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
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JOURNAL

OF

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Editorial

WITH this issue the *Journal of Indian History* enters on its tenth volume. The journal has managed successfully to tide over the difficulties incidental to this early stage of its existence, and has maintained the high standard that it had set before itself as a journal devoted to historical research. This is testified to by a competent judge, who has been at the pains to read some of the more recent issues of the journal carefully through, and states it as his opinion:

'I can assure you that I have far more than glanced through it. I have read it with the care and attention it deserves. I think you keep up a wonderfully high standard.'

It cannot yet be said to have achieved financial success, however, and the Editor hopes that it will meet with a much larger support than it actually does from those interested in the progress of Studies in Indian History at the Universities, and among the people generally. The study of Indian History which the journal has undertaken to promote is best done, and that in a permanent form by a rise in the number subscribing for it and contributing to it. In both branches of its work fresh accession would be quite welcome, and the Editor hopes that the assistance will be forthcoming.

The first issue of the new volume has delayed much beyond its due date owing to adverse circumstances, which could not very well have been avoided. Proofs that had to be sent great distances delayed owing to inconveniences to the authors, and the passing of the press under a new management also contributed somewhat towards this. It is hoped that the further issues of the journal will appear in time and such mishaps avoided for the future.

The Prince of Wales Museum Inscription of Jayakeśi III, the Kadamba King of Goa

BY

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THIS inscription is one of the several that are lying in the Gallery of Inscriptions in the Prince of Wales Museum of Western India, Bombay. So far as I could ascertain, they are all unedited. I record here my gratitude to the authorities of the Museum for their generous permission to me to publish them all.

The stone on which the following record is engraved is five feet tall and three feet wide. It bears at the top the usual symbolism of the Kadamba family, viz., a *linga* in the middle and a worshipper and a resting *Nandi* on the left side. The Kanarese script used here belongs to the 12th century A.D. It is perfectly clear except where the surface is indented.

The inscription in question belongs to the twelfth regnal year of Jayakeśi III, a Kadamba king who ruled from Goa for about 25 years from 1187-88 A.D. So the date of this record would be 1200 A.D. and it precedes by three years the earliest grant so far known of this Jayakeśi. The name of the king is spelt variously here—Jayakeśi, Jekeśi, Vīra Jayakeśi, Vijaya-keśi. He is, as a vassal under the Chālukya Emperor Tribhuvanamalladeva, said to have governed Banavāsi, Konkāṇ 900, Halasige 12,000. His capital was Goa. The district of Halasige, of which there is a poetic description, has retained its name even now, and the Eleya Pūrvaḷḷi, E—Pūrvadavaḷḷi, or E—Purbbaḷḷi of the grant is, no doubt, the modern Hubli. Three other places are mentioned; Navilūr, Chaugāum, and Uṇukel. The grant states that at the expense of the Kuriba Seṇiga tribe a school was built inside the temple of Seṇigeśvara and a piece of land was given to the God by the 200 mahājanas of Eleya Pūrvaḷḷi.

TEXT

(There are places in the text where the meaning is not clear. They have been marked with an asterisk.)

Svasti

1. Namas-tunga śira (h) śchum (ga) bi chandra chammara chā (ra) ve | traye|ōkyanagarārambha (m) mūlastambhāya sambhave ||

2. Nitya svatantra* sa (?) driśoh pra + yō + lo + rgñānārṇava kārāṇām-ya mantrāksharāṇām

3. lōpi (?) chetasvarūpam sadāśivam tam praṇamāmi mūrddhini || Śivāya namah ||

4. Svasti samastabhuvanāśraya Śrī Prithvīvallabham mahārājā-dhirājam paramēśvaram paramabhāṭṭarakam

5. Satyāśrayakuḷatilakam Chālukyārjunanum Chālukyakantḥi-ravanum Chālukyābha [ra] ṇanum

6. Sōmavana (?) mukhatīlakanum Śrī—ja Tribhuvanamalladevara Vijaya rāja (m) muttarō (ttarā)

7. bhivridhi pravarddhamānamāchandrarka tārambaram sukha samkathā vinō (va) dadim rājyam gai

8. yuttamire || Tata pādapadmōpajīvi || Svasti samadhiga-tapanchamahāśabda mahāmaṇḍalesvaram Banavāsipu

9. ravarādhīśvaram Śrī Kādambabhujabaḷa Vīra Jayakesi-devarasaru Konkāṇ Ombhainūruvam dushṭanigraha śisṭa.

10. pratipālanadim Halasige hannichchāsira sahitavāḍarasu-gaiyuttam Goveya neleviḍiṇoḷu sukha

11. sankathā vinōdadim rājyam gaiyuttamire || Śrī rāmōrukucha-dvayastvagita chanchatkumkumōdghriṣṭa sa

12. premālam [kri] ta vaksha (?) kshyasukham kshīrābdi-madhyōdatastōmāśeśa susikarākshata lasatśrī mastakam

13. Keśavam bhūmīśam Jayakesidevangīgīṣṭa samsiddhiya || Śrī Kādamba kuḷābdhichandra

14. namaḷachchālukya dauhitrajam lōkabyāpi [ta] kīrti kāntanhi-takshmā pālasāmrajyaśrīsvikāram śa

15. rapāga (ga) tārthijanatāsantāna Manvādisāstrākāmksyārtha-chāritranembudu jagam Jekeśibhū

16. pālana || *Pa — — da — rtthipraka — kke kalpakuja (?) vāma — ntavam banda — Harirājam śaraṇendavamgabhayadim

17. kāvam mahīpālabhāsuratejam Jayakesidevanenipam Bhūlōka-ḍoḷu varṇyanīśvarapādāmbujabhṛnganigāḷe (?) sevam kā —

18. dam Kādamba bhūpālakam || vara Gangājalachandrachūdanagajarddhāngasrujatpālanōttararūpam Śivanīśanādyanabhavam
19. Śrī Saptakōtīśanam stīravārādhīsi nīchcha nīchcha varavam Jekēśi bhūpālanādaradi kaikoṭtippanembudu jagam māhē
20. śvarōrvīś(v)ana || Intu pogarttevaḍeda Jekēśi devanāḷva Halasigenāḍa byāvarṇanamenten [da] de || vrittagaḍā ||
21. Halasigenāḍu nāde sogayippudu bhūvaḷayake śōbhēyam taḷe-delevaḷli pūgiphaḷa māmara kōmaḷa mātuḷanga vā —
22. jaḷaruha śaṇḍa maṇḍita taṭākasunirjhara vāridhāreyim puḷina-menippudūrggaḷa bahirvana Vāsavanandanāspada ||
23. Nagaragrāma sukheḍa kharvaḍamahāmānyāgrahārangaḷim bag-edallalli * sabā (?) subā (?chā) śitamomattadūrggaḷoḷu rāgaḍim naga —
24. vaḷokipa hāḍuvāḍuvavarim śringāravarānganōjjugadindippudu sārvaḷkālavadarim raiyam tadurvītaḷa ||
25. Ṭiligoḷanondanondi pariyuttirālā parinīranunḍu kattaliḷele-vaḷli pūgiphaḷa bāḷe rasōtkara vīle tengu māduphaḷam kariyikshu
26. danḍa kaḷado(?)tkara bhāradinoppi tōrutam beḷeḍu tadurvī tajanake māḍe basantamanāvakaḷamu || Intī negattegam
27. pogarttegam neleyāgirda Halasigenāḍoḷage Eleya Purvvaḷliya byāvarṇanamentendaḍe || Sasivaranondu tōṇ
28. ṭaḍoḷu pūgiphaḷangaḷa bhāradinda ondesegoragirdudonde-deyoḷondeḍeyoḷu turugirda gompalim sasina menippudom
29. [de] deyoḷondeḍeyoḷu kone kempanāgi nālu desegesedippu-dondeḍeyolonde hālugoneyindaloppam
30. gū (?) Odelevaḷliyāmaradināmarakoyyane kayya nīdi katta-lise tadandhakāradoḷagāvaranoyyane sōnke sōn —
31. ki mattalevavarila vāyuvāśadimdulihāgire tōṇṭakāra bandele-yane koyidu * jarevamagāgaḷe māppudanai —
32. de māḍuva || Erehaḷu haraḷu tōṇṭada bariyoḷu kāluveyanumba gaddegalindam pirid-Eleya Purvvaḷliya
33. dhareyellam beḷasu kaḷasaviṭṭantirku || varasāstrārthaviśāra-darssakaḷa vedānīka sampannaruttara tarkka prameya pramā —
34. nareredarggānandadindīvoḍam surabhūjōpamargaḷint—Eleya Purvaḷli dvijaśreshṭharam piridimnūrrvvaranagaḷum po
35. gaḷugum bhūlokavidvajjanā || Svasti yamanīyamasvādhyaya-dhyāna * dhā pāvaṇā (adhyāṇa ?) nanuṣṭhānaparāyaṇar vidīta
36. vedārtthavidyāpāragarssatkarmaniratarum saptasōma samavā (?) vabhrītāvagāhana pavitrīkrī —

37. taśarīrarum dvātrimsatsameyāgraga(m) [nya] rum ekavākya-rum duṣṭānigraha śiṣṭapratipāḷanarum
38. Śrī Mūrtti Nārāyaṇa devara labdhavaraprasādāsāḍitarumappa srīmadanādiyagrahāram E —
39. leya Pūrvvadavaḷliyūroḍeya pramukha mahajanangalinnūrvva-rum saviṭṭhaḍadu mahāsabheyāgirddu Chaugāmveya
40. Navilūra Kurumba Senigar * ro (?) khyavāsameya saroha-mgaḷa kaiyyalu (?) appaṇeyam konḍu ā Senigesvaradevara āgabhōga rangabhōga
41. kke chaitrapavitrika koṭṭa kramamentendaḍe || Svasti Kaliyu-ga samvatsaram 4288 sandandādiyāgi Śrī Kādambabhujabaḷa
42. Vijayakesideva varśāḍa 12 neya kāḷayukta samvatsarada Puśya ba || Āḍityavāra Uttarāyaṇa samkramaṇa
43. dandu Śrīmadāśeśa mahājanangaḷu koṭṭa keyya sthaḷa Uṇukella dāriya paḍuvalu Bra + [hmārga] ⁽¹⁾ puriya keyintenkala
44. sarvvanamasya sarva bādāparihāravāgi koṭṭu mattarentu devara paḷiyippattāru kaiya nīḷa yippattondu kaiya agalaḍoḷage
45. maṭha maneyāgi māḍidaḍam sarva bādāparihāravāgi mahā-janangaḷu koṭṭaru || Ā Kuriba Senigakuḷavarṇanamanen—
46. daḍe || Kuribitiga* panchapuṭṭigavariteyoḷem puṭṭi Kuriba Senigarembi terana kulavāgi lōkada nere māmā (he ?) śvararenippa hesaram paḍeda
47. ru || Jagadoḷagelliyum Kuriba Senigaremba kulōttamarssadā bageyudu dharmma jīrṇa Śivagehada māṭa samasta vistaram miḷi—
48. lene kīrttiyampadeyuttam Śivadharmmanāvakāḷamum bagegoṭutipparendu paratarssameyāḍigaḷeyde kīrttiparu || Antu kīrttisi ||
49. Mige sāhitya samasta śāstra vishaya byāpāradoḷu pēḷdaḍem Bhrigumindatyadhirkkaḷāsūrige vinnāpagaḷoḷu vīradoḷu hage sim—
50. hakkidīrāge tāgi kolvarpāva (m)na [Na] vilāuvayarmigilīn-toppe Kuriba Senigaridēm lōkakke vikhyātarō || Antenise ||
51. kanda || Navilūru Kuriba Senigaravarelam mukhyavāgi Chaugāveyavar tavatavage bandudam———rmo———vadīmdī keyya
52. haḍeḍu devarggittaru | Dīnānātharu bāḷvene kānīnana terade kuḍuvarahitarvvaralabhimānamane sūregombar-mānisa Navilū [ra]

¹ These two letters inside the brackets are engraved all by themselves at the bottom of the inscription. The preceding *plus* mark puts them in place.

53. [Ku]riba Seniga nivaha || Ī dharmmamanāvadara nirpôdhi-
gaḷim kādavargge suhasampada sūsādhita meniku vaḷipanigo

54. —narakābdhiyoḷage gaḷagaḷaniḷivaru || Svadattām paradattām
vā yô hareti vasundharā | Śasṭivarśśa sahasrāṇi viṣṭāyām jāyate
krimi ||

TRANSLATION

Lines

1-3. Well, Salutation to that Śambhu who is beautiful on account of the fan-like moon kissing the head aloft; to the pillar of commencement of the city of the Trilōkas. I salute God Sadāśiva who is ever free, who is the very essence of those hymns and letters which are the ocean of learning. A bow to Śiva.

4-7. While Tribhuvanamalla Chālukya (with the usual titles) was ruling the kingdom of the world, his dependant.

8-11. Vira Jayakeśi-deva, the strong arm of the Kadambas, the lord of the city of Banavāsi, the obtainer of the five great musical instruments, the great maṇḍalesvara, was ruling in happiness from his capital Goa, the Konkana district 900 and Halasige 12,000, putting down the wicked and protecting the virtuous.

11-13. May God Keśava who is immensely happy on account of having Lakshmi by his side and grant all the wishes of king Jayakeśi.

13-15. The world calls this king Jekesi, a moon to the ocean the Kadamba family, the great-grandson of the pure Chālukyas, and his fame known all over the world, one who has acquired the kingdom of enemy kings, with a host of needy people seeking the shelter of his generosity, and one who has in life accomplished the ideal of the sacred sciences like that of Manu.

16-18. He extends protection to him who approaches the King with the cry 'O King, protect me!' Ardently devoted to the worship of Śiva is this King of the Kadambas.

18-20. The world says of him that he constantly worships Śrī Saptakoṭīśvara who is the First Cause, Beginningless, who has the Daughter of the Mountain by his side, and Gangā and the moon on his head, and he obtains from Him boons both high and low.

20. To describe Halasige nāḍ which is glorious and ruled by Jekesi.

21-23. The whole land of Halasige sparkles, an ornament of the entire world, and can, with its leaves and creepers, areca palms, mango trees, citron trees, ponds adorned with vast clusters of lotuses, streams and torrents, sandy banks and parks outside towns, be compared to the Nandana garden of Indra.

23-24. That part of the earth is wealthy and beautiful for having been replete with cities and villages, hamlets and market-towns; with people in the towns always laughing and sightseeing, singing and playing; and with beautiful and well-adorned courtesans.

25-26. A stream lost itself in the limpid waters of a pool and flowed on; feeding on its water grew, heavy with fruits and leaves hiding the sky, creepers, banana plants, betel plants, cocoanut palm, citron, sugarcane, and so on; with all these, that part of the earth had produced, for its inhabitants, perennial spring.

27. To describe Eleya Purbbaḷli in this Halasigenāḍ which was the home of so much plenitude and prosperity.

27-29. In a garden an areca palm inclined to a side from the weight of its fruits; here others looked level (with the ground) on account of the fruits crammed on them; there, a tree had shot its tendrils out in all directions; elsewhere tender bunches of pods decked other trees.

30-32. The leafy creeper had spread from tree to tree and spread darkness; one lost his way and reached the enclosure. Hearing his cry for help, carried afar by the wind, the gardener came, cut down the leaves and in a derisive attitude led him out.

32-33. With arable land, plots of castor plants, canals on one side, and rice fields, the whole place, the great Eleya Purvadavalli looks like a crown of light.

33-35. May the scholars the world over always praise the celebrated two hundred Brahmins of Eleya Purvalli who are well-versed in the sacred sciences, masters of the several Vedas, experts in the arguments of logic, comparable in their generosity to the celestial tree.

35-41. Well, the two hundred Mahājanas of the ancient Eleya Purvadavalli who adhere to the pious practice of self-control, discipline, etc., devoted to learning and its practical application, always occupied with the six karmas, whose body is purified by the bath taken at the conclusion of the (?) seven Soma sacrifices, who are, the devout followers of the 32,000 conventions, men carrying out their

promises, punishers of evil and protectors of the good, and who have secured the grace of Śrī Moorty Nārāyaṇa, met in conclave in Savithāṇa, sent for the Kurumba Senigas of Navilūr in Chaugaum, and with their consent made a grant to God Senigeśvara for various services (āgabhōga, rangabhōga, chaitrapavitra). Its details are :

41-45. On the occasion of the summer solstice on Sunday, the eleventh day of the dark fortnight of Pushya of Kālayukti Kaliyuga 4288, the twelfth year of Kadamba Vijayakēśi's reign, all the Mahā-janas granted free of all imposts, a piece of land to the west of the road to Upukel and south of (?) Brahmārgapuri, and eight mattars, and a construction for school measuring twenty-six hands long and twenty-one hands broad, within the precincts of the temple.

To describe the tribe of these Kuriba Senigas :

46. Born, of a mother who was a Kuribiti by caste, of basket-makers, these Kuriba Senigas came to be known in the world by the name of Nere-māmā—(he ?) śvaras.

47-48. All over the world these Kuriba Senigas of that noble race have restored Śiva temples in all their details ; they have contemplated charity and the sacred creed of Śiva always ; they have shone by the adoption of the celebrated conventions.

49-50. Why describe all this with the flourish of language and the sciences ? How famous in the world are these Kuriba Senigas of the pure Navilūr family who kill enemies with bravery and skill and who surpass Bhṛigu ?

51. All these Kuriba Senigas of Navilūr chiefly, and other people of Chaugaum came of their own accord and gave away to the God whatever they could give with a generous hand.

52. These Kuriba Senigas of Navilūr are the refuge of the needy, and they rob enemies of all their pride.

53-55. To those who protect this grant will easily accrue wealth and happiness. But those who destroy it descend to hell.

Usual imprecations.

EDITOR'S NOTE

This record is dated Sunday, 11th of the dark fortnight of the month Pausya of the year Kālayukti, Kaliyuga 4288, 12th year of Vijayakēśi's reign—Kaliyuga 4288 is year Plavanga, Kālayukti being year of Kali 4299, the 12th year as Indians count it from Plavanga.

This provides the third instance of the error of 13 years which, according to Fleet, was a Telugu practice of counting the cycle of Jupiter beginning from the year 13th of the cycle, the year Pramādi. The two other instances noted by Fleet are Halsi Copper-plates of Siddhārti=Kali 4288, and the Kittoor inscription of Durmati=Kali 4289 (*J. Bo. Br. R. A. S.*, IX, 264). According to this record Kali 4288 is the 12th year of Jayakēśi. Jayakēśi then began to rule in Kali 4277. His father was ruling, according to Fleet, in 4275. He must have been succeeded by Jayakēśi in 4276 or 77. The grant was made in Makara Sankrānti which fell on Saturday, Bahula 10, both for Plavanga and for Kālayukta, according to Swamikkannu Pillai's *Ephemeris*, vol. iii.

The Historical Material in the Private Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai (1736—1761)

BY

C. S. SRINIVASACHARI, M.A.

IX

I. DUPLEIX'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH NASIR JANG

NASIR Jang halted at Valudavur after his triumph where he received Murtaza Ali Khan of Vellore to whom he gave Arcot. Mir Asad was made the Diwan of the Nawab; and both agreed to pay the Nizam an annual tribute of 50 lakhs for the subah.¹ Wandiwash was to be given over to Mir Asad who suggested that if, Pondicherry were blockaded, Chanda Sahib and Muzaffar Jang's mother who were there, would have to be given up and most of the sepoys would desert from the French side. Major Lawrence who was in Nasir Jang's camp is said to have written letters to Dupleix and D'Auteuil that he would arrange to effect a peace between the French and Nasir Jang. The Diarist's view was that the English could not remove from the mind of Nasir Jang his fear of the French, and as they could not attack Pondicherry directly and Nasir Jang insisted that he should not return without effecting something, 'they might have offered to make peace between us and him and have written to you.'² Nasir Jang was advised by his nobles like Sayyad Lashkar Khan and Sayyad Sharif Khan that the besieging of Pondicherry would prove a very arduous task and the English would not fight them as there was peace between them; they were of the opinion that the subah of Arcot should be given to Muzaffar Jang and peace should be made with the French; otherwise

¹ The Diarist tells us that Nawab Sadat-ullah Khan used to pay 12 lakhs a year; Anwar-ud-din agreed to pay 24 lakhs; and Mahfuz Khan 28 lakhs of rupees.

² Entry for April 12, 1750, p. 36 of vol. vii of the *Diary*.

The letter of the English and the reply of Dupleix are given in Martineau's *Dupleix et l'Inde Française* (1749-54), p. 121.

Chanda Sahib would return with European aid and renew the struggle for the Nawabship of Arcot. This was all the more effective as Murari Rao, Sanoji Nimbalkar, Chandra Sen and other Maratha sardars in the Nizam's camp were preparing to depart. In reply to communications received from Nasir Jang and Shah Nawaz Khan Dupleix sent ambassadors, including two of his Council, Mm. du Basset and Delarche.¹ Shah Nawaz Khan sympathized with the French; but apparently he was not able to persuade his master who demanded the surrender of Chanda Sahib and declined to give him the subah of Arcot. The envoys returned to Pondicherry with a letter from Shah Nawaz Khan explaining the situation, to which a veiled threat of war was sent as a reply. In fact, the envoys said that Shah Nawaz Khan and his Peshkar, Ramdas Pandit, told them secretly that if they departed without hesitation, marched again with troops and fell upon Nasir Jang's camp-guards by night, he would arrange to get Arcot for Chanda Sahib and restore his territory to Muzaffar Jang.²

¹ Orme states that the first letter of Dupleix to Nasir Jang was not replied to by that prince; but Dupleix made use of this pretext to continue the correspondence. The Diarist wrote for April 15th, that Dupleix observed to him that although six letters had been sent to the Nizam with the usual compliments, no reply had been received, the cause being that the letters were not couched in proper form. The letters from Nasir Jang and Shah Nawaz Khan were only received two days later.

One of the two French envoys spoke Persian with tolerable fluency. Du Basset had gone on an embassy to Nizam-ul-Mulk at Trichinopoly in 1743; according to their original instructions, they were to demand the restoration of Adoni for Muzaffar Jang, while Arcot might be given to Chanda Sahib or to the 'young prince', i.e., the younger son of Safdar Ali who was then residing at Wandewash. Dupleix himself subsequently wrote to the envoys that Arcot was to go to Muzaffar Jang, and later turned and agreed that Muzaffar Jang might be kept in prison, provided Adoni was given to his family. Thus 'M. Cultru concludes with reason that Dupleix still had no policy except that of hiring his troops to the highest bidder'. 'With such ill-defined aims, the ambassadors could accomplish little beyond getting a general idea of the parties into which the court was divided. They also seem to have sought relations with the Pathan Nawabs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savanur, who were already discontented at their prolonged detention in the south'. (Dodwell's *Dupleix and Clive*, pp. 48-9).

Also Martineau's *Dupleix et l'Inde Française*, (1749-54), p. 122

² According to Orme (who, however, says that the French deputies remained in the Nizam's camp for 8 days) Dupleix obtained the real advantages intended from their visit, a knowledge of Nasir Jang's strength and of the state of parties at his court. He continues:—'Suspicious were entertained of the clandestine conduct of the French deputies, and Major Lawrence was informed that some design was carrying on in the camp against the Subah (Nasir Jang) in which Shauwaze Khan, the prime minister, was the principal agent. The latter part

The French attacked Nasir Jang's camp on the night of the 27th April, killed and wounded nearly 1,000 of the enemy as well as a large number of horse and cattle. A detachment under M. de La Touche as the captain of the attacking party, was sent out by D'Auteuil who had taken the command again and he took by surprise one of the quarters of the camp and penetrated more than a mile.¹

II. INTRIGUES AND FACTIONS IN NASIR JANG'S CAMP

Ramdas Pandit is stated by the Diarist to have offered terms of peace by which Trichinopoly was to be given to Chanda Sahib, as well as a *mansab* of 5,000 horse, a *jaghir* in the Arcot subah and permission to seize and plunder Tanjore.² It was also stated that Muhammad Ali had been promised Arcot and that the English had agreed to help him on receiving a *cowle* for the Poonamalle and a part of Devanampatnam country as *inam*. In the *darbar* of the Nizam, when the consent of the nobles was asked for the appointment of Muhammad Ali to the subah of Arcot, Shah Nawaz Khan³ said that the subah should be given to Chanda Sahib who deserved favour. Sayyad Lashkar Khan said that he would very willingly consent to Muhammad Ali's appointment; but as the French were opposed to him, he thought it inadvisable. Muhammad Ali openly quarrelled with Sayyad Lashkar Khan for his remarks; and Nasir Jang dissolved the assembly without giving the dress of honour to Muhammad Ali. Dupleix was also told that Murari Rao wanted to make friends with him and believed that Nasir Jang had a wholesome fear of the French. This quieted the apprehension entertained at Pondicherry that Murari Rao would be given the right of *chauth* over the Arcot subah on condition of his staying in the country, as was reported.

of the report was not true; and the first could not be proved; however, the major, at an audience endeavoured to acquaint Nasir Jang with what he had heard. . .', vol. i, (4th edition, p. 145).

¹ It was the first of 'a score of such night-attacks made by both French and English, almost all of which were equally successful'.

² Purport of a letter written by the Pandit and brought by Chanda Sahib to the Governor (p. 89 of Vol. vii of the *Diary*). Ramdas Pandit was a partisan of Chanda Sahib and strove hard in his interest.

³ Shah Nawaz Khan was always ill-disposed towards Anwar-ud-din and was opposed to his appointment to the subah of Arcot. MS. of Buran-ud-din's *Tusuk-i-Walajah*, Book I, translated by M. H. Nainar (of the Madras University). The Khan continued his enmity towards the son,

Muzaffar Jang's captivity did not seem to have been harsh; and he contrived easily to maintain correspondence with his mother, Dupleix and others at Pondicherry. He entreated Dupleix to send his mother to him; but the latter refused to depart saying it would be unseemly to depart without repaying the Governor what she owed him.¹ She was hoping that if her debt was paid before Nasir Jang left the country, there would be a good chance of her son being released and treated well.

News meanwhile arrived that the English under Captain Cope took leave of Nasir Jang and departed for Fort St. David owing to the expected arrival of Portuguese ships,² which was strongly rumoured. Nasir Jang is said to have given an interview to Muzaffar Jang and to have relaxed the severity of his confinement, possibly as a result of the letter that the latter's mother wrote to him. On May 3rd, the Nizam held a *darbar* before marching at which besides Sayyad Lashkar Khan Shah Nawaz Khan, Sayyad Sharif Khan and his other diwans, were also present Nawab Abdul Nabi Khan of Cudapah, Himayat Bahadur Khan of Kurnool and other nobles. They all advised him to forgive Muzaffar Jang; while Jamil Beg Khan, the subhadar of Berar, advised the Nizam to conciliate the French and win them over to his side; and Sayyad Lashkar Khan and others offered the same advice as to Muzaffar Jang.³ Nasir Jang began his return march north; and the Diarist records that on May 5, he heard that Cope and Lawrence went to Nasir Jang's camp when he was about to commence

¹ Muzaffar Jang's mother was the half-sister of Nasir Jang and his elder brother Ghazi-ud-din Khan who were the sons of Nizam-ul-Mulk's second wife. The latter's first wife was the daughter of a Pathan noble; and Muzaffar Jang's mother was her daughter. Nizam-ul-Mulk had six sons. There was no truth in the scandal recorded by the Diarist that Nasir Jang was the son of Nizam-ul-Mulk by a low woman.

² 'The despatch of ships from Goa for the recovery of San Thomé was expected as a result of Dupleix's intrigues with Goa. But there is no reason to suppose that the English feared at this time any Portuguese interference'. Dodwell in his note on p. 102 of *Diary*, vol. vii.—See the writer's notes on the English Occupation of San Thomé by Boscawen, the letter of the Fort St. David Council to the Company justifying their action, the Portuguese Viceroy's letter of remonstrance to the English at Fort St. David, the latter's reply to him, May 4, 1750—the last two being quoted by Love in his *Vestiges of Old Madras*, vol. ii, pp. 400—1. The English possibly expected about this time a reply from the Portuguese Government at Goa (*Journal of Indian History*, vol. ix, pp. 341-45.)

³ Haji Fazil Khan, the steward of Muzaffar Jang's household, related these happenings as he had seen them, to Dupleix. (Diarist's entry for May 4, 1750).

his march, with the request that the Poonamallee, Mylapore and Devanampatnam countries should be given as an *inam* to the English, in return for their services; but they had to return unsuccessfully;¹ and Nasir Jang is said to have torn the letter of Lawrence, praised the services of the French to Muzaffar Jang and dismissed the English envoys with scant ceremony; and M. de La Touche also said he heard that the English had departed in great displeasure.² The French

¹ Dodwell says that the English ambassadors to Nasir Jang wrote on April 14, that a party was forming among the Nizam's ministers influencing him against them, at the instigation of the French; and they 'seem to intimate in their discourse that they hold the assistance we have given them in very little esteem.' On May 2, the ambassadors wrote, 'yesterday we got Nasir Jang's consent to our demands according to our former advices, and had our agreement reduced into writing in order for his signing it, that the *phirmaund* might be made out, but it is not yet perfected, and this day, his whole army has marched about six miles from us towards Arcot.' (Taken from the Orme MSS, India, volume ix, pp. 2175-7, containing the proceedings of the English embassy composed of Stringer Lawrence and Foss Westcott and accompanied by Captain Dalton, from March 24 to May 5, 1750). These contain letters from Dupleix to Lawrence and from the French Governor to Nasir Jang, asking him to reconcile himself to Muzaffar Jang.

The Fort St. David despatch to the Company, dated October 24, 1750, abstracted by Dodwell in *The Madras Despatches, 1744-55*, (pp. 112-8), says that Nasir Jang remained at Valudavur for about a month and then moved to Arcot; he desired the English to accompany him; but Lawrence etc., insisted on first receiving grants of the Poonamallee country, to which demand Nasir Jang returned no answer; and the English troops were recalled and reached Fort St. David, (April 22, May 3).

² The reception of the English by Nasir Jang was warm at first; a week after their arrival, they complained they had good reason to suspect that the French were tampering with some of the countries 'Indeed their services had not been such as to merit any considerable reward. They had proffered unwelcome military advice; they had refused to pursue the French in their flight; they had informed Nasir Jang that they could not enter the French bounds. Moreover, they were accompanied by a native agent, who, though long employed by the English, made no scruple about betraying their plans and letters to the French. On April 20, they refused to co-operate in an attack on Wandewash, unless their demands were granted. Again, they refused to join Nasir Jang in an expedition to raise tribute in Tanjore. On May 1, although Nasir Jang had agreed to their requests, 'this day the whole army had marched six miles from us towards Arcot.' So the ambassadors and their troops marched back to Fort St. David.' (Dodwell, p. 50).

Orme says of the English embassy as follows:—

'Meanwhile Major Lawrence . . . solicited Nasir Jang to confirm the grant, which Mahomed Ally, now esteemed Nabob of Arcot, had made to the East India Company, of a territory near Madrass, in return for the assistance of their troops. He had often promised to comply with this request; but his minister, Shah Nawaz Khan, regarded such accession as inconsistent with the majesty of the Mogul empire, and prevented the *phirmaund* or patent, from being issued from his

hoisted their flag at Bahur; and they heard that Nasir Jang was perfectly willing that Tanjore and Trichinopoly be given to Chanda Sahib along with a *mansab* jaghir, but the latter would not agree and wanted Arcot as well, though he was persuaded to yield for the present and to seize Arcot as soon as Nasir Jang should have recrossed the Krishna. Chanda Sahib knew that Dupleix would not consent to a settlement, if Arcot were not given, and replied accordingly; he contrived that his demands should be made known to Nasir Jang, knowing that the chances of a settlement would be indefinitely prolonged, unless Shah Nawaz Khan and Ramdas Pandit were definitely won over to his side.

Nasir Jang's order that the French factory at Masulipatam should be captured, was carried out by the subahdar of that place. The soldiers in the factory at Yanam defended themselves, but had to yield. These factories were seized in order to compel Dupleix to better terms. But Dupleix was not daunted; he sent troops to capture the fort at Valudavur; but as it was too strong to be taken by Indian troops alone without European reinforcements, he resolved to wait till Nasir Jang should have passed Arcot; there was also trouble with the sepoys (see below) who refused to act without their pay; and for the time the troops returned to Villianallur. He had ambitions that he could easily send by sea munitions to Yanam and Masulipatam, from which they could be easily carried to Hyderabad and Aurangabad.¹

office. Wearied with prevarication, Major Lawrence insisted on a peremptory answer, on which he was assured that he should be immediately satisfied, provided he would march with the battalion to Arcot . . . He did not think it prudent to comply with this proposal, lest the French and Chunda Sahib should take advantage of his absence and invade the English territory. He therefore endeavoured to divert the Soubah from this purpose, by representing that it would give the enemy an opportunity of recruiting their forces and recommencing hostilities; whereas by remaining near Pondicherry he might, by cutting off their communications with the country, reduce them to such distresses as would oblige them to accept of peace on his own terms. This reasoning producing no effect, the major returned with his battalion to Fort. St. David; . . . (Vol. 1, *Fourth Edition*, pp. 145-6).

¹ Dupleix contrived to have the following conveyed to Nasir Jang secretly:— 'Tell him secretly, that, if Masulipatam and the country be given to me, I will help Nasir Jang with all he needs to conquer the country as far as Delhi. I will send 4,000 soldiers to smite his enemies.'; also 'I will send munitions of war from here to Masulipatam and Yanam whence they can be easily carried to Hyderabad and Aurangabad; we of Pondicherry will conquer all who disobey

Conflicting news reached Pondicherry from Nasir Jang's camp. Shah Nawaz Khan wrote on May 11th that he would be remaining at Arcot for four months, and, if in the meantime Chanda Sahib gave satisfaction, the Arcot subah would be given to him, while Trichinopoly and a *mansab* jaghir for Tanjore would be granted immediately. Dupleix insisted that the places mortgaged to the French by Chanda Sahib should be restored to their possession till the money was paid; and the French factories in the Northern Sarkars should not be interfered with. He even offered to guarantee that Muzaffar Jang did not draw the sword against his uncle, as the latter feared he might do, if he were released and joined the French as was very likely.¹ Nasir Jang, it was reported, could not easily make up his mind; and it was also believed that Muhammad Ali Khan had been given Arcot and he had sent for 500 sepoys from the English as an escort and arranged to pay five lakhs of rupees to Nasir Jang and had sent for the amount from Trichinopoly.² A letter received by Jayaram Pandit at Pondicherry informed that Muhammad Ali was given the subah of Arcot and a dress of honour on the 11th May, i.e. on the night of the fifth of Jamādi-ul-Ākhir. Delay ensued in the matter of the proposal to release Muzaffar Jang and invest him with authority, as Nasir Jang feared danger for himself through such a contingency.³ Nasir Jang

him, and I will help him with all he needs to fulfil his desires.'—pp. 147 and 148—*Diary*, of the Vol. I. This offer was made in reply to the letter containing terms of settlement with Chanda Sahib received by Shah Nawaz Khan.

¹ Abdul Nabi Khan of Cuddapah urged Nasir Jang to release his nephew and give him his own country and Arcot, and then he would keep the French quiet and live at peace. Otherwise, he said, that if Muzaffar Jang should be carried away a prisoner, Nasir Jang should, for the sake of effecting perfect security, conquer the French, capture their fort, imprison Chanda Sahib and recover Muzaffar Jang's family who were at Pondicherry. The other nobles also advised Nasir Jang to the same effect; but one or two poisoned his mind with the fear, that, if Muzaffar Jang were released, he would win over the nobles and the army and bring about great trouble to Nasir Jang himself. (Entry for May 12, 1750).

² Dodwell points out that in a consultation held at Fort St. David on April 30, May 11, Flayer reported that Muhammad Ali had been appointed Nawab and desired that the sepoys in his service in the bounds of Fort St. David be sent over to him; and that, in consequence, it was resolved to advance their arrears amounting to 14,000 rupees and send them out. (Note on p. 154 of the *Diary*, vol. vii.)

³ 'Shah Nawaz Khan, Khazi Dayem and Moro Pandit are on Nasir Jang's side . . . all tell him that if Muzaffar Jang were released, he would seize and imprison both him and themselves, that Saiyid Lashkar Khan, the mansabdars, jamadars and others would choose Muzaffar Jang as their leader, seize the

continued to stay on for some days near Wandiwash, negotiating for the payment of a big sum of money to himself from Taqi Sahib who held the place, and was a son-in-law of Dost Ali. Once a storm of wind and rain beat down his tents; and in the confusion that ensued, a false rumour arose that Muzaffar Jang had escaped. The division of the Nizam's camp into the two parties respectively supporting the causes of Nasir Jang and his nephew, is seen more and more clearly in the entries of the Diarist. The latter's partisans like Sayyad Lashkar Khan, Jamil Beg Khan and the Nawabs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savanur are said to have resolved to overthrow Nasir Jang with their troops and to send Muzaffar Jang under a strong guard to Pondicherry for the sake of safety. Ramdas Pandit,¹ whom Grant-Duff calls 'the traitor Ramdass' was secretly in favour of Muzaffar Jang's elevation, pretended to seek Nasir Jang's interest alone and at the same time did all in his power to encourage Sayyad Lashkar Khan and Muzaffar Jang's party, communicating to them all that passed with Nasir Jang. It was only Shah Nawaz Khan and his adherents that were opposed to Muzaffar Jang; all the others wished Nasir Jang to be overthrown.² Dupleix even suggested that Muzaffar Jang might escape to Pondicherry by way of Alambarai where he would post some soldiers with boats and sloops, and from which he might go in a few hours to Kunimedu, Covelong or Pondicherry, whichever way the road should be clear, and arranged for some money being sent to him in pagodas as they would be easier to carry. The plot against Nasir Jang was expected to bear fruit in 15 or 20 days.

Meanwhile information was received that Shah Nawaz Khan had arranged that Trichinopoly and Tanjore should be leased out to Chanda Sahib, after being made over to Dupleix who could occupy them and then lease them to his protégé. Arcot was to be under

country. . . . That is why Nasir Jang has abandoned the idea of releasing Muzaffar Jang, now fearing that he will become an enemy and seek his death'—pp. 177-8 of vol. vii of the *Diary*.

¹ 'The fall of Nasir Jang was wrought by the intrigues of M. Dupleix. He gained a Brahmin, named Ramdas, a native of Sicacole, in the confidence of Nasir Jang, and through him raised seditions in the army, which Dupleix called into operation by an attack on the camp.' *History of the Marhattas*—4th ed. Chap. xviii—Vol. I, pp. 525-6.

² Diarist's entry for May 22nd, 1750—p. 183 of vol. vii.

Shah Nawaz Khan; and if Chanda Sahib should act for four or five months as he desired, and should pay the tribute due for Trichinopoly according to agreement, then he would receive Arcot. The amount owing to Dupleix from Muzaffar Jang should be paid by Chanda Sahib in return for the grant of Trichinopoly to him; and Muzaffar Jang's bond should be returned and his family sent away to him. Dupleix was assured by the envoy that the Mughals had made up their minds to seize Tanjore and grant it out; and though he expressed a fear that the Raja of Tanjore would apply to the English and the Dutch for help and promise them territory as against any French attack, still he was told that Shah Nawaz Khan desired to become the captor of the Tanjore fort, though the French should actually conquer it. Finally Dupleix agreed to be content with the grant of lands round Karikal equal to the cost of the expedition which would have to be sent to conquer Tanjore and to give an account of the total cost thereof¹. Dupleix was further told that Muhammad Ali was hard pressed for money and unable to pay at once all the amount due for the Arcot subah; and his brother, Mahfuz Khan (who had been made prisoner at Ambur, subsequently released by promising to pay Muzaffar Jang 11 lakhs for the Trichinopoly country and had later joined Nasir Jang's camp) was greatly depressed by the scant attention paid to him and threatened to turn *faqir* and go on a pilgrimage to Mecca². Sayyad Lashkar Khan, Sayyad Sharif Khan and others now departed with their contingents; while the Pathan Nawabs also sent their troops in advance; thus Nasir Jang could not stay long and must soon depart. He agreed to appoint Taqi Sahib of Wandiwash as the Diwan of Muhammad Ali, after which he proceeded to Arcot. Taqi Sahib also agreed to make Muhammad Ali Khan of Polur (Chanda Sahib's brother) swear to be friends with his namesake and gave plenty of trouble to Chanda Sahib's wife who was at Wandiwash and whom he now turned out of the fort.

¹ Conversation between Dupleix and Jayaram Pandit in the presence of Chanda Sahib and the Diarist, according to the latter's entry for May 26th.

² Shortly before Anwar-ud-din's death, Mahfuz Khan had been appointed as the deputy of his father at Arcot, by the diplomacy of his partisan Raja Sampat Rai. He had joined his father, before the struggle at Ambur (Burhan-ud-din's *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi*—Bk. I.)

III. THE EMPLOYMENT OF SEPOYS BY THE FRENCH

In the month of May when Dupleix presented medals to Abdul Rahman and Shaikh Hasan with commissions for them as captains of the sepoy and the Diarist entered this fact in his account, he gave an account of the origin of the sepoy in the French service, which is deemed by Dodwell to be a generally accurate account. In 1740, when war was threatened between England and France sepoy were first entertained; but it was not Dupleix that entertained them, as the Diarist says of the enlistment of Shaikh Hasan and others. 'They were first employed at Mahe in the war with Boyanore, 1739-40, when Dupleix was still at Chandernagore. Early in 1742 Dumas ordered three companies of them over to the Coromandel coast to assist in defending Karikal against the Tanjoreans. Two companies were sent back in 1743 and broke; but others again were obtained in 1746 at the request of La Bourdonnais, who had seen them in action at Mahe in 1741. It is interesting to note that whereas the English soon appointed European drill-sergeants and a European adjutant to their Sepoy-Corps, Dupleix left the command and discipline entirely in Indian hands, except when sepoy were co-operating with European troops.'¹ Ranga Pillai gives Dupleix the entire credit of the enlisting of sepoy. He says: 'Dupleix entertained in his service, Shaikh Hasan, Abdul Rahman and others who had formerly served in the troubles at Mahe on the coast of Malabar. After these troubles were over, Shaikh Hasan, Bikkan Khan, etc., came here with 200 sepoy. A year later Bikkan Khan and 100 sepoy were sent back; and Shaikh Hasan with his 100 sepoy was invited to stay. He did not receive enough even to buy *conjee* . . . but news came of war being declared between England and France (September, 1744). Thereon Shaikh Hasan was summoned and directed to invite his elder brother (Abdul Rahman) (who was out of service in Malabar) with 500 or 600 sepoy. Abdul Rahman came accordingly. When . . . Dupleix seized Madras . . . Abdul Rahman and his brother seized palanquins, elephants, horses, etc., . . . and the Governor permitted all to keep their booty . . .

¹ Dodwell's note on the Diarist's account, in p. 168 of the *Diary*, vol. vii.

'The raising of actual native regiments was first undertaken by the French, and it was due to the coming struggle for mastery in Southern India, that we owe the first conception of a regular native army.' McMunn in *The Armies of India*, p. 4.

When the English were attacked at Fort St. David and they attacked the French at Pondicherry, he brought some men under the pretence of enlisting them as sepoys. . . . He made more money on the expedition against Anwar-ud-din Khan by telling Chanda Sahib that he had raised 2,000 horsemen and sepoys. . . . Ranga Pillai is angry that he should have had a free hand in making so much money by plunder, and thinks that he cared very little for his commission as captain from Europe or his present or medals and looked to the getting of a high mansab for himself from the Mughals. Another detail that the Diarist supplied was that the sepoys still wore their traditional clothing of coats, trousers and turbans and their native commandants supplied them with it.¹

Shaikh Hasan and Abdur Rahman had frequently to suffer from the insubordination and mutinous spirit of the sepoys. The latter were usually in considerable arrears of pay. When Shaikh Hasan took Tiruvidi fort from its *killedar* in June, the sepoys actually refused to march without their pay. After the fort was captured, it was with great difficulty that they could be restrained from plundering; Shaikh Hasan told Dupleix, according to the Diarist, that the sepoys abused him so violently that he feared for his life, and they declared that if they were not allowed to give back their muskets and be dismissed, they would become afraid for their lives and then kill their captain.²

IV. FRENCH CAPTURE OF MASULIPATAM

On the first of June a sloop was despatched from Pondicherry to recover the Yanam factory which had been abandoned by its chief, Lenoir, on the approach of Khaja Namatullah Khan; but the Diarist thought that it was intended to procure the release of M. Coquet, chief of the factory at Masulipatam. Nasir Jang gave orders that the two French factories of Yanam and Masulipatam should be seized; the factories were easily taken possession of by Khaja Namatullah Khan, the subhadar of Ellore and Rajahmundry about whom mention has

¹ Diarist's entry for June 1, 1750, p. 219—of vol. vii of the *Diary*.

² Pages 265-66 of vol. vii of the *Diary*. Dodwell remarks that such mutinous episodes, due mainly to their pay being in arrears, were by no means uncommon among the French sepoys. 'The murder of Dewan Raghunath Das, a little later in the Deccan, shows that Shaikh Hasan's fears were not wholly imaginary. Bussy himself was at one time in apprehension for his life.'—*Ibid.*, footnote 1.

been already made. He advanced on Yanam with 2,000 foot and 200 horse; and Lenoir, the chief of that factory had the trees surrounding it to be cut down and the ground levelled. Dupleix had tried in the course of his secret negotiations with Shah Nawaz Khan that Nasir Jang should direct that the French factories should not be interfered with and give a written order to that effect. Lenoir abandoned the Yanam factory, even before it was attacked by the enemy; he took shelter in one of the islands at the mouth of the river, situated to the north-east, where the French had taken refuge during the late Mahratta invasion. At Masulipatam two French factors were taken prisoners and M. Coquet, the chief of the French factory, was asked to pay 15,000 pagodas. Lenoir retired to the island with all the goods, men and a few guns¹. Presently the Yanam factory was recovered; and Masulipatam was captured later. Dupleix knew of the defenceless condition of Masulipatam² and resolved to take it by assault, regarding it as an acquisition essential for the realization of his future views.

On July 9, 1750, two large vessels with a boat were despatched with 200 soldiers, 150 sepoys and 10 *topasses* under the command of M. de La Tour with mortars, cannon and other equipment to attack and capture Masulipatam; and a lakh of rupees was also sent in order to provide the factories with goods. The vessels arrived before Masulipatam on July 11th, and took possession of the fort without 'the least opposition', while the Mughals attempted 'to blockade the place, but quickly desisted.' The French landed in the night and took the town with very little loss; they kept possession of it and immediately began to put it into a better position of defence. The

¹ According to *Orme* (vol. i, p. 146), 'Nasir Jang's officers proceeded without violence, plundered nothing and sealed up what they took possession of. The detriment sustained was not considerable.' 'The French repeatedly declared that the English from the neighbouring factory of Ingeram had helped the Moghuls to take Yanam. Even M. Cultru makes the same assertion. However the English correspondence cited above (Fort St. David Letters received 1750) shows that they had no hand in it.' (Dodwell—*Dupleix and Clive*—Note 1 on p. 51). Dodwell says that, despite Nasir Jang's orders, only the four walls of the Yanam factory were left standing.

² According to the Diarist, the amaldars of Masulipatam trembled and said they had behaved foolishly when they extracted money from the French factory and feared that the French would come and burn and destroy the whole country; while the merchants feared that the town would never regain its old prosperity (entry for 5th June, 1750—p. 231 of vol. vii of the *Diary*.)

Mussalman authorities declared that they lodged the French prisoners well and treated them respectfully; and so they were not to be blamed for obeying the orders of their master, Nasir Jang. All the inhabitants were allowed to return; and the sepoys and Europeans were warned that they would be severely punished for any theft or plunder; and the Diarist notes with evident satisfaction that 'all those who fled from the town have returned, including even the Dutch and their families.'¹ Nasir Jang was sorely troubled by the loss of Masulipatam, where the French did not allow even the Dutch to fly their flag, though they did not in any manner interfere with the Dutch trade.² The Dutch Council at Negapatam protested that their factory site was given to them by the Mughal emperor, and they had his orders for flying their flag and hence the French ought not to have pulled it down. Dupleix replied that their contention held good so long as the port was in Mughal possession; but as the French had captured it, and 'as both flags cannot fly there, we have ordered theirs to be pulled down and that they can hoist their flag there only when they produce the orders of the King of France.' On October 22nd, the Diarist recorded that he heard that, owing to orders from Negapatam, the Dutch factory people at Masulipatam had sent all their goods by ship to Kothapatnam and Cocanada on the New Moon day; and as such a day was unlucky, a tempest arose and two Dutch ships sank with their cargoes of goods and money. The abandonment of the Dutch factory was intended as 'a protest against the action of the French in refusing to allow the Dutch flag to fly there.'³

V—FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Dupleix was frequently advised and persuaded himself into believing that for fear of him, Nasir Jang hesitated to entrust the subah

¹ Diarist's entry for July 25th, 1750—p. 325 of the *Diary*, vol. vii.

² Dupleix added, as Dodwell says, in his letter to Masulipatam; 'Nous pensons que, si vous aviez, voulu joindre vos sollicitations à celles des principaux marchands de Masulipatam pour la délivrance des Srs. Coquet et Lasalle, nous ne nous fussions point trouvés dans le cas de nous emparer de cette ville.'

³ The Dutch indeed landed a party of soldiers, a few weeks after the French captured the place, but were easily compelled to withdraw them. 'They seem to have displayed a political ineptitude similar to that which ruined their expedition to Bengal (1759).' After the English secured possession of the place they ceded their factory which was then in a very ruinous condition and all their rights along with it.

of Arcot to Muhammad Ali and nobody dared to accept the job. He resolved to tie *toranams*, as a mark of French occupation in the regions of Tiruvidi, Panruti and Villupuram and to get the mortgage amounts due to him from Mudāmiah, the faujdar of Chidambaram, who held the place from Abdul Nabi Khan of Cuddapah. Mudāmiah removed his goods and property to Devikottai, under the protection of the English; and Dupleix was advised by Ranga Pillai to send a few soldiers and sepoys with a couple of mortars in order to coerce him for the amount due. Mudāmiah complained that Muhammad Ali's men were demanding payment and protested that he would wait for instructions about the Chidambaram mortgage from Nawab Abdul Nabi Khan. Ranga Pillai and Dupleix distrusted Mudāmiah's professions and sent dragoons and sepoys against him; thereupon he fled to Devikottai with a number of people from Chidambaram. The French troops pursued him and his men agreed to remain in the fort and promised to pay a part of the amount in ready money and the balance in a few days. Evidently, he wished 'to be able to allege compulsion in case the other side called him to an account for the payments he made.' He negotiated with the Diarist for time in which to sell grain enough to pay 50,000 rupees and was told to give sowcar's bonds for the balance due.

After reaching Arcot where he stayed for some days, he was told by Muhammad Ali that he could manage the *subah* if he were allowed to maintain 10,000 horse and receive all the collections, but not otherwise; he had not the help of the English to oppose the French and meet them in battle, as Nasir Jang had refused to grant them the Poonamalle and Devanampatnam countries and Mylapore as *inam* and they had departed in consequence. The Diarist reported to Dupleix on June 11, 1750, that when Muzaffar Jang was imprisoned in the Arcot fort, he attempted to take his life by tying a cloth round his neck, but was prevented from doing so by Nasir Jang's guards; thereupon he was comforted by Shah Nawaz Khan, under instructions from Nasir Jang, with a promise of 'the kingdom he desired and a dress of honour'. Nasir Jang desired that the Pathan Nawabs who were anxious to depart should stay with him till he also started. Taqi Sahib of Wandiwash was afraid of the French and now desired that the proposal regarding Chanda Sahib should be carried out successfully although till lately, he was hostile to Chanda Sahib. Dupleix

was told that if the French should capture the fort of Valudavur, matters would be hastened by Nasir Jang towards a settlement; while Chanda Sahib was desirous that French troops should occupy the countries of Villupuram and Tiruvidi as well as Porto Novo in order that Nasir Jang might be frightened into granting him terms.

Conflicting counsels prevailed at Arcot. It was reported that Muzaffar Jang promised to bring round Chanda Sahib and fetch him to Arcot and that Mahfuz Khan advised Muhammad Ali that the French would kill whoever became *Subahdar* and would conquer the country.¹ Villupuram and Tiruvidi were occupied by French sepoys. Chanda Sahib was advised by his brother, Muhammad Ali Khan of Polur to beware of going to Arcot for an interview, even though he should be promised safety by means of an oath on the *Quran*. It was also learnt that Shah Nawaz Khan himself was preparing to to set out for Pondicherry to pacify Dupleix and Chanda Sahib and to take Muzaffar Jang's mother, wife and children. The capture of Tiruvidi frightened the Mussalmans at Chidambaram into compliance. Shah Nawaz Khan himself is reported to have secretly written to Dupleix, that if he should seize the fort of Valudavur, he would obtain what he desired through the very efforts of his enemies. The Pathan Nawabs, Abdul Nabi Khan, Himayat Bahadur Khan and Abdul Majid Khan refused to pay their *peshkash* to Nasir Jang on the ground that they had not paid any even to his father and would pay him none now, their lands were plundered by the *poligars* and the Nizam was responsible for the cost of their maintaining troops to chastise them. Nasir Jang became angry; and the Nawabs absented themselves from the *darbar*. A collision occurred between Nasir Jang's people and their followers, and Shah Nawaz Khan had to intervene to make peace.² There were also troubles between the Peshwa and Nasir Jang; and the former had sent word to the latter urging him to return. As if these troubles were not enough, Muzaffar Jang made a second effort to escape from his prison-room; and Nasir Jang had to put new and vigilant guards over him and took away from him the liberty of receiving visits and sending messages.

¹ Entry for June 13th—pp. 252-3 of the *Diary*, vol. vii.

² The Diarist, after recording these items of news, wrote:—'The Arcot people and other *killedars* who expected much are discontented. All Nasir Jang's old friends have become his enemies. . . His commands are disregarded and he cannot prosper. . .'

In the beginning of July it was rumoured at Pondicherry that a number of nobles of the Nizam had resolved to release Muzaffar Jang, establish him as the *subhadar* of the Deccan and seize or slay Nasir Jang; and Muzaffar Jang's attempted escape, noted above, was in reality done with their connivance; and when it failed, the latter took all the blame on himself and pretended madness. Chanda Sahib advised that agents should be employed to arrange matters secretly with the Pathan Nawabs for the deposition of Nasir Jang. Letters were written cautiously by Dupleix, to Chanda Sahib's men at the Nizam's camp couched in general terms;¹ and the messengers were given specific instructions to arrange an interview between the discontented nobles and the Pathan Nawabs.

VI. THE ENGLISH JOIN MUHAMMAD ALI

While thus Dupleix was taking advantage of the situation in Nasir Jang's camp, Muhammad Ali wrote to the English Governor Floyer, saying that the French were fortifying themselves in Tiruvidi, and declaring that a *sanad* granting Poonamalle to the English had been drawn out and lodged with a substantial merchant at Arcot and would be delivered to them when Muhammad Ali should become the Nawab, in September, after Nasir Jang should depart; he also sent a copy of the *sanad*, along with a bill of exchange for Rs. 20,000 to defray the expenses of the troops for two months in lieu of the Poonamalle revenues for that period.² As the French were preparing both openly and insiduously to make Chanda Sahib Nawab, Captain Cope was sent out with a body of 600 men and a field-train on June 30th, and joined the Nawab who had marched down from Arcot with a body of horse a little to the west of Tiruvidi.³

¹ 'So also you seek to remove evil from the country, and accomplish all that you undertake. I will therefore grant you all that you desire as soon as I hear that the matter has been settled.'—p. 304 of vol. vii of the *Diary*.

² *The Madras Despatches* (1744-55), p. 114.

³ The Diarist wrote that Major Lawrence who was acting as Governor at Fort St. David, had recalled Cope; but Muhammad Ali told Cope who was about to start that he had only come down in reliance on English help; and that if they now departed under the pretext that a new Governor had been appointed, he would be unable to fulfil his promises to Nasir Jang. Both he and Cope wrote to Lawrence for further orders. Entry for July 18, 1750, p. 31-4 of vol. vii of the *Diary*. Later the Diarist entered for July 26th, that Mr. Lawrence had refused help before reinforcements arrived to guard Fort St. David and declared that he could do nothing of himself without orders. (p. 327).

Muhammad Ali Khan later advanced to Tirupapuliyur, near Fort St. David, with his brother, Abdul Wahab Khan, his brother-in-law, Khair-ud-din Khan, Dewan Muhammad Abrar, Bade Sahib son of Hussain Tahir and other *jemadars*. He had about 4,600 horsemen, 4,000 peons and about 500 matchlock men of his own; while Cope had 700 Europeans, 13 field-pieces and about 2,300 sepoy and peons, besides a large number of horsemen etc. of the Nizam according to the information of the Diarist.¹ 500 horsemen were sent in the direction of Porto Novo and Chidambaram. It was feared that the English might go as far as Gingee. There was an engagement near Tiruvidi on the bank of the river on August 1st, between Muhammad Ali's troops and the French, the English also taking part in the fight.² In the end the English, after some cannonading, were compelled to withdraw. The situation thus dragged on, till Cope was recalled to Fort St. David, in the end of the month, 'as the French would not and we could not attack.' Muhammad Ali had written to Nasir Jang that the countries promised to the English before, should now be offered to them, though, in June itself, he wrote that a *sanad* had been made out for them. Thus the situation about the middle of August was very unsatisfactory for the English; and Dupleix pushed on with his efforts, and brought things to the crisis at Nasir Jang's camp ending in his assassination.

¹ Muhammad Ali procured the assistance of 600 Englishmen under Cope; while the French troops consisted of 500 Europeans under La Tarche, their best officer. According to Orme, the English ordered a body of 400 Europeans and 1,500 sepoy to take the field and the Nawab marched with an army of 20,000 men, of which more than one-half were the troops of Nasir Jang.

² According to Orme there was a skirmish which lasted till night (31st July) when the detachment was recalled. The next day Cope persuaded the Nawab to march against Tiruvidi fort in order to draw the French from their strongly pitched camp. The Nawab asked his troops, under the advice of Cope, to scale the walls, but they refused to undertake so perilous an attempt. The army marched back the next morning (2nd Aug.) towards the French encampment and formed for battle within gunshot of their entrenchments. The French commander sent a messenger to ask the reason why the English came so near their posts; Cope replied that the English were acting as allies to the Nawab and would accompany him into all parts of his dominions and assist him against all his enemies. In the struggle which ensued, the French, being in their entrenchment, suffered less than the Nawab and the English (pp. 148-9 of vol. i).

Peshwa Raghunāth Rāu's Agents in England

By

HARIHAR DAS

THE mission of the Peshwa Raghunāth Rao's agents to the Directors of the East India Company in London, is well known to students of Indian history, and there is, therefore, no need to expatiate on the circumstances which induced them to come to England.¹ There are several references to documents concerning the Peshwa and his agents in the 'Catalogue of the Home Miscellaneous Series of the India Office Records', compiled by the late Mr. Samuel Charles Hill. The students of the East India Company's records are under a deep debt of gratitude to Mr. Hill, not only for this thorough and valuable work, but also for his other contributions to modern Indian history. In volume 153 of the Home Miscellaneous Series, are contained two letters regarding the Peshwa's agents and their business with the Directors of the East India Company. The first letter is from the Earl of Hillsborough to Raghunāth Rāo, and the second from Sir Stanier Porten to Peter Mitchell, of the Company. The letters are copied *verbatim* :—

ST. JAMES'S,
31st July, 1781.

TO RAGOBATH ROW.
ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,

I should think myself very unworthy of the honor you have done me by your letter, if I omitted to express to you in writing the high sense I entertain of it. It is for this Reason that I deliver this letter to the three Persons you have sent into this kingdom. The King, my Royal master, having long since delegated the care of East India Affairs for this country, to the East India Company, those Persons were immediately referred to the Principal Directors of that Company,

¹ For further references to the Peshwa's agents, see the present writer's articles on 'The Early Indian Visitors to England', in the *Calcutta Review* (October 1924; January 1925 and April 1928); and also an article on 'Expiation for Foreign Travel' in *The Young Men of India* for September, 1930.

to hold Conference with them upon such matters as they had in charge from you, and I understand they have conferred with the Principal Directors accordingly.

I recommend you, Illustrious Sir, to the constant care and Protection of Almighty God, and am with great respect,

Your etc.,
HILLSBOROUGH.

ST. JAMES'S,
31st July, 1781.

PETER MITCHELL, ESQ.

SIR,

In answer to the letter you favoured me with of the 26th instant I am directed by the Earl of Hillsborough to acquaint you for the information of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East India Company that His Lordship has entirely dispatched Mr. Udny and the Agents from Ragobah and that they can have no further occasion to see His Lordship or be detained a day longer on his account.

SIR STANIER PORTEN.

The Historical Origin of the Distinction between Svārthanumana and Parārthanumana

BY

DR. SAILESWAR SEN
(Annamalai University)

IN his article ¹ 'Rapports entre la théorie bouddhique et l'enseignement des autres écoles philosophiques de l'Inde', Stcherbatskoi maintains that the distinction between 'inference for oneself' (*svārthanumāna*) and 'inference for others' (*parārthanumāna*) had its origin in the Buddhist logic. His theory is accepted by Keith who, in his *Indian Logic and Atomism* says—

'A further ² important innovation is the appearance of the distinction, wholly unknown to Gautama and Kaṇāda, of the process of inference for oneself (*svanīścārtha*) and for another (*parārtha*). The distinction is one which is accepted by the syncretist school, though not adopted by commentators like Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra, who remain faithful to the texts they explain.'

* * * *

'Yet ³ a further proof of the dependence of Praśastapāda on Dignāga may be derived from the fact that the distinction of reasoning for oneself and reasoning for another, which gives syllogism, is present in Dignāga and is expressly stated by Dharmōttara in his commentary on Dharmakīrti to have been introduced by him, and to stand in relation to his theory of the function of language in knowledge. . . . Praśastapāda's debt to Dignāga in this regard is clear, despite his slight change in terminology, which may legitimately be attributed to a desire to conceal his borrowing, for he retains in practice, if not in theory, verbal testimony as a means of proof, while adopting the principle of distinction between reasoning

¹ Le Muséon (N. S., Vol. V., 1904.)

² pp. 94-95.

³ pp. 106-108.

for oneself and reasoning for another, which in truth rests on the fact that verbal testimony is no true means of proof at all.'

Keith's contention that the distinction had its origin in the Buddhist logic thus rests on three principal assumptions, viz.—

(1) That the authorship of the distinction is expressly attributed to Dignāga in Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭṭika*.

(2) That Dignāga flourished before Praśastapāda who borrowed the distinction, among other ideas, from the Buddhist logician.

(3) That the distinction was unknown to Kāpāda and Gautama, nor was it adopted by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra. (It should be noted that no mention is made of Vātsyāyana either by Keith or by Stcherbatskoi.)

In support of the first assumption Keith refers to pp. 46-47 in Peterson's edition of *Nyāyabinduṭṭika*, though Dignāga's name occurs nowhere in those pages. Most probably the words *samprati* and *acārya* in the following two passages misled him into thinking that 'inference for others' was an innovation introduced by the Buddhist school, and that the original author of this innovation was Ācārya Dignāga.

(1) *Nanu ca samyag jñānātmakam anumānam uktam ; tat kimarthaṃ samprati vacanātmakam anumānam ucyate.*

(2) *Tataḥ pratipadakaṃ śabdān avasyaṃ vaktavyaṃ darśayann anumānaśabdeno'ktavān ācārya iti paramārthaḥ.*

The word *samprati* in the first passage which contains a *pūrvapakṣa* does not, however, necessarily indicate that 'inference for others' (which is verbal in character as distinguished from 'inference for oneself' which is a purely mental operation) is an innovation lately introduced by the Buddhist school. The *pūrvapakṣin* is very often a fictitious person who is credited with statements that have no historical foundation. As for the word *acārya* in the second passage, we fail to understand why it should refer to Dignāga, and not to Dharmakīrti, the author of *Nyāyabindu*. Besides, Dharmottara's authority as a historical source is of very little weight in this connection, as he flourished more than three centuries after Dignāga.

As against the second assumption, we would note that analogies between Dignāga and Praśastapāda do not necessarily prove that the former flourished before the latter. Further, Dignāga's priority cannot be adduced as an argument for Praśastapāda's indebtedness to the

Buddhist logician, at least so far as the distinction between 'inference for oneself' and 'inference for others' is concerned ; for the distinction is present, as we shall shew, in the Sūtras of Gautama and in the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, though we must admit that it is not clearly traceable in the Sūtras of Kāpāda.

That the distinction was not unknown to Gautama can not be better proved than by quoting the following passages from Keith's *Indian Logic and Atomism*, which are hardly reconcilable with the theory he maintains—

'The origin¹ of the syllogistic form can then be recognized as arising from the effort to expound a proposition to another : the proposition is stated ; the reason for it is asked ; the ground is given ; its validity is called in question ; an example familiar and therefore cogent is adduced ; and the similarity of the subject to the example is emphasized, and the conclusion is finally drawn.'

* * * *

'The inference² for another is definitely identified (by Praśastapāda) with the five-member syllogism, which in Gautama forms a category, and is not classified formally as a means of proof³, though inference itself is so classed.'

We fail to understand how, in the face of the above statements, it is possible for Keith to maintain without being inconsistent that the distinction was unknown to Gautama.

Apart from being a non-verbal mental operation, 'inference for oneself' differs from 'inference for others' in another important respect, viz., that it is a mode of discovery, and not a mode of proof or demonstration. It is true that the terms 'inference for oneself' and 'inference for others' occur nowhere in the N. S. But it may be pointed out that what is known as 'inference for oneself' in later logic is simply called 'inference' by Gautama, who never uses this term in the sense of proof or demonstration. In N. S. I., 1, 5, inference is distinguished into three varieties, viz., *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*. A similar distinction is found in Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya,

¹ pp. 87-88.

² p. 85.

³ *Pramāṇa* should be translated as 'means of true knowledge', and not as 'means of proof'.

though there we have only two varieties, and not three¹, viz., *dr̥ṣṭa* (*pūrvavat*) and *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa*. At the end of this discussion on the *dr̥ṣṭa* and *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa* inference, Praśastapāda observes: 'Such² is inference for the sake of one's own certainty.' That inference as defined in N. S. I. 1. 5. corresponds to Praśastapāda's *svanīścīlārthanumāna* is also confirmed by the similarity of Vātsyāyana's description of the genesis of inference in his Bhāṣya on that Sūtra to Praśastapāda's description of the genesis of *svanīścīlārthanumāna*. In explaining the significance of the word *latpūrvakam* in N. S. I. 1. 5. Vātsyāyana says:—

'Tatpūrvakam:³ By this [it is] meant [that there must be previous] perception of the connection of the sign and the signate, and [subsequent] perception of the sign. [It is also] meant [that there must be] remembrance of the sign consequent on [the previous] perception of the sign and the signate [as] connected [together]. By means of remembrance and [subsequent] perception of the sign an unperceived object is inferred.'

The above account is in all essentials similar to Praśastapāda's which is as follows:—

'From⁴ the perception, unassailed by doubt, [of the presence] of smoke [in a hill] and from the remembrance of the association [of smoke and fire],—subsequent to these [processes] the certainty [of the presence] of fire [in the hill] arises [in the mind] of one to whom the concurrence [of smoke and fire] is well-known.'

¹ Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya (with Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī—Benares Sanskrit Series), pp. 304–307. But we practically meet with *śeṣavad anumāna*, in the proof that P. gives of the existence of Ātman in pp. 130–31: *Parīṣeṣād ātmakāryatvāt*. In his Kiraṇāvalī U. explains it thus: *Parīṣeṣyāt prasaktapratīṣedhe'nyatrāprasamgāt śiṣyamānatayātmakāryatvāt*.—Cf. Vātsyāyana's explanation of *śeṣavad anumāna* in his Bhāṣya on N. S. I. 1. 5: *Śeṣavan nāma parīṣeṣaḥ; sa ca prasaktapratīṣedhe'nyatrāprasamgāt śiṣyamāne sampratyayaḥ*. In V. S. II. 1. 27 Kaṇāda says: *Parīṣeṣāl līṅgam ākāśasya*. In his Upaskāra, Śaṅkara Miśra explains it thus: *Ātrāpi śabdah kvacid ārito guṇatvāt rūpādivad iti sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭād aṣṭadravyātirikṭadravyasiddhiḥ*. From this it appears that *parīṣeṣānumāna* is considered by Śaṅkara Miśra to be a form of *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa*.—Cf. Faddegon's *Vaiśeṣika System*, p. 172, and pp. 312–13.

² *Etat svanīścīlārthanam anumānam*.

³ *Tatpūrvakam iṣyanena līṅgalīṅginoh sambandhadarśanam līṅgadarśanañcābhisambadhyate. Līṅgalīṅginoh sambaddhāyor darśanena līṅgasmrtir abhisambadhyate. Smṛtyā līṅgadarśanena cāpratyakṣo'rho'numīyate*.

⁴ *Prasiddhasamayāsandigdhadhūmadarśanāt sūhacaryānusmaranāt tadantaram agnyadhyavasāyo bhavati*.

That the term 'inference' is used by Gautama in the sense of 'inference for oneself' is also evident from the following passage in Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on N. S. II. 1. 45, where analogy is distinguished from inference by being described as *parārtha*.

'[Analogy¹ is different from inference], because this [man], who has learned the analogy [from another man] and has seen a *go*, understands the usage of the name-word *gavaya*, when he sees an object similar to a *go*. But inference is not like this. Moreover, analogy is for the sake of others, because it is employed, by one to whom both [the *go* and the *gavaya*] are well-known, for the sake of him to whom the subject of comparison is not well-known.'

In contrast with Gautama's inference stands his category of 'member' (*avayava*) representing the process of 'inference for others' which consists in proving or demonstrating a proposition to a second person in the form of a five-member syllogism. Apart from the fact that the terms *sādhyā* in N. S. I. 1. 33. and *sādhana* in N. S. I. 1. 34. are explained by Vātsyāyana as *prajñāpanīya* and *prajñāpana* respectively, the function of the 'members' is expressly stated by Uddyotakara in his Vārttika on N. S. I. 1. 33 to be communication of knowledge to others. To quote from the Vārttika—

'[Should² you ask]: But why are 'question' etc. not 'members'? [We would reply]: Because [question, etc.] do not communicate knowledge to others. 'Members' are those which, [being] significant each with a meaning not conveyed by the rest, attain the status of members of a sentence, [and] communicate knowledge to others'.

The 'members' arranged in their proper order and considered as a whole are called *nyāya*. Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattvacintāmani* says: 'And that "inference for others" is to be performed by means of *nyāya*'³. The use of the term *nyāya* in this technical sense is not,

¹ *Yadā hyayam upayuktopamāno godarśi gavā samānārthan pāsyati, tadāyam gavaya ityasya sañjāśabdasya vyavasthām pratipadyate. Na caivam anumānam iti. Parārthāñcopamānam. Yasya hyupameyam aprasiddham tadārthan prasiddhobhayena kriyati iti*.

² *Katham punar jīṇāsādayo'vayavā na bhavanti; parāpratipādatvāt. Parāpratipādakā yā ilaretarāpratyāyitenārthenārthavanto vākyāṅgatām upayānti te'vayavāḥ*.

³ *Tac cānumānam parārthan nyāyasādhyaṃ*.

however, unknown to Vātsyāyana, as is evident from the following passage in his Bhāṣya on N.S.I.1.¹

'The proposition, etc. [constitute] the five members of that whole expression-series through which the proof of the probandum attains completion. They are called 'members' in relation to the whole. In them [is to be found] the combination of the four means of true knowledge. The proposition is *āgama*; the probans is inference; the example is perception; the application is analogy whilst the conclusion shews the efficiency of the combination of all the four means of true knowledge for the attainment of a common end. This is what is called the *nyāya par excellence*. By means of this discussion, wrangling and cavilling take place.'

Though Keith's contention that the distinction was not adopted by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra cannot bear examination in view of our findings stated above, yet we would invite a reference to the following passage in Vācaspati Miśra's *Tatparyatīkā* on N.S.V.2.3., where the term 'inference for others' actually occurs—

'In "inference² for others" the merits and demerits belonging to a sentence are discussed, and not an object that is unconnected with the sentence'.

In the passage we quoted from Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on N.S.I.1.1. we were told that in a *nyāya* the four means of true knowledge converged. The question therefore arises: How are we to reconcile this statement with our contention that Gautama's five-member *nyāya* represents 'inference for others'? Before we attempt to answer it, we would quote the following passage from Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on N.S.I.1.39, where he gives a reasoned statement of the remarks contained in his Bhāṣya on N.S.I.1.1.—

'The [four] means³ of true knowledge, converging in a sentence [composed of] all the members, establish a fact by virtue of [their] inter-relation. To explain [their] convergence: the proposition is

¹ *Sādhaniyārthasya yāvatī śabdasaṁhāhe siddhiḥ parisamāpyate tasya pañcāvayavaḥ pratiññādayaḥ samāham apēkṣyāvayava ucyante. Teṣu pramāṇasamavāyah. Āgamaḥ pratiññā; hetur anumānam; udāharanaṁ pratyakṣam; upamānam upanayaḥ; sarveṣāṁ ekārthasamavāye sāmānyapradarśanaṁ nigamanam iti. So'yaṁ paramo nyāya iti. Etena vādajalpavilāṇḍhāḥ pravartante.*

² *Parārthānumāne ca vacanagatā guṇadoṣa vicāryante na tu vatanānapēkṣam vastu.*

³ *Avayavasamudāye ca vākye sambhūyetaṇḍarābhisambandhāt pramāṇānyarthaṁ sādhyanti. Sambhavas tāvat: Śabdaviśayaḥ pratiññā, āptopadeśasya*

about a fact derived from *śabda*, because of [the necessity of] re-examining the instructive words of authority by perception and inference, and because of the want of self-dependence in one who is not a *ṛsi* [in having access to such a fact]. The probans is inference, because of [the arising of] the knowledge [that a particular object is the probans] after one has observed [its concomitance with the signate in the example].¹ This very [point] has been explained in the commentary on 'the example'. The example is about a fact derived from perception, because of [the necessity of] establishing the unperceived by the perceived. The application is analogy, because of [the necessity of] summing up with 'So'. . . . The conclusion shews the efficiency of all [the four means of true knowledge] in establishing the same fact.

'The proposition is *āgama*' means that the subject-matter of X's proposition is a fact derived from *āgama* by X, but not by Y to whom X proposes to prove it by *nyāya*. Though X's proposition is a statement of what he has learned from *āgama*, yet it can not be accepted as *āgama* by Y, because it is assumed that X is not a *ṛsi*. Had it been accepted as *āgama* by Y, it would not have been necessary for X to prove it to Y by *nyāya*. To quote from Uddyotakara's Vārttika on N. S. I. 1. 1.—

'[Pūrvapakṣin] :

[It is] ² not right [to say that] the proposition is *āgama*, because *āgama*, [being itself a means of true knowledge], has the capacity of establishing a truth [independently of any other means of true knowledge], whilst the subject-matter of the proposition is [something which is yet] to be established.

[Uttarapakṣin] :

[There is] no fault [in saying that] the proposition is *āgama*, because that which is derived from *āgama* has to be demonstrated.

pratyakṣānumānābhyāṁ pratisandhānāt, anyeṣca svāntaryānuvāpattēḥ. Anumānam hetuḥ, udāharane samādrśya pratipattēḥ; taccodāharanābhāṣye vyākhyātam. Pratyakṣaviśayam udāharanaṁ, dṛṣṭenadr̥ṣṭasiddheḥ. Upamānam upanayaḥ, tāthetyupasaṁhārāt. . . . Sarveṣāṁ ekārthapratipattau sāmānyapradarśanaṁ nigamanam iti.

