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THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

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A MONTHLY REVIEW

FOUNDED BY JAMES KNOWLES

VOL. CX


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CONTENTS OF VOL. CX

	PAGE
UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE REPORT. By *Sir Ernest Benn*	1
VOLUNTARY SCHOOLS. By *Sir Amherst Selby-Bigge*	8
EGYPT: A NEW PHASE. By *Major E. W. Polson Newman*	21
BRITISH TRADE AND THE NEW INDIAN CONSTITUTION. By *Hugh Molson*	31
TECHNICAL EDUCATION IN SOVIET RUSSIA. By *J. G. Crowther*	41
NEW ERA IN LONDON TRANSPORT. By *C. D. Holmested*	56
THE REVIVAL OF VILLAGE LIFE. By *Vaughan Nash*	68
LAW AND THE POOR MAN. By *Dr. E. Blackwood Wright*	75
THE DECENTRALISATION OF BROADCASTING. By *Major R. Raven-Hart*	82
THE WORLD'S DWINDLING WILD LIFE. By *Bassett Digby*	90
THE FIRST MEMBER OF THE ACADÉMIE FRANÇAISE. By *H. M. Paull*	101
MAARTEN MAARTENS' NOVELS. By *Osbert Burdett*	113
THE HOOVER PLAN. By *H. V. Hodson*	129
REFLECTIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT LIBERAL. By *F. W. Hirst*	142
BEET SUGAR AND THE BRITISH TAXPAYER. By *Right Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel*	153
GANDI—SAINT OR SINNER? By *Major-General J. F. C. Fuller*	164
CHINA AND THE FEETHAM REPORT. By *O. M. Green*	179
THE VATICAN AND FASCISMO. By *Denis Gwynn*	194
BROADCASTING IN AMERICA. By *Sir John Reith*	204
A DECLINING PEOPLE. By *Sir Leo Chiozza Money*	213
GENERAL PERSHING AND THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. By *Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice*	222
LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE. By *Captain George S. C. Swinton*	232
VERSE AS SOCIAL HISTORY. By *L. A. G. Strong*	238
OF THE HUNTING OF DRAGONS. By *Austin Hopkinson*	248
THE ECONOMY REPORT. By *Sir Charles Harris*	257
NATIONAL POLICY AND THE MONETARY CRISIS. By *Right Hon. L. S. Amery*	272
THE HEALING OF EUROPE. By *Right Hon. Lord Dickinson*	285
THE PROSPECTS OF INDIAN FEDERATION. By *Sir Robert Holland*	297
ON CHANGES IN NAVAL THOUGHT. By *Admiral Sir Reginald Custance*	315
THE POSSIBILITIES OF MECHANISED FARMING. By *L. F. Easterbrook*	321
THE PUBLIC AND COMPANY ACCOUNTS. By *H. A. McClure Smith*	337
ANNUS MIRABILIS. 1831: FARADAY, CLERK MAXWELL, BRITISH ASSOCIATION. By *Dr. Alexander Russell*	345
ANOTHER UNPUBLISHED 'IMAGINARY CONVERSATION' BY WALTER SAVAGE LANDOR. Contributed by *Dr. M. F. Ashley-Montagu.*	353
THE PROBLEMS OF FRENCH POST-WAR LITERATURE. By *H. Petiot*	359
BULWER. By *S. M. Ellis*	373
GOLD AND THE POUND. By *Dr. C. R. S. Harris*	385
THE LABOUR PARTY FROM WITHIN. By *G. D. H. Cole*	397
THE SECOND ROUND. By *Austin Hopkinson*	407
PROSPECTS OF THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE. By *G. T. Garratt*	417
THE AUSTRALIAN READJUSTMENT. By *Hon. F. W. Eggleston*	429
GERMANY'S CRISIS. By *H. Powys Greenwood*	442
CIVIL SERVICE OR BUREAUCRACY? By *Douglas Veale*	453
HUMANISM IN AMERICA. By *Philip S. Richards*	464
HORACE'S JOURNEY TO BRUNDISIUM. By *A. S. Owen*	473
IN PRAISE OF CRABBE. By *Samuel J. Looker*	480

	PAGE
LIGHT IN DARKNESS. By *Seton Gordon*	503
A FRENCH VIEW OF THE WORLD CRISIS. By *Pierre Lyautey*	513
PROBLEMS AND PERILS. By *Harold Cox*	521
MANCHURIA AGAIN. By *K. K. Kawakami*	532
THE FACE OF MOSCOW. By *W. H. Hindle*	543
LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND THE CRISIS. By *Sir William Hart*	559
THE NAVY AND THE AIR. By *Captain Taprell Dorling*	570
RELIGION IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE. By *Joseph Needham*	580
THE GANDHI APOCRYPHA. By *Cornelia Sorabji*	594
CINEMA TECHNIQUE AND THE THEATRE. By *David P. Williams*	602
THACKERAY AND THE ARMY. By *Lieut.-Colonel F. E. Whitton*	613
POST-WAR FRANCE AND GERMAN CULTURE. By *W. G. Moore*	626
LABOUR AFTER THE DELUGE. By *S. K. Ratcliffe*	641
THE DOCTORS' DILEMMAS. By *Dr. F. C. S. Schiller*	654
INDIA—THE LONGER VIEW. By *Sir Elliot Colvin*	663
GERMANY AND THE CORRIDOR. By *William Harbutt Dawson*	671
THE RIOTS IN CYPRUS. By *Reginald Nicholson*	685
RUSSIA INDUSTRIALISED? By *Dr. L. Haden Guest*	694
WAGES. By *Sir Charles Harris*	703
THE FAITH OF A MAN OF SCIENCE. By *Sir Daniel Hall*	717
ERASMUS DARWIN, 1731–1802. By *Hesketh Pearson*	723
KING PANTOMIME AND HIS COURT. By *Arthur Waugh*	735
THREE CENTENARIES. By *S. M. Ellis*	746
ON A PARTY OF RUNAWAYS. By *C. W. Brodribb*	762


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N31.110

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCLIII—JULY 1931

UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE REPORT

> The far-famed sculptor, and the laurelled bard,
> Those bold insurancers of deathless fame,
> Supply their little feeble aids in vain.
>
> BLAIR, *The Grave*.

THE insurance muddle is neither a business, nor a statistical or economic difficulty. It is a typical political mess. When politics tries to help business, or to deal with 'the economic situation' (meaningless words in the mouths of politicians), nothing but trouble follows, or ever can follow. That unquestionable fact is seen very clearly if we consider some other political arrangement of non-political affairs. For twenty years we have forgotten the basis both of employment and insurance, and are now immersed in the irrelevant details of 'transitional periods,' 'intermittent vocations,' 'safeguards,' and other wholly fictitious political and bureaucratic what-nots. Let us for a moment, therefore, turn to any new political scheme, such as agricultural marketing, the establishment of consumers' councils, or the land tax.

Parliament is asked to approve the imposition of a tax of 1*d.* in the pound upon the capital value of land. Can it be doubted that, in twenty years' time, there would proceed from such a tax an institution rivalling in importance and magnitude the Ministry of Labour, and that the Government of the day will be appointing Royal Commissions to help us out of a maze of technical complication and injustice which in the meantime will have slowly robbed the land of most of the value that it previously had to anyone?

The Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance, notwithstanding all the credit for industry and courage rightly attaching to its work and its Report, has not produced a sentence or even a phrase having any serious bearing upon the fundamental difficulties which beset us. The Report, for instance, does not say 'The law of supply and demand still runs, and if, therefore, you are prepared to pay for unemployment, you will get what you pay for.' The nearest approach it makes to any such obvious truth is in two sets of inverted commas appearing on p. 27. There a glimmer of the reality of the situation is permitted to reach the benighted politicians for whose benefit the Report is written, and the Commissioners commit themselves to the reactionary declaration that *the word 'insurance' might cover many types of scheme.* They 'might' have added that the meaning of the word itself must be altered before it can apply with any propriety to the vote-catching payments for which it is now used.

If employment is insurable within the true meaning of the term, then why not cover many other common human difficulties in the same way? For example, it would follow that from the insurance of wages for the worker we ought also to insure profits for the employer. Both come out of prices, and we ought therefore to arrange a premium making provision for an adequate price whence the insured wages and the insured profits can be drawn. No great difficulty would be experienced by politicians who could go thus far in offering an insurance for married happiness or for certain incomes from sweepstakes.

It is really necessary, in reading the Report and studying the political proposals that will emerge from it, to keep in mind those common-sense realities which have long since passed out of the recollection of both Whitehall and Westminster. Let it be conceded at once that the Report is a monument to wisdom and courage when we remember that Parliament, in this matter, has to act without an effective Opposition. The unemployment situation is the work of all parties. It is the direct result of the political auction that for a quarter of a century has taken the place of political discussion. 'Insurance' has been the leading

counter in the bribing business in which all parties have taken a hand, until 'ninepence for fourpence' has become 'anything you want for nothing.' Thus we continue daily to skirt the fringes of the unemployment problem, almost wholly disregarding its essentials and with a totally inverted view of its nature. If we go to the root of the difficulty we shall find, to choose a typical example, a carpenter. Why does he exist? How did he come to follow his trade? What are the conditions that brought him about? How long will he last? What are his obligations to others, and the obligations of others to him? Unless we can provide satisfactory answers to these questions, we must confess our inability to discuss his employment. When we approach the subject in this simple way, a number of forgotten but elementary truths, altogether outside the scope of the Report, begin to reappear.

We see that a given man is a carpenter because his neighbours are in need of woodwork. As civilisation evolved there developed a kind of social contract between the carpenter and his neighbours, that if he would supply woodwork when the others needed it, on their part they would supply him with other goods in return. An implied condition of the contract, essential to its proper working, was well understood to be that when the requirements of the neighbours for carpentering were satisfied, or of the carpenter for any particular article in exchange for which he gave his labour, either party was under an obligation to find another market or to render some other service. The basis of the whole arrangement was the need of the neighbours for woodwork and the need of the carpenter for other commodities. But to-day the needs have disappeared from our calculations, and we consider only the carpenter and his wages. We have allowed the carpenter and everyone in a similar economic position to exist in a world of false values. The carpenter says, in effect: 'I am a carpenter. I will produce woodwork in such quantities and at such prices as shall be arranged by myself and my fellow-carpenters in union, and if others do not comply with our ideas and our requirements, if at any time they do not want our services on these terms, then we will be idle at their expense. They must continue to supply us with their products, but they may only have ours on our terms. If they do not want what we offer, then we will offer nothing else; we will wait until they see the wisdom of complying with our demands.' This is the attitude of mind so pithily summed up in the current phrase: 'Work or maintenance.'

In practice, of course, matters are by no means so simple as this. Centuries of complications have obscured the foundations upon which rest our economic life, but the foundations remain and are the more necessary to support the wonderful

fabric that stands upon them. The simple truth is that we work for others, however completely we may forget it, and however far modern commercial methods may remove us from those others. That truth remains and governs the whole situation. Until a different attitude of mind shows itself towards the consumer or the customer our employment difficulties will increase. We seem at the moment to have entered a period when current expressions of opinion give no indication of the consumer's existence, and when nobody therefore takes account of his convenience or his views. The distance we have travelled along the wrong road is amazing. Our minds cease to function, except on behalf of the worker, the producer or the supplier. It is agreed that it takes two to make a quarrel, but usually forgotten that in this respect a quarrel differs from few other human activities. Two at least are necessary for almost any economic process.

Man does not want work; he wants the product of the work of others, and it is the failure to realise this simple but incontrovertible truth that causes much of our difficulty. False issues are thick around the problem, and we have lost our way in a maze of political sophistication. There is no basis for argument, and we are reduced to the digestion of such degrading detail as is given in the Royal Commission's Report, and left to quarrel whether a benefit that ought never to have been paid shall stand at 17*s.* or be reduced to 15*s.* 1*d.*

If we forget others and think only of ourselves, the desire for 'safety first' gradually becomes uppermost, yet the civilisation that we enjoy has been built by those for whom their safety was the last consideration. The unemployment problem is not only a working man's affair, and our errors of judgment are not confined to the working classes. We all seek safety first, and we cannot have it. It is an impossibility. It is the fashion to sentimentalise and legislate as much for the inefficient employer as for the superfluous worker, and the former process increases our difficulties in the same way as the latter. A few more healthy bankruptcies would help our traders to see that safety cannot be secured by trade arrangements, but must be obtained by the harder method of giving satisfaction to customers. The more we do for the unemployed and the inefficient, whether workers or others, the more numerous they become.

Only by inference does the Royal Commission touch the most vital point of the whole problem, the question whether an unemployed person is 'genuinely seeking work.' The Act of 1930 repealed this essential condition governing the grant of benefit, put the onus on the insurer instead of the insured, and added insult to injury by providing that if a man 'refuses suitable employment which is notified to him' he only loses six weeks'

benefit. Nothing so monstrous was ever embodied in the law. Yet so deeply have we fallen into the vice of political cowardice that a Royal Commission can only leave the point to be noticed by inference. The Government talks of unemployment and insurance, but thinks of other things. It owes its position to the votes of people who demand 'work or maintenance,' and the Opposition parties lack the courage to make this fact clear. The continual repetition of that slogan has achieved its object in an intellectually lazy world, and it is to be feared that the fallacy embodied in it is very generally accepted as truth. People widely believe that the Government can so arrange matters as to provide work and, failing that, maintenance, and that the individual citizen has a claim on the country's rulers for one or the other. He is willing to work, the Government is responsible for the provision of work; that being so, 'maintenance' becomes a citizen's right.

There are two big mistakes in this point of view. In the first place, it attributes to Government powers that Government can never possess. In the second, it assigns to the citizen economic rights that do not, in the nature of things, exist. This common confusion of thought has developed in a natural enough way. Peoples began by claiming political rights that do definitely exist. Then they began to think quite wrongly that political power could be used to provide economic benefits. From thence to the establishment of 'economic rights' was a fatal and easy step.

Life is a struggle for existence against the forces of Nature, and it is on that firm basis of truth that we must begin any discussion of value on the way of life that will lead to the maximum comfort for all. 'The right to live' is a soft, comforting, easy lie. Constantly repeated, it will lead us deeper and deeper into difficulty. As a civilised people we can use our political power to say that when we are prosperous we will devote some of the fruits of our prosperity to the care of the unfortunate, but such an attitude is necessarily governed by serious practical limitations. Our ability to care for the suffering depends entirely upon our prosperity, and that prosperity must not be thrown away in the supposed interests of our social failures, for in that way we merely defeat our own charitable purpose. The first condition of our power to aid is that we should ourselves be prosperous, and attention to that end may prove of better service to the objects of our anxiety than direct attention to their particular needs.

There is another and more practical way of analysing this supposed 'right to maintenance' or 'right to live.' We are concerned, of course, only with the economic aspect of affairs, the provision of those material amenities that go to make

decent life according to modern standards. From this point of view, and taking only the simplest illustrations, the absurdity of the doctrine is manifest. For example, does 'the right to live' include a cup of tea? If so, how does it come from China? Does the Chinese recognise the European tea-drinker's 'right to live'? Is he, the Chinese, also possessed of a similar right, and who confers it upon him? Can he claim 'maintenance' without work? Has he some prescriptive claim upon English textiles? And are we prepared to honour that claim? Such questions have only to be asked for the inherent absurdity of the idea of these 'rights' to be completely exposed. Is a pipe of tobacco included in the 'right to live'? If it be, does it go so far as to give the smoker the right to a choice of tobacco? Can he, if he prefer, select a cigarette instead of a pipe? Has the possessor of the 'right to live' the privilege of reading Edgar Wallace or Arnold Bennett? Have authors rights? And if so, what are they? Would these rights include the right to a wife? And how shall society be arranged to balance the account between the man who marries a good housewife and the other who is not so fortunate? These are practical questions which ordinarily form no part of political speeches. In the tangled sophistry of modern debate they may seem trivial. But surely they serve to bring us back to realities, and enable us to realise that the sustenance of the people cannot be provided by Act of Parliament.

There is nobody without an instinctive sense of the complications of life, a sense that makes him doubt the wisdom or the practicability of simple political remedies. In our better moments we revolt against the idea that other people can manage our business better than we can do it ourselves. In particular we resent the notion, inseparable from the political method, that our troubles are always the fault of someone else. Rights, and freedom to enjoy them, are not capable of bestowal at the hands either of demagogues or of soothsayers. They are to be acquired only by those who will pay the price for them, and they are wonderful value, heavy though the cost may be. They are not the simple, unconditional gifts that they are commonly represented to be. They are only for those who recognise the paradoxical truth expressed in the words 'Whose service is perfect freedom.'

If these conclusions be accepted, this Report on unemployment insurance calls for opposition. The Commissioners themselves would have produced a very different document if there had been, or were likely to be, any public discussion and difference upon such a vital question as the 'right' of the worker to maintenance. But since, all the way from Karl Marx to Mr. Winston Churchill, our leaders are apparently unanimous in their belief that it is the duty of the State to provide for man anything that

he fails to provide for himself, the Commissioners are indeed to be congratulated on a bold and sane pronouncement. Their recommendations will not, of course, be accepted, because the trade unions object and there is none with the courage to raise objections from the other and saner end. Some few economies will no doubt be made. A man who is now paid 17*s.* a week because he has maintained his refusal to work for six weeks may have his income reduced to 15*s.* 1*d.*; we shall continue to call 'insurance' that which is uninsurable; we shall continue to 'borrow,' with no intention of repaying, from a 'fund' which is not a fund but only a 'Consolidated Debt'; and this game of squandering our great economic position will go on until a real Opposition offers an alternative Government worthy of the name.

ERNEST J. P. BENN.

VOLUNTARY SCHOOLS

QUITE apart from the question whether a measure to compel all children to stay at school till fifteen is inopportune or premature, there can be no doubt that some modification of the 'dual system' as established by the Act of 1902 is essential and urgent both in the interests of the children and in the interests of economy.

The principle of 'reorganising' the elementary schools, of giving all the children a 'fresh start' at the age of eleven, of grouping and redistributing the older children so that they may be better classified and taught and so that better value may be obtained for the money spent on teaching them, has been universally accepted. Many people thought that better social and educational value would be obtained if the plan were extended so as to include at once in the senior groups all the children up to the age of fifteen, but the rejection of that plan in no way weakens the argument for making the education of all children between the ages of eleven and fourteen, and of such children as voluntarily stay at school till fifteen, much more effective. The local authorities want to do it, and, regardless of their particular interests or rights, the teachers want it done and the voluntary school managers want to help in doing it. But the necessity and difficulty of fitting the voluntary schools into a reorganised system remains as great as ever, and they cannot be fitted in unless a good deal of money is spent on their buildings. Arrangements for that purpose are indeed an essential preliminary to any future raising of the school age, and from its own point of view the Government cannot afford to abandon efforts to make them. It is true that the rejection of the Government's third Bill for raising the school age has diluted the political incentive to tackle the voluntary schools problem, which has already caused it and many other Governments a good deal of trouble. On the other hand, it has strengthened the incentive to those 'educationists' who believe in an early raising of the school age to throw all their energies into the work of comprehensive reorganisation and the removal of obstacles to reorganisation, and it has given them more time to get that work done.

The 'Hadow Report,' which has been quoted by supporters of the Bill as an ultimate and almost apocalyptic authority on its major issues, is a Report of the Consultative Committee of the Board of Education which in 1924 was asked to advise upon 'the organisation, objective and curriculum of courses of study suitable for children who will remain in full time attendance at schools, other than secondary schools, up to the age of fifteen.'

The Board certainly did not mean to refer to its Committee the question of raising the age of compulsory attendance at school by legislation, a question which, in view of its political, social, financial and administrative issues, would be more appropriately considered by a Royal Commission or by a Departmental Committee appointed for that purpose. The Committee not unnaturally urged that a four years' course for all children from eleven to fifteen would yield a much higher educational return, both in quality and quantity, than a three years' course from eleven to fourteen. But its recommendation of legislation to compel all children to stay at school till fifteen as from 1932, and, incidentally, to modify the system of local education authorities, was a by-product of its reference.

The parliamentary use made of the legislative proposals of the Report has rather distracted attention from its very valuable and illuminating study of the objective, methods and implications of reorganisation. 'Reorganisation' with a view to the better provision of advanced elementary education had, it is true, been in the air, and to some extent on the ground, for a considerable time. The need for it was indicated in Mr. Fisher's Education Act of 1918 and emphasised by the Board in its Circular 1350 issued before receipt of the Report. But this Report converted the movement into a 'big push' and enlisted a new enthusiasm for it as an advance towards 'secondary education for all.'

Anyhow, after a distracting parliamentary interlude, we are now back again at the practical business of reorganisation, as the most pressing and fruitful and, in the interests of the children, the most imperative bit of educational business before us for several years to come. The Board has promised a special rate of aid from the Exchequer to help local authorities to enlarge and improve their own schools; the local authorities are tackling it energetically, though some of them will take a good deal longer to finish it than enthusiasts like to admit. For reorganisation, local authorities have indeed to work out a jig-saw puzzle, and not only fit the individual pieces as they exist into their places, but get the size and shape of a good many pieces altered and make new pieces to fill up the gaps. They can do what they like with their own Council schools, though they are beginning to look more closely at the cost, but they have to depend on the goodwill

and resources of the voluntary schools to get them fitted into the plan. They have, generally speaking, got that goodwill, and the authorities of the Church of England are most anxious that its schools should co-operate heartily with the local authorities in executing the best plan that can be made in the interests of the children and are most willing to adapt their arrangements for religious instruction to the preferences of the children's parents —*e.g.*, by using 'agreed syllabuses.' The managers of Church schools are generally willing to let them be 'decapitated,' and to allow their senior children to go to other schools, even Council schools, or to take in older or younger children from other parishes, or to convert them from boys' or mixed schools into girls' schools, or *vice versâ*. But these arrangements usually involve the spending of money on improvement and alteration of the school buildings. If the managers cannot raise the money by voluntary contributions, what is to happen?

The local authorities are debarred from spending money on voluntary school buildings except for internal repairs, due to fair wear and tear, and it is not generally realised how little power local authorities have to compel managers to spend money on them. They cannot require the managers to enlarge a voluntary school, and they cannot refuse to maintain an existing school which has more than thirty children and provides suitable accommodation for the number of children for whom it is recognised by the Board. It is true that the authority can call on the managers to make 'such alterations and improvements as may reasonably be required' by the authority, but that has always been interpreted as meaning such alterations and improvements as are necessary for the efficiency of the school as it is, not such as are necessary to convert it into a different kind of school. If they are not made, the Board can strike it off the list of public elementary schools, but more usually the penalty of non-compliance is a reduction of the number of children for whom it is recognised. And in either case the local authority may find it difficult to provide economically for the displaced children. 'Black listed' schools, indeed, have a long life, even those in the blackest category of schools 'unsuitable for continued recognition and incapable of improvement.' In 1925–6 there were 679 schools in that category, and there are still 328 in it, of which 119 are Council schools. The voluntary school managers have, indeed, done proportionately better than the local authorities, because only 55·28 per cent. of their orginally 'black listed' schools remain on the list, as against 68·76 per cent. of the Council schools.

For purposes of reorganisation, it is true that local authorities were given power under the Act of 1918 to group voluntary schools of the same denomination and redistribute the children among the schools in the group. But the exercise of this power in practice depends on the willingness and ability of the managers to alter their premises to suit the sex and age of the children assigned to them. The Board would be very reluctant, even if it had the power, to withdraw recognition of a school because the managers refused to spend money on converting it from, *e.g.*, a mixed school for all ages into a senior boys' school. And, apart from 'grouping,' the local authority has no power to require a particular school to part with its senior or junior children or its boys or girls, and it has no power to require children attending a voluntary school to go to a Council school. If the managers of voluntary schools 'sit tight,' they can, to a large extent, block all plans of reorganisation. They have no desire to do so, though the parents often dislike having their children shifted from one school to another; but how are they to find the money which usually has to be spent on the buildings? Parochial feeling in rural and even urban areas is still lively. Parishioners who may find money to keep their own school going for their own children are not forward in finding it to take in children from other parishes or to improve a school in another parish which their children will attend. I am myself trying to deal with two parishes which cannot play cricket against each other because a match ends in blows, yet one of them will have to take in the other's children. And most voluntary subscribers are feeling themselves very poor and expect to feel poorer. The demand made on them to help reorganisation is quite a new one, due to a new movement which was not thought of in 1902, and from their point of view it is only fair that a new way of financing it should be found. And this necessarily involves some modification of the 'dual system.'

The 'dual system' started in 1870. Previously all elementary schools were provided by voluntary effort aided by building and maintenance grants given out of taxes by the Education Department. In 1870 building grants were abolished, and Board schools, in which the use of denominational catechisms or formularies was forbidden, were provided out of rates to supplement the supply of voluntary schools. So far as the cost of maintenance was not covered by grants from the Education Department, it fell on the rates in the case of Board schools and on voluntary contributions in the case of voluntary schools. In 1902 the efficiency of elementary education was seriously impaired by the inability of voluntary schools to find the balance of the money required to pay the teachers and maintain the schools, and the present system was established. School boards were superseded and the present local education authorities were constituted. On those authorities were placed the duties of providing an adequate supply of schools and of 'maintaining and keeping efficient' out of the rates, aided

by central grants from taxes, all public elementary schools in their areas. The managers of voluntary schools were left with the duty of providing and repairing their school buildings out of voluntary contributions, but they retained the right of appointing and dismissing their teachers and the control of religious instruction in them. Under this system the whole cost of educating the children in voluntary schools, as distinguished from the cost of providing accommodation for them, is defrayed out of public funds derived partly from taxes and partly from rates. The bodies of managers of voluntary schools consist of six persons, four appointed in various ways to represent the 'foundation,' and two appointed by local authorities.

The Act of 1902 gave rise to a tremendous controversy and agitation in the country, with the accompaniment of passive resistance and a 'revolt' of Welsh local authorities. The Bill occupied fifty-nine days of parliamentary time and imperilled the existence of the Government. The main grounds on which it was fought were that it violated the principle of public control of public funds, especially funds derived from rates, that it paid for sectarian teaching out of public funds, and permitted 'ecclesiastical tests' for teachers paid entirely out of public funds. It placed 'Rome on the rates.' Free Church resentment was reinforced by Anglican discontent—the Act placed 'a rope round the neck of the incumbent'—and these largely contributed to the defeat of the Unionist Party at the General Election.

Three attempts were made by Mr. Birrell in 1906 and by Mr. McKenna and Mr. Runciman in 1908 to abolish the dual system and bring all elementary schools under complete and unified public control. All these Bills provided that no rate aid should be given to schools not provided by or transferred to the local authority, that there should be no 'tests for teachers,' and that teachers should not be required to give religious instruction. They provided for the transfer of voluntary school buildings to the local authority by agreement or by compulsion. 'Facilities' were to be allowed in transferred voluntary schools for 'special' (denominational) religious instruction, but it was not to be given at the cost of the authority. The Bills differed as regards forbidding or permitting it to be given by the teachers. The two last Bills permitted voluntary schools in certain cases to 'contract out'—*i.e.*, to receive State aid in grants but no rate aid. Mr. Birrell's Bill of 1906 occupied fifty-seven days of parliamentary time: it was extensively amended in the House of Lords and abandoned. All these Bills were complicated; it is doubtful whether they would have been workable, and it is very unlikely that any Government will again attempt a resettlement of the dual system on similar lines.

After 1908 the country settled down to make the best of the Act of 1902. Mr. Fisher's Education Act of 1918 left the dual system untouched, but it gave new emphasis to the problem of advanced and practical instruction in elementary schools, the solution of which required the most effective and economical use of all school buildings, and to the need for more systematic selection, promotion, and distribution of teachers so as to build up a coherent corps of teachers in each area. With this object Mr. Fisher in 1920 made some tentative suggestions for a new concordat, a resolution of the Church Assembly in 1922 was favourable to new arrangements, and in 1925 Lord Eustace Percy declared that the Government would be prepared to proceed on the lines of an 'Enabling Bill' if there was sufficient agreement to justify it.

In the meantime Scotland had by the Education (Scotland) Act of 1918 settled its denominational question on very broad and simple lines. It is true that Scotland had never had a 'Cowper-Temple clause,' and its conscience was not offended by using money derived from the rates for denominational instruction in Board schools, a practice which was specifically sanctioned and recognised by the New Act. The proportion of voluntary to Board schools was also smaller in Scotland than in England, and the voluntary schools contained only one-seventh of the school population. But the solution adopted was to provide for the transfer of all voluntary schools to the new local education authorities by sale or lease at a price or rent agreed or fixed by arbitration. The Glasgow authority paid nearly 500,000*l.* for the Catholic schools in its area. A school not transferred within two years would cease to receive any aid out of public funds. The authorities were given the sole right of regulating the curriculum and appointing teachers, but in transferred schools the teachers were to be 'approved as regards their religious belief and character by representatives of the Church or denominational body in whose interest the school has been conducted.' The time set apart for religious instruction or observance in a transferred school was to remain unaltered. The authority was to appoint an unpaid supervisor of religious instruction for each transferred school, approved in the same way as the teachers, to report on its efficiency, and facilities were to be given to hold religious examinations in each school. Any question arising under these provisions was to be decided by the Department. The local authority was directed to constitute 'school management committees' for schools or groups of schools containing representatives of the authority, the parents, the teachers, and, in the case of transferred schools, 'at least one member in whose selection regard shall be had to the religious belief of the parents of the

children.' The local authority was also empowered to provide new schools, which would enjoy the same privileges as existing transferred schools, to meet the wishes of parents belonging to 'any Church or denominational body,' and to take over on the same terms any new schools provided by voluntary effort.

The Scottish settlement is working well, and no trouble arises over the appointment of teachers qualified to give religious instruction. In two respects, however, it is unlikely that it would find acceptance in England—namely, the establishment of new denominational schools, which is the cause of some dissatisfaction in Scotland itself, and the purchase or lease of voluntary school buildings for valuable consideration. The cost of a 'business transaction' to acquire 11,000 voluntary schools (as compared with 290 transferred schools in Scotland) would be prohibitive. But many managers of English voluntary schools would probably be glad to transfer them to the local authority, without payment but otherwise on the Scottish lines, and many authorities would be glad to accept them if the law permitted.

The Government proposals for England are very modestly conceived. They are strictly *ad hoc* and limited to the specific purpose of getting over the immediate difficulty of working the existing voluntary schools into plans of reorganisation, by finding money for enlarging, reconstructing, or improving their buildings. The arrangements contemplated are merely permissive, and no authority or body of managers is obliged to spend or receive a penny of public money for that purpose. No device for getting something done which is necessary in the interests of the children could possibly be milder. But if, by agreement, public money is spent on any school by the authority, the authority must receive increased public control over it by taking over the appointment and dismissal of all the teachers, subject only to some provisions which will give the managers security that the teachers, or some of them, will be willing and competent to give the religious instruction which the managers are entitled to prescribe. In this respect the position under the Act of 1902 is reversed: instead of the managers appointing the teachers and the local authority having the right of objecting 'on educational grounds,' the local authority will appoint and the managers will have some right of objecting on religious grounds. It is unlikely that the right of objecting will be more frequently exercised in the latter than in the former case. The proposals completely satisfy the two canons laid down by Mr. Asquith in 1902 for rate aid to voluntary schools, that the additional money must go exclusively and entirely to increasing the efficiency of the schools, and that the ratepayers must have the commanding and controlling voice in its application. The money spent under the proposals will go solely to making the

schools more efficient, and not one penny will be spent unless the local authority thinks fit to spend it, or be spent in any way not specifically approved by the authority. And the net result of spending money in this way will be to reduce, not to increase, the total expenditure of the authority on reorganisation.

The proposals do not make 'a clean job of it,' as the Scottish Act does. The managers are left to do the current repairs, and the right of the authority to carry out or obtain future improvements is not clear; the stipulation, introduced in the last stage of the discussion, that if the authority spends anything on improvement it must pay 50 per cent. and may not pay more than 75 per cent. of the cost is a most unhappy restriction of the discretion of the authority. As the Minister himself said in May 1930, to make a contribution by the managers a 'compulsory condition' might 'in many cases render nugatory the object of the whole arrangement, which is to get satisfactory schools where voluntary money is not forthcoming.'

The present Government have not handled the matter very resolutely. In their first Bill of December 1929 they made no provision for enabling the authorities to tackle the voluntary schools difficulty. Before their second Bill of May 1930, 'conversations with representatives of the Churches and other interests had taken place, resulting in proposals set out in a White Paper and embodied in more precise terms in that Bill. The Government thought they had obtained the concurrence of all interests, and the Minister burnt his boats by declaring that, unless funds were found for properly utilising and reorganising the voluntary schools, 'in many parts of the country thousands of children will be left without the proper chance which we are trying to give to all.'

The Catholics, however, on the second reading indicated their dissatisfaction, and somewhat inconsiderately began a strong agitation, especially in the north-west, against the proposals as inadequate and unfair. In their third Bill of November 1930 the Government omitted any proposals relating to voluntary schools, but resumed conversations, and in January 1931 held a conference of 'interests.' The proposals as discussed were subsequently set out in a White Paper (Cmd. 3786). A note states that the representatives of the local authorities, the teachers, the Church of England, and the Catholics thought that 'the proposals as amended could be presented to their various interests with a likelihood of acceptance,' but that 'the Free Church representatives thought them still unacceptable.' It is obvious that the excessive claims of the Catholics made on the proposals of May 1930 had antagonised the Free Churches, and a comparison between the proposals of May 1930 and January 1931 shows that the Catholics had gained little or nothing by their tactics.

On the Report stage of the Bill on January 21, 1931, the Government were unable to announce an agreement, and in default of agreement were not prepared to pledge themselves to legislation in respect of voluntary schools. On an amendment moved in the Catholic interest by one of their own supporters they were defeated, and the Bill went to the House of Lords with a very badly drafted declaration tagged on to it that the Act should not come into operation till a further Act had been passed authorising expenditure of public funds on voluntary schools. It was pretty clear that a great majority of the House were in favour of making special provision for the voluntary schools and would accept such terms as the Government on its own responsibility would propose as fair and proper.

There is a dramatic irony in the incident—a Government which had been deterred by Catholic opposition from pursuing its proposals for the utilisation of voluntary schools was defeated because it would not pledge itself to legislate on very much the same lines as it originally proposed. No one who heard the 'Rome on the rates' war cry of 1902 would have prophesied that a Labour Government would be defeated in 1931 because it would not promise to put Rome still more on the rates. As a matter of fact, the Catholics of all communities have least to fear from parliamentary action or harsh local administration. Many members of the Labour and Conservative Parties are pledged to treat them fairly, and no local authority has any disposition to treat them untenderly. 'Catholic schools for Catholic children' must, for purposes of practical politics, be taken for granted.

The Free Churches and the Liberal Party are on principle opposed to the 'dual system' of elementary education and stand for a unified system under complete public control. But a unified system cannot do without the voluntary school buildings. As Mr. Asquith said in 1902, 'the denominational schools are an integral and indispensable part of our national system. You cannot get rid of them; you cannot by any practical means find a substitute for them.' More than half the schools (11,347 out of 20,747) in England and Wales are voluntary schools, and they educate 1,905,000 children, or more than one-third of the total. Of these schools 8521 are in county areas and 6906 in the 'rural parts' of county areas, and it is there that the difficulties of reorganisation are greatest. The value of their buildings at the low rate of 10*l.* a place is some 25,000,000*l.* To provide new accommodation out of the rates now costs anything from 20*l.* to 40*l.* a place. On financial grounds it is impossible for the ratepayers to buy them out or to replace them. The hope that voluntary schools will gradually fade out by closure or transfer to the

local authority is vain. The weakest schools have already been eliminated and the process of 'attrition' is slowing down.

At the back of the opposition to the proposals of the Government two feelings may be discerned. There is the feeling that the voluntary schools, which got far more than they ought in 1902, are now going to get something more without surrendering anything of real value to them. No one who, like myself, was on the inside of the denominational controversy of 1902 to 1908 can be surprised at the survival of that feeling. There is also the fear that if the voluntary schools are helped out of the present difficulty they will dig themselves in more firmly and be in a stronger position to bargain for terms if and when a general settlement is proposed. No changes ought to be made unless the voluntary schools give up a good deal. The real answer is that, whether the voluntary schools lose anything that matters to them or not, both the local authorities, representing public control, and the children gain a great deal under the proposals.

But what are the prospects of a general settlement? Present-day reformers have not ventured to suggest a concrete plan, and no Government is likely to embark on such an enterprise until a plan appears with a good deal of public support behind it. But if nothing is done either by way of resettlement or adjustment, the children must suffer: *plectuntur Achivi.*

Of the clean-cut solutions, a purely secular system of elementary education (leaving religious instruction to the home, the Church and the Sunday school) is a 'museum piece' brought out occasionally for inspection, but quickly put back on its Birmingham shelf because no one will look at it. A qualified secular system leaving all religious instruction out of the regular curriculum, but permitting outside teachers, employed *ad hoc*, to come in and give undenominational or denominational instruction in all schools, was an alternative suggested in Sir John Gorst's Bill of 1896 and discussed in 1902. It was a system of 'all-round facilities' and 'right of entry' in all kinds of schools. It was advocated by Lord Hugh Cecil (it was attractive to him because it disestablished Cowper-Temple instruction), and Mr. Balfour was willing to offer it, but there were 'no takers': Mr. Lloyd George saw in the plan the formation of 'sectarian pens' in the schools with possibilities of 'lamb stealing' even in Wales, and success for the Church of England by virtue, not of 'superior dogmas,' but of 'superior buns' for the children and blankets for the parents.

A system of undenominational instruction in schools provided by the local authority, with 'facilities' and 'right of entry' for denominational instruction at the cost of the denomination in voluntary schools transferred to the local authority, was the

basis of the plans of 1906 and 1908. But professional opinion has hardened a good deal since 1908 against facilities and 'right of entry' and the intrusion of volunteer or alien teachers in school hours, and they are of slight value if they can only be used out of school hours. There is no prospect of an agreed general settlement on a basis of 'facilities.' Facilities out of school hours in Council school buildings for children sent to them from decapitated Church schools may facilitate reorganisation, but their usefulness is limited.

The Scottish settlement of 1918 was simple and has been successful, but it was not cheap; few people in England know anything about it, and it offends the English Free Church conscience because it still permits 'tests for teachers.' It is quite natural that the teachers should prefer a system which would give them a 'conscience clause,' leave them quite free to give or not to give religious instruction as they please, and offer them equal prospects of advancement in all schools on merit and independently of any or any particular religious beliefs. The rights of civil servants in this respect have been claimed for them, though they are not, and, in their own interests, had better not be, civil servants. They are indeed public servants, but if the public service in which they have engaged has a religious as well as a secular function, they must accept its implications till the two functions are separated. Complete freedom in this respect is incompatible with service in any system of public education which is not purely secular, except on the assumption that it will not be exercised. So long as religious instruction, whether 'Cowper-Temple' or denominational, is a recognised and integral part of the instruction given in a public elementary school, those who employ and pay teachers must know whether they can count on them, or some of them, to give the usual religious instruction. The teachers, however, are practical people and put the interests of the children first, and, though they assert the principle of complete emancipation from all religious tests, they have not made acceptance of it a condition of accepting the Government's proposals. Under the Government proposals they gain a good deal. None of the public money spent under them will go to increase their pay, though it will give them more comfortable and convenient buildings to work in. But when the local authorities have the first, if not the exclusive, voice in the appointment and promotion of teachers in voluntary schools, the teachers will have the prospect of careers determined by more discriminating and less capricious selection. Selection of teachers is a difficult business, and local authorities on the whole are more expert and have more practice in it than isolated bodies of managers. From the point of view of an authority which wants to build up a coherent

and effective and well-distributed corps of teachers in its area with fair prospects of promotion for merit, there is a great advantage in the Government proposals. At present local authorities can and do promote good teachers in voluntary schools to headships of Council schools, but they cannot secure their promotion in voluntary schools, which in rural areas are the most numerous, nor can they deal with 'misfits' by transferring a teacher from one voluntary school to another. The right of the managers to object to the authority's action or to make representations on religious grounds is likely to cause little difficulty. Local authorities are sensible enough to desire working arrangements which will obviate religious disputes, which they cordially dislike, and the safety-valve of appeal to the Board of Education will seldom be used. Anyhow, there is no doubt at all that as regards the teaching, as well as the buildings in which children are taught, the Government proposals are conducive to the interests of the children, the supreme consideration.

But most significant of all is the change of atmosphere outside as well as inside the schools. The lambs of the different Protestant flocks have always fed happily together and have come more and more to enjoy the mixed rations fed to them by their shepherds, though the flockmasters may have sometimes said hard things about each other. There is no sectarian friction or favouritism inside the schools. The Report of the Archbishop's Commission on religious education of 1929 is another 'Hadow Report' not less notable than that of 1926. It is thankful for the excellence and value of religious instruction given in Council schools, and urges the need of making the religious teaching in Church schools much better. Its attitude is—let us all put our heads together to make religious teaching in all schools as real and good as possible. In fact, Church and Free Church ministers, teachers, and representatives of local authorities have been putting their heads together and produced a number of 'agreed syllabuses' which the Church authorities are quite willing to use in Church schools on most days of the week. Local authorities are impatient of denominational or anti-denominational controversy and are only anxious to get the children taught as well as possible. I am an 'old hand.' My experience of the denominational controversy began in 1902, and I have never known a time when there was a better chance or a greater occasion for settling it or taking a step towards its settlement, such as the Government's proposals suggest, than the present.

As a member of a county education committee, I approach the matter from the point of view of an authority which wants to carry out a necessary reform, as quickly, economically, and effectively as it can, in the interests of the children, and for this

purpose local authorities must have new powers. In May 1930 the Government proposed to give them new powers, and discussion of the terms on which those powers must or may be exercised has been proceeding ever since. If the necessity or expediency of such a measure is once admitted, it is waste of time to traverse the discussion of practical administrative details by constant appeals to large general principles which have no chance of being realised. Insistence on guarding against any possibility that a local authority may agree to something which gives either party too much or too little may greatly increase the difficulty of making any agreements at all, or of making the agreements which are best on a long view of the public interest. When it is a matter of spending public money local authorities are pretty keen on getting public value for it. In any case, they want to get on with the job, and if they are held up by bargaining in the market-place the children will suffer.

Last May Sir Charles Trevelyan appealed to the 'essential reasonableness of Englishmen' and expressed his sincere hope that the House would not allow 'any sectional influence or ancient prejudice to trick the children.' I am sure the vast majority of Englishmen share that hope, and believe that if the Government, having done all they can by way of conversation and conference, will boldly state the terms which they themselves consider fair and proper, they will, even on a free vote, obtain their endorsement by Parliament.

L. A. SELBY-BIGGE.

EGYPT: A NEW PHASE

Now that Sidky Pasha has been firmly established as a result of the elections in Egypt, it is interesting to review his Government's achievements of the past year in order to obtain some indication of what the future is likely to hold in store for the Egyptian people, and also to see what chance there is of a settlement of the Egyptian problem. But, before undertaking this task, I would urge my readers to bear in mind that deductive reasoning plays a small part in Egyptian affairs, and that the 'unexpected' is usually what actually happens on the banks of the Nile.

The last year has been remarkable economically and politically. Although it is unnecessary to recapitulate the circumstances in which Nahas Pasha resigned and King Fuad called upon Sidky Pasha to form an extra-parliamentary Cabinet, it is essential to realise that the Government of Nahas aimed merely at power, with all its personal privileges and appurtenances, and had manipulated the democratic institutions of the country to suit its own convenience. Politics were corrupt to the core, even in the Oriental sense of the term; the administration was under political influences and efficiency had severely suffered; the economic position was deplorable, largely owing to the foolish cotton policy of the Nahas Government; and, what was perhaps most important of all, the *fellahin* (the great mass of the Egyptian peasants) were in a state of discontent.

On the economic side, Sidky Pasha had to face circumstances arising out of the general trade depression and fall in the price of raw materials, especially cotton, together with the inevitable consequences of the use made by the Nahas Government of the reserve fund. Out of a total reserve fund of £E.30,000,000 intended for projects of national importance, such as irrigation, agriculture, railway and road construction, and public health, the Wafd had used £E.15,000,000 for the purchase of cotton, thereby using up half the nation's reserve capital and at the same time depressing the price of this commodity. Circumstances such as these made it very difficult for the new Prime Minister to see how the year's budget was going to be balanced, as he could

not reduce official salaries or wages for political reasons, and projects of national importance had to be carried out. Fortunately, Sidky Pasha is a first-class financier, and he was determined to straighten out the economic affairs of Egypt with the least possible delay, while upholding the principles of sound finance. Steps were immediately taken to stop all Government purchases of cotton, and to sell as much as possible of the vast quantities stored at Alexandria. The Prime Minister also instituted a policy of national economy, which was carried out with the utmost rigour and penetrated into every corner of the Government service. Indeed, so successful were his efforts in this direction, that by November of last year he had cut not less than £E.8,000,000 out of the Budget without interfering with any projects of national importance. Irrigation, railway and road construction were in no way curtailed, while education, public health, housing and agricultural projects were resumed. As months passed the prospects of the Budget appeared less depressing, and when the time came for it to be passed in April it was found to balance. Thanks to his skilfully devised economy campaign and to an increase in the import duties, Sidky Pasha not only succeeded in balancing his Budget, but he actually showed a small surplus of £E.432,000, and suppressed the 'octroi' duties, providing indemnities to local bodies out of additional dues on tobacco. It is remarkable how Egypt, owing to her powers of recuperation, reacts under the guidance of an able financial administrator.

On the political side, the new Government was faced with a parliamentary system too advanced for the needs, or even the welfare, of the country, as well as with the serious distress caused by three pronounced failures on the part of the Wafd, who had maintained themselves in power by wholesale deception of the *fellahin* and had so misused this power as to maintain a *régime* of the worst misrule. In the constitutional sense Egypt had tried to move too fast, and it had become obvious that the shortcomings of the 1923 Constitution must be rectified if the country was going to take a good place among the independent nations of the modern world. Sidky Pasha, therefore, undertook the task of stabilising the parliamentary system by trying to raise the value of the electorate and of its representatives in Parliament, as well as by devising means to eliminate undemocratic methods used for party and personal purposes. The result is the Constitution and Electoral Law of 1930, which marks the highest degree of parliamentary government suitable to the present circumstances and needs of Egypt. The new Constitution, as it stands, does not transgress any of the principles of modern democratic constitutions. The Executive remains

responsible to the Chamber; there can be no legislation without the assent of the majority of that assembly; and the Budget must have the same legal sanction. The new Electoral Law, on the other hand, is based on universal manhood suffrage, although the indirect system (still in use in many other countries) now replaces the direct system of election. The present state of Egypt's political development does not warrant the use of a one-degree or direct system, the two-degree system being much better suited to an agricultural country where the proportion of illiteracy is high and the voter is unusually susceptible to misrepresentation, false promises and propaganda. Under the new system every fifty electors is represented by one delegate chosen from among themselves and possessing certain qualifications; and this delegate, together with colleagues representing other similar groups in a constituency of 100,000 people, proceeds to elect the deputy, who must also fulfil certain conditions. It is thereby hoped to produce more discrimination and judgment, while still maintaining the principles of universal manhood suffrage. It was only in 1924 that a 90 per cent. Wafd majority abolished for their own benefit the two-degree system, which had been used in Egypt for some considerable time and was well understood in principle and practice by the vast majority of the Egyptian *fellahin*.

The change in the Electoral Law necessarily involved much technical organisation, such as the definition of constituencies, formation of electoral colleges, drawing up of electoral rolls, etc.; but Sidky Pasha was anxious to hold the elections as soon as practicable, and they finally took place during the last days of May and first days of June. Meanwhile, the Wafd, under the leadership of Nahas Pasha, and a section of the Liberals headed by Mahmoud Pasha, declared their intention to boycott the elections, pretending that they had the support of the great mass of the Egyptian people, and giving as their reason for adopting this course their desire to protest against the recent changes in the Constitution. Were this the case, it is more than obvious that the most effective policy would have been to fight the elections in a constitutional manner and obtain the majority which they professed to command. By this means they would have presented the strongest and most convincing protest of all, and would automatically have assumed a majority in the new Parliament with which they could even attack the new Constitution. But Nahas Pasha and his followers preferred to make 'sand castles in the desert,' to celebrate the elections by breaking lamp-posts in Cairo, and to make attempts to enlist the sympathies of certain British parliamentarians who are on much the same level of irresponsibility. The fact of the matter was that

the Wafd were far from sure of sufficient support, and were even doubtful of the wish of their followers to boycott the elections. Hence, Nahas Pasha felt it necessary to organise provincial tours of propaganda in order to stir up an agitation in favour of the boycott.

Since the very beginning of the boycott movement Sidky Pasha made it perfectly clear to the Wafd that, if they participated in the elections, they would enjoy their full rights as Egyptian citizens, with freedom of speech, movement and association, as well as a free Press, but that, as long as they maintained their determination to boycott, they would be prevented from taking measures to make the boycott effective. In taking this decision the Prime Minister was influenced by two important considerations. First, while everyone has the right to abstain from voting, it is laid down in article 75 of the new Electoral Law that anyone who exerts pressure to prevent others from voting is punishable by a month to a year's imprisonment and/or a fine of from £E.10 to £E.100; and, secondly, it is common knowledge that Wafd agitation always takes the form of stirring up riots, with serious consequences for Egypt. Only last summer the efforts of Nahas Pasha to stir up political agitation led to disturbances in Zagazig, Bilbeis, Mansourah, and Tantah, culminating in riots at Alexandria, and the recent trouble at Benisuef was merely a repetition of the same thing, with the difference that the greatest precautions had been taken by the Egyptian Government to maintain law and order. Disturbances appeal to the Wafd for the simple reason that they are likely to bring about British intervention, and thereby bring discredit on the Sidky Government both at home and abroad; but one of the most significant features of the whole series of events has been the absence of any spontaneous opposition. All opposition has been the outcome of organised effort on the part of the Government's opponents. Throughout the period preceding the elections the Wafd tried to create the impression that in reality they commanded a large majority, although not put to the test, and they exploited a general impression that the Wafd always have the real control of the Egyptian masses, whatever political methods may be used to prove the reverse. Although this may have seemed plausible to some, the fact that they were unwilling to put their popularity to the test ought to have been sufficient to show the weakness of their position. When the elections came, the boycott proved to be a complete failure, 67 per cent. of the registered voters going to the polls and 90 per cent. of the elector-delegates registering their votes. At the time of writing the new Chamber consists of 81 Shaabists (Sidky Pasha's new party), 38 Ittahadists, 15 Independents, and 8 Nationalists,

while the Wafd looks like forming an unofficial opposition, which will fight generally by illegal methods against the duly elected members of the Chamber. It has been a clear victory right through for Sidky Pasha, and, as far as one can judge at present, there are at last prospects of good government in Egypt. To say more than that would be to tempt Providence, but there is little doubt that the government of the country has passed from the self-seeking and extremist politicians to the better and more moderate elements of Egyptian society, and that a situation has been created which holds out good prospects for the future.

As was to be expected, the efforts of Sidky Pasha to restore democratic government in Egypt have drawn a fusillade of calumny from the Wafd, and from those in this country who cannot distinguish liberty from licence and are always ready to give their support to the forces of disorder. Unfortunately, the impression has gained ground among certain elements in England, whose knowledge of Egypt is insignificant, that the recent struggle, if it may be honoured by that name, has been between Sidky Pasha, supported by the King in an endeavour to restore autocratic government in Egypt, and Nahas Pasha and the Wafd as the champions of lily-white democracy. This is not the case. Indeed, the reverse is much nearer the truth, but I prefer to put it in this way. While the Wafd pose as the champions of democracy, they are in fact aiming at the restoration of the worst form of autocracy—the oligarchy of three or four irresponsible men which has misruled Egypt whenever that party has been in power. The Government of Sidky Pasha, on the other hand, is trying to clear up the mess made by the Wafd and to restore true democratic principles to Egyptian parliamentary life, but in order to carry out this operation in an Oriental country it is necessary to resort to methods which would not perhaps find favour in England or other countries of Western Europe. But such methods, being the only ones that are understood in a country such as Egypt, are just as necessary in Cairo as are the smoother methods of the Metropolitan Police in London. Sidky Pasha has performed a remarkable year's work under serious political and economic difficulties, and if his ways are not exactly our ways in these days of advanced democracy, it is as well to remember that Egypt is an Oriental country and that what may appear to be democratic sense in London may actually be sheer nonsense in Cairo. The outstanding difference between Sidky Pasha and the Wafd is that, whereas the latter represents the forces of disorder, the former stands for peace and good government.

Although it is most desirable that His Majesty's Government should maintain an attitude of strict impartiality in this internal affair of Egypt, so long as adequate measures are taken for the

protection of British and foreign interests, certain gentlemen of the House of Commons have come forward with the contention that the political methods of Sidky Pasha are 'entirely distasteful to British democracy.' As these gentlemen claim to support a policy of neutrality and seem to know so much about the methods of Sidky Pasha, perhaps it might be as well if they were to examine on the first opportunity the 'democratic form of government in Egypt' to which they urge a return. It looks, however, as if they will have to wait some time for this illuminating experience. Anyhow, the Egyptians are not interested in 'British democracy.' They want a system of government suitable to their own special needs. In these days there is too much talk about democracy in the East by those who have little conception of what it means. What we in the West understand by 'democracy' is altogether contrary to the deepest founded principles of Eastern society, and the introduction of Western democratic conceptions can only be carried out with the greatest care, the utmost caution, and many set-backs. Even then it is doubtful whether these conceptions are not so open to misuse as to be demoralising to an Oriental people. In every case it is an experiment, and as such it ought to be given a fair chance, always allowing for prevailing circumstances. In the same way Sidky Pasha's new Constitution is an experiment, and there are reasons why it shows good prospects of success. In any case, it should not be judged until it has been put to the test. It is significant that most of the attacks made on the methods of the Sidky Government come from quarters where a knowledge of Egyptian conditions is not to be expected, and the following example is typical of that lack of knowledge. At a recent meeting in Madrid of the General Council of the International Federation of Trade Unions the chairman accused the Egyptian Government of trying to suppress the labour organisations in Egypt, giving 20,000 as an estimate of their membership. Now, the actual position as regards trade unions in Egypt is as follows. As a purely agricultural country, there are no trade unions in the British or Continental sense of the term, although there are a few groups of workers in Cairo and Alexandria, usually under the control of some unsuccessful lawyer or politician. The workers themselves have no control over the expenditure of the funds of these organisations, to the head of which they make their monthly payments. Most of the industrial concerns in Egypt are in the hands of foreign capitalists; and, as long as the *régime* of 'Capitulations' continues, no Egyptian Government can impose on these foreign firms any measures for the protection of labour.[1] In point of fact, the

[1] In 1928–29 Mahmoud Pasha tried to introduce labour legislation, but found an insuperable obstacle in the Capitulations.

Government of Sidky Pasha is the first Egyptian Government to set up in the Ministry of the Interior a Labour Bureau under the control of a capable Englishman, the whole object of which is to improve labour legislation and conditions, to provide better housing, and generally to raise the conditions of life of the working people. In these circumstances it is difficult to see how the present Government can be accused of persecuting labour, and it is noteworthy that the accusation was unaccompanied by any supporting facts.

Whereas previous Governments in Egypt have devoted their attention chiefly to party considerations and vote-catching, the present Government has clearly set itself to work in the interests of the *fellahin* and the prosperity of the country, and it is here that lay the secret of its success at the recent elections. Politics only interest a comparatively small proportion of the Egyptian people, and cannot be regarded as fundamental matters on which the happiness of the majority depends. As long as there is ample water from the Nile, as long as the cotton crop is good, and as long as taxation is low, there is happiness in the land of Egypt. I believe that the first Egyptian Government to take a serious interest in these essential matters will rally the *fellahin* to its support, and that this support will be of a very different type from that which is stirred up by the misrepresentation of political agitators. Ever since the Declaration of 1922 the internal affairs of Egypt have been sadly neglected, largely owing to the prominence of Anglo-Egyptian relations in Egyptian politics and the fact that the treaty issue soon became a pawn for party bickerings and bargainings. Indeed, it is doubtful whether any serious domestic progress can be made until the treaty question has been finally settled and Egyptian politics become centred on Egyptian affairs instead of hinging on Anglo-Egyptian relations. Since 1920 His Majesty's Governments have negotiated with the Egyptian Government on no less than six occasions in their endeavour to reach a settlement, and on each occasion their efforts have been unsuccessful. In June 1920 Zaghlul Pasha negotiated with the Milner Mission in London, and in the following summer Adley Pasha had important conversations with Lord Curzon, the failure of which eventually led to the 1922 Declaration. Then in September 1924 Mr. MacDonald raised the question again with Zaghlul Pasha in negotiations which only lasted till the beginning of the following month, and in 1928 Sir Austen Chamberlain negotiated with Sarwat Pasha, whose Ministry was a coalition Government practically under the control of Zaghlul. More recently still, Mr. Henderson met Mahmoud Pasha in 1929, and last year continued negotiations much on the same basis with Nahas Pasha, who, like all his predecessors, had to return

to Egypt without a treaty. It will be noticed that out of these six attempts to reach a settlement Egypt was represented by the Wafd on three occasions, and on two other occasions non-Wafdist negotiations were wrecked in Cairo by the Wafd (in 1928 and 1929). In the Chamberlain-Sarwat negotiations the Egyptian Prime Minister was practically in the hands of that political organisation. These various negotiations have had the effect of creating in Egypt a competition for power, based on the terms which each party was willing to offer or accept, and it was natural that the party which made the greatest demands on His Majesty's Government should make the greatest appeal to the Egyptian electors. The consequence of this was that, if His Majesty's Government insisted on negotiating only with an Egyptian Government with a majority, it was practically forced to confine its negotiations to the Wafd, at the expense of the more moderate elements in Egypt, who have at heart the conclusion of a just and lasting agreement and lost their majority for this very reason. Now, as result of a policy of making promises which they could not fulfil, the Wafd were unable to come to terms with Mr. Henderson, with all his generous concessions, and for the same reason it is most unlikely that they will ever be able to seal an agreement with any British Government. Mahmoud Pasha failed through fear that he was not supported by the more extreme elements of the Egyptian Chamber. The power of the Wafd hung as a ' sword of Damocles ' over his head, and such will always be the case as long as the extremists are in the majority. It is essential in the interests of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian relations that the moderate elements should gain the upper hand, and it should be the most earnest endeavour of every British Government to facilitate this political change, without which an Anglo-Egyptian treaty is out of the question. If it is in the interests of Great Britain to conclude a satisfactory treaty with Egypt, it is equally important for the Egyptians to rid their national politics of this ever-recurring question so as to be able to concentrate their energies on the internal development and economic prosperity of their own country.

If optimism is justified at the opening of a new phase in the affairs of Egypt, it is because the Sidky Government represents the moderate elements of the Egyptian people and has nothing to fear from the extremists. There is a clear course before Sidky Pasha, who needs no help and only asks for a free hand, and there is no reason why he should not carry out a sound constructive policy for the benefit of the country and the consolidation of his own position. In this way he may well lead up to negotiations for an Anglo-Egyptian treaty, the successful conclusion of which would clear the way for less hampered and

more progressive endeavour. Sidky Pasha has a good chance of leading the first good Government in Egypt, and thereby of doing much to further the ideal of ' Egypt for the Egyptians.' To contend that his Government is not representative of the people of Egypt on the ground that there was no freedom of election is sheer nonsense. Nahas Pasha and his followers were given every opportunity and encouragement to participate, and they refused. What they were not allowed to do, and rightly so, was to take measures to prevent others from going to the polls. If the non-representative character of the present Government could be upheld, then it would certainly have to be admitted that, in negotiating with Nahas Pasha last year, His Majesty's Government tried to conclude a treaty with a Government which was even more non-representative, having been elected by methods of intimidation and political tyranny. There is a vast difference between elections in Egypt and elections in England, but it can be said with a clear conscience that the recent elections in Egypt have produced results as representative as can be obtained at the present stage of the country's political development. They are probably the fairest elections that have taken place since the Declaration of 1922, although there is ample room for improvement in many respects; and there is in any case little doubt that, in negotiating with the present Egyptian Government, His Majesty's Government would be dealing with representatives of the main body of the population—the hard-working *fellahin* of Upper and Middle Egypt.

Meanwhile, neither party is anxious to resume discussions on this difficult question, and it is well that it should be so. Time is necessary for things to settle down in Egypt. The new Government needs a chance to consolidate its position, while His Majesty's Government has yet to become accustomed to good government in Cairo, of which it has had remarkably little experience. Mahmoud Pasha made a serious mistake in 1929 by pressing the treaty issue before the situation was ripe, and before he was sure of sufficient support. Sidky Pasha would do well to bide his time, waiting until his position is secure, both in this country and in Egypt, and letting the question arise at a moment when conditions are favourable on both sides. At present this country is preoccupied with economic affairs both at home and abroad, and it is most undesirable that the Egyptian question should arise again at a time when responsible Ministers are not in a position to devote to it the attention which it deserves. This has already happened on too many occasions. Much, however, can be done during the present *detente* to prepare the way for future negotiations, and it would be a mistake to lose sight of the value of a negative policy. With a moderate Government

in power in Egypt the wisest course for His Majesty's Government would seem to be one of impartial detachment, realising that on the success of a Government such as that of Sidky Pasha lies the only hope of an Anglo-Egyptian settlement. If Mr. Henderson continues the policy which he is at present pursuing with regard to Egypt, there is good reason to look hopefully to the future for that final solution of the Egyptian problem which has long been the earnest desire of all moderate opinion both in Great Britain and Egypt.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

BRITISH TRADE AND THE NEW INDIAN CONSTITUTION

AT a time when Great Britain is anxiously searching the world to find new outlets for her manufactures it would indeed be paradoxical if we allowed ourselves to be cajoled out of our greatest existing market in India. Nor would it be any less strange if we failed to protect our investments in India at this critical moment when our assets as a nation are not much greater than our liabilities.

The British delegation at the resumed Round Table Conference will have to face two separate but related problems, and the solution of both should be found in the same agreement. A new Constitution for India must provide for the protection of British commercial and industrial interests established in India, while there is abundant moral justification for a claim that Great Britain's export trade shall be free from the danger of boycott and of discriminatory duties.

The position of British trade with India can be dealt with briefly, and it is not the principal subject with which this article deals. The minimum demand that Great Britain is likely to make is that India, which demands the privileges of Dominion Status, should be willing to accept the concomitant obligations, particularly as they are not burdensome. No one who knows the present temper of Nationalist feeling in India will assert confidently that if India were accorded complete self-government to-morrow she would refrain from imposing discriminatory tariffs against British goods. In India's present mood it is not unreasonable to apprehend that a Swarajist Government would seek to conclude a commercial treaty with some foreign country like Germany or the United States, and, having imposed a high standard tariff against all cotton imports for the benefit of Bombay, would give a rebate of 5 or 10 per cent. on imports of piece goods from some country other than Great Britain. That, of course, is a thing that no British Dominion has ever done, but such a policy would have influential advocates in India.

Indeed it is stated in the *Manchester Dispatch* of April 11 that documents dated March 16, 1931 (*i.e.*, ten days after the Irwin-

Gandhi settlement), had reached Manchester in which the Congress required Swadeshi mills to give the following undertaking:

> In respect of stores articles we will only buy such British articles as are indispensable and as cannot be replaced by Indian Swadeshi *or by non-British foreign articles*. We shall not purchase British machinery except when similar machinery cannot be had in any other country. [Italics added.]

It is essential in these circumstances that the British delegations at the Round Table Conference should ask for a guarantee of most-favoured-nation treatment—that is, that under the new Constitution British goods shall at least not be accorded worse treatment than those of any foreign country.

It is unnecessary to labour the importance to Great Britain of our export trade to India, but a few figures may be interesting, especially those relating to industries in which unemployment is most severe.

The value of our total exports imported into India averaged about 86,000,000*l.* for the three years 1925-26 to 1927-28. In 1928-29 the value was 84,900,000*l.*, in 1929-30 it had fallen to 77,327,000*l.*, and the provisional figures for 1930-31 show a reduction to about 45,938,000*l.* Cotton goods have always been our greatest export, and in 1927-28 we exported over 11,000,000*l.* worth of grey, 10,649,000*l.* of white and 9,440,000*l.* of coloured piece goods, and over 2,300,000*l.* of cotton yarn. The appalling decline in our exports in this commodity is proved by figures given in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State. Whereas in the first four months of 1930 India imported from Britain 475·9 million square yards of piece goods, in the corresponding period of 1931 the figure had fallen to 139·5.

An interesting example of how satisfactorily a policy of India first, Britain second, and foreigners third can work is afforded by the effect of the protective duty on steel imposed in 1927 under which British steel paid a lower duty than foreign. It was stated at the Imperial Conference of 1930 that of an annual increase in steel imports of 117,000 tons Britain's share was 103,000 tons, representing an increase of 143 per cent. on the annual average imports before the differential rates were introduced. This benefit to Britain was not at the expense of the Indian steel industry, which was protected even against British steel.

It is important to emphasise that most-favoured-nation treatment in no way detracts from the fiscal autonomy granted to India with the consent of all parties in 1920. It is not disputed that whenever India desires to give protection to her own industries she shall be at liberty to erect such tariff barriers as may

appear to her desirable, as much against British products as against those of any foreign country, and Lancashire is ill-advised to call this principle in question.

Far more difficult and no less important is the safeguarding of British commercial and industrial interests established in India. While the protection of British capital invested in India is a separate problem, it is closely connected with British trade with India and should be settled at the same time or by the same instrument. The great British commercial houses in India, some of them a century old, are the conduit-pipes at the same time through which British capital has flowed in to develop India and through which British goods are imported by India. If Dundee jute manufacturers may regret that British capital has built jute mills on the banks of the Hughli, Lancashire cotton spinners will testify that Bombay's cotton mills have affected them to an equal extent and that that industry was established by Indian enterprise in the first place. Exporters of mill equipment recognise that their large and valuable orders were partly due to the preference the British firms in India naturally gave to their products. So British industry as a whole may regret Indian industrial development, but, recognising it to be inevitable and right, prefers it to be undertaken by British capital. Like the villagers of old days on the Cornish coast, they may pray that no wrecks should occur, but, if wrecks must come, that they should come on the Cornish coast.

While that is the English attitude to British enterprises in India, it might be expected that the Indian attitude would be one of unqualified friendliness. The fact is, however, that there has long been a very pronounced hostility among Indian Nationalists to British enterprise in India.

The amount of British capital invested in India cannot be determined with any accuracy, but it has been conservatively estimated at 1,000,000,000*l.* Not only are those who have lawful possessions in India entitled at law to continue to enjoy them, but India has benefited so much by the development of her resources by capital and skilled management which she was unable to supply herself that the moral position is as unshakable as the legal. The jute mills are India's greatest and most profitable industry, and they have moreover created a demand for a raw material which is now the staple crop of most of the cultivators of Eastern Bengal. The rain-drenched forests of Assam have been pushed back to make room for the tea plantations, which constitute, not merely a new and valuable Indian industry and export, but should be favoured by those Indians whose aversion from alcoholic drinks ought to make them anxious for the production of an innocuous Swadeshi drink. The rich deposits of coal

and iron in Bihar and Orissa were there long before the British came to India, but it was they who created a great industry and enabled India to benefit by these natural resources, which had remained undeveloped, and indeed largely undiscovered, by the inhabitants of the country. The railways, which have done so much to banish the horrors of famine, are still partly in British hands, as are also many of the subsidiary industries which minister to the railways, like engineering and wagon factories. The coastal and inland steam navigation companies have given India cheap and easy transport for goods and passengers, the insurance companies have afforded Indians protection against many of the misfortunes of life, and the British banks have provided that easy medium of exchange which has not only enabled Indian production to be vastly increased, but also to be marketed cheaply and efficiently.

The Congress Party have recently shown an increasing interest in the economic question, and in the last fifteen years it has been becoming more and more apparent that political self-government would be used to expropriate, or at any rate to discriminate against, British commercial and industrial interests established in India.

This tendency can be accounted for chiefly by the alliance which has been formed between the Indian industrialist and the Congress. Mr. Gandhi has modified his devotion to the charka by approving Indian mill-made cotton goods, and by doing so has obtained the financial support he needed for his political campaign. The boycott was, however, not merely economic, nor merely political, but also racial.

How definitely the boycott was directed in the interests of Indian business men is shown by the fact that it was directed against mills in Bombay managed by firms of British managing agents as well as against cloth imported from Lancashire. If it were true that the boycott was genuinely an extreme version of 'Support home industries,' there would be no reason for mills in Bombay employing Indian workers, and principally owned by Indian shareholders, to be penalised. Every British firm of managing agents in Bombay has now been compelled by means of a strict boycott to sign a declaration which is not merely humiliating, but which must prove very harmful to British industry. In order to obtain the lifting of a strict boycott these British firms were compelled to profess their 'full sympathy with the national aspirations of the people' of India and to undertake not to import foreign yarn (including artificial silk), cloth, or piece goods; that not only would they confine their purchases as far as possible to Indian Swadeshi products, but would also place their business with Indian banking, insurance, and shipping companies as far as is consistent with existing obligations. They, moreover, had to agree that two-thirds of the directors of the mills should be Indian, and that recruitment of the staff should be reserved to Indians.

It is instructive to note that the last firm of British managing agents was finally forced by the boycott to capitulate after the agreement between Lord Irwin and Mr. Gandhi, in which the latter admitted that a political boycott 'will not be consistent with the participation of representatives of the Congress in a frank and friendly discussion of constitutional questions.'

Now the boycott and Mr. Gandhi's attitude to British enterprise in India are only the newest and most striking evidence of an attitude of which the British commercial community have long been aware. It is a common Indian allegation that British commerce was built up by a policy which deliberately aimed at killing indigenous industries. Although much of what is written about India's great industrial past is fairy tale, there was, it is true, some considerable mercantile marine centuries ago, a shipbuilding industry comparatively recently, while Indian muslins and other materials were, of course, world-famous. That these industries have disappeared is far more due to India's inability to adapt herself to changed conditions than to any malicious intent on Britain's part. The Indian mercantile marine had virtually disappeared as early as the seventeenth century, long before the English emerged as rulers of India. Thevenot, a French traveller of that time, wrote that before 1640 the trade between Persia and India had been monopolised by the English and Dutch, but that the Indians were at that time starting to compete. Thevenot, however, was rather nervous of the Indian ships because the Indians were new to the enterprise. The Dutch Company was in the habit of lending pilots to these ships, 'neither the Indians nor the Persians having the least knowledge of navigation.'

Similarly, the ships which till the early nineteenth century were built in India were wooden ships, and the industry died a natural death when steel and steam displaced wood and sails. The hand-weaving industry of India was injured by the invention of the power-loom, but it actually fared better than the similar industry in England which was killed.

The claim of the British commercial community in India is that they have built up the businesses they control by fair competition or by introducing new enterprises which were previously unknown in the country, and, while asking for no privileges, they decline to accept any less favourable status in India than that accorded to Indians in Great Britain. The development of the oil industry by the Burmah Oil Company is an example of how

British enterprise has discovered new wealth and enriched the whole country by so doing. At the same time the crude indigenous industry has been tenderly protected, so that in the middle of a number of modern wells are to be found 50-feet pits where Burmans with a supposed hereditary right ladle out oil by hand.

Indian business men and politicians do not regard the matter in this light, however, and it may be worth while giving an extract from a speech made in 1928 by the chairman at a meeting of the Scindia Steam Navigation Company. It had been suggested that instead of aiming at expropriation Indian business men should break new ground.

> Break new ground, indeed. When the entire carrying trade of India is controlled by non-Indians, when the rich mines of India are held on long leases by foreigners, when Indian railways have been and are worked as dividend-earning machines for the aliens, when the various plantations and the oil-fields are practically the preserves of the outside exploiters, when the currency policy of the country is determined solely with a view to help foreign industries and commerce. . . . No, there is no ground to be broken. Indians have only to reclaim the ground that has been usurped from them with the connivance and active support of the Government of the land.

As a result of the reports of the Indian Fiscal Commission in 1922 and of the External Capital Committee in 1925 racial discrimination in several particulars has become the accepted policy of the Government of India. Extreme suggestions were advanced in evidence which would virtually have prevented India from obtaining foreign capital for her economic development, but these proposals were rejected. It was recommended, however, that where a company enjoyed any monopoly or concession, received a subsidy or bounty, or was granted a licence to act as a public utility company, it should be registered in India, have a reasonable proportion of Indian directors on the board, and give reasonable facilities for the training of Indian apprentices at Government expense. This recommendation was accepted, and when the Steel Industry Protection Act was passed in 1924 bounties were made payable only to companies satisfying these conditions.

But the anti-British feeling does not limit itself to proposing restrictions for the future; it aims at injuring interests already established. The British India Steam Navigation Company has built up a great carrying trade on the coast of India as well as to the Far East, Africa and Europe. An Indian steamship company which has not been particularly successful includes amongst its employees a member of the Legislative Assembly. It is perhaps not wholly a coincidence that this member was responsible for introducing a Bill to reserve the coastal traffic of India to Indian vessels, 'Indian vessels' being defined to include the vessels of the company with which the member was associated and excluding those of the British India Steam Navigation Company. As the great fleet of the latter would have been debarred entirely from all coastal trade after five years, the Bill would appear to be discriminatory to the verge of confiscation.

A similar threat has been directed at British companies engaged in inland traffic on the Irawaddy, Brahmaputra, and other rivers. A Bill introduced into the Assembly contemplated restricting the right to purchase land. The exchange banks and the insurance companies have also been attacked, and malevolence has been shown to the tea companies and to the Burmah Oil Company.

There is therefore abundant cause for anxiety on the part of the British community as to the treatment that would be accorded to them and their interests by a Swaraj Government. Like all other minority communities in India, they asked the Simon Commission to recommend that the new Constitution should contain some adequate safeguard, but the method they suggested was rejected on the ground of practical difficulty.

The whole question was accordingly re-examined before the Round Table Conference met. The highest legal advice was taken, and it was decided to press for safeguards on two separate lines.

First, it seemed possible to preserve the idea of a safeguarding clause in a form which met the objections raised by the Simon Commission. It would be a statutory obligation on the Viceroy and Governors to reserve for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure any legislation which tended to discriminate in matters of trade, just as the Governor of Southern Rhodesia is under that obligation in the case of Bills tending to discriminate against the native inhabitants. The question of whether a measure was in fact discriminatory—and that is just what is almost impossible to define in a statute—would probably never come before the courts, for in all doubtful cases the Viceroy would obviously reserve the Bill. The effect of doing so would be to leave it for the Secretary of State to decide the matter at his own discretion having regard to all the circumstances of the case.

Secondly, it was felt that the whole of Britain's trade relations with and within India should be regulated on a basis of equality. It has already been suggested that Great Britain would be well advised to stipulate for most-favoured-nation treatment for her exports to India. It is also reasonable to demand that there shall be no discrimination in India between British subjects domiciled in India and British subjects domiciled in the United Kingdom, on the ground that there is no discrimination between the two in this country.

There is no constitutional difficulty about agreements being

come to between different members of the Commonwealth of Nations, India having concluded one in 1927 with South Africa, and another including all the Dominions and India having been substituted at the Imperial Conference of 1930, for the prohibitions of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894. The basis would be twofold—one of reciprocity and one of common British nationality. In view of recent constitutional developments, it hardly appears that Great Britain need any longer concern herself with the commercial treaties of the Dominions, and because they continue to discriminate against Indians they can hardly expect that India should include them in the Convention.

The European community therefore had a draft Convention prepared setting out in detail the rights which they considered fell within the principle of equality of treatment. It was anticipated that the principle would be dealt with in the Minorities Sub-committee of the Conference, and that probably the details would be referred to a special committee. When the Conference had approved the Convention, it was felt that the Government of India would have received a mandate to conclude the agreement formally with the British Government so that it could be included in a schedule to the new Act as an integral part of the settlement arrived at.

At the Round Table Conference Sir Hubert Carr, on behalf of the British community in India, demanded equality of trading rights and opportunities, and no voice was raised in opposition. The draft report of the Minorities Sub-committee referred to the matter as follows:

> (Par. 14.) On behalf of the British commercial community it was urged that a commercial treaty should be concluded between Great Britain and India, guaranteeing to the British commercial community trading rights in India equal to those enjoyed by Indian-born subjects of His Majesty on the basis of reciprocal rights to be guaranteed to Indians in the United Kingdom.[1]

This was regarded as quite unsatisfactory by Sir Hubert Carr and his colleagues, who were supported by Lord Reading and Lord Peel on behalf of their delegations. After numerous adjournments and private discussions over the week end a new draft was agreed upon and passed by the Conference with one dissentient only. The revised clause reads as follows:

> At the instance of the British commercial community, the principle was generally agreed that there should be no discrimination between the rights of the British mercantile community, firms and companies trading in India and the rights of Indian-born subjects, and that an appropriate convention, based on reciprocity, should be entered into for the purpose of regulating these rights.

[1] Proceedings of the Round Table Conference, p. 334.

It is quite clear that the European delegates scored a great moral victory in convincing the Conference of the justice of their claims, and this is the more complete because the whole matter was very fully ventilated, as will be evident to anyone reading the eighteen pages of the Proceedings (pp. 336 to 354) dealing with the subject: This was, in fact, the only case where a draft report was actually amended.

Tribute must be paid to a number of Indians of pronounced Nationalist views who supported the claim, having, indeed, no desire that India's political advance should be used by Bombay industrialists for the purpose of benefiting their own interests at the expense of their competitors. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, in particular, rendered great assistance by quoting the Nehru Report, which says:

> As regards European commerce, we cannot see why men who have put great sums of money into India should at all be nervous. It is inconceivable that there can be any discriminating legislation against any community doing business lawfully in India.

Unfortunately, subsequent events have shown that the settlement so happily reached at the first session of the Round Table Conference has not been accepted everywhere in India. The representatives of Bombay were bitterly reproached upon their return for their alleged surrender, and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce have reiterated their demand for discrimination against European capital. Most serious of all is the attitude that Mr. Gandhi, the representative of the Congress Party at the forthcoming meeting of the Conference, is reported to have adopted. A deputation of Indian merchants asked Mr. Gandhi for an assurance that the demand for equality of British trading rights in par. 14 of the Minorities Sub-committee's Report of the Round Table Conference would not be conceded. Mr. Gandhi replied that the Congress felt even more strongly than the merchants themselves did, and would take all possible steps to get par. 14 rescinded. 'The demand of the powerful British community,' he is reported to have said, 'for equality with Indians is like the demand of the elephant for equality with the ant.' He added that any Constitution which impaired the right of an Indian Parliament of the future to discriminate against non-nationals would be unacceptable to the Congress Party.

In face of these statements there is no excuse for Britain to be taken by surprise when our commercial interests in India and with India are attacked at the resumed Round Table Conference. It is important that the British delegates, home politicians, the City, and investors should be forewarned in order that it may be

made quite clear to the Indians from the outset that no concessions in this matter can or will be made.

It is scarcely disputed even by Congress that Great Britain is a party to the Indian negotiations, not merely *de facto*, but also *de jure*. Our moral position does not depend merely upon our past services to India, inestimable as they are; it depends upon our present responsibilities, and still more upon the protection and support which we are required to give in the future if 'purna Swaraj' is to be brought to birth—protection on the frontiers, at sea and within the country, and support in international relations.

There is much talk about the need for goodwill and an agreed settlement in India, but it is sometimes forgotten that goodwill cannot be one-sided and that an agreement implies more than one party. Let those who have the success of the Round Table Conference at heart remember that the consent of Great Britain to the new Constitution of which she will be the protector and guarantor is no less necessary than the consent of India. Nor should it be forgotten that the Constitution, to be satisfactory, must enjoy the confidence of the minority communities in India, amongst which the European is not the least important.

If the British delegates make their position plain, there should be no difficulty in obtaining the necessary guarantee in a form which should be gratifying to India's national pride. The advantage of a commercial convention over a statutory prohibition is that it substitutes agreement for coercion, and so harmonises with the spirit of the Round Table Conference. If India is asked when entering upon her career as a fiscally autonomous nation to agree not to discriminate against British exports, she is being asked to undertake no more than many foreign countries have undertaken. In promising to accord national treatment to British subjects domiciled in Great Britain she is not merely negotiating as a sovereign State, but she will also be showing her attachment to the principle of racial equality, for which she and the British Government have both contended in other parts of the Empire, and according to Britain the same treatment that she has herself received.

Above all, a convention of this kind is not only likely to be a condition precedent to any great constitutional advance, but by negotiating it and accepting it India will be establishing and demonstrating her equality with the Dominions, and so vindicating in practical fashion her claim to that Dominion Status to which she has so long aspired.

HUGH MOLSON.

TECHNICAL EDUCATION IN SOVIET RUSSIA

THE Supreme Economic Council of the U.S.S.R. invited a colleague and myself to visit Russia in November 1930 to discuss and advise on problems of technical education. I had the opportunity of visiting more than twenty technical institutions of various kinds and of learning something of the plans and programme of the department of higher technical education. In writing of the U.S.S.R. distinction between what is and what the authorities hope to achieve is necessary.

I shall start by giving some notion of their kinds of schools and conclude by discussing the future programme. There are three main types of school—the higher technical school of university rank, the *technicum* for producing workers of high skill such as shop managers, and the *rabfac*, which gives educationally backward adults of age eighteen to thirty a secondary education. Other types are secondary schools with a technical bias, training schools for technical teachers, State correspondence schools, factory schools training students 'on production,' and a large system of manual workshop classes organised by the Central Institution of Labour to give unskilled workers a six months' course or less in acquiring particular skills. Higher technical education comes under the control of the Supreme Economic Council. It was recently removed from the charge of the Commissariat of Public Instruction. It is to be organised in close contact with industry, on monotechnic lines. The tendency of higher technical education in Western European countries has been in the direction of polytechnics. Each institution was a collection of faculties, and students did a little in each for their course. The notion of the polytechnic has probably been borrowed unconsciously from the old notion of a liberal education, which is rooted much deeper in class organisation than is usually understood. What is called liberal education is something invented in the past for the preparation of gentlemen intended to rule rather than to work productively. Such persons require to know a little of everything, but need not specialise, as they will always employ the specialist drudge. The idea of liberal education is that the person to be educated shall be free to study what he finds of most assistance

to his own development. His bread and position are assured—he need not trouble to learn a skill making him capable of productive work. One of the peculiarities of our system of municipal secondary education arises from the attempt to give tens of thousands of boys something of the attitude suitable to the children of oligarchs. There is nothing absolute in the principles of liberal education; like any other set of educational principles, their existence and evolution can be analysed on Marxist lines, so that their necessity in one epoch and superfluity in another become obvious. The Soviet has dissolved its polytechnics into numbers of monotechnics. In a monotechnic the instruction can be much less diffuse and closer to the subject of the student's main interest, the source of the intellectual energy in whose disciplining his education consists.

