have so far been negligible. Japan here pursues entirely political aims, and her object has been to prevent Mongolia from acting as a connecting link between Soviet Russia and China. For this purpose Japan has formulated a plan for the construction of two railway lines, one being an extension of the Taonan-Suolon line to the west, and another leading from Tungliao through Kailu to the Inner Mongolian frontier. Apart from these purely technical measures, Japan has been exploiting all the discontent which has been caused by the policy of the Soviets. She has enlisted the support of the Mongol religious leader Panchen-Lama, who played an important rôle in 1923. Then, after his conflict with the Dalai-Lama, he emigrated to China and has recently been living in Mukden, whence he has been keeping up his connexions with the Mongol princes. In eastern Mongolia Japan has been countering the activities of the so-called 'government of Barga' of the Mongol Communist Fu Min-T'ai by means of the newly-formed 'Young Barga Party,' which is pro-Japanese in sentiment.

Mongolia is thus becoming torn asunder by the conflicting influences of Soviet Russia, which seeks to embrace Mongolia in the Soviet Union by introducing Communism, and Japan, which acts through the princes and the clergy, who still have considerable support. The Mongol Red army is finding its counterpart in Mongol units with Japanese equipment. References to such units are becoming more and more frequent in the Far Eastern Press.

Such, on the whole, is at present the political setting of the Far East. As we have seen, both Japan and Soviet Russia have each their advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of Japan is her central position and her network of railways, as compared with the three dislocated military areas of the Soviets. The main advantage of the Soviets is the support which they can get from the widely extended anti-Japanese elements in the Far East: the Chinese, the Manchurian 'bandits,' the Koreans and others, without counting such assistance which they may obtain from foreign Powers. It is evident that Moscow now considers that the advantages and disadvantages are sufficiently well balanced, and has accordingly abandoned her original plan of practically evacuating the Maritime and the Amur Provinces. It is difficult to speak of a Soviet military plan with any degree of certainty. It is likely, however, that in the case of an armed conflict an advance of the Trans-Baikalian forces against Hailar and the Barga territory is contemplated, as Barga is isolated from the rest of Manchuria by the range of Hingan. Such a move would be co-ordinated with advances of the Red Mongol units and the Chinese troops from Peking. It is quite likely that a demonstrative operation would be undertaken from the Maritime Province to northern Korea with the object of stirring up risings against Japan. A passive part would be played by the troops in the Amur Province, which would act as a liaison between the Maritime Province and Trans-Baikalia.

Such a plan entails enormous risks. If the Soviets count on risings in Korea and guerilla warfare in Manchuria, Japan too can consider the possibility of fostering rebellion within the limits of the Soviet Union. A successful attack on Vladivostok at the very outbreak of hostilities (an attack which would no doubt take place) would create a very marked impression. Moreover, Japan can undertake speedy manoeuvres, and concentrate the majority of her forces against the Trans-Baikalian front. Nevertheless, the Soviets have nothing to gain and everything to lose from a policy of procrastination, while a decisive stroke in the very beginning might prove successful.

I have purposely treated the whole question of the relations between Soviet Russia and Japan in Asia in the light of a possible

Soviet-Japanese conflict. I do not wish to imply that such a conflict is inevitable. What is certain is that there have been energetic preparations on both sides for war. But there are many reasons why both sides should wish to avoid war. As I have already stated, an armed conflict with Soviet Russia is not without its dangers for Japan. In the case of Russia the dangers are all the more acute, inasmuch as they are internal. The main difficulty is the question of how far the loyalty of the Red army can be relied on. The data which come to us on this subject are often contradictory. The attitude of the Moscow Government towards the army during the Sino-Soviet conflict of 1930 was apprehensive, and it was then suggested that what Moscow feared most was the return of a victorious army. But even if we allow, for the sake of argument, that the present standing army of the Soviets has been so carefully selected and so effectively propagandised that its loyalty can be relied on, we certainly cannot allow the same for such fresh recruits and reserve units which will have to be mobilised in the case of prolonged hostilities. Such recruits would be drawn from the peasantry, which is at present more hostile to the Government than at any previous period. It is for this reason that the main hope of the Soviets in case of an armed conflict would lie in a successful stroke at the outbreak of hostilities.

There may be grounds on which Soviet Russia and Japan could arrive at an agreement. At the outset of the Sino-Japanese conflict the suggestion that Russia and Japan had an agreement with regard to a partition of spheres of influence in Asia seemed very probable. Japan was to have a free hand in Manchuria, while Russia could establish a foothold in Chinese Turkestan. A conflict between Soviet Russia and Japan may or may not take place, but if it does take place it will probably be in the near future. On the whole, it may be said that Soviet Russia would gain most from direct action before Japan can thoroughly consolidate her position in Manchuria, while Japan's cause would be best served by a short delay. This delay, however, must not be long enough to allow Russia to complete (even partially) the military side of the Five-Year Plan.

J. BILIBIN.

AFRICA AND IMPERIAL PREFERENCE

AN Empire economically self-contained and operating as a single economic unit is the inspiring ideal for which an increasing number of individuals and organisations are working to-day. With this ideal before them the representatives of the self-governing Dominions, India, and the Mother Country are to confer at Ottawa, and it must be the earnest hope of all that at that Conference the delegates will be able to lay a firm basis for a policy of co-operative Empire development in which every individual unit will be able to play its part.

Amongst many people it appears to be the accepted opinion that, given the co-operation of the Dominions, the introduction of a system of Empire Preference and collaboration in the Crown Colonies and Protectorates would follow automatically. Such facile optimism may well lead to disappointment, which in turn might cause a slackening of effort at a time when effort is most needed, and therefore it seems most desirable that the obstacles which must be overcome should not be underestimated. It is possibly correct that certain of the less important territories not at present granting preference to Empire goods could introduce such a system without great delay or difficulty; but in others the necessity to avoid endangering existing commercial interests presents a problem of great complexity. Singapore, one of the most important transshipment ports in the world, is an outstanding example. In yet other territories we are precluded at present by treaties and mandatory systems from establishing a preferential customs *régime*. Unfortunately, this class comprises all our Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories in East and West Africa, with the exception of Gambia and Sierra Leone in the west and a part of Northern Rhodesia in the east. The territories in question, their areas, population and value of their trade are shown in the table on the next page.

It is a matter of some urgency that the position of these groups of territories should be investigated before the Ottawa Conference, as three of the countries to be represented there—namely, India, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia—are becoming increasingly interested in the trade of British East Africa and of certain

Territory.	Area in Square Miles.	Population.	Merchandise Trade in 1929			
			Imports.*		Exports.*	
			£	Per cent. from U. K.	£	Per cent. to U. K.
Gold Coast .	78,650	2,112,000	9,892,772	46	11,530,760	23
Togoland (Mandated Territory)	13,040	187,900				
Nigeria .	329,389	18,589,800	13,387,858	70	17,581,126	44
Cameroons (Mandated Territory)	34,236	718,864				
Kenya .	225,100	2,736,500	9,740,166	42	6,999,139	37
Uganda .	94,204	3,136,900				
Tanganyika (Mandated Territory)	373,500	4,319,000	4,295,221	35	3,683,645	16
Zanzibar and Pemba .	1,020	217,000	1,569,435	20	444,646	20
Nyasaland .	39,956	1,293,300	771,672	38	589,183	100
Northern Rhodesia†	287,950	979,900	3,627,423	42	815,674	55

* Similar information showing the percentage of trade enjoyed by other parts of the Empire is not given, as, owing to the considerable proportion of such trade representing transfers of imported goods from one territory to an adjacent one, and the fact that in certain cases exports of produce pass through an adjacent territory before reaching the port of shipment, the figures tend to be very misleading, unless studied in detail.

† Approximately a quarter of this Colony lies within the treaty zone. Separate figures of the trade within and without the zone are not obtainable.

adjacent territories under foreign control. The difficulties to be overcome before these territories can introduce a preferential system may be divided, roughly, into two classes: those arising from the conditions under which mandates were granted to Great Britain in East and West Africa and the administrative systems adopted thereunder; and those arising from the terms of various treaties entered into in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In this article it is proposed to deal briefly with the principal difficulties in each of these classes and to suggest, where possible, steps which might be taken to overcome them.

The African territories for which Great Britain is mandatory are part of Togoland and part of the Cameroons in the west and Tanganyika in the east. The general terms under which mandates were granted by the League of Nations are set forth in Article 22 of the Covenant, which divided the mandates into three classes, commonly known as A, B, and C. All such territories in Africa, with the exception of South-West Africa, are in class B, and these mandates contain a clause providing for freedom of trade which reads as follows:

The Mandatory shall secure to all nationals of States Members of the League of Nations the same rights as are enjoyed in the territory by his own nationals in respect of entry into and residence in the territory, the protection afforded to their person and property and acquisition of property, moveable and immovable, and the exercise of their profession or trade, subject only to the requirements of public order and on condition of compliance with local law.

Further, the Mandatory shall ensure to all nationals of States Members of the League of Nations on the same footing as to his own nationals, freedom of transit and navigation, and complete economic, commercial and industrial equality; except that the Mandatory shall be free to organise essential public works and services on such terms and conditions as he thinks just.

Under this regulation no system of preferential tariffs can be introduced in the mandated territories, but it is not interpreted as prohibiting the mandatory from granting tariff preferences to goods imported from territories for which it is responsible.

South-West Africa is a class C mandate and is treated for administrative purposes as part of the Union of South Africa (the mandatory), and has the same system of tariffs in force, which includes certain preferential duties. At present the two territories in West Africa (Togoland and the Cameroons) are administered by the Governments of the Colonies which they adjoin; in the case of the former, the Gold Coast, and of the latter, Nigeria. This procedure was doubtless adopted as the most economic and efficient from an administrative point of view, but it makes the introduction of Imperial Preference in these Colonies impossible unless the system of administration is very considerably altered. Such a change of system might be secured by instituting a special customs *régime* under which a flat rate of duty would be charged on all goods consigned to the mandated territories; or, alternatively, these territories could be put under entirely separate administrations set up for the purpose.

If the former course were adopted, it would probably necessitate the establishment of some form of customs barrier between the Colony and mandated territory in each case, to prevent goods which had paid preferential duty only, being smuggled into the mandated territory; or, if the rate of duty there were fixed at the same or a lower rate than the preferential rate in the Colony, to prevent the smuggling of goods into the Colony. Such a system would be expensive to maintain and of doubtful efficiency, and for the latter reason would probably give rise to serious complaints from members of the League interested in trade with the mandated territories. The alternative of putting the mandated territories under separate administrations might, to some extent, prevent complaints from other nations, but probably it would still be necessary to establish customs barriers to prevent smuggling, and

it would obviously add very greatly to the expense of carrying out the mandates. Another difficulty which would arise, should this course be adopted, is that neither of the mandated territories has its own port. British Togoland has no access to the sea, and all imports would, perforce, have to enter *via* the Gold Coast or by way of the port of Lomé, which lies in that part of the territory mandated to France. The section of the Cameroons mandated to Great Britain has a short coast line but no port facilities, and therefore here, also, imports would either have to enter through the adjacent British Colony—in this case, Nigeria—or through the ports in the French mandated territory.

In view of the mandatory difficulties to be surmounted if the Gold Coast and Nigeria are to be enabled to introduce Imperial Preference and this country, is to avoid the charge of violating the terms of its mandates for Togoland and the Cameroons, it would seem desirable to consider whether the latter are of sufficient value to be worth retaining under our control. Unfortunately, it is impossible to ascertain the amount of trade done with these territories, as the import and export statistics are combined with those of the Colonies at present responsible for their administration. It is probable, however, that Britain would experience no great loss of trade if the mandates were transferred to some other Power, provided the terms under which equal opportunities are granted to the commerce of all countries were strictly carried out by the new mandatory. The principal products of the territories are palm oil, palm kernels, and cocoa.

In examining this question with a view to ascertaining whether it would be expedient for Great Britain to surrender these mandates, it would be essential to consider a number of factors not directly connected with trade. Of these, probably the most important are the effects of such action on the natives in the mandated territories and the adjacent Colonies, and its possible repercussion on our relations with other Powers and with the League of Nations itself. In considering the former point, it should be borne in mind that the natives in the mandated territories have already been called upon to change their allegiance once during the present century, and that such changes are bound to have an unsettling effect, as the whole system of administration is likely to be altered by a change in the nationality of the administrators. Doubtless the Colonial Office could supply much useful information on this question from its files, and any additional particulars required could be secured from officials in the territories concerned. The second factor obviously has a direct bearing on the foreign policy of Great Britain, and therefore would fall to the Foreign Office for consideration. The two countries most likely to claim these mandates, if surrendered by Great

Britain, are France and Germany; the former because she is already mandatory for a large part of each of the territories, and the latter from the fact that they were originally held by her as colonies, and, as a result, she has considerable commercial interests in them. Such a conflict of claims would tend to exacerbate the feelings between the two countries, and for this reason alone it might be undesirable for the mandates to be given up.

In East Africa the position is somewhat less complicated, as Tanganyika Territory, for which we are mandatory, is separately administered and has its own ports and railways. Class B mandates permit the inclusion of the mandated territory in a customs union with adjoining Colonies under the control of the mandatory, and Tanganyika has such a union with Kenya and Uganda, which lie to the north. This customs union has been found advantageous by all three parties to it, and has undoubtedly lent weight to the support given to the movement in favour of a union of all three territories under one Governor. Fortunately, the British Government is not committed to this step, which probably would render impossible the establishing of a system of preferential duties in Kenya and Uganda.

It is to be anticipated that a considerable amount of opposition will be raised to any proposal to exclude Tanganyika from the customs union, unless it can be shown conclusively that Kenya and Uganda will gain more by instituting a system of Imperial Preference than by the maintenance of the present arrangements. The feeling on this question was shown very clearly some two years ago, when a resolution was passed by the Association of Chambers of Commerce of East Africa in favour of the continuance of the Congo Basin treaties, which preclude the introduction of Preference in these territories, as the institution of differential duties would necessitate the breaking of the customs union with Tanganyika, whereas it was felt that the paramount interests of East Africa lay in the development of closer trading relations. In view of the change in the political situation in this country, and the decision by the National Government to grant free entry under the new general tariff to all goods of Colonial origin, it is possible that the commercial community in East Africa might now be prepared to reconsider its attitude, but it can by no means be taken for granted that a decision favourable to the policy of Preference would result.

These impediments to the introduction of a preferential system in the East and West African territories would, of course, all disappear if it were possible to secure the consent of the League of Nations to the transfer of these mandates to class C, which permits the institution of preferential tariffs. It is very improbable, however, that an application to the League for this purpose would be favourably received, as practically all members interested

in the trade of these territories would lose by such a change of system.

On a first examination the position arising out of the series of treaties and conventions generally referred to as the Congo Basin treaties seems so inextricably confused that one may almost despair of Great Britain ever being able to free herself with a view to instituting a new era of closer collaboration with the vast territories, an empire in themselves, for which she is tutelary. Indeed, it is certain that some time must elapse before any action can be taken, as notice must first be given of our intention to terminate the present arrangements, and before even this preliminary step is taken it would seem desirable to submit the matter to some body of experts in international law, such as the Hague Tribunal, for an authoritative definition of the present position. This confusion originates in part from the fact that the first of these multilateral treaties contained no provision for denunciation, and the territories to which it referred were largely unexplored and not under the control of European Powers; and in part from our inability to secure the adherence of certain countries which ratified the early treaties to a later convention by which they were modified.

The treaties and conventions which contain the key to the situation, and with which it is proposed to deal, are the following: the General Act of Berlin of 1885; the General Act and Declaration of Brussels of 1890; the Convention between Great Britain and France of 1898 and Declaration of 1899; and, finally, the Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye of 1919.

The General Act of Berlin stipulated that the trade of all nations should enjoy complete freedom in all regions forming the basin of the river Congo, and also in a zone lying between that basin and the Indian Ocean, and that all imported merchandise should be free from import and transit dues for a period of twenty years. In addition, this treaty provided for freedom of access to the coast and all waters of the Congo, equality of treatment of shipping and of traders and in the granting of concessions, protection of the natives, of travellers and missionaries, and the suppression of the slave trade. It also incorporated Acts of Navigation for the Congo and the Niger and a declaration relating to the acquisition of additional territories by the signatory Powers.

The General Act and Declaration of Brussels of 1890 was largely concerned with the suppression of slavery, but it contained one article of great importance to trade which empowered all nations controlling territory within the treaty zone to impose import duties not exceeding 10 per cent. *ad valorem* for a period of fifteen years to provide revenue for this purpose. Provision was

made for a new conference to be called at the end of this period, and it was stipulated that if no conference took place the signatories would continue to be bound by the terms of the Act of Berlin, except that the power to levy import duties of 10 per cent. *ad valorem* was to be retained. No new conference was called in 1905, and consequently the Act of Berlin remained in force until the outbreak of war in 1914, which automatically terminated it as between nations at war with each other, but left the position unchanged between signatories which remained neutral and between them and the belligerent Powers.

The Treaty of Versailles provided for a conference of the Allied Powers and America to discuss African questions; presumably it was intended that this conference should elucidate the position of the various Powers under the pre-war treaties described above, which had been further complicated by the handing over of all ex-enemy territories to certain Allied countries for administration under mandate from the League of Nations. Actually the result of this conference, at which the Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye was drawn up, was to confuse still further an already very complicated situation. The Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye was signed by Great Britain and the Dominions, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and the United States of America, and was duly ratified by all of them except America and Italy, Portugal making certain reservations regarding her East African territory. The signatories agreed to endeavour to secure the adherence of all other States controlling African territories, and States, members of the League, which were parties to the Acts of Berlin and Brussels, but no further ratifications were obtained, with the result that, under international law, it may be the case that the modifications introduced by the Convention to these Acts should only regulate the relations between the signatories of the Convention, who are still bound by the terms of the Acts in their relations with other Powers which were parties to them. The countries in this category which ratified the Acts but not the Convention are Denmark, Holland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Spain. Germany, Austria, Hungary and Turkey, ex-enemy Powers which ratified the Acts, are bound by the Peace Treaties to accept the Convention.

The United States of America, as has been noted, failed to ratify the Convention, and as she likewise failed to ratify either the Act of Berlin or that of Brussels she has no rights under any of them, but has acquired similar rights by means of bilateral treaties with the various Powers controlling territory in the Congo zone. The Convention declares the previous treaties to be abrogated between those nations which are parties to it, and gives them complete liberty of action as to the customs tariffs to be

applied in their territories in the Congo zone as defined in the Act of Berlin, but stipulates that equality of treatment in tariffs and other matters shall continue. All the Powers concerned have utilised the liberty of action conferred by this clause and have imposed rates of duty higher than those permitted under the Act of Brussels, which, it will be remembered, stipulated that the maximum rate charged should be 10 per cent. *ad valorem*. These higher rates of duty are charged on the goods of all nations irrespective of whether they are parties to the Convention or not, and therefore in practice the limitation imposed by the Act of Brussels is ignored. The other articles of the Convention deal with such matters as freedom of access to the interior, of goods in transit, of navigation on all waterways in the area and of the Niger, equality of treatment in the granting of concessions and acquisition of property, etc. No provision is made for denunciation, but the final article stipulates that a further conference shall be called at the end of ten years to introduce such modifications as may be considered necessary. Great Britain, having ratified the Convention in July 1920, could, it is assumed, have demanded a further conference at any time since July 1930.

It has already been remarked that at the date of the Act of Berlin, which defined the Congo zone, much of the territory was unexplored and was not under the control of the signatories; as a result, at the present time, when the whole region with the exception of Abyssinia is divided up amongst various European Powers, it is found that the line defining the zone instead of following territorial boundaries cuts across them in a number of places. The territories which are thus partly within and partly without the zone are French Gabon, Middle Congo and Shari-Chad, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland in the north, and Portuguese West Africa, Northern Rhodesia and Portuguese East Africa in the south. The Belgian Congo and the British territories of Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika and Nyasaland are all wholly within the zone.

As might be anticipated, there has been a considerable variation in the interpretation of the obligations of the Convention by the different signatory Powers, and consequently the degree and manner in which it is enforced varies from territory to territory. Great Britain appears to have carried out her obligations in all the territories for which she is responsible, and grants complete equality of treatment to the trade of all nations. In Northern Rhodesia, which is only partly within the Conventional zone, two different tariffs are in force, preference being granted in that part of the Colony known as the Zambesi Basin, but absolute equality of treatment is given to all goods consigned to the Congo area. In the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, a very small

part of which is in the zone, no attempt is made to comply with the Convention, as Egypt, which is jointly responsible with Great Britain for this territory, was not a party to it.

France has adopted a similar system in her territories to that instituted by Great Britain in Northern Rhodesia, and has preferential tariffs in force outside the zone, but not within it. The extent to which the Convention is actually complied with in her territories is somewhat problematical however, as complaints of differentiation of one sort or another have been frequent. Portugal has followed the same method as France and ourselves as regards her West African colony, but in East Africa no attempt is made to comply with the article of the Convention prohibiting discriminatory tariffs, as she has preferential duties in force in the whole territory, although approximately half of it is in the Conventional zone. It is understood that Portugal reserved to herself the right to take such action when she ratified the Convention, although this was not clearly stated. Complaints have been numerous regarding Portugal's non-compliance with the terms of the Convention, and therefore its value to British trade and traders in her territories is probably very limited. In the Belgian Congo the goods of all countries receive equal treatment for tariff purposes, and it would appear that the terms of the Convention are carried out fairly satisfactorily. Italy, as has been noted, failed to ratify the Convention, and she does not comply with its terms or with those of the previous treaties, as preference is accorded to Italian goods in the whole of Italian Somaliland, although it lies half within the Congo zone.

It is impossible to assess with any accuracy the effects of the Convention and the previous treaties on the export trade of the Empire in the Congo Basin. Obviously, any comparison of trade statistics for the present time with any which could be obtained for the years anterior to the Act of Berlin of 1885 would be useless; and no really reliable comparison can be made between the statistics of trade within and without the zone. In those territories partly within the zone the only figures available cover the whole territory in each case, and Belgium does not possess any colony in Africa, apart from the Congo, which is wholly within the zone. At first sight, it might appear that a comparison of the trade statistics for Kenya and Uganda with those for Southern Rhodesia, which has a preferential tariff in force, would give some indication of the probable result of introducing a similar system into these territories. Actually, such a comparison would be very misleading, as Southern Rhodesia has a customs agreement with the Union of South Africa, and, further, she has a much larger white population, and trade conditions generally are different.

From an examination of the statistics and other data available, it would appear that, although the interpretation by some countries of their obligations under the Convention is not very satisfactory, yet on the whole it is probable that the trade of the Empire has benefited from the degree of equality and freedom secured in the foreign territories concerned. The foreign imports into the British territories covered are actually about half as great again as the imports from the Empire into the foreign territories concerned, but this is offset by the fact that our mercantile and shipping interests in these foreign territories greatly exceed the similar foreign interests in British territories. It is probable that the Union of South Africa, the Rhodesias, and the East African Colonies have benefited considerably from the freedom of trade in the Belgian Congo, where they have developed a market of some importance. This, if existing conditions are maintained, may be expected to increase with the development of the country, but would be endangered by a denunciation of the Convention, leaving Belgium free to impose discriminatory tariffs. In British East Africa India has secured an important share of the cotton textile trade, but latterly both she and ourselves have found Japanese competition increasingly difficult to meet. India, therefore, would doubtless welcome a change of *régime* which would give her goods a preference in this market, and presumably would be prepared to make some return by granting preferences to Empire goods.

In view of the circumstances surrounding the original treaties and the present Convention, it is evidently necessary and desirable that action should be taken at as early a date as possible to clarify the somewhat ambiguous situation that now exists. The opportunity to discuss the question in its relation to the trade of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and India will occur at Ottawa, provided the Imperial Government representatives are in a position to put forward definite proposals, and to define the extent of our commitments under international law. Probably no British country would wish to see the whole Convention abrogated, as its provisions for freedom of trade, of settlement, of access to the interior, etc., are of value, even though not as fully observed as is desirable; further, the obligations imposed on all signatories to protect and develop the native population are of the greatest importance and could not be denounced by Great Britain without great loss of prestige, since she has always led the way in the introduction of measures to improve the lot of the natives in such undeveloped territories.

Enough has been said to prove that the existing situation is unsatisfactory. We are uncertain of our position under the old treaties, the terms of the post-war Convention are not fully

carried out by some countries and are ignored by others, and we are unable to introduce any preferential system in our own Colonies and Protectorates. In the circumstances, therefore, it would seem desirable that, having ascertained our position under international law and secured the agreement of all parts of the Empire interested in trade with these territories, we should demand a new conference, to which all signatories of the Act of Berlin should be invited, and endeavour to secure agreement to—(a) a redrawing of the line defining the Congo Basin in order to make it follow existing boundaries and thus include territories now only partly within it; (b) a definition of all articles of the Convention providing for freedom of trade; and (c) a cancellation of the article restricting the rights of territorial Powers in the matter of customs duties. Provided such a general agreement could be secured, we could, no doubt, enter into some special arrangement with Belgium to protect the interests of those parts of the Empire concerned in the trade with the Congo, and, if necessary, with other Powers regarding their territories.

Finally, there are the Convention between Great Britain and France of 1898 and the Declaration of 1899. The Convention and Declaration are largely concerned with the delimitation of the possessions and spheres of influence of the two Powers to the east and west of the Niger, but in addition provide for equality of treatment by each signatory to the other in all matters of river navigation, commerce, and of tariffs and fiscal treatment and taxes of all kinds. Subject to this condition, the contracting Powers are free to impose taxation and tariffs at any level which may be considered suitable to their territories. Fortunately, unlike the other treaties, provision is made for denunciation of the article granting equality of treatment. This article was to remain in force for a period of thirty years, which actually expired on June 13, 1928, and since that date the signatories have been free to denounce it on giving twelve months' notice. The territories affected by the original Convention are Nigeria and the Gold Coast, belonging to Great Britain, and the Ivory Coast and Dahomey, belonging to France. The Declaration of the following year extended the area to which the article providing for equality of treatment should apply, so as to include part of French Military Chad Territory and the whole of Shari-Chad (the latter, it will be remembered, was only partly covered by the Act of Berlin and subsequent treaties), and that part of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to the west of the Upper Nile between the 5th parallel and 14° 20' parallel of north latitude.

The Convention and Declaration have been of undoubted benefit to the trade of Great Britain in the French territories in question, and therefore at first sight it might not appear that, on

commercial grounds, there is any case for denunciation. It is very probable, however, that if steps are taken to alter and modify the Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye, France may decide, at the same time, to recover freedom of action in these territories. Furthermore, our position is not as favourable as might at first appear to be the case, as under the most-favoured-nation clause of most of our commercial treaties we have to give similar treatment to the trade of other nations in the Gold Coast and Nigeria to that granted to France under the Convention. Approximately one-third of the import trade of the Gold Coast and Nigeria is enjoyed at present by foreign nations other than France, whose share is comparatively unimportant, and therefore it would be to the advantage of British trade if a preferential system could be introduced which would leave our Convention with that country undisturbed. To enable this to be done it would be necessary either to denounce all our trade treaties containing a most-favoured-nation clause applying to these Colonies in addition to the United Kingdom, which would appear to be the case in the majority of them, or to endeavour to secure the agreement of all countries with which we have such treaties to the exclusion of these Colonies from the operation of this clause. Should action be taken on these lines, it would obviously be advantageous if France would take steps simultaneously to free herself from any treaties under which the equality of treatment granted to British trade under the Convention has to be given to the trade of other foreign countries.

If in this article too much stress appears to have been laid on the difficulties to be overcome before a system of Empire Preference can be introduced in our African territories, it is probably due to a natural reaction to much of the propaganda carried on in recent months in favour of what is loosely called by such names as Empire Free Trade. Some of the leaders of this movement seem to imagine that at the mere waving of the wand of the orator an immediate transformation of our relations with the other parts of the Empire can be obtained; would it were so, but as it is not, it is better that we do not delude ourselves into imagining the task ahead is an easy one. The obstacles to be overcome are great, but the ideal to be achieved is greater.

M. J. WATT.

PERSIA AT THE CROSSROADS

Of all Eastern countries there is not one that has moved more rapidly, during the last few years, than Persia. Whether in the happiest direction is another matter. Time will show. Meanwhile she has caught the fever of Democracy, with the result that Progress—in other words, movement, change, experiment—is the order of the day. If evidence of the fact is needed, a journey from Bagdad to Teheran is all that is necessary. Twenty years ago the road was only passable in fine weather—a dilapidated victoria the best conveyance and a ramshackle inn the only place in which to find a shelter. As for Teheran, the capital, with its mediæval entrance gates, ancient buildings and motley crowds, never was there a more fascinating Oriental city. But these 'former things have passed away.' To begin with, a broad and well-kept road—and there are others—connects the north Iraq frontier with Teheran, along which motor cars pass continually at all seasons of the year. Lorries filled with every conceivable description of merchandise have practically ousted the camel caravan, and in the several towns passed through the inn has brought forth an hotel which, if not the acme of comfort, is a paradise compared with the *khan*, or caravanserai, where men and beasts used to be huddled together within a closed wall. And never has any town in so short a space of time been so transformed as Teheran; and the process is not yet finished. Entirely replanned, the historic gateways and old palaces are fast disappearing; whole districts are being levelled to the ground, and a network of thoroughfares as broad as the Great West Road are replacing the narrow streets. And that is by no means all. The very inhabitants themselves seem bent on struggling from the chrysalis stage, for the women are no longer veiled; whilst the men, with scarcely a murmur, have welcomed the law compelling them to wear European clothes.

It is queer reasoning, but Eastern nations, bent on democratic government, are firmly convinced that a change of clothes will inevitably result in a change of character! And for all these innovations and reforms the Shah is mainly responsible, for of the many occupants of the peacock throne he alone has dared to cut adrift from the past. A man of great resource and courage,

Reza Khan Pehlevi attracted those of the same fabric as himself, whilst his iron will has crushed opposition and moulded the weak. But over and above all, a product of the masses devoid of possessions, he was free of the load of unpopularity, and later aversion, that weighted his royal predecessor. And so it has come to pass that an unknown figure, once a soldier in the imperial army, rules the land of Cyrus to-day as 'King of Kings.'

Never was there a more retiring or modest potentate; self-advertisement—the craze of the West—ostentation, and public applause interest him not at all. Thus, instead of occupying the great palace in Teheran where for generations the Shahs of Persia have taken up their abode, a small, unpretentious villa satisfies the needs and desires of one who rules in their stead. No doubt the head 'that wears a crown' lies uneasy, but when the diadem belongs to another the trouble is intensified. In the circumstances, therefore, the first care of the new Shah was to square accounts with the army. Very wisely, he was not long about it, for here was his spear-head. Arrears of pay, bad food and worse clothing, to say nothing of revolutionaries in the higher command, are not the best ingredients out of which to mould a dependable force. Indeed, if the late Shah had realised this and taken the trouble to correct the many abuses he might have saved his throne. His successor took no risks; cost what it might, the army must be satisfied and well looked after. Within a few weeks, therefore, of the *coup d'état* the troops acclaimed him to a man—grateful for favours received and more to come! They have not been disappointed. And so it happens that to-day some 40,000 men are prepared to stand by him in any emergency. Instead of the old system whereby the entire command was concentrated at Teheran, the country is now divided up into four military districts, each with a tried general loyal to the new régime and entrusted with the fullest powers. So far everything has gone well; the machine, kept well greased, is turning out an armed policeman of an excellent type. Anything else in so short a time was not to be expected, for, although a Persian has the makings of a good soldier, the perfect article is not fashioned in a day, neither are officers with ability or experience. Discipline, too, is not a matter of quick growth. To arrive at the desired end the entire army needed reorganising and, what is more, popularising. 'My regiments,' said a former shah, 'are excellent, and, better still, though they have been three years without a fraction of pay, they never ask for arrears.' So long, however, as it is merely a question of maintaining law and order, the existing army is good enough; given time, it will undoubtedly become a fighting force. Meanwhile a possible external enemy is the only danger, and until Reza Shah is strong enough to cope with any such

emergency Persia's independence is at stake, not to mention his own throne.

If an iron hand alone was necessary, there is nothing to fear; the Bakhtiari have learnt that. A collection of tribes occupying the mountainous district of Southern Persia, they have always been a national menace. Independent, courageous, lawless, and almost inaccessible in their eerie abodes, they snapped their fingers at Governments, recruiting agents and tax-collectors, defiant in their splendid isolation. Finding them difficult to subdue, successive shahs have been content with a nominal sovereignty—to accept, as it were, an *imperium in imperio*. Such a state of affairs, however, was not at all to the taste of Reza Shah; the Bakhtiaris must acknowledge his undivided authority, and he set to work to make them. But there are other ways of killing a cat than by hanging: punitive expeditions are costly as well as too prolonged; he would try fairer means. Accordingly, ingratiating himself with the most important chiefs, he mediated in their tribal quarrels, invited them to Teheran, and asked their help in affairs of state. Several were given positions in the army, others were appointed governors of districts, with the result that not only have the wings of these stormy petrels been clipped, but they no longer fly in the face of authority. Here, again, Reza Shah by craft and diplomacy has succeeded where his predecessors failed. Occasionally, it is true, there is in some outlying village an effervescence of independence or a feudal quarrel. But such incidents only further the Shah's policy and allow a tightening of his grip, for, the disturbance quelled, the troops occupy the district and exact a crushing tribute from the wealthy landlords. Could any surer method of acquisitive penetration possibly be devised? Rightly pursued, the policy is sound; the danger is in the overdoing, for, unless organised government can offer something better than Western ideals and assured taxation, there may be a general revolt, and the last state will be worse than the first. So far, however, all is well. The country is being opened up, travel is becoming safe, industry is being encouraged. Not that there is any export trade at present, the handiwork of the Bakhtiari being confined to their own requirements. But for centuries past carpet-making has been the principal occupation of the women, and might very well be developed, for the texture, design and colours are very pleasing. Incidentally, the coarse fabric they weave, from goats' hair, with which to cover their tents, is the sackcloth one reads of in the Bible.

But to revert to the Shah's policy as regards Persia in general. To westernise the country thoroughly the will of the people—to be gauged by a counting of heads—was essential, and, the calculation made, 'peace and happiness, truth and justice' were sure to

follow. There is one refreshing characteristic about the Eastern—when he does move, he moves quickly. There is no pause when once he is set going; no half-way house. It is all or nothing. And so it happened that, popular government decided upon, a *majliss*, or parliament, was set up, and in a twinkling despotism made way for manhood suffrage. What took England centuries to arrive at, Persia acquired in a few days. As a matter of fact, things are not quite what they seem, for the vast majority of the electors, knowing and caring nothing about votes or representative government, are still content to abide by the will of Allah. And so it has come about that the ordinary member, regarded with indifference by his constituents, goes his own way; the business of the country is in the hands of a chosen few, and Reza Shah, alone and supreme, rules the roost. Democracy in Persia is really a huge fraud. But, strange to say, no one is in the least troubled by the fact—'the caravan goes on.' The truth is that Persia, unlike many another nation, had no delusions as to the blessings of popular government, either through lack of imagination or ignorance. A ruler, one who could maintain law and order, ensure justice and help the trader, great and small, was all that men wanted, though by what brand of government this could be arrived at was a matter of complete indifference. Before Reza Shah's coming the country was in the slough of despond. Discontent, corruption, and penury were not only the common lot, but generally accepted as a national birthright. With the passing of the old *régime*, however, an entirely new prospect has been opened up—whether illusory or real it is unnecessary to discuss. But if nothing else results, the present 'King of Kings' can at least lay the flattering unction to his soul that the people are thankful for a stable Government, and realise that their lot is happier and more prosperous than it has been for many generations.

But indifference, contentment, resignation, or whatever one likes to call it, is really the rockbottom cause of most of the country's troubles. Here is a truly Eastern defect; the leopard has a liking for its spots. The question is, will even the determination, energy, and reforming zeal of Reza Shah be able to uproot the trees of immemorial custom? For instance, as regards trade, the ordinary Persian hardly dreams of the possibility of becoming rich. So long as he can make two ends meet, he is content and expects nothing more. Indeed, the amassing of wealth runs counter to his religious teaching; the precepts of Mahomet still hold good with the masses. Again, if Persia is to be developed, capital is necessary. But how is this to be obtained? The Shah, having set his face against foreign loans and concessions, is relying upon money being found in the country. It so happens,

however, that the wealthier classes, who have been bitten more than once, are not inclined, anyhow for the moment, to embark on any industrial scheme that necessitates a big outlay. Development, therefore, in that direction is at a standstill, and will remain so until confidence in the Government, too often predatory in its actions, is firmly established. At present the one and only sound venture is the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Owned and managed entirely by Europeans, some 30,000 Persians are regularly employed, as hard-working, reliable, and content as are to be found anywhere. The annual wage-bill alone exceeds £2,000,000, whilst in addition the Government draws over £1,000,000 a year in royalties. Granted, therefore, the necessary capital, there is no reason why other natural resources—and there are many—should not be developed as successfully. But that is not going to be done without knowledge, skill and experience, which will take long years to acquire. Until, therefore, Persia has learnt her industrial lesson, she would do well to develop her agricultural resources; for herein lies her real economic future. Even in this respect expert advice will be necessary; for land improvement, irrigation, cultivation—in short, up-to-date methods of farming and cattle-breeding—are quite unknown.

One industry Persia may rightly claim as her own—carpet-making. But here, again, if it is to be developed, the hand-loom will have to make way for machinery, which, again, means capital, or her trade will be filched by some more enterprising competitor. But whatever the future has in store will be the sooner achieved by improved means of communication. Before the war there was not a well-laid road in the country; to-day there are over 6000 miles by which one can motor in comparative comfort. And the work is being extended. Repairs are the great difficulty; for there is a lingering idea that once a road always a road, no matter what the traffic! Nevertheless, the tax paid by those who use these roads, principally motorists, not only increased the national revenue last year by £700,000, but has done more than anything else to develop the country. With such satisfactory results and an increasing income, the natural course would have been to have extended the system until every village was connected up with the main arteries of commerce. Soon after the war, however, in order to be less dependent on trade with Russia, a policy of railway construction was decided upon and a line projected from Teheran southwards to the Persian Gulf. Unfortunately, in spite of contrary advice, the Government entrusted the scheme to two syndicates—a German group, that was given a contract for a trial section, in the north, and an American group, with British and French interests, under similar conditions in the south. At the outset all went well, but, owing

to a difference of opinion with Teheran as to payment for work done, the contracts were cancelled; but not before a considerable amount of money had been spent and probably lost, for so far a claim for reimbursement has met with no success. Whether the debt will eventually be honoured remains to be seen. Meanwhile, having ruled out all foreign capital and assistance, Persia has decided to carry on the work herself. That a completed line will take twenty years is the pious hope of optimists; that the cost will treble the original estimate is certain; but that it can ever be made to pay at all is a question that, oddly enough, troubles no one. As the principal articles sent by rail to the Gulf would be timber and rice, the chances are that it will prove a dead loss; for it is hardly possible that such commodities could compete successfully in any distant market. The day may come when Persia will have something of more value to export, and a railway then will be essential. As things are, however, even if the country was a network of lines, the commercial advantage would be *nil*.

Two considerations, and two only, have hurried the venture—display and strategy. A civilised country dependent upon road transport was an anachronism. Westernisation and railways are inseparable, and Persia was determined to be in the fashion. Whether or no passengers or merchandise would be forthcoming was beside the mark; all that mattered was to construct a line from somewhere to somewhere else. From the strategic point of view there is certainly more to be said, for internal disorders and unruly tribes must be dealt with. To this extent, therefore, a railway from north to south would be useful. But, oddly enough, those in authority have never looked further ahead and realised the importance of an eventual linking up with the Iraq line at Basrah. Here is a sound commercial proposition, for if Persia has any hidden resources—and she maintains that she has—Europe will be brought within easy and profitable trading distance. Until that time arrives, however, her nearest and second biggest market is Russia. But here she deals with a dangerous customer, whose agents, as ruthless as they are determined, exercise a stranglehold wherever they set foot. And Persia is fully alive to the fact and would like to be free. But it is not so easy; the snare has been well laid. Thus traders, subsidised from Moscow, sell their wares at prices that defy competition; dumping, too, is practised on a vast scale. On the other hand, the Persian merchant who crosses the frontier is compelled to accept 90 per cent. payment in goods and not more than 10 per cent. in cash. In short, the Soviet authorities 'rig' the market and fix prices to their own advantage. With the dice loaded in this way Russian importers sweep the board, and that to the slow ruin of Persian producers. As an example of peaceful penetration this is

certainly the most up to date and at the same time the most difficult to resist. If Persia was strong politically she might turn the tables, or at least hold her own. As it is, she must bow to the inevitable and watch the ruthless exploitation of her resources without being able to raise a finger. And yet, despite this, the curious anomaly arises that, whereas bankruptcy is a world trouble to-day, Persia is not only solvent, but far better off financially than most nations! It was said by Canning that next to facts, figures were even more fallacious. But, however that may be, measured by the accepted standard of trade returns, her position is undoubtedly sound. To begin with, she has practically no national debt or foreign loans; her annual budgets are regularly balanced and taxes are low. As to trade, it is on the increase, if—and it is a big reservation—the receipts from the oil industry are taken into account. Whether or no the country, as a whole, is more prosperous or contented is another matter. There is certainly no outward sign that this is so, but as the vast majority of the population never move further afield than the next village or town there is nothing to encourage a different or a better standard of living. As regards taxation, although the screw has not been long turning, once it begins there is no saying when it will stop. So far there is little to complain of. Still, if the Shah's policy of westernisation is to be carried through, more money will be needed and the peasants, who form the bulk of the population, will have to pay the piper—and that for a tune that only those in authority really want to listen to.

So much for the internal affairs of the country. But there is another equally important aspect of national life—namely, Persia's relations with foreign Powers. With her neighbour towards the east, Afghanistan, she is on the best of terms, and, as there is no clashing of interests or frontier disputes, things are likely to remain so. To the west there is Iraq, with whom peace is all-important, for the one reason, if for no other, that here is the main thoroughfare to Europe. As to Turkey, it would be hard to find any serious cause for trouble, except possibly towards Kurdistan, which is always a seething pot but seldom overboils. The Gulf and Baluchistan complete the square, and, as British influence is paramount in both, if trouble should ever arise Persia will only have herself to blame.

When all is said and done there is only one danger spot—her northern frontier. History relates that Peter the Great in his will urged Russia never to take her eyes off the sea, for in that sphere lay her greatness. Accordingly Russian policy is, and always has been, in the direction of the ocean. But she must have an ice-free port. For centuries her gaze was fixed on Europe, where by force of arms she hoped to attain her end. But her

efforts were doomed to failure; the Great Powers, and England in particular, were always the stumbling-block. Only of late years in the Far East has her dream been in any way gratified. There she has found an outlet; but of how little advantage! In Central Asia, however, there was still a possibility of success, and the way led through Persia. Accordingly her every effort was shaped in that direction. But she must move warily. By way, therefore, of disguising her intentions a new policy was adopted. Instead of penetration by force—that should come later—penetration by trade was the order of the day, and with a determination that has never flagged, and which has become more aggressive with time, Russia pursued her course. By fair means and the reverse she has succeeded in monopolising the trade of the northern provinces, and is now overrunning the south; exploitation on a more extended scale will follow in due course. Then, having firmly established her economic position, some excuse will be found to pick a quarrel, and if opposition is offered she will back her pretensions by an occupation of territory. When that day arrives it will not be long before Persia becomes a Soviet protectorate with the Gulf as a coast-line and India a passable frontier. The march of events is as sure as that of the seasons, and Reza Shah is fully alive to the fact, but until he possesses an army that can enforce respect matters will go from bad to worse. And not for the first time has Persia been a pawn in the Russian game; England, however, has always been at hand to preserve her integrity, for unaided and alone she would long ago have been absorbed in the Russian Empire.

To-day Persia's mistrust and dislike of foreign Powers is quite as apparent as it is real. But why should England be included in the anathema? If ever a nation deserved well at her hands, we can at least claim a measure of gratitude. Owing to our initiative her great petroleum resources were discovered and developed: when it has been a question of a loan, we have treated her even better than our Colonies; the telegraph system, that connects her with the outside world, was the result of British enterprise; the first bank to be established in the country was founded and managed by Englishmen. Moreover, within recent years we have linked her up with an air route of which she can take the fullest advantage. And all this without her subscribing the fraction of a kran. And how would her traders have fared in the Gulf but for British warships? We police the waters and, by preventing piracy, commerce is uninterrupted. Again, during the late war we patrolled her northern frontier, constructed roads at a cost of several millions, and trained and equipped a military force for her own defence. In short, England has always safeguarded and furthered her interests in every possible way. That

is not to say that our efforts were entirely altruistic ; international relations are invariably backed by something more than goodwill. But in view of the fact that we have always respected her political independence and obliged others to do so, and further have never ceased to advance her position as an Eastern Power, we surely have a right to expect more favour and consideration than those who exploit her simply and solely for their own ends.

And yet how do matters stand ? There is hardly a British enterprise that has not been subjected during the last few years to some petty annoyance or added restriction. In the case of the Indo-Eastern Telegraph Company, as also the Indo-European Telegraph Department, the position ultimately became so impossible that it was decided to hand over both to the Persian Government. The Imperial Bank, too, has been deprived of many of its rights and privileges ; whilst the Airways Concession is unlikely to be renewed on the score that the machines may be used for war purposes ! There are also several monetary claims long outstanding ; agreements entered into that have never been carried out—in short, questions affecting international harmony, which the Persian Government seems bent on destroying. It is a small matter, but, as an indication of goodwill, surely the Persian Exhibition recently held in London is sufficient proof. There were no ulterior motives ; no question of a *quid pro quo* or financial profit. The sole object was to stimulate interest in an historic nation through the channels of art. And in that respect nothing could have been more successful, for, quite apart from admiration of the treasures collected, the minds and thoughts of many thousands in England have been centred in a country of which they would like to know and see more. Could the stage be better set for mutual understanding and friendship ?

In the Far East the drums are beating to arms, which, unless the League of Nations can silence them, will be heard in other lands. Central Asia, with its warring nationalities always restless, may at any moment be in a ferment. Then will be Russia's opportunity, for the Shah's army will be no match for the forces of the Soviet. Rather than risk a quarrel Persia may agree to satisfy every demand of her arrogant neighbour. In the deplorable event of hostilities, unaided and alone she can never ride out the storm. Will she, as has so often happened in the past, appeal to England ? The answer will depend upon many circumstances. But if it should be decided that, our main interests being centred in the Gulf, intervention further afield is not to be expected, she will then realise the loss of an ally always ready in the past to ensure her independence.

T. COMYN-PLATT.

BREAKING UP THE ATOM

DR. J. D. COCKCROFT's and Dr. E. T. S. Walton's successful construction and operation of an electrical apparatus which will disintegrate atoms is a brilliant contribution to science. They have invented a powerful new technique for the investigation of the structure and properties of atoms, and incidentally they have shown for the first time how matter may be transformed into energy through the operation of a humanly constructed machine. Hitherto this has been done only with the assistance of naturally radioactive substances. As the earth contains little of these, there was no prospect of the energy of matter becoming available from the utilisation of them as part of an energy-releasing apparatus. Cockcroft and Walton have shown how some of the energy of matter may be obtained without using radioactive substances. The quantities of energy obtained in their experiments by the transformation of matter are very small, and very much smaller than the energy required to operate the apparatus. There is no early prospect of energy being obtained from matter for industrial purposes, but the work of Cockcroft and Walton is an important contribution to this end, which may be achieved in the future. Applied scientists wish to discover a source of energy infinitely richer than the combustion of coal or the kinetic energy of falling water, and the enormous quantities of energy fastened up as packets of matter are the object of their consideration. The energy of the stars almost certainly is derived from the transformation of matter into energy—by the annihilation of mass, as the astrophysicist says. Cockcroft and Walton are the first to have constructed a machine which will (though as yet only on an infinitesimal scale) imitate one of the activities which occur inside a star—namely, that particular stellar activity which enables mass to be transformed into energy. In the star mass is transformed into energy in the form of light. In Cockcroft's and Walton's apparatus mass is transformed into energy in the form of the energy of motion of flying atoms of helium.

These young physicists must experience an extraordinary elation when they reflect that the main line of man's struggle with Nature passes directly through them. They stand at the

point in evolution before which man did not know how to release atomic energy by machines of his own construction, and after which man is in possession of this knowledge. Cæsar himself was not more fortunate in his destiny. Cockcroft and Walton have, of course, had the fortune to be near the main line of evolution during a very progressive period, and have had the ability to apply the results of many recent advances to the solving of a great problem that had become ripe for solution. Others have solved problems of equal difficulty though not of equal moment. Einstein has remarked on his own good fortune in happening to be at hand when certain major problems in the theory of mechanics had become ready to be solved. His own contribution was not in itself greater than those of a number of others, but its effects appeared to be more momentous because it was the final step which enabled the climbers to see over the top of a great intellectual obstruction.

The branch of physics to which Cockcroft and Walton have made so important a contribution is not marked by any definite beginning. Atomic physics slowly crystallised out of the atomic philosophy of the Greeks, or even the anonymous atomistic speculators who preceded them. For twenty centuries the concept of atoms was fitfully used by natural philosophers to assist in the interpretation of natural phenomena. During that period it was useful as a theoretical rather than an experimental notion. Experimenters such as Robert Boyle employed the idea of atoms in order to interpret the properties of gases, but they did not use sufficiently precise atomic ideas to lead to new knowledge. Their atomic theories only made what happened seem reasonable and did not advance knowledge, so their conceptions of the atom were speculative, and not much developed beyond those of which Lucretius wrote so splendidly. Such seventeenth-century experimental physiologists as John Mayow, a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, ascribed the ability of air to support life and combustion to 'nitro-aerial particles' obtainable from air or nitre. These 'nitro-aerial particles' were a remarkable prevision of oxygen atoms. The advance from speculation to verification in the use of the concept of atoms was immensely hastened by Newton. He developed a science of mechanics which enabled the behaviour of 'particles' to be calculated exactly. The 'particles' of Newtonian mechanics had as little experimental reality as the 'atoms' of Lucretius, but as they enabled a multitude of correct predictions of the behaviour of moving bodies on and off the earth to be made, scientists began unconsciously to believe in atoms as a reality of Nature and not merely a valuable intellectual concept for interpreting natural phenomena.

Newton's free use of the concept of particles caused a large increase in the belief in the reality of atoms, though there was little more experimental evidence for their existence at the end than at the beginning of his period.

John Dalton was the first to use the concept of atoms as a guide to new knowledge, as well as an interpretation of old knowledge. His use of the concept to explain the properties of gases and of the laws of chemical combination of substances was an immense stimulus to experiment. His atoms helped chemists to visualise what happened in chemical combination. Their mathematical properties were of the simplest arithmetical kind, and they were therefore free from the mathematically elegant insubstantiality of Newtonian particles. Dalton's atoms were specially attractive to the non-mathematical minds of chemists. But within two generations the Daltonian concept of atoms had evolved in the direction of mathematical complication. Clerk-Maxwell and others applied the laws of statistics to collocations of elastic particles and deduced the probable properties of such collocations of particles. The size and speed of movement of the atoms in gases were calculated by the laws of statistics. By this time the properties of the average atom were becoming much better known. There is a fundamental difference between the concept of any particular atom and the average atom. When the concept of anything is deduced by averages it necessarily lacks all those features obliterated by the process of averaging. I believe the development of the statistical theory of atoms hindered the operation of the imagination in trying to think exactly what an atom was like. It was easier to stop thinking of this and to turn to the machine of mathematical statistics and by turning the mathematical handle to hope to learn more about atoms without imaginative conceptual effort. Thus the tendency to conceive atoms as indivisible units became steadily harder during the course of the nineteenth century, as the statisticians tended more and more to obliterate the conceptual individuality of atoms. By concentrating on the statistical properties of atoms physicists tended to ignore the structural properties of atoms, as statistical economists tend to ignore the personalities of men in favour of the featureless statistical man. This tendency much increased the intellectual difficulties confronting the creators of modern atomic physics.

The germ of modern theories of atomic disintegration may be found in a famous paper on the dissociation of chemical molecules published by Sir. J. J. Thomson nearly fifty years ago—in 1883. He discussed the electrical properties of molecules which dissociated into atoms when subjected to heat. The ideas developed in this work were adopted later to explain the phenomenon of the ionisation of gases. When gases are ionised they will conduct

electricity. The study of the discharge of electricity through gases led to the discovery of the electron. All gases were found to produce electrons under suitable conditions, so electrons were deduced to be a constituent of all atoms. When atoms were made to produce electrons they were, strictly speaking, disintegrated. The ordinary atom, which is the atom as conceived by Dalton, was supposed to be a final undifferentiated unit. When J. J. Thomson showed that electrons could be detached from atoms he had disintegrated the Daltonian atom. But this phenomenon, which was the explanation of ionisation, was too slight and temporary in its effects to be described as a disintegration according to the meaning of the word as used to-day. A normal hydrogen atom such as one might find in the gas from a gas-stove is now known to contain one electron and one proton as sole constituents. If subjected to electrical tension it may split into an electron and a proton. But if the tension is removed the electron and proton soon come together again and reconstitute a normal atom. Ionisation is a very mild and temporary form of disintegration which merely detaches electrons from the outside of the atom. When the ionising force is removed the atom is re-formed and reassumes its old character.

When an atom is disintegrated in the present-day sense of the term it undergoes a change of quite a different order. The matter in the atom is divided or combined into units which prove to be other sorts of atoms, and indeed some of the matter may actually be transformed into radiation or other forms of energy. The explanation of the difference between the mild and temporary disintegrations known as ionisation and the violent, permanent disintegrations to which the term 'atomic disintegration' is now exclusively applied was first clarified by Rutherford when he suggested his nuclear conception of the atom. He was the first to recognise fully that radioactivity was due to a natural disintegration of atoms which was of a character very much more violent and more permanent than the temporary changes of ionisation. He therefore ascribed radioactive phenomena to a part of the atom quite different from that responsible for ionisation. As the ionisation of atoms was due to the detachment of electrons which bear a charge of negative electricity, the seat of the profound changes of radioactive disintegrations was to be sought in the part of the atom which contained the positive electricity. Ionisation was concerned with negative electricity; radioactive disintegration with positive electricity. Hence the great question of early twentieth-century physics: Where and in what shape is the positive electricity in an atom? Rutherford found the answer. By shooting atomic particles at atoms and seeing how they rebounded he deduced that all of the positive

electricity in an atom is concentrated almost at a point in the centre. He named this concentration the nucleus. The outer parts of the atom were occupied by electrons. The explanation of the transitory nature of ionisation followed immediately from this conception. Ionisation was due to the detachment of electrons held comparatively loosely in the outer parts of the atom. The profound changes of radioactive disintegration were due to changes in the nucleus. As the nucleus was very small and with a considerable electrical charge of several units it was difficult to get at. If some cosmical being beyond the solar system flung a small star at it, he would more probably score an outer than a bull's eye—that is, his star would more probably hit one of the group of planets than the relatively small central sun. If he knocked off one of the planets he would not cause a very great change in the solar system, but if his star hit and disintegrated the sun, the solar system would be profoundly changed. As the chemistry of atoms—that is, the way in which they combine together—depends on the way in which their outer parts fit into each other, chemistry is a function of the outer parts of atoms. If the nucleus of an atom could be changed without changing the outer parts, the chemistry of this atom would remain the same as before.

This phenomenon is known, and indeed is the explanation of the odd relations between the masses of atoms of many substances as determined by chemists. For instance, the atoms of the gas chlorine are known to be 35.5 times the mass of a hydrogen atom. This is due, it appears, to the fact that chlorine gas contains two sorts of atoms, one consisting of mass of exactly thirty-five units and the other of thirty-seven. These two sorts are mixed in a proportion which gives the number 35.5 determined by the chemist. Thus the statistical approach of the chemist who deals only with millions of atoms at a time had (necessarily) not suggested that atoms which had the chemical properties of chlorine might not necessarily have the same mass. Atoms of different masses may have identical chemical properties. The chemical properties depend on the number of electrons in the outer parts of the atom. As the electrical charge of an atom as a whole is zero, the nucleus must contain as much positive electricity as the amount of negative electricity borne by the outer electrons. As each electron carries a unit charge, the number of units of positive electricity in the nucleus must equal the number of electrons in the outer part of the atom. Now the nucleus may consist of a combination of positive and negative units of electricity, with the number of positive units predominating. So long as the difference between the number of positive and negative units remains the same, the total positive charge on the nucleus

remains the same, and the chemical properties of the atom may remain the same. For instance, one kind of chlorine atomic nucleus contains thirty-five positive units or protons and eighteen negative units or electrons, leaving a positive charge of seventeen units. The other kind of chlorine atom contains thirty-seven protons and twenty electrons, leaving the same nuclear charge of seventeen units. But the masses are as 35 : 37, as the mass of the protons makes up nearly the whole of the mass of the nucleus. In order to transform an atom of one element into an atom of another element the size of the charge of positive electricity on its nucleus must be changed. This happens naturally in radioactive substances. Their atomic nuclei explode, with the emission of particles or rays and a rearrangement of the remaining constituent charges, which usually but not necessarily produces a nucleus of a different charge and hence an atom of different chemical properties. If the nucleus emits an electron and a proton together, the net charge on the remaining constituents remains the same, and the chemical properties of the atom remain the same, though the nucleus has lost part of its mass—in fact, one unit, as the proton is the unit of mass, the mass of electrons being negligible.

The phenomena of natural disintegration inspired Rutherford to attempt artificial disintegration. When a radium atom disintegrates it emits particles some of which travel at about 10,000 miles a second. If a zinc sulphide screen is placed in the way, these particles cause a little green flash when they hit it. The emission of particles may be detected by these means. The skilful and experienced experimenter is able to recognise the sort of particles from the sort of green flash or scintillation they make. If an atom of any kind is fairly and squarely struck by one of the particles emitted by radium, it is given a severe jolt, as the struck atom is of the same order of heaviness as the striking atom, which may be moving at 10,000 miles a second. Rutherford placed some atoms of a substance in front of a zinc sulphide screen and then placed a radioactive substance near the atoms, and looked to see what happened. In certain cases he found that when the substance was bombarded by the particles from the radioactive material green flashes appeared on the screen which could not have come from the radioactive material. He concluded that the green flashes were due to particles knocked out of the nuclei of the bombarded atoms by the particles from the radioactive source. In particular, he found that particles were knocked out of the nuclei of aluminium atoms by the nuclei of helium atoms which are emitted by radium preparations. From the nature of the flash these particles made, and by means of other tests, he deduced that they were protons, or nuclei of hydrogen

atoms. Thus he had removed hydrogen from aluminium. Other examples of similar changes were discovered. For instance, Blackett showed that a helium nucleus of a charge of two units could cannon into a nitrogen nucleus of a charge of seven units, forming one new oxygen nucleus of a charge of eight units, and one free hydrogen nucleus of a charge of one unit. He actually secured a photographic trace of the interchange with a Wilson apparatus.

In these first disintegrations of atomic nuclei there were changes of sub-atomic energy. In the nucleus of an atom there is a tiny closely packed group of protons and electrons. When tiny packets of electrical energy, such as protons and electrons, are packed together there is a small diminution of total mass. This is deducible from the behaviour of electric charges in a constricted region. For instance, the nucleus of a helium atom contains four protons and two electrons, but it is somewhat lighter than the mass of four separate protons and two electrons. In fact its mass is 0.76 per cent. less than that of the sum of the masses of these six particles. If six such particles could be made to combine to form a helium nucleus, 0.76 per cent. of their mass would disappear and reappear as some form of energy. Thus the production of helium out of hydrogen (which consists of an electron and a proton) would be attended by the emission of much energy. Indeed, the manufacture of one-hundredth of an ounce of helium out of hydrogen would be attended by the emission of energy equivalent to a million horse-power for one hour. Though Cockcroft has not made helium out of hydrogen he has done something resembling it, as will be explained presently, and he has obtained small emissions of energy due to the transformation of mass into energy when a proton has lost mass by being incorporated in an atomic nucleus.

The artificial disintegrations of atomic nuclei first effected by Rutherford were done with the assistance of such radioactive substances as Nature happened to provide. The experimenter was restricted to the use of the small group of radioactive substances which happened to emit particles which could be used as disintegrating cannon balls. He was restricted to sources which gave relatively few particles, because radioactive matter is very rare. In order to obtain stronger sources quantities of radium were needed larger than those which exist. Also, the naturally occurring radioactive substances emit only a comparatively small number of kinds of particles travelling at different speeds. The experimenter had to make shift with particles in such quantities and speeds as Nature happened to provide, and Nature happened to be parsimonious. Rutherford and his colleagues wanted disintegrated particles with unlimited speeds and in unlimited

numbers. Could such particles be provided by a machine? Could the experimenter be emancipated from the limitations set by the quantities and properties of radioactive substances? A different source of high-speed particles was required. Was there any method of causing relatively heavy particles such as protons and helium nuclei to move at high speeds? If such particles could be subjected to powerful electric or magnetic forces they might be accelerated to high speeds. Experimenters attempted to devise methods of doing this. Protons and other atomic nuclei are easily obtained from electric discharge tubes. When an electric current at high voltage runs through glass tubes containing gas at low pressure the atoms of the gas are ionised, and incidentally may emit light. For instance, the red light advertisement signs now so fashionable are electrical discharge tubes containing the gas neon. Under the voltage applied to the tube the nuclei of the neon atoms (and some inner electrons) move towards one end of the tube and the electrons towards the other. Hence there are two streams of particles. If the gas in the tube is hydrogen, one stream consists of protons, the other of electrons. Thus an electrical discharge tube will provide streams of protons. Protons are more useful than electrons for disintegrating purposes, because they are nearly 2000 times heavier than electrons, which may easily be obtained at very high speeds, but are too light to be able to deliver a severe shock to any atom they happen to hit. The speed of the protons in the tube depends on the voltage applied. As the voltage is usually relatively low, the speed is not high. A method of increasing the speed was required. Could the protons obtained from a discharge tube be submitted to extra electric or magnetic forces to increase their speed?

A very ingenious method was proposed by the American physicist Lawrence. He suggested that the protons should be accelerated in a circular magnetic field. When the particle enters the field it starts to move round the circle and gathers speed under the magnetic force. As the speed increases the centrifugal effect causes the circle to widen. The proton travels round a spiral starting from the inside, and as it passes down the unwinding arm is steadily increased in speed. This ingenious method should supply streams of protons of almost unlimited speed. But the experimental difficulties are great. In the early stages of the Cambridge experiments attempts were made to develop a method very similar to Lawrence's but were discarded in favour of a more direct method of attack which promised to give much higher intensities of proton streams. Meanwhile, other workers, notably Tuve, Hafstad and Dahl, have developed other methods of accelerating protons with voltages as high as two millions, but their methods are such

that the proton stream intensities are extremely low, and their machine is of a type which renders measurement of any sort extremely difficult. Cockcroft set out to design an apparatus which would provide proton streams which were intense and manageable besides being swift. This is a very important point. Mere voltage in an apparatus is of little help if it does not work with sufficient definition and current to be manageable, and to be applicable to instructive experiments. For instance, in experiments with light a powerful source is sometimes required. For this purpose a steady electric lamp may be more useful than a magnesium flare, though the flare may emit more light as a whole. Manageability and flexibility in an apparatus are as important as size and power. This is beautifully illustrated by Cockcroft's apparatus. In the present design it produces protons moving under less than 800,000 volts, which is several times less than the voltage used in some other kinds of proton-stream apparatus. But the manageability of his apparatus and its precision have enabled him to obtain results which other types of apparatus working under much higher voltages have not given because the experimenter could not or did not know how to use them effectively.

Cockcroft received an additional stimulus from the theoretical discoveries of the young Russian physicist Gamow, who showed that the nuclei of atoms should be easier to disintegrate than had previously been believed. Before the development of the new wave theory of matter physicists had tended to believe that the nuclei of atoms are extremely difficult to disintegrate; that immense powers are necessary to do it. This idea was partly a heritage from the belief in the immutability of atoms, and partly from the experience of the disintegrators who used radioactive substances. The disintegrating particles from radium move with an energy of 8,000,000 electron volts, so presumably protons moving under several millions of volts would be necessary to obtain similar results. Gamow's theory of the nature of nuclear disintegration suggested that much lower voltages might be successful, and Cockcroft was inspired to complete his apparatus for working at voltages which would have seemed uselessly low, before Gamow had produced his theory. Cockcroft obtains the protons from a tube containing hydrogen. These enter, at a relatively low speed, the top of a large vertical glass tube. The ends of this tube are attached to a source of high voltage, the difference being adjustable up to 800,000. When the protons enter this field their speed down the tube is enormously accelerated. At the bottom of the tube they may be moving with a velocity of about 10,000 miles a second. Cockcroft obtains his high-tension current from a 200,000-volt transformer such as is now commonly

used in the distribution of electrical power. By an ingenious arrangement of condensers and rectifiers he is able to multiply the voltage by four (up to 800,000) and to obtain a steady voltage in one direction. At the bottom of the tube there is a thin window of mica. The protons shoot through this, though the air outside the tube cannot go through. When working under a voltage of 710,000 the protons penetrate about half an inch of air and cause it to become luminous. Their speed is about 7000 miles a second. Cockcroft and Walton immediately made quantitative investigations with their apparatus. They measured the range of the protons in hydrogen gas and compared the data obtained from radioactivity experiments. They saw at once what significant measurements to make with their apparatus. Others who had produced swift proton streams had not, apparently, any clear idea of what to do with them. They had treated their apparatus rather as amusing toys than as instruments of quantitative analysis.

This difference shows the intellectual quality of Cockcroft's and Walton's work, for they immediately made measurements and significant investigations with the aid of their instrument, and did not bother much over the spectacular effects. They submitted specimens of various substances to the stream of protons. A layer of the light metal lithium was presented to the stream, at an inclination of half a right angle. A thin mica window was placed in the side of the tube facing the inclined layer. With this arrangement the lithium offered a considerable surface to the stream of protons and to the window, so that if anything came out of the lithium some of it would pass out of the tube through the window. By arranging the mica window at the side of the tube the possibility of protons from the stream coming through was eliminated—if anything came it must be from the lithium. Cockcroft and Walton discovered that when the proton stream was moving under the moderate voltage of 125,000 something was emitted from the lithium at right angles to the stream of protons (according to their observational arrangement) which passed through the mica window and caused scintillations on a zinc sulphide screen outside the tube. The differences in the scintillations made by different sorts of particles enable experienced observers to deduce from mere appearance the sort of particle which has caused them. These scintillations were almost certainly not due to protons. They were not the sort of scintillation a proton would have made if it had succeeded in wandering out of the tube. They resembled very much the scintillations made by helium atomic nuclei when ejected from radium. Lord Rutherford was the first to discover the nature of the particles ejected from radium which gave this sort of scintilla-

tion. Some thirty years ago he elucidated the nature of the α -particles, as he named them. When he gave the first account of the scintillations seen in Cockcroft and Walton's experiments to the Royal Society a few weeks ago he is reported to have said: 'I was present at the birth of the α -particle, and I recognised these at once as legitimate children.'

The scintillations suggested that the protons which had struck the lithium atoms had caused some to disintegrate and emit helium atomic nuclei. The identity of the sort of particles causing the scintillations was confirmed by Wilson apparatus experiments. When the particles entered such an apparatus they made tracks very similar to those made by α -particles. There are several theoretical reasons why these particles might be expected to be α -particles. There is evidence that the nuclei of atoms frequently contain α -particles as constituents. For instance, radium atoms emit α -particles when they disintegrate. When atomic nuclei are caused to vibrate by various sorts of bombardment they emit radiations which might be due to the vibrations of a group of α -particles. Further, the combination of a proton with a lithium nucleus to form two α -particles or helium nuclei would be theoretically reasonable. The mass of a proton is approximately one unit, that of a lithium nucleus is seven units, and that of a helium nucleus is four units. To a first approximation the mass of one proton plus one lithium nucleus exactly equals that of two helium nuclei. In their later experiments Cockcroft and Walton have proved that the α -particles are emitted in pairs, each member travelling in the exactly opposite direction. This is to be expected if their energy of motion arises internally from an atomic explosion in which some mass is transferred into energy. Moreover—what is much more exciting—the approximation is nearly exact to the second order. As explained in the earlier part of this article, the mass of one proton is rather more than one-quarter the mass of a helium nucleus. Hence if a proton combines with a lithium nucleus to form two helium nuclei, there should be a slight disappearance of mass, as the sum of the masses of the two helium nuclei is not quite equal to that of the proton and the lithium nucleus. This mass which disappears reappears as energy of motion in the two helium nuclei. They make up for their slight deficiency of mass by greater energy of motion. Cockcroft and Walton have estimated the energy of motion of the particles observed by them; it appears to be about 8,000,000 electron volts, making 16,000,000 for each pair. The quantity of mass that disappears is at present only known to within about 15 per cent., the measurements showing it is approximately equal to 14,000,000 electron volts of energy. This is a very fair first experimental agreement

The similar figures for the disintegration of fluorine atoms are in their agreement even more striking. The reader will have remembered that the proton which may release two helium nuclei of total energy—16,000,000 electron volts—from lithium may itself be moving in a field of only 125,000 volts. Hence the energy released in the disintegration is much larger than the energy of motion of the releasing agent. More energy is obtained from one disintegration than is needed to cause it. The swift proton may lead to a diminution of mass which represents a discharge of energy much greater than its own energy of motion. At first sight, the reader might conclude that energy was being created in the process. This is not correct. All the atoms, all the matter in the universe, represent packets of energy. At some time during the evolution of the universe matter has been made by congealing energy into packets of mass. We can reasonably suppose that these packets are not absolutely stable, and that a severe blow might explode them, as a blow with a hammer explodes a charge of dynamite. The proton bombardment is a method of pulling the trigger in certain atoms, and releasing much more energy than the amount needed to operate the trigger.

Though Cockcroft and Walton have for the first time in history succeeded in releasing sub-atomic energy by machinery, they have not as yet produced a power plant, nor is such an achievement in prospect—not for centuries, perhaps. First, at 400,000 volts only one proton out of every 10,000,000 accelerated succeeds in hitting and disintegrating a lithium atom. So even if in one disintegration energy is released as annihilated mass which is 100 times the energy of the proton which caused the release, the machine would need at least 100,000 times as much energy to produce the whole proton stream as was released by individual protons, which means that the machine in its present form is entirely impracticable as a source of energy. Secondly, the total energy of the proton stream is probably only a small fraction of the total electrical energy needed to produce the stream. So the 100,000 factor of inefficiency would have to be multiplied again into millions. But the construction of an efficient energy machine on the lines of Cockcroft's apparatus is not inconceivable. If the speed of the stream were very high, so that the protons could be fired into a block of lithium so thick that no proton could get through it without hitting and disintegrating a lithium atom, the release of sub-atomic energy might be greater than the quantity of electrical energy needed to operate the apparatus. The construction of such a machine is a problem for future engineers.

The physicist's immediate interests in the experiments are of a quite different sort. He welcomes them because they have

provided him with a new disintegrating technique which should soon be much superior to the old technique which depended on radioactive substances as the source of bombarding particles, and hence was limited by the rarity of these substances, and the comparatively small variety of the speeds of the particles they emitted. The new apparatus promises to provide swift particles of a variety of sorts and at an infinitely variable speed. For research the latter property is very important. By varying the voltage the speed of the particles may be varied. The knowledge of just what speed is necessary to obtain disintegration must help to give exact new knowledge of the structure of the atomic nuclei. Nuclei of helium and many other elements besides protons will be employable as bombarding particles. The results of bombarding atoms with swift nuclei of iron atoms, for example, should be very interesting. In fact, Cockcroft and Walton have developed a method of bombarding any sort of atoms with almost any other sort. The possibilities in the exploitation of their technique for atomic research are innumerable. They have already disintegrated many elements besides lithium, boron and fluorine—probably at least ten more; and they are working on other effects of equal interest not yet ready for publication. The years of fruitful experimentation started by their success must provide a large increase of data concerning the structure of atoms and hence lead to the deduction of more powerful theories of atomic structure, which must result in greater control over Nature.

The recent progress in physics which has brought the discovery of the neutron and of the first electro-mechanical method of disintegrating atoms and releasing mass energy seems strange against the present background of increasing social chaos. Is not the present social chaos in fact substantially due to modern advances in science? For the last 100 years science has been applied to industrial production more swiftly than the scientific attitude has permeated the administrators of these improved productive techniques. The percentage of administrators who understand science well enough to appreciate its attitude is still very small. How infrequently this understanding is found in officers of State and among the editorial staffs of the journals which form public opinion!

Is it not possible that a method of approaching problems which is so successful in physics and other branches of science may also prove to be successful in solving social problems? When some of the intellectual achievements of our own day equal the best of previous ages we are justified in expecting that this proved intellectual ability should help to extricate us from social chaos. We ought to insist that our social science shall be as successful as our physics. Recent achievements show that the human intellect

has not declined. Perhaps humanity will demand, as it increasingly appreciates the achievements of science, that methods which have been successful in one sphere shall be applied in others. Whatever our handicaps, we are not living in an age of intellectual decline. The present successes in science show that we are as intelligent as any of our ancestors. Such evidence of capacity ought to make us approach the social problems of the day with the maximum of confidence, and also with shame at having allowed them to arise.

J. G. CROWTHER.

L'AIGLON

Je ne suis pas prisonnier, *mais, mais.*

EDMOND ROSTAND, *L'Aiglon*.

At 4.30 in the morning of July 22, 1832, in Schönbrunn Castle, Vienna, there passed away the soul of a boy of twenty-one, who during his short life had been buffeted by outrageous fortune beyond his fellows. The pen of Edmond Rostand, and the divine genius of Sarah Bernhardt, immortalised him in the drama of *L'Aiglon*. His name was Napoleon Francis Charles Joseph—son of Napoleon Bonaparte and Marie Louise—the ill-fated 'King of Rome.'

It may be of interest at the moment to try to capture the real lineaments of this frail and fleeting figure through the tempestuous winds and waves that enveloped him from the cradle to the tomb, and that made him what he was. At one time it appeared as if Napoleon's marriage with Josephine, in spite of its childlessness, was to stand. He had come to believe himself incapable of having issue. On January 22, 1806, he had adopted Prince Eugène, thereafter known as Eugène Napoleon, as his successor on the throne of Italy. At that period the heir-presumptive to the throne of France was Napoleon Charles, the child of Louis and Hortense. And then, with dramatic suddenness, the scene changed. On December 13, 1806, Eléonore de la Plaigne, one of Napoleon's mistresses, gave birth to a son, Léon, of whom he was indisputably the father.¹ On June 5, 1807, his heir-presumptive, Napoleon Charles, died. Josephine's fate was sealed. On December 16, 1809, a Senatus Consultum announced the civil divorce.² On January 12, 1810, the religious separation was effected by the authority of the Metropolitan. Napoleon fixed on Marie Louise, Archduchess of Austria, as Josephine's successor. The proposed union met with Austrian and Papal sympathy as a means of avoiding a Russian alliance, and, although Marie Louise herself regarded her suitor as anti-Christ,³ she was prepared to sacrifice her prejudices for the sake of her country. Napoleon

¹ Aretz, *Napoleon and his Women Friends*, p. 196 (London, 1927).

² Masson, *L'Impératrice Josephine*, p. 1 (Paris, 1829).

³ Wertheimer, *Der Herzog von Reichstadt*, p. 18 (1902): Ravage, *Empress Innocence*, p. 67 (London, 1932).

overcame all hesitations and delays with characteristic decision. On February 6, 1810, he intimated through Eugène to Schwarzenberg that he was ready to marry Marie Louise if the contract could be signed within a few hours. The marriage was celebrated by proxy at Vienna on March 11, 1810, Napoleon being represented at the ceremony by his old adversary, the Archduke Charles. The civil marriage at St. Cloud followed on May 1, and the religious at the Chapel of the Tuileries on May 12, 1810. L'Aiglon was born on March 20, 1811, and received the title allocated to the future Prince Imperial on February 17, 1810, before the marriage of his parents, by the *Senatus Consultum* announcing the incorporation of the Roman States into the Empire, of 'King of Rome.'⁴ The public christening took place at Notre Dame on June 9, 1811.

Napoleon had married Marie Louise, however, for the purpose, not of securing the peace of Europe, but of consolidating his own dynasty. The disastrous Russian expedition broke the spell that he had cast over Europe. Then came a series of campaigns in which his military genius achieved victories that merely lured him into a blind resistance to all proposals for peace. On March 16, 1814, he wrote to his brother Joseph ordering the removal from Paris of Marie Louise and his son, whom he had on his departure in the previous January, to put himself at the head of the army, confided to the care of the National Guard, as soon as the Allies drew near to the city. 'He preferred,' he said, 'the Seine to the enemy.'⁵ He had always considered the fate of Astyanax the saddest tale in history.⁶ Marie Louise had been ready to defend Paris, but she obeyed her husband's orders, though the little King of Rome, not yet four years of age, struggled lustily not to enter the carriage that came to the Tuileries on March 29, 1814, to bear him away. On March 31, the Allies entered Paris. On April 2, the Senate pronounced Napoleon's deposition. The defection of Marmont turned the scale against a regency in the person of Marie Louise. The sentence went forth that Napoleon must abdicate for himself and his posterity and retire to Elba with the title of Emperor—an emperor whose sovereignty was limited to the island of his exile. On April 6 the abdication was signed. On April 11, 1814, the Treaty of Fontainebleau was concluded, by which Marie Louise acquired the independent sovereignty of the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, and the King of Rome assumed the title of Prince of Parma.

Thenceforward the policy of Metternich was directed to effecting the definite separation of Napoleon from his wife and

son. Marie Louise was urged to repair to Austria till Napoleon had an establishment ready for her in Elba. At first she demurred. 'Duty and inclination alike,' she said, 'called her to Napoleon's side.' But the old argument as to sacrificing herself for the sake of peace was used, and prevailed. On April 23, 1814, Marie Louise and her son set out for Austria. They arrived at Schönbrunn Castle on May 21. The people were delighted with the little Prince of Parma. 'He belongs to us,' they said. But the popular judgment on the mother was less favourable. 'Marie Louise is a Frenchwoman.' Her thoughts began to turn once more to Elba. She set out for Aix, nominally to take the baths, but really with the re-establishment of communications with Napoleon in view. Metternich regarded the expedition with apprehension, but the Emperor Francis shrewdly remarked, 'Her son, the Prince of Parma, remains in Vienna.' Unhappily, Napoleon, in September 1814, met her advances, such as they were, with bitter reproaches of having deserted him in his misfortune and separated him from his son, and had found solace for her absence in a visit from his beautiful Polish friend, the Countess Walewska. Her escort, Count Neipperg, destined to play so tragic a part in her life later on, made full use of his opportunity. On October 6, 1814, Marie Louise was back in Schönbrunn. By this time all correspondence between Napoleon and her had ceased. He was indignant at her failure to rejoin him, and still more so at the detention of his son in Austria—a reversion, as he bitterly complained to Sir Neil Campbell at Elba, to the ancient practice of keeping the children of vanquished warriors to adorn the triumphs of their conquerors. Marie Louise had already begun to pass under the influence of Neipperg—a distinguished soldier and accomplished Don Juan, whose other personal attractions were enhanced by a black bandage over the socket of one eye, destroyed by a French bayonet.⁷ And then, while Talleyrand, with the secret support of Metternich, but in the face of the opposition of the Tsar and the Austrian Emperor, was intriguing to deprive her and her son of their rights under the Treaty of Fontainebleau, the cataclysm of 'The Hundred Days' burst upon the world.

Encouraged by the reports that reached him as to the bickerings of the Allies at Vienna and the state of feeling in France, resenting the withholding of his son, and the alleged delays in the payment of his treaty allowances, Napoleon determined to put his fortune once more to the test. He left Elba on February 26, 1815. On March 20, he slept in the Tuileries. He had recovered France without striking a blow. Marie Louise heard the news of the flight from Elba as she returned from a

⁴ Wertheimer, p. 44, n. 3; *Cambridge Mod. Hist.*, ix., p. 140.

⁵ Wertheimer, p. 87.

⁶ *Correspondance de Napoléon*, vol. 27, No. 21, 497.

⁷ Oddie, *Napoleon II., King of Rome*, p. 85 (London, 1932).

walk. On March 18, 1815, in a letter to her father, written in French, probably with a view to its being brought to the notice of the Congress of Vienna, she placed herself and her son under his protection. Napoleon did not fail to perceive the political advantage to be derived from a reunion with his wife and son. He sedulously encouraged reports that both would shortly arrive in Paris, and did his best to fulfil the prediction by a succession of pressing letters to Marie Louise herself. Marie Louise handed the letters to her father and sent no reply to the appeals that they contained. It was not unnaturally assumed at Vienna that Napoleon would endeavour to obtain by ruse what had been denied to his entreaties. His emissaries were supposed to be everywhere, eagerly looking out for a chance of kidnapping the little King of Rome. Elaborate precautions were taken for his safety. He was separated from his beloved governess, 'Maman Quiou' (Madame de Montesquiou), and from other French influences. He was moved from his rooms in Schönbrunn to quarters in the palace deemed more secure. All the border towns were carefully guarded. In the event, no Scarlet Pimpernel was forthcoming, and the main interest of the entire episode is to be found in the description of L'Aiglon circulated by Freiherr von Hager, President of the Police Department, to all posting stations, in order to prevent his removal:

He is two and a half feet in height, rather sturdily built, has a smooth face, plump cheeks, colouring pink and white, blue, rather deep-set eyes, a small turned-up nose, somewhat wide nostrils, a small mouth with slightly pouting red lips, very large white teeth, long fair hair, parted on the crown, and falling in thick curls round about the head down to the shoulders. The Prince ordinarily speaks French, also a little German: he speaks with vehemence and interprets his meaning by gesticulations. His manner is vivacious.⁹

Napoleon's fortunes were followed by Marie Louise with undisguised anxiety. As far back as April 1815 we find her expressing fervent hopes for the success of the Allies and declaring that in no circumstances would she return to France. Her heart had already been given to Neipperg. Waterloo set her free. Napoleon abdicated in favour of his son. But opinion in the French Chambers was divided by the skilful intrigues of Fouché. The victorious Allies were determined to have done with the Bonapartist dynasty once and for all. The 'hospitality of the *Bellérophon*' led to the rock of St. Helena, and, as the curtain dropped, Marie Louise, writing to her father on July 28, 1815, expressed the hope that the man whose throne she had shared, and who was the father of her child, would be kindly treated but would trouble her life no more.

⁹ Letter of June 4, 1815, cited in Wertheimer, p. 171.

The story of the next few years is one of a long series of intrigues on the part of Metternich, aided by the timidity of the Emperor Francis and the weakness of Marie Louise, on whom the evil influence of Neipperg was constantly increasing, to strip the young Napoleon of every vestige of kingship, to dissociate him from all points of contact with his father's name, and, if possible, to blot out that name from the pages of contemporary history. In April 1816 Marie Louise, after having surrendered her imperial title and dismissed her French retinue, set out for Parma, the duchy of which had been provisionally secured to her by the Treaty of Fontainebleau, leaving her son in his grandfather's care—a fate to which Napoleon had written to Joseph that death was to be preferred.⁹ Her behaviour in Parma was sufficiently correct to satisfy even the watchful eyes of Metternich and Neipperg. She avoided all contact with the Bonapartists. The memory of Napoleon existed for her no more. She had, in fact, taken Neipperg as her lover on her arrival in Parma. But her subserviency could not win for her the confidence of the Bourbon king. Fresh fuel for his mistrust was soon provided. Through the medium of an Austrian named Welle, who had accompanied Baron Stürmer to St. Helena, Napoleon had received a lock of his son's hair. Marie Louise, as we know, was guiltless of any complicity in the despatch of this souvenir. But nothing would convince the Bourbon Court of her innocence. A swarm of plots, real and imaginary, for the rescue of the captive by force or stratagem was soon forthcoming. Russia, Prussia, and England caught the contagion. During the campaign of 1814, Schwarzenberg had said that it needed but the erection, in some prominent place, of a bogey, clad in a three-cornered hat, a dark green surtout, white waistcoat and breeches and riding-boots, to scatter the Allies like the wind. And now the temporary panics of 1814 were repeated. The precautions against a second flight of the Eagle from his cage to France were redoubled. The chancelleries of Europe were submerged by a torrent of despatches, and Metternich seized the opportunity of the general confusion to carry out his policy to the bitter end. The official Almanac for 1817 contained the names of Marie Louise, Archduchess of Parma, and her son, without any reference to the husband and father, or to the boy's contingent rights under the Treaty of Fontainebleau. Later on in the same year it was arranged that Marie Louise should rule Parma for life only,¹⁰ with an annual income of half a million francs, and that thereafter the duchy should revert to Lucca. The Treaty of June 10, 1817, by which this provision

⁹ Letter of February 8, 1814, cited in Masson, *Napoléon et son Fils*, p. 183 (Paris, 1904).

¹⁰ Oddie, p. 115.

was secured to the mother, contained no allusion to the son. But Austria had undertaken his maintenance, and in letters of August 13 and September 27, 1817, Marie Louise thanks her 'Dear Papa' for the 'good deed' he has done in receiving Napoleon's son as a younger prince of the House of Hapsburg. 'Dear Papa' did not, however, quite merit this expression of gratitude. On July 22, 1818, the young Napoleon was accorded the name, rank and arms only of a Duke of 'Reichstadt'—the name of the Emperor's own estate. But, in spite of Metternich, Francis and Marie Louise, L'Aiglou knew and adored his father's name. Welle's packet had contained the following lines written for him in French by his nurse, Madame Marchand, and signed by her: 'Here you will find a lock of my hair. If you have the chance, get your portrait painted and send it to me.'

The successive tutors of the young Duke of Reichstadt in Vienna—Dietrichstein, Foresti, Collin, and Obenaus—found the education of their pupil a difficult, and somewhat thankless, task. Napoleon had been determined to lose no time in commencing the education of his son. His instruction in the rules of French grammar began when he was two years old. Before his removal from Paris he knew by heart thirteen of the Fables of La Fontaine and had learned something of the elements of geography and history. The result of these well-meant but misguided efforts had been to implant in the mind of the young Napoleon a settled distaste for regular study, which his instructors struggled vainly to uproot. They treated him personally with kindness, although his alternate fits of laziness and anger called at times for disciplinary action. His toys were taken away, and on one recorded occasion Foresti, whom he had threatened to strike, put him in a corner. The system that his tutors pursued had as its main objects the eradication from his mind of all memory of the past and the substitution of Austria for France in his life and thoughts. He was allowed to mention his father's name in his morning and evening prayers, and no disrespectful allusion to the ex-Emperor was uttered in his presence. But he was taught to look upon Austria as his only home and the Emperor Francis as his sole support. In a measure this policy succeeded, as it was bound to do. The young Duke came to speak German fluently. He thought in German and not in French. But there were factors in the situation that neutralised every effort to make him altogether forget the past or the land of his birth. Their hold upon him had been strengthened by the influence of Madame Marchand, who had been permitted, owing to his delicate health, to remain with him till February, and of Madame Soufflot and her daughter, who were with him till October 1816. A still more potent circumstance was that from his earliest childhood he identified himself

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with the past and thought that he had lived through it. The words 'When I was King of Rome' were often on his lips. As years went on he realised that secrets were being kept from him. His apathy was only a mask, and from time to time he threw it aside. None of his tutors would tell him where his father was. But some of his questions had to be answered. 'Why was I once called King of Rome?' 'My father *must* have been a famous general?'. The Robinson Crusoe cave, which he built in the gardens of Schönbrunn Castle with the aid of Collin, was certainly associated in his mind with St. Helena. The death of the exile could not be concealed. Naturally, there was no official mourning at the Court of Vienna. But even Metternich saw no objection to a son mourning for his father, for whose loss he was transported with grief. Marie Louise wrote him from Parma, mingling her sorrow with his. But in the Mass for her husband's soul, for the celebration of which she had arranged in the duchy, the name of Napoleon was not mentioned, and she countered his last wish that his heart should be borne in a capsule to her in Parma by urging 'Dear Papa,' associating himself with England, to oppose a suggestion the only result of which would be to make Parma a centre of pilgrimage. In the three months' mourning which, on Neipperg's advice she had proclaimed in Parma, the ex-Emperor was unpaired except as 'His Serene Highness the husband of our most august sovereign the Duchess.'

The creation of a 'Duke of Reichstadt' had been intended by the Emperor Francis to satisfy the world that the young Napoleon was now, and would remain, an Austrian prince. To the fears of the Bourbon king it was merely the prelude to an attempt on the part of Francis to achieve his grandson's restoration to the throne of France. The irony of what remains of the story is that a restoration was prevented by the influence of Francis and Metternich alone. The political map of Europe was a patchwork of intrigues and counter-intrigues. Napoleon had latterly ceased to plot his own escape from St. Helena in the interests of his son. Conspiracies were rampant all the time. The conspiracy of August 1820 was followed by the explosion of a bomb in the Tuileries on January 27, 1821, and in 1822 a plot was launched to substitute a constitutional empire for the monarchy of Louis XVIII. Missioners, interested and disinterested—Pietra, Doudeuil, de Parrot, the Countess Napoleone Camerata, Napoleon's niece—followed each other in unending succession. The Bonapartist publicity department worked without ceasing. Pictures and representations of the young Napoleon were everywhere—and on everything, medallions, handkerchiefs, snuff-boxes and even braces—in evidence. Barthélemy published *Le Fils de*

l'Homme. His subsequent conviction was a worse than Pyrrhic victory for his opponents. Over the whole period, nothing that the royalists could do to achieve their own destruction was left undone. One section proposed the relegation of the Duke to the civil death of a monastery. Others were ready to effect the 'removal' of both father and son. For a time it looked as if the restoration of the latter was inevitable. He began—strangely enough, on the advice of Neipperg, who had wronged him so deeply—to devote himself to the study of his father's campaigns, without a knowledge of which, said Neipperg, he could never be a great soldier, and of French, which had become almost a foreign tongue to him during his residence in Vienna. On one point, however, he would seem to have been obdurate. He would not return to Paris merely as an imperial party leader. Nothing but the voice of France herself would serve. The voice of France was really calling him at times, but the policy of Metternich, in whose hands the Emperor Francis was but a puppet, deadened its message, and, unfortunately for him, the King of Rome at every critical period was far from the land of his birth. Metternich used his name as a pawn in the game of Austrian policy. It was allowed to be mentioned in connexion with the throne of Poland, and—a proposal to which, however, the change of religion that it would have involved offered an insuperable obstacle—of Greece. Metternich employed it as a threat to revolutionary activities in Italy, and Gneisenau supported the claim on the ground that it would lead to the dismemberment of France. But although the Countess Camerata succeeded in 'kissing the hand of her sovereign' and in delivering a letter to him in November 1830, the Duke of Reichstadt was, in the main, isolated from his would-be deliverers and from all real knowledge of the state of public feeling in his native land. The earlier Bonapartist conspirators had made a confidant of the Archduke Charles, and in later days his uncles Joseph and Lucien Bonaparte appealed directly to Metternich on his behalf. His Cousin Louis Napoleon dissociated himself from these appeals, and the whole web of intrigue was systematically displayed to the French Government by Metternich himself.

The young Duke's military training was thorough, and Dietrichstein saw to it that he received no premature promotion. He became captain in August 1828 and major in July 1830. On January 25, 1831, he met Marmont, the ex-Duc de Ragusa, who was charged with the duty of telling him the story of his father's battles, and of telling it truly. The Duke was not unaware of the unsavoury reputation of 'the man who betrayed Napoleon,' and at first received him coldly. But Marmont, although he doubtless omitted, or passed lightly over, the incident of his

treachery in 1814, and did not understate the importance of his own share in Napoleon's victories, appears not to have deserved Masson's description of his instructions as a '*déformation*' of French history,¹¹ and succeeded in gaining to a considerable extent the confidence of his pupil.

In June 1831 Count von Hartmann succeeded Dietrichstein as the Duke's instructor, and a period of severe work was entered upon. Then came the beginning of the end. The Duke, although delicate, had been a healthy child till his eighth year. He had escaped measles and scarlet fever, the usual ailments of childhood, and the chief cause of anxiety for his future health was the narrowness of his chest. In the spring of 1827 he complained of weakness and giddiness. But these symptoms were attributed to too rapid growth. He was still allowed, and indeed encouraged, to ride and to swim. But dancing and fencing were forbidden. His excitable disposition and his neglect of precautions brought back his maladies as soon as the care of his physician, Dr. Staudenheim, had succeeded in banishing them. 'He had,' said Dr. Malfatti, who attended him from the death of Dr. Staudenheim in May 1830 to the end, 'a soul of iron in a body of crystal.' In August 1831 he caught a catarrh and was sent back to Schönbrunn to recuperate. By the end of 1831 he had become affected by great lassitude. He exposed himself in all weathers as before, and fever and cough returned. During this period Marie Louise—regularly, although not perhaps fully, advised as to her son's condition—was absent for one reason or another from his sick-bed. But in May 1832 she had got as far as Trieste. She had no excuse now. Neipperg—whom she had secretly married after 1821 with ecclesiastical sanction, and to whom she had borne three children, the eldest in May 1817—had died in February 1829, and had been mourned for by her in a fashion very different from her mourning for Napoleon. Whether the young Duke knew the whole story of her relations with Neipperg is a question to which history has not furnished an answer. But public opinion, both in Parma and in Austria, demanded her presence in Vienna. On June 24, 1832, Marie Louise once more held Napoleon's son in her arms. He died at dawn on July 22, 1832. When his mother was summoned to his bedside he was no longer able to speak, but nodded twice to her in recognition of her presence. His father's name, omitted from the patent of July 22, 1818, creating him Duke of Reichstadt, was duly recorded in the inscription on the sarcophagus. He was laid to rest in the family vault of the Hapsburgs, but not before his death-chamber had been invaded by troops of relic-hunters, who 'within an hour of his passing

¹¹ *Napoléon et son Fils*, pp. 271, 273.

had snipped with irreverent hands every hair from the head of the dead Napoleon.' ¹²

Even death was powerless to wrest him from the whirlpool of politics in which his life had been spent and destroyed. The Bonapartist publicity department set to work again. Souvenirs innumerable appeared in all parts of France. Although tuberculosis was undoubtedly the cause of the Duke's death, the wildest charges that he had been destroyed by the Austrian Court were put in circulation. Metternich was, of course, the arch-villain. He had sent him a poisoned melon. He had encouraged him in excesses that undermined his health. In this connexion the name of the dancer, Fanny Tesler, held an evil, although apparently unmerited, pre-eminence.¹³ The torrent swept on with increasing violence till another Napoleon reigned in France. The shock of Sedan arrested it for a time. But twenty years later, when on March 15, 1900, *L'Aiglon*, a brilliant romance in every sense of the term, was first acted in Paris, it broke forth again, although since then its main current has flowed in the direction of securing the return of the ashes of Napoleon II. to France. Possibly the centenary of *L'Aiglon* may see the son restored at last to the father whom he loved, and whose love for him, tainted though it was by the alloy of ambition, was the purest passion of his life.

But surely the unique and abiding fascination of the story of the King of Rome lies elsewhere. It is the story of the life of an unhappy child, bereft of his father, deserted by the mother, who had been ousted from her place in his heart, as he was from his place in hers, by the demands of his expected destiny and the fierce, possessive, all-absorbing love of 'Maman Quiou,' sent to a strange land, drilled by kindly but narrow and unsympathetic tutors into forgetting his father's tongue and in ignorance of what his father's name had meant to the world, plotted over, tossed about on every wave of intrigue, and yet cherishing an undying love for the man whose image in his heart the purpose of his early training had been to destroy, and whom, as he grew up, he resembled in nothing but the pallor of his face and the occasional flashes in the deep-set eyes. Napoleon II. achieved nothing in life. He merely suffered. Almost the only piece of genuine history in Rostand's *L'Aiglon* is to be found in the dedication:

Ceci n'est pas autre chose
Que l'histoire d'un pauvre enfant.

¹² Oddie, p. 217.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

A. WOOD RENTON.

BEST-SELLERS IN FICTION

MRS. LEAVIS has written a remarkable book,¹ tracing the history of the best-seller, which, though it is perhaps somewhat marred by excessive 'highbrowism,' is nevertheless of more than passing value. She begins by noting the change that has taken place during the past two centuries in the habits of the reading public, which now reads comparatively little except fiction—educational books and vocational manuals being left out of the count. In the eighteenth century anyone who could read at all could read almost every novel published; also, he would be unlikely to let novels prevent the reading of poetry, history and *belles-lettres*. This holds until about 1880, though deterioration in the seriousness of the public's reading set in with Lytton. In (say) 1870, although 'Dickens, Reade, and Wilkie Collins were the idols of the man in the street and George Eliot and Trollope of the educated, yet each class read or perfectly well might have read the entire output of all the contemporary novelists, who all live in the same world, as it were, understand each other's language, live by the same code, and employ a common technique presenting no peculiar difficulty to the reader.' But now there are too many novels for any one person to read them all, even if he had nothing else to do. This material obstacle is partly, though only secondarily, responsible for the fact that since 1890 or 1900 the majority of the public reads the second-rate, if not indeed the worst, novels. A very significant declension, as we see when we recall that many 'text-book' novelists—Defoe, Richardson, Fielding, Smollett, Sterne, Scott, Dickens, Thackeray, Trollope, Meredith, Hardy, and others—were in their own day earning a good living; were, in fact, popular writers—best-sellers, in short. Many semi-literate persons as well as the educated could, and did, read and enjoy them.

To go adequately into the changes in environment that have caused this regrettable alteration in the quality of the fiction read by the many would require more space than can be spared. The sixteenth century could read with pleasure Lyly and Sidney,

¹ *Fiction and the Reading Public*, by Q. D. Leavis (April 1932: Chatto & Windus, 12s. 6d.).

the eighteenth could read Sterne, the nineteenth Pater; but only highbrows can—or at least do—read Virginia Woolf, E. M. Forster, James Joyce. In those past centuries readers were not easily bored; they concentrated easily: partly because there were fewer amusements. The temptations of the magazines, the newspapers, the circulating libraries of obvious fiction, the cinema, the wireless, the dance-hall, the motor car have either turned the public from serious reading or incapacitated it for such reading. The novel that cannot be grasped and appreciated immediately stands little chance nowadays. Instead of Gibbon, and even Macaulay, we now have amusing or witty biography; instead of Johnson and the Romantic critics, friendly short volumes of *belles-lettres* (though these sell comparatively few copies); science, theology, politics must now be bright and 'snappy.' Style has deteriorated; 'the change began when the mannered writing of the Romantic essayist, and later on of Pater, Meredith, and R. L. Stevenson, filtered down through the Press as the higher journalese: style became then something recognisably literary as distinct from educated speech-idiom. . . . A taste formed on mannered prose at the journalist's level is certain to find the classics of the language and the best contemporary literature insipid and dull.' The general reader may fairly be said to be now ignorant, in both senses, of that 'best contemporary literature'; yet Dr. Johnson rejoiced to find his opinion concurring with that of the common reader. A century later George Eliot, Meredith (after the initial struggle), and Hardy were read and enjoyed by the general public. Perhaps we need not stress the deplorable fact that the general reading public's capacity to read *and* enjoy good literature (past or present) has never been so low as now.

As early as 1909 a critic in the *New Age*, a brilliant journal that has been revived as the *New English Weekly*, could, as the result of a thorough investigation, say that the public prefers the novel to all other kinds of reading, because the novel 'gives the longest surcease from *ennui* at the least expenditure of time and money'—a judgment that obviously holds good for the present day. Novels are read not only to dispel boredom but to pass the time, to obtain a second-hand pleasure or else a compensation for life's hard knocks, to gain assistance in the art, more often the business, of living, and to refine and deepen, extend and correlate experience; the select few read novels, and of course more serious works, for more æsthetic and more intellectual reasons. The amount of reading has not lessened, but present-day reading is mainly of newspapers, magazines, and best-sellers. Mr. Compton Mackenzie thinks that these last are doomed to extinction, but, despite the rivalry of cinema and wireless, fiction will most

probably remain, for it fills a gap: 'it offers ideal companionship to the reader by its uniquely compelling illusion of a life in which sympathetic characters of a convincing verisimilitude touch off the warmer emotional responses.'

The ground, then, has been only too well prepared for the best-seller, (especially for the middlebrow and, more still, the lowbrow best-seller. It is the lowbrow best-sellers which have come to the strangest pass: their authors, if exceedingly popular and prolific, may become a limited company—e.g., 'Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc.', or 'Elinor Glyn, Ltd.' But for all classes of best-sellers it is the circulation which counts. The ascending scale is roughly this: The highbrow best-seller (E. M. Forster, Virginia Woolf) has a buying public of about 3000, a figure that, in special circumstances (political interest, libel, sexual audacity, personal news-value), may be increased to somewhere about 15,000 or 20,000; the 'literary' middlebrow best-seller (Hugh Walpole, J. B. Priestley) averages 20,000 to 30,000, and may go as high as 80,000 or a little more; the non-literary middlebrows (Philip Gibbs, Warwick Deeping) 50,000 to 100,000; the lowbrow, i.e., the 'real' or 'popular' best-seller (Ethel M. Dell, Edgar Wallace), runs from at least 100,000 to perhaps somewhere between 500,000 and 1,000,000, the average figure being 150,000–300,000.²

The reasons for the popularity of the middlebrow and the lowbrow best-sellers are various and disquieting—though, the condition of the reading public being what it is, natural enough. A best-selling author, whose novels had 'sold' 9,000,000 copies by the end of 1929, at which date he settled down to a steady million copies a year, has written, not hastily, but after due deliberation: 'The general public does not wish to think. . . . Without this specific idea in mind, I have, nevertheless, endeavoured to make all my descriptions so clear that each situation could be visualised readily by any reader precisely as I saw it. . . . I have evolved, therefore, a type of fiction that may be read with the minimum of mental effort.' He adds that many professional people enjoy his books 'because they offer the mental relaxation which they require of fiction.' Detective stories, for all their complexity, offer such relaxation because of their impersonality. Another very important reason for the popularity of the 'great best-sellers' (e.g., *The Sheik*, *Captains of Souls*, *The Constant Nymph*; this last being by a non-literary middlebrow, is even more of a 'freak'

² Irrespective of such a classification, it is well known among publishers that until an author 'gets a name,' his novels tend to stick between certain figures: 1000–1200; 2000–2500; 4000–6000; 12,000–15,000; 25,000–30,000; 40,000–50,000; 80,000–100,000. If the author has 'got a name,' these figures, I believe, represent the extent of certain publics. The same applies to the circulation of the highbrow *Criterion*, the middlebrow *London Mercury*, the lowbrow *Everyman*.

than the first-named) is what has been called wish-fulfilment; what we might also call fantasy-compensation; what the cynical might describe as an inexpensive chance to lead a double life.

The novel of romantic action (the modern and debased form of Scott and Dumas) affords perhaps the best case in point: *Beau Geste* (but not its sequels) has sold 500,000 since the original appeared in 1924. Romantic adventure is either 'a way of escape' or 'a form of self-indulgence'; add a potent dash of scantily sublimated (sexual) love, and you have a diet that is harmful because it leads to the 'not understood' complex; passion and stirring action are largely responsible for the enormous sales of *The Way of an Eagle*, *The Sheik*, and *The Blue Lagoon*, which last is, otherwise, much superior to the first two. Fantasy-spinning and day-dreaming play a very large part, as we see from the following announcement,³ by a small suburban circulating library, of 'Books' (significantly synonymous with Novels): 'good selection by "Sapper," Sax Rohmer, Zane Grey, E. M. Dell, May Christie, Edgar Wallace, William Le Queux, Margaret Pedler, Margaret Peterson, Kathlyn Rhodes, Olive Wadsley,' to which are added Rider Haggard, Phillips Oppenheim, and Ruby M. Ayres. If we further add E. M. Hull (ever to be calendared as the author of *The Shriek* as someone naughtily misnamed her most successful story) we get these notable results: of the fifteen writers here listed, eleven specialise in 'fantasying,' only the detective, thriller, and 'open-air' novelists refrain from a sticky wallowing in the emotional, and nine are women. Women, it may be noted, rival men also in the 1900-1920 period of best-selling: against Hall Caine, Nat Gould, and Charles Garvice we must set Marie Corelli, Florence Barclay, and Gene Stratton Porter. Though all six are dead, they had and still have a very large following, both men and women. But the women are the worse offenders; of the twelve we have just named, every single one was or is a day-dreamer, a romance-spinner (in their writings chiefly; in their lives they were, are, mostly very capable business-women indeed), whereas of the six 'greatest' male best-sellers of the last thirty years—Hall Caine, Garvice, Nat Gould, Oppenheim, Edgar Wallace, Edgar Rice Burroughs—only two can fairly be called day-dreamers (Edgar Rice Burroughs and Charles Garvice). There is no need to stress this fondness of women writers for such novels: the chief reason is that they know women readers to be 'passionately fond' of day-dreams. 'Fantasy fiction,' remarks Mrs. Leavis, 'is the typical reading of a people whose normal impulses are starved of the means of expression': not that the present writer excludes men; far from it! A famous woman novelist has recently said that 'fairly simple people (mostly

³ *The Publishers' Circular*, August 6, 1927.

women) . . . want to read of romance in a form not incompatible with their own opportunities.'

And, in this kind of interest in the novel, character has a very important share. Either the reader considers the persons as friends or enemies, or at the least as 'good to read about.' The keynote is given by a 'fan's' declaration of admiration to a lowbrow best-seller, 'Your characters are so human that they live with me,' and by such a novelist's declaration of faith, 'An author can have no greater compliment . . . than to be told that his or her characters appear to the reader *real people*.' Yet the characterisation may be very slapdash, very elementary, as can be seen in the exotically Colonial novels—the Indian stories of Ethel M. Dell and the rather better Maud Diver, the South African stories of Gertrude Page and Cynthia Stockley, in all of which, moreover, there is displayed no very intimate knowledge of the native population.

But there is something more than relaxation, wish-fulfilment, and lovable (or hateful) characters. There is that which, if combined with a first-class style, produces, or goes far towards producing, masterpieces: vitality. (The 'snag,' in the absence of a great style in the more popular best-sellers, is that a very good style usually connotes a distinguished or a distinctive mind.) This vitality may take shape as swiftness, as power, however crude, of expression, as pullulating fertility, and as emotion: the first is exemplified in Edgar Wallace, 'Sapper,' P. C. Wren; the second in Marie Corelli; the third in Charles Garvice and Nat Gould; the fourth in Ethel M. Dell ('he-man' emotion), Hall Caine ('Messiah' emotion), Florence M. Barclay (religious emotion and 'correct-sentiment' emotion). Of the last a highbrow novelist—as a highbrow, a quite good seller—has said: '*The Rosary* will probably live, because its power is very uncommon. . . . [The] power is terrific'; according to the same writer, Mrs. Barclay 'was undoubtedly a great writer *on her plane*—Shakespeare of the servants' hall.' This is the kind of envious admiration that we should expect from an intellectual, fastidious, none-too-prolific novelist, who views with a wryly-comic despair the vital energy of lowbrow novelists.⁴ The pity of it is that the power of the lowbrow best-seller is not devoted to the service of literature, well-meaning as many lowbrow super-sellers have been. Their vitality is made to subserve the general morality. Such authors as Hall Caine, Marie Corelli, Florence Barclay, and Gene Stratton Porter have in *The Christian*, *The*

⁴ Here we may cite two remarks by Mr. Swinnerton in his witty, disillusioned, yet sanely courageous book, *Authors and the Book Trade*: 'The best-seller is perfect in its kind,' in its own way; the other is quoted from a great and famous publisher: 'If we publish what we know to be good, we make money on it; but if we try for a popular success, we always come a cropper.'

Sorrows of Satan, *The Rosary*, and *The Harvester*, as in *The Eternal City*, *God's Good Man*, *The Mistress of Shenstone*, and *Limberlost* shown a genuine if misguided preoccupation in ethical problems, especially in emotional morality. The moral passion and the ethical explication are shockingly crude: these books have excited tremendous enthusiasm because, in addition to comforting day-dreams and nicely-veiled sexuality, they induce in ordinary readers, chiefly among women, an emotional tempest and a turbid or a romantic activity for which such readers find no scope in their physical lives. In the words of the delightfully acute critic whom already I have so often quoted, 'these novels will all be found to make play with the key words of the emotional vocabulary which provoke the vague warm surges associated with religion and religion substitutes—e.g., life, death, love, good, evil, sin, home, mother, noble, gallant, purity, honour. These responses can be touched off with a dangerous ease . . . and there is evidently a vast public that derives great pleasure from reacting in this way.' The novelists concerned in the production of such mass-drugs employ a 'Sunday-best' vocabulary; they pulpitize with dignity (very obtrusively assumed, consciously or subconsciously, for the occasion), some indeed with pomposity, and a few with a sickening unction (Hall Caine thought he resembled Christ in his appearance, nor did the delusion stop there). It may be observed, however, that detective, thriller, and racing best-sellers are comparatively free from such odious airs and graces, 'atmospherics' and Grace; Edgar Wallace, for example, can be seen 'intercalating' a homely morality of a naïve yet not unpleasant conscientiousness, but even then he avoids saccharine, sex, and saintdom.⁵

If Bulwer Lytton may be described as the first best-seller in the modern sense (his pretentiousness, his superficial versatility, his sciolism, and his sensationalism form the maleficent germs), the first *period* of best-sellerdom was that of Hall Caine and Marie Corelli, who not only reproduce the faults of Lytton, but add that of a spurious uplift and a sanctimonious audacity in dealing with what, in 1900, were regarded as 'unpleasant' themes. Their successors (from about 1914) have continued their unwholesome evangelism, their mawkish missionaryism, their laughable assumption of Juvenal's scourge and the right to pose, and even to be considered and revered, as *arbitri elegantiarum, judices artis vivendi*. The cultured reader and the reader with a brain worthy

⁵ Edgar Wallace also had in him something of a poet (third-rate, but genuine). But his greatest claim to fame is that, while he was very conscious that, as art, his novels were very much inferior to his plays, he yet succeeded in crossing the barriers between lowbrow and middlebrow, and was, and is, much read by the really intelligent, not the 'intelligentsia' in the narrower sense. He is greatly superior to Garvice and Gould—in fact, to almost every lowbrow novelist.

of the name cannot refrain from laughter: the equipment of these valiant moralists is so ludicrously inadequate to the issues they raise. In some ways the present-day counterparts of Hall Caine, Marie Corelli, Florence Barclay, and other less ostensibly moral novelists are still more of a menace, for our contemporaries are deflecting the procedure of their predecessors from harmless preachment and childish philosophy towards the consolidation of popular prejudice, on which they—or most of them—work shamelessly, and towards the blunting and lowering of 'the emotional currency': they appeal to 'the great heart of mankind' (a phrase crystallising an attitude very common among lowbrow best-sellers) by dealing—sometimes to offset a sordid theme—with fine issues, which they forthwith debase by the crassness, crudity, and impercipience of their ethics and their aesthetics. Not only do they sneer at literature (and art and morality and philosophy) that is above them, but they betray the weakness of their position by showing a certain veiled shamefacedness; they suspect—some of them know—that there exist standards by which they are despised. They twist and squirm: witness their flings at 'the merely clever novel,' their assertion that 'authorship is not so much a function of the brain as it is of the heart,' their over-insistence on a tenet that contains much but not all the truth. 'The core quality of the born novelist is *human*, not literary.'

If novels appeal thus directly and warmly to the heart, if they provide uplift, fantasy, compensation, comfort, excitement, then they have an excellent chance of becoming best-sellers. That most best-sellers are woefully unequal to the task of dealing either clearly or originally or even (save to half-wits) convincingly with the moral, psychological, and metaphysical problems they raise does not trouble them; the mere mention of such abstractions lends them an air of wide reading and deep thinking. They evoke a situation that they develop with stock phrases calculated to elicit the well-worn, involuntary responses; very often they so employ a seemingly cultured jargon, chiefly of popular science and psychology, that vague ideas arise in the minds of their readers; more often still they indicate a character by some well-known phrase ('absent-minded professor,' 'artistic temperament,' 'inferiority complex,' etc., etc.) that, by reminding the readers of something already familiar, saves the writers the labour of 'realising' the character. Blessed be the *cliché*, for *clichés* are like coins—good for a certain amount, representing universally familiar values and things! Then, too, best-sellers (the intelligent are excepted) rush in where angels fear to tread: clumsy-footedly stalk among feelings demanding a fine sensibility of treatment, among subtleties and profundities of thought that require a

trained mind to understand (let alone to set forth), among sanctities that wither at a besmirching, and among psychological obscurities that have not yet been cleared up by even the most abstruse psychologists. It has been advanced that it is well-nigh impossible for the genuinely original novel and the novel that affords an æsthetic experience to become popular nowadays; likewise, lowbrow best-sellers, and even the non-literary middlebrow best-sellers, if they *are* to be best-sellers, are debarred from the merits that raised the work of Defoe, Smollett, and Dickens above the level of popular fiction, although, like those rather more 'literary' writers, Fielding, Sterne, Scott, Thackeray and Trollope, they actually were popular in their own day. From about 1880-1890 fiction has foregone its right to be read critically, except, obviously, among those novelists who aim to be so read. Perhaps, too, we must admit the truism that 'genius can manage to exist almost independently of its background,' but the lowbrow and non-literary middlebrow best-sellers must keep their finger on the public pulse and 'give the public what it wants.'

The critics, if cultured, view the lowbrow best-sellers with amusement, and, if they notice them at all, apologise or write with perfunctory brevity; if themselves lowbrow, they 'enthuse.' Educated critics tend to consider such best-sellers as Ethel M. Dell and Edgar Wallace as symbols, while the more caustic treat them as figures of derision. The attitude of the public, especially the great public, need not be developed further. But the attitude of the best-sellers to their own work is illuminating. Highbrow best-sellers take their work seriously, as do most of the literary middlebrows; of the non-literary middlebrows, half are serious in their aims, while the remainder write either for a living or for their own amusement. The lowbrows are the most sharply divided, for while some think they are doing good work (both morally and permanently), others are frank opportunists seizing voraciously on the changes of popular taste, and others again, while more or less careless about that taste, go their own sweet way, secure in the knowledge that once they have got a solid lowbrow public they are not, with adequate publicity, likely to lose it. One admires those lowbrow best-sellers who have no illusions about their work and admit that it does not merit the attention of even middlebrows, let alone highbrows. Many non-literary middlebrows and most lowbrows are virtually journalists of fiction. It is, however, diverting to find that while the majority of lowbrow best-sellers consider that the work of their fellows is bad, very few consider their own work to be bad even if they know that it is *comparatively* unimportant in the literary sense. These writers emphasise the view that their novels provide 'clean entertainment,' or they argue that 'any fundamentally clean

book that tends to form [? encourage] the reading habit and engender within the reader a love of books is well worth its place in literature.' Almost every lowbrow best-seller approves and admires both classes of middlebrow best-sellers. The highbrow approves only the highbrow even if he envies the others for some such reason as their vitality or their fertility. Literary middlebrows, for the most part, either admire or approve highbrows, and a fair number of them approve, if they do not often admire, their peers. Non-literary middlebrows condemn the lowbrows, tolerate their fellows, admire the literary middlebrows, and even recognise some good points in highbrows. It is only the lowbrows who, as a class, scorn to be moved by the opinions of the critics.

But perhaps the classification of best-sellers will gain in significance and in pertinence if we give names.

Highbrow: D. H. Lawrence, James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, E. M. Forster, Aldous Huxley, Charles Morgan, C. E. Montague.⁶

Literary Middlebrow, and Middlebrow read as literature: Quiller-Couch, J. M. Barrie, H. G. Wells, John Galsworthy, Chesterton, Moore, Arnold Bennett, Somerset Maugham, Eden Phillpotts, Frank Swinnerton, Hugh Walpole, J. B. Priestley, R. H. Mottram, H. M. Tomlinson, David Garnett, Brett Young, Richard Aldington, Liam O'Flaherty, Rudyard Kipling, Thornton Wilder, Willa Cather, Theodore Dreiser, John dos Passos.⁷

Non-literary Middlebrow—i.e., Middlebrow neither writing for the lowbrow market nor yet read as literature: G. B. Stern, Sheila Kaye-Smith, E. M. Delafield, Margaret Kennedy, J. D. Beresford, W. J. Locke, Philip Gibbs, Warwick Deeping, Rafael Sabatini, John Buchan, W. W. Jacobs, P. G. Wodehouse, Sinclair Lewis, Upton Sinclair.

Lowbrow, or Absolute Best-sellers: 'Sapper,' Michael Arlen, Gilbert Frankau, P. C. Wren, E. Rice Burroughs, Jeffrey Farnol, Ethel M. Dell, E. M. Hull, Maud Diver, Berta Ruck, Ruby M. Ayres, Anita Loos, Agatha Christie, Edgar Wallace, E. Phillips Oppenheim, A. S. M. Hutchinson.

Of the pre-1919 best-sellers, Joseph Conrad belonged to the first group, Rider Haggard and Hall Caine belonged to the third group, Marie Corelli hovered between the third and the fourth, while Nat Gould, Charles Garvice, Gene Stratton Porter, and Florence M. Barclay (the two women would have shuddered at the collocation) belonged indubitably to the fourth and lowest class. Of this absolute best-seller class something has been said already; but there are several remarks that, out of the potential many, must yet be made. Certain sales have perhaps been sheer

⁶ Mrs. Leavis puts T. F. Powys in this section, but the quality and the nature of his fiction definitely make him a middlebrow read as literature; his sales however, hardly entitle him to mention.

⁷ A transition from this to the third group is formed by Rose Macaulay.

accidents: one of these is certainly *All Quiet on the Western Front*; another is less certainly *The Sheik*, of which a non-literary middlebrow has said: 'My own view is that such freak sales as those of *The Sheik* are not representative of the general reading public of average intelligence.' We hope not; but it is what we might expect from the public of rather less than average intelligence. A significant question was broached, in a typically middlebrow way, by Arnold Bennett when he wrote: 'The work of Charles Garvice has little [read *no*] artistic importance; but he was a thoroughly competent craftsman.'⁸ . . . Mr. [Middleton] Murry says that he can sympathise with my "evident desire to disconcert the preciousness of the aesthete." But when he says that things such as Charles Garvice made were "simply not worth making well," etc., I charge him with precisely the preciousness of the aesthete. Was it not worth while to give pleasure to the naïve millions for whom Charles Garvice catered. . . ? Ought these millions to be deprived of what they like. . . ?' But such authors certainly do no good and they may do harm to their readers, and indisputably they do harm to literature. Further, the fact that such best-sellers as Florence Barclay, Gene Stratton Porter, Marie Corelli, did not write primarily for money does not absolve them from the charge of vitiating the ethical sense as well as the literary taste of the public. The moral passion of such writers is also responsible in part for the emotional sameness of their work. All lowbrow best-sellers, thereby and in other ways, falsify life and, perhaps more reprehensibly, they interfere with the reader's free development and his spontaneities; they spoil the reader for any novel that demands mental readjustment. They offer an inferior article to a public too ignorant or too crude to know that it definitely is inferior.

That is a charge which can also be brought against some of the non-literary middlebrow best-sellers. Not against the literary middlebrows, who are apt to write on traditional lines; not that they are necessarily the worse for that! These writers (Galsworthy, Walpole, Willa Cather, etc., etc.) are thoughtful and cultured, technically skilful, morally blameless, in some ways impressive; nor do they greatly object if highbrows contend that, for all the 'surface stimulus,' their sentiments are commonplace, their psychology undisturbing, their technique outworn. If they have vitality and style, they need not worry; if they lack those two cardinal virtues, they are destined to rapid oblivion. If they have a fault, it is that they play too much for safety in morals, in technique, in psychology, and in their humour; there

⁸ Also he was thoroughly aware that his work was trash. This cultured man, who had a delightful country home, deliberately wrote down to the level of servants.

is a stinging proportion of truth in the highbrow pronouncement that they are 'the best fellows in the world.' The non-literary best-sellers have with the class on either side a kinship that it were tedious to particularise. They write seriously but without distinction; they eschew sensationalism and crudity, but they are somewhat lacking in vitality; with an adequate intellectual equipment they set themselves up as expositors of contemporary thought and guides of public feeling. They strive, or some of them strive, to pass on to the middlebrow public the cultural news from above; in doing this they keep a longing eye on the great public of the lowbrow best-seller. Such work of communication is, in itself, commendable, but in practice these writers so simplify complex, fine, and profound issues that only a garbled version reaches the public.

Highbrow best-sellers are particularly interesting because they are pioneers blazing trails that may, and often do, lead to dead ends; that may, on the other hand, revivify the theory and the practice of writing, and thereby affect not only the novel but the whole of contemporary literature. The influence of D. H. Lawrence and James Joyce has already been very considerable despite the objections offered by middlebrow and lowbrow readers. Highbrow novelists care little for recognisable, 'human,' even plausible character; this is partly because they refuse to consider fiction as a department of life and assert that it is largely independent of life. The technique and the style of James Joyce and Virginia Woolf constitute very real obstacles, for, to appreciate these two features of their writing, one must be prepared to wrestle with the meaning: they do not admit that the first duty of a writer is to make himself understood; they throw, Joyce nearly all, Mrs. Woolf much, of the onus on the reader. The other highbrow novelists, such as Montague, Lawrence, Forster, Huxley, owe their 'highbrowness,' not to a scorn of being easily comprehensible, but to the intellectual calibre of their work; they are also excellent and versatile stylists. It is these writers who are in the right path: the others are 'playing about'—very seriously, we allow, but in an extravagant exercise of their very remarkable virtuosity, a virtuosity and an intelligence that might go very far if their exponents were less eager to *épater les bourgeois*. Mrs. Woolf is obviously more, very much more, accessible than Mr. Joyce; to approximately the same degree as separates her from Lawrence, Forster, Huxley. It is a relevant point, too, that just as it is easier to imitate Joyce⁹ than Virginia Woolf, so it is easier to imitate her than Lawrence, Forster, Huxley: the more mannered and idiosyncratic a writer, the easier it is to imitate him. It seems a pity that so much

⁹ Just how easy was shown early this year in the *New Statesman*.

valuable energy should be expended in being, as Joyce's, almost incomprehensible and, as Virginia Woolf's, comprehensible enough but enjoyably readable only with a considerable strain on the attention and at the price of going over the longer sentences two or three times. The latter is seen to be more right in her technique than the former, for her meaning is, at the price mentioned, perfectly clear, whereas the former is so far from clear that several widely differing interpretations can be put on almost any sentence in the more difficult parts of his more difficult writing (*Ulysses*, *Work in Progress*). It hardly seems to be an advantage deliberately ¹⁰ to leave one's meaning so tortuous and so obscure. If we examine the highbrow novelists historically, we are forced to notice that Lyly, Sidney, Sterne, Pater, Henry James, Virginia Woolf, James Joyce are *not* in the first rank, either in reputation or in ability. Almost every highbrow novelist is intellectually the inferior of men like Defoe, Swift, Fielding, Thackeray, Hardy.¹¹

Yet it is a curious fact that highbrow critics either base their judgments on a very exclusive æsthetic or take an ultra-intellectual point of view. It is no great crime to put intellect first, but it is surely a mistake to deify it to the very grave detriment of all else, especially of humanity and emotion. The greatest writers have been such because, with a style and technique wholly adequate to their themes, they find room equally for intellect and humanity and emotion. That not only the lowbrow but the (often intellectual) middlebrow may grow irritated by Joyce and Virginia Woolf is not wholly to the credit of those two writers and their followers. Highbrow critics praise highbrow novels for delicate sensibility, sensitiveness to life, a refined and subtle discrimination; for the power to make us psychologically uncomfortable and unsure of ourselves, others, the universe; for a luminous irony, an unobviously rich style, and a difficult technique. Admittedly desirable qualities; but are they the greatest qualities? It is undoubtedly good that a novel should set up a series of shocks to our preconceptions, but it is erroneous to make this the test of a great novel: the more psychological, the more metaphysical, the more controversial a novel is, the more likely it is to administer those shocks; yet it is extremely unlikely that such a novel will be a great one. Shocks may be plentifully given, *in passing*, in a novel conspicuous for its power, its universality, its style, but they have little to do with the enduring merit of such a novel. The novel that stands or falls by such

¹⁰ He can, as in his earlier work, be admirably clear.

¹¹ It is doubtful if the highbrow novelists or the highbrow critics would claim Meredith as a highbrow; if they did, he would form an honourable exception. Moreover, though C. E. Montague is a most distinguished writer, even he is not in the very front rank of novelists.

shocks will be out of date in a generation or less; and genius does not become out of date. While it is true, as Mrs. Leavis well says, that 'a twentieth-century novelist if he is intelligent and sensitive has necessarily to waste some of his energy in avoiding the stock responses, the popular associations of the current idiom, or at least to sacrifice the simplicity and directness which was observed to characterise Fielding's novels,' it is also true that genius avoids these pitfalls almost by second nature and, on the other hand, often uses these responses and associations to serve his end; nor does genius find it necessary to sacrifice simplicity and directness—rather does he, even when most subtle, strive to remain simple and direct.

That, in our time, the greatest novelists are unlikely to get a very big public (larger, say, than 100,000) admittedly implies a grave criticism of the reading public in general, but it is doubtful if, with the present spate of publications and the multiplicity of other attractions, they can expect much more. So long as the best work does reach at least a large proportion of the significant public, the thinking public, the ruling classes in government, art, and literature, we need not despair unduly. 'Things are rarely so bad as they seem.'

ERIC PARTRIDGE.

QUEEN VICTORIA—THE END

WITH the publication of the ninth volume of the Queen's letters a great historical enterprise has been brought to a worthy close. Had the Queen herself been told that even her most intimate confidences to her Journal would be revealed to the public, and revealed within a generation of her death, her first impulse would surely have been towards indignant protest. Yet, since it was among her outstanding qualities never to palter with what she held to be the truth, we may conceive her granting that when the truth came to be told about her, it should be told with a fulness beyond challenge; and in authorising the publication of her correspondence up to the time of her widowhood King Edward acted in her own spirit. At the same time he undertook, as he must have realised, a great responsibility. The exact contents of the letters to be published were, of course, unknown to him, but, familiar as he was with the Queen's ways, he can have been in no doubt as to their tone. In deciding, therefore, that the secrets of the reign should be disclosed up to a date still within living memory, the King paid a remarkable tribute both to his mother's character and to his people's understanding. It cannot have been his intention that the tribute should be repeated. The papers of the later part of the reign, dealing as they did with issues still unsettled, seemed destined to remain sealed for another half century or so. But the stream of time, which flowed so slowly in the later years of the Queen's life, has moved with exceptional rapidity since 1901; and King George, appreciating that within twenty years of its close the whole reign had come to belong to a period definitely ended, has followed and even bettered his father's example. It is indeed matter for pride that this exceptional memorial to an exceptional sovereign has been prepared by the orders of her son and her grandson, and these nine volumes are evidence of the unique place which the British Throne holds in the regard of British subjects.

The publication of the third and concluding series is singularly opportune. This age, critical of everything, is exceptionally critical of the generation before it, and the divergent standpoints of youth and middle age have never been more manifest than in

talk about the Queen. Those to whom she was never more than a name dwelt upon her limitations and her oddities, avowing their desire to shatter the Victorian legend. To the protests of those who remembered the Queen in life that this was no legend but an authentic tradition, retort was made with some sneering reference to Victorian propaganda; and so the unequal battle went on, with inadequate and unworthy judgments gaining currency until the publication of Mr. Buckle's last two volumes abruptly quashed them. The tradition is established now.

Yet, though the Queen's memory has come into its own, no one born in this century can apprehend what she was to those who grew up between the two Jubilees. That she personified the solid, unostentatious dignity of her period is perhaps obvious; and the long tale of her days may be held to account for the personal veneration in which she was held. But only experience can be aware of her unquestioned and unquestionable authority, based on the conviction that she would never abuse it. All her subjects trusted the Queen, and their trust was the measure of their devotion. Maybe they exaggerated. There were matters which escaped even her eye, issues on which even her ripe judgments were distorted. But in her closing years, when she was collaborating with a Prime Minister in whom she had full confidence, her wisdom shone forth, and the last volume of her letters abounds in illustrations of her characteristic methods and of the success with which she applied them. They wear a quaint, old-world air nowadays when a more self-assertive public opinion makes it impossible for serious international issues to be disposed of in the family correspondence of sovereigns. Yet the influence of personality is strong even now, and the manner of its effective exercise in these intimate letters is not un instructive. No one can say whether, as the international situation grew more tense, the Queen could have continued to control it by the weight of her authority over a weak man in St. Petersburg and a rash man in Berlin; but at least her control was potent as long as it was exercised.

The pages which record her dealings with the German Emperor are among the most impressive in the volume, and, by a fortunate accident, the opening episode contains her own comment on her statecraft. The Jameson raid had occurred at the end of 1895. The Emperor's telegram to President Kruger was received in England with an outburst of indignation. The Queen, who in her Journal described its language as 'outrageous,' wrote to her grandson in restrained terms of sorrowful courtesy and, in forwarding his reply to the Prince of Wales, observed:

It would not do to have given him 'a good snub.' Those sharp, cutting answers and remarks only irritate and do harm, and in Sovereigns

and Princes should be most carefully guarded against. William's faults come from impetuosity (as well as conceit); and calmness and firmness are the most powerful weapons in such cases.

The time was to come when, the Queen's patience being tried beyond endurance, the 'good snub' was to be administered; but the hostile judgment was long in forming. In the spring of 1897 the situation in the Near East got out of hand. Turkey, secure in the friendship of Germany, had withstood Greek ambitions in Crete, and Greece had been provoked into a disastrous declaration of war. Alone among the Powers, Germany was resolved to make her taste the full bitterness of defeat. The Queen used pressure on the Emperor. Let him urge the Powers to propose an armistice. 'You have always expressed great regard for my advice; let me therefore urge this on you.' The appeal brought what the Journal calls 'a rude answer from William.'

The Powers have arranged that the proposal of an armistice must be begged for by Greece with the promise that she will unconditionally submit to the verdict of the Powers before they intervene; a *conditio sine qua non* is that Greece immediately recalls her troops from Crete.

Lord Salisbury having expressed the view that nothing could be done without Germany's consent, the Queen turned the other cheek. She telegraphed to the King of Greece the terms which she confessed her inability to modify, and 'for the sake of humanity' urged him to yield. The King yielded, and the Emperor telegraphed to the Queen his acceptance of a surrender on whose abject terms he laid some stress. The Queen wrote in her Journal: 'Received another grandiloquent telegram, also *en clair*, from William.' The words might serve for a summary of his reign.

The Emperor drew his own self-satisfied conclusions from this tactful treatment. Noting his fortieth birthday in her Journal, the Queen added a wish that 'he were more prudent and less impulsive at such an age!' A few days later a letter came from Berlin.

I venture to believe that, where the Sovereign will sometimes shake her wise head often over the tricks of her queer and impetuous colleague, the good and genial heart of my Grandmother will step in and show that, if he sometimes fails, it is never from want of goodwill, honesty or truthfulness, and thus mitigate the shake of the head by a genial smile of warm sympathy and interest!

Nemesis was swift! Three months later the Emperor was telling the British military attaché in Berlin that he could not come to England again so long as Lord Salisbury was Prime Minister, and

before the month was out he detailed his farrago of complaints in a self-righteous letter to the Queen herself. Lord Salisbury submitted a memorandum rebutting the charges in detail. His comment was a model of ironic reticence.

He entirely concurs with your Majesty in thinking that it is quite new for a sovereign to attack in a private letter the Minister of another sovereign; especially one to whom he is so closely related. It is not a desirable innovation and might produce some confusion.

Satisfied as to the facts, the Queen thrust home:

Your other letter, I must say, has *greatly astonished* me. The tone in which you write about Lord Salisbury I can only attribute to a temporary irritation on your part, as I do not think you would otherwise have written in such a manner, and I doubt whether any Sovereign wrote in such terms to another Sovereign, and that Sovereign his own Grandmother, about their Prime Minister.

The grandmother concluded the letter with an intimation that a visit in honour of her eightieth birthday might nevertheless still be paid. It was paid in the autumn, and, as his memoirs bear witness, even the cynical Bülow was impressed by the veneration which the guest showed to his hostess.

She, however, had already summed him up and had used all her prestige to circumvent his mischief. In March 1899 she wrote bluntly to the Tsar that the Emperor was full of tales of Russia's hostility to England. Neither she nor her Prime Minister believed a word of them.

But I am afraid William may go and tell things against us to you, just as he does about you to us. If so, pray tell me openly and confidentially. It is so important that we should understand each other, and that such mischievous and unstraightforward proceedings should be put a stop to.

That was the Queen's way, and her subjects were not ignorant of it. On the day when 'all previous records of English history are eclipsed by the length of your Majesty's gracious rule,' Dr. Randall Davidson, then Bishop of Winchester, wrote expressing his affection and thankfulness. He went on to note the 'rich significance' of the fact that 'your Majesty should also wield a personal and domestic influence over the thrones of Europe absolutely without precedent in the history of Christendom.' This volume reveals its significance in all its richness.

It would be easy to dwell on the authoritative quality of the Queen's rule in these closing years. We see her exercising a general supervision over all departments of government, now stirring the Borough Council of Windsor to the betterment of local housing conditions, now explaining to her Viceroy why the Victoria Cross should be bestowed on her Indian soldiers. Above

all, she is in perpetual warfare with red tape at the War Office, and Lord Lansdowne's gentle methods were little to her taste. The episode of the bandmasters' commissions has already become a classic example of War Office obstruction ; it is no less illuminating as an instance of her grip over the details of military organisation. We do not think of Queen Victoria as a war-lord, but she herself never forgot that she was a soldier's daughter or that she was the head of the Army. No regular officer could have had a clearer perception of the meaning and importance of military discipline, and when the code was violated by the publication of the Spion Kop despatches her horror was unconcealed. It is, however, characteristic that her censure of Lord Wolseley should have been conveyed, not in her own hand, but through the pen of her private secretary, Sir Arthur Bigge.

By the date of that episode the weakness of the War Office organisation had become patent to the world ; but the Queen, watching the scheme inaugurated on the Duke of Cambridge's retirement, had long since put her finger on its most radical defect. At the end of 1898 the Queen wrote to Lord Salisbury that

much will have to be done by-and-by, and above all to clear up the position of the Commander-in-Chief and Secretary for War, who seems to usurp *all* authority—which never existed or she thinks never was intended. Ever since the Office of Secretary of War was created, in a great hurry in '54, it has never been satisfactory, and there have been and are endless quibbles and equivocation.

Nor was the Queen in the least doubt as to the cause of the recent usurpations of authority by the Secretary of State. The Adjutant-General advised him on all duties connected with his branch, and since 1895 these duties had included discipline. The effect of this arrangement was to deprive the Commander-in-Chief of all direct control over the Army, and the Queen pressed for a modification of the Order in Council. Failing to carry her point, she stated it in a memorandum which she desired to be 'officially recorded at the War Office.'

It is easy to criticise the Queen's attitude. The office of Commander-in-Chief has now been put into commission, and even in the Queen's day the duties attached to it were probably too general for efficient discharge by one man. Moreover, she was jealous of her prerogatives, particularly when, as in this case, they had to be entrusted to a deputy. The Army was her Army ; she wished to see it commanded by her son, the Duke of Connaught, during her lifetime ; and she did not intend him to be a royal cypher enjoying only such authority as was delegated to him by the Minister responsible to Parliament. But in insisting

that there must be limits to the power of the civilian head of the War Office, and that in matters of strict soldiership the final appeal must lie to an officer whose status, whether through birth or through achievement, should place him beyond any suspicion of self-seeking, she showed an instinctive appreciation of military sentiment. In all this she was wiser than her Ministers ; and subsequent events suggest that she was in closer touch with popular feeling than they were prepared to admit.

The extraordinary thing about the Queen—extraordinary now even to those who once took it as a matter of course—was that all this conscious regality was associated with a simple homeliness. Victoria, Queen-Empress, whose conduct of affairs was worthy of her sonorous name and her splendid titles, was a little old lady in a widow's cap. This fusion of apparent incompatibles is the essence of the Victorian tradition, and will surely fascinate the imagination of posterity. It came of a conception of the British monarchy, suggested no doubt by Lord Melbourne and Prince Albert, but notably developed by the Queen herself during the first twenty years of her widowhood. The root principle was that there should be no distinction whatever between her public and her private life, and it was her insistence upon this that had led her to separate herself so markedly in her earlier years from those whom she called the old royal family. The Constitution of England, as she wrote to Lord Rosebery when he was her Prime Minister, had been committed into her keeping, and the public right, no less than her own innate love of truth, made it imperative that all should understand in what sort of hands this high trust had been placed. Therein lies the clue to the rigid etiquette by which the Queen denoted her relations with the outside world. On the one hand her duty, perpetual and all-embracing, which no Minister might minimise and which her own sorrows must never obscure ; on the other hand, her weaknesses—loneliness, physical infirmity, and the shyness natural to a lady of her epoch. In so far as the world realised that her duty was punctiliously discharged, it would and must make all the allowances which her position entitled her to claim. Because she gave all her strength and heart to her work, her claims were large ; and because they were made with fair and honest show of reason they were wholeheartedly conceded.

As she grew older her double burden of responsibility and sorrow became such that it was never possible to do enough for the Queen. Happily, those about her knew where she needed consideration most, and the preparations for her Diamond Jubilee gave touching occasion for its display. Ceremonial there must needs be ; on such an occasion the Queen could not show herself to her people unescorted. But her modest way of life must not

be altered, and, above all, she herself must be saved from undue physical strain. An informal beginning was made late in 1896 when the Queen's private secretary wrote to Lord Salisbury's private secretary and threw out the idea of a visit to St. Paul's. Lord Salisbury, who was shown the letter, contented himself with observing that it would be well to square the Dean. There were, indeed, obvious objections to the entrance of the Queen's carriage and horses into the Cathedral, and the possibility of asking her to walk even the shortest distance was never even entertained. The long drive would be strain enough. Happily, the Lord Mayor, who must have been given a hint of what was toward, found a way out of the difficulty.

Acquainted as I am [he wrote privately and confidentially to Sir Arthur Bigge] with Her Majesty's feeling as to alighting from her carriage, I will venture to suggest that a choral reception upon an unprecedented scale should be arranged as a greeting outside the Cathedral.

A few days later Lord Salisbury inquired, again of Sir Arthur Bigge, whether the Queen had agreed to attend a service in St. Paul's Churchyard, and went on to ask whether Mr. Chamberlain had submitted 'his idea of bringing over some Prime Ministers from the larger Colonies to be present on the occasion.' The scheme was evidently developing, and it was time for the ecclesiastical authorities to be consulted. The trusted Bishop of Winchester was authorised to communicate with his brothers of Canterbury and London. Dr. Temple sketched out an order of service, and Dr. Davidson himself gave it a shape thoroughly congenial to the Queen's ideas.

The musical authorities must be told it is to be no elaborate 'service' of *Te Deum*, but a simple chant or other rendering without 'vain repetitions.' It *can* be done, if it is ordered. It would not take many minutes.

And so it was arranged; and only gradually did the occasion reveal its inherent greatness.

At the instance of Mr. Chamberlain Lord Salisbury has submitted to your Majesty that eleven Colonial Prime Ministers should be admitted to the Privy Council. . . . Nothing can mark the character and results of your Majesty's happy reign more conspicuously than that the statesmen who administer the vast territories which have been converted into civilised and powerful communities during your Majesty's reign, should take their seats at your Majesty's Council Board. Lord Salisbury therefore respectfully and strongly urges on your Majesty the acceptance of this proposal.

The Queen herself, remembering 'this day sixty years ago, when I was called from my bed by dear Mama to receive the news of my accession . . . felt rather nervous about the coming days

and that all should go off well.' On the eve of the 'never-to-be-forgotten day' she came to London and 'seated in my chair, as I cannot stand long,' received all the foreign Princes assembled to do her honour. The ironic spirit of history saw to it that she should note in her Journal the name of the first of them. It was the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The Colonial Premiers and the Indian Princes were received after dinner. The ball-room was hot and badly lit, and the Queen was feeling very tired when she got back to her room soon after eleven. Next day she watched for a while the long procession pass her window, and in due time took her place

in an open State landau, drawn by eight creams, dear Alix, looking very pretty in lilac and Lenchan sitting opposite me. I felt a good deal agitated and had been so all these days, for fear anything might be forgotten or go wrong.

Her people, concerned at the strain of continuous bowing over six miles of route, had been informed that a swinging seat had been arranged for her in her carriage. If it should by chance swing too far forward, the Princess of Wales, seated opposite, would adjust it. So she drove through London, her customary black relieved by touches of white in her bonnet. She noted the denseness of the crowds and that 'the streets in the Strand are now quite wide, but one misses Temple Bar.' It had been removed nineteen years before. 'As we neared St. Paul's, the procession was often stopped, and the crowds broke out into singing "God Save the Queen."' By this date, and still more towards the end of her reign, it had become difficult to cheer the Queen, and her people preferred to greet her with her anthem. On this day, when 'God Save the Queen' had been sung at the close of the service, the Archbishop was inspired to relieve the tension by calling in his great voice, 'Three Cheers for the Queen' as the procession quickened into movement again. That night, after dinner, she walked into the ball-room, and, having seated herself, 'tried to speak to most of the Princes and Princesses,' though feeling very tired. She was aware that she had made history that day, and, with her usual wisdom of choice, had commissioned Mandell Creighton, then Bishop of London, to make a record of what had passed, with some comment on its meaning. The historian's instinct guiding him, he wrote:

The scheme took shape almost of itself, in obedience to the popular desire. There was no thought of making a national display, but the nation had such a deep desire to show its reverence to the Queen that things grew in proportion from day to day. The wish of England was re-echoed in England's Colonies. The occasion expanded into a significant manifestation of Imperial greatness, and of a fundamental unity of purpose, which

came as a revelation to England and the Colonies alike, and awakened the respectful wonder of all Europe. Yet this feature was entirely incidental: it was afterwards recognised with natural pride, but it was scarcely present at the time to the minds of spectators. They were not there to do honour to themselves as Englishmen; they were there to do honour to the Queen. The proceedings throughout were charged with strong personal feeling. It was not the grandeur, the dignity, or the display which was impressive: it was the intimacy and the sincerity of the respect and affection felt towards the Queen which was in the air, and brought home to every heart an over-powering emotion in the thoughts of what England had become under her rule, and what she had done for England.

She was to do more for England yet. There are those who wish she had been spared the dark close of her reign. Enough if she had lived to see Gordon avenged—how keenly she followed the advance of that expedition, and how courteously she bore herself to France in the hour of her triumph!—and had not known the disappointments and anxieties of the South African War. Yet that war had its compensations; it was not till men were called to fight for the Queen that they knew how much they loved her, and the devotion that surrounded her rose to its heights in her latest years. When she herself was moved to some gracious and tender act the response was overwhelming. Sir Reginald Wingate, who had succeeded Lord Kitchener as Sirdar, wrote to ask if he might call his little girl Victoria, and was told that the Queen not only gave her consent, but herself offered to stand godmother to the child. What was victory to such an honour as this!

It is impossible for me to express to you [Sir Reginald wrote to Sir Arthur Bigge] with what feeling of heartfelt gratitude and devotion my wife and I read that most gracious message in which her Majesty has so highly honoured us and our little daughter. I do not imagine any Sovereign in the world is so dearly loved and honoured as our Queen, and it is by such gracious acts as these that she so endears herself to her humble subjects. . . . I long to pour out my heart in feelings of the deepest gratitude for this most highly prized favour. The good news has done more than anything else to hasten my wife's recovery, and it is such an inexpressible joy to us both to feel that we are so honoured in actually having the Queen as our little daughter's godmother, that we can scarcely realise our good fortune.

Had that letter been published when it was written, its tone would have been regarded as entirely natural.

Fortunate were those who could do such a Queen some personal service. Lord Kitchener, commissioned to get a white Egyptian donkey for the Queen, will do his best to get the finest animal procurable, and asks for the measurements of the donkey Lord Wolseley had brought over, so that the pair may match. The telegraph boy who brought the news of the relief of Ladysmith

early one morning knew that the Queen would not be up, but was so resolved that that message should reach her at once that he persuaded her wardrobe maid to take it into her bedroom. If that telegraph boy is still alive, how proud he must be to know that the Queen appreciatively noted his action in her Journal!

The devotion which surrounded her was amply repaid. She was lamed by rheumatism and her eyesight was failing; 'I pray that God may spare me yet a short while to my children, friends and dear country, leaving me all my faculties and to a certain extent my eyesight,' was her pathetic entry on the first day of 1900; but with her own hands she knitted scarves to be given to Colonials fighting for her in South Africa. When the tide began to turn she came to London, and her people serenaded her as she sat in her chair by the palace window with a light held behind her.

I saw your Majesty three times in the streets and in the Park [Lord Rosebery wrote to her after those days]; and my overpowering feeling was 'What a glorious privilege to be able to make millions so happy!' And I came to the conclusion that that time, from Thursday to Saturday, was the most remarkable that I had ever passed in London.

The climax came with the news that the Queen, now turned eighty, had given up her holiday in the South of France, and would visit Ireland instead. 'I felt quite sorry that all was over,' the Queen wrote on her return to Holyhead, 'and that this eventful visit, which created so much interest and excitement, had, like everything in this world, come to an end, though I own I am very tired.' There was to be no remission of weariness in the few months still left her. From her birthday onwards complaints as to her health occur with increasing frequency. It is sad even after thirty years to read that she for whom all her subjects would have done anything was ill and miserable, and for those who knew her these latest entries must be almost unbearably poignant. Her appetite failed, but she struggled on, still maintaining her old grip on affairs. In the end it was sorrow rather than age that killed her. At the end of July her son, the Duke of Edinburgh, died. 'It is hard at eighty-one,' she wrote in the course of one of the most touching entries her Journal holds; and only a little later recalled how fifty-five years before she had spent Prince Albert's birthday in the castle where her son had now breathed his last. In October she bore the loss of her grandson, Prince Christian Victor, and at the turn of the year of Lady Churchill, one of her ladies and a friend of fifty years. On the first day of the new year she had the strength to drive to a soldiers' home, where there were convalescents from South Africa, but by now she could no longer command her body

to its old routine. To her annoyance she slept late into the morning. Her eyes refused their office. She signed her name, scarcely seeing. A daughter wrote her family letters; a granddaughter kept the Journal. 'They are all over-worked,' is the Queen's note, and as her feebleness gained on her she grieved at her children's distress. The Journal—an invalid's record now—was kept up till January 13; nine days later her course was run.

She has told the whole long tale for us now, and we who read it have the material to write her epitaph; but none of us who remember her would dare.

HAROLD STANNARD.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.

Letters as well as articles will be considered for publication, but letters should be confined to criticism or amplification of articles which have already appeared in the Review. No anonymous contribution is published.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



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A YEAR OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

A LIBERAL VIEW

It is just a year now since the famous Sunday night when the Labour Government broke in pieces and the National Government was born. The final verdict on Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's conduct on that occasion must still be left to the judgment of history (though there is little doubt, in fact, what the judgment will be); nor is there anything to be said of the week or two immediately following, when the new Government was occupied entirely with setting its house in order and with the purely formal duties of a caretaker. A critical analysis of the National Government's administration will begin naturally with the departure from the gold standard on September 21, and the General Election of October 27. This election will always hold a high place among the curiosities, the museum pieces, in the history of democracy. Cynics have often doubted how far an ordinary democratic electorate really understands the often complicated and intricate issues submitted to it for decision. But in this case there was no

room for doubt. No one could possibly believe that any but a tiny minority of the electors concerned really understood at all the recondite economic conundrums submitted to them. A satirist of democratic methods might have amused himself maliciously by imagining a situation in which an agricultural labourer, a teashop waitress, and a sweep would be called upon to pronounce judgment on the merits of a managed currency or the dangers of an adverse trade balance. But the satire would generally have been regarded as far-fetched. The General Election of 1931 was one of those things which no one would have believed if it had not happened.

The British electors rushed to answer these enigmas. They answered them decisively and uncompromisingly. A Liberal candidate visited a poor woman, living with two children on the brink of destitution, to solicit her vote. He was asked whether he was a supporter of the National Government, and he gave a cautious compromising reply. 'That,' said the woman, 'will not do. I will only vote for the man who will support the Government out and out. We must maintain the pound.' What did she mean? What did she even think she meant? It is possible to guess. Vaguely she thought that the nation was in deadly peril; that the deceased Labour Government had 'let the country down'; that, unless something was done, society—that is to say, the old familiar ways and habits and customs which she knew, and, because she knew, loved—would collapse in ruin; and that the only way to avert that horrible catastrophe was to give to the honourable gentlemen who had formed the National Government unlimited power to do whatever they thought necessary. That was the mandate given by hundreds of thousands of humble voters to the National Government. It is really rather to the credit of the steadiness and self-control and patience of the much-abused British democracy that twelve months after its return to power on the crest of such a wave of emotion the Government should still be secure of so large a measure of unwavering support. There is no evidence that its position is as yet at all seriously shaken. The by-election results show, of course, a heavy fall in the enormous majorities piled up at the General Elections; but the main cause of that is not hostility to the Government, but the electors' customary apathy in unexciting by-elections.

Yet it might have been expected that there would be a swift and violent reaction, unless the Government could either shelter under the shadow of some great name or justify the enthusiasm which created it by shining and conspicuous triumphs. The personal prestige of the Government is not, in fact, particularly high. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Mr. Baldwin are hardly yet

national heroes in the sense that Pitt and Gladstone and Mr. Lloyd George in the day of his power were national heroes. Its triumphs at present (apart from Lausanne) consist in the fact that Mr. Neville Chamberlain succeeded in balancing his Budget and is carrying through, with unexpected ease so far, a gigantic conversion operation. These facts have raised immensely the prestige of the country abroad. They are hardly the sort of triumph which one would have expected to excite enthusiasm at home. It is difficult to imagine a housemaid's pulse beating quicker at the thought that the Budget was balanced; or a miner's heart leaping up at the glad news that the 5 per cent. War Loan stock had been reduced to 3½ per cent. There is moreover a formidable account to be set against these successes. If the Government has done some things well, it has done others by no means so well. The case against the Government has been much weakened by the insistent efforts of the Opposition to pretend that the crisis of August 1931, when the National Government came into being, was not a real crisis. This is a suggestion that will not bear examination. The crisis of August was real enough. Mr. Henderson and his friends appreciated its reality very feelingly at the time; and indeed it could scarcely be exaggerated. Whether after the pound had fallen and it was clear that the results were not going to be as disastrous as had been supposed the Government were justified in going on painting the devil on the wall, as they did all through October, is quite another matter. There was no necessity imposed on Ministers to do this, unless it were an electoral necessity.

But this mild exhibition of political cynicism becomes tame and dull by comparison with their tariff campaign. This stands revealed now as a pure ramp, naked and unashamed. Despite all the casuistry expended in explaining them or explaining them away, the pledges actually given by Ministers in regard to tariffs are perfectly plain. Tariffs were not to be introduced without inquiry; they were to be experimental, and they were only to be imposed if and when they were found necessary to meet the existing state of emergency. The National Government was returned. Tariffs were promptly imposed without any inquiry at all. They were not temporary. They were not experimental. And many of them—including some of the most important—had obviously and avowedly nothing particularly to do with the existing 'crisis.' They were just ordinary experiments in constructive 'Protection.' It would really be rather difficult to find, even in the grimy records of political chicanery, any example of quite so bland and thoroughgoing a piece of cynicism. Looked at from this distance, the whole election campaign of the Government wears a slightly tawdry air, like a stage seen in the cold

light of morning. Ministers, as experienced politicians, guarded themselves against any pledge to lead the people into any promised land. But their speeches encouraged the belief in the simple that at least they were to be led out of the wilderness; and they have been led into a worse. Unemployment has leapt up; beggars have multiplied to the view of the eye: if there has been any 'turning the corner' it has been a turning for thousands from privation in a mean street to positive destitution in a slum. Its gross and palpable failure to deal with unemployment ruined the Labour Government. Labour Ministers protested plaintively, and not quite unjustly, that they were being abused for incapacity to cure a disease quite beyond their control. The failure of the National Government to cure unemployment has been grosser and more palpable; and, except a few obscure and unregarded trade union leaders, hardly anybody shakes a finger at them for it.

Apart from Lausanne, this failure in the main field has not been concealed, as such things sometimes are, by any conspicuous success in others. Many Liberals supported the Government largely from anxiety to see the Indian experiment carried to its issue, and there at least continuity of policy preserved. But Lord Willingdon's policy can hardly, without abuse of language, be called a continuance of Lord Irwin's, despite official asseverations on the point; and the state of India, with 30,000 Indians in prison, with the communal feud raging more fiercely than it has done for years, with a sporadic murder campaign held only with difficulty in check by extraordinary police measures and the sorely tried Indian moderates abandoning at last all hopes of the Government, has never been more disheartening nor less promising. Ireland has no doubt brought a temporary accession of strength to the Government; for most Englishmen, whatever their opinions on other subjects, dislike Mr. de Valera's malevolent fanaticism and the chop logic with which he defends it. But it cannot be a lasting source of strength. There is no permanent credit for anybody in this squalid squabble in a backyard: not even for the police.

Tariffs have turned traitor. Even Free Traders anticipated that the immediate effect of the imposition of tariffs would be a temporary boom. But there are few real signs of any such thing. Here and there no doubt an individual firm has picked up a little business as the result of tariffs; but it would seem that much more, especially in the entrepôt trades, has been lost. The general picture painted by the trade reports is one of rapid and general trade shrinkage. For the rest, the war cloud in the East was merely one more perplexity and anxiety. As to the Conferences, the newspapers have done their best patriotically to make the obscure intelligible and the tedious dramatic, but with

dubious success. An examination of a hundred persons selected at random in the streets on what has been happening at Geneva and even at Lausanne, and why, might be quite amusing. It is doubtful if it would encourage the belief that the details of these efforts at world salvage have excited any very intelligent interest in the breast of the ordinary citizen.

The position of Parliament has been very interesting. Some time ago Mr. Ramsay Muir had a vision of Parliament as the saviour of society. His Parliament consisted of parties so neatly balanced that the able leader of the smallest was able to take office, and, using Parliament as the Grand Council of the nation, to bear rule by its means. The gods puffed the dream away. The Parliament which appeared as the result of the 1931 election was so monstrously one-sided that many people, not excepting the Ministers of the National Government, regarded it with alarm. They feared that the huge majority might run amok, like the Cavalier Parliament after the Restoration, and demand the heads of its political enemies (figuratively speaking, of course) upon chargers. But this nightmare also proved unsubstantial. The Majority was intolerant (all vast majorities are intolerant from mere self-consciousness); but it was not vindictively intolerant. Frankenstein knew how to control his monster. Mr. Baldwin, ingeminating moderation, sought peace and, on the whole, preserved it. The Opposition has been so ineffective that it was barely worth trampling upon; it could not even obstruct seriously. The majority itself was perhaps a little frightened at its own power. It included an unusually large number of members without parliamentary experience. They did not know quite how to use their power, nor what would happen if they did. For these and other reasons Parliament has emerged neither saviour nor tyrant, but in the main as little more than as a registry office for the Government's decrees. This office it has performed—it is only fair to recognise this—with wholly laudable application and industry. But the result has been a little dull and drab. It is significant that by far the most interesting debate of the year, and the one which has elicited the best speaking, turned, not on any of the issues on which the fate of civilisation is understood to depend, but on the question whether cinemas should or should not open on Sundays.

Not that what has been happening at Westminster during these last months is of no account. By no means. It is possible that the National Government will appear in the histories in quite a different part from that for which it cast itself. The reluctant schoolboy of the future may be taught to regard it, not as the pilot who weathered the storm, nor as the saviour of society, but as the only author and begetter—the almost

inadvertent author and begetter—of certain very important constitutional reforms. To look at, these children are neither promising nor attractive. No one really loves the 'agreement to differ.' The Conservatives greeted this arrangement with shouts of angry laughter. The Liberals were only restrained with some difficulty at Clacton from denouncing it root and branch. The Ministers who accepted it did so with great searchings of heart. It has not worked very well. The spectacle of Ministers quarrelling openly with each other on the front bench has done nothing to enhance the repute of the Government nor the dignity of Parliament. But it has worked for the greater part of a year, and there seems no reason now why it should not continue to work indefinitely. A precedent in that case will have been established, and a precedent which, if we ever return to what Mr. Hoover calls 'normalcy,' it will be very tempting to follow. For no Minister really likes resigning. A Prime Minister does not ordinarily love seeing his Government severely shaken by the resignation of a Minister on a point of principle. This 'agreement to differ' offers a door of salvation to both.

The 'agreement to differ' is not in fact quite as absurd as it looks. If it can be made to work, a *prima facie* case has been established for it. For the system which it supersedes is absurd, too; the only defence of Cabinet solidarity is that it works. That the right honourable gentlemen who compose any given Cabinet all think exactly the same on any given subject is manifestly a constitutional fiction. It is not true—it never has been true; and recent changes in the character and atmosphere of Cabinets have made it increasingly difficult to maintain the fiction. But the new 'agreement' has proved in practice rather difficult to work. It will be immensely more difficult when the Government of the day is an ordinary party Government faced by a strong, able Opposition watching every opportunity to pounce on any weakness that betrays itself. It will probably be quite impossible to work in these conditions without a drastic change in the status and constitution of our Cabinets. But this is not impossible. We may come to see kaleidoscopic Cabinets, with Ministers passing in and out in the bewildering combinations familiar in France. Ultimately Mr. Ramsay Muir's vision may yet be realised, and the Cabinet be reduced to little more than the management committee of Parliament.

But the other constitutional innovation which the practice of the National Government threatens weakens the authority, not of the Cabinet (which may be desirable), but of Parliament. It is astounding that more attention has not been paid to the character and proceedings of the Tariff Commission. Here is a body which owes nothing to Parliament, except the bare formal

right to exist—nominated by the Government, exercising functions defined arbitrarily by the Government. This body proceeds coolly to revise and recast the constitution of the most important of British industries (for steel is the key industry, on which almost all others are in some greater or less degree dependent). It utters threats, which the Government will, if necessary, have to enforce; it disposes, not for a year, but for an indefinite period, of an indefinite amount of the taxpayers' and the consumers' money (for it is of course the consumer and the taxpayer who will ultimately have to pay the cost, great or small, of the protection of steel). Doubtless Parliament will be called upon eventually to ratify these proceedings; and doubtless Parliament will. What else can it do? It will be faced with a *fait accompli*—a settlement which it cannot overthrow or even seriously alter without causing a political crisis at Westminster and unthinkable confusion in the commercial life of the country. The real power of Parliament has for a number of reasons been declining for a long time. But if this precedent is accepted and endorsed, if great departments of the national life are to be in effect removed altogether from the real control of Parliament, it would seem that what we have known as parliamentary government is at an end. To be sure, Parliament still retains the irresistible weapon which made it what it has been. It is as irresistible in the last resort as ever, and a strong Parliament will make an end of bureaucratic commissions as promptly and effectively as its predecessor made an end of the Star Chamber. But will it ever venture to use this power, or even to threaten seriously to use it? Strong forces will be on the side of this new and startling development of bureaucracy. If they show courage and pertinacity, and Parliament shows neither, they may prevail; and then the axe is indeed laid, not perhaps to the root (for that is still the power of the purse), but certainly to the trunk of the tree; and from the point of view of those who have lived under its shade the effect is the same.

It is of no avail to say that these changes are mere emergency measures, not intended to be permanent. Constitutional innovations very often are in origin emergency measures, arising almost inadvertently from causes often quite trivial. Our own Constitution is a tissue of illustrations of this. George I., withdrawing, bored to tears, from the conferences of Ministers whose language he did not understand, was not deliberately founding the Cabinet system; yet he was founding the Cabinet system. William III., sulkily consenting, after efforts to avoid it, to draw his counsellors from one party only, was not deliberately establishing the party system; he was only yielding reluctantly to what he doubtless hoped was a temporary state of affairs. But his action established

the party system. The barons who faced King John at Runnymede would stare aghast—positively horrified—at many, even at most, of the reforms which they are now supposed to have insisted upon at the sword's point. Yet the lawyers' fiction that these reforms were implicit in their demands has a core of historical truth in it. The clergy, withdrawing for purely personal reasons of their own from legislative association with the burgesses and the knights of the shire, did not know that they were making the British House of Commons; but they were. These are merely the commonplace well-known instances which leap to the mind of a tendency well marked in all British Constitution-making. These latest experiments have exactly the same air of casual improvisation. They are not the less important for that. A thing is what it is none the less because it may be something very different from what its author intended it to be.

The National Government is not, and never has been, a national Government at all, if by that be meant a Government whose policy is accepted and endorsed by the whole nation, with perhaps a few insignificant exceptions. The first Coalition of the war period came much nearer to this ideal than the National Government has ever come; even Mr. Lloyd George's Coalition, in its palmy days, was probably nearer. It is essential to remember the fact (concealed as it is by our freakish electoral system) that at the General Election last year 6,600,000 electors voted against the Government. This number has since greatly grown. Labour, disheartened and broken as it is, is still fiercely—almost viciously—anti-Government. The bulk of Liberal opinion has swayed over from cool support to bitter criticism, and from suspicion to downright hostility. Round Mr. Lloyd George, his reputation recovering from its momentary eclipse during the election and the rather malicious and quite unfounded rumours about his health, a motley army is gathering of Free Traders of all descriptions: unbending theorists discontented with the association of the other Liberal leaders with the Government; Protectionists disgusted with the taste of their own medicine; and representatives of the various trading interests which the tariffs are hitting. And this force is being continually recruited. The mutterings of revolt on the Conservative Right may not at present mean very much. But if Ottawa comes to nothing, a section of this body of opinion will probably have to be classed as definitely hostile to the Government. It is probable that if only the politically conscious elements be taken into account very nearly half must already be reckoned as anti-Government; and the numbers of this Opposition are growing daily.

The strength of the Government lies in the support on which it can still probably rely safely of two huge masses of electors—

those who know almost nothing of politics, and those who care hardly anything about them. The new franchise has put into the hands of these classes the control, whenever they are not too indifferent to use it or too divided to pull their weight effectively, of the electoral machine; and so long as a Government has their support it can hardly be displaced. The National Government still retains it because, while not a National Government in the representative sense, it is not quite unworthy, in another not unimportant sense, of its great name. It is the most English Government, in its methods and temperament and outlook, that the country has had for a long time. It must be recognised that what to a philosopher seem its defects, seem to thousands and thousands of Englishmen merits. It appears to have no considered co-ordinated policy. It is so passionately addicted to compromise that it will compromise on almost anything on almost any terms. Its departments are permitted to do seemingly pretty well what is right in their own eyes. It may be an invention of the enemy that Mr. Chamberlain introduced his silk duties without even submitting them to the Cabinet. The significant thing is that it should be possible for such a story to gain any credence. It is slow in action, and obviously reluctant, unless it is absolutely necessary, to take any action at all. Its Ministers contradict each other glibly in public, and contradict themselves, when they are so minded, without the smallest hesitation. It is the picture, that is to say, of an opportunist Government. But then the Englishman is a born opportunist.

This is a fact which our public men are surprisingly slow to seize. The Socialist, staring at his audience of round-eyed indifferent Britons, thinks that their indifference is due to their failure to appreciate the beauty of his system. But it is not the beauty of his system of which they are doubtful. It is the necessity of any system. The Free Trader is wrong in thinking he injures Protection in the eyes of an English audience when he says it is an unscientific system of taxation. The English audience does not want a scientific system; it prefers it unscientific. The Protectionist who rails at his Free Trade opponent as a doctrinaire, on the other hand, hits harder than he probably knows. The accusation is indeed meaningless: Protection is just as much a doctrine as Free Trade, and Mr. Amery is a doctrinaire in a sense in which Mr. Cobden never dreamt of being. But the accusation goes right home, for a doctrinaire is an abomination to the ordinary Englishman. The idiot curate's prayer, 'Oh Lord, deliver us from all evil thought, and indeed from all thought,' is a travesty, of course; but a travesty of a quite real position. The fate of the Liberal Industrial Report illustrates this position interestingly. At the Report as a whole the British public

looked somewhat askance: they had a suspicion that it was clever. But they saw the practical value of many of the suggestions in it. For the temple they had not much use, but they appreciated with native shrewdness the gold of the temple. Successive British Governments have taken from the Report here a little and there a little, and embodied these fragments, sometimes askew, sometimes upside down, by legislation or administrative ordinance in the structure of our social organisation, with the result that a very considerable part of the Report has in fact been carried into effect. This is how the Englishman likes to see his Governments working, because it is the way in which he has himself worked for centuries. Mr. Chesterton has hit off the mood in the Middle Ages with his customary fantastic neatness:

They potted about and prayed:
They built a cathedral here and there
Or went on a small crusade.

So long as a thing will work at all, it is sufficient for their philosophy; it is good because it is good enough.

A Russian friend of mine, a technical expert, being shown over a certain factory in England, was astounded to see there a machine, which must have been at least thirty years old, of a pattern obsolete even in the days when it was made. 'Why,' he asked, 'do you keep that thing?' 'Oh, but why not?', replied the manager; 'it works.' The method must be wrong, of course. In any circumstances the waste entailed must be abominable. It is not hard to imagine circumstances in which such a temper would seem to mean irretrievable ruin. But it is no good saying this to the ordinary Englishman. He merely replies obstinately that the method has worked well enough hitherto; and this is true. It has worked almost miraculously well—so well that at times even the most sophisticated philosopher, looking out upon the chaos that was once civilisation, may feel dispirited by a moment's doubt as to whether there may not after all be something to be said in practice for this cool, unambitious opportunism. Certainly a hand-made raft is not the shipwright's last word as a method of ocean travel. But perhaps it may be better to be saved, if only for a time, on this humble craft rather than to be drowned in the apparently hopeless task of constructing a scientific lifeboat.

STUART HODGSON.

LAUSANNE—AND AFTER

FOR more than twelve months of moratorium Europe, and with her the world, has now been dragging through the slough of economic despond. The Hoover Year has had to become the Hoover Year-and-a-Half; economic depression and political unrest have had to be doubly and trebly intensified before the first frontal attack upon the politico-economic legacy of the war could be launched. All the roads of the last two years—that is, since the onset of the economic blizzard which now seems our settled weather—were leading to Lausanne; but until a week or two ago they were either blocked, or else the national pedestrians stayed at home. Now the roads are open—the delegates have come and gone; something has been attempted and something done, but is it calculated to achieve what had to be achieved? The answer can only be discovered by an analysis of two sets of conditions—the conditions precedent to the Lausanne Conference, and the subsequent conditions upon which the success of its achievement depends.

The conditions precedent to Lausanne can be thus briefly summarised. The world-wide slump in gold price levels since mid-1929 concentrated apprehension on the annual services of all debts, chief among which were the reparations of Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria, and the war debt between the Allied Powers. The reparation services had only been regulated anew at the beginning of 1929 by the Paris Agreement. The new Young Plan had abolished the 'index of prosperity,' which, as an integral part of the Dawes Plan, had provided a safeguard against too crushing an annual incidence of Germany's payments. In the words of the Young Committee's Report, the reason for its abolition was that, as both Germany and the world were economically set on the road to 'recovery,' the retention of such an index in the better and still better years to come would really redound to Germany's economic disadvantage by requiring correspondingly heavier annual payments as German prosperity went hand-in-hand with that of the world at large: 'in no circumstances could Germany benefit therefrom, and the disappearance of this element of uncertainty is wholly to her benefit.' Unhappily

the Young Plan left Germany's annual debt services, and indeed those of all debtors whose debts were contracted as so much weight of gold per annum, to the sport of a far more uncertain element—that of the world's price level under a gold standard which functioned neither automatically nor by conscious international co-operation. Instead of increasing prosperity together with a stable or an advancing price level we have had, since mid-1929, a slump in world prices which can only be termed catastrophic, an abandonment by half the world of the free gold standard, a *régime* of rigid exchange control in every debtor country, an outcrop of emergency tariffs, quotas and prohibitions on imports, and, last but not least for world affairs, the transformation of Britain overnight from a free-trade to a highly protectionist Power. Thus were the logical premisses of the Young Plan stultified.

At the end of June 1931 came President Hoover's dramatic gesture. Its *raison d'être* was to provide a breathing-space in which the European nations should settle, promptly and finally, their own politico-economic disorders before an approach by individual debtors to the United States should prove necessary. It was made clear that the United States Administration would view with extreme disfavour any attempt at a 'united front' attitude in Europe—at any rate, before the ground of reparations and disarmament had been cleared. Upon this moratorium as basis began the examination of Germany's capacity to pay reparations. There were two Basle committees of experts, as well as conferences of private creditors like the bankers. The first Basle report last September made it a matter of urgency that the Powers should make a final scaling-down of German indebtedness; but nothing was done. The second Basle committee reported just before Christmas, 1931, in words of extreme gravity and insisting on the urgency of the need for a solution which should be final and drastic lest complete collapse of Central European economic life should result. The time by now was less opportune, for in the meanwhile the League, the only international organisation which could hope to deal with an amorphous world in such a degree of chaos, was faced with a Far Eastern conflict between two of its members which strained its energies to the utmost, and also with the overdue Disarmament Conference for the relief of a world weary of war and shattered by its aftermath. Moreover, the political terrain was now most unfavourable. In Germany there were State and Presidential elections, which in such economic circumstances only served to make the Nazi gains more striking and French apprehensions more solidly intransigent. In Britain the currency and tariff problems were paramount, and an Imperial Conference was in preparation. In the United States a degree of

financial and industrial chaos had been suddenly superimposed on a people who had never paused to imagine that such a thing was possible; and yet another Presidential election was preparing that country for its periodical four-yearly split into two factions. In France Ministry succeeded Ministry with Gallic precision and a frequency which increased with the approach of the general election in May. In Central Europe conditions had rapidly become so bad as to rival the state of affairs just after the war, and the international field was cumbered with conflicting measures, mostly *ad hoc*, for Central European rehabilitation, while defaults and compulsory moratoria (*De moratoriis nil nisi bonum*!) were the order of the day. In such conditions the Lausanne Conference, originally called in January, was postponed to June or July. At last, when with almost incredible *Kühnheit* President Hindenburg dismissed Chancellor Brüning and installed the von Papen 'General Staff Government,' it had become plain that Germany had only the alternatives of civil war or external aid with her burdens, and every sane European knew that the knell of reparations had sounded. What no one knew was how to reconcile a purely economic solution with its inevitable political aftermath, though the actual terms of the settlement were soon agreed.

Into the actual Lausanne solution, as far as its terms are concerned, it is not necessary to go. It is sufficient to note that there are no political reservations in the agreement with Germany; there are no more reparations, as such; there is a provision for a 'contribution to European reconstruction' by Germany, the issue of which is entirely at the discretion of the Bank for International Settlements after three years and up to eighteen years from now, and which in any case is of minimal proportions. These are the *prima facie* results of Lausanne, and they represent the best settlement possible on paper. But they are not at all the more important results. Far more important, because far more wide-reaching in their after-effects, are the 'conditions subsequent' to the Lausanne agreement in the form of separate, but contingent, agreements. These are the so-called 'gentleman's agreement' between the creditor Powers, and the 'confidence pact' first announced as between Britain and France.

The bare agreement at Lausanne which was first published to the world is an achievement, of its kind. Its kind is the type of agreement which recognises ineluctable facts because there is no other escape save in annihilation, and which therefore makes a virtue of necessity. Everyone—even the wiser of the French—knew that the creditors of Germany would have either to forego for ever the hope of reparations, or else let loose the dogs of war, civil and international, upon an economically prostrate Conti-

ment. No economist of any standing in any Western nation could reasonably have suggested another moratorium for Germany; for the question, in the last analysis, was no longer a question of how long it would take Germany to recover to 'paying point,' but rather of how long that very entity called Germany could hold together at all. In brief, it was now a question of the very existence of a national and federal State. Subsequent events have shown how weak were the foundations of 'democratic Germany,' and we have witnessed the relapse into Junkerdom as a result. It was admittedly difficult to get the delegates of France and Germany to agree on a formula which should reconcile France's 'sacred rights' with the right to existence of Germany, but it was the *formula* which provided the difficulty, and never the facts. So the success of Lausanne was just that the creditors of Germany agreed with Germany in recognising the ineluctable, and in writing it down. To that extent Lausanne was over-sentimentalised in the Press; but, significantly enough, not on the London money market, which quickly discounted it because of its fundamental weakness—the lack of sanctions. Lausanne, it must be reiterated, has not ended anything of itself; it has merely drawn up a formula which expresses the common attitude of European creditors to Germany and of Germany to them. That common attitude, however, is not unconditional. It depends on the fulfilment of a parallel condition, which a lawyer would call a 'condition subsequent of the contract.' And there we touch the core of the matter—the 'gentleman's agreement.'

Undoubtedly the least satisfactory element in the Lausanne result was this 'gentleman's agreement,' as is evidenced by the veritable tempest of criticism, interpretation, discussion, and confusion to which it has given rise all over the world. Indeed, it is difficult to see why the term was ever employed. A 'gentleman's agreement' in commercial practice usually signifies a mere oral or written agreement, but one which it is never intended to enforce by legal sanctions—one, that is, which depends on the honour of a gentleman for its binding force. The Lausanne 'gentleman's agreement,' however, was an actually binding agreement in international law—an agreement not to ratify the main instrument before the fulfilment of a certain condition subsequent—similar to many other such agreements (or protocols) between nations which we have seen since the war. But this very insistence upon the fulfilment of a condition subsequent makes the 'gentleman's agreement' itself the main condition of the entire Lausanne contract; so that all we really have is another species of moratorium until the United States deals with its European debtors to their joint and several satisfactions.

However rosy the results on paper, the procedure at Lausanne

was singularly unfortunate from several points of view. First, it was a tactical blunder to lay on the shoulders of the United States the responsibility for the success or failure of the European reparations settlement, when Congress had always, and especially since its resolution of last December, made it clear that its own attitude to its debtors would depend upon their own attitudes among themselves. Is it an equitable act to draw up an agreement which says, in effect: 'We hereby agree to do what the United States wants us to do for our debtor, immediately after the United States has done what we want it to do for us'? This is the exact attitude most condemned by the French in the German people—the debtor setting his own conditions for a composition with his creditors, an inequitable proceeding. 'He who comes into Equity must come with clean hands. He who seeks Equity must do Equity.' Those are two of the maxims of equity which the American people are not likely to forget in this connexion. Secondly, it is not a document which is calculated to strengthen our hands in our future dealings with the United States, for if the United States dares to stand on its rights and demand that Europe shall unconditionally release Germany and all other debtors from reparations and war debts before sending her individual nations to negotiate separate releases with the United States itself, that is no more than law and equity together, and for Europe to oppose the threat of repudiation to the United States in the alternative is extremely questionable policy if she desires to encourage American co-operation in the forthcoming economic conference for reconstruction. And world economic reconstruction without the United States is unthinkable. Thirdly, this 'gentleman's agreement' makes the main agreement of mere hypothetical worth, for in the event of the war debts question not being satisfactorily settled it provides for a 'return to the *status quo ante*.' But we know that such return is a figment of the imagination. It cannot be. So that means yet another conference on reparations and war debts by the European parties. We are thus no nearer the 'final settlement' which Lausanne promised us. Fourthly, the actual circumstances of the publication of the Lausanne proceedings and results have been 'fumbling'¹ to a degree. Presumably the French need of political reassurance for M. Herriot in his equilibristics between Right and Left dictated the semi-official publication of the details of the 'gentleman's agreement.' Thenceforth the fat was in the fire; two days later it was published in London—an inoffensively worded but unmistakably significant document, for all that, in American eyes, where it appeared as the European 'united front' in war debts and disarmament questions. Then the game

¹ An American characterisation.

of explanations began: M. Herriot in Paris, Mr. Chamberlain and the Prime Minister here, Sir John Simon almost everywhere—explanations, reassurances, provisos were poured forth; and, finally, to cap it all, the text of yet another agreement was issued—that of the Anglo-French ‘confidence pact,’ so-called.