¹ Cf. Vācaspati: *Udāharane dṛṣṭāntadharmini sādhyasādhanaṇyoh prati-bandham sādṛśyam samyag dṛṣṭvā līngasya pratīṭhē.*

² *Āgamaḥ pratiññēti na yuktaṁ, āgamasyalaitvavyavacchedakatvāt, pratiññārthasya ca pratipadyatvāt. Āgamādhigatasya pratipadyatvāt āgamaḥ pratiññēti na doṣaḥ. Ya evārtha āgamenādhigatas tameva parasmā 'caṣṭa ityāgamaḥ pratiññētyucyate.*

One states [in the proposition] for the sake of others the same fact as has been derived [by one] from *agama*. So it is said that the proposition is *agama*.¹

But the question arises: Is the subject-matter of X's proposition always a fact derived from *agama*? Propositions like: 'The Ātman exists' have *agama* for their original source, no doubt. But what about propositions like: 'The hill has fire'? For an answer to this question we would refer to the following passage in Vācaspati's *Tātparyatīkā* on N. S. I. 1. 1.—

'This Śāstra¹ functions for the purpose of establishing the Ātman and other knowables. It treats of *nyāya*, because it is indispensable for that [purpose]. It treats of only that which directly establishes the Ātman and other knowables, or that which establishes the trustworthiness of *agama* which [again] establishes those [knowables]. The proposition, which is the first member of that special *nyāya* is about a fact belonging to *agama*. It has [such a fact] for its subject-matter directly, or [if it is the proposition of a *nyāya*] which establishes the trustworthiness of *agama*, [it has an *agama*-fact for its subject-matter] indirectly. Hence the proposition is *agama*. The reason for using *agama* in a figurative meaning [consists in] this: *nyāya* is promoted by the message of truth [in the shape of] *agama*, and [thereby] it becomes purposeful, because the knowledge of truths contained in *agama* being acknowledged as the cause of [the attainment of] the *summum bonum*. Hence though the proposition in every *nyāya* is not an *agama*, [yet the statement that the proposition is *agama*] is to be regarded [as true] from the point of view of a genuine *nyāya*. And also, it is to be understood that by reference to *agama*, [the possibility of] a proposition being about an imaginary something is excluded.'

Thus, whilst conformably to the principal purpose of syllogistic reasoning, which consists in producing knowledge conducive to the

¹ *Atmādi-prameya-pratipādanoddeśena hi śāstram etat pravṛttam. Tannāntarīyakatayā nyāyam vyutpādayat. Tameva vyutpādayed yascātmādeḥ prameyasya sākṣānniścāyakaś tatpratipādakāgamaprāmāṇyāniścāyako vā. Tasya ca nyāyaviśeṣasyādya 'vayavaḥ pratijñā āgamārthaviśaya sākṣādviśaya' gamaprāmāṇya-pratipādakasya ca paramparayā. Tasmād āgamaḥ pratijñā. Āgamopacārasya prayojanam idaṃ padārthasambādenāgamenānugṛhyate nyāyaḥ saprayojanaśca bhavatyāgamārthajñānasya niḥśreyasahetubhāvena nirūḍhatvāt. Tasmād yadyapi na nyāyamātravartinī pratijñā gamas tathāpi prakṛtanyāyābhīprāya draṣṭavyam. Tathā cāgamānusandhānena pratijñāyāḥ kalpitaviśayatvam api nirākṛtam veditavyam.*

attainment of the *summum bonum*, the proposition should be about scriptural truths; empirical facts like 'The hill has fire'; are not excluded from its scope. Though such facts are not known from *agama*, yet they are not unworthy of being demonstrated by syllogistic reasoning on the ground that, unlike imaginary objects, they do not come in conflict with *agama*.

We have already pointed out that according to Vātsyāyana, 'inference for oneself' involves three steps, viz.,

- (1) Previous apprehension of the concomitance of the sign with the signate (*lingalingisambandhadarsana* = *prathamalingadarsana*).¹
- (2) Subsequent apprehension of the sign (*dvitīyalīngadarsana*).²
- (3) Remembrance of the sign as previously apprehended in concomitance with the signate (*lingasmṛti*).

In later logic, a fourth step, viz., consideration of the sign (*lingaparāmārśa* = *trītyalīngadarsana*) was added.

In a *nyāya* the *prathama lingadarsana* finds expression in the third, the *dvitīya lingadarsana* in the second, and the *trītya lingadarsana* in the fourth member. The *dvitīya lingadarsana* is called by Vātsyāyana inference, or the means of inferential knowledge (*anumitīkarana*). 'The probans is inference' therefore means that the *dvitīya lingadarsana* which finds expression in the probantial statement², is the means of inferential knowledge. The following passage may be quoted from Vācaspati's *Tātparyatīkā* on N.S.I. 1. 31. in further elucidation of the point.

'The second³ apprehension of the sign is the probans, but it is not inference, because of the third apprehension of the sign, which forms the subject matter of the application, being such.⁴ Hence he says:

¹ Cf. *Tātparyatīkā* on I-1-1: *Sambandhagrahaṇasamaye lingadarsanam prathamam, tadapekṣayā lingadarsanam sādhyadharminī dvitīyam.*

² Cf. N.S. I. 1.34: *Udāharāṇasādharmyāt sādhyasāadhanam hetuḥ. Vātsyāyana interprets sādhanam as sādhanatāvacanam.*

³ *Dvītyam lingadarsanam hetur na ca tad anumānam, trītyasyopānaya viśayasya lingadarsanasya tathābhāvāt ityātī'āha: Udāharāṇa iti. Udāharāṇe dṛṣṭāntadharminī sādhyasāadhanayoh pratibandham sādṛśyam samyagdṛṣṭvā lingasya pratīlek. Etad uktam bhavati: Yadyapi trayāṇām api lingadarsanānām sasmṛtīnām anumānatvam, tathāpi tadekadeśa madhyame'pi lingadarsane samudayopacārād anumānavyapadeśa iti.*

⁴ Cf. Nvāyavārtika on N.S.I. 1.5: *Eke tāvad varāṇyanti lingalingisambandhasmṛtir anumānam iti. Itarair lingalingisambandhadarsanādibhir anumṛhyamāṇā. Apare tu manyante lingaparāmārśo 'numanam iti. Vayam tu paśyāmaḥ: Sarvam anumānam anumīles tannāntarīyakatvāt. Prādhānopasarjanatavivakṣayām lingaparāmārśa itī nyāyam.*

'In the example etc'. [*Udaharaṇe samdṛṣṭya pratīteḥ*] means 'because of [the arising of the second] apprehension of the sign after one has well observed the similarity [in respect of] the concomitance of the probans and the probandum in the example, [i.e.] in that which possesses the essential characteristics of a familiar instance. This is [what is] said: though all the three apprehensions of the sign along with the remembrance [of the sign] partake of the essential characteristic of inference, yet the intermediate apprehension of the sign, which is but one of the steps of that [inferential process] is given the designation of inference by the figurative application of [the notion of] the whole [to a part].'

'The example is perception' means that it is about a fact derived from perception.

By analogy Vātsyāyana means in his Bhāṣya on N.S.I. 1. a statement, e.g., 'As is a *go*, so is a *gavaya*', whereby X makes known to Y an unfamiliar object by comparing it to a familiar object. Now, in the application only the second half of such a statement occurs, the first half occurring in the example. Therefore the statement that the application is analogy, should be regarded as a figurative one, in which part has been used for the whole.¹

To sum up, *nyāya* is chiefly concerned with the demonstration of scriptural truths. It consists of five steps. In the *pratijñā* which is figuratively called *āgama*, X states a truth he has learned from *āgama*. The *pratijñā* is followed by the statement of a *hetu* which is figuratively called *anumāna* or *anumitīkaraṇa*. The *hetu* is then strengthened by

(i) an *udāharana* or the statement of a *dṛṣṭānta* which is a *pratyakṣaviśaya* for both X, and the person spoken to, Y, and in which both X and Y have perceived the connection of the *hetu* with the *sādhyā*, and

(ii) the *ūpanaya* or the statement emphasizing the similarity, by means of the word 'So', of the case under demonstration to the case cited as an illustration.

¹ Uddyotakāra's interpretation is somewhat different, though he says that the application has been called analogy figuratively. The term *upamāna* is used in various senses in Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya. For a full discussion of the subject, see Dr. S. Sen's paper on 'Upamāna in Ancient Indian Logic', which was read at the Fifth Indian Philosophical Congress,

Finally, in the *nigamana* the *pratijñā* is shewn to follow as a necessary consequence.

In a *nyāya* the principal part is played by the *hetu*, to which the *udāharana* and the *ūpanaya* serve as auxiliaries. And as the *hetu* is called the *anumitīkaraṇa*, the knowledge produced by a *nyāya* must be inferential in nature. That this is so is also evident from the use of the word 'Therefore' in the *nigamana* or the conclusion. In this connection reference may be invited to N.S. II. 1.48¹, and also to Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya² thereon, where it is stated that the *upasaṃhāra* 'Tat'ha' (which stands in contrast with 'Tasmāt') is met with in analogy, but not in inference.

¹ *Tat'hetuyupasaṃhārād upamānasiddher naviṣṭaḥ.*

² *Tat'heti samānadharmopasaṃhārād upamānaḥ siddhyati, nānumānam.*

(To be continued)

Mir Qāsim's Intrigues against Mīr Jāfar Nawab of Bengal

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THE accidental death¹ of Miran was the signal for an endless intrigue. Mir Qasim could now safely proceed with his scheme of effecting a revolution at Murshidabad. The distracted condition of the Nawab's affairs was just the opportunity that he needed. His intrigues against the Nawab are too significant to be overlooked. The part he played in the deposition of Mir Jafar has not been correctly estimated. On a closer examination of the evidence, it will be found that it was he, and not Mr. Holwell or Mr. Vansittart, who first conceived the idea of a revolution, and realized its practicability. It was he who suggested and arranged every detail of the scheme. Mr. Vansittart merely played the game of Mir Qasim.

It is interesting to note that he proceeded against Mir Jafar in almost the same way as Mir Jafar had done against Siraj-ud-daulah. The only material difference in his case was that he had no control over the Nawab's army. Although this was a serious handicap, he did not allow himself to be deterred by this. He could, at any rate, resort to diplomacy and intrigue. He availed himself of the discontent that prevailed in the army against the Nawab, and seduced it to a

¹Miran was killed by lightning, but foul play was suspected. Mir Qasim was accused of having got his rival assassinated. Even Burke, while addressing the House of Lords during the impeachment of Warren Hastings, spoke with his usual rhetoric, 'My Lords, thus was the Gordian knot cut. The prince dies by this flash of lightning. There were at that time, it seems, in Calcutta a wicked sceptical set of people who, somehow or other, believed that human agency was concerned in this.' (*Vide* Speeches of the Managers and Counsel in the trial of Warren Hastings, edited by E. A. Bond, Vol. I, p. 60). There is a footnote in Burke's *MS*—'Many believed at that time . . . that the Nawab had been murdered by some emissaries of Cossim Ali Khan'. It must be admitted, however, that there is no direct evidence to prove Mir Qasim's complicity in any such affair. Jean Law, a contemporary and a shrewd observer, disbelieved the story of Miran's accidental death and thought he had been murdered (*vide* his 'Memoire' edited by Martineau, Paris, p. 452.)

great extent. A mutiny of the troops at Murshidabad had given him an excellent opportunity of earning their good-will by promptly paying up from his own pocket a part of the arrears due to them.¹ He employed his friend Ali Ibrahim Khan for winning over the Nawab's officers, ministers and other prominent nobles.² Two of the most prominent Hindu officials, who had played no small part in the late revolution of 1757 were again in the forefront of the discontented party.³ One of them, Rai Durlabh, was soon won over. The other, Raj Ballabh too supported the cause of Mir Qasim. The Seths⁴ who had played an important part in the overthrow of Siraj-ud-daulah also wished for a change in the government, and agreed to support the cause of Mir Qasim.

Sure of his ground at Murshidabad, he turned to the English for help. The revolution of 1757 had taught him a valuable lesson. He therefore cultivated the friendship of the Company's officials at Kasimbazar⁵. He won the good opinion of Mr. Hastings, the Resident at Murshidabad. To crown all, he even secured the good-will of Clive who recommended him for the post held by Ram Narain at Patna⁶. After Clive's departure, Mir Qasim with characteristic shrewdness won the support of Mr. Holwell, and wrote⁷ to him frequently about his desires. Being assured of the latter's friendship, he paid a visit to him sometime during the last week of February, 1760⁸. The real object of this visit can not be exactly ascertained, but what is significant is this that soon afterwards, Mr. Holwell openly espoused the claim of Mir Qasim to the office held by Miran, and requested Col. Caillaud to support the cause of his candidate. How far Mir Qasim's diplomacy

¹*The Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, Alld-Univ: MS. p. 733.

The Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh of Kalyan Singh.

(*J.B.O.R.S.*, Vol. V, p. 346.)

The Seir, Vol. II, p. 375.

Vansittart's Narrative (Vol. I, p. 43).

Fort William, August 18, Select Committee Report.

Press list of Records. Series I, p. 7.

(Reference to a letter from Warren Hastings, dated Morad Bagh, July 18, 1760.

²*The Seir*, Vol. II, pp. 376 and 381. (Translation—Calcutta Edition.)

³Fort William: Select Committee Proceedings, July 18, 1760.

⁴*The Riyaz-us-Salat*, (Translation, p. 385). *The Seir*, Vol. II, p. 383.

⁵*The Khulasat*—*J.B.O.R.S.*, Vol. V, p. 345.

⁶Holwell's 'Reputation of a letter.'

⁷Holwell's 'Address to the Proprietors of East India Stock.'

⁸Holwell's 'Letter to Caillaud' February 24, 1760; (*vide Tracts*, p. 27).

had succeeded can be best judged from Mr. Holwell's letter to Col. Caillaud, dated May 5, 1760, wherein he wrote: 'I shall receive as a favour your interesting yourself in behalf of Cossim Aly Khan'.

The immediate issue was the problem in regard to the respective rights to future succession of Mir Qasim, and Mir Sidoo, the illegitimate son of Miran. Col. Caillaud and Mr. Amyatt were in favour of the latter², but Mr. Holwell and the Select Committee at Calcutta pressed the claims of Mir Qasim. Both Mr. Holwell and Mr. Hastings were persuaded by Mir Qasim to request the Nawab to appoint him as his successor. The Nawab thus replied to Mr. Holwell³, 'you acquaint me that he (Qasim Ali) is a noble, good, and brave man. Mr. Hastings also has wrote me to the same purpose, and has desired me to let him succeed my son. This rejoiced me much, because I was sensible he is highly deserving of my favour and friendship. I have no friends dearer to me than himself and family, but the Colonel has wrote me a letter . . . you will then be able to judge what motive has induced me to prefer the Chota Nawab's son'. Mr. Hastings, however, wrote to the Select Committee, arguing at length in favour of Mir Qasim's⁴ claims.

In all his intrigues against the Nawab, Mir Qasim could count upon the unfailing help of Mr. Holwell owing to the latter's inveterate hatred and piqué against Mir Jafar⁵. Apart from personal reasons, Mr. Holwell was convinced that Mir Jafar had completely failed as a ruler, and that his misrule would lead to the ruin of the Company's affairs in Bengal⁶. In addition, he framed specific charges against the Nawab of faithlessness, and actual treason⁷. That he gave up his original scheme⁸ of securing the *Subadari* for the Company from the Emperor was due to the successful intrigue of Mir Qasim. The latter also won over the two Armenian merchants, Khoja Gregory and Khoja Petruse who had been the agents of the English in their negotiations against

¹ Holwell's Address, p. 56.

² Vansittart's Narrative, I, pp. 41 and 68.

³ Imperial Records Office, Abs. P.L.R. 1759-65, p. 24.

⁴ Gleig's *Memoirs of Warren Hastings*, vol. I, p. 89.

⁵ First Report, 1772, p. 161, and Caillaud's letter to a friend, *Orme's Mss.* (India, xii, ff. 32, 39, etc.)

⁶ Holwell's Address—p. 10.

⁷ Holwell's 'Memorial.'

„ 'Refutation of a letter.'

„ 'Important Facts'.

⁸ Holwell's Address, pp. 59, 60, 63.

Siraj-ud-daulah, and employed them as his confidential agents in his secret negotiations with the Select Committee at Calcutta¹. The only thing which worried him was the Nawab's prejudice against himself² and so he secretly prepared for an open rebellion as the last alternative³ especially when he saw that the Nawab entrusted the affairs of the Government to a Persian adventurer, Mirza Daud⁴. Matters were in this state when Mr. Vansittart arrived as the permanent Governor of Fort William. Mir Qasim decided to go to Calcutta⁵ to win over the new Governor with the help of Mr. Holwell.

Mir Qasim now simply needed a good pretext to go down to Calcutta. In his very first letter to Mr. Vansittart he expressed the desire for an interview.⁶ Besides writing frequently⁷ to the governor, he wrote more freely to Mr. Holwell⁸. Mr. Vansittart was at last induced to invite Mir Qasim on some convenient plea.⁹ One was suggested by Mir Qasim himself¹⁰, and this was finally approved¹¹. It was the question of adjusting the operations of the next campaign against the Shahzadah, and finally settling the accounts of the assigned lands¹². Mir Jafar who had already begun to suspect the designs of his son-in-law, proved unwilling to let him go to Calcutta¹³. Pressed by the Governor, he had to yield. In the meantime, Mir Qasim had deputed Khoja Gregory on a confidential mission to Calcutta¹⁴. He personally set out from Murshidabad early in September, and reached Calcutta on the 15th of September¹⁵. No sooner had he arrived at Calcutta than he requested the Governor to grant him a private interview¹⁶. The meeting took place on the night of September 15.¹⁷

¹ Abs. P. L. R. 1759-65 pp. 2 and 19.

² *The Khulasat* (J. B. O. R. S., Vol. V, p. 344) and (*The Seir*, Vol. II, p. 375).

³ *The Seir*, Vol. II, p. 382.

⁴ Vansittart's Narrative, Vol. I, p. 42.

⁵ J. B. O. R. S., Vol. V, p. 346.

⁶ Abs. P. L. R. 1759-65, p. 45.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 2.

⁸ Holwell's Address, p. 88.

⁹ Abs. P. L. I. 1759-65, p. 7.

¹⁰ Holwell's Address, p. 89.

¹¹ Abs. P. L. R. 1759-65, p. 37.

¹² *Ibid*, and Vansittart's Narrative, I, p. 43.

¹³ *The Seir*, II, p. 375, J. B. O. R. S., Vol. V, p. 346.

¹⁴ Abs. P. L. R., 1759-65, p. 2.

¹⁵ Abs. P. L. I. 1759-65, p. 7.

¹⁶ Abs. P. L. R., 1759-65, p. 2.

¹⁷ Select Committee Proceedings, Sept. 16, 1760.

During the interview, Mir Qasim expressed his apprehension of Col. Caillaud's designs, and referred to the latter as his enemy.*¹ Mr. Vansittart assured him of his sympathy. Mir Qasim thereupon adroitly declared his desire to obtain the management of the Nawab's affairs to which Mr. Vansittart did not object.*² Mir Qasim subsequently suggested that he would relieve the financial distress of the Company by making territorial assignments, if he were entrusted with the control of the administration. He warned the Governor that the Nawab would surely oppose his elevation, and emphasized the need of coercing the Nawab and his ministers. In other words, Mir Qasim asked for military help, and ultimately convinced Mr. Vansittart of the supreme necessity of a radical change in the Nawab's government.

The success of Mir Qasim's diplomacy was due to a combination of circumstances. The treasury at Calcutta was exhausted, and the normal expenses of the settlement could not be provided for.*³ The monthly subsidy of the Nawab was considerably in arrears. No remittances were expected from England, and the investments had been stopped. The cost of the upkeep of the Bengal army was far more than the allotted revenues.*⁴ There was no prospect of peace in Behar owing to the presence of the Shahzadah. To make matters worse, the Nawab was demanding the return of the assigned districts.*⁵ The company was now also engaged in a decisive struggle with the French in the south, and the presidencies of Bombay and Madras depended on supplies from Bengal. The consequence was that the Council at Calcutta had to borrow heavily to meet the expenses.*⁶ Mr. Vansittart was thus hard-pressed for want of money.⁷ He was not sure of the Nawab's payments, he did not know how to provide funds for Madras.*⁸ The select committee resolved, 'It becomes necessary to secure to the company such an income as will bear them clear of charges, and bring in besides a supply for the

*¹ Holwell's Address, p. 89.

*² Vansittart's Narrative, I, p. 96.

*³ *Ibid*, p. 36.

*⁴ Select Committee Proceedings, Sept. 11, 1760.
Second Report of the Committee of Secrecy.

*⁵ Abs. P. L. R. 1759-65, p. 27.

*⁶ 'A Letter to the Proprietors' By Henry Vansittart, p. 12.

*⁷ 'Vindication of Mr. Holwell by his friends,' p. 74.

*⁸ Select Committee Proceedings, August 7th, 1760.

emergencies of their other settlements, and for providing cargoes for loading home their ships.*¹ The immediate problem was how to secure such an income! Mr. Vansittart had appealed to the Nawab for the grant of the *Foujedarship* of Sylhet and Chittagong;*² and for the cession of Burdwan and Krishnanagar*³ but in vain. The governor expostulated fruitlessly as the Nawab was obdurate*⁴. Foiled in his attempt to win over the Nawab, he considered the expedient of negotiating with the Shahzadah. This policy had originally been advocated by Mr. Holwell*,⁵ but Mr. Vansittart, unlike Mr. Holwell, was opposed to the idea of a revolution in Bengal. The select committee finally resolved,*⁶ 'That the entering into an alliance with the Shahzadah is a necessary and expedient measure.' Thus it is evident that neither Mr. Vansittart, nor the select committee had up to September 15, 1760, any desire for bringing about a revolution at Murshidabad. On the contrary, Mr. Vansittart had set his face against any such step. Mir Qasim saw the plight of the Calcutta Government, and determined to exploit it for his own benefit. He held out a helping hand to the Governor, and the latter without correctly grasping the situation at Murshidabad, merely played into his hands. He seems to have thought in the beginning that Mir Qasim meant to have for the present the *Diwani* alone, and so readily fell in with the latter's proposal.⁷ He did not realize at the outset that Mir Qasim really aimed at the *Subadari* also. In the meantime, Rai Durlabh approved⁸ of the promotion of Mir Qasim to the *Diwani* when he was consulted by the Select Committee. Khoja Petruse now acted as the intermediary between Mir Qasim, and the Select Committee.*⁹

After some meetings with the Governor, Mir Qasim had a private interview with Mr. Holwell on September 25.¹⁰ It was on this

*¹ Select Committee Proceedings, 11th September, 1760.

*² Abs. P. L. I. 1759-65, p. 36.

*³ Letter from Mr. Vansittart to Col. Caillaud, Aug. 4, 1760.

*⁴ Letter from Mr. Sykes, Sept. 16, 1760.

and Abs. P. L. I. 1759-65, p. 37.

*⁵ Holwell's 'Interesting Events' Part I, p. 183.

*⁶ Select Committee Proceedings, Sept. 15, 1760.

⁷ First Report, pp. 230-31.

*⁸ Select Committee Proceedings—September 16, 1760.

*⁹ Vansittart's 'Letter to the Proprietors', p. 142.

¹⁰ Holwell's *Tracts*—Address, p. 80.

'He discovered his views were more extensive than had been imagined.'

occasion that he formally discussed his real objects and plans. In fact, Mr. Holwell was not even prepared for such views as were now expressed by the latter. He thus sums up the latter's views: 'He urged the repeated treacherous conduct of the *Suba* and the late young Nabob to the English, expatiated on their cruelties and murders, and the universal abhorrence of the people against the *Suba* and his house; dwelt much on his personal ingratitude to himself; in his two attempts which he had made on his life at the instigation of the late young Nabob; exclaimed against the secret negotiation he had carried on with the Shahzadah and the Dutch, closing this introduction with saying that the *Suba* was incapable of government; that no faith or trust could be put in him.' In short, Mir Qasim made out a strong case against the Nawab.¹ Mr. Holwell's account of this interview further shows that Mir Qasim even proposed the assassination of the old Nawab.² This idea was dropped at the instance of Mr. Holwell himself.³ That Mir Qasim suggested the murder of the Nawab shows how unscrupulous he was. When he found Mr. Holwell horrified by his inhuman proposal, he expressed his profound disappointment and declared that the latter 'was not so much his friend as he had hoped and expected.'⁴

This account could not obviously have been concocted by Mr. Holwell, as the latter was his friend and advocate. He had no reason for defaming him falsely. Mr. Holwell, however, contradicted himself in a roundabout manner subsequently only to defend his protégé⁵ and to vindicate the revolution of 1760. Even then he used ambiguous language, and merely refuted a fresh charge levelled against Mir Qasim. Certain gentlemen of the Calcutta Council sent a memorial⁶ in 1762 in which they alleged that after his accession to the *masnad*, Mir Qasim attempted to murder Mir Jafar. Mr. Holwell denied that Mr. Qasim could do anything of that kind during his occupation of the palace at Murshidabad. He should not therefore be taken to mean that even the aforesaid proposal had not been made at Calcutta.

¹ Kalyan Singh corroborates the statement of Mr. Holwell. (Vide *J.B.O.R.S.*, Vol. V, p. 346).

² Holwell's Address, p. 90, and Scrafton's Observations, p. 26.

³ Holwell's *Tracts*, p. 91.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Holwell's Refutation (*Tracts*, p. 114).

⁶ First Report.

Sir George Forrest is mistaken when he observes¹, 'Holwell in a Refutation of a Letter denied that the proposal was ever made.'

After the preliminaries were over, there was a discussion on the articles of a secret treaty to be concluded between Mir Qasim and the company. A study of the main terms of the treaty shows that the former secured all the advantages that he wanted. Besides, what is more significant, he also succeeded in his consistent opposition to the proposed alliance with the Shahzadah. Thus, Mir Qasim completely upset the plans of the Select Committee, and obliged the latter to play the part chalked out by himself. On the night of the 27th September, the treaty agreed upon was duly signed by Mir Qasim and the Select Committee. Mir Qasim then offered to reward the Select Committee for their good will, but Mr. Vansittart gracefully declined the proffered bribe for the present.²

Mir Qasim's intrigues were now crowned with success. He had deliberately betrayed the trust reposed in him by the Nawab, as he had no right to conclude a secret treaty which meant the virtual deposition of the Nawab. The latter recently wrote to the governor expressing his intention of bestowing a sardarship on his son-in-law³; little did he anticipate that Mir Qasim was returning from Calcutta recognized as the *de facto* Nawab of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa.

¹ Forrest's *Life of Lord Clive*, Vol. II, p. 212.

It must be understood that Mr. Holwell did not 'actually' contradict his original statement in his 'Address'. His 'Refutation of a Letter' was published as a supplement to his 'Address'. He could easily have suppressed the passage in question from his Address if he had so intended. Even in his Refutation occurs this significant sentence, 'Supposing this charge to be really true surely it will bear some explanation when the provocation is considered'. Did Mr. Holwell intend to slur over the guilt of his hero?

² Holwell's *Tracts*, p. 120.

First Report, p. 161.

³ Abs. P.L.R., 1759-65, p. 27.

Reviews

'A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LIFE—Vol. I
THE COMING OF THE WHITE MAN 1492-1848

BY

H. J. PRIESTLEY

*Professor of American History in the University of California,
New York*

[The Macmillan Company, 1923—pp. xx and 411]

THIS is the first volume of a History of American Life, planned in 12 volumes under an able Board of Editors and treats of the Spanish, Dutch and French settling in the middle zone of North America that has contributed its own quota to the fabric of American life. The more characteristic and permanent results of transplanted Latin cultures are found not so much in the history of the United States as in that of New France and New Spain where the white man first settled in the New World. The world has not fully grasped the fundamental differences that underlay the founding of Anglo-Saxon and Latin America, as was pointed out by Ernest Gruening in his recent book on *Mexico and Her Heritage*. For long the culture of the Anglo-Saxon colonies seemed a puny thing beside that of old Mexico, as well in physical wealth as in intellectual effort and achievement. Thus the book shows that New Spain had run through an entire cycle of artistic, literary and other development before its northern Anglo-Saxon neighbour had scarcely ever made a beginning. This difference was not wholly due to more than a century of priority of time, but was caused by the operation of deeper factors.

Mr. Maurice Law in his book *The American People*, published more than twenty years ago, has remarked that 'America and the Americans were an undiscovered country and an unknown people and each literary Columbus returned to feed the imagination with a newer . . . tale'. The account of Mr. Priestley is certainly new to

many readers in the Eastern Hemisphere, and informing and thought-provoking as well. He describes, initially, how the first Spanish settlers brought with them all that they had of practical civilization, while the land was just ripe for what they had to offer. Missionary zeal for conversion was one of the most important forces of expansion, and the use of the mission by the Crown as an active, but subsidiary agent of subjugation, is one of the outstanding features of the Spanish Colonial System. The author is at special pains to show that the defence of the border was the characteristic motive of expansion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries along the whole frontier line from California to St. Augustine, and that, because of this progress, was held up completely or allowed to proceed only at a very slow pace. The farther north the Spanish settlements went, the fiercer was the native Indian fighter who was not prepared for the social transition to a sedentary life and other consequences of Spanish settlement.

New Mexico, now in U. S. A., projected northwards several hundred miles beyond the early Spanish settlements. In the seventeenth century it lay at the outermost fringe of the white man's civilization and was peopled by a handful of Indians, half-breeds and mulattoes led by a few civilians, missionaries and soldiers. The disappointment of its colonization led to Spain's turning to fairer valleys in the East, and, faltering on account of exhaustion, finally resigned them to the English and the French. The New Mexican settlement was the last notable Spanish expansion before their eighteenth century defensive thrust that added the northern Pacific coast. On the east, expansion into Texas and Florida was undertaken as a measure against foreign aggression and heresy. The writer points out emphatically that the social and political organization that Spain planted within the present bounds of U. S. A., in Florida, Texas and California, was of a transitional and frontier type, and a feeble reflection of the Greater Spain of which the Conquistadores were vaguely conscious. The type of life developed in Old Mexico, with its survival of the Indian masses, and all the social, political and economic implications of that factor, gives a far more correct perspective reflecting Spanish achievement. Thus 'without the survival of Indian blood and tradition, the growth of New Spain would have been quite unlike what it came to be; so, too, the

life of the Mexican nation and its relations with the United States'.

The question of Spanish attitude towards the Indians is a large and complicated one, and the forcing of Christianity on them was a sharp crisis with a sequel of long-drawn-out tragedy and an abundance of trouble for the Spaniards themselves. Yet, according to the Spaniard, his faith was his most important contribution and his most unselfish gift to his new charges. 'The faith was his most generous gift, the transfusion of his blood was his most lavish compliment.' These two were respectively expected to create 'unity of blood' and 'identity of body' which were the basic concepts on which the institutions of society were to rest. Needless to state, the actual results were far removed from the expected ideal.

The book tries to remove the false impression that Spanish life brought few of the amenities of civilization. The prejudice of the English due to religious feud and commercial competition has been largely responsible for this impression. The Americans have nourished the English tradition and strengthened it with the many unpleasant memories of their political and military contact with the Mexicans—a feature illustrated in their attitude towards the recent Mexican revolution, and not merely due to the original distinction between Anglo-America and Hispano-America. The pageant of the culture of New Spain, so belittled in the American mind, was however confined only to the towns and was little reflected in the rural parts and frontier regions. The Spanish colonial population was comparatively immobile, largely due to restricted immigration, the liberal importation of negro-slaves and to the evil effect of the land-system which was in turn due to climate, topography and social organization.

The French builders of Louisiana and Canada pursued somewhat different methods. The French traded with the Indians on equal terms, which, however, was bound to vanish in course of time; and the absolutist ideal of the French government gave Canada an evolution and finally a fixity of form strikingly similar to that of New Spain. The French occupation of the lower reaches of the Mississippi was brought within the imperial purview by La Salle only under an impulse from New France, Louisiana and Illinois had their own peculiar characteristics; while the wild French trappers and woodsmen

of the interior have left their impress upon Wisconsin society. There is no deep meaning in Dutch effort in America; and Dutch role in the colonial epoch was peculiarly that of a commercial career. There was no large transmission of higher forms of culture through them. The book is a carefully-prepared account of the non-British influences, cultural and institutional, that have helped in the formation of American life.

C. S. S.

'WARREN HASTINGS AND PHILIP FRANCIS'

BY

SOPHIA WEITZMAN, Ph.D.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

RAMSAY MUIR

[Manchester University Historical Series No. LVI—Manchester University Press, 1929—pp. xxx and 400]

THE controversy between Warren Hastings and Philip Francis had momentous consequences both in Britain and in India, alike on contemporary events and on the later policy pursued by the British Government in Indian affairs. English classical literature at the close of the eighteenth century was 'saturated with party-politics', and according to Sir Henry Maine, this would have been a less serious fact 'if, at this epoch, one chief topic of the great writers and rhetoricians, of Burke and Sheridan, of Fox and Francis, had not been India itself'. The 'excessive dryness and severity of style' of James Mill which produced an impression of accuracy and labour which a study of all available original materials does 'not always confirm' was fortified by the rhetoric of Macaulay who accepted Mill as an authority deserving the fullest confidence. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen was the first writer to deviate from the beaten track and apply 'robust, careful and dispassionate criticism' to this period of history; and he dispelled one of the imaginary crimes of Hastings, *viz*, the judicial murder of Nanda Kumar. Sir John Strachey took up another thread of the tangled skein, and in his work on the Rohilla war, endeavoured to show that the crime of selling the services of the British army for exterminating the Rohillas, is also largely unfounded. Sir G. W. Forrest has brought out the story of Hastings' administration as

revealed by the letters and the narratives, the dissents and the discussions of the chief actors. The latest apologist for Hastings Mr. P. E. Roberts, maintains the surging tide of Hastings' worship and semi-deification which has been steadily flowing for more than half a century; he declares that the impeachment was a calamitous mistake, and before it had gone far, had developed into something like a cruel wrong. Sydney Grier, Sir Charles Lawson and others, not to speak of Malleson and Lyall, form the main links in the chain of Hastings' champions; and Sophia Weitzman and Miss Monckton-Jones have come, the latter with an able account of the constructive work of Hastings as the Governor of Bengal, and the former with this book under review on the very complex and controversial conflict between the Governor-General and his bitterest foe.

Miss Weitzman has consulted and utilized some hitherto-unutilized manuscript sources like the Robinson collection, the East India part of which has not been classified by the Historical Manuscripts Commission, and contains an invaluable wealth of documents. Robinson was Secretary of the Treasury in the ministry of Lord North and until 1784, his private dwelling served 'with The India House, as a sanctum for the India papers among others'. The Hastings MSS. in the British Museum, the numerous volumes of the Francis MSS. in the India Office Library and the letters and papers of Richard Johnson, assistant to Middleton, are among the more important of the manuscript treasures of the period. The immensity of the sources is, according to Professor Muir, one of the greatest obstacles in the way of the student; the records of the Company at home are exceeded in volume by the consultations and other records of the Indian governments; and both have been heavily supplemented by the growing accumulation of the private or semi-private correspondence of the leading actors, brought to light frequently.

Out of an examination of this mass of evidence, Miss Weitzman concludes that Francis was a much worse man than he has been pictured by many previous writers. Even his biographer, Merivale, was forced to the conclusion that he was 'a political adventurer who was utterly unscrupulous in the use of means' and whose 'sincerity, even when he was sincere, was apt to assume the form of the most ignoble rancour'; while 'no ties of friendship or party or connection seem to have restrained his virulence'. Sir James Stephen held that

this severe condemnation was justified; and now Miss Weitzman condemns him as a failure both as administrator and statesman. She analyses the deeper principles at issue in the controversy between Hastings and Francis, and shows that while the contest was, to a large extent, a war of petty personalities, it was backed by real differences of opinion on policy, Francis holding opinions on internal administration, justice, revenue and foreign policy, that were diametrically opposed to those of Hastings. He was convinced that the English dominion in India was an evil, self-interested growth, and advocated non-intervention. Till 1780, when the climax of their quarrel was reached in the duel, Francis utilized to the fullest possible extent his biting pen and his influence with the home administration to damage his rival, and, if possible, to step into his shoes. After he reached England, he continued his vengeful endeavour and easily captured a party among the Directors, the managers of the two Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry then instituted, and functioning against Hastings and the press generally. The India Bills of Fox were animated by Francis and adopted the administrative system sketched out by him; and Pitt's Bill adopted, in its essentials, 'the findings of the Secret and Select Committees, couched in the very words of Francis', frequently denunciations, and incorporated the political and revenue systems he advocated.' He was the power behind Hastings' impeachment and was painted in contemporary caricatures as the prompter behind the scenes; while Burke never hesitated to acknowledge his indebtedness to Francis. The acquittal of Hastings was deemed by him to be his own condemnation. 'Hastings has been impeached and I have been condemned', he violently declared. The book maintains a very high level of treatment and points out the capacity and skill of constructive statesmanship that Francis had. It rightly declares that Francis, though beaten in the conflict both in India and in England, still contrived to snatch a portion of the laurels. 'Immortalized by Burke and his brilliant contemporaries, his philippics became a part of the legacy of the Whig tradition . . . And once pronounced, his false verdict has been accepted by posterity which knows Hastings only as a great but unscrupulous statesman.' The treatment on the whole sustains the anti-Francis note, but does not err on the side exaggeration of Hastings' merits.

C. S. S.

'THE NABOBS OF MADRAS'

BY

HENRY DODWELL

[Williams and Norgate, London, 1926—p. 263.]

MR. DODWELL has written a very pleasant readable, and withal, a true, picture of the old-time Nabobs as they lived, in the Southern Presidency in the eighteenth century, their comparatively brief and very chequered lives. The Nabob became a target for literary slander and ridicule, and a by-word of political corruption and backstairs influence. From Burke and Sheridan downwards, every one had his fling at the Indian Nabob who became more and more unpopular as the century advanced; but, in spite of their social pretensions and lack of real culture, these old-time Anglo-Indians were possessed of a tough moral fibre, a spirit of self-reliance, gift of command and love of adventure, and generally speaking were not much worse than other people of their age and grade. Professor Dodwell pictures the voyage out to India of the cadets, the crowded and tedious passage, the sighting of the Coromandel, and the strange method of landing across the rough surf on the back of a wet fisherman, and go on the Sea-Gate of *Fort St. George*, which served as the Apollo Bunder of that age. Life in the Presidency was interesting enough from our point of view; but the European population was heterogeneous and supplemented by gems of Spanish or Portuguese extraction, Armenians and domiciled, pure and half-caste Portuguese, all of whom have left their impress upon the city. Methods of making money were easy enough both for the Company's servant and for the private adventurer; and the strange careers of Paul Benfield and the Hollands who were 'Nabobs in the bad and popular sense of the word' are declared by the author, to be exceptions, and we are cautioned against mistaking them for fair samples of the Company's servants.

'The average was not very different from the rest of the generation at home and achieved neither the enormities of Holland, nor the fortunes of Benfield.'

The chapter on the origin and development of the Madras Army which came to be an efficient fighting force under Major Lawrence who has been called 'the Father of the Army' gives us many illustrative anecdotes and accomplishments as well as numerous instances of

discontent and sedition and even occasional mutiny. The growth of the class of free merchants indicated the rise of a numerous and comprehensive population including all the Europeans who were not servants of the company or officers of the Army. While in the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Governor and Members of Council were the chief merchants, at the end of it, the control of trade had really passed from the covenanted servant to the free merchant; while regular firms had grown up in the place of loosely associated individual merchants. Along with them came the lawyers, a good specimen of whom is furnished by Stephen Popham, an Irish M. P., whose name has come to be inseparably associated with the development of Madras.

Mr. Dodwell gives in his inimitable manner the stages of the development of the suburban country-houses, and the expansion of the settlement by the inclusion of the Choultry Plain and other vast stretches. Comforts were few, though beverages were many, and indeed water was used as little as possible. Exotic customs, ill-judged gaiety of clothes, big houses and innumerable servants ensured 'a reputation for tasteless and exorbitant expense'. One is glad to read that the Nabobs were 'familiar with some great and not a little good literature.' Thus 'on many bookshelves you would find Shakespeare and Milton, Swift and Pope; the essayists from the *Tatler* to the *Rambler*; minor poets like Pomfret and Akenside. For Classical History they had Rollin, Plutarch and Gibbon; for English History, Mrs. Macaulay, Hume and Smollett; for the history of their predecessors in India, the judicious Orme, the laborious Cambridge, the moral Raynal besides the lively pamphlets of Holwell and Scrafton. Officers carry with them on campaigns, *Tom Jones*, *Don Quixote* or *Gil Blas*. . . Temple and Clarendon, Camden's *Britannia* and Montaigne's *Essays*, Spenser, Johnson and Raleigh, all appear. Every now and then we strike a wider range of reading—Boileau, Moliere and Montesquieu in French, Camoens in Portuguese, Ariosto, Tasso, Machiavelli, and Guicciardini in Italian.' Printing presses and news sheets were fairly active; racing and hunting developed into organized pastimes, and there was no lack of duels, quarrels and court-martials. The picture that we have in this book of old Madras, its life and activity is valuable alike to the historian and the lay reader; and a full bibliography at the end of the sources of information further enhances its value.

C.S.S.

THE CHRISTIAN TASK IN INDIA

BY

VARIOUS WRITERS

EDITED BY

THE REV. JOHN MACKENZIE

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

THE MOST REV. THE BISHOP OF CALCUTTA

[Macmillan & Co, Ltd., 1929—pp. xvii and 297—price 7/6.]

THE need for a fresh and vital orientation of Christian attitude is more urgent now than a few years ago, and the separableness of a truly Christian life from the holding of correct beliefs, is coming to be held as more and more possible. As the Metropolitan of Calcutta forcibly points out in his introduction, the most urgent need of Christian workers at the moment is to present the Christian religion far more as a way of life and to demonstrate, as forcibly as can be done, that the spirit of Christ is the spirit of service in the diverse fields which poverty of many kinds affords in this as in other countries. 'The demand for education, healing and uplift has given ample scope for presenting in a practical way the ideals of the Christian life and the secret of its power.' The book is a collection of essays on the different aspects of Christian activity going on in the country, written by expert workers in the field. In the opening chapter Mr. S. K. Datta points out the danger of the Christian cause suffering, as it has suffered, from being identified as the ruler's religion and of being thrust aside as the symbol of the foreign governing race by the forces of developing nationalism. Christianity has also been challenged on her failure to live up to her own teaching and on the erection of distinct quasi-caste barriers in Western countries. Above all, true Christianity has got to assert its separation from industrialization and possession of economic power, and from the consequent association with secular views of life. Mr. Datta rightly stresses on the extreme importance of a readjustment of the educational ideas and technique of missionary bodies who could meet the present situation most vitally in their educational activities.

As regards the attitude of the Indian *intelligentsia*, Mr. J. C. Winslow will conclude, though one may well differ from that conclusion, that there is a widespread acceptance of the main principles of Christ's teachings, particularly of his ethical teaching. Moral standards of conduct are basically, and in their fundamentals, similar in all the principal religions of the world; and ideas about the brotherhood of man are not peculiar to any one religion. Again, when it is claimed that the educated Hindu feels no difficulty in interpreting Hinduism for himself in a way that does not conflict with Christian teaching, it seems to be something like stretching a point. It is true that some think that to be baptized into the Christian Church is not simply breaking with one's religious heritage, but also with one's whole social and cultural inheritance also. Professor Radhakrishnan maintains in his *Hindu view of Life* (pp. 71-4) that the doctrine of *Karma* when rightly viewed, does not conflict with the reality of freedom which is the basis of all ethical values, and that there is room for repentance and consequent forgiveness in this scheme. This is taken up by Dr. Winslow to imply 'a *rapprochement* to Christianity from the side of Hinduism which no thoughtful Christian can do otherwise than heartily welcome'; but it may be regarded justly as taking too much for granted. The writer is on firm ground when he urges the Indian Christian community to make impossible the reproach of denationalization by becoming as truly Indian in its life and outlook as the other great communities of the land. From the Bishop of Dornakal who tries to prove that the social and national problems of Mother India are solved most effectively where the religion of Christ has had a chance, we have the statement that only in the village can the Church become truly self-supporting, self-propagating and self-governing.

Alice Van Doren points out how India may show to the world a new type of womanhood, offspring of the union between the spirit of Jesus Christ and the inherited spiritual culture of the East as in Pandita Ramabhai who was a true *Bhakta* of the Cross. She pays particular attention to the needs of the rural woman and stresses on the necessity of avoiding the danger of Europeanization. Dr. John Mackenzie cautions Christians and others against depreciating the value of the educational missionary, simply on the ground that he does not lead directly to the making of converts. Christian educational institutions are exercising an enormous influence, intellectual, moral and spiritual,

over the lives of their students and are helping to break down racial and national barriers, amongst other services that they do; and the writer stresses on the quickening of spirit fostered by these institutions which has led to a multitude of social service activities. Thus, the spiritual results of higher missionary educational work are deep and potent and should not be lightly undervalued. Dr. N. Macnicol yearns for 'the appearance of groups of Indian Christians who shall be able, by a careful and sympathetic study of their Christian faith in the light of their Indian heritage, to plant the universal message of Christ deep in the soil of the Indian soul.'

The ministry of healing has been regarded as an essential part of Christian teaching; and the service thus rendered is a natural and vital expression of the spirit of Christ; the co-operation of this branch with others of Mission activity should be stressed; and in its own sphere, preventive medicine and medical research should be pushed forward. An ambitious chapter of the book under review is devoted to a consideration of the causes of the appalling poverty of the country and believes in the wholesale efficacy of the application of the doctrine of Jesus Christ as the prime mover who can touch the springs of life and bring prosperity and happiness. We are told that the Gospel of Jesus is as wide as the needs of men spiritually, socially, industrially, politically and economically. The attitude of the Christian movement towards the shaping of public opinion in matters of social reform has got to rest on forces which it is difficult to determine and evaluate; but that Christ alone can serve as a universal panacea for all ills of Indian society, and that India's public moral problems will not discover their solutions in orthodox Hinduism, are both the result charge of a narrow outlook and lack of proper perspective.

Mr. A. Davies, in his contribution to the book, declares that the missions are beginning to understand that they have gone to India not merely to give, but also to receive, to learn as well as to teach. The efforts of Indian indigenous Christians are detailed in a separate chapter and shown to have a definite and important place in the Christian movement. The case for missionary co-operation and the union of separated Christian bodies is put on the ground that Christian unity in life and practice is necessary for the worthy presentation of the Gospel. This co-operation is most needed in public questions, in the joint maintenance of different pieces of work, and in the shaping of

thought and experience. In the last chapter but one on the *Church of Christ in India* stress is laid on the fact that the nationalist movement has made the Church less exotic, and enabled it to have a really indigenous, cultural and economic background. The Bishop of Bombay explains the operating tendencies towards unity, and prefers that organic union should be aimed at rather than federal union. The different contributions are thought-provoking and give the thinking reader a great deal of matter for acute reflection and cogitation.

C. S. S.

'STUDIES IN TAMIL LITERATURE AND HISTORY'

BY

V. R. RAMACHANDRA DIKSHITAR, M.A.,

Lecturer in Indian History—University of Madras, 1930. Luzac.

'THOSE who are interested in the study of Tamil literature are bound to feel thankful to Mr. V. R. R. Dikshitar for the publication of his studies.' As stated in the preface, the author has collected his 'stray writings together with the results of his further studies on the subject.' The book consists of seven chapters on the Sangam, some Sangam poets, some Tamil mystics, Tiruvalluvar, Administrative institutions, the art of War, and Social life in the Tamil land. Each of these is divided into several sections and hence the reader can perceive at a glance what the author is going to speak about—a great convenience indeed in these days of stress and strain when lay readers have too many things to occupy them and hence too little attention to spare for the utterances of the research-worker. Again, the topics chosen for examination are all of them interesting, each in its own way; and thus the different portions of the book will appeal to different classes of readers.

Scholars know that the subjects chosen by the author for his 'studies' are so vast that each one of his chapters must be developed into a volume as big as the present book if they are to be treated adequately. Some of them are still controversial in nature. The existence of the Sangam is an instance in point—yet Mr. Dikshitar has stated Mr. P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar's opinion and answered the arguments. *Apropos* of that, he has also attempted to establish a

connection between Pliny's reference to the transfer of the Pāṇḍyan capital from Korkai to Madura and the Śīlappadikāram reference to the incident of the sea swallowing a portion of Pāṇḍyan territory. The explanation is not unacceptable. The account of the extant Sangam works is brief but not meagre. The six sections dealing with Nakkīrar, Kapilar, Paraṇar, Avvaiyār, Iṅgō-Adigaḷ and Śāttanār, which make up the second chapter are as satisfactory biographical sketches as they can be expected to be in our present state of ignorance. The Sangam poems and the half-believable Purāṇas have been carefully examined for the purpose. The religion of Iṅgō-Adigaḷ and of Śēraṇ Śenguttuvan has been analysed utilizing the views of the late Kanakasabhai Pillai and the learned Pandit Swaminathier. In discussing the date of the poet, the vexed question of the Sangam date crops up; but the author avoids dogmatizing and rests content with the remark, 'It is reasonable to assume that these two epics belong to the epoch of the Sangam.' When the author takes up for examination the Buddhistic philosophy of Śāttanār, he says, 'It is in this connection that the poem is invaluable;' but he does not say much more than that and is probably right in caring for the feelings of the reader by avoiding the technicalities which led Dr. S. K. Aiyangar and Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri to different conclusions.

The author is at his best in Chapter IV. There he is in his own element; his fairly sound knowledge of Sanskrit helps him considerably in making the really good comparisons between the parallel passages of the Kural and the several Sanskrit works like the Gīta Mānava Dharma Śāstra, Kāmandaki, the Artha Śāstrā etc. The next chapter on administrative institutions runs over nine sections and bears on the face of it every evidence of a thorough-going and searching study of the originals. In tracing the evolution of kingship in the pre-historic period, Mr. Dikshitar pitches upon the words *Kō* and *Kōn* which are applied both to kings and cow-herds, and argues that 'the origin of the dynasty of the Pāṇḍyan kings can probably be traced to the headship of the Āyar tribe.' This inference is of doubtful validity; for it is generally 'war that begets the king' and not the peaceful pursuit of cattle-tending. But this does not seriously affect the author's general conclusions. When he passes on to the qualifications of the king, the minister and the members of the Council, in the epoch of the Tirukkural, he has naturally to draw his

inferences from the Kural itself (which has, in this particular, very much in common with the Artha Śāstra) and one may perhaps have a doubt as to whether the Kural represented the ideal or the actual state of affairs. The same remark applies to the character of the kingship, the conduct of princes, abdication, etc., dealt with in the succeeding section relating to the epoch of the epics. But the student of the *Ideals of Ancient South Indian Polity* has ample material in these and the subsequent sections of the chapter which cover many important subjects such as taxation, administration of justice, and village institutions. These sections of the book are very valuable for the comparison instituted between South Indian Polity and the ancient Hindu Polity of North India.

Chapter VI is certainly pleasant reading and will be much appreciated by those who are eager to know something of the martial qualities of the ancient Tamils and the manner in which they conducted their wars. The author has utilized the Sangam works for this purpose with exceptional skill and patience. The concluding chapter provides plentiful information about town-life and village-life, marriages and dances, festivals and superstitions. He is right when he says that he has given a 'picture' of the chief features of Tamil Social life, at least such of those pleasing aspects which would afford rich food for thought to the antiquarian.

The author has done his task well and deserves our congratulations.

The book is beautifully printed; and considering the enormous cost of such publications, the price is only reasonable.

C. V. N.

INDIAN PRINCES UNDER BRITISH PROTECTION

BY

P. L. CHUDGAR, BAR-AT-LAW.

[Williams & Norgate Ltd., London 1929].

THE problem of the Indian States has three aspects. In its purely internal aspect the administration concerned and the paramount power whatever that term may connote are responsible. In most economic questions of all India importance these States have interests in common

with those of British India. As regards foreign policy and international action, British India as well as the Indian States have to act through the British Government in England. In all the three aspects internal, British Indian and international the question has assumed much practical importance at the present moment when the readjustment of the Indian constitution on progressive lines is being attempted.

Mr. Chudgar's study of the question is both exhaustive and informing. He approaches the subject from the point of view of a citizen of the Indian State and the discussion assumes that modern democratic standards are those upon which judgments ought to be arrived at regarding the soundness and justice of the various institutions and methods in these states. This is the keynote of the book. For years together these states have been governed according to medieval notions by rulers who have been brought up upon principles akin to divine right; and the peoples of these states have also retained the awe and veneration with which divine monarchies have been looked upon. Only advanced education and contact with virile foreign democratic institutions could create a population which would render the continuation of the present autocracy unfashionable if not impossible. There, as Mr. Chudgar points out, the princes and their administrations lay themselves open to the charge of deliberately failing to provide facilities, financial and otherwise, for the educational advance of their peoples. But let us bear in mind, in justice to the princes whose peculiar environment and upbringing entitle them to our sympathy, that they could not of their own motion embark upon a progressive educational policy and for obvious reasons. The charge ought properly to be laid at the door of the British Overseer. The paramount power had undertaken responsibility for the maintenance of internal order in the States. The first condition of order in any civilised State is an informed citizenship, citizenship informed of its rights as well as of its duties. The paramount power has done nothing even by way of moral persuasion to induce these princes to undertake popular educational schemes to implement this condition. They have been winking at a policy which permitted of colossal expenditure, amounting often to over 50% of the revenues, on the personal requirements of the Ruler, while on education and public health, the proportion spent would be an unbelievable jest. The

maintenance of internal order is a formula which has been in practice interpreted to cover only the maintenance of the supremacy of the Ruler and not the progress and contentment of the subject.

The facts brought together and the conclusions derived by Mr. Chudgar are sufficient to show that the policy of the various authorities towards the people of the Indian States must alter radically. The subject of the Indian State is more like the slave in the city-state or in Rome than the citizen of a modern State. He toils that the Princes may enjoy. A reawakened mass conscience must put a stop to this unjust state of affairs.

The introduction of the progressive policy is a problem bristling with difficulties. On the one hand efficiency of the administration has to be severely maintained. On the other, that efficiency must be in furtherance of the legitimate rights of the people themselves. This is the usual problem of democratising a people mostly ignorant of and unaccustomed to the exercise of their rights. The sudden creation of democratic institutions without the creation of a competent electorate capable of choosing wisely, will be a sad mistake. The first thing to do is to have compulsory universal education immediately. All else will follow. Money must be found anyhow for this.

Mr. Chudgar discusses various other interesting questions, the most important of them being the political relations between these States and British India in future. The Round Table Conference is attempting to evolve a scheme by which this relation would become a constitutional one. The scheme has immense difficulties and, to be sure, the optimism of its promoters is a little bewildering to those who are familiar with the principles and history of federations. If a workable scheme were evolved it would be a triumph of statesmanship and political imagination. Failing that the problem will yet remain as to how the crown in its English right, the British Indian democracy, and the various Indian States would be related and reconciled to each other. Mr. Chudgar has not tackled this aspect of the question.

In the words of Mr. J. C. Wedgewood in the arresting preface, this book needed writing.

N. D. V.

'HISTORY OF ORISSA, VOLUME I'

BY

R. D. BANERJI

[R. Chatterjee, Calcutta]

IN this work, the talented author, the late Mr. R. D. Banerji, attempts for the first time, on a comprehensive scale and in the light of material some of which was only recently made available, the History of Orissa from the earliest times down to the period of the introduction of British rule. It is apparently intended to be completed in two volumes, of which the volume before us takes us from the beginning of Kalinga History to the period of Muhammadan conquest under Akbar. Even so, it is a pretty long period of varied interest, and the copiousness of the material available varying also from almost no material to a very considerable volume of it. Mr. Banerji takes us through this varied history with the care and caution expected of a scholar of his standing. Dealing with the topography, the peoples and the pre-historic antiquities, he passes rapidly through the references to the country in ancient Indian literature, and then goes on to the first historically important chapter, 'Orissa under the Nandas and the Mauryas.' This chapter and the next one Kharavela are interesting, and the account presented by Banerji is quite worthy of him as the joint author of the *Hathigumpha* inscription published in the Behar and Orissa Research Society through the energetic enterprise of Mr. K. P. Jayaswal. Then we enter a dark period, the period of Kalinga expansion overseas, and the position of the Kalingas up to the age of Harsha. Two chapters are taken up with 'the Sailodbhavas of Orissa', the contemporaries of Harshavardhana, and the chapter following deals with Orissa as described by the Chinese traveller Hiuen T'sang. Then follow three chapters bearing on the dynasties of whom comparatively little is known, and what little of information is available is sorted out, analysed and presented by Mr. Banerji with care. Naturally, these would be rather uninteresting to the general reader. That is matter, for which no author could be held responsible. Then he enters on more interesting ground when he comes to discuss the Somavamśa kings of Kosala and the early Gangas. Mr. Banerji fixes the Ganga era his own way, and takes it a few centuries earlier

than the others. Then follow three interesting chapters upon 'the history of the Eastern Gangas' beginning with Vajrahasta and coming on to Narasimha IV. Then follow three chapters upon the more interesting period of Orissa history beginning with the foundation of the empire under the usurper, Kapilendra, who extended the power of Orissa from the frontiers of Bengal, almost the line of the Ganges, far down into South India along the coast. The account given in these chapters is about as full as, in the present circumstances of historical research in Orissan history, would make it possible, Mr. Banerji makes an effort to present his account clearly and with critical ability.

Here as elsewhere in the critical part of his work, the late Mr. Banerji shows an unfortunate feature, too often associated with him of not always taking care to understand the position of those whom he criticizes, nor to make his criticism really acceptable even when he happens to be reasonable. Numbers of instances like that could be quoted where, with something like a supercilious flaunt of care, he points to small errors in others, but oftentimes falling into more serious ones himself. It is not our business here merely to pick holes in a difficult work done with a considerable amount of ability and care, and therefore we do not propose noting down all the small errors. But we must draw attention to where he takes it upon himself to criticize other positions without taking adequate care that the position that he has taken is not open to almost the same, if not more adverse criticism. We have noticed it in his *History of Orissa* published in the *Indian Antiquary*, and we find it repeated, perhaps in more detail, in this history. With reference to Kapilendra and Purushotama Gajapati and their achievements against the empire of Vijayanagar, he begins with the statement 'a considerable amount of misunderstanding exists amongst scholars, especially those who hailed from South India about the true nature of the conquest of Kapilesvara in the Tamil Country.' Here the whole question is that during the period of rule of Kapilesvara Gajapati, which extended from 1435 to 1469 how far Orissan conquests actually extended in the south, and what was the nature of the conquests. It would take too long to discuss the position, and a review note is not the place for the whole discussion. The late Mr. Banerji takes hold of a few inscriptions in the Tamil country dated in the years 1470-71 and referring to the previous

conquest of Kapileswara Gajapati of that region. They do not refer to the specific details of it, but refer to the times of disturbances owing to the incursion of the Odḍiyan, which Mr. Banerji mistakes for a special Tamil designation, but Odḍiyar is the regular Tamil form for the inhabitant of Oḍra or Oḍḍa. Unfortunately Kapilendra's period of power corresponds to the rise to importance of Saluva Narasimha, whose inscriptions are found in abundance all over the Tamil country, and who is exhibited as gradually raising himself to importance from his ancestral patrimony at Narayanavaram in the Chittoor District, of the Madras Presidency, *not in the Mysore State*, as Mr. Banerji notes. He gradually imposed his authority over all the Tamil districts in the centre, extending westwards into Mysore to as far as Naga-mangala, and gradually advancing northwards till he could place himself in great force on the banks of the Godavari when later Sultan Muhammad III of the Bahmani kingdom found it difficult to dislodge him from the position that he had taken on the banks of the great river near Rajahmundry. Here Mr. Banerji takes it upon himself to assume that his interpretation of the Tamil inscriptions and their significance as being of superior historical value, to what is contained in a Sanskrit classic composed in the court of Narasimha himself and dedicated to him. Nobody would urge that a poem that was dedicated to a ruler, and written ostensibly for his patronage, would contain undressed truth. But when it is stated that these poems utter falsehoods, one may well demur. But when these poems get confirmed by material, such as the inscriptions to which Mr. Banerji would attach the highest value, the presumption that other statements may contain truth does not border on simple credulity. The coast region and the central block of Vijayanagar territory had passed under the chief Saluva Narasimha so far that European travellers at that period got to call the whole empire of Vijayanagar Narasinga. This is evidence of the position of authority of the Saluva chief, Narasimha. Because Kapileswara made conquests in the south, and even planted garrisons in certain places of his southern conquests—that so far only in the Nellore country—is not an indication that he brought all his conquests under his own rule, and this applies with greater force to the Tamil districts, where some of the inscriptions refer to him and even are referable to him by name and authority. During the period in question, conquests and reconquests have been the order of the

day. The empire of Vijayanagar in the south, the Bahmani kingdom in the middle and the empire of Orissa in the north-east, were facing each other, looking out each one for an opportunity to extend its authority or deal a crushing blow to the enemy as opportunity offered. From the nature of the position, therefore, wars could not have been as decisive as the Great War and the League of Nations that immediately followed to settle frontiers once for all, and make an honest effort to avoid war for the future. The period of the rise of Kapileswara corresponded to the period of weakness and disturbance in the Bahmani kingdom, and the personal unpopularity of a particular ruler in Vijayanagar, and gave the opportunity for Kapileswara to extend his authority southwards. As soon as things bettered in the one place as in the other, it would naturally provoke a reaction, and the rise of Saluva Narasimha to power exhibits that reaction on the side of Vijayanagar and the rise of Nizam-ul-Mulk Bahri exhibits it in respect of the Bahmani kingdom.

It would take a good deal more by way of regular proofs before Mr. Banerji's conclusions could be accepted that Sanskrit *kāvyas* are worthless as historical evidence, and his own interpretation of inscriptions and even Muhammadan historians such as Firishta and Saiyad Ali are beyond question, correct. For one thing, he casts aside the detail contained in the drama *Gangadasa Pratāpavilasam*. Banerji here does not notice that the statement there is that the attack upon Vijayanagar was made by the Bahmani Sultan and the ruler of Orissa jointly, when the great Devaraya II died and was succeeded by his son Malikarjuna. That must have reference to the period 1449–51. Why should this be impossible? He has given absolutely no reason beyond his own opinion. Similarly he forgets, when he makes a comparison between the accounts of Firishta and of the Burhan-i-Ma'asir regarding the period immediately after the death of Kapileswara and before the accession of Purushotama that the two historians may be describing two different events. The responsibility lies upon him to prove first of all that the two authors describe the same incident in their history. Neither of the authors pretends to have written an exhaustive history, or a strict diary. They were both of them alike historians who worked at a later period from material available to them, and, as Banerji himself admits elsewhere, 'one sometimes mentions incidents which the other fails to, but for reasons

which perhaps we may not understand.' In those circumstances, the possibilities are that Firishta is describing what took place in more detail, and describes that the succession of Purushotama was not quite peaceful, and therefore he is not describing the later war with which the *Burhan-i-Ma'asir* actually deals in the passage quoted. In another connection, he is similarly carried off his feet where he tries to transform Vinukonda into Penugonda and wishes to give to Kapileswara the governorship of the region dominated by Penugonda. This is absolutely unwarranted, as there is no reference to Penugonda in the Munur inscriptions, from which he quotes on page 297. Penugonda was in the interior, and at the time was under the rule of the empire over which Virūpāksha was ruling. The region along the East coast and the region to the south of Penugonda were places where the imperial authority had grown weaker, and the authority of Saluva Narasimha was getting gradually accepted. Saluva Narasimha and his agent Narasa were both of them active in this region, and in course of years they gradually became masters of the whole of the south leaving the central block of territory with the part extending to the West coast under the direct rule of the emperor Virūpāksha. Kapileswara's efforts have all been to extend his authority along the region of the coast, and, where the inscription also says that he established two governorships under his authority in Kondavidu and Vinukonda, it refers to the region near the Krishna delta. He had not advanced farther south as yet.

We need not labour the point further than to point out that Banerji's interpretation of these inscriptions leaves a good deal to be desired. In this part, at any rate, his account will gain in clarity if he took a little more care to arrange the historical events more chronologically, and kept his prejudices against the South Indian scholars a little more subdued. He quotes the Cambridge History as against us. But one chapter of the Cambridge History of 32 pages compressing into it a history of 600 years is not the place where a detailed discussion of these could be made. Mr. Banerji does not show that he knows the little book, *A Little Known Chapter of Vijayanagar History*, which gives a detailed account of the rise of Saluva Narasimha to power, and which contains a detailed discussion of these very points. It is a pity that Mr. Banerji is no more, and we have had to point out these, not in any spirit of want of charity, but in

the interests of historical truth, as it does not really matter, and ought not to, either to the late Mr. Banerji or to us whether it was Kapileswara Gajapati or Saluva Narasimha that had the better of it in their struggle. What is really to the point is what indeed is the correct position warranted by the historical material before us including in them Firishta, Saiyid Ali, Mediæval Sanskrit poets, held in such contempt by Banerji, and the invaluable inscriptions which have to carry such a heavy burden of Mr. Banerji's own interpretation put upon them all alike, and a conclusion that does not satisfy these fairly, cannot be accepted as valid or final. If it cannot be final for the present, we shall have to wait upon the future to make us wiser. Before we conclude the review, we feel bound to invite attention to two other points of some importance. We sincerely regret that Mr. Banerji is no more, but feel that we should, none the less, draw attention to these, while we should have been delighted had he lived to consider the position. The first is a serious error of statement, possibly, merely due to confusion of names. It occurs on page 323, and in another place it is repeated, that it was Narasa Nāyaka's will and testament to his son that he left the fort of Udayagiri in particular in the possession of the rulers of Kalinga. We do not recollect having heard of any such testament. The testament to which prominent attention is drawn by the Portuguese chronicle of Nunis, is the dissatisfaction felt by Saluva Narasinga on his death-bed. He pointed out to his general Narasa Nāyaka three important frontier fortresses he was not able to take, and exhorted the general that he might complete what Narasinga himself was unable to do before his death.

The other one is a theory, rather elaborately expounded by the late Mr. Banerji that the acceptance of Vaishnavism of the Chaitanya school by Prataparudra of Orissa was probably responsible for the deterioration of the military character of the inhabitants of Orissa and therefore of the decay of the Orissan empire within a decade of the acceptance of Vaishnavism by Prataparudra. We do not wish to be dogmatic in regard to the matter one way or the other. We know nothing in the Vaishnavism of Chaitanya differing very materially from the Vaishnavism of others, except the possibility of the exaggeration of a feature or two. In any case, the theory of the late Mr. Banerji is incomplete, as he does not appear to have taken into account that Saluva Narasimha, who was the first to oppose the

extension of Orissa in the south, was a Vaishnava. So was Krishnadevaraya, who defeated Prataparudra even before he accepted Vaishnavism, and carried the Vijayanagar arms victoriously, at any rate, as far north as Simmachalam in the Vizagapatam District—very much more of a Vaishnava than Saluva Narasimha—and if his work *Amuktamalyada* is evidence, he was fairly a devotee of Vishnu without any antagonism as such against other religions. Both Rama and Tirumala, who for years maintained the power of Vijayanagar against the Sultans of the Bahmani kingdom were Vaishnavas of almost the same persuasion as the great Krishnadevaraya. If Vaishnavism had such a tendency, even the Vaishnavism of Chaitanya—this apparent incompatibility requires explanation. We shall not be controverting the position. Our wish is merely to point out that it is possible for one to theorise on much too slender evidence.

'BULLETIN OF THE MADRAS MUSEUM'

[Edited by the Superintendent]

WE welcome the revival of the Madras Museum Bulletins that used to be issued in the days when Mr. Thurston was the Superintendent of the Museum and which had suspended publication for a number of years since. We have had two such sent to us. The first is an Archæological Bulletin of the Buddhist Sculptures from a *stupa* at Goli in the Guntur District. We shall make a detailed notice of it later. The second is the bulletin under notice, the Adichanallur skulls, a study by S. Zuckerman of the University of London, and Research Anatomist to the Zoological Society, with notes by Professor George Elliot Smith, F.R.S. This refers to two skulls discovered in the excavations conducted by Mr. Rea, the Archæologist of the Madras Presidency and noticed by Mr. Thurston so long ago as 1909. Two of these have been examined recently and it is they that form the subject of this bulletin. Without getting into any details for which reference may be made to the very interesting and carefully written bulletin of twenty pages, we may content ourselves with the general conclusions derivable therefrom.

The examination of the skulls seems to show that, from the mere cranial measurements, the two examples subjected to measurements and examination, may be regarded as possessed of distinct characteristics justifying the labelling of these two distinctly. The first one is

Australian and the second one Dravidian. Of course, this would naturally raise the question whether Australian and Dravidian are two distinct ethnic varieties, and whether we have evidence justifying this division; and that is examined in the portion that follows. The difficulty of classifying the so-called Dravidian population of India into Dravidian and pre-Dravidian is explained. While the general position is tenable that the pre-Dravidian population of India and the Australian may be related to each other, the Dravidian being an invading population from the north-west, the Austroid characteristics of the Australian of to-day raises difficulties towards confirming this classification. From a mere cranial examination, the two types represented by the two skulls of Adichanallur stand clear. But whether a cranial measurement constitutes irrefutable evidence of race is open to doubt. The distinction Kolarian and Dravidian is shown to be more or less philological and not ethnical, and it is pointed out on an elaborate examination of the researches carried on by Turner that the elaborate cranial examination of the peoples of the Deccan does not support a specific pre-Dravidian stock to which belonged the Australians, the jungle tribes of Southern India and the Veddahs of Ceylon. It is pointed out that this may however be due to racial mixture. But the two Adichanallur skulls seem nevertheless to support the notion that the aboriginal inhabitants of Southern India were in many respects similar to the Australians of to-day, and this conclusion seems to lend justification to a pre-Dravidian aboriginal stock consisting of the jungle tribes of Southern India, the Australians, the Sakai of the Malaya Peninsula and the Veddahs of Ceylon. The same evidence is not conclusive in regard to the fact that the present Australian native is a result of a cross between the Australian and invading Indians. The indications are rather against such a possibility. But so far as the Deccan itself is concerned, the association of a Dravidian skull and that of an Australian in Adichanallur shows that the Adichanallur remains must be referable to the Dravidian period, whatever that be. There is perhaps evidence to support that primitive man made his way to Australia from Asia, probably from India. Such a hypothesis would explain the occurrence of similar peoples in Ceylon, the Malaya Peninsula and the East Indian Archipelago, all of them describable by the comprehensive term pre-Dravidian. The Talgai and the

Wadjak skull remains give definite evidence that the original inhabitants of Australia were of a more primitive type than the present-day Australians. That would mean that the Australoid skulls of Adichanallur No. I of the Bulletin is by no means the most primitive type of Southern India. Possibly he had a predecessor like the Australian, of a race assimilable to the Talgai race. The bulletin is excellently printed and the illustrations are all that could be desired.

'SOME PROBLEMS OF VIJAYANAGARA HISTORY

BY

DR. C. NARAYANA RAO, M.A., L.T., Ph.D.

(Reprinted from the Ceded Districts College Magazine.)

In this article the author makes a survey of the recent publications on the Vijayanagara History, with special reference to its origin. He examines Prof. Father Heras' Hoysala theory and takes it to be incorrect. The arguments adduced are not however convincing. The author also discusses the theory whether Vidyaranya was the founder of Vijayanagara, and criticizes the views of Prof. Heras who has rejected the connection of Vidyaranya with the foundation of Vijayanagara.

BEGINNINGS OF VIJAYANAGARA HISTORY

BY

REV. H. HERAS, S.J., M.A.

(Published by the Indian Historical Research Institute, Bombay, 1929).

THIS monograph by the Rev. Father Heras, the author of the *Ara-vidu dynasty of Vijayanagar*, is a valuable addition to the historical studies connected with Vijayanagar kingdom. The book contains the two lectures delivered by Prof. Heras under the auspices of the Mysore University. The titles of the two lectures are 'the Foundation of the city of Vijayanagar' and 'the Origin of the Sangama Dynasty.' The learned author discusses in the first lecture the legends centering around the foundation of the city and incidentally examines the story of Vidyaranya's connection with the foundation

of Vijayanagara. He then makes a critical study of the accounts of both Ferishta and Nuniz, and concludes rightly, as historians of Vijayanagara History have maintained, that the foundation was by the Hoysalas to avert the Musalman invasions at the north of the Empire.

The second lecture turns on the first dynasty of Vijayanagara kings, well known as the Sangama dynasty. Fr. Heras examines the question who was Sangama and who were his ancestors. The purpose of this study is to find a solution as to the Kannada or Telugu origin of the Vijayanagar empire. The author succeeds in reinforcing the theory of Kannada origin.

But his views regarding of the fabrication of the story of Vidyaranya by the ascetics of the Sringeri mutt and incidentally his views regarding the philosophy of these ascetics (pp. 33-35) may not find general acceptance.

LOYAL INDIA

BY

PERCY H. DUMBELL

[Constable & Co., London.]

THIS is a work which attempts to give on the basis of authoritative documents at the India Office, a survey of the British administration during the seventy years from 1858 to 1928. The author, an official of the India Office, who was on the staff of the late Lord Morley as Secretary of State, has selected the documents bearing on the question and has arranged them in a number of chapters under separate headings. His idea in writing this book is 'to proclaim his conviction that here, in a reversion to the councils of that temper (that of Morley) and to the orderly procedure then adopted, is to be found if anywhere, the safe line of advance towards the establishment of a true and lasting commonwealth'. He calls for co-operation between the Indians and the English in this great work, and feels that if he did not do what lay in his power to bring this about, he would not have done his duty by India. In order to set India on her path of progress for the future, he believes what is required is first, a knowledge of the native Indian theory of government in ancient and modern times; then

a series of historical documents of the British Royal House incorporating the rights and liberties of the princes and peoples of India, and then a clear understanding of the existing constitution of India and of the various stages of its growth. He starts with the conviction that the normal Hindu state is a monarchy, notwithstanding the fact that it was not autocratic in character. He says that the European ideal of national government where the whole community has a determining voice is foreign to Hindu modes of thought. Without attempting to controvert him, we may say this is not as foreign as is implied by this definite statement and the difficulties of introducing that kind of a notion is not quite as great as he makes it out to be. It might prove that a mere copy of the Western notions of democracy in practice may not be what would succeed in India. But there could be no doubt that if the Hindu government of India should be understood properly, the democratic principle as an ideal working out in actual practice had never been quite so foreign to the governmental organization of India as a whole. It is hardly necessary to point out that circumstances have a great deal changed and what proved a success in the centuries before the establishment of the Muhammadan empire in India might cease to be of application to the present times in detail. But the principle underlying and guiding governments would still be largely capable of application.

In regard to the other two parts, the work gives the well-known documents—the Royal Charters—first of all, and traces in another part the growth of the British administration by giving *in extenso* the various important documents, which introduced changes in the administration from time to time. Apart from these sections therefore the author has added a chapter on the Services, one chapter on education consisting of an important chapter of the Sadler Committee Report. There are two other valuable chapters, the first relating to Indian policy in respect of Indian States, and the second on the relations between India and the British Empire. Then a chapter is devoted to India and the late War with an appendix containing an appreciation of Lord Morley, printed from the Civil Service opinion. It is an interesting and authoritative work, which deserves well of all serious students of Indian Constitution at this time when a earnest effort is being made to set India on a progressive path towards self-determination.