When will people recognise that quantity of intellectual effort is the truest measure of education, and that severe intellectual effort can rarely be made in more than one subject at once? Interest in other subjects should arise from irradiation from a central effort, and the intenser the central effort, the wider the irradiation will be. That is why a specialist education is generally broader in its results than a liberal education. In the Soviet monotechnics these educational tendencies are observable. The syllabus is arranged around one subject—*e.g.*, turbines or margarine. The secondary subjects arising out of an interest in turbines or margarine are many, so in the end the specialist in turbines and margarine has a broader culture than the student of liberal education who has studied many subjects for their own sakes, with equal disinterest, because they were supposed to be good for him.

The old polytechnic at Lesnoe, outside Leningrad, has been reorganised into a group of independent monotechnics. The directors sit on a board under a chairman (without special authority) elected from amongst themselves. Each monotechnic is run in close connexion with the industry manufacturing the material studied; for instance, the Turbine Monotechnic runs its courses in connexion with turbine factories. The students perform part of their practical engineering course in the associated factory, and the State trust owning the factory has some say in the control of the monotechnic. There are mixed committees of industrial, trade union, teaching, research, and students' representatives to watch the various interests in the collaboration between institute and factory and preserve a balance so that industry shall not encroach on research, for example, or teaching drift away from industrial requirements. The courses are for four years five months, including six months' military training, divided into two three-monthly periods. Forty per cent. of all hours are

passed in factories, and the professors superintend students' work in the factories. The turbine students spend three months out of the first year in a turbine factory, the same period in the second and third years, and three months in the fourth year are spent in the organisation and management departments of the factory. The students work as labourers, engineers, and managers. Sometimes they receive some theoretical training in the factories. They have two months' annual vacation and work 235 days in the year. Every day the student has six hours' class work and three hours' preparation. The attendances of students, professors and teachers are nearly 100 per cent. The method of teaching is mainly by recitation. It is similar to the American recitation method. A problem is discussed by a class of, say, twenty. The professor asks students to go to the board and show how it should be solved. If difficulties arise the suggestions of other students are considered. This method is a cross between lecturing and tutoring, between, say, the Scottish and the Oxford styles of teaching. It is more expensive than lecturing, but less so than tutoring. It is particularly favourable to originality. Apart from the recitations students are expected to do a good deal of work on their own. Besides the practical work in the factory, 20 per cent. of the students' time is spent in laboratory courses. Each student finishing the course is given free trips to big works in the Soviet Union for six weeks to three months. It is hoped to increase this travelling period to six months.

A new engineering academy is in process of organisation. It will give refresher courses and extra courses for engineers already engaged in industry. The improvement of the engineering knowledge of adult engineers is a prominent part of Soviet technical education activity. The refresher course will be for two years, six months of which are to be spent in travelling in the U.S.S.R. and abroad. In the Lesnoe monotechnics there are continuous shifts of classes, owing to the five-day week. They have 7500 students and have planned to increase the number to 10,000 in 1931, and to 32,000 at the end of the Five-Years' Plan. They cost 14,000,000 roubles a year to run (*i.e.*, about 1,400,000*l.*), which includes students' salaries and keep. The students are paid by the schools except when they work in the factory and go on the factory pay-roll. When they have 32,000 students they expect the running costs will be about 64,000,000 roubles (*i.e.*, 6,400,000*l.*), about 1600 to 2000 roubles per student per year. Each engineer costs about 10,000 roubles to train (about the same as in England). The cost of upkeep of buildings is 6,000,000 roubles and cost of education for each student is 800 roubles. Professors do research in other institutions. The total staff is 1500, of whom 220 rank as professors. Of the graduate students 10 per cent. must by

regulation do research for two to three years. The aspirant becomes assistant, and after publication of his thesis doctor, and then professor. Of the graduates 3 per cent. become permanent research workers and 7 per cent. go in for teaching. By regulation this 10 per cent. is chosen (*a*) by intellectual capacity, (*b*) by social class.

The first-year course in the engineering academy for improvement of engineers' qualifications is theoretical. Each student has a special plan and works under the personal direction of the professors. There will be a research laboratory for physico-mechanical research on engineering problems similar to the laboratory at Delft, in Holland. The 400 students will be drawn from all parts of the Union, and will spend a considerable part of their time discussing engineering problems of the Five-Years' Plan.

The students are accommodated in vast dormitories. Many of them were built for the old Polytechnic in pre-revolution days, and there are new ones under construction. On the way to Lesnoe there is a vast new unfinished dormitory for 3000 beds. It lay on the flat grey Leningrad landscape as if it were a materialised chip of the Five-Years' Plan itself. In Moscow I inspected a similar new dormitory for chemical students. It had 1300 beds, 700 of which were for women. The men's beds were six in a room, the women's four. The building and furniture were of the very simplest. There was a refectory, but no common-room, the students using the rest-rooms of the Chemical Institute for social purposes. A young Communist observed, 'It is poor, but one can live.' The Moscow Central Station Engineering Institution is a technical high school. Most of the buildings were erected before the revolution. Recently they have been renovated and re-equipped. It is for the training of central power station engineers. There are two main blocks of buildings some distance apart. The first building contains departments of machine design, illumination, railway engineering, electrification of factories, cables and insulation, and electrical measurements. This part of the institution is being passed on to the All-Russia Electrical Trust this year There are 900 students. The students' laboratories were excellently stocked with apparatus, clean and worn-looking, as if subjected to very frequent use. In Russian electrical laboratories much use is made of interchangeable sliding panels. A panel bearing the instruments for an experiment can be slid on to any of the students' benches, the time of setting-up of apparatus being eliminated. In ordinary laboratory work the student wastes a good deal of time in fixing up connexions, for the educational value of doing it himself disappears after the first few times he has done it. In the illuminating engineering department there was a large collection of types of electric lamp used in factory and

house. The distributions of light given by the various designs of lamps were exhibited in diagrams, and the improvement effected by suitable reflectors was shown. The effect of glare was demonstrated by an apparatus consisting of one of those opticians' cards bearing rows of letters in type of various sizes. In the middle of the card, sunk flush with its surface and not illuminating it, was a lamp directed towards the observer. When the lamp was off the small type was readily readable, but when switched on it became blurred owing to the lamp's glaring into the observer's eyes, though the type was illuminated with the same intensity as before. Of the three groups of measuring instruments in the laboratory two were Russian-made.

In the high-tension laboratory there were high-voltage transformers. We were told they would give 1,000,000 volts. The apparatus was partly dismantled, and groups of students were working around the parts, armed with blue-prints. The large pieces of apparatus and the floor and galleries, crowded with parts, the whole swarmed over by students, made a picture of the peculiar appearance of Soviet technical activity. In Russia to-day there is a unique attitude toward machinery. The young Communist has a romantic feeling for it which even its inventors and constructors do not show. The physics lecture-hall and preparation-room were in excellent condition. Where equipment had been renewed the special instruments were usually German, the less delicate of Russian manufacture.

In walking through the laboratories and lecture-rooms we found much group work in progress. Four students were doing one experiment or discussing a problem between them. Mutual aid between students is exploited to the utmost, for educational reasons, and also because of a shortage of lecturers. In a second-year applied mechanics class we found about twenty-five students doing a 'recitation.' We sat at the back and watched. The lecturer wore an overcoat and many of the students both overcoat and hat or cap. The weather was warm. Presumably they wished to save the trouble of continually taking their things out of the cloak-room. Owing to the excess of numbers, organisation of classes is difficult, and students spend much time getting about, often having to go to buildings at a distance from each other.

The problem being discussed was a calculation concerning the right number of rivets in a bridge frame. The diagram was drawn on half the black-board, the other half being left for calculations. The lecturer discourses on the points of the problem, and students then come to the board and show how they consider the problem should be tackled. This method demands confidence and power of expression in students. One wondered how far the disquisitions were monopolised by good students. While we were there a dark,

enthusiastic, and apparently able young man in breeches and black leggings did all the talking. Near us was a young student with cap and tuft of hair sticking from under the kneb in well-known proletarian fashion. His mouth remained open all the time, and he certainly looked as if he were taking in nothing. There was a considerable percentage of women students. They all looked very much alive, but did not enter into the engineering discussion while we were in the room. The lecturer was an engineer loaned from a boiler-works for two hours. Much use is made of part-time lecturing from working engineers. On the whole, this class looked workmanlike, though so different from one in an English technical college.

The students receive their wages from the institute office. The married receive more than the single, the average being about 80 roubles (8*l.*) a month. Many workmen prefer to keep their daily jobs and study in the evening. In the factory the worker might get 200 roubles a month, and it was pleasanter to live on this and study in the evening than study whole time and have 80 roubles only to live on. There is not enough space or money to have day students only. Fourth-year evening students are also paid a State salary. In the selection of day students their social activities are taken into consideration. Day classes start at 8 a.m. There are six or seven classes a day, each of fifty minutes, with a ten minutes' interval between classes, and the complete course lasts four years. Freshmen are usually eighteen to twenty years of age and have previously spent two or three years in the factory.

The section of the institute dealing with boilers, turbines, Diesels, central station and high-tension equipment has 1530 students. It is being turned over to the Energy Trust, which operates central power stations. Seventeen technical high schools and thirty-five *technicums* will be associated with the trust. The new electrical equipment in this building was rather startling. There was a 120,000 volt direct-current laboratory, a 600,000 volt 100 k.v.a. transformer equipment for testing transmission insulators. Flash-overs were demonstrated for us. There were Pick impulse apparatuses, and an electric railway motor model fixed on its bogie on an experimental stand for full-scale testing. There was an extensive collection of power-line relay models. From these models the student may learn what will happen when a short circuit occurs in any part of a high-tension transmission system.

The two departments are a makeshift preparatory to the Central Power University to be built outside Moscow. The designs are for 6000 students, with a *rabfac* of 4000.

The students of the Central Power Station Institution had a social evening to which we were invited. The event was to mark

the inauguration of a 'Socialist competition' between the students of this and another institution. An immense lecture-hall accommodating over 1000 was crammed with students. When we arrived at 9 p.m. the chairman of the All-Russia Central Station Trust was addressing the packed audience, which, though fairly quiet, whispered among themselves. An old woman, presumably on the institute's cleaning staff, came in and seated herself below the rostrum and listened to the speaker with crystalline attention. When the distinguished visitor had finished, representatives of the students of the two institutions made speeches on the draft of the terms of the 'Socialist competition.' The visiting representative was what we call a 'knut.' He wore a blue blouse tucked inside shapely knickerbockers, had carefully cut and well-oiled black hair, and inconspicuous—too inconspicuous—pince-nez. The student replying for the home institution was of an artless, humorous type. He made a long set speech gazing into the heavens, falling into the manner of the modest when thrust forward. There were twenty-eight items in the agreement. I cannot remember whether the *Internationale* was played after each item was signed by both representatives, but the frequency of the repetition of the strains of that anthem left the impression. The ceremony concluded, there was an interval before the musical programme. Students clustered around us, asking questions mainly in German. Their enthusiasm and friendliness were wholly delightful. Those unable to speak German fired questions at us through our interpreter, a Russian Jew who had learned English in Toronto. During all the chatter and turmoil the insatiable thirst of the Russian student for print was evident. Many students read text-books or scientific periodicals, or periodicals with 'scientific serials.' Russian newspapers often have serials on the principles of technology. While the chatter, the absorbed reading, the clambering of students around us, the students' band playing selections, went on, a scuffle arose near the door. A very raw and earnest-looking student had tried to enter the hall by the platform door. He pushed in and was promptly thrown out. He advanced again with increased force. Presently he was convinced that no one was trying to do him out of the entertainment, and he was persuaded to enter by the right door.

The first turn was an octette of Ukrainian singers. They were quite first class. I was reminded of the quartette which sang in the Schools at Oxford during the reception of the British Association in 1926. In Russia one sees first-class professional talent at students' evenings. There are no rich to pipe to. The Ukrainians sang ordinary and revolutionary folk-songs and strummed on instruments like large fat banjos. They were encored repeatedly. The next turn was a series of dances under the projection of a

beam of light from a lantern. There was a hitch before it could begin, since the illusion of transformations by coloured projections on to a white-attired dancer could not succeed without complete darkness in the hall. There were two safety lights not on the lighting circuit. They were inaccessible, and no one knew how to turn them off, so a human pyramid was formed to reach them. Caps and coats were wrapped around them, but not successfully enough. The dancers still demurred, so finally lamps, brackets and all, were fetched down among general cheers. Then there was some difficulty with the lantern. The student in charge jumped and skipped and sweated over it, in the way operators of recalcitrant lanterns have. The dancers did their turns with splendid vim and persistence, especially the exceedingly plump leader. One observed with interest how swiftly so broad a lady could spin. Leaving the meeting just before midnight we saw in the refectory as we passed many students eating portions of dark bread, pickled cabbage, and the simple fare upon which their labour and enthusiasm are sustained.

The second main type of technical school is the *technicum*, of which the Margarine and Oil *Technicum* in Moscow is an example. There are about 500 students, 150 of whom are preparatory, and their ages vary from sixteen to thirty-two in the day classes. In the evening there are refresher courses for students engaged in the industry. Different teachers take the day and evening classes, but the courses are determined by one committee of professors. The school has a margarine factory in the suburbs, where students can be trained 'on production.' The margarine made in their practical classes is sold if edible. There is a dormitory for country students. The course is three years, and has been shortened by reducing vacations which used to be five months a year and are now forty days only. This shortening enabled a four-year course to be reduced to three years. The general subjects taught are mechanics, physics, chemistry, mathematics, social science; in the first year inorganic and in the second year organic chemistry.

According to plans, the present building will be converted into a hostel and a new school will be built. The chemical and physical laboratories had been recently renovated and were well equipped, the large ventilation shafts being specially prominent. The advanced chemistry classes are taken by visiting professors from research institutes. There was a refectory in the cave-like basement, full of students eating very plain food. Sometimes technical high schools, *technicums*, and *rabfacs* are organised as a group and called combination schools. The School of Building in Moscow is of this type. It has three types of school in its organisation. Its departments include—(1) house building; (2) factory building, including light railways, conveyors, etc.; (3) agricultural buildings; (4) sanitary engineering; (5) hydrotechnic building; (6) irrigation and drainage; (7) heating and ventilation; (8) water supply and canalisation. These are the subjects taught in the day and evening classes of the technical high school. The *rabfac* prepares worker students of eighteen to thirty for entrance to the high school. In general, *rabfacs* are for intelligent but educationally backward students. They are not intended for preparing students for what we would call a technical school, but for the university; *rabfac* students do not, as a rule, proceed to the *technicum*. This particular *rabfac* is an evening institution only. A day *rabfac* is run in connexion with the School of Building, at Kenischma. The course is four years (evening) of a secondary type but with a technical bias. In view of their greater practical experience, adult students have modified courses. The evening class hours are from 5.45 to 10.5 p.m. In the evening *rabfac* there are 250 students; in the day *rabfac* at Kenischma there are 400. Evening class students who have completed three years of their course spend the fourth year in day classes. There is a two years' evening course for foremen with a bias more technical than the *rabfac*. The *technicum* or middle technical school student cannot as a rule proceed to the high school. The entrant must have a seven years' elementary education and be of age fifteen to sixteen. The day *technicum* has a three years' course in mechanics, mathematics, physics and chemistry. The evening *technicum* has also a three years' course in the same subjects, but the students must have had three years' factory experience before entering. In the day there are 1100 students and in the evening 750. Two years after finishing his course, having gone into industry, he can come back for refresher courses.

The entrants to the high school are mainly good secondary school students and *rabfacs*. There are 680 day students. The director is Professor Fiachtislov, an architect who graduated in 1918. They have 450 lecturers, few of whom are full-time. There are twenty full-time technical lecturers and 100 full-time general teachers. Thirty of the staff have professorial rank and eighty have doctorates. Besides these departments there is an elaborate correspondence course with 3200 students. These will be increased to 15,000 in the future in all parts of Russia. The correspondence courses are run in conjunction with factories. Committees are formed in the factories and teachers from the factory staff carrying out the correspondence course instructions. The courses vary in length from four months to five years. Some of the organisers of the classes in the factories are paid by their factory. Before the revolution the main building of the School of Building was a church school for girls. Among the students

there are 300 Communists and 800 Young Communists, about 50 per cent. of the day students. The continuous week allows the laboratories to be used every day from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. On an average 40 per cent. of their courses is practical and 60 per cent. theoretical. The equipment of the institution was first rate. The collection of builders' models was better than I have seen anywhere. Some had been collected from old institutions and many were new. The hydraulics laboratory had the usual equipment of pumps and channels. Two pieces of research were in progress, apparently on the destructive effect of floating timber on bridges, etc., and the effect of wattle barriers on the silting of streams and channels. There was a very fine extension several storeys high, consisting of drawing and lecture rooms and laboratories. The new strength-of-materials testing machines were of German, Swiss, and Russian manufacture. In the military cabinet two girls and a youth were receiving military instruction. The cabinet contained rifle and gas-mask equipment, and all students have to receive military instruction. The wall diagrams showed the English gas-mask of 1917. The institute paper has a circulation of 2000. Discipline seemed good. Considering the huge number of students, the shortage of space and paper, etc., the discipline was relatively excellent. The incessant political activity of the students and the serious attention paid to their organisations seem to develop their sense of responsibility. The head student in a Soviet technical institution is an important person, whose views, and those of whom he represents, are respectfully considered by the director. The social responsibility of English is much less than that of Soviet technical students; in fact an English student would be rather surprised at the idea of being vested with social responsibility. This sense of responsibility enables the Soviet students to do much reading on their own. We repeatedly found classes working with application by themselves.

There are some residential technical schools, of which that attached to the Three Mountains Textile Factory in Moscow is an interesting example. This textile school has 474 students between the ages of fifteen and seventeen and eighteen and twenty. Two hundred and thirty of the students are boarders, forty of them being girls. The students are not allowed in the dormitories during the daytime—*i.e.*, between the hours 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. The boys slept thirty in a room, and there were some rooms for nervous boys unused to crowds The excellence of the work and *morale* in this school were obvious. Probably much was due to the director, an old student and an enthusiast. The school was founded long before the revolution. Recently new weaving and spinning sheds had been added, furnished with German, English,

and Russian machinery. The laboratory assistant, an old worker —a 'character,' as we should say—was particularly proud of showing us the new Russian carding machines, which to us looked much less well-finished than the Western European. We found that German was taught in connexion with German spinning machinery and English in some lessons on English weaving machinery. Plans for large extensions of this school exist. A wooden building, previously used as a class-room, has been converted into a club-room or 'red corner.' There is a stage and a cinema-projector. The four chief departments are weaving, spinning, chemistry, and textile engineering. The work in the art department seemed very good, and there were medals the school had won at exhibitions before the revolution. The students were exceptionally bright. They were full of cheerfulness and impishness in conversation, and their exercise-books contained first-class work. The classes studying without supervision were notable. One wondered whether the attractive tone of the school was partly due to the residential organisation; had they here a combination of what in England is called the 'public school spirit' with Bolshevik ideals?

The Rietz Factory School in Moscow was interesting. It was a factory of some size converted into a school 'training on production.' Of the 690 workers employed 430 were students. Workers in factories who wish to improve their education apply to be moved here, and workers in the factory not wishing to continue their education are moved elsewhere. Beside the shops containing machinery producing machine tools, cutters, etc., were wooden lecture-rooms. When inspecting these we were astonished to find a high official of the State Higher Technical Department giving a lecture on analytical geometry. There is something to be said for making Whitehall officials do some teaching to preserve their knowledge of practical conditions. The shortage of teachers is such that even organising officials have to do some teaching if they possess special technical knowledge. There are three grades of students. For entrance to the first grade a four years' elementary school knowledge is necessary, for the second a seven years' school knowledge, for the third a nine years' secondary education. Besides the grades, which contain 370 students, there are sixty students in special one-year courses. The grades correspond to those for foremen, technicians, and fully qualified engineers. The subjects for the third grade are, for example, social science, foreign language (German), mathematics, physics, mechanics, electrotechnics, machine design and drawing, details of machines; special course in tools, construction of cutting tool machinery, general technology of metals; heat treatment of metals, technological process work, manufacture of tools, safety,

metallography, management, military training and physical culture. The age of students is eighteen to thirty-five years. Three days out of five, seven hours are spent in the factory and three in classes. On the other days one is free and the other devoted to social work. Later the course runs in periods of six days' work and four days' study. Plenty of work was being done in workshops and class-rooms, but there was a great deal of mud and muddle outside. Building material seemed to be dropped anywhere, and in the factory office workers seemed to be swarming in an under-controlled manner.

The Moscow School for Training of Technical Teachers was specially interesting, for there is no school of that kind in Britain, where we train teachers for primary and secondary teaching only. There are 2150 students working in two shifts, spread over mechanical engineering, chemistry, textiles, building and transport. The institute has a *rabfac* attached. Twenty-five per cent. of the prospective teachers come from the *rabfac;* 20 per cent. are teachers from country schools without technical training. Some are sent by trade unions, some come voluntarily. In 1930 there were 8000 applications for the 860 places in the school. Last year there were only 220 places; in 1933 they expect to have 3000. During 1931 similar schools are to be organised at Kazan, Rostov-on-Don, and Sverdlovsk. There are two courses, technical and social. Students without technical experience work in factory workshops before admittance; they cannot be accepted without factory experience. They are employed after graduating in technical secondary schools. Entrants must have had a nine years' secondary education. Railway transport students must have had railway experience, and so on. The general subjects are mathematics, physics and pedagogy. There is a variable sandwich system, the student putting fifty to sixty days in at the factory under special supervision during his course. Ten to fifteen per cent. of the course is in practical pedagogics, and teaching practice is done in the technical secondary schools. There were large new workshops for bench work, turning and fitting. The hordes of students in this school seemed too large for control. Like many Soviet schools, it resembled a disturbed educational ant-heap. The disorder of reconstruction, loose building material, and the ragged and active students struck one. What is the degree of efficiency? I was unable to judge.

We inspected the school attached to the Dynamo Factory in Moscow. This contained a small *technicum* (with large extensions under construction) and a large secondary school with a technical bias. The technicum had 210 students between fifteen and eighteen and 2000 students in the secondary school between seven and a half and fourteen. In the latter the technical bias amounts

to eight hours' metal work in ten days in the last year, six hours' woodwork in ten days in the last but one, four hours in ten days in the previous year, and two in ten days in the year before that. There was a refectory, clinic and gymnasium, with two instructors and the usual apparatus of Swedish ladders, etc. The children have three months' holiday a year. We found a soldier instructing about twenty *technicum* students, including two girls, in rifle drill. The cost of running the school falls on the Dynamo Factory. This school was one of the best things we saw.

The description of schools visited will give the reader an impression of the variety of technical instruction in existence in Soviet Russia. The authorities have clear conceptions of many interesting types of schools. They are co-ordinating them in a vast integration of industry and technical education. One can have no doubt of the quality of the scheme. It is extremely interesting. But the abolition of the examination system makes the efficiency difficult to measure. Not knowing the Russian language, I could not very well question students. One felt that many of them must be pretty weak. There were many also fairly obviously able and enthusiastic. The shortage of paper for exercise books, the transport difficulties which cause students to waste hours on tramcars, the shortage of teachers, and the hard conditions of life must lower efficiency. But the fire of enthusiasm from social creativity makes up for much, perhaps more than makes up in certain spiritual aspects, for the material drawbacks of restricted food and clothing. I felt that the Soviet technical schools have a strong educational atmosphere. Unlike English secondary schools, they have not succumbed to utilitarianism; they teach technics for social reasons instead of literature for examinations. People reared within the coils of examinations do not perceive how culture is strangled by examinations, especially in English girls' secondary schools. I remember once visiting a girls' secondary school in London recommended to me as specially progressive. I found the girls sub-divided into groups for different examinations with an efficiency which would have caused Mr. Henry Ford to blush. In the Soviet schools there is the incessant propaganda: 'Equip yourselves to build the Communist State.' Contrast this with the slogan: 'Equip yourselves to get the school certif.' I think there is little doubt the English schools inculcate more facts for effort made and money spent, but that the culture they evoke is deeper is not so clear. I consider the Soviet technical schools compare favourably in cultural atmosphere with English secondary schools.

The universal payment of technical students is of vast importance. As all students are paid, they can live anywhere. They are emancipated from the family. They are mobile. They

can be sent to institutions; institutions have not to be taken to them. Since the State employs everyone, problems of organisation are simplified and organisational possibilities immensely increased.

The scale upon which the Soviet conceives technical education is conveyed by their estimates. For 1930–31 they will have in operation:

Institutions with courses of university standard	188
Middle technical schools	663
Rabfacs for training adult students	321

All these institutions are industrial and come under the supervision of the Supreme Economic Council. The estimates of numbers of students are:

Technical High Schools	1930–31	108,146
	1931–32	173,341
	1932–33	237,876
Technicums	1930–31	110,624
	1931–32	183,452
	1932–33	254,452
Rabfacs	1930–31	139,555
	1931–32	205,766
	1932–33	270,489

The financial estimates are:

	Roubles.
1930–31	527,105,000
1931–32	869,981,000
1932–33	1,292,160,000

These extraordinary figures require some consideration. At gold rates they mean the Soviet intends to spend nearly 53,000,000*l.* on technical education in 1930–31. Britain spends 4,000,000*l.* per annum on technical education. The British Empire probably spends altogether less than 8,000,000*l.* per annum. Allowing 4,000,000*l.* for the cost of supporting students, paid by parents, etc., in Western countries, one may assume the annual expenditure of the British Empire is 12,000,000*l.* per annum, and probably much less. The Soviet estimates of 53,000,000*l.* for 1930–31 include 20,000,000*l.* for students' wages, or keep. The question is, are these roubles gold roubles? In Russia people seemed to differ on this point. Some said they were gold and others paper. If paper roubles, they may be worth only one-third of the gold value, making the estimates for 1930–31 worth only 17,000,000*l.* in sterling. Even then they are much greater than the estimates for the British Empire.

What is one to think of this Soviet drive for technical education? From whatever point of view it is examined, the greatness of the conception remains. Even if the scheme were only a fiction the stimulation of it would be valuable. But it is certainly much more than a fiction. The hordes of students in institutions even between 11 p.m. and 12 p.m., the laboratory equipment, the wide signs of studiousness (in tramcars, in corridors, on window-sills, nearly everywhere one saw students reading technical or political literature), show that at least a considerable part of the vast programme is being performed. Personally, I have found the experience of studying the Soviet technical schools immensely illuminating. I find I understand the English technical education much better. I can see how unsystematic it is, how individualistic and how comfortable! Experience in Russia and Germany seems to teach me that Britain is a country of vast wealth, isolated from the main social currents of Europe. Its people have quietly invented a new religion—the religion of comfort. The worship of their new god leaves them with little time for other things—for instance, creativeness in industrial technology. In recent years British industry has been depending alarmingly on foreign patents. We are so engaged in the struggle to become independent middle-class persons that serious creativeness is forgotten. One feels, therefore, that English civilisation is being suffocated in the succulent ideals of the modern middle class. Britain has still a very long way to fall and is full of ability, but the contradictory forces in her social structure cause inhibition so that she cannot rationalise herself. The comparative positions of higher technical education in Britain and in Soviet Russia seem to make this clear to me. The Soviet, with all the power of State, is using technical education as a weapon of social creativeness, with gigantic, conscious design. In Britain 'representatives of industry' and 'representatives of the workers' and 'representatives of education' are still paying windy compliments to each other in preliminary discussions on the necessity for technical education. Indeed, in recent years quite a number of prominent British politicians have got as far as discovering the importance of technical education. They are still decades away from the discovery of the importance of a system of technical education, and still more decades from the time when an adequate system will be implimented. By that time Britain may have ceased to exist as an important civilised Power.

J. G. Crowther.

NEW ERA IN LONDON TRANSPORT

THE co-ordination of London passenger transport has still to be fought out in Parliament on the political issue.

Conservatives, having attempted to destroy Mr. Herbert Morrison's London Passenger Transport Bill on the grounds that it aimed at nationalisation of transport and was too socialistic, are not likely to abandon their opposition now, because, on strictly business considerations, the traffic 'Combine,' with Lord Ashfield at its head, has come to an agreement with the Minister of Transport, and the four main line railway companies have agreed to the 'pooling' of their passenger receipts in the London area with those of the undertakings to be controlled by the proposed Transport Board.

Events have moved rapidly in the last few weeks, and Mr. Morrison will now be able to steer his craft through waters from which many of the most dangerous mines have been swept. At the same time, nothing has happened to bridge the political gulf which is not, as might be expected, the clear-cut difference between public and private ownership. Most of the tramways involved by the scheme are already municipally owned, and under the Minister's proposals they will merely pass from the control of a number of public authorities to a new public authority. It is no part of the Conservative case that these tramways should be returned to private ownership.

The biggest of these owning authorities is the London County Council, and until it became evident that the Underground and main line railways were no longer opposing the scheme it looked very much as if the Council was to be used as the cat's paw to get the political chestnuts out of the fire. Negotiations are now proceeding between the Minister of Transport and the London County Council, and if a settlement is reached the way will be clear for the passage of the Bill through Parliament in the early summer.

Public confidence in the Labour Minister's scheme has been enhanced by the authoritative statement that it is hoped Lord Ashfield will be at the head of the new Transport Board, and that Mr. Frank Pick, managing director of the Underground Railways, will be one of his colleagues.

No measure has ever been introduced into Parliament which could not be improved on its way to the Statute-book, and the present Bill is not an exception. The Opposition may direct their efforts towards removing defects, or they may attempt to kill the scheme out of sheer wantonness as its predecessor, the child of the London County Council and the Underground Railways, was killed by the Labour Government when they came into power two years ago. Two blacks, however, do not make a white, and any attempt actuated by pique to defeat the proposals of the Minister of Transport will show a complete disregard of the interests of the citizens of London.

Briefly stated, the Bill makes provision for the establishment of a new authority—a Transport Board for the London traffic area. The Board will consist of a chairman and four other members appointed by the Minister of Transport. They must be persons who have had wide experience and have shown capacity in industry, commerce or finance, or in the conduct of public affairs. The London traffic area will cover, roughly, an area of 1846 square miles within a circumference of 25 miles from Charing Cross. This area comprises, in addition to the county of London, large portions of the counties of Essex, Hertfordshire, Kent, Middlesex, Surrey and Buckinghamshire. The duty of the Board will be to secure the provision of an adequate and properly co-ordinated system of passenger transport within this area.

There will be transferred to the Board the undertakings of the group of companies under the control of the Underground 'Combine' (including the London General Omnibus Company); the Metropolitan Railway Company; the London County Council tramways system and the tramways systems of the Middlesex and Hertfordshire County Councils, and of the local authorities of Barking, Bexley, Croydon, Dartford, East Ham, Erith, Ilford, Leyton, Walthamstow, and West Ham; the Tilling undertakings; and the undertakings of some fifty-eight independent companies most of which are operating motor omnibuses in the area. The whole of these services will be administered by the Board as one vast passenger transport undertaking. It is estimated that the capital involved exceeds 110,000,000*l*.

The only passenger services not to be taken over by the Board are the suburban lines of the four big railway companies, but there is to be a joint committee representing the Board and the companies in order to secure co-ordination by means of through bookings, through working, inter-availability of tickets, apportionment of receipts, etc. The Board will have power to run a service of passenger vessels on the Thames.

Provision is made for the revision of fares and charges on the application of a local authority, or in certain events of the Board,

to the Railway Rates Tribunal enlarged by two members, of whom one is to be a person with experience of local government in London, to be appointed by the Minister after consultation with the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee, and one a person having experience in financial affairs to be appointed by the Minister.

Since the Bill has been before the Joint Committee of both Houses it has been agreed that local authorities shall have the right to initiate suggestions as to fares, improvements, extensions and other matters, and to bring them before the Board. Local authorities will also have the right to make representations to the Minister with respect to the withdrawal or reduction of any services or facilities in their area or with respect to the need for new or improved services. The Minister has then to refer the matter for consideration and report to the Traffic Advisory Committee, unless he is satisfied that it is unnecessary to do so.

The Traffic Advisory Committee is, however, to be reconstituted and will consist of thirty-four members. Of these six will be appointed by the London County Council and six by the metropolitan borough councils, so that the county of London will have a direct representation on the Committee of rather more than a third. Of the remaining members, four will be appointed by the Minister of Transport to represent 'persons providing means of transport and users of mechanical propelled and horse-drawn road vehicles within the London traffic area'; three by the Minister of Labour, to represent labour; two by the Middlesex County Council; and one each by the Home Secretary, the Minister of Transport, the City Corporation, the County Councils of Essex, Kent, Surrey, Buckinghamshire and Hertfordshire,[1] the County Boroughs of Croydon, East Ham and West Ham, the Home Secretary to represent the Metropolitan Police, the City Corporation to represent the City Police, and the Home Secretary again to represent the county and borough police forces in the area.

The financial consideration for the transfer of the undertakings varies. In the case of the 'Combine's' undertakings 'transport stock,' as determined by arbitration, will be distributed among the holders of existing stocks and shares; the same plan will be followed in the case of the Tilling and independent undertakings, with the alternative that they may be bought out entirely or in part for cash; but in the case of municipal undertakings there will be merely a transfer from one public body to another, on the basis that the local authority shall neither incur a loss nor make a profit on the deal. No consideration will be paid for past

[1] The County Councils of Buckinghamshire and Hertfordshire are united for this purpose.

losses, but the Board will assume responsibility for the service of the outstanding debt of the undertakings, and the local authorities will be relieved of the necessity of providing for future capital obligations as regards both capital and interest in respect of their undertakings.

The fundamental objection which is being raised to Mr. Herbert Morrison's scheme on political grounds is that it involves the nationalisation of the passenger transport services of London and far into the Home Counties. It is argued that what is done in London may afterwards be done in all parts of the country, and that the London Passenger Transport Bill is a first step towards 'Socialism in our time.'

At the same time opponents are constantly changing their ground. Not long ago Sir William Clare Lees, president of the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, wrote to the Minister urging him to amend the Bill in such a way as to provide that the appointments to the Board 'are not subject to the influence of any political party,' yet last October the London Municipal Society received the Bill with the declaration that 'the non-elected public Board, subject to no political control, has, in effect, sounded the death-knell of municipal socialism and nationalisation.'

A very complete answer to criticism directed against the Board is to be found in what is taking place under our very eyes in regard to electricity. The Central Electricity Board, which is concerned with the bulk supply of electricity to the whole country, was brought into being by the Conservative Party. A tremendous development in the use of electric power is anticipated when its great nation-wide scheme is in full operation and the country is covered with a network of cables. It has never been seriously argued that this great scheme ought not to have been attempted because it savours of Socialism. An even more convincing instance is that of the Post Office, which is absolutely nationalised. When, during the life of the last Government, Lord Wolmer, the then Assistant Postmaster-General, said the Post Office was inefficient and that many of its duties might be more satisfactorily carried out by private enterprise, Mr. Baldwin administered to him a very sharp rap over the knuckles, and the criticism has not been repeated in orthodox Conservative circles. On the whole, it will be time enough to consider the merits and demerits of nationalisation if and when proposals of this nature are put forward in regard to passenger transport services.

In the meantime, it is sufficient to consider how the scheme of the Minister of Transport meets the crying needs of Greater London. A better precedent to consider in this case is that of the Metropolitan Water Board. Experience showed that the old

water companies were bought out at too high a figure, so that for some years at any rate the public of London were charged too much for their water, though they probably got it purer than they had ever had it before. By issuing stock instead of buying the 'Combine' out, the danger of making the same mistake is entirely avoided. As a matter of fact, the bone of contention in the financial arrangements arises, not from this cause at all, but from the fact that the undertakings of municipal authorities are being dealt with on an entirely different basis from that which is to be followed in the case of the 'Combine.'

Of the local authorities' undertakings the largest and most important is incomparably that of the London County Council, and the London County Council has decided to oppose the proposals of the Minister of Transport by all the means in its power. It is a decision arrived at absolutely on party lines, the Municipal Reform Party being in power and outvoting the Labour Party, who are prepared to support the Socialist Minister of Transport in anything he proposes, whether he is right or wrong. The whole controversy, as it has developed at County Hall, has provided a glaring object-lesson of the enormous harm that has been done by allowing parliamentary party politics to obtrude themselves upon purely local government administration. The intrusion of party politics into local administration has, perhaps, been inevitable, but it is none the less to be deplored.

In the present instance it is not easy to decide how far the objection of the Council is influenced by legitimate motives and how much by purely party motives dictated by the fact that the Conservative Party are in opposition at Westminster, and by resentment at the fate which overtook the dual Bills of the Council and the 'Combine' after the last General Election. Under those two Bills, which were introduced in the last session of Mr. Baldwin's Government and dropped by the Labour Government when it came into office in 1929, an agreement was to have been made for a common management and a common fund in respect of the undertakings of the two bodies.

The railway companies had declined to enter the scheme with their suburban lines, and so far as the extra-London local authorities operating tramways and the independent companies were concerned, they were to be afforded the opportunity of participation, with the probable alternative of being squeezed out by the new monopoly. Although the London County Council tramways would have remained the property of the Council, this would have been in name only, for they were to have been transferred to the monopoly on lease for a period of forty-two years. It is not putting the case too strongly to say that the municipally owned tramways would have been placed in the position of

subsidiary companies run by the holding company, which would have been the 'Combine,' on the board of which the London County Council would have had two directors out of eighteen. There would have been an advisory board for the purpose of consulting upon tramway matters, and on this board the Council would also have been represented. Regard was to be paid to the capital expended by the Council on its tramways, and a proportion of it was to rank as a prior charge; interest was to be paid on the tramways out of the common fund. Roughly speaking, 80 per cent. of the capital represented would have been private, and the bulk of the new capital would have been raised on the security of the common fund, thereby securing in part the advantage of municipal credit, while most of the capital would have been privately owned.

The 'Combine' looked forward unquestionably to being able to secure such a net income as would meet the divident requirements of their existing capital and to provide a margin out of which to finance fresh capital for undertaking a steady and continuous programme of tube extension. Ample safeguards were inserted for the protection of the interests of the users of tubes, omnibuses and trams, the Minister of Transport having the final word on the question of the level of the fares and the adequacy of the services, and in these matters he was to be guided by the London Traffic Advisory Committee. The sole proviso insisted upon by the 'Combine' was that the Minister's decisions should be governed by proper commercial considerations, and that the passenger transport system was maintained in a self-supporting position. The Minister was also to be given the last word in deciding in which directions fresh traffic facilities should be provided and in fixing the reasonable return to which the 'Combine' would have been entitled under the scheme.

It will readily be observed that outside the political issue of public or private ownership the two schemes have much in common. If the original one had gone through, it would, from the public point of view, have worked out quite satisfactorily, for it would have brought to an end the present competitive methods and placed the co-ordinated services of tubes, omnibuses and trams under the unified control of, perhaps, the most efficient passenger traffic organisation in the world. It is a great tribute to the genius of Lord Ashfield, its controlling spirit, that the Minister of Transport is hopeful that he will accept the invitation to be chairman of the new Board.

But that first scheme is dead and cannot be revived. Its political opponents complained that it added to the perplexity of the situation by endeavouring to secure a common management not only of the constituent undertakings of the 'Combine'

and other private concerns, but of municipal undertakings whose finances were on an entirely different basis. Even so, it was pointed out, co-ordination was incomplete because there was no compulsion upon any transport undertaking to enter the common pool and the common management. The very fact that the nominal ownership of London transport was to remain in the hands of a very large number of undertakings was held to be conclusive evidence of the incompleteness of the co-ordination proposed to be effected. It was, however, on the rock of public or private ownership that the Bill really foundered.

The lack of proper passenger transport co-ordination has been noticeable in London far too long for anybody to deny or ignore it. The London Traffic Advisory Committee was set up in 1924 to consider the problem, and Sir Henry Maybury, who was chairman of that Committee, says of the present Bill that it embodies the various points and principles for which he and the Committee had contended, and that if it is passed and the Board set up he thinks there will be an efficient transport authority for the large area in and around London.

The Labour Party killed the scheme of the London County Council and Lord Ashfield, thereby incurring the responsibility of producing their own solution of the problem. Mr. Morrison did not hesitate to jettison a report of the London Labour Party executive, drawn up about five years ago, in which it was demanded that all London passenger services should be merged under the control of a public authority consisting of representatives of the county and county borough councils in the London traffic area. To that authority it was suggested there should be transferred not only the powers of the Ministry of Transport and the Advisory Committee, but new powers altogether for the control of traffic and for securing the safety of pedestrians. It was a scheme that could never have won public confidence. Municipal control of this kind would have been disastrous, and even if Mr. Morrison, as leader of the Labour Party on the London County Council, as he then was, gave it his benediction at that time, he very quickly discarded it, lock, stock and barrel, as soon as he ceased to be critic and became the responsible Minister.

Things might have been very different, perhaps, if the plans for a Greater London Authority had materialised, but that scheme came to nothing, and the only evidence that it ever existed in men's minds is to be seen in the many vacant seats at County Hall even when the Council is sitting in full strength. The vision was of a great central authority whose jurisdiction would have extended as far out as the London traffic area and beyond it. If such an authority had existed at the present time a case might

have been made out for giving the management of London passenger transport into its hands.

Mr. Morrison has frankly admitted that in the framing of his scheme he has broken away from the old Socialist conception of direct State or municipal management on departmental lines. The two principles which have guided him have been, first, the financial and administrative co-ordination of London passenger transport on the basis of public ownership, and, secondly, a quite definitely business rather than political management with final accountability to the public. Clearly Mr. Morrison has travelled far from the London Labour Party's ideal of municipal control and ownership, but the political issue of public or private ownership remains as insistent as ever. Conservatives regard as a large assumption the Minister's conclusion that no form of liability shall be entailed upon public funds or credit. If taken literally, they say, this assumes that the employees of the new consolidated system will not take advantage of the fact that they are in a sheltered undertaking which has no direct parliamentary control, and is, therefore, peculiarly susceptible to political pressure. They also urge that the further postulation that the public body will be as efficient as private management in administrative control and in business enterprise is not only against experience, but against reason.

This point of view may be countered by pointing out that Parliament has already recognised the necessity in many cases of entrusting national or local services to public bodies somewhat of the nature of that proposed. Mention has already been made of the Metropolitan Water Board and the Central Electricity Board; and another analogous instance is the Port of London Authority. Each of these bodies controls a public utility service for the conduct of which business management is essential and the cost of which is paid by the consumer. The closest parallel, so far as constitution is concerned, is offered by the Central Electricity Board, for while the others are composed of many members—in the case of the Port of London Authority by as many as twenty-eight—the Central Electricity Board consists of a chairman and seven other members appointed by the Minister of Transport, after consultation with representatives of various bodies and interests affected by the supply of electricity.

To any business mind it must be clear that Mr. Morrison has adopted a wise course in keeping the numbers of the Passenger Transport Board down to a chairman and four other members. The Minister will appoint the members as he now appoints the members of the Electricity Board; but there is this great difference, that whereas in the latter case he does so after consultation with representatives of various bodies and interests affected by

the supply of electricity, in the case of the Transport Board he will appoint the members after consultation with the Treasury. It might have been a good thing, perhaps, if, in regard to, say, one seat on the Board, provision had been made for consultation with representatives of stockholders.

While opponents of the scheme assert their fear that the Board will soon become a Government department controlled by civil servants when the original members pass away, this is the very thing the Minister says he has been careful to avoid. He expresses great admiration for the Civil Service, but he has declared that he was so favourably impressed by the example set by the last Government in setting up the Central Electricity Board that he decided to follow it. Like that body, the new Board will not be a political body; it will not be a State department, but a business board.

It is true that the Bill bristles with such phrases as 'The Minister may by order appoint,' 'It shall be lawful for the Minister,' and so on. The overriding authority of the Minister of Transport is defined in no fewer than sixty different places in the measure in these and the like expressions, but it is a reiteration which may unduly alarm those who fear that Mr. Morrison is playing into the hands of a devouring bureaucracy. The Minister, under this Bill just as much as under its predecessor, will have to watch over the interests of the public, and the repetitions are traceable to this cause.

Lord Ashfield, who so completely convinced the vast majority of shareholders in the 'Combine' that their interests lay in accepting the scheme, is still engaged in negotiations with the Minister upon amendments which, in his opinion, are required in the Bill, and he has intimated that, even if those are agreed to, it will be necessary to watch closely every amendment which may be introduced, the terms of agreement with the Minister including the right to withdraw from the settlement in the event of any material alteration to the Bill by Parliament repugnant to the provisions.

On the other hand, the London County Council set out definitely with the object of wrecking the scheme, but the fact that they have recently held conferences with the Minister suggests that the course of events has caused them to modify their attitude. The predominant party on the Council disclosed their intentions clearly enough, but the 'Combine' and the railway companies, in their businesses, are not swayed by party political motives. The Council has seen that others have been able to make satisfactory agreements with the Minister, and the indication is that they are now prepared to accept the Minister's offer to 'enter into further discussion with any parties who desire to come into the agreement.'

It is scarcely necessary, in these propitious circumstances, to consider the consequences of their wrecking tactics if they had succeeded. The teeming thousands of Londoners whose only interest in the matter is that the best means shall be provided for getting them to and from their work would have had something to say about it. Time was—and not so very long ago either—when the Municipal Reform Party was far from keen about tramways, and it might have been thought that they would welcome any offer from Mr. Morrison to take them off their hands on terms which would have secured the safety of the capital invested in the service. They would have parted with them to the 'Combine,' but they were not willing to part with them to Mr. Morrison's Transport Board, on the ground that the ultimate control of policy will be vested in the Minister of Transport and taken altogether out of the sphere of municipal committees. Yet, under their own scheme of two years ago, the representation to be given to the Council on the board of the 'Combine' was so small as to be negligible.

The Municipal Reform Party is too closely allied with the Conservative Party to be absolved from the suspicion that other and very different considerations weighed with them while there was a chance of paying Mr. Morrison back in his own coin for his share in the overthrow of their Bill in 1929. That their antagonism is based on motives of this kind is a suggestion they would hotly resent. They contend that they are fighting in defence of London's tramways—a strange argument indeed in the mouths of those who, a quarter of a century ago, when the old Progressive Party were in power, were ceaseless in their efforts to show that the trams were a burden on the rates. The position was never so black as they painted it then, and perhaps they are inclined now, in framing estimates, to be too optimistic about possible net surpluses.

At the same time, it must be remembered that the financial affairs of the service are conducted in a different way from what they would be if the trams were the property of a company. It is because of this that confusion has arisen in past years, and it has been wrongly asserted that the trams are losing money. Not only do the accounts have to provide for the renewal of track out of revenue, but, unlike many private companies, the Council has all along been repaying its capital. The effect of this can be illustrated by taking the year 1927–28. The accounts in that year showed a deficiency of 225,189*l.*, but there was a debt repayment of 499,181*l.*, so that there was an actual profit of 273,992*l.* As a result of this wise administration the total debt incurred by the Council has been reduced over a period of years from, roughly, 18,000,000*l.* to 8,000,000*l.* In addition, the tramways pay rates

on their permanent way and debt charges on street widenings of about 30,000*l.* a year; and it is estimated that the rating authorities—that is to say, the borough councils—derive a saving of 233,500*l.* a year in consequence of the obligation of the Council to maintain the paving along the tramway routes. When the Passenger Transport Board takes over the London County Council tramways the Council will get no credit for the big effort it has made to pay off debt—so big, that in little more than twenty years the tramways would have been substantially debt-free. If the Board were a private concern such a scheme would be expropriation of the worst kind, and the Council would be justified in fighting it tooth and nail on behalf of the ratepayers. The fact that the Board will be a public authority operating the co-ordinated services of tubes, trams and omnibuses in the interests of the travelling public of London does make a tremendous difference. It is the Minister's justification for treating the private companies and the local authorities on a different footing. Local authorities owning undertakings which are at present operated at a loss will be relieved of the necessity of making provision for those losses, and, therefore, have no complaint. Those who, like the London County Council, are working at a profit, though they may not always do so, take the view that the ratepayers' property should be acquired on terms no less favourable than those being offered to the 'Combine.' This is an argument which cannot be seriously maintained in view of the public nature of the new owning authority. If the London County Council have any case at all for further consideration of the scheme as it affects them, it is in respect to the sum of rather more than 1,000,000*l.* which has been taken from past ratepayers to meet deficiencies.

It is, comparatively speaking, a very small matter, and it is quite certain that the ratepayers who found the money cannot be repaid. The fact that the Council is inclined to emphasise the matter as a serious defect in the proposals of the Minister is, perhaps, the measure of the weakness of its objection, which is—or, perhaps, I had better say now, was—to be carried to the extent of destroying the Bill if possible. Admitting that it is not equitable that the Council should be required to part with the ownership of its tramway undertaking on terms which preclude it from recouping the rates the amount previously contributed from that source, the question is surely one for readjustment in Committee or by agreement. A provisional agreement has been arrived at between the promoters of the Bill and the London County Council under which the latter will receive, in exchange for the tramways, 4½ per cent. stock to the amount of the outstanding debt, taken at the round figure of 8,500,000*l.* Against

this the Council will continue to pay interest on its own stock which has been raised for tramway purposes. The Council retains control of its sinking fund, the benefits of which were to have passed to the Transport Board. This fund earns a higher rate of interest than that paid to stockholders, and the difference accruing to the Council should compensate for the 1,200,000*l.* which has been taken from the rates for the repayment of debt when the revenue of the undertaking was insufficient for the purpose.

A Government defeat on the London Passenger Transport Bill might mean good parliamentary party tactics for the Opposition, but it would be purchased at a heavy price to the London travelling public. The alternative to Mr. Morrison's scheme of public ownership is the perpetuation for many years to come of the present competitive system of traffic facilities, overlapping and wasteful, and controlled by a multiplicity of separate undertakings entirely uninfluenced by the necessity in the case of Greater London of regarding passenger transport as a whole.

C. D. HOLMESTED.

THE REVIVAL OF VILLAGE LIFE

IT may be questioned whether the revival of village life which has been in evidence since the war is as yet quite appreciated at its full significance. Economically and historically the village had no business to wake up, and its perversity is aggravated by its doing so when agriculture appeared to be in extremity. Historians and economists had written off the village from the Book of Life, and with good grounds, for the disappearance of the peasantry and the countryside industries had left it spent and to all appearance moribund. In his recent important work entitled *England*, Dr. Dibelius would indeed even deny it the right to its name. 'The so-called English village,' he writes, 'is a mere collection of workmen's cottages which belong to the landlord, and house poverty-stricken land workers; an artisan or two, a few shopkeepers, and a handful of retired persons of the upper classes complete the picture.' He adds the prediction that 'no real change can come about until the agricultural labourer is made a free peasant again—in other words, until the whole course of development, beginning in the sixteenth century, which led to the degradation of the peasantry, is reversed.' Nevertheless, the fact stands; village life is reviving apace. Regardless of logic and prophecy, and without waiting for the major operation prescribed by Dr. Dibelius, a change in life and outlook has come about. I propose in what follows to indicate the nature of this change, and to seek an explanation of the surprising outburst of vitality which accompanies it.

Let me begin with a conversation I had the other day with a smallholder and carrier established in a little village in the South. He has three sons who go in for folk-dancing, and I congratulated him on the victory of the local team at a recent contest. He had not heard of it, and asked which team it was; and so it came out that there were four teams—the women's institute team, the 'kiddies'' team, the sword team, and the mixed team. This seemed rather excessive till I remembered Miss S. and the six evenings in the week she devotes all the year round to teaching dancing, and that this was one of the villages on her beat; also that twice a week there issued from the institute hut the strains of

a piano and the beat of pattering feet. A circumstance so trivial becomes significant, apart from any flavour (*vide* Dr. Dibelius) of the sixteenth century that may chance to attach to it, when one reflects of how many villages it can be said that '*Tout le monde y danse, y danse*' since Cecil Sharp showed them the way. Not that all the grey-haired folk are given to dancing, though some of them are; but dancing has come to rank high as a village interest and art, and looks as if it has come to stay. Village people 'listen-in' to the Albert Hall Folk-Dancing Festival on the chance of catching the beat of familiar feet or hearing the name of their county announced as the winner.

Choral singing has also taken firm hold of the countryside since the war, though the rebirth of English popular choral singing is older. The country musical competitions founded in 1885 by Miss Mary Wakefield were a starting-point for scores of similar festivals all over the country; first in the musical North, later in the Midlands and the East, South, and West. In these three last the outburst of music since the war has trebled the number of festivals, and brought even remote hamlets within the framework of the British Federations of Musical Competitions. Village choirs, church choirs, school choirs, women's institute choirs, join in these competition festivals, as do occasional village orchestras. Music, in short, has come back again in a flood, and the villages are expressing themselves and finding contact with their neighbours through song as well as dance.

The return of village drama has provided an element of endless interest and delight. All over the country, producers are as busy as conductors, and short-course schools, frequently conducted by distinguished actors and dramatists, have been established to keep pace with the demand. No entertainment gives such unalloyed satisfaction as that in which neighbours take the stage before an audience of neighbours. 'Bottom, thou art translated,' we exclaim, whether it be the parson in sombrero and moustaches, or the washerwoman in flounces and frills. The translation of the familiar figure, whether he makes a job of it or not, is a thrilling thing in a small community. Happy is the producer's task, for it is not a case of prospecting in barren country, but of tapping veins of fresh and often rich material. I remember discussing the question of the amount and quality of village dramatic talent three years ago with a lady famous as a producer and trainer of producers, and her telling me that, of all the material that had passed through her hands, there had only been one case of complete failure, 'and she made quite a good statue.' The value of the dramatic accomplishment as a whole must be judged by the efforts, adventures, and discoveries on the way. Such efforts, adventures, and discoveries are taking

place in nearly, if not quite, all the 4,700 villages in which women's institutes are established, and in many more besides.

It would be a mistake to assume that the thirst for amusement, so fiercely denounced, is at the bottom of this movement, or that it is in any way an offshoot of urban entertainments —jazz, music-halls, cinemas, broadcasting, or the like. This home-made village recreation is something distinct, depending as it does on the contribution the village community, by its own effort, can make to its own enjoyment. Of course, amusement comes in, and plenty of it, but if a craving for amusement were the only motive we should not expect to find, as in fact we do, so marked a revival of intellectual interest and curiosity astir at the same time. The outcrop of educational and social activities now brought within range of the villages is remarkable. Busily engaged with village audiences and classes throughout the winter are to be found the missionaries of the Workers' Education Association, the officers of the county agricultural authorities and the research institutes, the panel of women's institute lecturers, and many others. In not a few cases the county councils are enlisting voluntary organisations in a task which has become too heavy for them. In Derbyshire, for instance, where the Rural Community Council has come to the rescue, nearly 400 lectures were provided last winter, with an attendance of about 11,000 at single lectures and 3243 at twenty-six courses of six, nine, or twelve lectures. At single lectures the average attendance was sixty and at courses twenty-five. Discussions and debates, too, are nowadays a common feature of the village pabulum. The rapid spread of the library movement in the country districts must be noted too.

Then, again, there are the county organisations and corresponding G.H.Q.'s which exercise surveillance over these various activities, welding into a rough whole movements which would otherwise have been scattered, sporadic, and unaffected by progressive standards. Such is the work of the English Folk Dance Society, the musical and dramatic societies, and the County Federations and National Federation of Women's Institutes—the last-named body fortified for some years by unobtrusive but substantial help from the State. Indeed, our English trick of organisation shines out brilliantly when one takes stock of the quality of the shepherding that in recent years has been devoted in unstinted measure to the welfare of the countryside. By linking up voluntary and statutory agencies for common purposes, the Rural Community Council, latest comer on the scene, provides a coping-stone of county effort, and a fresh and vigorous organ of service and opinion. To the Carnegie Trustees the countryside certainly owes the homage due to benefactions.

When, then, Dr. Dibelius, expanding his theme, tells us that 'the unnatural structure of rural society' prevents the development of 'a common interest' and 'anything like a strong communal life,' the answer is that, whatever their structural defects, the English villages of to-day have in fact come into many common interests and are entering on a strong communal life in the social, æsthetic, and intellectual realm. It is possible that Dr. Dibelius may have had in mind the villages of the past—those which shared in the ducal festivities at Belvoir, with their 'beef and ale and music and dancing' as catalogued by Greville, or drank from the 'fountain of benevolence' fed by the ladies of Panshanger, which spouted 'flannel, medicines, money'; or he may have been thinking of the dreary hamlets nearer to our own time, where the stagnation and monotony of existence were only broken by an occasional *fête* or penny reading. If so, we may concede the point that common interests and a communal life were no part of the tradition or practice of villages then.

But the change of tone induced by the new activities is of greater moment to the village, and, indeed, to the nation, than the dancing, acting, and singing in themselves. Socially, and intellectually, the village that dances, sings, and acts—whether actively as performer, or sympathetically and critically as spectator—enters into a new inheritance, not merely of interests, but of relationships. Neighbourliness in the village acquires, as the philosophers say, a fresh content, which, even if it fails to oust gossip and charity, provides a vastly better basis of daily relationship. Similarly with the lectures and debates; food for thought and imagination imparted intelligibly by word of mouth should be fruitful in social results.

Observe again how, under the new dispensation, relationships with other villages and with the county are worked into the community fabric. The group meeting of the institutes, the dramatic competition, the dancing contest, or the musical festival—to say nothing of the cricket and football matches—are instances. The Hampshire Pageant at Whitsuntide, organised last year by the women's institutes, meant the enrolment of 1200 women from 142 villages, and involved problems of transport, properties, rehearsal, and commissariat of a formidable kind. With all these goings-on, isolation and stagnation are naturally disappearing and the spirit of the village is responding to the invigorating touch of the new influences and activities.

Here, then, is a fine tonic for corporate life; and in this connexion it is impossible to overrate the interest all classes and degrees are taking in the turning of the new leaf. Drama, music, and dancing are good for unstiffening manners and relations, and so are pageants. When, therefore, it comes to

building a hall, or establishing a village council, something like a united effort may be hoped for. The pace is not alarming, and it will be long before every village has its own hall and playing-fields, or even its refuse-dump. The countryman still lives in close contact with the seasons, and with crops and herds whose movements are all leisurely, and no rhythm devised by the reformer is likely to alter his pace. But if civic consciousness is a plant of slow growth, it has at any rate been planted, it is being watered, and it promises to grow.

In the readiness of countryfolk to cultivate arts so long disused we detect an unmistakable sign of vitality. The faculty and the will for artistic expression have been preserved—that is the miracle. The blacksmith, accustomed to shoe horses and repair farm implements, discovers the capacity and taste for bending iron into lovely shapes when the horses cease to come to the smithy. This faculty has been in his bones without his knowing it until the occasion arose. And so it may be with other arts. What is not so clear is the occasion of the revival. It was certainly not due to any exhilaration arising from a sense of well-being. Wages are better than before the war, but the balancing of the weekly budget is still an anxious problem if food and clothes are not to be seriously stinted. The villager's home is often cramped and none too healthy, for the group of council cottages has left the problem of overcrowding unsolved; and up to the war the social tone of the village was far too chilly and unwholesome to encourage such manifestations as I have described. The war, however, puts us on the track. On their return from Flanders or Mesopotamia cowmen, ploughmen, and carters could not fail to be farm workers with a difference; nor could the women, who for four years had striven to keep things going at home, subside into their former dulness. But if the ground gained was to be held, the new sense of status and citizenship maintained, and with it the capacity for common effort, some animating force there had to be to take charge at the critical moment when things were still malleable. It was the women of the villages who were to play this part, and the women's institutes, born during the war for war work in field and garden, and converted after the peace into the institutes of to-day, were the agents. Their call was not in the nature of a clarion cry, but resembled rather the friendly tinkle of the tea bell, bidding the village women assemble and bring their babies and their problems. There might be a little music or dancing or a scene from a play. Social distinctions just then were at a discount, and the question 'Who is my neighbour?' created no difficulties in manor-house or cottage. The suggestion that all should pull together in peace as they had done in war met with favour; also

the vetoing of politics, party, proselytising, and patronage. The subscription was fixed at 2*s.* a year, tea being undertaken by teams in rotation. Women with leisure and education gave themselves enthusiastically to the work, and their membership has counted for more than can be told. So the institutes, on their peace footing, got going—Scotland with a parallel organisation of its own—and it soon became clear that a new leaven of neighbourliness and good-will was at work. In due time the institute became the village hostess and entertainer, and as its members gained confidence the singing and playing and dancing, together with the discussions of village problems and practical work in handicrafts and the like, went on apace. The tale has been told by Mr. Robertson Scott in his *Story of the Women's Institute Movement*, and those who are interested in its doings may be recommended to turn to his book. The sovereign and historic achievement, as I see it, was the creation and maintenance of a fresh atmosphere in the village, an atmosphere in which people could breathe freely, and therefore one congenial to the arts, which are in their nature social. Well may the institute be proud of its position as nursing mother of the movement that has followed.

Unfortunately the countryman has been left a little behind in the march, though his share, both direct and indirect, in the advance must not be underrated. He is, I fancy, alive to the situation, and may feel some disgruntlement at the extent to which women are ruling the roost. The remedy is not far to seek. With a more general provision of village halls the need for clubs and reading-rooms should be made good, and the village council, established as yet in only a few places, offers him an opportunity for pulling his weight and asserting the masculine standpoint when required. Halls and councils should go far to help in placing the villages on an even keel.

There are, I know, persons of influence, devoted to the country, who view with some concern the stress that is being laid on æsthetic and social amenities at a time when the economic situation is peculiarly threatening and there remain heavy arrears to be made good in cottage building and repairs. This attitude demands respect; but on the other side it may, I think, properly be urged that the present pre-occupations of the countryside are in fact an indispensable preliminary to the stage of effectively influencing the agrarian situation. It takes time for the villages to thaw out after a frost that has lasted for generations, but during the thaw they are learning lessons in team work and the art of citizenship; they are gaining in self-reliance, and many of their people are qualifying for leadership. If the first step towards reform and reconstruction be to get men's

minds in motion and accustom them to standing firmly on their feet, the revival outlined here should count for much. If it proves a source of fortitude to a hard-pressed people, and brings some capacity for united action, the villages will find themselves better equipped in character and powers for dealing with the real politics of land, housing, and local affairs.

VAUGHAN NASH.

LAW AND THE POOR MAN

THE Law Society's Report on the working of the Poor Persons Rules in the Supreme Court calls attention, not only to the working of a most excellent charity, but at the same time raises the question in thoughtful minds whether there is not something wrong in our system of exacting court fees from litigants as a condition of doing justice. Have court fees the effect of denying justice to the poor? Ought justice only to be obtainable on payment of fees?

The Poor Persons Rules only apply to the Supreme Court, not to the county court. Under these rules the Law Society appoints committees both in London and the country to investigate into and report on cases of poor persons who wish to take proceedings in the High Court. Their income must not exceed 2*l.* a week (in exceptional cases 4*l.*) and their property not exceed 50*l.* If the committee, after looking into the facts of a case, comes to the conclusion that the applicant has a good case, it reports in that sense to the court. The court thereupon makes an order admitting the applicant to proceed without payment of court fees; and a solicitor and a barrister are nominated who act without charging any fees. These lawyers are persons who have volunteered to act in that capacity, of whom a list is kept.

The history of this procedure is as follows. Lawyers working in the University Settlements and at Toynbee Hall came across so many cases in which the poor were wronged and had not the money to appeal to the courts that they formed a joint committee of the various settlements to take the matter up and see what could be done. Judges were invited to help, and several of them came and attended the committee, amongst whom the late Mr. Justice Shearman was prominent. Representations were made to the proper authorities, but little progress was made. It was a matter involving a loss of revenue, or rather a possible loss; for if the poor could in no case pay court fees there could be no actual loss, but only doing work for nothing, *i.e.*, trying cases. At one time it was intended to raise money by voluntary subscriptions. The war intervened. The enormous increase of matrimonial wrongs, and the fact that the poor had obviously no remedy,

aroused public opinion; they could not afford divorce actions. Some reform was clearly necessary. It was so plain that there was one law for the rich and another for the poor. Since then divorce actions can be tried on assize, so saving the cost of coming up to London with all the witnesses and the delay involved; and the Poor Persons Rules were passed in 1925.

The judicial statistics for 1928 show that 5302 applications were made to sue without payment of court fees upon reports of the Law Society's committees. The court granted 2100 of these. In 1534 cases the plaintiffs were successful. Divorce applications numbered 1477. The remainder were actions in the King's Bench and the Chancery Divisions. The last report of the Law Society shows that in London alone 10,000*l.* was recovered by the London Society's action and the assistance of the Bar. There are no less than eighty-four provincial societies; so there is no doubt that this sum only represents a portion of the sum recovered under the working of the rules and unjustly withheld. It cannot, therefore, be denied that a system that exacts fees before it will admit an action to be brought, or even defended, results in a denial of justice in all sorts of cases. *The Times*, in commenting on the report in a leading article, described the 5000*l.* voted by Parliament towards the administrative expenses of carrying out the rules—hiring rooms and clerks' salaries—as the best expended money ever voted. It has been estimated that the court fees in these cases would have amounted to 15,000*l.*

The State must be held responsible for any denial of justice that is the result of its own action. So far, therefore, as justice is not done, and wrongs are allowed to remain unremedied owing to its refusing the assistance of its courts until it is paid fees, it has failed in its duty. It may be said that if all court fees were abolished the courts would still be barred to the poor owing to lawyers' fees. This is not so, for there are litigants in person, and judges give them every assistance; but if it were true, one wrong cannot be justified by another. As regards lawyers' fees, the State takes upon itself the responsibility of seeing that they are reasonable by fixing scales and by taxing them when they are alleged to be excessive. Lawyers cannot be expected to work for nothing. They have had to go through a long and expensive training. If their fees were not sufficient to admit of a reasonable income being earned, a high class of men would not enter the legal profession. Litigation would fall into the hands of sharks, who would by their knowledge be enabled to rob the unwary.

On what principle are the Poor Persons Rules based? Is it on the assumption that only those coming within these rules are prevented getting justice—that all others are able to pay for justice? Or is it suggested that, though all persons should be able

to get justice freely, the country cannot afford to do justice to others except on payment? If this is not the real explanation, on what principle is a rigorous line drawn at 4*l.* a week? Is it all a question of revenue? It looks as if the question of how far court fees resulted in a denial of justice had never been seriously gone into, but as if those responsible for framing the rules had felt that if lawyers were willing to give their services for nothing to such people, the State could not for very shame refuse to do likewise! Or did the risk of the courts ceasing to be self-supporting prevent court fees being dealt with on broad principles?

In criminal cases under the Poor Prisoners' Defence Act of 1903 committing justices have the power at their discretion to order that a prisoner should be defended at the expense of the country if they think that he is unable to pay for it himself. No similar discretion is given to either High Court judges or County Court judges. On the contrary, County Court judges have been called to book when they have remitted hearing fees. Indeed, the Committee, over which Mr. Justice Finlay presided, on Legal Aid to Poor Persons reported against giving County Court judges this discretion, on the ground that too many persons might apply and speculative actions be brought. That Committee was precluded from inquiring into the working of the Poor Persons Rules by its reference.

Is it denied that to dispense justice is an elementary duty of the State—one of its first duties? Or is it maintained that those that want justice must pay first for it? The citizen whose house is broken into has not to pay more than any other citizen for the punishment of the burglar. Why should he be specially taxed when he seeks to protect his civil rights in the courts? The community suffers equally if civil rights are invaded. In the Bible the importunate widow, by means of her importunities, at last got justice from the unjust judge. Nobody accuses our judges of being unjust. Nevertheless, no importunities of a widow would get her justice unless she first paid court fees or brought her case under the Poor Persons Rules. The ordinary suitor is sufficiently handicapped when his opponent is a rich corporation or the State, without having to pay court fees before he is allowed to defend his rights. They can employ the most distinguished advocates and can afford to appeal if so advised. The State is not asked to establish legal hospitals by giving legal advice and assistance free to those who are wronged, or think they are. It is quite another thing to ask it not to refuse a hearing to both plaintiff and defendant without first exacting a fee.

The total cost of the Supreme Court came, according to the Civil Estimates ending March 1930, to the sum of 902,497*l.*

Towards this the litigants paid in fees 728,450*l.* Probably to this amount should be added another 11,000*l.* which appears in the Finance accounts of 1928–29. If the cost of administering the criminal law is deducted, it will be found that the litigants paid the whole cost of the law courts, for the country has to have, anyhow, judges to try crime. The judges were occupied on assizes at criminal work at the Old Bailey, and, in acting as a Court of Criminal Appeal altogether 917 days out of 3911, nearly a quarter of the sitting. There is also to be taken into account circuit allowances, the salaries of the clerks of assize, and a number of other expenses, such as the expenses of the Court of Criminal Appeal. An official account of the High Court receipts and expenditure for the year 1928–29 gives the fees received at 783,723*l.*, Crown Office fees (honours and dignities) 5922*l.*, and then adds to this a sum of 50,359*l.*, which represents interest on a sum of 3,714,745*l.* odd belonging to suitors and held by the old Court of Chancery. The total receipts therefore come to 840,004*l.*; the expenditure, taking in maintenance, rates, audit, etc., to 791,175*l.* If the interest on the suitors' fund of 50,395*l.* above mentioned is taken into account, there is actually a profit of 48,829*l.* The official account does not show how the judges' time has been estimated, but it corresponds more or less with the figures arrived at from the civil estimates. It is not suggested that any of these officials are overpaid. On the contrary, when one considers, on the one hand, what they receive from the country and what it takes back in income tax, they are probably underpaid.

The Lord Chancellor's department has become a tax-collecting office which tries as far as it can to make justice self-supporting. The figures just quoted show that it has succeeded; but it is open to question if it has not done so by at the same time preventing persons going to law. To make justice self-supporting the fees were raised both in 1922 and 1924. The number of cases in the Supreme Court have diminished steadily since then. In 1925 they diminished by 6·6 per cent. from those of the previous year; in 1926 there was a diminution of a further 4·6 per cent.; in 1927, a further decrease of 2·7 per cent.; in 1928, another 4·3 per cent. In 1924 there were 120,042 cases in the Supreme Court; in 1928, only 99,761. The department has shown a most laudable desire, speaking generally, to fix fees according to the services rendered and the time occupied; but this is hardly the principle on which justice should be administered, although we are a nation of shopkeepers.

Bentham over a century ago showed that taxes on justice could be defended on no principle. In his eloquent *Protest against Law Taxes* he denounced all court fees as the most iniquitous of

taxes. 'Mark well,' he says, 'that of all sorts of men, it is the poor, and they the more certainly in proportion to their poverty, that are despoiled in this way of the protection of the law, that inestimable jewel which in the language of that very law is defined the citizen's universal and best birthright.' Again he says: 'A tax on a necessary of life can only lessen a man's share of that particular sort of article; a tax on justice may deprive a man, and that in any proportion, of all sorts of necessaries.' He particularly protests against taxes in civil cases, quoting from Magna Charta the words '*justice shall be denied to no man, justice shall be sold to no man.*' He considers such taxes as a worse kind of tax than a tax on bread; for he says if a threepenny tax were put upon a loaf one could still get a piece without paying the whole tax; but one cannot get half of a writ or half of a judgment.

Dealing with the argument that the burden of litigation should be borne by those who bring or defend an action, he points out that those upon whom the whole burden is cast are those who have least enjoyment of the benefit. The security which others enjoy for nothing those who are so unfortunate as to have to go to law are forced to purchase. A tax with the object of stopping litigation—whether to enforce or to defend a right as plaintiff or defendant—is no more or less than an avowed desire of denying justice. As regards vexatious actions, he argues that a plaintiff bringing such an action where the defendant had to pay no costs to the State to defend himself would not be able to bring such pressure upon the defendant to yield to his unrighteous demands, as there would be nothing to lose. On the other hand, a defendant who had no defence would not be able to deter the plaintiff from pursuing his remedy by fear of being put to great costs. If court fees really are a check on speculative solicitors bringing groundless actions, they also are a check on proper actions, the parties having to lie down under their wrongs. Those who support the present system are taking a serious responsibility by preventing justice being done. The fact that in London alone 10,000*l.* was recovered in hard cash for persons whose total income was probably under 2*l.* a week, and certainly under 4*l.*, shows that it is certain that if the right to sue without payment of costs were not so rigidly limited many more sums would be recovered that are now unrighteously withheld and other wrongs would be righted that cannot always be expressed in money. The very least that could be conceded is that there should be no court fees until the action had been tried out and the judge is in possession of the facts. No doubt in some cases such court fees would not always be recoverable, but in no case would parties have been denied justice by the action of the State in trying to make justice a self-supporting institution. Charges of

1*l.* 10*s.* for a writ and 2*s.* to enter an appearance per defendant are unjustifiable. Nor are the following fees legitimate: 2*l.* for giving notice of trial and a fee of 2*l.* for the judgment, increased by 10*s.* for every part of an hour over five hours occupied in the trial, especially when the party who has to pay the extra costs may not have been at fault.

The very least that court fees can come to in an action that is tried out is 6*l.* 14*s.* If there are any interlocutory proceedings, which is usually the case, 30*l.* would be nearer the average amount.

The rules of court contain provisions for dealing with the abuse of the process of the court. Probably these rules are not drastic enough. It is difficult, if not impossible, to decide whether a case comes within the mischief without hearing it out; but the maxim applied in criminal cases applies equally to civil cases. 'It is better that ten guilty persons should escape than that one innocent person should be punished.' It is better that some groundless cases should be brought than that justice should be denied to anyone. As to what cases are frivolous, it is impossible to say what is a frivolous case. Either it is a case where the law has been infringed, or it is not. What to one man may appear a frivolous action does not appear so to another. Light and air cases are very good examples of this.

It may be thought that the county courts are a remedy for this state of things. They are not a poor man's court. They are small cause courts with limited jurisdiction in which all kinds of cases cannot be brought. Divorce cases cannot be tried there. The fees are proportionate to the amount claimed. Where the claim is for an amount over 100*l.* the fees are actually higher than those of the High Court. Those of the High Court are practically the same in all cases; hence the proportionate scale works higher in the lower court, as against the cost of a writ in the High Court, which is 1*l.* 10*s.* The hearing fee is also proportionate to the amount claimed, so that if the case is disposed of in one day the court fees in the county court are higher.

The litigant in the county court also pays the bulk of the cost of the upkeep of these courts. The cost of the county courts, according to the Civil Estimates for 1930—judicial accounts of 1929—came altogether to 978,694*l.* The fees received came to 739,648*l.* If one looks at the finance accounts for the years 1928–29 it will be seen that to that amount has to be added another 64,336*l.*, so that the amount received in fees came to 800,984*l.*—all taken from suitors in small cases. Surely we do our best to make law self-supporting! The suitor pays nearly eight-ninths of the sum these courts cost the country! This has nothing to do with the amount of lawyers' fees—charges as to

which the country has nothing to do, except to see that the scale fees are not fixed too high and to see, in taxing costs, that the scale is not exceeded. Whether, for example, they are not excessive in the case of judgment summonses in proportion to the amount involved is another question.

Abroad the court fees are much lower—in France and Belgium, at any rate; but they try to make this up by charging a percentage upon the execution of a judgment; of course, this percentage is added to the judgment. Therefore, to avoid being actually out of pocket, the plaintiff makes inquiries into the means of his defendant before taking out execution. If he is not likely to recover the out-of-pocket expenses involved, he never executes the judgment. If the defendant has means, it is sometimes agreed not to do so, as thereby considerable sums are saved.

If we did not proceed on the basis of making justice pay for itself as far as possible and practically deny it to the impecunious, we might reasonably inquire before giving up any exterritorial rights, not only whether the judges of the foreign court of the country in question dealt justly and whether the law was in accordance with modern ideas, but also whether the fees were such as to deny justice to the poor.

In conclusion. Is justice to be regarded and treated as a mere luxury to be given to those who are prepared to pay for it, and therefore to be made self-supporting? Is it to be compared to a telephone that those who require must pay for? Or are the courts to be open to all and sundry free, as provided by Magna Charta?

E. Blackwood Wright.

THE DECENTRALISATION OF BROADCASTING

In no European country except Germany do the broadcast programmes in general seem comparable in interest with those in Britain; in no European country except Germany does there appear to be such general satisfaction with the programmes on the part of the listeners.

This latter statement is made on the basis, not of a relative absence of criticism in the Press, which might equally well be due to satisfaction or to apathy caused by despair of any improvement, but on that of a very striking technical point—the type of receiver chiefly favoured in Germany. The matter can best be made clear by a comparison with the conditions in France, where also a certain type of receiver so dominates the market that it can be called typical. In France this receiver is the superheterodyne, costly and unsatisfactory from the point of view of faithful reproduction as it is in nearly all cases; in Germany the 'typical' receiver consists of a detector followed by one or two low-frequency amplifiers. No greater contrast could be found; the one outstanding advantage of the superheterodyne is its ability to 'reach out' through the local transmitters and get distant programmes, whereas the typical German set is practically useless except for the local stations (but, incidentally, gives a vastly superior rendering of these). Now, in France, the local programmes are, almost without exception, bad and the transmissions atrocious: the French listener is not satisfied with them; hence the superheterodyne, and hence the stock query of the French purchaser, 'Will it get Lagenberg?' or 'Will it get Daventry?' One is therefore forced to conclude that, on the other hand, the German listener is satisfied with his local programmes, or he also would insist on receivers that would enable him to get distant ones.

Another interesting proof of this attitude on the part of the German listener is the number of wireless journals which print only the local programmes. In Berlin, for example, there are at least five giving the full Berlin and Königswusterhausen programmes, with hardly a mention of the rest of Germany, and practically every area has its own local programme-paper: for example, that published at Cologne devotes fifteen pages to the

local programmes, condensing all other German stations together with seven foreign ones to one page and a half.

As in England, the German broadcasting system is State-owned, and is administered by an officially privileged company (the National Broadcasting Company). The outstanding difference is that the administration of the broadcasting, and above all the responsibility for the programmes, is decentralised, being passed on to nine subsidiary regional companies—Berlin, Bavaria (Munich), Central (Leipzig), Northern (Hamburg), Eastern (Heilsberg), Silesian (Breslau), Southern (Mühlacker), South-western (Frankfurt), and Western (Langenberg). Each of these, besides the main station quoted, runs also one to four relay stations (which, however, not infrequently have their own programmes, or supply from their studios the programme for their main station), and several fixed studios at other points in their area (besides, of course, installing microphones in concert-halls, churches, etc., for special features). There is also a tenth company, the 'German Wave,' which runs the one and only German long-wave station, Königswusterhausen, together with the short-wave (32-metre) station associated therewith; but this station differs from all the regional ones in that its object is primarily educational.

The results would seem to indicate that there may be certain advantages in this decentralisation as compared with the British system: admittedly, there are also several very serious disadvantages, chief among which is the considerably higher cost of running ten separate organisations, each with its director, orchestras, etc., and clerical staff. (In this connexion it may be added that the yearly licence fee in Germany is 24*s*., the Post Office taking 40 per cent of this.) There is also the possibility that a want of co-ordination between the various regional programme directors may lead to a duplication of items, or to simultaneous programmes of a very similar nature, especially on occasions such as the centenaries of authors or musicians. One might also perhaps fear that the level of the programmes in some of the smaller groups might fall far below the general level; but it must be remembered that there is no question of water-tight compartments; even with the simple set quoted as typical the listener can have the choice of at least three programmes except in the most extreme case (*e.g.*, if he lives exactly below the aerial of his local sender!), and should his local programmes fall below the level of the other two he will soon let the director know of it.

Perhaps the chief advantage of the regional company scheme is that it encourages a healthy competition between the programme directors. It continually happens that some company starts a particular type of item which finds favour locally, and

which is then copied by other directors; or other companies may even ask to be allowed to take the item jointly, if it is of a serial nature. (In such cases, by the way, the second company of course pays the rentals of the land-lines necessary to link its transmitters to the studio of the originating company, and if the item is of an expensive nature it will as a rule also bear a portion of the costs.) Examples of such items are the 'No Admittance except on Business' series started by Breslau, where microphone visits were made to such places as the main electric generating station of the town, to a bridge being built, including the interior of a caisson being sunk for pier support, to the tramway depôt and traffic-control offices, and so on. The Cologne (Langenberg) group did a similar series, but specialised on visits to factories, and other groups have followed suit, a special technique having been developed in which a dialogue between the 'visitor' and the 'guide' is interspersed with conversations with workmen who explain what they are doing. (An unexpected offshoot from this series was Frankfurt's visit to the preparations being made for the rocket flight to the moon, ending in the departure of the rocket—on April 1 last!) Again, to quote another example, Frankfurt was the originator of the rather disquieting 'History in the Making' series, which began with a reconstruction, in German, of the principal parts of the debates in the French Chamber of Deputies on war debts and reparations—'reconstruction' in the sense that not only were the principal speeches redelivered, but the general anti-German atmosphere of the Chamber was developed, in the form of interruptions, cries of protest, applause, etc. A later item in this series was the Snowden-Chéron dispute at the Hague, complete with 'grotesque and ridiculous,' and a recent one was the reconstruction of a debate on unemployment in the House of Commons. This series may be taken as an example of how a popular item is extended, since, for the last-mentioned item, the Berlin, Stuttgart, and Leipzig groups linked themselves to the original Frankfurt company.

Perhaps a clearer idea of how this interchange system works, and of the great use made of it, may be obtained by considering a day at random—for example, January 4. On this particular Sunday, Berlin, Leipzig, and Breslau took the midday concert from Königsberg, and also a reading by Broust from his own works in the evening; Breslau also took a Bach cantata from Leipzig and a radio farce and the dance music from Berlin (these last two items were also taken by Königsberg and Leipzig); Königswusterhausen took the Munich evening concert and then Berlin's dance music; Langenberg took the morning concert (at 7 a.m.!) from a ship in Hamburg harbour, as also did Leipzig and Mühlacker. There were also other minor exchanges, but this will

give an idea of the interlocking practised, and of the flexibility of the system.

Another great advantage of the decentralised system is that the personal ideas, and even prejudices, of any director extend to one group only; this is perhaps even more noticeable in the choice of musical items than in that of lectures or running reports. For example, Langenberg may perhaps be considered the 'conservative' station musically, with a special tendency to hunt up and revive the works of unjustly forgotten composers; whereas Berlin tends rather to foster modern, and even ultra-modern, music. The important fact is that with the decentralised system it is impossible for the personal preferences of any one musical director to colour the whole broadcasting system, as could so readily be the case in Britain under the present organisation.