This ‘confidence pact,’ having been hailed in the French Press as the revival of the *Entente Cordiale*, made another flutter in the dovecotes. Germany asked for full details. In Italy it led to wholesale reshuffling of the Cabinet. The smaller League members at Geneva openly expressed their perturbation at the way in which international relations were being managed by the minority of the greater Powers to the exclusion of the lesser. Indeed, this fact had already caused Japan, Portugal, and the lesser creditor Powers at Lausanne itself to reserve their assent to the final Act and to voice their grievance at the way things had been managed. But that was conceivably vital to the need for some quick decision. Could the same thing be said, however, of the shadowy conference foreseen in the ‘gentleman’s agreement’ in case of a rupture with the United States, or of this new Anglo-French ‘confidence pact’? Why, asked the smaller Powers, was it necessary, in view of the League and of its European Commission, that France and Britain should pledge themselves just now to employ candid and open discussion of all points in which they were both interested, including their attitude to the Disarmament Conference? Why does ‘Pertinax’ continue to fulminate against the ‘dropping’ of the French Little Entente allies? Why did Mr. MacDonald ever propose such a thing as a Six-Power Pact at Lausanne, when the League exists with all its appurtenances? And why is all this separatism in the guise of ‘pacts’ necessary if we have all to go to the United States and make our debt settlements singly? Finally, the United States again asked if this new Anglo-French ‘agreement to collaborate’ meant collaboration to rob the Hoover disarmament proposals of their efficacy. The upshot, as might have been foreseen from the fate of the ‘gentleman’s agreement,’ is that M. Herriot and Sir John Simon have had to invite the accession of any other European States to this new ‘confidence pact’; while again it has become necessary for Britain to reassure the United States that the ‘pact’ is no new attempt to create an anti-American united front in Europe. Nevertheless, American senators, congressmen, and Press have been more unfavourably disposed to European politicians (and to Britain as well) than at any other time in the last twelve months, and the adjectives applied to the type of European diplomacy and diplomats which have fathered these late pacts, agreements, and understandings upon a confused European situation are anything but complimentary.

We can therefore make out the Lausanne balance-sheet something like this: on the credit side we have the *de facto* end of reparations coupled with the conditional freeing of most of the economic powers of Germany, the chances of Franco-German economic co-operation, a conditional basis for the world Economic Conference next autumn, and these are all contingent assets; on the debit side we have the very contingent nature of the whole settlement, the worsening of political antagonisms inside Germany, the American stiffening-up which is not a bit contingent, and the consequent economic uncertainty of the world before next November, and these are mostly actual liabilities. The war debt settlement remains the crux. But is this the total of ‘conditions subsequent’ to the practical fulfilment of the Lausanne agreement? Not at all. There are in addition to war debts the problems of disarmament, of Ottawa, of the European political situation, of the functioning of the League, and of the world Economic Conference in November. On concurrent solutions of these six problems the ultimate success of the Lausanne agreement depends, and it will be necessary to consider them in turn, albeit briefly.

First, in regard to war debts, the Young Plan provided for Germany’s payments on reparation account being split into two portions. The first, spread over the first thirty-seven years, covered the net inter-Allied debt payments to the United States and also left a handsome surplus to France for reparation pure and simple, while the second period of twenty-two years thereafter left no such surplus to France and merely covered net inter-Allied indebtedness to the United States. Over the total fifty-nine years the United States would have taken 65 per cent. of the reparation payments, about 35 per cent. going to reparation in Europe.² It was also provided that if the United States scaled down the debts due to her at any time in those fifty-nine years, Germany should secure a scaling-down of her reparation payments equal to two-thirds of the United States remission if within the first thirty-seven years, and equal to the whole of such United States remission in the last twenty-two years. Thus, whatever the United States may say of the rights of her own case, the European war debts to the United States were already in 1929 linked to the Young Plan on an equitable ground for Germany; so that now, if the United States still demands that the European creditors should settle their accounts with her singly, she cannot object to their arranging among themselves to contribute to a common ‘pool’ and to make *pro rata* a demand on Germany for some economically feasible contribution in the event of American

² *The Recovery of Germany*, by J. W. Angell (London: Oxford University Press, 1929), p. 336.

insistence upon, say, a quarter of a pound of flesh instead of the whole pound, whether after a further moratorium or not. But, be it noted, this is what the present Lausanne agreement has precisely failed to do. It has drawn up an instrument of release for Germany, but made its entry into force entirely dependent upon separate settlements by the United States with European debtors proving satisfactory to each debtor; and, in addition, Germany has agreed upon a figure for a 'contribution' to European reconstruction in advance, provided she can safely pay it. It would have been far better to have merely cancelled reparations and European inter-Allied debts outright, *retaining the American liability* in the faith that Germany and her creditors could together raise a 'pool' or that the United States would then act on her own *bona fide* promises, than to have 'insured' against American bad faith by the present agreement and its conditions; for then, at any rate, if the United States pleaded that Europe had presented her with the alternatives of default or cancellation, Europe could have replied: 'We have only done what you told us to do.' As it is, we can now only wait and see the inevitable bickerings which must result between Germany's creditors when they attempt, ~~at~~ being bound by Lausanne, to make each of them the best bargain with an ominously critical American people.

Secondly, there is the thorny problem of Disarmament which, more than anything else at present, must be taken as the true test of American opinion on European affairs. It was no coincidence that the most dramatic proposal for disarmament which the Geneva Conference has yet had to debate (apart from the Russian voice crying in the wilderness for complete disarmament) has been President Hoover's sweeping programme. Here again, however, the reception accorded to it has antagonised American public opinion; for the only great Power to give it wholehearted and unreserved support has been Italy. Germany is already disarmed. France has rejected part outright and smothered the rest in particular amendments. Britain has given it a lukewarm, guarded reception, both here and in Geneva; and, in the case of naval building, we have actually countered its provisions with no proposals for immediate disarmament at all, and nothing before 1937 but stabilisation at the present level. It is undeniably a fact that Britain has Imperial responsibilities, and that Britain is the only Power to have consistently followed a 'reduction' policy since the war; but there is no doubt that wholehearted British support of the American proposals at the present moment would range the whole of the American fleet on our side if the Kellogg Pact should ever be broken to our danger. That is a selfish but none the less real consideration; for Japan is inveterately opposed root and branch to the American proposals,

and it should be our job to step in where Japan has elected to step out, and to reap the harvest of American goodwill. Instead we have brought forward a fine series of reservations against the clear-cut American proposals—dealing with maximum weights of tanks, calibre of naval guns and tonnage of cruisers for our own particular purposes, etc.—and therewith ranked ourselves with France and Japan. To damn Mr. Hoover's plan with faint praise while robbing it of its essentials is not conducive to winning the Americans' support for a particularly favourable interpretation of our liabilities to them in the matter of war debts, especially when our own proposals involve a much greater annual outlay on armaments than the Hoover Plan. The Americans are nothing if not logical in matters of relative expenditure. True, the Simon-Beneš Draft displays an impressive list of objectives minus methods of achieving them; but if the Conference emasculates the Hoover Plan, or produces no result to impress the United States with its *bona fides*, negotiations for the final settlement of war debts and reparations after November will become trebly difficult, if not altogether abortive.

If there had ever existed doubts that the peoples of the world really demanded disarmament for its own sake before 1932, their several resolutions and demonstrations during the course of the Conference at Geneva have set those doubts for ever at rest. But the most pressing problem of democracy is the bridging of that gulf between popular demands and the feasibility of their fulfilment by the political machinery of the modern State. The ideological environment of leaders differs from that of the led, and even from their own ideology before they became leaders; and so the interpreters of public policy trim their sails to the wind of international conferences; nor is it easy to see how this can be otherwise. But one thing is certain—we have witnessed in the last six or twelve months an altogether alarming return to the noxious diplomatic methods of the nineteenth century, both at Geneva and elsewhere; matters of general import have been fixed and settled by 'experts' whose authority in such matters should be adjectival and not substantive; and technical commissions and committees everywhere now follow the model of the Berlin Conference of 1878 in having the essential conclusions agreed before going in to confer. Clear principles have been obscured in cloudy pacts and agreements of a collateral nature. Similarly, in the last year we have witnessed in Germany, chafing under compulsory disarmament, the rise of a vast private army within the State, whose aim to capture the main body of the Reich has just been realised, to the accompaniment of threats of civil war. To relieve Germany of reparations is not enough if Germany now bends her energies to achieve the right to re-arm.

The only way is to give her tangible proof of the international will to disarm by actual reductions in present scales of armaments, and to that policy we have now the United States, Russia, Italy, and Spain committed. Britain, France, and Japan stand outside, wanting to effect a compromise at or around the present level of armaments. In that case Britain and France are in the wrong camp, for the United States will certainly judge them with Japan when the time comes for talking of war debts. Therefore the Lausanne agreement can only be rendered effective if it is coupled to unreserved co-operation with the United States to perfect the Hoover Plan. Though Mr. Gibson has 'approved' the Simon-Beneš Draft, he made it clear that he regarded it as a poor second to the prevention of attack inherent in the Hoover Plan. There is, of course, the chance that Britain and Italy, say, might accept the Hoover Plan *in toto* while France and Japan rejected it. In that case the obvious thing to do would be to split both reparations and war debt agreements; to leave France and Japan to negotiate as best they could their respective claims on Germany and their liabilities to the United States and this country. Probably the upshot would be that a general agreement could in that case be carried by the United States, Italy, and Britain standing together. One thing remains certain: as long as the European nations make of the Geneva Disarmament Conference a laughing stock in the United States they will have little to hope from the Government of the United States, and the Presidential Election will not vary that. The European attitude to disarmament is at present the only thing 'above the battle' in American politics.

Thirdly, there is the British Imperial Conference at Ottawa. The importance of this is indirect, but very real. If Britain is thereby committed for the future to a full-blooded protectionist policy *vis-à-vis* foreign countries which it cannot legally vary because of its undertakings to the parts of the Empire, then Britain may find she is providing the French and the Germans with by far the greatest incentive to closer economic co-operation since the war; and, if the Lausanne agreement is ratified in due course, the export capacities of Britain to her largest customer, the continent of Europe, will be drastically curtailed, for one clause in any agreement between France and Germany would certainly be a common aim to shut out Britain from the Continental market. Indeed, this exclusion could in that case easily be effected in the natural course of events without any extra tariffs, for the French and German industries combined would be far more competitively efficacious on the Continent than our own. Germany, freed from politico-economic control, minus the export of deliveries in kind and minus the tax they represented, will certainly co-operate with France on the economic plane if once the

disarmament question is settled. France has the capital available; and a judicious management of the minorities question and of the Eastern Frontier question would lay the foundations for by far the most significant economic move since the *Zollverein*. But is that what this country wants? We ought to weigh this dispassionately and unsentimentally. Do we yet realise what, in the long run, the agreement to make as self-contained an Empire as possible may mean to Britain? It may mean industrial stabilisation, if not stagnation, minus our freedom to offer the benefits of our import market to other customers of ours lest their tariffs be raised against our exports. In brief, the European continent is to-day watching Ottawa every whit as attentively as we are ourselves, which is why our actions there cannot be divorced from the general European political problem and from the question of the ultimate efficacy of the Lausanne solution.

Fourthly, there is the general alignment of political forces in Europe for the maintenance of the Treaty of Versailles or for Treaty revision, for Central European hegemony, for anti-Russian bulwarks, etc. There is the French thesis and the Italo-German thesis, upon whose reconciliation depends the practicability of disarmament, and, therefore, the appeasement of European bitterness and American scepticism. In the Saar there is soon to be a test of French goodwill towards Germany. In the Danubian basin there is the entire *Zersplitterung* of the former Habsburg free-trade empire to be somehow welded once more into a great free-trade area—perhaps on the lines along which the Scandinavian countries or Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland are now travelling. There can be no investment in such areas, nor indeed in Europe as a whole, either from European lands or from across the Atlantic, until the political substratum appears likely to withstand more strain than at present; and a first condition for all this is again the success of the Disarmament Conference, which itself would then pave the way for the settlement of war debts and political differences and, therewith, for the fulfilment of the Lausanne agreement.

Fifthly, there is now the question of the League's mechanism and its functioning. The valuable machinery which the League has perfected since its inception lies to hand, but it must be used more. The Manchurian conflict and the Disarmament Conference need not be detrimental to the future of the League. One cannot hope to run before one has learned to walk. The questions of international standards related to the work of the International Labour Office, of the B.I.S. and its relations to the European Commission and the Economic and Financial Section of the League, of the Agricultural Mortgage Bank for distressed agrarian countries, and of that cardinal point, 'sanctions for the League,'

these have all to be probed and resolved before we have that degree of international government which will permit us to turn our eyes inward on our own deficiencies in peace, confident of our ability to repair them without fear of aggression and without the crushing burden of individual defences. In fact, any examination of the evils from which the whole world is suffering in 1932 must convince the most hardened nationalist that the prerequisites of international co-operation in matters economic and political must be met before peace can be ensured or prosperity invoked. And to that end the perfection, not alone of the League's machinery, but also of the means of using it on all occasions, must precede the results. In this connexion the Lausanne agreement has stated the alternatives fairly and squarely: we have there an agreement which can lend itself equally to individual and co-operative treatment on the international plane. If the matter be tackled in the right way, indeed, it may well be that the successful working out of the Lausanne agreement will involve a much closer co-operation between the United States and the League, and to that extent it is incumbent on this country to act as mediator between Europe and the United States. Here, again, we have only to refer to the United States' interest both in Lausanne and in Geneva to see the points of coincidence.

Lastly, there is the prospect of the great Economic Conference in the autumn, which has not only to set the seal upon the Lausanne agreement, but also to deal with the international monetary standard, exchange control, tariffs and quotas, foreign investment, transport, and industrial rationalisation and marketing agreements. Whatever way the American election goes, it cannot alter the American conditions for this Conference. It is obvious that, given satisfactory solutions to all the foregoing problems, there will be every economic incentive to this world conference to set the wheels of trade and investment running again. The Lausanne agreement will have its logical complement in the Economic Conference, upon the success of which its own success depends, and without the success of which its own settlement of reparations and war debts, even if ratified, will be left high and dry and devoid of practical significance as far as the rehabilitation of the world's economic life is concerned. An Economic Conference before the debts agreement has clarified the Lausanne position is unthinkable. So far a preparatory committee has been set up, with Sir John Simon as its chairman, at Geneva. But more than that is necessary. No lawyer (and, indeed, no economist) will suffice to render the Economic Conference successful, and certainly no amount of Foreign Office or Chancellery preparations. Before the Conference meets there must be an actual measure of international co-operation on the

part of politicians, Governments, statesmen, bankers, and industrialists to the effect that when the time of the Conference comes it will not be necessary to spend weeks in jockeying for tactical positions by the manipulation of draft resolutions, amendments, or special sub-committees, as at the Disarmament Conference. Reparations and debts once out of the way, the United States and Europe can then set up committees and initiate proceedings. Moreover, the nations must each have a considered economic policy by that date, comprising their proposals for the freeing of the wheels of commerce, and indicating the lengths to which each is prepared to go in the common purpose. Nor should it be forgotten at Ottawa that the Empire will also be called on to play a leading rôle in the work of economic reconstruction. Lausanne by itself is even less than disarmament by itself; but both the debts-reparations question and disarmament can only have significance if their results be set within the framework of a more embracing international economic programme. Otherwise it is difficult indeed to see when the end of this three-year economic blizzard is likely to come.

Thus, though the Lausanne agreement is striking enough when compared with national attitudes a year ago, it must be judged not so much by reference to the conditions preceding it as by those succeeding it; and the latter, as we have seen, are of wider significance than the mere cessation of reparations or war debts themselves. It is a great achievement even to *promise* the removal of the economic cancers induced by war; but the actual surgical operation has yet to be performed, and the present agreement to perform it waits upon issues of more profound international significance for its fulfilment. It is to the resolution of these further issues that the energies of the world's statesmen and men of vision must now be wholeheartedly directed. And, as with all matters of international import, the fulcrum of events lies in the satisfactory solution of the disarmament problem. Once that is settled and the settlement is being carried out—once the United States and Europe have been united on that common ground—it is not rash to predict the speedy oblivion which will perforce descend on those legacies of former armaments, reparations and war debts, the issues at Lausanne. Then, and only then, will the Economic Conference next autumn, upon which all our reasonable expectations of 'recovery' are at present based, stand a chance of being more than an exercise in economic excogitations, and of more than palliative efficacy. Between Lausanne and Washington there lies Geneva!

D. GRAHAM HUTTON.

REFLECTIONS ON THE SPANISH REVOLUTION

IN the twinkling of an eye, so it seemed, Spain exchanged an unconstitutional and despotic type of monarchy for a peculiar intellectual, spiritual, and democratic republic, and, what is even more surprising, underwent this operation with the minimum of pain and without the shedding of blood. To the outside world Spain had been sedulously presented as an essentially monarchical country, conservative, traditional, untainted by the almost ubiquitous doctrines of modern democracy. What has happened? people asked. Has Spain gone mad? Has she changed her character entirely? The answer is, neither is she mad nor has she changed. She has simply given expression to the latent but ever-recurrent feeling of intuitive dislike of repressive discipline. In her mentality there has been no change. It is only the trappings which have been discarded—not entirely for new, but for forgotten robes.

There are two mysteries for foreigners in connexion with the Spanish Revolution. The first is its past, the other its future. In the first place, why and how did it come so swiftly, so silently and so effectively? And, secondly, is it finished, is it going further to the left, will Spain 'go Bolshie,' will it end in anarchical chaos, will there be a reaction, or will the republic, prematurely born as it was, consolidate its position and develop into a strong, healthy country, freed from clericalism and the fear of ever-recurrent military *coups d'état*? It came when it did directly owing to the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Had it not been for the prolongation of this *régime* for seven years, the republic would never have materialised in 1931, though whether, with the amazingly picturesque and romantic character of King Alfonso always in the offing, its ultimate arrival was not inevitable must remain a doubtful question.

Take the question of the dictatorship first. Dictatorships, to be successful, must be relentless and firm. Primo de Rivera's was neither. It was of a vacillating would-be 'benevolent despot' type. Dictatorships—that is to say, open and avowed dictatorships, for all human relationships are in the nature of a

dictatorship, the subservience of an inferior to a superior will—occur in history at some national crisis when the ordinary methods of government prove unequal to the occasion. Such was Pride's Purge, such was *Brumaire*, such was the *coup d'état* of September 1923. Temporarily these '*coups*' may be popular. In the present instance King Alfonso was presented to his subjects, or allowed himself to be presented, as a democratic monarch who had been held in captivity by the old gang of *políticos*. The old political methods had obvious limitations. Bribery and corruption were rampant. Changes of Ministries were frequent, their duration was short (one lasted only twenty-four hours). With the exception of Canalejas (who was assassinated), and possibly Maura, it appears to have been a case of 'St. John was for St. John, and Harley for Oxford, and Marlborough for John Churchill always.' The elections were arranged; sometimes the lists of successful candidates are said to have been published before the results were known. Clearly the system was rotten, and opinion seems divided as to whether the personal factor of King Alfonso simplified or complicated matters. In a word, was King Alfonso a genuine patriotic and statesmanlike king, or was he merely exceedingly clever and astute, in the way that his *políticos* were astute, he himself being just one cleverer than they? At any rate, this system fell in September 1923. The Cortes were suspended. What did the King do? What could he have done?

The Court was at that time at San Sebastian, within less than an hour's motor ride of the frontier. It has been suggested that had King Alfonso at that moment left Spain voluntarily rather than break the Constitution of 1876, which in his coronation oath he swore to observe, he would in a year's time have been recalled to Spain as the popular guardian of the nation's liberties. This view may or may not be correct, but it well illustrates the emphasis which was laid by all legal theorists, by politicians, and latterly by the man in the street, on the sacred character of the Constitution. To us, no doubt, who suffer from a surfeit of constitutionalism—indeed, constitutional rule might be said to be England's chief contribution to civilisation, as the Ford car is that of America—such an attitude seems pedantic and obsolete, particularly as foreigners had grown to regard Spain as a country fitted for the *régime* of a military monarchy and dictatorship. But this attitude is comparatively new in Spain. It had been introduced by the house of Austria and further developed by the Bourbon dynasty, who, fresh from the clarity and centralisation of the French Court, were bewildered by the numbers of local parliaments in Spain, the *comuneros* and the *fueros*. They appeared to forget that representative government flourished

in Spain even before Simon de Montfort summoned two knights of the shire and two burgesses to the famous Parliament of 1274. Even in the reign of that most absolute monarch Philip II., Father Vitoria wrote: 'The prince derives his authority from the Republic'; and the oath which the deputies of the Aragonese Cortes took to the king was of an even more democratic character: 'We who are as good as you swear to you who are no better than ourselves to accept you as our Sovereign lord provided you obey all our statutes and laws, but not if you fail to do so.'

In the nineteenth century a period of so-called constitutional rule would be succeeded by a decade of reaction and *camarilla* government. The names of squares were regularly changed from *Plaza de la Constitución* to *Plaza del Rey*. The religious orders were periodically expelled in bursts of anti-clerical spleen of a far more violent character than those of last year: periodically they returned, together with bleeding nuns, confessors and all the superstitions and picturesque paraphernalia of the Roman Church. Four, if not five, Constitutions were drawn up between the year 1812 (Constitution of Cadiz) and the year 1876. Either they were not sufficiently practical or too advanced for Spain, and in most cases they were disregarded by the monarchy. The fact is they failed to work, and from their failure has grown up the theory that constitutional rule was not suited to the Spanish temperament. The King, therefore, in breaking the 1876 Constitution, had the precedent of his Bourbon ancestors to follow—Fernando VII., Maria Cristina, and Isabella II. Primo de Rivera expressly states in the articles published posthumously that the King was not in league with him in any way when he raised the standard of revolt at Barcelona and hurried to Madrid. On the other hand, Señor Madariaga, in his illuminating book on *Spain*, implies that King Alfonso 'spent the time motoring between San Sebastian, Burgos and Saragossa, to keep in touch with his garrisons while allowing things to ripen.' The Conde de Romanones, the Lloyd George of Spain, the most astute and subtle of the old school of *politicos*, in his defence of the King against the Act of Accusation in the Cortes on November 19, 1931, read a telegram which Primo de Rivera despatched to the Governor-General of Madrid, from which he wished to make it clear that if the King did not accept the dictatorship as a *fait accompli* civil war would follow. The adherents of the monarchy maintain that by accepting the creation of the dictatorship as the expression of the popular will the King saved his country the futility of civil war as he saved it again on April 14, 1931, by handing over his powers of government to the Republican Junta. Another, and as it proved more correct, view was that of his mother, Queen Maria Cristina, who had carefully nursed a two-

party system of government. On being told of the King's acceptance of the dictatorship she is reported to have said: 'My son, you have gambled with your crown and lost it.'

There is certainly little doubt that from his early years the King showed a marked tendency to rely upon the army for support, and not a few of his speeches during the World War may be interpreted as suggesting to the Spanish people that the time had come to sweep away a rotten and discredited political system. Monarchists tell us that he was inspired by patriotic motives and that he honestly believed that the Spanish people were too local and too individual to benefit by constitutional rule. But the simple expedient of cutting the Gordian knot does not solve the problem. It merely postpones an ultimate catastrophe. The Conde de Romanones has described graphically the first Cabinet Council at which Alfonso presided, and particularly emphasised the dictatorial manner which he adopted towards his Ministers. The young King said: 'The Constitution confers upon me the granting of honours, titles and grandeeships; that is why I warn you that I reserve for myself entirely the exercise of this right.' At this first Council meeting the chief characteristics of the reign were already apparent—the King's love of personal power based on the army, and the weakness of the *politicos* who were his Ministers. Church and army—these were the bulwarks on which the King preferred his throne to rest rather than upon Constitution and Cortes.

But all this, in itself, would not have led to the fall of the monarchy. The Court might have continued its blithe, picturesque and self-centred existence; the processions of the *Capilla Publica*, the washing of the beggars' feet, the Orders of Santiago and other knighthoods might have retained their pageantry, if the dictatorship had concluded its work earlier and the Cortes been opened sooner. The King was now, apart from Primo de Rivera, his own Minister, his own adviser. Himself a gifted *politico*, he had outmanœuvred all the politicians. But, alas! statesmanship he had none, and if there were any statesmen, under the dictator's *régime* they could find no outlet for their patriotism. Kingship is still a sacred institution, and kings must remain immune from party politics. In England, when Mr. Baldwin or Mr. Lloyd George or any party political leader becomes unpopular he goes into Opposition. But for kings who play a political rôle there is only one opposition, and that is exile. Romanones, in his speech in the Cortes, maintains that the King rarely exercised so small an influence as he did during the dictatorship. But it is generally believed in Spain, and it was everywhere maintained by the enemies of both dictator and King, that the contrary was the case. The King had now made enemies of all

the old politicians, who, corrupt and self-interested as they may have been, could at least have kept him in touch with what was going on in the minds of his people. As it was, with a firmly censored Press and a tight grip of the army, no genuine expression of opinion occurred until the fateful municipal election of April 12, 1931. Undoubtedly the dictatorship benefited Spain from a material point of view very greatly. Roads—always the delight of dictators in every century—were vastly improved, trains ran punctually, an efficient tourist agency was formed and run as a branch of the Government, new and costly buildings were raised, the Exhibitions at Seville and Barcelona advertised the commercial prosperity of Spain to the outside world. Above all, Barcelona, which had been in a state of anarchy, was tranquillised and the war in Morocco, more by good luck than good management, brought to a successful conclusion. (It was indeed believed that a chief reason for the dictatorship was to prevent an inquiry into the disasters at Anual, in which the King and the highest military authorities were said to have been implicated.) High tariff walls benefited certain industries, but greatly raised the cost of living. This prosperity, however, was of a spurious window-dressed variety. Economically it was disastrous. Politically all free thought was stifled, and though it may be an exaggeration to say that a 'terror' existed, spies and imprisonments without legal trials were certainly not uncommon. Professors like Unamuno lost their chairs, students such as Sbert were exiled, politicians like Señor Alba remained in angry isolation outside Spain.

One of the greatest tragedies of Alfonso XIII.'s reign is that nearly all the intellectual classes were republican. It is, of course, a fallacy—which in 1929 seemed strongly prevalent in England—that intellectuals must be left-wing thinkers and philosophers. But in Spain the behaviour of the Crown and the sterile Opposition which surrounded it, above all the pro-German feeling in official classes during the war, drove the 1898 generation further and further away from the monarchy. The year 1898 is generally regarded as the beginning of a new spiritual era of Spain. In it she lost Cuba. The last province of her once enormous empire had dropped from her grasp. The war was disgracefully mismanaged, and the nation felt that it had been kept in the dark as to the real state of its finances and its army. It therefore determined to turn its eyes inwards upon the internal state of the country instead of embarking on grandiose schemes abroad. The people reacted against the hollow pomp of the Restoration. The intellectual leaders of this movement were to become in time the strongest forces in Spain. So far from forming a coherent and orthodox literary group, they may be said to have interpreted in their own methods the teaching of the

great anti-clerical educationist Don Francisco Giner (a sort of Spanish Socrates). Pio Baroja (the most original and the most forceful of Spanish writers), Pérez de Ayala (the most graceful stylist and most tragic of Spanish novelists), Azorín, the philosopher Ortega y Gasset, Unamuno, were the chief figures in this group. The clericalism which they one and all attacked was not the profound yet adaptable dogma of the days of Ferdinand and Isabella, but the crude repressive obscurantism which flourished with such dire results for the people in the nineteenth century. Pio Baroja indeed proclaims himself a complete iconoclast. *Lo establecido me cansa*, he says ('Established institutions bore me'), and his '*odium anti-theologicum*' is rampant in every page of his psychological autobiography, *Juventud y Egoíatria*. Such extreme anarchical theories were wisely watered down by the lucidity of the brilliant intellect of Ortega y Gasset, who to-day is generally referred to as the Philosopher of the Republic. In 1914 this brilliant thinker made his public *début* in the Comedia Theatre. 'Official Spain,' he said, 'consists in ghostly parties, upholding ghosts of ideas which, backed by the shadows of newspapers, keep going Cabinets of hallucinations. Our generation, when it hears the word Spain, does not think of Calderón and Lepanto, it does not remember the victories of the Cross, it does not call forth the vision of a blue sky—it merely feels, and that which it feels is grief.'

This was one of the earliest public expressions of the ideas of the 1898 generation, which, had they been studied by the official classes with sympathy, might have restored the monarchy on the constitutional model of Ferdinand and Isabella. In essence few of their theories were revolutionary. Unamuno, indeed—unless I have misunderstood his Shavian diction—is still a monarchist.¹ Not merely the 'intellectuals' but the other sections of the middle classes in Spain were little by little forced by unconstitutional behaviour of the Crown into the opposite camp, where they finally joined forces with the Socialists' organisation at San Sebastian in August 1930. Neither of the two alone could have effected the overthrow of the monarchy, but the temporary union of both rendered them apparently irresistible.² The middle class

¹ When Unamuno speaks of the Spanish monarchy he uses the phrase in its etymological sense—namely, that of a unitary government. His dislike of the centrifugal tendencies, of which the movements in Catalonia, the Basque country and elsewhere are signs, has led him to emphasise the *united* character of the Spanish Republic as a whole.

² This union of the middle classes with the revolutionary party has been the subject of a vigorous attack by Señor Cesar Falcon, a well-known Spanish journalist, in a book entitled *Crítica de la Revolución Española*. Señor Falcon says: 'To unite does not always mean to increase one's strength. In some cases, on the contrary, it means to weaken it.' Revolution, he maintains, is not a calculated but a passionate act. The Pact of San Sebastian was the undoing of the chances of a successful revolution, by which he means a revolution which

in Spain is, in any case, small when compared with the ramifications and solidity of its English counterpart. It is these widely spread middle classes which act in England and other countries as a preventive against revolution. In Spain their numbers were limited, and, though naturally conservative, they found themselves forced by circumstances into the Republican camp.

The intellectual centre of all that is best and sanest in the new Spain is the Residencia de Estudiantes, a Spanish replica of an Oxford or Cambridge college. It is built on the outskirts of Madrid and enjoys a wide view over the country, bounded by the snow-flecked peaks of the Guadarrama Mountains. Its master, Don Alberto Jiménez, is one of the sanest and most active men in Spain, and a great admirer of what is best in English education. On his shoulders has fallen the mantle of Don Francisco Giner—'El Abuelo' (The Grandfather), as he is called. He is married to Doña Natalia, the daughter of Manuel Cossío, the great art critic, who is often regarded as the spiritual father of the republic—a sort of Spanish Massaryk who at one time was suggested as a possible first President of the Republic. 'Just like an English-woman,' is the usual comment of my countrymen on their introduction to Doña Natalia, and I hope she is pleased. Indeed, the wide, airy drawing-room of the master's pavilion, with its comfortable usable chairs and large windows, has about it the atmosphere of an English family sitting-room. Although she has translated into excellent Spanish prose some of Bacon's essays and Milton's prose, Doña Natalia has nothing of the blue stocking about her.

would change society radically in the interests of the working classes. Señor Alcalá Zamora and Señor Miguel Maura had never been included among revolutionaries, but the dictatorship drove them into an alliance with the latter. Señor Falcon thinks this alliance unfortunate. He says: 'The only true revolutionary was and still is the profound feeling of the great masses of oppressed workers. For only in this sentiment palpitates the desire to overthrow completely the social order created by the monarchy, to transform totally—*en su totalidad*—the monarchist State and to create a new democratic State.' For instance, he blames Señor Alcalá Zamora for not having given a popular character to the Jaca revolt, and states that Zamora threatened to retire from the committee if Ministers of the Berenguer Cabinet were arrested in Madrid. Fermín Galán, whose revolutionary zeal frightened the committee, was practically excluded from the conspiracy. But 'to realise the revolution it was indispensable to make it, and to entrust the movement to the people.' When on April 14, 1931, the people found themselves in the streets and momentarily masters of the situation, when they at last had the opportunity to create a real revolution, which presumably is what Señor Falcon desired, they were easily restrained by Señor Alcalá Zamora and Señor Maura, because 'the lack of a solid "indoctrination" of revolution hindered them from overstepping their prejudices and stupid moral precepts.' The indirect result of such views ought to act as a good advertisement for the present régime, for clearly the present leaders of the republic, whom Señor Falcon criticises, are far from being the extreme revolutionaries as they were at first described in the excited language of bewildered monarchists.

She and her husband represent, to me at any rate, the best in Spain, the combination of a love of the traditional and the artistic with a sense of the practical and the progressive. Their influence, kindly, helpful, disinterested, must be felt on all the students in the *residencia*, where emphasis is laid more on the methods of teaching than the subject actually taught, both Giner and Cossío having based their ideas on the spiritual and reasonable lines of Socratic culture. Tennis courts, laboratories, and the new Rockefeller buildings are to be found in the vicinity of the ivy-covered *residencia*, where the students have their bed-sitting-rooms. They eat in 'hall' and attend lectures at the university or elsewhere in Madrid, engineering being a particularly popular subject. The *residencia* therefore may be regarded as the spiritual nucleus of the new Spain, and the tragedy of the reign of Alfonso XIII. (from the point of view of the monarchy) was that instead of acting as a bulwark for the throne (as in England), the intellectual elements were forced by the autocratic tendencies of the King to become its opponent.

As a contrast to the intellectual undermining of the throne there was the American invasion of Spain, the influx of foreigners during the war, the spread of mechanisation by means of the *coche* uniting scattered *pueblos*, and, above all, the ubiquity of the cinema. The cinema, indeed, was the unconscious John the Baptist of the revolution. It prefaced the way, at any rate superficially, for the advent of the republic. Indeed, it accelerated the birth much quicker than the Republicans themselves had desired. In Madrid the cinema is nearly always full. The customs of other countries, the modern savagery of America, were presented to the ignorant people in all their callow meretricious glitter. The Spanish 'talkie,' largely controlled by America, hastened the process. *El cine* became part of the daily life of the Spaniard. The feeling grew that Spain was regarded by foreigners as a backward country, that an absolute monarchy was an anachronism, and the fact that Russia, Germany, Austria had all been transformed from bureaucratic empires into republics was continually being dangled before the eyes of the people in the 'pictures.' Not that the cinema was employed consciously as a means of political propaganda. But it had that so-called 'emancipating' effect on the Spanish people, and the result was—April 14, 1931.

These and other views were, in the latter period of the dictator's régime, sedulously advocated by the left-wing section of the Press, and the moment the censorship was removed a torrent of abuse and criticism burst forth. It must be remembered that the Spanish workman, though not enjoying all the educational advantages of his British counterpart, is a curiously

political animal. His interest in the government is much keener than that of the average British labourer, and as time passed, and he found himself still without a parliament, he began to consider himself implicitly insulted by the continuance of the dictatorship. It was as though he himself had been personally affronted. Discipline and organisation, two factors at which any dictatorship, however inadequate, must aim, are anathema to the Spanish character. *Cada uno quiere hacer lo que quiere* ('Each one likes to do whatever he pleases'). Every Spaniard reads his newspaper, and newspapers in Spain are more often occupied with views than with news. Politics—amateurish but still very vital politics—run through nearly all departments and social strata in the towns, and even in the country apathy is not as common as is often supposed. The printed word, like the machine, still exercises an almost magical effect on the lower-class Spaniard. Parrot-like, he remembers almost every word he reads, and the arguments he thus absorbs, or rather which he memorises, he disgorges on to the practical arena of national life in the form of a *jaleo*—a riot.

In February 1930, barely a month after the fall of Primo de Rivera—a fall caused mainly by the suicidal act of the General himself—Sánchez Guerra, an ex-Conservative Minister and former Monarchist, delivered a long personal attack on King Alfonso in the Zarzuela Theatre. This terrific speech may be said to have heralded the fall of the monarchy. Sánchez Guerra's acquittal by the military court who tried him for treason to the dictatorship in November had been Primo de Rivera's most serious defeat, and led directly to his downfall. Now this vigorous old man was to set about the overthrow of the monarchy.

In spite of this writing on the wall, the second dictatorship, that of General Berenguer, went about its task of returning to normal constitutional methods in a regrettably dilatory manner. It certainly gave the impression of no great anxiety to return rapidly to parliamentary government. Yet by this time the King's only chance, and that a poor one, would have been to summon Alcalá Zamora, bidding him convoke *cortes constituyentes* immediately. It is said, however, that the King was firmly opposed to the idea of *cortes constituyentes*—that is to say, *cortes* which should draw up a new Constitution to replace that of 1876, defining the position of the monarchy and in all probability modelling it on the idea of the English Crown. The King's reply no doubt was that as king he could not step down from a divinely appointed throne, to which Zamora may have argued that, as His Majesty had already broken his coronation oath, his throne had ceased to be divinely appointed—had indeed ceased to be a throne at all since September 1923. 'Reality is more powerful

than royalty,' said Zamora on the occasion of the King's last political victory in February 1931—or some enterprising journalist may have created the phrase.

With alarms and excursions 1930 rolled to its end. In November a house collapsed and four workmen engaged in building it were killed. It was alleged that the capitalist owners had purposely employed rotten material, and the funeral was made the object of a popular demonstration. When the procession reached a certain point the crowd wished to divert the path into the Puerta del Sol, thus circulating the central part of the town. The reply was given that the procession must keep to its prescribed route. Some of the crowd threw stones at the Guardia Civil, who replied with shots, and several individuals were wounded. A forty-eight-hour strike of all shops, taxis, and tramways followed as a protest. This was the first incident of the last scene. It passed almost unnoticed in official circles.

The second, which was of a more sensational character, occurred in December. This was the military revolt at Jaca, which was easily suppressed. So long, in fact, as opposition to the King relied on force, little could be effected. The army, at least until the last three months, remained nominally loyal to the throne, and in any case certain picked regiments, such as the Escolta Real, would have all gladly perished for the monarchy. On this occasion two officers were shot, one of them a young officer named Galan. This was a terrible blunder. Galan at once became a martyr. His name now stands encircled by a laurel wreath in the Cortes next to that of Canalejas himself. On the night of April 14 Galan's portrait was carried aloft, fastened to taxis, kissed by women, while busts of this young rebel were sold in every Madrid *verbena* in the summer. Who was to blame for this error is not known. In Spain royal pardons are always popular and are often given. Why not in this instance?

The Jaca episode, followed by Franco's ridiculous aeroplane flight over the Palace of Madrid, certainly fluttered the official doves. Something really ought to be done. '*Es una cosa seria*' ('This is a serious matter'), a Spaniard said to me at the time—as though until then nothing very serious had happened. Politics, it seemed, might really become nasty, if bombs might be dropped and rebels actually shot. 'Still,' he continued, 'nothing is likely to happen of a truly bad character. For the feeling in Spain is too local to unite successfully against the monarchy. Armed resistance will always fail.' Like many other Spaniards, this speaker could only visualise a rebellion by force: a revolution by an election—it was too absurd to be considered.

So the drama continued. In February 1931 came the last scene before the *finale*—a political crisis, which Alfonso apparently

weathered with that consummate political sagacity which up till then had never failed him throughout his reign. Crises, one felt, existed for Alfonso to weather. He appeared so clever, so quick, so masterful. Every politician had felt that peculiar masterfulness, even the Conde de Romanones, who after a long political seclusion now returned to take office as Foreign Minister under Admiral Aznar. The crisis ended, after many comings and goings to and from the palace, with a victory for the crown. Picturesque and debonair, King Alfonso had outplayed his foes. That was his error. He should have met them.

When the republic finally made its dramatic appearance it came like a prematurely born child, unexpected at that moment even by the Republicans themselves. Few people can seriously have anticipated that the monarchy and the huge edifice surrounding it would be swept away in a single night, though many believed that it would fall in the course of the year. To the outside world the shock and surprise were great. It seemed incredible. Countries whose social structure is solidified by the ubiquitous ramifications of the middle classes can hardly realise the sudden changes which may overwhelm a caste-ridden nation. And such was Spain. Grantees and people. No intermediate class, or at least only a small body of misunderstood and criticised 'intellectuals.' The storm broke in the municipal elections on April 12. Too late, the elections were at last to be held. All the towns, with small exceptions, voted for the republic. Madrid is given over to a bloodless carnival of flag-waving, *Marseillaise* singing, breaking statues. At four o'clock in the afternoon the Republican flag is hoisted from the post office tower. The King is going. No, he is planning a *coup*. There is to be a military dictatorship. Is the army loyal? So the rumours fly to and fro. In the palace that happy, optimistic note of complete solidity has ceased. Consternation. Tears. Recriminations. It is the politicians' fault. They should have warned the King. Romanones is to blame—traitor, Jew, false to his people, false to his King. Poor Romanones! The grantees assemble for the last time, to take farewell. It cannot be true. Surely, in the twentieth century, such things as a collapse of a monarchy cannot happen. Yes, Russia, Germany, Austria—but then that was the war. Not an eye is dry, not a lip is steady. He is leaving to-night. The army? Well, it seems uncertain. Perhaps disloyal. Powerless, helpless, they in the palace watch that detestable crowd gather in the Plaza del Oriente before the palace. They hear those hateful cries, 'Viva la Republica! Muere al Rey!' Is there no way out? The King—who to them had always appeared *tan simpático, tan inteligente*—surely once again he will save the situation. Well, he does—by leaving.

History may in years to come be hard upon Alfonso. It is always easy to fix the blame upon the head of a single individual. But it will certainly admonish in no vague terms the attitude of the aristocracy during the last decade of that reign. Exceptions such as the Duke of Alba there were. But, generally speaking, the upper classes of Spain led lives of complete selfishness, unredeemed by culture or patriotism. Agreeable to meet, socially charming—and, after all, why not? What else could they be? They led a self-centred existence, without sense of responsibility, moving in monotonous circle from palace parades to the *puerto de hierro* (the country club) with occasional invasions of foreign embassies. The Queen's example of Red Cross work, Anti-Cancer League, and other philanthropic endeavours had no effect in rousing the majority of the aristocracy from the torpor in which they had buried themselves—a torpor all the more harmful, because it was concealed by a veneer of modern progress, cars, 'make-up,' London and Paris tailors, perfect English accent. And the climax of their self-centred career seems to have been their pusillanimous flight across the frontier, laden with pesetas and jewellery.

So with sharp pangs the republic was born—with grief for some, for many with joy, with astonishment to all. Spain's most centralised institution had disappeared. What had taken its place? Now that the hymns of jubilation have somewhat subsided, it becomes possible to consider a little more rationally the future. Foreigners may be excused if they ask: Is this republic merely a repetition of its twenty months' predecessor in 1873? Is this Bourbon expulsion a nineteenth-century tale retold? For it must be remembered that more than once has the Spanish monarchy disappeared from the scene of action; and the surprising fact is, not that King Alfonso lost his throne, but that with his inherited characteristics he should have retained it so long. Monarchists maintain that this is merely a Kerensky phase, that the bloodless revolution of April is a prelude to the establishment of a Communist State by violent measures. Historic analogies are useful sticks with which to beat new-born Governments. In point of fact, however, no people are less communistic than the Spaniard, more individual and more opposed to Soviet doctrines. Their favourite expression—*Hombre!* (Man!)—is a symbol of their stark individuality. The horrors of the Russian revolution were rendered possible partly by the war which cut Russia off from the rest of civilised Europe, and partly by the fact that no popularly elected parliament existed as it does to-day in Spain. The very fact that the revolution sprang from the people in the April elections is its safeguard.

The astonishing thing is that up to the present the disturbances

have been so few, so localised, and so easily settled. That order has so far been maintained in Spain, after an event apparently so cataclysmic, is due not merely to the essentially peace-loving character of the Spanish *pueblo*, but also to the strong hand and organising abilities of Señor Azaña, the 'man' of the republic. Before the revolution Azaña was little known to the general public, and, like most of his colleagues, had had no experience of practical politics. He had written essays and plays and had translated into excellent Spanish Borrow's *Bible in Spain*, but little else was known about him. In April 1931 he took over the portfolio of War Minister, and in the autumn, when Señor Alcalá Zamora, whose eloquent oratory was of such use to the republic in its early months, resigned on the religious question, he became Prime Minister. To-day his round, phlegmatic face and ironic slightly Pickwickian expression are the most familiar symbols of all that is best in the new—or rather in the essential—Spain.

The first act which displayed his energy to the outside world was his energetic curtailment of the army. The number of officers in monarchist times was somewhere near 20,000—an unnecessarily large figure, since, as has already been stated, Spain was in no danger of invasion and Morocco constituted her sole overseas possession. Azaña reduced the number of officers to 8000 and reorganised the regiments and battalions on more modern lines. It was he, again, who was chiefly responsible for the separation of Church from State, for he believes that the Roman Church is no longer representative of modern Spanish tendencies. Although he admits that Catholicism cannot be separated from Spanish history, and that the debt of Spain to Catholicism is no less than that of Catholicism to Spain, he feels that so far as concerns the chief representatives of her culture, Spain has ceased to be Catholic and that the Roman Church should be considered. In the words of Señor Araquistain, a left-wing journalist of pro-English views who is now Ambassador to Berlin, the establishment of the republic made a *de facto* separation of Church from State automatically.

Much has been written in the foreign Press about the so-called persecution of the Roman Church in Spain and the burning of the convents which occurred three weeks after the fall of the monarchy. It is an ironic commentary on men and things that a certain section of the British Press should constantly goad the Spanish Republic in the matter of its religious policy, although the ideas of Azaña and others of the 1898 generation are to some extent modelled on those of English nineteenth-century Liberalism. To the so-called 'intellectuals' in Spain during the last century the English combination of toleration and tradition and its elastic yet essentially conservative Constitution seemed models of sanity

which might eventually be transplanted and adapted to their own country. But whereas in the nineteenth century the disappearance of an absolute monarchy, such as that of the Bourbons in Spain, would have been hailed with joy by English people, on the present occasion the Press has adopted a tone of curious disapproval, particularly in criticising the republic's religious policy. For example, few newspapers in England mentioned the fact that this is not the first time that the Society of Jesus has been dissolved. Actually the republic, in dissolving this order, was following in the footsteps of the best monarchical tradition. Charles III., Spain's most enlightened monarch, himself expelled the Jesuits from Spain in the eighteenth century, describing his action as instigated by a desire to maintain his subjects 'in obedience, peace and justice.' In the nineteenth century *all* the orders were dissolved at least twice—in 1820 by Ferdinand VII. and in 1835 by Mendizábal, the astute Jewish politician. Between 1836 and 1844 £24,000,000 worth of monastic property was put on the market, and £100,000,000 sterling of national indebtedness and expenditure cancelled therewith.

Again, to burn convents, as distinct from churches, seems a hereditary trait of the Spanish character. Even as late as 1909, in the reign of Alfonso XIII., forty convents were burnt at Barcelona, and the veteran Republican politician Lerroux, in the course of one of his electoral campaign speeches last summer, reminded his hearers of the message sent by the Mayor of Reus (a town near Barcelona) to the Central Government in Madrid: 'The massacre of the monks continues without the least change.' To this gory precedent the behaviour of the people in 1931 presented a meritorious contrast, and indeed no monk or nun has been killed during the anti-clerical riots, nor have the gloomy pictures which may have haunted students of Carlyle's *French Revolution* shown signs of materialisation up to the present. Rightly or wrongly, the people of Spain have grown to regard the Jesuits as synonymous with reaction and repression. Señor Albornoz, when he was Minister of Justice last autumn, described them as 'capturers of inheritances, shareholders in the bank, editors of reactionary papers,' and asked how their presence was compatible with the existence of the republic. Such views are certainly popular, not merely in the Cortes, but in most parts of Spain, and the fact that churches are full at Mass does not militate against the statement that the orders as a whole, and the Jesuits in particular, are extremely unpopular. That churches are full shows that the Government have every wish to be tolerant of the Roman Catholic faith, provided it refrains from obtruding itself into the political arena.

The feelings of the people towards the religious order were

well illustrated by the curious passive attitude which they displayed at the time of the burning of the convents. They neither helped nor hindered. They contented themselves with watching, the prevalent feeling being that justice was being meted out to those who deserved it. '*Hay cosas inevitables!*' ('Inevitable things!') they would say with a fatalistic shrug of the shoulders, or if reminded that all priests were not *malos hombres* would reply philosophically, '*Si, hay de todo!*' ('Yes, there are all kinds!').

Naturally it is difficult for English people who for four centuries have enjoyed the benefits as well as the disadvantages of a reformed Church to appreciate the extent of this feeling or to understand its origin. Anti-clericalism seems to us an anachronism in the twentieth century, an example of tilting at windmills. The extinction in Spain, however, of all opposition to Rome produced mental and almost spiritual stagnation, and this condition of affairs could only be changed by sporadic outbursts of anti-clerical spleen. Such events are a punishment on the Jesuits for having meddled in politics and for having forgotten the words of Christ: 'Render unto Cæsar the things which be Cæsar's, and unto God the things which be God's.' The separation of Church from State established by Article 3 of the Constitution is therefore likely to benefit ultimately both parties, since the identification of religion with an obsolete form of society deprives the former of its real spiritual essence and cannot in the long run preserve the latter from decay. We have witnessed a more violent change in Russia, where Christianity became identified with capitalism, and to-day is no more than a hated memory.

The friends of the Jesuits tell us that the fathers supplied the sole educational force in Spain. In fact, although their schools were numerous and well attended, particularly in the richer provinces, there have been other and excellent non-clerical schools whose chief work lies amongst the poorest quarters. To-day the number of such schools is rapidly increasing, and the comforts and facilities of such places put to shame many of the elementary schools in England.

If Azaña has given expression in the Cortes to the anti-clerical feeling in the country, he has rendered Spain a yet more signal service by his parliamentary skill and political tact. He can break into a debate at the correct moment and makes concessions in a conciliatory and yet dignified manner. His three-hour speech on the Catalan Statute, in which he painted the history of Spain from the days of Ferdinand and Isabella to the present, was hailed by his admirers as a tremendous *tour de force*, and, apart from the interesting remarks on revolutions in general and on the centralising rule of the houses of Austria and Bourbon as opposed

to the unitary character with federative tendencies of the republic, it illustrated the calm way in which he can handle a subject on which all Spaniards feel most passionately. The Catalans, like the Irish, are to have home rule, but to remain within the Spanish State. 'The pretension,' said Azaña, 'is legitimate; it is legitimate because the law authorises it, nothing less than the constitutional law.' In effect, he says, we cannot ignore the movement. We recognise its historical and legitimate tradition. Cataluña will be granted certain autonomous rights. His political skill was particularly noticeable in his method of dealing with what he called the 'myth of the Pact of San Sebastian,' about which so many ill-founded rumours have been current. As he observed, the Catalan problem is much older than August 1930 (when the Pact was made), nor will it be solved merely by one sitting in the Cortes. With time it will solve itself. His enemies, chiefly Monarchists, bring against Azaña the charge that he is a dictator in disguise, who gags the Press and emulates the autocratic rule of Primo de Rivera. Azaña, rightly, replies that he has the constitutional justification of a parliamentary majority for whatever he does. 'Within the law all our disputes shall be settled.' The republic, he maintains, is the form most clearly adhering to the traditions of Spain. The sixteenth century cut across the true development of the Spanish nation and put its energies at the service of a foreign dynasty. 'I myself,' he said, 'am the most traditional of men.' At any rate, he is a man, an individuality—that dearest of all things to the Spaniard—not a Lenin, nor a Primo de Rivera, nor a modern edition of Cardinal Cisneros, to whom monarchist writers compare him. He is the product of parliamentary government, and many of his speeches have about them a forensic flavour reminiscent of Gladstone and Asquith.

And the future? Azaña has assured us that '*Il peut arriver n'importe quoi mais pas les Bourbons.*' Monarchists tell us that such phrases are not new, are, in fact, a repetition of what was said at the time of Isabella II.'s exile in 1868, and that six years later her son returned as a constitutional monarch. But the times, as our parents constantly tell us, have changed. Restorations are no longer fashionable. The personal character of King Alfonso commands to-day in Spain small respect, and the tremendous growth of organised Socialism, as well as the spread of the cinema, make a Bourbon restoration highly improbable for the present. Adherents of the old *régime*, however, assert that if the country were to fall into confusion, a dictatorship might then be found necessary to restore order, after doing which it might recall a member of the Bourbon family to the throne. Perhaps their wish is father to their thought. In any case, all this is in the

realms of fanciful improbabilities, and, as *The Times* correspondent has remarked, 'the part of a prophet is a thankless one in Spain.' The unexpected, it is true, takes place in Spain, or appears to take place, at the most unexpected moment, and all large electorates, even that of England, change with unaccountable rapidity. Now, however, that Spain has been started on her path of democratic constitutional government the best that England can wish for her is that she may continue on this road without further obstruction or straying off along sidepaths, in the vain hope that they may be short cuts. There are no short cuts in history. Spain could not plunge straight from the eighteenth to the twentieth century by the agency of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship. There is only one method of progress, the inevitability of gradualness. Ortega y Gasset has quoted in one of his speeches the words of Goethe: '*Hay que hacer todo en la vida como hacen por el firmamento su marcha las estrellas; sin prisa, pero sin pausa*' ('Our actions in life should be modelled on the stars who traverse the sky without haste, but without cessation'), and they might well serve as a motto for the republic to-day.

So the Spaniard, patient, courteous, individual, remains in his peculiar ethical isolation, prodded like a mule by the pens of innumerable journalists and writers. Some days he may read in the paper he has changed enormously, the next that he remains essentially the same; and what is oddest is that both statements will be partially true. '*Aquí no pasa nada*' ('Here nothing happens') is the superscription on one side of the coin; on the other is written '*Pero ocurre algo de vez en cuando*' ('But something occurs from time to time'). Whatever her form of government, the patient spirit of Spain, the spirit of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, of Unamuno, Pérez de Ayala, and Azaña, will retain its unchanging primæval individuality—solitary, mystical, yet practical. A revolution was necessary in her history, as once it is necessary in the life of every man, when he may throw off the superfluous excrescences of atavistic traditions and step forth, boldly, naked, into a new world. Like the phoenix, Spain may rise from the ashes of Bourbon repression to soar upwards into a blue Castilian heaven of purer and more spiritual ether.

Another Athens shall arise
And to remoter time
Bequeath, like sunset to the skies,
The splendour of its prime;
And leave, if nought so bright may live,
All earth can take or Heaven can give.

PHILIP ROBINSON.

OTTAWA AND EMPIRE MIGRATION

THOSE responsible for framing the agenda paper at an Imperial Conference may refuse to arrange for any formal discussion of population problems. They may justifiably feel that economics and trade questions, tariffs and markets, are the true basis upon which any return to prosperity must be founded. And it is true enough that Migration ebbs and flows, in sympathy with the tide of commercial welfare. Your prospective migrant takes courage to attempt betterment of his fortunes in the New World when good wages have heartened him in the Old. He shrinks within the defence of social services, as to a city of refuge, when lack of employment and of good food have eaten into his moral force. In this sense there is wisdom in maintaining that economic questions are the first line of advance, for promoting spread of population from an overcrowded centre to the undeveloped outskirts of the Empire. Lord Snowden lately declared that, apart from physical and moral deterioration, it is cheaper to maintain our unemployed in idleness than to spend money in finding them work. On the same principle, there is much to be said for first improving conditions of trade, which will then inevitably attract workers, and will enable capitalists in the Dominions to call for fresh supplies of labour. This is the view of economists and men concerned with what are called 'practical' issues. We have yet to learn that the imponderable motives—psychology and philanthropy—are unpractical. But it is exactly that touch of wise philanthropy, recognising the moral claim to rescue, of those broken on the wheel of industrial confusion, which makes the difference between a beneficent statesmanship and a heartless soviet, between the empire of Le Roi Soleil and a Victoria. On these grounds enthusiasts demand greater, if uneconomic, use of Empire settlement.

Informal discussions between leaders from Africa, Australasia, Canada, and the Home Country will certainly be held at Ottawa, on a matter which many long-headed thinkers claim to be of first-rate importance. And the informal exchange of views may be more valuable than any full-dress debate or official agreement. Mr. Thomas will learn from Mr. Bruce more than can be told him by Whitehall, and Canada has very definite views

to express. This, indeed, is a growing factor of future progress—the recognition by England that each Dominion has, after a century's growth, developed its own national character and policy. Advice on migration, or any other question, which can be mistaken for dictation, is deeply resented. Leading statesmen of the Dominions are apt to be more imperially-minded than those whose outlook is limited to Westminster and a hasty trip overseas. It is not surprising, therefore, that they stand astonished at the tone of the Report presented by Lord Astor's Committee on Empire Migration. A more pessimistic and horizoned Jeremiad than the first half it would be hard to conceive of. And why? The authors of it are academic in their islanded limitations. They are guilty of two profoundly pernicious errors—the first, that machines are more important than men, the laws of political economy more availing than the dictates of humanity and goodwill; the second, that the vested interests of this island need more defence, than the interests of Englishmen in widest commonalty spread. This narrow outlook has sadly vitiated the value of an otherwise well-studied report.

But you must 'verify your references' if you would advise rightly. The master-truth in this regard is that 'there is no wealth but life.' The well-being of the Empire is bound up with spread of population. To any common-sense view it is abundantly plain that every fresh transference of 100,000 men to New South Wales increases *pro tanto* the consumption on the spot of locally produced food, leather and wool. It adds, so far as such an increment is finding occupation and paying its way, a revenue-producing power for the payment of taxes and lessening of debt burdens, and it lessens congestion at the centre. Much criticism, for an instance, has been advanced against the West Australian Group Settlements. The land allotted may have been badly chosen and badly administered. The cost of continuing the scheme may be prohibitive. An undue proportion of the settlers may have pulled up their stakes and deserted half-developed farms. But they have in very large measure found other more satisfying occupation. They have adopted the conditions and become denizens (in the full sense of the word) of their new Dominion. As living men and women, with in many cases large growing families, they have become an invaluable asset to the Commonwealth. This writer saw them six years ago, when they had reacted with joy to the change of conditions, from over-infested Bermondsey or Woolwich to the rough hardihood of Denmark and kindred villages in the bush. You simply cannot estimate the value of such a transfer of 6000 souls by ledger accountancy in pounds, shillings, and pence. Nor is there any yardstick available by which you can measure the total benefits

accruing to the transferees or the State which welcomed them. They are both blessed. Mazzini preached that the virtue of a people is shown by what it has done and suffered to bring home its conviction to others. Judged in this light, West Australia gave a self-sacrificing lead, and will not lose its reward. National prosperity is sustained, not by gaining, but by giving. And that is a truth which we are much concerned for our statesmen to implement. A certain type of religious enthusiast has at all times assumed that it will be heard by the powers that be, for its much speaking. An early instance is the prophets of Baal, who leaped upon the altar which was made, when there was no voice nor any that answered. 'O Baal, hear us!' They have their modern followers in the type of mind which persists in the conviction that they can instruct the apparently uninstructed Almighty. His attention must be called to neglect of His duty. Other devotees of a like delusion base all their plans for Empire betterment upon presumed advantage to the Mother Country, or calculated backing of their own Dominion. This may be sound parish politics, but to call it Imperial statesmanship is a misnomer. Yet this is a main impression given by the first thirty pages of the Astor Report. And gentlemen who from the purlieus of Caxton Street and Whitehall think that they can divert the course of a nation's hiving are singularly ignorant of their limitations. Basic laws and deep instincts will have their sway. When lemmings choose to fare forth in hordes from the shores of Norway, neither ocean nor tide can withstand their move. Man also is an animal, who migrates at his will and pleasure, in answer to an instinct which is as much beyond all calculations of statisticians and economists, as God's Will is above man's wishes. This is not to say that human instincts cannot be furthered by political means. Very sensibly they can; and to that portion of our subject we will presently return. For the moment we are anxious to gainsay a prevalent heresy that the migration period of the Anglo-Saxon is over. Because economic world conditions are at the moment more difficult, because Dominion Governments are, for a season, unable to meet the cost of *assisted* migration, it is suddenly said that migration has definitely ceased. With such a negation of history no one who has first-hand knowledge of Dominion conditions can possibly agree. And let this be said in all seriousness. Knowledge which is worth while cannot be gathered from a few months' hasty trip to Australia or Canada.

The Astor Report gives some backing to our main contention: 'We think it of great importance that a steady flow of British migrants to the Dominions should be maintained—though it seems likely to us that the future influence of economic forces will be predominantly adverse to the development of migration.'

This is to dam the springs of enterprise with very faint support, and is in painful contrast to the high-hearted words of a previous Commission, that of the Industrial Transference Board (1928). It is fair, however, to add that the terms of reference in 1930 were 'to consider the question of migration from the United Kingdom to overseas parts of the Empire in its *economic* aspects: (a) in the immediate future; and (b) over a longer period; and to advise whether Government action to stimulate such migration is economically or otherwise desirable.' The terms have been deemed wide enough to allow discussion of falling birth-rate, from which the conclusion is drawn that our population in this island would begin to decline from about 1940, if the 1928 rate of emigration were to continue, and would become stationary by 1950 if emigration ceased altogether. And it is assumed that a birth-rate tendency in this kingdom, comparable to that of France, will have a like sequel in lessening desire for migration. This is to ignore entirely the radical difference in national characteristics between ourselves and the French. 'From the economic standpoint,' it is observed, 'even if a smaller population [in this Island] is desirable, emigration is a wasteful means of securing it.'

Again, a disgruntled cold douche of despair is contained in the statement, 'Whether assisted or unassisted, the emigrant tends in each category of the population to be the least obviously surplus—the standards imposed by the Dominions require a physical and intellectual capacity that is probably above the average—emigration draws unduly upon those elements of which this country has most need.' The inference apparently is that this country should discourage migration of all but its less capable men and women. The supposed interests of the United Kingdom are to be counted more valuable than the undoubted interests of our adventurous young. This is narrow-minded timorousness of a most deplorable kind. It is as anti-Imperial and ultra-nationalistic as can be. Almost it would seem as though a tariff wall was recommended to block over-enthusiastic overseas ventures. And this is exactly what the lover of humanity most indignantly resents. If he has real knowledge of the Dominions he is well assured that, in normal times, there are six times more chances in the New World for enterprise and industry to achieve dignity of independence than in the Old. His desire is to spread this knowledge, and to give overcrowded islanders the chance of enjoying these benefits. Incidentally, he is convinced that thereby backbone is given to the Imperial stock, a greater market opened to Empire commodities, and that the centre is strengthened by the prosperity of its extremities. The plea for support to vested interests in this country leaves him cold. Great Britain's

welfare has never yet suffered by reason of her generosity to others. Even this cautious Report admits that in recent years emigration has never risen as high as 1 per cent. of the population of working age, and on balance it is satisfied that 'in present conditions of unemployment in Great Britain, emigration, regarded as a whole, is of definite economic advantage to the State.' So much for its recommendations as to an immediate migration policy—*i.e.*, for any present help in time of trouble. And it cannot be said that very much has, so far, been advanced worthy of even informal discussion at Ottawa.

When we come to Part II. it is a different story. The wiser and more far-seeing members of the Commission have taken control, and they put forward opinions which should arrest the attention of statesmen in Greater Britain. With its wide and sane outlook on Empire security and maintenance of British characteristics, its insistence upon the need of diversified careers, and its practical recommendations, the marvel is that both parts of the Report could have been issued at the same time by the same authors. It may well be that within the committee-room much more discrepancy of view was felt than was expressed in print. Here first of all is a word which seems to be the direct contradictory of what has been said as to the inevitable shrinkage of emigration. 'The discovery of new goldfields or of oil in Australia would cause a large inflow of population into the Commonwealth'; and in this connexion attention is drawn to the indirect but possibly great importance to migration of scientific research in the Dominions. It might have been added that this same scientific research is in Australia working a revolution in the stock and wheat raising industries. Mr. E. Tristram Crutchley, after studying problems on the spot, has reported on the enormous advance lately made in milk production by greater attention to breeding. It is known that vast districts of supposedly desert areas have now been opened to the plough and paying production of wheat. It is by no means unlikely that further research may discover how to find good use for stony wildernesses in the neglected back-blocks.

The principle of most far-reaching potency in the practical recommendations—and they accord both with experience and with common sense—is that greater scope must be given to the energy of voluntary organisations. A Church, a society, a single enthusiast, can do better work in this field than State agencies. The one doeth the Will of God from the heart, the other performeth the behests of man from his head. One has no axe to grind save benefaction to his neighbour. The other is concerned to magnify his office and please his superiors. The one keeps in human touch with the living souls, sought out, commended and

shepherded. The other counts transference of so many units beyond the Line, to be the full extent of his task. Hence may we rejoice that more than a fifty-fifty contribution from State funds, for work properly done, is recommended. This, indeed, is but to call into action a universal rule. Public opinion backs, in the end, philanthropy which has been proved to be worth while. Individual initiative is in all fields of prime importance. In no realm of thought is the modern habit of standardised mass production so soul-killing as here. Instance after instance could be given of centralised amalgamation which has resulted in dull inefficiency. An all-important Grand Inquisitor succeeds in crushing the life out of a small organisation for the sake of his greater glory. He makes a desert and he calls it peace. But it is arid death. Many experts no less well informed than the Astor Commission have reached the same conclusion, as to the ineffectiveness of State agencies, by comparison with voluntary societies.

Excluding for the moment, since management must wait on economics, heroic projects of mass migration such as the Salvation Army and Commissioner Lamb are best qualified to execute, voluntary schemes rank in something like the following order for cost and effectiveness :

First, is the settling of whole families. This is the most difficult of all. For, in addition to cost of transport, a sphere of work, with a dwelling-house, must be found which is more or less permanent from the start ; opportunities must be secured for schooling of the children, and medical care. But it is the natural method, seeing that parents have undertaken a great venture for the sake of their children. They may strike no great success for themselves, but their offspring, inured to Dominion conditions of life from early years, will without effort accommodate themselves to more hopeful surroundings. And they will do this under their natural guardians, who have taken big risks for their sake. This is the line of a scheme which was being supported by the St. George's Day Fund of the Church of England Council, until conditions in Canada compelled surcease. It was suggested and commended by Lord Lovat, then Under-Secretary for the Dominions, and a similar policy has been followed with success by the Hudson Bay and Canadian Pacific Companies. This principle calls for considerable money capital, and a delay of ten to a dozen years before any family has grown to full citizenship. It is worth what it costs. It supports and blesses the most worthy instincts of enterprising parents. And of them there is still a plentiful supply.

The second is so far like unto it that it builds entirely on the family sentiment, though in the case of Fairbridge it is adopted parentage. In this scheme, by which children under fourteen years of age of both sexes are adopted by the Child

Emigration Society and brought up in West Australia, the maternal principle and scientific philanthropy are united. Three hundred and fifty orphans or unfortunate children, rescued from less happy conditions in our large towns, are planted, mothered, taught, each in a cheerful family of a dozen, on a farm of 3500 acres in Bunbury Diocese. They drink in farming tastes with their morning milk, graduate insensibly from book lore to manual crafts and domestic science, till at eighteen they are in large demand as helpers in house and station throughout the State. They have grown into the atmosphere, been 'salted' to the climate, and soundly trained, with love, for their life work. Such a scheme is abundantly blessed, and is well seen by authorities, governmental and social. Obviously, it is expensive and unhasty in operation. But it has at the finish done something worthy, and the family wardship is continued through life. This model is rapidly ousting all the outworn types of soulless institution, whether at home or overseas. Dr. Barnardo, Waifs and Strays, Foundling Hospital, Masonic orphanages and the like, may all, as occasion serves, be willing to follow a model which encourages migration in its best form, and sweetens life for the less completely blessed. When there is a Fairbridge school in half the States of the Dominions, 20,000 well-grounded citizens every year will have been prepared for joy in open-air work.

Single women, perhaps, rank next in value as migrants to the New World. They are a focus of stability and high-spirited endurance. With few exceptions, Mr. Crutchley found that they had readily adapted themselves to conditions during the last most difficult years in Australia. Herodotus remarked centuries ago on their inevitable attraction in this special connexion, emphasising the unchanging truth that the unit of society is not a man *or* a woman, but a man *and* a woman. The shortage of females in certain of the newer States and their surplusage in the Old World point to the value of encouraging their transference at all costs. Single men of like age fail to assimilate novel surroundings with the same sure touch. Boys of under twenty, who have been proceeding to Canada and Australasia in considerable numbers until the depression closed down the openings, present another set of problems. In times of normal prosperity they are eagerly sought for as helpers on up-country farms. They are more biddable and willing to face the monotonous grind of hard toil than the native-born of Australia and Canada, who, in the second or third generation, gravitate with avidity to the easier life of towns. With particular good luck, good health and careful saving of their wages, they may hope, as to a small percentage of them, to establish their independence on a small holding within ten or a dozen years. Their outstanding capital

being industry, enterprise and character, more clamant than most needs is the supply, to those who have justified that confidence, of money capital for development of their farms. Without this help from State banks in prosperous times, or from a generous system of loans, a large proportion of them are unlikely to rise above the status of agricultural labourers. And this, for the English public school boy, whose training and energy is an enormous asset to the New World, is an unattractive prospect to his parents. Even more important than the supply of money capital at the ripe moment is the need for supply of that fatherly or elder-brotherly oversight which, for want of a better word, is called 'after-care.' Advice, sympathy, guidance, occasional succour in cases of misfit or unemployment, sweating or injustice, can prevent what easily grows into a tragedy, where there is no parental influence to soften the prickles of difficulty.

These are the main lines along which voluntary organisations can work for doubling the outposts at the economic front. It may well be that all Governments will be slow during the next years to do more than subvent such schemes as, emanating from an individual brain and being launched by private enterprise, have proved their abiding worth. The Fairbridge farm of the Child Emigration Society is such a scheme, and continues to receive the support, even in the worst times, of Home and Dominion Governments. This is sound wisdom, for many experts look to see no recurrence of State-assisted migration of the usual kind. None the less, they welcome the recommendation that, where a Church or other voluntary agency has shown, *in petto*, that it can 'deliver the goods,' assistance from Government funds should not be limited to the fifty-fifty arrangement: the full cost should then be borne. The day of over-wide unscientific outpouring of subventions is passed, but, with the necessary curtailment of private resources owing to increased taxation and other causes, there will be absolute need that well-trying schemes should be publicly financed projects. This is payment by results on safe lines. The El Dorado Settlement demonstrates the power of a single brain to initiate a success from the good store of volunteers who are always awaiting their chance.

The Report rightly refuses to evade real issues which are portentous. 'The reservation of Australia as a field for British settlement can only be justified if settlement is maintained on a reasonable scale. . . . The position of Australia has already been a matter of concern [brought up at the League of Nations], and the maintenance of substantial migration from Great Britain to Australia may prove vital in the long run to the avoidance of serious international issues.' This is plain speaking of a kind which does not commonly appear in print, least of all in a Govern-

ment publication. And it is needed. Few of the 6,000,000 to 7,000,000 of British stock in Australia have realised that Darwin, their most northerly port, is sixty hours' sail nearer to Yokohama than it is to Melbourne. Singapore and Yokohama may be taken to be centres round which 900,000,000, half the population of the earth, revolve. The cultural effect upon the East of 60,000,000 or even of 30,000,000 white men settled in the Island Continent should be considered; and the insurance value of such a manning of the wastes is one of the issues towards which improved propaganda literature should be directed. All that a man hath will he give for his life. Even the less far-seeing politicians of Canberra would welcome discussion on such lines at Ottawa, and again in London. Dominion statesmen are not blind to world movements. Canada, if it will give effect to the strong desire to stock its prairies with British blood, may well consider whether she must maintain her rule of enforcing apprenticeship on the land before the often inevitable drift to the cities occurs. Secondary industries need man-power, and the thorough technical training more readily obtainable in the Old World, if they are to attract capital and become established. The most hopeful development of Empire settlement may well be precisely in this direction. The wool clip and raw leather of Australia will not for all time be brought 12,000 miles across the ocean to be made up into blankets, suits of clothes, and boots, before re-export. The right Bradford climate will be sought and found in the Commonwealth, and the appropriate workers sent for, to operate manufacture on the spot. The one exception allowed by John Stuart Mill to the evils of protective tariffs is in the case of young colonies fighting to defend their infant industries. We may believe, with the first half of the Report, that 'it is hardly likely that large-scale emigration would be economically advantageous to us [*i.e.*, Great Britain] as a long-period policy.' We may, on the other hand, assert that the gradual transference of some millions of men and women to larger space, even at some cost to home industries, would be a mighty boon to the whole Empire.

Social services in the Old World are, indeed, more extensive than in the New, because they are more essential to life and health. With the faint-hearted this doubtless acts as a deterrent from migration. It does not at all affect the courageous and enterprising. At the moment 'the Dominions may appear to offer as an immediate prospect, a life more precarious and with fewer amenities than that which they must leave behind.' The statement might well be the slogan for a Society for the Prevention of Migration. In the long view this allegation of 'fewer amenities' would not be accepted by those who have real first-hand knowledge. The English race, wherever settled, and most

decidedly where most sparse, can produce social amusements, sport and recreation, to offset ordinary deprivations. Such an invention as 'wireless' has halved isolation in the bush, and aircraft enable children to travel hundreds of miles weekly to their school. The author of *Farmer's Glory* has recorded his sheer regret at having to leave a lonely hard-driven selection in Manitoba, small though his worldly prospects appeared. The five months snow, with its clogging handicap, its intervals of sport and monotonous loneliness, exercised an attraction, magnified by the creative zest of ploughing virgin acres, which countervailed the sedate security of Wiltshire. Adventures are to the adventurous, and joy of existence is a heritage of the joyous. Intensified interest in work is worth more than money-bags.

There are those in the crowded ranks of the industrial world who feel that no discoverable niche allows them to develop a personality which shies at convention and resents the commonplace. There is, we are convinced, a growing percentage among our urban dwellers whose taste for Nature in the wild, for strong battling with the vast forces of drought and bush fire, of deluge and distances, sweetens all the handicaps of insecurity and the unknown. It is a great merit of the Report that it recognises the right of these rebels against ultra-normal sameness to satisfy their cravings by settlement in the Dominions. They are called to be pioneers and blazers of the trail, the sharpshooter advance-guard of the community. Very wisely, it would have them encouraged and helped. Variety of career is real enrichment of life. Those of this type who fit into no mould, preferring to be the architects of their own fortunes, give small trouble to 'after-care' agents. They will 'make good' in their own appointed way, counting that for success which others undervalue, while they develop a resourcefulness and resilience of character which is essential wealth. It is childish to imagine that these men, the salt of the earth, are adversely affected by 'absence of amenities' and the precariousness which is their only certainty. By such things such men live. It is right that their rôle should be officially recognised, for they are the true successors of the adventurers who first staked out our claims. If the criticism of the Social Service Council in Canada is well grounded, that insufficient care in the selection of its boy settlers has been used at the home base, the real moral is that *Ar* choices should be given the prize of occupying the front line. Not yet is the baleful theory dead, that misfits in England will fill the bill in the Dominions. Australian and Canadian authorities have had bitter experience to teach them the exact opposite. And they are strong enough to insist on their opinion being enforced.

Much has been learned from the mistakes of the last six years.

Never again may ill-considered shovelling of untrained men upon ill-chosen plots be allowed to wreck lives by the hundred. Commendation and after-care, inspired by a sympathy rooted in altruistic motive, far to seek in State services, must be the ground principle of future work. Selection of the fittest volunteers spells welcome and success, and it will need to be backed by money capital. The Church of the nation is the greatest potential engine for the spread of true information and the creation of enthusiasm. In spite of the noble lead given by its Primate, it has failed hitherto to rise to the occasion. One clear call from Ottawa might perchance galvanise its dry bones into life. But let no man say that this whole question is not the outstanding problem of the moment, or that the situation is not instinct with the fullest hope. There are 11,500,000 square miles over which the British flag flies, and more than 1,000,000 of them were added between 1879-1889. Rome never had more than 2,500,000 square miles of country in all. In dealing with alien races she probably succeeded better than we. Our particular task of filling up vacant acres, as a pledge of permanent Empire, never faced them.

A far-seeing business man has lately written :

No adjustment of tariffs—not even the total abandonment of tariffs, desirable as that would be—and no conceivable improvement in world conditions will entirely solve our unemployment problem at home or in the Dominions. Unemployment will not be abolished in the great cities of Australia, Canada and the other Dominions until the great, almost illimitable, natural resources of these countries are developed, as they can only be by a great increase of population. They need immigration and on a large scale. Only a short view can fail to see this. We in Britain need emigration : whatever happens, full employment will not be found at home, in our time, for a large proportion of our unemployed.

Working capital is necessary. . . . Untrained immigrants without capital, who would possibly add to the unemployed in their cities, will not be admitted to the Dominions. But immigrants with sufficient capital will be welcome. . . .

I am well aware that the capital required to deal adequately with the mutual problem will, if the problem be faced, be very large, and will have to be borrowed. But the mutual benefit that will accrue will justify the large expenditure and it will come back. The alternative will be much more costly in the long run. The provision of such necessary capital is of supreme importance to the Empire; and neither our unemployment problem at home nor that of the Dominions will be solved without it.

Here speaks the sane prophet who deserves study. Shall he be *vox clamantis in deserto*? Not, we may be certain, when a better instructed public opinion, here and overseas, has grasped the facts.

ARTHUR G. B. WEST.

THE PROBLEM OF KASHMIR

THE State of Jammu and Kashmir covers an area of 84,258 square miles. Excepting a strip of level land along the Punjab border, it is almost entirely mountainous, and can boast of some of the grandest scenery in the world. It has a total population of some 3,750,000 souls. Its geographical position, as well as its political status amongst the Indian States, is of very great importance to the future political and economic development of India as a whole. The State till recently has not attracted so much public attention as it deserves. Tourists visit Kashmir in large numbers from all parts of the world every summer to enjoy its natural scenery, its wonderful climate, and the abundant facilities it affords for all kinds of sport. In rank the Maharaja of Kashmir holds the fourth place amongst the Indian Princes, but, the people being backward in education and the country undeveloped, the great possibilities that this great land possesses have not as yet been fully realised, either in India or abroad.

The ethnographic and political history of Kashmir is most interesting. Over 75 per cent. of the whole State population are Mohamedans and the remainder chiefly Hindus. The Mohamedans have been as much in the shade as Hindus are in States ruled by Mohamedans. Sir Francis Younghusband in his book on *Kashmir* says :

The inhabitants were not, however, always Mohamedans. Originally they were Hindus. It was only in the fourteenth century that they were converted—mostly by force—to become Mohamedans. The present indigenous Hindus of the valley are generally known as pandits, and Kashmir pandits are well known over India for their acuteness and subtlety of mind, their intelligence and quick-wittedness.

The ruling family is an alien in Kashmir, as it comes, not from the valley itself, but from Jammu. Mr. Biscoe, who has worked for over thirty years for the Kashmiris, in his book *Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade* describes the Kashmiris in the following terms :

The ordinary Kashmiri such as I have known for thirty years is a coward, a man with no self-respect and deceitful to a degree, and I perhaps may write with a clear conscience, for I have told this to all classes of them

to their faces times without number, and, to give them all credit, they never resent it, because they know it is true. Kashmir has been conquered and reconquered by invaders, who have murdered, oppressed and enslaved their ancestors, and so ground the life and heart out of them that their better selves have been crushed.

It will obviously be beyond the scope of this article to give an historical account of several successive dynasties which ruled over Kashmir. Sir Francis Younghusband says :

The normal state of Kashmir for many centuries, except in the intervals when a strong, firm ruler came to the front, was a state of perpetual intrigue and assassination, of struggles with brothers, cousins, uncles, before a chief even came to the throne ; of fights for power with ministers, with the military, with the ' nobles ' when he was on it ; of constant fear of poisoning and assassination ; of wearying petty internecine wars, and of general discomfort, uncertainty, and unrest.

The Moghuls conquered Kashmir in 1586, and their rule was fairly just and enlightened. With the decay of the Moghul Empire, Kashmir fell once more into wild disorder, and when in 1750 it came under the Afghans the oppression of the Hindus was at its highest. Forcible conversion to Islam made many leave the country, and a number of Hindus were killed. It was Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu who saved Kashmir from the Afghans, and it was he who founded the present ruling dynasty. Under the Treaty of Lahore the Sikhs ceded to the British the provinces of Kashmir and Hazara, and the British in March 1846 signed a separate treaty with Raja Gulab Singh for which they transferred and made over Kashmir to him after receiving payment of 75 lakhs of rupees (then about £750,000). Before Raja Gulab Singh acquired actual possession, however, he had to apply to the British Government to aid him to establish his rule. At that time the economic position of the country was deplorable. The Government took from two-thirds to three-fourths of the gross produce of the land, corruption was rampant amongst officials, and the Government held a monopoly in the sale of grain. During the time of Gulab Singh's successor, Rambir Singh, considerable improvement was made in the administration, which was further developed during the time of the late Sir Pertap Singh. Sir Walter Lawrence, as Settlement Commissioner, rendered the most signal service to the Kashmiris. The revenue demands of the State were fixed in cash, and its share was also greatly reduced. Sir Francis Younghusband in a significant conclusion to the historical chapter in his book says :

The history of the people has shown that there is latent in them much ability and taste, but that they have always prospered most when most subjected to the influences of the great world outside Kashmir. Those influences are now strong upon the country, and the future prosperity of

the people will very largely depend upon how they meet and profit by them. Needless to add, a weighty responsibility lies also upon the British Government that it should guide their destinies aright.

Sir Walter Lawrence in his book *The India we Served* gives a graphic account of the state of Kashmir when he went as Settlement Commissioner in the following words :

My object was to encourage the peasants to cultivate their fine land, and to restore the land revenues of Kashmir. The object of the pandits was simply to take the best of the land and to force the Moslem cultivators to work for nothing. The wicked system of forced labour had ruined the country, and as I settled in each division of the valley the revenue that the villagers were to pay, in cash, and not as heretofore in kind, not to middlemen pandits, but to the State, I set free the villagers from the crushing exactions which were enforced by the privileged classes under the tyrannous system known as Begar.

When Sir Walter Lawrence was working in Kashmir the Maharaja had been deposed temporarily, and a State Council was appointed with Raja Amar Singh, father of the present Maharaja, as President, and during the latter part of Sir Pertap Singh's reign the present Maharaja was the senior and Foreign Minister.

The foregoing brief historical summary is intended to convey to the reader the several vicissitudes through which this beautiful country has passed. And if, as Biscoe said, the manhood has been crushed out of the Kashmiris through centuries of oppression, how is it that they were able to organise themselves and forcibly to resist Sir Hari Singh's Government in a manner which has necessitated a general overhauling of the whole administration from top to bottom? No ruler of an Indian State inherited such a wonderful legacy of a kingdom fraught with such momentous possibilities from his predecessors as Sir Hari Singh. Personally endowed with great energy, shrewd common sense, and a fine personality, the present Ruler had immense opportunities of bringing contentment and happiness amongst the miserable people of Kashmir, both Hindu and Moslem, who have been morally and materially depressed for several centuries.

During the past twelve months events in Kashmir have attracted a great deal of public attention, and at one time the situation in Kashmir, as well as in Jammu, was so serious that it became necessary for the Ruler to seek military assistance from the Paramount Power to deal with the troubles that arose in respect of his internal administration. Early this year there were many wild rumours as to the situation and much speculation in this country as to the genesis of these troubles. Since then the situation has become easier owing to certain changes in the personnel of His Highness's Government, the introduction of British officers as Ministers, and the appointment of two commis-

sions of inquiry which sat one after the other in quick succession—one presided over by Mr. Middleton, of the Indian Civil Service, and the other by Mr. Glancy, also of the same Service, the main object of the investigation by these two Commissions being to inquire into the grievances of the people, and to suggest remedies. Owing to the violent nature of the disturbances last year, in the course of which there were serious conflicts between the State forces and the people, and the serious aggravation of communal trouble that took place subsequently, His Highness's Government were compelled, after all the resources at their disposal had been exhausted, to apply to the British Government for help and advice. In the exercise of power at the disposal of His Highness every available means, both in the civil as well as in the military organisation of the State, had been utilised. As a last resort, the Kashmir troops being unable to cope with the situation, the British troops had to be requisitioned from the Punjab. A wave of discontent almost akin to religious fanaticism prevailed amongst the Moslems in British India, who organised bands to march into Kashmir with the ostensible object of helping their co-religionists, who were believed to be labouring under serious disadvantages. The Middleton Commission devoted its attention primarily to the rioting and mob violence and the alleged excesses on the part of His Highness's military and police forces, but, as this inquiry did not give general satisfaction, His Highness appointed a second Commission to inquire into the grievances of his subjects and to suggest remedial measures. Both Mohamedans and Hindus were represented on this Commission, but the Hindu members subsequently withdrew. Mr. Glancy, who is an officer of the Political Department of the Government of India and had some years ago official connexion with the State as one of its Ministers, was chairman, and had therefore considerable local experience. The Sikhs, who constitute a minority in the State, were not represented, but they took their grievances direct to the British Prime Minister, Colonel Colvin, who was recently appointed in succession to the Hindu Prime Minister, Raja Sir Hari Kishen Kaul. This gentleman is a Kashmiri pandit with a brilliant record in the Punjab Civil Service, and he was appointed Prime Minister during the disturbances of 1931, when the Maharaja felt powerless to direct affairs as his own Prime Minister. This appointment did not satisfy the Moslems, who demanded his immediate removal. The Maharaja, however, did not then comply with the request, although he made a change a few months later, and appointed a British officer as his Prime Minister.

The Glancy Commission gives the public an idea of the nature of the long-standing grievances through its voluminous report. This shows an impartial inquiry into the complaints of both the

Hindus and the Moslems, and deals with matters which for the most part affect the social and economic status of the latter in the State. These matters, however, do not appear to be connected with the direct causes that led to the serious disturbances last year, although some of them may lie at the root of the discontent and bitterness caused by the general policy of the State in regard to the liberty of the Moslems, and the proprietary rights of the agriculturists. The State records of the past five years will show, however, that His Highness's Ministers have on various occasions dealt with many such questions in an advisory capacity, but the people knew nothing about the recommendations, which never saw the light of day or reached the stage of final decision. With the experience I gained in two years in Kashmir as Foreign Minister, I have reason to state that the patient and law-abiding subjects of His Highness of all classes almost came to the brink of despair owing to procrastination, uncertainty, the want of decision and the intrigue in the public administration of the country. The fact was that the administration was so over-centralised that it gave an unlimited scope to corruption and injustice, thereby causing grave hardship, due in part to the slow grinding of the machine. The rising in Kashmir, therefore, is not so sudden an explosion as many people are led to believe, nor has it anything to do with the Pan-Islamic movement. It is partly the repercussion of events in British India, but mainly the result of the cumulative effect of many curious anomalies and anachronisms in the administration of the State. Though in some matters the Maharaja showed great industry and expedition, the flood overtook the Government when it was least expected, to come down in torrents in the same manner as the rains from heaven caused the whole valley of Kashmir to be flooded with such serious loss of life and property in 1928. It must be admitted also that the Maharaja did not always take the advice of his constitutional advisers, and thus ignored the very sound counsel of Lord Irwin given at a State banquet during his Viceroyalty, that the Rulers, once they appoint their Ministers after careful selection, should repose absolute trust in them. It is a matter of common knowledge that in regard to many of the grievances of the people, especially those relating to the form of government, the retrenchment of needless expenditure, the absence of facilities for making representations, the corruption in the public services, the inadequate facilities for the education of the masses and the impartial recruitment to the State services of all grades, the Maharaja was continuously kept informed of the needs of the administration. But he preferred to follow the line of his own judgment.

One of the untoward political events in Kashmir in recent

years was the disciplinary action taken by His Highness against those who were instrumental in presenting a petition to the Viceroy when he visited Kashmir in 1926. Two of the most influential Moslem jagirdars were deprived of their places in the Durbar and their property was confiscated. It was after repeated representations from these individuals, and also considerable agitation in the Press outside Kashmir, that His Highness decided to cancel his order and restore the privileges as well as the jagirs to the aggrieved parties. The feeling that was roused amongst the Mohamedan inhabitants of the Kashmir State by this political act was minimised at the time, but it had a far-reaching effect on the minds of the Kashmir Moslems as well as on their co-religionists in British India. Owing to the enforcement of a rigorous control over the Press and also over individuals who contributed articles thereto, there was no possible opportunity for the ventilation of popular grievances within the State, with the result that most of the public agitation was conducted outside the borders by partisan newspapers in the Punjab. His Highness's Government made it a deliberate policy to exclude from circulation all newspapers printed in the Punjab that contained any criticisms of his administration. This order might not unreasonably have been applied in occasional specific instances owing to the personal nature of the attacks on the Maharaja, but its general application was resented by the Moslems of all classes, by landlords as well as by agriculturalists and artisans. His Highness must be credited with the best of intentions and with a very progressive and enlightened policy, when one considers some of the measures introduced by him during the first three years of his rule. But even these measures failed to recognise local conditions. Grave hardships resulted from their sudden enforcement, and corruption and intrigue were brought into play amongst the officials, who were entrusted with the enforcement of the measures without adequate supervision and control. The Ministers had really no power over the officers working under them, for the Maharaja continued to be his own Prime Minister till the disturbances broke out. Yet he could not possibly attend to the volume of routine that was submitted to him or to the larger problems worked out by the several committees of Ministers which he set up for deliberation and advice.

Last year, when the Round Table Conference was holding its session in London, some of the influential Moslem delegates showed considerable concern in regard to the internal situation in Kashmir, and even gave expression to opinions which caused an alarm in the minds of their fellow Hindu delegates, as if the whole agitation were due to a Pan-Islamic movement. In that connexion correspondence was published in the British Press, and I then took

the opportunity, provided by knowledge of the local conditions in Kashmir, of removing this misapprehension, and published in the *Manchester Guardian* a letter from which I may with advantage give the following quotation :

The Kashmir subjects of His Highness are the most simple-minded and aw-abiding people in the whole of India. They are easily governed and have laboured for centuries under the influence of the Kashmiri pandits, whose brain dominated the affairs of every village in the valley. The people are illiterate and economically depressed. If there is any general dissatisfaction owing to long-standing grievances, the Moslems outside can have no direct hand in its expression. The Kashmiris are not in close touch with their co-religionists outside Kashmir. They do not read newspapers, being illiterate, and the Press in the State is under strict ownership. The few Lahore newspapers that ventilate Moslem grievances have, rightly or wrongly, been interdicted within the State as being personally hostile to the Maharaja. Whether Pan-Islamic propaganda exists in Western Asia or in other parts of India itself is a question that does not arise, though with my study of some of the conditions of Moslem countries during my travels I am inclined to the opinion that it is a mere bogey raised by mischievous people aiming at the disturbance of the peace of the world.

To sum up the position so far as the internal administration of the State is concerned, an impartial observer may, perhaps, without prejudice judge the present Maharaja, not as the cause, but the victim of circumstances. Be that as it may—and on this point opinions may differ—the Kashmir administration is now being tightened up with British aid. Although the British Government intervened, not *suo motu*, but at the request of the Maharaja, a grave question involving a new precedent which has now been established arises—namely, is the Paramount Power, after the grievances of subjects over a period of years have been disregarded, to come to the aid of the ruling Prince, and virtually take over the reins when they rise in protest? The policy of non-intervention was first laid down during the Viceroyalty of Lord Minto in his famous Udaipur speech. If the Princes want a minimum of interference, and yet when they are in trouble with their people they invoke the aid of the Paramount Power, wherein lies their sovereign authority; and when they enter the Federal Constitution, will they not be mere pawns in the game under the new Constitution?

There is, however, a more important aspect of the Kashmir problem generally overlooked, and this has special reference to the frontier policy of Kashmir. The frontiers of Kashmir abut on five sovereignties, including three empires. The foreign policy of the State has been, till the accession of the present Maharaja, more or less under the direct control of the British Government. The political agency at Gilgit has been entrusted during the past several years with the important duty of watch and ward over

the frontiers and of carrying out the policy of conciliation in respect of border chiefs, some of whom, but not all, are in a position of subordination to the Kashmir Maharaja, and who are without exception Moslems. In the past a spirit of co-operation between British and Kashmir authorities has characterised policy in regard to the frontiers of Kashmir, though the direction lay with the British. Even the financial expenditure has been divided between the two in the proportion of half and half. Latterly there has been a tendency in the State to assume a greater responsibility in regard to Kashmir's frontier policy, to belittle the importance of these chiefs, and thus some unrest has been caused within this area, which is a source of danger to India as a whole. This subject is of sufficient importance for public discussion in India, but neither the Government of India nor the Kashmir Government has ever given it the publicity which it requires. History may perhaps prove one day that the determination of such matters of policy *in camera*, and without instructing the public, has been lacking in statesmanship and forethought.

There are many matters connected with the Kashmir frontier which are necessarily secret, but there are others which can be studied with reference to public documents and treaties. I will refer only to the latter to indicate the necessity for revision of the frontier policy of Kashmir, a necessity which will be obvious in the light of the recent disturbances in the State, and the unrest which prevails outside its borders. Having visited Russia, and also studied the problem of Soviet influence in Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and China, I have reason to believe that Soviet influence is bound to increase in Central Asia, and has to be carefully watched. A weak internal Government in Kashmir is therefore sure to act and react on the frontier. No more statesmanlike policy could have been pursued by Lord Willingdon's Government than to strengthen the hands of the Maharaja by lending him competent British advisers to assist him to govern. It is hoped that the frontier policy in the State will soon be brought into line with the general British policy of guard and defence, conciliation and maintenance of goodwill with friendly tribes and chiefs over the Kashmir border, who should be encouraged and helped to rally as real allies and friends, both to the British Government and the Maharaja of Kashmir. This can only be done by a revision of the existing arrangements relating to the Gilgit Agency, and by placing the frontier policy of Kashmir beyond the jurisdiction of the future Federal Government. The formation of Soviet republics in Central Asia and the developments in the Russo-Chinese and Afghan borders have to be constantly watched. Judging from recent experience, it seems imperative that undivided British control should be provided for,

and the British military expert authority, and not a joint agency as now exists, should be invested with this responsibility under a new treaty, to remain unaffected by the new Federal Constitution that is shortly coming into existence in India. Another alternative that suggests itself is that the whole of the Gilgit Agency might be transferred to the North-West Frontier Province. There are grave dangers that have to be guarded against the spread of Bolshevik influence along the Kashmir frontiers which abut on Afghanistan, the Russian Pamirs, and Chinese Turkistan. Unrest amongst the frontier tribes and chiefs over the border, many of whom are under the suzerain authority of the Kashmir Ruler, should be guarded against. When the Gilgit Agency was established in 1877 the principal object was 'to collect and enable the British Government to obtain early and authentic information of the cause of events in the frontier districts of Kashmir, and to establish friendly relations with the communities of the frontier.' The effect of the recent internal troubles in the State on the frontier chiefs and communities can very well be imagined. The allegiance of the small frontier States to the Kashmir Maharaja will soon be an historic fiction, unless the whole position is reviewed in the light of recent events. In a recent book on *The Problem of the North-West Frontier*¹ Mr. C. Collin Davies has exhaustively dealt with the menace from Central Asia and considered all questions affecting the defence of India as having a very important bearing on the political problem. The urgent problem of Kashmir, which is an all-India problem, is to give the subjects of the Maharaja a just and firm Government and adequately to guard the Kashmir frontiers. The Kashmir Rulers have not been able to provide these at any stage during her past history, and now the repercussion of the communal differences in British India are having a further disturbing effect upon the people. 'A weighty responsibility lies on the British Government that it should guide their destinies aright.' No truer words were said. The State administration has now virtually passed into British hands, but how long such a situation can continue without violating the very principle of autonomy, the essence of the Federal Constitution, is a serious question. The frontier policy of Kashmir and the adequate protection of Moslem interests are delicate problems. One cannot be blamed if the lessons of Kashmir are quoted as the strongest justification for the conclusions of the Simon Report, both as regards the Federal plan and the communal problem.

The greatest of Indian patriots, Gokhale, said that the attainment of a democratic form of self-government depends on the average strength, character and capacity of the people. The

¹ Cambridge University Press.

problem in Kashmir is being further complicated by the promise of a Legislative Assembly on a communal basis and the appointment of a Franchise Committee, when the very requisites which Gokhale emphasises—namely, universal elementary education, the improvement of the condition of the peasantry, higher education, the building up of the industrial strength of the country, and the promotion of closer relations between different communities—are lacking. I have always stood for a closer association of the people with the administration of Indian States. Kashmir to-day is half a century behind any British Indian province, and some of the advanced Indian States. A speedy redress of both Hindu and Mohamedan grievances by the Government before any Assembly on a communal basis is established seems to be imperative for the full restoration of public confidence. The geographical position of Kashmir is a problem by itself, and through the gradual weakening of British power in the Indian subcontinent Kashmir will be more than ever subject to the same vicissitudes that have blotted her history and marred her progress before the advent of British rule in India. The solution of Kashmir's external problem is a new treaty between the Maharaja and the British Government under which frontier defence is transferred entirely to the British, thereby ensuring an effective resistance to all foreign aggression and internal intrigues with foreign enemies. Without these being safeguarded, India will break up as did the Roman Empire, federation or no federation. Internally there should be an exclusive Indian Raj in Kashmir as in all other Indian States, and no compromise or temporary sacrifice of the vital principle which governs the general policy relating to them. Dual responsibility for autonomous States must end in a ghastly failure. Indian States should be allowed to work out their own salvation or pass out of existence if the Princes fail to justify themselves in the eyes of their subjects. It is, indeed, interesting to speculate what the future Federal Government in India will do when such justification is lacking. Will the policy be deposition or annexation?

ALBION BANERJI.

FILMS AND THE BRITISH PUBLIC

UNTIL recently the film world had come only very spasmodically to my notice—less through any form of ‘snobbery’ about the matter than through the fact that, sitting regularly in a theatre for four or five evenings a week, as a dramatic critic must, I had had neither the time nor the inclination to spend a fifth and sixth cooped up in a cinema. I had seen a few films, often at year-long intervals. D. W. Griffith’s *The Birth of a Nation* was a youthful memory. Later I had seen another Griffith film, in which I seem to remember little Lilian Gish, strapped to an iceberg, cruelly set to float over Niagara in a snowstorm, to the great pity and terror of an audience. And I remember thinking, my head still being full of the theatre, ‘To do that for three performances a day must be a strenuous life; these film actresses earn their money!’ and then recollecting that, thanks to the magic of the new medium, a feat once achieved was achieved for all time. Miss Gish had only to float over Niagara once—provided that she and the camera and Niagara got it right—and her screen image would continue to float over it three times a day for all eternity, and in fifty different cinemas. (This last consideration is, of course, the basic foundation of the cinema’s world-vogue. A film actress is as ‘real’ and palpable—or at least as comparatively real and as comparatively palpable—in a fifth-rate cinema in Budapest as she is to the audience at a so-called New York ‘première.’ The same strip of film embodies her. It is possible to travel, as I once travelled, down the whole eastern border of Europe from north to south, and from frozen Riga through mid-European Vienna down to Asiatic Constantinople, to see the same three or four names blazing in sky-signs above each capital—Greta Garbo, Brigitte Helm and Anna May Wong. . . . The celebrity of the film star is quite unlike anything ever enjoyed by any public character or performer before. She can multiply herself by division as can the amoeba. Even Bernhardt at the height of her popularity could not appear in half a dozen European capitals at once.)

Later I had seen a Fairbanks film, and then a couple of the early talkies—which had seemed to me mechanically, crudely,

and emotionally detestable to a point unique in the annals of drama. But I was told on all hands that ‘the talkies had come to stay’—the sense of sheer physical revulsion that they occasioned in me did not apparently extend itself to the rest of humanity; and later a note of genuine modernity was struck in my education when I was taken to see Jannings and Marlene Dietrich in a more advanced talkie, *The Blue Angel*. Here most of the mechanical problems seemed on their way to solution. One could understand the talking, and one could hear the singing. If bits of the story were childish, other bits of it were amusing and dramatic. And the most hardened theatre critic had no more reason for feeling ashamed of himself than the most ingenuous film fan in falling under the sway of the exquisite Marlene singing ‘Nimm dich in Acht vor blonden Frauen.’ The intellects of the world united in her praises. After which I saw by accident a couple of the Russian silent films, *The End of St. Petersburg* and *The General Line*, and immediately went back to see them twice. Here at last was something for which no apology was needed—no explanation that it was a ‘new art’ and therefore in its infantile stages; that it was a ‘popular art,’ and that therefore a certain amount of crudity must be tolerated. Judged by any standards by which an art may be judged, it had ‘arrived.’ Here was drive and drama and purpose, and wonderful beauty of photography. Here was a directing intelligence that could sweep all objects, a cream separator, a cow byre, the silhouette of a cannon against a sky line, into the full stream of dramatic excitement, and could cast over everyday things the veil of poetry—everyday things seen now with fresh wonder. Art had at last come into the cinema. One could hear the beat of its wings.

All this may stand for acquaintance with a very rough cross-section of the cinema’s activities up to date, but does not represent any deep knowledge of the cinema. I had not seen Greta Garbo, and I had not seen Norma Shearer, nor Ronald Colman. I had seen only two or three, of the two or three thousand, talkies that must have already come out of Hollywood. I was altogether ignorant of certain names that film-producers assume to be as familiar in the household, and as frequently conjured with, as those of the President of the United States or the Royal Family of England. I did not know then that if a film-producer is trying to describe or imagine a film story he describes or imagines it almost exclusively in terms of other film stories—‘We want a sort of Wallace Beery part put in there,’ or ‘It will be like that piece of business that Lionel Barrymore uses in his last picture. . . .’ I was more ignorant, that is to say, than the most juvenile regular reader of *Peg’s*

Weekly Film-Goer. My capacity for surprise was all the more genuine, therefore, when I suddenly found myself, turned cinema author at a week's notice, caught up 'mazed, motionless and moonstruck' on to the floor of a British film studio. The conclusions set down hereafter cannot claim to be the fruit of long study. They represent the practical experience of making one picture from beginning to end, and many views that I heard from more experienced professionals in the process. If they have any merit it is because I was in the cinema world long enough to see it (or a representative slice of it) at first hand, and yet not long enough to lose all sense of outside proportion.

The first thing that I noticed—and probably the second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth things, for I was continually being impressed by instances of it—was the energy, coupled with good temper, that everyone, without any exception, brought to bear on his or her work. It impressed me, and continued to impress me, because instances of it are on the whole extraordinarily rare in the 'legitimate' theatre. On the first morning of the 'shooting' of the film I drove down to Elstree in the dawn with the producer. I say the dawn, but we actually started a little earlier. It was November, and we left Piccadilly Circus in black night. We arrived at Elstree as a sun like a red cannon ball was just pushing itself above the rim of the horizon through grey morning mists. There, already drawn up before us at the studio door, was the long grey car of the 'leading lady.' Work was not officially supposed to begin on the studio floor before 8.30. It was highly unlikely, being the first day of a new film, that it would begin within an hour or two of that; and in point of hard fact, it did not actually start until nearly midday. But the leading lady was taking no chances. She was a workman who respected her job. She liked a clear hour in which to make up, and then some further time in which to compose her mind and read over her part, and every day of the proceedings up to the end she was the first person to arrive in the building. This dawn enthusiasm, to my great admiration, was continued up till the end of work, whenever it might be that work ended. The film was being made by a smallish company that did not own its own studio. It had to hire it, and to hire it at a pretty stiff rate, paying somewhere in the neighbourhood of £400 a week. It was consequently of importance to make the film as quickly as possible and to get out. In the first days of the filming we worked from 8.30 in the morning up to 5, 6, and 7 o'clock at night. In the later days we worked from the same time in the morning up to 10, 11, and 12 o'clock at night; and there were two final sittings that were not over before 1 and 2 o'clock the next morning. These are long hours for work, whatever sort of

work it may be. I have noticed that any company of actors in a theatre is apt to get extremely restive if a rehearsal lasts for more than six or seven hours. The cinema folk will do fourteen or fifteen hours at a stretch, if it be necessary, and, as far as my experience went, will be working as good-temperedly and strenuously at the end of the day as at the beginning.

I particularly remember one occasion. It was at the end of one of the longest days. A particular 'shot' was to be made before we finished. I will not conceal the fact that the film was by way of being a melodrama; and the situation to be dealt with in the 'shot' was that the leading lady, sleeping a chaste sleep in a four-poster bed, had to perceive that a young gentleman had broken in at the door of her bedroom, had to sit up in bed and transfix him across the room with an indignant and disdainful glance, and to say, 'I see! Just a cad, are you!'—or words to that effect. Now a 'shot,' in cinema technique, that may only need a single line of dialogue and fifty feet (or thirty seconds) of film, may have to be very elaborately planned beforehand. In the present case a four-poster bed had had to be erected, a leading lady had had to be put to bed in it, roughly a score of lamps, from small 'baby-spots' to great 'sun-arcs' a yard and a half across, had had to be trained on it with very considerable precision and adjustment, a camera had had to be inserted among them (and then enclosed in a rubber-padded sound-proof box known as a 'blimp' to muffle the noise of its mechanism), and then, when the whole huge mass of paraphernalia and scaffolding had come to suggest to the uninitiated eye that some gigantic surgical operation was about to be performed on the poor girl by the hands of fiends, yet another contrivance had had to be added—the 'mike-boom' (the instrument supporting the sound-recording apparatus) had had its snaky length inserted in such a way as to hang a few inches above the victim's head. These preparations, as I say, though leading only to some thirty seconds of dramatic (or melodramatic) emotion, had lasted not less than half an hour in the making, while the leading lady patiently grilled in a glare of incandescent light hot enough to fry an egg. The moment arrived. Silence was bawled for. The signal was sent to the sound-recording room. The camera turned. The fateful words about the cad were uttered with appropriate intensity, when there was a mutter from the camera-man, a shout of 'Cut!' from the producer, and everything to do again from the beginning. The camera at the psychological moment had run out of film.

Here was a moment, it seemed to me, when, if the circumstances had been transported to an ordinary theatre, there would have been an occasion for a display of temperament from several

different people. The leading lady might have dissolved in an emotion that had nothing to do with the film story; the producer might have relieved himself of a general curse; and the operating staff of a dozen men, kept another half-hour from their hearths and their families, might have been tempted, temporarily at least, to look upon the unfortunate camera-man as belonging to a lesser breed without the law. But in point of fact none of this happened. It was recognised that the occurrence had happened at the end of a fourteen-hour day. It was recognised that, given the immense amount of technical apparatus involved in lighting, sound-recording and photography, it was rather remarkable that mechanical failures did not happen more often; and, in short, no word of reproach was spoken, the camera-man was bidden refill his camera, and the leading lady turned to attack the sentence about the cad again with as much composure as if she had come straight upon the studio floor. I claim this to be an instance of good humour, of hard work, and of a professional attitude towards the job in hand. I admired it and respected it. All of us lived like anchorites during the time the filming was in progress, for there was very little else to live like. We normally arrived back in London at an hour when all restaurants were closed; and would have been too tired to go to them if they had been open. For most of us the 8.30 rule of the studio floor of the morning at Elstree meant rising regularly between 6 and 7 o'clock in London. All of us (actors, producers, camera-men, and most of the technical staff) lunched together in the middle of the day—the admirable one-and-sixpenny lunch of beef and treacle tart (or cognate attractions) provided by the canteen attached to the studio. The canteen was not licensed, and no one drank anything except coffee or tea. The one thing in which there was immoderation was tea. At the last late-night sittings the studio would positively flow with it—and very strong. But in all other ways it was an ascetic and strenuous existence; excellent fun, among an excellent and hard-working company—a company that was obviously capable, as far as will and enthusiasm went, of turning out as good work as is to be found in any 'legitimate' theatre. If given the right material . . . ? That was the question. In giving the following opinions I am quoting my film-producer, whose knowledge may not have been exhaustive and comprehensive, but who had at least a deep practical experience of the English film world, and whose line of thought, roughly, governs the English cinema of to-day.

Roughly again, with a recognition of the good will and good humour with which our own company did its immediate work, my respect for the English film world came to an end. My first brush with my film-producer was over my own story. I had

written a psychological play—that is to say, a play that had the marks of human intelligence upon it. The play itself was not to be filmed, but an 'idea' had been extracted from it and bought (and paid for), and a film was to be made round this central idea. I had suggested keeping the play as it was—the two cardinal points in its heroine's character being that, as a young girl, she had lived what in modern terms would be called a 'reckless' life, and that her mode of life later led to tragedy both for herself and others. (It will be seen that though my play dealt with an immoral character, its 'moral' was rigidly moral.) But it was here that my film-producer found himself unable to see eye to eye with me. The character of a film heroine that should delight the English provinces must be pure as the driven snow. 'No, no, old boy,' I hear him saying to me as I recall those discussions, 'we don't want any more tarnish. . . . There's been too much tarnish already. There's been *Tarnish*, and *Her Tarnished Past*, and *Her Past Life* and *Her Sin*. . . .' He was able to reel off at memory a long list of films whose incidents were apparently as familiar and significant to him as are, say, the incidents of *David Copperfield* to a Dickens enthusiast. I had not then noticed, nor have I noticed since, that the white flower of a blameless life is an essential requirement of all screen heroines. I understood that 'vamps'—both baby-vamps and super-vamps—had their own categories in the Hollywood *dramatis personæ*; and very shortly afterwards Marlene Dietrich began to draw all London to a film in which she appeared as 'The Shanghai Lily,' a character whose middle name was Tarnish. But English films are apparently different. We are limited to immaculateness. I do not say that this is necessarily always a bad thing; but in certain cases, notably where the conflict is between so-called 'good' people and so-called 'bad' people, it is enough to render the dramatist's intention completely futile.

With that we came to the question of the 'unhappy ending.' I will only say as regards my own story that it was logically impossible that it should have a happy ending, yet a happy ending was nevertheless provided. I had seen that coming, and could make no effective protest; but the general theory on which it was done was illuminating. 'My dear boy, the public doesn't want unhappy endings; the public won't *stand* unhappy endings!' I had heard it all before in the world of the theatre. It is useless to point out to theatre managers that, so far from the public being unable to stand unhappy endings, the chief big money-making successes of past years have almost without exception had unhappy endings. *Journey's End*, *A Bill of Divorcement*, *Loyalties*, *The Skin Game*, *Young Woodley*, *Autumn Crocus*, *The Constant Nymph*, Strindberg's *The Father*—each of

these has had sheer box-office success of an overwhelming nature, and they have contained between them suicides, madness (twice), the death of heroines as the curtain fell, and broken romance and frustration. The most successful play in London at the moment is a brilliant young man's play at the Criterion, *Musical Chairs*—a tragedy. The London theatre is remarkable in that it will, after it has lost money on forty bad comedies, and has found occasion to declare forty times over that 'the London theatre is dead,' at last risk its money on a tragedy, and often be overwhelmingly successful. But the rule in the English cinema about happy endings is apparently immutable. I returned to the subject many times, and finally got this much of a concession out of my producer. He said: 'All right! One day I'll make you a film with an unhappy ending—an ending after your own heart; but on condition that you will then come round with me to Wardour Street and watch me trying to sell it!'

And it was thus that we got down to the core and kernel of the whole matter. 'Beauty, delicacy, tragedy, wit or intelligence—come with me to Wardour Street and see if we will find buyers! I will not dwell on the fact that in our own film, if we made any attempts at beauty, delicacy, wit, intelligence and so forth, we were hampered by another consideration on top of this—the sordid consideration of money. We were making what is called a 'quota picture.' English films have to be shown, or at least bought, in a fixed proportion to the number of American films imported. In the larger London cinemas they are usually shown as a make-weight to a big American 'star picture,' or are sometimes bought and not shown at all. Their refuge is the English provinces. Not much money—as money in the cinema world goes—is paid for them; and correspondingly not much money can be spent on making them. We were continually handicapped by this. The rent of the studio was an important consideration. Every extra day that we spent in it meant extra cost. We were consequently rushed through with a carelessness as regards artistic details that was hair-raising. Once the *approximate* result was achieved as regards lighting, camera position, sound-recording and so forth, and at the very moment when, under reasonable conditions, attention should have been free for what the actors were going to do—how to bring effectiveness and subtlety and suspense and *nuances* into their performances—the producer's voice would be heard with his 'Cut,' and we would pass straight on to the next 'shot.' We never once got nearer than an approximate result; and often, as it seemed to me with my unaccustomed eyes, we put up with results that were plainly fantastic. But there could be no arguing about this matter. It was a question of cash; and if the result in any one case would

have been sixty times as good with a few minutes' extra care and thought being spent on the actual 'actor's' art, time still seemed to be lacking to give it. But supposing we had had time to give it, and had, by the wildest stretch of imagination, made the film into something that could bear remote comparison with the splendour and fervour of the best Russian films, or the delicacy and brilliance of the French films of René Claire? What then? Would Wardour Street have rushed to buy it? The result would have been—according to my producer, who had slaved for some fifteen years in the film world, and who presumably knew what was what—that Wardour Street would not have even looked at it!

Wardour Street is the buying centre for all films that are shown throughout Great Britain. There are many other hands through which they pass before they are seen by the public—the sub-divisions of the buying firms, then the 'renters,' the 'distributors,' the 'exhibitors' who own chains of cinema palaces, and lastly the managers of the individual picture houses themselves. Each of these groups is a definite world in itself, and each forms a step in the film's progress, that it cannot leap over or avoid. But Wardour Street is the fountain-head; and Wardour Street, with its eye on the most remote and unsophisticated English hamlets, has apparently set its face resolutely against anything new that may happen under the sun. 'Beauty, delicacy, subtlety, imagination, intelligence—let us vie with one another in avoiding them!' I heard this argument reiterated a dozen times during the making of my own picture, and was given a score of instances of it. But the most interesting experience of all was to become convinced, after long research and comparison, that Wardour Street, within the limits of its own commercial advantage, was completely right. The dialogue would go somewhat as follows:

Myself. Why not try making a good English picture for a change?

The Producer. Wardour Street doesn't want good pictures.

Myself. Well, why bother about Wardour Street? Why not show the picture to the public direct?

The Producer. The public doesn't want good pictures.

Myself. Rot! How can you say such a thing? Do you admit that the Russian films have had a very considerable vogue at the Academy Cinema in Oxford Street?

The Producer. I do. But not a single Russian film has ever been booked in the provinces.

Myself. Do you admit that the René Claire films have drawn all London to the Rialto near Leicester Square?

The Producer. I do. But the René Claire films hardly ever get a booking outside of London.

Myself. Do you admit that Marlene Dietrich, who is a beautiful artist

and a beautiful person, can fill the largest London cinemas for four or five or six or seven weeks on end?

The Producer. I do. But Marlene Dietrich is a name that means almost nothing in the provinces.

And there it is; and there the argument stands, and there is nothing to add or to be taken away from it. London is London. But the cinema trade of England does not, speaking generally, concern itself with or interest itself in London. There are fifty of England's great provincial towns, and a couple of hundred lesser towns, and some scores of hundreds of towns smaller still, hamlets and villages between Land's End and John o' Groats, that have cinemas and audiences with money to spend on watching celluloid. The big London 'premier release,' the possible enthusiasm of critics, and queues that fill the Haymarket for as much as three or four or five weeks on end, are not in themselves enough to pay for a tithe of the aggregate cost of making a moderately expensive picture. It is the fees that arise like moisture from the earth's surface all over England—from the 15,000 or 20,000 suburban, provincial, parish-hall, and purely back-wood cinemas dotted over the land—that provide the big and permanent money to recoup the producer. In no other art that has yet been given to mankind has the taste of the least educated imposed itself on the taste of the most educated to the same extent. In the allied art of the theatre it is—at least, as a general rule—the London successes that are sent on tour in the provinces. In music it is the reputations gained in Continental capitals that draw money wherever they are taken. And even in painting it can be said that the Leicester Gallery does not organise its exhibitions at the dictates of the suburbs and of Wigan. But in the art of the cinema it is the suburbs and Wigan that rule supremely.

This can be verified whenever one takes the time and the trouble to do so, and to an extent that would have seemed almost incredible before one has. For the purpose one must divide tastes into cultured and uncultured—uppishly assuming one's own taste to be cultured, simply because it coincides in this with the taste of other people whom one has always assumed to be cultured. One may say, therefore, that the taste for Russian films is a cultured taste because all intelligent people who have seen them seem to suggest that merely in the strength and magnificence of their photography alone they have brought something new and vital to the service of the cinema. But this does not alter the fact that 99 per cent. of the regular film-goers of the country have never even heard of them. One may assume René Claire's films to represent a certain high-water mark of lightness, delicacy and wit, in what the cinema has so far attained to. But this does not alter the fact that a René Claire film—*A Nous la Liberté!*—was

shown in Harrogate not very long ago, and was withdrawn after a single evening for lack of the slightest interest in it. Yet again, of all the stars that have come out of Hollywood one would most assume Marlene Dietrich to be, in the popular phrase, 'everybody's money'—the delight both of the intellectual and of the man-in-the-street. Her posters fill London, and her headlines fill the newspapers. *The Shanghai Express* is one of the greatest successes that London has ever had. And yet when an English cinema magnate organised the other day a *plébiscite* among cinema-goers up and down the country to decide who was the most popular cinema star, the beauteous Marlene—

with the low voice that my soul hears,
As a bird the fowler's note and follows to the snare—

did not even come into the first six! Miss Norma Shearer (the suburbs' idea of sophistication) headed the list. Miss Greta Garbo, who has claims to be considered a great actress, came third. Miss Dietrich, whom most of us in London would have thought to be the star of stars among cultured and uncultured alike, did not secure a mention. Of a truth, London and the provinces think differently. I may be excused if I suggest that the provinces think worse. But it is the taste of the provinces that has ruled, is ruling, and will probably continue to rule, the making of English films. The commercial exploiters of the cinema have debauched provincial public taste for so long that they have now placed themselves almost beyond remedy: if they were to change their policy in a night (as there is not the least prospect of their doing) and to declare in future only for the finest films that could be made, they would lose their markets immediately; not a soul in the provinces would go to them.

Can a remedy be found anywhere? There are a few scattered seeds of hope that may come to fruition in the course of much time—late, or perhaps even unexpectedly. One of them is the success of the small Academy Theatre in Oxford Street, that has consistently shown the best films, and that has lately become extraordinarily popular. Six months ago it was frequently empty. Now one has to wait in a queue to get near it. Another sign is that the Duke and Duchess of York have publicly attended the fine German film *Kameradschaft*. The far-reaching effect of the patronage of Royalty would not be denied by any manager in the country.

Again, the René Claire films are having such a vogue in London that it is even possible that their fame will spread, and the next time one is taken to Harrogate it will endure two nights instead of one. And last and most hopeful of all—the attitude of a certain recent audience in London. An English film was being

shown. The psychological moment of drama arrived when the husband had to enter to announce that his wife was dead, and was received by the entire audience standing on its chairs and hooting its derision and its laughter. Such occurrences, all too rare though they may be at the moment, are a useful reminder to film-producers, and even to Wardour Street, that there is a limit of futility below which they may not sink. Such stories are apt to spread abroad quickly. And even in the provinces it is not the best of all advertisements for a film that it has been shouted off the screen in a London theatre.

HUBERT GRIFFITH.

ORDNANCE MAPS: THE FOURTH REVISION

A HUNDRED AND FORTY-TWO years ago General Roy, whose work had ensured the establishment of an official Ordnance Survey in this country, died by candlelight correcting the proofs of a paper he was to read before the Royal Society. A year later—in 1791—the Ordnance Survey was officially established with offices in the Tower of London, and set immediately to work on the production of a 1-inch map of the British Isles. The first sheet of the fourth revision of that map (Plymouth, sheet 144) was published on August 17 last, and it may be worth while to examine, in the light of this, the maps of England as they are to-day.

During the first thirty-three years of its existence, before large-scale or cadastral survey work was initiated, the Ordnance Survey was allowed to go on with its task in peace. But ever since 1824 it has been subjected to a series of orders and countermands, Royal Commissions, Committees and Select Committees, very prejudicial to work that must necessarily be organised on a long-term plan—work in which foresight is as essential as in the management of forests. Sometimes technical contention, but more often economy, has been the cause of these interferences—economy that tends in a democratic country to strike at technical and scientific expenditure, however essential, rather than at institutions whose human interest can be used as a fulcrum for public indignation.

The general statement that Great Britain possesses a finer series of maps than any other country in the world is largely justified by our cadastral surveys—by the 6-inch and the 25-inch maps; and as a result of economies recommended in 1916 and 1918 we are mainly living on capital in the case of these. The abandonment of enormous town plans (5 and 10 feet to the mile) at the end of the nineteenth century was justified, since the same purposes could adequately be served by enlarging the 25-inch sheets. But the further abandonment of the twenty-year revision period that applied nationally to both the 6-inch and the 25-inch maps is difficult to describe in acceptable terms. It meant, crudely, that cadastral work was reduced to an incoherent sequence of local property surveys undertaken only when they were

unavoidable, and that the 1-inch scale became our only national, systematic map. 'We are in the position,' writes the Director-General, 'of a man who has bought an expensive property and is letting it deteriorate for lack of paint and attention to the guttering.' A forty-year revision period for districts whose population is under 100 per square mile is now the rule on both scales, and the 25-inch sheets are not published at all for areas described as 'waste or mountainous.' The twenty-year period was allowed to stand in populous areas, and the Ordnance Survey, snatching a mournful advantage from the destruction of the national character of cadastral maps, reduced or increased it at discretion according to the pace of development in separate areas.

The 6-inch map was begun in Ireland and went on there till 1840, when, on its completion, the Ordnance Survey turned its attention to Scotland and northern England. The 25-inch map of Great Britain was begun in 1855, but only definitely sanctioned in 1863. It is, of course, true that when these maps were undertaken and their frequent revision authorised they were more necessary than they are now. The wholesale conversions of land to industrial use, enclosures, and feverish engineering activity—railways, roads, pipe-lines, canals, drainage, water supply, gas—were all dependent on an adequate system of land survey.

The 6-inch map is predominantly the engineer's map. It includes six square miles of country, however barren; it shows contours at 100-foot intervals, beginning with 50 and 100 feet; it is drawn to scale except in the hearts of towns, where the width of streets may be exaggerated to make room for their names, and it costs 2s. The 25-inch map, mainly used for estate work, has no contours, is strictly to scale in every case, and states areas to three decimal points of an acre. It costs 6s. 8d. and is arranged on the 6-inch sheet lines, four 25-inch maps covering the same ground as one 6-inch. Its scale is not strictly 25 inches to the mile, but 25.344, or 1-2500—an extremely useful choice that satisfies international requirements (400 times the scale of the International Map of the World), and at the same time handily approximates 1 square inch of map to either 1 acre or 4000 square metres.

About 15,000 6-inch maps cover the whole of Great Britain, and all these are published; of the 60,000 25-inch sheets that would make up a national system some 50,000 are issued. The first revision of these large-scale maps was finished in 1905 and many sheets of the second are already published, but it would be a mistake to suppose that the publication of sheets since the first revision can be predicted. The third revision of many sheets is well under way long before the second of others is complete, and quite possibly some sheets may reach their fourth revision

before less fortunate areas have any cadastral survey for the present century.

Apart from property surveys, internationally admired but slowly falling into decay, the Ordnance Survey can claim the finest series of small-scale maps in existence. It would, of course, be shameful if it could not. A small country where land, besides its industrial value, has a peculiar sentimental significance; a country with a long history and confused rules of property as a result; a country intensely susceptible to changes in the world's markets, whose industrial centres and developed areas are resultantly the most changeable in the world—all these characteristics of Great Britain cry out for good maps on every scale. The 1-inch maps, whose fourth revision is in course of publication now, deserve discussion by themselves. They are the maps most familiar to the public, and as well as forming the basis of the smaller scales they represent a higher scale of competence in cartography. The remaining general maps are $\frac{1}{2}$ inch, $\frac{1}{4}$ inch, 10 miles to the inch, and 16 miles to the inch, this last especially interesting as being on an international scale (15.782 miles to the inch—the one in a million scale). Of special purpose maps the Geological Survey 1-inch is issued through the Ordnance Survey, and sheets of it obtainable through retailers are outstandingly obsolete. Aviation maps on the $\frac{1}{2}$ inch and the 10 miles to the inch scale, both with an unwelcome wealth of detail and an unnecessary complexity of symbols, are published for the Air Ministry. Aerial cartography is still, of course, in its pioneer stages and far too closely bound by cadastral traditions.

Next comes a comparatively new venture on the part of the Ordnance Survey—its series of historical maps on the one in a million scale. Roman Britain (1927) was the first of these, and its popularity justified a second edition that was at once better informed and a better map. A historical map calls, of course, for more explanation than a general map, and the Ordnance Survey included with the folded editions of this map an explanatory account of the subject, an index, a bibliography and a chronological table, all of them admirably concise, which made it extremely valuable educationally. Their one failure lay in ignoring changes in the national coastline and in a general hesitation in representing other geographical alterations. The folded linen edition of this is the most convenient and costs 5s. The map of seventeenth-century England, largely produced to indulge scholastic lust for the events of the Civil War, is on the same scale, and its physical features are emphasised in the same way by a layer system, but its explanatory letterpress presented a much greater problem of compression. Three chapters by the appropriate authorities and chronological tables of the various

aspects of life in Stuart England were designed to give as comprehensive an account as a half-hour's reading allowed. Inevitably, in a period where evidence and history are so thick, the results could be neither so complete nor so balanced as in the case of Roman Britain, but, apart from a slight kings and battles bias, the introduction is successful. A large-scale map of London in 1660 makes this venture additionally valuable. The road system, mainly owing to John Ogilby's '*Britannia Road Book*,' turns out to be surprisingly well known. This sheet costs 6s., folded on linen.

The historical series is to be continued, and sheets of mediæval Oxford and of Saxon England are in preparation. It is hoped in time to publish sheets in this series to serve every general historical purpose, and the Survey is closely enough in touch with historians and archaeologists, and enterprising enough, to be able to complete its task efficiently. It has always indicated antiquities on its maps by the use of special styles of lettering. Its opportunities in this respect are inclined to be taken for granted and forgotten; an excellent cure for this state of mind is to mention to an American that archaic styles of lettering are used only on sites previous to 1688. In the same way strangers from abroad are as a rule politely incredulous of the existence of a map that distinguishes, as our 25-inch does, between quarries, sand pits, gravel and clay pits, as well as marking brushwood, mixed, evergreen, deciduous woods, and orchards by separate symbols.

One in a million is the smallest scale the Ordnance Survey descends to; a small country can conveniently be included in a single sheet on this scale. Its general maps in this class are not its most successful. It publishes a physical map covering Great Britain in two sheets (2s. 6d. each, on linen), combining contours with a layer system and chiefly suitable as a wall map; and a map of the United Kingdom, also in two sheets and also not an outstanding success. This scale, indeed, is too small to be more than irritating to those who are used to working with the highly accurate and complete 1-inch edition. It omits and generalises too sweepingly to be interesting outside an atlas of the world, where bad cartography and glossed ignorance is the rule. The scale is, indeed, only interesting from an international point of view, since it has been chosen for the International Map of the World. This series, when complete, will be invaluable as the basis of a good atlas, and a good atlas of the world does not at present exist. The nearest approach to one is that published by the Touring Club Italiano.

Great Britain falls, in the Million Map of the World, on seven sheets. Kent is published by France and the remaining six by the Ordnance Survey. It is obvious that these are not likely to

command much of a sale in England except among cartographers. If anyone wants maps of England on that scale he will not be likely to buy them in the form of an expensive jig-saw puzzle stretching from Amsterdam to Paris. But with the 10-mile map we emerge from the metric system and atlas scales into something more useful. This map covers Great Britain in three sheets; but a special map of Scotland is issued separately, taking in an area more convenient to Clyde and Edinburgh motorists. These are all 5s., folded and mounted on linen. The layer system, that relies on colours ranging upwards from green to brown to supplement contours, is extremely successful here, and, indeed, in all the Ordnance Survey motoring maps. It is not a system the pedantic cartographer is fond of—it represents land as if it went up in terraces, it tends to obscure detail, and the brown heights are never clearly distinguishable from one another; but for immediate intelligibility on small scales no other system touches it, given good printing. It is, moreover, pictorial, and motorists cannot as a rule read maps except in the sense that a man who can read a comic strip may be said to be literate. They can take in a general idea of the country pictorially and follow the symbols just enough to get crudely from place to place, but they are not able to read a quarter of what the surveyor has written. The layer system is therefore apt to be scorned by purists as 'contours told to the children'; but small-scale maps largely make this point of view unpractical, and even if this were not so there is no reason why the children should not be told. Ten-mile maps are the obvious choice for anyone who wants a large area covered as efficiently as possible by a single sheet. Probably the ideal combination for a motorist is a 10-mile map for planning tours and for through journeys and $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch sheets for use on the tours themselves.

The $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch sheets (new series) cover about 10,000 square miles each. England and Wales have eleven sheets and Scotland ten, but one sheet is common to both countries. The maps mark the Ministry of Transport road numbers, which is more than the Ministry of Transport does, and they are the smallest scale on which by-roads are seriously marked. They, too, use the layer system to reinforce contours, and the results on the English sheets are equally successful. In the Welsh and Scottish highlands the differentiation between the various brown height layers is not adequate. Perhaps it could not be made so. The fact is that there are not eight clearly recognisable degrees of brown, and the Survey, naturally wishing to give at least 200-foot layers, have used shades that often need close attention to identify. Moreover, the Cairngorms look like stewed tea. These sheets cost 4s. each on Place's waterproof paper, and no other edition should be bought. Both retailers and the Survey themselves have a stock

of obsolete $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch maps, especially of Scotland, which are liable to be sold to the unwary. Obsolete editions are not sold on Place's waterproof paper, as this was not introduced until 1930. But even the experienced map buyer should not buy a map on this scale unless it is printed on Place's paper, because this paper has rendered all other map material completely obsolete. For predominantly indoor maps, such as the 25-inch or the 10-mile, which are kept on shelves and used on flat tables, specially durable paper is not necessary. But for the $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch and the 1-inch, whose outdoor use is almost universal, it is. The normal styles in which the Survey issues maps are—(1) paper flat; (2) mounted on linen and folded in covers; (3) mounted on linen and cut into sections to fold. Cadastral maps, being for office use, are issued only in the first style. This style is unwieldy, only possible to use indoors, and even then, without office equipment, scarcely possible. Its main use is in uncoloured editions for those who are conducting some sort of research or regional survey that involves entering details of a specialised sort on a skeleton map. The second style is the commonest. It is, within limits, durable. Much-used sheets disintegrate first at the joints and then completely; but it seemed, until the introduction of Place's paper, as much as you could hope for, and is still as much as you can rely on getting. The third style is 1s. dearer—the same price as Place's edition—and has nothing to recommend it. It is bought by inexperienced people because it costs more than the normal folded edition, and therefore should be better. It is the same as the second style, except that the map is cut into sections and pasted on to linen with gaps in between each section. This makes the judgment of distance difficult, renders the map flabby and irritating to hold, and, far from preventing disintegration at the joints, it makes it spread up the sides of each section. If exposed to wet weather, whole sections may even peel off. I have never heard a good word said for it, except by a closed-car owner, who found its flabbiness made it droop conveniently over the steering-wheel. Place's edition will ultimately be standardised for $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch and 1-inch maps; but present stocks of linen sheets must first be exhausted, and there is every reason to suppose that the Survey does not realise how immeasurably better than linen Place's paper is. It can be crumpled up, stamped on, rolled in mud, washed, ironed, refolded, and you have a new map again; yet the first sheet of the fourth revision and new reprints of third revision 1-inch maps are still being issued on linen. There is, moreover, no additional cost, either in paper or production, to justify the extra 1s. over the cost of the folded linen edition. I am reliably informed that the paper costs one-sixteenth of a penny per sheet more than non-waterproof paper of equal quality,

and, as it need no longer be backed with linen, there can be no real difference in cost. Of course it is worth an extra 1s., or, for that matter, an extra 2s., but there is every reason to suppose that dislike of change and a wish to dispose of accumulated stock has made the Ordnance Survey reluctant to encourage the use of this new material to anything like the extent it deserves. The extension of this policy to the fourth revision is surely regrettable.

The $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch scale is not popular, and does not deserve to be. Each sheet (mounted on linen, 3s.) covers some 450 square miles—England and Wales forty sheets, Scotland thirty-four. The layer system is not successful on this scale, where 100-foot vertical intervals are shown. The scale is too large to generalise on and too small to show detail reliably. It is used by cyclists, whose cruising range its area suits, and also by mistake. Nor is it only the scale which is unsatisfactory. Ministry of Transport road numbers are not marked. The northern sheets of Scotland are available only in a hill-shaded edition long ago obsolete, and the Scottish sheets as a whole date from the close of the nineteenth century; and no $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch maps are published on Place's paper.

In addition to the general topographical $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch there are $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch county maps, useful for administrative purposes, and marking in colours the boundaries of local government and parliamentary units. The $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch Ministry of Transport road maps, issued through the Ordnance Survey, are 2s. 6d. (folded, on linen). Seventy-three sheets on the same system as the topographical $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch cover Great Britain. 'A' roads and their numbers are printed in red, 'B' in green. There is no layer system or contouring, and, except for roads and water, the maps are uncoloured. It is not clear why contours are left out; their absence naturally greatly reduces the value of the maps outside the Fen districts. But they have excellent points. They have the year of issue clearly printed on the outside cover—a frankness which the Ordnance Survey would do well to imitate. They classify roads on a contemporary plan instead of trying to maintain, in the teeth of national convenience, a classification of their own. And the date on the cover prevents the buyer being fobbed off with old stock. It may here be added that the Survey's grudging admission of Ministry of Transport road numbers as subsidiary to a classification of their own is a grave national disservice. Even from the purist surveyor's point of view this insistence on classification by width is untenable unless it is backed, as of course it is not, by half-yearly revisions.

The 1-inch map is the Ordnance Survey's triumph. Whatever criticisms are made of its recent editions must be absolute rather than comparative. But it may be worth while to deal from a

critical point of view with the details of their production without forgetting that as a national series of maps their cartography is quite unequalled. The Irish Survey sheets were handed over to their respective Governments in 1922. They were not handed over in good order, but in a thirty-year-old edition, hachured and without contours, not well printed, and the size of a man's handkerchief. In this condition, except for the addition of indigenous emblems on the covers, they have remained. They are published at 3s., mounted on linen, and except that nothing better is obtainable would be valueless. It is illuminating to remember that these Irish sheets compare favourably with most of the world's cartography, only those of India, Egypt, Turkey, Japan, and the Atlantic seaboard of America bearing comparison with them outside Europe.

Scotland can certainly not be criticised in the same way. Her maps are better than our own and less obsolete. This is explained by the methods of revision. Each revision starts in Cornwall and works westwards and northwards like a shuttle. The third revision—that at present on sale—began in Cornwall in 1913. It reached Scotland in 1921. The completion of the third revision for Scotland was announced for 1928, and actually took place at the end of 1931. As a result of this English maps are largely pre-war, both in technique and information, while the Scottish 1-inch sheets are for practical purposes contemporary. Nor did England reap the benefits of this earlier revision, since the war held up the publication of revised sheets till 1919, with the result that English maps were published very little earlier than Scottish, but embodied information ten years older. This is to some extent offset by the embodiment of our own third revision information in smaller scale maps while the Scottish are often based on the second revision, by their costing 2s. 6d. instead of 3s., and by the fact that England will be the first to benefit by the fourth revision.

In the second revision England and Scotland were not based on the same meridian or drawn on the same projection; they were covered by a great many ill-arranged sheets, they tried to combine the already discredited system of hachuring with contours, their roads and railways were poorly emphasised, their vertical interval not uniform, and the type faces employed were undistinguished. They were, it is to be understood, good maps, but these were their faults. The third revision in England was not a very striking advance on the second. A uniform vertical interval, plainer roads and railways and much plainer railway stations, the abandonment of hachures, and the use of fuller lists of conventional signs represent the sum of their improvements. The type faces used were still characterless and the colour of the

contours ill-chosen. But the Scottish third revision, making use of the improved technique of the war, is not only a striking advance on the second revision, but on the English version of the third, and even, as I hope to show, on the English version of the fourth, of which only one sheet has so far appeared. Possibly the best method of conveying the qualities of the new fourth revision is to make clear its differences from the Scottish third.

The Scottish third revision covered in 92 sheets what had formerly taken 131. It eliminated the confusion of sheets formerly prevailing on the border. It retained the 50-foot vertical interval, but thickened the contour every 250 feet, making mountainous districts stand out in startling relief. It is only fair to say that these thickened 250-foot contours, wandering aimlessly over level ground, were sometimes confusing. It was helio-zincographed, and this method of reproduction, besides its greater speed, proved greatly superior to the copper engraving of the English maps or the stone transfers of Ireland. It introduced a system of mile overlaps which made work involving the use of more than one sheet much easier. It showed adjoining sheets and their numbers superimposed on an outline map for the whole country instead of the English sheet method of showing only adjoining sheets, and then merely as rectangles *in vacuo*. Its clarity of detail was impressively greater, and its system of type faces, each one distinct and all of them businesslike, was almost as much a revelation as its use of thickened contours in mountainous areas.

The fourth revision must be judged on the evidence of a single sheet (144, Plymouth) published in late August. Other south-western English sheets will follow at intervals, but at the time of writing this is the only sheet published. It is, of course, a very clear advance on the English third. It differs from the Scottish third—(1) in employing hachuring and discarding thickened contours; (2) in the use of different type faces; (3) in altering and adding to its conventional signs.

For (1) there is nothing to be said. Hachuring, briefly, is a system of representing by aggregations of short, thin lines the intensity and directions of slopes. Each line points up (or down) hill. Where the slope is steep they are set close together, and as it levels out they are more widely spaced. Where there are no contour lines, as in the Irish Survey, they are useful in giving a clue to slopes of which there would otherwise be no indication. But with a 50-foot contour system they serve no purpose beyond darkening the background and obscuring detail. The result of hachuring sheet 144 has been to turn every slope in Devon magenta. They are, in any case, thoroughly at variance with the spirit of a good map, being purely approximate and based

on no evidence not implicit in the contours. They are methods of emphasising contours unnecessarily, and are as irritating as prose in which every fifth word is underlined.

The discarding of thickened contours is, of course, due to their replacement by hachures as a means of conveying relief. How far the thickened contour would be successful on featureless ground is disputable; it could certainly be used in Devon, and I do not see how it could be worse anywhere than a system so long ago obsolete as this refinement of the hairy-caterpillar hill.

Difference (2)—the use of different type faces—is again an unfortunate alteration. The Ordnance Survey has gone historical and introduced into the regular series affectations tolerable on maps of seventeenth-century England, but elsewhere unwise. It is especially regrettable when it is remembered how rich a choice of beautiful and businesslike type faces have been produced since the war. I have never seen so many affectations gathered together in 3 square feet, except possibly in 'tea shoppe' signs. The *f*, *g*, and *y* are the most striking examples, but the typography as a whole is thoroughly insincere and, after the Scottish sheets, an unpleasant shock to have to use. The types are distinct from one another, but that is all that can be said for them.

The third alteration—the employment of different or additional symbols—is thoroughly happy. The plainness of the symbol introduced for level crossings is the greatest improvement. Electricity transmission lines, which I take to be the 'grid,' are now marked. These are invaluable landmarks. The tidal limits of rivers are now indicated. So are National Trust areas. In addition to public telephones there is now a special symbol 'T.C.B.,' meaning, for some reason, 'Telephones (not public).' Obviously the Survey cannot intend to distinguish houses with telephones from those without; it does not attempt to do so. So that a telephone (not public) is evidently not a private telephone. I do not think it clear what it is. This is their only dubious symbol, or it would not be worth mentioning.

But except for this marked improvement in symbols the Scottish third revision is easily the more able piece of work. The abandonment in the fourth revision of 2-mile squares extending in a grid over the whole map and their replacement by 5000-yard squares seems to have no advantage whatever. It is based on a method of stating exactly the position of any place on any sheet in terms of a point south and west of the British Isles. Its co-ordinates can be worked out in yards. This is no doubt valuable, but it would have been equally possible to introduce the same advantage without discarding the 2-mile grid. The advantages of a 2-mile over a 5000-yard grid are great and

obvious. The eye could count map squares from place to place and almost unconsciously calculate distance. It is not an improvement to have to reduce the result from thousands of yards to miles with a remainder to remember. The new grid squares have no co-ordinates. It used to be possible, in defining a position, to begin with square 2A and then go on to more precise details. The square was identifiable at a glance. Now the equivalent, short of working out the co-ordinates of a point south and west of the British Isles, is square 170-175 $\times$ 815-820, and each figure must be carefully checked. And, finally, the 2-mile square enclosed a plain area (4 square miles), and was therefore a valuable unit for bird-census work and for any other purpose involving area, while the 5000-yard square, equally valueless metrically, encloses an area of 8 square miles, 45 acres, 4 rods and 24 square yards. It therefore does not seem to me a good idea.

The cover of the fourth revision is bright and pleasant, but a little flabby. Inside is a diagram of the relative positions of the local $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch and $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch sheets and of adjoining 1-inch sheets. The blank inside of the back cover might profitably have the 1-inch sheet numbers for the whole country imposed on an outline map. And the maps are not issued on Place's paper.

But however this compares with the Scottish 1-inch, it is a great improvement, both in technique and information, on the current maps of England, and its rapid publication is especially essential in view of the sweeping changes in development and afforestation that have placed the third revision so far beyond salvage by minor corrections. For a map is nothing if not accurate. Its accuracy, indeed, exceeds its material, for not only may the surface of paper betray it by even imperceptible shrinkage, but the lashing crowns of elm-trees and the 5-fathom troughs of waves about the Fastnet succeed momentarily in confuting that plain tale that puts them so justly down.

BASIL D. NICHOLSON.

SIR JOHN HAWKINS: ADMIRAL AND ADMINISTRATOR

THE younger of the two sons of 'Old Master William Hawkyns,' as Hakluyt calls him, John, was born at Plymouth in the year 1532, and, like his kinsman 'Fransyes Dracke,' was destined for a sea career from his cradle. Applying himself diligently as a young man to the study of seamanship and navigation, he first went to sea as a privateer, and soon began to show aptitude as a man of business. This fact is important, as the Elizabethan privateers started life principally on commercial lines, which ultimately developed at the expense of Spain. They were purely merchant seamen, and did not sail under the national flag unless a crisis arose, in which case they usually lent or gave their services and those of their ships to the Queen. The brothers Hawkins were fortunate in having a good start in their seafaring careers, for they soon became wealthy shipowners, inheriting as they did the ships and wealth of their father in 1553. John further improved his prospects by making many influential friends, chief of whom was Benjamin Gonson, then Treasurer of the Navy, whose daughter he married in 1559, and whom he was destined to succeed as Treasurer in 1573.

It was in the Elizabethan era that England first assumed her modern character—modern in the sense that she then began to find herself in the main current of commerce, and to direct her energies to the ocean sea and the New World. But our great navigators, bold and enterprising as they were, came late upon the scene. The voyages of Columbus, Vasco da Gama, Diaz, and others had revealed an El Dorado from which treasure ultimately poured into the coffers of Spain. They led to similar attempts by English seamen, amongst whom, and on a very far-reaching scale, was Hawkins himself. But Spanish imperialism and papacy jealously barred the way to the secrets of the New World. Consequently, the excursions of the early English buccaneers of Elizabeth's reign caused endless clashes of arms against Spain; thus began the gradual merging of the merchant adventurers into the seasoned crews who manned the Queen's ships twenty years later in the great struggle against the imperial fleets of Spain;

and thereby was laid the foundation-stone of our modern Royal Navy. In this process 'John Hawkyns, Maryner,' as a contemporary describes him, played a prominent part. His famous voyages, so well described in Hakluyt, and in particular the third voyage, which ended so disastrously at San Juan de Ulloa in 1568, were the first of their kind to demonstrate to any marked extent the importance of the attack and defence of seaborne commerce. When, therefore, that 'most persistent and troublesome Englishman,' as the Spaniards called Hawkins, became Treasurer in 1573, his voyages had made sure that the breach between England and Spain had so widened that nothing but cannon shot could carry across it.

At this juncture the mantle of Hawkins fell upon Drake, who carried on at sea where he had left off. Hawkins, on the other hand, fresh from the sea, with an intimate knowledge of the Spaniards and of their ways of fighting, and of the main requirements of naval warfare, set to work in his capacity as Treasurer to forge a weapon which could be relied upon to crush Philip when the time came. With the exception of the few fateful weeks which culminated, twenty years later, in the destruction of the Armada, his remaining services afloat were relatively of no importance. It requires but a brief survey of naval history to perceive the tremendous fluctuations that have constantly taken place in the strength of our Fleet: periods of the highest pitch of efficiency and those of deep decline. The efficient periods usually coincided with a national crisis or enterprise, and required a man, usually far in advance of his time, to supply the necessary driving power in order to overcome political or financial opposition. This resistance also depended largely on the state of public opinion, and, in early times, on the ambitions and personality of the sovereign. When Elizabeth ascended the throne the Royal Fleet was at a low ebb. Numbers had been reduced by half, and the administration was growing lax and corrupt. In fact, the work of England on the high seas was being carried on almost entirely by the privateers. By the fall of Calais in 1558 the nation had received a severe shock. This, following Mary's marriage with Philip and the Catholic persecutions, plunged the country into what would now be called a 'navy scare.' A brief period of activity followed, during which was produced a sound scheme of naval policy known as the 'Book of Sea Causes.' This was a valuable document which outlined in the clearest terms the naval requirements of the times. The effort, however, was not sustained. Although schemes for rapid mobilisation and the like had been prepared, there was as yet no directing brain capable of providing the necessary organisation wherewith to put these schemes into effect. Energy at the dockyards was being dissipated

into building ships unsuited to the conditions of sea service. Corruption was once more rampant, and there was a danger that the sound teachings of the 'Book of Sea Causes' would be forgotten.

Such, briefly, was the state of affairs when Hawkins became Treasurer. His main tasks were to purge the administration of corruption, to induce the Government to pursue a naval policy best suited to the needs of the country, to examine and modernise all matters of ship construction and *matériel*, to improve the conditions of life ashore and afloat, and, lastly, to see that all departments of the Admiralty pulled together. At a time when even the Court was proverbially corrupt it is small wonder that bribery and abuses existed, especially among those through whose hands passed large sums of money and quantities of stores. Captains were said to dismiss pressed men for bribes, to retain wages and to keep back arms; pursers to steal provisions, to make false entries, and to remain ashore while their ships were at sea. Cooks recouped themselves at the expense of the seamen, and boatswains stripped a ship of movable fittings and stole rigging and cordage. In Elizabeth's reign the 'Office of the Admiralty and Marine Affairs' was organised much on the same lines as those laid down by Henry VIII. The functions of the Navy Office were, however, finally settled in 1560. The various departments, each decentralised as far as possible, were under the supreme control of the Lord High Admiral, assisted by the Vice-Admiral of England. These officials were often gentlemen of high rank with little or no sea experience. The Treasurers, also, though they may have been honest men, did not bother to probe so deeply into the doings of the various departments as Hawkins, who, with his profound technical knowledge, had clear ideas concerning what each department should accomplish with its available resources. He was therefore determined to investigate every detail. In so doing he could be no respecter of persons. High and low were served alike. If by his inquiries he found anything suspicious, those responsible were promptly arraigned or dismissed.

Naturally, therefore, he made many enemies. He was accused of plundering the Exchequer and of living on the profits himself. Wynter seems to have been particularly vehement against him. Writing to Burleigh, he says: 'As I deseir comfort in God's handes, there is nothing in it but cunninge and crafte to mayntayne his pride and ambision, and for the better filling of his purse. He careth not to whom he speaketh, nor what he sayeth; blushe he will not.' On the other hand, Lord Howard, writing to Burleigh, said: 'For Mr. Hawkyns bargain, this much I will say: I have been aboard of every ship that goeth out with me,

and in every place where any may creep, and I do thank God that they be in the good estate they be in; and there is never a one of them that knoweth what a leak means.' But his strenuous methods resulted in such an outcry against him that in 1583 a Commission sat to inquire into his administration. The result is not known, but cannot have been very detrimental to him. Indeed, a good proof of his integrity is the fact that, in spite of all the calumnies levelled against him, he held the post of Treasurer until the day of his death, a period of nearly a quarter of a century. He had set out to create an efficient Fleet, and when the hour of trial came it more than stood the test. It is also significant that the attacks on him practically ceased after 1588. Sir William Monson, too, criticising the Navy Office in the reign of Charles I., desires, we are told, 'to bring it to the state of Hawkyns and Burrough's time, who were perfect and honest men in their places, the one as Treasurer and the other as Comptroller.'

Hawkins found himself directing affairs at the close of a period of transition in naval architecture—the period when oars had given way to sails, and when the gun had replaced the arrow and the sword. Although gradual, this transition was intensified by two great events: the Renaissance and the discovery of the New World. Prior to the latter event the coasts of Europe had defined the limits of sea travel. When, however, voyages were made to the Indies the question of ship design had to be revised. Geographically, too, England was particularly affected. Oared vessels being unsuitable for ocean voyages, a completely new departure was necessary. In its earliest form the first type of ship to meet the new requirements was the 'great ship,' or galleon. This applied broadly to warships and merchant ships; in fact, there had been little difference in the build of the two types up to this time. A feature of the war galleons, however, was that they were sailed and navigated by the 'maryners' and fought and commanded by the soldiers. In other words, they were great floating castles carrying battalions of infantrymen to whom the 'maryners' were quite subordinate and greatly inferior in numbers. They were short and unwieldy ships, and, as Monson says, 'majesty and terror to the enemy.' But they were designed for close-quarter fighting only. In these craft, and in oared vessels, Spain was well represented. The two countries were, therefore, building galleons of this sort as their great ships of war when Hawkins brought his scientific brain to the Admiralty. He realised at once that the time was ripe for the introduction of a new type of galleon, owing principally to the altered conditions of sea service, which necessitated long voyages and required much seamanlike skill. Clearly, then, the proportions of 'maryners' to soldiers had to be reversed, and the ships not only sailed but

fought and commanded by the 'maryners,' with an element of soldiery to assist. Spain, however, still clung to her large battalions and her unwieldy floating castles.

Here, indeed, was a weakness of which, in view of the long voyages the Spanish galleons were wont to make, Hawkins was not long in taking full advantage. Furthermore, just about this time vast improvements were taking place in regard to ordnance, which, apart from other considerations, rendered these cumbrous ships still less suitable. It now became possible for the first time to engage one's adversary at a distance, or to close him at will. Hawkins, therefore, produced a flush-decked, fast 'race-built' ship, 'sunk and low in the water, well armed, and able to engage a highly charged opponent within pistol shot, below the water line, without the enemy's ordnance being able to touch her.' In fact, even the Duke of Medina Sidonia himself bears striking testimony to the success of these ships. He wrote: 'The enemy pursue me; they fire on me from morning to night, but will not close with me. They are fast and we are slow.' Indeed, this type of ship which Hawkins had produced was the direct forerunner of the famous line of battleship of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and which, as a type, survived till the middle of the nineteenth century. It was in Elizabeth's reign that the English first began to use the gun scientifically, realising its tremendous power if employed to the best advantage. King Philip also realised this, for he specially warned Medina Sidonia 'to take notice that the enemy's object will be to engage at a distance on account of the advantage which they have from their artillery.' As a type, the new weapons which were mounted as the 'great ordnance' of all our ships survived, with but few alterations, till the middle of the nineteenth century. In them the gunners of the time placed the utmost confidence. They were the direct outcome of the research which Hawkins had at once instituted on his becoming Treasurer. By the Spaniards, however, the gun was still regarded as an ignoble arm. In other directions no detail of *matériel*, however small, was overlooked. Cordage, pumps, rig, sheathing, boarding appliances, and many other devices all came under Hawkins' personal review. Cordage, especially, needed a vast improvement in quality. Writing in 1579, he said that he had taken steps to remedy this and other evils, 'whereby the offyce wold not onelye flouryssh but, within a few yers, be bountyfullye provyded of all maner of provycion without extra charge to her Maiestie.'

Since the accession of Elizabeth privateering had increased by leaps and bounds. The privateers, imbued with the traditions born of the practical necessity of the sea, were men of rare initiative and independence. Privateering, moreover, was so much

more profitable and popular than service in the Queen's ships that Hawkins, as a shipowner and privateer himself, felt it necessary to make the fullest use of the privateers in manning the royal ships. He therefore set about at once to make the Queen's service less unattractive than hitherto. He was anxious to avoid anything in the nature of 'sea discipline' like the Spanish system, 'cast in a military form and hidebound with limitations that, excellent as they were on land, were fetters afloat.' One of the most important matters to be attended to was the pay, which, on Hawkins' recommendation, was raised in 1585 from 6s. 8d. to 10s. per month for a common seaman. He hoped thereby to raise the standard of living afloat, so that 'her Maiestie's shippes wold be ffurnished with able men, such as can make shyfte for themselves, clene, without vermyne and noysomeness, which breedeth syckness and mortalletye.' The pay of the officers was also placed on a more satisfactory basis. They were paid a fixed sum per month according to the rate of their ships, instead of the old and unsatisfactory method of 'paying the officers the wages of a common man,' and adding to this a graduated proportion representing 'dead shares' and rewards. It had taken Hawkins many years to bring about an increase in pay, and having obtained it his efforts were practically nullified by the irregularity and perversity of the Treasury in making the payments. To the Queen the sailors were all 'of the common sort,' and it was against this idea that Hawkins set his face. 'God knoweth how they shall be paid,' he said, 'except her Maiestie have some consideration for them.'

As regards the victuals, men had hitherto been well fed in quantity, but were sometimes poisoned by the bad quality of the food. Hawkins, we are told, took care to have his stores of an extraordinary price and goodness, to keep the men in health.' He has often been criticised concerning the serious complaints made that the seamen could obtain no victuals after the first stages of the Armada, and also regarding the repeated calls for more ammunition during the passage up channel. The victuals and ammunition were provided, but, due to a failure in transport, the stores did not arrive in time. When one considers the facilities for transport in those days, this breakdown in the organisation seems understandable. 'You would not believe,' said Howard, 'what a wonderful thing it is to victual such an army as this where a man would think that neither victuals were to be had nor a cask to put them in.' Other improvements connected with personnel which Hawkins introduced dealt with clothing, uniform, gratuities, and, above all, the charitable institution founded by Drake and himself, known as the 'Chatham Chest,' for the relief of incapacitated sailors. The human trait in his character which

prompted him to pay such detailed attention to the welfare of the men shows him to have been a man of heart and common sense. Indeed, he was one of the few commanders of the age who recognised a claim to consideration in his inferiors, and who made some attempt to secure their health and comfort.

Among Elizabeth's other eccentricities was that of starving the service financially, and yet relying on her servants of State to make adequate provision for the defence of the realm. As Treasurer the burden of naval finance lay on Hawkins. The naval expenditure, exclusive of pay, etc., took the form of a 'contract' or 'bargain' with the Treasurer, who was allowed a fixed annual sum of £5714 by warrant dormant with which to meet all ordinary charges, excepting that of construction, with an extra £2500 for extraordinary expenses. With this modest sum he was for the first ten years of his administration expected to keep the older ships efficient, and also those that were built in the meanwhile. Pressure was continually being brought to bear on him to economise, and yet to organise such and such a scheme, build docks here, or ships there. He often had to provide the money out of his own pocket, and had great difficulty in getting it refunded. 'Continual thralldom,' he called it; and, writing to Walsingham, he added: 'I wish to God I were delivered of the dealing for money.' Reports were even called for by Burleigh from Hawkins' subordinates as to how Hawkins had 'performed and accomplished his bargain.' 'I am daily backbited and slandered,' he wrote. But, judging by the efficiency of the ships in 1588, Elizabeth can have had little cause for regret at having paid no heed to these slanders. Concurrently with this mass of administrative work, the far-sighted Hawkins was constantly urging the Queen and her Council to pursue a resolute policy according to the needs of the country. At this time England was faced with a foreign enemy intent on her overthrow. She was also governed by Ministers some of whom refused to discern the signs of the times, and yet who had a considerable influence on policy. She was also dependent for her existence on the strength of her Fleet.

In judging Elizabeth for her continuance of piratical rather than open war against Spain we must remember that general reprisal, as a form of hostility falling short of war, was essentially suited to an age in which the status of overseas possessions had not yet been fixed. She naturally regarded the Spanish Indies as fair game for hostility of this nature. Philip, too, was for a time compelled to acquiesce, being too weak at sea to dispute such an attitude. For political reasons, also, privateering suited Elizabeth's convenience at the moment. On the other hand, there came a time when privateering was no longer suited to the

best interests of the country. Frequent reports were being received from Spain regarding the 'enterprise of England,' and there was no excuse for a wavering policy. 'If we stand at this point,' wrote Hawkins, 'in a mammering and at a stay, we consume, and our commonwealth doth utterly decay. We have to put on our virtuous and valiant minds to make a way through with such a settled war as may bring forth and command a quiet peace.' Drake, by his operations off Cadiz in 1587, had prevented the Armada from sailing in that year. That it did sail in 1588 was due to our failure to continue similar blockading measures, which Hawkins, Raleigh, and others had so continuously urged on the Queen and her Council. But, advised by Burleigh, Elizabeth was obsessed with the idea that the early months of 1588 were an occasion 'full of hope for stretching out the hand of peace.' From a naval point of view, however, it was the moment to strike with her whole force.

The defeat of the Spanish Armada, although one of the decisive battles of the world, was even more important because the fleets represented two principles of naval policy. The Spanish preparations had been great, but ours were greater because they had been conducted by men who had begun to grasp the true meaning of sea power. Philip had constructed an immense fleet and a splendid army, but he failed because he had not grasped how to use his fleet to the best advantage. His ships were inferior to ours owing to their poor equipment and antiquated design, and his men were inferior because the majority, being soldiers, were fighting in an element with which they were not sufficiently familiar. Moreover, by his further failure to apply the lessons taught by that great event, Philip allowed the command of the sea to pass, in the fulness of time, to this country. But these far-reaching results could not have been achieved without the labours of the man, so far in advance of his time, who during the twenty odd years of his administration forged the weapon wherewith to achieve them. That man was John Hawkins; and it is a fitting sequel to his work as Treasurer that, as rear-admiral of the English Fleet, he was able to play a distinguished part in wielding that weapon in its hour of trial.

Not so brilliant an adventurer as Drake, because his opportunities were fewer, but as a great seaman and English gentleman, as a leader of men, as a gifted administrator, and as one of the chief pioneers of the British Navy, must be given an honoured place in history to this 'very wise, vigilant and true-hearted man.'

A. J. L. PHILLIPS.

LOVE GREEN

DESCRIBED in the county directory as a hamlet, Love Green lies among the seaward-swelling chalk downs, approached by a lane that leaves it only to scramble round a green hill and rejoin the main road. It is an agricultural village, and this may be seen by the architectural predominance of its barns, that rise stone-built and massive among the cottages. Even the ricks and haystacks overtop the roofs of thin slate or threadbare thatch. Being an agricultural village, it is a poor one. Year by year husbandry decays, and the large squares and oblongs of arable that look like carpets tightly stretched upon the contours of the downs show by their colour the invasion of thistles and sorrel and the resurgence of flint. Year by year fewer men are employed upon the land, and the physical standard both of labourers and draught horses grows lower. Upon one farm in Love Green a mule is used; another, for cheapness' sake, is worked by old men and boys.

At one end of the village is the church, at the other the inn. Here, two years ago, a badger-baiting was held. From one of the few badger earths in this part of England—a ruinous city of earthy tunnels—a female badger was dug out and carried in a sack to the inn. News of the proposed frolic went round, and every man who owned a dog or loved sport went up to drink that evening. A ring was made and the badger loosed into it. As it turned this way and that from the dogs a kick and a shout stopped its escape, till, fighting sullenly, it met its end.

The inn provides other traditional games, though not such stirring ones. Shove-halfpenny and rings are played there, and, if someone can be found to put up the money, Will Francis will perform his celebrated feat of drinking eleven pints at a sitting. This achievement is interesting as a rarity; but Will Francis is not an enlivened drinker, even upon eleven pints. Intellect tells, even in a country public; and Jimmy Matthews, the 'enlightened man' of Love Green, is by far the best company among those who visit the inn. Jimmy is a reader, one who enjoys, as he said himself, 'books of any nature, poetical, historiolical, or Scriptural,' and being lent Lecky's *History of European Morals*,

found it much to his taste. He also spent a whole day sitting on the green reading Marcus Aurelius, but did not think so much of him. Theology is Jimmy's forte. When on March 23 he wished me, with every cordiality, a Happy New Year, he added that if I had any religious doubts I had only to apply to him; and if my religion were substantial enough to support doubts, I daresay I would do so. On this occasion he was about half seas over; but I have been assured that when Jimmy is thoroughly glorious he begins to recite the Bible by heart, and cannot be stayed, however urgently his fellow-drinkers protest at this interruption upon the ordinary tavern conversation of scandal, bawdry, the weather, and social injustice.

Few women visit the inn. Those who do so are of the old school. The remainder, who either have pretensions to gentility or ape such pretensions, send there for beer or whisky and drink it at home. It is common, too, to make home-made wines—carrot, mangold, elderberry, parsnip—and, more rarely, mead for domestic drinking. These home-drinkers certainly do not drink less than the inn-goers, and from the point of view of social pleasantness the custom is to be deplored, since it increases the suspicion and narrow-mindedness which are cankers of village life.

During the winter Love Green joins with the next village in fortnightly whist drives. But these, since prizes are awarded, cannot be classed as anything so light and trivial as mere social relaxation. They are attended in a spirit of religious cupidity, and on the morrow the winner of a set of pink-handled tea-knives, a china biscuit-barrel, or a cigarette-case walks out with the strained simper of one who has roused the envy and fury of mankind. So solemn, indeed, are these orgies that the unfortunates whose station exposes them to the levy of fortnightly prizes dare not give below the level of expectation; and the level is a rising one, since it is known who gave what, and to give the handsomest prize is equal in glory, if not in satisfaction, to being its winner. A member of the prize-giving class in Love Green pays, I suppose, anything from £3 to £4 yearly upon this score—a ridiculous and unprofitable mulct, since the convention of good manners demands that the prizes should always be of a completely useless nature.

There is, of course, the expedient of giving the booby prize. Once, some years ago, this was awarded to a girl in the neighbouring village, who took the matter so much to heart and was so briskly teased about it that she drowned herself.

Such are the diversions of Love Green. The games of its children are even more closely in touch with real life. The smallest among them play, as all very young children do, by pretending

to be their elders ; but once infancy is outgrown they turn to the traditional rural sports of harrying strangers, teasing the half-wit, and tormenting animals. The nature study learned in the school has put a slightly different complexion upon this last sport. But whether the victim be called a stickleback or a ' minnie ' it meets the same underheel end. Meanwhile, in the economy of Nature, the elder boys harry, tease, and torment the children and any half-grown girl they can lay their hands on.

Yet, among the older folk of Love Green, there is a legend that its children were once well-behaved. That was thirty odd years ago, when Mr. Pagan was parson here. In Mr. Pagan's days every family received at Christmas beer, a joint of beef, and a plum pudding. Each new-born child was inspected and a half-sovereign wedged into its small grasp ; any older child who, playing, chanced to butt itself against Mr. Pagan's legs or muddy his broadcloth trousers with a hoop was likely to get half a crown, and those who had come to a competent age and attended the confirmation classes were refreshed with chocolates. In Mr. Pagan's day no one who went to the parsonage for succour was ever turned away, and the church was always full, for a score at least sang in the choir, and those who were not qualified to do this attended in order to hear the singing and watch the children parading the church behind the gold cross with a crimson jewel in it. Nor did Mr. Pagan neglect that most important part of a parson's duty—to give his parish something to wonder at on week-days ; for it was his custom to drive through the village in a swift gig, preceded by eight black dogs leashed together in couples.

A materialistic Eden, no doubt, in the light of present-day use, when few people of Mr. Pagan's mind or means go into the church, and when flocks are chiefly edified by the gifts of the spirit. Nor, from those who remember him, have I heard a word breathed that might suggest that Mr. Pagan had quickened their spiritual life. He is remembered as a generous man and a stout drinker, just such another shepherd in his own line as is Mr. Kid of Love Green—Mr. Kid whose sheep always fetch good prices, who never nicks a ewe at sheep-shearing, whose dogs cringe at his enormous bellow, and who, on summer evenings, may be seen in his garden trimming the heads of the Love Green labourers with a pair of sheep-shears. Yet Mr. Pagan's influence is still discernible in those who grew up under his regiment. They preserve a certain good humour and natural self-respect which not even the acrimony, vanity, and squalor of village life has quite obliterated. They themselves are well aware that things have changed for the worse. Love Green was different in old Pagan's time, they say, in the days when it had a parson of its own. Actually, Mr. Pagan had a successor before the parish was

amalgamated with its neighbour, and so lost a resident cleric. But he, being a poorer man, giving away less and keeping no retinue of dogs, counts for nothing in the village memory ; not even the fact that he went mad at his wife's funeral has endeared him to posterity.

Now, once a Sunday, the three church bells jangle their ditty for a formal minute or two, and the churchgoers walk up the road. It is a slender congregation. The old guard, Mr. Pagan's remnant, attend pretty regularly, still holding to the belief that to put on their best clothes and join in the hymns is in some way a right and proper proceeding. The remainder attend only when they feel some special call to do so. Their reasons are various : a new pair of boots, a well-combed child to exhibit, a recent death in the family, or a smoky chimney. It is only for harvest festival that the whole village turns out to admire the decorations, the pulpit with straws in its hair, the font wearing moss gaiters, the phenomenal cabbage before the altar, the vegetable roasts of apples, marrows, and potatoes balanced along the hot water pipes, and to listen to the anthem—a yearly hazard, like the Derby. Deeply and contentedly excited they throng creaking in, and crowd the pews and sing, whatever the season, ' Now thank we all our God ' with enthusiasm. The offerings go to the local hospital ; and on the morrow everyone agrees that they are wasted there, thrown away or eaten by the nurses, with chapter and verse of how, when our Sheila was in, she never so much as set eyes on an egg or a good plateful of greens. But that is no bar, when harvest festival comes round again next year, to giving the crispest savoy or the finest beetroot, for the offerings are made to nothing so immaterial as a God or so concrete as an institution. Love Green is incapable of worship ; but somewhere in their world, perhaps under the green hill, lurks a deity or demiurge, and it is this being, curiously compounded of manure and the weather, that they propitiate.

If the religion of Love Green is a trifle behind the times, its politics are up to date. Those who bestir themselves to think at all are Communists, and the rest, who know at any rate that something must be wrong with a world where wages are so low and summers so rainy (though the wireless is the likeliest cause of that), follow their lead. Every village has its Robespierre, and the Robespierre of Love Green is Mr. Taddy, who understands everything. Mr. Taddy is a small man, reddish and diligent, like an ant. So deep is his scorn for a capitalist society that it is his boast that he will beat his children within an inch of their lives if ever he hears them use a servile ' sir ' or ' ma'am.' Meanwhile, by exemplary industry, enterprise and thrift, he has become the richest man in the village, and will shortly buy a car.

Mrs. Taddy is a Communist also, noticeably whenever her rival, young Mrs. Trey, appears in a new dress or buys new household gear. For the discontent of Love Green, that might seem so well justified by what people lack, is in truth aroused by what other people have. In the years since the war a new standard of living has been imposed upon the old, but imposed as paraffin upon water; it is the upper layer only that is kindled by discontent and flares up in anger and threatenings. In Love Green there are only outdoor privies; water has to be caught from the roof gutters or drawn from wells liable to contamination; the cottages are small and inconvenient, some barely weatherproof, and infested with vermin. These conditions are accepted without a murmur. No one minds the prospect of living for ever without a vestige of plumbing, or packing three into a bed, but not to be able to afford a wireless fills them with fury and resentment. When young Lucy Mendicott came back from the sanatorium to die of tuberculosis, the fact that the one place where she could sleep apart from her family was the larder-cum-pantry was taken for granted, calling for no comment unless it were the remark that now she could get at the sugar whenever she pleased; but even down-draggled Mrs. Mendicott, the poorest woman in the village, so poor that her children are fed upon biscuits and bottled lemonade, has spirit left enough to rail at a social scheme which denies her a string of imitation pearls and a fur coat.

This deep feeling for superfluities is not a new thing in village life or in human nature. But it is now of such rampant dimensions that it must be counted as a new social factor. At the level of life in Love Green materialism is inevitable, for in the pinch of not-having the lust for possessions is biologically quickened as a compensation. Winter sets squirrels hoarding, and the cottage living-room, unwieldy with belongings, is as sure a sign of poverty as the room poverty has swept bare. But now the Love Green appetite for possessions is fed, like the young Mendicotts, upon biscuits and bottled lemonade, and is fast losing the taste for anything more solid. If proof be needed as to how this passion for rubbish is sweeping the countryside, the reader has only to visit a London Woolworth's and one in a country town and compare the wares sold in one and the other. The very cheapness and accessibility of these toys inflame the breasts that pant after them. When the Mrs. Taddy of a previous generation outpaced her Mrs. Trey it was by something solid—a marble-topped washstand or a set of grand fire-irons; and, however sternly Mrs. Trey resolved to get even with Mrs. Taddy, a certain time must elapse before enough money could be saved up for the riposte. But in this warfare of trumpery there is no time for desire to

settle down into intention, or envy grow tired of watching the rival.

Meanwhile Mrs. Taddy and Mrs. Trey continue to fetch water from the same dubious well. The open quarrels and clapper-clawing that might have eased their ancestresses are not possible to them. Love Green has long known that it is low to quarrel—such doings may be left to the gipsies. So Mrs. Taddy and Mrs. Trey commend, with distant civility, each other's wall-flowers, or inquire, with pale, set faces, after each other's cats. Not even the intimacy of open hate is allowed them by their code of respectability. Their husbands stand apart from these dissensions—such things are women's work. But in such a community as Love Green any social relationship is women's work. The labourer, a-field for eight hours, walking perhaps two or three miles to his work, only knows his village as the place where he sleeps, breakfasts, sups, keeps his wife and children, and visits the inn. At the inn he meets other such tired animals as himself, and treats with them with an animal gregariousness, the comradeship of a team of cart-horses.

The fate of Love Green as a village—that is to say, as a compacted unit in English country life—is in the hands of its women. If they fritter away that feeling of community which has bonded village life since first men built their mud huts neighbourly together for the mutual society, help and comfort that they looked for and were even, in the necessarily slighter degree, prepared to give, there is nothing to save it from disintegration, from falling away, like an old lavender bush, from its dead centre. The church is powerless; the inn, under the attacks of respectability and refinement, is fast losing what power it had. Even badger's blood gave but a temporary fillip; and now the badger's earth is forsaken. Of the three sizable houses in the village, whence one might expect some show of leadership, two belong to farmers who cannot manage even their own affairs; the third is let to a lady who is so busy organising county uplift that she scarcely knows the names of her neighbours. And even if one rose from the dead, from the extinct class of the squirearchy that produced Mr. Pagan, it is doubtful if it would be of any avail. The atavistic feudalism of Love Green is worn very thin now, cadging old Mrs. Tibbs with her curtseys, and a general aptitude to toady, its last manifestations. Yet the feeling of a common lot is still in existence among the Love Green women, however it may be smothered under a desire to seem superior to one's neighbour—so superior that one would prefer to have nothing to do with her. Women, by nature so much more susceptible to change than men, are by circumstance much more deeply tethered to permanence; and, confronted with a really rousing scandal or a

saliently unfortunate childbed, Mrs. Taddy and Mrs. Trey will cast off their touch-me-not civility, gossip heart to heart at the well, or hurry up the road together to offer their services.

Such puffs of accident will rouse up a flame from the core of the old fire. But it seems doubtful how much longer it will last under the steady drench of new influences. Indeed, Love Green is now so little a true community, so increasingly a fortuitous collection of dwelling-houses, that perhaps it is idle and Epimethean to look for saving virtue in anything out of the past. With the decay of farming the labouring class is becoming migratory—people come to the village, stay for a year or two, and then are dismissed or move off in search of something better; motor transport brings town commodities and town novelties to the cottage door; education and the newspaper direct attention away from the village to the advantages of genteel professions or what is being worn on the Lido; and if any commendation of rusticity reaches Love Green it is of the folk-dancing, rustic pottery, sun-bonnet-revival kind—so many hand-made nails in the coffin of rural life. An adjunct to its tall barns and rickyards, Love Green waits upon tillage, and from the very decline of the old order draws a certain outward permanence—the little-changing aspect of something too weak to register change; but if ever there should come a revival of agriculture the façade which yet screens the change of heart must crumble, and Love Green be a village no longer, but instead, what even now it hankers to be, a small West of England Middletown.

SYLVIA TOWNSEND WARNER.

MATTERS OF TASTE

A CONVERSATION PIECE

Half an hour from Charing Cross, in a room so book-lined as to be indistinguishable from a library, four persons have recently seated themselves at a dinner-table set in the bow of a Cheshire-cheese window. The window looks over a paved garden, and though, inside, shaded candles are already lit and a wood fire crackles in a brass grate, outside, the sun's waning beams still burnish the corals and crimsons of polyantha roses. The diners are MRS. RAY, hostess [a widow of 50], SIR CHARLES SUTCLIFFE, DAME CELIA COSOMATI, and a DR. MEADE. All four are of the same order and speak the same language, and their talk is punctuated by laughter and minor signs of sympathy in variance.

DR. MEADE. Dare I praise this superlative *bisque*? Surely own cousin to *bouillabaisse*?

MRS. RAY. Its base comes from the quayside restaurant in Marseilles where I first met it. The proprietor told us he exports it to all but savage countries.

SIR CHARLES SUTCLIFFE. Every Frenchman is at his most French when food is the topic. Who but the French would have celebrated the centenary of a cheese—Camembert—with all the *hôteliars* of the country at the ceremony?

DR. MEADE. Didn't a Minister with portfolio travel from Paris to pronounce the *discours*?

DAME CELIA COSOMATI. No doubt a highly polished gem.

SIR CHARLES. He might unquestionably have adapted Johnson on Garrick and eulogised his subject as having increased the public stock of harmless pleasure.

DAME CELIA. I like to think of the memorial erected near Arcachon to commemorate the discovery of asparagus. You remember how a shepherd, minding his flock there, having observed repeated eager nibbling of certain green shoots, took some home to his wife to cook for supper. The birth night of *asperges en branches*.

MRS. RAY. [*While glasses are being filled.*] I didn't offer you

cocktails. [*She glances at the wine.*] In any case, you, Charles, eschew them.

SIR CHARLES. [*Setting down half-emptied glass.*] What is elsewhere surrender would in this house be sacrilege.

DR. MEADE. [*To DAME CELIA.*] An *apéritif* is our modern version of grace before meat. One is quite sure Lamb would have surrendered. I confess I succumbed to a vermouth before leaving home. [*DAME CELIA smiles indulgently.*]

DAME CELIA. A bolder omission results in this table looking loveliness itself with no 'floral decoration.'

SIR CHARLES. There again, French influence. The French are purists. They are too wise artists to *mêler les genres*.

DAME CELIA. Realising that good food needs no bush?

SIR CHARLES. And recognising no disgrace in dining for dining's sake. The 'stove' flowers and potted maidenhair that flanked *épergnes* in Thackeray's England were designed to redeem a vice from its grossness.

DR. MEADE. Or to mask its grossness. Victorians ate to excess and, secretly knowing it, screened themselves from one another behind massed pelargoniums. The habit of moderation is an after-blessing of the enforced curtailments of war.

MRS. RAY. Also, simplification has knocked out bogus *tours de force*. I remember my father-in-law describing a state banquet in the 'seventies at which two vast hams, stated to have been boiled in champagne, were entombed under twin models of the Albert Memorial. Nobody ventured to disturb them.

SIR CHARLES. What a picture! Rows of whiskered feasters all craving more carving and less gilding.

MRS. RAY. I myself once encountered a sucking-pig architecturalised into a castle with almond turrets. Horribly over-handled.

DR. MEADE. Good 'dishing up' preserves respect for native material. Justifiably, a mullet may be trimmed and curled to look as though moulded by Palissy and grapes and gherkins arranged as though fresh from the touch of Luca della Robbia.

MRS. RAY. [*Momentarily preoccupied in helping herself to sweetbread.*] Delightful! Dessert ought to be Spanish-looking.

DAME CELIA. The charming meals of history have always been simple and slight.

DR. MEADE. Now you say it, I believe they have. The Marriage Feast at Cana. The original authority makes no statement concerning dishes. Veronese's evidence as to their elaborateness is undocumented.

SIR CHARLES. Ah, the great Louvre canvas with Vittoria Colonna plying her toothpick. How Veronese loved to paint magnificence!

MRS. RAY. A modern woman painter of the same scene places on each postprandial plate the rind of a segment of melon; it goes well with a stylised and chastely angular company. No smallest sign of the host's cutting a dash. Just melon and a red wine.

SIR CHARLES. I wish I knew the picture. Might it be named beside the *Déjeuner* by Monet in Frankfort?

MRS. RAY. Well, no, for Monet's is the unique expression of what one *feels* about delectable foods.

DR. MEADE. Disgraceful to acknowledge, I don't remember Monet's *Déjeuner*. Can I have seen it?

MRS. RAY. An interior. A mother and a delicious baby of about two and a half who points at her plate with his spoon. On the table two plates, each with *œufs à la coque*—one in the cup, one beside it—so opulent. A big dish of oysters in the middle of the table, a long loaf, an earthenware pot of honey with the paper cover on, *vin ordinaire* in a fat bottle and Madame drinking it out of a fat tumbler. She wears a stiff collar with the points turned down to show her nice fat neck.