MUGHAL RULE IN INDIA

BY

THE LATE S. M. EDWARDES, C.S.I., C.V.O.

and

H. L. O. GARRET

(Oxford University Press)

THIS is a handbook of about 370 pages devoted to a study of Mughal rule in India and begins with Babur the Conqueror, who laid the foundations of Mughal power in the country, and carries the history forward down to the decline of the Mughal Empire, or at least to the beginnings of it with the death of Aurangzeb. It may be said to be practically a history of the Great Mughals and does not take into it the decline and fall of the empire. It is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the history of the period under the different reigns, covering more or less 150 pages of the work. The second part is devoted to the general topics, such as the Mughal administration, the economic and social features of the Mughal age, Mughal architecture and the arts, followed in conclusion by a chapter tracing the causes of the decline of the Mughal power. These topics are treated with a brevity and lucidity which makes the work a really valuable book for the use of students of Indian History preparing for the Honours courses and the competitive examinations. It would serve admirably as a reading book for those students, and thus fills the want of a suitable handbook of Indian History for such students for a part of the whole subject. We welcome it as a contribution to this much-desired end.

THE CALIPHS AND THEIR NON-MUSLIM SUBJECTS

BY

PROFESSOR A. S. TRITTON, MUSLIM UNIVERSITY, ALIGARH

(Oxford University Press)

THE Caliphs and their non-Muslim subjects is of considerable importance in general history, and its importance is certainly not less at the present time, when the most engaging topic of the hour is the reformed constitution of the Government of India. As the author

himself explains in a sub-title, the work constitutes a critical examination of what is generally taken to be the covenant of 'Umar, the second Caliph, on the particular topic. Professor Tritton deals with his subject with the perspicacity we have learned to associate with him, and examines, on the most authoritative evidence of Islamic literature, what the covenant of 'Umar is taken to be, whether such a covenant existed, what the law based on the covenant or otherwise, happened to be and how far and in what particular respects practice differed from the pedantic statements of law. As far as we could see, he has dealt with his sources exhaustively, and indicates, that among the authorities, there seems to have been no idea of a covenant of 'Umar during the first century of the Caliphate, and during the second century it begins to come in and about the year 200 of the Hejira it had become a settled notion with Islamic writers. He then examines in detail the most accepted text of the covenant under various heads, such as government services, the position of churches and monasteries, the treatment of churches, etc. He says that there is no uniformity of practice such as would follow if a single document like that of the covenant of 'Umar had held the field, and proved the authority for the successors of the author of the covenant. Practice varied from time to time, and had been considerably modified by the personal character of the Caliphs for the time being. It is a very interesting study and would pay perusal for those who might seriously wish to study the character of what Islamic administration was in the best days of its power.

In Memoriam

SIR RICHARD CARNAC TEMPLE, BT., C.B., C.I.E., F.B.A.,
F.S.A., ETC.

THE death of Sir R. C. Temple on the 3rd of March last removes one of the greatest names in the field of Oriental Research. Temple was born in India in Allahabad on the 15th of October 1850 when his father, Sir Richard Temple, Bart, G.C.S.I., was serving there as a junior member of the service. Educated at Harrow and Trinity Hall, Cambridge, he joined the Royal Scots Fusiliers and arrived in India in 1871 when his father had reached the position of member for Finance of the Governor-General's Council. After a few years he joined the Bengal Staff Corps and served with the 38th Dogras and the 1st Gurkhas. He went on active service in the Second Afghan War, and had the distinction of receiving a medal and being mentioned in despatches. Thereafter he was transferred to civil employ and became a Cantonment Magistrate in the Punjab. When the Third Burmese War broke out in 1885, he was transferred to Burma and occupied various places both military and civil. He served as Assistant Commissioner, Cantonment Magistrate, and Deputy Commissioner in various places in Burma, and became finally the official President of the Rangoon Municipality and Port Commissioner in 1891. In addition to these offices on the civil side he raised and commanded the Upper Burma Volunteer Rifles, the Rangoon Naval Volunteers, the Volunteer Engineers and the Rangoon Port Defence Volunteers. He occupied the position of Honorary Lieut.-Colonel of some of these, his substantial military rank being still that of a Major of the Indian Army. These services earned for him a C.I.E., and secured him the post of the Chief Commissioner of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Superintendent of Port Blair. While still holding this office, he succeeded to the baronetcy on the death of his father in 1902. He retired from service in 1904 and resided for some years in his ancestral home 'the Nash', in Worcestershire, which had been the home of the family for two centuries.

From 1905 onwards he used the freedom from public service to purpose, by editing many works, which required wide culture, vast learning and a high degree of critical acumen, assisted in this work by an able and energetic collaborator in Miss L. M. Anstey, associated with him for thirty-two years. He was a member of most of the learned societies interested in India and the East. He was an Honorary Vice-President of the Royal Asiatic Society, a member of the Royal Geographical Society, the Hakluyt Society, the Royal Anthropological Society, the Bengal Asiatic Society and many other societies in England and elsewhere. He was one of fifty Fellows of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. He was a Fellow of the British Academy and of the British Society of Antiquaries. He was also an Honorary Fellow of his own college, Trinity Hall. He occupied the position of Chairman of the Standing Committee of Baronetage for fifteen years. He presided over the Anthropological Section of the British Association in 1913 when he delivered his presidential address on the Administrative Value of Anthropology. In 1928, he presided over the Jubilee Congress of the Folklore Society when he delivered a presidential address on Mystery and the Mental Atmosphere.

During his life, particularly the latter part of it, he rendered valuable public service in connection with the Territorial Army Association, of which he was Chairman from 1908 to 1921. He was associated with the St. John Ambulance Association, of which he was created Bailiff, Grand Cross, in 1927. During the Great War, he worked as a member of the Joint War Committee of the St. John Ambulance Association, and of the British Red Cross. He was awarded a C.B. for services in connection with these. He was also associated with other philanthropic efforts of which the Homes of Rest for Nurses associated with the name of Edith Cavell and the British Hospital for Mothers and Babies in the building of which he was largely instrumental, deserve mention. He had now reached the proverbial three score and ten, and the work that he had to do began to tell upon him, as his eyesight became seriously affected and other ailments associated with age supervened. He therefore had to divide his time between England and places like Switzerland and the Continent, and latterly he had to try several places on the Continent in turn, such as Montreux, Wiesbaden and Territet. He was in residence in the last pleasant resort close to the Lake of Geneva

where he breathed his last. He was seriously ill last year when he was almost given up, but his native strength asserted itself and he pulled through. He had so far recovered that he resumed work. When he actually died he was not even ill. He died with papers actually in hand quite suddenly, death being caused by a clot on the brain.

During the long span of sixty years of active work since he came to India as a subaltern in 1871, the variety and the volume of work that he did would constitute a big bibliography. He practically began work of a literary character when after the Second Afghan War, he was turned to civil employ. The first of his publications is the *Legend of the Punjab* in three volumes, and much that was written in the Punjab Notes and Queries, to which he contributed largely, and *Wide Awake Stories* in collaboration with Mrs. F. A. Steel connected with Punjab and Kashmir in particular. His interest in the Punjab and Kashmir was sustained for over forty years when in 1924 he published a versified translation of Lalla, the Prophetess, a woman Saiva Ascetic of Kashmir. Apart from the excellence of the translation, and its attractive character in its versified form, he contributed a masterly introduction which gives evidence of his wide interest and vast study. To the period of his employment in Burma belong the *Thirty Seven Nats*, a phase of spirit worship prevailing in Burma. Later on he published, in collaboration with Dr. Burnell, the *Devil Worship of the Tuluvas*. Later still he issued a report on the Census, and memoranda on the forests and the hills of the Andamans and Nicobars. Besides these he published a grammar of the Andamanese and Nicobarese languages and wrote accounts of these islands both for the *Imperial Gazetteer* and the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Since his retirement, he published many volumes for the Hakluyt Society, the Indian Records Series and other series with valuable introductions and annotations. Some of these are *The Countries round the Bay of Bengal* by Tomas Bowrey, a *Journal of Peter Mundy* in four volumes, the *Bowrey Papers*, the first volume alone, the journals of *Streynsham Master*, two volumes, *Drake's World Encompassed*, the *Itinerary of Ludovico Varthema*, the *Tragedy of the Worcester*, and later on a *New Light on the Mysterious Tragedy of the Worcester*. He also contributed in the course of his illness, *The Life of John Olafsson* for the Hakluyt Society in two volumes. He also edited his father's work,

Journals kept in Hyderabad, Kashmir, Sikkim and Nepal in two volumes very early in his career as a literary man. To the later period belong the *Cult of the Peacock Angel* dealing with the heretical sect called Yazidis so late as 1908. Almost at the ebb of his life he found time in the intervals of illness to classify and arrange the voluminous material collected by him on the Muslim sects intended to be his *magnum opus* in five volumes. We had the pleasure of receiving a letter from him expounding the character of the work and sending a syllabus of one of the volumes of the projected publication, which exhibited the comprehensiveness and the systematic analysis of the material that he was able to collect. We note with pleasure that, notwithstanding the expression of diffidence at finding a publisher, that the first volume of this work is actually in type.

Temple's name is known more widely in association with the *Indian Antiquary*. He began to contribute to the *Indian Antiquary* in 1879 while the founder James Burgess, was still editing it. He was a continuous contributor ever since to the columns of the journal and his writings continue and may go on for a considerable length of time yet. When Burgess retired in 1884, the late Dr. J. F. Fleet and Sir Richard Temple took it over from him on their joint responsibility. When Dr. Fleet retired in 1892, Temple became the sole editor and proprietor till in 1924 when, having regard to his age, he formed the Indian Antiquary Limited and got into an agreement with the Royal Anthropological Institute, which assumed the responsibility for the journal from 1st January 1925. Temple's contributions began with volume viii and the current volume is volume lx of the journal. The late Sir Richard Temple was a man of indefatigable industry, who enjoyed his work. His range of knowledge and his intense interest were so wide as to cover almost every branch of Oriental Research. Without claiming to be an expert, he had a vast amount of very good work in the large number of branches constituting oriental research as a whole. He was one of those who insisted on sounder principles of viewing Indian history, life and culture as a whole, the neglect of which principle has been responsible for unfortunate results in certain cases. One special feature of his character which ought to be noted is his readiness to encourage those with talent for this kind of work, and to take a great amount of trouble to put these in the way. His suggestion for the improvement of one of my own articles to the *Indian*

Antiquary was how I came to know him twenty-five years ago, and that acquaintance, without personal knowledge, ripened into what may well be defined as friendship of long years, and during the last eight years, I have been associated with him in the editing of the *Indian Antiquary*. The loss to the *Indian Antiquary* and the loss to Oriental Research alike are great; my own personal loss is not less. He was one of those who was quite ready to tender useful advice in difficulties and showed a sympathy, not met with too often. It would be doing nothing but discharging a duty to offer my sympathies to the bereaved Lady Temple and the family.

EDITOR.

Select Contents of Oriental Journal

Epigraphia Indica

VOL. XIX, PART VII

July, 1928—

- N. LAKSHMINARAYAN RAO, M.A.: 'Jura Prasasti of Krishna III.
N. C. MEHTA, I.C.S.: 'Bhadavana Grant of Govinda Chandra-
deva of Kanuj.'

The Indian Antiquary

January, 1931—

- R. R. HALDER: 'Chitor and its Sieges.'
C. E. A. W. OLDHAM: 'Sidi Ali Shelebi in India, 1554-1556.'
J. C. GHOSH: 'Where was Tarkkari?'

February, 1931—

- Rev. Fr. H. HERAS: 'The Prison of the Emperor Sadasiva Raya.'
SIR GEORGE A. GRIERSON: 'On the modern Indo-Aryan vernaculars.'
Sir R. C. TEMPLE: 'Scraps of Tibeto-Burman Folklore.'

March, 1931—

- R. V. JAHAGIRDAR: 'A note on the Ten Plays of Bhasa: re-examines the age and the authorship of the plays by the evidence provided by the number and characteristics of the ślokas or verses in anuṣṭup metre.
Miss L. D. GREENE: 'Nature study in the Sanskrit drama "Sakuntala."'
B. BANNERJEA: 'Possible origin of the Caste system in India.' Three principal hypotheses examined: occupational basis, somatological basis and Totemic basis of the division with caste.
REV. H. HOSTEN: 'Is S. Thome in civitate Iothabis?'

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London

January, 1931—

- O. G. VON WESSENDONK: 'The Kalavāda and the Zervanite system.'
A. E. ROBINSON: 'The Mahmal of the Moslem Pilgrimage.'

SELECT CONTENTS OF ORIENTAL JOURNALS 83

Rev. Fr. H. HERAS: 'Krishnadevaraya's conquest of Rachol. Father Heras does not accept the identification of Rachol with Raichur as explained by Sewell, but would identify it with the fort of Rachol in Salsette.'

Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik

BAND 8. HEFT I. 1901

- A. VENKATASUBBIAH: 'Devamārga.'
VON FRZ. JOS. MEIER: 'Der Archaismus in der space des Bhāgavata Purana nüt besonderes Bernicksichtig ungder verbal flexion examines the archaism in the language of the Bhagavata Purana in a lengthy contribution with numerous illustrations.'
H. JACOBI: 'Aber das alter des Yogaśāstra, a learned discussion of the age of Patanjali and Vasubandhu.'
J. C. TAVADIA: 'Pahlavi passages on Fate and Freewill.'

Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal

(Numismatic Number)

VOL. XXV, 1929, No. 2

- H. E. STAPLETON: 'A find of 182 silver coins of kings of the Husaini and Sūri Dynasties from Raipara, Thāna Dohar, District Decca, Eastern Bengal.'
K. G. KUNDANGAR: 'Andhra coins in the Lord Irwin Agricultural Museum, Kolhapur.'
V. D. B. TARAPOREVALA: 'Aurangzeb's Rupee of Dārus-sur ūri. Burhanpūri.'
C. R. SINGHAL: 'Coins of Nasir Shah of Gujarat.'
M. F. C. MASTRI: 'Some Rare Ghaznavid coins.'
S. H. HODIVALA: 'Akbarpūr-Tanda and Akbarpūr.'

Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society

October, 1930—

- S. SOMASUNDRA DESIKAR: 'Identification of Sopatma and Phrounion of the Greek writers.'
DEVAN CHANDRA: 'Hindus as Pioneers of World Civilization.'

Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society

October, 1930—

PROF. G. JOUVEN DUBREUIL: 'Amaravati, from A.D. 100 to 700.'

R. SUBBA RAO: 'Gautamiputra Satakarni.'

Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society

September–December, 1930—

K. P. JAYASWAL: 'Problems of Saka-satavahana History.'

R. C. ROY: 'Aboriginal village organization in India.'

NARAYANA TRIPATHI: 'Two Sulki plates.'

Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society

December, 1930—

SIR J. J. MODI: 'Rustam Manock and the Persian Qisseh.'

DR. GANGANATH JHA: 'Kumarila and Vedanta.'

DR. PALHAH: 'On the date of Śakatāyana-Chintamani.'

S. K. BELVALKAR: 'An authentic' but unpublished work of Sankarā Cārya: 'Sankara's commentary on Altareya Aranyaka II and III.'

K. S. VAKIL: 'Education in Bombay (1804–1929).'

PROF. EZEKIEL: 'The position of women in Rabbinical Literature.'

K. G. KUNDANGAR: 'Development of the Kannada Drama.'

SIR J. C. BOSE: 'Mechanism of Life.'

MRS. NORA GOFFIN: 'European social life in Bombay 1804–1929.'

The Round Table

Summary of articles in the December issue

'WHERE is Europe going?' This is the first question dealt with in the December issue. The attention of the British Empire has been lately absorbed in the Imperial and Indian Round Table Conferences. People both in Great Britain and elsewhere are, in any case, too full of their domestic woes to pay much attention at the moment to political troubles abroad; but it is evident from the Round Table article that there is room for grave anxiety. Europe, in fact, is at a parting of the ways, and, as the writer puts it, there are two conflicting tendencies, one leading back to the old pre-War balance of power, and the other to international co-operation for peace. The reader will form his own opinion after reading the writer's survey, which covers all the potential storm centres and brings out the hopeful as well as the gloomy side of the picture, as to which tendency is likely to prevail.

The second article, *The United States: the Slump*, makes it clear that other people have their troubles besides ourselves. But, while there are factors which militate against the rapid recovery which the optimists at first looked for, the writer is by no means blind to the hopeful side. A concluding section shows how the hard times are hitting the President, and the party in power, as well as trade.

An *Imperial Conference* usually heads the Round Table contents bill. This time it comes third. But, although, as the writer shows, a great deal of useful work has been done, the main issue with which the article is more particularly concerned, which involved a conflict between the British tradition of free trade and the economic nationalism of the Dominions, the problem of Imperial economic co-operation, has had to be postponed till next year, when there will be another Conference at Ottawa to consider it.

The fourth article is *England in the Great Depression*. The writer explains why the decline in prices hits her worse than other countries. There is, however, it would appear, a hard core to the British problem derived from maladjustment as long ago as 1924, and

represented by the first million of unemployed, which cannot be put down to the world slump. It demands a special explanation and special treatment. Both are suggested.

The fifth article, *India: Conference or Intransigence*, takes us from the hopeful atmosphere of the London Round Table Conference back to the troubled Indian scene, where the largest group, the Congress party, has continued the civil disobedience campaign, hostile to the idea of Conference. Even here, however, there are hopeful signs.

From India we pass to *Russian Realities*, an extraordinarily suggestive picture of life in a provincial Russian town, subject to all the exigencies of the Five Years Plan.

The Crown and the Dominions follows, a penetrating analysis of one of the most interesting sides of the constitutional aspect of the Imperial Conference's task, and it, in turn, is followed by *An Immigrant's Impression* of Canada which possibly throws more light upon the Imperial question than any direct examination of either constitutional or economic problems.

Africa from the South comes next, a timely account, in view of the appointment by Parliament of a Joint Committee to examine the East African question, of the way in which East Africa, indeed tropical African problems generally, are beginning to affect opinion in South Africa.

The Great Britain article brings out the way in which events are reacting upon the different parties, and the usual contributions from Ireland and the Dominions follow. The former, besides other things, describes the attitude of the Irish Free State to M. Briand's idea of a 'United States of Europe', and, among the Dominion articles, the section on public finance from Australia will attract most attention. The issue winds up with an abstract of the official Report of the Imperial Conference.

Summary of Articles in the March issue.

The first article in the March issue of the ROUND TABLE is *India—Constitution of Chaos*. That, since the Round Table Conference, is, the writer points out, the choice before Indians, for the Conference and the leaders of all three British parties are agreed that the maximum possible of responsibility should be transferred to Indian

shoulders. There will, of course, be reservations to cover the period of transition. They are shown to be as necessary in the interest of India as of Great Britain—and it is up to the people of India to agree among themselves upon a workable constitution. That is a condition precedent. But, though the difficulties in their way, which are discussed in detail as well as the various ways of meeting them, are great, the obstacles to Indian progress can no longer be put down to this country.

The second article, *Russian Realities*, is a continuation of the vivid picture of real life under Bolshevik rule given in the December issue. It takes us to a typical Russian village in the grip of the Five Years Plan. One sees, as one reads, the strong as well as the weak points of the agricultural side of that plan, and what the peasant feels about the collective farms. The article certainly makes it easier to understand Bolshevik mentality.

The third article is *The United States in the Great Depression*, an impressive study of the causes of the American slump, especially the part played by the machine, the monster which is fast becoming our master.

China—a Brighter Outlook comes as a relief. The gloom is at all events beginning to lift in one quarter of the globe, and the importance for our trade, if a country with over 400 million inhabitants really settles down after more than a decade of civil war, cannot easily be overestimated. The writer believes that there is ground for tempered optimism.

The next subject is a different one. The recent Prayer-book controversy brought the relations between Church and State in England, national institutions both of them, into the limelight. The fifth article in the ROUND TABLE is on *Church and State in France*, where there is a national State and an international Church with claims to which it is difficult to set a limit. There has been, the writer shows, conflict broken by temporary understandings all through French history—conflict which, at first temporal, as time went on assumed a spiritual, almost a religious, character. The war, in which both bishops and priests earned golden opinions, helped to bring about reconciliation; but there were many other factors which must be realized by anyone who wishes to understand French political life.

The next article is on *The Unrest on the Indian Frontier* last summer. The understanding between the Pathan and the Congress party seemed to be a case of the lion lying down with the lamb, and all sorts of reasons for such an unnatural alliance were suggested, Bolshevik propaganda among others. Causes as well as events are dealt with in this article.

The next article is on the debated question of the recent separation of the posts of Governor-General and High Commissioner in South Africa, and some reasons are given which, in spite of critical letters from ex-Governors-General, suggest that there were good reasons for the change.

Next come the usual articles from Ireland and Great Britain. The strong financial position of the Free State to-day is brought out in the former, and the latter describes Mr. Lloyd George's understanding with Labour, now apparently cemented by the Prime Minister's public acceptance of his national development programme, which, following as it did upon Mr. Snowden's warning about the need for the strictest economy, puzzled the political world. There is also a section on the coal and cotton stoppages.

Among the Dominion contributions the account of the economic difficulties of Australia will probably have pride of place, but there is also an excellent article from South Africa on the question of secession, upon which his party expected General Hertzog to secure a definite pronouncement at the Imperial Conference, and, in view of the character of the Russian Five Years Plan, the section on wheat from Canada has an interest of its own.

OUR EXCHANGES

1. *The Annals of the Bhandarkar Research Institute*, Deccan Gymkhana P.O., Poona.
2. *Bharat Itihasa Samshodaka Mandala*, Poona City.
3. *Bulletin de l'Ecole Française D'Extreme-Orient*, Hanoi.
4. *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, London University, London, Longmans, Green & Co., London.
5. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, London Institution, Pinsbury Circus, London.
6. *Calcutta Review*, 3, Senate House, Calcutta.
7. *Hindustan Review*, Patna Junction, E.I.Ry.
8. *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 96, Amherst St., Calcutta.
9. *Journal Asiatique*, Librairie Orientaliste, Paul Geuthner, Paris.
10. *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Patna.
11. *Journal of Oriental Research*, Managing Editor, 'The Ashrama', Luz, Mylapore.
12. *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Bombay.
13. *Journal of the Kern Institute*, Leiden, Holland.
14. *Journal of the Bombay Historical Society*, Exchange Building, Sprott Road, Bombay.
15. *Muslim Review*, 3, Government Place, Calcutta.
16. *Nagari Pracharini Sabha*, Benares.
17. *The Political Science Quarterly*, Kent Hall, Columbia University, New York.
18. *Quarterly Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society*, Andhra Historical Society, Rajahmundry.
19. *Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society*, Daly Hall, Cenotaph Road, Bangalore.
20. *The Yale Review*, Washington, U.S.A.
21. *Yoga-Mimansa, Km'javana*, Lonavla, Bombay.
22. *The Modern Review*, 91, Upper Circular Road, Calcutta.
23. *The Vedic Magazine and Gurukula Samachar*, Gurudatta Bhavana, Lahore.

24. *The Ceylon Journal of Science*, Office of the Archæological Survey, Anuradhapura (Ceylon).
25. *The Historical Studies*, Accession Department, University Library, University of California, Berkeley, California.
26. *The Indian Review*, Esplanade, Madras.
27. *The Servant of India*, Servant of India Society, Poona City.
28. *The Shrine of Wisdom, Aahlu*, 6 Hermon Hill, London, E. 11.
29. *The Telugu Academy Journal*, Cocanada.
30. *The Mysore University Journal*, Mysore University, Mysore.
31. *The People*, 2 Court Street, Post Box 116, Lahore.
32. *The Young Men of India*, The Thottam, Salem.
33. *The Gackwad's Oriental Series*, Oriental Institute, Baroda.
34. The Superintendent, Government Museum, Madras.
35. *Social Science Abstracts*, 611, Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York City.
36. 'Tarikh' *Kollah Akbar Jah*, Hyderabad (Deccan).
37. The Superintendent of Archæology, Gwalior State, Gwalior.
38. Verlag Der Asia Major, Leipzig C1, Scherlstr, 2.
39. *The Indian Literary Review*, D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co., 190, Hornby Road, Fort, Bombay.

DACCA UNIVERSITY SUPPLEMENT

The Arab Invasion of India

By

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INTRODUCTION

THE Muhammadan conquest of India is one of those epoch-making events which have left a permanent impress on subsequent ages. It may be regarded as the most important episode in the history of India since the Aryan invasion, as it has radically changed the entire aspect of Indian history such as no other event has yet done or is likely to do in future. No apology is therefore needed for an attempt to reconstruct the history of this all-important episode.

At first sight such an attempt may appear superfluous. For, thanks to the historical instinct of the Muhammadans, we possess contemporary or nearly contemporary records of their military expeditions and most of these are now available to general readers. But two considerations have impelled me to undertake the task, and these may be explained at the very outset.

In the first place, these chronicles refer to isolated chapters of that great episode, and, to have a correct perspective view of the whole, it is necessary to link them together in a continuous narrative.

Secondly, all these chronicles represent only one side of the picture. The victors are painted by themselves, and naturally their deeds loom large in these pages. Great caution and circumspection are, therefore, necessary in utilizing the data supplied by them. Besides, no serious student of history should be prepared to accept an one-sided version of the struggle recorded by one of the combatants, and must try to check the narrative by means of accounts given by the other side. The absence of Hindu chronicles has made this wholesome checking

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impossible in the present instance and the evidence of Muhammadan historians, unchecked by other means, has gained currency as history.

The lack of Hindu evidence is, however, not as complete as is generally supposed. The archæological discoveries of the last hundred years have placed at our disposal a number of valuable data which at least help us in checking and correctly interpreting many of the episodes of this tragic drama. Time has, therefore, come for a critical study of the Muhammadan chronicles with the help of such Indian documents as are available to us, and such an attempt is made in the following pages.

The Muhammadan conquest of India may naturally be divided into three phases—according to the sources from which the invasions had proceeded, viz., Arabia, Ghazni and Ghor. It will be convenient to subject each of them to a separate review before we attempt to draw a general picture of the whole.¹ But in order to have an accurate idea of the first phase of the Muhammadan conquest, we must have a clear notion of the western border-land of India on the eve of Muhammadan invasion.

CHAPTER I

THE WESTERN BORDER-LAND OF INDIA ON THE EVE OF THE ARAB INVASION

The spirit of martial energy which the Prophet had infused into the Arabian people produced remarkable results. At the time of the death of the Prophet, in A.D. 632, His sovereignty did not extend beyond the Arabian peninsula. Within six years, Syria and Egypt were subdued by His successors. Northern Africa was conquered between A.D. 647 and 709 and Spain was subjugated by A.D. 713. Within a century of the death of the Prophet, the Muhammadans had advanced to the heart of France when their further progress was checked by the victory of Charles Martel between Tours and Poitiers in A.D. 732.

The Muhammadans attained equally brilliant success in the east. The mighty Persian Empire was laid low at the battle of Cadesia in A.D. 636, and within 8 years the whole of Persia as far east as Herat

¹ This article deals only with the first phase. The second and third phases will be similarly dealt with in future.

was annexed to the growing empire of the Arabs. By A.D. 650 its northern frontier was advanced to the Oxus and all the countries between that river and the Hindu Kush mountains were included in it.¹

These events which were destined to change the face of the world do not seem to have created any great stir in India and the Far East. The Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsang who was proceeding at leisure along the Trans-Hindu Kush regions in A.D. 643 does not refer to any Arab conquest in his note of the political situation of the surrounding country. He writes an account of Persia under the old régime in blissful ignorance of the great catastrophe which had overwhelmed that ancient empire during the last decade. But while nearing the Oxus river he probably heard something of the political cataclysm that had overtaken these regions—for we find him suddenly giving up the old route which he had resolved to follow, and instead of proceeding through Bākh and Samarkhand he took an easterly route *via* Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan.²

But although Hiuen Tsang had not probably heard of the Arab Empire, he has left a very interesting account of the countries bordering upon it in the east. Various speculations have been made by scholars regarding the political condition of these countries and the races to which their people belonged at this time, but we cannot probably have a better guide in this respect than the Chinese pilgrim who passed through those countries.

It appears from the accounts left by Hiuen Tsang that the western border-land of India was dominated at that time by three powerful Hindu kingdoms,—the kingdom of Kāpiśi in the north, that of Sindhu or Sind in the south, and the kingdom of Tsao-Kuta or Tsao-li between the two.

¹ Cf. *Muir-Caliphate*, Chapters 1-51, for details.

² On the eve of Hiuen Tsang's departure from India Harshavardhana addressed him as follows:—

'I know not by what route you propose to return. If you select the southern sea-route then I will send official attendants to accompany you.'

The pilgrim replied that the king of Kau-Chang whom he visited on his way to India had prayed him to visit him on his return journey. He then continued 'My heart is unable to forego this duty; I will therefore return by the northern Road'. (*Beal-Life of Hiuen Tsang*, p. 188). This naturally leads to the inference that there must have been some special reasons which ultimately induced Hiuen Tsang to give up the old route which passed *via* Kau-Chang.

I. The kingdom of Kāpiśī lay to the east of Bamian. According to Hiuen Tsang the king of this country, who was a Kshatriya by caste, ruled over ten neighbouring countries. Among these the pilgrim specifically refers to four states, viz., Lan-po (Lamghan), Na-ka-lo-ho (Jalalabad), Gāndhāra (Peshwar) and Fa-la-na (Bannu) as directly under the king of Kāpiśī. The question now arises as to the other five countries which were subject to Kāpiśī, for the Chinese pilgrim clearly refers to ten states, apparently including Kāpiśī, over which the power of the king of that country extended. It is only natural to suppose that the countries adjacent to Kāpiśī and which are not specifically referred to as subject to any other kingdom, were possibly included within this category. Following, apparently, this line of argument, Cunningham¹ reckons 'the whole of Afghanistan, from Bamian and Kandahar on the west to Bolan pass on the south, in which Hiuen Tsang places ten separate states or districts, as subject to Kāpiśī.

It is not necessary for our present purpose to discuss the merits of Cunningham's theory or to enter into the vexed question of the identification of these ten states. It is sufficient to note here that according to the description left by Hiuen Tsang, Kāpiśī must be regarded as a very powerful state. As regards the extent of this kingdom, we can only have an approximate idea from the location of the four states specifically referred to as subject to Kāpiśī.

The following details, gathered from Watters' translation of Hiuen Tsang's account, with notes, may be taken as the basis of our discussion.

The pilgrim left Bamian, and then 'going east from this, entered the snow mountains, crossed a black range and reached Kapishih'.² This country was above 4000 li in circuit. Hiuen Tsang, before proceeding further in his narrative of journey, gives a long account of India. This indicates, as Watters so justly remarks, that 'our pilgrim has now reached the territory which he, like others, before and after him, calls India'.³

'From Kapis the pilgrim continued his journey, going east above 600 li through a very mountainous region; then crossing a black range

¹ Cunningham—*Ancient Geography*, pp. 19-20.

² Watters, vol. I, p. 122.

³ *Ibid*, p. 180.

he entered the north of India and arrived in the Lan-po (Lampa) country.'

'Lan-po is supposed to represent the old Sanskrit Lampāka and the district has been identified with the modern Laghman.' This country was above 1,000 li in circuit and had recently become a dependency of Kāpiśī.¹

'The pilgrim proceeded from Lampa south-east, above 100 li, crossing a high mountain and a large river, and reached the Na-Kie (Ka)-lo-ho country.' The life of Hiuen Tsang represents him as going south instead of south-east.

'Na-ka-lo-ho had no king but was a province of Kāpiśī. It was above 600 li from east to west and 250 or 260 li from north to south.'

It is generally agreed that this country is represented by the modern district called Nungnehar and thus included the present district of Jalalabad, the valley of the Kabul river from Darunta on the west to Mirza Kheyl on the east, and according to Mr. Simpson, 'it might reach from about Jugduluck to the Khyber'.²

The pilgrim next proceeded south-east to Kan-to-lo (Gāndhāra country). 'This country was above 1,000 li from east to west and above 800 li north to south reaching on the east to the Sin-tu (Sindhu) river. The capital was Pu-lu-sha-pu-lo (Purushapura=Peshawar) and the country was subject to Kapis'.³

Now from what has been said above, it is quite clear that the kingdom of Kāpiśī, together with its subject states, extended from the frontiers of Bamian on the west to the river Indus on the east. Considering the fact that the two states Kāpiśī and Lan-po have to be placed between Bamian and Jalalabad we must regard the whole of the Kabul valley as comprised within the jurisdiction of Kāpiśī. As the kingdom of Kāpiśī itself was four thousand li in circuit, evidently the whole of Kafiristan also must have been included in it.

To the south of Gāndhāra lay Fa-la-na. According to Hiuen Tsang the country was over 4,000 li in circuit and was subject to Kāpiśī.⁴

¹ Watters, pp. 180-1. Kāpiśī is the correct form though Watters and other writers render it in various other ways (e.g. kapis, kapishik, etc.).

² Watters, pp. 182-5.

³ *Ibid*, pp. 188-9.

⁴ *Ibid*, vol. II, p. 262.

There is no doubt that Fa-la-na corresponds to Varnnu, the name of a country in Pāṇini, and it has to be identified with the mountainous regions to the west of the Indus round the present Bannu district.¹

Thus the kingdom of Kāpiśi extended, roughly speaking, from Hindu Kush mountains to the Bannu district, and included the famous cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Peshawar.

It may be urged against this view that Cunningham has identified the kingdom called by Hiuen Tsang Fu-li-shih-sa-t'ang-na with the Kabul district.² Apart from the fact that this identification has not been accepted by others, there are insuperable objections to it. Without going into a detailed examination of the question, it will suffice here to state that between Fan-yen-na and Na-ko-lo-ho of Hiuen Tsang, which all authorities agree in identifying respectively with the Bamian and the Jalalabad district, the pilgrim locates two kingdoms, Kāpiśi and Lan-po, the former above 4,000 li (800 miles) and the latter above 1,000 li (200 miles) in circuit. It is, therefore, impossible to identify the Fu-li-shih-sa-t'ang-na, which was 2000 li (400 miles) from east to west, and 1,000 li (200 miles) from north to south with the Kabul district.

There is an indirect evidence to show that Kabul was included in Kāpiśi. The Chinese traveller Ou-Kóng who visited Afghanistan in A.D. 753 states that the eastern capital of Ki-pin was in Gāndhāra.³ As Watters has pointed out, the Kāpiśi of Hiuen Tsang denotes the same country as Ki-pin,⁴ and the inclusion of Gāndhāra in Kipin corroborates this view. Now Ou-Kóng says that the reigning king of Gāndhāra, and therefore of Ki-pin, was a descendant of Kanishka.⁵ On the other hand Alberuni refers to the Shāhiya rulers of Kabul as descendants of Kanishka.⁶ It is therefore reasonable to hold that the kingdom of Kāpiśi or Ki-pin denotes the Shāhiya territory and included Kabul.

¹ Watters, pp. 262-3; Stein—*Report of Arch. Survey* in N. W. F. Province, Peshawar, 1905, p. 5. Mr. S. N. Majumdar's note on p. 679 of his edition of Cunningham's *Ancient Geography*.

² Watters, vol. ii, p. 267.

³ *Journal Asiatique*, 1895, p. 349.

⁴ Watters, vol. i, p. 123. The same view is expressed by Cordier (*La Chine*, vol. i, p. 24) and Sten Konow (*Ep. Indica*, vol. xiv, p. 292).

⁵ *Journal Asiatique*, 1895, p. 356.

⁶ Sachau—*Alberuni*, Ch. XLIX, vol. ii, p. 13.

Assuming the identity of Ki-pin and Kāpiśi, which seems to rest on quite satisfactory grounds, it is interesting to note the close alliance between this kingdom and the Chinese court. During the period between 619 and 750 no less than six embassies were sent from Ki-pin to China.¹ The Chinese historians sometimes even regard Ki-pin as a vassal state of the Chinese empire,² but this need not indicate anything more than an alliance between two states of unequal power. This alliance was apparently sought as a protection against the menace of Arab conquest. It is also interesting to note that the fear of Arab invasion forced the kingdom of Udyāna to come under the protection of Ki-pin and this incorporation took place before 745 A.D., when the king of Ki-pin took the title of king of Ki-pin and Udyāna.³ Udyāna comprised the present districts of Swāt, Panjkora, Bijāwar, and Bunir.⁴ With this addition Ki-pin or Kāpiśi, or the Shāhiya kingdom of Kabul, as we may call it on the authority of later texts comprised the whole of the trans-Indus districts, to the south of Hindu Kush mountains, Chitral and Gilgit.

II. The kingdom of Sind adjoined Bannu, the southern-most part of the territories of the king of Kāpiśi. It comprised at least four states, viz., Sind proper, A-tien-po-chih-lo, Pi-to-shih-lo and A-fan-tu. It is difficult to locate definitely any of these states, but the four together certainly comprised the entire valley of the lower Indus to the south of the point where that river is joined by its five tributaries, its northern boundary being formed by the kingdoms of Multan on the left and Bannu on the right side of the Indus.

Immediately to the west of Sindhu lay the kingdom of Lang-kie-lo which roughly corresponded to modern Makrán and Kirmán. According to Hiuen Tsang, it was subject to the kingdom of Persia which lay immediately to the west. The town of Ho-mo, identified with Ormuz, was on the border of the two countries.

To the north of Lang-kie-lo, and west of Bannu lay the kingdom of Ki-kiang-na (Kekkāna) (corresponding to Kikánán or Al-Kikán of Arabic history). It had no chief ruler but was divided among a number of independent clans.

¹ *Journal Asiatique*, 1895, p. 376.

² *Ibid*; also Cordier—*La Chine*, vol. i, p. 454.

³ *Journal Asiatique*, 1895, p. 348 f. n. 3.

⁴ Watters, vol. i, p. 226.

As we shall see later on, according to Chach-nāma, Multan, Lang-kie-lo and Ki-kiang-na were all dependencies of Sind. Hiuen Tsang does not seem to have personally visited Sind and hence his information was not very accurate. We must remember also that according to Chach-nāma sometimes these outlying provinces declared independence, as for example shortly after the accession of Chach in A.D. 622. Hiuen Tsang's account may refer to such a period. But the categorical and detailed statements in Chach-nāma, would certainly entitle us to include all these territories in Sind.

III. Beyond the territories mentioned above, and between the kingdoms of Sind on the south, Fa-la-na (Bannu) and Ki-kiang-na (Kekkāna) on the east and south-east, and Kāpiśi with its tributaries on the north, Hiuen Tsang locates a vast kingdom called Tsao-ku-ta or Tsao-li. This may be identified with the country which is referred to by Arab geographers as Zabul or Zabulistan, and comprised the upper valley of the Helmund river, and a large extent of territory both to the east as well as to the west of it. Numismatic evidence shows that some powerful rulers flourished in this region in the seventh century A.D. They used the old title Shāhi, and one of them, Shāhi Tigin, calls himself lord of 'India and Persia' or more properly of 'Takan and Khurāsān'. Another, Śri Vasudeva, calls himself king of Zaulistan and Multan. The coins of these two kings contain legends both in Indian and Pahlavi characters, and from a comparison with the coins of Khusru Parvez of Persia, Shāhi Tigin may be placed at the beginning and Vasudeva in the middle of the seventh century A.D. Coins of several other kings, some of them containing the word Zaulistan, have been found in the Indus valley, and although it is not possible to construct a detailed history, there is hardly any doubt that a separate kingdom flourished there with a long line of powerful kings. The province of Khurāsān formed a bone of contention between this kingdom and Persia, and it formed something like a buffer state between Indian dominions proper and the Persian empire.¹ Hiuen Tsang also describes the kingdom as above 7000 li in circuit.

¹ I am indebted to Dr. H. C. Roy Chaudhury for the suggestion that Tsao-Kuta may be the same as Zabulistan. The variant form Tsao-li may be easily taken as equivalent to Zauli. For Tsao-Ku-ta or Tsao-li cf. Watters, vol. ii, p. 265. For a detailed account of the coins, cf. Cunningham—'Coins of the Indo-Scythians.'

For a detailed geographical account of Zabulistan, cf. Chap. III, f.n. 9.

Hiuen Tsang has fortunately left us some account of the races of people that inhabited these kingdoms and their culture.

The king of Kāpiśi was an Indian, Kshatriya by caste, but the language and literature of the people bore affinity to those of the Turks. Their culture and civilization were not of a very high order though both Buddhism and Brahmanism flourished.¹ Lamghan, Udyāna, Na-ko-lo-ho, Gāndhāra and Bannu were mainly Indian in language, literature and religion.² The language of Tsao-ku-ta or Tsao-li seems to have been somewhat different and the religion of the people was a mixture of animism, Buddhism and Brahmanism.³

The kingdom of Sind and its three dependencies were Indian in language and culture, and very nearly the same was true of Lang-kie-lo which bordered on Persia. The pilgrim says about this country 'The letters are much the same as those of India: their language is a little different There are some hundred saṅghārāmas . . . (and) several hundred Deva temples'.⁴

In the biography of Hiuen Tsang also we are told 'From this (Lang-kie-lo), going north-west we come to the country of Po-la-see which is not within the boundaries of India'.⁵ This also implies that in the opinion of the pilgrim, Lang-kie-lo was included within the boundaries of India.

Judged by the test of language and culture, the western boundary of India, as described by Hiuen Tsang, may thus be roughly delineated by an imaginary line drawn from Kandahar to Kabul and then extended north-east right up to the Hindu Kush, and south-west along the boundaries of Baluchistan to the sea-coast. That part of the hilly country in the north which lies between this line and the Hindu Kush mountains was still politically a part of India being ruled with other Indian states by an Indian chief who originally dwelt at Ohind on the Indus. But the population had a strong admixture of Turkish element, due no doubt to the invasions of the Śakas, Kushāṇas and Hūṇas. The chief who ruled over Kāpiśi in the time

¹ Watters, vol. i, p. 123.

² Hiuen Tsang treats them definitely as belonging to India and does not refer to any difference in language.

³ Watters, vol. ii, p. 264.

⁴ Beal, vol. ii, p. 277.

⁵ Beal—*Life of Hiuen Tsang*, 150.

of Hiuen Tsang was traditionally believed to be descended from the Kushāṇas, and if this is true, the fact that Hiuen Tsang refers to him as Kshatriya furnishes a striking evidence of the absorption of the foreign elements in the Hindu society.

Thus the natural boundary of India to the north-west, viz. the Hindu Kush mountains still remained the political and cultural boundary although an Indianized Turkish element was introduced therein by the Śakas, Hūṇas and the Kushāṇas. In the south-west also, the territory corresponding to modern Baluchistan which, as we have seen above, formed politically a part of India, was Indian in language and culture.¹

As to the general character of the hilly tribes in the border-land of civilized areas things have not probably changed much since Hiuen Tsang's day except that they now profess Islamic faith instead of Buddhism. The following description of Hiuen Tsang about the people on the western border of Sind might perhaps be applied to many other groups of people in the same region.

'Among the low marshes near the Sin-tu (Indus) for above 1,000 li were settled some myriads of families of ferocious disposition who made the taking of life their occupation, and supported themselves by rearing cattle; they had no social distinctions and no government; they shaved off their hair and wore the Bhikkhu garb, looking like Bhikkhus yet living in the world; they were bigoted in their narrow views and reviled the "Great Vehicle". According to local accounts the ancestors of this people were originally cruel and wicked, and were converted by a compassionate *arhat* who received them into the Buddhist communion; they therefore ceased to take life, shaved their heads and assumed the dress of Buddhist mendicants; in the course of time, however, the descendants of these men had gone back to their old ways but they still remained outwardly Bhikshus.'²

Thus, about the time of the rise of Islamic power, three kingdoms which may be roughly described as Kabul (Kāpiśi), Zabul, and Sind formed the western boundary of India, which extended up to Makrān and Khurāsān. This view about the western border-land of India is also confirmed by early Muhammadan writers. Thus Al-Mas'ūdī

¹ This conclusion is corroborated by Balādhuri as will appear in the course of our narrative.

² Watters—vol. ii, pp. 252-253.

(A.D. 10th cent.) refers to Kandahar as part of Sind¹ while Al-Balādhuri refers to Kish, which is to the south-west of Kandahar, as belonging to the land of al-Hind.² Al-Mas'ūdī further says that India extends on the side of the mountains to Khurāsān.³ Thus both these writers regard the region round Kabul and Kandahar as part of India. 'In a map of the 10th century A.D. given in the "Kitābu-l Masālik wa-l Mamālik" of Ibn Haukal the Hirmand is styled "the river of Hind and Sind".' It also states that Kabul is a Province of Hind.⁴

Alberuni refers to the boundaries of India in the following lines: 'In the western frontier mountains of India there live various tribes of the Afghans, and extend up to the neighbourhood of the Sindh Valley. . . The coast of India begins with Tiz, the capital of Makrān. . . .'⁵ In his account of the towns of India, Alberuni includes both Kabul and Ghazna.⁶ The Arab Geographers generally refer to Kandahar as belonging to India or on the Indian frontier.⁷

CHAPTER II

SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EARLY ARAB RAIDS

In spite of the abundance of historical texts regarding the early history of Islam, authentic references to early Muhammadan raids on India are surprisingly few. The only historical work which professes to give a connected account of the various expeditions is that of Al-Balādhuri.⁸ It chronicles the main incidents without always giving

¹ Elliot—History of India, vol. i, p. 22. ² vol. ii, p. 143. ³ vol. i, p. 20.

⁴ Raverty—Notes on Afghanistan, p. 64.

⁵ Chap. XVIII, vol. i, p. 208.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁷ Le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, p. 347.

⁸ The full title of the book is 'Kitab Futūḥ al-Buldān' and the full name of the author is 'Ahmad ibn Yahya ibn-Jābir al-Balādhuri.' A critical account of the author is given in the Introduction to the first volume of the English translation of the work by Dr. Philip Khuri Hitti (Columbia University, 1916). The Indian conquests are narrated in the second volume of English Translation by Dr. Francis Clark Murgotten. Elliot translated extracts from this work and gave some account of previous notices of it in his *History of India* (1867) vol. i, p. 113 ff. I have followed Murgotten's Translation. All references to Balādhuri should be understood to refer to this book. Mr. Fida Ali Khan, Head of the Department of Persian in the Dacca University, kindly revised this English translation and suggested some changes which I have incorporated.

precise dates or details, but the approximate dates of most of them can be ascertained from the context.

The other original historical texts can merely be used for supplementing or checking Al-Baládhuri's account. Among these may be mentioned At-Tabari and Khulasat-ul-Akbar. The former has been utilized by Weil in his 'Geschichte des Chalifen (Mannheim 1846-50)' and all relevant passages from the latter have been quoted by Major David Price in his valuable work 'Chronological retrospect (or Memoirs of the Principal events of Muhammadan history from the death of the Arabian legislator to the accession of the Emperor Akbar' published in 1811.¹

In addition to these there are various other modern works² on the early history of Islam, but they hardly contain any new information about the Muhammadan raids on India. This evidently shows that not much of historical importance regarding this episode has been discovered among the many Arabic and Persian works that have since come to light. For the history of the Muhammadan conquest of Sind, however, we possess a detailed account in Chach-náma.³ This is a Persian translation of an old Arabic history of the conquest of Sind by the Arabs. The Persian translation was made about A.D. 1216 by Ali Kúfí, who got the original Arabic manuscript from the Kazi of Alor, a member of the same Sakifí tribe to which belonged

¹ In addition to the three original texts named above, stray references occur in other original historical texts of later date, such as e.g. *Tarikh-i-Guzidd*. The conquest of Sind is, of course, referred to in many later works.

² The following books deserve special notice :—

1. J. Welhausen ... *Das Arabische Reich. Und sein Sturz* (Berlin, 1902).
2. G. Van Vloten ... *Recherches Sur la domination. Arabe* (Amsterdam, 1894).
3. A. Müller ... *Der Islam im Morgen und Abendland.* (2 vols.) Berlin, 1885.
4. Sedillot ... *Histoires des Arabes.* (2 vols.) 2nd Edition, Paris, 1877.
5. Muir ... *Annals of the Early Caliphate, from original sources.* (Smith and Elder 1883).
6. Elliot ... *The History of India.* (Vols. I, II.)

³ I have used the English translation of the work by Mirza Kalichbeg Fredunbeg (Karachi, 1900)—but the important passages quoted in this paper have been carefully compared with the original text (with the help of the copy of the Manuscript in the possession of the Asiatic Society of Bengal) by my friend Dr. Muhammad Sahidulla.

the famous Muhammad ibn Kásim, the conqueror of Sind. This circumstance no doubt explains the fact as stated by the Kazi, 'that an account of this conquest (of Sind) had been written in the Arabic language by his ancestors in a manuscript which had been handed down as a heritage from one to another to his time'.

Although there is no means to determine the time when the original Arabic history was written, its importance as the earliest detailed account of the kingdom of Sind and its conquest by the Arabs cannot be over-estimated. Leaving aside the usual parables, maxims, verses and romantic stories, the book contains a kernel of historical facts which are substantially corroborated by more authentic historical texts such as those of Al-Baládhuri. The data supplied by it must, no doubt, be accepted with great caution, but they may be used as auxiliary evidence, specially when they are not inherently improbable in themselves nor contradictory to known historical facts.

The Arab conquest of Sind is also described in some detail in two later works viz., (1) *Tárikhu-s Sind* by Mir Muhammad M'asúm (also called *Tárikh-i M'asúmi*) composed in A.D. 1600¹ and (2) *Tuhfatu-l Kirá'm* by Ali Sher Káni which was completed in A.D. 1767-8 or a few years later.²

Both these works merely give a summary of Chach-náma in describing the Arab conquest of Sind. But on some important dates and details they give a different version from the existing text of Chach-náma. It will be shown later that some of these dates are more reliable than those found in the present text of Chach-náma which are obviously wrong.

CHAPTER III

RAIDS AGAINST KÁBUL AND ZÁBULISTÁN

The first shock of Muhammadan invasions was equally felt by the three great border kingdoms of Kábul, Zábul and Sind. For the sake of clear understanding we shall discuss the topic under two heads: (1) Raids against Kábul and Zábulistán, and (2) Expeditions against Sind.

The incidents in connection with the first are mainly to be gathered from the accounts of Al-Baládhuri occasionally supplemented by other

¹ Elliot—i, pp. 212 ff.

² Elliot—i, pp. 327 ff.

sources. The following bald summary of events may be offered as the result of a careful perusal of all available authorities.

In the year A.H. 28 or 29 (A.D. 649-50) 'Abdalláh ibn 'Ámir¹ a young enterprising military chief was appointed governor of Al-Basrah by the Caliph Uthman. 'Abdalláh made some conquest in the land of Fars (a province in the south-east of Persia), raided Khurásán and advanced up to the Oxus. (pp 159 ff).² While proceeding from Fars to Khurásán, in the year 30, he deputed one of his lieutenants ar-Rabí on to Sijistán (p. 141). Ar-Rabí made various conquests in the neighbourhood of Zarah Lake and ultimately besieged Zaranj which capitulated on terms. Ar-Rabí remained at Zaranj (p. 143) for two years and was then succeeded by 'Abd-ar-Rahmán ibn-Samurah as the governor of Sijistán. The new governor is said to have established his rule over every thing between 'Zaranj and Kishsh of the land of al-Hind, and over that part of the region of the road of ar-Rukkhaj which is between it and the province of ad-Dáwar' (p. 143).

This is the first mention of India in the narrative of Muslim conquests as given by al-Baládhuri and as such the passage requires careful scrutiny. It is apparent, as already noted above, that Kishsh was regarded as the first city on the frontier of India by the writer of the passage.

Fortunately, the topography of the locality is fairly well-known and the identification of the places mentioned is not a difficult task. Le Strange has made a critical geographical study of these in the Lands of Eastern Caliphate³ and his conclusions, so far as they relate to the subject under discussion, may be summed up below.

'The broad valley, down which the Helmund flows from the mountains of Hindu Kush to Bust, still bears the name, Zamín-Dáwar, the Persian form, of which the Arabic equivalent is "*Ard-ad-Dawar*" "the Land of the Gates".⁴

'Half-way along the remaining course of the Helmund, from Bust to Zaranj, stands the town of Rúdbár, the *Ar-Rúdhbár* of Baládhuri;

¹ I have not thought it necessary to repeat the long titles of the Arab chiefs as given by Baládhuri, but have merely given the first part.

² The page references within brackets are to Murgotten's translation of Baládhuri, vol. II.

³ Le Strange—*The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, Cambridge, 1905.

⁴ p. 345.

and near this Ar-Rúdhbár was *Kishsh* which appears to be the place called Káj, or Kuhich, at the present day.¹

'The *Rukkhaj district*, occupying the country round about Kandahar, lay to the eastward of Bust along the banks of the streams now known as the Tarnak and the Argandáb.²

Thus the Arabian force advanced towards India along the Helmund river and came into conflict with the Indians near modern Rúdbár on the frontier between modern Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Their first triumphal career led them as far as Bust. Three marches above Bust lay the mountain of Az-zur containing a temple. Ibn-Samurah, says al-Baládhuri, went into the temple of the Zur (apparently Surya = Sun) an idol of gold with two rubies for eyes, and cut off a hand and took out the rubies. But the gold and jewels were returned by him, saying to the astonished governor of the place: 'I only wanted to show you, that it had no power to harm or help (p. 144).' But the progress of Islamic forces seems to have stopped here, apparently due to disturbances in the head-quarter during the Caliphate of Uthman. An amicable agreement was entered into with Bust and Zábulistán, but its terms are not specified (p. 144). 'Abd-ar-Rahmán ibn-Samurah then retired to Zaranj. He had shortly to leave Sijistán placing it in charge of Umair, but the people of Zaranj, expelled Umair, and closed the town (p. 144). Thus the Muslims lost almost all that they had gained.

When the next Caliph 'Ali had consolidated his position, he made renewed efforts to re-establish the power of Islam in Sijistán, and succeeded in recapturing Zaranj (p. 145). When Mu-áwiyah became Caliph 'Abd-ar-Rahmán ibn-Samurah was appointed as the governor of Sijistán and with this began a fresh triumphal career of the Islamic forces.

'Abd-ar-Rahmán raided the country, whose people had apostatized, and subdued it either by force, or by making treaties with its people, advancing as far as Kábul. This city was ably defended, and the Arabs laid siege to it. After a few months a breach was made in the city wall by means of stones thrown by *manjaniks*. Then the Arabs attacked the city at night, but though they fought the whole night, they could not overcome the defence. At day-break, the defenders

¹ p. 344.

² p. 346.

made a brave sortie. Unfortunately an elephant that was killed at the battle fell just at the gate from which they issued, so that they could not close it and the Muslims entered the city by force. A treaty was concluded—on what terms we do not know—but it was shortly broken and Kábul had to be conquered a second time (pp. 146–47).¹

From Kábul the conqueror proceeded against Zábulistán.² By this term, the Arabs meant particularly the country around Ghazni though

¹ Raverty gives a somewhat different account of this conquest of Kábul on p. 62 of *Notes on Afghanistan and part of Baluchistan*. He writes:

In 43 A.H. (A.D. 663–64), the Arabs invaded the territory of Kábul, under 'Abd-ur-Rahmán, son of Sumrah, who was the lieutenant of Abd-ullah, son of Amir, governor of Khurásán. He marched from Sijistán after capturing the capital of that country. Kábul Sháh, at that period, was known by the title or name of Ariji; but this appears to be an Arabic word, and signifies lameness from birth. He moved out, with his forces to meet the Musalmán invaders, and after a severe battle, retired within the walls of Kábul, and did not sally out again. Abd-ur-Rahmán continued before it for a full year, after which, his army having suffered great hardship and fatigues, the place was taken. The fighting men were put to the sword, and the women and children were made captives. The Kábul Sháh was also taken, and his head was ordered to be struck off, but he was spared on his agreeing to become a convert to Islám. He was then received into favour, a tribute was fixed, and the Musalmáns retired.

Raverty does not indicate his source of information about this detailed campaign, but it is evidently based on *Turjuma-i-futuh* of Ahmad bin Asmi Kufi, quoted by Dowson (Elliot, vol. II, p. 414 f. n. 1). It is not certain whether the account refers to the first or the second conquest of Kábul. The latter seems more probable.

In connection with the Muslim conquest of Kábul, Baládhuri makes a very interesting statement which deserves more than a passing notice—'Abd-ur-Rahmán', says he, 'took with him to al-Basrah, slaves captured at Kábul, and they built him a mosque in his castle there after the Kábul style of building' (p. 147). The fact that one of the earliest mosques to be built at an important centre of Islam was modelled after Kábuli style of building, is full of importance for the history of the origin of Saracenic style. But this topic being only of secondary importance in the present discussion, cannot be treated any further here.

² Both Elliot and Raverty, and following them, other scholars, have accepted the view that both Kábul and Zábul denoted one and the same kingdom under Ratbil. This erroneous conception has confused their entire account of the Muhammadan raids in Sijistán and Kábul. A careful perusal of Baládhuri leaves no doubt that Zábulistán was clearly distinguished from Kábul. Thus, describing the victories of 'Abd-ur-Rahmán, he mentions separately the conquest of Kábul and Zábulistán (p. 147). Then describing the subsequent discomfiture of the Muslim army, the same author says: 'Then Kábul Sháh assembled a force to oppose the Muslims and drove out all of them that were in Kábul. And Ratbil came and gained control of Dhábulistán (or Zábulistán) and ar-Rukhkhaj as far as Bust'. (p. 147). Again, Baládhuri clearly distinguishes the two when he says that Ratbil sent to him ('Ubaidallah) asking for peace for his own country and the land of Kábul (p. 148). Again, it is said with reference to al-Mamun that he

it was applied vaguely to denote the whole of the great mountainous district of the upper waters of the Helmund and the Kandahar rivers. As already noted before, 'Abd-ar-Rahmán, during the first period of his governorship, had entered into an agreement with this country. But the inhabitants had broken it and now attacked the Arabs. They were, however, defeated (p. 147).

'Abd-ar-Rahmán was superseded by ar-Rabí ibn-Ziyád, and died in the year 50 A.H. (A.D. 670).

The removal of 'Abd-ar-Rahmán emboldened the chiefs of Kabul and Zabulistan to throw off the Muslim yoke. The king of Kabul 'drove out all the Muslims from Kábul'¹, and Ratbil² (apparently a title of the kings of Zábulistán, by which they are referred to in Arab History) came and gained control of Zábulistán and ár-Rukhkhaj as far as Bust. 'Ar-Rabí, the Arab governor, attacked him at Bust, put him to flight, and pursued him until he reached ar-Rukhkhaj. After attacking him in ar-Rukhkhaj, ar-Rabí continued to advance and subdued the city of ad-Dáwar.' Ubaidallah who succeeded 'Ar-Rabí as governor of Sijistán continued the campaign and reached Razan

collected double the tribute from Ratbil, but he subdued Kábul whose king promised obedience.'

No reasonable doubt can thus be entertained that the two formed separate kingdoms. They often formed an alliance against their common foe, the Muslims, and this no doubt explains their long resistance to the powerful arms of Islam. It may be noted here that Raverty admits that Kabul and Zabul are distinct places and should not be confused with each other (*Notes on Afghanistan*, p. 61).

As to the geographical position of Zabulistan we can have no better guide than Le Strange whose conclusion is based upon accounts of early Muslim writers. According to him 'The highlands of the Kandahar country, along the upper waters of the Helmund, were known as Zabulistan' (p. 334). Le Strange further remarks:

'As we have seen, the whole of the great mountainous district of the upper waters of the Helmund and the Kandahar rivers was known to the Arabs as Zábulistán, a term of vague application, but one which more particularly denoted the country round Ghaznah. On the other hand, Kábulistan was the Kábul country, lying more to the north on the frontiers of Bamiyan' (p. 349).

¹ Mr. Fida Ali Khan translates the passage: 'sallied forth with all those [i.e. all his available army] from Kabul.'

² The name Ratbil has numerous variants. Elliot observes: 'Nevertheless there is no certainty as to the proper mode of spelling the name. The various readings of the European authors who have noticed him, show how little the orthography is settled. Ockley calls him 'Zentil'; Weil, 'Zenbil'; Reinaud, 'Ratbyl' and 'Zenbyl'. Wilson, 'Rateil, Ratpeil, Ratbal, Rantal, Zantil—variations easily accounted for by the nature of the Persian letters'. E. Thomas, 'Ratpíl', Price, 'Reteil', 'Rattail', or 'Ratpeil'. (Vol. II, p. 417.)

when Ratbil concluded with him a treaty of peace for his own country and the land of Kábul. As regards the terms we are simply told that the peace was established on the payment of 1 million *dirhams*.¹

But the peace was short-lived. Towards the end of the reign of Caliph Yezid (64 A.H. = A.D. 683) Kábul revolted once more and imprisoned Abu-'Ubaidah ibn-Ziyád. Yazíd ibn-Ziyád, the governor of Sijistán, proceeded against Kábul and a great battle took place at Junzah. But the Muslim army was completely routed. The governor himself and some distinguished members of the aristocracy lay dead on the field and the rest fled. Abu-'Ubaidah had to be ransomed for 500,000 dirhams.

Ratbil fomented and aided rebellions in the Arab domain of Sijistán where the people expelled the Arab governor. 'Ratbil soon declared war against the Arabs' and apparently proceeded nearly as far as Zarah lake, for we are told that the new governor 'was compelled to stop in the city of Zaranj.' But Ratbil was killed and his soldiers were put to rout (A.D. 685).²

¹ Baládhurí (p. 210) refers to a border raid in 44 A.H. by Al-Muhallab in course of which he passed through Bannah and Al-Ahwar, towns between Multan and Kábul, and reached al-Kíkán. Bannah seems to be the same as Bannu and Al-Ahwar was probably a neighbouring town. As regards the result of the raid, Baládhurí simply says that 'the enemy met and attacked him and his followers'. Evidently Muhallab did not achieve any success.

Ferishta, as usual, gives an exaggerated account and takes Muhallab to Multan. Elliot goes one step further and identifies Al-Ahwar with Lahore. These presumptions are absolutely without any basis and may be dismissed as incredible. It may be doubted whether the city of Lahore existed at that time, at least under the present name. The objective of Muhallab's raid was al-Kíkán, and both Multan and Lahore were far away from the route. Elliot (Vol. II, p. 415) gives some details of 'Abd-ar-Rahmán's campaign against Kábul, apparently on the authority of Baládhurí. But the text translated by Murgotten does not give these details.

² Elliot apparently refers to this episode (vol. ii, p. 416) when he says:—

'In 64 A.H. = 683-4 A.D., 'Abdu-l-'Aziz, the governor of Sístán, declared war against the king of Kábul and in the combat which took place, that king was defeated and killed. The war continued under his successor and he was compelled to submit to the payment of tribute, but whenever opportunity offered, renewed efforts were made by the Kábulis to recover their lost independence'.

But Elliot confuses it with the campaign of 64 A.H. Besides, this campaign of 'Abdu-l-'Aziz was directed not against Kábul but against Ratbil, king of Sijistán. As noted above, in f.n. 2, on page 16 the presumption that Kábul and Zábul formed one kingdom under Ratbil, has vitiated the account of Elliot.

The passage is translated as follows by Murgotten: 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'was compelled to stop in the city Zaranj because Ratbil was at war with him' (p. 149). The passage is translated differently by Mr. Fida Ali Khan. According to him it means 'he was allowed to enter the city and attacked Ratbil'.

The war was, however, continued by Ratbil II, the son and successor of the late chief. He did not oppose the advance of the Muhammadans till they penetrated deep into his country. Then he blocked the mountain paths and passes, and forced the Muhammadan general 'Abdalláh to conclude a treaty on easy terms.¹ The Caliph 'Abd-al-Malik however, disapproved of the treaty and dismissed 'Abdalláh (p. 150).

Shortly after Al-Hajjáj became governor of Irak (A.D. 695), his general 'Ubaidalláh made an attempt to subdue Kábul. Here, too, his enemy blocked the mountain path and Ratbil soon joined them. 'Ubaidalláh was ready to extricate himself from this difficult position by offering easy terms to his opponents, but Shuraih ibn-Háni al-Háriti dissuaded him from this course, saying 'Fear Allah and fight this people, for if thou doest what thou art about to do, thou wilt weaken Islam on this frontier'. So 'a battle ensued and Shuraih made a charge, but was killed. The army fought their way out, although hard pressed, and made their way along the desert of Bust. Many of the men perished of thirst and hunger, and 'Ubaidalláh died of grief for what he had brought upon his men and the fate that had overtaken them.' (p. 151).

It was a veritable disaster for the Muslim forces and its subsequent effect convulsed the whole Islamic world. Al-Baládhuri briefly passes over this unfortunate episode. But other sources give more details. It appears that the Muslim forces were allowed to retire only on the payment of a humiliating ransom.² To avenge the

¹ According to this treaty, 'Abdalláh agreed, on payment of 300,000 dirhams, not to raid in future the kingdom of Ratbil. It was in the nature of a *Chauth* exacted by the Mahrattas, in later ages.

² Cf. for example the passage from *Tárikh-i-Alfi*, quoted by Elliot (vol. ii, p. 416): 'Ranbal, retiring before his assailant, detached troops to their rear and blocking up the defiles, entirely intercepted their retreat, and in this situation exposed to the danger of perishing by famine, 'Abdulla was compelled to purchase the liberation of himself and followers for a ransom of seven hundred thousand dirhams'.

Raverty evidently follows the same authority and adds to the above extract:

It is said that, when his ('Ubaidullah's) wearied and half-starved troops reached Musalman ground and their own people brought forth food and relieved their necessities, many eat their fill and fell down dead immediately after'. (Raverty—*Notes on Afghanistan*, p. 62). Raverty gives the name as 'Ubaidullah—which agrees with that of Baládhuri. Elliot spells it as Abdulla. Both give 79 A.H. (698-99 A.D.) as the date of the event. Cf. (Price, vol. i, p. 454) the account of Khullassut-ul-Akbar, which substantially agrees with the above.

affront an army was raised, named the 'peacock army', so splendidly was it equipped at the cost of a heavy war-cess on Al-Basra and Al-Kufa. The command was placed in the hands of 'Abd-ar-Rahmán ibn-Muhammad ibn-al-Ash'ath who marched against Ratbil in 80 A.H. (A.D. 699) put him to flight and ravaged his land. The commander, mindful of the recent reverses, wanted to proceed cautiously; but Al-Hajjáj, upbraiding him with faint-heartedness, peremptorily bade him fight on, and when the commander expostulated with him, threatened his supersession. The army, as well as its commander, strongly resented the action. 'Abd-ar-Rahmán made favourable terms with Ratbil, and declaring war both against Al-Hajjáj and the Caliph, marched on Al-Irák, and captured Al-Basra. The rebellion having assumed serious proportions, the Caliph took alarm and offered terms to the rebels. 'Abd-ar-Rahmán was inclined to accept the offer, which included supersession of Al-Hajjáj, but the rebel army rejected it. At last a great battle was fought in 82 A.H. (A.D. 701-702) and 'Abd-ar-Rahmán was signally defeated by Al-Hajjáj. Pursued by the latter 'Abd-ar-Rahmán was again beaten on the Persian border and took refuge with Ratbil, who a year or two afterwards sent his head to Al-Hajjáj.¹ He is said to have died or committed suicide.

¹ Elliot vol. ii, p. 416. Price, (vol. i, pp. 455-463). On the authority of Khulassat-ul-Akbar. *Muir-Caliphate*, p. 336. Strangely enough, Baládhuri passes over the whole episode though he refers to the rebellion of 'Abd-ar-Rahmán, and his tragic end.

Raverty gives interesting details, but, as usual, does not indicate his authority. He says that 'Abd-ur-Rahmán, after prolonged fight with Hajjáj, was compelled to fly in 81 A.H. (700-1 A.D.) and took shelter within the walls of Bust, which was held by one of his own subordinates named 'Iyáz. Raverty then continues:

'He ('Iyáz) seized and imprisoned 'Abd-ur-Rahmán and proposed to send him to Hajjáj. Zantbil (i.e. Ratbil) immediately on hearing of this marched his force to Bust and infested it on all sides and threatened 'Iyáz and all within the place with impalement if a hair of the head of 'Abd-ur-Rahmán should be injured, and that he would never leave the place until he should be released. This had the desired effect, and he was set at liberty, and took refuge with Zantbil (Ratan-pal?). Hajjáj sometime after sent an agent to that ruler making him very advantageous offers and requiring him to give up 'Abd-ur-Rahmán, which he did, along with eighteen of his kinsmen, in the year 82 A.H. (701-2 A.D.), but on the road back, 'Abd-ur-Rahmán succeeded in throwing himself from the flat roof of a building in which they had alighted to rest, and dragged the agent with him. Both perished' (Raverty op. cit., p. 63).

This episode, if true, throws interesting light on the powers and magnanimity of Ratbil.

According to Al-Baládhuri, Ratbil betrayed him from fear of Al-Hajjáj, because the latter had written a threatening letter. Thereupon 'Abd-ar-Rahmán threw himself from the top of a cliff (p. 151).

Ratbil did not fail to take full advantage of the internal split in the Muslim world, and concluded a favourable treaty with al-Hajjáj. The latter agreed not to make war upon him for 7 (or 9) years on condition of an annual subsidy in kind. This arrangement continued till the death of Al-Hajjáj (A.D. 714) in spite of occasional disputes over the value of the goods paid as subsidy in which Ratbil always scored against his enemy (p. 152).

When, in the Caliphate of Sulaimán, Yazíd became governor of Irák in 96 A.H. (A.D. 715) and his brother Mudrik, governor of Sijistán, Ratbil refused to pay any tribute at all. He was evidently encouraged by the confusion which prevailed in the Muslim world during the last days of the Umayyids. For more than forty years, the Muhammadans could not exact anything from him. (pp. 152-3).

It was not till the establishment of the Abbassids, that the Muhammadans could renew their offensive. During the Caliphate of Al-Mansúr (A.D. 754-775), Kandahar was conquered (p. 231) and the Muhammadan governor of Sijistán again demanded tribute from Ratbil (apparently Ratbil III or IV). The latter sent some camels, tents and slaves, reckoning each at double its value. The governor Ma'n became angry and declared war against Ratbil. He overran ar-Rukhkhaj and secured many captives, but Ratbil was far from being subdued.² For we are told that during the next three Caliphates, the Muslim officers collected tribute from Ratbil of Sijistán 'as well as they could', (or, according to a different rendering,

¹ We learn from Tabari that in the year 90 A.H. (A.D. 709) Ratbil agreed to aid the Maliks of Balkh, Marw-ar-Rúd, Tál-Kán, Fáryáb, and the Gúzgánán against Katibah, son of Musallam-ul-Bahili (Raverty, op. cit., p. 63; Price, Vol. I, p. 469).

² Baládhuri says (p. 154) that after the campaign, Mawand, the lieutenant of Ratbil, asked for safe-conduct in order to be taken to the Commander of the Believers. Ma'n granted it sending him to Baghdad with 5,000 soldiers, and Al-Mansúr treated him generously, 'pensioning him and his chieftains', (or according to the translation of Mr. Fida Ali Khan 'fixing an allowance for him and appointing him a military commander').

It is possible that some understanding was arrived at regarding the payment of tribute in future.

'according to their strength or weakness') which certainly does not mean much.¹

When the Caliph al-Ma'mún (A.D. 813-833) visited Khurásán, Ratbil paid double tribute to him, but was evidently left unmolested. Al-Ma'mun, however, sent an army against Kábul, probably the Shahi ruler of Kábul, who submitted to taxation and acknowledged obedience. Baládhuri further says that the king of Kábul professed Islam and promised obedience, but he apparently regained independence and apostatized almost immediately after.²

Next we hear of the conquest of Kábul and Zábulistan by Ya'kúb, son of Lais about A.D. 870. The king of Kábul was made a prisoner while the king of Zábulistan was killed and its inhabitants forced to embrace Islam. Henceforth, Zábulistan ceased to belong to India, either politically or culturally, but Kábul recovered its independence and remained, as before, a part of India from both political and cultural point of view till the time of the Turkish Sultans of Ghazni.³

We may now sum up the results of these early Muhammadan raids. During the period of 50 years that elapsed since the first raid in 28 A.H. (A.D. 649) we may distinguish three periods of alternate success and failure. The first period of 7 years ended with the Caliphate of Uthman (A.D. 656). In spite of a promising beginning, the Islamic forces achieved very little during this period. During the second period, renewed efforts were made by the Caliphs 'Ali and Mu-áwiya, and, thanks to the brilliant skill and energy of 'Abd-ar-

¹ Baládhuri, p. 155. Price refers to an expedition against Kabul in 107 A.H. (A.D. 725-6) during the Caliphate of Hisham (Vol. I, p. 567). Raverty refers to two expeditions against Kabul, in 152 A.H. (A.D. 769) and 170 A.H. (A.D. 786-7). But none of these achieved any substantial results. Possibly, Kabul fortified its position by an alliance with China and Kashmir. That the Arabs could not make any impression in Afghanistan about this time also follows from the itinerary of Oukong (*Journal Asiatique*, 1895, part II, pp. 348 ff. pp. 381 ff.

² Baládhuri, pp. 155, 203.

As to the king of Kábul's accepting Islam and promising obedience, the Arab accounts repeat it too often to be taken seriously. It seems that the Islamic creed and political subordination sat very lightly upon that ruler and he always took the earliest opportunity to throw off the yoke and apostatize. There are good grounds to believe that that was also the case on this occasion. In any case we find again an independent Hindu ruler in Kábul at later times.

³ Raverty, op. cit., p. 63; Elliot, Vol. II, p. 419.

Rahmán ibn-Samurah, Islamic forces obtained notable successes against the rulers of Kábul and Zábulistan. The removal and death of 'Abd-ar-Rahmán in 50 A.H. (670 A.D.) ushered in the third period of nearly 30 years in which the Islamic arms sustained serious reverses, both in Kábul and Zábulistan, which had their repercussion on the whole Muslim world. The fruitless efforts of half a century (A.D. 649-700) convinced the Arabs that the conquest of these territories was beyond their power. Henceforth they were glad to leave them alone and merely sought to impose some sort of suzerainty upon them. But even this was with difficulty maintained for a very brief period (A.D. 700-14). For the next century and a half, Kábul and Zábul maintained their authority practically unimpaired. The Abbassid Caliphs, no doubt, occasionally exacted some tributes from them, but with the exception of this and occasional raids, Kábul and Zábul were left undisturbed till the former was conquered by Ya'kúb, son of Lais, in A.D. 870.

CHAPTER IV.

THE KINGDOM OF SIND ON THE EVE OF THE MUHAMMADAN CONQUEST

Although the three border-kingdoms of Kábul, Zábul and Sind had all to bear the brunt of the first Muhammadan invasion, the wars with Sind were more prolonged and led to more permanent results. And of the kingdom of Sind alone it is possible to give some detailed account for the period immediately preceding the Muhammadan raids. For this we are indebted to the well-known work *Chach-náma* already referred to above. The *Chach-náma* begins with an account of king Sahiras, son of Sahasi Rai. His dominions are said to have 'extended on the east to the boundary of Kashmir, on the west to Makrán, on the south to the coast of the sea and Debal, and on the north to the mountains of Kurdan and Kíkánán'.¹ The central part of these

¹ In the *Tārīkh-i-M'asúmi* and the *Tuhtat-ul-Kirá'm*, the boundaries given are as follows: 'On the east, Kashmir and Kanauj; on the west, Makran, Debal (Lahore in M'asúmis) and the sea-shore of Oman; on the north, Kandhár, Sistán, the Suleiman mountains and the Kíkánán Hills; and on the south, the sea-port of Surat.' (Ch^o. p. 11 f.n.).

territories was under the immediate charge of the king with his capital at Alor and the rest was divided into four provinces, each under a governor,¹ with headquarters respectively at Bahmanábád, Siwistán, Iskandah and Multan. The king, however, lost his life in a fight with the king of Nimruz, a province of Persia, who had invaded his territory and entered Kirmán. According to *Tuhtatu-l-Kirám*, the battle took place near Kich.

Rai Sáhasi II,² son of Sahiras, then ascended the throne and ruled over the entire kingdom. During his reign, a poor Brähmana named Chach,³ gradually rose to power and high office, and after his master's death, secured the throne for himself. He married the widowed queen and had two sons by her, *viz.*, Daharsiah and Dáhar, and a daughter Bái.