A further idea of the way that programmes vary with the personalities of the directors (not uninfluenced by the preferences of local listeners, be it added) may be obtained from the published projects of certain groups for this winter. A consideration of these will also serve to indicate the vastly greater choice permitted to the German listener as compared with the British, since in any but exceptional cases (as already mentioned) even the cheap 'typical' set will get the programmes of several of the groups. Breslau, for example, is emphasising the importance of talks by giving them from 8 to 8.30 every evening one of the preferred positions on the programme. Further, instead of the old system of running several series of talks on various subjects, each on the same evening of each week, during six or seven weeks, it now proposes to give one week to each subject, closing on Saturday, with a summary (of a purely factual, not critical, nature) of what the various speakers have said, together with a short bibliography of the subject for those wishing to study it further. This is in exact opposition to what other companies (Berlin, Hamburg, Langenberg) have done: these groups have preferred to remove all talks, other than on subjects of immediate interest arising out of the news of the day, from the evening programmes, and in general to reduce educational talks very greatly, leaving them to Königswusterhausen, whose speciality they are.

Munich proposes concerts of music by living composers, with introductory explanations, paralleled by concerts of chamber music by pre-classical composers, also with introductory talks. The modern poet is also to be given his chance in a cycle 'The Unknown Author Speaks.' Leipzig proposes to develop especially the radio drama, in all its forms, and is asking for modern works specially written for wireless, but is also adapting several of the classical comedies for broadcasting. In music they are specialising

on concerts for children and '*Laienmusik*'—concerts for the musical layman. Another peculiarity here is that they propose to abandon the broadcasting of complete operas, and to give single acts only: this is contrary to the ideas of most of the other musical directors. Frankfurt, to take a last example, is a strong believer in the simultaneous public and broadcast performance, whether of symphony orchestra, opera, or chamber music: here, again, other directors tend to reduce these simultaneous performances, on the ground that different techniques are necessary in the two cases, so that no one performance can be suitable for both. Their 'History in the Making' series, already referred to, will continue; one item is to be the Dayton trial (Darwinism, or, as they call it, the 'Ape Trial'). They also propose discussions on controversial subjects with a considerable number of speakers instead of the usual two or three; and perhaps oratorical competitions in connexion with these will be arranged.

So much for the variety of programme introduced by decentralisation, with the consequent avoidance, on the one hand, of programmes for the whole country unduly coloured by the preferences of the one central programme director, and, on the other hand, of the colourless programme intended optimistically to please everyone. There is, however, another point of view which is even more important, and this is the result of the regional decentralisation upon present-day authors and composers. In Britain, if a play (for example) is written and submitted to the B.B.C., a refusal means its relegation to the rubbish-basket: authors may therefore reasonably be expected to think twice before giving themselves the trouble of preparing work for this one and only market, where, in addition, the demand is relatively small. In Germany, on the other hand, the author has nine directors (or ten, with Königswusterhausen) to whom he can submit his work; nor (the obvious retort) need he fear that the relative smallness of the group which accepts him need necessarily limit his audience or his fees, since experience has shown that all good items have been repeated by other groups after the original performance has shown their value, or alternatively in many cases have been repeated by the same group originally producing them, with other groups linked thereto by land-lines. Incidentally, this gives the listener the advantage that if he missed the original production he can get the item later, or if he wishes to hear it again he can do so. Exactly the same argument applies to the composer—perhaps with even more force, since here the personal preferences of the musical director must almost inevitably be a very strong factor in deciding the acceptance or refusal of a work. And here, again, the composer need have no reason to fear that his work will be heard by a limited audience only, for,

if it favourably impresses the listeners, other groups will almost at once demand to be allowed to perform it.

Another person who would presumably gain by decentralisation is the member of the orchestra, since competition between directors should lead to better wages, and in any case he would not feel so tied down to one employment as at present. Even more is this true for the announcer, as the instrumentalist can at least find work with other orchestras if he is dissatisfied with the broadcasting organisation, whereas the announcer is a specialist and entirely dependent as such on wireless. And yet another person who should welcome decentralisation is the engineer (not, of course, that he is of any great importance: the writer is one himself), whether from the point of view of the engineer employed by the broadcasting company or the independent research engineer, interested in selling his ideas and above all in having them tried. The point that decentralisation should make for more rapid progress in the art, anything successfully tried by any one of the technical directors being interestedly watched and rapidly copied by the others, hardly needs labouring.

It may be quite reasonably objected that, in music at any rate, it is the already existing musical decentralisation of Germany which makes the decentralisation of broadcasting possible; that in Britain all the musical life is concentrated in London, whereas in Germany provincial centres such as Leipzig, Dresden, and Cologne are at least as important, musically, as Berlin. To what extent this is true may be questioned, except perhaps as regards the larger symphonic orchestras; but as regards smaller orchestras, chamber music, and above all vocal music, there seems to be little basis here for an argument against decentralisation. The same is true as regards opera, since, although it is admitted that 'grand opera' can be produced for simultaneous public and broadcast purposes only in London, it is the *public* side of the question that makes this the case: there is no reason why the provincial centres should not be equally well able to produce for broadcasting only, and there is at any rate a tendency, if nothing more, to consider that such studio productions are more suitable for wireless than the transmission of public performances. In any case, it must surely be accepted that a decentralisation of broadcasting would quite indisputably tend towards a musical decentralisation (at first perhaps at the expense of London, but finally to its advantage), which cannot be regarded except as a thoroughly satisfactory symptom of the musical health of the nation as a whole.

To what extent local patriotism may enter in making the German listener satisfied with his local programmes may be disputed. There certainly exists a tendency to praise the pro-

grammes of the local group merely because it is 'our' station, and to take a special interest in the talks because it is 'our' professor, or in the orchestral works because we see the conductor in the street daily; but this is probably counterbalanced by the tendency, which equally certainly exists, to prefer any programmes but the local one because they are harder to get. 'Distant cattle have longer horns.' Here, again, however, it is at any rate certain that the inverse effect cannot be denied—most certainly the local programme does tend to foster local patriotism, an interest in local folk-songs, dialect, and in local writers and composers; nor, I think, can this be regarded as an undesirable result. In Germany, for example, all the stations whose winter plans were quoted above insist on the importance to be given to works by local composers and writers—to Silesian poets 'from Angelus Silesius to Klabund,' for example—and to local traditions, folk-songs, and especially dialect. Perhaps the most striking example of the importance given to dialect (though this example could be closely paralleled elsewhere) is a quotation from one of the fascinating *school* broadcasts from Cologne (Langenberg), where it was impressed on the little class round the microphone, and through them on the hundreds of scholars officially following the course, that they should talk either 'German' or '*Kölsch*,' but not a '*misch-masch*,' thus putting the Cologne dialect on a level with the official language. This example may perhaps come as a shock to those who believe that present-day Germany tends rather towards standardisation at all costs: it certainly compares interestingly with the B.B.C. and its lists of 'standard' pronunciations.

A minor advantage of decentralisation, yet one which should not be neglected, is the possibility it gives of duly honouring the anniversaries of local worthies, whether literary or other, who are not of national importance, but who should not be forgotten. A host of names will at once come to everyone's memory, and here again, surely local patriotism would be no bad thing?

A quite obvious argument against decentralisation in Britain is that it would be impracticable, on account of the small area as compared with Germany. This is not at all true, however; the essential feature is to have independent directors, and there is not the least need for the areas covered to be different (though, of course, the decentralisation by regions adds great interest, by virtue of the very local patriotism just mentioned). For example, there is not the least reason why two 'London' stations should not be treated as two unities, each with its own organisation and direction. In fact, the results in such a case might in some respects be even more interesting than decentralisation by areas, since here the listeners would have a perfectly clear choice

between the two programmes, purely as programmes, whereas in the case of decentralisation by regions the listener would always tend to prefer the nearest transmitter for purely technical reasons, other things being equal.

More especially would the experiment of decentralisation be of interest if each listener were able to give a tangible proof of his preferences, which suggests a possible extension of the German system by allowing each listener, when taking out his licence, to allot the amount (less the Post Office deductions) to whatever station or group he preferred; or, if this were considered too drastic, to allot thus perhaps one half of the amount, the other half going into a common fund for eventual division between the companies, as at present. This is, of course, going much further than even the German system, and it is possible that the extra book-keeping involved might be too expensive to make it practical: still, the idea has a certain fascination, especially for the 'disgruntled' listener.

R. RAVEN-HART.

THE WORLD'S DWINDLING WILD LIFE

THE dwindling of the world's wild life proceeds, undramatically for the most part, like the erosion of our coasts. If you walked up and down on the other side of the tamarisk hedge which shuts my garden off from the beach you would not see any evidence of the steady drowning of this part of the south coast of England. There are no cliffs to fall, no sand dunes to be eaten into: just a low bank of coarse shingle, 10 or 15 yards wide, along which brushwood brought from the hazel copses on the Downs has been deeply bedded, intermingled with wire netting, in a line. Yet old fellows on the farms hereabouts well remember having played football and tended cows in the meadows out yonder where wild seas are raging this stormy afternoon.

A bit here, a bit there. Here, there, and everywhere one finds a species that is now scarce, very scarce, or extinct, though even middle-aged persons remember when it was plentiful. Let us glance at the state of affairs all round the globe and get an idea of what is going on.

In Europe the most spectacular creature which naturalists are trying to preserve from extinction is the huge shaggy-coated aurochs or bison, which, to judge from the numerous bones and cave-drawings that have been found, was abundant in pre-historic days. The herd in the Polish forest preserve was largely reduced during the World War, though I have been told that a few specimens still remain there, in strict preservation. The bulk of the survivors were bought about seven years ago by a wealthy Swede, who established them in a preserve near Engelsberg, in Sweden, where they are breeding. During the war a genial Swedish professor undertook to give a good home, as one says in adopting kittens, to some hungry bison from a German zoo, the director of which foresaw that they would be eaten if they stayed much longer. He parked them on a little desert island in the Baltic, where their forage bills nearly reduced him to tears, but he felt compensated when he heard accounts of the stark horror with which stray yachting parties, putting ashore for a camp meal or a stroll, glanced up to see a gigantic bison's head distrustfully surveying them from a clump of bushes! I was informed not long ago that the Prussian Government had allocated 180 acres of land near Hanover as a bison preserve, and that, under the auspices of Dr. Heck, son of the director of the Berlin Tiergarten, the first pair had been turned loose there. Some wild bison—no one can estimate how many—are still roaming certain inaccessible tracts of the Caucasus forest, where they are occasionally seen; so 'difficult' is their country that they seem to have every prospect of holding their own for a long time to come against human enemies. A contagious cattle plague might wipe them out. While we English are continuing to do our best to exterminate our North Sea seals on the sandbanks of the Wash and elsewhere, the Germans have issued regulations for the protection of those congregating on the banks off Bremen and Hamburg.

Now and then one encounters among usually well-informed naturalists a belief that one of the vanishing species of European animals is 'the four-horned St. Kilda sheep.' There never was such a creature; but there does appear to have been a curious strain of four-horned sheep on the north-west Scottish island of North Uist. What is happening to the strain now I do not know.

The beaver is generally assumed to have become extinct in Europe; but this is not the case, although it has had a pretty close escape. It was lost sight of altogether in its Swedish habitats a few years ago, but Herr Johnson, the Swedish preserver of the bison, has now nursed the breed up to considerable numbers by dint of having a vigilant watch kept on it. Wild beavers still are seen occasionally in the headwaters of the countless streams rising in the uninhabited forests of the mountain range dividing Norway from Sweden. Favourable tidings can be given, too, of the Swiss chamois and of the rare Spanish ibex, *Capra Pyrenaica Victoriæ*. Although huntsmen, almost exclusively guides, are allowed to do a little gunning for chamois every year, the breed is now increasing, though still far from being as plentiful as it was fifty years ago. The ibex became nearly extinct a few years ago, but has now been strictly preserved. 'We did it,' explained King Alfonso with a smile, when attending the unveiling of a group of three mounted specimens which he had given to our Natural History Museum at South Kensington, 'by turning the poachers into gamekeepers.'

Apes and camels are still wild in Europe. The former, believed to be descendants of pets brought over from Africa by the Moors many centuries ago, exist only on the ledges and steep slopes of the top of the Rock of Gibraltar, where sixty years ago they came very near extinction, for no more than seven were ever seen simultaneously and logged in 'The Monkey Register,

which was kept by the soldiers on duty in the Upper Signal Station. There are now said to be a few dozen.

Wild camels—and of semi-aquatic habits, too—would seem to be one of the least likely discoveries to encounter in Western Europe, yet numbers of them exist in the big stretch of marsh and swamp at the mouth of the Guadalquivir River known as Las Marismas. They are descendants of a herd imported a century ago by a local landowner for work on his farms.

Now to turn to Asia.

My own extensive journeys in Siberia have shown me that the fur trapper has already caused a considerable thinning of several species of animal, despite the very thin population of the enormous expanse of forest and tundra in the north. Every Tom, Dick, and Harry up there collects furs with the matter-of-courseness of English countryfolk collecting blackberries, nuts and mushrooms. The presence of a squirrel or a fox on an English hillside is an incident regarded as a pleasant spectacle. Over there it is the signal for someone to rush off for a gun. Squirrels have been quite exterminated over huge tracts of country and rendered rarities in others. Foxes have been thinned to a small fraction of their numbers twenty-five years ago. Otters, from being abundant a few decades ago in the forest streams of territory 2000 miles from a railway, have become scarcer than they are to-day in the Thames Valley and within a couple of miles of Falmouth Dockyard. The beautiful little sea otter, which used to be common along the coast of Kamchatka and around the Bay of Okhotsk, has been almost exterminated as a result of high bids in the fur marts of Leipzig. The sable had become so scarce that about 1913 a veto was placed on its killing or capture, and on the marketing of new pelts, for a period of several years. That merely drove the trade underground. The sable's relatives, the martens, also are quite scarce by now and fast growing scarcer.

In the good old days, up to about 20,000 years ago, the mammoth, the woolly rhino, and the thick-coated Siberian tiger ranged abundantly about north-east Siberia. Then man, with his adroitly contrived pitfalls and his hankering for large meat meals, pushed mammoths and rhinos up to the very top of the world, as, 20,000 years later, the Canadian Indians pushed the wood bison up to the top of their country by their steady and relentless pressure. It was not the cold winter climate which caused these two big creatures to die out. The further north you go, the more remains of them there are, culminating in the New Siberian Isles, up in the Arctic Ocean, where the tusks and bones come toppling out of the cliffs by the ton when landslips are caused by gales sending in ice-floes to pound and grind against them. The tiger,

as is the way of cats, was a wilier customer. He did not fall into pitfalls as a rule; and when he was guilty of such a lamentable *gaucherie* he promptly scrambled out again and treed the lurking little hairy men. So he survived, and, until quite recently, was commonly seen in the marshes verging on the lower Amur, in the forests of Kharbarovsk, and ranging down through the Ussuri region and the Vladivostok hinterland to the woods along the Korea-Manchuria frontier; deep snow lies there all winter, and temperatures often go to far below zero Fahrenheit. Twenty years ago the pelts fetched poor prices, and there were hardly any attempts to trap specimens alive. Of late, however, there has been a general enthusiasm for tiger-trapping, following visits from German wild beast dealers, who were paying 200*l.* each for cubs.

The *Rhinosceros sondaicus* of Burma is destined to disappear before long, it would appear, as there is such a demand for it by doctors in China for the compounding of queer physics. The authorities try to protect it, but poachers cross the frontiers from Siam, in addition to those who prey on the beast at home. Mr. Arthur Verney, who knows it in its haunts, has reported that natives make guns out of bits of gas pipe, creep up to its wallow, and fire several shots at it simultaneously.

A freak of fashion, 'popularising,' for a while, a novel type of shoe for women, is wiping out the useful lizards of Bengal, according to the Forestry Department of that Government, which recently lodged a formal complaint with the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. The result of English and American women buying these shoes is that large numbers of Indian women and children are being killed by poisonous snakes which would otherwise have been devoured as eggs or youngsters by the lizards.

India is so large and diversified a land that, naturally, its conditions vary a good deal. There are several black spots where fauna is being exterminated wilfully by man. The state of affairs in the forests of Northern Oudh was graphically described not long ago by Waris Ameer Ali in an address to the East India Association.

> I found [he said] that the ghural, or Himalayan chamois, a little beast perfectly harmless to crops or anything else, had been virtually exterminated from a mountain where they had formerly been plentiful. Within my five years at Gonda, the *Ungulata* (deer and wild boar) have been almost exterminated from many parts of these magnificent forests. Beats which one knew to contain many mature sambhur stags, as well as brockets, now contain not a single one and barely a doe. Axis, or spotted deer, have been estimated to be 75 per cent. fewer there than in 1912. The cause of this has been ruthless poaching, both on our side and from the Nepalese side of the frontier. Large armed gangs of Gurkhas come down in broad daylight in the cold weather and shoot in line through our forests,

slaying everything they see. Our forest subordinates are terrified of them.

Waris Ameer Ali took the matter up with the highest authorities in Nepal, who promptly issued drastic orders to have the poaching stopped. Co-ordination is badly needed. Burma has taken the lead in this respect by appointing a Forestry officer as game warden. He is inaugurating a game protection society, with a mixed membership of all races in the province. In Northern Bengal European planters and Indian landlords have combined in so-called shooting clubs to protect as many areas as possible from the destruction which is so rife in that province.

It is difficult, if not, indeed, impossible, to sum up in a sentence or two the wild life situation in Africa. It is not, on the whole, I believe, nearly so bad as some persons think. The authorities nearly everywhere are fully aware of the desirability, on several scores, of stopping indiscriminate slaughter and of affording continual protection to many species. As Mr. Arthur Verney, the big-game hunter, remarked not long ago :

> There is more danger of game becoming extinct in India than in Africa, because the game laws there are not so strictly enforced. There is a certain amount of indiscriminate shooting by so-called stalkers, who ' stalk ' as much game as they possibly can, but I think I am right in saying that in many cases game is increasing. At any rate, that has been my own experience around Kenya.

In Tanganyika, however, the laws are less strict, and full advantage is taken of the fact. A healthy sign of the way the wind is blowing is the stiffening of public opinion against shooting from aeroplanes or motor cars.

Two admirable moves have been the establishment of enormous big game sanctuaries in the Transvaal and the Belgian Congo. The Albert National Park, 6000 square miles in extent, near Lake Kivu, enables Belgium to prevent the extinction of the gorilla, of which, according to Dr. Derscheid, only some 600 specimens remain. The Albert Park comprises marsh, plain and hilly bush country between Lakes Kivu and Edward, and includes eight volcanoes, the highest being as big as Mont Blanc. Eighty thousand antelopes of many species and large numbers of chimpanzees, baboons, hippopotamuses, elephants, buffaloes, and rare and beautiful birds dwell there, and a tribe of 300 human pigmies. About 150,000 big game animals live in the Kruger National Park in the Transvaal, which is the biggest wild life sanctuary in the world ; they are protected from rifles and traps, though they have to take their chance with the 600 lions and numerous leopards and other beasts of prey. Quantities of giraffe, a creature as urgently in need of protection as the gorilla, roam the park.

A considerable export trade in wild animals is done from the Zoutpansberg region of the Northern Transvaal, *viâ* depôts in Johannesburg and Pretoria, but not large enough to have any remotely perceptible effect on the total South African fauna. Half a dozen lions, of Africa's tens of thousands of them, undoubtedly exterminate more *general* fauna in the course of a year than all the menagerie collectors from Morocco to the Cape. The danger of the live animal collector is in connexion with a few especial rarities such as the okapi, the gorilla, and the white rhino, which are procurable only by ruthless slaughter of the parents or elders in the vicinity.

It was discovered a couple of years ago that the graceful little gazelles of Algeria and the French Sahara were being slaughtered in huge numbers in response to a fashion ' created ' by Paris dressmakers. The Governor-General of Algeria promptly put a stop to this state of affairs by issuing a decree forbidding gazelle shooting or trapping and prescribing imprisonment and a fine for any offender.

North America's most notorious wild animal massacre of the past century was that of the bison. It was characterised by the same ruthlessness and contempt for native fauna as is being demonstrated in Queensland's present wholesale slaughter of the amusing little koala bears. Neither ' Doc.' Carver (presently to become Buffalo Bill's first partner in the Wild West Show business) nor his multitude of admirers in the 'sixties saw cause for anything but noisy applause in his boast of having shot more than 30,000 specimens. Until as recently as the building of the trans-continental railways bison were quite plentiful on the plains between Chicago and the Rockies. So thorough was the massacre, that only one small herd survived, and that in captivity. It changed hands twice or thrice and eventually found its way up to south-western Canada, where, strictly preserved, it is multiplying to such an extent that the overflow is having to be shipped up north and turned out to shift for itself, which it is doing very efficiently.

Canada's benevolent supervision of her magnificent game sanctuary in the Thelon country, east of Great Slave Lake, has assured the survival of the fast-dwindling musk-ox, nearly 300 specimens of which roam the preserved territory. More than 50,000 caribou were seen there in 1929, although in Northern Ontario this fine deer has been thinned to a dangerous degree by hordes of American and Canadian city ' Babbitts ' in motor cars, eager to bring home proofs of their prowess as big game hunters, and red-blooded he-men of the great open spaces.

The United States have lost the Eastern pinnated grouse, or

heath hen, which in the 1700's was so plentiful along the coastal country from Massachusetts to Virginia that servants used to complain at the frequency of its appearance at the dinner-table. The blue crab, the favourite edible variety of the Americans, most of which come from the waters of Chesapeake Bay, is within measurable distance of something like extinction, according to the United States Fisheries Bureau, unless the fishermen reduce their catch by 30 per cent. Native American lobsters are nearly extinct, as the result of a few decades of the convention that an after-the-theatre supper must include a corpse of that indigestible crustacean whether anyone cares for it or not.

Wild horses and donkeys in the western United States and Canada are doomed. Wyoming, where roamed nearly 300,000 wild horses two or three years ago, now authorises their slaughter by anyone who pleases. Great herds have been driven across the plains to Ogden, in the State of Utah, where they are sold to makers of soap, glue, and poultry food. In Canada the wild horse situation has had its amusing aspects. The first Government theory was that, as the cinema films say, ' the example of a good woman would touch his rough heart.' Wild horses were corralled and given the company of tame ones. Whereupon, in the very near future, the tame horses hearkened to the voice of the tempter and vamoosed into the wilds with the newcomers. A couple of years ago 2000 were lassoed and sold to Russia for 4*l.* each. There have been no repeat orders from Moscow.

The poor donkeys (or *burros*, as they are called, after the Mexican example) are descendants of forbears turned loose up in the goldfields of the Western Sierras in the gold rush days. Most of them now range the less arid, though trackless, regions of the Californian Desert. A single herd, in a lonely cañon of Death Valley, consists of some 500 members. Nobody wants them, but —all honour to the squatters in that harsh region !—nobody accepts blood money for sending them to the glue and poultry food companies which inquire after them. Not long ago, when a troupe of film actors went into the desert to make a picture, a herd of lonely *burros* discovered them and joined company in the friendliest fashion. One pertinaceous ass, whose faithful attendance on the director of the troupe proved so embarrassing that she was repeatedly driven out into the wilderness, eventually returned, for the seventh time, and confronted that functionary, putting her tongue out at him. This *geste* of defiance so pleased the actresses that, with one accord, they adopted her and bore her back to Hollywood as an honoured pet.

The little isle of Inagua, in the West Indies, is one of the rare entries on the other side of the ledger in the lamentable story of the world's vanishing wild life. A recent Government survey

reveals that more than 40,000 head of wild cattle, thousands of wild horses and asses, and increasing numbers of flamingoes are to be found there.

The increasing use of aeroplanes for transport up in Alaska has produced a difficult problem in the new attitude of society towards the large fierce dogs which used to be indispensable to man for hauling sledges. Knowing that their faithful friends can live off the land, owners have turned them loose instead of shooting them. They have become considerable nuisances as marauders of farm stock and attackers of pet dogs, children and deer, in addition to small creatures, and settlers dare not shoot suspected wild dogs which are not actually attacking for fear of heavy claims for damages. It appears likely that a much closer control will be exercised over the breed in future, and that it is destined to become scarcer and scarcer.

In Australia the position is relatively more serious than in any other continent ; the fauna which can be killed off for the enrichment of a chain of alien fur dealers in Sydney, Leipzig, Whitechapel, and the sweatshops of New York is fast being annihilated. True, the killing of that most amazing creature in the world, the Mesozoic platypus—with a duck's bill, a furry body, and a poison ' fang ' in each of its webbed hind feet !—is forbidden by law ; but fur is fur, and the authorities are well aware that platypus pelts, minus head and feet, are being stuffed into bales of rabbit skins and sent abroad for the few extra pence that each may fetch in the wholesale marts of Europe and America. The jolliest little bear on earth, the koala, a veritable ' Teddy ' from the toy-shop come to life, feeding on superabundant eucalyptus leaves, has been most shamefully flung to the fur traders by the Government of Queensland, which, too, has played a leading part in the rapidly approaching extermination of the opossum ; Queensland permitted in one open season recently the slaughter of a million little koala bears and more than five million opossums, Victoria a year or two ago allowed a great slaughter of opossums which aroused much indignation even in Australia. A report from Brisbane stated that the fur sales in progress had thus far realised 3,220,000*l.*, and were notable for the large quantity of opossum furs coming from Queensland and for the rising values. The average price, on a batch of 300,000, was 6*s.* 8*d.* each, rising to 16*s.* 11*d.* for those of bluish tint. ' As most of the stores of agents are still packed with unsorted lots, competent authorities estimate that not less than a million opossums will have been killed in the one month allowed by the Government for killing.'

Australia's kangaroos and wallabies, too, are fast being killed off, though the continent's superabundance of poisonous snakes

are not the subject of any repressive legislation. Two creatures which are actually increasing in numbers, however, are the common sulphur-crested cockatoo (which is so abundant in some districts as to make a nuisance of itself), and, in the north, a race of buffalo, originally imported from Timor about a century ago for domestic purposes, and now run wild. Reversing the usual procedure, which is for domesticated creatures to become thinner and lighter when they revert to type, these buffalo, which have a fine 10 feet spread of horn, have nearly doubled in weight, now turning the scale at about three tons. Their hides, which are an inch thick, are worth only a couple of pounds or so, and entail a lot of annoying work for the hunter, so they have every prospect of surviving the aboriginal fauna.

Over in New Zealand it is gratifying to be able to hazard that the quaint wingless kiwi is still apparently holding its own in certain districts, one of which is the northern woods of Waipoua. Its big relatives, the moas, have been extinct, of course, for some time.

The world's wild bird life is in a pretty good position on the whole, largely owing to women in the hat-wearing countries having ceased to surmount their heads with those extraordinary erections of fruit, flowers, and plumage which 'the mauve 'nineties' adopted with such enthusiasm. The Dutch have stopped the indiscriminate slaughter of some forty species of birds of paradise, and are keeping close watch on the number of plumes that are exported from their eastern Malaysian islands. Some nations, of course, will always persecute birds and look on with parental pride at such lusty, healthy boyish behaviour while their young sons fling stones at any small song bird which, having escaped the local sporting club's guns, may rashly have turned its back for a moment. Some races will continue to net migrant nightingales by the dozen for the village stewpot and the market-stall, and to collect sackfuls of swallows by erecting electrified wires on the cliffs for their hospitable reception. But public opinion in most countries has already become clearly and, so far as one can see, permanently in favour of protecting wild birds.

There are queer contrasts, of course. The United States now leads the world, for instance, in the study of bird life and the spending of large sums of public and private money on bird sanctuaries. But its numerous interesting species of wild ducks and geese are being killed off much more quickly than they breed.

In Mexico, too, migrant ducks get short shrift. At some times of the year stacks of them 12 feet high are to be seen in the market-places, where they are sold for twopence each, irrespective of species. In Britain, Scandinavia, and Holland the great

increase in gunning of recent years has reduced enormously the numbers of all sorts of wild ducks and geese, as well as snipe and plover. Pot-hunting has become much easier, for with bungalows, garages, streams of thundering lorries along roads skirting estuaries and lakes, and the ubiquitous noisy motor boat, such birds no longer distribute themselves over thousands of square miles of their erstwhile haunts, but tend to concentrate in small, quiet areas where even the clumsiest amateur pot-hunter can be sure of a certain amount of killing and wounding if he merely shuts his eyes and pulls the trigger. According to Dr. Lonnberg, the Swedish ornithologist, 137 decoys in Holland make an annual catch that averages about 5000 migrant ducks for each. A great decoy on the island of Sylt caught 45,000 in one recent year. Computations based on the number of rings returned to markers by gunners who killed ringed birds show that at least 35 per cent. are being shot. Dr. Lonnberg avers that 30,000 golden plover are being netted in the Netherlands every year.

The dodo has undoubtedly become extinct; it was left so long alone in its Garden of Eden on Mauritius and a neighbouring island or two out in the Indian Ocean, without a foe or an incentive to fly, that its wings atrophied and it fell easy prey to the first human arrivals and their dogs. Fleet Street is very much too prone, however, to assume that the great auk has entirely vanished from the face of the waters, since the worthy islanders of St. Kilda, in the early Victorian 'forties, cudgelled to death the last specimen which came into the limelight of publicity because they suspected it of being the incarnation of a witch.

To interrupt, for a moment, our glance at the birds, I may add, for the information of readers who have not had the time, the opportunity, or the inclination for going thoroughly into the matter, that, after an investigation I undertook a few years ago as to 'the sea serpent,' I came to the very definite conclusion that certain great marine saurians (not snakes) of prehistoric type, and probably of more than one species, do exist in certain seas. Having eliminated the evidence of less trustworthy persons, I found about ten detailed reports that pointed incontrovertibly to the existence of 'sea serpents.' Some of the creatures may belong to a genus of sea reptile resembling the ichthyosaurus, a surviving form of plesiosaurus, or a form of basilosaurus (zeuglodon), a marine mammal generally held to have been extinct for some million years, as its fossilised bones have been found hitherto only in Tertiary strata. Basilosaurus skeletons of as considerable a length as 75 feet have been found; the teeth and the bones of the short fin-legs resemble those of seals.

To return to the birds. A century ago Audubon wrote that nearly every cactus in Florida supported the nest of a pink ibis,

and referred to the 'roseate clouds' of this species overhead. Some time since it has been declared extinct in the region, but a year or two ago a specimen of it and one of a large white ibis were reported to the State Game Commissioner, and there are grounds for hoping that it still breeds in remote swamp-bound spots in the Everglades.

Upper Florida was once the home of vast flocks of flamingoes which have now been wiped out, though Mr. Edward Bok and subsequently the United States Government, have imported several head in an attempt to start a new colony near the hill called Iron Mountain. Flamingoes were a familiar sight, within the memory of living men, on most of the isles of the Caribbean Sea, as well as in Florida. Several pairs were still breeding in the swamps of Yucatan in the early part of this century; but now only five breeding grounds exist in the West Indies region. At Moron and Punta Alegre, a couple of seasons ago, dead flamingoes for eating were on sale at 2*s.* each—and eggs at 1½*d.*!

On the barren isle of Andros, in the Bahamas, the colony owes its life to a modest settler of Scottish descent, Mr. Elgin Forsyth, who lives 30 miles from any white neighbour and has his own ways of dealing with the sponge-fishing blackamoors, who have been wont to declare that 'fillymingoes are good white meat.' When these charming children of nature rowed ashore in their dinghey to obtain fresh meat for the schooners, their *modus operandi* was to run across the flock of flamingoes with a taut rope, which conveniently broke the fragile stilt-like legs and slender necks of all the young birds which could not fly. Only one egg a year is laid by each mother bird, so the result of this sort of thing can easily be seen. It no longer goes on.

BASSETT DIGBY.

69164

THE FIRST MEMBER OF THE ACADÉMIE FRANÇAISE

THAT Richelieu founded the celebrated Académie Française is a matter of common knowledge; but the man to whom its existence was indirectly due is now practically forgotten. His personality, however, was so extraordinary, and his career so characteristic of the manners and morals of the seventeenth century, that it may be of interest to give a brief account of his life.

Born in 1605 at Dreux, Antoine Godeau was the son of the 'Lieutenant des Eaux et Forêts' of the Count of Dreux. He was a precocious boy, but extraordinarily small and ugly, whilst a dark complexion still further contributed to his peculiar appearance. Even as a youth at college he was a busy rhymster, addressing his verses to the various objects of his early adoration.

As a young man he fell seriously in love with a certain girl whom, in the affected style of the day, he called 'la bergère Bellinde': she has been identified as Mlle. de Saint-You. He proposed to her, but was, not unnaturally, refused. Shortly afterwards she married, but, becoming a widow before long, Godeau renewed his suit, again without success. Even to the end of his chequered life he never ceased to regret her.

To readers of the present day it will seem strange that the young man of twenty-one should see no impropriety in publishing a selection of his letters to the cruel Bellinde—not from a desire for revenge, but solely to display his literary talents. He dedicated the volume to Richelieu, with whom, however, he could have had no acquaintance at this date (1627).

At the same time that he was sighing for Bellinde the large-hearted poet was declaring his admiration for a certain Mlle. de Rotrou, to whom he addressed a number of poems under the pseudonyms of 'Lisis' and 'Ergaste.' Nor was all his passion reserved for these respectable ladies, for he confesses (and regrets) in his later years his tempestuous youth.

There now occurred an event destined to have an important influence on Godeau, and incidentally on French literature. His cousin and intimate friend Conrart bought the important post

of Secrétaire-conseiller du Roy, and went to Paris to take up his duties. His tastes were literary, his means ample; and he soon gathered round him a circle of friends of similar interests. He was a great admirer of the talent of his country cousin and in due course invited him to Paris—an invitation promptly accepted.

By this time (1628) Godeau had definitely decided to devote himself to literature. He had a moderate fortune, so was relieved from the necessity of earning his livelihood. But even the attractions of the muses proved inferior to those of the opposite sex, and in Paris he fell a victim to a Madame de Loges. Though still faithful to Bellinde, he found his new flame so adorable that 'miracle, merveille' were words too weak to express his sentiments. His friend Balzac was even more enthusiastic. But alas! Madame left Paris the same year, and Godeau returned home.

Near Dreux stood the Château de Mézières, to which Godeau received an invitation. Here he met the daughters of the house, to whom he promptly made love in the fashion of the day, nor were they unwilling to be the objects of his 'galant' verses; later on Chapelain wrote to him chaffingly of 'les aimables bergères druides' of Clermont. But his *bergères* took but a secondary place, for at the château he met Angélique Paulet, 'la belle lionne' of the Hôtel Rambouillet, the Elise of Mlle. Scudèry's *Grand Cyrus*.

She was now nearly forty years old, but still at the height of her attractions. Her skill in dancing, her singing, her lute playing, to say nothing of her glorious red hair and personal charm, made an immediate conquest of the susceptible poet. But the wonder is that Angélique accepted the adoration of this ugly, dwarfish young man, and that the friendship begun at the château only ended with her life.

Her position was a peculiar one, and difficult to reconcile with modern ideas. When she appeared at Court in 1609 she made a great sensation, and many *grands seigneurs* made love to her: it is said that Henri IV. himself was an aspirant to her favours. But apparently she managed to keep her lovers at a distance; at all events, her reputation remained unsullied. She announced that she did not intend to marry, and she kept her word. Not that her decision prevented her from having open admirers—'*mourants*,' in the language of the day—of whom Godeau was one. But it really does seem as if she combined a strict virtue with a licence which in our day would be ruinous to any reputation. Ninon de l'Enclos nicknamed such ladies 'les jansénistes de l'amour'; and there is abundant evidence that even in that 'gallant' age there were 'précieuses prudes' as well as 'précieuses galantes.'

In due course Mlle. Paulet returned to Paris, to shine in the brilliant circle of the Hôtel Rambouillet. Godeau resolved to follow, led to the capital by his literary ambition. For the next few years he divided his time between Dreux and Paris.

He received a warm welcome from his cousin Conrart, who not only housed him but introduced him to his literary friends, Balzac and Chapelain amongst them. These two held a high position in the literary world, and it speaks volumes for Godeau's ability and charm that both these men became his intimate friends. He read a discourse on Malherbe to Conrart's circle, and it was well received; before long he had made himself so popular that he was acknowledged to be the life and soul of the society. When he returned to Dreux, Chapelain wrote to Balzac that Godeau was missed in Paris by both sexes.

Most of the members of Conrart's circle were *habitués* of the celebrated Hôtel Rambouillet, and Godeau was duly introduced to the Marquise by Angélique Paulet and Conrart. The hôtel was now at the height of its fame. For the first time aristocrats and bourgeois met on equal terms; intellect and wit were the connecting links. Prejudices are not, however, so easily forgotten; for instance, Voiture, who was of frankly bourgeois origin, became M. *de* Voiture when received at the hôtel, and his name appears with the prefix in Pélisson's *History* of the Académie.

Godeau soon established himself as a favourite, especially with Julie d'Angennes, the daughter of the Marquise: so attached did they become that he was known as her dwarf (*le nain de Julie*); a nickname which he was so far from resenting that he adopted it in his own verses. But he was still faithful to his beloved Angélique: he found no difficulty in adoring several deities at the same time, nor did it occur to the ladies to be jealous; they had, too, many '*suspirants*.' Godeau little anticipated that years later it would fall to his lot as a bishop to marry Julie to M. de Montausier, who had waited fourteen years for her.

Voiture, the spoiled pet of the hôtel, was in Spain when Godeau became one of the Rambouillet circle, and Mlle. Julie could not resist the temptation of writing a mischievous letter to him, announcing the advent of a rival: 'Il y a ici un petit homme plus petit que vous d'une coudée. Il est mille fois plus galant.' Voiture was not the man to be silent under such a challenge; he retorted in an extravagant letter to her, and defied Godeau to write one 'a thousand times more gallant.' This led to a poetical duel between the rivals; I quote a verse from one of Voiture's efforts which will give a good idea of the style of the period. It will be noticed that Godeau was already known as a sacred poet: paraphrases of portions of Holy Writ were amongst his earliest poetical effusions.

Quittez l'amour, ce n'est votre métier ;
Faites des vers, traduisez le psautier ;
Votre façon d'ecrire est fort jolie ;
Mais gardez-vous de faire folie,
Ou je saurais, ma foi, vous châtier
Comme un galant.

It was in his reply that Godeau wrote of himself as *le nain de Julie*. It must be owned that his verses were not equal to the elder poet's in spontaneity and wit, though as regards facility he had no rival: he could write verses on any subject and at any length. Their rivalry does not seem to have prevented their being good friends: each professed an admiration of the other's work, and Voiture, writing from Africa, declared that even there he had seen nothing more extraordinary than Godeau's writings, to which he adjudged the palm under which he was reading them. Remembering that Voiture was at that time the rage, that his letters and verses were hailed as founding a new style (which indeed they did), it is clear that the ugly little provincial must have possessed remarkable charm to have been considered the rival of the spoiled favourite of the hôtel. All his contemporaries testify to his exceptional wit; but this must have been more apparent in his conversations than in his writings.

Whilst still a frequenter of the Hôtel Rambouillet and a professed admirer of several members of its circle, Godeau indulged openly in libertinism. The notorious Marion de Lorme was one of his flames, and he addressed a rondeau to a friend reproaching him for disdaining 'la belle courtisane.' But Mlle. Paulet did not approve of this defection, and with an elder sister's solicitude rated him soundly for his conduct, and persuaded him to cease his visits to the fascinating Marion. But Godeau could not resist the temptation to prove himself a man of gallantry. When a certain Mme. de Vigeau installed herself in a house in the Rue Thomas du Louvre she found Godeau, in a fancy costume, awaiting her at the foot of the staircase, a poem in his hand; whilst at the door of her room a nymph, with a significant lack of clothing, presented her with a further madrigal from the same pen. As her abode seems to have been in the same street as the Hôtel Rambouillet, it argues a considerable amount of impudence on Godeau's part to flaunt so openly his admiration of the newcomer.

But it is time to leave the social successes and follies of the past to relate how, though indirectly, he was the cause of the establishment of the Académie Française, which has had so great an influence on French literature.

After Conrart had settled in Paris he kept in close correspondence with his brilliant country cousin, who used to send him his

poems. Conrart so admired them that he used to assemble his friends to hear them. So pleasant were these reunions that they gradually developed into a sort of literary club, the members of which met to discuss literary and other subjects in a free and unconstrained fashion. Of course this coterie could not be compared with that of the Hôtel Rambouillet as a social centre, nor from a literary point of view with that which Malherbe had held in his comparatively poor lodgings, for with the exception of Chapelain no member had an established literary reputation. But in one respect it was the most important of them all, for from it sprang the Académie Française.

The idea of an Academy was by no means a novelty. So early as the middle of the preceding century J. A. Baif had gathered at his house a number of literary friends, amongst them Ronsard, Dorat and du Bellay, and had founded an Académie de Poésie et de Musique, for which he obtained letters patent from Charles IX. in 1570. On that monarch's death the Académie obtained the protection of Henri III., and became the Académie du Palais with an apartment in the Louvre, Ronsard pronouncing the inaugural discourse. But on Baif's death in 1589 the society withered; mainly because at that time religious controversy overpowered literary interests.

In 1612 Rivault, préceptor of Louis XIII., printed a project for an *Académie des Conferences*, which came to nothing. But the idea was in the air, and the success of the Hôtel Rambouillet resulted in the establishment of numerous *salons*, some literary, as Malherbe's, some theological, philosophical, or simply social. Of these an account is given in M. Emile Grassier's valuable and exhaustive history of the Académie (*Les Cinq Cents Immortels*: 1906), though his short account of Godeau is inexplicably inaccurate.

Malherbe evidently meant to found a literary academy, for statutes were drawn up; but he died in 1628. On the other hand, nothing was further from the thoughts of Conrart and his friends than that their informal gatherings should ever take an official form. No doubt the friends felt that the miscellaneous crowd which thronged the Hôtel Rambouillet was too addicted to amusement, and they preferred sometimes a smaller gathering of greater intimacy, where they might air their opinions with more freedom.

The weekly symposiums were a great success, especially after Godeau became so popular a member. It was agreed to keep the existence of their meetings a secret; very possibly because at that time every sort of assembly was illegal unless sanctioned by the authorities. But one of the members, M. de Malleville, indiscreetly mentioned the matter to M. Faret, who had just

published his *Honnête Homme*, and who asked for and obtained permission to attend a meeting and submit his work, a copy of which he presented to each member. Through him the knowledge of the society spread to a few others, and amongst them was M. Boisrobert.

This gentleman was an intimate of Richelieu, rich, witty and indiscreet. It was his function to amuse the great man by bringing him all the latest anecdotes and gossip of Paris, and so valuable were his services that when Richelieu was ill and depressed his physician used to recommend a dose of Boisrobert. Naturally he told his patron about the society, and Richelieu, who had a genuine love of literature and loved to play the patron of arts, commissioned Boisrobert to offer the society his patronage. He suggested that it should become an official 'corps' under public authority, Richelieu undertaking to do all he could to promote its success, and to show particular favour to its members.

The proposal came as a thunderbolt to the circle. There was nothing they desired less than to lose their liberty of unrestrained criticism for official control. Was this to be the end of their pleasant gatherings, which so happily combined literary pleasures with congenial conviviality? Some voted for a blank refusal of the proposal, but they were out-voted; for, as Chapelain pointed out, it was now a question of either the favour or the enmity of the all-powerful Cardinal, and to refuse his offer meant the break-up of the society. So, having decided to accept the inevitable, they did so as gracefully as possible, in terms which must have been flattering even to the Cardinal. This was in 1633.

By February of the following year the statutes of the official society were drawn up; Conrart was appointed secretary and the Register opened on March 13, and on March 20 the name of the Académie Française was adopted. The fifty articles were approved by Richelieu with one exception which ran: 'That each Academician promises to revere the virtue (*vertu*) and the memory of Monseigneur their protector.' But the supple Academicians, though obeying Richelieu's request to delete the article, ordered it to be recorded in their Register. The statutes were formally registered by the Parliament in July 1637, the long delay being due to the hesitation of that jealous body to promote any scheme of which Richelieu was the author.

At the head of the first list of Academicians stands the name of Antoine Godeau, so, at least, assert Tisserand and the Abbé Fabre; and the learned M. Doublet follows them. (*Sept lettres inédites du Premier Académicien.*) It is only right to state, however, that Pélisson, who wrote his *History* of the Académie as early as 1652, gives no list showing priority, and merely mentions Godeau as one of the first members. On the other hand, M. A. Leclerc, giving the list of members 'par fauteuils,' puts Bardin in the first place (probably because he came first alphabetically), and the author of the article in *La Grande Encyclopédie* is also against Godeau's claim.

Be that as it may, there is no doubt that Godeau was a highly esteemed and important member. He took an active part in drawing up the rules, and he was appointed to make one of the earliest harangues before the Académie. His subject—a curious one for an orator—was 'Contre l'Eloquence,' the more curious in view of the fact that a fortnight before Du Chastelet had pronounced the first discourse entitled 'Sur l'Eloquence Française.' Was the witty Godeau 'pulling the legs' of his serious colleagues? Moreover, it was Godeau who was chosen to pronounce the *Éloge* of the first member who died, Monsieur Bardin. A further proof of his standing is contained in a letter written to him by Chapelain, in which he is informed that pending his return from Dreux they have suspended the sittings of the Académie, 'of which we are aware that you are the prince and chief.'

By the time the Académie was established Godeau was in fairly close relation with Richelieu; it is clear from the dedication of his book *Œuvres Chrétiennes*, published in 1633, that the acquaintance had then existed for some time. This dedication is couched in the extravagant terms usual in such cases: the author states that the Cardinal's profession and virtues place him 'au rang des choses sacrées.' He also states that in future he means to write on sacred subjects only.

This is indeed a surprising resolve, and to explain it we must go back a few years, though to explain it satisfactorily is almost impossible. Yet the fact remains that this professed gallant and undoubted libertine wrote his profane and sacred verses with apparently equal sincerity.

It must be borne in mind that at this period even the religious profession was not considered a bar to the indulgence in worldly pleasures, a fact of which Richelieu himself was a notorious proof. Godeau's bent towards piety had been shown early in his career; in 1632 he paraphrased in verse various epistles of St. Paul, a form of literature to which he was much addicted. His *Œuvres Chrétiennes* was a more important work, consisting of 'Églogues Sacrées,' an imitation of the Song of Solomon, and other poems. This celebrated volume will give us a specimen of his powers as well as any other; nor need it detain us long, for as a poet Godeau can only claim a mediocre place.

As Dean Farrar is said to have 'elongated the Gospels,' so Godeau elongated those portions of the Scriptures which he chose for the exhibition of his talents. To the song of Moses in

Exodus on the delivery of Israel he devotes eighteen verses of six alexandrine lines: the phrase 'la montagne de l'heritage' becomes

> Cette terre où regnent les délices,
> Où les fleurs au matin sont couvertes de miel,
> Où sur un sable d'or serpentent les fontaines,
> Où jamais les brouillards n'obscurcissent le ciel,
> Où jamais sans moissons on ne trouve les plaines.

This is a fair specimen of his powers, and it is difficult for modern readers, even French ones, to understand the enthusiasm with which the work was received. A second edition was called for in the same year. Balzac lent his copy to his cousin, the superior of a convent, but wrote for it back as he could not bear to be parted from it. Louis XIII. was so taken with the version of certain psalms that he set some to music. Alas! a modern French critic sadly announces that Godeau's poems are forgotten and his prose works seldom opened.

As we have seen, the work was dedicated to Richelieu. So highly did he esteem Godeau's literary ability that he consulted him regarding his own efforts, and submitted to him for his criticism a discourse which he thought of printing. Godeau had the courage to disapprove of it, and Richelieu the good sense to abandon it in consequence. So highly did he esteem Godeau that Tallement des Reaux reports that he had a habit of saying of any admirable piece of writing 'that if Godeau had written it it would not have been better.' As will be seen later, the Cardinal's patronage had unexpected results.

Presuming on his intimacy, Godeau requested Richelieu to send to the Bastille a certain M. Costar, who had attacked him in his *Discours Satirique*; but to this demand Richelieu turned a deaf ear.

Meanwhile the indefatigable poet had turned his attention in another direction, and had entered the legal profession, becoming an *avocat* in 1632. But there is no evidence that he ever practised, and in fact his thoughts soon turned towards another profession which was to be his final one—the Church.

Even now, however, Godeau had not abandoned his taste for the amusements fashionable at the time. So late as the year before he entered the Church he showed he still retained his taste for gallantry. The Marquise de Rambouillet making a visit to Pomponne, Godeau rode to meet her in an antique dress, attacked her with a lance of straw which he broke against her, threw her a cartel of defiance in gallant verse and received some blows in return, after which there was a general feast.

There is no record of when he made his final decision to enter the Church, but it must have been at the time when the

establishment of the Académie was under discussion. What is certain is that in May 1635 he became a *sous-diâcre*, and that he passed rapidly through the intermediate stages.

So soon as his decision had been finally made he returned to Paris, and there gave himself up to the composition of religious poems; sometimes writing as many as 300 verses in a day. His friends complained that he lived the life of a hermit. In 1635, the year he became sub-deacon, he wrote to his cousin Conrart to destroy the 'vers amoureux' which he had left in his charge.

Amongst the poems he was then engaged on was his version of the cantique *Benedicite*. This he presented to Richelieu in 1636. The Cardinal was enthusiastic, and read and re-read it in the presence of the author (Pélisson).

In May (just one year after he entered the Church) he became a priest, and eight days later Richelieu offered him the bishopric of Grasse with the remark, 'Vous m'avez donné le Benedicite, et je vous donne Grasse.'

So the story runs, and it may be true that the Cardinal indulged in the wretched pun. At any rate, Godeau himself used a similar one in a poem written from his see.

In that age the fact that ecclesiastical preference should go by favour and not by merit was accepted as a natural state of things. The Bishop of Grasse, who had died so opportunely on May 3, was but thirty-five. Richelieu himself had been made a bishop at the age of twenty-one, but that was after having given to the Pope the birth certificate of his brother. To him it was quite natural to give a bishopric to his friend Godeau, and great was his surprise to have his offer refused.

But Godeau seems to have taken his ordination seriously. He pointed out that he had been a priest for one week only. But Richelieu waived aside his objections, and Godeau finally agreed to abide by the decision of his spiritual director. This was in favour of acceptance, so Godeau at the age of thirty-one became the titular Bishop of Grasse.

It was a poor affair as bishoprics went—the income only 4000 livres. In fact the income was not equal to the expenditure, and it was found necessary to add 2000 livres as a charge on the diocese of Cahors to enable the bishop to make both ends meet.

It must have been a wrench for Godeau to tear himself away from the delights of Paris and the society of his friends to take up his abode in a remote country province. One of his friends wrote to him to enjoy himself as much as he could before he started, seeing no inconsistency in a priest indulging himself in any way he pleased. Certainly Godeau had no illusions as to his future, and it must have struck him that his qualifications for

the post he had accepted were few indeed; he did not even know a word of the language spoken in his diocese.

Nearly a year passed before he took up his duties. Grasse was not then the flourishing town which is known to visitors to the Riviera, although the largest town in the district. The new bishop found himself in the midst of political and local disputes, cut off from civilisation as he understood it. He wrote to Chapelain that he found in Provence more thorns than orange blossoms. But with his usual energy he threw himself into his new duties: he reformed the cathedral services, introduced some discipline into the nunnery, and made in course of time a visitation to each of the sixteen parishes of which his diocese consisted. Remembering that at this date many bishops did not even reside in their dioceses, and many more never attempted to make a visitation, it must be conceded that Godeau deserves some praise.

Two consolations he had of which he availed himself freely—correspondence with his Paris friends, and the composition of sacred and profane verse. He tried to persuade himself that he was content, and in a volume published in 1637 he wrote:

Maintenant que loin des dangers,
A l'ombre des verts orangers
J'ai de si douces destinées.

But naturally his former associates held a warm place in his heart, and he kept up a continued correspondence with his old friends, who on their side showed the genuineness of their regard by frequent letters. Angélique Paulet especially did not let absence diminish her regard: so assiduous was she in her correspondence that she was nicknamed Mlle. de Grasse. Godeau still took his old interest in all that concerned the hôtel, and took part in the quarrels and amusements of his old associates. But he felt his exile keenly, as may be seen by the following verses which he addressed to Julie after his first visit to Paris in 1639:

Dans ce désert où je suis retourné
Mon cœur languit, à souffrir destiné,
Et mon esprit plein de mélancholie
Ne pense plus qu'à la belle Julie.

. . . . . .

J'aimerai mieux être aux fers condamné
Dans le dur froid de l'âpre Corilie.
O Rambouillet! O nymph si jolie!
Souffrirez-vous que je sois confiné
Dans ce désert?

This sounds like a genuine *cri du cœur*, and yet to his flock he appeared a devoted and dignified ecclesiastic. Olivet (who annotated Pélisson's *History* of the Académie) thus summarises his character shortly after his death: 'It can be seen from his

published letters that M. Godeau was in effect a bishop very devoted to his duties, of great moral innocence, (!) of an exemplary piety.' A modern critic, on the other hand, M. Emile Magne, holds that he was uncertain of his vocation, scarcely succeeding in adopting a pastoral tone; 'still carrying in the pocket of his violet *soutane* the cap of the "berger galant."' This seems rather severe, and M. Doublet is at pains to prove that the bishop's piety was genuine and sincere. If his letters and verses to Julie and Angélique still bore some traces of his gallantry, on the other hand he wrote to them 'to imitate the humility of the infant Jesus'; nor were his correspondents likely to receive his admonitions with a smile, for a contemporary wrote to a friend that 'it will be good news for the Hôtel Rambouillet that he [Godeau] is engaged on another sacred poem.'

The rest of his life can be briefly summarised. In 1644 Innocent X. joined the diocese of Vence to that of Grasse, though his predecessor Urban had refused to do so a few months previously. For nine years Godeau was bishop of both dioceses, but he seems to have found the responsibility too great: so early as 1646, when he was only forty-one, he writes of 'his condition and his age' leading him to greater retirement. In 1647 he journeyed again to Paris as a delegate of the ecclesiastical conference of Provence; but now Mazarin reigned in the place of Richelieu, and in spite of Godeau's protests he was compelled to obey a recent order for all bishops to return to their dioceses, in fact, he was threatened with the Bastille if he did not obey. In 1653 he resigned his bishopric of Grasse and went to reside at Vence, where he was hissed and shot at on his arrival. He writes of Vence as a solitude, and explains his resignation of Grasse to his desire to devote himself to God more completely, 'and in a more profound repose.'

Vence, where I write these lines, was a town of but 3000 inhabitants, with an old cathedral and a bishop's palace. The cathedral (now a church) still stands, but the only memorial of Godeau is the adjoining Place Godeau. Here he devoted himself to his pastoral duties and to writing. His enormous industry is shown by the fact that whilst at Grasse he published paraphrases of the Canonical Epistles in 1640, of St. Paul's Epistles in 1641; also a *Life* of St. Paul and one of St. Augustine. He now devoted himself to a *History* of the Church to the end of the eighth century in five folio volumes, in addition to numerous poems on sacred subjects. His passion for writing knew no limits: it was a saying of his that 'Paradise for an author was to compose; his Purgatory to revise; his Hell to correct proofs.' Many authors will agree with him.

There is a story of his later years which throws a pleasant

light on his character. On one of his rare visits to Paris he was in a bookseller's shop when he heard some of those present discussing his *History* of the Church, then in course of publication, a certain Père le Cointe criticising it somewhat severely. He called on his critic the same day, disclosed his identity, thanked him for pointing out the faults in his work, which he corrected in the next edition, and took the gratified father into his friendship.

Many of his ties with Paris had now been broken. Voiture died in 1648, Angélique in 1650, the Marquis in 1653, the Marquise in 1665. Julie was married. Godeau settled down after his stormy career to end his days as a model ecclesiastic. He died on April 21, 1672, at the age of sixty-seven, leaving his fortune to the *Confrèrie de la Miséricorde*.

His portrait—a half length—hangs in the sacristy at Grasse. The features are plain, but not ill-looking; his hair is grey, as are also his minute moustache and imperial; the expression is kindly. His hatchment hangs on the same wall.

In spite of the fact that his works are now nearly forgotten, he holds an important place in the history of French literature. We have already spoken of his contemporary renown: Chapelain held that 'few people have written as much or as elegantly as he.' Even Corneille condescended to borrow some lines from him for his *Polyeucte*, for which Voltaire reproaches him, leading a critic to remark that Voltaire was more skilful in concealing *his* plagiarisms. M. Emile Crépet states that Godeau, with Voiture and Ménage, created a special style in literature, 'that which we know as the literature of society.' (*Nouvelle Biographie Universelle*.) M. Doublet calls him 'the last of the *beaux esprits* of the time of Louis XIII.' To him, also in conjunction with Voiture, belongs the credit of helping to break down the social barrier which divided the aristocracy from the men of intellect, an enterprise to which the Marquise de Rambouillet lent her invaluable aid.

Very possibly his 'fatal facility' militated against the permanence of his renown. A list of his works occupies four pages in Pélisson's *History*. But, whether he is now read or not, he remains an interesting figure in the history of French literature.

NOTE.—The most important authorities on Godeau are the Abbé Cognet, M. Kerviler, and, above all, M. Georges Doublet, who is a specialist in the history and antiquities of the Alpes Maritimes.

H. M. PAULL.

MAARTEN MAARTENS' NOVELS

MUCH good work, as anyone who has burrowed into the past will have discovered, fails to survive its day, but the best of it will never lose the chance of recollection. This chance has now come to Maarten Maartens, who, for most people, perhaps for all born in the present reign, had become a name until the publication of his *Letters* last autumn made us ask how much we recollected of him. Even those who could mention *The Sin of Joost Avelingh*, the first and the most famous of his novels—unless they had been ripe readers for a whole decade before—would have been puzzled to name half a dozen of his other books. Of his life, virtually nothing was known outside the circle of his English intimates. Maarten Maartens, from the first, had something anomalous about him. He vanished from our ken, as he had entered it, anonymously.

To begin with, Maartens was not his real name; and he never lived in England after he had become a novelist. To complete the oddity, he was beginning to be claimed as the founder of Dutch fiction at the very time when his reputation here and in America was waning. The war extinguished his vogue in English-speaking countries, and he died on August 3, 1915, at the age of fifty-seven, three years after *Eve*, his last novel, had been published. The silence that ensued seemed strange to his admirers, and it is impossible to read his delicious letters, to Barrie and to the Gosses, to Quiller-Couch and to Robertson Nicoll, let alone to read their affectionate and admiring answers, without sharing their opinion that a character so humane, a wit so lively, a writer so sincere, could but fade like the sun before returning. The Gosses stayed with him at his beautiful home on the now historic island of Doorn; Quiller-Couch entertained him at Fowey, but it has fallen to Mr. Norreys Jephson O'Conor, one of his American admirers, to write the Memoir by which the *Letters* have been introduced.[1]

From this we learn that Joost Marius Willem van der Poorten Schwartz, the son of a converted Jew (who made a name for

[1] *The Letters of Maarten Maartens*, edited by his daughter. With a preface by Sir A. Quiller-Couch and a Memoir by Norreys Jephson O'Conor. (Constable.)

himself in the chief cities of the Continent by his work for the London Society for the Propagation of the Gospel among his own race) and of a Dutch lady, was born in Amsterdam in 1858. When the boy was six years old the family brought him to London, where he stayed till he was twelve, when, upon the death of Dr. Carl Schwartz, he returned with his mother to Holland. The perfection of his English is thus explained, even if he had not also inherited the linguistic gifts which had helped to make his father such a potent missioner of the London Society. His education was worthy of this aptitude, and Holland, England, Germany, and Italy, to say nothing of the France which he regularly included in his travels, combined to complete the studies that ended in establishing the young man as a lawyer at Utrecht, after a brilliant career at its University. These studies had proved his unusual abilities, but he had made the most of his cosmopolitan upbringing. The consequence was that he was as much at home with the peoples as with the languages of at least four countries, and his width of view, added to this personal knowledge, made him as nearly a good European as can be cited. Even in his youth he had a breadth of outlook, a fund of observation, beyond that to be expected of a son of an ambassador. Certainly, the young Joost had been exceptionally well educated, but he was himself a young man of exceptional observation, reflectiveness, and brains.

At twenty-five he married the cousin, four years his junior, to whom he had proposed at the age of eight, and her subsequent ill-health, persisting through their marriage, led him, not reluctantly, to abandon the profession of the law and to spend much of his life in travel. This would have made any but an artistic profession out of the question. The sensitiveness that distinguishes his letters makes it no surprise that he began by writing verse.

Five years after his marriage, in the year 1888, he happened to be in Paris, and, stirred to emulation by some detective story, he exclaimed, 'I can do that!' Soon after this he had finished in his room at the hotel *The Black Box Murder*, and at the same time was writing *The Sin of Joost Avelingh*, the novel by which he was first, and probably will always be best, known.

For this book he had invented the name of Maarten Maartens. The language that he loved best, he said, was English, and he wished to write under a Dutch-sounding name that Englishmen might find it possible to pronounce at sight. This first novel received so warm a welcome, both in England and in America, that Maartens, as it is simpler now to call him, realised that his destiny was to write books.

From this skeleton of fact little can be inferred concerning the

character and tastes of the new author, but before we have finished *Joost Avelingh* we have become much better acquainted with him. The man who could write such a first novel at the age of thirty was clearly full grown, but he had already revealed something of himself in his sonnets and poetic tragedies. In these the influence of Tennyson and of Browning can be discerned, a combination of ideal sweetness and Puritan gravity. Thus it was not fortuitous that the writer should have chosen such a title as he did for his first novel. The characters are Dutch; the scene is laid in Holland; the subject is a conscience in the grip of remorse; and to the circumstances and the characters of the story a man with legal training and a mind detached by various experience and tempered by religion have contributed.

The subject and the attitude bear some resemblance to Hawthorne's, while the construction and the telling are akin to Thomas Hardy's. The novel, moreover, has a plot, and so belongs to the past (and to the future); but the plot of *Joost Avelingh* is so good that, except in the matter of its resolution, we realise that 'a novel with a plot' only won its bad name when writers with no imagination or knowledge of the human heart resorted to mechanical devices to conceal their poverty. A good plot is like the plan of a good building—not a frame of coincidence into which the characters have to be squeezed by pressure from without, but the necessary tangle produced by the tempers and circumstances of an organically related group of people. It really comes to this. A story with a good plot, unfolded to its inevitable issue, requires a creative imagination of an order as high as it is rare, for it satisfies the same sense that a fine fugue satisfies in music or a building, say by Wren, in architecture. No greater achievement is possible to narrative prose. Great work can be done in other kinds of fiction. At the opposite extreme there is Proust. He carried analysis to epic proportions. Great work is of more than one kind. The story of Joseph and his Brothers or of *Beauty and the Beast* is very simple, yet its greatness suffers no abatement from the development accomplished by a Proust. The telescope and the microscope are no fitter for comparison, but the human eye is nearer to the former, and this, no doubt, is the reason why the name 'epic' has been reserved for the simpler and the broader form.

Joost Avelingh is a remarkable book; for a first novel it is more than remarkable. Indeed, so solid is its achievement that it may be doubted whether its author ever equalled it again. Had Maarten Maartens surpassed *Joost Avelingh* to the extent to which *Joost Avelingh* surpasses most first novels, he would have been a great novelist—too great for his position in the first rank to be in doubt.

The story is one of an orphan brought up by an aristocratic

uncle, who had shut his door against his sister when she had married the village doctor who became the father of her boy. The Baron Dirk van Trotsem, a wealthy bachelor, obsessed by family pride and devoted to the management of his estate, was an implacable and lonely man, a prey to violent emotions, the most sacred of which was his family pride. When, after doubtfully deciding to give shelter to his orphaned nephew, the Baron, with that hunger for love that can make life bitter to a man whose pride is always fending love from him, tried to gain the little boy's affection, he bungled each attempt. The sensitiveness of Joost was turned into a raw wound, and the child came, in excusable ignorance of his uncle's motives, to dread and finally to hate the stern old man. Too haughty to give reasons for his conduct, and alienated by the absence of coarse vigour in his nephew, the Baron seemed to Joost to delight in thwarting him: a process carried to its extreme when his uncle forbade him (without explaining why) to follow his father's profession and to marry the girl on whom he had set his heart. Over this love-affair a climax of fury occurred. The uncle swore that he would immediately disinherit Joost if he persisted, and ordered Joost, then and there, to drive him to the notary's so that he might alter his will. On the way the Baron had a seizure in the carriage, and was found to be dead when it stopped at the notary's door.

With this drive, by way of prologue, the novel opens. Joost, suddenly his own master and a rich man, marries his lady and devotes most of his time and his income to public and charitable work. To rid the castle of its hateful memories he dismisses all his uncle's servants, who had been the involuntary spectators of so many of his miseries, and among these servants the groom who had sat at the back of the buggy during the Baron's last drive. Some years later this man, who has fallen into difficulties and taken to drink, suggests in his liquor that the Baron's death was not fortuitous. Joost is brought to trial for murder, acquitted at the last moment though still condemned by popular prejudice, to confess himself, in the end, not indeed the murderer of his uncle, but the passive spectator of his uncle's dying struggles. Joost had done nothing to aid the Baron, and he admitted (at that moment) a wish for his death. This is the sin on which his Puritan conscience had been brooding, which had made his public behaviour at times so odd, which explains the moodiness and the shadow under which his devoted wife had been living with him. So much for the theme: a story of remorse. The purpose of the plot is to explain the uncle's reasons for his apparently callous prohibitions, and to allow the tale to include pictures of social life, of legal procedure, of class-feeling, the show and the hidden motives of public men, against the landscape of Holland. It

makes a rich canvas. The numerous characters, as always in Maartens' books, are individual and alive. The story has the movement of a drama. The final quarrel with the Baron, the procedure of the courts, the behaviour of Joost's wife before and after the crisis, are true to life and moving; and the plot comes very near to being the inevitable tangle produced by the different tempers and circumstances of the characters concerned. As with most plots, however, the last quarter of the story is the weakest, for the resolution does not maintain the hold which the first three impose, and even increase, upon the reader. Only towards the close, when the Baron's secret motives have been brought to light, does the reader question not so much the credibility of Joost's repentance as the author's impartiality.

Joost is the scapegoat required by all Puritan story-tellers. In thought, at least, he has sinned, and therefore no excuses can mitigate his punishment, which indeed enables him to free himself from the coils of conscience. It is not this superstition of expiation that we question, for the Puritan standard is apparent early in the story, and it is common for people to accept it still. We rather ask the author if he has been as fair as he pretends. Because Joost is his hero, no excuses are allowed to him. But this hard measure is not meted to his uncle, who (if he had been the hero) would not have been allowed to ride off with his 'weaknesses' so easily. Yet the uncle's pride, his harsh reserve, his actual spoiling of his nephew's early life, by the Puritan measure are just as evil in their consequences (if just as involuntary) as Joost's ungenerous passivity when the passion of their quarrel is still uncooled. Both men were disingenuous. Yet for a moment's lapse Joost is utterly condemned, while for years of harshness the Baron is covered with excuses. His motives, however, do not justify the arbitrary concealment which provoked the catastrophe. Parental right, adult right, is being invoked as wildly as divine right had been. It is not the conviction of the nephew, but the acquittal of the uncle, which impairs the justice of the story. From Beatrice Cenci in Shelley's play to Joost in Maartens' novel people (as the author observes) will always argue about the circumstance of provocation. The real issue, in this novel, is not that. The victimiser ought to be weighed in the same balance as his victim if we are not to feel the author loading his scales.

Leaving, then, the Puritan bias on one side, the setting and the human nature are absorbing. The skating-party which ends in Joost's engagement to Agatha; the wintry scene; the pictures of private life and public life in Holland; the freedom from illusion over the procedure of the public stage, over the varying gusts of public opinion and class-feeling; the faithful attribution of mixed motives to all the characters, make a rich skein. Not Dutch life

nor Dutch weaknesses do we see, but human life functioning in Holland; and, no doubt, because such detachment is uncommon in any country, and, when it occurs, is most shocking to the provincial limitations that it has escaped, the success of *Joost Avelingh* in England, in America, and generally speaking abroad, became an offence in the eyes of the author's fellow-countrymen. The Dutch would have liked Maarten Maartens to write in Dutch, but in no language were they then ready to condone the urbane detachment which made his writings interesting to all the world. The Dutch pretended that he was fouling his own nest, that he was making fun unfairly of his neighbours, and that it was only because the English were known to be without taste that such a novel won their admiration. In *A Question of Taste*, his next book, we find the following:

> No country in the world in which literature is so hopelessly in disgrace and disgust as in Holland. It is not very highly honoured anywhere, perhaps, but nowhere else does it expose its enthusiasts to such depths of poverty and insult.

Even if the author had not written about his country in a foreign language, he would (it seems) have made himself an alien in Holland by this book. The curious tension that ensued made his peculiar situation more difficult. He lived in Holland, but he wrote in English. In Holland no one knew the author. In England hardly any knew the man. Without literary friends in his own country, he could spend only a fortnight every summer in England. This unresolved duality was to haunt him to the end. One half of his life could never be assimilated to the other. His instincts were affectionate and patriotic; his education had been European, and the language in which he chose to write was not that of the little country which he loved and in which all his ties with home were centred. Some confusion was inevitable. The question remains whether a sterner character would have made him undertake the task of being a pioneer in modern Dutch literature. In fact, his cosmopolitan upbringing had rendered it impossible for him to be content with the Dutch language when his knowledge of other literatures opened to him richer traditions and a circle of readers more ready to accept the best work that he could give. We can well understand the reason for his belief that it is a misfortune for an author to be able to *write* any language but his own.

Before we leave *Joost Avelingh*, here are two examples of the author's treatment of inanimate nature and of the inner life of the soul:

> The glow and sparkle had gone out of the landscape. The sun hung low, and half-way veiled, behind a line of pink clouds. The whole scene was grey and cold and hazy. There is nothing so ashen and death-like as the sunset of a fine winter's day.
>
> . . . . .
>
> Joost Avelingh sat in his prison-cell. . . . He had learned—he would have been surprised, had he known how unexpectedly and how thoroughly—what a difference there is between calling one's self a sinner and being called a sinner by the law. He knew well enough that he was not a good man. Above all, he had had weighing upon him for many years the half-admitted consciousness of a great transgression. He had played with it, and mourned over it, and repented and done penance for it. He had been miserable over it just with that amount of misery which makes a man interesting to himself, and contented with the working of his own conscience. Such thoughts were not unpleasing to him, for they seemed to him like a patent of his soul's nobility. . . .

The strength of Maarten Maartens' stories is his sense of character, which, as a little imagination tells us, is the root of story-telling. Circumstances are the material which character shapes or spoils, and plot is the name given to the resulting pattern or tangle. When the term is used for a mechanical device, a 'plot' degenerates into the 'manufacture of a misunderstanding.'

In his third novel, *An Old Maid's Love*, Maartens again shows us the moral dilemma of one who, under great provocation and on the impulse of a moment, nearly gave an overdose of morphia to the siren who had stolen her nephew's heart. This time, however, the incident is not the fulcrum of the story, which is mainly a domestic landscape suddenly thrown into confusion by a wanderer from the great world. The contrast is effective, since writers are rare who can describe with equal insight a Puritan spinster and a woman of fashion. The scene in the old aristocrat's flat at Auteuil is an unforgettable chapter.

God's Fool has the interest of being its author's favourite story, and his comment upon it, to be read in the *Letters*, throws light upon both Maarten Maartens' character and his best work. The hero is a man who, at the age of ten, was rendered deaf and blind through an accident due to the jealousy of his half-brother. In the unfortunate Elias the author concentrated all his idealism: that 'wisdom is a thing of the heart,' he told Edmund Gosse, is 'the idea of the book.' This man, whose mental development was arrested, like the holy fool of ancient legends, is contrasted with the scheming worldliness of his two half-brothers. They become the trustees of the vast fortune which Elias has inherited, and the temptation to abuse his trust proves too much for the elder once the second brother has been safely lured out of the way. On the latter's return, in disgust at his discovery and with a passionate desire to save the remainder of the fool's inheritance, this brother murders the defaulter in circumstances which throw suspicion upon Elias himself. Elias, who fancies himself to be

partly to blame, wishes to take the guilt upon himself because, the author wrote, 'I wanted to afford my hero a splendiferous opportunity of crowning his idiot-life with a great renunciation.' The murder, though passably managed, is a blot on the story, which opens with a charming picture of boyhood and with a sympathetic study of the stricken child. In Maartens, inward faith and keen criticism of actual existence were equally balanced. One never destroyed the other, but he could never blend the two into a harmonious picture of the world. The women in the early novels are characteristic. The indifferent characters are drawn with detached and critical eyes, but any woman who has gained the author's regard is seen through a halo. We accept these heroines, but we forget them, for they are scarcely individual beings. The mixture of motives that, Maartens has convinced us, makes a live person is absent from the good women of his earlier books. These are rather the residuary impression left upon his heart by the wife whom the author idolised; and the odd mingling of ideal passion with a pair of critical and observant eyes made Maartens generalise about women like an American sentimentalist while describing particular women with the insight of a La Rochefoucauld.

Since a heroic character is harder to draw convincingly than a villain, because most authors are not heroic themselves, the test of Maartens' growth is the question whether, as he matured, his favourite ideal could become more concrete and vivid in his heroines. Maartens is good with children, with the misunderstandings of different ages and temperaments, with cosmopolitan characters, with growing things. He can raise a family tiff into a vision. He can see his characters from a height. *The Greater Glory*, once its various opening strands have become woven into a central narrative, is a better story than *God's Fool*, and the contrast between the greater glory of aristocratic devotion and the social ambitions of vulgar wealth, as shown in two families, is vividly drawn. Traces of autobiography, especially in its concluding pages, abound. The opening (too long to quote) of chapter xxxix. is a charming bit of landscape-painting, and the reflections of the professional diplomat turned poet under the influence of Victor Hugo brings us close, evidently, to the author's past:

> He was not (we read) a 'popular poet.' . . . Besides the Dutch, great in painting, are dead to poetry. Even in painting imagination is a sin. . . . We live both comfortably and righteously in Holland—nowhere more so—but we do not live by admiration, hope and love. We live by the fear of God and the care of our purses. And we all of us, except the poets, despise a poet just a little for not being something else.

Maartens now could write with the experience of a practised author behind him. His hero writes in French—as one accepting a call to a great city-church. Dutch is at best but the language of one family, with a large proportion of deaf-mutes among its children. French is the language of the civilised world.

In spite of his success, the poet in the story feels compelled to 'come down to prose' and cannot repress a feeling of bitterness that his own father would 'weep to think I have not failed' in literature. The iron had bruised him, and his faith and his knowledge of the world issue in a comment that defines admirably Maartens' position among writers: 'Enthusiasts are ignorant of life, and those who know life are no longer enthusiasts.' As his knowledge of life grew, Maartens' own faith in the great triad of Goethe deepened. He was, perhaps, too sensitive of the contradiction to be able, in his writings, to overcome the unresolved duality, and thus, so far, fell short of the unity of great work. But readers who are tired of little egoisms will receive a breath of the great sea from which his inspiration came.

In *The Greater Glory* Maartens reached his maturity. It is the meeting-point of his early and his ripest work. The interactions of the upstart and the declining families on which the story hinges strain the long arm of coincidence a little, but once again we are aware of an imagination contemplating the wide landscape of society, of a rich power for conceiving widely different characters, while a tendency appears to multiply episodes. His novels become longer as each episode in them is elaborated. With *The Greater Glory* its successor *My Lady Nobody* forms a pair. In both the dramatic interest, which gave unity to *Joost Avelingh*, is replaced by a more leisurely narrative, so that the characters form a group and the unity is jeopardised. Minor characters, like Father Bulbius, remain in the memory more vividly than the more important, and in Ursula, the heroine of *My Lady Nobody*, a woman for the first time becomes the centre of the tale. For this reason, Ursula is more individual than the 'good women' of the previous novels. We now see that Maartens was a novelist of many gifts: he could draw any character; he knew the most diverse walks of life; he had a ready invention; he could write dramatically; he had a vision worthy of a poet, an observation that a cynic could enjoy; he had a power of construction, a sense of the architecture of a story; there is a geographical background to his books. With so much, we yet feel that the promise of *Joost Avelingh* has not been fulfilled, that something has been lost as if his first novel had risen like a rocket to disperse its energy in a shower of lesser stars. By the time of *My Lady Nobody* he has proved his title rather than improved upon it. His versatility impresses us, but nothing has appeared to efface the memory of *Joost*. The tendency to subdivision; whereby a single story changes from a column into a clustered shaft, from a

single flower into a raceme, has no advantages to overweigh this dispersal of interest. Not even Mynheer W. van Maanen, the author of a detailed thesis upon Maarten Maartens,[2] can clearly and shortly summarise their plots or disentangle, for one who has not read them, the central story from the cluster of detachable episodes. Besides these novels and *The Price of Lis Doris*, which deserves separate consideration, there are two tales with modern medical practice for their theme, and five volumes of short stories. One reason, possibly, why the best of the latter are so good is that Maartens could not proliferate in the narrower compass, and the best of these short tales maintain or recapture the dramatic tensity of *Joost Avelingh*, where, it will be remembered, Maartens clove as strictly as Hardy to his principal theme.

His next novel, *Her Memory*, which was written after an interval of three years, is different. It is short; its scene is English; it is not crowded; it is simple, artistically an innocent book. In one of his letters to Lady Gosse, Maartens called it 'a picture: there is no view of life in *Her Memory*,' he said. It is the tale of a widower, whose life became so empty by the death of his beloved wife that he left his 'county' existence and carried off his little daughter to indulge his faculty for painting and study in Florence. To the painting of his wife's portrait he devotes four years, and then, the death of his brother causing him to succeed to the baronetcy, he yields to the clamour of his family and shoulders a life of public work and politics. Painting has become an occupation of the past. As an artist, he regards himself as an amateur and, being conscientious, he comes to share his family's view of his responsibilities. One of his friends is Lady Mary Hunt, an outwardly hard but really humane woman, and while his daughter grows, a little forlornly, to young womanhood, feeling the loss of her mother, whose memory haunts the father's life, he is glad to be amused by Lady Mary. She is admirably drawn, and, in the end, she persuades him to exhibit this hidden picture anonymously in Paris. At the time he has just become an Under-Secretary, but the reputation that the picture makes suddenly reminds him of what might have been, had his brother not died, had he been allowed to spend his life painting. The effect of the book is to show the part that circumstances play in people's lives, to show how events, by now encouraging and now suppressing different faculties, shape our careers and affect our characters. The author's characteristic wit is seen not only in the sallies of Lady Mary, but in such a reflexion as this, on fashionable schools:

[2] *Maarten Maartens: Poet and Novelist.* By W. van Maanen. (P. Noordhoff, Groningen, Holland, 1928.) This detailed study the kindness of Mr. N. J. O'Conor has enabled me to see.

> girls especially must grow up in a circle of similar acquaintances, planted like apple-trees in an orchard, each in the same little paling of proprieties, rooted in prejudice, painted white with pretence. . . .

One of the successes of the book is the character of the girl, whose elusive growth is very delicately suggested. Despite her father's devotion, she has an air of loneliness, of orphanhood. Some gulf of years divides them. We do not know her as well as we—as he himself—would like to know her. She is unformed, growing, as a child must, partly underground, and there is pathos in her over-conscientiousness, which she inherits from her not quite vital, rather protected (but otherwise admirable) father. The tale lacks, as most of the author's books do, not geography, but landscape. Maartens was mainly interested in social backgrounds. He could paint Nature, but he did not often try except in asides. If he had sketched the countryside as he sketched 'county,' or the Riviera to which he took the father and child, the book would have been richer. Character was his chief interest, and he was content with character. This, oddly, makes his books appear flat. The characters seem to live indoors. Perhaps this explains why there is often a sense of greater depth and richness in his short stories.

The two medical novels, *The New Religion* and *The Healers*, are excellently observed satirical studies of medical practice. To-day few people retain many illusions about doctors: their former aura of benign mystery has now disappeared. We consult them reluctantly; we have little faith in them; we are grateful to them in emergencies; we invoke them, like the undertaker, when we must; we know that we cannot avoid their aid entirely; but we prefer a doctor in whose character we believe to the most famous of consultants. This was less true fifteen years ago, but Maartens' observations are still prophetic and instructive. The two novels are worth reading for their insight; they are too much involved to be good stories. The author was writing from a long personal experience sadly acquired through the chronic illness of his wife, and since he was a responsible writer, whose ethical was even stronger than his artistic conscience, we cannot dismiss as idle satire the substance of his observations. A touch of caricature does at times intrude, but the disagreeable element in the picture is the commercial element in medical practice where private commissions and percentages influence the recommendations of these doctors, particularly in regard to their partiality for certain health-resorts and sanatoria. The professional novel is a class of its own, not often attempted, but, where attempted with narrative skill and knowledge, it makes an instructive chapter in our social history. In the preface to his own play, *The Doctor's Dilemma*, Mr. Bernard Shaw called Maarten Maartens'

novel a 'scathing and quite justifiable exposure of medical practice.' Maartens could have done the same or even better for the legal profession; he was a qualified lawyer himself; but he used his knowledge of law only to give detail and verisimilitude to the lawyers and the matters arising out of wills as they happen to occur in his books.

There was an interval of some years, occupied (amid domestic distractions) with the writing of numerous short stories, before *Dorothea* appeared in 1904. It is a long book, to which some have given their preference. Dorothea is a serious, high-minded girl, brought up apart from her father, by a couple of very conventional but not unlikeable aunts, and it shows the conflict between her strict standards and the loose and moneyed crowd on the Riviera, whither her cosmopolitan father takes her on the eve of her coming of age. She finds him out, and blushes for her discoveries, so hard for her to reconcile with his many good qualities, and marries a good man whose incidental infidelity again wrecks her conception of marriage. She discovers, rather by experience than by reflection, that there *is* one standard for men and another for women, that, as a thinker would put it, the masculine equivalent for adultery is not adultery, but desertion, and after many sufferings is reunited to her husband. Here the author's own opinions show a deeper knowledge of life. The first part, equivalent to a short novel, is perhaps the best. Once the slightly tedious aunts have been left behind, the tale engrosses us. The Riviera and the battle of flowers are vividly depicted; there is a dramatic account of an earthquake, and the characters, as usual, are completely individual and alive, types appropriate to their cosmopolitan locality. Dorothea has been called stiff; but what else could she be? She fills us precisely with the mixed feelings that such a person would arouse in actual experience. The Dutch servant, the French maid, the Italian gambler with his system, the Prussian family with their devoted groom, the peasant Hans, the doubtful baroness, the German barmaid who married the insignificant Lord Archie, the soldier-father of Dorothea himself, are genuine portraits. Though the group is large and the divagations lengthy, the unity of the tale is not lost. Its defects are that the episodes are more dramatic than the tale which they embellish, and that it is hard to share Egon's, the husband's, despairing view of his momentary lapse.