SIR CHARLES. Ah, that long loaf! In that lies the centre of value. Bread is the one food no snobbery can impair. Blessed common daily bread! Equally with sunlight and sleep it demonstrates that the best things people possess are those they share with everybody else.

MRS. RAY. Hear, hear! Give us our bread. But did I ever allege that a periodical dinner roll does one any harm or that rare meats are necessarily the best? All the same, palates require education.

DAME CELIA. Wasn't there a Doge who taught himself to enjoy peacocks' eyes?

MRS. RAY. Meanwhile, it is worth knowing, Charles, that you have no rooted prejudice against well-made toast as an accompaniment to caviare.

DR. MEADE. Did you know that Hamlet founded his caviare comment on a current story of someone to whom a little barrel of caviare had been sent returning it with the message, 'Commend me to my good lady and thank her and tell her we have black soap enough already'?

SIR CHARLES. I like to linger over meals in contemporary art—they are so amusingly austere. I suppose Matisse set the fashion. Henry Lamb's 'Round Table,' for instance—five people, a brown teapot far too small for five, a red checked cloth and very little else, except pictorial quality and memorableness.

MRS. RAY. High tea, the sit-down tea, should be the ideal meal for painters, because everything is in sight at once.

DAME CELIA. High tea may be obsolete, but it is an enchant-

ing meal. Why don't we split the husk of routine and go back—or go north—to high tea? A Swedish *smörgåsbord* is a near relative of high tea.

SIR CHARLES. Not of the high tea my memory cherishes in houses round Selby. Its component parts were standardised. Sausage rolls, tongue, either cold fowls 'smothered in' white sauce and starred with geraniums, or pigeon pie—how I loved to see the claws sticking through! Then came apple cake, calves'-foot jelly, pikelets, and, on a heavily loaded tray, a teapot with a silver strainer hung from the spout. In its own *genre* that high tea was unsurpassable.

DAME CELIA. Every child delights in an occasional egg at ordinary tea. Do you remember [*looking across at MRS. RAY*] the ecstasy of dawdling with which one cracked the shell?

MRS. RAY. And dipped bread-and-butter fingers into the yolk. Rather! On dancing-class afternoons. [*MRS. RAY'S reminiscent eyes ignore forty intervening years.*] But, oh, the disaster when the white wasn't set!

SIR CHARLES. Let me see. We four are dining at my house next Thursday. Shall I turn dinner into a high tea?

DR. MEADE. It's an idea. But how about that Romanée you promised? [*A silence ensues.*]

MRS. RAY. Celia, it looks as though the Return to High Tea will survive as a sentimental aspiration.

DAME CELIA. Betrayed by burgundy! Bartered for burgundy!

SIR CHARLES. Delacroix says in his *Journal*, '*Les grands hommes qui écrivent leurs mémoires ne parlent pas assez de l'influence d'un bon souper sur la situation de leur esprit.*'

MRS. RAY. [*Recalled to things present, looks from SIR CHARLES to DR. MEADE.*] I am afraid this Perrier-Jouet is too old. '99. This is the first bottle of the last half-dozen. I had it recorked last year. It is almost still.

SIR CHARLES. [*Tasting critically.*] But yet speaketh of its year and character. There remains more than 'the shade of that which once was great.'

DAME CELIA. Delacroix was right. Some day, Clio will insist on knowing just what was Cleopatra's last meal in the Monument and King Alfonso's on the night of the flight from Madrid. Why have we taken Parson Woodforde to our hearts? Because over a period of forty years he daily noted the solid constituents of his dinners.

DR. MEADE. Had Delacroix, a psycho-physiologist before his time, lived to-day he would have reworded his remark and simply stated that the influence of vitamins on the endocrine glands is a problem as yet insufficiently investigated.

MRS. RAY. 'Simply stated'! I veto any reference to vitamins and refuse to consider myself in terms of endocrine glands. I think nobly of the soul.

DAME CELIA. *Anch'io*. Sublimation is the only word in the new text-books for which Mrs. Ray and I have any use. We believe in idealising physical instincts.

SIR CHARLES. Meade, you are getting the worst of this. The beautiful art of civilised meals is not to be sullied by a brutish terminology hailing from Harley Street.

DAME CELIA. [*Looking out of the window.*] What an exquisite evening! Just observe that sickle moon.

DR. MEADE. [*Turning to look.*] Is the sky Nile green?

MRS. RAY. No. Pale, warm turquoise.

SIR CHARLES. And one lone star.

DAME CELIA. The star that bids the shepherd fold.

MRS. RAY. Now, have done with your Miltonics, and attend. I want to decide whose meals in secular biography we should like best to have shared.

SIR CHARLES. Anyhow, not Wordsworth's. The Wordsworths never ate regular meals. They had something cold out of a cupboard. So says Harriet Martineau, who was their neighbour.

DR. MEADE. Bearing out Cottle's diverting yarn about the bottle of brandy, the noble loaf and the stout piece of cheese on the day when Wordsworth and Coleridge essayed to unharness a horse.

DAME CELIA. There is magic in every association with S.T.C.—in the younger days, that is, the care-free Quantock days.

DR. MEADE. To whom do you ascribe the epicurean avowal, 'I plead guilty to the breast of a partridge, the back of a hare, the backbone of a grouse, the wing and side of a pheasant and a woodcock *passim*'?

SIR CHARLES. To some ripe gastronome. La Regnière or Brillat-Savarin, well translated.

DAME CELIA. I happen to recollect it was Keats who said it. Keats was a sheer aristocrat, wasn't he—claret, game, Greek myths?

SIR CHARLES. Hitherto I had fancied Keats lived on some species of porridge.

MRS. RAY. Imagine, Celia! Charles thought Keats lived on porridge. Keats! [*DAME CELIA smiles her sage smile.*]

SIR CHARLES. Forgive me, but before the good minute goes I must ask what our present course consists of.

MRS. RAY. It is my specialty, so I call it *laitues MAISON*. Rolled lettuce leaves spread with chopped ham and parmesan and heated in butter and thick gravy. I'll send your cook the formula

SIR CHARLES. Sincere thanks.

DAME CELIA. I should not have cared to dine with brooding, bearded Tennyson. He would not have bothered to be agreeable. I believe he had an intense dislike of dining out.

MRS. RAY. They said he drank port out of his publishers' skulls.

SIR CHARLES. He liked cuts from the joint and minced them on his plate.

DR. MEADE. 'Denture' making was as yet an infant art.

SIR CHARLES. In his den upstairs over a thoughtful pipe far into the night Tennyson was at his kindest, I have heard.

DAME CELIA. The poet Gray, on the other hand, was so fastidious he could enjoy nothing less delicate than apricot marmalade. Doesn't that go well with his window-sill mignonette and his blue china and his dislike of mud? Once, at all events, he ate raspberry puffs at a famous London pastrycook's with Frederic Hervey; and how jolly Hervey was at finding himself a bishop.

DR. MEADE. I see the recent Life of Gosse has sent you to Gosse's Life of Gray.

DAME CELIA. Yes, because Gosse said Gray's death made him shed blinding tears. Yet he did not make Gray's death emotional.

DR. MEADE. It would be unveracious to make Gray emotional in death or life. I rather take to the cosiness of Cowper's modest, curtained suppers at Olney with Mrs. Unwin. [If modest, why curtained? *murmurs* SIR CHARLES to MRS. RAY.] They mostly supped on eggs, radishes and a glass of wine.

MRS. RAY. Too Spartan, too suggestive of Tolstoy or Gandhi. It recalls an advertisement I saw of a 'Vegetarian Guest House' on the south coast: 'A generous table is provided, including fired and unfired diet.'

DAME CELIA. Surroundings count. Certain meals one has eaten live in memory by virtue of some quality of romance in the place where one ate them.

SIR CHARLES. As where?

DAME CELIA. I was thinking of that curiously attractive restaurant in Dijon—Raconchot, isn't it? Such an *ancien régime* house, with steep roofs; grey-panelled dining-rooms *au premier*; fascinating food. The elderly head waiter showed us how snails should be eaten. It was a *chef d'œuvre* of mimetic movements. Coquelin *atné* could not have acted *gusto* more convincingly.

MRS. RAY. Have you, in Florence, ever slipped into the underground restaurant beneath Palazzo Antinori where wine is sold by weight? The bright-eyed zeal of the waiters is rather entertaining. Also the place. A tunnel lined with varnished posters.

DR. MEADE. Lapi's. I know it well. As each waiter glides and slides, balancing about ten soups and, later, *zabaioni* on his arm, he calls out, '*Subito, subito, sub, sub!*'

MRS. RAY. And an ancient street hawker is allowed to shuffle round with his tray of shell-fish, and gipsies sing at the end of dinner. But Lapi's has grown too bravura.

DR. MEADE. I heard a distinguished Florentine asking there for macaroni—with butter, waiter, plenty of butter, so much butter that I shall say, "What a *lot* of butter you have brought me!"

DAME CELIA. One sees Continental folk indulging in the unlikeliest combinations of foods. In Innsbruck this spring we were breakfasting at 9.30 in a little café-restaurant, and at the next table a well-dressed girl and her swain were partaking of iced water, boiled eggs, seed cake and large glasses of beer. The same evening, in the garden restaurant of Hôtel Greif, Bolzano, we watched a party, ostensibly at dinner, two of whom drank fruit syrups and ate nothing while the other three consumed pork chops and sauerkraut followed by monster cream buns. Foreigners are incalculable.

MRS. RAY. Not the French. Yours were Mitrop-ers. One treasures the occasional discovery that rewards experiment. For instance, potted calves' liver with hot buns and cold butter. I discovered that *entente* almost accidentally and have tempered the rigours of Good Friday with it ever since.

SIR CHARLES. 'Give the romantic time and it will become the classical.' Success lies in rejection of the merely bizarre.

DR. MEADE. No doubt we English are unadventurous. Till recently we never ate a dressed salad with cheese. Even now we don't realise what an excellent analogy exists between cheese and fruit, particularly between small, sun-browned grapes of the *midi* and a goats' milk cheese.

MRS. RAY. [*Grouse at this moment being handed.*] The reason I rang you up for this evening is disclosed. Harry sent me three brace from Speyside. He reports the season as below normal.

SIR CHARLES. I hear from Yorkshire birds are scarce.

DR. MEADE. These are cooked with the really right prodigality of—shall I say?—internal unction.

MRS. RAY. You observe that the toast is spread with the liver pounded with butter, salt, cayenne. A Highland receipt.

SIR CHARLES. Macbeth need not have counselled his thanes to mingle with the English epicures. They had little to learn.

DAME CELIA. An uncle of mine sent me a Michelin map of *La France Gastronomique*. Are you a seeker after regional dishes, Dr. Meade?

DR. MEADE. When actually regional. They need the mettle of their native pasture. The alternating regional *cuisines* provided by certain Paris restaurants strike one as artificial.

MRS. RAY. Well cooked, the local dishes of everyday life are admirable. The difficulty is to find them.

SIR CHARLES. Which of the Bath hotels offers buns, chap, polonies, olivers?

MRS. RAY. Without going into the wilds the most curious place food I know is the Bergamesque *polenta con uccelli*. Nowhere but in Bergamo have I seen those little birds in polenta. There they fill the trattorie windows and look like diploma pieces by a high-class confectioner.

DAME CELIA. Among shop windows Aix in Provence bears the palm for jewel effects produced by crystallised fruits.

MRS. RAY. Yes, indeed. With tiers of idyllic green melons, *glacés*. But doesn't that whole town radiate a large calm beauty all its own?

SIR CHARLES. On your list of alluring windows don't omit Corcellet, Avenue de l'Opéra, where a full-feathered pheasant, each feather fresh as paint, presides over an assemblage of *pâtés de faisan* like a sitting hen.

DR. MEADE. French alimentation is so cunningly abetted by its terminology. Contrast '*une sole dorée*' with 'fried sole'! Then what clarity and crispness of nomenclature links a *plat* with place or person, as in '*tripes à la mode de Caen*' or '*poule Henri IV.*'! Consider the enumeration of the gustatory items Boule de Suif carried in her basket when she and the other refugees fled from Rouen; the episode forms the most appetising passage in literature.

MRS. RAY. Allow something for the genius of Maupassant. I can laugh alone at his recital of how, when someone called a lobster the cardinal of the seas and someone else derided the ignorance involved, the elderly sister, the old aunt, looked down her nose and said she could not be amused at a pleasantry that ridiculed the clergy.

DAME CELIA. Names of French hostelries are so lovable. Witness *Café à la Tartine du Nord* outside the *Paris-Nord* station. Also our beloved *Univers et Portugal*. And hundreds equally joy-making.

SIR CHARLES. I ever remember 'The prisoner's arm was tattooed with *Vivent la France et les pommes de terre frites*.'

MRS. RAY. Has anyone counted the French words we have used during dinner?

DR. MEADE. Inevitably many, since our talk has centred upon the leading French art.

SIR CHARLES. From language to literature. Besides

Maupassant, whom should you call the finest word painters of eatables?

DR. MEADE. Dumas, a past master, perhaps in both senses. Balzac has many pages for the prose half of an anthology of taste. Zola had too heavy a hand.

MRS. RAY. My choice would be Proust, Vol. I.—the marvellous portrait of Françoise in her kitchen at Combray.

DAME CELIA. Percy Lubbock's blue garden book has some very readable paragraphs on the Gurneys' cook and her admirable works on the Earls'ham kitchen table.

DR. MEADE. And she was only English!

DAME CELIA. Has it struck my fellow-guests that our talk this evening has been an implicit tribute to a perfect dinner cooked by one Englishwoman under the guiding brain of another?

MRS. RAY. Celia, you are the most fortifying of friends! I never feel an apology needed for gastronomic intentness. After all, cookery, clothes and architecture are the world's basic arts. Though all else passes, they endure. Moreover, the subject of food makes the whole world kin. So why not discuss dietetics?

SIR CHARLES. Emily, what is this seemingly simple savoury?

MRS. RAY. Grated schabzieger. Don't you know it?

FLORENCE MARY PARSONS.

THE GOLDEN EAGLE

It is not so many years since the golden eagle and the sea or white-tailed eagle (sometimes known as the *erne*) nested in the highlands and islands of Scotland. The white-tailed eagle, like the osprey, has now been lost to us as a nesting species, but the golden eagle remains, and it is pleasant to be able to record that some of the largest Scottish landowners afford it strict protection. The golden eagle is preserved by Act of Parliament in most Scottish counties, but this protection is of little use unless it is backed up by private efforts, and so great credit should be given to those landowners who have done all in their power to give sanctuary to this splendid bird.

The chief enemies of the golden eagle are the owners of grouse moors, and so it is interesting to record that the eagle's eyrie where the following observations were made was built on a combined deer forest and grouse moor where grouse are healthy and plentiful although the eagles have nested there from time immemorial. The eyrie is built upon a broad ledge of rock on a steep rocky slope facing north, and on the ledge, about 12 feet from the nest, my friend the stalker and gamekeeper built the foundations of a turf hide in the autumn of 1930. Deep snow covered the ground until the end of March 1931, but early in April the stalker spied with his telescope from the opposite side of the glen and saw that the eagle was brooding on the eyrie. Fearing lest the bird might desert her nest if he visited it before the eggs had hatched, he did not climb to the eyrie until the beginning of the second week of May, when he found the eaglet a day or two old. On this and a subsequent visit he finished building the sides of the hide with heather sods cut from the hillside near, and made a roof of wire netting, covering it over with heather. He then telegraphed to us that all was ready, and on the afternoon of May 20 my wife and I, with our collie Dileas, arrived at the glen. Early next morning we all set out for the eyrie. The sky was cloudless and the ground white with frost. As we approached the eyrie both eagles sailed magnificently overhead, and we were interested to see one of them attacked by a lapwing, which may have been nesting farther up the glen. We climbed to the eyrie, and found

the eaglet about a fortnight old. The strong morning sun was shining full on Francis—thus we named the eaglet—and as he was breathing fast and was obviously distressed by the sun I covered him with my cap while we were putting the finishing touches to the hide. At 9.40 I crawled into the hide, and my wife and the stalker with our collie made as ostentatious a departure as possible down the glen. I was left alone with Francis, my camera in position in a hollow in the front of the hide, my eye at a small peep-hole. That hide was a masterpiece, and the stalker who made it shares equally with us the credit for the observations we made and the photographs we took. It resembled so closely the hillside on which it stood that even at a distance of 20 feet it could be seen with difficulty. I had been only fifty minutes in the hide when the mother eagle alighted at the eyrie, and fed the eaglet with great care upon the choicest parts of a grouse which was lying in the nest. She swallowed the remains of the carcase herself, then tidied up the eyrie like a good housewife, and ended by arranging tiny heather twigs over the eaglet. At 11 o'clock, after she had been at the eyrie for half an hour, she apparently noticed the lens of the camera for the first time and, her suspicions aroused, flew away. She returned in an hour, and then brooded Francis until 1.15, when she became restless, often looking out over the glen, and at last taking flight. She returned to the nest, and then her mate also flew in. Both splendid birds stood together at the eyrie for a couple of minutes or so, and I was lost in admiration at their grand appearance. The male was smaller and much lighter in colour than his mate. His eyes were larger (I wonder if all male eagles have larger eyes; it is possible, because they do most of the hunting for the eyrie and thus must be equipped with keen vision), and this gave his head a more flattened appearance. His movements were quick and imperious. He was unmistakably the king of birds. The female eagle was darker and larger. The feathers on her thighs were longer and, as we subsequently discovered, were wet and bedraggled after she had brooded the eaglet during a night of heavy rain. In disposition she was quieter and less nervy than the king. Her expression was intelligent; her movements deliberate and graceful. She looked often and lovingly at the eaglet and was obviously wrapped up in her only child. Both male and female eagles had golden heads. The rest of the plumage of the male was so bleached as to appear, in some lights, almost white. The plumage of the female was a dark chocolate brown.

I remained five hours in the hide, and noticed that the eyrie was in shade after 11 o'clock because of the steepness of the hillside behind it. At 2.30 in the afternoon my wife climbed to the hide in order that I might leave unobserved by the eagles.

It was important that the observer should never leave the hide unless a second person was near. Eagles are no different from other birds. They are apparently unable to count, or perhaps I should rather say to do a simple subtraction sum. An eagle cannot take 1 from 2 and find the answer 1. When an eagle takes 1 from 2 it finds the answer nothing every time. If one person climbs to the hide built beside its eyrie and enters the hiding place, the eagles know that danger remains and will not return to the nest. But if two persons visit the eyrie and one leaves it, the eagles never seem to realise that the second person has been left inside the observation post. Sometimes after leaving my wife in the hide I felt that the eagles might possibly have slight suspicions, and to allay these suspicions I buttoned my Burberry round my stick and held it at arm's length until I had walked some distance from the eyrie. This dummy I hoped might represent a second figure to the eagles, watching at a distance.

For the next eleven days either my wife or I kept daily watches in the observation post when weather conditions permitted. On one occasion my wife kept an all-night watch, and saw the eagle, standing over but not actually brooding the eaglet, sleep for ten hours. Throughout the dark hours of a short May night she heard golden plover singing their love songs as they cruised invisible high above her, and in the early hours of the morning a ring-ousel came to sing to her on a rowan tree a few feet from the hide. But perhaps the most interesting thing she saw during her long and cold night watch was the arrival of a wandering black-bird, which at dawn sang his liquid song from the same rowan, and awakened the sleeping eagle, who opened her eyes and gazed at the singer in mild surprise.

Since the sun went off the eyrie so early in the day it was necessary when the mornings were sunny to make the first watch as early as possible, and most mornings my wife and I left the lodge where we were staying before 6 o'clock. After the warm sun of the first morning came an interval of cold weather, but May 27 dawned cloudless. The early sun shone from a sky of deep blue as the stalker and I made our way up the glen. As we were nearing the eyrie one of the eagles came over, high overhead, and was pursued by a flock of common gulls which looked no larger than sparrows as, glinting in the sun, they made angry but cautious dives towards the great bird, which sailed on supremely indifferent to their attacks. This was a day full of excitements for the watcher in the hide. At five minutes to 7 I was left in my hiding place by the stalker. There was no food in the eyrie, and Francis slept. At 8 o'clock I saw the shadow of an eagle pass over the roof of the hide, and a few seconds later the mother

eagle alighted with a branch of heather in her bill. Daily she brought fresh heather to the nest, and on this occasion I photographed her as she stood facing me. Thirty seconds later, and before I had time to change the plate, the male eagle alighted at the eyrie. He glared at the lens (he never got used to it during the 1931 watches, but the female soon became indifferent to its eye), then threw down on to the eyrie the hindquarters of a hare. The pair then stood together splendidly in the bright sunshine, but, alas, before I could change the plate the male flew off. How I wished I had not photographed the female with heather in her bill! I felt despondent that I had lost so rare an opportunity. A ring-ousel came and sang to me in the rowan tree. The sun became warmer. I could smell the delightful scents of young summer on the breath of the soft breeze that entered through the back of the hide. Both eagles had now left the eyrie. Perhaps they had heard the slight noise of the changing of the plate holder. At all events the mother eagle when she returned was suspicious, and for ten minutes stood listening, rigid and motionless. During all that time I scarcely dared to breathe, but at length her suspicions left her and, walking slowly forward, she picked up the remains of the hare and fed Francis upon it, tearing off large pieces for him. The sun shone more fiercely. The heat was now intense. I was then the spectator of one of the most wonderful sights I have ever seen in the bird world. The eagle walked between the eaglet and the sun, and very slowly opened her great wings to shield the youngster from the rays. I looked, almost spell-bound, at this wonderful picture, and was fortunate to be able to photograph it several times without alarming the eagle. The water from the overhanging rock dripped on to her left wing and, glistening, ran to her tail and thence to the ground. Twice she very gently fondled and massaged the eaglet's downy head, looking down lovingly upon him. At 10.45, just as the shadow of the rock was creeping over the eyrie, the male flew over, and a few minutes later the female closed her great wings (the eaglet was now in shade), walked to the edge of the nest, and sailed out over the glen. For an hour she was absent, then returned with more heather and proceeded to give Francis another square meal! His small crop soon bulged with fulness. With ease he swallowed entire bones of the hare carcase, but at length he could not be persuaded to accept another mouthful, and at 12.20 the mother eagle flew from the nest. Shortly afterwards I was relieved at the hide, my mind full of all the inspiring things I had seen that morning.

The following day the eagle brought to the nest a freshly gathered rowan branch, with young leaves upon it. This she laid carefully over the back of the eaglet, and then stood awhile,

obviously admiring the colour effect. Later she became suspicious, looking often down the glen, and I saw a little party of cows and a pony being herded slowly through the glen by two men. It recalled the old highland days, when the people at the coming of summer went up to the summer shealings in the hills, and I afterwards heard that a shepherd was moving to a new home in the north-west, and was taking the short cut through the hills. That afternoon I learned something of the keen sight of the golden eagle. The eagle had been gazing happily upon Francis for a time, when she began to show uneasiness. She looked often down the glen, and at last I also looked cautiously in that direction through a peep-hole in the back of the hide. I saw, in the distance and appearing scarcely larger than specks, my wife and Dileas, our collie, on their way to relieve me. I calculated, from the time they must have taken to walk from the lodge, upwards of two miles away, that the eagle must have seen them when they started, and not only seen them, but had her suspicions aroused. I believe that the vision of most birds is infinitely less than a man's, but the sight of the golden eagle must be superior by far to human vision. Sometimes, as I sat in my hide no more than 12 feet from the eagle, her glance seemed to pierce right through the hide, and I felt it to be impossible that she could be unaware of my presence within. On June 1 bad weather compelled us to give up our watches for a time, but on June 21 we returned for four days. By this time Francis had lost his white down with which he was clothed during his early youth. He was now more than half feathered and was much wilder, crouching when the stalker and I approached him. Although it was midsummer, a westerly gale was roaring through the rowan and tearing off the young leaves. The flowers on the tree had not yet opened. The parent eagles now came much less frequently to the eyrie, for they realised that their child was able to be left unprotected. The mother eagle never fed the eaglet, as it was fully able to do this for itself. Occasionally the male, who did all the hunting, flew in with the carcase of a rabbit, or the hindquarters of a hare. Once he brought in a water-rat; sometimes grouse were the prey. A number of gulls were daily flying about in the glen, and one morning I saw the eagle planing down from a great height at a very high speed. He 'swooped' (in play, I believe) at one of the gulls, which received the fright of its life. The eagle went on without attacking, but the gull to ensure itself against a second surprise began to climb at its utmost speed, rising in spirals with much vigorous wing flapping until it was a mere speck in the heavens. When last I saw it the seagull was still climbing. We did not visit the eyrie after this, but the stalker wrote that the eaglet made its first flight successfully from the eyrie in mid-July.

In mid-April of the present year I was very glad to hear that the eagle had returned to the same eyrie. The hide was intact, although it had a narrow escape during the stalking season when a stag which had been shot fell over the rock a few feet from the hiding post. The owner of the forest very kindly gave us permission to observe and photograph the eagles again, and on May 7 my wife and I arrived at the glen. This time we hoped to photograph and record the earliest stages of the eaglet's growth. The weather was severe, and snow showers were falling. Early next morning we left for the eyrie. The stalker had not been near it, as he wished to take no risk of the eggs becoming chilled by the frost-laden winds which had swept the glen for a full month. We climbed to the nest, and found again one eaglet and one addled egg lying beside it. It was a disappointment to find that the eaglet was fully as old as its predecessor had been last year on May 20. It is probable that the wonderful weather experienced in the highlands during February of this year had caused the eagle to lay a full fortnight earlier than in 1931. A bitter air blew on the eaglet—which we christened Francis Junior—and as we were repairing the hide I covered him with my cap. The hide was in surprisingly good order, and as we left it we saw, through a gathering snow squall, the mother eagle drop almost vertically from the storm cloud and sweep darkly across the rock on to the eyrie. The following morning (May 9) was like a day in November when my wife and I made our way up the glen. The ground was frost-bound. The sun shone pale and watery through an increasing bank of cloud. At 7.30 I was left in the hide, and in half an hour I was glad to see my old friend the mother eagle alight at the nest. She arranged the heather around the eaglet, then very carefully brooded Francis Junior, sitting with her head away from the hide. This showed me that she remembered the camera lens from the preceding summer, and had no fear or suspicions of it. At 8.30 snow began to fall softly and it became very dark. I was numbed with cold, and did not dare to move my position. The eagle brooded motionless, the snow falling and melting on her dark plumage. A grouse was in the eyrie, and at 9 o'clock, the snow lessening, the eagle rose and with extreme care and gentleness fed the eaglet upon tit-bits from the grouse, standing upon the carcase to tear it up and then advancing a step with the right foot each time she held out a morsel of flesh to Francis Junior. Sometimes the eaglet seemed reluctant to take the food. The mother had to persuade him three or four times, holding the small piece of grouse patiently towards him until at last he took it in his bill. Sometimes he dropped it, and then she was always careful to pick it up, lest it might soil the cleanliness of the eyrie—for this eagle was a bird

of tidy habits. If the piece of grouse was too large for the eaglet the mother eagle swallowed it herself. The eaglet was very attentive, looking with something like awe at his large mamma. For one so young he had an interesting and intelligent expression.

When walking over their eaglets to brood them golden eagles are always anxious lest their strong claws injure their chicks, and not only close their talons, but bend their legs outwards on these occasions. The cold wintry morning passed uneventfully except that at 11 o'clock the eagle stood up, and after having fed herself upon the remains of the grouse picked up what was left of the carcase, and, holding it in her bill, stood a while motionless before flying away with it. During our numerous watches we were interested in noting that when the male came with prey he held it invariably grasped in one foot, while the female, when she removed a carcase from the eyrie, held it in her bill. The following day was even colder than the first, and my wife, who took the watch that morning, saw nothing of special interest. Most of the time the eagle dozed or slept as she brooded the eaglet. Fortunately for the comfort of our watches, the weather changed on May 11. The bitter north wind dropped light, and, although the air remained cold, the sun shone warmly. I was left in the hide by my wife at 7 o'clock that morning. There was one grouse in the eyrie. Ten minutes after I had begun my watch a meadow-pipit alighted at the eyrie. It looked tiny in that huge nest. Its mate joined it, and the two birds flew away together. It is interesting that small birds show no fear of the eagle. A wren was often singing beside the eyrie, and a wheat-ear was nesting near it. I had been in the hide only fifteen minutes when the female eagle arrived. She fed, and then brooded, Francis Junior. At 8 o'clock the male arrived with a splendid rush of wings. He brought some prey in his talons, then stood quite still for a second or two with the bright morning sun full upon him. At 8.30 the mother eagle listened to the fluting of a green-shank in the glen below. At a quarter to 9 she gave the eaglet a good meal of grouse, and at 8.50 she flew away. Five minutes later the male arrived. Not knowing the eaglet's meal hours (this was the first time I had seen him feed Francis Junior), he attempted to induce his offspring to eat another breakfast. With a father's want of knowledge of the wants of the very young he picked up the carcase of the grouse and actually offered it entire to the tiny eaglet. Francis Junior did not know what to do. He wisely did nothing, and as his father repeatedly held out the grouse carcase patiently to him I could imagine him saying to himself, 'Young children are so trying.' It was perhaps fortunate that just then the mother arrived with heather, and busied herself with the arranging of it while the father got ready to fly. I was glad that

at last the male eagle had got over his suspicions of the lens of the camera, for to-day he entirely ignored it. At 10.20 the female left, and at 10.30 the male arrived, and for the first time I saw him brood the eaglet. This he did for fifteen minutes, until, at 10.45, he rose on the nest and the female alighted beside him. As both birds stood together beside the eaglet I had an opportunity of noticing that the female was more bleached about the head than last year, but that the male was still the lighter in plumage of the two. It was of interest to note that he was not so exceedingly gentle with the eaglet as his lady. The following morning was my wife's watch, and again the father eagle fed the young, and remained brooding the eaglet during most of the morning.

That afternoon a thunderstorm with torrential rain and hail visited the glen, and next morning, which was warm and sunny, I noticed that the underparts and legs of the female eagle were wet and bedraggled, while the male was dapper and dry. During a part of this morning the female slept with her head sunk forward on her breast as she brooded the eaglet. She was obviously contented that at last the weather had turned warmer. The following morning the eaglet was for the first time outside the cup of the eyrie, and was sleeping so soundly that when I lifted a wing he did not awake. Both eagles were standing on a rock about 400 yards from the eyrie, and a pair of common gulls were swooping down upon them, one after the other, with harsh shrill cries. For some time after I had been left in the hide the eaglet continued to sleep lying on his side, his head pillowed on the eyrie. When the mother arrived she fed him and removed a rabbit carcase which was lying in the eyrie. Then mother and child played together delightfully for a few minutes, after which she very carefully preened him all over. Francis Junior, wishing to sleep, resented this, and had the temerity to aim several pecks at his mother. The addled egg was still in the eyrie, and this morning she brooded it carefully, from time to time rising and listening intently for life within it. It was so warm that there was no necessity for her to brood the eaglet, but she was very busy brooding the egg and rearranging the heather on the eyrie to her liking. Through my peep-hole I could see the great hill at the head of the glen rise snowy and majestic to the blue sky. Later a huge primrose-tinted thunder cloud grew rapidly until it towered behind the hill-top. The eagle was brooding the addled egg so closely that she did not leave the eyrie until my wife, who was relieving me, had actually reached the foot of the rock. After two days of thunder and mist May 18 gave promise of fine weather. At sunrise, as my wife and I walked up the glen to the eyrie, the sun shone golden through windows in the mist, and

when I had left her in the hide and was walking down the glen to the lodge the air was clearing. After my breakfast the light was so good that I spied the eagle's rock from the lodge through my glass, and saw the eagle leave a rock near the eyrie and fly in and alight upon the nest, where I could see her moving about. It says much for the clearness of the light and the power of my glass that I was able to do this at a distance of almost two miles.

My last watch was on May 19. When I crawled into the hide that morning a wandering robin was at the eyrie. I have no idea where he came from. A stone-chat which nested in the glen below also visited the eagle's nest. I had great trouble with the lens of the camera, for the moisture repeatedly condensed on it, and I feared that the eagle might arrive while my hand was outside the front of the hide wiping the lens. I had been in the hide for two and a half hours before the mother eagle came in, and Francis Junior, reproachful and hungry, pecked her hard and often. She fed him on a rabbit, then stood motionless over him, with one great wing half open, as though inviting him to take shelter from the warm sun. The sun increased in power, and she then opened the wing to its fullest extent, making a very beautiful and striking picture as she looked long and lovingly at him as he lay beside her. It was thus that I left mother and child, and was sad at heart to say good-bye to them, and to the glen that lay green and inviting in the warm sunlight.

Red deer were feeding beside the river. Grouse were calling. The grass, which on our arrival had been as brown as at mid-winter, was fresh and green and the home of innumerable small violets. I often picture the eagles and their child in their mountain home, for now I can look upon them as old friends, and I wish them well wherever they may wander.

But there is one sad thing. They have made me realise that beside them all other birds are dull and uninteresting, and when in my hide photographing perhaps a buzzard or a ptarmigan I am, perhaps unfairly, apt to compare them with my eagle friends and wish that once again I watched beside the king and queen of birds where the rowan perfumes the lonely rock, and the ring-ousel makes wild music at the midsummer dawn.

SETON GORDON.

TROTSKY AND THE REVOLUTION¹

It is undoubtedly to the great advantage of mankind that Lef Davidovich Trotsky is confined to the island of Prinkipo. The enforced inactivity has compelled him to find a vent for the energy of his teeming brain in producing a monumental work, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, of which the first volume, translated into American by Max Eastman, has recently been published. It is interesting not only as a historical document, but as evidence of the mentality of the author. It deals with the 'Overthrow of Czarism'—that is, the period from February 1917, covering the subsidence of the monarchy, up to the July days, the Kornilov movement. It opens with a panegyric by the translator in the words, 'this is the first time the scientific history of a great event has been written by a man who played a prominent part in it.' Mr. Eastman has overlooked a work by a distinguished soldier, the late General Caius J. Cæsar, whose account of the war in France is generally recognised as authoritative.

The book is remarkable, as its author is a remarkable man. He was, indeed, a professional writer before he became a professional revolutionary. And now, in exile once more, he reverts to his pen to earn his living as he did twenty or more years ago. For a time he lived in Sofia, where he eked out an existence as correspondent of the *Pravda* of Odessa—precarious enough, and doubtless of little hope. I have not myself seen, but a friend, a distinguished soldier who was in Bulgaria on duty, told me that he was shown as a curiosity by a lady an autograph which has no doubt great value in the eyes of collectors to-day, an acknowledgment of the loan of ten *leva*, signed by Leiba Bronstein. The name Lef Trotsky, which he assumed when he exchanged Judaism for Orthodoxy and so was able to move freely about Russia, now commands a market for his writings which Bronstein never knew, and his early experience is no doubt useful to him, for he has a vigorous and a mordant pen. At the same time we must do him justice. This book is written very *objektivno*. He refers to himself always in the third person, and only in two passages is there a

¹ *The History of the Russian Revolution*, by Leon Trotsky, translated by Max Eastman (Victor Gollancz, Ltd.).

touch of reminiscence. If his pen is dipped in acid when writing of the *bourgeoisie*, he is restrained when referring to his enemies within his own fold. In spite of an early savage attack upon Lenin, of which Stalin made artful use in later years, Trotsky seems to have worked loyally under him, and refers to him here in terms of admiration, making him the hero of the drama. Of his deadly enemy Stalin he writes with restraint. It is strange that so experienced a plotter, incomparably superior to Stalin in intellect and attainments, was beaten by him at his own game and to-day is eating out his heart on a Turkish island, while the steel-like Gruzino-Osset is undisputed tyrant of the hundred and fifty million. It is the irony of fate that the very revolution for which he worked so hard so many years, for which he suffered exile in his youth, should turn round and reject him in his success, driving him once more into banishment. Still, the last round has not yet been fought.

Trotsky was born in 1879, and adopted the profession of revolutionary from his early years. He was a young man of twenty-five in 1905 when, we are told, he was president of the St. Petersburg Soviet, the occasion when that ominous word first assumed its technical meaning. The second crisis in his career was in October 1917, when, under Lenin's orders, he led and organised the insurrection which became the Bolshevik Revolution of October. The third was when he became Commissar for War in the Soviet Government, surrounded by a bodyguard of Letts and Chinamen. The translator believes that the present history of the revolution will rank with these three 'high points' as one of the 'supreme achievements of this incredibly versatile and powerful mind and will.' Although taking a leading part in such affairs in his twenties, Trotsky joined the Bolshevik Party only on the eve of the October revolution. When on his defence in Moscow in after years he referred to himself as 'one of the old guard,' he was on those very grounds laughed to scorn by his enemies. He did not arrive in Russia until May, and therefore had no personal knowledge of the events described in the earlier chapters, but his position afterwards gave him sources of information and access to eye-witnesses and official documents, so his work conveys the impression of truth, though the documentation is disappointingly meagre. At the same time, only a relatively small portion of space is allotted to historical narrative, salted with thumb-nail sketches of personalities and interesting anecdotes, as so much is taken up by the eternal theorising on revolutions and Leninism, so dear to the Bolshevik mentality. He gives us plenty of sneers at the ineptitude and scandals of the Court and the incapacity and feebleness of the *bourgeoisie*, although he makes the common mistake of Bolshevik writers in maintaining

always that his enemies were wholly bad and wholly incompetent, which would weaken their case if their appeal were to reason. He implies that the credit for the whole thing should be given to the revolutionary leaders. To tell the truth, they were little better.

One could wish that Trotsky were less impersonal, for a touch of reminiscence would enliven a ponderous and fatiguing work. There is, it is true, an allusion to the 'good-natured crocodile,' the German who thrust the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk down his throat and then invited him to dinner. Only in the appendix do we find a picturesque and interesting personal passage worth reproducing. Half-way down the river Lena, about a week's journey from the Trans-Siberian Railway at Irkutsk, at the junction of the tributary Kirengi, a lieutenant of Yermak, the Cossack Cortes of Siberia, built a fort of larch logs just 300 years ago. The monastery, with its windows of mica, stands to the present day, and the town of Kirensk is still built of larch logs, though there are two brick buildings—the prison and the distillery. I was told that neither were really adequate. Here there formerly lived and traded a merchant, Jacob Andreevich Chernykh, who dealt in furs, calico, vodka, and other goods over an area as big as a kingdom. He employed for a time, as book-keeper, a Jew with a screwed-up face known as Lef Davidovich Trotsky. If Jacob Andreevich had realised that his employee was an important ingredient in a highly explosive mixture, he would probably have knocked him on the head and pushed him under the ice. One can imagine in what terms he would have described Trotsky, and no doubt does to-day if he is still alive, but we know how Trotsky describes him. The revolutionary who once spent two months entering *poods* and *arshins* in his ledger refers to him as 'the most finished and convincing incarnation of our [Siberian] industrial backwardness, barbarism, primitiveness, sparseness of population, scatteredness of peasants, towns and villages, impassable country roads . . . universal illiteracy.'

Trotsky has elaborated a new science of 'revolutionology.' He is the author of the 'celebrated theory of Permanent Revolution,' and swells this book with dissertations and discussions upon the theory of revolution in general. He regards it as a normal historical phenomenon. He enounces his Law of Unevenness, by which he means the spasmodic progress of backward countries in their endeavour to overtake the more advanced, so that under the whip of external necessity their backward culture makes leaps. Thus it was that Russia built modern factories under the stimulus of European finance, and that, to take a recent instance, the Abyssinian Government employs aeroplanes against its rebels. Arising from this is his Law of Combined Development, by which he means a 'drawing together of the different stages of the

journey, a combination of separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with modern forms.' Thus slavery and aviation may co-exist in one country, as they do, in fact, in Russia to-day. His point is that without this law it is impossible to understand the history of Russia or of any country of the second, third, or tenth cultural class. He then devotes a whole chapter to Dual Power. This, he states, is a feature of all social crises, which has not been noticed, much less discussed, most noticeable of all in Russia. He means that while the moral power is in the hands of the new parties, the machine remains in the hands of the old. This he finds in all revolutions and quotes our own. The English Revolution of the seventeenth century, he writes, was a 'great shattering of the nation down to the bottom, which affords a clear example of this alternating dual power with sharp transitions in the form of civil war.' In Russia it was seen in the influence of the Executive Committee, which overrode the Provisional Government informally—in other words, our old friend the 'hidden hand.' He quotes as an instance the action of the railwaymen, over the heads of the Provisional Government, forbidding the movement of the Tsar. In recent years the Trades Union Congress has shown us an attempt at the same phenomenon in this country. Trotsky is clearly no believer in democracy—at least, in time of crisis—for, commenting on the fact that the country was placed before a *fait accompli* by the revolution in Petrograd, he writes:

This casts a sharp light on the question of the function of democratic forms in general, and in a revolutionary epoch in particular. Revolutions have always struck blows at the judicial fetishism of the popular will, and the blows have been more ruthless the deeper, bolder and more democratic the revolution.

In an interesting chapter Trotsky contrasts the development of Russia with that of Western Europe. We English, and indeed Western Europeans in general, have never been able to understand the Russian character, and few of us have any idea of Russian history. As Rostovtseff has pointed out, she began as a commercial country when we were feudal and became feudal when we became commercial. Trotsky points out that she never enjoyed that powerful contributor towards civilisation so characteristic of the West, the craft guilds, nor those urban communities which filled so important a rôle in the history of Europe, of which, we may remark, Russia never has been, and probably never will be, an integral part. Industry in Russia is a modern exotic. The cities, having no industries, never became vital units, not even Novgorod. At the most they were administrative and military centres, mere agglomerations, and, what is more important, not producers, but consumers. So feudalism was a late development, and there was no class of great territorial magnates. Thanks to

the feebleness of the cities and the weakness of the baronial class, Tsardom arose, and Russia remained until our time a vast primitive agricultural country. From the dawn of history she has been an importer of ideas and exporter of raw materials and food, to trade in which the ancient Greeks established settlements on the shores of the Black Sea. Consequently she has been at heart nearer to Asia than to Europe, and still is. As Trotsky remarks, she is more like India than England. Her industries until the other day were not yet separated from agriculture—the craftsman still a peasant. Her cities are like Asiatic cities, her despotism an Asiatic despotism, and still is. Upon this primitive Oriental community Western capitalism found fine scope and imposed its system. In the West capitalism and industrialism grew. In Russia they were grafted on from the outside. With us the industrial proletariat is the product of evolution; in Russia men went straight from the plough to the lathe. The consequence of this was the late development of the middle class and its weakness. The *bourgeoisie* always seemed unnatural in Russia, and, though it produced many intellectual giants, was politically impotent. When the war came, it was unable to make the Tsar listen to reason. When the February revolution happened all unasked, it was surprised, unready, unwilling, alarmed. Within a few months it was swept away.

The monarchy subsided with hardly a push from the outside from its own inherent weakness. The *bourgeoisie*, inflated with wind and words, was caught unawares, lacking the will and decision to rise to the occasion, collapsing under the weight of a responsibility too vast for its shoulders. The peasants, with which the army was now identified by dilution, were too ignorant, too uneducated, to be able to take the lead. The old regular army had been a monarchical institution. The new army, of 8,000,000 men in uniform, was nothing but the peasantry organised and equipped. It has always seemed to me that this fact was the key to the revolution. It was the inert mass which required stimulation into action. It was the revolutionary leaders that did it, though not immediately. For the police had seen to it that their teeth were drawn. Lenin had been ten years in Switzerland, with Krupskaja, his wife, as secretary, and Apfelbaum-Zinoviev, the agitator. Trotsky was in America, Stalin and Kameneff in exile in Siberia, and Dzerdjinski in prison. Only nonentities were at the head. The Bolshevik Party was barely known, and such as there was of it was hated and distrusted. The movement, spontaneous and headless, existed only in Petrograd. Yet the whole country swallowed it. Russia had no Vendée. So when the guards mutinied and led the processions of strikers that were parading the streets and were hardly more than bread riots, there

was a collapse of everything. It was never even established who it was that led the masses from strike to revolution, and afterwards seven men claimed the honour of having led out the Volynski Regiment. The army was now so saturated with the peasant element that the great gulf fixed between officers and men yawned more openly than ever. The men disregarded the officers. The organisation of the country ceased to operate. Timidly the Constitutional Democrats, the Ka-De or Cadets, supported by the Social Revolutionaries and all sorts of doctrinaires and various grades of theoretical Socialists, nominally headed by the Liberals under Miliukoff, but actually controlled by the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers, pretended to govern the country. The leader in the eyes of the world was the lawyer Kerensky, whom the Socialists of the West took so seriously.

Trotsky's contempt for his *régime* is constantly expressed. The fundamental paradox of the February revolution, he writes, was that the democracy was diffident, feared anarchy and the unbridled elements, and considered itself only a left wing of a *bourgeois* order; that in one half of it the revolutionists were begging the Liberals to save the revolution, in the other the Liberals were begging the monarchy to save liberalism. Then in answer to the question Who led the Revolution? Trotsky answers thus, 'The conscious and tempered workers, educated for the most part by the party of Lenin'; but he admits that there was no leadership to take over the power. And he makes it quite clear that the revolution was acephalous, a spontaneous phenomenon, rising out of the ferment of the war acting upon the manure of Lenin's underground propaganda. Although the effect was not seen for some months, the critical date was April 3, when Lenin arrived. Trotsky describes the remarkable scene at the Finland station. Here was the man who knew his own mind and had the necessary will and determination. He knew, too, the land-hunger of the peasants, and when the moment came he played upon it with skill. He said, '*Grabit!*'—which is equally good Russian and English. And they grabbed. All this took place in the midst of a terrible war, but the enemy was shrewd enough to stand by and let the army rot. It always seemed to me that the class hatred between officers and men, as between landowners and peasants, was more like a racial than a social phenomenon.

Trotsky gives us some thumb-nail sketches of his political *confrères*, out of which we may choose some observations about three of the best known, whose names are familiar to English readers—Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin. This was the triumvirate which formed the 'Politburo,' into whose hands fell the power on Lenin's death in the early part of 1924. I was in

Moscow at the time, and heard a little bated gossip about the Zin-Kam-Stal, as it was called. Apfelbaum-Zinoviev, the letter-writer, Trotsky describes as essentially an agitator who, like all demagogues, was indecisive. He adds the detail that he had an 'exceptionally quick scent,' which leaves us wondering whether this is conscious irony, for the only information that I could gather about him at that time, when he was commissar in Lenin-grad, was that he was personally malodorous, so that it was unpleasant to remain in the room with him. Kamenev is described as a distinguished propagandist, orator, journalist, not brilliant, but thoughtful, '... nobody ever misjudged him as a political figure.' I was told that his attitude at that time was 'sitting on the fence.' The third was Stalin. They told me that he was pig-headed. He is certainly cunning. He is of very different type. Trotsky is mild to his enemy, whom he describes as a 'strong but theoretically and politically primitive organiser, distinguished for energy, persistence and inventiveness in the matter of moves behind the scenes'—in other words, the king of conspirators. He has certainly conspired to some effect. The success of Lenin he attributes to an unexcelled ability to detect the mood of the masses, who became the unqualified leader of the 'most revolutionary party in the world's history because his thought and will were really equal to the demands of the gigantic revolutionary possibilities of the country and the epoch.' That is his way of saying that Lenin rejected as an unnecessary handicap the code of ethics which has always been generally accepted among civilised peoples. He adds that to most the revolution was national, but Lenin made it international.

The villain of the play in Trotsky's eyes is Miliukoff, whom he compares with Mirabeau, who also wanted to save the dynasty, but he describes his history of the revolution as 'false from beginning to end.' The Serbs will be interested to read his categorical statement that on March 20, 1917, Miliukoff, a Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, tried to persuade the Allied ambassadors to betray Serbia in order to purchase the treason of Bulgaria to the Central Powers. Of the other Russian public men whose names are known in this country, he alludes to Chaikovsky as a military chauvinist lacking in talent and past (meaning of course, revolutionary past), who 'headed one of the Governments financed by Churchill.' He has also a passing mention for the 'superannuated anarchist Kropotkin,' 'who made use of the war to denounce everything he had been teaching for almost half a century.' For Kerensky, who inspired such hopes in our sentimentalists, he has an incisive description. He is an 'educated nincompoop, with no theoretical preparation, no political schooling, no ability to think, no political will. The

place of these qualities was occupied by a nimble susceptibility, an inflammable temperament, and that kind of eloquence which operates neither upon the mind nor will, but on the nerves.' It is instructive that he alludes to Kerensky's 'hysterical giggle,' with which we may compare the expression used by a distinguished Russian at the very opposite pole of Lenin's philosophy, P. S. Nazaroff, who writes: 'I knew the creature when he was a schoolboy, with all his boasted claims, a hysterical windbag, a mere super.'²

Of the 'Lusitania' Riots in Moscow in May 1915 Trotsky writes that the food disturbances 'turned into a *pogrom* of Germans, although the participants in this were chiefly the scum of the town armed under police protection.' The mob, not clearly distinguishing between German and other foreign names, sacked a number of shops indiscriminately, but three of the chief German businesses in the city suffered. I was told that about seventy Germans were killed and no doubt some private grudges wiped out. Two pictures remain in my memory of that day. One, of the Petrovka covered with broken glass and deserted at three in the afternoon, save for one mounted policeman looking on philosophically, and a rough-looking fellow in rags and an expensive fur coat, a not inappropriate symbol of the day's entertainment. I left that night for the Caucasus and from the train window saw the town encircled with fire. 'German' factories were burning.

His allusions to British affairs are not numerous, but interesting. In discussing the advantages of 'backwardness in historical development' which enables such States to take over modern institutions ready made, he states that the 'conservative anarchy in the British coal industry, as also in the heads of MacDonald and his friends, is a paying-up for the past when England played for too long the *rôle* of pathfinder.' He suggests that it was at least widely believed in Russia that our Ambassador was privy to an alleged plot to dethrone the Tsar, based on the widespread belief in the Germanophilism of the Empress and even of her direct contact with the enemy. This latter belief was certainly general. In the early summer of 1915 I myself saw honest and patriotic Russians in a public restaurant ostentatiously spit on hearing the name of the Tsaritsa mentioned. Trotsky reminds the Russian Liberals that parliament was not born on the banks of the Thames by peaceful evolution, but was the fruit of a struggle that lasted for ages, in which a king left his head at the cross-roads, and proceeds to make an interesting analogy between the cases of Nicolas II. and his Tsaritsa, Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, and Charles I. and Henriette, from which one draws the conclusion that Trotsky is a misogynist.

² *Hunted through Central Asia*, p. 313 (London, 1932).

England, says Trotsky, exploited the whole world. This

softened the inner contradictions, accumulated conservatism, promoted an abundance and stability of fatty deposits in the form of a parasitic caste, in the form of a squirearchy, a monarchy, a House of Lords and a State Church. Thanks to this exclusive privilege of development possessed by England, conservatism combined with elasticity passed over from her institutions into her moral fibre. . . . But exactly at the present moment, when England, hard pressed throughout the world, is squandering the last resources of her former privileged position, her conservatism is losing its elasticity, and even in the person of the Labourites is turning into stark reactionism. MacDonald will find no other methods but those with which Nicolas II. opposed the Russian revolution. Only a blind man could fail to see that Great Britain is headed [*sic*] for gigantic revolutionary earthquake shocks, in which the last fragments of her conservatism, her world domination, her present machine, will go down without a trace. MacDonald is preparing those shocks no less successfully than did Nicolas II. in his time, and no less blindly.

In which connexion it is worth pointing out here that there is a factor in this country which he is incapable of appreciating. Russian Jews were treated and regarded as foreigners. They were confined to a pale. Often have I heard a Russian say, 'You are not a Russian; you are a Jew!' Consequently their attitude towards their own country was hostile, and patriotism is an emotion foreign to them and incomprehensible. In others they regard it as a form of weakness and hysteria. Yet, it is true, a Russian Jew once said to me, 'You ought to go on your knees and thank your Creator every night that you were born an Englishman. You have a noble heritage.'

Trotsky is sarcastic at the expense of perfidious Albion. 'Pious Mr. Asquith,' he writes, 'had given Parliament a learned classification of annexations, from which it could be unmistakably inferred that all those annexations were to be condemned as immoral which conflicted with the interests of Great Britain.' Alluding to the quaint suggestion that Mr. Henderson should supplant our ambassador, he writes that 'Buchanan was exactly in the right place, for he was a resolute opponent of annexations in so far as they did not coincide with the appetites of Great Britain.' Trotsky evidently does not like France, the 'Shylock on the Seine,' who was demanding an offensive 'with a furious shaking of her promissory notes,' while her official policy he describes as the quintessence of *bourgeois* perfidy and rhetoric. M. Maurice Paléologue, the French ambassador in Petrograd during the war, was a 'refined psychologist for French academicians and janitresses,' who offered 'a meticulously licked portrait of the last Czarina.' America gave him a home when no one else would have him, so perhaps that is why he confines himself to

describing the democracy of Wilson as a mixture of knavery with democratic piety.

Trotsky has a vigorous style, with an odd turn of phrase, partly taken from the Russian, partly from the vocabulary of the Bolsheviks. It is worth quoting some samples of his style, as well as of his opinions. Thus he disposes of the Provisional Government, on which Europe placed such rosy hopes:

As a result of a victorious insurrection of workers and soldiers, there appeared at the helm of government a handful of the very richest landlords and industrialists, remarkable for less than nothing, political diletantes without a programme and at the head of them a prince with a strong dislike of excitement.

He polishes off the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet in equally contemptuous terms as the 'highest organ of democracy, made of two parties, which had lost their illusions but preserved their prejudices, with a staff of leaders who were incapable of passing from word to deed.' There speaks the contempt of the terrorist for the Gironde. He defines a revolution as a class struggle carried to its conclusion, and adds with somewhat laboured irony that it is 'always distinguished by impoliteness, probably because the ruling classes did not take the trouble in good season to teach the people fine manners.' As a very characteristic sample of his literary style we may quote the following:

The ill-luck of Nicolas II., as of Louis XVI., had its roots, not in his personal horoscope, but in the historical horoscope of the bureaucratic-caste monarchy. They were both, chiefly and above all, the last-born offspring of absolutism. Their moral insignificance, deriving from their dynastic epigonism, gave the latter an especially malignant character.

Few English readers except specialists will wade through this book to the end. Apart from the verbosity, which the author must have caught from the Russians, the translation is uncouth. It is frankly in the American dialect, so we must not take exception to 'stock-ticker,' 'chair-warmers,' 'rumbunctious,' 'puttering,' 'bunk-shooters,' though we often have to guess the meaning. Presumably 'defencism' is also an Americanism, but such words as 'ambitiousness,' 'suspiciousness,' 'influentialness,' which occur on almost every page, require a different label, as above all 'illuming' and 'beseeched.' Sometimes we are left wondering what he means when he writes of the 'calloused hands of the Russian generals,' and 'the crowd were tossing in their arms a Cossack who had slaughtered a police inspector.' We read that certain administrative organs, 'having barely arrived, were already stricken with the impotence of belatedness,' and 'least of all he wore the imprint of a certain emigrant narrow-

ness,' where emigrant clearly means what we should call *émigré*. Some explanation is due to English readers of such expressions as a man with 'a seed-shell on his lips.' Here there might well be a footnote explaining that chewing sunflower seeds and spitting out the husks is the Russian equivalent of chewing gum. The classes who ran to the Soviet for advice and assistance were 'solicitors, complainers, petitioners, expositors.' Were there no co-respondents? The cause of the trouble is that, apart from pure Americanisms, the translator has rendered almost word for word, so that the Russian constructions protrude from the text, making it jerky for English readers. When the Social Revolutionary Party is described as a grandiose zero, it requires a little ingenuity to realise that what is meant is an imposing cipher. We find the expression 'land union,' though it has nothing to do with Irish politics. Obviously the same thing is meant by the 'county union' in another chapter. It would be better to keep the Russian word *zemstvo*, with which most English readers of Russian matters are long since familiar. It corresponds, approximately, to our county councils. What is meant here is evidently the Association of Zemstvos, the organisation which, under Guchkoff, made energetic efforts to induce the Tsar to tread the road of sense and reason. The use of the forms *czar* and *czarina* is a reversion to an old fashion which may be defended as an accepted convention, though that does not make it correct. The Russian forms are *tsar* and *tsaritsa*, to which English readers are long since accustomed. *Czar* and *czarina* probably came to this country with the influx of Polish refugees two generations ago. Why drag in a third language?

There are two mistranslations. The word 'landlord' is constantly used where the context shows clearly that the Russian word was '*pomeschchik*.' Now this means landowner, the class against which the greed of the peasants was in particular aroused. A landlord, who might be a man who rented a house in the slums and let bedrooms, was not nearly so obvious an enemy. The other mistranslation is serious, as it gives rise to a definitely false impression. On p. 88 it is stated that the possibility of a palace revolution was discussed, among other places, in 'officers' meetings.' This conveys the impression that the officers were holding formal debates, or at least meeting with the purpose of discussing a palace revolution as a matter of practical politics—that the officers were, in fact, plotting. The word 'meeting' is clearly a translation of the Russian word '*sobranie*,' which would be correct enough if applied to shareholders. But the context, especially the qualification with the word 'officers,' makes it perfectly clear that Trotsky used the ordinary term, with which he must have been familiar, '*ofitserskoe sobranie*,' which means the officers'

mess, so that all the author intended to imply was that such a possibility was in general a subject for conversation among officers.

The translator is well known as a writer on Communism. From 1913 to 1922 he was editor of papers called the *Masses* and the *Liberator*, and is author of several works on Communist Russia and the leading Bolsheviks. He is a personal friend of Trotsky, and therefore we must regard this translation, highly individual as it is, as authoritative. The publisher has produced the book in an attractive form. In spite of the 500 and more pages, with complete appendices and a full index, it weighs only 1 lb. 13 oz. Still, we cannot help wishing he would give us an abridged edition, with only the historical narrative, personal sketches and anecdotes, in English.

MALCOLM BURR.

POSTSCRIPT.—Since the above was written, an article by Alexander Kerensky has appeared in *The Slavonic Review* for July 1932 entitled 'The Policy of the Provisional Government of 1917,' written without knowledge of Trotsky's book, in defence of the Provisional Government. The author refers to the Army Order No. 1, the dualism described of the Government and the Soviets as part of a whole repertory of hostile legends. The villain of the play here is not Trotsky but General Kornilov, to whose attempt to establish a military dictatorship he attributes the failure of the Government and success of the Bolsheviks.

M. B.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.

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ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

To appreciate the present-day condition of Anglo-American relations it is necessary to survey them first over a period of years. The late Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson used to advise his students of history to ascend in a mental balloon. As they rose higher in the air they could take a wider survey of the earth beneath them and its happenings. In examining the political relations between the two great English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States of America, it is necessary to take a wide survey also; and from such a height their most striking feature is the way in which they have fluctuated, especially during the twentieth century. It is the fashion to speak of the 'unthinkable war' between England and America. Such a negative state of feeling between the two leading nations is, I submit, insufficient for the needs of the world. Co-operation, it will be generally agreed, is necessary. But such co-operation has fluctuated between the closest working alliance and the reluctant exchanges of meagre information with 'observers.'

At the close of the last century our relations were excellent,
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thanks, largely, to British moral support for the United States in the American-Spanish War. Even the South African War, which among certain nations of Europe roused considerable hostility against this country, did not affect Anglo-American good feeling to any extent. In the years before the Great War the sentiment between the two countries was so good that, in our strategic dispositions and preparations made in the event of the expected conflict with Germany, the United States Navy—then the third in order of importance—was never taken into account by the British Committee of Imperial Defence or the Admiralty. When the Great War broke out there was a swing of American sentiment in favour of the Allies, particularly Britain, France, and Belgium. As the war progressed there was a hardening of American feeling towards Britain owing to the operations of our blockade of Germany. This cut across the well-established American doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas, and was eagerly seized on by German and pro-German propagandists to make mischief between the two countries. They succeeded to a certain extent, until the Germans in their turn, with their submarine campaign against merchant shipping, outraged American feeling. Indignation in the United States increased steadily as the German submarine campaign was intensified and became more ruthless in its methods, and finally became so strong, after the shock of the disclosure of the German plans to stimulate an invasion of American territory by Mexico, as to compel the peace-loving Mr. Wilson to take his country into the war. Though an associated Power, the United States was, in practice, an ally; and the alliance was very effective. From the moment of the American entry into the World War the relations between the British and American Navies were of the closest. The American military commanders in France worked more harmoniously with the British generals than they did with the French, or the French with ourselves, as every soldier knows. But it was at sea where the relations were most cordial, and the co-operation closest and most effective.

I was a member of the Admiralty War Staff when the United States intervened in the World War and during those first critical months which followed their intervention. It is literally true to say that we disclosed all our naval secrets to our new Allies. In the most confidential division, where future plans were made for the War Staff, an American officer was admitted for permanent liaison duties. We supplied the American Navy with our fire-control apparatus, then far in advance of that in use in any other navy, including their own. A squadron of American 'Dreadnoughts' operated with the Grand Fleet. American destroyers and other small craft under British admirals played important

roles in the western Channel approaches working from Queens-town, and in the western Mediterranean working from Gibraltar. There has never been such an example in all naval history of an ally who worked with us so whole-heartedly or with such good feeling. At the time of the Armistice, despite a few incidents on the Western Front caused by national pride and the natural pugnacity of young British and American soldiers, 'Anglo-American relations' as expressed by the fighting men were on a footing of firm friendship and mutual trust. The departments in each country responsible for shipping, supplies, and finance co-operated with equal cordiality.

The last six months of the year 1918 saw Anglo-American relations reach their peak of sincere geniality. Thereafter the fluctuations began. The first post-war trouble came with the British refusal to incorporate in the Peace Treaty or the Covenant of the League of Nations the American doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas. This refusal may have been inevitable. The war had left all peoples raw and neurotic. As Mr. Lloyd George said to Mr. Wilson when they met after the 'Hang the Kaiser' election, if he gave way on the second of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, which demanded, in effect, the abolition of the weapon of private blockade, he would be out of office the next day and another Government, just as intransigent on this point, would replace his Cabinet; and in the state of public opinion at that time this was probably true. President Wilson's blunder in not taking the Republican Party chiefs with him to Paris is now part of history. It was one of the principal causes of the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and the Anglo-American Treaty undertaking to defend the French frontiers in the future. In the bitter campaign waged in the United States for the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles the anti-Wilson politicians represented Britain as the profiteer of the war who had gained colonies, territory, and merchant shipping, and now, with the removal of the German Navy from the international chessboard, was the predominant maritime Power. The secret treaties published by the Soviet Government after the second Russian Revolution were used to blacken Allied diplomacy, and particularly British diplomacy, in the eyes of the American public. Anglo-American friendship cooled. The three principal naval powers—Britain, the United States, and Japan—all embarked on costly ship-building programmes. The American Navy had a large number of ships of the most powerful type under construction as part of the war programme. With the official mentality of war finance still in control, the British and Japanese Admiralties followed suit. After the controversy over the Peace Treaty and the inevitable accusations made against Britain by party politicians,

naval rivalry was the most important cause of the cooling off of Anglo-American friendship. With brief intervals of better understanding, it has been one of the prime causes of misunderstanding and suspicion ever since.

There have, of course, been other factors, to which I shall refer. In the years immediately following the peace attention in America, especially among the advocates of preparedness—that is, preparedness for war and therefore of strong armaments—was turned to Japan. Inevitably the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance was the subject of adverse criticism. On the Pacific coast of America there has existed for several decades a strong local hostility against Japan combined with some fear of Japanese ambitions. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance caused doubts in Washington, as, for that matter, it did in Australia. But when the Russo-Japanese War broke out British and American diplomacy worked well together in endeavours to confine the struggle, and our Foreign Office whole-heartedly supported the late Mr. Roosevelt in his peace efforts, which ended successfully in the Treaty of Portsmouth. When Russian armed merchant cruisers in the Mediterranean held up both British and American shipping suspected of carrying contraband to Japan, and exercised the belligerent right of visit and search thousands of miles away from the seat of hostilities, the British and American Governments joined in a note to St. Petersburg. Indeed, so resolute was the combined action of the two Governments that the Russian naval authorities completely abandoned their operations against shipping in the Mediterranean. It is curious how the Anglo-Japanese Alliance only excited American suspicions in the post-war years. But that it did excite such suspicion is a fact. This Treaty was not renewed, partly as a deliberate policy of improving Anglo-American relations, partly to meet the wishes of our Australasian Dominions. This non-renewal had a good effect in America, which was heightened by the comparative success of the 1921 Washington Naval Treaty and the Six-Power Pacific Treaty. This remarkable Conference at Washington, called by President Harding, led to a substantial scrapping of heavy capital ships built or in course of construction by the three principal naval Powers. True, the scrapping of keels actually afloat was chiefly by the United States and Japan; but Britain nevertheless gave up a heavy shipbuilding programme. Anglo-American relations took a turn for the better. They were still further improved by Mr. Baldwin's debt settlement during the premiership of the late Mr. Bonar Law. Mr. Baldwin has been criticised both for the terms of the debt settlement and for his promptness in settling. However this may be, the settlement itself raised our prestige high in American eyes, and but for

subsequent difficulties arising out of the world trade depression and the fall in gold prices the effect would have been more lasting.

From 1924 until 1929 the United States enjoyed a trade boom. Her people were busy making money, the country had apparently embarked on a continuing era of increasing prosperity, and the doctrine of isolation was specially popular. But a new shipbuilding rivalry had commenced. The 1921 Washington Naval Treaty reduced and limited the larger warships—battleships, battle-cruisers, aircraft-carriers. But agreement had been impossible on the number of cruisers, though their size was limited to 10,000 tons. A shipbuilding race began in this smaller but still costly type of war-vessel. The usual campaign in Congress for credits for shipbuilding was accompanied by accusations against Britain of 'stealing a march' in naval construction, secretly raising the elevation of the guns of the surviving capital ships, and the like. By 1927 it was necessary to call another Naval Conference in an attempt to limit cruiser construction and check the incipient shipbuilding race. This Conference, which met at Geneva, was a failure. It broke down on the usual disagreements among the technical experts on the calibre of guns and the size of ships, of which we have had unpleasant repetitions at the World Disarmament Conference during the first six months of the present year. The French and Italians, as in London at the 1929 Conference, presented a separate and different problem owing to their own naval rivalries. No substantial agreement was reached between the three major maritime Powers, and the Conference broke down, to the huge delight of the American engineering and armour-plate-making firms, whose activities in subsidising special propagandists to make mischief was subsequently disclosed in a Congressional Inquiry. This moment, when Anglo-American friendship was once more at a low ebb, was chosen to make known to the world an agreement on future policy towards disarmament between Paris and London. An Anglo-French agreement on the subject of disarmament always causes hostility and alarm in Washington. This particular agreement was not of very great importance; but it irritated the Americans.

In 1929 came a change of Government in England. Mr. MacDonald in his second premiership turned to Anglo-American relations as a personal diplomatic problem to be tackled, just as in his first premiership, when he was Foreign Secretary as well, he set to work to improve Anglo-French relations. Mr. MacDonald hoped to do in 1929 with Mr. Hoover what he had done with M. Herriot in 1924. His visit to America as Prime Minister was part of a long prepared plan to this end, and was a preliminary to the calling of another Conference on Naval Armaments by the

five principal maritime Powers. Unaccompanied by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Henderson, he received the boisterous welcome that the American public always extends to the leader of a foreign State. Little official information has been issued about his conversations with President Hoover at Rapidan. But a great deal of unofficial information has leaked out, from which it would appear that, however cordial the personal relations of the two heads of States, no precise agreement that could be accepted by their respective Foreign Offices and Navy Departments was reached. What happened was that President Hoover, influenced by Senator Borah and other prominent personalities at Washington, did open up the question again of the Freedom of the Seas and the acceptance of the discarded second point of President Wilson's Armistice terms; and Mr. MacDonald made much the same response as Mr. Lloyd George did during the Peace Conference. The two statesmen and their advisers, therefore, fell back on the mathematical method of reaching agreement on disarmament. As experience has shown before and since, this was found to be a lengthy process. In any case, there were Japan, France, and Italy to be taken into account.

Mr. MacDonald returned to London, and the Naval Conference assembled. The 1929-30 negotiations for disarmament led to certain results, despite the same difficulty as before with France and Italy. It postponed the replacement of heavy capital ships allowed for under the 1921 Washington Treaty, and set certain limits to the construction of cruisers, submarines, and destroyers, the numbers of which had been left unlimited in 1921. The figures agreed upon were high, however, and resulted in very heavy American shipbuilding programmes, which in the years following the great slump have been felt increasingly onerous by the American taxpayer. This period, nevertheless, showed a distinct improvement in Anglo-American relations. The friendship was still further strengthened by a blunder, this time on the part of the Prime Minister of France. The Hoover moratorium for German debts last year was accepted immediately by Britain, but with such reluctance and with so much delay by France as to undo much of the good that was expected. Then M. Laval, during his subsequent visit to Washington, allowed it to be supposed by the American public that France was prepared to use her deposits in New York as a diplomatic weapon and was threatening to force America off the gold standard by withdrawing them. All the 'Lafayette' sentiment for chivalrous France evaporated in a night.

The steady behaviour of the British public following the departure from the gold standard raised our prestige higher in American eyes than at any time since the end of the Great

War. To complete this account of the extraordinary fluctuation of Anglo-American relations it should be noted that during the first three months of 1932 they were of the best. We were regarded with sincere admiration by practically the whole American public. The way was open again for close collaboration between the two peoples and their Governments for the solution of the many difficult economic and other problems which assail us all. The succession of crashes in the American stock markets, the rising unemployment, the depression in business, and the general pessimism that has been a feature of the last two years, had had a chastening effect on American opinion generally. This had led to a more sympathetic and kindly feeling towards Britain.

The only cloud in the sky at the beginning of this year was the belief that Britain was rather too sympathetic towards Japan in her Manchurian and Shanghai adventures. The extreme 'correctness' of British diplomacy as manifested in Washington, and Sir John Simon's reluctance to join with Mr. Stimson in sending a joint Note to Japan in the beginning of her adventure on the mainland of China, caused widespread disappointment. The old anti-Japanese feeling has grown again in the United States to a considerable strength. It was felt on the other side of the Atlantic amongst all classes and in all parts of the Republic, with the exception perhaps of a few financiers interested in Japanese bonds, that an opportunity for Anglo-American collaboration in the cause of peace had been lost. It is difficult for the average English person to realise the strength of anti-Japanese feeling in America at the beginning of this year. It has died down a good deal since with the distraction of other troubles, it is true; but the boiling up of the old anti-Japanese feeling appeared to become more bitter as one travelled westward across the continent. In the Middle West the pacifist and anti-war leaders felt that the Japanese adventure was a direct challenge to the Kellogg Pact for the Outlawry of War. On 'the coast' the memories of the old racial conflicts arising out of immigration difficulties still continue to exist. There are many prominent Americans in the State of California who apparently believe with all sincerity that the militarist party in Japan has ultimate designs on their own territory on the mainland of America. For a generation a legend has been fostered that the Japanese imperialists intend first to dominate the Pacific and then to demand the right of entry into United States territory west of the Rockies, and to enforce this demand, if necessary, with arms in their hands. American opinion on 'the coast' is particularly apprehensive of Japanese naval power. Those Americans who take an interest in foreign politics and affairs outside their own country but live in other

parts of the Union believe that the Japanese have designs on the Philippines at least. Though it is part of the politics of the advanced Democrats to grant autonomy to the Philippines, the idea of any Japanese interference with this American dependency fills them with indignation and alarm.

The Chinese are comparatively popular in the United States. Speaking generally, they are good citizens and not regarded as any menace. China is a very important market for American exports. When the Japanese forward policy in Manchuria took shape, still more when the Japanese Navy began operations at Shanghai, there was serious talk of inviting the other Powers to join with America in an economic and financial blockade. It was felt that the whole principle of the Kellogg Pact for the Outlawry of War was in jeopardy, and that the Japanese adventure must be checked at the very beginning at all costs. So strong was this feeling that Senator Borah, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, felt it necessary to issue a warning against the proposed economic blockade, which he said would be indistinguishable from a military operation and might lead to actual war. While it is perfectly true that the American people as a whole are, on the surface, indifferent to affairs outside their own borders, they are nevertheless subjected to waves of emotion from time to time over questions of foreign policy. Thus, although British interests and property in China are greater than American, and we do a larger trade with China than does the United States, more space was given by the newspapers to the Asiatic news at the beginning of the Japanese incursion than in the British newspapers. American newspaper editors, with their ears to the ground, soon sense when public interest is aroused and assist in stimulating its emotion. There are a large number of American men and women living in all districts, who in their groups study foreign affairs, and are interested in disarmament, peace, and such questions as the oppression, or alleged oppression, of small or weak nations. Women's organisations, religious leaders, the widely scattered branches of the Foreign Policy Association, students of international affairs—all these in the aggregate, when their interest is aroused on any particular question, are capable of giving a lead to public opinion and do so. The statement, therefore, that Americans are only concerned with their own affairs and are indifferent to what goes on outside their country must be subject to considerable qualification. And this is particularly true with regard to the Japanese 'forward' policy in China and Manchuria.

The very different attitude of the British Government caused serious disappointment. Nevertheless, with this one exception, the barometer of Anglo-American relations was set fair during the

first half of 1932. There has been a change since, however, and the barometer of public opinion in the States has moved back to 'unsettled' or 'stormy.' It is undoubtedly the desire of the great majority of the British people to be on good terms with their American cousins, and they look to American collaboration in attempting to solve the many difficult questions of an international nature which trouble all the great nations of the world. But very delicate handling will be required in the months that lie ahead of us. I suggest that it would be as well if we tried to understand the change that has once more taken place in the mutual feeling between the two countries; and the state of American public opinion and the attitude of the politicians who try either to lead or interpret it is of undoubted importance. What, therefore, is the cause of this 'cooling off'?

The renewed difficulty with the Irish Free State has not, so far, had a great effect on American opinion. The apparent settling of the Irish question for all time by the signing of the 1921 Treaty establishing the Free State Government was a contributory cause of the improvement in Anglo-American relations. The Irish-Americans are not so powerful politically as they used to be, because the stream of Irish immigration has been swamped by a flood of new citizens from most of the countries of Europe, whereas in the latter half of the nineteenth century it was the great Irish migration which helped to provide the urgently required new labour for a rapidly developing country. There have since been successive waves of Italians, Austrians, Poles, and Russians. There are still numerous and influential Irish-American communities in such cities as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago. The peculiar Irish genius for politics and aptitude for police work still makes the Irish-Americans a force to be reckoned with. During the Irish revolution, in the years immediately following the Armistice, very considerable agitation was evident throughout most States of the Union. The Irish 'pull' in State and Federal politics was felt strongly. The apparent settlement of this centuries-old Anglo-Irish dispute put a number of professional agitators out of employment, and weakened the cohesion of the Anglo-Irish political community. The subsequent civil war either divided the Irish in America between Republicans and Free Staters, or else sickened them of the whole business. There is some danger, however, of a recrudescence of the old hostility of the Irish in America to Britain. It should not be exaggerated in importance, but it is there all the same. The beginning of the present Anglo-Irish dispute occurred when the Eucharistic Congress was in session in Dublin. The Congress was attended by thousands of Americans of Irish descent, who were naturally seized almost exclusively of the Irish

side of the controversy. These Irish-Americans—clerics, business and professional men—have returned to their own country in a pugnacious mood. They are declaring, for example, that it is improper for Britain to take the lead amongst the European Powers in suggesting a scaling down of the debts owed to America by Europe while she is demanding her 'pound of flesh' from the little Irish Free State. These people may not be numerous enough or powerful enough by themselves to affect Anglo-American relations to a great extent, but their arguments have been seized upon, and will be seized upon, by opponents of debt revision.

This brings me to the subject of the debt. I found in the United States this year a hardening of opinion compared with what I experienced during another extended visit five years previously. Highly prosperous America was then in a generous mood. If the Government at Washington had been approached in the right way it might have been possible to arrange for a revision. But the European attitude was not very helpful. Americans are sensitive people, and the jibe of 'Uncle Shylock' hurt them severely. To-day taxation is heavy, incomes are much reduced, and the ordinary citizen hesitates, for purely financial reasons, to agree to debt revision. American opinion on the debts can be analysed as follows: well-informed citizens, captains of industry, bankers, economists, university professors, men of letters and the like, agree in private that it would be to the advantage of the United States to assist in the reconstruction of Europe by adopting the policy of the clean slate. This applies also to those engaged in the export trade for materialistic reasons, and to the intellectuals for idealistic reasons. But most of these persons are reluctant to speak out boldly. The mass of the people in the eastern States are less intransigent on this subject than in the south and middle west, or on the other side of the Rockies; and one idea that has bitten deeply into the American mind, which it will be difficult to eradicate, is that if the United States forgives her former associates in the Great War the debts incurred during and after it, they will only spend the money on increased armaments. This, indeed, has become an *idée fixe*. Senator Borah, and a few other leaders like Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, have spoken out with great courage in favour of revision or cancellation in the highest interests of the American people themselves. But they are careful to bracket this opinion with statements about the necessity for substantial reductions in armaments. President Hoover hints at tariff concessions in addition.

The debt question is complicated by another factor that is not generally understood in Britain. There is fierce hostility through-

out the United States to the institution described loosely as Wall Street. By this is meant the banks, financiers, company promoters, stock exchange dealers, and the rest of the fraternity who manage, or mismanage, finance and credit. Americans see the bubble of continually expanding prosperity pricked. Looking round for the cause, they have fastened on the misdoings, or the alleged misdoings, of the Wall Street business men. The farmers in particular, suffering by reason of the fall in the prices of their commodities and the enhanced burden of their debts and mortgages caused thereby, are particularly violent in their hostility; and it is these farmers who hold the balance in State and Federal politics outside the industrial belt. Now some of the great banks of New York are known to be heavily involved in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Germany in particular. During the speculative boom they floated European loans wholesale and traded the bonds to the new investing public throughout the United States. They are accused of advocating the revision or cancellation of inter-governmental debts in order that their private investments and loans may be saved. As they are the object of intense hatred by their victims, the very fact that some of the most prominent financial leaders of the country are known to favour debt revision arouses the stubbornness of a large section of the American public.

If more spectacular results had emerged from the Geneva Disarmament Conference the policy of revision would have had a better chance. As it is, there is grievous disappointment. President Hoover's disarmament proposals were popular in the United States and a more ready response from Britain was expected. It is perfectly true that Mr. Stimson, the Secretary of State, went out of his way to praise the British Foreign Secretary publicly for his attitude; but the lawyer-like caution of Sir John Simon, and his very careful comments on the Hoover proposals, were the first to reach the American public. In a matter of this kind it is first impressions that count the most. The legend was created that the British Government, and therefore, *ipso facto*, the British people, were lukewarm about disarmament. This legend was magnified and given currency by two different and opposing schools of publicists. The party of preparedness—those who believe in disarmament for other countries but strong naval and military forces for America, and they include all those who have a vested interest in the manufacture of armaments or the building of warships—declared it to be obvious that the other Great Powers, and Britain in particular, had no intention of disarming; it would therefore be insanity for the United States to pause in her own armament programme. The other school are those who are really anxious for disarmament, the peace lovers and idealists

generally, who had been gratified by President Hoover's proposals and who have been loud in their expressions of disappointment both at their apparently cold reception and the slow progress at Geneva. There is a hypocrisy in national as in human affairs. It is particularly evident in this question of disarmament. Every nation is apt to thank God that it is not as its neighbour. This attitude is particularly noticeable in the United States in other matters than disarmament. The American military authorities who send their experts to Geneva are as ingenious at framing reasons why poison gas, for example, should not be done away with as any European staff officer, while American admirals at all the Disarmament Conferences have been particularly resourceful in finding adequate reasons on technical grounds why, for example, the size of battleships should not be reduced. Yet the American public believes that the nation is wholeheartedly in favour of disarmament and that the reactionary Governments of Europe are the only stumbling-block. They usually make some exception where England is concerned, because of our record on the League of Nations, and because of the strong movement in support both of the League and of disarmament that has been so active in the post-war years through the churches and various societies and organisations in England. For this reason it comes as a special shock to American opinion if the British can be represented as opposing measures of disarmament.

That this question of armaments will be linked very closely indeed with the debts controversy is most evident. For example, on July 27 last the American Ambassador in Paris, Mr. Walter Edge, informed the French Premier that if the French Government desired co-operation between the two Republics, American public opinion must be satisfied as to France's attitude towards armament reduction. On the very same day Senator Watson, the 'floor-leader' of the Republican Party, made a speech demanding that there must be 'disarmament' in Europe as a preliminary to the proposed World Economic Conference. This was an awkward suggestion to make, because the Geneva Conference had adjourned until January 1933, only the special committees meeting in September of this year. As it was hoped to hold the World Economic Conference as soon as possible after the Ottawa Conference, and the month of October has been suggested, some miracle would have to happen to fulfil the senator's condition. But it is perfectly true that Senator Watson in this speech expressed the opinion of many of the rank and file of both the Republican and the Democratic Parties, even making allowances for the exigencies of the Presidential campaign, which in the last week of July was just getting into its stride. 'It is unthinkable,' said the senator, 'that we should permit Europe to keep money owed to

us to enable them to build up larger military establishments. So far as we can see, this is their plan.' This sentiment is not specially directed against Great Britain, but it must be taken note of when discussing Anglo-American relations.

Fortunately, the Presidential campaign is being primarily fought on domestic questions this year. Prohibition is the really burning issue, with the record of President Hoover in relation to national prosperity as a close second. The effect of the campaign is to impose extreme caution on Republicans and Democrats alike where foreign relations are concerned. If the Democratic Party could fasten on to the Republicans generally, and President Hoover in particular, the accusation that he was in favour of the unconditional revision or cancellation of the war debt, they would make great play with it. Of this Mr. Hoover and his managers are well aware. Governor Roosevelt is known as an advocate of closer co-operation with Europe, and especially with Britain, and for American entry into the League of Nations. But the governor has adopted a cautious attitude with regard to the debt, and even towards American participation in the proposed Economic Conference. He is a low-tariff man, but he shrinks from the accusation of internationalism. Mr. Roosevelt's present attitude is that Europe must pay her debts to the United States of America, but that the United States of America must lower her tariffs to enable her debtors to pay. It is not without significance that Mr. Newton Baker, the Secretary for War in the Wilson Cabinet of 1916-21, made no showing in the Democratic Convention which chose the Presidential candidate. Mr. Baker at the beginning of the present year was well in the running, and, indeed, had strong backing, especially by the all-powerful business interests and Wall Street. He had declared himself boldly in favour of debt cancellation, and this did not improve his chances of nomination.

This and other evidence goes to show that much patience will be required, as well as very careful and diplomatic handling, before the United States adopts the British policy of the clean slate on debts and reparations. And this careful diplomatic handling was unfortunately missing during and immediately after the Lausanne Conference. Washington's attitude had been that Europe should settle her own problem of debts and reparations and then approach the United States. This unofficial advice from Washington was apparently taken too literally. The 'gentlemen's agreement' and the Consultative Pact created a most unfortunate impression. The very term 'gentlemen's agreement' has a sinister meaning in the United States, and is an example of the different interpretation given to the same words by the two English-speaking peoples. In England a 'gentlemen's agreement' is understood to be an understanding between men of honour; in the United States it is

usually interpreted as meaning a tricky arrangement come to between rogues. The permanent officials in Downing Street are accomplished linguists, but they do not understand the American vernacular, or such an expression would never have been allowed to be cabled to the United States. Also, the way the information was allowed to leak out did much mischief. The British Government, no doubt, considered that there were sound reasons for saying nothing about it for a few days. The story is that it was intended to inform the State Department in Washington through the British Embassy. But the close working arrangement between the politicians and journalists of France was overlooked. So that the first news of the agreement reached the United States *via* Paris, and with a French emphasis. So also did the first interpretation of the Consultative Pact and M. Herriot's statement that the latter would prevent any separate arrangement ever being made again on such matters as debt payments between England and America without French assent. This touched American susceptibilities on their tenderest spot.

The combined effect throughout the United States was deplorable. It was represented that a secret arrangement had been made to the effect that the reparations agreement would depend on the American attitude to the debts. And it is a fundamental principle in American foreign and financial politics that debts and reparations must be kept in separate watertight compartments. Furthermore, a real sensation, which had several days' start, was created throughout the United States by the accusation, prominently displayed in most of the American newspapers, that Lausanne had resulted in a united front against America. Subsequent denials, explanations, and *démarches* have done little to remove this unfortunate impression. Therefore at the very time when it is most necessary that America and Britain should collaborate together in economic reconstruction there is more suspicion and distrust on the other side of the Atlantic than at any time since the early days of the Great War.

Economists and statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic are gradually coming to a mutual understanding and agreement as to the steps necessary to restore world trade. Amongst these informed persons there is wide agreement on the necessity of very drastic revision, if not cancellation, of inter-governmental indebtedness. There is a wide measure of agreement also on the need of exchange stability and concerted international efforts to raise wholesale prices. For example, important economists and bankers in Canada are in favour of certain measures of monetary reform such as the remonetisation of silver, exchange stability, and the extension of the functions of an international bank. But so much trade is done between Canada and the United States, and

Canadian indebtedness to America on account of capital investments is so heavy, that Canadians are generally agreed that little effective action can be taken without American collaboration. There is wide agreement also on the need of removing certain commercial and exchange restrictions, apart from tariffs, if the channels of international trade are to be cleared and reopened. Here, again, American collaboration is a necessity. There is even considerable agreement with regard to the necessity of lowering the tariff barriers themselves. But it will be useless to hope for any results unless the United States and the British Empire can be induced to keep in step. Yet with these two in agreement and collaboration a real lead can be given to the whole world in the direction of economic reconstruction aimed at the revival of trade. It is unfortunate that the official invitation sent by the British Government to the United States Government for the Economic Conference stated specifically that tariffs, debts, and reparations would not be discussed. But we need not despair on that account. Tariff discussions at Ottawa overshadowed and blanketed the vital subject of monetary reform and co-operation, with its corollary of price-raising and 'reflation.' If the World Economic Conference would concentrate on this subject alone, great and beneficial results might follow. The way would then be open for a smaller conference of the principal Powers to discuss, and, if possible, to settle, debts, reparations, and tariffs.

I would venture to summarise the present state of Anglo-American relations by the statement that Britain has neglected America on account of pre-occupations in Europe, especially during the year 1932. This was partly the fault of Washington for not participating officially in the Lausanne Conference, referred to above. But it can be repaired; and perhaps the most effective way would be to hold the projected World Economic Conference in Washington instead of in London. If it is held in London, the American delegates will be ever fearful of their own public on the other side of the Atlantic. If it is held in Washington, the European delegates need not have the same fear of public opinion in their own countries. Among the principal Powers it is only in the United States that there is the same degree of independence of the Executive from the Legislature. However inconvenient it may be to European Prime Ministers, some of whose personal political positions are not very secure, to cross the Atlantic, there are far greater risks in not having this conference in Washington. Indeed, I would go so far as to support the opinion of many eminent observers that its only chance of success lies in its being held on the other side of the Atlantic, and under combined Anglo-American leadership.

J. M. KENWORTHY.

THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT

I. IS DISARMAMENT POSSIBLE?

THE World Conference on Reduction and Limitation of Armaments has sat for six months, manned by the pick of European statesmen and equipped with all the expert advice which could be required to enable them to complete their task. And yet it has failed; or, to be quite fair, let us say it has failed *so far*—since the Conference has only adjourned, and when it reassembles in 1933 it may succeed. For the moment, however, it is foolish to try to make out that the Conference has been anything but a failure. It is wiser to recognise that it has failed and to discover, if we can, the reasons for that failure. That it has not achieved the object for which it was established is clear. It has done a lot of work and has doubtless facilitated considerably the private exchange of views. It has, indeed, produced a resolution, and a resolution is something, though not much to show for six months of hard labour. But let us remember that the Conference was summoned in order to reduce armaments; and the resolution reduces nothing. Even its own parents will not claim that it alleviates by one halfpenny the immense burden of the world's expenditure upon munitions of war. It is this that entitles us to say that the Conference has, so far, failed.

Let us see what the resolution is worth. In the first place, it must be noted that it is not a resolution of the Conference, although the word 'conference' appears in it. It is really only the draft of a resolution which, some day, is to be submitted to the Conference. It is true that the General Committee which has agreed to it includes a delegate from every State represented at the Conference, and thus it is improbable that the full Conference will go back on it; but a door for retreat seems to have been left open. However, even if the resolution is to be taken as the irrevocable decision of every Government whose delegate voted for it, we are still left in doubt as to how far the resolution commits them to anything beyond what they had long ago accepted when this matter was discussed in committees of the League of Nations. The resolution is, in fact, so extraordinarily

indefinite that it is no exaggeration to say that if it had been submitted to the various Governments a year ago it would probably have been accepted by them without having to set up all the paraphernalia of a world conference or compelling some hundreds of persons to waste their time in Geneva from January to August.

In order to substantiate this assertion, and at the same time to inform the reader of what has been done, let us look at the resolution which obtained the assent of the General Committee on July 23 last. Stated very shortly, the effect of the resolution is to declare, first, that a substantial reduction of world armaments shall be effected and that the primary objective shall be to reduce the means of attack; secondly, that military aircraft, heavy artillery and tanks shall be limited in number and size, and that a strict limitation and a real reduction in effectives shall be brought about; thirdly, that air attacks against civilian populations shall be prohibited and (subject to certain conditions) all bombardment from the air shall be abolished; fourthly, that chemical, bacteriological, and incendiary warfare shall be prohibited; and, fifthly, that a permanent Disarmament Commission shall be set up as recommended by the Preparatory Commission appointed by the League of Nations. There are other provisions for inquiring into various questions, such as the trade in arms, the possibility of limiting expenditure on national defence, etc., as to which the committee which framed the resolution does not profess to have come to any definite decision.

Of the five propositions set out above, only two have any reference to reduction of armaments. The last merely carries one step further the scheme for permanent supervision prepared by the League of Nations, which, it may be assumed, the Governments represented on the League have long ago recognised to be indispensable. The third and the fourth have really no relation to the subject of reduction. They prohibit certain methods of warfare. These prohibitions—no doubt excellent in every way—may be of service in 'the next war,' although it is to be feared that when 'the next war' comes they will be no more observed than were the Hague Conventions against poison gas observed in the last war; but they effect no reduction of armaments. Indeed, it is worthy of note that the resolution makes no attempt to prevent the Governments, or private individuals, from preparing chemical and bacteriological war material or even poison gas, about which there has been so much discussion.

We are thus left with the two proposals first mentioned—namely, a substantial reduction of world armaments and the limitation in size and number of military aircraft, big guns, and tanks. Here the General Committee does venture to approach

the question for which the Conference was summoned, but it fails to come to any definite conclusion. Let us, in fairness, set out *verbatim* the paragraph which has reference to 'Land Armaments.' It runs as follows :

(1) All heavy land artillery of calibres between any maximum limit as determined in the succeeding paragraph and a lower limit to be defined shall be limited in number.

(2) The limitation of calibre of land artillery shall be fixed by the Convention.

Subject to an effective method being established to prevent the rapid transformation of guns on fixed mountings into mobile guns, different maxima for the calibre of land guns may be fixed as follows :

- (a) A maximum limit for the calibre of coastal guns, which shall not be less than the maximum calibre of naval guns ;
- (b) A maximum limit for the calibre of guns in permanent frontier or fortress defensive systems ;
- (c) A maximum limit for the calibre of mobile land guns (other than guns employed for coastal defence).

It is not easy to see what all this verbiage means, or, at any rate, to understand to what extent it carries the question of reduction beyond the position which it has occupied ever since the Peace of Versailles. There is to be a reduction ; but surely this proposition has been accepted long ago ! The question now is, What reduction ? To this question the resolution quoted above gives no answer. It lays down that certain of the great engines of war are to be limited in size and number, but what size and what number remain untouched upon. Until these details are filled in, or until some principle is laid down on which these details are to be based, it is impossible to guess at what reduction, if any, is in the mind of the General Committee.

But, beyond this, there would appear to be other questions which must be settled before any attempt can be made to fill in figures and which are not mentioned in the resolution. First, what limitation is there to be of armaments other than the great guns, etc., named above ? It does not help to reduce armaments if for every cannon of high calibre withdrawn from service a State is free to substitute three cannons of lower power. It is clearly necessary to extend the scope of limitation so as to embrace, in some way or another, the whole array of arms with which a State is to be free to provide itself. A second point of omission that is of the greatest importance is that there is no indication as to how the rules of limitation shall be applied to individual countries. For instance, if France is to be allowed so many hundreds of big guns, may Belgium possess the same number if she so wishes ? Or is she to be permitted only to have a number which is proportionate to her population ? Most people will hurriedly reply, 'The latter !' ; and they will quote

Mr. Hoover, since that is the basis of his last proposal. But the matter is not so simple. If because a State is populous, wealthy, and strong you are to allow it more means of defence than you do to a smaller and weaker nation, it is as though in a duel between private individuals the bigger and stronger of the two were allowed to use a sword a few inches longer than his opponent. This point has already cropped up in relation to the agreed proportion between the capital ships of the Japanese and American navies, which was fixed at Washington at the figures 5 to 9. The further reduction by 33 per cent. now suggested, if applied equally, would be far more injurious to the Japanese navy than it would be to that of the United States. Hence the protest raised by Japan immediately after the Hoover plan was made public.

For the moment it is unnecessary to discuss these points. They are only referred to in order to show what little distance the resolution of the General Committee carries us along the road to disarmament. It seems extraordinary that questions such as these, and others of equal importance, should be left in exactly the same stage of uncertainty as they were in when the Conference met in February. It justifies us all the more in asserting that so far the Conference has failed. There is, however, one further point of supreme importance as to which the resolution is silent. It would not be reasonable to blame the Committee for this, as it would not be free to pre-judge so great an issue at this juncture. It is, of course, the position of Germany and the other disarmed Powers. How are the new limitations, whether resolved upon now or later, to affect them ? When the maximum figures contemplated in the paragraph on 'Land Armaments,' quoted at an earlier stage in this article, are filled in and the number and calibre of big guns, military aircraft, etc. (now forbidden entirely to Germany), are agreed upon, will Germany and Hungary and the others become entitled to manufacture and use these engines of war ? It is difficult to see how they can be prevented if there is to be a general system of disarmament. And if these States are to form part of the new general system of mutual insurance against war, were it not well to have this understood at once ? Such an understanding would facilitate immensely the progress of the Disarmament Conference. Indeed, it would render success possible where, at present, it seems to be almost beyond the bounds of hope. As is well known, the absence from the resolution of any reference to the way in which this question is to be treated led the German delegate to refuse his support to it. Sir John Simon did his best to explain that the door was not closed and that this branch of the subject would be considered later on ; but this did not suffice. Indeed, the question of

whether Germany is to come into, and take her share in, the arrangements for limiting armaments seems to be a question precedent to all others, and no one can reasonably take exception to her representatives viewing it in this light. That the Conference has been unable to make any declaration on so fundamental a point is further proof of its failure, since it is impossible to believe that during the six months of public and private discussions this all-important matter has not received consideration.

It is, of course, admitted that the Conference has been confronted by some serious obstacles. The uncertainty caused by the elections, first in France and then in Germany, made it especially difficult for the representatives of those countries to arrive at decisions which the results of the elections might render nugatory. But even this fact shows how little ready these two nations are to reach agreement on the question of their armaments. If there were any strong public demand for reduction, the mere possibility that a Government might fall on some purely national issue would not necessarily prevent all progress from being made on a question of international concern. The truth is—and we are compelled to recognise it as being an important factor in the present situation—that on the continent of Europe there is no widespread desire for reduction of armaments for its own sake. In England and America and in some of the minor European States strong bodies of opinion exist capable of supporting the Government in the efforts it may make to bring about disarmament; but elsewhere the Governments have to take up what is really an unpopular cause amongst their own constituents. The Germans, of course, profess to be very anxious for reduction of armaments; but it is because they wish to see their neighbours' armaments cut down to their own level, and not because they have any real belief in doing away with armed force. At the present moment militarism is once more in the ascendant, and the pacifist movement in Germany has received a check which has rendered it almost helpless. In half the States of Europe disarmament, necessary though it is from every point of view, advocated and supported as it has been by practically all the European Governments at the Conference, has not yet the popular support behind it which is essential if it is to have any chance of being carried into effect. We are driven to the conclusion that unless a great change can be brought about in public opinion before the Conference resumes its session, it will come to no more satisfactory a decision than it reached in July. It is of no use for our statesmen to spend another six months in trying to persuade the other statesmen to do something they do not like doing, if at the end of that time the people they represent are in the same frame of mind as they are in at this moment.

How can we work upon foreign public opinion? Certainly not by merely telling them what they ought to do. The more lecturing that goes on across the Channel, or across the Atlantic, the less influence it has. It generally only shows how little acquaintance the lecturers have with the conditions on the Continent. The only chance for disarmament lies in the people of France becoming convinced that it will be for their own advantage to diminish their armaments, and the people of Germany realising that they have nothing to gain by being a menace to their neighbours. Fortunately there is in France a minority, growing in numbers every day, who are beginning to see that to insist upon Germany remaining permanently unarmed whilst the nations around her are armed to the teeth is to demand something that is impossible. Apart from the fact that the signatories to the Treaty of Versailles are morally, even if not legally, bound to approximate their own measure of disarmament to that imposed upon Germany, there is the common-sense view that so long as the present inequality lasts there will be in Germany a constant incentive to build up a military organisation, if not openly, in any case by stealth. The development of new modes of warfare—by aeroplanes, chemicals or germs—will render preparation in secret comparatively easy. Moreover, if Germany is not a party to the Disarmament Convention (as she certainly will not be if she is denied that equality of status that her representatives at Geneva have demanded), the difficulty of controlling her actions will become insuperable. A system of mutual disarmament and mutual defence is impracticable unless all the partners in it have the same obligations and the same duties. In fact it is only by reducing her own forces that France can make herself safe.

But this may not be quite sufficient to calm the anxiety of the French people. They may reasonably ask for something more—something more from Germany and something more from the rest of the world. If France were to offer to Germany to waive all the disarmament clauses in the treaties and to substitute for them agreed provisions for the general reduction such as will eventuate from the Disarmament Conference, Germany should be willing to give in return every security against attack that France might consider necessary. The Locarno agreements have already provided a great measure of security; but it is well known that the French do not regard this as being fully effective, since they do not give equal protection to Poland, and in any Polish-German trouble France could not fail to be drawn in. This and a few other questions which still endanger the peace of Europe could be much more readily settled if the German Government could say to the German people that both the

Reparation clauses and the Disarmament clauses of the treaties of 1919 have come to an end, and that the only question now is as to how the States of Europe can concert together in building up a new system for preventing any future war arising between them.

Such arrangements as these can only be made by France and Germany. The less other nations interfere in the matter the better. But there are other requisites to a general settlement which must be provided by the other nations. The British have not yet taken their full share of responsibility for action in the event of war breaking out. We have accepted very grave responsibilities under Locarno ; but with regard to our responsibilities under the Covenant of the League we have minimised them to such an extent that the French, at any rate, think that we would back out if real trouble were to arise. We ought now to make it clear that this will not be the case. Moreover, we might do something more which, if done in concert with the United States, would materially assist the Disarmament Conference in its further proceedings. We might make a declaration, in which all the other States would join, that in the event of a breach of the Briand-Kellogg Pact there shall be no neutrals. We might do this much more easily now, inasmuch as, from the recent statement by Mr. Stimson and the opinions of the international lawyers, it seems clear that the Pact does not admit of any signatory claiming a right to be neutral. If this be so, it would be advisable to put the question beyond doubt by a formal convention to this effect signed by all, including the United States. If these questions of principle could be settled in the course of the coming autumn, during which time the committees of the Conference are developing their further plans for reduction and limitation of armaments, there is every possibility that when those plans come before the Conference they might be accepted even though they may not be so exhaustive or complete as some might wish them to be. The two main principles of equality and security will have been agreed to and the rest will follow. By this road disarmament is possible ; by none other.

DICKINSON.

THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT

II. GENEVA AND THE NAVIES

THE Conference at Geneva brought the first stage of its work to an end with no decision other than to send invitations to the Powers, parties to the Naval Treaties of Washington and London, to confer as to what further measures of naval disarmament might be possible ; and to the other Powers to determine what limitations they would be prepared to accept. This indicates no very striking progress in solving the problem of naval armaments. How, then, was the Committee employed during the five months between February and July ?

The Committee began by attempting to determine the degree of 'offensive character' possessed by certain types of fighting vessels. It was asked to select those weapons whose character is 'most specifically offensive against national defence and most threatening to civilians.' Lengthy addresses by the several representatives disclosed the most pronounced differences in outlook, and, in the end, the Naval Committee could do no more than find 'that nearly all naval weapons possessed to some extent both an offensive and a defensive character at the same time,' since 'the character varies according to the circumstances of the different countries.' This would seem to be so elementary and obvious a fact as not to need the expenditure of time and money involved by the gathering at Geneva. Finding it impossible to frame the desired generalisation, a question of a more limited scope was asked. 'Supposing one State (a) adopts a policy of armed aggression, or (b) undertakes offensive operations, against another State, what are the weapons which, by reason of their specific character and without prejudice to their defensive purposes, are most likely to enable that policy and those operations to be brought rapidly to a successful conclusion ?' That question is as yet unanswered ; it depends entirely on which are the two States in question.

The examination of the problem was directed to 'capital ships,' aircraft-carriers, submarines and mines. The surface cruising types—the 'cruiser' and the 'destroyer'—were not

brought under review. This omission is peculiar, for if there is one outstanding fact in naval warfare it is that offensive operations have always been directly conducted by the ships and vessels of the lesser type. It was the frigate, sloop, and the various forms of privateer in the past, and the cruiser, the armed ship, and the destroyer in modern warfare, which conducted the directly offensive operations against enemy commerce—the very operations which give the submarine its principal powers of offence. The inference to be drawn from the omission of these vessels is that the cruiser and destroyer are regarded as purely defensive in character, a conclusion which indicates a singular want of understanding of the operations of sea warfare, and also of how greatly the growth of the surface flotillas of foreign Powers, both in numbers and in size, affects the security of Great Britain. Are the great 'Dunkirkers' and 'Malouins' forgotten? Did the 2000 small craft sent out by the American Colonists between 1775 and 1782 conduct defensive warfare?

The question 'Which naval instruments are the most efficacious against national defences?' gives rise to a counter question: What are the particular national defences against which naval action is directed? National defences, in the case of naval action, are provided to guard against the kinds of injury which that action is capable of inflicting—that is to say, bombardment of those localities on the coast which are centres of population and industry, and interruption of that external commerce upon which the life and prosperity of a people depend, or invasion over the sea.

The defences provided against naval bombardment are, in the main, fortresses. Those for the defence of interests at sea are naval forces. Those for defence against invasion by sea may be either land or sea forces. It is perhaps natural that several of the Continental nations should interpret the words 'national defences' in terms of fortresses only. Their armies secure them against invasion by sea, and while their defence against blockade is naval, it is not their navy which they regard as their principal instrument of national defence. It is equally natural that they should see in the very large ship, armed with very large guns, the principal threat to themselves, and that they should therefore unanimously label the 'capital ship'—meaning thereby the great ship of over some 10,000 tons—as 'specifically offensive.' Hence we see Argentina, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Greece, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Roumania, Siam, Sweden, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., and Yugo-Slavia taking this view, with the rider that 'the larger the ship is, the more specifically offensive and the more efficacious against national defences she becomes.' So also think Italy and France, who have long coast lines with

important towns, and, for various reasons, have no inclination to furnish themselves with very large ships, and also Germany, who is forbidden to have them. No soothing syrup in the form of earnest assurances that battleships at no period have been a match for shore defences will alter this view. The rejoinder is too obvious. However true it may be that '*un canon à terre vaut une batterie à mer*,' the security of the city can only be purchased at the cost of those batteries, and the larger the ships, the bigger and the more costly must those batteries be. Besides, is it not battleships that have always, in practice, been used to coerce smaller States? It was a fleet of battleships that went to Copenhagen in 1801 and 1807, to Algiers in 1816, to Alexandria in 1882; and it was battleships that were sent to Greece in 1885, Crete in 1898, and more recently to Palestine and Cyprus.

This point of view may not appeal to the particular Powers who wish to retain the very large ship, nor, in their view, constitute a reason for depriving themselves of ships of a size which they believe to be essential to the operations of their own naval defence against other Powers. They do not provide themselves with great ships to coerce small or unmaritime Powers. The bombardment of defended places has no place in the strategy they have to contemplate, for it is, as they are well aware, not only a futile form of action, but a definite misapplication of force. So we get this difference of opinion as to the character of the big ship, called a 'capital' or 'battle' ship. The views are, clearly, irreconcilable, and either the one group of nations must accept the greater expenditure upon its fortification, if it believes this form of national defence necessary, or the other, if its estimate of necessity of such great size be correct, must without them be exposed to the danger it believes can only be averted by very large ships—to wit, invasion or the destruction of its commerce.

If that were the last word on the matter, a solution satisfactory to both groups would be impossible; and presumably it would be no less impossible to decide whose interests ought 'morally' to give way. But there is something more in it. Is it, in reality, a fact that such great size is essential? Even among the protagonists of great size there is a marked difference of opinion as to what that size must be. The American thinks the ships cannot, with due regard to the security of the United States, be less than 35,000 tons. The British have held no very settled views. In 1919 they took the American view, but since then they have lowered their figure at intervals—to 30,000 in 1927, to 25,000 in 1930, and to 22,000 in 1932. Thus there seems to be some lack of a governing principle in determining the necessary size of a fighting ship. Is it the guns she must carry that determines her size? It appears to be, as a British proposal says that

if the gun is reduced to 12-inch, the ship may be of 25,000 tons; if to 11-inch, she may be of 22,000 tons. But this again leaves us in the dark. We were given originally to believe, in 1919, that a 16-inch gun was indispensable. Now we are told that an 11-inch gun is sufficient. What, then, dictates the size of the gun? Why is an 11-inch gun necessary in one particular type of ship called a battleship?—a term which Admiral of the Fleet Sir Edward Seymour condemned as wrong over twenty years ago for the reason that all fighting ships fight battles.

What, in fact, is a 'battleship'? What is it that she has to do? Size, in all human affairs, is dictated by function. What, then, is the function of this particular ship, which is variously called a 'battleship' or a 'capital ship'? It is surely an impertinence to answer this serious question by the use of those quasi-strategical copy-book maxims that are so constantly trotted out to-day to take the place of reasoned argument. It is, indeed, no argument, in a scientific sense, pontifically to affirm that 'the battleship is the expression of the maximum fighting power,' 'the battleship must be immune from injury from every other type,' or 'the capital ship is more precious than rubies.' The last of these is, incidentally, evidence of her total unfitness for that rough-and-tumble business of war, in which risks have to be run if success is to be attained. Assuredly Hawke would never have taken a squadron into Quiberon Bay in a November gale if he had regarded his ships as 'rubies'; nor would Nelson have taken the risk that he took with his at the Nile, Copenhagen or Trafalgar; nor would Farragut have said 'Damn the torpedoes!' and acted accordingly. Those maxims are, in fact, by no means axiomatic. The nature of an axiom is that it is a self-evident and established truth, questioned by nobody. There is, however, a large school of naval thought which absolutely denies the accuracy of these definitions. I do not seek here to express my own views, but to point out what appears to be one unmistakable lesson to be learnt from this otherwise barren Conference—namely, the burning need for some really accurate thought upon, and analysis of, the subject of 'what dictates the size of the fighting ship.' We see a variety of view, amounting to a difference of 13,000 tons (which means a cost of £2,500,000 per ship, apart from the added difference in the cost of upkeep), even between the protagonists of the very great ship. We see many officers of experience who think even the smaller of these sizes unnecessarily large. We see also one very definite obstacle to the abolition of the submarine, for there are those who say that the submarine is the 'poor man's' answer to the big ship. We see an obstacle to solution of the problem of German equality. Assuredly the people of the various and several nations are entitled to demand a

clear explanation of the reason why such sizes as these are held to be absolutely essential to security at sea. They were not considered necessary a few years ago when battleships of 10,000 tons were thought large enough. Why are they necessary to-day? This question is not to be dismissed with mere jargon.

The belief was expressed by a French delegate, in a reply made to a proposal from the delegate of Spain to restrict the tonnage of the 'capital' ship to 10,000 tons, that a larger tonnage than this is needed for protection against 'modern forms of attack'—those forms being, presumably, the submarine and the aircraft. Yet no lesson stands out more clearly from the war than that small size proved the true prophylactic to the submarine. Not only did it give security—such security as may be reasonably expected in that insecure business of war—because so small a target was exposed, but it also gave the added security which results from possessing, what the large ship does not possess, capacity to conduct offence against a submarine, a power which made the submarine wary of her approach. The big ship feared, the small ship mastered, the submarine. If it be correctly deduced from the attitude of the 'land Powers' that they would not regard smaller battleships as 'offensive' in character, and if their reply to the large battleships is, as some of them appear to imply, the submarine, we have a very curious situation. The 'greater' naval Powers assert the need of great ships in consequence of the existence of the submarine. The 'lesser' Powers assert the need of the submarine as a reply to the great ship. The 'greater' naval Powers cry out for the abolition of the submarine. The 'lesser' Powers cry out for the abolition of the great ship. Was ever a more vicious circle invented for the waste of public money? The Powers of the two groups appear to have tied themselves in a knot. Alexander the Great would certainly have seen how to settle this question. Among the singular arguments put forward to prove how unoffensive is the character of the very great ship, one was to the effect that she could not be regarded as offensive as she could undertake no offensive operations without the support of other types. For speciousness this deserves a palm. A siege gun is a weapon designed to be employed only upon offensive operations. Does it possess no intrinsic offensive character because a siege cannot be conducted by siege guns alone, without the protection of infantry?

Among the musty formulæ and pseudo-axioms dragged in to prove the necessity for great size there is one which has often figured in this discussion, and made its reappearance at Geneva: 'The big ship is the backbone of the fleet.' 'For certain countries,' so the sentence runs, 'having great maritime interests, lines of communication, long coast line to defend, and are depen-

dent on their fleets for security, the capital ship constitutes the essential backbone of their fighting forces.' In this phrase the term 'capital ship' means one of very great size. A 10,000-ton ship, it is said, would not provide this 'backbone.' What, one asks, if one is a student of the history of sea war, is the meaning of this apparently impressive phrase? Where do we find evidence of its truth in the great sea wars of the past? Did some 'backbone' decide whether Greek or Persian, Mahomedan or Christian, commanded the Ægean or the Mediterranean, Englishmen or Dutchmen the North Sea or Channel, Britons, Frenchmen, or Spaniards the oceans where their interests lay and clashed? Was it essential that each of these contending Powers should possess some nucleus of a few extremely powerful ships? Most certainly it was not.

The military aim of war at sea was precisely the same as war on land, to effect the concentration of a force greater than that of the enemy, and by that means to disable his fighting force and so obtain freedom to traverse the sea in safety. Presumably it is this concentration which is visualised in the use of the word 'backbone.' It appears to be imagined that concentration of force can only be achieved, and its superiority maintained, if the vessels of which it is composed are vessels of from 22,000 to 35,000 tons. How fallacious this is will readily be discovered by anyone who chooses to study the art of war at sea in its history, or, indeed, who uses his own common sense. An old seaman would no more have dreamed of describing the 150 ships of the line of the eighteenth century as the 'backbone of the fleet' than a soldier would have described the whole infantry force of the army as the 'backbone' of the army. Nor is the massing of a great many guns into a single hull the only form which concentration can take. Concentrations can be effected by greater numbers. It is that which is done in land warfare. It is that which has been done in innumerable cases in war at sea. One reason why this 'backbone' cannot be composed of ships smaller than 22,000 or more tons is said to be that one Power might be able to call in its cruiser detachments while the other Power could not, and by this means could redress its inferiority in battleships. The cruiser would in fact be a potential battleship, available for the use of one Power which has nothing it needs to defend in the outer oceans, but not available to another, which must keep its cruisers abroad, whether or not its opponent withdraws its own.

Without arguing this extremely disputable theoretical conception of strategy, it is difficult to see how, if it were true, it stands in the way of a general acceptance of the 10,000 tons of the ship of the line and the 6000-ton cruiser allocated to Germany—ships regarded, apparently, as non-offensive by the 'lesser'

Powers. To take a purely, and purposely, imaginary ratio in the battleship strength of two Powers, 'A' and 'B.' 'A' has twenty 'Deutschlands,' 'B' has ten. How many unarmoured cruisers, each armed with 6-inch guns, would be needed to equalise the strength of those fleets—that is to say, would be the equivalent of ten armoured ships each armed with six 11-inch guns? It would be very interesting to know what this number would be considered to be, and of the probabilities, not only that the possible enemy would possess this number over and above its fleet cruisers, but also that no similar withdrawal would be possible on the other side.¹ Observe, further, how directly this reason for great size in the battleship, the 'ship-fit-to-lie-in-the-line-of-battle' (which is the real meaning of the word 'battleship'), contradicts one of the other reasons for size. Great size, we are told, is necessary because smaller ships cannot face the dangers of modern weapons. Yet here we are told that far smaller ships can play a most important part in battle and even balance a number of the greater ships. How can they do so if those dangers from modern weapons are what they are represented to be? Surely there is a great want of consistency in these arguments—a want of consistency which furnishes the plainest evidence of the need for more accurate thinking.

Thus, while the group consisting of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan for various reasons argued that the very large ship was defensive in character and could not be reduced in size without endangering national security, the opposing group argued that she was offensive in character, and a threat to their own national security and to the lives of their citizens. When, however, the discussion turned on submarines, there was a difference of view in the 'large-ship group'; and not only a difference of view, but a difference in the action proposed which had little in it of logic. The United Kingdom² denied that the submarine was most specifically offensive or most efficacious against national defence, but asserted that it was most threatening to civilians, because it could not help attacking merchant ships. For this reason—humanitarian, not strategical—she advocated the abolition of the submarine, or, if abolition could not obtain a general acceptance, a reduction of size to 250 tons. The United States, on the other hand, while considering this type most specifically offensive, most efficacious against national defence, and specifically threatening to civilians, did

¹ Admiral Troubridge, with four ships mounting thirty-six guns of 9·2 inch and 7·5 inch calibre, did not consider himself strong enough to engage one ship mounting ten guns of 11-inch calibre. A court-martial acquitted him of any misdemeanour. Would four ships mounting thirty-six 6-inch guns be a match for one mounting six 11-inch guns?

² The Argentine and Australia concurred with the United Kingdom.

not, as might have been expected, propose abolition nor so drastic a limitation in size. They proposed a tonnage of 1200 tons, thus leaving the submarine in possession of a high degree of that offensive character which they consider it possesses. Japan, though an adherent to the big ship, took a precisely opposite view to that of the other two Powers on all these arguments concerning the submarine. Not only did she consider the submarine defensive, but that its defensive character did not vary with its size; and that the maximum ought not to be less than 2000 tons—a tonnage which allows to the full for the conduct of oceanic offensive warfare against commerce. She regarded also the submarine as being indispensable to a Power with an inferior navy.

While there were these divergencies in details in the opinions of the 'great-ship' Powers, all the remainder maintained the view that the character of the submarine would mainly be defensive. Some admitted certain qualifications, such as that the capacity for offence varies with size, small submarines being predominantly defensive, but large ones being capable of acting offensively. While some admitted that they were threatening to civilian life, others confined this to those occasions when they did not conform to international law—though no suggestion was made as to how international law could be enforced between two combatants. In general, one may sum up this view with the sentence that, in the opinion of the great bulk of the Powers, the submarine is an essential weapon of defence of a weaker Power.

This is precisely one of those assumptions which call for the most searching examination by people who are capable of extracting from witnesses the reasons why they hold their particular views, by cross-examining those persons called 'experts.' On the surface the presumption has an eminently reasonable appearance. If a 'small' Power has submarines, a 'large' Power cannot lie off its ports in its battleships and seal up those ports, or take up a position off them and bombard them at its leisure. That is plain. But it fails to take account of the fact that if the small Powers have submarines, so also will the large Powers have them; and that if the large Powers have them, they must also provide themselves with large flotillas to guard themselves against each other's submarines. If, then, an occasion should arise in which a large Power becomes embroiled with a small one, it will in any case possess a large flotilla; and it is that flotilla, and not its battleships, which will proceed to seal up the ports of the small Power—to do, in fact, what the battleships have hitherto done, which is to bring superior force into use. The submarine is, as we well know, unable to contest the command of the sea with the small surface craft. The small surface craft, as we have said

before, does not fear the submarine, but is definitely her superior. Thus all this expenditure upon submarines for defence against the 'great' Powers is purely waste of money based upon a complete fallacy.

It embodies another fallacy—that the small Powers are, in practice, in danger, and not only that they are in danger, but that they can be lifted above that danger by the possession of submarines. If that were true, the small Powers must have been in perpetual danger in the days before submarines were invented. Were they? And if they were, how is it that they still survive as independent States—Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Portugal? Why have all these small States not long ago been absorbed into the greater ones? It is not, assuredly, because of any armaments they have possessed, but for the simple reason that it is not to the interests of the Great Powers that the small should be annexed by one or other of them. It is only if a number of sufficiently powerful States combine to dismember and divide the spoils of a small Power that annexation becomes practicable, as, for instance, in the partitions of Poland. But no flotilla of submarines would save Poland from a similar catastrophe if similar associations of robber States combined against her to-day, any more than it would save her from invasion by her powerful neighbours. One group of Powers³ remarked that submarines can co-operate in many defensive operations, that they can furnish defensive patrols and scouting forces. This is perfectly true, but when a long view is taken, when the eye is not confined to one operation or to special conditions (a very familiar form of error), it may well prove that these possible advantages in one particular case are purchased at a cost which renders the retention of the submarine disadvantageous in the gross. Statesmen will make a great mistake if they allow their decisions to be determined by these special pleadings with a limited outlook.

In the case of aircraft, the arguments regarding the offensive character of these vessels took the same form. Those who have none firmly asserted that they are offensive; those who have, or wish to have, aircraft-carriers warmly protested their strictly defensive character. Many of the reasons given can only be described as ingenuous. One, for instance, was that a carrier, being only an aerodrome, could not possibly be termed offensive; it was not she, but the type of aircraft that she carried, that constituted her character or powers of offence. So with equal logic might one say that a battleship possesses no offensive character against a fortress; for is it not merely the guns that she carries that give her the power to attack? Others, again, maintain that the number of bombing planes the carrier can use

³ Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Roumania, Siam, Venezuela.

is so few that an attack, like the baby in Marryat's story, could only be a little one. One delegate said that scouting was essential, and that scouting was a defensive operation, and gave information of the approach of an attacking or invading force—a claim to which the Japanese replied drily that scouting was also used by an attacker who was seeking his enemy. But such special pleading is surely out of place in a matter of this moment. When nations are driven to such trivial methods of argument, either the questions propounded must invite trivial treatment, or the case they support must be a poor one. The real question is, would the national defence of any country be weaker if the aircraft carriers were either abolished or drastically reduced in size? What functions do aircraft-carriers perform? Is it impossible to conduct the operation of war without them? Were not the extensive operations of the Russo-Japanese war and of the recent war conducted without such aircraft-carriers as we see to-day, and did such aircraft-carriers as there were in any way affect the course of the recent war? Much was made in the discussion of the advantage which one nation, able to employ aircraft from shore bases in certain seas, would have over another which possessed no available shore bases within the area concerned. Whether, however, any number within the realm of practical possibilities of these floating aerodromes could neutralise this advantage is a very different question. The problem, in fact, is obviously not whether aircraft-carriers are specifically offensive in character, but whether the large carriers of to-day are indispensable for those operations at sea by which the defence of a nation and its interest at sea are conducted. I am convinced that they are not.

If any real results are to be attained at the next stage of the Conference some very different methods must be followed. The statesman must make as his object the reduction of naval armaments. He must insist that the expert, so-called, explains to the full, under searching cross-examination, precisely why it is he requires these various instruments which he now claims to be indispensable.

H. W. RICHMOND.

HOUSE OF LORDS REFORM

THE question of the reform of the House of Lords, in order to render it functionally adequate to the country's needs, is once again attracting public attention. Perhaps the chief reason why no progress has ever been made is that this vital matter has usually been considered from too strictly a party standpoint. These party standpoints have been irreconcilable. The extremists of the Labour Party have thought more of abolition than of reform, the rest of the Labour Party and most of the Liberals preferring to retain a weak because hereditary House. Conservatives have either failed to see the inherent weakness of the hereditary principle, or have given the impression that they were ready to die in any number of last ditches in defence of it. Between the opposing forces there has been little hope of agreement.

In many respects the present political situation is favourable to an unprejudiced consideration of the whole question of a reformed Upper House and its relative position, powers, and functions in the Constitution of this country. A strong and stable National Government is in power. This Government, although almost entirely Conservative in the House of Commons, was undoubtedly returned, and is conscious of having been returned, by the votes of large numbers of Labour and Liberal supporters. It is therefore less Conservative and more national than the number of its parliamentary followers would appear to warrant. As a national as opposed to a party Administration it is eminently suited to handle this vexed question in a statesmanlike way. It is obvious that a purely party approach, far from settling outstanding issues, could only intensify differences. A method of approach to the problem must be evolved that will secure substantial support in all parties. This is essential, because no mere party reform can be beneficial or lasting.

To achieve this, at least in principle, should not be as difficult as it may appear. Probably only one thing is necessary, the jettisoning of the hereditary right to legislate as a *sine qua non*. With this concession by Conservatives neither the Labour nor the Liberal Party could well refuse to participate in considering reform. With the hereditary principle insisted upon, both Labour

and Liberal support would probably be refused, and any reform that might become effective during the life of the present Administration through the insistence of the Conservative members would be bound to be the subject of bitter contention, both now, when we cannot afford such bitterness, and in the future.

In suggesting the abandonment of the hereditary principle I am not unmindful of the great part that the peers have played in the history of this nation. They have established a noble tradition of public service. But times have changed. Feudalism has long since vanished. Both the responsibilities and the opportunities of present-day peers differ very little from those of more ordinary folk. Only a few still have landed possessions. No longer in education nor in actual administrative experience have they advantages over others.

If the present House of Lords were merely a pleasant anachronism, there would be very little reason to worry about it. Anachronisms are not all harmful; some, indeed, give colour to a drab, workaday world. The difficulty about the House of Lords, however, is that its composition prevents any unbiassed public consideration of its proper powers and functions. Yet this consideration is essential to the conduct of the business of the State. In practically every country where there exists any form of parliamentary government the need for an effective Second Chamber is recognised. The Bryce Committee (1918) ascribed four functions to a Second Chamber:

(i.) The examination and revision of Bills brought from the House of Commons, a function which has become all the more needful since that House increasingly acts under rules limiting debate.

(ii.) The initiation of Bills dealing with subjects of a comparatively non-controversial character, which may take up less time when subsequently introduced into the House of Commons if they have been fully discussed and put into well-considered shape in the Upper House.

(iii.) The interposition of so much delay (and no more) in the passing of a Bill into law as may be needed to enable the opinion of the nation to be adequately expressed upon it. This would be specially needed in the case of Bills affecting the fundamentals of the Constitution, or those raising issues upon which the opinion of the country may appear to be almost equally divided or not to have been fully tested.

(iv.) Full and free discussion of questions, particularly those affecting foreign policy, at moments when the House of Commons cannot find sufficient time for them.

All these functions of a Second Chamber are becoming increasingly important with the trend of modern life. The movement of events is so rapid, the problems of government so numerous and complex, that the modern voter, in default of any guidance, is apt to succumb to hopeless bewilderment. Moreover, the modern elector is necessarily more ignorant of national

problems than his father was. This is due to no fault of his, but to the fact that the simple, much-discussed political questions of yesterday, such as Home Rule or Woman's Suffrage, have given way to complicated economic world problems such as unemployment, international trade, the working of the gold standard, etc.—problems which baffle the very expert. Amidst this jungle of things which he cannot understand the ordinary elector is inclined, in a sort of despair, to turn his back on politics. Circumstances and his own inevitable ignorance force him to entrust his liberties, as well as his present and future welfare, to a House of Commons which he and his fellows, practically powerless to estimate the issue at stake, have at some time or other elected. The trend, therefore, is to place more power and responsibility in the hands of the Commons. In the opinion of many people, however, it has become an insufficient instrument for the effective manipulation of the ever-increasing volume of public business. The pressure on its time is such that adequate consideration and discussion of vital and even fundamental measures are often denied it. This suppression of discussion on, say, new financial proposals, in which the Lords can have no effective part, may easily create a situation of great danger. In the 1931 Finance Act the Labour Government set aside only six days for the consideration of the land taxes, which were novel in principle and far-reaching in application. In consequence, a minority Government was able to force through Parliament a measure which was inadequately debated in the Commons, little understood in the constituencies, and not re-examined in the Lords. These taxes have subsequently been condemned by nearly every non-political and non-partisan society interested in preserving the amenities of the countryside and assisting in the ordinary planning of land development. Under our present Constitution the House of Lords could neither reject, nor revise, nor even delay these proposals.

That is but one instance of the need for an effective Second Chamber. Others could be given but for fear of preaching to the converted, for all moderate opinion, in this country and practically wherever parliamentary government exists, is in favour of bi-cameral government. All modern parliaments are in fact bi-cameral, except those of Costa Rica, Panama, San Domingo, Salvador, Honduras, Bulgaria, Jugo-Slavia, and certain other post-war republics of the smaller sort. In this country, although in theory we enjoy bi-cameral government, we live in fact under a system of uni-cameral government. Too frequently policy dictates that the hereditary peers should let things slide rather than provoke a storm possibly disproportionate to the cause at stake, a storm in which the actual controversy would be obscured by the cry of the Peers against the People. The country

believes that it possesses an Upper House with powers curtailed, it is true, by the Parliament Act, but still very substantial. This is, unfortunately, an entirely mistaken belief. In theory the Upper House still has considerable power. The threat to prevent a Bill from becoming law for two years is a far more significant weapon than is generally recognised. A Government will not lightly embark on unsound or unpopular legislation when it knows that for two years its defects and consequences will be explained to and scrutinised by the electorate. Ministers will usually agree to any reasonable compromise in order that their Bills should not be held up for two years. In practice, however, the House of Lords uses, and has used, its statutory powers so little that by disuse they are tending to become obsolete.

The danger of the present position is not appreciated. The fact is that the House of Lords, being afraid to use its legitimate powers, refrains from acting as a revising body to temper precipitate and ill-considered legislation or to modify unwise measures, for fear of risking a public outcry on the totally irrelevant question of the rights of hereditary peers. The rights and wrongs of some particular Bill, about which the two Houses differ, must under the present arrangement inevitably be obscured by clouds of (possibly) engineered controversy as to the rights of a hereditary, unrepresentative, and irresponsible House to deal with such a Bill. The greater the actual need for intervention, the louder is likely to be the vituperation and chorus of misrepresentation. As things stand at present, real political issues are far too likely to be lost sight of in the stress of noisy conflict between the unrepresentative and the representative, the undemocratic and the democratic Chambers. The cry '*Peers v. People*' was successfully raised in 1910. It could again be made a rallying point—how effective would depend largely upon events and the issues at stake—were the Lords ever to rouse themselves from their long and possibly politic inaction.

That such a thing should be possible is obviously undesirable. Any Second Chamber ought to be quite free to deal in a proper and unembarrassed way with such measures as the recent Coal Mines Bill, the Trades Disputes and Trade Union Bill, the Education Bill, the Agricultural Land (Utilisation) Bill, etc. Yet the right of the Upper House to deal even with Bills such as these was challenged by certain sections of the Press, and even by responsible politicians, on account of its personnel. Socialist writers and speakers abuse or ridicule the House of Lords whenever it seeks to exercise the functions of a Second Chamber—but far less for what it does than for what it is. Moreover, the House has recently suffered loss of esteem by reason of the way it conducts the business that is still entrusted to it. The invasion of

'backwoodsmen' peers (many of whom may never have voted before) on the occasion of some issue affecting their interests or prejudices is not an edifying spectacle.

But the spasmodic flooding of the House when particular measures are being decided is perhaps not more open to criticism or misrepresentation than the continued absence of so many of its members. Last year, when Lord Hailsham moved a critical amendment on the Agricultural Land (Utilisation) Bill, only 113 peers voted out of a possible 740, 82 being for Lord Hailsham and 31 against him. This year, on the occasion of the division in connexion with the second reading of the Wheat Quota Bill, only 57 peers voted. These figures are all the more significant, inasmuch as the peers are supposed to take a particular interest in Land and Agricultural Bills. In 1930 the Lower House sat for 167 days, the Upper for 104. The Lower House usually sits each day for eight hours; but only on thirty-one days out of the 104 did the House of Lords sit for longer than three hours, on twenty-one days it sat for less than an hour, and on four days for less than fifteen minutes. As against 457 divisions which took place in the House of Commons, there were only thirty-nine in the House of Lords. At any given moment, however, the great army of absentees may pack a division, and members of other parties more than suspect that of this army 100 per cent. are Conservatives. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the opponents of the Conservative Party willingly avail themselves of the ready-made argument that the dice are loaded against the representatives of democracy. Whether the actions of the House of Lords are hide-bound or enlightened, patriotic or selfish, the general distrust of that body as hereditary legislators will always afford exceptional opportunities for misrepresentation. It is true that on occasion the House of Lords speaks in such a way as to deserve and win respect. Periodically it has full-dress debates on such matters as Divorce Law Reform, Prayer Book Reform, the League of Nations. On such occasions the speeches are interesting, dispassionate, and erudite. By the approval with which these debates are greeted the peers are apt to over-estimate their popularity as legislators, and so their potential power to act and deal with highly controversial political matters. The real fact is that the House of Lords is chiefly popular when it is not called upon to carry out its true functions by acting in difficult or controversial situations.

But it is obvious that even a discredited Socialist or Radical Government, looking for a soft spot on which to fall, must always find it in the personnel of the House of Lords. This is a serious flaw in the Constitution, and a potential source of great danger. Even Mr. Asquith, when he carried through his Parliament Act, did not mean the House of Lords to be as weak as it has sub-

sequently become. He meant to retain an Upper House, able to interpose two years' delay before very controversial, possibly dangerous or entirely novel, legislation could be passed into law. Two years give sufficient time for a decision to be given by the nation (declared in by-elections, through the medium of the Press, and by pressure from the constituencies brought to bear upon supporters of the Government) on the merits or demerits of a particular Bill. That is a point that cannot be over-emphasised. The House of Lords cannot assert what power it does retain without provoking a storm wholly disproportionate to the issue at stake, or, worse still, a storm of such an irrelevant nature as to obscure the issue at stake. The country thinks that it has a Second Chamber ready and able to exert the powers defined for it by the Parliament Act; but in fact, whenever there is real reason for action, the House of Lords, owing to the out-of-date principle of its composition, becomes manifestly conscious of its impotence. The hereditary principle robs it of the strength which the least of Second Chambers should possess, and so denies it the opportunity of fulfilling its essential functions. Even apart from its peculiar composition, the House of Lords can hardly be called representative or impartial, inasmuch as it has passed Conservative Government legislation almost automatically, confining itself to checking only Liberal and Labour proposals. A more representative Second Chamber might have seen its way to amending at least some Conservative measures. Were it necessary at this stage, it could be shown that the House of Lords has passed Bill after Bill sent up by Conservative Governments almost without comment, and without considering whether or not they were in tune with the general feeling of the nation.

Some people fear lest the abandonment by the Upper House of its hereditary basis might endanger the monarchy. There is no analogy between the two institutions. The Upper House, in order to carry out its duties, must necessarily concern itself with party politics. The Crown is traditionally remote from party politics. Modern monarchies are most secure where personal power has been surrendered.

The peers of to-day are not the barons of the Middle Ages. With the passing of feudalism their responsibilities and their experience have diminished. They are increasingly removed from personal contact with large sections of the people, the landed estates of the majority having dwindled until very few of them now fill the rôle of governor, philanthropist and friend to whole towns and villages tenantry their domains. In the place of the old landed aristocracy a new peerage has sprung up, recruited from the most diverse sources. They are the sons and grandsons of men rewarded for commercial success, for national

services, or for contributing to party funds. These men do not inherit traditions of feudal or even necessarily of national service, or of that responsibility which is associated with landed property. The principle of hereditary legislators was originally based both upon reason and expediency. It would be hard to show that it is now based upon either.

Up to the present most schemes of reform have had to be abandoned either because they sought for increased powers for the House of Lords or because they attempted to deal first with the powers and only secondly with the personnel. It is unreasonable to expect the public to support a movement to alter or augment existing powers, until people know who is to exercise these powers in a reconstructed House. Certain elements of the Conservative Party are now once again pressing for reform. If when the whole party moves in that direction they make it clear that they are not going to ask for further powers for the Upper House until the question of composition is settled, and that they are not going to insist on the retention of the hereditary principle, their political opponents will find it impossible to oppose them. It is inconceivable that the Liberal and Labour Parties should insist upon maintaining an undemocratic hereditary Upper House. It is not my object in this article to insist exclusively upon one particular scheme of reform, but rather to urge the vital necessity of some reform—genuine reform which will give an Upper House able to carry out the functions of a Second Chamber. When all is said and done, the Constitution is something that all parties may from time to time be called upon to operate. Reform, therefore, is the concern of all parties. A Second Chamber cannot be designed to be merely a sort of watch-dog on the actions of one particular party in the Lower House, as some Conservatives appear to wish. It must, indeed, be so fashioned as to be a corrective, revising, and, when occasion demands, delaying instrument to whatever party may happen to be in power in the Lower House, although obviously an Upper House must intervene more frequently when changes are proposed, and so will always be more conservative than radical.

The present House of Lords has about 740 members. This is far larger than any other Second Chamber in the world. The next largest is the Italian, with 451. The Canadian Senate may not exceed 104, the South African 40, that of the United States 96. The German Second Chamber consists of 66 members, the French 314. Lords Cave and Birkenhead in 1927 brought forward proposals which contemplated a reduction to 300–350. The Bryce Report had suggested 327. Modern opinion is inclining to the idea of a much smaller House, perhaps in the neighbourhood of 150 to 200 members.

The Bryce Report considered the following as 'elements that ought to find place in a Second Chamber':

(i.) Persons of experience in various forms of public work, such as judicial work, local government work, civil service work, parliamentary work; persons possessing special knowledge of important departments of the national life, such as agriculture, commerce, industry, finance, education, naval and military affairs; persons who possess a like special knowledge of what are called Imperial questions, such as foreign affairs and matters affecting the overseas Dominions.

(ii.) Persons who, while likely to serve efficiently in a Second Chamber, may not have the physical vigour to bear the increasing strain which candidacy for a seat in the House of Commons and service in it involves.

(iii.) A certain proportion of persons who are not extreme partisans, but of a cast of mind which enables them to judge political questions with calmness and comparative freedom from political bias. No Assembly can be expected to escape party spirit, but the excesses of that spirit can be moderated by the presence of a good many who do not yield to it.

An easy method of bringing the House down to 200-250 is by election by the peers themselves. This is the principle on which the sixteen representative Scottish peers and the twenty-eight Irish peers are chosen. The Scottish peers assembled at Holyrood each read out a list of sixteen of their number; proxies are handed in, and the Lord Clerk Register reads out the list of the sixteen peers elected. Scottish peers are elected for the duration of Parliament, Irish peers for life. Experience unfortunately has shown that any substantial independence on the part of a Scottish Conservative peer may cause him to be rejected at a subsequent election. The tendency, therefore, of this system is to make the peers more partisan and less independent. This method also leaves untouched the hereditary principle. A House so constituted would labour under the same fundamental disadvantages as do the Lords to-day in times of crisis and conflict between the two Chambers. It would not be able to stand up to the Lower House on a controversial issue without there being raised the old red herring of 'Peers v. People.' All the same, for the sake of historical continuity, which in this country can never be ignored, it might be found desirable to combine some modification of this method with another. In a reformed House the peerage might for some years contribute a quota of the total number of members, proportionately decreasing with the passage of time. The existing members of the House of Lords might be more ready to be replaced by other legislators if they themselves elected the first Chamber from their ranks and then were gradually replaced.

Alternatively the Upper House could be a directly elected Senate, as it is in the United States. The qualifications of the electors might perhaps differ from those of the Lower House, as might the tenure of senators and the constituencies that they were

to represent. Unless some such differences were introduced, the Upper House would be in danger of becoming a mere replica of the Lower. In the United States the franchise is the same for both Houses, but the period of office is six years for the Senate as against two years for the Lower House. Each State in the Union has two senators irrespective of its size or population. The adoption of such a principle of territorial representation in this country would give to counties (and so to agricultural areas) a greater degree of representation than they could ever possess under a representative system based on population. The danger of such a system of direct election with very large constituencies would lie in the increased power of the party machines. This might, however, be reduced by the introduction of proportional representation.

On the other hand, the Second Chamber could be chosen by regional electoral colleges composed of the members of county and county borough councils situated within each region or constituency. Anyone familiar with any aspect of national organisation will recognise the areas into which England, Scotland, and Wales are politically and economically divided. These areas number under sixteen, which would imply that the electoral colleges would represent really large and important districts. The Bryce Committee, reporting in 1918, objected to this method as being likely to introduce party politics into local government elections. Whatever may have been the position in 1918, most local government units are to-day imbued with the spirit of 'party.' Under this method of election proportional representation might do much to defeat undue party influence, and would give to independent individualists ample chance of election. The French Senate is chosen by a system of indirect election, the electoral college in each department consisting of (a) delegates chosen by the municipal council of each commune in proportion to the population; (b) the deputies, councillors-general and district councillors of the department. Senators chosen by some such method of indirect election might hold office for a long term of, say, ten to fifteen years and might be designated lords of Parliament.

Another possible method of election would be occupational membership. Under this method, which exists in practice only in Italy and Russia (and is there applicable to either Chamber), persons are elected as legislators by virtue of their occupation. They are elected by the votes of those whose trade, profession, craft or occupation is the same as their own. It involves, of course, the registering of every voter under some definite occupational category.

Ex officio membership is a favourite suggestion for recruiting

the Upper House, the principle being that persons sit in it by virtue of an office or position that they hold, such as the heads of the various churches, presidents of church assemblies, the heads of employers' federations and trade unions, etc. The weakness of this method of selecting the whole of the Upper House lies in the fact that 'experts' are not necessarily the best men for the task of governing. They are apt to see everything from the standpoint of their own particular trade, profession or interest. The qualities required in governing are not those of the expert, valuable as these may be, but those of the perfect jurymen. Judgment rather than knowledge is the great need of the legislator.

The principle of nomination for the Upper House has already been recommended by Mr. Baldwin. Obviously this principle lends itself to a large variety of methods. Much would depend on how and by whom members of the Upper House were nominated, and for how long. Mr. Baldwin's view was that the personnel of the Upper House should be regularly rejuvenated, 'blocks of members going out and new ones coming in at definite periods.' The whole House would not be nominated *en masse*. If members were appointed for a term of years, the appointment would be for a reasonably long period—probably not less than ten years. Nomination for the vacancies created by the periodic retirement of a definite percentage might be proportioned to the strength of the parties constituting the House of Commons at each period of nomination. Safeguards might have to be introduced to dissuade party leaders from merely nominating party hacks, or wealthy subscribers, or members of the Commons who had outlived their usefulness. One way of doing this would be to give to each leader the right of submitting to a recognised tribunal a panel consisting of, say, not less than twice as many and not more than three times as many as his party had a right to have nominated to the Second Chamber to fill the vacancies caused by statutory retirements. The final selection might then be made by the Crown acting on the advice of this tribunal, which in its turn might be appointed by the Crown on the advice of, say, the Speaker and the Lord Chancellor. On a change of Government the new Prime Minister should, on the first renewal, have the right of appointing a quota sufficiently increased to represent in some measure the swing of the electoral pendulum. He should also have the power of nominating to the Upper House at any moment any person whom he desired to have associated as a Minister. The number which could be added in this way would never be large enough to upset the relative proportions of parties, but it would give the head of a Government the power of including in his Government persons whom he might require. It is undoubtedly often the case that those who would be most

valuable as Ministers either fail to be elected to the House of Commons or are unwilling to face the turmoil of an election. Parliament itself stands in need of the services of many persons who either lack the platform manner, or who find it distasteful to make the sort of appeal thought necessary to win a constituency, or who have lost their seat through the swing of the pendulum or some mischance.

The method of nomination to such a House might in the first place be through panels as suggested in the preceding paragraph. Vacancies, which would of course be small in number and occurring at unforeseen and infrequent intervals, might be filled upon the nomination of all leaders in the first place, and subsequently on that of the Prime Minister, who would be empowered to submit names of persons who had filled certain great offices in the State.

Many reformers favour a mixture of several schemes. The difficulty with combined schemes lies in their almost invariably complicated nature. Popular support will never be won for any scheme that is not easily understood in the constituencies. That is probably the reason why such proposals as those of the Bryce Committee failed entirely to win support from the nation. Between so many schemes which appear to work well on paper and so many traditional interests that need placating in practice it is not easy to steer a correct course. I am disposed to think that the Upper House should number between 150 and 200 peers, either elected on an indirect basis (electoral colleges and large constituencies) under a system of proportional representation, or nominated, along the lines laid down above. Each lord of Parliament should hold office for, say, ten years. In the case of a nominated House 10 per cent. of the members might retire each year, and in that of an elected House 20 per cent. every other year. In both cases members should be eligible for reappointment. In the transitional stage members of the existing House of Lords would have the opportunity of electing some of their own body, but this special element should very soon disappear. Peers must also be eligible for election to the House of Commons.

Once the question of the personnel of a reformed Upper House had been settled, it should be possible to consider, again from an unbiassed and non-party standpoint, what should be its powers in relation to the House of Commons. The acquired and traditional right of the Lower House to initiate Money Bills could with difficulty be weakened, but some attempt might be made to remove the responsibility of deciding exactly what is a Money Bill. Under the Parliament Act it lies with the Speaker to declare what is and what is not a Money Bill. This duty might perhaps be transferred to a Joint Standing Committee of

both Houses, who would be greatly helped in their task if an attempt had previously been made, in the Act constituting the reformed House, to define within very narrow limits and in precise terms the exact nature of a Money Bill. Whilst the new Upper House would not have the right to impose taxation, or to alter any taxation which was imposed in a Money Bill for the current financial year, they might have power to amend outside the current financial year, as in the case of the land tax. They might also have co-ordinate power with the Lower House in the case of proposals involving expenditure based on a new principle of taxation or even on an entirely new form of expenditure. Under these latter proposals, whilst it would be the duty of the Upper House to scrutinise any novel expansion of national expenditure or mode of raising revenue, it would be the peculiar function of the Lower House to find the money for 'footing the bill.'

A point that needs consideration is that of the right of Ministers to speak in both Houses. By this is usually meant the right of holders of certain important offices—*e.g.*, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary—to speak on important occasions in either House. This suggestion is perhaps most commonly made when a member of Parliament, who has been promoted to the Lords, finds that his new position debars him from being Prime Minister or possibly even leader of his party. There are a number of quite obvious arguments in support of the proposal. It would appear at first sight desirable for the chief Ministers to be able to defend their Administration in either House on critical or important occasions, or to expound matters of high policy. But there are, perhaps, stronger arguments against it. Leading Ministers are already severely overworked, and to make them argue with two different sets of critics, one of which would be unfamiliar, would impose an added strain upon them. The great present need is for the chief Ministers to have more time for reflection, not more opportunity for talking. What was given as a right might come to be interpreted as a duty. Ministers might be compelled to speak constantly in both Houses. Those very Ministers who would be expected to speak most frequently in both Houses would be those who would have had imposed upon them the exhausting task of speaking and arguing at international conferences at Geneva and elsewhere. This might seem an argument for putting the Prime Minister in the Lords, where he would be less busy, and allowing him to speak in the Commons. But nowadays it is essential for the head of the Government to be in intimate touch with the Commons, on the continued support of which the fate of the Government depends. Lack of touch between the Prime Minister and the Commons can only be looked upon as a

very serious thing, since this House must always remain the chief legislative body, the main duties, although not the sole duties, of the Upper House being concerned with revision.

In describing these various plans for dealing with the Upper House, I have not discussed any schemes in detail. I have allowed myself, however, to make quite plain my opinion that the hereditary principle is obsolete and anomalous in any active branch of the Legislature. Whilst any vestige of it remains it is liable to turn the scale in a contest between the two Houses. Normal and necessary powers can never again be exercised by a hereditary House without provoking irrelevant partisan agitation. The hereditary principle in a democracy such as ours can only be a source of danger in times of crisis.

ASTOR.

MR. DE VALERA AND HIS PROGRAMME

IN less than six months since assuming office, without even commanding an absolute majority in the Dail, Mr. de Valera has shown himself to be a far more formidable politician than most people had ever imagined. Starting from a position in which it seemed almost impossible for him to adopt any reckless course without being held in check by his allies of the Labour Party and among the Independents, he has developed his revolutionary programme step by step with most remarkable skill, carrying a majority of the Dail with him at every stage, and leading it on until it has accorded him such extraordinary powers that he is already virtually a dictator. He has avoided the danger of a split in his Cabinet by the simple expedient of sending to Ottawa the two Ministers who were most likely to disagree with the more recent developments of his policy, and whose departments were most affected by the revolutionary measures he has introduced. When he had persuaded the Dail, at the outset of the 'economic war,' to invest the Cabinet with dictatorial powers, Mr. Cosgrave and his supporters made a strenuous effort to insist that the Dail should be summoned to consider any crisis which might arise. Once again Mr. de Valera succeeded in obtaining his desires, by agreeing that the Dail might be summoned at any time, but only on the petition of a majority of its members. In practice that means that he need no longer trouble about the Dail unless the Labour Party terminates the alliance which has by this time grown almost inseparable. And even if the Labour Party should break away, it is extremely improbable that the Irish Republican Army would allow the Dail to meet for the purpose of turning Mr. de Valera out of office, when it can count upon carrying out a successful *coup d'état* at any time.

Whatever one may think of the revolutionary programme which Mr. de Valera has set himself to carry out, there is no denying that he has shown himself a most formidable political strategist. The prevalent conception of him outside of Ireland is very widely mistaken. It is customary to describe him as a morbid fanatic who can think of nothing but the oppression of Ireland under Elizabeth or Cromwell. He is believed to be so

steeped in the wrongs of past Irish history that he is unable to look ahead. Yet his record during the past six months would seem to prove quite the contrary. For the past five years, since he agreed to enter the Dail, he has preached a programme of complete economic and social reconstruction in Ireland. It has been widely assumed that his proposals were mere claptrap, and that they were so revolutionary and impracticable that he could not possibly intend to carry them out if ever he obtained control. Yet he has been doing no more than carry out that programme, step by step, with methodical consistency. Far from being absorbed in the past, he is already engaged in achieving, under great difficulties, a complete economic and social revolution. In so far as he appeals to the past, he is not concerned with Cromwell or Queen Elizabeth, but with Wolfe Tone, the pioneer and high prophet of revolutionary Irish nationalism during the French Revolution, and with the programme which Patrick Pearse and James Connolly and the other authors of the Dublin insurrection in 1916 had clearly mapped out.

That he would have been entrusted with office, if the Irish electorate had really believed that he had such a programme in view at the elections of last February, may well be doubted. Writing in this Review in April last, I pointed out the main causes of Mr. Cosgrave's defeat at the elections. In estimating Mr. de Valera's chances of success it is necessary to consider how far those causes still operate in his favour. First among them was the fact that Mr. Cosgrave and his young Ministers had been in office continuously for ten years, and had incurred the unpopularity which any Ministry must incur in so long a period. Undoubtedly a large proportion of the electorate decided to vote against Mr. Cosgrave in the sincere belief that a change of Government was desirable in principle, in order to introduce new blood and new ideas into an Administration which had been entirely in the hands of a small group since 1922. It was believed that Mr. de Valera had accepted the Treaty as a basis upon which to work; and that, as the constitutional Opposition, his party were entitled to an innings. Many other reasons combined to bring down Mr. Cosgrave's Government. One was the deliberate policy of Mr. Blythe in keeping the Irish income tax at a low level in order to attract rich residents and English capital into the Free State, while he refused to spend money lavishly on unemployment relief. Another was Mr. Blythe's refusal to sanction various schemes for industrial development or public works which did not seem likely to pay their way or to be economically sound. Another was his strict pursuit of economies which involved many dismissals from the public service and many disappointments to applicants for local patronage. While Mr. Blythe's financial policy had

made the Government unpopular, the main campaign against the Cosgrave Ministry was on the ground that it pampered the rich and disregarded the claims of the poor. It was denounced for public extravagance in paying excessively high salaries to civil servants and judges and Cabinet Ministers, and especially to the Governor-General. Mr. de Valera's party claimed that they could reduce the Budget by £2,000,000 within six months without impairing the efficiency of administration.

But, more than any other cause, the Fianna Fail Party won votes by its concentrated campaign against payment of the land annuities to Great Britain. It had found legal experts of high standing who staked their professional reputation on the opinion that the land annuities were not legally due to the British Government. Mr. Cosgrave was accordingly accused of reckless extravagance on the one hand, in providing for his own friends who enjoyed high salaries or low rates of income tax, and on the other of paying to the British Government an annual tribute of £3,000,000 which he might legally withhold. All over the country that propaganda gradually brought the Cosgrave Ministry into discredit. It told against him specially in the 'congested' districts of the west, where denunciation of the land annuities gradually assumed the character of a 'No Rent' campaign. The small farmers, who had never hoped to escape having to pay the annuities with which they were liquidating the purchase of their farms under various Land Acts, began to realise that if Mr. de Valera were returned to power their liability to pay the annuities would be called in question; whereas Mr. Cosgrave and his Ministers would always enforce payment with the severity which they had shown since the beginning of the civil war in 1922. Mr. de Valera always insisted that the annuities must still be paid, but that the money would be spent in Ireland on agricultural development. But the small farmers had their own views on the subject, and their chief interest was to have a pretext for refusing to pay.

Until the full effects of Mr. de Valera's 'new economic policy' (to use the phrase which his spokesmen have borrowed boldly from the Russian analogy) are clearly apparent, the small farmers all through the crowded counties from Donegal to Kerry will most probably be convinced that a temporary dislocation of markets is well worth the sacrifice, if it results in abolishing their obligation to pay the land purchase annuities. The small farmers are, broadly speaking, in the same position as any working men in this country who have contracted agreements with a building society to buy their houses by instalments spread over a number of years. At the time of making the agreement it seemed extremely good business, and the annual instalments have been less than the old

rents which gave no hope of owning the land. But the possibility of escaping all future payment must make a strong appeal to any small farmer who is suffering from trade depression. There have been so many revisions of rents in the past fifty years under successive Land Acts that complete repudiation must seem neither impossible of attainment nor as immoral a proposition as might be expected. And the effects of Mr. de Valera's economic policy will have to be much more serious than they are as yet, before the tenant farmers decide that it is better to abandon the hopes which he has raised and resume the former regularity of their payments. Moreover, the 'economic war' hits the small farmer much less acutely than is generally believed. The chief loss has been incurred by the graziers in the depopulated midlands who find they cannot sell their cattle. But the life of the small farmers west of the Shannon (where nearly half the 3,000,000 of the Irish Free State population are congregated) is very largely self-contained. Along the coast the small holdings produce very little beyond their own requirements of food; and a great many of Mr. de Valera's supporters are not directly concerned by any restrictions upon the cattle trade. They have progressed surprisingly little from the conditions of a hundred years ago when potatoes were almost the only food they knew. The improvements have been chiefly in their housing, and in the marketing of eggs and the small supplies of butter which they contribute through the co-operative creameries. They have enjoyed gradually improving markets for the small surplus, which has given them a slight increase of material wealth. But the possibility of escaping the burden of land annuities will, for some time at least, outweigh the immediate loss they are already suffering.

The agricultural labourers, and especially the unemployed, are also unlikely to be deterred at first. They have of course been the chief supporters of the Irish Labour Party. But the Labour Party has steadily lost seats to Fianna Fail, as Fianna Fail has increased its promises of subsidies and other aids to the poorest section of the people. At the last election only seven candidates of the Irish Labour Party were returned to the Dail. Their leader in the last Dail, Mr. T. J. O'Connell, lost his seat, and his place as chairman was taken by Mr. Norton, who had not previously been of any special note. Mr. Norton soon announced proudly that, as the Labour Party held the balance of power in the new Dail, Mr. de Valera would have to do what it dictated. But an interview between Mr. de Valera and the Labour leaders in Dublin soon showed that they had found the basis of a close alliance. In the Dail Mr. Norton devoted his first speech chiefly to an attack on the Cosgrave Government for having shown no sympathy with

the working class, and he announced that Labour would support Fianna Fail chiefly for that reason. But in the Senate Mr. Thomas Johnson, who has long been the ablest of the Labour leaders, welcomed the new Government in terms which suggested plainly that the Fianna Fail programme would have Labour's warm support. That was why Labour's early anxieties about the results of any conflict with the British Government over the Bill to remove the Oath of Allegiance played so small a part in the subsequent controversy. Mr. Johnson denounced resistance to the Bill on the ground that it was delaying the important programme of social reconstruction which he was awaiting. He accepted entirely the claim by Fianna Fail that the Oath of Allegiance was a purely domestic question on which negotiations with London were unnecessary. The new social and economic programme was soon afterwards revealed in Mr. MacEntee's most remarkable Budget statement. In his determination to discredit the Cosgrave régime Mr. MacEntee opened his statement with an extraordinary survey of the Irish public debt, which was certainly not calculated to assist his later announcement that new borrowing would be necessary. Making the picture appear as black as possible, he capitalised the land annuities as part of the State debt, without even mentioning that the State was entitled to collect the interest upon it from the tenant farmers in lieu of rent. By capitalising the land annuities, and also the Royal Irish Constabulary pensions (which, as Mr. Blythe pointed out, was as unreasonable as it would be to capitalise the cost of the Civil Service), he opened his Budget by declaring that the total public debt of the Free State, after allowing for all assets, was no less than £115,000,000. Revenue, he proceeded, had fallen heavily during the past year owing to trade depression; and he made an elaborate calculation in gold ounces of the depreciation of Irish capital and assets through the departure of the British Government from the gold standard. The obvious purpose of this deliberately discouraging picture of the situation was to provide pretexts for the drastic new taxation which he imposed. The main features of the new taxation were to raise the Irish income and super tax rates to the level adopted in Lord Snowden's emergency Budget of last autumn while at the same time granting special exemptions on dividends derived from Irish investments, of which the new Government would issue an approved list, and a long schedule of new protective tariffs. In ordinary conditions this drastic increase of income tax would be no more than a matter of financial controversy. But the Budget contained provisions which showed quite plainly that it was intended to penalise certain firms whose directorates were known to be out of sympathy with the new political and economic programme. Mr. Blythe had

said repeatedly, in justification of the lower income tax level, that he hoped to attract rich people to live in Ireland, and that his policy had already produced that result to an increasing extent. He had frequently said that if even a dozen of the few wealthy people who still lived in Ireland were to leave the country, the Exchequer would lose more than it could gain by raising the tax to the English level. But Mr. MacEntee has not only repudiated that policy, but deliberately made taxation of certain big industries in the Free State higher than what they would have to pay if they transferred their business to Great Britain.

It was shown in the Budget debates that the Guinness breweries will actually have to pay higher taxation (as the corporation profits tax is still kept on, in addition to the English level of the new income and super tax) than they need pay if they removed their business from Dublin. The Budget proposals in this respect are all the more provocative because it is well known that Guinness and a few other large industries in Dublin will find it impossible to maintain their large export trade if Imperial Preference is withdrawn from the Free State in November. Messrs. Jacob, the biscuit manufacturers, had issued a public statement before the Budget was introduced saying that they would be obliged to transfer their Dublin business to Liverpool if Imperial Preference were withdrawn. But so far from minimising the difficulties of these firms, in view of the probable withdrawal of Imperial Preference, Mr. MacEntee has imposed taxation upon their profits at a higher rate if they decide to remain in Dublin. Still more remarkable was the deliberate discrimination against the largest tobacco factory in Dublin, which had been opened a few years ago by the Imperial Tobacco Company. The Budget, in increasing the tax on tobacco, allowed a special rebate to all Irish manufacturing firms which had been founded prior to 1922—a provision which was obviously aimed at excluding the new factory from its benefits. Messrs. Gallaher have replied by closing down their Dublin factory at once; and Mr. de Valera's newspaper merely announces that various foreign firms are already considering purchase of the factory for some other industry. There was no suggestion of any compromise or mitigation of the new taxes, which immediately produced other inevitable results. Lord Powerscourt, who has been chairman of the Irish Sweepstakes and has earned wide popularity by his public spirit, announced that owing to the new scale of taxation he would be unable to keep up his property in Wicklow, and that he was offering it for sale. A few days later came the still more ominous announcement that Bishop Plunket, who some years ago inherited the immense fortune of Lord Ardilaun, was similarly offering his estate near Dublin for sale. His departure from

Ireland would mean that one branch of the Guinness family will go. That the Guinness breweries would be closed down was all the more probable. But a close examination of the Budget suggests that even this result has been expected. The Budget provides special rebates to the small brewers in Ireland, whose business would naturally benefit greatly if Guinness were to go. A substantial rebate has been granted on the first 5000 barrels, which, though it means nothing to a great brewery like Guinness, may well raise the hopes of the small brewers.

The Budget, with its wholesale imposition of new tariffs on imports, left no room to doubt that the new policy was designed to cut down Anglo-Irish trade ruthlessly. It was soon followed by a new measure for the control of manufactures in the Free State, deliberately framed to discourage English capital. No new industries could be started in the Free State except by licence from the Government, which would require that the controlling interest of the industry must rest with nationals of the Free State. These far-reaching measures had all been proposed before the controversy with the British Government over the land annuities reached a serious stage. Meanwhile Mr. de Valera kept up the pretence of being seriously interested in participating at the Ottawa Conference. So long as the Irish delegation was preparing to go to Ottawa, it was impossible to say for certain that he intended to go far beyond his election programme and to aim boldly at secession from the British Commonwealth. The Labour Party especially were nervous on that matter, and they were receiving anxious inquiries from the Labour Party in England, who were willing to back them up to a certain point, but could not be expected to support the secession of the Free State from the Commonwealth. Mr. de Valera's handling of that delicate situation has been, from a tactical point of view, masterly. He has kept up the appearance of intending to abide within his election pledges, while creating step by step a situation in which wider developments would inevitably follow. He had announced in his election programme that the land annuities would not be paid to the British Government. Mr. MacEntee's Budget statement was curiously vague concerning them. He explained that the Executive would refuse to hand them over unless the question was judicially settled in favour of the British Government; and he foreshadowed a much less severe Budget next year if the land annuities could be retained. But he did not indicate what was being done with the moneys received from the tenant farmers in the meantime. Mr. de Valera did not mention the subject to the British Government until after he had issued a statement of his intentions to the American Press. When the Dominions Office raised the question it assumed much larger proportions. Not only

the land annuities, but the R.I.C. pensions and other grants hitherto paid annually under agreements between the two Governments, were to be withheld. The annual payments involved were thus increased from £3,000,000 to £5,000,000. When discussions with the British Government became inevitable Mr. de Valera was fully prepared to stultify any offer of arbitration. As he had consistently refused to admit the principle of settling inter-Commonwealth disputes without reference to the League of Nations or the Hague, agreement was almost unthinkable unless he was willing to compromise. He did not even mention that the moneys were being paid into a suspensory fund (of which no mention had been made in Mr. MacEntee's Budget speech), and he easily reached a deadlock in discussion with Mr. J. H. Thomas.

The Irish Labour Party still held the balance in the Dail, and they were not only committed to their own pledge to avoid any open conflict with the British Government, but were being subjected to strong pressure from the Labour Party at Westminster to produce a compromise on the land annuities question. But Mr. MacEntee's Budget had already brought about an irrevocable alliance between Labour and Fianna Fail. The Budget had made special provision for two impending measures of legislation—one to extend the limits of the Old Age Pensions Act, which Mr. Cosgrave's Ministry had always refused to extend, and the other to increase the scope of the military service pensions payable to the casualties of the civil war. Both those measures were calculated to catch votes; but they were as nothing to the bribes which Mr. MacEntee's Budget offered, in spite of the dismal picture he had presented of the Free State finances. A grant of £250,000 was to be made in relief of rates on agricultural land. To provide milk for necessitous children there would be another grant of £100,000; and the same amount would be given, to relieve unemployment, in aid of housing schemes undertaken before September. There would be a further £350,000 for public health work, minor roads, and arterial drainage schemes, and a further £150,000 to be used in works to absorb the maximum of unemployed labour. Beyond that, an extra £1,000,000 would be borrowed on security of the Road Fund, in addition to the £877,000 already available from the fund. And the local authorities would receive new loans, at much lower rates of interest than formerly, for local public health and housing schemes. Taking all these schemes together, Mr. MacEntee had claimed that the grants in aid of unemployment would total £2,150,000. It was no wonder that the Irish Labour Party found it impossible to exercise any restraining influence upon the new political programme. Mr. de Valera had gone far beyond the most daring proposals of the

Labour Party for economic and social reconstruction. The rich were to be taxed even at a rate higher than that in England. The unemployed were to be given not only subsidised employment, but also housing schemes on a vast scale. The small farmers were being persuaded that the land annuities need never be paid to England; and for their own part they would see that the annuities would fall in arrears. And apart from all this programme of open bribery to the electorate, the new economic policy was to transform the whole organisation of the country's economic life. The bacon, butter, and eggs produced in Ireland were in future to be consumed at home instead of being sold to England; and the British manufactures which had hitherto been bought in exchange for such exports were to be discouraged, so that Ireland might manufacture for its own needs. Gallaher's factory might go; Jacob's might go; and even Guinness, with its great export trade, might go. But they had never been chiefly concerned with the Irish market, and the small tobacco factories and breweries and other factories would be encouraged to capture the home market thus left open to them, providing employment in many local centres instead of only in Dublin.

That programme was already being expounded on many platforms when the trouble over the land annuities reached its climax. The British Government's proposals to levy a duty on Irish imports of cattle, and agricultural produce generally, were announced when the programme was just developing. Far from being deterred, Mr. de Valera and his friends announced their joy at being given an opportunity to take drastic measures which would revolutionise the country's economic organisation. They had been preaching for years that the dependence of Ireland upon trade with England was fundamentally wrong. It had led to all the rich lands of the midlands being given up to grazing, instead of supporting a large and prosperous peasant population. The cattle trade, they had said for years, had been the curse of Ireland. To reorganise the system under normal conditions would be the work of years. But once the British Government themselves imposed prohibitive duties upon Irish cattle, there would be a swift and entirely healthy reorganisation. Foreign imports would be discouraged and the country would be compelled to become self-supporting. The British Government had played straight into Mr. de Valera's hands; so much so indeed that one can scarcely avoid the conclusion that he had deliberately provoked them into reprisals. By provoking such reprisals Mr. de Valera has succeeded in gaining power to an extent which a few months ago seemed almost impossible except by a *coup d'état*. The 'economic war' was at once made the pretext for demanding dictatorial powers. It was perhaps significant that, in the week

before the Dail was asked for such powers, the Irish delegation sailed for Ottawa. It contained the two Ministers, Mr. Lemass and Dr. Ryan, who had been regarded as least inclined to follow reckless courses, besides nearly all the principal civil servants in Dublin. The futility of their mission was so apparent that it had been said freely, in the Dail and elsewhere, that the results to be obtained by any possible agreements with the Dominions could not justify even the travelling expenses of the delegation. Yet practically every important civil servant in Dublin, as well as Mr. Dulanty, the High Commissioner in London (whose diplomatic abilities had helped greatly in preventing any open breach in Whitehall), has been sent on a wild goose chase across the Atlantic, while Mr. de Valera and Mr. MacEntee and Mr. Aiken and Senator Connolly have accelerated the crisis at home. Not the least successful of Mr. de Valera's tactical moves was his approval of Mr. Norton's last mission to London to see Mr. MacDonald as to the chances of resuming negotiations. In so doing he satisfied the British Labour Party that he was still in earnest in seeking a settlement by conciliation. But on the day that Mr. Norton was in London the Irish Labour Party voted with Mr. de Valera's followers for the Emergency Powers Bill which has established him as a dictator.

For years Mr. de Valera has preached that Ireland must become a self-contained country, and that its dependence upon trade with England must be brought to an end. His record during the past six months shows him to be a realist, much rather than a visionary, in politics. He has even admitted in the past few weeks that trade with other countries than England probably never can be built up. But he has never disguised the fact that such a self-contained Ireland would have to do without many things which it has recently enjoyed. His conviction is that a poor but self-contained and independent existence is preferable to dependence upon another country. Such doctrine does not necessarily imply even that he is radically hostile to England. He desires only independence and the simple life. That he has already within six months advanced so rapidly towards the consummation of his programme is proof of his great tactical abilities as a politician, whatever one may think of his notions of economics. The few big industries which have helped to make Dublin an important city will almost inevitably disappear if he succeeds in carrying out his programme. Much unemployment in Dublin will result; but it does not even follow that he will at once lose his popularity in the poorer parts of Dublin. To the unemployed and to the half-starved casual labourers in the Dublin slums his policy provides, at least for the present, doles and housing schemes which would never have been introduced

by his predecessors. How long the illusion will last is another matter. He has already asked and obtained from the Dail a special vote of £2,000,000 to tide over the emergency which he has created. The whole Budget has been thrown into chaos by the 'economic war,' and reckless finance must lead very quickly to inflation. Prices will inevitably rise, and the loans which Mr. MacEntee foreshadowed in his Budget will be very difficult to raise—even though a year ago the loans floated by Mr. Cosgrave were actually quoted at a higher figure in New York than the British War Loan. Meanwhile Mr. Cosgrave and the Opposition are completely powerless. The Dail has risen until October and cannot be summoned sooner unless the majority combine against Mr. de Valera. In that case the menace of the I.R.A., who have been steadily recruiting their numbers and obtaining new supplies of arms in addition to those which remained hidden in the secret dumps since the end of the civil war, would materialise at once. Resentment among the prosperous farmers is widespread already, but they also are powerless in face of the new dictatorship. The ultimate goal of Mr. de Valera, and still more of the I.R.A.—whose leaders are notoriously in sympathy with Russian Communism—still remains to be revealed. That Mr. de Valera himself desires to break away from the British Commonwealth is well known. He even told the Senate, quite early in the present controversy when he moved the second reading of the Oath Abolition Bill, that he personally believed that Ireland had a 'more prosperous career' before her in complete separation from the Commonwealth than as a member of it. Its advantages he admitted, but he holds that the disadvantages of the association are greater than the advantages.

Two larger problems still remain. One is whether the Left Wing will force Mr. de Valera to establish not only a Republic but a Communist State. The other is whether the Catholic Church will be able to call a halt, if that is the real object of the I.R.A. Only last year the Irish hierarchy decreed a formal excommunication of all who belonged to certain specified societies which were admittedly Communist in their aims. At the same time they denounced, though without actually naming the I.R.A., a secret society which was attempting to override constitutional government by armed defiance of law. The I.R.A. have not forgotten that condemnation of their activities. If they gain control, there may yet be an open conflict between them and the Catholic Church. What Mr. de Valera's attitude would be in such a conflict is a question which no one can yet answer for certain. He not only is a practising Catholic, but has identified himself closely with such religious celebrations as the pilgrimage up Croagh Patrick, where he served Mass on the mountain top

in the early morning. The time may come soon when he will have to choose between his religious and his political associations. It will be known then whether he is in reality the Irish Kerensky, or whether he is a more formidable revolutionary than he has even yet shown himself to be.

DENIS GWYNN.

GERMANY—DICTATORSHIP OR CHAOS?

ON Saturday, August 13, a decisive interview took place between President Hindenburg and Herr Hitler; it was short and dramatic. They never even sat down. Obviously all the preparatory work had been done beforehand during the long conferences between Hitler and Chancellor von Papen and in the negotiations with the Minister of Defence, General von Schleicher. These took place the very same day as the Presidential interview and lasted many hours. There was an atmosphere of great tension. People were asking themselves what would happen if Hitler were refused the Chancellorship, which, according to his Press, he so badly wanted, or what the developments would be if he actually were offered it and declined to take it on any but his own as yet unacceptable conditions. A *coup d'état*? A march on Berlin à la Mussolini? Quiet surrender to the facts would appear absurd from a revolutionary and emotional movement like Hitler's, whatever his assurances of the 'legality' of his methods. Even if his desire for it were genuine, the hysterical frenzy to which he has whipped up his 13,000,000 followers is not a thing that can be controlled or even measured. The conditions on which President Hindenburg offered Hitler a share in the Government proved unacceptable to the Nazi leader. He demanded everything or nothing. He wanted to be made a dictator, and on such terms that the aged Field-Marshal declared he could not assume the responsibility of agreeing to them. Thus at least for the time being the attempt to canalise Hitler's movement into General von Schleicher's channels has failed. The whole position would be ridiculous were it not so tragic. If it is remembered that only quite recently, in the bitter fight for the Presidency of the German Republic, Hindenburg and Hitler were opposed to each other as the respective representatives of law and order and of violence and political adventure, the irony of fate which has compelled Hindenburg to offer office to Hitler assumes supreme proportions. It is also an indication of the direction in which Germany has travelled during the last few months.

The month of July for two successive years has seen the most unsuspected and spectacular developments in Germany. Last

year, on the 13th, there broke out a banking crisis so acute that it assumed the character of a national or even an international calamity. Owing to certain personal rivalries or dislikes, and owing to the clumsiness of the Brüning Government as well as that of the Reichsbank, the crash of the Darmstädter Bank was not averted in time. This cost the country a great deal of money and a great deal of prestige. And the whole episode left everybody with the feeling that nothing still worse than the so-called '13th of July' could happen to Germany—in fact that this time the proverbial rockbottom had been reached. But precisely a year and a week later, on July 20, 1932, there has happened another event in the destinies of Germany, which has completely eclipsed the 1931 episode. The *coup d'état*, or rather *coup de théâtre*, that suddenly took place in Prussia on July 20 would have filled the world with rollicking laughter had it happened, say, in Albania or some musical-comedy country, where such things are usual. But that it should have happened in Germany—in Prussia, of all places—is a tragedy the full measure of which it is difficult even to estimate.

At 10 a.m. that day a conference took place between Chancellor von Papen and leading members of the so-called temporary or 'business' Government of Prussia—Herr Hirtsiefer (deputy Prime Minister), Herr Severing (Minister of the Interior), and Herr Klepper. The Chancellor told these gentlemen that, in the opinion of his Government, law and order were threatened in Prussia, and that therefore the President of the Republic was by an emergency decree appointing him (the Chancellor) as special Commissioner and Prime Minister of Prussia. He in his turn had decided to appoint Dr. Bracht, the well-known Bürgermeister of Essen, as his deputy. The Prussian Prime Minister, Otto Braun, and Herr Severing were to consider themselves as relieved of their respective offices. Herr Severing replied that he did not recognise the validity of the Presidential decree, and would only surrender to force. Herr Hirtsiefer also protested. Thereupon a second Presidential decree was signed declaring Berlin and the province of Brandenburg in a stage of siege and placing all executive power into the hands of the Minister of National Defence. An officer of the Reichswehr and two soldiers 'occupied' the Prussian State Ministry. Herr Otto Braun sent a letter to Herr von Papen demanding the reasons of all this, and the Prussian Government lodged a complaint against the Government of the Reich with the Supreme Court at Leipzig. Furthermore, it refused to meet under the presidency of Herr von Papen. Herr Severing was removed from his office by force, and later in the day the other Ministers shared his fate. A number of prominent permanent officials were dismissed. The

head of the Berlin police, Herr Grzesinski, his deputy, Dr. Weiss, and the officer commanding the police force, Herr Heimannsberg, were suddenly arrested, released, and, in the case of the latter, rearrested to be released again.

All this happened within twenty-four hours or so. Did a revolution break out? Was there a general strike? Did the members of the Government that has ruled in Prussia for so long offer any resistance? A lieutenant and two soldiers proved sufficient to kick out the heads of two army corps of a heavily armed police force, to incarcerate them and throw out of office a whole Government, whose normal job would appear to include such a thing as the protection of the State against the usurpers of power! But the Prussian Ministers did nothing of the kind. Perhaps it is a proof of their great patriotism and statesmanship that they preferred their own disgrace to civil war, which would have resulted had they offered armed opposition. Perhaps also they realised the futility of an appeal to arms and knew beforehand that they would fail. Whether they were actuated by great political wisdom, or whether they just submitted to brute force, their exit was both undignified and pathetic. Could anybody in his right senses have imagined for a moment that the Supreme Court in Leipzig would find Chancellor von Papen's action illegal, would annul it and demand the reinstatement of Prussia's old Government? And what would have been the position supposing this had been the case? Did they fancy that in such an eventuality Herr von Papen would retire and apologise to them? There is no need to be a learned German lawyer to know that, even if the grounds on which the Prussian Government was kicked out were true, still the action of Herr von Papen was anti-constitutional. Furthermore, it is impossible to bring any convincing proof that these grounds were in any way justified; in fact, the hatred between the Communists and the Socialists is so notorious that to accuse the Socialists Braun and Severing of favouring the Communists is manifestly absurd. Whatever the legal aspect, however, an officer and two men seem to have been far more eloquent than the Constitution. They represented power, and that settled it. Meanwhile the anti-socialistic reaction in Prussia continues. One after the other the leading civil servants who are known to belong to the Social Democratic Party are being dismissed or temporarily suspended, and the party itself is being turned into a sort of pariah in German political life. An almost animal hatred of the Social Democrats is the only thing the other parties have in common. This hatred was suddenly allowed to break out with particular vigour—in fact, at times it seemed as if it were deliberately encouraged by those in authority. And it must not be forgotten that these events took place at a time

when an election campaign, unprecedented in its bitterness, was reaching its final stage. On July 31 Germany was once again to elect a new Reichstag, because Herr von Papen had seen fit to dissolve the previous one.

There is nothing new in the fundamental causes of these developments. Those who have kept in close touch with the political and economic life of Germany could see them coming for some considerable time. The wave of violent reaction that is now sweeping over Germany did not start with the dismissal of the Brüning Cabinet and the substitution of the so-called 'Baron's Government' under von Papen, or with the Prussian *coup d'état*. And readers of the *Nineteenth Century and After* will perhaps remember that as long ago as September 1930 I ventured to express doubts about the policy of the universally admired and universally overestimated Dr. Brüning. He it was who dissolved the Reichstag at that time without any tangible reason, but with the very definite purpose of getting rid of the Social Democratic Party. The Socialists were then the most numerous party in the Reichstag, and it was difficult or impossible to rule against or without them. It was the Chancellor's hope to bring about a union between the various middle parties, his own party, the Centre, and the Right wing—in other words, to free himself from the necessity of socialistic support by the creation of a powerful *bloc bourgeois*. This calculation failed. The Socialists were not crushed, but the very allies Brüning was seeking suffered severe setbacks. Those who benefited most, however, by Brüning's ill-advised manoeuvre were the two extreme wings, the Nazis and the Communists. Over 100 followers of Hitler were elected to that Reichstag, and this was met with universal consternation. The world and Brüning himself breathed a sigh of relief when the Socialist Loebe was re-elected President of the Reichstag and when those very Socialists whose removal from power Brüning had tried to engineer agreed to support him and his Government.

There followed a period of about two years, when Brüning's authority was really supreme. Not only the great personal integrity of the man and his obvious disinterestedness, but also the realisation of the fact that he alone stood between order and chaos, gave the Chancellor a unique position both at home and abroad. Contrary to the opinion of most people, I consider that Dr. Brüning's period of office has been disastrous for Germany. And I am not being wise after the event, for I have repeatedly criticised his activities while he was still in power.¹ Admittedly, the world crisis was against him; admittedly, he might have

¹ E.g., 'The Enigma of Germany,' in the *Nineteenth Century and After* March 1932.

received more support from England and France, although it is difficult to see why and how. But almost everything he has done or has omitted to do has been fraught with most devastating consequences: the notorious 'Anschluss' business; the unnecessary and ill-fated 1930 elections that let in Hitler; his attempt to rule with Socialist support against the Socialists and the policy of fighting the Hitlerites while at the same time making overtures to them; his treatment of some of the fundamental internal issues; the 13th of July; the way he tackled the Presidential election; the appointment of General Groener to the two important posts of Minister of the Defence and the Interior, and his subsequent abandonment under Nazi pressure (Groener had dared to take action against the Hitlerites). These are only a few cases.