The provincial governors at first refused to acknowledge the suzerainty of the usurper. Chach marched in person against Iskandah and Multan and subdued them. He then proceeded further up to the hills of Kashmir and definitely fixed the frontier between the two kingdoms. Chach next proceeded against the governors of Siwistán and Bahmanábád and subdued them.⁴

¹ In Ch^o (p. 25) the four governors are referred to as four tributary rulers and it appears that their status was much higher than that of an ordinary governor. The ruler of Multan, Bachchera, e.g. was a near relation of Sáhasi (p. 27). The governor of Siwistán is called a king and a son of a king (p. 31-2). He conspires against king of Sind (39-40).

² Not much information is given of the dynasty which ended with Rai Sáhasi II. It is said (Ch^o, p. 20-21) that Maharat, king of Chitor, was the brother of Rai Sáhasi, and on the death of the latter, he marched towards Alor with an army and sent the following message to Chach:

'I am the rightful heir to this kingdom, and this country is the property of my fathers and grandfathers. It is but right that I should have for my own my brother's heritage.'

King Maharat was, however, defeated and killed by Chach.

According to *Tuhtatu-l-Kirám*, this event took place in 1 A.H., and the dynasty overthrown by Chach ruled for 137 years (A.D. 485-622). It consisted of the following kings: Dewaij, Sáhiras I, Sáhasi I, Sáhiras II, Sáhasi II, each being the son of his predecessor.

In Chach-náma, Sáhiras' father, the senior Rai Sáhasi i.e. Sáhasi I, is said to be son of Dewaij (p. 25). Apparently, there is some confusion about the genealogy. But there is no justification for Cunningham's assumption that 'Diwaj II was the father of Sahirás (or Siharas)'. (Later Indo-Scythians, p. 105.)

³ For a discussion of the various forms of the name and the caste to which he belonged, cf. Elliot, Vol. I, pp. 409 ff.

⁴ See Appendix Geographical Note A, for full details.

Having thus settled affairs at home, Chach wanted to take advantage of the confusion in the Persian kingdom to extend his territory in that direction. He passed through and subdued a portion of Makrán, and fixed the western limits of his kingdom at a stream that separated Kirmán from Makrán. Then Chach marched towards Kandábil and its people agreed to pay an annual tribute.¹

Chach died at Alor after a reign of 40 years,² and was succeeded by his brother Chandar who ruled for 7 years. The death of Chandar was followed by an internal split. Dáhar, the younger son of Chach, sat on the throne at Alor, while Duráj, son of Chandar, established himself at Bahmanábád. But Daharsiah, the elder son of Chach, ousted Duráj after a year and occupied Bahmanábád.³ For the next 30 years, the kingdom was divided between the brothers Dáhar and Daharsiah with headquarters respectively at Alor and Bahmanábád. Then, after Daharsiah's death, the united kingdom came into the possession of Dáhar.⁴ Eight years after this event Dáhar's kingdom was attacked by the neighbouring king of Ramal but Dáhar easily repulsed him.⁵

The dates of these kings may be ascertained from several data supplied by Chach-náma and *Tuhtatu-l-Kirám*. According to the latter, Chach ascended the throne in the year of the Hijrí, *i.e.*, A.D. 622. This is, however, in conflict with the statement in Chach-náma that Chach had already been 35 years on the throne when, in 11 A.H. in the Caliphate of Umar, Mughaira led an expedition to Debal. The year 11 is evidently a mistake, as Umar had not succeeded to the Caliphate till 13 A.H. The expedition, referred to in Chach-náma, took place, according to al-Baládhuri, about 15 A.H. Even assuming this date to be true, Chach's accession falls about A.D. 602. Now the mistake in Hijrí date for Umar, too palpably absurd in a history written by a Muhammadan, and similar other wrong Hijrí dates in the book suggest some mistake in the reading or writing of figures in original copies or transcriptions of the Text of Chach-náma. Besides, the data for the reign-periods of the kings as given in Chach-náma, lend support

¹ See Appendix, Geographical Note A, for full details.

² Ch^o, p. 39.

³ Ch^o, p. 42.

⁴ Ch^o, p. 54.

⁵ Ch^o, p. 55. In the *Tuhtatu-l-Kirám*, the invader is said to be Ramalrai, king of Kanauj, and not king of Ramal.

to the date as given in *Tufat-ul-Kirām*. According to this theory we can arrange the dates as follows:—

Chach	...	...	40 years	...	A.D. 622-662
Chandar	...	...	7 years	...	„ 662-669
Dáhar } Duráj }	...	...	1 year	...	„ 669-670
Dáhar } Daharsiah }	...	...	30 years (p. 54)	...	„ 670- 700
Dáhar	...	...	8 years + x	...	700-708 + x

Chach-náma continues the story of Dáhar down to the invasion of the king of Ramal, and then begins his account of the Muslim invasion of Sind. Now the invasion by the king of Ramal took place in the eighth year after Daharsiah's death, (i.e., in A.D. 708) and this brings us to the epoch of the great fight between Dáhar and the Arabs. Thus the theory accepted above, is quite in accordance with the detailed account furnished in Chach-náma.¹

The Chach-náma represents Sind as a great and powerful kingdom, extending up to the borders of Kashmir and Kanauj on the north and east and to those of Kirmán in the west. The details scattered in the book, such as the names of towns under different governors, journeys of kings and their victorious expeditions, all corroborate this general picture. Al-Baládhuri states that al-Kíkán (modern Kelat) is part of the land of As-Sind where it borders on Khurásán.¹²

It must be noted, however, that the solidarity of the kingdom was destroyed in the seventh century A.D. by several incidents.

¹ Elliot's Chronology (Vol. I, pp. 406, 412-414) is somewhat different. He finds inconsistency in *Tuhfatul-Kirām*'s statements, because while it gives 92 years as the total period of duration, the sumtotal of the reign-periods of the three kings, as given in it, only comes up to 81. Hence Elliot places the accession of Chach in 10 A.H. But the detailed accounts of the reign of the different kings, as given above on the authority of Chach-náma, really makes the total duration of the dynasty one of 90 years, if we assume Dáhar's death to have taken place in 712 A.D. The 90 solar years of India would correspond very nearly to 92 years of a Muhammadan writer. The real mistake of *Tuhfatul-Kirām* was perhaps the reign-period of 33 years which is assigned to Dáhar, whereas according to Chach-náma, he ruled for nearly 43 years. For the first 31 years of this period, he ruled only over a part of Sind, and it was only after Daharsiah's death that he came to be the sole ruler of the country.

¹² Baládhuri p. 210. For Kíkán see App. Geographical Note A.

First, the usurpation of Chach. It was preceded by the murder of all the nobles of the Court who opposed him and followed by the rebellion of the provincial governors. Though these were quelled with difficulty, Chach sowed the seeds of discontent which overwhelmed his son at no distant date. We shall see later on how important officials of state deserted the son of Chach and joined his Muslim enemy. This might have been inspired in no small degree by their loyalty to the old dynasty which was so basely betrayed by Chach. As a matter of fact, we find that immediately after the death of Chach, one of his governors made a secret plot with the kings of Kashmir and Kanauj with a view to seize the kingdom for himself, and the hostile armies approached the very walls of the capital city.¹

Secondly, the virtual division of the kingdom after the death of Chandar must have weakened the resources of the kingdom by constant conflicts between Alor and Bahmanábád. This internal dissension lasted for more than 30 years, and it was during this period that the Muhammadans were knocking at the gates of Sind.

Thirdly, the kings of Sind were hostile to, and not infrequently at war with, the neighbouring kingdoms of Kashmir, Kanauj and Ramal. Almost at the very moment when Muhammad ibn-Kásim was marching towards Sind, king Dáhar was fighting with the king of Ramal.

Fourthly, the existence of powerful Buddhist monks who wielded great political authority as rulers of districts or owners of strongholds, was a positive danger to the Bráhmanical state.² Many of these

¹ Ch^o—pp. 39 ff. Another governor, when attacked by Chach applied for assistance to the king of Kanauj (Ch^o, p. 33).

² Various references to the Samanis or Buddhist monks are scattered throughout Ch^o. Thus when Chach proceeded against the governor of Bahmanábád, the latter, himself a Buddhist, sought the help of Samani Budhgui or Budhrakhu (i.e. Buddhagupta or Buddharakshita). Ch^o says: 'When Chach had come to know that Agham (the governor) and his son had compact with the Samani and that it was owing to his sorcery, enchantments, magic and counsels, that the war had been prolonged for a year, he had sworn: 'If I succeed in taking this fort, I shall seize the Samani, take off his skin, give it to low-caste people to cover drums with it and to beat them till it was torn to pieces' (Ch^o, pp. 33-34).

Again, the town of Armanbil was 'in the hands of a Buddhist Samani descended from the agents of Rái Sahiras, king of Hind. . . . In course of time, however, he had thrown off his yoke and had become his opponent' (Ch^o, p. 38).

Even the important fortress of Nerun (Haidarabad) was in charge of a Buddhist Samani named Bhandarkan who basely betrayed his master to the

Buddhists surrendered their state or strongholds to the Islamic invaders and made alliance with them.

Thus, inspite of the large extent and vast resources of the kingdom of Sind, the internal situation was not quite favourable to a sustained opposition to determined invaders.

CHAPTER V.

THE MUHAMMADAN CONQUEST OF SIND

The early Arab raids were directed against the coast-land of India. From their secure base at Oman, an army was sent across to Tanah, i.e., Thana, near Bombay about 15 A.H. (A.D. 637). Similar expeditions were sent against Barwas or Broach and to the gulf of Ad-Daibul, i.e. Debal. Al-Balādhuri records a Muslim victory at Debal, but is silent about the results of the other two raids. On the other hand, according to Chach-nāma, the Muslims were defeated and their leader was killed by the governor of Chach at the battle of Debal.¹ It may be safely concluded that the Muslim arms did not

Muslims even before the Muslim forces achieved any victory (Ch°, p. 72). He is reported to have said to Muhammad ibn-Kāsim: 'I myself and all my men are subjects of the Khalīfah, and we hold this place subject to the command and in accordance with the terms of the letter of Hajjāg. In fact we owe our permanent position to his help and patronage and encouragement.' There was a secret compact between him and Hajjāj, and he opened the gates of Nerun when Muhammad had besieged it in vain and was in great straits (Ch°, p. 91).

The Buddhist community at Siwistān, another strongly fortified town, forced the ruler to surrender it to the Muslim army, saying, 'We people are a priestly class. According to our faith, fighting and slaughtering are not allowable. We will never be in favour of shedding blood' . . . (Ch°, p. 93.)

The same unpatriotic and treacherous spirit was shown by the Buddhists of other places (Ch°, pp. 105, 173).

¹ Ch° (pp. 57-58) places this event shortly before the murder of Umar but gives the date as 11 A.H. This seems to be a mistake for 21 A.H. Similarly on p. 37 Ch° refers to some events in Persia in 2 A.H. whereas the right date seems to be 12 A.H. These two dates are either due to misreading of original figures or counted from the death of Muhammad—for it is difficult to believe that a Muhammadan author would give 11 A.H. as the date for an expedition undertaken during the Caliphate of Umar, as the latter succeeded to the Caliphate only in 13 A.H. Similarly Ch° gives wrong dates for the beginning of the Caliphate of Ali (p. 38) and Mu-āwiyah (p. 61).

The statement in Ch° that Chach had ruled for 35 years when this expedition took place, cannot be correct. This is not only in conflict with the statement in

gain any appreciable success in any of these raids which were all undertaken during the Caliphate of Umar (A.D. 634-43).

The defeat at Debal must have taken by surprise the Caliph Umar whose arms were victorious in distant parts of the world. Having failed to approach Sind from the sea-coast on the south, he sent an army to Makrān and Kirmān with a view to attack the western frontier of the kingdom, but like a true statesman, he at the same time asked the governor of Irāk to send him detailed information about the country. The governor reported that the king of Sind was very powerful and by no means willing to submit to the Muhammadans. Thereupon all ideas of sending further expeditions against that country were abandoned.¹

The failure of the previous raids induced the next ruler Uthmān to attempt an invasion of Sind by land. He sent his agents to collect information about the country, but their reports were unfavourable. So Uthmān too gave up the enterprise.²

During the next Caliphate, that of 'Ali, a great expedition was sent against India (38-39 A.H.). The Muslim army, which included a

the *Tuhfatu-l-kirām* that Chach ascended the throne in 1 A.H. but is also irreconcilable with the general statements in Ch° on the basis of which the genealogical table of Chach and his successors has been drawn above on p. 26.

It may be noted here that Ch° does not mention the naval raids against Thana or Broach which are mentioned by Balādhuri (p. 209).

¹ The statement that Umar sent an expedition to Makrān and Kirmān is based on the authority of Chach-nāma (pp. 58 ff.) But it is clear from the context that the expedition was recalled before it could achieve any success. Al-Balādhuri ignores this expedition altogether. Later authorities refer to the success of Muslim arms in this expedition. According to Ta'rikh-i-Guzida, the Muslims conquered on this occasion not only Makrān and Kirmān but also Sijistān, although the ruler of Sind helped the Chief of Makrān (p. 181). Hasan-bin-Muhammad Shiraji, referring to the same incidents, adds that the ruler of Makrān, called Zambil, who was also king of Sind, was killed. Habibu-s Siyar (Price—Vol. I., p. 138) and Tabari also refer to this expedition. These authorities, however, give different names for the leaders of this expedition, and a perusal of Al-Balādhuri, our earliest authority, leaves no doubt that the whole thing was a confused echo of certain incidents which happened at a later period. Al-Balādhuri, for example narrates many incidents described by these authorities, but refer them to a later period. Further, Makrān and Sijistān were conquered by the Muslim forces at a much later date.

Elliot seems to have accepted the later authorities (vol. i., pp. 417-8) which are in conflict with the statement, accepted by him (Ibid, p. 421) that at a later period the governor of Basra sent his agent 'to explore Sijistān and Makrān as well as the countries bordering on the valley of the Indus.'

² Balādhuri, pp. 209-10; Ch°, pp. 59-60. The two accounts agree very closely.

large number of nobles and chiefs, advanced, without serious opposition, up to Al-Kíkán or Kíkánán which was a part of Sind. The people of this country (which corresponds to the mountainous regions in Baluchistan round Kelat) made a brave stand and routed the Muslim army. The leader of the Muslim host 'was killed together with all but a few of his followers' (42 A.H. = A.D. 663.). This is the version of Al-Baládhuri. The Chach-náma, on the other hand, relates, that the Muslims obtained a victory at Kíkánán, but turned back on hearing of the murder of 'Ali. This seems to be only a thin pretext for hiding the defeat and disgrace, and the version of Baládhuri seems to be confirmed by later events. Besides, the version in Chach-náma is based on the authority of Amir, son of Háris, son of Abdul Kais, while, according to Baládhuri, Háris was himself the leader of the expedition. The son of the defeated leader naturally suppressed the inconvenient details.¹

Henceforth Kíkánán became the chief objective of the Muslim expeditions, and during the Caliphate of Mu'áwiyah (41-60 A.H.), several attempts were made to subdue this outlying frontier post of the kingdom of Sind. The first expedition was led by Al-Muhallab in the year 44 (A.D. 665.) He advanced against Kíkán from the side of Kábul in the north, but did not achieve any conspicuous success.² The second expedition led by 'Abdallah, in spite of initial successes, ended in a disaster, and the routed Mussalman army fled to Makrán.³ Sinán, the leader of the next expedition, 'proceeded to the frontier and conquered Makrán. He established a garrison there and made it his headquarters.'⁴ The Muslim forces were apparently unable to

¹ Baládhuri (p. 210). Ch° (p. 60) gives the date as 80 which is evidently a slip or misreading for 40. For, immediately before, it refers to the year 38 A.H. It is, however, wrong in stating that the Caliphate of 'Ali began towards the end of that year. As a matter of fact 'Ali became Caliph in 35 A.H. 38 A.H. is the date of the expedition (cf. Elliot, vol. i, p. 422).

² This is omitted in Ch°. Curiously enough, here again, Ch° puts 44 A.H., the date of the first Indian expedition under Mu'áwiyah, as the date of the beginning of his Caliphate (see f.n. 1 of Chapter III, p. 18).

³ Baládhuri (p. 211); Ch° (p. 62) gives more details of the disaster. Both authorities refer to the curious anecdote of a pregnant woman by way of illustrating the hospitality of the leader of the expedition. Baládhuri refers to some initial success of the Islamic army but this is omitted in Ch°. This expedition probably took place in 46 A.H. (Weil-Geschichte, vol. I, p. 291).

⁴ Baládhuri (p. 212). Apparently there is some confusion about this incident. Baládhuri refers to a tradition according to which Makrán was conquered by

proceed any further. Hence Sinán was replaced by Rashid who proceeded from Makrán and led a successful raid against Kíkánán. But later, while raiding the Mid (i.e., Meds), he was defeated and killed.¹ He was succeeded by Sinán who led another expedition against Kíkánán. He proceeded up to the district of Budhia in Kíkánán but the people there rose against him and killed him.² The next expedition was led by Al-Mundhir (Munzir in Chach-náma). He raided al-Búkán and al-Kíkán and conquered Kuşdár, which, although previously conquered by Sinán, had rebelled against the Muslims. But al-Mundhir died at Kuşdár. The command was then taken over by ibn-Harri who subdued Kuşdár and fought a fierce and successful campaign there, acquiring much booty.³ But Kíkán was far from being subdued. For more than twenty years, the Muslim forces had concentrated their efforts upon the conquest of this frontier of Sind, but failed to achieve any lasting results. The only notable success of the Muslims in this direction was the conquest of Makrán.

During the next twenty-five years, the kingdom of Sind obtained respite from the repeated Muslim aggressions on its frontier. But with the appointment of Al-Hajjáj as governor of Irák, things assumed a new turn. After putting down some internal feuds, he appointed

Hakim ibn Jabalah al-Abdi. Ch° (p. 63) refers to Sinán as having 'succeeded Abdulla, but does not refer to his conquest of Makran. It, however, says that Ahnaf, son of Kaish, who was selected for the holy wars in Hind remained at Makrán for two years.

¹ Baládhuri (p. 212). Ch° (p. 64) gives more details of this expedition. It says that Rashid returned after a year from Kíkánán, and, 'travelling via Sistán, he came to the mountains of Mauzar and Bharj. The natives of this mountainous country mustered about 50,000 men strong to stop him on his way. A bloody battle ensued and Rashid fell a martyr'.

² Ch° (p. 65). Baládhuri (p. 212) refers to Sinán's succession in command, but is silent about his expedition to Kíkán and death. Ch° quotes a memorial verse relating to the martyrdom of Sinán. For the position of Budhia, cf. App. A.

³ Baládhuri (pp. 213-14); Ch° (p. 66) says that Munzir died of illness at Burabi, and does not give any details of his success. Nor does it refer to ibn-Harri's campaign. Ibn-Harri seems to have conquered al-Búkán. Baládhuri refers to a memorial verse to that effect and adds: 'The inhabitants of al-Búkán to-day are Muslims . . . al-Barmaki built a city there which he named al-Baida (the white). This was in the Caliphate of al-Mutasin-billah'.

Elliot thinks that Munzir referred to in Ch° is a different person from Munzir referred to by Baládhuri (vol. i, 425).

Mujjā'ah as governor of Makrān. Mujjā'ah made some raids and conquered portions of Kandābīl (modern Gandava). On his death, a year later, Muhammad ibn-Hārūn was appointed governor of Makrān during the Caliphate of Walīd.¹

About this time² the king of Ceylon³ sent to Al-Hajjāj some women who were born in his country as Muslims, their fathers, who were merchants, having died. He wanted to court favour with Al-Hajjāj by sending them back.⁴ But the ship in which they were sailing was captured by the pirates of Debal.⁵ Al-Hajjāj thereupon wrote to Dāhar, King of Sind, to set the women free, but Dāhar pleaded inability, saying 'I have no control over the pirates who captured them.' Hajjāj regarded this as the *causus belli* against Sind and determined to make renewed effort on a large scale for conquering a country which had so long defied the arms of Islam. The Caliph was at first unwilling to sanction the risky expedition, but ultimately gave his consent at the importunities of Hajjāj. Hajjāj thereupon sent 'Ubaidallāh to raid Debal but he was defeated and killed.⁶ Then a second expedition was sent by way of sea from Oman, under Budail (called Bazīl in Ch°). Budail got reinforcements from Muhammad ibn-Hārūn and marched towards Debal. Dāhar, on hearing the news, sent a force under his son Jaisirha to protect

¹ Balādhuri (p. 215), Ch° (p. 69) gives 85 A.H. as the date for the conquest of Kandail (i.e. Kandābīl of Balādhuri).

² No definite date is given either by Balādhuri (p. 215) or in Ch° (p. 69). The latter, however, states, before relating this incident, that Muhammad Hārūn was appointed governor about 85 A.H. and ruled for five years. This would place the event in or shortly after 91 A.H. (= 709 A.D.). This is in full agreement with the general statement in Ch°, on the strength of which the chronological table of the kings has been drawn up above on p. 26. It will be seen that Ch° relates events up to 708 A.D. and then begins his accounts of the Muslim expedition which took place the following year. cf. f.n. 1 on page 37 below.

³ Balādhuri says 'island of Rubies' (p. 215). Ch° says 'Sarandeb' (p. 69).

⁴ Balādhuri (pp. 215-16). Ch° (p. 69) refers to presents, including pearls and jewels, both for Hajjāj and the Caliph. It also refers to a number of Muslim women 'who went to visit the Kaaba and the capital city of the Caliphs'. Balādhuri refers only to one ship but Ch° refers to a small fleet of boats. Both Balādhuri and Ch° refer to the miraculous legend 'that the captive women cried out 'O Hajjāj', and Hajjāj replied 'Here am I'.

⁵ According to Ch° (p. 70) the robbers belonged to the tribe of Nagamroh. Balādhuri says they were 'Meds'.

⁶ Balādhuri (p. 216). Ch° does not refer to this.

Debal. A pitched battle ensued, which lasted the whole day. At the end the Muslim army was routed and Budail was killed.¹

Al-Hajjāj then made elaborate preparations for the invasion of Sind, after obtaining necessary permission from the Caliph Walīd.² He appointed his nephew and son-in-law Muhammad ibn-Kāsim as commander of the expedition and provided him with soldiers, arms and ammunitions on a most lavish scale. He asked for and obtained from the Caliph the services of 6,000 Syrian soldiers fully armed. Siege materials were sent by boats, and elaborate and detailed plans were made by Hajjāj himself to ensure the success of the campaign. Muhammad ibn-Kāsim was instructed to put himself in constant communication with Hajjāj and never to take any important measures without his consent.³

Muhammad halted at Shiraz to collect his forces⁴ and then advanced by slow stages to Makrān. After staying there for some days he advanced and conquered Kannazbur and Armail.⁵ Then he

¹ Balādhuri (p. 216) is very brief, Ch° (p. 71) gives interesting details. Bazīl 'sailing by the sea of Ammán (i.e. Oman) arrived at the fortified town of Nerūn. Being reinforced there by the large army sent from Makrān by its governor Muhammad ibn-Hārūn, he marched towards Debal. Nerun is probably a mistake for some other port; for Nerun is further inland than Debal. Of course, it is just possible that Budail sailed up a mouth of the Indus other than that on which Debal was situated, and having thus reached Nerun, marched to Debal. But it is extremely unlikely, for no veteran soldier would sail up with his army to the interior leaving strong and important sea-ports unconquered in his rear.

² Ch° (pp. 71, 73) more than once refers to Hajjāj seeking permission of the Caliph in order to declare a religious war against Hind and Sind. The Caliph is said to have been at first unwilling to take this step, but was prevailed upon to agree to it on account of the importunity of Hajjāj and on his promising to repay double the amount spent for the war. Ch° quotes some letters passing between Hajjāj and the Caliph in this connection—but their genuineness is doubtful. But the unwillingness of the Caliph Abd-el-Malek to subject the Muslims to perils of a distant expedition are referred to by Arab writers (cf. Weil-Geschichte der Chalifen, vol. i, p. 504 f.n.).

³ From this point the account in Ch° is very detailed. It quotes many letters passing between Hajjāj and Muhammad. The latter seems to have referred every matter to Hajjāj, who may almost be said to have directed the whole campaign from a distance. This is also corroborated by Balādhuri, (p. 218).

⁴ According to Ch° (p. 77) Muhammad was joined at Shiraz by 6,000 horsemen, 6,000 camelmen, 3,000 loading camels and large number of coats of mail sent by Hajjāj.

⁵ 72 A.H., the date given in Ch° for this event, is certainly a mistake, as the Caliphate of Al-Walīd extends from 86 to 96 A.H.; 72 is probably a mistake for 92, the date given in the Tārīkhi Māsūmī.

⁶ Balādhuri (p. 217). Ch° (p. 77) writes *Armandelah* for Armail, both being apparently different forms of the same name, but makes no reference to Kannazbur.

proceeded to Debal and made an entrenched camp. The siege materials reached him by way of sea and he made preparations for taking the fort. Catapults were taken out and fixed. There was a great Buddhist temple in the city with a high flag-staff over a dome. A curious story is told in Chach-nāma in connection with this flag-staff. A Brāhmaṇa, we are told, came to Muhammad and said 'We have learnt from our science of the stars that the country of Sind will be conquered by the army of Islam. . . . But as long as that standard of the temple stands in its place, it is impossible for you to take the fort'. Then Muhammad asked his chief engineer to remove the standard by throwing stones from the Catapult, and the standard was broken in no time. Balādhuri relates this incident, but makes no mention of the prophecy of the Brāhmaṇa. The destruction of the standard demoralized the besieged and the town was taken by assault. No quarter was given, and for 3 days the inhabitants were ruthlessly slaughtered by the victorious foe.¹

Muhammad then sent the battering-rams, etc. by boats and himself advanced to Nerun. Its Buddhist priests had already entered into a treasonable correspondence with Hajjāj and now openly received Muhammad and supplied him with provisions.² Muhammad then advanced to Siwistān (Sehwan) and conquered many cities without any serious opposition. The only resistance which he met with was from the city of Siwistān.³ Here, too, the Buddhist party welcomed the Arabs and entered into a compact with them against their own governor. The Buddhist sections of other towns were actuated to do the same, partly on account of their aversion to slaughter and bloodshed, and partly due to their belief in the prophetic saying of the sacred

¹ The date 73 given in Ch° (p. 79) for the conquest of Debal, is evidently a mistake for 93. The Ch° quotes several letters passing between Dāhar and Muhammad but their genuineness may be doubted. Balādhuri says (p. 218) that after the capture of Debal, Muhammad marked out a quarter for the Muslims, built a mosque and settled 4,000 colonists there. For the identification of Debal, see Geographical Note A, Appendix.

² Cf. Ch°, pp. 72 and 89 ff. A Samani, probably a Buddhist, was the governor of Nerun (which is represented now by modern Haidarabad). He not only surrendered Nerun but actively helped Muhammad in the subsequent campaign. Balādhuri calls the place al-Birun (p. 219, but cf. Elliot, vol. i, p. 121 f.n.) and says that its inhabitants had sent two Buddhist monks to al-Hajjāj and had made a treaty with him.

³ This is called Maoj, 30 leagues from Nerun (Ch°, p. 93) and also 'the fort of Siwistan' (p. 95). Balādhuri calls it Sahban (p. 219). Maoj was apparently a suburb of Siwistan, modern Sehwan.

books about the conquest of India by Islamic force.¹ Muhammad pursued the ruler of Siwistān as far as Sisam, in Budhiah, and then returned to Nerun, and occupied the city.²

Some leading chiefs of the country now tendered homage to Muhammad and he took by assault the fortified town of Ishbhā.³ Then he proceeded to the country of Raor and Jitor and reached the western bank of the Indus. He now entered into alliance with an important chief called Mokah son of Basāyeh who basely deserted Dāhar on receiving the district of Jortah and the whole province of Bet,⁴ and promised to supply Muhammad with boats for crossing the Indus.

Muhammad then encamped on the bank of the Indus. But before he could cross the river news reached him that Chandram Hālah who some time ago had been the ruler of Siwistan, had caused a revolt, taken possession of the fort and driven away the Arab soldiers. Muhammad sent one of his lieutenants who reduced Siwistan and returned with 4,000 warlike Jats from the place.⁵

¹ Ch° (p. 105). Balādhuri (p. 219) cf. Chap. iv, f.n. 14.

² Ch° here reproduces some of the incidents which took place at the time of the first conquest of Nerun (cf. p. 91 and 104). It is possible, though not very likely, that the incidents might have been repeated.

³ Ch° (p. 105) places it in the year 93 A.H.

⁴ It is difficult to follow Ch° at this point. Muhammad writes to Hajjāj from Nerun (pp. 99-100): 'There is one of the tributary rulers under Dāhar, who is the owner of the fortified town of Bet, to the east of the Mehrān, on the bank of a rivulet in an island of the gulf of Khānbehāt and is called Basāmi Rāsal. All the chief officers and noblemen of Rai Dāhar as well as most of the princes of Hind and Sind are under his influence. This prince has been advising and inducing everyone of these great men and nobles to submit to us. They have now great confidence in us and have sent us humble messages promising to be loyal to us.' Next we are told that when Muhammad proceeded from Ishbhā to Raor he was joined by Jāsen, the ruler of Bet. Then suddenly we are introduced to Mokah, son of Basāyeh, a tributary chief and a relation of Dāhar, and Muhammad secured his alliance by cession of Jortah and Bet and granting other honours, and Mokah on his part promised to collect and supply boats to enable Muhammad to cross the Indus, (pp. 104-8).

It is difficult to explain what became of Basāmi Rāsal and Jāsen, both described as rulers of Bet, and why Mokah assumed such an importance in the eyes of Muhammad.

⁵ Ch° (pp. 116-7), Balādhuri seems to refer to this episode as the conquest of 'Sadusan' (p. 219). Apparently, he uses the two names 'Sahban' and 'Sadusan' to denote the same place 'Siwistan,' also called Sewan, without probably knowing it himself. Balādhuri is silent about the incidents that took place during the period between the conquest of Siwistan and the suppression of revolt in that place.

Dáhar, with his army, also encamped on the opposite bank of the Indus¹ and his son Jaisimha joined him with a large number of men and instruments of war in boats by the small river of Kotak. Muhammad ibn-Kásim was also reinforced by 2,000 select horse sent by Hajjáj. But he halted on the bank of the river for nearly two months, whereupon Hajjáj reprimanded him and urged him to cross the river and fight with Dáhar. Muhammad, in obedience to Hajjáj's command, made preparations to cross the river. He came to the country of Sakrah, in the district of Jhim, posted a strong garrison at the island of Bet and crossed near it without much difficulty by means of a bridge of boats.²

Muhammad, having crossed to the eastern bank of the Indus, made himself master of the fort of Bet and then proceeded towards Raor. He soon arrived at Jitor and occupied the bank of a lake between Jitor and Raor.³ Dáhar despatched his son Jaisimha to oppose Muhammad, but his army was routed and Jaisimha fled to Dáhar, who was encamped to the east of the lake.

¹ The identification of the place where the two armies were encamped on the opposite banks of the Indus, has been discussed in Appendix B.

² Muhammad crossed the river without any loss. According to Al-Baládhuri this was due to the help of a neighbouring king, Rasil, the king of Kassah (probably the same as Mokah) who allowed a bridge to be built near his territory. The Chach-náma, on the other hand, suggests that Dáhar deliberately allowed Muhammad to cross the river when the latter offered him the alternative of either crossing the river unopposed, or allowing Muhammad to do the same. An Arab chieftain in the service of Dáhar gave him good advice viz. to oppose the crossing of the Indus by the enemy and to harass them and intercept their supply of provisions by means of guerilla warfare. Dáhar was convinced of the soundness of this advice, but still gallantly offered the passage of the river to Muhammad, saying, 'lest it be imagined by him that we are in perplexity and have become very weak and powerless' (pp. 108-111). Such mediæval chivalry was completely out of place in fighting with a stubborn and determined enemy. But, all the same, Dáhar, according to Ch° (p. 125), sent the brother of Mokah whom he appointed the governor of Bet, to oppose Muhammad's passage. 'Muhammad, therefore, ordered all the boats to be linked together in a line along the western bank to the length corresponding to the breadth of the river at that place . . . then moving the whole block of boats, keeping one end of it fixed at the crossing-point and turning the other, the head boat was made to touch the opposite point on the eastern bank.' The Arab soldiers now landed from the boats and made vigorous assaults. Dáhar's soldiers fled and were pushed up to the fort of Jhim (Ch° 125).

It may be noted here that according to Tárikh Másúmí, Muhammad crossed at Talla in order to go to Alor.

³ Ch°—pp. 126 ff.

The brother of Moka, whom Dáhar had appointed governor of Bet in place of the latter, now joined Muhammad. By the help and advice of the two renegade brothers, Muhammad crossed the lake that lay between his and Dáhar's army and encamped at Jitor on the stream of Doharah whence he could command both the front and rear of Dáhar's army and cut off its supply. Dáhar then went to the fort of Raor and having left his baggage and retinue, took up a position about a league from the Arab army.

Here a pitched battle took place between the two armies. The Chachnáma has described it in detail.¹ In spite of desertion and

¹ The details of the battle are taken from Ch°, pp. 133 ff. Baládhuri's account is very brief.

The date of the defeat and death of Dáhar at the hands of Muhammad ibn-Kásim is variously given. Chach-náma (p. 137) gives the date as 93 A.H. (= A.D. 712). Tuhfat-ul-Kirám places the event on the 11th day of Ramzan (16th June A.D. 712) (Ch°, p. 137 f.n.). Baládhuri does not mention any date, but Tabari gives the following chronology. 'In the year 90 Muhammad ibn-Kásim killed the king of Sind. In the year 94 he conquered India and in the year 95 he conquered further India with the exception of Kiráj and Alimandel (f. 188. Translated by Weil in Geschichteder Chalifen. p. 506 f.n. 1.) The interval of 4 years, between the death of Dáhar and the conquest of India by Muhammad ibn-Kásim is difficult to explain, and it may be suspected that 90 is a misreading for 93.

According to both Abul Fida and Abul Faraj, the conquest of India took place in 94, while ibn Kutaiba places it in 93 (Elliot, p. 436). I do not know on what authority A. Müller gives the date as 89 A.H. (Der Islam in Morgen Und Abendland, pp. 412-13).

On the whole it would, I think, be safer to take 93 A.H. (A.D. 712) as the date of the battle.

The piracy at Debal which was regarded as *causis belli* by Hajjáj must have taken place a few years before this. No definite date is given for this event in Chach-náma but there are some details which enable us to arrive at an approximate date. We are told (p. 69) that Muhammad Hárún was sent to Hindustan (apparently the border-land of Makrán) after 86 A.H. when Walíd became Caliph, and spent five years in fighting with Alafis and other enemies. As the incident about piracy is placed after this, it cannot be dated before 91 A.H. On the other hand, this date cannot be pushed any further, for between this date and the year 93, the date of the expedition of Muhammad ibn-Kásim, we have to place the negotiations between Hajjáj and Dáhar and two unsuccessful expeditions sent by Hajjáj, permission for which had to be secured, with difficulty and after some delay, from the unwilling Caliph.

According to Tárikh-Másúmí, Muhammad ibn-i-Kásim started on his Indian expedition in 92 A.H. (Ch°, p. 75 f.n.). This would make the date 91 very doubtful, if not impossible. On the other hand, a statement by Abul Fida would induce us to push back this date very considerably. This passage, quoted by Weil (Geschichte der Chalifen, p. 504 f.n. 1) may be summed up as follows: 'Hajjáj, therefore, requested Abdul Malik to send an army to India but he declined to subject the Muslims to perils of a distant land. When Walíd succeeded, he granted the

treachery, Dáhar fought with valour, and on the second day the Muslim army was nearly routed. 'Thus the infidels made a rush on the Arabs from all sides, and fought so steadily and bravely that the army of Islam became irresolute, and their lines were broken up in great confusion. It was generally believed that the Arabs were defeated and put to flight and men were struck dumb and overawed.'¹

Muhammad rallied his men by evoking the name of the great and glorious God, and the renegade chiefs of Sind came to his aid. The battle was renewed. 'Dáhar drove his elephant upon the army of Islam. Muhammad ibn-Kásim then ordered his naphtha-flingers to shoot their naphtha, and one of these men threw a naphtha arrow at the litter of Dáhar on the elephant and the litter immediately caught fire.' The elephant thereupon madly plunged into water. Although Dáhar got back on shore, he became the target of Muslim archers, and an arrow struck him at his heart. He slowly dismounted from the elephant when an Arab swordsman cut off his head.

As usual, the death of the king was followed by a complete rout of the army, and the survivors took refuge in the fort of Raor. Jaisimha, the son of Dáhar, now retreated to the strong fort of Bahmanábád while the widowed queen was left to defend Raor. The queen put up a brave resistance, and when conditions became hopeless, burnt herself along with other ladies to escape the infamy of falling into the hands of the Muslims. Raor fell into the hands of Muhammad ibn-Kásim.

Muhammad now marched towards Bahmanábád. On the way he had to spend nearly four months for capturing two fortified towns called Bahrór and Dahlelah. Jaisimha also made elaborate preparations, but he suffered a serious loss by the desertion of the old Wazir to Muhammad. Jaisimha strongly fortified Alor, the capital, and Bahmanábád, and himself moved with an army to harass the enemy and cut off its supplies. Muhammad ibn-Kásim besieged Bahmanábád. 'Every day the besieged came out and offered battle and fierce fight continued from morning till evening.' In this way they fought for six months. When Muhammad ibn-Kásim despaired of taking the fort his mind became full of anxiety. But here again treachery played its

request of Hajjáj.' According to this, the piracy must have taken place sometime before 86 A.H. the date of the death of Abdul Malik. This would place the piracy 6 or 7 years before the expedition of Muhammad ibn-Kásim—a very reasonable period to account for all that happened during the interval.

¹ Ch°, p. 142.

part and some leading citizens entered into a secret covenant with Muhammad and betrayed the fort.¹ Muhammad subdued several other places and then proceeded to the capital city, Alor, which was in charge of Fofi, son of Dáhar. After some fighting, the residents of the city wanted to make peace with Muhammad, whereupon Fofi withdrew from the city and joined his brothers Jaisimha and Wakiah at a place called Nazwalah Sandal in Jitor. Alor submitted to the conqueror.²

After conquering the strongholds of Bábiah, Gholkonda and Sakkah, Muhammad proceeded to Multan. Here a brave resistance was offered by Kundrai and Bachchra. Fighting continued for two months and Muhammad was unable to make a breach in the walls. Here, again, treachery played its part. A traitor pointed out to Muhammad the source of water-supply for the town. Muhammad cut it off and the besieged were obliged to surrender.³

The conquest of Multan was the last great achievement of Muhammad, although he followed it up by other minor conquests. He conquered al-Kíraj, subdued al-Bailamán and made peace with the people of Surast. The death of Hajjáj in 714 A.D. and that of Caliph Walíd, the year following, brought in evil days for him. The next Caliph Sulaimán was a great enemy of Hajjáj and wreaked his vengeance on the members of his family. Muhammad ibn-Kásim was recalled to Irák where, with certain other adherents of Hajjáj, he was put to torture and died.⁴

¹ Ch°, pp. 156-171. Baládhuri, p. 221.

The date of the capture of Bahmanábád is given as 93 in the Text of Ch°—but is evidently a mistake for 94 (p. 159 f.n.).

² Ch°, pp. 175-181. Baládhuri (p. 221) names Baghrur, Sawandrai and Basmad as having been conquered by Muhammad between Bahmanábád and Alor. Ch° names Musthal, Bharowar, the lands of the Sammahs, Luhanahs and Sahtahs. Alor fell in 94 A.H. This is implied in Ch° and expressly stated in Tuhfatul Kirám (Ch°, p. 177 f.n.).

³ Baládhuri (p. 222) only refers to the conquest of Sikkah and Multan. Ch° (pp. 187-192) gives fuller details. Cunningham has argued against the probability that Multan could have been forced to surrender from want of water (Anc. Geo., p. 275).

⁴ Muir—*The Caliphate* (New Edition), p. 354. According to Baládhuri Muhammad returned from Multan to Alor on hearing of Hajjáj's death, and then conquered Al-Kíraj. He also sent force against Al-Bailamán, which submitted, and made peace with the Mids of Surast. (For identification, cf. App. B).

As soon as Sulaimán became Caliph, he sent Yazid to Sind. Yazid put Muhammad in chains and tortured him to death. According to Ch°, Muhammad did not return from his expedition to the north.

According to Chach-nāma Muhammad had proceeded from Multan to the frontiers of Kashmir, and at the same time sent an expedition against Kanauj. But before any material success was obtained, the fatal order of the Caliph condemning Muhammad to a barbarous death stopped all further proceedings.¹

The Indian kings did not fail to take advantage of this internal commotion among the Muslims, and re-occupied their kingdoms. Dāhar's son Jaisimha re-occupied Bahmanābād. The Caliph sent Habib to subdue Sind. He conquered Alor and made some minor conquests.²

The next Caliph Umar II (A.D. 717-720), himself a man of austere religious devotion, wrote to the kings of Sind, inviting them to become Muslims and be subject to him, agreeing to let them continue on their thrones and have the same privileges and obligations as the Muslims. Many kings, including Jaisimha, son of Dāhar, accepted Islam and adopted Arab names. Thus the province of Sind became independent again, and Kandābīl or Gandava is referred to as 'on the remotest frontiers of the Arab Empire'.³

During the Caliphate of Hishām (A.D. 724-743) Junaid was appointed the governor of Sind. A quarrel soon broke out between him and Jaisimha, the son of Dāhar. Jaisimha apostatized and declared war against Junaid, but was defeated in a naval engagement in the lake of Sarki and taken prisoner.⁴

Junaid then conquered al-Kiraj and sent expeditions to the interior of the country. He sent lieutenants against Marmad or Mirmad, al-Mandal, Dahnaj and Barwas. He also sent an army to Uzain and

¹ Ch^o relates the story how two virgin daughters of Dāhar, who were sent as prisoners to Caliph Walid, brought about the death of Muhammad ibn-Kāsim by falsely accusing him of having outraged them before sending them to the Caliph. The story seems to be palpably absurd. The Caliph who ordered the death of Muhammad was not Walid but his successor Sulaimān, and his barbarous treatment of Muhammad and other partisans of Hajjāj can be easily explained by the strained relation between the two.

² As the accounts in Ch^o do not proceed beyond the death of Muhammad ibn-Kāsim, our sole authority for the account that follows, unless otherwise stated, is Balādhuri (pp. 225 ff.). The name of Dāhar's son is written as Hullishah, but cf. Balādhuri, vol. ii. p. 225 f.n. 1 and Elliot, vol. i. p. 124 f.n. 2.

³ Elliot, vol. i. p. 440.

⁴ The original expression is *Baṭṭhatu'sh-Sharqiy*. Haig takes it to mean 'the eastern inland sea' that is, the sea that once permanently covered and that still periodically covers the Ran of Kachchh ('Indus Delta country,' p. 65).

the land of Al-Malibah. They waged a war with Uzain, raided Bahrimad and set fire to its suburbs. Al-Junaid himself conquered al-Bailamān and al-Jurz.¹

Among the places named, Marmad may be safely identified with Maru-Māra corresponding to Jaisalmer and part of Jodhpur. Barwas is undoubtedly Broach, and Al-Mandal probably denotes Mandor. Jurz was the Arabic corruption of Gurjara and Al-Bailamān probably refers to the circle of states referred to in Ghatiyālā inscription of Kakkuka as Vallamaṇḍala. Uzain and Maliba no doubt refer to Ujjain and Mālava, i.e., the eastern and western Malwa.

The Nausari plates of the Gujarat Chālukya Pulakeśirāja, dated A. D. 738, refer to Arab expeditions in course of which they defeated the kings of the Saindhavas, the Kachchhellas, Saurāshtra, the Chāvotakas, the Mauryas and the Gurjaras. There can be hardly any doubt that these expeditions refer to those undertaken by Junaid or his lieutenants. We learn from Nausari plates that Pulakeśirāja defeated the Arabs, while the Gwalior inscription of Bhoja tells us that the Pratihāra king Nāgabhaṭa defeated the powerful forces of a *Mlechchha* king. As the dates of both these events fall within a decade of A. D. 724 it confirms and explains the statement of Al-Balādhuri that 'in the days of Tamīm (the successor of Junaid) the Muslims withdrew from the land of Al-Hind, and abandoned their headquarters and they have not returned so far as that since'.² Unfortunately the fragmentary nature of Indian evidence does not supply us detailed information of the course of events which compelled the Muslim forces, after the first flush of their success, to take shelter behind the Indus. Whether the result was due to the combined efforts of Indian chiefs including the Pratihāra king Nāgabhaṭa, and the Chālukya king Pulakeśirāja, or to isolated victories obtained by them, we do not know; but there is no doubt that henceforth the Muslim suzerainty stopped short at the right bank of the Indus. This is confirmed by the following statement of Al-Balādhuri.

¹ These conquests of Junaid have been partly discussed in my monograph on the Gurjara-Pratihāras (*Journal of the Department of Letters*, Calcutta University, vol. x. pp. 20 ff.) The two paragraphs that follow are merely summaries of that discussion. For further discussion on the identity of the kingdoms named cf. App. B.

² Balādhuri, (p. 228).

'Afterwards, while al-Hakam ibn-'Awānah al-Kalbi was ruler, the people of Al-Hind apostatized with the exception of the inhabitants of Kassah. A place of refuge to which the Muslims might flee was not to be found, so he built on the further side of the lake (al-Buhairah), where it borders on Al-Hind, a city which he named al-Mahfūṭhah, establishing it as a place of refuge for them where they would be secure, and making it a capital.¹

Later on, continues al-Balādhuri, al-Hakam 'built on this side of the lake a city which he called al-Manṣūrah. It is where the governors reside to-day'.²

Al-Hakam fought and scored some successes, but was killed. Afterwards, the governors 'kept fighting the enemy and seizing whatever came into their hands, and subduing places in the neighbourhood whose inhabitants rebelled'.³

Thus the period of confusion in the Islamic state during the last years of the Umayyids also witnessed the decline of Islamic power in India.

With the establishment of the Abbāssids, a fresh effort was made to extend the power of Islam. Al-Manṣūr (A. D. 754-775) appointed Ḥishām ibn-'Amr-at-Taghlibi, governor of Sind. 'He conquered Kashmir, obtaining many prisoners and slaves. He conquered al-Multan and cleared out a faction of Arabs which was in Kandābīl. He went to al-Kunduhār with the fleet, and conquered it, throwing down the Budd (i.e. a temple) and building a mosque in its place.'⁴

It is difficult to imagine that Kashmir, then at the height of its power, was conquered in any sense of the term. At the utmost it can only mean some successful frontier raids. On the other hand it has been inferred by Levi and Chavannes from some statements in the *Rājataranginī* that Lalitāditya Mukṭāpīḍa (c. A. D. 733-769) thrice defeated

¹ Balādhuri, (pp. 228-229).

² *Ibid*, p. 229.

³ *Ibid*, p. 229.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 231. Al-Kunduhār is Kandahar (Le Strange, p. 347). For other identifications cf. Elliot vol. i, p. 445. But it is difficult to understand how Kandahar could be approached by a fleet. The Abbassid governors had to fight with Arab factions, evidently partisans of the Umayyids, both in Kandābīl and on the bank of the Indus, for Balādhuri tells us (p. 230) that Mūsa routed the army of Manṣūr ibn-Jamhūr al-Kalbi, somewhere near the Indus, and the latter fled towards the desert and perished of thirst. As to Kandahar, the place was evidently taken from the Indians, first, because no Arab faction is referred to, and secondly, because the destruction of a Hindu temple and building of a new mosque in its place, are signs of a new conquest.

a ruling chief of the Arabs. The fact that we do not hear of any further Arab invasion of Kashmir seems to confirm the view that Lalitāditya effectively checked the aggression of the Arabs in that quarter.¹

The reconquest of Multan shows that the Arabs had lost the whole of northern Sind during the period of confusion.

In the next Caliphate, that of al-Mahdī, a naval expedition was sent against India under Ar-Rabī ibn-Ṣubh al-Fakīh, but it was a failure. Ar-Rabī died and was buried in one of the islands in the year 160.² During the Caliphate of Hārūn-al-Rashid, his governor of Sind is said to have conquered a few places in western Sind.

The Abbassids do not seem to have gained much success in their Indian expeditions, nor were they able to consolidate the Muslim conquests in Sind. Imrān ibn-Mūsa, the governor under Caliph Mutasim-billāh (A. D. 833-842), 'made an expedition against the Kikānites, who are Zutt, fighting and defeating them, and building a city which he called al-Baiḍa', where he established his army'. This shows that the hardy Jāṭhs of Kikānān, who defied the Muslim arms as early as the year 42 A. H. (A. D. 662), were far from being subdued yet. Further, we hear of frequent conflicts with Jāṭhs and Meds in the neighbourhood of Alor, the capital of Sind. Sometimes the Muslim army met with serious disaster. Thus they captured a place called Sindan during the Caliphate of al-Ma'mun, and sent later on, from this base, a naval expedition with 70 ships of war. The fleet conquered Fāliand returned to Sindan. The Hindus of Sindan, however, rose against its ruler and killed and crucified him. They became masters of the city but 'left its mosque for the Muslims to assemble in and pray for the Caliph'.³

With the decline of the Abbassid power, the Muslim governor of Sind became virtually independent. In 257 A. H. (A. D. 871) the

¹ *Rājataranginī*—Ch. IV. v 167. Levi and Chavannes infer from this verse that Lalitāditya thrice defeated the Arab chief, the word *Mummuni* in this verse being taken by them as equivalent to 'Amir-al-Mumenim' the title of the Caliph (*Journal Asiatique* 1895, Part II p. 350 f.n. 1). Stein, however, does not accept this view (cf. his remarks on his English translation of this verse).

² Balādhuri, p. 96.

³ Balādhuri, pp. 231-233

The identity of Sindan is doubtful. According to Rashid Uddin it was between Broach and Supara, and nearer to the latter (Elliot Vol. I, p. 66; cf. also *Ibid*, p. 402).

Caliph practically handed over the province to the famous Suffarid leader Ya'kub ibn-Lais. Upon the latter's death, the Muslim territories in Sind were divided between two independent chiefs, those of Manşúra (near Bahmanábád) and Multan. None of these ever attained to great power, and both had to live in constant dread of their Indian neighbours.

CHAPTER VI

RETROSPECT

If we pass in review the main incidents narrated above in connection with the early Muslim raids on the western border-lands of India, we can have a better perspective view of the history of three centuries of Arab efforts for the conquest of India. The first thing that strikes us is the persistent effort of the Arabs to conquer India, and their wonderful organization, backed by superior knowledge and statesmanship. Since the days of the Second Caliph Umar, the conquest of Hind and Sind loomed large in the eyes of successive Caliphs and their eastern governors, and they set about their task with a method and determination so rarely to be met with among other nations of that age.

It is well-known that only four routes are open to a hostile army operating against India from the west. One way is by the sea, and the other three lie, roughly speaking, through Khyber Pass, Bolan Pass and the Makrán coast. It cannot be regarded as a mere coincidence that, from the very beginning, we find the Arabs endeavouring to penetrate into India through every one of these routes. The early naval raids against Thana, Broach and Debal, and subsequent raids in the same direction, mark their vain efforts to reach India by sea. Of the land-routes, the Khyber Pass was guarded by Kabul and Zabul while the Bolan Pass was guarded by the brave Jāths of al-Kikàn or Kikànàn. The long-drawn struggles of the Arabs with these powers, which we have narrated above, mark their steady but fruitless endeavours to enter India through the two great passes. The hardy mountaineers of these regions, backed by the natural strength of their hilly country, offered a stubborn resistance to the conquerors of the world, and though often defeated, ever refused to yield. Unfortunately we have no independent evidence of the brave and heroic fights they

put up for more than two hundred years, and our knowledge is entirely derived from the picture as painted by the hands of the victors. But even from the records of Muhammadan writers we can have some idea of the wonderful skill and energy which they displayed against enormous odds, and the crushing and humiliating defeats which they not unoften inflicted upon the army of Islam. If India had her history, the heroic deeds of these brave peoples, who defended her gates against Islam for two centuries, would probably have ere long received the recognition they so eminently deserve.

When all the three routes failed, the Muhammadans attempted the fourth one through Makrán coast. Makrán was then dependent on the ruler of Sind, and he must have undoubtedly opposed a resistance to the Muslims in that region. The Muhammadan historians have dimly preserved the reminiscence of this, though details are lacking.¹ Here, again, the early efforts of the Arabs did not prove very successful, but ultimately Muhammad ibn-Kásim forced his way through it to the heart of Sind.

We may pause for a moment to consider why the Arabs succeeded in this route, while they failed in the other three. In the absence of fuller knowledge of details, it is not possible to give a complete and satisfactory answer to this question, but several points seem to suggest themselves on a perusal of the scanty material that we possess.

In the first place, the equipment of the army of Muhammad ibn-Kásim was made on a lavish scale and forces were requisitioned even from distant Syria.² Hajjáj, the energetic governor, had staked his reputation upon this one expedition³ and personally looked to the smallest details. His master-mind directed the whole operation from a distance; and he found in Muhammad ibn-Kásim a faithful, honest, able and obedient lieutenant. The value of this factor can be easily judged when we contrast this expedition with that sent against Zabulistan under 'Abd-ar-Rahmán about 13 years before. That expedition too, was splendidly equipped, but the personal differences between Hajjáj and Abd-ar-Rahmán led to a veritable disaster.

¹ Cf. Ch. V, f.n. 2.

² For details of Kásim's army cf. Elliot, Vol. I, (p. 434 ff.)

³ Cf. Ch. V, f.n. 18.

But while the army of Islam had had all the advantages, the kingdom of Sind was labouring at this moment under some peculiar disadvantages which have been stated above.¹ While these had undermined the strength of the kingdom, the personality of the king and the treachery and superstitions of the people were no less important factors in bringing about the downfall of the state. King Dāhar was not lacking in courage or bravery, but his statesmanship and military skill were of a very inferior type. Muhammad ibn-Kāsim had chosen the Makrān route and was obliged to send his heavy luggage, particularly the siege materials, by way of sea. It is impossible to explain why Dāhar did not make any efforts to engage the Muslim fleet before it reached Debal. The Muhammadans were not a strong sea-power, and the very fact that they dared send their heavy war-equipment by way of sea shows that they did not regard the naval strength of Dāhar as of much importance. Yet precisely it was here that Dāhar showed a lamentable lack of insight. He could not possibly be unaware of the constant and determined endeavours of the Muslim forces to invade his kingdom. He knew that the enemy could choose either the route through Bolan Pass or the Makrān coast and although an invasion by sea alone was not likely, the sea-power was an important factor for an army marching through Makrān. For, that army would have to depend upon a fleet for carrying its heavy siege materials, and even apart from that consideration, an enemy fleet cruising along the coast would make the position of the invading army sufficiently precarious. Thus the command over sea was essential for the success of an invading army marching through Makrān.

All these facts should have been obvious to the king of Sind, but although he evidently put forth great efforts to guard the Bolan Pass through Kikān², he did not seem to have taken any precaution to guard against the invasion by Makrān. He seems to have hardly any navy. He confessed to Hajjāj that he could not control the pirates near the coast of Debal, and we do not hear of any opposition being given to the Muhammadan navy, either in the course of its journey by sea to Debal

¹ See Ch. IV, pp. 23 ff.

² As Kikān was, at least nominally, included in the kingdom of Sind, it may be presumed that the king of Sind was aiding the people of Kikān in their brave defence.

or in the course of its sailing up the Indus to Nerun. The absence of a navy in a state which possesses an extensive sea-coast exposed to enemy raids is almost incredible. It can only be accounted for by the fact that for nearly 30 years, from 670 to 700 A.D., Dāhar was not in possession of the southern part of Sind and it came into his possession only about 10 years before the expedition of Muhammad ibn-Kāsim. While Dāhar was busy fighting with the Muslims near his frontiers at Kikānān, the rival king Daharsiah was probably making a friendly gesture to the Arabs against their common enemy. In any case the subsequent events show that the southern parts of Sind were favourably inclined to the Arabs. Both Nerun and Siwistan, the two main strongholds of Sind in the south, opened their gates to Muhammad ibn-Kāsim without any resistance, and the details given in Chach-nāma certainly indicate that an alliance already existed between the leading people of Nerun and the Muslim power.¹ In addition to rivalry between the kings Dāhar and Daharsiah, religious differences also helped to further the split between the north and the south. The latter was the stronghold of the Buddhists and, for reasons stated above, the Buddhists fraternized with the Muhammadans, instead of rallying to their king and defending their country.²

This unpatriotic character of the Buddhists is, no doubt, partly due to their aversion to war and bloodshed insisted upon by their religious creed, but it is also partly due to the international character which was associated with the religion from an early date. The spread of Buddhism outside the frontiers of India, gave it a catholic character and the ideal of universal religious fraternity transcended that of a nation or country. That is at least the most favourable interpretation we can give of their desertion and treachery.

But even if the absence of the navy may be explained, it is difficult to account for the way in which Dāhar allowed the Muslim army to cross unopposed the mighty river Sind. Chach-nāma has preserved a story which ascribes it to the mediæval gallantry on the part of

¹ Chach-nāma states (p. 72) that the Buddhist governor of Nerun sent his confidential agents to Hajjāj and entered into an agreement with him, even before Muhammad ibn-Kāsim set out on his expedition.

² Cf. Ch. IV. f.n. 14; cf. also the speech attributed to the Buddhist priests of Siwistan in Ch^o, p. 93.

Dáhar but we can only describe it as an incredible folly.¹ According to Chach-náma, an Arab chieftain advised Dáhar to oppose the crossing of the river and to harass the enemy and intercept their supply of provisions by means of guerilla warfare.² Whether this be true or not, the course suggested was one which should have commended itself to any one possessing an ordinary degree of military skill. The position of Muhammad ibn-Kásim was a difficult one. With the mighty river in front and the hostile hilly country behind, he could have easily been harassed, in the way suggested, for any length of time. But Dáhar failed to take advantage of his strategic position. Compare this with the skill with which the kings of Kabul and Zabul fully utilized the natural advantages of their hilly country by luring the enemy into inextricable situations amid the hills, and we shall find adequate reason for the failure of one and the success of the other against the Muslims.

To the inexplicable want of strategy on the part of Dáhar, and the treachery of the Buddhists of the south, we must add the base betrayal of the chief officials and grandees of Sind to account for its ruler's ignominious end. All important chiefs and officials seem to have deserted his cause. This is partly accounted for by the superstitious idea prevailing among the people that according to the Hindu Śāstras (sacred books) the country was destined to fall into the hands of the Muhammadans, and it was therefore useless to fight.³ But the attitude of the chiefs was perhaps also due to personal feelings against the son of the usurper who had driven out the old royal family.

All these causes, and perhaps others which we do not know, account for the fall of Sind. The conquest of Sind should not,

¹ Cf. Ch. V, f.n. 31.

² *Ibid.*

³ When Muhammad was besieging Debal, 'a Brahmin came forth from the garrison, and cried for mercy. He said 'We have learnt from our science of the stars that the country of Sind will be conquered by the army of Islam and the infidels will be put to flight' (Ch°, p. 81). Again, the chief of Budhiah told Muhammad ibn-Kásim; 'our astrologers and interpreters of dreams have found out by means of the astronomical science, and have openly given out, that this whole country will fall into the hands of the army of Islam' (Ch°, p. 97). Mokah, son of Basáfeh, deserted his master and joined Muhammad ibn-Kásim because 'the sages and philosophers of Hind, who are the original residents of this country, have found from their books of antiquity, by the use of their astrolabe and their astrology, that this empire will be conquered by an army of Islam' . . . (Ch°, p. 107).

therefore, be regarded as indicating in a general way the superiority of the Muslims over the Indians, from a military point of view. This is further borne out by the fact that the conquest of Sind was the first and the last great achievement of the Arabs in India. Junaid, no doubt, was triumphant for a time over the petty states in the neighbourhood of Sind, but as soon as he came into conflict with the powerful states like those of the Pratihāras and the Chālukyas, the spell of his success was broken. Even the greater part of Sind was lost in a short time. Ultimately, after three centuries of unremittent efforts, we find the Arab dominion confined to the two petty states of Mansura and Multan.

The Arab penetration into India and Europe presents some striking parallels. The Arabs got a footing in a corner of Europe through the conquest of Spain, almost about the same time that they obtained a similar hold on India by the conquest of Sind, treachery playing no small part in either case. In both cases they started from the base, thus secured, to make further conquests and enter into the very hearts of Europe and India. For a time they seemed to carry everything. But Charles Martel saved Europe by the famous victory at Poitiers, and about the same time the Arabs received a similar check in India, in the hands of Nāgabhaṭa and Pulakeśi. But neither history nor tradition has preserved the name and fame of these Charles Martels of India. Only the study of archæology in recent times has rescued from oblivion the names of the two heroes to whom belongs the credit of saving India from the hands of the Arabs. The check in both cases proved effective. The Arabs occupied Spain, but had to give up the ambition of conquering Europe. In India the Arabs continued to occupy the valley of the Indus, but their attempts to penetrate further inland proved abortive. Even on the Indus their position was a precarious one and the hardy trans-Indus tribes like the Jāṭhs of Kikánán were far from being thoroughly subdued.

The decline of the Arab supremacy in India, after the short but brilliant successes of Muhammad ibn-Kásim and Junaid must be attributed to two main causes, viz., the internal condition of the Muslim empire in the last days of the Umayyids, and the alertness and strength of Indian States. The conquest of Sind made the Indians realize the gravity of their danger, and fortunately there were powerful kings who had enough military strength to inflict crushing defeats upon the

foreigners. Reference has been made to the Pratihāra king Nāgabhaṭa, Chālukya king Pulakeśirāja and the king of Kaśmir, Lalitāditya, who all defeated the Muslims. The extent to which the Indians realized the nature of this danger appears from the fact that sometime between A.D. 713 and 741 a king of Central India, (most probably king Yaśovarman of Kanauj, which, as we have seen above, was threatened by Muhammad ibn-Kāsim), sent an ambassador to the Chinese emperor with a view to make a common cause against the growing menace of Islamic power.¹

The Arabs scored their early successes against one great border kingdom when the mainland had hardly realized the importance of the rise of the new power. But in the second quarter of the eighth century A. D. the latter became alive to the danger and proved fully equal to meet them. Even the establishment of the strong Abbassid power could not materially alter the situation. For about the same time arose two great powers, the Pālas and the Pratihāras which were able to defend their country against the aggressive Islamic power. King Dharmapāla is said in Khālimpur plates to have compelled the Yavana king to acknowledge his suzerainty,² and the term *Yavana* can, at this period, refer only to some Muslim power. The Pratihāra king Nāgabhaṭa II, who flourished early in the ninth century A.D. and was a contemporary of the great Caliphs, Hārūn Ar-Rashid and Al-Māmūn, is described in the Gwalior inscription as having defeated the kings of Sind and captured the strongholds of the Turushkas.³ Here, again,

¹ Muhammad ibn-Kāsim sent a message to Rai Harchandar Jahshal, king of Kanauj, asking him to submit (Ch^o, p. 192).

Jahsal may be Arabic corruption of Yaso (varman) who, we know, was ruling in Kanauj at the time. For the embassy to China cf. Sylvain Levi—Le Nepal—Vol. II, pp. 174-175.

² *Ep. Indica*, Vol. IV, pp. 243 ff. Dharmapāla, according to verse 12 held at Kanauj an assembly of his vassal chiefs, viz. kings of Bhoja, Matsya Madra Kuru, Yadu, *Yavana*, Avanti, Gandhara and Kira. As he conquered the states in western and Central Punjab (Gandhara and Madra) and also Malwa and probably Kathiawar Peninsula (Avanti, Yadu) he might have approached the *Yavana* (Muslim) territory either from the north or from the west.

³ *Ep. Indica*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 99 ff. In verse 8 we are told that the king of Sindh submitted to Nāgabhaṭa. Again in verse 11 Nāgabhaṭa is said to have forcibly seized the hill-forts of the Turushka king. The reference in both cases, and at least in the latter, seems to be to the Muslim ruler of Sind. The reference to Turushka may be explained by the fact that sometime the governors of Sind came from Tukharistan (cf. Balādhuri, p. 230).

the reference is undoubtedly to the Muslim power in Sind. This evidence from Indian side is fully corroborated by the significant fact that Muslim chroniclers do not record any successful Indian campaign since the days of Junaid.¹

We have got a picture of the Muslim power in India about the middle of the tenth century A.D. from the pen of Al-Mas'ūdī.² At that time the Islamic power was confined to the two principalities of Multan and Mansūra. The latter extended, roughly speaking, from the sea to Alor where the former commenced. None of these seems to have been a very powerful state. As regards Multan we are told that one army of the Pratihāra emperor of Kanauj was engaged in fighting with its Muslim ruler. The latter, however, found his security, not so much in his own military strength as in the religious superstitions of the Hindus, for Multan possessed the famous idol which was venerated all over India. 'When the unbelievers' says Al-Mas'ūdī, 'march against Multan, and the faithful do not feel themselves strong enough to oppose them, they threaten to break their idol, and their enemies immediately withdraw'. Similar statement is made by Iṣṭākhri who adds that otherwise the Indians would have destroyed Multan.³

The position of the kingdom of Mansūra, according to Mas'ūdī, was equally unsafe. 'It was constantly at war with a nation called the Meds, who are a race of Sind, and also with other races on the frontiers of Sind.'⁴


Besides the two principalities of Mansūra and Multan in the Indus valley there were other Muslim principalities in the west beyond the Indus, such as Turan and Kushdar, corresponding to old Kikánán, Makrán, and Mushki on the border of Kirmán. Thus even after efforts of 300 years the Arabs were unable to get much beyond the western trans-Indus frontiers of India. When we remember their wonderful

¹ The Dholpur Inscription (Z.D.M.G., Vol. XI, pp. 39 ff.), dated 898 V. S. (= A.D. 842) states that powerful Mlechchha rulers on the river Chambal made obeisance to (*Pranātā Sevām Kuruvanti*) the Chāhamāna king 'Chañḍa Mahāsena. If the 'Mlechchha' denote the Muslim, we have another interesting evidence of the breakdown of the Muslim power in the first half of the ninth century A.D. in consequence of the rise of powerful Hindu ruling dynasties.

² Elliot, Vol. I, pp. 23-24.

³ *Ibid*, p. 28.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 24.



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military success in other parts of Asia and Africa, the comparatively insignificant results they achieved in India certainly stand out as a marked contrast. The cause of this, however, does not lie in the religious and social peculiarities of India as old historians like Elphinstone vainly attempted to establish. The cause lies undoubtedly in the superior military strength and state-organization of the Indians as compared with most other nations of the time. However incredible this might appear in the light of subsequent events, this is the plain verdict of history.

APPENDIX

GEOGRAPHICAL NOTE

A. THE TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF THE

KINGDOM OF SIND

THE extent of the kingdom of Sind in the reign of king Sahiras, son of King Sâhasi Rai, is described in Chach-nâma, Târikh-i-M'asûmi and Tuhfat-ul-Kirâm (Ch° p. 11 f.n.). From these it would appear that the kingdom at that time included the modern province of that name together with a large portion of the Punjab and Baluchistan. The Târikh-i-M'asûmi and the Tuhfat-ul-Kirâm, no doubt, bring its southern limit up to the port of Surat, but there is no authority for it in Chach-nâma and it does not seem likely.

The kingdoms of Kashmir and Kanauj formed its northern and north-eastern boundary; but these must have included a portion of northern and eastern Punjab. On the west and north-west the boundary must have been variable and can not be exactly defined. But it seems to have included Makrân and the hills of Kîkânân, the region round Bolan Pass.

The central portion of this kingdom was under the direct sway of the king with his capital at Alor. The rest was divided into four provinces, with headquarters respectively at Bahmanâbâd, Siwistân, Iskandah and Multan. These governors were more like feudatory princes, and not unoften rebelled against the royal authority. They seem to have all rebelled against Chach when he usurped the throne, and he had to undertake a prolonged and tedious campaign against all the four provinces in order to establish his authority over them. From details of this campaign as given in Chach-nâma, we get a fairly accurate idea of the nature and extent of the kingdom of Sind, shortly before the invasion of the Arabs.

We proceed to discuss the four provinces mentioned above, separately, beginning from the north.

I. The division of Iskandah with 'Bâblah, Sawârah, Jajhór and Dhanód as its chief places'. (p. 12).

As this division was subdued by Chach before he proceeded to Multan, it must be located between Alor and that place.

Bâblah was the first stronghold in this division which was conquered by Chach (p. 26). Bâblah is also written as Pâya, Bâhiya, Pâhiya etc., in different manuscripts. [Cunningham has suggested its identification with Bhatia (*Anc. Geogr.* (p. 294) and this is very plausible in view of the fact that apparently the same place is elsewhere named Batia in Ch° (p. 156). But Raverty denies this and takes Bhatia in the sense of the city of the Bhatti tribe (*J. A. S. B.* 1892, p. 247, f.n.). According to Alberuni, Bhati was midway between Aror and Multan]. Ch° places Bâblah on the southern bank of the river Bias which then flowed as a separate river to the south and east of Multan (Cunningham, p. 271). It may be safely identified with 'Pabiyah-Puberwalla' on the maps about 29 miles to the eastward of Uchch (Raverty *J. A. S. B.* 1892, pp. 388-9).

From Bâblah Chach proceeded to Iskandah, the chief city (p. 27). This name is also written as Askalanda (Elliot I, p. 138) and various other ways. Cunningham identified it with Uchch, which was also supposed to be the site of Alexandria

(pp. 277 ff). But Raverty has shown good grounds for rejecting this (*J. A. S. B.*, 1892, pp. 251-2, f.n.).

Among the other places Sawārah may be identified with Seorai, the strong fort, which was captured by Husen Shah Arghun on his way from Bhakar to Multan. Cunningham identifies it with the village of Sirwahi, 96 miles below Uchch and 85 miles above Alor (*Anc. Geo.*, p. 292).

Jajhór and Dhanód cannot be identified at present.

II. The Multan division which comes next was a fairly extensive one. Chach first captured the fort of Sikkah, opposite Multan, towards the east, and then Multan itself fell into his hands. Sikkah, according to Cunningham, 'must have been somewhat near the present Māri Sital which is on the bank of the old bed of the Ravi, 2½ miles to the east of Multan' (*Anc. Geog.*, pp. 273-4). Chach then proceeded forward. 'The governors of Brahmapur, Karur and Ashahar paid their homage to him and from these places he came to the borders of Kih (Kumba) and Kashmir'. He gradually reached the fort of Shakalhar higher up the town of Kih, which is said to be the boundary of Kashmir.

Of these places, Karur is a well-known city situated on the southern bank of the old Bias river, 50 miles to the south-east of Multan, and 20 miles to the north-east of Bahawalpur (*Cun. Anc. Geog.*, p. 277).

The town of Shakalahar I would identify with the famous ancient town of Sākala, represented by modern Sialkot. Ch° says that it was the boundary of Kashmir. According to Hiuen Tsang, Sākala was the capital of Cheh-Ka, which lay immediately to the south of the dominions of Kashmir. It is further to be noted that Hiuen Tsang does not refer to any kings of Cheh-Ka and the neighbouring states in the eastern Punjab though he has referred to the political status of the countries which he describes immediately before and after them. Hiuen Tsang visited these countries during the reign of Chach and the statement of Ch° therefore finds an indirect support in his account.

The town of Ashahar may be identified with Asarur in the Gujran-wala district, the extensive ruins of which are described by Cunningham (*Anc. Geo.*, p. 219).

Brahmapura may be identified with Brahmapura (modern Brahmaur), the ancient capital of Chamba. It is situated on the river Budhil, the southern affluent of the Ravi (*Ann. Report Arch. Survey*) 1902-3, pp. 266, 269). It may be noted in passing that as Brahmapura ceased to be the capital when Ch° was written, a reference to it is an evidence of the genuineness of the account.

It would thus appear that the Multan division included nearly the whole of Eastern and Southern Punjab, and the dominions of Chach in this direction touched the frontiers of Kashmir. It is said in Ch° that Chach planted trees on the boundary of Kashmir upon the banks of a stream called the Panj Mahiyat (or Panj Nahiyat) which is close to the hills of Kashmir (pp. 30, 192).

III. The third division had its headquarters at Siwistan. Its principal places were Ludhia (or Budhiah or Budhpur) and Chingán (or Jankan) and it included the hills of Rojhán up to the boundary of Makrán (p. 11). [Haig writes Jangal in place of Chingán and identifies it with Jhangar, 13 miles west of Sewan (*Indus Delta country*, p. 57 f.n. 79)].

This division corresponded roughly to modern Baluchistan. When Chach proceeded to restore his authority over it he crossed the Indus and advanced towards Budhiah. Its ruler is said to have had his capital at Kákárāj which is called by the natives Siwis (Ch°, pp. 30 ff.). For a proper understanding of the geography of this region, we may quote the following from Le Strange:—

'On the north-eastern frontiers of Makrán and close to the Indian border, the Arab geographers describe two districts; namely Túrán, of which the capital was

Kuşdár and Budaha to the north of this, of which the capital was Kandábíl (p. 331).

'To the north of these districts was Bális or Wálishtán with the towns of Síbí and Mastanj (p. 332). The capital city according to Išākhri was Síbí, spelt Síví or Siwah (p. 347).'

'Kandábíl has been identified with present Gandava lying south of Síbí and east of Kelat (p. 332).'

Budhiah of Ch° is no doubt the same as Budaha, and this principality seems to have included the district of Bális or Wálishtán. The capital Kákárāja or Siwis is no doubt the same as modern Síbí, north of Kandábíl (Gandava).

From Síbí, Chach marched to Siwistan, the headquarter of the division. Siwistan can be easily identified with Sehwan, situated on a lofty isolated rock, near a large lake in the vicinity of the Lakki Hills (*Cun. Anc. Geo.*, p. 304).

As has been said above, this division reached up to Makrán and Chach proceeded in course of his campaign to its furthest limit.

First he proceeded towards Armanbel. This is the same as Armabíl. To quote again from Le Strange:—

'Armabíl and Kanbalí were two important towns, on or near the coast, about half-way between Tiz (a sea-port, and capital of Makrán) and Daybul (Daibal) at the Indus mouth. Išākhri describes these as cities of considerable size, lying two days' march apart, and one of them was situated half a league distant from the sea. Their people were rich traders who had dealings chiefly with India' (p. 330). 'The ruins of Armabíl are probably at Lus Bela and those of Kanbalí at Khayrakot' (p. 330 f. n.).

From Armanbel, Chach proceeded to the district of Makrán (p. 38). When he went beyond the steep declivity and the hills of Makrán, he found himself in the division of Bakr. There was an ancient fort in that town called Kanbar (or Kang, or Kanarpur or Kinarpur). Kanbar may be identified with Kannazbur in Makrán which is frequently written as Kannajbur (*Le Strange*, p. 329, f.n. 2).

From this Chach proceeded towards Kirmán and encamped on a small stream running between Kirmán and Makrán. Certain date trees on that stream were fixed as the boundary between Kirmán and his own dominions. It is difficult to fix this line. In the mediæval period the boundary line between Kirmán and Makrán ran to the east of Banpur near Fahraz, and Chach's dominions may be said to extend to its neighbourhood.

'From there Chach returned to Armanbel, and passing through the district of Túrán, he came into the desert and no one dared to fight with him till he arrived at Kandáíl (or Kandhábel), otherwise called Kandhár.' (p. 39). The identification of these places has been discussed above on the authority of Le Strange.