The best of the short stories possess the attention to the same extent as *Joost Avelingh* does from first to last. There is a certain thinness in the subsequent novels, a defect disappointing in an author of such varied gifts and capable of such dramatic power.

With *The Price of Lis Doris*, published in 1909, we reach undoubtedly the most interesting and the most moving of his later works. The story somewhat strains our credulity, but, given its possibility, the telling is Maartens at his best. Yetta, the child of a Dutch pastor, becomes almost absorbed by the little son of the village grocer, in whom she discovers an instinct to paint and draw. The object of her half-maternal and wholly disinterested affection for him is to give him his chance in the world. Odo, a rich stranger, who is an amateur of the arts, arrives at the village. He takes pleasure in drawing Yetta's beautiful hands. By consenting to sit for him Yetta is able to provide the boy Lis with his first professional paint-box. She persuades the stranger to teach Lis the elements of drawing. Odo Pareys, a man of pleasure, is as much attracted by Yetta's good looks as he is chilled by her simple goodness and high sense of honour. To her, love is a spiritual devotion; to Odo, a matter of the senses. Her want of carnality both irritates and excites his desires, and in him she sees an avenue of escape from the dull routine of school-teaching. Yetta wishes for herself a life of distinguished surroundings, untrammelled, spacious, free. Only so can she also fulfil her instinct to nurse distinction in others, especially, of course, to ease the path of Lis. When Odo asks her to marry him she is perfectly candid. She wishes, she says, to have command of money—she even names a sum; but she does not promise to love him—only to become his wife. Her wishes are whims to Odo, who knows nothing but his desire to possess the attractive girl. Once married, Yetta, unknown to Lis, secretly purchases, upon the death of his father, the grocery shop and the first two drawings exhibited by him. With this capital Lis is able to become an art-student. He takes to landscape painting, and is urged by his artist friends to compete for a travelling scholarship. As generous as Yetta by nature, he does not sign his work, or even exhibit it so long as he can live on his capital. Just before this is exhausted, Yetta and her husband return to his neighbourhood after some years of travel. Lis is invited to stay with them. On his visit Pareys takes him aside, tells him that he, Odo, is to be one of the judges in the scholarship competition, and informs Lis that it was directly to Yetta, and thus indirectly to her husband, that Lis has been able to study art at all. Overwhelmed at such generosity, Lis offers to do anything to repay the debt. Odo's reply is that Lis can let Odo sign Lis's pictures!—all of which (except one, overlooked by accident) Odo has already abstracted from the young man's room in order to submit them to the opinion of two distinguished artists who are also staying with him. If Lis will consent, Odo will give the casting vote that will ensure Lis the scholarship, provided that Lis agrees never to paint another landscape during Odo's lifetime. Lis does agree—partly stunned by the infamy of

the proposal, partly for the happiness that (he knows) Odo's pretended talent will give to Yetta.

If we can accept such a sacrifice, the development of the story holds us fast. Odo's name is made by the exhibition of 'his' pictures in Paris; Yetta now looks at him with self-reproachful eyes; Lis drudges away at commercial portraiture, for at the last moment he has declined to enter for the scholarship. The years pass. Odo's admirers begin to complain that Odo produces no more masterpieces, and Yetta, not knowing the truth, but feeling something mysterious in her husband's career, tells Lis that if Odo can only exhibit one more picture, which is supposed to have been mislaid in his country house, her husband, now desperately ill, may die happy. Lis therefore parts with this landscape also to Odo's personal servant, a vindictive wretch with a slave's devotion to his master, all of whose secrets he shares. Odo Pareys dies, and Yetta once more comes to Lis's neighbourhood. Though watched by the servant, who is determined that none shall ever betray his master's secret, she visits Lis and, from a sight of some recent landscape-studies in his inner studio, she guesses the truth. In a fine scene, they avow their lifelong devotion, though before his death Odo, always tortured by jealousy, has extracted a written promise that Yetta will never marry Lis when his own death shall have set her free. The servant, aware of this interview, and guessing that such secrets cannot be kept, contrives to lure Lis into a motor-car accident in which the servant himself is killed and Lis is fatally injured. Yetta is among those who receive the shattered form of Lis into his house; he is carried into his inner studio, and, surrounded by the pictures that he has lately made, he dies with his secret in splendid disclosure about him. The book ends on these words:

> Yetta closed the door on the silence around her. The candles stopped flickering. The long room was brilliant with colour and light. Then again she took her place . . . her arms around the crushed body, her face against the calm face.
>
> 'Oh, noble heart! Oh, noble heart!' she whispered. 'Where there is no marrying nor giving in marriage! No marrying, no giving in marriage! Where love is, and life is, eternal! The love and the life of the spirits—the pure spirits—the pure spirits of God!'

This is but the main thread of the story, which is intensified by further sacrifices on his part, by further selfless devotion on hers. Among the characters that of Job, the manservant, has something of the enormity of Heathcliffe, and toward the end of the story we almost dread to turn the page. Both Yetta and Lis, like two of Hardy's characters, are nobler than the fate which encompasses them, and Maartens inclined to that desperation of goodness which shall give everything in this world and shall receive nothing equal in return. The book's conclusion reaches, I think, the height of its author's idealism, and, as he conveys this to us, our opinion of his work will depend upon our own valuation of his vision of things.

Some will say that he took too spiritual a view of human existence to be more than a sublime story-teller; others that Gosse was right when he said, speaking of *Eve*, 'You are always, for my sentiment, a little Puritanic': so that, observant as he was of life, rich in creating character, endowed with a graceful narrative skill, something in his imagination itself was lacking for fusing all his gifts into a unity larger than themselves. It is in the single scene that he is most effective; in dialogue of every sort that he excels. There is an arbitrary limit to the frames of his stories in the oddest contrast to the width of his observation, his cosmopolitan ease, his dramatic instinct. The schemes of his stories could have occurred to much smaller-minded authors. It is his manner of filling with life these arbitrary frames that one admires. He was a writer of great gifts, but of restricted imagination, as if, with the whole of life before him, he was viewing it from the windows of the manse. Consequently, there is something spiritually overwrought in most of the novels. Only in the short stories, and in particular in those concerned to portray the aristocratic world, is he entirely objective. His style is fluent and conversational, but with no beauty peculiarly his own. Where it charms us is in its wit; where it moves us we are drawn to the man more than to the writing, to that high soul whose spiritual ambitions were cruelly at odds with the world under his eyes. All these qualities contributed to *The Price of Lis Doris*, from which it would be a descent to dwell on either *Harmen Pols* —the peasant story liked by Thomas Hardy—or the tale of the repentant adulteress in *Eve*, his last book.

Maartens, a writer who belonged to his century, might, I think, have better proved his originality had he written for the stage.[3] His distinction, wit, and personal charm, which made him contrast himself with Horace Walpole, can be gathered abundantly from his published *Letters*. If I were to choose three other volumes to represent him at his best, the choice would fall upon *The Sin of Joost Avelingh*, *The Price of Lis Doris*, and to that collection of short stories called *Some Women I Have Known*. To-day, when spiritual ambitions are out of fashion, he is likely to fall short of his due; and indeed that due is hard to define in set terms, because the various gifts of which he was master share that want of fusion which is reflected in his own life. Perhaps the

[3] His one-act play *The Jailbird*, a stage-version of the short story called 'A Comedy of Crime' in *My Poor Relations*, is so slight as to be negligible, though it proved a successful curtain-raiser at Wyndham's Theatre in 1904.

novelist who is much concerned with cases of conscience has taken a too restricted ground, a ground which only the imagination of a poet (a Shakespeare in *Hamlet*, a Hawthorne in *The Scarlet Letter* or in *The Marble Faun*) can fructify. Maartens, falling short of poetry though not of drama, had the gifts of narrative and construction; he has been called the 'novelist's novelist,' but, unlike Hawthorne, he cannot be read for the beauty of his style alone. We go to him for the truth and variety of his characters, for the humanity and liveliness of his dialogue, for his dramatic scenes and episodes, for the rare pleasure of understanding foreign types and people, for his undeluded observation of professional and of public life, for wit, for spiritual sincerity; but his panoramic gaze is focussed from a narrow point of vantage His foreign name, moreover, disguises his place in the mid-stream of English storytelling. Yet he wrote in the tradition of Thackeray, and in all but the setting of his stories be belongs to English fiction, to the company of Victorian novelists who have the ingredients without the finality of great work.

But, when the great Victorian novelists shall have recovered their prestige, Maarten Maartens will be recalled with honour, though they, and he with them, may still have twenty years to wait. Meantime, to enjoy the flower of an aristocratic soul, we need only to open any page of his delicious *Letters*.

OSBERT BURDETT.

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Letters as well as articles will be considered for publication, but letters should be confined to criticism or amplification of articles which have already appeared in the Review. No anonymous contribution is published.

THE

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AND AFTER



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THE HOOVER PLAN

HOOVER CHANGES HIS MIND

GORGED with a surfeit of bombshells, the numb palates of English newspaper readers tasted a genuinely explosive thrill when President Hoover proposed, on June 20 last, that for a year all payments upon inter-governmental debts arising out of the war should be postponed. Little heed was paid to the tip given by the acting Secretary of State a week earlier, in view of the persistent deafness of American Administrations to the pleas of bankers, economists and university presidents for a mitigation of war debts, an affliction from which President Hoover had suffered almost as much as his professionally hard-boiled predecessor. The thousand million dollar deficit that the United States had in prospect was as stern a fact as the poverty of Germany.

If we are to understand the sudden reversal of form that confounded the political bookmakers, we must inquire into both the condition of the track and the inner secrets of the stable.

The peculiar economic relations between the United States and Germany and the involutions of Washington politics together helped to make President Hoover change his mind. After the signature of the Dawes Plan foreign investment in Germany developed on a large scale; from 1925 to 1928 (according to *Wirtschaft und Statistik*) the imports of new long-term capital averaged over 80,000,000*l.* per annum. Besides this, many existing German securities were exported. A very large proportion of the capital thus acquired was found in the United States, but it is important to note that the German securities were absorbed by the public abnormally slowly, and that, in spite of energetic bond-salesmanship at home and abroad, the American finance houses have never succeeded in 'unloading' many of their purchases. Hence, although the financial stake of the United States in Europe, and especially in Germany, grew so rapidly, the general public had no great share in it.

The Wall Street boom altered the whole course of international investment, striking no country more hardly than Germany. The volume of long-term loans which she raised abroad sank suddenly to 11,000,000*l.* in 1929—little more than one-sixth of what it had been in the previous year. Some economists despaired of her ability to stand the strain, but for the time being their fears were proved groundless. An inward balance of merchandise trade of Rm.1,285,000,000 (65,000,000*l.*) in 1928 was changed into an outward balance of Rm.1,555,000,000 (77,000,000*l.*) in 1930. But (as fiscal controversialists so frequently forget) it is imports that represent real wealth to a country, and exports a drain upon its resources; hence the readjustment of Germany's balance of trade was secured only by dint of hardship. Organised dumping—that is to say, mulcting the home consumer for the sake of securing exports—aided the tariff in forcing the necessary sacrifices upon the German people. Most important, the cutting off of foreign supplies of long-term capital dried up the sources of short-term capital also, since foreigners were less willing to lend and since German firms had to employ their liquid assets in buying necessary capital re-equipment. The shortage was not manifest at once because of the ability (though diminished) to borrow abroad at short term and the elasticity of the banking system, but it has certainly been felt very acutely during the present year.

On top of this trouble came the stupendous fall of world prices. For Germany, owing perhaps 40,000,000*l.* a year upon her foreign investments, as well as some 85,000,000*l.* upon reparation account, every decimal point of the decline of the international price indices increases the burden of her debt and

enlarges the sacrifice that her people must make in order to pay it. The concessions made by the Young Plan, as compared with the Dawes Plan, were wiped out in a few months. Rarely have economic forces more plainly shown their mastery over politicians.

Stern efforts have undoubtedly been made by Germany to cope with these misfortunes. Taxation has been increased and social services, notably unemployment relief, have been curtailed. Wages have been reduced in several industries, and the salaries of public servants cut down. These efforts are all the more to the credit of the Brüning Government in that the continuance not merely of the policy of fulfilment but even of the republican *régime* was threatened by the success of the Nazis and the Communists at last September's elections. The plan for a customs union with Austria and the pocket battleship programme, undiplomatic and provocative as they were, are excused by the dangerously poised condition of German politics, which the French apparently refuse to recognise. On the other hand, certain of the measures of economic reform, including the stringent *Notverordnung* (necessity decree) that was to have come into operation on July 1, may have been inspired not so much by the spirit of courageous sacrifice as by the desire to offer no loopholes to the international committee which would have examined Germany's *bona fides* were she to apply for a moratorium under the Young Plan.

Germany was not only very hard hit, but was extremely vulnerable. Up to 1930, short-term capital had been pouring in at as great a rate as long-term capital. It was capable of pouring out even more rapidly. As a matter of fact, in 1930 the inward flow almost ceased, and as the months of 1931 dragged past without a sign of economic revival the patience of financiers gave way and heavy withdrawals of capital began. Like a rumour which starts a run on a bank, the opinion that Germany was down and out and would default on her overseas debt engendered a true *crise de confiance*. Investors rushed to withdraw their money before it should be too late, and so rendered the bankruptcy of the concern all the more probable.

There were, then, a number of factors in the German situation which help to explain the precipitancy of the President—first, the vast investments of the United States in Germany; then the gathering strain placed upon the economic structure by the cessation of foreign investment and by the fall in prices; the danger of an overthrow of the constitution by Fascists and/or Communists; the sudden failure of financial confidence. As I write, it looks as though, after all, his action came too late.

We may now turn our inspection towards the internal politics of the United States. Mr. Hoover was washed up triumphantly in 1928 on the flood tide of the boom, but it swiftly retreated and left him cold and stranded. His opponents were not slow to turn the business slump to his discomfiture. They plastered the country with posters bearing his portrait and the legend 'Hoover, the man who lost you your job.' In the Senate a group of 'Progressive' Republicans turned against the President, and the congressional elections of 1930 enabled the Democrats and the dissident Republicans together to thwart the Administration in the lower house. The Prohibition issue was also shifting the sands beneath the President's feet. In 1932 a new President would be elected, and it became apparent that although Hoover was the most probable Republican candidate, the feeling against him in his own party might secure the election of his Democratic opponent. Thus he was placed in a precarious position from which only a bold action could rescue him. What action was more likely to succeed than a theft of the rebellious Republicans' thunder? The rebels were opposed to the high tariff, to the 'big navy' policy, to isolationism, and were inclined to favour more generous co-operation with Europe.

When in the first fortnight in June Mr. Hoover went off into the Middle West, he no doubt found alongside the desperate economic distress a craving for a strong political lead, without which Republican allegiance might be irrevocably diverted. On his return on June 19 he was faced with alarming reports from Europe, where his Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Mellon, had just interviewed the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary and the Governor of the Bank, who themselves had recently conversed with Dr. Brüning and Dr. Curtius. A flight of capital was draining the foreign exchange resources of the Reichsbank and threatening the monetary stability of Germany. Neither the imminent application for a reparations moratorium nor the entry into force of the *Notverordnung* could save the situation. The President acted. On the evening of June 20 he issued a statement proposing 'the postponement during one year of all payments on inter-Government debts, reparations and relief debts, both principal and interest, of course not including the obligations of Governments held by private parties.'

Creditors and Debtors

This was just the fillip that the commercial markets wanted. Theirs was not to worry about the references to disarmament and to the inviolability of the debt agreements with which the pill was gilded to suit the taste of the American public. Nor, for

the moment, did the possibility of rejection deter operators on the stock and commodity markets. The financial stability of Germany had been reprieved, and the Hoover announcement was the biggest bull point since the crash. As the New York financiers had promised the President, Wall Street and the commodity exchanges of America shared fully in the cheerful little boom, although it was the United States that was making the chief immediate sacrifice. Thus did the professionals exhibit their faith in the economic efficacy of the plan.

But, once the first excitement was over, attention was fixed upon the countries that were to share in Uncle Sam's bounty. When it was seen that to most of them it meant, not an immediate benefaction, but a request to contribute, the ranks of the doubters swelled. It is well to recall what the size of these contributions was. As between reparations, Allied war loans and the American debt, Great Britain would find herself about 700,000*l.* out of pocket.[1] But there were other credit items which she would be expected to forgo—war loan payments from the Dominions and India, and instalments due on reconstruction and relief debts—bringing her total sacrifice up to 10,665,000*l.* The chief beneficiaries among the Dominions would be Australia and New Zealand; Canada alone would sustain a loss, though South Africa's generous refusal of the Imperial Government's offer would leave her 114,000*l.* on the wrong side. France stood to lose in the year almost exactly half as much again as Great Britain, namely, 16,100,000*l.*,[2] while Italy would lose about 2,000,000*l.* and Belgium nearly 3,000,000*l.* Other creditor countries, such as Jugo-Slavia and Greece, also stood to lose, while Austria and Hungary and Bulgaria as well as Germany would gain on balance. A rough balance-sheet of the Hoover Plan may be drawn up thus:

Contributors	£ millions	Beneficiaries	£ millions
United States	50	Germany	80
France	16	Other reparation debtors	2
Great Britain	10	British Dominions	4
Belgium	3		
Italy	2		
Others, and errors	5		
Total	86	Total	86

[1] See statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the House of Commons on June 29.

[2] See *Economist* of June 27.

The various parties naturally took somewhat divergent views about the reasonableness of this plan to relieve Germany. In spite of the sacrifice that she was called upon to make, Great Britain, through the mouths of the leaders of all three political parties, cordially and immediately accepted the proposal. There will be some to criticise this action as extravagant quixotry. Great Britain, they will say, has been sold the latest of a litter of reparation pups. But there is no country in the world which would gain more than Great Britain from a general revival of trade, none which stood to lose more by the cataclysmic depression that must have followed a rejection of the American offer, once it had been made, none more practised or more successful in casting bread upon the waters that it may return after many days, none more insistent in the plea for a mutual cancellation of war debt and reparation. Yet we have still to face the practical question, How is a Budget which already promises a substantial deficit to withstand a further disbursement of 10,000,000*l.* for the sake of a commercial rival. How, indeed? There can be no answer save that this is no time for the financial rectitude that prosperity can afford. The 10,000,000*l.* loss is non-recurring, but that is all the stronger reason for not laying another straw upon the taxpaying camel, whose back will not be eased by the assurance that the load will be lifted after a while. Mr. Snowden, the upright and orthodox Chancellor, has already excused himself from repaying an instalment of a previous deficit because the proceeds of the Young Loan had filled the gap; he may as well invert the process and claim that as the loss under the Hoover moratorium is only a postponement it may properly be covered by borrowing. Thus financial chastity, while losing her maidenhood, might retain her honour.

Like Great Britain, Italy and Japan warmly accepted the plan. The prompt and emphatic Italian acceptance, and the cordiality of the present relations between Italy and Germany, are most significant and ought to have warned France against antagonising the Great Powers again. But, with the approval of Belgium and perhaps of others, she disregarded the warning. Our own sense of magnanimity should not prevent our sympathising with France's objections both to the methods and to the substance of the Hoover proposal. Touchy to the quick about reparations, she felt aggrieved at being suddenly invited, without previous consultation, to accept, or reject if need be, a ready-made plan. She was being asked to agree—with the alternative of becoming the scapegoat for the world—to add 16,000,000*l.* to her own budget deficit in order to benefit her traditional enemy, who had just affronted her by the Austro-German customs union proposal and who could afford to build a chain of expensive and

formidable battleships. France must go on paying for the restoration of her devastated areas, but was being asked to forfeit the wherewithal to pay, justly furnished by the devastators. And who knows what might happen if the finality of the reparations plan, which she had accepted in return for the premature evacuation of the Rhineland, were once called in question? What is more, the French Press and French politicians had all along pooh-poohed the suggestion that Germany was on the verge of economic breakdown; her trouble was a crisis of confidence, not of commerce, and was to be cured rather by an internal purge than by an external balm.

So the French reply to Mr. Hoover, while accepting the principle of the offer, was hedged with qualifications. These, as disclosed in the reply and the subsequent negotiations, touched six main matters. In the first place, France wanted an assurance that the principle of the continuity and finality of reparations should remain inviolate. Then she wanted to be satisfied that the relief to the German budget would not be utilised for an increase of armaments or for any other non-economic purpose. She sought, initially, to exempt the unconditional annuity from the scope of the moratorium, on the plausible ground that the experts of the Young Committee had regarded them as being within the capacity of Germany to pay in any circumstances, but on finding that the United States would not hear of such an exemption she confined her request to the payment of the unconditional annuity to the Bank for International Settlements, the latter to reinvest it in Germany and in any other European countries whose finances would be injured by the operation of the plan. The French Government quarrelled about the rate of repayment of the postponed annuities. Further, they were naturally anxious about their liability under the Young Plan to furnish an interest-bearing contribution of 25,000,000*l.* towards a guarantee fund in the event of Germany's suspending the transfer of reparation payments. Finally, they demanded the continuance of deliveries in kind during the period of the moratorium, lest the established system of commerce that had been based on them should be disrupted to nobody's benefit.

Some of the French demands were rejected by the Americans as contrary to the spirit of the plan, which indeed they were, but of course the spirit of the plan might have been erroneous. In the end an agreement was reached on July 6 retaining enough of the spirit of the plan to satisfy the United States while compromising sufficiently upon the substance to satisfy France. The German Chancellor had already publicly promised that the relief should be devoted to productive economic purposes. There was no difficulty about the principle of the

continuity of reparations, the interests of France and the United States being identical, since recommendation of the plan to American public opinion had required stern insistence upon the nature of the offer as a postponement, not a free gift. Over the unconditional annuities a compromise was effected; Germany was to pay them to the Bank for International Settlements, but the latter would reinvest them in bonds of the German railways, whence they might find their way back into the coffers of the Reich. Repayment of the suspended annuity would be spread over ten years—France proposed five and the United States twenty-five. The remaining questions—relief for Central and Eastern European Powers, the guarantee fund, and reparations in kind—were agreed not to be the direct concern of the United States, who will be satisfied if agreement is reached along certain lines which admit the weight of the French arguments.

It is easy to sneer at the miserliness of France in response to the generosity of the United States. The doubts and delay were certainly deplorable, and took the edge off the psychological stimulus that the plan afforded. But upon a narrow and restricted view the French case is cogent and even sage. We need not blame France for cherishing her bird in hand because we prefer the chance of snaring two in the bush. The critics of France must base their argument on the fact that her attitude was contrary to her own self-interest. Like other commercial countries, she stands to gain by a trade revival such as a generous international financial policy might initiate; she stood to lose as much as any other country from a breakdown of Germany's economic and political fabric. A moratorium under the Young Plan would have placed her in a far worse financial position than will the Hoover proposal. A collapse of the mark might mean that the expensive restoration of the years 1924 to 1929 would have to be repeated, and certainly that the continuity of reparations would have to be abandoned. A Fascist revolution in Germany would probably mean a farewell to reparations altogether. Thus by her response to the Hoover proposal, quite apart from her later determination to attach political conditions to any provision of financial assistance for Germany, France came within an ace of repeating the disastrous error of the Ruhr occupation, and may yet be shown to have done so. Worst of all, she has lost her finest opportunity of gaining, through a *rapprochement* with Germany, a stronger and more lasting security than she can ever achieve by force of arms.

The German Crisis

The continuauce of the financial crisis in Germany makes it impossible to write with certainty of the effect of the Hoover

Plan. The immediate result was a sudden spurt in commercial and stock markets. But optimism was damped by the hesitation of France, and by the time that she reached agreement with the United States doubt and delay had done their work; prices moved no further. It is impossible to see in the advance that took place the beginning of the end of the slump, for a rise in prices does not in itself enlarge the volume of trade and diminish unemployment, especially if it is but precariously sustained. It can only act indirectly, by encouraging diffident traders to buy and potential borrowers to come forward with their issues lest it should be too late and the advantage of favourable conditions be lost. The trouble about a depression is that people are depressed, and dare not severally take those optimistic steps which in the sum vindicate optimism. Confidence is therefore an essential condition of recovery. Unfortunately the confidence of financiers and business men was first sapped by the attitude of France and then demolished by the difficulties of Germany. The rise and fall of typical prices is shown in the following table:

London Prices

Commodities	June 18	July 7	July 14
Cotton (American middlings, per lb.)	4·79*d.*	5⅝*d.*	5·02*d.*
Copper (Standard, cash, per ton)	33½*l.*	36¾*l.*	33⅝*l.*
Tin (Standard, cash, per ton)	101¾*l.*	117*l.*	110*l.*
Stocks			
German 7 per cent. (Dawes Loan)	95	98	89
British Celanese	4*s*	6*s.*	5*s.*
Cables and Wireless B	7¾	9¾	8¾
Ford (English)	43*s.* 6*d.*	56*s.*	52/3
Anglo-Persian Oil	1 5/16	2 5/16	2⅛
International Nickel	11⅞	15⅞	13⅞
Kreuger and Toll	18¾	22¾	19
Swedish Match B	9 7/16	11½	10

If the reichsmark were unmistakably stabilised and the German credit system saved, the lost ground would certainly be recovered and one could speak with confidence of a large and permanent improvement. For the Hoover Plan is of real value in correcting the economic ills from which the world is suffering. The Macmillan Report has emphasised how much they are due to the maladjustment of international credit movements. The interruption of lending by the creditor countries drove the debtors into cut-throat international competition for the sake of securing exports and simultaneously diminished their power

to purchase the products of the creditors. Their internal finances were imperilled, their credit destroyed, and thus the likelihood of their obtaining fresh loans still further diminished. The Macmillan Committee thought 'that the first measure towards the restoration of the international price level must necessarily be taken on the initiative of the creditor countries, and that it must consist partly in a greater willingness to buy and partly in a greater willingness to lend.' The Hoover Plan is the equivalent of a short-term loan by the creditor Powers; lengthen its term and add to it a reduction of tariffs, and it fulfils all the Committee's conditions.

That is all on the assumption that Germany's financial stability is quickly restored. Unfortunately, as this article is being written that seems far from certain. Mr. Hoover's announcement, partly because it was already too late, partly because German internal politics were so threatening, partly because France's attitude remained in doubt, did not immediately demolish the crisis of confidence in Germany. Although withdrawals of capital decreased, they totalled at least 10,000,000*l.* in the fortnight following the announcement and then, as fears accumulated, rose again to the rate of 5,000,000*l.* a day, till the Reichsbank was forced to limit payments of foreign currency and a general two-day moratorium was imposed by decree. The Darmstädter und Nationalbank, one of Germany's 'Big Four,' closed its counters. The reichsmark, though it recovered later, sank below two-thirds of parity, and for the time being Germany was virtually off the gold standard.

What could be done? It was generally agreed that the first condition of restoration was the negotiation of an international credit—not a loan to the Government, but an open credit for the Reichsbank—of a size and kind to reassure both foreign investors in Germany and Germans themselves, who were already fleeing their own currency. The attitudes of London and New York, and apparently also of the Bank for International Settlements, were precisely alike in this matter. A joint rediscount credit of 20,000,000*l.* had been absorbed in a few days; while not withdrawing that, those centres felt that any further credits would be only good money sent after bad, would only enable the panic-stricken German rentier to escape the consequences of his country's debts and financial errors, unless the political atmosphere were cleared. The participation of the Bank of France in a big new credit would have given sufficient political assurance, but it is a sad fact that the Bank of France is far from independent of its Government, and the Governments of France and Germany were at open enmity.

France demanded political concessions as the price of financial aid; whatever the good-will of the German Government, the political facts that it had to face put such concessions out of the question. That is the deadlock which, as I write, remains unresolved. The two concessions most frequently mentioned were the denunciation of the proposed customs union with Austria and the abandonment of the second pocket battleship. Such demands, as the price of financial succour, were not merely hitting below the belt; they were in themselves indefensible. The customs union proposal, in its juridical aspect, has been referred to the Hague Court, and until judgment has been given no German Government could survive the odium of abandoning it. The pocket battleship programme is a regrettable but excusable reply to the failure of the Allied Powers to disarm, and the proper place to bargain for its renunciation is the Disarmament Conference next year.

Moreover, both matters are trivial beside the economic issues involved. A financial collapse of Germany, such as may have occurred before these words are published, and might occur if a similar crisis happened in the future, must dislocate the whole system of international credit and call in question our own ability to retain the gold standard. The setback to Germany's internal trade and industry and the threat of a return to the nightmare conditions of the inflation period would surely be the signal for an attempt to overthrow not merely the present Cabinet, but the whole parliamentary system. Whether a Fascist or a Communist or even another parliamentary system of government would emerge is irrelevant. The plain fact is that thereafter it would be impossible politically to collect reparations and impossible economically to transfer them even if they were exacted.

Logically, therefore, France's attitude can only be justified if she really wants no reparations at all so long as she can see Germany poor and divided. One prefers to accuse France, as a civilised country, of mere shortsightedness. The immediate effect of Mr. Hoover's Plan, in spite of France, has been rather to enhance than to diminish her chance of receiving reparations. Whether she will even or can ever receive what she bargained for at Paris and The Hague is another question.

Reparations in the Melting-pot

On July 1, 1932, payment of war debts and reparation under the funding agreements and the Young Plan will be resumed, with the addition of the annuities postponed under the Hoover Plan, spread over a period of years. Between June 1929 (when the Young Report was signed) and June 1931 (when Mr. Hoover

made his proposal) wholesale prices fell by over 31 per cent. [8] The incompatibility of those two propositions is startling, unless a big and rapid rise of prices should succeed the present slump, and our economists warn us against harbouring such an expectation. Let France and the United States proclaim as they may the inviolability of their rights to pounds of flesh, later if not now; Antonio will as inevitably bare his breast and Portia as surely proclaim defiance. Even if her monetary system is now safely underpinned, Germany will be as unable to meet her bond in 1932 as in 1931, and her creditors will once again be forced to choose between part of the loaf and no bread.

Much, but not all, will then depend upon the action of the United States. We ourselves must be prepared, sooner than see another collapse of German credit, to add still further to our burdens. France, with her great accumulations of gold, could more easily than ourselves increase her international obligations, though it is exceedingly doubtful whether she would be willing to do so. Fortunately there are signs that the United States will not be adamant. Weighty journals like the *New York Times*, which have long supported a policy of revision, hail the moratorium as the beginning of the end. The numerous and influential supporters that Mr. Hoover has secured for his new policy will find it difficult to harden their faces and plead for 'back to the funding agreements' in 1932. Now that the hindrance caused by the war debts to international prosperity has been openly acknowledged, public opinion will scarcely endorse their restoration in full. Business men and politicians alike are coming to realise that whereas a high tariff and no debts is a plausible combination, high tariff and unmitigated debts are mutually inconsistent policies likely only to impoverish the world. As for Mr. Hoover himself, the need for placating the Progressives will be even greater next year than this, with a presidential election imminent. A delicate feat of word-swallowing should enliven American politics next summer.

The President, and the American public, undoubtedly look to the Disarmament Conference to provide them with a condiment for so unpalatable a mouthful. Laden with the spoils of peace, the Administration could 'put revision over.' But failure at Geneva means a hard-hearted Hoover, and, irksome as the sanctimonious dictatorship of the United States is, Europe should remember that fact and be warned. There is, after all, sound sense in the American argument that those who can afford great armaments can afford to pay their debts. If Europe wishes to make the dollar feel a little less almighty, she must present to

[8] *Economist* index number.

America a united front; that is as much out of the question in a *régime* of competition in armaments as in a *régime* of skinflint exaction of reparations. 1932 presents a grand chance to be done with both.

HARRY V. HODSON.

NOTE.—This article was written before the calling of the Seven-Power Conference in London.—EDITOR.

REFLECTIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT LIBERAL

PUTTING aside the four years' agony of the Great War, I cannot recall or think of any period in the history of the last century more momentous or critical than this summer of 1931. Whether we survey domestic or foreign scenes, whether political or financial conditions be taken as the test, our eyes are met by such a sea of troubles, by skies so dark and threatening, that the overworked word 'crisis' seems for once fairly and fully applicable to the perils of the hour. In the observations that follow I propose to express myself with perfect freedom. Most newspapers have been syndicated or politically muffled, and most editors feel bound to suppress or doctor not only the opinions of their correspondents on public affairs, but also the speeches of opponents, or indeed any views which appear unfavourable to the policy enjoined by the owner or managing director. These facts are well known and account for the very slight influence now wielded by the Press, with a few notable exceptions. At the same time they emphasise and enhance the value of a Review which seeks to give expression to authentic bodies of opinion and encourages its contributors to speak their minds, in accordance with Hellenic and Miltonic precedent:

> This is true liberty, when freeborn men,
> Having to advise the public, may speak free:
> Which he who can and will deserves high praise:
> Who neither can nor will may hold his peace.
> What can be juster in a state than this?

We Englishmen are at any rate in a better position than so-called 'citizens' in the spy-infested half of continental Europe even as Periclean Athens enjoyed a liberty of thought and writing (*illa priorum simplicitas*) which the satirist of Imperial Rome could only exercise on the dead. Yet for a politician to discuss with perfect candour the situation of the Labour Government and of the Liberal and Conservative Parties is not very easy, and the attempt to do so in my case justifies a brief explanation; for everything depends on the standpoint.

We are all of us heirs of the past, even those who pretend to

an originality, which, after all, in politics or finance can only be the vacuity of unlettered ignorance and raw inexperience. For myself, I am not at all ashamed of owing much to great Liberals, from Milton to Mill and Gladstone, or from Adam Smith to Richard Cobden and John Morley. Nay, I am proud to carry on a tradition—to be a torchbearer, however humble, in such a procession, so long as it is still marching in the right direction. That the party or school to which I belong—whether you call them Liberals, Philosophic Radicals, or Cobdenites—happens at any given moment to be distracted or badly led is unfortunate. It may exclude me from active participation in parliamentary government. But that is no reason for abandoning principles or recanting opinions. I have never thought that the prodigal son deserved the fatted calf; but I cannot help feeling a certain contempt for those who are engaged in fatting calves in order to provide a hospitable reception for limping Liberals in the Conservative or Labour camp.

I do not deny that the loss of several of these deserters is regrettable; but I am sure that the country remains liberal and will always be the home of liberalism. I am also sure that we cannot do without a Liberal Party. The trouble is that, with three parties substituted for two, the present electoral system of one-member constituencies does not work. Parliament no longer reflects political and party opinion. A city of a million inhabitants with a quarter of its electors Liberal and another quarter Conservative may not return a single Liberal or Conservative member. This is a prodigious evil. In the first place, the moral right of Parliament in a modern democracy to govern a country depends upon whether it can fairly claim to represent the electors. If not, then the door is open to violence—to Fascism, or Communism, or to the *coup d'état* of a popular dictator. In the second place, you may have a party, which has polled far less than half the votes, controlling the House of Commons by a very large majority. Consequently you may have, as we had from 1924 to 1929, a Conservative Government, which, instead of fulfilling its own pledges of economy, actually increased public expenditure, and added to the customs tariff a considerable number of protective duties, although the electors had rejected the Protectionist policy by an overwhelming majority. Some day perhaps a similar distortion may hand over the country to Socialism. If at the last General Election half a million or a million more votes had been transferred from the Conservatives to Labour, the Labour Party might conceivably have carried through this Parliament by large majorities such a series of revolutionary measures as would have converted Great Britain into a Socialist state by wholesale confiscation of private capital.

If by Conservatism one means a desire to preserve the fundamental laws and institutions of the country on a basis of individual freedom and impartial justice, and if Liberalism or philosophic Radicalism includes, as it always has done, the doctrine of majority rule subject to the right of a minority to turn itself into a majority, I should have supposed that Conservatives and Liberals would readily have combined to carry a measure of proportional representation, at any rate for London and the large towns, in order to ensure a fair representation to each party and to every substantial group in all future Parliaments. After the last General Election I thought, and still think, that the Liberals, who, as it happened, held the balance in the House of Commons, though they were miserably under-represented, should have offered to maintain the Labour Party in office on four conditions:

(1) The introduction of a Bill for proportional representation;

(2) The removal of all protective duties from the tariff;

(3) The elimination of waste and extravagance from all the spending departments of Government; and

(4) An international policy, aiming at peace, at a reconciliation on the continent of Europe, and at a general and proportionate scheme of disarmament.

A coalition, or alliance, built upon such a basis as this would have been justifiable; and if the offer had been rejected, the Liberal leaders might then have made it to the Conservative Party, substituting for my second clause an understanding, like that offered to the country by Bonar Law in 1922, that no new protective duties should be added to the tariff until after a General Election based upon proportional representation.

To my mind, our present political distractions and the deplorable state of our public finances spring from the Liberal Party's failure to impose these essential conditions of political justice and national safety upon the present Government and Parliament. If they had tried and failed, they would have strengthened their position in the country; if they had succeeded, we should now have had a balanced Budget, lower taxation, less unemployment, and a democratic guarantee against rash and revolutionary changes in future. So far as the Liberal Party is concerned, the moral to be drawn is surely this, that it should return to the principles and practice of Gladstonian Liberalism, and place itself in the hands of men who are honestly devoted to its ideals. Shortly before Lord Morley's death I asked him what he thought of the political future. In reply, he expressed his confident belief that England would remain—what it had always been—the home of liberalism; that Liberalism, and not Socialism, or Militarism, or Imperialism, was still the

predominant tone and temper of the nation; and that in time a party would be formed or re-formed incorporating liberal principles and liberal sentiment—a party representing neither class nor privilege, but aiming at equality of opportunity, and (in the famous formula of Bentham) the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

John Morley, though sometimes called a doctrinaire, was never tired of insisting that even the best of Governments under the most favourable conditions was to be content, as a rule, with second bests. When men with common ideals act together, there must be perpetual compromises and concessions, not only to one another, but also to their supporters. Continual adjustments of policy to the course of public opinion at home and of events both at home and abroad are inevitable. The best-laid schemes may fall under the blows of fortune—no one can provide against the chapter of accidents. But there is all the difference between a statesman with ideals like Morley, who draws lessons from history and inspiration from great thinkers or statesmen of the past, and the mere opportunist, who trims his sails to every passing breeze, and readily attaches himself to any policy or party that is likely to give him office. From those who have no fixed opinion, no philosophy of public life, no understanding of fiscal and financial practice, no insight into the laws of political economy, no perception of the miseries into which all classes will be plunged by a course of public extravagance, we cannot expect consistency or high-minded devotion to principle or great services to the nation. The most we can hope to find in them is the humbler microcosm of party loyalty, and even that is rather rare.

It is a commonplace among all observers of politics at home, and I think also abroad, that the standards of public life have fallen lamentably since the war. This is really not at all surprising. It was so in the later stages of the Napoleonic wars and in the years that followed the peace. Desperate discontents created revolutionary violence and ferocious oppression. It took years to settle down to a belief in constitutional movements and constitutional remedies. The radical movement in England, before which even the Duke of Wellington quailed, came to a head sixteen years after Waterloo. Important reforms followed; but another ten years had to elapse before the fiscal policy of Sir Robert Peel and the development of railways set going that great expansion of British trade which put an end to starvation and enriched so marvellously all classes of our countrymen during the lifetime of Queen Victoria. We must not be surprised, then, if the Great War with Germany, which destroyed in one-fifth of the time infinitely more life and capital than the Great War with France, should have left behind it a long and deep train of depres-

sion. But we may well ask why an aggravation of the economic crisis should have arrived in the summer of 1931, and why the united wisdom of civilised Governments, assisted by the advice of expert economists and bankers, should have been unable to save Germany from financial collapse.

This is no place to attempt a full explanation of the crisis which has spread since the *débâcle* of Wall Street in the autumn of 1929, in a more or less acute form, to all parts of the world. But we may rightly associate the crisis with the prodigious legacy of gold debts and indemnities left by the war, and with the prodigious accumulation of hoarded gold in the United States and France. We also rightly associate it with the multiplication of tariff barriers in Europe, with the almost prohibitive tariff recently erected by the United States, with the Australian embargoes, and with the Indian boycott. These causes operating together, combined with mistrust and with national animosities left by the Treaty of Versailles, help to account for a collapse of prices in all countries and of public credit in many. For several years past the burden of all gold debts contracted during the post-war inflation of prices has risen so rapidly that it is now causing private and public bankruptcies on a scale never before known in time of peace.

On the day when all the German and Hungarian banks were closed there appeared the Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry, presided over by Lord Macmillan. That Report is largely concerned with the price level, and with political remedies. The members of the Committee include two or three ingenious economists, who are doubtless responsible for the remarkable definition, or description, of the fall in prices as 'a monetary phenomenon which has occurred as a result of the monetary system failing to solve successfully a problem of unprecedented difficulty and complexity set it by a conjunction of highly intractable non-monetary phenomena.' That being so, I venture to agree with Lord Bradbury, who in a separate report dissents from some of the Committee's recommendations, on the old ground that Governments are not omniscient, and that, far from being capable of developing new functions in the sphere of finance and trade, they are largely responsible for our present sufferings through their proved incapacity to perform even their old functions satisfactorily. If an independent Liberal or philosophic Radical, who has spent a good part of his life in studying the relations of public authorities to political economy and finance, may be permitted to express a judgment, it would be that Governments—instead of trying to direct and divert the course of trade from its natural channels by subsidies, bounties, tariffs, regulations, monopolies and restrictions, involving vast expenditure, heavy

borrowing and intolerable burdens on taxpayers and consumers—should reverse the process, disembarrass commerce and industry, allowing people to exchange their surplus products freely with others at home and abroad, buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest markets. Lord Bradbury thinks that, apart from the recent heavy fall of world prices, the economic troubles of Great Britain since the war have been due to the burden of unproductive debt, the over-lavish expenditure of national and local authorities, the excessive cost of distribution and of the sheltered or protected industries, and finally to the attempt of all classes to maintain a standard of living higher than is justified by economic facts.

Consequently, he writes:

> The best contribution which the State can make to assist industry and promote employment is strict economy in public expenditure and lightening the burden of debt by prudent financial administration. Attempts to give positive assistance by diverting international trade from its natural channels, the State financing of enterprises other than the ordinary public services, or the artificial cheapening by State guarantees of the supply of capital to particular undertakings are more likely to retard than to accelerate the restoration of a healthy and progressive national economy.

This is what John Morley would have called the pure milk of the Gladstonian word. Take the national expenditure in round figures, including the Post Office and other 'self-balancing' items. In the year ending March 31, 1914, the Budget of national expenditure totalled 197,000,000*l.* sterling. In the year ending March 31, 1921, it was 1,195,000,000*l.*, having been multiplied by about six times. Then, at last, the Government set to work to economise, and in the year ending March 31, 1924, the total was reduced to 788,000,000*l.* But the Conservative Party, returning to power under Mr. Baldwin, still held that economy was imperative. In the words of the King's Speech, December 1924, 'the present heavy burdens of the taxpayer are a hindrance to the revival of enterprise and employment. Economy in every sphere is imperative if we are to regain our industrial and commercial prosperity.' In his manifesto to the electors Mr. Baldwin had declared: 'The burden of taxation weighs heavily upon industry and trade, diminishes real wages, and in a variety of ways adds to the cost of living. To assist in relieving the community of this burden, the most rigid economy is essential.' Unfortunately for the nation and for the credit of the Conservative Party, Mr. Churchill, in spite of falling prices and declining war pensions, raised the expenditure in two years to 842,000,000*l.*, though he had informed the House of Commons that, in his opinion, it could and should be reduced at the rate of 10,000,000*l.*

a year. It is true that he lowered the income tax by 6*d.*, but it is also true that he laid more new taxes upon trade and consumption in his five Budgets than had been imposed in time of peace by any British Government since the Reform Bill of 1832. Mr. Snowden, embarrassed by the extravagance of his predecessor and of his colleagues, budgeted in 1930 for a total expenditure of 871,000,000*l.*, which was exceeded by 10,000,000*l.* To meet this he had to restore the 6*d.* which Mr. Churchill had taken off the income tax. This year his estimates are nearly 14,000,000*l.* higher than last year's. In view of the rapid decline of trade and the rapid increase of unemployment, it is almost certain that his revenue will fall far short of his estimates. There is no sign of the prospective economies by which he justified his temporary devices for balancing the Budget, and consequently, so far as I can judge, he is likely to be faced next year with an appalling deficit of something like 60,000,000*l.*, which is equivalent to 1*s.* on the income tax. Even that makes no allowance for surreptitious borrowing at the rate of about 1,000,000*l.* weekly, which is still going on, to supply the bankrupt unemployment fund.

One piece of extravagance, for which the Conservative and Labour Parties are jointly responsible, is the sugar subsidy, which, along with the manipulation of sugar duties, has already cost the country 30,000,000*l.* without achieving any useful purpose; for the cultivation of beet sugar in this country has no chance of competing on competitive terms with the cane sugar of Cuba or of the Dutch East Indies. Instead of growing a profitable crop of turnips, the British farmer has been bribed to grow an unprofitable crop of beet sugar, and a number of companies have been called into existence for the purpose of building factories to convert sugar beets into sugar, which companies have been paying large dividends entirely out of a bounty provided by taxpayers. Another 1,000,000*l.* is being voted this year to the beet sugar industry, and Mr. Baldwin has recently expressed his intention, when he returns to office, of doubling the area of sugar beet cultivation—in other words, of doubling the expense!

I have explored elsewhere the field of possible economies in relation to the national Budget, and will only remark here that the fall in wholesale and retail prices alone would justify very large reductions in nearly all kinds of public expenditure. There is no reason why the unemployed, now that they have doubled in number, should receive in real benefits individually far more than they received three or four years ago. The Committee appointed by the Government has made an interim report recommending a saving of 33,000,000*l.*, but most of its recommendations have been shelved, owing to the opposition of trade unions and the strength of the unemployed vote. It looks as if

for want of Gladstonian leadership, our public finances will go on deteriorating until an emergency as dire as that of Australia or Germany forces the House of Commons to cut down salaries, wages, and all classes of expenditure with a ruthless hand.

As an independent Liberal, despairing of effective economies from either of the two larger parties, and faced with the certainty of a disastrous fiscal experiment, if a General Election should return Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Neville Chamberlain to office, I ask myself whether there are not enough independent Liberals in the House of Commons with weighty backing in the country to draw up a practical policy of financial reform, which would win a large measure of popular support and bring about, before next spring, a powerful and general movement of public opinion in the right direction. You never know until you raise a standard how many people will flock to it; but, from what I hear in a wide circle of friends and acquaintances, I feel certain that an immense number of the quiet and undemonstrative people, who are usually classed as Conservatives, and usually vote Conservative, would welcome the opportunity of voting for a Liberal who combined a policy of drastic public economy with Free Trade. A tremendous increase of indirect taxation on all the necessaries and comforts of life, except perhaps wheat, combined with retaliatory warfare against the United States and many other high tariff countries, and discrimination in favour of India and Australia against some of our best friends and customers—*e.g.*, Holland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark—is not likely to be a popular policy in a country justly renowned for common sense.

What people want is not an increase of taxation, with an artificial raising of prices at home and of the cost of production by the imposition of hundreds or thousands of customs duties on imports, but sweeping all-round reductions of national and local expenditure to the tune of at least 100,000,000*l.* a year. Such a policy would completely alter the financial and commercial outlook. On a Gladstonian plan of economy, all classes of taxpayers would be relieved, and the money thus released would be partly saved, partly spent. The millions annually saved would be invested in business or Stock Exchange securities; the money spent in the shops would set idle factories, idle trains, and idle ships in motion. At present our business men are divided between the fear that what remains of their income and capital will be confiscated by further additions to the income tax and death duties under the auspices of Mr. Snowden, or that our overseas trade will be stifled and our immense entrepot business brought to an end by the general and semi-prohibitive emergency tariff which has now been prepared, as we know from Mr. Neville Chamberlain, and is to be launched as soon as the Protectionists

command a majority in Parliament. The only alternative that I can see is the Liberal policy of public economy, Free Trade, and a general reduction of taxation. In this way the Sinking Fund could be reinforced; the unemployment leakage could be stopped; and a conversion scheme reducing huge blocks of war debt from a 5 to a 4 per cent. rate of interest would rapidly become practicable, thereby saving the country 20,000,000*l.* a year, which could be applied to further reductions of debt and taxation.

At the same time the Irwin-Schuster policy of interposing barriers between the trade of India and Great Britain, with such disastrous consequences to Indian agriculture, English industry and Anglo-Indian shipping, should be revised in the light of experience by co-operation with a federal Indian Constitution, based upon Sir John Simon's Report. This would give expression to the real interests of India, and put an end to the exploitation of the native States and of some 300,000,000 Indian peasants by the small but powerful clique of Bombay manufacturers, who, with the assistance of Mr. Gandhi, dominate and control the present Congress.

When one looks at the plight to which Australia has been reduced by the combined results of prohibitive Protectionism and extravagant Socialism, one cannot help feeling that an appeal on the liberal lines which I have suggested would meet with a general and enthusiastic response. I see in a *Times* telegram from Adelaide, dated July 15, that Mr. Hill, Prime Minister of South Australia, has introduced a Bill giving effect to the plans adopted by the Australian Labour Parties in order to avert the dire consequences of public bankruptcy. The Governor and the judges have voluntarily agreed to large diminutions of salary. The salaries of Ministers have been cut by 15 per cent. and are to be cut by another 5 per cent. Those of members of Parliament will be lowered by 10 per cent., and the salaries of civil servants by 20 per cent. The financial situation here, if only it is taken in time, can be restored by less drastic sacrifices than those to which, at the last hour, Australia has been driven.

But we must recognise frankly and fully that the whole machinery of government, both central and local, has become, since the war, absurdly and intolerably expensive. There has been a perfect orgy of extravagance in the name of social services, the cost of which has risen in twenty years from something like 70,000,000*l.* to something like 400,000,000*l.* annually. In Sir Ernest Benn's recent book, entitled *Account Rendered*, a local illustration is provided on pages 134 and 135 by a comparison of the numbers and salaries of the officers of the Rural District Council of Godstone in 1913 and 1929. In 1913 the total expenditure of the council was 36,421*l.*; in 1929 it amounted to 219,126*l.* The

population of the administrative area had fallen from 34,158 to 24,696, and consequently the expenditure per head had risen more than eight times—from 21*s.* to 176*s.*! In 1913 the officers of the council numbered fourteen, and the highest salary was 350*l.*; in 1919 the staff numbered fifty-two, the highest salary was 750*l.*, and four of the officials received more than 350*l.* In all parts of the country, in great cities and towns as well as in urban districts and rural districts, the same sort of thing has been going on, and the vastly increased expenditure has been found partly out of the rates, partly out of the taxes.

No wonder that trade and profits dwindle, as more and more is subtracted in direct or indirect taxation from the pockets of all classes of the community. This system cannot go on very much longer. Ignorant tub-thumpers tell credulous audiences that the national purse is bottomless; and there are even monetary 'reformers' who tell us that, if any difficulties should occur, universal prosperity can be diffused by extending credit to those who want it without regard to security, and by printing paper money to any extent as and when required!

Communities, like individuals, are subject in the long run to economic laws, which cannot be defied with impunity, or violated without ultimate disaster. The troubles that result from over-expenditure and over-borrowing in war or in peace can only be remedied by a painful course of economy. A nation as a corporate body must cut its coat according to its cloth. If a people is to be prosperous and well employed, its Government must be at least as careful about the public money as is a good trustee about the funds committed to his charge. Not only must the national expenditure be kept within the national revenue, but the national revenue must be so managed that it does not exceed a reasonable proportion of the aggregate income of the nation. Already in this country the yield of taxes is diminishing, and if next year direct and indirect taxation is pushed higher to cover the rising expenditure, it is practically certain that this tendency will be accentuated until a point is reached (as in the case of the cigar duties not many years ago) when an addition to a tax will result in a diminution of the revenue.

We must not forget that, in consequence of the war, hundreds of millions of productive capital invested at home and abroad have disappeared in smoke, and hundreds of millions more have been consumed by death duties applied year after year to defray current expenses. The losses of British investors since the collapse of the Wall Street boom have cut deeply into the incomes of practically all income tax payers. They are forced to economise, but the House of Commons goes gaily on authorising more expenditure, more borrowing, and more taxation. If we look

fairly and squarely at the situation, the argument for public economy is irresistible. The tragedy of Parliament and of political life is this, that the two largest parties in the State, instead of competing with schemes for reducing taxation by retrenchment of unnecessary expenditure, are quarrelling over the question whether new burdens on the people shall take the form of direct or indirect taxation—whether the scale of income tax and death duties shall again be raised, or whether a tariff, like that which suffocated the external trade of the country a hundred years ago, shall be reimposed. From time to time voices are raised to urge that the true course is to reduce the expenditure instead of increasing the revenue. If sane opinion could be organised, it would assuredly prevail before our financial and commercial conditions become desperate.

Those who honestly believe that trade and employment can flourish while extravagance is the rule of public life, and those who wish to give favoured classes an interest in new taxes to be imposed upon consumers, cannot be expected to agree with these reflections of an independent Liberal, who prizes individual liberty and equality of opportunity, who resents the encroachments of bureaucracy, and sees no possibility of progress, if individual enterprise and initiative are to be stifled by officialdom.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

BEET SUGAR AND THE BRITISH TAXPAYER

THE State has seldom been fortunate in its attempts to foster the creation of new industries. The cost has almost always been quite disproportionate to the result. The latest example, the beet sugar subsidy, has been the most costly of all. The facts have now been fully disclosed in a Report published by the Board of Agriculture. The public will be surprised, and I believe gravely disturbed, at the situation which is revealed.

For several years an effort had been made by a number of public-spirited people to foster in Great Britain, in emulation of Continental countries, the industry of manufacturing sugar from beetroot. It was hoped to substitute home production for a large part of our importation of sugar, and to offer to British agriculture a welcome market for a new crop. There were soon found, however, to be serious financial difficulties in the way, and the State was urged to assist. In 1922 the Government of that day granted a measure of protection, by remitting the excise duty on any sugar that might be produced at home. In 1924 an excise duty was reimposed, though on a much smaller scale than previously, and at the same time the principle of a subsidy from the Exchequer for home-grown beet sugar was conceded. This was under the first Labour Government, with Mr. Snowden as Chancellor of the Exchequer. In the following year Mr. Baldwin's Government passed the British Sugar (Subsidy) Act. Its operation was for a period of ten years; during the first four years there was to be a grant from the State of 19*s.* 6*d.* per cwt. of sugar produced, during the next three of 13*s.*, and during the last three of 6*s.* 6*d.* We are now in the first year of this final period. Meanwhile the remission of excise duty has been twice increased, in 1925 and 1928, and is now equivalent to a further bounty of 5*s.* 10*d.* per cwt.

The Report tells us that, after making certain deductions for which the industry might claim credit, the total value of the State assistance from 1924–5 to 1930–1 has been about 27,500,000*l.*[1] By the end of this year the amount will be over 30,000,000*l.*;

[1] Report on the Sugar Beet Industry at Home and Abroad, 1931, p. 218.

by the end of the ten years' subsidy period it will be nearly 40,000,000*l.*

It is a matter for surprise that, when a review is undertaken of this immense expenditure from public funds, it should not have been made by an impartial committee, including representatives of the taxpayer and of the business world. The preparation of the Report now presented was entrusted, however, to the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry entrusted it to two gentlemen: one of these was a member of its own Markets Division; the other was selected 'as representing the industry.' They were assisted, in a consultative capacity, by a third; and his qualification was not that of being an independent accountant or industrialist, but that he was 'a director of the Anglo-Scottish group of beet sugar factories.' The Report so prepared is published in the usual official form; the Royal Arms are printed on its cover, and it is to be obtained from the Stationery Office; yet the Ministry of Agriculture, we are told in the foreword, 'assumes no responsibility for the Report or any part of it'! I have no reason to question any of the facts or figures set out in this volume. It gives a comprehensive and able survey; its 300 pages are full of valuable information on every aspect of the subject; but when conclusions are to be drawn as to the manner in which public money has been spent, and as to the value of the results in proportion to the cost, it might have been better if, of the persons engaged in the inquiry, two out of the three had not been representatives of the interests who have been the direct recipients of the money that has been granted.

Let me give a few of the facts which the Report reveals, and which help to account for the immense size to which the expenditure has been swollen.

The farmers who have been growing sugar beet have been paid a price 'which is roughly double that paid in Continental countries.'[2] It may be said that this is justified because the higher scales of wages payable here would involve a higher cost of cultivation. But, much to the credit of British agriculturists, the cost of cultivation is not higher. Tables are given[3] which show that the cost of growing sugar beet per acre is much the same in Great Britain as it is in France, Germany, Belgium and Holland, and the Report states as a fact that 'Continental costs of cultivation are not substantially different from those in this country.'[4]

The British farmer asks for a higher price per ton than the Continental farmer—for one reason, among others, that on the average he produces a smaller tonnage from the same acreage. 'The average yield,' says the Report, 'of beet per acre obtained abroad on the basis of figures from six foreign countries is two

[2] Report, p. 183. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 92, 94. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

tons higher than in this country—10·7 tons compared with 8·7 tons.'[5] It is true that 'many growers in this country obtain yields comparable with the best obtained on the Continent'[6]; but 'new and inexperienced growers have been constantly taking up the crop throughout the period, and this must tend to keep down the average'; and 'the high prices ruling during the first period of the subsidy induced many farmers to grow beet on unsuitable land.'[7] A table is given which shows that the actual amount of sugar produced per acre of beet is nearly half as high again on the Continent as it is here—in France, 3146 lb.; Belgium, 3557 lb.; Germany, 3668 lb.; Czechoslovakia, 3709 lb.; Holland, 3929 lb.—an average of 3602 lb. In Great Britain the production is 2493 lb.[8]

The cost of transport from farm to factory is an important consideration in dealing with so bulky a product as beet. The industry here is so organised that the average length of haul is not far short of twice what it is on the Continent—26 miles here, according to the latest figures; 15½ miles there.[9] If we compare the actual cost of the average journey of a ton of sugar beet, it is 5*s.* 9*d.* in Great Britain; in Germany, 1*s.* 4*d.*; in France, 1*s.* 6*d.*; in Czechoslovakia, 2*s.*; and in Holland, 2*s.* 3*d.*[10]

The beet arrives at a factory which has been built and equipped at the much higher costs that have been prevalent since the war.[11] When the subsidy was granted it was made a condition that 75 per cent. of the machinery should, in the absence of special dispensation, be bought in this country. Until then only Continental firms had been accustomed to manufacture this class of machinery, and the Report tells us that, owing to the condition imposed, 'it is probably true that the capital cost has been higher than it would otherwise have been.'[12] No attempt is made, however, to estimate by how much.

On the other hand, the British factories have one great advantage over their Continental competitors. A governing factor is the number of days that are available between the harvesting of the crop and the beginning of the early frosts which deteriorate the roots. Owing to our milder climate, a much longer period of the year is available in this country in which to handle the crop and extract the sugar, and consequently smaller factories and less equipment are needed to deal with the same tonnage. The period in this country varies from ninety to 120 days, against forty-five to eighty days on the Continent.[13] In spite of this, and although the manufacturing costs in the British factories have been greatly reduced in the last few years, they

[5] Report, p. 173. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 88. [7] *Ibid.*, p. 86. [8] *Ibid.*, p. 86.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 118. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 119. The figure for Belgium is not given.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 180. [12] *Ibid.*, p. 179. [13] *Ibid.*, p. 173.

are still half as much again as they are in the Continental factories —6*s.* 7*d.* per cwt. of sugar here, as against an average of 4*s.* 3*d.* there.[14]

These, then, are among the principal facts which emerge from the Report:—In the countries in Europe with which we are competing, the farmer is paid for his beet about half what the British farmer is paid; his crop produces per acre about 50 per cent. more sugar than the British farmer's crop; the cost of transport is about one-third of what it is here; the cost of manufacture is about two-thirds. These would appear to be somewhat serious handicaps. But they have in no way hampered the companies which run the industry, or diminished their financial prosperity. There is a resource which covers all such drawbacks. The British taxpayer readily makes up the difference. And in his benevolence he not only provides for all these deficiencies, but he furnishes the companies with money enough to pay back, in six years, half the whole capital which they had invested and, at the same time, to distribute dividends, free of income tax, which may well be the envy, in these hard times, of every other industry in the country.

Considering the scale on which the subsidies and the rebates of taxation were granted, it is not surprising that the number of beet sugar factories increased in five years from three to nineteen, 'a development beyond expectations.'[15] The State, in addition to its other favours, helped to find the capital by guaranteeing, under the Trades Facilities Acts, loans of 2,215,000*l.*[16] Of this, 638,000*l.* has been repaid. But of the remainder, the Treasury has been called upon to make good its guarantee to the extent of no less than 545,000*l.* 'Towards these payments 12,000*l.* has so far been recovered; and of the remainder some 162,446*l.* must be regarded as irrecoverable.'[17]

The factories are mostly on a large scale, and the companies have spent, in one way or another and from first to last, the great sum of 8,703,000*l.* As against this they have been able to allocate out of their trading profits to depreciation 2,789,000*l.* and to reserves 1,330,000*l.*, and have retained as unappropriated balances 375,000*l.*[18] This is a total of 4,494,000*l.*

As to the dividends that have been paid, it is difficult to obtain full information. I addressed a question to the Minister of Agriculture on July 3, asking him 'if he can state what was the amount of dividend paid on the preference and ordinary capital of each of the beet sugar factory companies receiving subsidy

[14] Report, p. 188. [15] *Ibid.*, p. 264. [16] *Ibid.*, p. 176.
[17] Parliamentary Answer by the Secretary to the Treasury, July 10, 1931.
[18] Parliamentary Answer by the Minister for Agriculture, July 3, 1931.

from the Exchequer in each of the subsidy years.' To this Dr. Addison replied: 'I regret that I am not in a position to give the information desired. I understand, however, that those companies that are public companies have from time to time published their dividends in the Press, though the private companies have not.' In view of the fact that all these dividends have been paid out of grants of public money, one might have expected that the rates would have been available for the general information.

The Report states, however, the amount distributed in dividends by all the companies taken together, and from this it appears that in 1929–30, the last year given, the sum, *after providing for income tax*, was 481,408*l.* As the share capital was 4,658,140*l.*,[19] this is equivalent to a dividend, tax free, of slightly over 10 per cent. There is no special reason, however, why the shareholders in beet sugar factories should not pay the same income tax on their profits as other people; the distribution is equal to a dividend, subject to income tax, of 13 per cent.[20]

There has been a heavy fall in the price of sugar, and this has been almost continuous for several years past. But the Report states that, 'despite the steep downward trend of prices, the sugar beet industry in this country, by reason of the subsidy, was in a satisfactory position in 1929, and, according to the latest reports available, the factories maintained this position in 1930.'[21]

The Report tells us, further, that 'the total concession in duty and subsidy to the home-grown sugar industry for the seven year 1924–5 to 1930–1 is equivalent to almost exactly 2½*d.* on every lb. of home-grown sugar produced.'[22] Now the wholesale price of white sugar, apart from the duty, varied in the first half

[19] Report, pp. 289, 290.
[20] A Parliamentary Answer by the Minister of Agriculture (July 17, 1931) gives separate particulars as to the Anglo-Dutch group of beet sugar companies. In round figures they are as follows:

Total capital	2,006,000*l.*
Share capital, included in above	1,945,000*l.*
Provided for depreciation	1,364,000*l.*
Placed to reserve	1,096,000*l.*
Paid in dividends 1925-31 (*tax free*)	1,358,000*l.*

Of these the English Beet Sugar Corporation (which is the sugar company with the largest share capital, but with only thirty-eight shareholders—Report, p. 174) paid dividends of 12½ per cent. tax free for the first two years of the subsidy period, and of 20 per cent. tax free for the last five years. One of the other companies has been paying 5 per cent. tax free, two others 12½ per cent. tax free for the last five years, and the remaining company 10, 8, 10 and 10 per cent. tax free in the last four years.
[21] Report, p. 265. [22] *Ibid.*, p. 218.

of that period between 1¾*d.* and 2¾*d.* a lb., and in the second half between 1¼*d.* and 1¾*d.*[23] State assistance to the extent of 2½*d.* a lb., in order to encourage the production of an article worth from 1¼*d.* to 2¾*d.*, may be regarded as somewhat more than a frugal care for the public purse would justify.

Or the matter may be put in another way. In 1930, before the latest fall in the value of sugar, the wholesale price of granulated sugar, apart from the duty, was about 12*s.* 6*d.* a cwt.[24] The quantity of sugar grown at home in 1929–30 was 288,000 tons.[25] If we had never embarked upon the policy of the subsidy and had bought that sugar in the ordinary market, it would have cost the British consumer 3,600,000*l.* In addition he would have paid the customs duty on it, but that would have gone back to the Exchequer and would have saved him the payment of other taxes to an equal amount. Under the existing arrangement the consumer paid for the British sugar 3,600,000*l.*, which was its market price, together with 5,330,000*l.* in subsidy and rebate.[26] In the following year the price fell to about 10*s.* 6*d.* a cwt., and the tonnage of home-produced sugar increased to 418,000. The value of the sugar was 4,389,000*l.* and the State assistance given was 7,830,000*l.* In other words, in those two years the public paid over 21,000,000*l.* in order to obtain sugar worth 8,000,000*l.*

Or, to give another illustration—if the grant is to be regarded as a subsidy to agriculture, we find that every acre of land under beet was subsidised last year to the extent of 22*l.* 9*s.*[27]

The question now presents itself, What advantage has the country gained in return for its 30,000,000*l.*?

The gift of 2½*d.* for every lb. of sugar produced has not meant that the consumer has obtained his sugar cheaper by that amount. If it had, he would have received his sugar for nothing, apart from the customs duty. The Report frankly states that the grant 'has not, of course, affected sugar prices in this country, as the price of home-grown sugar is governed by world market conditions.'[28] The British production is still only 1·6 per cent. of the total world production of sugar,[29] and this is far too small a fraction to be an appreciable factor in determining prices. Apart from the financial advantage derived by those of its citizens who are shareholders in the companies—and, incidentally, one-third of the share capital belongs to foreign owners[30]—the country has gained through a certain amount of additional employment provided by the industry. It is important to know

[23] Report, pp. 236-7. [24] *Ibid.*, p. 237. [25] *Ibid.*, p. 170. [26] *Ibid.*, p. 216.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 80, 216. [28] *Ibid.*, p. 218. [29] *Ibid.*, p. 10. [30] *Ibid.*, p. 175.

the extent of this addition and the relation which it bears to the expenditure of 30,000,000*l.*

The representatives of the industry are accustomed to quote the number of acres that are now devoted to sugar beet and the number of persons employed in cultivating them, and to suggest that all those acres and all those persons must be put to the credit side of the account. But there is, of course, no warrant for supposing that those figures represent a net addition to British cultivation and agricultural employment. As the Report says, they 'only give an estimate of the actual and not the additional employment provided by the crop. The introduction of beet has meant that other crops have been superseded. These have been sometimes cereals, sometimes roots.'[31]

It appears, indeed, that in the five counties where sugar beet is most largely grown, and which produce about two-thirds of the crop, while the area under beet has gone up by 221,000 acres during the years of the subsidy, the area under other roots (excluding potatoes) has gone down by 85,000 acres.[32] In addition to that there was the area which the farmers have been induced by the subsidy to change to beet from cereals, as to which there are no figures. Whether beet cultivation provides more employment than other root crops is a question on which different opinions are held. This Report suggests that the figure is rather higher.[33] On the other hand, the late Colonel Sapwell, who was recognised in the Eastern Counties as one of the leading authorities on agricultural matters, wrote as follows:

> I continually hear it contended in favour of sugar beet that they provide so much labour; and so they do for a time. But I doubt if they provide more labour taken all together than a crop of swedes or mangolds. . . . Agreed that planting and hoeing the sugar beet will take up twice as much or more labour than swedes and mangolds, and allowing that the delivery of the sugar beet will take up more than mangolds and swedes, there is the winter work of clearing the roots, carting them to the premises on the farm, feeding the cattle with them. I think it will be found that there is not much extra employment of labour in the crop of sugar beet.[34]

Further, we are told in the Report that 'a large number of farmers, especially on the smaller holdings, have been able to carry out the operations upon their sugar beet crop with their regular hands, without supplementary labour.'[35]

[31] Report, p. 79.
[32] Parliamentary Answers, February 23, 1931. Last year, while the beet crop of England went up, compared with the previous year, by 117,000 acres, the potato crop went down by 92,000 acres. In the four beet-growing counties the figures were—beet, an increase of 75,000; potatoes, a decrease of 36,000. (Parliamentary Answer, July 22, 1931.)
[33] Report, p. 79. [34] *Eastern Daily Press*, November 11, 1929.
[35] Report, p. 79.

The Report gives a table [36] which shows that the area under arable in the four principal beet-growing counties—Norfolk, Suffolk, Lincolnshire and Cambridgeshire (Isle of Ely)—has decreased in the last six years much less than the corresponding area in the rest of England. So also the number of agricultural workers exhibits a much smaller decrease. The conclusion is drawn that this is due to the beet crop, and therefore to the subsidy. But the table is misleading, because it covers too short a period. If it had started with the year 1921 (the first year for which the statistics of agricultural workers are available), it would have been found that precisely the same tendency was already apparent in those counties, without the beet crop and without the subsidy.[37]

There has been, of course, the new employment given in the factories, and some additional employment among transport workers. It is possible that, although the agricultural effect has mainly been to induce farmers to grow one arable crop in substitution for another, some men have been retained upon the land who would otherwise have left it. It would be impossible to spend 30,000,000*l.* of public money in a comparatively small part of Great Britain in the course of a few years without an effect being felt in local employment. The remarkable fact is how small the addition has been in proportion to the expenditure.

The Report gives figures for the year 1929, and states that on the farms the employment on the beet crop, in permanent and casual labour, was equal to the employment of 17,000 men for a year.[38] But this, of course, is not additional employment. If we were to assume that, had there been no beet crop and agriculture had been left to its ordinary course, one-half of the men would have had no work at all, we should be making an assumption far too favourable to the industry. But let us take it at that. Let us assume also that all the men engaged in the sugar factories would have been otherwise unemployed. Three-fourths of them are engaged only for three or four months in the year. The work altogether is equivalent to about 4500 man-years. We have thus a maximum additional employment equal to the work of 13,000 men for a year. As the cost of the State assistance in

[36] Report, p. 77.

[37] In the pre-subsidy period the arable area decreased in the beet-growing counties by an average of ·67 per cent. per annum; in the subsidy period by exactly the same percentage—·67. In the rest of England and Wales the decline was 2·34 per cent. per annum in 1921-24, and distinctly less, 1·97, in 1924-30. So far as the agricultural workers are concerned, in the beet-growing counties the decline was 1·20 per cent. per annum in the earlier period, and ·25 per cent. in the later, a difference of nearly 1 in the percentage. In the rest of England and Wales the figures were 2·63 and 1·55 per cent., a difference of a little over 1 in the percentage. (Parliamentary Answer, July 17, 1931.)

[38] Report, p. 255.

1929–30 was 5,330,000*l.*, this is equal to 410*l.* for each man employed, or over 25*s.* for every working day.

Apart from employment, there is, however, one advantage for which the beet sugar industry claims credit. This crop is said to be very useful in the agricultural rotation. It is valued in the Continental countries 'largely for its effect on soil fertility.' The Report tell us that 'beet sugar may in a sense be regarded as a by-product rather than a primary product.'[39] Indeed, it is stated, on the strength of facts which are given, that, 'both here and abroad, enquiries show that a 15 per cent. increase in the yield of wheat and a 10 per cent. increase in the yield of crops generally are not too much to expect as a result of introducing sugar beet into the rotation.'[40] But if this is true—and it is for agricultural experts to say how far these claims stand good, and whether they may be outweighed by other factors—the question arises why it should be necessary to subsidise the crop so heavily. A 'by-product' which adds 10 per cent. to the value of the main product should not be unprofitable.

One further point remains, and it is one of great importance. An enterprise which was designed to compete with the beet sugar industry of the Continent is found to be competing also with the cane sugar industry of our own colonies, and of the rest of the world. It would have needed no great foresight to have anticipated that that would be so. Petitions have been submitted to the Imperial Parliament by the Legislatures of Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbadoes, and the Leeward Islands, complaining that the subsidy has injured one of their staple industries.[41] It has artificially stimulated a new competition in the British market.

Indeed, the enterprise has been launched in this country at a period when the production of sugar in the rest of the world was already far exceeding the effective demand. Fifty years before the war the world production amounted to 3,000,000 tons annually. In 1913 it had risen to nearly 20,000,000 tons. Last year it was close on 30,000,000 tons.[42] Demand has not kept pace. The statistics published by the trade show that the 'visible supplies' in May 1929 had been 6,500,000 tons; in May 1930, 7,400,000 tons; in May 1931 they were 8,200,000 tons.

There has resulted an intense competition between cane sugar and beet. But this Report tells us that 'beet sugar is produced in the temperate zone under conditions which make for higher productive costs than those of cane sugar.' It is not only a question of wages and of taxation; 'a much lower yield of sugar

[39] Report p. 4.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

[41] Parliamentary Answer, July 8, 1931.

[42] Report, p. 7.

beet is obtained per unit of area.'[43] Large-scale production has been developed in the cane sugar industry; and, while 'little progress seems to have been made in sugar beet yields during the last twenty years,'[44] 'great improvements have been effected in the sugar yield of cane by the breeding of new varieties—particularly in Java, where the sugar yield per acre increased from 2·8 tons in 1893 to 5·9 tons in 1929.'[45] Compare this with the 1·3 tons per acre from the beet sugar farms of Great Britain![46] The British farmer and the British taxpayer have been induced to enter into an alliance in order to engage in a somewhat unequal contest against the tropical sun.

As the Report states, 'the world's sugar industry is at present faced with a serious crisis. Over-production has resulted in an unprecedented fall in the world price of sugar.'[47] And 'the depression has been seriously aggravated by the widespread protection of the industry, particularly the sugar beet industry, throughout the world by tariffs or subsidies.'[48] Strenuous efforts have been made in recent years to arrive at an agreement among the sugar-growers of all the chief producing countries to restrict their output. The League of Nations has intervened. Conference after conference has been held; scheme after scheme has been proposed.[49] And recently a plan has been accepted, 'the Chadbourne Plan,' to apply a general measure of restriction. But while the industry as a whole sees very clearly that it is necessary to produce less, the Governments of many of the countries in which it is situated continue, by subsidies and tariffs, to offer their own particular sections every possible inducement to produce more. Conspicuous among them in recent years has been our own Government.

No doubt the policy is highly popular in the counties and among the interests which have been the beneficiaries. In these days 30,000,000*l.* of public money would be most acceptable anywhere—to the cotton industry, for example, or the coal industry, or steel, or shipbuilding. And any one of them could probably provide far more employment for the money. They do not ask for it, and if they did they would not receive it. We shall know before long whether the beet sugar industry is prepared to stand by its contract and forgo any further help at the end of the specified period. The fact is not propitious that in the present year, on the ground of the fall in prices, it has made fresh demands; and the Government has been obliged to concede, and Parliament to approve, yet another grant, the probable cost of which is estimated at between 200,000*l.* and 300,000*l.* And Mr. Baldwin has declared in a public speech that not only should

[43] Report, p. 227. [44] *Ibid.*, p. 230. [45] *Ibid.*, p. 8. [46] *Ibid.*, p. 86.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 264. [48] *Ibid.*, p. 230. [49] *Ibid.*, pp. 230-6.

the present acreage of sugar beet be maintained, but that it should be doubled. 'Whether it will be better to do that,' he said, 'by a bounty or by an arrangement of duties, I cannot yet say, but by one or the other it is a thing that ought to be done and shall be done.'[50] And this at a time when the most frugal public economy is recognised to be vital to the welfare of the State.

HERBERT SAMUEL.

[50] Glasgow, December 12, 1930.

GANDHI—SAINT OR SINNER?

CONCERNING Mr. Gandhi—or Mahatma Gandhi, as he is variously called—much has been written both by himself and by others; but nearly all that I have read, by friend or foe, has, in my opinion, woefully misrepresented him as a sinner or a saint. His most fervent followers believe him to be an *Avatar* sent by God, his bitterest enemies class him as a dangerous revolutionary, and in between these two extremes a large number of people mildly regard him as a visionary and a humbug. All, I think, up to a point are right, but only up to a point; for Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, to give him his full name, is all these things and many more besides. He is so complex a personality that it is only by comparing the various accounts of him, more especially those written by his admirers and disciples, that his true character can, so to say, be synthetically extracted from the mass of verbiage which has and is daily gathering around his name. Besides, his nature is at one and the same time so complex and so simple, so rigid and so flexible, so honest and so slippery, that to judge the man from one or two of his biographies, or his own autobiography, is altogether impossible. His nature is such that much earth must be sifted and washed away before the gold which is in him can be discovered.

He was born on October 2, 1868, of well-to-do parents of the *Bunia*, or trading, caste, which is a comparatively low one. They were *Vaishnavas*—that is, followers of the god *Vishnu*. One of the doctrines of this sect is *Ahimsa*, the principle of not harming any form of life, which in actuality means that no vermin is exterminated, and no suffering animal is put out of its misery. *Ahimsa* is not so much love or compassion as indifference to suffering; and certainly, until the British put a stop to it, it did not discourage *Suttee*—that is, widow-burning. This doctrine, and the rigid caste rules laid down by Manu, Gandhi imbibed from his earliest childhood, and, though an extremely shy and sensitive boy, he cannot be accused of lacking courage. Tempted by a friend to become strong like the English, whose strength it was thought was derived from eating meat, to reform himself he actually carried out this un-Hindu experiment, and passed a terrible night of

anguish in consequence. 'Every time I dropped off to sleep,' he writes, 'it would seem as though a live goat were bleating inside me, and I would jump up full of remorse.' At the age of thirteen he was married, and when nineteen he decided to complete his studies in England, which decision at this time, 1888, shows a quite exceptional moral courage; for his caste community not only looked upon a journey to England with abhorrence, but the headman outcaste him and threatened anyone who should help him or see him off at the dock with 'a fine of 1 rupee 4 annas' (20 pence)!

From the mediæval atmosphere of Gujarat and the endless recitals of the endless *Ramayana*, the Iliad of northern India, Gandhi set out, and, in September, landed at Southampton in a white flannel suit which he had set aside especially for the occasion. Finding that he was the only person wearing such clothes, he became extremely shy and nervous; but once in London he soon settled down to his new life. Before leaving home he had taken an oath to live as a celibate in England and never touch wine or meat; and to keep this vow he dined with crank vegetarians, from whom he absorbed 'advanced' doctrines. Next he visited Bond Street and spent 10*l.* on an evening dress suit—wasted, as he says, 'ten minutes every day before a huge mirror, watching myself arrange my tie and parting my hair in the correct fashion'—and even became so civilised as to take lessons in dancing. From such trifles we see that, as a young man, he was normally human.

With these superficialities of civilisation as his canvas he began to read Tolstoy, with the result that his mental picture became blurred and out of perspective. Vain by nature, as nearly every Hindu is, sensitive as they all are, and both shamed and irritated by the colour bar, the spirit of the visionary and the reformer began to awake in him, and, little by little, out of these heterogeneous elements his philosophy took form heavily veneered with Europeanisms. The influence of Tolstoy was profound, and on the Russian aristocrat-peasant mystic he began to mould himself.

In 1891 Gandhi returned to India, not the simple village boy of 1888, but a contending mass of conflicting cultures. He had watched the grandeur and sordidness of European life, had been terrified by its energy, its efficiency, and its heartlessness. Then back to his native city of Porbandar, where time was of no account, where caste rules were rigid, and where the peasant ploughed as his forefathers had ploughed for thousands of years. There he found himself still outcaste by a large section of his community, for not even his near relations were allowed to entertain him. Not wishing to hurt their feelings, the old spirit of *Ahimsa*, now clothed in a Tolstoyian smock, took possession of him, with the

result that he discovered that such happiness as came to him was due to his own non-resistance.

The inward man had not, however, vastly changed, for there is still to be found lurking within him the boyish vanity, the touchiness and sensitiveness of his early days. In 1893 legal work—for he was now a qualified barrister—called him to Natal, where some 150,000 Indian emigrants had settled: a rough-and-ready country, where Dutch and English saw no great difference between an Indian and a negro, and where the colour bar was of iron—a country where a man must have a thick hide and a heavy fist; consequently at every turn Gandhi was met by insult, for he has no fist at all and his hide is of the thinnest. Each insult is a nail driven into his soul, sinking into him and wounding his instinctive vanity, jarring on his moral courage, and awakening it into compassion for his fellow-men—the outcaste and untouchable coolies of the white man's land. Here he read Arnold's *Light of Asia*, and studied the Sermon on the Mount—was persuaded to become a Christian, but would not; yet he claims that through the words of Christ a great joy welled up in him, and that thus the full meaning of passive resistance was revealed to him.

I must hasten through this period of his life, though it is one of great interest. In 1899, when the South African War broke out, he offered his services to the Government and raised an Indian ambulance corps. He did this, so it seems to me, out of true nobility of heart, and also because it would prove to the white man that the downtrodden coolie was equally a man of courage—courage being, as Gandhi rightly guessed, a predominant factor in Western civilisation. Then after the war he organised a plague camp, was immensely influenced by the principles of the simple life as laid down in Ruskin's *Unto this Last*, took part as an ambulance worker in the Zulu rebellion, founded a Communist settlement at Phœnix; and finally, on account of the Government of South Africa refusing to repeal the poll-tax on Indian workers, he found it impossible to pocket 'this insult offered to the mother country,' and so started his *Satyagraha* (Soul-force) movement, which mainly consisted in a passive resistance campaign, for which he was thrown into gaol on three successive occasions. Yet the movement grew, spreading from the Transvaal to Natal; monster meetings were held, strikes proclaimed, and masses of Hindus marched about the country alarming public opinion in Africa and exciting it to frenzy in India. The outcome was victory. The tax was undoubtedly unjust, and in 1914, shortly before the outbreak of the World War, it was repealed, and Natal was opened to free Indian labour.

In the crucible of South Africa Gandhi's sensitive soul was turned to iron, yet the outer man remained as flexible as high-

grade steel. His contact with Christian missionaries and his meditations on the New Testament had taught him, in Milton's words, 'the irresistible might of meekness'; even more important than this, his struggle with the Government had revealed to him the Achilles heel of democracy. He discovered that majorities are always weak, because they rely on numbers in place of ideals, on physical force in place of spiritual, or what he prefers to call 'truth' or 'soul,' force; on popular opinion, fickle and ever-changing, in place of religious authority which comes from God.