And was it not Brüning who completely abolished parliamentarism in Germany and ruled her by Presidential decrees under paragraph 48 of the Constitution? Was it not he who really put an end to personal freedom, democracy, and even unrestricted private property, by issuing these innumerable emergency decrees that were meant to regulate everything, but at the same time disorganised a great deal? He toured the capitals of Europe and persuaded everybody that he alone could deal with the German situation, and asked for support and understanding. He got a fair share of it, both at home and abroad; but did he deal with anything? He was continuously drifting, but in an unknown direction. In 1930 he should have either compelled the Nazis to join the Government or have suppressed their movement altogether. In those days it was still possible. He did neither, but seemed to play into their hands in an astounding way. They began to flood the country with their speakers, agitators, and propaganda; they were winning the elections to one local Diet after another. Brüning obstinately pursued his policy of treating them like his worst enemies one day and of inviting their friendly co-operation the next. His Socialist supporters he treated like mud, and seldom concealed the fact that if only he could find support elsewhere he would have no hesitation in abandoning this somewhat compromising alliance with the Socialists for something more congenial: a man who certainly did not seek any benefit for himself, but one whose long ambiguous and provocative drifting prepared the way for civil war in Germany. Brüning's object was ostensibly to keep Germany going as best he could until the crisis was over and until some final world settlement would become possible. It was all a case of carrying on, of just prolonging one's existence, and the difficulty of his task was universally recognised and his courage was greatly admired. He was 'tolerated' by everybody, except the Communists and the Nazis. But while the latter were getting more and more violent,

the former sank into relative insignificance and directed most of their vituperations against the Social Democrats, whom they accused of betraying the proletariat.

The position of the Social Democrats in Germany is really tragic. They were against the war, but out of patriotism and loyalty agreed to put their country above party interests and did their duty as good Germans. They received little gratitude for that. Then came the catastrophe of 1918. The Kaiser deserted his people and his country and took refuge in Holland. Government and authority collapsed. Germany was on the verge of Bolshevism and civil war. The Social Democrats stepped in and assumed the burden of carrying on the government and keeping the State together. They even had the great courage to shoot down some of their old comrades who had turned Communist and who threatened the civil peace. And they helped to achieve a formal conclusion of the war, for the initiation and the loss of which they were not responsible. Incidentally, by doing all these things they also saved the lives of many a rich industrialist who is now financing their enemies and detractors. For years the Social Democrats have been the pillars of the State in Germany, always putting its interests above those of their party. This is more than can be said of the majority of the other parties, who have invariably tried to make party capital out of every difficulty. Of course, the Socialists have made many mistakes; they have done many things that are open to criticism; they have tried when circumstances permitted to achieve and consolidate certain privileges for the working classes. But all this sinks into insignificance compared to the services they have rendered the State. And the continuous defamation of the Socialists in Germany is the most scandalous piece of ingratitude and deliberate misrepresentation that reduces German political life to a level unworthy of a great country.

Charges of every kind of 'moral turpitude' have been brought against the Social Democrats: treason, revolution, corruption, incompetence and inefficiency, the imposition of ever-increasing social charges. It is this latter thing that has rendered them so abhorrent to the *bourgeois* and capitalist groups, who do not realise that the Social Democrats are their last protection against expropriation by either the Nazis or the Communists. People in Germany refuse to see that there is really nothing 'Marxian' about these Socialists, that they are a petty middle-class Conservative Party, the most stable element in Germany since inflation destroyed the old middle classes. No, the Socialists have always been represented by demagogues of the Right and of the extreme Left as villains who only want to squeeze more and more money out of poor Germany to benefit their own class

interests! And the hatred has reached such limits that, in the words of a brilliant German journalist, people would almost prefer a small pogrom to any further direct or indirect capital levy.

In this atmosphere, and under the strong pressure of certain reactionary circles, President Hindenburg on May 30 suddenly dismissed the Brüning Government and appointed Herr von Papen as Chancellor. The universal consternation that followed is still vivid in everybody's mind. After two years of apparent most intimate collaboration and so soon after his re-election to the Presidency, which he owed to Brüning and the Social Democrats, Hindenburg was throwing out the Chancellor in the way one dismisses an unworthy servant. Brüning fell from Olympus in a way he did not deserve, but in a way he should have expected.

The time for drifting had come to an end. It was necessary to make a definite choice between the Right and the Left. And President Hindenburg chose the Right. To use Trotsky's very apt simile, the ball that had been placed on top of the pyramid, and which was bound to roll down either on the left or on the right, came down with a crash on the right. The new Papen Government was received with amazement and hostility by all the international Press, not to speak of the Republican German papers. The Chancellor's unfortunate record in the United States during the war was brought up against him, and Brüning's departure was met with a chorus of lamentations. The cause of this appears incomprehensible to me. During the war Herr von Papen only did his duty and carried out the instructions of his chiefs, whoever they were. As to the noble origin of the German Chancellor and the composition of his Cabinet, is not a definite 'Junker' Government in Germany infinitely preferable, both from a national and international point of view, to a vague and heterogeneous agglomeration like the various Brüning coalitions? And is not Herr Papen's Minister of Finance an acknowledged expert, and his Foreign Minister a very accomplished diplomat? The hostility shown to Herr von Papen and his colleagues on account of their past record was unfair and unjustified. They must be judged on their record since they took office, and that is devastating enough. Not one of the objects for which they were put into power has been fulfilled, not one of the problems solved, not one of the country's most fundamental issues brought even within a measurable distance of any kind of settlement.

Despite all their attempts to get Hitler into line with them and to get his open or his secret support, they have failed. No Government could have gone further out of their way to gain the sympathy and the help of the Nazis, on whom attentions and

privileges galore have been lavished in vain. Hitler's answer has been plain: everything or nothing. He will never again be offered office quite in the same way. But he has rejected Herr von Papen's company and has preferred to take a very great risk. The Centre Party, of which Herr von Papen is a dissident, has also rejected him; they even prefer Hitler and his Nazis to a collaboration with him, and they said so in a most emphatic way. Herr von Papen has not been successful in creating even a nucleus of parliamentary support for himself by rallying any other parties, groups, or individuals to his side. The old Reichstag, which he arbitrarily dissolved, was too heterogeneous to do any useful work or to produce a clear and stable majority of any kind. But the new one, elected on July 31, is even more hopeless. It has no possible majority for any single constructive or political action. On the other hand, it has a certain majority for every obstruction that may break out at any moment with or without the slightest provocation. Perhaps the wisest step would be actually to provoke a row and then send home this new Reichstag, the composition of which makes its normal functioning as a parliamentary machine quite impossible.

The elections themselves deserve a few comments. The only surprise has been the increase in the Communist vote; they not only recovered all their losses of recent years, but actually exceeded the largest figure ever polled by them. This they owe entirely to Herr von Papen, who up to the last day of the election campaign kept on attacking them with particular bitterness and put all the blame for Germany's political unrest on them. The reaction that came was inevitable, but the ten seats gained by the Communists are rather more in the nature of an anti-Papen demonstration than the sign of a pro-Communist tendency. Thus in yet another respect the new Government had failed—namely, in keeping down the Communists. That the various 'middle' parties would be wiped out in this election was a foregone conclusion. Only the Centre Party, with its close associate the Bavarian People's Party, emerged, as ever, triumphant. This purely Roman Catholic, disciplined, and efficient organisation is in many ways the most powerful political entity in parliamentary Germany. No combination is possible without its support, unless, of course, the basis of dictatorial power is substituted for a parliamentary one. The Social Democrats lost three seats, but did much better than in the various local or Presidential elections. Herr Hugenberg and his *Deutschnationale* seem to have attracted a few of Hitler's former followers, who must have become frightened of the revolutionary and anti-capitalistic aspect of the Nazi movement. This is symptomatic. Although Herr Hitler doubled the number of his votes as compared with the

1930 Reichstag, his movement suffered a definite setback in comparison to the continuous triumphal advance in the elections to the numerous local Diets and the two ballots of the recent fight for the Presidency. Herr von Papen and his Ministers did not stand—another anomaly of the present position—and could therefore neither be elected nor defeated. From a purely parliamentary point of view, of course, they suffered a crushing defeat. For, even assuming that the combined Right would agree to support them in the new Reichstag—and this, as we know, is by no means the case—the maximum of votes they could hope to obtain would be 277 out of 607. If, none the less, they express their satisfaction with the results, a different explanation must be sought for this curious self-sufficiency.

Germany is no longer a democratic and parliamentary country, and therefore all arithmetic considerations about votes and majorities is perfectly futile. It was known before these elections that Herr von Papen intended to remain in any circumstances. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say General von Schleicher, for the Minister of Defence is the real ruler of Germany to-day. And it was known beforehand that as long as he has got the Reichswehr and the police force at his disposal nothing can affect his very firm position. Logically, the Papen-Schleicher Cabinet should have shared the fate of the Prussian Ministers so picturesquely kicked out by them. Everything they said about the Prussian Government not being able to maintain law and order or not representing the electorate applies to them in a far greater degree. But they claim to be in a very different position. In Prussia, they say, the old Government proved incapable of keeping down the Communists, the only enemies of the State, and even showed them specially favourable treatment. That is why it had been necessary to appoint a special Commissioner with dictatorial powers, which incidentally has brought about a state of latent conflict between the Central Government and all the other States composing the Reich, a most serious, or even dangerous, situation. The attitude of Bavaria and some of the other leading States has shown in a sufficiently plain way that in this respect also the new Government has made a terrible mess of things. But has Herr von Papen's action in Prussia at least brought about the results for which it was undertaken? Previous to it a sort of guerilla terrorism between Nazis and Communists had been raging for some time; the number of mutual aggressions, however, was small, although bad enough for a great and civilised race like the Germans. But can this in any way be compared to the series of organised outbreaks of murder and violence that were perpetrated by the Nazis almost immediately after the Prussian *coup d'état*? This had, indeed, followed a Com-

munist riot in Altona. But since we have had Königsburg, Breslau, Kiel, and a number of other Prussian cities in which savage Nazi murderers and bandits, armed with bombs and even in possession of an armoured car, committed a number of crimes that cry out to the world. And these were the representatives of a movement whom Herr von Papen has described as 'constructive forces,' supposed to be true to the Constitution and poetically minded national heroes pursuing a great ideal.

What did he do after these outbreaks? His deputy, Dr. Bracht, a man of great intelligence and singular charm, who obviously undertook his very unpleasant duties out of patriotism, issued a number of warnings. These proved of no consequence. The murder wave that had assumed this unprecedented scale since August 1, the day after the elections, continued to sweep over Germany despite the repeated warnings and threats of the Government. It was so perfectly organised, so well prepared, that anybody could see the crimes were being directed from some mysterious headquarters. First there were only suspicions; then it was proved that the overwhelming majority of the aggressors were Nazis and belonged to the S.A. or S.S., assault troops of the movement. Still the Government hesitated; it talked, but refrained from taking action. Then it did something so supremely farcical that it almost looks as if some malicious humorist had played a practical joke. It compiled and published some statistics of the political murders and other acts of violence that had taken place between June 1 and July 20! A most useful document for a future historian, but not exactly a measure restoring law and order or inspiring the terrorised citizen with confidence in the Government's ability to protect his life and his belongings. Anyway, the citizen could read that in these six weeks there had occurred in Prussia, not counting Berlin, 322 political acts of violence; that 72 persons had been killed and 497 wounded; furthermore, that in 203 cases the responsibility for starting the row rested with the Communists and only in 75 with the Nazis. Apart from the fact that in most cases it is impossible to say who actually started the quarrel, it may be observed that the Nazi terror began on its big scale only after August 1, a period which is not yet included, and that no figures are published for the city of Berlin. No doubt a further publication will complete this first record of the fratricidal warfare that is going on in Germany.

Meanwhile the Government actually has published a new emergency decree against terrorism, which even threatens capital punishment, but its practical results have still to be seen. What form the German civil war, which exists but is as yet conducted under the surface, will take now that Hitler has refused to join the Government it is premature to say. Will his followers drive

him to an adventure? If so, when and how? Will they feel disappointed that he has not taken his chance of participating in the Government, and will they revolt against him? Will his place be taken by a Goebbels or a Strasser, his rivals as well as his lieutenants? Or will he be able to control his movement and preserve that much-talked-about 'legality,' which in his case is a deliberate misuse of the word? For even if he did accede to power in a 'legal' way, what is the value of such 'legality' when immediately upon establishing himself in power Hitler wants to introduce a 'legality' of his own, the basis of which would be religious, racial, and class war—in fact, legalised terrorism? And supposing he did get the power into his hands, what could he offer his followers apart from these things? He has promised them bread, freedom and work. So did Lenin in Russia in 1917. A hungry and embittered mob believed him; we know the rest. Jew-baiting and a wild agitation against the Socialists, the Roman Catholics, and the idle rich may win an emotional movement like Hitler's millions of supporters for a certain period of time. But if he wants to keep them he must offer them something more than that. Neither in the sphere of domestic nor in that of foreign politics can he offer anything tangible. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the international situation. But in the present state of the world's affairs there is little or nothing that any German Government can do in respect of its foreign policy. Internally, of course, the wave of terrorism may assume the proportions of civil war on a scale very different to the present one. There is also always the danger of the disappointed Nazis going over to the Communists. The prospects are gloomy.

For all those who know and admire the many great qualities of the German race the present tragic position is a matter of particular concern. What can avert complete chaos in Germany? What can stop the further decomposition of a race that has lost all sense of measure and of self-esteem? It is hopeless to look to the old Republican elements, whose failure the whole world has just witnessed. The utter political impotence of the chosen leaders of Social Democracy, their total lack of a sense of reality, of will to power and of civil courage, is in a large measure responsible for the present lamentable state of affairs. They had Germany in their hands and they could have ruled her to her own and to the world's advantage. But they have lost their chance. Herr Breitscheid and Herr Hilferding have invariably displayed the absence of even the most fundamental qualities of leadership whenever any decision was required. For a time it looked as if at least Herr Otto Braun or Herr Severing had stamina and courage. The recent events in Prussia have proved the contrary. Not until the party machine is completely renewed

and reorganised will Social Democracy regain its vitality and its independence. The 'middle' parties exist no more. Were it not for the fact that the Roman Catholic character of the party makes it unacceptable to large sections of the country, the Centre, under a leader other than Dr. Brüning, might yet play a decisive part in the destinies of Germany. The *Deutschnationale* under Hugenberg are too definitely a class party of heavy industrialists and wealthy agrarians. Besides, Hugenberg, who is a good organiser and an able businessman, has invariably proved himself a poor politician. Enough has been said of Hitler. There is only one man in Germany to-day who can save her from chaos. This is General von Schleicher.

Can he, will he, do it? So far he has played his hand quite well and has emerged as the single ruler of Germany. He controls the army, the navy, and the police, and this means everything. For a long time he had been the object of mysterious rumours. But the man with an impenetrable mask, whom a popular legend made the leader of a kind of military *camarilla*, and whom his friends and acquaintances consider a singularly jovial, able and ambitious officer, has suddenly revealed himself. He sat down in front of a microphone and made a speech, which clearly showed that he was the real power in the Papen Cabinet. He discussed domestic and international affairs, military questions, finance, commerce—in fact, he covered all the subjects with which, in the normal course of events, the Minister of Defence would not be concerned at all. What his colleagues in the Cabinet thought of this broadcast speech remains a matter for conjecture. General von Schleicher did not seem to care. His attacks on France were tactless and unjustified, and undoubtedly did Germany's international position a great deal of harm. But at home the speech made a great impression. The General's somewhat crude expression about '*der innere Schweinhund*' was repeated from mouth to mouth. The country recognised in him the man who would rule it with a rod of iron and seemed to rejoice at the prospect. For, curious though this may seem, there are many people in Germany to-day who are by no means militarists or reactionaries, but who would be delighted to see a return to the pre-war display of Government authority—a system under which Germany was prosperous, successful, and happy. Discipline is inherent in the German race, and nothing proves it better than the military formations of the Nazis, the Republican Reichsbanner, and even the Communists.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of General von Schleicher's broadcast speech is the acknowledgment by him of the impossibility of a reconstruction of normal life in Germany by force of bayonets and dictatorial decrees alone. He admitted that a

Government cannot indefinitely rely on the support of its armed forces, and must find its strength in the natural popular acceptance of its ideas and activities. And he further made the very sound and clear statement that the purpose of the army was not to keep down any one class in the interests of another; he even alluded to the fact that in no circumstances should it be misused to 'bolster up obsolete forms of economic life or intolerable conditions of ownership!' This would not appear to indicate that General von Schleicher's intention is to bring about the restoration of the monarchy or a return to pre-war conditions. What his actual purpose is no one can say. Is he a Republican? A Monarchist? Does he want an official sanction of his own dictatorship? Whichever it is, if he does not want to be swept away by the extreme radical elements of the Right and of the Left, if he does not want to be only a temporary dam to the flood of chaos and revolution, he must immediately carry through a number of urgent reforms and endeavour to give the people of Germany new work and new courage to live. And he must realise, and teach his people to realise, that the road towards recovery is not hatred and violence, but peace and co-operation.

GEORGE SOLOVEYCHIK.

SOCIALISM AND MR. KEYNES

MANY people must have wondered why Mr. Keynes is not a Socialist; and many Socialists, at one time or another, must have had hopes of his conversion. For at almost every point in his economic work where he touches on the same issues as Socialism he suggests similar conclusions. The implications of his general attitude on economic affairs, as well as in pure theory, are closely allied to Socialism; and his ideas on economic policy exercise a greater influence on the Labour movement than those of probably any other single person. Yet he is no Socialist. Why not? It is a curious problem.

Nor is it the only problem; it deepens into the larger and more important question, why is it that the most brilliant economic mind of our time, who exerts so wide an influence on economic opinion, has had so little effect upon action? His advice has been persistently neglected by those in authority at every major turning in our policy since the war; and events have proved that he was in the right, and that they were wrong—in some cases, as over the return to the gold standard, disastrously wrong. How to account for this failure to be effective?

That Mr. Keynes is aware of it is indicated by his bringing together this year his various pronouncements on economic policy,¹ to stand as a record of his advice and warnings on the economic issues of the post-war years. The record has an extraordinary quality of dramatic excitement in the reading: one watches Mr. Keynes hard at work, while the issues are impending, to persuade bankers, statesmen, industrialists to be reasonable in the interests of their own system, if not in ours; to apply intelligence to the problems that confront them, not Mumbo-Jumbo and the rule of thumb. Alas, so much in vain; for, one after another, one sees the decisions made fatally wrong. And then one notices the persuasive spirit of the publicist becoming embittered at so much futility in high places, and the sense of helplessness and defeat growing in the course of the record; until in the end, surveying his commentary on the dreary mistakes of a second-rate decade, he seems almost resigned to being

¹ *Essays in Persuasion* (Macmillan, 1932).

ineffective, and, though aware of the problem why it should have been so, unable to explain it: 'Here are collected the croakings of twelve years—' he writes, 'the croakings of a Cassandra who could never influence the course of events in time.'

The problem, though it has many facets, is really a political one. It goes down at bottom to a mistaken conception of political activity, one that is far too rationalistic, and lays an exaggerated emphasis on the part played in politics by reason and opinion. It is this that leads Mr. Keynes to attach the importance he does to appealing to the intelligence of those who direct affairs; whereas more important in politics than to hold right views is to place yourself in touch with the group interest which will make your views, when right, effective. Consequently in political tactics he has followed the hopeless line of allying himself with Liberalism, the *laissez-faire* presuppositions of which he has rejected, and of refusing, for reasons which are entirely inadequate when they are not frivolous, to put himself into relation with his effective environment, the Socialist movement, to which his economic views logically lead him and whose economics is mainly in line with his.

Let us take what I may call the rationalist fallacy underlying his view of politics. He is always bent on appealing to Public Opinion—an attitude all the more quixotic because he never goes into what sort of thing public opinion is, if indeed it is there at all! 'In one way only can we influence these hidden currents [*i.e.*, which shape events]—by setting in motion those forces of instruction and imagination which change *opinion*. The assertion of truth, the unveiling of illusion, the dissipation of hate, the enlargement and instruction of men's hearts and minds, must be the means.' No wonder he finds himself so ineffective; such an estimation of the forces at work in society, though it does every credit to his character, is almost wholly illusory. He is too much the rationalist. He sees what is reasonable to be done, and then wonders that nobody does it. Of course, they will not; that is not the way things work in society: it may not be to people's *interest* to do it, and that is what counts. There are so many interests pulling them in a different direction; if you want to understand how society works, investigate first those interests! which is what the Liberal mentality never likes to do—as if there is something indecent in the spectacle of economic interest at work.

Besides, such a mistaken estimation of forces is bound to detract from one's effectiveness, and may lead to defeat. In 1929 Mr. Keynes, in placing his policy of expansion to cure unemployment before the Liberal Party, promised them that 'Over against us, standing in the path, there is nothing but a few

old gentlemen tightly buttoned-up in their frock-coats, who only need to be treated with a little friendly disrespect and bowled over like nine-pins.' It reads very funnily; but it was Mr. Keynes who was bowled over like a nine-pin, and the old gentlemen who won—as they will always win, as long as Mr. Keynes sees the conflict in those terms.

It is curious that Mr. Keynes, whose economic views are Socialist in their implication, should in politics place his hopes upon Liberalism. It is true that from 1906, and perhaps before, Liberalism has had a genuine impulse to social legislation, and an advanced left wing which was prepared to co-operate with Socialism. But it is impossible for anyone with a historical sense to believe that Liberalism can be persuaded into changing its historic nature. As a party based essentially upon the lower middle class, the shopkeepers and small-holders, it stands, as it always has stood, for the consumer's interest and free trade. Its outlook is *laissez-faire*. Mr. Keynes set himself manfully to transform this outlook after the war to one more in accordance with the changed conditions. Discouraging as it must be to try and get the leopard to change his spots, it is no more hopeful an occupation with a tame tabby! Mr. Keynes had a factitious and temporary success with Mr. Lloyd George, who, fishing in a bottomless pool for the shrimps of office, was glad of anything in the nature of bait and leaped at the *Liberal Yellow Book* and the Unemployment Scheme. These, as publications, are not to be despised: they have all the brilliant inventiveness of Mr. Keynes's mind. The shortcomings were the shortcomings of his political judgment: first, to suppose that you have only to lay before the electorate a brilliant policy and it will respond; second, to imagine that historic Liberalism could transform itself into the exact opposite of all that it has ever stood for. For the purposes of the election, it made the attempt; the results were not encouraging to further experiment. It is clear now that such Liberalism as survives has reverted with Sir Herbert Samuel to *laissez-faire*; that Mr. Lloyd George's leadership has come to an end, and with it Mr. Keynes's hopes of reviving Liberalism on Socialist lines. The most surprising thing is that he should have continued so long to cherish such hopes of the Liberal Party.

In the realm of pure theory Mr. Keynes has been the foremost critic of *laissez-faire*, sapping and undermining the supports upon which, intellectually, Liberalism rests. As early as 1923, in the *Tract on Monetary Reform*, he wrote: 'I think that it is not safe or fair to combine the social organisation developed during the nineteenth century (and still retained) with a *laissez-faire* policy towards the value of money.' In his *Economic Consequences of*

Mr. Churchill, two years later, he develops the same point in relation to wages policy :

The truth is that we stand midway between two theories of economic society. The one theory maintains that wages should be fixed by reference to what is 'fair' and 'reasonable' as between classes. The other theory—the theory of the economic Juggernaut—is that wages should be settled by economic pressure, otherwise called 'hard facts,' and that our vast machine should crash along, with regard only to its equilibrium as a whole, and without attention to the chance consequences of the journey to individual groups.

After this, it was not unexpected (though at the time it caused a sensation) that he should have declared a final breach with the system of *laissez-faire* principles in his lecture at Oxford: *The End of Laissez-Faire*. In it he invited us

to clear from the ground the metaphysical or general principles upon which . . . *laissez-faire* has been founded. It is *not* true that individuals possess a prescriptive 'natural liberty' in their economic activities. There is no 'compact' conferring perpetual rights on those who Have or those who Acquire. The world is *not* so governed from above that private and social interest always coincide. It is *not* a correct deduction from the principles of Economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest generally is enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these. Experience does *not* show that individuals, when they make up a social unit, are always less clear-sighted than when they act separately.

It is a heroic effort to throw off the presuppositions of a lifetime, to think himself free, if such a thing is possible, from the cast of mind which has moulded his own. It is a manifesto against *laissez-faire*; but it is a negative manifesto. He says in it what it is that he does not accept; if you piece out the pattern of principles which he rejects, what is there that remains positively except the general principles upon which Socialism rests?

There is, in any case, a large measure of agreement between him and Socialism as regards current policy. On all the three major controversies of the post-war period, into which Mr. Keynes 'plunged himself without reserve'—the Treaty of Peace and the War Debts, the Policy of Deflation and the Return to the Gold Standard—he has had more consistent support for his point of view from Socialists than from anybody else. Similarly he has been in sympathy with their case as regards the social services; he has made their preservation and development a main consideration in his resistance to deflation and its consequent creation of unemployment. He has pointed out the unfairness of its incidence upon different classes in the community; he has shown how the coal miners have been peculiarly the victims of our

monetary policy. Similarly, at the time of the May Report, and again with the National Government's Economy Bill of 1931, he protested with indignation at the injustice and unwisdom of placing yet worse burdens on the most depressed classes while still further contracting purchasing power and productive enterprise. His part in all these conflicts reveals a remarkable sympathy for the working class, and a rare understanding of how the economic impact of capitalist society weighs most heavily on them in the end.

Again, with his conception of the public concern as a model for large-scale enterprise in the transition to Socialism, he is in line with current Socialist opinion. Mr. Keynes popularised the conception in the *Liberal Yellow Book*; but it was Mr. Herbert Morrison who gave these ideas their practical embodiment in the London Traffic Bill. He arrived at this conception by the same path as Socialist critics of Capitalism; like them, he observed 'the tendency of big enterprise to socialise itself. . . . We see here, I think, a natural line of evolution. The battle of Socialism against unlimited private profit is being won in detail hour by hour.' He agrees that the trend has not gone far enough and must be carried farther: 'It is true that many big undertakings, particularly public utility enterprises and other business requiring a large fixed capital, still need to be semi-socialised.' And he suggests

that progress lies in the growth and the recognition of semi-autonomous bodies within the State—bodies whose criterion of action within their own field is solely the public good as they understand it, and from whose deliberations motives of private advantage are excluded—bodies which in the ordinary course of affairs are mainly autonomous within their prescribed limitations, but are subject in the last resort to the sovereignty of the democracy expressed through Parliament.

His scheme begins to look oddly like Guild Socialism: 'I propose a return, it may be said, towards medieval conceptions of separate autonomies.' Certainly it is open to the chief objection against Guild Socialism—its inadequate provision for the co-ordinating functions of the State. But even more strongly; for at this point there is a lacuna in Mr. Keynes's ideas, and he provides no means of integrating these various discrete corporations and bringing them effectively into relation with the general political structure. Again, it is his conception of politics which is lacking, a failure to draw out the necessary political conclusions from the right economic premises. It may be said that he looks to a measure of monetary control for this; but it is not monetary control that would effect this particular purpose: it needs the integrating power of the State itself, on a very comprehensive

conception of the State's powers. In short, it requires the Socialist State.

No one has pursued the campaign for monetary control in itself with more constancy and force; the idea that this country could subsist on a managed currency at all may almost be said to be Mr. Keynes's creation. Very early on, before our return to the gold standard, he was arguing for a system of monetary control which should be manipulated in the interest of productive enterprise and employment, instead of that of the *rentier* class and of our foreign lending. Such 'a deliberate control of the currency and of credit by a central institution' he regarded as the best means to cure many of the greatest economic evils of our time—the great inequalities of wealth, unemployment, the slowing down of production owing to the failure to expand either profits or demand. And there is the further corollary of this control, in the field of savings and investment:

I believe that some co-ordinated act of intelligent judgment is required as to the scale on which it is desirable that the community as a whole should save, the scale on which these savings should go abroad in the form of foreign investments, and whether the present organisation of the investment market distributes savings along the most nationally productive channels. I do not think that these matters should be left entirely to the chances of private judgment and private profits, as they are at present.

In the later *Treatise on Money* he elaborates the view that the lack of co-ordination between savings and investment is a main cause of trade depression; and he urges that the decisions as to the proportions of the flow of future output should be made by the same people who decide how much is to be saved. Without prejudice to the theoretical question, what is this but what the Bolsheviks in fact do?

With this he definitely crosses the frontier between Capitalism and Socialism. Up to this point his views, though in line with Socialist thought, might reasonably be regarded as not going beyond the bounds of the new Liberalism. But with this control over foreign investment he is laying his hands on the central citadel of Capitalism. For some reason he regards this advance as merely an 'improvement in the technique of modern Capitalism,' and not at all incompatible with it. I suspect it to be due to his not defining Capitalism clearly enough, for he says that its essential characteristic is 'the dependence upon an intense appeal to the money-making and money-loving instincts of individuals as the main motive force of the economic machine.' Surely this is not an adequate differentia? For one can imagine a *régime* based on the appeal to money-making which was not capitalistic for all that. Is it not rather the fact that this society based on

money-making is manipulated by individuals who are irresponsible to it that makes the difference? So that one might, theoretically, retain the appeal to money-love, but operating in the conditions of an egalitarian society; and it would not be Capitalism. The difference is constituted by the fact that power, in a capitalist society, is the result of economic inequality, and is held irresponsibly—that is to say, on terms laid down by itself, and not by society. However, it is a far more serious consideration that divides him from Capitalism on the issue of savings and investment. It is a struggle of power; and for all his seductions, capitalists are not likely to give up the key to the control of their system.

But he has some uncomfortable words to say to them concerning this indispensable part of the machine:

The system [*i.e.*, of foreign investment] is fragile; and it has only survived because its burden on the paying countries has not so far been oppressive, because this burden is represented by real assets and is bound up with the property system generally, and because the sums already lent are not unduly large in relation to those which it is still hoped to borrow. *Bankers are used to this system, and believe it to be a necessary part of the permanent order of society.* . . . The practice of foreign investment is a very modern contrivance, a very unstable one, and only suited to peculiar circumstances.

But it lies at the root of Capitalism in its most developed form; economic imperialism could not survive, in the form we know it, without finding foreign markets in which to invest its surpluses and from which to draw its raw materials. What, then, does Mr. Keynes think of the future of Capitalism in this country without the stress on foreign investment? He might answer that he looks to the time when most of these surpluses will be devoted to raising the standard of living inside the country and to re-equipping industry; in that respect his aim is the same as the Bolsheviks'. But does he think that can come about, without the State having a great deal more control over private Capitalism than there is in being or than Capitalism allows for? True, he is in favour of some such instrument as a Board of National Investment to control the allotment of surpluses as between home and abroad, industry and industry. But so far there is no disposition whatever on the part of capitalists to admit the insufficiency of their own system or to agree to any control of investment by a State Board such as Mr. Keynes has suggested.

There are other reasons for regarding Capitalism as unstable, without some such control as would transform its nature—reasons connected with the general mechanism of money and credit, which no one has done more to elucidate than Mr. Keynes. In the *Tract on Monetary Reform* he first investigated this element of instability due to the dependence of the system upon a monetary

standard which is liable to great fluctuations in value; he estimated the social consequences of these changes and showed that it is precisely because Capitalism leaves saving and investment to the individual, without imposing a social control, that the instability of money values is liable to be all the more disastrous to the whole machine. 'The Individualistic Capitalism of to-day, precisely because it entrusts saving to the individual investor and production to the individual employer, *presumes* a stable measuring-rod of value, and cannot be efficient—perhaps cannot survive—without one.' The post-war period has revealed the insecurity of the foundations upon which Capitalism built; and even the most convinced believers in the eternity of the system must be considerably shaken by now. The effect has been electric in every direction; to take only the most obvious of its consequences: the throwing out of gear of the relations between creditor and debtor countries; the similar maladjustment between creditor and debtor interests *within* countries; the disturbance to the expectation of profit which has had such a destructive effect upon productive enterprise. Any one of them is enough to deal a severe blow at the stability of the system. In order that enterprise may be given a normal expectation of return for its work, Mr. Keynes would provide for the redistribution of wealth when necessary, as he would have welcomed a capital levy after the war, to reduce the claims of the *rentier* interest upon production. On the question how far Capitalism can survive the instability of its monetary standard he says:

Modern Capitalism is faced with the choice between finding some way to increase money values towards their former figure, or seeing widespread insolvencies and defaults and the collapse of a large part of the financial structure;—after which, we should all start again, not nearly so much poorer as we should expect, and much more cheerful perhaps, but having suffered a period of waste and disturbance and social injustice, and a general rearrangement of private fortunes and ownership of wealth.

This passage might be described as the Prelude to Socialism. Nor does Mr. Keynes differ from Socialists in his conception of the transition from Capitalism to what can only be called Socialism: 'the transition from economic anarchy to a *régime* which deliberately aims at controlling and directing economic forces in the interests of social justice and social stability.'

In what, then, consists the difference between Mr. Keynes and most Socialists? It is very hard to find any fundamental divergence of principle in their aims, or in the way they envisage the economic problems of society. Perhaps it may be said that they diverge in their estimation of the importance of the *entrepreneur* and the treatment he would receive in a Socialist State. But this is doubtful. Mr. Keynes sets great store by the active

spirit of business enterprise. Doubtless it is very precious; and under the existing system it operates best through the encouragement offered by monetary rewards. But that does not mean that without these it would not operate at all. Power is what it wants most; and if given power—a Socialist State would give it power all right—it should have no difficulty in working within the social conditions prescribed by the system. If it wants power, it should be prepared to make such sacrifice of the mere accessories of power under the existing order as would be necessary under the conditions of the new. Surely it would be willing to give up its conventional standard of living, to forego the comforts of its present social *milieu* if necessary? The point is whether, given the chance of reorganising the heavy industries of the country, or running the Bank of England or the traffic of London, you would not be prepared to give up your house in Park Lane in order to qualify under Socialism. No one with the real desire for executive power would hesitate for a moment—any more than a great manager like Krassin did on the outbreak of the Russian Revolution. Still this remains a very important issue for Socialism: upon what terms the very able administrative and managing class in this country will come over to it. If they are as clever as we are led to suppose, they ought to be able to see that their future is with Socialism, not against it. The cracks in the existing edifice are too patent; and the consequences are liable to affect them adversely. For example, one of them is the liability of the attackers to confuse the *entrepreneurs* with the leisured class; another is that the system of differential rewards no longer functions properly on the old basis. Under joint-stock enterprise, particularly in its later developments, responsibility can no longer be brought immediately home to the individual business man, as Capitalism assumes. If he is inefficient, he goes on being inefficient; he probably does not become a bankrupt. So that we have under the present system—it is a notorious cause of inefficiency—what the *Liberal Yellow Book* called 'the pocket-boroughs of industry.' It is all very well to point them out to a laggard public; but what hope is there of dealing with them unless by transforming the system?

Mr. Keynes has a soft spot in his heart for the *entrepreneur*; and this affection leads him at times to overstep his own logic and allot him a larger part in the economic system than his premises allow. For example: 'The intensity of production is largely governed in existing conditions by the anticipated real profit of the *entrepreneur*. Yet this criterion is the right one for the community as a whole only when the delicate adjustment of interests is not upset by fluctuations in the standard of value.' Is this a good enough criterion, indeed? Of course not; there are

other conditions to be fulfilled besides stability in the standard of value before it can be admitted that the profit of the *entrepreneur* is the criterion of the community's welfare. We can all agree with his recognition of the constructive capacity of the *entrepreneur* class. In his criticism of Mr. H. G. Wells's *Clissold* he underlines Mr. Wells's intuition that a constructive revolution cannot possibly be carried through by the sentimentalists and pseudo-intellectuals of the Labour movement, who have 'feelings in the place of ideas.' In Mr. Wells's view, at least in *Clissold*, 'the creative intellect of mankind is not to be found in these quarters but among the scientists and the great modern business men. Unless we can harness to the job this type of mind and character and temperament, it can never be put through—for it is a task of immense practical complexity and intellectual difficulty.' But he sees more clearly than Mr. Wells that 'they lack altogether the kind of motive, the possession of which, if they had it, could be expressed by saying that they had a creed. They have no creed, these potential open conspirators, no creed whatever.' And even on a more restricted ground, whether the aims of the business man should prevail in the organisation of society, he is with us: 'We doubt whether the business man is leading us to a destination far better than our present place. Regarded as a means he is tolerable; regarded as an end he is not so satisfactory.' In the result, his criticism of capitalist society becomes this, that though he regards it as more efficient technically than any other alternative system, he regards it as inadequate on social grounds.

For my part, I think that Capitalism, wisely managed, can probably be made more efficient than any alternative system yet in sight, but that in itself it is in many ways extremely objectionable. Our problem is to work out a social organisation which shall be as efficient as possible without offending our notions of a satisfactory way of life.

One wonders whether he is so convinced now, as when he wrote that, that Capitalism can be made so much more efficient and yet remain capitalist. And as for the problem, no Socialist would take exception to his statement of it.

Why, then, does he hold aloof in this curious, and apparently inexplicable, isolation? In my view, it is due to a defect of political vision—a defect which, I hasten to add, is not irreparable. When he writes on politics he displays little of the characteristic excellences of his technical work. He is liable to make a howler, even—as when he identifies public opinion with Rousseau's General Will. He would hardly have committed this crime of mistaken identity if he had been brought up at Oxford instead of at Cambridge! Rousseau's notion of the General Will is a much more profound concept; it is something much more allied to the

ideal of the common interest of society. Whereas public opinion means—well, what? Mr. Keynes has the idea that the function of the publicist is to be concerned with what public opinion should be, to form it rather than to take his cue from it. But ought not the first business of a writer on public affairs to be to know what public opinion is, and how it is made up? He would find it a reflection of group interests, lagging somewhat behind them in its expression of their needs. Sometimes so much so, it may even cease to serve the ultimate interest of the group it is intended for. However, it remains, whether enlightened or not—more often not—a psychological state moulded in accordance with the class organisation of society. It is merely an example of the rationalist fallacy to suppose that it moves by its own volition.

This excessive rationalism of outlook, to which Liberals are peculiarly susceptible—Tories have no illusions in the matter—has made him fail to understand the relations that subsist between party and class. His objection to the Labour Party is that it is a class party. The Liberal Party is not a class party: it is 'disinterested as between classes.' One has heard it so often that it might appear to be a platitude—if it were not an obvious falsehood. All parties are class parties; the differences between them are the differences between the classes of which they are constituted. It is absurd to complain of the Labour Party that it appeals to the class feeling of the working class. Would indeed that it did a little more forcefully! Is it necessarily a bad thing to appeal to class feeling? Would the *régime* of feudal privilege have been abolished in France by the Revolution if it had not appealed to the class hatred of the *bourgeoisie* for the aristocracy? That may be appealed to, it seems: at least, it is allowed by all Liberal opinion; but to the legitimate feeling of the working class, not. This frame of mind goes along with the defence for themselves—everybody is always ready with a defence for himself—that *they* care particularly for Truth. They want to find out what the truth is—they want to be free of the connexions and the class associations which hinder other people from the pure service of the truth. As if such a state of theoretical nudity were possible, however desirable it may be! We also want to get at truth; though we have not so simple and naïf a view of its nature. (When one sometimes crosses the tracks of the pure devotees of the truth in action, one is tempted to ask if their view of it is not a more subtle sort of deceit intended to advance their all too practical ends.) We know how it is always the people who are in search of pure truth, who neglect the bias which interest—both of the group and of the self—exerts upon the mind, and who are always the most blind to the way in which class associations affect their own outlook. The only remedy is to

bring all such economic and psychological bias into the foreground and make it explicitly a part of your thought—which is a radical principle of Marxism.

Mr. Keynes's point of view is far too realistic for this to be specially applicable to him; it rather marks him off from the common ruck of Liberals. When it comes to the point, he can give expression to a realistic view that is refreshing, if crude.

Ought I then to join the Labour Party? Superficially that is more attractive. But looked at closer, there are great difficulties. To begin with, it is a class party, and the class is not my class. If I am going to pursue sectional interests at all, I shall pursue my own. When it comes to the class-struggle as such, my local and personal patriotisms, like those of everyone else, except certain unpleasant zealous ones, are attached to my own surroundings. I can be influenced by what seems to me Justice and good sense; but the *Class* war will find me on the side of the educated *bourgeoisie*.

Now this is altogether too restricted a view; its danger is that, just for lack of making one further step, it may land its holder in pure cynicism. Which would be a pity; for his great gifts should be at the service of the community. But in these terms of interest and class it is possible to understand each other. Let us try now to close the gap. How if the interest of the working class were more closely identified with that of the whole than any other sectional interest? How if it were the only possible basis for that drawing together of the closest bonds between peoples which Mr. Keynes has worked so devotedly for? So devotedly, and so much in vain; for it looks as if it is not possible to bring about any real co-operation through the governing classes of the world, to whom Mr. Keynes has exclusively looked in the past. Can it be that the only lasting foundation is to be found in the working classes of the world? *Workers of the world, Unite?* If so, if it can only be brought about on this basis, then it needs the concentration of all the ability we have to the task. But the most brilliant mind in England remains sulking in his tent.

It is only a figure of speech and may be thought an unjust one. For, indeed, Mr. Keynes can claim that he has struggled manfully for right and justice, and more consistently than most, on all the great issues since the war. More, he has been right about them all, and in the teeth of prevailing opinion. But that is precisely the tragedy of the situation. It is a melancholy satisfaction for a man to know that he has been right all the time, and that nobody in power took any notice of what he said. Why should this be? He has been unfortunate in that he was a Liberal in the time of the decay of Liberalism. But it goes deeper than that; nor is he without fault in the matter himself. He has not cared to bring about a right relation to the one movement that could make him

effective. It is not only exact thinking, good leadership, and a programme that are necessary. To suppose that they are enough is the kind of mistake a rationalist, an intellectual, would make. In making his appeal to Liberalism he offered all these: 'We must take risks of unpopularity and derision. Then our meetings will draw crowds and our body be infused with strength.' They took these risks: the crowds did not come; for crowds do not respond to programmes. They respond to *interests* that they have in common; it is the work of the real leader to clarify these and to direct them to the right social ends. As for ideas and programmes, the movement is more important than either; what it is, will determine what it will do. And if the intellectual is really to be of use, he will use his intellect, not to make superficial points, like those that are so easy to make against the Labour movement—and Mr. Keynes makes them all—but to understand what it implies and whether by working through the working-class movement the changes he desires, along with us, may come about. If he begins to consider this, he may realise that they will not come about on any other basis.

It is difficult to see that there is any rational reason for his refusal to cross the frontier in politics, when he has already done so very amply in economics. It must be due to some emotional inhibition. The emotional reaction is impossible to mistake in what he has written with regard to Communism. 'How can I accept a doctrine,' he says, 'which sets up as its bible, above and beyond criticism, an obsolete economic text-book which I know to be not only scientifically erroneous but without interest or application for the modern world?' Can it be that he has been defeated in the attempt to read Marx, or that he has never tried? I have long suspected the one or the other. It is certainly very easy to be defeated by '*Das Kapital*,' though it is no more out of date than, say, Mill or Ricardo. But it is a purely emotional judgment to say that it is 'without interest or application for the modern world': would he be so certain of it now as he was then? Or again: 'How can I adopt a creed which, preferring the mud to the fish, exalts the boorish proletariat above the *bourgeois* and the *intelligentsia* who, with whatever faults, are the quality in life and surely carry the seeds of all human advancement?' That 'surely' strikes a note of inner uncertainty. Of course, the proletariat are sadly lacking in all that they should be, viewed from the region of Bloomsbury. But for all that, theirs may be the creative *role* in modern society; when his own *bourgeois* are losing their constructive power in politics, and nobody has demonstrated their economic failures better than he has himself. When Christianity first arose, to be a world movement, it sprang, not from the Pharisees, nor even from the

Sadducees, but from a handful of doubtless very unsatisfactory fishermen. True, it was given the organisation it needed by a thorough *bourgeois*, St. Paul; but it is a *rôle* that is always open to be filled by any *bourgeois* that volunteers, though Lenin has staked out rather an impressive claim to it.

And one wonders how much of the ill-balanced cocksureness of 1925, as to the significance and achievement of Communism, has survived with the years. 'On the economic side I cannot perceive that Russian Communism has made any contribution to our economic problems of intellectual interest or scientific value.' Would he be so certain of it now, or of this?—

I do not think that it contains, or is likely to contain, any piece of useful economic technique which we could not apply, if we chose, with equal or greater success in a society which contained all the marks, I will not say of nineteenth-century individualistic Capitalism, but of British *bourgeois* ideals.

For it may be that these same *bourgeois* ideals forbid any significant change in the nature of the system, and that for that you will have to look to the working-class movement for leverage.

It is not dissimilar, as we have seen, to his attitude to Socialism in England. He says of it: 'Socialism offers no middle course [*i.e.*, between the old *laissez-faire* and the new *régime* of control], because it also is sprung from the presuppositions of the Era of Abundance, just as much as *laissez-faire* individualism and the free play of economic forces.' A pedantic point, which can be replied to equally pedantically by pointing out that it sprang from precisely those classes which enjoyed least abundance. Of the inner constitution of the Labour movement he has, like most Liberals, a fantastic notion; the trade unionists with the Communists cheek by jowl play nefarious *rôles*.

The Labour Party contains three elements. There are the trade unionists, once the oppressed, now the tyrants, whose selfish and sectional pretensions need to be bravely opposed. There are the advocates of the methods of violence and sudden change, by an abuse of language called Communists, who are committed by their creed to produce evil that good may come, and since they dare not concoct disaster openly, are forced to play with plot and subterfuge. There are the Socialists, who believe that the economic foundations of modern society are evil, yet might be good.

He goes on to add: 'The company and conversation of this third element, whom I have called Socialists, many Liberals to-day would not find uncongenial.' He conceives that there is much sympathy between them, and a similar tendency of ideas; and that they will draw nearer together in constructive work as times goes on. In the end, the only difference he arrives at between Socialism and his own version of Liberalism is 'a certain

coolness of temper, such as Lord Oxford has, and seems to me peculiarly Liberal in flavour.' One may easily over-estimate the importance of coolness of temper in politics; and anyhow, Lord Oxford is unquestionably dead.

Mr. Keynes's economic ideas, I have shown, imply Socialism. Then why does he not draw the necessary conclusions from his economics in the political sphere? It is due, again, to the exaggerated rationalism of his outlook on politics; he fails to go on from the economic principles he has laid bare to the necessary institutions which embody them in society. It is that typical *bourgeois* phenomenon, the victory of the technician over the power to conceive society as a comprehensive whole. It is the same rationalist fallacy which leads him to choose his political home on the principle of repulsion, rather than the principle of attraction, and 'to go to those whom he dislikes least'; the same fallacy leads him to misconceive the necessary *rôle* of trade unions in politics and to dislike their association; it leads him to suppose that the unthinking mass of the modern electorate may be won with bright ideas, and their political allegiances changed by programmes; it led him to make his famous invitation over the wireless to the public to go out and spend their cash, the ridiculousness of which ordinary common sense at once saw through; for what was the point of going out and spending all you had while the claims of the debt holder and the *rentier* and the income tax collector remained what they were? Yet it is very revealing of the man that his essential economic ideas lead him to a position which he rejects on emotional grounds, while at the same time, when viewing the mass of the people in politics, whose behaviour is instinctive, barely conscious and anything but rational, he insists on applying a rationalist technique, fit only for a don's domestic affairs. How provoking the most intelligent of mortals can be! There he remains, betwixt and between—an inescapable influence upon the thought of his time, and with no discernible effect upon action. Yet he will not take the last and obvious step to it. Like Newman at Littlemore, he prolongs the agonies unconscionably, while those who watch outside see more clearly the right and inevitable step. And yet, even now, it is possible he may never make the journey from Littlemore to Edgbaston.

On the other hand, there are some signs he may. He reveals again and again his perception that what society needs is a creed. He seems to understand this need perhaps better than Mr. Wells does; at least, it is the ground on which he criticises *The World of William Clissold*. But when he comes to look into the future himself, the *Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren*, with all his optimism as to economic progress, he has nothing to say, or

but little, as to our spiritual need. We find he is only saying that in the future we shall have more and more material comforts. But if this is all that the Communists meant by their Revolution it would not have been worth the sacrifice. They intended not only the increase of material comfort, but the creation of a Just Society. He combines, then, this pathetic desire for a creed with an inability to believe in one. For such a person there is only an intellectual persuasion that remains. Having seen its necessity, he may be open to persuasion as to the source from which alone it can come ; and we may expect a reasonable act of imagination towards a system, not of his own fashioning nor of his own environment, but that is nevertheless necessary for the world.

A. L. ROWSE.

COAL: THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

THE purpose of this article is to give a brief introduction to some of the questions in connexion with the coal industry, of which much will be heard during the coming year. The pious wish, so often expressed, that now at last there is some prospect that mining matters may be kept out of politics was never more surely destined to be disappointed, and the reorganisation of our staple industry is one of the most important and difficult tasks before the National Government.

It should not, of course, be necessary to stress the vital importance of coal to this country, for it is common knowledge that, as the source of supply of unlimited cheap power, it was the keystone in the arch of British commercial supremacy in the last century. But it is not generally realised that even to-day it plays a pivotal rôle in the whole structure of British trade and industry. It is the largest individual item in our export trade, for although in value it only amounted to 8·9 per cent. of the total in 1931, in weight it represented nearly 81 per cent. of our exports, and therefore provided the bulk of our outward cargoes. It is also important to remember that coal is the only natural product which we export, and thus it is the only export upon which we can always count to pay for our imports, and into whose structure no imported article enters. Again, approximately 10 per cent. of the population of Great Britain are more or less directly dependent upon the prosperity of the mining industry, for, including about 300,000 unemployed, there are about 1,100,000 miners: taking these, their wives and families, and the other inhabitants of mining towns, such as shopkeepers and doctors, a figure of over 4,000,000 is easily reached. In addition it must be borne in mind that as the mining population is concentrated in, and monopolises, more or less well-defined areas, the social and financial consequences of the collapse of the whole or part of the industry would be of extraordinary gravity for the country as a whole.

The quantities of coal raised and disposed of in 1913 and 1931 and an estimate for 1932 are, respectively, 287, 219 and 208 millions of tons. Of these totals, exports account for 73, 42,

and somewhere between 31 and 35 million tons. The number of miners employed has dropped from a maximum of nearly 1,200,000 to about 835,000, and a large proportion of the latter are habitually working short time. It is not necessary, then, to emphasise the gravity of the situation, but it may be of interest to give some brief account of the reasons for the steady decline in the sale of British coal both at home and abroad.

A heavy blow has been dealt to the industry by the increased use of oil. For most marine purposes its advantages are overwhelming, with the result that by 1931 42·8 per cent. of the tonnage registered at Lloyd's was oil-driven, the corresponding figure for 1914 being 3·4 per cent. Taking the Royal Navy alone, the coal consumption in 1931 was only 8 per cent. of pre-war. In industry the use of oil is increasing every day, and the same applies even to domestic appliances for cooking and heating. Another important factor affecting the demand for coal is improved technical practice in fuel economy, which has resulted in a substantial reduction of unit consumption. This is particularly noticeable in the iron and steel, gas and electricity industries, while even in the coal industry the amount of coal consumed in colliery boilers is proportionately less than formerly. Statistics are tedious, and it will suffice to quote the electricity industry as an example, where, comparing 1930 with 1921, the number of units generated went up by 138·7 per cent., but the amount of coal consumed only increased by 35·5 per cent. It is true, of course, that the present depression in the heavy industries accounts for much of the decrease in consumption, but even were those industries restored to prosperity, the factors above mentioned would prevent, in an ever-increasing degree, any return to pre-war figures of the quantity of coal used.

So much for the home trade; the export trade not only suffers from the same causes, but also has other difficulties to contend with. Countries which before the war were partially dependent upon imported coal have, either in the course of normal economic development or in order to render themselves more self-sufficient, increased their own production to a remarkable extent. Particularly striking are the figures for Holland (500 per cent. increase), Spain, Japan, the Union of South Africa, Indo-China, and British India. Then the world production of lignite (brown coal), which is not found in this country, increased, as between 1913 and 1929, from 127 to 226 million metric tons; in Germany alone, comparing 1930 with 1913 (present territory), production increased by 58 million tons. Again, in Scandinavia, Italy and Switzerland, as well as in other countries, hydro-electric power has severely cut into the market for imported coal. These are purely natural factors; there are in addition certain political

influences of even greater consequence. In the last twelve years Germany has delivered 142 million tons of Reparation coal to France, Belgium and Italy, and of this quantity certainly the 34½ million tons delivered to Italy prevented corresponding orders coming to this country. But this is nothing to the damage done to us by the creation of Poland as an independent State. By *plébiscite* and *coup-de-main* Poland secured most of the Silesian coalfields, and the maintenance of their mixed population in a reasonable degree of contentment is a matter of pivotal importance for the whole country. As they have been deprived of their natural markets in Central Europe, this has only been made possible by the creation of an artificial export trade through Danzig and Gdynia. It is artificial, because only by the aid of a large State subvention, whether direct or by way of reduced transport rates, can the Silesian coalfields, which are about 360 miles from the coast, compete against British coal in the world markets. Incidentally, the inroads of Polish coal were inconsiderable until we presented the Polish coal-owners with a golden opportunity, which was eagerly seized, by the stoppage of 1926. This gave them an invaluable footing in Scandinavia and elsewhere, and the low price and high quality of their coal have enabled them to consolidate the position thus gratuitously yielded to them. The net result is that to-day Poland is our most serious rival, not only in Europe, but all over the world.

There remains yet one other factor which has contributed to the loss of our export coal trade. This is the system of import restriction, commonly called the quota system, which has been adopted within the last year by France, Belgium, and Germany successively, and which has been applied with particular and, according to the British thesis, with discriminatory severity against this country. The question is complicated, and it is enough to say that in a full year, at the present quota rates, we shall probably suffer a loss of at least 7 million tons. Side by side with the progressive limitation of markets, both at home and abroad, the actual or potential supply of coal has increased. This has been chiefly due to improved methods of coal-getting, particularly to the increased use of coal-cutters and conveyors. It is difficult to give with any accuracy the present potential output of this country, but estimates vary between 300 and 330 million tons per annum. The result has been to create a state of disequilibrium between supply and demand, which is rapidly becoming more and more menacing, and which would have led by now to a crisis of the first magnitude were it not for certain steps which have been taken with a view to its postponement or mitigation.

Although recent developments, particularly the present world

crisis, have aggravated the critical position of the industry, the situation was already sufficiently disturbing in 1930 to induce the then Labour Government to attempt by legislative action to regulate the industry, and to prevent the catastrophe which was threatening. The Coal Mines Act of 1930 is of immense importance, as it represents the first example of large-scale State interference with private enterprise in a major industry upon which a British Government has ever embarked in time of peace. The ostensible reason for the introduction of the Act of 1930 was to enable the Labour Government to implement its election promise of a return to the seven-hour day in the mines and to prevent the need for any reduction in wages. It appeared that the only way to achieve this end was to maintain or raise the selling price of coal. It was equally clear that this could only be done by fixing prices, limiting output, and eliminating cut-throat competition. Part I. of the Act of 1930 provided for the setting up of elaborate machinery with these objects. Put briefly, there was instituted a Central Council 'composed of representatives of all the owners of coal mines in the several districts' whose main duty is to allocate to each district 'a maximum output for the district.' This is usually done quarterly, but in the case of a sudden increase in demand, such as that which was caused (temporarily) by our departure from the gold standard, additional tonnage can be allocated at fairly short notice. District boards were also set up whose duty was to assess the standard tonnage (subject, of course, to revision) of each colliery in the district and to determine 'the proportion (in this Act referred to as the "quota") of the standard tonnage which each of the coal mines in the district is to be allowed to produce.' The district boards also have the task of fixing minimum prices for each class of coal produced in the district. The Board of Trade has powers, under this part of the Act, to amend or alter both the central and district schemes, upon representations to that effect being made to them by the respective councils. Although any such amendment or alteration is subject to the approval of Parliament, this is practically equivalent to giving the owners a free hand in this respect—a power of which they have not yet availed themselves. This section of the Act is rather ill-defined, and probably legislation would be required for any very extensive amendments. The rest of the Act is of minor importance. Part II. set up a Reorganisation Commission to assist and suggest amalgamations; Part III. dealt temporarily with hours; and Part IV. gave powers to the Board of Trade to constitute a National Board for the industry. The owners refused to have anything to do with the National Board, and Part IV. has remained a dead letter.

Part I. was originally due to expire on December 31, 1932,

but by the Coal Mines Act of 1932 its operation has been extended for a further period of five years. The Act has therefore been in operation for over a year and a half, and there is enough data for an inquiry into the degree of success which it has achieved. It has certainly achieved something, for, ignoring for the moment the decline in output which has already been dealt with, the industry stands where it did, both as regards wages and prices. This, in the present economic state of the world, is something to be thankful for, as it has saved us from the otherwise inevitable vicious spiral of competition, price cutting (except *sub rosa*), wage reductions, and strikes. On the debit side of the account the entries are more numerous. The attack is led by those who maintain that any interference with the natural effects of the laws of supply and demand is in itself a mistake. They urge that the results of free competition will in the end provide the solution to the problem of the disequilibrium between production and consumption, by forcing the less economic and less efficient pits to close down. They consider that it is not in the best interests of the wage-earner to attempt to maintain wages by interference with natural laws. This type of argument, or rather dogma, is familiar, though its familiarity does not necessarily invalidate it. Going into greater detail, it is alleged that the system of fixed prices has gravely injured the export trade, as nothing is easier than for the foreign rival to ascertain our prices and then quote just below them. It is pointed out that the quota system merely bolsters up the inefficient pit at the expense of the efficient, as the latter are forced to share with others an output which, under conditions of free competition, they could command themselves. It is also said that the honest producer is penalised by the fact that his competitors evade the fixed minimum prices by scores of tricks and artifices, such as selling to subsidiary selling agencies, who themselves are not bound by the minimum prices, or by invoicing a superior grade of coal under the name and at the price of an inferior grade. Many criticisms are of course made of the details of the Act, such as that the Central Council is powerless to stop inter-district competition, and that there is nothing to prevent one district from fixing prices too low in relation to other districts; Scotland is cited as a particularly bad offender in this respect. Finally, it is said that once you start on the policy of State interference you cannot stop—that having given the industry a crutch, it will never again be able to walk without it.

Generalisations are always dangerous, but they are unfortunately unavoidable in dealing with such a vast and complex subject. Speaking generally, then, it is agreed that the wages question alone puts a return to unrestricted competition out of the question, as any attempt to reduce them further would be

resisted to the uttermost by the men, and, taking into consideration their present level, could hardly be supported by the Government. It is also generally admitted that such price reductions as would be brought about by a fall in wage costs would not result in greatly increased sales, the root cause of the depression in the industry being the absence of demand and the restriction of markets rather than the high price of the article itself. This is the pivot of the whole situation, for, if it is conceded that wage reductions are not practical politics, it must be clear that some form of regulation, both of output and of selling, is unavoidable. It is obvious, too, that the present system set up under Part I. of the Act is rapidly approaching the point where evasions and subterfuges make it so ridiculous that alterations are imperative. The future is not clear, but it is safe to prophesy that the present system of fixing minimum prices will go, and it is possible that it will be replaced by some form of district selling organisation combined with overriding central powers to prevent inter-district competition. The particular difficulties of the export trade will probably also be dealt with by co-ordinated selling without fixed prices. But even with this degree of reorganisation the export trade will be crippled unless the Government can conclude satisfactory bilateral agreements with foreign countries generally, and especially with those who are mainly dependent upon the British market for the disposal of their agricultural produce.

The problem of the elimination of the so-called uneconomic pit is more involved. It is difficult to see how the humane suffocation of the redundant producer, even if and when you have decided which producer is redundant, can be achieved without some scheme of purchase by the more prosperous undertakings. If no such scheme is instituted, undoubtedly, in the course of time, the gap between supply and demand would close up; but a coal mine is, like Charles II., 'an unconscionable time a-dying.' In most cases a mine is forced into liquidation by foreclosure on the part of the debenture-holders or the bank. The undertaking is then purchased for a much smaller sum than the total of the original capital, and, relieved of most of the fixed charges which originally caused its downfall, it carries on until the process is repeated perhaps three or four times more. Thus it is usually several years before a mine sinks so low in the economic scale that it is finally shut down for good; even then there is always the risk that a temporary boom in trade may induce some enterprising individual to open it up again. If the necessity for a co-operative extinction scheme is admitted, you are at once faced with two difficulties: first, the difficulty of raising the sum required by a levy on tonnage without inflicting permanent damage on the market for coal, particularly the export

market; secondly, the difficulty that, as the undertakings to be eliminated would have to be dealt with by way of voluntary liquidation, all prior charges would have to be met first, and this would often make the operation an exceedingly costly one. Another point that will arise is that certain mining leases carry with them obligations as to dead rents and the sinking of new shafts. But whatever the difficulties to be faced, faced they must be if reorganisation is to be achieved.

It will be seen, then, that if the Act is to be of benefit to the industry it must be dramatically amended—in fact, amended out of all recognition; and also that a task so controversial and of such magnitude can never be achieved by the industry itself, but must come from above—that is, by legislation. In this field alone it is clear that the Government have a heavy programme in front of them. But even more serious is the outlook as regards relations between owners and men. Under this head the two main questions are, of course, hours and wages. Failing the conclusion of an international agreement for the limitation of the hours of work in coal mines, of which there is no immediate prospect, the hours question appears to be settled for the time being by the Act of 1932, which established the seven-and-a-half-hour day. The history of recent hours legislation starts with the Eight Hours Act of 1908. This was amended by the Seven Hours Act of 1919, and in 1926 a further amendment was made that for a period of five years the seven-hour legal working day should become, at the option of owners and men, an eight-hour working day. In effect this meant a general return in most districts to the eight-hour day. When this Act was due to expire in July 1931 it had been hoped that the reorganisation consequent upon Part I. of the Act of 1930 would have permitted a return to the seven-hour day, but as economic circumstances rendered this impossible without reductions in wages, a temporary compromise was reached whereby a seven-and-a-half-hour day was fixed for a further twelve months. As stated above, this temporary compromise has since become a permanency. The Miners' Federation have always demanded a seven-hour day, and this has been promised them again and again, conditional upon other countries agreeing to do the same. At present, however, our rivals are not disposed to put up their costs in any way whatever. Before leaving the subject of hours it should be pointed out that usually fully half an hour has to be added to the nominal length of the working day to describe the actual length of time that the miner is below ground. It may also be worth adding that, contrary to the general belief, the British miner has, in the past, always worked longer hours than miners on the Continent.

Coming to the question of wages, happily it is not necessary

to enter the complicated maze of basis rates, percentage additions, minimum percentages, subsistence allowances, and deductions, which comprise a miner's pay-sheet. Wages are based upon the piece rates agreed in individual pits between the miners and the owners, and consequently vary from district to district, from pit to pit, from seam to seam, and even from one part of a seam to another. Most of the workers at a pit are, however, what are often called 'datal' men—*i.e.*, they are paid by the day, and not on output. As stated above, piece rates are based on rates agreed on in each individual pit; datal rates are based on a standard district rate. These are what are called standard rates; the actual wages drawn consist of this standard rate, plus a percentage addition, less certain deductions. This percentage addition is the same throughout a district, but varies from district to district. In some cases, where a standard rate plus the percentage addition is low, it is replaced by a minimum wage rate or a subsistence wage rate. Incidentally, a district is sometimes a county and sometimes a coalfield: England consists of twelve districts for these purposes, and Scotland of one. It is claimed, and pretty generally conceded, that a miner's wages are definitely on the low side, even when he is working full time, which is not always the case. True, he has certain advantages, such as free coal and often a free house, but in spite of that it can safely be asserted that mining wages are lower than wages in many other trades and considerably lower in purchasing power than they were before the war. At any rate, they are so low that the Miners' Federation of Great Britain would resist any reduction by every means within its power, and in so doing would undoubtedly have the support of every miner in the country, whether individually affected or not. Past history has shown that a national coal strike is a matter of national concern and cannot be considered as a private affair between the masters and men of the particular industry affected. When it is pointed out that wage agreements in every district will be liable to revision after July next, and bearing in mind the present state of the export trade, it will be seen that, unless steps are taken during the coming winter to avoid wage reductions in those districts which are already the lowest paid, a first-class catastrophe may ensue. There is one fixed point, and one only: in the exporting districts the men would sooner subsist on public relief indefinitely than accept a substantial reduction in wages, and it would take a very long stoppage indeed to make them change their minds.

But, leaving on one side for the moment all question of the humanity or political practicability of forcing the exporting districts to accept lower wages, the outstanding fact remains that such an attempt would be resisted, not only by the districts

affected, but by the united miners of all Great Britain, and no one in his senses could suggest that a repetition of the events of 1926 would be anything but catastrophic. Yet it is difficult to see how the exporting districts can survive under present conditions, unless costs are drastically reduced; and wages form at least 70 per cent. of total costs. And on July 8, 1933, the 'gentleman's agreement' not to reduce wages comes to an end. This is the immediate problem that confronts the industry and the Government.

Before venturing to outline the course which events may or may not take, it will be convenient to indicate the main characteristics of the three protagonists. The miners are organised in district unions which are, with one exception, combined in the Miners' Federation of Great Britain. The percentage of membership of the unions varies from pit to pit, but at least two-thirds of all miners in Great Britain are members of bodies affiliated to the Miners' Federation, a proportion large enough to give the Federation absolute control of the workers in the industry. Consequently the secretary of the Miners' Federation may be said to be the leader of the miners of Great Britain. Until his death in February of this year this post was held by Mr. A. J. Cook, though for the last year of his life he was incapable of fulfilling any of the duties of his office. Mr. Cook, though personally likeable, was a fanatic, and his leadership of the miners showed none of the statesmanlike characteristics desirable in one holding such an important position. On his death in February he was replaced by a man of utterly opposite temperament—Mr. Ebby Edwards. Mr. Edwards, who is a Northumbrian, is the right man in the right place—honest, courageous, sane and diplomatic. The industry is fortunate indeed in finding such a leader.

The owners are organised upon the same lines—in district associations and in a central body, the Mining Association. It would be ridiculous to question the capability of the owners either as individuals or as business men. Nor can any criticism be levelled at them on account of the relations existing between employers and employed in the various districts, which are uniformly excellent. The fact remains, however, that, taking the Mining Association as the body which represents the combined owners of the staple industry of the country, it has hitherto shown itself to be gravely lacking in those qualities of generalship which are essential if the industry is to prosper. This, though regrettable, is not surprising. It must be remembered that it is only a figure of speech to talk of the mining industry as if it was in any degree a single entity. There is probably no other industry in Great Britain, excepting always agriculture, which is composed of so many different and mutually competitive interests, and in

which the constituent undertakings vary so greatly in size and importance. It would need a superman to lead, and a demi-god to secure any degree of unanimity. But, even making these allowances, the Mining Association has laid itself open to criticism only too often on the score of procrastination and intransigence, not to speak of the very human failing of always waiting for something to turn up rather than facing facts.

The third and most important party is the Government, which will be forced reluctantly to decide the whole matter when the Federation and the Association have failed to come to an agreement. The department most directly concerned is the Mines Department, which is subordinate to the Board of Trade, and it is unlikely that the Cabinet would refuse to endorse a line of action which was strongly recommended by Mr. Runciman and Mr. Foot (the Secretary for Mines). The mining policy of the Government largely depends upon these two, both Liberals, of whom one has had a lifelong experience as a captain of industry, the other being remarkable for the doctrinaire tenacity with which he clings to some, at any rate, of his political beliefs. But, whatever may be their theoretical principles, there are no two men who have given greater proof of their readiness to face the facts of the mining situation. This alone justifies some measure of optimism. As far as the Government is concerned, one is naturally completely in the dark as to their intentions, but it is quite certain that if the Association and the Federation agree on a line of policy, they would receive every assistance, legislative and other, from the Government in carrying it out. So far they have only agreed on one point, which was to ask for the continuance of Part I. of the Act of 1930, a request which was granted in the Mines Act of last June. Though the owners were by no means unanimous on this point, the fact that the Association officially asked for continuance rather than for repeal is of immense significance, as it means that both sides in the industry are committed to what one may call the policy of 'conscious planning.'

But to return to the present situation. The position of the Mining Association is perfectly logical. Briefly what they say is: 'When we are ready we shall produce a list of the amendments and additions to Part I. which we think are desirable. These will, we hope, so contribute to maintain prices that wage reductions, which we should deplore as much as anybody, will be unnecessary. But in any case we refuse to make any promise to maintain wages in the future under conditions which we cannot forecast. And we refuse to negotiate with the men on any but a district basis.'

Taking these points *seriatim*: so far no suggestions for the amendment of Part I. have been produced. In fact it is open to

question whether the leaders of the Mining Association will ever be able to secure a sufficient degree of unanimity to enable them to make concrete proposals. But be that as it may, it is a fact that the one proposal which might have reassured the Miners' Federation that the exporting districts were not to be left to face the blizzard unaided was not adopted, although it was advocated by some of the most important men in the Association. This was the proposal that for the time being the export markets should be assisted by a subsidy to be raised by a tonnage levy on inland sales. Apparently the practical difficulties proved insuperable. As to guaranteeing wages in circumstances which it is difficult to foresee, the Association's position is unassailable, unless they admit responsibility for seeing that prices are maintained. It is difficult to see how they can evade that responsibility or deny that they have, or could easily get, the powers necessary to carry it out. Again the old difficulty crops up of securing sufficient agreement within the Association. These difficulties might be surmounted; the rock upon which the ship will split is the familiar one of a 'National Wage Agreement.' Although, theoretically, it is one of the aims of the Miners' Federation to secure that throughout Great Britain all miners should have their wages calculated upon the same basis, in present circumstances they would be the first to admit that this is little more than an ultimate ideal, and the battle that will be waged during the coming few months will be fought, not over the principle of 'equal pay for equal work,' but over the question of a national organisation for the settlement of district wage disputes. For both sides this is a question of decisive significance. From the point of view of the men it is essential that wages in exporting districts should be the concern, not only of the owners in those districts, but of the owners in all the other districts as well; for the threat to the miners' standard of life lies in the fact that at present the owners can attack wages district by district, and clearly if the other districts remain at work the men in the particular district affected could never hope to win the day. The implication lying behind the attitude taken up by the Miners' Federation is that the industry as a whole must be prepared to come to the aid of the less prosperous districts.

The argument of the Mining Association is not so much that they object to the principle of the more prosperous districts helping the weaker ones—though this view is held very strongly by the majority of owners—but that national negotiations always end by dragging in political considerations. They claim with complete justice that while wages remain a district matter it is to the interest of both sides to reach a settlement, but that if an appeal were to be made to an outside body the present excellent

relations that exist locally would be ruined. They also point out that, while both sides are always on good terms with each other in local negotiations, national negotiations on any matter whatever always end in bitterness and recrimination. So strongly are these views held by every owner that this was one of the causes of the dispute in 1926, and to-day any suggestion of national wage negotiations is met with a categorical refusal. There is no question but that from every practical consideration the owners' contention is sound; but the unpleasant fact remains that, unless the men receive some guarantee that there will not be a district by district attack on wages, there may very well be serious trouble in the near future. For the men the only hope lies in a national body to ratify district wage agreements, and logic seems to be on their side. For the principle of treating the industry as a whole, and nationally, was conceded by the Mining Association when they asked this year for the continuance of Part I. for a further period. In the words of the President of the Miners' Federation: 'If the nation recognises the need for co-operation on a national basis for production and distribution, it must also in time provide for working conditions and wages to be considered nationally.'

It is highly unlikely that either side will yield, with the result that the Government will be forced to adjudicate between the two, and forced to implement its verdict by legislation. The policy which will be adopted is not known to anybody outside the Government, but intelligent anticipation is, after all, half the point of politics.

Mr. Foot, in his official utterances, has made it clear that he is most anxious that some form of National Board should be set up, some body that might ultimately develop into a sort of parliament for the whole industry. But he is probably aware that in the present circumstances it would be hopeless to expect that the industry by itself could ever arrive at a settlement in any wage dispute. There seems to be only one course open to him—to set up some form of National Board, with compulsory arbitration by the Government in the event of any disagreement arising. This would be regarded by the Government as a last resort, and no doubt every effort is being made, and will be made, to attain the same results without recourse to legislation. They will be helped in their endeavour by the fact that both sides are wise enough to dislike the principle of compulsory arbitration. This may provide some sort of machinery for dealing with disputes as they arise, and as such will certainly be an improvement upon the old practice of letting things come to a head before entering upon serious negotiations; but it will, by itself, contribute nothing towards the reorganisation of the industry. As mentioned above,

the suggested export subsidy scheme was not adopted by the Mining Association; but it is significant that it was referred to the districts for further consideration, and at present this is being done.

Although it is highly improbable that any individual district will accept the whole of the scheme, it is likely that each district will report favourably upon some part of it. In fact, it is said that the scheme was drawn up by its ingenious authors with that end in view. In this event, it is conceivable that the Government, failing the production of agreed suggestions by the Association, may prefer to introduce legislation in which every district will find something acceptable. Action of this sort may easily result in the complete reorganisation and control of the selling side of the industry on the lines followed by Continental cartels, with contested and uncontested zones, and the whole structure of levies and subsidies.

Enough has been said to show that during the coming year much will be heard of the mining industry: enough, too, to prove that decisions will be taken of the utmost importance. For if, as seems probable, we are in this basic industry about to take irrevocable steps in the direction of conscious co-operative planning both of production and selling, it may well be that coal is blazing a trail that will be the pioneer of future relations between the State and industry.

But, apart from politico-philosophic speculation, the fact remains that the industry is desperately sick. Profits are everywhere turning into losses, reserves are dwindling to vanishing point. Pit after pit is regularly working short time, week by week the queues outside the labour exchange stretch further and further down the street. There is no need for hysterical despair, but if clear thinking and deliberation are to provide a solution, it can only be when the whole community realises that the day is long past when mining problems can be regarded purely as matters of sectional or local interest.

GODFREY NICHOLSON.

THE RETURN OF THE BENEDICTINES

THE consecration of Buckfast Abbey, in Devon, last month in the presence of the Papal Legate, who presided in the name of the Holy Father and spoke to the crowds as *Legatus a latere*, as one sent 'from the Pope's side,' his sermon being broadcast to the whole country from the abbey church by the B.B.C., gives one much food for thought. Such a thing has not happened in England for many hundred years, and certainly not since the change of religion.

Indeed, the beautiful Abbey of Our Lady of Buckfast, built by the hands of its own monks within the last twenty-six years, seems like an apparition and a portent. As though from the tragic ruins of so many such places, which still ennoble the English landscape with their beauty even in death, one at least had re-arisen—yes, from the very foundations of its predecessor; as though the very stones had towered up and blossomed again in pillar and capital and arch, and there it stood amid the trees, mirrored once more in the stream, served as of old by the monks in this Devonshire valley. And one asks oneself, as one looks on it in the ineffable peace of an English summer evening amid the woods and green pastures, beside the loveliness of the Dart, what does it mean? Can it be that that which made it in the beginning, the Faith which founded it, is returning—after 400 years?

The history of Buckfast is well known. Here from before the Conquest till the great spoliation of Henry VIII. there stood an abbey, which in the twelfth century became affiliated to Savigny and later to Cîteaux, and was still a Cistercian house at the dissolution in 1539. The last Mass was said in that great abbey church beside the misty Dart on a February morning, and there followed a silence of three centuries, in which the church and monastery were hacked to pieces: neither their beauty nor their age saved them; they were destroyed. In September 1882 a letter appeared in the *Tablet* describing the property as 'now in the market,' and declaring that 'the owner, although a Protestant, is anxious that it should again come into the hands of the Catholic Church, and would agree to very liberal terms in treating with any Order which would become a purchaser. . . .'

This letter attracted the attention of the French Benedictines of the Cassinese Congregation, expelled from Pierre-qui-vire in 1880, and then living in a house in Dublin. They rented the place with the option of purchase, and presently took up their residence in the forlorn old house, half ruinous and comfortless, which had been built amid the stones of the monastery, to the astonishment of the village, where the very name of Catholic was unknown. These Benedictines said Mass there on October 28, 1882, Feast of Saints Simon and Jude, for the first time after 343 years. They soon began to find adherents and converts and proceeded to build a temporary church and a school. On Lady Day, 1884, the church was solemnly inaugurated, and presently the old house was made habitable, and by the munificence of Lord Clifford of Chudleigh a south wing, with refectory, cloister and cells, was taken in hand. In February 1899 Buckfast was erected into an independent community, distinct from Pierre-qui-vire, and in 1902 it was raised to its former dignity as an independent abbey, the community choosing Dom Boniface Natter, who had been a novice at Buckfast in 1882, as their abbot. Abbot Natter was a fine administrator, and on two occasions was entrusted with special missions for the Order in the Americas, and tragically lost his life by shipwreck in returning to Europe in August 1906. The consternation of the monks of Buckfast may be imagined. They proceeded on September 14 to elect as their abbot Dom Boniface's companion on his last voyage, who had been rescued from the shipwreck of the *Sirio*—Dom Anscar Vonier, then thirty years of age.

It is with the election of this remarkable man that Buckfast, as we have come to know it, begins. Hardly had he been solemnly blessed as abbot when on All Saints' Day, 1906, Dom Anscar announced in chapter his intention of beginning the rebuilding of the great abbey church with the New Year. There was no money in hand: certain persons on hearing of the project were willing to contribute small yearly sums; in all £70 was promised. One of the monks, Brother Peter, was a mason; there was sand in the Dart, a quarry close by. Such were the material assets; let us add to them the faith and character of Dom Anscar Vonier.

On November 15 a first cartload of stone was brought through the abbey gate, carted by a brother, and placed at the disposal of Brother Peter. Then Miss Sampson, the owner of the quarry, gave the first 100 loads of stone. On Boxing Day Sir Robert Harvey presented the abbot with 100 guineas in memory of Abbot Boniface. Dr. Macnamara, of Torquay, gave another 100 guineas. From the beginning gifts never ceased, and on July 2, 1907, the Feast of the Visitation of Our Lady, the first stone of Our Lady's Abbey was solemnly laid by Bishop Graham, of Plymouth. In three years the monks were thinking about a belfry!

Thus was the great abbey, now completed and consecrated, begun. It would be hard to find an 'act of faith' more amazing or one more triumphantly justified. No doubt a Catholic would say that Our Lady saw to the rebuilding of her great church, which now stands exactly on the foundations of the one Henry VIII. destroyed. Perhaps it was she who sent that vision years ago to a novice of Buckfast. He still tells the story—how one Christmas, as he made his meditation before the night office of the Feast of the Nativity, he saw as in a vision Buckfast new made, all towered and splendid, and the monks, as of old, singing in a noble choir and the very office of Christmas being sung therein, instead of in the humble little bare chapel where he was professed. This strange dream—dream or vision, was it?—he confided to the prior, who replied, as the old, in kindly mood, will do to the young, that all things were possible with God. Well, the very thing has come to pass. With their own hands the monks have built the great church of the novice's dream. Its noble central tower, with its fourteen bells, the greatest of which weighs two tons, rises now under the woods; the beautiful church of the vision, all of solid stone and vaulted with stone, is finished and has now been consecrated in the presence of the Papal Legate. And the novice who had that Christmas vision is now Abbot of Buckfast. His dream has come true.

Buckfast does not stand alone. It is even very far from being the first or the oldest abbey of the return, in England. No less than eight such now stand up across south England—south of Thames and Severn—between Dover and the Atlantic. It is possible nowadays to traverse all that country in its whole breadth and to sleep at a monastery every night. Very much older than the new Abbey of Buckfast is the Abbey of St. Gregory at Downside, on the Mendip Hills, some twelve miles from Bath. This great monastery belongs to the English Congregation of the Benedictine Order, which is, I suppose, the oldest of the national congregations. After the suppression in the sixteenth century some of the English Benedictines found refuge abroad, hoping for a restoration of the former state of things; and in Queen Mary's reign some of them were established at Westminster Abbey under Abbot Feckenham in 1556. One of the monks then professed, Dom Sigebert Buckley, after forty years' imprisonment, and when near to his death aggregated two English priests, already monks of St. Benedict, of the Cassinese Congregation at Padua, to the English Congregation and to Westminster. He and they were thus the link between the monks St. Augustine brought into England and all the pre-Reformation English Congregation and Downside to-day. The true succession was thus happily perpetuated. To them were joined a number of English monks

then training abroad, and the monastery of St. Gregory at Douay was established in 1605.¹ After some 200 years of a peaceful life at Douay the French Revolution broke out; the monks' school for English Catholic boys had to be disbanded; the community were imprisoned for nearly two years before they were allowed to return to their monastery, in 1794. Petition after petition was sent to England for leave to return to their own country, and at last, after many refusals, this was granted, and on March 2, 1795, the monks of St. Gregory arrived at Dover.

Through the generosity of Sir Edward Smythe they found a temporary home at Acton Burnell, in Shropshire, where they remained for twenty years of a hard struggle for existence. In 1814, however, they were able to purchase for themselves, at a cost of £7000, 'all that messuage, tenement, etc., known as Mount Pleasant, Downside with 66 acres,' and there, almost within sight of the ruins of the most venerable abbey in England, to found a new Glastonbury. There, too, they founded or refounded their school, now famous throughout England. In June 1899 the monastery was raised to the rank of an abbey by Pope Leo XIII., and Dom Edmund Ford, to whom Downside Abbey and School alike owe so much, at that date prior, was chosen as first abbot. In 1823 the monks had built a chapel, known later as the 'Old Chapel,' an amusing account of the opening of which may be read in the *Journal of a Somerset Rector* (Murray, 1930). In 1876, however, Prior Murphy laid the foundation-stone of the present glorious abbey church, with its vast and lovely choir of seven bays, transept, and nave, beautiful lady chapel at the east end, and numerous chapels. The building was begun by Dom Aidan (afterwards Cardinal) Gasquet, who was prior in 1878. The transepts were opened in 1882, and in 1902 the foundation-stone of the choir and presbytery was laid, the nave of eleven bays (it still lacks three) being built after the war as a memorial to the boys of Downside School who had fallen 1914-18. The great tower, visible far over the Mendips, is to be finished as a memorial to Cardinal Gasquet.

If Downside is the oldest of these refounded Benedictine monasteries, not more than fifty miles north of Downside, on the Cotswolds among the Cranham woods, stands Prinknash Priory, the most recent of these foundations. Like Buckfast, Prinknash (pronounced to rhyme with spinach) belongs to the Cassinese Congregation, but the monks wear a white habit like those of Monte Vergine.

¹ St. Laurence's at Dieulouard, in Lorraine, was founded in 1606 by the English Congregation; it is now represented by St. Laurence's Abbey at Ampleforth, in Yorks. St. Edmunds was founded at Paris in 1611 and is represented to-day by St. Edmund's Abbey at Woolhampton, in Berkshire.

It seems there was upon the island of Caldey, off the coast of Pembroke, an Anglican community of men, following some form of the Rule of St. Benedict. About twenty years ago this community, with the exception of two members, was received into the Catholic Church and submitted to the Roman See.* They hoped to continue as a genuine Benedictine house on the island they loved, and in fact did so for fifteen years after their conversion. But without the means, of which their entry into the Catholic Church had deprived them, their hope of remaining there permanently was dependent upon assistance chiefly from friends in America, and as time went on it became clear that this help would not be forthcoming. In the meantime Mr. Dyer Edwardes, an old friend of Caldey in its Anglican days, who had bought Prinknash Park in 1888, had himself been received, at more than seventy years of age, into the Catholic Church. He had more than once offered Prinknash Park to the monks of Caldey for a foundation. He now wrote renewing his offer. Only a few months after the deed of gift had been signed, the generous and pious donor died in Naples in 1926. His death so soon after the gift made the gift invalid in law, and Prinknash reverted to the Earl of Rothes, Mr. Edwardes' grandson and heir. Lord Rothes is not a Catholic, and might well have refused to sacrifice a valuable and historic part of his inheritance to provide a home for religious. He, however, with a disinterestedness and generosity which all Catholics will ever gratefully remember, chose to uphold his grandfather's wishes. And so it is that Prinknash comes once more into Benedictine hands.

I say comes once more: Prinknash originally belonged to the Benedictine Abbey of St. Peter, in Gloucester (now the Anglican cathedral), and the great house, now the priory, was built by the last abbot, Abbot Parker, who used to spend the winter there, where there had always been a hunting lodge on the property of the abbey. The place was seized by Henry VIII. in 1539 and let to Sir Anthony Kingston, who with his father shared so largely in the spoil of the Gloucestershire religious houses. Prinknash has what I suppose to be the smallest monastic church in England, but a great church is already being planned. Mr. Dyer Edwardes is buried in the sanctuary of the present church.

If from Prinknash you take the road through Bibury and Cirencester for Swindon and on to Hungerford and Newbury, some four or five miles before you come to Reading, you will enter the village of Woolhampton, and there above the village, northward on the last of the Berkshire downs, stands the Douay Abbey of St. Edmund, a great building of red brick with an

* An account of this transaction, entitled *A Correspondence*, has been published and may be obtained at the priory.

imposing gateway, all half-finished as yet, and looking a little new in so old a landscape. This is the most recent of the abbeys of the English Congregation of the Benedictine Order, the sister house of Downside and Ampleforth. It is the descendant of St. Edmund's Priory of Paris and Douay.

St. Edmund's was in its origin an offshoot from St. Laurence Dieulouard (Ampleforth). In the year 1615 six monks were sent from St. Laurence at the invitation of Princess Marie of Lorraine, abbess of the royal Abbey of Chelles, to act under Dom Francis Walgrave, their leader as chaplains at the abbey, and to study at the Sorbonne. Thus a new community was founded which put itself under the protection of St. Edmund in memory of the great and ancient abbey of their order at Bury St. Edmunds. It was to this community that James II. turned in his exile at St. Germain. He had his own cell in their monastery, and when he died his body was entrusted to these monks. This English monastery, however, was suppressed by the revolutionary Government in 1793, and by 1818 only three of the monks survived. These had the courage to resume conventual life in the house, then ruined, of St. Gregory in Douay, which the monks of Downside did not propose to reoccupy. Surmounting incredible difficulties, they prospered during some eighty years, and in 1900 their priory was erected into an abbey by Leo XIII. Then new trouble befell them. In 1903 the French Laws of Association expelled them from France and confiscated their possessions, and once more they were without a monastery. Fortunately, we read 'There had been time to convey to England a good many of the more valuable possessions of the house. A very noteworthy collection of pictures, including one of himself, given to St. Edmund's, Paris, by James II., and other portraits, was sent to England and is now at Woolhampton. The church plate and the more valuable vestments were also saved, as were the archives and the more important portion of the books.' Indeed, they fared better than with their other robber, Henry VIII. of England. The community decided to return to England and re-establish their school for English boys there. It was a good decision. They finally accepted the offer of the Bishop of Portsmouth to settle at Woolhampton, in Berkshire, and there they appeared on September 17, 1903. As it happens, the new abbey stands on ground that has always been Catholic. Thus the third and last of the original houses of the English Congregation returned home after 300 years of exile. The Monastery of St. Edmund at Woolhampton is far from complete; but the school buildings are adequate and the playing-fields beautifully situated. There is also a fine cloister new made, and the monks are about to build a great abbey church.

Another congregation of Benedictines which the Laws of Association expelled from France in 1903—their fourth expulsion, as it happens—was the famous Gallican Congregation of Solesmes, established by Dom Guéranger in 1837, which has produced so many famous scholars. The monks of Solesmes settled in the Isle of Wight, where they bought the ruins of Quarr Abbey and began at once to rebuild this pre-Reformation monastery. The great buildings which now stand there amid the beautiful trees and meadows are their work. Their work on plainchant and singing of the Divine Office are famous all over Europe. Many of the Fathers have now, under a more enlightened *régime* in France, returned to Solesmes; but enough have been left behind in the island to continue the Divine Office and to carry on the monastery. The Congregation of Solesmes is again represented in England by the Abbey of St. Michael, in Farnborough, under Abbot Cabrol. Indeed, the most attractive, as well as the most interesting, thing in Farnborough is the beautifully situated abbey church begun in 1887 by the Empress Eugénie as the memorial and burial place of her husband and son, who lie in a crypt beneath the presbytery.

Some 25 or 30 miles south-east of Farnborough, near Horsham, in the weald of Sussex, we come in our journey across south England upon what in some respects is the most remarkable, as it is an unique, monastic foundation in all England—I mean the Carthusian monastery of St. Hugh at Parkminster. The great mass of building, under the tall spire of the abbey church, stands up on one of the last southward outliers of the forest ridge, and is visible far over the weald. But though the monks have been now long in Sussex, it is still with surprise and a quickening of the breath that a traveller, who knows something of the history of his country, meets in the Sussex lanes the white-habited Fathers of St. Hugh's. As a small boy put it, with the ironical logic of childhood: 'Daddy, I wish there were knights in armour too.' Well, perhaps there are, there must be; only it is *arma lucis*, the 'armour of light,' and not visible to mortal eyes.

Carthusian monasteries have always been rare in England. Henry II. founded the first at Witham, in Somerset, which with Hinton Charterhouse, near Bath, was rich in numbering two capital houses. In all pre-Reformation England there were, I think, but twelve, the most famous being the London Charterhouse, whose monks behaved with such heroic sanctity and were so brutally martyred by Henry VIII. when they refused the royal supremacy.⁸ To-day there is only this one house, but it is, I am

⁸ They refused to accept the King as head of the Church. The prior and many monks were martyred for this, and the remaining eight died of starvation and fever in Newgate Prison. One member of the Order accepted the royal supremacy, bitterly repented, and was reconciled to the Church.

told, the largest Carthusian monastery in the world, with thirty-six 'cells' and 3166 feet of cloister and a magnificent great church, with over fifty choir monks, some of whom are refugees from Montreuil. It is easy to understand why Carthusian houses have ever been few, for the life is highly disciplined and severe. Yet it must have its compensations, even from a quite human point of view, in its opportunities for solitude and privacy (every monk of this Order has his own little house and garden plot), whereas life in ordinary community as lived by other monks must often be irksome—at least, one might suppose, to the highly nervous modern spirit. The last house of the Carthusians in Catholic England was Sheen, founded in 1414 by Henry V., and it was there that Queen Mary gathered nineteen of the monks from the Charterhouses ruined by her father, under Prior Chauncy, the one renegade of the London house, now repentant. He lived to see them all scattered again and died in 1581. But his community founded Sheen Anglorum at Nieuport, in the Low Countries, which remained till it was suppressed by Joseph II. in 1783. The last prior died at Little Malvern in 1797. His papers, the seal of Sheen Anglorum, and many relics may be seen at St. Hugh's.

It was St. Augustine, himself a Benedictine monk, who at the command of Pope St. Gregory the Great, another Benedictine, brought at once Christianity and the Benedictine Order to the English more than twelve centuries ago. He landed in Thanet, and it is fitting, therefore, that we should find the Benedictines there to-day. Their monastery, founded in 1856, with its rather small church built by Augustus Welby Pugin, stands within two miles of the spot where St. Augustine landed with his monks so many centuries ago. This monastery at Ramsgate is dedicated in honour of that saint. Like Buckfast, it belongs to the Cassinese Congregation of the Order. The first monk to arrive at Ramsgate thus to commemorate not only St. Augustine, but the two great Benedictine abbeys that were the pride of Canterbury, Christ Church (that was always the Cathedral) and St. Augustine's, was Father Wilfrid Alcock, O.S.B. Four years later, in 1860, the present monastic buildings were erected by Edward Welby Pugin and the monks opened their school in the cloister, later to be greatly enlarged with one school building after another. St. Augustine's was not yet a priory, but it was raised to that dignity in 1880 with Father Thomas Bergh for prior, and in 1906 it became an abbey with Prior Egan as first abbot. The abbey church is especially interesting as perhaps the masterpiece of the Gothic revival. At any rate, Pugin considered it as his only satisfactory work. Here that amazing genius lived his curious and nightmarish life, working night and day unaided, dressed in his velvet cloak and shut away from the world like the old monkish

builders he adored. He had no idea that the church he built for love and for his own satisfaction would one day be an abbey. He lies in the vault of the south transept of the building, which is thus his tomb and his memorial.

Such are the monasteries of the Benedictine revival in south England, to which, as it came in our way, I have added the great Carthusian house of St. Hugh in Sussex. I have no room to write of the great monasteries of the midlands and the north. I have said nothing of the friars' houses neither, even of so lovely a place as the Franciscan Friary of Chilworth, or of the innumerable and often very ancient convents such as Lanherne of the Carmelites, Sion Abbey of the Bridgettines, or the Franciscan Convent of Taunton, some of them representing pre-Reformation houses. But seeing that the Orders are returning, indeed have returned, it is astonishing that we do not find, in all south England, a single Cistercian house. Their monasteries were the most numerous of all in Catholic England. They were, indeed, farmer monks, and in a sense the Order was English with an English founder, St. Stephen Harding, though without St. Bernard all might have come to naught. To-day in England these monks have a house in Leicestershire, St. Bernard's Abbey, near Coalville, and the French monks have acquired the monastery on Caldey Island vacated by the Prinknash community, but there is no English Cistercian house in south England. Should the Cistercians return in any number and make a success of farming, as they might well do, living as they would be in community and without wages, they might lead a real 'back to the land' movement; the result of which might well be amazing in quite a brief period.

Dreaming there in sight of Buckfast, *sicut cervus ad fontes*, on these moonlit nights when Compline is over and before the monks have begun the Night Office, almost anything seems possible. Buckfast itself is little short of a miracle, a resurrection from the dead, if ever there was one. And it is easy to recall that even now there are more choir monks at Downside to-day than there were at Glastonbury before the Suppression; that there are more too at Ampleforth now than there were at Rievaulx and Fountains put together. Moreover, with the development of elementary education and the means of travel many people seem to have taken up a new attitude in regard to these things from that of their forefathers or even their parents. But the future is hidden from man. At least here, as by a miracle, stands once more in all beauty beside the stream the thousand-year-old Abbey of Our Lady of Buckfast. *Esto perpetua!*

EDWARD HUTTON.

HINDU SWAMIS AND WOMEN OF THE WEST

I WAS late getting to the Maharajah's garden-party, but his A.D.C. was still receiving guests at the end of the strip of Turkey-red where the Governor had alighted. 'You know your way to the reception tent,' said he; 'it's in the usual place.' To get to it I had to cross the lawns where guests stood talking, or sat at tea-tables in the open. My way took me past a group larger than was conventional—almost a street preacher's audience. A pseudo-swami dressed in pink robes, his locks flying loosely about his head, giving him the appearance of an Indian Stopford Brooke, was addressing Indian men of all races. 'I left 500 American women lying prostrate before the god of illicit love,' said he. And the men laughed. 'Wah! Wah! Shabash!' ('Well done').

I went up to the swami. 'I heard what you said. You have been in America?'

'Yes, many years. I am a guide and teacher to many.'

'And have received American hospitality, and "eaten their salt" in the Far West? I thought that Indians never betrayed "the salt." You know our traditions.'

'But they believe all I say. They believe anything and anybody,' he said stoutly, 'who comes from the East. They are flattered by our attention.'

I waited no longer. Comment was useless.

He bore, I discovered, a name well known at a certain *muth* (monastery) which advocated a modernised Hinduism. He spoke a fluent English with a rich American accent, and he wrote books—the pages thickly sown with words derived from Hindu philosophy. But none of my orthodox Hindu friends would have eaten with him or called him a Hindu. I asked the 'Truth-Named,' Bawaji Swami Satnam Singh, about him. He was a genuine Hindu mahatma, and he managed to speak truth, without giving offence to any, and without misleading the genuine inquirer after truth. I asked him about this 'Stopford Brooke' swami and others who were wont to go to America and England. He had a quaint habit, my Truth-Named friend; before answering the simplest question he would screw up his eyes, lay his finger

along his nose, and meditate. Presently he spoke: 'The answer will be given later.'

When the datura bushes hung out their clusters of white bells, and the pilgrim season had begun, the Truth-Named came to me in as much excitement as his calm abstraction from all emotion permitted. 'There is a *lat* [lord] swami,' he said, 'sitting in a grove at Dum Dum. Would the Miss Sahiba like to talk with him?'

'Is he holy?'

'I know him not; but he is called a *lat* swami; he should be holy. He has been teaching religion in the Further England [America]; and it is said that he has many disciples in every country.'

So it came to pass that on a day the Truth-Named himself took an English friend of mine and me to a palm grove and bamboo wilderness in the suburbs of Calcutta. We found the *lat* swami dressed in yellow silk robes, sitting beside a bed of white lotuses. His face did not appeal, but we put that aside as prejudice. 'Ask him the big-little questions,' prompted our guide in Hindi. So we asked: 'What is life?' 'What is death?' 'Whence do we come?'

The reply came in pompous English, 'I refer you to my book, which has been well reviewed by the *Daily Mail*. My disciple will explain.' And before our gasp of amazement had spent itself his disciple, an American woman dressed in a saree, appeared from the garden house near by and, falling at the feet of her master, produced his book. We were silent as we walked away.

'So the Miss Sahiba, and the Miss Sahiba's friend, did not like that holy man,' said Bawaji; but there was a smile in his eyes.

'No, we did not.'

'I am glad.'

'But it was you who took us to him.'

'How should I know? Besides, in a garden one must smell every flower. . . . To me it seemeth as if the foolish ones of the Further England have robbed him of his virtue by their praise and admiration. It is the way of foolish ones. . . . Once that swami had excuse for knowledge.'

And we knew we were answered about 'Stopford Brooke.'

Swami Vivakananda's visit to the Chicago parliament of religions—about fifty years ago now—was perhaps the beginning of the swami influx into America. Not all who have followed have maintained Vivakananda's reputation. A few weeks ago I was lunching with a friend in a New York hotel, when a stranger accosted us: 'Will you introduce me? I also am a disciple of Vivakananda.' My friend could not very well avoid asking her to join us; and presently I said:

'I must undeceive you. I am not a disciple of Vivakananda.'

'Oh, well, neither am I; but of —, once of Boston.'

'I am not his disciple either.' And then I laughed, 'You *do* let people take you in in America—do you not?—for all your real shrewdness.'

That led to her telling me stories about the man whom she had named, and how his disciples had to request him to leave America. 'And yet —' I began. 'But I have a new Hindu swami now, a real one—"Swami Wiggley," an Englishman who was made a swami by the lamas in Tibet.' It was no use explaining to her that Hindu swamis and Tibetan lamas do not follow the same religion. She spoke with wrapt face—of having learnt for the first time from Swami Wiggley the meaning of true religion. America is so large-minded and hospitable that one is ashamed of those who exploit her credulity with regard to things religious. Poor America has been damned with the label 'material,' just as we have been glorified in the East with the label 'religious.' Maybe the explanation lies in this matter of labels. But labels are never true—are they?—of more than the groups of individuals who originally justified their use. My deduction from observation is that American women are *au fond* deeply religious; and that those who run after swamis and fancy religions are really feeling after something to ease their hearts, not having taken enough time to study what their own country has had to offer. It's the way of sick men with nostrums, is it not? 'This or that may cure . . .'

There are mahatmas or holy men (and holy women too) in India. I have known two whom I would put beside the saints of mediæval Europe. One of them was *Bawaji*, the Truth-Named, the other my *Mathaji*, Wisest-of-the-Wise. *Mathaji* had spent sixty years meditating in the Himalayas in solitude. Then she came down from the mountains, saying, 'Now I am a little less unfit to do some work.' Both were orthodox Hindus: they spoke no English, and could not have crossed the waters without breaking caste rules. They made no attempt to convert anyone to their faith. '*Nascitur, non fit*' is the Hindu doctrine, and they smiled at the advertised converts to Hinduism. Of all such *Mathaji* said once to me: 'They were born in another faith. In that faith they should have found God. Hinduism is a matter of caste. There is no one who in this life can give them *caste*.' About Vivakananda and the Rama Krishna sect, as about Brahmos and Arya Samajists, said this woman, whose orthodoxy was regarded as greater than the orthodoxy of the Benares Brahmins: 'Nor are such people Hindus. They write their own prescriptions for right action.' 'But they say that theirs is the true Hinduism, the Hinduism of the Vedas.' To this objection both *Bawaji* and *Mathaji* made answer: 'Should we who keep the

rules of Hinduism know what is Hinduism, or should they who have forsaken the way in order to make a way for themselves? At the Pan-Hindu Temple, where sweepers were reported last April as allowed by so-called Hindu priests to officiate in co-operation with Brahmins, they would have laughed. 'It may be a good temple—Gautama Buddha would have liked it. But it is not Hindu.' They had no fault to find with those who chose to modernise Hinduism. They simply wished to be explicit in asserting that they were not Hindus.

To me the curious thing was the beauty which these two were able to extract from a religion which they themselves admitted embraced the most degrading practices, together with the breadth of vision of the meticulous observers of a creed which was in essence no more than a book of Leviticus. Perhaps it is the very superabundance of ritual which forces the truly religious to these unfettered flights of meditation—whence they return with such exquisite piety; or to those discussions of the mahatmas who 'sit apart'—whence they extract the self-knowing which is the prelude to God-knowing. They often admitted me, of their kindness, to these discussions, and I learnt reverence for these keepers-of-a-rule, beyond which they had long since progressed, but which, nevertheless, they kept so scrupulously.

'Be self-knowing—God is within; and it is the God within us that seeks to find God,' said Bawaji. 'How does one find God in meditation?' I asked. He had already explained the way of meditation—to sit silent and empty the mind of every thought, to hold it still by imagining a hollowed-out bamboo, and then to travel in thought up and down, up and down that bamboo. One can do this honestly only seconds at a time at first; but when the habit of holding-still is established, one slips off into meditation before one is aware of achievement. 'Then imagine Light and Light and Light—that alone: pulsing, throbbing . . . everywhere. From the beginning was That and only That: and That was God. But with God exists the power and mercy of God, as closely allied as the fragrance of the rose to the rose. Men talk of one God, as if there could be two gods or three gods. There is just God—the All-pervading, the Essence of Being, the Heart of Beauty, the Great First Flame which lights every flame that leaps into life. . . . Light and Light, the God-spark in everything created. By recognising this we shall learn to recognise God. There is no other way. Yet the windows of the soul get dimmed, and the flame gives no light. Is that the fault of the flame? Clean the windows of the soul: such work is allowed to man, such alone; not his to create Light. Light was and is from eternity. One day all the several sparks of Light will go

back to the Great Central Light whence they came. The soul will find God. What need to make haste? Every soul must find God at long last. Light will return to Light.'

'Is that Hinduism, Bawaji?' I asked. 'No, that is what the individual soul brings back from meditation. It is what men of any religion may discover for themselves. Hinduism is the observance of caste.'

One day when he had talked on this wise I thanked him for giving me food for thought. He said: 'Huh! Miss Sahiba, that was not yet talk of God. I did but try to make a clearing in the jungle where we might sit down and think.'

'There are three diseases in the world,' he said another day: 'Actual Sin (breaking the rule of your religion), to be cured by good works; Restlessness, to be cured by meditation; and Joylessness, to be cured by making occasion to give joy to others. The mark of a true religion is Joy.'

'Then you do believe in the efficacy of good works?'

'Good works,' he answered, 'are fetters—fettters of gold, but still fetters.'

It was Mathaji who talked of Life and Death. 'Life is a dream in the heart of a dream.'

'And Death?'

'To-morrow's dream—the next-door house. God has given me a lease of this house of the body in which I live: but the lease is undated. . . . There will be other houses.'

The things Hindu women say, all unconscious of their beauty—even ordinary Hindu women, not the holy ones alone!

'May the shadow of the thought of God which is in my heart fall upon you and give you peace!' was a blessing which an old Hindu widow friend would often give me, standing at the sunset hour wrapped about in her yellow silk shawl of prayer, bathed in Light. Yet—in the time of trouble this beauty and peace seems to fall away from them. Conventional Hinduism is too strong a force. They are back at propitiation of every idol, back at the feet of the priests, shielding their defenceless heads against curse and anger, and the blood-lust of the gods. The religiously-minded Hindu has indeed much to offer the world: the ability to keep a rule; the habit of meditation; the real interest, born in the Eastern, it would seem, in things of the Spirit as opposed to things temporal; the simple faith which scorns explanation, and which has its dangers, but which has, as one has seen, also its great rewards. It takes one's breath away to imagine what might ensue upon the meeting of East and West, what might ensue if these Eastern impulses were swept into the religious consciousness of the West, into the Christian Church. The West has its gifts for the East also. Is

it not, indeed, reciprocity, the interchange of characteristics, the sharing of what is ours as a nation or people—which some day will produce the Perfect Gift which man offers to the Eternal? Saddhu Sunder Singh told me that when he became a Christian he used his habit of meditation for all the needs of soul and body; and that, whereas his former meditations were but a trance, from his meditations as a Christian he brought back the most marvellous visions for his own spiritual guidance, and for the service of his fellow-men. Hinduism would seem to need something more than personal human effort—personal human beauty for the attainment of the Highest.

Mathaji and Bawaji, my two mahatma friends, were as perfect as human beings could be; but the belief in curses—and in the power of the curse, for instance—still held them. It was in their blood. Mathaji, to my knowledge, used her power to curse most effectually—with a twinkle in her eye, I doubt not. But the cursed one did not see the twinkle. Both of these truly holy Hindu spiritual leaders were conscious of the unspeakable things done in the name of their religion. It was of them I learnt about the practices of Tantric Hindus, and of undisguised wickednesses committed or commanded by practising Hindu priests. But they never lifted a finger to reprove, or to save individuals from priests of whose morals they did not approve. Hinduism was not a question of ethics, but of keeping caste rules. Evil as well as good proceeds from God; and morals equally with social service represented God's business, not theirs. We were children, ruled by 'Karma' by what we had earned. Why fuss or fret? The one particular as to which they allowed themselves latitude, and the service of others, was the matter of discussion of the 'big-little' things, of abstract questions, of reaching out to God through meditation. Mathaji and Bawaji were saints in spite of their religion. If such as these could come to America and England, or could share their thoughts with the West, the Western woman's interest in Hinduism would find reward. But such as these do not cross the waters, and do not speak the English language.

The Reformed Hindus who have written books for the West have translated the *Bhagwad Gita* and other beautiful thoughts from the ancient writings; and the world is the better for these. But a great deal of the literature prepared by swamis who visit America is of the nature of the Indian curios which were at one time made in Europe and sold to tourists in India. I have seen pictures of Romeo and Juliet in the balcony scene labelled *Radha-Krishna* (the flirty god, with one of his ladies) and sold at Kalighat to the Western visitor. Green says in his *History of the English People*, of Milton's *Paradise Regained*, that 'Adam

and Eve entered Paradise *via* England.' These swamis enter Hinduism *via* America. They tell Americans what they would like to hear, and prepare books for their women disciples peppered with 'Karma,' 'the pranic fluid,' 'reincarnation,' 'Yoga,' etc.—all which make the readers of these books feel learned and esoteric. The swamis do not tell them that the orthodox Hindu believes that his Karma may earn him rebirth as, say, a flea. It never worries the Hindu, because he believes that he has millions and millions of lives, and during any one life all memory of the past is lost, as are all possibilities of the future. There, I think, the system fails. It has no practical value. If you remembered when you were a flea that you had fallen so low because you were a bad man during your last chance as a man, the scheme would at least have some deterrent and moral value; it would help you to be a good flea, so that you might climb up again.

But you do not remember. And when American women talk yearningly of the beauty of the reincarnation theory I appreciate the malady of a lepcha (Darjeeling hillman) cook I once had. He could not be left alone in the kitchen when night fell 'because he saw the ghosts of all the things the Miss Sahiba had eaten walking in procession round the room.' It might, of course, be a new diversion to let your imagination run riot about your undesirable acquaintances and picture their procession of rebirths according to your judgment of their deserts—walking, flying, hopping round the room at any given moment. But, since you would be taking the like chances yourself, adoption of Hinduism because of its reincarnation theory would not seem good enough.

One word must be said about the Rama-Krishna *muth* (monastery) at Belur, near Calcutta. A charming American lady whom we all love has built herself a house in the grounds, and visits the *muth* almost yearly. She calls herself both a Hindu disciple of Rama-Krishna-Vivakananda and a Christian. There are other Westerners—English, Australian, etc.—who do the like. Miss Noble (Sister Nivedita), an English woman, used to lie prostrate before the image of Kali on Christmas Eve and then say to the monks: 'Now let us go into the fields equipped with crooks and read the story of the shepherds of Bethlehem.' In her room were Tanagra statues of the Virgin and Jesus Christ, side by side with images of Kali and Ganesh and other Hindu deities. Theosophy would seem to be based on such associations. Was not Krishna Murthi advertised as the reincarnation of Christ and Krishna and Buddha, who stood each of them for such different and opposing ideals? The Hindu-Christian individuals I have known have stoutly refused to examine things for themselves. That would explain their incongruous loyalties. At Belur the resident American lady had never visited, she tells

me, the temples and Monks' Chapel. Yet these are veritable Hindu imitations, differing in this alone—that in the Vivakananda and Rama Krishna temples, for instance—the idols are represented by photographs, not images, of these Hindu leaders. Go to 'vespers,' as they call the evening service at Belur, in the Monks' Chapel, up the flight of stone steps over the old refectory. You will see what your guide describes as a 'high altar'—a golden canopy over three gilded chairs, against the backs of which chairs stand three unframed photographs of Rama Krishna, Mrs. Rama Krishna, and Vivakananda. At the feet of the Rama Krishna 'throne' sit his sandals in a badly made glass-topped box. Vespers begins with Gregorian chanting from the choir sitting on the verandah. Then a yellow-robed monk—a genuinely beautiful figure, though dressed like a Buddhist, not a Hindu—incenses the three photographs, the sandals of Rama Krishna and the congregation, offering the *arati* (borrowed from orthodox Hinduism), the ceremony of the five-fingered lighted wicks in the tall brass stands, to the 'Holy Trinity.' Vespers ends with a procession to Rama Krishna's bedroom next door. Rama Krishna's photograph is put to sleep in a huge old-fashioned English four-poster, with long bolsters either side—'to keep him from falling out of bed,' as a monk explained to me. In the bedroom are massive wardrobes containing loin-cloths for Rama Krishna. Poor Rama Krishna, who in life possessed, I am told, only one loin-cloth, which faithful women disciples washed when they carried him down to the Ganges for his daily bath! The monks work in their vegetable garden, and the mission as a whole is responsible for commendable welfare work—activities alien to Hinduism, borrowed from the West. This last is all to the good. But people of Hindu origin, unless they bravely cut themselves away from Hinduism in name and essence, as in all else, would seem to be held ruthlessly in the dead hand of fear and formalism.

One knows how even individual Brahmos—theists who have really renounced Hindu ritual—revert to Hinduism in times of difficulty. It is courage, to face gods and demons, which is lacking; and are not those of us who have not been born into the like thralldom losing our chance of helping when we accept the westernisation of an ancient religion without examining for ourselves its implications? I was lately at the Vedantic centre in Boston, where the swami in charge, dressed as an English cleric, serves an 'altar' on which were Easter lilies, and at the foot of which burned a red light in a tall brass Hindu property. His helpers are 'consecrated women'—Western women; those at the Los Angeles centre dress like nuns. One of them lectures on Hinduism. She told me she had spent three months in India!

There is no reason why people should not study Hinduism for themselves without the aid of pseudo-swamis. There are books and translations enough, made by scholars; and the practice of meditation, of going into the silence, cannot fail to help us all. Any beautiful thought may be used for the practice of Yoga as understood by my two old friends; and the posture of the body was, in their opinion, immaterial. I have seen a Western woman bend to and fro, saying 'Ram-Ram-Hari-Ram,' hundreds of times at a sitting. 'The foolish deluded one!' said Mathaji. But the deluded one said she was practising Yoga as her *guru* had taught her, and that it was wonderfully uplifting. She did look a little disconcerted, I must say, when asked if she knew that the words she used represented the invocation for the dead, chanted by the carriers of the corpse on its way to the Burning Ghat.

Be not deceived. Whatsoever a woman soweth, that shall she reap. Could we perhaps sow 'discrimination' in this matter of selecting a spiritual guide, East or West? Old Bawaji used to talk of giving our judgment 'a sickness' when we used it in error, or wrongly. That was indeed a 'true word'! (*sutch bāt—sahi bāt*).

CORNELIA SORABJI.

THE LEGEND OF ABBOTSFORD¹

ON May 6, 1838, Lord Cockburn wrote in his *Journal* :

Dear Scott ! When he was among us we thought we worshipped him, at least as much as his modesty would permit. And now that he is gone we feel as if we had not enjoyed or cherished him half enough. How would we cling to him were he to re-appear ! It is a pleasure, which the next generation may envy, that I still hear his voice and see his form. I see him in the Court, and on the street, in company, and by the Tweed. The plain dress, the guttural burred voice, the lame walk, the thoughtful heavy face with its mantling smile, the honest hearty manner, the joyous laugh, the sing-song feeling recitation, the graphic story—they are all before me a hundred times a day.

These words—the tersest, tenderest and truest picture of Sir Walter in the days of his flesh—are the epilogue to some general remarks on Lockhart's *Life*, the last two volumes of which had just appeared. Cockburn admired but could not bring himself to say he liked the performance. His strictures are best given in his own way :

Amidst much praise Lockhart gets much blame for his execution of this work. The blame proceeds chiefly from the idolators of Scott, who think that he should have disclosed no imperfection in his character or imprudence in his conduct ; and from the friends of the Ballantynes, Constable and others, whom Lockhart has abused, as they say, unjustly. To a great extent the indignation of the latter is well-founded. The censure of the former is totally groundless. A son-in-law perhaps ought not to have written the *Life*. But if he was to do it, it ought to have been done fairly.

Thus far Cockburn is clear enough. Lockhart was bound to deal with Scott's failings and indiscretions, otherwise his *Life* would have been not only grossly untruthful but barely intelligible. But, being unable to make his hero's image absolutely white, he tried to give it a comparative whiteness by blackening the associated images without compunction or conscience. After saying that, however, Cockburn suddenly seems to turn round

¹ *Sir Walter Scott*, by John Buchan (Cassell & Co., Ltd.) ; *The Laird of Abbotsford*, by Dame Una Pope-Hennessy (G. P. Putnam's Sons, Ltd.) ; *Sir Walter's Postbag*, written and selected by Wilfred Partington (John Murray) ; *The Waverley Pageant*, by Hugh Walpole (Eyre & Spottiswoode, Ltd.).

and accuse Lockhart of bad taste or worse in his actual handling of Scott. Fairness, he says, could have been achieved,

though a great deal of the useless and vulgar matter which pervades the work had been left out. The author seems to have supposed that no further reason could be required for introducing anything whatever, except that it was true, and related to Sir Walter ; forgetful that there is no day of the greatest and purest man's life with all the details of which the public has any concern. All Scott's peculiarities could have been easily described without the injustice and offensiveness of not only exposing, but of expatiating on the exposure of selfish transactions and paltry thoughts, which were probably immaterial at the time, but are represented in this *Life* as fixed and essential parts of the man.

That Lockhart's work 'is Scott to the life' he readily concedes, but 'whether the publication of this portrait will do any good to his memory is a different matter.' In short, Cockburn's verdict is

'Tis true, 'tis pity ; and pity 'tis 'tis true.

Now, all this at first sight seems confused and inconsistent. How can Lockhart be blamed for being so biassed in favour of Scott that he is scandalously unfair to Constable and the Ballantynes, while in the next breath he is reproached with deliberate unkindness to Scott himself ? And why should it be a matter for head-shaking that the truth about Scott should be known ? A little reflection will explain the mystery to anyone who knows his Lockhart. For one thing, Cockburn felt, and felt truly, that, whatever might be its merits, there was something in the *Life* fundamentally wrong, though he could not, or at any rate did not care to, fix it in words. To-day it is permissible to resolve and articulate Cockburn's perplexity. It amounted simply to this—that it was an infinite pity that the task of writing the life of Walter Scott should have fallen to a man so opposite and unsympathetic. In his vast circle of acquaintance there were many who regarded Scott's opinions as contemptible where they were not actually detestable ; there were even some who did not rate his literary genius very highly ; but there was none that did not confess his capacity for inspiring personal regard. And herein is the damning defect of Lockhart's *Life*. In all its ten laborious volumes there is not a trace of honest affection. Adulation there is, and plenty of expressive hatred of those whom Lockhart conceives as having treated Scott badly, but no love. On the contrary, as Cockburn's sensitive nature detected, there are even sly streaks of spitefulness—the occasional hint that, while of course Sir Walter was a great and good man, he was rather crude in some ways—in fact not quite a Balliol man's idea of a gentleman.

There is another thing to be considered. We are always sensitive about the frailties of a loved one, and the warmer our love the more we wince at the very thought of them; it seems an outrage that they should be exposed to the uncharitable gaze of the world. We imagine that strangers, who know not the integration of virtues, the incommunicable something that inspired our love, will see nothing but the shortcomings. This is a fallacy, caused by our failure to recognise that our sensitiveness is part and parcel of our affection and that the world, not having the one, cannot have the other. The world is not so much uncharitable as indifferent. It has no interest in seeing things out of their just proportions. Cockburn's apprehensions, as we know, have proved groundless. The danger to Scott's memory, indeed, has come to be from the opposite direction. For the world's judgments of great men, though generally sound, are necessarily summary and apt to be expressed in 'legends.' Those features in Lockhart's image that Cockburn deemed harsh and unflattering have been so softened by time and the constant attrition of the kisses of devout worshippers that there is only the vaguest semblance of human outline left. The natural result has followed. Three generations have passed away since Scott died, and now a generation has arrived that sees nothing to admire, still less to worship, in this featureless image. In this centenary year nothing could be more remarkable than the general indifference to the occasion.

To show how little the popular tradition of Scott corresponds to the reality I venture first to state as briefly as possible what may be called the Legend of Abbotsford and then to give the leading facts as far as I have been able to ascertain them. Perhaps I ought to add, as I see them; for presumptions of fact must not be omitted. The legend in its crudest form can be stated in the terms of a schoolboy's essay thus: 'Sir Walter Scott was a Scotsman who got into debt through building a large house called Abbotsford. He said, "My right hand shall pay my debt," and sat down at Abbotsford and wrote novels. These are called the Waverley Novels because he always used a Waverley pen. They are very long and dull and all about history, but in those days people liked them, so Sir Walter paid his debts. He was a very good man for paying his debts, and we must always admire him, because he worked so hard at the Waverley Novels that he died of paralysis. He is one of the glories of our literature. He was also a very good poet.'

This, in all seriousness and without much exaggeration, represents what I have found to be the sum and substance of the average educated person's 'knowledge' and opinion of Sir Walter Scott. It makes an instructive prelude to a commentary on the

'official' legend, approved by the eminent ministers of the cult, which may be rendered thus:

Walter Scott was of gentle birth, being a member of the ancient family of Border gentry, the Scotts of Raeburn. A few years after his admission to the Scottish Bar Scott met and fell romantically in love with Miss Charlotte Carpenter, a young lady some years his junior, the orphan ward of Lord Downshire. She was a Frenchwoman, whose name had originally been Charpentier. Her father, who had held an official position at Lyons, had sent his wife and family to England for safety on the outbreak of the Revolution. M. and/or Madame Charpentier (now deceased) were Huguenots, hence there was no religious barrier to their daughter's marriage to a Scottish Presbyterian. The marriage took place without delay and was in all respects successful. Mrs. (afterwards Lady) Scott was pretty and vivacious, was much admired, and proved an excellent wife and mother. She was a worthy chatelaine of Abbotsford.

From childhood Scott had literary tastes, having a passion for old ballads and desultory antiquarian studies. But until he was about thirty years of age he showed not the slightest sign of any gift of original composition. A few spirited but amateurish translations from Bürger and Goethe were followed by *The Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border*, a compilation on the model of Bishop Percy's *Reliques*. The success of the *Minstrelsy* inspired him to try his hand at an imitation of the ancient ballad manner. The result was *The Lay of the Last Minstrel*, which had an immediate success. Thus encouraged, he wrote *Marmion* in the same manner, which made him the most admired poet of the day. The pinnacle of his poetic fame was reached in *The Lady of the Lake*. *Rokeby* and *The Lord of the Isles* followed in quick succession, but were not so well received, because by this time Byron had become his rival in popular esteem. Providentially, however, between *Rokeby* and *The Lord of the Isles* Scott lighted upon an old half-finished prose MS. that he had mislaid and almost forgotten. It was a novel of the 'Forty-five Rebellion. On glancing through it he thought it not so bad, finished it in a few weeks and had it published anonymously under the title of *Waverley*, or *'Tis Sixty Years Since*. Such was the accidental beginning of the great series of Waverley Novels, which are his chief title to fame and brought him for many years enormous profits.

Although a lawyer by profession, and a good and careful one, Scott was no business man. He was a poet and a man of letters, and as such was bound to be a fool in business matters. Also he was generous to a fault, and as a matter of course designing people took advantage of his generosity. At the very beginning of his literary career, out of sheer kindness of heart, he was induced to

lend a considerable sum of money to an old friend of his boyhood, James Ballantyne, who, after failing as a country lawyer, had set up as a printer. He even managed that all the printing contracts for his own works should go to James Ballantyne. Later he helped James Ballantyne's younger brother, John Ballantyne, to set up as a bookseller and publisher in Edinburgh—again out of kindness of heart. But James Ballantyne was indolent and John Ballantyne was not honest, and both were incompetent. Then there was Archibald Constable, who ultimately published most of Scott's work. All these people, having insufficient capital, financed their businesses by means of accommodation bills, which they took to Scott to be backed. Scott backed the bills without a moment's hesitation, being a very innocent man without any experience of commercial guile. John Ballantyne's bookselling and publishing business made nothing but losses, and after a few years had to be closed down. It nearly ruined Scott; but, thanks to his industry and the ever-growing popularity of his novels, he recovered and by 1825 was on the way to becoming a rich man. But at the end of that year a disastrous financial panic set in. Constable's London agents failed, and their failure brought down Constable and James Ballantyne, who were deeply involved with them. The three firms went into bankruptcy; and, as their assets yielded very little, Scott became liable for practically the whole amount of the bills he had put his name to. But instead of going into bankruptcy like the others he heroically undertook to pay off the whole debt with his pen. He succeeded in doing so, but the strain of it brought him to a premature grave. He died happy in the consciousness that he had behaved as a man of honour and had saved Abbotsford, the beautiful home he had built for himself on Tweedside.

Such is the gist of the legend that since Lockhart's day every writer upon Scott has been required to accept on peril of anathema. Any deviation from it, except in small details, renders the sinner liable to the bitterest invectives in which not even his private character is spared. Having myself had some experience, I do not wonder that even a writer of the commanding position of Mr. Buchan has elected not to ask for trouble by straying into new paths. '*Stare super antiquas vias*' is his motto, or, to use his own words, his modest purpose, 'to re-cut some of the lines of Lockhart's imperishable memorial,' which means that at the end of his exceedingly competent and readable book we are precisely where we were. If we worshipped Scott before, we shall applaud Mr. Buchan's piety. If we contemned Scott, Mr. Buchan will not have shown cause why we should mitigate our contempt. Dame Una Pope-Hennessy, as befits her sex, is much more courageous. Her book, though ostensibly limited to the latter

part of Scott's life, definitely adds to our knowledge of the man's character, especially if one has the gift of reading between the lines; for, although cautious, she makes it clear that she knows much, and infers more, that she does not care to set down in black and white. Let me now, with some assistance from Dame Una, contrast the legend with the life of Scott.

Like R. L. Stevenson, he was a product of the Edinburgh professional class. His father was a solicitor in decent but not great practice; his mother was a daughter of the Professor of Medicine at Edinburgh University. His paternal grandfather was a prosperous farmer and stockbreeder in Roxburghshire. His only claim to 'gentle' birth lay in the fact that his great-grandfather was a younger son of a petty Border laird. About Lady Scott Lockhart is reticent. She rarely appears in his pages. His account of her antecedents is meagre, and, such as it is, quite fictitious. Who or what Marguerite Charlotte Charpentier was is to this day a matter of dispute. There appears to have been a deliberate destruction of documentary evidence, for Mr. Partington notes as one of the mysteries of the Letter Books that they contain no correspondence for 1797, the year of Scott's marriage. 'How came it,' he pertinently asks, 'that Scott, preserving all these thousands of intimate and curious writings, did not include the business-like 'love letters' sent to him by Charlotte Charpentier, which were yet accessible to John Gibson Lockhart for use in the *Life*?' One can but conjecture. All that can be ascertained beyond doubt is that she was the daughter of Lord Downshire's French mistress; that as a girl in her teens she was baptised at St. George's, Hanover Square; and that her mother's lawful husband, Jean Charpentier, kept a smart riding school at Lyons, where young noblemen and gentlemen of all nations appear to have had opportunities of improving themselves in other polite accomplishments besides equitation. On the principle '*Pater est quem nuptiæ demonstrant*,' Lady Scott was the daughter of Jean Charpentier, but, apart from her mother's association with Lord Downshire, there are circumstances that entitle us to add '*Sed quære*.' Her exact paternity is of no interest save for its dubiety. She may have been the bastard of an Anglo-Irish peer, or she may have been the lawful child of a French provincial pimp—it matters not much.² In either case she was a curious choice of a

² She was baptised at St. George's, Hanover Square, in the name of Marguerite, and in the register is stated to have been born at Lyons in 1770; and it has been established from a parish register at Lyons that an infant daughter of Jean Charpentier was baptised in December 1770 in the name of Elie Marguerite. If the identification is correct, Lady Scott was nearly a year older than her husband, instead of several years younger. There is also the puzzling change of name to Charlotte, corresponding to her brother's similar change of name from John David to Charles. If Charlotte and Charles Carpenter were born French subjects

wife for a respectable young Scottish barrister with social ambitions. However, the marriage was successful enough for ten or fifteen years. Children were born, but not too many, and there was no lack of money. The happy period coincided roughly with the period of Scott's poetic fame—i.e., until about 1815, after which Charlotte began to go to pieces. She was a silly woman, with just enough education and manners to make a very nice wife for a very nice professional man, such as Walter Scott looked like being when she married him. Her husband's sudden rise to fame and fortune at first delighted but soon bewildered her. She never had any notion that he was a man of genius. All she knew was that he was a wonderful fellow for making money and friends and that he involved her in a style of living that she could not cope with. The Abbotsford adventure demoralised her with its responsibilities. She lost heart, took to the bottle and drank herself to death in ten years. When she died, Cockburn tells us, people had long forgotten that once she had been pretty and agreeable. They remembered only an ageing woman, bloated, besotted, and bad-tempered.

Whatever he himself may have said to the contrary, Scott was no exception to the rule that before a man can write a masterpiece he must have served a long and arduous apprenticeship.³ It was Scott's humour to give out that *Waverley* was written more or less by accident and that it was his first attempt at prose fiction. The story is on the face of it wildly improbable. Even Lockhart is obliged to admit that in one important particular it is flagrantly untrue, and tries to patch it up with a conjectural amendment that was never very plausible and is now known to be wrong.

Waverley was not Scott's first attempt at a novel, nor his second. It is doubtful if it can even rank as high as his third. It was simply the first novel that he deemed fit for print. From the time he was a new-fledged advocate—perhaps earlier—he had been diligently experimenting in the novel, putting aside one attempt after another as unsatisfactory, but not destroying them. His first essay seems to have been *The Black Dwarf*. Next came—though in what order it is hard to say—*Guy Mannering*, *St. Ronan's Well*, *Redgauntlet*, and *The Monastery*. All that can be reasonably conjectured is that *The Monastery* was the latest of the 'prentice works and was written about the same time as *The Lay of the Last Minstrel*. *Waverley* followed immediately,

it is curious that there is no record that either of them was ever naturalised in this country. Yet Charles entered the East India Company's service, for which aliens were not eligible. [Mr. Partington, I note, accepts Lockhart's story that the Charpentiers were *émigrés*, which they certainly were not.]

³ I here accept and extend the conclusions which since the publication of her book *Dame Una* Pope-Hennessy communicated to *The Times Literary Supplement* of April 28, 1932.

and once he had begun it Scott, with the unerring instinct of the artist, knew that at last he had mastered his job and was fit to appear before the world as a novelist. He had kept his previous attempts a dead secret, but now he ventured to show the first few chapters of *Waverley* to one or two intimate friends. They were interested, and one at least was enthusiastic; but all were agreed that, in view of the amazing popularity he had meanwhile achieved as a poet, it would be injudicious to appear in a new and unfamiliar character that his public might not like.

Years passed before the appropriate time came for *Waverley* to be finished and published, but when it did come Scott had the richest satisfaction of his life. He had toiled long and secretly to produce a novel that should not only be good but be acclaimed as good, and he succeeded so far beyond expectation that another novel by 'the author of *Waverley*' was demanded at once. Accordingly he rummaged through his earlier manuscripts, decided that one called *The Astrologer* was the most suitable, which he recast hurriedly and renamed *Guy Mannering*. He then wrote an entirely new novel, *The Antiquary*. Next, having a good contract from Blackwood for the first series of *Tales of my Landlord*, he saw no harm in including his earliest work of fiction, *The Black Dwarf*, and was very angry when the astute publisher smelt a rat and said so. After that Scott was chary about drawing upon old stock, but at moments of pressure he did so at least three times—in 1820 with *The Monastery*, and four years later with two successive novels, *St. Ronan's Well* and *Redgauntlet*. These early works, of course, were not published simply as they stood. *St. Ronan's Well* was very largely rewritten, while *Redgauntlet* is like a Gothic cathedral, with a Norman choir and Perpendicular nave and transepts.

In no respect is the traditional portrait of Scott farther from the truth than in representing him as an amiable booby in practical matters. He was not in the strict sense unbusinesslike. On the contrary, there was not a man in Scotland who was more exact and methodical in the conduct of his affairs. Above all, he was a bold and ambitious adventurer, who combined audacity with a certain furtiveness that proclaimed him a true son of the Border reivers. His weakness was that he had no business acumen, and, with all his geniality, he was very headstrong and masterful. He could not abide opposition. James and John Ballantyne were pliable creatures whom he chose because they could be trusted to do as they were bid. Scott was their master, and he never let them forget it. The two Ballantyne concerns were financed, directed and controlled by Walter Scott, the nominal principals being little more than salaried managers. For six years, indeed (1816–22), Scott was sole partner in James

Ballantyne & Co., and used the business as a kind of private bank on which he allowed himself an unlimited overdraft for the unsightly extravagance of Abbotsford. He was enabled to do this mainly by the complaisance of Constable, who, in his anxiety to retain the monopoly of Scott's work, became a party to the vicious Scott-Ballantyne system of paper finance. When the crash came Scott turned on Constable with bitter reproaches. Certainly Constable was blameworthy, but not as Scott complained. He had for some years been alarmed by Scott's reckless bill transactions, and had he put his foot down firmly the ultimate disaster would have been avoided. But, though himself masterful enough, Constable hesitated to pit his masterfulness against Scott's. Moreover, in business matters he was the very antitype of Scott. He had an acumen that was almost uncanny, but he hated the routine of business and could hardly be induced to look at a balance-sheet.

If Scott had any ground of complaint it was against the Scottish banks, who were his principal creditors and treated him in a manner that it is impossible to think of without indignation. They had indulged him with vicious and dangerous credit facilities, in consequence of which he found himself liable on an enormous mass of paper, not much more than half of which represented value received. Cynically taking advantage of their own wrong, they looked on while Scott worked himself to death to get money for them to which they had not the shadow of a moral claim. Yet, in strange contrast to his bitterness against Constable, Scott was humbly grateful to them for their consideration in merely stripping him naked and refraining from flaying him.

Why did Scott so meekly yield his bosom to the knife? He was not, in general, a meek man or a believer in the doctrine of non-resistance to evil. Carlyle, as we know, could see no merit in Scott's refusal to go into bankruptcy, which he ascribed to the stubborn vanity of a man whose eyes were incorrigibly set on the things of this world. 'He said, I will retrieve myself, and make my point good yet, or die for it.' Mr. Buchan quite rightly regards Carlyle's judgment as a piece of surly sentimentality; but when he goes on to say that Scott's conduct was dictated by his desire to retrieve his honour and that any other course 'would have meant that his creditors would not have been paid and that innocent people would have suffered from the results of his folly,' we hardly feel the explanation is adequate. There was, as we have seen, no question of 'innocent' people suffering, and honour would have been amply satisfied with much less than Scott bound himself to do. The true source of action came from a deeper emotional level. After the first outburst of

resentment at his humiliation, which spent itself on the stricken figure of Archibald Constable, Scott was able to interpret the riddle of his calamities. He had been guilty of *ὕβρις*, the sin of the giants, the sin of doing what he wanted to do and enjoying it thoroughly. And of course (as every Scotsman knows) Heaven does not approve of that. Scott bowed to Heaven's sentence and bore the discipline without a murmur. He would not ask to be spared a single stroke from the full tale. It is true he dramatised himself a little. '*Agere et pati Romanum est*' was his favourite saying during the last sad years, but who will grudge him that modest dose of the martyr's legitimate anodyne? He was a great endurer. We do Walter Scott poor honour when we think of him as a simple soul who laboured to pay his creditors. He was not a simple soul. He had the most complex and baffling nature that ever afflicted a man of genius; and it was no earthly debt that he laboured to clear off. It was a debt that he conceived as due to the Eternal Order. He may have been wrong—probably he was—but he did his task and died. Salute to Sir Walter!

Yet, in paying that tribute, one can hardly help being reminded of the blasting *obiter dictum* of Stevenson's Lord Justice-Clerk on his wife's cook: 'A good Christian woman! Get a hure aff the street that can boil a potato.' It is no doubt a fine thing that a good artist should also be a good man, just as it is a fine and even rarer thing that a good cook should also be a good Christian. But the conjunction, however admirable, is irrelevant. It is the artistry and the cooking that matter. How, in this view, does Scott stand?

The answer is not easy; for, although Scott did an unconscionable amount of bad work, it is mere idle paradox to pretend that he was no genius and no artist. Let the sceptic turn to Mr. Walpole's admirable collection of excerpts from the Waverley Novels—a stout volume yet by no means exhaustive—if he wants proof that within his range he could show supreme genius and the most perfect artistry—when he chose. Unfortunately, more often than not he did not choose. There have been men of genius who never knew when they were doing good and when bad work, but Scott presents the strange case of a man of genius who well knew but cared little. A Balzac, a Wordsworth, a Shelley, even a Galt, may fail and fail badly, but they always know what they want to do and they do it with their might, and if the public do not like it they can lump it. Scott never had this rigorous sense of artistic duty. Nothing, indeed, could be more remarkable than the contrast between his moral inflexibility and the laxity of his artistic conscience. It would have been well for him if he had been a little less talented, for his versatility and the material

rewards it brought constantly led him away from his vision. He set out to be a novelist of manners, especially of the manners of the old Scotland that he saw passing away. He was diverted from that by the astounding popular success that followed his discovery that he could tell a tale of chivalry in lively rhyme. When the vogue for his rhymed romances began to fail, he returned to the novel. Success again attended him and again betrayed him. From the moment when he had the unhappy inspiration to write *Ivanhoe* Scott entered upon a manner of composition that has not only damaged his own fame but has done incalculable mischief to imaginative literature; for it was the beginning of the pernicious practice of writing, not for those who care to read, but 'for a public,' the renunciation of the serious tradition of the novel and the first phase of its degeneration into that poor thing of to-day that is content to be known as 'fiction.'

DONALD CARSWELL.

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Letters as well as articles will be considered for publication, but letters should be confined to criticism or amplification of articles which have already appeared in the Review. No anonymous contribution is published.

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POLITICS AND POLITICIANS

THERE are various classes of mankind who seem peculiarly capable of exciting the resentment, or, it may be, the professed contempt, of their fellow-citizens. Clergymen, lawyers, medical men, appear at all times to have their instinctive enemies, and to them may now be added politicians, if constant allusions in current writings be good evidence of popular opinion. Ignorance, incompetence, mendacity, low craft, selfish indifference to higher interests, and sometimes actual financial corruption, such are among the allegations freely launched, albeit in such general terms that no retribution in the courts can follow. If, however, there be anyone who wishes to judge fairly the class impugned, it behoves him to learn something of the conditions under which they have to work.

Now, politics implies the business of governing, and governing means the art of steering, both in letter and in fact. Further, steering implies wind, waves and rocks, and the success of the steersman or captain depends on the capacity of his rudder, his engines and his crew. Neither theoretical knowledge, nor courage,

nor will-power will bring a ship into harbour of itself. Navigation is a complicated and applied science, but in the application of his art to his end the captain of a ship enjoys the singular advantage of an absolute control over the men and the machinery that serve him. Far otherwise is it with the captains of most ships of State in modern times. Louis XIV. of France may have said with truth, 'I am the State'; Mussolini or Stalin may think it now; but most rulers know only too painfully that they govern only by the capricious consents of many persons and divers interests under many forms. And just as the servants of an autocrat watch anxiously for his frown or smile, so do the Ministers of a democracy note the moods of that public opinion on which their reign in the end depends. Both the names courtier and politician have come to possess an ill connotation, and individuals of either class may be unprincipled or timid, but neither, of whatever character or courage, can be indifferent to the humours of those with whom the power immediately or ultimately lies.

In Great Britain the ultimate power lies with the huge mass of adult voters, the immediate power with the House of Commons, subject to certain checks and delays. Therefore the chief Minister of the King, who is the active ruler of the nation, depends upon the House of Commons, and as that body has 615 members he must be sure of the constant goodwill of 308 of them, or with a working margin of safety—let us say 330—so that there are always 330 persons before his eyes whom he must not seriously offend, nay, whom he must call upon day after day to give him constant and laborious service. His position is that of a battalion commander were the Army Act suspended. He must rule by exhorting and humouring his men, or he is lost. And again, behind each of the 330 are tens of thousands of men and women on whom, perforce, his eye in turn must rest. Each of them has a share of power, though many are strangely indifferent as to its exercise. If, however, even a small fraction of them become really excited on some question, the reaction on their representatives is felt at once. And if this excitement occurs in a considerable number of the seats held by the 330, the leader of the 330 cannot ignore it.

Now, of course, it may be said that the leader of a party, who is also Prime Minister, should go right ahead with the policy he thinks right regardless of consequences. On a really vital issue this is so; but observe the dilemma in which he is placed. If only a small number of the 330 desert him, not only does he lose on the immediate issue, but he sets back a number of causes dear to his followers and perhaps puts men into power whose policy he may firmly believe to be disastrous to the nation. Be he the most conscientious of men, he must ask himself whether to take the particular risk may not conflict with his duty as a whole.

There are few vital issues in politics where a great moral obligation stands out so clear that all other considerations may be ignored. The saving of Belgium was certainly a case, and I think I could find others, though less indisputable; but the usual political question involves a balance of advantages or a choice of evils. Lord Milner's famous expression, 'Damn consequences,' was perhaps the most unfortunate of that great public servant's life. I can see no governing principle in politics save expediency; but an expediency subject to the Ten Commandments. To erect into an immutable principle the continuance, say, of Free Trade or of an hereditary Second Chamber is to confuse the means and end. A political leader ought not to be wedded to any maxims save the good of his country and the moral law. Of course, if he be committed to something of which he repents or which he finds impossible, his only proper action may be to resign. I should say that in this connexion there was a case against Peel on the Corn Duties and against Palmerston on the Danish question. Peel was overborne by the distress of the time and Palmerston by the House of Commons, and perhaps the Court; but I cannot think that either should have stayed in office when so leading a feature of his policy proved impossible to maintain. Pitt's action on Catholic emancipation affords a far finer precedent. Be this as it may, however, these instances are striking illustrations of the limits of all Prime Ministers' power.

If it is unjust to judge political leaders on the assumption that they are completely their own masters, it is equally untrue to suppose that they can give to each question as it arises their full, mature, and informed judgment. The physical limitations of English politics are not in the least understood even by the best educated laymen. The calls of constituents, the demand for public speeches, the insistence of deputations, the pressure of departmental work, the long hours and searching interrogations of Parliament, leave far too scanty a time for any Minister to apply himself to independent deliberation and research. Though I have not been in the highest circle of a Government, I think it no rash guess to say that on many questions a Cabinet is simply forced to accept the view of the Minister principally concerned, and he in turn the opinion of his permanent advisers. It is a matter of time and strength, and flesh, blood and brains can do no more. Something has got to be decided, and the man who is supposed to know prevails. There was once, I believe, a theory that the Prime Minister kept an eye on the work of each department, but if it was ever more than a theory I doubt if now it exists at all.

The instabilities of Government policy and the want of time for independent thought are both part of the price of democracy. In the eighteenth century the owners of small boroughs were the

powers behind the Speaker's chair. Twenty years back it was the National Liberal Federation, reinforced by the Free Church Council. Lately it was the Trade Union Council, and whereas the borough owners acted individually and spasmodically, the Trade Union Council is highly organised, ever-present and vigilant, and cannot be stroked down by titles or ribbons. So far, happily, there is nothing comparable under the present Administration, though there have been times when the National Union of Conservative Associations seemed to have aspirations to play a like part. Under a Protectionist system there would be a real danger that some permanent organisation of manufacturing interests, employing and employed, might attain to undue power; but fortunately it has been the policy of the present Government to prevent this by the establishment of an Independent Tariff Commission whose assent to new duties has to be obtained.

The demands on the time of members of Parliament have grown greater and greater with the extension of the franchise. Party organisations that were adapted to bodies of 15,000 voters have become quite insufficient for 60,000. Local branches have become semi-independent bodies and the central councils or executives that might be expected to control them have themselves become large, unwieldy and difficult to direct. All this means many more people than formerly with a status that gives them a claim on their member, and that claim is often inconsiderately used. The real work of a member is quite lost sight of in the desire to parade him locally, and it is more important for him to go round the fêtes (if possible with a smiling wife) than to sit down to the hard unreported drudgery of the parliamentary daily task. It is by capacity for the former rather than the latter function that at least Conservative organisations too often choose their candidates and judge their members; and yet, if a member misses an important division by reason of his presence in one polling district, he will not be forgiven by many of his supporters in the others. Omniscience and omnipotence are expected of the leaders and ubiquity of the rest.

Such, then, are the present conditions of English politics. The control is in the hands of over-worked and harassed men, who, amid ever-changing situations and difficulties, are never certain of their own power or place. 'Who is sufficient for all these things?' it may be asked, and the answer is, inevitably, 'No man.' If a leader like Lord Balfour or, in his different way, Mr. Baldwin, preserves a cool and detached judgment, is chary of premature commitments and refuses battle on dangerous ground, he may lose the enthusiasm and even the support of his followers; if he obscures issues, like other leaders, with a smoke-screen of facundity, he may carry his point for the moment, but at the cost

of lasting and perhaps justified distrust. The strong superman who of his own will-power can rule the country with inflexible decision has no place in the British Constitution, and when such a one did arise in the seventeenth century and broke that Constitution by military force it may perhaps be conceded that he cost too much.

'Enough,' it may be said, after the manner of Rasselas, 'you have convinced me that no man can be a ruler in England.' And yet England must be ruled, is ruled after a fashion, and might be easily worse ruled than now. I have tried to explain the instability of Governments: let me now try to show how they are able to exist at all. In the first place, the great majority of members of Parliament soon realise that it is only by union and discipline that any real advance can be made. If the Government which they support disappears, their own particular cherished projects will disappear in all likelihood also. Moreover, the rules and practice of the House make it next to impossible for a private member, even with the best of luck, to succeed in getting a Bill of his own passed unless its scope is very narrow or its provisions almost wholly uncontroversial. The result is that members are obliged to look to the Government to carry out their wishes; but it is clear that the Government will not move unless a large number wish the same thing. If, however, the thing desired is impracticable, unsound or gravely unpopular, the pressure on the Government is very unlikely to be carried to the breaking point. If it were, not only would the particular project fall, but a great deal else would come down with it.

This brings me to the second point, which is that a party or parties supporting a Government are always to some extent cemented by fear. The spectre of a premature dissolution is never far away. However much the position of a member of Parliament may be depreciated by glib writers, it gives a very real status, power, and engrossment of interest which its holders are loth to risk. In France the term of a Parliament is fixed and Governments rise and fall during its term. In England the breakdown of a Government probably involves an election in which the former majority is almost certain to suffer loss, if not disaster. The dread of defeat is always a potent factor for union in every English House of Commons. This fear is reinforced by a worthier motive. Whatever may be said by cynics, my own experience leads me to assert that the great majority of members have a true sense of responsibility and duty. If they have a sincere attachment to their party it is because they believe that no other could so well conduct the national affairs. They may, indeed, carry their solidarity too far, but their motives in maintaining a united front are largely patriotic. And to patriotism may often be added a real personal loyalty to a leader and resentment of cabals against him.

'But,' it may be said, 'is not all this unity bought at the expense of sincerity and conscience? Do not men vote, as the Persians fought, under the lash?' The answer is, first, that a conscientious dilemma arises far less often than might be supposed, for the simple reason that Governments take good care not to offend the convictions of any great number of their followers. In individual cases, however, I should say that the whips always respect the conscientious feelings of their men, if properly informed. What does excite their wrath, and rightly, is that men should give a hostile vote without notice. Of course, if a dangerous number do give notice, the proposal in controversy may be changed or dropped. In all this connexion I am speaking according to my knowledge of the Conservative Party, but I have no right to suppose that things are otherwise elsewhere, and I think that cases of gross intolerance (*e.g.*, the treatment of Sir Robert Young) will be found due to outside organisations and not to any pressure within the House.

Having said so much, I must add my view that Governments have pressed the principle of solidarity too far as regards their proposals for legislation. Obviously a Government cannot survive a vote of want of confidence passed against them, or if the supplies for the year are denied them by the House of Commons. When, however, it comes to changes in the law I cannot see why an Administration should not be prepared to accept defeat and pass on to the next business. The primary business of a Government is to administer, not to legislate, and their capacity as administrators should not in logic be affected by legislative failures. Members should be free to consider the provisions of a measure on its merits and without regard to the consequences of a hostile vote either to the Government or to themselves. I fancy that in former times there was much greater independence—as witness the transformation of the Education Bill of 1870; while again quite lately the exigencies of a minority Government made them accept repeated rebuffs on their proposals—a precedent which, on the whole, I think ought to be followed even by Governments who undoubtedly hold the confidence of a majority of the House.

Nevertheless, there are great difficulties in applying this logical distinction between executive and legislative functions. Nothing can prevent a Government from making any division a matter of confidence if they choose. On the face of the issue it was ridiculous that Lord Rosebery's Government should have resigned on the Cordite snap vote; but of course they were already at the point of death both from internal and external maladies, and they probably welcomed the opportunity of a decorous exit. Again, if a Government is repeatedly beaten on

its Bills, its followers will grow restless and discontented and disintegration is likely to set in. In any case, Ministers cannot throw Bills at the House and leave them to take their chance. If the results are not to be chaotic they must guide the measure in its passage, and if guidance is repeatedly rejected it is only natural that the guides should strike. Nevertheless, I would try to establish a canon, to be subscribed to by all political leaders, that defeats on legislation should not normally be fatal. I put forward such a suggestion with Lord Hugh Cecil in 1914 when we served on a Committee on Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, and we got support from the Speaker (Lord Ullswater), but not from the party leaders, and of course the committee and its work were blown out of existence by the hurricane of war.

In considering the House of Commons as a legislative body there remains the very serious problem of the growth of obstruction and the counter-measures it has occasioned. It is quite useless to rail against obstruction. It is '*vitium adultum et prevalidum*,' and its addicts have the excuse that, if they cannot defeat a particular measure, they can prevent others from coming forward. The reply to obstruction is, of course, the guillotine, but the result of the guillotine is that many provisions are undiscussed and Government amendments are passed in silence. Under this procedure the Government draftsmen show extraordinary ability in making a measure coherent, but even so it often leaves the Commons in a form in which it could not work; and this brings me to the House of Lords.

I should say that the work of revision in the Upper House was extremely well done, but was done under a sense of sufferance and lack of power which results partly from the composition of the House and partly from the one-sided party legislation of 1911. No great parliamentary body can enjoy the prestige which should be its permanent attribute, if not a fifth of its members normally attend. No such body can develop a full sense of responsibility if its decisions are rendered futile, not by the expressed will of the nation, but by the mere effluxion of time or, in the case of financial Bills, the technique of the measures concerned. Of course the question of reform is far too large to be properly dealt with in parenthesis in an article like this, and here I can only say that I personally should favour a change under which the House should be constituted:

- (1) As to a fraction, by self-selection among the hereditary peers, and as to the rest
- (2) By direct election—
 - (a) of one-third at three fixed intervals,
 - (b) under proportional representation in large areas, and
 - (c) by electors of thirty and over;

and, further, I suggest that the new Upper House should have the same powers as the House of Commons, save for the initiation of taxation and money votes, and should not be overridden except as a result of an election or referendum.

As things now are, the institutions of Great Britain, in so far as the Constitution protects them, are in a more precarious position than those of any other great country. Elsewhere the power of the Legislature is restricted, and fundamental innovations cannot be made without some kind or another of extraordinary and complicated procedure which makes it clear that the country really desires the change. With us a revolution by statute could pass with fewer checks than a Gas Bill, and if a majority of the House of Commons held together for two years any institution could be destroyed without the people having ever been consulted: nay, if the revolution could be clothed in strict financial form, it would take but five weeks to produce chaos. In so desperate a situation the only remedy would be to invoke the dormant veto of the Crown, a step perhaps involving the existence of the monarchy, which (in Mr. Burke's phrase) would be the last resort of the thinking and the good. All this is perfectly well known. Government after Government has been warned, twenty-one years have passed since the Parliament Act, and yet nothing has been done. Ephemeral problems have been allowed precedence, there has been tepidity and uncertainty of counsel, with a blind attachment to the existing order, and, I fear, in some degree to privilege and place. I have noticed in some a superstitious faith in the ability of the ship of State to right itself in any storm, while others see nothing but the possible dangers of a new departure, as if there were not the gravest risks in the policy of drift that has so long prevailed. The question was grossly mishandled by the last Conservative Government (the worst page of a good record), and if the present Government does not solve it they will deserve the worst that can come to them. I will add only that I do not believe that it will be possible to construct a Second Chamber with adequate powers except, in the main, on the elective principle, which, however, should be applied at times different to the elections of the Commons, and also by different methods and to some extent by different electors.

To return to the House of Commons, it is, I submit, a fallacy to expect it either to represent solely the wisdom of the country or to conduct its proceedings on the lines of municipal or commercial business. If it is to fulfil its end, it must represent not only the wisdom but the interests and passions and follies of the people, and all these elements must find expression. The House is often described as a talking shop, and a talking shop it is meant to be, as the very name 'Parliament' implies. And in this there

is real wisdom as the energies of innovators get dissipated in utterance, and cherished grievances are exposed and destroyed in the free, if often tedious, atmosphere of debate. Over and over again it happens that some alleged hardship or scandal has been sedulously nourished in newspapers, until an apparently formidable case has been made out—only to be blown to pieces by two hours of oral discussion. Save in the case of set party wrangles, I should say that nowhere is the truth quicker or better arrived at than in the House of Commons, partly because of the open scoffing with which false points are received, and partly because of the vast collective knowledge which the members own. Whatever the subject and whoever the orator, he can hardly speak for half an hour without touching on a point on which some other member, perhaps ineffective on all other subjects, knows more than he does himself and may presently arise to his confusion.

On many points the House of Commons is often unfairly and foolishly attacked; but there is one sphere in which for decades it has lost its use. There is an old phrase 'Grievance before supply,' and this has come to mean in practice that, while grievances are amply ventilated, supply is hardly discussed at all. For twenty or more days in the session enormous sums are submitted to the House, but the discussion that follows does not turn upon the sums themselves, but on some alleged mistakes or defaults of the department that submits them. Then the sums are voted and spent without any real parliamentary check; indeed, probably in the course of the debate suggestions will have been pressed on the Government which would involve prodigious fresh expense. For many years past the House of Commons has been a grossly extravagant body, and far more prodigal than the contemporary Governments. For every financial concession made to any class, description, or interest there is instant pressure to extend it, without the slightest regard at the moment for the taxation that will certainly be involved. It is true that there is an ancient and salutary rule that no grant can be increased save on a resolution by a Minister of the Crown; but there are circumstances (too technical to describe here) in which this rule may be evaded, and in any case the pressure may be so great that a new resolution may have to be introduced. Of course, when the day of taxation comes there is weeping and gnashing of teeth, often by the very men whose act or consent has made the taxation inevitable and whose renewed pressure or supineness may make further burdens equally inevitable next year. The House checks the recklessness of the Executive! It simply loads them with money and commitments, or has done so up to a year ago.

Now that the country has been really alarmed, great efforts are being made to revive a real parliamentary control over expenditure though many of the commitments appear almost irrevocable. I imagine proposals will be made to set up an Estimates Committee to examine and report on Estimates before they come before the whole House, but I should say that several committees will be necessary if the expenditure of all the departments is really to be closely scrutinised. Whatever else is done, I would urge that the departments should have greater liberty to vary their own expenditure within the limits of the total sums voted and to use their savings on their own objects. At present the working of the rigid accounting system perfected by Mr. Gladstone deprives the departments of incentive to economy and of financial responsibility, as they cannot use what they may be able to save, but have simply to hand it back. Years ago I tried to get this changed and got considerable support within the House; but Sir Michael Hicks-Beach rose in his wrath and scrunched out the attempt. Nevertheless, all that has happened since convinces me that the present practice entirely defeats its own end, and I am glad to see that this has been recognised in the case of the Post Office by Lord Bridgeman's report. Lastly, and this is of the first importance, I would make it impossible by standing order for members to propose increased expenditure in those cases where it is now allowed.

There is one charge against politics and politicians to which I have already alluded, but which demands some further comment. In its fullest form it is that of financial corruption. In a diluted shape it is that Premiers and Cabinets are somehow controlled by a few plutocrats. One writer, a man of the highest character and deserved distinction in other spheres, states categorically that whoever wielded power in the past, that power has gone in our time to a limited number of wealthy men, and that, although a chief Minister may call himself Premier or *Président du Conseil* or *Reichskanzler*, he is but the puppet of moneyed interests, whether he resents or acquiesces in his dependence. To my thinking this notion is simply grotesque. I can remember Lord Salisbury well enough to see the kind of broad smile that would have illumined his face at the notion that he was anybody's puppet. I doubt if it would have made him or any of his successors even angry, though I would not say that there have been none of them who have not unduly courted the favour of wealthy individuals. Certainly a Prime Minister's powers are limited, as I have tried to show, but they are limited by visible and known forces; and suppose that five plutocrats told a leader that he must do something, and fifty of his followers in the Commons told him he must not, it is the fifty who would win each time.

The truth is that politics is not in any way 'a dirty game,' though it may be played dirtily and by dirty players. It is amazing how educated people apparently pride themselves on the fact that they take no part in the government of their country. There may indeed be good reasons for many to abstain from public life, but that such abstinence can be matter for self-complacency shows how strangely some minds must be composed. Sometimes the excuse is that they would be tarred and corrupted by the sordidness of the life. Now the life is very tiring and full of uncertainties and disappointments, but it is not sordid in the least. There is, of course, much to condemn, more particularly on the electoral side—simulated indignation, insincere shibboleths, suppression of facts—but in twenty-six years in Parliament I never smelt a whiff of financial corruption. I cannot prove a universal negative, but I have been a whip and a friend of Chief Whips, and for some eight years occupied an office (that of Chairman of Committees) where the evil, if at all prevalent, might be expected to be felt. The chairman has a general supervision over the system of procedure in 'private Bills,' and on occasion he can do a good deal to promote, retard, or defeat them. Now these Bills deal with enterprises often of the greatest magnitude in which very large interests are involved, and issues almost vital to the promoters or opponents may be involved in success or failure. All I can say is that in all my time not even the most distant overtures were ever made to me, and when I say that my virtue remained intact, I am bound to add that it was never assailed. In the United States of America the educated and leisured have for the most part abstained from political life, with results to their nation and their several States that were never more obviously disastrous than now. Hitherto in Great Britain there has been an unfailing supply of active and able young men who have given their best to their country without hope of other reward than an honourable ambition may rightly seek. If the cynics or academic moralists who libel the public life of their nation should prevail in inducing abstention with those whom I may term the graduate classes, then indeed the public life of England might become the mere arena for the struggles of conflicting interests in which the strength of the nation might be dissipated for ever. May the day never come when the old saying 'Noble is the prize and great the hope' (καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀθλοῦν καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη) ceases to be as true of English politics as it can ever be of terrestrial effort.

RANKEILLOUR.

OTTAWA

I. A RETROSPECT

IN the summer of 1894 a solitary Englishman voyaged to Canada at the behest of the British Government. He was charged to observe and report upon, but in no wise take part in, a Colonial Conference which had been called at Ottawa by the Canadian Government to consider ways of promoting trade within the Empire—a movement which was viewed in Britain with grave suspicion as a threat to the religion of Free Trade. Thirty-eight years later a great company of officials, headed by the most important Cabinet Ministers, sailed for Ottawa to attack in its Dominion citadel the heresy of Protection, and to take from it the doctrine of Preference, to which it had given birth and sustenance all these years, under the pretence that Free Trade, which had always hated it, would henceforth cherish it as her own child. After four weeks' siege the crusaders retired, without having accomplished their design, but consoled with the honours of war in a priceless formula and after exchanging gifts of good-will.

In the July number of this Review I attempted to analyse the conditions of the impending Conference and to suggest some possible results.¹ Certain difficulties were foreseen, one being the unavoidable complexity of the problem itself, and another the legacy of past politics in Britain, which had made it an article of party faith for the Liberal and Labour members of the National Government—if not for some of the Conservatives also—that taxes on imported food would be a terrible 'sacrifice' for this country to incur. Having regard also to the shortness of the time which would be available at Ottawa, it was suggested that perhaps no immediate tariff agreements ought to be expected; and that in any case the true criterion of success or failure ought to be sought in other directions. In my view the Conference would be a success if it only succeeded in establishing some permanent body on a Commonwealth basis, to deal continuously

¹ 'Ottawa: 1894 and 1932.'

with proposals for effecting or revising the details of Preference between any two or more of the States, by making recommendations to the Governments concerned. Also it seemed important, considering the situation in the Irish Free State especially, that this Conference should explicitly reaffirm the principle—which was implicit in previous resolutions, beginning at Ottawa itself in 1894—that Preference should be regarded as an attribute of allegiance to the Crown; with the consequence that any import duties whatsoever imposed in any of the States should be subject to an automatic rebate in favour of Commonwealth products—a rebate which would be the starting-point for any bargaining. Not only would the Commonwealth itself thus be strengthened, by identifying it with an inalienable privilege of felt value to most of its citizens in their quest of livelihood, but also the much-talked-of 'lead to the world' might be given, by showing how the principle of *status*, taking precedence of bargaining and contract, could be invoked to protect the economically weak and blunt the weapons of tariff war.

In that light the Conference would appear to have failed, since it has neither recommended any joint organisation of a permanent kind, nor enunciated any fiscal doctrine to differentiate the Britannic States from any other group which, without being united by a common allegiance, might happen to have felt that their economic interests were such as to call for treaties of mutual preference. On the other hand, the Conference did succeed in producing an impressive set of bilateral Agreements, especially between Britain and the several Dominions together with India, for submission to the various Legislatures; and its success has been acclaimed, not only by the Ministers concerned, but by the greater part of the Press both here and overseas. Yet the very fact of these Agreements, owing to their interaction and extreme complication, seems to emphasise the necessity of having a permanent Board to facilitate their operation; and also the importance of basing Preference primarily upon *status*, if only for the sake of future simplification.

It is indeed a notable achievement to have broken at last the long record of sterility at Imperial Conferences, and to have produced such concrete results not merely within the short space of less than five weeks—the Conference having opened on July 21 and closed, with the Agreements initialled, on August 21—but in the teeth of the most formidable difficulties. It was not a triumph of preparation, though that had been thorough, at least in London, but of personality. At the final session Mr. Baldwin, moving a vote of thanks to Mr. Bennett as President of the Conference, paid a just tribute to his 'power of drive' and 'grasp of detail,' and also his 'accessibility'—a quality, one may add,

which was enhanced by the contrast with British practice. 'But for the impelling power at the top,' Mr. Baldwin went on to declare, 'the work of this Conference would never have been completed.' Among the throng of visitors some had called Mr. Bennett a fraud, others an enigma. The wiser were content with the estimate of his friends, who credited him not only with genuine strength of character, and a deep sincerity which vitalises a Canadian patriotism extending to the Empire, but also a hidden reserve of force, which in emergency might be evoked with decisive effect.

I do not propose to discuss in the present article the economic value of the agreements reached—which, in fact, have not yet been published in full—but rather to consider the work of the Conference as an outstanding event in the incipient history of the Britannic Commonwealth. The old constitutional ties of the British Empire having gradually been reduced to the single thread of a common allegiance, some of us have felt that the economic ties could and should be so developed as to reunite the Britannic States as autonomous units in a conscious system of mutual aid in living, which might be expected to evolve its own appropriate organs of joint policy and common action. But to this conception, which was encouraged by the birth of the Imperial Conference at the beginning of the century, the great obstacle was always Britain's dogma of Free Trade and policy of free imports, until the war made a breach in both. With the advent last year of the National Government, and the compelling deficiency both of employment and revenue, the path was thought to have been cleared at last. Otherwise Mr. Bennett would not have invited this Conference for the purpose of retrieving the failure of 1930.

But from the beginning of the campaign for tariff reform its opponents have argued that the policy of Preference, if ever carried out, was more likely to disrupt than unite the Empire, owing to friction which would be caused by commercial haggling between Governments, the impossibility of satisfying so many diverse interests, and, above all, the British 'sacrifice.' As regards friction, one must sadly admit that this first attempt to organise reciprocity on an adequate scale may seem to have justified these critics. Although the proceedings began and ended smoothly enough, during the central period the Press correspondents were daily reporting such disputes, recriminations, tensions and crises as might at any moment, it seemed, terminate in a complete breakdown of the Conference. Well might Mr. Baldwin, comparing its course to that of the Canadian weather, remark that besides blue sky and sunshine at the start and finish, they had also experienced 'storms with thunder and lightning, and had been

nearly washed out.' Disaster in fact was only averted by Mr. Bennett's indomitable will. Let us try to identify the causes of so much dissension, which will have to be removed if the future is to fulfil our hopes.

In the previous article I noted the insistence of British Ministers that the objective at Ottawa should be 'freer trade' within the Empire, as an example and prelude to a later world conference. In other words, the Dominions would be asked to make their existing Preferences more effective by lowering their duties on British manufactures, rather than by raising the scale further against the foreigner. But the full implication of this proposal was not revealed until, when the Conference set to work, the British side launched a bombshell by demanding that the Dominion tariffs should be so revised as to put the British exporter on an equality with his local competitor, after taking into account the higher costs of manufacture in a new country. In effect this demand was a direct attack not only on the policy of Protection, but also on the system of Preference as hitherto understood throughout the Commonwealth. The Protectionist slogan had always been 'our own country first, the Empire next, the foreigner last'; implying, not a 'competitive' tariff in the sense demanded by the British, but a definite margin of advantage for the home producer first and the Empire producer next. Moreover, Free Trade Ministers, when seeking in the past to defend their rejection of Preference, were wont to insist that each Government should be allowed to frame its fiscal policy in the interests of its own people, according to its own judgment, without dictation or interference from the others. Thus the new and imperious British demand, that the Dominions should abandon the protectionist principle in favour of the 'competitive,' was in fact revolutionary, and could hardly fail to create violent friction at any Conference of this kind.

Yet it is easy to explain and extenuate this perilous move, which came near to wrecking the Conference, and led in the end, as we shall see, to a compromise filled with the seed of future dispute and friction. The policy of Preference is by nature an offshoot of Protection, not Free Trade. It therefore requires Protectionists, not Free Traders, to carry it out, if it is to get fair play. But the National Government, having established Protection to some extent at home, reverted to Free Trade in their approach to Ottawa. In his opening address Mr. Bennett assumed too confidently that because the United Kingdom had now adopted 'the principle of tariffs as an instrument of economic advancement . . . our policies are now uniform,' and co-operation therefore easy. Within the Government the Liberal and Labour representatives, headed by Mr. MacDonald as Prime Minister,

had made no profession of surrendering their Free Trade principles except to the extent necessitated by a temporary emergency, or as a final resource for breaking down other people's tariffs—beginning, as it now appears, with the Dominions. To meet them always half way was the conscientious purpose of their Conservative colleagues, who themselves had not wholly thrown off the old fiscal tradition. Mr. Chamberlain, whom Tariff Reformers had regarded as the soundest of the bunch, was immersed in the strenuous business at Lausanne up to the last minute, and could have had no time to think about Ottawa before embarking on the ship. More than ever, it seems, the directing of British policy was in the hands of the permanent officials, who came in full strength of numbers, and the Whitehall tradition, which contains more affection for Free Trade and Treasury way than for Empire policies and their plain-speaking oversea champions. In Mr. Runciman—who, as President of the Board of Trade, would be mainly responsible—they had a chief whose ideas would readily coalesce with their own.

But much wider influences must be taken into account. Probably the British policy would have been endorsed in advance by any public meeting at home. The 'competitive' principle would appear a logical step in the direction of Empire Free Trade, which most advocates of Preference cherish as the ideal, and which had been widely advocated by Lord Beaverbrook, with more zeal than knowledge, as a practical policy for to-day. The truth remains that the political conditions for Empire Free Trade do not exist. The postulate is that it should be a matter of indifference to subjects of the Crown in what part of its Dominions any industry is located. But the 'economic nationalism' which makes the Canadian want to establish manufactures in Canada and kept the Englishman loyal to free imports until lately—the selfish motive being one and the same—is a product of democracy, and seems likely to last as long. Democracy calls for local secondary industries, to provide, without the hardship of exile from home, the urban occupations which are its ideal of civilised life. Throughout the ages its cult has been urban in origin and outlook, instinctively regarding agriculture as an inferior existence, of servitude to Nature, and an industry of little social value except in so far as townsmen must have food to eat and a market at hand for their workshop wares. So we find our public education infected with an 'urban bias,' which agrarian reformers seek in vain to change, and the State seeking to promote the means of herd livelihood by whatever fiscal policy seems best calculated to do so. In the Dominions—and in India since the 'Reforms' began—the policy of Protection has thus been chosen. It has certainly fulfilled its purpose to a consider-

able extent, at whatever cost to the consumer, who is mostly a struggling agriculturist. It must be expected to prevail against not only the gospel of Empire Free Trade but also the half-way proposal of competitive tariffs, unless and until either it becomes suspect of destroying more urban employment than it creates, or democratic government is superseded.

Further, the drive for 'competitive' tariffs was in accord with the advice of the most influential economists, and especially the bankers, who were insisting that the main cause of the universal depression lay in the obstruction set by protective tariffs to the free flow of trade. Here one may rather doubt than dogmatise. Of late years these reputable authorities, while agreeing about tariffs, have been too much at variance among themselves, too inconsistent in their successive prescriptions (*e.g.*, as to increasing or restricting production), and too often belied by the event (*e.g.*, the consequences of leaving the gold standard) to command the same respect as formerly. Is it possible that the world has entered upon a new phase which they, their minds steeped in the past, have failed to understand? It seems hardly self-evident that the recent growth of industries in so many countries which formerly relied upon imported manufactures is on balance an economic loss to the world, even if it does shut down English mills, threaten the service of external debts, and put much shipping out of commission. In modern industry every ingenuity is exerted to eliminate unnecessary transport. Yet, listening to Mr. Runciman, for example, one may sometimes have felt that the statesman views the world through the glasses of the ship-owner, and would rather have British ships carrying coals to Newcastle than laid up, even if it put Newcastle out of business. And if coals to Newcastle, why not cottons to Montreal or Bombay, which are not so near home? But when all is said, a demand which challenged the whole history and spirit of the Preference movement overseas ought never to have been made.

One preliminary event which was bound to affect the atmosphere at Ottawa was the dispute with the Irish Free State. The introduction at Dublin of the Bill to abolish the oath of allegiance had been quickly followed by Mr. De Valera's refusal to continue the land annuities. Either action was calculated to strain British patience intolerably. The Government responded to the public feeling by declaring that they would not negotiate any Preference agreement with the Free State at Ottawa or anywhere else. They did not, however, base this attitude upon the doctrine that Preference goes with the common allegiance which the Oath Bill attacked, but on the ground that it would be futile to make a treaty with a treaty-breaker. No doubt the sanctity of treaties is an admirable principle. But when successive

British Governments, including Mr. Thomas and his former colleagues in Labour Cabinets, had refused to outlaw Russia after flagrant violations of agreement, it seemed a little invidious to make a first example of a State which was still a British Dominion. Owing to this action the Free State representatives at Ottawa were reduced to the position of privileged spectators as regards the main business—a difficult part which they seem to have sustained with tact.

Meanwhile the British Government procured the passage of the (Irish Free State) Special Duties Bill, under which they proceeded not merely to deprive the Free State of the Empire exemption from the 10 per cent. general tariff already in force, but to impose a tariff of 20 per cent. upon cattle, meat, and the other main lines of export from that country. This action sufficed to destroy the hope of any general resolution at Ottawa associating Preference with allegiance, because the Free State, being still nominally in allegiance, would thereupon have become entitled to the withdrawal of the special duties, to the discomfiture of the British Government. The latter would have then been bound to grant the Free State not merely the best terms accorded to any foreign country, but the automatic rebate as well, reducing the 10 per cent. general tariff to, say, 8 per cent. It may well be that under such an arrangement the revenue from the duties would not have been less, but more, since the high rate of 20 per cent. had the immediate effect of greatly diminishing the volume of the dutiable imports and throttling the trade. At any rate, the mere discussion of the suggested form of resolution would have had the effect of calling attention to the possible advantages, illustrated by a case of immediate interest, of founding Preference upon status instead of letting it depend wholly on grace or contract.

On the second reading of the Bill Mr. J. H. Thomas, the Secretary for the Dominions, explained that

The Budget for the year included millions of pounds which we had a right to expect would be paid to us, and he wished definitely to emphasise that the Government would not call upon the already heavily burdened taxpayers of this country to shoulder a further burden which they ought not to be called upon to pay. (Ministerial cheers.) The object of the Bill was to provide the amount of the Irish default; to recoup ourselves of the sums due to us under a legally and morally binding agreement, and not a penny more. [*The Times*, July 7.]

Here we find the Government spokesman plainly assuming that the incidence of the duties would be on the Irish exporter or producer; whereas the orthodox theory, professed by all the Liberal and Labour Ministers, was that such duties would infallibly fall on the British consumer, whose 'food would cost

him more.' No doubt it was a lapse due to the temper of the moment, honest anger submerging the vote-catching legend. But the whole business again illustrates the drawbacks of allowing Free Trade politicians to handle the unfamiliar instrument of tariffs. It was quite unnecessary for the Government to urge, whether correctly or not, that their expedient for rebalancing the Budget would be paid for by Irish, not British, citizens. As it is, they have enabled Mr. De Valera to claim, in due course, that in any case the Free State cannot be liable for this year's instalment, because it will have been paid through the tariff, and if the amount so collected turns out to be a single 'penny more,' he will hold them to their word and demand a refund. That, however, is by the way. The relation of the incident to Ottawa is that it queered the pitch for the British delegates when they wished to bargain with the old plea that import duties on wheat or meat would be a grievous burden on the poor consumer in Britain. When Mr. Thomas had so recently given the game away, it would hardly be surprising if it were received on the Dominion side with some impatience, not to say irritation, at the humbug of it all. Indeed, as one follows in the Press reports the successive phases of the negotiations, especially upon meat and wheat, it appears as if the British side had in reality no theory of any kind about the incidence of duties. According to the convenience of the moment they would take the line that the self-same proposals would make food intolerably dear for the poor consumer, or would have so little effect upon prices as to be worthless to the producer at home or overseas. Surely some consistency is necessary to harmonious negotiation.

Space forbids anything more than a cursory glance at the actual proceedings. It was decided to plunge at once into the detailed work, instead of beginning with any general resolutions beyond the customary address to the Crown—which was the only formal recognition by this Conference of any special relationship subsisting between the assembled States. But since, as is now apparent, neither of the resolutions suggested above, which might have facilitated the business in hand, would have had any chance of general acceptance on this occasion, the decision to get on with the job was probably wise, especially as time was so short.

The next choice lay between attempting a general agreement, to be signed by all or most of the States, or a series of bilateral agreements between Britain and the others severally, to be supplemented by inter-Dominion pacts. The first plan would recognise the theoretical unity of the Empire rather than its actual diversity. The second, recognising the diversities rather than the unity, seemed to offer less difficulty and was accordingly chosen. In the same practical spirit the fact that the Dominions

generally were largely interested in the same primary products, for the British market, was turned to account by setting up separate committees to devise proposals regarding these, which the Dominions might jointly present for consideration on the British side. In the opening addresses the stage was set, unconsciously perhaps, for the coming conflict between the official British and the general Dominion view as to the immediate object. Both sides agreed that trade within the Empire should be increased, which incidentally should assist world recovery. Beyond that point they parted company. In the Dominion view tariffs were, as Mr. Bennett put it, 'an instrument of economic advancement'; and Preference was the means whereby each and all of the Britannic States might 'equalise the benefits' of a protective policy as between primary and secondary industries, or agriculture and manufactures, by procuring a sheltered market overseas for the excess production of either branch, as the case might be. On the other hand, in the official British view, as Mr. Baldwin stated, the main object was to break down existing tariff barriers as between members of the Empire. When all was over, and it only remained to shake hands, the interests of honour and publicity were satisfied by the adoption of a general resolution, which ingeniously associated the rival creeds in a common 'conviction' for future guidance. But the tone of Mr. Baldwin's opening speech suggests that his own feeling was less militant than that which had been displayed by some of his colleagues in the parliamentary debates before leaving England. Thus he admitted the alternative possibility of increasing the existing preferences by raising the barriers against the foreigner; and he reiterated the broad standpoint which had been professed beforehand by them all:

It is not needed to measure too closely or too exactly the relative value of the preferences given and received. If we all approach the problem with a view to seeing how much each can contribute to the common stock without detriment to our own national interests, we shall not need to concern ourselves with the relative advantages obtained by each, since we shall know that an increase of purchasing power in any member of the Empire must show itself in the increased Imperial trade and prosperity of each, and add to the prosperity of all.

Alas! within a few days the 'relative advantages' had become the ground of hot dispute, of statement and counter-statement, exhausting energies and tempers, making it the pivot of success or failure for the whole Conference. Up to a point it was easy for the British side to get Dominion assent to certain measures of 'freer trade.' In particular, no Dominion Government was anxious to maintain any longer than could be helped the special restrictions which had been widely adopted owing to

the currency chaos. Again, in Canada and Australia, which are the leading Protectionist States, Governments can always reckon on strong support from the large agricultural element for any reduction of duty on manufactures. But Canada was the main stronghold of the system which the British were out to undermine. Not only was her Government the most definitely Protectionist, but the competition of local industry, often sustained by American capital and brains, was more effective there than elsewhere—the textile and steel industries, in particular, being well-established and progressive. The tariffs securing these seem to have been specially singled out, therefore, for violent attack. To the defenders the British objective did not appear to be any increase of Empire prosperity, but simply the transfer of employment from Canada to Britain.

On the British side all the heavy artillery—though some of it was obvious camouflage—was brought into action. Play was made with the automatic lapse of the exemption under the 10 per cent. tariff after November 15—though to let that take effect would have been fatal to the prestige of the National Government and its Empire policy. More insidious was the hint that surely Mr. Bennett could not 'contemplate with equanimity the assumption of an onus of responsibility—which the Opposition party in Canada will make haste to lay upon his shoulders—for the banishment of the high hopes with which the Conference opened.'² But Mr. Bennett was not going to be bluffed into deserting the principles he had consistently upheld, and making the real 'sacrifice'—of live industries, as against the myth of 'dear food,' which was the bargain proposed. In the end the situation was saved by the usual device of a formula, in the drafting of which Lord Hailsham is said to have shown wonderful skill at the supreme crisis. It was embodied in the agreements with Canada, Australia and (with some variation) New Zealand. It provides that in these Dominions the tariff should protect only 'those industries which are reasonably assured of sound opportunities of success'—as though Protectionist Governments would ever admit any different aim—and

shall be based upon the principle that protective duties shall not exceed such a level as will give United Kingdom producers full opportunity of reasonable competition on the basis of relative cost of economical and efficient production, provided that in the application of such principle special consideration may be given to the case of industries not fully established.