IV. The Fourth Division, with Bráhmanábád as its headquarters, included the southern part of the kingdom up to the sea-coast. The famous city of Bráhmanábád was 'situated in the hitherto deserted plains which stretch away to the east of the Indus, eight miles south-east of the railway station of Shahdadpur, and forty-three miles north-east of Haidarabad'. (*Cousens—Antiquities of Sind*, p. 48; for a detailed account of the topography of the locality, and the results of recent archæological excavations, cf. pp. 48-71). Bráhmanábád is now spelt as Bahmanábád on the strength of a legend that it was founded by a Persian king Bahman, but its truth may be doubted.

According to Ch° the governorship of Bráhmanábád included 'the fort of Nerun and Debal, Luhánah, Lákhah, Sammah and the river.' (p. 11). The identification of the first two is discussed in Appendix B. Luhánah, Lákhah and Sammah were three tribes, and apparently they gave their names to the districts in which they settled.

V. The Central Division, directly under the king, with headquarter at the capital city of Alor, included Kurdán, Kíkánán and Barhamas. Alor, also spelt as Aror, Al Rur and in various other ways, is now represented by a small village of the same name about five miles south by east of Rohri (For topography, cf. Cousens—*Antiquities of Sind*, pp. 76-79). Kurdán and Barhamas cannot be identified.

But Kíkánán, which is referred to in Baládhuri as al-Kíkán played an important part in history. Le Strange identifies it with modern Kelat (p. 332). There is no doubt that Ki-Kiang-na mentioned by Hiuen Tsang (Beal, vol. ii, p. 282) is to be identified with Kíkán, all being variants of the Sanskrit Kekkāna. Hiuen Tsang places this region to the west of Fa-la-na, about 350 miles south-east of Tsao-Kuta, the capital of which has been located at or near Ghazni. The position of Ki-Kiang-na would therefore very well correspond with a region 'in the vicinity of Pishin and Quetta' as Cunningham supposed, in spite of the criticism of Watters (vol. ii, p. 262). Kíkán may thus be located in the hilly region containing the Bolan Pass.

Baládhuri says: 'al-Kíkán is part of the land of as-Sind where it borders on Khurásán.' As Le Strange has observed, Khurásán at that time included all the Muslim provinces east of the Great Desert, as far as Sijistán (p. 382). Kíkán would thus be located in the hilly region to the east of the Helmund and Kandahar rivers, and this agrees well with the identification proposed above, viz. the hilly region round the Bolan Pass.

B. THE EXPEDITION OF MUHAMMAD IBN-KÁSİM

Muhammad Kásim marched from Shiraz (p. 76) to Makrán. He then proceeded via Kannajbúr to Armanbel. The identification of these two places has been discussed above. It seems that he followed the route described in detail by Ibn Khurdádhbih, which starting from Fahraj, in Kirmán, on the border of the great desert, led by 14 stages to Fannazbúr or Kannajbúr, the then capital of Makrán. (Le Strange, p. 332).

From Armanbel, Muhammad followed the road along the coast to Debal, where he expected to be joined by the force under Hazim and Mughaira, and the boats carrying the siege materials.

The identification of the famous sea-port of Debal is still a matter of dispute. Formerly it used to be identified with Thaṭṭah, but Raverty ably refuted this view by quoting several passages from old writers wherein Debal is distinguished from Thaṭṭah (*J. A. S. B.* 1892, p. 317 f.n. 315). Since then Mr. Cousens has reaffirmed the identification with slight modifications. 'There was', he says, 'Dewal proper, the city that the Arabs assaulted, and, later, as the state of the river necessitated, a port nearer the mouth, to serve the city This port became known as Bandar Dewal (port of Dewal) as the Tuh fatu-l-Kirám calls it Later writers, losing sight of the connection of Dewal with Thaṭṭah, thus came to speak of Dewal Bandar as Dewal only.' (Op. cit., p. 124). This view has been supported by Oldham (*Ind. Ant.*, 1931, p. 20).

Thus, according to Cousens, Debal, at the time of Muhammad ibn-Kásim, occupied the site of Thaṭṭah, but later on, as the mouth of the river advanced further south, the name was transferred to the port that served the city. This is undoubtedly a good hypothesis, but does not carry immediate conviction, and so the question must be regarded as open. Cunningham places Debal on the western bank of the Baghár river, below the junction of the southern branch of the Ghára, about 5 miles to the north of Lari Bandar (*Cunn. Anc. Geo.*, p. 342). According to Raverty, the town was about 15 miles from Thaṭṭah and stood near to the shrine

of Pír Patho, or a little further to the south-west, at the foot of the Makkahí hills and near the Bhágar branch of the Indus which was in those days a great stream (*J.A.S.B.* 1892, p. 322 f.n. V. Smith—*Early Hist. Ind.*, p. 104).

According to Haig, Debal is now represented by the ruins at Kakaṛ Bukēra, 20 miles south-west of Thaṭṭah (*Indus Delta Country*, pp. 44. ff. where other views on the subject are discussed).

According to *Sind Gazetteer* (1919), the most probable site of the seaport of Debal seems to be Bhambor. The following account of the place is taken from the *Gazetteer of the Province of Sind*, B volume I (1919), p. 53.

'Bhambor is the local name of a mound of ruins on a low rocky elevation situated on the north bank of the Gharo creek 3½ miles westwards from the village of Gharo in the Taluka of Mirpur Sakro . . . The remains of a fort, with walls and bastions, are distinctly traceable, and from among the heaps of broken bricks, and old coins have been frequently picked up after a fall of rain . . . As the Gharo creek is the most westerly channel of the Indus, it is probably the oldest . . . This also gives an air of probability to the hypothesis that Bhambor, and not Thaṭṭah, nor any of the other places that have been suggested was the great Hindu town known as Debal.' Raverty, of course, says that the identification of Bhambor with Debal is wholly out of the question (op. cit., p. 322) but I do not see any adequate reason for this sweeping assertion in his elaborate note. But the objections urged by Cousens (op. cit., p. 80) are most cogent. The writer in the *Gazetteer* himself admits that 'there is not room on the site for a town of any size and no direction in which it could have extended.' This seems to be a vital objection, for according to Ch° Debal must have been a town of considerable area.

From Debal, Muhammad proceeded to Nerun which is represented by modern Haidarabad. It was situated on a hill which is now called Ganja, 1½ miles long, and 700 yards broad with a height of 80 ft. (*Cun. Anc. Geo.*, pp. 320-22).

From Nerun, Muhammad advanced to the fort of Siwistan or Sehwan (cf. Haig, *Indus Delta country*, pp. 54-55), and its ruler fled to Sisam, on the bank of the Kanba, the residence of the ruler of Budhia. After Siwistan fell, Muhammad proceeded to Sisam. The place cannot be definitely located, but Haig thinks Sisam may be identified with Shah Hasan, a place at the western end of Manchchar lake (Haig, op. cit., p. 58). Kanba is apparently the Kumbh river (*J.A.S.B.* 1892, p. 470-Map; but Haig takes it to be the Manchchaur lake, op. cit., p. 58).

Muhammad returned to Nerun. From this place he began his great campaign against the king of Sind. Proceeding along the western bank of the Indus, he passed through the countries known as Raor and Jitor and encamped on a site opposite Dáhar's army. We further learn that he crossed the river near Sakrah, opposite the fort of Bet, the ruler of which had already gone over to him, and that the passage was facilitated by posting strong garrison at the island of Bet.

After Muhammad had crossed over to the eastern side, only a lake stood between him and Dáhar's army. As soon as Muhammad crossed this lake, Dáhar went to the fort of Raor, and having left his baggage and retinue, took up position in front of the Arab army. There the great decisive battle was fought. The line of advance followed by Muhammad from the time he left Nerun till the decisive battle was fought, cannot be properly understood in the absence of definite identification of any of the places mentioned above. It is obvious that there was an island (Bet) in the river Indus opposite Sakrah where Muhammad crossed it, and that the fort of Raor could not be very far from the landing place of the Muhammadan army on the eastern side of the Indus. But views diverge very widely regarding the location of these places. Haig places Raor in Lower

Sind 'about 80 miles from Brāhmanābad and 70 miles to the south-east of Haidarabad, on the far side of the delta from Debal' (op. cit., pp. 63-4). But this position, which would place Raor almost on the Ran or sea-shore is hardly acceptable in view of the physical condition of the country (cf. Cousens, *Antiquities of Sind*, p. 23 f.n. 1). Raverty places Raor within ten miles of Brāhmanābad. But his mistaken identity of Nerun, which he places about eighteen miles south of Haidarabad, deprives his identification of other places in the neighbourhood of much real value (cf. Raverty's long note on this subject in *J.A.S.B.* 1892, pp. 231-44 f.n. 183-189).

I am inclined to place Sakrah at or near modern Sukkur, and to identify the island of Bet with the rocky island of Bhakar or Bakhar, which is such an important landmark in the topography of that part of modern Sind. Raor would then be naturally identified with Rohri.

After I had arrived at this conclusion by a study of the details given in Ch°, I came across the following remarks of Cousens.

'In connection with Muhammad's movements, up and down the west bank, to find a suitable crossing, he is at one time, within the district of Jhim, and this name may possibly be perpetuated in Jhim Pir, the name of the tomb upon the islet in the river opposite Rohri. Indeed, we might almost have identified the Bet of our story with the island of Bakhar, did we not know for certain that the river did not flow in that bed in those days, and Bakhar is also known as Bet' (op. cit., p. 23 f.n. 2.)

The difficulties of identifying the old courses of the rivers in Sind with absolute precision are such that nobody is justified in making any dogmatic assertion as to whether a river did or did not pass by a place at any particular time. Raverty has discussed the problem in a long and masterly paper (*The Mihrān of Sind and its tributaries, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1892, pp. 155-508). He has traced the courses of the two rivers Indus and Hakra at different periods, and his discussion includes not only the main beds of these rivers but also the various channels through which their water found its way to sea from time to time. But although Raverty's work is the most painstaking, nobody would possibly pretend that all or even most of his conclusions can be readily accepted. His wrong identification of Nerun, on which he greatly relied in fixing the courses of the rivers, certainly vitiates many of his arguments and conclusions.

According to Raverty, the river Sindhu was a tributary, along with the other rivers of the Punjab, of the Hakra which having all united into one great river at the *Dosh-i-ab* formed the Mihrān of Sind. 'Lower down than this point of junction,' says he, 'it sent off a branch to the westwards which passed Aror, the ancient capital of Sind, on the east.' (p. 316).

But whether this view be true or not, according to Ch° the Muhammadan army coming from south and west had to cross the Mihrān before reaching Aror. Therefore the Mihrān of Ch° cannot mean the river which is in the view of Raverty, as that was to the east of Aror. Hence Raverty has postulated the existence of another river the Kumbh, which branched off from the Indus near Ghyarispur, and following a westerly course passed to the east of Sehwan. According to the sketch-map of Raverty, this river passed quite close to Rohri at the time of the Arab conquest (*See Map facing, p. 470—Plate VI.*). Whether this river was the Mihran, or mistaken as such by the author of Ch°, is immaterial for our present discussion. The fact remains, that the river which Muhammad ibn-Kāsim had to cross in order to reach Aror, did pass quite close to Rohri. Raverty, of course, places this river at a little distance, about 10 miles from Rohri, but no data have been put forward to show that we have any reason to precisely fix it where Raverty has put it and not a few miles to the east of his line. On the whole

therefore, while the ever-shifting course of the rivers of Sind, must make any identification at best a hypothetical one, there is nothing in the proposed identification of the island of Bet with Bhakar, and Raor with Rohri, which may be regarded as *prima facie* impossible. Haig, who studied the course of the rivers of Sind very thoroughly, believes that as early as Alexander's time a channel passed through Rohri-Bakhar gap, its bed becoming in later times, the channel of the main river.

The traditional legend which accounts for the shifting of the river from Alor to Rohri, may be based upon an actual change of the river-course, but it is obviously impossible to fix the time of the change by an attempt to find out the date of the legendary king Dilu Rai (Cousens, op. cit., pp. 148-149) or otherwise (Haig, op. cit., pp. 133-4).

It may be mentioned here that Cousens has placed the fort of Raor, 'some twenty to twenty-five miles to the west or west-by-south of Alor, just below Kingri' (*Ibid.*, p. 23, p. 24. f.n. 1).

Certain passages in Ch° indicate that the place where the Muslim army crossed the river was not very far from Alor. Thus while Muhammad ibn-Kāsim was encamped on the other side of the Mihrān, ready to cross the river, Bhandwir Samani came to Dāhar and said: 'O King . . . you are amusing yourself with the games of chess and dice while the Arab army has already arrived and alighted by your capital' (Ch°, pp. 121-122).

This shows that the point where Muhammad crossed the river may be in the neighbourhood of Rohri or Kingri but cannot be placed very far to the south as proposed by Raverty and Haig.

This view is strengthened by the accounts of Mir M'asūm. According to this writer, Muhammad, after the fall of Sehwan, rejected the advice given him to attack Bahmanābād first, and instead, marched direct to Alor, and killed Dāhar in an engagement near the city. Mir M'asūm has here confused Raor with Aror, but as the two places were quite close and their names resemble each other, the mistake is easily explained. But Mir M'asūm definitely states that from Siwistan, Muhammad did not march towards Bahmanābād but towards Aror. This is also corroborated by the fact that after Bahmanābād fell, Muhammad marched towards Aror and Bagrur, although the last-named place was first mentioned with Raor. Raverty's attempt to explain it away is not convincing (op. cit., pp. 237, 241-44).

The question naturally arises why Muhammad, after defeating Dāhar's army near Raor, proceeded towards Bahmanābād without first attempting the conquest of Alor which was quite close by. The reason seems to be that the main army had followed Dāhar's son Jaisimha to Bahmanābād, and so instead of wasting time by prolonged siege of Alor, Muhammad wanted to beat the hostile army before it could gather strength.

After the defeat and death of Dāhar in an open engagement near Raor, the Sindhians avoided pitched battles and defended the strong fortified towns of the kingdom such as Raor, Bahrur, Dahlelah, Bahmanābād and Alor. Bahrur and Dahlelah cannot be identified with certainty, but they were on the way from Rori to Bahmanābād. Dahlelah may be the same as Darbela referred to by Raverty (*J. A. S. B.*, 1892, p. 317).

After the fall of Alor, Muhammad proceeded towards the north. He conquered successively Bābiah, Gholkonda, Sikkah and Multan. Gholkonda cannot be identified, but the position of the other three has been discussed above.

Al-Balādhuri records several other expeditions of Muhammad after his return from Multan. The places named are al-Bailamān, Surast and al-Kiraj. It appears that Muhammad personally went to Kiraj, and sent forces against the other two.

Later on, Junaid raided Kíraj, which had broken the covenant, and sent his lieutenants against Mirmad (or Marmad—Elliot, vol. i, p. 126) al-Mandal, Dahnaj, Barwas, Uzain and al-Malibah. The identification of most of these places has been suggested in the text (p. 41). Surast is evidently Surāshṭra and Dahnaj cannot be identified.

As to Kíraj against which both Muhammad and Junaid marched in person, it is evidently the same as Kurij mentioned in Ch° (p. 181 ff.), for Balādhuri gives the name of the king of Kíraj as Duhar while in Ch° the king of Kurij is written as Drohar.

Kíraj may be identified with Kira of Indian literature, which according to *Bṛihat Saṃhitā* belongs to the North-East division of India.

The details given in Ch° enable us to locate more definitely the site of ancient Kira. Ch° tells the romantic story how Jaisia, the son of Dāhar, the deceased king of Sind, was at first given shelter by Drohar, the king of Kurij, but was afterwards driven away by the machinations of Drohar's sister whose immoral proposals he refused with scorn. It is related that having learnt of the plot to murder him, Jaisia left Kurij and 'journeyed on, till he arrived at Jālandhara in the land of Kashmir.'

Thus this country should be placed in the neighbourhood of Jālandhara. Now two inscriptions from Baijnath give the name of that place as Kíragrāma, and refer to its rulers as subordinate vassals of the lord of Jālandhara. Burgess supplies the following note about the place. 'Kíragrāma or Baijnath is a small town in the east of the Kangra district about thirty miles east of Kot Kangra, in latitude 32° 3' N. and longitude 76° 41' E. The number of old temples about the village point to its having been in early times a place of some note.'

The identity of the name and its proximity to Jālandhara naturally point to Kíragrāma or Baijnath and the surrounding tracts as the ancient Kira country, referred to by the Arabs as al-Kíraj or al-Kurij.

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JOURNAL OF INDIAN HISTORY

Abul Hasan Qutub Shah and His Ministers,
Madanna and Akkanna


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
(Paper presented to the 10th Annual Meeting of the Osmania University
Historical Society, revised and reprinted by permission)

MADANNA and Akkanna were two brothers, who had risen to the position of the chief minister and controller of the military administration of the Qutub Shahis under the last Qutub Shah Abul Hasan who ruled from A.D. 1672 to 1686-87, when Golkonda was overthrown and the kingdom was absorbed into the empire of the Mughals under Aurangzeb. Among the collection of copper-plate records belonging to the Maṭha of the Sankaracharya of Kumbhakonam, there is one, No. 6, which according to the Epigraphist, refers to the Maṭha when still at Kanchi, from which it shifted later on, according to tradition, to Kumbhakonam. It refers to a grant made in Śaka 1608 (A.D. 1686) in Mēlupākkam to one Rama Sastri on a lunar eclipse from a village already granted to Mahādēvendra Sarasvati, the predecessor of the teacher of the Maṭha at the time, by Madanna and Akkanna. The plates register a grant of land by the teacher to the said Rama Sastri. The land happened to be in a village granted to the Maṭha by the Golkonda ministers, and hence the reference to them. In

referring to this record, the Madras Report on Epigraphy extracts, in section 64 of the report for the year 1915, what the Dutch journal *Hawari* has to say about these two ministers, and reproduces from the journal the original plates containing representations of Abul Hasan Qutub Shah, the king, Madanna, the Minister, Akkanna, the general or controller of the forces, and the scene in which these two were killed and dragged along the streets of Golkonda just before the fall of the city. According to this journal, they were two brothers born of a very poor family and entered service as shroffs in A.D. 1666 on a pay of ten guilders per mensem under Saiyyad Mustapah, a nobleman of Golkonda, known to fame as *Mir Jumla*. Madanna, alias Suryaprakasa Rao, is stated by the Dutch journalist to have been an intelligent man, whereas his brother Akkanna was a man of cunning and roguery with very little of understanding. The brothers are said in the journal to have risen to rank by an act of treachery, which deprived Mir Jumla of his high office under the Qutub Shah of Golkonda. Madanna is said to have become a prominent figure in the administration of the kingdom which the Sultan left entirely to his management and was satisfied with 75,000 dollars for his personal use. Madanna is said to have been a man well versed in Persian, Hindustani and the vernaculars of the country. According to this authority, he lived in a kingly style, and, at sight of his golden palanquin in which he went about the streets, people showed their respect by stopping on the way. This journal acknowledges that he was very kind to the Dutch, and that the author 'had the honour of seeing Madanna often'. The author of the report on epigraphy follows it by adding the information that the high position, to which they attained under Abdullah Qutb Shah, they were not able to maintain for long, as Aurangzeb marched with his army into Golkonda, and plundered the house of Madanna, who is stated, on what authority, we do not know, to have been accused of high treason by the people, and, under the orders of the Sultan, were murdered. What follows is not of very particular interest to the history of these ministers. The only other piece of information that this report gives regarding them is that it mentions their nephew, Ramadas, who was the Tahsildar of Bhadrachalam. He spent away the money of the government in building a temple to his favourite god Rama, suffered imprisonment and torture therefore, and was ultimately miraculously saved by the intervention



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of Rama and his brother Lakshmana, who appeared at dead of night, paid the Sultan the amount due personally, and obtained a receipt of acquittance therefor.¹ That is as far as the information, in the Dutch journal, can take us.

Madanna and Akkanna were undoubtedly ministers of Golkonda under the last Qutb Shah, Abul Hasan, generally known as Tana Shah, the gay and happy king. According to Professor Sarkar, Abul Hasan Qutb Shah succeeded to the throne of his predecessor under somewhat peculiar circumstances. Abdullah Qutub Shah died in A.D. 1672 leaving behind him only three daughters, and no son. Of the three daughters of Abdullah Qutb Shah, Aurangzeb's son had married the second daughter. The first was married to one Sayyad Ahmad, a pure-blooded Arab claiming descent from the noble families of Mecca. He was at the time *de facto* ruler of the state. The third daughter was to be married to a protégé of this Sayyad Ahmad, but the arrangement broke off as the result of a domestic quarrel. In order to serve his interests best, this powerful son-in-law Sayyad Ahmad brought about the choice of Abul Hasan, said to have been descended on the father's side from the Qutb Shahhi family itself, and was at the time leading a lazy life, as a disciple of the saint Sayyad Raju Kathal. He seems to have served his master well, and a jocular remark of the saint is said to have turned true when he was, to his great surprise, dragged from his humble position, and elevated to the rank of a son-in-law of the Sultan. When Abdullah Qutb Shah died, everything indicated that the powerful first son-in-law, Sayyad Ahmad should, in the ordinary course, have succeeded to the throne. His everweening character, and perhaps the rigour of his administration, made him unpopular, and an influential party at court headed by Sayyad Muzaffar, a general of high Persian origin, and Musa Khan Mahaldar, managed to overpower Sayyad Ahmad and put Abul Hasan on the throne. Accordingly Abul Hasan was crowned king, Sayyad Muzaffar became his minister, Musa Khan, officer in command, almost next in rank. The new Wazir is however said to have attempted to turn his master into a cypher by his greed of power and policy. Exasperated at this attitude of the minister 'Abul Hasan bought over Madanna, the Brahman factotum of Muzaffar, and through

¹[See also: Sarkar's *Aurangzeb*, iv. 353-5.

him corrupted most of the captains to his personal followers, so that one day Muzaffar was quietly deprived of his wazirship, which was conferred on Madanna with the title of Suryaprakasa Rao.¹ This change of ministers is said by the same authority to have taken place about A.D. 1673. Sir Jadunath continues 'his brother Akkanna became commander-in-chief, and his nephew, the gallant and learned Yengena, surnamed Rustum Rao, was given high command. Musa Khan too was sent into retirement and Muhammad Ibrahim, a creature of Madanna, was created Sar-i-ikel, master of the horse, and then premier peer (great Nawab) for a bribe of 1,10,000 *hun* paid to Madanna.'² The learned Professor does not indicate the exact source for this particular statement, but we have to take it that the statement is made on authority. It would be clear at once that there is really something incompatible between the two statements if Madanna started life as shroff on a salary of ten guilders, as is stated by the writer in the *Hawari*, in 1666, he could not have risen to the commanding position that he held in 1673. That that statement of the journal is absurd is clear when it says that he started on his humble career as shroff in 1666, and under Mir Jumla. Mir Jumla was not in Hyderabad in 1666, nor is it correct to say that Mir Jumla suffered at the hands of Abdullah Qutb Shah through the intrigues of Madanna and Akkanna. Therefore notwithstanding the knowledge that the writer claims of having been in personal touch with Madanna, his information relative to the earlier career of Madanna cannot be held to be correct. Sir Jadunath, who quotes this in an appendix, omits the name Mir Jumla, although he quotes from the same epigraphist's report. It is clear therefore that the two accounts leave something to be desired. According to Sir Jadunath, Madanna already occupied the position of *de facto* minister under Sayyad Muzaffar, and so his rise to the position of chief minister was due to the masterfulness of Muzaffar, and the fear of Abul Hasan that his position in the state was being reduced to one of no influence. That such an important official as Muzaffar should be removed from his office, and that a Brahman official like Madanna should have been raised to his position, as quietly as it is described to have taken place, would naturally lead to the inference that there was perhaps nothing very unusual in the step taken to

¹ Sarkar's *Aurangzib*, iv, 334.

² *Ibid.*

deprive one minister of his power or to instal another in the place for one thing; and it would show Abul Hasan Tanashah was not such a hapless, reckless and ease-loving administrator that he is generally represented to be by this author himself. Suryaprakasa Rao was not a title conferred on Madanna. Suryaprakasa Rao must have been his name, Madanna being more or less a familiar name, by which he must have been known among his own people, the proper name being the other. Assuming therefore that both Madanna and Akkanna started life, as in fact most people of that class did, in a comparatively humble position they must have risen to the high place that they occupied by sheer dint of work, and not without worth. While it is probable that they started service in such a small position under Mir Jumla, that start could not have been in A.D. 1666. It must have been very much earlier, and in the circumstances, it seems very probable that their entry into service was owing to Mir Jumla's capacity for discerning merit where it could be found. That apart, we may take it that these two Brahman brothers entered service early in their life, and very probably under Mir Jumla in a comparatively small capacity as revenue officials of some kind. Through perhaps a score of years they had risen to the high position, and had attained, if not to the titles and dignities, at any rate, to the real power of being controllers of the finances of the state under ministers during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah himself. When therefore Abul Hasan ascended the throne, he had naturally to fall back upon the party that was in power, and as that party was headed by Sayyad Muzaffar and his friend Musa Khan they were both of them entrusted with power; and when Abul Hasan discovered, that he was being reduced to a cipher in the administration, he naturally had the foresight to take opportunity by the forelock and deprive the ambitious minister of his power before it became too late for him to do it, as it happened in the case of Mir Jumla under his predecessor. In those circumstances, if Abul Hasan fell back upon the Brahman ministers instead of some of his Muslim officials, it must have been on the ground that to him it seemed, in the circumstances, that he could depend upon officials of his own creation rather than the hereditary nobility, or even men of rank, who had attained to their position under his predecessor. Whatever be the motive of Abul Hasan, we have so far the fact that Madanna and Akkanna, the brothers, were chosen to carry on the administration for Abul Hasan

Qutb Shah, sometime in the year 1673, and perhaps 1674, as one of the letters from Fort St. George mentions the change to have taken place just before the date of the letter in 1674.¹

We have some little information from extraneous sources for what Madanna and Akkanna did as ministers, and what sort of a ruler Abul Hasan turned out to be, though such information as is available to us is hardly enough to help us to a complete history of the careers of these. The main events or incidents that took place under the administration of these are more or less indisputably on record. The differences which are certainly wide, are in respect of the motives that induced the particular lines of action adopted and policies put into effect during the last years of existence of the state of Golkonda as a kingdom. To understand therefore the career of either the sovereign, Abul Hasan or his ministers, the Brahman brothers, we shall have to take into account the condition of affairs in the years following 1672 and cast about for the events of importance in which they played an influential part. It is only then that we can arrive at something like a tenable judgment as to the character and motives of action of any one or all of these.

The year 1672 is a year of great importance in the history of South India in various ways, and the position of parties and affairs were in an unstable equilibrium and held out no promise whatsoever of any permanence. Since the extinction of the Nizam Shahi state, the Mughals had become, in a sense, a Dekhani power as well; and their movements had an important influence upon the shaping of the politics of South India. A Mughal Viceroy was stationed in Daulatabad, and his function was to keep watch over his neighbours in the south, and advance the Mughal power southwards as opportunity offered to gradually reduce his southern neighbours to a condition of complete tutelage to the Mughals, if not of reduction to subordination, which perhaps may be considered the ultimate end of the Dekhan policy of the Mughals. The three powers, whose position the Mughal viceroy of the Dekhan had to keep watch over were: the Mahrattas under Shivaji occupying the territory on this side of the Ghats and making an effort at conquering and occupying the coast region as far as could be done without getting into a regular conflict with the Mughals. This

¹ Letter dated November 21, 1674. No mention of the new minister in letter of May 15, 1673.

activity took him all over the Konkan coast from Surat down to South Kanara under the Nayaks of Ikkeri, one of the provinces of the empire of Vijayanagar at the time. The Mahratta power was nominally subordinate to the kingdom of Bijapur, but actually it comported itself as though it was an independent state with a policy of its own, and called for the first attention of the Mughal government in the Dekhan. In Bijapur itself Ali Adil Shah died, and was succeeded by a baby, Sikandar; and the state suffered from all the evils of a regency in a state dominated by factions contending for the most influential position. In Bijapur as in the Dekhan States before, there were the three parties, the Mughal, the Afghan, and the Habshi, sometimes resolving itself into the Dekhani, the Afghan and the Mughal. The regency was to begin with under Khawas Khan, the head of the Dekhani party. He was overthrown and assassinated by the Afghan party, and this Afghan party tried to secure the support of the Mughal governor for the time being under Diler Khan, who was himself an Afghan. In this confusion and struggle, the state was hardly in a condition to exercise its authority normally, and had therefore been politically paralysed. For the time therefore, Bijapur was in no condition either to molest Shivaji, or to be a source of anxiety to the Mughals.

As was pointed out already, there was a change of rulers in Golkonda, Abul Hasan Qutub Shah being put upon the throne in succession to Abdullah Qutub Shah his predecessor, the government being in the hands of Sayyad Muzafar Khan and Musa Khan, the two men that were responsible for this succession. In the course of a year, or two, they had made themselves so objectionable to Abul Hasan that he deprived both of them of their power, and had advanced instead the Brahman brothers, Madanna and Akkanna to the chief positions in the state. Golkonda was therefore in a condition, as formerly, to quietly extend its authority to the southward with some effect, and showing itself to some extent active on the northern side, at least to put up an effective defence against the advance of the Mughals. From this position of parties, it will be clear that the Mughal danger was real and the Mughal power hung like a Damocles' sword on the three southern powers, and their position of independence depended entirely upon their capacity to defend themselves against Mughal aggression, which was likely to come whenever an opportunity offered itself. It

was not like providing for a possible contingency ; much rather it was a real danger, a watchful attention to ward off which having become the immediate objective of the southern states.

Behind the territories, under the immediate authority of Shivaji, Sikandar Adil Shah, and Abul Hasan Qutb Shah lay what was the empire of Vijayanagar which had come to be now divided into a number of principalities. The territory lying on the easternmost side and extending along the coast from Masulipatam to almost, at any rate, as far as Madras, and extending into the interior to the Anantapur District and the Ghats farther south, was the part that Golkonda had conquered from out of the falling empire of Vijayanagar, which under the last emperor Sriranga III had not yet given up the ambition of recovering the lost territory, though the chances seemed against its realisation. Immediately to the west of this lay the Bijapur conquest from out of Vijayanagar, taking into it the eastern half of what is the present state of Mysore, and the margin of territory along its eastern frontier leading southwards through the Baramahals of Salem into the South Arcot District and extending almost to the banks of the Kaveri and the Coleroon in the lower reaches of the delta. This territory was ruled over by a number of petty chieftains placed in salient positions who were holding their power in subordination to Bijapur so long as that state was in a condition to assert its authority. But in a period of weakness, such as at this particular time when the state was hardly in a condition to exercise effective authority, they ruled almost independently of the headquarters. South of this region was the Nayakship of Tanjore immediately on the other side of the Kaveri, with Tanjore as its capital. The Nayakship of Madura was the next principality with its capital at Trichinopoly, Madura still retaining its importance as the historical headquarters of the viceroyalty of Madura under Vijayanagar. To the north of the Nayakship of Madura, and in touch with the whole of its northern frontier lay the territory of the Odayars of Mysore, and in the year A.D. 1672 a change of ruler had taken place. The old Maharaja Devaraja Odayar I died, and was succeeded by a nephew, Chikkadevaraja Odayar, a younger and more masterful man, who cherished the ambition of extending his power and enhancing his prestige, as the imperial power seemed almost at its last gasp. Just to the north of it, in what is now the Malnad Districts of Mysore, lay the state of Ikkeri, which, at this time, had

extended its authority down to the west coast and came into touch on the western and northern frontier with the territory of the Mahrattas under the authority of Shivaji. This state had to maintain its position as against the European powers, the Portuguese and the Dutch struggling for possession of salient positions on the West Coast, and against the Mahrattas in the north.

Through the whole of this region, the position at the time was complicated by the presence of the last emperor of Vijayanagar, Śrī Ranga Rāyal, making an effort as yet to retain the imperial authority and regain something of the suzerainty that he had been gradually losing through a struggle of over a score of years. His position had so far been damaged that the feudatory powers were going on with their wars and campaigns without reference to him, and it looked as though his power had effectively vanished. He had not yet given up hope, and, in spite of the Bijapur conquests of Gingee under the joint command of Shahji and Moula, he still made one effort, and seems to have had, in that effort, the support of a number of his feudatories who had previously showed themselves hostile to him. This grand effort was made in the reign of Chokkanātha Nāyaka of Madura, when all the powers supported the claims of Śrī Ranga Rāyal as against the ruler of Mysore. A battle was fought near Erode. The Mysoreans gained the victory in that. That seems to have dispelled such hope as the Emperor Śrī Ranga Rāyal has had of reviving his authority for ever. The emperor became a fugitive, and found an asylum in the court of Ikkeri, which made one more effort on Mysore. This resulted in no good to the emperor, and his pretensions so far as Mysore went. We hear no more of the emperor afterwards, and we might mark the end of Vijayanagar practically with that.

We have to make ourselves clear in respect of dates for these events, and particularly the two attempts in favour of the emperor. According to the Mysore accounts, the effort made in behalf of Śrī Ranga Rāyal, in which even the name of Shaji's son Ekoji figures on behalf of the emperor, was defeated by Chikkadevaraja Odayar, who, as a prince, volunteered his services when the kingdom was threatened by this danger. Devaraja was an old man, and was rather perplexed as to the general to whom the campaign against this formidable combination was to be entrusted. In that position

Chikkadevaraja Odayar volunteered his services from Tirukanambi, where he was living with his tutors undergoing education as yet. The battle therefore of Erode in favour of the emperor Śrī Ranga Rāyal must have taken place near the end of the reign of Devaraja, and before Chikkadevaraja Odayar ascended the throne in 1672. Inscriptions of Chokkanātha, the ruler of Madura are found in Kumaralingam and Tiruchengode ascribed to the years 1667-1668, while inscriptions of Devaraja Odayar of about 1670 are found at and near Satyamangalam. The battle must have been fought between these years. Very probably the battle was fought in the year 1669-70. Śivappanāyaka of Ikkeri is said to have sent an expedition against Chikkadevaraja Odayar soon after his accession in 1672. It is just possible that this invasion took place in the year 1672 or 1673. Thus the last shred of hope of reviving the empire under Śrī Ranga Rāyal vanished with 1674 or 1675, the last possible year. As a matter of fact, about this time or a little later, we hear of an invasion, according to the *Rama-Rājīyamu*, undertaken by another scion of the ruling family, Kodandarama, who advanced at the head of an army as far as Hassan and Sakkrepatna, and was driven back by Chikkadevaraja Odayar. This invasion under Kodandarama must have been after the death of Śrī Ranga Rāyal, and therefore about 1675—it may be even 1674—perhaps the last date known for Śrī Ranga III. With him vanished perhaps the empire of Vijayanagar as a real, political entity, and what constituted the provinces of the empire therefore could regard themselves rightfully as independent kingdoms, as in fact they had been doing for some time before. Thus the province of Gingee was under Bijapur. The territory belonging to Vijayanagar to the north of Madras belonged to Golkonda. The Nayakships of Tanjore and Madura were in perpetual conflict with each other, and the Tanjore Nayakship was nearing its end. Mysore and Ikkeri on the plateau maintained themselves in a position of some importance, and could not be said to have adopted an effective policy of mutual friendship and alliance. Ikkeri had to maintain herself against various enemies of her own, which kept her engaged on her western frontier, and the activity of the Mahrattas kept them engaged on the northern. So Mysore was free to pursue her own policy of active expansion into the territory on its northern frontier. Such was the position of affairs in the south when Shivaji's attention was turned that way, and called for the

adoption of a policy of intervention in the affairs of the south, for which he sought the assistance of Golkonda, and brought the diplomatic and administrative talents of Madanna and Akkanna into play.

Affairs in Tanjore were moving fast, and effectively called for the intervention of Shivaji. The last Nayak Vijayaraghava of Tanjore had shown himself by no means friendly to Chokkanātha Nayaka of Madura. Hostility seems to have been the cardinal principle of policy between these two states ever since the Civil War that followed the death of the great Venkatapati Rayal in 1614. That attitude continued generally unbroken, and as occasion offered itself, the two states went to war with each other without any influencing cause other than this. Occasions offered themselves now and again for one reason or another. Chokkalinga in the course of one of his wars against the Maravas of Ramnad took the fortress of Vallam on the Tanjore frontier, which Vijayaraghava soon recovered. The hostility thus engendered increased when, as the local accounts have it, Chokkanātha asked for the hand of one of the daughters of Vijayaraghava in marriage. The reply given to this was negative, and referred to an older incident of a domestic character not complimentary to Madura, and thus fanned the flame. In the war that ensued Vijayaraghava was defeated and killed as also his son, and, in the holocaust of the victims of the royal family in that falling fort of Tanjore, a baby Chengamaladas, as he was called, son of Vijayaraghava's son, alone escaped through the efforts of his dying mother and a nurse. When Madura conquered Tanjore, Chokkalinga appointed a half-brother of his to conduct the administration of Tanjore on his behalf. That half-brother turned traitor, and possibly he sought the intervention of Shahji in Gingee; but Shahji's intervention seems to have been brought about in behalf of the baby, and nominally under the authority of Bijapur. Shahji's officers under command of Ekoji, otherwise known as Venkaji, marched forward, turned out Chokkanatha's cousin for lack of assistance from him, and placed Chengamaladas on the throne. Very soon there was trouble, and the administration under a baby suffered from the disadvantages natural to such an administration, and Ekoji's intervention was sought again, and this time Ekoji conquered and occupied Tanjore, not to give it back again to any scion of the Tanjore family. He might have taken possession even of Trichinopoly if he had made a

strenuous effort, but he thought it prudent not to draw upon himself the whole force of Madura—it may be even others in alliance—and therefore was content with the conquest of Tanjore. The first years of the administration are reported to have been very good.¹

The government seems to have been placed in the hands of experienced administrator, the two brothers Raghunatha Narayan Hanumante and Janardana Narayan Hanumante, sons of the old Karbari of Shahji by name Naro Tirumal Hanumante. The father was a faithful servant of Shahji, and naturally the sons were trained for the same service, and were already occupying responsible positions under Shahji in the administrative line. They were entrusted therefore with the civil administration of Tanjore, while Ekoji was placed at the head of the administration. The father's officers naturally assumed a paternal attitude in carrying on the administration, and caused dissatisfaction probably to the rising ambition of Ekoji, whose army and officers seem to have contained a good contingent of Musalmans, as armies even nominally of Bijapur were bound to contain. Young Ekoji began to chafe under the authority assumed by the older officials, and in this attitude was perhaps egged on by some of the Muhammadan officers near him, as against the Brahman civil administrator, an attitude not unusual under the Muhammadan governors of the Dekhan generally. This made Ragunath Narayan throw up his office, and, without doing damage to his state, he thought it best to lay the whole matter before Sivaji, who, in the opinion of the Karbari, was likely to take a more reasonable line of action, and whose opinion might possibly prevail for good over the brother. So Ragunath Narayan broke up his establishment, and with his brother and nephew and two other trusted officers of the group marched up through the territory of Gingee northwards through Golkonda back to Sivaji. This journey of Ragunath Narayan happened to synchronise with the vanishing of the power of the emperor of Vijayanagar, and it must have struck him that the authority of Vijayanagar having become non-existent practically, the territories over which the empire had suzerain claim were likely to be going without a suzerain. As an old official with the most thorough knowledge of the condition of affairs in the kingdom of Bijapur, he must have also realized that there

would be no possibility of assertion of Bijapur authority over the territories conquered by Shahji in behalf of Bijapur; so that the territory included in the government of Gingee, the territories under the governments of Tanjore, and the other small governments under Bijapur to the northward of Gingee, all of them alike seemed to him to be in a condition fit for appropriation by one that could conquer them and hold possession of them effectively. He therefore thought that the best service that he could do to his master Shahji, and, after his death, his sons, more particularly Sivaji, was to make it possible for him to take possession of all that was Shahji's, and add to it his own part of the territory in Maharashtra, so that the so-called Bijapur Jaghirs of Shahji may remain intact in the family. Whether the idea dawned upon him that the disappearance of the empire of Vijayanagar opened a new vista of imperial ambition may well be doubted though it does not seem impossible if Gāga Bhatt could entertain a similar idea that led to Sivaji's coronation. It would be nothing strange if the vision dawned on him. Anyhow there was the more practical question which the *Sar-karkun* could, and did understand, in going forward to lay the matter before his master. He thought he might as well prepare the way for the carrying out of the project, as far as he could do it without authority from his master Sivaji. He visited Golkonda where already Madanna and Akkanna were in the ascendant so far as the actual exercise of power and the formulation of a policy went. Ragunatha learnt the partiality of Madanna for Sanskrit learning, particularly on the side of religion and philosophy, and, being a very learned man himself, he thought he could turn his talents to purpose. He went there as a mere learned Brahman, and soon showed his talents which received the fullest mead of appreciation from Madanna. Raghuntha soon became the much-respected guest of the great minister. He sought and obtained opportunities for confidential discussion of the matter occupying his mind at that time, and prevailed upon the minister to consent to a policy of an offensive and defensive alliance with Sivaji as the best course of action to be adopted in the circumstances, both as against the advancing tide of Mughal aggression, and as the best safeguard for the preservation of, what was worth preserving, the Hindu India of the south that was fast vanishing before their very eyes. Madanna's part in this affair is one of the cardinal facts of the Qutb Shahhi administration upon which

¹ Jesuit Letters : *Nayaks of Madura*, pp. 279-80.

Madanna is to be judged as to his loyalty and capacity for rule. We shall consider therefore, in the circumstances, whether the course of action adopted by him was in the best interest of the state that he served or no.

At the time that Ragunath Narayan was returning to the Mahratta country from Tanjore, and passing through Golkonda on his way, the position of affairs happened to be somewhat as follows:—the kingdom of Bijapur was under the regency of Abdul Karim Buhlol Khan, the Afghan, who was in alliance with Diler Khan, the Mughal governor, and the Afghan party was in the ascendant. This personal relationship naturally threw Bijapur into the arms of the Mughals; and Bijapur thus detached, the Mughal danger became far more real both to the Mahrattas and the rulers of Golkonda. It was about that time that Bahadur Khan came into the command of the Mughal government. Diler Khan in combination with Bijapur made a joint attack on Shivaji, and the war was conducted on both sides somewhat languidly, as the emperor himself was moving towards Hasan Abdal against the Khaibar Afghans, who had risen in revolt. Diler Khan was called to the north-western frontier, and Bahadur Khan was sent in his stead for the charge of the Dekhan. A successful expedition against Bahadur Khan was undertaken about the end of October, and the war was carried on in the following months till about the February of the next year. Then Shivaji opened negotiations with Bahadur Khan, and ultimately came to an understanding with him. But the negotiations proved futile, as they were probably intended to be on the side of Shivaji, and Aurangzeb cautioned Bahadur Khan from falling into the snares of Shivaji again. Having garrisoned his forces and supplied them with provisions, Shivaji threw off the mask, and brought down upon him an invasion from Bahadur Khan of a more active character than usual. Sweeping through the Mahratta country, he came down upon Bijapur and pressed Bijapur hard. Bijapur under the regency of Bulol Khan, sought the assistance of Shivaji, and, in return for a contribution of 300,000 *huns* annually, he undertook to assist Bijapur against the Mughals. But very soon this understanding broke off and Shivaji felt free to proceed further. Bahadur Khan continuing his attack on Bijapur, Shivaji had nothing to fear from that government. But it was worth while coming to an understanding with Bahadur Khan. On the initiative of Bahadur Khan a peace was

concluded between Shivaji and the Mughal viceroy, and something like a peace was patched up for the time being. Bijapur being thrown out of action, and the Mughal government of the Dekhan being under alliance of some kind, Shivaji was able to put into practice the scheme adumbrated by Ragunath Narayan. He naturally therefore looked towards Golkonda, the passivity of which, if active co-operation was impossible, was absolutely essential to him, in case he should mature his plans of carrying out the schemes of Ragunath Narayan in the Karnatak.

The Golkonda government under Abul Hasan Qutb Shah and Madanna Pandit, his chief minister, found themselves in a rather more dangerous position than usual. We pointed out already that the safety of these southern governments lay in their acting together and adopting a common policy at least as against the Mughals. That was the really advantageous policy for them to adopt, and, at any rate, they tried to do so on occasions. Now more than ever, it was necessary for them to provide themselves against the activity of the Mughals under Bahadur Khan. Bahadur Khan having got into an agreement with Shivaji, and seeing that the Bijapur government was powerless to do anything effective against him, was bound to pursue a more active policy as against Golkonda. The immediate neighbour of Bijapur being out of action, it was to the best interest of the Golkonda rulers to get into alliance with Shivaji if possible, and thus provide themselves against any successful attack by Bahadur Khan, whatever be the Qutub Shahi policy in respect of the Karnatak. An alliance with Shivaji therefore, apart from his intentions in regard to the Karnatak, was essential to the Qutub Shahs. If Shivaji was impelled towards gaining the alliance of Golkonda for his Karnatak enterprise, Golkonda was under no less imperious need for getting into alliance with him to keep off the Mughals. But so long as the Mughal general was occupied with Bijapur, they can countenance such movements as Shivaji might make on the southern territories of Bijapur, which certainly did require being put into order even in the interests of Golkonda. Shivaji therefore persuaded the Golkonda government to come to an agreement with him; and both Madanna the minister and Abul Hasan Qutb Shah, the sovereign, found it to their interest to enter into a definite agreement with Shivaji, and permit him to carry on his southern campaign, which after all was to all appearance, to put his father's

jaghir into order and put an end to the anarchical condition of the south. So the two states entered into offensive and defensive alliance after a visit to Golkonda by Shivaji. Shivaji was allowed to undertake a campaign in the south, Golkonda providing him with the sinews of war, and a contingent of troops, particularly artillery in which arm Shivaji's army was weak. Shivaji was to receive a subsidy of 3,000 *huns* a day and should be assisted by an army of 5,000 men together with a train of artillery. Shivaji was to give Golkonda in return therefor such parts of the conquest in the Karnatak as did not belong to his father Shahji. The treaty did contain a condition of a common defensive alliance against the Mughals.

In regard to this treaty and the consequent facilities provided for Shivaji's invasion of the Karnatak, it is beyond question that Madanna had a very important share of responsibility, notwithstanding the fact that he had the completest support of Abul Hasan Qutb Shah. Whether that was a policy which was to the advantage of Golkonda or no, is really what ought to guide us in our judgment of the part that Madanna played in bringing about this. What was the position of Golkonda at the time, and whether it stood to gain or lose by the alliance are really the only issues that ought to decide this question. Golkonda was in constant danger of being overrun by the Mughal army and her frontiers, particularly the north-western frontier, were entirely open to Mughal operations. The Bijapur government having been thrown out of action, as was stated already, the only security for keeping the Mughal from the frontier consisted in an alliance with the Mahrattas. To that extent so far as that part of the treaty is concerned, it was undoubtedly for the advantage of Golkonda that they should get into an alliance with Shivaji. What was the interest of Golkonda in the operations of Shivaji in the Karnatak? It was pointed out before that the Karnatak was hardly in a satisfactory condition, particularly the Bijapur part of it. The greater part of Bijapur conquests in the Karnatak was directly or indirectly under the rule of Shahji, and after him his son Ekoji; and such portions as were not directly under Ekoji's rule were more or less in a condition of anarchy, ready to fall an easy prey to any enterprising power that was in a condition to take advantage of it. Mysore and Madura showed themselves to some extent active in this direction. Their ascendancy would inevitably bring on the destruction of Tanjore

sooner or later. In the condition of affairs that prevailed, the state that attempted to remain stationary was bound to suffer in the long run. The authority of the Bijapur government over her southern possessions was of the slightest. Even in the interest of Bijapur, it would be very much better that they be brought under one common authority and if possible, under the nominal authority of Bijapur itself. But that was not very much to the interest of Golkonda. The affairs of Golkonda required perpetual vigilance all along the frontier between the territories of Bijapur and those of Golkonda. This can never be regarded as satisfactory so long as the Mughal Viceroyalty of the Dakhan continued to exist. Hence if Shivaji could guarantee a more satisfactory condition of the whole of the Karnatak as a result of the expedition, Golkonda had something substantial to gain thereby, although undoubtedly Shivaji would be infinitely the greater gainer.

There is one other possible question in regard to this. Shivaji had now crowned himself king. At least some of the Mahratta Bakhairs give indications of their not having been unaware of a kingdom going by default in the south, now that the empire of Vijayanagar had passed into the unknown. There might have been that ambition in Shivaji of creating for himself a kingdom, which he could maintain in independence, and out of reach of the arms of the Mughals. If Gāga Bhaṭṭ could think of it, as the Sabhasad Bakhair makes it clear, it might as well have dawned upon himself and upon Ragunath Narayan Hanumante. Whether Abul Hasan Qutub Shah could sympathise with a movement like that may be open to doubt. But that Madanna could have been in active sympathy if such an idea had been put before him may be presumed; but whether it was put before him or no, we have no means of knowing, although it seems exceedingly likely that Ragunath Pant would have put it before him, and might have received a sympathetic reply therefor. Since the advantages to Golkonda of the treaty were so direct in other particulars it would not perhaps be proper to put this possibility as counting against the actual loyalty of the Hindu minister to the Muhammadan Sultan of Golkonda. We have very good reason to believe that since the accession of Madanna to the chief power in the state, efforts have been constantly made to introduce some kind of an order in the southern acquisitions of Golkonda. That was a matter of great difficulty as long as the emperor Śrī Ranga lived and moved effectively, though practically a

fugitive. Now that he had vanished, this state of affairs may as well be put an end to, and one way of doing it is to let Shivaji acquire possession of what was his father's territory, in order that the much-needed peace may prevail in the south, even to the comfort of the Golkonda rulers in regard to their southern territory.

According to the records of Fort St. George, Abul Hasan's reign began with Sayyad Muzafar Khan as the chief minister, and Musa Khan, Khan-i-Khanan as the Golkonda governor of the Karnatak, a position almost exactly like that of Mir Jumla before he went over to the Mughals.¹ The document under advertence refers to the death of Neknam Khan, who granted a cowl for Fort St. George in the first instance, and to the arrangements in succession. Neknam Khan was succeeded in the chief ministership by Sayyad Muzafar Khan, and in the Nawabship of the Karnatak by Musa Khan. Venkatapati, the Brahman agent of the Company in Golkonda was sent with presents to the new Nawab, and the record contains a resolution sanctioning an expenditure of 500 pagodas for presents, etc., to the new Nawab on his first visit. The cowl that was given by Neknam Khan for the possession of Fort St. George was confirmed by his successor Musa Khan as Nawab of the Karnatak. This state of things seems to have continued for two years and about the end of the year 1674, or early the next year, both Sayyad Muzafar and Musa Khan were turned out of office, and Madanna and Akkanna took their place respectively. It is after this that a change of local administration took place, and gradually the *tarafdars* had changed and finally the whole administration. Musa Khan was succeeded by a Muhammadan official by name Nandar Khan. He seems to have been succeeded by Ibrahim Khan, and in succession to him Akkanna becomes governor of the Karnatak. This change seems to have taken place somewhere about 1675. We get a reference to it for the first time in a record of date 21st November, 1694, and again in one of 16th July 1675, and Podili Linganna, the nephew of Madanna and Akkanna, became Tarafdar of Poonamallee, within whose territory Fort St. George was situate. With the coming in of Podili Linganna, there was a stiffening in the administration, and the understanding between the government of Fort St. George and that of the Tarafdar was one more or less of open hostility. This

change of position is fully described in a British document O.C. 4215 dated 23rd July 1676.¹ According to this letter both Muzafar Khan and Musa Khan were set aside; Chinnapalli Mirza, as he is called, in front of San Thome was killed by poisoning, and the former Tarafdar Pollepalle Venganna was removed from office. It was this document that contains a statement that Muhammad Ibrahim was made the great Sarkel, Sar-i-Khel, for a consideration of 1,10,000 Pagodas. The cause of the differences between Lingappa, the nephew of the brothers, Madanna and Akkanna, and of the government at Fort St. George concerned more or less the position of Fort St. George in relation to the Government of Golkonda. The first point at issue was whether they were answerable to the Tarafdar of Poonamallee in whose division Fort St. George was situated. From out of this sprang various others, such as the collection of rent, the trade between the fort and the territory immediately outside, the customs revenue which the fort was bound to pay, the various changes in the condition of Fort St. George that took place as a result of the changed circumstances in its immediate surroundings, all which does not concern us directly. What is to the point is that, after the change had been brought about, the administration in Golkonda under the Brahman ministers made an effort to introduce a more vigorous administration within the limits of the territory of Golkonda conquered from the empire of Vijayanagar. This seems more or less to synchronise with the march of Shivaji to the south, at any rate the proposal therefor, so far as the Golkonda government was concerned. Whether the change was brought about as a normal consequence of the change of ministry, or whether it had anything whatever to do with the agreement between Golkonda and Shivaji, does not appear clearly. The Company's people complained bitterly of the Brahman administration being very exacting, and the demands of the Tarafdar of Poonamallee particularly irksome. The Company's officials at Fort St. George cannot be regarded as altogether unprejudiced witnesses to what took place about them, and all that they say regarding the government of Golkonda at the time perhaps could not be taken at their full value. It is in this state of affairs that Shivaji started on his southern campaign, and in the sources accessible to us we hear nothing of his doings in a military way

¹ Quoted in Love's *Vestiges of Old Madras* : I, p. 356.

¹ *Factory Records of Fort St. George*, Vol. I, 25th April 1672.

in the territory of Golkonda. We get reports of his achievements only when he got actually into the territory of Bijapur. It seems therefore that Shivaji did nothing worth mentioning in the territory which ostensibly belonged to Golkonda, and it is only when he passed that territory and came into the region dependent upon Gingee outside the sphere of Golkonda, that he began his activities one way and another.

So far as his operations in the territory dependent upon Gingee were concerned, they seem to have been thorough-going, as was anticipated. The government of Gingee itself seems to have become effete and fell an easy prey to the attacks of Shivaji, as Martin's *Memoirs* and other sources seem clearly to indicate. Gingee was mastered possession of, it may be by a stratagem, as is generally believed, Shivaji asking the governors, the sons of the Khan-i-Khanan at Bijapur for an interview, making prisoners of them and taking possession of Gingee. From there he continued his attacks upon Sher Khan, who was governor of the territory south of that with a strong position at Tiruvadi. But Sher Khan was in no condition to meet the attacks of Shivaji on any terms of equality. He was easily driven off from Tiruvadi and from Bluvanagiripattanam into the forests of Ariyalur on the northern banks of the Coleroon. It was only Vellore that offered stout resistance and stood a siege of fourteen months. Abdullah Khan the governor gave it up as hopeless at the end of the period, and stipulated for a provision for himself when he surrendered the fort. This provision is sometimes represented as a bribe offered by Shivaji, which is hardly the only possible inference in the circumstances. Then it is that Shivaji got into diplomatic transactions with his brother which proved far more unsatisfactory than perhaps he anticipated.

Shivaji's main object seems to have been to get his sovereign rights recognised in the southern territory as successor to his father, his brother Ekoji playing the subordinate political role of a feudatory to his brother. As a matter of fact, Tanjore, and the other places dependent upon Gingee, were conquests that Shahji made for Bijapur; and so long as Shahji lived, they were counted as part of his Jaghir, which he administrated in behalf of Bijapur. When Shahji died, the Bijapur government seems to have conferred the Nayakship of Tanjore on Ekoji. In the circumstances it looked rather strange that Shivaji should have been particularly oblivious of recent history to

have made the demand of his brother. The demand must have had an inner motive, and not merely the almost untenable position of asking his brother to recognise what was perhaps not exactly the actual position. Shivaji's demand amounted to a share of what belonged to his father, and, so far as the moveable properties went, Ekoji made no difficulties. The irreconcilable difference between the brothers was in regard to the territory of Tanjore. Shivaji's position was not exactly that of grabbing for territory. He seems to have been anxious to get the supreme title to himself, while he seems to have been quite prepared to let his brother conduct the administration, perhaps under the safeguard that he was in good hands for carrying on the administration. Notwithstanding all that is usually said about the bad administration of the Mahratta ruler of Tanjore, one of the Jesuit letters¹ makes it abundantly clear that the early years of Mahratta rule in Tanjore were years in which the administration exerted itself to bring about the prosperity of the country with great success. That was the period of administration under Ragunath Narayan Hanumante, who is exhibited as an arch mischief-maker in the whole transaction. It is perhaps after he went away that the administration suffered a certain amount of neglect. Shivaji's motives might have been partially the restoration of good administration under Ragunath Narayan Hanumante; at the same time we cannot altogether neglect the fact that the territory under the control of Shivaji was a comparatively extensive territory fast passing out of the hands of Bijapur. If ultimately it should be that Bijapur lost it, it would be much better that he had a title to it, so that whatever befell his territory in the north, he could claim to a position higher than that of a mere feudatory chieftain that he actually was in the Mahratta country. So he strained every nerve to get his brother to agree to his suggestion that Shivaji may be recognised as Shahji's successor to the title, and when Ekoji would not agree to it, Shivaji offered him terms which limited his government in the south if ultimately he should insist upon continuing there; but offered an equivalent in the Mahratta country itself by preference.

The whole of this transaction does not directly concern the administration of Madanna and Akkanna, and the territories of

¹ *Nayaks of Madura*, p. 280, Letter of 1676 *cf.* also Martin in Dr. Sen's Translation : p. 341. Foreign Biographies of Sivaji.

Golkonda. They are of concern to this extent; that one of the terms of the treaty consisted of a promise by Shivaji to restore to Golkonda such conquests as he might make of territories which once belonged to the Nawab of Golkonda. It is just possible that there were bits of territory dependent upon Vellore which came into this category, and which Shivaji would have had to make over to Golkonda. We have not come upon any record in which this point is at issue between Golkonda and Shivaji. The whole arrangement made about the year 1676 by the new administration of Golkonda for the carrying on of the government of the territory on this side of Golkonda seems to have had that point in view. There is a reference in Martin's Memoirs that Golkonda wrote to the agency at Fort St. George not to render any assistance to Shivaji in his transactions round Gingee. But the available records at Fort St. George do not throw any very particular light upon it, and Shivaji does not appear to have interfered with the complicated transactions that took place between the English, French, and the Dutch round Mylapore, or in what each one of these parties attempted to get from Golkonda by way of advantage from the fall of Mylapore to the French and its ultimate recapture by the Dutch and the Golkonda forces together. We have therefore to assume that so far as these transactions went, Shivaji committed no breach of the agreement with the Golkonda government. In his conquests in the territory up the plateau in the region of Mysore, it is just possible that he trenched upon Golkonda territory. We have it on record in the Company's correspondence that Podili Linganna, the Tarafdar of Poonamallee at the time had become the governor of the Karnatak in succession to Akkanna, and thus occupied a position corresponding to that of Mir Jumla or Musa Khan or Muhammad Ibrahim in regard to this. He claims having taken the town of Chickkanayakanahalli¹ from the Bijapur territory probably belonging to the province of Sira. That happens to be after the death of Shivaji, and probably he took the place from the Mahrattas, thereby indicating clearly that so far as Podili Linganna was concerned, he exerted himself to discharge his duties faithfully to the state of Golkonda. His struggle throughout, during the administration of Fort St. George

¹ Letter dated October 27, 1682, from Viraraghavayya at Golkonda, p. 113. Letter to Fort St. George, vol. ii, 1682.

by Sir Streyensham Master, was again a struggle for the assertion of the authority of Golkonda over Fort St. George, and incidentally, of course, of bringing Madras into the sphere of his own official authority first as Tarafdar of Poonamallee, perhaps more clearly afterwards, when he became actual ruler of the whole of Golkonda Karnatak. He was dogged in his demands, and Master adopted highhanded measures as counter-strokes, and the position of the Company at Fort St. George became really uncomfortable. In regard to the demands of Lingappa, the rights of the question were not altogether all of them on one side, and they got complicated by the steps and countersteps adopted, and, on the whole, it cannot well be said that Lingappa was doing anything that was not in the interest of the Golkonda administration. We come across remarks in the Company's records, perhaps more often in Martin's Memoirs,¹ of the stiffening character of the Brahman administration on the one hand and the demand for *peishcush* on the other, and it is an illuminating commentary that the Brahman agent in Golkonda, Venkatapati, himself a Brahman makes a remark that the Golkonda officials being Brahmans put out their hands whenever something had to be done.² This statement of the Brahman notwithstanding, the question of *peishcush* was a thing, which, at the time, does not appear to have been the peculiar characteristic of this class or that. The very English East India Company was prepared to offer it, and actually volunteered when Shivaji wanted certain things for which he offered to pay. The Council under Sir William Langhorn solemnly laid down once and again that it would be ridiculous to accept a price for those things supplied to Shivaji notwithstanding the offer of payment, because he was a great man and great advantages might accrue from this consideration. In the circumstances, it would not do to hurl it in the teeth of a particular historical character of the period as if it were a vice peculiar to him.

In regard to the Qutb Shah Abul Hasan himself, he seems to have begun his administration more or less as a vigorous ruler. At one time, he was on a tour through his territory accompanied by Madanna.³ The Company's records contain a reference to his anticipated visit to

¹ Letter to Fort St. George, vol. ii, 1682, p. 335.

² Letter dated March 3, 1681-82, from Viraraghavayya. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³ Fort St. George: Diary and Consultations. November 21, 1674.

Masulipatam and the details as to how exactly to receive him and what presents to make. Another time a reference is made to the Dewan Madanna being away with the Nawab on business connected with the administration.¹ There is a record of date July 16, 1675 O.C. No. 4100 quoted in Love's *Vestiges of Old Madras* (*Ibid.*, p. 356) where the Qutub Shah is said for the first time to have given up all his power to the ministry. It is a general remark and no details are given, and it may be that perhaps he did not concede all that he was asked to, while it is just possible that the administration had actually passed into the hands of the ministers. Even granting that the Company obtained the information from their agent in Golkonda, what really lies behind the remark is the influential position of the Tarafdar and the extraordinary difficulty experienced in getting what the company wanted from the Dewan. The records make it clear that in the first instance the factory at Fort St. George wanted to regard themselves as absolutely out of the control of the Tarafdar of Poonamallee, and again taking advantage of the relations between the Tarafdar and the Dewan and his brother, the agent, they sometimes made an appeal even to the Sultan direct, through others such as the Sar-i-Khel, Muhammad Ibrahim. The Company did not get their way, and it would naturally lead to the inference, justifiable from their point of view, that the Sultan had completely neglected the administration, and it was the ministers that were actually carrying it on.

The next important transaction with which Madanna's name is preeminently associated is the series of transactions between the Mughals on the one side, Bijapur and Golkonda on the other, while yet Shivaji was in his southern invasion. This has reference to the campaign carried on against Bijapur by Bahadur Khan, the Mughal viceroy. Bijapur was under the regency of Bulol Khan, the Afghan, who had the sympathy of Diler Khan, the Mughal general. Bahadur Khan gave shelter to the Dekkanis, who suffered at the hands of the Afghan party under Bulol Khan in Bijapur, and in support of the Dekhani party he persisted in attacking Bijapur. This attack of Bahadur Khan fared very badly, and it was with great difficulty that Bahadur Khan could extricate himself from the position. He therefore turned to the

south-east and laid siege to the town of Akalkot and Naldrug. Here again the Bijapuris under Bulol Khan inflicted a heavy defeat and forced Bahadur Khan to raise the siege. The position of Bahadur Khan became critical when an army from Golkonda marched under Madanna Pandit himself to reinforce the Bijapuris. Bahadur Khan managed to buy off the Golkonda forces, and collecting together all his own resources and the Dekhani generals from Bijapur, he made even an attempt at securing the friendship of Shivaji. This demonstration in power brought Bulol Khan to fear the consequences, and he agreed to let the Mughals conquer the exposed parts of the Bijapur in the north. Bahadur Khan was able to take Naldrug now in May 1677, and early in July following Gulburga as well. But these successes came too late for him. Aurangzeb already displeased with his failure in diplomacy with Shivaji, recalled him, because of the reverses he suffered at the hands of Bijapur egged on to that end by Diler Khan in combination with Bulol Khan, the Bijapur regent and friend of Diler Khan. The emperor felt so far persuaded against Bahadur Khan, as not only to recall him, but also to give the command to Diler Khan. Bulol Khan, the regent in his attempt to bring about this culmination offered to conquer Hyderabad and to crush Shivaji if only the emperor would be pleased to order the imperial troops to assist him. Aurangzeb agreed, and Diler Khan and Bulol Khan together arranged to invade Golkonda territories late in 1677. Bahadur Khan left the Dekhan in September 1677. The Wazir, Asad Khan, who was sent by the emperor to put matters right in the Dekhan, returned very soon to the emperor's side, and Diler Khan, at the command of forces in the Dekhan, continued operations initiated by Bahadur Khan which resulted in the acquisition of a vast tract of land enclosed by a line drawn from the river Bhima and the Manjera to Bider and Gulburga, turning southwards towards Halsangi, not very far from Bijapur. On the south-eastern side, the frontiers came into touch with the important fortresses of Golkonda on that side particularly Malkhed. Neither the successes of Bahadur Khan, nor the alliance of Diler Khan with Bulol Khan of Bijapur, brought the Mughals any nearer to possession of Bijapur, which was the object that the emperor set his heart upon. In accordance with the terms made by Bulol Khan, a joint attack was made upon Malkhed. While Bahadur Khan himself had been laying siege to Gulburga in June 1677,

¹ Fort St. George : Diary and Consultations. April 10, 1679.

the Qutub Shah massed his forces on the western frontier under the commander-in-chief, Muhammad Ibrahim, merely to watch the frontier and not to enter into the war. When Gulburga fell Golkonda was threatened with attack unless the Qutub Shah delivered up to the Mughals Shivaji and Shaik Minhaj, the Dekhani general of Bijapur, who had taken service with him. The negotiations¹ developed ultimately into a demand for a crore of rupees and ten thousand horse as a fine for Golkonda having assisted Shivaji. Golkonda offered to pay five lakhs of rupees and no more. But Diler Khan and Bulol Khan made up their minds to attack Malkhed in reply. After various incidents, the Golkonda forces got the better of it ultimately as the combined forces of the Mughals and Bijapur were hard put to it in the course of the war. Diler Khan therefore solicited peace as his friend Bulol Khan was in his death-bed. In the meanwhile, Golkonda's intervention was sought by Siddi Masaud and other nobles still faithful to the house of the Adil Shah. Abul Hasan Kutub Shah's intervention brought the different parties in Bijapur to agree to the following terms. Bulol Khan was to resign the regency, Siddi Masaud succeeding him. Six lakhs of rupees, the arrears of pay due to the Afghan soldiers, should be paid by Masaud and the forces disbanded on condition that these forces quitted Bijapur. Bulol Khan was to retire to his own fief. The Qutub Shah agreed to see that the Bijapur territory was not attacked for the future, and a Golkonda agent was to be stationed in Bijapur, whose advice was to be taken in regard to the administration of affairs. Akkanna, the brother of Madanna, was chosen for this post. At the same time, Masaud met the Mughal general Diler Khan at Gulburga, and agreed in return for the Wazirship of Bijapur to take orders from the emperor Aurangzeb, and not to make any alliance with Shivaji, but rather to help the Mughals in their attempt to take from him the Mahratta territory. The Adil Shah's sister Padsha Bibi was to marry a son of the Mughal emperor. On the face of it, Masaud had put himself in an ambiguous position. Bulol Khan died in December 1677, and Masaud entered on his regency. His first difficulty was the disbanding of the Afghan soldiery in Bijapur that he undertook to do depending upon a promise of Golkonda to find the money. The Qutub Shah delayed payment, and the Afghan troops

¹ Martin : p. 331.

of Bulol Khan went into mutiny, and life became impossible almost in Bijapur. Masaud's power was of the slightest even inside the capital. In this desperate position, he alienated the sympathy of the Mughals by attempting to get into a secret alliance with Shivaji. The disorders encouraged the activities of Shivaji on his side, and, notwithstanding the protests of Diler Khan, Masaud invited Shivaji to help him out of his difficulties in Bijapur. Masaud brought upon himself the troubles that he attempted to avoid. The terms of the treaty with Diler Khan were a negation of the obligations that he undertook to discharge to Golkonda, and naturally Golkonda refused to put him in resources for disbanding the Afghan soldiery. Their mutiny almost paralysed the administration of Bijapur, and drove the regent into the arms of Shivaji as the only means of safety. This alliance with the Mahratta made the Mughal general hostile. So the hostility of the Mughal general on one side and the coolness on the side of Golkonda put Masaud completely at the mercy of Shivaji. Shivaji made an effort to render the assistance that was asked, but even there what the Regent did was hardly what was to have been expected of an ally. Shivaji's troops were looked upon with suspicion. After making an effective diversion against Shivaji, Diler Khan found out the shiftiness of Masaud's policy; and not only withheld further assistance, but felt even compelled to attack the Adil Shahi territory again. With the internal disturbance brought on by misunderstandings between the regent and Sharza Khan, affairs in Bijapur were in such utter confusion that nothing could be done against the advancing Mughals. Shivaji having been looked upon with suspicion, the Mughal general thrown into opposition by the attempted alliance with Shivaji, affairs in Bijapur itself being in a hopeless condition, Bijapur was at the mercy of Diler Khan. Diler Khan wanted to take possession of Bijapur by a *coup*. Information of it somehow leaked out, and those in Bijapur whom he wished to capture had time to escape, and Diler Khan's attempt proved abortive. He was driven to the alternative of bribing Bijapur troops and nobles to betray the interests of Bijapur rather more successfully. Masaud had no alternative but to agree to what terms Diler Khan demanded, and among them was the proposed marriage of the Bijapur princess Padishah Bibi, who by a voluntary act of hers left the city of her birth to become two years afterwards the wife of prince Azam, son of Aurangzeb. Not satisfied with this surrender,

Diler Khan demanded the resignation by Masaud of his regency. A war became inevitable, and Diler Khan had to carry on the war under very disadvantageous circumstances as the viceroy. Shah Alam was very far from friendly to him. Diler Khan's operations therefore delayed, Masaud was just able to provision the fort and put in such troops as he still had command of into the fort. He had no alternative but to appeal to Shivaji, who rendered prompt and effective assistance. Masaud utilised this and the disadvantages under which Diler Khan laboured to gain time, so that Shivaji might have the chance of crippling the Mughal power. Shivaji succeeded in raiding the Mughal territory so effectively that Diler Khan's ruin became certain, as complaints were constantly reaching the prince viceroy in regard to the destructive activity of Shivaji's forces, and the incapacity of the Mughal general to render effective assistance. Diler Khan's trump-card in these operations happened to be the person of Sambaji, son of Shivaji in camp. He had run away from his father at the end of the previous year and was well received by the Mughal general in whose camp he happened to be. But in the midst of these troubles, he managed to escape first to Bijapur and ultimately to Panhala, early in December 1679.

With the return of Sambaji the position of Sivaji had improved much. He had rendered valuable and effective assistance to Bijapur, and had been the means of saving Bijapur for the time being. This would be a very good set-off for all that he may have done against Bijapur, although ostensibly he was still on terms with them as before. Diler Khan's position had been terribly damaged. His efforts to take Bijapur ended in failure. The advantage of having Shambhuji in his camp which he regarded as a trump-card had been lost; his operations against Golkonda so far had been only futile, and all this was cause enough to give the emperor the greatest dissatisfaction. The emperor was getting himself involved in a very difficult struggle against the Rajputs of Chitor and Udaipur; but for this, he might have shown his anger more decisively. What the emperor actually did, however, was to call back Shah Alam the viceroy and Diler Khan the general, and send in their stead minister Khan-i-Jahan to rehabilitate the Mughal position in the Dakhan. The net result of the operations so far had been the promise of subordination that Shah Alam got from the Bijapur authorities

to the Emperor. Otherwise things had gone wrong all round. The operations that Sivaji began as a counter-stroke to the attack on Bijapur by the Mughals by carrying depredations into the Mughal territory and distracting their attention, still continued and put an end to their authority all along the whole frontier from Burhanpur in the north to the territory immediately round Sholapur in the south. While they were being reduced to stalemate like this, occurred the death of Sivaji and the accession of Shambhuji to power. The disturbance immediately following Shambhuji's accession to the throne kept the Mahratta trouble under control, and gave a certain amount of respite to the Mughal Wazir to bring the whole Mughal Dakhan into some kind of order and give to the subjects of those territories some peace and security which they badly needed. In the meanwhile occurred the rebellion of prince Akbar who set himself up against his father; proclaiming himself emperor, he had dethroned the old great Mughal by proclamation, and had put himself under the protection of Shambhuji. The Mughal resources had to be turned to this new danger and a campaign had to be undertaken against Shambhaji, and prince Akbar. This dragged on for a while till the Emperor himself brought to a close his campaign in Rajputana, and was able to arrive in the Dakhan and take command of the operations about the end of the year 1681. His presence in the Dakhan changed the whole aspect of affairs, and Mughal armies were sent into the Konkan and into the southern Mahratta Country against Shambhaji. But Shambaji showed himself in this campaign a worthy son of Sivaji, and kept the whole Mughal army at bay. The campaign dragged on for two years like this and it was only the application of all the Mughal resources that brought the Mahrattas to bay and finished this campaign successfully.

The Emperor could turn his attention to Bijapur which in his opinion was responsible for the Mahratta trouble. The best way to get rid of the Mahratta power was by concentrating all Mughal forces against them. So the various divisions of the Mughal army were called to headquarters, and were sent down to attack each its own particular portion of the Mahratta frontier. Shambhaji was at that time occupied in a struggle against the Portuguese, and the opportunity for this onslaught was well chosen as the Mahratta feudatories

were getting gradually discontented against the rule of Sambhaji, and several chieftains of note were ready to adopt a policy of defection to which they were incited by the agents of the Great Mughal. Notwithstanding this Shambhaji was able to carry on for a considerably long time; but gradually he had to give way before the operations under the command of the Emperor himself. At the end of 1684 the Mughal outposts were pushed in along the frontier, and the Mahrattas were brought under control in a way. Then the Mughals hurled themselves against Bijapur as getting rid of Bijapur and annexing it to the Mughal territory would weaken the Mahrattas very considerably. The Emperor discovered that Bijapur was still playing into the hands of the Mahrattas, and rather than overcome the Mahrattas and attack Bijapur, it seemed to him better to get rid of Bijapur first. One way of starving the Mahrattas, it appeared to the Emperor, was to destroy Bijapur and annex it to the Mughal dominions. The operations against Bijapur began actively about the end of 1683, and the war dragged on, along with the operations against the Mahrattas, throughout 1684, and the siege of Bijapur really began in 1685. The Bijapuris put up as efficient a defence of the fortress against the Mughal attack as they possibly could this time, and ultimately the Emperor had to change the original arrangements and to draw himself closer to the scene of operations. He removed his headquarters to Sholapur where he remained during the siege. The Adil Shah in turn received assistance from Siddhi Masaud from distant Kurnool, the Golkonda forces arrived from Hyderabad under Ambaji Pandit, and Shambhuji himself sent an army corps under Hambir Rao. At this stage of the operations the Emperor in spite of all his efforts found the Qutub Shahis joining forces with Bijapur. The Emperor wanted Abul Hasan not to help the Adil Shah in any way. But Abul Hasan responded to Adil-Shah's appeal in July 1684, and adopted, under the advice of Madanna, the wise policy of standing side by side with the Dakhani powers as against the common enemy. The Emperor found it necessary to divide his forces and send Shah Alam and Khan-i-Jahan to attack Hyderabad. The Mughal siege of Bijapur continued, Bijapur having various successes.

The grand army having been long in occupation of the territory of Bijapur all round, famine threatened the camp; supplies could not come with regularity from the north; communications were closed.

Prince Azam was in great straits to carry on the operations successfully, and it became a question whether the siege operations were to be continued or given up. The emperor responded to his appeal and sent supplies and reinforcements in time. Simultaneously success attended the operations of Shah Alam against Hyderabad. He was able to enter Golkonda and the murder of the minister Madanna drove Abul Hasan to shut himself up in Golkonda. In March 1686, the emperor shifted his headquarters to very near Bijapur itself, and ultimately Bijapur fell on September 12, 1686, after a siege of very near two years. A week after Aurangzeb himself entered the fort and Bijapur became a Mughal possession.