In these days he became intellectually a Manichæan; the world had to be freed from darkness, and everything sensual in man was the outflow of this evil element. Mani, that dire and fateful religious master of the third century A.D., had forbidden marriage, killing and impure speech. So now did Gandhi. From the Western point of view his behaviour to his wife is utterly brutal; whether dangerously ill or not, his will must dominate her will as well as her physician's. At his settlement at Phœnix he compelled her to do sweeper's work and clean the bedroom and empty the slops of a Christian clerk, a *Panchama* (untouchable). In his relation of this he adds: 'I would have her do it cheerfully.' Why? Because of his unbendable humility. Here we see the Oriental despot creeping out of this humble saint. Not only has his meekness turned to combativeness, but his vanity to disciplinary resolutions, trials of will power, his will against his body, his reason, his common sense, and against any will outside him.

In South Africa he passed through the fire of persecution and the smoke of the colour bar—not to emerge a saint, but a spiritual Masochist. 'Pain to a *Satyagrahi* [one who practises Soul-force] is a pleasure,' he writes, and again: 'Progress is to be measured by the amount of suffering undergone . . . the purer the suffering, the greater the progress.' Though 'you must not try to compel another by physical force to become good,' you may make use of the most refined mental tortures to achieve this end. This is the identical outlook of many of the magicians, sorcerers, and monks of mediæval Europe, and right through Gandhi's life it is astonishing to see how again and again the early impressions of his childhood in Gujarat draw him back to mediævalism, making of him a reactionary.

As his struggles against established power succeeded—unconsciously, I think, but nevertheless surely—did his vanity grow into an obsession. The complexities of life began to vanish, and more and more did his aim become the simplification of existence rather than its development. Tolstoy and most other mystics have passed through a similar spiritual phase, which is in fact the first step towards self-apotheosis, a combination of

evil one only.' Taxation is all but to disappear, for in this ideal world there will be no armies, hospitals, schools, etc., for the State to support. But the vials of his utmost wrath are poured out on the machine and all that the machine stands for. 'Machinery is like a snake-hole which may contain from one to a hundred snakes': it is 'the chief symbol of modern civilisation; it represents a great sin'; it enslaves nations by creating money, which is 'as much a poison as sexual vice.' The machine must go, and yet Gandhi is not such a fool as not to realise that, if it were possible to abjure all modern inventions in India and revert to mediævalism, the death warrant of tens of millions would be signed.

Are these the ravings of a maniac, or the frothy utterances of a hysterical demagogue? No, neither; they are the considered opinions of an educated man whose honesty is beyond doubt. When Gandhi uses the word 'Satanic' it is no figure of speech, but as grim a reality as it was 500 years ago to our forefathers. Here he speaks like a pure Manichæan, to whom compromise with Satan is the sin of sins.

Having destroyed Western civilisation in India, root and branch, what does Gandhi propose to substitute in its place? If Western civilisation is Satanic, then obviously Indian civilisation must be God-like, for such is the logical conclusion of his Manichæan outlook. The question now resolves itself into one of definition; what does he mean by God-like? His answer is both as simple and complex as is he himself. Follow his doctrines to the letter, carry out his message of non-co-operation in all its details, with the utmost regard for the principles of *Ahimsa*, non-violence, and *Rama Rajya* can be accomplished within a year.

His difficulty is not, however, solely one of overcoming Western civilisation, but, curiously enough, of Europeanising Hinduism. He is a firm believer in the sanctity of the cow. 'Cow protection,' he says, 'is the gift of Hinduism to the world; and Hinduism will live so long as there are Hindus to protect the cow.' He is an equally fervent believer in the caste system. He writes: 'We cannot choose . . . our own parents, or our own birthplace, or our own ancestry. Why should we claim as individuals the right during this present brief life-period to break through all the conventions wherein we are placed at birth by God Himself?' Thus far he is a conventional Hindu; but now the European in him creeps out—he will not tolerate 'untouchability.' To him all men are as equal as they were to Rousseau or Tolstoy, and, though this heresy may win European and American sympathy as well as gain the support of a few democratically minded Indians, it is anathema to the bulk of the people,

and damnation to the Brahmins. *Rama Rajya* in a year is consequently a sheer absurdity.

His doctrines may be divided under three headings: political, ethical, and economic; these I will now examine in turn.

'To say that British rule is indispensable is almost a denial of the Godhead. We cannot say that anybody or anything is indispensable except God,' he writes; and again, 'If India copies England, it is my firm conviction that she will be ruined.' What, then, is his idea of nationalism? It is 'that my country may become free, that if need be the whole of the country may die, so that the human race may live. . . . It is the absolute right of India to misgovern herself'; also, 'Anarchy under home rule were better than orderly foreign rule.'

This is not a cheerful conception, yet it is crystalline in its honesty, for to Gandhi disorder spells salvation if through order India is to lose her faith in *his* conception of God. Democracy means nothing to him; he has never supported national independence from a democratic point of view, and he has always condemned those among his fellow-countrymen who have aimed at it. He believes in a civilisation of entirely separate and self-supporting villages, the inarticulate whole, called India, having nothing whatever to do with outside nations. 'One must not expect the people of one country to provide for the needs of another, even for philanthropic reasons.' And again: 'We should avoid being intimate with those whose social customs are different from ours. . . . Every man is a brook. Every nation is a river. They must follow their course, clear and pure, till they reach the Sea of Salvation, where all will blend.'

This curious monastic and mediæval outlook is the heart and soul of his *Swadeshi* (belonging to one's own country) movement. We must accept what God has given to us; to renounce tradition is sinful; social conditions are fixed by birth, and men must remain, in the words of the Church of England catechism, 'in that state of life to which it has pleased God to call them.' How is this negative social status to be attained? By *Swaraj* (self-government), which is a combination of sex suppression, non-violence, and self-support.

Mr. C. F. Andrews, a fervent admirer of Gandhi, says: 'There is no question that Mahatma Gandhi is one with the mediæval saints in a passionate belief in celibacy as practically the only way to realise the beatific vision of God.' Like Mani, he holds that everything that ministers to the flesh is evil. 'I cannot imagine Sita,' he writes, 'ever wasting a single moment on pleasing Rama by physical charms.' And this by a man who on supposes has studied the *Ramayana* and also the *Mahabharata*

both of which epics are replete with sexuality. 'Chastity,' he says, 'is one of the greatest disciplines without which the mind cannot attain requisite firmness. When a husband and wife gratify the passions, it is no less an animal indulgence on that account. Such an indulgence, except for perpetuating the race, is strictly prohibited. But a passive resister has to avoid even that very limited indulgence, because he can have no desire for progeny.' If marry you must, no marriage is to be out of caste—this is pleasing to the Brahmins; but then, once again, the European emerges from his hidden lair, for out of genuine sympathy for the millions of young widows in India, many of whom are virtually outcaste, he says to his followers: 'I want you to make this sacred resolve, that you are not going to marry a girl who is not a widow; you will seek out a widow-girl, and if you cannot get a widow-girl you are not going to marry at all'—a union which to a Brahmin is worse than incest. Birth control, so necessary in India, he holds in abhorrence; but when one of his students seemed somewhat perplexed over the sex question he said to him: 'Then you fear there will be an end of creation?' 'No. The extreme logical result would be, not extinction of the human species, but the transference of it to a higher plane.' Why not, then, a transference by instalments? No. This does not entail suffering.

The killing of all desire, which includes all home life and the love of wife and children, is part of Gandhi's interpretation of the doctrine of *Ahimsa*, which forbids the taking of life (apparently, according to him, also the begetting of it), and which in India has become an all but unbearable burden. Gandhi, as may be supposed, takes an ultra view, far outdistancing that held by the Lollards, Quakers, and other idealist minorities in the West. Not only is self-protection evil, 'but, I go farther,' he writes, 'If we resent a friend's action, or the so-called enemy's action, we still fall short of this doctrine.' Cowardice, however, is no part of this belief, because it is 'a negation of all force'; it is 'impossible to teach a mouse non-violence in respect of a cat. It would simply not understand what non-violence could be, because it had not the capacity for violence against a cat.' Such subtle distinctions may be logically correct, but I much doubt, when ignorant peasants and artisans are called upon to carry out non-violent non-co-operation, whether they are altogether clear to them. Also, I am not at all certain whether they are clear to Gandhi himself; for in his letter to the Viceroy, before beginning his civil disobedience campaign, he says: 'Lacking inward strength, we have been reduced by all but universal disarmament to a state bordering on cowardly helplessness'; and in another letter he writes: 'Disarmament has resulted in the "emasculation of the whole nation."' But, as usual, Gandhi is consistently inconsistent.

To turn now to his economic doctrine, it is as simple as it is impossible. It can be expressed in one word, *Charka* (spinning-wheel), or in that of its resultant, *Khaddar* (home-spun cloth). To Gandhi, the spinning-wheel is the panacea of all human ills; its powers are nothing short of magical. 'And how will the spinners bring *Swaraj* (self-government)? you ask. I say, nothing will have to be done after you have universalised the spinning-wheel. You will have acquired a power and a strength which everybody will automatically recognise.' It is true that for nearly half the year cultivators in most parts of India have little to do, and that home spinning may with advantage be encouraged. Gandhi clearly sees this, but refuses to acknowledge that, until all machine looms are abolished, it is useless to expect large numbers of hand looms to replace them. The cheapest hand-woven cotton cloth, and then of a poor and coarse quality, costs 8 annas (8 pence) a yard to produce, which is a high price when compared to similar machine-made material. But Gandhi's object is not entirely an economic one. He considers that free time and leisure are a curse to Indian women, and consequently should they be given more efficient machines their time and leisure would be spent in wickedness. The spinning-wheel will kill time, it will kill thought, it will kill violence. A lawyer must give up his profession and 'take up a hand loom.' A doctor must give up his medicine, and 'rather than mending bodies, he should mend souls . . . he must take up the hand loom.' A wealthy man must devote his money 'to establishing hand looms,' and so on *ad infinitum*.

Such is Gandhi's philosophy: a narrow exclusive nationalism of self-supporting and non-co-operating villages; an ethical code which destroys all morality, Christian and universal, and an economic system based on the most primitive instruments of hand labour, the plough and the spinning-wheel. Well may Rabindranath Tagore, a great poet and still greater seer, exclaim: 'In olden days, in our primeval forests, our sages, *gurus*, in the plenitude of their vision, called on *all* seekers of truth. . . . Why does not our *guru*, who wants to lead us to action, make the same call?' His only command is 'spin and weave. . . . Is this the gospel of a new creative age? If large machinery constitutes a danger for the West, will not small machines constitute a greater danger for us?' Nations must co-operate. 'The awakening of India is bound up in the awakening of the world. Every nation that tries to shut itself in violates the spirit of the new age.'

To turn now from his philosophy to his activities in India. As soon as his struggle in South Africa was over he sailed for

England, landing there on August 4, 1914. He at once offered to enlist as an ambulance bearer, was accepted, fell ill, and returned to India, where he was well received by the European community in Madras.

During the war his actions were, as usual, contradictory, and whether this was due to the general war neurosis, which at the time inflicted so many, or to a mixture of loyalty and cunning, it is hard to decide. To me it seems that the European within him urged him to support the British Empire, and the Oriental to carry on his task of self-realisation by leading every discontented cause. Or was it vanity—eagerness to display the man?

From enlisting villagers to fight Turks and Germans, and appealing by means of a recruiting leaflet for the repeal of the Arms Act, which he stated was among the many misdeeds of British rule the blackest history would look upon, he carried out an intensive campaign of agitation in Kathiawar, Champaran, Gujarat and elsewhere, in which *Satyagraha* was consistently preached and the magical spinning-wheel offered as the Universal Solvent. In South Africa he had been rich, earning several thousands of pounds a year; now sworn to poverty, a poor man, he was accepted by the poor. He convinced them by simple arguments, sometimes of the most illogical nature, and when tripped up would turn and laugh against the tripper. Should he be asked for his autograph, he would answer: 'My price, sir, is moderate enough—half an hour's spinning every day for the country and a promise to wear *Khaddar*.' He proclaimed untouchability a sin, which was strongly opposed by the Brahmins; founded an *Ashram* (place of retreat) for his students, who were compelled to take a vow of celibacy, and where the pupils of four years old and upwards were separated from their parents, who had to renounce all authority over them, and who were not even allowed to visit them until they were grown up. By means of this mediæval establishment he expected to create a new and sterile race.

Whilst Gandhi was carrying out his missionary work amongst the peasantry, sedition was boiling over in the towns. Home rule, not in Gandhi's form of self-government, but of democratic government (which was anathema to him), was being demanded by a host of extremely energetic and unscrupulous agitators. In 1917 Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, promised the gradual development of responsible government, and foolishly, so I think, in order to check revolutionary outrages, on March 19, 1919, the Rowlatt Act became law. By this Act special courts of three judges, without juries or assessors, could try cases of sedition. This was met by fierce opposition, and Gandhi, I feel, both through conviction and vanity, placed himself at the head of the

agitators, and on March 30, 1919, opened his first passive resistance campaign in India.

This *Hartal* (general strike) was like spark to tinder. The Hindus, Sikhs, and Moslems joined hands against the Government, open rebellion broke out in the Punjab; at Amritsar the mob fired the Anglican church and the town-hall, burnt the goods station, looted and murdered. This led to the proclamation of martial law on April 13 and the killing of 359 and wounding of 1200 Indians by General Dyer at Jalliawala Bagh, which, however, broke the rebellion.

Gandhi had lent all the prestige of his name to a congeries of seditious parties, who in no way supported his religious views. This was the inevitable result of mixing politics with religion; for his name as a saint was used by his unscrupulous *confrères* to urge their already hysterical followers 'to fight to the death against English cheats and to dishonour English women.'

In December 1919 the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms passed the House of Commons; this split the agitators into Moderates and Nationalists. At the same time an organised Moslem agitation, known as the Khilafat movement, was set on foot with the object of compelling the Imperial Government to restore the Sultan of Turkey to his pre-war footing. Once again Gandhi entered the arena, for, as he said: 'Such an opportunity of uniting Hindus and Mohammedans . . . would not arise in a hundred years.' Here again he blundered, for the whole of this movement was a make-believe, which collapsed, not through British action, but through Turkish, for Mustapha Kemal abolished the Califate. In support of this movement Gandhi opened his non-co-operation campaign, which consisted in his adherents voluntarily withdrawing from Government service, schools, law courts and legislative bodies; besides which, the soldiery and police were to be encouraged to mutiny.

Having succeeded in gaining the support of the National Congress, he went up and down the country preaching his subversive doctrines, and at Nagpur he made the following ominous declaration: 'Before the battle with the British Government was ended, they might have to wade through seas of blood.' This could have but one result—turmoil; and by the beginning of 1921 disorders had broken out in many provinces. In February, 130 Akalis (a sect of Sikhs) were butchered by the abbot of the Nankana Sahib shrine in the Punjab. In August the Moplahs revolted, in which revolt Sir Sankaran Nair says:

> More than two thousand Mohammedans killed by troops, according to official estimates, thousands more in other ways, larger numbers wounded; the number of Hindus butchered in circumstances of barbarity, skinned alive, made to dig their own graves before slaughter, running into

thousands; women, and *purdah* (veiled) women too, raped, not in a fit of passion, but systematically and with calculated revolting and horrible cruelty for which I have not been able to find a parallel in history. . . . All this due directly to the visit of Gandhi and Shaukat Ali and to the organisation of Kilafat associations.

What does Gandhi say concerning this rising? Of the Moplahs, who are Mahomedans, he said: 'The brave, God-fearing Moplahs, fighting for what they consider as religion, and in a manner which they consider as religious.' Why did he say this? There are two possible answers. The first, and the more probable, is that the politician within him had for the time being enthralled the saint—his aim was to keep the Hindu-Mahomedan *entente* alive; the second, that the saint had mastered the man, religious anarchy, with all its horrors, being infinitely to be preferred to law and order under Satanic British rule.

Not being quite mad, though a little before this he had taken a vow to drink no milk or eat milk products, and to live on groundnut butter and lemons, the man emerged, and in the next outbreak held in leash the saint. This occurred in November, when, through an act of extreme folly, the Home Government decided to send the Prince of Wales on a visit to India. In August, before his arrival, Gandhi had already caused riots and disturbances in Bombay, for, imitating Savonarola's act in Florence, he had ordered all foreign clothes and materials publicly to be burnt, and thus unwittingly stirred up the destructive instincts of the mob. Then, when the Prince landed, he declared a *Hartal*. The streets were at first deserted, then mobs collected, and in the ensuing riots many houses were looted and burnt, and fifty-three persons were killed and 403 wounded. Certain of the leaders being arrested, Gandhi demanded their release; but a tragedy directly due to his campaign, the responsibility for which he did not disclaim, brought him to a halt. At Chauri-Chaura, in the United Provinces, a mob of 3000 frenzied men led by his volunteers stormed the police barracks, and amid scenes of revolting cruelty burnt twenty-one police constables alive. This brought him to his senses. 'God spoke clearly through Chauri-Chaura,' he writes; 'I must undergo a personal cleansing'; and he held a prolonged fast.

From now on his influence began to wane. On March 2, 1922, he writes in a Masochistic mood: 'I have become literally sick of the adoration of the unthinking multitude. I would feel certain of my ground if I were spat upon by them. . . . If we do not take care, we are likely to be drowned in the waters whose depth we do not know.' Then on March 10 he was arrested and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

In deep waters he had sailed, deeper than he could fathom.

He began to feel that he had been exploited by others. 'My only safety lies in my shamelessness,' he writes; '. . . the only tyrant I accept in this world is the "still, small voice" within.' I think that joy filled his heart as he passed into his prison; the *Avatar* was left outside, the humble human being went within with gentleness and compassion towards all men. Yet the man in him remains inconsistent. In 1924 he fell a victim to appendicitis. Medical science he had declared to be 'blade magic,' and hospitals 'the instruments of the devil.' Now he was offered the service of his own Ayurvedic physician,[1] but he was wise enough to leave himself in official hands, and was successfully operated upon by a 'Satanic' surgeon.

Soon after his recovery Gandhi was released. Meanwhile a new political party, called the *Swaraj* Party, had arisen. Realising the failure of boycott, its aim was to wage a war for freedom in the legislatures themselves. In 1924 it urged full responsible government in India, and for that purpose it demanded the assembly of a representative Round Table Conference to thrash out the ways and means.

Of Gandhi's further activities little remains to be told. In May 1925 he expressed his doubts as to Hindu-Moslem unity, and said: 'So long as untouchability disfigures Hinduism, so long do I hold the attainment of *Swaraj* to be an utter impossibility . . . that gift would be a curse upon this land.' Once again he changes his mind. In 1929 he was elected for the Congress presidency, but stood down in favour of Jawaharlal Nehru, then learning the art of government in Moscow.

On December 29, 1929, the Congress met in turmoil, and Jawaharlal Nehru announced 'the complete repudiation of India's national debts,' and on December 31 he unfurled the flag of the Indian 'republic.' In this excitement the politician once again sloughed the saint; for on December 30 Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy stating that he would call off civil disobedience if certain offers were accepted forthwith. Among these were: total prohibition, halving of the land tax, abolition of the salt tax, halving of military expenditure and free licence for fire-arms. Failing to win acceptance to these impossible terms, in March 1930 he set out on his salt tax march, and on April 6, clad in a loin cloth, he entered the sea, scooped up a handful of sand and salt water, and thus once again twisted the Lion's tail. On May 4 he was arrested and imprisoned.

Towards the end of the year the Round Table Conference met in London, and its one great achievement was that it took place,

[1] Medical treatment according to the Vedas, in which cow dung figures largely as a cure-all. In India I have seen it applied to open wounds, and, when working as a cantonment magistrate, I remember two men dying of tetanus as the result.

for this fact alone put all those members of Congress who had boycotted it in the wrong. Whilst they were creating disorder in India and on the frontiers of India, the Englishman honoured his word. The Indian National Congress, through its vanity and child-like irresponsibility, was thus placed in the wrong, and to save its face Gandhi was once again released. A tired old man, and I think somewhat disillusionised, he left his gaol with his spinning-wheel to creep up the steps of the Viceregal Lodge. The Viceroy met him as an equal, and, endowed with a higher spirit of *Ahimsa* than is generally to be discovered in the East, he pacified the saint and so left untarnished the vanity of Congress which stalked behind him.

Whether this generosity will be met by gratitude is extremely doubtful. Gandhi himself talks cryptically; he promises peace and he promises 'before long to discharge every one of the political prisoners . . . possibly even those condemned to the gallows.' I doubt whether he himself knows exactly what he means; but I for one think that his spiritual bolt is spent. His halo saved the face of Congress, and in the saving of it, so it seems to me, it has lost somewhat of its lustre, for the man who crept up the steps of the Viceroy's house was the politician and not the saint.

Had he never left India to become contaminated by Western trickery he might have become an *Avatar;* somehow he feels this himself. 'I am really too ambitious to be satisfied with a sect'; and to a Hindu who apologised to him for not knowing him he answered: 'How can you? I shall be known only after I am dead.'

As a boy he came to the West full of the mystic faith of the East; there, from the hands of Tolstoy, he drank of the cup of Rousseau. The fumes of Western politics intoxicated him. India was to be transformed, and in her transformation was he to find salvation; yet unlike Christ, one of his spiritual masters, he never learnt the statesmanship of the words 'Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's.' He will pass his way like many another who has trodden his thorny path, a saint who for the love of God has sinned against humanity, and on the tomb of his memory will the words '*Non pacem sed gladium*' be inscribed in letters of blood.

J. F. C. FULLER.

CHINA AND THE FEETHAM REPORT

WHEN I had the honour of writing about China in *The Nineteenth Century* for March, she was looking forward to the People's Convention, and, with due regard for caution in prophesying, there really appeared a hope of better days. This fair outlook has since been sadly marred. On the very eve of the Convention the Cantonese members of the Kuomintang broke away violently from Nanking, set up a rival Government in Canton, and now announce a 'punitive expedition' against the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek and the general alleged falsity of Nanking to the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the approved style. The physical difficulties in the way of fighting are so great, since there are no trunk railways south of the Yangtze, that an organised campaign seems unlikely. But the breach will give endless opportunities for petty generals to resume their depredations, together with fresh scope, as Moscow newspapers have gleefully pointed out, for Communist activities; and though the Canton rebel Government is an impossible hotchpotch, the prestige of Canton as the birthplace of the revolution is so great, and the Cantonese have always been so vital a part of the Kuomintang, that the quarrel threatens to have evil consequences for the peace and progress of China.

This fresh evidence of the inability of Chinese politicians to compromise on their differences gives additional point to the warnings uttered in Mr. Justice Feetham's report on the future constitution of Shanghai against any hasty surrender of foreign safeguards in China. Coinciding with the appearance of this report, our own negotiations with Nanking over the abolition of extraterritoriality have reached an extremely delicate, not to say dangerous, stage. However much China's intelligentsia may quarrel among themselves, they may be trusted to shout together for the abolition of extraterritoriality, which has become for them a question of 'face,' and therefore of far greater importance in their eyes than the infinitely more urgent problems of national reconstruction. Against which demand we are fully justified in considering the enormous British interests in China, and the physical inability of the Chinese Government, however good

its intentions may be, to give them adequate protection. Here, then, are hard facts which it is particularly necessary to try to bring into a common focus for general understanding.

It may be recalled that when the 'Young Marshal,' Chang Hsueh-liang of Manchuria, intervened in the war between Nanking and the Northern Coalition last September, General Chiang Kai-shek, in Nanking's name, promptly accepted his demands for an ending of the Kuomintang monopoly of power and privilege, reform of the Government on popular lines, and the summoning of a People's Convention. At the November Conference of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang the Nanking politicians, overawed by the alliance between Chiang and the Manchurian leader, were obliged to give way, though there was no doubt then, as subsequent events have proved, how deeply some of them detested the implied surrender of their prerogatives.

One can but guess at the sort of intrigues that went on during the winter. The crisis came early in March over the proposal to adopt a Provisional Constitution during the period of 'political tutelage' prescribed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in which the people were gradually to be educated up to the exercise of full self-governing powers. It may here be mentioned that more than two years ago this period of political tutelage was definitely fixed by the Kuomintang at six years; that nothing whatever has yet been done to train the people in the arts of self-government; and that, as those arts are no more to be learnt in a class-room than swimming can be taught by diagrams on a blackboard, there was every reason for adopting the very cautious form of self-government which the Provisional Constitution contains. These arguments appealed strongly to the realists in Nanking, who have been seriously alarmed by China's economic degradation and the threat of the Russian Five-Year Plan, and have long seen that stability can only be achieved by broadening the basis of government in popular support. But to the purists of the Kuomintang the proposal was anathema, meaning as it did the beginning of the end of their prerogatives; and they opposed it furiously, as equally unnecessary and contrary to the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. But the realists won. Hu Han-min, champion of the purists, a former secretary of Dr. Sun, a man of marked personality, intellect and energy, but one who would cheerfully sacrifice all China on his own Procrustean conception of Kuomintang right, was driven from all his offices and virtually made a prisoner in Nanking.

The offence to the Cantonese at the public disgrace of their leader was not softened by the bitter rebuke for his narrow-mindedness with which Chiang Kai-shek consigned Hu Han-min to oblivion. In the ensuing weeks many Cantonese officials were

dismissed from their posts in Nanking; others made haste, in the expressive phrase, to 'get out while the going was good.' Among the latter were four Cantonese members of the Control Yuan (Council), which is virtually the same as the old Board of Censors of imperial days—a vivid example, by the way, of how China continually turns to her own past for assistance. The four Censors hastened to Canton, where they impeached Chiang Kai-shek for aiming at a dictatorship and trying to destroy the Kuomintang. They were joined by all other malcontents; General Chen Ming-chu, the pro-Nanking Governor of Canton, was forced to flee to Hongkong; and three days before the opening of the People's Convention at Nanking an independent Government was proclaimed at Canton.

In trying to estimate the rights and wrongs of the quarrel due allowance must be made for the tremendous force of provincial feeling, a force so well understood by the emperors that, under them, no magistrate was allowed to hold office in his own province. Since the empire fell the deepest impulse in every province has been freedom to manage its own affairs. The whole policy of the Kuomintang, sound in principle though ill-conceived in action, has been to subdue this provincialism to its own will; yet here, in the Kuomintang, it bursts out more strongly than anywhere. Chiang Kai-shek is not a Cantonese, but a native of Chêkiang, on whom, in fact, the Cantonese have always looked down as an upstart. His brother-in-law, T. V. Soong, the Minister of Finance, is a Shanghai man. Another brother-in-law, Dr. H. H. Kung, Minister of Industry, Commerce and Labour, is a descendant of the old Shansi bankers, and the 'Young Marshal,' who remains Chiang's ally, is, of course, a Northerner. Whatever Chiang Kai-shek's faults—and no one would deny he is autocratic—his worst sin is that he would not truckle to the Cantonese. This explains why the veteran Tong Shao-yi has thrown in his lot with Canton; why Dr. C. C. Wu, the Chinese Minister in Washington, has resigned his post to do likewise; why Sun Fo, Minister of Railways, son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, having accepted a mission from Nanking to treat with the insurgents, used it only to get away from the capital and promptly declared for Canton on arriving in the south; and why the experienced and broad-minded jurist Dr. Wang Chung-hui, though he will not join a rebel Government, seizes the chance presented by his judgeship in the International Court at The Hague to quit Nanking. Failing the resurrection of an emperor who would bludgeon the provinces one by one into submission in the old approved style of every founder of a new dynasty, this provincial feeling will have to be accepted and provided for in the ultimate Constitution of China.

Whatever it may yet become, the Canton Government is too heterogeneous and too discordant in its present composition to have anything to offer China except more rebellion. At its head is Tong Shao-yi, who as Governor of Fengtien in Manchuria proved himself one of the empire's ablest officials. After the revolution of 1911 the Manchus deputed him to discuss peace terms with the Republicans at Shanghai; then he became the republic's first Premier, and for several years he has now been living in retirement developing a model estate among his tenants in southern Kuangtung—a polished gentleman, owner of an unsurpassed collection of porcelain, a charming host, too old to be a force, and too fastidious to co-operate harmoniously with the wild extremists and rude generals who are his associates. Much of the same stamp is Dr. C. C. Wu, steeped in the Chinese classics, equally at home in Western learning, master of an exquisite style in despatch writing, whether in Chinese or English; he was much better situated as Minister at Washington than he will probably be as the member of the Canton Government, and he would be happier devoting himself to letters than in either capacity. Then there is Wang Ching-wei, also one of Dr. Sun's intimates, who is universally believed to have forged the Master's Will, a man of fiery energy, an undoubted patriot according to his lights, but so extreme in his views that most people, though he denies the charge, believe him a Communist. Quite a number of old Cantonese grandees have come out of seclusion for what they can get, including General Li Fuk-lum, the erstwhile 'King of Honan.' There is, of course, a large posse of generals; fifteen of them have been appointed as a commission to prepare the attack on Nanking, and the Canton Government will inevitably take its predominant hue from them. They include two of the old Wuhan clique, Lu Chung-lin and Pei Chung-hsi, whom Nanking, with the help of German advisers, defeated two years ago; Chang Fa-kuei and his famous 'Ironsides,' who have been roving southern China for nearly two years in rebellion against Nanking; and Chen Chi-tang (in Cantonese Chan Chai-tong), who has been supposed to be suppressing rebels, the 'Ironsides' included, in Kuangsi; but, unable to get the money he wanted and jealous of Nanking's Governor in Canton, he has 'ratted' to the malcontents.

The best known member, first selected as Canton's Foreign Minister, is Eugene Chen. He was born a British subject in Trinidad, and when his bitter tongue and virulent journalism landed him in a Peking gaol a few years ago he appealed to the British Legation to get him out. On arriving at Canton he denounced Chiang Kai-shek as 'a man with a mediæval mind, who envisages China as his private property, a creature to be pursued and destroyed.' Now it was Chiang who in 1927 overthrew the Communist Government in Hankow, in which Eugene Chen was Foreign Minister, a fact to be duly remembered in estimating these diatribes. Perhaps it was Eugene Chen's close association with Borodin in Hankow days, followed by his years of exile in Russia, that has led to his resignation—if, as reported, he really has resigned. For the Canton Government is anxious not to let it be supposed that it has any dealings with Communism.

The Canton Government is proceeding 'according to plan'—collecting a year's taxes in advance, levying forced loans, seizing railway revenues and reimposing the likin, which T. V. Soong has been trying to abolish. They are even said to have imported $5,000,000 worth of Persian opium, to finance their military expedition—news not confirmed, but by no means improbable. They have also seized all the Customs stations in South China—a grave blow to the integrity of the one service that has hitherto remained intact, the backbone of national finance, an action which the Powers would once have prevented, as they did prevent a similar attempt by Dr. Sun in 1923. That Canton has promised to hand over the monthly proportion of the revenue due from South China for the service of foreign loans does not lessen the danger to the whole organisation and the fear that other recalcitrants will copy their example. It is curious that Nanking seems to have acquiesced without much protest in Canton's seizure of the Customs, provided the foreign loan service is maintained. It suggests that Nanking has hopes of patching up the quarrel, and that meantime it tries, by accepting what it cannot prevent, to preserve the unity at least of the personnel of the service.

In fact, Nanking is far more concerned about the Communists than about the threat of attack from Canton. So much has been reported in the daily Press of the Red peril, both in South and now in North China, that no long description is needed here. At the People's Convention General Ho Ying-ching, the Minister of War, who has been directing operations against the Communists, supplied a minute report on their elaborate organisation, with its bureaux and sub-bureaux covering the whole of China and Manchuria, full details of which had been obtained from documents found in cities recaptured from the Reds. The system includes a 'Reactionary Eradication Committee' to 'remove' all landowners, educated men, Government officials and shopkeepers; and General Ho estimated that, in Kiangsi and Hunan, the Communists had murdered, in two years, 258,000 people, burned 220,000 houses and destroyed over $900,000,000 [1] worth of property. There is no reason to suppose these figures exaggerated—in the fourteen years of the Taiping rebellion 70,000,000 people

[1] The Mexican, or silver dollar, nominally worth about 2s., actually about 1s.

are believed to have perished—and there is still the incomplete tale of Hupeh and other provinces to be given. Meanwhile the great mobility of the Communists and the ease with which they disguise themselves as ordinary peasants make them most difficult to suppress, while every week of civil disorder increases the fertile ground on which they batten.

The attitude of North China may be described very simply. The Northern Chinese detest Kuomintang, Nanking, and the South in a common abhorrence. Quite an interesting little riot occurred in Peking some three months ago, headed by members of the Anti-Kuomintang Society, when the offices of a pro-Nanking paper were wrecked while the police turned their backs. But the North will not interfere with the South, if it is let alone. Canton is trying to induce the Christian General Feng Yu-hsiang to join her: he is established somewhere in the north-western province of Shensi with all his favourite troops about him. But after last year's defeat Feng has neither money nor munitions—Canton certainly can send him none; and while the 'Young Marshal' of Manchuria remains loyal to his alliance with Nanking, Feng is not likely to attempt a move.

To turn now to the People's Convention which sat in Nanking from May 5 to 17. Some passages from General Chiang's address are interesting to the student of Chinese history, as showing how completely China has abandoned her old cherished insularity. For example, when General Chiang discussed and rejected Fascism as a political system; when he dwelt on the world's economic depression and its reaction on China; when he described the then prevailing tension in France and Italy and spoke of Europe as an armed camp; and, most noticeable of all, when he dwelt on the danger to China of the Russian Five-Year Plan, of the new Russian railway to the border of Sinkiang connecting with the Chinese Eastern Railway, and urged China to unite and prepare herself against the Russian menace. The Convention was remarkable for a prolonged demonstration greeting the introduction of a manifesto against the 'unequal treaties' and for the adoption of the Provisional Constitution.

One searches the official translation of this document curiously for some explanation of the violent resentment it aroused in the Cantonese. Their great outcry is that Chiang Kai-shek packed the Convention in order that it might elect him President, and that he so designed the Provisional Constitution as to concentrate absolute power in his own hands. But there never yet was a conference in republican China of which those who were left out did not clamour that it had been packed. And at any rate the Convention did not elect Chiang President of China. There is, in fact, no such thing. General Chiang is President of the National

Government, which is quite another matter. It was expressly stated at the Convention that the committee system of government was to be preserved; and, although the Provisional Constitution says that 'the sovereignty of the Republic of China is vested in the people as a whole,' during the period of political tutelage the Kuomintang continues to exercise the ruling power on the people's behalf.

Twenty-two articles are devoted to defining the rights of individuals under the law, under which all are to be equal, regardless of sex, race or religion. No one may be arrested without cause shown, nor have his house or property entered, sealed, attached or confiscated without due process of law. (It may be remembered that the barefaced confiscation of desirable 'enemy' properties by the *tangpu*, or Kuomintang district councils, has been a crying scandal for two years past.) Any person on being arrested must be brought to trial within twenty-four hours. Freedom of religious belief is proclaimed (but how will this agree with the Kuomintang regulations forbidding all religious teaching in schools?) and freedom of speech, of assembly and of the Press, except in times of emergency—such, evidently, as the present, for the censorship has been clapped on again in full force. These provisions are simply the old Bill of Rights which the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang threw out in January 1930. Everything, of course, depends on how they are carried out. But at least there is a charter in black and white formally proclaimed as the law of the land, and for the first time the individual has something in writing to appeal to—may it be hoped, not in vain.

There is a chapter on the respective rights of central and provincial Governments, and the latter are empowered to enact laws and impose taxation, but the central Government will have the fullest scope in overriding them. Certain means are provided for the eventual establishment of district assemblies. Meanwhile,

> In each province, a provincial Government shall be established . . . under the direction of the National Government. Its organisation shall be determined by law.

This suggests that the provincial Government will simply be appointed by Nanking. That is distinctly disappointing. A promise that

> when . . . a province reaches the period of constitutionalism, the (provincial) Assembly of People's Delegates may elect a provincial governor . . .

and that when a majority of the provinces attain to this happy state a permanent Constitution shall be adopted, is the maximum of comfort that the people can extract from the Provisional

Constitution. Still, it marks an advance on the previous absolutist *régime* of the Kuomintang, while the inquisitorial powers of the National Government certainly could be used to keep the dreadful *tangpu* in order.

The National Government is to have sole command over all forces by land, sea and air, power to declare war, make peace, grant amnesties and pardons, and to control finances. Since General Chiang is president of this organisation, these clauses are presumably the basis of Canton's wrath. But as the Government is merely composed of members of the Kuomintang, from whom technically it derives its authority, it might have been thought possible for the Kuomintang to settle their internal differences without the public disgrace to themselves and the misery for China of an open war.

That they evidently cannot do so, that authority remains a shadow and justice a figment, is the foundation of Mr. Justice Feetham's well-reasoned criticisms and inevitable warnings. How Mr. Justice Feetham came to China at all needs, perhaps, briefly to be explained. With their demand for the cancellation of the 'unequal treaties' and the abolition of foreign consular jurisdiction, the Chinese have coupled a declaration that all foreign concessions must be surrendered to them. These would include the separate national concessions at Tientsin, Hankow and Canton, and the great International Settlement of Shanghai, the wealthiest and most important city in the East outside India and the sixth port in the world. The French have their own concession at Shanghai and, it may be said, have not the slightest intention of relinquishing it. The fact that the Chinese show no resentment towards the French is another example of the well-attested truth that they never rebel when an opponent stands firmly on what they know to be his rights—a truth which our own diplomatists would do well to bear in mind. In the International Settlement fourteen Powers have equal rights, and their own courts. Foreign Governments have tacitly acquiesced in China's demand, but neither she nor any other Power has ever suggested how it might be gratified with fair regard for the protection of the colossal interests, both foreign and Chinese, centred in Shanghai. Accordingly, at the beginning of last year, the Municipal Council, with only too much cause for fearing what the diplomatists would do if left to their own devices, invited Mr. Justice Feetham from South Africa, who enjoys a high reputation as a juridical authority on international problems of various kinds, to come to Shanghai and to make recommendations for its future constitution, as a basis on which the Treaty Powers might work.

A more complicated problem than that of Shanghai could scarcely be found in the world, and indeed it is unique. That it

is an anomaly, and that the Chinese have reason for complaining that the greatest city in their country is wholly outside their control, we can readily admit, if we try to imagine, say, Liverpool, similarly governed by foreigners. Yet Shanghai is the growth of circumstance, not of any 'imperial aggression,' and what it is, as Mr. Justice Feetham clearly shows, it has become through the security, honest administration and rule of law afforded by foreign management. When the Chinese Government allotted a few swampy acres in 1843, where foreigners might live and manage their own affairs, no compulsion of any kind was used. Foreigners bought their land—at four or five times the market price, too—and no Chinese was obliged to sell. Each stage in the gradual development of the Municipal Council from the old Roads and Jetties Committee into the elaborate Government it now is, with a police force and volunteer corps of several thousands, schools, hospitals, fire brigade, and incomparable public works and health departments, can be envisaged as the response to some tangible menace or change of circumstances entailing possibilities of menace from without. In a well-ordered country Shanghai could not have arisen. But through the decay of the Manchu dynasty, the carnage of the Taiping Rebellion, and the increasing anarchy of the so-called republic, Shanghai simply had to defend itself. It still has to defend and somehow to govern an ever-swelling tide of Chinese flowing into it for protection. It is, as Mr. Justice Feetham says, an 'island of security,' and all the Chinese who talked to him were quite plain that it was such solely through foreign protection and the rule of law.

The peculiarity of the situation is enhanced by the fact that Shanghai really belongs to nobody but the people who own the land on which it stands. Its situation is guaranteed by the treaties, and the Municipal Council which governs it is always subject to a court outside its own authority. Yet, for what it does, the council is responsible only to the ratepayers who elect it annually, and while the Diplomatic Body may advise the council, it cannot order it to do anything—as was clearly established after the trouble of May 30 in 1925, when some riotous Chinese students were shot down while attacking a police station. The Municipal Council naturally incurs some criticism; yet on the whole Mr. Justice Feetham warmly commends the efficiency with which it has discharged a most onerous task, for which its members had no previous experience, while they give their services wholly voluntarily; and he thinks they have held the balance very fairly between Chinese and foreign residents.

By reason of the special character of the Settlement *régime* [Mr. Justice Feetham says] it has proved possible in the Settlement to provide

more successful solution of the problem of order and the problem of ɔerty than can be attained in China generally under existing conditions.

The description of these ' existing conditions ' is not flattering ɔ Nationalist *amour propre*. The Oriental conception of govern- ıent is totally different from the Western. In no city of China utside Shanghai have the public one word in the appointment f officials or the spending of taxes ; indeed, they never know ow much revenue is collected. The powers of the officials are uite arbitrary. The Kuomintang, who are the source of govern- nent, are an absolute dictatorship above all law. Yet even so he authority of Nanking is circumscribed to a very small space, nd throughout China as a whole is merely a name, while mili- arists and local party organisations do according to their own weet will.

Worst of all is the subservience of law courts to the whim of ɔarty organisations and officials, who hold firmly that judges exist to do their bidding. This was the main ground on which he International Commission of jurists sent to report on China's eadiness for the abolition of extraterritoriality pronounced gainst it, in spite of the improvement of prisons, codification ɔf laws, and modernisation of some courts. Mr. Justice Feetham's report shows how little improvement has been made in the past five years. In fairness to the Chinese judges, many of them are anxious to do their best, but they are powerless. The classical example is the attempt in 1929 by the Government to seize the estates of Sheng Kung-pao (who died twenty-two years ago) on a mere declaration that he had made his fortune corruptly. Three presidents of the District (formerly the Provisional) Court at Shanghai lost their jobs for refusing to assist in this outrage on justice ; and such of the property as is safe in Shanghai has escaped seizure. But it is easy to guess what would have happened if Shanghai had not been under foreign control. Mr. Justice Feetham speaks of the continual attempts by Chinese authorities outside the Settlement to seize persons whom they want from inside the Settlement by the machinery of the District Court. He gives details of one particularly bad case ; here the Municipal Council intervened and, after carrying the matter through two appeal courts, saved the man. But what if there were no council ? Instances might be quoted of foreigners who have lost their extraterritorial rights (for example, all Russians, Germans and Austrians) being arrested, shut up for several days in filthy prisons and arbitrarily fined, for no apparent offence—at least none proved—and this, not in the remote interior, but on the very borders of Shanghai. Mr. Justice Feetham's conclusion is that, while Chinese and non-extraterritorial foreigners can resort to the courts, they will not there find ' any effective protection

against the illegal acts of officials, or of military authorities, or of party organisations.'

In these circumstances he unequivocally rejects the idea of rendition : even the alternative of government under charter from Nanking is unacceptable ; Mr. Justice Feetham says that it could have no reality and little prospect of preserving the indis- pensable security and rule of law. The distance to rendition, he says, is to be measured, ' not in years, but decades ' ; and before it can take place there must be convincing proof of authentic civil authority in Nanking, cessation of civil war, the independence of law courts in practice as well as in theory, and the exercise of self-government by the Chinese in other districts.

Mr. Justice Feetham suggests that the demand for rendition could be countered by a declaration by the Powers that the present *régime* in Shanghai is not permanent. Meanwhile, he has drafted a scheme for the increasing introduction of Chinese residents into the administration of the Settlement, with equal co-operation between the foreign and Chinese communities as the ultimate goal. An important item in his programme is that the council's powers should be clearly defined ; they never have been, and if they were, many causes of friction with the surrounding officials would disappear. It is unnecessary to give his proposed reforms in detail. They are, generally, an amplification of the policy proclaimed by the council in 1925 and since then steadily put into practice. Chinese merchants have sat on the Municipal Council and its sub-committees for the past three years, and there could be no better augury for Mr. Justice Feetham's plan, nor better proof of its wisdom, than the public spirit shown by the Chinese councillors and the sincerity with which they have worked with their foreign colleagues in the common interest of the Settlement. There is not the slightest doubt that the Chinese business com- munity would readily accept Mr. Justice Feetham's impartial and statesmanlike report, as foreigners certainly would. What the politicians will say is another matter.

It is unfortunate, to say the least, that our Foreign Office should have pressed on the negotiations for the abolition of extraterritoriality as it has done, before the conclusion of Mr. Justice Feetham's work. The haste shown in sending Sir Miles Lampson to Nanking, with obvious instructions to get something settled as quickly as possible, is utterly inconsistent with all our official utterances, from Sir Austen Chamberlain's speech at West Birmingham in January 1928, warning the Chinese that the rate of our concessions must depend solely on the reality of their reforms, down to our well-reasoned refusals, in the summer and autumn of 1929, of Dr. C. T. Wang's demand for the abolition

of extraterritoriality. But Foreign Office words and actions are very different.

By the beginning of last May we had apparently given up everything, only insisting that in Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, and Canton our extraterritorial rights must be maintained. The indefensible nature of this arrangement was well shown in the *Daily Telegraph* of June 27 by a resident in Swatow, who described it as based, 'not on the solid ground of justice, but on the quicksands of expediency.' For if the Chinese are not considered ready to take charge of British subjects in the large ports, why are they to be allowed to take charge of them in the small? However, worse was to come.

At the beginning of May a complete deadlock was announced. The Chinese immediately countered by publishing the regulations under which they declared their intention of taking judicial control over all foreigners at the end of the year. This was, of course, merely a Chinese device to see if we were in earnest; had we stood firm, the regulations would have been as much a dead letter as the Mandate of December 1929, which declared extraterritoriality abolished. But it had the effect of sending Sir Miles Lampson hurrying back to Dr. C. T. Wang, the Chinese Foreign Minister, with fresh proposals, and only a month later Mr. Henderson informed the House of Commons that a stage had been reached at which both Ministers could report progress to their respective Governments. It is quite certain the Chinese have made no further concession—that is not the Oriental's way when he sees his opponent so eager for a settlement—so that the conclusion that we have made some further hasty and ruinous surrender is inevitable. The possible nature of this was indicated in *The Times* of June 17—namely, a time limit for Shanghai of five or ten years, after which British extraterritorial rights would lapse automatically. If this is true, it would be almost as bad as immediate abolition. The Chinese would instantly concentrate all efforts on getting the time limit reduced; and even if our Government, having yielded so much, stood out on this point, the mere fact of a time limit would destroy all confidence.

Two points specially need to be emphasised. First, Mr. Justice Feetham explicitly warns us that any general surrender of extraterritoriality must immediately bring about the rendition of Shanghai; and he dwells on the formidable crash in land values—as much as half a million sterling per acre in the business section of the settlement—that would ensue. Secondly, we are not alone in this matter and have no business to behave as if we were. Thirteen other Powers have an equal say in the destinies of Shanghai, and any yielding on our part is bound to weaken their

position. Where we had given way they would soon be forced to follow.

At the moment of writing a further respite appears to have been granted in Sir Miles Lampson's unhappy discussions with Dr. C. T. Wang, owing to Nanking's quarrel with Canton, and thus there is time to review the situation calmly in the light of Mr. Justice Feetham's report. China's claims to exercise sovereign rights in her territory are easily understood and must be respected. But the foreign community also have their rights which cannot be ignored. They are there in China, not of malice or imperialist aggressiveness, but for the lawful pursuit of business, into which they entered with the approval of and under treaties concluded by their respective Governments. Thousands of them have never known and never will know any other home. Thousands of them have invested their all in China. In Shanghai British interests alone, in land, banks, mills, shipping, insurance and mercantile houses, are estimated at hundreds of millions sterling. Foreigners, indeed, have made Shanghai one of the wonder cities of the world. The notion that, in so doing, they have somehow done China a wrong is a pure invention of Moscow's, put forward in 1925-7 when the Bolsheviks dominated the Nationalist movement. The truth is that Shanghai and, in a lesser degree, the other Treaty Ports have done more for China than for foreigners. They are the refuge of hundreds of thousands of Chinese, the repository of enormous Chinese wealth, the mainstay of national finance.

Between the opposing interests of Chinese political demands and foreign and Chinese business welfare Mr. Justice Feetham's report indicates a happy and practicable compromise. It reasonably meets all Chinese claims, it gives to the Chinese community their just part in the management of Shanghai, and it is in perfect accord with the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which prescribes local autonomy as the goal of all government for China.

To recapitulate briefly the main features of the wide landscape over which this article has been ranging. During the months of last autumn and early spring there appeared, in the opinion of the best judges, the greatest hope of China's 'settling down' that had been seen since the Manchus' downfall twenty years ago. This hope was frustrated by the internal jealousies of the Kuomintang and the quarrel between Canton and Nanking. The nature of that quarrel, the immense and pathless distance which separates the combatants, and the extreme provincial insularities which they represent, make the triumph of either party by force of arms extremely remote. Meanwhile the breach unsettles all China, checks reform, and gives fresh opportunity for the Communists, who, without exaggeration, are rapidly sapping the

strength and constitution of all China. This is assuredly no time for relinquishing in any particular the safeguards of the foreign community.

The news that General Chiang Kai-shek is at present disregarding Canton while he directs all forces against the Reds is the best augury of the moment. It inspires a hope that Nanking intends to concentrate her energies on peace and reform in the Yangtze valley, as, indeed, she has often been urged to do. If she took that course, such prosperity would result, such accession of revenues from the valley alone, that other parts of China would inevitably be drawn into its ambit, and political unity, which will never be won by war, would be automatically achieved. There is just a hope that the present quarrel between Nanking and Canton may lead to a system of federated regional Governments, a United States of China, the old autonomous *régime* of the viceroys recast in republican mould. And in so vast a country no other solution appears possible, for no dictatorship by one party—or worse, by one faction of one party—will ever be accepted by China as a whole.

No reasonable man would deny the existence of a new spirit at work in China, while the work that has been done in the building of thousands of miles of road, reconstruction of towns, aviation and industrial expansion is really remarkable amid so much war and disorder. The manful efforts of the Minister of Finance to maintain China's credit abroad and to suppress likin and internal taxation deserve to be recognised, and we may believe that the realists in Nanking are sincerely anxious to fulfil their promises and to act up to their engagements. But in China the tail too often wags the dog—and there are so many tails! The good impulses are still diffused and unco-ordinated. The centralising power of direction is lacking, and will continue to be lacking while China's constitutional difficulties remain unsolved. Until they are much nearer that happy state than they can be for perhaps many years, it would be equally injurious to her and to the foreigners in her midst to impose upon her new responsibilities which she is not ready to shoulder, and to enter with her into agreements she could not perform.

O. M. GREEN.

P.S.—Since this article was written, news has come of the disappearance on June 3 at Quinsan, near Shanghai, of a British youth named John Thorburn. Consular officials have traced his movements to where he was seen in custody of military police at Soochow; but the colonel there denies that any foreigner has been detained or arrested. Local Chinese say that they saw Thorburn tied to a tree and beaten, and with his ear cut off. Nanking, in answer to British protests, promised an inquiry, but six weeks later has neither produced the victim nor information about him. Presumably it fears to incriminate the military. Yet it repeatedly declares itself fully able to give foreigners all the protection of law.

O. M. G.

THE VATICAN AND FASCISMO

No one who watched at all closely the situation which resulted in the Treaty and the Concordat between the Quirinal and the Vatican in February 1929 can have imagined that the equilibrium which was temporarily established could be preserved without more or less violent interruptions from time to time. The respective claims of the two powers, when stated in theory, were incompatible in fundamental matters. But Pius XI. had firmly insisted that no treaty with Italy was worth considering unless it was based on a concordat. And the Concordat at least suggested that a definite understanding had been reached which would prevent any encroachment by either side upon the legitimate sphere of the other. The concessions made by the Quirinal were so far-reaching that they seemed to preclude any likelihood of interference with purely religious activities; while the Vatican's agreement to obtain the approval of the Quirinal in the future appointment of bishops, and in other matters, showed a real desire to avoid all possible causes of friction.

Broadly speaking, the most important aspect of the settlement, from the Vatican point of view, was to establish the claim of the Holy See to recognition of its temporal sovereignty. The old idea of the ' temporal power,' in the sense of a claim to govern certain territories which had been taken from the Papacy, had been generally abandoned. Even in Pio Nono's time there was a widespread feeling that the civil administration of territory was an embarrassment from which the Holy See would gladly be relieved under a fair agreement. But the claim to sovereignty, as a guarantee of absolute independence of action, became constantly more important. The enormous expansion of the Catholic Church in America and in the newly developed continents made it more than ever necessary that the Pope should be untrammelled by any possible interference in Italy. When the long and complicated negotiations were concluded, the Pope himself at the last minute renounced sections of territory in Rome which the Italian Government was willing to concede, thereby emphasising the essentially spiritual character of his claim, and the indifference of the Holy See to questions of territorial detail.

To achieve an arrangement which would leave the Pope entirely free from civil or military interference, or from local censorship, was so obviously desirable that most people wondered why the Pope should have insisted that any treaty for the recognition of his sovereign rights should be inextricably bound up with a concordat with the Italian Government, which must involve many controversial details. But the Pope would not contemplate a settlement upon any other basis. He preferred to leave matters as they were, rather than enter into agreement with a State which did not give full demonstration of its sympathy. The events of the past few months have thrown much light upon the Pope's approach to the question.

Signor Mussolini unquestionably gained enormous moral prestige, not only in Italy, but among Catholics in all parts of the world, by accomplishing a settlement of the Roman question. Certain features of the settlement seemed to indicate that he was genuinely anxious to prove himself a loyal Catholic. The first article of the Lateran Treaty definitely recognised the Catholic Church as the established Church of Italy. The Concordat was even more significant. It was well known, for instance, that although as a young man the *Duce* had refused to recognise any marriage contract whatever, he had since becoming dictator been formally married in a Catholic church. The Concordat now definitely recognised religious marriages as having full validity in civil law. He had already restored crucifixes in the schools; and under article 36 of the Concordat he now solemnly agreed that

> Italy considers the teaching of Christian doctrine according to the forms received from Catholic tradition as the foundation and crown of public education. Therefore Italy consents that the religious teaching now imparted in the elementary schools be further developed in the middle schools according to a programme to be agreed upon between the Holy See and the State.

The new arrangements appeared to give such clear proof of encouragement to the Church in Italy that Catholics all over the world proceeded to praise his achievements and his ideals with unrestrained enthusiasm. A typical instance was a volume[1] published soon afterwards by a zealous American Catholic, Mr. Thomas Ewing Moore, formerly secretary of the American Embassy in Rome, which described in detail ' the origin, development and settlement of the Roman question.' Many similar books were published in other countries, some of them by prominent ecclesiastics, which all spoke with unbounded enthusiasm of Signor Mussolini and his achievements and aims. Mr. Moore's book may be specially mentioned because he even quotes, with

[1] *Peter's City*, by T. E. Moore (Harding & More, 1929).

implied approval, from the remarkable *Fascist Catechism* which has been compiled for the education of all children in Italy. But even in some of the passages which are quoted in that typical outburst of enthusiasm it was easy to discern the seeds of the conflict which has suddenly developed in the past few months.

For instance, under the section 'The Fascist State' the *Fascist Catechism* teaches:

> But, more precisely, what is the State according to Fascism?
>
> According to Fascism the State is the supreme authority which subordinates the activity and interests of the individual citizens to the general good of the nation. This authority is manifested in the executive power.
>
> The interests of the nation, then, correspond with those of the State?
>
> Yes. The State cannot be anything but the united absolute expression of the will, of the power and of the conscience of the nation understood as the expression of the race, and all therefore that lies within the confines of the nation must be subject to the authority of the State.
>
> Is there, then, a sovereign power?
>
> This executive power which controls all the armed forces of the State is the sovereign power of the nation. The supreme head is the King.

Later, under the section entitled 'The Leader,' the catechism continues:

> What is the duty of Italians towards Mussolini and towards the Fascist Revolution?
>
> It is contained in this oath: 'I swear to follow without demur the orders of the *Duce* and to serve the cause of the Fascist Revolution with all my power and, if need be, with my blood.'
>
> Why is the Church considered one of the bases of national society?
>
> Because religion is the sacred patrimony of the people, and because the Church has the supreme dominion of it.
>
> What does Fascism recognise in the Church?
>
> Fascism recognises in the Church this supreme dominion, her universality, her necessary liberty in the religious field, the immense moral force exercised by her in the world, and Fascism has imposed, and will continue to impose, respect for the Church in public life.
>
> Has the Church some particular significance for Fascism?
>
> For Fascism the Latin and imperial traditions of Rome are represented also by Catholicism, which is a universal idea radiating from Rome.

That Fascist catechism may be taken as a fairly clear, if bombastic, statement of what the Italian State is determined to teach every child in Italy. In spite of the appearance of support for the Church, the claim made for absolute obedience to the existing Italian State is obviously incompatible with the elementary teaching of the Church in regard to the divine source of authority in any State. Moreover, the oath of obedience to the existing State must inevitably produce a conflict of loyalties if Fascism should ever become involved (as it is now involved) in a direct conflict with the Holy See.

However, the Concordat of 1929, which the Pope deliberately made the basis of the Lateran Treaty, appeared to place a modified interpretation upon these rhetorical claims. Its first and second articles prescribe clearly that

> Italy, according to the terms of article 1 of the Treaty, assures to the Catholic Church free exercise of spiritual power, free and public exercise of worship, as well as jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters, in conformity with the regulations of our present concordat: where it is necessary, it assures to ecclesiastics the defence of its authority for acts of their spiritual ministry. . . .
>
> The Holy See communicates and corresponds freely with bishops, the clergy, and the whole Catholic world without any interference by the Italian Government. In the same way freely with their clergy and all the faithful. . . .

In practice, therefore, the Holy See has since the Lateran Treaty regarded itself as being not only the established religion of Italy, but also entitled to absolute immunity in all its ordinary activities. But the position has gradually been strained by the energetic development in recent years of the Pope's far-reaching programme of what is called 'Catholic Action.' The Pope himself claimed recently that the Catholic Action movement is more highly organised in certain other countries than in Italy. It is vigorously active all over Europe, in America and Australia, and not least in this country and in Ireland. Its general aim has been repeatedly described by the Pope as 'the participation and the collaboration of the laity with the Apostolic Hierarchy.' In Italy the movement has naturally flourished vigorously. It embraces all forms of lay activity—for men, women, and children alike—in that wider development of lay participation in the work of the Church which has been one of the chief characteristics of the present pontificate. Its affiliations include such work as the charitable visiting of the poor by members of the St. Vincent de Paul Society; the organisation of Catholic groups in the professions; the Catholic trade union and social reform movement; the pious confraternities and sodalities of men and women; the encouragement of vocations for the priesthood; the formation of Catholic scout troops and gymnastic federations for children and young people; and a great variety of other similar societies.

In no other country except Italy has this general Catholic Action movement, which the Pope has fostered with great energy and affection, aroused opposition. But in Italy, for reasons which are inevitable under any dictatorship, the Government has watched with jealousy every sort of organisation which might become a nucleus for the expression of political discontents. The Italian State is now organised on such an elaborate basis that it claims a monopoly in many directions, affecting almost every

sphere of ordinary life. And this ambitious programme of State direction and supervision is being supported by a deliberate inculcation of certain political ideas in all the schools and universities. Conflict with the Holy See has been gradually developing as a result of that system, for two reasons. One is that the State distrusts the efforts of the Church to organise large societies on a more or less professional basis, even though they are only organised for religious purposes. The other is that the attitude towards established government which is taught in Catholic schools all over the world is incompatible with the exaggerated hero-worship and State-worship which the Fascist system inculcates.

Even after the signing of the Concordat had seemed to provide a formula for reconciling otherwise incompatible doctrines, it was still highly probable that an open conflict would sooner or later be inevitable. It is not easy, however, to find the immediate occasion for the recent decision by the Fascist Government to denounce and suppress the Catholic Action societies. Anti-clerical outbreaks occurred in Rome at the end of May, for no apparent reason unless it were a repercussion of the revolution in Spain, but the Vatican claims that it had warnings of such possible trouble fully a month beforehand. Two days after the riots in Rome the Government suddenly took possession of all the Catholic Action offices and confiscated the correspondence kept in them.

The only immediate pretext for such intervention, apparently, was the publication of the Pope's encyclical on social questions (*Quadragesimo Anno*). In it he recalled and brought up to date the famous encyclical (*Rerum Novarum*) on the condition of the working classes which was issued forty years ago by Pope Leo XIII. The *Rerum Novarum* encyclical has long been recognised as the charter of the Catholic trade union movement. In view of the prevailing economic distress throughout the world it was decided to advance by ten years the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of its publication. Elaborate arrangements were made in all countries for its celebration in May, and were duly carried out with great fervour. Special pilgrimages, including a deputation from England, went to Rome for the occasion from all parts of the world.

The Catholic Action societies in Italy took the opportunity of holding their annual congress at the same time in Rome, for the first time since the Lateran Treaty was signed. The Pope's new encyclical, issued for the occasion, was a very powerful pronouncement. It renewed the former condemnations of Socialism and Liberalism (in the Continental sense of both words); and in reviewing the later developments of modern capitalism it condemned very strongly the modern tendency to eliminate small properties in order to establish enormous capitalistic combinations. His encyclical claimed that *Rerum Novarum* had shown the way to many of the social reforms which have since been widely adopted—from recognition of the right of the working class to combine in trade unions, to minimum wages and more reasonable hours of work, and insurance against sickness and unemployment. It outlined a definite programme of social reform for the future, but it contained nothing which could have provoked resentment in Italy.

The impressive magnitude and fervour of the Catholic Action Congress, however, appears to have roused alarm in the Government. The prospect of a new impetus being given to the Catholic trade union movement in Italy, as elsewhere, was not without menace to a Government which tolerates no political party other than its own. The Government thereupon took action quite unexpectedly against the Catholic Action societies as a whole, claiming that they were a political movement masquerading under religious banners. The Pope, with his usual energy and decision, retorted at once by issuing a special benediction to the Catholic Action movement, denying vehemently that it had any political character, and ordering all the bishops in Italy to assume personal direction of it in their districts. To this the Government replied with sweeping statements that the correspondence which had been seized left no doubt that the movement cloaked a political conspiracy against the State.

A more definite accusation was then brought forward by all the Government-inspired newspapers, that the Catholic Action movement was nothing else than a resuscitation of the Partito Popolare, of which Don Sturzo was the founder and the leader until his party was suppressed by the dictatorship in 1926. It was claimed that the Catholic Action movement was controlled by Don Sturzo's former associates. A striking instance of how effectively this propaganda was used appeared in the messages sent from Rome to the London *Daily Express*, which sent its principal foreign correspondent, Mr. Ketchum, to Italy to investigate. Among many inaccurate statements concerning Don Sturzo which Mr. Ketchum had received from authoritative sources in Rome, he explained that Don Sturzo, 'now living in lonely retirement in a Jesuit monastery in England,' was 'the one man above all others responsible for the present dangerous *impasse* between the Vatican and Mussolini,' and that his Partito Popolare had 'become a secret society,' which after the Concordat 'came out into the open and, under the ægis of the religious organisation Azione Cattolica, formed associations for political as well as religious purposes.' A few days later the *Daily Express*

published a long apology to Don Sturzo, accepting his correction, and explaining that he had resigned from the Azione Cattolica in 1918 and had never since had any relations with it, and also that he had never lived in a Jesuit monastery in England.

One statement in Don Sturzo's correction, however, is illuminating. He points out that his party won 107 seats in the Chamber in 1921. It was, broadly speaking, a Catholic democratic movement, formed under the inspiration of the social reform encyclicals of Leo XIII. and his successors, and it had a specially strong following among the Catholic trade unions. The suppression of his party by Signor Mussolini has left that very large element of Italian opinion without direct representation, and entirely out of sympathy with much of the Fascist *régime* and policy. Its members, being fervent Catholics, were inevitably attracted into the Catholic Action movement; and there can be no denying that they form a considerable proportion of it. The celebration of the *Rerum Novarum* encyclical naturally roused them to special enthusiasm. It is clear that the conflict between Mussolini and the Pope very largely concerns them. The Government is determined to prevent them from enrolling in large numbers in any powerful organisation, whereas the Pope welcomes their ardent support for his religious activities, and personally guarantees that they will not exploit religious societies for political purposes.

The controversy quickly grew embittered, and the Pope has continued to protest with remarkable vehemence. In one of the many recent addresses he has delivered to pilgrims from Catholic Action groups in other countries he told the pilgrims from Czechoslovakia early last month, 'You will be able to relate what you have seen; this monstrosity—that Catholic Action can flourish in the land of John Huss, and is persecuted in Peter's City.' The tone of the many diplomatic exchanges which have been proceeding has become more, rather than less, embittered. The Pope protests against what he denounces as a wholly unjustified act of aggression, and challenges the Government to produce any real evidence that the movement has ever become political in spite of his own orders. Up to the time of writing the Government has not even attempted to publish any such corroborative evidence from the correspondence which it seized all over Italy.

The conflict entered upon a new phase when, after the Government had replied to the Pope's protest by broadcasting a wireless statement of its case, the Pope issued a letter to all Catholic bishops, and had it published first abroad, instead of communicating it at the same time to the Italian Government. His action was denounced as a deliberate provocation, and Signor Mussolini quickly retaliated by announcing that membership of the Fascist

Party was henceforward incompatible with membership of Catholic Action. That result was anticipated, and the Pope's very unusual procedure in publishing his letter was clearly intended to impress the world with his difficulties. The *Osservatore Romano* was printed some hours earlier than usual, to prevent any possible interference with its despatch by post and through the agencies. And special couriers were sent from the Vatican to bring copies of the letter to Paris and to London, for transmission by telegraph from there. This was clearly intended to show the Pope's distrust of the Italian Government. The Vatican State has its own postal service, but its telegraphic communications are linked by agreement with the Italian system.

The incident was well calculated to impress the world with the importance of the Pope's sovereign independence. The *Osservatore Romano* would still be liable to censorship, and to suppression, if it were not printed within the Vatican State. And even the Papal couriers would be liable to interference if they were not provided with the diplomatic passports which the Vatican State can now issue. The wireless station erected under Signor Marconi's supervision within the Vatican also provides the Pope with a means of direct communication with the whole world, which cannot be interfered with unless an actual invasion of Papal territory were undertaken. The Pope himself has thus drawn attention to the importance of his immunity from Italian political influences. But it was the Pope also who insisted that the Treaty of the Lateran must depend upon the Concordat with Italy, and that Treaty and Concordat must stand or fall together. Actually the Concordat has been so gravely shaken by recent events that the position is decidedly unstable.

On both sides it is claimed that the Concordat has been violated. Its second article, for instance, guarantees that 'both the Holy See and the bishops may freely publish instructions, ordinances, pastoral letters, diocesan bulletins, and other acts regarding the spiritual government of the faithful which they may choose to issue within the province of their competence.' The Italian Government presumably contends that it is entitled to decide itself, for purposes of censorship, what is the 'province of competence' of the Holy See and of the bishops. But in practice it has repeatedly prohibited publication in the Italian newspapers of what other countries have published freely as important news. The Treaty of the Lateran also provides (article 8) that 'Italy considers the person of the Supreme Pontiff as sacred and inviolable. . . . Offences or insults publicly committed in Italian territory against the person of the Supreme Pontiff with spoken or written word are punishable as such offences or insults against the King.' There have been many such outrages, some of them

involving bloodshed, in the past few months, and the Pope has protested vigorously that the responsibility for them rests with the Italian Government.

On the other side, the Fascists complain that the Pope has himself violated both Treaty and Concordat by allowing the Catholic Action movement to be used for politics. But the Pope's detailed reply to that charge makes the accusation appear surprisingly absurd. He quotes the statement by the Government that 'the strongest argument that can be used in justification for the destruction of the Catholic circles of youth is the defence of the State, which is no more than the simple duty of every Government.' To that the Pope replies that every State has a perfect right to protect itself. But he points out that not only have the ladies' Sodalities of the Children of Mary been suppressed, but also among the 'circles of youth' 10,000, having a membership of 500,000 girls and young women. Even of these, 100,000 were little 'aspirants'; and over 150,000 more 'still smaller children called Benjamins.'

In regard to the Partito Popolare, the Pope does not deny that many of its former members have joined the Catholic Action societies. He says that the Government, which has cheerfully absorbed the former members of suppressed Masonic and other societies, ought to be glad that the former members of the Partito Popolare should have found a non-political outlet for their enthusiasms. He insists that in 1919, before the Fascists had even become a powerful party, it was decreed that 'no one who had occupied a position of responsibility in the Popular Party could at the same time hold any directive office in Catholic Action.' Moreover, recent inquiries have shown him that, since the suppression of the Popular Party, only four of its 'local ex-directors' had subsequently 'become local directors of Catholic Action.' He describes that number as 'infinitesimal,' in relation to the total of 250 diocesan committees, 4000 sections of Catholic men, and 5000 circles of Catholic youth.

The real root of the controversy would seem to lie in the Fascist determination to obtain a monopoly in the training of youth, to inculcate its own ideas of hero-worship and State-worship, as enunciated in the Fascist catechism and oath. The Pope roundly denounces that system as being essentially pagan. Without Catholic teaching, he insists, the youth of Italy will be trained in a purely pagan school. He has used many strong expressions, talked of 'persecution,' and of the 'destruction of religious sentiment and even of moral education.' It may well be asked whether the Pope's personal energy and force of character have not made the situation unnecessarily acute. But those very qualities have created the Catholic Action movement as a vital

force all over the world. Without Pius XI. there might have been less controversy, but there would probably have been much less Catholic activity also. Nor can it be assumed that the retirement of Cardinal Gasparri, and his replacement by a much younger Secretary of State, Cardinal Pacelli, has made any real difference. Those who followed the bitter controversy over the *Action Française* condemnation some years ago will remember the vigour with which Cardinal Gasparri conducted his part in it.

The Pope himself is never likely to behave differently than he did when he was Papal Nuncio in Warsaw, when the Bolshevist armies were advancing upon the city. He combines the indomitable courage of a great alpinist with the powerful intellectual abilities which made him a conspicuous success as the director of the Ambrosian Library in Milan, and later of the Vatican Library. He is the author of the Vatican State, and no one has better reason to know what practical advantages have been gained for the Church by its establishment. But if the Treaty and the Concordat, which he deliberately made dependent upon one another, are both to go by the board he is certainly not likely to make the slightest compromise to preserve an unstable situation. In his reply to the charges brought against Catholic Action by the Fascist Government he has stated his position once and for all.

> We must affirm with deep dismay [he wrote in his letter to the bishops of every country] that in our many years of active life as a librarian we have rarely seen an article so tendencious and so contrary to truth and justice in its references to the Holy See, to Italian Catholic Action, and particularly to the Associations which have been so harshly treated. If we should be silent, and if we should not contradict these things—that is to say, if we should permit them to be believed—we should be too much more unworthy than we are already to occupy this august Apostolic chair.

DENIS GWYNN.

BROADCASTING IN AMERICA

WITH an increasing recognition in most countries of the influence —potential, at least—of broadcasting, it is natural that there should be some interest in the system under which it is established and conducted in other countries, in the policy adopted, the methods followed, and the results obtained. As a matter of fact, there appears to be more interest on the part of other countries regarding British procedure than there is in this country in what is happening elsewhere. I am not referring here to the mere desire to listen to foreign programmes. Whether British programmes are more acceptable on the Continent than Continental programmes here, either in particular conjunctures or absolutely, is a question irrelevant to the main theme that is discussed in these pages. I shall, therefore, have little to say on the merits or demerits of programmes. Not only would this be improper, but there is no definite and universal criterion to apply, and there are too many factors of which account would need to be taken. It is quite easy, if one is so minded, and for ulterior or 'stunt' purposes, to engender a fury of indignation against the best programmes, and to label as 'poor' the output of a month because of the individual unsuitability of an hour.

But the interest taken in the B.B.C. by this country and by other countries may be (and in fact is) general as well as particular; it is not confined to the special service which the Corporation has to render. It extends to the constitution of the body and to the manner in which it is structurally fitted to meet its problems—quite apart from any critical judgment of the product, for the proof of the pudding is not entirely in the eating. This interest in the B.B.C. is due to the fact that the Company and the Corporation are, or at any rate were, experiments in a new and increasingly favoured type of public utility management; one may call it rationalised nationalisation, or nationalised rationalisation, as one prefers.

The essential requirements in the management of such services have been stated as follows:

(*a*) Public control over major policy;
(*b*) Absence of public interference in management;

(*c*) The right field of operation;
(*d*) Disinterestedness;
(*e*) Expertness.

Even in bodies as differently constituted as the Port of London Authority, the Central Electricity Board, the Imperial and International Communications Company, and the British Broadcasting Company and Corporation, it can certainly with some show of reason, and perhaps justly, be claimed that these requirements have all been met, and that the differences which they present are differences of degree rather than of nature. But in one the presence of elected representatives may be regarded as a derogation from (*b*); in another a dividend motive (even when the dividend is limited) and a 'trade' board may seem to prejudice (*d*). Obviously the extent of the prejudice caused by the participation of elected representatives in the consideration of what should be straightforward business obviously depends largely on the manner of the election and on the character of the individuals concerned. Similarly, disinterestedness need not be affected if the play of the dividend motive is in effect restricted to securing a reasonable interest on borrowed capital—though 'borrowed capital,' again, may take many forms with varying obligations and inconveniences attached to it.

The original Broadcasting Company (December 1922–December 1926) qualified under (*a*), through its Government licence, and in (*b*), (*c*) and (*e*) by virtue of its own policy and practice; but it was inevitably, though unjustifiably, suspect with respect to (*d*), its directorate being composed of representatives of the radio trade. By the establishment of the Corporation (January 1927) this objection was removed, and the situation with respect to (*a*) was strengthened. Nothing exactly similar had been achieved before. Doubts were expressed as to the wisdom of the change, chiefly on the basis that 'Government control,' or a vague 'political control' in some form or other, was somehow implicit. These are without foundation, but even to-day one hears the Corporation referred to as if it were literally a Government Department.

With regard to the right field of operation, there must be some definition of the adjective. According to the service in question, it may indicate an economic rightness only, or it may refer to the right determination of a more complex field made up of economic, technical, administrative, geographical, social and cultural elements. It was in view of some of these considerations that radio broadcasting in this country was inaugurated as a monopoly, or, to use a more satisfactory expression, under central control. The wisdom of this decision was before many months reinforced by the consideration of each of the remaining factors.

There is usually much to be said both for and against centralisation as against devolution of control, and radio broadcasting is no exception. It is in fact one of the cases in which there is most room for such an argument, since it involves so many of the subtlest and most intangible values, which cannot be subjected to the criteria of any customary or explicit scale.

Be that as it may, we have in these points, (*a*) and (*c*), with which (*d*) is more or less involved as a corollary, the fundamental difference between the British and American broadcasting systems. It may be inaccurate to speak of an American 'system' at all. There is actually no system in the ordinary sense of the term. But, even if negation of system produces that which is unsystematic, to say so is not necessarily to condemn it; for the result may be very good. What we have to do is to examine the facts. America has, not by positive decision after due deliberation, but spontaneously or by default of deliberation—whichever way one prefers to put it—built up her broadcasting practice on lines directly contrary to the British in respect particularly of these two factors. Reviewing the problem now (and Americans recognise that there is a problem; in other words, they are not quite happy about their broadcasting), they mostly seem to say, quickly and impulsively, 'Whatever happens we can't have monopoly and we can't have Government control.' In such terms many of them imagine that they dismiss the British system from any possible application to America. But there are two main misconceptions. One of these is obvious to those who understand the British system, which is certainly not under Government control. The other is not so obvious; it is, in fact, a matter for discussion—namely, whether a monopoly, to use the invidious term, must necessarily be accompanied by the positive and negative disadvantages so often associated with it.

One sets out, therefore, to persuade the sceptical American that our (*a*) and (*b*) are not incompatibles, that Government or public ownership in some form or another need not, at the outset and in the framing of the constitution, embrace Government or public management, or Government or public interference in management—quite the contrary in fact, for these must be obviated. But he has great difficulty in accepting such a possibility. Even if he can comprehend and accept the idea as an intention, he is almost sure to reject the possibility of its being carried out. 'For,' says he, 'what will be the plan of management? Who will the men be? Who will appoint them? How will they keep clear of political pressure and political interference? Won't they always have one eye on those who can stop their reappointment, and who in turn have their eyes on the constituents who elect them?' Well, we hear a great deal about 'politics' in America—politics in the sinister sense of the term, in municipal, State and Federal affairs, in the management of public services and in national and international matters. We also hear a good deal about gunmen, racketeers and gangsters in Chicago, for instance. The visitor to the States finds Chicago as peaceful and orderly (and, incidentally, as goodly) a city as any. Exaggerated reports, he thinks. But he questions responsible and representative men—and they are very frank—and he comes to the conclusion that reports are not so exaggerated after all, although some of the conclusions that he may have drawn are false. So also in the case of 'politics' he declines on second thoughts to believe all that he has heard; but here again his American friends are outspoken and categorical. To put the matter in the simplest way, and in terms of the broadcasting problem, they are unable to visualise a board of directors or governors, such as exists for broadcasting in this country and certain others, doing what they were charged to do, impartially, consistently and regardless of any consideration other than the good of the service. There is a distrust of the 'politician,' a dislike of him; but he is feared, and above all he is accepted. 'Inevitable? For all time, and in all his manifestations?' So it would seem, but one Briton—from previous residence in the country and many contacts with its citizens—may perhaps be permitted to have more faith in the future.

Such being the attitude in America towards anything in the nature of Government ownership—an attitude which remains substantially the same even after misunderstandings have been eliminated—central control appears to many to be excluded too. That, however, does not quite go without saying, since practically monopolistic services do already exist in the United States; this point also, therefore, must be examined by itself. Many arguments may be advanced in opposition to monopoly and in support of competition in general. But is it inevitable that a centralised system should carry all or any of these disadvantages? And, with respect to the benefits of competition, is it inconceivable that somehow or other these benefits should be incorporated in a centralised system? On the other hand, does not competition carry obvious and profound disadvantages in some spheres of activity, and is not radio broadcasting quite definitely one of these? Some arguments apply with more cogency than others, or have greater application to one country than to another. In any case, they range over the whole field of policy control, of administrative efficiency, of financial economy, of moral responsibility. There is nothing new in such arguments—except perhaps with respect to the last consideration. What really matters is the fact that the subject about which the arguments are bandied to

and fro is not merely new, but is already a profoundly important element in our civilisation, not to be handled in any spirit of levity or indifference or bias. And that is the great question. In the United States competition is practically unlimited and practically unbridled.

A word as to the situation in Canada. In 1929 a Royal Commission presided over by Sir John Aird, after careful investigation in different parts of the world, recommended the establishment in Canada of a body under federal control and on lines similar to the B.B.C., but permitting of considerable provincial autonomy. Nothing has been done since, and there is in Canada a sharp division of opinion on the matter. Arguments similar in nature, although less emphatic in degree, are being urged by the one party against the adoption of the Aird recommendations. I had an opportunity of meeting the two gentlemen who might be regarded as the protagonists of the respective parties. The misunderstandings of the British system, or at any rate of its application to Canada, were as obvious as in the United States.

I must also digress from consideration of the American situation to make an observation on a recent article in *The Nineteenth Century* commending the decentralisation in the German broadcasting system. The article was reasoned and interesting. But it should be pointed out that the Germans began decentralised, and that, for instance, whatever the Bavarian may be, he is certainly not a Prussian; that, in fact, Germany is still a grouping, for political purposes, of several States, formerly independent, and still widely differing in tradition, in outlook and in culture. In spite of this, however, a form of centralisation has been instituted in the form of the Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft, and the influence of this body and of large regional groupings is becoming increasingly effective and noticeable. The conclusion, therefore, is not quite as the writer of the article would suggest.

Until the passing of the Radio Act of 1927 there was literally no control over radio broadcasting in the United States. The department concerned could not refuse a transmitting licence, nor even assign a wave-length. In that year the Federal Radio Commission was established. The Commission consists of five persons appointed by the President, but the appointments have to be confirmed by the Senate for a period of six years. Their function is the licensing and technical regulation of radio transmitter stations of all kinds. It is in connexion with broadcasting, however, that their activities are most conspicuous and most necessary. They are empowered to put a station 'off the air,' if they do not consider it to be in the public interest that it should remain, but, on the other hand, they are required by the law to exercise no censorship over broadcast matter. How are these

two somewhat conflicting clauses to be interpreted? A great deal depends upon which is regarded as the more important. There is an elaborate system of appeal against the Commission's decisions, cases being re-examined first by their own examiners, then by the Commission again, and thereafter, if the applicants for new licences or renewals are still dissatisfied, by the courts. With things as they are, few could envy the Commissioners their job. If they offend a group of individuals in a particular State, they hear about it from the local congressman, or the local senator. If the Commission is criticised for not taking action where action seems to be manifestly required, the reply may be that it is not the fault of the Commissioners at all, but of the circumstances in which they are placed.

There are still over 600 broadcasting stations in America—far too many. The Commission has certainly done a great deal to clear up the chaos of mutual interference between stations. The country is now in trouble on this score with her neighbours to the north and south, but there appears to be little jamming or other technical interference internally. There is a system of allocation of wave-lengths, and where necessary of allocation of times. It is still easy, however, to secure a licence for broadcasting purposes, and there is little if any control of the quality of the matter offered for public consumption.

There is no clear answer to the question 'What do you think of American broadcasting?' To begin with, there are the two great companies, the National and the Columbia, each feeding and partly controlling a network of some eighty stations spread across the continent, although themselves owning three or four only. Then there are the more important individual stations. in whose operation a sense of responsibility is obvious. Beyond that, some hundreds of stations, of many of which the less one says the better. There is no licensing system for listeners. We are told that such an idea is inconceivable. Many individual inquiries in America elicited the reply that the individual himself would be delighted to pay an annual receiving-licence fee of $2.50 or even more, but doubts were frequently expressed as to whether other people would. There is, to begin with, a standing popular objection to anything which looks like Federal taxation. Further, with conditions as they are now, the division of licence revenue would present extraordinary and perhaps insuperable difficulties. But there is something else. It is with the licence fee idea just as it is with 'monopoly' and 'Government control.' Even if we eliminate the misunderstandings that so quickly gather around those terms, even if the American is convinced that he would be better served under public ownership or some form of centralised control and a licensing system, he will still in all probability say

that it cannot be done. There is a hopelessness and a defeatism about this attitude, and of all the factors producing it one would chiefly attribute it to the outlook upon 'politics' which has been alluded to above.

So to-day the expenses of the broadcasting programmes have to be met either by the owner of the station out of his own pocket, and presumably debited against an advertising or propaganda appropriation, or else by 'selling time.' The sale of time is, in fact, the standard method of financing the programmes. The commercial sponsor, *i.e.* advertiser, pays for the programmes and for the use of the technical facilities; to be fair, it should be added that some of the broadcasters employ part of this revenue for mounting 'sustaining' programmes during the unsold time. This sponsored system came into force towards the end of 1924, more or less accidentally, when the provision of programmes by the owners of stations for their own purposes was in general found to be no longer profitable. It may be that if the sponsor had not come forward so quickly, a licensing system would be in force to-day. As it is, the United States is one of the very few countries of any size in the world where no contribution is made by the listener. Sponsored programmes, be it observed, are by no means so terrible as they are sometimes represented to be. If they were, they would defeat their own purpose. But there are many who feel that they are on the road to doing so now, and I find it difficult to credit the argument advanced in one quarter, that the American public would take less interest in the programmes if they were not sponsored. Certainly I myself found evidence of a growing impatience with and even resentment against advertising.