Very significantly, only the New Zealand Agreement contains the interpretation, obviously intended by the British, that the tariff should 'place the United Kingdom producer in the position of a

² *The Times*, August 9. Dispatch from Ottawa.

domestic competitor.' In the Protectionist view, of course, any duty which is not prohibitive is *ex hypothesi* competitive. As to South Africa or India, neither, it seems, could be brought near the water. In the South African Agreement we find nothing at all about limiting protection; while the other expressly provides for 'the preservation unimpaired of the protection enjoyed by certain Indian industries,' or which may be granted hereafter.

In Canada and Australia the authority for applying the formula, which may be on the appeal of the British Government with full rights of audience, will be their respective Tariff Boards. These, we should remember, have been designed to regulate Protection, not to promote Free Trade. On their recommendation the Parliament will be invited to 'vary' the tariff, which might mean putting it up as well as down. In New Zealand, not having a Board, it will be the Government. Somewhat akin to the above compromise is the British stipulation that the duties agreed to be imposed here on foreign wheat, copper, lead, and zinc shall be conditional upon Empire producers continuing to supply them at 'not exceeding world price'; and also that the quota restriction of foreign meat shall be removable whenever Empire supplies are not 'adequate to meet the requirements of consumers in the United Kingdom'—as judged, presumably, by the British Government. Each Government having thus reserved the right to have the contentious formula interpreted by its own judgment or its own tribunal in its own country, they were bound to shy at any proposal of a permanent joint committee; to which, as might soon be suggested, questions concerning the 'reasonableness' of a protective duty, or the 'adequacy' of Empire supplies at any time, should be referred for more impartial decision. At any rate, the much-canvassed proposal was again turned down. South Africa retains the dread of centralisation which, twenty years ago, General Botha had imbibed from his friend and mentor, Sir Wilfrid Laurier. She and the Free State rejected the permanent committee in principle, though willing to consider '*ad hoc*' committees. So it came down to the appointment of a temporary committee, to investigate the working of the Imperial Shipping, Economic, and other existing official committees. At present these are all dependent on the British Government as regards funds and control, and are liable to some overlapping. It is a matter of urgency, owing to the impending withdrawal of the £1,000,000 grant which finances the Empire Marketing Board—this having been started in 1924 in lieu of certain Preferences which will now be more than made good to the Dominions. The committee is to make its report in May next year, for the Governments to consider not later than September. Whether by that time the idea of a permanent body, representing the whole

Commonwealth for economic purposes, will have become more acceptable remains to be seen. Trouble arising out of the trade agreements might tell in either direction. But it would depend partly upon whether the suggested form of organisation, if any, were such as to guarantee its real independence of Whitehall and Downing Street.

It remains for these agreements to run the gauntlet of the several Legislatures. Being so interwoven, they cannot admit of much amendment. At Westminster, the special clause in the Canadian agreement which provides for measures against dumping of the Russian kind should be welcomed by a large majority. Though this also is reported to have involved much disputation and redrafting, it appears too straightforward to admit of evasion; and, as Mr. Bennett insisted, the promised preferences on timber, etc., might be rendered useless otherwise. But the British farmer will have his own case to put, especially about the unexpected and ill-considered substitution of quota devices for straightforward import duties on meat. Moreover, the latter would have brought in a big revenue instead of adding to expense. On the other hand, all should rejoice over the general extension of preferences by the Dominions to all British Colonies which may be willing to reciprocate, thus recognising the proper community.

But the main lesson is, once more, that Britain must attain a real 'uniformity of policy' with the Dominions, by a similar, systematic use of tariffs both for revenue and protection, if Preference is to become the sound, material cement of the Britannic Commonwealth. There should be no occasion at these Conferences for statistical warfare, fictitious bargaining, or ingenious formulæ to make future trouble, all under a hectic strain which seldom portends workmanlike results. Perhaps we have allowed ourselves to be dragged too far by the internationalists from the original idea that increased trade within the Empire involves diverting it from foreign countries. But experience shows that the normal effect of Protection is not so much to reduce the volume of imports as to regulate their character, while the volume increases. Let us look after Empire trade, and the foreign trade will take care of itself.

RICHARD JEBB.

OTTAWA

II. A LIBERAL VIEW

EVEN if judges, counsel, and jury could agree as to what criterion should be applied to decide the success or failure of the Ottawa Conference, it is not likely that at this stage a unanimous verdict covering all the different Agreements could be obtained from a British tribunal. After hearing all that can be said at present for and against, an impartial layman, reasonably well informed about politics and economics, might hesitate to express a final opinion for at least two reasons. In the first place, the Colonial part of the contract with the Mother Country has not been performed, and may not be performed for some time. Secondly, the promises made by the Governments of Canada and Australia are so vague that we cannot say as yet whether they will prove of much advantage to British manufacturers and exporters.

Again, there are many who will deny that any theoretical or scientific judgment can be passed on any fiscal or commercial policy until it has actually been put into full operation. During the Tariff Reform campaign, which Joseph Chamberlain initiated in 1904, we became familiar with the argument that the policy of Free Trade, as expounded and executed in the 'forties, 'fifties and 'sixties by Cobden and Bright, Peel and Gladstone, was right at the time for Great Britain, and was fully justified by the great expansion of trade and the great increase of popular welfare which ensued. But we were also told that what was once advantageous to Great Britain had ceased to be advantageous, and that 'one-sided Free Trade' could no longer be defended. It was asserted that other nations had not followed our example, that other nations ought to know their business interests, and that if they were right we were probably wrong. Chamberlain fortified his arguments for protection of the home market by the ideal of a Free Trade Empire or Customs Union; and ever since that time the inviting prospect of vastly extended markets in India, the self-governing Dominions, and the Crown Colonies of the Empire has been dangled before British manufacturers, who have found, especially since the Great War, more and more

tariffs and restrictions imposed upon their exports. Although these arguments failed to convince the country when placed before it at a series of general elections, it is not surprising that the sharp and long depression, culminating in the crisis of last year and our abandonment of the gold standard, converted many English men of business to the view that an experiment in Protection and Preference was worth trying, if only because things could hardly be worse. The patient, they said, was in such desperate straits that any remedy recommended by respectable and responsible State physicians deserved a trial.

In forming an opinion about the Ottawa Conference, I do not think we ought to pay very much attention to purely political considerations; for two contradictory propositions can be defended with plausibility, and neither can be proved. One is that held by Imperialists of the Chamberlain school, who, in spite of the loud dissatisfaction expressed by Lord Beaverbrook and his disciples, contend that the Conference and the Agreements represent an important step towards a fiscal and political unification of the Empire. This, no doubt, is the predominant view of the Conservative Party. Against it must be set the predominant view of Liberals, and possibly also of the Labour Party, that wrangling and bargaining with the self-governing Dominions about tariffs and the attempt to circumscribe the taxing powers of the British and Dominion Parliaments are more likely to provoke ill-feeling than to cement the friendly and confidential intimacy which we all desire to perpetuate and enlarge. To this should be added the danger involved in the adoption by Great Britain and the Dominions on a much extended scale of discriminating duties against foreign countries. A Free Trade Empire disarms foreign hostility; an Empire which aims at closing or partially closing its markets against foreign countries invites hostility; and such a policy may end in another series of disastrous tariff wars, which would make the task of universal disarmament not merely difficult, but impossible.

But as a matter of fact, the British Delegation to Ottawa set out, as its chief, Mr. Baldwin, told the House of Commons on June 16, not only with 'the general objective' of freer trade within the Empire, but also with the intention and belief that the attainment of this objective would be 'a step towards a world-wide lowering of trade barriers and restrictions.' It is stated that a series of resolutions were drafted by the British Delegation describing this as the purpose of the Conference, and representing it as an effort to free the trade of the world from the curse of economic isolation. These resolutions, it seems, were discussed on the night of August 19 until nearly four o'clock in the morning of August 20. After being challenged and bitterly opposed by

the Canadian delegates, they were finally withdrawn and watered down to a mild statement that the trade of the world would be stimulated by any lowering or removal of tariff barriers within the Empire. The truth seems to be that both the Canadian and Australian Governments, and in a less degree the Governments of South Africa and New Zealand, look at the fiscal question mainly from the standpoints of their manufacturers and producers, rather than from those of the consumer. Their chief aim at Ottawa was to secure as far as possible a monopoly for their exporters of wheat, meat, dairy products, fruit, etc., in the markets of Great Britain, and to obtain there higher prices than they would obtain in the absence of an agreement with the Mother Country. To secure these advantages they had to make some offers in return; and so, if we are to reach a conclusion from a British point of view about Ottawa and to assess the advantages and disadvantages of the compact, we must find out what those offers are worth and try to discover whether the total volume of our overseas trade is likely to enjoy a substantial increase in consequence of their acceptance on the assumption that Parliament will ratify the Agreements.

Applying this criterion and putting aside moral and political considerations, I proceed to an analysis of the Agreements. They are twelve in number; but of these there are only seven to which the United Kingdom is a party. Canada has made three others—with South Africa, Southern Ireland, and Southern Rhodesia; while South Africa has made two others—with New Zealand and Southern Ireland. Our seven Agreements are with Canada, Australia, South Africa, India, New Zealand, Newfoundland, and Southern Rhodesia. The effect upon the mind of anyone who reads these treaties, in whatever part of the Empire he lives, will depend upon whether he is governed by a theory, or by his own interest as a producer or consumer. If he is guided by theory or principle without regard to his own individual interest, his verdict on each provision will depend upon whether he adheres to Free Trade or to Protection—whether he follows, say, Gladstone and Snowden or the Chamberlains and Bennett. A Free Trader will treat every addition to the tariff of his own or any other country as a loss, and any reduction either in his own tariff or in the tariff of the other party to the bargain as a gain. Hence the question he will ask and try to answer before pronouncing his verdict on the economic consequences of Ottawa will be: 'Measured by these tests, do the prospective losses of consumers and producers in my country, caused by the additions to cost of living and production and by the restrictions on our foreign trade, exceed or fall short of the advantages which will accrue from the additional markets we shall gain in other parts of the Empire?'

The Protectionist, on the other hand, disregards the consumer. A rise of prices in the home market is desirable because he thinks it will be beneficial to home manufacturers or farmers. In his eyes, therefore, any additions to the existing customs duties on imports and any extensions of the list are welcome, while reductions of customs duties on Empire products are only acceptable if the losses they inflict on home manufacturers and farmers are compensated by similar (and if possible greater) reductions in their favour by the other countries of the Empire. From these two widely differing standpoints, each of the seven bargains struck by the British delegates will be examined critically by politicians and economists, as well as by all who stand to lose or gain in their business with foreign or Empire customers. Broadly speaking, I would suggest that this country will gain or lose according to whether the total volume of its overseas trade is increased or diminished by the diversion, which is certain to take place, of its commerce with foreign countries to its commerce with the Empire.

Proceeding now from the general to the particular, and from theory to detail, let us look first in the light of these considerations at the Agreement with Canada. On behalf of Great Britain His Majesty's Government undertakes to continue the present temporary exemption of Canadian produce from the general *ad valorem* duty of 10 per cent. imposed on an immense number of foreign goods by the Import Duties Act of 1932; and it further undertakes that this general *ad valorem* duty of 10 per cent. shall not be reduced without the consent of the Government of Canada. Thirdly, the Agreement is to remain in force for a period of five years, after which (if not denounced after four and a half years) six months' notice of its termination may be given by either party. If, in the meantime, either the Government of Great Britain or the Government of Canada think that the terms of the Agreement should be varied, the two Governments are to consult upon the matter. As these three stipulations are contained in all the Ottawa Agreements I may offer a few comments before proceeding further.

(1) In the first place, a much better bargain with the Colonies could have been struck if the new 10 per cent. tariff had been applied provisionally to Empire products as well as to foreign products, since Colonial producers would then have felt, as foreign producers feel, the inconvenience and loss inflicted by a tariff on their exports, and at the same time would have appreciated the enormous value of the free British markets they have so long enjoyed.

(2) The second undertaking seems to me to be not only mischievous, but humiliating. It is mischievous, because it will

obstruct the conclusion of similar commercial treaties with foreign countries, which, as customers and sources of supply, are far more valuable and important to British trade than all the self-governing Dominions put together. This weakening of our bargaining power in commercial negotiations with foreign countries is perhaps from a business point of view the worst feature of Ottawa. But there is also a grave constitutional objection to making the customs duties of the United Kingdom dependent for a term of years on the will of one or more Colonial Legislatures. It is an exact inversion of the policy of George III. and Lord North, which lost us the American Colonies. The Colonial Assemblies at that time preferred to fight rather than submit to a trifling customs duty on tea which Great Britain imposed. I can hardly believe that the House of Commons will tamely renounce its power to reduce at any time any tax which it has levied; for this is the most ancient and esteemed of all its privileges, the historical basis and the very essence of its authority. The present Parliament may persist, even in the face of shrinking trade and employment, in its determination to maintain or increase protective duties. But surely it cannot pretend to prevent its successors from touching the taxes which it is about to impose, or the taxes which it has already imposed since it was elected? Earlier in the year Liberals foresaw the danger, and issued a warning in the shape of a resolution passed by a unanimous vote of the National Liberal Federation at its annual meeting in April. The resolution ran as follows:

In view of the Ottawa Conference and the danger that this country may find itself committed by commercial treaties with the Dominions to permanent tariffs of a discriminatory character on imports from foreign countries, it [the National Liberal Federation] gives notice in advance that no such treaty can be permitted to interfere with the constitutional right of Parliament at any time to reduce or remove any such taxes.

This constitutional right is a privilege won from the Crown by centuries of hard struggle; and it should be equally precious to the Parliaments of the self-governing Dominions, on whom it was freely conferred by the wisdom of our own Legislature. I can conceive of nothing more invidious than this interference by the Dominion Governments with our right of control over our own Budget. Curiously enough, it is a right which two important British Ministers emphasised so lately as February 9, 1932, during the tariff debate. Mr. Baldwin said:

Much of the debate has run on the difference between the permanent and the temporary nature of the tariff. There is no such thing as permanence in politics. Whatever one Parliament does, it is in the power of another Parliament to confirm, to increase, to diminish or to abolish.

Here we have the true constitutional doctrine, unambiguously expressed by the leader of the Conservative Party. Mr. Walter Runciman (President of the Board of Trade) said in the same debate:

The other objection taken to our proposals is that they are permanent. Certainly nothing in our fiscal system is permanent. The yearly Budget comes up for discussion here and for examination in Committee of Ways and Means, and is varied from time to time according to the constitution of the House and the opinion of the electors.

It is one thing, of course, to agree with another Government that both parties will reduce or remove customs duties which impede their exchange of commodities, and quite another to agree that they will, for a term of years, maintain high customs duties against other countries which may be equally ready to enter into good commercial relations. The Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1860, which Cobden and Gladstone negotiated with Napoleon III. and Chevalier, was an admirable example of a highly profitable arrangement, which enormously increased the trade between England and France without in any way endangering or limiting freedom of trade with other countries. It was a liberation and in no way a restriction of world commerce.

Another provision of the Agreement with Canada (article 2) requires the British Government to invite Parliament to impose customs duties, or to increase customs duties, on a number of imports from foreign countries which compete with Canadian exports. These include new duties of 2s. per quarter on wheat and 2d. per pound on raw and refined copper, along with an addition (which seems to work out roughly at about 50 per cent.) to the duties already imposed on foreign butter, cheese, eggs, condensed milk, and fruit. A similar list, including canned and dried fruits, oranges, grapes, honey, etc., is required by the Australian Agreement; while the South African Agreement, in addition to a long list of fruits, adds a 10 per cent. *ad valorem* duty on maize. A preference of 2s. per gallon is also to be given to Australian and South African wines; and in the South African Agreement there is a stipulation that British preferences on a number of South African products shall not be reduced without the consent of the South African Government. There is a similar list for New Zealand, with a similar provision that existing preferences on a number of New Zealand products are not to be reduced without the permission of New Zealand. New Zealand, however, reciprocates by promising that the 20 per cent. margin of preference for British over foreign goods shall not be diminished without the consent of the British Government.

It thus appears that, so far from providing—as Mr. Baldwin

and the British Delegates set out to provide—for the liberation of trade, the British Government, in the process of bargaining, has been induced by the Colonial delegates to impose higher tariff duties on many important foods which are vital necessities of our industrial population, with the intention of raising their prices at home for the benefit of Colonial producers, and of diverting more and more trade from foreign to Colonial channels. But an even worse principle than tariffs has been introduced. In order perhaps to propitiate the Labour Party, and soften its opposition to Ottawa, the British Government has adopted in one department of commerce the Labour Party's programme for a socialistic regulation of trade by means of Import and Export Boards. It has already appointed a Committee to reorganise 'the pig industry in the United Kingdom,' and it promises on receiving the Report of that Committee that it will 'arrange for the quantitative regulation of the supplies of bacon and hams coming into the United Kingdom market.' A similar article in the Australian Agreement provides for the regulation of imports into the United Kingdom of frozen mutton and chilled beef, for the avowed purpose of raising the existing wholesale prices of frozen meat, on the pretence that its present cheapness and abundance may cause 'a serious decline in production and consequent ultimate injury to the consumer.' This, I believe, is the first and only occasion on which the interests of the British consumer attracted sympathetic attention at Ottawa. That he will be consoled for the rise in prices by these crocodile tears when he visits the butcher's shop seems to me unlikely. But considering how hardly hit our exports have been through the quotas on coal and other British exports imposed during the last year by foreign countries, it is surely the height of folly to adopt at this moment a method infinitely worse than tariffs which every intelligent business man condemns.

I now come to the question what British manufacturers have obtained in return for all these concessions. So far as the Dominions are concerned, no definite or satisfactory reply can be given—possibly because the Dominion delegates, unlike ours, felt that they must consult their own Parliaments. Thus the Australian and Canadian Agreements contain an undertaking that protection against British competition shall only be afforded 'to those industries which are reasonably assured of sound opportunities of success.' Again, the Canadian surcharges on imports from Great Britain are to be removed 'as soon as the finances of Canada will allow'—as if prohibitive duties were beneficial to the revenue! 'Sympathetic consideration' is also promised by Canada to our request that the exchange dumping duty applied to imports from the United Kingdom should be removed and

ultimately abolished. On the whole, one feels, after reading the Canadian Agreement, that a lawyer would consider the contract void from the first on the ground that there is no 'consideration' on the part of Canada, and no certain benefit accruing from it to Great Britain. As a large part of the Canadian manufacturing concerns are in American hands, it is also highly probable that this Agreement will supply many American specialities with a free market in Great Britain.

Australia's undertakings are a little less vague and a little more satisfactory. Embargoes are to be repealed, and also 'as soon as practicable' surcharges on British goods. Some reductions have actually been made in the Australian Budget, but it seems only too likely, when our part of the bargain has been completed, and probably for several years to come, that both the Australian and Canadian tariffs will continue to be far more hostile to British manufacturers than they were three or four years ago. Consequently only a small portion of our old export trade to these two countries will be recovered by means of concessions which will certainly be prejudicial to our foreign exports.

South Africa promises to publish a list of further preferences for certain products of the United Kingdom, which will favour iron, steel, machinery, and cheap textiles. Southern Rhodesia also promises a new schedule of preferences, and so does Newfoundland, but not until July 1, 1933.

A more important accession of trade may, it is hoped, result from the Agreement with India, by which, in return for its free entry to British markets, India grants a 10 per cent. preference on a large range of goods. Unfortunately, the heaviest losses from the protective policy initiated after the war by the British Indian Government, and greatly intensified by Lord Irwin and Sir George Schuster, were inflicted on Lancashire's cotton trade to please the Bombay manufacturers; and these duties are excepted from the preference, and are quite as likely to be raised as lowered. It has always been a source of wonderment and disgust to me that the Government of India, during the last few years, has deliberately neglected the economic interests of 90 per cent. of the inhabitants of British India (including the Native States which have no voice in tariff legislation) in order to cultivate, without any success, the approval of Mr. Gandhi, and to enrich, at the expense of an impoverished peasantry, a few groups of manufacturers. This policy has half ruined our trade with India, and is responsible for the economic discontent which naturally finds vent in dissatisfaction with the Viceroy's Government. Unless the Ottawa Agreement reduces the cost of food and clothing in India, and leads to a substantial expansion of Indian imports and exports, it will possess little real value; and

it may entangle us in serious trouble with Japan, China, and other nations which do a large business with British India.

In popular discussions of the economic consequences of Ottawa the duties on essential and non-essential foods and their effect on prices at home are sure to play a prominent part, and are likely to produce rapid changes in the proportional strength of parties in this country. If gold prices continue to fall, and sterling prices follow, the effect of Protection will be masked, and the prices charged by butchers, greengrocers, provision dealers, fruiterers, etc., will merely be higher than they would have been. But merchants and shopkeepers are already finding out the meaning of a tariff, and candidates supporting the fiscal policy of the National Government will soon learn that the new taxes on wheat, maize, butter, cheese, eggs, canned goods, and fruit are disliked by the masses in most constituencies. The Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress have wobbled so woefully on the tariff question that they cannot hope to lead the Free Trade movement, or attract the Free Trade vote at elections where a genuine Liberal Free Trader is forthcoming. Nor will the middle classes quickly forget the consequences of Labour Party finance; and their fears of State Socialism will revive whenever they attend a Labour meeting or read a Labour newspaper. It follows, therefore, that the Liberal Party, which remains practically unanimous for Free Trade, and may be trusted, I hope, to restore Gladstonian traditions in finance, will gather strength rapidly as the reaction against Protection develops. And, unless I am much deceived, it will before long gain support from many Conservatives, especially in Liverpool and other ports.

It was hoped by the Birmingham Tariff Reformers that the expansion of trade at home and with the Colonies would far more than compensate for the restriction of our commerce with foreign countries. So far these expectations have been completely disappointed. Unemployment is worse than ever, and the first six months of the Great Experiment show that our overseas trade has suffered an alarming diminution. Taking the Board of Trade figures for the first half of this year, as analysed by the *Economist* of August 20, we find that, compared with the first half-year of 1931, our total imports fell by nearly 14 per cent. and our total exports by 6 per cent. Our imports from Europe declined from 175 to 124 millions, and our exports to Europe from 73 to 68 millions. Our imports from other foreign countries declined from 115 to 105 millions, and our exports to them from 38 to 34 millions. The diversion of trade by preferences is shown in our commerce with the British Empire. Imports rose from 126 to 130 millions, while exports declined from 87 to 83 millions. If Mr. Chamberlain and his friends can find comfort in these

figures, they are welcome to it; but there is, I should hope, sufficient intelligence left in the nation to perceive that so far the much-vaunted tariff has proved a ghastly failure. But there is no reason for surprise. Experience is again vindicating common sense and illustrating truths established long ago by the science of political economy.

Common sense and past experience alike tell us that trade, when left to find its natural and most profitable channels, follows, not the flag, but the price list. Hitherto, our merchants have been accustomed to buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest without regard to the nationality of those from whom they buy, or of those to whom they sell. How small a part sentiment plays in trade appears from the fact that in 1931 British exports to Ireland and South Africa were larger than British exports to Canada and Australia. Nor should it be forgotten that the tariffs of Holland and her colonies, as well as of Belgium, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, are far lower and more favourable to British manufacturers than those of the self-governing Dominions. Yet taxation has been imposed to induce British carpenters and builders to buy the wrong sort of timber from Canada rather than the kind they want from Scandinavia. Under the Ottawa Agreement British farmers are exposed to the full blast of Colonial competition, while Colonial manufacturers maintain high protection against British competition. Our delegates seem to have acted on the theory that the inhabitants of the overseas Dominions and of India are entitled to give us worse treatment than we get from many foreign countries, and at the same time to receive from us far better treatment than we accord to foreigners. This theory is usually supported by sentimental talk about our kinsmen across the sea, though that can hardly apply to India or the Crown Colonies. But is there any good business man who would dream of preferring a bad customer because he is a brother or a cousin to a good customer who is merely a friend or acquaintance?

Another current fallacy, which finds general support in Parliament and the Press, is that a favourable balance of trade consists in an excess of imports over exports, and that the greater the excess the greater the prosperity. Therefore, they say, 'tax imports and subsidise exports.' But imports are receipts and exports are payments; and, as a general rule, a growing excess of imports over exports is a sign and consequence of commercial expansion; for the invisible exports, which make up the balance, consist of interest on investments and payments for shipping and banking services. The cause of British mercantile and maritime expansion in the seventy years preceding the Great War is no secret. Our trade was emancipated, while that of our leading competitors remained in shackles. Our business men were

allowed to import freely whatever they wanted at its untaxed market price from all quarters of the globe ; and so not only as consumers, but also as producers, they enjoyed a differential advantage over other countries whose imports were taxed and restricted. Like other nations, we suffered from foreign tariffs. But as our cost of living and production was diminished by cheaper and more abundant supplies, we could undersell our protective rivals in neutral markets. Consequently, Britain far outstripped all other countries in overseas trade and shipping. We exported and imported per head twice or thrice as much as the Germans, the French, and the Americans.

Such was the system and such the policy which made England prosperous. It has been abandoned under the influence of a trade depression so severe that many manufacturers were induced to listen to fallacies and sophistries which, in better times, would have been ridiculed or ignored. I see no way back to national prosperity, still less to any recovery of our commercial ascendancy, until we return to free trade. But public economy, a practical cancellation of war debts, a general removal of quotas and exchange restrictions, and an international reduction of armaments are of equal importance to Britain as a commercial power and a leader of civilised progress. To these grand objectives I would add another which was discussed but wisely postponed at Ottawa. I mean an international reform of the currency which would enable all nations to return to a trustworthy medium of exchange and a stable measure of value. I hope that the Economic Conference will consider, not Bimetallism, but the advisability of calling in silver as a useful adjunct to gold for the purpose of steadying prices and exchanges. But this opens up a large subject which would carry me far beyond my present theme.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

JAPAN AND THE MANCHURIAN QUESTION

SOON after the demise of our great Emperor Meiji (in 1912) *The Times* published a remarkable article by its Tokyo correspondent. The writer thought that Japan had reached the summit of her success, and that she would deteriorate after the Meiji era. It is regrettable that this has proved to be true in the main, and that we are at present repeating our own history of 1820 to 1870. To cite a few examples :

(1) Even towards the end of the Tokugawa period (1603-1871) some of our intellectuals knew that it was much better for Japan to emerge from her isolated position. But all who gave expression to such ideas were either imprisoned or assassinated. Now, after more than seventy years of foreign intercourse, isolation has again become the predominant note of Japan, though the form in which it is represented is somewhat different. At Geneva she stood quite alone ; and many of my compatriots seem to be proud of it. Recently a member who spoke about the advisability of 'back to Asia' in the Imperial Diet was loudly applauded.

(2) Some leaders of the anti-foreign movement of the olden time knew perfectly well that the expulsion of foreigners was an impossibility. But at the same time they knew that nothing but the disastrous failure of the attempt could stop the popular movement ; so they continued the agitation. The same attitude is being tacitly taken at present by many people who have more foresight than others.

(3) In 1853 the United States of America advised Japan to open the country to foreign intercourse. The great majority of the people was opposed to it, but our Government gave a reluctant consent. After the lapse of sixty-seven years the same country proposed the Disarmament Conference, and our people's opposition and the reluctant consent of the Government were repeated as at the earlier stage of our history.

(4) In 1860 soon after the opening of the country the Prime Minister was assassinated. During the Washington Conference the then Prime Minister was assassinated, in 1921 ; since then two more Premiers have shared the same fate.

(5) The fighting at Shimonoseki and Kagoshima has its counterpart to-day in Manchuria and Shanghai.

(6) The great financial and economic difficulties at the end of the Tokugawa period are recurring to-day, involving many confusing ideas of the same kind regarding finance and economy.

(7) For some time before the Reformation our people used to talk about the 'Gods' Way,' to distinguish it from the Chinese culture which was predominant in those days. Lately, many of our learned as well as ignorant men have begun to assert that what they are following is the 'Gods' Way.' Even the Manchuria and Shanghai affairs are described by some of them as the results of following the 'Gods' Way.' No one knows what that means; nevertheless, the slogan is repeated.

(8) In such a time even Nature repeats itself. The great earthquake of seventy-seven years ago, which nearly destroyed the whole of Yedo, was repeated in 1923 at Tokyo and Yokohama.

I will try to explain briefly the cause and the effect of these phenomena. Originally we were a highly proud people knowing nothing of the outside world. Ignorance often begets pride. We thought that the Japanese were the only people who were descended directly from gods, while all other human beings were made of baser clay. So it was our earnest desire to maintain complete isolation from the outside world, secluding ourselves in the island empire of the Far East. We always boldly opened fire on any foreign ship which happened to come near our sacred island. Even after the treaties of intercourse and commerce were exchanged, self-styled patriots were in the habit of attacking foreigners. They thought it a great exploit to stain the Japanese sword with the blood of intruders. At last an Imperial Edict to expel all barbarians was issued; and the feudal lords of Chōshū and Satsuma, supposed to possess the strongest fighting forces, recklessly attacked the foreign gunboats. They fought with the best traditions of the 'Samurai,' but were easily defeated. Had we continued in this obstinate frame of mind, attempting to drive away all foreigners, even Yedo and Osaka might have been occupied by foreign troops, threatening the independence of the empire itself.

The Japanese soon realised their mistake in thinking that they possessed the most efficient weapons in the world. Even before these incidents some of our countrymen who were more intelligent and better informed knew that bows and arrows were no match for firearms. So some of the feudal lords tried to organise their retainers in rifle regiments. But almost all the 'Samurai' caste refused to obey these orders, and some of them went so far as to commit 'harakiri' by way of protest. They thought that, as they were born in 'the house of the bow and arrow,' it was the greatest disgrace to be drilled like the foreign devils with despicable rifles on their honourable shoulders. But

soon after the two defeats at Shimonoseki and Kagoshima the eyes of all Japanese were widely opened. They recognised for the first time the superiority of foreign instruments of war; and decided with one accord to study the use of them, so as to save their national existence. Thus the mentality of the Japanese fundamentally changed. They went from one extreme to the other. Instead of despising all foreigners, the leaders of the nation began to worship them, and the masses blindly followed the new fashion. Though we have committed many mistakes in the course of adopting Western civilisation, we were able to discern many excellent institutions and organisations in the English Navy, the German army, Austrian medical science and American business methods, not forgetting the political as well as the educational systems of the different countries of Europe and America. We have earnestly tried to learn the best of them; and in this effort I am happy to say we have succeeded—so much so that in the course of less than forty years we have emerged from an insignificant nation in the Far East to be welcomed as one of the greatest Powers. In our versatility of adoption and adaptation of foreign things we can beat any nation in the world. Herein lies our strength as well as our weakness. In the case of a nation which has its own civilisation, it is difficult to acknowledge the excellence of others. Even after this recognition, it is difficult for the people to adopt foreign institutions, as they are naturally averse to giving up their own.

It is one of the most curious and interesting parts of Japanese history that we possessed no means of recording our speech. There was no written language until Chinese characters were introduced by the Koreans in 285 A.D. Historians proudly claim that the accession to the throne of Jimmu Tenno, our first emperor, dates back more than twenty-six centuries; but it is difficult to verify this, as we possessed no hieroglyphics, nor almanac, for many centuries. No one can tell what was the length of the so-called year. It might have been one month, or five or ten months. Even after the introduction of the Chinese written characters and Chinese civilisation, our reckoning divided the year into ten months; so that the same month of January sometimes brought snow and sometimes tropical heat. It could be either spring, summer, autumn, or winter in the course of one man's life. A certain emperor recognised the great inconvenience of this irregular system, and consulted some Korean savants who were employed as court councillors. They pretended to be surprised at the great sagacity of the emperor, and asked permission to organise a committee of their learned compatriots to study the subject. After seven years of 'profound study and research' they submitted a plan for the revision of the

calendar which was to increase the number of months in a year to twelve. Needless to say, Korea had a twelve-month calendar for many centuries before that time. The so-called Japanese civilisation was the culture from Korea, China, and India transplanted, improved, and adapted to suit the physical and psychological conditions of Japan and the Japanese. Very little of our culture was original. In such circumstances it is easier for us than for other people to discover the best foreign things, either spiritual or material, and to assimilate them. It is this versatility and genius for adaptability which made Japan progress so quickly after the Reformation.

Even after our eyes were opened to the advantages of European civilisation the great majority of our countrymen reluctantly accepted it through sheer necessity. Had it been possible for us to become powerful and prosperous by our own resources, we must have preferred that course, like all other nations. After the victory over China in 1895, our original pride returned. Many Japanese now thought that they had gone too far in the admiration of Occidental civilisation. The reaction which was then gradually setting in increased by leaps and bounds. After the Russo-Japanese War this tendency grew even stronger, and many of our countrymen completely lost their heads. (You must excuse us for this weakness. Most nations lose their heads after great successes. The Germans lost their heads, and consequently their empire, after the splendid success of the Bismarckian régime.) Before these two victories those people who went abroad and studied Occidental ways were highly esteemed, and most of them procured good positions either in the Government or in business circles. The simple fact that they had been abroad was a diploma which qualified them for a good position and high salary, even though they had spent their time in Europe and America idly without serious study. During the first thirty years of the Meiji period the greatest ambition of every young man was to go abroad. After the Chinese and Russian victories this national psychology underwent a change, and these foreign-mannered young men were ridiculed and denounced as 'high collar' (which, in colloquial Japanese, means 'wasted ashes') instead of being admired as of yore. The brain and heart of many Japanese reverted to the olden times, when all foreigners were despised as 'barbarians.'

Before we recognised the superiority of Occidental civilisation we used to call all Europeans and Americans 'Ketō-jin.' I am not sure what this expression really means, but translated word for word it is 'hairy Chinamen.' As the Japanese did not know any other foreigners they used to call them all, without distinction, 'Tō-jin,' which literally means 'Chinamen.' The Westerners

who came to Japan in the olden time affected beards and moustaches and often very long hair. They looked very different from the Chinamen, who shaved their heads and wore long pig-tails. So it seems we called the Occidentals 'hairy Chinamen' (a scornful appellation) to distinguish them from the common Chinese. During about thirty years of our reverence for the Occident that expression disappeared altogether. But after the victory over Russia, when our ignorant pride returned, the same ugly word began to be heard all over Japan. The retrogression to the former state of mentality brought back the same old expression. But this time it was abbreviated from 'Ketō-jin' to 'Ketō'—omitting 'jin' (man). It must have been thought that in this age of speed even such expressions must be curtailed. During the time that we applied the scornful appellation of 'Ketō-jin' to all Occidentals we committed many blunders in both internal and external policies through ignorance and self-satisfaction. And Japan then found herself at the point of disintegration. It became evident even to the ignorant people that she could not exist any longer under the Tokugawa régime and feudal system. The restoration of the emperor to power, the abolition of the feudal system, and fundamental changes in every direction were the result, which led to the glorious reign of the Emperor Meiji (1867-1912).

After the reversion of our psychological condition to that of the end of the Tokugawa period we began to repeat many errors committed in the former time under different names. I will explain this general psychological condition in my special field of politics. While we respected and were bent on introducing Western ways, our parliamentary elections and deliberations had nearly the same results as those in the foremost countries of Europe. It was comparatively easier for opposition candidates to obtain more votes than those on the government side. At parliamentary meetings good reasoning and sound fact often had more influence than the number of heads. The minority was often victorious over the larger party in the parliamentary decisions. After the victory over China the change began, and after our Russian victory it became exceedingly easy for the government party to gain the majority in a general election; and any party in the majority could without fail decide the fate of the debate. In a word, our constitutional government is now conducted in the feudal spirit—i.e., by the worship of power. Our feudal régime lasted about 800 years. During this long period the whole nation was trained to worship established power, disregarding even emperors when impotent. One military upstart exiled the reigning emperor to a remote island; yet the whole nation meekly obeyed the tyrant instead of rallying to the imperial cause.

Ever since the great reaction set in our parliamentary elections have been conducted in this spirit ; hence the victory always for the party in power. For this reason our party leaders make no attempt to win popular support through sound principles and good administration. They merely climb into power, employing all means of corruption and base intrigue. If our party government is conducted in a feudal spirit, and our foreign relations with the heart of an exclusionist, how can we avoid the repetition of the disasters which we encountered towards the end of the Tokugawa régime ?

If you keep these facts in your mind, it must be easier to understand our behaviour in the Manchurian question. The great majority of the Japanese do not know much about Manchuria. The only thing they know is the fact that we fought twice in Manchuria—once against China, the next time against Russia. Each of these countries is ten times larger than Japan. If we had lost either of these wars Japan would not have been able to exist as a nation. We fought against our unequal enemies with the utmost energy ; hundreds of thousands willingly sacrificed their lives in these two wars. The present-day Japanese think they must also die for the sake of Manchuria as their predecessors did. They think it is simply a question of life and death for the nation. They do not know what kind of treaties we have with regard to Manchuria ; neither do they calculate economic gain and loss. We have great interests in Manchuria, but we have incomparably greater interests in the whole of China. If we lose Chinese trade because of the conflict in Manchuria it is quite obvious that the loss will be many times greater than the gain. But when Manchurian questions arise all Japanese lose their sense of proportion, and forget everything else. They only think they must die for the sake of their national existence. This is the source of the difficulty for Japan. The present trouble may have been started by the army ; but as the whole nation backs it, people who know better are quite powerless.

At one time the whole of Manchuria was under Russian sway, and if we had not fought against Russia it must have been lost altogether to China. Besides, Manchuria is outside the Great Wall which divides China from the outsiders. In olden times China herself did not like to come into contact with Manchuria ; that is the reason why she built the Great Wall to shut it out. China was only too glad to get rid of Manchuria for more than 2000 years. After the Russo-Japanese War we secured the South Manchurian Railway, and through our keeping Japanese soldiers along the railway zone it became the only place of peace and safety in China, and it began to prosper greatly. From half a million to a million Chinese emigrated to it every year. This is a clear

proof that the Manchurians and the Chinese are much happier under Japanese influence than under their own authorities. If they can get rid of their nationalist bias, it is much better for the Chinese themselves to let the Japanese govern Manchuria and live and prosper there. If foreign influence prevails all over China, the Chinese will be many times happier than under the present condition of internal strife and chaos. If you look at the foreign concessions of Tientsin, Canton, or Shanghai, which are, in fact, international towns, you will be able to discover the true conditions at once. While the inhabitants of all other Chinese cities are in great danger of life and property from war lords and bandits, the foreign concessions are prosperous, and the life and property of their inhabitants are quite safe. The Chinese emperor and Chinese statesmen and millionaires always seek safety in the foreign concessions. Even the so-called patriots, who are generally anti-foreign, come and live there for the sake of safety. This is the best proof that the Chinese cannot govern their own people while the foreigners can. So when nationalism was not in fashion among the Chinese they used to act in quite a different manner. From very remote times the Chinese as a race were very peace-loving and internationalist, so that they did not object to having foreign rulers over them. They were ruled by foreigners many times and for many generations. For more than 200 years in the recent past they were ruled by the Manchu dynasty, which is a family of outside barbarians ; but they were quite contented. Lately the Chinese have begun to have nationalist ideas and sentiments like the Occidental peoples, and have become very troublesome and unhappy. Narrow nationalism is the source of the present troubles, not only in Manchuria, but all over the world. The foundations of almost all nations are laid on might and selfishness. The chief instruments of their founders were murder and robbery on the grand scale. Was it not Cavour who said, ' If we do for the individual what we are doing for the sake of the nation, all of us will be called rogues ' ? A famous Chinese of yore expressed the same idea in another way, ' A man becomes a king if he steals a country, while he will be prosecuted if he steals money.' Such being the origin of all nations and States, I do not blame the unfairness of those people who only see and judge international questions from the nationalist point of view.

As a supporter of the League of Nations, I do not like to say anything against it to decrease its influence and the chance of its future development. But to demand from Japan the withdrawal of her troops from Manchuria within a fixed date, without advising China to respect the Sino-Japanese Treaty, is quite unfair and unreasonable. It has only helped the Japanese

militarist element to defy the resolution of the League Council, and induced the whole of the Japanese nation to unite against outside interference. Even without such an omission, the present-day Japanese are very sensitive about foreign interference. This mental condition is the result of historical facts. In the eyes of the Japanese most acts of foreign interference have proved to be injurious to Japan. Worst of all was the 'Three-Power Intervention' at the end of the Sino-Japanese War. Our lawful prize of the war, the Liaotung Peninsula, was snatched away by the combined force of Russia, France, and Germany, and soon after Russia appropriated the same territory to herself. The memory of such an unfortunate incident never fades from the Japanese mind. The average Japanese is prejudiced against all kinds of foreign interference, even if it is kindly intended. This is the reason why my compatriots are against everything which the League of Nations and the United States of America do with regard to the Manchurian question. While the Japanese hate foreign interference, the Chinese are rather fond of it, and often invite it. They call it 'The policy of playing off one barbarian against another.' They have practised this traditional policy for more than 2000 years, and they are past-masters at it. In the present case one group of barbarians is the Japanese, and the other group is either the League of Nations, or the United States of America or Russia, or the combination of all the three, as the case may be. At the end of the Sino-Japanese War Li-Hung-Chang invited Russian intervention to recover the Liaotung Peninsula from Japan, and lost nearly the whole of Manchuria.

Besides, the Manchurian question, which is the essence of the so-called 'twenty-one demands,' was started for home consumption at first. By the way, there never really was such a thing as the 'twenty-one demands.' In 1915 we tendered sixteen demands together with five 'advices' to Yuan-She-Kai, the President of China and opponent of Sun-Yat-Sen. The 'advices' could not by their nature be pressed, and were given up in the course of negotiation. But the Chinese, being clever propagandists, published our demands and 'advices' in the same category under the name of the 'twenty-one demands,' and the whole world swallowed them. As the Chinese Government accepted the majority of our demands before the ultimatum was sent, it is not true to say that the treaty of 1915 was signed under compulsion. Even if it were so, there is no room to doubt its validity. Soon after it was signed and promulgated, Yuan-She-Kai tried to become emperor. We opposed him, with the concurrence of the United States of America, England, France, and Italy. By the death of Yuan while the question was pending, the republic was saved, and Sun-Yat-Sen and his party, the present Kuomin-

tang, were very grateful to us. At one time Sun went so far as to intimate his secret idea of handing over Manchuria to Japan, partly out of gratitude for the help he received from the Japanese in his life-long work, and partly to defend China from Russian aggression. Many Chinese thought Russia to be the most aggressive country and had great fear of her. At the same time, he was thinking of the necessity of filling the Chinese mind with the spectre of some external enemy as the best policy for the unification of China. 'Even quarrelling brothers defend each other in the presence of an enemy' says the old Chinese proverb. He had an ideal enemy in either Japan or Russia. He was always grateful to Japan, as he spent the greater part of his time as a political refugee there, and was treated very kindly by many Japanese friends. But to unite China he thought he must sacrifice anything. At last he sought the help of Soviet Russia, and started the Manchurian question. After his death matters went further than he intended; and the result is the present trouble.

There are a great many Japanese who were brought up in the Occidental school of the 'blood and iron' period. Our Minister to the Court of the Tsar, who often cited international law, was bluntly told by the Russian Foreign Minister that 'while a man from a small and weak country may talk about international law, we, the people of a great Power, are always thinking how to evade it.' Nowadays we are often blamed for being militarist, but it was the Occidental nations who made us militarist. While we were very peaceful composing poems, cultivating flower arrangement, studying the esoteric cult of incense burning—in a word, while we were addicted to things artistic and beautiful—they did not give us a place even among third-rate Powers. It was only after we adopted the naval and military systems of England and Germany, and had won wars against two of the biggest nations of the world, that Americans and Europeans accepted us on an equal footing. Thus all kinds of good things as well as bad things were taught by the Occidentals. We are grateful for the good things they taught, and blame ourselves for the bad things we learnt. But common people do not discriminate; and it is much easier to learn bad things than good things. Now that we have an efficient army and navy, a great many Japanese want to put into practice what they were taught by Occidentals in olden times. They do not understand the great change of mentality in Europe and America since the World War; they still believe in the doctrine of might prevalent in the pre-war period. They imagine that all peace treaties and the League Covenant are only camouflage to deceive simple folk. They always thought that if we stood firm, Europe and America would give way. They went to Manchuria and stood firm there;

and they imagine that the League of Nations and the United States of America have already given way. The League Council which roared like a lion at Geneva bleated like a sheep at Paris, to their minds. Thus they became much stronger in their determination, and are more popular than ever among the populace. Perhaps some of the members of the Council might have thought that Japan could be intimidated by the suggestions of the withdrawal of their representatives and of an economic boycott. It is a great pity they did not know that bluff and intimidation are the worst weapons to use against the Japanese, who will die rather than be humiliated. They became stiffer through this kind of threatening, and defied the Council's demand for the withdrawal of our Manchurian army.

For many generations all the coloured peoples of the world, counting more than one billion, prostrated themselves at the feet of the white race, and thought they could never compete with them. It was the little Japanese who stood up against the domination of Europeans and beat back the Russian invasion. It was little Japan which led the so-called 'revolt of the yellow race.' If Japan had not stood up against the domination of the white people, China must have been partitioned by this time, and the question of Indian independence might not have come into existence. If the members of the League Council had kept these facts in mind, they might not have treated the Manchurian question in such a light-hearted way, to the great harm of their prestige. Our chauvinistic elements said from the first that the League may bark, but will not bite, as it has no teeth. They do not understand that the pen is mightier than the sword, and that the tongue is more influential than the teeth; so they marched on without paying any regard either to their advice or to their demands, and the new State was started. Moreover, it has been recognised by Japan. We have crossed the Rubicon and burnt our boats. Retreat means death. After this, it becomes more and more difficult to compromise.

No one can be quite sure about the contents of the Lytton Commission's Report. But it can be safely surmised that its main points may not be much different from those circulated unofficially. If it gives all important rights and interests to Japan except nominal sovereignty, it may be wiser for Japan to accept the solution of the Commission. But wise ideas are seldom followed by any nation, especially when the people are excited to boiling-point. If this proposal for a solution supposed to be in the Lytton Report had been made by the League of Nations and the United States of America before the creation of the new State, Japan might have accepted it; but it has come too late. Even those intelligent people who are aware of the great dangers

which Japan is obliged to face say 'Shikataganai' ('Cannot be helped'), a Japanese expression of fatalism meaning strong determination combined with some despondency and resignation. Even if we are left to ourselves without interference from any third party, I am afraid we shall have grave difficulties to meet.

(1) The Chinese members of the Manchukuo Government may become very difficult to manage later on, when they feel their positions are quite safe. Some of them will demand more power, and some will demand more money, to such an extent that we cannot afford to satisfy them. We had much sad experience in Korea during the protectorate; I cannot imagine the Chinese being easier to manage and less greedy than the Koreans. Chang-Tso-Lin became a very powerful war lord of China under the protection of the Japanese army, and his life itself was twice saved by us; but he opposed us in many ways for many reasons, one of which was the necessity of retaining his popularity among the Chinese inhabitants. The same fate awaits the prominent members of the Manchukuo Government. If they are inefficient, they will simply become a burden to us, not a help.

(2) It will be a very difficult task to subdue all irregulars and bandits in Manchuria, where the great majority of Chinese are antagonistic in their hearts and are helped from China proper. To sweep away the disturbers of the peace in Manchuria without occupying Peipin and Nanking is something like an attempt to extinguish a fire without touching its main source. Many Chinese dynasties found it an almost impossible task to govern Manchuria and Mongolia. Unless we are favoured with some unexpected good fortune, peace in Manchuria cannot be recovered and maintained under the present *régime*.

(3) If it becomes a safe place to live in, a million immigrants will come there every year from the mainland of China, while Japanese immigrants will be quite insignificant in comparison. In this age of self-determination this will prove a rather serious question in the future. There will have to be some modification of the 'open-door' and 'equal opportunity' policy.

(4) Even without Manchurian expenditure, we have great financial difficulties at present. The great budgetary deficit is filled up by loan after loan. The farming population are suffering from want of money and food; they are clamouring for assistance, which means a vast expenditure—almost beyond our means. For Manchuria we shall be obliged to spend £20,000,000 to £40,000,000 every year for a long time to come, unless we can settle the relations with China amicably.

So far I have written on the supposition that the Powers neither within nor outside the League of Nations will interfere with Manchurian affairs. If they had the wish to enforce the

Covenants of the League, the Kellogg Pact, or the Nine-Powers Treaty, they ought to have taken a firm stand at the beginning of the affair. Instead of doing so, they gave negative encouragements to Japan by wavering and procrastinating. One year of 'wait and see' policy was long enough for her to consolidate her position. To cry 'halt' after she has crossed the Rubicon will give the impression of being, not only tactless, but also cruel to the average Japanese. Besides, Europe has many urgent questions of her own. She has to set her house in order first. In South America there are two wars raging at present. 'Why does not the United States of America try to pacify her neighbours before interfering in the Far East?' many of my countrymen are asking. But all these things are their business, not ours. They may have good reasons for their conduct which we do not know. We must be ready to meet and conquer our own difficulties. Most of my countrymen seem to be too light-hearted on such a grave occasion. They march on and offer prayers at dead soldiers' shrines. Dead men cannot save us; we must save ourselves. But how? I can only give a negative answer at present. As long as we think we can prosper by ourselves in this interdependent world we cannot be saved. The first essential of our revival lies in the change of our mentality.

On the previous occasion the crisis came in the form of isolation and the lack of fighting power. So the first necessity after the Reformation was the opening of the country and the organisation of the army and navy. This time our national crisis will take the form of isolation and of an economic catastrophe. We shall therefore be forced to reorganise our financial and economic conditions thoroughly and fundamentally, cultivating good relations with all the countries in the world, especially with our big customers, like China, the United States of America, and the British Empire. To do that we must emerge from the present position of isolation and throw off our ignorant arrogance and blind self-satisfaction. We must utilise our unparalleled ability for adopting and adapting the best features in Western civilisation, spiritual as well as material. The essence of the first Reformation was the abolition of the feudal system. The essence of the second Reformation must be the breaking away from bigoted and narrow-minded nationalism. This is the only way to repeat the glorious pages of the Meiji period in the Shōwa era, and to inaugurate the Second Reformation of Japan.

YUKIO OZAKI.

THE BASES OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY

THE present year has already witnessed two great international conferences (that on Disarmament at Geneva and that on Reparations at Lausanne), and a third, to discuss economic and financial problems generally, is to be held in the winter. It is unfortunately true that the practical result of the two of these gatherings that have so far taken place has up to the present been negligible, but they have certainly not been entirely without value from one point of view, for they have shed a great deal of light upon the principles which are governing the foreign policy of the leading Powers. Both at Geneva and at Lausanne the world's statesmen have been under the necessity of putting their cards upon the table, and the consequence has been that it is now possible to survey the whole field of international politics in a way that would have been out of the question only twelve months ago. In short, the chancelleries have been forced by pressure of circumstances out into the open, and we can at last see where they stand. The first impression is that the immediate post-war period is over, and that the friends and foes of that era no longer regard one another in the same light. After the Treaties of Utrecht and Vienna this state of affairs was reached more quickly, for, unlike the Treaty of Versailles, they were freely negotiated between victors and vanquished, not imposed without discussion by the former upon the latter, and so left no legacy of hate behind them. As the late Marquess of Salisbury once wrote to Lord Lytton, 'the commonest error in politics is sticking to the carcasses of dead policies,' and it is an error that is often committed on the morrow of a great war. Those who have been obliged during the progress of hostilities to think along one line are apt to find that they cannot think along any other, and the outcome of this is always disastrous. So it was during the decade that followed the Armistice. The Allied and Associated Powers, to give them their official designation, endeavoured to work together in peace as they had in war, although the cause that had made them unite was removed and their interests were pulling them in different directions. That phase would appear to be at an end, and policies are now being shaped regardless of what happened during the war period.

Then, again, just as a receding flood gradually brings to light once more, though possibly somewhat altered, the old landmarks, so the disappearance of the war mentality is being followed by the resurrection of the traditional policies. Great Britain is at pains to point out that she wishes to be entangled in purely Continental affairs as little as possible, and that her only actual interest in the mainland of Europe is to secure at the earliest possible moment the settlement of the liabilities created by the war, after which she will immerse herself in her Imperial concerns. The attraction which, since the days of the Hohenstaufen, Germany and Italy have always had for one another is again becoming manifest, and in the case of the latter Power seems likely to prevail against the ties of blood that connect her with her Western neighbour. As for France, her realistic statesmen hardly waited for the last shot to be fired before, in a new world, they put into force the old policy of their country—namely, to make friends of the smaller States in the rear of Germany: in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the latter had been Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, and after the Armistice their place was taken by Poland and the Little Entente. The truth, of course, is that no nation can for long break with its traditional allies, and what is happening at the present time is that the force of tradition is reasserting itself. Such, then, is the background of the international stage in the autumn of 1932. The Powers are resuming their traditional rôles, though these will not be exactly what they were in pre-war days, for they have necessarily been modified as a result of what has happened in the interval, while the whole of international policy is under the influence of financial and economic considerations as never before. A brief examination of the attitude of the leading States is, however, necessary before it can be estimated how far synthesis of any sort is possible in the superior interests of civilisation as a whole.

For France the primary consideration is security, and this thought dominates her political life. Immediately after the war she sought to obtain it by a definite pact with Great Britain and the United States, but the latter would not agree. Since that time she has signed the Locarno and Kellogg Pacts, and has put forward both a scheme for the creation of a United States of Europe and of an international police force under the control of the League of Nations, while side by side with this she has, as already mentioned, pursued her old policy of making alliances that may be useful in the hour of need. In spite of this she does not feel secure, for it is the fixed French belief that the pacts in question are not worth the paper upon which they are written, while it is in the last degree unlikely that the French General Staff is under any illusions as to the help which the Poles and the

nations of the Little Entente, all of whom have powerful enemies of their own, would be able to give in an emergency. With every year that passes France feels that her insecurity has increased, and the coming of the next war is openly discussed in a way that would astonish English people who never leave their own country. The accusation commonly made against France by those who are ill-disposed towards her is that her sole aim is to retain the hegemony of Europe which she acquired by the Treaty of Versailles. That there was until recently a great deal of truth in this charge cannot be denied, and for some years after the war the French did believe that the days of the *grand siècle* had returned. This is so no longer, and the motive that actuates France to-day is, not ambition, but fear. She sees Germany rising from her defeat, not only with her factories well equipped for the struggle for the world's markets, and with her internal debt abolished, but with the military machine which three times within a century violated French territory *in posse*, if not actually *in esse*. The French army, on the other hand, although superior to the German in point of numbers, is no more than a half-trained militia, and the politicians of the Third Republic will not allow it to be converted into an efficient professional force in case it should overturn the existing *régime*. The plain fact is that France is frightened, and the actions of a nation in a panic are incalculable.

The result of this has been that the rulers of France are firmly convinced that any alteration in the existing order, particularly if it implies a modification of the Peace Treaties, must necessarily make the situation of their country worse. Therefore M. Briand, as soon as he discovered that there was no hope of obtaining an Anglo-American, or even a purely British, guarantee, put out his proposal for a United States of Europe which should be based upon the territorial *status quo*. This project came to nothing, so early in the present year M. Tardieu brought forward a disarmament scheme which, if adopted, would have had the effect of rendering any alteration of the Peace Treaties impossible without the consent of all the signatories. The Powers warmly welcomed this idea in principle, as they do every suggestion for hastening Disarmament, and then proceeded to introduce such amendments as to ensure that it should never be put into practice. France thus finds herself no better off than she was before, while Germany is growing visibly stronger every day, and all that she was able to achieve at Lausanne was to prevent a sponge being passed over the 'war guilt' clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, upon which the payment of Reparations depends, and to insist, for what it was worth, that the agreement should not come into force until she had come to terms with the United States in the matter of war debts. This was better than

the British policy of trusting implicitly to the kindness of heart of Washington, but, in view of the widespread belief that Germany never really intends to pay anything again, it was only relatively satisfactory. France thus believes herself isolated, and at the present time she is looking round for some means that shall bring this state of affairs to an end. Recent events have shaken her faith in the League of Nations, and it would be idle to pretend that there is not a considerable body of French opinion which has come to regard that organisation as very definitely Germanophil in its tendencies. Some of the best minds in France would welcome a close understanding with Italy, but the traditional policy of the Quai d'Orsay, as well as the enormous influence of Freemasonry, is against this, and the Italian Government itself now looks rather in the direction of Berlin than in that of Paris. A revival of the old alliance with Russia is hardly practical politics at the moment, but it would be foolish to rule it out altogether: after all, the Third Republic is no further from Communism in 1932 than it was from absolutism in 1890. In fine, France feels insecure and isolated, and her whole foreign policy is being devoted to the remedying of this state of affairs.

The most important factor in the international situation is still the rivalry between France and Germany, and each Power thinks in terms of its suspicion of the other. The German attitude is perfectly clear, and it is simply a determination to use every available means to regain what was lost by the late war; in effect, the policy of Berlin is exactly the same as that of Paris in the years immediately following Waterloo. It is true that there have been differences on the subject within the Reich itself, but they have been differences as to means, not as to ends, for upon the desirability of tearing up the Treaty of Versailles all Germans are agreed, and from their point of view they are perfectly justified in the line they are taking. Fortunately for them some of the clauses of that Treaty are so manifestly unjust that few people in the ex-Allied countries now wish to defend them, and this has given German diplomacy an advantage of which it has not been slow to make use. From an international standpoint the danger is that in any modification of the Peace settlement the good may be swept away with the bad, for the injustice which the Treaty of Versailles inflicted in some directions should not blind us to the fact that it did right a great many wrongs in others.

Germany has no reason to be ashamed of what she has accomplished in the direction of revision in the thirteen years that have elapsed since the Treaty was signed. The annuity which she was to pay on account of Reparations has been progressively reduced from the original figure of £330,000,000 to £125,000,000

(the Dawes Plan), from that to £106,000,000 (the Young Plan), and now by the Lausanne agreement to £7,500,000. In the political field she has secured the liberation of her territory, while her election in 1926 to a permanent seat upon the Council of the League of Nations marked her definite readmission as a Great Power to the comity of nations. The one reverse which she has suffered was when, by the conclusion of the Austro-German Customs Pact, she tried prematurely to force the pace, but the true story of that incident has yet to be told, and, when it is, it may be found that Berlin was blackmailed by Vienna. For the rest, there has been no real difference between the policy of Stresemann, Brüning, and Von Papen; Brüning was more forceful than Stresemann, and Von Papen has been more forceful than Brüning, but only because the reviving strength of Germany has enabled them to be so. Those who believe that the internal politics of the Reich will exercise any moderating influence upon its foreign policy are doomed to be disappointed, and if they pin their faith to the Centre and the Social Democrats they would do well to reflect upon the attitude of these two parties in August 1914. Germany is doing exactly what France did a hundred years ago—namely, endeavouring to retrieve in the council chamber her reverses in the field; and just as there was no essential difference in the foreign policy of the Restoration, the July Monarchy, the Second Republic, and the Second Empire, so there will be none between a Germany ruled by Socialists, by Nazis, or by restored Hohenzollerns. One statesman may be more *suaviter in modo* and another more *fortiter in re*—that is all. At the same time, Germany is very far from being satisfied, and she is as fearful of France as the latter is of her. Moreover, she is convinced that there is a sinister plot in existence between Paris and Warsaw, and that on a given signal from the former the Poles will overrun East Prussia and march on Berlin. This is the explanation of her recent decision to arm unless her neighbours show some sign of disarming. She does not immediately aspire to equality with France, but she is determined to be in a position to deal with Poland, should the necessity arise. Furthermore, the present administration is convinced that the existing army is not sufficient even to maintain internal order in the event of a serious emergency. On the other hand, there is no desire in any quarter to rebuild the navy on anything approaching the pre-war scale, which, it is now generally recognised in Germany, was a serious blunder.

Italy is in the peculiar position of having been numbered among the victors, and yet of having come to find herself in greater sympathy with the defeated than with her own late allies. The reason for this apparent paradox is not far to seek,

and it lies in the fact that, owing largely to the incompetence of her representatives, she did not obtain at Versailles that to which she considered herself entitled, either in equity or by the Treaty of London of 1915, and by its corollary the Pact of St. Jean de Maurienne. In particular, Italy resents a settlement which did not give her, the only victorious Power with a superabundant population, a single mandate. Furthermore, the existence of several outstanding questions between her and France has caused Italy to look rather for support to Central Europe, where of late she has found it to an increasing extent. Indeed, while Dr. Brüning was still in office it was one of the complaints of the Nazis that he was too prone to allow Italy, both spiritual and temporal, to influence German policy, and it was contended by his opponents that in this matter the Vatican and the Palazzo Venezia worked in conjunction. In spite of all this, Italy has not burnt her boats (she never does) so far as her former allies are concerned, and she has in no way departed from her traditional policy of friendship with Great Britain: on occasion, too, she has even acted in close co-operation with France, as, for instance, in her opposition last year to the proposed Austro-German Customs Pact, which threatened to bring Prussia down to the Brenner. She has for some time advocated a revision of the Peace Treaties, which is considered inevitable in official circles in Rome, where it is believed that the sooner this is done the less extensive it will need to be. Here, of course, the policy of Italy clashes with that of France, and in Rome there is no sympathy for the French view that the Treaties are sacrosanct. Ten years ago Signor Mussolini, in his first speech in the Chamber after his accession to power, remarked significantly, 'Treaties are not eternal, and they are not unalterable; they are the chapters of history, not its epilogue.' These words express the policy of Italy to-day, and in the financial field the 'clean slate' in the matter of Debts and Reparations has been consistently advocated. At the same time Signor Mussolini is in no way desirous, as are the Germans, of throwing all the provisions of the Peace Treaties into the melting-pot: what he wishes is a modification of those articles which experience has shown to be unworkable in their present form.

No account of Italian foreign policy would be complete without some mention of the part played in its formulation by Signor Grandi, the new Italian Ambassador in London. If the inspiration has been that of Signor Mussolini, it is Signor Grandi who has revived, in a modified form, that doctrine of the balance which was the outstanding feature of the diplomacy of Metternich. Signor Grandi, while a patriotic Italian, is also a good European, believing that Europe is at least as important as its constituent

parts, and he sees the only hope for the future in the existence of a general, if tacit, understanding between Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany to act together in any emergency that affects Europe as a whole. This does not, of course, imply the revival of the so-called Concert, which consisted of two competing bands playing out of tune without a conductor, and it is the very reverse of the doctrine of the balance of power; rather is it based upon the conviction that if, where the major issues are concerned, the Great Powers of Europe do not hang together, then sooner or later they will hang separately. In this connexion it is not without interest to remember that by the pursuit of this policy Metternich preserved peace for over thirty years, and had he not had the misfortune to live in an age when extravagant nationalism was considered to be the height of political wisdom his system might have continued in force for a great deal longer. The world is already under a heavy debt to Signor Grandi for his revival of the ideas of Metternich, and it is to be hoped that circumstances will permit him to continue in London the work which he has been doing to such advantage at the Palazzo Chigi.

In comparison with the policy of France, Germany and Italy, that of Great Britain has, since the war, been wanting in definiteness, and, on occasion, it has tended to be purely negative in character. Successive British Governments have, it is true, obeyed the instructions which George Canning drew up for his cousin, Stratford, in 1824, and which began with the observation that 'to preserve the peace of the world is the leading object of the policy of England,' but they have not always realised that to effect this a very considerable amount of constructive statesmanship is necessary. Perhaps the chief reason for this failure is the fact that no statesman of the first rank has held the office of Foreign Secretary since Viscount Grey of Fallodon, and the result has been that the course of British policy has given the impression that those responsible for it were unable to see the wood for the trees. There has been a commendable desire to harmonise the views of Washington, Paris, Berlin, and Rome, but it has too often taken the form of merely discovering a formula which shall permit of the conference of the moment breaking up without appearing to have done nothing. The belief has been engendered that the Foreign Office has its gaze directed rather upon the composition of the next conference than upon the problems which will be discussed there; and in retrospect the attitude of Great Britain during the past fourteen years seems, while actuated by the highest motives, to have been somewhat futile, and not quite worthy of her position in the counsels of the world.

There can, of course, be no shadow of doubt that the preserva-

tion of peace is the supreme British interest, but it is another matter to agree that British Governments have of late always gone the best way about achieving this end. Great Britain is in Europe, and yet not of it to the same extent as the purely Continental Powers, while her overseas interests bring her into touch with American opinion in a way that is not the case with the other European States. In these circumstances she is in a unique position to take the lead in matters of international policy, and it is to be regretted that she has not taken advantage of her opportunity. Instead, the most constructive proposals for Disarmament have come from the United States and France, and for the settlement of financial problems from Italy, while the British contribution has been rather by way of criticism than of suggestion. In consequence of this Great Britain has come to be regarded as a somewhat unreliable factor. It is felt that the cardinal points in her policy are to do nothing that will offend Washington, or seriously annoy Paris, while there is also to be taken into account the traditional British friendship for Italy, and the rapidly reviving sympathy for Germany. In a serious crisis this makes for a contradictory line of conduct, and British statesmen are considered abroad to be too liable to confuse benignity with statecraft. The revision of the Peace Treaties in theory, but in practice to let sleeping dogs lie; the policy of cancellation of the Reparations and Debts, but not the logical sequel of the presentation of a united front to Washington; the advocacy of Disarmament without the removal of the friction of which the armaments are the outward and visible sign. These are some of the inconsistencies with which Great Britain is charged, and, one must admit, with considerable justice. What is not always appreciated abroad is the absence in the British Isles of an instructed public opinion where matters of foreign policy are concerned, combined with the belief of no inconsiderable section of the population that the less Great Britain has to do with the affairs of the Continent the better. These facts do not make the task of a Foreign Secretary any easier, and they render his attitude specially liable to misrepresentation in the Press. With the exception of a few newspapers that can be numbered on the fingers of one hand, the standpoint of Fleet Street towards international problems is quite irresponsible, and although the views of the man-in-the-street need not be considered as carefully by the Foreign Office as by other Government departments, yet in a democracy there is always the possibility that they may influence policy at some inopportune moment. Then, again, while the signature of Signor Mussolini or of M. Herriot is the signature of Italy or France, that of Sir John Simon does not commit the British Empire, and the necessity of consulting the

Dominions causes delay which is often misconstrued abroad, so that Albion is not in reality so *perfidie* as she is painted.

Last, but by no means least, there remains to be considered the attitude of the United States, and the true appreciation of this is not rendered any easier by taking it for granted, as is so commonly done, that the American people are a collection either of Shylocks or of philanthropists. The difficulty of working with the United States is due, not to the hardness of heart of its citizens, but to their ignorance where the Old World is concerned. Because there is no fortified frontier with Canada, and the military power of Mexico is negligible, the ordinary American finds it impossible to conceive of the conditions existing upon the mainland of Europe: to him the European nations are just a set of crooks who pretend that they cannot pay him what they owe, while all the time they are spending vast sums upon armaments. Owing to his isolation, he has never learnt to put himself in the other man's place, and so he does not realise, for example, that when Great Britain demurs to some proposal for naval disarmament put forward by the spokesmen of the United States, it does not mean that she harbours some sinister design of reversing the verdict of Saratoga and Yorktown, but merely that the needs of her Navy, which has long trade routes to defend, are different from those of the American. The State Department at Washington is under no such illusions, but it must take some notice of public opinion, particularly when an election is pending. It remains to be seen to what extent the economic crisis has modified the American attitude towards international problems, and that will not be easy to discover until it has been decided who is to be the next occupant of the White House. One thing, at any rate, is already clear, and it is that the United States is becoming aware that in the modern world no nation can, fortunately or unfortunately, be sufficient unto itself. She thought that by rejecting President Wilson's proposals, and by turning her back upon the League of Nations, she had washed her hands of Europe altogether, but she soon found that such was not the case. Since then American policy has been by no means consistent, and it has varied between an excessive interference and a frigid aloofness. Washington made the mistake of believing that it was possible to found world dominion upon wealth alone, and that led the United States into a whole series of blunders. If she has learnt the lesson, mankind will be the gainer, for the cordial co-operation of America in the solution of the outstanding problems of the day would be of incalculable advantage in view of the detachment of her geographical situation. If her present troubles teach the United States to think internationally they will not have been entirely useless.

Such are the interests and policies of the leading Powers, and it is, as in the past, the clash between them that is embittering the international situation, and that has made worse the effects of the general slump, even if it has not actually caused it. Each of these Great Powers has its satellites, and so the conflict of their aspirations concerns, in some way or another, practically every country on the face of the earth. In these circumstances, the only hope of inducing them to act together for the sake of civilisation as a whole is to discover some one overriding interest that they all have in common, and that is to be found in the maintenance of peace. If peace is to be preserved it will have to be in spite, not with the aid, of the pacifists. It is no use attempting to deter mankind from fighting by stressing the horrors of modern warfare, for 'safety first' makes no appeal, as Mr. Baldwin found to his cost at the General Election of 1929. Equally useless is the denunciation of war as immoral, for, in addition to being an arguable proposition, immorality as such is no deterrent in the twentieth century. Then, again, it is beside the point to say that no nation can afford to fight, for this fact has never stopped a war yet, as Pitt was forced to admit after for years having buoyed up the courage of himself and of his fellow-countrymen by an annual examination of the apparently hopeless financial position of revolutionary France. Why war must to-day be avoided at all costs is because it would mean the triumph of Bolshevism, and the consequent destruction of everything for which civilisation stands. If proof be wanted of this statement, it lies in the fact that whenever, in any country, there is a prolonged crisis Communism invariably raises its head, and in the event of war upon an extended scale its great opportunity would have come. It is by no means certain that the last conflict was not the Peloponnesian War of modern Europe, and another would assuredly have far worse consequences than that which spelt the ruin of Hellas.

No Power, except Russia, has any interest in producing this state of affairs, while all have very definite reasons for avoiding revolution at all costs. The aim, then, of all must be the preservation of peace, and the localisation of any conflict that may arise. At the same time this does not necessarily mean the perpetuation of the *status quo*, which inflicts more than one injustice, and if injustices are allowed to continue they inevitably lead to war, for sooner or later there comes a time when men will fight sooner than tolerate them any longer. It is useless to expect that the existing causes of friction will disappear in a moment, but if the Powers will concentrate upon what they have in common—namely, the maintenance of peace as the sole means of avoiding revolution, instead of upon their differences—it will not be long

before there is a better spirit abroad. Moreover, the present is an exceptionally good moment to stress the essential unity of civilisation, for nationalism is everywhere chastened by the chaos it has produced, while democracy, that other great fomentor of trouble, has likewise had its teeth drawn, and is generally too discredited to be capable of harm. Fortunately, also, the Governments of the leading Powers rest upon a realistic basis, and the era of Right Ministers drawing their support from Centre majorities, while pursuing Left policies, which gave an air of unreality to international politics for so long, is at an end. It is an old and true saying that it is only when the devil is sick that he shows any disposition to become a monk, and it is advisable to make him commit himself irrevocably before he recovers. Similarly, while the world is still suffering from the headache due to its nationalistic debauch is surely the most appropriate moment to ask it to sign the pledge.

It is difficult in these circumstances to resist the conclusion that while the summoning of the coming world conference is clearly a step in the right direction, it is by itself not enough. Admittedly, one of the first problems to be settled is the question of currency and the stabilisation of rates of exchange, but there still holds true the observation of the great Finance Minister of France, Baron Louis, to the Duc de Richelieu, 'Give me good politics, and I will give you good finance.' The two are inseparable, and while there remain so many causes of political friction in the world it is useless to expect any marked improvement in its financial and economic condition. On the other hand, to throw the whole Peace settlement open for discussion once more would be a remedy worse than the disease, and would merely render the existing confusion worse confounded. What is required is the revision, by mutual consent, of the more onerous terms of that settlement, not its substitution by another, which might well prove to be equally unsatisfactory. The only Power to take the lead in a matter of this sort is Great Britain, for neither the supporters nor the opponents of the existing order could charge her with having any axe of her own to grind in doing so. The consent of France, Italy, and Japan would, of course, have to be secured in advance, and then an invitation could be sent in the name of the four Powers to Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey asking them to state exactly what are the alterations in the Peace settlement that they desire, for, although there has for years been a great deal of loose talk in all five countries about revision, the Governments concerned have never yet stated exactly what they wanted. It is very probable, too, that the replies would necessitate consultation with other Powers. The *sine qua non*, however, of modification would have to be a

guarantee to abstain from any demand for further revision for a definite number of years, and a promise by the Governments concerned to repress any movements in that direction. It is not suggested that such a course would not present great difficulties, but without revision there will be no real reduction of armaments, and without that there is little hope of effecting a financial settlement with the United States.

A policy of this nature would, it must be confessed, call for a good deal more firmness and prescience on the part of British diplomacy than has yet been displayed, but it would accord admirably with the position of Great Britain in the world to-day. The alternative is the exacerbation of the present discontent until war once more breaks out, and that must lead, through the triumph of Bolshevism, to the overthrow of civilisation itself.

CHARLES PETRIE.

ECONOMY AND THE HOUSING PROBLEM

THOSE who realise the far-reaching effects of good and bad housing on national welfare must be anxious as to the fate of housing in the present campaign for economy. In the House of Commons on July 11 the Chancellor of the Exchequer declared that the Government was not afraid to face conclusions, when it had once come to a definite decision that certain steps ought to be taken. But he made it clear that economies, if they were to be substantial, must be carefully weighed and considered in all their bearings before they were embarked upon, and that much hard thinking would need to be done on the subject. Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues and the Treasury officials must have needed a substantial holiday after their colossal labours of the past twelve months, but the hard thinking has been going on in other quarters for many months and policies must take shape and be announced when Parliament reassembles. This article sets forth what appear to be the main results of such hard thinking in various quarters in regard to the housing problem in the towns. Rural housing must be dealt with separately, in connexion with agriculture.

The recovery of industry and employment is clearly of greater value to the masses than better housing. The financial world-storm continues and this country is in danger till the seas are quieted down around it; we must continue to lighten the ship. £15,000,000 housing subsidy per annum from rates and taxes is a heavy cargo to carry in such weather, and more of it is constantly coming on board. How much is to be jettisoned, how much refused? And yet the object of these subsidies is of compelling importance. Mr. John Galsworthy reminds us that 'In Greater London nearly a million people are still living in overcrowded conditions—the direct cause of injustice, vice, misery, discontent, disease, degradation and degeneracy. They mean canker in the core of the greatest Empire the world has ever seen.' There is indeed no need to emphasise either the intense evils of bad housing, especially of overcrowding, or our duty, both corporate and personal, to do all we can to secure its improvement. But in the light, especially, of limited resources there is great need to clarify the actual facts, requirements, and oppor-

tunities of the problem. Initiative may be supported, but it may be undermined, by State action and subsidy. Economy does not necessarily mean retrenchment; it does mean revision of expenses, self-reliance, and careful expenditure in future, in due proportion to the respective claims on the national, local, and household purse. If we are not getting full value in health, morals, and character for money spent, we can and must economise, either by regulating the expenditure or by diverting it into more fruitful channels or by cutting it down.

At what, then, are we aiming? At the better housing not merely of the working classes but of the overcrowded and poorest workers. Roughly, this states the unsolved problem before the national authorities, over and above present housing activities. The Report in July 1931 of the Inter-departmental Committee on the Rent Restrictions Acts (Cmd. 3911: price 1s.) is a useful guide to the situation. 'In England and Wales,' it says, 'since the war, from public and private resources, more than £1000 million has been spent in the building of more than 1½ million houses.¹ . . . It is clear that this large number of new houses has not had the effect of improving the conditions of the poorest workers to the extent which might have been anticipated.' The first essential, however, after the war was to provide a large number of houses for the working classes in general. The Census of England and Wales in 1931 shows that there were eighteen months ago nearly 9,500,000 houses for nearly 40,000,000 persons, or 244 dwellings per 1000, giving a house for every 4.2 persons. In 1911 there were but 7,319,420 houses for 36,000,000 persons, or 203 dwellings per 1000, giving a house for every 4.9 persons. On average, therefore, there is great improvement, but not in the housing of the poor. The filtering-up that was expected from overcrowded dwellings into the new houses has not taken place; and this for four reasons—(a) the number of families in proportion to population in all classes has increased and the new houses have mainly been filled from the better-paid workers and minor professional, clerical, and trading classes; (b) decontrol of the poorer property on change of tenancy has in general resulted in increase of rents, lifting such property out of the reach of the poorer workers and reducing the supply of housing within their means; (c) unemployment has added largely to the numbers of the poor; (d) old age pensions have kept the aged poor in their houses instead of the workhouse. Of new houses since the war about 1,000,000 have been built for sale and the remaining 500,000 are let at rents beyond the means of the poorer workers.

¹ The Annual Report of the Ministry of Health for 1931-2 gives the latest figures of post-war houses of rateable value up to £78 (£105 in the Metropolitan Police District) as 1,861,267, of which 1,064,018 were built with State assistance.

When the housing figures of the 1931 Census are published, it is doubtful if there will be any reduction of the 3,500,000 persons shown in the 1921 Census as overcrowded, *i.e.*, as living more than two persons to a room, living-rooms included.

Let us be clear as to what we mean when we speak of 'rents beyond the means of the poorer workers.' The standard commonly arrived at as a rough guide by experience since the war is a rent, with rates and rail (the three R's) or other fare, not exceeding one-fifth of the total family income. It is essential to include the fares to and from work of all the workers in the family as a material factor in the cost attributable to the housing problem in the family budget. It is essential, on the other hand, to include the total income of the family—the occasional earnings, for instance, of the mother, the minor earnings, perhaps, of children, the assistance of sub-tenants or lodgers, pensions or private income. One of the wealthiest households on a post-war London County Council estate was that of a humble charwoman, who on investigation was found to have four daughters at work, bringing the total family income to £10 a week—not a proper case for housing relief. The rough working rule thus adopted presses, of course, more hardly on large families with children under sixteen: it would not apply to the clerical and professional classes, requiring a higher standard of living; it postulates continued employment; it is generous to those who live simply with few calls on the family purse. But in general this working rule fairly defines the task of the State as that of enabling a man and wife earning 50s. a week to find a properly habitable dwelling near their work at 10s. a week, all in, or less in the suburbs. And yet for those who must live near their work in Central London the lowest rent with rates in the otherwise admirable schemes of the London County Council is 16s. 11d. for three rooms, 19s. 8d. for four.

What, now, is the financial burden of the efforts hitherto made to deal with this housing problem on the State, on the taxpayer and ratepayer, and so on industry and indirectly on the industrial worker, or would-be worker, in all grades? The total capital expenditure on subsidised housing since 1919 is now roughly £380,000,000 by local authorities, £250,000,000 by private enterprise—total £630,000,000, with a further £20,000,000 sanctioned last year and more this. Exchequer contributions already made amount to £110,000,000. The rates of interest on loans from the Public Works Loan Board were reduced last April from 5 to 4½ per cent. But why should so high a rate be payable when the State gets money at 3½ per cent.? Here there would seem to be a possibility of saving some millions a year in interest. The Annual Report of the Ministry of Health for 1931-2 (Appendix VIII., p. 283) shows the Exchequer contributions mounting up

from £20,000 in the year 1919-20 to nearly £13,000,000 in the year 1931-2, with further commitments (p. 114) of £400,000, due at this higher figure for twenty, forty, or sixty years, with a corresponding commitment from the rates at over £2,500,000, making a total commitment for houses already built or authorised in England and Wales of £15,500,000 a year. Further expenditure on this scale is impossible; indeed, it is not required. Consider the amount of help thus given to the tenant in his rent. The average house built by the London County Council under the 1919 (Addison) Act, in addition to rates at 4s. 6d., requires an economic rent of 31s. 6d. a week; the tenant pays 13s. 6d., the public purse pays 18s. The London County Council house under the 1923 (Chamberlain) Act, besides rates at 4s., requires an economic rental of 17s. 3d., towards which the tenant pays 10s. 7d., the public purse 6s. 8d. Since 1929 the London County Council have reduced rents on their three largest estates of Becontree, Downham, and Watling on an average by 1s. 6d., at a cost to the rates of £98,640 per annum. Is this not a dole in kind, no more justifiable than a contribution from public funds for clothes or food? Is this not merely a respectable form of poor relief without the safeguards of the public assistance committee? Not entirely; for half the Exchequer contribution is in respect of the 214,000 houses built under the 1919 Acts at the very heavy cost necessary to restart the disorganised building trade at work after the war; costs were very high, and an excessively high standard of accommodation and design was demanded, not for some only, but for all houses subsidised. But in considerable degree it must be reckoned that, after writing off the difference between costs and standards in 1919 and 1932, tenants of subsidised houses are in effect being relieved out of public funds and are, justifiably or not, a drag on the community. What, then, is to be done? The overcrowded are not yet properly housed and nothing has yet been done for the poorest workers.

The second essential to emphasise is the power of artisans and others with family incomes over 75s. a week in London and 40s. in the country to provide housing for themselves. Under section 92 of the 1925 consolidating Housing Act local authorities can help workers with loans to acquire or provide their own houses. This object is carried out on a vast scale by the building societies, through whom, for instance, a £300 house may be built with a deposit of £60, the balance of £240 being obtained from the building society on a loan repayable over sixteen years by monthly payments of £1 18s. 5d. (8s. 10d. a week), including interest (instead of rent), at the end of which time the house belongs to the tenant. During this period he can always sell his house, subject to the mortgage, with the consent of the society, or,

alternatively, sell outright and repay the loan; and when the house is his own, there is already, and in the future there is still more likely to be, a ready market for it, if he has kept it in good order and local demand continues, as in general seems now probable. Outside the big towns, families with an assured income of 50s. a week should thus be able broadly to provide for themselves. For those living in subsidised houses a means test, however disguised, is not only justified, but in honour due alike to the fellow-citizens who suffer in order to provide the Exchequer and rate contributions and to those other fellow-citizens, poor and very poor, who need public help for their housing and are still without it. Some tenants, rightly accepted as tenants of subsidised houses, are now in better circumstances; others should never have been accepted. Some local authorities have already taken steps to clear well-to-do families out of their subsidised houses. All should do so. Local authorities might well give them the alternative, now urged on them by the Ministry, of quitting or of paying the full economic rent, for the benefit in either case of those still in need of houses. Here is an opportunity for the exercise of public opinion and of personal persuasion on those who could now afford to provide for their own housing needs. Further, the rebate system, by which rents are varied according to means and liabilities—and, as Miss Eleanor Rathbone, M.P., has put it, 'children who are liabilities to-day become assets to-morrow'—is a logical application of the need for economy, now that a means test is recognised in connexion with public assistance. By carefully adjusting rebates the Kensington Housing Trust, for instance, distributes the subsidy according to means and need and lets four-roomed flats at rents varying from 10s. to 18s. a week. The difficulty in administration is one that economy calls on us to face in directing and limiting public charity to individual needs.

Thirdly, as to reduction of standard, little more can usefully be done. In January last the Ministry of Health issued a circular recommending as a result of the experience of many local authorities that they should concentrate on the provision of the three-bedroomed non-parlour house with a superficial floor area of 760 square feet. Provision of smaller houses for aged persons is made under the 1930 Act; and a reasonable number of two-bedroomed non-parlour houses with an area of 650 square feet is in certain cases justified. But, with simple equipment, further reduction of standard should be resisted. I cannot help thinking, however, that architects might devise simpler standard plans that would satisfy a proper demand for simple beauty of design and good taste and in many areas materially reduce costs.

Fourthly, appeal must be made to the building industry still further to reduce costs. The cost of certain building materials is

still about double their cost in 1914. In the building trade itself, while the cost of living has increased by 43 per cent., wages have increased generally for skilled workmen by 70 to 75 per cent., for labourers by 92 per cent. In the provinces the bricklayer's wage was, in 1914, 8d. an hour; in 1926, 1s. 7½d.; in 1931, 1s. 6d. Moreover, output which on similar work under a typical provincial firm of good standing was reckoned in 1914 at eighty bricks per hour, worked out in 1926 at forty-five and last year at sixty-five per hour—or still 19 per cent. below that of 1914. Further, the ten-hour day is replaced by an eight-and-a-half-hour day—with the lesser output and the increased wage. The cost of laying 100 bricks thus worked out in the three years 1914, 1926, and 1931 respectively at 17s. 5d., 75s., and 48s. 5d., corresponding to 100, 331, and 278. As the cost of labour—indirectly, in production and transport of materials, and directly—is 87 per cent. of the total cost of building, there is room here for a considerable reduction of cost. As a sheltered industry trade union leaders may have been justified in maintaining wages at a higher comparative level than in unsheltered trades; but no trade is now sheltered from the present financial crisis, and unless costs are materially reduced work will stop. The claim of the builders to virtuosity in their craft is challenged by experience. Given supervision, with common sense and opportunity, the unemployed can be trained in a few weeks, as was found in the Army training schools, to build their own houses.

The cost of an ordinary non-parlour house, taken at £180 in 1913 and £1000 in 1920, fell in March 1932 to £304. For a house costing £300 (all in), the economic weekly rent is 7s. 6d.; subsidy under the 1924 Act, with the usual contribution from the rates, would provide 4s., bringing the subsidised net rent down to 3s. 6d.—or with rates perhaps to 5s.—within the means of a family living close to their work and earning 25s. a week. But in the present crisis we cannot reckon on a continuance of subsidy at present rates, if at all; and its place must be taken by a reduction of costs. Indeed, as already stated, for our general object a subsidy is no longer justified. When a subsidy capitalised at £75 a house was given in 1923, the average cost of a non-parlour house rose from £346 to £386 in the following year. The Wheatley Act of 1924, with its subsidy of £160, raised the cost by October to £451. After the cut of £25 in December 1926 the cost came down by March 1927 to £425, by September 1928 to £360. In December 1928 the subsidy under the 1923 Act was abolished and that under the Wheatley Act was cut by £25; but this was restored by the Labour Government a few months later, and the average cost is now £304. Obviously, reduction of costs is not solely, and can only be indirectly, due to reduction in subsidy.

But it is clear that the effect of a subsidy has been to increase costs; the effect of its reduction to reduce costs. Nor has the reduction of subsidy led to any eventual reduction of building. It is only common sense that subsidies should stimulate any demand for a wider margin of security in profit, easier terms of work, and better wages; should increase gross costs; should to a considerable extent evaporate before they reach the future occupant of a house in the form of reduced rent. It is only common sense that when a subsidy is reduced the building trade will reduce costs to obtain orders, rather than lie idle or dissolve their organisation. The case for a withdrawal of subsidies seems clear; the place of subsidies must be taken by a reduction of costs. A family earning 50s. a week can afford the economic rent (7s. 6d.) and rates (1s. 6d.) of a £300 house without subsidy. Building loans, on the other hand, by the local authorities may benefit the worker in regular work; and if the allocation of houses to those who need them be maintained, the overcrowded and poorer workers will be indirectly benefited.

To this argument for the abolition of subsidies there is an obvious exception to be made in the case of such uneconomic housing as is necessary in the public interest—namely, in the building of houses to take the place of insanitary houses and areas condemned as unfit for habitation. The Act of 1930, passed for this purpose with the approval of all parties, had the further merit of fixing a subsidy on the basis, not of new houses built, but of persons rehoused. In this, our fifth item of policy, we are coming to the crux of the problem, which has hardly yet been touched. The poorer workers are essentially, although not solely, those in slum areas or slum houses, for whom special provision is made by the 1930 (so-called Slum-Clearance and Improvement) Act. Two thousand five hundred houses were thus completed last year at a cost of £5100 for forty years, and it is on these lines that local authorities should build for the sake of the very poor. But for the very poor it must not be forgotten that old houses, like old clothes and old books, are cheaper than new, pre-war houses than post-war houses; and the most economic use of our 9,500,000 houses must be for degradation of the house in age and value to correspond with degradation in the economic credit of its occupant. Roughly, the streets of oldest houses still allowed to be inhabited are the most suitable for the poorest classes. Our object, therefore, on behalf of the poorer workers requires—(a) proper adaptation, maintenance, and repair of houses; (b) the clearing out from the older houses of occupants in excess. By the routine action of local authorities under Housing and Public Health Acts 252,000, and by informal action another 300,000, houses every year are made fit. But much more

can be done, especially to require adaptation of houses by their owners for occupation by more than one family. Grants and loans should be made available for reconditioning in the towns, as already provided in rural areas under the Housing (Rural Workers) Act, 1926. Reduction of overcrowding can only be secured by further building for workers in regular employment, by the co-operation of voluntary workers with local authorities, as explained at the end of this article, in filling new houses from houses hitherto overcrowded, and above all, in the long run, by a return of prosperity to industry and to the would-be worker. The real housing problem is that of overcrowding, not only of the very poor, but of families without other provision within their means. Every local authority should schedule all such families in its area and devise a policy to meet their needs, by direct or indirect rehousing and by securing the adaptation of overcrowded houses to the requirements of the medical officer of health, until proper provision has been made for every family.

By far the greatest contribution to the housing of the poorer worker is and can be made by local authorities, and it is a plain duty of all public-spirited and philanthropic persons to support local authorities and to take an active part in their work, both as electors and, where possible, as councillors—one of the highest opportunities of social service in the housing of the very poor. If it is clearly our duty to demand action for the improvement of housing, it is equally our duty to do justice alike to property owners and to would-be tenants, to employers and to employed. To secure their willing co-operation the rights of each must be respected as well as their responsibilities; their share in the common burden must be emphasised as well as their dues. Housing enthusiasts are most effective, as they are most rare, when they recognise the generous help given by many owners and employers, and the difficulties that beset others; when they realise that many owners have small means, that some tenants are bad tenants and do not adapt themselves to improved conditions; when they recognise that subsidies from the rates and taxes seldom, if ever, reach their intended destination intact and largely evaporate on the way.

Private enterprise, on the other hand, is doing much on natural lines, and with automatic safeguards, to improve the position. Of the 1,861,267 houses built since the Armistice of a rateable value not exceeding £78 (£105 in the Metropolitan Police District), 797,249 have been built without State assistance. In the year 1931-2, of 201,000 new houses built, 131,000 were unassisted; and as the housing needs of the artisan, tradesman, and clerical classes are becoming satisfied, so private enterprise will devise means, in the absence of subsidised competition, of reducing

costs and meeting the needs of the workers. The building societies, which finance the purchase or building of houses out of savings to the extent of £70,000,000 a year, have made great strides and will have further scope for their work as the financial crisis passes and employment and industry improve. This form of saving may well be encouraged. Good work has been done, though necessarily on a limited scale, by the Peabody, Sutton, Guinness, and Lewis Housing Trusts, requiring but a small return on their capital outlay, and philanthropists might well be advised to add to their resources by will. Here the flats and houses are self-supporting, the trust exercising its charity in the form of a lower rental for the quality of housing provided, earning a lower rate of interest on the capital outlay. But this is in effect an additional subsidy; and to avoid a pauperising influence the administration of such a charity requires, as much as any other charitable or municipal agency, a means test in principle, and a careful adjustment and readjustment of the housing provided to the actual means and needs of applicants and tenants. Last, but by no means least, reference should be made to the benevolent work of some landowners, of many employers, both individual and corporate, in housing their own workers; of public utility societies² and housing associations, of the Women's House Property Managers, of Copec and Somers Town. These, indeed, get down to the personal needs of the very poor more than any official agency can do; and they do most good when they work in with the local authorities, medical officers of health and sanitary inspectors in their area. An intimate, personal knowledge of the tenants must take the place of a means test, and a strict discipline must implement the lenient tendency of philanthropy to guard against exploitation and abuse of the charitable moneys entrusted to these benevolent agencies. But by a careful study of overcrowding in their neighbourhood they can often help the local authority, not only to fill their new houses with suitable tenants, but also to use the vacancies thus created in old houses for the better housing of those remaining in them. A single new municipal house at 15s. to 20s. a week may thus be the first link in a chain of several removals, resulting in the better accommodation of half a dozen families. Urgent cases need to be scheduled and individual attention given to the needs, requirements, and powers alike of occupant, owner, and local authority. Much improvement is thus possible with persistent effort even without further accommodation. The lesson of making the best of what you have is of utmost use in various quarters in matters of housing.

² For information, apply to the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association, 3, Gray's Inn Place, Gray's Inn, W.C. 2.

Finally, the Rent Restrictions Acts must be at once revised in the light of the Report of Lord Marley's Inter-departmental Committee of July 1931. There it was clearly shown that, other things being equal, it was scarcity value in any grade of housing that governed prices; that the scarcity of houses rented with rates at from 10s. to 12s. a week or less (14s. to 17s. in London) enabled owners of houses, when decontrolled under the 1923 Act on change of tenancy, to increase rents, thereby diminishing the supply of houses for the poor; that no such increase took place in decontrolled houses of the upper grades, for whom post-war housing had supplied the demand; and that for these control was no longer required. If so, it is no longer justified. Private enterprise, it was shown, had, as should be expected, concentrated on supplying the most remunerative type of housing demanded. The Report classified controlled housing in three grades, according to rateable value. In class A, with rateable value £35 (or in London £45) and upward, the demand was now satisfied and decontrol should be effected. In class B, with rateable value from £13 to £35 (or in London £20 to £45), the demand was being rapidly met by new building and by decontrol under the 1923 Act on change of tenancy; such control as remained was automatically disappearing, but was still needed. In class C, with rateable value below £13 (or in Greater London £20), decontrol on future change of tenancy should cease. These Acts are a relic of the war and a great hindrance to development and to the natural working of economic law. They may well be now largely rescinded and modified, even to a greater degree than was recommended in last year's Report. But they are still required, with certain modifications, for the sake of the real poor in class C, until the main needs of this class can be further satisfied.

Further economies on a large scale are required. *Reculer pour mieux sauter*. The State must for a time forego many even useful activities in finance and return some way towards its earlier conception as the power responsible solely for defence and justice, keeping the ring for its citizens to develop their activities according to their several powers and desires. Sweet are the uses of adversity. The late Labour Government laid down as a principle, 'Help only for those who need it and only for so long as they need it.' With a constant determination to help according to power and to opportunity, we have a great and hopeful task before us in these difficult times in assisting both piecemeal and in general the better housing, with others, of the poorer workers and the very poor, without reliance on taxes and rates for finance, except for the most urgent cases.

FRANCIS FREMANTLE.

POLICE REFORM

DAY by day the newspapers record an ever-increasing volume of serious crime—hold-ups, motor thefts, jewellery thefts, and crimes of violence—all carried out on a scale, and with an audacity and masterly forethought, unknown in the pre-war days. Notwithstanding the large proportion of these cases successfully dealt with by the police, one hears on every side the question, 'What are the police doing?' The question, of course, is natural; but the tone of its asking too frequently overlooks the credit due to the police for the successes they do achieve in the face of increasing difficulties. It must be remembered that most things have changed since the war; and the under-world is now very extensively recruited from sources equipped with a higher brain power than was the case twenty years ago; from criminals possessing a knowledge of the latest mechanical devices which they do not scruple to use in furthering their nefarious designs—the telephone, motor vehicles, and even broadcasting. Consequently the problems of the police have become very much more complex. Not for one moment must it be imagined that the police chiefs throughout the country are at all complacent regarding their achievements in grappling with large-scale and mobile crime. On the contrary, they are bending all their energies to developing counter-enterprise in the forces under their control in order to attain an even higher standard of success. If the criminal career is attracting a higher standard of intellect, the same may be said of the police service, and one occasionally hears of university graduates joining the police service at the bottom rung of the ladder. In co-ordinating all these efforts to fight the under-world the Home Office takes a most active part. It is directly responsible for the administration of the Metropolitan Police, and has a considerable say in the administration of every police force in England and Wales, through the annual inspections carried out by His Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary, and, in the last resort, through its power to withhold Exchequer grants (representing 50 per cent. of the total cost) where the local administration falls short of the required standard to a glaring degree.

Even outside the Metropolitan area the responsibility for stimulating the adoption of new devices in crime detection and generally raising the standard of efficiency in police administration rests very largely with the Home Office. A notable reform secured by the department in recent years has been the institution of district conferences of chief constables. The whole country has been mapped out into districts; and within each district the chief constables for the region meet periodically to exchange views, and to devise schemes for co-ordination. These conferences have done much to quicken co-ordinated efficiency as between the various police units. Over and above that reform is the valuable work of co-ordination performed by His Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary in suggesting and stimulating developments of practical police work. In the course of their inspections they lose no opportunity of drawing attention to enterprising methods that come under their notice; and thus chief officers of police are kept constantly informed of developments in practical working which are found efficacious in other areas. One constantly reads in the papers of experiments with police wireless equipment, with the teleprinter, and with other devices calculated to tighten up police efficiency; and it is a very usual thing for His Majesty's inspectors (or one of them) to be present at such demonstrations. Moreover, this work of the inspectors is not spasmodic. It goes on day in and day out throughout the year.

Well as the Home Office has done, its determination to aim at a still higher standard of efficiency throughout the police service appears to be in no sense blunted. This determination was expressed in the Home Secretary's review of the criminal statistics in the House of Commons last spring. If further indication of that determination were required, it was provided by Sir Herbert Samuel's announcement in the House of Commons of his intention in the near future to set up a Departmental Committee on Police Administration and Organisation. The subjects which will come under the purview of this Committee were not specified: but presumably there will be a thorough overhaul of some of the methods of police work and training; and some of the other matters claiming its attention might well be the further development of bureau work, the relations between clearing-house work and the local bureau work, advanced detective training, co-operation between detective units and the uniformed men, the intelligence side of the work, the possibility of extending still further the use of broadcasting, and of systematising the circulation of all information by the methods which are employed between one force and another, and within the different forces themselves. Without slavishly copying the methods of foreign countries, it does appear desirable

that our own police authorities should be made fully aware of what is being done abroad. There can be little doubt that the projected Departmental Committee will have before it very clearly the Treasury's demands for retrenchment in public expenditure. Those demands must—at any rate, to some extent—necessarily affect the nature of their ultimate recommendations very materially. On the other hand, the reconditioning of the framework of our police forces to meet present-day needs cannot be allowed to languish on merely parsimonious grounds. Omelettes were never made without breaking eggs. Economy is important; but efficiency is of paramount importance. It may well be that economies can be effected in the existing administration; and these could be regarded as a set-off against imperative new expenditure. Anyhow, the importance of the whole question demands exhaustive exploration of every possibility.

Another problem facing the Home Secretary is the expediency of amalgamating (or 'merging') some of the smaller borough forces with their respective county forces. It is no new question. In 1919 the then Home Secretary (Mr. Edward Shortt) appointed a Departmental Committee, presided over by Lord Desborough, to go into various questions of police administration. That Committee came to be known as the Desborough Committee, and its recommendations concerning the pay, pensions, and standardisation of conditions in the police service were largely adopted immediately they reported in 1920, and have generally proved so acceptable to the rank and file that they are now described as 'the policemen's charter.' The Desborough Committee also made a recommendation in favour of 'merging' the smaller borough forces into the county forces. Their recommendation was as follows:

As to the line of demarcation between the borough forces which should be absorbed and those which should be retained, a number of suggestions have been put before us. We should have been inclined to fix the limit for a separate police force to boroughs with about 100,000 population and upwards: but, on the whole, for reasons of administrative convenience, we recommend that in England and Wales all existing separate forces in non-county boroughs should be merged in the county forces (on terms to be approved by the Secretary of State); that no new force should be established in any non-county borough, and that the consent of the Secretary of State should be required for the establishment of any new force in a county borough, which consent should not be given unless the Secretary of State is satisfied that, for some exceptional reasons, the establishment of a separate force would afford some definite administrative advantage.

The adoption of this particular recommendation of the Desborough Committee bristled with local difficulties, not the least of which

was the local pride of existing police authorities. The nature of these difficulties is perhaps best defined by the following extract from the Desborough Report :

From the earliest times the maintenance of law and order in this country has been a matter primarily for the local authorities—originally the magistrates, and now the magistrates and police authorities as constituted by later enactments—and the theory of the law has been that the concern of the Crown in regard to the police (excepting the Metropolitan Police) is mainly that of seeing that the local authorities keep up the local forces, rather than the exercise of direct control over them. We consider it important also to bear in mind that the constable, even in the execution of his duty for the preservation of peace, acts not as the agent of the Government, exercising powers derived from that fact, but as a citizen, representing the rest of the community, and exercising powers which, at any rate in their elements, are possessed by all citizens alike.

Owing to these difficulties and to the lack of parliamentary time the Desborough Committee's recommendation as to 'merger' has not been carried out ; but recent happenings indicate that the Home Office has always been convinced that its adoption in some form or other was clearly desirable in the interests of efficiency and economy. Probably there was a certain amount of hesitation to stir up the local passions involved ; and, possibly even, there may have been the hope that the local authorities concerned would, with the passage of time, become less parochially minded—a vain hope, it is to be feared ! If the reform is ever to be accomplished now is as good a time as another ; and probably better. Sir Herbert Samuel, apparently, has made up his mind to grapple seriously with the question ; but before asking for parliamentary powers he felt that it might be advantageous for a Select Committee of the House of Commons to hear a recapitulation of the evidence tendered to the Desborough Committee, in order to ascertain whether the question stands just where it did thirteen years ago or not. The Select Committee on Police Forces (Amalgamation) was appointed, and commenced its deliberations in April last, presenting its Report shortly after the House of Commons adjourned for the summer recess in July.

Now, theoretically, a Select Committee possesses advantages over a Departmental Committee. The Desborough Committee was a Home Office Departmental Committee, and its members were appointed by Mr. Edward Shortt largely because of their interest in and knowledge of the subjects to be investigated. A Select Committee is more fortuitously constructed. Before election by the House of Commons itself its members are nominated by the whips of the various parties, and qualifications for the job in hand are frequently a matter of chance. Whereas a Departmental Committee has generally some knowledge of its

subject to start with, the members of a Select Committee more frequently have to acquire their knowledge as they go along. Still, there is the theoretical advantage of appearing more impartial, and being less malleable to the departmental point of view. As a matter of fact, partiality or malleability are not seriously a danger under either method. Judging by the pusillanimity shown by this particular Select Committee, one might reasonably prefer a body whose partiality was more open to suspicion if their recommendations had carried us farther. As it is, broadly speaking, if the Home Office is to proceed with what its experience tells it is the very necessary reform in view, the department itself must take its courage in both hands and frame legislation on much bolder lines than those adumbrated in the recommendations of the Select Committee.

The Select Committee's Report is a disappointing document. It is very unfortunate they did not see their way, or feel able, to give some more reasoned discussion of the main issues they had before them. The method they adopted of amalgamating all sorts of points, relevant or irrelevant, important and unimportant, sometimes without verification, may have been convenient from the point of view of presenting a brief report ; but the result is that their Report is uninforming and valueless to the uninitiated. It lays such stress on matters of minor importance that it is difficult to see the wood for the trees, and leaves one wondering whether the Committee had any very clear perception of the problem they had to tackle. Certainly that problem is not adequately stated in the Report.

Broadly speaking, the problem which confronted the Select Committee on the question of 'merger' had changed singularly little in the thirteen years since the Desborough Committee reported, except in intensity ; and this fact was amply borne out by the material balance of the evidence. In the interval nine borough forces have been merged into their respective county forces, voluntarily under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act, 1840 ; and uncontradicted evidence was given to the effect that those nine mergers had worked, and are working, satisfactorily. Otherwise on most other points conflicting evidence was again given representing the views of those who offered conflicting evidence to the Desborough Committee ; and little, if any, modifications of view appear to have taken place between the contending forces in the interval. Those in danger of being absorbed were still opposed to the scheme ; and those who would absorb remain in its favour. Their respective arguments were, more or less, brought up to date, but, so far as their evidence was concerned, it took matters no farther. By thus cancelling each other out the contending factions unconsciously

played into the hands of the Home Office, which was most ably represented by Mr. A. L. Dixon (the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for police matters) and His Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary. The strength of their very pertinent evidence lay in the fact that their sole concerns were to secure—(1) the greater efficiency of the service; (2) economies in administration where compatible with efficiency; and (3) that any necessary changes to secure these objects should be carried out in a spirit of justice to those concerned, and that their achievement should be devoid of even the suspicion of harshness. They, in common with all the other witnesses and with the Committee itself, united in giving unequivocal emphasis to this third point.

Mr. Dixon, in the course of his examination, stated that the number of non-county boroughs (outside the Metropolitan Police District) policed by the counties is 243. Further, he said that the conclusion arrived at by the Home Office was that there would be a distinct and definite gain in the efficiency of the police service if the small forces were merged and the number of separate units reduced; and that this would be marked most particularly by the co-ordination of the various methods of detecting crime, and the circulation of the particulars of crimes. Moreover, if the police services of the country were arranged in larger units, he claimed that the technical equipment could be more efficiently and economically provided. He summarised the main heads of the administrative advantages aimed at by the Home Office as:

- (1) The unification of the conditions of service;
- (2) The reduction of the number of police units;
- (3) The further development of detective work, and the co-ordination of technical equipment connected therewith; and
- (4) Centralised training for the higher officers.

The Home Office suggestion to the Select Committee was that if the sixty-eight boroughs with a population of under 75,000 were merged into their respective county forces there would be a saving of from £75,000 to £100,000 per annum, it being pointed out that half of any resultant savings would accrue to the Exchequer. In fixing a minimum population limit of 75,000 Mr. Dixon was at pains to point out that that figure coincided with what is now the minimum population qualifying a borough to become a county borough. He went on to state that, assuming all police units serving a population of less than 75,000 were merged in larger units, nineteen county boroughs would be brought in, and forty-nine non-county boroughs; and if the principle were extended to counties, eleven counties would be brought in.

The Select Committee boggled at recommending a diminution of powers in the case of county boroughs, some few of which had enjoyed that status since the Middle Ages. Accordingly, they recommend that no county borough should be deprived of its right to maintain a separate police force; but they express the opinion that voluntary agreements between counties and county boroughs should be encouraged. (It is to be feared that these county boroughs will require more than 'encouragement'!) The Committee go further, and recommend that where such mergers take place, statutory provision should be made for securing representation of the borough police authority on the standing joint committee of the county. With regard to the non-county boroughs, the Select Committee recommend that the limit of population for the maintenance of a separate police force should be raised from 10,000 to 30,000. This, of course, is a step in advance; but it does not carry matters far enough if much is to be achieved in the way of increased efficiency and economy. Certainly the £75,000 to £100,000 hoped for by the Home Office cannot be secured on these lines. This is more apparent when it is borne in mind that there was complete unanimity between the Committee itself and everybody concerned that where compensation became necessary for loss of office there should be statutory provision for such compensation to be assessed not only on adequate, but on generous lines. However, disappointment at the minute step forward recommended must not blind us to the fact that it is a step in the right direction, and in itself amounts to a recognition of the desirability of the principle of amalgamation. The fact that it is only the thin end of the wedge, rather than a clear cut, provides little solace to those interests which were anxious that the Select Committee should recommend a final decision one way or the other, so as to put an end to the uncertainty which has enshrouded the question for years past. The word 'finality' is not embodied in the spirit of the recommendations of the Select Committee. They are rather a nibble—an augury of more sweeping reforms to come.

Considerable evidence of a conflicting character was tendered as to the respective efficiency of county and borough forces, especially in detective work. Much of this evidence was of an amusingly explosive character—too explosive to be convincing. It is obvious that detective methods, and the intensity of their application, must vary in some aspects as between urban and rural areas. In a large urban area there is every justification for keeping a staff exclusively occupied in detective duties. The same justification does not exist in a purely rural area. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to assume that the rural area is inefficient in this respect. It is customary in most county forces

for certain personnel to have training in detective technique, either at Scotland Yard or at other suitable centres, although in their own area there may not be sufficient crime of a nature to justify their exclusive employment on such duties. It is not by any means an unheard-of thing for the village constable to have undergone a course of training in detective technique; nor must that training be regarded as wasted because he still performs the duties of a village constable. It is the avowed aim of the Home Secretary to improve, and even standardise, the technique in crime detection throughout the police services, and to secure the introduction of up-to-date methods wherever they do not exist at present—however remote the locality. It is evident, therefore, that the larger the area of the police units, the greater will be the efficiency in crime detection, because of the enhanced justification for specialising in this branch of work, and because of the greater resultant facilities for training in up-to-date methods.

One of the advantages claimed for the merging of the smaller forces was the resultant lessening of the number of police boundaries throughout the country. Theoretically, the existence of boundaries between one police area and another does not lessen efficiency; but in practice it is found to do so. Crossing any boundary is always the occasion for a slackening of speed; and this slackening is as inevitable in the pursuit of criminals as it is in anything else—and, what is more, pursued motor bandits bank on the fact. Then it is also inevitable that chief constables in smaller areas should divide crime into two categories, 'home' and 'foreign,' the former being crimes originating within their own borders, and the latter being of origin in a neighbouring or distant police area. Under existing conditions it is natural (although undesirable) that chief constables of small forces should succumb to the temptation of concentrating more intensively on the 'clearing up' of crimes of local origin. They work under watch committees, who, as a rule, while quite keen themselves about local law and order, are inclined to be lethargic about crime of 'foreign' origin. In fact, they are frequently the reverse of enthusiastic about spending local rates on such work. Too frequently their horizon is limited, and their keenness is parochial rather than national. It will be realised, therefore, that with a chief constable so circumstanced the 'clearing up' of local crime is a matter which affects his prestige with the watch committee; but the same incentive is absent when it comes to dealing with 'foreign' crime. Now, serious crime, in these days, assumes national proportions, and its perpetrators are keenly alive to the advantages of transporting themselves (frequently in a stolen car!) to the comparatively safe haven to be found within the boundaries of a small police unit administered with such a lack

of national outlook. In such cases the detective organisation, if existent at all, is too crude to cope with the wide experience of the 'swell mobsmen.' Were the unit to become part of a larger administrative area, pervaded by a more national spirit, and with the advantage of participating in more up-to-date detective training (and larger opportunities for its practice), there would be a great advance in efficiency. On the other hand, the parochially minded would point out—and did point out to the Select Committee—that their chief constable (as such) would disappear, and that the police powers of the watch committee itself would cease. Clearly the choice is between securing efficiency and economy and preserving the retention of the watch committee's police powers, plus an official with the status of a chief constable. Another angle of the choice to be made is the retention of an expensive headquarters organisation and premises, as against the lower cost of a branch organisation which would at least be as efficient, and which, as part of a more widely flung organisation, should be infinitely more efficient.

Roughly speaking, there are three types of police force in England and Wales—the Metropolitan Police, with its twenty odd thousand men under the direct control of the Home Secretary, the county constabulary forces, and the borough forces. In an ideal world, and if all police forces had to be established *de novo*, it is probable that we should get a national police force on the Metropolitan model. But for practical purposes that ideal may be dismissed at once as unattainable. Vested interests have grown up in the matter of police forces (as has been pointed out already), and the best we can hope for is to tinker as satisfactorily as possible with existing conditions. Indeed, the Home Office specifically disavows any intention of setting to work with a national force as its ideal. That would probably be crying for the moon; but the department frankly avows that the only hope to avoid nationalisation is to embark on amalgamations. The borough forces are senior to the county forces by at least four years. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 required the watch committee of every borough to appoint a sufficient number of fit men to be borough constables; while it was not until 1839 that the justices in quarter sessions were authorised to raise a police force for the county, and even then the duty did not become obligatory until 1856. Of course, many boroughs had voluntarily provided police forces before it became obligatory in 1835. The management and discipline of the county and borough forces is fundamentally different; and this fact is the basis of quite a volume of the opposition to amalgamation. In the counties the chief constable is invested with the powers of an autocrat in appointing, removing, and dismissing the rank and file; and only

in the event of dismissal are his powers subject to appeal—an appeal to the Home Secretary. In the boroughs, roughly speaking, the watch committees control the police. Under them the chief constable is responsible for discipline; but his decisions are not operative until confirmed by the watch committee—a condition of affairs highly prized by the borough constables. Now, in the event of a borough force being merged into that of a county, the men's witnesses all emphasised their objections to coming under the autocratic powers of the county chief constable, although no evidence was forthcoming as to the harsh use of such powers. The Select Committee were much impressed by the strength of the feeling on this matter, and considered it would be unfair to deprive members of merged forces of what the Report describes as 'their existing right of appeal.' (As a matter of fact, the personnel of all forces, county or borough, possess the right of appeal to the Home Secretary in the case of dismissal.) In referring to 'the right of appeal' to watch committees the Select Committee were labouring under a misunderstanding. There is no such thing—at any rate, technically. Legally, the watch committees themselves are the disciplinary bodies for borough forces, not the chief constables. Any disciplinary recommendation of a chief constable in a borough has no force until his recommendation is confirmed by the watch committee, whose decision it is. Therefore, the only 'right of appeal' possessed by the personnel of a borough force is from the watch committee to the Home Secretary in the case of dismissal. The disciplinary powers of the watch committees are as absolute as those possessed by the chief constables in the counties.

The Select Committee 'recognised that it would be impracticable to have men serving in the same force with different rights in the matter of discipline.' They recommended, therefore, that in any case where the police force of a borough is merged in that of a county the members of the county force should have the right of appeal against the decision of the chief constable in matters of discipline to the standing joint committee, or to a sub-committee appointed by that body for the purpose. In view of the disciplinary recommendations of the Desborough Committee, it is scarcely likely that the Home Secretary will adopt the Select Committee's recommendation on this matter. It will probably be informing at this point to quote from the Desborough Committee's Report on disciplinary matters:

We have already described in the First Part of our Report the special nature of the obligations to the community which a policeman undertakes when he joins the Police Service. These obligations can only be discharged by the strictest attention to duty, a high standard of conduct and the subordination of personal considerations to the interests of the Service

and of the community on the part of all ranks. In a service such as the police it is essential that a high standard of discipline should be maintained, and that irregularities of conduct which would not be noticed in other employments should be the subject of disciplinary treatment. Otherwise the police would be unable to retain the public confidence, and the proper performance of their duties would become impossible. But good discipline involves both loyal obedience to all orders of superior officers and a just, considerate and impartial treatment of subordinates; and we regard the maintenance of a sound esprit de corps and relations of mutual confidence between the various ranks as one of the principal tests of the efficient management of a police force. We think these considerations have been fully recognised by the great majority of the witnesses who gave evidence before us on behalf of the various ranks of the police, and such complaints as have been made in matters of discipline (and the complaints have been very few) have been concerned mainly with points of detail.

In matters of discipline, as in various other matters to which we have drawn attention, we find different systems in the County and the Borough Police. In the County Police in England and Wales the Chief Constable is the sole disciplinary authority, and can punish by fine (not exceeding one week's pay), by reduction in pay, reduction in rank or dismissal, and there is no appeal against his individual decision. In the Borough Forces the Watch Committee is the disciplinary authority: the Chief Constable has no disciplinary powers of his own, and if the Watch Committee delegate to him authority to punish for minor offences his decision has no effect until confirmed by the Watch Committee. In some of the larger boroughs disciplinary powers are delegated to the Chief Constable, and his decisions, in the absence of an appeal, are confirmed as a matter of course, but in others the cases are dealt with by the Watch Committee as a Court of First Instance, and in some forces disciplinary matters, such as the punishment of a constable, are brought before the Town Council and become matters of public discussion at their meetings. In Scotland the system is different, and disciplinary powers are vested in the Chief Constable in both county and burgh forces.

We have heard a good deal of evidence as to the relative advantages of these respective systems. We consider that the divided authority which results from a constable being under the orders of the Chief Constable but subject to the Watch Committee for purposes of discipline is very undesirable; and we are strongly of opinion that the public discussion of the delinquencies of individual constables before the Watch Committee or the Town Council is prejudicial to discipline. If such matters are dealt with by an elected Committee there is risk of members of the Committee being canvassed by or on behalf of the constable concerned, or their being influenced by personal matters which have arisen between themselves and the police. Though the risk of irregularities will be greater in the small boroughs than in the large city forces, the principal objections are inherent in the system, and we recommend that, subject to . . . a right of appeal against dismissal, disciplinary authority over all lower ranks should be vested in the Chief Constables in the borough forces in England and Wales, as well as in the county forces and all forces in Scotland.

Another fear that was expressed generally by the witnesses of

the Police Federation and other witnesses was that men who have joined borough forces because they wish to serve in a particular town, or who have purchased (or are purchasing) houses in the expectation that the whole of their service would be spent in a particular district, might become subject to arbitrary removal in the event of amalgamation. Generally speaking, this fear—although a very natural and even proper one—does not appear to be based on inherent probabilities. Chief constables are not likely to embark on a policy of removing men arbitrarily from one locality to another for the mere sake of removing them. A man who has spent many years in a town force has acquired skill in a largely different type of duties from those required in a rural area, and such skill takes time to acquire. He is acquainted with traffic control, and with any local by-laws that may be peculiar to that town, besides knowing the town and its people. To place him in a village would be to entail his learning a different set of duties under different conditions and surroundings, and acquiring the necessary knowledge to administer the duties which fall to a rural constable—under the Diseases of Animals Act, to mention only one branch. Therefore, removals of that character are inherently improbable—at any rate, on a large or wanton scale. These men have another claim to consideration if any serious danger existed: in many cases their families have had, or are having, an education suitable for a town career, and it is easier to find jobs in the towns for young people than it is in the country. The Select Committee have with much wisdom recommended that these town constables should be safeguarded in such matters.

A point which loomed largely before the Select Committee, although it scarcely came within their terms with ^{reference} ~~to~~ ^{the} ~~dis~~ ^{service} ~~satisfaction~~ amongst all ranks in ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{thumended} ~~the~~ ^{which} ~~caused~~ by the appointment of ^{of} ~~a~~ ^{of} ~~borough~~ ^{previous} ~~police~~ ^{experience} as chief constables. Such appointments in the past have been more characteristic of the county than the borough forces. The Police Regulations, if observed, now deal adequately with the point; but the Select Committee expressed the opinion that, unless the spirit of those regulations is adhered to in the future more strictly than it appears to have been in the past, the advantages to be gained from their general recommendations will in some degree be counterbalanced by the dissatisfaction in the service. Put baldly, there were complaints in the course of the evidence of the practice in the counties of appointing retired naval and military officers to the position of chief constable, and much evidence of a conflicting character was heard as to the suitability of these gentlemen. People are never so virtuous as when attacking nepotism! The Select Committee went on to recommend, in

order that there may be an adequate supply of candidates from the police forces with proper qualifications for the higher posts within the service, that steps should be taken to organise the discovery of administrative capacity within the service by the selection and training of suitable men. Evidently the Select Committee are not blind to the advantages of securing chief constables who have become accustomed to the habit of command; but they desire to ensure that before they command in the police forces they shall first have had police training. It would not be surprising if the Home Office welcomes this recommendation as strengthening its hands, for training for the higher positions has been one of the department's problems for some time past. The difficulty has been to secure the necessary funds; and the excellent idea of establishing a training college has had to be postponed indefinitely on financial grounds.

So inconclusive have been the findings of the Select Committee on 'merger' that the Home Secretary will probably not think it worth while embarking on legislation on that subject until he also has before him the recommendations of the projected Departmental Committee. He will then be in a position to frame an omnibus Bill embodying the approved recommendations of the Departmental Committee, and at the same time deal with the 'merger' problem from the point of view of police administration as a whole. It is abundantly clear that the time is ripe, and even over-ripe, for reconditioning the framework of our police services on comprehensive lines, so as to free them from any shackles which may be found to impede them in waging a ruthless warfare on the denizens of the under-world. The primary responsibility for taking such steps will be the Home Secretary's; but, unless the passion of the Anglo-Saxon race for enforcing law and order has sapped, ^{h^h to} ~~h^h to~~ ^{rd a good} ~~rd a good~~ ^{ly} ~~ly~~ ^{upon} ~~upon~~ the whole-hearted backing of the nation, both ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{items} ~~items~~. We ^{ncially} ~~ncially~~ in any measures that he can demonstrate are necessary ^{under} ~~under~~ to achieve the end in view.

H. W. J. STONE.

MEDICAL LANDMARKS OF THE LAST TWENTY YEARS

THE recent centenary of the British Medical Association—in its essence an association of general practitioners—has demonstrated once more the immense number of sciences that have become germane to modern medicine. The avenues of medical research have become so divergent, indeed, and its ancillary sciences so numerous, that it has necessarily become difficult for the worker in any one of them to criticise results obtained in the others. Some of the ablest of our senior bacteriologists, for example, would probably be the first to admit and lament a comparative ignorance of biochemistry. In their student days it simply did not exist as a subject for routine instruction. It is not a point that need be laboured, though many examples could be quoted. But the result is a natural tendency by the experts in any particular branch of medicine to exaggerate or minimise the achievements recorded by others, of which their knowledge is less intimate—the universal importance, let us say, of the latest modification in radiological or serological technique. Ultimately, however, as the centenary meetings have shown, all these research-workers and specialists are ranged behind the man at the bedside—the general practitioner, with his unequalled experience of practical daily-life results. Too busy to read very much and certainly to remain acquainted with the masses of material thronging the hundred special journals, it is he, of all men, who is in the closest living touch with the fruits of research as translated into terms of human activity. It is he who remains, therefore, the best judge as to what is or is not a medical landmark; and for him it is something that, in its particular sphere, means that text-books have to be rewritten, and that compels him, for the sake of his practice, to turn aside and master it.

It is an exigent test, and it is all the more remarkable that, in so short a period as twenty years, there should have been at least five advances in medicine that may reasonably be said to have fulfilled these conditions. None of them has been so dramatic, perhaps, as a single event, as the coming of anæsthesia

or antiseptis, but each has definitely, and by now demonstrably, marked an epoch in the treatment of disease. Chronologically, though like every medical discovery they have all had an ancestry of previous experiment and observation, they are the introduction of neosalvarsan in 1912 for the treatment of syphilis; the modern and intensive study and appreciation of vitamins, that may be said to have begun at about the same time; the discovery of susceptibility tests for diphtheria and scarlet fever in 1913 and 1924 respectively, and the immunity work upon these and other common fevers that has since resulted; the discovery of insulin in the treatment of diabetes in 1922; and the discovery of the raw-liver treatment for pernicious anæmia in 1927.

Such has been the harvest of twenty years, though other and greater achievements may well be in the womb, and it will perhaps be convenient to consider first those that rank more strictly as advances in actual treatment. Behind Ehrlich's introduction in 1912 of neosalvarsan for the treatment of syphilis there were the events of seven previous years. In 1905 Fritz Schaudinn, the brilliant son of an East Prussian innkeeper, discovered the organism responsible for syphilis, which he termed the *Spirochæta pallida*. A year later August von Wassermann, a Jewish professor, who had been a pupil of Koch, the discoverer of the tubercle bacillus, and who afterwards became director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Experimental Therapeutics at Dahlem, near Berlin, devised the blood test for the presence of syphilis that has since made his name a medical household word. It is a reaction due to the presence in the blood of a substance that has been caused by the infective agent, and it is demonstrable, in certain stages of the disease, in practically 100 per cent. of cases. Meanwhile Paul Ehrlich, a Jew born in Silesia, was already one of the outstanding figures in histological and physiological research. By his work on the staining of living tissues, including the staining reactions of the tubercle bacillus and his theory of immunity, he was known throughout the medical world. And when Schaudinn announced the discovery of the organism responsible for syphilis, he set himself to the task of devising a means of destroying it by mass attack. This was in accordance with his belief that there was a specific affinity between different organisms and various chemical substances; and his object was to find something sufficiently toxic to kill every spirochæte in the body by one large injection into the blood stream, which should yet be innocuous to the patient.

It was a difficult and dangerous task to evolve this *therapia magna sterilisma*, but at his 606th attempt he produced an arsenical compound, briefly known as salvarsan, that seemed to fulfil the purpose. That was in 1910, and its entrance was in

the highest degree dramatic. In case after case its injection into the veins produced changes that appeared almost miraculous. Disfiguring rashes and ulcers, that had hitherto resisted the orthodox treatment, or were yielding to it but slowly, vanished within a period measurable by hours; and it quickly became evident that a new era had opened in the routine treatment of syphilis. But salvarsan, or 606, as it was called, had certain grave disadvantages. It was difficult to prepare. It was by no means fool-proof; and, owing to its toxicity, there were a few casualties. Ehrlich therefore set out to discover a modification, both simpler to use and less dangerous, and after another 308 experiments produced in 1912 the preparation known as 914, or neosalvarsan. This is a powder that can be dissolved in distilled water, and though not so abruptly effective as the original salvarsan it was found to be very nearly so, and has become, with various slight alterations, the first and most powerful weapon against the disease. That it has not fulfilled all Ehrlich's hopes must of course be admitted. Spirochaetes that had already ensconced themselves in the deeper tissues were not, as it was discovered, destroyed at the first assault; and the treatment has become longer than was at first thought necessary and is usually reinforced by one of the older remedies. But it has nevertheless altered the whole aspect of a justly dreaded disease as well as revealing many other possibilities in the way of intravenous medication.

If the chief credit for this great advance in the etiology, detection, and cure of syphilis must thus be assigned to Germany, it is to Canada that we owe the immense boon that has been conferred by insulin. Diabetes, as is generally known, is a disorder of the bodily functions, whereby the blood becomes overloaded with sugar. This is due to an interference with the normal mechanism, whereby the sugar absorbed from the food, notably the carbohydrates, is no longer converted into its active form and stored as glycogen in the liver, where it forms one of the chief sources of muscular energy. As a result the body wastes and becomes enfeebled, and the unaltered accumulating sugar in the blood is associated with toxic products usually leading to coma and ultimate death. Though in its less severe forms, and especially in more elderly people, it could be held in check by a restricted diet, this meant a considerable curtailment both of comfort and bodily activity; and in its severer forms, and especially in the young, it was generally rapidly fatal. Such was the position before the discovery of insulin, the culminating triumph of a long series of investigations. It was in 1899 that Oscar Minkowsky, a Russian, and Joseph von Mering, a German, demonstrated that the responsible organ was the pancreas.

They found that total extirpation of this organ in animals invariably produced diabetes, while the retention in the body of as little as one-fifth of the pancreas was sufficient to prevent it. Long before this, the pancreas was known to be the source of powerful digestive juices, an external secretion poured into the intestine by means of the pancreatic duct. The question therefore arose as to which portion of the organ was associated with the alteration and natural absorption of sugar; and in 1916 Schäfer suggested that it was the little congregations of cells known as the islands of Langerhans. He deduced in these the existence of a specific internal secretion or hormone, to which he gave the appropriate name of insulin.

There then followed a period in which various workers tried to isolate this substance, and preparations of pancreas were tried unsuccessfully in the treatment of experimental diabetes. Ultimately this ill-success was attributed to the action of the other powerful digestive secretions of the pancreas, which destroyed the hormone, if indeed it existed, in the islands of Langerhans. Meanwhile it had been observed that, after ligation of the pancreatic duct, while the rest of the pancreas quickly degenerated, the islands of Langerhans remained apparently unaffected. And it was a young Canadian, F. G. Banting, who first suggested that this phenomenon might be utilised in the isolation of the desired hormone or internal secretion. If time were given for the rest of the pancreas to degenerate, the contents of the still intact islands of Langerhans might thus, he thought, be successfully isolated. Banting, a young graduate of Toronto University, who was only qualified in 1916 and won his Military Cross in the war, had drifted into research from a general medical practice in London, Ontario. He was largely inspired by the work and teaching of J. J. R. McLeod, now Regius Professor of Physiology at the University of Aberdeen, but then Professor of Physiology at Toronto; and it was in association with C. H. Best, J. B. Collip, Campbell, Fletcher, and other workers that he carried through the series of investigations destined to save so many lives. Obtaining insulin by the means he had so brilliantly divined, he was able, by injecting it into a dog suffering from diabetes, to keep the animal alive and well for a period of seventy days. The experiment was repeated. Other dogs were kept alive and in health for indefinite periods; and finally a boy suffering from severe diabetes was treated with a similar result.

Banting and his fellow-workers thus felt themselves justified in making a definite announcement, and in 1922 insulin was ushered into the world of medicine. From the very beginning there was no doubt as to its supreme importance. Observers

everywhere quickly confirmed its value to their own patients. It enabled them to eat food previously forbidden with no ill effect upon their blood-sugar and with an immediate and immense access of general comfort, well-being, and energy. Though it did not cure them, it provided them from outside with the vital agent lacking in themselves, and by its means they were not only saved from death but restored to a life of comparatively normal activity. There remained the problem, of course, of its manufacture; and the original slow and cumbrous method of obtaining it has since been replaced—again chiefly thanks to the work of Banting, Collip, and their group of Canadian colleagues—by a successful method of extraction with alcohol. Based upon its reaction upon the blood-sugar of a rabbit under constant conditions of size and diet, a standardised unit has been set up; and this has been co-related, as the result of further research, with a definite amount in weight of powdered insulin.

No less remarkable, though in a more restricted field, has been the discovery of the action of raw liver tissue upon the condition known as pernicious anæmia. This discovery, too, has come from America, but from workers in the United States, and its triumph has been as instantly and generally confirmed as that of insulin in diabetes. Though pernicious anæmia, as it is called, had been previously observed and described, it was Dr. Addison, of Guy's Hospital, who may be said to have put it on the medical map in the year 1849. Later it was described again independently by Professor Biermer, of Zurich, who labelled it with its present name, but regarded it rather as a condition associated with several diseases than a disease in itself. When Ehrlich's work, however, on the staining of vital tissues opened up new fields in the microscopy of blood conditions, it was discovered that Addison had been right. The blood-picture of pernicious anæmia was entirely characteristic and differed in essential particulars from that of other anæmias. Briefly it was a picture that showed a reduction of the normal number of red blood corpuscles—from four and a half to five millions in a cubic millimetre—to a million or even less, and the presence in the blood stream of a large number of immature and ineffective red blood corpuscles in every stage of development. Patients suffering from the disease exhibited, as a consequence of this, extreme and growing pallor and debility; and although it was a malady of remissions, it inevitably terminated in the patient's death. Whether this was due, as many observers believed, to an excessive destruction of the red corpuscles, or to some interference with their normal manufacture, was a debatable and undecided point.

It was clear, at any rate, that although there were many lines of treatment, none was permanently effective; and the

observations that have led to the triumphs secured by the liver diet were originally made in another connexion. In 1920 and the following years G. H. Whipple, of the University of Rochester, U.S.A., was working with colleagues on the effect of various foodstuffs upon the recovery of dogs after severe losses of blood. And in their restoration to health from this secondary or accidental anæmia, they had shown the ingestion of raw beef and liver to be particularly effective. This and similar work by other American observers led G. P. Minot and W. P. Murphy, working at Boston under the auspices of Harvard University, to try the effect of raw liver upon certain cases of pernicious anæmia. The results were immediate and astonishing, and they were able to report in 1917 upon 125 cases of typical pernicious anæmia treated over periods extending from three months to three years. Where there had been no intercurrent complications they had met with constant and uniform success. As the result of administering half a pound of raw, or very lightly cooked, liver a day they found that they could raise the number of corpuscles per cubic millimetre, in their worst cases, from one and a half millions to nearly three and a half millions in an average period of a month, and that by the end of from four to six months the normal number was reached and could be maintained. Concurrently with this, their patients gained colour and strength and were able to resume their ordinary everyday lives.

The work of Minot and Murphy has also thrown fresh light on the basic character of the disease, which now seems clearly to be a matter of the abnormal production rather than excessive destruction of red blood corpuscles. And it has become evident that, whether it originates there or not, the liver contains a substance that controls their normal manufacture. This has been confirmed by the work of their colleague E. J. Cohn, who has successfully isolated a liver fraction, soluble in water and able to produce the same results, if not quite so effectively, as the whole liver itself. The exact chemical or biological nature of this has not yet been determined. But for practical purposes the Minot-Murphy diet has established itself all over the world. As is the case with insulin, it is not a cure in the strict sense of the word. But it gives the sufferer the normal and necessary agent that his own tissues lack, and its advent has already been reflected in the mortality tables.

So much for advances in definite treatment that the last twenty years have witnessed; and the other two landmarks may be more particularly assigned, perhaps, to the no less important sphere of prevention. Of these the discovery of the substances known as vitamins is undoubtedly by far the most widely known, and it would be impossible to enumerate here, let alone describe,

the vast number of experiments that have established our knowledge of them. That certain diseases could be influenced by particular foodstuffs had, of course, already long been known. Experience had shown, for instance, that scurvy could be prevented or cured by the addition of fruits and green vegetables to the diet of sailors and explorers—a precaution, as it is interesting to remember, advised by Gilbert the Englishman, one of the two English physicians mentioned by name in the prologue to Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*. But probably the immediate source of the recent great advance in our knowledge of the relationships of diet to what are known as the deficiency diseases were the investigations begun at the end of the last century into the disease known as beri-beri.

This is a condition peculiarly associated with the rice-eating peoples of the East, its principal features being an extreme languor and debility, accompanied by an affection of the nerves known as polyneuritis, and sometimes by paralysis and dropsy. Thanks to the observations of such early investigators as Professor Christian Eijkman, of Amsterdam, it was eventually discovered that the disease only occurred when polished rice—rice deprived of its natural coverings—was the staple diet. And, like not a few of outstanding medical discoveries, it was due, in the first instance, to a rather amusing accident. Eijkman had been sent out as a young man on a Dutch commission to study beri-beri, which was then assumed to be probably of a bacterial origin. After the return of the commission, he remained in Batavia as the director of a laboratory, and needing some fowls for an investigation, he found it economical to feed them on scraps of food discarded from the wards of the hospital to which he was attached. These scraps consisted chiefly of polished rice, and presently the fowls developed a condition of local paralysis and neuritis. The director of the hospital became annoyed and forbade the further use of hospital scraps, whereupon the fowls recovered and their successors remained healthy, and ultimately Eijkman identified the condition from which they had suffered with that of beri-beri in human beings.

It was later found that upon a diet of whole rice this never appeared, and that patients suffering from it immediately began to improve when whole rice was substituted for the decorticated rice upon which they had previously been existing. And it was by such a substitution that Takaki succeeded in abolishing beri-beri—formerly one of its chief scourges—from the Japanese navy. The underlying reason for this, however, was not understood. Eijkman at first believed that the disease must be due to some poison in the polished rice, of which the natural antidote was contained in the husk. But in 1911 Casimir Funk, working

at the Lister Institute, showed that the symptoms of beri-beri could also be produced upon an artificial diet of pure carbohydrates in which rice was not included. It was not the presence, therefore, of a poison, but the absence of some vital factor, that appeared to be responsible; and soon afterwards he succeeded in making an extract from rice coverings that was able to correct the condition. Though it evidently contained the specific factor, this extract was afterwards shown to be a mixture of substances. But Funk was the coiner of the word 'vitamine'—the *e* was subsequently dropped—which thus made its entrance into the medical world just twenty years ago.

Meanwhile a large number of new observations were being made upon the effects of artificial and restricted diets—a work in which Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins, who shared with Christian Eijkman in 1929 the Nobel prize for medicine, was one of the chief pioneers in this country. Thanks to the researches of such workers as the Mellanbys at Sheffield, Professor Plimmer, Colonel Robert McCarrison of the Pasteur Institute at Coonor, in South India, Dr. Bourdillon of the National Institute of Medical Research, Professor Windaus of Göttingen, and many others, at least six of these specific vital factors, or vitamins, are now known to exist. For the sake of convenience they have been given an alphabetical nomenclature, and already a great deal has been learned about them. Vitamin A, from which vitamin D was disentangled about ten years ago, is typically found in cod-liver oil and other fish oils, in butter and cheese, the yolks of eggs, and in a lesser degree in green vegetables. It has become known as the anti-infective vitamin, and Colonel McCarrison has recently shown that it is particularly associated with the functional health of the superficial cells of the body, both within and without. Thus colonies of rats fed upon a diet from which this vitamin was absent were not only peculiarly liable to bacterial invasions, but developed enlarged tonsils and adenoids and, in some cases, gastric ulcers. Chemical research has also proved it to be closely associated with carotene, which appears to become its precursor in the human body.

Vitamins B₁ and B₂ are the anti-neuritic or anti-beri-beri and anti-pellagra vitamins respectively, pellagra being characteristically a southern European disease, associated with severe indigestion and skin changes. They are typically to be found in yeast, the germ of cereals, and to a lesser degree in the yolks of eggs and fresh fruit and vegetables. Their chemical composition and closest chemical affinities are not yet known. Vitamin C is the anti-scurvy vitamin and exists in fresh fruits and vegetables, and most abundantly in the juice of oranges and lemons. Though it has not yet been definitely isolated, work

on its composition, undertaken in Scandinavia, is said to have very nearly, if not actually, solved the problem.

Vitamin D, which, like vitamin A, is most richly to be found in cod-liver oil and other fish oils, is peculiarly associated with healthy growth, and especially with that of the bones and teeth. It is the anti-rickets vitamin, and it seems probable that its artificial synthesis has now been achieved. About four years ago it was discovered that there was a constituent in the above group of food substances which could be converted into vitamin D by the action of sunlight or ultra-violet rays. This constituent, apparently the precursor of the vitamin, was identified almost concurrently by Windaus in Germany and Rosenheim and Webster in England as ergosterol. Further work upon this by Dr. Bourdillon and his colleagues and Professor Windaus in Germany has now led to a second simultaneous discovery of what appears to be the vitamin itself, a dinitro-benzoate, to which in this country the name of calciferol has been tentatively given.

Vitamin E, of whose chemical composition very little is at present known, appears to be associated with the reproductive function, and is chiefly contained in olive oil, peanut oil, and the oil expressed from wheat germ. But it is an important fact to note that all these vitamins have been shown to be contained in milk.

As a result of this whole body of achievement food purveyors and manufacturers all over the world have been compelled to examine and revise their methods, and it would be difficult to exaggerate the potential effects of this upon the general future health of the human race.

Finally there is the work that the last twenty years have witnessed upon the common infectious fevers of childhood, notably diphtheria, scarlet fever, and measles. The bacillus of diphtheria has now become, of course, a relatively old discovery, and the antitoxin treatment, which has for many years been based upon it, has revolutionised the treatment and immensely reduced the mortality of this once dreaded and often fatal disease. In 1913, however, a test was devised by Professor Bela Schick, of Vienna, which has enabled the susceptibility to diphtheria to be gauged beforehand. A minute amount of the diphtheria toxin is injected under the skin, and in susceptible subjects a small and harmless local reaction becomes apparent within a few days. So extensive has been the work done upon this test that certain conclusions may now be accepted. Up to the age of six months most infants are naturally immune from the disease. From six months to five years 90 per cent. of children become susceptible. But from the age of five this percentage progressively declines as adult life is

approached, probably owing to an unconscious immunity having been acquired by small and unrecognised infections of the bacillus. Thanks to the Schick test, it has now become possible, by means of injecting a small quantity of diphtheria toxin, deprived of its virulence by the addition of formalin, to stimulate the production of antibodies in the blood-stream, and thus to confer an active and probably permanent immunity against the disease itself. In large institutions where children are living together this preventive measure has already proved its value, and there can be no doubt of its large, if not routine, extension in years to come.

With regard to scarlet fever, the last twenty years have seen a similar advance. Its causal agent that so long baffled discovery is now definitely regarded as being a specific hæmolytic streptococcus, and founded upon this, a test was introduced in 1924 by two American investigators, Drs. George and Gladys Dick, comparable with the Schick test in diphtheria. Here again a minute dose of diluted scarlet fever toxin is injected into the skin, and is followed in susceptible cases by a brief but quite recognisable local reaction. As in the case of diphtheria, observations with this test have shown that the majority of children over the age of six months are susceptible to scarlet fever, the percentage declining as adult life is reached. Thanks to the researches of the Dicks and others, immunising doses of scarlet fever toxin can now be given as a preventive measure. Four or five such doses are injected at weekly intervals, and in the majority of cases it has been found that immunity is complete at the end of a month and is of many years' duration. Indeed, it was found in Dairen, where such active immunisation has been extensively practised, that the incidence of scarlet fever cases fell from 43 per 1000 in 1925 to 1 per 1000 in 1930.

More recent still is the similar and very promising work that has been made upon measles. In this case the causal agent has not yet been established, and therefore susceptibility tests, based upon a toxin derived from it, have not become possible. But it has been shown by experiment that the blood-serum of convalescent patients, when injected with suitable precautions, has been able to confer a passive immunity lasting for several weeks. The importance of this in schools and hospitals where an outbreak may have occurred need not be stressed; and in a recent series of 625 cases, quoted by Drs. Nabarro and Signy, of the Hospital for Sick Children, Great Ormond Street, it was found that 613 were completely protected, and in only one of the cases in which measles subsequently developed was the attack at all severe. These findings were confirmed in another and independent series observed by Dr. W. Gunn, of the Park Fever Hospital, Lewisham,

who was able to report complete protection in 95 per cent. of his cases.

Though this work on the common fevers of childhood has not yet reached the stage of general domestic application, there can be little doubt that this will eventually follow; and since there lies in it the promise of relegating to the past what are now usually accepted as inevitable visitations, it seems fairly entitled to rank amongst the landmarks registered by medicine during the years under review.

H. H. BASHFORD.

THE INDUS CIVILISATION¹

EVER since 1862, when the Archæological Survey of India was first instituted, excavations carried out in all parts of India had revealed a continuous and progressive civilisation of which the earliest structural monuments could be assigned to the Mauryan period—*i.e.*, the middle of the third century B.C. It was, however, obvious that long before this a highly developed and flourishing civilisation must have existed for hundreds of years, though of the monuments erected during that period no example had survived, save, perhaps, the cyclopean walls of the old city of Rajagriha, a city reputed to have been abandoned by King Bimbisara, the contemporary of the Buddha. Nothing whatever had been recovered which could, even with probability, be referred to the Vedic Age, which was believed to have resulted from the Aryan conquest of about the middle of the second millennium B.C. This strange scarcity of material evidence of the Vedic culture after sixty years of archæological research was believed to be due to the custom of building in wood, as well as to the destructive Indian climate, which, assisted by the ravages of white ants, obliterates everything of a perishable nature. Of the possible existence of structural remains of the pre-Aryan period no idea had been entertained, as it had always been supposed that the pre-Aryan peoples of India were black-skinned, flat-nosed barbarians on an altogether lower plane of civilisation than their Aryan conquerors, and that, in its simplest terms, 'the earliest history of India was the story of the struggle between two widely different types of civilisation, an unequal contest between metal and stone.'

Until the year 1922 there was nothing to disturb this belief, as all archæological material in India, with one exception, fell into place in one long chain of development, and it was rarely that jewellery, sculpture, and even bricks, could not be assigned with certainty to the Mauryan, Indo-Greek, Indo-Scythian, Kushan, Gupta, or succeeding periods. Those exceptional

¹ *Mohenjo-daro and the Indus Civilization*. Edited by Sir John Marshall, late Director-General of Archæology in India. Three volumes. (Arthur Probsthain, £12 12s. net.)

antiquities to which no place could be allotted came from a series of mounds at Harappa, in the Montgomery district of the Punjab. They consisted of seals bearing a pictographic script, earthenware goblets and beakers of special form, curious large stone rings, and bricks of a size for which no place could be found in the long and well-documented series from Mauryan to Mughal times. Specimens of these curious seals had been recovered as long ago as 1872; General Sir Alexander Cunningham published several specimens in 1875, and the late Dr. J. F. Fleet wrote a short note on them in 1912,² but their purpose, import, and place in Indian archæology remained enigmatical until 1922. In that year Mr. Banerji, of the Archæological Survey of India, excavating around a Buddhist *stupa* crowning the highest of a group of mounds at Mohenjo-daro, in the Larkana district of Sind, came by chance upon several of these so-called 'Harappa seals.' As it happened, excavation of the Harappa site had been started in the previous year, and sufficient had been revealed to demonstrate that its remains, including its characteristic seals, were referable to the Chalcolithic Age. Mr. Banerji's opportune discovery made it plain that this civilisation was not isolated at Harappa, but had been widespread in the Indus valley, since Mohenjo-daro is situated some 400 miles distant to the south-west. The importance of these discoveries was immediately recognised, and the Mohenjo-daro site has since 1923 been subjected to continuous excavation by a succession of archæological officers under the direction of Sir John Marshall, Director-General of Archæology in India, and the results of their researches from 1923-7 have just appeared in three monumental volumes.

Mohenjo-daro, 'The Mound of the Dead,' is situated 25 miles from Larkana, its precise position being 27° 19' N. by 68° 8' E. The mounds which hide the remains of an ancient city are conspicuous from afar, the highest rising 70 feet above the plain. Although the actual area marked by mounds is now no more than 240 acres, there is little doubt that outlying and lower parts of the city lie buried deep in the alluvium deposited by the Indus during the last 4000 years. Floods, erosion, and the extreme aridity of the climate have all contributed to the denudation of the mounds, furrowing their sides and widening and deepening the depressions marking the ancient streets. The mounds present a most desolate and unprepossessing appearance, as does also the adjacent plain, which is white with salt and sustains little beside dwarf tamarisk, babul, and tussocks of coarse grass. The excavations reveal that the city was intersected by wide, straight thoroughfares, oriented to the cardinal points. One, 35 feet wide, has been traced for a third of a mile, and can accommodate with

² *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1912.

ease a double line of bullock carts, as well as animal traffic and foot passengers. On either side of the streets rose blocks of well-planned buildings, of which no less than seven strata have been already revealed. All these structures, of well-burnt rectangular bricks laid in mud or in mud and gypsum mortar, fall into three main classes—dwelling-houses, buildings of uncertain purpose, and public baths. In all cases the basis of planning was the open courtyard encompassed by chambers, the more pretentious structures having a succession of courtyards. Most buildings of any size had private wells admirably constructed of wedge-shaped bricks. Two very noticeable features are the bathrooms and the drains. The former are invariably carefully paved, and usually have connexion with the street drainage system. Horizontal drains are generally of brick, but vertical ones are of terra-cotta pipes with closely fitting spigot and faucet joints protected by brickwork or built into walls. The terra-cotta pipes bear a close resemblance to those recovered in Crete. Doorways and windows were probably spanned by flat wooden lintels, but corbelled arches may have been used, for these are not uncommon as the covering of drains. No example of a true arch has been found. Rubbish chutes constructed in the thickness of the walls were sometimes provided with a bin on the outside for clearance by scavengers from the street. Although so much attention was paid to conservancy, it is remarkable that the street drains merely discharged into brick cesspits in the open thoroughfares.

But by far the most astonishing of all the buildings unearthed at Mohenjo-daro is the Great Bath, which appears to have been part of a vast hydropathic establishment. In the centre is an open quadrangle with verandahs on the four sides and behind these various galleries and rooms. A large swimming bath 39 feet by 23 feet, sunk 8 feet below the pavement and with a flight of steps at either end, occupied the centre of the quadrangle. The bath was filled from a well in one of the chambers, waste water passing off through a covered drain, of which the corbelled roof is over 6 feet in height. In the construction of this tank every possible precaution was taken to render it at once stable and watertight, the lining being of finely dressed brick laid in gypsum mortar to a depth of several feet. Backing this was a course of bitumen an inch in thickness, then another brick wall, behind which was a packing of sun-dried brick and then the very thick and solid brick outer walls of the structure. The effectiveness of this mode of construction is apparent from the present condition of the tank, which even after the lapse of some 5000 years is wonderfully preserved. Of the elevations of these buildings and the treatment of the *façades* nothing is known, for the walls are entirely unrelieved by mouldings or string-courses.

Carved woodwork may have relieved the bareness, but nothing of this has been preserved and no moulded or carved bricks have been recovered. Roofs were in all probability flat and carried on stout timbers supporting planking or matting covered with beaten earth. A sealing from Harappa portrays a structure with verandah, portico, and pinnacles, but on too small a scale to throw any real light upon the question.

Valuable as is the evidence afforded by the structural remains, the light thrown upon this culture by the antiquities recovered in their clearance is still more important. These include pictographic seals, pottery, statuary, figurines, household utensils, copper tools, weapons and vessels, personal ornaments, games and toys. From these it is plain that the Indus people were acquainted with gold, silver, lead, and tin, though the last has been found only as an alloy of copper. No iron has been recovered, and as flake knives of chert were still in use and copper was the metal from which weapons were made, this culture is designated Chalcolithic. Nevertheless, none of the stone objects from Mohenjo-daro, whether dishes, bowls or weights, can be regarded as typical artifacts of a Stone or Chalcolithic Age, and it would have been impossible to determine their age but for the circumstances in which they were recovered. Weapons comprised axes, spears, daggers, bows, arrows and maces, but of defensive armour there is no trace. The spear heads are noticeably primitive in form, thin and broad in the blade, and lacking a strengthening midrib, and with a tang instead of a socket. Very few copper arrow heads have been found, and of stone arrow heads not a single specimen. Though copper was used for domestic utensils, household needs were generally met by pottery. This is of excellent quality, wheel-made, well-fired, and generally plain, though painted ware is not uncommon. In the latter case the designs are in black on a dark red slip, and this characteristic Indus ware is of a type readily distinguishable from other black and red painted pottery from Baluchistan and adjacent areas. Neither in form nor in decoration is this painted ware at all striking. Nevertheless, its uninspired and routine character is not due to primitiveness, but to countless repetitions of stereotyped motives, as is proved by the fact that potsherds from all the seven strata display such uniformity as to defy discrimination. Other articles of earthenware are spindle whorls, toys, and figurines. Among the toys are rattles, whistles, animal and human figures, birds, and little carts. Some of the animal toys have movable heads; others had been fitted to rods like the familiar 'monkey on a stick.' Whistles sometimes took the form of birds, and toy oxen were yoked to little clay carts. The latter are among the earliest representations of wheeled vehicles. It is

curious to note the entire absence of any objects which can definitely be stated to be lamps, and nothing at all resembling the Indian *chiragh*, the commonest object recovered at all historic sites in India, has come to light. The Emperor Babar's bitter complaint against Hindustan and its inhabitants, 'They have no candles or torches—never a candlestick,' inevitably suggests itself, though possibly with injustice in the case of the Indus people; and equally surprising, seeing that Mohenjo-daro lies in a river valley and, even now, only a few miles from the Indus, is the absence of all representations of boats. Wooden models would naturally have disappeared in the damp and saline soil, but terra-cotta, ivory, faience or metal models might have been expected, or, at least, representations on the seals and painted pottery.

That spinning and weaving were common is evident, from the numerous spindle whorls of terra-cotta and faience found in houses of all classes. A few minute scraps of cloth found adhering to a silver vase proved on expert examination to be cotton, resembling the coarser varieties of present-day Indian cotton. This disposes of the idea that the fine Indian cotton known to the Babylonians as *sindhu* and to the Greeks as *sindon* was a product of the cotton tree and not a true cotton. So few statues have been recovered that we are ill-informed as to the dress of the inhabitants, but males apparently wore a long shawl which left the right shoulder bare. Some of the terra-cotta figurines and a bronze figure of a dancing girl depict both males and females as entirely naked, but it would be as unsafe to assume from this that nudity was general in the Indus period, as it would be to draw a similar conclusion for the Sunga and Kushan periods from the female figures on the Buddhist railing pillars of Bodh Gaya and Mathura. On the question of personal ornaments we are better informed. These were freely worn by all classes, and beautiful specimens of necklaces, armlets, fillets, girdles, earrings and anklets have been recovered in gold, silver, faience, ivory and semi-precious stones, indicating a high level of craftsmanship. Precisely similar ornaments, but in shell, bone, copper, and terra-cotta, were worn by the poorer classes and have been recovered in considerable numbers.

Agriculture appears to have been largely practised, both barley and wheat being grown, the near presence of the great river facilitating irrigation and transport. Whether the hoe had been replaced by the plough is not known. From the skeletal remains, terra-cotta figurines and animals engraved on seals, and copper tablets, it may be inferred that the Indus people had domesticated the humped and short-horned bulls, buffalo, pig, sheep, dog, elephant, and camel. No remains of the horse, which

can be assigned with certainty to the prehistoric period, have been found, the wheeled vehicles being drawn by oxen. To what pitch of excellence these humped bulls had been bred is proved by engravings of them on certain of the seals. It is doubtful whether finer animals are to be found in India to-day. Wild animals known to these people include the tiger, rhinoceros, deer, the *gaur* or Indian bison, monkey, bear, and hare. That trade was organised, and the sale of at least the more precious substances carefully regulated, is indicated by the Indus weights, of which numerous examples have been recovered. Nearly all the small ones are cubes of polished chert, the larger being made of other stones, and generally conical in form. Careful examination has revealed that the ratio of the Indus weights is at first binary, but subsequently decimal—namely, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64; 160, 200, 320, 640, 1600. The most frequently recurring weight with a ratio of 16 has a mean value of 13.71 gm., which bears no relation to either the light Babylonian or the heavy Assyrian shekel.

But the most characteristic antiquities associated with the Indus culture are the engraved press seals. These generally depict in intaglio an animal in profile with a line of pictographs above. On the majority of the seals the animal is apparently a single-horned creature, in front of which is a curious standard-like object. On other seals appear the humped bull, short-horn bull, buffalo, tiger, rhinoceros, elephant, crocodile, and occasionally mythological composite creatures, but these always without the curious standard which accompanies the 'unicorn,' and which is, in all likelihood, a cult object. Although designated 'seals,' their purport is still uncertain, and so far not a single true sealing of any of them on unbaked clay has been found at Mohenjo-daro. The only seal impressions recovered there are on baked clay or faience, and it is suggested that these sealings may have served as amulets. Nevertheless, a clay sealing bearing the figure of a bull and a line of pictographs, obviously an impression from an Indus seal, has been found at Djoka (Umma), in Babylonia, the back of this bearing the impression of what has been taken to be the woven covering of some bale. This impression on the reverse may, however, be due, not to any woven material, but to the impression of a seal with a device of small squares, several specimens of which have been found at Mohenjo-daro. In short, this clay sealing may bear impressions of two Indus seals and have left India in that form unattached to any merchandise.

But important as are these seals as evidence of the artistic achievements of the Indus people and for the light they throw upon the fauna known to them, their supreme interest lies in the pictographic script, which remains at present enigmatical and inscrutable. Though nothing of this script has so far been read, it has been subjected to expert examination by Professor S.

Langdon, Mr. Sidney Smith, and Mr. J. C. Gadd. Of the signs in general, it may be stated that they are pictographic and have not been worn down by use to conventional summaries like the Egyptian hieratic or Babylonian cuneiform. This may be due in part to the material (steatite) upon which they are usually engraved. The signs are probably syllabic with the admixture of some ideograms and, perhaps, determinatives. Extensive use is made in the script of modification and combination of signs. It has been suggested that the inscriptions are personal names, but in any case it does not appear that any connexion exists between the inscription and the animal depicted below it. Professor Langdon is of opinion that the early Indian alphabet known as the *Brahmi Script* is derived from this ancient pictographic writing, and also that there is a definite connexion between the most archaic Sumerian script and the Indus pictographs. The other two scholars, however, find nothing to confirm their faith in any direct connexion between the writing of Sumer and that of the Indus valley. They, like Professor Langdon, have prepared a list of signs which should prove of great assistance to future workers in this field of research, when once the clue to their decipherment is found. Indus seals having been recovered in Mesopotamia, the hope for this clue seems to rest upon the finding in that country of a bilingual record. All three scholars agree that the script is to be read from right to left.

At neither Mohenjo-daro nor Harappa are relics of a religious nature at all abundant, and to none of the numerous structures can any sacred character be assigned. Indeed, the only material evidence on which an idea of the religion of the Indus people can be formed consists of the engraved seals, a few sealings, some copper tablets and figurines, certain stone rings, and a few stone images in the round. Meagre as are these materials, they furnish the only authentic and contemporary evidence touching the religious beliefs of the pre-Aryan inhabitants of the Indus valley, and are a welcome corrective to the hitherto purely speculative conclusions based on later religious texts. In the main the religion appears to have been the worship of a Nature or mother goddess, along with that of a male god. The latter is depicted on a seal as three-faced, seated on a low throne in a typical *yoga* attitude and crowned by a pair of horns and a curiously high headdress, which together resemble a *trisula*. On either side of this deity are two animals—an elephant and tiger to right, a rhinoceros and buffalo to left. Beneath the throne are two deer. Now the prince of *yogis*, no less than the lord of beasts, is Śiva, and two deer are portrayed on many a mediæval image of that god. The distinguishing attributes of this Indus deity proclaim him at least as the prototype of the historic Śiva. If this view be accepted, Saivism has a history going back to the Chalcolithic

Age and is the most ancient living faith in the world. In addition to this god and goddess there appears to have been the worship of trees and tree divinities and of bœtylic and phallic stones, including the *linga* and *yoni*. Certain curious objects, seemingly of a religious character, whose purpose remains at present conjectural, are the ring-stones, found in large numbers at both Mohenjo-daro and Harappa. They range in size from half an inch to 4 feet in diameter, the smaller being of shell, faience, imitation cornelian or stone, the larger specimens of stone only. The more typical have their upper and lower surfaces undulating. The most reasonable explanation of these ring-stones is to be found in the magical properties which holed stones from time immemorial have been supposed to possess, and in the awe in which they are still held in India. Well-known examples of this class of stones are the Śrigundi stone at Malabar Point, near Bombay, through which Śivaji crept to purge himself of the murder of Afzal Khan, and the small fissure in the rock at the Gayaśira Hill at Gaya, looked upon as the *yoni* of Brahma, by crawling through which pilgrims hope to escape rebirth. The ring-stones of Mohenjo-daro may well have had a similar significance in the Chalcolithic Age. Evidence is not lacking at Mohenjo-daro of zoölatry, and among the therianthrope deities or demons is a semi-human, semi-bovine creature represented on one of the seals as attacking a horned tiger. The close resemblance of this creature to the Sumerian Enkidu is worthy of note, but in general all the material of a religious character recovered at the Indus sites appears to be characteristically Indian, making it clear that iconic and aniconic cults then existed side by side, precisely as they do in India to-day.

Little light is thrown upon the religious beliefs by the manner of disposal of the dead. At Harappa cemeteries have been discovered, revealing two forms of burial—namely, complete burials in open ground with deposits of funerary vessels, and burials in large urns. The urns already examined have been found to contain fractional burials, consisting of a skull and a few other bones, but never a complete skeleton. The decoration of these funerary urns is extremely interesting. Peculiarly significant are three peacocks on one jar, as placed horizontally within the body of each bird is a human figure. This suggests that the peacock may have been believed to carry the ethereal body of the dead to the Abode of Bliss, and may possibly account for the strong superstitious feeling for this bird still existing in many parts of India. No cemetery has been traced at Mohenjo-daro, though one fractional burial has been revealed. Twenty-one skeletons have also been found there, but it is doubtful if these are burials in the orthodox sense. A group of thirteen skeletons was found in one spot and a second group of six in another area. An attempt

has been made^a to interpret these as a sacrifice of the same nature as the multiple burials found at Ur, but, in the absence of a principal burial and of grave furniture, human sacrifice is improbable. Sir John Marshall considers that these complete and fractional burials are in general of late date, and that post-cremation burial was the usual method of disposing of the dead during the flourishing period of the Indus civilisation. The evidence for this is largely conjectural and based upon the discovery at Mohenjo-daro and Harappa 'of a class of large, wide-mouthed urns . . . containing a number of smaller vases, bones of small quadrupeds, birds, or fish, and frequently a variety of other small objects such as beads, bangles, terra-cotta figurines and chert flakes sometimes mingled with ashes and charcoal.' After listing all the recorded examples, we note that the contents are not constant, ashes and charcoal are not invariably present, and in the detailed accounts of the excavations there is no mention of charred or calcined human bones. Moreover, some of the urns suggested as funerary might equally well have served other purposes. One buried in a floor and projecting above it seems to have been, at least originally, a household store vessel, while another lying beneath the mouth of a drain issuing from a building was obviously intended to receive the discharge. The heterogeneous contents of these urns is not incompatible with their use as rubbish bins.

The art of this civilisation is disappointing, for the love of ornament so characteristic of every manifestation of Indian art in the historic period, which had been believed to be due to the pre-Aryan stock, is entirely absent. No traces of the decoration of the buildings remain, the utensils, implements and weapons of every-day life are conspicuously plain, and the designs of the painted pottery uninspired and commonplace. It is only on the engraved seals, amulets, and other small objects that any art worthy of that name has survived. Some of the bulls are indeed 'distinguished by a breadth of treatment and a feeling for line that has been rarely surpassed in glyptic art,' but human images in the round are surprisingly few and, save a small statuette from Harappa, notably archaic and primitive. Sir John Marshall is inclined to attribute this Harappa statuette, which, he admits, exhibits modelling such as was unknown in the ancient world up to the Hellenistic age of Greece, to the prehistoric period, although conscious that archæologists will probably take another view. It is, moreover, contended that an artist capable of engraving on the seals the magnificent bulls referred to above would have little difficulty in carving the statuette. The achievements of ancient art in human sculpture do not, however, support this contention. Writing apropos of an analogous and seemingly contemporary art, Walters remarks: 'Mycenean art exhibits its highest levels

^a *Illustrated London News*, December 19, 1931.

in the minor arts of painting, gem-engraving and metal work; sculpture properly so called and architecture were as yet in a rudimentary condition.' The Harappa statuette appears to me the work of a sculptor in full possession of an advanced technique, and unconnected with the Indus people.

The researches at present carry the date of Mohenjo-daro no further than the fourth millennium B.C., though earlier strata still await investigation. This dating rests upon a comparison of this culture, as revealed by the monuments and antiquities, with those of Elam and Mesopotamia, and upon a variety of objects recovered from the Indus, Elamite and Mesopotamian sites, which indicate the existence of a lively intercourse between these countries at the close of the fourth millennium B.C., when Mohenjo-daro and Harappa were at the height of their prosperity. The most important of these objects quoted by Sir John Marshall are five seals of characteristic Indus pattern discovered at different sites in Elam and Mesopotamia, which, in two cases, must be definitely assigned to the pre-Sargonic period, and in no case to a later date than the third millennium B.C. And as I write further evidence is forthcoming from Ur; for Mr. C. L. Woolley records 'the discovery in a grave shaft of the Second Dynasty of Ur of 'a circular seal of grey-brown steatite carved with the figure of a bull and an inscription in the Indus Valley Script,' and continues: 'If the seal belongs, as it appears to do, to the original filling of the shaft, it was put there about 2800 B.C. and it gives an authentic starting point for Indian Chronology.' Though there is evidence at Mohenjo-daro of some inferiority in the buildings during the later period of its occupation, the antiquities from all the seven strata exhibit an astonishing uniformity, bricks, seals, and pottery alike defying all efforts to arrange them in typological sequence. It is plain, therefore, that at the moment this civilisation reveals itself it is fully fledged.

Evidence as to the authors of this civilisation is scanty. The statues of human beings are too few and the figurines too crude to warrant any conclusions as to the composition of the population. Nevertheless, human remains belonging to twenty-six individuals have been recovered at Mohenjo-daro, and all the skeletons save one appear to be referable to the Chalcolithic Age, though to its later period as represented at Mohenjo-daro. Despite the fragmentary nature of some and the warping of others, it has been possible to take measurements of a more or less reliable character of twelve of the skulls. These are by no means a homogeneous series, four different racial types appearing to be represented—namely, the Proto-Australoid, Mediterranean, the Mongolian branch of the Alpine stock, and the Alpine. Which of these races was indigenous in the Indus valley and which the prime author of

this civilisation are questions awaiting solution. Hope for further light lies, we believe, in the cemeteries of Harappa, where such abundant anthropological material awaits examination, though with which of the strata at that site these human remains are contemporary has yet to be determined. To me the Harappa cemeteries appear early in date, not only because of the manifest Sumerian character of the complete burials, but also on account of the heraldic designs, so reminiscent of Mesopotamian art, appearing on urns containing fractional burials.

It is plain that the Indus culture is part of that widespread Chalcolithic civilisation which has now been traced from the Mediterranean to the Pacific Ocean, and that India was one of those areas where civilisation had its beginning. Though no claim can be advanced for its recognition as the cradle of mankind, it doubtless made its contribution to the common stock of knowledge, and while maintaining its own special character was influenced in its turn. The belief that the Vedic civilisation was the first worthy of that name which arose in India, and that the pre-Aryans must necessarily have been what the Indian jungle tribes are to-day, seems to have blinded Indianists to the part which the great rivers of India must have played in the history of civilisation. The Indus valley, with its warm climate, well-watered plains, and its network of waterways providing ready means of irrigation, transport, and intercourse, must have afforded as favourable a field for human advancement in the Neolithic Age as the Nile or Tigris. Because of a few resemblances between certain of the Indus pictographs and a few of the archaic signs of the Sumerian syllabary, this culture, when first recognised, was designated Indo-Sumerian. With more circumspection it is now styled the Indus culture, for it has already been traced as far as Rupar, in the Ambala district. Its existence so far west in the Punjab renders it highly probable that exploration of the lowest strata of ancient sites in the Jumna basin will furnish evidence of its extension further eastward in Northern India, for, after all, the Ganges valley 5000 years ago offered as favourable a field for early man as that of the Indus.

Be that as it may, surveys in the Indus basin continue to reveal more and more Chalcolithic sites, and at Amri, some 80 miles south of Mohenjo-daro, two culture strata have been disclosed. The upper yielded the typical Mohenjo-daro black and red ware, but in the lower, and embedded in the silt of the Indus, was recovered an entirely different type of thin painted ware akin to pottery from Seistan and Baluchistan, so that even in the Indus valley it is by no means certain that the earliest culture is that represented at Mohenjo-daro and Harappa.

H. HARGREAVES.

⁴ *Illustrated London News*, February 13, 1932.

REMAKING LONDON

O London won't be London long,
 For 'twill be all pulled down ;
 And I shall sing a funeral song
 O'er that time-honoured town.

THESE lines, attributed to Dr. Maginn, occur in some verses entitled a *Lamentation over the Golden Cross*, written a little over a century ago when that once famous hostelry was demolished in connexion with the Strand improvement of 1827. The Golden Cross of those days, the days when Dickens brought David Copperfield and Steerforth there, and when he himself knew the place intimately, stood cheek by jowl with other buildings, approximately where the Nelson column now towers aloft ; and it was from under the archway leading to its stable-yard that the coach bearing Mr. Pickwick issued, and Jingle uttered his famous warning to the passengers to take care of their heads, illustrating the word by pointing down Whitehall to the spot where a royal head had once fallen. Now just as Maginn, or whoever wrote the above lines, deplored the passing of a landmark 100 years since, so we can to-day apply his words to the disappearance of its successor, the Golden Cross which was a feature of the east side of Trafalgar Square since Mr. (afterwards Sir William) Tite, the architect, designed it in the year 1832. The removal of this prominent feature is symptomatic of what is occurring in all parts of London, and as we see great structures which we and our fathers and grandfathers have known all our lives falling about our ears and a new city rising on their ruins, we are, I think, inclined to re-echo the mournful refrain that ' London won't be London long.' There are, of course, numbers of reasons for the wholesale demolition that to-day confronts us on all sides. There is, first and foremost, the requirements of a large and ever-increasing population ; there is the need for more modern conveniences than can be found in buildings set up at a period when such things were but in their infancy ; there is the opportunity for making money by raising on a spot hitherto covered by a relatively small and unremunerative structure a vast pile towering to the skies and capable of housing, not a family, but an army ;

there is, finally, that restlessness which comes over all nations, as it does individuals, at certain periods, and which urges some to embark on adventures among bricks as it urges others to embark on adventures among beasts. But above all it would seem as if after every century some influence were abroad to prick men on to the work of destruction and reconstruction. For it is a curious fact that what is going on now went on during the reign of George IV. and William IV., and what occurred then had occurred during the earlier years of George II.'s reign ; while if we trace London's building development backwards we shall find that, roughly, 100 years elapsed between these wholesale efforts to recreate and extend the metropolis.

There is a tendency on the part of many who have not turned their attention to the past and what was then going on, to suppose that the great building activity now proceeding in London is something in the nature of a portent ; and there are, too, those who, fond of finding parallels when such seem to possess an ominous significance, point to the fact that Rome's decadence largely coincided with Rome's mania for the erection of stupendous edifices and the creation of vast and costly dwellings. Like all comparisons, such as these are analogous rather in outward appearance than in essential fact, and if the downfall of the British Empire were merely to be judged by the energy of its architects and builders one would, I feel sure, have little to fear for the future. But there is, too, a class which whenever something is demolished, something to which they have before paid little if any attention, bewail its disappearance and cry out with a lack of discrimination as to the value of the loss, which is almost as bad as the attitude of that other class which would make a clean sweep of everything that bears upon it the impress of antiquity or of an art alien from that of its special predilection. In these latter days we have had many object-lessons in both directions. We have seen much that was unworthy of preservation cleared away ; we have seen streets and houses whose only claim to interest was their age, but which (as in the case of much human age) had arrived at a stage which lacked grace and even dignity, given over to the pickaxe of the housebreaker, and fine and dignified structures raised in their stead ; we have witnessed the wholesale clearance of areas where dirt and disease and crime herded together and where vice seemed to have stamped itself even on the decaying walls of its rotten rat-riddled habitations ; we walk along broad streets which were once congeries of fetid alleys and can see the blue sky whose light not often penetrated the foul dens of an earlier day. And we have seen, one regrets to remember, beautiful and historic structures ruthlessly pulled down to make way for immense blocks of flats and hotels whence every grace of architecture seems to have

been banished, and which raise their utilitarian heads like some tall bully proud in the strength of his repulsive features. But even this vandalism is nothing new. Those who still bemoan the fate of Devonshire House, which as the outstanding example of the achievement of Kent (not a supreme architect perhaps, but a most consummate master of interior decoration) should have been preserved as a national monument, and would have been had it stood in Paris instead of London, forget that Clarendon House, the splendid residence which the great Lord Chancellor erected but hardly dwelt in, met the same fate when the seventeenth century was drawing to its close. When Northumberland House was demolished in favour of an arterial improvement which, by the way, could have been made as easily without such a sacrifice, those who cared for the architectural features of London, and rightly resented the act, did not recall to mind that a series of private palaces along the Strand and Fleet Street had also gone the way of all bricks and mortar at an earlier time.

And so it is that many are apt to regard what is occurring in this direction to-day as something unprecedented and as something which bodes ill for the future of the country at large. For the pessimist seizes on anything that is likely to support the hopelessness of his outlook, and it is because of this recognised attitude that those who care for the preservation of what is beautiful, or at least examples of what was considered so by an earlier age, and raise their voices when such things are destroyed, are regarded as reactionary and pessimistic and all the rest of it. The antiquary and the archæologist are of course looked upon as prominent among such. But the perspicacious among them recognise, as well even as the man in the street (of which band he is himself after all an entity), the desirability of much that has been done in the way of demolition, and only raises his bark when some special object is sacrificed, and above all when some inappropriate structure is raised in its place. For what we have to fear in these progressive days is not so much the pulling down of the old as the character of the new that takes its place.

In recent times we have been given food for thought in this direction, apart from the destruction of much that was cumulatively interesting in the way of old buildings, such as many that disappeared when Shaftesbury Avenue and the Charing Cross Road were formed—two of the greatest examples, by the way, that any city has to show of the scandalous neglect of a splendid opportunity, for here was the chance of creating two fine thoroughfares lined with adequate shops, lost in the erection of a kind of artisans dwellings above third-rate business premises—and those that went under when the great Aldwych-Kingsway scheme was carried into effect, resulting in something really worthy

of the city and its town-planners, as well as other instances that might be cited both in the City and West End. We have seen the passing of not a few of those private palaces the annals of which were interwoven with the history of the country, and whose architectural and other decorative features combined in making them objects at once dear to the art lover and antiquary.

The reasons which have influenced their owners in giving up these great houses form, as it were, a pendant to those already stated, which have resulted in their being readily disposed of and destroyed in favour of newer kinds of dwellings. The incidence of increased taxation is, perhaps, the foremost cause, but it is in many cases not the only one. The fact is a change has come over modes of life just as it has over the fashion of our dress, habits, and customs. That old form of existence which had something limpet-like in its character, when people were content to pass from their country domains to their town houses at stated and fashion-regulated intervals, has given way to a restlessness which keeps them continually on the move. Increased facilities for comfortable quarters in hotels, or in travelling, has had, no doubt, something to do with this; and so instead of the owners of great town houses wishing, or being financially able, to keep them going during their absence in the country, or entertaining in them during the season, they put up at huge caravanserais and there receive their friends, or embark on those sea voyages to all parts of the world which have become a feature of the time. Thus it is that great houses are now found to be not only too expensive to keep up but in a way largely useless. Many of these mansions occupy ground which is valuable to a degree undreamt of by their original owners, and so added to the above reasons is that tempting one of being able to dispose remuneratively of something which has lost its interest and in a measure its uses. In the past many of these palaces were given up and demolished because they were situated in places which fashion had deserted. Once Aldersgate Street was, if it can be believed, not unfashionable, but when it became commercial Shaftesbury House, which Inigo Jones had designed, went down. Devonshire Square once possessed an aristocratic abode, and Fleet Street and the Strand were lined with the splendid dwellings of the rich and powerful. But they all fled before the coming of commerce, that insistent power which has now for many years been creeping into the very heart of the West End, and which has converted Hanover Square and Cavendish Square into business quadrates, and is beginning its work in Berkeley Square and has almost finished it in St. James's Square. Indeed, the squares of London are the spots where much of the reconstruction of the city can be best realised. If you penetrate into that of Bloomsbury you will find the whole of the

east side filled with a splendid structure whose classic character fitly consorts with that of the adjacent Museum, but is sadly out of keeping with the remaining Georgian houses. Russell Square, close by, and Kensington Square, far away, are both examples of what has been done in more or less recent years to eradicate their original features and thus alter their character; while Smith Square, in Westminster, has been entirely rebuilt on lines which, however, happily recreate something of the old style of architecture in this still picturesque quarter. It would seem that when reconstruction has to take place it is really better that it should be done in a complete form, as it has been here; for at least all the new buildings are consistent with the character of the area and are homogeneous, whereas in a case like that of Bloomsbury Square, for example, we have that lop-sided effect which comes from variation in height and that inappropriateness which arises from variation in architecture.

In recent days, of all the architectural changes that have taken place in London those in Park Lane have created the greatest amount of criticism, because Park Lane is known generally to most people. Once it was a lane leading to the gallows which stood at its north end; then when Lord Chesterfield built his beautiful house (until recently the home of the Princess Royal and the Earl of Harewood), at that time standing in a wholly rural environment, and Sir Richard Grosvenor developed the area now known as Mayfair, it gradually became popular, and fashion went there and built itself great houses. Later, in our own day, it was for a time the special objective of those whose millions began in the diamond fields, and other fields of activity, of South Africa. And now we all know what has happened and is happening in that quarter: gone is the large mansion at the Marble Arch end, known as Camelford House, once the abode of the Princess Charlotte and Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg; gone is Gloucester House at its southern end, long the residence of the late Duke of Cambridge; while between these extremities two splendid private palaces have disappeared, Dorchester House and Grosvenor House; and it is probable that it is only a matter of time before Brook House and Dudley House share the same fate. Already one learns that Aldford House is to be demolished, and yet another block of flats is to be raised on its site.

Now we may or may not appreciate the style of architecture which is taking the place of much with which, maybe from long association or from some inherent artistic or inartistic sense (whichever you like), we were in sympathy; one age which has had for a time its own way in such things must give way to the new ideas and different tastes of another, and so it is useless, if not unfair, to quarrel with much which does not meet with the

wholehearted approval of many of us. But there is one thing in which I think even those who hate the name of Nash and to whom Burton is anathema will agree, and it is that at least certain specimens of the architecture of a past day might be permitted to remain if only to show how greatly we have improved on, say, Wren and Chambers and the rest! For the admirers of what is now being erected would probably be grieved to think that when another century has elapsed, and still newer ideas have come into vogue, a clean sweep would be made of all the buildings now regarded by them as the last word in beauty. And so one does feel that it is not unreasonable to regret that in the wholesale rehabilitation of London something cannot be spared, especially something that possesses for many architectural charm allied to interesting tradition. No one is perhaps sorry that Grosvenor House has gone down in the holocaust, because it was not in itself an outstanding architectural feature, and the additions made to it by Cundy were, although not unimpressive in themselves, absurdly out of keeping with the structure on to which they were tacked. But it was a crying shame that that wonderful reconstruction of an Italian palace, Dorchester House, probably the finest private dwelling in London, should have been permitted to be destroyed. For apart from its external beauty it was within, as most people probably know, full of the work of Alfred Stevens, the greatest decorative sculptor that this country has produced, a man worthy to be named with the masters of this art in the past, Verocchio and Donatello, even with Michael Angelo himself. France would have acquired such a place, made it a national monument, and opened it as a Stevens Museum, and incidentally made it a paying proposition—as was done in the case of the Hôtel Biron-Gontaut, where the work of Rodin (whose studio was once there) is collected and exhibited. In some cases in London care has been taken to reconstruct a building whose very age had made it unsafe, but whose gracious outlines it was happily determined to perpetuate. Harrington House, in Craig's Court, is an instance of this, and there the old work has been adapted to modern uses in a very ingenious and creditable way; and one is glad to see that Newcastle House, Lincoln's Inn Fields, recently refaced, has been dealt with in the same way, and now presents in its reconstructed form the appearance it presented when the Duke of Newcastle employed Vanbrugh to make additions to the mansion which Captain Winde had designed for Lord Powis.