After the fall of Bijapur the days of Golkonda existing as an independent state could not be many. But before coming to the fall of Golkonda we shall have to note the salient features of its history and mark the evolution of its policy which brought about its downfall. We have already noted the part that Golkonda played in regard to the kingdom of Bijapur in the immediate neighbourhood, and the Mahratta state under Shambhuji. The policy adopted was one of alliance with the Dakhan rulers as against their common enemy the Mughal. This alliance continued unbroken up to the death of Sivaji notwithstanding the fact that after 1677 the relation between Sivaji and Golkonda was not perhaps as cordial as before because of differences in regard to Sivaji's conquests in the Karnatic. The general policy pursued by Golkonda was perhaps the only sound one at the time and in the particular circumstances, namely pursuing a common policy with Bijapur and the Mahrattas as against the Mughals, if the independence of this southern kingdom from the Mughal empire was at all a worthy ambition. The Qutub Shahi kingdom was not protected by a natural frontier against the Mughals in the north. It was the same case with the Bijapur kingdom to a considerable extent. The only question to consider in regard to this policy is not whether it was right or wise, but whether it was possible and whether the Qutub Shah's resources were such as to make an effective stand against Mughal attack. The weakness of the policy consisted in the impossibility of the three states co-operating and adopting consistently a common policy. Aurangzib hardly wanted a cause for war. But he wanted a suitable opportunity when he could attack these kingdoms and annex them successfully.

If Aurangzib was kept from annexing these kingdoms, it is not want of will, but much rather the facility to do so. Sir Jadunath Sarkar tells a story that Mirza Mohammad, the Mughal envoy in Abul Hasan's court, one day took the Qutub Shah to task by making the remark 'it does not become you to assume the title of the emperor. If Aurangzib hears of it, he will become more angry.' The Qutub Shah replied promptly 'you chide me by mistake. If we are not called Padishahs how can Aurangzib be styled the Padishah of Padishahs.' This gives an idea of what the Mughal policy was towards Golkonda. 'Resigning his royal position to his Wazir, Madanna, he shut himself up into his palace with an army of concubines and dancing girls.'¹ Whether this character given to Abul Hasan is historically sound we shall consider a little later. But in the meanwhile what we have to consider is the more important sequence of historical incidents which would give an idea of what the administration of the state of Golkonda was during the period. We have noticed already that Abul Hasan actively pursued the policy of Madanna of assisting Bijapur as against Mughal attacks. Abul Hasan and Madanna were responsible for pursuing an active military policy along the Mughal frontier of their dominions, and beating back more than one Mughal invasion. They came to a definite agreement with the Adil Shahi kingdom, and assured themselves of the adoption of a similar sound policy by that state by even appointing a resident in Bijapur in the person of Akkanna as was already stated. During the period (1674-79) of five years we hear already that Abul Hasan and Madanna were making a tour in the course of the administration of affairs. The first which refers to about 1673-74 was delayed, but it was undertaken sometime in 1675. On another tour Abul Hasan and Madanna were reported to have been residing in Bezwada early in 1679 according to the reports to the Company at Fort St. George. This is referred to by Martin in his Memoirs. That does not look exactly like confining himself to his palace, and fuddling himself with wine and women.² The Mughal historians and those historians that wrote about these states from outside

¹ The same learned historian relates 'From the thoughts of these humiliations and the impending ruin of his house, Abul Hasan, like Wajid Ali Shah, sought distraction or oblivion by plunging into unrelieved sensuality.' (Fryer, I. 85).

² Dand C. Letter of 29th February 1675-6; also 22nd April 1679. Letter from Fort Saint George, 6th February 1678-9.

have little to say of Golkonda or Bijapur when they did not come into contact with the Mughals. The period 1668-86 was a period when these complications of operations demanding concentrated attention upon the Mahratta country put perhaps Bijapur and Golkonda outside the horizon of those historiographers who wrote about the history of operations of the Mughals. But what we are able to gather of this period from the information that is available from the records of Fort St. George gives us an entirely different idea. We have referred already to one feature that a couple of tours were undertaken by Abul Hasan Qutub Shah; but the facts of history come to us in an entirely different light from the records. These are generally found in letters written by a Brahman who was in residence at Golkonda to transact business for the British Company in Fort St. George. There were similar agents of other Companies such as the Dutch. These people kept sending news of what was taking place at Golkonda. These Companies themselves had to transact items of business of varying importance from time to time. The Brahman ministers of Golkonda, Madanna and Akkanna, appear in these British records in a light which is entirely different from that which one would infer from extracts given above. The Company's servants no doubt complain of the exacting character of the Brahman ministers; but when the actual exactions get to be analysed it is found that it is nothing more than enforcing strictly the incidences of the administration coupled of course with what these people generally called *Sallabad*, the *mamul* of modern times, in regard to presents which were bribes and nothing less. The Company's agents in Fort St. George were struggling might and main to get their possession of Fort St. George out of the official control of the local ruler for the time being, namely, the Tarafdar of Poonamallee within whose territory lay the town of Madras.¹ The Tarafdar was more than equal to these and held fast to his official right, and pointed out to the government that, even to the Company, the carrying on of this administration efficiently would be impossible unless the headquarters transacted business with the Company's agent at Madras through him. This Tarafdar was no other than Podili Linganna one of the nephews of Madanna. Another of their nephews was the Tahsildar of Bhadrachalam by name Gopanna who is better known perhaps to

¹ D and C. December 1676 and 20th idem.

tradition in his new devotional name Ramdas. Another nephew of theirs rendered distinguished service as a military man and is known by the title Rustam Rao. Madanna kept his position as chief minister; Akkanna began by occupying the position of the controller of the forces, and had been at one time described as commissioner of the south who had been in a progress of pilgrimage and inspection to the south when he visited Tirupati and Kalhasti not far from each other, and quite close to Madras.¹ Akkanna advanced from that position to that of the Golkonda Resident in Bijapur, and later on, he seems to have held for a while the position occupied by Mir Jumla of the governorship of the entire Golkonda Karnatic. But after 1682 he was occupying a post of great importance at court because we hear of Podili Linganna being promoted to that position, the position held by Neknam Khan who was one of the successors of Mir Jumla. While one does not see very much of Abul Hasan Qutub Shah's work directly in what appears in this correspondence, one is able to see clearly that the administration was carried on with efficiency. The Company's agents did complain about the *Tashrif*s and demands at various time for various amounts of presents. They did not complain of things not being done. Privileges were demanded, and bribes were offered in proportion to the value of those privileges. It was not always possible to secure the privileges demanded even at the price. One would interpret this as a sign of efficiency rather than that of inefficiency; but that Abul Hasan Qutub Shah was not a cypher in the administration is clear from the fact that some of the agents of the Company could appeal to him and get things done. Of course that happened only occasionally, and always through other high-placed men of the court such as the Sar-i-Khal Ibrahim through whom, for a certain period of time, the Company's agents of Fort St. George were paying their annual rent of 1,200 pagodas.² The matter of contention between Podili Linganna and the Company generally were in regard to the rising in commercial position of Fort St. George through various causes, and particularly the deprivation of the customs revenue of the state of Golkonda which was fast passing to Fort St. George even to the detriment of the harbours in the immediate neighbourhood

¹ D and C. 27th March 1681; 4th April 1681 and 15th idem.

² D and C., December 1676.

such as Mylapore.¹ This spelt the complete ruin of the customs revenue of Golkonda, and meant necessarily the increase of the customs revenue of Fort St. George to that extent and perhaps more. Then again it was another point that Linganna could never forget or forgive, that Fort St. George should pay its rent only through him, and should have no transactions directly with the king and his ministers at Golkonda. He often complained to the head-quarters, and often succeeded in getting the headquarters to agree with him. There is a letter written by Akkanna to the agents of Fort St. George that Linganna had power to transact business, and that the Company's agents would be wise if they did their business through him, as he had the power.² To some considerable extent it seems to have been recognised in the days of Sir William Langhorn and when Gyfford assumed the agency. In the interim however, when Sir Streynsham Master held the agency, things went to an unpleasant extent. Linganna was inexorable in enforcing his official rights. Master was equally tenacious and went the length of adopting high-handed measures to enforce what he deemed to be his rights. But these were nothing short of coercive measures put upon the subjects of Golkonda and would have been sufficient cause for war.³ Master notes in his Diary that minister Madanna and his master Abul Hasan Qutub Shah were in Bezwada at one time, and even distant Madapollam at another time. He notes that at Madapollam a house built by an Englishman was looked upon as good enough by the Shah to be purchased for his use in case of need.⁴ In regard to the time when the two visited Bezwada it is mentioned that both of them were there with a view to inspecting the locality and refortifying the stronghold of Kondapalli to which they intended moving the treasures in case of need.⁵ This was sometime about A.D. 1679 while Aurangzib's attack had not begun. In the light of these facts which should be regarded thoroughly historical, that Abul Hasan could be regarded exactly as Fryer describes him would be hazardous. The fact of Abul Hasan's offending the emperor are set down in the latter's own words.

¹ D and C. 29th February 1675-6.

² Letters to Fort St. George: Ollampana's letter, June 1681; Accanna's letter, 2nd October 1681.

³ 22nd April 1679, p. 81. ⁴ 10th April 1679, p. 96. ⁵ See note 3 above.

'This luckless wretch (meaning Abul Hasan Qutb Shah) has given the supreme power in his State to a *kafir*, and made Sayyids, Shaikhs and scholars subject to that man. He has publicly allowed (in his realm) all kinds of sin and vice viz., taverns, brothels, and gambling houses. He himself is day and night sunk in the deadly sins, through his excessive devotion to drink, and fails to distinguish between Islam and infidelity, justice and oppression, sin and piety. By refusing to respect God's commands and prohibitions, by sending aid to infidel Powers, and by promising one lakh of *hun* to the *kafir* Shambhu, he has made himself accursed before God and man.' (K. K. ii, 328.)

Analysed, it comes to this: Abul Hasan appointed a Hindu prime minister to conduct the administration. He has tolerated the Hindus and Hinduism without distinguishing between Islam and infidelity, justice and oppression, sin and piety. He assisted infidel powers like the Mahrattas, and was on terms of peace with Śivaji and his son Sambhaji. These three sets of his acts were inexcusable in the eyes of the fanatic Emperor, and therefore of the orthodox historian.

We shall examine these separately. Abul Hasan Qutb Shah was a man of humble origin, and was by chance elevated to his high destinies. He found the nobles of the court not inclined to show him the respect that was due to his position—a feature not uncommon in Muhammadan history. He preferred therefore those that would be more loyal and deferential to him and his position. He appointed officials in the persons of the two brothers who brought hard work and efficiency to their work; who had risen to a position from which they could be elevated to the highest dignity in the state. If that is a crime, under Islamic law, Abul Hasan could quote illustrious precedents for it. The ultimate test is whether these men conducted themselves efficiently in the interests of the State, and in those of their master Abul Hasan. In regard to the first it is fairly clear that the policy they adopted in regard to it was probably the best in the circumstances, notwithstanding the ultimate adverse result. It was perhaps inevitable that ultimately these kingdoms should be absorbed in the Mughal Empire. About the result, the dictum of history is certainly not united in a chorus of praise. The civil administration seems to have been at least as efficient in this state as in those contemporaneous with that of Qutb Shah including the Empire. Except for the personal

hatred conceived, and a general dislike to the ministers carrying on a policy of rigorous retrenchment at the time, there is nothing on record against them as such. Even Sir Jadunath Sarkar notes down: 'Madanna very wisely advised him not to shut himself up in Golkonda but go to Warangal or some other distant fort so that, in the event of Golkonda being besieged by the Mughals, he would be free to move about to reinforce its defenders. But this advice only deepened the king's suspicion of his Wazir's sinister design as suggested by Shaikh Minhaj.' This relates to the time when Aurangzib succeeded in detaching Mirza Ibrahim from his loyalty to Qutub Shah. As a result of this desertion, Abul Hasan shut himself up in the fort of Golkonda. This does not show Madanna at all in the light of a disloyal traitor to his master.

A desertion like that of Mirza Ibrahim at this critical juncture,¹ as of Mir Jumla on the previous occasion, gives adequate explanation why Abul Hasan on the first occasion, the chance offered itself, appointed the Brahman brothers to the highest offices in the state. So long as Aurangzib, or his agents were in the Dakhan and pursued the Dakhan policy inaugurated long before, the danger of defection of Muhammadan Officers was quite real. The chances of Brahman ministers deserting their ruler and joining the Padishah must have seemed to him unlikely, as in fact it was, not because Aurangzib would not make the effort, but Aurangzib was far from likely to have made himself acceptable to them. While Aurangzib therefore may be regarded as quite right from his own point of view, in objecting to the Qutb Shah's appointment of Brahman ministers, the Qutub Shah could offer valid justification for the policy that he adopted in this matter. So neither the appointment of the Brahman ministers, nor the vesting of his confidence in them that Abul Hasan Qutb Shah did, need be held to indicate weakness on the part of the Qutub Shah.

Coming to the second point of his offending, which is more or less intimately connected with this, namely, of his placing the *Kaffir* above the faithful, and conducting himself impartially as between the Islamic and alien faiths, the Qutub Shah may have to plead guilty to the fact, but perhaps, may plead in extenuation, that it was a measure of more

¹ Letters to Fort St. George, 22nd March 1682 and 17th May 1682.

prudential policy as proved by the experience of his predecessors even. Before becoming the Qutub Shah, Abul Hasan was of poor parentage and may have been thrown very much into the company of Hindus, and the Islamic Pir, in whose services he happened to be at the time, may have been a teacher of a more liberal form of the Islamic religion than perhaps the Emperor would have approved of. Whatever be the actual reason, in the surroundings in which Abul Hasan Qutub Shah was placed, he probably felt that he ought, as far as may be, to hold the balance even as between his Hindu and Muhammadan subjects. We have no definite evidence of historical documents in regard to the pursuing of a liberal policy in religion like that; but there is a continuous living tradition in the story of Ramdas and his misappropriation of public funds for the purpose of building a temple, and otherwise providing for the requirements of the temple, to Śrī Rama in Bhadrāchalam. When after long years of demand, the Qutub Shah took actually coercive measures, the story has it that a miraculous payment of the sum was made, and a receipt obtained directly from the Qutub Shah himself, by two men calling themselves Rama and Lakshmana, peons of the Bhadrāchalam circar, who came overnight, paid the balance demanded in cash, and obtained a receipt then and there of the Padishah himself. The historian is not called upon to believe in the miracle or its occurrence. But the fact that the Tashildar, a faithful servant of the government till before this, and influentially connected as he was, should have allowed himself to be tortured severely all for the sake of his own faith in Śrī Rama, may possibly have made an impression upon the Qutub Shah, and, if that, should have happened early in his reign or even later, it might account partially for perhaps a more than usually liberal policy towards his Hindu subjects. Whatever it be, it does not appear to have been so unusual in the history of the Dakhani Sultanates that the Hindus enjoyed high official preferment under the various kingdoms during the first days of their existence, though generally the Muhammadans enjoyed more than their share of the loaves and fishes of office. As it is we have seen that apart from the two brothers, Madanna and Akkanna, three of their nephews occupied positions of importance, and one of them was advanced to as high a position as that of the distinguished Golkonda governors Mir Jumla and Neknam Khan; and this could not have been all through sheer favouritism. The tenacity with which this particular

man fought for the financial advantages of the Golkonda government against the British Company at Fort St. George and its masterful agent Sir Streynsham Master, and the fact that he even distinguished himself in a military way by carrying on war against Sambhaji's officers, and acquiring for Golkonda the possession of a place like Chikkanayakana-halli in Mysore,¹ redound to his credit and ability no less than his loyalty. It was not unworthy favouritism that brought him up, nor that he was guilty of sacrificing the interests of the state to selfish ends.

The third charge against Abul Hasan Qutub Shah is the pursuing of a pro-Mahratta policy, the responsibility for which the historian assigns a good measure to the prime minister Madanna. Nothing succeeds like success; but success is not the only test of the soundness of a policy adopted under certain circumstances. In the circumstances in which Abul Hasan Qutub Shah came to the throne, and, in the surroundings in which he was actually placed, there were only two courses open to him—either submitting himself to the Emperor and 'placing his neck under the yoke' in the language of the Islamic historians, and perhaps becoming one of the mansabadars of the empire,—in other words, bringing about the political extinction of the Golkonda state as such. The other is, so long as there was a chance, to bring the resources of the three states of South India together, and set a term to the advance of the Mughal power in the Dakhan. From the point of view of the Muhammadan Aurangzib this would be a heinous crime, if for no other reason than this, namely, that it would assure the permanency of the Mahratta state in the condition in which it was, if not, give it a new lease of existence. Subsequent history has amply demonstrated the unwisdom of the policy pursued by Aurangzib as against the Mahrattas, and with no great success. This policy would bring no advantage, either for Bijapur or for Golkonda; but would amount to committing a political suicide and becoming merged in the empire, unless it be to put the Mahrattas in a position of disadvantage in the struggle against the advancing power of the Mughals. It was really to the interests of these Islamic states, their political interests, that the Mahratta state should not go out of existence, and the conditions of the problem made it certain that the previous destruction of the Mahrattas could only put off the destruction

¹ Letter to Fort St. George, 27th October 1682.

of the Muhammadan power for a short while. The previous submission of the Islamic powers would put the Mahratta state at a considerable disadvantage and even immediate jeopardy. But it was not likely to have altered the course of history of the Mahratta struggle at the time. The policy adopted by Abul Hasan Qutub Shah at the time of alliance with Sivaji and Bijapur was one which perhaps was best in the circumstances. If all the three pulled together and put forth their utmost resources and fought hard, the success of the imperial power would have been really difficult; and if they held it for a few years and old Aurangzib passed away, they might have continued to exist as separate states.

If what is said above is justifiable historically, the part that the Brahman ministers played is one which ought to be held to redound to their honour, and to the loyalty with which they served the master that employed them. In the alliance with Sivaji, the part that Madanna played must have been one of smoothening the difficulties in the way and bringing about the alliance with far greater ease than perhaps would have happened otherwise. It is just possible that the minister, or the ministers, sympathised inwardly at any rate, with the ambition of Sivaji; but there is no hint in any of our sources that Sivaji cherished the ambition of annexing Golkonda to his dominions, and of the Golkonda ministers agreeing to a proposition like that. The worst that could be said is that, in allowing and actively assisting Sivaji to make his conquests of Bijapuri Karnatak, Golkonda may have expected a share of the spoil. But in all accounts of the campaign there is no mention that Sivaji carried on operations against any division which might be regarded as belonging to the Golkonda Karnatak. He seems to have confined himself entirely to what he might have regarded as the part of the Karnatak conquered, no doubt for Bijapur, by his father Shahji or his brother Ekoji. As a matter of fact, his operations were confined to the portions conquered by Shahji himself, and he had no thoughts of attempting any military operation against Tanjore. If it is found to be a part of the agreement that a share of these conquests should be given to Golkonda, that question would arise only when his conquests should be definitively regarded as his own. They were so far conquests that he made ostensibly under Bijapur, and, it might be said, held of them as firmly as other portions of the territory belonging to Bijapur held by him. So far as the

position of the ministers were concerned there is nothing in this transaction that would compromise their loyalty to the state that they served. We have already indicated that in civil administration they carried it on with a little more of bureaucratic efficiency than before. For the bribery and corruption that may have prevailed, the times were responsible, and there is absolutely nothing to show that they were more corrupt than their contemporaries, officials and non-officials, Muhammadans and Hindus. It would be interesting to note in this connection what the French writer Martin has to say of the Brahman ministers in regard to the rigours of whose administration his complaint is as bitter as those of any other.

Referring to the Mughal demands before the invasion by Aurangzib, Martin writes, 'The great lords of his court perceiving the weakness of the government of the prince, and that he entrusted it entirely to the minister Madanna, who daily reduced their salaries, kept some understanding with the court of the Mughals. It is believed that it was by their advice that considerable sums were daily demanded with the object of having a pretext for attacking the kingdom if they were refused, or, if the money or a part of it was paid which would ruin and render the king incapable of raising troops when he would attack.' The administration had to be carried on under the gravest disadvantages possible. The army had to be maintained on a war-footing, and wars were of frequent occurrence and had to be carried on. This would necessitate considerable stringency in regard to money and the raising of revenue for the purposes of the state. A Brahman minister in an Islamic state would, under the best of circumstances, be unpopular; but where the administration was, under the imperious necessity, to adopt measures of retrenchment, the minister chiefly responsible for it should necessarily become unpopular. Certainly he seems to have been unpopular with the Muhammadan nobles and officials at the court; but the ordinary people seem to have regarded him with reverence as the extract from the Dutch journal Havart pointed out. People seem to have respected him and exhibited considerable regard. Even that journal Havart says 'Madanna was well versed in Persian, Hindustani and the vernaculars of the country, and lived in a kingly style; as the golden palanquin in which he went out in the streets appeared, people showed their respect by stopping on the way. He was very kind to the Dutch.' That popular respect

could not have been obtained without some justification in the administration, at any rate having done them some good. The source of information for this Dutch journal, whatever that be, was anything but favourable to the ministers, as we shall have to note hereafter. But it will suffice here to say that even this hostile witness had to state it that Madanna enjoyed a measure of popular respect, while he was undoubtedly in the last years of his rule unpopular with Muhammadans of position. Speaking of the Brahman administration generally, the following remarks of Martin seem to the point: 'A party of Reddis, these are people who keep most of their lands, withdrew to the woods because Sivaji's officers did not observe the conditions of their treaties with them. There was a general disorder in the province and (this was always) caused by the Brahmans. They also wanted to cause us some damage at the commencement of the month of September. On the pretext of getting measured (surveyed) a garden that we had outside the lodge, the residences of our married Frenchmen who were in the colony and the houses of the people of the country who were in the Company's service and to enforce a tax upon (us). I strongly opposed it.' These remarks have reference to the neighbourhood of Pondicherry in the province of Gingee. It was a new conquest, and it was Raghunath Pant and his officials that were trying to introduce an orderly administration, which certainly must have caused considerable dissatisfaction, legitimate as well as other than legitimate. That the dissatisfaction could be other than legitimate is clear from the instances given by Martin himself. It is not obvious why the garden occupied by them should not be measured like other lands, and why this land should not be put under the usual kind of revenue. This kind of dissatisfaction naturally would be given in a fairly large number of cases, and that was the kind of dissatisfaction that one hears of generally from the records of the foreigners. But, be it said to the credit of Martin, that unlike the average of them he is more discriminating even where he has something to say directly concerning the administration of Raghunath Pant. He says in a passage regarding a conversation that the French Brahman agent had with Ragarnat Pandit (Raghunath Pant). The Governor-General of the province Raghunath Pandit is said to have complained strongly that the French carried on no commerce and brought in no revenue to the

state, and if anything, they were disadvantageous to the state inasmuch as the Dutch who were carrying on trade and were paying revenue, had to abandon their factory because of the presence of the French. Raghunath Pant offered to wait for another year or two to give them time before he took any measures to eject them from the country; but in the meanwhile he demanded a certain sum of money which he badly needed to carry on the administration, when the agent explained to him that the French had no money, that they would be quite willing to leave the place as soon as they should have facility to do so. Martin notes that Raghunath Pant was actually set up against the French, and the unsatisfactory treatment of the French by him was due to that. And then he proceeds to note, 'It is true that the Governor-General lacked money for paying the troops, but that proceeded from two causes; the first (was) that the Brahmans from the highest officer to the lowest robbed with impunity; the second reason (was) the ill-treatment accorded to the people which drove many to leave and pass on to the territory of neighbouring princes; so that the province did not yield two-thirds of its ordinary revenue. It must, however, be admitted that the Brahmans were more careful in making the lands profitable than those under the government of the Muhammadans had appeared to us to be. A number of places around Pondicherry covered with brambles and brushwood only, of which nobody thought (anything), was reclaimed and these have produced since, but the best part of these improvements went to the profit of the Brahmans.' While appraising the value of the evidence of even a man like Martin, we have to make a distinction between that which appears on the surface and visible to the on-looker, and that which is a little more recondite. In this passage while one may readily accept what he has to say regarding the ill-treatment of the inhabitants and the better character of the cultivation, etc., one might well question how far his remarks regarding the misappropriation of the revenue would be valid. The government of Sivaji, by all accounts, was careful in regard to this particular, and in arranging for the orderly administration and the collection of revenue of a new province, Sivaji must have had the means to ascertain what was necessary by way of revenue, and would have taken steps to assure himself that the bulk of what was collected went into his treasury. Of course in the stages of the initial introduction of administration in a newly

conquered province recently emerging from war, things are not likely to be quite regular, but that the revenue should all be appropriated by the officials to the extent the words of Martin would imply, one might well doubt. It is hardly necessary to exonerate Raghunath Pant and his official staff from all blame. In regard to the matter it would be carrying credulity too far to accept the statement at its face value, as it would mean that in Mahratta administration, checks from above were non-existent even under Sivaji. Anyhow, as far as the main features of the Brahman administration so much complained against is concerned, it reveals a bureaucratic efficiency which hit hard the dishonest ryots certainly, and perhaps the honest ryot to some extent. If Raghunath Pant had been *Karbari* under Shahji and the son of Shahji, the *Karbari* must have been a trained administrator and administered the province carefully, and if Sivaji placed him at the head of the revenue administration of the new province, the appointment could not have been for the purpose of Raghunath Pant and his official staff swallowing all the revenue for themselves, with a ruler like Sivaji above. But that has nothing to do with the Golkonda administration or Madanna directly.

Judged on the whole, the administration of Madanna may be regarded in some respects thoroughly good; and such unpopularity as attached to him and his administration were incidental to the exigencies of war and the demands of the abnormal position of Golkonda during the period.

We have pointed out elsewhere that the arrangements made for carrying on mining operations at Gollapallee¹ in the Krishna District show themselves in several particulars very much more advantageous than the arrangements under which diamond mining had to be carried on under Mir Jumla in the neighbouring Districts. In the mining localities of Ramallakotta, as Tavernier calls this, actually Ravalkonda and Kollur in the neighbourhood, the terms imposed according to Tavernier's account seem very hard, and leave comparatively little to the miners by way of wages or profits. Whereas the mines that were working in Gollapallee earned more and looked very much better in condition as testified to by Sir Streynsham Master who noted it

¹ *Journal of Indian History*, ix. p. 361. Also *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, Patna, 1930.

carefully in his diary. These Gollapallee mines were brought into work, after having remained abandoned for about two or three years, in 1673, almost with the accession of Madanna and Akkanna to power under Abul Hasan Qutub Shah, and by the time that Sir Streynsham Master visited the locality the mines have been working for seven or eight years. The following extract gives an idea of the condition of the workers :

'The two towns of Mellavallee and Razipent the mines are very large and populous, but the buildings all thatched hovels; the people are well fed, well clothed and look as though they fed well to undergo the hot labour, though corn etc., sold at excessive rates; and the place must needs be full of money to pay thirty or forty thousand labourers in the mines besides many others.'

Further down he notes :

'The country around the locality looked "pleasant like England or London, but Razipent is a large pleasant green valley full of flocks of woolly sheep; thence to Mustabad where we lodged this night, we travelled through the mountainous country, by very pleasant valleys with tanks of water, and came to our journeys' end about 8 at night, having travelled two gentue leagues.'"

In regard to this passage as many as forty or fifty thousand labourers worked, the labourers earned as much as 15 pagodas a year and the town paid a rent of 60,000 pagodas. The customs duties which were usual were 50 per cent here unlike in the other mines where it was quite a 100 per cent. The license fees demanded were two pagodas, and four to five pagodas, per mensem, according to the number of labourers. Where a similar number of labourers were engaged, it was two pagodas per diem, under the old arrangements. If the details be compared, the arrangement made under Abul Hasan Qutub Shah show themselves liberal and to the great advantage of the growth of the industry. The two sets of arrangements are the arrangements made by that great administrator Mir Jumla under Abdulla Qutub Shah in the one case, and the arrangements made by Madanna and Akkanna under Abul Hasan Qutub Shah in the other.

In the light of what has been said above, the estimate of the Dutch journalist which he had set down briefly in the four portraits that he had drawn of (1) Abul Hasan Qutub Shah, (2) Madanna, (3) Akkanna, and (4) the riotous scene in which the two brothers were murdered and

dragged about, would seem anything but true. Of the first he says: 'He was king only in name and not in deed. He attained to that dignity from the very lowest position, and allowed himself and his kingdom to be governed by others. He was a stupid and silly man, and not kingly in manners (never behaved like a king); when now fortune had fooled with him for a long time, he was kicked by (deprived of) his crown and throne by his own faults. He crept in the sand, ate dust and had to humiliate himself (behave) like a slave. Woe to that country where kings are mere children.' This certainly is an over-drawn picture. The supersession of the first minister and general was an act of Abul Hasan Qutub Shah as well as the appointment of the Brahman brothers Madanna and Akkanna. According to the hostile evidence of authorities, otherwise dependable, that he entrusted the administration to others may be admitted as true; but that he took no responsibility therefore nor took any part in it, stands unproved from what has been said above. Certainly he lost his kingdom ultimately as many others had done before. The inaccuracies of this writer do not come out clearly in this. We come upon them fully in the next passage regarding 'Madanna-Suryaprakasa Rao.' 'Here we see Madanna drawn to life who was the plaything of fortune from the beginning of his youth until his death. He has risen from nothing to such a high level that even the king must obey him. He has removed his own master from office and state. (O, sacrilegious act of scoundrelism!) Nay, he dared to do anything. But, while attempting to deliver his king into the hands of his enemy, he was discovered, and lost his life through Sidemakta's sword. In the end, after all, the burden must be borne.' This exhibits to the fullest extent the unsatisfactory character of the information possessed by this illustrious representative of the fourth estate. Madanna started life in a small capacity under one of the most capable administrators of the Qutub Shahi kingdom—Mir Jumla; and by steady work rose from position to position till he came very near the top when Abul Hasan Qutub Shah found him ready to hand, in his effort to remove a minister who wanted to reduce him to the condition of a cypher. Such a career is not what exactly could be described as a 'plaything of fortune.' The Muhammadan surroundings were not likely to have been friendly to the advancement of Madanna and his brother. If in spite of it they could rise, it must have been through work, and certainly through

some little of worth. That is for the first part of the statement. There could be absolutely no truth in either of the two statements that he makes regarding his treatment of Abul Hasan Qutub Shah. It nowhere appears in any authority that he was handing over the Qutub Shah into the hands of the Mughal. It was much rather otherwise. He had taken steps years before, in anticipation of this end, to provide a safe position for the Qutub Shah to retreat into when such a need arose. It was through his efforts actively seconded by the approval and active co-operation of the Qutub Shah himself, that Kondapalli was being fortified, and a strongly fortified city was almost ready for occupation if the Qutub Shah was not unduly suspicious. Even when the enemy was at his doors, it was the advice of Madanna that the Qutub Shah should not immure himself in the fortress of Golkonda, but rather fight in the open and escape, if need be, to the distant fortress of Kondapalli. So the more serious of the two statements could be proved wrong to the very hilt. It is not so easy to demonstrate that he threw his master into the background; that he literally removed him from his office is perhaps un-warranted even for a journalist's information; but that he carried on the administration which, to all external appearances, seemed as though he was ultimately responsible for, and not his sovereign, is quite possible; but that it need not necessarily be, needs no demonstration. As was pointed out above, a vigorous policy of retrenchment was adopted. It could be done only when the minister believed that he had persuaded the king, or the king persuaded himself, that the minister was doing the right thing. When the king had given the minister his confidence, then it would certainly appear as that the minister was doing everything and the master nothing. That this may be only for the look, the fact being otherwise, is quite possible, and seems in this case to have been the truth.

What this authority says of Akkanna certainly is 'tarring with the same brush.' He speaks of Akkanna as 'a beast in human form; whose cunning wicked tricks, whose scoundrelism and pride, should not be uttered (spoken of). No greater villain did the town of Golkonda ever witnessed. Participating the treason of his brother he was never contented; he suffered the same punishment and at the same time as Madanna.' This requires no separate criticism. Akkanna seems to have been a man of overweening character, but that he

participated in the treason of his brother which has no bottom to rest on, may therefore be dismissed as being no more reliable than the other. In regard to this matter of the treason of the Hindu ministers. Abul Hasan Qutub Shah seems to have been firm in his confidence in the brothers, till the defection of Mirza Ibrahim, the Sar-i-Khel.¹ In spite of the fact that several of his other generals remained loyal to him, the defection of Ibrahim was put before him as though that of a protégé of Madanna's, and, at the critical time, the king's mind was haunted with suspicion whether it was the doing of the minister. It was then that he decided to immure himself in the fortress of Golkonda. Madanna advised him not to shut himself up in Golkonda, but to move out towards Warangal and keep himself free, beating in reinforcements and finding safety in a distant fortress. It was the evil genius of Abul Hasan in the person of Shaik Minhaj that misinterpreted even this advice, and confirmed the rising suspicion in him against the minister. Madanna seems to have believed that the attack on him, and the fate that overtook the brothers were actually given effect to under the orders of the Sultan. Iswar Das, one of the writers of authority contemporary with the event, puts it into the mouth of Madanna, crying out against Abul Hasan, 'O, thoughtless fool, as you are slaying me at the interested accusation of my enemies without investigating the truth of the charge, I know that the term of your kingship has neared its end. You will not sit on your throne for more than six months after this.' Sir Jadunath Sarkar records that Khafi Khan was particularly well informed regarding the affairs at Hyderabad; and Khafi Khan states clearly that the murder of the ministers was perpetrated without Abul Hasan's knowledge or consent. Even Bhim Singh, the author of the *Dil Kasha*, who was present at Shah Alam's camp at the time, agrees with Khafi Khan in regard to this point. As against these authorities the statement of the journalist will have to be taken as something worse than bazaar gossip.

This provides a very apt illustration for demonstrating how far contemporary evidence can be positively wrong and even absurdly

¹ In regard to this Ibrahim, Abul Hasan's dissatisfaction was a growing one. As early as 22nd March 1682, he was dissatisfied with the general for his part in the operations against the Mughals, and the taking of Basavapatam by the Naik of Ikkeri. In a letter of May 17 idem, Ibrahim was removed from the Sar Laskarship by Abul Hasan Qutub Shah after a visit to Madanna in his house. See note above. Also, Martin entries for April 1678, p. 325, and August idem, pp. 331-2.

misleading. The statements contained in the *Havari* in the essential particulars of the career of the Golkonda ministers are every one of them wrong in the light of other evidence. As was pointed out before, it was not possible that Akkanna and Madanna could have started their career under Mir Jumla, and, at the same time, commenced their career in A.D. 1666. The chances are that they commenced their career under Mir Jumla in a humble capacity, that means, in a comparatively small official position to begin with, and from there they gradually worked their way up to the high position that they were in at the time of the accession of Abul Hasan Qutub Shah. That is the first point.

The next point is that Abul Hasan Qutub Shah himself was not such a worthless man, that he placed himself in the hands of his ministers entirely and made a nobody of himself. This again seems to be very much aside of the fact according to the authorities relied on by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, and which, in the circumstances, seem very probable indeed. Having regard to the circumstances of Abul Hasan's position before he became Sultan of Golkonda, it was very likely that his Musalman ministers showed themselves to be far from showing the respect due to his position, because of his previous humble station in life. The man that felt this humiliation and took prompt measures to counteract it by appointing those men of his own creation, on whose loyalty he could count, certainly was not the man, who is likely to resign so completely his power into the hands of his ministers, even though they be of his own creation, as to obliterate himself. The chances are, what one often does meet with in bureaucratic administrations, that the officials are allowed to carry on the administration under the authority of the chief, the chief keeping himself not so open to access to everybody for the sake of the attainment of the unity and thorough efficiency of administration. Abul Hasan's position seems to have been something like that. The complaint that is made by the servants of the English East India Company, as well as the Dutch East India Company, is that he was not accessible to them, or to their agents, to do them the favours that they sought, which were really privileges, which, if accorded to them, would lead to the inconvenience of an administration within an administration, which both the minister and the king alike would wish to avoid, but did not wish to say so plainly. If the king therefore was not

as accessible to these agents as they would have liked it, we should not be surprised if these people chafed under the authority of the ministers and the inexorable character of their administrative demands, and speak ill of the king himself. We meet with passages here and there in the English Correspondence of that tenor and what the Dutch Journal, *Havart* has to say is nothing different in point of character from the complaints that the East India Company's servants actually made.

But the really decisive point in regard to the matter is where the Dutch Journal charges Madanna with having betrayed successfully, or having very nearly succeeded in doing so, Abul Hasan Qutub Shah into the hands of Aurangzeb. This is not at all possible even to be thought of. The whole head and front of the Qutub Shah's offending the emperor was his appointment of these Brahman Ministers, and of the confidence he placed in them. That was matter about which these men should have had knowledge; and apart from this particular knowledge Madanna and his brother should have known thoroughly what a fanatic Aurangzeb was, and what little they stood to gain by betraying Abul Hasan Qutub Shah into his hands. If there was any purpose in this betrayal, it should have been selfish gain. But what sort of a selfish gain would these have made by betraying the Qutub Shah, perhaps the liberal-minded ruler of Golkonda, into the hands of a fanatic like Aurangzeb? Taken all round therefore this contemporary authority shows himself to be possessed of no information of any authority, and is merely ventilating the gossip of the bazaars, such as he might have heard, some interested Islamic gossip, who might have chafed under disappointments or inconveniences of his own. So it becomes clear that absolutely contemporary evidence could be about as misleading as later evidence, and the character of contemporaneity gives the information no guarantee that it is more correct than information that might be gathered at a later period, perhaps from more authentic sources. It would be unsafe to accept as true all contemporary evidence, and cast aside all evidence of a later period as necessarily the less reliable.

Before concluding the subject, we would like to invite attention to an interesting note appended to chapter XLVI of Professor Sarkar's *History of Aurangzeb*. After giving some details in regard to these brothers, he makes the following concluding reflections;—'He

(Madanna) had never realised that the ultimate basis of government is force, and that a minister might bask in the sunshine of royal favour and trust, but if he has no army behind him, his position is precarious and his power a hollow show. Evidently long political degradation of the Hindu population of Golkonda had robbed them of the power of self-defence'. The reflection contained in the first sentence of this quotation and its implication would command but little approval among recognised authorities in state-craft. We pointed out before already that Sultan Qutub Shah's change of ministers at the commencement of his reign was because of this possibility, and even if that were a sound political dictum of general adoption by ministers, how does it serve the ministers really usefully? Muhammad Gawan, the great Bahmani minister and several others, whose names could be cited in a similar position in Bahmani history, had not gained by providing themselves with a military force to fall back upon unless it be to create a civil war, local turmoil and bloodshed. Whatever it might have been in Islamic politics, that certainly was not the principle that was accepted among Hindu politicians. A minister was a servant of the ruler and was not to set up as a rival, and Brahman ministers always pursued it as a solemn policy in state-craft. Even in the matter of the provision of *Jaghirs*, what may have been conferred upon a Brahman was not regarded, and had not become, hereditary. It began with him, and he continued to enjoy the privilege only so long as he held the office. Apart from that, here is a dictum or two from the great Vijayanagar ruler, king Krishnadevaraya, in regard to Brahman ministers in particular:—

'If a Brahman who is a scholar, who is afraid of *adharma*, who is well-versed in *Rajaniti*, and who is between the ages of fifty and seventy, who is healthy in body, whose connection with the king has come down from previous generation and who is not conceited, accepts the ministership under a king and looks after his business would it take more than a day for the *angas* (constituents of royalty) of such a king to increase?'

'In the absence of such a minister if a king is not contented with ruling himself to the best of his genius according to (the science of polity) and with the help of a strong army and a full treasury, and has recourse to a minister who is devoid of virtues, the minister would prove a source of trouble like the pearl of the size of a pumpkin

and the king would ultimately find himself in the hands of that minister.'

It is not the tradition therefore of Brahman ministership to provide themselves with forces to fight the sovereign in time of need. This would mean a preconcerted act of treason with an elaborate preparation therefor, which is against the grain of sentiment of Hindu politics and Hindu statesmen. The Hindu population might have risen against the Muhammadans if the minister had been one who had been appointed to represent the Hindus of Golkonda. There was no such notion of communal politics in those days even of Mughal rule. The minister was a minister, Hindu or Musalman, and he was the minister of the Sultan; and whether it was physically possible for the Hindus to rise, even if they wished, is another question. But the ordinary Hindu feeling is, if a minister misbehaves and the ruler finds it necessary to punish him, it was a question purely of master and servant, not a question of a civil war between a suzerain and a feudatory.

On the whole, therefore, a synthetic appreciation of the whole mass of evidence would justify the conclusion that Abul Hasan Qutub Shah was not such an absolutely incompetent ruler, as it is ordinarily taken. The Brahman ministers that he chose of his own free will were men who carried on the administration in the best interests of the sovereign and the state, according to their lights. Their fall was due not to any act of treason on their part, but to the machinations of a greater power, fanatic in the extreme in regard to a Shiah sovereign and his Brahman ministers, who had set his heart upon conquering these southern kingdoms by all means in his own power, without any scruple as to the actual means adopted to gain this end.

A Puzzle in Indian Epigraphy

BY

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MORE than half a century has elapsed since Fergusson started his novel theory of the foundation of the Samvat era. Stripped of its speculative extravagance, yet confirmed in the main, by the later researches of Fleet, it easily attained to the rank of a well-established historical fact, and became, in its turn, a solid basis for many another hypothesis. According to this theory, the present Vikrama era was founded, not by the King Vikramāditya of the Hindu legends, but by the Mālava clan (*Mālava-gaṇa*), in commemoration of their republican government, and Chandragupta II of the Gupta dynasty adopted it as his own era a few centuries later, and gave it the name which it still bears. It will be easily perceived, first, that this view makes the existence of the legendary Vikramāditya a very doubtful question, if not entirely a nonentity. And, secondly, it reveals the very surprising fact (if fact at all it was), that two thousand years ago there was in India a warlike clan which was not only powerful enough to constitute itself a republic and found an era, but also fortunate enough to out-rival all the greatest monarchs of Bhāratavarṣa in the perpetuation of that era.

And yet how slender sometimes, and how uncertain, the evidence on which mighty issues rest. In the present instance it is only an expression or two in the Mandasor inscriptions, on the doubtful interpretation of which such a huge historical fabric has been reared. Needless to say that it must inevitably fall in case that interpretation is proved erroneous. And as it is quite unjustifiable to reject, except on the strongest grounds, an interpretation which has been in vogue for over half a century, I propose in the present article:—

Firstly, to give a decidedly better, and more harmonious, interpretation of the phrase *Mālava-gaṇa-sthiti*, which occurs in the Mandasor inscriptions, citing a competent authority in its support for the first time.

Secondly, to prove that King Vikramāditya was a historical personage, the son of Mahendra of the Pramāra dynasty, the emperor of Ujjayini, the founder of the era which bears his name, and the patron of learning.

And thirdly, and lastly, to explain why the era was styled the Mālava era in its early centuries.

Fleet, whose rendering of the expression under discussion has been accepted by all antiquarians, with but the slight modification suggested by Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar, naturally took the words *gaṇa* and *sthiti* in their very usual sense. Little did he imagine that the former is used as a neologism, in the Mandasor inscriptions. He therefore takes it to mean 'a tribe' (*samūha*), which is the ordinary connotation of the word. So also the latter is taken by him in its most ordinary sense. And thus the two words *gaṇa* and *sthiti*, in juxtaposition, have been twisted to yield the meaning '(the reckoning from) the tribal constitution of the Mālavas.' Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar, however, corrects Fleet by justly pointing out that the word *sthiti* must be taken here in the sense of 'usage'.¹ According to him the phrase means 'the usage of the Mālava tribe'.

But he too failed to perceive that *gaṇa*, in that particular context, means *gaṇanā*, a sense which is recorded by the *Śabdārṇava-kośa*: *Gaṇastu gaṇanāyām syāt gaṇeṣe pramathe cayē*. The *Śabdārṇava*, indeed, is not extant at present,² but the above citation is found in the commentary of Mallinātha on stanza 33³ of the *Meghadūta*. The commentator seems to have particularly availed himself of the aid of this *Kośa* in writing his commentary on the above-mentioned poem of Kālidāsa. From the quotations given there it is quite evident that this *Kośa* records more meanings of words than the *Amara*, *Medini* and others.

Kielhorn, indeed, had felt the necessity for taking the word *gaṇa* as equivalent to 'reckoning' (*gaṇanā*), in connection with the expression *Mālavānām gaṇa-sthityā*, etc.; and thus having hit upon the right sense of the word by a wonderfully accurate conjecture, he observes,

¹ Compare, for a similar use of the word *sthiti*, *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, i. 119.

² I am informed there is a MS. of it in the *Bodleian* by Mr. P. P. S. Sastri. There appears to be a MS. of this work in the Madras Government MSS. Library. *Editor*.

³ This is stanza 37 in the Southern editions of the work. *Editor*.

'and I would accordingly translate the phrases, *Mālavānām-gaṇa-sthityā* and *Mālava-gaṇa-sthiti-vaśat*, simply with "by, or, according to, the reckoning of the Mālavas".¹ Equally accurate is his remark that it would not be permissible to supply, as was done by Mr. Fleet the words "the reckoning from" simply to bring out the meaning of the instrumental'.² Of all the Sanskritists who devoted their attention to the solution of this epigraphic problem—and they were not a few, Indians and Europeans alike—he alone seems to have realized the important fact that the suppression of such indispensable words as 'the reckoning from' would be highly unjustifiable, if Fleet's interpretation of the word *gaṇa* were correct. Indeed, such a suppression would be against the very genius of the Sanskrit language. And yet Kielhorn could not turn his conjectural interpretation to advantage, probably, for want of the requisite authority. Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar criticises his suggestions as follows:—'He (Kielhorn) thus makes *gaṇa* equivalent to *gaṇanā*, which is objectionable. For the word *gaṇa* has never the sense of *gaṇanā*, and when placed in juxtaposition with Mālava must signify a "tribe", and a "tribe" only.'³ But with the authority just cited, it is scarcely necessary to remark that Kielhorn, and not his critic, is in the right. The word *gaṇa* does mean *gaṇanā*, and Vatsabhaṭṭi has evidently used it in that sense, inasmuch as it quite suits the context. Thus the phrase *gaṇa sthiti* means neither more nor less than *gaṇanā-paddhati* (mode of reckoning). Dr. Bhandarkar is scarcely more correct in the second part of his remark, *viz.* that the word *gaṇa* when placed in juxtaposition with Mālava, must signify a 'tribe' and a 'tribe' only. For whatever ambiguity there might lurk in the compound *Mālava-gaṇa-sthiti-vaśat*, there is absolutely none in the uncompounded phrase *Mālavānām-gaṇa-sthityā*. That is, in other words, the compound is to be dissolved as *Mālavānām-gaṇa-sthiti* and not as *Mālava-gaṇasya sthiti*. The whole expression, therefore, means 'The system of reckoning (time) of the Mālavas,' i.e. prevalent in the Mālava country, or among the Mālava people.

Then again, the phrase *śri-mālavagaṇāmnāte* which occurs in the third Mandasor inscription, may now be rendered 'in the year counted according to the reckoning of the Mālavas'. Strangely

¹ *Ind. Ant.* xix, pp. 56-7.

² *Bhandarkar Com.*, p. 191.

³ *Ibid.*

enough, Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar, who brought the inscription to light, gets puzzled over the word 'āmnāta.' The word, however, means simply 'counted' or 'mentioned.' In this sense it is of pretty frequent occurrence, as for instance, in the *Kāvya-prakāśa*, vii, *atra daivata-subdo—pumsī āmnātopi na kēnacit prayujyatē*. And now it will be easily perceived that the word *gaṇa* is used in all the three Mandasor inscriptions, as a neologism, the sense of which is recorded only by the *Śabdārṇava-kośa*. When the proper sense is assigned to it the Gordian knot is cut, and the whole verse yields a meaning which is quite felicitous. Had the author really meant to convey the idea of the rising of the Mālavas as a sovereign clan, as has been believed so far, it is pretty certain that he would have used the proper word, namely, *utthāna*, instead of *sthiti*, without doing the least violence to the metre. It is also interesting to note from the philological point of view, that the word *varṇa* which in its origin, is exactly similar to *gaṇa* came to have the sense of *varṇanā* in later times. The *Amara* does not record it, but the *Medini* does; 'Ya'soguna-Kathāsvāpi'; which little fact is sufficient to bear out the truth of my remarks. But interesting as the word is, it is still more interesting in its contradictory form. Vatsabhaṭṭi has twice used the word *nagaṇa* to the great confusion of the decipherers of epigraphs. Fleet and others have taken it as the name of a tree, though such a tree is never mentioned by any of the *Kośas*. Thus a veritable pseudonym has been brought into existence without the knowledge that it is so! But now in the light of this new sense of the word *gaṇa* it will be easily perceived that *nagaṇa* simply means 'countless' (*na-vidyate gaṇah-gaṇanā-yasya*). And this meaning of the word suits very well the two contexts in which it occurs. It is impossible to suppose that Vatsabhaṭṭi, the author, indulged his poetic fancy so far as to group with the best known flower-plants a tree like *nagaṇa*—a tree unknown, not only to the poets but even to lexicographers.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the phrase *gaṇa-sthiti* can no longer be a proof of the existence of anything like a republic of the Mālavas. In connection with Mālava it simply stands for 'the system of reckoning time in the Mālava country.' Every student of Sanskrit knows that the names of countries are always plural in form, and as such they have absolutely no reference to the political constitution of the people. Even the distinct mention of

warlike clans as such does not prove anything of their internal form of Government. For we find the Vṛṣṇis or Yādavas mentioned as a powerful race in the *Mahabharata*, but clearly they were under a monarchic government. So also, in later Indian history, several Rājput clans like the Rāṭhōrs, renowned for their bravery, are mentioned without the least reference to their political constitution.

And now the next question is: Who founded the Mālwa era, if not the Mālwa clan? To this question there is but one answer. King Vikramāditya of the Pramāra dynasty, the son of Mahēndra, the emperor of Ujjayinī, and the hero of numberless romantic legends, founded the era in the year 57 B.C. That he was a historical personage and not a fictitious character, I shall now prove from sources which scarcely seem to have been handled heretofore for this purpose.¹ The first and earliest account of him is to be found in the *Kathāsaritsāgara* which, though not very old in itself, is yet considerably old in its original, namely, the *Bṛhatkatha* of Guṇāḍhya. Another account of him we get in the chronicles of the Rājput bards, who whatever their drawbacks as historians might be, were never in the habit of giving false names and fictitious genealogies. From these chronicles of the Rājput bards Abūl Faẓl has given a short account of Bikramajit (Vikramāditya) and also of his genealogy.² According to this account Āditya Punwār (Pramāra) was the founder of the dynasty. The name of Vikramāditya's father is given as Gandhabba (Gandharva) there, but I think, it is hardly correct. The names of several kings were probably missing, and the bards, in consequence, were obliged to prolong the reins of the known monarchs in order to make up for the discrepancy. Thus the genealogy, though correct in so far as it is available, is not quite complete. The *Kathāsaritsāgara* has it that Vikramāditya was the son of Mahēndrāditya and Saumyadarśanā, and I think, that is the more correct account of the two.³ The fact that Āditya was the founder of the race and that Mahendra and Vikrama appended the title Āditya, each after his name, clearly, proves that the dynasty took it as a common appellation even as the Guptas did three centuries later. It is not therefore an integral part of the name of the founder of the Sarnvat era, any more than is the

¹ See *Beginnings of South Indian History*, by S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, published 1918, pp. 56-7. *Editor*.

² *Ain-i-Akbari*, Sūba of Mālwa.

³ *Kathāsaritsāgara*, XVIII, 1.

word Gupta of such names as Samudragupta, Candragupta, etc. Hence it is that we find in the iron pillar inscription at Delhi the name of the king given as Candra only, and not as Candragupta. Thus the name Vikramāditya was originally only a proper name, and not at all a high-sounding honorific title. True, the name became such a title in after times; but this was more because of its immortal association with the great monarch who bore it first, than because of its import. Instances in support of this view are to be found in the histories of all countries. Names like Akbar, Śivaji, Frederick and Napoleon—names which were only proper names at first became later on honorific titles for the descendants of those great men and other claimants for distinction. If Candragupta II, then, assumed the title Vikramāditya, as unquestionably he did, it only proved the fact that the name of the great founder of the Vikrama Samvat had attained a very high degree of renown in the 4th century A.D.

The *Kathāsaritsāgara* gives an interesting account of the parentage, birth, and romantic exploits of *this* Vikramāditya and of no other. The romance we may discard here, as it is useless for our present purpose. But the account of his parentage and birth is very important from the historical point of view. For, in the first place, such a graphic account cannot be a fiction; and, secondly the name of the hero and the character which is given to him therein, are in perfect accordance with those of the founder of the Vikrama era—the traditional Vikramāditya. And an examination into the date of the *Bṛhatkathā* will clearly settle the point. The *Bṛhatkathā* of Guṇādhya, as is quite well known, was a book written, not indeed in Sanskrit, but in the Pāṣāṇī language. In bulk it was as big as the present *Mahābhārata*, on which obviously it seems to have been modelled. For if the *Mahābhārata* is divided into 18 *parvans*, the *Bṛhatkathā* was divided into as many *lambakas*. Evidently, therefore, this equality as regards the number of divisions and the number of verses, leaves little or no doubt that Guṇādhya emulated Vyāsa.¹ As to the date of this prolific writer, it is generally believed that he was a contemporary of the Sātavāhana kings, an account of whom he gives in his book.

¹ Hopkins, in fixing the date of the *Mahābhārata*, clearly seems to be unaware of Guṇādhya's debt to Vyāsa. If the date of the *Bṛhatkathā* is the first century A.D., the date of the present *Mahābhārata* must be at least a few centuries before Christ.

Any thing later than that in point of time, he does not narrate. And this is what helps us in fixing his date as the first century A.D. For, like the author of the *Mahābhārata*, he does not lay claim only to high antiquity, with the reservation of the right to describe later kings and events by way of prophecy. He has, indeed, no reason to impose himself upon the reader as an older writer than he really is. Those scholars, therefore, who attempt to fix the date of the *Bṛhatkathā* as the 4th century A.D. are manifestly in the wrong. Dr. A. B. Keith, indeed, frankly admits that there is no evidence to suppose that the book was not written in the 1st century A.D. But even taking it for granted that the *Bṛhatkathā* was composed in the 4th century A.D., it may be asked, what Vikramāditya is this that is described in the last *lambaka* thereof? For, as already remarked above, the account is not a fiction, and if that Vikramāditya were no other than Candragupta II, how is it possible that a writer who lived in the 4th century A.D. and who therefore was a contemporary—or almost a contemporary—of that monarch, should give such a false account as regards his parentage, country, etc.? Are we to believe that the author was so ignorant of these important particulars about the great Gupta emperor, if he chose him for one of his heroes? And, if not ignorant, what motive could he have—*cui bono*,—as the Roman lawyer was wont to ask—for giving us such a tissue of falsehood? Certainly the Guptas were not like some plebeian monarchs, who endeavour to exalt themselves in the eye of posterity by inventing specious relationships with former renowned families. On the contrary, so far from being plebeians, they came from a noble and distinguished stock, and inherited the best and the noblest blood. In their inscriptions we find them dwelling at great length on the dignity which they derive from their nobility of descent, as well as their alliances with the Lichhavis and other distinguished clans of those times. The *Bṛhatkathā*, must be regarded, therefore, as a work of the 1st century A.D., and the Vikramāditya described therein is no other than the founder of the Samvat era. The account of him as given in the *Kathāsaritsāgara* fully tallies with everything which tradition has preserved of that great and good ruler.¹ According to this account, he was a *gaṇa* (attendant) of Śhiva, Mālyavat by name, specially sent down to the

¹ *Kathāsaritsāgara*, XVIII, 1.

earth for the annihilation of the Mlechhas (barbarians), the suppression of anti-Vedic creeds like Buddhism, and the revival of Vedicism or Brāhmanism. He seems to have been a devout Śaiva, though not a bigot, and the creed of Śaivism seems to have obtained a permanent ascendancy in Mālava on account of the magnificence of his own piety. The famous shrine of Mahākālā at Ujjayinī, destroyed by the Muhammadans in the 13th century A.D. was, as we may now believe, built by this very Vikramāditya. The following extract from Firishta, the celebrated historian, will be found very interesting in this connection.

'After the reduction of Guāliar, the King (Sultan Altamesh) marched his army towards Malwa, reduced the fort of Bhilsa, and took the city of Oojein (Ujjain), where he destroyed a magnificent temple dedicated to Mahakaly (Mahākālī) formed under the same plan with that of Somnāth. This temple is said to have occupied three hundred years in building, and was surrounded by a wall one hundred cubits in height. The image of Vikramāditya, who had been formerly prince of this country, and so renowned, that the Hindus have taken an era from his death, as also the image of Mahakaly (Mahākālī), both of stone, with many other figures of brass, were found in the temple. These images the king caused to be conveyed to Dehli and broken at the door of the great mosque.'¹

All this is perfectly in keeping with the creed, the greatness, and the beneficence of the legendary Vikramāditya only. And nothing can be farther from the truth than to assign to Candragupta II the credit of such a notable achievement. For, in the first place the Guptas were avowed Vaiṣṇavas in their creed, and secondly there is not even the least reference to this in their inscriptions, though such a reference would be well in unison with the splendid account of their greatness which they are pleased to give us. It is, besides, absurd in the highest degree to imagine a Vaiṣṇava king, however wealthy or mighty he may be, rearing such a stupendous structure in honour of Śiva, a structure, which according to the above account from Firishta, must have strained the resources of a prosperous kingdom for a number of years.

The *Rajataranginī* also mentions two Vikramādityas, who at any rate, are other than Candragupta II. The first of these two belongs to

¹ *Firishta*, Trans. by Col. Briggs, vol. I, p. 211.

a period which is, at least, a century B.C. : 'Then a king of the name of Pratāpāditya, a relative of King Vikramāditya, was brought by them from afar and crowned (on the throne of Kashmīr)'.¹ The second Vikramāditya of Kalhaṇa is Śilāditya of Ujjayinī. But so confused is the whole chronology of Kalhaṇa in the case of the earlier rulers of Kashmīr, that he assigns a reign of three hundred years to Raṇāditya alone! It is, therefore, perfectly clear that he is misled in his account of this latter king Vikramāditya. As a matter of fact, he criticises his predecessors for confounding the two kings.² But I think that *they* are right, and that he himself is wrong. It also appears to me that he attributes to the second a grandeur and a renown which really belong to the first. Such a confusion, indeed, is natural in one, who, though a historian of good critical acumen, does not pretend to know the history of other dynasties but those of Kashmīr. His first Vikramāditya therefore, is in all probability the same as the one described in the last book of the *Kaṭhasaritsāgara*, that is to say, he is the same as the founder of the Saṃvat era.

All this historical evidence, so far neglected by antiquarians, points unmistakably to one and the same Vikramāditya. And he is none other than the hero of the very numerous legends which survive to this day. His long and remarkably successful career, his patronage of learning, his romantic adventures, and his piety, seem in their combination, to have imparted a peculiar glow and immortality to his name, which since then, became a source of inspiration for all aspiring Hindu princes. During his long and glorious reign there appears to have been that revival of Brāhmanism and Brahmanical learning which made Mālava a stronghold against Buddhism and Jainism, and at the same time the mother of poets and astronomers. A second, and in some respects similar, revival took place in the period of the Guptas also, but that was not certainly the first, as Dr. Keith and a number of Western Orientalists confidently assert. For the Guptas are never credited with anything of the kind by the *purāṇas*, which explicitly mention the Agnikula Kṣatriyas as the first restorers of the old order. Nor were they fortunate enough to leave behind them any kind of glorious traditions. But, however we may account for it, the fact remains undisputed that no tradition relating to any of the Gupta

¹ *Rajataranginī*, I, 2-6.

² *Ibid.*

emperors has been handed down to posterity. All their history, as is well known, is based on epigraphic and numismatic data. The vast body of tradition, on the other hand, refers only to that Vikramāditya who is the founder of the Samvat era. And so strong is their cumulative effect that at least Edgerton and Vincent Smith have, in spite of the epigraphic puzzle, recorded it as their opinion that such a king might have lived at the time, i.e. in the first century B.C.¹

And now when the epigraphic puzzle is got rid of, and a body of direct historical evidence has been adduced, the existence of the legendary Vikramāditya, I think, should be no more doubtful than that of Samudragupta in Indian history. Besides the legacy of traditions, he has left his immortal era to posterity.

As, however, antiquarians disbelieved the very fact of the foundation of the era by Vikramāditya, naturally they indulged their fancy in a large amount of speculation as regards its connection with his name. To their great satisfaction, they found in Candragupta II, their first Vikramāditya, a ruler, who, if not the actual founder of the era, was at least the patron and appropriator of the same. It is remarkable that none of the historians and scholars who have recorded this opinion seems to have been struck with the strangeness of the assumption. For it is not only against all analogy, but it is against the very Indian idea of imperial dignity. No Indian ruler has, as yet, attempted to appropriate, or rather misappropriate, the era founded by another. Had Candragupta made the alleged misappropriation, certainly it would have been a good example for a number of later kings to follow. And instead of a number of eras of mushroom growth that obtrude themselves upon our notice, we would have discovered only attempts at misappropriation in that case. No known king, however, down to the time of Śivaji, is guilty of such a crime. Few indeed, have been fortunate enough to continue their eras for a long time; but all such as aspired to that greatness have been dignified enough to found them separately in commemoration of their supremacy. But besides these general reasons, Candragupta had an additional reason against the alleged misappropriation. The Gupta era had been already founded by his own illustrious ancestor in the year 319 A.D. And if he had patronized another era in supersession

of it, he would have been guilty of sullyng the sacred bequest of his own ancestor. Thus the belief that he gave his name to the Mālava era is only a gratuitous assumption, an assumption which has its origin in the misinterpretation of the phrase *gaṇa-sthiti*, and its development in the confusion consequent upon it. The era, in fact, was neither founded by the Mālava clan, as has been already proved above, nor named after Candragupta II, *alias* Vikramāditya.

Now it is true that the Samvat era is mentioned in the earlier inscriptions without the founder's name connected with it. But that does not prove that it was nameless at the time, or that it was otherwise designated. For it is a fact, too flagrantly notorious, that Sanskrit writers have been all along in the habit of making an indifferent mention of the eras they use. Expressions like 'the era', 'the era that is current', after the lapse of—years since the 'Śaka Kings' etc., are generally to be met with in Sanskrit writings. Thus Varāhamihira simply says *gatāni varṣāṇi Śakendra-kālāt* i.e., 'the years that passed since the time of the Śaka King'.² His commentator, Utpala also makes a similarly indifferent mention of the Śaka era: *Vasvaṣṭastamite* (888) *Saka* at the end of his commentary. So also in the inscriptions: *Gupta-prakāle gaṇanām vidhāya* (Girnār Rock Inscription of Samudragupta); *Samāsu samatītāsu Sakānāmapī bhubhujām* (Aihole inscription of Pulakeśin II). Thus it is clear that Sanskrit writers were not particular to mention eras in their proper style. It is very probable that the Gupta era also bore the full name of the founder, and in the popular parlance of those days it was known in its full and proper style. As to the Śālivāhana era, we find it generally styled the 'Śaka era' till nearly a thousand years from its foundation. But no antiquarian has, as yet, thought it worth his while to propound a theory similar to the one about the Samvat era, probably because there is no king of the name of Śālivāhana about that period in Indian history, with whose name the era could be conveniently connected. It is, however, by no means difficult to explain the indifference or looseness of the style in which all eras are mentioned by Sanskrit writers.

First they were handicapped by the exigency of the metre, which, in most cases, could not permit a full expression of the usual style of

¹ Edgerton's *Vikrama's Adventures*, Intro., p. lxv.

² *Byhatsamhitā*, VIII, 20.

the era. Secondly, there was a conflict of various eras in India in the early centuries after Christ. And it is scarcely necessary to remark that until that conflict ended in the supremacy of one and the abolition of others, writers and inscribers expressed themselves in general phrases in so far as reckoning of years was concerned. It is these general phrases that have so considerably added to the confusion of the writers of early Indian history, though the authors of the various inscriptions meant thereby to avoid ambiguity. Thirdly, men like Vatsabhaṭṭi, who flourished in the times of the Gupta rulers, would not offend their sovereigns by an explicit mention of the Vikrama-Saṁvat-*era*, while the Gupta era was the recognised era of the court and of official documents. The very fact, however, that the Vikrama Saṁvat is used in the Mandasor inscriptions is a piece of evidence which unmistakably proves that it was gradually gaining ground among the populace in spite of the rival eras. And the same fact completely vitiates the theory that has stood uncontradicted so far, viz., that the original Mālava era came to be styled the Vikrama era after Candragupta II, who gave himself the title of Vikramāditya. For, if it were so, how is it possible that Vatsabhaṭṭi should be either so ignorant or negligent as to retain the old style, even after the lapse of nearly a century since the supposed act of appropriation? The era indeed, is not discovered as yet with the name of Vikrama associated with it till the time of the Dholpur inscription of 842 A. D. The Candragupta theory would have been at least a plausible conjecture if it had been discovered that immediately after that monarch the Mālava era came to be designated the Vikrama era. But this is exactly what it fails to prove, and thus it becomes a superfluous hypothesis. It is quite strange that such a hypothesis should have so readily fallen in with the natural inclination of a very large number of scholars, and for so long a time! Such a theory, indeed, is as little needed for the Saṁvat, as for the Śaka era. The reasons adduced by me above, are quite adequate to explain the indifference or looseness as we may call it, of Sanskrit writers in naming the Vikrama, the Śālivāhana, and the other eras known to them. Nor can any rational inference be drawn from the fact that the Vikrama Saṁvat is styled as 'Vikrama Śaka' in several places.

And now I come to my conclusions, which are these :—There never existed a republic in Mālava, either in the first century B.C., or before

or after it. King Vikramāditya of Ujjayinī founded the Saṁvat era, though like the Śālivāhana Śaka era, it is vaguely called 'the system of reckoning in the Mālava country', in the earlier inscriptions. And, finally, the hypothesis which has obtained general credit among scholars, and for more than half a century—the hypothesis that seeks to account for that vagueness of style by connecting the era with Candragupta II—is as groundless in the assumption, as it is unserviceable for the purpose which it is called upon to serve.

The Historical Material in the Private Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai (1736-61)

BY

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X

I. FRENCH VICTORY AT TIRUVITI AND BUSSY'S CAPTURE OF GINGEE

THE Diarist was told on the second of September (1750) that, on the previous day, the French attacked Muhammad Ali Khan who was encamped at Kumaramangalam and forced him to abandon his camp and set fire to his tents and goods, while the English were abused for dishonestly abandoning him 'like a guide deserting a blind man in midstream.' The army of Muhammad Ali was computed by Orme at 5,000 foot and 15,000 horse; but his disposition and camp were absurdly arranged.¹ The French advanced with their field-pieces in front, baggage carts in the rear and cavalry on each wing; the enemy's cannon and musketry did no execution; and on the advance of the troops within 200 yards of their camp, their entrenchments were abandoned and cannon deserted. The camp was broken into and the cavalry was thrown into utter confusion. Some 20 cannon, 1,000 matchlocks and 2,000 muskets were taken from them; while the tents were set on fire and Muhammad Ali himself made his escape with great loss and hurried away in the direction of Arcot. On the French side only one officer and six or seven sepoy were killed. It was reported to the Diarist that Muhammad Ali was slightly

¹ 'His camp extended between two villages which secured the flanks; the rear was defended by a river; while in the front there were several entrenchments occupied by the infantry; and in the other intervals where there were no entrenchments, cannon were planted; the cavalry, instead of being out on the plain, formed a second line within the camp.' (Orme vol. i, p. 150). In the French attack, La Tour commanded the right wing, Bussy the left, and D'Auteuil the centre. The whole camp of Muhammad Ali and all his artillery, including 30 guns and 2 mortars, bearing the arms of Great Britain according to Dupleix's *Memoirs*, fell into French hands (Dodwell).

wounded in the leg by a bullet. Dupleix planned that the troops at Tiruviti should march towards Arcot by way of Gingee or Wandiwash.¹

Meanwhile Nasir Jang continued to be indifferent to the state of affairs; and mutual recriminations were freely indulged in by his courtiers. Shah Nawaz Khan charged Mir Asad with treachery and with being in correspondence with the Pondicherry people, while Murtaza Ali Khan was told to attack Pondicherry with Mir Asad who was rebuked for having originally advised that Muhammad Ali was to be helped at all. Shah Nawaz himself is said to have boasted that, but for the Nizam's orders that he should return at once to Aurangabad, he himself would soon set out to attack the French.

Fearing that Muhammad Ali might take refuge in Trichinopoly, Chanda Sahib was advised by Dupleix to write to the *killedar* of that place, persuading him not to admit the refugee prince into the fort and promising him a valuable *jaghir* as reward. It was also reported that Muhammad Ali was afraid to halt at Gingee whither Nasir Jang had promised to send him reinforcements. Dupleix was also hopeful that, if French troops should advance in the direction of Arcot, the Pathan Nawabs of Cuddapah and Kurnool would, as they had formerly promised, have a good chance of seizing the person of Nasir Jang; while Muhammad Ali would never approach the French troops that were advancing under M. Bussy and Shaikh Hasan, the *jemadar* of sepoy. The Diarist even heard that Nasir Jang who boastfully recalled all the troops he had sent away, declaring he would march in person against the enemy, had again ordered the artillery and troops to return without delay. Mr. Saunders, the new Governor of Fort St. David, which remained the seat of the Presidency till April 1752, is said to have received a letter from Muhammad Ali, demanding

¹ It appears from the *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi* that Muhammad Ali had secured the friendship of the English by giving them the hope of the grant of the *jaghir* of Poonamalle, that Nasir Jang was persuaded by the intriguing Pathan Nawabs and Ramadas Pandit to order Muhammad Ali to sever his relationship with the English, that he had ordered Abdul Nabl Khan of Cuddapah and Himmat Khan of Kurnool to subjugate Fort St. David and Madras respectively, that Muhammad Ali contrived to give a large bribe to Ramdas Pandit through Raja Sampath Rai and Raja Bashan Das and to persuade them and Shah Nawaz Khan to see that the order for the expulsion of the English was withdrawn. When the battle was lost, Muhammad Ali fled to Gingee, but wished once again to proceed to Tiruviti to engage with the enemy; but he was suddenly recalled by the Nizam to his presence.

powder and shot for which he had advanced money and complaining of Cope's behaviour, while the latter justified his conduct, saying that the fault was not his, but that he had only obeyed Major Lawrence's orders to march back to Fort St. David.¹ The Diarist says that he heard that Floyer was at the bottom of the whole thing, while Morse was being kept under surveillance, and Lawrence was being frequently summoned to the Fort for consultation; and also the Major would be soon returning to Europe and be succeeded by Cope in command. Meanwhile events moved in quick succession. Nasir Jang remained inactive at Arcot; and the English were sulky with Muhammad Ali and 'reduced to an almost compulsory inaction.' Dupleix sent orders to D'Auteuil to detach a sufficient force under M. de Bussy to attack Gingee, the possession of which great fortress would be decisive of the fate of the Carnatic.² Bussy carried the fortress by escalade (11th September); and the feat was regarded as a wonderful achievement; while the loss of this fortress awakened Nasir Jang to the true peril of his situation.

II. FRENCH INTRIGUES—NASIR JANG'S DEATH

There followed an inaction of more than two months' duration till the beginning of December. On the side of the French, D'Auteuil seemed to be 'strangely resolved to rest on Bussy's laurels'. Dupleix indeed wrote to him urging him to advance at once against Nasir Jang. Even before the capture of Gingee, he was anxious that the French troops should march towards Arcot, as then the Nawabs of Cuddapah and Kurnool would have a good chance of seizing Nasir Jang, according to their promise.³ One of the Maratha *mansabdars* in

¹ Orme says that Major Lawrence was much offended by the prevarications of Muhammad Ali who first made excuses for payment and at last declared he had none, having exhausted his treasury by giving Nasir Jang twenty lakhs of rupees. When there was no prospect of an action, as the French would not and the English could not attack, and as the English officers and men were daily falling sick, Lawrence, with the advice of Stark and Powney, recalled the troops. (Vide *Despatch to the Company from Fort St. David*, dated October 24, 1753.)

² For details of the exploit of the capture of this famous fortress see Orme, vol. i, pp. 151-2; Malleson's *History of the French in India*, new edition, pp. 263-5; and Martineau's *Dupleix et l'Inde Française*, vol. iii (1749-54), pp. 134-8. The force at the disposal of Bussy consisted of 250 Europeans, 1,200 sepoys and four field-pieces. The capture of Gingee was hardly rivalled 'until 40 years later under Cornwallis, we (the English) stormed certain of the rock-forts in Mysore.'

³ Diarist's entry for September 5, reporting a conversation he had with the Governor (p. 376 of vol. vii).

Nasir Jang's camp, sent a message to Chanda Sahib and Dupleix that, if the French had marched on Arcot immediately after taking Gingee,¹ the Nizam could easily have been seized, and urged that the time had now come for the French to move, in order to capture or slay Nasir Jang and establish Muzaffar Jang on the throne. It was also added that as the Pathan Nawabs and other *sardars* were secretly working on the French side, French troops should have continued to advance beyond Chetpattu which they had reached, but from which D'Auteuil had hastily retired, on hearing that Nasir Jang's forces had reached Dēsur (twenty miles off) and justified his retreat by asserting that the Pathan Nawabs and others were only deceiving them with false promises.² Dupleix tried to console himself as best he could, by saying that the French troops had not retired for any lack of confidence in themselves, but only on account of the constant rains and flooded rivers, and they would advance as soon as the rains were over and the roads became passable. Things were much worse on Nasir Jang's side. In the beginning of October, his army was encamped on the north side of the Cheyyar river which was flooded; for want of fodder and the rains, horses and bullocks were dying in numbers; the artillery could scarcely cover four miles in a day; the horsemen were unwilling to march; and Nasir Jang himself marched in the rear and not in the front of his army. The Diarist was told that many of the *sardars* had not marched with the troops, that Arcot was

¹ *The Tuzuk-i-Walajahi* of Burhanu'd-din says that after the French had captured Gingee, Nasir Jang ordered Muhammad Ali to lay siege to the captured place and to prevent any succour to the besieged from Pondicherry; and accordingly the latter sent his *Bakshi*, Md. Abrar Khan, with an army to Gingee. But the conspirators persuaded Nasir Jang to transfer the forces of Muhammad Ali to protect Conjeevaram, which, they said, was threatened by the French troops at Chingleput; and thus Abrar Khan was recalled from Gingee and sent with augmented forces to Conjeevaram; thus, in the quaint words of Burhanu'd-din, 'the *maidan* of impudence became extensive for the French and for those corrupted by mischief.'

² Vide pp. 395 and 399 of the Diary, vol. vii. Dupleix had gained over to his side Ramdas Pandit who was high in the confidence of Nasir Jang and through him had tried to raise sedition in the Nizam's army.