The work of the great 'chains' (systems of wire-linked stations) is quite admirable. Their chief officials appreciate their responsibility to the medium and to the public. In the field of serious information and education, and perhaps even of serious music, the Americans would not claim to have made as much progress as has been made in this country; but there is an increasing recognition of the educational possibilities of the medium, and they are prepared to give facilities for educational material. They cannot, however, do so irrespective of other considerations. On the lowest terms they have to keep the service 'off the red'—to make it pay for itself. Sponsors naturally desire the best evening hours, and, although they are quite prepared to stand down on special occasions of national importance, it is not easy to visualise in the near future any serious and co-ordinated educational effort at times when most people are able and ready to receive it.

Whereas at one end of the scale American broadcasting is thoroughly bad, at the other end it is thoroughly good—provided,

of course, that one is prepared to accept the sponsored system and submit to the advertising matter which intrudes itself in greater or less degree throughout the evening. The president of the National Broadcasting Company is convinced that before long advertising material will be considerably reduced, and that, in fact, he will be in a position more or less to control the amount and content of it. I hope he is right. But I am satisfied that to-day he is unable to do all he would like to do, and that under the present system, or lack of system, he will never be able to make the best he can of his programmes. He and the president of the Columbia system, many of their colleagues, and many others associated in one way or another with broadcasting, have no doubt as full a realisation as anyone in any other country of the immense influence and of the immense responsibility of this new force. These gentlemen are as well able as any to discharge it worthily and fully. The fact is that they operate under handicaps—serious handicaps; and until these are removed, or at least mitigated, radio broadcasting will not be in America, and will not do for America, what it is, and is doing, elsewhere.

Things are, however, moving. Many stations are finding it hard to keep alive. They will drop out—in the opinion of many Americans, the quicker the better; and it is to be hoped that something will be done, perhaps by strengthening and activating the machinery of the Federal Radio Commission to speed up the process. Management is tending to concentrate, and the great 'chains' are extending the scope of their activities in proportion to the increasing dissatisfaction with the output of the minor local stations. There is a growing impatience with the abuse of the ether, or at any rate with the absence of responsibility and sincerity in its exploitation. In this matter public opinion is slow of mobilisation and somewhat inarticulate, but it is developing, and the more it develops the better it will be for those organisations mentioned, who are equipped to deal with the situation in a large way and a large spirit. The two great companies will in all probability become more and more powerful. They may continue their separate existence for many years, but even so, and to judge from their present attitude, the American people have everything to gain in the process of consolidation, even though it is not unification. And even the latter is not inconceivable. Large concerns in other fields of activity in this country and in America have, within a year or two of merging, disclaimed any possibility of such a happening. Were the two great chains eventually to come together there would inevitably be an increased measure of public control, either through the Federal Radio Commission, or a reconstituted Commission made independent of 'politics,' or some other organ yet to be established. What would the position

be then as compared with that in our own country? In all essential points the five requirements tabulated at the beginning of this article would appear to be met.

Almost all other countries in the world now have systems operating in a similar manner to the British. Many of them are endeavouring to approximate more nearly to it. There are certainly problems in America peculiar to that country, but every country has its own problems, and the Americans are not likely indefinitely to permit their shibboleths to stand in the way of their getting the best from their broadcasting service. The British system by no means involves a renunciation of the individualism so precious to American sentiment. Institutionalism and individualism are both demanded in this field. And it is the absence of the institution which is preventing the best men from doing their best work, and, at the same time, permitting others to operate without much idea of their responsibility to the public or of the possibilities awaiting the touch of a wise idealism.

J. C. W. REITH.

A DECLINING PEOPLE

BRITISH vital statistics have changed so rapidly in recent years that, I confess, I feel a fresh sense of astonishment every time I approach them. It is the incredible that has happened. Twenty years ago none would have believed that such a sea-change could have been brought about so soon. The swift movement of the figures is charged with profound importance; it is the life of the nation which is now at stake. The facts here adduced will show that the Registrar-General's quarterly return entitled 'Births and Deaths' might be well entitled 'Report on a Declining People.'

Birth-rates and death-rates make little or no impression upon the public at large. Quarter by quarter a few lines are devoted to the subject in the newspapers, as to a matter of small importance; a little higher than the dogs, a little lower than the horses. It avails nothing to tell readers that the birth-rate is lower than ever before. Many people, perhaps the great majority, believe that there are far too many of us already, and news that the nation is still increasing year by year is regarded as recording an undesirable fact. The popular view of the economics of population is cordially endorsed by most educated people. It is that there is not enough work to go round, and that the sooner we reduce our numbers the better for those that remain. In this view, now apparently accepted by the nation at large, the sterile woman is a benefactor of society, since she adds no more ordinary shareholders to a company which is believed to be unable to increase its revenues.

Most people know that the Irish people were long ago so dispersed by misfortune and emigration that whereas in 1841 the population of Ireland was over 8,000,000 it is now little more than one-half that number. The decline of Ireland continues. Scotland and Wales also are now in actual decline. What increase of the British population still remains is attributable to England alone. Even as to England, however, the 'natural increase,' as it is termed—the excess, that is, of births over deaths—is purely illusory. England is in virtual decline, the fact being masked for the present by the survival of individuals who are not being

replaced by new births. National sterility has already reached such a point that the recorded births are not sufficient to replace the existing population. The nation's inheritors have been so far reduced that if the present rate of reproduction continues the nation will die out. If that is to be counted success, the control of births has been already completely successful. But the birth-control propaganda continues, and a thousand social agencies assist it. The success, therefore, is likely to succeed increasingly.

The provisional returns for England and Wales and for Scotland of the census taken in April have been issued, and it is clear from the comments in the Press that their remarkable character has not been fully realised. They show that in the ten years 1921–31 the population of England and Wales rose by 2,061,232 to 39,947,931, while the population of Scotland fell by 39,943 to 4,842,554. Thus the population of Great Britain was raised to 44,790,485. Let us set out the figures of each census since 1901 :

POPULATION OF GREAT BRITAIN

Census of		Persons.	Increase in Ten Years.
1901.	England and Wales . .	32,527,843	
	Scotland	4,472,103	
	Total . . .	36,999,946	
1911.	England and Wales . .	36,070,492	
	Scotland	4,760,900	
	Total . . .	40,831,394	3,831,450
1921.	England and Wales . .	37,886,699	
	Scotland	4,882,497	
	Total . . .	42,769,196	1,937,800
1931.	England and Wales . .	39,947,931	
	Scotland	4,842,554	
	Total . . .	44,790,485	2,021,289

Now we can see at a glance the amazing thing that has happened. In the ten years 1901–11 the British population increased by 3,831,450. In the next censal period, however, the

increase was no more than 1,937,800—as nearly as possible one-half the increase of the preceding ten years. This great fall, however, was largely due to the World War, which killed over 700,000 of our young men and divorced millions from family life for several years. Let us remind ourselves of the number of men who were called to arms. In August 1914 it was 730,000; in December 1915 it was 2,650,000; in December 1916 it was 3,450,000; during 1917 and 1918 it was nearly 4,000,000. Even in December 1919 it was still 700,000. Thus for five years a large part of the manhood of the country was in military service.

Turning from the census of 1921 to that of 1931, we are now able to appreciate the incredible character of the changes. It is clear that in the ten years 1921–31 the number of lives suppressed by birth-control was at least as great as were killed or suppressed by the war, for the increase in the population in the last ten years was roundly the same as in the previous ten years.

Even this survey, however, does not bring out the full extent of the suppression of life which occurred, and for two important reasons. The first of these is that there was a heavy fall in the death-rate in 1921–31 as compared with 1911–21. The second is that there was little migration in 1921–31 as compared with 1911–21. If we take the record of births in England and Wales we get the following facts :

BIRTHS IN ENGLAND AND WALES

During	Number of Births.
1911–21	8,281,000
1921–31	6,930,000
Fall . . .	1,351,000

Despite the war, 8,281,000 children were born in England and Wales in the ten years 1911–21. In the next ten years, in time of peace, the number fell to 6,930,000—a decline of 1,351,000 !

Moreover, the latter years of the last inter-censal period exhibited the greatest decline. The census averages the ten years reported upon. Let us note, then, that in 1922 the birth-rate in England and Wales was over 20 ; that it was still over 18 in 1925 ; that even in 1928 it was 16·7 ; and that last year it fell to 16·3.

It comes to this, that British society in the last ten years has elected to inflict upon itself a loss of life much greater than was inflicted upon it by all the deadly scientific devices of the Germans in 1914–18. We may remind ourselves that when Augustus Cæsar legislated against the celibates of Rome he declared them to be, in effect, slayers of the Roman people.

The Registrar-General's Report on the Census points out that England and Wales have now a lower birth-rate than any other country except Sweden, and adds that whereas a birth-rate of about 19·5 per 1000 is necessary if a future decline in population is to be avoided, our actual birth-rate is now about 16 per cent. below this modest figure. He goes on to say that, 'though further slight increments in the total population may be expected during the next two decades owing to a rapidly expiring, but not quite exhausted momentum imparted by the higher birth-rates of the past, there can be no doubt that, failing a considerable rise above the present birth-rate figure—of which there is no sign at present—a population maximum will then be reached and will be followed in its turn by a small but increasing decline.'

These remarks of the Registrar-General have been interpreted to mean that the British decline will be a slow one. What Mr. Vivian actually says is conditional. He does not and cannot measure the future course of either the birth-rate or of migration. All the forecasts of the past have failed—and we need not wonder that they have failed—to take account of the astonishing 'success' of the birth-control movement. Among the great masses of the people, including both the middle and working classes, it is becoming rare to find a home containing more than one child.

It is not realised that the nation is already in virtual decline. While births exceed deaths the nation is believed to be still preserving and increasing its posterity. That is very far from being true. What we have to inquire is this: are children being born in numbers sufficient to *replace* the existing population? The answer to this all-important question is No. The fertility of British women at the present time is inadequate to replace the population. The aggregate population is still loaded with the survival of the older, larger families, but when these die they will, in too many cases, leave no heirs. For the same reason, the average age of the population is rising, and as the nation grows up, unreplenished by an adequate supply of new births, the death-rate will presently rise, because a larger proportion of the population will have attained those years in which death is rife.

Let us be clear as to the conditions of replenishment of the population. These have been stated with admirable brevity by Mr. Robert R. Kuczynski in his study of population entitled *The Balance of Births and Deaths*. He says:

> If each woman has two children who become parents in their turn, the population will hold its own. If she has three such children, the population will increase by one-half within one generation. If she has less than two such children, the population will sooner or later decrease.

And, applying this to the particular case of England, he says:

> Let us, for a moment, consider England, which in 1927 had 655,000 births and 485,000 deaths. It may seem at first sight that an excess of 170,000 births is a proof of considerable vitality and it may even be assumed that by further improvement in public health the number of deaths might still be reduced. Yet, incredible as it may sound, those 655,000 births of 1927 means that on the average each woman during her life-time gives birth to but two children, and that if the population is to hold its own not one of the children thus born must die before attaining parenthood. In case, then, that natality does not again increase, the population of England is bound to die out, no matter how low mortality may be reduced.

On the fertility figures of 1927 England was already in virtual decline. Since 1927 the birth-rate has again fallen and is now barely more than 16 per 1000 of the population. There is every indication that it will fall still further; there is every likelihood of a fall to 12 or even 10 per 1000; the former rate has already been achieved in some districts.

In the course of a little while, that is, the number of children born in a year in England and Wales will probably fall to about 450,000, while the deaths will greatly exceed that number. In these circumstances, a moderate rate of emigration would reduce the nation rapidly and seriously.

We do not know when actual decrease will come, or at what rate it will proceed. All past calculations, and many have been published, have been falsified by the amazing acceleration in the fall in the birth-rate. Thus *The Round Table* of September 1928, in a thoughtful paper on the subject, quoted an estimate made as recently as 1924 'on the hypotheses that the annual number of births is the same as in 1921–23, that the death-rates are as in 1910–12 and that there is no migration.' But the birth-rates in the years in question were 22·4, 20·4 and 19·7 per 1000 respectively, whereas in 1928 there had already occurred a fall to 16·7. As we have seen, the rate is now about 16. A rate of 19 to 20 per 1000 is needed merely to maintain the population without increase.

Indeed, so many agencies combine to reduce British fertility that we may well wonder where, short of zero, the fall is to be stayed. It is already at zero for a great army of women. Between the ages of fifteen and fifty-five the number of females in England and Wales exceeds the number of males by 1,300,000. That excess, however, by no means represents the number of unmarried women. If we take the period of fertility, fifteen to forty-five, the number of unmarried women is exceedingly greater than the excess of females over males; it amounts roundly to

5,000,000. As to the married, there is a growing number of people who enter deliberately into what may be called nominal marriages, marriages which by agreement are to remain infertile. Families of more than two are rare, so rare that those consisting of three children and upwards are not nearly numerous enough to give us that average of over two children per woman which is necessary merely to maintain the population. A large proportion of the population has thus, either by election or through misfortune, determined, in effect, that the nation shall not continue.

No doubt social, industrial and commercial developments play their part in the issue. The marriage-rate has fallen, although not nearly as much as the birth-rate, and it will naturally fall continuously as the proportion of young people in the population declines. Marriage associated with family life is likely to decline further through the rapidity of the changes in social habits and the great growth of the amusement industries. The number of licensed motor cars, motor cycles and dogs increases as rapidly as births decrease; it is obvious that small incomes cannot support both a family and a motor car. The conception that a child is a luxury is as absurd as it is harmful, but it is nevertheless widely accepted. A child ought not to have money lavished upon it, and it were perhaps better for the nation, much as it needs children, to go without many of the spoiled specimens of our numerous one-child homes. The wise rich man keeps his children 'poor'; all children ought to be poor in the sense of being kept from luxury.

Dean Inge thinks that 'we must acquiesce in and even welcome a shrinking population, for we cannot resist the inevitable trend of social evolution.' He then goes on, with delightful confusion of thought, to add, 'But this does not mean the break-up of the family. It will make marriage much more attractive to an intelligent woman, who wishes to have two or three children, but not to be a mere domestic drudge.' But, if our women endowed us with three children apiece, the population would *not* shrink. On the contrary, it would make a healthy increase which would at once keep the nation well replenished with new lives and provide a small surplus for emigration. Why acquiesce in the decline and fall of the British Empire when plain thought and plain speaking on the most important of all questions might yet save the situation? It is not that the nation needs large families, or even families averaging four or five. It is not that we need oppose family limitation, or demand drudgery of women. As we have seen, families of three, allowing for the spinsterhood of a certain proportion of women, would preserve our posterity.

Turning to the economic side of the problem, it is for consideration that the nation as a whole is growing old. The child population is falling so seriously that we shall soon have to pull down many of our schools. The new entrants into industry will rapidly decline. Few realise that in the last two years the fall in the number of children attending school in London was 48,943. The fall in 1919–1929 was as much as 138,529; we may note the acceleration of decline. At the other end of the scale, the aged are becoming an increasing burden. The persons among us over fifty-five years of age now number over 16 per cent. of the population, whereas eight years ago they formed only 11½ per cent.

It has been often repeated, so often that it has come to be universally believed, that the poor are still multiplying rapidly and that it is the educated classes who are responsible for the fall in the birth-rate. Upon this absurd misunderstanding many arguments have been founded. The most elementary knowledge of arithmetic should make it obvious that the heavy fall in the national birth-rate cannot be a result of the limitation of families by a limited class. The fact is that all classes are restricting their families, and that the poor are beginning to limit them more narrowly than the well-to-do. It is common now to find a labourer with only one child. To illustrate this point on a large scale, let me quote the case of the Borough of East Ham, London, East.

As recently as 1914 East Ham, a district in which the income tax paying classes are conspicuous by their absence, had 42,959 children under the age of fourteen years. The last report of the East Ham Education Committee shows that the borough has now only 30,511 children under fifteen years of age, and that the number of children of compulsory school age is only 21,227. The borough has as nearly as possible one child per house. One may indulge a faint hope that the publication of such facts may call a halt to the oft-repeated statement that the 'masses' are still breeding too freely and that the 'classes' are ceasing to breed because of the iniquity of the income tax. The truth, as is so often the case, is the very reverse of a well-worn fallacy. I think there is no doubt that we shall very soon arrive at a condition in which the working classes will become the chief exponents of birth-control; indeed, they are the subjects of a special intensive propaganda.

There are those among us who quite honestly and sincerely admire and rejoice in this process of national self-destruction. They believe, and are, I suppose, entitled to believe, that there are already too many people in Britain, that unemployment is largely a question of not enough work to go round among so many, and that the sooner we reduce ourselves to 30,000,000 or even 25,000,000 the better for everybody. Give us quality, they

say, and a small nation with plenty of work to do, rather than a big nation worried by social problems which are the direct result of too many children being born.

I do not myself share the view that British unemployment is a problem of over-population. I believe that every child is born with a pair of hands and, save in exceptional cases due to race poisons, with the natural gifts of its race. I believe that when we consider the splendid British home resources (which include the finest coal in the world close to good ports), the special and magnificent resources of the British Empire, and the general resources of the world at large, it is something worse than ridiculous for the British race, having painted so much red on the maps, to refuse to people the areas in which it has hoisted its flag.

I go further and say that history knows no record of a race increasing in prosperity while it declines in numbers, and that, if and when Britain succeeds in reducing her population to 35,000,000, she may easily contain a larger proportion of unemployed persons than exist at this moment, while, of course, the 35,000,000 will have upon their shoulders a much larger burden of aged lives than we now possess.

It is true that Britain is not the only country in the world which is set upon decline. Germany, Scandinavia, France—all now exhibit a fertility which is insufficient to maintain their peoples. France, the France of real Frenchmen, has diminished since the Franco-German War, and her population has been barely maintained in numbers by the importation of millions of aliens. In Africa, France trains a black army for those future wars in which, even more than in 1914, there will not be enough Frenchmen to march against the enemy. It is a curious thought that it was through French birth-control that millions of English boys had to go to France in 1914–1918.

The British case is much worse than that of France, however, because our fertility is even less and our responsibilities much greater. There is the British Empire, almost entirely unpeopled by whites. In all the Dominions, Colonies, and Protectorates there are at the present time only about 21,000,000 white people, or, say, about 4,000,000 families, and of these about one-fourth are not of British stock. Canada has a population smaller than that of Argentina, the great continent of Australia has fewer people than Greater London, and New Zealand 50 per cent. more people than the city of Glasgow. In all these places, as at home, the birth-rates are falling, and enormous areas, the use of which the world badly needs, are withheld from due development. If with Dean Inge we accept as ' inevitable ' a shrinking population. the British Empire must fail for want of material, and all the

grandiose Imperial programmes of the politicians are conceived in vain. I know of no more serious political consideration in the world than that France and Britain, both declining in population, possess 24,000,000 out of the 56,000,000 square miles forming the world's entire land area.

If this article is true, and I have given the evidence, the widely accepted view that Britain is necessarily declining in prosperity should be completely abandoned. The danger before the nation is not that it lacks the means to support the existing or a larger population, but that failure may come through lack of new births and the mentality which is depriving Britain of its vital inheritance. Great Britain is an island so favoured by nature for modern industrial operations that its people have no cause to fear the future, which unfortunately is not the same thing as saying that they are not possessed by fear. Britain, indeed, is fearing her fate too much. There is no other area in the world, not even in the United States, so favoured by nature for work as the island of Britain. Why, then, should the British people imagine that the markets of the world, which are not yet more than fractionally developed, will not afford them in the future larger opportunities than in the past? The current preaching of a gospel of despair is an astonishing phenomenon, and if it is not effectively countered it will be proved in fact that nothing fails like failure. And if, possessing unparalleled resources, Britain reduces her population while clinging to the magnificent territories she refuses to people, she will raise world questions of a very serious character.

LEO CHIOZZA MONEY.

GENERAL PERSHING AND THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

GENERAL PERSHING, in his account of his stewardship during the Great War,[1] says that he has written for the American people 'without consciously magnifying or minimising the effort of any army of any people.' His main object has been to explain to his fellow-citizens how greatly the cost of the war to them in effort and in money was increased by the lack of adequate preliminary preparation. By far the greater part of his book is therefore taken up with the difficulties he encountered in his effort to create an American army. These difficulties he ascribes in the first place to the rigid view of the requirements of neutrality held by President Wilson's Administration right up to the declaration of war by the United States, to lack of appreciation in Washington of his requirements, to the fact that to the very end he had to rely on his allies to supply him with guns, aircraft and tanks, and lastly to the constant interference with his plans by the French and ourselves, due to eagerness to get American troops into the line alongside, or intermingled with, our armies. We are not in a position to adjudicate upon General Pershing's criticisms of American policy and of American administration, though much that he has to say on these matters is of interest and value to us, but some of his comments upon our aims and methods invite reply.

It is often said that the reluctance of the United States to participate in the affairs of Europe in other than business fields is due, not merely to respect for the advice of George Washington, but also to a conviction amongst Americans that they do not understand European methods, and to a fear that their honest negotiators will be hoodwinked and bamboozled by more cunning and astute European politicians. One still frequently hears in the United States that such was the result of the Washington Naval Conference. Much that General Pershing has written leaves the impression that he came to Europe subconsciously influenced by these suspicions, and that in approaching us he

[1] *My Experiences in the World War*: John J. Pershing. (Hodder & Stoughton, 31s. 6d.)

was normally on the defensive. Some of his comments seem singularly naïve and lacking in understanding in a book published thirteen years after the war.

General Pershing landed in England on June 8, 1917, and, after he had been received by the King, he was taken to see one of our training centres. He comments on the fact that we were sending recruits out to the front after only nine weeks' training, and that training was confined to trench warfare. 'Much to my surprise they gave little thought to the possibilities of open warfare in the near future, if at all.' This first impression of our training methods seems to have lingered, for he again and again throughout the book refers to them. He ascribes our losses in March 1918 largely to the fact that our men were not trained for open warfare, and refers repeatedly to the superiority of the American methods. It does not seem to have occurred to General Pershing that in the summer of 1917 we had to limit training at home to a bare minimum in order to fill the gaps in our ranks, and that he was able to give as much time as he wanted for training because we and the French were holding the line for him.

In point of fact, Haig's constant endeavour was to have a reasonable number of divisions out of the line for training, and there was a continual conflict between the very natural demand of the French that we should take over more line and Haig's equally natural insistence on the vital importance of more opportunities for training. In the event, our methods produced results which dwarf those of the American Expeditionary Force. From August 8, 1918, when we began the Battle of Amiens, up to November 11, our operations took on increasingly the character of open warfare. In that period we drove the Germans back some 80 miles, capturing 200,000 prisoners and 2080 guns. The American experience of open warfare was limited to ten days in November 1918; the depth of their final advance from Avocourt, begun on September 26, to Sedan was 35 miles, and until November 1 they were engaged in bitter trench warfare. Their captures amounted to 26,000 prisoners and 874 guns. Yet General Pershing thinks that we and the French failed to set that example of aggressiveness which he was trying to inculcate, and says that, 'after considerable experience, it was the inevitable conclusion that, except for the details of trench warfare, training under French or British was of little value.' The inevitable conclusion would seem to be rather, that while it is hard to learn from the experience of others, it is supremely hard when the others belong to another nation.

General Pershing reached Europe at the time of the greatest crisis on the Allied side during the war. The mutinies which

followed on the failure of Nivelle's campaign had rendered the French army incapable for the time of offensive action, while it was at least doubtful whether it could withstand a serious German attack. The Russian revolution, begun three months earlier, if it did not yet make certain the complete collapse of the Eastern Front, had already caused the Allied commanders to discount help from that quarter. Above all, the ravages of the 'U' boat warfare were making it at least possible that we might be forced by the danger of starvation to make peace. We know now from the last volume of our Official Naval History, just published, that on April 27 Jellicoe had told the Government: 'The real fact of the matter is this. We are carrying on the war at the present time as if we had an absolute command of the sea, whereas we have not such command or anything approaching it.' He proposed that in order to shorten our sea communications we should withdraw from Salonika; that we should only bring troops from the Dominions in ships which also carried essential supplies, should cease importing coloured labour, and should ruthlessly and immediately stop the importation of everything that was not essential.

From April to June the shipping losses had gone on mounting. In the latter month they reached 700,000 tons, and between the inception of unlimited 'U' boat warfare and the end of June they had mounted to 2,000,000 tons. There can be no doubt that the entry of the United States into the war helped materially to tide over this grave crisis, and that General Pershing's arrival in Europe as the forerunner of the American army had a most encouraging effect at a time when encouragement was badly needed. The French, for obvious reasons, kept the extent and effect of the mutinies very secret, but we told General Pershing in confidence of the serious state of affairs at sea, and Admiral Sims, who was already at work in London, confirmed all that we said. But he appears to have thought that we were exaggerating: 'It seemed to me, however, that they allowed their pessimism to carry them too far.' When he came to London a second time in April 1918 we made a mistake in putting him up at the Savoy Hotel and in doing him as well as possible, for his comment is: 'Little evidence of food shortage at the Savoy where we are stopping.' We should probably have done better for ourselves if we had provided him with ration cards and taken him round to see the food queues. He never seems to have believed that we were honest about the state of our shipping.

Owing to all the difficulties and delays which he describes it was not until October 1917, seven months after the United States entered the war, that the first American division went into the line with French assistance on a quiet section of the

front in Lorraine. At the end of the year there were four American divisions in France, and on January 9, 1918, General Pershing told Sir William Robertson that 'no one in the world could even guess' when more American divisions would reach France. Now by November 1917 the Russian collapse was complete and the steady procession of German divisions from the Eastern to the Western Front was in full swing. Our own man-power and that of the French was approaching exhaustion. The French had already decided to reduce the number of their divisions in the field in order to maintain the strength of the remainder. We had come to the conclusion that we should be forced to disband one battalion in each British brigade for the same reason, and this in fact we did in January. Naturally both we and the French were anxious to have the greatest possible help from the American army by the spring.

If in the winter of 1917–18 the situation of the Allies on land appeared to be critical, that at sea had fortunately taken a pronounced turn for the better. Sir Henry Newbolt, the official naval historian, says truly that during the summer of 1917 'the threat to our overseas supplies continued to overshadow every other problem of the war.' But by November the introduction of the convoy system, the reinforcement of destroyers supplied by the United States, and the improvements in our methods of submarine detection and of mine sweeping had wrought a remarkable change. The shipping losses, which in June had amounted to 700,000 tons, in November had fallen to 232,000 tons. In the first half of 1917, eighty-nine British merchant vessels had been sunk or seriously damaged by mines; in the second half of that year the number had dropped to forty-eight. By November we were, with American naval help, definitely on the way to get control of the German 'U' boat menace and to sweep up the German minefields. Now in that month we and the French had each to send five divisions to Italy in consequence of the disaster to the Italians at Caporetto, and this, added to the shortage of man-power to which I have already referred, made the question of American help more urgent. I was the Director of Military Operations at the War Office, and, as the problems of sending reinforcements to any of our numerous theatres of war and of transporting troops from one theatre to another depended primarily on the shipping available, I naturally kept in touch with the Shipping Controller. Towards the end of November I learned from him that for the first time in 1917 there was then likely to be a surplus of shipping over essential requirements, which could be made available for the movement of troops. It then occurred to me that, as more American divisions were not ready and were not likely to be ready in time to meet the

anticipated German attack in the spring, it might be possible to get American battalions over to take the places of the battalions to be disbanded in our brigades if we offered the United States the necessary shipping, and I put the proposals in the form of a memorandum for my chief, Sir William Robertson, and he put them to General Pershing. At this interview Pershing tells us Sir William Robertson began by saying that unless the Americans could furnish man-power to build up British divisions ' there was the possibility of the British reaching such an exhausted condition by the severe fighting in prospect that the Allies would have a very heavy task in winning the war.'

That, I am confident, is the only thought that was in our minds. There was a crisis ahead for which we wished to provide, and we proposed the temporary incorporation of American battalions in our brigades as the best available expedient in the circumstances.

The Americans were taking an unconscionably long time to send over troops, and, while we did not know all the reasons for delay of which General Pershing has now informed us, we were well aware that reinforcements were urgently needed before the spring. It never occurred to us to consider that the creation of an American army was of greater importance than meeting an imminent German attack, nor that we should be charged with delaying deliberately the creation of that army for our own ends. We wanted to win the war. Yet this is how General Pershing continues his account of his interview with Sir William Robertson :

> The arguments General Robertson advanced clearly indicated that the British were playing for advantage to themselves in offering to transport our troops. In other words, they had the shipping to transport American battalions on condition that they would serve in the British armies. Their purpose was to build up their own units instead of aiding the cause in general by augmenting the number of complete combat divisions on the Western Front.
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> The question that naturally arose in my mind was that if tonnage was available for this purpose, why had it not been offered to us some time before, or, indeed, why not at that very moment. If the broad view had prevailed that our forces would add just as much to the strength of the Allies, they could have provided the additional shipping quite as well before as after the crisis of March. We could then have brought several more divisions to France and had them prepared to go into the line much earlier than was otherwise possible. And it is conceivable that they might have been able to prevent the disasters that came to the British in March and to the French in May. But of course the British were not thinking in terms of the American army at all.

It is perhaps natural that General Pershing, in his eagerness to hasten the creation of an American army in the field, should

have thought at the time that we were exaggerating, in our own interest, the danger of a German attack in the spring, or that he should have forgotten how critical had been the shipping situation. But it is amazing that he should have published this passage in this year of grace, when the full facts are available. In the event, after much further discussion, I signed on behalf of Sir William Robertson, an agreement with him on January 30, 1918, at Versailles, that British shipping should be used to bring over entire American divisions, and that the infantry of those divisions should be trained with our army. Before this agreement had taken effect the great German attack of the spring had begun, and within a few weeks we were fighting, as Haig said, ' with our backs to the wall.' That effort cost us considerably heavier casualties than were suffered by the American army throughout the war, and of it the American troops in France were spectators. Had General Pershing accepted our proposal early in December there might well have been in France before the German attack such a reinforcement as would have brought that attack to a standstill at an early stage. This would almost certainly have ante-dated the German collapse and saved many lives and much treasure. It would seem that General Pershing became so obsessed by the difficulties and delays which he encountered in the creation of an American army, difficulties and delays which were certainly not caused by his Allies, that he allowed the problem of creating that army to obscure in his mind the facts and requirements of the military situation.

On July 10, 1918, Pershing went to see Foch to urge upon the *generalissimo* once more the vital importance of expediting the creation of an American army :

> I went on to say that with American units scattered all along the Western Front, assigned to no particular zone for future operations, we were postponing the day when an American army would be able to render its greatest help to the Allied cause. I stressed the point that we were thus dissipating our resources for lack of a plan and were not in a position to utilise the full capacity of our facilities. Instead of thinking of the future, even the immediate future, we were merely temporising. In short, if we were to do our part to the best advantage, we should at once have a definite place at the front which could be served by our own lines of communication.

We learn from the recently published memoirs of Marshal Foch that at this interview Pershing requested Foch to withdraw artillery from the French army to complete the American divisions. Foch's reply to that request, given in his memoirs but not by General Pershing, is clear and conclusive :

> On July 10 [1918] he [Pershing] came to see me with a request to expedite as much as possible the formation into army corps of American divisions in the French zone ; he also asked me to furnish artillery for

those divisions which had none, drawing it, if need be, from French units. I was emphatic on this occasion in once more assuring General Pershing that no one desired more fervently than myself the constitution of American corps and armies, and sectors in which American troops would fight an American battle, and that my best efforts were being directed to this end. I was, indeed, firmly convinced that the soldiers of any country only give of their best when fighting under their own leaders and under their own colours. National esteem is then engaged. General Pershing's experience and character, moreover, were a guarantee that, whenever he might engage American troops, he would only halt after success had been achieved. Unfortunately the lack of guns still prevented the furnishing of artillery to all the American divisions or army corps which it might have been possible to form. However, the object of the Entente was to obtain an indispensable superiority in numbers, and it would scarcely have accorded with its interests to deprive French units of their artillery for the benefit of American divisions. On the contrary, the American divisions which had no artillery would be very advantageously used to relieve French divisions in quiet sectors, and so make the latter available for battle.

General Pershing found other reasons for withdrawing American troops from the British and French armies as quickly as possible, and these have naturally given considerable offence. On July 28, 1918, he wrote to Mr. Secretary Baker:

I have had to insist very strongly, in face of determined opposition, to get our troops out of leading strings. You know the French and British have always advanced the idea that we should not form divisions until our men had three or four months with them. We have found, however, that only a short time was necessary to learn all they know, as it is confined to trench warfare almost entirely, and I have insisted on open warfare training. To get this training, it has been necessary to unite our men under our own commanders, which is now being done rapidly.

The additional fact that training with these worn-out French and British troops, if continued, is detrimental, is another reason for haste in forming our own units and conducting our own training. The *morale* of the Allies is low, and association with them has had a bad effect upon our men. To counteract the talk our men have heard, we have had to say to our troops, through their officers, that we had come over to brace up the Allies and help them to win and that they must pay no attention to loose remarks along that line by their Allied comrades.

The fact is that our officers and men are far and away superior to the tired Europeans.

This, by no means the only reflection on Allied *morale*, was written ten days after Foch's counter-attack on the Marne, which started the Allied advance to victory, had begun, and from July 18 'the tired Europeans' drove the Germans back for the best part of two months before the American army, constituted as such, took a hand. The fact is that the Americans came to France with the enthusiasm and valour of ignorance, just as did our own new army divisions, and they mistook the cynicism born of experience for depression.

Eventually in September 1918 the American army under General Pershing's command took the field; on the 12th of that month it began an attack which in four days obliterated the St. Mihiel salient.. This was a complete and brilliant success, but was, after all, a minor incident in Foch's whole plan. General Pershing exaggerates somewhat when he says:

The St. Mihiel victory probably did more than any single operation of the war to encourage the tired Allies. After the years of doubt and despair, of suffering and loss, it brought them assurance of the final defeat of an enemy whose armies had seemed well nigh invincible.

Three weeks before the Battle of St. Mihiel was begun Haig had sounded his trumpet call to his armies, telling them that a great change had come over the situation and urging them to press forward with the utmost energy. Before a shot was fired at St. Mihiel we had driven the Germans right across the battle-fields of the Somme, had captured Peronne and Bapaume, and were too much occupied with our own achievements to give more than a passing cheer to the Americans of St. Mihiel.

A fortnight after St. Mihiel, on September 26, the American army began its part in Foch's general advance on the Meuse-Argonne front, and there what Clemenceau called 'Pershing's invincible obstinacy' got him into difficulties. Pershing's original proposal was that the American army should follow up the St. Mihiel attack by a general advance eastwards through Lorraine, but towards the end of August Foch had become convinced that Haig was right and that the time had come to go all out for victory in 1918—'Tout le monde à la battaille'; and the battle was to take the form of a general advance towards the Maubeuge-Charleroi-Sedan railway, the backbone of the German internal communications on the Western Front. To this end Foch wanted American help in the attack northwards through the Argonne towards Charleroi and Sedan. But, as he doubted that it would be possible for a complete American army to be transferred in time from St. Mihiel to the Argonne front, he proposed that American corps and divisions should be attached to French armies. Pershing saw in this yet another attempt to disrupt the American army, and a somewhat acrimonious discussion, of which he gives a full account, followed. Foch gave way, and the Meuse-Argonne front was allotted to the Americans under Pershing's direct command. The transfer of the troops from St. Mihiel to the new front was admirably carried out, but the time left to prepare attack on formidable defences was short, and Pershing saw in every offer of help another attempt at interference.

In our attacks in 1915 both we and the French had learned

the difficulties of organising the communications in rear of a modern battle, and we had paid a heavy price for the mistakes we then made. General Pershing's account of the Meuse-Argonne battle is somewhat meagre, and he omits to say that he was quickly involved in the same difficulties, which he might have avoided if he had been a little more ready to accept advice. Of the situation on September 29, four days after the attack had begun, Foch writes:

> The American army, squeezed into the narrow corridor between the Meuse and the Argonne, opposed by a resistance which was all the stronger because favoured by difficult, broken country, and hampered in its advance by flanking fire both from the Argonne and from the east bank of the Meuse, continued to mark time. It tried to overcome its difficulties by increasing its forces in the front line; but this only intensified these difficulties, and resulted in a complete blocking of the communications.

Many of the American troops at the front were half-starved, at a time when the roads were congested with supplies. On this September 29 Clemenceau visited the American army, and, as was his practice, he went up to the front. He was not at all favourably impressed with what he saw, and apparently expressed his opinion to Foch. At any rate, on October 3 Foch sent Weygand to Pershing to propose that the congestion on the American front should be relieved by transferring American divisions to the French armies on their right and left. Pershing saw Clemenceau's hand in this, though in fact it was a very natural military solution of a difficulty, and believed it to be a political manœuvre to prevent the American army from playing its full part as such, with a view to weakening the American influence at the Peace Conference. He therefore would have nothing to say to Weygand's very reasonable proposal. The deadlock on the Argonne continued, while our men and the French were progressing triumphantly, and eventually on October 21 Clemenceau wrote a strongly worded letter to Foch in which he said:

> I would be a criminal if I allowed the French army to wear itself out indefinitely in battle, without doing everything in my power to assure that an Allied army which has hurried to its aid was rendered incapable of fulfilling the military *rôle* for which it is destined.
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> The French army and the British army, without a moment's respite, have been daily fighting, for the last three months, battles which are using them up at a time when it is impossible to reinforce them immediately with fresh effectives. These two armies are pressing back the enemy with an ardour that excites world-wide admiration, but our worthy American Allies, who thirst to get into action and who are unanimously acknowledged to be great soldiers, have been marking time ever since their forward jump on the first day, and, in spite of heavy losses, they have failed to conquer the ground assigned to them as their objective. Nobody can maintain that these fine troops are unusable; they are only unused.

He urged Foch to appeal to President Wilson to remove Pershing, if the American commander-in-chief did not 'resign himself to obedience, if he did not accept the advice of capable generals, whose presence at his side he has until now permitted, only that he might reject their counsels!' Foch, scenting the end, and finding that the American army was learning by bitter experience how to overcome its difficulties, wisely took no further notice of Clemenceau's criticisms, and in the event the American army at the beginning of November broke through the Kriemhilde line and reached Sedan before the Armistice became operative.

To that Armistice Pershing was opposed. He wrote to the Supreme War Council on October 30:

> I believe the complete victory can only be obtained by continuing the war until we force unconditional surrender from Germany, but if the Allied Governments decide to grant an armistice the terms should be so rigid that under no circumstances could Germany take up arms.

It would appear that General Pershing still believes that our terms were not rigid enough, for he writes:

> If unconditional surrender had been demanded, the Germans would without doubt have been compelled to yield and their troops would have retired to Germany without arms, virtually as parolled prisoners of war. The surrender of the German armies would have been an advantage to the Allies in the enforcement of the peace terms and would have been a greater deterrent against possible future German aggression.

A conclusion which appears, somewhat oddly, in the same year as President Hoover's proposals to prevent the financial collapse of the German Reich.

F. MAURICE.

LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE

EARLY last year to the many societies and kindred bodies which lead us up to the recognition and appreciation of beauty there was added yet another, an Institute of Landscape Architects; and as at the inaugural meeting one listened to the speeches made, one wondered, first, why such a society had not come into existence long ago, and, secondly, so modest were the claims of the speakers, whether these quite realised the delights of the subject they were discussing and its glorious possibilities. For when we talk of landscape architecture, we are, let us hope, not thinking only of buildings in a landscape, but the creation of landscapes, and we should be out to ally, to the skill of cultured designers, to the imaginings not only of architects and painters and foresters and gardeners, men trained on special lines, but of every lover of the beautiful, all the possibilities of Nature, from the heavens above to what may be on the earth below. For it should mean not simply what you can place in a landscape, but how a landscape can be discovered, evolved, perhaps conjured up almost out of nothing. For the designer there is such excitement in anticipation and creation, for others such joy in the unexpected.

Nature has done, and can do, so much for us. Why should anything be ugly? Assuredly wherever there are mountains, wherever there is water, generally wherever you can grow trees or shrubs or flowers, it is only a question whether you do not spoil her work. Probably when the Romans built their theatre which still stands at Taormina, the view from it of that great sweep of ground leading away to Etna was finer than it is now. We can see for ourselves in Canaletto's picture that when he painted from Whitehall that curve of the Thames, he looked on a more pleasant prospect than any Charing Cross Bridge scheme is ever likely to produce to-day. One wonders what the poet who wrote the song 'Farewell, Manchester—lovely town, farewell,' would say if he now revisited Lancashire.

What, then, should this new body do for us—and how should it set to work? For it must both teach and preach, encouraging and suggesting and condemning; it must be critical as well as

helpful. Nothing should be outside its scope, the new Delhi or a mining village, the prospect from a palace or a hovel. Its object must be to educate us all in beauty, and it should attain its object by stimulating our imaginations. For, above all, its votaries must be dreamers of dreams.

Pause and think. Do many of us realise that the most wonderful sight upon which we can ever set our eyes is one of the commonest, that somewhere round our wide world it is always with us, but still that it is something in which we poor human beings have no say whatever, a gift of the gods which to us is intangible and indestructible? Is there anything comparable in beauty to the riot of colour of a sunset? Can any work of our hands for one instant compare with it? And still, because we are so accustomed to it, because—though admittedly with infinite variety—it is a commonplace in our lives, do we value it as we ought? I have often wondered how many architects when building houses, or their clients either, have considered the advisability of a sunset outlook, that some room, and if so what room, should have that privilege. Think. Another day has slipped away, never to be recalled. Everything is older. It is a solemn thought. We are assisting at a funeral; there may be sadness, black misery in it, there may be an amazing glory. Assuredly nothing in landscape architecture should be considered before it.

Next let us take the folds on the earth's surface, mountains, near or far, hills and valleys, almost anything which gives variety in levels, the more abrupt the changes the greater the advantage. So easily in this way do we get the play of light and shade, sometimes over great distances; the sun picking out the high-lights, the shadows of the clouds sweeping across, colour here, darkness there. And when, anywhere, afar or near, you can find rock with its jagged profiles and clefts, it is worth a king's ransom. How few realise what can be made of even a quarry-face, raw though it may look at first. For it can be fashioned into a precipice.

And then water—the sea, with its changes between calm and storm, the sweep and swirl of a great river, the ripple of a lowland stream and the flashing lights and music of a tumbling Highland burn, the mirror-surface of a lake, bringing down the sky, even of a mere pond if happily set about with anything worthy of reflection. Never forget that value of reflected light and shade and colour, but also remember always that water, to appear natural, should be looked down on. What is the advantage if it is set up as in the basins round Queen Victoria's monument in front of Buckingham Palace? For there no one can see it unless they go to look for it. Think, in contrast, of the pleasant

simplicity of the round pond in Bushy Park, and how naturally that lies before us.

Now there are things which we all appreciate when our attention is called to them, some of us perhaps more, some less; but to how many comes the desire to create them? And often it may be such a joy to try. And is not this what we should mean when we talk of landscape architecture?

It is not so easy in the old towns and cities, where the people have crowded together. In some streets there may be vistas if we dare imperil our lives by standing still to look at them. But even at the crossings of the river, how few landscapes can be evolved in London! And could anything be more supremely ridiculous than that the Mall, our one great processional road, should lead westwards to the façade of the King's palace, and eastwards to the blatant advertisement of an enterprising newspaper—this catastrophe being possible only because the Admiralty Arch has not been built high enough? Paris and Vienna afford us specimens of a magnificent formality, and Washington has already risen, Delhi is rising, and Canberra may some day rise worthily; but in how few of the greater cities of the world are there landscape possibilities: Rome, with her hills and ruins, and St. Peter's; Edinburgh; Stockholm, with her environment of wooded hills and inlets of the sea. In the smaller cities and towns it may be easier, for often they have a more varied rise and fall of ground, but always we have to deal with conflicting interests and the sacred rights of private property.

But in the open country, how different it is; and—may I say—what amusement and excitement it can bring. How one can transform dullness, often so easily, and—no small point—so inexpensively!

For rich and poor alike these things are our necessities. Always we wish for sunshine, sometimes for shadow as well—and, in cases, for shelter. You will, of course, have considered amenities and communications, according to your requirements, your duties, and your pleasures, tastes, and means. There is much in the advantage of a first impression, and when approaching, be it a city, a town or a village, a castle or a cottage, much hangs on the aspect on arrival. That is why we should have wide parkways leading into all our great centres of population, and why our railway stations everywhere should be worthy, why our entrance-lodges, our garden-gates, our doorsteps should invite. And, as we stand at these last, let the outlook also be pleasant. What a difference small details sometimes make! How much depends on the interpretation and pleasant realisation of the word 'Welcome'!

Then with regard to buildings. We have to consider both

prospects and aspects. Some are allied—they are out both to see and to be seen. Windsor Castle dominates the whole valley of the Thames, as the Galata Tower commands the Bosphorus, and the Palace of Buda the Danube. And it is the same with castles, such as Edinburgh and many another. They rule and challenge even to-day. But the great pile of Bamburgh, the capital of a long dead Northumbria, a relic of almost forgotten history, savagely solitary, stares out across the North Sea towards the distant shores from which our islands were long ago invaded. It sees nothing but memories and ocean and storm and ships. Then, as a complete contrast, cross to Ireland. As, in days long gone by, one sat in that delightful window of curved glass in the house of Killarney, now, alas, burnt down, one looked out on almost everything which made for beauty. Where could there be an environment more delightful, and still so natural? Gardens, lawn, park and meadow, trees and lakes and mountains; in the forefront, just where one would have desired to place it, the old keep of Ross Castle; to the left, nestling in its woods, Muckross Abbey. Here was Nature, soft and entrancing, unadorned because requiring no adornment, but still at its very best. Given the variety, the rise and fall of ground, as where Drumlanrig stands up commanding a wide valley, and Longleat and Knole and Hurstmonceaux, and many another great house built in more peaceful times, sit down where there is water and shelter—so many of them on abbey lands—we learn in our own countryside how our dwellings can be worthily placed, in endless variations of method. Assuredly the teaching is this. Where you can have height and long distant prospects, always try for them. They are worth a king's ransom. But if this is impossible—well, think of other advantages. If you cannot get distance, see what you can do near at hand. At any rate, you have the sky above you, and other compensations. And always look years ahead, and consider the seasons, how the sun strikes and how the shadows will fall. More especially before you plant trees.

Sometimes in landscape architecture it is a question, not of construction, but of reconstruction. The old advantage may have gone somehow. Too often in these days the want of money for upkeep brings desolation in its train, but also we see places where wasteful and tasteless expenditure, or perhaps sheer carelessness, may have destroyed much. Often the trouble is that overgrowth has blotted out prospects and thereby altered character, an excess of planting, a timorousness in thinning and cutting.

And then what joy to get to work with saw and axe, and release a beauty which has been concealed. For an instance, take this. Imagine an ancient dwelling-place in undulating

country; the house to-day is Georgian, but it has memories centuries old. The church in the garden, girt about with innumerable walls, goes back to 1400, and near it is a keep-tower which must have seen the Wars of the Roses. The house was, and is still called, a castle, and rightly, for its stance commands the junction of two valleys through which run roads and also streams. And still when I knew it first its old character had gone—utterly. It was delightful when you arrived at it, but it had no aspect, no prospect. It was imprisoned. Rare shrubs and specimen trees surrounded it and shut it in. By climbing to the roof one saw up one valley to the distant hills, and other views as well, but from the windows—nothing. One glorious tree was the arch-enemy, for it was the keynote of a wide encircling screen.

And then—at long last—permission was obtained, and that great tree came down, to be followed, as the possibilities were at last realised, by some fifty others. It was a transformation—ruthless, yet unashamed; and, when accomplished, there opened out the blue distance, the glittering streams meandering through the meadows in the valleys, the foliage on the further slopes, and all the varying play of sunlight and shadow. It was born again—a castle. It looked out and down upon the world. Once more it dominated.

It should be almost unnecessary to elaborate a few other possibilities. Naturally the towers and spires of churches, and bridges, fall pleasantly into any landscape, and we all know the advantage of bringing in, at however great a distance, prospects of historic buildings. Imagine a viewpoint from which you could see both Salisbury Cathedral and Stonehenge! And think also of the interest of an outlook over Runnymede, or Flodden Edge, or Naseby field, or Culloden, over places fateful not only to our forefathers, but to ourselves.

And, of course, never forget the blossoms of the spring and the tints of autumn. In all countries there is charm in the promise of the coming year, but as one mounts into higher latitudes it is the wild beauty of the turn of the leaf which overwhelms us. No flower-garden can surpass this in glory.

When one reads of the majesty of the wilder places on the earth's surface, of the brave men who penetrate into the arctic and the antarctic, daring heat and cold, desert and forest, of some dying on the summit of Mount Everest and others turned back by the impossibilities of Kanchenjunga, how insignificantly small are the natural features which we see in these islands; and still how pleasant they can be. There are so few things worth producing which we cannot arrive at somehow. Outside, or in our hothouses, we can grow everything, but what would not many countries give if they could produce as easily as we can our

quite ordinary English lawns? With sunlight and shadow playing across them they are the very foundation of our most homely landscape architecture. A green carpet, soft and lovely as velvet, melting away perhaps into the rougher grass where the wild flowers may be encouraged to grow, giving us every conceivable form of beauty, to glades where we find rhododendrons and rare shrubs, and the darkness of yews and hollies, and great stems of trees. Formal gardening gives us brilliant masses, and it is necessary in places such as the parks of our great cities; but is there anything more delightful than a lawn losing itself into a wood, as though both were boundless, seats perhaps in places, possibly statuary, even temples and summer-houses and fountains, sometimes pleasantly unexpected—everything which makes for comfort and beauty alike in sunshine and in shadow.

And this—quite naturally, and in due sequence—brings one to a form of landscape architecture of the simplest kind, applicable even to the ugliest country, which, quite purposely, I have left to the last. It is a somewhat unusual method of dealing with a landscape, one which few seem to realise, though it may often be so easily arrived at, and with so much advantage.

Many would say that a flat, wooded country must be dull because it can afford no landscape effects. Perish the thought! Henry Ward Beecher wrote: 'Of all men's works of art a cathedral is the greatest. A vast majestic tree is greater than that.'

How true this is, provided that the trees have been well looked after, and have fine clean stems as the result; for then they stand up as a glory, and they can be acclaimed as 'Pillars of the Temple.'

Look into the depths of a wood, and they rise, royally, supporting and leading up to the crown of foliage above them. Thus their stark majesty is always acknowledged. But how few realise that we can get even a greater advantage by looking, as from a cloister, through the wood, between the stems, freely, under their dark overshadowing canopy of branches and leaves, to discover, further on, quite a different prospect and environment, perhaps sunlit parkland or meadows, perhaps water, perhaps the brilliant colour of shrubs or flowers, perhaps that wonderful melting into a blue distance which we always covet—perhaps even the sunset!

There can be nothing more delightful, and indeed inspiring, than to gaze through darkness on to brightness. For it gives a new outlook on to life. Often, when one sees houses standing closely girt about by dark and dismal woods, one wonders why so few seem to have grasped this quite simple form of what may most correctly be called 'Landscape Architecture.'

GEORGE S. C. SWINTON.

VERSE AS SOCIAL HISTORY

SOME time ago I undertook to edit, for a period of five years, an annual anthology of magazine verse. To do this I was obliged to read all periodicals, American and British, in which verse appeared: and the experience of preparing the first issue made me consider, for the first time, the possibilities of verse as material for the historian.

Once the idea had occurred to me, it seemed not only plausible, but natural. First of all, the writing of verse is as nearly disinterested as any modern activity can be. There is no money in it. Poets will even pay for a hearing. Their work, therefore, runs little risk of being dictated by anybody's wishes but their own. It should be sincere. Furthermore, a man never gives himself away so completely as when he sits him down to write a poem. Freed from the logical restraints of prose, he writes emotionally, in undress. His conflicts and secret ambitions rise to the surface, and find imaginative expression, either directly or in symbols, but always in a language in which emotional values are the strongest. What he really believes is more likely to appear in his poetry than in any reasoned credo. Ordinary prose is the vehicle for all our practical transactions—law, medicine, advertising, the filling up of our taxation forms, the technical jargon of our daily lives. We acquire a sense of responsibility towards it, a knowledge that we must be careful what we are saying, lest it be taken down in evidence against us; and this makes it a less sympathetic vehicle for the thoughts of our inward selves. There should be, therefore, a case for verse, even before experience had put us on the track. An almost incredible amount of verse is written, and it is largely the work of the younger generation, that fascinating source of copy, the mainstay of journalists and reformers. We know something about their surface lives. Will the confessional of verse reveal anything deeper?

Let us take the five consecutive issues of my anthology, and, even more important, the material from which their contents were selected. This will give us a larger field than that covered by the most industrious reviewer, because, while the best of the verse published in magazines appears later in volume form, the magazines contain a vast amount which gets no further. Also, for an inquiry of this kind we are concerned less with the æsthetic quality of the verse than with its value as a reflection of life. We are looking at verse as a social phenomenon, and need the bad as well as the good. As each issue of the anthology contained about a hundred poems, and for every poem included rather more than seventy were passed over, there will be plenty of matter for our investigation. For our purpose, it does not matter whether the verse is the work of amateur or professional poets. Some classification we must have, and perhaps the best will be the scholastic method, Alpha plus, Alpha, Alpha minus, and so forth. If that sound too academic, we can use the military categories, from A1 in varying grades of disability to C3. Both will work out much the same, and so the reader who dislikes one may think in terms of the other. One more point. We are obviously not concerned with any question as to the nature of poetry in itself. The magazine editors have taken upon themselves the onus of that decision, and anything they print as poetry is material for our quest.

The A1 class of poets is naturally small, though there are a good many who come under the heading Alpha minus. For the moment we can exclude it from consideration, not because we are aiming at partial conclusions, but because we shall save time by first finding the most representative class. Once we have found that category which is typical of the mass, in the sense that it gives backbone to it, we shall have time to adjust other values afterwards. To this class examiners would undoubtedly give the label Beta plus. It is not the largest numerically, but it constitutes the health of the body poetic. The poets in this class are influenced by their betters and copied by those beneath them, and so, while scoring the biggest weight of decent achievement, they furnish a clue to all other categories, above or below. There is nothing derogatory in the label B1, or Beta plus. The B1 poets are sensitive, cultured, and intelligent: they care very much for poetry, are sincere, ambitious to write, and possess a considerable degree of skill. They differ from the A class not so much in kind as in degree. They are a fine, respectable, healthy class, growing annually in number, advancing steadily in level of accomplishment, yet definitely second-rate.

We are treating poetry as confession, as the revelation of what its creators desire and are. If the most representative body of this poetry is second-rate, does this mean that its creators are second-rate human beings, with second-rate ambitions? If not, how comes it that their work expresses them so ill?

It is fashionable, first of all, to blame the conditions of modern

life for any falling off, supposed or real, in the arts. 'Romantic Ireland's dead and gone,' cried the poet, and his cry is paraphrased into a thousand contemporary applications, all to the effect that poetry is made impossible by these later marvels of a mechanistic age. But the difficulty does not lie here. It is precisely by the waters of Babylon that the singer most melódiously remembers Zion; and since art springs either from the acceptance or the rejection of life, an ugly and noisy modern city should be the strongest stimulus a poet can have to fashion a fairer city out of his own imagination. He should be driven to the discussing of other aspects of life than those symbolised by the subway and the radio.

The real trouble is that he cannot attain intellectual solitude. The most resolute of first-class gifts are needed nowadays to preserve a spirit uninfluenced by all that is written and said around it; and the B1 poet is here made the victim of his own good qualities. His very quickness and his sensitive apprehension make him over-susceptible to the work of others. Even supposing that he has started to write spontaneously without reference to any other talent, his curiosity and his reading soon make him self-conscious. The B1 poets never become deliberate imitators, nor adulterate their gifts, but their powers of appreciation are over-stimulated, and lead them to catch any note the leaders utter, and give it a personal echo. Let an admired A poet discover birds, delighting the poetic world with his discovery, and the attention of the B1 poets will be irresistibly drawn to the same subject. What each writes will be his own honest thought, but he did not find the subject for himself. In a word, the Beta poets follow a pioneer, and make his blazed trails safe for motor traffic. Valuable work—honest, skilled work; but its tendency is to follow, not to lead.

The representative average poet, then, is an honest and eager explorer of things spiritual and temporal, who has not been able to resist exposure to the discoveries of others. The classes below are still valuable for our purpose, but less and less so. They descend in proportion as their work is vitiated by mimicry, insincerity, and sheer inexperience in the use of words. The poets of the A class, the originals, do not succumb easily to a generalisation. If they did they would no longer be A class poets. Their significance (from our point of view) lies in giving a lead to the rest, and in the fact that their commentary upon life tells us how some of the most independent contemporary minds react to the problems of our time. But the B class is our stand-by. Let us go ahead, and find out what they say.

The first discovery, when we look at the verse of these five years, is that every year a ruling interest, or idea, finds independent expression through a number of poets, both in America and Britain. This idea is not a reaction to some great material happening, such as a war or an earthquake, but is abstract, a concentration of the poetic intelligence upon one of the main interests of life.

In the first year, for example, the dominant note was a perception of Nature's indifference to human purposes. It was inspired by no particular aspect of materialism, but by the more merciless qualities of life itself; and expressed most often in terms of Nature. The rocks, the sea, the woods, that are cruel or indifferent to man; the prairie that defeats his effort, the flood that swamps his home; scores of harmonies on that one recurrent note. Next year the poets had become philosophers, and were engaged upon the interpretation of life. In fact, there were so many philosophical and religious poems of quality that the editor was advised by more than one reviewer that there were other criteria of poetic excellence than a taste for metaphysics. The next issue developed this into the personal relationship of one human being to another. The question 'Why do you and I love one another best?' became 'How can you and I love one another best?'—if so crude an illustration will serve. It was a year of 'you and I' poems, and you and I were by no means always he and she. When they were, in a great majority of cases they were she and he. Women poets write almost all the verse about the relationship between the sexes. However, there will be more to say about women poets presently.

The next year was one of biography pure and simple. We had an ambitious number of character sketches, which served to expose a deal of bad writing. It is amazing how few writers handle these even decently well; how many make their subjects picturesque, or 'quaint': how much unconscious patronage there is, and how many see a strange character not as himself or in relation to his own background, but merely in terms of difference from their own way in life. The best of these biographical poems, those in which character was studied honestly, exhibited yet another surprising characteristic. In work of the kind one might well expect to find criticism of contemporary life and conditions, but there was hardly any. The poets tended to consider character in the abstract; to avoid contributory causes, and analyse only the result. Most of the people studied could have lived in any age. Character thus abstracted must be brilliantly realised not to leave a sense of incompleteness. These figures were seen against no background, in contrast to the false backgrounds we spoke of a minute since. Moreover, very few poets let character make its own impression upon them. Most of them are too eager, and start dramatising before the impression is complete. They

are in a wild hurry to rush into print ; yet this very eagerness is a symptom of something deeper, an intense interest in self which will not be satisfied if it cannot express that self in a regular output of definite achievement. Like those people who have no confidence in their own personality, but seek to enhance it with all manner of tricks, affectations, and petty accomplishments, these poets feel that they must all the time be giving evidence of their muse.

Ordinary egoism, then, spoils the majority of these biographical poems ; and one may well ask why on earth so many poets light like this upon a type of subject for which they are not fitted ? If they are not sheep, how is it they flock to the same themes ? We shall get help in answering this if we look back for a moment to the year of religious and philosophical poems. During this year there appeared a number of poems having for subject the impregnation of humanity by the divine. The first note was struck by the greatest of living poets, in a poem entitled *Leda*. Many others expressed the idea in a pagan setting, many in a Christian. By others it was handled less explicitly, under the form of divine inspiration. One might suppose from this that the lead given by an A class poet was eagerly caught up and developed by his followers, and that the case for conscious imitation was thereby proved. An examination of the dates at which the various poems appeared—dates recorded in the anthology—shows this to be impossible. The *Leda* poem did in fact precede the rest, but by a matter of days only, and it appeared in a Dublin periodical which had a small sale, and could not possibly have reached America in time to get up such widespread reverberations. In every case investigated, most of the similar poems appear almost simultaneously, and in both countries. It would seem that ideas are infectious, and break through the world's consciousness in several places at once, like the eruptions that announce a disturbance under the earth. The same co-incidence often happens with mechanical inventions. When a discovery is announced, other men are found to have been busy upon similar researches elsewhere, and the successful inventor has distanced them by days only.

Can we take that year's verse as a sign of the spiritual revival so long prophesied ? Henry Adams put the widest rim of his objective phase soon after 1920, after which man's consciousness was to turn inward to his spiritual resources, instead of outward to a civilisation of apparatus. Does this dim, fragmentary remembering that we are vessels of the spirit denote a first stirring of the new phase ? We cannot assert as much ; but many men of science are now saying that the poets are their surest allies, and the vehicle of the seer's utterance, the ancient

speech of religion and of magic, seems historically the fittest to express the birth-pangs of a newer order.

We may likewise, if we wish, take the biographical year to manifest an altruistic intention, a gesture, however ill executed, showing a desire to understand the lives of others. All impulse to study human relationship may be interpreted along the same lines ; indeed, it is hard, when one reads the poems, not to be impressed with the uniformity of purpose at the back of them. If it is indeed so, the new era has been well begun.

We said just now that women wrote more fully of love than men. There are other poetic differences between the sexes besides this—though we must remember that in the lower categories there are four women poets to one man. In the real A class women are rare. Several score an Alpha minus ; in the Beta pluses they total more than half, and below that grow speedily to the proportion stated. These figures may be challenged, and no infallibility is claimed for them, but they are reached after five years' study. Nor do they express any sex prejudice, whether in themselves or in the assigning of categories, for as a rule the reasons which restrict women poets to the lower categories are more creditable to them as individuals than those which restrict the men ; and it is character with which we are now concerned.

The A class women poets are almost all intellectual in their verse. Apart from one or two lyric poets, they are sceptics, piercing the stuff of experience very deeply. Women poets of the B1 class, on the other hand, represent the topmost rung of mere sensibility and womanly feeling, qualities which are the impulse of 90 per cent. of the women whose work appears in magazines. By ' mere sensibility ' is meant a sensitive response to life from a woman's angle ; sympathy rather than analysis. The A class poets have this sympathy, of course, but they add to it some degree of personal interpretation. They are less content with their emotions. The B class of women poets, recording their impressions of life as it affects the intelligent woman or girl of to-day, are the most helpful of all to our inquiry, for they write upon a far more concentrated range of subjects than the men, and from a more definite standpoint. If they do not explore so far afield, they advance in closer formation. They are, as a class, more serious than the men, and more sincere. When a woman poet writes ill, it is generally because she never questions the validity of her feelings. Genuinely moved, she longs to record her emotion, and records it in whatever words come readiest to her mind. Do not let us flatter her : as often as not she does so from indolence, from mental gush, from habitual sloppiness in her choice of words. The point is that the original grain of sincerity is there. Women write the worst poetry that our period

can show, but that is because the particular women who write it have been badly educated. The difference between male and female bad verse is the difference hitherto prevailing between male and female education. As a result there appear morasses of trite, pretty-pretty stuff few men would write, simply because there exist few men unsophisticated enough to feel sincere emotion upon such themes and to express it in such artless language. The least successful of the women poets are in intention as sincere as the best, because there are some subjects which every woman must take seriously. The bad masculine poem usually contains an alloy of deliberate dishonesty ; it is bolstered up to look better than it is. The woman proclaims hers joyfully, without misgiving ; she deceives nobody but herself. And all, from grade B1 downwards, write about the same subjects.

They write first of all of love in all its aspects, and bring to its consideration a high seriousness and a deal of sense. There is no echo in woman's verse of flapperdom or cocktail parties. Nor is there any direct expression of her new economic independence ; though it is likely that the stronger and more active note in all her verse, and particularly in the love poems, is its natural outcome. Even during the five years we are considering, women's love poetry has taken a larger share of initiative—not that she asserts herself aggressively, but that she regards love less and less as a thing which may or may not happen to her at masculine discretion.

The only poems treating of marriage as a state come from women. (Plenty of men look upon it as a joyful and desirable event, but they seem to speculate no further.) Parenthood, whether from the mother's or father's point of view, is also entirely a feminine preoccupation. Social evils, treated indirectly in poems about their victims, interest more women than men. Arraignments of civilisation are evenly divided between the two —with the interesting difference that men are more allusive, referring constantly to golden ages or heroes of the past (' Milton, thou should'st be living at this hour '), whereas women think in terms of practical, present-day disease and remedy. In fact, this concern with the things they really need care about, as distinct from the things that leisured gifts find time to think about, is the real contribution of the women poets. I do not mean that sincerity is their monopoly ; but the men, by the very fact of their wider range, and the byways they explore, have shown that their choice of subject is arbitrary and mental rather than a condition of their lives. These are broad generalities, riddled with exceptions : yet with the average poets they hold good. The woman writes rather out of her emotional and physical life, the man out of his journeys ; she from what she is, and he from what he does. When a man tries to be original, he looks for a

fresh subject. A woman, suffering from the same ambition, rings changes on the old ones. But this does not happen so often, for, as we said, she is less critical of her emotions.

In her poems upon social subjects one detail stands out unmistakably. The interest is personal, not abstract. She does not consider the washerwoman Mrs. Jenkins, but Mrs. Jenkins the washerwoman : the person first, the calling afterwards. Thus we get no studies of washerwomanhood, except such as are implicit in a series of Mrs. Jenkinses. This objective method, which is woman's peculiar gift, cannot fail to benefit poetry. It is a good offset to male intellectuality, and has had an excellent influence on many men already. Perhaps the fact that we have discovered nothing new about woman from her poetry is a final tribute to the genuineness of that poetry as an expression of her life, and the consequent pertinence of our inquiry.

The lower categories need not keep us long, for the sufficient reason that their defects are technical and æsthetic. They want to say much the same things as the others, but are less successful. Their faults have a certain interest, as showing certain qualities and defects of mind, but on the whole they reveal no more than the daily chatter one hears in train or subway. They are all *clichés*, ' rubber stamps,' and easy reactions to a passing emotion. In form they fall under two main headings—a sort of sloppy free verse, written without any realisation of the difficulties free verse entails, and the sonnet. There are plenty of other forms, but these are the favourites. The themes are equally well marked. In every hundred bad poems there are several one can rely upon to score double figures. There is the gentleman who, while walking the city street, suddenly bethinks him of the country and wishes he were there, and his poetic half-brother, whom fish seen in a shop window inexplicably remind of the sea. Other hardy annuals are the girl who ' never let him see ' ; the old man watching the young things dance, and ' remembering ' ; and the similarity remarked by so many magazine poets between the laughter of children and music in heaven. Not to mention the daffodils, the first crocus, the heather, the sumach, and the roses twining on that little cottage, way down in such-a-place. After a fortnight of these stage properties, one can barely look Nature in the face.

As regards national differences, the American poet is far more enterprising than the British ; but he has less polish and technical skill. Lest this fact appear misleading, we may explain it as chiefly due to the difficulty of contributing verse to British magazines. There are so very few of them that competition is

keen, and the standard of surface accomplishment therefore higher. Indeed, in England there are a bare dozen outlets for the poet who aspires above the jingle of the popular magazines. Unless his talent is definitely insular, he sells most of his verse to American editors. The difference, then, is not so much one of national character as of economics. A much smaller percentage of the verse written in England finds its way into periodicals than is the case in America. Irish poets fare even worse: their 'literary' papers can be counted on the fingers of one hand, with a finger or two to spare. The standard is accordingly very high, and their representation in the five anthologies out of all proportion to their numbers; for it must be remembered that the anthologies are recruited from the magazines alone.

The Irish poet is a fine craftsman, imposing upon passionate devotion to the past, or to the actual soil and granite of his country a cold wrought-iron discipline in verse. This would be a good augury for Ireland if poets were in the majority or held the reins. Otherwise he is a violent satirist; sometimes both. His verse shows nothing of the traditional fecklessness and pathos of his race, but often a cold fury, the scorn of an ambitious and dissatisfied intellect—Hamlet confronted with a French farce or a cash register. Of practical politics he speaks no word at all. Indeed, Irish verse bears striking testimony to the fact that in Ireland men do not wear their heart upon their sleeve. Those who live abroad are less reticent, and voice their nostalgia to some profit.

In England minor poetry—Bi poetry—seems to have got into a backwater, and we can make little of it. It is too much of a parlour game, played with subtle but infinitesimal variations, to tell us about contemporary England. There is a deal of 'Nature' poetry, the result of a cult perhaps, but a cult to which England is more prone than another country. The Alpha poets speculate, take their craft to task, and tend to use larger forms than have been the fashion. The war has left a dissatisfaction and restlessness which cannot escape the most casual reader; but the verse in itself is not a sufficient guide to the troubles of which it is a symptom. It is curiously on the defensive. The Georgian cult of escape is discredited, but no definite movement has taken its place.

It may seem, then, so slender are our results, that the novel must give a better picture of our times than poetry. I wonder. The novel is deliberate, an exposition of everyday life as it is or as the writer would like it to be. Thought outruns practice; and thought finds ready utterance nowadays. But the novel must treat of life plausibly: it must give chapter and verse; it must convince. If a novelist makes his characters fly to the moon, he must invent apparatus and scientific detail which shall persuade our everyday minds to accept the expedition. If a plumber is to win the love of a millionaire's daughter, we demand circumstances which shall prepare us for an event we would certainly wish to believe, but know to be unlikely. Therefore the novel is often a misleading guide to the life of its time, since its first business is to appear lifelike. From the poet we demand no such how and when and wherefore. When he says significantly 'I have slain an eagle and kissed a queen,' we accept his claim at once. We do not ask at what altitude or with what weapon he encountered the one, nor how he overcame the divinity which hedges the other: we understand he has done all that man could ask, and we murmur our approval. The poet has only to convince us in the life of values, whereas from the novelist we demand facts and prices. Therefore verse, freed from the necessity to be literally plausible, can give us a better guide to the inward life of its period than can the novel; and this short survey, if it is no more than a suggestion for future research, will not have been altogether beside the mark.

L. A. G. STRONG.

OF THE HUNTING OF DRAGONS

WHEN a parliamentary constituency has furnished a young man of spirit with arms and horse, his natural, and entirely right, instinct is to ride about searching for dragons whereon to test his virgin blade. Inexperience leads him to think that the uglier the dragon, the more pernicious must it be. Hence it happens often that unprepossessing, though harmless and even useful, old monsters find their slumbers rudely disturbed by calls to battle, while those of the more handsome, but venomous, varieties are neglected by the young knight-errant who, having blunted his sword by vainly battering scaly adamant, subsequently endures the sneers of nasty old men. Disappointment of this kind too often engenders a distaste for the sport. Yet those of us who, in our political salad days, did a bit of dragon hunting are well aware that in this pursuit no harm can arise from mistaken zeal. For the nature of dragons is fortunately such that those of the harmless species are invulnerable, while those of the poisonous variety are dangerous but mortal. Hence the young man who perseveres in his determination to slay a dragon will bag one of the bad kind sooner or later, though it be but by mistake.

The tragic feature of dragon-hunting is not the fact that young knights chance occasionally to be devoured—for, indeed, there is likely to be no making of omelets without breaking of eggs—but rather that so many become cynical about the whole business and even go so far as to deny the existence of dragons. It behoves us, to whom increasing years forbid the sport, to combat this tendency of the rising political generation and to insist that, though dragon-hunting demands a quick eye and a supple frame, it is an occupation fit for grown men so long as they retain those advantages, and not a mere make-believe game for children.

A book recently published [1] is the subject of the present essay and well illustrates the above points, since the author has selected almost the ugliest dragon in existence, by name Whiggery, and belabours it with a zeal unrestrained by the knowledge that

[1] *Ich Dien*, by Viscount Lymington, M.P. (Constable & Co.).

it is a most respectable old beast entirely proof against sword-thrusts. Thus engaged, he fails to perceive that Toryism, on whose behalf he takes the field, is in danger of falling into the clutches of the most poisonous but specious dragon of all, a double-headed monster combining political trade unionism with political capitalism. Nevertheless, it is better to hunt the wrong dragon than to hunt no dragon at all.

When, after the lapse of a dozen years, Lord Lymington again turns over the pages of his little book, doubtless he will experience that cold shudder which travels down the spines of all who in after life encounter the literary indiscretions of their earlier days. We who, like him, had the temerity to be sincere in print have, however, on such occasions of reperusal drawn comfort from the recorded opinions of men older and more experienced whose appreciation of what we intended to say has been embalmed in the same medium which preserved the corpse then gibbering at us. Though unacquainted with the writer of *Ich Dien*, except in so far as one may deduce the author from his book, I feel safe in making the prophecy that, by the year 1943, he will hold the opinion that it is a very bad book indeed, and will be able to prove this to his own satisfaction by the evidence of the text itself. Nevertheless, he will be in error. A hostile critic could doubtless, with the pseudo-impartiality of plentiful quotation and careful avoiding of any recognition of what is behind the written word, butcher the book to make a Liberal holiday. But to do so would constitute murder of a peculiarly wicked kind. For in the present instance the victim would be the offspring of an author who is at once modest and sincere, and has the further, though perhaps less important, quality of being in the main right.

My object, then, in this essay is to preserve in print a criticism which while perhaps guarding the infant from undue parental indulgence at the moment may shield it from equally unjustifiable parental contempt in the future. Let us bury the assassin's hatchet and prepare the operating table. The agonised parent must bear in mind that the small patient has a constitution sound enough to enable it to survive the exploratory and other operations about to be performed. It is an odd little imp, but a few incisions will prove that it has good red blood, and a few excisions will improve it immensely—that is to say, in the opinion of the surgeon.

In the first place, it is to be observed that the title is an excellent one, bringing by historical association the reader's mind at the outset into a fitly receptive state, and thus enabling the author in the body of his work to avoid too direct reference to the romantic chivalry which alone can give a firm basis for

idealism in politics. The title has a further merit, in that it reminds some of us that the book is perhaps not unconnected with a modern movement of which more may be heard in the future. That movement is, I think, doomed to inevitable, though not ignoble, failure, since its success would seem to depend upon the possession of certain qualities by certain persons, and, unhappily, the latter in actual fact are not endowed with the former. Yet, like all ideas which are noble, however impracticable, it will have its effect upon the political thought of the new generation.

Proceeding onwards, we find the first chapter headed 'A Re-statement of Toryism,' and here we must use the knife to some extent. The author seems to be right in his statement (page 17) to the effect that 'the Tory believes in the Samurai leading.' But he does not altogether answer the inevitable countering question, 'But who are the Samurai?' It is true that he eliminates from that category the whole, or apparently the whole, of the female population (page 41), and settles their destiny with the remark (page 20) 'because we confused democracy with leadership, we gave the franchise to girls instead of educating them to tend the hearth.' Further study of his plans for industrial regeneration by currency inflation (page 54) and by a refusal to trade with foreign countries (page 55) gives one reason to believe that he also eliminates from the Samurai caste all whom he would class as 'productive workers,' and therefore as fit objects rather than subjects in regard to leadership. It is clear that the latter, like the women, are to have no choice as to their occupation. On page 42 we read 'the boys need to be taught vocationally,' and from this it is manifest that their vocation must be decided for them before we begin to teach them. Surely reminiscences of Plato have betrayed the author of *Ich Dien* into the advocacy of a polity fitted only for a city where the manual labour is performed by hereditary slaves? In this connexion it is to be observed that, when modern writers on politics begin to talk about 'functions,' we invariably find that they have it firmly fixed in their minds that all their fellow-citizens can easily be permanently labelled as miners, cotton-spinners, clerks, or what you will. Indeed, the word 'function' is a terribly dangerous one, and should be avoided by all writers except Fabians.

This question 'Who are the Samurai?' demands an answer from a book which purports to state the policy of those who believe that the essential condition of national happiness and progress is the subordination of the common herd to the beneficent autocracy of a minority. Plato, having reached the same conclusion as Lord Lymington, sums up the matter in the words

'Until, then, philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill; no, nor the human race, as I believe.' But neither the one nor the other gives a clear indication as to the method by which we may recognise those who are fit to rule, though Plato certainly hints that they may best be sought among those who do not wish to rule.

In the above paragraph I have not had the least intention of treating the subject with any sarcasm. The proposition round which Lord Lymington builds his policy is one which has been recognised as thoroughly sound for more than 2000 years. It is, indeed, a truism, since, in its simplest form, it may be expressed thus: 'Government is best conducted when it is conducted by those who can conduct it best.' The reader will probably agree with that proposition. But he will doubtless also agree when I suggest that there is no man, however wise and however modest, who does not in his heart believe that he himself is a good example of the 'Samurai' or of the 'philosophers,' who alone are fit to rule. It is even conceivable that those who, like the Government of this unhappy country, have devastated it for the last two years really believe that the present ruin is to be ascribed to unkind fortune rather than to their own ghastly incompetence. Hence, as I believe, Lord Lymington's theory of Aristocracy is incomplete, and takes us, indeed, not even so far as does Plato in his *Republic*. But I will survey that matter later, and for the moment will ask the reader to consider whether the writer of *Ich Dien* helps us by his proposals to keep out of the seats of government those who are obviously unfit to occupy them.

In chapter ii. he puts forward a cogent plea for the re-establishment and reform of the House of Lords, and appreciates what many of his Conservative colleagues have utterly failed to observe. He realises that it is not practical politics to restore the power of the Upper House until first its personnel has been improved. Furthermore, his main proposal for effecting the latter object is thoroughly sound, for he suggests (page 28) an extension of the system under which at present the Scottish peers elect representatives from among themselves. This system has hitherto worked well, since the hereditary peers undoubtedly constitute an admirable electoral college, no matter what adverse criticism may justifiably be directed against individuals of their number. But our author unfortunately is not content with a Second Chamber thus constituted on a basis of heredity qualified by selection. He evidently feels attracted by the Soviet system, and suggests the addition of peers representative of various trades and professions. 'Great captains of industry' should, he says (page 31), 'be elected from bodies of the employers.' But experience has unhappily shown that the distinction between

'captain of industry' and '*chevalier d'industrie*' is not always immediately to be observed, and the disreputable company promoter of to-day is too often the great industrialist of to-morrow. Even among those whose personal characters stand high, many of the greatest, and the most likely to be selected, are those who are engaged in conducting huge top-heavy com binations through a series of reconstructions to ultimate liquidation. Indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that, as soon as a man is generally recognised as one of the leaders in his industry or in his profession, we need no further evidence that he has outlived his usefulness.

Candidly, I fear that the number of Samurai dredged up by such a trawl would not be large. And when we find (page 32) that the trade unions are to contribute their quota of peers, doubt is certain to arise in even the most sanguine mind. An inscrutable Providence created the persons now prominent in political trade unionism presumably in pursuance of the one increasing purpose. But he is truly a bold man who would suggest that they were formed to be the true pattern of the Samurai.

When we reach chapter iii. our difficulties are increased rather than diminished. We there learn (page 46) that protective tariffs are desirable, because 'with Protection only can we live our national life.' This is subsequently explained as meaning that a large number of people must leave the towns and occupy themselves with agriculture. Now at length we are locked in close combat with the dragon of Whiggery. The Whig, in his blindness, believes that people know what they want better than other people know it. Further, the Whig believes that a man ought to be at liberty to get what he wants if he can do so without infringing the liberty of other people. Not so the Tory. 'Our national life,' it is clear from the context, means for most of us the life of an agricultural labourer. And as the Tory believes that the 'Samurai should lead,' it is clear that the latter should at once enter upon that life in order that the lower castes may have leaders. Here we encounter a grave difficulty. For the Samurai have also the duty of governing the country, and the nature of the work done by an agricultural labourer is such as to make it extremely inconvenient for him to complete each evening his hedging, or ditching, or feeding of stock (or whatever an agricultural labourer does—for I really do not know) in time to enable him to get washed before undertaking legislation and administrative duties.

At this point dragon Whiggery mildly counter-attacks. The Tory, like the Socialist, thinks that it would be good for the bulk of the people to take up agriculture. The people themselves

strongly adhere to a contrary opinion. How, then, are the former to carry out this 'back to the land' policy. The Socialist is in no doubt as to the method. He says, 'Compel them to go on the land,' and does so. The Tory says, 'Make food prices so high that the inducement to go and dig potatoes becomes irresistible.' Both methods are sound and effective. But the Whig says, 'If people prefer one occupation to another, it is tyrannous to force them to pursue the latter rather than the former.' Hence, if you are quite certain that the culture of the countryside is higher than that of the towns, you must start by persuading the people that this is the case. The only way to do this is to go and be an agricultural labourer yourself. Then the town-dwelling worker will begin to think seriously of a move 'back to the land.' Incidentally, the Samurai will then be leading.

Again, the Tory Protectionist says that it is good for men to be engaged in making steel, but bad for them to be engaged in making steel into galvanised sheets, and the like, for export. Hence he proposes to exclude the steel imports, which now form the foundation of many exporting industries. A score of similar examples could be adduced to show that Protection is the policy of those who are convinced that other people do not know their own business. Protectionist and Socialist alike hold the pathetic creed that something called the State is the best judge of what is good for other people. The Whig doubts it.

It would be an easy, though invidious, task to go through the whole book tearing it to pieces. For an author whose economic theories are so hopelessly out of date as to make him a Protectionist offers himself as a helpless victim to the criticism of those who have intimate and daily experience of practical industry and commerce. Slow as are the inhabitants of the United States in the appreciation of economics, even they are beginning to perceive the ruin wrought in their country by Protection, the impossibility of building up a shipping industry or export market for their manufactures, and the destitution of their farmers. They have taken the first step back to free trade. But the war debt moratorium must become permanent, and the tariff must be abolished, before real prosperity can return to the United States; and the people of America realise this at last. Australia offers a further example of the fallacy of Protection, if one is required.

But, for the purposes of this essay, it is unnecessary for me to revive an economic controversy which has at length been settled by the crashing failure of the experiments carried on for many years in the countries cited above. What concerns the main principle enunciated in *Ich Dien* is the question whether a tariff tends to place power in the hands of the Samurai. It were

perhaps, unkind to suggest to Lord Lymington that the disappearance of the tariff issue from British politics might leave forty vacant seats to be filled by Samurai.

But *Ich Dien* is far too good a book to be left thus mangled on the operating table. For underlying all its economic fallacies and impracticable proposals is the political principle of transcendent importance—the Aristocratic Principle that the true progress arises, not from the enlightened self-interest of the many but rather from the enlightened self-sacrifice of the few. Progress, the reader will doubtless agree, is any movement which takes men further from the beasts and brings them nearer to the gods, which renders them less the slaves and more the masters of environment. History and biology alike bear witness that such progress has always been the achievement of individuals who dare to defy the spirit of the herd. The cup of hemlock or the cross rewards the pioneer to-day as in the past. But still the work goes forward, and each succeeding generation has shown its aristocrats,

> Each stepping where his comrade stood
> The moment that he fell.