There is no doubt that to-day the duty of preserving those relics of a past age is more clearly recognised by the authorities, and even by those whose private rights place them under no special obligation in this respect. Public opinion, with the help

of the publicity of the Press, has done much towards this, and the exertions of such bodies as the London County Council, the London Society, and the Society for the Preservation of Ancient Buildings have resulted in much being saved which might otherwise have been destroyed. But even as it is, interesting landmarks are frequently demolished before anyone is conscious of even impending attacks on them. It is of course impossible to save everything, but I cannot but think that some means should be taken at least to make known the imminence of such danger, so that at least efforts might be made to save some relics of a gradually disappearing city. Were a law in existence by which the owners of any building dating from, say, before the beginning of the nineteenth century, should be obliged to inform the London County Council of the intention to sell or demolish, although of course the owner would have a perfectly free right to do what he liked, it would at least enable those who recognise the intrinsic value architecturally or historically of such a structure to take steps if possible to preserve it. Suppose, for example, we one day awoke to find the housebreaker busy at work on Holland House when it was too late to save that supremely interesting relic, probably the only building now remaining which was due to the architectural skill of John Thorpe, and one whose diverse memories give it an almost unique place among the great houses of London, what a cry would go up at this realisation of Lord Macaulay's mournful, but happily as yet unfulfilled, prophecy! One does not anticipate anything so dire as this, particularly as the owner of that beautiful place has shown himself specially interested in the annals of the past connected with it; but there have been many who, with like reverential feelings, have been obliged through force of circumstances to give up their once cherished possessions; and in these days nothing seems really safe from depredation. Should, however, such a thing occur, ought Londoners not to have a chance of I will not say preserving such a place in its present position, but of doing what the French authorities have done in the case of the Hôtel Massa, in the Champs Elysées—namely, of reconstructing the building elsewhere, so that we may at least have one, and now that Northumberland House has gone the only, private mansion dating from Elizabeth's time in London preserved as an example of the architecture of that period, to which the association with it of Addison and Fox and Rogers have added imperishable memories. To take another instance, Lord Derby has given up what was for long known as Stratford, but is now called Derby, House, in Oxford Street. If that graceful mansion disappeared it would be sad, because although, curiously enough, there seems to be no documentary evidence of the fact, it has all the signs on it of at

least the influence of the Adams, and much of their work in London will no doubt soon cease to grace the city. Luckily, certain circumstances have occurred to save for a time other landmarks. Lansdowne House will remain as a club; Spencer House has for some time been one; Montagu House shelters a governmental department; and Stafford House has become the London Museum. But one cannot help feeling that the builders have their eyes upon others—Brook House, in Park Lane, for instance, and Bath House, in Piccadilly, and—who shall say?—perhaps even Marlborough House itself; while some of those large mansions at the corner of Belgrave Square, Seaford House and Devonshire House, and so on, must be tempting baits to the speculator in bricks and mortar. For what vast flats could not be erected on their sites, what stupendous hotels could not cater for the millionaire of the future, who will never, apparently, again dwell in his own home, but will have suites of rooms in vast communal dwellings where, if known at all, he will, like a convict, be known by a number!

To apply a proverbial saying to my present needs, it may be said that when utilitarianism comes in at the door beauty flies out at the window; and so it is that with the new style of formless architecture we are gradually losing those graces of decorative beauty with which such men as Wren and Chambers and the Adams clothed their work. The one objective now appears to be size, and size without grace is but a multiplication of the horrific. This is, doubtless, a revulsion from that equally bad period when buildings, like furniture, were overloaded with redundant and ridiculous excess of ornamentation and factitious embellishment; and it is the swing of the pendulum which has carried us to the other extreme. That there is a certain tendency to moderate this and to return to a more normal condition is, I believe, gaining ground, and so one can only hope for an improvement of things which will satisfy all except the extremists in modernism, and will not be anathema to any but the hidebound reactionary. The danger lies, of course, in the fact that when a vast structure is erected for commercial purposes there is a desire to restrict its outline to a purely undecorative character, on the ground of expense if for no other reason; and then it is that the artist is gradually eliminated in favour of the artisan, apparently on the supposition that the former is no longer needed. This is one of the dangers which a democratic country has to face; for a land without art is as much a decadent land as is one where art, and art only, is its objective.

If you wander about the city noting what has been destroyed and what erected in its place, you will, I think, come to the conclusion that, with a few notable exceptions, most of the new work

bears on it the imprint of Continental influence. From the Germanised façade of Olympia, in the Hammersmith Road, to the Germanised frontage of the Shell Mex buildings, on the Victoria Embankment, there seems to be a propensity, more or less marked, to copy rather than to originate. This influence is obvious, although, perhaps, in a lesser degree, in the offices of the *Daily Telegraph*, in Fleet Street, as it is in a very obvious one in Broadcasting House, in Langham Place, and in the offices of the Underground Railway at St. James's Park Station.

A heaviness which recalls something of the solidity that marked the structures designed by Vanbrugh seems to stamp most of the new work, even where foreign influence is not markedly present. Sometimes, from the open nature of the environment, this is not so insistent, as, for example, in the case of the Port of London Authority's headquarters; but where something analogous is erected in a comparatively narrow thoroughfare, such, for instance, as the new Freemasons Hall, in Great Queen Street, the effect is oppressive and incongruous. In the same way a place like the Embankment, with its large open spaces, can well support such vast structures as Thames House and Unilever House, and even Shell Mex House (their very names seem to require space), because we can get away from them and thus contemplate them, if we want to, from a distance, but when we find relatively small areas filled, cheek by jowl with the remains of an earlier and more restrained period, by such Brobdingnagian efforts as we do in Portman Square and on the south side of Finsbury Square, an air of incongruity is at once obvious.

There are in London numbers of new erections which are excellent in themselves, but which are stultified by their position, and which not infrequently stultify the older structures which adjoin them. But those who admire the new and cannot away with the old should in this respect be of good cheer. For at the rate London is being rebuilt we shall soon have nothing of the past remaining, and then the piles that have arisen will only have themselves to rival in size and, as some of us think, in ugliness. We are swiftly passing into a new architectural phase. We have had our Gothic and our Tudor and our neo-Classic, and so forth; we are now, apparently, in for a particularly heavy load of the Pompous.

E. BERESFORD CHANCELLOR.

SHORT STORIES

THERE is probably no literary form at the present time as interesting, or as full of possibilities, as the short story. It makes a subject which will offer us abundant data, for we have all encountered a great number of short stories, and many of us have tried our hand at adding to the number. Yet the subject is not an easy one. In the first place, it is difficult to be certain precisely what it is we are discussing. If we had chosen to consider the sonnet, or the epic, no such difficulty would arise, for there is a general agreement as to what constitutes these forms. About the short story we shall find no such agreement. I confess that, for my own part, I find this an advantage. Where there is no canon, we are free to begin at the beginning, and make our own way, without fear of the scholar and the professional critic. Literary criticism has become such a preserve that it is pleasant to find common land, where the public may wander and picnic at its ease. Since there is a great divergence of opinion as to the nature of the short story, we will approach the subject in our own way, and consider, without allegiance to any critical axiom, the variety of productions offered to the public under this heading. We may consider them from any angle—commercial, historical, or merely literary—and improvise a technique for reducing them to order. Luckily, too, the short story form is comparatively new, so that we shall not be obliged to go far back into history. In fact, there is no field into which the amateur may adventure with so little danger.

When an editor declines the work of a beginning writer, he does so on the ground that it does not resemble what he wants. (I am supposing that the work is competently done, and that the editor has no special reason for declining it.) He will say, in the case of a short story, that it is too gloomy, has not enough action, is obscure, or lacks a plot. He will suggest that it is not a short story at all. This sort of rejection letter usually begins: 'My dear Mr. So-and-So, we have read with great sympathy and pleasure your charming sketch, but much regret, etc., etc.' If any single word were to be found graven upon the heart of a modern short story writer, it would be that word 'sketch.' He meets it week in, week out, and it angers him every time.

The beginning author at this point indulges in a little research. He ascertains, for example, that the work of Katherine Mansfield was not accepted by the editors of fiction magazines. Yet the reputation of Katherine Mansfield stands high. Greatly concerned, he searches the leading fiction magazines for the names he has learned to venerate. I will not say he does not find them; but, in a year's files, he finds one or two of them, once or twice. Other names, not mentioned in the circles wherein he moves, appear a dozen or a score of times. There are, of course, several of the safe, big names; and just a few of the middle, rising names, on whom the editors appear willing to take a chance. He returns from his researches, and sits down, facing a hard fact: that between magazine editors and the best-praised of the younger writers (not only the younger writers, either) there exists a vital difference of opinion as to what constitutes a short story. The presence of the big names means nothing one way or the other, he decides. They are there for their names, not because the quality of their contributions especially delights the editor. The younger names owe their appearance to a fluke, or to the editor's desire to show how up to date he is. They are not there on their intrinsic merit as creators of literature. If they were—if the editor really looked upon them as a standard—there would be no place for the remaining nineteen-twentieths of his magazine's contents. The conclusion is inevitable. The editor's idea of a short story does not coincide with, or at all resemble, the type of story written by the best-praised writers.

There are not one, but two quite different sets of differences: a difference of opinion between the fiction editors and the connoisseurs, and a variety of differences between the various connoisseurs. In other words, a general lack of agreement as to what is a short story. The first difference, that between the fiction editor and the connoisseur, is by far the widest; so we will consider it first. And, to consider it fairly, let us drop all prejudices. As the whole ground is so disputable, let us clear our minds of any supposition that the connoisseur is likely to be right, and the editor wrong. Let us gather data by examining, first of all, the magazine type of story.

I guarantee that anyone who does this at all systematically will emerge with an increased respect for the magazine story. Comparing the average magazine story with the average literary story, he will find that while it has much less to say, it says it infinitely better. It is businesslike, far quicker off the mark, better proportioned, and, in the all-important matter of communication, better written. This is because it belongs to a recognised type, has no lack of models, and is obliged at every paragraph to consider its reader. It owes its merits to the very

qualities that most mercilessly give it its defects: its rigid form, its lack of enterprise, its monotony of style, its commonplace outlook. Writing to please others is a trade, and can be taught. Writing to please oneself cannot be taught. It can only be learned.

Ninety-nine per cent. of magazine stories will be found to state and solve a problem. All else being equal, both development and solution are expressed in terms of action. Thought is not popular. The nearest approaches to it are the brief cogitations of the characters about the action which will next be necessary. Whatever the problem, they must be up and doing. The first task of the author, then, is to think of a problem which will interest a large circle of readers, and oppose a number of severe but removable obstacles to its fulfilment. Hence it naturally follows that most magazine stories select for their problem love. If the girl is beautiful and the hero's heart is in the right place, everyone will approve of the problem. There remains only to provide obstacles of which we all will disapprove—rivals, villains, wills, parents, poverty, etc.—and remove them by the most drastic means at our command. This love of action explains the monotonous request of editors for 'novelty love stories, quick, sharp action, embodying the latest mechanical invention'; and it explains the frequency with which the characters in these stories take journeys to distant places. To these aims and methods must be added an appropriate technique. If, as is so often insisted, the average reader is to be able to identify himself with the central character, that character must never shock or surprise him by an original reaction. He (or she) may perform prodigies of strength or agility, may exhibit infinite resource and courage in the face of danger. This will occasion no embarrassment, for it will merely fulfil the reader's daydreams. But all mental and emotional reactions must be cut strictly to pattern. Likes and dislikes must be those of the average reader. Thus in the magazine story we may have novelty of circumstance, but never novelty of thought.

For example, I once wrote two stories on the theme of marital infidelity. In the first, a young wife receives from her lover the present of a man's silk dressing-gown. It comes ostensibly as a birthday gift from the lover and his wife, who are friends of the husband; so that there is no need for him to be suspicious. When he comes home in the evening the wife shows it to him, with a certain natural trepidation. He says nothing, but goes into the bedroom to wash. She hangs up the dressing-gown in the bedroom, and returns to the drawing-room, where she sits down and plays the piano. When she stops, he calls to her from the bedroom to go on. Happy at this indication that all is well,

she goes on playing. When she stops for the second time, there is complete silence. She goes into the bedroom, and sees the beautiful dressing-gown, lying on the bed, all slashed to bits with a razor, and smeared with toothpaste. While she gazes horror-struck, her husband leaps out from behind the door, coat and hat in hand, and rushes out of the front door and down the steps, yelling 'Yah! Yah! Yah!'

In the second story, a husband, returning unexpectedly at night, discovers his wife with a lover. His first emotion is one of laughter at the ridiculous figure cut by this gentleman. Later he tells his wife she must sleep in the spare room. She is contrite and tearful, and argues with him. 'Very well, then,' he says, 'I will.' She protests that he cannot; the bed is not made up. She will go herself. He lets her go with misgiving, thinking how uncomfortable she will be. Starting to undress, he sees himself in the glass, and is reminded of the ridiculous appearance of his rival. This finishes him. He calls his wife in again, and falls asleep just as she is beginning to explain to him how it all came about.

For the first of these stories, which is violent and bizarre, and in which the man behaves like a savage, I received a generous price from a popular magazine, *plus* a request for more. The second, in which the man exhibits ordinary human consideration and a sense of humour, excited the scornful indignation of every editor to whom it was offered. For the man in the first story was 'sound' and 'right.' He expressed himself oddly, but there was no doubt about the soundness of his general attitude. But the man in the second story had no right feeling, no principles. A man may forgive his erring wife, but only after a decent interval and a number of appropriate scenes. To let his wrongs slide because he was sleepy and the thought of her discomfort was keeping him awake, is to outrage morality and to do the reader out of a legitimate bit of drama. A worthier example, for the truth of which I can vouch, concerns one of the greatest living masters of the short story. A manuscript of his went in to one of the big fiction houses, and presently the editor-in-chief rang up Coppard's agent to go round and see him. 'This,' said the editor, laying his hand upon the manuscript, 'is the finest story that's been into this office in the last ten years. But I can't print it. What's this here—characters, officials, letting a man be hanged when they know he isn't guilty! I can't print that in a popular magazine. Public wouldn't stand it for a moment.'

Thus, then, we arrive at two of the requisites for the magazine story: orthodoxy in reaction to experience, and conformity to public opinion. There is a third requisite, not so essential perhaps, but exceedingly valuable. We shall best expose it by analysing briefly a typical magazine story.

The heroine—I believe she was named Olive—was a successful solo dancer, who kept a school of dancing. Every year she gave a gala performance with her pupils, and every year 'he' came down to see it. Olive was twenty-nine, and occasionally showed her age at the corners of her eyes. It was the day of her gala performance. Each year, so far, she had taken the chief solo part and danced her best for 'him.' To-day she feels tired and depressed. It is no good. She cannot put forth her best to-day. She may as well give up hope and content herself, as best she may, with his friendship. So she gives the solo dance to her star pupil. After the show he seeks her out. She forces herself to ask him what he thought of the star pupil. 'Pretty little thing, isn't she?' she asks him. To her astonishment, he tells her he has no eyes for anyone but her. He has never seen her in ordinary clothes before. He has never realised her as a woman. Till to-day, she was only a beautiful dancer. Will she marry him?

The story was short, businesslike, competently told, with colour and movement. It was a neat trade job, adroitly done, and as such I have no quarrel with it. But let us for a moment examine its implications. It appeared in a popular magazine catering almost exclusively for young women—a magazine read by shop-girls, nurses, typists, and suburban wives. The readers at whom it is aimed commonly want, in fiction, something which will 'take them out of themselves.' They get it; and, in this case, they get something else as well. The story I have just read flatters and consoles them in their very weakest spot. It suggests that by being 'ordinary' and 'everyday'—the very things they are most depressingly conscious of being—they may be all the more attractive. A comforting thought, in kitchen and office and small country rectory. There is another exceedingly common type of story, which deals frankly with the richest of the rich, in the most gorgeous possible surroundings, but makes them behave in such a way as to establish that the differences between scullery and marble hall are entirely accidental. A further consolation.

An added requisite of the magazine story, therefore, is that it should in some way flatter its readers. This it does with such success that beyond doubt it often makes their lot easier to bear. It provides an escape—always the main *desideratum* of a popular art. Its danger lies in the fact that with this fairy-tale quality is mingled an appearance of reality. The physical circumstances of these stories resemble those of ordinary life; and the escape is contrived by a falsification of values, a subordination of all other features in the story to the consummation desired by the reader. Specious and dangerous though such an argument may sound, I think it could be argued with some force that the serious

writer should attempt to gain a hearing in the popular magazines, if only to aim at providing a better escape, and a level of ambition less crudely prompted by humanity's more obvious desires.

One more condition we must notice, before passing on to consider how all this has come about, and that is the organisation of the magazine story—what its editors call 'the plot.' Convention demands that the story, the actual framework on which the writing hangs, shall be decisive and symmetrically proportioned. This is the one department in which the magazine author can teach his 'literary' colleague, for, whether you have plot or no, the various parts of your story must have a fixed symmetrical proportion to one another. Failure to observe this rule is the commonest defect of the 'literary' story. From the point of view of the editor the ideal story—possessing already the characteristics we have described—is one which successfully manipulates three or four strands of interest and ties them up tightly in a knot at its conclusion. The smarter manner of narration at the present time is to start your story in the middle, preferably by means of a telephone conversation, then go back to the beginning for a minute or so, and hop about excitedly among the mechanism in an effort to stimulate and keep engaged the supposedly jazz-jigging intelligence of your auditors.

There are, of course, endless varieties of magazine story; but we have said enough to illustrate the special characteristics of those professing to deal with contemporary life, enough to distinguish them from the 'literary' story using similar material. This brings us to the second step of our inquiry. If the foregoing is even a rough picture of the state of magazine fiction, how did such a condition come about? What is the magazine story's parentage? Who is to blame? Here, American and British fiction lie down together; for to this question the professional critic will usually reply, 'O. Henry.' It cannot be denied that this writer has formidable claims to be called the father of the modern magazine story. He wrote with indefatigable skill, he is immensely readable, and his influence upon magazine technique has been enormous.

It will repay us to consider briefly two typical examples of his work. The first represents him at his best, the second, though it is most frequently held up as a model, at his worst. It is all the more dangerous for being a marvel of adroit construction, and for achieving with consummate ease the effect at which it aims.

The first story, *Gifts of the Magi*, is constructed upon a simple framework, which we may symbolise by a wide, flat X—like a squashed multiplication sign. The strands of interest, starting with the same intention, meet, cross, and finish up in the same position on the other side. It is Christmas-time, and a young

married couple wish to make each other a fine present. He decides to get her combs for her beautiful hair, and sells his gold watch to buy them; she decides to buy him a chain for his gold watch, and sells her beautiful hair. It is an admirable little story, spoiled perhaps, from the formal point of view, by a superfluous paragraph at the end. At least, we may say that the additional effect scored by the paragraph does not compensate for the effect lost by putting it there.

The other story is called *The Last Leaf*. In a Bohemian tenement in Washington one of two sisters lies ill with pneumonia. Outside her window, against the opposite wall, is a vine, whose leaves are falling. The sick girl watches them, and decides that she will die when the last leaf falls. Downstairs lives an old German, who has failed as an artist, but who never loses hope of painting a masterpiece. The sisters have befriended him, and used him as a model. He hears of the sick girl's plight, and is very sympathetic. One by one the leaves fall, till there is only one left. The sick girl makes ready for death. But the last leaf hangs with miraculous stubbornness to the vine. Day after day it stays there, glowing, beautiful. The invalid recovers. When she is well enough her sister tells her that the old German is dead. They found him lying in the yard, cold and soaked through with rain. He had crept out, one stormy night, with ladder and lantern, and painted on the wall the leaf which never fell. 'So you see, dear, he has painted his masterpiece after all.'

I do not think we need discuss this story in any detail. On the technical side, no summary can do justice to the skill with which the theme is handled—the casual, apparently unpurposed, introduction of the old German, the economy of development, and the completeness of the surprise. Nor can we adequately characterise the story's scale of values. It makes its author's claim to have begotten the modern magazine story a very strong one. O. Henry had a vast knowledge of the circumstances and opinions of lower middle-class life. His material was in effect very much that of the music-hall comedian, and he exhibits in its arrangement the genius displayed by the greatest professors of that art. He *was* a genius, and a great technical innovator; but he was too easy-going, and his outlook was commonplace and vulgar. No influence is so hard to resist as that of an artist who presents brilliantly a commonplace outlook. Like trivial music beautifully played, it corrupts taste, by persuading people that the best is nothing more than this—a recreation, to be understood without discipline, and savoured without thought. Still, whatever his influence in his own country, there is a serious objection to considering O. Henry as chiefly responsible for the state of the English magazine story—which is that, until comparatively

lately, he had not been widely read in England. A great deal of his influence must have reached us through his imitators, and, though historically his, it has brought other characteristics with it. He is influencing the English story now, but what brought it to its state before him? We must look elsewhere—not necessarily abroad. We British are a conservative race, and, despite our readiness to hail the foreign artist, no theory of the short story will be sound which neglects to consider native influences. There is one other writer we must inspect—a writer who shared some of O. Henry's defects, but who at his best reached quite a different level, and that is Jack London.

Jack London wrote often hurriedly for money, and the careless generosity of his life is often reflected in his writing. He was often too lazy to wait for the right word, or to care greatly how he got a paragraph down as long as he passed on to the next one. As a result, he is sadly underrated by a generation which prefers care to vigour, and sets mannerism above inspiration. The best stories of Jack London, while they are immediately palatable to the magazine public, are the work of a born story-teller with a wonderful eye and a sure sense of form. They depend upon incident rather than plot, and afford, without apparent effort or contrivance, a natural opportunity for describing the events, the scenes and characters through which the story runs. This sounds a truism. All stories must do this, or they are not stories. Remember, however, we are in an uncharted country, seeking for definitions. Perhaps we have found one.

For an example, consider the outline of one of London's best stories, *The House of Mapuhi*. Mapuhi, a South Sea pearl diver, has found a marvellous pearl. He will exchange it to Raoul, the young inexperienced trader, for a house, complete with verandah, kitchen, and octagon drop clock. The trader laughs at him, and offers cash. Fortified by his wife, daughter, and mother, Mapuhi refuses. News of the pearl spreads. A bigger trader, to whom Mapuhi owes money, comes along, sees the pearl, and pockets it, telling Mapuhi that his debts are cleared, and he will be given additional credit. In sorrow Mapuhi bears the reproaches of his family as the vision of the lovely house fades from their sight. The day, which has been overcast, turns stormy. Raoul puts back, despite the weather, to close with Mapuhi about the house. He is relieved to hear that the matter is out of his hands, for he is only agent for another, but less pleased to hear that the pearl has been sold to Levy, a third and greater dealer, for \$25,000. The weather becomes more and more terrifying. Heavy seas roll in and shake the little atoll. The two big dealers put hurriedly to sea and run before the storm. Raoul is too late: he stays. Then there is a hurricane, and of this I can only say that a reader

familiar with Conrad's *Typhoon* is under no temptation to forget Jack London's hurricane. It is a magnificent bit of natural and unself-conscious narrative. In the morning there is not a tree nor a house on the island, and over two-thirds of the people have perished. Mapuhi, his wife, and daughter are safe—so is Raoul; and it is typical of London's skill that he shows us the hurricane through the perceptions of the sophisticated Raoul, who could be consciously and articulately aware of all that was to be described.

The interest of the story now shifts to Mapuhi's old mother. She has been carried away to an uninhabited island fifteen miles distant. Lying there, awaiting death, tired of pushing away the corpses with which the sea festoons her little beach, she notices in her stupor that one of the most persistent of them has red hair. It is Levy, the big pearl dealer. She drags herself down to the water, searches the body, and finds the pearl. Inspired with the will to live, she explores, collects coconuts, and discovers finally a case of tinned salmon. By dint of collecting all the junk she can find, she gets materials for a clumsy kind of boat. For a paddle she uses a bit of the salmon case, cutting off her hair with a piece of broken glass to make the lashings, and gnawing wedges with her teeth to fix them. After eighteen days she sets sail for home. She is weak and emaciated. She has to stop every hour and bale. When she gets within three miles of the shore a current sets westward, and she is obliged to swim. She meets a shark, who, being lazy and full-fed, plays with her before attacking. Waiting till he comes close, she pretends to attack him, and he flees. When she does reach home—when she does find the new improvised shelter in which Mapuhi is living—she is taken for a ghost. But at last all are convinced, and we leave them once more discussing the house of Mapuhi, with the verandah, the kitchen, and the octagon drop clock.

The ease and natural manner of this story may well blind us to the skill with which it is written. The title theme and the pearl are introduced at the start. We meet Mapuhi at first only through the trader Raoul, who is the central character till the end of the hurricane. This unnoticed emphasis guards London against the dangers attendant upon a change of interest, and enables him without any break to cross over to a character who has hitherto been only a super. There are a hideous number of pitfalls in this story, and every one is avoided with perfect ease. There is no apparent 'plot,' in the magazine sense of the word. Nothing is distorted, nothing faked. A little more care in the actual writing, and the story would be a masterpiece.

Jack London's stories enjoyed a great popularity in this country, and, as usually happens, the worst part of his work has

been more potent than the best. A robust sentimentality was a more seizable characteristic than his narrative skill; and seized it was. London was better out of doors. The simplicity and speed with which he reacted to the objective elements in life led him to over-simplify the personal relationships of his characters; and the result is a form of sentimentality sadly apparent in the magazine fiction of to-day. To O. Henry, then, we concede a great share of influence in his own country, and a small, but growing, share in England; to Jack London, a far greater share in England, and, quite obviously, a great influence over certain classes of American short story. Now, looking for a few minutes at the English story only, we pick out three vigorous writers who were very busy thirty or forty years ago. They are Mr. Rudyard Kipling, Mr. H. G. Wells, and, at a respectful but respectable distance, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.

Kipling influenced the magazine story by the undoubted genius and brilliance with which he told a tale and presented an acceptable set of values. It is the set of values, rather than the tale, which has directed most of his influence downwards. He is out of favour in literary circles nowadays, but this fact should not blind us to his staggering gifts. No writer in our time has had a more fertile and swift imagination, or a better knowledge of his own intentions. Dazzling is the only epithet for Mr. Kipling's gifts. Unfortunately, they have dazzled himself as well as the public, and too often the brilliant superstructure has but shoddy foundations. A dozen magnificent short stories have influenced the literature of the world; the rest have influenced the magazines. Of his imaginative powers there can be no doubt. Anyone who has read *Puck of Pook's Hill* and its sequel—fair examples, for they are not his best work—cannot fail to admire the swiftness and conviction with which he moves, and the surface appropriateness of story to period. Where all takes place so vividly, where men so persuasively resemble the men we know to-day, it seems in the worst of taste to cavil. Yet these retrojections of the public school spirit, these Indian Civil Service proconsuls, these county council feudal overlords, seem sometimes a little too simple to be true. Mr. Kipling has seen that men engaged on a particular job must have a deal in common with their predecessors and with those who come after them; but he has become intoxicated with his discovery, has simplified it, and allowed it to become a formula; and that way lie the magazine stories. More serious are the occasional lapses into a facile sentimentality—easy emotions attributed at discretion to the characters, with no regard for verisimilitude or propriety. It is just this facile, journalistic appropriateness which, popping out at intervals, ruins for the adult reader a series of tales which, in sheer inven-

tion, have no equal in modern literature. And the word 'journalistic,' once admitted, sticks. It sticks to the Anglo-Indian characters, in the other tales; it sticks to the descriptions of places; and it sticks closest of all to the three carefully selected soldiers whose adventures are so much more interesting than their conversation. If we except the Jungle stories, which have earned the praise of so dissimilar a writer as 'Æ,' and the miraculous story of *The Ship that Found Herself*, we have left a body of work which has had a great influence on the popular magazines, and a bad one.

Mr. Wells is another matter. His influence has tended upward. A great deal of the 'sense of achievement,' so stressed by the correspondence schools, may well be due to his inventive genius, and the courage with which his little, handicapped men struggle against the odds of organised society and come through. For the influence upon a given art of a writer who has practised it does not depend only upon his exercises in that art. Numerous though Mr. Wells' short stories have been, his moral influence upon the short story derives also from his novels; and it has been a good one. It has been good because, in a popular art which will in the nature of things be practised by artists of imperfect taste, a model in which the characters struggle against material odds is more suitable for imitation than one which encourages the misrepresentation of human values. Whatever Mr. Wells's characters are up against—society, marriage, or their own imperfect elocution—the obstacle is so concretely imagined as to become a chemical substance in a laboratory which resists analysis. The material imagination, manifest even in such a story as *The Country of the Blind*—where it is concerned almost altogether with the collective and mechanical problems of blindness—and a story of human jealousy such as *The Cone*, supplied the writers of short stories with new matter, and matter to which their commercial exploitation could do little harm. It made for businesslike structure, objective narrative, and kept its author to the facts. However we consider the relative merits of Mr. Wells and Mr. Kipling, there is no doubt whose influence has been the better in the special field we are discussing.

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle is not a writer of the same stature as either of these, but he was a prolific and excellent author of short stories. There was a richness and vigour about the period in which he flourished, a sheer careless fertility of ideas, which is our envy to-day. Conan Doyle, though his actual writing was often laboured and heavy, told a fine story, and his bent for detective work gave him a compact sense of plot. To the magazines he bequeathed Sherlock Holmes; but he left also such models as *The Striped Chest*, *The Croyley Master*, and *Captain*

Sharkey. Judged by the same test we have applied to Mr. Wells—that is, the type of material to which he draws attention, and the direct way in which he handles it—the work of Conan Doyle must be accounted one of the good influences on the English magazine story.

I have said nothing about the humorous story. Here the original is clearly Dickens, with Messrs. Jacobs and Barry Pain in the direct British line of descent; with Bret Harte and Booth Tarkington on the other side; and Mr. Wodehouse as the unchallenged modern master, combining both. I do not know if Mr. Wodehouse owes anything to O. Henry, whom he resembles in complexity of plot and strict attention to business. If so, he has surpassed his model, subjecting a rich talent for folly to a cast-iron discipline, and writing with a skill which has to be appreciated to be believed. He is one of the best craftsmen of his time. But such work as his is outside our scope. We have been attempting to define the characteristics of the magazine story, and to find sources for those characteristics, both good and bad; and if the method has seemed hitherto a little aimless, I think it will be justified by the conclusions to which, by implication, we have come.

We see now, I submit, that the magazine short story aims at certain uniform qualities. We see that it derives from few ancestors, and is to-day endeavouring to copy them. We see that it depends upon formula, and aims at a precise economic mark. It is aimed at its readers. We understand, therefore, the great difference of opinion between magazine editors and serious authors as to what constitutes a short story. And when we come to consider the 'literary' short story, with its far wider ancestry, we see at once that the differences of opinion as to what constitutes a literary short story are its finest possible asset; for they are preventing it from becoming standardised. If no one is agreed as to what a short story ought to be, the writers will shrug their shoulders and go their own way—which is precisely what we want to happen.

The fact that critics do differ is partly due to the wide range of types to which individual loyalties and preferences can be attached, and partly it is a legacy from the influence of the magazines. Kipling and Wells both write a compact and neat story with a plot, and the upward trend of their influence, the influence of their best work, has left this quality as a *desideratum*. The strong personal idiosyncrasy in the stories of Conrad has also played havoc in this way—played havoc, that is to say, in proportion as they have tended to range critics on their side for or against Tchekov or Hardy or De Maupassant. For we are all human, and the kind of story we admire becomes, unless we are

very careful, the right kind of story. It is easy for you and for me, now, to be wise and admit many contrasted excellences; but it was not so easy for those whose opinions had to be formed ten, and twenty, and thirty years ago, when a new art, deriving from glorious and accepted models, began to grow and multiply and spill out over the edges of the channel so carefully cut for its progress. To-day, what uniformity is to be expected or desired in an art influenced by Flaubert, who made a character the thread for a marvellous and intricate tapestry; by Tchekov, who made a mood or an episode the imaginative key to the whole lives of its actors; by De Maupassant, whose skill lay less in plot than in the complete portrayal of a situation; by many another writer, and, already, by some of its own youngest practitioners? No. We not only do not know what a short story ought to be, but we do not want to know. What we do want is that each piece of short prose fiction should have an aim worthy of an artist and should succeed in hitting it.

And, before we go a step further, I plead for the widest conceivable liberty in the writing of these short pieces of prose fiction, and for the free extension of the term 'short story' to cover them all. Only so can we have that freedom to experiment without which any art must die. I have learned two things about short stories. One is that you must go on your own lines, and write your own story, regardless of what anyone else thinks about it; and the other is that, if you go on doing that long enough, you will become aware of certain rules, which will in the end enable you to obtain admission even to the magazines. It will not be regular admission, for your gods are not their gods—as often as not, it will depend upon a fluke; but if you cultivate patience and a very thick skin you will achieve it.

But I was talking about rules. Are there any rules—any universal rules—governing every sort of short story? I think there are at any rate two. The first, which we have already mentioned, is that the various parts or stages of the story should bear such proportions to one another as will make a symmetrical whole. That you should be able to represent pictorially the substance of your story, and find that the various masses and colours balance one another. The average beginner's story—let us suppose it is 4000 words long—introduces a character, tells you about him, takes you back into his past life; then brings on a second character, or a place, and repeats the process; and the action of the story does not begin till two-thirds of the way through. This sort of story, which one might represent pictorially as a tadpole, will fail because the action is not proportioned to the still, or descriptive, part. There is no reason why a story should contain action at all; but if it does, the action must

be spaced out so that the story can float evenly along its length, instead of being three parts under water. Or, to take another metaphor, the reader's progress through a story should be even and controlled. To slow him up just when he is encouraged to think he is getting a move on; to stop him dead, and rush him off his feet to make up for it; to hustle him from traffic block to traffic block, is to invite his attention to inessentials and defeat one's own object.

The other requirement is that, wherever the climax of a story lies, the preceding events should keep it always in view and lead up to it without digression. In this respect a short story is like a lyric. It must keep to the road. Apparent digressions there may be, but they must all ultimately have brought one nearer the central point of the story. 'No admittance except on business' must be the writer's rule, and he must enforce it ruthlessly against the most attractive paragraph, the most tempting aside, unless they are really necessary to the mechanism or atmosphere of his tale. There is always, for instance, the temptation to complete a character sketch by the addition of malicious or otherwise pleasing details. Unless they are relevant to the character's part in the story they should be sacrificed. This is a hard saying, but practice bears it out. Unlike the novel, the short story gives one no leisure, no opportunity to stop by the roadside and look around.

Let me finish with a few preferences and a few prophecies. At one time it appeared that Mr. Sherwood Anderson was going to claim some entirely new territory, and he did claim it; but the clearings did not remain, and weeds are growing in them. Three or four imaginative triumphs, and a lost path. Mr. Hemingway, that most impressive figure, has not yet consolidated his ground. We think we see where he is heading, but reserve judgment till he gets there. Meanwhile, he remains the most potent influence America has yet given us—upon the literary story, that is to say. Leaving these two aside, I do not personally feel any doubt as to who is the finest artist, nor as to who has the greatest inventive genius. The artist is Coppard; and if I had to choose a story I think it would have to be *The Higgler*, one of the saddest and loveliest stories I ever hope to read—a story whose pain comes back again and again into the mind. The inventive genius—not that he is not a great artist too, at his best—is Liam O'Flaherty. The range and variety of this man's stories is perfectly astounding. Like most fertile writers, he has his ups and downs; but the short story form suits his genius, and he can show at least a dozen which are the envy of his colleagues. *The Shilling*—an absolute masterpiece; *Mackerel for Sale*, and the very moving, grand story *The Mountain Tavern*: one has no

sooner mentioned these than one's memory is assaulted by *The Cormorant* and *The Death of the Cow*. There is no objective writing like Liam O'Flaherty's at the present day.

Not long ago there appeared in a popular English magazine a story which is almost revolutionary. I do not think it is too much to say that it adds definitely to the scope of the English short story. It has been rescued from the magazine, and now appears as the title story of Mrs. Elizabeth Bowen's book *Joining Charles*. I was never more astonished in my life than when I read it where it first appeared. Incidentally, why do not more women writers concentrate upon the short story? No form seems to offer them a greater opportunity. The qualities which they are bringing to the novel, the quick objective vision, the flexibility of mood, the particular understanding of human relationships, find even greater scope in the short story, where they can be their own justification, without the mechanism of a longer work. None of the difficulties of stamina or constructive power, relatively the weakest points in the novels of women writers, would enter it. It is significant that two such writers as Miss Dorothy Edwards and Miss Norah Hoult should begin brilliantly with short stories. *Six Mrs. Greenes* was really a book of short stories. The average publisher's contract will allow an author one book of short stories per three novels, and this state of things will not alter till more people read short stories and more people write them.

To name other names can be only wilful and arbitrary. Besides the stories mentioned, I find a good many jostling at my memory. I can never forget Mr. Daniel Corkery's *The Child Saint*. Neither Mr. Corkery's stories, nor his novel, *A Munster Twilight*, have had a quarter of their due. Nor shall I forget Mr. John Metcalfe's *Picnic*, though it has mistakes in it. I shall not be allowed to forget a magazine story by Mr. Britten Austin, called *An Affair of Honour*. It was cluttered up with some conventional love stuff, but the rest of it was a model of exciting workmanship. On another of the popular sides Mr. Michael Arlen has achieved a perfect liaison between matter and manner.

The difficulty, as always when one starts 'naming names,' is that the naming of one or two means the naming of several more, for the sake of proportion. To speak of the above mentioned, and one or two others I wish to put my money on, without mentioning such influences upon the short story as D. H. Lawrence, James Joyce, and Somerset Maugham, would look merely ignorant. D. H. Lawrence was a master who brought to the short story a nervous force—one might almost say a nervous system—which was the masculine counterpart of Katherine Mansfield's contribution. Not that the two were alike; but each enlarged the nervous sensibilities of the short story, made it more highly

strung, from the directness and intensity of their personal attack. For this very reason, the influence of each will probably turn out to be unfortunate. Too many writers who lack the art will be encouraged to build stories round the vividness of their own sensations. The stories in Mr. James Joyce's *Dubliners* will have to be reckoned as another authoritative contribution to the short story. A more salutary contribution, perhaps; for, while highly experimental, they are strict in form—obedient to a stern inward architecture. An American writer who has done unforgettable work is Mr. Wilbur Daniel Steele. He is unequal, and he sometimes tortures his plots; but, when his eye and hand are in, he is very fine indeed. There is one story by Gouverneur Morris which I shall never be able to forget. Mr. Dreiser's spade (or electric tunnelling scoop) gives more impressive results when it is allowed to dig out a mountainous novel, but some of its single scoops are full of ore.

But enough of names. Let me finish by summarising briefly the ground we have been over. There is no general agreement as to what constitutes a short story. So much the better. Writers can go their own way unhampered—except those who depend on pleasing editors. Their defection will matter less, because, more and more, the big men, whose names editors require, are obliging the said editors to accept as short stories material which a lesser writer would be told politely were not short stories at all. The short story, despite appearances to the contrary, has no national boundaries. British and American stories are so interrelated that the writer in either country is eligible for the periodicals and bookshops of both. Be free, therefore, and courageous. Learn to write your own stories in your own way. Success will come to you, the boundaries of your art will be enlarged, and popular taste—including that of editors—will be enlarged also. The future is in our hands. Let us make the most of it.

L. A. G. STRONG.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.

Letters as well as articles will be considered for publication, but letters should be confined to criticism or amplification of articles which have already appeared in the Review. No anonymous contribution is published.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCLXIX—NOVEMBER 1932

NOW OR NEVER

It is usual to say that the war ended in 1919. If, as we have claimed in speech and in written words, in books and upon the war memorials, the war was a struggle between might and right, a war 'to end war,' a clash between two fundamentally opposed conceptions of world governance, then to say that the war ended in 1919 is to say a lie. In 1919 the war changed its outward appearance, but below the surface the conflict between nationalism and internationalism has been raging all these long post-war years. Sometimes the battlefield has been Washington, sometimes London or Paris, more often Geneva. But now, after eighteen years, we seem to have reached the decisive moment in the struggle. We are at the turning-point of the drama of which the events of 1914–1918 were but a bloody prologue. We stand to-day at the parting of the ways, and it seems impossible to escape the conclusion that within the next few months, perhaps even weeks, decisions upon which will depend the fate of ourselves and our children must be taken. The compromises and wriggings are becoming harder and harder within the contracting space

between the issues of Peace or War. Which is it to be, Peace or War? That is the question we must now answer.

In 1914 the groupings of the Powers assumed the existence of two worlds living uneasily side by side, opposed to each other, so that where one gained the other lost. The assumption was false. There were not two worlds; there was one world whose economic unity was becoming more definite with each step forward of material progress. This false assumption landed us in a war which became a world war, and this fact proved that a stage had been reached in human history when it was impossible to cut off national noses without spiting one's own international face. In 1919 the wise men of the earth were gathered together at Versailles. They were, so to speak, on the bridge of the ship of Civilisation. Their vessel lay wallowing and waterlogged in the confused cross-swell which was the aftermath of the typhoon. Then from the steerage, tenanted by the starving inhabitants of Central Europe, came cries of distress and threats of disturbance, whilst near to the vessel, not then perhaps too far off to be quite out of touch, floated a raft of Russians—people who had abandoned the ship to try new methods of navigation. From this collection of mariners two groups arose—the master mariners, or 'Big Five,' as they were named, and the others. These latter were dismissed to the lower bridge; there were already four captains too many on monkey's island. The master mariners were confronted with the task of reconstructing the vessel, but first she must be got into port, or, to put the matter less nautically, the Peace Conference at Paris had to do something, and do it quickly, in order to prevent an economic collapse, and it also had to decide upon the principles which should govern the reconstruction of the post-war world. It is the tragedy of our times that the short-term and the long-term policies were inevitably dealt with at the same moment.

As regards the long-term policy, there were two extreme courses open to the statesmen who made the Peace Settlement. On the one hand, it was possible to proceed on the assumption that the war had not been an event of fundamental importance, that the post-war world should be organised and operated as before along the principles of nationalism, of alliances, of groupings. That was the view of Clemenceau. On the other hand, it was possible to proceed on the assumption that the war had been unique, that it had altered everything, that it marked a turning-point in human affairs, and that the post-war world should be organised and operated in accordance with novel principles, such as those of internationalism and close co-operation between national States in defence of moral standards publicly set up as guides to conduct. This was the view of President Wilson.

In between Mammon and God stood Great Britain and Lloyd George, and such are the abilities of our people in the art of compromising that when the Peace Treaty was signed it was observed that, though Mammon had drafted the Reparation clauses, Wilson (as God's agent on earth) had been allowed to write the League Covenant into the document. He had also written these words:

PART V.

NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR CLAUSES.

In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of armaments of all nations,¹ Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.

It is easy to be wise after the event, and it is difficult to see how the British Government could then have acted differently, for it was both the strength and the weakness of our policy that we were obsessed with the extreme importance of ending the state of war as rapidly as possible and so avoiding the great collapse of Europe. A bad settlement was better than no settlement. The compromise of Versailles between nationalism and internationalism postponed the collapse; it gave Europe breathing space, but, though the fact was not recognised at the time, it was only a temporary measure, for the settlement was naturally looked upon as something permanent, or at all events as permanent as anything can be in human affairs. Clemenceau and Wilson are dead and lie in their neglected and half-forgotten graves, but the spirits of their policies still contend for the mastery in world affairs. Up and down the fortunes of the battle have swayed. Locarno, Germany's admission to the League, the Kellogg Pact, are waved aloft on the banners of the forward-looking men. 'Pieces of paper,' declare those whose hearts are back to '1914 and all that,' and they point to Japan's policy in the Far East, to the Nazi movement in Germany, to General von Schleicher, to the Disarmament Conference. The realists say, and their voices are growing louder: 'This post-war world of covenants, of pacts, of high ideals and gentlemanly behaviour in the conduct of international affairs, is a façade and a sham unrelated to the facts.' Are they right or wrong? If they are right, then the sooner the truth of their contention is openly recognised the better for all of us. A League of Nations which is a fraud is worse than no league, for it stands in the way of the creation of the real thing. If they are wrong, then it is of vital and immediate importance to prove beyond all doubt that the post-war world is a league world, something radically different from the pre-war world. This issue can only be settled by reference to a test case, for it is according to what happens when a practical

¹ Italics mine.—S.K.-H.

problem comes up for solution that world public opinion will pronounce judgment.

The issue is so tremendous and of such unparalleled importance to humanity that it is small wonder that men have shrunk from facing the facts for as long as possible, but at last we can wriggle no longer—unless, indeed, the whole case for the league world is to be allowed to go by default. We must now decide what is to be done about the test case of Disarmament, and one might add the Sino-Japanese dispute. I am dealing in these pages with the disarmament question, so I will say no more about the Sino-Japanese dispute beyond observing that it would never have arisen if Japan had not believed that the writing on the wall had appeared at Geneva, and that if the European Powers can solve the disarmament question, Japan will waste no time in following the prevailing fashion.

Solve disarmament, and it is hardly an exaggeration to say that you solve everything, for such an event would push the world over the dead centre upon which it is stuck at present. It would lead us out from our 'wanderings between two worlds—one dead, the other powerless to be born.' In saying that the solution of the disarmament problem is to turn the key in the door which stands between us and a reasonably assured prospect of peace, I wish it to be well understood that I do not think that armaments cause wars. Wars are made in the hearts of men, and armed forces are but the outward and visible symptoms of inward and hidden fears. The reduction of armaments is chiefly important as a sign that fear has been conquered. It is the conquest of fear which is the difficult task. When the French cry aloud for security they cry with the voice of fear. It is an understandable fear, a real fear, a genuine and mortal apprehension. I also should be afraid if, with the assistance of the spectators, I had knocked out a heavy-weight boxer and found myself sitting on his body and the giant began to stir and at the same time the spectators, especially the British and American spectators, began to drift away. In so far as the war was a Franco-German affair, the weakest nation won, and has been afraid of the consequences of victory ever since that moment in 1919 when Germany's representatives drained the cup of humiliation at Versailles.

Fear is a bad counsellor, and it is impossible to blame the French for their continuous attempts, in and out of conferences, with and without allies, to keep the German giant prostrate. But consciousness has returned to the giant; he stirs, he stretches, he threatens to burst asunder the cords which were bound upon him at the moment of his defeat. Many Frenchmen have said to me, 'You British do not know the Germans; they are not like

other people.' It is always difficult to explain to a Frenchman that the inconvenient thing about the Germans is that they are exactly like other peoples in their determination to revolt against being treated as the depressed classes of Europe. The German demand for equality resembles the French demand for security, inasmuch as it is a passionate outcry, an emotion, not a coldly calculated political move. It is not a demand which can be satisfied by legal arguments. The German attitude on armaments is the product of genuine mass emotion on a nation-wide scale, and such movements, if not satisfied at an early stage in their development, feed on their own fat and soon become quite unmanageable. It was the constant preoccupation, first of Stresemann, then of Brüning, to keep in check the German sentimental revolt against her inferior status, whilst they laboured to obtain substantial concessions on the Rhine and in regard to reparations. Briand and Stresemann had this much in common, that each was perpetually struggling with a public opinion which endeavoured to prevent the two statesmen from keeping step. France was always pulling Briand back; Germany was always pushing Stresemann forwards. There were moments when the two statesmen took a few steps side by side—one notable occasion being when they marched up to Locarno and were simultaneously presented with a British guarantee which has never been understood by the British public. Briand and Stresemann went to their graves worn out by their efforts to achieve the impossible. They were bound to fail because they were attempting to perpetuate the compromise which Great Britain had initiated at Versailles—the compromise between French security based on pre-war notions, and German security based on League ideals. They were bound to fail because the possibility, the justification for the compromise, had passed away. The immediate post-war economic crisis had been overcome, world production in general, and even European production in particular, had overtaken the pre-war figures and the 1930 economic crisis was still below the horizon.

When Briand and Stresemann disappeared and the Nazi movement was conceived the stage was set for that last act in the post-war drama whose climax is now at hand. We are to-day—and I make no apologies for repeating the statement—at the parting of the ways. Is it to be peace or war? It is in one sense a great misfortune that this momentous decision must be taken during a fierce economic crisis, for men are more pessimistic to-day than they were in 1919. In those days the difficulties before us were seen to be immense, but at least the goal was clear. We were trying to reconstruct the world and the British compromise between Clemenceau and Wilson had defined that it was to

be a pre-war world modified by the addition of the League. We were like men at the foot of a great mountain whose precipices were formidable but whose summit could be seen. Thirteen years have passed—we have laboured in vain. The compromise is seen in retrospect to have been impossible even as a semi-permanent measure; the mountain top was a mirage. We are now like men in the flatness of an immense desert; we know not whether to go east, west, north or south, so we camp where we are, which is neither the pre-war nor the post-war world. But, as recent events have shown, to camp where we are soon means that the familiar slums of the pre-war world begin to appear. The wretched proceedings of the Disarmament Conference have provided a masterly example of static mobility, with the result that the ordinary man, upon whose views everything ultimately depends, has become first bewildered and then apathetic. He is beginning to feel that disarmament is like the weather, something which it might be nice to control, but which is in fact beyond human control. He is losing sight of the distinction between thunder and lightning as acts of God and bombardments as acts of men. At this time of economic crisis it is difficult to persuade people that forward movement is essential if we are to avert disaster. The strain of the crisis has made men and their Governments very timid, fearful of enterprise both economic and political, and fear has routed hope. Nevertheless, the move must be made. By whom? By what methods?

By whom?

France or Germany cannot see the international scene for the dust of national excitement. Each is convinced that it has a perfectly reasonable case and is sitting tight. Neither can appreciate that the logical result of an adherence to their present policies must be the negation of that security which is the purpose of those policies. There are left the United States of America and Great Britain. The United States of America's heart is in the right place, but the Americans are bad at translating ideals into practical politics. The peculiarities of their Constitution make it difficult for the Executive of the United States of America to act rapidly and decisively in foreign affairs. They suspect Europe and are suspected by Europe. There remains Great Britain, a European and a world Power. We can talk European and understand American. We have a National Government; we have balanced our Budget. Our prestige stands high, and once again the pessimists who predicted the downfall of Great Britain have been confounded. We have behind us a long tradition in the business of leadership. We said, 'Industry is a good thing,' and the world

followed our lead. We said that sport was a good thing, and the world took to sport. From high finance by day to the dinner jacket by night we have set fashions, and we have been successful because we have not bothered to look over our shoulders in order to see who followed. When we cease to lead the world, then indeed will our star be setting, and all over the globe men are looking to us to-day and asking themselves the question, 'What is Great Britain going to do?' We are the object of many last hopes. If we are ready and willing to discharge our traditional function and give the world the leadership it sadly lacks, how should we set about the business? Successful leadership involves the application of certain principles. The actions of a leader must be rapid and decisive, for this upsets the doubting and compromising minds; his actions must be simple and easily understood so as to give no grounds for argument as to what he really means to do; his actions must be dramatic so as to appeal to the imagination.

The simplest way in which to explain how I believe those principles might be applied in practice at the present time is to quote the draft of a State document (not hitherto published). It is a memorandum intended to be the basis of a speech by the Prime Minister. It is important that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald should make this speech at the Disarmament Conference, for this would not be an occasion upon which the frigorific products of eminent legal minds would be appropriate.

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Government being gravely concerned at the slow rate of progress which has marked the proceedings of the Disarmament Conference, and being convinced that if it should break down the immediate result would be a revival of competition in national armaments with all the grave consequences to which such conditions must lead, have decided to initiate action as follows:

His Majesty's Government propose, subject to one condition, to proceed forthwith to the reduction of the forces of Great Britain to the level set forth in the Hoover Plan. It is intended that the British programme of reduction to this level be completed by January 1, 1935. The sole condition which must be fulfilled if His Majesty's Government is to carry out this proposal is that the German Government shall give Great Britain an undertaking that, though His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept unreservedly the German claim to equality of status in armaments, Germany will not, up to January 1, 1935, make use of that equality in order to increase her armaments beyond their present level. His Majesty's Government feel that in return for the

unilateral reduction which Great Britain will make under this plan, it is entitled to expect the co-operation of the German Government in refraining from increasing the total quantity of armaments in the world.

As regards the United States of America, His Majesty's Government content themselves with noting that in introducing his proposals President Hoover observed: 'These proposals are simple and direct. It is folly for the world to go on breaking its back over military expenses, and the United States is willing to take a share of responsibility by making definite proposals that will relieve the world.' His Majesty's Government express the hope that the United States of America may also be willing to co-operate with Great Britain in sharing such risks as exist in unilateral disarmament to the level of the Hoover Plan.

As regards France, His Majesty's Government recognise the extreme anxiety on the part of the French Government for security, an anxiety which has not been sensibly allayed by the Locarno Treaties or the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Since the French Government holds the view, contrary to that held by the British Government, that security should be based on armaments, Great Britain, whilst warmly welcoming any French proposal to co-operate in the plan to reduce to the Hoover level, will in no sense be disappointed if French anxiety for security makes such co-operation impossible.

Similarly, Great Britain recognises that the action of Italy is likely to depend upon the nature of the action taken by France.

In conclusion, His Majesty's Government desire to point out that reduction to the level of the Hoover Plan by 1935 can only be considered as an instalment of disarmament. If, as it is hoped will be the case, the United States of America and Great Britain are at the Hoover level by 1935, whilst Germany is still at her present level, it is intended that upon that date France and Italy be invited to reduce to the level of the Hoover Plan by 1938. If France agrees to this proposal, it is suggested that the United States and Great Britain might agree to reduce armaments from the Hoover level to the German level between 1935 and 1938, and that by 1938 France and Italy be invited to reduce to the level of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany by 1941.

I will conclude this article by offering some comments upon the plan outlined in that imaginary document. From the general point of view I claim that the plan would be dramatic and striking. It would cause a stir throughout the world and rally to its support all those who believe that bold measures are necessary in a crisis. Secondly, if carried through it would result in the virtual abolition

of armaments within nine years. I attach considerable importance to this time factor, because year by year those who know what war means are passing away. The saving of money during this period would be immense, and would materially assist the world's economic recovery.

From the particular point of view it will be simpler to consider the plan from national angles. First, the United States of America. The Americans want disarmament, but are afraid of being 'had for mugs' in this business. The fact that Great Britain was in the same boat would reassure them, and they could not fail to feel pleased that it was their plan which we had chosen as the practical method of advance. Next, the point of view of France. The French would be on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, it would be impossible for them to deny that the plan would give them a full measure of security according to the French thesis, but, on the other hand, the fact that France was practically being told by 120,000,000 Americans, 70,000,000 Germans, and 43,000,000 British that these 233,000,000 of people quite understood that the 40,000,000 French were full of fear, and must be given special concessions for the sake of their nerves, would be extremely displeasing to a nation which justly prides itself upon its position in the vanguard of Western civilisation. France would feel isolated, and the fact that her isolation left her sitting on the sharp rock of heavy armaments expenditure amidst a falling tide of disarmament would not, I believe, be thought very consoling in France. For, no matter how great might be the superiority in armaments of France *vis-à-vis* the disarmament *bloc* of the United States of America, Great Britain, and Germany (and, in fact, the difference would not be extraordinary), 40,000,000 people need more than armaments to impose their will upon 233,000,000 people. I believe that the first French reaction to the proposed plan would be one of incredulity, of conviction that there was a catch in it somewhere, but that within a year of its practical application the French, partly through economic necessity, partly through fear of isolation, would insist upon their right to disarm as much as anyone else. I recommend that this French demand be resisted as much as possible, and that we press the French to remain armed until they are quite convinced that if they join the United States, Germany, and Great Britain they will not suddenly feel insecure. We must continue to impress upon the French that we thoroughly understand and make all allowances for the fact that France is in a very nervous state of mind.

Next, the British point of view. How does the plan affect this country? The Hoover Plan affects Great Britain approximately as follows: To take the Navy first. As regards the

heaviest ships—that is, warships of over 10,000 tons that are forbidden to Germany—Mr. Hoover's proposal abolishes one in every three, so far as the British, the American, and the Japanese navies are concerned. A word about the aircraft carriers. So far as the British Navy is concerned, it means that the oldest of our carriers, the *Argus*, disappears in 1936 instead of disappearing by 1938 at latest. In regard to 8-inch gun cruisers, there is no change so far as the British Navy is concerned from the agreement reached at the London Conference. We have all the 8-inch gun cruisers that we have built and that are permitted to us by the London Conference. The Americans, on the other hand, are forbidden by the Hoover proposals to build the extra three out of the eighteen against our fifteen that the London Conference proposals permit. Then as regards 6-inch gun cruisers, the adoption of the Hoover proposal means that instead of building another thirteen cruisers of about 6500 or 7000 tons (*Leander* class cruisers) between now and the end of 1936, we build none; but we do not scrap any ships that we would not have to scrap under the London Treaty. As regards submarines, we do not scrap any ships that we would not have to scrap under the London Treaty. But we cannot build 17,000 tons of new submarines before the end of 1936, which we could do under the London Treaty. As regards destroyers and flotilla leaders, we do not scrap any ships that we would not have to scrap under the London Treaty. But while the London Treaty would allow us to build 90,000 tons of new construction not yet laid down before the end of 1936, the Hoover proposal would only allow us to build 60,000 tons. If Mr. Hoover's plan were accepted, the total saving to the British taxpayer for new naval construction alone would exceed about £40,000,000 in the next four years. In regard to the Army, tanks, chemical warfare, and large-calibre guns would be abolished, but there would be no change in the personnel of the armies of the British Empire. In regard to the Air Force, there will be a substantial cut, because the bombing 'planes disappear.

From the technical point of view the risk to us in the adoption of the plan lies in our material inferiority *vis-à-vis* France in the period 1932–1935. This I am prepared to risk. With the United States of America and Germany at my side I am not much afraid of French bombing 'planes or French submarines. I am at all events very much more afraid of the inevitable consequences of a breakdown of the disarmament movement. On the other side of the picture, I feel that the action recommended to the British Government would enormously strengthen our prestige throughout the world and might do much to create the psychological conditions necessary for the solution of the world economic crisis. It would also strengthen the ties between Great Britain and the

United States of America and rally to our support all the Scandinavian countries.

Next, the German point of view. In my plan Germany is given that legal equality in armaments which is absolutely essential to the satisfaction of German national pride. On the other hand, although Germany must promise not to build up armaments between 1932 and 1935, would this be looked on as an evil in Germany? I believe not. The economic situation is so serious that most Germans would be delighted to have a good excuse to refrain from taking advantage of her newly acquired equality of status. Moreover, the promise to abstain for three years from increasing armaments is to be rewarded by the spectacle of the United States of America and Great Britain receding from the French level and descending towards the German level. Germans will feel that at last they are in good company and no longer the outcast of Europe. I admit that a distinguished German with whom I discussed the plan said to me: 'A year ago I felt confident that the whole of Germany would have accepted your idea of a stand-still agreement, but now I am not sure that we should not have to have a few samples of the forbidden armaments, a tank or two, a submarine or so.' If he is right—but for technical reasons I think the German military experts would not approve of this waste of money—then I suggest that as Great Britain reduces to the level of the Hoover Plan, we sell some of our superfluous material to Germany.

There remain to be considered the positions of Japan and Russia. As regards Japan, she can be safely ignored for the time being. 'But,' it may be said, 'surely this is a strange argument just when Japan is causing so much trouble by her actions in Manchuria.' The explanation of my theory that Japan's attitude towards the proposed disarmament plan is not of much consequence lies in the facts of the Japanese economic situation, which is about as bad as it can be. It is because the internal situation in Japan is so serious that the Japanese militarists have staked all upon Asiatic adventures; we can safely leave Japan to learn a lesson in Manchuria which, for the time being, will effectually prevent her playing much part in the larger field of world affairs. If Japan is up to her neck in Manchuria, Russia is up to her waist in the Five-Year Plan, and can be safely left there for the next three years, even if the Soviet Government does entertain the grandiose plans of armed assault on Western Europe with which they are credited in some quarters. On the other hand, the Soviet have always declared their readiness to disarm, and it is at least worth noting that no one has ever dared to call the Russian bluff in this matter, if bluff it is.

In conclusion, I must note the fact that a section of public

opinion in this country will criticise the proposed plan on the ground that it is not practical politics. These people will say, with justice, that up to the present we have done our share of disarmament, and perhaps more than our share. Looking at the problem from the point of view of multilateral action, I agree with these critics. From this point of view we have done our best, but multilateral action has not solved the problem, and it is therefore a matter of no practical importance whether or not we have done more or less than other nations in the course of efforts which have been fruitless. There is, I believe, general agreement that if the problem is not solved the world will be heading straight for disaster. Multilateral methods have failed; unilateral methods must be the subject of experiment. Unilateral methods presuppose leadership, and I have explained why we are the only people strong enough, sure enough of ourselves, and sufficiently experienced to give the world the lead, for lack of which it stands in peril. I am not, I hope, a spineless, watery-blooded idealist of the 'my-country-always-wrong' school of thought. On the contrary, I incline to the view that we have certain unique qualities which enable us to accomplish tasks beyond the powers of many of the nations. Nor am I incapable of assessing the technical risks of the plan recommended in this article. In the course of a naval career which included experience at both the naval and military staff colleges, and in various staff jobs ashore and afloat, it was necessarily my business to study war and Imperial defence. This Review is not the place in which to enter into a technical defence of the plan, so I must content myself by saying that it can be adequately defended against the criticisms of those who may believe that its inevitable result would be to leave us for three years at the mercy of French armaments.

If the plan is not practical politics, is it to be understood that another world war is practical politics? The Zulus have a saying, 'If we go backwards we die; if we go forwards we die: let us go forwards and die!' It may be that our present civilisation is doomed whether we go forwards or backwards, but at least let us go forwards and find out whether or not that means the death which is surely awaiting us if we go backwards.

STEPHEN KING-HALL.

IS A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT STILL NECESSARY?

BEFORE proceeding to answer this question it is necessary to emphasise the fact that this country certainly wanted a National Government at the time of its formation last August. No one can or would deny that the dramatic change which involved the resignation of the Labour Government and the substitution of a National Government under the leadership of Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Baldwin, and Sir Herbert Samuel was welcomed by the vast majority of the people. But I hold that there was no just cause for the subsequent General Election. I still regard this as a crime committed against the national interest by a combination of party zeal and personal ambition. It was—and Viscount Snowden's letter of resignation is conclusive proof of this—mainly the work of men who, in their hearts, had already declared against any 'national' solution of our problems, and were resolved in any case on a policy of Protection; whilst the strenuous, and it might have been successful, efforts of those who opposed them were at the last moment rendered futile by unexpected defections. We Liberals were not quite so simple-minded as to be ignorant of this Protectionist plot. But when, despite all the efforts of Sir Herbert Samuel and his followers, an election was forced on the country, we were the more determined to form part of the new Government in order to ensure that Liberal and Free Trade principles should have some representation.

We wanted a National Government, and the country elected a National Government, or, rather, what it expected to function as a National Government. The way things had been manoeuvred, nothing could prevent the Conservatives from forming the great majority; but it was only 'die-hard' Conservatives who voted simply Conservative. The vast majority of the people voted National. I admit that Protection was to some extent the issue, but not, apart from a few rare instances, as a partisan policy: rather was it proffered as one policy to be duly considered in the effort to find a national solution. I myself stood openly as a Liberal Free Trader, ready to bring my own principles to the test of the national emergency, and also ready, as I promised my

Conservative supporters, to give honest consideration to Conservative proposals. Nevertheless, in the interests of the nation, I only pledged myself to support the National Government on an agreed policy. I had almost as many Labour supporters as Conservative, and many of those with whom I talked had always voted Labour hitherto, and still remained Labour; but they believed that only a National Government could deal with the situation.

The electorate certainly voted National, for that was what the leaders of all the parties had asked them to do. I quote again from Viscount Snowden's letter of resignation:

I helped to the best of my powers to secure the unprecedented National victory at the polls last autumn. I did this on your [the Prime Minister's] assurance and that of Mr. Baldwin that a National Government reinforced by a popular mandate would work only in the national interests and would not be used for party purposes and policy. I accepted the declaration in which you said:

'So far as I am personally concerned I am not going to be run by any party. It may be they [the Conservatives] might try to put something over us. I am not their man.'

Mr. Baldwin himself bears out the fact that the electorate voted National. Last November, when the election was well over, he declared at the Guildhall: 'We are a National Government. The Cabinet and Administration consists of members of all parties, none of whom has shed his party allegiance.' And still more striking was his admission made in the House of Commons as recently as May 26 that many seats in the Midlands and the North would never have been won by merely Conservative candidates; and he referred to 'the force of Lord Snowden's speeches and broadcasts in helping to win seats which we should never have won.' Many Conservative back-benchers take the same view. Thus, Mr. Gurney Braithwaite, M.P. for Hillsborough, declared in the House of Commons on July 13: 'If we were given one mandate more than another, it was this: "When you get to Westminster, pool your brains; if necessary, forget all your own shibboleths and doctrines; adopt any remedy you like to get us through our difficulties and towards better times."'

This National Government has in certain important matters so far justified its existence. Precisely because of its national character it has been able to accomplish all those measures which have proved beneficial to the country as a whole. The Budget has been balanced; stern, and therefore unpopular, economies have been enforced; borrowing for the Unemployment Fund has been stopped; the important Lausanne Agreement, which puts an end to reparations, has been reached; the great War

Loan conversion has been successfully accomplished, and the threat to our national credit has been removed. I have yet to meet any responsible person who would venture to hold that such important measures as these could have been carried out by any party Government. For these a National Government was an absolute necessity.

Other measures, however, have been taken by this Government which have led to the resignation of Sir Herbert Samuel and other Liberal Ministers, thereby modifying the national character of the Government very considerably. These measures are the work of those who have been resolved throughout on transforming this into a Protectionist country. I will not go so far as to say that all these extreme Protectionists have deliberately betrayed the mandate given to them by the country; it may be that a misunderstanding of the word 'National' has encouraged them in their one-sided view of the situation and their preposterously one-eyed remedies. Any intelligent man should have known that the words 'National Government' were used to denote an all-party Government—a Government, that is, where all parties, regardless of party advantages, would pool their ideas for the common good. But these Protectionists have taken National to mean Nationalistic, or, at the most, Imperialistic. They have conceived our complicated economic problems in the primæval terms of economic nationalism, that is, as the disorganisation of our industry through foreign competition. So they have put their simple nationalistic heads together, and by sheer force of weight and wind compelled the Government to adopt a general tariff policy. The full extent of the disastrous results of this policy have yet to be seen, but the immediate disaster that threatened, namely, the break-up of the National Government, was averted by the wise and ingenious device of the agreement to differ. But within a few months the tail of the Protectionist party had encroached still further on the head, as is proved by the North Cornwall by-election, when Mr. Baldwin gave his support to the Conservative and ultra-Protectionist candidate against Sir Donald Maclean's Liberal and Free Trade successor. The obvious inference is that Mr. Baldwin had surrendered to the opinion of the least enlightened of his followers, that only a Protectionist can be accounted a supporter of a National Government. This makes it easier to understand why the Liberal Ministers came to the conclusion that resignation was inevitable.

The futility of Protection has already been realised by all except indurated fanatics, and even they must have had their faith badly shaken by the Dead Sea fruit of the Ottawa Conference. One certain result achieved by this wind-blown congeries of

contradictions is that the Mother Country will pay more for foodstuffs and raw materials, whilst the Dominions may pay less for manufactured articles. But I have yet to meet that industrialist, no matter what his party politics, who can express the least confidence that Ottawa will bring much relief to him and his workpeople. A much more dangerous result of Ottawa is that this country has made herself dependent on the consent of the Dominions before altering the duties on certain articles imported from foreign countries. This is both unconstitutional and humiliating, and, incidentally, makes bargaining impossible so far as those articles are concerned. The pity of it is that we have entered into these burdensome and useless commitments just when there is the possibility of a world-wide movement towards freer economic relations. The tariff-ridden countries are in a like plight with us or much worse, and are now beginning to see that the segregation of one country from another by tariff walls only intensifies the trouble; and the most serious objection to Ottawa is that it has made it more difficult still for Great Britain to give a lead towards a more enlightened policy.

Yet, Free Trader though I am, I am not so infatuated as to believe that the wholesale removal of all tariff barriers throughout the world would, by itself, suffice to restore national and international prosperity. The problem is much too serious and complicated to be cured either by the quack operations of Protection or the laxatives of Free Trade. It is because I regard the problem before us as so serious and complicated that I am firmly of the opinion that a National Government is still necessary, and accordingly view the resignation of the Liberal Ministers with most serious apprehension. What kept the Government from pursuing a beneficial and constructive policy was the unfortunate fact that a vast majority of its supporters came to Westminster with the sole object of making the country Protectionist. To an alarming extent they have had their reckless way, and the country is no better off. Indeed, although I do not press this point unduly, the deplorable increase in the number of the unemployed—about 300,000—since a Protectionist policy was adopted may prove to be due in the main to that fact. But, thought I, now that the Protectionists have had their fling and failed to score a point, the way may be open for saner and wider policies to prevail. It was for this opportunity that the Liberal supporters of the Government had patiently been waiting. Then, precisely at this moment, when what I may term the junk had been thrown overboard, and the decks were clear for effective action, the Liberal and Free Trade Ministers were driven from their posts. For, in spite of all pretence to the contrary, events made their resignations inevitable. These

Ministers were honestly convinced that the Ottawa Agreements, quite apart from any other faults, would, to a very great extent, nullify the World Economic Conference in advance; and, since the World Economic Conference is a most important part of the policy of the National Government, they urged that the ratification of the Ottawa Agreements be held over until the Conference had met. It was, admittedly, asking a great deal to expect the Tory heads to brave the fury of their massive tail so far as that; it was more than the Protectionists could stand to be denied the immediate enjoyment of their Imperial mess of pottage. Yet this concession on the part of the Tory leaders would have been no greater than that of the Free Traders last January. But, of course, they refused. All unwittingly, the electorate last year acted the part of Frankenstein and created such a monstrous Tory majority as to destroy all possibility of a balanced national policy.

Yet, as things stand at present, the resignation of the Liberal Ministers only means that they have surrendered the pretence of authority within the Cabinet in order to serve the national interest more potently from outside, and it is the duty of all Liberal members to prevent the Government from losing what is left of its national character. For the country is not yet safe enough to be entrusted to a Tory Administration. True, the crisis in the form it came last summer is now over. But the problems that led to it still remain largely unsolved, and, if no solution is found, the crisis will shortly recur and this time prove a catastrophe beyond our control. The most serious problem of all, namely, unemployment, has actually grown much worse, and that fact alone is enough to convince me that a National Government is still necessary; for no purely party Administration could combine in itself the wisdom and strength required to frame and apply measures at all adequate to meet the situation. Some may approach our difficulties from a different angle, but, for two reasons alone, I think it is best to make the unemployment problem our starting-point. In the first place, unemployment is what is most persistently before the mind of the great mass of our population, and, secondly, its consideration will take us most directly to the heart of the present-day evils.

The position was made abundantly clear in the Distressed Areas Debate in the House of Commons on July 13. Take the following passage from a speech by Mr. Leckie:

In England and Wales there are 113 towns with an insured population exceeding 5000 where the unemployment is over 25 per cent. of the whole of the insured population. The list ranges from Liverpool with 28.9 per cent. to Tynemouth with 58.7 per cent. of unemployment among the insured population. There are nine counties with unemployment ranging from 37.7 per cent. in Northampton to 39.6 per cent. in Durham.

There has never been anything like this before in recent history. In a few instances, perhaps, forces that have hitherto operated may again bring some alleviation, but of certain industries we can definitely declare that they are never likely to reabsorb more than a fraction of their present unemployed; in others we can unfortunately foresee an increase in unemployment. Those industries which are dependent on our export trade are likely to find things worse rather than better in the future. The truth is that improved mechanisation and scientific management have led an increasing number of countries to produce for themselves what previously they used to import from us. But let this be noted. Although new industries have come into being throughout the world, although countries which used to import now manufacture for themselves, thus creating new employment for their people, yet these very countries share with us the menace of a terribly increasing number of unemployed.

Most economists hold that a very important cause of the unemployment throughout the industrialised world is the collapse in prices, which is in large part a monetary phenomenon—that is, due to a failure of the monetary machine to cope with the grit that has been thrown by politicians and others into the mechanism; and they regard this monetary phenomenon as only temporary, and liable to be dispelled by, for instance, a careful policy of reflation. But, after giving all due weight to this view, I lean more and more to the conclusion that, for the most part, our increasing volume of unemployment is directly due to the rapid improvements in mechanised production and scientific management. For a long time the rapidly increasing production was absorbed by the discovery of new markets and by the satisfaction of new needs created among the workers themselves. But in course of time fewer markets were available, and what were once markets became themselves industrial centres. Also the number of new needs to be satisfied is limited by the consumers' capacity to pay. All the finest devices of that latest and most meretricious of all the arts, the art of salesmanship, are unavailing against the hard fact that the wages of the workers cannot permit an effective response; and at the present time the brightest triumphs of salesmanship mean little more than diverting money from one form of expenditure to another. Furthermore, the full meaning of the dislocation caused by improved mechanisation was obscured by the operation of what must be called 'irrational' adjustments—e.g., the writing down of capital, bankruptcies, and especially war. As a recent writer¹ puts it:

Recurring wars are not merely the inevitable consequence of the present economic system—they alone make the present system in any

¹ C. Marshall Hattersly, *This Age of Plenty*, p. 101.

way possible or enduring. For war is the great consumer, and during times of international strife the problem of consumption is solved.

Because of these adjustments the growth of unemployment was regarded with little or no apprehension (except by the sufferers themselves) as a 'reserve' for industry and a recurrent temporary evil, which, while it could not be cured, could, at least, be mitigated by such a device as the provision of unemployment benefit. The unemployment benefit schemes do, indeed, mark an important stage in the humanising of industry, but the evil which they were framed to deal with was beyond all mere palliatives. Yet at the time society was satisfied that it had found a solution satisfactory to all concerned, when, actually, it had committed itself to what was to prove the unlimited responsibility of maintaining an ever-increasing army of economic derelicts. The Great War hastened the catastrophe. Hitherto war had served as an 'adjustment,' but on this occasion war turned traitor on the economic system. For this war was too long and comprehensive merely to consume the waste ordinarily produced by the economic system. Its galloping consumption was beyond the capacity of our existing mechanisation to cope with, and potential resources of mechanisation and scientific management had to be developed to such an extent that, when at last the war ended, with its inordinate consumption, the world's productive capacity had been increased five or ten fold, without any corresponding increase in the number of workers required. During the boom years the effect of this was not felt, because money was plentiful and it took industry some time to adjust itself to peace conditions; so that there was no great amount of unemployment. But a great increase came so soon as surplus cash had been spent and every industry had reverted to peace-time production. For there were by no means enough consumers to employ our vastly increased productive capacity. The consequent leap in the unemployment figures meant a diminution in our effective consuming capacity, which, in turn, meant more unemployment. And so the tale goes on. As the number of unemployed increases, the contributions paid by the industries themselves are drained to exhaustion point. To an ever-increasing extent the deficit has to be made good by loans from the State, and society finds itself burdened with an entirely new class of people, whom, without any offence, I can only call the 'idle poor.'

Among our 2,858,000 unemployed there are many thousands, still of working age and capacity, who, for the rest of their days, are likely to be maintained by one form or other of insurance benefit. Still worse, there are many thousands of young people who, since leaving school, have been maintained by the community, maybe without ever having done a stroke of work. At

one time the popular agitator blamed all our social injustices on what he called the 'idle rich.' But the 'idle rich' are now little more than the figment of a luxurious dream, and their place has been taken by the 'idle poor.' They, too, 'toil not, neither do they spin,' yet the community maintains them, although by no means in luxury. We cannot blame the unemployed for this, nor grudge them their pitiable dole. What we must blame, and that most severely, is our economic system, if it allows these millions of honest citizens to exist in such an utterly degrading state. These 'idle poor' are in a much more morally disadvantageous position than ever the 'idle rich' were, for these latter were accepted for centuries as part of the social system, and could, at least, develop a by no means unworthy code of *noblesse oblige*, whereas our unfortunate 'idle poor' are continually conscious of being unnecessary and unwanted. Such a state of things puts an almost insupportable strain, not only on the material, but, what is worse, on the moral resources of the community.

Bringing the matter down to essentials, the task before a National Government is nothing more nor less than the abolition of this new class of 'idle poor.' It is a canker eating into the very vitals of society. It matters not how greatly we develop our intelligent control over the forces of Nature for the production of life's necessities and amenities. We shall never attain the Splendid Life; nay, rather, we shall be unable to save ourselves from the abyss, so long as we are impeded, thwarted, and oppressed by such a monstrous incubus. Nor can any form of human society long endure if the very fount of human progress—namely, our sense of responsibility—is derided by an ever-increasing class of unwanted irresponsibles. It is the modern form of the old Roman disease of *panem et circences*, and will bring our modern civilisation crashing down. The human brain is ever instant to devise new and better machines, new and better methods of reducing labour and increasing production; but, unless the human brain is also ready to devise a way of producing effective consumers, all these new and better methods only serve to increase the present horror. Our society is becoming more and more like a Tantalus, whose raging thirst cannot be assuaged in the midst of abounding waters. To allow things to go on as they are is to court disaster—either that of another great war or the overthrow of our whole economic system.

Yet I firmly believe that a remedy can be found; but, since the evil to be cured is one that affects every section of the community, so the cure may come into conflict with almost every sectional interest. In so far as any Government is to apply this cure, it must needs be a Government peculiarly pledged to find a

national solution, and not to carry out the programme of any particular party. It is important also to realise that there may be various approaches to a remedy. There is, to begin with, the approach by way of monetary policy. Production would undoubtedly be greatly stimulated if price levels were raised by some form of international reflation. This policy has been strongly advocated in the House of Commons by such men as Sir Robert Horne and Mr. Winston Churchill, who are both alive to the fact that such a policy could only be pursued effectively if, at the same time, a resolute effort was made to bring down to a much lower level the tariff barriers between nations. It is for the achievement of this approach to a remedy that the World Economic Conference has been made part of the policy of the present Government; yet, ironically enough, it was in the interests of this Conference that Sir Herbert Samuel and the other Liberal Ministers made their protest against Ottawa.

Another approach, and one very popular among a large number of Government supporters, is that of far-reaching economies in national and local expenditure. It must be fully realised by all, even the most enthusiastic and well-intentioned spenders, that our national expenditure—to speak of that alone—has soared to a terrifying height. In 1913-14, when, as a community, we were in a sound financial condition, our annual budget was £195,794,923. Last year, even after Lord Snowden's emergency Budget, Government expenditure reached the formidable total of £851,000,000, and, in spite of stringent and unpopular economies, the budget still stands at £848,000,000. A great reduction must still be made, for production cannot profitably be engaged in so long as industry has to struggle under the dead-weight charges which such expenditure involves. But there are many pitfalls in the way of economies. We must remember that reductions in our heavy debt charges are a much more genuine economy than mere reductions in the social services. Take education, for example. Any reduction that would lower, in the least degree, the quality of our citizens would prove eventually a gross extravagance. And, despite the fact that somewhere or other great reductions must be made, it may well be that an increase in useful and far-sighted expenditure by local and national authorities would, by decreasing the number of unemployed, prove a most beneficent economy. Personally, I believe that much could be done by a great decrease in armaments, but, if we are to have that economy, the Government must be much more aggressive in the interests of international peace than it has so far been.

The approach I myself most favour is one that seems to me to be most directly concerned with the problem of unemployment,

and that follows definitely from what I have said previously about the effects of the mechanisation of industry. It is the reduction of the hours of labour, which has in fact already been advocated at a recent meeting of the International Labour Office by the Italian Government. Which is the more rational—to have all our workers actively employed on shorter shifts, or to have a section of them quite idle (and paid for it) whilst the other section is working longer shifts? We shall have to keep in mind that unemployment varies in our different trades and industries. In some the hours of labour could not be reduced for some time yet, whilst in others the hours must be considerably reduced. Nevertheless, as far as possible, an approximation to a uniform weekly wage must be attempted, although the amount of work done will be far from uniform. For the issue is not the prosperity of this or that particular industry, but the prosperity of *all* industry; not the well-being of this or that group of trade unionists, but the well-being of the whole community of workers. If by reason of the improvements in machinery and the application of scientific methods less human power is needed to maintain the standard of production, then this should not mean, as now, fewer men still working the old hours, but all men working shorter hours. It cannot be denied that such a reduction of working hours might involve a temporary reduction in wages. But, as things are, this cannot be made into an insuperable objection, so long as the workers are given no reason to think that they alone are singled out for sacrifice. Unpleasant though the task may be, this Government may have to go much further still in a policy of all-round reductions, and this, surely, is better than persisting in the present unhealthy state of things, where certain sheltered occupations and interests maintain the old standard whilst millions are kept in a state of idle and useless penury. And eventually, if the past is any guide, the reduction in hours will be followed by an increase in wages. At any rate, there are many in the House of Commons who will on no account submit to any policy of wage reductions unless it is part of a comprehensive scheme of reductions definitely designed for the ultimate benefit of all.

I do not wish to appear narrowly dogmatic, especially as my sole object is to enlist all the intelligent forces of good-will in a comprehensive effort to relieve our present serious situation. The reduction of working hours is the approach I personally stress as likely to be more hopeful of results; but none of the approaches to a remedy that I have outlined is mutually exclusive. Yet they must be employed with due regard for each other. For instance, any economies and reductions in wages would be considerably modified if our monetary policy actually resulted in sending up the price level; and the reduction of working hours in this

country could be much more favourably achieved along with international economic arrangements. Yet all these approaches should have one great object in view—the immediate reduction of unemployment and the eventual abolition of the class of economic derelicts. Only as we achieve this can we save our society; any delay in its achievement brings disaster still dangerously nearer.

The remedy I propose should be brought forward by the Government as a definite and comprehensive measure, so that its object could not possibly be mistaken for anything else nor side-tracked by the opposition of any one section of the community. It is clearly a measure that only a genuinely National Government could possibly undertake, since it cuts across the peculiar preserves and privileges of almost every party, class and interest. No one party could undertake the work, and we do not want a dictator. We Liberals felt a little flattered when, a few months ago, Mr. H. G. Wells suggested the formation of a Liberal Fascism to carry out the far-reaching reforms so urgently and immediately needed; but, despite our recent discouraging experiences, we still feel that our Liberalism would be far more compromised by our imitating Signor Mussolini than by trying to work with Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Neville Chamberlain. The real value of this suggestion is that it shows Mr. Wells as fully alive to the spirit that is needed for the task—the determination to get things done with a sympathetic understanding of the needs of all.

I believe that that spirit still exists in the present Parliament, although it is by no means as widespread as it ought to be. Let me, as an unrepentant Liberal, pay a tribute at this point to a certain number of Conservative members who, as I know from first-hand experience, are better than their leaders in the sincerity with which they approach all the issues before this Parliament from a national and not a party standpoint. How many there are of these I cannot exactly say, but certainly several score, and most of them are young and full of zeal for the removal of social and economic injustices. The presence of such men makes it less difficult to remain loyal to the Government in the hope that it may yet show itself capable of facing up to the real problems and attempting their solution in a bold and comprehensive spirit.

But while it is the duty of all supporters of the present Government to prove themselves superior to party, they will make a grievous error if they begin to think about forming a new National Party. Unfortunately, a certain number of the more progressive young Conservatives to whom I have referred, as well as a few Liberals, have been bitten with this idea. There are two great, and, to my mind, conclusive, objections to it. First, the special

quality of an All-Party Government would be lost if it ceased to contain genuine Liberals, genuine Conservatives, and genuine Labourites, because all their special points of view and experience are needed in framing measures to meet the needs of the whole community in this critical time. Secondly, it would be difficult for the founders of such a National Party to forget all about the next election. Many of those who are urging it represent constituencies either as Conservatives dependent on Liberal votes, or as Liberals dependent on Conservative votes, and are not therefore quite disinterested. But what the country wants is a National Government now, not a National Party in the future.

So long as Mr. MacDonald keeps his health he is the best man to hold the position of Premier in a National Government. I must frankly confess, however, that I am by no means alone in feeling that the Premier has not yet given us the lead the country expects of him. He does not seem to realise the full strength of his position in the House. So far as mere back-benchers are able to judge, our impression is that he has made up his mind that his policy must reflect almost entirely the opinions of the largest party. What he ought to realise is that he is the right and proper leader of a National, or All-Party, Government, precisely because he has no party organisation of his own. His apparent weakness is his real strength. And those people who are wasting their own and also Mr. MacDonald's resources in trying to build up a National Labour Party 'with a view' have completely misread the position. Mr. MacDonald's position will be weakened, and not strengthened, by the formation of a National Labour Party. As things are, he is far more independent of party ties and obligations than either Mr. Baldwin or Sir Herbert Samuel, and is therefore the very man to lead. He can act, if he will, as an independent statesman. The people gave him his present place, not a party caucus. He may perhaps find himself in a very peculiar position at the next election. But why worry? He is in a very peculiar position now. He has—what no other Premier has ever had—a 'Doctor's Mandate' to serve the people as he will.

The vastly important measures that must be brought in are precisely those most in accord with his own special quality of mind. There is no man to-day more capable of thinking socially and internationally. That is precisely what we need. He must be prepared to stake all on this opportunity, without worrying about what would happen if the majority of the Cabinet failed to support him. In so far as they are honest and intelligent, and in so far as he makes his proposals on a broad social basis, they will feel themselves under an obligation to support him. If the worst comes to the worst—that is, if party and sectional interests override the needs of the country—then he himself will have to

resign. Why not? He will have deserved well of his country. In any case, whether he carries the Cabinet with him in measures for the general good, or resigns his place, he will awaken and strengthen the national spirit of the present Parliament. But he must, if things go that way, resign magnificently and at all costs avoid being jockeyed out by petty manoeuvres in which all sight of the real issue is lost.

And, after all, is not this the real issue: whether or not this country, with its Mother of Parliaments, is still able to meet the test of this grave crisis by means of constitutional and parliamentary methods? The faith of the people, so strikingly revealed at the last election, cannot be betrayed without disastrous consequences. We in this Parliament must show the people that a national spirit can exist and can express itself through its elected representatives. The great Tory Party, with its boasted tradition of patriotism, may prove itself incapable of the magnanimous gesture it owes, and must bear the blame for any dire consequences that follow. But if the Prime Minister has to resign because he cannot carry his colleagues with him in a comprehensive measure for the good of all, there still remains some hope for our Mother of Parliaments. He will, at least, have shown that the national spirit is not dead, but has fled the darkness of a petty-minded Cabinet, fiddling tariffs and Toryism, to take its place among those who in due course can be entrusted with the growing task of repairing the ruins these others will have made.

ERNEST H. PICKERING.

THE LYTTON REPORT

THE Lytton Commission was created by unanimous resolution of the Council of the League of Nations on December 10, 1931, in order 'to contribute towards a final and fundamental solution by the two Governments of the questions at issue.' It was empowered 'to study on the spot and to report to the Council on *any* circumstance which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb the peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them on which peace depends.' Acting on this wide mandate, the Commission proceeded to the Far East, and has now presented the results of its investigation in a Report which takes high rank among the public documents of our time. It is contained in a volume of 80,000 words written in cogent English far removed from the pedestrian style common to most Blue-books; and it places the world in possession of a comprehensive review of the Manchurian problem more complete, up to date, and authoritative than any that has yet been made. The members of the Commission conceived their duty in a large spirit—not to censure or upbraid, but to analyse, illumine and appease; and that duty they have discharged with singular freedom from bias and with a breadth of view that gives the most prejudiced mind little ground for protest. They state the whole case so temperately that even the strongest partisans of nationalism on both sides of the China Sea must realise that they are under the discriminating eye, not of a harsh judge, but of a conciliator whose sole purpose was to find the truth and lay the foundation of better relations between China and Japan.

The Report is divided into ten chapters, accompanied by a number of valuable annexes and fourteen maps. At the outset it places the Manchurian question in its true setting as part of the general problem of China. The Commission inevitably found it necessary to extend its study beyond 'the limits of Manchuria itself and to consider in their widest aspect all the factors which determine present Sino-Japanese relations. The national aspirations of the republic of China, the expansionist policy of the Japanese Empire and of the former Russian Empire, the present dissemination of Communism from the U.S.S.R., the economic

and strategic needs of these three countries; such matters as these, for example, are factors of fundamental importance in any study of the Manchurian problem.' While thus giving the true historical perspective of the problem, Lord Lytton and his colleagues envisage the dispute as arising fundamentally from internal disorder in China; and they show clearly that if the republic within the Great Wall had made better progress in putting its house in order, the situation in Manchuria could not have deteriorated into the point where Japan found her excuse, if not her justification, for military measures. While refraining from explicit censure of either party, the Commission impartially assigns responsibility to them both, by saying that 'though the issues between China and Japan were not in themselves incapable of solution by arbitral procedure, yet the handling of them by their respective Governments, especially those relating to Manchuria, had so embittered their relations as sooner or later to make a conflict inevitable.' Implicit in their whole argument is the thesis that while radical reform is needed in China itself, the course pursued by Japan is a violation of international obligations and may even be regarded as short-sighted in her own interest. In a sense it may be said that the substance of the Lytton Report is a plea for a reconsideration of Japanese policy. A true appreciation cannot be made without bearing constantly in mind those two aspects of the problem, and the partisan will do well to ponder the Commission's words: 'Throughout this review of the issues, we have insisted less on the responsibility for past actions than on the necessity of finding means to avoid their repetition in the future.'

Now the factors which have made Manchuria a field of conflict are well known. Economically it is a partial vacuum owing to the policy of the Manchu dynasty in forbidding Chinese immigration from within the Wall; and though the immigration from Shantung and Hopei in recent years has placed beyond doubt the permanent character of its future population, the constitutional weakness of China has left its political future uncertain. By this colonisation from China proper the Chinese people reassert their rightful claim, but, as Mr. Owen Lattimore reminds us in the most valuable book yet written on Manchuria,¹

... on either flank stand Russia and Japan, in strategic positions which we are accustomed to describe as 'dominating,' but which are really more than that—they are imperative. As far as can be seen from present conditions the pressure of these two nations on Manchuria, unavoidable because inherent in their positions, has not yet reached its maximum. It is commonly held that the Chinese are proving that in the basic fact of colonisation, by occupying Manchuria with a Chinese population, they can

¹ *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict*, by Owen Lattimore (Macmillan, 1932)

put themselves beyond competition from Russians or Japanese, and far beyond competition from the non-Chinese indigenous races. If, however, Manchuria is in this respect primarily a field of Chinese colonization, yet China is handicapped by the difficulty of asserting its power and control over Manchuria as an integral part of China, or even as an outer dominion, for China is weak in its relation to any alien power. The power of united China is growing, undoubtedly; but that growth depends to a gravely dangerous extent on the goodwill of foreign nations, so that the Chinese are not yet fully masters of their own destiny. The incorporation of alien principles with the traditional culture of China itself has not yet been successfully completed; a critical period has yet to be faced in which China must prove that its reconstructed culture can develop the power of fresh social growth, and it must therefore be considered still an open question how far Manchuria may come to be a colonial region, occupied by Chinese, but in some degree dominated, and correspondingly exploited, by non-Chinese governments.

It was this 'open question' which the Lytton Commission had to consider in the light of the events of the past year. Postponing for the moment the consideration of the Japanese contention that it is no longer an open question, because the recognition of 'Manchukuo' has closed it, we must agree that the problem of the Manchurian vacuum cannot be solved unless it is treated on the lines of the ten conditions laid down in the Report: (1) The interests and rights both of China and Japan must be recognised and safeguarded; (2) Soviet Russia cannot be ignored; (3) the international foundation must rest on the Covenant of the League, the Pact of Paris, and the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922; (4) the rights, interests, and historical associations of Japan with Manchuria demand, and should receive, special recognition; (5) it is desirable to restate the whole relationship of China and Japan in a new and comprehensive treaty which shall supersede all others; (6) it is equally desirable to create means for settling disputes in the future; (7) the new form of government must give Manchuria real local autonomy, within the embrace of Chinese sovereignty, and at the same time guarantee stable government; (8) internal peace should be in the hands of a special gendarmerie and all other forces should be withdrawn; (9) a new commercial treaty is required; (10) international co-operation in Chinese reconstruction (not merely in Manchuria) is necessary to assist in removing Chinese internal disorder, which is one of the parent causes of the Manchurian trouble.

These basic conditions are not 'theory and sentiment,' they are all derived from the facts of the case; and, if some of them may seem academic, it is none the less essential that they should be laid down as the preamble to any international plan that may be found possible. Unless it be acknowledged that Japan is justified in cutting the Gordian knot with the sword, the ten

points here proclaimed can be accepted as a working foundation. The Commission, at all events, had no doubt about the matter; for, after weighing the alternatives, it concludes that there can be no return to the *status quo* before September 18, nor can the *régime* set up thereafter be regarded as satisfactory. The first would merely restore the evil conditions which engendered the crisis; the second 'is opposed to the interests of China, disregards the wishes of the people of Manchuria, and it is at least questionable whether it would serve the permanent interests of Japan. It is the very simplicity of the 'Manchukuo' solution which makes it inadmissible, for it ignores too many of the fundamental facts.

Having deduced these ten conditions from a study of all the facts of the case, having also concluded that neither the *status quo ante* nor the *régime* of 'Manchukuo' can be accepted as a satisfactory solution, the Commission proposes that the Council of the League should seek a settlement by inviting China and Japan to meet in conference for the purpose of constituting a 'special *régime* for the administration of Manchuria.' It is to be noted that Manchuria is here described as the 'Three Eastern Provinces,' which means that Jehol (Eastern Inner Mongolia) is excluded, though it is included within the ill-defined boundaries of 'Manchukuo.' The personnel of this advisory Conference is to be composed of representatives of the two Governments and of the delegations representing the local population of Manchuria, one selected in a manner prescribed by the Chinese Government, and one selected in a manner prescribed by the Japanese Government. Its scope will be confined to the problem of Manchuria. Sino-Japanese questions of a more general character are to be simultaneously discussed in negotiations conducted apart from this Advisory Conference; and the aim of the whole proceeding is to create an entirely new relationship between China and Japan embodied in four separate instruments: (1) A declaration by the Government of China constituting a special administration for the Three Eastern Provinces, in the terms recommended by the Advisory Conferences; (2) a Sino-Japanese Treaty dealing with Japanese interests; (3) a Sino-Japanese Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration, Non-aggression and Mutual Assistance; (4) a Sino-Japanese Commercial Treaty. These would all be important instruments; but it is the 'declaration' which has the greatest immediate interest, for it reveals the outline of the future picture of Manchuria which the Commission has in mind.

The declaration, which would have 'the binding character of an international engagement,' would recognise the special status of Manchuria and define the respective functions of the central Government of China and of the autonomous Government of

the Three Eastern Provinces. The central Government would reserve to itself (1) the control of foreign affairs, of the customs, post office, and Salt Gabelle; (2) the appointment of the chief Executive and the right to instruct the chief Executive in matters of central concern. All other powers would belong to the autonomous local government. The embryo of representative institutions is suggested in the proposal 'to secure an expression of the opinion of the people on the policy of the local government through the traditional agency of the chambers of commerce, guilds and other civil organisations.' Doubtless because the Commission proposes to offer only a sketch of the system of government, it has made no proposals regarding the law-making power, but has left this part of the problem to the same process of trial and error which prevails in Nanking itself. It contemplates the employment of foreign advisors (a substantial proportion of them Japanese) in all departments of State, and proposes the appointment of two special foreign officers of different nationalities, with 'extensive powers' to supervise the fiscal administration and the constabulary. Another high official is to be the general advisor to the Central Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, appointed from a panel submitted by the Bank for International Settlements, though why the Central Bank of China should not be recognised as the central banking authority for Manchuria is a question which the Commission apparently did not consider. The Commission recognises in all this that 'it will be expedient to appoint a relatively large number of Japanese advisors,' but it declares that 'the goal to be kept in view throughout the period of transition is the creation of a civil service composed of Chinese, who will ultimately make the employment of foreigners unnecessary.' To preserve order a special corps of constabulary is to be created; and since it 'would be the only armed force within the Three Eastern Provinces . . . all other armed forces, whether Chinese or Japanese, should be withdrawn from the territory' when the gendarmerie is actually in being. For the local purpose of peace and order this might be adequate; but it follows that the inviolability of Manchuria from foreign attack must be guaranteed by an international declaration of its integrity, or else the central Chinese Government must be permitted to maintain the necessary forces on the territory for national defence.

The narrative by which these proposals are introduced is full of interest. Each subject on which the Report gives evidence—the political system (or lack of system) in Manchuria, the railway conflict, the dispute over the leasing of land, the thorny Korean controversy—demands careful study, but none of them can be treated here as amply as it deserves; and therefore only one or

two salient points can be noted. The Report makes it clear that the general situation in Manchuria had deteriorated since the death of Chang Tso-lin, that the economic depression of the world provoked agrarian unrest in the form of banditry (which is the classic form of agricultural unemployment in China), that the advance of political influences from the south introduced a factor of disturbance which had hitherto been held in check, and that all these coincided with a change of opinion in Japan in the direction of militarism. During the years from 1928 to 1932 the building of Chinese lines of railway, in a manner which Japan interpreted as a violation of the 1905 agreement, gradually brought the long controversy to a head; but as late as July 1931 the authorities of the South Manchurian Railway were still seeking a settlement by negotiation. The breakdown of the Railway Conference at that time was the real point of new departure.

On the long-disputed question of 'treaty right' or 'secret protocol,' on which Japan based her protests against Chinese railway projects, the Report contains a passage which lays controversy to rest by stating clearly the real question at issue. After examining all the relative documents in Nanking, Peiping and Tokyo, it is stated that 'the alleged engagement of the Chinese plenipotentiaries of the Peking Conference of November-December 1905 regarding so-called "parallel railways" is not contained in any formal treaty,' but is to be found in the minutes of the Conference of December 4, 1905, where the Chinese Government 'engages not to construct lines in the neighbourhood of, or parallel to, the South Manchurian Railway.' The Chinese and Japanese official translations of this entry 'leave no doubt that the disputed passage concerning parallel railways is a declaration or statement of intention on the part of the Chinese plenipotentiaries.' That some of the Chinese lines violate this engagement is undoubtedly true, but it is equally certain that the Japanese have pushed their claim under it beyond reasonable limits. In view of the new situation, the *immediate* value of this carefully reasoned part of the Report (pp. 44-49) may not be great, but, since it deals with a subject which has played a vital rôle in the whole controversy and will be heard of again, the reader may be advised to study it with care.

Leaving aside the interesting narrative of the events of September, we must pass at once to the illuminating account of the making of 'Manchukuo,' the new Manchurian State which is not a State. The Commission describes the phases through which Manchuria passed, from the complete disorganisation of the province of Liaoning (Fengtien) which followed the collapse of the Mukden Government in September 1931, through a rapid metamorphosis which ended in the recognition by Japan of her

own creation a year later. It is a story of crucial importance, and leads to the following conclusion :

Since September 18, 1931, the activities of the Japanese military authorities, in civil as well as in military matters, were marked by essentially political considerations. The progressive military occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces removed in succession from the control of the Chinese authorities the towns of Tsitsihar, Chinchow and Harbin, finally all the important towns of Manchuria ; and following each occupation, the civil administration was reorganised. It is clear that the Independence Movement, which had never been heard of in Manchuria before September 1931, was only made possible by the presence of the Japanese troops.

A group of Japanese civil and military officials, both active and retired, who were in close touch with the new political movement in Japan to which reference was made in Chapter IV., conceived, organised and carried through this movement, as a solution to the situation in Manchuria as it existed after the events of September 18.

With this object, they made use of the names and actions of certain Chinese individuals, and took advantage of certain minorities among the inhabitants, who had grievances against the former administration.

It is also clear that the Japanese General Staff realised from the start, or at least in a short time, the use which could be made of such an autonomy movement. In consequence, they provided assistance and gave direction to the organisers of the movement. The evidence received from all sources has satisfied the Commission that, while there were a number of factors which contributed to the creation of 'Manchukuo,' the two which, in combination, were most effective, and without which, in our judgment, the new State could not have been formed, were the presence of Japanese troops, and the activities of Japanese officials, both civil and military.

For this reason the present *régime* cannot be considered to have been called into existence by a genuine and spontaneous independence movement.

This judgment rests on the support of the Commission's own observations, of information from reliable neutral sources, and of 1550 written communications from Chinese residents in Manchuria, of which all except two were hostile to the Manchukuo Government and to the Japanese. The opposite view was presented by many delegations representing public bodies and associations which usually presented written statements. Most of the delegations were introduced by the Japanese or 'Manchukuo' authorities, and

we had strong grounds for believing that the statements left with us had previously received Japanese approval. In fact, in some cases persons who had presented them informed us afterwards that they had been written or substantially revised by the Japanese and were not to be taken as the expression of their real feelings. These documents were remarkable for the studied neglect to comment either favourably or otherwise upon Japanese participation in the establishment or maintenance of the 'Manchukuo' administration. In the main these statements were concerned with the relation of grievances against the former Chinese

administration and contained expressions of hope and confidence in the future of the new State.

This is the sober estimate of an international Commission of which certain members were at first not disposed to take an unfavourable view of Japanese policy ; and, since the Report is unanimous, it represents, not an extreme statement, but a fair and agreed conclusion, in the making of which a balance has been struck between the natural differences of opinion held by individual members. And it displays clearly not only the historical origins of the present dispute and the complicity of both China and Japan in its result, but also the magnitude of the task which Japan has undertaken in imposing upon a hostile population a government alien to its desires. In passing judgment on Japanese action the Commission never loses sight of Japanese interests ; nor does it make light of the difficulties and provocations which Japan has encountered in recent years. It recognises that 'fundamental among the interests of Japan is the strategic importance of this territory,' and they have nothing but praise for her achievements in developing it. At the same time, it gives Manchuria a less prominent place in the whole economy of Japan than most Japanese are wont to claim, thereby correcting a false estimate which Japanese propaganda has planted abroad. The Report is at pains to remind us that, both in exports and in imports, China and the United States of America are more important to Japan than Manchuria can ever be ; and it quotes the present Japanese Foreign Minister as saying (August 30, 1932), 'the Government considers the question of Sino-Japanese relations as more important than the question of Manchuria and Mongolia.'

Such is the picture of Manchuria, past and present, which Lord Lytton and his colleagues paint. They have made the outlines of the new proposed *régime* tentative ; for they evidently felt that, while their mandate required them to present a Report of a definite and constructive character, the way to a solution would be the more easily found if they refrained from appearing to prejudge every issue by offering a cut-and-dry solution in advance of negotiations between China and Japan. In assuming that such negotiations were feasible, they are open to the charge of taking too much for granted ; but they did not ignore the possibility that Japan would forestall their otherwise practical plan by open recognition of 'Manchukuo,' and they declare their belief that even in that event their work would not be valueless. Japanese spokesmen have admitted that the Lytton proposals would have offered a basis for discussion six months ago, and that admission must be read as proof that, whatever may have been the opinion and intention of Tokyo, the Japanese army in Man-

churia deliberately jumped the claim in order to present the League with a *fait accompli*. The Japanese had a shrewd idea of the general tenor of the Report; and it is significant that in haste they sent General Muto to go through the form of negotiating with 'Manchukuo' a 'fundamental treaty' of recognition at the moment when they knew that the signing of the Lytton Report was imminent. The suspicion grows irresistibly that even the militarists of the forward school recognised in advance the essential reasonableness of its proposals and determined to put Japan into a position from which pride would forbid any withdrawal.

Let me recall here Mr. Yukio Ozaki's interesting article in the October number of *The Nineteenth Century*. Mr. Ozaki is a former Cabinet Minister in Japan, and when he tells us that 'a firm stand [by other Powers] at the beginning of the affair' would have induced a more sober frame of mind in the Japanese military party, and that 'a year of wait and see was long enough for Japan to consolidate her new position,' we can see how much was lost by the irresolution of the Powers—not the League, be it remembered—in the early stages of the Manchurian crisis. Mr. Ozaki predicts that 'our national crisis will take the form of isolation and national catastrophe'; and he insists that 'Japan must emerge from isolation, breaking away from bigoted and narrow-minded nationalism.' Bearing in mind that there are Japanese who see thus clearly, many questions arise as we contemplate the problem which international diplomacy has to solve. Is it true that Japan has turned her back upon the West and seeks the hegemony of Asia by force? Are we to assume that Japanese liberalism is a spent force, and that the corruption of the parliamentary régime has given the neo-militarism of the younger officers a deep hold on the national mind? Or is not the strongest point in their success to be found in the fact that they have encountered little or no resistance? The task before the League, and particularly the League *plus* America, is to enable Japan to retrace her steps from 'Manchukuo'; and the process requires firmness as well as persuasion. Japanese 'face' is involved, and therefore the attempt to coerce the Japanese Government too openly would defeat its purpose. But, since Japan is vitally dependent on foreign finance for her daily industry, she is vulnerable to pressure skilfully and unobtrusively applied. And if it were made clear that the aim was not to deprive her of legitimate gains, but to guarantee her rights in Manchuria on the lines of the Lytton Report, it is reasonable to assume that she herself might find a formula of escape from a position which is to-day not easy and will yet become menacing.

Meanwhile Japan takes her stand on 'Manchukuo' as the

solution; but, though she dismisses Lord Lytton as too late, she has not said her last word. And what of China? Conflicting voices are heard, and we do not know what is the real reaction of Chinese opinion to the Lytton proposals. I anticipate that, though there are features in the Report which many Chinese will dislike, the Chinese Government will probably accept it as the lesser of two evils. China knows that she cannot expect the League or anyone else to pull the Manchurian chestnut out of the fire for her, but she would probably regard the transitional Constitution sketched by the Lytton Commission as a substantial guarantee to her sovereignty. The Chinese already know that co-operation with the League can be very useful to them. They may suspect that a design of international intervention of the old kind lurks in Lord Lytton's tenth point—international co-operation with China. But if its purpose is carried out in the manner in which the expert missions of the League have already discharged their function in internal Chinese reform, that suspicion will easily be laid to rest. A month before the Report was signed the influential Tientsin newspaper *I Shih Pao* said (August 13):

If the Powers will agree not to recognise Manchukuo, China will be infinitely grateful. That is all we ask of them. Heaven helps those that help themselves; and if we cannot recover our lost provinces, and put up a prolonged resistance, without outside help, not only shall we show ourselves lacking in will-power, but also lost to all sense of shame. The doctrine of non-recognition will not only strike a blow at Japan and her puppet Government, but will also afford China time to organise her resistance. If China misses this further opportunity, she will have brought the trouble on herself; she must not blame others.

This may be taken to show that opinion in North China is prepared to support a long campaign of resistance, by guerilla warfare in Manchuria, and that some importance is attached to Mr. Stimson's doctrine of non-recognition. But there are also signs of a very different kind. Just as during the Shanghai hostilities there was no real co-operation in national defence, so to-day Manchuria is the cause of personal and political recrimination in party circles instead of being the cement of a much-needed unity. Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang made an appeal for national resistance to Japan in October, but seemed as much concerned to excoriate the Nanking Government as to rally the Chinese people for the struggle. His criticism derived some force from the dissensions known to exist in Nanking, but it altogether ignored the extraordinary difficulties of the National Government. Taking all the factors into account, it is clear that no Chinese Government dare yield an inch on the issue of 'Manchukuo,' that China will use the machinery of the League for what it is worth and probably

accept with reservations the principles of the Lytton Report. But her power to influence the course of events does not stop there. She cannot force Japan immediately to desist or change course; but, by boycott and by supporting the anti-'Manchukuo' forces in Manchuria, she can make Japan's self-appointed task too costly to be fulfilled on its present lines. Thus China is not a negligible factor, and it is a profound mistake to ignore her possible influence in the development of the situation.

The immediate problem, however, lies, not in China, but in Geneva. When the Lytton Report comes before the Council and the Assembly ingenious draftsmanship will doubtless find a formula which will endorse the principles of the Commission and yet avoid a breach with Japan. But this is not enough, for it would give Japan her much-prized substance, leaving the League with the shadow, and, by repeating the untimely meekness of last year, encourage the military party in Manchuria (and in Japan) to believe that there are no limits to international complaisance and therefore none to their ambition. The *fait accompli* of 'Manchukuo' makes the problem of right action more difficult than it was before; but so long as the neutral Powers refuse to recognise it, the question of its ultimate destiny must remain open. Therefore non-recognition, both in the sense of a refusal to admit the existence of 'Manchukuo' as a *de jure* political unit, and in Mr. Stimson's other sense, is something more than an empty and negative profession. It will create anomalies and difficulties which Japan will have to face by changing her policy. It has therefore a practical value. But it must be sustained by something more than fine words. It has hitherto lacked the right kind of backing for two main reasons: first, because England and the United States were not in true accord upon Far Eastern policy; second, because Japan believed, not without reason, that she could count on the support of France and perhaps of some other Powers. Both of these reasons flow from one source—namely, that, with the exception of the United States, no Power concerned in the long debate has yet seen clearly enough that the essential issue is not one of merely Manchurian scope, but affects the whole structure of international relations. In recent weeks, notably since *Le Temps* published its significant article on August 16, the French attitude had perceptibly changed because it was seen that not even the ingenuity of the Quai d'Orsay could successfully preach one doctrine in Berlin and its opposite in Tokyo without impairing the force of one or the other; and, since the German problem was first in importance, the French decided to condone no longer the violation of treaty engagements in the Far East. What this will mean in Geneva we have yet to see.

But, welcome as the change is, it will not vitally affect the treatment of the problem unless it is accompanied by more cordial Anglo-American co-operation. And the foundation of such an accord can only be found in a truer appreciation of the issues that are raised by, and that far eclipse in importance, the Manchurian conflict. England did not jettison the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1922 merely to have the worst of both worlds. She deliberately created, with the other Powers at Washington, a new system in which she undertook obligations in common with them. And if it be true, as it is, that Japan has flagrantly denied her obligations, it is equally true that the issue, thus provoked, has grown graver because England has tacitly ignored hers. The new collective system is at stake; and it is both a British interest and a British obligation to see that it does not founder in the storm now blowing round the world.

A. F. WHYTE.

STRESA AND AFTER

WHILE reading the protocols of the Conference of Stresa and of the last meeting of the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry for European Union dealing with the reconstruction of Central and Eastern European countries, one wonders why the advice of Lord Snowden given at the second Hague Conference in January 1930 has not been followed up. He said that the delegates should be shut up in a room without food and drink until they agreed—on something practical and realisable, we may add. After all, there was no lack of agreements at Stresa. But the problems discussed seem so far to remain unsolved because 'there is not much danger that the agreements will be ratified,' as one of the delegates sarcastically remarked.

The Convention of Lausanne instructed the Conference of Stresa as follows :

(a) To submit proposals as to the measures required for the restoration of Central and Eastern Europe in particular to overcome the present transfer difficulties of those countries and to make possible the progressive suppression, subject to the necessary safeguards, of the existing systems of exchange control ; and

(b) To revive activity of trade both among those countries themselves and between them and other States, and to overcome the difficulties caused to the agricultural countries of Central and Eastern Europe by the low price of cereals, it being understood that the rights of 'third countries' remain reserved.

Under the chairmanship of M. George Bonnet, representing France, there were assembled at Stresa the creditor countries—England, Holland and Switzerland ; the consumer countries of Central and Eastern European products—Italy and Germany ; the Danubian countries—Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which were joined by Poland and Greece (all debtor countries). The so-called agrarian bloc, consisting of Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, held a conference previously at Warsaw, at which the Baltic States were represented also, but these sent only an observer to Stresa.

If we consider the manifold political and economic contro-

versies existing between these countries,¹ and if we remember the failure of the London Conference on the Danubian problem, held in April, there is no doubt about the importance of the resolutions unanimously adopted at Stresa. But can we say that the spirit of Lausanne inspired the delegations to agree, or was that on which they agreed something on which they could not fail to agree, at least for the sake of 'saving face' ? What are the results of Stresa ? Before answering this question, we have to remember that it was not the purpose of the Stresa Conference to produce definite agreements. According to the Convention of Lausanne it was charged to make proposals to the European Union Committee of the League of Nations, which again would use these proposals for the preparation of the World Economic Conference, at which the Danubian problem and the reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe will apparently form a separate subject for discussion.

The Conference of Stresa produced two reports : the voluminous report of the Financial Committee, with much useful data on the financial position of the Central and Eastern European countries, and the report of the Economic and Agrarian Committee to which the scheme for the Agrarian Fund is attached. Except for this annex and a few pages about the settlement of post-war debts, with which I shall deal later in greater detail, the whole of these reports is a remarkable theoretical treatise, very similar to the protocols of the Conference of Portorose, held in 1921, on the co-operation of the Succession States of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy between almost the same countries as were represented at Stresa.

The Governments of the States represented by the signatory delegates shall, as soon as possible, take the steps necessary to re-establish freedom of imports and exports in the relations between their several countries. In any case, they shall abolish all import prohibitions and restrictions in July 1922 at the latest and shall before that date make arrangements among themselves to fix, by common consent, a date whereon all export prohibitions, control, or other restrictions affecting the exportation of any merchandise shall be abolished. It is agreed, moreover, to avoid customs legislation which would establish customs duties or other taxes, equivalent to actual export or import prohibitions.

If we change 1922 to 1932 we have the wording of the Stresa resolutions, which are in fact less binding. More than ten years has elapsed between these two Conferences, during which financial reconstructions under the auspices of the League of Nations were tried, large foreign loans were poured into these countries, numerous conferences held, and yet the last Conference had to deal

¹ Cf. my article, 'The Danubian Problem,' in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, May 1932.

with the same problems and could not make any other recommendations. We can quote a still more important and earlier resolution, that of the Allied Supreme Council made in March 1920, which was fully endorsed by the International Financial Conference at Brussels:

The States which have been created or enlarged as a result of the war should at once re-establish full and friendly co-operation, and arrange for the unrestricted interchange of commodities in order that the essential unity of European economic life may not be impaired by the erection of artificial economic barriers.

Judging the present difficulties in the light of these statements and of the intervening ten years' experience, we cannot fail to conclude that, though the world-wide economic crisis is in a considerable degree responsible for the condition of Central and South Eastern Europe, the situation created by the Peace Treaties was not only 'unjust but incorrect and unwise,' as Senator Borah has said, and rendered the carrying out of the wise recommendation of the Allied Supreme Council and the realisation of resolutions like those of the Portoroze Conference impossible. The working of the clearest and wisest economic scheme is obstructed by the political atmosphere which has existed in Europe since the war. The underlying danger in the situation remains always the lack of confidence, the distrust which hinders and frustrates all effective co-operation. Will Europe wait another ten years? And if so, will it be able to face the next crisis, even if it recovers now? Or will it create through the revision of the Peace Treaties the right atmosphere for political understanding and economic co-operation to build up a European economic system, which not only could deal with the world crisis, but would also abolish all danger of Bolshevik upheavals and would be able to secure the prosperity and peaceful cultural development of all European countries? Will Great Britain take the leadership in this task of pacification? Will France and the Little Entente follow? These are the questions which are being asked in all corners of Europe. It is interesting to note that while the delegates of Hungary and Austria felt obliged to avoid carefully almost every reference to the consequences of the dismemberment of their countries by the Peace Treaties, the Stresa reports contain nothing about this important cause of the crisis in the Danube valley.

Almost the only new elements in the Stresa reports are the proposal concerning the establishment of the Agrarian Fund and the recommendations concerning the settlement of post-war debts. Opinion on the Agrarian Fund proposal is divided. Expectations ran high in Central and Eastern Europe, but they were disappointed on reading this scheme. Leaving aside for

the moment the probability (or the reverse) of ratification, it may be admitted that the Agrarian Fund, if put into actual working, would be an important element in starting the reconstruction of the agrarian countries. Through its agency export surpluses could be disposed of according to a fixed schedule at higher prices and the inland price level in these countries would be relieved of the pressure of world market prices. This is imperative in order to enable these countries to carry through the much-needed reorganisation and readjustment of their production, since the preferential system contained in the scheme can be only a transitory measure. The Agrarian Fund provides for the revalorisation of cereals in the following way: The grain exporting countries are to receive a premium of 2 Swiss francs per quintal on exported wheat up to the limit of 16,000,000 quintals, which is the average of the quantities exported during the last three years; and of 1fr. 50c. on 15,000,000 quintals of barley and 13,500,000 quintals of maize; while in addition a preference is secured for 4,000,000 quintals of rye, 3,000,000 quintals of beer-barley, and 1,000,000 quintals of oats. Greece applied for the inclusion of tobacco, to which the European Union Committee agreed. The sum-total of the subsidies is proposed to be 75,000,000 francs. This amount is to be provided for partly in cash and partly by means of preferential duties—i.e., countries which adhere to the agreement, but do not import cereals from the agrarian countries, will contribute in cash the amount allotted to them, while the importing countries will give a corresponding reduction in their duties on cereals. The import quotas are to be fixed by bilateral agreements. The fund will be managed by a committee consisting of one representative of each of the exporting and importing countries and two of the European non-importing countries. The committee may invite two representatives of overseas countries in a consultative capacity. The theoretical objections to the fund are of course based on the 'most-favoured-nation' clause.

So far as the countries represented at the Stresa Conference are concerned, it was unanimously agreed that, though the scheme means a breach of this clause, it can be agreed upon as an emergency measure limited to certain countries and certain quantities and to a given period of time. The draft convention provides a duration of not more than three years. The other members of the European Union Committee—the Northern European countries and Russia, who were not present at Stresa—protested against the scheme at Geneva, but this alone should not prevent its acceptance by the signatories. Great Britain's attitude towards the fund is not quite clear. Mr. Eden, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated at Geneva that the British Government was in full agreement with the general principles

of the Stresa resolutions, notably where budget problems and external debts were concerned. With regard, however, to financial guarantees the position of the United Kingdom was well known, and he would recall the reservations already made in this connexion by the British delegate to the Conference. At Stresa the British representative declared that Great Britain would be unable to give any financial assistance. In view of the Ottawa agreements, it is not likely that England would grant preferential treatment to the Central and Eastern European countries. This means that Great Britain's only contribution would be a negative one—namely, that she would not object to the temporary suspension of the 'most-favoured-nation' clause.

The practical objections to the scheme arise from the fact that on the one hand Italy, where the *battaglio del grano* produces remarkable results, and Germany, where agrarian protection is high, will have to import this year only quite small quantities of cereals; while on the other hand the agrarian countries have not much wheat for export this year, though there will be a surplus of barley and maize. Objections are directed also to the monetary subsidies payable out of the fund, and M. Bonnet's statement that 'the scheme will put the debtor countries in a position to meet their foreign obligations' is, to say the least of it, somewhat optimistic. The situation is still more difficult in respect of the other agrarian products, such as live and slaughtered animals and dairy produce, which do not receive any preferential treatment, and which would suffer especially from the Ottawa agreements, not only in consequence of the direct loss of the British market, but also through the increased competition of Holland and Denmark in the German market. It is but a poor consolation for the agriculturalists in the Danubian countries to say that 'this Agrarian Fund is only a beginning,' the more so since it is very uncertain when or whether the 'beginning' will begin at all.

On the other hand, the Stresa proposals do not contain any substantial provision from which Austria could expect any improvement in her difficult situation. Though she has been promised a new League loan of 300,000,000 schillings, this loan would not much alter her present position, since part of it will be used for the purpose of repaying credits to the Bank for International Settlements and the Bank of England, while the balance is going to be used for the payment of interest on the Reconstruction Loan of 1922, which is guaranteed by Great Britain, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. Should she fail to pay interest on this loan the respective Governments would have to continue payments, and therefore it is very probable that Austria will receive the credit promised. But what Austria really needs is an

outlet for her industrial products, and a closer economic co-operation with some larger territory providing a market for her exports. Since the *Anschluss* with Germany has been frustrated, she can look only towards the Danubian countries which formed with her the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Stresa could probably have produced better results if attention had not been dispersed upon so many different countries, but concentrated upon co-operation between Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania and Yugoslavia.

The report of the Financial Committee, like that of the Economic and Agrarian Committee of the Stresa Conference, contains general remarks on the ways and means by which the present exchange restrictions and other hindrances to trade can and should be removed. While stating that the establishment of a sound currency is the *conditio sine qua non* for abolishing exchange restrictions, the Committee conclude that a sound currency cannot be established unless exchange restrictions are removed, without showing how to break this vicious circle. In fact, neither a sound currency nor the abolition of exchange restrictions can be realised if these countries are not put on a strong economic footing and if the problem of foreign debts is not settled. It seems superfluous to explain once more how Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, and Greece were obliged one after another to declare transfer moratoria and to institute exchange restrictions. The service of the excessive foreign loans, contracted in gold at high rates of interest, constitutes such a heavy burden on the balance of payments of these countries that in the present circumstances, when the prices of their agricultural exports have fallen in some cases by about 70 per cent. and when export markets are being virtually closed, they are simply unable to obtain sufficient foreign exchange to pay interest and amortisation on foreign debts. The statistics contained in the financial report on p. 556 give a picture of this situation.

From this table we see how catastrophically foreign trade has shrunk during recent years, and also how the service of the foreign debts constitutes in some cases over 50 per cent. of total exports, while the trade balance itself is in many cases passive or in a state of painfully forced equilibrium. This means that such countries would have either to increase their exports by more than 100 per cent. or else to scale down their imports by 50 per cent. in order to be able to discharge their foreign obligations. This appears to be an impossible task in the present circumstances.

The Stresa Conference did not feel authorised to handle the settlement of post-war debts, and was satisfied with general recommendations which were themselves the result of a compro-

FOREIGN TRADE AND DEBTS OF THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (in millions of Swiss francs)

		Imports	Exports	Debt Service	Short- term Foreign Debts	Long- term Foreign Debts	Total
Austria . .	1929	2,379	1,597				
	1931	1,576	954				
Jan.-June	1932	544	275	214	731	1,692	2,423
Bulgaria . .	1929	308	239				
	1931	173	229				
Jan.-June	1932	77	68	33	34	645	679
Greece . .	1929	892	464				
	1931	544	285				
Jan.-June	1932	215	83	140	71	2,347	2,418
Hungary . .	1929	968	945				
	1931	500	516				
Jan.-June	1932	154	138	248	1,408	2,366	3,776
Rumania . .	1929	997	964				
	1931	529	736				
Jan.-June	1932	197	270	225	410	4,856	5,266
Yugoslavia .	1929	695	720				
	1931	435	435				
Jan.-June	1932	124	130	116	290	2,979	3,269

mise reached after prolonged discussions between creditors and debtors. On this point Stresa was faced with the dilemma of all the recent international economic conferences. The general reports of these conferences contain clear and correct statements of the causes of the crisis and the conclusion that monetary measures alone cannot help, but that economic and financial problems should be solved together. In spite of such clear recognitions a financial problem, like the settlement of post-war debts, is either shelved, as at Stresa, or else some vital economic issue, such as tariffs, is excluded beforehand from the programme, as in the proposed World Economic Conference, which, in addition to this defect, is not supposed to discuss world debts. In discussing the debt problem the Conference of Stresa assumed a somewhat different attitude and showed signs of the first organised clash between creditors and debtors. The memorandum of the London Committee of League Loans drawn up under the chairmanship of Sir Austen Chamberlain and with the collaboration of Sir Arthur Salter did not fail to make a deep impression. The creditors' demands are certainly not only comprehensible, but justified. On the other hand, however, the debtors' situation with regard to their willingness and ability to pay ought to be considered. There is no lack of willingness, but there is at least a temporary inability.

The Conference of Stresa proposed two main methods for the

abolition of exchange restrictions in order to remove these serious obstacles to trade. There is, without doubt, a serious disadvantage in the system of exchange restrictions, especially in the presence of the double rate of exchange, as in the case of Austria and Hungary, where the National Bank quotes rates at the gold parity, while in private business on the 'black bourse' rates are quoted 20 to 25 per cent. below this parity. In the presence of exchange restrictions the price level did not fall in sympathy with world prices before the recent rise in commodity values, neither did it rise, but it was kept more or less stable by the moderate deflationary policy of the National Bank. But what happens to the export trade under exchange restrictions? The exporter is in fact penalised, since he has to deliver his foreign exchange at par to the National Bank, and the importer secures a premium, since he obtains, though in very limited amounts, foreign exchange cheaper than the actual rate. Therefore it seems logical to demand that the currency be devaluated and exchange restrictions removed. But in some Central and Eastern European debtor countries very important obstacles arise. A 30 per cent. depreciation of the local currency, for instance, would mean a 30 per cent. increase in the service of foreign debts contracted in gold. Hence it would lead to an aggravation instead of an improvement in the ability of the debtors to pay. On the other hand, in these countries the psychological conditions are lacking for a depreciation without immediate stabilisation. The gap in the balance of payments is much too wide to be filled up by a 30 per cent. depreciation if the full service of foreign loans is to be resumed. It is not an exaggeration to say that in the present circumstances all the goods in stock in Austria and Hungary would hardly be sufficient to pay back all at once their short-term debts and interest on their long-term debts in gold. We have to remember, also, that these countries have been for a long time only nominally on the gold standard, which is regarded as *tabu* for the purpose of preserving the purchasing power of money—the first requisite for a balanced budget. The problem can only be solved by reducing all Government expenditure, so as to secure a sound state in public finance, and by simultaneously settling the matter of foreign debts by carrying through funding schemes and by scaling down the burden of gold interest rates and readjusting them to the present price level. Then a devaluation of the currency can follow, accompanied, if necessary, by an energetic deflation to stabilise the exchanges. Sacrifices on the part of both debtors and creditors are necessary. It is no use casting accusations at one another, since the post-war international loan transactions can be considered with equal justice as unwise borrowing or as unwise lending. It is in the interest of both

creditors and debtors to come to a settlement by which debtor countries will be enabled to pay their debts. The new Hungarian Minister of Finance, Dr. Imrédy (a former director of the National Bank), seems to be resolved to achieve some settlement of the foreign debts which would enable him to relieve the country from the paralysing effects of the present situation.

At the Stresa Conference the Swiss delegate made a few very clear remarks on the problem of debt payments, stating that Switzerland, being a creditor country, understands that the debtors cannot pay otherwise than in goods, and that Switzerland was willing in principle to accept goods, but insisted upon competitive conditions. He also remarked that no clearing and quota arrangements are of any use for the payment of debts unless they allow a surplus over the regular trade which balances itself by imports paying for exports. It seems that in the present situation this is the only way in which the liquidation of debts can be attained. A certain relation must be established between exports and debt payments, and a kind of sliding scale ought to be adopted to safeguard the interests of both parties. Though clearing and quota arrangements are certainly not the most advantageous regulations of international trade, they nevertheless provide the machinery by which creditor countries can allot the necessary import quotas to debtor countries with which the debts can be paid off. At least this has to be done if creditors wish to collect their loans now. Foreign loans were made under the supposition that, through what we may call 'indirect transfer of payments,' sufficient foreign exchange would be obtained, say, by Hungary from exports to Czechoslovakia, to pay debts to England. This system works, however, only under a system of international free trade, from which we are moving further every day. No doubt the re-establishment of international free trade would represent the best solution of the present transfer difficulties, but at the moment we have to apply the ways and means which are practicable under the actual conditions. Unfortunately the financial report of the Stresa Conference is very vague on these points.

It contains, it is true, a few words about a common currency normalisation fund proposed for the purpose of supporting central banks during the period of transition while exchange restrictions are being abolished. There does not, however, seem to be much need for a special fund for this purpose, since the Bank for International Settlements could perform this task, as it has in some measure already done. Such proposals, even if made in more concrete form, are very likely to share the fate of the scheme for the establishment of an International Agricultural Mortgage Institute, which was proposed two years ago without reaching any realisable form. The Stresa Conference was unable to do

more than to urge the establishment of this fund 'as soon as possible'—which is the well-known burying formula for international schemes. Such international credit institutions are really greatly needed both for agricultural and for industrial credit, not so much for the purpose of making new loans as to consolidate the large amount of frozen short-term debts. The settlement of these short credits constitutes a more difficult task than that of the long-term loans. The short-term credits were largely granted by banks out of the money of 'third parties,' deposited with the banks, or through discounts, and therefore the bankers cannot consent to or carry through any funding scheme unless they will be reimbursed. The situation of the international money market, on the other hand, does not make possible at present any long-term foreign financing, and therefore international co-operation is badly needed in this respect also. But there are problems which need not be postponed until these definite settlements can be arrived at—e.g., the application of the so-called blocked accounts, into which interest and amortisation instalments on foreign credits are paid in local currencies. If budgets are sufficiently balanced such funds could be lent to the Government for investment purposes, or else could be used for the purpose of promoting trade between Central and Eastern European countries. These funds would be suitable to finance such schemes as the proposed Agrarian Fund. It would be within the scope of practical measures to lend these accumulated funds on long term to Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Germany to finance agricultural purchases, and, on the other hand, to the agrarian countries to enable them to buy industrial commodities or else to execute the public work proposed by the Stresa Conference. Any proposition for the settlement of post-war debts presupposes, however, an organisation of the creditors in each country to form an international joint body of creditors. This is, unfortunately, still far from realisation. Such an international creditor organisation could, under the auspices of the financial section of the League of Nations, investigate the situation of the individual debtors and reach a settlement which would relieve Central and Eastern Europe from the deadening pressure of exchange restrictions and transfer moratoria.

What can the Central and Eastern European countries expect from the proposals and recommendations of the Conference of Stresa? The answer may be best found in the lessons of many international conferences, which have produced similar documents but provided no practical instruments for effecting remedies. Some warning may be taken also from recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe which occurred almost simultaneously with the Stresa Conference. The Austrian delegate,

THE POLICY OF POLAND

STORM clouds gather thick and fast over Europe. In addition to the malaise caused by the world economic depression, and besides her special reactions to the developments in the Far East, there is in Europe herself a growing feeling of political unrest and uncertainty, in spite of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, of pacts of non-aggression, treaties and other agreements galore, all making apparently for peace. The League of Nations is menaced with disruption and collapse—partly from the East, but also partly, and more immediately, from the West. Not only is the equilibrium of Europe threatened, but her very foundations seem unstable, for the post-war settlement, brought about by the Treaty of Versailles and consequential adjustments, is being subjected to violent attack. Though shaken by her convulsive efforts to struggle to her feet, Germany still feels herself strong enough to fling her challenge into the arena: 'Disarm! Or I shall rearm!' To those who imposed the Versailles Treaty on the vanquished these words, uttered with such boldness no more than thirteen years afterwards, must surely seem very strange, and perhaps may suggest that the victory was much less complete than had been supposed, or that policy has somehow not kept faith with the Treaty in those subsequent years. The fact is that Germany from the start resisted the Treaty in every way that was open to her, and not without success as time went on, her occupied territory being evacuated well ahead of the specified date of release, and reparations virtually wiped out. To a certain extent, then, the Treaty has been revised. Next on the German programme comes territorial revision: the demand for further Treaty revision means just that.

Is it this demand that informs the German attitude to the question of disarmament or rearmament? The talk about Germany being a great nation that cannot be 'held down' is beside the point. Why does she want a large army? She has a very considerable army actually and potentially. But who threatens her? Certainly not her neighbours. Is France really aggressive? Is Poland? To judge from some articles in the British Press, it might be thought that the French army was only

waiting for the word to march on Berlin. If these writers were to go up and down France they would find that the great body of the French people are such out-and-out pacifists as to come perilously near being defeatists. Some of these writers picture Marshal Pilsudski as a hardened, blood-stained man of war ready and eager to launch his legions on Danzig, East Prussia, or the Reich itself. It is all absolutely, ludicrously untrue. What France and Poland want is not adventures into the vague, but the more and more perfect stabilisation of the existing political status of their own countries and of Europe as a whole—in brief, no territorial revision; they stand by the new Europe. The present article, however, is not concerned with France, but with Poland and her foreign policy. The Poles may be a nation of partisans, but they unquestionably are a nation of patriots, and in their circumstances they put their foreign policy before their domestic politics, and are practically unanimous about it.

The greatest positive political fact of the post-war settlement of Europe was and is the reinstitution of Poland as a State. A glance at a map of Europe in 1914 and at another dated 1924 will show how enormous was the transformation wrought by the re-emergence of Poland on the European scene, especially when it is taken in conjunction with the disappearance of the Hapsburg Empire, the greatest negative political fact of the period. The Poland that was brought to life again is in area a little more than half the size of the Poland that had been completely erased from the map in 1795; but it is not a small State in itself, for it is larger than Italy, and half as big again as the United Kingdom with Northern Ireland thrown in. If on the east a vast territory has been lost to Soviet Russia, the extensive territory that remains is the old, essential Poland which Napoleon, writing in exile at St. Helena, described as the *véritable clef de voûte européenne*, the true keystone of the European arch. In setting up the Duchy of Warsaw he made an attempt to put the keystone back into its proper position, but the effort was only half-hearted, and in any case was on too small a scale. Had he reconstituted a really great Poland, his own story, and that of Europe, would probably have been very different from what they were. With his overthrow the duchy vanished, and for a century Poland remained divided up between Germany (Prussia), Austria, and Russia, but still was recognisably Poland, living though dismembered. When the Allied and Associated Powers resuscitated Poland they said that the spoliation of the Polish nation was one of the 'greatest injustices ever recorded by history, a crime the memories and consequences of which have long poisoned the political life of a great part of the continent of Europe.' Owing partly to the Allied victory and partly to her own efforts, the

Poland whose frontiers were finally established in 1923 has an area of 388,000 square kilometres, and a population of approximately 33,000,000; within ten years, at the present rate of increase, it will exceed 40,000,000, and may then be about equal to that of France, if the French birth rate remains as low as it has been for a long time past. Such figures cannot but suggest that Poland is on the way to be a Great Power, even if she is not one already. At any rate, it can be said that Poland may be expected to play a proportionately important rôle in high politics, and must in truth be a powerful factor of equilibrium or of disequilibrium in the *ensemble* of Europe.

The foreign policy of a country is determined by various elements in its position in the world—its history and traditions, the character and temperament of its people, its trade and commerce, and the like; but the most important element is its geographical situation—in other words, its frontiers. Poland has a seafront of only 140 kilometres—very small, yet most important; but she has 5394 kilometres, or more than 3000 miles, of land frontiers. Of these the longest is the frontier with Germany, which, if the 600 kilometres of the East Prussian frontier are included, is upwards of 1900 kilometres in length. This calculation does not cover the frontiers of the Free City of Danzig, which are some 120 kilometres long. The main frontier with Germany extends from the Baltic on the north down to the Katowice district on the south in a wavy line which is the western limit of the Polish provinces of Pomerania (or Pomorze, as the Poles call it), Poznań, and Upper Silesia, the two former provinces having belonged to Germany (Prussia) since the third partition in 1795, except during the few years of the existence of Napoleon's Duchy of Warsaw, when Poznań reverted to the Poles. The process of seizing Polish territory in this area began with the Prussian occupation of Pomerania in 1772, the date of the first partition. History took a different course in Upper Silesia, as that territory had ceased to belong to Poland centuries before; it remained Polish, however, in speech and Roman Catholic in religion. Polish Pomerania is the so-called 'Corridor.' At the moment German nationalist demands for territorial revision centre on the reoccupation of Polish Pomerania, but they threaten the whole line of frontier on that side of Poland, and make the area involved the danger zone of Europe. The frontier is what is known as 'open.'

Poland's next longest frontier, about 1400 kilometres in length, is that with Soviet Russia, and it extends from Latvia on the north to Rumania on the south. Here it may be noted that whereas the Polish-German frontier was to a very great extent settled by the Versailles Treaty in 1919, the Polish-Soviet frontier

was not definitively recognised—by the Ambassadors' Conference—till the spring of 1923, though it had virtually been settled by the Treaty of Riga in 1921, the political outcome of the victories of Pilsudski and his armies over the Bolsheviks in the decisive battles of Warsaw and of the Niemen in the previous year. The frontier thus established included an area of about 110,000 square kilometres, or a third, of what the Poles term the Kresy, all of which had belonged to Poland before the first partition in 1772, the land itself being occupied mostly by peasants of mixed nationality, among whom were many Poles. Most of this frontier is also 'open,' but apart, of course, from the policy that is implicit in the Bolshevik dogma of the World Revolution, the Soviet Government has made no demand for frontier or territorial revision. During the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 it did attempt to interfere with the Polish boundaries by making a treaty with Lithuania which recognised, among other things, Vilna as Lithuanian, but in the Treaty of Riga that treaty was annulled by a clause in which it was stated that the question of the frontiers of Poland and Lithuania was to be settled by those countries themselves. The Polish-Lithuanian frontier is 465 kilometres long. The continued opposition of Lithuania to Poland gives this frontier an interest of its own, but it is not one that causes Poland—who holds that the Vilna controversy has been definitively settled—any deep political concern. For all that, Lithuania should not be considered as entirely negligible, for her antagonism to Poland persists; for some time she leaned towards Germany, but at the moment the Memel dispute has put a rather different face on the matter. In the military sense the Polish-Lithuanian frontier is 'open,' though in the political and economic sense Lithuania still keeps it 'closed.'

Taken together, the German, Soviet, and Lithuanian frontiers of Poland are, in round figures, 3900 kilometres (with Danzig upwards of 4000) in length, out of her total frontier length of 5400 kilometres. The difference is made up by the frontier with Czechoslovakia (about 900 kilometres long), with Rumania (about 340 kilometres), and with Latvia (about 110 kilometres). These States, however, are friendly to Poland; she has an *entente* with Czechoslovakia, and Rumania is her ally. The figures respecting the frontiers of Poland may seem rather dull, but are of enormous importance in a consideration of her policy, which was, is, and must be determined by the politico-geographical situation thus disclosed. This was inevitable from the very beginning—once the frontiers of the restored State were defined by the Treaty of Riga and the decision had been made respecting the division of Upper Silesia. On the east lay Soviet Russia, defeated, but vast and still formidable; on the west was Germany,

defeated, but potentially powerful and implacable. How was so dangerous a situation to be met by Poland, especially when there was always the possibility of the combination of these Powers against her? In answering this question it has to be remembered how severely the Polish people had been tried by six years of almost incessant fighting—first in the Great War, and then in the struggle against Soviet Russia. What they needed and wanted was peace. In 1921, when the fight for the frontiers had been won, the Polish army numbered a million men; it was rapidly reduced to a much smaller figure, which, however, was still impressive. The policy of Poland stood out clearly. In his book entitled *Poland and Peace*, published in 1923, Count Alexander Skrzynski, twice Foreign Minister and once Prime Minister of Poland, summed up that policy when he said that, owing to the 'particularly unfavourable geographical situation' of his country, the double obligation was imposed on the State of maintaining an 'absolutely pacific policy,' and at the same time an 'army as strong as possible.' In short, peace and the means of defending it. In pursuance of this policy Poland contracted alliances in 1921 with France and Rumania—both defensive alliances, as the treaties embodying them plainly indicate.

Eternal vigilance is the only price of safety, says the old, wise saw, and Poland's constant preoccupation has been her frontiers. On the whole, her Russian frontier has given her comparatively little trouble, though she has had to be ever on her guard. From the first she entered into friendly relations with the Baltic States which border Soviet Russia—namely, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia. These States are small, as their total population is less than 7,000,000; but they derive a high political significance from the fact that their eastern boundaries march for hundreds of miles with those of Soviet Russia, and thus form no inconsiderable part of the great international frontier, with Russia on the other side of it, that stretches from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Several conferences of these States and Poland were held at Helsingfors, Tallinn (Reval), Riga and Warsaw, the principal object aimed at being a common defence against aggression by the Bolsheviks. At the Warsaw Conference in 1922 the four States signed a convention which suggested that a Baltic League was about to be formed, but the convention was not ratified by Finland, and it fell through. The idea of such a League, with Poland as its base, was anathema to the Soviet Government, which sought to counter it by a conference with the four States at Moscow, where it submitted disarmament proposals that were found unacceptable to the others.

In the course of that year, 1922, Poland was alarmed by the

German-Soviet Treaty of Rapallo, the most striking outcome of the abortive Conference of Genoa; there were raids across the frontier by bands organised with Soviet connivance; in May the *Eclair* of Paris published what purported to be a military convention between the heads of the Soviet army and the German General Staff which had been signed at Berlin. In time the alarm over the Rapallo Treaty died down, but Poland did not forget this agreement between her two chief enemies, nor the statement made by the Paris newspaper. The next event which threatened the peace of the Baltic occurred in December 1924, when Communists, at the instance of the Bolsheviks, attempted a *putsch* at Tallinn aiming at the subversion of the Estonian Government and the setting up of a Soviet *régime*; it was an affair of some magnitude, as its failure led to the execution of no fewer than 200 Communists. Early in the following year a conference of Poland, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia was held at Helsingfors—the eighth of these meetings. On this occasion the four States discussed the question of their common security, and resolved to keep in touch respecting all matters affecting it. They signed a treaty of conciliation and arbitration, but did not form a Baltic League; Meierovitch, the Latvian Prime Minister, was strongly in favour of it, but Finland persisted in her opposition. Still, the collaboration of the three Baltic States with Poland was sufficiently evident: a collaboration for peace.

Naturally this state of things was not particularly agreeable to the Bolsheviks, who had tried for some time to play the Baltic States off against each other, and to keep them apart, on the well-known principle *divide et impera*. One result of this policy which it had not expected was that Estonia and Latvia entered into a defensive alliance in 1923. In 1925, the year of Locarno, the Soviet Government suggested to Poland that a non-aggression treaty should be negotiated between them. Poland replied that she would accept the suggestion provided that Moscow made similar suggestions to the other border States—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Rumania. This, however, did not suit the book of the Bolsheviks, who were also given to understand by the Baltic States that they stood by their obligations as members of the League of Nations. In 1926, the year of the German-Soviet Treaty of Berlin, the Soviet Government again came forward with proposals to Poland and the Baltic border States to negotiate separate non-aggression treaties. Pourparlers went on and on, the net result over two years being shown in a semi-official statement by Estonia, when celebrating in 1928 the tenth anniversary of her independence, to this effect:

Estonia and also the other Baltic States have during several years tried to strengthen their relations with Russia by separate negotiations for

non-aggression and arbitration treaties, but so far these have not shown any results, as Russia does not recognise neutral chairmanship, and the obligations of the Baltic States towards the League of Nations.

This was the case, too, with Poland; no treaty which did not recognise the League of Nations could be acceptable to her.

Up till September 1926 Poland was not a member of the Council of the League, but had a representative at Geneva in a Minister specially designated for that purpose. Before Germany was received into the League in that month Poland had raised the question of herself being given not only a seat but a permanent seat on the Council. As Zaleski, her Foreign Minister then as now, put it:

The geographical position of Poland, the territory she occupies, the extent of her population, and her importance as a political factor in the economic relations of Europe, assign to her a high rôle in world politics, a rôle so high that it is impossible to imagine any solution of the problem of the general peace without her active and permanent participation. Only the permanent collaboration of Poland in the Council of the League will permit the League to fulfil completely and fruitfully the rôle to which it is called in virtue of the fundamental principles of the Covenant

This was the view of all Poles, irrespective of party. In the upshot Poland was accorded by the Assembly a non-permanent seat in the Council by the votes of forty-five out of its forty-nine members; a second vote gave her a non-permanent seat for three years; and a third vote declared her re-eligible at the end of the three years' period. She was re-elected in 1929, and again on October 3 of the present year, by majorities larger than were necessary by the regulations governing the voting. Poland congratulated herself on so satisfactory a showing, both as evidence of the place she holds in the world and, even more, as a testimony to her belief in the League. She is convinced that nothing is to be gained and much may be lost by its dissolution. She has often herself been a 'client' of the League, most frequently in connexion with disputes about Danzig, and to a less extent disputes with Germany, and she has always respected its decisions. Nor should it be forgotten that in the Assembly, 1927, she submitted a general pact of non-aggression, which eventually was passed unanimously in the form of a resolution prohibiting wars of aggression—a forerunner of the Briand-Kellogg Pact in the following year renouncing war as an instrument of a nation's policy.

In 1927 Polish relations with Russia were disturbed by the murder in Warsaw of Voikoff, the Soviet Minister, but Poland, who could not see that she was to blame for the tragedy, dealt firmly with the heated protests of Moscow, and the agitation ceased. Next year the Soviet Government made fresh non-

aggression proposals, embodied in what came to be known as the Litvinoff Protocol, and postulating the coming into immediate operation of the Pact for the Renunciation of War as between the two States. Similar proposals had been made to Lithuania, which was not a border State, and Poland again asked why like proposals had not been put before the border States—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Rumania—as in this matter she wished to act with the 'friendly Baltic States and her ally Rumania.' Litvinoff agreed to fall in with the Polish views, and the pact was signed at Moscow in February 1929. Zaleski's comment was that 'Poland supported every pacific action,' and was glad to give further 'proof that the accusation levelled at her of harbouring aggressive designs against any neighbouring State whatsoever was unfounded.' Two days earlier the Polish Parliament had unanimously ratified the Briand-Kellogg Pact. During the present year Finland, Estonia, and Latvia signed non-aggression treaties with the Soviet Government, these treaties bearing a different character from those previously offered them, inasmuch as they cover their obligations to the League of Nations. On July 25 Poland also signed a non-aggression treaty with Soviet Russia, a treaty which, however, implicitly protects her alliance with Rumania and is anchored to the League of Nations. She expects, however, that Rumania will also conclude a non-aggression treaty with Moscow before long. There is undoubtedly a *détente* in the relations between Poland and Soviet Russia, as well as between it and the Baltic border States. Not that there is any change of heart on the part of the Soviet Government: how can there be? Sufficient reasons for its present policy are to be found in the pressure of Japanese expansion on it in the Far East, and the difficulties encountered in carrying out the first Five-Year plan, with the consequent lamentable conditions now prevailing throughout Red Russia. It is not her frontier with Soviet Russia that is the main preoccupation of Poland to-day, though her well-disciplined and alert frontier guards continue to patrol her side of it, as they have done for the last six or seven years. It is her frontier with Germany and all that it implies which give her the deepest concern.

Germany's first attack on this frontier of a serious nature was economic; it began as far back as 1920, and, with some intermissions, has continued ever since, though it has not been successful. A military effort was impossible, but Germany had done her utmost to cripple the Poles in the war with Soviet Russia by forbidding transport of war material across her territory to both combatants, a prohibition which in the circumstances applied in practice to Poland alone. She thought she saw her opportunity in the economic field and that she would be able to bring about

the economic collapse of Poland in a short time. The means she used for this object was a trade boycott in 1920 and 1921, and some of her writers gleefully announced that Poland would be 'bled to death.' The Germans, however, had underestimated the Poles, as is their way. Not only did the expected result not materialise, but they themselves discovered that the boycott was double-edged and most damaging to their own interests. The boycott stopped in 1922. There was a large volume of trade between the two countries, but Poland now proceeded to extend her trade with other countries, seventeen commercial treaties being negotiated by 1925 and new markets opened up. Consequently there was a diminution in Polish-German trade; but it still was very considerable, and Germany kept on trying to use it as a political weapon. Another consequence of this German economic and political pressure, which was aggravated by difficulties with Danzig, was the construction by Poland of the port of Gdynia on her bit of the Baltic littoral.

This combined pressure on Poland came to a head in 1925. By the Polish-German Upper Silesia agreement, 1922, Germany imported, free of duty, 500,000 tons of coal monthly from Polish Upper Silesia till June 1925. When that date approached Germany announced herself ready to renew the agreement, but only on condition that Poland would forego certain rights and give certain privileges to her. Poland refused to be coerced, and Germany declined to take any more coal; one thing led to another, and a customs war broke out between them. One pitiful result of the breach was the extrusion of a large number of German 'optants' from Poland, and a corresponding number of Poles from Germany. Later in the year Poland informed Germany that she renounced her right to expel the German optants who remained on her soil—a *beau geste*, inspired by Locarno, which met with no response from Germany. The economic war continued, but Poland was not ruined by it, as many Germans had predicted. 'It's an ill wind that blows nobody good,' and the British coal strike in 1926 led to the opening of new markets for Polish coal, markets which Poland has succeeded in keeping to a great extent. Yet the customs war was injurious to both Poland and Germany, and across it negotiations, which had been started in 1925, for a commercial treaty went on, with several breaks; but one was actually concluded in March 1930, and Poland hoped much from it. Germany has never ratified it, though Poland has. Moreover, Germany raised her customs tariff in April 1930 so as to reduce or negative its benefit to the Poles. Recent developments have slightly eased the tension, but it is perfectly plain that the German economic attack has failed, as Poland remains undefeated. It

is to the point to note that she adheres to the gold standard, with few or none of the restrictions other gold countries have been compelled to resort to for their protection.

So much for Germany's direct attack on Poland. Her indirect attack proceeds along two lines: one is to prejudice Poland, especially through the League of Nations, by damaging representations respecting her actions towards her national minorities, and the other is incessant propaganda and attempted intimidation. Let it be said at once that Poland has not always been happy in her treatment of her minorities, but she has faced every charge brought against her at Geneva, and when at fault has admitted it and sought to make amends. But she has not often been in the wrong, and it is pertinent to remark that she has to contend with something that does not figure in the discreet proceedings of the League—the support and the funds supplied by her enemies to hostile minority organisations in her own territory and abroad. In Geneva, however, the real nature of the attacks on her in the League are now well understood, and they are no longer formidable.

Germany's campaign of propaganda has undoubtedly met with considerable success, especially in this country and in America, their information respecting Poland being supplied chiefly by Berlin—a biased, and therefore tainted, source. From the start the Poles were given a bad name: they were described as proud, quarrelsome and difficult; they were said to be reproducing the anarchy which had led to the national downfall in the eighteenth century, and the swift end of the resurrected State was freely foretold. But Poland has not disappeared, nor is she likely to do so. This is precisely her inexpiable offence, her unpardonable crime in German eyes. The Germans find it 'intolerable'; at first they thought it incredible that their 'manifest national destiny'—the *Drang nach Osten*—should be thwarted by these pestilent Poles! But they do not stress this point in their propaganda; for German imperialism still stinks in the nostrils of the world rather too much for that, and the demand made by von Schleicher, as well as Hitler, for frontier revision scarcely disguises it. What they do concentrate on is the 'wicked Treaty of Versailles' and the 'injustice' of separating East Prussia from the rest of Germany by the '*Danziger Korridor*,' apparently sublimely unconscious of the fact that far greater wickedness and injustice were shown in the partitioning of Poland, for which Prussia was responsible in that identical part of the Continent in 1772. As for East Prussia, what the Allies said to Germany in 1919 about it is more cogent now than it was then, owing to the marked increase of the population of Poland and the decrease of the German population in that province: 'The

interests which Germans in East Prussia, who number less than two millions, have in establishing a land connexion with Germany are less vital than the interests of the whole Polish nation in securing direct access to the sea.' Leaving Danzig aside, the 'Corridor' as well as Poznanian were and are overwhelmingly Polish. How short were the roots the Germans had in them was clearly demonstrated by the rapid efflux of much the greater part of the German population from this whole area soon after the war. And as for Danzig, which can prosper only with a friendly Poland, its vital interests were prejudiced from the outset by the slackness of the Allies, who permitted its Government to pass into the hands of Germans from Berlin, known to be hostile to the Poles, and determined to lose no opportunity of hitting at them. If Danzig resents and dreads the competition of Gdynia, it has only itself to thank; but at the moment, owing to the good work of a representative of the League last August, the situation is better in the Free City, as it now shows a more realist attitude towards Poland—an attitude that was doubtless facilitated by the political reaction that took place in Danzig when it was seen that Hitler did not have the majority he and many Danzigers expected in the German general election on July 31, and was unable to fulfil the promises he had made, among them being the immediate reunion of the Free City with the Reich.

Poland refuses the German demand for territorial revision; on this matter every Pole is heart and soul agreed. Poland has repeatedly stated that she desires to live in good neighbourly relations with Germany, but, as Zaleski said in a speech that has become historic, nobody in Poland will ever consent to buy them at the price of a revision of the frontiers. 'We shall not cede an inch,' he declared; 'every Pole will sacrifice his blood and his fortune to defend these territories'—he had referred specifically to Pomerania (the 'Corridor') and Polish Silesia—'against all attempts from whatever side they may come.' As it is, the Polish army, 275,000 strong on a peace footing, is maintained only by an immense sacrifice on the part of the whole nation, nearly one-third of the annual expenditure of the State being devoted to defence. The Poles shoulder this immense burden—for they believe it necessary—mainly because of Germany. This, then, is the position: Poland will surrender to the German demand for frontier revision only when she is compelled to do so. She will fight with all her resources (her own and those of her allies) against being *partitioned* again. The German demand, if persisted in, means war. This is a thing that should be fully understood in this country.

ROBERT MACHRAY.

ROAD AND RAIL

It is usual to think of the road-rail question as one affecting only the owners of motor vehicles on one side and the railway shareholder on the other side, with their respective employees. In actual fact there are several other persons to be considered—the trader, the traveller, the ratepayer, the pedestrian and the cyclist, and the resident or worker in buildings adjoining the road. These persons have different and sometimes opposing interests. Thus, the motor owner wants to retain his present almost uncontrolled use of the roads, while the railway shareholder wants to get back the traffic which motor vans and coaches have attracted from the railway to the roads. Between these two stand the trader and the traveller, who each want cheap and speedy transport, and care little how the real cost of the services is met provided their own charges and fares are not raised. Evidently the ratepayer ought to have some say in the matter, since he has to provide and maintain the permanent way along which motor vehicles travel. In the background, too, lurks the Chancellor of the Exchequer, always a partner in every firm and a stockholder in every company.

How, or how far, if at all, are all these different interests to be reconciled? This was the real question set to Sir Arthur Salter and his colleagues in the Conference on Road and Rail Transport, and their Report gives an answer to the greater part of the question. The Conference, as it was called, to distinguish it from a Royal Commission or a committee of judicial investigators, was appointed by the Minister of Transport, and consisted of four representatives of the railways and four representatives of organisations transporting goods by road, with Sir Arthur Salter as the chairman. No doubt the eight representatives came to the conference table with definite views on one side or the other, like employers and trade union leaders meeting to settle an industrial dispute, but all must have been anxious to influence the open mind of the impartial chairman. From a committee thus constituted one might have expected majority and minority reports, or at least a reservation by one side. Through the diplomatic skill of the chairman, or through the reasonableness of

the two parties, a unanimous report was signed. Moreover, unanimity was not reached, as often happens, by evading difficulties or by agreeing on platitudes.

The Salter Report, as everyone now calls it, is a masterly document. It gives a clear review of the position, it analyses the costs incidental to road and rail transport, and it offers precise recommendations based on scientific calculations. For a long period the railways enjoyed something like a monopoly of inland transport, though limited by a certain amount of competition from canals and improved natural waterways, and by the more ancient rivalry of coastwise shipping. Possibly in this period the railway companies became too conservative in their outlook, and were not willing to adopt the improvements which at a later date have been forced upon them. Early in the present century a new competitor—the road vehicle driven by an internal combustion engine—entered the field and grew rapidly in size and speed. Moreover, the new form of transport had two great advantages over the old: it could offer a door-to-door conveyance, and it found its permanent way already constructed, repaired, policed, and lighted by the obliging ratepayer. Whereas the railway train ran along a track which had been bought and constructed, and was still maintained, lighted, policed and signalled, by the railway shareholder. This last fact explains why the road vehicle can quote a lower fare or goods rate than the train, and why it has been growing in size, weight, and speed. Most people, when they travel or send goods by railway, imagine that the fare at the booking office or the charge at the parcels office is payment for the train journey. As a matter of fact, possibly half the fare or charge is required to pay for the line and the stations, an expense which the road vehicle can ignore. No exact apportionment between the cost of running a train and the cost of maintaining and constructing the line and stations can be made; for this reason, among others, railway fares and charges are not, and cannot be, based on the 'cost of service.' It is, indeed, very difficult to reckon the real cost of some commodities as well as of many services—*e.g.*, what is the real cost of (a) a mutton chop at the Savoy Hotel or at a Lyons café, or (b) a surgical operation or a doctor's visit?

But in the case of a motor coach or lorry the owner has only to reckon the cost of his vehicle, garage, petrol, wages, licence and insurance; he can then tell roughly how much he requires in order to cover his weekly expenses. If his vehicle earns more than this total, he makes a profit; if it does not, he makes a loss. A railway manager, however, cannot say, 'My train will cost £20 running from A to B; so if I get fifty passengers at 10s. each, it will pay.' He must allow a further sum (which he cannot

calculate precisely) for his permanent way and other overhead charges. Again, he knows that increased weight and speed mean a heavier and stronger locomotive and a more expensive permanent way and bridges. To the motor owner these last considerations are unimportant; he puts his heavy vehicle on the road, and the highway authorities must make their roads and bridges strong enough to carry it. By an extraordinary failure to link taxation with weight, which shows the Treasury and the Ministry of Transport in a most unfavourable light, the use of the heaviest motor lorries has actually been encouraged by the scale of licence duties payable for goods vehicles. These are supposed to be taxed according to their unladen weight; but there is a maximum tax (£60 for a 5-ton lorry with hard tyres, or £48 if it has pneumatic tyres) and no maximum weight! Since the lighter vehicles pay about £15 per ton, this scale resembles an income tax which should take 4s. 6d. in the pound from a clerk, 2s. 6d. in the pound from his employer, and 6d. from a millionaire. Moreover, the Treasury and Ministry of Transport have ignored the express recommendations of the Royal Commission on Transport,¹ 'that the use of vehicles with an unladen weight in excess of 4 tons should be discouraged,' and that 'additional steps at each ton should be provided for the purpose of taxation and that at each step there should be a substantial increase in the duties payable.'

It is clear that any business which is allowed to throw a large part of its working expenses on some other organisation can sell its product or its services at a lower price than competitors who enjoy no such subsidy. This is the real reason why road transport concerns can quote lower rates and fares than a railway company. There are all kinds of other anomalies in the scale of licence duties payable in respect of the various classes of commercial motor vehicles; but they agree on one point—they tax the lighter vehicle at a heavier rate per ton than the heavy vehicle. How this strange inversion of the accepted principle of progressive taxation, or taxation according to ability to pay, came to be proposed by the Treasury and adopted by the House of Commons has never been explained. A similar anomaly prevailed from 1880 until 1910 in the case of the duties paid for a public-house licence. Small houses paid higher rates than big houses, and there was a maximum duty of £60 on a house rated at £500 a year. In the Budget of 1909-10 this scale was abolished in favour of the more logical basis of half the annual value. Since that date hardly anything has been heard of the 'licensing problem,' which had been for many years one of the burning questions in English politics.

¹ Cmd. 3751, December 1930.

We may now return to the Salter Report, reminding ourselves that unanimity must mean that neither the road representatives nor the railway managers got all that they wanted. Moreover, they were careful to consider other interests, knowing that if they did not, their recommendations would be useless. They start with the facts. There are now about a million private motor cars, 627,000 motor cycles, 364,000 goods motor vehicles, and 87,000 taxi-cabs, motor omnibuses and coaches in Great Britain. These new vehicles 'have transformed the economic and social life of the country.' They have created additional transport and travel; they have also diverted much existing traffic from the railways. In some cases the road is intrinsically more suitable. It is preferred for the convenience it affords, or is really cheaper when every allowance for full cost is made. But where the new vehicles do not pay their fair share of the cost of the roads, or escape the restrictions imposed upon the railways, the diversion of traffic may be both economically unsound and socially undesirable.

At the beginning of the century our roads cost about £12,000,000 a year, having cost less than £8,000,000 ten years earlier. Now they cost about £60,000,000 a year, and this is the figure adopted as the basis of the calculations and recommendations made by Sir Arthur Salter and his colleagues. As against this figure, the railway representatives calculated the annual railway track costs at the surprising total of £64,000,000.³ On the other side, motor vehicles pay a licence duty, and in most cases a petrol duty as well. These two duties yield about £60,000,000 a year, or a sum equal to the annual cost of road maintenance. Nothing is included for the capital cost of the roads, though in the case of the railways interest on capital accounts for a large part of the cost.

Turning to the different classes of road vehicles, the Conference says that the proceeds of the licence and petrol duties are equal to current expenditure on the roads. But the burden of paying for the roads is not equally distributed between the various classes of road users. Owners of private cars pay more than their share; owners of commercial vehicles pay less, and it is with the latter alone that the Conference was concerned. Sir Arthur Salter and his colleagues have no doubt that the taxation of certain classes of goods vehicles needs to be increased. But they do not think that such an increase, even when combined with additional regulations in the interests of the public, will have much effect in forcing back traffic to the railways and so restoring their fortunes. Where the Conference feels justified in helping the railways is by dealing with any existing unfairness in the incidence

³ Interest on capital, £800,000,000, at 4½ per cent. = £36,000,000; maintenance and renewal, £18,000,000; signalmen, £6,500,000; rates, £3,500,000.

of highway costs and inadequacy of the regulations to protect the public and other users of the road against undesirable forms of road traffic by goods vehicles. This is something which ought to have been done by the Ministry of Transport years ago; in fact, the Report of the Royal Commission was a mild reproof, and the Report of the Road-Rail Conference is a severe censure on the Ministry of Transport for its failure to perform the functions for which it was created.

If the road vehicles can compete with the railway when they no longer enjoy a concealed subsidy from the ratepayer, then the Salter Report offers the railway no help. One important consideration, often forgotten, is that the rate structure of the railways, both in this and in other countries, depends on securing a definite proportion from highly rated traffic. A railway company spreads its expenses over its various classes of traffic on the principle of charging according to the value of the services rendered as opposed to the cost of that service. This principle of charging 'what the traffic will bear' is sometimes regarded as a form of extortion; it may just as well be called 'not charging more than the traffic will bear.' There is nothing extortionate or even strange about it—in fact, it is the usual principle adopted by the retail trader in fixing his prices; thus the grocer expects more profit on a pound of butter than on a pound of margarine, though the two articles cost him just the same to weigh, pack, and deliver. The same is true of cotton and silk goods, cigarettes and cigars, or plums and peaches. A railway carries coal, iron ore, grain, building materials, and other commodities of great weight or bulk in comparison with their value, at a much lower rate per ton than ordinary merchandise, which one buys over a shop counter at so much per pound or per yard. But if, as now happens, the road vehicle cuts in and takes away this highly rated merchandise traffic, the railway is left with the low-rated traffic on which it gets hardly any profit.

A railway company is obliged by Act of Parliament to carry all traffic offered to it (with insignificant exceptions) and to provide reasonable facilities for dealing with its traffic. A road vehicle, on the contrary, has no such obligation; it can pick and choose its traffic, and, not being bound to make up on the swings what it loses on the roundabouts, it can afford to charge less than a railway company for merchandise, thereby skimming the cream off the railway's goods traffic. No doubt the railway companies could make out a case before the Rates Tribunal for an increase in their rates for minerals and other low-rated traffic. But these are precisely the raw materials of our heavy industries, which can least afford to pay any addition to their working costs. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the small difference between the

railway and the road charges for highly rated traffic, such as silk, tea, or butter, ever finds its way to the consumer. While these considerations must apply to nearly every country, there is one consideration which applies especially to Great Britain. The Railways Act of 1921 is at least one of the governing factors, if not the chief factor, in the economics of British railway transport. That Act was a kind of bargain between Parliament and the railway shareholder, under which the latter agreed to carry all the traffic, both goods and passenger, offered to him in return for the dividends of the last pre-war year together with a mere commission of 20 per cent. on all net receipts above the pre-war standard. If receipts fail to give the standard revenue of 1913, he may apply to the Rates Tribunal for leave to raise his charges; if receipts rise above the 1913 level, the Rates Tribunal can order him to give back 80 per cent. of the rise in lower rates and fares. Such a bargain makes the trading and travelling public the senior partner of the railway shareholder. The poor man has two other partners as well—first, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and, secondly, the ratepayer. Ordinary firms and companies are rated on the annual value of their fixed property without reference to the profit or losses they may be making. A railway company is rated on its actual profits; consequently the ratepayer is really a shareholder in every railway company. It has often been said that 'the railway shareholder is the biggest ratepayer'; it is equally true that the ratepayer is the biggest railway shareholder. Hence the community has a direct pecuniary interest (larger and more direct than in any other case I can think of) in maintaining the prosperity of British railways.

As it happens, the standard revenue, fixed by the Rates Tribunal at £51,000,000 a year, has never been reached even in the best year since the Act of 1921 came into operation. For 1931 the revenue of the four groups came to £33,300,000 only, and will be even smaller this year, since the gross traffic for the first forty weeks of 1932 shows a decline of £11,300,000. Perhaps half of this decline will be balanced by economies, but, even so, it seems doubtful whether the L.N.E.R. will be able to pay as much as 2 per cent. for the year on its first preference stock, while the £66,000,000 of second preference stock, until recently a trustee security, will certainly get nothing. Now these stocks, and others like them, are held in the main, not by rich people, but by those of moderate means, and by charities and educational bodies. Their trustee status was created by Parliament, and Parliament cannot disclaim its responsibility towards those who have invested in its hall-marked securities. The railway companies have satisfied the Rates Tribunal that they have conducted their business with efficiency and economy as prescribed by the

Act of 1921; consequently they are entitled to ask for higher rates and fares. But, on reviewing the situation, they have decided that it would not help their net revenues to raise their charges, and it is clear enough that the heavy industries are not in a position to pay higher charges. If the heavy industries gained appreciably by road transport, Parliament might be content to disregard the strain on railway finances, but it does not appear that they do. On the contrary, they cannot do without railway transport, and what they want is lower rates for their materials and products; therefore they must wish the railways to get back the highly rated traffic and other traffic which they have lost to the road vehicles.

Returning to the Salter Report, we find the Conference considering how it ought to divide the actual cost of our roads between the different classes of road vehicles. An excellent principle was put forward by the railway representatives, who suggested, as a basis for the division of functions between railways and roads, the action which would be taken 'if a single administration, without divergence of financial interest, were solely occupied in meeting the needs of the public by the most convenient and economical arrangement of transport.' They added, of course, that this administration would not make its calculations as if it were starting with a clean slate, but would bear in mind the capital equipment represented by the railways. On the other side the road representatives did not ask that commercial road transport should pay less than its fair share of the cost of the roads, nor did they ask that motor users should be credited with the amounts spent on roads in the old days of horse transport. In this, and in their objection to taxation beyond this point and to restrictions on their occupation 'more than the public interest generally requires,' they had the support of the railway representatives. Roads are used for more than one purpose, and motor vehicles do not enjoy a monopoly. In addition to walkers, cyclists, and horse-drawn vehicles, there are other users who carry pipes and wires underneath the road surface, though they make no payment for this last privilege. Tramways in this country pay no rent for their franchise, though in America they make substantial contributions to city revenues. But a tramway company has to keep its track in repair, and pay rates on it, even if the track is worn out by a motor omnibus which has drawn away its passengers.

All this is what the Conference terms the 'community use' of the roads, and its value cannot be measured in money. Against this may be set the fact that the roads are here, having been made by earlier generations and left as a 'legacy from the past.' This is a very big legacy, and an important part of the national wealth,

though, again, its value is not easily calculated. One thousand millions is certainly too little, having regard to the hundreds of millions spent within living memory to give a very small addition to the road mileage, although no doubt a very great improvement to the surface and carrying capacity. Being unable to give a figure either for the community use or for the legacy, the Conference agreed that the two should be regarded as cancelling each other. Thus it arrived at the simple principle that the total contribution payable by all classes of motor vehicles in licence duty and petrol duty should be equal to the current expenditure on roads.

After various additions and subtractions, the Conference agreed on a total of £60,000,000 as the annual cost. Next it looked round for a basis of allocation between the different classes of motor vehicles, and examined three principal systems—(a) speed-tons, (b) petrol consumption, and (c) ton-miles. Much information was collected on these questions, and the Conference agreed on a large mass of statistical data, which is printed in seven appendices and occupies nearly half the slim volume of the Report. Petrol consumption would be the easiest basis, but by itself would not work out fairly, even for petrol-using vehicles. Thus a light van of 24 cwt. laden weight does 18 miles to the gallon, and a heavy lorry of 15 tons laden weight $4\frac{1}{4}$ miles to the gallon. The heavy lorry transports three times as much weight over a given distance for the same petrol consumption. This fact suggests a conclusion which seems to have escaped the Conference—namely, that the heavy lorry ought to pay a heavier duty per cwt. than a light van. As between different vehicles of the same weight and description it serves very well, reflecting as it does both distance and speed.

The third basis considered was that of ton-miles, and this has many advantages, though, again, it is not sufficient by itself. Finally the Conference adopted a combination of petrol duty and ton-mileage, with a special addition for the heavier vehicles on the ground that they entail some greater expenditure in road construction and maintenance, and often by their bulk and shape some greater use and disturbance of the common amenities of the road. One might have expected the Conference to recommend the total prohibition of vehicles above a certain weight and size, seeing that some of these Juggernauts must cause an amount of destruction for which no conceivable licence duty can pay. There are cases, no doubt, as the Report says, when these large and heavy vehicles have an economic value—e.g., for transport from docks through congested streets to a factory in the same town. As a further result of its elaborate statistical calculations, the Conference decided to allot road costs in the proportion of

£23,800,000 to commercial goods vehicles and £36,200,000 to all other mechanically propelled vehicles. A slight revision in favour of goods vehicles brings the final figures down to £23,500,000 for goods vehicles and £36,500,000 for the rest.

In view of the very large, but necessary, additions to the licence duties recommended for vehicles driven by steam, electricity, or heavy oil, it is rather surprising to find that the total of £23,500,000 is only about £2,500,000 more than the present yield of petrol and licence duties on goods vehicles. At present these last three classes escape the petrol duty entirely, and make no contribution except the licence duty, which is supposed to be fixed according to their unladen weight. But we have the amazing anomaly that a 10-ton vehicle pays no more than a 5-ton vehicle, and this, combined with the further anomaly of exemption from any fuel tax, has led to an increasing use of the heaviest and most destructive vehicles. It is difficult to understand how any self-respecting Minister of Transport could have allowed these anomalies to continue for so many years at the expense of the community. It is true that the Conference calculates that only some £1,500,000 of the £60,000,000 should be attributed to vehicles weighing more than 4 tons unladen. Apparently this section (81) of the Report refers to goods vehicles only, the motor coach and omnibus having been excluded from the terms of reference.

At this point in the Report we have the new scales of licence duty, which are given as the unanimous recommendation of the Conference, and have struck the imagination of the public by the startling increases which they suggest for the heavier vehicles, especially those driven by steam, electricity, and heavy oil. The first two classes—showmen's and farmers' vans and lorries—are not very important, as the numbers are small and the calculated mileage inconsiderable. This last fact may explain why a showman is asked to pay less than half the duty charged to a manufacturer or trader. Even in imperial Rome *circenses* did not come before *panem*. In the case of ordinary vans and lorries driven by petrol there is little increase in the licence duty for vehicles under 3 tons, but after 5 tons it rises sharply, so that a hard-tyred van weighing $9\frac{1}{2}$ tons will pay £282 instead of the present duty of £60. For vehicles driven by heavy oil or steam the duties are increased all down the scale, a $3\frac{1}{2}$ -ton Diesel lorry (pneumatic tyres) having to pay £104 instead of £38, while the $9\frac{1}{2}$ -ton lorry will pay £332 instead of £48. For steam-driven lorries the duty is doubled even for the smaller vehicles, the lowest being £53 up to 2 tons instead of £25. A $9\frac{1}{2}$ -ton steam lorry will pay £170 (pneumatic) instead of £48. Electric vehicles pay less, as they do now, but at $5\frac{1}{2}$ tons the duty will be £74

instead of £24. Other classes are not very important, but they are all asked to pay a considerable increase. One good point about all the scales is that there is no maximum duty. In one case only does the Conference suggest a flat rate. At present one trailer may be attached to a lorry for the insignificant sum of £6 a year; and tractors may draw three trailers for the same duty. One would have expected the Conference to propose a graduated scale for trailers based either on their weight or on their carrying capacity. Possibly it did not consider this point, for it proposes merely that the sum payable shall be raised from £6 to £16 in every case. Will not this omission enable the lorry owner to evade a large part of the new duty? He can transfer the carrying capacity of his vehicles from the lorry itself to the trailer. What is to happen in the case of road trains—i.e., the tractor with its three trailers and a cart—is not clear from the Report; the schedule speaks of 'Tractors (General Haulage including Trailers),' with no mention of the additional duty specified for the other classes. This may mean that the weight of the trailers is to be added to that of the tractor. Two small recommendations in favour of the railways bring this part of the Report to an end. The Conference would relieve them of their legal obligation to maintain the road surfaces of bridges carrying the highway over a railway. It would also relieve them of their obligation to publish rates in regard to their regular road transport services so long as no similar obligation rests upon hauliers in general.

These new scales of duty have evoked natural protests from those who have to pay them, but they can be proved to be perfectly just and ought to be embodied by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the next Finance Bill. A more valid criticism of the financial basis adopted by Sir Arthur Salter and his colleagues is that they have taken £60,000,000 as the annual cost of our roads. In a period of depression this is much more than we can afford to spend, and it is certainly more than we need spend in order to maintain the roads in a reasonable condition. Moreover, the proposals of the Conference, if adopted by Parliament, should lead to a considerable reduction in the wear and tear of our road system, since they must act as a check on the use of the very heavy vehicles, which are specially destructive. A second valid criticism would point to the continued permission to use hard-tyred vehicles. Is there any reason why hard-tyred motor vehicles should be licensed at all for general use after a short time limit? Most owners find that pneumatic tyres give better results, because they prolong the life of the vehicle and carry the load with less jolting.

The last chapter deals with co-operation between road and rail; the Conference hopes that the new duties will lead to a

more economically sound distribution of functions between road and rail goods transport. Incidentally it admits that similar principles must be applied to passenger transport, just as it proposes to apply to goods the licensing system which Parliament has already adopted for the coach and the omnibus. It endorses the Royal Commission's view that it is not in the national interest 'to encourage further diversion of heavy goods traffic from the railways to the road,' and agrees in recommending that certain classes of traffic should not in future be transferred to the road. But the Conference evidently relies mainly on the good sense of the two parties to 'co-ordinate their services and give the public the full advantages of complementary service.' It hopes, indeed, that hauliers and railways will so organise their services as to attract all classes of traffic in which large-scale organisation has special advantages. Generally speaking, the road vehicle should be preferred for local collection and delivery and for short-distance conveyance. The Salter Report should be read in full before one can appreciate how thoroughly the nine signatories surveyed their problems. Their recommendations, being a compromise, also need to be taken as a whole; otherwise the carefully devised balance may be upset. Parliament need not hesitate to turn these proposals into law.

Unlike most reports of commissions and committees, the Salter Report does not contemplate the spending of the taxpayer's money or the setting up of a new department. On the contrary, it would save his pocket, and may possibly lead to the suppression of a superfluous Ministry.

J. E. ALLEN.

A GENERAL STAFF FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE

I FEEL that the title of this paper is rather an anachronism, but I can think of no other which would briefly describe the proposal which I wish to put forward—namely, that a number of officials in the Civil Service should be selected who, although already allotted to administrative posts in different departments of the State, would be expected to co-operate in preparing for the Cabinet memoranda which would present important questions of the day in a national rather than a departmental aspect.

It is only if we cast back our minds to the condition of the Army in the early years of this century, when Lord Haldane as War Secretary was reorganising it on the lines which had been started by his predecessor, Mr. Arnold-Forster (to whom, perhaps, sufficient credit has not been given for his share in the reforms), that we can begin to appreciate the great changes that have taken place. The reorganisation of the Army into self-contained divisions instead of a mass of separate units and the establishment of the Territorial Army on a sound and coherent basis are perhaps the two most striking features of these reforms, but it is questionable whether either of these changes was as important in its results as the creation of the General Staff, which was the first offspring of Lord Esher's Committee. The changes in Army reorganisation were indeed directly due to the formation of a General Staff, and would probably not have taken place independently.

I happened to be at the Staff College when the changes were being discussed, and later on at the War Office I was able to appreciate their initial results. It is somewhat difficult to realise the chaotic state of affairs which existed prior to these changes; the first scheme of defence of the United Kingdom was not drawn up until 1909, and any plans for operations outside the United Kingdom were in an equally backward state, except those for very special circumstances—*e.g.*, the defence of the Indian Frontier. The fact that at the Committee of Imperial Defence the question of our supply of artillery ammunition was withdrawn from the purview of the General Staff, accounts for our lack of ammunition in the first years of the war. Individually the units

of the Army remained much the same after the General Staff had been formed, and there was no sudden and wonderful improvement in the intellect of the officers; but the whole outlook was altered—partly as a result of the co-ordination of the different units and the simplification which ensued, but mainly owing to a certain homogeneity of direction which governed the use of our military forces. This homogeneity, due to the recognition of certain guiding principles, had the inevitable result that men, whose point of view was otherwise very divergent, learned to see alike when matters of broad policy were being considered. The study of military history and the working out of military problems on paper led to a realisation of the great principles of war, and clearly demonstrated that there were certain basic laws, like the rules of navigation, from which no leader, however great, could safely afford to depart.