³ Raja Ramdas was a low servant receiving the wage of one *hun* under the government of Nawab Shaheed (Anwaru'd-din) when the latter was the Nazim at Chicacole and gradually rose to importance in the durbar of Asif Jah. Later by the kindness of Nawab Nasir Jang he was given the title of Raja and was promoted to the position of the *Peshkar Bakshi* of the army.—*Eng. tr.* of the *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi* of Burhanu'd-din, done by Mr. Md. Husain Nainar of the Madras University.

crowded with all sorts of people and rice was scarce and sold in camp at five *pucca* seers per rupee. In his opinion, D'Auteuil knew these facts well, but had retired ingloriously from Chetpattu and attempted nothing in spite of frequent encouraging letters from Dupleix. When Sanoji Nimbalkar and Ramachandra Rao were ordered by Nasir Jang to march as an advance guard, they refused, pleading it would be dangerous and they could do nothing and advised him that war should cease and peace be made. Shah Nawaz Khan was of the same opinion and advised his master not to fight, as the army was small and a favourable time would offer itself later.¹ D'Auteuil demanded his recall from the field and pleaded sickness, the heavy rains and his men's reluctance to continue in camp in such weather; and 'Dupleix had much ado to prevent his marching his troops back to Pondicherry and forwarded to him every scrap of encouraging news that he received.' D'Auteuil actually returned to Pondicherry on October 22; and Dupleix asked the Diarist to write to Muzaffar Khan, the *jemadar* of sepoys, to remain in the villages lying between Villupuram and Gingee and join the main body if he should be directed by De la Touche who had succeeded to the command, and not to send in the guns from Gingee.

Murtaza Ali Khan meanwhile contrived to send a message to Dupleix suggesting that he would secure Arcot from Nasir Jang, that he might be made the Nawab and Chanda Sahib might get Trichinopoly, or as an alternative, that he should be confirmed in the possession of his *killa* and *jaghir* and be *diwan* to Chanda Sahib. Dupleix did not take this seriously at all. He deplored that D'Auteuil's indecision and weakness had spoiled the whole situation and that the rains should prevent the French from using their muskets and artillery which gave an advantage to the enemy.

Nasir Jang had at last ordered his troops to march towards Gingee and himself joined the main body in the beginning of October. His army was considerably less numerous than when he entered the Carnatic; but he could still count, according to the authority of Orme, 60,000 foot, 45,000 horse, 700 elephants and 360 pieces of cannon.² On the evening of the 24th October, a body of Nasir Jang's horse

¹ Diarist's entries for October 10 and 12—pp. 401, 404 and 405 of vol. vii.

² According to letters received by Dupleix, the Mughal effective cavalry was not more than 15,000.

about 4,000 in number who were lying in ambush in several places round Gingee, were encountered by a few French dragoons and Muhammadan troopers. As it was heavily raining, the Muhammadan troopers could not fire and insisted on retreating to camp; the dragoons lost their way and many were killed. The French army marched the next day, but was obliged by the heavy rains, to retreat to Gingee where there were not sufficient provisions.¹

Dupleix continued his active intrigue with Nasir Jang's court where it was presently rumoured that Mir Asad and Murtaza Ali Khan were in the immediate favour of Nasir Jang and urged him to march against Pondicherry and Chanda Sahib, and that the latter had a design to seize the suspected Pathan Nawabs who were consequently on their guard.² All the same Nasir Jang let Dupleix know, through Kazi Dayem, that he was not averse to negotiations, would let bygones be bygones and would even visit Pondicherry and become the friend of the French, adding that if he were to give way to Dupleix's demands, he would be regarded as weak, feeble and helpless. Dupleix replied in suitable terms to this secret offer, protesting that he had ever been Nasir Jang's well-wisher and had not himself sought

¹ According to the letter of the *amaldar* of Gingee, quoted by the Diarist in his entry for the 27th of October, 1750.

² According to the *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi* Mir Dayem Ali Khan, the sirdar of the advance guard of Nasir Jang's army, warned his master against the intended treachery of the Afghan Nawabs and the evil disposition of Raja Ramdas, on the very eve of his assassination. Nasir Jang even gave an order for the killing of Muzaffar Jang; but Ramdas bribed the executors and sought to delay them. The Nizam mounted an elephant, unarmed and without being protected by any armour; he was surrounded only by a few torch-bearers and *bandars*; and he rode, as the day dawned, towards the elephants of Abdul Nabi Khan and Himmat Bahadur Khan and salaamed to them. But they pretended ignorance of his presence; and he saluted them a second time with a loud voice; and followed up with the words that it was incumbent on them, brothers of the same faith, to fight the stranger. Then Himmat Bahadur aimed with his musket at the Nawab and shot him through the heart. In the confusion that ensued, Muhammad Ali departed for Trichinopoly with only Gazanfar Ali Khan and a single guide. He was joined by a dozen servants of his at Tiruvannamalai. At Ranjangudi, its Jaghirdar, Mutabir Khan Tahir, pretended under cover of hospitality to receive him in the fort, with a view to get him secured. It was only by the presence of mind of Gazanfar Ali Khan, who held the Jaghirdar in firm grip, that Muhammad Ali was enabled to escape; and the rescuer also quickly rejoined his master in safety.

See also Wilks, vol. i, note on p. 166 in which he gives the narrative of Nasir Jang's end almost verbally from the *Serve-i-Azad* whose author was in the tent of the Nizam when the alarm was given and assisted him to dress.

his enmity and had always desired the country merchants and inhabitants to be at peace. He even offered to stop all fighting if the negotiations should begin. This was the situation on October 29, after which date there occurs a hiatus in the diary which lasts on till the 16th of April, 1751. This is one of the principal lacunæ and possibly this, like other breaks, represents lost volumes; and the Diary would probably have given us much interesting information about the negotiations with Nasir Jang and about the circumstances under which the French attacked Nasir Jang's camp on the fateful day of 16th December and the alleged mistake under which the attack was delivered just at the moment when Dupleix had made peace, whether genuinely or not.

III. A HIATUS IN THE DIARY: OCTOBER 1750 TO APRIL 1751— SUMMARY OF EVENTS

Before the Diary begins again for us in April 1751, Muzaffar Jang who was raised to the throne after his uncle's assassination, had appointed Dupleix as his deputy in all the country south of the Krishna and made a grant, to the French, of Masulipatam and Divi Island; and it was deemed necessary that a French force should proceed to Golconda to secure Nasir Jang's treasure and firmly establish Muzaffar Jang there before any party could be raised against him. Bussy was chosen to command the French contingent and was rewarded with a present of 4 lakhs of rupees, while Dupleix received an immense sum in jewels and treasure, and all men of the French contingent received three months' pay in advance, besides valuable presents. Bussy had, as his second and third in command, Kerjean who was a nephew of Dupleix and Vincens who was his stepson. The contingent was composed of 300 Europeans and 1,800 sepoy with about 10 field-guns. Muzaffar Jang, on departing for the north, appointed Chanda Sahib to the government of Arcot. While at Pondicherry, Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Sahib wrote to the English, demanding the restoration of the sea-ports like Devikotta that they had occupied during the recent troubles. This revolution alarmed the ruler of Tanjore who now demanded English assistance in consequence of a treaty that he had concluded with Floyer. Muhammad Ali who escaped to Trichinopoly put in his claims also for English support, but also opened negotiations with the French, as it was the harvest season and the

longer he could remain at peace with them, the greater were the chances of his collecting any revenue. He therefore contrived to prolong negotiations with Dupleix and Chanda Sahib for four months (December, 1750 to March 1751), and communicated regularly to the English all his discussions with them. Saunders, the English Governor, maintained that as Muhammad Ali had been appointed Nawab of Arcot by Nasir Jang, he continued to be the legitimate and rightful Nawab till another appointment was made from Delhi; the English having received *farmans* for the districts granted by Muhammad Ali, a detachment was sent to Trichinopoly under Captain Cope to secure it from any attempts by Chanda Sahib; and another detachment was sent to assist the ruler of Tanjore in consideration of a *farman* that he granted for Devikottai and its bounds. The English also intended to send men to Divi Island and Masulipatam to hoist English flags on the island and in the factory.¹

Chanda Sahib and the French moved out from Pondicherry only in March, 1751, and after reducing one or two forts, proceeded to Arcot to receive the tribute of the *killedars* and other notables; and he prepared to advance against Trichinopoly only towards the end of May or later, by which time Saunders had sent a force under Captain de Gingens to oppose his march.

Meanwhile events in Muzaffar Jang's camp had also moved fast. The Pathan Nawabs looked on with jealousy at the turn that affairs were taking. Pondicherry was now the pivot of the whole country; all matters were decided by the French, who were enriched by securing considerable accessions of territory.² Consequently there was great discontent which was bound to break out as soon as Muzaffar Jang

¹ Despatch of the President and Council of Fort St. David to the Company, dated Fort St. David, January 24, 1751—summarised in Dodwell's *The Madras Despatches, 1744-55*—pp. 118-9.—See also Orme MSS. O. V. 17; 1; and 15; 5; pp. 24 and 22 of Hill's *Catalogue of the Orme Collection of MSS.*

² Muzaffar Jang, according to the *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi*, conferred on Dupleix the title of Zafar Jang, granted the French the *jaghirs* of Gingee, Tiruviti and other places, while Law, D'Auteuil and other French captains were given suitable titles, *mansabs* and presents. Himmat Bahadur Khan was given the title of Rustam Jang and the *jaghirs* of Raichur and Adoni. Abdul Nabi Khan got the *jaghirs* of Gandikotta, Gooty, and Gurramkonda; and Abdul Karim Khan secured the *jaghir* of Sira; and Ramdas Pandit got the title of Raja Raghunath Das; while Abdul Rahman got the title of Muzaffar Khan. Muzaffar Jang also wrote a friendly letter to Muhammad Ali Khan at Trichinopoly, according to the plan and counsel of Dupleix and Januji, the Maratha, and sent it along with letters from the latter.

should depart from the Carnatic. When he was encamped at Raya-choti, 5 days' march from Arcot and in the dominion of the Nawab of Cuddapah, the latter and the Nawab of Kurnool complained that Muzaffar Jang was allowing the Marathas to plunder their country contrary to his promise; and they seized some French horse and stopped the French ammunition. The Pathan Nawabs had agreed, before Dupleix and under his pressure, that half the money found in Nasir Jang's treasury should be divided amongst them, while their dominions should be increased by some districts, which were however much less than what they first demanded; and they also agreed that all the jewels should be reserved for Muzaffar Jang.¹

In the skirmish that ensued, the Nawab of Cuddapah attacked the rear-guard of Muzaffar Jang's troops which escorted the women,² whereupon the Nizam ordered his whole army to halt and prepared to march against the Cuddapah troops. Bussy who had received specific instructions to avoid all occasions of being drawn into committing hostilities, now intervened and persuaded Muzaffar Jang to first call upon the Nawab to explain the reason of his conduct. The Nawab, though defiant to Muzaffar Jang's message, sent word to Bussy that he was ready to submit to the Nizam through French mediation. This behaviour stung Muzaffar Jang to the quick and forced him to instant action. The troops of all the three Pathan Nawabs had already been drawn up in battle array and Muzaffar Jang marched to attack the rebels without French assistance, being impatient of the slow pace of their battalion. At first Muzaffar Jang's troops were repulsed; but the

¹ The Nawabs signed an agreement to this effect and swore on the *Koran* an oath of allegiance to Muzaffar Jang; and they declared that Nizam-ul-Mulk himself had never been able to obtain from them this mark of submission—(Orme: vol. I, p. 160).

² *The Tuzuk-i-Walajahi* says that Muzaffar Jang was not feeling quite safe, because of the knavery of some of the amirs of the army and the Afghans, especially of Himmat Bahadur Khan. Beyond Damalcheruvu, Mughal sepoys plundered the properties of the Afghans, in spite of their master's prohibition. In the course of the march, the Afghans one day looted a cart belonging to Muzaffar Khan (Abdul Rahman), the *llaqadar* of the French forces. Abdul Nabi Khan offered to pay compensation, but Muzaffar Khan did not agree; and the struggle began. Abdul Karim Khan of Savanur perished; Himmat Bahadur Khan fled, heavily wounded; he was later killed by order of Nizam Ali and his head fixed on a spear. The Mughal army plundered Cuddapah on the way; but Abdul Majid Khan, brother of Abdul Nabi Khan, sought peace by paying 3 lakhs of rupees. Kurnool was attacked and the wife and children of Himmat Bahadur were taken captive.

fire of the French artillery changed the fortunes of the day and forced the Nawabs to retreat. Muzaffar Jang, heedless of the advice of Bussy, pursued the fugitives, and left the French battalion behind once more, which however endeavoured to keep in sight of him. The Nawab of Savanur died on the field; while the Nawab of Cuddapah fled precipitately, being severely wounded. In his pursuit of the latter, Muzaffar Jang came up with the Nawab of Kurnool and proceeded to attack him personally, when, having uplifted his sword to strike, he was pierced in the head by the javelin of his opponent. Both the Nawab and his troops were overpowered and cut to pieces. The death of Muzaffar Jang left the French in great consternation, because they had now no pretension or claim to interfere in the affairs. But Bussy did not lose his presence of mind, assembled the generals and ministers, and persuaded them to raise Salabat Jang, the eldest of the three brothers of Nasir Jang who had been kept in close confinement, to the throne. French arms had again been decisive; and Salabat Jang agreed to confirm all the cessions to the French made by his predecessor and granted additional villages round Masulipatam, as well as a large donation to the French contingent. As soon as Dupleix's approbation was received, the Mughal army left the country of Cuddapah and continued its march towards the Krishna.

IV. CHANDA SAHIB'S MOVEMENTS: APRIL-JUNE 1751

The Diarist whose available narrative begins after the hiatus from April 16, 1751, mentions the capture of the fort of Chetpattu by Chanda Sahib who had at last moved out of Pondicherry with a French contingent under La Tour and the imprisonment of Mir Asad and his family. On April 18, news was received that Salabat Jang was encamped 12 *kos* on the other side of the Krishna, after taking Kurnool and making prisoners of its Nawab (Himayat Bahadur Khan) and his family, and that when the army had advanced 16 *kos* beyond the river, where a large Maratha army was lying in wait for them, Salabat Jang made a settlement with them, through the mediation of his minister Ramdas Pandit, by consenting to give them a *sanad* for the *chauth* of the provinces of Golconda, the Carnatic and Trichinopoly and that the minister was rewarded by the Nizam with a *mansab* of

7,000 horse,¹ Salabat Jang left a son-in-law of Muzaffar Khan (Abdul Rahman) in charge of the *kill* of Kurnool.² The Diarist, recording affairs in the Carnatic, said that the Vellore affair was settled by Chanda Sahib for 6 lakhs of rupees, which meant that there was a compounding with the evil-hearted Murtaza Ali. Shaikh Hasan, the sepoy leader who accompanied Chanda Sahib along with De la Tour was to have the fort and *jaghir* of Arni, yielding two lakhs of rupees; and his uncle, Muhammad Kamal, was also to receive a *jaghir*. Dupleix also arranged to give the lease of the Tinnevely country to

¹ The Peishwa, Balaji Baji Rao, had been jealous of Nasir Jang's rise and had entered into negotiations with Sayyad Lashkar Khan, the governor of Aurangabad, through the mediation of Ramdas Pandit. Sayyad Lashkar Khan induced Ghaziu' d-din, the eldest son of Naizamu'l-mulk, to oppose the succession of Nasir Jang and offer to cede to the Marathas, in return for their support, the two *subhas* of Aurangabad and Burhanpur. Thereupon the Peishwa left Poona towards the end of January, 1751, with a large army, accompanied by Fattah Sing, Raghuji Bhonsle and other leaders. The Marathas demanded a contribution from Sayyad Lashkar Khan, which, on pretence of coercion, the latter levied to the tune of 15 or 17 lakhs of rupees; and then they spread over the country and occupied the two *subhas*, and finally proceeded to the banks of the Krishna. When Balaji Rao was at Pangal, seven marches from Hyderabad, he received alarming news from Poona that Tarabai was preparing, in league with Damaji Gaekwad, to undermine his supremacy; he resolved to return to Poona, and ordered Sanoji Nimbalkar to make the best terms possible with the enemy. Salabat Jang who was ignorant of the Peishwa's situation, offered 17 lakhs of rupees, two in cash, and the rest in bills on bankers in Hyderabad, Aurangabad and Burhanpur. (See Kincaid and Parasnis—*History of the Maratha People*, vol. III, pp. 1-2; and Grant-Duff—*History of the Mahrattas* (4th ed.), vol. I, p. 527). Grant-Duff calls Ramdas Pandit, 'the traitor Ramdass, a fit instrument for the unprincipled ambition of Dupleix.' See also *Selections from the Peishwa's Daftar*, 6, *Ramaraja's Struggle for Power*—Letters Nos. 167, 163, 180 and 201.

The Diarist's entry, that news came from Satara that Shahu Raja's wife Tara Bai Umma Bai had been imprisoned and that internal dissensions were likely, does not convey any clear meaning (p. 431 of Vol. VII). It was in reality a plot woven by two women, Tara Bai and Uma Bai, the latter being the widow of Khanderao Dabhade who had been destroyed by the Peishwa. Tara Bai saw in Uma Bai a ready ally for her plan. Uma Bai was to equip an army under Damaji Gaekwad and effect a junction with Tara Bai who even sent emissaries to Ramdas Pandit who was in Salabat Jang's service and offered him the office of Peishwa if he would advance with the Nizam's army to her help. But the plan miscarried and the Peishwa was able to triumph.

² Abdul Rahman was the dewan of M. Bussy, and better known by his title of Hyder Jang. His father was a defaulter of revenue under the Nizam's government at Masulipatam and had been friendly to the French. In his distress he fled to Pondicherry where he was kindly treated by Dupleix. His son, Abdool Rehman, then a boy, soon acquired the French language, was useful to Dupleix in carrying on his intrigues with Ramdass, and upon the success of them, accompanied Bussy when he went with the Mughal army; and he was rewarded, as seen in note 2 on p. 163 with the title of Muzaffar Khan, by Muzaffar Jang.

Titarappa Mudali who afterwards became the renter of the district under Nawab Muhammad Ali and the English.¹ Titarappa was to pay 10 lakhs to Chanda Sahib and a present of 1 lakh to Dupleix, besides presents to Madame Dupleix, Madananda Pandit and others, and was to give a lease deed for 5 years; and the Poligar of Sivaganga and other chiefs were written to, to give the renter all possible assistance in occupying the country. But rumour was rife that as Muhammad Ali was made strong at Trichinopoly by the English and as Chanda Sahib was not in actual possession of the country, Titarappa's chance of occupying Tinnevely was not great; while Kumarappa Mudali, the *dubash* of Governor Saunders at Fort St. David, sent word to Titarappa that he would arrange to get him the lease of the Tinnevely country from Muhammad Ali and the English Council would write about it to Mr. Cope who was with Muhammad Ali. But the cause of Muhammad Ali was not yet to gain the upper hand. The *Maravas* and others attacked the troops of Captain Cope and Muhammad Ali which advanced to take the Madura fort, broke them up and captured 3 cannon and a large number of muskets from them. Cope himself escaped with two wounds, while about 100 English soldiers were said to have fallen.²

¹ Anwar Khan was *saujdar* and *amil* of the Tinnevely country in the time of Nawab Anwaru'd-din; he was succeeded by Mir Ghulam Hussain Khan and Hussain Muhammad Khan who jointly managed affairs till 1749. After the battle of Ambur, Chanda Sahib appointed, as *amil*, Alam Khan who managed the district on his master's behalf in 1750 and 51. He was succeeded for a short time by Titarappa Mudali and Moodemiah, the agent of Chanda Sahib. (Extracted by Caldwell from the letter of Mr. Lushington, Collector of Tinnevely, dated, May 28, 1802; see p. 125 of his *History of Tinnevely*.)

Alam Khan was, according to Orme, a soldier of fortune, who had formerly been in the service of Chanda Sahib and afterwards in that of the king of Tanjore; he came to Madura, took the fort from one Abdul Hakim Khan, and observing the course of events, proclaimed his adherence to the cause of Chanda Sahib; he was in power in Madura in the beginning of 1751. (See Nelson's *Madura Manual*, Part III, p. 269; and Orme.)

² Orme says that Captain Cope offered to take Madura, though his detachment was ill-equipped for a siege, and proceeded with 3 field-pieces, 2 cohorns and 150 Europeans, accompanied by 600 of the Nawab's cavalry under Abdul Wahab Khan, a younger brother of Muhammad Ali. Before Madura, these were joined by the detachment that Muhammad Ali had sent to the Tinnevely country under another brother of his. The troops were repulsed from the walls and had to relinquish the attack. Captain Cope blew the cannon to pieces, but a very large body of cavalry deserted over to Alam Khan both before and after the English broke up their camp. (pp. 169-170)—also Orme MSS.; O. V.

Ranga Pillai notes, in his entry for April 30, 1751, that Dupleix sent the old *cowle* from Salabat Jang to Muhammad Ali and wrote desiring him to accept it¹ and deliver the fort of Trichinopoly to Chanda Sahib's people; and to this the latter replied that he had already received from Ghaziu'd-din Khan at Delhi, a copy of a *parwana* granting him the *subahs* of Payanghat and Balaghat (Carnatic) and directing him to take possession of them, along with a copy of the Mughal Emperor's letter to Ghaziu'd-din Khan. Dupleix was greatly irritated at this reply and sent urgent letters to Chanda Sahib urging him to settle the Arni matter without further delay and, without turning aside to Arcot, to proceed straight to Trichinopoly by way of Tiruvannamalai.

Having received the submission of the *killadars* of Vellore, Chetpattu, and Arni, Chanda Sahib deemed the Carnatic to be secure enough for him under the circumstances and began his march for Trichinopoly, reaching Tiruvannamalai about the 20th of May. Dupleix asked the Diarist to write letters to the Rajas of Tanjore and Mysore and to 'the 72 *poligars* of Trichinopoly' whose names are enumerated, beginning with Malavarayan of Ariyalur, the Greater Marava (of Ramnad), the Lesser Marava (of Sivaganga) and enumerating 72 *poligars* and the six divisions of the *Kallars* (the Collieries of Orme).² The list that Ranga Pillai gives has 34 *Poligars* as belong-

Alam Khan is said to have subsequently proceeded and subdued the Tinnevely country and appointed Nabir Khan at Tinnevely and Mantimiya (Mundamiyah or Moodemiya) at Madura as his lieutenants and then joined Chanda Sahib at Trichinopoly, where he died soon after his arrival, struck by a cannon shot (Saka, 1674)—see p. 48 of vol. II of W. Taylor's *Oriental Historical Manuscripts* (1835).

¹ The *cowle* from Salabat Jang which was sent by Dupleix to Muhammad Ali, was not probably known to the Diarist, and is given as Appendix No. 1, in vol. VIII of the Diary by Mr. Dodwell. It is dated March 12, 1751, and granted the *sarkars* of Rajahmundry, Chicacole, Ellore, Masulipatam, Mustafanagar and Muzaffarnagar to Muhammad Ali along with two strong forts and a *jaghir* and also promising not to call him to account for the dues of his father and himself with respect to the Carnatic and Trichinopoly revenues.

² W. Taylor gives from the *Mackenzie MSS.* a list of the 72 *palayams* appointed to guard the bastions of the Pandyan capital as they were in the time of Tirumala Nayak, including Travancore, Ramnad, Sivaganga and Pudukotta, the three last being like the adopted children of the Madura Government, and Ariyalur, Turaiyur, Iluppur, Marungapuri, Nattam, etc.

The following table, comparing Taylor's list with Ranga Pillai's enumeration, may be useful. Where it has not been possible to equate names in the Diarist's list with those of Taylor, a blank space has been indicated. (*Cont.* on pp. 169-171).

ing to the Trichinopoly country and 38 as belonging to the south. The letter that was sent to these explained how Muzaffar Jang had given Dupleix the charge of all the country and the palayams between

TAYLOR	RANGA PILLAI
1. The Ramnad Setupati	... Setupati
2. Udaiya Tevar of Sivaganga	... Udaiya Tevan
3. The Reddi of Turaiyur	... The Reddi of Turaiyur
4. Puchi Nayakan of Marangapuri	... Puchiya Nayakan
5. Leckiya Nayakkan	... Lakkayya Nayakan (of Kumaravadi)
6. Viramalaipalayam; Kama Nayakan	... Kammaya Nayakan
7. Iluppaiyur; Kamakshi Nayakan	... Kamakshi Nayakan
8. Nattam; Lingama Nayakan	... Lingama Nayakan
9. Pillai-Muzhungi; Muttayya Nayakan	... Muttayya Nayakan
10. Ideiya-kottai, Ayalur; Valakondama Nayakan also Maduvur; Vallakondama Nayakan	... Vallakondama Nayakan
11. Ramagiri; Sami Nayakan	... Samaya Nayakan
12. Maruluttu; Amiya Nayakan	... Ammayya Nayakan
13. Yemacalapuram; Kulappa Nayakan	... Kulappa Nayakan
14. Kannivadi; Appayya Nayakan	... Appaya Nayakan
15. Palni; Chennama Nayakan	... Sennava Nayakan (of Palni)
16. Periakulam; Ramabhadra Nayakan	.. Ramabhadra Nayakan (of Virupakshi)
17-25.	... The nine Goundars and Poligars of Kangayam
26-32.	... The seven Hill Poligars living in Kambam and Gudalur
33. Malayalam; Nanjinattu Raja	... Nanjanadu
34. Ariyalur (Ayalur); Nayanar	... Malavarayan (of Ariyalur)

THE POLIGARS OF THE SOUTH

TAYLOR	RANGA PILLAI
1.	... Sinnananja Tevan
2. Sivagiri; Varagunarama Vanniyar	... Sivagiri Vanniyar
3. Alakapuri Rettai-kudi (Rettai-kottai) Vanniyar	... Irattakkudai Vanniyar
4. Do.	... Alagapuri Vanniyar
5. Settur Tiruvannata Tevar	... Settur Tiruvana Tevan
6. Kolang-kondan	... Kollangondan Vanda Tevan
7. Ettaiyapuram; Ettappa Nayakar	... Ettappa Nayakan
8.	... Annichi Nayakan
9. Dumbichi Nayakan	... Tumbinji Nayakan
10.	... Kama Nayakan
11. Kollarpatti; Kalanka Nayakar	... Kalanga Nayakan
12.	... Kandama Nayakan
13. Eramadai	... Elumadai Nayakan
14. Chokkanpatti	... Chokkathalavan

the Krishna River and Cape Comorin and how the grant had been confirmed by Salabat Jang; it then proceeded to state that Muhammad Ali

TAYLOR	RANGA PILLAI
15.	... Thadiyathalavan
16. Panchalankurichi; Kattabomma Nayakan	... Kattappa Nayakan
17. Uttumalai Maruthappa Tevan	... Marudappa Thevan
18.	... Tāli Vēli
19.	... Sūttala Tevan
20.	... Saluva Tevan
21. Urkad; Servakāran	... Seturayan
22.	... Nallakkuttu
23.	... Nambi Thalavan
24.	... Ananja Thalavan
25.	... Ramabhadra Reddi
26.	... Ramaswami Reddi
27.	... Kumaraswami Reddi
28.	... Venkatachala Reddi
29.	... Sankaranarayana Reddi
30.	... Kechalappa Nayakan
31.	... Pethana Nayakan
32.	... Kadalakkudi Nayakan
33. Nagalapuram; Iravappa Nayakan	... Nagalapuram
34. Melmandai Nayakan	... Sirumalai Nayakan (of Melamandai)
35.	... Indra Thalavan
36.	... Kumara Thalavan
37.	... Eravappa Nayakan

(only 37 poligars are enumerated by the Diarist)

A number of Palayams mentioned by Taylor are not found in the list of the Diarist which includes several later creations. The chiefs of Perambur and Kattalur who were Tevans by caste were among the poligars of Tirumala Nayak's time; and Marungapuri of the Puchi Nayak family threw off an offshoot which formed a separate palayam (of Karisalpattu-Varappur) of the Boma Nayaks.

A list of the names of the chiefs actually appointed by Visvanatha Nayak and by his co-adjutor and *dalavai*, Aryanatha Mudali, can be made out from the materials contained in Ward's *survey* and in the two lists published in Taylor's *Oriental Historical Manuscripts* (vol. II, pp. 160-8) as well from an unpublished Mackenzie *MS.* Many of these chiefs are called Nayakars who were the descendants of the captains and soldiers who helped the Nayak rulers of Vijayanagar to conquer the Madura country. The traditional story of their migration is given in several of the Mackenzie *MSS.*; and they belong, for the greater part, to the castes of the Tottiyars and Kambalattars, corresponding to the Telugu Gollas and Yerragollas (Thurston and Rangachari—*Castes and Tribes of South India*, vol. vii, pp. 183-197). Among the other chiefs one is a Reddiar, another is a Tondaimanar (Kallar) and others are Gounders, Servaikarar, Tevans and Nayanars. Taylor's list divides the fiefs into 9 sections, the first comprising the bigger fiefs of Nanjinadu, Ramnad, Sivaganga and Pudukottai, the others being respectively those attached to the Manapar taluk, Dindigul taluk, Kambam and Gudalur, Madura and Trichinopoly, Tinnevely, Coimbatore and Salem. The list should have been subject to perpetual fluctuations being 'increased or diminished with the absence or existence of any one preponderating power among them.'

was given a *cowle* from Muzaffar Jang and invited to act as Dupleix desired, and, instead of doing so, he had taken shelter in Trichinopoly and made frivolous excuses; and Chanda Sahib and the French forces had, therefore, orders to capture Trichinopoly and punish Muhammad Ali; and the poligars should not help him on pain of losing their fiefs and being punished, but should help Chanda Sahib.

Ramnad was founded about 1605 by one Muthukrishnappa, rather restored to the ancient line of the *Setupathis*, according to the manuscript history of the *Carnataka Governors*, the account of the *Setupathis* translated by Taylor and the historical memorandum furnished to Nelson (in the *Madura Manual*, 1868) by Ponnuswami Tevan, the then manager of the *Zamindari*. Sella Tevar, *alias* Vijayaraghunatha Setupathi, was the ruler of Ramnad from 1748 to 1760. Sivaganga was an offshoot from Ramnad; and its existence as a separate fief dates only from about 1730; it was then ruled by Periya Udaya Tevar, the son of its founder Sasivarna Periya Udaya Tevar. The *Tondaimans* of Pudukottai, not mentioned separately by the Diarist, and evidently included by him in the divisions of the Kallars, came into prominence on account of their services to the Nayaks, about the close of the 17th century. They rose from one of the Kallar tribes settled near Anbil, in the land east of Trichinopoly, south of Tanjore and north of Ramnad, which were originally known as *Arasu*. Vijaya Raghunatha Tondaiman was the ruler at the time and took a very prominent part in the operations round Trichinopoly that followed.

See for the Poligar system, *Wilks*, vol. I, p. 34 note; Caldwell's *A History of Tinnevely*, pp. 57-8; Wilson's *Historical Sketch of the Kingdom of Pandya*, p. 43; Nelson, Part III, Ch. IV *et seq*; *The Fifth Report of 1812* (1866 edn.)—vol. II, (Madras Presidency)—pp. 89-90; and C. S. Srinivasachari's paper, 'The Poligar system in the Tamil country: Its Origin and Growth' contributed to the *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, Nagpur Session, 1928*.

Mr. Dodwell's notes to the Diarist's List (pp. 6-9 notes) identify the then fief-holders of Ariyalur, Turaiyur, Kollankondan, and Kolarapettai: he fixes also the fiefs of several of the poligars mentioned by the Diarist; but the places mentioned by him are not in all cases the same as those of Taylor and can be explained by the assumption that the original palayams might have been shifted. Light's *Report* (Military Consultations) of 1781 has been thoroughly utilised by him in locating these.

The main sub-divisions of the Kallars which were returned in the greatest numbers at the Census of 1891 were Isanganadu (Visanganadu), Kungiliyan, Menadu, Nattu, Piramalaiadu, and Sirakudi. The Kallars of Madura are however divided into 10 endogamous sections which are territorial in origin. Mr. T. Turnbull, writing in 1817, says that the Kallars appropriated to themselves various *nads* (regions) in different parts of the southern districts; and in each of these territories they had a chief among them whose orders and directions they must all obey (Thurston and Rangachari—*Castes and Tribes of Southern India*—vol. III, p. 53). The Visinganattukallar, Piranmalai Kallar and Tannarasunnattu Kallar seem to have been tribes living in the Pudukotta territory (vide *A Manual of the Pudukottai State*, p. 183; and Mr. S. Radhakrishna Iyer's *A General History of the Pudukottai State*, p. 67). The filiations of the Kallars are hard to fix; but they have got, according to tradition, some close connection with the Maravars and the Agambadiyans (See Sir Athelstane Baines: *Indian Ethnography* (*Encyclopædia of Indo-Aryan Research*), pp. 81 and 47-48.

Chanda Sahib wrote shortly afterwards that he had to postpone his march to Trichinopoly, as the English under Gingens took Vriddachalam and hoisted their own flag there; Dupleix was so anxious that the place should be retaken and the English should be driven completely out of the neighbourhood that he arranged for Shaikh Hasan, the *jemadar* of sepoys, who had been sent to reduce the Chittore palayams, should be required to come and help to beat the English. The horsemen on the French side gave some trouble as their pay was in arrears; and their demand had to be forthwith complied with; and a lakh of rupees was immediately despatched to Papayya Pillai, who was one of Madame Dupleix's agents and who was now appointed *receveur general des finances du Carnatic*, in which capacity he acted tyrannically and made a very bad name for himself. In this connection, the Diarist described how large sums of money had been received by the French on Chanda Sahib's account and arrangements had been made for a bill of exchange for 16½ lakhs of rupees on Kasi Das Bukkanji, payable at the Masulipatam factory, on account of the present which Muzaffar Jang had promised to make when he reached Golconda and which had been confirmed by Salabat Jang; he also wrote that Dupleix had ordered that all payments got, other than the sums due from Mir Asad of Chetpattu and Murtaza Ali Khan of Vellore which were to be paid to Chanda Sahib for the charge of his troops, were to be received for himself.

V. THE ENGLISH AND CHANDA SAHIB ADVANCE ON TRICHINOPOLY

Captain de Gingens had with him about 500 Europeans and took the field in May in order to bar the way of Chanda Sahib to Trichinopoly. He had also under him a force of *coffres* and sepoys and 8 pieces of cannon. His original instruction was that he was to wait in the vicinity of Fort St. David till he should be joined by Muhammad Ali's troops, from Trichinopoly. The English till then did not like to appear as principals in the struggle. After six weeks of waiting, Captain Gingens was joined about the middle of May, by 600 horse and about 1000 *peons* of Muhammad Ali. He then moved westwards and came in sight of Vriddachalam, whose fortified pagoda was garrisoned by 300 of Chanda Sahib's troops. The place was on the high road to Trichinopoly; and its reduction was deemed to be necessary

for the preservation of Fort St. David. The pagoda surrendered after a slight assault;¹ and after leaving a small garrison there, the English continued their further march and were joined by about 100 Europeans detached by Captain Cope from Trichinopoly and about 4,000 troops of Muhammad Ali, both cavalry and foot, commanded by Abdul Wahab Khan, a younger brother of the latter. The exact place where the junction of the troops took place is not clear; according to Captain Dalton it was at Valikandapuram (the Volcondah of Orme and other historians). Gingens was encamped in a grove about a mile and a half from the latter place, while Chanda Sahib's forces were posted about 4 miles to the north. The rock-fort by whose side Volcondah village was situated, was that of Ranjangudi which was in the possession of a Mussalman *jahirdar*, who, though a relative of Muhammad Ali's,² was afraid to throw in his lot definitely on the side of his kinsman and refused to open his gates to the English. Gingens first captured and burnt the village (or *pettai*) of Volcondah, but he could not take the rock-fort; while the *jahirdar* permitted the French troops to go over to him. An action took place in the dry bed of the river which runs beneath the fort, in which the English troops fled for no apparent reason, though the officers including Clive who was then a lieutenant, did all they could to stop the disgraceful flight. This so-called battle of Volcondah [it was in reality the battle of Ranjangudi, (June 30)] was considered 'a disgraceful affair' by both Wilks and Malcolm. Orme says that Abdul Wahab Khan's troops stood their ground; and it was only the English battalion that got so

¹ Chanda Sahib's garrison surrendered as soon as they perceived the scaling ladders being put up by the attackers. The report that reached the Diarist tells that the defenders made a fairly prolonged resistance. Vriddachalam was thus the only fort north of the Coleroon which remained loyal to Muhammad Ali, after the first English attempt to succour him failed. Clive and Pigot, one of the English Council, accompanied a small detachment sent by Saunders to Trichinopoly and convoyed stores to Vriddachalam which was then beleaguered by a hostile *poligar* (July, 1751). After having entered Vriddachalam and sent on the detachment further, Clive and Pigot set out to return to Fort St. David when they were immediately surrounded by the *poligar*'s troops and escaped only after a close race. 'It was a close race and Clive's fighting nearly came to an end.'—See Forrest's *Life of Lord Clive*; vol. i; p. 135 and Francis; *Gazetteer of South Arcot District*—pp. 400-01.

² The *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi* says that the *jahirdar* of the place was Mutabir Khan Tahir, son of Md. Husain Tahir; he was therefore a Tahiran and a hereditary enemy of Anwaru'd-din's family.

demoralised and broke up in panic.¹ The troops of Muhammad Ali 'behaved in this action better than ever they did afterwards, and even in the field of battle reproached the English for their want of spirit,' according to Clive, in the memorandum that he gave to Orme in 1763. According to another version, the English were regarded as having lost all their courage in this engagement. The Diarist wrote that, a letter which was received declared the English had a loss of 90 Europeans killed, including 2 officers besides the wounded, while in the detachment of Cope 110 persons had been either killed at Madura or died of sickness; but according to the English version they lost only one ensign and five or six men.²

The Diarist also makes mention of two envoys from the Raja of Mysore who came to Pondicherry with jewels and cloths as presents to the Governor who desired that the amount of the present might be given to him in ready money. It was possibly, as suggested by Mr. Dodwell, to frustrate this negotiation that Muhammad Ali sent an envoy named Seshagiri Rao to Mysore for assistance.³ A Brahman who came to Pondicherry, alleged that he had been sent by Muhammad Ali, without the English knowing it, to desire Dupleix to send some one to Trichinopoly to hoist the French flag there. This was only one phase of the intrigue by which Dupleix urged Muhammad Ali to take up the offer of Salabat Jang of the Northern Sarkars and confirm it with a grant under the seal of Chanda Sahib which latter was received by Muhammad Ali through M. Law. The person who was sent to Trichinopoly along with the Brahman, reported according

¹ For details see Captain Dalton's *Memoir* (Memoir of Captain Dalton, H.E.I.C.S. (1886) pp. 92 *et. seq.*; Orme, vol. i, pp. 172-4; Martineau's *Dupleix*, vol. iii, p. 194, and Forrest's *Life of Lord Clive*, vol. i, pp. 128-31, which says that some of Orme's statements are founded on a memorandum which Clive sent him in 1763. See *Catalogue of the Orme Collection of MSS.* by S. C. Hill—p. 272.

² According to a separate despatch from Governor Saunders to the Company dated August 15, 26, 'the Nawab's people and the *coffres* behaved well and our people ill. The unlucky action encouraged their (enemy's) people and depressed ours.'

³ The Dalavai, Deva Raja, was not willing to embark on this enterprise; but his younger brother, Nanja Raja, was tempted by an extravagant promise of the cession of Trichinopoly and of all its possessions, down to Cape Comorin, to lend the required assistance and agreed to make provision for Muhammad Ali by giving him the *jaghir* of Hardanahalli, at the head of the pass to Trichinopoly (p. 2470 of Ch. XI of the *Mysore Gazetteer* (New edition); vol. II; Part IV), and also Wilks, vol. I, p. 172.

to the Diarist, that the place was full of the English, and Muhammad Ali was only the nominal ruler.

Chanda Sahib had, after the action at Volcondah, followed Gingens to Utattur, situated about 25 miles from Trichinopoly and fifteen miles south of Perambalur. Two miles north of the place, the road from Trichinopoly passes between a hill and a ridge of rock which were described by Orme as the 'streights of Utattur' and by Dalton as 'the barrier to the Trichinopoly country'. Gingens was encamped in the streights, though they could have been avoided; and Dalton was posted as an advance-guard. The enemy forces were about 8 miles behind and thus the two forces watched each other for several days. On the 20th of July the English troops, consisting of a few dragoons, about 150 of the Nawab's horse and a company of sepoys were decoyed into an ambushade of some 3,000 horse and foot. The cavalry escaped; but most of the sepoys were cut to pieces, and Lieutenant Maskelyne was taken prisoner. This disaster, though small by itself, followed so closely on the failure at Volcondah, that it had a most disheartening effect on the English. Chanda Sahib thereupon advanced his camp three miles and offered a general engagement with a very large body of horse and sepoys. Dalton who occupied the outpost, retired with skill to the main camp of the English. Chanda Sahib resolved upon a general action; but a heavy fire from the British artillery made him waver and soon compelled his troops to flight. This attack of Chanda Sahib, though repulsed, made Gingens resolve to abandon the streights on account of the possibility of the enemy posting his cavalry between the place and Trichinopoly; he moved out the same night and after a quick march of eighteen hours, encamped close to the northern bank of the Coleroon and occupied a fortified pagoda (Pichchandar Kovil). They then crossed the river followed by the French and Chanda Sahib, took possession of the Srirangam Island and the great pagoda. But even here they did not deem themselves secure from the enemy, crossed the Kaveri and took refuge on July 28th under the walls of Trichinopoly. The French also rapidly pushed on after the English; they and their allies took possession of Srirangam, conquered the mud-fort of Koiladi, near the eastern extremity of the island, crossed the Kaveri and encamped on the plain to the east of the town in the neighbourhood of what is known now as the French

Rock which stood about a mile to the south-east of the fort.¹ The position of the English was certainly inferior at that time to that of the French. Gingens was not equal to meet the situation; there were cabals and quarrels among his officers; and according to Dalton, all the English officers were young soldiers, 'at that time little experienced in the country-method of making war'.

From the Diarist we learn that the French troops were not better off. Chanda Sahib is said by him to have written that D'Auteuil and other French officers stubbornly refused to cross the Coleroon after the engagements at Volcondah and Utattur and wished to return to Pondicherry with their soldiers and that Shaikh Hasan and his sepoys bore the brunt of the fighting both at Volcondah and in the taking of Srirangam and the neighbouring pagoda of Tiruvanaikoyil, while the French troops, instead of marching in advance as usual, lagged several miles behind the rest of the army. Presumably, the French refused to advance and allowed Chanda Sahib to cross the Coleroon alone and occupy Srirangam as soon as the English quitted it. Chanda Sahib was reported to be telling people that the Europeans had done nothing but talk big and write daily to Dupleix letters full

¹ The date of the French and Chanda Sahib crossing the Coleroon is not certain. According to Orme, Chanda Sahib and the French took possession of Srirangam soon after it was evacuated by the English; and about the middle of August they sent a strong detachment to attack Koiladi which was defended by a small body of English troops for several days and then given up. This success determined Chanda Sahib to cross the Kaveri, and leaving a garrison in Srirangam, he encamped with the rest of his army to the east of Trichinopoly (Vol. I, pp. 180-1). As Dodwell points out, the French, according to Law, did not cross the Coleroon until September. The Diarist writes in his entry for September 14, that he heard from a letter of Chanda Sahib that he intended to cross the Coleroon and occupy Srirangam. Apparently Chanda Sahib first crossed the Coleroon alone, without the French and possibly 'withdrew when the French refused to follow him.' (Note on p. 29 of vol. viii of the *Diary*), as several letters from Chanda Sahib are reported to have come from camp, on September 17, saying that he was about to cross the Coleroon into Srirangam.

According to the *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi*, Husein Dost Khan (Chanda Sahib) broke the pot of his honour at the *maidan* of the Nawab's Tank, adjoining Utattur and hastened to Samiavaram and encamped there. He stayed in that same place for a period of two months and twenty-days and engaged himself in taking possession of the kingdom and entrusting it to various agents. Ahsanu'd-din then marched with a French army according to the instructions of his master, Husein Dost Khan and brought under his control the temple of Srirangam and Jhamgir (Jambukesvaram) which was like a fort; and the vapour of his breath caused by the heat of his exertions to subdue the tract of land from the Kaveri up to the back of the hill of Dhobykonda (French Rock?) went as far as the sky.

of false complaints. The Diarist also heard news that Cope and his men got on so badly with Muhammad Ali Khan that they had resolved to depart. D'Auteuil was said to have resolved to leave Chanda Sahib's camp; and the next day news was received from Chanda Sahib that he had actually left the camp in anger and that M. Law who had already made a mark, might be made the commandant of the European troops. Dupleix was reported to be very angry at D'Auteuil's departure, but unwilling to appoint Law as his successor.

Muhammad Ali himself sent a letter to Dupleix which was received on August 8, in which he pretended that he was ready to leave Trichinopoly under a safe conduct, according to the terms of Salabat Jang's *cowle* and willing to visit Pondicherry and discuss the whole situation. The Diarist also heard that he had sent emissaries to Alam Khan at Madura and offered him terms in return for his assistance; he suspected greatly that Muhammad Ali was already suspicious of the English and could be easily persuaded into believing that the English were ready to abandon him. So when Governor Saunders wrote to Chanda Sahib, taxing him with having unjustly seized the Trichinopoly country that had been mortgaged to the English by Muhammad Ali,¹ and a reply was sent, under Dupleix's instructions and according to his dictation and wording, that the country had been given by Salabat Jang to him and the English had no right at all to it. 'Advantage was taken of Mr. Saunders' sealed letter, to prepare an inner slip, as though addressed by Mr. Saunders to Chanda Sahib, offering to deliver up the fort of Trichinopoly and the person of Muhammad Ali, provided such and such were done. This was to be folded up in the cover and given to the confidential people whom Muhammad Ali sends to M. d'Auteuil and Shaikh Hasan, to be carried to their master. As Muhammad Ali is already suspicious of the English and is secretly sending people to us for terms, it is hoped that this letter will cause quarrels between him and them and increase their ill-feeling. I hear that special letters to Chanda Sahib and M. d'Auteuil were also written about this.' Comment is needless on

¹ Saunders wrote to the Company that he had a mortgage bond for Trichinopoly and hoisted the English flag there and would protest against any French hostilities that might be committed there (letter dated August 15, 1726).

this entry of the Diarist; and Dodwell remarks that this was 'a device characteristic of Dupleix, no matter whether proposed by him or not.'

The fort of Vriddachalam was to be taken by the French, as it was the only fort on this side of Trichinopoly, still in possession of the English and Muhammad Ali. Rango Pandit, Madame Dupleix's *amaldar*, was ordered to fortify his place in the neighbourhood and entertain topasses, sepoy and Portuguese artillery men for that purpose; but when he marched against the place, the enemy sallied out and attacked him, and Rango Pandit had to run away, spiking his guns. The Diarist was glad that the attack miscarried, because, had it been successful, it would have redounded to the credit of that rascally Brahman (Rango Pandit) and Madame Dupleix.¹ Not only was this set-back a source of depression to Dupleix; but the news that the Tanjore people were inclined to the side of Muhammad Ali and the English and hailed with joy the news of Ghaziu'd-din Khan, the elder brother and new rival of Salabat Jang, recognising the title of Muhammad Ali and even celebrated the hearing of the news as an occasion for thanksgiving and festivity put him out greatly, though he affected to believe that the English should have spread the news which the Tanjoreans so readily took in. An agreement was made at Pondicherry with Gopal Rao, the *vakil* of Murari Rao Ghorepade² that the latter should take Chanda Sahib's part

¹ The Diarist's entry for August 18th, that the 200 men who marched from Cuddalore were encamped outside Vriddachalam when Rango Pandit's attack was repulsed means probably the detachment that was sent out by Saunders with a large convoy of stores to the relief of Vriddachalam which was accompanied by Clive and Pigot and which dispersed, according to Orme, the troops of a neighbouring Poligar.—*Vide* note 1 on page 173.

² Murari Rao (a grand-nephew of the famous Santaji) was the Maratha governor of Trichinopoly left by Raghuji Bhonsle; he took some part in the revolution that followed Safdar Ali's assassination and later evacuated Trichinopoly to Nizamul-Mulk and quitted the Carnatic (1743). He was hired by Nasir Jang as the commandant of a body of 10,000 horse when the latter came down into the Carnatic and sent forward to the Coleroon where he met and harassed the army of Muzaffar Jang, and Chanda Sahib returning with the French battalion from the Tanjore expedition (February-March, 1750). When Muzaffar Jang had submitted to his uncle, and the French had retired hastily with Chanda Sahib into Pondicherry (April), Murari Rao pushed on in pursuit of the French troops and greatly harassed them. He had established himself at Gooty in 1746 and got hold of Penukonda and became supreme among the *poligars* of the Ceded Districts. For his character, see Orme, vol. I, p. 363. He had a very interesting part to play in the operations round Trichinopoly and later against Hyder Ali.

either by openly attacking the enemy or by joining them and secretly working against them and that Chanda Sahib should pay each trooper that the Maratha sent, Rs. 20 per month, besides an additional sum to him when matters should have been settled. Murari Rao was expected at Pondicherry and was to be welcomed with great honour and *eclat*.

On the last day of August, news was received that Governor Saunders had despatched to Trichinopoly from Devikottai a few soldiers with provisions, shot, powder and other munitions of war; that some of Chanda Sahib's troopers and the Tanjore army attempted to attack them when they got near Trichinopoly, but that they broke through and reached the fort safely. Dupleix was angry that the Tanjore people did not effectively obstruct their march and to capture their munitions and provisions, to which the Tanjore *vakil* at Pondicherry gave an evasive reply.¹

VI. CLIVE'S CAPTURE OF ARCOT—EVENTS TILL THE END OF 1751

Dupleix resolved, according to the Diarist, to despatch 200 soldiers and officers, who had lately arrived, to Trichinopoly, on the 1st of September and asked Raza Sahib to accompany them; the latter agreed to do so and begged for two lakhs of rupees at least with which he could pay off sepoy and horsemen who were heavily in arrears, but had to start only with half a lakh. Soon the news of Clive's diversion to Arcot came to be known. It was deemed by Madame Dupleix that it would not be advisable to recall Chanda Sahib's or the French troops from before Trichinopoly but that they would be sending troops from Pondicherry to help Polur Muhammad Ali Khan (brother of Chanda Sahib) at Arcot. She asked that the two sons of

¹ This refers to the second reinforcement sent by the English to Trichinopoly where great discontent prevailed among the officers and several had to be removed. A commission was given to Clive (Fort St. David Consultation of July 22/August 2, 1751) and he proceeded with a detachment into the country of Tanjore where he was joined by another from Devikottai under Captain Clarke who took the command to the whole which consisted only of 100 Europeans and 50 sepoy with one small field-piece. The French detached from Kolladi, 30 Europeans and 500 sepoy and had a skirmish with the English detachment, at a place 10 miles east of the latter. The English gained access to Trichinopoly by making a detour in order to avoid the enemy's camp. (Orme; vol. i, p. 182 and Forrest's *Clive*, vol. i, p. 137).

Bangaru Yachama Nayaka of Venkatgiri¹ and other poligars of the neighbourhood should be written to immediately to send troops to Arcot, while Chanda Sahib was asked to send as quickly as possible 2,000 horsemen to Arcot for the help of Polur Muhammad Ali Khan; and Sayyad Muhammad Khan of Tadpatri who had been ordered to go to the Musaravakkam *killa*, was now ordered to proceed to Arcot with his 200 match-lock men.

News was received on September 12, that the English had reached Conjeevaram and tied *toranams* there and were intending to occupy Kaveripakkam and Musaravakkam, while a small body of Polur Muhammad Ali Khan's men were encamped near Damarle (Damal) in order to attack the English. Dupleix tried to encourage the merchants who were alarmed by telling them that a very large army was being despatched from Pondicherry to Arcot, so that no fort or army could resist them, whereas in reality he could send only about 150 men of very inferior calibre. On the 15th of September, it was known in Pondicherry that on the previous day the English had hoisted their flag at the Nawab's palace and occupied the fort, while the day before (i.e. 13th September) Polur Muhammad Ali Khan and others had fled to Vellore.²

¹ Bangaru Yachama Nayaka, surnamed Sarvagna Kumara, died in 1748, leaving two sons, Bangaru Yachama Nayak and Pedda Yachama Nayak. The latter quarrelled with his brother and attempted to get a *sanad* for the whole estate of Venkatagiri from the Nawab of Arcot who decided that the two brothers were to live in peace at different places. Their *vakils* were at Pondicherry, soliciting Dupleix's favour and being compelled to pay large sums both to Dupleix and to Chanda Sahib. The younger brother died in A.D. 1754; and the elder received the *sanad* for the whole estate in the previous year from Nawab Muhammad Ali who had triumphed over his rival. It was reported by the Diarist that, after the death of Nasir Jung, the two Nayak brothers were to pay Muzaffar Jang two lakhs of rupees and Chanda Sahib one lakh. The former payment was made through Ramdas Pandit; and as a *jaghir* had been given for 4,000 horse, although the *mansab* was 5,000, the Nizam now gave the additional *jaghir* for 1,000 horse. Chanda Sahib demanded three lakhs, but was paid one lakh through Dupleix who got bonds from their vakils.

² Saunders wrote on August 15/26, that it had been resolved to leave 3 or 400 men to defend Trichinopoly fort, and according to the Nawab's desire, make a diversion in the Arcot country, with the rest, joining the Nawab's forces, with a view to raising contributions. Subsequently he wrote on the 30th September/11th October, to the Company that he had put in execution the design of making a diversion in the Arcot country, in order to draw off the enemy from Trichinopoly. 130 men under Clive embarked on August 22/September 2, from Fort St. David for Madras where they were joined by 80 more. The detachment that proceeded against Arcot, consisted of about 200 Europeans and 300 sepoy with 8 officers

The English capture of Arcot did not greatly disturb the minds of the Pondicherry folk. Polur Muhammad Ali Khan wrote to say that when the English garrison at Arcot marched against Timiri fort, he sent his son with a small force of Murtaza Ali Khan of Vellore and repulsed them; and that, with reinforcements, the enemy could be quickly driven out of the Arcot *killa*. Murtaza Ali Khan sent word to the same effect and required reinforcements before the enemy could strengthen himself. Dupleix however realised the seriousness of the loss of Arcot and was so angry that the Diarist wrote, 'even I fear to stand before him; how much more then will others fear? He urged that Chanda Sahib who had already sent 1,000 horsemen, should write to his son, Raza Sahib, to march at once to Arcot with another 1,000 horse; and also that he should immediately cross the Kaveri and attack Trichinopoly.

M. d'Auteuil and other officers had all along been written to by Dupleix that they were not to return to Pondicherry, but advance with Chanda Sahib's troops. It was likely that when Chanda Sahib crossed the Coleroon first, D'Auteuil obstinately refused to follow him and demanded to return. A letter from Chanda Sahib received at Pondicherry on August 7, is reported by the Diarist in his entry for that date, to have contained the news that D'Auteuil had left the camp in anger and should have already arrived and reported the state of affairs and that Law might be made the commander of the European troops. On September 17, another letter received from Chanda Sahib says, according to the Diarist, that if D'Auteuil departed, Law might be appointed commander. To this Dupleix is said to have replied that he had recalled D'Auteuil and Bernier and appointed Law as commander with orders to cross the Coleroon and the Kaveri before

and 3 field-pieces. They marched from Madras on August 26/September 6, reached Conjeevaram three days later and the neighbourhood of Arcot on August 31/September 11, and took possession of the fort the next day, hoisting both the English colours and Muhammad Ali's flag and protecting the inhabitants.

It is to be stressed that, for sometime past, Muhammad Ali had been proposing a diversion in the direction of Arcot, and at first Saunders and the English Council thought that this might be effected by Gingens leaving a sufficient number of men in Trichinopoly and marching with a force into the Arcot country. But Gingens could not appreciate his capacity for the task and Clive persuaded Saunders that he could do it. News of the English march to Arcot did not reach Dupleix for a week.

the Nawab's troops. Law set out from Pondicherry for camp on September 8th and took over the command on 18th; and the real operations of Chanda Sahib against Trichinopoly began only after this date.

In his letters, Chanda Sahib said that Muhammad Ali had sent *vakils* to him, promising to accept the terms of the *cowle* formerly offered to him and to evacuate Trichinopoly twenty days later and asked that D'Auteuil who had the *cowle* with him, might be desired to hand it over to him. Dupleix had, by this time, become very suspicious of Muhammad Ali and was convinced that the latter was asking for a truce of twenty days in order merely to strengthen his position at Arcot and to collect provisions and stores for the defence of Trichinopoly, which he could not have the least intention to give up. He wrote thus to Chanda Sahib and asked him not to allow even the least delay in crossing the Coleroon and the Kaveri.

On October 11, letters were received at Pondicherry that Chanda Sahib's army was encamped round the fort of Trichinopoly and that Alam Khan of Madura, to whom the English had written offering a place under Muhammad Ali, in return for his assistance, was marching to Chanda Sahib's assistance, along with other poligars from the south, while the Raja of Mysore was inimical towards him openly. Ranga Pillai's *Diary* furnish no details of the events happening before Trichinopoly in the fateful months October 1751 to February 1752; and there follows a hiatus during March and April. With regard to the Mysore negotiations with Pondicherry of which mention was made by the Diarist in his entry for July 8th, nothing seems to have followed. A letter of the captain of the English forces at Trichinopoly, written to Fort St. David was seized by the French on September 13th; therein, according to the Diarist's version, it was stated that the Mysore army had not yet arrived, but when they did, he would, in conjunction with them, attack the enemy. This meant that an agreement had already been made between the Raja of Mysore and Muhammad Ali. The Mysore *vakil* who had been sent to Pondicherry, still continued at that place; and when questioned by the Diarist, he declared that when he was accredited to Pondicherry, his master had no idea of assisting Muhammad Ali, but that troops had been marched only as a measure of precaution. He also added that Chanda Sahib was always abusing the Mysoreans to their *vakil* at his camp and

threatening to seize their country. In October, as was seen above, the Diarist wrote that Chanda Sahib and the Raja of Mysore were on bad terms. In the next entry of the Diarist, dated November 8, Chanda Sahib is said to have written to Dupleix that he was again friendly with the Raja of Mysore whose *vakil* had proposed certain terms and that he had agreed to the demands which were as follows:— (1) That part of the Trichinopoly country which had long been in the possession of Mysore should not be interfered with; (2) the poligars who had joined Mysore should not be molested, and (3) 2,000 horse and 5,000 foot of the Mysore army which should constantly remain with Chanda Sahib, the latter should assign for their maintenance lands adjoining Mysore and yielding 3 lakhs annually. Chanda Sahib agreed to them and offered to cede Sondikuppam and certain countries seized by the Tondaiman for the maintenance of the troops, and not to molest any poligar except him of Turaiyur. Dupleix agreed to write to the Dalavai of Mysore, promising to fulfil the terms of Chanda Sahib's agreement, as desired by him.¹ It was likely that the agreement of Chanda Sahib with the Mysore *vakil* was not intended to be a genuine one, but, as Mr. Dodwell suggests, 'only to delay matters until the Mysore preparations were complete' and 'represent a stage in the bargaining between Mysore and Muhammad Ali which ended in his unfortunate promise to cede Trichinopoly.' As a matter of fact though a letter was received at Fort St. David in October, 1751, from the Mysoreans promising to join Muhammad Ali, their contingent did not arrive at Trichinopoly till early in the following year.²

On the 13th of December, the Diarist heard that Nanja Raja (who was exercising all real authority and was usually called the young *Dalavai* as well as surnamed *Karachuri* [hand and dagger], equivalent to the English phrase 'a word and a blow') had assembled at Dharmapuri, above the Changama Pass, 2,000 or 3,000 horse and 5,000 or

¹ The Dalavai, Deva Raja, was averse to engaging to help Muhammad Ali or interfere at all; but his younger brother, Nanja Raja, was tempted, by extravagant promises, to assist him. According to Meer Hussein Ali Khan Kirmani (*History of Hydr Naik-tr* by Col. W. Miles, 1842—p. 35), Nanja Raj associated himself with Murari Rao and other poligars and marched towards Trichinopoly with an army of 7,000 cavalry and 10 or 12,000 foot, the Raja however not consenting to this movement. The aged Dalavai, Deva Raj, was averse to the proposals of Seshagiri Pandit, the ambassador of Muhammad Ali to Mysore (Wilks—vol. I. p. 172.)

² See notes on pp. 58 and 69 of the *Diary*, vol. VIII.

6,000 foot and that Murari Rao had visited him and was also there with 2,000 horse and that both intended to help Muhammad Ali. When Dupleix heard this news, his anger against Chanda Sahib burst forth and he exclaimed that the latter had made enemies of the Rajas of Mysore and Tanjore, alienated the poligars, who hindered all cultivation and that he might be pensioned off with a *jaghir* or forced to retire to Mecca, as the country would be ruined if it remained in his possession longer. The Diarist was glad that the Governor was angry with Chanda Sahib and wrote, 'God has dealt justly with Chanda Sahib and punished him within the year for his having cheated me (of expected rewards)'.

As a measure of retaliation for Nanja Raj joining Muhammad Ali, Dupleix ordered that the Turaiyur people should tie *toranams* in the adjoining Mysore country. But just at that time Deva Raja died and Nanja Raj had to return to the capital, but not before he and Murari Rao had time to plunder the Salem mint and fort.

To return to the doings at Arcot:—The alleged repulse of the English before Timiri fort reported by Polur Muhammad Ali and written by the Diarist in his entry for September 18, 1751, had probably a reference to Clive's first movement against Timiri on September 15th, when the English, according to Orme (vol. I, p. 184), marched out to meet the fugitive Arcot garrison of 600 horse and 500 foot drawn up near Timiri and forced them to retreat to the hills in their rear. Dupleix urged that Raza Sahib should immediately proceed to Arcot; but the latter asked for 2 lakhs of rupees towards the charges of his 3,000 horsemen, as otherwise, they might retire from Volcondah to which they had advanced, to Gingee and refuse to accompany him (Diarist's entry for the 24th of September).

Meanwhile Clive's troops had sallied out on Timiri (a fort situated about 7 miles south of Arcot, on the Arni road) on the 17th, but could not secure its surrender. On the night of the 25th September, when the reinforced enemy took up a stand within 3 miles of Arcot, Clive made a surprise attack and returned with some plunder. When the latter seized the Conjeevaram pagoda, Clive sent a small body to dislodge him and convoyed safely the 2 eighteen-pounders that were sent to him from Madras and beat back the enemy who advanced to attack the fort (27th September). When Raza Sahib finally reached Arcot and took possession of the town and

the palace, the famous siege began (4th October). Clive's sortie on the besiegers (5th October), the failure of a reinforcement under Lieutenant Innis to reach the besieged, the securing by Raza Sahib of battering cannon from Pondicherry and of Murtaza Ali who came with 2,000 men, the latter's trick of pretending to quarrel with Raza Sahib and inviting Clive to join in attacking him, the decision of Murari Rao to throw in his lot with the brave besieged, Raza Sahib's offer of a proposal to Clive to surrender, the final attack of the besiegers on the 24th November, their failure and departure on the next day—most of these incidents are not noted by the Diarist; and he only records in a matter-of-fact manner how Raza Sahib was driven from Arni to Chetpattu, by the English and the Marathas (entry for the 17th December) and how Clive marched on Conjeevaram which had meanwhile been taken by the French, reduced it and compelled the garrison to flee to Chingleput (entry for the 31st December).

Regarding the operations before Trichinopoly we have better information from the Diarist. In his entry for the 11th October, he wrote that letters were received on that day to the effect that Chanda Sahib's army had been encamped round the fort of Trichinopoly. On the 8th November he reports that Chanda Sahib had sent on Salabat Jang's *takid* parwana to Muhammad Ali and was expecting news of its receipt by the latter and of what might take place in consequence.¹ He is said to have also written that, if Muhammad Ali did not accept the *parwana*, the sepoys in the fort who had accepted a *cowle*, would make over the fort to him. Dupleix replied that Chanda Sahib should not relax his efforts, but make every effort, day and night, to capture the fort without delay. Towards the close of November, news was received that Hasanud-din Khan and his troops attacked the battery built by Cope outside the fort gate and that Cope and Gingers were not

¹ Chanda Sahib mentions in his letter that a copy of the *parwana* was sent to the Governor of Fort St. David. It is interesting to note in this connection that Saunders in writing to the Directors on 24th October (o.s.) mentions a letter alleged to have been sent by Salabat Jang, but suspected to be the production of Dupleix and Chanda Sahib; and remarks that it was curious that the letter should arrive on the same day as Chanda Sahib's answer to his previous letter (see note 1, p. 176), and it was bruited about that Chanda Sahib and others have counterfeit seals of the Mughal and his officers. Saunders offered that Chanda Sahib might hold Arcot, and leave Trichinopoly to Muhammad Ali, pending the Mughal's decision; but the offer was rejected—see Dodwell's *Madras Despatches*, 1744–55, p. 146 and p. 145.

pulling on well, the latter favouring Muhammad Ali Khan and the former opposing him. Towards the end of December there was a battle between the English and Hasanu'd-din Khan at Trichinopoly in which the latter was repulsed after a severe fight and rescued by Law and Alam Khan moving to his assistance and rescuing Shaikh Hasan and those who remained with him. The Diarist heard that Hasanu'd-din Khan was lured into an ambush and many of his men were cut off, though Chanda Sahib, Alam Khan and Law advanced to his help; and finally they were forced to abandon the battery which they had occupied.¹ Thus the year 1751 closed with the French fortunes beginning to sink in both the Arcot and Trichinopoly spheres. The triumphant march of Salabat Jang and Bussy to Aurangabad, their subjugation of the rebellious *killedar* of Nirmal, the great influence of the French at the Nizam's Court—these are noticed by the Diarist in their places; but the details available of Bussy's doings are scanty.

¹ M. d'Auteuil had been succeeded by Law, the nephew of the famous financier who was obstinate, if anything, and resolved against Dupleix's advice that the city should be reduced not by storm, but by sap and mine. The English thought at first that Chanda Sahib would merely blockade the place and not even besiege it (Saunders' letter to the Company of September 30/October 11). The French established themselves at Sarkarpalayam (Chukleypalayam of Orme) on the south bank of the Kaveri, about 1½ miles north-east of the city, and their principal battery was raised a little to the south of the north-east angle of the fort. They also mounted guns on the French Rock and in the Srirangam Island and on the rock of Erumbesvaram.

(For a plan of the dispositions and operations see Hemingway's *Trichinopoly District Gazetteer*—map between pp. 330 and 331; Forrest's *Life of Lord Clive*, vol. I. map facing p. 60 and Orme vol. III. (ed. of 1862), maps and plans and Martineau's *Dupleix*, vol. III, map facing p. 206). The first fight took place when the French surprised the English entrenchments opposite the French Rock. Their guns were not effective and Law would not change their position. When a party of Mysore horsemen arrived about the middle of October, they accompanied a body of English troops under Dalton who put a large body of Chanda Sahib's cavalry to flight. There were a few other engagements in December in which Chanda Sahib's cavalry fared badly. The incident of the ambush is probably that narrated by Orme in pp. 204-5 of his first volume (1862 ed.)

(To be continued)

The Historical Origin of the Distinction between Svathanumana and Parathanumana

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THE first part of the article which appeared in the previous issue of the *Journal of Indian History* was originally submitted as one of the six subsidiary 'stellingen' for the doctorate of the University of Amsterdam in 1924. Since then two important books on Indian Logic have been published, viz., Randle's *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, and Stcherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic*: vol. ii. Our failure to find Dignāga's name in pp. 46-7 of *Nyāyabindutika*, to which Keith refers in support of his statement that the authorship of the distinction is expressly attributed to Dignāga by Dharmottara is shared by Randle, who in a foot-note to p. 160 of his book says: 'I find no such statement in *Nyāyabindutika*, pp. 46-7. The reference is perhaps wrong'. In this connection we quoted two passages from *Nyāyabindutika* and hazarded the supposition that Keith was probably misled by the word *acarya* that occurred in the second passage. Our supposition has derived confirmation from Stcherbatsky's translation of this passage, which we quote below:

'Our Master (Dignāga)¹ has given the name of inference to propositions, in order to suggest that (the method of) expressing inference must necessarily be discussed.'

Furthermore, our principal contention has found support in Randle, who says:

'The distinction² between inference as a thought-process in one's own mind, and that process expressed in words for communication to others, is an obvious one, and is already contained in Vātsyāyana's distinction between *anumāna* on the one hand, and

¹ *Buddhist Logic*, vol. ii, p. 112.

² *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, pp. 160-61.

nyāya or *sādhakavākya* or *pañcāvayavoppannavākya* on the other hand. But in defining the *avayavas*, or members of the *vākya*, the Sūtrakāra does not keep the two things distinct, his definitions being sometimes rather definitions of aspects of the inferential process (premises “inference for oneself”), than definitions of those *propositions* (verbal expressions of premises) which alone can form part of a *vākya*, a probative *statement*. This, as we learn from Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra, exposed him to the criticism of Vasubandhu: and these criticisms would perhaps draw attention to the necessity of making more explicit than Vātsyāyana had done the distinction between inference in itself and the expression of it in words. It does not seem, in the light of these considerations, that there can be any question of priority of discovery as between Praśastapāda and Dignāga. Nor is it clear that there is any connection between the recognition of the distinction between *svārthanumāna* and *parārthanumāna*, and the denial of the claim of verbal testimony to be a separate source of knowledge. It was inevitable that all schools should draw the distinction between inference in the mind and inference expressed in words,—whether or not they admitted Testimony as a *pramāṇa* or instrument of valid cognition.’

We do not, however, accept the theory that in defining the *avayavas*, Gautama does not keep the idea of verbal reasoning distinct from that of non-verbal reasoning. It is true that his definitions of *hetu* and *udāharana*, when taken without context, do not necessarily indicate that they are *vākyas*. But we have no reason to take them without context and imagine that they are not *vākyas*, when the definitions of *pratijñā*, *upanaya* and *nigamana* leave no room for doubting the verbal character of these *avayavas*. In criticism of Gautama’s definition of *hetu*, Dignāga¹ says: ‘*Sādhanaṃ yadi sādharmyaṃ na vākyamso na pañcamī.*’ Dignāga’s criticism is based on the assumption that in the Sūtra *hetu* is identified with *sādharmya*. But the use of the ablative suffix after *sādharmya* leaves no room for such an assumption. In fact, Dignāga’s statement could be very well used to prove the thesis that in the Sūtra *hetu* is not identified with *sādharmya*. As regards the words *dṛṣṭānta* and *udāharana* in Gautama’s definition of *udāharana*, nothing stands in the way of our understanding them as *dṛṣṭānta-vākya*

¹ *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṅkā* (Chaukhamba), p. 276. Also Randle’s *Fragments from Dignāga*, pp. 42-6.

and *udāharana-vākya*, since *lakṣaṇika-prayoga*’s are not uncommon in the philosophical literature of Sanskrit.

There is another point on which we are unable to find ourselves in agreement with Randle. Vātsyāyana’s statement: *Āgamaḥ pratijñā* or *sabda-viśaya pratijñā* gives rise to the question: If the proposition be about a fact derived from *āgama*, how can Gautama’s *pañcāvayava-vākya* be called a verbal expression of an inference which one has drawn for oneself? ‘The *nyāya*,’¹ says Randle, ‘in its origin was not a “syllogism”; but became such as soon as it came to be regarded as the verbal expression of an inference, as Praśastapāda and Dignāga regarded it.’ Whatever the origin of *nyāya* might be, there is clear indication in Vātsyāyana’s *Bhāṣya* that he regarded Gautama’s *pañcāvayava-vākya*, which he called *parama-nyāya*, as a verbal expression of an inference, in spite of his statement that the proposition is about a fact derived from *āgama*. In support of this thesis we would quote the very passage from Vātsyāyana’s *Bhāṣya*, which Randle quotes to prove the contrary.

‘But² what is this *nyāya*?’

‘*Nyāya* is knowing an object thoroughly by the instruments of valid knowledge.’

‘Reasoning is subservient to perception and *āgama*. It is *anvīkṣa* (post-spection). *Anvīkṣa* is examining that which has been apprehended by perception and *āgama*.’

‘[This *Śāstra* is called] *Anvīkṣikī*, *Nyāya-vidyā*, or *Nyāya-śāstra*, because it works with that.’

‘But that reasoning which is hostile to perception and *āgama* is [not *nyāya*, but] *nyāyābhāsa*.’

Reading the above passage with the one which occurs at a later point in his *Bhāṣya* on the same Sūtra and in which he explains the nature of each member of the *pañcāvayava-vākya*, which he calls *parama-nyāya*, we would note the following points in interpretation of the intentions of the *Bhāṣya-kāra*:

¹ *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, p. 163.

² *Kaḥ punar ayaṃ nyāyaḥ. Pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇaṃ nyāyaḥ. Pratyakṣā-gamāśritam anumānam, sānvīkṣā, pratyakṣāgamābhyām īkṣitasānvīkṣaṇam anvīkṣā. Tayā pravarttata’ ityānvīkṣikī nyāyavidyā nyāyāśāstram. Yat punar anumānam pratyakṣāgama-viruddham nyāyābhāsaḥ sa iti* Randle’s translation of the passage is defective: *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, p. 164.

1. *Nyāya* = *anumāna* = proof. (This is probably the only instance in the *Bhāṣya* where the term *anumāna* is used in the sense of a mode of proof. In *Nyāya śāstra* it is always used in the sense of a mode of discovery.)

2. To know an object merely by perception or by *āgama* is not knowing it thoroughly from the point of view of Logic, which demands that what is known by perception or by *āgama* should be *anumita* = *anvīkṣita* = proved by reasoning.

3. Proof attains its consummation when it is expressed in the prescribed five-membered sentence to the satisfaction of an opponent.

But does not the expression of a reasoning presuppose that the reasoning must have been worked out in the mind of the reasoner in order to be made available for expression in the prescribed form? Thus though the subject-matter of a proposition may be ultimately derived from *āgama*, yet it must be mentally proved by the prover to his own satisfaction before being verbally proved in the prescribed five-membered sentence to the satisfaction of an opponent. We therefore conclude that Vātsyāyanā's statement: *Āgamaḥ pratijñā* or *śabda-viśaya pratijñā* does not militate against his regarding the *pañcāvayava-vākya* as an expression of a reasoning which one has performed for oneself.

Sindābūr of the Arab Writers

BY

GEORGE M. MORAES

IN the works of the Arab Writers of the Middle Ages, one often comes across the mention of a city called Sindābūr, which is described by them as an important commercial centre on the West Coast of India. It is very clearly mentioned by the Arab traveller Al Masudi as early as the 10th century of the Christian era.¹ Its location is suggested by Al Biruni² and Il Idrisi³ in their works, the former in his enumeration of the cities on the Western sea-board of India, and the latter while specifying that it was at four days' journey from Baruh along the coast. However, in spite of the unmistakable hints afforded by these writers the location of this city has long remained a disputed point in the mediæval geography of Western India. Scholars had for a long time held widely divergent opinions as regards its identity, some confounding it with Sindan, which according to Rawlinson has been corrupted into St. John, the modern St. John's Point of Rennel, between Damaun and Bombay, and others with Sidhapur in North Kanara, frequently referred to in the local inscriptional records.⁴ Ibn Batuta's description of Sindābūr as an island consisting of thirty-six villages in contradistinction to the description of it by the previous writers as a city, seems to have aggravated rather than helped the solution of this difficulty. Nevertheless, the geographical position assigned to it by Ibn Batuta as being at three days' sail to the south of Koukah (i.e., Gogo in Kathiawar) and at a day's journey to the north of Honawar⁵ inclined Prof. Gildemeister to locate it in the neighbourhood of Goa, and it was later identified with Goa itself by Colonel Yule.⁶ In the course of his identification this author remarked

¹ Elliot-Dowson, *History of India*, I, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, p. 68. 'Of the cities on the shore the first is Sindābūr, then Faknur, then the country of Manjarūr.'

³ *Ibid.*, p. 89. Baruh is Barūch, i.e., Broach.

⁴ *Madras Journal of Literature and Science*, XV, p. 198.

⁵ Defremery-Sanguinetti, *Voyages D' Ibn Batoutah*, IV, pp. 61-2. Prof. Gibbs' Translation, *Broadway Travellers Series*, is now quite serviceable. (Editor).