'Who are the Samurai?' I asked of our author at the beginning of this essay, and in truth I expected no answer. For it does not become a man at the outset of his period of service to break through that reticence which nature, training, and custom have hallowed to his caste and, tearing his very soul from its solitude, expose it naked to the sneers, it may be, of this most cynical generation. But there need be no such constraint on those of whom it may be said that they have:

> Fired their ringing shot and passed,
> Hotly charged,—but broke at last.

The fort of folly still stands unshaken above us, and we whose bodies lie beneath the walls know too well that our failure came but through our insufficiency. Confessing this, we may perhaps be permitted to tell what modesty forbade the author of *Ich Dien* to write.

Know, then, that the Aristocratic Principle teaches that progress for the many comes only from the self-sacrifice of the few, that men follow the true aristocrat, not because they love him, but rather because he loves them, and that he attains the power to love them only by making himself their servant. Thus, and only thus, does the least become greatest. Nor do any others escape death. For to no others can the material universe become completely subject.

But the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount are a snare and a delusion unless those who follow them keep ever in their minds the economics of the Manchester School. Mr. Gradgrind has

proved triumphantly right. *If* the main desire of the poor is to become richer, and *if* they are to be allowed to multiply as rapidly as they choose, and *if* the true work of the statesman is to secure an ever-rising standard of living for an ever-increasing population (and these three conditions appear to be generally admitted), then the method of Mr. Gradgrind is shown by the history of the last hundred years to be entirely effective. In place of a small population on a very low standard of living, we could until recently support an enormous population enjoying a life which their ancestors would have deemed incredibly luxurious; and, by the way, the people are not one whit the happier for the change. If you do not grind the faces of the poor, neither they nor their descendants will ever be anything but poor, and unless the rich are made richer the poor will inevitably become poorer. Whenever Socialists have become rulers they have invariably proved this thesis. They have prevented anyone from becoming richer, and thus rendered everyone progressively poorer. A little consideration will convince the reader that this must be the case, until in industry philosophers are kings; which is to say, until men capable of amassing great riches play the game for the sake of the game and not for the silver-plated toast-rack, thus becoming industrial aristocrats.

In Imperial matters, also, there is urgent need of aristocracy. The Roman Empire was cemented with mutual advantage, and its constituent nations had every reason of self-interest for upholding it. Yet it fell to pieces as soon as any disruptive strain was put upon it. Yet, ever since the influence of Birmingham began to prevail in our country, successive Governments have striven to make our Empire into a kind of glorified department store, and to secure cohesion by bidding in halfpennies when others bid in dollars. The material advantage to be gained by leaving the British Empire and joining another is so obvious that such a method of preserving our Commonwealth must necessarily be ineffective. Furthermore, such an Empire would be a mean and common thing and in no way worth preserving. For my part I cannot but believe that Lord Lymington and those rising politicians for whom he speaks will soon free themselves from the Joseph Chamberlain complex, and will realise that there is for the aristocrat but one true conception of empire. If the constituent nations believe that the civilisation and the ideals of England are the highest which the modern world presents, then the Empire will hold together through every trial. But, if they admire the civilisation of America and wish rather to follow in the footsteps of that great nation, then the sooner they part from us the better will it be for all concerned.

The British Empire is doomed to early disruption unless,

both at home and overseas, the new generation realises that Imperialism is not a matter of reducing the import duties on pickled walnuts by a halfpenny a bottle in return for an infinitesimal preference in respect of the bottle. Nor can the Conservative Party be regarded as the upholder of aristocracy while it continues to degrade Imperialism as it has done during the present century. It would appear, indeed, that the party will lose the support of the best of our young people unless it can uphold the opinion that the future of our nation is not to go on getting fatter and fatter and more numerous. In the last century we played out that game to the end. And now others can manifestly play it better, perhaps because they can go into the arena with wholehearted enthusiasm for it, while we have now grave doubts as to whether it really is the greatest thing in the world. The first task of the new generation in England is to decide what is to be the game played by the nations in the future, and then to show that they can beat all comers at that game. Lord Lymington and vast numbers of young men and women of every class and every part of the country believe that our nation's future lies, not in the export of goods to the markets of the world, but rather in the export of ideas which may make life a better and a nobler thing for the peoples of the earth.

This is my interpretation of what the author of *Ich Dien* would have written, had not modesty forbidden, and I believe the call will in due time meet with its response from our young people. To such a generation we may safely surrender our heritage of empire, a heritage not of insolent power and wealth, but of that true imperial spirit whose only demand is ever wider fields for service and still extending scope for sacrifice.

AUSTIN HOPKINSON.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12, *Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.*

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THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCLV—SEPTEMBER 1931

THE ECONOMY REPORT

IT is perhaps as well that publication of the Report of the National Expenditure ('Economy') Committee, signed a week before Parliament rose, was delayed till after the debate of July 30. The inevitable Majority and Minority reports present two irreconcilable schools of thought—the economists and the spendthrifts—and such chance as we may still have of avoiding some more or less disguised form of default should be improved by giving all members of Parliament adequate time for serious study of a notable document, before debate hardens opinions on so vital a question into party cries. In approaching that study, everyone should bear in mind certain facts that differentiate our financial position from that of our neighbours and rivals in trade. Our trouble is not merely a phenomenon of an exceptionally severe but transient slump; to say that we are standing the shock of the world crisis better than others is a false presentation of the fact that our fall to the basement is not from the roof, but from the first floor only—we had long been losing ground before

it came. The fact that our unemployment figure before the slump exceeded one third of the present total (nearly three millions) is not really a point in our favour. The maldistribution of gold cannot account for our long-standing failure to sell our products in competition with other gold-standard nations. Our enormous revenue is not a sign of wealth, but of loss of wealth by over-taxation. Even that comfortable phrase 'Safe as the Bank of England' must take on a new meaning when the Governor must go, hat in hand, to foreign banks for credits, not (as on the last occasion) to enable us to resume the gold standard after a great war, but to save us from being driven off it in peace, and we must submit to be told by French journalists that these credits 'can in no way dispense the British Government and Parliament from putting an end to the disorder in their public finances' lest worse should happen. The end of the world slump, restoring prosperity to other nations, will leave us as its beginning found us—the home of vast decaying industries—unless we change our ways.

The majority of the Committee are in no doubt what the change should be: 'the country must face the disagreeable fact that its public expenditure—local as well as national—is too high and that it must be brought down to a lower level.' From examination of the general features and trend of expenditure in the several departments, they conclude that, on present commitments only, the Estimates of 1932 would show a net increase of 12 millions, and those of 1933 of 17½ millions, over those of 1931. This includes sinking fund provision on present lines, but nothing for sundry expensive schemes already formulated, such as the Education (School Attendance) Bill, the Agricultural Land (Utilisation) Bill and a number of other projects in various stages, nor for any effects of the Hoover moratorium. They hold the view, which after the Treasury evidence before the Unemployment Commission hardly admits of dispute, that the 40 millions to be borrowed in 1932 for the Unemployment Fund on present lines can no longer be regarded as repayable within any reasonable period by the Fund (which by April next will have a debt of well over 100 millions), but must be faced as a revenue liability, and the same with the 10 millions to be borrowed for the Road Fund; thus increasing the expenditure to be budgeted for in 1932 by a total of 62 millions, on present commitments. On the revenue side, income tax 20 millions down, and 37 millions of nest-eggs taken to balance this year's budget, will reduce receipts by 57 millions, leaving a total gap to bridge of 119 (say 120) millions —a figure which may easily be increased if the slump continues —apart from any new commitments, 'to produce a properly balanced budget in 1932.' So austerely orthodox an authority as the *Economist* (issue of August 8) has indeed suggested that 'this

figure of 120 millions deficit rather seriously overpaints the gloom,' because 50 millions is accounted for by sinking fund applications, and 40 millions by unemployment borrowings, as to the inclusion of which the Committee disagree with the Chancellor. It is a question of words: what does 'balancing a budget' mean? Should we congratulate France on a balanced budget if her expenditure exceeded her budget revenue by the amount of the receipts permanently assigned to the *Caisse d'Amortissement*, her equivalent for a sinking fund? Do we hold that a *properly* balanced budget (the Committee's phrase) need not cover the specific sinking funds we promised the lenders when we floated our loans? They account for nearly the whole 50 millions. Do we differ from the Treasury evidence as to the realities of unemployment borrowings? Whatever words we may use, there is no dispute about the facts, and nothing novel except 'telling the shareholders.'

Towards the 120 millions the Committee propose economies totalling (in the first full year for each item) 96½ millions—a figure which cannot be fully realised in 1932—and so leave some 20 or 30 millions to be covered by 'revisions of general taxation,' which they piously hope to be practicable without either singling out public servants and pensioners from the rest of the community for special sacrifice or imposing any further burden on productive industry beyond a small increase in unemployment contributions. Of the 96½ millions, no less than 66½ millions would be saved on unemployment finance, as explained further on. Two features of this programme stand out. It is a bold answer to the constant challenge of spendthrift Ministers: 'Show us where any economy is possible'; and for all its boldness it confesses that we are so far on the road to ruin that without breaking solemn pledges it is now impossible to stop the rot by reductions of expenditure only, so blindly and foolishly have our Ministers of all parties not only squandered the present but mortgaged the future. One negative point may be mentioned. Both majority and minority hold that no large fresh savings can be made on the fighting services, unless there is 'disarmament all round'; and express the hope that their conclusion after full examination, that there is no possibility of saving millions by creating a Ministry of Defence, will be accepted as finally disposing of that product of Cloud-cuckoo-land.

Audi alteram partem. The Minority report breathes another air. Its authors profess to be 'no less impressed with the need for wise economy' than their colleagues, but the meaning they attach to those words is a special one.

'The majority recommendations in many respects would not achieve real economy, though they might for the time being secure an actual

reduction of expenditure. . . . Public expenditure has ample justification when it rests primarily on the necessity for readjusting the use of the national income in such a manner as to transfer expenditure from less essential or desirable channels into those which are designed to mitigate social injustices or those which improve the economic structure of the nation. . . . We can see no special reason why a period of economic difficulty should necessarily be required to bear its own financial burden at the price of scaling down social services. . . . The renewal, the remodelling and the replanning of the economic and social structure of the country is essentially a task which the State, in association with the local authorities and other large organisations, should undertake and . . . the most favourable occasion is when money and man-power are readily available and can be utilised without the disturbing effects of the withdrawal of either from its normal employment in industry.'

Their whole presentation is in fact an expansion of the ministerial dictum that whether the nation can afford a thing depends upon how badly it wants it. They show by analysis that the proportion of expenditure to *national* (not State) income has grown since 1913 from 7·4 to 18·9 per cent., the chief increases being service of the debt 7·93 per cent., war pensions 1·36 per cent., social services 1·41 per cent. ; and thereupon deny that the proportion of national income applied to social services shows excessive growth, or that 'they absorb an undue share of the proceeds of national taxation.' In other words, the Great War has taken from us nearly 10 per cent. of the nation's total earnings, and this, regarded (presumably) as a form of indulgence of the idle rich, justifies their being called on to pay a further 1½ per cent. of the total in the shape of more 'public assistance' to the wage-earners. Nowhere in the Minority report is there any recognition of the fact that the latter, as a body, have for years been themselves enjoying all the 'uncovenanted benefits' brought by the price fall to fixed money incomes.

Thus the issue between the economists and the spendthrifts raises the familiar basic questions of Socialism, on which most people have by this time taken sides and will judge these reports accordingly. This does not encourage hopes of any agreed solution of the budget problem of 1932 ; yet within the next three months we have got to find some solution, unless we drift from want of courage to take a decision, and so follow Australia down the path of least resistance, in which case (as has happened to her) the severity of the remedies we shall have to apply a little later will be vastly increased. For generations our public men, accustomed to magnificently elastic revenues and growing national wealth, have displayed the mentality of the ducal housekeeper who, when Lady Mary, about to marry an artist, asked her for some wrinkles in domestic economy, grandly replied that she was 'very imperfectly acquainted with the contrivances of persons

of limited means.' A very rich man may well 'reach a hand through time to catch the far-off interest' of a wise investment, without any question whether he has the ready cash to invest. But the man who is already overspending and has been steadily losing capital must deal, not with 'wise economy' in the long run, but with the choice between pulling-in till times are better and some definite plan for finding the money to carry on or even to increase his expenses. It is from this unaccustomed point of view that we must approach the Committee's plan : not do we like each item ? but what precisely would we substitute for it in balancing future budgets ; and do we like that better ? Our parliamentary procedure, with its rigid separation of 'Supply' from 'Ways and Means,' leading to the approval of expenditure—for our Estimates are always approved by the House just as they are printed—before anything is known as to the taxation it involves, shows how completely foreign to our system is the idea of such intelligent choice.

The Government, of course, is not pledged to accept the advice of the Committee, and may take the line that all its more important proposals involve questions of policy such as were expressly reserved, by the terms of reference, for the *exclusive* consideration of the Cabinet, though it was 'open to the Committee to review the expenditure and to indicate the economies which might be effected if particular policies were either adopted, abandoned or modified.' Such a reservation is entirely necessary, subject to a reasonable interpretation of the term 'policy.' The plain man would understand that the Government intended to be guided by the Committee unless its advice was opposed to something more than the risk of unpopularity and outcry of threatened interests which everyone knew to be inevitable whatever savings might be proposed. On this point I wrote in *The Times* of February 16 (just after the motion for the Committee had been accepted) under the head of 'What is Policy ? ' :

In public affairs it is a relative rather than an absolute term. As principle at the centre is transformed down into action at the circumference, at any link in the chain the job of the man farther down appears as administration, and that of the man higher up as policy, *i.e.*, the taking of decisions from a more comprehensive point of view ; and this 'more comprehensive' view-point may include considerations which are not willingly avowed as influencing the decision. It is therefore convenient (*sc.* to Ministers and officials) that any enquiry working from the circumference towards the centre should be liable to be stopped by the plea of policy ; and I think members of the Estimates Committee, at any rate in its earlier years, . . . will remember how the hunt was often called off just when it seemed to promise a kill. With acknowledgments to the shade of Samuel Johnson, I would hazard the definition : 'policy is the last outwork of the indefensible.'

If it should turn out that the minority have intelligently anticipated the attitude of the Government towards reduction of expenditure, and it elects to raise by extra taxation not the 20 or 30 millions of the Majority report, but twice or thrice that sum, two questions will arise: the meaning of the minority's vague phrase 'sacrifices should be made by all sections of the community, with proper regard to the relativities of capacity to make and to bear'; and the political combinations that may result. Mr. Snowden, in the debate of February 11, spoke of 'some temporary suspension [of schemes involving large expenditure], some temporary sacrifice,' as necessary to maintain the present standard of living; and again: 'the position will involve some temporary sacrifice from all, and those best able to bear them will have to make the largest sacrifices.' But he found it necessary to take a very early opportunity of explaining that the only sacrifice that threatened the wage-earner was the suspension of the increase of public assistance. Speaking on July 30, he was very careful: 'After my experience I will not go beyond saying this: that I shall make every possible effort to balance next year's budget, although it may involve rather disagreeable consequences to certain classes and to certain people'—a phrase in which it may be significant that 'sacrifice by all' has disappeared. Perhaps this means no more than that he is awaiting instructions from his party as to the direction in which it would be led, for the 'certain classes, etc.,' might as well be those on whom the brunt of the reductions of expenditure would fall, as those selected for higher taxation. In any event, what constitutes sacrifice? and how is capacity to bear it to be measured?

The economic history of the last three years shows, for the great body of wage-earners, pegged rates of money wages in spite of a heavy fall in prices, resulting in a continuous increase of their purchasing power ('real wages'); for the *entrepreneurs*, whose income consists of variable profits, heavy losses of income and, in very many cases, of capital too; for the *rentiers*, or holders of fixed-interest securities, and the salaried classes, a continuous increase of real return, as for wage-earners; the novel feature being that wages, instead of being variable (like profits) with the prosperity of the industry, have become an addition to the fixed-income category. Scientific economists, both here and abroad, have for some time been pointing out the close connexion between this pegging of the general level of money wages and our industrial troubles (excessive costs, loss of markets and rising unemployment). And Sir Henry Strakosch, in his well-known paper on 'Gold and the Price-level,'[1] has shown how, with wages pegged, the whole gain which falling prices bring to the fixed-income men (now including

[1] Supplement to *Economist* of July 5, 1930.

Labour) is necessarily made at the expense of the *entrepreneurs* unless it is provided by increased national output, which is certainly not the case with us at present. We are here concerned, not with the difficult question how far the present catastrophic price fall is caused by the gold position, but with the effects of the fall on industry, which are not thereby affected. In his standard year (1924) the total of fixed obligations, salaries and wages was about four and a half times the total of the *entrepreneur's* profit, so that a small percentage increase in the goods and services taken by the former group is magnified into a much larger percentage loss of profits; and when that increase reaches 22 per cent., all the profits are lost and thereafter business can only be carried on by drafts on capital, with the results only too familiar of late: 'reconstruction,' with vast sums written off capital as lost, short time (a very bad way of reducing wage-earnings, because it reduces output), and ultimately closing down of works and rising unemployment. The obstinately maintained claim that there shall be no reduction of money wages with prices—*i.e.*, that the workman shall drain an ever-increasing real income from the capital which is the life-blood of industry and the fountain of employment—at this point begins to defeat itself, and the increased income of the more fortunate workers is provided in part by reducing the less fortunate to the dole. That admirable feature of our public financial system, by which each year starts afresh with a clean slate, applies neither to individuals nor to industrial concerns; and no equitable sharing of sacrifices could ignore either the cumulative gains of the workers for years past or the corresponding losses of the employers, not only during the same period but as the necessary counterpart of the gains. Of the two 'partners in industry,' in times of depression, the most that the worker can claim is that his real wages should not be reduced, and the least the employer has a right to expect is that he should not have to increase them out of capital. Sacrifice, under such conditions, should mean actual loss of purchasing power; and ability to bear it may be put, as a minimum, at the amount gained in real income since the present price fall began. Workers continuing to pocket progressive increases in real wages and only marking time in the public assistance they enjoy in addition, already raised since the war by hundreds of millions found from the proceeds of taxation to which they hardly contribute, are bearing no sacrifice at all. It is argued by some that any reduction of wages would only make matters worse for industry, by reducing purchasing power. If so, we must believe that we have been providentially guided to the optimum level of wages, departure from which, either up or down, can only injure industry; for no one in his senses will hold that a rise in money

wages would now do it good ; there would be no increase in the total of purchasing power, but merely a still further transfer of such power from one set of persons to another. To say that real wages are not reduced means that the demand for the articles consumed by workers, and the amount of employment in producing them, are not diminished. There is nothing in the way the workers have been spending their recent uncovenanted benefits to suggest that a further transfer to them from other classes would increase national wealth.

The *rentier* and salaried classes have also profited by the price fall, but not to the same extent as the wage-earners, because the prices of the things on which wages are mainly spent have fallen much further than the services on which large parts of higher incomes are spent, such as educational, medical and other professional fees, and particularly wages themselves, which show little or no change. Salaries are easy to deal with ; but the majority declaration that the price fall ' provides a strong *primâ facie* case for the revision of money obligations fixed under other conditions ' is of course applicable also to fixed interest, and here the practical difficulties of revision are very great, and the equities of the case are not the same. Conversion is the proper cure for high rates of interest, but this requires accumulation of capital and good credit for borrowing, and Mr. Snowden has been unable to launch his great War Loan operation because the revelations of our public extravagance have damaged our credit. Compulsory conversion, negatived even in Australia, would ruin once for all our Government credit and London as the world's financial centre. Moreover, wages are a very short-term contract, and a fall may at any future time be restored by a rise ; but a money loan is a very long-term contract, which the lender has no power to reopen before the appointed day ; and if he has once accepted conversion to a lower rate of interest, no subsequent rise in the prevailing rate can profit him. The Minority report, while recognising that for debt held externally the problem is ' complicated by important international considerations,' seems to intend special differential taxation of certain kinds of investment income held at home ; but, apart from the difficulty of doing this equitably, it might have much the same disastrous effect as compulsory conversion. Voluntary conversion, of which the prospects in Australia are now said to be promising, would be found to be a different problem in a highly developed financial centre like London. We are brought back to the point that any such scheme must be fully defined and explored before it can be accepted as an alternative to the reductions of expenditure proposed by the majority.

Bearing always in mind the principle of equality of sacrifice,

let us now look at the majority proposals in some detail, and the views of the minority upon them. The proposals are stated to be based on three general principles : the declaration (above quoted) as to revision of money obligations ; that we have to consider what we can afford and not what we should wish to do if we had the money ; and that only by the strictest economy and efficiency for a long period can we regain prosperity. This third principle has led the Committee to look beyond 1932 and to make a series of valuable recommendations which would bear fruit in later years, but considerations of space confine this article almost entirely to proposals operative in that year. The second principle enforces the necessity (above touched upon) of condescending to the ' contrivances of persons of limited means.' The first is a definite principle of selection among possible economies, and the Committee emphasise the fact that in applying it they have been careful not to create inequalities between different classes, but only to remedy those which have existed since the war and to ' re-establish fair relativities over the field of Government and local authority servants, and with wage-earners generally.' This, further enforced by the declaration that any scheme of reduction of incomes all round should include a further cut on the reduced scales here recommended, is the Committee's answer in advance to the ' victimisation ' cries already raised by threatened interests.

Soon after the war, when prices were very high and prevailing notions about remuneration fantastic, new scales were settled for the Forces, Civil Service, teachers and police. For officers of the Forces and for all ranks in the Civil Service the scales included a variable element following automatically the cost of living index ; for men of the Forces, teachers and police there was no such provision. Sir Alan Anderson's Committee in 1923 recommended reduced rates for officers of junior rank and for men generally ; for civil servants it approved the general level, with an increase of the London seven-hour day to the provincial eight hours. Nothing was done till 1925, when modified reductions in pay of the Forces were approved—for new entrants only. The Committee now propose to save 2 millions on pay by applying the new rates to officers and men entered before 1925, making their acceptance a condition of promotion for officers and for re-engagement or extension of service for men ; and a further saving (which would accrue very gradually) by extending this condition to embrace the reduced rates of pensions for men approved in 1930, although by Royal Warrant (or equivalent instrument) all men now serving have been guaranteed ' the benefit of any warrant or regulation in force at the date of enlistment.' A further £600,000 would be saved, under the present trend of prices, by making the pay and retired pay of officers conform more promptly to the fall. This

would of course carry with it an equally prompt rise when the tide turns. The proposed enforcement of reduced rates of pay and pension could only be effected by giving officers and men the alternative of terminating their service, and this raises the question whether our Forces, which have other and possibly nearer preoccupations than another world war, can safely face the risk of losing their backbone of long-service personnel. Desirable as it is to terminate quickly the present anomaly of different pay-scales running concurrently, as well as to secure every practicable reduction, doubt may well suggest itself whether the Committee has rightly estimated the difficulties, especially as to reduction of men's pensions. Here is a real question of 'policy.'

For the Civil Service the Committee endorses the Anderson Committee's proposal to lengthen the London day, and its approval of the general level of pay, but on condition of further *automatic* reductions for cost of living if the fall continues, in contrast to the Royal Commission's plan of now consolidating pay and bonus and leaving any future reductions to special negotiations at longer intervals. They also propose some reduction of leave, the lowering of a special bonus now paid to dockyard and factory workers to the level obtaining in the trade (£325,000), and the abolition of marriage gratuities to women (£167,000).

Since the new scales for police and teachers were set up, various authorities have reviewed them and recommended reductions, but nothing adequate has been done. The Committee proposes for police a cut, in two instalments, of 12½ per cent., leaving them far above the level recommended by Lord Chalmers' Committee in 1927, the heavy price fall notwithstanding, and saving the Exchequer 1 million; and for teachers a cut of 20 per cent., with such a reduction of the State grant for these salaries as will secure the whole saving (over 9 millions) to the Exchequer. Elementary teachers, on the average, would still have more than double their pre-war figure; and adjustment of their salaries on Civil Service bonus lines would have meant a much larger reduction.

The minority accept reductions in the above cases as justifiable, but would reduce teachers by 12½ per cent. only, and show so little appreciation of the dangers of delay that they attach the condition that the actual figures should be settled by the recognised machinery of negotiation, where such exists.

On War Pensions the Committee trace the stages by which successive Governments (mainly Tory) have nullified the statutory provision for reduction of rates with cost of living, and give the current extra charge in consequence as 6¼ millions—an object-lesson in premature stabilisation and the political application of considerations of 'policy' to matters of equity. No reduction,

the Committee finds, can now be made unless under a scheme for reduced incomes all round.

On Defence, apart from pay and pension, minor savings of about ¾ million are proposed, as representing things we cannot now afford. The minority agree, but make a reservation that the dockyards should be kept well employed, even at extra cost.

On Development Services the chief cut proposed is nearly 8 millions on road expenditure, by slowing down construction and lowering the very high standard of repair; coupled with abolition of the Fund and borrowing for it. Other minor reductions, including the abolition of the Empire Marketing Board, bring the total for development to 9½ millions. The minority, on the grounds already indicated, dissent in principle and in detail, but admit that some slowing down in new construction of roads is permissible and that the Marketing Board might go. No person of balanced judgment who has seen the way in which highway authorities have been bribed by lavish grants to spend money on 'luxury' roads—*e.g.*, among the Scottish mountains—and who appreciates how little the millions so poured out do to mitigate unemployment, will fail to approve this reduction and to look for its increase in later budgets. The Fund, with certain revenues specially appropriated to it, was always an unsound departure from the principle of the Consolidated Fund; its analogy, as a 'self-balancing' service, with the Post Office, which *earns* its revenue, was false; and its inherent dangers are now manifest.

With Social Services we come to the main saving of 66½ millions on Unemployment. The fact that the Committee condemns as inadequate the Royal Commission's proposed savings complicates the matter, which is, however, so supremely important that everyone should know the main features of the rival schemes. Both assume 2½ millions of people unemployed, limit the insured benefit to twenty-six weeks, provide for uncovenanted ('transitional') benefit to follow it, and propose substantial economies by stopping the legalised abuses politely called 'anomalies.' But while the Commission reduces benefit scales by an average of 11·7 per cent., the Committee reduces them by 20 per cent. all round, defending this by figures showing that the 30*s.* weekly now paid to a family of man, wife and two children, after reduction to 24*s.*, would still leave them (allowing for the price fall) 67 per cent. better off than when Labour was last in office (22*s.*), 7 per cent. better than in 1925 (27*s.*), and within 10*d.* of the 28*s.* fixed as adequate in 1928. The Commission proposes increased contributions at the rate of 9*d.* from man, employer and State; the Committee puts the rate at 10*d.*, which the employer paid in 1925, and proposes to bring into insurance the staffs of banks and

insurance offices, State and municipal workers, the employees of railways and other public utility companies, and non-manual workers paid from £250 to £350 or £400 a year, thus securing a net gain (some 6 millions) to the Fund. Transitional benefit, now borne entirely by the State, the Commission would reduce from 44 millions (to which it would be primarily increased by the twenty-six weeks' limit to insurance) to 34, by the lower scale of benefit and the imposition of stricter conditions, including a means limit in certain cases. The Committee, having reduced full benefit by 20 per cent., would further impose a means test in all cases as soon as insured benefit was exhausted, and hand over administration to the local public assistance authority. In view of the fact that 'under existing arrangements local authorities have received an extensive relief, not contemplated when the great increase of Exchequer contributions to local authorities was granted under the Local Government Acts of 1929,' local funds should bear the charges for benefits, receiving from the Insurance Fund capitation grants, not exceeding 12 millions in all, for persons transferred to local charge; the whole cost of keeping the Fund solvent being shared equally by employer, employed and Exchequer. Insurance finance for 1932 would then stand roughly as under:

		(£ millions.)		
		On present lines.	Royal Commission.	Economy Committee (enlarged scheme).
Insurance Fund	Expenditure	84	61	68½
	Income	44	53	67½
	Balance (borrowed)	40	8	1
Voted expenditure	Contribution to Fund	15	18	22½
	Transitional benefit	35	34	
	Total	50	52	22½
Saving effected	On Votes	—	— 2	27½
	On borrowing	—	32	39
	Total	—	30	66½

The minority decline to discuss the question, relegating the whole matter to the Royal Commission, possibly with the hope that its views, when finally formulated, will be ignored as completely as its interim pronouncements have been by the Government that created it.

Any view on insurance matters propounded by Sir George

May is assured of respectful attention; but two features will disappoint many who looked to see the finance of Insurance proper separated from that of Doles, and some movement in the direction of proportioning the premiums of different industries to their risks rather than the bringing in of large new classes under the flat rate just because—*sic vos non vobis*—they will pay in much more than they will take out. In so complex a matter, with two schemes in the field, it is unlikely that either will be adopted entire; but the Committee has successfully demonstrated the possibility of very large savings, including the abandonment of borrowing.

Under Health Insurance it is proposed to reduce the panel doctor's capitation fee from 9*s.* to 8*s.* in recognition of the 'common knowledge that the standard of remuneration of the profession has been greatly increased as a result of the Health Insurance scheme and there has been growing difficulty in filling salaried medical posts under Government and the local authorities at rates of pay corresponding to those in other classes of public service.' The renewal at this juncture of agitation for higher pay and pension for medical officers of the Forces, which if granted would upset the whole scheme of parities between different 'Arms,' supports this view. Further pooling of the finances of strong and weak Approved Societies, in place of Government grants, brings the saving to 1 million. A scheme for an elaborate maternity service, to be run by local authorities, at the expense of the State to the extent of 1½ millions, is one of the things we cannot now afford. The minority agree generally, under this head, but consider the maternity scheme an overdue improvement which in default of other funds the State must finance at once.

Under Education the whole saving of over 8 millions on salaries is secured to the Exchequer. Other items are the abolition of a minimum limit (which favours richer areas) in the calculation of grants (1½ millions); increased secondary school fees, for parents who can afford them; slackening of the rapid expansion of secondary schools (which in fact is almost entirely in 'free places') in view of the imminent decrease of pupils (war births), and discontinuance of a recent extra grant to universities (¼ million), which is said to have gone largely to increase salaries. The above figures apply to England and Wales; the same reductions applied to Scotland add a further 1½ millions, making some 14 millions in all. 'None of these reductions involves the withdrawal of any educational facility now being afforded.' The minority dissent fundamentally. Restriction of any kind is altogether wrong, seeing that the children are not responsible for the financial crisis, but should be the better equipped to cope

with the burden when their turn comes to bear it! In any reduction of salaries, the readjustment of grants should be arranged to benefit the poorer areas. Slower provision of free places for secondary education, increase of fees, income tests, are all condemned.

Under Miscellaneous Services an increase (½ million) in the share of Broadcasting fees retained by the State is proposed; Government to guarantee a loan for capital expenditure as a set-off, since the Corporation can give no security beyond the term of its charter (1936). The minority object to anything being disturbed before that date.

On the future finance of Housing there are (as was to be expected) acute differences of opinion between the two sides, but nothing can now be done to relieve the 1932 Budget.

The Majority report concludes with a proposal for a standing Finance Committee of the Cabinet, on the analogy of the Imperial Defence Committee—a proposal the Prime Minister has accepted—and with a final warning that the best-devised machinery of financial control will not avail if the will to control be absent; observing that of late, as regards major items of policy, the machinery 'has again and again been put out of action before it has had any chance of functioning.' This, I fear, will always be liable to happen, until we have organised sufficient systematic publicity as to the financial position and commitments, not only present but future, to set the watch-dogs in and out of Parliament barking—let Ministers say 'the geese cackling' if they will—before it is too late.

In reviewing the situation as a whole, it must be remembered that the Committee's sphere was limited to State expenditure, excluding State revenue and all the rest of our national concerns. On the most favourable view as to reductions, there must be heavy further taxation, and it may be that the Government will choose the policy of yet heavier taxation in preference to reduced expenditure, though the former can never be a real substitute for the latter. I can attempt no forecast of the political combinations which will ultimately determine, and be determined by, their choice; but it is permissible to hope that, with a House of Commons composed of three minority parties, and the world's eyes upon us, party strategy and tactics may somehow be subordinated to the national interests. Taxation need not all be direct, and indirect taxation is not necessarily protective; and it would be consistent with the national preference for compromise rather than clear-cut logic, if the three parties could agree on emergency measures of a practical kind without prejudice to their freedom to resume the pursuit of their several ideals when the storm has been weathered. This would seem possible only on the

basis of general acceptance of the broad facts of our position: that the motive force of our economic system is Profit; that for the immediate future we are obliged to consider first the export markets; that we cannot now *spend* our way back to prosperity; that to attempt radical change in these respects in the next six months would be sheer folly. But if the Prime Minister insists that money wages and public assistance can move only upwards, whatever may happen to profits; Mr. Baldwin, that the first necessity is an all-round tariff; and Mr. Lloyd George, that it is a Development Loan of hundreds of millions, we get nowhere. Owing to the evil habit of thinking in terms of money, industry has for years been bled white both by its employees and by tax-gatherers; until it has been nursed back to vigour there can be no real and permanent recovery in our State finances. On the comparatively minor problem of restoring due parity of incomes between different classes of public servants, the Committee has fearlessly shown the way; it remains for others to tackle the greater task of restoring due parities in industry between sheltered and unsheltered wages, between wages generally and profits. To cure the canker of unemployment, in the interests of all alike from top to bottom of the social scale, every step now to be taken should be determined in the light of the truth that (to quote Mr. Keynes) 'nothing in the world can increase employment which does not create in the minds of manufacturers and contractors the expectation of an improved margin of profit.' As to what may happen to that profit, ***after it has been realised***, there is room enough for differences of opinion.

C. HARRIS.

NATIONAL POLICY AND THE MONETARY CRISIS

On November 5, 1929, Mr. Snowden, an unwitting Guy Fawkes, lit a train which may yet be destined to result in the blowing up of many cherished policies and superstitions. For on that day, by Treasury Minute, he appointed a Committee 'to enquire into banking, finance and credit, paying regard to the factors both internal and international which govern their operation, and to make recommendations calculated to enable these agencies to promote the development of trade and commerce and the employment of labour.' For the first time for many a long year our financial system was to be examined, not from its own point of view, but from the point of view of its service to trade and employment. This purpose was reflected in the composition of the Committee, which, under Lord Macmillan's wise and skilful chairmanship, combined such regular representatives of finance as Mr. Cecil Lubbock, Mr. McKenna, Mr. Brand, and Lord Bradbury; with industrialists like Mr. Lennox Lee and Sir W. Raine; Labour and Co-operative representatives like Mr. Bevin and Sir T. Allen; and last, though not least, economists like Mr. Keynes and Professor Gregory. Appointed, as it turned out, at the very moment of the American crash, the Committee has in the last eighteen months enjoyed a unique opportunity of following through the consequences of that event, superimposed upon the forces already at work, and has brought out its report in time—but only just in time—for the consideration and action required if we are to escape disaster.

The Report, as far as its analysis of the causes both of the present world crisis and of our own critical position and its main conclusions from that analysis are concerned, is a document of immense significance. It makes plain the tremendous and devastating effect upon the whole structure of the civilised world of the operation, under modern conditions, of a monetary machine uncontrolled by any deliberate, comprehensive policy, but worked more or less automatically according to a few simple rules of thumb evolved by the purely banking experience of the last century. To meet these dangers 'the era of conscious and

deliberate management must,' such is the general conclusion, 'succeed the era of undirected natural evolution.' Such management, aimed at counteracting the serious economic and social effects of instability of prices, is not, in the opinion of the Committee, an impossible task. On the contrary, they hold that 'monetary influences on prices are more controllable than any others.'

The present world crisis is, in the view of the Committee, primarily a monetary crisis: 'We think that the recent increase in unemployment in every part of the world, accompanied by a decline in production, can in the main be attributed to the fall in the level of prices.' Chapter X. of the Report gives the figures of that fall as between 1924 and February 1931—a fall, as compared with 1913 wholesale prices as the basic figure, from 159·3 to 91·6—and proceeds to trace the effects of such a fall upon industry, public finance, and social relations. It points out that 'the first person upon whom the impact falls is the business man.' Caught between falling prices on the one side and, on the other, fixed overhead and debt charges, and the natural and to-day highly organised resistance of labour to wage reductions, he loses his trade, dismisses men, lets his machinery go unrenewed, and finally goes under. The nation is burdened visibly by the cost of relieving unemployment and invisibly by the increase in the deadweight of its debt and of other fixed or partially fixed charges. Any attempt at readjustment by lowering wages or scaling down public expenditure raises the most difficult problems of social justice.

> A study of history would, we believe, confirm the opinion that it is in the changes in the level of prices and in the consequential alteration of the position of debtors and creditors, *entrepreneurs* and workers, peasants and tax-gatherers, that the main secret of social trouble is to be found. . . . The problems thus raised transcend in importance any others of our time and generation.

The cause of this unparalleled fall in prices is attributed by the Committee, in the main, to a shortage of gold, arising, not so much from a total insufficiency of the precious metal, as from its maldistribution. The maldistribution, in its turn, is the result of the action upon the world's existing monetary system of a number of non-monetary factors, which have asserted themselves with tremendous potency in the post-war period. First of these, in the public estimation at any rate, come reparations and war debts converging ultimately on two countries, France and the United States. Then come the interest payments due to these countries, and more particularly the United States, in respect of their foreign investments. Thirdly comes the tariff policy of these countries, which precludes payment in kind of these debts and creates yet further debts in respect of their favourable trade

balances—all ultimately payable in gold. Left to themselves these factors would long before this have drained the world of its last ounce of gold.

The one countervailing factor has been the foreign investment of the creditor countries. In the case of this country foreign investment represents a consistent policy, based on long habit and profoundly influenced by the experience that it pays to help debtors through their temporary difficulties. French and American investment has proceeded on very different lines. The French, after their experience with Russia, have been intensely reluctant to lock up any money abroad and have tended to confine themselves to short-term advances. This, as the Report points out, is almost as bad as the actual hoarding of gold, for either gold has to be kept in reserve to meet sudden demands for repayment, or else the borrowers run the risk of the kind of financial disaster which nearly overtook Germany, and from which we, as recent events have shown, may be by no means as immune as we have imagined. America, too, has very largely lent short, and, in any case, her policy of foreign investment has been intermittent and liable to diversion by her own internal fluctuations and by alternating moods of over-confidence and panic. It is this failure of the two great creditor countries either to buy or to lend consistently that has precipitated the crisis.

The story begins with the restoration of the gold standard in Europe and the consequent scramble for the gold required for the conventional currency reserves. We were the first, and our restoration of the pound sterling to the old gold parity in 1925 seriously accentuated the handicap of high production costs from which we had been suffering all through the previous period when we had been steadily deflating our currency. In the view of the Committee this policy provides ' the major part of the explanation of the adverse change in our costs of production compared with elsewhere.' So far from accepting the view that our loss of trade has been due to inefficiency, they consider that only a high degree of efficiency could have enabled us to maintain such trade as we have done against so heavy a handicap. As for the argument that the policy we pursued was justified by the benefits accruing to us from our international financial business, the Committee bluntly conclude that it is not likely that these benefits have ' gone even a fraction of the way towards compensating the losses of wealth through unemployment in recent years.' And, indeed, if one unemployed person represents a national loss of some £200 a year, and costs a further £80 a year to maintain at the public expense, it would appear that our financial policy has cost us since 1920 the better part of from £280,000,000 to £700,000,000 a year!

The general restoration of the gold standard in Europe was only made possible by large-scale American investment. According to the Report, the United States, in the four years 1925-28, invested nearly £1,000,000,000 in foreign long-term securities. This process was deliberately fostered by the Federal Reserve authorities, who, anxious to reduce the accumulation of gold in America, which had reached some £900,000,000, quoted specially low money rates in the autumn of 1927 in order to stimulate a boom in foreign securities. Not only was the gold drain checked, but by the end of June 1928 nearly £120,000,000 of gold had found its way back across the Atlantic. The whole world situation was eased and a general return of prosperity seemed at hand. Unfortunately, cheap money in America also contributed to the rise in the price of American common stocks and to the great share boom, which before long began not only to deflect investors from foreign investments, but to suck into its vortex money, both American and European, from overseas. After the crash at the end of 1929 more money was drawn in to meet liabilities, and political uncertainty in Germany has since been responsible for yet further withdrawals. Upon this situation were superimposed the effects of a French position in which reluctance to invest abroad, except to some extent on short call, and the legal limitations upon the powers of the Bank of France combined to create a steady piling up of gold. This result, economically unprofitable, was no doubt in the main unintentional and almost automatic, though perhaps not unwelcome in quarters where a large gold reserve is believed to be a valuable asset in war and not without its influence in diplomacy.

With this breakdown, after a short period of expansion, of the process of international investment there remained nothing to stop the drain of gold to France and America and the collapse of prices in a world whose currency and credit basis is fast melting away. How little margin is left for a continuance of the process is shown by the figures quoted on page 134 of the Report. According to these, the creditor countries—*i.e.*, the United States, France, and in a lesser degree Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and Sweden—increased the gold in their Central Banks and Treasuries between January 1, 1929, and January 1, 1931, from £1,277,300,000, or 65 per cent. of the world total, to £1,564,000,000, or 74·5 per cent. of the total, while the gold in the rest of the world went down from £680,000,000 to £531,000,000. As at least two-thirds of this last figure is immobilised under the laws regulating the currency reserves of the debtor countries, it is, as the Report points out, ' unlikely that the debtor countries can continue much longer to square their international position by parting with gold at the rate of £70,000,000 a year.' But since last January the rate of flow has doubled, and France and the

United States together have sucked up at least another £80,000,000 in seven months. A considerable part of this has come from this country, which, owing to the ever-increasing deficit on its trade balance, had practically ceased to be a creditor country last year and is to-day undoubtedly one of the debtor countries.

If the Committee's analysis of the situation is correct, we are, unless immediate and drastic steps are taken, nowhere near the end either of the gold drain or of the collapse in prices. We are in fact sliding faster and faster towards a Niagara of almost immeasurable disaster. But is it possible that the Committee are wrong? Can it be that all this transfer of gold to one or two countries, where it is almost as effectively sterilised as if it had been put back in the mines, is really only an irrelevant incident in a depression due to over-production or to mere psychological conditions, and so likely to right itself as soon as surplus stocks have been worked off and confidence begins to revive? If so, all we need do is to sit tight and wait till the clouds roll by. This in substance is the advice given by Lord Bradbury in a wittily phrased, but almost entirely negative, memorandum of dissent from the unanimous conclusion of his colleagues.

Over-production there has undoubtedly been in certain commodities, such as sugar, coffee and rubber, and such over production has, no doubt, contributed to the depression. But there is very little evidence of general over-production. In any case, the cumulative effect of the sequence of interacting causes and effects set out by the Committee is far too strong to be dismissed as irrelevancy by any reasonably impartial mind. The trouble is that there is a type of mind, still very influential in City circles, which, while only too ready to recognise the power of monetary influences to create inflation, regards deflation, however violent and however disastrous, as a mysteriously beneficent process which it is unwise to question and dishonest to interfere with.

That certainly is not the outlook of the Macmillan Committee. Their one positive general conclusion is that the raising of prices above their present level is an immediate necessity, and they declare their emphatic opinion that to allow prices to be stabilised at their present level—not to speak of a further fall—would be

> a serious disaster for all countries of the world alike, and that the avoidance of such an event should be a prime object of international statesmanship. . . . Our objective should be, in so far as it lies within the power of this country to influence the international price level, first of all to raise prices a long way above the present level, and then to maintain them at the level thus reached with as much stability as can be managed. We recommend that this objective be accepted as the guiding aim of the monetary policy of this country.

When it comes to the practical execution of the policy thus

enunciated it is difficult not to have some sympathy with Lord Bradbury's criticism of his colleagues' schemes as 'in conception too ambitious and for application too nebulous.' The fact, no doubt, was that even Lord Macmillan's skill could not keep so heterogeneous a team together in the working out of definite constructive proposals as effectively as in the less contentious task of statement and analysis. On the international side the main suggestions are that the Central Banks should work together to achieve the object in view; that they should be permitted to reckon balances with the Central Banks of other gold-using countries, or with the Bank of International Settlements, as gold for all the purposes of the law; that the legal requirements as to the gold reserves of Central Banks should be relaxed; that gold-standard countries should agree not to allow any gold to pass into circulation.

The recent co-operation of the English, French and American Central Banks to provide a £50,000,000 credit to London to stop the gold outflow and the measures taken since the London Conference to prevent a further run on short loans to Germany are no doubt instances of the kind of thing aimed at. But one may be inclined with Lord Bradbury to doubt whether either their legal powers or the support of their publics will allow them to give effect to such a policy of co-operation in gold redistribution on anything like a sufficient scale.

On the domestic side their most important recommendation is that we should definitely abandon the gold basis of our internal currency and keep gold purely for exchange purposes. The present system is really, they point out, a meaningless survival from a period when people still thought in terms of actual metallic currency and were entitled, whenever they wished, to be paid in such currency.

> The present system . . . is wrong in that it associates the amount of the gold which the Bank of England should hold immobilised and unavailable for export with the amount of the active note circulation. Formerly when the Bank's gold was held for two purposes, partly to meet an external drain, and partly to meet an internal drain, it may have been reasonable to earmark a substantial part of it for the latter purpose. But now that the second purpose has disappeared, and has in part been abolished by law, so that the gold reserve of the Bank is held for no other purpose than to meet a foreign drain, the effect . . . is to forbid the Bank to use the greater part of its gold for the only purpose for which it is held or could be used.

The obvious futility of the present system and the rigid linking up of gold and currency which compels the contraction of domestic credit because some quite fortuitous circumstance, like an American boom or a Paris panic, withdraws our gold, and

only enables domestic expansion to take place when the foreign exchanges are favourable, clearly commend the Committee's proposals, which are, in brief, to allow a maximum volume of currency, provisionally fixed at a somewhat elastic total of £400,000,000, to be issued as required irrespective of the state of the gold reserve. This latter is not to go below a minimum of £75,000,000 except in a very special emergency, and is normally to be kept at least as high as at present, but with much greater freedom to vary it according to exchange requirements. With this major proposal are coupled various others for affording more guidance to the investor in home industries, for better statistics, etc. Here again, when all is said and done, we are left with the feeling that the remedies, excellent in themselves, are quite inadequate to the scale and urgency of the problem to be dealt with.

The fact is that the Committee, for quite intelligible reasons, felt itself precluded from investigating further some of the non-monetary factors which underlie the monetary crisis and seeing how far action in this particular field might assist the situation. This is particularly true of the tariff factor, whose dominant influence upon the whole situation is recognised throughout the Report. But no attempt is made in the main body of the Report either to analyse the effect of this factor or to discuss the possibility of remedies on the tariff plane. It is true that an addendum signed by Messrs. Allen, Bevin, Keynes, McKenna, Frater Taylor, and Tulloch (and on this issue supported strongly by Sir W. Raine and with many hesitations and qualifications by Mr. Brand) advocates a tariff in order to improve our balance of trade and as a preferable alternative to a reduction of wages and salaries. But the treatment of the subject shows so vague a comprehension of the nature and effect of a tariff, and so curious a confusion of arguments in its favour, as to deprive it of most of its practical value. Suffice it to say that the tariff is advocated in the same breath as a scheme for a fair all-round lowering of wages and salaries by raising prices, as a means of keeping down imports and of increasing employment and investment at home.

In any close consideration of the effect of tariff policies on the world's distribution of gold it is necessary to take into account not only the policy of such countries as France and the United States, which discourage importation, but also the policy of a country like the United Kingdom, which indiscriminately accepts every kind of import, and does not even attempt to levy on competitive imports any customs duty to balance the incidence of taxation on our domestic production. When this is done it at once becomes clear that this country is at least as much responsible for the maldistribution of gold as America and France,

and has it in its power, by a change of policy, in a large measure to correct it. A glance at the figures will make this clear.

The total excess of American exports over American imports for the years 1924-29 averaged £141·3 millions a year. Over the same period the excess of British imports from the United States over British exports to the United States averaged, according to our statistics, £154 millions a year, a figure which should be reduced to roughly £120 millions to be strictly comparable. In other words, this country has been responsible for six-sevenths of that excess of American exports which has been one of the primary factors in the drain of gold to America. Similarly, in the case of France her large credit balance in her trade with us, averaging £33 millions for 1924-29, has obviously been an important factor in assisting her policy of scraping together and immobilising so much of the world's gold. Our Free Trade policy has, in fact, proved a misfortune for the world as a whole, as well as to ourselves, by handing over the gold, which we should have steadily diffused by consistent overseas investment, to others less capable of using it for world purposes.

The actual effect of a domestic tariff in this country on the balance of trade and so on the gold situation would work out roughly as follows Assuming that the tariff would, within two years, transfer £100,000,000 of foreign to British production (a minimum figure), there would be a total increase of British production (on the official basis that each new unit of direct production initiated in this country gives rise indirectly to another unit of production) of some £200,000,000. This would involve a large increase in the imports of raw materials required for the additional production, and of foodstuffs required by the workers engaged upon it, which would have to be set off against the reduction of £100,000,000 in our manufactured imports. The immediate gain to our balance of trade position would, therefore, be comparatively small, possibly not more than £30,000,000. On the other hand, the export position of our industries would be greatly strengthened, not only by reduction of factory overheads through working more up to capacity, but also by the reduction of taxation, which would follow upon a reduction of unemployment and upon the strengthening of the revenue by the increased total volume of wages and profits. The improvement of our balance of trade through this factor might easily be two or three times as large as that due to the mere reduction in imports. To these figures would have to be added an improvement in our freight earnings due to increased exports and to the substitution, in our imports, of bulky raw materials and foodstuffs, mostly brought over long ocean voyages in our own ships, for manufactures sent over shorter distances and largely in foreign ships.

Lastly, our gold position would be still further strengthened by more active British home investment and, in all probability, also by American investment in prosperous British industries. So much for the domestic aspect of fiscal policy. In these matters, however, the Imperial aspect is even more important than the domestic. The immediate scope for increased export of our manufactures within the Empire is at least as great as the scope for increased production for the home market, and would, in its turn, strengthen our whole position as regards costs by further increasing our scale of production and by bringing about yet further reductions of taxation made possible by reduction of unemployment and increased yield of revenue through fresh production. The reciprocal increased purchases by us of Empire products would stimulate development overseas and lead to yet further exports, while the whole process of development would attract not only British but American capital. Incidentally, a policy of inter-Imperial financial co-operation might help to economise gold in inter-Imperial trade and keep yet more of it free for extra Imperial trade and investment. It is a strange fact, not altogether without significance, that from beginning to end of the Report there is not a single sentence from which the reader might even infer that such a thing as the British Empire existed, or that any form of Imperial co-operation were conceivable or worth considering.

Within a very few years relative economic positions in the world would be so changed that the drain of gold would not merely be stayed, but that most of the sterilised gold of America and France would begin to flow back into the British Empire and be used to promote both its own development and that of other countries. A policy of domestic protection and far-reaching Imperial Preference would, in fact, not only help to stay the further fall in prices from the onset, but would gradually bring about a complete new redistribution of the world's gold supply.

Is there no other remedy which would have an even more immediate effect in securing that prompt rise in world prices to which the Committee attach such paramount importance? I think there is. Among the causes of the crisis mentioned at intervals in the Report, curiously enough as a non-monetary cause, is the collapse in the price of silver. But here, again, no attempt is made to estimate the extent of its contribution to the depression or to investigate the possibilities of mitigating or removing the cause of trouble. As a matter of fact, it is obvious that a fall of from over 26*d*. an ounce in 1927-28 to 13*d*. an ounce and under in the last few months cannot but have exercised a very material influence upon world affairs. It has halved the value of China's only medium of purchase as well as of all the

accumulated savings of India. Its effect, both direct and indirect, through social upheaval, boycott and all the other inevitable outward and spectacular manifestations of economic distress, upon the trade of the gold-using world, and more particularly of Lancashire and Japan, has been very serious indeed. It has helped to keep down raw material prices by involuntary dumping, and manufactured prices by the impoverishment of two markets already among the most important in the world and of immense capacity for absorbing over-production elsewhere if their purchasing power were allowed to expand instead of being artificially contracted. It threatens before long to add the competition of artificially subsidised factories to our other problems. It has directly added to the gold shortage by stimulating the hoarding of gold in the East, and threatens to create an additional drain on the gold supply by the efforts of India and China to get on to a gold currency basis.

I lay stress on the word 'artificial,' for the fall in silver in the last three years, and, indeed, in the last sixty years, has not been due to natural causes such as excessive production. It has been entirely brought about by Government action, influenced largely by the desire of countries to be in the fashion and discard what was supposed to be a more primitive and less dignified basis to their currency. In this question, as in the restoration of sterling to its pre-war gold parity, in order that 'the pound should look the dollar in the face,' a queer, childish snobbery, an instinct to follow the crowd, has exercised far greater influence than any real arguments of economic advantage. As a matter of fact the production of silver during the last 400 years has not exceeded that of gold by more than 14½ to 1; during the last 100 years the ratio has been 11·8, and during the last 30 years 10·9, figures which of themselves clearly could not account for a fall from the standard ratio of 15½, which prevailed before demonetisation began in 1873, to over 70 to-day.

Since the war the production from the mines has never equalled the demand. The total shortage from 1920 to 1930 inclusive has been some 328,000,000 ounces, only converted into a surplus by the selling off of demonetised metal by Governments to the tune of 408,000,000 ounces. The fall of the last three years has been due to the sale of over 200,000,000 ounces between 1928 and 1930, chiefly by the Indian and French Indo-Chinese Governments. The importance of the actual figures lies in their revelation not only of the cause of the trouble, but also of the smallness of the amounts involved. The whole fall of the last three years has been caused by Government sales of about £15,000,000 worth of silver at the average price fetched. Regarded as a pure business proposition, there ought not to be

the slightest difficulty in doubling or even trebling the price of silver in a few months, if the Government of India announced that it would not sell any of its silver reserve under the price aimed at, and if the British Treasury or Bank of England, with or without the help of other Central Banks in the Empire and outside, bought silver in quantities trifling as compared with the magnitude of the trade revival that would be created. There is no reason to fear that any rise in price of the order indicated would lead to a vast increase of production. Three-quarters of that production is a by-product in the winning of lead, copper, zinc, etc., and is consequently almost unaffected by changes in the price of silver itself. Nor does experience suggest that a rise in price brings hoarded silver into the market. On the contrary, the higher the price the more the Indian peasant hoards it and the less he is forced to surrender to the moneylender when crop failure or other difficulties compel him to clear his debts.

The advantage due to the mere raising of the price of silver as a commodity would, of course, be greatly enhanced if the silver acquired in the process were utilised by the Western world to expand its shrinking supply of gold. Without going the length of remonetising silver as currency, or of making it legal tender at a definite and permanent ratio, it would substantially increase the amount of gold available, as well as keep up silver prices, if the Central Banks were authorised to keep a percentage of their metallic currency reserve in silver at market price. A complete bimetallic system would, no doubt, have great advantages. It would avoid exchange fluctuations between the gold and silver using halves of the world. It would also, at some such ratio as 20 to 1, provide, as far as can be foreseen, just about that extra amount of metallic currency basis as would be required to make up for the estimated prospective total shortage of new gold as compared with world needs (apart from maldistribution). But the establishment of any such system would only be possible on the basis of a wide measure of international agreement. The lesser steps mentioned could be taken at once within the Empire, and would in all probability be widely followed outside even in the absence of formal agreement. If the British Government would convene, or agree to attend, an immediate International Conference on Silver, announcing at the same time that it meant in any event to take some definite action itself, there would be little doubt of its securing decisions which would probably do more to ease the immediate situation than any others that could be reached in the same time.

At the outset of their analysis of the situation the Committee were careful to insert a proviso :

> If our budgetary position is unsound, and if our industries, owing to the level of their costs, or for other reasons, are unable to compete successfully, as they used to do, in the markets of the world, no management of the terms and quantity of credit will be able to maintain our national prosperity.

But the Committee made no suggestions as to how these essential conditions were to be fulfilled, and they certainly are not being fulfilled at this moment. Essentially the two conditions are one, for it is the failure of our industries to hold their own that is the main cause of our budgetary difficulties. Only increased production can reduce unemployment and create new revenue. And only a policy which gives fair play to British industry at home and can secure for it a more favoured position in Empire markets and a better bargaining position in world markets can lead to increased production.

In the preceding paragraphs domestic protection and Imperial Preference have been advocated as a most effective instrument for raising world prices by securing a better distribution of gold. In so far as they achieve that object, and in so far as it is achieved by the restoration of silver to its proper function in the world's monetary system, to that extent both remedies also ease the budgetary position which has been made infinitely more difficult by violent deflation. It should never be forgotten that the burden of our expenditure, national and local, which was only 70 per cent. greater in 1920 than in 1913, when allowance is made for the difference in wholesale prices, is 150 per cent. greater to-day than in 1920. But the main object of Protection and Preference, after all, is to restore our competitive power, and to set right our budgetary position by stopping the drain of the dole, by revivifying all the sources of revenue, and, incidentally, by adding an extra source of revenue through the duties on such foreign goods as continue to enter the country. In other words, the policy I have advocated is one which will create the essential conditions underlying an improvement of the monetary position as well as exercise a favourable influence on that position itself.

There is no solution except on these lines. To think that economy by itself, a mere cutting down of public expenditure, can save us is to betray an utter lack of perspective. Economy is essential and can materially help us to turn the corner, just as wasteful extravagance has undoubtedly helped to aggravate our present critical situation. In this connexion the Report of the Economy Committee has come at the right moment. It has compelled us, one way or another, to face the facts of our budgetary position. It has given a valuable lead in indicating the only directions in which reductions on any large scale are possible, in so far as it is by reduction of our expenditure that the problem is

to be solved. But it must be remembered that Sir George May's Committee worked under peculiar limitations. They were only asked to deal with half the budget—the half concerned with administrative as apart from debt expenditure. Nor were either the monetary or the fiscal problems within their purview. Their whole calculations have been based on both the present level of prices and the present level of unemployment. No Government can ignore either the warnings or the positive recommendations of the May Committee. But no Government can decide to what extent those recommendations can and must be carried out unless it has first made up its mind whether it accepts the main conclusions of the Macmillan Committee and has further decided how far, and by what means, it can give effect to those conclusions.

The importance of these considerations is emphasised by much of the loose talk which is current about the desirability of a National Government to carry through a policy of economy. Nothing could be more unfortunate, at this moment, than a national concentration upon a secondary object which would in any way weaken its concentration upon the only policies which can save us. A National Government prepared to carry out a tariff policy bolder and more far-reaching, especially on the agricultural and Imperial side, than any which even the largest Unionist majority would dare to introduce, and to give to that policy a truly national sanction; a National Government that would tackle the monetary question on really big Imperial lines, and by dealing with silver cut the tap-root of Indian discontent; a National Government that could ruthlessly prune away waste, but yet make it clear that it stood for the maintenance of a high wage standard, and lent no countenance to the idea that we look to sweating, either public or private, as the way to salvation—such a National Government, if attainable, might be well worth having. But a coalition of all the most negative and timid elements in all the 'old gangs' in order to prevent the country coming to a clear decision on the fundamental issue of economic policy, that, indeed, would be a crowning disaster.

L. S. AMERY.

THE HEALING OF EUROPE

THE financial crisis has had one good result. It has compelled the statesmen of the world to take stock seriously of the political conditions of Europe. Ever since the plenipotentiaries at Versailles, exhausted by their efforts to restore Europe to consciousness, left her sick bed no systematic attempt has been made to promote her recovery. True, there have been occasions when the doctors have been recalled to stop a sudden hæmorrhage or to prescribe for some special emergency; but the careful watch that a wise surgeon keeps over his patient for months after an operation has been, in this instance, totally neglected.

It is, of course, a fact that the League of Nations has been installed at Geneva and has made some well-meant but unsuccessful attempts to revive trade and reorganise industry; but the duties definitely imposed upon it by the Covenant were mainly directed to discovering ways to prevent war. This duty it has fulfilled; the road to war is far more difficult now than it was prior to 1914. But the League had no duties with respect to developing peace—except perhaps in its capacity as the guarantor of minority rights; and one cannot blame it for the fact that Europe has been so slow in recovering and is still in a condition of dangerous debility. It is no exaggeration to say that Europe is at this moment more unsettled, more nervous, and more irritable than she was during the forty years that intervened between the Franco-German war and the outbreak of the Great War. Were it not that no existing Government is so insane as to think of making war just now, it might be said that Europe was never more in danger of war. For, whilst it would be untrue to say that any nation wants war, there are millions of people whose minds have been so wrought upon by a sense of injustice or by racial antipathies that they are ceasing to regard war as a thing to be avoided at all costs and are not unready to admit that it may be in some cases preferable to death by suffocation.

It will, of course, be said that this is conjuring up imaginary dangers, or, at any rate, magnifying the importance of certain ebullitions of national ill-temper; but I believe my statement will be borne out by anyone who, in the last two or three years, has

visited, or known the people in, the Polish Corridor, Upper Silesia, Lithuania, East Prussia, the Polish Ukraine, the minority districts of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania and Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian and Russian settlements in Bessarabia, the Dobroudja, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Croatia, the South Tyrol, the Slav-inhabited portions of northern Italy, and both sides of its north-western frontier. In all these places the talk of the market-place and the public Press is far from being that of the Sermon on the Mount. Love for a neighbouring race plays little part in the mentality of the men and women of these lands at the present time. Nor, if one looks nearer home, does it bulk very large in the British or American Press at times when the weather forecast is 'stormy.' These places are not mentioned in any spirit of hostile criticism towards the inhabitants. Indeed, it is impossible to reproach them for their sentiments. It is not their fault. They are suffering from a nervous disease for which they are not responsible. Those who are responsible are the successive Governments of the Great Powers who have stood by without attempting to make any united effort to remedy the manifest evils which were left by the peace treaties or to heal the sore places which have made their appearance in the body of Europe during the thirteen years of her slow struggle towards recovery.

Let us take as an example the Polish Corridor. No one can travel over that broad belt of land which cuts Prussia into two portions, or stay in Dantzig or in East Prussia, without arriving at the conviction that the present arrangement cannot be permanent. This is not due to the fault of either people. It is the result of a blunder by those who thought to solve a political problem without taking account of human nature. It is evident that no East Prussian will accept permanent separation from the rest of the German Reich; nor will any Pole contemplate abandoning the Polish peasants who inhabit the Corridor, or the great new seaport of Gdynia. Both parties regard the problem as being unsolved and each has its own way of solving it. The Germans would re-annex the Corridor together with Dantzig, and the Dantzig folk would welcome them with joy; whilst the Poles would take East Prussia, which once was a part of ancient Poland, where many of their own race would be ready to greet them. Even if these two competing projects are not seriously entertained by any large number of persons, each nation credits the other with harbouring the evil design against it, and the outcome of it all is that on both sides of the frontier people stand in a state of perpetual distrust, and in such an atmosphere peace cannot be propagated. One of the most urgent requirements of Europe is a reconciliation between Germany and Poland,

and yet, in the Corridor, we keep open a festering sore which renders reconciliation well-nigh hopeless.

It is a difficult but not an impossible task to find a remedy. If the Governments of Germany, Poland, France, and England were to undertake it with a fixed determination to arrive at a settlement it could be reached. It will require sacrifices on both sides, but these would be nothing in comparison with the gain to each that would result from the removal of this unnecessary source of irritation. A similar spring of turbid and unreasonable trouble is to be found in Upper Silesia; but this case is so well known, and occupies so constantly the attention of the Council of the League of Nations, that it is unnecessary to dilate upon it. Its cause lies in a super-excitable sense of nationalism, and it would rapidly disappear if there could be created an atmosphere of reconciliation over the German and Polish nations.

There are other places where a wise physician could apply successfully a little healing ointment. Why cannot the recurrent bouts of fever in the Balkans be reduced? Especially those that arise out of the relations of Bulgaria and her three European neighbours. There is no nation more anxious to live at peace than is Bulgaria; and yet there has been hardly a year since 1919 when some trouble has not arisen. It is not easy, nor would it be profitable, to try to discover at whose door the fault lies. It is due to the fact that whilst numbers of people investigate the conditions of the Balkan States and produce all kinds of nostrums for putting things to rights, and whilst the inhabitants themselves willingly join in conclaves and conferences to discuss means of bringing about unity in the Balkan Peninsula, no one gets further than the stage of discussion. The spots where treatment is required are well known. There is Macedonia, with its revolutionary organisations and its large bodies of exiles now refugees in Bulgaria, where they are a source of constant uneasiness to all concerned. There is the question of the Bulgarian access to the Ægean Sea. There are difficulties with the Bulgarian proprietors of land in Roumania. There is the adjustment of farms on the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. There is the existence of secret societies in Bulgaria called into being by the troubles in Macedonia. No one denies that these evils exist. Indeed, each of the Governments affected says that it is doing all that it can to remedy them. This is partly true; but things do not move. Or if they move, they move so slowly that before one gangrene is cured the infection from it has spread and others have taken its place.

Then there is the perpetual difficulty with the minorities; in particular those whose homes lie along the frontier lines of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Roumania, and Italy. These people live in districts which after the war were

transferred from a defeated State to one which had been victorious. These districts have always been inhabited by mixed races. They are so still. The only change is that the race that formerly ruled is now the ruled. The upper dog has become the lower dog, and he does not like it. In some places (*e.g.*, the belt along the Danube on the southern edge of Slovakia and some strips of land between Roumania and Yugoslavia and between Yugoslavia and Italy) the minority population greatly exceeds in numbers those in authority over it. It has become evident that in some of these cases mistakes were made by those who framed the peace treaties; but it is very difficult to retrace one's steps in these matters, since any return of territory to its former owner would carry with it, against their will, some thousands of inhabitants who are now happy in being reunited to their own kith and kin. Nevertheless, it seems essential that some rectification should be effected, and it ought not to be beyond the wit of man to discover some means of rearranging things provided always that the demands of minorities are generously and completely met.

The various minorities in Europe present a situation which, perhaps more than any other, requires wise treatment. It has arisen out of the fact that, owing to movements of population, extending over many years, parts of Europe are inhabited by mixed races. These peoples, although dwelling side by side, have conserved their individuality in a very remarkable way. Within a few miles of Berlin there is the Wend people, talking still a Slav dialect, using Polish forms of worship, hardly ever intermarrying with the Germans living almost at their door. Transylvania is dotted over with German villages whose folk speak German, wear German costumes, live in houses of German styles of architecture. With their own language, their own religion, their own customs, they carry on German traditions; although they have no relations, political or other, with Germany. The maintenance of their racial characteristics is sacred to them and has not been hitherto incompatible with loyalty to the State under whose flag they lived.

These conditions were well known to the statesmen who met at Versailles in 1919, or rather, they were known to their advisers. For the 'Great Four' were not very well up in the details of European history. They recognised, however, the importance of the question, and were sufficiently far-sighted to realise that the reshaping of the map of Europe on which they were engaged would add greatly to the complications of this minority problem. For example, the partition of the Austrian Empire, whilst it would convert some of the former minorities into majorities, would inevitably create new groups of minorities which, whilst less in

number than those who were to be liberated, would probably be more troublesome. Neither Germans in Poland, nor Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, nor Austrians in Italy, were likely to settle down under their new allegiance in a happy state of mind. Accordingly, the Allied and Associated Powers took the view that the only way to reconcile these minorities to the change would be to allow them to retain as far as possible their racial characteristics and the modes of life that they had been accustomed to. It was a wise decision, since the great majority of the persons affected were of a class that clings to its home and mixes little in politics so long as its natural instincts have free play, and a change of allegiance does not entail a change in habits. Human nature will stand a good deal of interference so long as it does not intrude too much into the home.

Thus it came about that the treaties of peace concluded at Paris were based upon the principle that the conquerors would not impose upon the conquered a *régime* of denationalisation. They would recognise that in Alsace Germans might remain German in tongue and culture; in Italy Tyroleans and Slovenes might retain their respective languages and customs; Hungarians might speak Hungarian and bring up their children in Hungarian schools notwithstanding that they were subjects of Czechoslovakia, Roumania, or Yugoslavia. This principle was embodied in certain treaties that go by the name of the 'Minorities Treaties'; but it was not deemed necessary to require written undertakings in every case. With France and Italy, professing to be great liberty-loving nations, the Powers were satisfied with assurances that the people whose homes they had annexed would have no cause to complain of undue interference with their ordinary course of life.

But here again too little account was taken of human nature. The ideas of these statesmen were too lofty for the ordinary citizen, and when the Minorities Treaties became operative and it was discovered that the privileges intended for the minorities came into conflict with administrative convenience or nationalistic sentiment, schools began to be closed, subsidies were withdrawn, minority scholars found themselves unfairly handicapped in examinations, and, in short, the minorities' rights were filched from them in a dozen different ways. Then complaints arose and recrimination followed. Minorities who claimed redress were denounced as irredentists. Reconciliation between the races became less and less possible.

This is still the situation, although some Governments are making genuine efforts to redress grievances. In Roumania a Minister for the Minorities has been appointed. In Yugoslavia agreement has been reached with the German churches. In

Czechoslovakia the policy of the Government has been for some years past that of satisfying, so far as possible, the minority demands. Nevertheless it cannot be said that the minorities are satisfied. There are few who would not welcome any upheaval which would give them the chance of returning to their old allegiance, and, as the total number of persons living under minority conditions in Europe is over thirty millions, so large a body of malcontents cannot fail to have a disquieting influence in world politics. Indeed, its repercussions extend into the United States of America, where active organisations exist for championing the cause of the minorities in European countries.

Closely related to the question of minorities and largely resulting therefrom is the present political tension between Italy and Yugoslavia. The seizure of Fiume by Italy and allocation to Yugoslavia of almost all the eastern shore of the Adriatic are not forgotten on one side or the other. But since those events the treatment of the Slovene minority in northern Italy, resulting as it has in many thousands taking refuge in Croatia and other parts of the kingdom of Yugoslavia, has embittered the feelings of the Slavs to such an extent that a visitor to Zagreb at this moment finds little else being talked about. There are so many possible causes of friction between Italy and Yugoslavia that it seems a pity that this particular source of irritation is not removed, as it easily might be by a more generous treatment being accorded to those groups of alien parentage who have been forced by the events of the war to become Italian citizens.

There are still other open wounds which might be described; but it will suffice to name them. There is the situation of the Ukrainians in Poland, into which a committee of the League is now inquiring. There is the danger spot of Bessarabia, as to which no one knows whether it is to be Russian or Roumanian. There is Spain, now working out her own salvation, whose revolutionary waves may at any time overleap their breakwaters. There is little Albania, gradually becoming Italianised, to the grave concern of Greece and Yugoslavia. Then there is the thunder cloud of Russia hanging over Eastern Europe and watched by anxious eyes in Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Poland, and Roumania. And lastly, France and Germany.

For two centuries the peace of the world has depended upon the relationship existing between the French and the German peoples. They are two peoples highly civilised, cosmopolitan in outlook, holding, both of them, high moral positions in the world, capable, if united, of guiding the destiny of Europe. But they are so different in character that it seems to an outside observer as though it was impossible for them to coalesce. They are like two individuals who get on each other's

nerves. It may seem somewhat presumptuous of an Englishman to make this observation, but it is made only because it will not be until the English people appreciate this elementary fact that they will be able to be of any assistance in healing the wounds of Europe. At this very moment Frenchmen are saying, 'Oh! Those English will never understand us. They had better leave us alone to settle our differences with Germany by ourselves.' But this is just what is impossible. The trouble between the two nations is too deeply seated, too complicated, and too much involved in relations with other countries, to allow of its being removed by the sole effort of the two parties. It is a part, but, of course, the major part, of the disease from which all Europe is suffering. If France and Germany could be brought together, the rest will follow. If they cannot combine, cure of the rest is out of the question.

The fact of the matter is that so far as popular sentiment all over Europe is concerned, it is drawn into two currents—the pro-French and the pro-German. Nations are like individuals. They love to take sides. So long as France and Germany stand out as potential combatants no Treaties of Locarno or Kellogg Pacts, or anything else of that kind, will prevent public opinion in other lands from grouping itself on one side or the other. What peacemakers must strive for is to lead the people in France and Germany, not merely to tolerate one another, but to co-operate with each other in some great common enterprise. They must play in the same team. When Europe sees this there will be a chance for complete cure. It is towards this goal that all must strive, and no nation can render better help than the British. We are less closely affected by trouble in Europe than are the Continental peoples. We have wider influence over the world. We are a little more tolerant. But we are very ignorant about our neighbours, ignorant of the French and the Germans alike. We must try to understand them, and it must be an understanding not merely on the part of a few politicians or students here and over there, but an understanding amongst the masses. For it will be the masses who will make, or save us from, the next war. It will be mass consciousness that will swing the world over the precipice, and it is only through mass reconciliation that this disaster can be averted.

Let us, then, try to understand what the masses both in France and in Germany are thinking. It has been well said that you cannot indite a nation. Nor can one make any single statement that is applicable to an entire people. Still less ought one to generalise in respect to two so great and varied communities as France and Germany. Nevertheless, one may say that the general sentiment in each country is so full of bitterness and

suspicion of the other's intentions that it constitutes an international danger as serious as any that has arisen since the war. It is true that other forces are at work in both countries, and there is a growing body of men on each side who are labouring to reconcile their respective peoples before it is too late. May they win the success that their efforts deserve! But they will need assistance from other nations, particularly from those who are more happily situated than they, such as the British Empire and the United States of America. Are we both ready to render this assistance, and do we realise what sacrifices on our part it will entail?

Compelled to act by the cry of the financier, which seems to be the only cry that appeals to people nowadays, our two nations have come back into the arena. It is high time that we did so, because our aloofness has somehow caused us to drop out of tune with the moral sense of Europe. This is very noticeable in France. If we imagine that the French people have great respect for us, or profound gratitude for having helped them to win the war, we deceive ourselves. The service we rendered is not forgotten, but it is shrouded by the mists that have crept up since the war. These mists began at Versailles when English and American influence prevented France from putting her frontier on the Rhine where she thought she would be safe. She yielded to our views and accepted a less well-secured line. But it was on the understanding that England and America would guarantee it and, as members of the League of Nations, would 'preserve, as against external aggression, her territorial integrity.' We know how America backed out of the League and how we were compelled by that fact to withdraw our offer. No Frenchman forgets these events, and no conversation in French society leaves the stranger in any doubt as to what is thought of that episode. Nor has Locarno done much to remove those memories.

It is difficult for any fair-minded man not to sympathise with the French in this matter. Their's is a land with a stationary population overlooked by a neighbour whose numbers, wealth, and power are continually increasing. Twice in our lifetime that neighbour has overrun their territory. They have no faith in his honour or his assurances of good-will. This lack of confidence is probably not justified—certainly not with regard to very large sections of the present German people; but the feeling is very real, and those who would cure the ills of Europe must not leave it out of account. When this fact is fully grasped it may be that we shall look at certain recent events with a different eye. During the financial crisis in Germany the British Press has been inclined to be very critical of France. She has been censured for her slowness in coming to the rescue of Germany. Her action has been

regarded as ungenerous and short-sighted. It is not appreciated in England or America how greatly French policy has been due to our own default. The Frenchman reasons thus: 'If we aid Germany to re-establish her financial position by lending to her our money, what guarantee have we that she will not utilise her regained strength to bring about our undoing? Can we look to England or America to help us if she does? They have failed us in the past. The British Government disappointed us in 1925 when we had tried, by the Geneva Protocol, to strengthen the hands of the League. And America, though she joined with us in creating the Pact of Paris, refuses to accept any obligation which would make that instrument effective.' It is possible that this line of argument is not fully justified, but it is that which is constantly running through the minds of the French, and we cannot exercise any influence with the French unless we recognise their way of thinking on this point.

At this moment it is most necessary that the nations should understand each other's mentality. In five months from now their representatives will be meeting for the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. That Conference is bound to fail unless the nations can be brought much nearer together than they are at present, and failure will be disastrous. Failure to arrive at a practical measure for reducing and limiting armaments will be a confession that the League of Nations is unable to fulfil what was described at Versailles as one of its first duties; it will entitle Germany to say that, as the condition on which she accepted the disarmament clauses in the Peace Treaty has not been carried out, the obligations imposed upon her must be reconsidered; it will destroy the chance afforded by the coming Conference of bringing Russia into a concerted scheme for the limitation of all armed forces including her own—an opportunity which it were folly to throw away.

Therefore no effort should be spared to bring the leading States of Europe, and especially France and Germany, into a frame of mind which will render agreement possible. This, however, is not an easy task, as on the question of disarmament the French and German peoples hold views which, at first sight, seem to be irreconcilable. This is the impression which is left on the mind of anyone who studies the statement of policy issued by the French Government on July 21. First it rules out of the discussion the doctrine that the general reduction of armaments should have some reference to the methods and strengths of armament imposed on the Central Powers by the peace treaties. Secondly, it insists upon connecting more closely than ever the process of disarmament to the better organisation of mutual assistance against aggression. Thirdly, however, it declares that 'the

Conference of 1932 should not let slip the opportunity which presents itself of resolving the real problem, that of organising peace.'

The first point is advanced in order that there may be no mistake as to the attitude of the French towards a thesis, put forward widely in Germany, to the effect that the peace treaties were intended to provide, not only for the disarmament of the vanquished Powers, but also for the ultimate disarmament of the victors to a like extent. The second is a reiteration of the well-known argument that the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant with respect to reduction of armaments can only be brought into play when arrangements shall have been made which will ensure to all members of the League absolute security against attack. In the view of the French this has not yet been achieved. In order to appreciate the importance of the first point one must know the train of thought which has been moving around this subject in Germany. By the Treaty of Versailles the German army was reduced to 100,000 men, and Germany was prohibited from possessing any of the heavy *materiel* which is indispensable for waging modern warfare. When her representatives accepted those conditions they did so after a definite assurance by M. Clemenceau, on behalf of the Allies, that ' their requirements in regard to German armaments were the first step towards the reduction and limitation of armaments which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote.' The Germans argue from this that the obligations imposed upon them were conditional upon an immediate reduction of armaments by all the other Powers, and had it not been so understood Germany could never have accepted them, as it could hardly be suggested that one nation should stand in a position of perpetual inferiority to that of her neighbours. Moreover, since the treaties were made Germany has entered the League of Nations, and as a member of the League she takes her part in shaping the new system of general disarmament under the provisions of Article VIII. That article contemplates that every member of the League shall be entitled to possess such armament as is required for ' national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.' It is impossible, so the Germans say, to accept a situation under which some members of the League are permanently treated differently from the others in this respect.

It is the permanency of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which gives rise to what is a universal protest in the mind of Germany. Or, to be more accurate, it is the allegation that the inequality with respect to other nations is to be permanent that renders the present situation intolerable. Nor can one expect anything else ; for it is not only inequality as compared

with France. There is Poland and Czechoslovakia ; there is also Russia. The German feels that he is not to be permitted to take measures to enable him to defend himself or even to protect the world from war. It is clearly impossible to imagine the indefinite continuance of the present arrangements. They must be revised by the League of Nations in accordance with Article VIII. ; and they can only be revised on a basis of common action by partners having equal rights. It will be impossible to avoid this question from being raised at the coming Conference. It affects not only Germany, but other States whose people are quite as much agitated about it as are the Germans. There is Hungary, there is Bulgaria, and there is Austria. In all these countries the resentment against permanent subordination to their neighbours is ready to flare up at any moment. It is folly not to provide against such a conflagration.

It is difficult to find a way out. The French and German views seem too far apart. And yet it may be found if the French are ready to implement the third point of their statement of policy—namely, to ' organise peace.' Permanent peace can only be organised on a foundation of equality. Built on any other basis the structure will crumble to pieces. It may not be necessary to erect the whole building at once. Sensible people in Germany will recognise this. But we dare not wait too long, as the temperature is rising rapidly. We must begin now. As the French document says, we must ' not let slip the opportunity which presents itself.' France and Germany will be sitting down at the same table to devise a means whereby the world may ultimately throw away its arms, and with them will be all the other nations ready to assist.

England and America will be asked to do their share. What the French people think that should be appears clearly from the ' statement.' The ' system ' to which the French Government will give unreserved support must ' include formal pledges for effective mutual assistance in case of attack.' We are back in the *impasse* of the Geneva Protocol, for we never really escaped from that by the Treaties of Locarno. They did not give the real security which Continental Powers consider to be necessary before they consent to disarm. The Disarmament Conference will have no result unless we can find a way to promote among our colleagues in the League of Nations confidence in our willingness to assist in suppressing international disorder. During recent years the British people have dropped into a habit of saying that they will not go one inch beyond their obligations under the Covenant, and that the question of what those obligations are is one which they will decide for themselves. It is evident that if everyone were to take that view the Covenant, in a moment of crisis, will be a very

feeble instrument. The fact is that we must recognise that the new system of world order demands methods of ordered co-operation. It is this that the French insist upon as being an intrinsic part of general disarmament, and it is difficult to see how either Great Britain or America can resist their contention.

There is no doubt that we must make some advance in the direction of greater mutual assistance. After all, it is no more than declaring ourselves ready to fulfil the moral obligations that we accepted when we signed the Covenant. We then promised to preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity of all members of the League, and we agreed that the Council of the League should advise as to the means whereby this obligation shall be fulfilled. We can hardly pretend now that when we accepted these words we did so only because we knew that in our case they would be inoperative unless our consent be given when the need for action arises. At any rate, a real attempt ought to be made to remove this obstacle in the way of disarmament, and all are equally concerned that it should be successful. It will be rendered the more easy for all if they know that France and Germany are loyally co-operating. When the masses in those countries begin to understand each other Europe will have taken a great step along the road to peace.

But even then the end of the road will not be reached if we leave unhealed the sores which have been described in an earlier part of this article. They are not so difficult to deal with as disarmament, but they require to be treated in the same manner—by joint consultation and honest co-operation with a real desire to discover a remedy in a spirit of give and take and with a willingness to sacrifice something for the common good. When these exist ' organising peace ' will be a simple matter.

DICKINSON.

THE PROSPECTS OF INDIAN FEDERATION

HIS MAJESTY'S Government is once more faced with the problem of devising a system of government for India which, based on the consent of the people and the co-operation of the Princes, will satisfy the claim for recognition of India's status, will engage the loyalty of men's hearts, and will command confidence in its impartiality, stability and power. During the months which have elapsed since the Round Table Conference adjourned in January last the political situation in India has altered in a manner which must have bewildered those who thought that the problem could be solved by effecting a compromise between parties or personalities, by concocting formulas, or by creating a favourable atmosphere for negotiation. Parties are transformed by fresh impulses and ideals; leaders lose influence or quit the stage, formulas are seized as a basis for new demands, and atmosphere laboriously generated vanishes in an outburst of execration. At the moment, the Irwin-Gandhi settlement is imperilled and the Conference outlook is clouded by Mr. Gandhi's sudden refusal to sail for London except on terms wholly inconsonant with the discharge by Government of its fundamental responsibilities.