At the Staff College in 1905 the instructors might almost have been chosen because of the dissimilarity of their characters—Rawlinson, brilliant but somewhat impatient of detail, with his counterpart in Capper, who, had he turned his abilities towards trade, would probably now have been one of the great leaders of industry; Ashton, who made sure that our studies did not lack a dash of colour from the Bluewater School; Du Cane, with the imperturbable soundness which led Foch to choose him as his adviser; Gough, impetuous for attack; and, last but not least, Kiggell, for many years Haig's Chief of the Staff, the thinker who developed the idea of a great strategical counterstroke twelve years before the Allies put it into effect in 1918.

The students were certainly quite as mixed in outlook as their instructors, and yet a study of the lessons of great campaigns, hammered into shape by an interchange of opinions, resulted in a common line of thought, which in the Great War ensured that *team-work* which probably saved the British Army from complete disruption during the various German offensives. The South African War disclosed great points of weakness in the higher command, but at the Naval War Course, six years after the South African War was ended, one got the impression that the Army had advanced beyond its great sister service in this respect, though not in the efficiency of its units. The Navy was still divided into two distinct schools of thought following Fisher and Beresford, and the three months' course of study of strategical and tactical problems at the War Course proved but a partial counterpart to the two years spent at the Staff College. Things have changed so completely in both services since that date that no one can reasonably resent this comparison of the Army with its former self or with the Navy, especially when this comparison is being used to demonstrate the improvement of the two services since those

days. The advance made during the past twenty years in both these services owing to the encouragement of combined study has been emphasised in order to try and show that there is a great possibility of a like result if similar methods were introduced into the Civil Service. Recent naval and military history has clearly proved that it is no longer enough to have individuals of the highest intellectual attainments in a service (and undoubtedly in this respect the Civil Service can claim superiority over any other service in the State), but it is also necessary, in order to get the best results, that such men should combine in examining the complex problems of the day. It will be noted that although the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry are all so closely associated in Whitehall, it has been found advisable to have an Imperial Defence College in which the co-ordination of the three services may be specially studied. If a course of instruction is found necessary in the comparatively narrow sphere of military problems, how much more essential does it become when all the other great national questions are under consideration!

It may be urged that the personnel of a service stationed in Whitehall or its vicinity has opportunities for meeting and discussion very different from those which exist in the fighting services, and that the problems of the moment are the subject of interdepartmental conferences in our Civil Service, even before they reach the Cabinet, where they may probably be subjected to further consideration by *ad hoc* committees. There is doubtless some cogency in this argument, but there are two considerations which it does not meet: the first is that under this method each problem is dealt with separately, and very often urgently as a result of a critical situation; and, secondly, that the officers dealing with it have seldom had time for the combined study of general principles, and are therefore liable to approach the subject from a restricted point of view, even if they succeed in avoiding a purely departmental outlook. One of the great dangers of the times is the temptation to Governments to use for permanent evils palliatives of a very temporary effect which should be reserved for transitory epidemics of depression. It is said that in Great Britain, £400,000,000 of the taxpayers' and ratepayers' money is being spent on social services, in addition, of course, to the large sums provided from charitable sources. It will be admitted that, however admirable may be the purposes on which these vast sums are being expended, there is probably a great deal of overlapping which entails unnecessary waste. Reliance on State aid, instead of self-help, has spread from the born shirker upwards, and has even reached those who control great industries. An example of a similar state of affairs on a small scale was brought home to me when I was Officers' Friend at the Ministry of Pensions, a post

created by Lord Craigavon with the approval of Lord Haig. In 1919 Lord Haig told me that he was very dissatisfied with the treatment being accorded to ex-officers, in spite of the promises of the Government and the splendid co-operation of many unofficial organisations. I replied that there were five excellent societies which were looking after disabled officers, the widows and families of officers, and dealing with their housing, training and employment in civil life, and that there was a number of smaller societies scattered over the country doing similar work, but that it was very difficult to get any co-ordination between the help given by the Government and that of so many willing helpers outside, so that there was unnecessary expense in administrative costs, and also a good deal of restlessness on the part of officers, who were required to fill in so many forms of application. I was therefore afraid that the funds were sometimes being exploited for undeserving cases and were doing more harm than good by weakening the moral fibre of men who, keyed up to self-sacrifice during the war, were already suffering from the inevitable reaction. Moreover, I told him that there was no clear understanding on the part of the officers or of the public generally of the assistance which was being afforded to ex-officers by the Government and these various agencies. Lord Haig thereupon set up a small committee, of which he acted as chairman, and of which I was one of the four members, and as a result of its investigations the Officers' Association was formed to act as a kind of clearing-house for ex-officers. This Association was able to collect from the Ministry of Pensions a record of an officer's history and past service, and was then able to ascertain his individual requirements and to put him into touch with one or more of the voluntary agencies, which were so anxious to give him help. Subsequently, Lord Haig founded the British Legion to deal with all ex-servicemen in a similar way, and there is no doubt that the close touch which was eventually secured between this Association and the Ministry of Pensions has done a great deal to secure the best possible use of the funds—public and private—for the assistance of deserving ex-servicemen, and it has also secured a far better spirit amongst them than would have prevailed if the former haphazard methods had been allowed to continue. It has also given the public confidence that their help is being properly used—a confidence which is sadly lacking in respect of the social expenditure by the State and local authorities. This example is quoted because it indicates what appears to be happening now—namely, that this vast expenditure on social services is not producing the result which one would expect. There is the question of waste, due to overlapping; but quite apart from this, one might reasonably have hoped that this huge contribution

from the taxpayers, often at a very heavy sacrifice, would have ensured that a spirit of mutual trust and understanding would grow up between all classes which would have carried the nation a long way through its present difficulties. Such, however, is not the case, and there has been that absence of clear thinking which was Lord Haldane's constant cry about the conduct of the War Office when he was setting up the General Staff, and consequently neither those who contribute nor those who receive have ever had the matter put clearly before them.

Another objection to these proposals, and one which is likely to carry great weight, will doubtless be that the establishment of a Civil Service General Staff would increase the influence of civil servants in dealing with problems of the day, thus undermining the authority of the Cabinet by encroaching on its sphere of work. This objection is likely to appeal especially to the Conservative Party, which has consistently opposed any extension of bureaucracy. Perhaps the best answer to this argument is to ask our statesmen whether the deliberations of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which is so closely associated with the Cabinet offices, have been improved or impaired by the creation of General and Naval Staffs, and whether they would be content to have great questions of policy in matters of defence put forward for their consideration in the half-prepared state that would have been normal twenty odd years ago. An examination of this question would probably be sufficient to allay any fears which they might entertain in this respect, and would lead them to see that the power of a Government will be increased by the improvement of its machinery. In other words, it is suggested that Ministers, overwhelmed now with intricate points of detail, including the competing interests of their respective departments, are trying, as it were, to advance through a forest with dense undergrowth, whereas the formation of a civil General Staff would enable them to choose a course already cleared of those entanglements. In setting up the special committee of distinguished civil servants to advise on the problems of unemployment relief, the Labour Government did, in fact, make an advance towards the suggestions put forward in this paper; but does not the handling of this problem rather resemble our conduct in the South African and other earlier campaigns, in which it became necessary to send a Kitchener and a staff to cope with a situation which had been allowed to get out of control? Was it not, in fact, an improvisation to deal with an emergency which would never have become acute if in the early stages there had been available full information, based on sound principles and clear forethought, on which the Government could formulate its policy? The young civil servant keen on his work no doubt thinks that, if he were given the powers

of a Mussolini, he could, out of hand, vastly improve the conditions of the country; but as he is brought more and more into touch with the problems of government he learns to appreciate not only the difficulties of making sudden changes owing to the complexity of interests involved in an Empire such as ours, but he also begins to realise the heavy responsibilities resting on Ministers of the Crown, who, in their turn, have to convince an electorate, composed in the main of people with a very limited perspective, of the soundness of the policy which they may know to be the right one and yet find it impossible to introduce. The more the civil servant realises the broad general principles of the government of the British Empire and of its administration, the more valuable will be the help which he can render to his political chief.

The possibility that this proposal may entail increased expenditure at a time when the heads of the Service are rightly considering how they can give the nation the much-needed lead towards economy is a matter which has naturally given one anxious thought. Perhaps this sentence hardly does justice to the Civil Service, which, through the operation of the bonus system, which varies salaries according to the cost of living, has already made drastic cuts in salaries, though, unfortunately, these have been counter-balanced by expenditure on the additional personnel required for the new services for which Parliament is directly responsible. The cost of a General Staff would be limited to the establishment of the proposed college, and to the extra expenditure necessitated in seconding from their duties the instructional staff, and also the students during their year's training. It would be relatively very small. Let this question be considered dispassionately by the Treasury, simultaneously with the suggestion that the formation of a General Staff should lead to a greater fluidity of personnel amongst the different departments. The question whether the Treasury has anything to fear from the spread of sound principles throughout the Service has only to be put to receive its answer, and it does not seem an altogether unfair way of presenting the problem. In dealing with the other great departments of State, the Treasury is often hampered by the point of view which can perhaps best be illustrated by the conversation of a young British civil servant with a friend who, in deprecating the extension of the Government's activities beyond its normal functions of direction, wound up by saying, 'No man is indispensable,' to which the young official replied, 'I'll take jolly good care that at any rate one is.'

It is true that the Government which initiates the establishment of a Civil Service General Staff will certainly have to face criticism of a searching character, but a National Government is

in an exceptionally strong position for introducing a reform of this kind, and would not be accused of trying to achieve any party purpose. Sir John Simon, in a speech at King's College, London, last December, referred to the improvements that had taken place in the Cabinet machinery since he first joined a Cabinet, fifteen years ago. If it be admitted that the Committee of Imperial Defence would lose half its value without a General Staff to do the spade work, is there any reason to think that this would not equally be true in questions other than those of national defence? The strain placed on members of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister is severe, more especially in these democratic days when deputations feel aggrieved if they fail to get the personal attention of the leader. Even the comparative rest secured by Ministers during periods of opposition is unlikely to be available for our present statesmen in the near future, and unless they can rid themselves of some of their encumbrances, by delegating more of their work than they do at present, not even super-men will be able to bear the burden of responsibility for many years without losing that freshness of mind which is essential for those guiding the destinies of an Empire. If the nation, which has now accepted a General Staff as part of our military machinery in spite of its foreign origin, would also accept it as part of our national machinery, they would get greatly increased efficiency in administration without in any way undermining the authority of the Government, nor of those who elect it.

So far the examination of this subject has been limited to the Civil Service in Great Britain, and it is recognised that the proposal must stand or fall by its merits with that limited application. But this suggestion is put forward with a wider aim in view, although admittedly any development would have to be gradual. Before the war the training of staff officers of the overseas Dominions, first at the Staff College and then in staff appointments in the Army, had progressed so far that one of the infantry brigade commanders at Aldershot was, I think, a member of the New Zealand Dominion forces, and there were certainly many other instances in which an interchange of staff officers with the Dominions had been arranged. At Ottawa a suggestion was made that there should be a joint Economic Staff to consider Empire problems, but although supported by the other Dominions it was not adopted owing to the opposition of the Irish Free State and South Africa. The proposal may have seemed somewhat revolutionary, but if there had already been in existence a college at which these problems had been studied, the need for such machinery would have been realised. At the beginning of the century very similar difficulties arose with the Dominions in regard to military matters, but any mistrust which may have

existed was soon removed when representatives of these Dominions had come to our Staff College for joint study, and certainly if these overseas officers learnt something from us, we learnt far more from them of the difficulties peculiar to each of the great Dominions, and this, in turn, led to a proper appreciation of their requirements at the War Office and thus ensured the creation of that sympathetic atmosphere and interchange of staff which became of vital importance in 1914. There is little doubt that the overseas Dominions would avail themselves of an opportunity to obtain expert training for the members of their Civil Services as readily as they have done in the case of the personnel of their fighting services, and if this training should ultimately lead to an interchange of some members of the civil staffs there would be an opportunity to give to the cement which binds the Empire together an additional ingredient which should improve its quality. The Colonial and Indian Civil Services would probably wish to send their quota, so that there should be little difficulty in reaching a total of twenty-five or thirty students.

The small Civil Service with which I am connected—that of Northern Ireland—owes a great debt of gratitude to the Imperial Civil Service, which did everything in its power to help its young brother at the time of his birth, and subsequently to assist our efforts to follow the great traditions of the British Civil Service. We are exceptionally well placed, since not only does the Imperial Civil Service Commission pick our candidates for the administrative grades from the common pool, but there has to be daily intercourse between the two services owing to the interlinking of our administrative functions. Speaking unofficially, I feel sure that although we already enjoy these special advantages, yet should an invitation come from the Imperial Government to send a representative to attend a training course such as has been outlined, it would be eagerly accepted.

Perhaps it would be opening out too ambitious a programme to refer to a further possible development, namely, the co-operation of the staff of the local authorities in the United Kingdom. Although, in view of the amount paid directly and indirectly towards the expenditure of the local authorities from Government funds, the Government might perhaps not unreasonably suggest their co-operation in any proposal of this nature, yet it would seem wiser to let the initiative in this matter rest with the local authorities themselves. The county councils might wish to share in the college from its inception, contributing directly to its foundation and to its personnel; on the other hand, it might be better to let this part of the proposal remain in abeyance until a scheme already in operation can be laid before them. I have little doubt that, in that event, the main difficulty

which would arise would be to give an adequate response to the requests that are then put forward.

There are various activities outside the Civil Services of the Empire which in the past have made demands on the home Civil Service for their staff, and this is likely to continue in the future. The League of Nations is one of several openings of this character, and in the memorandum recently issued by the Trades Union Council and the Federation of British Industries the possibility of large additional requirements in staff within the Empire is also foreshadowed. The Bank of England and the London Midland and Scottish Railway both have distinguished civil servants in their directorates. It can scarcely be denied that it would be to the benefit of this country that some of those who leave our service for appointments of this kind should first have an opportunity for combined study and training whilst still in the ranks of the Civil Service. Moreover, the establishment of a Staff College would probably still further intensify the demand upon the Civil Service for nominees for similar appointments, and, in spite of the grumbling of the old type of regimental officer, who corresponds with the narrow departmental point of view which might at one time have been found among one or two of the permanent heads of departments in the Civil Service, it is becoming generally recognised that both regiment and Ministry gain in freshness by the tidal ebb and flow of good personnel within their ranks.

It may make it clearer if an attempt be made to give the scheme in somewhat greater detail, though the proposals are only intended to be a rough sketch which will require a great deal of handling by experts before reaching its final form. The aim is to create in the Civil Service a General Staff for service in any Government department in Great Britain. The possibility of an interchange with the Civil Services outside Great Britain should not be lost sight of, though the temporary exchange of volunteers with the acquiescence of their Governments would seem best to meet the case. A college would be founded under the ægis of the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury as head of the Civil Service, to give a year's training to officers (many of whom would be young principal officers) who had been in the Service, say, eight to fifteen years, and who would be chosen from the various departments by a Selection Board, of which the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury should be the chairman. During the course these officers would be seconded from their respective Ministries, and their places would not be kept open, in view of the likelihood that they may, on completion of their studies, be posted by the Treasury to some other department. The number of candidates to be admitted from the Indian, Colonial, and other services would be for arrangement. Although a certain proportion of staff would be required at this Staff College as instructors, a

great deal of reliance should be placed on the assistance to be given by those who hold high positions in the Service and in local government, those who have left the Service for great positions in industry, and other experts in varying calls of life. In regard to the small instructional staff required it is suggested that the commandant might hold the rank of assistant secretary and that the position should be regarded as one which, after four or five years, would lead directly to the rank of Permanent Secretary in one of the Ministries; he would require three or four assistant instructors, of whom the majority should be chosen from the Civil Service, being seconded from their departments for four or five years. The Service, fortunately, possesses men of the widest experience, some of whom during or immediately after the war were administering the territories which have become the new States of Europe and Asia. As no difficulty is experienced at the Staff College from having some students of rank equal with the instructors, no difficulty need arise from that cause in a civil college. Indeed, distinct advantages arise from this in promoting the feeling that both instructors and those instructed are studying their profession together.

Whether it would be advisable to have on the instructional staff an officer who would deal with the 'A' and 'Q' side of staff work—i.e., the handling of personnel, Whitley Councils, and the use of the mechanical appliances now so much in vogue—depends very largely on the time available for the course, but it would be advantageous if some study of these important matters could be included even if it had to be confined to a few lectures by those who are experts.

One of the most important parts of the instruction would be a foreign tour. It is suggested that after the first six months of the course groups consisting of five or six officers with one of the instructing staff should be sent for a two months' course to study a definite problem in a foreign country. As an example one of the parties might go to Italy to investigate the action taken by the Government to secure, by administrative action, a simultaneous fall in salaries, wages, rents, and the cost of living generally, not only in the Government service, but in all walks of life. Another party might go to Washington to study the statistical system introduced into the Ministry of Commerce by Mr. Hoover. A third would no doubt go to Geneva, and possibly the fourth would be able to see the Soviet five-year plan in operation. The difficulties of language will prove remarkably small in view of the knowledge already possessed by so many civil servants, and it should be easy to ensure that in each party there are at least two persons having a fair knowledge of the language of the country which is being visited. As time goes on, the opportunities afforded by

these tours will probably lead to a greater knowledge of languages being acquired by those civil servants who are anxious to take advantage of them, especially if it is known that the study of a language is one of the considerations that will be taken into account in choosing men for the General Staff.

As is no doubt still the case at the Staff College, problems of the future would be sent to the Civil Service College for study and report. Nearly all departments would receive valuable hints—possibly of a novel kind—from such reports, although naturally they would have to digest and reject much of the material submitted. Training at the college should be directed towards the enunciation of sound general principles calculated to secure the best result out of any policy determined by the Government; it should not be directed towards the creation of that policy. In some cases, perhaps, such training would have the effect of mitigating the ill effects of unsound political direction, but this could hardly be a cause for serious criticism! The instruction at the college should be closely watched by the head of the Civil Service, so that he may be able to ensure that it is kept on the lines desired, and either he or his nominee should be kept in touch with the work of individual students, so that, when they pass out, they may be utilised to the best advantage in the interests of the Service as a whole. The Civil Service is criticised—nearly always unjustly—for the narrowness of its vision, such criticism being based on the assumption—also only partially true—that the activities of its officials are restricted to the vicinity of Whitehall. Owing to the war and the consequent multiplication of duties of a varying character thrown upon all classes of civil servants at that time, there is little or no justification for such criticism at present, but there is a distinct danger, when the younger members of the staff reach responsible posts, that they will tend to have a more restricted vision than the men in control at the present time, unless a course of training such as has been proposed, followed by a change in their sphere of duties, is introduced to broaden their outlook.

In the old days there were elements in the Army which scoffed at any suggestion that the regiment or battery could not offer all the facilities for training required by any military officer. Similar opposition should be anticipated now from certain quarters, but it would be surprising if it came from the most enlightened civil servants or from those who, during the war, cheerfully undertook responsibilities which could never have been anticipated, and which afforded them opportunities of development unlikely to be open to their juniors.

WILFRID SPENDER.

THE TALE OF THE TANK¹

No one could tell the story of how the tank and the tank idea developed as well as General Swinton, for no one saw so much of the weeds and stones which interfered with its growth, and no one had more responsibility for bringing it to fruition. He has taken a long time before setting down his knowledge on paper, but the delay has been worth while in that it has allowed the dust of controversy to settle, and so enabled a cooler appreciation of the truths underlying that story. The tank was the most powerful military development of the World War. We ourselves, who profited by its use, are not so well qualified to judge its potency as those who had to face its terror. But the historian who studies and compares the records from both sides is more and more led to recognise the compound truth of General von Zwehl's comment: 'We were not beaten by the genius of Marshal Foch, but by "General Tank," in other words, a new weapon of war, in conjunction with the widespread reinforcement of the Americans.' If it be suggested that this verdict is merely a post-war excuse, an exculpation for defeat, the answer is that on October 2, 1918, when the German Supreme Command informed the leaders of the Reichstag that it was useless and hopeless to continue the war, the military chiefs declared: 'Two facts have been decisive for this conclusion: first, the tanks . . .' Such a confession of their failure in foresight and military readiness was not lightly made.

But General Swinton's book is an equally devastating record of how little readiness, and still less foresight, was shown by the military chiefs who gained the advantage through this unsought asset. As the fullest story of the origin and growth of this war-winning device, General Swinton's book has an assured historical importance. But its significance is wider. For by reflection it is an indictment of the mentality developed by the military profession and its suitability for conducting the business with which it has been entrusted. By capping the terrible if restrained recital of failures, tactical and technical, that the

¹ *Eyewitness*, by Major-General Sir Ernest Swinton (Hodder & Stoughton).

volumes of the Official History up to date have already furnished, *Eyewitness* forms an urgent argument for an inquiry into the deeper psychological causes of this repeated failure. But, it may be said, General Swinton was himself a professional soldier. Yes, but with a difference. Not merely a difference in his reaction to a new idea, but a difference in his mental preparation and education. The latter may well explain the former; and, if so, it has a more than personal importance in its bearing on the general inquiry.

General Swinton is 'the military man of many aliases,' and in his case each alias has been a just claim to celebrity, not merely notoriety. As 'Backsight Forethought' he wrote *The Defence of Duffer's Drift*, the most popular of all military text-books, and the most entertaining. It has run through many editions in several lands. Never has a bitter pill been better wrapped up in jam for the infant palate. As 'Ole Luk-Oie' he wrote several outstanding works of military fiction and veiled instruction. *The Green Curve* is unforgettable, whether as a story or as a lesson. These books are characterised by a vivid realism, by a freedom from dogmas and conventions, and by a sense of humour, which implies a sense of proportion. These qualities in his literary work explain much of the success of his war work, especially on its more practical side. As 'Eyewitness' he became the most read of all war correspondents. If official nomination and a triple layer of censorship cramped his style they could not cramp his circulation, because he was the only war correspondent allowed to be on the scene, and so to be read, in the early part of the war. He got the job, he tells us, through Churchill reminding Kitchener of the authorship of *Duffer's Drift*. He kept it under difficulties, abused by journalists for his monopoly, and by some of the soldiers for his frivolity, when actually hedged round by restrictions that he can only now reveal. But if in this precarious rôle he was sterile of news he was fertile in ideas. He wrote the first propaganda leaflets dropped from the air; a shrewd sense of probabilities led him to have them printed on poisonous-looking green paper to deter their enemy recipients from using them for a contemptuously utilitarian purpose. As a pioneer in this promising method of mind attack he had been forestalled, as he later learnt, more than a century by Lord Cochrane, 'who had pamphlets dropped from kites towed by the brig *Pallas* when cruising along the French coast.' The coincidence is worth remark, for Swinton would seem to have inherited the free and fertile military mind which made Cochrane one of the pre-eminent figures in our history; it is to the discredit of our military historians, and the disadvantage of our efforts, that Cochrane's career has been so little studied. It is not surprising to learn that after one trial in 1914

this method of mind attack was disapproved, and discontinued, until the responsibility was handed over to civilian hands.

Swinton followed up the idea of mind attack with a new proposal for mined attack. He suggested that mine galleries should be driven deep under the enemy's defences, and from their hidden exits machine-gunners should emerge in the Germans' rear when the next attack was made upon their front. The idea proved too unconventional to be acceptable to those who preferred to pursue the vain plan of renewed and unassisted frontal attacks on the trench barrier. Less unconventional, and so more successful, was his proposal for drawing the enemy out from cover to become targets by a sudden cessation of artillery fire, and simulation of an imminent infantry assault, followed up by a fresh downpour of shells as the enemy manned their parapets. The ruse became so regular later that it almost became a routine—as is apt to be the way of military efforts after surprise. Again, as early as December 1914 Swinton perceived the expensive futility of holding continuous trenches in strength, and instead proposed, unsuccessfully, a method which anticipated, by three years, the German 'pill-box' defence in depth which frustrated our attacks so effectively in late 1917.

But all these anticipations pale before the glowing achievement of Swinton's responsibility for the appearance of the tank on the battlefield. It lighted the path of our troops out of the slough of despond and the stagnation of trench warfare. The story of its development has certainly been told by many lips, and with rather confusing effect, although the outlines at least have in recent years been firmly traced and the credit fairly apportioned. As a result it is with irrefutable authority as a witness that he comes to tell his own story in full and the story of the tanks in appalling nakedness. As an exposure of military Brahminism the book ought to be read by everyone who is concerned for his country, and the lives of his countrymen, should another test await us. As an exposure it is the more striking because it is seemingly unintentional. Time has obviously made the author charitable and allowed his sense of humour to dominate his reflections. Thus he is tolerant to excess, and tones down even the most deserved criticisms. He suggests excuses which are hardly tenable, and emphasises redeeming personal qualities in undisguisable public enemies. But the hard facts stand out through the gloss. As 'Eyewitness,' Swinton was an onlooker who saw most of the game, in the sense of being early impressed with the chief obstacle that was to render all our attacks futile—the entrenched machine-gun. He was the more receptive to this truth through the indirect experience gained in compiling the British Official History of the Russo-Japanese War. In pondering

the problem of how to overcome the obstacle his mind reverted to an agricultural machine, the Holt caterpillar tractor, that he had known of before the war. Why not armour such a machine, and adapt it as a machine-gun destroyer capable of breaking through wire entanglements and crossing trenches? The idea conceived, the next thing was to disseminate and propagate it.

He dropped the first seed with Sir Maurice Hankey, who proved fertile soil. But it was slow to grow because of the strong resistance shown by Kitchener and his technical advisers at the War Office. The excuses that Swinton charitably inflates for Kitchener's attitude are punctured by Swinton's own point that no man had had a better chance than Kitchener to realise, at Omdurman, the effect of modern firearms. 'Shortly after Omdurman, in discussing that action with a friend, he confessed that he was wondering what was going to happen when *we* had to undertake the offensive under similar conditions.' He soon had a chance to learn—against the Boer riflemen. He then had fourteen years to digest the lesson before it was repeated with graver emphasis by the German machine-gunners. It is to his credit that he early came to doubt the prospects of attempted offensives against the entrenched front, but it is a strange reflection and a spot on his vision that he sought no fresh means of overcoming the obstacle, nor even encouraged the one that was offered him. The best explanation is the ossification of mind that so often comes with age, but this is not an excuse. Even when the tank was produced and had demonstrated its obstacle-crossing powers over a private course in Hatfield Park, Kitchener remained 'entirely sceptical' and dubbed it 'a pretty mechanical toy.' Perhaps after all there was some excuse for his assertion that such machines would be quickly 'knocked out by the enemy's artillery,' when one knows how often the same belief is hopefully reiterated by officers, nearly twenty years later, when tanks can course at thirty miles per hour compared with the three miles per hour of their 'Mother.' Kitchener was not alone in his scepticism. The second seed, dropped by Swinton at General Headquarters in France itself, was withered by the Engineer-in-Chief's scornful blast. Even in June 1915, when the oft-baffled General Staff lent its ear to Swinton's proposals—as tardy compensation for its lack of vision all these months—the Engineer-in-Chief advised that 'before considering this proposal we should descend from the realm of imagination to solid facts.' Happily at this stage the General Staff were not deterred by his advice. Moreover, from real fighting soldiers, notably Lord Cavan, Swinton had found practical encouragement.

Meantime the first seed at home had long since reached Mr. Churchill, in whom it found soil not only fertile, but soil that was

already being ploughed. Under his energetic impulse and ceaseless care, 'landship' experiments were initiated and continued by the Admiralty—of all strange military foster-parents—until the War Office was ready to guide these efforts to a practical goal with the aid of specifications of performance required, drawn up by Swinton and approved by General Headquarters. It is implicit, if not explicit, in Swinton's narrative that interdepartmental jealousy may sometimes prove a substitute for vision in promoting creative achievement.

But jealousy has to claim its sacrifice, customarily at the expense of those who propagate a new idea. First, it claimed Swinton's assistant, Brough, who had been sent to command the infant tank force in France, and had been 'difficult'—to use the favourite word of condemnation in the military hierarchy—in trying to curtail the absurd antics which the tanks were made to perform on arrival in France for the edification of the Higher Command. Next, Brough's successor was in turn replaced by a *protégé* of General Headquarters. Swinton showed a shrewdness unusual in a prophet by recommending the most suitable junior member of General Headquarters for the post. Finally, when the chance of a great surprise had been thrown away by the premature use of the first handful of tanks available, although this handful had done enough to justify expansion, Swinton himself was moved out of the way. He, too, was found 'difficult.' Yet he has the philosophy and humour to content himself with quoting the old Persian proverb: 'The dogs bark, but the caravan passes on.' In the more usual if less charitable translation the proverb runs: 'The curs bark.' But the caravan 'moved on caterpillar tracks'—an apt symbol of endless motion. But the moral is not to be so lightly dismissed. If anything is more depressing, in its revelation of hierarchical human nature, than the story of how the tank was resisted, it is the account of how its utility was jeopardised on arrival in France. In April 1916 Swinton saw Haig and his Chief of Staff, Kiggell, who expressed their agreement with the policy that the tanks should be launched as a surprise in masses, not in dribblets. Yet they went back on this declaration when their own Somme offensive was failing. Such is the power of discipline to gag common sense that even Swinton, so it would seem from his narrative, felt unable to offer any serious protest or to open the eyes of his superiors to the folly. But having determined to use the first handful, their chances of usefulness might at least have been helped. Instead, the possibility of control was thwarted by a General Headquarters ruling that the tanks were not to be fitted with wireless. Dummy balloons had been prepared so that the sight of a row of them behind might help to guide the half-blind tanks. But, 'again at

the last moment, it was decreed by General Headquarters that the balloons should not be sent out—lest they might draw fire.' So the balloons were handed over 'to the Air Defence of London, to be used as targets—somewhat costly ones perhaps—for its anti-aircraft guns.' The provision of mobile workshops was delayed by instructions that the specification must be sent out to General Headquarters for approval. And when that approval came back it was 'with the sapient suggestion that possibly two 4½-inch lathes might be substituted for one 9-inch lathe—which is equivalent to asking whether two No. "7" collars would not serve as well as one No. "14"!'

On arrival in France the tanks were 'made to give frequent displays, which crowds of officers, both French and British, came from all quarters to witness.' They were made to do all kinds of foolish if entertaining 'stunts.' These 'were wearing out both machines and personnel. In addition to the almost continuous work of repairing, cleaning, and tuning up their tanks, the men barely had time to eat, sleep, and tend themselves.' Not time to complete their training for the imminent battlefield test. On detraining, a difficult process, the only encouragement they received from a senior officer, who stood looking on watch in hand, was the curt barked-out comment, 'Not quick enough!' 'By what means this individual was able to gauge the time required for an operation which he had never before seen performed was not evident.' The restrained recital of the way high staff officers treated this 'new toy' makes the hearer wonder whether such men were fitted to handle anything more than toys. It is all too evident that they had the minds of schoolboys, without the elasticity that makes it possible for the schoolboy when he emerges into a wider world to shake off the fetters of his kind. Yet it was to such senior officers, grown old before they had grown up, that the nation entrusted millions of lives, its finest manhood, and its destiny. The failures of those years can be glossed over. It is our kindly national tendency to suggest that as the harm cannot be undone the failures should be glossed over; foreigners, misunderstanding it, are apt to call it our national hypocrisy. Some of the senior officers of to-day are arguing that these failures should be glossed over as a precaution against the risk that junior officers may not have the old respect for their present seniors. But, unfortunately, nothing can erase the mental effect of such disastrous stupidity as is represented by the tale of the tank, of the Somme, and of Passchendaele.

As a professional soldier, but a front-line soldier, Colonel Hanbury-Sparrow, has emphasised in one of the most courageously candid of recent war books, *The Land-locked Lake*, it was not merely that the culminating folly of Passchendaele 'shattered our

moral force,' so causing the disasters of March and April 1918, but that 'subsequently there has been scarcely a single development affecting this country that has not got one root in the mire and misery of these Flanders slopes.' One consequence of that experience, he argues, was that it 'drained the war generation of all its creative force. Peace when it came saw these men robbed of all energy to make headway against the strongly entrenched hierarchy of the old or the growing contempt of the young. As the floods of war slowly subsided it revealed them for what they were, a land-locked lake, impotent to rejoin the main stream of life; impotent to convey to it the deeper lessons of the war that they alone had sensed.' It is for the sake of the coming generations that those who shared in the experience of those years should struggle to scrape off the varnish and to reveal the true lessons. For if the harm cannot be undone, some of its causes are capable of remedy. As a beginning, we need a thorough spring-cleaning of the military mind, of the doctrines which guide it and the so-called histories which nourish it: too commonly have armies depended for their historical data on romantically minded civilians or on back-area officers without experience of the battlefield. Here let it be said that our own official histories of the last war have shown a notable improvement, and would have been better still if their compilers had been free agents.

Unless there is frank recognition of past failures there can be no adequate chance of remedying them for the future. For obscured vision is the chief cause of the trouble, and is to be found so consistently throughout the history of modern war, and in all professional armies, that we can only deduce that there is something in the military system which gives it a predisposition to intellectual cataract. Further light is thrown on these symptoms by another recent book,² a most able and searching examination of the past hundred years. Its apt motto is the quotation from Frederick the Great: 'What is the good of experience if you do not reflect?'

Surveying the field of military progress, it points out that as early as 1805 'the Rev. Alexander John Forsyth devised the percussion system, and offered it to the Army, but with no results.' It might have been invaluable in the Peninsular War. However, it was adopted in time for the Crimean War, but only a few years before this! 'In 1824 Captain Norton invented the cylindro-conoidal bullet,' which 'caused the rifle to become the most deadly weapon of the century.' We failed to adopt it until 1851. Even when we were given the Minié rifle we 'entirely misapplied' it in the Crimean War, 'relying on the bayonet and

² *War and Western Civilisation*, by Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.).

shock tactics'—like our allies and foes. Between 1859 and 1862 the British Army was equipped with breech-loading field-guns. In 1865 they were scrapped and a return was made, for a time, to muzzle-loaders. In tactics progress was equally belated. In 1874 Wolseley recorded that 'The fighting tactics of Frederick the Great, improved by the Duke of Wellington to suit the arms of his day, are still alone to be found in our Field Exercise Book.' Even in 1932, one could add, our drill, instead of being a foundation for tactics, is still a survival of Wellington's period, when it had a tactical value. The germ of the tank was seen 'when, during the Crimean War, Boydell steam engines fitted with footed wheels were sent out to negotiate the Balaklava mud.' But it was only a civilian, James Cowen, not any of the soldiers, who saw the tactical possibilities of such a machine.

But other armies were at least as blind. The breech-loading magazine rifle showed its tremendous advantage in the American Civil War, but equipment was so gradual that it never had a chance to prove decisive, as it might well have done. The bullet ruled the battlefields of that war, and the soldiers often discarded their bayonets, but the armies of Europe continued to rely on the bayonet. During that war, indeed, most of the conditions and inventions of the World War half a century later were vividly foreshadowed. But none of the professional armies of Europe attempted to profit by them. In 1866 the Austrians, armed with a muzzle-loader, owed their defeats and their disproportionate losses mainly to the fact that the Prussian infantry were armed with a breech-loader, whose adoption the Prussian generals had strenuously opposed. The Austrians, on the other hand, were provided with new, rifled, cannon which might have redressed their disadvantage, but its correct use 'was unrecognised by the Austrian General Staff.' In 1870, similarly, the French forfeited the advantage inherent in their new *mitrailleuse*, a machine-gun, by using it as a field-gun. On these fire-swept battlefields cavalry were still hopefully taught to charge with the sabre, yet only one charge was successful, and that very expensive. Even after their costly failures in 1877 the Russian generals found consolation in reciting Skobelev's absurd remark: 'The bullet is a fool, the bayonet a hero.' And the chiefs of other armies were not immune from the delusion. For in the years that followed, with firearms growing ever more deadly, the French and German armies returned increasingly to thick lines and to reliance on weight of human bodies in a massed assault. 'Reality is now completely lost in the clouds of romance.'

'The worst offender, not because he was the most miserable, because he was the most eminent, was the late Marshal Foch.' With fantastic mathematical calculations which look now, as

General Fuller says, like 'complete lunacy,' he supported his doctrine of 'attack! attack! attack!' The one man who clearly saw and prophesied the realities of the next war was a civilian banker, M. Bloch. 'The only soldier of note who troubled himself to criticise this book, one of the most remarkable ever written on war, was the veteran General Dragomiroff. He condemned it because it failed to prove that "the bayonet was still supreme."'

The British Army profited a little from a lesson it had from the Boers. It began the war on Crimean lines and shock methods, and was naturally handicapped in applying saner methods. As Sir Ian Hamilton noted, 'In situation after situation where our soldiers were helpless the Boers were perfectly at home. It was this which made one Boer equal to three freshly landed British soldiers in everything except those hammer and tongs fights which . . . are quite exceptional.' Such candour helps one to understand the professional resentment and suspicion which have since pursued Sir Ian Hamilton. General Fuller courts them, too, when he adds: 'It was indeed a matter of brains; brains rendered useless by petty barrack routine, by pipeclay and red-tape, by the hunting and the cricket spirit, by anything and everything except a soldierly spirit and an interest in war. The British military tradition had emasculated the British Army . . .' If we learnt the value of musketry from the Boer War, we grasped so little the wider significance of fire power that in 1914 we had only two machine-guns per battalion, and gave little interest to these. But even after months of war, when the machine-gun had become mistress of the battlefield, General Headquarters resisted an increase, Haig declared that the scale was 'more than sufficient' and the weapon 'much overrated,' and Kitchener laid down that, at any rate, four should be a maximum. It was left to Mr. Lloyd George to intervene and multiply the scale sixteen times!

The foreign armies had learnt nothing from the Boer War. The Germans learnt a little, but not the French, from the Russo-Japanese War that followed. Tactics were remote from reality. Thus when the greater war came in 1914, as Fuller remarks, 'armies, through their own lack of foresight, were reduced to the position of human cattle. They browsed behind their fences and occasionally snorted and bellowed at each other.' The tale of the tank—which could have been available before the war, for plans of such a machine had been contemptuously pigeon-holed—is but a segment of the mosaic of military marble-mindedness. Its glassy opaqueness is as dreadful to contemplate as the sinister uniformity of its pattern. Yet there are soldiers, entrusted with our preparedness for another test, who seem to think that its

appearance can be improved by a coat of varnish! What is the message of this mosaic of history? What is the true moral that we should draw from it?

The increasing influence of science on war, and the consequent acceleration of change, together with the fact that the military sphere has become more and more inseparable from the wider national issues in war and peace, clearly indicate the need for intellectual ability in the higher posts of the Army equal to that of the leaders in other spheres. To ensure this is certainly not easy, for no one can pretend that the military profession offers equal attractions and prospects to talent as others. To remedy this condition would involve a drastic alteration in the prevailing system of promotion, in which seniority predominates. Nevertheless, there is a makeweight in mankind's variability of tastes. The man with an inborn taste for soldiering, and a natural interest in strategy and tactics—the contest of minds at its most intense pitch—will not easily be deterred from following his bent. Those who cannot understand its fascination may find some elucidation in Marcel Proust's *The Guermantes Way*. Proust is only one of a number of great writers who have felt its appeal—indeed, it grips the layman as often, perhaps more often, than the professional soldier. But in this appeal lies the explanation why a military career, despite all its peace-time drawbacks, attracts a sprinkling at least of men who compare not unfavourably with those drawn to other careers. Unfortunately it is easier to attract them than to keep them. The slowness of advancement and the tedium of routine soldiering is naturally felt more by the enthusiastic and the able than the mediocre. Hence the reason why so many of the 'alpha' class drop out while still young. Nothing has been more depressing to an onlooker, who instinctively makes a mental note of the officers of promise he comes across in training, than the frequency with which he learns a year or two later that they have left the Army. They have gone while the going was good, while they were still young enough to have prospects in civil life. And it is inevitably those who can command such prospects who are the most likely to leave. But the dulness of military prospects is by no means the only reason.

Here we come to a fresh issue. It is easier to attract men of intelligence than to keep their intelligence sharpened. In peace-time soldiering there is apt to be too little to keep interest alive and too much to distract it. During their passage through the junior ranks, and until they reach the colonel's list, officers are too continuously engaged in the ordinary course of duty to have much leisure for study and reflection, especially in view of the time conventionally devoted to sport and games. Sometimes that duty is interesting, sometimes tedious, perhaps more often

trivial, but in any case little of it is related to the scientific study of war. And so much of a soldier's service is apt to be spent in provincial or colonial garrisons that offer neither a convenient place nor a stimulating atmosphere for such pursuit of knowledge. Perhaps the best remedy might be to establish periods of 'detachment' for promising officers—some military variant of the idea underlying the university fellowship. When officers reach the higher posts they have in most of them, outside the War Office, more freedom from detail. But in actuality their time becomes so occupied with the ceremonial and social duties of their position that the opportunity to study war is more than ever restricted, even if the inclination survives. This, of course, is the fate of anyone who rises to prominence in any career, and it is rare for such a man to have the resolution to ration his engagements for the purpose of continuing his studies. But nowhere is there more difficulty, if nowhere more necessity, than in the Army. It is the more necessary because, unlike most other professions, the military offers but rare opportunities for actual practice. Most of its operating experience is necessarily in the realm of make-believe. It is as if a surgeon were confined for his training to the dissection of frogs and dead paupers. The rest of a soldier's training for command lies in the realm of theory. If this has gravedisadvantages as a basis of preparation for the hard realities of war, its dangers need not be as great as they have actually proved in the past century.

For there is an alternative to pure theory—in history. And history is an essential supplement even to the most ample practice. No man's personal experience, however long and however highly placed, can cover more than a fragment of any one war. It suffers still worse limitations in comparison with the general experience of warfare in its different conditions and times, so that personal experience of one war may be more misleading than helpful in preparing for another. But in history we have bottled experience, from all the best growths, only waiting to be uncorked. Unfortunately the professional soldier, with very rare exceptions, is an amateur in this knowledge of his craft. His study of military history is neither sufficiently extensive nor intensive. Customarily it follows the method of concentrating on a few campaigns without a background, without acquiring a broad knowledge of all warfare—the method that Napoleon advocated and that the earlier Great Captains had adopted. Moreover, the study of these few campaigns goes no further than an absorption of the facts and deductions set forth in some of the published accounts of and commentaries upon those campaigns. This reliance on someone else's research into the facts would be a less precarious approach to knowledge if the books used were themselves the product of

true research. But too many compiled from secondary sources in an uncritical spirit offer a worse than second-hand acquaintance with the facts. And selection of the books for study is often made with so little discrimination that the student unknowingly is led to feed upon fiction rather than upon historical fact. But at the best, as we have seen, what passes for the study of military history in the Army, even in staff colleges, corresponds to the level of undergraduate work in other branches of history. The repeated errors of the military profession in the past can be traced to this superficial treatment of the only alternative to pure theorising upon make-believe and upon fragmentary personal experience.

But not to it alone. For underlying it there is a psychological attitude that is a fundamental obstacle to truth. The soldier has never been taught to approach his problem in a scientific spirit of inquiry. His early training is directed, above all, to the cultivation of loyalties—multiple loyalties—to King, country, service, arm, regiment, and superiors. To strengthen him for his fighting function, and for the tremendous trials of fortitude which this entails, the development of an intense spirit of loyalty has great value. But, obviously and inevitably, it becomes an obstacle when the man so brought up turns to investigate the facts of warfare. His compound loyalties create prejudices which inevitably colour his vision and bias his judgment. Truth may not be absolute, but it is certain that we are likely to come nearest to it if we search for it in a scientific spirit, and analyse the facts with a complete detachment from all loyalties save that to truth itself. The other loyalties may be essential to the soldier in action, but they are a danger in reflection. The attitude of uncritical loyalty may be essential towards the winning of a war, but it is a fatally blind attitude in which to prepare for a war. To understand this fundamental difficulty of the military mind may help many who feel bitter at its follies to become more charitable in judging them. But charity does not imply contentment with the results. It may be that only a philosopher could achieve a harmonious reconciliation of these opposing loyalties, but something can be done to help the normal soldier in adapting himself to the conflicting rôles of loyal executant in war and truth-loyal student of war. The first need is a change of attitude towards criticism and independence of thought. It is true that, in recent years, soldiers in authority have frequently dwelt on the importance of encouraging thought, but they have failed to see the incompatibility of thought and uniformity of doctrine, which they contradictorily preach with the same breath. And they have too palpably shown their disfavour of any soldier who, acting on their advice, has indulged in criticism that offends their conventional sense of discipline. Yet their own experience of human

nature, if digested, should have taught them, first, that it is the men of personality and originality—in other words, the men fitted to be leaders—who are always the most critical. Secondly, that to suppress criticism does not extinguish it, but merely diverts it into sub-surface channels that are far more subversive than open comment honestly expressed. The history of armies bears witness all too strongly to the prevalence of such sapping by whisper. A true understanding of loyalty would reduce the causes of trouble. It would also curtail the artificial emphasis of this quality. As an intimate observer of armies I have long come to realise that the type of senior officer who is always preaching loyalty essentially means loyalty, on the part of his subordinates, to his own interests. The man who is naturally loyal takes it for granted among his fellow-soldiers. Linked to this is the explanation why the worst obstacles to necessary change and improvement have come from what one may describe as the 'alpha minus' class, the type of aspiring 'examination-wallah' who is pedantically clever but devoid of real originality. The practically minded 'beta,' or even the rather stupid but essentially fair-minded 'gamma,' is far more open to conviction once he has been confronted with hard facts that quicken his imagination.

This reflection brings us to see a second need. A better understanding of loyalty and its reactions must be coupled with a new humility. Satisfaction with present knowledge is the chief bar to the pursuit of knowledge. It has been so in all branches and professions. If the Army is no worse than others, that is no just cause for contentment. Nor does the history of armies yield any cause for self-satisfaction to any soldier who digs down into it. Moreover, those who have studied war the most cannot avoid becoming acutely conscious that the exploration of war as a scientific subject has scarcely been begun. In these conditions lack of criticism is a proof of virgin ignorance. And our sense of humility should be more than personal. Loyalty to the truth coincides with true loyalty to the Army in compelling a wider extension of humility. For the idea that an army which, in its last four major wars, has such a record of obtuseness as the Crimean War, the first and second Boer Wars, and the World War reveal (even in the official histories), is now immune from military cataract must seem incredible to anyone with the least historical sense. To count upon it would be as rashly optimistic as to back a horse that has gone lame in its last four races to win the Derby.

The moral is that unless we become 'invarnishedly' honest about our past, and alertly critical about our present, the odds are heavily against any improvement in our future.

B. H. LIDDELL HART.

ASQUITH¹

FEW men who have played a great part in public life have been so free from histrionics as the late Lord Oxford and Asquith. His attitude to affairs was abstract, intellectual, impersonal. He disliked public emotionalism, 'kept himself to himself,' as the homely phrase goes, and took as much pains to avoid the limelight as some men take to attract it. The mystery in which Disraeli enveloped his personality and the Sinaitic fervour with which Gladstone touched the popular imagination were equally alien to his taste and temper, and he brought with him no sense of the theatre. He did not move through life in scarlet and gold, but was reminiscent of the 'russet-coated captains' of Cromwell's ideal. In Parliament he was at home, and his intellectual mastery of the House of Commons at his zenith was as unchallenged as that of any statesman in history. But his platform manner was unimpassioned and detached, and in private no one cultivated the arts of flattery less than he did. There was in him, apart from his native Yorkshire brusqueness and directness, an integrity of mind and character that not only forbad any kind of affectation or pretence, but led him to the other extreme. He was conscious of his own inhibitions and reticences, and late in life, in a letter to Lady Horner, he said :

There are some things which, as you say, it is difficult to materialise and there are reticences which are not inconsistent with the most intimate and confiding friendship. I am hedged in and hampered in these ways by a kind of native reserve, of which I am not at all proud, for it is due partly to temperament, partly to shyness—a most potent negative force—and probably in part to vanity.

It would not have been surprising if the biography of a man of so reticent a temperament had been lacking in colour and drama. Instead, the joint authors have achieved a masterpiece of vivid portraiture and of action rising to great drama against the almost cosmic background of the World War. Dual authorship is always a risky experiment, and it can rarely have been so happy in its results as it is in the present case. Mr. Cyril Asquith's

¹ *The Life of Lord Oxford and Asquith*, by J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith (Hutchinson & Co. Ltd.).

share in the task is the record of his father's early career and the revelation of his intimate life and character, while Mr. Spender covers the vast canvas of Asquith's public action. But there is no break in the unity of the story. It moves forward with a cumulative and governed momentum to the final catastrophe. Asquith was at the centre of world events during the most thrilling period in history, and the record of those events is necessary to the understanding of his character ; but the authors never lose grip of their main theme, and he emerges from the historical background as vivid and convincing a figure as any to be found in the annals of statesmanship. There are some biographies that turn their subjects to stately marble. Morley's *Life of Gladstone* I think is one of them. Mr. Spender and Mr. Cyril Asquith have almost reversed the process. In these pages Asquith comes to life with an intensity unsuspected save by few of his own contemporaries.

From his earliest years his exceptional gifts were apparent. Born at Morley, in Yorkshire, in 1852, of Puritan strain, he lost his father while a child, and at nine years of age came with his brother William Willans to London, where he lived under the guardianship of his uncle, John Willans, and went to the City of London School, then under the headmastership of Dr. Abbott. 'He did everything for himself,' said Abbott. 'There was nothing left but to place before him the opportunities of self-education and self-improvement ; simply to put the ladder before him and up he went.' The most remarkable of his accomplishments was his mature gift of speech revealed in the school debating society, where, said Abbott, he 'could plunge into an intricate and involved sentence with such an artistic prescience of what he had to say that all the members of the period fell, as it were, into harmonious co-operation, so that in the end he brought his hearers to a full and satisfactory, a logically and rhetorically complete and weighty conclusion, without any sacrifice of point, force, and, above all, of clearness.'

The bent of his mind was never in doubt. He loved scholarship, and applied to it a powerful and masculine intelligence that made his career at school and at Balliol a record of dazzling triumphs, and to the end of his life his talk was steeped in the literature of the ancient as well as of the modern world. But scholarship was not a cloistered and fugitive virtue. It was an enrichment of life, a discipline of taste and judgment, and an instrument for service in the dust and heat of the daily battle. Nor was he attracted by the 'fuliginous jargon' of speculative philosophy. Mysticism and metaphysics were alien to a mind that was all daylight, and no one, says his son, ever discovered what views, if any, he held about the Ultimate and the Absolute.

'Probably he considered that most speculations on these subjects were a beating of the air.' His preoccupation was the world of men and the philosophy of government, and he never could understand how an intelligent man should not desire the capacity to influence events or fail to rejoice in its exercise. Even as a small schoolboy this predilection for public affairs was evident. His Uncle Willans told me that the boy once invited him to test his capacity to name the seat for which any member of Parliament then in the House sat and that he survived the examination without a fault. And his letters to his mother and sister at this period indicate a precocious interest in political affairs. Thus at the age of twelve he sends his mother a detailed account of a debate he has heard in the House of Commons, and adds gravely :

The debate has been the best and the longest they have ever had on the Bill, though the division was one of the most adverse. I was looking over the Division List this morning and found no less than 30 professing Liberals in favour of Lord Elcho and Mr. Black. . . .

The destiny of Asquith is implicit in that picture of the boy in knickerbockers solemnly scanning the parliamentary division list and lamenting over the misbehaviour of those '30 professing Liberals.' Oxford, much as he loved and revered it, and much as it appealed to 'that sense of the significance and majesty of the past' which was one of his deepest instincts, did not offer him the career on which his heart was fixed. Nor was the Bar more than a convenient approach to that career.

But if convenient, it was also hazardous, for he had no private resources, no social or professional backing, and a congenital distaste for the artifices that make for success at the Bar.

We know from one of his rare gleams of self-revelation [says his son] how keenly Asquith felt at this period the weariness of knocking at closed doors. The hope deferred that maketh the heart sick, the impatience of eager faculty fusting unused were, as term followed infructuous term, his daily companions, making their presence felt whenever he heard a solicitor's clerk pause on the stairs outside his chambers and pass on.

During these lean foiled years of waiting he supported himself by lecturing for the Law Society and by writing for the *Economist* and the *Spectator*, and his lot was sweetened by a home life of rare felicity. He had married in 1877 Helen, daughter of Dr. Melland, a Manchester physician, a gracious and unworldly woman by whom he had five children, and of whom, when she died in 1891, he said that she had given him eighteen years of unclouded happiness. It was not until he had been called seven years that there came a turn in the tide in his affairs. He had become 'devil' to R. S. Wright, then just appointed 'devil' to the Attorney-General, Henry James. It was the time of the Brad-

laugh imbroglio, and Gladstone, then preparing his Affirmation Bill, directed the Attorney-General to have compiled a memorandum on the law and history of the Parliamentary Oath. James delegated the task to his 'devil,' and his 'devil' passed it on to his 'devil.' The masterly result brought Asquith into the light. Both James and Gladstone discovered the author, and James afterwards expressed the opinion that, with the single exception of Gladstone, Asquith was the ablest man with whom he had ever worked. He preserved the fateful notes on the Parliamentary Oath, and, on the occasion of Asquith's second marriage in 1894, presented them, handsomely bound, to his wife.

At last Asquith's goal was in sight. He no longer waited to hear the solicitor's clerk pause at his door and pass on. Briefs began to come in, and the parliamentary career which had been his ambition since a boy became practicable. He entered Parliament for East Fife in 1886 in the midst of the political convulsions caused by Gladstone's introduction of the first Home Rule Bill. It was on the Irish question that he made his maiden speech, and when he sat down the House, from Gladstone downwards, realised that a new force had entered Parliament. Asquith had no apprenticeship to serve here. From the start he assumed the authority of a front-bencher and the House accepted him at his own valuation. Henceforth the law played a secondary part in his activities, though it was after this that he achieved his first great forensic triumph by the cross-examination of Macdonald, the manager of *The Times*, before the Parnell Commission. But all his heart was in politics, and though he went back to the Bar after his first Ministerial experience as Home Secretary, his interests were elsewhere, and at the hint of the break-up of the Balfour Government in 1905 he threw up the most valuable brief ever offered him—a brief marked £10,000—because it would have carried him out of England at a critical moment.

The most revealing episode of the book, so far as the intimate life of Asquith is concerned, is that dealing with his courtship of his second wife. Whether Asquith, who himself destroyed his love-letters to his first wife, would have approved of the publication to the world of his letters to 'Margot' may be doubted; but the world will be grateful to the authors for enriching the literature of love with liberal extracts from these passionate and beautiful epistles. In doing so they have lifted the curtain of Asquith's reticence and disclosed, as nothing else could, the flame of feeling and the high and chivalrous thought that he shielded so sedulously from the public eye. His second marriage was an adventure for both. He was approaching middle age, immersed in law, politics and serious affairs, bred in an austere and Puritan tradition, and

with five young motherless children to care for. She was the darling of society, the most be-paragraphed young lady of the time, whose name suggested all the gaieties and irresponsibilities of life. It is not surprising that the friends of both looked askance at the union of such opposites. Rosebery and Randolph Churchill issued their warnings from one side, Jowett of Balliol from the other. These pleaders saw that his career would be ruined: those that her bright light would be extinguished by the burden of a family not her own. She herself halted feverishly between 'Yea' and 'Nay.' She had been engaged to a kindly, sport-loving friend of the hunting field, Peter Flower, but contact with Asquith had filled her with doubts about the sufficiency of the heedless life she was living. She had known his first wife, and had introduced her to her own circle only to be told by her that 'she did not think she would ever care for the sort of society that I loved and was happier in the circle of her home and family.' That memory only added to her doubts whether she was the person to be a mother to Helen's children. Asquith himself was the only assured mind on the subject. He would marry Margot or no one, and he pressed his suit with a fervour none the less passionate because it was always couched in exquisite English. Even in the urgency of his love-making he could not forget his perfect periods. He writes about books and politics, men and affairs; sometimes in high spirits, sometimes in sad, according to whether the star of his hope was in the ascendant or the decline. And when at last consent has been won he breaks out into an anthem of thanksgiving. One extract from this must represent the spirit that suffuses the whole of these remarkable letters:

What am I to say to you on your birthday? There is no good or perfect gift I do not wish for you in the year which you are beginning, and which promises to be the most momentous in your life and mine. My thoughts go back to this day last year when I remember well what I wrote to you. At that time I felt instinctively that the sky was beginning to cloud over my head, and that faintly but quite perceptibly the light of my life was withdrawing itself. A month later my forebodings were realised, and the darkness came. I was miserable—starved and frozen in spirit, driven in upon myself, only to find blankness and barrenness and to feel that I could not live without you. You were not happy—not really happy. So once more we drew near to one another. Then came the summer which brought you no rest, ending in that tumultuous week at Glen which we shall neither of us ever forget. But through it all, then and always, you were noble, true to yourself, disdaining the illusions and deceptions and make-believes in which the weak find a sorry and crumbling refuge. You would not lie to yourself, nor to me. And now I feel that all the pain and anxiety, the doubts and fears, the shiftings between hope and despair, were well worth while; for through them all we have come to solid ground, on which we can stand and rest and build. Darling, don't think I misjudge you. I know how much there remains for me to do before I can be to you

what I hope and am resolved to be. But you have put your hand in mine and you will not draw it back, because you have faith and hope. I will never let it go, and as months and years pass you will come nearer and closer, and what seems strange and almost hazardous will become natural and even sweet. . . .

The next, and the only other thing I ask you to-day (there are others but they will keep) is that you shall feel free. The tie will always be there to keep us close, but I couldn't bear that it should chafe you. Remember our old favourite—the very first poetry we ever quoted to one another, and the best—'Ode to Duty.' 'Flowers laugh before thee on their beds, And fragrance in their footing treads.' That is how I should like you to feel it: that all the order and self-mastery which the taking of a great burden and the following of a serious purpose brings into life, does not deaden its quickness or mutilate its grace, but is only the counterpart of the pulse and rhythm of the stars, and 'the most ancient heavens' themselves, where the 'reign of law' manifests itself in eternal freshness and beauty, and (as Goethe says) the regular working of the natural forces 'weaves for God the garment thou seest him by.'

That is love-making in the grand manner, and no portrait of Asquith would have been complete or true without the glamour of this episode. And the glamour did not fade. Twenty-five years after, on the morrow of the hardest blow of all, his defeat in the constituency he had represented for half a lifetime and the wreck of the party that embodied all the ideals for which he had lived, he wrote to his wife:

It is sad that we cannot spend your birthday together, but I am sure you were wise, both for your own sake and Elizabeth's, to start as soon as you did. You know that I wish for you every blessing that earth and heaven can give. I see no reason why we should not be happy. I am in my 67th year, and looking back (while I think worse of men's brain, and of their hearts and characters than I once did) I have not many grievances against Fortune. Few men have had a life more crowded with interests, both big and small; and none that I know has been so nearly blessed in his home. If we live to May 10th we shall celebrate our Silver Wedding Day: and I will lay any odds anyone likes that there is not on the face of the globe a couple—man and wife—who have made as much of 25 years in every possible way.

Puff [his youngest son, Anthony] and I had a charming farewell: his is the most perfect character I have ever known, or ever shall. . . . I only pray that our complete and unique comradeship may continue to the end.

Although Asquith was himself the least theatrical of men, events conspired to make of his public career a personal drama of singular unity and poignancy. He came to supreme power when the sky at home and abroad was darkening with menace. A new mood of revolt filled the labour world with unrest and the challenge of direct action. The question of the enfranchisement of women had emerged from the academic phase and assumed a formidable

and fantastic violence. Two capital issues which had perplexed the political world for a generation—the veto of the House of Lords and the question of Home Rule for Ireland—had reached a point at which a violent explosion seemed inevitable. And enveloping and overshadowing all these domestic problems was the deep and growing anxiety of the European situation, the widening gulf between this country and Germany, the implications of the Anglo-French *entente* which his Government inherited from its predecessor, and all the premonitions of the catastrophe that engulfed the world in four years of unprecedented conflict and wrecked the whole structure of the white civilisation.

The qualities of mind and character which Asquith brought to a task more formidable than any that had ever confronted a British statesman are implicit throughout Mr. Spender's illuminating record of his public career, and give to that career a design and coherence rare in the annals of public life. No one less empirical or adventurous ever played a great part in affairs. His reverence was for facts and the practical possibilities of things. If he dreamed dreams and saw visions, he did not cultivate them in public, or employ them to arouse unattainable expectations. Utopia was beyond the horizon, and his concern was with the visible realities of the immediate situation. He would not force an issue when the omens were against it, but was prepared to wait for times and seasons which made its accomplishment possible. This enlightened opportunism did not imply lack of enthusiasm, still less a loose hold of principles. It was due to that economy of effort which was characteristic of him, and to that concentration on the essential and the practical which led him to dismiss the irrelevant and the inopportune. He was the despair of discursive minds and talkative people, and those who had experience of him in conference all bear witness, not merely to the patience with which he listened to those who 'meandered round about a meaning,' but still more to the force and brevity with which he brought those meanderings back to the central point.

He more than once said that, like Pitt, he regarded patience as the first article of statesmanship, and no one exercised that virtue more constantly than he did, both in his dealings with men and in his contact with events. The quality laid him open to the suspicion that he was lacking in force and decision, and it would hardly be too much to say that in the end he was hooted out of office by Lord Northcliffe's daily chant, maintained month after month, of 'Wait and See.' That phrase, used by Asquith years before the war in reply to 'fishing' questions in the House, was dinned into the public mind as representing the spirit of his conduct of the war, and the 'damnable iteration' undoubtedly

undermined public confidence in him and had its influence in the final overthrow. But the implication of the phrase was a grotesque misreading of his character. On great issues that called for immediate decisions his action was swift and masterful. It was he who, when Sir John French proposed, after the retreat to the Marne, to take the British Army out of the line, sent Kitchener to France to forbid such an act of treachery. His assumption of the War Secretaryship in the Curragh crisis was a dramatic stroke the effect of which will never be forgotten by those who heard its announcement in the House. His visit to Dublin on the morrow of the Easter rising of 1916, his substitution of Haig for French as Commander-in-Chief, and a multitude of other incidents bear witness to the prompt and bold front with which he could meet the challenge of a critical occasion.

But it is true, nevertheless, that patience was the most constant weapon in his armoury. He would not act on impulse, or on suspicion, and turned a blind eye to intrigues and a deaf ear to the warnings of those who thought he was not blind but ignorant. I do not think he was ever ignorant, but he chose to use the blind eye rather than risk a political crisis that would threaten the solidarity of the country in a time when solidarity was its greatest need. In relation to events he was patient because he believed in the moderating influence of time. Let men talk, give them time to blow off steam and cool down, wait for a favourable wind and keep the atmosphere as far as possible dispassionate and minds open and accessible—these were the axioms implicit in his handling of difficult public issues such as the great miners' strike of 1912, the struggle over the Parliament Act, and his conduct of the Home Rule Bill.

It may be that he carried his doctrine of patience too far, and that in doing so he encouraged the belief that he was lacking in courage and could be relied on never to strike. The most conspicuous instance of this indisposition to meet violence with the strong hand was the case of the threatened civil war in Ulster and the challenge to the authority of Parliament which the Carson army openly and flagrantly implied. What the issue of that great controversy would have been we do not know, for on the day that the Buckingham Palace Conference broke up and civil war seemed unavoidable, Austria sent her ultimatum to Serbia, and in ten days the British Army was embarking, not for Ulster, but for Flanders. But it is not necessary to assume that lack of courage was the explanation of Asquith's avoidance of violent retaliations. The trait is sufficiently explained by his entirely impersonal habit of mind. He approached every problem of politics as dispassionately as a mathematician approaches a theorem, and no affront could sting him into personal conflict or

personal defence. No man so completely eliminated himself from the argument. For years after his Home Secretaryship he never rose to address a public meeting without encountering a storm of cries of 'Featherstone,' but at no time was he provoked into a word of retort or defence, and in the historic 'pot-house brawl' in the House of Commons on the occasion of the Parliament Bill his only comment on a personal outrage never before inflicted on a Prime Minister was a scornful shrug of the heavy shoulders as he sat down after vainly trying to speak for the best part of an hour.

He was not merely patient with his opponents. He was patient with his colleagues. His freedom from the common vices of ambition and jealousy did not blind him to the ambitions and jealousies of others; but he ignored them in the pursuit of the public ends which were his sole preoccupation.

When things were going well with his Government [says Lord Grey] he would be careful to see that any colleague got credit, if he were entitled to it, without regard to whether any credit could be given to, or left for himself. On the other hand, if things were going badly he was ready to stand in front and accept all responsibility; a colleague who got into trouble was sure that the Prime Minister would stand by him.

Charles Masterman told me in the midst of the Marconi affair, when Mr. Lloyd George's career was in the balance, that going to the Prime Minister's room he found him walking to and fro in the deepest agitation and murmuring, 'I cannot save him; I cannot save him.' He was heard to say that until the test of the war came he had no idea how his colleagues differed from one another in character and temperament, and sometimes he dropped shrewd observations in private about their behaviour:

Winston who has a pictorial mind brimming with ideas is in tearing spirits at the prospect of war, which to me shows a lack of imagination; Crewe is wise and keeps an even keel; no one can force Grey's hand, he and I see eye to eye over the whole situation; Lloyd George is nervous; Haldane, Samuel, and McKenna very sensible and loyal.

His disagreements with his colleagues had no element of personal feeling in them, and Campbell-Bannerman, with whom he had been at issue on the Boer War, thanked him on his death-bed for being 'a wonderful colleague, so loyal, so disinterested, so able.' 'You are the greatest gentleman I ever met. This is not the last of me; we will meet again, Asquith,' were his parting words.

If he was moved to anger, it was not on personal grounds, but on public issues. His philosophy of government had its roots deep in the traditions of public law and the doctrine of constitutionalism. He had much of Burke's reverence for the past. He saw the rule of law and the idea of liberty coming down from

precedent to precedent in ordered majesty, and his mind revolted equally against the reactionaries who would check this august development and the revolutionaries who would substitute for it the doctrine and practice of violence and catastrophe. Liberalism meant to him the wise equilibrium between the forces of stagnation and the forces of convulsion, and the authority of Parliament and the sanctity of international agreements were the guarantees of civilised relationships. Who laid a hand on either violated the ark of his covenant, and it was against such that his wrath, so quiescent under personal attack, flamed out in a white heat. The invasion of Belgium, the Black-and-Tan infamy, and the General Strike were to him breaches of the tables of the law by which human society was held together. If they were condoned, civilisation itself was outraged.

He did not wear his heart on his sleeve for daws to peck at, and he bore the blows of fortune which befell him from 1916 onwards to the end with uncomplaining dignity and without a murmur of recrimination. They were blows both personal and public, the death in battle of the eldest and most gifted of his gifted children, his fall from power as the result of a squalid intrigue, his defeat in the constituency that had been faithful to him for a generation, the 'assassination' (to use his own word) of the Liberal Party at the 'coupon' election, the unworthy rejection by Oxford of the greatest and most devoted of its sons for the Chancellorship, the final and humiliating blow at Paisley which ended his career in the House of which he had been the most illustrious figure, and the impoverishment which was the penalty of the sacrifice of a great professional career to the public service and of his own indifference to the calculations of self-interest. The spirit in which he accepted all this is illustrated in a touching passage quoted in the book from the diary of his daughter, Lady Violet Bonham-Carter. It deals with that last blow at Paisley. The election is over, and Asquith's public career is at an end. The tearful farewells had been taken and Lady Violet and her father are alone in the railway compartment.

As we steamed out of the station I lay back feeling bruised from head to foot—and recoiling instinctively from the pile of newspapers that lay by my side—their head-lines stinging me like adders. I looked across at Father in an agony of solicitude (for I knew how the good-byes had moved him)—then meeting his calm gaze I realised suddenly that he had already made his peace with events. Groping wildly for a life-line that might draw me into smooth waters by his side, I asked in as steady a voice as possible: 'I suppose you haven't by any chance got an old P. G. Wodehouse in your bag that you could lend me?' A smile of instant response, mingled I thought with relief, lit up his face as he replied triumphantly: 'Being a provident man I have got in my bag, not one, but *four brand new ones!*' My wounds were healed—for I knew that he was invulnerable.

Historically and dramatically the book reaches its climax in the vast episode of the war, and Mr. Spender's narrative of the events that led up to the *coup* of 1916 and the overthrow of Asquith by Mr. Lloyd George is none the less moving because it is told with his characteristic sobriety and restraint. It is the first complete and documented record of the most momentous intrigue in history—momentous not merely in its bearing upon the war, but still more upon the even greater issues of the peace. That intrigue was the culmination of a clash both of ideas and of men. Certain governing principles were inflexibly adhered to by Asquith throughout his conduct of the war. He sought above all to preserve the solidarity of the Government and the unity of the country in the face of unparalleled danger. Warned by the experience of Lincoln, as well as by his own strong sense, he did not aim at assuming the military direction of the war. The larger objectives of military policy were to be dictated by the Government, but the strategy of the war was the affair of the soldiers. If they proved inadequate to the task he did not hesitate to supplant them, as in the substitution of Haig for French. But while they were in command their responsibility must not be undermined by civilian interference. He had strong convictions on questions in which political considerations and military strategy overlapped, and here he exercised his authority. In the great controversy of the Easterners and Westerners, for example, he was throughout inflexibly a Westerner, and in this, of course, he was supported by the overwhelming consensus of military opinion. Certain concessions to the other school were necessary, partly because of our obligations in the Near East, *e.g.*, Egypt, partly because of political pressure from France. But that the main theatre of the war was in the West and that it would be won or lost there was his unwavering conviction.

On these and other major issues Asquith had the support of his colleagues in the Government with one formidable exception. Before many weeks had passed Mr. Lloyd George began to exhibit impatience with military men and the military mind, and as early as January 1, 1915, he launched his 'famous memorandum' demanding that the British force should be transferred from France to Eastern Europe and that 'our main military effort should be directed against Austria, instead of vainly continuing the attempts to break through the German defences on the Western front.' From these two motives—the civilian control of the strategy of the war and the prime importance of the Eastern theatre—Mr. Lloyd George's political activities proceeded. His fundamental differences with Asquith were none the less real because they did not at first appear upon the surface. Asquith's

dislike of personal conflict, his sense of the paramount importance of preserving unity in the Government and the country, his practice of turning a blind eye to what he did not wish to see, and his doctrine of patience, together with his high regard for his colleague's dynamic qualities, prevented an open breach. He believed that experience of the military men would modify Mr. Lloyd George's attitude towards them and that the course of events would correct his view as to the vital theatre of the war.

But the more power he conceded to his colleague the more the screw of pressure was turned. Mr. Lloyd George had one enormous advantage in the struggle. In the Government and in Parliament Asquith's pre-eminence was unchallenged, but outside his position was much less secure, and in the agitated circumstances of the time the surge of public opinion exercised a powerful influence upon events. Asquith not only had no art of self-advertisement—he had a profound dislike of it; and his relations with the popular Press had always been cold and even inimical. He believed in government by Parliament and not in government by an emotional and sensational Press, and he took no pains, not even legitimate pains, to preserve cordial terms with the newspapers. Mr. Lloyd George, on the other hand, had always realised the importance of a good Press. He might forget an engagement with an archbishop, but he would never forget an engagement with a newspaper reporter, still less with newspaper magnates, like Lord Northcliffe and Sir Max Aitken, who through their multitudinous organs had the ear of the public from John o' Groat's to Land's End. Thus from the earliest days of the war Asquith became the target of ceaseless sniping from the popular Press, and all those who were supposed to stand by him, like Sir Edward Grey, Haldane and Kitchener, shared in the odium he incurred, while Mr. Lloyd George was daily exalted as 'the Little Wizard from Wales,' who alone was passionately trying to win the war in face of the incompetent 'wobblers' whose watchword was 'Wait and See,' and who, if they were not actually in Pemberton-Billing's Black Book, were, at all events, guilty of 'feeding the Germans' and contemplating an inglorious peace.

In the final assault of November 1916, which was launched while Asquith was reeling under the heaviest personal blow he ever sustained, the death of his eldest son in France, the inspiration came from Sir Max Aitken. He was the closest personal friend of Bonar Law, and his chief part in the plot was to detach him from Asquith and win him over to Sir Edward Carson, who was attacking the Government from without, and to Mr. Lloyd George, who was attacking it within. The task was not easy, for even as late as November 14 Sir Max (now Lord Beaverbrook) records that the chief difficulty was 'that Bonar Law had formed

the opinion that in matters of office and power Lloyd George was a self-seeker and a man who considered no interests but his own.' To the end it is clear that Bonar Law was an unhappy participant in the intrigue, but he yielded to the vehement pressure of his friend, and by the 27th had been prevailed on to divulge the Lloyd George scheme to his Unionist colleagues in the Cabinet. He found himself confronted by the unanimous and uncompromising resistance of those colleagues who, in Lord Beaverbrook's words, 'were absolutely determined not to proclaim a dictatorship with Lloyd George as dictator.' This was still their attitude on the critical Sunday, December 3, when (the mine having been exploded the previous day in the Northcliffe and Beaverbrook Press) they met and passed a resolution the significant clause of which was a hint to Asquith to tender the resignation of the Government as a preliminary to re-forming the Ministry and bringing Mr. Lloyd George under control. The fact that the terms of the resolution were never presented to Asquith is the darkest incident of the amazing story. If they had been shown to him—as they had already been shown by Bonar Law to Sir Max Aitken, who was waiting in an adjoining room while the Unionist Ministers met—Asquith would have tendered the resignation of the Government, re-formed it, and destroyed the plot. But he was led by Bonar Law to believe that his Conservative colleagues had deserted him for Mr. Lloyd George, and from that misunderstanding the rest followed and three days later the *coup* was an accomplished fact. Asquith had disappeared from office, never to return.

In those brilliant letters, just published, of that strange, disruptive genius D. H. Lawrence, there is one dated December 5, 1916, in which he says: 'It is bound to come, the smash-up in this country—and oh, oh God! if only it would come quickly. But it will never take place while Asquith holds the Premiership. He is too much the old, stable, measured, *decent* England.' When that letter was written Asquith (although the fact was unknown to Lawrence) had already gone, and in the perspective of the troubled years that have elapsed since he fell, and in the light of the calamities that beset this country and the world to-day, it is not difficult to see how much of that 'old, stable, measured, *decent* England' went with him. The authors hesitate to pronounce on Asquith's title to greatness, but I do not think that anyone can close these absorbing volumes without the sense that they have been in contact with a superb intellect, a noble and unselfish public spirit, and a great Englishman.

A. G. GARDINER.

SLATIN PASHA

SLATIN PASHA is dead. A romantic figure which might well have found its origin in the vivid imagination of some dramatic novelist has passed. To the younger generation he was more or less unknown, but to those who remember the 'eighties and the 'nineties he stands out as one whose life was singularly varied and crammed to its fullest with adventure.

Rudolph Carl von Slatin was born on June 27, 1857, at Ober St. Veit, near Vienna. His earlier years call for no special comment, but the month of July 1878 may be regarded as a date which definitely marked the beginning of his romantic career. At that time he was serving in the Austrian army as a lieutenant in H.I.H. the Crown Prince Rudolph's regiment, the 19th foot, during the Bosnian campaign, when he received a letter from General Gordon inviting him to come to the Sudan and to take service with the Egyptian Government under his direction. Slatin had previously visited Egypt in 1874, and was making a tour of that country and of the Sudan when an Arab revolt cut short his visit. He returned to Khartoum undecided as to what he should do next, when he wrote to General Gordon for advice on the subject. This approach had resulted in an invitation from Gordon for Slatin to come to visit him at Lado, where he was then residing. Young Slatin had been suffering from fever, and letters from his family in Vienna arrived urging his return to Europe; besides, he was under the obligation of completing his military service in the Austrian army during the following year. In the end he decided to comply with the wishes of his family. Whilst at Khartoum he met a Dr. Emin (afterwards Emin Pasha), who had also been invited to visit Gordon and had accepted. Before leaving for Lado Slatin begged Emin to recommend him to the General, which he did, and the result was the invitation which reached him three years later on the Bosnian frontier. The campaign was at an end, and as an officer of the reserve he was granted leave to accept the invitation from the Sudan.

Slatin was twenty-two years of age when he set out for Egypt the second time in December 1878. He arrived at Khartoum on

January 15, 1879, where he met Gordon. This meeting was a prelude to a great friendship between the older and the younger man, establishing as it did immediately feelings of good-will and mutual attraction. Gordon found a house for young Slatin close by the palace, and asked him to come over every day to share his evening meal, and sometimes his midday meal also. It may not be out of place to touch here upon a point about which there has been controversy, and statements have been made which do a great injustice to the memory of so splendid a character as 'Chinese' Gordon. The accusation has been made that Gordon over-indulged in strong drink, and that those occasions when he claimed privacy from the world and its affairs for the purpose of religious exercise and devotion were in reality only a mask to hide his drunken orgies. Slatin has stated in writing that, although Gordon was in the habit of taking a little brandy with his meals, he never once saw him under the influence of drink. Coming from one who was in daily contact with the General, the statement should effectively dispose of the baseless and ungenerous rumour.

At this time there was considerable unrest amongst the populace, especially amongst the poorer section, on account of the severe taxation. A study of the prevailing conditions at that time will reveal a certain amount of unfairness and not a little hardship. But a long view has to be taken. In the first place, the Sudan was still suffering from age-old complaints of a serious and degrading nature. The corruption inherent in every native State in the East and Near East was by no means alien to the intimate life of the Sudan. Graft had infected every rank in the political service; oppression sat heavily upon those who had the misfortune to form the lower classes; women, whose position in Eastern countries seldom rises above that of degrading concubinage, were for the most part regarded merely as a question of price—a price which diminished as the years of their life passed. In fact, this commerce in living human flesh resulted in a considerable slave-trade that constituted a serious problem in itself. Let those who question the policy of British rule in the Sudan study carefully the life and conditions of its peoples before the coming of that rule and contrast them with what has resulted. Any unbiassed judge must give an unequivocal verdict that the experiment, if it may be so-called, has more than justified itself.¹ It was to this thorny problem of taxation that Gordon turned the energies of his young assistant. Early in February 1879 he appointed Slatin as financial inspector. The appointment was not destined to last long. Slatin tackled his new job with all the

¹ Cf. the article by Madame Odette Keun, 'A Foreigner Looks at the British Sudan,' in *The Nineteenth Century* for September 1930.

energy in him, but finding the situation, as he himself states, 'radically wrong, and corrupt through and through,' he soon tendered his resignation, which was accepted.

Gordon did not regard his resignation as a sign of failure. On the contrary, after a short time he sent Slatin as *mudir* to Dara, which comprised the south-western district of Darfur, to which place Gordon himself had gone. Within two years he had risen, at the age of twenty-five, to be Governor of that huge province. In this new capacity Slatin found an outlet for his earlier training as a soldier. Here he was required to conduct military operations against the Sultan Harun, the son of a former sultan, who was bent on endeavouring to wrest back his country from its Egyptian conquerors. Internecine warfare continued for some time, and it required the very best in Slatin to meet situations as they arose. Gordon had gone away, and on his return journey he instructed the young Governor to meet him somewhere between El Obeid and Tura el Hadra, on the White Nile. When they met, Gordon turned out to be very tired and exhausted, and suffering not a little from sores on his legs. It was to prove the last occasion for a meeting between the two. Slatin went on board the *Ismailia*, and the situation in Darfur was carefully discussed from every angle. He has described his parting scene with Gordon:

It was ten o'clock when he bade me 'good-bye.' He had previously ordered the fires to be lighted as he was starting that night for Khartoum, and, as I stepped over the side, he said in French, 'Good-bye, my dear Slatin, and God bless you; I am sure you will do your best under any circumstances. Perhaps I am going back to England, and if so, I hope we may meet there.' These were the last words I ever heard him utter; but who could have imagined the fate that was in store for both of us? I thanked him heartily for his great kindness and help, and on reaching the river bank, I stopped there an hour, waiting for the steamer to start. Then I heard the shrill whistle, and the anchor being weighed, and in a few minutes Gordon was out of sight—gone for ever!

A new chapter was about to begin in the history of the Sudan. It was destined to be a chapter of religious fanaticism writ large in letters of blood, so large that it would be read in every part of that vast domain. It was the rise of the Mahdi! Mohammed Ahmed was born near the island of Argo, in Dongola, and was of a poor and obscure family, one which claimed to be *Ashraf*, or descendants of the 'Prophet.' This claim was neither inquired into nor was it acknowledged by anyone. He was known generally as Dongolawi. His father was an ordinary *fiki*, or religious teacher, who had given his son his early instruction in reading the Koran and in writing. When still a child Ahmed was taken to Khartoum. His father died on the journey near Kerreri, where his son subse-

quently erected a tomb to him, known as 'The Dome of Sayed Abdullahi.' After his father's death young Mohammed Ahmed, left entirely to his own resources, studied more assiduously than ever; he learned the Koran by heart and received instruction in theology at Berber as the pupil of the well-known Mohammed el Kheir, who completed his religious education. Arrived at manhood, he quitted Berber and returned once more to Khartoum, where he became a disciple of the celebrated and highly revered Sheikh Mohammed Sherif, to whom he became very devoted. Sherif's father and grandfather had been the principal exponents of the Sammania *Tarika* ('Way,' or 'doctrine'). The duties of these holy personages consisted in writing a certain number of prayers and texts of the Prophet, which the devotees were called upon to repeat a certain number of times, and thus facilitate the 'way' to those heavenly mansions which are the desired goal of all true believers. Mohammed Ahmed soon showed himself a zealous supporter of the Sammania *Tarika* and evinced every devotion to its head, Sheikh Mohammed Sherif. He now went to live on the island of Abba, on the White Nile, where the order made their home.

Differences, however, arose between the young disciple and his head. It came about in this fashion: One day Mohammed Sherif gathered all his sheikhs and disciples together to celebrate a feast and gave them leave to amuse themselves at will by singing and dancing, saying he would pardon in God's name any sins that might be committed during the festivities which were contrary to the religious law. It was, doubtless, greatly to the credit of the youthful Mohammed Ahmed that this attempt to exercise an improper indulgence constituted a matter for conscientious objection on his part. He pointed out that singing, dancing, and playing were transgressions against the laws of God, and that no man, be he even *Sheikh el Tarika* ('Guide to the Way'), could forgive such sins. This declaration, especially coming as it did from a young devotee, roused the fury of old Mohammed Sherif, who in a heated scene abused Ahmed roundly, and though the younger man endeavoured to pacify him by attempting reason, and even with great humility asked the other's pardon, expelled him from the Sammania order. The unbending attitude of Mohammed Sherif rendered the other defiant. He promptly applied to Sheikh Koreishi to be received into his order. The request was willingly granted, and Ahmed found a warm welcome awaiting him. Thereupon Mohammed Sherif, hearing of the new turn the matter had taken, offered to pardon and reinstate Ahmed, but this suggestion was met with a dignified but curt rebuff. News of the split between Mohammed Ahmed and his former spiritual guide spread far and near in the

Sudan, for that an inferior in a religious order should have refused the forgiveness of his superior was an unheard-of proceeding. But the incident proved to be of enormous value for the younger man, in that it secured for him an immense amount of public sympathy and brought his name prominently forward, adding considerably to his prestige. In fact, he became the hero of the hour.

It is probably not incorrect to infer that the foregoing incident, small in its beginnings but large in its results, was the direct cause which led to the spectacular rôle this otherwise obscure young man was destined to play in the history of the Sudan. For a time he carefully covered the country, making it known secretly to the sheikhs what his real aims were and enlisting their sympathy and support. He had conceived himself to be nothing less than the Mahdi—the chosen messenger of Allah. In a country like the Sudan there is never wanting a very large section of the native population who are always ready to credit the claims of some new messenger. Thus it proved in the case of Ahmed; and doubtless the fact that the country was under the hated domination of Egypt lent additional and powerful support to his claim and induced an even readier response. Rumours of what was happening and of the growing unrest began to reach the ears of the Government. At first these rumours received little credence; but eventually the Government began to realise that this self-styled Mahdi was a real danger to the public peace, and they determined to put an end to the matter once and for all. Mohammed Ahmed received a stern order to go to Khartoum and to justify himself before his master Rauf Pasha, the Governor-General. He indignantly refused. Immediately realising that there was no time to be lost, and that having once aroused the notice of the Government it behoved him to act quickly, Ahmed lost no time in writing to all his supporters throughout the length and breadth of the land, stirring them up against the Government. But in this decision for quick action he was not alone. The Governor-General also resolved to act without delay, as he realised the seriousness of the situation.

He despatched two companies, each under the command of an adjutant-major, to seize the fanatic. As an incentive he promised that the commander who succeeded in the task would receive promotion for himself. Thus opened the Mahdist war. In the meantime the response to the Mahdi's call to arms was not great. It needed some sign for the people to realise that the man who called himself the Mahdi of Allah was in truth what he claimed to be. This sign was to be forthcoming. The military expedition arrived and the two companies separated, each commander bent upon securing the fanatic before the other, in order

to gain the promised reward of promotion, approached from opposite directions. Word reached the Mahdi of the threatening danger, and he promptly ordered all his people to evacuate the huts and to take to the high grass, where, armed with swords, lances and clubs, they awaited the coming of the military. The two companies arrived simultaneously, and, without being aware of the fact, took up positions on opposite sides of the town. They opened fire which had the result of doing deadly damage to each other. In the midst of this hopeless confusion the villagers leapt from their ambush and created terrible havoc amongst the already demoralised men, who fled in all directions. The stimulating effect of this success on Mohammed Ahmed can readily be understood; but even so, he not unwisely decided to increase the distance between himself and the Khartoum authorities by retreating into southern Kordofan.

The greatest enthusiasm now prevailed amongst the Mahdi's followers, who lost no opportunity of telling the credulous and superstitious populations through which they passed of his victory, which appeared to them nothing less than a wonderful miracle. Had not Allah clearly shown that this was in fact his chosen messenger, by taking him out of the hands of his enemies when capture seemed certain? The following increased in numbers daily. Other attempts were made by the authorities to capture the fanatic, and in some cases dilatoriness or carelessness caused failure. News of the Mahdi's victories which placed the whole of southern Kordofan in his hands spread far and wide, and amongst an uneducated population, accustomed to indulge in exaggeration, stories were circulated of quite a ridiculous nature. Roused by the spirit of fanaticism, multitudes quitted their homes and joined the Mahdi's throng. Meanwhile, massacres in the districts became of almost daily occurrence. Tax-collectors and other Government officials fell an easy prey to the blood-thirsty Arabs.

As Governor-General of Darfur and commandant of the troops, Slatin waged war against the Mahdi. Battle after battle was fought, encounter followed encounter. Had the soldiers under his command been Europeans, or at any rate Christians, one of his greatest difficulties would not have existed. But they were Moslem troops, and as such were more than likely to become infected by the same germ which now inflamed their co-religionists in the camp of the Mahdi. Sooner or later this was bound to tell. Each victory, or even appearance of victory, on the Mahdi's side was interpreted in a light most favourable to the enemy. In fact, it was not long before the story began to circulate amongst Slatin's troops that the main reason why he was not successful was entirely due to his being a Christian. Slatin

was now confronted with a new problem which was as difficult for him as it was distasteful. In the end, he decided to adopt the religion of Islam as a means of stemming this current of prejudice and infusing his troops with new loyalty. He says:

My ruse succeeded to a greater extent than I had expected, but the proceeding had been a distasteful one to me. I had no pretensions to holding very strict religious views on the expediency or otherwise of the step I had taken; nevertheless, at heart I was, I believe, as good a Christian as the majority of young men of my acquaintance, and that being so, a continuance of the life of religious deception I was then living was by no means a prospect which I appreciated.

But even in spite of this attempt by means of his change of religion to facilitate matters, the time arrived when Slatin decided that the military situation, so far as holding out any further against the Mahdi, was hopeless. After anxiously weighing the matter in his mind he decided to surrender. His letter to the Mahdi ran:

In the name of the Most Merciful God. From the slave of his God, Abdel Kader Salatin [Slatin] to Sayed Mohammed el Mahdi. May God protect him and confound his enemies! Amen! For a long time I have been defending the province which the Government confided to my care, but God's will cannot be fought against. I therefore hereby declare that I submit to it [God's will] and to you, under the condition that you send one of your relatives, with the necessary authority to rule this country, and to whom I shall hand it over. I demand a pledge from you that all men, women and children within the fort shall be spared. Everything else I leave to your generosity.

The surrender was effected, and Slatin, being presented to the Mahdi, took an oath of allegiance. Thereupon he was attached in the capacity of a *mulazem*, which was practically a sort of servant, to the Khalifa Abdullahi, the Mahdi's right-hand man, and as such had always to stand behind him when on duty. So began a period of captivity which was to last for over eleven years. When the Mahdi arrived near Omdurman he decided to press the siege against General Gordon, who was in Khartoum a short distance away; but finally he came to the conclusion that it might be well to make an effort to induce the General to yield without a clash of arms. He called for Slatin and made him write to Gordon. Slatin wrote two letters—a short one in French and a long one in German. In the former he said briefly that he desired to join Gordon and to enter his service. The second letter gave a full account of how he had fought against the Mahdi in Darfur and went on to explain how when things had come to a desperate plight he had, in order to gain more influence with his troops, become a Mohammedan. 'Whether by my conversion,' he wrote, 'I committed a dishonourable step is a matter of opinion—it was made more easy to me because I had, perhaps

unhappily, not received a strict religious education at home.' The effect of this news on Gordon is clearly shown by an entry in his journal on October 16: 'If he [Slatin] gets away, I shall take him to the Congo with me; he will want some quarantine; one feels sorry for him.' But on October 17 he writes:

I shall have nothing to do with Slatin's coming here to stay unless he has the Mahdi's positive leave, which he is not likely to get; his doing so would be the breaking of his parole, which would be as sacred when given to the Mahdi as to any other power, and it would jeopardize the safety of all those Europeans, prisoners with the Mahdi.

In this attitude of Gordon towards European prisoners such as Slatin who had confessed Islam one gets a glimpse of the iron discipline with which he could curb the promptings of a naturally kind and generous spirit. Where religion was concerned there could be no compromise. He would have no dealings with anyone who had foresworn his allegiance to his Lord and Master Christ. Previously he had written letters to the Mahdi on what he termed the 'apostasy of the Europeans.' He noted in his journal (September 10): 'They may be, and are, no doubt, hard, but it is not a small thing for a European, for fear of death, to deny our faith; it was not so in old times. . . .' So, like an Ironsides of those old times, Gordon closed his heart to the call for human sympathy and sent back Slatin's messenger without a word. Before the messenger returned, horsemen from Berber had ridden into the Mahdi's camp telling of the death of General Sir Herbert Stewart, who was on his way down the Nile with the first British detachment of troops sent to relieve the beleaguered town of Khartoum. They produced papers and other documents which had been discovered on the *Abbas*, including Stewart's detailed journal, a number of letters, copies of the cypher telegrams that Gordon had sent to Cairo, and Gordon's own cypher key which enabled the telegrams to be deciphered. The same evening the Mahdi again had Slatin write to Gordon telling him of the wreck of the *Abbas* and the death of Stewart. To such a message as that, thought Slatin, the General must certainly reply. He wrote to Gordon:

Your Excellency, I have fought twenty-seven times for the Government against the enemy and they have beaten me twice, and I have done nothing dishonourable. If Your Excellency has perhaps understood that I have done anything contrary to the honour of an officer, and if that hinders you from writing to me, I pray you give me a chance of defending myself, and judge according to the truth.

That night Slatin fell into disfavour and was by the Khalifa's order put in chains and thrown into close confinement. Eight months were to elapse before those chains left his body.

Three times did the Mahdi call upon Gordon to surrender, but Gordon's replies were conclusive. There would be no surrender. On the morning of October 23 the Mahdi ordered a general advance. Tents were struck, baggage packed and loaded on camels, and the whole camp was in motion. Slatin, weighted down by the heavy chains round his feet and neck, was placed on a donkey and held in position by a man on either side. 'We halted on some rising ground in the afternoon,' he writes, 'and from here I could see the palm trees in Khartoum; how I longed as one of the garrison to join in its defence. . . . the Mahdi now ordered the siege to be vigorously pressed. . . .' Between then and the following January 25 the situation grew more and more desperate for Gordon and the people in the unfortunate city. The 26th was to see the culmination of the siege. A traitor visited the Mahdi's camp and conveyed information which indicated how entry into the city could be effected. In the early hours of the morning the Mahdi's wild hordes made the attempt, and Khartoum fell. Some of the party rushed to the palace, where Gordon met them on the top of the stairs. A Dervish plunged his spear into the General's chest and ended the life of a great and noble man. A few hours later Slatin, sitting in chains at the door of his tent, saw some men approaching him, one of whom carried something wrapt in a cloth. The man undid the bundle and displayed before the horrified eyes of Slatin the head of Gordon.

The blood rushed to my head and my heart seemed to stop beating, [he wrote] but with a tremendous effort of self-control I gazed silently at this ghastly spectacle. His blue eyes were half open, the mouth was perfectly natural; the hair of his head and his short whiskers were almost quite white. 'Is not this the head of your uncle the unbeliever?' said Shatta, holding the head up before me. 'What of it?' I said quietly. 'A brave soldier who fell at his post; happy is he to have fallen; his sufferings are over.'

The death of the Mahdi resulted in the succession of Slatin's master, the Khalifa, whose character was as deceptive as it was decadent, as cruel as it was falsely kind. The outwardly studious observance of religious duties on the part of the Khalifa were in reality only a means of furthering his own ends. They entirely lacked sincerity. His rule was so despotic that human life was a matter of no consequence to him. Wholesale hangings, beheadings, and mutilations were the natural sequence of a nature prone to suspicion and entirely ruthless. The treatment he meted out to Slatin was varied. Alternately he received savage cruelty and comparative indulgence. When in favour the Khalifa would show his pleasure by sending him presents, but as Slatin remarked:

Instead of allocating a small sum of money from the *Beit el Mal* by means of which I could have procured for myself a few comforts he kept on sending me wives, who were not only a source of considerable expense to me, but also a cause of much anxiety and worry, inasmuch as I was continually struggling to free myself from their unwelcome presence.

Slatin made many attempts to escape the accursed grasp of the bloodthirsty tyrant. He managed to communicate with some of the English and Austrian diplomatic officials in Egypt, who worked hard to secure his freedom, none more than Sir Reginald (then Major) Wingate, of the Egyptian Intelligence Department, who was instrumental in effecting his escape at last in March 1895. The story of that escape under the guidance of Zeki Belal and Hamed Ibn Hussein forms an epic in itself. It is one of hair-raising adventure; of flight across the desert, wanderings amid the hills, hidings, lonely vigils, narrow shaves with those on the look-out to secure his rearrest, until finally the Egyptian frontier was reached and Slatin once more breathed the air of real freedom and security after twelve harrowing years. He reached Assuan, where he was most kindly received by the English officers in His Highness the Khedive's service and the Egyptian officers. The Khedive received him in person and conferred on him the rank of Pasha. Queen Victoria gave him the C.B. He was appointed a staff officer, and two years later, in 1897, took part in the campaign which ended in the capture of Omdurman. The K.C.M.G. followed as a further honour, and in 1906 he was ennobled by the Emperor of Austria. In 1907 he was made an honorary major-general in the British Army, and in 1912 was created G.C.V.O. From the year 1900 until the outbreak of the Great War he was Inspector-General of the Sudan. When the clouds gathered along the frontiers of Europe in that fateful August of 1914 Slatin found himself once more torn between conflicting emotions. He had grown to love the English, whom he had served so faithfully and so well, but his heart was yet with his fatherland. He could not bring himself to fight on either side. So in the end he chose a way of service which was honoured by both—he presided over the Austrian Red Cross for the Aid of Prisoners of War.

In June this year Slatin came to London at the special invitation of the King and lunched with His Majesty at Buckingham Palace. It was a Slatin grown old, and infirm with illness—perhaps a little wistful, a little disappointed. The eyes had not lost their fire, nor the slender frame its military bearing. But he was tired. He returned to his beloved Austria to wait for his approaching end.

RICHARD CLAVERING.

D. H. LAWRENCE IN HIS LETTERS¹

It is a measure of D. H. Lawrence's originality that he is so difficult to write about satisfactorily. With most writers we derive at least a degree of what we feel to be legitimate self-congratulation from having set down this or that conclusion. Here, we say, is my finding: differ from it if you must; anyhow, I think I have made myself clear. But with Lawrence, though clarity is most desirable, a clear statement is no sooner made than it begins to look doubtful, even misleading. The plainest-seeming and best-meaning phrase undergoes a baffling metamorphosis. We become aware that Lawrence himself would have rejected the label with a vehement or a laughing head-shake. His is a 'bisy ghost, aye flickering to and fro,' and making pronouncements dance a jig in which each hands over the scrap of truth confided in it to its antithesis. Mr. Harold Nicolson has very truly said that the 'correct approach' to Lawrence is 'in terms of the normal, almost of the ordinary.' With no less truth Mr. Huxley has said that 'it is impossible to write about Lawrence except as an artist.' But Lawrence himself would probably have allowed neither way. For both are hedged about with current images of the sort he wished to destroy and pass beyond. In his view the 'ordinary' had ceased to be a living approach and the 'artistic' had become rarefied from vital experience. Assuredly the ordinary approach has caused at least half the misunderstanding of this man and his work, and the artistic approach has been as fruitful of mischief. It was part of Lawrence's difficulty that he had to create a new kind of approach between himself and others, and the whole of his aim was to indicate a fresh approach to life. Yet words, even familiar terms, have to be used. He used them himself—the more familiar the better for him. But he safeguarded his intent by maintaining a consciousness within himself that should be 'unbroken, yet storming with oppositions and contradictions.'

'Me, I take my stand on the exception,' he says in an early letter (not in Mr. Huxley's collection), from which I quote from

¹ *The Letters of D. H. Lawrence*, edited and with an introduction by Aldous Huxley (Heinemann). *Etruscan Places*, by D. H. Lawrence (Secker).

memory. And in a letter of 1926: 'They did make a *tightness*—that peculiar tightness that goes with more or less ordinary people—as if the landscape were shut in, and the air didn't move.' At the same time he was very often a heaper of contempt upon works of art and their makers, and he looked with a sidelong grimace at most persons who claimed to be something above the common. The high solemnities of a Goethe made him want to spit: the 'boiled-down,' æsthetic quality of art masterpieces—a quality which takes the edge off everything—bored or revolted him. This, though he had in his early life experienced a disciplined admiration and appreciation of both romantic and classical work. But in his maturity, which came early, he was a merciless picker and chooser. And it was not from the motive of art that he picked and chose and blasted, any more than it was from the motive of morals. It was from a motive of life that is as rare among artists and moralists as among those to whom the language of either is strange. 'If you want uplift,' he writes in his posthumous book on the Etruscans—a book as gay as it is crisply determined—'go to the Greek and the Gothic. If you want mass, go to the Roman.' 'But if you are content with just a sense of the quick ripple of life, then here it is.' So saying he might as well have pointed at himself as at any Etruscan decoration. The fact that the Etruscans were 'lost' was a large part of their attraction for him. Humanity, with its normal approaches, its noble monuments of art and its massed power, had in his eyes lost the satisfying way of life. Believing that more satisfying, though never perfect, ways had existed at times and in places, and might exist again, he searched about everywhere for ancient clues and for new hints. His Good and True and Beautiful were to be found here, there and everywhere in unexpected manifestations of which the charm was ever of one kind—fugitive. And because of this his own expression must also partake of fugitiveness—must have a sort of careless and transparent imperfection that is in opposition to the aims of the pure artist as we have learned to think of him. For our pure artist becomes enamoured of his special material and strives for a separate perfection in it, inducing us also to detach ourselves from life while we examine his perfect production or criticise it for failing of perfection. But we find Lawrence delighting more in a lizard than in a Laocoon, and he is moved to the quick by the special imperfections of an Etruscan drawing in which the artist—or more likely artisan—has made repeated outlines of a horse, one over the other, without troubling to erase his earlier attempts. Here 'you cannot think of art, but only of life itself.' Mr. Huxley has noted how Lawrence rewrote his books three and four times—not, as most writers do, to polish, correct, improve, with an abstract perfection in mind, but to let

through, if it might be, his dæmonic impulse more richly and clearly.

His pleasure in the Etruscan horse throws light upon his own technique. He desired, not perfect creations, but subtle or agitated indications of what lies behind creation. Before and beyond being an artist he was a diviner. Into a familiar field where we are used to watch men sow and reap there comes a stranger who does neither. He proceeds to make incomprehensible gestures and to move his body into queer postures—intent, mocking, confiding, impassioned, destructive. We find him inappropriate and absurd; until we learn that beneath the field's exhausted surface he has detected a much-wished-for water spring. 'Every real discovery made, every serious and significant decision ever reached, was reached and made by a sort of divination,' says Lawrence. 'Columbus discovered America by a sort of divination. The soul stirs, and makes an act of pure attention, and that is a discovery.' For him, 'there is no other way when you are dealing with life.'

This, of course, does not negative Lawrence as an artist. Rather it should emphasise his achievement in having invented a vehicle suitable for his unique necessity. Though the necessity was not artistic, the vehicle had to be and is. Those who believe they have said something when they say that 'Lawrence was no thinker' have reckoned without the rare order of thought by which a man provides his own medium for the communication to his fellows of something unexpected. In indicating a life that should satisfy Lawrence put desire, in its widest sense, before intellect in the sense of knowledge. But he decried the intellect only in so far as he found the intellectual ideal to be a usurper of spontaneous life. When it came to a demonstration of his findings he knew quite well what he was doing, and his language is the result of much hard, cool, honest thinking. His rejection of the term 'artist' in his work, 'love' in his marriage, 'devotion' in his friendships, 'Christian' in his actions, and 'perfection' in his aims was deliberate and intellectual. How much so will be found by comparing his early letters with those of his prime. In youth he had tested the meaning and accepted the discipline of these things more sensitively than most men. But advancing into life he found that they were devitalised. A 'new-starting reality' was due. For its coming a 'fresh consciousness' was needed. Before this could make itself felt a whole world of 'social images' had to be smashed. Art, love, devotion, perfection, Christianity, were high among the images. Here we have what irritates and antagonises so many people in Lawrence. He was an industrious and incorruptible artist, a faithful husband, a dutiful son and brother, an honest citizen, a scrupulous friend,

and a virtuous man. And for those who flouted the common decencies he had a strong distaste. Yet he did his utmost to break down the ideal of a life that is added up in such a description. Is there not something here that is absurd, divided, impossible? Lawrence gives the simple reply in one of these letters: 'Primarily I am a passionately religious man.' Who else in our time could have made so simply this confident remark? Certainly not the Pope of Rome or the Archbishop of Canterbury, nor even General Booth or Mr. Gandhi. Thus to expose oneself one must be very sure and very pure.

I began by saying how difficult it is to write satisfactorily about Lawrence. Even more evidently it is impossible to refrain from making the attempt. If the one is a measure of his originality, the other is a measure of his fascination. Those—and they are many—who resent his troublous presence in the literary landscape would gladly see him interred with a few well-chosen words. I imagine Mr. Huxley smiling gently to himself, and to the shade of Lawrence, when he reads this and that reviewer's gracious acceptance of his introduction as a tasteful funeral oration after which anything more said must be regarded as an intrusion on good manners. Tasteful—in the happiest sense of the word—Mr. Huxley has been. His words are chosen wisely, wittily and well, and what he says is the more valuable because it is admittedly a tribute in a language Lawrence did not use. Of Lawrence he notes as early as 1927: 'He is one of the few people I feel real respect and admiration for. Of most other eminent people I have met I feel that at any rate I belong to the same species as they do. But this man has something different and superior in kind, not degree.' Coming from Mr. Huxley, this observation, which experience has not caused him to revise, is received with a fitting respect. Recorded by another it might not be so kindly treated. It might even be designated as hysteria. We say all the better that it comes from him. But Mr. Huxley is the last person to regard a potential originator of species as so easily disposed of, and he knows that Lawrence cannot be susceptible to funeral orations, however moving, just or enlightened. In spite of difficulties from within and discouragements from without, Lawrence will still be written and spoken of and wondered over, often foolishly. Exasperating it may be. The resurgence of a phoenix causes an uncomfortable, sometimes a vulgar, crackle of smoke and flame. But it cannot be helped. It is the way of a phoenix. Throughout much that misses any other point it will become increasingly plain that Lawrence's life and work combine in such a way as to seize upon the common imagination.

In these letters we find the man and may learn the best approach to his work. 'Few men,' as Mr. Huxley says, 'have

given more of themselves in their letters,' and 'In them Lawrence has written his own life and painted his own portrait.' It may be added that in doing so Lawrence well knew what he was about. He knew that explanation of this sort was needful in his case, so that letter-writing was as vital a means of expression to him as poetry, fiction, painting, or the essay. In this abridged selection we have some 850 pages from his huge correspondence. Other letters already in print are those to his family and friends of his youth, to be found in his sister's book, *The Young Lorenzo*, and those to Mrs. Luhan, his American hostess, in her book, *Lorenzo in Taos*. Many more exist, and from their intrinsic interest are bound to be published in due time.

To read the letters is—as Mr. Huxley says of being with their author—'a kind of adventure.' And this, even more than their beauty and absorbing interest, gives them their especial quality. But 'beautiful and absorbingly interesting' they are. And they are also exceedingly amusing. For Lawrence had a tongue. The way he used it was his one vice. Gossip he did, and with what fury! To the deadly venom of a wit that might be termed classical was added a vigour of language acquired from labouring men, and directing these was a ferocity of perception that was all his own. He spoke of people behind their backs as Voltaire must have spoken, or Alexander Pope. But there was this difference, that he had no jealousy in his composition and was as incapable of unkindness as of guile. No man ever desired more truly to see everybody happy and vital up to the measure of their beings. 'I hate my enemies,' he writes in one letter, 'but I mostly forget them.' It was true. And he would never grudge any good that might come to an enemy, though this was not in the sense we understand as Christian, but from an overflowing, impatient life. He was never tolerant, but always sensitive, where others were concerned. Frequently his friends of one day were his enemies of the next, and *vice versa*. It was less at the individual than at some lack of spontaneous life he found there—some gloomy or glassy unawareness, or some twist excluding life—that he directed his strokes. But the strokes were many and reckless. Those who heard in talk his wild and wicked sketches of the absent were transported with amazement or with laughter or both. You might be incredulous about the portrait-chart—invariably as well as a portrait he gave a chart claiming to reveal the individual's way of life—or shocked or hilarious. But you had to admit its vigour and its originality. Neither could you afterwards survey the subject of it without reference to the incisive outline which, at the time, had appeared to you as exaggerated or merely fantastic. You might still refuse to believe that what Lawrence had said really told you the essential truth about the individual

in question. But remembering what he had said, and looking at the individual, you felt that life, including your own, was elucidated and enriched.

It caused, and will continue to cause, trouble. Remarks came, in a version less innocent of spite, to the ears of the person concerned, who became a resentful victim. Lawrence was often called to account. And if he could sometimes confess that he 'rather liked getting into a bit of a mess with people,' at other times he swerved violently away from the petty or painful revelations he brought about. Then he cursed himself and others. Yet he would maintain that what he had said was both true in its essence and without malevolence in its intent, and that therefore it could not do anything but good in the end.

Opinion here may differ. What is certain is that Lawrence had an unbridled tongue of the kind we more readily associate with a woman than with a man, and that his tongue extended into his letter-writing pen—with one striking difference. He wrote letters as he spoke, so that to those who knew him his voice echoes through these pages. They fairly flash with quick life, presenting us in turn with the writer's malice, insight, plain speaking, shrewdness, loveliness, rage and devastating mockery. And all these come as if without forethought or afterthought, with no other consideration than of the mood and the correspondent of the moment. About the most serious or the most violent passages there is an inherent lightness which argues as superficial the contention that here are the letters of an egoist. Beneath the gayest stretches there is the seriousness of one who detests 'having a good time' as heartily as he thinks the world well lost for happiness. But in direct address the written word forced him to a candour that he did not feel able to observe when face to face with people. In the common exchanges of life he was the reverse of a Carlyle. He liked to please and to be pleased. 'I'm really more good-natured than most people,' he lamented. Socially he was timid, though not nervous. When he first grew his beard he wrote to me beforehand begging me not to smile when I should see him, and before you could get him to tell you in speech anything unwelcome about yourself you had to ask for it. In spoken candour there is an indecency as of physical assault. Besides, it is unfair. The face is too exposed. If it came, as it so often does, to a choice between truth-telling and delicacy, Lawrence was delicate. In company he bore his share of 'pretending.' 'My kindness makes me sometimes a bit false.'

But when Mr. Huxley, after quoting this admission (which, if I remember aright, occurs, not in a letter, but in one of the *Assorted Articles*), identifies it with Lawrence's ability to adapt himself to each different correspondent, he goes a little beyond

its meaning. Lawrence was considerate of his correspondents' interests and moods. But with a pen in his hand he did not evade any truth that seemed relevant to their needs. "... let's not pretend," he writes to one. 'By pretending a bit, we had some jolly times, in the past. But we all had to pretend a bit—and we could none of us keep it up. . . . We are a dissonance.' If there be one thing more striking than another in his letters it is this. Where frankness matters they are shatteringly frank. Many letters too frank for present publication must still exist in manuscript. It is stated that passages as well as names have been excised from those here in print. (Here let me express the only fault I have to find with Mr. Huxley's editing. Excised names have necessarily to be represented by a dash; but apart from that there is no typographical indication of the excision of phrases and sentences; and such excisions are considerable. This is apt to be misleading, and a general warning that excisions have been made is insufficient.) But there is enough Lawrentian candour to be going on with, and we are indebted to the appreciative courage of some of the correspondents in submitting their letters to so valiant an editor.

The halfness of your friendship I also hate and between you and me there is no sensual correspondence. . . . You're not superior to sex and you never will be. Only too often you are inferior to it. . . . I do *not* want your friendship, till you have a full relation somewhere, a *kindly* relation of both halves, not *in part*, as all your friendships have been. That which is in part is in itself a betrayal. Your 'friendship' for me betrays the essential man and male that I am, and makes me ill. Yes, you make me ill, by dragging at one half at the expense of the other half. And I am so much better now you have gone. I refuse any more of this 'delicate friendship' business, because it damages one's wholeness.

So Lawrence, in a characteristic letter to a woman, with a like truth-telling of his special kind in the case of some of his men friends. In talk he had not the sort of courage that says such things. How many have the courage or the capacity to write them? He must have been aware that he could write where he could not speak without wounding, and to wound was never his intent. Because of the subtle purity of his truth-telling, these letters do not seem to have wounded their recipients, but rather to have assured them of profound good-will. By any other reckoning it would seem unthinkable that we should find them here for all the world to read. That Lawrence braced himself to write them was an honour rendered by him not to truth alone.

It must be added that this extraordinary directness in some letters does not prevent in others a subtler intimation of Lawrence's opinions any more than it does away with his ruthless remarks to one person about another. Taken in conjunction, the

two are highly diverting and deeply informing. Lawrence's manner was governed by the occasion; his matter was inveterate. He was an incorrigible gossip. I repeat that this was the one vice of a man to whom many have been attributed. And it was no excrescence, but a part of the man, of his material and his genius. Without it his letters would not be what they are, either by way of entertainment or enlightenment. Also he was not more ruthless with others than with himself. 'Born' by his own acknowledgment 'in chagrin,' he practised the richest, most casual admissions of his own faults.

And of course the personal is but one, and not the most important, aspect of his letters. For we find in them that highly original being, a gossip who took small interest in 'character' and was bored with 'personality.' The rigidity of the first—in which for a long time he could not bring himself to believe—was a stumbling-block to him, the pretensions of the second an offence. Both interfered with the fluidity of life and brought home the knowledge of 'societal frustration,' a frustration, as Lawrence saw it, 'much deeper and much more devastating' than that of the sex instinct. 'People don't mean much to me.' It goes up like a sigh again and again or is rapped out like a curse. So we turn, sharing the writer's own relief, to his descriptions of what are usually regarded as inanimate objects, to indications of his aims and problems, to sharp pronouncements of his findings, to the tackling of material difficulties, and to the felicitous phrases that seem to fall by accident upon the page at the sight of mountain or of mouse. We see 'Liberty clenching her fist' in New York Harbour, follow with a leap of the heart the tracks of birds and beasts in the snow of Derbyshire, learn to respect the practical plans of this hard-pressed, unaccommodating writer, agree that 'You can convince a man that he lusts after his grandmother—he doesn't mind!—but how are you going to bring him to see that as an individual he's a blown egg!', discover that 'happiness is a subtle and aristocratic thing,' and at the same time assent to the belief that 'the essential self is so simple and nobody lets it be.'

'The greatest virtue in life is real courage, that knows how to face facts and live beyond them.' 'And the hero is he who touches and transmits the life of the universe.' These are Lawrence's deeply considered definitions of heroism. It is difficult to read his letters without feeling the impulse to hand the palm to him as the hero of modern life—this whether we see him as right or wrong, victorious or a tragic failure, fulfilled or foiled within himself.

Mr. Huxley sees in these letters a curve that is 'splendid' but drooping 'tragically' 'at the end toward the darkness.' This is

eloquent, and it is truly felt. But it is not necessarily true. Even if not haunted by a mortal illness which carries him away in pain after darkening years that should have marked his middle age, the letters of a man like Lawrence, extending over a period of twenty years, are not likely to describe either a straight line or an ascending curve. To reinforce his image Mr. Huxley has had to draw attention to the savage mood of *Nettles* and the 'lovely and profoundly moving story' of *The Man Who Died*. It may with equal plausibility be argued that a healthy Lawrence could, indeed must, have written *Nettles* after an incident like the condemnation of his pictures. And for *The Man Who Died*, the first, most moving, part was written early in 1921. Why omit from the reckoning the gaily slashing *Apocalypse* and the carefree *Etruscan Places*, which were written so much later and were both associated with serious attacks of illness?

Lawrence's illness is important, but its importance may be, and too often is, wrongly stressed. Mr. Huxley was at Venice. It is easy, therefore, to forgive him. He gives expression to his own pain. But Lawrence's response to the defeat that is in mortal illness will probably be found in the forthcoming poems written by him during his last winter at Bandol. Mr. Huxley himself candidly points out that during a middle period—when Lawrence was travelling round the world—the letters notably declined in number and in richness of self-committal. And he offers the explanation that 'for one reason or another Lawrence did not want to feel himself in relationship with anyone.' Further, although 'the stream began again,' it is felt 'that Lawrence no longer wanted to give of himself so fully to his correspondents as in the past.' Well, naturally not. There are, that is to say, more curves than one in the course of a correspondence that covers youth and middle age, and these may be explained as well by the passage of time and the variety of experience as by the darkening of disease. It is not the fulfilled who show a rising curve with middle life in their letter-writing and their 'ability to give themselves,' but the fearful, like Cowper, or the futile, like Fitzgerald. That Lawrence's letters should tail off should be a matter for cheerful rather than tragic musings.

In this connexion, if in contradistinction, when Mr. Huxley hazards the opinion that 'Lawrence's . . . was not a very good philosophy for old age or failing persons,' one might submit that Lawrence's accommodation to these things was inherent and well provided, and that disease alone was the confounder. 'I like being older.' He could say this in all simplicity. And if he might have attained his three-score and ten, no man would more imaginably have been able to say 'I like being old.' Like his Etruscans, his 'philosophy' was 'not a theory or a thesis but if

anything an *experience*.' In the trap of illness his courage stayed firm. 'May he not have been even more nicely adapted to meet the commoner lot of growth and decay? For his findings were directly prompted by life, and he was the enemy of nothing but death in life. Against that, and that only, when he saw it—and he saw it remarkably often—he waged 'the subtlest, most intimate warfare.' 'People are too dead,' he writes, 'and too conceited.' 'One fights and fights for that living something that stirs way down in the blood, and *creates* consciousness'; and between whiles, when the fight looked like deadening something in himself—one can but swim, like a trout in a quick stream.' Thus refreshed, he was always claimed once more by the fight. 'I must get in another blow at the lily-livered host,' he wrote me not very long before the end. Had he lived to be a hale hundred, Lawrence would still have had to say 'I am essentially a fighter—to wish me peace is bad luck—except the fighter's peace.'

CATHERINE CARSWELL.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCLXX—DECEMBER 1932

THE STATE AND THE UNEMPLOYED

To inquire into the provisions and working of the Unemployment Insurance Scheme and to make recommendations with regard to:—(1) Its future scope, the provisions which it should contain, and the means by which it may be made solvent and self-supporting; and (2) The arrangements which should be made outside the scheme for the unemployed who are capable of, and available for, work.

THE Royal Commission happened to present its long-awaited majority and minority Reports—for the Interim Report of 1931 allowed no hope of unanimity—just as the House of Commons was entering on a three days' debate of the unemployment problem; and yet the oral and printed discussions hardly touched at any point. For the House was urgently concerned to discover remedies for unemployment as it exists to-day, and the first thing to notice about unemployment insurance is that, however well designed and administered, it can never remedy unemployment; in fact, experience gives only too much reason to fear that it may aggravate it. The questions 'set' to the Commission (quoted above) show that it was not concerned with the reasons

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why millions of men and women have no work, or how to find it for them. Its position was that of a doctor called late in the day to a chronic case, to prescribe measures for keeping up the patient's strength and making him as comfortable as might be, but not to deal with the causes or cure of his malady. Yet a doctor in such case cannot do his best for the patient by simply treating the symptoms and ignoring the disease, because treatment thus blindly applied may do serious harm. The Governments of the last ten years had entirely lost sight of the extent to which the rapid increase in the rates of payment to unemployed persons and the progressive relaxation of the conditions of entitlement might do harm, piling fresh burdens on weakened industries and so contracting still further their power of giving employment; and making unemployment itself to large numbers of individuals a not unattractive status to attain and preserve. In judging the proposals now made for a new insurance scheme to replace that which neglect of all such considerations has ruined, it is essential to have some regard to the nature of the industrial disease of which unemployment is the external symptom; and it is not surprising that, with different views obtaining on that point, there should be irreconcilable differences between the majority and minority of the Commission.

The majority Report explores at considerable length the nature and causes of the present unemployment, and the reactions of its endowment on the state of employment. It distinguishes two elements: (a) widely distributed intermittent unemployment, and (b) chronic concentrated unemployment; the former corresponding roughly to the trade-cycle phenomena and seasonal fluctuations, while the latter is found in certain industries which, after great expansion in war, have shrunk far below their former peace development, other contributory causes being labour-saving inventions, loss of markets, and the failure of costs to conform to price movements. With a slightly different analysis, we may distinguish three 'layers' of unemployment now superimposed: the trade cycle and other wave movements; the chronic unemployment in some of our old-established industries before 1929, when other leading industrial countries were strikingly prosperous; and the catastrophic slump which started in that year in America and has progressively hindered not only international exchange of products across the wire entanglements of tariffs, quotas and exchange restrictions, but also the exchange of primary and manufactured products in such a great area of internal free trade as the United States. Our insurance scheme of 1911 was designed to cope with the first layer only; happy-go-lucky extension of it to the second layer overstrained it, and the final slump would have caused a crash but for the

emergency measures of the autumn of 1931. We began in 1911 with weekly contributions from employed man, employer, and the State of 2½d., 2½d., and 1½d. respectively, in selected industries with some 2½ million workers. Benefit was limited to one week for every five contributions paid and to a maximum of fifteen weeks in a year, the rate for man, wife, and two children being 7s. a week only, as for a single man. By 1914, the Fund had a balance of some £3 millions. In 1930, contributions were 7d. (man), 8d. (employer), and 7½d. (State), while benefit to the typical family was 30s. a week (in spite of a steep price fall), with practically no limit to its duration; and the scheme covered some 13 millions of workers, with a rapidly rising percentage of unemployment. In spite of the emergency measures of 1931, raising contributions, reducing benefit rates, and reintroducing time limits, the end of that financial year saw an accumulated debt of £115 millions on the Fund, and an unemployed list of nearly 3 millions. It cannot be said that the insurance scheme, in its expanded form, broke down, for it was never tried under conditions which could possibly be spoken of as 'insurance.' These figures are of course no proof that raising benefits stimulates unemployment; but they show that successive Governments have thoroughly tried out the poultice treatment, and they afford a striking illustration of the saying that *l'appétit vient en mangeant*.

It is not possible to estimate what proportion of present unemployment pertains to each of the three layers; but, so far as we can now see ahead, the first layer is a permanent phenomenon of trade activity, though good management should enable the cycle to be damped down; the third layer, it may be hoped, the world will find some means to avoid repeating in future. The middle layer, peculiar to this country while industry elsewhere was in full blast, threatens also to be permanent unless its roots are cut out. It is primarily a phenomenon of what the Report terms 'loss of competitive effectiveness,' connected with the elementary fact that an industry will employ more labour at a lower than at a higher wage level; so that, whatever the level of general prosperity, any given intensity of unemployment can be produced by labour putting a sufficiently high valuation on its services in production. The employer is then driven to attempt to regain competitive effectiveness by using more and better machinery and less labour, and we have a self-boosting lay-out for the production of unemployment. Between 1924 and 1930, while wages were practically pegged, wholesale prices fell from 100 to 65 and the cost of living index from 100 to 88, transferring some hundreds of millions annually of the national income from the *entrepreneur* to the wage-earner in the shape of higher real wages, and making

industry unprofitable on a vast scale. This has been well described as the refusal of labour to employ capital ; and, though not the only factor, is the great central fact in the genesis of our second layer of unemployment.

In the autumn of 1930 the intractability of the disease and its rapid increase as the slump spread, led to a three-party Conference to take the salvation of industry out of the field of party politics ; but the Conference never reported, and there is no published account of what happened at it. The terms of reference to the Royal Commission, which was then appointed to take over the problem, suggest that some common ground had been found, for they instructed the Commission to assume the existence of a scheme of insurance and of too much unemployment for it to carry ; and indicated, as the lines of reconstruction, insurance so far as it could be made solvent and other provision for those left outside. There was thus, for the Commission, no question of abandoning insurance against unemployment as impracticable or of continuing the poultice treatment regardless of financial limitations. The minority Report now published refuses to accept these instructions, controverts all the most important arguments and recommendations of the majority, and declares roundly that the risk is uninsurable ; that no scheme can be acceptable that does not extend its benefits to all genuinely unemployed persons, including the industries now excluded ; that, beyond small contributions from employer and employed to preserve the epithet ' contributory,' the Exchequer should bear the whole cost ; and that benefits restored to the maximum scale of 1930, irrespective of price levels or anything else, should be a statutory right for all, without means test or time limit. In short, the basic conceptions of the relation of the State to individuals to be found in this notable document contradict those to which the nation as a whole adheres, and are totally unrelated to the realities of our present situation. It is accordingly not proposed to discuss them further here. The majority Report itself covers 374 pages, full of detail ; and in the absence of the usual summary of principal recommendations—for the five pages of ' Conclusions and Recommendations ' are but an index—this article can do no more than survey the salient features of the ground, notice the roads closed to the Commission ' by order,' and indicate the choices they have made of those left open.

Attempts have been made to deduce the characteristics of the future scheme by exegesis from the term ' insurance.' Thus, the Blanesburgh Committee of 1927, with fire insurance practice in mind, made the fatal deduction that as ' it is the damage done by the fire, and not the number of premiums paid, which settles the compensation payable,' no relation should exist between the

benefit an unemployed individual may draw and the number of contributions to his credit. The present Report deduces various features, such as that the major part of the cost must be borne by the potential beneficiaries and their employers ; that receipt of benefits is conditional on payment of contributions by the beneficiary ; that the title to benefit on the occurrence of the misfortune insured against is subject to whatever conditions the scheme may impose. On one ground or another, the minority challenge all these propositions either as not being essential to ' insurance ' or as unsuitable to an unemployment scheme ; and conclude, with some force, that ' all parties will continue to assert the various definitions of insurance that happen to suit the particular provisions they are advocating.' We may be unable to define an elephant, but know one when we see it ; and the various features at which the majority arrive, each on relevant practical grounds, collectively form a scheme which may properly be described as ' insurance.' In substance, they take the present rates of contribution of the three parties (10d. each) as being the highest practicable, and so limit the benefits to be paid, in amount and duration, as to keep the Fund solvent on an assumption (3 millions unemployed) which is greatly in advance of earlier assumptions and tolerably safe on the experience of the past year. As it is impossible to distinguish the three layers of unemployment in such a way as to exclude one or more of them from the scheme in actual working, its liabilities must be limited by another method—namely, the ratio rule, explained below. When the individual has reached his limit of benefit, he is ' out of insurance ' and comes into an entirely different scheme of ' Unemployment Assistance,' based on ascertainment of the needs of his household and any means he possesses, as described further on. Taking the principal features of the Insurance Scheme :—

Flat or Differential Rates for Different Industries.—The proportions of unemployment in different industries vary very widely, so that if all industries pay the same contributions and draw the same rates of benefit, the bad risks are very largely carried by a tax upon the good. The portworkers' (docks) industry in the years 1921–29 brought £6 millions into the insurance fund and took £22 millions out of it. At the other end of the scale, in a period of four years before 1931 the distributive trades brought in a yearly average of £6 millions and took out an average of £3 millions. To oblige the Fund to carry such liabilities at flat rates is like asking a fire office to insure the crowded wooden chalets of a Swiss mountain village at the same rate as an isolated fireproof building. The scientific remedy for this is clearly to fix different rates of contribution and/or benefit for different industries according to the incidence of unemployment ; and Sir William

Beveridge (of whom it may be said colloquially that what he does not know about unemployment insurance will go in a nutshell) made suggestions to the Commission for differentiating between different industries in this way, and even between different individuals; but after exploring the administrative difficulties arising out of demarcation of the several industries and the frequency with which individuals would cross whatever boundaries are fixed, the Commissioners pronounce the plan 'impracticable, though attractive in theory.' Their further objection, that low-wage industries with high unemployment, if grouped by themselves, could not pay sufficient contributions to secure adequate benefits, is creditably humane, but may remind the low-risk industries (which have to foot the bill) of the local magnate who, 'of his great bounty, built a bridge at the expense of the county.' But another feature, designed primarily for the solvency of the fund as a whole, mitigates this defect in practice, namely:

Restoration of the Ratio Rule.—Limits to the period of benefit like those of 1911, by regulating the individual's power of suction in the interest of the Fund, also control (though they do not remove) the power of a specially thirsty industry (like the dockers) to drain off more than its share. In the great extension of the scheme after the war, the original limits of one week's benefit for five contributions and fifteen weeks in the year were gradually widened and finally (as already noted) declared by the Blanesburgh Committee to be wrong in principle and abolished, with the result that, as the Government Actuary has said, the benefit became a pension. The action taken last year on the Commission's interim report restored a yearly limit of twenty-six weeks' benefit, but not a ratio rule. The Commission now recommends an ingenious combination of the two checks, giving the man with a good employment record better treatment than the man who just qualifies, by keeping him longer on insurance benefit: thirteen weeks in a year to anyone showing thirty contributions in two years, and additional weeks at the rate of one for every ten contributions in the last five years less the average weeks of benefit drawn yearly in that period. This gives the man with a 'best possible' record a maximum of thirty-nine weeks instead of twenty-six.

Differentiation for Wage Level.—Differential rates of contribution and benefit, if barred in relation to unemployment risk, might still be possible in relation to higher and lower wages, which accustom people to different standards of living during employment and make what is a liberal subvention for the lower-standard man an acute pinch for the higher. In the German system there are as many as eleven wage groups, the contribution and benefit rates rising as the wage scale is ascended. There are,

of course, administrative difficulties here also, notably at the start a complete absence of statistics for incidence of unemployment at different wage levels. The Commission finds the principle right, but postpones its adoption under the rule against swapping horses in mid-stream. The point has (as we shall see) a certain bearing on the question of savings under the means test.

Scope of the Insurance Scheme.—The original scheme made elaborate provisions enabling special industries to contract out of the general scheme and frame schemes of their own; also for employing trade unions with out-of-work benefit schemes of their own to act as agents in paying Government benefit, and other ideas aimed at making employers and workers feel that the Fund was their property and giving them a live interest in protecting it; but these features disappeared almost completely when the scheme was extended to cover all industries with certain specified exceptions. Only two special schemes (for the very special 'industries' of banking and insurance) exist to-day, and the Commission, convinced of the general impracticability of differential schemes, is against any restoration of contracting-out, but would retain the two schemes in being. There are other great industries (agriculture, domestic service and, to some extent, railways) which are outside the general scheme and have no scheme of their own, because of the special conditions of life in them. The Commission, after re-examining the position at length, finds that railway workers should continue to be exempted after three years' service, as being then sure of permanent employment; but if a substantial proportion of unemployment obtains in fact, the whole industry should be brought into the general scheme. Agricultural unemployment is growing, but the general scheme would be unsuitable for it, especially in view of the present high rates of employers' and workers' contributions. The Commission's examination of the question once more confirms previous decisions in favour of exclusion, but it considers that in this very special and important case the possibility of a special scheme should be further explored. Domestic service, just because it is domestic and not industrial, should remain outside. The dock industry is in the general scheme, with disastrous results to the Fund, and forms a strong case for a special scheme, were it not for the administrative difficulties such schemes involve. It appears that numbers of dockers are still able, owing to the special conditions of their work, so to alternate spells of piece work with absenteeism as to acquire and retain the paying status of partial unemployment in addition to high weekly earnings. The system of engaging labour in this industry, in spite of all that has been said about decasualisation, still requires reform and special control; and the Commission concludes (rather lamely) that if

anomalies are still found to exist under the new scheme, the choice lies between facing the acute difficulties of making a special scheme and the confession of failure involved in simple exclusion from insurance.

Juveniles.—The age of entry into insurance (now sixteen years) should be advanced to meet the normal school-leaving age (now fourteen), those continuing full-time education being credited with (imaginary) contributions to the Fund, lest education should appear as a manifest handicap in later life.

Rates of Benefit.—The average reduction of about 11 per cent. under the interim Report would have reduced the rates for single adults from 17s. (man) and 15s. (woman) to 15s. and 13s. respectively. The May Committee called for a 20 per cent. cut all round. The Government decision limiting so-called 'sacrifice' to 10 per cent. as a maximum, arrived at on political grounds without reference to the position of the Fund, left the rates at 15s. 3d. and 13s. 6d. The Commission repeats its former recommendation of 15s. and 13s. 'unless there should be a further fall in cost of living or of the general wage level.' Taking 1924 = 100, the cost of living index, 84 when these rates were first recommended and 83.5 when the reductions were actually made, was on November 1, 1931, 81.5. The general wage index has fallen from 96.75 in September 1931 to 95. The actuarial member of the Commission (Mr. Trouncer), in view of the general failure to reduce the burden on the Exchequer, would (among other proposed economies noticed below) further reduce the adults' rates by 1s. a week at once (making 14s. and 12s.) and the juveniles' rates by 6d. These proposals seem to be thoroughly justified, and indeed called for, from the point of view of the Fund; but there may be difficulties in what might be represented as a breach of the 10 per cent. pledge—another illustration of how political exigencies interfere with the application of business principles to public concerns.

These, with many other valuable recommendations in detail, form the framework of the new insurance scheme, now to be set up and kept clear of such political liberalities as scuttled its predecessor. The general financial results are dealt with later, but it may here be noticed that continuity is preserved by a provision that the new scheme should accept an initial handicap of one third of the accumulated debt (£115 millions) of the old. Of this total, to be funded in the form of an annuity of £4½ millions for sixty-five years, two-thirds should be shouldered by the Exchequer and £1½ millions yearly should be found by the Fund.

Any scheme drawn up to meet the conditions of to-day must obviously require frequent readjustment of details to meet future

changes; and perhaps the most valuable of all the Commission's recommendations is the constitution of a Statutory Commission to keep the scheme and its fund under constant review. The Minister of Labour, retaining full responsibility to Parliament, should have delegated to him wide (though limited) powers to make, without fresh legislation, necessary alterations in the scheme. If he initiates, he must consult the Commission before deciding. The Commission may also propose to the Minister new orders or regulations at any time, and should report to him annually on the position of the Fund and any measures necessary to keep it solvent. Whichever side initiates, the Minister should communicate to Parliament, within a stated interval, the views of the Commission and his action thereon. The fact that since 1920 the Minister has had important delegated powers to alter the scheme so as to keep the Fund solvent 'if the Treasury so direct,' and that no use has ever been made of them, shows that some such provision is necessary to ensure Government action. These recommendations accord with the principles laid down by the recent Committee on Ministers' Powers, and it may be hoped that the last has now been heard of the crusade to reassert 'the rule of law' against the supposed sinister design of our 'Triumphant Bureaucracy' to erect a 'New Despotism.' The complicated details of modern social legislation can be neither adequately discussed before enactment, nor kept in touch with new developments, by the ordinary processes of legislation and the law courts; and delegation of powers to the Executive, under proper safeguards, is essential to efficiency, and especially to economy. The inexcusable waste of millions by delay in correcting the grossest legalised abuses ('anomalies') in the working of the Unemployment Insurance Acts under 'the rule of law'—waste that a civil servant of average ability would have been perfectly capable of stopping at once—is a never-to-be-forgotten case in point.

The same statutory Commission would have similar duties and powers in connexion with the relief scheme for those outside insurance—the second part of the Royal Commission's reference—to which we now come.

A scheme of 'unemployment assistance,' intermediate between insurance and the Poor Law machinery for the relief of destitution, is unavoidable, because, after the practically limitless transitional benefit which has been so long (and so foolishly) paid at full insurance rates to those who have fallen out of insurance, it is impossible now to relegate these persons to the provisions of the Poor Law, though there are numbers of the workless, equally deserving, who, having never been insured, have had to rely on that 'public assistance.' As long as we could pretend that transitional benefit came out of an insurance fund to which the

insured had contributed when they could, we could give some sort of reason for denying equal treatment to people who had never been asked to pay contributions. But now that the transitionals are a separate flock, paying nothing and drawing assistance direct from taxes and rates, the fact that they had once been insured no longer justifies such preferential treatment; so that the intermediate scheme must be extended to all otherwise qualified unemployed workers, irrespective of their insurance history. It is an unfortunate result, in our present sorry financial plight; and there is no certainty that we can refuse further extensions.

Next come two questions about the 'Means Test': (1) are the private possessions of the unemployed to be completely ignored in determining what assistance from public funds they need when their contract of insurance no longer runs? And, if not, (2) on what basis and to what extent are they to be taken into account? For the first question, take an actual case: a single woman has £1700 invested, with dividends of £60 a year; is she to have all her needs met, as if she were penniless, out of taxes falling on many persons far worse off than she is? To this question there can be only one answer. The case taken is exceptional; but cases of substantial private property among the unemployed are quite common. There must be discovery of means. Until its merits in raising grievances against the Government had been grasped, this necessity was accepted by practical men of all parties and needs no argument; the agitation worked up against it is insincere. In the House of Commons on November 9 an ex-Minister backed his protest by saying that 'working people do not save for the income they get on savings, but for a rainy day.' Is prolonged unemployment, then, to reckon not as a rainy day but as a chance of making hay while the sun shines?

The second question is complicated and difficult; and in the past year, for want of central guidance, different local authorities have answered it in too many different ways; now that the right hand knows so well what the left hand is doing, only substantial uniformity of principles can avoid grievances. The Commission has taken leading classes of 'means' likely to come in, and various possible relationships of the individuals composing the household, and has brought to bear such considerations as the encouragement of thrift, the necessity of making it worth while to secure supplementary earnings, the fact that members of a household who are themselves earning have a clear claim to appropriate to their own needs and satisfactions a fair proportion of their earnings before bringing them into hotchpot for the benefit of unemployed members. The conclusions it reaches are stated in the form of definite rules for typical cases: *e.g.*, that if cash savings are below

£50 they should go free, while if above that figure, the first £50 should contribute 1s. a week and thereafter each complete £25 a further 1s., up to £300, beyond which no assistance should be given in normal cases. At this rate, a man with £250 bringing in 4 per cent. would begin to reduce his capital at the rate of only £13 in the first year. So long as we maintain flat rates of contribution for the whole range of wage levels, we leave the highly paid worker in employment ample means from which to accumulate private reserves to supplement his provision for a rainy day; and too much tenderness, at the taxpayer's expense, displayed in obviating the use of these reserves when the occasion arrives, is misplaced. The Government's formula, in its financial resolution on this scheme (1s. for each £25 up to £300, with immunity for the first £25), differs only in taking 1s. a week when the total lies between £25 and £50. If, as is held by high authority, the existence of substantial insurance benefit (to which the worker contributes only one-third) for a first period of unemployment tends unduly to stiffen the resistance of labour to reductions of money wages when prices and profits are falling, and so to encourage unemployment, statutory provisions to enable a man to come through a further ten years or more without exhausting his savings must have a like effect.

The deductions for 'means' fall to be made, not from fixed rates of assistance applying everywhere, but from a special assessment of the needs of each household, arrived at by local investigation and taking account of local rents, prices and other conditions. The assessing officer must of course have in his mind some guide scale, and this the Commissioners think will be provided by experience already gained in dealing with Poor Law and unemployment cases. Variations for local conditions will, and ought to, exist; but under the central guidance of the Ministry of Labour they should be kept within limits representing real economic differences. Under this plan, the level which unemployment assistance should reach in relation to insurance benefit is not capable of precise statement, but the Commission indicates, as guide-lines, that there should be some advantage on the side of insurance, and that 'it will conform to the public interest and the general desire that the standards should be as high as is consistent with the limits imposed by economic necessities.' But as it also states that 'wherever possible the conditions of the insurance scheme should be adjusted to yield benefit at a higher rate than relief; and this is a factor to be borne in mind in determining the finances of the insurance scheme,' we are left without any fixed datum point and, alas! with a lead in the direction opposite to economy.

Should the assessment of needs and the investigation of means

be conducted by a new staff, local but belonging to the Ministry of Labour, or by the existing staffs of local authorities, accustomed to similar (though not identical) tasks? The Commission chooses the latter alternative, but would have a new Unemployment Assistance Committee of the local authority, formed to direct the work, distinct from the Public Assistance Committee and under the guidance of the Ministry of Labour. These administrative arrangements may not be free from difficulty, and there will at first be need of careful supervision to prevent assessing officers, accustomed to the old destitution standards of the Poor Law, from unconsciously applying them to the new scheme; but the duplication of staffs and standards involved in the former alternative should certainly be avoided. It is time we should bury the skeleton of the old 'Poor Law taint' instead of rattling its bones at every opportunity.

Since the local authority will be determining expenditure from the Exchequer, it is essential that it should have a substantial interest in the economy of the administration of unemployment assistance; and the Commission proposes that the excess over a grant of £58 millions (calculated as shown below) should fall on rates, not in each area, but over the country as a whole. (We have already seen that the new scheme will take a large class of cases off the Poor Law funds.) In distributing the Exchequer grant between areas, it is tentatively proposed that each area should bear its own unemployment assistance up to the produce of a 4d. rate, only costs in excess of that sum being taken into account in the distribution of the Government grant by a formula to be worked out, adjusting the share of each local authority to the extra burden thrown upon it by unemployment and so helping distressed areas. The Minister should retain power to reduce the formula grant to any authority failing to administer to his satisfaction.

With numerous valuable recommendations about employment exchanges, training schemes, courses of instruction and other matters there is here no space to deal.

The financial summing-up, with an assumed average of 3 million unemployed, shows for the new insurance scheme receipts of £59,100,000 and outgoings of £57,040,000 including a contribution of £1½ millions to the debt charge as above explained, but reducing by half a million the charge of £4 millions made by the Ministry of Labour for administration of the insurance scheme, which the Commission thinks excessive. If all conditions remained as at present, the insurance scheme would show a deficiency of £9,400,000, including £5½ millions for interest on debt. For transitional payments, the expenditure (with means test) would be £55½ millions, including cost of administration.

On the new plan, as there would be a transfer of individuals from insurance to assistance, this expenditure from the Exchequer would grow to about £58 millions (including administration). The total liability of the Exchequer, on the old lines, would be £84,600,000 and on the new system £81,670,000, this figure including £3 millions for debt charge, £58 millions for unemployment assistance, and the half million left on the Estimates by reducing the charge to the Fund for administration. In January 1931 Sir Richard Hopkins gave the then rate of charge on the Exchequer as £37 millions, anticipating growth to £55 millions or even more. By September last the rate had in fact reached £80 millions a year.

Frankly, these results are disappointing, and two members of the Commission append notes proposing to improve them. Mr. Clay argues that, under the new safeguards for the solvency of a strictly limited insurance scheme, it need not be planned to show a credit balance in a single year with 3 millions unemployed, provided it does so over a longer period including better days. It would be safe, and even beneficial, so to modify the new ratio rule (explained above) as to keep men with good records still longer on insurance before transferring them to assistance; the insurance fund borrowing to cover the temporary deficiency so caused, and the Exchequer profiting by the reduction under assistance. With deposits overflowing in the banks, as at present, to increase current expenditure by borrowing would be helpful, as tending to accelerate revival of industry. Mr. Clay gives no estimate of the amount to be thus gained by the Exchequer. Without questioning the economic theory, it may be permissible to doubt the political merits of this plan at the present moment. In the rough-and-tumble of party strife, nice distinctions of economic doctrine are apt to be neglected, and with 1931 fresh in many memories, a popular statement of the case might run somewhat as follows: 'Oh, of course, borrowing for the Insurance Fund was mortal sin while we were in, but is quite all right when we are out. Another bankers' ramp!' The Statutory Commission is still in the future; but when it has firmly re-established faith in the administration of the Fund, reasonable temporary borrowing, which might ease the burden on industry, need not be always barred.

Mr. Trouncer, considering the figure of £58 millions for the Exchequer grant to assistance unsafe, if it is not restricted to classes hitherto entitled to transitional benefit, would so restrict it for the present, to protect local funds from the risk of being swamped. He would also (as already noted) reduce benefit rates for both adults and juveniles, with a corresponding lowering of the standards of assistance, increase workers' contributions and

reduce those from the Exchequer, in view of its taking over £77 millions of old debt. In these ways, while providing for raising the Exchequer share of assistance to 95 per cent., he reduces the total Exchequer charge by some £18 millions, to £66½ millions. His scheme would reduce the margin on the insurance fund to £110,000 (with 3 millions unemployed); but there would be no borrowing.

A necessarily hurried reading of this Report leaves on my mind a deep impression of the thoroughness and success of the Commission's performance of its task, coloured by disappointment that the cause of economy did not find wider support. On the other hand, the central recommendation of the Report, the creation of a permanent Statutory Commission, promises great future financial advantage from the substitution of continuous and businesslike control of the policy of the whole system for the spasmodic political and legislative handling which in the past have produced such a lamentable mess.

C. HARRIS.

OTTAWA EXAMINED

Now that Parliament has given the Ottawa Agreements statutory force we are free to assess the value of this, the latest, Imperial pact. The Commons debates, since neither jot nor tittle of the wording could be altered, rapidly wore threadbare and ended in a hash of resurrected arguments over-seasoned with personal amenities on the reawakened fiscal consciences of dissenting Liberal ex-Ministers. Little else could be expected, since the Agreements had been thoroughly ventilated in the Press before Parliament dealt with them. The Samuel Liberals, sensing their parliamentary impotence, took refuge in repetition and the unearthing of fine constitutional points, but left the House cold, everyone realising that the country was in no mood for theories and would surely judge by results. The Socialist remnant cleverly 'ca'cannied' by asseverating that they worshipped neither Free Trade nor Protection (tongue in cheek on sheltered industries), but were prepared to bless whichever policy turned out to be successful, a move hardly statesmanlike, but typical of astute politicians to whom the cry of dear food was manna from Heaven, and not to be discarded until a good new slogan was visible in the offing. The Conservative majority, which carries the National Government and the Simon Liberals, blessed the proceedings generally, but with a strong reservation that home agriculture did not seem to be in the picture. The Lords having decorously approved, the Bill duly became law. But since, on these Agreements, Parliament will for some time be silent, the opportunity is presented for a reasoned examination of the bargain. While criticism of these family arrangements should be offered in no carping spirit, we ought to discover, if we can, what Ottawa really means for us and for the Dominions. One envies that clear eye of faith, undimmed even by logic, which sees high Protection or unfettered Free Trade in a glorious whole, to be blessed or cursed, without reservation and without equivocation. To those of us still stumbling along the stony path of trade and industry no such comfort is vouchsafed. We are realists.

Here are the Agreements, now the law of the land. Let us

look, first, simply and directly for their essence, and uncover, if we may, what principles seem to be involved, and finally assess the hopes of permanence, since without reasonable continuity the experiment is foredoomed to failure. These Agreements follow logically on our slide to Protection which began with the Import Duties Act. We now accelerate our pace on the path by putting a preferential ring round the Empire. It is true the ring is not too tightly drawn at present, but it is there. We need not discuss the campaign for complete Imperial Free Trade, because the Dominions would never accept such a limitation on their manufacturing and exporting hopes. We, with half our population dependent on a production which must be sold in international markets, cannot afford to stultify ourselves by turning from a fruitful existing market to promises which cannot be sufficiently met until generations of migration have filled empty Dominion spaces. Hence the argument that we have adopted Protection as an expedient to secure greater freedom of trade throughout the world. Having signally failed both by example and precept to educate our competitors, we are unwillingly compelled to take up the cudgel of counter tariffs and so resume effective bargaining power. Incidentally we accept, albeit in a limited sense, the nationalist economic unity thesis of France and the United States in the hope that the Empire will establish itself as an economic bargaining unit with foreign nations. So for the moment the breed of Protection, pure or mixed, is immaterial, because both roads appear to lead to Rome.

Now to closer touch. We continue free entry for all Imperial products now admitted free of British duties. We place new duties on certain foreign imports. We maintain certain existing preferences by maintaining existing duties on foreign imports. We regulate certain meat imports by quotas favouring Dominion production. We deal with dumping generated by State action which affects certain Canadian exports. In return the Dominions concede to our manufactured goods certain increased tariff preferences either by reducing their tariff rates to us or by increasing these rates to foreign importers. With the exception of India, which has a two years' term, the Agreements run for five years. The object of the pact is to create greater freedom of trade within the Empire with the prospect of an overlap into international markets. The Agreements (except that with India, which is before a committee for report to the Legislature) are now undergoing a rapid examination by the Dominion Parliaments, and will certainly be sanctioned. The Indian position is difficult and delicate. While the Dominion delegations held complete authority from Governments secure of ample majorities in popularly elected Parliaments, nothing certain could be predicted

of the India Legislature. The report of the Indian delegation has been favourably received in Indian commercial circles, and probably will be ratified eventually, since the period is only for two years and the Agreements are regarded as economically useful, and do not clash with nationalist political views.

The real questions are—Will this sketchy British five-year plan work, and into what may it develop? The people of the Dominions will be the last to resent any reasoned criticism of their economic future. They value their own trade independence too highly and therefore readily appreciate it in others. They are, moreover, wide awake to the wreckage which the world economic blizzard has left in its track. All, in the main, are dependent for prosperity on primary production, and therefore thoroughly appreciate the wide-open market—and the only one—the United Kingdom offers their products. They recognise, too, that selfish nationalism is a poor foundation for the erection of a progressive State; and for the time being have squashed their political extremists. Probably, therefore, protective grouping in a wide economic unit strongly appeals to them.

But we must dig deeper than the general terms of the Agreements, and wider than the simple statement of exchanging manufactured goods for foods and raw materials. The problem has not the stark simplicity demanded by a political platform. Close examination of the tariff schedules reveals conditions and tendencies not apparent in the easily framed verbosity of Conference resolutions. To these details more definite consideration will be given later when the conditions of each Dominion are reviewed. At the outset a caveat must be entered on behalf of British agriculture—our oldest industry, which to many supporters of the National Government seems to have been drowned in too Imperial a pæan. Our farmer delegates were no doubt delighted to feel the voice o'er Eden breathing that every country's first care must be its own agriculture, but they must have been decidedly disgruntled when not required to sign the marriage register of the Agreements.

Our agricultural position is all too clear. The Dominions are among our most intensive competitors, closely run and often passed by the Argentine and Denmark. We are to-day slowly sinking in a flood of wheat, meat, and dairy products. Against foreign competitors we have agreed to levy duties, but for three years the Dominion tide may continue to run almost at flood, with the exception of meat, which is limited by a quota now found to be quite ineffective. The British farmer may be forgiven if he suggests to the Dominions that he be allowed to take a leaf out of their book, first raise a tariff for his own reasonable protection, and then give them compensatory preference on that tariff.

Should the British farmer be forced into bankruptcy—and many are fast heading there—it is immaterial who pushed him into court. It is now generally agreed, even in urban centres, that British farming ought to be encouraged. While some relief has been accorded wheat-growers by quota and plans are on the way to improve marketing and secure for the industry a better share of the consumer's price, the mass of meat now being shot into England has reduced the price level to an impossible economic basis. The farmer's complaint that Ottawa brought him nothing is fully justified by the emergency agreements hurriedly made between this country, the Dominions, and foreign countries for an immediate and drastic quota restriction far beyond that originally planned. It says something for economic sanity that world producers have at last realised how dangerous is their position. Whether from the farming point of view any system of meat quota can become effective is wide open to question, and we must always face the unpleasant fact that if initial steps lag we may well find ourselves stretching out into a controlled ladder of slaughtering, marketing, regulation, distribution, and even production—a vista never before contemplated for an industry intensely individualistic, and certainly not by a majority whose gorge is always ready to rise at the first whiff of State Socialism. But nowadays our political education is rapid and intensive, and we may before long find ourselves inventing, and even accepting as logical, a distinction between two forms of Socialism—political and industrial. There is, of course, an alternative. But the choice is not an easy one: the Scylla of Quota and the Charybdis of Protection. We have taken the plunge with a two-shilling duty on wheat, taxed every other kind of food, and still boggle at meat. There is little logic in this attitude, and probably no reason to fear political repercussion when the Government asks for another electoral mandate, since, on its own admission, it will have failed in its considered policy unless wholesale prices are higher. The electors are far more likely to brush aside catchwords and give their general verdict on better trade and more employment. Much more might be written, but we need to keep agriculture in proper perspective with all other industries.

In the tariff schedules, from our export point of view, there is a general family likeness, but it will be easier of examination to relate these to the countries concerned individually. Canada naturally comes first, and the essence of the question there is her prospect of economic and political stability. It is true we have a five-year plan, but Canada has no five-year Parliament. Before the Agreement expires there will be a general election, and the complexion of the Government may alter. We need not fear that Mr. King, if he returned to power, would at once break the

bargain to our detriment. But the outlook would inevitably be altered and British industry compelled to face the uncertainty of possible changes. On the other hand, such changes might measurably improve our position and generally open wider to us the Canadian market. It is no secret that our delegation found the Canadian manufacturers almost impossible to deal with, and, since these industrialists are the mainspring of the party now in power, concession without their consent was hopeless to expect. What did we get? In iron and steel, by previous trade bargaining, preferential import consideration on a complementary basis and of definite value to British industry. Some hope, also, for the chemical industry. For our textiles but little was obtained, and that little only after hard pressure. An examination of the schedules reveals duties at a level which completely shields Canadian manufacture from effective outside competition. It is true the *Winnipeg Free Press* writes 'the crumbling of the tariff wall has begun,' but not for textiles. That journal also draws attention to a position not yet fully appreciated on this side of the water. 'For two years Canadians have suffered from the exactions and oppressions of tariffs framed in the spirit of Protection run mad'—tariffs raised to inordinate heights two years ago; and the reductions now made are from that prohibitive basis. Moreover, as rightly stressed in our own parliamentary debates, preferences which are not effective because the tariff is prohibitive are not genuine. Clearly high Protection in Canada is not yet finally entrenched. At her last general election the voting margin between the two parties was narrow. The battle is still running fiercely between the primary producers and those industries sheltered by existing high tariffs, and compelling what the farmer regards as monopoly exactions, for which his production in these days of low prices cannot possibly offer any real economic exchange. It has been said, 'How can these domestic problems affect Great Britain?' Most certainly we are concerned. Reading from *The Times* of October 18, reporting the Canadian debates, we find:

Mr. King went on to say that if returned to power the Liberals would proceed to bring back the tariff to the level where they had left it on going out of office, and would go even further by establishing a general preferential rate of 50 per cent. for all British goods entering by Canadian ports.

Should such a policy mature before the termination of the existing five-year Agreement we need not object to a modification that would give us the genuine preference we certainly lack under present arrangements.

Wide discussion has ranged over the Canadian promise that, in effect, there shall be no protection of nascent industries which

cannot be assured of success, that the basis of protection shall have regard to the relative British and Canadian costs of economic production, and that a Tariff Board shall be established before which British producers will be welcome to state their case. It is said that this is both a change of heart and of method. The Tariff Board was constituted by an Act of 1931, but the skeleton has never yet been clothed. Although the suggestion to make it effective was not welcomed by the Canadian manufacturers, they eventually withdrew their objection. There is no ground for asserting that the members of such a board will not carry out their duties fairly and squarely; and, indeed, the Canadian Government has undertaken that a speedy review of duties by the board shall be considered in relation to a competitive costs basis, and that no higher duties shall be imposed on British imports without reference to the Tariff Board. But the final arbiter on any recommendation is the Canadian Parliament, a majority of which to-day firmly backs high Protection, and will inevitably consider the cost basis on the standard of living regarded as necessary in Canada rather than in Great Britain. Already one Canadian politician has pointed out that the wages paid in Lancashire cannot be regarded as reasonable from the Canadian standpoint. That attitude gives simple illustration to the view that, for the purposes of statutory comparisons in Canada, Lancashire wages might be deemed as uneconomic as we should consider those of Russia in relation to our own standard of living.

It may be that the present Canadian Government is not pledged to high Protection throughout its parliamentary life, and that Mr. Bennett has agreed to an existing stabilisation only for such a period as will enable Canadian manufacturers to tune themselves in to the proper wavelength of Imperial Preference. There are elements in his backing which would welcome a reduction of tariffs and in prices, and therefore the work of the new Tariff Board may lie in the direction of a complete reconsideration of the position. Such a work may be assisted by the undoubted willingness of the United States to reconsider not only the basis but the very advisability of high Protection in the light of the present world economic upheaval. We in England shall certainly welcome any change of tariff wind in North America.

But what may emerge economically we can for the moment ignore. Our side of the bargain is certainly generous to Canada, and we can certainly believe that the Agreements as a whole will have revived Canadian interest in the Empire, and so, we hope, have strengthened a tie with Great Britain and the other Dominions, which for geographical and financial reasons had stretched somewhat thin.

The economic problem Australia has to solve is rather different to that of Canada. She is an island continent with a people of recent British origin, which, while strongly retaining the political character of the race, is sometimes prone to extremist action. Both her political instinct and her geographical position tend to keep her within the Empire. She has recently tried the experiment of establishing a standard of living for her urban populations which bore little relation either to her costs of manufacture or to the needs of her primary producers. The experiment was based on high Protection and unlimited powers of borrowing, and inevitably failed when loans could no longer be negotiated. She is to-day compelling a drastic recovery, and within the limits of necessary import restriction is carefully reviewing the basis of her import duties. Australia has for some time had a working Tariff Board—probably from our point of view not entirely independent of political influence, but logically operative. She now accords to British manufacturers the same right of audience as that given to her own people, and is prepared on lines similar to those agreed by Canada to review existing duties. We have accorded extra preference to her wine and free entry for dairy products (at least for three years); and have agreed a meat quota. For wool her market is international. The new preferences accorded to our manufactures are at present by way of increasing existing rates on foreign imports, but the Tariff Board is to take into immediate consideration the reduction of rates on British imports. As in Canada, the problem of high Protection yet remains to be settled. Should a Socialist Government of the last complexion again be returned to power, then probably once more, working on a standard of life basis, high Protection would become the rule, since the Australian extremists hold the view that if only wages are fixed high enough prosperity follows as a matter of course. Were such a policy again put into practice our exports to Australia would at once suffer serious contraction.

New Zealand has always kept her internal economy strongly based on the land, and, while encouraging certain classes of manufacture, has never sought to develop the growth of large urban areas nourished by hot-house industry sitting on a monopoly basis. Her new preferences to us are an appreciable and effective increase, and she receives in return a free market for her fruit and dairy produce and a reasonable quota for meat exports.

South Africa has met us very fairly. The outside treaty made some time back with Germany is denounced and the Dominion again comes within the Empire economic circle. She finds in Great Britain a wide open market, with extra preference for wine, fruits, tobacco, whale-oil and certain minerals, and so obtains an export outlet which would not be easy to find else-

where. In return the preference accorded to British machinery is appreciable, and this, with consideration for a wide range of manufactured material, should certainly lead to an increased volume of trade. Meat quotas in the future may have to be reviewed in the light of our recent further restrictions on imports.

Newfoundland, in return for a preference on cod-liver oil and frozen salmon, the free entry of cod fish and a quota for iron ore, gives a 10 per cent. preference on manufactured goods. Any appreciable increase in trade depends radically on the readjustment of the Dominion's sadly over-spent position rather than on natural resources, which are definitely limited.

Southern Rhodesia, in exchange for a good margin on tobacco, and consideration for copper, asbestos and citrus fruits, gives a generous preference to our manufacturers.

The Crown Colonies and Dependencies, through the Mother Country, are parties to the Agreements.

The Agreement with India (not yet ratified) breaks new ground and definitely acknowledges for the first time the principle of Imperial Preference. In return for new duties on wheat, rice, linseed and oils, with the existing preferential margin accorded by us, we receive a 10 per cent. margin on a wide range of manufactured articles. Among those conversant with Eastern trade a strong belief is expressed that there should be a considerable extension of British-Indian trade when the Agreement is ratified.

Even when all the Agreements are sanctioned and the plan working, it is not easy to see the way clear. World conditions and currency depreciation have caused the imposition of all kinds of exchange, quota, primage and depreciation charges and restrictions on the free import of commodities: these do more to prevent the flow of trade than any stable tariff schedules. Such changes can be and often are manipulated to operate as complete barriers to imports either by way of adding impossible percentages to existing duties or preventing customers from exporting currency to pay for the imports ordered. All these tricks are, of course, the very negation of trade, and, being very largely the result of panic and a wild desire for self-preservation, probably will tend to disappear when economic sanity returns. In the meantime the undertaking given by the Dominions to remove every check as soon as practicable shows their definite honesty of purpose and their desire to carry out the Agreements in the spirit as well as in the letter. Until such checks are removed it will be impossible for producers and traders to judge what definite benefits may be derivable from the new preferences. There is little doubt that old channels of trade will be interrupted, and that some friction may result until new connexions are established, but such diffi-

culties in any scheme of world reconstruction must be suffered and accommodated.

Other than domestic reasons make these Agreements interesting in that they contain a common undertaking to deal with the difficult problem of State dumped goods. It is true that reprisals will be restricted to State as opposed to private action, and that only in the direction of complete State control and handling. Russia is obviously aimed at, but any other country setting up a State industry in any part of its territories and casting the product on a world market without reference to real initial costs might well find itself within the rule. The rule will no doubt operate by prohibition, since no form of duty can be so effective and so quickly applied. How far in the future the rule may be borrowed to extend to State subsidies of private industry, which thereby gain a special advantage against competitors, is open for consideration; but it does seem that, the end in both cases being identical, the principle therefore is applicable. With any exclusion policy the vista of possibilities and repercussions is endless. The copper duty experiment will be watched carefully. It may be the forerunner of others of a like nature, but that will depend on the measure of success. The initial advantage is that enough copper can be produced within the Empire to supply its reasonable needs in all parts. The Government has taken the wise step of confirming a bargain between producers and consumers, a step possible only because of the complete regimentation of the two interests. This experiment in regular and ordered production with sure marketing may prove an economic pointer of considerable value.

If we are to get the best out of these Agreements, and what may ultimately spring from them, it is clear that trade interests must come more closely together. While there can be no question of interfering with individual output, marketing and financing, it is the trade or industry as a whole which is concerned with the preservation of an existing market and the opening up of new centres of demand. It may fairly be said that the energy of the iron and steel leaders in combination gave them in Canada not all they wanted, but more than they would have got as units relying on insufficiently informed civil servants. Probably the solid strength of the Canadian Manufacturers Combine gave them a resistance on which our much weaker textile representatives could make no impression. But the lesson is clearly readable; and if in future the case of British industry is to be properly argued before the Tariff Boards of Canada and Australia, then that side must be put by representatives who come from effective organisations of the industries concerned, where the membership is all-embracing of the industry, and where the preparation of the

material for final presentation has been thorough and intensive. That has never been so in the past ; therefore it is not unreasonable now to say to British industries : These Agreements give you the means ; you yourselves must seek the end.

Regret has been freely expressed that no decisions have been taken on what is loosely termed Empire currency and on migration. In existing circumstances an Empire currency is impossible, and so the Conference declared. The control of note issues and banking systems stretches throughout the whole life of States, and were they deprived of this much of their independence would vanish. It is better for a State to pay its way and show by the stability of its exchange what the value of its currency may be. It is no cause for wonder that migration was left for future discussion. To-day, for reasons applicable to all parts of the Empire, it is at a standstill. Its future consideration will probably be on a basis far more comprehensive than the unit and fostered movements of the past, and to be effective must be arranged on a wide national and subsidised plan.

There is a final and far-reaching implication in what has been done at Ottawa. Derision has been cast on the delegations for bargaining. But why ? There is no shame in honest bargaining, and, indeed, it is the only sane path to agreement. Some approve of it with foreigners but shy when applied to the Dominions. The effort at distinction is childish.

We have at last established one definite principle agreed by a number of self-governing States. It is that the Empire comes first, composing a fiscal unit which will no longer bargain with other nations except in common consultation. So aligned it presents a solid front to outside attack. It is true that in some small measure internal fiscal independence will be abated, but that is the make-weight always to be paid for the advantages of combination ; and if in the end the means are justified, the change will be forgotten in the general profit.

Warnings have been given that our Imperial fiscal unity may provoke foreign reprisals, and that we shall frighten foreign nations into hostile tariff groups. So far from this fear having been openly expressed, the contrary is true. Foreign nations have recognised our right of Imperial combination ; and are now willingly seeking to fit their own economic conditions into the new order of British and world trade. There is room for all. There is need for all.

GEOFFREY ELLIS.

FROM HOOVER TO ROOSEVELT

FROM among the many comments by American publicists cabled to England on the morrow of the astounding November election I should select as especially accurate and discerning one by Mr. Walter Lippmann, whose articles, regularly syndicated by the New York *Herald-Tribune*, have attained a remarkable degree of influence throughout the United States. By their overwhelming poll, Mr. Lippmann says, the American people did more than repudiate the Hoover Administration. 'They repudiated the post-war régime, because it had failed to ensure them work, security, peace and order.' He went on to point out that, while the depression was the immediate cause of this immense stampede, the decisive portion of the electorate had clearly come to the conclusion that the blame for the disastrous economic and social conditions of present-day America must be placed upon the party responsible for the controlling policies of the past decade. Those policies arose out of the system first constructed in 1920, when Warren G. Harding was elected to the Presidency amid the ruin of Wilsonism. Its three cardinal points were : a refusal to take any further part in the after-war settlement, 'a determination to pursue a policy of ruthless economic nationalism,' and the support of Prohibition. Hence, Mr. Lippmann infers, an aggravation of the world-wide economic dislocation, the inflaming of commercial warfare, and in America an unparalleled volume of corruption, lawlessness, and waste of public money. It was upon all this that the massed electorate turned, thereby inflicting upon Mr. Hoover, who inherited the system, a defeat so crushing as to be almost unrealisable.

I will consider the bearings of Mr. Lippmann's diagnosis at a later stage of this article. But first, it would be well to pass in brief review the outstanding events in the later career of the President whose term ends on March 4 next year, and of this year's election campaign.

The close of the Coolidge period of five and a half years found the Republican Party without a national leader. Mr. Coolidge himself had no doubts as to the right time for retirement. The party conditions were altogether unfavourable to the develop-

ment of political leadership, and when the nominating convention met in the summer of 1928 Mr. Hoover was unchallenged. His seven years in the Cabinet as Secretary of Commerce had given him a powerful position in Washington; he had built up a personal organisation of unknown capacity; the masters of the Republican Party machine, who confessedly did not wish to see Mr. Hoover in the White House, had been unsuccessful in their search for an available alternative, and they did not know how to checkmate this non-political politician. His victory over Governor Alfred E. Smith was far easier to forecast than had been the victory of Mr. Coolidge in 1924; and it would be true to say that, although Mr. Hoover had made little impression on the American public and could command almost no personal support in the Press, his Administration was generously welcomed, and he began work in an atmosphere of widespread goodwill. The country was tired of machine politics, and was eager to see what an engineer-statesman could make of the most important, and the most exacting, elective office in the world.

The choice of Mr. Hoover was to mean 'four more years of prosperity,' but before the date of his inauguration there were signs of the coming storm. In the first half of 1929 the American public were carried into the wildest excesses of stock exchange speculation. The inflation of stocks and the universality of the gambling fever went beyond anything known until that time. The entire nation appeared to be in it. There was a wild defiance of reason and arithmetic, the peril of which should have been apparent to the most ignorant politician or business-man; and the most ironic circumstances were that the frenzy had caught the American people while the ultra-cautious Calvin Coolidge presided in Washington, and it was continued over the early months of the term during which the affairs of the United States were directed by the first President to come directly out of the realm of international business. After the country had been stricken, Mr. Hoover put the fever of speculation first among the causes of the great depression; but it is certainly true that during the fatal half-year, a time when the new President could have counted upon the fullest national response to any advice or admonition from him, the American people were left without authoritative guidance in a matter of economic life and death.

Mr. Hoover, naturally, has not been allowed to forget a certain passage in the speech he delivered on the day of his acceptance of the Republican Party nomination:

In America to-day we are nearer a final triumph over poverty than in any land. The poorhouse has vanished from among us. We have not

yet reached the goal, but, given a chance to go forward with the policies of the last eight years, we shall, with the help of God, soon be within sight of the day when poverty will be banished from this nation.

There, as it is hardly necessary to recall, was Mr. Hoover's initial error, and it proved fatal to his reputation. He ascribed the progress of the United States towards the abolition of poverty—a goal which, five years ago, did not look fantastically remote—not to the country's position in the world and its natural advantages, or to its general development of productive efficiency, which then appeared to be of triumphant force, but, unfortunately, to the policies of the Harding and Coolidge Administrations; and those, long before prosperity had begun to take flight, were being severely handled in speech and writing by the most influential American critics, both political and economic. This was not a good beginning, and it was remarked upon as singular that Mr. Hoover, whose reputation outside America had been made through two remarkable examples of humanitarian and supernational service, should have run his election campaign entirely upon the materialist appeal of still better times to come, and should then, in his first year of office and after the crash of 1929, ally himself with the most unreasoning supporters of economic nationalism, whose chosen instrument of policy was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. The occasion was tragic, but the challenge manifestly unique. The United States had been plunged from a height of material good-fortune to the lowest depths. Here if anywhere was the opportunity for the first President of a new order.

Mr. Hoover had been Secretary of Commerce in two Administrations. In that office his work, which was far-reaching and of high administrative quality, had fallen mainly under three heads. He had reorganised his department, and had gained a large measure of co-operation from American manufacturers in his effort to reduce the area of waste in industry. He had encouraged the discussion of programmes in preparation for emergency schemes of work and relief in the event of industrial calamity. And he had carried out a noteworthy change in the foreign field, bringing the commercial attaché in all the embassies and legations under the Department of Commerce instead of the State Department. That change, with its attendant plans, was designed to prepare for a great extension of American overseas trade, ironically enough just before the framers of impracticable tariffs and the builders of barriers everywhere found themselves in a position to impose their notions of economic isolation upon a great productive and trading nation and so clamp the fetters upon foreign commerce.

For the second Prosperity President it was the worst of ill-

fortune that the collapse should occur almost before he was in command of the resources of Government. But at the same time it seemed providential that a master organiser should be in the White House when the United States was plunged into this unprecedented ordeal. The opinion was widely held that Mr. Hoover's initial action, in the winter of 1929-30, was calculated to clear the air and to put heart into the American public. The co-operation of the most important business men was invited; the President let it be known that the Government was in favour of every possible effort to maintain employment and the established wage scales, and a spacious programme of public and private development was adumbrated for the purpose of checking unemployment. But before the end of the first bad year it was realised that these activities consisted mainly of publicity. The bankers and large employers had succumbed to panic, workers were laid off in huge numbers, wages and salaries were being cut, the volume of trade, domestic and foreign, showed an alarming decline. And the engineer-President was manifestly helpless. His programme was not being put into effect, and it was remarked that the statesman who as head of the Department of Commerce had been active in preparing emergency plans, upon a basis of large Government appropriations, was as President reluctant to push towards the carrying out of such plans. Whether it was that the Executive was prevented from acting, by political pressure and the hostility of the industrial powers, or that Mr. Hoover, confronted with a terrifying problem, found himself unable to move without breaking away from the actualities of that American system by which he stands, one does not find it easy to say. But certain it is that during the first two years of the depression Mr. Hoover came to be regarded as an ultra-cautious President, curiously unwilling or unable to employ the initiative and large-scale organising power which were understood to be his specialty.

There are reasons peculiar to Washington that may go far to account for the situation, and two in especial: first, that from the beginning the President found it almost impossible to work with Congress, which, to be sure, has been sufficiently outspoken in its antagonism to him; and secondly, that his Cabinet proved to be an ineffective instrument for grappling with the clamant needs of the country. But there was more in it than this. Mr. Hoover, beyond all doubt, was his own worst enemy in one most important respect. It is possible that, until the present year, he had formed an inadequate estimate of the scope and depth of the national calamity; that it was for him a thing impossible to believe that the Coolidge-Hoover prosperity was completely dissolved and the unassailable American system broken down. But whether this was or was not his actual state

of mind before the present year, it is plain that he misread the temper of the American people under the strain, and so was led to adopt an attitude and follow a course which resulted in the collapse of his great reputation, the destruction of his influence, and the rise throughout the country of a bitter and resentful feeling against the President such as very few of his predecessors have been called upon to suffer. No one who knew the United States in 1918-20 would be disposed to understate the ferocity of the attacks upon the war-time President. But Woodrow Wilson could count upon a great body of supporters, very many of whom preserved a passionate admiration for him until the end. The tragic part of Mr. Hoover's lot has been that as a President in adversity he seemed to have lost the bulk even of his personal adherents. One could see that, for a variety of reasons, good Republicans found it hard to uphold him and impossible to make a convincing plea for his Administration. And for this, I am convinced, there was one sound and sufficient reason—Mr. Hoover's failure to realise that the mass of ordinary folk, being in hourly contact with the harsh facts of the depression, were looking to the President for downright statement and the straightest counsel.

Mr. Hoover, we must suppose, came to the deliberate conclusion that the cause of patriotism and prudence demanded a repetition of the phrases of the older American optimism, now so startlingly exploded. He announced that the depression could not be other than brief; he was affirming that the worst was over; and, with the outlook growing ever darker, he was assuring the nation that there would be jobs for all within two or three months. Such examples of non-realism were inexplicable in a statesman of Mr. Hoover's standing and experience, and I am afraid it must be added that for a long time before the election many millions of the American people were thinking that they were inexcusable. Nevertheless, it must in fairness be emphasised that during the past year, the third of the great depression, the Hoover Administration has been energetic in policy and has achieved some good things in the way of constructive economic insurance if not of actual remedy. But the results of dilatoriness and of later ill-considered action have been very serious. The distressed farmers of the West were the first to make their need effectively known in Washington, and the Federal Farm Board was one large result of their agitation. It was one of the most daring experiments in Government business policy of our time. It involved enormous expenditure and a corresponding interference with the produce market, but I have yet to meet the economist, or the agrarian politician, who will maintain that the board is to be regarded as an agency of value to the rural States.

The West to-day lies in a condition of extraordinary distress and dismay. The immense farming community has never carried so crushing a burden of mortgages, debts, and hopelessness. Farmers have been organising strikes against the selling of agricultural produce at the existing ruinous prices, and as Congress assembles this month, detachments of indigent farmers in their old motor cars are converging on Washington. America has not witnessed any form of the hunger march more forlorn than this. In the sphere of finance and business, where, of course, he is far more at home, Mr. Hoover's most ambitious achievement has been the setting up of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, with command of enormous funds for the support of existing corporations and industrial concerns, and for the release of credit along such channels as may be judged most serviceable to the community. It is directed by men of acknowledged ability, and I think I am right in saying that the business world in general has given approval to much that has been accomplished. But, as was inevitable, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation has been assailed by the opposition as a powerful agency for the protection of Big Business, as yet another attempt to repair the credit of a financial and industrial system the spinal structure of which is in decay. There remains to be mentioned, in this connexion, one other expedient of the retiring Congress and the Hoover Administration—the large federal appropriation for the amelioration of industrial distress. Mr. Hoover has been immovably against all proposals for the direct federal relief of unemployment, and one would judge that in this he has majority opinion on his side. But he was also opposed to federal grants in aid to the State Governments for this purpose, clinging as long as possible to the view that the States, counties and cities should take care of their own people. Only with the greatest reluctance did he give way, signing the Bill passed by Congress in the summer. The President urged that the States should apply to the federal Treasury only under the compulsion of necessity. The speed with which, one after another, the State Governments took advantage of their quotas under the Act afforded an impressive demonstration of the national need. And it is beyond question that such federal aid must be expanded.

The lines of the Democratic assault on the party of Prosperity and its President were, of course, unmistakably laid down. Prosperity was the great Republican asset. The country had flourished because the electorate had been wise enough, in three successive leap years, to elect Republican Presidents. Under the third of these, and by far the ablest, prosperity had melted away. If good times had been made by the Grand Old Party, as the President so earnestly proclaimed, who was responsible for the

worst and longest period of misery and economic chaos from which the United States has ever suffered? The argument was almost too simple, but certainly it could not be countered by the orthodox Republican politician, while for Mr. Hoover the dilemma was awkward in the extreme. The Democrats, when once their candidate had been chosen, had only to go ahead with the attack on all fronts, their confidence increasing week by week. Everything was in their favour—the mistakes and evasions of the Administration, the wretchedness of the agrarian States, the gathering disillusion of manufacturers and merchants in respect of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, the unbounded popular resentment of the multitudes of small investors, who had thrown away their savings and now were identifying the Republican bosses with those 'malefactors of great wealth,' as Theodore Roosevelt used to call them, through whose evil designs and practices, as it was supposed, the mighty structure of joint-stock credit and international loans had been laid low. And the Democrats were strengthened by two allies of enormous weight—the appalling total of 12,000,000 unemployed, and the terrific force of Anti-Prohibition sentiment, released into the Democratic channel by the repeal plank in the party platform and the unequivocal declarations of the Democratic candidate. Any summary of the foregoing conditions, and others that might be added, could lead only to the conclusion that Governor Roosevelt and the Democrats were assured of an electoral victory. The newspaper straw-votes indicated its overwhelming character. In recent years these volunteer enterprises have contained only a narrow margin of error. In 1932 they were close enough to suggest to the cynically inclined that, so long as the unreformed electoral system continues, the ruinous cost of arranging the parties for mutual slaughter might be saved, and the business of counting votes left to that enterprising weekly the *Literary Digest*.

It is chastening, not to say affrighting, exercise in the Wallasian study of human nature in politics to lay side by side the political maps of the United States as shaded by the last four Presidential elections. In 1920 the popular repudiation of Wilsonian democracy gave Warren Harding in the electoral college all the States that the Republicans can expect to win in a very good year. In 1924 a third-party candidate helped Mr. Coolidge to hold all, save only Wisconsin, that mattered to his party. In 1924—the last national election in which the Dry vote could be mobilised, and the only one of modern times in which religious passion and fear have been systematically exploited—Mr. Hoover beat Governor Alfred E. Smith in all but six States of the South and two of New England. Because of the shrinking area (economically speaking) of the old Solid South, a victory such as that of 1924 is possible

for the Republicans. It has been taken for granted that for a Democratic candidate, no matter what the conditions might be, a victory of similar magnitude was unimaginable. But Governor Roosevelt has surpassed it. The Democratic shading on the map of this year spreads over the entire West and Middle West, the South and the border, and the Atlantic coast with the exception of Pennsylvania, little Delaware, and four small New England States. Pennsylvania, rock-ribbed in Republican orthodoxy, the most powerful industrial State in the Union, and to-day the region which, more strikingly than any other, displays the character of the American depression, was nearly lost. If Pennsylvania had gone Democratic, President Hoover's party would have been confined on the political map to a little island in the north-east corner. Such is political democracy, in a nation of 125,000,000, expressed in the crudest and most sweeping terms so far associated with universal suffrage and the ballot-box. The bewildered citizen of our own land which, three times within fifteen years, has witnessed results not greatly dissimilar from the result now before us, puts once again the inescapable query, Can political democracy survive?