⁶ Yule, *Cathay*, p. 444.

that 'Sindābūr could be from the use of the *ṣwad* by the earlier writers, and from the Chintabor of the European maps, *Chandapur* rather than Sundāpur,' but added that 'no Indian name like this has yet been recovered from inscriptions as attaching to Goa.'¹

It is the purpose of this paper to show that the identity of Sindābūr with Chandrapur as suggested by Colonel Yule has been fully borne out by the researches that have been recently made in the History of the Konkan.

To begin with, Ibn Batuta's description of Sindābūr as an island consisting of 36 villages; and surrounded by a gulf the waters of which were fresh and agreeable at low tide, but salt and bitter at high tide; and the fact that there were two towns in the centre of the island, one ancient built by the Infidels, and the other built by the Muhammadans, when they first conquered the island;² remove all doubts about its identification with the Goa territory. For we know from Ferishta's account of the Muhammadan occupation of Goa, that in or about A.D. 1310 Malik Kafur overran the whole of this country, penetrating as far as Ramēswar on the sea coast, i.e., *cabo de Rama*, the southernmost point of the Konkan.³ He left the territory soon after the conquest, entrusting its government to one Mullik Tubliga, who remained at the head of the administration till A.D. 1320, in which year he was recalled by the Emperor to Delhi in order to prove the charges brought by him against the viceroy of the Dekkan Malik Khusru.⁴ After the withdrawal of Malik Tubliga, the Muhammadans seem to have relinquished their hold over the Konkan, since it had to be conquered again by Muhammad bin Tuglak in 1327.⁵ It is very probable that during their first occupation of Goa the Muhammadans built a new capital not far from Gōpakapaṭṭana, the old city of the Kadambas, the dynasty conquered by them, so that when Ibn Batuta passed by that island, he saw the two cities. The description of the country as a delta island surrounded by a gulf with its concomitants of ebb and flow perfectly agrees with the description of a delta island like Goa. Moreover the fact referred to by Ibn Batuta

¹ Hobson-Jobson, p. 838.

² Defremery-Sanguinetti, *Voyages D'Ibn Batoutah*, IV, pp. 61-2.

³ Ferishta-Briggs, *History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India*, I, pp. 373-4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, pp. 391-2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 413.

that it contained 36 villages—which is also mentioned by Barros while speaking of Goa which he writes was known to the natives as Tiswade,¹ a name signifying 30 villages—is another proof of its identification with Goa. To this may be added the curious circumstance mentioned by Al Masudi that the bay of Sindābūr abounded in crocodiles, a fact that finds singular confirmation in the accounts of the Portuguese historians such as Barros, Castanheda, and Correia. According to the first of these writers the crocodiles were introduced there as a 'guard against surprises and the escape of slaves'.² Castanheda when speaking of Goa and its river says that 'in this river there are many water lizards, which also exist in other rivers'.³ That these water lizards were but crocodiles is obvious from the following words of this author: 'After the Cabayo (Bijapur Sultan) took possession of this island, he ordered, when fortifying it, that all those who had been condemned to death should be thrown into the river to the din of bugles and panderettes, which was to serve them (crocodiles) in the long run as a sign that the meal was ready; for they are man-eaters and gathered at once as soon as they heard those sounds'.⁴

Having thus far determined the identity of Sindābūr with the island of Goa, it now remains for us to see if a city of the name of Chandrapur ever existed in this territory during the period covered by the Arab travellers spoken of above.

In our study of the history of the Konkan, we have often come across a city of no mean importance, called Chandrapur, which may easily be identified with modern Chandor in Salsette, Goa.⁵ It has been suggested that it derived this appellation from the fact that it was founded by the Chalukya prince Chandrāditya, who was governing the Konkan as viceroy on behalf of his father Pulikēsi II.⁶

¹ Barros, *Da Asia*, Dec. II, liv, V, c. I, vol. II, part I, p. 432 (Ed. 1777).

[The name Tiswade seems corrupted from Sans. Trīmśadvati, which may be a contraction of 'Shad-trīmśadvati', the 30 in the one case and 36 in another of villages contained in the island.—*Editor*.]

² *Ibid.*, pp. 433-4.

³ Castanheda, *Historia do Descombrimento & Conquista da India pelos Portugueses*, Livro III, p. 20.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Cf. Moraes, *The Kadamba-Kula*, p. 392. Stuart Gomes, *Chandrapur não sera Chandor Boletim do Instituto Vasco da Gama*, No. 7, pp. 41-2.

⁶ *Ibid.* Cf. I. A., viii, p. 45.

However that may be, the ancient importance of the place cannot be called in question, for we know from the documents that the Kadambas of Goa made it the capital of their kingdom, when they emerged as feudatory chiefs in the 10th century of the Christian era. We have specific mention of this city, in a 11th century inscription of Shashtha-dēva II of this dynasty, and in the *Dvyasharāya*, a Sanskrit work, probably written by the Jaina guru Hēmachandra in the 12th century. The first of these records states that in splendour this city 'excelled even the metropolis of the gods';¹ while the *Dvyasharāya* implies that it was the capital of Jayakēśi.² It is needless to say that these chiefs selected it for their capital, because of its ancient importance no less than its excellent situation on the bank of a river, easily accessible to maritime commerce. This river known as the river of Parodā is at present a struggling rivulet, but there is no doubt that it was quite navigable in those early days of which we are speaking. For it is observed that in this river the silt deposits of succeeding years have filled up the bed much more rapidly than in any other in Goa, as may be seen from the fact that even as late as the latter half of the 19th century large-sized country crafts used to ply between Chandor and the mouth of the river, which has since been entirely closed for purposes of navigation.

The great prosperity of this city which the above-mentioned record of Shashtha-dēva II attests, was undoubtedly due to the commerce that was carried on between this city and the outside world. Just as Goa became in later times the entrepot of the east, so Chandrapur must have been the rendezvous of traders from far and near in the early mediæval times, and it was thus that it came to be known to the Arab travellers. In the time of Ibn Batuta, however, it was eclipsed by other cities, though it did not entirely escape from men's memories. For the country about Sindābūr, was still called by that name and not after the new city that had risen to prominence. Indeed it took a long time for Chandrapur to be completely dissociated from the commercial geography of Western India, for even in the sixteenth century, Goa which had long superseded the old port of Chandrapur, was known as Guvah-Sindābūr to the foreign traders. This becomes

¹ Moraes, *The Kadamba-Kula*, p. 390; 392. चंद्रपुरमिंद्रपुरातिरेकं ॥

² *I. A.* iv, p. 233.

apparent from Sidi Ali's Turkish book of navigation called the *Mohit*, where the author devotes a section under the caption '24th voyage from Guvah-Sindābūr to Aden'.¹

The decline of this city would appear to have begun in the reign of Jayakēśi I, for it was in this king's reign that the capital of the Kadambas was transferred from Chandrapur to Goa. It may be inferred from his Goa charter that this city was developed at the cost of Chandrapur.² Though the whole volume of trade was not diverted from the latter it is nevertheless evident that it had thenceforth to be content with the rôle of playing second fiddle to Goa. Towards the close of the Kadamba period, however, the fortunes of Chandrapur would seem to have revived. On the overthrow of their rule in the island of Goa by the Delhi Muhammadans, the Kadambas retired to the mountain fastnesses, whence after the withdrawal of the Muhammadan troops they returned and settled down at Chandrapur and fortified the city. During the first expedition of the Muhammadans this city had, not being then the capital, probably escaped destruction at their hands. But the second expedition of 1327 under Muhammad bin Tuglak spelt disaster to this ancient capital. However, Chandrapur appears to have soon outgrown the effects of the Muhammadan invasion. What with the weakness of the central government and the infidelity of the provincial governors, the outlying provinces of the Empire were soon lost to the Delhi sovereign, and thereupon the Konkan once more came under the rule of the Kadambas. But the end of this dynasty was not long delayed. Hostility broke out in 1343 between the reigning Kadamba King and his son, and the latter invited the Nawab Jamal-ud-Din of Honawar to seize Chandrapur, promising that he would embrace Islam and marry the Nawab's sister. Jamal-ud-Din accordingly equipped a strong fleet of fifty-two vessels and sailed to Chandrapur and carried the place by assault.³

This is the last mention of Chandrapur we have met in the historical records. The powers that ruled over the Konkan after the Kadambas bestowed their care, doubtless for reasons of trade, exclusively on the new city that had come into being and in consequence of this policy Chandrapura eventually passed into oblivion.

¹ *J.A.S.B.*, v, p. 464.

² *Arquivo da Secretaria Geral do Governo, Pangim, Moncoes do Reino*, No. 93, fol. 1396.

³ Defremery-Sanguinetti, *Voyages D'Ibn Batoutah*, iv, pp. 106-8.

Reviews

NYĀYAPRAVEŚA

PART I. SANSKRIT TEXT WITH COMMENTARIES

EDITED BY

ANANDSHANKAR B. DHRUVA

[Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. xxxviii; Oriental Institute, Baroda; 1930; price Rs. 4.]

THE publication of the Sanskrit text of the *Nyāyapraveśa* cannot but be of considerable interest even to those who have come to give up the belief in Dignāga's authorship of that work; for, it has been the subject of so much controversy of recent years that the publication of the original text had begun to be eagerly awaited. The text itself is not long, running to not more than eight pages of bold type. The exposition, mostly of fallacies of reasoning, is very brief, consisting often of but a single short sentence for each fallacy. The two commentaries provide, therefore, elucidation that is much needed in many places; and for those who do not possess the equipment needed to benefit by the commentaries alone, Principal Dhruva's notes are invaluable.

The introduction addresses itself to three main questions: the authorship of the work, its relation to the *Mañimēkalai*, and the relationship between Dignāga and Praśastapāda. In each case, the editor re-states the main conflicting positions with remarkable clearness and fairness, merely indicating his own position, towards the close of the discussion. On the last of these topics he holds that 'the balance of probability is in favour of Praśastapāda's priority to Dignāga', a position which is gaining ground steadily to-day, as against that of scholars like Keith, that Praśastapāda borrowed from Dignāga and disguised the borrowing.

On the question of authorship, the editor has not arrived at any definite conclusion, because, as he rightly says, 'no single piece of evidence, nor even the general weight of the whole, which is at present available, is found to be conclusive'. One feels, however, that, in the circumstances, he should not have drawn even the *tentative*

conclusion he attempts, that the work was by Śankarasvāmin, and was designed as an introduction (*praveśa*) to his master's great work, the *Nyāyadvāra*. The 'Tibetan blunder' is sought to be explained by Tubianski on the ground that the Tibetans had with them only the *Nyāyapraveśa*, while they had heard of the *Nyāyadvāra*, and that they not unnaturally identified the two. We have, at the present day however, no work called the *Nyāyadvāra*; we have a work called the *Nyāyamukha*, which is identified with the former by Tucci. But is the identification so secure as to be unquestionable? Has not Pandit Viduśekhara's equation of *dvāra* with *praveśa*, supported as it is by Tibetan tradition, at least as much plausibility as Tucci's equation of *dvāra* with *mukha*? As the editor himself recognises, there is a great amount of uncertainty on the whole question; and it is a matter for some regret that he should have refrained from exercising his critical acumen in the matter of Tucci's identification.

The most interesting aspect of the work, to the South Indian Student, is its relation to the *Mañimēkalai*. Hitherto, all that it seemed necessary to postulate was a relation of dependence of either on the other, in view of the remarkable resemblance between the two in the treatment of fallacies, particularly in the enumeration of nine *pakṣabhasas*, in the place of the five known to the other work of Dignāga. With the Sanskrit text before us, however, we are able to go further and say definitely that it is the Tamil classic which is dependent, in part, on the Sanskrit work, containing, as it does, an almost word-for-word rendering of the latter, with some elaborations here and there by way of improvement or elucidation. The problem of the date of the *Mañimēkalai* is not, however, cleared up with this. As was pointed out in a paper on 'Buddhist Logic in the *Mañimēkalai*' (*J.I.H.* ix, iii), there seem to be at least two strata of logical teaching: the first revealing a rather primitive conception of inference, very sceptical of the validity of inference from effect to cause, and the second revealing an advanced stage of logical thought, characterized by an exhaustive and minute classification of fallacies. It was there suggested that an interpolation may not implausibly have taken place, and that, on such a hypothesis, lines 111 to 471 of chapter xxix may be treated as having been inserted later. This may have been the work of some enthusiast, inspired by a misguided zeal to perfect the logical teaching of this literary classic. Now, line 111 begins just where the

Nyāyapraveśa begins, with a statement of the three essentials of inference—*pakṣa*, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta*,—and the nature of each. In the Tamil work, some of the information is unnecessary; for, lines 111 to 146 repeat, for the most part, what has been said earlier about the two kinds of example and the three characteristics of the *probans*; in the Sanskrit work, of course, there is no such defect to explain. The suggestion that the *Nyāyapraveśa* was sought to be incorporated whole sale, gains ground from the interpolator's blindness (it could hardly have been the author's) even to the obvious defect of repetition (*kaṇiyadu kaṇal*), a defect of first-rate magnitude in any work of merit. The rendering of the ideas into Tamil suffers from considerable obscurity. The Tamil definition of *pakṣa*, for instance, has taxed the ingenuity of all translators, while the Sanskrit definition is fairly clear: *pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmī prasiddhaviśeṣeṇa viśiṣṭataya svayam sādhyatveṇa'psitaḥ*. The word *ēlamil* seems to be introduced merely for metrical purposes, to judge from corresponding portions of the Sanskrit text. Thus, where the Tamil *ēlamil riṭṭantamm iruvakaya* the Sanskrit reads *dṛṣṭānto dvividhaḥ*. With this, there is grave reason for doubting whether *ēlamil* has any logical significance, when it is used with *pirattiyam* (perception), in line 48. There may be no justification for taking it to mean either *samyak* (as suggested by Prof. S. Kuppaswami Sastriar) or *abhrānta* (as suggested in the article already mentioned from the *Journal of Indian History*). A brief mention of other variations of the Tamil account from the Sanskrit may not prove uninteresting.

Mañimekalai, CH. XXIX*Nyāyapraveśa*

Ll. 153, 186, அப்பிரித்த சம்பந் தம்	for	P. 2, l. 16, p. 3, l. 4, <i>prasiddha sambandha</i> . [This is undoubtedly the correct form].
L. 193, அந்யதா சித்தம்	for	P. 3, l. 9, <i>anyatara-'siddha</i> . [This undoubtedly is correct].
L. 194, சித்தா சித்தம்	for	P. 3, l. 10, <i>sandigdha-'siddha</i> .
L. 219, சத்தமறித்த மறியப்படு தலின்	for	P. 3, l. 19, <i>śabdaḥprameyatvaṇ nityaḥ</i> .

Mañimekalai, CH. XXIX*Nyāyapraveśa*

Ll. 215, 254, உபயைக தேச விருத்தி	for	P. 3, l. 18, <i>ubhaya-pakṣai 'kadeśavṛtti</i> .
L. 216, விருத்த வியபிசாரி	for	P. 3, l. 18, <i>viruddha-'vyabhi-cārin</i> .
Ll. 291-302, referring to the Sāṃkhya argument about assemblages being for the use of another and so on; the treatment is far more detailed	than in	P. 4, ll. 7-11.
Ll. 319-325, தன்மி விசேட விபரிதசாதனம்; explanation differs slightly from	that in	P. 5, ll. 16-18.
Ll. 331-333 use விகல	for	P. 5, ll. 21-2 using <i>asiddha</i> .
Ll. 383-384, உண்டென்பானுக் காகாச நித்த வுமுத்தமாதலா லவ னுக்குந் குறையும், introduce a further refinement in the <i>asa</i> variety of <i>ubhaya-</i> <i>'siddhi</i> ; this is	not found in	P. 6, ll. 9-10.
Ll. 395-401	fuller than	P. 6, ll. 13-14.
Ll. 427-449 recognise two varieties of உபயா வியா விருத்தி	not found in	P. 7, ll. 2, 3.

The twenty-ninth chapter of the Tamil work seems to close with the middle of the seventh page of the Sanskrit work. On page 8 of the latter, there is mention of *dāṣaṇas* and *dāṣaṇābhāṣas*, which find no place in the *Mañimekalai*. The second half of the seventh page makes an all-too-brief mention of the two *pramāṇas*—*pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. Though the definition of the former corresponds to that in the *Mañimekalai*, the treatment of *anumāna* in lines 52-110 of that work finds no parallel in the *Nyāyapraveśa*. It is not possible, therefore, to hold that the *Nyāyapraveśa* is responsible for the entire logical discussion in the *Mañimekalai*, the order of treatment alone being changed. The mention of three kinds of inference, the disparagement of one of these varieties, the failure to treat another (the inference from analogy) in

detail, the mention of non-perception as a *probans* (which seems *primâ facie* to suggest a borrowing from so late an authority as Dharmakīrti), all these are left unexplained even after a reference to the *Nyāyapraveśa*. There is also the curious mistake noted by Principal Dhruva that in lines 109, 110, the two other members of the syllogism are said, to be included in the *distanta*; for, though the three members, according to some, contain all that the five members are required to express, it was no one's contention that *the third member included the fourth and the fifth*. This mistake, again, could not have arisen from the *Nyāyapraveśa* or from a misunderstanding of any statement made therein. We seem then to be left with about sixty lines of verse, setting forth a primitive and rather confused version of inference, followed by nearly four hundred lines, devoted to a meticulous treatment of fallacies and corresponding, almost point by point, to the *Nyāyapraveśa*. The conclusion that the second part is an interpolation seems irresistible, in the circumstances. And with this, we are again left very much in the air, as to the date of the Tamil classic. One has to judge of that on purely historical and literary grounds, aided, perhaps, by such considerations as the treatment of the Sāmkhya, which seems to bear traces of the relatively early epic exposition. But a study of the Sanskrit text of the *Nyāyapraveśa* will serve at least to dispel, once for all, the ill-founded hope that the logical teaching of the *Manimekalai* may provide a key to its chronology.

S. S. S.

STUDIES IN INDIAN HISTORY

BY

DR. SURENDRA NATH SEN

[Published by the University of Calcutta, 1930—pp. viii and 267]

THIS book is a collection of nine essays which originally appeared elsewhere with the exception of two, bearing on Portuguese records on Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan and the instructions left to his successor by the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa (1744-60) the Marquis of Castello Novo and of Alorna, as to the policy that was to be followed in the matter of the acquisition of territories known as *Novas Conquistados*. These two new essays are fresh reading and supply us with some new

sources of information about the history of Goa in the 18th century. The paper on the Portuguese records on Hyder and Tipu is merely a list of the letters, of the Portuguese Viceroys and Governors, preserved in the *Archivo Ultramarino* of Lisbon with a short explanatory note appended to each. The letters range in date from January 1764 to May 1800, fully a year later than the death of Tipu. The first letter noticed, contains a short biography of Hyder which may be found useful. The Portuguese were apprehensive of Hyder's attempts to create a naval power for himself and to construct a naval station at Bhatkal. The letters that Dr. Sen notices as bearing on Hyder's maritime power and that he utilizes in his paper on Hyder Ali's fleet, show that he launched his fleet some time between 1763 and 1765 and employed European officers in it. The Bhatkal project was entrusted to a Dutch shipwright; and Sir Edward Hughes destroyed Hyder's navy off Mangalore in the latter part of 1780. The information given by the Portuguese letters noticed here should be valuable, not only in this matter, but also in connection with Tipu's treatment of the Portuguese priests and Christians and his likely designs on Goa. A letter of 1792 says that Hari Pant Phadke played an important part in the peace-parleys before the Treaty of Seringapatam; and the last is a short narrative of Tipu's career, which is bound to be interesting and deserves translation by the author in full. The Marquis of Alorna's paper is in three parts: the first part which alone is given in the book describes the petty kingdoms like Bednur, Savanur and the Angrias, the Maratha state and administration, the usurpation of supreme power by the Peishwa after the death of Shahu, and the efficiency of Maratha military organization. Then the extracts of Dr. Sen describe the Portuguese possessions of Goa and the neighbouring stations and the manner in which they could be defended. These have particular reference to the situation of the Sardesai of Kudal, called the Bhonsla whom Alorna had defeated and deprived of some possessions, and to the friendly ruler of Sunda who was helpful in the crushing of the Bhonsla.

The first of the papers, bearing on the value of the historical records preserved at Goa, is worth the republication that it has had. The paper on the Karnatak Expedition of Shivaji questions very effectively Sir J. N. Sarkar's Assumption of the Shahnava Kalmi Bhakar as a contemporary authority and his opinion that Shivaji

could not have really intended to annex the Carnatic and only desired to squeeze the land of its wealth and peel it to the bones. The paper on the *Shringeri letters* of Tipu Sultan is really based on the information given in the *Mysore Archaeological Report* for 1916 containing the substance of letters showing Tipu's concern for the safety of the *Mutt* when it was injured by Maratha raids; it tries to prove that the Sultan's fanaticism was never directed against his own subjects and was displayed only on those whom he considered to be his enemies and that he was not less tolerant or more cruel than his father: and consequently religious intolerance could not have been one of the real causes of his ruin.

All the papers, except perhaps one, that on *Heretics* during the Pathan period, can be regarded as having a bearing on the history of the Western Coast during the 17th and 18th centuries. As they are presented, they remain only a collection of separate papers on disjointed subjects, but conveying valuable information.

C. S. S.

LORD HASTINGS AND THE INDIAN STATES
BEING A STUDY OF THE RELATIONS OF THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN INDIA
WITH THE INDIAN STATES
1813-1823

BY

M. S. MEHTA

WITH A FOREWORD BY

SIR P. S. SIVASWAMY AYYAR

[Bombay: D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co., 1930—pp. xv and 275.]

ONE of the important aspects of British Indian History is the evolution of a definite policy adopted by the Suzerain Power in its attitude towards the Indian States. Apart from the important bearing that this aspect has on the present problem of constitutional reconstruction and a federation between British India and the States, the study itself is of great value, legal, constitutional and administrative. Sir William Lee-Warner, in his classical treatise, *The Native States of India*, tells us that the administration of Lord Hastings marks a new

departure in policy, an assumption of its imperial position and responsibilities by the British Government and an enunciation of the rule that the proper position of the states in the interior of India was to be one of isolation and subordinate co-operation. The monograph under review, describes, first, the political situation of the country as it was at the time of Hastings' accession to office, when the policy of non-intervention and ring-fence had come to be largely modified by the system of subsidiary alliances introduced by Wellesley, the aggressive Pro-Consul. It then traces the scheme which the new Governor-General first put forward, *viz.*, the formation of a league of all the principal States under British hegemony, the members of which would have to surrender their rights of war and peace and would be allowed only internal autonomy. As the subsidiary States had already come by treaty into such a dependence, it was the aim of Hastings only to force such states as still remained outside the pale of treaty relations with the British into the proposed league. The Calcutta Council, however, refused to countenance the scheme which had consequently to be dropped, particularly in view of the fact that the Board of Control and the Court of Directors were both unwilling to sanction any wholesale revision of existing alliances. It was the Pindari danger and the Governor-General's rooted idea that the Sindia was at the bottom of all the mischief that brought about the wars of 1816-18 and enabled Hastings to establish complete British paramountcy over large areas very much in the manner he had planned. His ideas were, (1) the States should support the suzerain power with all their forces on any call, and (2) they should submit all their mutual differences for British arbitration, without resorting to war. Lord Hastings enlarged and amplified his scheme in the organisation of British relations with the States of Rajputana, Central India and Kathiawad. The so-called operative ascendancy of the British power was implemented by Hastings, mainly by means of treaties to a large extent, but supplemented on necessary occasions by other acts of practical interference. He was eager to blot out all vestiges of even shadowy independence and power that the deposed Peishwa in his retirement and the decrepit Mughal phantom at Delhi might be believed to possess still. It was this motive that led him to support the assumption of the title of the King of Oudh, by the Nawab Vizier, so that the latter might be completely free from any possible

revival of the pretensions of the Mughal House. This was, however, in effect the bolstering up of one shadow, only a shade more substantial, in order to efface another shadow, already dropping out of view. He declared that by the Charter Act of 1813, the sovereignty of the British Crown in its Indian dominions was asserted by Parliament and entrusted by it to the Company—a great stretch of its political implication. Mr. Mehta is at great pains to explain that while all the attributes of external sovereignty, had been, either explicitly or implicitly, formally conceded by existing treaties, the problem of the internal sovereignty of the States raised complicated issues for the Suzerain Power. With the system of British Residents, complete abstention from interference in matters of internal administration was an impossible feat and could not be maintained. Hastings himself had repeatedly urged on the Home authorities the view that interference in the internal concerns of States was not within their province. Such a view was expressly mentioned in the treaties; but it was impossible to maintain it in practical administration; and the nature and degree of interference depended on the personality and temperament of British agents and residents. Most of these latter had been trained in the Wellesley School and were only too ready to interfere on slight pretext. Lee-Warner indeed says that the statesmen of the time of Mountstuart Elphinstone were sound scholars and applied lessons that they had learnt from Roman History; and they knew perhaps too well, of the break-down of the Roman attempts to maintain the independence on even the treaty-rights of the allies of the Republic. But they apparently forgot that the main help which Roman History could afford to the political agent, was the lesson of warning, and not of example.

As it is, Mr. Mehta stresses on the incompatibility between abstention from internal interference and the guarantee of the immunity of the rulers provided for in the treaties against enemies, both external and internal. Hastings' letter to Metcalfe, Resident at Hyderabad, explains his views with regard to internal intervention. As yet, however, there was no possibility of the evolution of a distinct political law, that would take the action of the Paramount Power outside the field of military, and quasi-international treaty considerations.

The author has the distinct advantage of an enormous amount of printed material for his task, viz., the elaborate account of the

contemporary historian, Prinsep, the voluminous biographies, correspondence and minutes of the great lieutenants of Hastings, like Munro, Metcalfe, Malcolm and Elphinstone, the printed papers of the wars of the time and the mass of unpublished material in the Calcutta Record Office and in the India House, including secret political consultations and despatches. He has been careful and non-partisan in his views, cautious in the method of treatment, and assiduous in his documentation, analysis and conclusions. He has also been cautious and correct in his statement of views about the external and internal sovereignty of the princes. Perhaps he could have utilized Indian and unofficial sources, like the records accumulated in the Peishwa's Daftar and by private Maratha agencies. The book, as a whole, forms depressing reading, a fact largely due to the nature of the topic and the times, marked by the moral and military degradation of most States.

C. S. S.

MYSORE GAZETTEER

EDITED BY

C. HAYAVADANA RAO

[Compiled for Government, Volume II, Historical—Parts I, II, III, and IV, pp. xvii, 3206, etc.—New Edition—Bangalore, 1930.]

THESE four books form the second volume of the new *Mysore Gazetteer*, the revised edition of which was published in 1897 under the editorship of Mr. B. Lewis Rice. Twenty years elapsed between the first publication of the *Mysore Gazetteer* and Mr. Rice's revised edition; and now after an interval of nearly a quarter of a century has appeared the much-expanded new edition in which the historical section has been enlarged many times over and made to cover four thick volumes. Of course the new treatment has collected, under appropriate headings, the materials rendered available by archaeological and other researches, and attempted to utilize them in elucidating the history, particularly in its earlier sections. The claim has been made by the Editor that 'almost every period of Mysore history has been re-written in the light of the new facts made available by research within the past four decades' and that certain errors which had crept into the last edition of the work in the account of the reign of H. H. Sri Krishnaraja Wodeyar III. have been corrected in the light of original documents now available in regard to it. The result is expected to be that the

myth of mal-administration that has gathered round the name of this Maharaja will be dissipated. Thus, in part IV (pp. 2876 *et seq.*) the attempt is made to prove (1) that the administration of Mysore was taken over by Lord William Bentinck before he received the report of the Committee he nominated to inquire into the causes of the disturbances in Mysore, and not afterwards; (2) that the Governor-General perceived, on a perusal of the Committee's report that he had been too harsh in ordering the British assumption of the territories in their entirety and wrote to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors that the assumption of a part of the territories would have sufficed for the purposes of the British Government, and that he entertained doubts both as to the legality and the justice of the course he had adopted; and (3) that the assumption was quite a temporary measure. It should indeed be a matter of gratification to all Indians that in the matter of the rendition of Mysore, the British Press, one of whose leaders was John Morley, displayed commendable goodwill towards H. H. Krishnaraja Wodeyar III's just and legal claims, and to read that Dr. J. C. Campbell, the Durbar Surgeon, and Major Evans Bell, the well-known publicist, helped so much in getting English public opinion to veer round to the side of the dispossessed Maharajah whose charitable disposition is generously described by the Editor.

One chapter, the last in the first part, devotes itself to the literary associations of Mysore in recent English literature, particularly from the epoch of Scott and Byron. Well-known writers on Mysore like Wilks, Buchanan-Hamilton, Bell, Major Dirom, Bowring and Rice have also been properly noticed. Another chapter at the very end gives short biographical notices of notable personages, Indian and European, connected with Mysore in recent times and is fittingly termed *The Roll of Honour*. The list however is, by no means, exhaustive and has not been enlarged, on account of exigencies of space and the difficulty of proceeding to deal with earlier centuries in a similar manner. The space devoted to the various epochs and topics may be deemed disproportionate in a few instances; and what has been called the early history of the land has been projected forward so as to come up to the date of the foundation of the Vijayanagar monarchy whose life of a little over two centuries down to 1565 is made to constitute the mediæval history. The proto-history of the land is discursively treated. The Haihayas, Parasurama, Sri Ramachandra, the Pauranic

heroes of Kishkindha and others are all detailed, and Pargiter's views are summarised in reference to the earliest Indian genealogies recorded in Pauranic tradition. These seem to be perhaps unnecessary in their bulk in a gazetteer of Mysore. The inscriptional material referring to the State is abundant and has been utilized to a great extent by Rice in his *Mysore and Coorg*, and *Mysore, a Gazetteer*. The Editor opines that the *puranas* or punch-marked coins found in association with Roman and Chinese coins of the 1st and 2nd centuries B. C. are probably much older and are wholly indigenous in origin, owing nothing to foreign influence; also he inclines to the view, largely based on other support, that the sculptural work of the State, up to the beginning of the 3rd century B. C. was mainly Buddhist. He gives copious information about the iconography of the temples, and about painting which was deemed a religious art and entirely subordinated to sculpture and became secularised only comparatively recently. The art of engraving finds its most perfect specimens under the Hoysalas; and the different literatures of the land have been surveyed, including European contributions to their growth.

The second part comes to history proper, beginning with Chandragupta's migration to Karnataka along with Bhadrabahu and taking the reader through the Andhra, Kadamba, Ganga, Pallava, Chola and Hoysala dynasties, with all available information about them summarised. Incidentally, we are shown that Vishnuvardhana Hoysala's interest in the Jain religion was sustained throughout his reign and there was no trace of sectarianism in him.

The third part devotes itself almost completely to Vijayanagara rule, down to the time of Sriranga VI. An attempt is also made to construct a list of the later kings of the fourth (Aravida) dynasty on the basis of a list drawn up for Colonel Colin Mackenzie in 1801 which would bring the political life of the line down to the times of Hyder and Tipu. Great care has been bestowed on the collection of materials in this part; and we are treated to a translation of the summary of the teaching of the science of Politics which the great Krishnadeva Raya conveyed in his *Amuktamalyada* as well as to an analysis of the various heads under which the principles of administration set forth by the Raya could be practically applied. The elaborate treatment testifies to a careful collation of the abundant available material, both indigenous and foreign. The attempts of Robert di Nobili and other early

Christian missionaries to spread their faith are also detailed. The genealogical lists of the different dynasties as well as those of connected families like the Velugotis of Venkatagiri have been built up in tables on the basis of available material, up-to-date.

The growth of the present ruling dynasty is traced in the last part, beginning from their conquest of Seringapatam in 1610 under Raja Woodeyar. Bijapur incursions, Shahji's achievements, and Chikka-deva Raya's rule are compassed within brief dimensions; while the succeeding rulers down to Hyder have received but scanty treatment. The hiatus caused by Hyder's usurpation and the events of the reigns of the Sultans are naturally more detailed on account of increasing sources of information. English records and books became abundant from the epoch of the Mysore wars. Wilks and Bowring are amongst those quoted most frequently. The 19th century history of the State, the period of Commission rule, the Rendition and the progress of the subsequent half a century that has elapsed, have received more than adequate treatment. While commending the industry and power of sifting displayed in the book, one cannot but remark that small errors like Paidayur (for Padiyur) and Jagadek-amalla should not have been allowed to creep in and Dr. V. A. Smith should not have been dubbed a knight instead of a doctor. The treatment is prolix in many places and shows a tendency to be jejune. But the book, as a whole, is a valuable storehouse of information collected from numerous quarries of knowledge and should be useful not only for the student of Mysore history, but for a much wider circle.

C. S. S.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SULTAN MAHMUD OF GHAZNA

BY

DR. MUHAMMAD NAZIM

WITH A FOREWORD

BY THE LATE SIR THOMAS ARNOLD

[The Cambridge University Press, 1931—pp. xv and 271.]

THE study of the life and personality of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna has been rousing great interest recently. A few years back, Professor Mohammad Habib of Aligarh brought out a *Study of the Sultan* in The Aligarh Muslim University Publications Series, with the

object of endeavouring to secure a scientific evaluation of his work and policy and see how far Sultan Mahmud deserved to be adored as a Saint of the Faith. The eleventh century world of Islam was, according to Mr. Habib, devoid of the higher spirit of faith and marked by sectarian feuds and theological disputations; and as a reaction from this deadening atmosphere, finer minds turned to the resuscitation of the ancient Persian culture which came to be blended with Islamic ideals and produced a new spirit of Renaissance. And Mahmud was the most magnificent, if not the most discriminating, patron of this new movement. Of course, Professor Habib dwelt also on the Sultan's military genius and his new secular imperialism. His attitude towards the Hindus and their religion produced in the Indian mind an inveterate hatred of all Muslims, to which Albiruni bears testimony; and yet, Mr. Habib asserts, Mahmud was a secular minded prince and accepted the principle of toleration in the restricted form in which his age understood it; and 'Islam, though it was not an inspiring motive, could be utilized as an *a posteriori* of what has been done'; and thus 'to later generations Mahmud became the arch-fanatic he never was.'

Professor Habib's attitude, put in a crude form, might savour to some extent of the spirit of the partisan; and now Dr. Nazim has come forth with this work, in which the Sultan has much of the fanatic in him taken out and is said to have displayed a laudable spirit of toleration for religious differences though he had the missionary spirit in him. He does not support the view that a burning hatred for Islam was created in the Hindu mind, because it was presented in the guise of plundering armies; and he also holds that, as an administrator, Mahmud deserves to be mentioned with respect, and that he was able to keep good order in his vast empire, even during his long and frequent absences on distant expeditions. He was also punctilious in the performance of his religious duties, believed in the religious unity of the state and punished rigorously all dissenters; while his hostility to the Carmathians was accentuated by the attitude of the Caliph towards them. Dr. Nazim also traces in great and accurate detail, the Sultan's wars and campaigns in India; he attempts a correct sequence of the campaigns against the Hindushahiyya Rajas of Waihand (the Udabhanda of Kalhana), about which even Sir Wolseley Haig has encountered some confusion. He

details next Mahmud's relations with the Carmathian ruler of Multan and his campaigns on Bhatinda, Thanesar, Kashmir, the Gangetic Doab and Bundelkhand fringes. In an Appendix, he identifies the Bhatiya of the chroniclers with Bhatinda, which was Bhatti-da-nagara or Bhatida according to Cunningham. The famous march to Somnath from Multan is traced, as well as his return route through Cutch and Sind. Many places mentioned by the historians, but not identified satisfactorily, are now located. And Gauda of Kalinjar is here described as having composed a verse in Hindi in praise of the Sultan for which he was rewarded with the grant of fifteen forts and other presents.

The author of this book would maintain that the tears that the Sultan shed on his death-bed on seeing for the last time his jewels and precious stones spread before him, were tears of remorse for the terrible drama of a lifetime which bore these fruits, and not the sorrowing that the Sultan felt at having to leave these behind him, as has been maintained by later writers. He also devotes considerable space to an account of the administrative system of the Sultan, including his ministers, their departments, the army organisation and some details of the provincial government which was divided into three important branches, civil, military and judicial. We note the existence of a regular postal system of official service throughout the empire; and the official news-writer of a province was a man of high rank and of great trust and responsibility.

His wars in Sistan, Iran and Central Asia were barren; and even at his death the Sultan could perceive the gathering storm of the Seljuks who were to bring down the fabric of empire so soon. Dr. Nazim points out this very clearly, besides giving a good picture of the political condition of the Muslim world in the 4th century A.H. and an account of the rise of the Ghaznavid dynasty. His examination of the different classes of sources of information is a model of critical thoroughness which discounts the liberal mixture of pious fiction that has entered into many of the histories, both early, non-contemporary and later works. He has tried to estimate the value, for his specific purpose, of standard works of historians like Utbi, Gardizi, Ibnu'l-Athir, Ibn Khabdun and Ferishta and of other writers like Albiruni, Unsuri, etc. He regrets that no Hindu sources are available to correct or supplement the statements of Muslim

writers—even the Jain chroniclers of the Solanki kingdom, having drawn a veil over the doings of the Sultan—and also the scantiness of the archaeological evidence of the period. He would insist on the value of the geographical setting of the campaigns and other facts which would greatly enhance the authoritativeness of the account. One of the main objects of the author is to rebut the charge of fanaticism which has been so often levelled against the Sultan; but this he has not been able to do effectively. His account of the Sultan's reign and chronology and of the system of administration prevailing under him, are an admirable contribution of a careful and widely-read scholar to a little-known period of Indian History.

C. S. S.

HISTORY OF DHARMAŚĀSTRA

BY

PANDURANG VAMAM KANE, M.A., LL.M.

Ancient and mediæval Religious and Civil Law

(Government Oriental Series Class B No. 6)

[Prepared under the supervision of the Publication Department of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.]

It is with great pleasure we acknowledge the receipt from the learned and distinguished author of the above book, the copy forwarded to us for review in our pages. It is marked as Publication No. 6 in Class B of the Government Oriental Series, prepared under the supervision of the Publication Department of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, which has done so much already in this line of work. What has now been published purports to be only the first volume of the projected history the plan of which in the words of the author was, 'to treat in a single volume of the chronology of the Dharmaśāstra and the historical developments of the various topics comprised therein from the earliest times'. This volume alone consists of 760 pages of closely printed matter. No one can read without a touch of pathos the following sentence, in the author's preface, regarding the future volume. 'Following as I do the exacting profession of an Advocate and not being in the best of health, I feel great misgivings whether I shall carry out my original intention of publishing another volume on the development of the various subjects

comprised in the Dharmaśāstra, such as marriage and other Samskāras, judicial procedure and actions at law, daily observances, *vratas*, *śyaddha* and impurity, from Vedic times down to modern days. I hope however that, time and health permitting, I may be able to issue the second volume in a few years more.' It is indeed to be regretted, that men of such devotion to scholarship as the author of this monumental work, should by the conditions of life in the country and the absence altogether of any agencies by which they could be adequately supported and remunerated, should be driven to make a living, however lucrative in other professions to the detriment of those to which they feel called by a natural attraction or by acquired talents.

The stupendous nature of the work can easily be imagined, when we find that to the body of the book are appended two lists, the first entitled 'List of works on Dharmaśāstra' running to about 170 pages and containing about 5,000 works; and the other entitled 'The list of authors on Dharmaśāstra' running to about 72 pages and containing about 1,800 names. The preparation of two such lists alone must have involved research and scholarship of a very strenuous character. More than a hundred Dharmaśāstras are treated in detail by the learned author. To most readers undoubtedly it must certainly be a revelation that there have been in this country so many writers and so many works on Dharmaśāstras. The investigation into the meaning of the word *Dharma* is interesting and scholarly. To those engaged in the contemplation of the history of Dharmaśāstra in this country, it must be a striking tribute to the paramount authority of the Vedas that all books and authors on Dharmaśāstra, even while actually departing from, or enlarging on the Vedic doctrines with regard to Dharmaśāstra, acknowledge the supreme authority of the Vedas. To a history, perhaps otherwise devoid of an unifying interest, this single silver thread runs through the whole and furnishes a basis on which the historical changes and developments might be studied intelligently. The learned author makes it abundantly clear that standard works on Dharmaśāstra were extant in this country more than 2,500 years ago. The author is unable to accept the view that the Dharmaśāstras were in point of time earlier than the Dharmaśāstras composed generally in verse. The author then proceeds to deal with the Dharmaśāstras of Gautama, Bauddhāyana, Āpasthamba and others. The views of the

learned author with regard to the vexed question of the existence at one time of what was known as 'Mānava Dharmaśāstra,' now lost, in opposition to the views on the subject of such great Orientalists like Max-Müller, Weber, Bühler and others, are refreshing and deserve the careful consideration of all those interested in the discussion. The section devoted to the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya and its connection with, and bearing upon, Dharmaśāstra is full of interesting and instructive matter. There are several illuminating discussions on points of special interest in the sections dealing with the Manu Smṛti and the Yājñavalkya Smṛti. We cannot in this brief review do better than to suggest to the ardent student of the subject, a close and careful study of the great work under review: nor let it be understood in a spirit of mere submission and acceptance, but in a truly questioning and critical spirit which alone is sure to be appreciated by the learned author.

Before concluding, we cannot do better than quote a sentence or two from the author himself: 'The number of authors and works on Dharmaśāstra is legion. All these numberless authors and works were actuated by the most laudable motive of regulating the Aryan Society in all matters, civil, religious and moral, and for securing for the members of that society, happiness in this world and the next. They laid the greatest emphasis on the duties of every man as a member of the whole Aryan Society, as a member of the particular class to which he belonged, and very little emphasis on the privileges of man. They created great solidarity and cohesion among the several classes of the Aryan Society in India in spite of their conflicting interests and inclinations and enabled Hindu Society to hold its own against successive aggressions of foreign invaders.'

While congratulating the learned author on the valuable contribution he has made to Oriental studies in this monumental History of the Dharmaśāstra, we feel no doubt that the study contained in these pages of the vicissitudes of Hindu society during thousands of years, will afford a mine of rich and hitherto-unknown material for all the scholars of the future engaged in the investigation and study of the evolution of human society and of sociology, law and religion. Let us conclude with the hope that the talented author will be blest with the health to carry his project through by the publication of the supplementary volume in the coming years.

V. V. S.

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V. V. S.

INDIA UNDER WELLESLEY

BY

P. E. ROBERTS

[Messrs. George Bell & Son, Ltd., 15 Shillings]

THE administration of Lord Wellesley was the most important formative period of British Indian History. The career of the Governor-General and his individual contribution to the building-up of the British Empire in India required to be dealt with in a larger span than it has hitherto had, the only good monograph on the period being the very Rev. Dean Hutton's work in the *Rulers of India Series*. Not even a large biography of the Governor-General has so far been made available. By this work of Mr. Roberts the want is filled to some extent, though, as the author himself admits, this is not the book that will supply the want altogether. The study of the problems confronting Wellesley comes in with a certain amount of appropriateness when responsible people in India and England are in similar travail over the organization of an administration for India for the future. Though Mr. Roberts does not consider his work an adequate history, or a satisfactory biography of Wellesley, it constitutes undoubtedly a fresh study on a larger plan adequate for all practical purposes and of refreshing impartiality. Wellesley's was, according to Roberts, 'the greatest of all British administrations in India, whether considered from the point of view of military glory and territorial additions, or from the point of view of the conception of an empire in India for the British and its permanence'. Wellesley had to carry through his work not always with the support of, but even against, the authorities at home, there being two, the Company and its Directors on one side, Government and the Board of Control on the other. Naturally autocratic in temper and an imperialist to the very core, he was impatient of control, and still had to steer his course without going too far in opposition to the two authorities at home. It must now be said that he did that work with success, and the credit of achieving that success is a great deal due to him, although a number of distinguished lieutenants of his come in for a share of the credit as well.

In regard to the material, there is a great deal that has to be studied and digested for an adequate work according to Mr. Roberts,

At the same time, he has actually found it that there is very little that has escaped the publisher of the *Despatches of Wellesley*, Montgomery Martin. He is able to say that the statement of the late Lord Curzon that there were 400 volumes of manuscript still lying unexplored in the British Museum, is quite wide of the truth; a partial examination of these at any rate, has shown Mr. Roberts that the statement, if not altogether untrue, overstates the case a great deal. While Mr. Roberts states it plainly that he has not exhausted all the material, he has still been able to examine a good deal of it and make some contribution to the study of the subject. As he points out rightly, he has gone much farther than his predecessors in respect of the information conveyed regarding the college of Fort William; the opinion of Sir John Malcolm on the Treaty of Bassein is given here for the first time; and the position of the Court of Directors and the Board of Control in respect of Wellesley. In regard to the last point, he corrects the general impression that the Court of Directors were all wrong and that Wellesley was always right. There was a good deal to say on the side of the Directors and their view, and this work of Roberts does them justice. Incidentally, the correspondence exhibits the great qualities of Lord Castlereagh, which he had occasion to exhibit later on in the reorganization of Europe after the French Revolution. On a comprehensive view the verdict of Mr. Roberts is that, in spite of all personal defects and the adventitious advantages that Wellesley enjoyed, there remains a greatness of achievement in Wellesley's Indian career totally inexplicable except on the assumption that in affairs, in administration and in the management of men, he stands out supreme above the ordinary statesmen of his time. The verdict is justified by the material brought to notice in the volume.

SELECTIONS FROM THE PEISHWA DAFTAR

[Published by the Government of Bombay, Nos. i to xvii]

THE Indian Historical Records Commission which assembled in Poona early in 1924 visited, among places of interest to them, the Record Office at Poona known as the Peishwa's Daftar. On examination and on enquiry of the officials in charge of it, enough information was available for the Commission to appreciate the importance of the records sorted out to some considerable extent, arranged and kept in a comparatively well-preserved condition. A resolution was adopted

for the systematic examination of these records for the purpose of making them available to students of history. The Bombay Government accordingly took steps towards doing this, and as a result of their action, we have before us 17 booklets containing extracts in original from the Mahratti records. They are taken up topically and the documents are brought together round central incidents such as Baji Rao's entry into Malva and Bundelkhand (No. 13), Baji Rao's advance upon Delhi (No. 15), the Bassein agreement (No. 16), letters and despatches relating to the battles of Udgir and Panipat (Nos. 1 and 2), and so on. The last of them, No. 17, has reference to the transactions of Sahu and Baji Rao, and bear upon the administration of the Mahrattas. There are other interesting pamphlets like 'Sahu and his private life', and so on.

The plan of the work is that useful documents according to the view of the particular reader who is assisted by those acquainted with the records and could read them with facility, are selected for preservation. These documents are published *in extenso*, followed at the end by a comparatively short note in English to give an indication of what actually the document contains, so as to give a sort of a calendar of the papers, enabling the more serious student of history to go into the actual documents of value, even where he is not accustomed to reading Mahratti with fluency. Of course, there is the necessity for such to get the portions translated. This difficulty could hardly be avoided unless funds could be found in a far larger measure than are available for this particular purpose. As it is, where really valuable documents are made available even in this form, a regular translation of all the documents, or a more or less elaborate digest of the material contained therein could well be left to research enterprise by those interested in the history of the Mahrattas as a whole. What is done already is a great step in the direction of making the records which lay hidden from view completely, available at least to this extent to serious students of history.

Having gone so far, there yet remains the one question as to what is done with the papers not selected for publication. The understanding so far seems to be that they are not regarded as of any importance and may therefore be disposed of on that understanding. This would leave the discretion to one individual, who is in charge of it, and it gives him too wide a discretion to dispose of matters of value which

would get lost for all time, once this kind of disposal is permitted. A suggestion was made that, as papers are in any case read, something like a brief calendar of them could be made then and there, and either published in an abbreviated form for public information or preserved in manuscript along with the papers themselves, so that those that may be interested in the further study or investigation of the material may have the chance of doing so. The Government of Bombay who are responsible for the publications deserve to be congratulated upon doing so much to assist serious students of history, and it is hoped that they would continue the liberal policy, and thus make a valuable source of Mahratta history available to students of history in the subject.

SĀNKHYAKĀRIKĀ OF ĪSVARA KRISHNA

BY

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI, M.A., BAR-AT-LAW

[University of Madras]

THIS work and another on the Śivādvaita by Śrīkhanṭha are the first fruits of the institution of a Chair of Indian Philosophy at the University. Among the schemes of expansion of the teaching side of the University, as a result of the passing of the Act of 1923, the institution of a department of Indian Philosophy was one of the earliest recommendations, and the scheme effectuated in the appointment of Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri as the first occupant of the Chair of Indian Philosophy. Mr. Sastri had been at work on the Śaiva Siddhānta and connected topics for some time, and, in the course of his main study, the need for clearing up many topics became more and more felt, and this is one such, and the work of Śrīkhanṭha is another. We shall notice that one separately.

The Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īsvara Krishna is the standard classic, of the Sāṅkhya system, and the work has not been readily available in a handy form for the comparatively lay reader for some considerable time, and Mr. Sastri has done well to have brought out the Kārika with a translation and notes. The importance of the Sāṅkhya in the philosophical systems of India is generally well known and acknowledged, though the system itself may not be so well known or understood. While there has been much exposition of the system

itself, the material of an authorized character upon which the exposition could be placed required to be provided, and this fills that want. In an excellent introduction of a little over forty pages, Mr. Sastri discusses the bearing of the Sāṅkhya as a whole and the important place occupied by the Kārikā among the text-books on Sāṅkhya. The relation between Sāṅkhya and the Upanishads, Sāṅkhya and Buddhism, and the different developments of the Sāṅkhya itself as a theistic or a non-theistic system, all these required to be cleared up; and the introduction gives evidence of careful thought upon these topics, and conclusions are offered without the assertion of certitude oftentimes met with. The classical Sāṅkhya as it is dealt with in the technical text-books is found by the author to differ in important particulars from that in the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas. The bearing of this as expounded in the Tamil classic *Maṇimēkhalai* also comes in for reference. The Kārikā verses themselves are printed in Devanagari followed by an English transliteration and a translation, each one of the Kārikā being expounded in rather expanded notes to understand the bearing of each and its position in the series. It is commendable work and does credit to the author, and justifies the institution of the Chair no less than the appointment of the particular individual to it.

PANORAMIC INDIA

BY

W. R. WALLACE

INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY K. H. VAKIL

[Published by Messrs. D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co., Ltd., Bombay.]

MESSRS. D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co., Ltd., Bombay, have recently taken it upon themselves to place before those interested whatever pertains to Indian culture generally in all its branches. The work before us is one which comes within their plan for the series of publications intended to achieve this end, another publication of theirs calling for mention here being one that they published two years ago under the title *The Splendour that was Ind* by Mr. K. T. Shah, to which the Marquis of Zetland contributed a foreword, and of which His Majesty King George V was so gracious as to accept a copy.

This publication consists of 64 panoramic views taken over the whole of India with a brief introduction indicating the special features by the art critic Mr. K. H. Vakil. The views are well chosen and present an excellent array of some of the most important beauty spots in India. The work of the photographer and the block-makers alike is quite worthy of commendation, and the work is likely to serve the very useful purpose of stimulating interest in India more generally than by specialized treatises. We congratulate the enterprising publishers upon the production of this handy and valuable collection of views.

RELATIONS OF GOLKONDA

(Issued by the Hakluyt Society for 1930)

EDITED BY W. H. MORELAND, C.S.I., C.I.E.

THIS important publication consists of three separate accounts of the kingdom of Golkonda in the early years of the seventeenth century. The first is by a distinguished servant of the East India Company, the Agent at Surat, William Methwold. The second is an account by Shore, and the third remains anonymous so far. Methwold's Relation is reprinted from *Purchas his Pilgrimage*, the other two being translated for the first time. As Mr. Moreland states it in the preface, he has in that translation made an attempt to bring out as near as possible the sense of the original by a literal translation. This is followed by an introduction, in which the position of Golkonda, historical and geographical, at the time to which the relations refer are set out.

The first of these is the work of William Methwold who was the Agent of the British at Surat between 1633 and 1639. He entered the service of the East India Company as a factor in 1615 and became general merchant in the following year of the Unicorn to the Pepper Ports of Sumatra. While there, he was chosen as the principal factor of the coast of Coromandel and entered on his charge at Masulipatam in 1618. He held that office till 1622 and actually terminated his service in 1624, returning home. It was about this period of his resignation, or soon after, that the account of Golkonda was written by him by invitation for publication in the Encyclopaedic work on India, *Purchas his Pilgrims*. The account, however, came too late for

inclusion in the work and was published as an appendix to the work in a separate volume in the following year. As such it had become rare, not having been reprinted, and Mr. Moreland has rendered very valuable service in bringing it out in this new form. This is an account by a good writer, who intended it for publication, and is full and interesting as having been intended to be read generally.

The other two included are of a different character. They were both of them written not for publication, but merely, for the view of the official superiors concerned and therefore are of the character of reports to their employers. Mr. Moreland finds from the records that Mr. Shorer, the author of the second relation, served in Masulipatam between the years 1609 to 1614, at the end of which period or during the last year the report was actually written. The third is an anonymous relation published in a Dutch collection of voyages issued with the title *Origin and Progress of the United Dutch Chartered East India Company*. But from the mention of a Dutchman Van Wesick, with whom the author witnessed the widow burning described by him, the time of the work gets limited to the period between 1608 and 1612, in which year Wesick left the Coromandel Coast for Bantom. There are other items of internal evidence, which confirm this dating, and the work therefore relates to the early years of the seventeenth century. On the basis of a reference to a war between the Portuguese and the kingdom of Ahmadnagar which lasted from 1612 to 1615, we are enabled to infer that the account must have been written some time in the year 1614, as this writer says, that he was in residence in Masulipatam from 1608 to 1614. Mr. Moreland has come to the conclusion, on an examination of the list of officials engaged in the period, that the author must be a Dutchman, Pieter Gielez van Ravesteyn, who came to Masulipatam as junior factor in 1609. After a discussion of dates relating to Ravesteyn's engagement in the service of the Company, Mr. Moreland comes to the conclusion that the account must have been written in the second half of the year 1614. It will thus be found that the two Dutch Relations are of about the same date, and the account by Methwold relates to a period about ten years later. They contain more or less general accounts of the condition of the country with details of the produce and the character of the trade of the locality concerned. They throw a flood of light upon the general

condition of the country, but the really historical light that one could get therefrom is not as much as one would wish. As a matter of fact, having regard to the purpose for which the accounts were written, we have really no right to expect anything definitely historical in the three papers published.

It is hardly necessary to say anything about the work of the editor, who has gone into it with the thoroughness we are accustomed to associate with the author of *India at the Death of Akbar* and *India from Akbar to Aurangzeb*. The accounts are annotated carefully throughout, and as much light as is possible is thrown upon the narratives by information from other sources. A few points, however, seem to call for remark. In the introduction page 16, there is a discussion on the word 'Masulipatam'. The first point taken for discussion is the *patnam*, which is used uniformly in all the three relations, and not the Portuguese modification of it. He therefore rightly infers that it must have taken the name from the natives of the locality, and not from foreigners like the Portuguese. That is quite true. In regard to the derivation itself the first part of the word is, as it is popularly known, Machli which Moreland tries to derive from Urdu *Machuli* fish. Sanskrit *Matsya* is *Maccha* in Dravidian, certainly Tamil, and that Dravidic variant must have obtained both in Telugu and Kanarese, so it is not exactly the application of a distant name from Urdu. As it is explained now it is a particular kind of fish, which seems to be available in plenty in the locality that has given the name. The latter half, *pattnam* is again a Dravidian word, the Tamil *pattnam* with the special name of a coast village in Tamil as distinct from Sanskrit *paṭṭanam* a town of a particular size with a variant form *pattanam*. *Paṭṭanam* for a coast town, and one peculiarly with a coast town of the fish is nothing strange, having regard to the number of similar names from peculiarities of the kind; such as for instance, one part of Madras, known in Anglo-Indian Chepauk, is nothing more than *Selpaukkam*, the *pakkam* or the fishing village of the fish called in Tamil *Sel*. So the town means nothing more than 'fishton'—in this case of the *Sel* fish.

On page 53 of Shorer's narration, the fortification of Pulicat is given in detail. Shorer, like others of his contemporaries, refers to the Vijayanagar ruler as King of Vellore. In a footnote, Mr. Moreland quotes Floris as giving the name of the ruler as 'Wenkataraajadrapa',

king of Vellore and the queen who had the government of the region round Pulicat as 'Objama' in one place and 'Obyama' in another. He adds the information that three of his wives burnt themselves on his funeral pyre. The king under reference is undoubtedly Venkata, who may be called Venkata I, if we limit ourselves to only those of the name that actually ruled. He ruled from 1586 to 1614 when he died. The form of the name given by Floris Venkatadrappa, is the equivalent of Venkatadri and Appa an affix of respect, the first word being the name. So the name of the queen mentioned here is the name Obajamma, sometimes purely Obamma, the 'ji' being merely an honorific. Oba is a familiar name, a contracted form of Ahobala, the name of the Vishnu god at Ahobalam, and the Telugus of the locality affect the name very much, both men and women taking it. Venkata had married four wives, of whom this Oba was the daughter of Ranga-Raja of the Jillēlla family. Floris is probably right as one of the four queens, Kondamma as she is called, claimed having had a son, which was the cause of the civil war, and leaving her, the other three would be entitled to commit themselves to the flames, as having been childless. The Telugu work *Ramarajtyamu* gives the details of the marriage, etc. On page 72, the word *Maldaer* occurs, and the note by Mr. Moreland takes it to be the same as Amaldar. Amaldar comes from the word 'Amil', a small revenue division, and Maldar as it is written here is no other than Mahaldar, Mahal being a division like that. While an Amaldar is a government official, the Mahaldar may be a person, an owner or holder of the lands of the locality. Ordinarily, these permanent landlords would be the persons entrusted with the office of village munsifs, as they call it nowadays in these parts.

In regard to the reference to *Velur*, the town under reference is Vellore, and Vellore was certainly not the capital in the ordinary sense of the term till much later than this period. In the days of Venkata certainly, the capital was still Penugonda where he had to stand a siege by the Golkonda army in 1612 and where he actually died in 1614, if the local accounts could be believed. The alternative capital was Chandragiri, and this is more often associated with the name of this ruler because he was habitually in residence there as viceroy during his elder brother's reign. He seems oftentimes to have stayed in Chandragiri for long periods even as emperor. The fifty years length of reign given to him by one of these Relations would

not be far wrong if the reign period included his administration of viceroyalty as a prince. It is just possible that Pulicat was in what was the Vellore division, and the officials of the Company might have negotiated their business with the king in camp there on some occasions, just as the English obtained their charter when Sri Ranga was in Vellore at the time, 1644-45.

On page 75 of the Relations occurs the statement in connection with the pilgrimage to the Ganges by the Hindus regarding a certain Ramarāja. 'They often make vows to travel to visit to other pagodas, especially near the Ganges, where, they say, is buried the head of Ramaraja, formerly lord of the whole country, before his vassals rebelled; it is said that a mighty concourse of people gather there.' In a footnote, Mr. Moreland takes it that this refers obviously to the story of the *Ramayana* and its hero Rama. We have not come across any reference to the hero Rama as Ramarāja, nor have we come across any association of Rama with the incidents such as are mentioned in the context. There is no question of the burial of the head of Rama, nor is such burial associated with the Ganges, and the character of the reference itself could hardly be to the hero of the epic. It obviously is a reference to one of the Ramarājas of Vijayanagar, in fact the one that fell at Talikota. He is stated in a Hindu chronicle to have been, at his own request, put to death by the Adil Shah, his friend, who carried out his wishes by sending the remains to the Ganges for holy disposal. The reference to a ruler of this part of the country and of the vassals rising against him ought to be held to preclude any reference to the hero Rama and could mean only either Rama of Talikota fame or the Rama that succeeded to the throne as the result of the war of succession on the death of Venkatapathi Raja. But having regard to the date of this anonymous Relation, the reference could hardly be to the second Rama, who could not yet have come to the throne. It therefore seems clear the reference is here to Rama that died in Talikota and thereby confirms what is stated in the Kanarese *Bakhair of Ramaraya*, for which reference may be made to the *Indian Historical Records Commission Report*, Poona Session, 1924.

We may conclude the review with our congratulations to the editor upon this valuable addition to the well-known series of the *Hakluyt Society* publication, to which this makes quite a worthy addition.

MANDELSLO'S TRAVELS IN WESTERN INDIA

BY

M. S. COMMISSARIAT

THIS edition of the travels of Mandelslo, published in this form by Professor Commissariat, is an account of the travels of a German officer, who was in India, a guest of Methwold, spoken of in the review immediately above, as the chief of the English factory in Surat. He was sent out into Upper India during his long stay in Surat to see for himself places of interest, and the account here contains his notes of this visit through Gujarat, and salient points of Upper India. There is also included in it what he saw of India southward of Surat on his voyage home when he returned with Methwold himself, particularly of what took place in Goa during the voyage. Mandelslo's work has been published in a translation already—a work under the name *Mandelslo*—which includes much that is not Mandelslo's work. The first English translation was published in 1662, and that has become rare. It is known from a French translation reproduced from the German of *Olearius* and published in the same year 1662 by Abraham d'Wicqufort. The account therefore is interspersed with all that the French editor was able to collect relating to places and matters of interest referred to in the work. So in a sense it ceases to be Mandelslo's work. Professor Commissariat's work separates the account of Mandelslo's from these excrescences and gives the original account of Mandelslo alone in an English translation. The work is mostly the personal experiences of Mandelslo, an officer in immediate attendance upon the Duke of Holstein, who came on his travels to the East along with others and proceeded from Persia by himself alone to India and went back with Methwold, as was stated already. There are interesting details throughout, and Professor Commissariat has done well to have brought this out separately apart from his incorporating the matter in his *History of Gujarat*. The work throughout is well annotated and leaves little to be desired. Much of the matter, however, has already been used by various writers, and it is hardly necessary to take time here to refer to any of these in a review. That Mandelslo was a careful and intelligent observer of all that he saw has been satisfactorily proved and accepted. The author and the publishers in this edition deserve the thanks of the serious student of Indian History.

BOLSHEVISM AT A DEADLOCK

BY

KARL KAUTSKY

[Translated by Prichard. Messrs. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London.]

SOVIET Russia is the object of attention to all interested in sociology, and attention is now particularly directed to the experiment that is generally known by the term the *Five Year Plan* of social organization. Karl Kautsky is himself a socialist, was working along with Lenin, from whom he separated, not approving of the method pursued by the Russian Leader. His study of the *Five Year Plan* therefore, may be regarded as more or less an inside study by one who is in sympathy with socialism and socialistic reformation of society. At the same time, it ought not to be forgotten that he is a socialist reformer, who differs, and naturally differs strongly, from other socialists in respect of the methods to be followed and the results that are likely to result from particular schemes of social experiment.

The interesting little book of less than 200 pages contains his examination of the *Five Year Plan*, as it works in Russia. The principal feature of this is the introduction of collective farms in agriculture and the policy pursued by the Bolsheviks in bringing about this movement of agricultural organization. The *Kolhosi* and *Sovhosi* which are the names given to farming of this kind are examined with an eye to the ultimate result and with a view to the object aimed at by the Soviet party in introducing this organization. The method of procedure adopted is, according to this author, fundamentally faulty. While as a socialist he would not object to the socialisation of all natural instruments of agriculture, he complains that Soviet Russia and its leaders neglected altogether the other organizations that must co-exist for the success of the agricultural organization. He finds that there is not the co-ordinated effort at bringing agriculture and the industries to co-operate with a view to the maximum benefit derivable from large farming. He objects to the depletion of the intelligent middle-class without whose co-operation success would be impossible both in the field of pure agriculture, and in the accessory organizations required to make large-scale agriculture at all successful as a more efficient method of producing the wherewithal

for the maintenance of society. He points to the gradual disappearance of the class of intelligentsia, such as school-masters, engineers, and the other classes of people whose work is of the first importance to the success of any agricultural organization. He believes, and his conviction seems to be based upon facts of direct knowledge as well as information collected from official sources of information in Russia itself, that the principle of organization is fundamentally faulty. While he would admit the correctness of socialization of land, he objects strongly to the deprivation of the means possessed of those accessories more particularly the accessories, whose work cannot be commandeered exactly in the same fashion as that of the ordinary agricultural labourer.

Coming to the general question of organization, he thinks that the attempt to carry out a social programme by an autocracy could only pave the way for another revolution, which he already sees preparing in Russia. He finds the organization of society in Soviet Russia to be an autocracy of the labour proletariat commandeering agricultural labour and putting it to work for the benefit of the labour proletariat. He considers that in a social reorganization, which may result from the coming revolution anything like autocracy ought to be avoided altogether and that could be done by bringing about social democracy of communities governing themselves and federating in large bodies for the purpose of competing on equal terms with larger communities in the world organization on a capitalistic basis.

The book, though small, is clear in its exposition of the principles and is well worth the study of those interested in Russian *Five Year Plan*, about which most people are enthusiastic, even without knowledge of its bearings. Whether it be a fact that another revolution is preparing in Russia or no, the possibilities indicated in this book are worth careful attention by those who may be even remotely interested in any reorganization of society. We commend the little book to the attention of those interested in the subject.

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- PANDIT BINAYAK MISRA: 'The Narasinghpur Charter of Uddyotakēsari Mahābhavagupta IV issued from Yayātinagara in Western Orissa.'
- TARAPADA CHOWDHURY: 'On the Interpretation of some doubtful words in the Atharva Veda.'
- DR. HIRANANDA SASTRI: 'Painting of Ragmālas by the artists of Kangra.'
- S. PATNAIK: 'Sobhaneśvar Temple Inscription of Śrī Vaidyanath who was the builder of the Temple.'
- PARAMATMA SARAN: 'Sher Shah's Revenue System.'
- MATHURALAL SHARMA: 'Magical Beliefs and Superstitions in Buddhism.'

The Indian Historical Quarterly

VOL. VII, No. 2

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- A. K. MITRA: 'The Origin of the Bell Capital.'
- S. B. CHAUDHURI: 'Topography in the Puranas.'
- DR. N. N. LAW: 'Dvaidhī bhāva in Kauṭilya.'
- DR. N. DUTT: 'Bodhisattva Prātimoksha Sūtra.'
- S. C. DATTA: 'The First Śāka of Citod.'
- D. C. BHATTACHARYA: 'Mandana, Surēśvara and Bhavabhūti—The Problem of their Identity.'
- M. MUKHOPADHYAY: 'Some Notes on Skanda Kārttikeya.'
- K. R. PISHAROTI: 'Kulaśēkhara of Kerala.'
- N. R. RAY: 'A Sūrya Icon from a Daśavatāra Temple, Pagan.'
- MISS M. D. GUPTA: 'Early Viṣṇuism and Nārāyaṇīya Worship.'

Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society

VOL. V, PART III

January, 1931—

- G. JOUVEAN DUBREUIL: 'Buddhist Antiquities in the East Godavari District.'
- M. RAMA RAO: 'The Recherla Family (a feudatory family of the Kakatiyas).'

- K. ISWAR DUTT: 'Studies in Vijayanagar Polity.'
 M. SOMASEKHARA SARMA: 'Indrabhattāraka and the Ganga Era.'
 M. RAMAKRISHNA KAVI: 'The Identity of Surēśvara.'
 R. SUBBA RAO: 'The History of the Eastern Gangas of Kalinga—Sources; the Ganga Era.'

The Indian Antiquary

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April–August, 5 numbers—

- L. D. GREENE: 'Nature Study in the Sanskrit Drama, Shakuntala.'
 SIR R. C. TEMPLE: 'On Certain Specimens of Former Currency in Burma.'
 BIREN BONERJEA: 'Possible Origin of the Caste System in India' (serial).
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 S. H. HODIVALA: 'Notes on Hobson-Jobson' (serial).
 DR. STELLA KRAMRISCH: 'A Stone Relief from a Kalinga Railing.'
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 PRAN NATH: 'The Date of the Compilation of Kautalya's Artha Sastra' (serial).
 NUMA LAFITTE: 'A Note on Certain Signs inscribed on Pottery found in ancient funeral urns in S. India.'
 K. DE B. CODRINGTON: 'Some Indian Terra Cotta Figurines.'
 JEAN PRZYLUCKI: 'The Name of the Kharoshthi Script.'
 SIR R. C. TEMPLE: 'Scraps of Tibeto-Burman Folklore.'
 BIREN BONERJEA: 'Prayasçitta or Hindu Ideas of the Expiation of Sin.'

The Round Table*Summary of articles in the June issue, No. 83.*

IN the June number of the *Round Table*, as is proper at this time, pride of place has been given to an article on Great Britain's economic problem. The article first describes the conditions of world-depression under which we labour—the slump in prices, reduced turnover of trade, unprofitable business, unemployment everywhere—and then puts forward a suggestive summary of our special difficulties. They include our failure to readjust our economic life after the war, our dependence on exports, and the rigidity of our industrial structure. Finally, the writer suggests that, since it is a condition of recovery that industry should be restored to a profit-making basis, the choice lies between all-round reduction of costs and the adoption of protection in some form or other. 'There is no reason to doubt' he writes, 'either the will of the nation to survive or its readiness to make whatever effort or accept whatever sacrifice may be needed, so soon as the nature of the effort and of the sacrifice is made clear to it'.

The second article discusses the post-war relations between France and Germany—a discussion rendered peculiarly apposite by the conclusion of the Austro-German customs agreement, the political implications of which form the crux of the article. The history of the last twelve years is viewed first from the German and then from the French standpoint. The Germans bitterly resented the dictated terms of peace and, until the Stresemann policy tempered hatred into scepticism, viewed the League of Nations as an instrument of Allied domination; the invasion of the Ruhr and the failure of the Allies to disarm, fostered still further her attitude of distrust. France, on the other hand, has been genuinely afraid of a revival of central European power, genuinely suspicious of Germany's ostensible disarmament, and has sought an instrument of defence in the hegemony of Europe. And now France, like Germany, has reached a parting of the ways, but the time in which she can make up her mind is dangerously short.

Next, an article on the Russian *Five Years Plan* offers an answer to the question, which has been acutely raised by the recent heavy

sales of Russian grain, whether the Plan presents a menace to the economic life of western capitalistic countries. The writer examines the basic tendencies of Russia's external trade, and analyses the implications of a planned economy, devised for a country backward in industrial progress but determined to industrialise itself, and to make sacrifices in order to achieve that purpose.

The fourth article examines proposed economic safeguards in India in the light of the work of the Round Table Conference. After sketching in a historical background, of which the most important features are the special position of British capital in certain Indian industries, the growth of protection and the peculiar currency system of India, the writer critically examines each of the proposed 'modifications of responsible government' and suggests some alterations.

From the United States comes an article on the position of President Hoover midway through his term of office. It was expected of the heir of 'Coolidge Prosperity' that he would guide his country through a period of ever greater prosperity, but disillusionment, occasioned by the world slump, has entirely altered the face of American politics and rendered precarious both parliamentary and popular support for the President. His policy and achievements are reviewed, special attention being given to foreign affairs and to the operations of the Federal Farm Board.

An article in the last issue of the *Round Table* advised a 'tempered optimism' with regard to China. That attitude is confirmed by a further article from Shanghai, but several disturbing forces are noted. The first volume of Mr. Justice Feetham's report on the government of Shanghai is summarised in an appendix.


A correspondent in India describes the course of events since the Round Table Conference—the reception, on the whole laudatory, accorded to its work by the various sections of thought in India, the Irwin-Gandhi settlement and its reaction on public opinion, the eruption of the communal question, the Karachi Congress. An examination of the attitude of various important groups towards the plans for constitutional advance suggests that many difficult problems still await solution.

The usual article on affairs in Great Britain analyses the nature and causes of the *entente* between Mr. Lloyd George and the moderate Labour leaders, which 'goes back in spirit to the years 1906 to 1910'.

There is a careful resumé of the arguments for and against the proposed land tax.

The batch of contributions from the self-governing Dominions opens with one from the Irish Free State in which, among other matters, proportional representation, tariffs, gunmen, the railways, the trade depression, and the hospitals sweepstakes receive lively treatment. 'The people as a whole are utterly sick of arid disputes about the Treaty and Republic, and want to get on with the work of making the country prosperous.' From Canada there comes, besides a record of current events, a pointed plea for the development of an all-British air route to the Far East, lest we should find ourselves forestalled by American enterprise.

Of special interest in the article from Australia is the account of the realignment of the political parties following the restoration of Mr. Theodore to Cabinet office, Mr. Scullin's inclination, on his return from the Imperial Conference, to turn to the Left rather than to the Right, and the emergence of Mr. Lang's repudiation policy. A separate section suggests a plan for cutting the losses on the present expensive colonization of the Northern Territory. From the White Australia policy it is but a short step to the problems of native franchise and Asiatic immigration, which exercise the Government of South Africa, and which are discussed, along with other current events in the Union, in the next article. Mr. Havenga's plan to meet a big deficit are also fully described. The writer from New Zealand likewise depicts a strenuous attempt to make both ends meet. Readers at home, as much as those in the Dominion, by suggested wage cuts in government services and in trades subject to official wage awards.



OUR EXCHANGES

1. *The Annals of the Bhandarkar Research Institute*, Deccan Gymkhana P.O., Poona.
2. *Bharat Itihasa Samshodaka Mandala*, Poona City.
3. *Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise D'Extreme-Orient*, Hanoi.
4. *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, London University, London, Longmans, Green & Co., London.
5. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, London Institution, Finsbury Circus, London.
6. *Calcutta Review*, 3, Senate House, Calcutta.
7. *Hindustan Review*, Patna Junction, E.I.Ry.
8. *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 96, Amherst St., Calcutta.
9. *Journal Asiatique*, Librairie Orientaliste, Paul Geuthner, Paris.
10. *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Patna.
11. *Journal of Oriental Research*, Managing Editor, 'The Ashrama', Luz, Mylapore.
12. *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Bombay.
13. *Journal of the Kern Institute*, Leiden, Holland.
14. *Journal of the Bombay Historical Society*, Exchange Building, Sprott Road, Bombay.
15. *Muslim Review*, 3, Government Place, Calcutta.
16. *Nagari Pracharini Sabha*, Benares.
17. *The Political Science Quarterly*, Columbia University, New York.
18. *Quarterly Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society*, Andhra Historical Society, Rajahmundry.
19. *Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society*, Daly Hall, Cenotaph Road, Bangalore.
20. *The Yale Review*, Washington, U.S.A.
21. *Yoga-Mimansa, Kun'javana*, Lonavla, Bombay.
22. *The Modern Review*, 91, Upper Circular Road, Calcutta.
23. *The Vedic Magazine and Gurukula Samachar*, Gurudatta Bhavana, Lahore.

24. *The Ceylon Journal of Science*, Office of the Archæological Survey, Anuradhapura (Ceylon).
25. *The Historical Studies*, Accession Department, University Library, University of California, Berkeley, California.
26. *The Indian Review*, Esplanade, Madras.
27. *The Servant of India*, Servant of India Society, Poona City.
28. *The Shrine of Wisdom, Aahlu*, 6 Hermon Hill, London, E. 11.
29. *The Telugu Academy Journal*, Cocanada.
30. *The Mysore University Journal*, Mysore University, Mysore.
31. *The People*, 2 Court Street, Post Box 116, Lahore.
32. *The Young Men of India*, The Thottam, Salem.
33. *The Gaekwad's Oriental Series*, Oriental Institute, Baroda.
34. The Superintendent, Government Museum, Madras.
35. *Social Science Abstracts*, 611, Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York City.
36. 'Tarikh' Kottah Akbar Jah, Hyderabad (Deccan).
37. The Superintendent of Archæology, Gwalior State, Gwalior.
38. Verlag Der Asia Major, Leipzig C1, Scherlstr, 2.
39. *The Indian Literary Review*, D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co., 190, Hornby Road, Fort, Bombay.
40. *Triveni*, Editor, 2, Appu Mudali St., Mylapore, Madras, S.



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