A mass election, especially one such as we are here concerned with, does not and cannot produce a genuine debate on fundamentals, or even on the large and obvious problems of the hour. Mr. Roosevelt and the Democrats everywhere set out first to rub in the facts of the depression and to proclaim the responsibility of the Republicans for the economic ills which afflict the United States. But it was difficult for Mr. Roosevelt to make a case for his own side, since the Democratic platform was necessarily as cautious and evasive as usual, and all America is aware that an Administration formed by Mr. Roosevelt with the aid of the most conspicuous Democrats, all of whom are well known to the country, must be favourable to the great interests, if not actually representative of them. Wall Street and the industrial East started with a violent antipathy to Governor Roosevelt—not altogether to be wondered at when it was so clearly apparent that his nomination in the Chicago Convention had been secured through a combination of Mr. W. R. Hearst and Mr. W. G. McAdoo, once Secretary to the Treasury and more recently the rival of ex-Governor 'Al' Smith, who was able to deliver a large block of Western votes. But Wall Street and Big Business accepted the inevitable. Ordinary business people refused to be frightened by a vision of the Democrats in power, and Mr. Hoover's appeals to the fear motive, which became inappropriately strident, fell entirely flat. Governor Roosevelt was rebuked as a false prophet of the millennium, and then reprobated as a preacher of destructive ideals fatal to the American system itself; and at

the end of the campaign Mr. Hoover was announcing that if they permitted the Democrats to come in, they would see grass grow in the streets of a hundred cities and a thousand towns and ruin sweep over millions of farms. The voters, however, had made up their minds; and as they listened on the radio to the vaticinations of their President it is likely enough that many thousands of them made a mental comment to the effect that (allowing for the rhetorical flight as to farms in millions) the description was a not too outrageous picture of the United States after twelve years of government by the extraordinarily powerful directors of the party that was about to be dethroned.

Mr. Hoover, plunging late into the contest, found that an effective defence of his Administration could not be devised. The battle was already lost. And yet it cannot be said that Governor Roosevelt made a straight issue on any one of the major questions, except, I think, the increasingly important matter of hydro-electric power. The power companies have in recent years exhibited the political resources of an aggressive monopoly in Congress and the Press to an extent that makes their machine for lobbying and publicity look like the strongest of all the forces of 'invisible government.' On the power question Mr. Hoover is a complete conservative. Mr. Roosevelt, though concessive towards the powerful interests, has been fairly candid in maintaining that public control is the right American method for such immensely important enterprises as those of the St. Lawrence, Muscle Shoals, and the Boulder Dam. On the tariff question he was outspoken so long as he was dealing with the Smoot-Hawley Act and the Hoover record, but on the problem as it lies in America between the manufacturer and the farmer he was Franklin Yea-and-Nay, and in these days a Democratic candidate can hardly be otherwise. Nor was Mr. Roosevelt any happier in his approach to the baffling problem of grain. Speaking in the States of the Wheat Belt he offered proposals for Government action to raise the price of wheat in the United States, apparently without reference to prices in the world market. What that would mean to grower and consumer we need not pause to ask. Manifestly, however, a Democratic Administration, backed by a large majority in Congress, will move towards a reduction of tariffs. And doubtless it will also, as Mr. William Hard stated in a broadcast address from Washington, aim at a larger and firmer Government regulation of banks and stock exchanges and of public-utility corporations. It will, in a word, be generally more experimental than a Republican Administration can be. The President-elect has identified himself with 'a new deal,' and by that he will try to steer. In the first part of his term he will be negotiating with an adequate Democratic

majority in the Senate and a swollen majority in the House of Representatives. There is not much in that to tempt him into rejoicing. An unwieldy majority is bad in itself. In the Congress of the United States the party label, and even the assumption of political regularity, is no guarantee against a strong splitting up into factions. Congress is a fickle ally.

But what of Prohibition? There, surely, the lines were sharply drawn, and the Democratic victory means an early change in the law and the end of the Dry régime? We cannot go so far as that. The Democratic pledge to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution cannot be carried out in Washington, and may not be redeemed beyond the opening stage in the Congress elected last month. The abandonment of national Prohibition must be accepted as a political and social fact. The great experiment is a proved impossibility. The American people would not obey the Dry Law and there was no moral authority in it; enforcement was from the beginning a gross anomaly and a public shame. Mr. Hoover was elected as a Dry President; his inaugural address was mainly an appeal for law observance, but in advance of this year's campaign he approved the party decision to give up federal Prohibition and return the responsibility of liquor control to the separate States. The public demand had become clamorous, and the Democrats seized the strategic advantage by coming down on the side of repeal. Theirs, accordingly, has been the Wet vote—an angry and tremendous tide. In the cities enforcement will go; it is already at an end. The more or less open selling of liquor will henceforward be common. And yet nullification has nothing to do with the Constitution. The Volstead Act may be repealed or transformed, but so long as the Eighteenth Amendment stands the Wets are legally unsuccessful. Congress having passed a repeal resolution by a two-thirds vote, it would require ratification by the Legislatures of thirty-six States out of the forty-eight, and that is a long way off. I do not believe that the country will tolerate an indefinite spell of nullification in practice; but I doubt whether any American alive can forecast the movement towards repeal.

This survey of the electoral campaign and its conditions is rough and incomplete; but my space is exhausted, and I have room only for a bare salute to the President-elect. Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt is a vital, expressive, and open-hearted American who makes, in every respect, a striking contrast to his two immediate predecessors. His victory over paralysis in the limbs counts in his personal life as a splendid achievement. He is well informed and of many interests, knows Europe, and has had an exceptional experience of affairs—in the Navy Department

for eight years and as Governor of New York State since 1929. In international thought he belongs by habit and training to the Wilson school, and we cannot doubt that he will give a generous turn to America's relations with the outside world. Surprising though it may sound, he has been absorbingly anxious to gain the Presidency, and the prize has fallen to him in an hour of chaos and the deepest gloom. His term should last until 1937. The bare thought of what may happen to the American system, before the dawn of that year, is a thought to stagger the mind.

I come back, in a concluding word, to Mr. Walter Lippmann's explanation of the enormous electoral overturn. There can be no serious difference of opinion upon one point of his analysis—namely, his statement as to the popular revulsion against the policies and methods of the past twelve years. Those were the product mainly of economic causes and they could be maintained only under prosperity conditions. A great change of public opinion and sentiment was inevitable when the conditions were reversed. Mr. Hoover, carried to power on a tide which seemed to be still rising, was in fact a victim of the most cruel economic illusion. Those who were enabled to follow closely his public work and his plans during the years immediately before the 1924 election knew that he cherished large ideas of the Presidency and of its possibilities in an altered world—ideas which were as far removed as any could be from the bad old game of machine politics. Had his chance come to him at another time the results would have been very different for the United States. The economic disaster made it impossible for Herbert Hoover to be the kind of President that he wished to be.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

THE DRAMA OF THE INDIAN EMPIRE

WHEN Providence decreed that merchant adventurers from the West should make their first contacts with the Indian sub-continent and establish trading stations there, no human being could foresee that the outcome of these enterprises would be an Indian Empire governed by a mere handful of Britons. That was the first act of the drama, and it closed with the Battle of Plassey in 1757, when the definite turn towards the government of the country was made. The second act extended from the Battle of Plassey to the Indian Mutiny, 100 years later. The third act began with the great Proclamation of Queen Victoria in 1858, when the administration of the East India Company was brought to an end, and the British nation and Parliament, through the mouth of the Sovereign, accepted direct responsibility for the peace, progress, and contentment of this vast population, from prince to peasant. This third act came to an end with the termination of Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty.

The first two acts were periods of constant warfare ; the third ushered in profound internal peace, and was marked by progress of so remarkable a kind that the historian of the future cannot fail to describe it as a golden age between the military conflicts that preceded and the political contests which followed it. It was undoubtedly a period of contentment, of the rich as well as of the poor. There stands in Regent's Park a fountain upon which is inscribed the fact that it was ' the gift of Sir Cowasjee Jehangir (Companion of the Star of India), a wealthy Parsee gentleman of Bombay, as a token of gratitude to the people of England for the protection enjoyed by him and his Parsee fellow-countrymen under the British rule in India. Inaugurated by H.R.H. Princess Mary, Duchess of Teck, 1869.'

In 1901, when Queen Victoria died, there was very genuine grief throughout the land, and many, in expressing their sorrow, described themselves as full of anxiety lest, with the passing of the great Queen, their times of happiness and prosperity should also pass away. These forebodings were soon to be justified, for within a very short time symptoms of trouble manifested themselves. With Lord Minto's Viceroyalty, anarchical conspiracy

developed in Bengal, and thenceforward political strife, with occasional lulls, has exercised an increasing interference with the day-to-day administration of the country. This fourth act in the drama is now drawing to a close, and act 5 will open when the new Constitution, whatever it may be, comes into operation. The four acts have covered a total period of 325 years, thus :

The first Charter of the East India

Company down to the Battle of

Plassey 150 years, or six generations.

Plassey to the Mutiny 100 years, or four generations.

Viceroy to Lord Curzon 50 years, or two generations.

Lord Minto's Viceroyalty to the
present day 25 years, or one generation.

It took altogether 300 years to build up the great Indian Empire to the point which it had reached when Lord Curzon laid down his office. During these three acts of the drama the country was governed by administrators, military and civil, who dealt with facts as they occurred, who knew the country well and the character of the people, who were not above taking the advice of eminent Indians, but who also knew whose advice to take. They were stern with the oppressor and kindly towards the poor. Lord Curzon himself was the greatest of Viceroy, with wide administrative vision, who had prepared himself for his great task by study and travel, but from the time of his departure British politicians began to take over the reins of government, and political theories began to gain the mastery over facts. Politicians who know and understand facts are necessary agents in modern systems of government, but when they are ignorant of the facts, and apply their political precepts to a country where these have no genuine currency and are completely exotic, they become dangerous doctrinaires playing with fire. The tyranny of phrases has taken the place of the benevolent despotism of Lord Curzon and his predecessors. This tyranny has proved disastrous to India's welfare, and may end in dispelling for ever that Pax Britannica under which she was so long happy and prosperous.

The fourth act began innocently with the introduction of the Morley-Minto Reforms. Lord Morley was a Radical statesman, but he knew better than to advocate parliamentary forms of government for India, ' even though his life were to be extended to twenty times its probable duration.' He did not want to supply the Deccan with fur coats suitable to Canada. His Reforms were designed to give, and gave, constitutional opportunity for the small intellectual element in the country to make its voice heard, and to influence the policy of the Government.

But the control by that section of all the millions of India was not part of his plan. Representation on the new Councils was secured, not by pure territorial electorates, but by classes and interests—the only way in which minorities can secure a fair hearing. The Government of India was not 'responsible' in the technical sense to the Imperial Legislative Council, but it heard all sides, and even a solitary spokesman of a particular interest could not be swept aside by a majority vote. On the contrary, his representation could, and often did, receive satisfaction at the hands of the Executive Government. The Morley-Minto Reforms were working perfectly well, and the late Mr. Gokhale, shortly before his death, asked, as the next step forward, only that the elected element of the Legislature should be increased so as to give a bare majority over the rest, a composition of the Council which already existed in Bengal.

When the Great War broke out the burst of loyalty which followed was the greatest possible proof of the satisfaction of the Princes and people, and of their belief in the stability of the British Raj. As the martial races continued to supply more and more men, and the moneyed classes contributed liberally to all the war charities, the kindly British nation was anxious to show its gratitude in some concrete shape. But how was this to be done? Lord Hardinge recorded his views before he left in 1916, but he did not suggest any of the political follies that followed. Lord Chelmsford's Government discussed this question for some months, and communicated their conclusions in a Dispatch of November 1916. They were entirely opposed to any form of parliamentary government. This Dispatch was never answered and never published. In other words, it was suppressed. Mr. Montagu, when, after a few weeks' incumbency of his office, he made his famous announcement in 1917 and stated that he had the full agreement of the Government of India in its terms, was not going to disclose to Parliament the fact that the Government of India had swallowed its own convictions of a few months before. Nor was he going to explain that most of the local Governments had not been consulted, while those who had, had been expected to make up their minds in a few hours on a momentous declaration. Mr. Montagu's Indian diary makes plain that on his subsequent tour of the country with Lord Chelmsford he was prepared to ride rough-shod over all those who disagreed with him. He certainly hypnotised the Government of India into expressing an agreement with his remarkable scheme of government. The passage of the Government of India Act of 1919 through Parliament was effected with great political adroitness. In front of it the atmosphere was created of the urgent necessity of rewarding India for her great services, and in the

background lurked the unexpressed idea that these Reforms were necessary to avert a revolution. As for the reward, it was a reward to the men who had hindered and not to the men who had helped. As to the idea of rebellion, it was a myth, for the savage outbreak in the Punjab had been fostered on false issues and had already been suppressed, and the effect of the Reforms, coupled with foolish amnesties to non-repentant rebels, merely encouraged plotters to pursue their policy of harassing the Government at every step.

Mr. Montagu is commonly believed to have been grievously disappointed at the result of his great Reforms, and only a short time ago I had a letter from an Indian correspondent to the following effect. After referring to the 'colossal blunder' of the Reforms, 'which Mr. Montagu in his enthusiasm introduced,' he adds: 'Though in his last letter to me a few months before his death he frankly acknowledged that had he foreseen the extremes of the Congress, Gandhi and company, he would never have gone to the limits he did.' These regrets were, alas, too late. All that the British Government got from their opponents in India, whom it was hoped to placate, was not gratitude but a long period of non-co-operation which struck a disastrous blow at British prestige and was not terminated until Lord Reading at long last decided to prosecute Gandhi. But why had there been three years' hesitation, during which time Gandhi had daily disseminated gross sedition, and his pseudo-pacific utterances had been accompanied by intimidation, and invariably followed by riot and bloodshed? With the collapse of this first Non-co-operation movement, India, under Lord Reading's guidance, enjoyed better times. An Act was passed in Bengal to deal with a recrudescence of anarchical crime in that province. With the good harvests and the able management of her finances by Sir Basil Blackett the country resumed its progress, and Lord Reading was successful in keeping at bay the wrecking tactics of the Swarajists. During this interval of political quiet the disturbing feature was the intensification of strife between Hindus and Moslems, who no longer confined themselves to stone-throwing and *lathi* blows by contending mobs, as had wont to be the case, but engaged in savage pogroms and cold-blooded murders in back lanes—an ugly feature which has continued up to the present day, and surely should convince all impartial persons of the danger of entrusting law and order to the control of partisans in this strife. Lord Irwin succeeded Lord Reading in 1926, and few could have then foretold that in four short years British prestige would have sunk almost to zero, and that in 1932 we should be in the position that Britain now finds herself in her relations with India.

A book has just been published by Professor Coatman¹ which just covers the period with which I am now dealing. The author is a fervent admirer of Lord Irwin. For this I do not quarrel with him. But he is also an ardent admirer of Lord Irwin's policy, and in regard to this I must beg to differ, holding that his policy must be judged, not by his merits as a man, but by its merits as a policy. I shall have occasion to quote here and there in this article Professor Coatman's book, and comment upon some admissions and omissions which I find there, that bear greatly on the merits of his presentation of the case.

I have already said that this fourth act of the Indian drama has been characterised by phrases dear to politicians in both countries, who have entirely failed to take cognisance of real facts. Such, for example, was Mr. Montagu's 'new angle of vision.' The use of this phrase begs the question that the new angle is better than the old one, whereas the former view provided a true perspective, and the new aspect is through a distorted lens which magnifies many times the importance of the noisy Indian politician and minimises almost out of sight the interests of some 97 per cent. of the vast population of India. Then there is that beautiful phrase 'self-determination'—Mr. George Lansbury's guiding star whenever he speaks on the subject of India. President Wilson, as a British Cabinet Minister once wrote to me, 'by the use of that phrase is likely to cause more bloodshed than Nero.' No one quite knows what it means, but, so far as history can tell us, national self-determination is either the outcome of one war or the cause of another. If Mr. Lansbury's 'self-determination' were to be applied to India by means of a majority vote, this would result in civil war between Hindus and Moslems, and I hardly think that this kind of 'self-determination' would commend itself to Mr. Lansbury. Yet there does not seem any alternative, unless the British Government holds the ring in India, in which case there would be an invasion of self-determination. While both were being governed impartially, friction between them was in abeyance. The mere talk of 'self-government' has revived old strifes and started new ones.

We are also told by Lord Lothian that 'the only cure for irresponsibility is responsibility,' but in this phrase 'irresponsibility' is used in its ethical sense and 'responsibility' in its technical sense—namely, to describe one particular form of government which has proved successful in only a few countries in the world. The phrase is in any case only a half-truth, but there is one case in which it is entirely untrue—namely, when a Legislature is elected by ignorant and irresponsible persons. I find confirmation of this view in the Report of Lord Lothian's

¹ *The Years of Destiny—India, 1926-1932.*

Committee, par. 14: 'On the implications of responsible government.' After pointing out the necessity for the Executive being responsible to the Legislature, and for an electoral system likely to produce Legislatures capable of supplying stable and competent Ministries and oppositions of equal competence, the Report goes on to say:

It is no less important that the electorate itself should be reasonably able to discharge the ultimate function of deciding the issues submitted to its judgment at a dissolution. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, the structure of Government itself may be endangered, and, if Government goes, Self-Government and social and economic progress on democratic lines go with it.

In the next paragraph the Report goes on:

In the second place Responsible Government implies that the main driving force behind Legislation is public opinion making itself effective through the electorates and the members returned to the Legislature by the electorates.

With these admirable propositions there need be no disagreement; but the amazing thing is that the Committee, having laid them down, proceed to put forward proposals for extending the franchise to 43 per cent. of the adult male population and 10 per cent. of the adult women, in a country in which over 90 per cent. of the people are illiterate, and in which the entire population is riddled with superstition. The expense of an election will be prohibitive in the reduced financial state of the country, while, in order to keep order at the polling stations, the entire police force will be removed from their duties. We know from all experience that corruption and graft are rife throughout India, and that personation and intimidation are common features on a polling day. Does the Committee think that this hotch-potch of humanity will produce an electorate which, to use their own test, 'should be reasonably able to discharge the ultimate function of deciding the issues submitted to its judgment at a dissolution'?

Surely the way in which the malignant Congress campaign was carried out, and the manner in which the masses were deceived, while intelligent and even wealthy persons suffered tamely under it, are sufficient to prove conclusively that all the conditions essential to a democracy free from corrupt practices of every description are totally absent. The Committee's terms of reference required them to devise widely extended franchise. They have carried them out with conspicuous industry and ingenuity—on paper. If Mr. Montagu's announcement was regarded as the Magna Carta of India, then we are now trying to compress into a period of some fifteen years in India political

development which it took us in England over 600 years to accomplish. That, in fact, is the situation in which the British Parliament to-day finds itself. The Morley-Minto Reforms were wantonly pulled up and thrown away after seven years' experience. The Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution is following them on to the rubbish heap, after another seven years, counting up to the advent of the Statutory Commission. We are busily engaged, not in merely pouring new wine into old bottles, but in forcing it into these bottles under a pressure of several atmospheres.

What has caused all this rush and tumult in the drama? Simply that Lord Irwin, in hot pursuit of a great ideal, forgot facts for theories, and ended, like Frankenstein, by creating his own monster. In his first year of office he emulated Lord Curzon's zeal in trying to learn all he could about the country, and devoted himself to assuaging, if he could, the terrible combats between Hindus and Moslems; but the event that set him off on his political adventure was the boycott of the Simon Commission. From that time onwards, as his admirer, Professor Coatman, shows, the political ideal absorbed his whole mind, to the virtual exclusion of all other considerations. His whole being became absorbed by the hope that it might be given to him so to reconcile the hostile elements represented by the Congress that he might thereby bring about an amicable scheme of self-government in India, under which that great sub-continent, in spite of all its internal turmoils, might settle down to becoming a contented partner in the British Commonwealth of Nations. It was a noble ambition, but the pursuit of it could only be justified by complete success. Those acquainted more closely with the working of the Oriental mind than was possible to a Viceroy after a single year of office felt that it could not succeed, and that if it failed the failure was bound to have disastrous consequences, while even if it nominally succeeded, that success must be wholly evanescent. For no democracy that we could set up in India in form could ever work in fact, any more than a single all-European democracy could come within practical politics in any measureable distance of time.

The decision to constitute the Statutory Commission in the way in which it was constituted was most unfortunate. It was logical and legal, but it took no account of Indian sentiment, and it was to prove the prime cause of both logic and law being thrown to the winds. Indian extremists, including also the Liberals, were already determined to supersede it if they could by a Round Table Conference, and they eagerly seized upon 'an affront to India' as a pretext for starting an acute agitation in the attempt to conciliate which most of the advantages of a detached and impartial inquiry were sacrificed. The appointment of independent parallel committees, central and provincial,

made it almost impossible for evidence to be tendered affecting the conduct of business by Ministers and legislative bodies under the Montagu Reforms, and, again to conciliate this implacable opposition, Lord Irwin, with the eager concurrence of the Labour Government, plunged into the famous announcement that Dominion Status was implicit in the term 'Responsible Government.'

Simultaneously he announced the decision to hold a Round Table Conference in London. A suggestion to hold conferences between British and Indian delegates and the Princes and Chiefs to discuss the future relations between the Princes and British India was made by Sir John Simon because the Commission's terms of reference did not include the Indian States, but the proposal was enlarged in the Prime Minister's letter to include all the questions at issue in a Round Table Conference such as Indian politicians had been demanding as a condition of relaxing boycott. The Dominion Status announcement, however, was made without the approval of the Statutory Commission, and, it was rumoured, almost led to their resignation. The announcement completely took the wind out of their sails, for it simply prejudged the issue which Parliament had appointed them to investigate. Even Professor Coatman recognises this, for he says²:

It is obvious that unless the Report accepted Dominion Status as the goal of India's political progress, and proposed definite steps to take her some distance on the way, and moreover unless it made proposals for a Constitution for India which should develop automatically into Dominion Status, without the need for further Commissions or enquiry or concessions by the British Parliament, it could have no chance of acceptance by the majority of Indian politicians, or a very large part of Indian public opinion.

He emphasises that this was not Lord Irwin's intention. If even his admirer admits that Lord Irwin failed to see the obvious, it is a little unfair for Professor Coatman to speak sarcastically about British critics at this end. The announcement was in fact of the nature of a *double entendre*; to English questions in England it was to mean nothing more than a restatement of the Montagu formula. To the Congress and Liberal agitators it was a sign that the Government were prepared to go to the furthest limits in order to placate them, and it gave them the strongest possible incentive to press home their advantage. All that happened was that efforts to patch up some agreement between all shades of politicians in India were inconclusive, and within two months the Congress at Lahore had declared war in the thin disguise of boycott, civil disobedience, and non-violent non-co-operation throughout India.

To such lengths was this futile attempt to win rebellious

² *Op. cit.*, p. 291.

enemies carried that the Bengal Criminal Law for dealing with anarchists, introduced in 1925, was allowed to lapse in 1930, although the police placed information before the Government which showed that it was ten times more needed than in 1924, and this, moreover, when the Congress was just entering upon its violent campaign. Mr. Wedgwood Benn described himself as 'having joyfully repealed' that Act. By this joyful repeal he recklessly exposed a number of his officers to almost certain death, and man after man has been murdered. For Bengal terrorism received a respite and encouragement before the lapsed Act could be re-enacted to which we owe the terrible state of Chittagong and Bengal to-day. All he can do now is to plead ignorance, but ignorance that no statesman could dare to plead. Professor Coatman has omitted to mention this occurrence among the panegyrics which he extends to Mr. Wedgwood Benn, and, similarly finding no excuse for the disgraceful events on the Peshawar side, he throws the whole blame for them on the weakness of local officers. Can one wonder at this hesitation on the part of lesser men, when the higher authorities temporised even with anarchical crime in the vain pursuit of inducing the Congress to come to the Round Table Conference?

Similarly, Professor Coatman seeks to excuse the failure to arrest Mr. Gandhi before he had started on his famous Civil Disobedience march. He writes that to arrest Mr. Gandhi 'before he had committed any offence would have caused an uproar in India.' This plea evades the whole issue. Mr. Gandhi had been committing for many months with complete impunity the same offences for which in 1922 he had been sentenced to six years' imprisonment. The illegal making of salt was in itself a petty fiscal offence, but it was to be the fiery cross which was to unloose the devil of intimidation and resistance to the law. When he was arrested he was not prosecuted and sent to the imprisonment which he deserved. Instead of this, he was made a State prisoner, a sort of compulsory guest of honour of the Government, a proceeding which demonstrated to the people that Mr. Gandhi was someone above the law.

Lord Willingdon, who succeeded Lord Irwin in 1931, found himself much embarrassed by all that had gone before, as well as by the woeful condition of the finances, which having received a grievous blow from the previous campaign of boycott were further shattered by the world economic slump. Once he was clear of the Irwin-Gandhi pact he was able to deal firmly with the guilty, and great progress has been made in the restoration of law and order. Bengal anarchy alone remains defiant, requiring yet stronger measures before it can be suppressed.

In the meantime, after the infructuous visit of Gandhi, to

secure which all this sacrifice of life and property had been made, rough plans of a new Constitution for India, the outcome of the two Round Table Conferences, have gone forward some stages: the parliamentary White Paper has been adopted in principle by Parliament; the Reports of the three fact-finding Committees have been published; the Prime Minister has announced his Communal Award. The Gandhi fast, a cunning and illegal device, has already broken into the distribution of seats of that Award, and the depressed classes have been craftily led into a surrender of their separate electorates; while a third, if smaller, Round Table Conference is at hand, and we are fast approaching the last scene of act 4 of the great Indian drama. The Prime Minister's questions at the outset of the first Round Table Conference, propounding the crucial test of any scheme that might be discussed—'How will it work?'; 'How will it evolve?'—still remain unanswered.

Professor Coatman has written in his book: 'As a man, Mr. Gandhi is justly revered by millions. As a politician, he is a sham and a dangerous sham.' Is it impertinent to ask why all these sacrifices were made, and India plunged into disorder for the sake of bringing a dangerous sham to London? Professor Coatman was asked at a meeting in my own hearing a short time ago: 'What control have the intelligentsia over the masses?' His reply was prompt and effective: 'They can inflame them,' he said; 'they cannot control them.'

I have referred just above to the 'Gandhi fast.' The implications of this fast and its consequences are not easily understood by those unacquainted with Indian conditions. To frighten somebody into agreement by threatening him with a penalty, if he does not agree, that you will starve yourself to death at his door (with dire consequences to him in this world and the next) is a blackmailing device in India which the Indian Penal Code makes a special offence.*

The whole scheme was well thought out beforehand. The Brahmins were most anxious to keep the Depressed Classes within the Hindu fold, and they dreaded the effects of special electorates for these classes in which electors and elected were solely composed of those low castes. Since the Franchise Committee published their Report recommending seventy-one seats for these special electorates, the Hindu Mahsabha, through one of their brighter lights, Dr. Munje, had been busy in securing the defection of a section of the Depressed Classes, through Mr. Raja, a leading member of those classes, towards the acceptance of

* Indian Penal Code, section 508, included in chapter xxii. dealing with criminal intimidation and kindred offences—the offence of inducing one to believe that he will, by some act of the offender, become an object of Divine displeasure.

reserved seats in place of special electorates, but they had not succeeded in winning over to that view Dr. Ambedkar, the best educated man among these low castes, who had represented them upon the Round Table Conference. To secure his adhesion to the reserved seats system, Gandhi's fast, and the succeeding negotiations, was the master-stroke. Incidentally, it was well calculated to bring Gandhi himself back into the limelight. Under the guise of benefiting the Depressed Classes the Hindus put this superstitious pressure upon Dr. Ambedkar to induce him to give up the special electorates which the Prime Minister's Award had allotted to the Depressed Classes, and to accept in exchange more than double the number of reserved seats in which the candidates should be chosen by the Depressed Classes, but were to be elected by the General Electorate, of whom the majority would be Hindus of higher castes. Dr. Ambedkar, as reported, described the Gandhi threat as a 'political stunt,' and when first tempted with additional reserved seats declared that 'he wanted quality, not quantity'; but when the fast began, and Gandhi's condition was reported to be serious, he gave in. He was prepared to agree to a panel of two candidates for each seat, from whom the General Electorate would elect one, but the Brahmins, with apparent generosity, conceded a panel of four candidates, out of whom the General Electorate would elect one to the legislative body. The Hindus knew full well that they were thus doubling their chances of securing a candidate from the Depressed Classes, who would be a subservient tool to the Hindu majority which had elected him. For, after all, a man who is elected by a certain electorate is responsible to those who elected him, and not to those who merely nominated him.

How can an agreement obtained in such circumstances of superstition, pressure, and precipitancy be regarded as a sound one? If Dr. Ambedkar had held out for his special electorates, and Mr. Gandhi had died, the sin of causing the death of so holy a man would have consigned Dr. Ambedkar and the Depressed Classes to become the objects of such grave Divine displeasure that they would be execrated by all caste Hindus, and would, in the next reincarnation, be reborn in the most degrading form of life, which is usually described as that of an insect in hell. This illegal pressure reacted even upon His Majesty's Government, in so far as they were compelled to accept the agreement varying the Prime Minister's Award without any breathing time in which to ascertain the effect of the agreement, or even whether it represented genuine Hindu opinion. The negotiators, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Pandit Malaviya, and Mr. Jayakar—namely, two men from Allahabad and one man from Poona—had no credentials authorising them to commit some 160,000,000 caste Hindus to an agree-

ment of this kind. As a matter of fact, orthodox Hindus have already condemned the arrangement as repugnant to genuine Hindu opinion. The extra seventy-seven seats will have to come out of the general or territorial electorates; in other words, seventy-seven territorial areas in which caste Hindus will be in a majority will be relegated to the position of being compelled to be represented by members of the lowest castes. Furthermore, the electoral schemes for all the provinces have been manipulated by the action of three or four self-appointed negotiators. The Prime Minister had stated that he would modify his Award only if all parties concerned came to an agreement. Did he ever contemplate that the agreement which he would be called upon to accept would be one enforced by the commission of a criminal offence? Mr. Gandhi had been offered temporary release from prison during his fast, but this would have, in Hindu eyes, helped to spoil the effect of the 'sitting *dharna*,' which his continuance in the prison so well completed. He was, therefore, sitting on the doorstep of Government so as to render his hosts probable victims of Divine displeasure if he fasted unto death. He is now reported to be threatening a repetition of this offence under section 508 of the Penal Code, in order to secure a spectacular admission of Untouchables to temples of special sanctity. But this spectacular demonstration will be of no benefit to the Untouchables, because it will have no effect on ameliorating their social position, but will rather arouse the special hatred of higher castes against the unfortunate Untouchables.

Lord Irwin's policy completely overlooked the important part Moslems must play in the future of India. All his efforts were spent in conciliating Hindu agitators. Mr. Wedgwood Benn was invariably polite to all his interviewers, but he never seemed to recognise that in the eyes of India he was fawning upon the King's enemies and frowning upon the much greater number of His Majesty's loyal subjects. Obedience to the law in India is on a very delicate balance. The slightest inclination of one scale upsets it. Once it is upset, it is extraordinarily difficult to restore equilibrium. No one who is not blind to the course of events should have failed to notice that the one thing that matters most in India is *izzat*, or personal honour. In an Oriental country (and men do not cease to be Orientals because they are adepts at languages and law), to suffer insults to your person, your sacred emblems, or your women-folk brings upon you the contempt even of the very humblest in the land. '*Nemo me impune lacessit*' must be the motto of a raj in the East, or it will not endure for long.

We have now been manoeuvred into a position in which we are made to appear as being pledged to present India with a

democratic Constitution and a federal structure in which provinces governed by responsible government in name and States governed autocratically are to be the federating units, under a Federal Government responsible to a Federal Legislature, in which these units will be represented. To prevent reckless legislation, financial insolvency, and tyranny over minorities there are to be provisions called 'safeguards,' which are to be put into use by the Governor-General and Governors of provinces, and there is reservation 'during a period of transition' of the Army, certain high financial matters, and foreign relations. The Princes refuse to recognise any authority over them of British India, and British India will never recognise any authority of the Princes over itself, for the natural right of the Princes is confined to their own particular States. When this period of transition is over, apparently even the reservation of the Army will come to an end, and no one knows when the period of transition will end, or who will pronounce that it has ended. There has never been such a federation in the world, nor have such a heterogeneous collection of peoples, nations, and languages ever tried to govern themselves as a democratic whole. Europe and South America on a large scale, and Ireland on a small one, have provided object-lessons which point to the failure of any such scheme for India, and yet we proceed, in order to gratify Indian politicians who call themselves Liberal and have occupied the seat which the extremists occupied only three years ago. It was one of the 'Liberals,' a Privy Councillor, who a short time ago said in public that Indians valued Dominion Status because it would give them the right to secede from the Empire! The idealists will tell us that you cannot put the clock back. That is just what they are about to do, under a plea of putting it forward. All progress depends on Indian security, which is gravely endangered if law and order are now handed over to Ministers who will have to bow the knee to communal pressure and the ravings of an irresponsible Press. Does anybody contend that the clock of China has gone forward since the so-called republic took the place of the Chinese Empire?

Those who criticise the present scheme and the policy which led up to it are held up to ridicule and dubbed 'diehards,' and they are charged with having no policy except 'Back to Curzon.' It is a very easy method of putting aside people with long experience of India, and of the inner administration of affairs in that country. But none of them has ever said 'Back to Curzon,' and those who make this charge have armed themselves with the panoply of political theories to meet the dangerous realities of the situation, which they are too ignorant to gauge, or too proud to admit. These so-called 'diehards' are not opposed to political progress, provided that it is adjusted from time to time to the

capacity of the people concerned. They are opposed to squeezing into fifteen years exotic developments which it took our own people over 600 years to attain by their own evolution.

The policy followed during the disastrous period from 1929-31 took no account whatever of the interests of 97 per cent. of the population of India. The people who believe that the voice of a section of the English-speaking intelligentsia is the voice of the whole population of India will tell you if you try to put a check on so-called political progress that you are merely advocating a policy of machine-guns. This is an absurd exaggeration, for as long as the Congress was kept in check by the ordinary criminal law, including the law against sedition, there would have been no occasion for the use of machine-guns or for any other weapons than those which have occasionally to be employed from time to time against riotous mobs. A large section of the urban population that has figured in mob turbulence consists of members of the criminal classes who have pursued their predatory avocations under the shelter of the Congress flag. The Indian respects and obeys power, and when he sees a raj retreating before an organisation like the Congress he merely jumps to the conclusion that the raj has lost its power and that the only thing to do is to follow the power which has supplanted it. If the British Government starts with the assumption that the Congress section is irresistible, it is the surest way to make it increasingly difficult to resist them. When people talk of the Congress being the only organised political body in India it is, surely, proof that India is not yet fit for self-governing institutions. For if the strongest political body in India depends for its existence upon foul calumnies, blackmail, intimidation and violence, it must have a very bad case. When the law is not enforced, victory is to the most unscrupulous.

Let us go back to the Statutory Commission and examine their proposals without prejudice but with knowledge. That Commission's proposals for giving over law and order, and for abolishing Executive Councils, were made before the story of the last two years could be told. When the Labour Government threw over the Statutory Commission, composed of members of all parties in the State, it made a most disastrous error. If this step is not taken, and the whole position once more thoroughly examined, we shall be entering on the process so well described by Mr. Lloyd George as 'jerry-building for a crash.' The fourth act will close with the jerry-building and act 5 will be the crash.

REGINALD CRADDOCK.

NEW ZEALAND AND THE WORLD CRISIS

A LESSON IN SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

TWENTY-FIVE years ago New Zealand was regarded as a land of political experiment; its legislative innovations were watched by social reformers in all parts of the world. There came the inevitable time when the pace of progress slackened, but the policy was maintained, and even extended in a modest way, until a long course of rising prices ended. Then an erstwhile thriving community, facing a loss in national income due to a fall of 43 per cent. in export values during the period 1928-32, began to take stock of a difficult situation, and for the first time seriously to count the cost of its attractive legislative experiments. How much of its social welfare activities under State direction will weather the storm? The varied phases of New Zealand's State experiments are worth examination, now that they have reached the real time of test. We will see, as the survey progresses, how much is likely to survive.

An extensive programme of experimental legislation was planned and completed by the Liberals under the strong domination of R. J. Seddon from 1890 onwards. When that forceful personality was succeeded in 1906 by his chief colleague, the late Sir Joseph Ward, the spring of innovation was running dry, and further developments were not of basic importance. Throughout the Seddonian *régime* the Conservatives, figuring under various party names, constituted the parliamentary Opposition. Under the leadership of the late Mr. Massey their advocacy of the freehold for the large State tenantry created by the compulsory acquisition of land for settlements, and aided by cheap State loans, ultimately led to success, and the Reform Party, with Mr. Massey as Prime Minister, came into power in 1912. In his time as leader of the Opposition Mr. Massey had denounced 'the Seven Devils of Socialism' which he saw in the Liberal programme of 'the humanities,' but the new power in politics during a *régime* of sixteen years made no serious alteration in the Seddonian legislation. It granted the promised right of freehold to State tenants, and toned off some highly competitive aspects

of State trading departments, which were now required to pay income tax and present commercial balance-sheets. The Liberal programme was perfectly safe under Reform administration. The old hostility had been replaced by such complete tolerance that for a long period Liberals and Reformers in their election programmes competed in suggesting fresh attractions. The Reform Government increased old age pensions in line with the rising cost of living, and in 1926 made its own distinctive contributions to 'the humanities.' It passed the Family Allowance Act, under which an allowance of 2s. weekly is paid for each child in excess of two where the joint family income does not exceed £3 12s. per week; and it provided pensions for the blind. A scheme for payment of pensions to destitute invalids was under discussion, but the Reform Party's opportunity of extending the list of social welfare statutes came to an end with the defeat of the Coates Government in 1928.

'The humanities' had survived all political threats, and the testing time was not reached until the tide of prosperity began to recede and national income proved inadequate to carry the load of social welfare legislation. Politics had by this time taken an unexpected alignment. The Forbes Government, succeeding to power on the retirement of Sir Joseph Ward in 1930, held office precariously on the support of Labour, then the third, or middle, party. The serious condition of public finance, due to long-sustained economic depression, made retrenchment inevitable. No single party could face the hard tasks and survive. In this crisis the Reform Party, under Mr. Coates' leadership, joined their old opponents in a coalition, which made a successful appeal to the electorate in December 1931, though its programme was not phrased for popular appeal. The Forbes-Coates Cabinet undertook to retrench and to balance the national Budget. How this was to be done was not disclosed in detail, though higher taxation was admitted to be inevitable, as well as heavy reductions in salaries and in loan expenditure. New Zealanders faced the situation, and returned the Government with its unattractive programme by an overwhelming majority. The critical overhaul of progressive legislation of past decades in the light of present costs and income was thus made the joint concern of the ancient friends and foes of 'the humanities.' It has been tackled in the most thorough-going fashion, with the aid of the best brains in the community, regardless of political associations.

For three years New Zealand has been actively coping with the problem of high costs in face of constantly declining revenue. The first step was the institution of a Cabinet Economy Committee, in association with the heads of the Public Service and Treasury, to prune drastically departmental Estimates. Sub-

stantial savings were made, but when parliamentary approval was sought for some of the proposals the weakness of party government in such a situation became more and more evident. Labour support was limited to measures involving more borrowing and the relief of unemployment, but scarcely any further, and New Zealanders saw the strange phenomenon of a Government being deserted by a middle party, then maintained in office by an accession of support from the official Opposition, the Reform Party. This was the first sign of the Forbes-Coates coalition. The hope of early lifting of the depression appeared to justify palliative measures, but at the end of 1931 the coalition Government, facing a graver financial position, instituted a national stock-taking of the most complete and interesting character. First, four professors of political economy and the Secretary of the Treasury were appointed to examine the economic and budgetary position of the Dominion. As all the basic facts were available to the Committee in public documents, there was no delay in hearing witnesses, and the report was made available last February. It discussed in an illuminating way the basis of past prosperity, the contribution which had been made by overseas borrowing, and the causes of the depression in the Dominion. It was pointed out that the national income had been reduced owing to the low values of exported produce, but that at the same time this handicap on the community had been appreciably increased by local and national taxing authorities, who took a less amount, but a still greater proportion, of the national income.

This extra burden [stated the economists] is well illustrated in New Zealand, where in 1928-29, from an estimated national income of £150 millions, the State and local bodies took £24 millions in taxation, or 16 per cent. In 1931-32 the national income is estimated to total £110 millions, and the average taxpayer's income has been reduced in proportion—that is, by 26 per cent. But State and local taxation budgeted for sums amounting roughly to £26 millions, which is nearly 25 per cent. of the national income. The difficulty found in realising such Budget estimates suggests that the limit of taxable capacity is very near.

The tax and debt burdens of the Dominion were set out impressively in the following figures :

TAXATION RATES PER HEAD					
State.			Local.		
£12	12	1	£4	8	7
PUBLIC DEBT PER HEAD					
£182	13	10	£47	16	8

The influence of the European War on State debt is strikingly evident on comparison with the figures for 1914, which showed the indebtedness per head to be £87 10s. 2d.

The next step in national stock-taking was to appoint three able business men of wide experience and political independence, an accountant in public practice, and a former head of the Treasury as a National Expenditure Commission to review the whole of the Dominion's public expenditure. The Commission started work in January of the present year, and issued in February an interim report of great value to the Government in carrying out severe measures of retrenchment during an emergency session of Parliament called for the purpose. The final report has now been made, recommending not only further economies totalling £845,000, but also drastic changes in administrative methods which, if approved, will remove one degree further from the control of Parliament the expenditure of loan money. This Commission had no hesitation in recommending substantial curtailment of the expensive social welfare activities of the State, and the Government adopted in part its proposal to reduce old age and several other forms of pensions, though European War allowances were not touched. The education vote received the Commission's particular attention, for the total had grown from £1,745,939 in 1914 to £3,179,183 in 1931. The cost per head of this service prior to the war was £1 2s. 11d., but to-day it is £2 8s. Education is wholly a national concern, and recapitulation of the leading items in the annual Estimates illustrates the wide range of the Education Department's scope :

	£
Administration	27,610
Elementary education	2,033,653
Secondary education	379,880
Universities	73,851
Manual and technical	219,265
Teachers' training	147,140
Native education	81,990
Physical instruction	7,064
Education of the blind	2,805
School for the deaf	5,499
Schools for feeble-minded	11,456
Child welfare	129,272

New Zealand universities have large land endowments and a substantial revenue from fees, so that they do not rely wholly on the national Exchequer for their maintenance. The National Expenditure Commission expressed its definite opinion that the cost of post-primary education had undoubtedly outgrown the ability of the country to pay. It suggested, in general, a policy of making some of the education services more self-supporting by the charging of fees and by increasing existing fees, while a long list of detailed economies showed the possibility of making

immediate savings of nearly £370,000. The Government has been actively carrying out economy in this branch of national expenditure without curtailing the facilities for free education in the primary stage. School children, for example, had hitherto received free dental treatment from specially trained nurses, who confined their attention to the early teeth. Parents are now being asked to provide the cost of materials used in these clinics.

The Commission's final report severely condemns past extravagant expenditure on public works. Such a verdict had been anticipated by the coalition Government in its decision (nearly a year ago) to curtail loan expenditure by 40 per cent., and subsequently to cut down further this limited programme by one-half. A temptation to 'mortgage the future' is very strong when New Zealanders, holding a country about the size of Britain, carrying a population of only one and a half millions, realise how immense are the advantages of well-planned expenditure on development. They will not, it can be predicted, fully subscribe to the Commission's cautious advice except during hard times. The Commission's recommendation to establish independent boards controlling public works, land settlement, hospitals, and education would involve carrying to its extreme a tendency already expressed in the Dominion's administration. Nearly twenty years ago a substantial proportion of the State service was removed from direct Ministerial control and placed under a Public Service Commissioner. It is an offence against the law for any member of Parliament to use influence in connexion with appointments to the public service.

This tendency to relieve the people's elected representatives of embarrassing privileges has been more pointedly expressed within the last two years by placing the entire administration and control of the State railways in the hands of a board of business men, with a chairman who was formerly General Manager of Railways, but, having retired on pension, is quite free from political direction. The national Exchequer, of course, has to retain financial responsibility, and the taxpayer has for several years carried the burden of railway deficits. However, expenditure has gone down in faster ratio than revenue, and the recent announcement that the deficit on the Dominion's accounts for the past year was less than half that estimated at the beginning of the financial year is largely explained by a lightened load of railway interest to be carried by the consolidated revenue. Parliament still retains the right to direct railway policy on broad lines, for New Zealand has been developed through the medium of railways pushed far ahead of immediately paying traffic; and the time may again come when, in the interest of the country's development, some important railways on which construction has been suspended

may have to be completed. But the Railway Board, if directed by Parliament to carry out any specific policy likely to result in loss, can report its opinion to Parliament, and make it clear that the taxpayer will regularly receive the bill. Another illustration of the tendency to move away from direct Ministerial control is provided in the newest public service—radio broadcasting. It was pioneered by a private company holding a contract from the Government, which collects the high annual fee of 30s. from listeners. On the expiration of the agreement, control was vested in a non-political Radio Broadcasting Board, in the appointment of which the opinions of radio listeners are consulted, though not actually given expression by vote.

Enthusiastic outside observers of the first few years of compulsory arbitration in industrial disputes described New Zealand as a country without strikes. That flattering phrase was soon forgotten, for the Dominion experienced some notable industrial upheavals on a national scale, including the coal-mining, waterside and freezing industries, and the Government railways. The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act came into force just at the right time for success. The Colony in 1894 was emerging from a serious depression, and fortunately experienced a long course of prosperity during which rising world prices and greatly improved methods of transport for the country's food products combined to provide the margin of profit needed to meet the workers' demands. Twenty years ago, however, a pioneer of compulsory arbitration, the late Edward Tregear, Secretary of the Department of Labour, saw difficulties ahead, and declared that the Arbitration Act was running under storm sails. He realised that the pressure on the system was progressively heavy, and that there must come a time when the limit of concessions would be reached. The first great blow to compulsory arbitration was administered by large national trade unions whose militancy was checked in the judicial atmosphere of the Court of Arbitration. They exercised their right of organising outside the Act and conducting negotiations with the employers through the medium of conciliation councils. One has to admit, after long experience of the working of the Arbitration Act in New Zealand, that on the whole the militant trade unions outside the Act have done better than the arbitration unionists. A comparison between wages paid to skilled and unskilled workers was made by the New Zealand Department of Labour a few years ago to demonstrate the relatively small extra reward of the skilled worker who serves an apprenticeship. It was an official admission of the opinion I have expressed, for the most militant unions who ignore the Arbitration Act are to be found among the semi-skilled and unskilled workers.

The economic storm broke with violence over the compulsory arbitration system. From 1929 till 1931 export returns fell continuously, until they were 40 per cent. below former levels. A committee of economists appointed by the Government to examine the position reported that the value of the Dominion's exports in 1931 was £32 millions, compared with £55 millions in 1929. So great a decline in national income demanded a rigid overhaul of costs, and the opening attack on compulsory arbitration was made when Parliament amended the Arbitration Act so that the Court could at any time make general orders varying the minimum wages under awards 'taking into consideration the general economic position of the industry.' This led to a general reduction of 10 per cent. in existing award wages, and thus ended a well-established system of basing wages mainly upon the cost of living. The depression continued, industry showed no signs of revival under the new condition of lowered wages, and the final blow to compulsory arbitration was administered early in 1932, when Parliament eliminated compulsion altogether. It gave power to review existing industrial awards by conciliation councils on the application of either party, and directed that no question could be referred from the councils to the Arbitration Court—the decisions of which are legally enforceable—except by agreement of a majority of the conciliation council so substantial that in practice such a step can only be taken by mutual agreement between employers and employees. New Zealand employers have not rushed to use their new-found privilege of throwing arbitration into the melting-pot. There is a substantial body of opinion in favour of legally enforceable minimum wages and conditions of employment as a protection against unscrupulous employers who are tempted to take contracts at unfair rates, trusting to sweating methods to clear a profit. The new conditions have not operated sufficiently long to demonstrate how the situation will resolve itself, but it is safe to predict that the machinery of conciliation will be generally used, and that the employers, while quite willing to make agreements on such questions as wages and hours of work, will refuse to countenance a large number of restrictive conditions which in their opinion add more to overhead costs than the minimum wages embodied in awards.

Now we turn to the sphere of State activity. The economic stock-taking already described led to the discovery that New Zealand's social welfare activities were absorbing fourpence out of every shilling collected from the taxpayer. An extremely liberal system of free education from primary school to university was one of the heaviest items in the bill, while a variety of pensions added to a loan hard to carry in times when the State railways, instead of being a source of profit, became a burden to the State.

Customs revenue dropped to minor proportions owing to restricted imports, and the other main sources of revenue—namely, land tax and income tax—had shrunk alarmingly. New Zealand's hospitals are maintained by national subsidy, supplemented by local rates. Charges are made for treatment, but the collection of fees is in accordance with means to pay, and scarcely half the amounts owing can be obtained from patients. All State servants holding permanent appointment are entitled to superannuation allowances under a contributory system involving heavy annual subsidies from the general revenue. In addition, many other classes of people receive pensions, the Dominion's annual obligation under this heading amounting to £2,906,000. The chief items are :

	£
European War pensions	1,285,000
Old age pensions	1,250,000
Widows' pensions	340,000
Family allowances	76,000
Disabled miners	65,000
Pensions to the blind	17,500
Maori War pensions	9,102

In the readjustment enforced by failure of national income the New Zealand Parliament reduced all classes of pensions except those paid to the European War veterans. The clause in the statute to reduce old age pensions by 2s. 6d. per week was adopted by the narrow majority of two in the House of Representatives. Salaries of all State employees, Ministers of the Crown, and members of the Legislature have been involved in the severe pruning process which brought the Dominion within sight of a balanced Budget before the recent improvements in the prices of its leading exported products gave promise of heavier overseas buying and consequent revival of Customs revenue.

The State is the largest mortgagee in New Zealand, and the experience of the State Advances Department during this time of stress demonstrated its capacity to withstand the storm while giving adequate shelter to its clients. This State activity is quite typical of the country's institutions, socialistic in principle, but far from conforming in practice to the ideal of the theoretical Socialist. New Zealand's Parliament has never been avowedly socialistic, and its Opposition to-day, hardly a quarter of the total membership, is the Labour-Socialist Party. The many forms of State enterprise have grown out of a realisation that some things required by the whole community can best be provided by the community through organised government. But there has always been a sensitiveness over political interference, and the successful battle-cry of the Reform Government when it obtained

renewal of its majority in the 1925 general elections was : ' More Business in Government, and less Government in Business.'

The State Advances Department is administered by a board of public servants on such conservative lines that the economic depression failed to shake the stability of the institution. Since the inception of the scheme in 1894 loans aggregating £50 millions have been made on landed security, and nearly £22 millions have been repaid. The principal business is that of advances to farmers, and when prices of products fell to less than the cost of production the State Advances Department, in common with all other lenders, had to meet the situation with the knowledge that failure to pay interest was not due to the borrower's incapacity as a farmer. Postponements of interest were arranged, and in cases where the borrower had substantially reduced the principal under the terms of the table mortgage invariably issued by the department, arrears have been capitalised and a new mortgage issued for a long term which substantially reduces the amount of the half-yearly payments. Losses have been made, but principally in the separate branch for workers' dwellings, where falling values have completely absorbed the equity. The losses to March 1931 in this branch were equal to 2s. 9d. per £100 advanced. The basic principle of the State advances scheme was to use the superior credit of the State to borrow at the lowest rate of interest, to lend to the private citizen on terms which meet all costs of the original loan and administration. Lending was possible for many years on a 4 per cent. basis, but, in line with increasing cost of money, the rates for new mortgages have risen to 5½ and 6 per cent. Owing to the large annual repayments under the table mortgages issued by the State Advances Office, the National Economy Commission's suggestion that there should be no more borrowing for relending purposes would not interfere with the continuance of this activity on a fairly large scale if the proposal is approved.

Another great venture into the field of private enterprise was State insurance, covering life, fire, and accident. These State insurance departments pay income tax, and their rates are not so low as to be destructive of the companies' business. Private insurance concerns flourish in the Dominion; one important English life insurance office has just decided to enter the field, and the State insurance offices are now in the position of regulators of the rates, their premiums being exactly in line with those of private offices. A bonus by way of rebate on renewal is paid annually by the State Fire and Accident Insurance Department, and similar rebates are made by its competitors. These vary according to the results of the previous year's business.

The State has a heavy investment in the Bank of New Zealand, and the Government nominates a majority of the

board of directors, but there has been no suggestion of political interference with the bank's policy, which is thoroughly in line with that of the associated banks. Control over overseas credits was imposed during the last producing season, on the advice of a majority of the trading banks, for the purpose of making sure that all outside debts could be honoured before credit became available for imports. When the trading balance showed that this restriction was unnecessary it was withdrawn, and further improvement on balance now points to an extension of overseas purchases which should contribute to the prosperity of British industries.

New Zealand is emerging from a trying time well equipped to take advantage of the improvement in world prices. Land value inflation, the most difficult factor in the readjustment to low prices, has been fairly and squarely faced, production has steadily increased right through the time of stress, and scientific farming methods have been so thoroughly practised that it is not an exaggeration to say that in the application of science to his industry the New Zealand farmer is in the forefront of the world's producers. The Dominion will carry forward into prosperous times no legacy of debt due to the problem of unemployment, because this has been financed wholly out of revenue. Useful work on road improvement, land drainage and subdivision, afforestation, and sand-dune planting was organised and paid for, first out of the receipts from a small wage tax subsidised on a pound for pound basis from general taxation, and to-day wholly out of the revenue raised from a wage tax of 1s. in the pound, collected when the wages are paid.

CHARLES E. WHEELER.

PIGS AND PLANNING

WILL the Report of the Pig Industry Commission prove to be a historical document? It is not impossible that it may. For it is more than an attempt to organise a big agricultural industry. Its main features embody a series of principles strikingly different from anything that our grandfathers understood as the capitalist system; indeed, many open-minded people to-day are a little nervous about its suggestions lest they border too closely upon socialism. But can one really regard as socialistic a scheme in which all the interests concerned remain in private hands, in which the State neither confiscates nor buys out anyone's property, in which the skilful breeder, the clever feeder, the good organiser, and the efficient curer all find scope to profit or lose according to their efficiency? But of this, more later.

It will be helpful, before going further, to consider the problem presented to the Commissioners. The chief countries supplying us with bacon were highly organised. Forced by the facts of geography to export to us through a bottle-neck, they utilised this limitation to control, by various means, the quality of the goods they sent us. Down at the London docks side after side of Danish bacon may be seen being unloaded, each as alike as two peas. It is good, it comes regularly; above all things, it is reliable and creates no disgruntled consumers for harassed grocers to appease. To all intents and purposes this bacon is a nationalised export, not in the Socialist sense, but in the sense that organisation in the chief exporting countries has become so closely knit that the whole exported product can come under some unity of control. Some countries, such as Poland, give a national subsidy to the bacon sent to us. All the Baltic countries were producing especially for us, and were not themselves consumers of the commodity. Their Governments have encouraged good bacon production by various means. The embargo that we placed six years ago on foreign pork had forced them to concentrate upon our bacon market, and this had the effect of diverting our own pigs from the competition of the open bacon market to the comparative seclusion of the pork market. The Danes pre-eminently had spared no pains to study our needs,

and the highest praise is due to them for the efficient manner in which they designed a product to meet them. It has meant, however, that a large section of their agriculture was dependent upon the English market; we were, in effect, employing the Danes as our pig-keepers, and since the breakdown in Germany a large part of the money we paid them has not, as it did before, found its way back to us through that country.

The condition of the bacon industry at home was (and still is, for that matter) deplorable. In the heyday of our manufacturing supremacy we consciously and willingly sacrificed agriculture to the profitable business of exporting manufactured goods. Foolish as some believe this was, it at least showed that we had the intelligence to realise that goods and services can only be paid for ultimately by goods and services, and we chose to be paid in food because there was less money profit to be made from producing it than from other kinds of goods. Our farmers have never been given any real incentive to become efficient suppliers of the home market, and, in contrast to the bottle-neck of foreign exports to us, they had the disadvantage (paradoxical as it may seem) of a huge market at their doors and a rival dealer round every corner to deflect them from any centralisation of marketing. We had thirteen breeds of pigs, producing progeny of which not 25 per cent. were fit for making into first-class bacon, and we had the rival attraction of the pork market to prevent any sustained concentration on one or the other. Pig recording and litter testing, which our overseas rivals have found so valuable in building up their bacon industries, were non-existent for all practical purposes, and our bacon factories were operating with the most violent fluctuations in supply and seldom at capacity. This added greatly to the cost of marketing our bacon. An unnecessary host of middlemen had become interposed between the producer and the factory, so that the cost of getting a pig from the farm to the factory in England was about 12s. 9d. compared with from 3d. to 11d. in Denmark.

Price fluctuations were violent also, for we were exposed to a constant flow of foreign imports. The only regulation of supplies came when many of the producers at home and abroad had nearly ruined themselves by over-production, with resulting low prices, so that they stopped producing pigs. Prices would then rise again—sometimes gradually, sometimes in alarming jumps. Producers would once more be attracted, only to be forced, within a predictable period, to kill off their breeding sows because once more they were the victims of this absurd cycle. Farmers

¹ Report of Pig Reorganisation Commission (H.M. Stationery Office, price 6d. net: see p. 56). Estimated costs of 1 cwt. of green bacon vary from 9s. 2d. with average kill of 684 per week to 5s. 1d. with average kill of 2500 per week.

spent their time chasing the market, and usually failed to catch it, for success in gambling has never been the strong point of the agriculturist, although every farmer believes himself to be the solitary exception to this rule.

This was the position presented to the Commissioners, and it has been described at some length because very similar situations exist in other industries, not necessarily agricultural, that still await planning. The Government said to the Commissioners in effect: We have now definitely decided that we can no longer ignore our agriculture in the changed world that confronts us. Produce a plan for pigs that will give scope for an efficient and expanding pig industry, and, if possible, use quotas to deal with the imports question. It is the quota element in the plan that has caused many thoughtful people, including most of the economists, to feel the most nervous. They describe the quota, quite rightly, as a dangerous weapon; they foresee it causing serious shortages that will send prices soaring: they say it is the most drastic barrier to trade that has yet been conceived, that it 'rigidifies' inefficiency; and they point out that not only will it raise the cost of our own produce, but of the imported article also. The quota certainly is potentially dangerous: so is any powerful instrument in the hands of a fool. But must we assume that it will be so badly mishandled that it will cause serious shortages of supplies? Buying and selling are now conducted through such centralised channels that it should not be impossible to estimate fairly accurately our requirements, and the Commissioners have wisely stipulated that deliveries under the quota must arrive in evenly regulated quantities, fortnight by fortnight. This fortnightly check should go some way towards alleviating the fear of a sudden gap between supply and demand. We shall not find ourselves glutted with bacon at one moment and with none arriving from anywhere a few months later. Arrangements are to be made for a year in advance. We must face the fact that large-scale buying arrangements (not necessarily synonymous with such devices as Import Boards) have been forced upon us by large-scale selling arrangements, such as the Canadian Wheat Pool, U.S.S.R., or the organised exports from Denmark and Holland. Anyone who believes that there is any longer a serious alternative is a dangerous visionary. Should any foreign country be foolish enough to try to exploit the quota of bacon that we grant it, our obvious remedy would be to take all or part of its quota away and give it to someone else. But the intelligence already shown by those abroad who cater for our bacon market suggests that such an exhibition of stupidity is the last thing we may expect from them. The Dutch, in fact, were making preparations for falling in with an English

bacon quota scheme some months before the Pig Report was published.*

It should be remembered that the British pig quota scheme differs fundamentally from all the Continental schemes tried hitherto. These were little more than embargoes, introduced at times of crisis with the sole object of shutting out imports. The scheme that we propose goes further. It not only guarantees a share in the British market to home producers, but guarantees a share in that market to foreign producers also. It aims at ending the waste of home and foreign competition, in which there is often a surplus that never finds a reasonable market at all. Unconsciously, and almost against our will, the civilised world is slowly rolling forward into a single economic unit, with a single common level of basic prices. The proposed quota is a recognition of this, and it is queer to find intelligent people, with the financial lessons of the world-wide havoc wrought before their eyes by the collapse of Germany, critical of the quota because it may save our customers in other countries from going bankrupt also. It is less surprising that the ultra-Protectionists, who seldom see a hole in a ladder until they have fallen through it, have failed to realise that the quota is a far more efficient bargaining weapon than ever a tariff could be, and not less efficient because it can be used to obtain foreign trade agreements amicably (e.g., the new agreement with the South American meat exporters, who, after the amount of their quota had been tentatively fixed, voluntarily agreed to reduce it) instead of by the roughshod, slapstick method of clumping on a thundering duty, which has hardly made for goodwill towards England in Ireland.

The quota, wisely handled, can be better than a mere restriction of goods. It has possibilities for reopening the doors of international trade through the exchange of goods. It can remove the manufacturer's or the farmer's fear that an influx of foreign goods may be so heavy and uncontrolled that it will depress prices far below production costs, and, by approximating closely to a highly developed system of barter, can go some way towards making up for the breakdown of gold as the lubricant of international trade. It is not impossible that we are advancing towards a system under which goods over and above a nation's internal requirements may be exchanged through an international clearing-house, abolishing those devastating surpluses that now roam round the world, suffocating their recipients with their unbounded plenty, bringing such loss to everyone by this unrestricted policy of scramble and grab. It is these surpluses and the inability of the capitalist system to accommodate them without incurring heavier losses than benefits that have made

* See *The Farmer and Stockbreeder*, September 19, 1932, p. 1975.

Protection as dead as Free Trade. They can jump any tariff wall, and therefore, while tariffs must make unduly dear those things we really need, they are useless in excluding those things which we do not require. Except in times of surplus, it is tariffs, and not quotas, that add to the cost of *all* the supplies of a given commodity. Quotas aim at eliminating, so far as is humanly possible, both shortage and surplus. Tariffs do not pretend to do this. In practice they merely increase the price of all supplies when they are short and do nothing to improve prices when supplies are too abundant.

The Baltic countries that send us our bacon are not themselves consumers of it. The United Kingdom is their only outlet. They must send it here until their industry perishes, whatever the tariff, and they, our customers, must be impoverished by a collapsed price for *all* their bacon, not merely for that proportion of it that is surplus to requirements. The original 20 per cent. tariff on Irish Free State cattle did nothing to improve beef prices in England. They became worse after the tariff was imposed because large reserves of cattle had accumulated in Ireland and this was their only outlet. Since there was no restriction on quantity, but only an attempt to keep it out by interfering with prices, raisers of all Irish store cattle, both of the cattle we needed and of that which we did not need, have been the immediate sufferers. But not far behind in the list of victims come those in England who lived by exporting to Irishmen who were able to buy from them. Tariffs may be less dangerous in the hands of lunatics than quotas; fortunately they are. But they are infinitely more stupid and less effective, and it is noteworthy that the Pig Commissioners went out of their way to record their 'appreciation of the wisdom of the instructions given us' (*i.e.*, to consider how far the quota system, and not tariffs, was applicable to planning a home bacon industry).

So long as this market, with or without tariffs, was open to unlimited quantities of foreign bacon it is natural to suppose that those who now export to us would have fought hard to maintain their hold—fought to prevent a British bacon industry from developing. Some means had to be found to break the vicious circle, to give our bacon producers a breathing space to turn out a suitable article and find a market for it. The incubus of imports had to be lifted to the extent to which we could replace them. It is difficult to see what other device could accomplish this without a desperate battle, with heavy losses on both sides and by no means a certain result.

It is strange, also, to find those who advocate tariffs criticising quotas as perpetuating inefficiency. Tariffs, when they act as they are intended to act and increase the price of imports, are no

less bulwarks against inefficiency than quotas. Already the Import Duties Advisory Committee is threatening the market gardeners with a withdrawal of duties because they have made no serious attempt to organise their industry now that tariffs shelter them. Nor does Free Trade ensure efficiency: witness the unprotected British pig industry to-day. Tariffs or quotas may provide a useful means of threatening those who are protected but will not organise; but other devices are needed for the constructive promotion of efficiency, and, beyond the unanswerable argument that only a fool would shelter an industry that insists upon producing by wasteful methods at an uneconomic price, the whole question of quotas *versus* efficiency is not very relevant. But in addition to those who fear the quota as a barrier to trade, an incitement to inefficiency or as a weapon that might cause famine prices by a miscalculation, there are others who frown upon the general idea of raising prices at all. They are right in so far that a big rise in retail prices would be a disaster. But can they seriously contend that the present low prices at which producers are selling benefit anyone? The crying need of the moment is a general rise in wholesale prices. In the past when such rises have occurred they have usually gone to the opposite extreme, because, by leaving matters to the unrestricted play of supply and demand, prices have only risen because impoverished producers have been driven out of business and a shortage has resulted. If that is the best the capitalist system can ever hope to do, its doom is sealed.

For man has solved the problem of production, that was a continual nightmare to the human race until a few generations ago. From henceforth, so far as our productive powers are concerned, no one need ever be hungry again, no one need even be without what were considered the luxuries of the rich a hundred years ago. We have mastered in this century the task to which mankind has had to devote the greater part of his physical and mental energies since human beings were created. It has taken us by surprise. We were not ready for it. We are perplexed by what we have done and are lost in our new-found freedom, so cannot make full use of it. The change has created the necessity for new principles in distributing this sudden wealth, and we have barely begun to experiment with them. But one thing is certain. The human race will not permanently endure a system that allows millions to starve in the midst of plenty and is so wasteful that it forces us to endure five years of impoverishment by superabundance and another five years of impoverishment by famine prices in return for perhaps five years of normal prices and prosperity. A few people gain by high prices; practically no one gains by disastrously low prices. The

capitalist system has not an indefinitely long period in which to adapt itself to this change. The system has proved so amazingly flexible that the writer believes it can be done, but only if it adopts some method of long-period contracts, planned ahead to insure itself against surplus or shortage and aiming at a price level that is neither disastrously low nor unduly high. If this is indeed the next step that confronts us, then neither Free Trade nor Protection are any longer vital issues.

But, to revert to the immediate question of pigs: while it is true that there is a fairly close relationship between the price movements of baconers and the price of bacon, that movement is not reflected by a very heavy variation in retail prices of bacon, and in some cases retail prices even move in the opposite direction. In 1927, for instance, the average price of seven-score baconers was 100s. 10d. and the average retail price of streaky bacon was 1s. 5d. per lb. But in 1930, when the price of baconers rose to an average of 107s. 4d., the average retail price of streaky bacon fell to 1s. 4d., and was only $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per lb. dearer than in 1924, when the average baconer price dropped as low as 93s. 4d. These figures suggest that there is room for considerable movement in the baconer price without necessarily affecting the retail price to any alarming degree. But in addition to this the economies of a planned pig industry could also allow considerable increases in the price paid to the farmer without affecting the retail price. If, for instance, we could reduce by efficiency our pig marketing costs to the highest figure that it costs the Danes, then 11s. 10d. per pig, or 1s. 8d. per score, could be added to the farmer's price and not cost the consumer one halfpenny. Factories working at full capacity could save up to 3s. 6d. per cwt. on their bacon, equivalent to another 4s. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per pig, or 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per score.³ The biggest variation in baconer prices that has occurred between 1924 and 1930 has been 32s. 6d. per score—namely, 93s. 4d. in 1924 and 125s. 10d. in 1926. Yet in those two years the average retail bacon price only differed by 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per lb.—namely, 1s. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. in 1924 and 1s. 8d. in 1926.

A planned bacon industry could cheapen its production costs by improving our pig breeding so that not only could we produce a higher percentage of good class bacon pigs and save money both for the farmer and the factory, but profit by obtaining higher production per sow. Our present average is eleven or twelve pigs per sow per annum. In the Scandinavian countries it is between fifteen and sixteen. It would eliminate also the wild speculation and erratic buying by small-scale individuals all working in ignorance of one another's moves, all making at times disastrous losses that can only be recouped by extortionate

³ See footnote on p. 701.

profits. It would eliminate the unnecessary dealers, the gratuitous railway journeys, and the superfluous diversions through markets and their auctioneers whereby so many pigs at present make their zigzag course from the farm to the factory, shedding a little of what should be the farmer's profit at each unessential operation. British bacon enjoys a price preference in the shops of about 20 per cent. compared with Danish. The Danish farmer pays about the same for his feeding-stuffs, but more for his rent and rates. He pays his labourers approximately the same in real wages as the Englishman, and those who reply that Denmark is a country of small-holdings should remember that only 3 per cent. of our holdings exceed 300 acres and 80 per cent. of our holdings do not exceed 100 acres. The average size of English holdings is 63 acres; of Danish, 49 acres. The Danish curer has to rail his bacon to the ship, unload, load on board, and unload again at an English port before he is on equal terms of transport with the English curer. It is true that much of this advantage is lost by preferential freights granted to importers, but it is the general experience that the railway companies are quite prepared to make concessions when firmly handled and presented with a proposition that means a regular flow of transport all the year round. Assuming that no one considers he has a right to expect to buy his goods below the general production cost, surely there is room for both the farmer and the curer in England to produce bacon profitably within the scope of the 20 per cent. price preference we already are willing to pay above the retail price of imported bacon. If there is not, and all this scheming only results in British bacon produced at fantastic levels compared with the prices at which it might be bought abroad, then the sooner we go out of the bacon business the better. The plan will have failed. But gone also will be the dreams of those who talk about 'supplying all our own bacon,' but offer no constructive method of achieving this object save the worn-out device of tariffs, that have proved such a conspicuous failure, such a disaster to the whole world.

The second most important section of the Pig Report deals with regulation of home supplies under the Marketing Act. It has been shown at the beginning of this article that the lack of a 'bottle-neck' through which home supplies must pass robs us of what has proved to be an advantage to our competitors abroad. This regulation of home supplies is a necessary complement to the regulation of imported supplies; the one is useless without the other. The instrument we have invented to achieve this organisation at home is the Marketing Act, which some affect to call the 'Socialist' Marketing Act. Actually, as most people know, it is anything but Socialist. It gives more drastic

powers to private enterprise than any other law that has been placed on the Statute-book. It first began to take shape in the hands of a Conservative Government, planned by a Conservative Minister of Agriculture. It was purely incidental that, by the time it was ready for presentation, a Labour Government happened to be in office, and Dr. Addison, who finally piloted it through Parliament, paid a handsome tribute to the support Conservatives gave to it. In the end, many Conservatives were more ardent supporters of it than the Labour Party. Everyone now knows the principles of this Act, how, after somewhat lengthy and complicated procedure, it enables a substantial majority of producers to prevent a lawless minority from sabotaging their work, how it creates the opportunity for self-administered discipline and large-scale planning, and frees the producer from the chaos of competition run mad. Here, again, it has been necessary to face the facts of a new world. While the problems of production were still unsolved, there was much to be said for unrestricted competition. The absence of it in Russia to-day, where shortage is still their difficulty, has imperilled the Five-Year Plan on the agricultural side. But in countries such as ours, where the problem of production has been replaced by the problem of distribution, the chaotic methods by which everyone can throw unwanted produce on the market regardless of the market's demands have become uneconomic and anti-social. It is senseless to talk about 'the liberty of the individual' being infringed. Few desire the 'liberty' of being forced to go bankrupt. It is not the State that imposes these restrictions upon the predatory anarchist who refuses to refrain from wrecking the businesses of a majority of his fellow-producers. The Act merely gives power to a majority to safeguard themselves against this common enemy. In the general interest we restrain the burglar and bandit, and even the financier who goes too far in anti-social activities. It is only logical that we should restrain also the lawless trader who can bring ruin to thousands by his anti-nomianism.⁴ This is not Socialism, nor bureaucracy, nor even a very startling innovation. The State gives the protection against banditry that a majority are entitled to demand, and delegates the work to the particular industry concerned. It is only because the necessity for this particular kind of protection is new in the history of our civilisation that some have so far been unable to adapt their minds to understanding it.

The Commissioners propose a Pig Marketing Board created under the Marketing Act and, if the Act can be amplified to include it, a Bacon Marketing Board. The first would represent

⁴ A 7½ per cent. minority of hop-growers who refused to accept the voluntary organisation of the other 92½ per cent. were sufficient to wreck the hop industry.

the producer's part in the industry and carry out the necessary work of standardisation and improvement of raw material for the factories, eradication of scrub boards, saving of some of the enormous waste suffered from swine diseases, institute pig-recording and litter-testing. The second board would represent the curers, and its work would be to operate a market information service, with details of foreign killings and arrivals of imports, record the prices of rival commodities and the extent to which quotas were being filled, and carry out research into possible export markets, into developments in curing methods, and into the nature of consumers' tastes in different areas. Both these boards would be composed of representatives of producers and curers respectively and be administered by them. That there would be plenty of work for them to do may be seen by referring to p. 11 of the Report, where fifteen of the chief weaknesses of our pig industry, that are mainly weaknesses of organisation, are summarised. Twelve are quoted from the Report of the Pig Industry Council, composed of representatives of the pig industry, and three more are added by the Commissioners. Much of the work of the Bacon Marketing Board might be done by a third body, the Pig Industry Development Board, composed of representatives of the two marketing boards with a nucleus of independent members. This body would consider all matters of common policy and use its influence in promoting the development of an industry in which both parties to it have so many mutual interests. It would also act as negotiator if the producers and curers were unable to agree on contract prices.

Contract prices are another innovation. They would be based upon a formula designed to guarantee the producer at least his production cost, and would be applicable to standard bacon pigs, with additions or deductions according to quality. It has been a long standing grievance among producers that they get no more for a high quality pig than for an indifferent one.

Contracts would be made, not for what farmers hope to supply or think they should supply, but for what they undertake to supply, and no bacon pigs could be sold by any other method, although slight variations in supplies 'over and under' will be allowed. Contracts will be agreed for a year in advance, and will be fixed between producers and curers. Any producer may select any curer, but undercutting of national contract prices will be impossible. This new principle fits in neatly with the other parts of the plan. The regular breeder will be protected against the 'in-and-out' producer, who now plays havoc with the pig market. Regular production is essential to the regular prices that farmers have always been so anxious to obtain, and unless we can estimate fairly closely the quantity of home-produced pigs

we may expect to produce in a given year, an expansionist policy for our bacon industry is impossible. For although we can insure, by the quota, against over-supplies, there is no other means but the yearly contract system of insuring against under-supplies. From the factory's point of view contracts are even more important. The factory must have stability of output. It is an important item in factory costs, but in sales its effect is vital. Curers must be able to count upon an even, sustained flow of pigs to make bacon for their retailers, who cannot be expected to chop and change their sources of supply from week to week. Retailer, curer, and producer all need this assurance of a definite supply and a definite market for at least a year ahead if they are to plan their work with the greatest economy. A fairly accurate knowledge of a year's supplies is no less necessary in the interests of the consumer, who would be among the first to suffer if a more sketchy method of anticipating supplies were attempted and these fell short of the estimate.

This is the general framework of the pig industry plan: Quotas for home and overseas bacon supplies to adjust them to demand, to guarantee a market for a definite and expanding quantity of our own pigs, but to guarantee also a market for those we must import. Producers' boards, to conduct for themselves their respective parts of the industry, improve the quality of their product, develop the market, agree prices, and eliminate those anti-social elements of competition that at present levy such heavy toll upon efficiency, such heavy costs upon farmer and curer alike; at the same time to leave plenty of scope for personal enterprise to the *bonâ fide* pig or bacon producer as opposed to the speculator. A system of yearly contracts to give the producer something approaching a guarantee that at least his production costs will be covered, ensure him a market, release the factory from its violent and costly fluctuations in supply and guarantee a regular output of English bacon to which a definite place in the nation's economy can be assigned. Surely this is an attractive alternative to the chaos in the pig industry described at the beginning of this article, an alternative worth our while to put forth great efforts to make as workable in practice as it sounds in theory? That there will be mistakes is inevitable. This is our first attempt to plan a great industry; we are venturing on entirely new ground, attempting to fit new mechanism to the engine of capitalism while it is still running. Even that this tricky operation should appear to be possible is a wonderful tribute to the flexibility of that system. It is romantic that agriculture, that has never hitherto quite caught up with the results of the Industrial Revolution, should now be the pioneer of these new principles.

There may be miscalculations also in the Commissioners' plan.

Their assumption, for instance, that the carrying out of their proposals will immediately enable the factories to pay a price to the farmers that will cover their production cost, while the factories themselves have no price guarantee, may prove over-optimistic. There may be more difficulty than they anticipate in getting pigs of the right bacon type in sufficient quantities, and by the time unsuitable pigs are rejected for bacon they will be too big for pork. It may be, as has happened before, that price differentiations for various grades cannot be made sharp enough, in practice, to encourage the best quickly. Danger also lurks in omitting pork entirely from the scheme—a point on which Sir William Haldane has made an important reservation to the findings of the other Commissioners. For if British farmers produce their bacon pigs of the right shape and quality rapidly, the pork market may be starved because of the embargo on foreign imports of pork. Pork prices might then shoot up in relation to bacon prices and embarrass the bacon scheme. There are plenty of mischievous people about who would take that opportunity to point to this price difference and produce from it a plausible story to show that the bacon plan was a failure. We must be prepared for all such contingencies, for the scheme is no cut-and-dried, fool-proof machine. Its success will depend upon even more than the goodwill of those interested; it will need their active co-operation. It is only too plain that there are possible dangers in it. Anything new is always dangerous. But it is equally dangerous to have to rely upon something that has become obsolete. Anyone who cares to look round the world and see the new problems with which the conquest of production and the centralisation of selling has presented us, at the obvious failure of either Free Trade or Protection to cope with these, at the enormous price in waste and financial loss that we are paying for unfettered competition in some instances, must realise that these Victorian approaches to the complex situation that confronts us are no longer sufficient. They were never meant to deal with the problems that modern science has created for us.

Tinkering is no good. We cannot indefinitely botch up the capitalist machine just enough to carry us to the next crisis. However much one may hate the U.S.S.R., they have thrown down a challenge which capitalism, with its confessed failure to find room for 20,000,000 workless people within its system, dare not ignore. The pig plan suggests nothing very revolutionary. It only puts into words what men have been discussing for years. It is merely in touch with the times, and so will take none but the politicians by surprise. But no one so far has put forward any serious alternative, save Communism, to the principles of planning that it embodies.

L. F. EASTERBROOK.

FIFTY YEARS OF PSYCHICAL RESEARCH

THE Society for Psychical Research, familiarly known as the S.P.R., is this year celebrating its jubilee, and at such a period it is natural to review its history and its achievements. It was founded in 1882 by Professor Henry Sidgwick, of Cambridge, and a group of scholarly and scientific friends. Its object is to investigate unrecognised phenomena for the study of which no other society exists—phenomena, that is, which are not recognised by orthodox science, but for which a certain amount of evidence seems to exist. It deals with suggestive therapeutics, dreams, multiple personality, and many other psychological things. It is not concerned with proving anything; it exists for investigation, not propaganda; it seeks the truth. Its aim is to approach these things without prejudice or prepossession of any kind, and in that spirit of exact and unimpassioned inquiry which has enabled science in the past to solve so many problems, once not less obscure or less hotly debated. Its membership list has been said to contain more names famous in science, philosophy, and literature than any other society except the Royal Society itself. Among its presidents have been the late Earl of Balfour and his brother the present Earl, Lord Rayleigh (the great mathematician), Sir William Barrett, Sir William Crookes, Sir Oliver Lodge (who is president again this year), Professors Bergson, William McDougall, L. P. Jacks, William James, Charles Richet (of the University of Paris), Bishop Boyd-Carpenter, and many others equally distinguished. The S.P.R. is a scientific society; it exists for investigation only. It is in no sense a propagandist society. This is not always sufficiently understood; and accordingly it has been jeered at by materialists as a crank assemblage of credulous people, while on the other hand it has been anathematised by some spiritualists as a Society for Suppressing Knowledge, because its standard of evidence is high and it criticises severely. It has no doctrines; but of course individual members have their own views.

There is one preliminary point which should be mentioned. I suppose it is not necessary to adduce evidence for telepathy between the living. All investigators of experience have been convinced of its reality. Under certain conditions which are not

yet completely understood ideas may pass from mind to mind through channels other than the known sensory ones. That is the official definition. Now, some have said that the transmission may be something like wireless, and may be an affair of ether waves. But this is a mere guess, and as a matter of fact it is not held by those who know most about it. Indeed, there is strong ground for disbelieving in any wave theory of telepathy. The evidence is of a kind which seems inexplicable on that theory. It points to communication from mind to mind rather than from brain to brain. Of course the perception is experienced often in sensory terms, so to speak, as when it is a visual or auditory hallucination; but the transmission seems primarily from mind to mind. And if this is so, it occurs in a non-physical world. The process is not a physical process. If this is established, the existence of a spiritual world is established straight away. Minds exist in it already, and may continue to exist when they cease to manifest through brains in the present material order.

Let us turn, then, to the evidence for human survival. I was once told, in an argument with a clergyman, that he could see no evidence for Evolution. I replied that he could not see it if he did not look for it, but that his failure to look for it did not abolish the facts. It is legitimate for anyone to say that the evidence does not convince him, but no instructed person will deny that there is evidence. So with psychical research and the evidence for survival. It may not be convincing; I am not sure that anyone ought to be convinced by mere reading. But evidence certainly exists. The *Proceedings* of the S.P.R. run to about forty volumes, and though these are not concerned solely with survival evidence, the matter has in all cases some bearing on the survival question. The library of the London Spiritualist Alliance contains several thousand volumes; I have read about 2000 of them, and do not advise anyone to follow my example, for most of them are not critical enough to be of much use. But they are at least honest records for the most part, and cannot be dismissed offhand.

It is common knowledge, accepted by psychologists of all schools, that sane and healthy people may have unusual experiences such as a vision of someone who is not there in the physical sense. They are usually called hallucinations—percepts which lack, but which only on distinct reflexion can be recognised as lacking, the objective basis which they suggest. It is for science to find out their cause, to determine whether they can be explained by reference to bodily states, or whether it is in some cases necessary to suppose that some external cause is concerned. Ben Jonson sees an apparition of his son, whom he left at home in good health; it is found afterwards that the son died about

the time of the vision. John Wesley in his *Journal* tells of a young lady who saw her *fiancé* with the left side of his head bleeding, and it was found that he had been killed about that time by a bell swinging down in the belfry where he was standing. It struck him on the left side of the head. John Wesley, by the way, would have made a good member of the S.P.R., for he was keen on getting corroborative testimony and making the case as good as possible from the evidential point of view. Now in these cases was the coincidence due to chance, or did the departed person find himself able somehow to influence the one who saw him?

Many years ago the S.P.R. sent out a questionnaire to 20,000 people, asking whether they had ever had any psychical experiences. The people were not selected as being likely persons to have had such experiences; they were chosen at random. About 17,000 replies were received, and many of them described what are usually called hallucinations of sight or hearing. Some of these were visions of departed people, occurring at or about the time of death. In most cases of this kind it is possible to suppose that expectancy and anxiety may have caused the experience; but in many cases there was no expectancy or anxiety, the percipient not being aware that the person seen was ill or in any danger. Now it is a fact that the experiences coincided closely with a distant event which they suggested; they were veridical or truth-telling. Was this due to chance coincidence, or was there a causal connexion? Did the deceased person cause a vision of himself to be seen? The committee of the S.P.R. studied the replies, tabulating the results. The committee worked at the data for three years, and summed up its conclusions in notable and carefully guarded words: 'Between deaths and apparitions of the dying person there exists a connexion which is not due to chance alone.' This was signed by Professor Sidgwick, who was once referred to by William James as the most exasperatingly critical mind in England. I need not go into the details, for they can be read in vol. x. of the *Proceedings* of the Society. Still, I may mention one case of this kind, though of a later date, as illustration. A British aeroplane was shot down over the German lines on March 19, 1917, and the pilot and observer were killed. The pilot was the son of friends of ours. The bodies of the two young men were not found until a fortnight later, for the aeroplane fell in a lonely place remote from any troops. During this fortnight no one knew what had happened to these two.¹ On the day of the incident the observer, Captain B—,

¹ This is to be noted, because any intimation of their death could not be due to telepathy from any living mind. The two were posted as missing the day after their death, but their fate was not known. They might have reached ground only wounded, and might have survived.

was seen, a few hours after his death, by his niece in England, a little girl of three, and by his half-sister in Calcutta. In both cases he seemed perfectly normal and life-like, and the half-sister thought it was really her half-brother, who, she supposed, must have been sent out to India with his regiment; she did not realise that it was an apparition until it vanished. Further, a lady in England who was an old friend of the family had an overwhelming impression that Captain B— had been killed, and wrote to his mother for news. This also was on the day of the death. The latest news from France had been that he was in a rest camp well behind the lines, and likely to be in safety for some weeks, so the family were not anxious, and the experiences were not due to expectancy.² There are many such cases on record. None of them can supply crucial proof of survival, for there are always alternative hypotheses; but anyone who studies the mass of evidence now available will probably reach the conclusion that the agency of discarnate minds is not to be dismissed as an untenable hypothesis.

A converging line of evidence is supplied by visions seen by dying people. These may sometimes be due to delirium, but what shall we say in cases where the dying person sees someone whom he does not know to be dead but who as a matter of fact has died? There are some good cases in Sir William Barrett's book, *Death-Bed Visions*. These visions of departed people, however, are no proof of the agency of the person appearing—that is, they do not prove his survival, for they may have been caused by the mind of someone still in the flesh. In other words, they may be due to telepathy from the living. But there are a few cases on record which seem to go far towards eliminating this hypothesis, though it is hardly possible to eliminate it altogether. For example, there is the Chaffin Will Case, described in the *Proceedings* of the S.P.R., vol. xxxvi., p. 517. A man named Chaffin made a will, leaving everything to his third son. This will was proved in the ordinary way, and the third son inherited the property. Some time later one of the other sons dreamed that his father appeared to him and said that he had dreamed that his father appeared to him and said that he had made a later will, which would be found in a certain old overcoat. The overcoat was hunted up, and inside the lining was found, not a will, but a piece of paper with instructions to read Genesis, chap. xxvii., in the old family Bible. The Bible also needed some hunting, but when found the leaves at chap. xxvii. of Genesis were found folded in to make a sort of pocket, and in it was a later will leaving his property equally among his sons. The earlier will was contested and the later one was proved as valid.

² S.P.R. *Journal*, vol. xix., 39-46 (circulated only among S.P.R. members; I may refer to the case, but may not quote it in full).

So far as could be ascertained, no living person knew of its existence, so the hypothesis of telepathy from the living seems to have no support from known fact.

Another interesting case is related by Mr. S. G. Soal in *Proceedings*, vol. xxxv. Mr. Soal is personally known to me; he is on the Council of the S.P.R., and is a lecturer in mathematics at the University of London. He had some sittings with a medium, and his brother Frank purported to communicate, giving a good deal of evidence of identity. Mr. Soal asked for something which no one but Frank had known, in order that telepathy from the living should be excluded. In reply, Frank said that he had once buried a medal, in a certain corner of a summer-house in which the boys played, and had told no one about it. He thought it could be found if someone would dig up the ground there. Mr. Soal went, taking witnesses, and did dig up a metal disc with a hole in it for a ribbon; it had no impression on it, and was not a medal, but looked like one if not examined closely. Careful inquiries were made and did not reveal any knowledge on the part of Frank's friends, so, on the basis of the facts known, the hypothesis of telepathy from the living has nothing in its support, and the hypothesis of telepathy from the dead seems to be the most scientific. But alternative hypotheses are not quite excluded, though they are perhaps too technical to go into here.

So far, with the exception of Mr. Soal's case, the experiences described have been spontaneous, and have been unusual, occurring only once or twice in the life of the experient. But there are some people in each generation who have this power of seeing more strongly developed; and such people can often induce the experience if they make their minds quiet and receptive. Sometimes they remain quite awake and conscious, sometimes there is a state of trance, though it is very different from ordinary sleep. I have known several people who had this power, notably a man named Wilkinson, now dead, with whom I was able to experiment over a period of twenty years. Usually, if he sat silent and placid, he would begin to see human forms standing about in the room, and would get their names, and messages from them, by some sort of inner hearing. They were all of them people he had never known or heard of, and were mostly my own relatives or friends. At first I assumed fraud, but soon had to give that up. Then I assumed telepathy from my mind, but had to abandon that also, for things were said which I did not know but which turned out to be true. In fact, some of my deceased friends seemed to be trying to give evidence which would exclude telepathy from my mind by bringing friends of theirs whom I had not known. Then it became necessary to suppose that the medium could read the minds of distant people whom he had never heard of, if the

phenomena were to be explained by telepathy from the living. But this is difficult to believe, and moreover, as we have already seen, there are phenomena which do not seem explicable even on that hypothesis; and when I review the whole mass of my evidence I am compelled to admit that I see no rational and scientific explanation of the facts except on the hypothesis of real communication from the other side. I may mention that I took shorthand *verbatim* notes of all that the medium said, also of all that I said, so that I might be sure of having given no information away. These notes were typed out, indexed, and carefully arranged in files for further study from time to time. I have published extracts from them, but proof is cumulative, and I cannot convey the full force of the evidence to anyone else. But I am bound in honesty to state the conclusions to which I was led by the facts. And I do not think I had any bias towards those conclusions. I began the research in an entirely sceptical frame of mind. But I should like to make it clear that this man's powers were exceptional; I think the majority of so-called mediums do not amount to much.

Now to glance at another line of evidence. It will be noted that telepathy works both ways in the matter of proving survival. It suggests the existence of a spiritual world, but renders such existence difficult to prove, because telepathy from the living may often account for what claims to be telepathy from the dead. This was very much in the minds of the early workers of the S.P.R., and various experiments were tried with a view to getting evidence which would exclude telepathy between the living. But after the deaths of Sidgwick and Myers there began to appear a new kind of evidence which no one here had thought of. In the automatic script of various automatists, all of them S.P.R. workers and none of them professional mediums or Spiritualists, there appeared fragmentary and not understood words or sentences which, when seen by the research officer, were found to make sense when pieced together, and were characteristic of the ostensible senders, who were Sidgwick, Myers, and other departed leaders of the Society. This kind of evidence had not been thought of by those left on our side, so it can hardly be due to telepathy between the living; it seems to have been devised by those on the other side. It is too complicated to deal with here, and must be studied in the volumes of our *Proceedings*.

Another kind of evidence is that in which classical scholarship, going beyond anything that the medium can be reasonably supposed to possess, is shown in communications purporting to come from departed people who in life were classical scholars. There is a fair amount of evidence of this kind, but it is difficult to illustrate because of its complexity. I will, however, try to give some

idea of one of the cases, premising that this condensed account is inevitably a poor substitute for the full narrative, which should be studied in the paper called 'The Ear of Dionysius,' by the Rt. Hon. G. W. Balfour (now Lord Balfour) in the S.P.R. *Proceedings*, vol. xxix., p. 197. It does not furnish crucial proof, but it greatly impressed all the investigators concerned.

The automatist is a lady of education and social position, but she is not a classical scholar. In her automatic script, or sometimes by direct impression, as in telepathy, there came messages purporting to be sent by Professor S. H. Butcher (formerly Professor of Greek at the University of Edinburgh, and not known in life to the automatist) and from Dr. A. W. Verrall (formerly a lecturer at Cambridge). The two had been friends, had been interested in psychical research, and seemed now to be devising some new kind of evidence which should exclude the hypothesis of telepathy from the living. They referred to the Ear of Dionysius, to Cythera, to Aristotle's *Poetics*, to Polyphemus the Cyclops, Acis and Galatea, somebody's satires, to jealousy, Ulysses. The sitters, although classical scholars, being mainly Mr. Balfour and Mrs. Verrall, were puzzled by all this. Of course the Homeric allusions were clear enough, but what had Polyphemus and Ulysses to do with the Ear of Dionysius? The whole seemed a jumble. At first, indeed, Mrs. Verrall, herself a classical lecturer at Newnham, did not remember anything about the Ear of Dionysius, though this does not count, for it is described in classical dictionaries. It was a sort of grotto adjoining the quarries at Syracuse, where Dionysius put his prisoners of war; it was so called from its fancied resemblance to a donkey's ear, and also because it was a whispering gallery which enabled Dionysius, unseen, to listen to the talk of the prisoners. These fragmentary allusions came, off and on, during many months, the communicators saying that it was a kind of puzzle, and that they were giving the investigators time to solve it. But they could make no sense of it, so in about eighteen months the solution was sent, by the single abbreviated word 'Philox.' This was looked up, and all was clear. 'Philox' was short for 'Philoxenes,' a little-known Greek poet of the fifth century B.C., whose works have not come down to us. They are referred to, and a line or two quoted, by some other writers. He had been a prisoner in the quarries of Dionysius at Syracuse, had been noticed by the tyrant, who fancied himself as a poet, and had quarrelled with him; some accounts say because he had been too friendly with a beautiful girl named Galatea who was a favourite of Dionysius, and some say because he criticised the tyrant's poetry too frankly. Philoxenes' chief work was his *Cyclops*, a poem in which he satirised Dionysius under the name of Polyphemus, himself mas-

querading in the poem as Ulysses. It will be readily seen that all the allusions fall into place when we have the key. There were many more allusions, but the above selections give an idea of what happened. There can be no doubt that the mind concerned in sending the script did possess a great deal of little-known classical knowledge. The question is, Whose mind was it? The investigators were satisfied that it was not the mind of the automatist, which did not contain the necessary knowledge; it did not seem likely that it was any mind still in the flesh—anyhow, there was no evidence in support of that assumption—and it was certainly characteristic of the two minds which were claimed to be the senders. The whole of the facts could not have been obtained from any classical dictionary; acquaintance with more recondite sources is certainly shown.

We have glanced at a few converging lines of evidence which we may recapitulate below:

- (1) Veridical hallucinations and dreams, sometimes almost excluding telepathy from the living, as in the cases of the apparitions of Captain Bower and the Chaffin Will Case.
- (2) Visions of the dying, in some of which telepathy from the living is a possible but not an easy explanation.
- (3) Mediumistic phenomena of the Wilkinson type; in cases such as that of Frank Soal's medal, telepathy from the living is, once more, difficult to accept.
- (4) Cross correspondences and cases of scholarship going beyond the knowledge of the sensitive. In this class of evidence the initiative seems to be undiscoverable in incarnate minds, and it seems necessary, on the evidence available—if we are to theorise at all—to believe, at least provisionally, that some discarnate mind is the agent.

I say 'provisionally,' for we seek the truth, and if anyone can furnish a more scientific explanation of the facts, we of the S.P.R. are very willing to accept it. But there seems none at present. If we assume some unknown kind of telepathy, such as telepathy from the subconscious *plus* fraud, *plus* a very conscious ingenuity such as is apparent in the cross correspondences and the scholarship cases, we are not scientific, for there is no evidence for such a mixture as would have to be supposed. A theory of that kind would begin to look rather like the complicated Ptolemaic astronomy, with its epicycles, when the simpler Copernican system explained the facts more satisfactorily. We are ready to be convinced that we are wrong, but until someone can so convince us we say that the hypothesis of survival and communication seems the best explanation of at least some of the facts.

The further question arises, If we continue to live after bodily death, what are the conditions of that life? I prefer to say little

about that, for we cannot know much about it. Discarnate experience must be very different from ours, and a mind on the other side, trying to describe its kind of life, will find itself somewhat in the position of a bird trying to describe its life to a fish; it could only say that its life is freer, movement quicker, beauty greater, and so on, but that the framework of perception is much the same. I think it is impossible to get proof of statements received about conditions over there, and the S.P.R. does not concern itself with that point. Personally I believe that conditions on the other side are more like our own than has sometimes been supposed; minds seem to be still clothed in some sort of body, and there is something equivalent to our world of sense-perception. But this is going a little beyond what is scientifically evidenced, though I believe it is what will eventually be established. Sir Oliver Lodge's book, *Beyond Physics*, seems to point in this direction.

The trend of psychical research—or parapsychology, as it is now being called, in order to bring it into line with scientific nomenclature—is thus definitely toward belief that the universe is something more than a physical thing; that it extends beyond what is perceptible or measurable by physical processes; that human minds continue to exist and to progress, in company with some that they have known down here, toward some high attainment unthinkably above our present station. This supports the religious view that we are the children of a Great Spirit who is our loving Father, which is the central point of the Christian faith. Indeed, the results of psychical investigation are by far the most effective reply to the materialist, for they are obtained by the scientific methods to which he gives his blessing. They are the outcome of observation of facts, and cautious inference from those facts. Myers said that, in consequence of the modern evidence, fifty years hence everyone will believe in the resurrection of Christ; whereas, in default of that evidence, in fifty years no one would have believed it. He called it a bold saying, and it was; probably it was over-enthusiastic. But there is no doubt at all that the modern evidence is rendering credible once more many narratives which fifty years ago seemed incredible. It has been so with me and with many that I have known; but it will not bring back the obsolete theological systems. It is the teaching of Christ that is supported by the results of psychical research, not the teaching of the theologians.

But though psychical science is thus supporting a spiritual view of the universe, and is rendering religion once more rational, it is necessary to be cautious. We want no return of superstition and witch-burning or persecution. Superstition is belief without sufficient evidence. We must follow the facts, but must not

invoke remote causes when near and known ones will suffice. We know much more than was formerly known about the powers of the incarnate mind. The subconscious is even yet very much of a mystery, and we must feel sure of its inadequacy as an explanation before seeking causes in the discarnate realms. I believe that we are justified in adventuring into those realms in respect of some of the phenomena, but we must do it only when it is necessary. We must keep close to scientific method, making sure of firm ground beneath us before we advance further. Professor Sidgwick, F. W. H. Myers, and their friends struck a spade into the ground and said 'Dig here!' Indeed, they did some digging themselves, and found ore. These metaphors are deliberately mixed, for one is not enough. But the fact is that we have good reason to believe, from what has already been done, that much added territory may be added to the present area of the known, or much added wealth of knowledge—whichever way we like to put it—will result from the further prosecution of this research. It was formerly thought that these things were not amenable to scientific method and must be left to faith; but it is dangerous to set limits to the possibility of knowledge. Comte said that we could never know the composition of the stars; and almost immediately the spectroscope was invented, and we learnt much, not only about their chemical composition, but also about the speed of their motion and its direction in the line of sight—a result which could hardly have been anticipated. It may be so in psychical research. New methods of experiment have already been devised, as indicated above; and at any moment there may be invented some psychical spectroscope which may reveal as much of the super-physical world as the material spectroscope revealed of the stellar bodies in the depths of space. Faith in science and close adherence to scientific method—these are the fundamental needs in the research.

J. ARTHUR HILL.

LORD ROBERTS AND THE GENERAL STAFF

RECENTLY, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Lord Roberts, an appreciation of his services, written by his son-in-law, General Lewin, appeared in the columns of *The Times*. Two days later the same newspaper published a letter of mine in which I ventured to suggest that General Lewin had failed to do full justice to the greatest reform Lord Roberts achieved when he was Commander-in-Chief of the Army in the early years of the present century. 'He not only gave the Army the Field Service Regulations,' I wrote, 'but, more important still, he revived in the home army the staff system that Wellington had initiated during the Peninsular campaigns.' To my astonishment this statement of mine was received sceptically by some and was even vehemently repudiated by others, men with military experience, who might be expected to be conversant with what happened at the War Office while Lord Roberts was there in supreme command. In support of the contention that he left matters much as he found them, the article in the *Dictionary of National Biography* dealing with his career has been adduced as evidence. The passage in point runs as follows:

'As Commander-in-Chief he [Lord Roberts] had no organised general staff to support him, and *he did not know how to set about getting one.*' The italics are mine. This statement being, as it is, so diametrically opposed to the truth, it is full time that, not the Army alone, but the whole nation, should be made aware of the outstanding service to staff organisation which Lord Roberts rendered while he held the post of Commander-in-Chief. Justice demands that the true facts should be stated.¹

The first portion of the passage in the *Dictionary of National Biography* quoted above is indisputably correct. At the time of the South African War no sort of General Staff organisation was in existence. And this fact was appreciated by no one more fully

¹ The main arguments and statements of fact contained in this article were published in somewhat different form about two years ago in the regimental journal of the Loyal Regiment of which I was at the time the colonel. I mention this to show that I am not now writing in a controversial spirit merely to disprove what is said in the *Dictionary of National Biography* or the contentions advanced by the critics of my *Times* letter.

than by Lord Roberts himself. I go farther, and will endeavour to prove that in 1902 he was one of very few in England, possibly the only man, who had a clear perception of what a real General Staff implies. For a General Staff is, or ought to be, essentially an operations and a training staff, and, provided it fulfils the purpose for which it is intended, it is just as effective by any other name. Because Lord Roberts, with ample precedent to support him, habitually thought and spoke of an operations staff in terms of a Quartermaster-General's staff, it is mere prejudice to assert that he did not know how to set about getting a General Staff.

In the evidence he gave before the Royal Commission which sat to consider and report on the events of the South African War Lord Roberts made the following pregnant remark:

It is not easy to understand why the distinction between the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster-General's departments—a distinction sanctioned by the authority of Wellington, familiar to the Army and tested in so many successful campaigns in all parts of the world—should have been so completely obliterated.

Nor is it in the least surprising that he should have thus expressed himself, seeing that he himself had served for a long period on the Quartermaster-General's staff in India.

Lord Roberts arrived in India in April 1852, being then in his twentieth year. In July 1856 he became a D.A.Q.M.G., and, as he himself states in his *Forty-one Years in India*, he spent the next twenty-two years of his life on the Quartermaster-General's staff, finishing up as Q.M.G. in 1878. During this period he took part with distinction in the Indian Mutiny, when he won the Victoria Cross, in expeditions on the North-West Frontier and in Assam, and in the Abyssinian Expedition. He had held no high command prior to 1878, towards the close of which year he was appointed to lead the Kurram Valley Field Force against the Afghan forces and frontier tribesmen—a by no means easy operation. In the following year he commanded the main column in the advance against Kabul, after Sir Louis Cavagnari's murder, and it is interesting to observe that he himself rated this operation as a more difficult and dangerous one than his famous march from Kabul to Kandahar. In 1881 he became Commander-in-Chief in Madras, and later Commander-in-Chief in India. He left India in 1893, being then in his sixty-first year.

Now the chief feature of military interest in Lord Roberts' career is this, that from his twenty-fourth to his forty-sixth year he served continuously on the staff, and that at the end of this long period of complete detachment from regimental duty he still remained what he proved himself to be as a commander. The

explanation of this achievement is two-fold. First, the Commander-in-Chief and his staff were in India kept constitutionally apart from administration, from financial administration, that is to say—in other words, from soul-destroying minutiae which ultimately may have to be explained to treasuries, public accounts committees and like bodies. Such details were the concern of a Military Secretariat which was not under the Commander-in-Chief. Secondly, Lord Roberts' staff experience was wholly on the Q.M.G.'s staff, which was the direct lineal descendant of Wellington's operations staff in the Peninsula. On service, intelligence, reconnaissance, and the framing of operation orders were the business of the Quartermaster-General's representative. In peace analogous functions fell to the Q.M.G.'s staff. The Q.M.G.'s staff officer in India was never tied to the office stool to the same extent as the staff officer at home under the post-Crimean system. As a commander in the field Lord Roberts managed his staff exactly as Wellington had done. There was no Chief Staff Officer standing between him and the staff. He dealt directly with his Q.M.G.'s and A.G.'s staff officers and with his commissaries of supply and transport. All this is made abundantly clear in his *Autobiography*. Small wonder that he was mystified when, in South Africa, he found himself, and his subordinate commanders, expected to carry on *minus* a Q.M.G.'s staff.

Lord Roberts has placed on record a most illuminating commentary on the system that obtained in India during the last century and of its effects on the career of the individual officer. In 1862, when he was close on thirty years of age, he was offered an appointment in the Military Secretariat. 'The Secretariat,' he writes in his *Autobiography*, 'had its attractions, particularly as regards pay, but I decided to decline the proffered appointment, as my acceptance of it would have taken me away from purely military work and the chance of service in the field.' Here you have in a nutshell the considerations which determined his career. A high fence existed between the fighting man and the office man, and for the former to climb the fence and come down on the other side meant, possibly, a life of ease and comfort and much interesting work, but it also entailed the sacrifice of martial ambitions. *Chacun à son goût*. Under the old Indian system the fighting man remained a fighting man, and the office man developed on his own lines in an entirely different atmosphere. The paradox of an officer spending ten, fifteen, or twenty years in an office, absorbed in the business of purely peace routine, and emerging thence to take high command in the field, was unthinkable in India before 1905.

We have next to consider the differences that existed between

the Indian system of staff organisation and the home system as Lord Roberts found it during the South African War and when he entered the War Office. Before the Crimean War both systems had been identical. In both countries the executive functions of the Commander-in-Chief and his staff had been kept separate and distinct from the financial administration of the Army. At home the Commander-in-Chief had his headquarters at the Horse Guards, administration being vested in the Secretary-at-War with his office in Pall Mall, this office being the analogue of the Military Secretariat in India. Doubtless this separation of functions led, and was bound to lead, to a certain amount of circumlocution and friction, but it is noteworthy that men like the Duke of Wellington and Lord Hardinge, with full knowledge of its disadvantages, strongly upheld and defended the pre-Crimean order of things on purely military grounds, while statesmen like Castlereagh, Liverpool, and Palmerston supported it for constitutional reasons. Moreover, it is an interesting but little-known fact that the Prussian system which survives to-day in Germany was a creation of Wellington's mind. It was on his advice that the King of Prussia, in 1821, created a General Staff Office, distant more than a mile from the *Krieg's Ministerium*, or War Office, in imitation of our own Horse Guards. Evolution on these lines made possible the production at one and the same time of two such opposite types as the elder Moltke, the strategist and leader, and Roon, the organiser and administrator.

There can be little doubt that if in India changes, say, in 1856, had been made similar to those which were then carried out at home, Lord Roberts' career would have been vitally affected thereby. It is hard to believe that he would have been what he was towards the close of his military life had he spent long years on the staff under the conditions which obtained at home from 1856 onwards. These conditions were the direct outcome of the drastic changes effected in the constitution of the Army after the Crimean War. A Secretary of State for War was then appointed for the first time, and the great administrative services—transport, supply, ordnance, medical, barrack building, and so forth—which hitherto had been scattered and wholly civilian in character, were brought under his control, to be militarised in course of time. A further change of far-reaching importance ensued. The Commander-in-Chief and his staff were brought over from the Horse Guards into the War Office in Pall Mall and, as a result, the time and the energies of the soldier became more and more absorbed in details of financial administration. The line of demarcation between military command and administration, hitherto clear and distinct, soon became blurred and eventually disappeared altogether.

The result was what men like the Duke of Wellington and Lord Hardinge had foreseen and had raised their voices against in solemn warning. 'The Commander-in-Chief,' said the Duke, when giving evidence before a Royal Commission in 1837, 'has and can have nothing whatever to say to finance. This is the principle of the constitution of the British Army.' On the same occasion Lord Hardinge asserted that 'it would be very undesirable to have a Commander-in-Chief transacting the finances of the Army. He is not a ministerial, but an executive officer.' The confusion of thought that was bound to arise, once the Commander-in-Chief was brought into the War Office, had its repercussions in the commands outside. The daily demands of peace administrative routine, insistent as they are, in that financial questions of greater or less moment are usually involved, tended all the time to distract the attention of commanders and their staffs from the serious consideration of war problems and war training. More and more the staff officer came to be judged primarily by his aptitude for dealing with the office file and his ability to find a suitable reply to War Office conundrums. Allow the two streams of peace administration and war preparation to flow in one and the same channel, and, during a sufficiently long period of peace, the result is inevitably the same. The channel at long last will be found to contain one element only, and that element has little or nothing whatever to do with war.

The experiences of the period between 1856 and 1901 had one curious, probably a natural, consequence. Before the Crimean war the Quartermaster-General's staff had remained in principle what it had become during the Peninsular War, essentially an operations staff—much what the General Staff is, or ought to be, in present circumstances. Long before the end of the nineteenth century, however, it had faded away and left no trace. A Quartermaster-General still existed in name at the War Office, but he was merely the head of certain supply services; he had practically no say in staff work; and in all respects he played second fiddle to the Adjutant-General. The Intelligence branch which still existed owed no sort of allegiance to him, despite the fact that intelligence had formerly been, and in India still was, an important part of the Quartermaster-General's duties. No staff officer in the districts at home had the Q.M.G.'s appellation. All were designated A.A.G.'s or D.A.A.G.'s. No single fact marks more significantly the results of the revolution effected in 1856 than the decay and ultimate disappearance of the Q.M.G.'s staff and the gradual rise of the Adjutant-General to supreme power. The story is told at some length in the Report of the Esher Committee. Summarised it runs as follows: In 1868 the functions of the Quartermaster-General were for the first time officially

subordinated to those of the Adjutant-General. In 1873, owing to the strong (if temporary) impression produced by the events of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, the duties of the Q.M.G.'s branch were re-defined in the Queen's Regulations. Internal conditions at the War Office appear, however, to have militated against the maintenance of an operations staff, and, in the confusion of administrative ideas which prevailed, peace arrangements regained predominance. In 1888 the existence of the Quartermaster-General's department as an integral part of the staff of the Army was destroyed. The most important duties of an operations staff were not assigned to any branch of the Army, and seem to have been forgotten.

When the South African War broke out, not only was there no trained General Staff, but some of the most important duties of such a staff were not assigned to any body of officers. At this time, 'drill and military training,' combined with such incongruous subjects as cooking, school of music, and sergeants' messes, were dealt with at Army headquarters by a small section, under two officers of the Adjutant-General's department. Small wonder that the Esher Committee concluded their survey of the conditions prevailing at home between 1856 and 1899 with the following verdict: 'We have no hesitation in stating that such conditions gravely prejudiced the conduct of operations in South Africa.' In 1890 the duties of the Adjutant-General were thus officially defined: 'He is responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for the efficiency of the Military Forces of the Crown, for their distribution and mobilisation, for the technical education of officers and men, and for the efficiency of Army schools. He is the channel for communication of the Commander-in-Chief's orders to the Army. In the Commander-in-Chief's absence he is empowered to act in his name.' Thus the Adjutant-General had become the outstanding example of all that the term 'Chief Staff Officer' connotes—of the theory, that is, that the highest qualities of leadership as well as keen business acumen can reasonably be looked for in one and the same individual. In the course of a long war, or of a series of wars, this paragon, it is true, does very occasionally appear on the scene; but during a prolonged period of peace it is any odds against this double-headed prodigy being produced artificially. And the longer a period of peace lasts, the more certain is it that, under a Chief Staff Officer *régime*, the art of war will be sacrificed to administrative exigencies.

It must be so. The true strategist usually loathes the restrictions of office routine. He thinks in terms which are as much beyond the ordinary man's comprehension as is the Einstein theory. Save as a form of insurance policy, the politician has

no use for a Moltke or a Foch in peace, and unfortunately this is the sort of insurance that democracy shuns like the plague, unless, as in France, national existence is visibly threatened from without. Even Lord Wolseley, whose early staff experience in China and in Canada had been on the Q.M.G.'s side, when he became Adjutant-General in the 'eighties, and, later as Commander-in-Chief, was always a source of embarrassment and suspicion in the political world. To the late Lord Salisbury is attributed the remark that Wolseley ought to be kept in a glass case, to be produced only when war was pending. Nor will the Army readily forget the virulent and most unjust attack that was made on him in the House of Lords while the South African War was still in progress. On the other hand, his successor, Sir Redvers Buller, exactly suited the rôle of Chief Staff Officer. He was a man of strong character, with an established reputation as a fighter in small wars; he had a natural bent towards administration, but little taste for, or understanding of, tactical and strategical problems. He spoke the same language as the politicians and for years he was their accepted idol. It was a mere chance that he was not appointed Commander-in-Chief in 1895 in lieu of Lord Wolseley. He was the supreme product of a system which recognises no sort of barrier between the study of the art of war on the one hand and peace routine on the other. Buller is the prototype of any member in the military hierarchy, label him Chief of the General Staff, Adjutant-General, or Quartermaster-General, as you will, who is exalted above his fellows and is allowed, or encouraged, to play the part of a Chief Staff Officer. Incidentally it is not uninteresting to observe that at one time during the Peninsular War the appointment of a Chief Staff Officer was mooted. But the Duke would have none of it. He preferred to treat his three principal assistants—his Quartermaster-General, his Adjutant-General and Bissett, his Commissary-General—on an equal footing. Lord Roberts in Afghanistan took exactly the same line.

My excuse for the length of this preamble to the story of Lord Roberts' work at the War Office must be that no true appreciation of the events of the South African War, of his part in it, or of his achievement as Commander-in-Chief is possible, unless and until the mind is fully seized of the system under which he had worked in India in contrast to the system that had grown up at home from 1856 onwards.

What now remains to be told is mainly a record of personal experiences. In 1902 I was working at Winchester House with the late Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, the talented author of *Stonewall Jackson* and other military classics, when one day Lord Roberts—I think at Henderson's suggestion—sent for me and

directed me to prepare a manual dealing authoritatively with the British staff system in war. He gave me no clear lead as to the lines on which the manual was to be framed. He merely said that in South Africa he had found that there was no uniformity in staff work, that each individual commander appeared to have his own idea on the subject and that some measure of symmetry was essential. While I was turning this problem over in my mind, I had a new task thrust on me at short notice. Colonel Henderson was suddenly called away to South Africa in connexion with the *History* of the war on which he was engaged at the time and, before leaving, he asked me to take over and complete the revision of *Infantry Training* (the *Infantry Drill Book* it had been called hitherto) which he had had in hand for some time past. Sixty or seventy per cent. of what Henderson had written under Lord Roberts' personal instructions applied just as much to the other arms as to infantry. Moreover, the existing training manuals of the various arms, all of them prepared quite independently the one of the other, disagreed on fundamental matters of principle. The Adjutant-General under whom I was working brought this state of affairs to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief, who at once decided that a manual laying down authoritatively a doctrine regarding the tactical employment of all arms should be drawn up and published. For this purpose a small committee was assembled at Aldershot of which Lieut.-General Sir Henry Hildyard was the chairman and I was the secretary. In less than three months, working on Henderson's legacy, we got out the little work entitled *Combined Training*, which later developed into Part I. (now Part II.) of the Field Service Regulations. Later again the Staff Manual Lord Roberts had directed me to prepare became the nucleus of the existing Part I. of the Field Service Regulations. Accordingly no one can possibly gainsay the fact that it is to Lord Roberts that the Army owes these all important War Regulations.

Having got the training manuals out of the way, I was free to turn my attention once more to the original problem of staff organisation. As a preliminary step I sent up to the Adjutant-General a short memorandum proposing a system exactly on Wellingtonian lines. This entailed the Quartermaster-General becoming the head of an operations staff with duties similar to those now assigned to the General Staff, and the Adjutant-General being constituted the organiser *par excellence* of the Army. A third principal staff officer, designated the Commissary-General, as in Wellington's time, was to assume the functions now allotted to the Quartermaster-General. The first fruits of my effort to find out what Lord Roberts wanted was a very unpleasant quarter of an hour with the Adjutant-General. He began by

abusing my luckless memorandum in roundest fashion. Pointing to it lying on his table, he exclaimed, 'What have you left me and my department to do? Nothing but burying dead horses'—an allusion to sanitary arrangements which in the field were to come within the purview of the Adjutant-General's representatives. He went on to say that he disagreed *in toto* with every proposal I had put forward, that there could be one staff, and one staff only, both in peace and in war, and that the Adjutant-General must stand at its head. However, General Kelly-Kenny, an old friend of mine and the kindest hearted of men, soon cooled down and added that I was quite right to find out what Lord Roberts wanted, and that he would forward my memorandum to the Commander-in-Chief, at the same time expressing his entire dissent from its contents. This, I may mention, he did in no uncertain terms.

The file containing my memorandum went the round of all the big-wigs at the War Office—it was rather a case of *quot homines, tot sententiæ*—and it finally reached Lord Roberts, who gave his decision at considerable length. Briefly, the outcome was that the Quartermaster-General's branch was to be expanded into a real operations staff, and on this decision I was now in a position to push on with the preparation of the staff manual. I had already made a good deal of progress when, towards the end of 1903, the Esher Committee was assembled to reconstitute the War Office on the lines of the Board of Admiralty, and I was appointed its secretary. Accordingly I was then in a position to bring to their notice, in concrete form, Lord Roberts' view regarding staff organisation in war, and they had no hesitation in deciding to make the war system the basis of the new constitution of the War Office. Throughout their preliminary discussions the Esher Committee talked of the three branches of the staff under the Peninsular nomenclature which Lord Roberts had already approved—namely, Q.M.G., A.G., and Commissary-General; and it was only at the last moment, just before their first report was published, that they substituted the term 'General Staff' for the operations branch, leaving the Quartermaster-General to remain what during a long period of peace he had become—namely, the controller of the great supply services. A name only was changed; the distribution of war duties between the three branches of the staff was, with a few minor exceptions, as Lord Roberts had already conceived it. Though the Esher Committee were inclined to accept Lord Roberts' views of staff organisation as being essentially sound, they were soon to receive a mass of counter-evidence from men who had spent their whole lives under the post-Crimean system. Most of the senior officers, in common with the Adjutant-General, held the view that the Chief

Staff Officer theory was the ideal to be aimed at, and nothing, I may say, gave the Committee more serious food for thought than the conflicting opinions they listened to on this subject.

I well remember Sir John French's evidence. Before the Boer War he, more than any commander at home, had refused to bow the knee to the Baal of administration. Office life and administrative detail were wholly repugnant to his nature. As general officer commanding the Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot in 1898-9 he had ever regarded the war training of his units and his own studies in the art of war as outweighing in importance the demands of a centralised peace routine. And in 1904, when he had become general officer commanding the 1st Army Corps at Aldershot, he held firmly to the same ideas. When he came before the Committee, Lord Esher asked him the same leading question he put to other general officers commanding: 'Are you satisfied with the staff system as it now exists?' 'Perfectly,' answered Sir John; 'my excellent Chief Staff Officer relieves me of all routine work and I have only to go once or twice a week to the office to sign papers.' And much more in the same strain. Then came a remark, the result of an after-thought, which revealed in a flash the practical working of the Chief Staff Officer theory. 'I have only one complaint to make,' added the General, 'I can never get the services of a staff officer for my own work: they are all so busy in the office.' Now the army corps staff at Aldershot in 1904 was nearly, if not quite, twice as numerous as the headquarters staff had been five years earlier when I served on it as a D.A.A.G., and I can truthfully assert that in the earlier period, though we had plenty to do, we were none of us overworked. Yet in 1904 it was found impossible to detail even one officer for what we now regard as General Staff work, and if the staff had been redoubled I have little doubt but that under the Chief Staff Officer *régime* the result would still have been the same. It is hardly to be wondered at that at long last the Esher Committee rejected the Chief Staff Officer theory and declared that 'the principle of the division of training from administration which we have sought to apply throughout our scheme appears to us to be fundamental.'

The credit of creating a General Staff belongs to the Esher Committee, but to Lord Roberts is due the initiative which gave us a staff system in 1914 so widely at variance with what had obtained in the Boer War. At the time it was a case of *Athanasius contra mundum*, and I am fully persuaded that, but for Lord Roberts, the changes effected in 1904 would have run a different course. Accordingly I will conclude by repeating, I hope now without fear of contradiction, what I wrote in my letter to *The Times*:

people under the letter B, 504 were men and 18 women, or 1 in 32. Nor can it be suggested that the better showing of women in the local lists of *Who's Who* and the *Dictionary of National Biography* is really indicative of contemporary or British superiority. It simply means that the original 1000, from whom the first casual observation was derived, were more stringently selected. The higher the intellectual quality of the list, the lower the proportion of women.

Another dredging in different waters, however, produced a more favourable result. Out of 207 saints and martyrs in the Christian calendar for January, 171 are men, 36 are women—that is to say, 1 in 6. But this is open to the objection that saints and martyrs are canonised for piety or morals, not for intellect; the higher proportion of women in this field seems in fact to suggest that they may have taken rather too literally Kingsley's advice 'Be good, sweet maid, and let who will be clever.' Even so, the disproportion between men and women in the *Acta Sanctorum* is very great; and whether the figures as a whole distort or reveal the truth, they seem definitely to confirm the common feminist reproach that this is a man-made civilisation.

I must confess that these results astonished me. No doubt most men think women their mental inferiors. What women think about men is, perhaps mercifully, hidden from us; though a little corner of the veil seemed to be lifted when a woman, in an unguarded moment, remarked that no woman could expect to have both a good father and a good husband. It is one of the paradoxes of life that the more loquacious sex is really the more silent sex; but I have been assured by women whose judgment I respect, and who can have had no motive in deceiving me, that when conversation turns from ordinary social discussion to the more abstract intellectual plane all women suffer from an inferiority complex. Personally I should not have suspected it; but perhaps I have been fortunate in the women I have met. From my own very limited observation, I have of course noticed that women always tend to discuss matters in terms of persons rather than principles; which is sometimes a disadvantage to them and sometimes not—for a woman of insight can often put her finger on the vital centre of a particular case, while a man of perhaps far greater experience is still boggling round the circumference of general considerations, which may have no relevance to the issue actually under discussion. But I take it this simply means that women, having usually more limited experience, wisely keep debate to the narrower channels with which they are familiar; a man in similar circumstances would do the same. And I am satisfied that a great deal of the fashionable theory that the mental processes of the sexes are fundamentally different is

pretentious psychological humbug; the essentials of masculine and feminine thought are very similar, and the doctrine that men think rationally and women intuitively seems to me sheer nonsense, as misleading as the persistent superstition that the lower animals act from instinct and the human animal from intelligence. Women are as rational in their judgments as men—perhaps that is not saying very much—at least on issues which they understand, but they often have to argue from a smaller base of practical knowledge. It is true that this unfortunate world contains myriads of silly women who simply jump at conclusions (which is all that intuition means). It also contains myriads of stupid men who are mere bundles of ignorant prejudice, and who only think they are thinking intelligently when in fact they are simply obstructing somebody else's thought. Both, no doubt, have been created by Providence, presumably in a fit of absence of mind; but a strong case can be made out for these mental differences (if and when they exist) being the product of local environment rather than the natural or necessary result of sex.

On the major point, however, of relative performance, every naturalist knows that there is no necessary superiority of one sex over the other. In some species the insignificant male is a mere parasite on the female; in others the unfortunate female is simply a passive instrument for carrying on the species, and perishes in the act of fulfilling her duty. But nobody in his senses thinks of men and women like that, nor would physiology support him if he did. The average male brain weighs about 49 ounces, and the average female brain about 44 ounces—a ratio of 10 to 9, which appears to be fairly constant at all ages from birth to death. This quantitative difference between the sexes, which is obviously comparable with the difference in their physical strength, is probably the result of women leading a more sheltered life. (Exactly the same difference, but proportionately much greater, exists between the brain of the wild and the tame rabbit.) There is no reason to suppose that the deficient quantity of the female brain is compensated by superior quality, as some feminists have suggested. But since it is admitted that most men only use a fraction of their brain, this small feminine deficiency could hardly on the face of it have been regarded as of decisive importance. The facts, however, remain; and if so small a difference of equipment has produced, or at any rate consorted with, so large a difference in productive intellectual result, it simply means that the causes which determine individual success and failure, and even decide the character of civilisation, are themselves so small and obscure as to be frequently overlooked. The facts, I say, remain. But it is at least a curious reflection that if the average male brain had been 3 ounces lighter, and the average

female brain 3 ounces heavier, the intellectual position of the sexes would have been reversed. It would now be men who had to confess to an inferiority complex when women talked politics and philosophy over the dinner-table, men who had to agitate for admission to those learned professions which women selfishly monopolised, and men who had to complain that their sex had never been given fair play by the women who ran big business. To which, no doubt, the answer would be made that men were all very well in their rough-and-ready physical way, but that the unfortunate handicap of sex rendered them unsuitable for responsible positions where the finer and more delicate mental qualities were essential.

What sort of a world would it have been if the intellectual basis of civilisation had been feminine, not masculine? In some ways, of course, it would not have been any different. Mathematics is not perhaps the strongest point of women, but not even feminine arithmetic could make 2 and 2 anything but 4. The great external facts of Nature are the same whether men or women rule, and geology, chemistry, and other physical sciences are not concerned with sex or influenced by sex-bias. Biology, however, would probably be treated rather differently—a woman's approach to the problems of life can never be quite the same as a man's; and this in turn would influence the development of psychology and religion. No longer would men make gods for women to worship, but since we all make gods in our own image, the official deity would probably be a goddess—the ideal woman's ideal woman. Not, I think, a God of Love—a purely masculine hypothesis to which the facts of Nature give little support—but a noble and fearless Diana of life and creation and continuity. Incidentally it is one of the defects of the female mind that it is not interested in machinery—perhaps because the machine is not only the rival but also the opposite of life. For that reason engineering would probably be left to men, and I doubt if any mechanistic philosophy would get a hearing. The vitalists would presumably have things very much their own way. History, of course, would be different, and differently taught—probably with more emphasis on the relation of the individual to society, and less attention to constitutional matters than is at present fashionable.

Morals, I imagine, would be much the same: for women have at least as strong a sense of property and inheritance as men; and if they have no special respect for the quibbles of the law, they have the same interest as men in justice—perhaps even more interest in it, since they have had less of justice in the past. From the smaller sexual aspect, morals would no doubt be different in the feminist State. The dominant sex, like the dominant class, is always inclined to abuse its power, and women

jurists would make short work of the present matrimonial laws. Civilisation might conceivably be more peaceful; but, in spite of current opinion, I doubt if women are less bellicose than men, and neither the great queens of the past, nor the kings' mistresses, have shown any real reluctance to go to war. There is evidence to show that the social and economic position of women sometimes improves during war, owing to the withdrawal of male competition. Wars would still, presumably, be fought by men,¹ and therefore strategy and tactics would remain a male preserve; but politics and high policy would be directed by women in a State under feminine rule, with men as adjuncts or departmental heads but with women in the key positions.

At this point in the argument I made a close analysis of several lists of notable or noble women of the past and present which had been drawn up for me, in the belief that these might furnish some indication of the probable tendencies of women in our hypothetical feminist State of the future. A close examination of these lists both surprised and disappointed me. With the ignorance, but I hope not the arrogance, of the male, I had thought that women would fail in science and philosophy, shine brilliantly in the arts, and make a poor showing in politics. So far as the first category was concerned, I was right. With the possible exception of Mme. Curie, women have done very little in science; its theory and practice, its ideas and observations, its popular inventions and recondite discoveries, have been almost exclusively masculine. And with the possible exception of Hypatia (a neo-Platonist whose works have perished) they have done very little in philosophy—a field in which their typical attitude seems to have been that of the adoring Eloise to her leader and lover Abelard. In religion, it is true, women have produced great mystics like St. Catherine of Siena, but neither doctors nor doctrines in theology; this last, however, may obviously be due to the refusal of the Church to accept women as other than subordinates. The priesthood is a male monopoly.

But as regards the other two categories the position was exactly the reverse of what I had expected. In spite of their artistic, or at least decorative, sense, women have done little in the arts. In spite of their physical handicap, they have done much in government. In literature, indeed, their record is curiously uneven. There is no great female historian—which is odd, in view of the fact that more than one woman has written

¹ It is quite impossible to estimate the average physical courage of women. Cleopatra ran away at Actium, and (if legend can be trusted) Lady Ingilby faced Oliver Cromwell bravely at Ripley Castle; but individual instances prove nothing. Courage, like other physical and moral qualities, probably varies as much among women as men, and as surprisingly.

contemporary diaries and series of letters which are more vivid and more authoritative than most history. Whether the presence of the one and the absence of the other in the feminine record shows a lack of imagination or a disinclination to undertake a rather dreary form of research, or whether women are instinctively more interested in current life than recorded death, is a matter for discussion by women themselves rather than men. There are several women novelists, especially in England, equal to men who are famous the world over; two or three, like George Eliot and Lucas Malet, have been in the front rank. But we still await the supreme artist in that kind—the female Hardy who can touch the heights and depths of human suffering and weakness with the sorrowful but astringent pity of the hand that wrote *The Mayor of Casterbridge*. Verse is a bitter disappointment. One would have said that women have a sense of poetry and song, and the beauty of form and line and rhythm, at least equal to men. But the one great woman poet is Sappho; for, with the best will in the world, we can hardly rank Christina Rossetti, Mrs. Browning, or Alice Meynell in the same class with Virgil or Dante. And (what is perhaps even more surprising) despite the fact that women have so quick an eye for the dramatic effects and the personal contrasts of life, they have produced no dramatists and no drama. In painting there are Rosa Bonheur and Angelica Kaufmann; both first-class, but not equal, I should suppose, to such supreme masters as Rembrandt and Whistler. And (what is again surprising) despite women's proverbial insight into character, they have produced no splendid portraitist of the quality of Valasquez, Reynolds, or Augustus John.

In music there is Chaminade, who at her best almost touches the sweetness and light, though never the poignant sadness and sombre depths, of Chopin; but what is she beside the mighty masculine company that includes Bach, Beethoven, and Wagner?

Taken as a whole, this is frankly a deplorable record, and the plea that male jealousy and prejudice have blocked the way is not entirely convincing, for there is no sex barrier in the arts, as there is still in the Church and was until recently in medicine and law. Fanny Burney, Jane Austen, Charlotte Brontë, and other female novelists found no more opposition in literature than Fielding and Dickens. No academy of arts has ever made sex the test of painting or a piece of statuary. And music, which is actually an entirely sexless art, is popularly (though erroneously) supposed to be rather a feminine taste.

If, then, women have not done more original work in the arts, what is the reason? Three possible causes may be suggested: (1) Circumstances (i.e., unfavourable social or economic environment) may have prevented their success. (2) They may not have

thought it worth while to excel. (3) They may have lacked the capacity to do so.

I believe that each of these factors has played a part in reducing the artistic performance of woman to its miserable minimum. Obviously the first (unfavourable environment) counts for something. The sudden appearance of a dozen or more women writers of merit in the first half of the nineteenth century, compared with the almost complete absence of women writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, suggests a sudden improvement in environment rather than a sudden enlargement in capacity; and there is clear evidence that that improvement in the literary firmament definitely occurred. There was no noticeable improvement in feminine education—that came half a century later; but Grub Street and the noble patron were superseded by the commercial bookseller catering for a larger public, and this gave women writers an opportunity they had previously lacked. When the demand is small, then, the woman does not compete; when it is large, she takes the fringe of the market, like any other trader opening up new ground. It is, however, only in literature and journalism that the demand has grown so rapidly. Neither in painting nor in music has it spread to anything like the same extent; and accordingly the woman artist or musical composer is much more rare than the woman author. But if that is so, manifestly a great many women would not think the game of fame worth the candle of effort. They might have the capacity but lack the strength of will to excel, and therefore remain content (or discontent) with the modest reputation of gifted amateurs, while the professional male becomes famous or is even recognised as an immortal. Tacitly or not, a lower standard has been set, and to some extent accepted, for the intellectual work of women; and that attitude of traditional inferiority—which Dr. Johnson epitomised in a brutal epigram—still survives. Obviously it can only be broken down by definite and recognised and continuous achievement.

This brings us to the third and, of course, the crucial point: Have women the capacity to excel, or are they definitely inferior to men in creative mental work? It is impossible to answer that question with the same precision in the intellectual field as the athletic, where women compete among themselves (with an average performance, for instance, in running that is four-fifths that of a man). A very large allowance has to be made for unfavourable environment in the past, and for the continuing tradition of inferiority and the direct antagonism or (what is probably more irritating) the kindly tolerance of the male in the present. And something, too, must be deducted for the weakness of will, physical or psychical, which makes women tempera-

mentally inclined to be spectators and appraisers of male achievement rather than creators of feminine achievement. But when all is said and done, men of genius have also had to face unfavourable circumstances, and the hostile criticism or indifference of a world which did not want the work they felt impelled to do; and the greatest men have conquered. In view of their economic disabilities and special responsibilities, women could certainly not have dominated the intellectual world as men have done, and it is doubtful if they ever will. But as certainly, in view of the very small difference in mental capacity between the sexes, women could have done much more than they actually have done, and, even when all allowances are made, I feel that they should not have been so completely outclassed in the arts as they demonstrably have been. Whether their failure has been due to lack of driving power and sustained purpose, or to lack of imagination and creative mental idea, or to both in combination, is an open question. What is certain is that civilisation must be incomparably poorer from their past inability to produce original intellectual work of the highest standing. It is as though humanity looked out on the world of thought with one eye shut.

In government and public affairs, however, which have usually been regarded as a male preserve, if not almost a male monopoly, the record of women is surprisingly higher than in the arts; and this is the more curious and significant, since here the sex barrier operates in its most rigid form. Women have never been eligible for naval, military, ecclesiastical or legal positions which have led to high power in the State. In England they have only been members of the House of Commons for a few years. They are not yet admitted to the House of Lords. Their economic influence has been negligible. In most other countries their position appears to be worse than it is here. The sneer of Tacitus—that the Germans are sunk even below servitude, since they obey a woman—still has its point. The appearance of women in politics, then, has always been individual, almost always accidental and fortuitous, and it has been confined in the main to an occasional female sovereign when the regular male succession has failed. Apart from Lady Jane Grey—a mere cipher in the hands of ambitious men—I can find no case of a woman having usurped the throne. In these circumstances it would not have been surprising if female monarchs had been either puppets of their male advisers or, drunk with unexpected power, had made fools of themselves, as many men have done in similar circumstances. But the facts are rather different.

Women often make fools of men, they seldom make fools of themselves; and the record of great queens who have risen splendidly to the occasion is exceedingly impressive. Elizabeth

and Victoria in England, Maria Theresa, Catherine the Great, Anna Comnena, and Zenobia are all major names in history, not minor labels; and to these we may properly add such examples as Florence Nightingale, Mrs. Fry, the Countess of Huntingdon, St. Theresa, St. Angela de Medici, and St. Clare—to say nothing of Joan of Arc—to show that women are not incapable of administration and organisation or of that triumph of personality which results in leadership. Considering their limited opportunities of functioning in public affairs, and allowing for ciphers like Queen Anne and failures like Isabel of Spain, women seem to have a higher percentage of successes in this category than men. They may not be able to seize power, but they have risen to the occasion when the occasion presented itself, and frequently exercised power with what we are pleased to call a masculine intelligence when it has come their way. One swallow certainly does not make a summer, and too few women have had political power to make a summer, and too few women have had political power to allow of any dogmatic conclusions. (At the same time this argument cuts both ways, for thousands of men have had political power, and if they have evolved the perfect State history has failed to record it.) But it is, I think, significant that in a small list of twenty-four of the most famous women in my collection only five were celebrated in the arts, six in religion, and thirteen in politics.

Be the explanation what it may, then, it looks as though women were better equipped for executive or administrative work than for the purely intellectual fields of science, mathematics or mechanics, or the emotional expression of literature and the arts. If that is so, women should rule action and affairs while men rule thought in Utopia; but in the world as it is, nobody is likely to believe this.

A. WYATT TILBY.

It would therefore seem that Professor Tucker Brooke in his recent *Life of Marlowe* (1930), in the Methuen edition of the dramatist's works, was warranted in seeking to identify the author of the 'note' with Richard Baines of the Middle Temple, son of an elder Richard Baines, merchant of the Staple in London, a dealer in wool, and a landowner in Shropshire and Montgomeryshire. In the valuable Appendix X. to his *Life* Professor Brooke gave quotations from documents in the Public Record Office, and from the Acts of the Privy Council, bearing on the two Richards, father and son. By further investigations at the Record Office and at Somerset House, and in printed parish registers, we have been able to trace the family history in greater detail and to a later date, and to strengthen, as we think, the circumstantial evidence that points to Richard Baines, the younger, as being the author of the 'note' denouncing Marlowe.

The elder Richard Baines was wealthy, unscrupulous and litigious, cast in the same mould as the William Gardiner with whom Professor Leslie Hotson has recently made us familiar in *Shakespeare versus Shallow*. With his earlier law-suits, arising out of quarrels in Shropshire and Montgomeryshire, of which Professor Brooke gives details, we need not deal further here. But the case in which he and Robert Woodruff became involved in 1581 concerning the payment by Jerome Benalio to Woodruff for 251½ tods of wool has some features of special interest. In the first place, the will of Grace Baines, widow of the elder Richard, of which the greater part is quoted below for the first time, shows that he and Robert Woodruff were not only, as Benalio declared, 'parteners and joynt occupiers together,' but brothers-in-law. In an imperfect document (S. P. Dom. Eliz. 154/77) and a more detailed 'note and true declaration' (S. P. Dom. Eliz. 149/34) the matters at issue are set forth from the point of view of Woodruff and Baines, and in another set of articles (S. P. Dom. Eliz. 154/78) from that of Benalio. The case was fought with great determination on both sides in the Courts of Exchequer, Nisi Prius, and Chancery. It is interesting that Benalio's counsel was 'Mr. Sergeant Puckring,' to whom in 1593, when he had become Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, Thomas Kyd wrote his two letters concerning Marlowe's 'Atheism,' which support many of the charges made by the younger Richard Baines.

By what would now be held an unwarrantable intrusion of the executive into the judicial domain, Sir Francis Walsingham, the Queen's principal Secretary, intervened on behalf of Benalio. The trial in the Court of Nisi Prius took place in the Guildhall before Sir Roger Manwood, the Lord Chief Baron, on June 6, 1581. From a hitherto unquoted letter (S. P. Dom. Eliz. 149/33.)

written on that date by Manwood to Walsingham, it is evident that the Secretary had warned him to examine the case with the utmost care for 'yt was to be doubted there would be vsede some synister practyzes on the parte of the plaintiff.' Manwood's letter was dictated, but it was corrected, dated from Serjeants' Inn, and signed by himself. He asserts that he has been 'mys-reported,' and that he will be 'as careful in the examinacion of the case that no sinister practizes be vsed, as I would be for my father's cause.' He was, however, evidently doubtful as to the effect of his letter, for he ends, 'I meane neverthesse to attende you between viij and ix of clocke to the hall warde.' According to S. P. 154/77 Walsingham thereupon called Woodruff before him, in the presence of the Lord Chief Baron, and forced him to agree to a postponement of the proceedings. It is evident that Manwood was already suspected of the crooked dealings on the bench which in later years led to his downfall. But what is more important for our present inquiry is that Robert Woodruff and Richard Baines, the elder, were accused of 'synister practyzes' by so responsible an authority as the Secretary of State.

When Manwood's letter to Walsingham was written on June 6, 1581, Richard Baines, the younger, was aged eleven years and seven months. Professor Brooke says that 'he seems to have been born about 1566.' It can now be stated with practical certainty that he was born in that year towards the end of October, for the registers of St. Peter's, Cornhill (Harl. Soc. Regs., vol. i., p. 12), contain the following entry:

1566 Nouem 1 Monday Christning of Richard Baynes sonne of

The name of the father is unfortunately omitted here and in a later entry:

1568 Februa 2 Thursday Christning of Mary Banes daughter of . . .

But there is ample proof in documents quoted later in this article that they were the children of Richard Baines, merchant of the Staple, who is mentioned in two further entries:

1577 June 23 Sondag Christning of Fraunces Baines daughter of Richard Baines, merchant of y^e Staple, born the 19th daye of June.

1580 Nouem 6 Sondag Christning of Verela Baynes daughter of Richard Banes Merchant Stapler; born the first of Nouember being tuesday.

Richard Baines, the younger, was, on this evidence, the eldest of a family of four, and was his father's only son and heir. He appears to have had the education suitable to his position and

prospects. Professor Brooke quotes from the *Minutes of Parliament of the Middle Temple* (vol. i., 251, ed. C. T. Martin) the admission entry on May 21, 1582, of 'M^r Richard, son and heir of Richard Baynes of Shrewsbury, gent., specially; fine £5.' The elder Baines had presumably property in Shrewsbury as well as elsewhere in the county of Salop, for this 'M^r Richard' is evidently the same as the 'Richard Baynes of the Middle Temple,' son of the merchant of the Staple, deceased, the subject of the Privy Council's Orders on December 31, 1588, and February 2, 1588-9, quoted below. There is only one Richard Baines in the Middle Temple admission lists. But if our date for his birth, late in October 1566, is correct, he must have been admitted at the unusually early age of fifteen and a half. It seems, however, to have been at this time a *pro forma* admission (members of the Inns of Court themselves sometimes entered their children in infancy). For it was usual then, as now, for law students to proceed to the Inns of Court after residence at the university. Witness the dialogue between Justice Shallow and his cousin Silence in *King Henry IV.*, part ii., act iii., sc. 2 :

SHALLOW. I daresay my cousin William is become a good scholar. He is at Oxford still, is he not ?

SILENCE. Indeed, sir, to my cost.

SHALLOW. He must then to the Inns of Court shortly.

Joseph Foster had therefore reason in his *Alumni Oxonienses* for identifying the Mr. Richard Baynes of the Middle Temple with 'Richard Baynes of London, gent.,' aged seventeen, who matriculated at Oxford, as a member of St. John's College, on February 8, 1583. Through the courtesy of Mr. J. U. Powell and Mr. A. Lane Poole, Fellows of St. John's College, we are able to give fuller particulars of Baines's career at Oxford. Though he did not formally matriculate till February 1583, he had come into residence at St. John's in the Michaelmas Term, 1582. For in the college buttery books his name appears in the list of receipts for that term '*pro Batellis convictorum*'—i.e., for the batells or board of commoners (as distinguished from '*socii*,' or fellows). The entry is repeated in the three later terms of the academical year 1582-3, in the four terms of 1583-4, and in the first and last terms of 1584-5. Thus Baines completed the greater part of his academical course, though the interruption of his studies during half of his last year at Oxford may help to account for the fact that, so far as the records show, he did not take a degree.

His father, who, according to Elizabethan standards of age, was now growing old, may well have wished, as some of the documents quoted later suggest, to initiate his son and heir into some of his complicated financial affairs. Any such association

can have lasted little more than three years. For we can now determine within a few days the date of the death of Richard Baines, the elder. The burial register of St. Peter's, Cornhill, for 1588 contains the following entry :

Decem 3 Tuesday M^r Richard Baynes Merchant of the Staple, pit in y^e south Chapell yers 56.

Two days later, on December 5, a commission which we have found at Somerset House (Prerog. Court of Cant. Adm. Act Book, 1587-91, p. 82) was granted 'Richardo Baynes filio naturali et legitimo Richardi Baynes nuper dum vixit parochie omnium Sanctorum major in Themstreate Civitatis London defuncti' to administer the goods of the same, 'cum consensu Gracie Baynes relicte dicti defuncti.' There can be no doubt, as the name of Grace Baines, the widow, proves, that the reference here is to the merchant of the Staple and his son Richard. But as his chief connexion in London was with the parish of St. Peter's, Cornhill, it is curious to find him described as of the parish of All Hallows the Great. Presumably he had some property there ; every new document adds to the extent of his holdings.

As the younger Richard was only twenty-two when his father died intestate (as is stated in a letter of the Privy Council, December 31, 1588), he was scarcely equal to the responsibility of administering a considerable estate, and he soon got into trouble. The Privy Council's letter, quoted by Professor Brooke, states that the elder Richard Baines, merchant of the Staple, had borrowed of John St. Leger, merchant stranger, the sum of £338 15s., and was, when he died, 'of sufficient wealth and ability to discharge the said debt' ; but that his son Richard 'seeketh by deceitful and subtle means to defraud the said St. Leger.' He was therefore to pay him within some reasonable time, or to be bound 'to answer the same before their Lordships with convenient speed.' The sequel is recorded in a minute of the Privy Council, February 2, 1588-9 :

Richard Baynes of the Middle Temple in London, gentleman, being bound to make his appearance before the Lords of her Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, this day made his said appearance, which for his indemnity for the said bond is entered into this Register of Council, and he thereupon enjoined to give his attendance daily on their Lordships till by their order he shall be dismissed.

The formula, with the substitute of bond for warrant, is practically the same as in the Privy Council minute of May 20, 1593, concerning Christopher Marlowe himself.

Nor, as we are now able to show, was this an isolated instance of corrupt practice on the part of the younger Richard in the administration of his father's estate. Professor Brooke suggested

ditions, with such a calamitous end. And it is notable that, so far as we are aware, there is in any case no further mention of him in any contemporary document. Of special significance is the omission of his name from his mother's will, made on August 17, 1597. Her death took place within eight days, as is shown by this entry in the burial register of St. Peter's, Cornhill:

1597 August 25 Thursday: M^{rs} Grace Banes widow, her pit in the South Chappell 50.

We have found the will of Grace Baines at Somerset House (Prerog. Court. Cant., Cobham 83), and we print here its main sections, because they have a bearing on the problem of Richard Baines, the younger, and because they reintroduce members of the family already known to us, and some others less closely related.

In the name of God Amen the seavententh daie of August One thowsand five hundred ninetie seaven. . . . I Grace Baynes of London widdowe beinge of perfect minde and remembrance thanks be to Almighty God make and ordaine this my last will and testament in manner and sorte followeing. . . . I most hartelie desire that my bodie maie be laied and placed in Sainct Peters church where my late deare husband Richard Baynes lyeth And I doe by this my last will and Testament give and bequeath to my daughter ffrauncis Baynes the somme of three hundred and fiftie poundes of lawfull monie of England Also I give and bequeath her the lease of my house which I now dwell in scituat in Sainct Peters parishe I give to my good brother Sir Nicholas Woodrofe for a remembrance of me a ringe of fortie shillings price and the like to my brother M^r Robert Woodrofe Also I give to my welbeloved sisters M^{rs} Kingsmill my Ladie Woodrofe Mistris Grevell and M^{rs} Woodroffe everie of them one ringe of twentie shillings price for a remembrance of me I give to my goddaughter Grace Reve twenty shillings Item I give to my cosen Kente twentie shillings To my cosin Allin twentie shillings in monie and some of my olde apparrell at the discretion of my Executrix. . . . I give and bequeath betwixt my two daughters, that is Marie Smith and ffrauncis Baynes all my linnen whatsoever my beddinge and whatsoever belongs thei to except bedstedes Also my carpettes and cushions brasse and pewter to be equallie devided betwixt them by the discretion of some of my honest neighbours or frendes. I give my daughter Smith my Rubie ringe my Ale cuppe and two spoones of sylver and guilt Item I give to my sonne in lawe Robert Smithe my Saphire Ringe my guilt standinge cuppe with a cover. . . . I give to Ursula Katherin Robert and Marie Smith my daughters children everie of them tenne poundes to be paide them by my Executrix at theire ages of eightene yeeres if they or anie of them so longe live Item I give to my brother Robert Woodrofe his children to be devided amongst them fortie poundes of lawfull monie of England I doe ordaine and appoint my daughter ffrauncis Baynes my full and sole Executrix of this my last will and testament.

All the above items in Grace Baines's will are, it will be seen, family bequests. But intermingled with them are various other

legacies which show that she did not confine her benefactions to her kith and kin, but remembered her less fortunate neighbours and her dependants.

Item I give to the poore in St. Peters parishe where I dwell fortie shillings. Item I give toward the maintenance of the children of the Hospitall three poundes in monie.

Item I give my servantes that shall take paines with me above their wages twentie shillings a peece.

Item I appoint to be bestowed on my buriall at the discretion of my Executrix twentie poundes.

She also bequeathed ten pounds to John Penyfater, of London, haberdasher, and twenty shillings to 'Saraie Graie,' his sister, who were two of the six witnesses to the will. This will, with its detailed dispositions to relatives of different grades in three generations, besides its minor and charitable bequests, makes the impression of having been very carefully drawn up by the testatrix. But two names are conspicuously absent, those of her son Richard and her youngest daughter Ursula. The latter must have died in childhood. Richard, too, must have been dead. He had either not married or his wife and offspring were passed over in his mother's will. Grace Baines speaks affectionately of her 'late deare husband'; her silence about her late only son is easily understood, if he died a felon's death at Tyburn.

The litigious spirit of the family was not confined to the men, for Grace Baines's will was proved on September 3, 1597, only after sentence had been promulgated in a suit between Mary Smith, *alias* Baynes, daughter of Grace Baynes, and Frances Baynes, daughter and executrix, pronouncing for the sanity of the deceased and the validity of the will exhibited by the said Frances. The elder married daughter, Mary, may have been partly consoled for her defeat by the grant of a commission to her (Prerog. Court Cant. Admin. Act Book, 1592-8, f. 224) on October 20, 1597, to administer the goods of her father, late of St. Peter's, Cornhill. She thus, after her mother's death, succeeded to the administration which had fallen to the younger Richard in December 1588. We may hope that she was more scrupulous than her brother, of whose apparently ill-starred career this is a last echo. Whatever were his other follies and misdeeds, it is as an informer against Marlowe that he will have an unenviable immortality.

F. S. BOAS.

E. VINE HALL.

THE BRONTËS AND THEIR BIOGRAPHERS¹

INTEREST in the Brontës is never-ending. And we do not wonder at it, for those who love their works can never get from their minds the moving life stories of the immortal sisters. It may to some seem surprising that every detail of their doings seems of such paramount importance, and that the exact relationship borne to them by a highly peculiar and unreasonable father and a tipsy, ill-behaved brother is matter of almost fierce dispute. But of course it is not surprising at all, because everything that pertains to the appearance in history of two writers of genius (for the third sister, Anne, hardly comes within that category), in surroundings as unpropitious as any that can be imagined, must be of intense interest and importance. Why should these girls be born to parents so unpromising? From the father they might have derived physical health, but they did not, for all died young. Had those who succumbed as children lived to maturity, would they have been equally remarkable women? Would the one brother, had he been guided into leading a decent life, have been a genius like his sisters?

All these questions are made to press specially upon us just at this time because a great edition of the Brontës—their *Lives and Works*—is being issued by the Shakespeare Head Press. Now the *Lives and Correspondence* have appeared, brought together in four large volumes by two Brontë enthusiasts, Mr. Wise and Mr. Symington, from the collections of Mr. Clement Shorter and many others; but the rest of the edition will follow speedily. Every letter that can be discovered bearing any relation to the sisters—and there are a good many in which that relation is, to say the least, slight—has been collected, and now we have a better opportunity than we have ever had of forming our views on the subject in point. There is not much to influence the reader in the opinions expressed in the letterpress, since, perhaps wisely, the editors have only inserted sufficient of their own matter to make the letters intelligible. At the end one asks whether one's

¹ *The Brontës: Their Lives, Friendships and Correspondence*, edited by T. J. Wise and J. A. Symington. (Oxford: The Shakespeare Head Press, 4 vols.) *Charlotte Brontë*, by E. F. Benson. (Longmans, Green & Co.)

views have been materially altered, and I do not think that the answer will be in the affirmative. We still have the enigma before us of those three girls working their way in inexpressibly dreary surroundings and with no sort of encouragement, occupied either with the constant drudgery of domestic life or the, to them, utterly uncongenial work of teaching little children in strange, unsympathetic *milieux*, and yet living and writing in another world all their own.

The more one reads of the letters, the more one is convinced that Branwell—the dissipated brother—had little if anything to do with the composition of *Wuthering Heights*—surely one of the most masculine works ever written by a woman. Mr. E. F. Benson, in his *Life of Charlotte Brontë*, goes minutely into this question, and concludes that he had a part at any rate in the two first chapters of the book, which are certainly somewhat detached from the rest. But even this it is difficult to believe when we see the letters and poems that he did write at the time, though, of course, his life and conversation had no doubt its influence on the form and wording of the novel. How could it fail to do so considering the limited range of Emily Brontë's knowledge of human beings? She was a child of Nature, almost untouched by human influence, and it was Nature alone that seemed to teach her its lessons. As a literary figure she towers above her elder sister: she was a genius such as has to be accepted and not explained, for she could say what only the greatest can say, truths that are true for every person and every time. In poetry, anyhow, none brought her either words or thoughts. They were hers, and hers alone.

There is an interesting account in Mrs. Gaskell's *Biography of Charlotte* of the weird childhood of the Brontë children, though children in the ordinary sense they never were. The youngest girl, Anne, was not two years old when her mother died, and the elder girls tended the younger. It is not to us so incredible as it seems to some critics that they even took out little Anne, the toddler, to the moor close by. Perambulators hardly existed in those days, and toddling mites were conveyed along by elder sisters as soon as they could walk, being given a lift when necessary. The old servant may have given exaggerated accounts of the father's conduct, but Mr. Brontë evidently did not take the main accusations made in the first edition of the *Life* very seriously, and was content to laugh at them. One would have thought that the account of the children's home conditions, even in the expurgated edition of the book, might have concerned him, not because of cruel usage, but because of lack of loving care; but this was not so. He wrote even at the first that he had

perused the Memoir with a degree of pleasure and pain which can only be known to myself. . . . You [Mrs. Gaskell] have not only given a picture of my dear wife, and all my dear children, and such a picture too, and so full of truth and life. The picture of my brilliant and unhappy son is a masterpiece. Indeed, all the pictures in the work have vigorous, truthful and delicate touches in them, which could have been executed only by a skilful female hand. There are a few trifling mistakes which, should it be decreed necessary, may be corrected in the second edition.

Surely this is the mildest reproof ever given to a traducer, if, as Mr. Benson is inclined to think, Mrs. Gaskell were such. The only incomprehensible point in the letter is the quite extraordinary appreciation of the more than outspoken account of Patrick Brontë's son Branwell's delinquencies. No wonder Harriet Martineau—the blunt, outspoken Harriet—exclaimed, 'The old monster! Anything so appalling as one sentence in it I am sure I never saw come from a human hand'!

It is interesting in this connexion to read that very vivid recently published letter from Mrs. Gaskell's daughter Meta telling of a visit to old Mr. Brontë made by the two after Charlotte's death. This would surely give his considered opinion, for by now much had appeared in print criticising Mrs. Gaskell's account of the Brontë father. In consequence the writer was in some trepidation as to her reception by the old gentleman. He, however, was, as before, courtesy itself, saying, 'As I told you in my first letter, the Memoir is a book which will hand your name down to posterity.' He went on to speak of the one fault he had to find with it—namely, the statement that he had not allowed his children to have meat, and that this might (as had been said by the defenders of Cowan Bridge School) have been the cause of their delicacy rather than the fare they partook of there. He had not, he said, chosen to defend himself at the expense of proving Mrs. Gaskell inaccurate. All this does not betoken serious indignation over the story as told by Mrs. Gaskell, or indeed serious criticism of it. Still, we hope and believe that the extremest forms of violence recorded against Mr. Brontë were, as Mr. Benson and the present editors think, unwarranted.

As to the account of the school that is supposed to be the origin of Lowood in *Jane Eyre*, Mrs. Gaskell stuck manfully to her guns despite violent attack. The Brontë children were hypersensitive perhaps, but probably she knew enough of the private schools of that day to be prepared to believe the worst. I myself have heard from personal sources accounts of Yorkshire schools of a similar date—even of schools accounted 'high-class'—in which the treatment was no better and in some cases even more cruel. The standard of child care was not high in the earlier part of last century, and there was firmly implanted in people's minds the

belief that for those not likely to be endowed with many worldly goods, preparation must be made early for that hardship which might be before them later on, and also that the body must suffer to save the soul. Naturally, as Mr. Benson points out, the sufferings of children depended on their psychology, and were apt to be magnified in retrospect, or at least realised as they were not in childhood itself, which accepts the apparently inevitable without demur. And the poor little sensitive, shy Brontë children were spared nothing. Charlotte was always clear that she exaggerated in no way in her account of children's sufferings at school. Mr. Wilson, whose action was so much criticised in connexion with the institution, edited and partly wrote a paper called *The Children's Friend*, in which were many of those stories of sudden death and damnation which were meted out to the young in those days. In this paper it is, for instance, related how a child of three had its naughty will crossed by its mother, and cried and stamped and was finally struck dead by God. The solemn question was then asked, 'Where is she now?' We have many records of little children, even at a later date than this, lying awake at night with this dreadful thought in their minds, and being told, as were the children in Mr. Wilson's paper, that 'God demanded that they should be whipped to make them remember what a sad thing sin is.' And those who carried out this system were reputed good people at heart!

Where everybody concerned—the sisters and, above all, Mrs. Gaskell—went grievously astray, was in regard to the doings of Branwell, the wild, unstable brother. He had told exaggerated and really false tales about his relations with the wife of his employer when acting as tutor in the family, and also about the stipulation in the husband's will concerning him. The stories were believed—one wonders why, but doubtless they were related with convincing unctiousness—and not only his sisters, but Mrs. Gaskell, accepted them as truth and believed that the lady's action drove him desperate. It is possible, of course, that the lady invented the story about her husband's forbidding in his will any intercourse with Branwell for reasons of her own, since she might have wished to bring her relations with him to an end. Her children appeared to have helped to give credence to much of the gossip about her. Mrs. Gaskell, anyhow, had to suffer, for a legal action was threatened, and she only escaped this fate by deleting from her *Life* of Charlotte Brontë the offending paragraphs, and through her legal representative and relative apologising in *The Times*. The strangest part of the tale is that the offending statements were ever allowed to pass the publishers' eyes.

Branwell's conduct well-nigh drove his sister Charlotte crazy. He came next to her in age and had been her ally, while the two

younger girls, Emily and Anne, naturally clung together. But Branwell, when he took to drink and drugs and made himself a nuisance in the home, must have been much more trying to Charlotte—the neat, precise, tidy Charlotte, whose house is described as immaculately clean and dainty—than to Emily, to whom all these things took a very secondary place. Branwell not only could not keep a situation, and latterly would not seriously look for one, but he spent money where there was little to spend. 'It has been our lot to see him take a wrong bent; to hope, expect, wait for his return to the right path; to know the sickness of hope deferred, the dismay of prayer baffled; to experience despair at last—and now to behold the sudden, early, obscure close of what might have been a noble career.'

Now the impression which many like Mr. Benson have, is that Charlotte repudiated her good-for-nothing brother too soon, and that Emily was the sister who upheld him through thick and thin. For three years, he says, there had been a silent antagonism over Branwell growing between the sisters. Emily would not accept for herself the compassion withheld from him. But there is no support for this view from the newly published Letters. No doubt to Emily the conventions of life meant nothing. She lived her own life in her own way, and that life led her to rise above the petty incidents of the world to the eternities beyond. When one reads the account of her last days one's heart bleeds for Charlotte—so anxious to help, so unable to do so. It was not love that was lacking, it was understanding; and how many people could have understood Emily? Charlotte immensely adored her sister—'Mine bonnie love,' she used to call her; but her reason, as she knew, advanced by a different road from hers. She knew, for instance, that Emily would turn from the 'great world' of London in disgust. As her sister's illness was growing on her and she refused to take advice, Charlotte said: 'Her reserved nature causes me great uneasiness of mind. It is useless to question her—you get no answers.' She tried to leave all in God's hands, but faith and resignation were difficult to practise. Poor Charlotte! 'When she [Emily] is ill,' she says, 'there seems to be no sunshine in the world for me. The tie of sister is near and dead indeed, and I think a certain harshness in her powerful and peculiar character only makes me cling to her more.' And yet when the end came she remembers in sorrow how her occupation was gone—the occupation of bringing the news to her from without. When pressed to go into society, Emily would say, 'What is the use? Charlotte will bring it all home to me.' When her sister Anne followed Emily's footsteps and passed away likewise, the unfortunate remaining sister was indeed in despair: 'Waking, I think, sleeping, I dream of them; and I

cannot recall them as they were in health, still they appear to me in sickness and suffering. . . . This pain must be undergone; its poignancy, I trust, will be blunted one day!'

It is difficult, if not impossible, to know the inner workings of family life, especially of a family so reserved in expression as the Brontës, but we can hardly believe that there was any deep estrangement between Charlotte and Emily. Where there is so strangely little material to go on different biographers have made different pictures of the family life none of which can be verified. Branwell's maunderings to his friends cannot be taken as evidence. No doubt Emily hated her poems being accidentally discovered by Charlotte, but Charlotte herself tells the tale. No girl who writes poetry would enjoy her poems being discovered, but it would be an exaggeration to talk, as Mr. Benson does, of her desk being 'rifled.' Charlotte told the story to exemplify her sister's dislike of coming before the public, and to explain how she had managed to persuade her to do so, and surely it is making a mountain out of a molehill to say it was a 'stern invasion of her private life.' We may thank God that it was successful.

It is indeed tempting to form a picture, such as has been done with great skill and effect, of the members of the family group all seated happily at their work, of Branwell's entrance and Charlotte's hard reflections on her disgraceful brother, of how she heard Branwell's voice still coming from Emily's room and wondered how she could tolerate his disgusting presence. It might have been so, and were one writing a play it might be considered legitimate so to describe the scene. But as to hard facts we cannot tell; we give Charlotte the benefit of the doubt, and we can do so with some confidence. She, anyhow, had hopes of her brother while in his railway posts, and, though from their loneliness, they may not have given him the best chances in life, we may well ask what practical alternative would have been better. What Charlotte herself, writing in 1841, says about her home life must be taken into account. 'It is a hard thing for flesh and blood to leave home, especially a *good* home—not a wealthy or splendid one. My home is humble and unattractive to strangers, but to me it contains what I shall find nowhere else in the world—the profound, the intense affection which brothers and sisters feel for each other when their minds are cast in the same mould, their ideas drawn from the same source—when they have clung to each other from childhood, and when disputes have never sprung up to divide them.' Of course, all these sentiments may be taken as representing an ideal rather than a real state, but still they are pretty definite as to the general goodwill that existed in the family. Hence it is untrue to say, as Mr. Benson says, that 'for publicans and sinners, for the weak, the self-indulgent, and

the erring, Charlotte had no compassion nor any fellow-feeling, and she included her brother in her pitilessness.' She did pity him while she could not but condemn.

It may be strange to us that Charlotte Brontë was happiest when working in the house, ironing and keeping the rooms clean. 'I am much happier black-leading the stoves, making the beds, and sweeping the floors at home than I should be living like a fine lady anywhere else.' The house, every visitor records, was kept meticulously clean. 'There was not much carpet anywhere except in the sitting-room and on the study floor. The hall floor and stairs were done with sandstone always beautifully clean, as everything was about the house; the walls were not papered but stained in a pretty dove-coloured tint; hair-seated chairs and mahogany tables, bookshelves in the study, but not many of them elsewhere. Scant and bare indeed, many will say, yet it was not a scantness that made itself felt. Mind and thought, I had almost said elegance, but certainly refinement, diffused themselves over all, and made nothing really wanting.' It is understandable that it must have been trying to have Branwell breaking in from the 'Black Bull,' reeking of spirits and unable to walk steadily, but down to 1843 we have sisterly letters written to him showing nothing of the feeling of resentment. Doubtless it was hard to bear, and Charlotte expresses her feelings strongly to her friend, but it is surely an exaggeration to say with Mr. Benson that 'one wearies of these incessant girdings and bleeds for the unpitied brother more than for the pitiless sister.' And why is the woman who suffered so intensely not to be thought of? Why is she condemned because she wished her brother to try to get back to his situation as a railway-ticket collector at Luddenden Foot? It is said that there he would have no stimulus of home and relations to keep him from going to ruin, and Charlotte is reproached for advising this step to give her a selfish happiness. But it was clear that home close to the 'Black Bull' and his boon companions was the very worst place for Branwell, and there seems no good reason for his remaining there to make his sisters miserable. It is, anyhow, quite unjust to say that the stern Puritanism fettered her capacity for pity, and that she held her brother in unmitigated hatred and contempt. Pity even for the maudlin brother would have been given had there been the chance, and the supposition that Emily maintained a sisterly friendship towards him, thereby making another cause for estrangement with Charlotte, would require much further evidence than is now produced. Emily recognised his hopeless condition like the others.

It is unfortunately true that their profession of 'governessing'—the only one then open to women—was the last that Charlotte or Emily should have embarked upon, since they had never been

children themselves. The children were, Charlotte says, 'noisy and over-indulged,' and she disliked their 'rude familiarities.' She saw insults where none were intended, and understood children not at all. One of her situations was at Stonegappe with a Mrs. John Benson Sidgwick, a cousin of Archbishop Benson (Mr. E. F. Benson's father), where she was probably quite unnecessarily miserable. No doubt she saw things through a distorted vision. But practically all governesses in those days were treated as inferiors, and Mrs. Gaskell tells us of one of the little pupils saying, 'I love 'ou, Miss Brontë,' and being remonstrated with by his mother, who exclaimed before all the children, 'Love the governess, my dear!' Could any atmosphere be less suitable to this highly sensitive, imaginative creature, to whom every event of life formed an impression so vivid and acute that she who encountered it was able to convey it to posterity just as it presented itself to her. And Charlotte had a bitter pen and did not mince her words. But the part of Charlotte's career with which most people are interested concerns her relations with M. Héger, of Brussels. It will be remembered that Miss Brontë made two stays in Brussels at Mme. Héger's establishment. The first was in company with her sister Emily and lasted for six months only, since they were brought back by the illness and death of their aunt Miss Branwell. Emily—the home-sick Emily—was no doubt glad to be home, but Charlotte felt she had not accomplished her task of perfecting herself in French and German and decided to return. It is not fair to say she 'left Emily to do most of the housework and console herself with the society of an old servant of over seventy years of age,' for Emily wished for nothing more than to be left in her home and among the moors. M. Héger wrote most strongly urging Charlotte's return. The girl had made remarkable progress and worked hard under her instructors. The Hégers were grieved over their departure, because they were leaving before being fully fitted to carry on the work for which they were preparing themselves, and it seemed a terrible responsibility for the father to bring their education to a premature end. On the face of this it appeared to be the most natural thing in the world for Charlotte to depart leaving Emily at home, and though no doubt she wrote to Ellen Nussey to say that she went against her conscience, prompted by what seemed an irresistible impulse, and that she was punished for her selfish folly by a withdrawal for more than two years of happiness and peace of mind, there is no necessity to take any very exaggerated view of the situation. Had she stayed at home she might, she very likely thought later, have helped to check her brother's downward career and the tendency in her father to 'over-conviviality' instead of leaving her sisters to grapple

with these adverse conditions. And there is no doubt that M. Héger's good opinion of her and her own growing admiration for him must have caused her to have feelings, innocent enough, which gradually developed, and which are evidenced in the letters that were preserved and finally published—pitiful letters they were, that ought to have been burned. It is difficult to believe in Mlle. Héger's story of their being twice saved from destruction in the waste-paper basket: others believe that M. Héger simply kept them himself and even occasionally read them to his friends.

Charlotte gave lessons to M. Héger, and though later she says he hardly spoke to her, he was attentive and loaded her with books. After the summer vacation she gave notice to Mme. Héger, who would, she says, certainly have set her at liberty to return; but M. Héger pronounced with vehemence his decision that she should not leave. She could not have persevered in her intention without exciting him to passion. It is probable that it was only quite towards the end of her stay that Charlotte realised what the situation had become. She writes at the end of 1843 to 'E. J.' (Emily) that she had decided to return after her year in Brussels—not two years, as Mr. Benson says, but just the year that was likely to perfect her in her work. Indeed, it was hardly a year, for she left at the end of January and arrived on January 2 in the following year. 'I am not ill in body,' she writes to her sister. 'It is only the mind which is a trifle shaken—for want of comfort.' There was a depth of tragedy there. Doubtless M. Héger's personality, which made an impression on all his pupils, deeply affected the lonely, home-sick girl with one man only to converse with. It was an innocently begun but injudicious and improper passion such as is not difficult to understand. Does it deserve the denunciations of Mr. Benson on her frantic folly, and his reflection on her disregard for other sinners while herself sinning? 'For publicans and sinners, for the weak, and self-indulgent, and the erring, Charlotte had no compassion nor any fellow-feeling,' he says, and her hopeless attachment is supposed to have made her contrast her own conduct with Branwell's under similar conditions. It was all melancholy but surely comprehensible, and, as Mr. Benson allows, we owe much to its existence. Charlotte's heart was long in being touched, and now it was so to the depths, though there was no thought of any wild step being taken, and it does not appear, so far as we know, that there was any return. But one can hardly believe that Héger's letters were written by his wife, whose handwriting Charlotte would have known.

M. Héger had clearly shown the letters to Mrs. Gaskell. In a letter to Miss Winkworth in 1856 Mrs. Gaskell writes: 'I dreaded

lest the "Professor" [the publication of the book was under discussion] should involve anything with M. Héger. I had heard her say it related to her Brussels life, and I thought if he were again brought before the public what would he think of me? I believe him to be too good to publish those letters, but I felt that his friends might really with some justice urge him to do so. So I waited the arrival of the "Prof." with great anxiety. It does relate to the school; but not to M. Héger, or Madame, or Madame Beck, who is only slightly introduced; and on that ground there could be no objection to publishing it.' This is fairly clear evidence, and Miss Brontë's sentiments for M. Héger could not have been unknown to her friends at home, for in Catherine Winkworth's *Life* she tells of her talk with Charlotte Brontë before her marriage to Mr. Nicholls on love affairs generally and on the relationship of husbands and wives. Miss Winkworth came to certain conclusions in spite of Charlotte's very tepid account of Mr. Nicholl's virtues and the frank confession of his narrow outlook, for she writes: 'If only he is not altogether too narrow for her, one can fancy her much more really happy with such a man than with one who might have made her more in love, and I am sure she will be really good to him. But I guess the true love was Paul Emmanuel after all, and he is dead [of course a misapprehension]; but I don't know and don't think Lily [Mrs. Gaskell] knows.' Mrs. Gaskell probably knew as much as the letters reveal—an overflowing devotion to a man who could not be her husband on the part of a woman who had never had an outlet for her aspirations and interests beyond what this man could and did give her. Could the story have been told when Mrs. Gaskell wrote, even if, as it appears, she knew? It was impossible to detail the profoundly emotional experience even if, as we all recognise, it adds enormously to the real interest of Charlotte Brontë's life. Of course Mrs. Gaskell might have abandoned the biography altogether rather than omit this episode, but that would have been a regrettable step to take.

The dreadful year in which Charlotte lost her brother and both her sisters hardly bears writing about. 'I cannot forget Emily's death-day; it becomes a more fixed, a darker, a more frequently recurring idea to my mind than ever. It was very terrible. She was torn, conscious, panting, reluctant, though resolute, out of a happy life.' Yet the passing of the stoic Emily, who disdained pity, refused all outside help and stood up to die, was followed so soon by the death of the gentle, amenable Anne, who without anything of Emily's force of character had a warm place in Charlotte's heart. I can shed no tears before the public. The deep, real tragedy of our domestic experience is yet terribly fresh in my mind and memory. . . . What we deeply feel is our own—

we must keep it to ourselves. Ellis and Acton Bell were for me, Emily and Anne, my sisters—to me intimately near, tenderly dear—to the public they were nothing—worse than nothing—beings speculated upon, misunderstood, misrepresented. If I live, the hour may come when the spirit will move me to speak of them, but it is not come yet.' Could there be anything more tragic than this tragedy? There was no complaint, just acceptance; no looking for a way out, no hope for easy solution of troubles which could not be solved. And yet for Charlotte there was a dim sort of happiness still in store.

Constantly Charlotte Brontë laments her little knowledge of the world. 'It would be difficult to explain to you how little experience I have had of life, how few persons I have known, and how very few have known me.' 'What an advantage has Dickens in his knowledge of men and things!' she exclaims to Mr. W. S. Williams. The faculty of imagination had lifted her when she was sinking in her sorrow; its active exercise had kept her head above water, and this imagination she had exercised on the material to her hand. Amongst this material she took the various curates who came to work in the parish, and one of these was the man who afterwards became her husband.

Charlotte Brontë's marriage to Mr. Nicholls has always been somewhat of a puzzle, and we have a good deal of matter regarding it in the new work. Certainly it proved the fact that persistence may gain its way where faint-heartedness is sure to fail. Her admirer got no encouragement at first, and met with bitter opposition from old Mr. Brontë. Indeed, it seemed as if he was the least likely of Charlotte's several suitors to make an impression. Strange to say, however, the critical, self-reliant Charlotte required the support and sympathy of a man on whom she could rest as much as any ordinary love-sick girl. Her friend Ellen Nussey did not altogether fill the rôle. However, Mr. Nicholls, who was narrow-minded in the extreme, and far from intellectual, was passionately in love, and gradually Charlotte succumbed, partly, one fancies, because of the brutal treatment meted out to him by her father. When rebuffed by him, the curate resigned his curacy and left the district. Very properly he continued to correspond, and finally he ventured to come to stay with a friend at Haworth. Charlotte told her father of her correspondence and finally managed to bring the two men together. Why all this, surely very normal, love-making when a parent is unreasonable should be regarded as an 'amazing and entrancing intrigue,' as Mr. Benson regards it, one cannot guess. Trollope would have delighted in the tale. No doubt Charlotte knew that her father disapproved of an engagement, but she was thirty-eight and surely capable of making up her own mind. It is also hard to

conceive why the gentleman with whom her love-stricken swain stayed should be pilloried as a secret ally and fellow-conspirator. Mr. Benson pictures her, 'demure and mouselike, stealing from the Parsonage, when Mr. Brontë was safely occupied over his sermon, to keep her assignation with her lover,' and finally, when telling of how Mrs. Gaskell records that she always heard Charlotte come downstairs again when she was in her room, asks, 'Is it too much to hope that Mr. Nicholls was waiting in the Churchyard?'



This really is carrying suppositions to an extreme that is quite unwarrantable. In more than one letter Mrs. Gaskell says that after Charlotte had gone downstairs she heard her pacing to and fro in the room below in her old accustomed manner. She had every chance of seeing Mr. Nicholls in an open way, and did not have to make night visits to the churchyard. Charlotte's own account of her engagement as given to Miss Winkworth shows no great enthusiasm, and even after her marriage Mrs. Nicholls, as she became, kept warning her friend Ellen Nussey of the danger of urging women into matrimony. 'Indeed, indeed, Nell, it is a solemn and strange and perilous thing for a woman to become a wife.' It was a case of very deliberate 'walking into love.' Whether or not married life added to Charlotte's happiness in the beginning or not, it is difficult to say. She wrote mainly to her friend Ellen, who had been her steadfast ally throughout her life, but her time was taken up by her husband's claims upon her. 'My time is not my own now; somebody else wants a good portion of it and says "We must do so and so." We do so and so accordingly; and it generally seems the right thing.' There were callers, village entertainments, and all the rest. A study was made for Mr. Nicholls, but none for his wife, of course. Perhaps, she says, it was not bad for her that his bent was so little inclined to the literary and contemplative. He had, however, some clear ideas. Ellen was to write out a 'plain pledge' that she would burn her friend's letters, if his wife was to continue her correspondence. Fortunately, she did not do this, and it was not long before Mr. Nicholls and old Mr. Brontë begged for the use of the letters when the *Life* was being written. Mr. Clement Shorter liked Mr. Nicholls, whom he visited before his death in Ireland, and a month before her death Charlotte wrote: 'No kinder, better husband than mine, it seems to me, there can be in the world.' Her life had had so little joy, there was so much to do for others, so little done for herself. 'All her life was but labour and pain; and she never threw down the burden for the sake of present pleasure,' as an early friend wrote. Had she lived to have a child, to have known the joy of motherhood, it might have been different.

On the whole we must acknowledge that Mrs. Gaskell did her

work well, criticise it as we may, and Mr. Benson hardly does justice to the excellence of her work. Mrs. Gaskell's biography was a difficult one to write, since to give any satisfactory account of Charlotte Brontë as a writer it was necessary to deal with very trying family events, and this had to be done while the actors were still in life. She had to retract what could not be established as fact, and she had doubtless been hasty, as her correspondent and Charlotte's lifelong friend, Mary Taylor, says. But the latter added, 'Libellous or not, the first edition was all true,' though necessity might demand that it should not be published. It was not all true indeed, but, after all, the incorrect portion was a small part of an important book. 'The book is a perfect success,' Miss Taylor writes, 'in giving a true picture of a melancholy life. . . . Though not so gloomy as the truth, it is perhaps as much as people will accept without calling it exaggerated, and feeling the desire to doubt and contradict it'; and Mary Taylor knew Charlotte Brontë's life and surroundings thoroughly.

It may be true, nevertheless, that we have not yet the biographies of the sisters that we ought to have. Mrs. Gaskell's had manifest drawbacks, for it was written hastily and with the pen of a novelist rather than a historian. But it has the great advantage of being written with personal knowledge and contemporary information, and it has not been seriously impugned. We now have a well of information from which all can draw, and, though there is not a great deal that is new to us, the matter is carefully and accurately collated.

ELIZABETH S. HALDANE.



Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the
NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street,
Leicester Square, W.C.2.