On January 19 the Prime Minister, speaking on behalf of His Majesty's Government, gave his blessing to a scheme for placing responsibility for the government of India upon Legislatures—Central and Provincial. The scheme, admittedly provisional and on many points indefinite, was balanced upon three uncertain supports—first, the Federation of All-India, embracing both the Indian States and British India in a bicameral Legislature; secondly, the reservation of certain powers to the Crown and its agents, not only as safeguards to meet the needs of a transitional period, but also as guarantees for protection of the political liberties and rights of minorities; thirdly, the settlement by agreement of communal tension, especially as between Hindus and Muslims.

These supports have been severely shaken, if not wrecked, by recent events. Rumour had it that at the March meeting of the Chamber of Princes there were many dissentients to the resolution which approved the Federation scheme in principle. The Patiala

manifesto published in June and the proceedings of the Bombay meeting of Princes and Ministers have tended to destroy the semblance of unity previously achieved, with the result that, quite apart from the question whether British India would admit the States to a Federation upon acceptable terms, it now appears improbable that the States as a body are prepared to make the sacrifices which entry into any Federation would entail. The nature of these sacrifices will be described later. Moreover, the proposed safeguards and guarantees have been the subject of concerted attack in India. Most important of all in its significance, the communal feeling between Hindus and Muslims, so far from showing signs of amicable settlement, has gathered strength and bitterness, till it threatens to overshadow all other administrative problems.

The Hindu-Muslim trouble may conveniently be dealt with first. The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the communal outbreak of March last in Cawnpore—a painful document—analyses the fears and passions of the contending parties, as nakedly revealed at a time of crisis, and describes in simple and convincing language the predisposing and immediate causes of the riot. The relevant portions may be summarised as follows:

The Congress was active and highly organised in Cawnpore. Hartals, processions, public meetings and propaganda of every kind were utilised to keep up public enthusiasm. The Muslims, who looked upon the Congress organisation as a purely Hindu body, were exasperated by its assumption of authority and, as a counter move, organised their own religious demonstrations. The Congress Hindus generally were irritated with the Muslims for standing aloof from what they believed to be a national movement, were jealous of Muslims carrying on business as usual during hartals, and feared that their religious demonstrations were directed against Hinduism. The attitude taken by Government towards the Civil Disobedience movement increased Muslim fears. Through stoppages of traffic and picketing of foreign cloth and liquor shops, Congress leaders had made their will prevail in the city and had manifested an authority parallel with, if not superior to, that of the magistracy and police. The movement had openly aimed at paralysing government, yet the Government of India had not only opened negotiations and made a pact with its leader, Mr. Gandhi, but had released from gaol a multitude of Congress agents who had been sentenced for breaking the law. The Muslims read in this a recognition by the Government of India of the strength of the movement, if not a surrender to it, and their conviction deepened that the Hindu majority was being permitted to impose its will on the Muslim minority.

Their general view finds support in the remarkable admission

of the Governor in Council, made in the Resolution on the Report, that in combating the Civil Disobedience movement he might with advantage have directed a firmer and more consistent recourse to the penal and preventive sections of the ordinary law during the earlier days of the agitation. Clashes between the communities in other places confirmed Cawnpore Muslims in their fears: the mine was laid, and the spark which fired it on the morning of March 24 was the Congress Committee's order for a strict hartal in memory of Bhagat Singh, a Punjab revolutionary and murderer, who had been executed on the previous day at Lahore. In the course of the hartal Hindus and Muslims came to blows. This developed into a riot of unprecedented violence and atrocity, having as its worst feature the slaughter of women and children, which spread with unexpected rapidity through the whole city and even beyond it. Murders, arson and looting were widespread for three days, temples and mosques were desecrated or destroyed, and many houses were burnt and pillaged. The number of verified deaths was 300, but the death roll is known to have been much larger. Turbulent elements in the city—mill hands, goondas and badmashes—contributed later to the spread, continuance and intensity of the trouble. Measures for its suppression were handicapped by an error of judgment on the part of the District Magistrate and by failure of individual members of the police force to deal with the emergency with their usual efficiency and zeal. Finally, the Report concludes with the warning that 'An aftermath of bitter feeling still remains in Cawnpore and extreme nervousness exists on both sides which may easily result in panic and a fresh outbreak.'

Under Moghul rule Muslims held most of the lucrative and responsible posts, both in the Army and in the civil administration, because they were not only the political but the intellectual power in India. They lived on terms of amity with Hindus because they had no reason to fear their rivalry. British rulers for about seventy years carried on the system which they had inherited, but gradually, and for excellent reasons, the very foundations of the administration were changed. A new scheme of public instruction was introduced, English was made the official language, the doors of the public services were opened to all British Indians, and the principle was announced that India was to be governed for the benefit of the Indians. Muslims, who spurned a secular system of education, soon found every avenue of public life closed to their sons. Those who had been lords and masters in the land for hundreds of years could hope for nothing more than the crumbs of State patronage, the leavings of the Hindus. Nevertheless, Muslim discontent and resentment at first found expression, not

against Hindus, but against British rule, which seemed to have betrayed them. For many years, down to times within the memory of man, Hindus and Muslims, despite occasional clashes, lived side by side in such friendliness and tolerance for each other's religious beliefs and social customs that they even took part in each other's religious festivals, especially in rural areas. Muslims gradually realised that the British system of administration, although alien to their ideas, guaranteed to their community protection and impartial justice, and enabled them to enter the lists against Hindus on equal terms. They began gallantly to make up for lost time. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan founded the Aligarh College with the object of ' regenerating a fallen people,' the lamp of Muslim culture was relit, and educational institutions all over the country soon began to pour out candidates for every branch of the public service. Western education was welcomed, and British dominion was accepted by Muslim reformers as a ' third kind of territory,' neither the ' territory of Islam ' nor the ' territory of War,' but a territory in which Muslims were protected and permitted to practise their religion undisturbed.

A change began when the British Government introduced Western political ideas and the goal of democratic government was set up. Educated Muslims perceived that the British regarded their rule as a trust, and that, in fulfilment of their pledges, they would inevitably resign it in the fulness of time. The apprehension grew that the Hindus, with their larger population, greater wealth and stronger political organisation, would then capture the reins of power. Communal tension manifested itself first in rivalry between the educated classes of the two communities and in jealousy over the distribution of appointments and honours. Then mob passions were aroused, and fanaticism was inflamed and exploited by politicians and the Press for selfish ends. In the Punjab, perhaps the most important arena, feeling became especially embittered owing to the deplorable indebtedness of the Muslim peasantry to Hindu moneylenders. The backwash of events outside India, in North Africa, Turkey or Persia, at times swept Muslims into a brief and uneasy alliance with Hindus. The Khilafat movement of 1920 was exploited to the utmost by Hindu leaders in the hope that it might bring about real union and effective co-operation, but the Treaty of Lausanne and the abolition of the Khilafat destroyed its momentum and allowed communal animosities to revive. During recent years tension has steadily grown, each side striving to grasp new vantage points and to consolidate its position in anticipation of the trial of strength to come. Many grave outbreaks of violence have occurred and are now occurring, each with its tale of bloodshed,

looting and sacrilege, leaving, as in the case of Cawnpore, an aftermath of bitter resentment and nervous apprehension.

Muslims have secured various pledges and assurances from the highest quarters that their rights and interests will be protected by safeguards under any new system of government, but they nevertheless remain uncomforted and unconvinced. Why is this? The answer is implicit in the Cawnpore Report. The Muslims' belief that Government no longer holds the scales perfectly evenly between the two communities, and that the machinery of administration is running down, finds most unfortunate justification in recent events. The fine speech of Sir John Simon in the House of Commons on July 9 seems to lead infallibly to this conclusion. The Muslim must, however, press the argument further. He will say, ' If such deterioration can set in while the Central Executive is still uncontrolled by the Legislature, what hope can there be for my community under a system of responsible government? ' ' If there is to be a rule by vote, which must mean the setting up of a Hindu Raj, through what agency will the British Government hold the scales even? '

Let us examine the reasons for the present deterioration and see what likelihood there is that the proposed safeguards and guarantees would carry conviction to the Muslim community. The damaging admission as to weakness was made by the Government of the United Provinces, but the ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of law and order rests upon the Central Government, and it is from the centre that paralysis has spread. The debility of the Central Government is unfortunately a matter of common knowledge. It is described as follows in paragraph 121 of the Report of the Indian Central Committee, 1928–29, in the course of a survey of the position of the Government *vis-à-vis* the Assembly during the preceding ten years.

> We believe that an impartial verdict on that survey must be that, far from introducing ' an element of strength into the Central Government,' as its authors fondly believed, the scheme has resulted in a weakening of the Central authority which can only be described as deplorable. The Government of India is technically responsible only to the Secretary of State; but its immediate juxtaposition with an elected majority in its Legislative Assembly necessarily rendered it extremely sensitive to the expression of opinion in that Assembly. Its constitutional responsibility to an outside authority, however, made any consistent accord between it and the Assembly impossible; while its natural desire to carry the Assembly with it in its proposals, coupled with the fact that it could not count on its stable support, made its own action uncertain and hesitating. . . . The position, in our opinion, is intolerable and cannot be continued.

Anyone who is familiar with the course of events in India since the Report was written is aware that the process of deteriora-

tion has steadily continued during the last two years. It may easily be understood by a brief reference to the history of the Assembly.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report, while expressing the view that, pending development in the Provinces, the Government of India must remain responsible only to Parliament, clearly envisaged responsible government as the ultimate goal, and as a first instalment framed a scheme for advance far beyond the Morley-Minto position. The essential feature of the scheme found place in the Act of 1919—namely, that in place of a Legislative Council with an official majority whose elected members could criticise but not control expenditure, and could not prevent the passage of any Act, there should be a large bicameral Legislature predominantly elective. The power of the purse was very largely handed over by the Act to the Legislative Assembly, although this was not contemplated in the Report. In order to ensure that the capacity of the Supreme Government to obtain its will in all essential matters should persist unimpaired, powers were reserved to the Governor-General of sanction for the introduction of certain classes of measures, of veto, of certification, of passing temporary ordinances, and of restoration of budget grants for essential needs.

During the first session of the newly constituted Assembly a spirit of mutual forbearance was displayed in dealing with contentious questions, and there was not much outward indication of displacement of the centre of gravity. This may be ascribed to the deep impression created by the inaugural ceremonies, to the personal influence of the first President, a British officer, to the readiness of Government, from the outset, to meet the Opposition's demands, and to the fact that the elected majority did not realise the full extent of their latent powers. In the next session the rising tide of non-co-operation outside the Assembly produced its reactions within, and opposition to Government became more acute and more factious. In the daily struggle to preserve amicable relations and to gain the Assembly's support, the Executive loosened its grip on the tiller and began to deviate from the traditional course of government. The concessions which Government considered it necessary to yield during the session showed that the Assembly could exert very effective control over the Executive, in spite of the fact that the statute made no provision for constitutional responsibility. The exercise by the Viceroy, for the first time, of his power of 'certification,' in order to pass the Indian States (Protection against Disaffection) Act, 1922, produced such reverberations as to discourage the future use of this two-edged weapon in the case of measures which might excite widespread opposition. In the following session opposition to Government hardened and became more

wayward. The Viceroy found it necessary to override the Assembly's rejection of the salt duties, but this exercise of his exceptional powers brought swift Nemesis in the defeat of the Moderates at the forthcoming general election, and the entry of the Swarajists to the Assembly as the dominant party.

It is needless to pursue, through succeeding sessions, the reactions of the Central Executive and the Legislatures upon each other. It may readily be admitted that the Legislatures showed considerable sense of responsibility. They added new taxation boldly and accomplished much useful work, especially in regard to questions of far-reaching administrative and legislative importance. The Central Executive, in spite of the heavy handicap of an opposing majority in the Assembly, managed somehow to carry on the government of the country, but its tactical successes were won at the cost of a gradual decline of supremacy. The tendency was for the Central Executive to become enmeshed in the web of Assembly oratory, and to dissipate its forces in struggling towards compromises which seemed to offer temporary relief or advantage but in fact led to deeper entanglement.

The position of the Assembly, on the other hand, was greatly strengthened through the growth of convention and practice. The device of an annual Finance Bill, following roughly the model of the House of Commons, was an important innovation, since it limited the term of taxation, except in the case of tariffs, to one year, and it also enabled the Assembly to establish the practice of questioning and discussing non-votable as well as votable expenditure, at the supply stage. Although the Assembly failed to establish its contention that, under the Government of India Act, it alone should be competent to deal with money Bills, yet it secured recognition for the practice that money Bills should not be initiated in the Council of State. The Standing Finance Committee, a non-statutory body instituted in 1921, exercised powerful influence in the case of proposals for new votable expenditure, and the Railway Finance Committee, started in 1924, secured for the Assembly control over the whole field of railway finance. By interpellation, resolution and motion, the Legislature has been able both to sway the general course of administration and to bend Government to its will in particular cases. Lastly, the Chambers have effectively extended their influence over the details of administration by means of standing and special committees. The latter committees in particular have directed successful attacks against the Executive in matters of first importance.

Here, then, we have an object-lesson which reinforces the teachings of political history and should prevent any future misconceptions as to the value of safeguards. If there is an

elective Legislature, the Executive must, in all essentials, work in harmony with it. In the case of the existing Central Government, harmony has been achieved through sacrifice of the Executive, because the object of the Congress and Nationalist groups has been, not to support the Administration, but to force constitutional advance. They must necessarily be antagonistic to an Executive which is irremovable, or at all events responsible only to an alien Parliament.

Under a Federal system of government the Central Executive would be, for the most part, responsible to the Legislature, which would therefore be far stronger than it has been under the 1919 Reforms. The Congress and Nationalist leaders argue, with a considerable show of reason, that the Central Executive would also thereby gain much needed strength. This is true in part, but unfortunately the condition of India is such as to render it essential that most important powers should be, for the time, withheld from responsible Ministers. The functioning of the irremovable element in the Executive, and especially the exercise by the Governor-General of his safeguarding powers on behalf of minorities, would be a constant source of friction and must eventually end in deadlock. The Hindu majority would have scanty tolerance for the remaining rump of autocracy, and the Executive would, therefore, be weaker than ever at the point where strength is most needed. For this reason Muslim leaders, who have a perfectly clear idea of the position, are not likely to pin their hopes to any powers that might be reserved to the Governor-General to enable him to discharge his responsibility to Parliament for observance of the constitutional rights of minorities. If effective safeguards were set up, the responsibility of the Executive to the Federal Legislature would be a mere sham. If Muslims are to subscribe to a Federal Constitution, they must find their guarantees within the framework of the Constitution, by working out, through agreement with the Hindus, provisions which will give them a sense of security. The British Government cannot prescribe a settlement, because it would then be charged with the duty of enforcing it—an impossible task, for the reasons given above. Arbitration by some independent body, such as the League of Nations, is also ruled out by the difficulty of enforcement. Nor can there be any hope of lasting result from a truce, patched up by British mediation, between individual delegates from either side. Nothing will avail but a comprehensive agreement, whole-heartedly approved by the great majority of each community, as a just and enduring settlement of the problem. At present there is no sign whatever that such a settlement is likely to come about, and without it no Federal Constitution can be constructed.

No useful purpose would be served by attempting to fix responsibility for the present situation either upon the two great communities or upon any particular Government, political party or individual Minister, Viceroy or party leader. There may have been errors of judgment or want of nerve in the conduct of affairs, but recrimination will not help. The course was set, and gallantly set, when it was announced nearly a century ago that India was to be governed for the benefit of Indians. The barque of hopes is labouring at the moment in storms off a lee shore, but there is yet time to wear ship and reach for the open sea. The harbour is far distant, but some day the true landfall will appear ahead.

No sane man would wish, by any public utterance, to sow further discord between Hindu and Muslim or to discount the hopes of an honourable and lasting settlement, but, on the other hand, at this crisis facts, however repugnant, must be faced, and rightly understood, if any cure is to be found for India's ills. The kernel of the matter may be stated in words lately used by that great authority Sir Theodore Morison. He said that: 'to describe the Hindus and Muslims of India as communities merely is to misrepresent the facts and to underestimate their seriousness. A truer statement would be that two nationalities are here in conflict.' The passions which drive Hindus and Moslems into collision in India are of the same magnitude as the passions which in Europe produced the catastrophe of 1914. These passions, nurtured by fear and pride, spring from vivid and deep-rooted religious antipathy which penetrates the social and domestic life of the people at every point, and which can never be dissolved unless in the fire of a new revelation. They lie dormant so long as Government is able to inspire belief in its firmness, tolerance and impartiality; so long as, to quote the words of the 1858 Proclamation, none are 'in any wise favoured, none molested or disquieted by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all alike enjoy the impartial protection of the law.'

Hindus and Muslims alike have now lost confidence in the stability of the British Raj. They are convinced that it must give place to something new, and they are manœuvring for position with a view to the great struggle for power, and perhaps for very existence, that must soon begin. Each community is spurred on partly by pride in its religion, its culture and its splendid past, and partly by fear of what may happen if its rival succeeds in gaining the upper hand. Each fears that, unless it can predominate, it will be enslaved; that its religious practices will be interfered with, its sons barred from the public services and its culture suppressed. Hindus pin their hopes to their superiority in numbers. For this reason they want the Central Assembly to be constituted by direct instead of indirect election,

and for this reason they are bound to fight to the last ditch against attempts by the Muslims to secure separate electorates in perpetuity or weightage by other means. They believe that a majority of votes will at least entrench their community in perpetual security, even if it does not assure domination.

Muslims, on the other hand, cannot surrender one iota of their claims without surrendering the ground on which the claims rest and accepting by implication a position of permanent inferiority. They would have no doubt as to the issue if it had to be decided by fighting, but they fear that under a ballot-box Constitution the scales would be weighted against them through Hindu control of the organised forces of the country both military and civil. Constitutional government would probably hold greater danger for Hindus than for Muslims in the long run, because sooner or later a simple and infallible principle would come into operation which would materially alter the balance of power. No self-respecting country can permit its armed forces to be the instruments for carrying out a policy in the settlement of which it has no voice, and therefore, when the transfer of responsibility at the centre is complete, the majority in the Assembly will no longer have the support of British bayonets. Many Hindus, however, turn a blind eye to this principle and to the danger that a sullen and discontented Muslim community might once more proclaim India as a ' territory of War.'

Neither Hindu nor Muslim is to blame for failing to enter into an agreement which might afford a basis for federation. It is not in the power of party leaders to concede essential points, because any settlement of which their followers did not approve would be the signal for fresh disturbances. The communal trouble must grow steadily and perhaps rapidly worse, unless means can be found of allaying the apprehensions and checking the ambitions of the parties by convincing them that the Central Government both can and will hold the scales even between them for the future.

One support of the provisional Federation scheme has crumbled into dust. We may now examine the second support—namely, the co-operation of the Princes.

The Princes who at the Round Table Conference lent their support to the idea of Federation appear to have been swayed by four motives. First, their well-known and proven loyalty to the British throne, to which their dynasties are anchored, impelled them to back the scheme which seemed to afford the most certain means of scotching the revolutionary movement and maintaining the British connexion. Secondly, they wished neither to stand in the way of reforms for British India nor to appear to do so. As patriotic Indians they desired that India should through Federation attain to equality of status with the sister Dominions within the British Empire. Thirdly, they believed that a Federal Constitution, into which the States would enter by treaty of their own free will as equal partners, would secure their internal autonomy and safeguard their fiscal and other rights in matters of common concern. Fourthly, they hoped that in the process of Federation the treaty rights of the Princes would have to be defined in such a manner as to eliminate the discretionary element from paramountcy. This may be gathered from the speeches at the Conference.

The Indian States Delegation, in assenting to the principle of Federation, made stipulations to the following effect :

(1) That entry into the Federation should be by treaty, and that it should be at the discretion of each individual State whether to conclude such a treaty or not.

(2) That the inherent sovereignty, autonomy and treaty or other rights of the States should be safeguarded and maintained intact, except to the extent to which the Rulers delegate them voluntarily to the Federation.

(3) That all matters affecting the Rulers personally or their dynasties should be reserved for decision by the Viceroy as agent of the British Crown.

At the meeting of the Chamber of Princes in March a resolution was passed supporting the scheme in principle, but there were indications that some of the Rulers present felt grave doubts as to its wisdom and practicability. The Nawab of Bahawalpur voiced his misgivings by a circulated memorandum which was afterwards published, but the opposition did not find a leader until the Maharaja of Patiala, the late Chancellor of the Chamber, published a manifesto in June attacking the provisional scheme. His Highness, after discussing the nature of a Federal Constitution, expressed his preference for a union of the States alone in relationship with the Crown, on grounds which may be summarised as follows :

(1) That it would be well-nigh impossible to devise a Federal scheme which would embrace the vast number of States and Provinces existing in India, and that if such a scheme were devised it would be unworkable and doomed to failure.

(2) That there is at present no trace of the existence of a Federal spirit throughout India. Without it no Federal scheme could succeed. There is no political or cultural affinity between the States and the Provinces.

(3) That the scheme would be prejudicial to the interests of the States, because it would entail disproportionate sacrifices on their part. There would be no equality, because the States and Provinces possessing the greatest population and resources would outweigh the others.

(4) That the States would gain no advantage as regards the question

of paramountcy. The paramount powers lying outside the scope of the Federal Constitution would continue to be exercised by the agents of the Crown in the same manner as before, but the Federal Legislature and Executive would inevitably interfere, not only in respect of federalised subjects, but also in matters outside the scope of the Federal Constitution. It would be impossible to secure a judiciary sufficiently strong and independent to maintain the equilibrium between conflicting powers and interests.

(5) That there must be a clash of political traditions and ideals between the States and British India, and that Federation would in this manner subvert the basis of their well-tried and time-honoured political institutions. It is therefore futile to contend that the sovereignty and treaty rights of the States would remain unchanged.

(6) That a vast number of smaller States and Principalities would certainly be swallowed up and disappear from the map.

The majority of the Rulers and Ministers who attended an informal conference at Bombay last July under the present Chancellor, H.H. the Nawab of Bhopal, expressed themselves in favour of the existing scheme, but recent telegrams from Bombay suggest that the Patiala plan for a preliminary confederation of the States has powerful backing. The Princes are wisely keeping their own counsel as to tactics; but one thing is quite certain—namely, that they will agree to nothing that may be incompatible with the three stipulations made by the Indian States Delegation.

The following are some of the conundrums which their Highnesses will have to face:

As regards the first stipulation, how will it be possible for each individual State to preserve discretion as to the terms upon which it will enter a Federation? Must not the powers of the Federal Executive and Legislature be uniform throughout the Federal area, and will it not therefore be necessary for all States which decide to adhere to the scheme to enter upon the same platform—that is to say, upon terms which will be, generally speaking, identical for them all? Again, apart from the contribution to be made to the Federal authority as a qualification for union, will not many smaller States have to lose a large measure of individuality through the grouping which will inevitably be necessary in order to constitute them into federable units? Further, how could the Rulers, even as a body, be the sole arbiters of the measure of sovereignty which they will surrender as the price of union? Must not their contribution be dictated by the minimum needs of a Federation, because otherwise there could be no Federation at all? No one yet knows what the minimum needs of an Indian Federation would be, but it is easy to envisage subjects such as Finance, Customs, Excise, Opium, Railways, Salt, Public Debt, Regulation of Labour and even Civil and Criminal Laws, in regard

to which the Princes would be most reluctant to concede what Federation must require. The Joint Committee of the Conference which dealt with the classification of subjects left many gaps in regard to highly controversial questions, and a great deal of further exploration is needed before it can be said that the Princes can fairly be expected to make the sacrifices that entry into a Federal union would involve. They could never agree to the demand, which will certainly be made, that residuary powers should be vested in the Federal Government and not in the federal units. Finally, is it not probable that the Princes would have to contribute something more substantial than a measure of their sovereignty as the price of union? In the light of such inquiry as has been made into the financial outlook under Federation, is there ground for the Princes' hope that the fiscal and economic interests of the States would be safeguarded and benefited by the change?

As regards the second stipulation, the Princes will have to take note of the strong hints that have already been thrown out from the Congress side—namely, that the Rulers would be expected, as conditions of being allowed to join a Federation, (*a*) to democratise their internal systems of government within a given period; (*b*) to permit the States' representatives, in the Federal Assembly at least if not in the Upper Chamber, to be elected by the people; and (*c*) to grant to their subjects the right of appeal from State courts to a Federal Supreme Court. If these demands were conceded it would mean that the internal independence of the States and the Princes' treaty rights, as they understand them, would not be maintained intact. The Princes will also have to take note of another line of Congress thought—namely, that, when once the Princes are enticed within the Federation on such terms as can be negotiated, 'it is as certain as anything can be in human affairs, that the internal evolution of the States will be even more rapid than the internal evolution in the Indian Provinces has been during the last two decades.' Would it be possible for the States, under a Federal system, to maintain their present regulations as regards the Press, freedom of speech, and exclusion of political agitators? If they attempted to do so, would they not come into sharp conflict with the democratic party in the Legislature? Very delicate questions will arise regarding the proportion in which the States and British India shall find representation in the Federal Legislatures and Executive, regarding the allocation of seats between the States concerned, and regarding the respective powers of the two Houses. The conclusions to be reached on these points must materially affect the attitude of the Princes towards Federation. But the most important question of all under this head is what safeguard the

Princes would have for protection of their treaty or other rights in the event of encroachment by the Federal Government in the manner anticipated by the Maharaja of Patiala? They could hardly implead the Paramount Power, and they would receive cold comfort from a Federal Supreme Court, because such a Court cannot be expected to decide administrative issues.

The Princes' third stipulation opens up the very complex subject of Paramountcy, which cannot be discussed at length here. Two questions will, however, present themselves for the Princes' anxious consideration under this head. The first is, would the Viceroy, as agent of the Crown, be in a position to give effective support to a Ruler faced with a widespread and popular demand for change, based, not on real grievances, but on the desire for a democratic form of government? Would not the majority in a Federal Legislature naturally be disposed to sympathise with democratic agitation in a State for the supersession of monarchical rule? Would the Viceroy have at his disposal the force which might be required for intervention, and would not action by him on the Ruler's behalf be liable to bring him into conflict with the Federal Government on a point of principle?

The second question is, what likelihood is there that, to use the words of Sir Manubhai Mehta, the 'bubble of paramountcy would be pricked' by the entry of the States into a Federation with British India? Can Rulers ever hope to place themselves beyond the scope of intervention by any other means than through the establishment of a system of government responsible to the people, and is not the Paramount Power's faculty of intervention the surest safeguard against the subversion of political institutions which the Maharaja of Patiala fears will take place? Is not intervention the obverse side of the Ruler's dynasty guarantee? There is no scope for a 'deal' with the Princes over the question of paramountcy with the object of luring them into Federation. The faculty of intervention, now exercised by the Paramount Power, not merely as a right, but as a duty, is a part of the constitution of every State and is a safeguard just as vital for the Ruler as for his subjects. It must be exercised by some authority under any Federal scheme, unless and until the State Government is made responsible to the people. Any offer to abrogate it would be a mockery, because there is no bargain countermarked 'perpetual autocracy.'

None of these points will be missed by the Princes, who are wise statesmen and keenly mindful of the interests of their States and people and the prerogatives of their houses.

The Princes' decision to support the idea of Federation was rooted in four considerations. The third and fourth of these may

be proving illusory. What of the other two? In each of them, as phrased, is clearly discernible the fundamental anxiety of the Rulers as to the survival of their States and dynasties. The problem may be stated in simple terms as follows:

The Princes have hitherto enjoyed a unique and splendid position under British paramountcy. Their thrones are buttressed by British power, their obligations are light, their dignity is great; they are the last survivals in civilised lands of benevolent and almost unlimited monarchy. It must needs be a powerful impulse that drives them from the shelter of their treaties and assurances. Many Rulers are fervent patriots and would gladly see India grow to the full stature of nationhood within the Empire. Nevertheless, not one would for this cause, or for any other cause, hazard the existence of his State, his throne, or the interests of his people, because the first duty of every Prince is to hand on untarnished to his successor the sacred trust which has come down to him from his ancestors. But the Princes may well be puzzled as to which of the courses open to them offers the best hope of fulfilling this duty. The British Raj, under which they found peace and security, seems to be passing; its outworks are surrendered, the very citadel is encompassed and Congress forces are massing for the assault. Are not the treaty rights of the States riddled by every volley directed against autocracy at the centre? Is there any hope for them in confederation under the British Crown? Would it not be best, while their thrones are still firm, to stake all upon a gambler's throw and seek new treaties with the rising power? And if they hold aloof, is it not certain that subtle forces, hitherto leashed, will be loosed against them in their own States? Would not the position of a dissenting minority of States in a Federal India be especially precarious? Even if the experiment is foredoomed to failure, and India is to pass through another Armageddon, is there not a sporting chance that the larger States at all events may emerge unscathed and perhaps with expanded frontiers?

Truly the choice which the Princes have to make is a difficult one, and many of them may sit on the fence until they see how the Government of India will deal with the administrative crisis which is looming up, and what will happen when the Conference reopens. They will have the sympathy of every Englishman who has served and loves India, and who believes that through personal rule alone can the masses of India find security and contentment and freedom from communal troubles.

This brief review of the position does not encourage the expectation that united and enthusiastic support will be forthcoming from the Princes for the provisional Federation scheme. Even those Princes who applaud have indicated plainly that they

reserve full freedom to revise their views when the Federal Constitution is revealed in its final form and all its implications as regards the States are apparent. Two of the three pillars of the scheme are tottering. The safeguards and guarantees which were to be the third pillar are regarded by Congress merely as an attempt to block the way to Dominion Status which must be resisted at all costs. It is argued, with good reason, that if the safeguards were to be as defined in the Conservative Party resolution passed on June 30—namely, ' real and permanent and capable of being exercised by the Imperial Parliament in the interests of this country no less than in those of India '—there could be no responsible government and the Federal Constitution would be a camouflage for autocratic rule by the Governor-General. He would be able to act at the bidding of the British Parliament, and in disregard of his Government, in all matters affecting external affairs—paramountcy over the States, defence, currency, exchange, budget arrangements, minority interests, and law and order. Feeling in India is hardening to the view that it would be better to let the Conference break down rather than agree to safeguards in the form proposed.

The general conclusion which emerges is that the provisional Federal scheme is founded on false hopes and misconceptions and is doomed. If a Federal Constitution is wrought by superhuman efforts out of the faulty and flawed material available, it will fly asunder under the pressure of human passions and rivalries, because it can never excite men's loyalty or command their confidence in its impartiality and power. What, then, is the alternative ?

The position can be stated very simply and briefly. England has been committed for a hundred years to the task of enabling India to attain self-government. Rightly or wrongly, in earnest pursuance of our object we have given so many assurances and delegated so much of our rulership that our very foothold in India has become precarious. The element of responsibility introduced into the Central Government, in spite of disclaimers by all who had a share in the changes, has grown into a canker which is strangling the Central Executive. We are now trying to govern by cajolery and compromise instead of by firmness and impartiality. Unless India absolves us from our pledges, there can be no drastic operation to restore the lost virility of the Central Government, such as the recreation of the official majority or the reduction of the Assembly's powers. Even if it could be honestly held that the events of the past eleven years afford a warrant to the British Government, under section 84 of the Government of India Act, for withdrawing their pledges and restoring the autocratic powers of the Executive, it would be impossible at the moment to put the clock back. A retrograde movement would unite all parties against the Government and would be the signal for a renewed campaign of civil disobedience on a far wider scale, coupled with bombings and assassinations. We, a handful of an alien race, have ruled India through the good-will of the people. Their loyalty has been a personal loyalty to British officers and their confidence has rested in the firmness and impartiality of our administration. That good-will no longer exists in the hearts of the people who at the moment count in India. The seed of national consciousness which we planted and fostered has grown rapidly and spread over the whole country. The intelligentsia are, naturally enough, determined to oust the rule of the British and to prove that Indians can manage their own affairs, whether within or without the Empire. If we were in their position we should feel exactly the same, although we should not adopt similar methods or fasten our hopes to such wild-cat schemes.

But the movement is no longer confined to the intelligentsia. Agitation has been driven deep among the masses, who are bewildered and look in vain for a sign that the Sirkar's arm is nothing weak and its strength is not gone by. The old loyalty to the British officer has been destroyed by frequent transfers, by changes in administrative methods and by complicated legislation, while confidence in the firmness and impartiality of Government is dying of inanition. The experiment, however rash and ill-advised it may now seem, has got to be pursued to the very verge of an administrative breakdown. Many and grave warnings show that the breakdown is not far off. Repeated communal outbreaks, spreading even to the States which were formerly immune ; general contempt for law and order shown by murderous attacks on officers and constant abuse and threats against the police, with resultant loss of *morale*, as at Cawnpore ; the flight from the rupee, which is one of the surest signs of waning confidence in Government ; the no-rent campaign, which threatens conflagration in the rural areas of the United Provinces, based on purely political grounds but exploiting the economic distress and poisoning relations between landlord and tenant and between both and Government ; attempts to undermine the loyalty of soldiers ; the Red Shirt menace on the Frontier, and the restlessness of the border tribes ; the spread of defeatism in former strongholds of loyalty and even among European business men and Government servants ; the volte-face by some of the Princes : all these and many other indications mark the fact that the machine is running down. There will be a heavy strain upon it in the coming cold weather. If the Congress Party abstains from participation in the Round Table Conference, an early resumption of civil disobedience seems inevitable and a general conflagration may ensue.

It is just conceivable that, before the existing order of things is shattered, all parties in India may realise that the mantle of independence for which they are clamouring will consume them like the garment of Nessus when they don it. They may beg, instead, for the wise and statesmanlike plan in the Simon Commission Report whereby the experiment of parliamentary government would be tried first in the Provinces, the Central Government, on which the peace and safety of India ultimately depends, being preserved at all costs in strength and unity. But this is indeed a slender hope. It is more probable that, whether the Conference breaks down or not, the British Government will steadfastly pursue the policy to which they are pledged until the moment when the whole fabric of administration seems about to dissolve in ruin. Then, whether a Federal Constitution has been set up or not, England must assume a clear mandate to re-establish a strong Central Government to last until, after a further period of preparation, some new and sounder method may be tried for transferring the reins of power to Indian hands. So might be reborn, in travail and sorrow, the good-will and confidence and loyalty on which alone the British or any other Raj can stand, and so the Rulers might learn again how to hold the balance even.

R. E. HOLLAND.

ON CHANGES IN NAVAL THOUGHT

ON November 5, 1813, the Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, is reported [1] to have said in the House of Lords that 'it would be the policy of England not only to give full security to her friends but to her enemies.' This announcement was made after the battles of Vittoria and Leipzig had been fought and won. Hence we may infer that the unwritten theory underlying English policy at that time was that in war the political object is security in the widest sense and is to be attained by battle. After twenty years of war it was natural that security resulting from battle should be in the forefront of men's minds.

During the long peace after the year 1815 touch with realities was lost. Long accustomed to complete security at sea, men forgot its fundamental importance and spoke wrongly of 'command of the sea' and 'control of communications' as ends in themselves, not realising that they are only vague phrases which do not assure the attainment of security. Both terms are misleading. Command of the sea, because it is never complete, needs explaining and qualifying, and is provocative to other nations; control of communications, because attention is diverted from the real political object, the security of the shipping on the trade routes, to the trade routes themselves. In consequence, thought was deflected from escorts for convoys to the patrol of trade routes and to the search for raiders on the wide ocean.

The phrase 'command of the sea' had been long in use; but 'control of communications' was comparatively modern, and seems to have been more common after the year 1894, when the Admiralty decided to lay down the *Powerful* and *Terrible* in reply to the Russian *Rurik*, against the advice of the First Sea Lord, who was overborne by the Controller and the Director of Naval Construction. This far-reaching decision initiated the large-cruiser policy which substituted large cruisers for a greater number of small ones, and finally culminated in battle-cruisers only. This policy was based on the idea of pursuing and destroying individual enemy ships on the high seas, the difficulty of finding them not being recognised. It may be spoken of as the

[1] *The Times*, November 5, 1813.

'search' system. Ultimately it undermined belief in the convoy system, upon which the security of our trade at sea had depended for generations.

Thus it came about that these phrases were used in the 1902 Admiralty Memorandum [2] laid before the Colonial Conference, which reads: 'The importance which attaches to the command of the sea lies in the control which it gives over sea communications. The weaker sea power is absolutely unable to carry to success any large military expedition oversea.' Here the sea communications referred to were limited to those of an army, which can be easily cut, as the examples given showed. They might include those through terminal areas, but not the trade routes to which the meaning of the word has been improperly extended, since these cannot be controlled along their whole length in any practical sense.

The Memorandum went on: 'The command of the sea is determined by the result of great battles at sea.' Here the political object (security), although not expressed, was implicit in 'command of the sea,' and stress was laid on the military aim (battle). The unwritten doctrine of 1813 had been unwittingly reproduced. But was it not a mistake to make use of vague terms requiring explanation?

In the year 1904 a new Board of Admiralty entered into office with a different theory of war. As is well known, the policy of building battleships of ever-increasing size was further developed with the view to overawe any possible enemy and thus to avoid the need of battle. Further, the large-cruiser policy of 1894 was pushed to the extreme. Only battle-cruisers were laid down, no small cruisers were begun, and many ships suitable for the convoy service were scrapped.[3] Thus any belief remaining in the convoy system was destroyed. Seemingly, the security of the sea-borne trade was to depend upon success in the search for enemy ships on the high seas.

The fallacy underlying the battleship of ever-increasing size is that other nations can follow suit, and ultimately no advantage results from the additional cost, as was shown by Barfleur before the war. The error latent in large cruisers is that they represent a concentration of force, which tends to further concentration into squadrons on both sides, as, for instance, Spee, Cradock and Sturdee. This reduces their chances of making prizes on the one hand and of finding raiders on the other. The

[2] *Journal R.U.S.I.*, vol. xlvii., p. 818.

[3] Barfleur's comment at the time was: 'The new departure, under which many ships have been condemned, swept away "with one courageous stroke of the pen" a large proportion of the force available for the convoy service and protection of the trade, which will certainly be necessary in time of war.' (*Naval Policy*, p. 131.)

field is left open to small ships of no great power, as was also explained before the war.

It became evident that the importance of the decisive battle was not understood; also that in any future war the security given to the sea-borne trade would depend upon an untried system and might fall below what was needed. This gave cause for anxiety and showed the need to examine the whole subject of war at sea. This was begun in the year 1909, and after fifteen years' study and research the 1813 theory of war was rediscovered and was set forth with reasoned arguments and facts derived from ancient and modern wars.

It will be useful to examine the problem of providing security for the sea-borne trade, which is a particular case of the general theory of war. The security of the sea-borne trade is a political object and is attained by destroying or by neutralising the enemy armed force which threatens that trade. The difficulty is to find that force, which may be spoken of as the 'raider.' The German cruiser *Emden* evaded more than twenty cruisers sent in pursuit of her during the late war, and was finally destroyed by one of the escort from a passing military convoy. That case and subsequent ones showed that it is practically useless to search for raiders on the high seas, and goes far to prove that the search policy is unsound. But the raider may perhaps be intercepted off his port of exit, or forestalled at his destination. The ports of exit may be numerous and the difficulty of watching them may be great. In consequence the chances of intercepting the raider on putting to sea vary and may be small. The destination of the raider is the merchant ship, which may be found either in frequented areas or in convoys. Here, then, can he be forestalled. This justifies the convoy system. The armed ship awaits the raider either in the frequented area or as an escort alongside the convoy, not to defend anything, but to attack, or to threaten to attack, the raider or submarine when she appears—to destroy her and thus give security, not only to the convoy, but to other ships, or to neutralise her action against the convoy itself.

This accords with the 1813 theory of war and with the 1902 Memorandum, which declares that 'the primary object of the British Navy is not to defend anything, but to attack the fleets of the enemy, and by defeating them to afford protection to British dominions, shipping and commerce.' [4]

If it is admitted that the search policy has been discredited, it becomes evident that the convoy system is the only really effective method which the Navy can apply to give security

[4] Barfleur commented in 1907: 'The military reasons for convoy are believed to be as valid now as ever they were.' It was surprising to find later on that the convoy principle was not understood.

to the sea-borne trade against any really serious attack. Its disadvantage is that it causes delay and retards the stream of shipping. It should not, therefore, be introduced until the necessity arises. Upon what does that necessity depend?

The political object is to keep the trade moving, and not to allow it to be stopped. Its continued movement depends upon the Navy and insurance, as was explained before the war. The two supplement each other. If the Navy fails, the losses by capture increase, the insurance premiums rise, and the stoppage increases until a point is reached when the delay must be accepted and the convoy system introduced. This is the general principle. Its application depends upon particular circumstances. When the losses are small and easily covered by insurance, delay is not justified, but armed escorts may be needed on some routes and through some areas. During the opening years of the late war, owing to this cause, the failure of the search system against surface ships was not recognised, nor seen to be due to a wrong principle. Thus, when the submarine attack caused great losses, reliance was still placed on it—although the difficulty of finding the submarine was greater and the convoy principle of placing the armed escort alongside the merchant ship was more important than ever. The convoy system was not started in time, because naval thought had ceased to believe in it.

What has vol. iv. of the Official History to say on the subject? It appears that early in the year 1917 there were two schools of thought. The one favoured the use of the whole available force to attack the German submarines—the search system. The other wished to use this force to escort merchantmen through dangerous areas—the convoy system. The protagonist of the convoy system wrote:

> It is necessary to decide the relative urgency of—(i.) protecting and patrolling the coast, (ii.) protecting the traffic along the coast. At first sight it would seem that these two objects are similar, and that if the coast is patrolled and protected, traffic should be able to proceed safely along it. Experience has shown that is not the case; patrols have given little, if any, security to shipping during the war; submarines attack vessels close to the coasts and mines are continually being laid off the shore.
>
> Escorts have, however, proved an effectual protection, and a system of escorts does, to a large extent, fulfil the conditions of a patrol, the escorting vessels being placed in the best positions for meeting and attacking hostile submarines.

The problem had been at last solved. But to the solution was added the fundamental error which has misled thought for many years. The escort was to be placed alongside the convoy because it had given effectual protection. But the Navy does not defend

or protect anything. It attacks in order to give security. The escort is placed alongside the convoy because there will most likely be found the opportunity to attack. Further, vol. v. reveals the fact that previous to this the convoy principle was not understood; that in the forefront of thought was trade defence and not trade security, to be attained by destroying the raider or submarine; that too much was made of convoy difficulties. These may have been the immediate cause of the delay in introducing the convoy system, but the initial cause is traceable to the misleading influences of a long peace, as has been seen. Further, does the reader think that the convoy principle was really understood after the war had ended?

It cannot have been recognised at the Washington Conference in 1921, seeing that 10,000-ton cruisers were recommended to be built. These must have rested on a belief in the search system, since their high speed made them unsuitable for the convoy service. Nor was any reference made to the convoy system in the official case presented at the Geneva Conference, as reported in *The Times*. The argument explaining our requirements for cruisers dwelt on the great difficulty in stopping raiders on exit from and return to their base ports; stressed the great length of the lines of communication and the wide areas over which the sea-borne trade was scattered; showed the futility of attempting to patrol 80,000 miles of trade routes, to say nothing of the wide areas, with only one cruiser to 2500 miles. In short, it confirmed the war experience that the search system is impracticable and can give no security to the trade, but made no mention of the convoy principle which can do so. Does it not seem possible that the entirely erroneous and unfortunate impression was unwittingly left that security cannot be given to our sea-borne trade? Has not past experience shown that, given suitable ships, properly used, the Navy can give the security needed, if its action is supplemented by insurance to spread the losses?

Has not the shipbuilding policy of the last twenty-five years been based upon wrong principles? Have not battleships been built of ever-increasing size, culminating in the *Rodney* and the *Nelson*? Do not those ships represent the principle underlying the three-deckers—concentration of gun *power* in one ship when ranges were short? Do not the increased ranges of modern guns make it possible to discount the value of large ships and large guns by spreading the risks and concentrating the gun *fire* of several smaller ships armed with guns of sufficient power to do the work? Had not the search system produced at the outbreak of the war nine battle-cruisers, built and completing, at a cost of about £17,000,000? That sum would have given upwards of

fifty small cruisers in addition to those already existing. The battle-cruisers were battleships with fighting power sacrificed to speed. As one consequence three were sunk at Jutland. It is true that two were sent out to repair the strategical mistake of leaving Cradock too weak. Were there not armoured cruisers available to have given him ample strength? Did the defeat of Spee justify building ships which weakened our line of battle strength on the one hand and our trade security on the other?

Upon what conception should our cruiser building policy rest? Can it be doubted that sooner or later the submarine will force the adoption of the convoy system in any future war as it did in the last one? As soon as convoys are started, will not escorts be required for them? The strength and composition of our cruiser force will, therefore, depend largely upon the demands of the convoy service. These demands will call for numbers and fighting power rather than for excessive speed.

But cruisers have many other duties to perform besides convoy work. They represent a compromise and will be required in great variety. The solution of the complex problem can only be left to the instinct and judgment of officers with wide experience, whose aim will be to attain security for our varied interests by battle or the threat of battle at the smallest cost.

REGINALD CUSTANCE.

THE POSSIBILITIES OF MECHANISED FARMING IN ENGLAND

IN the flood of literature and other written contributions on the subject of agriculture that have been published in the last five years it is remarkable how little is the information that has been given as to what is really being done in the farming world. We have been so busy discussing such side-lines as Protection and Free Trade, the respective advantages of quotas and import boards, how we can settle more people on the land or what form a State dole to agriculture shall take, that we have forgotten the most important point of all—namely, what can the agricultural industry itself do to cheapen its production costs? This is quite understandable, for with all three parties competing for the agricultural vote it might be a little unwise to suggest that farming must ultimately depend upon economics and not on politics for its security; and it is rather crude, and almost vulgar, when you are vote-hunting, to hint that a State-helped farming industry that is not also self-helped would merely turn our countryside into a heavily subsidised agricultural museum of value to no one but the overseas visitor or the curious motorist.

The two chief political parties have both committed themselves to certain methods of assisting agriculture; but the fact is that, in spite of innumerable committees and reports, we have not yet the requisite information for deciding the extent to which such assistance should be given, or even if it is necessary to give it at all.

Our information is only sufficient to increase our uncertainty. Not long ago the official spokesmen of agriculture indicated that 55*s*. per quarter was the minimum price at which wheat could be profitably grown in England. The figure has since slipped down to 50*s*. And yet an English farmer last year, with no particular natural advantages, produced wheat at a cost of £3. per acre, or 15*s*. per quarter on a four-quarter yield, excluding interest on capital, rent, tithe, and stand-off time for the men. This year he hopes to produce at less. Another has given his costs for planting 60 acres of oats, including ploughing, drilling, harrowing, and 9*s*. per acre for seed, at 12*s*. 3*d*. per acre, and

the same man in 1926–27, when costs were higher than now, was producing milk at 7·2*d.* per gallon. Similar evidence can be found abroad of changes in agricultural practice that are revolutionising the data on production costs that we possess. In the United States the claim has been made that wheat has been produced at a cost of 8*s.* 8*d.* per quarter, excluding rent and taxes, and under exceptionally favourable conditions, and Messrs. Thomas Baxter, of the National Farmers' Union, George Clarke, of the National Union of Agricultural Workers, and J. E. Newman, of the Institute of Agricultural Engineering, University of Oxford, testify to visiting a farm in Montana where wheat is grown at a bare profit even at the present price of 21*s.*, making full allowance for depreciation and all overheads.[1]

In all these instances the mechanisation of the farms has been the chief factor in the results obtained, but it would be the greatest mistake to assume that the English farmer is a fool for continuing any longer under the old system. For the plain fact is that we know little of its possibilities in England. We do not know the ideal sized mechanised corn farm, or, to put it another way, we do not know yet what mechanical equipment is the ideal for an arable farm of given size. We are only at the beginning of devising implements for tractor draught instead of improvising horse implements for tractor use; we are not absolutely certain of the minimum size of field for economic mechanised working, we do not know how much more intensively mechanised farming will allow land to be farmed, or even if tractors can or cannot entirely take the place of horses on land that tends to get heavy and wet. There is good reason to believe that the combine harvester-thresher can be completely successful in the English climate if used in conjunction with an artificial drier, but it is not yet fully proved, and it would be a rash man who asserted that the mechanised farming practicable on the lightish lands of Hampshire and Wiltshire would be equally suited, without modification, to Essex or Yorkshire clay or to the Lincolnshire fens.

Nor have the implement manufacturers been encouraging. It is true that every year brings fresh improvements to existing implements and a small number of valuable inventions, and true that if British farm implements have a constructional fault it is that they are built too solidly and too durably. But the manufacturers do not seem to have realised that mechanised farming is not a possibility of the near future, but a certainty, and where they might have given an active lead by demonstrations and other forms of propaganda to farmers they have, with a very few honourable exceptions, been worse than half-hearted.

[1] *The Use of Agricultural Machinery in Canada and the U.S.A.*, Bulletin No. 27, H.M. Stationery Office. (Price 1*s.* 3*d.* net.)

The writer may have been unfortunate in his experiences, but in the instances that have come to his notice the manufacturers have either refused to assist farmers who needed their help in devising new implements, or modifications of existing ones, for mechanised farming, or they have met such requests with the greatest reluctance and the gloomiest forebodings of failure. American firms, no doubt because of the greater strides mechanised farming has made in America and Canada, have been more open-minded. When one remembers that there are 10,000,000 arable acres in Britain, and that if 75 per cent. of them became mechanised at a cost of £4 per acre for the new mechanical equipment no less a sum than £30,000,000 would pass through the makers' hands, it is a little surprising that they have not taken a more active interest in this movement.

These facts have made farmers chary of taking the plunge into mechanised farming. Coupled with them is the remarkable absence of knowledge of what is already being achieved by farm mechanisation, the farmers' lack of capital after a series of lean years, and their prejudice, worthy of every respect, against getting rid of some of their men. John Prout, who sixty years ago was the pioneer of arable farming without live-stock and extensive use of steam cultivation, observed the same indifference of farmers, in a time of similar depression, towards a new system that produced demonstrably good results.

> In what other branch of industry [he wrote in 1881] would it have been possible for success equal to mine to be left during nineteen years with so few imitators? . . . Unless I am prepared to libel the qualities of Englishmen and to malign the intelligence of my brother farmers, I am obliged to assert that it is the ill condition of the land tenancy in its laws and customs in this country which stands so obstinately in the way of at least one proved way of reaping profit from clay soils of whose future many people now despair.[2]

Since Prout's day the tenancy laws have changed. The farmer tenant has greater security and greater freedom of cropping, and one quarter of the agricultural land of England and Wales belongs to owner-farmers. It is possible, however, that the large arable farms most suitable to mechanisation are held under tenancy in a greater percentage, and there is little doubt that the old *régime* under which the landlord was more an active partner with the tenant and was usually the initiator and experimenter in new methods has left a psychological influence that is anything but stimulating to an experimental outlook on the part of the tenant. The absence of such traditions in new countries such as Canada and the United States has almost certainly been

[2] *Profitable Clay Farming*, John Prout. (London: Edward Stanford, 1881.)

one strong factor among many in encouraging farmers on the American continent to strike out in new lines. It is the English corn farmer, too, who is the most strongly influenced by his profession to take his time in thinking about his industry. He lays out money to-day for returns that do not come for fifteen months. He plants this year the crop that he may not cash until 1934, and the slow, orderly processes of Nature are in his blood and part of his very upbringing. For a generation at least he has grown up in surroundings where it is assumed that America and Australia are the wheat-growing continents of the world, and people have never ceased to tell him how hopeless it is to try to compete with the virgin soil and ideal climate of these wheat lands. More recently, the activities of Soviet Russia in corn production have made him feel additionally uncertain about laying out fresh capital and undertaking the very considerable mental effort for so completely transforming his methods of corn production.

To draw hasty conclusions, therefore, about the lack of enterprise of the British arable farmer is not only unfair, but is likely to increase the difficulty of deciding upon the best means of bringing our soil under the plough again and restoring prosperity to our oldest and greatest industry. For something must be done. This year only one-third of our cultivated area is being ploughed, and since statistics were first collected in 1866 over 4,000,000 acres in England and Wales have gone out of cultivation. It is perfectly true that everything combines to make Britain primarily a country for live-stock and dairying, fruit, poultry and market garden production, and it may even be possible that we should not attempt to grow our own wheat for bread because of the disabilities English wheat suffers from the baker's point of view. But even granting such a contention—and it is a very large admission—no system of farming has yet been discovered that would enable our corn-growing belt from Dorset to East Anglia to produce anything in quantity but corn, and if we were to concentrate upon live-stock we would still need cereal food for them, grown as cheaply as possible. In Denmark, where poultry, pigs, and dairying are the chief agricultural industries, 85 per cent of the land is tilled. If Britain grew the same amount of corn in proportion to her area as Denmark, our corn production would be more than doubled.

It comes, then, to this. Can Britain produce corn as cheaply as it can be grown and transported here from the great corn lands of the world? (It should be borne in mind that it costs a little less than 13*s*. 4*d*. per qr. to carry corn from Western Canada to Liverpool.) If she cannot, how cheaply can she produce it, and to what extent should State assistance be given to corn-

growing to make it a commercial proposition for both economic and sociological reasons?

Perhaps it is fair to warn those who have read so far that no trite answer to these questions will be found in this article. For the truth is that neither the writer nor anyone else knows. Results, and rather startling results, have been obtained which will be given in detail on a later page, but existing knowledge is far too slight for any cut-and-dried reply. No one but a politician —the one profession for which neither training nor knowledge is demanded—would dare to dogmatise on the information we have.

It was to expedite and collect this knowledge that the large-scale farming clause in the Land Utilisation Bill was inserted. It was deleted by the House of Lords ostensibly on the ground that we could not afford the £1,000,000 required for this research. Research has never been a popular favourite, especially with the country-bred, and the word 'mechanisation' is even more hateful to a certain type of rural aristocrat. The combination of the two was too much, and the clause was flung out. But the real causes of its trucidation were sentimental. The thought of the mechanisation of the countryside was abhorrent to a body of men of whom a large number are genuinely and passionately devoted to it, and the fallacious post-war custom of judging a country's prosperity by the number of its unemployed gave a veneer of false economics to the view that the mechanisation of farming was against the national interests because it required less men to do a given piece of work.

Neither argument will stand a moment's examination. We already have tractors, steam tackle, reaper-binders, and other machinery in the countryside. They have not spoilt its amenities nor robbed their operators of all those characteristics of the countryman that are so rightly admired. We could easily solve our unemployment question to-morrow by passing a Bill of one sentence forbidding the use of any form of agricultural machinery. Such an Erehwonian Act would bring back the men to the land by the hundred thousand. From dawn to dark they would sweat with scythe and hook in the fields at a quarter of the present wages. They would creep home to starve in filthy hovels, for both landowner and farmer would be unable, in their impoverished state, to house or feed them in a manner fit for human beings. Most seasons the autumn rains would come to ruin part of the crop before it could be collected by such methods. We would have no unemployment, but we would have a standard of living that would very properly provoke a revolution. In a less degree the same picture is true of arable agriculture under the orthodox methods pursued to-day. We are doing by the sweat of the human brow much work that machinery could do better for us.

Farm wages are low—too low for the modern standards that other industries, through mechanical development, have made possible for their employees. Bad times in farming have impoverished farmers and landlords, and in all too many of those 'quaint' rural cottages—'rose-covered hovels'—the evil of this penury is to be seen. On the few farms where the writer has seen mechanised farming in practice wages are rather better, housing is good, toil has been lightened, and the men have cleaner jobs. As one of them put it, 'I would not like to go back to clod-hopping again.' More demand is made upon their intelligence and skill, less upon their mere muscular output. By a paradox, mechanised farming has made their job more human and less mechanical. Which is the more attractive picture to the true lover of the countryside and of the inhabitants of its many villages and hamlets?

There remains the objection of the decreased amount of employment. It is true that machinery needs less men to perform a given operation. But it is untrue, and against all the teachings of history, that machinery results in less men being employed in the mass. The machinery that at first threw so many out of work in the Yorkshire and Lancashire looms ended in creating a standard of living that our great-grandfathers would never have credited. It has provided additional employment on an enormous scale. There is good reason to believe that the mechanisation of farming, coming fifty years later than in any other of our great industries, will reproduce the story of the Yorkshire and Lancashire looms over again. For cheap corn means cheap feeding-stuffs for producing beef, mutton, lamb, bacon, milk, eggs and poultry. Beside and within the mechanised corn farms these other agricultural industries could flourish as they have not for many a day, could we produce the corn more cheaply than it can be grown and transported from America. Our land is good, our climate kind, and mechanisation can overcome many of the difficulties of our capricious rainfall. Rents are low, lower than in Denmark or Holland, and we have the space to produce these feeding-stuffs, while Denmark and Holland are so small that they cannot grow more than a proportion of their corn, but must import considerably from abroad. Transport costs from Canadian farms to Liverpool give us a margin of at least 12*s.* 6*d.* per quarter to work upon, and by improving our organisation for distributing corn in the areas where it is grown and by working in live-stock production more closely with corn production for feeding it this margin might be fully used in many districts. The result would be a great stimulus to the live-stock branches of agriculture, which represent by far the greatest proportion of our farm output. It would represent

a great increase in corn production also, for mechanised farming does *not* mean 'ranch' farming. As Professor Orwin has pointed out,[3] mechanised farming permits more continuous cropping of the land. It is also a system which, if successful, would bring back under the plough many acres of light down land that are now producing perhaps one sheep to the acre.

Mr. Roland Dudley, the only English corn farmer whose farm is fully mechanised, spoke significant words to the writer on this subject.

> Now I can produce corn so cheaply, [he said] I am thinking of going in for pigs also, because of the low cost at which I can feed them. I shall probably start a unit of pigs. If that succeeds, I shall add a second unit, then a third—maybe a fourth or fifth if things work out all right. By then I may be producing enough pigs to run my own abattoir, and I can foresee the day when I may well be employing more people on my land than the old system of farming would have allowed.

These are the grounds on which mechanised corn farming may well claim that it would eventually increase employment on the land. They were never even mentioned in the House of Lords debate on the subject. The growth of mechanised farming on the American continent, and the success that has attended the initial experiments in England, is proof that sooner or later it will become more general here, whether we like it or not. One may yearn for the old days of rustic peace and simplicity, but that will not bring them back again. The alternatives are to see more and more of our corn land being lost to the plough in the face of overseas competition, or a state of affairs too ludicrous for serious consideration. We would have to forbid by law mechanised farming in England and pay a huge subsidy every year to maintain rural England as a museum of antique agricultural practices. The real question regarding the 'mechanised farms' clause in the Land Utilisation Bill was whether it would pay us best to spend £1,000,000 on such experimenting in the hope of obtaining the necessary data quickly, or whether we can afford to wait for existing research institutions and private individuals to provide the information we required. That is a debatable point, but the House of Lords did not debate it in any sense that showed they had a real understanding of the problem, and there is nothing in the report of the discussion to indicate that they realised how much there is to find out before mechanised farming can be adapted to the very varying conditions of this country.

But large-scale demonstration farms are not the dream of a visionary or the fad of one or two experimentalists. They are not even a new suggestion. They were mentioned by the Agri-

[3] *The Future of Farming*, by C. S. Orwin. (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford, price 5*s.*)

cultural Policy Sub-committee of the Reconstruction Committee in 1918, recommended by the Selborne Committee in a report signed by Lord Selborne, Lord Ailwyn, Sir A. D. Hall, and that great agriculturist, the late Mr. Edward Strutt, and, more recently, by no less acute an agricultural expert than Professor C. S. Orwin, principal of the Agricultural Research Institute at Oxford University, who has indicated more clearly than anyone, in the book already quoted, the nature and possibilities of this new development in agricultural practice that has changed from a possibility into a reality within the last five years.

To follow out the excellent motto of the Royal Agricultural Society of England, ' Practice with Science,' let us now see what is actually being done in England to introduce industrial and factory methods into the ancient business of agriculture.

By a coincidence, the two leading pioneers of mechanisation in dairy farming and arable farming live within half an hour's motor drive of one another. They are Mr. A. J. Hosier, of Wexcombe, near Marlborough, Wiltshire, and Mr. Roland Dudley, of Linkenholt Manor, near Andover, Hampshire. The two men also have many other things in common. Mr. Dudley is a civil engineer with a business training and an intimate knowledge of machinery; Mr. Hosier also has engineering experience behind him, although he gained it in a rather more romantic manner. In 1904 a brother-in-law, who was an agricultural engineer at Pewsey, died and left his business in rather a bad way. Mr. Hosier forsook farming and administered the business for six years in the interest of his sister, handing it back to her at the end of that time as a going concern. It is significant that he attributes no small part of the success he has since obtained in mechanised dairy farming to this experience.

Both men own their land, both began their adventures on farms by no means best suited to dairy farming and corn farming respectively; both realised from the start that new methods were necessary if they were to obtain financial success. Both were openly derided by their neighbours at the beginning of their enterprises, and have since found that those who laughed at them were later among the first to come to them to learn. In each case they found that they had to do much of their own implement and machinery devising for their needs, or had to go abroad for some of their most important requirements in this direction. In character also they are not unlike. They share a common antipathy to waste in any form, particularly of unnecessary waste of human or mechanical energy. Mr. Hosier has installed a telephone system to various parts of his farm to save the time and trouble of many journeys, and his dairying ' outfits ' carry a week's supply of fuel and oil with the same object. In

the days when he used to cool his milk at his dairy, the water for cooling was the water pumped up to the farm for his cattle, but diverted first through the cooling apparatus, so that cooling cost him practically nothing. Mr. Dudley similarly operates his corn-grinding mill by the engine that makes his electric light at the same time, and utilises the heat of the exhaust of his corn-drying apparatus to dry the corn when it is not too wet, thus cutting out the expense of a coke furnace. These may appear small items, but multiplied many times they make a difference and reveal the mentality of the modern pioneer who cuts production costs to the bone. On neither farm is a dung cart to be seen, for no dung is spread. They say they cannot afford the cost of the labour involved. Mr. Hosier avoids this operation by an ingenious method that will be described; Mr. Dudley prefers to rely entirely upon artificial fertilisers, which can be spread at a very much lower cost. In this respect, of course, they are merely endorsing the findings of such men as John Prout and George Baylis, who came to the same conclusion last century, and they are by no means unique, although they represent a small minority of farmers. Both men show a great readiness to experiment with any new machine or implement, and are willing to scrap what they have been using if the new promises to be more efficient or economic, but neither will buy a new type of implement just because it is new. They go carefully into costings, and unless it will give a definite saving in total costs they will not look at it, even though it may substitute a mechanical for a manual operation.

As regards the farms in detail, we will take Mr. Hosier's farm at Wexcombe first, for he was the first to begin. He is dairy farming on 1800 acres of grass land on the bleak Marlborough hills, where the mean temperature is lower than that of Aberdeen. The land was exceedingly poor when he bought the greater part of it in 1920—in the words of the valuer, ' not worth a dam.' The only cowshed was one near the house at the extreme end of the farm. Little wonder that his neighbours thought him mad when he proposed to turn it into a dairy farm.

He proceeded, however, to adapt a system to it that now bears his name and has become so well known that it need be only briefly described. He decided that, as it was so inconvenient to bring his cows to the one inadequate cowshed, he would take his cowsheds to the cows. He invented travelling sheds of galvanised iron, without floors and mounted on wheels, which he called ' bails.' They are hauled about the farm by tractors. Each bail contains six stalls, and a milking machine milks six cows at a time. While they are being milked they are fed from a manger in each stall with concentrated foods put in by an overhead hopper, from which one pull on a lever by the cowman

discharges each cow's correct ration. After the milking machine has finished its work the cowman strips it by hand, pulls a rope that opens a sliding door in front of the cow and lets her out into the open pasture. Another cow then takes her place from the corral of chestnut paling into which the whole herd is rounded up each milking time. Power is provided by a small oil engine in a shepherd's hut attached to the bail, and in the hut is also a generator for making electric light in winter time and a boiler to generate steam for sterilisation. The milk passes by an overhead pipe to the end of the bail, through a brine cooler, straight into the churns. A cooling device eliminates any rehandling of the milk. The churns are sealed in the field ready for delivery. The sterilising device blows steam through the whole milking plant, leaving it clean and ready for use at the next milking.

Sixty cows go with each bail, for that is the 'economic unit' that works the machine at full capacity, and is the maximum number that can be milked by one cowman and his assistant. The cows live out all the year round and have benefited greatly in health thereby. Milk yields are excellent. It is also one of the cleanest methods of milk production that could be devised. Each outfit is a self-contained unit, with its own labour staff and mechanical equipment, supplied with its own pony and float for bringing empty churns and the day's concentrated foods for the herd and returning with full churns. Mr. Hosier now has six of these outfits.

So far as financial returns are concerned, Mr. Hosier milks his unit of sixty cows at a labour cost of less than £5 per week. The normal labour cost with hand milking would be from £12 to £15 per week. He is saving also the interest on money spent on buildings and the cost of keeping them in repair, and also the cost of removing dung from the cowsheds, carting it and spreading it on the land. For his bails move all over the farm, transported complete with shepherd's hut and corral by tractor, and thus the dung gets to the land with no handling, and the valuable liquid manure goes back on to the land also. The effect of this upon the originally poor Wexcombe pastures can be seen by inspecting the rough grass, furze, and rubbish that surround Mr. Hosier's boundary fences and comparing it with the ever-improving pasture, full of wild white clover, which his system, helped with light dressings of artificials, is creating. All cost of root growing and carting is also eliminated. In 1926–7 Mr. Hosier was producing milk at a cost of 7·2*d.* per gallon. More recent figures have not been published, but the fall in prices must have made his production costs even less. Production costs under the orthodox system are difficult to calculate, for dairy farms range from those carrying several hundred cows to those

where all the work is done by a small farmer and his family. There must be few farms, however, where milk is being produced at less than 9*d.*, and many where 10½*d.* and 11*d.* is probably the figure.

It may be urged that not all types of land are suitable to this kind of dairy farming, and obviously it would not do for sticky, wet land in winter time. But what one feels about Mr. Hosier is that in whatever surroundings he had found himself he would have devised something to meet the situation by an equally revolutionary method of production. Climate, pasture, and buildings were all against him when he started, and to provide the necessary water supply alone involved an outlay of £5000. To quote Professor Orwin [4]:

> To describe Mr. Hosier as a specialist in milk production would be true enough, but it would not begin to tell the tale of his achievements. He should be regarded more properly as a specialist in farm organisation, and the object of this study is to draw attention not so much to his ingenious milking bails, which are well known, nor to his success in the production of clean milk, as evidenced by the exceptional bacterial examinations, but rather to the skill with which he has set himself to organise his farming—milk production as it happens—though it might have been anything else.

Not content with his achievements in cheapening milk production, however, Mr. Hosier decided that he could grow his corn for feeding-stuffs even more cheaply than it is now purchasable, and in 1929 he added Collingbourne, an 800-acre farm, to his holding at Wexcombe. He is farming this also on the principle of artificials and clover crops in the place of animal manure and occasional fallowing to keep the land clean. He uses a Lanz tractor, burning crude oil, with two drivers working eight-hour shifts when necessary. It is equipped with headlights for use in the short days, and so he makes one tractor do the work of two. A five-furrow plough covers over an acre an hour, and a seed box mounted on the plough deposits the corn at the bottom of the furrow. The land is then harrowed. Two drivers and one tractor recently ploughed and drilled 60 acres of oats in four days, and 220 in a month. He cuts his corn with an 8-feet tractor-binder, carries it in waggons hitched to the tractor, and stacks in the field with an American stacker. His costs for planting 60 acres of oats worked out as follows:

	Total cost. £ s. d.	Cost per acre. s. d.
Ploughing and drilling . .	8 3 4	2 9
Seed corn (180 bushels at 3s.) .	27 0 0	9 0
Harrowing	1 11 1	0 6
	36 14 5	12 3

[4] *Progress in English Farming Systems*: No. V., C. S. Orwin. (Clarendon Press, price 1s. 6d. net.)

Mr. Dudley's methods are somewhat different. On the 500 arable acres of his 1000-acre farm at Linkenholt he is producing corn for sale, and not for consumption on the premises. His land is quite good as Hampshire land goes, but some of it decidedly on the sticky side—difficult land to catch at the right moment for ploughing and sowing. Having had some experience of arable farming by the orthodox method, he was determined, when he was left with the farm on his hands two years ago, that he would somehow make it pay. He is doing so, even at present prices, although he considers that the price of wheat should be 40*s.* per quarter to yield an adequate living for the trouble, capital, and risk involved in growing it.

For his 500 arable acres he uses two 15-horse power caterpillar tractors and two tractor drivers. At special times an extra hand or two is occasionally brought in. From one end of the year to the other no horse is used for one single cultivating operation. A common objection to mechanised farming is that the tractor cannot be used on sticky land all the year round. Mr. Dudley's land may not be as sticky as the Essex clay, but some of it certainly is sticky, and yet the tractors have given him no trouble on it. He contends that the average pressure of the caterpillar tractor is 5 lb. per square inch, compared with 8 lb. per square inch for a man's foot and 30 lb. per square inch for a horse's hoof. The swifter working of the tractor will also enable the farmer to wait until the land is in exactly the right condition for putting machinery on it, and he attributes much of the excellence of the crops he has grown to this factor. His two men and two tractors cultivated the whole of his 500 acres last year, and another 120 acres for his neighbours, which gives some indication of the 'economic unit' for the machinery that he has.[8] It is interesting to note that his costings show that little is to be gained by working in fields that exceed 35 acres in size, although the field of 5 to 25 acres is definitely uneconomic. This is valuable information, for it means a saving in the cost of grubbing up hedges, filling in roads, etc., on the typical English farm, with its rather small fields, and is encouraging to those who dread the thought of the English countryside being turned into unbroken expanses of 'prairie' farms.

He does his winter ploughing with a six-furrow plough made specially for him by an English firm. Cross ploughing is done by a sixteen-furrow disc plough of American manufacture. He uses drills that sow forty-five rows at a time instead of the

[8] The authors of *The Use of Agricultural Machinery in Canada and the U.S.A.* (see *op. cit.*) record a visit to a Saskatchewan farmer who was farming 1280 acres single-handed, with one extra man engaged at harvest to ride on the combine.

customary fifteen, and the trouble here is that the seed boxes on the drills empty too quickly. Deeper boxes would give too high a pressure of seed when full, so he is now thinking out a method whereby an extra supply of seed can be carried on the tractor and fed to the drills. His harrows are about three times the width of the usual harrow.

The following is an account of the work done in one week on Mr. Dudley's farm with two men, two tractors, and one extra man used to ride on the drill. He was used for the drilling only. There was one wet day and no work was done on Sunday. The time was a statutory week with twelve hours overtime:

ONE WEEK'S WORK

(Saturday, April 11, to Friday, April 17th)

	Acres covered.
Drilling (three fields)	94
Harrowing (three fields, two twice)	155
Fertiliser distributing (four fields)	104
Cultivating, 10 inches deep (one field twice)	54
Rolling (one field)	40
Total	447

It will be noticed that the cultivation was 10 inches deep. Mr. Dudley makes a practice of deep cultivation, believing that it releases the fertility and improves the soil of the furrow pan that may not have been touched for generations. His crops appear to benefit by this, and it shows that his idea of mechanised farming is anything but a superficial scratching of the land to obtain quick, cheap cultivation at the expense of good husbandry.

One field of barley on which he has kept careful costings is a revelation of what can be accomplished under his system. It is 34 acres in size, and was ploughed, twice cross-ploughed, harrowed, drilled with seed, then fertilisers, harrowed again, then rolled, at a total operating cost (excluding cost of seed and fertilisers) of £13 10*s.* By the old method this cost might have been as much as £150.

But it is the combine harvester-thresher that is the *pièce de resistance* in saving costs and facilitating this method of farming. Mr. Dudley has found it to be entirely satisfactory—an experience shared by others of the few users of this machine in England. Far from considering it unsuited to our climate, he considers that the wet harvest last year proved it to be a vital necessity in this country if used in conjunction with a mechanical grain drier. He found that it could be put into a crop to cut and thresh it at about the same time as the same crop would be fit to cut by

the ordinary reaper-binder. A certain amount of experience is required in adjusting the speed of the engine on the combine that threshes the wheat to the speed at which the machine travels over the ground, but his men learnt quite quickly to handle his combine efficiently, and last year he obtained top price for his barley while his wheat was highly praised by the miller. An East Anglian combine user also obtained the top price for barley harvested by a similar machine. He uses no other method for harvesting and threshing his crop, and for the complete operation he estimates that it saves him quite 30 per cent. of the cost of the old method of cutting, stooking, carting, and threshing in separate operations.

The grain, threshed and sacked up in the fields, is brought straight into the barn by lorries and dried artificially. The drier, together with elevators, conveyors, and bins for storing 1,200 qrs. of grain, cost £1500 to instal. It is operated by an oil engine that draws in hot air from a coke furnace. Several manufacturers have been turning their attention to these machines, and there is hope of the initial cost being considerably reduced. Also, if mechanised farming were more general, one machine might well be bought and used co-operatively by the surrounding grain growers. On Mr. Dudley's farm wheat has been cut and threshed in the fields with a moisture content of 24 to 26 per cent. and dried down to 16 per cent. without any difficulty at a cost of 4½*d.* per sack. Other records give drying costs as low as 2*d.* per sack; it naturally depends upon the moisture content. Grain can be dried at the rate of twenty sacks per hour.

This method saves the time spent in rick-building and the cost of thatching. It saves also loss of grain through rats and mice (estimated at 10 per cent. of the rick) and loss by rain penetrating the thatch (estimated at 2½ per cent. of the rick).

Mr. Dudley uses petrol for his tractors, for he considers it the most reliable form of fuel at the moment, and he cannot afford the risk of a tractor being out of action when the weather is just right for using it. For the same reason he takes more care of his implements—by cleaning, oiling, and covering them up when not in use—than is customary among farmers. He looks forward to the day when a crude-oil caterpillar tractor of proved efficiency will be put on the market, for in using petrol he is heavily hit by the petrol tax, instituted by the last Government to compensate the derating of agricultural land. He finds it a tax on his production costs that amounts to 3*s.* 6*d.* to 5*s.* 6*d.* per acre, and last year it cost him double the amount he formerly paid in rates. It increases his ploughing costs by 25 per cent., and is, in his opinion, a food tax that blocks the way to progress in mechanised farming.

The following figures show Mr. Dudley's costs for certain field operations. Beside them are the figures for the same operations undertaken by a farmer on a highly organised farm producing wheat at under 40*s.* per qr. where tractors are freely used, but not a fully mechanised farm. They illustrate the fact that mechanisation produces savings that no amount of organisation alone will achieve:

	Costs at Linkenholt (per acre).	Costs on highly organised but non-mechanised farm (per acre).
Ploughing	2*s.* 6*d.* to 4*s.* 6*d.*	14*s.* 6*d.*
Drilling	1*s.* 6*d.* to 1*s.* 8*d.*	1*s.* 6*d.*
Harrowing	8*d.* to 9*d.*	1*s.* 6*d.*
Rolling	1*s.* 2*d.* to 1*s.* 4*d.*	1*s.* 6*d.*
Cutting, carting, and threshing	10*s.* 6*d.*	42*s.* 6*d.*

NOTE.—The Linkenholt figures include a 25 per cent. allowance for depreciation in every instance except for the combine harvester. For this the rather liberal allowance of 7*s.* 6*d.* per acre has been made. The published accounts of the other farm referred to do not make it quite clear whether allowance for depreciation has been made or not.

To put the results of Mr. Dudley's work at Linkenholt as clearly as possible, he is doing with two men and two tractors and a very little casual help at special times the work of ten pairs of horses and a dozen men on an ordinary arable farm of the same size. It means that his seed bed ought to be prepared at not less than 25*s.* per acre, the straw should practically pay for the fertilisers, and the cost of harvesting should not exceed 15*s.* per acre. Seeds, sowing, and harrowing at £1 per acre give a cost of £3 per acre to set against the sales of grain. At eight sacks to the acre this represents a production cost of 15*s.* per quarter of wheat, excluding interest on capital, rent, tithe, and stand-off time for the men.

Besides low operating costs, however, the system has other agricultural advantages. Mechanisation paves the way to more continuous cropping, so that three-fifths of the land should eventually be under wheat each year, and the speed at which the work can be done enables the weather to be circumvented and the land taken just at the right time. One tractor can plough 1 acre an hour, drill 1 acre in six minutes, cut and thresh the crop at the rate of 1½ to 2 acres per hour. When all the necessary work can be done on fine days, the large number of wet ones we experience assume far less importance and our climate handicap almost disappears. We do not suffer the Canadian frosts, the droughts of Australia or the United States, nor the heavy rains of the Argentine coming at the wrong time of the year.[6] It

[6] See *Remunerative Wheat Growing*, by R. Dudley, A.M.I.C.E. (Messrs. Holmes & Sons, Andover. Price 1*s.*)

should be remembered also that Mr. Dudley is a pioneer who has only been experimenting for two years, and he is hopeful, in fact determined, that he will still further reduce his production costs.

In the old days of horse draught the successful farmer was usually one who had a pretty good knowledge of veterinary science. Mr. Dudley and Mr. Hosier have shown that, in a mechanical age, engineering knowledge is no less essential, together with an aptitude for accounting and business organisation that brings agriculture into line with the other great industries of modern times. What prizes can farming offer to attract men when such ability is demanded, and how can such rewards be brought within their reach? That is exactly the problem that confronts us, and if it is to be solved within a reasonable time it can only be done by the most careful documentation and research.

L. F. EASTERBROOK.

THE PUBLIC AND COMPANY ACCOUNTS[1]

THERE are many who consider that the Crown blundered when it accused Lord Kylsant and Mr. Morland with having wilfully issued false and fraudulent balance-sheets to the shareholders of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. There are probably many more who think that it acted ungenerously in not at once withdrawing the charge when the evidence of its own witnesses showed that there were no real grounds on which it could be sustained. But it is an ill wind which blows nobody any good. An unsatisfactory case has had, at least, this satisfactory result—it has aroused public interest in the condition of the law governing public companies and their accounts. That is perhaps a somewhat bitter consolation for the men who have had to endure the indignity and strain of a criminal trial. But it is the hard and apparently immutable rule of life that the individual must sometimes suffer in order that the community may benefit.

It is one thing to acknowledge the legality of the Royal Mail accounts and to recognise the integrity of the men who issued them. It is quite another thing to approve of the code of law which makes possible the publication of such unsatisfactory documents. But the shortcomings of the law must be remedied by Parliament. It is asking too much of human nature to expect the City to adopt a self-denying ordinance and to forgo, of its own accord, its traditional policy of secrecy. It is hardly fair to attempt to drive it into such an action by making scapegoats of two of its most honoured and distinguished citizens.

After the evidence which was given in the Kylsant case, it must be clear to any impartial mind that the present state of company law is unsatisfactory. To say this is not to overlook the facts that the company whose accounts were under scrutiny was not an ordinary limited liability company, but was incorporated under royal charter, and that since those accounts were published certain changes have been made in the law. For,

[1] The references to the Kylsant case in this article relate only to the charges concerning the published accounts of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. The additional charge against Lord Kylsant of having issued a false prospectus is entirely outside the scope of the argument. Since that charge is still *sub judice*, it would in any case be improper to comment upon it.

though the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company had a special legal basis, its accounts were nevertheless drawn up in accordance with current commercial practice and the requirements of ordinary company law, nor is there anything in the new legislation which would have materially modified their form or compelled greater frankness. Broadly speaking, there is no legal reason why an ordinary public company should not produce a similar set of accounts to-day. Though the Companies Act of 1929 introduced some reforms which were long over-due, it failed to break down the fog of obscurity in which the accounts of so many companies lurk. That, perhaps, is not surprising, since the Greene Committee, on whose recommendations the Act was based, not only held the amazing view that ' in general . . . the shareholders . . . have little ground for complaint with the form of accounts,' but also put forward the even more astonishing opinion that it ' should be left to the shareholders to make such requirements as to the form of their company's accounts as they may think fit.' The truth of the first conception we will examine shortly ; the utter impracticability of the second must be patent to all.

The fact must be faced that secrecy is the fetish of the average British business man. How far it is justified will be considered later. But it is as well to recognise the probability that, so far as it concerns the publication of informative accounts, commercial practice will always cling close to the minimum requirements of company law. At present those requirements are sadly insufficient. The present form of accounts may have been suitable for the old type of family business, whose principal shareholders were actively engaged in its management. But it is quite inadequate for a modern combine, whose directors often have little or no financial stake in it, and whose shareholders have no direct knowledge of its affairs. New wine cannot be satisfactorily, or even safely, stored in old bottles. It is the duty of Parliament to ensure that the shareholder receives an adequate set of accounts from his directors. At present he too often receives documents which are both scant and uninformative.

The ordinary shareholder is neither an exacting nor a tyrannical master. He does not desire to control the policy or to meddle in the management of his company. He realises that these things require a knowledge and experience which he does not usually possess, and he is quite content that they should be left in the hands of the directors and executive officers. But while he is prepared to pay the piper and let others, better qualified than he, call the tune, he maintains a right to be told what the tune is to be and whether the piper is fit to play it. One would require to have a very strange conception of the rights of property to condemn so modest a claim. Yet it must be confessed

that it is often rejected in practice. The shareholder of to-day is frequently denied any clear information about either the value or the prospects of the business in which he has invested his money.

Mr. Justice Wright remarked in the course of the Kylsant case that shareholders are not sheep, or at any rate should not be treated by the directors as such. There are two vital questions which every intelligent shareholder tries to answer, and he has a plain right to receive sufficient data for his purpose : first, whether his capital is reasonably secure ; and, secondly, whether it is earning a satisfactory return. To a large extent, of course, the two questions hang together, since the value of fixed assets depends almost entirely on their earning power. Apart from the directors' report, which is often purely formal, and such information as the chairman of the company may feel disposed to give at the annual general meeting, the shareholder is dependent on the published accounts for the material he requires. It would need a very hardened optimist to assert that these documents are always adequate to the occasion. It is sometimes said that, even if they were, the ordinary shareholder would be incapable of reading them aright. But that is really irrelevant. The shareholder who is completely ignorant of the language of accounts will presumably consult somebody who is not. But, as things are at present, the most brilliant and perspicacious accountant in the world would not be able to answer his questions from the data provided by the published accounts of some companies. It needs a Moses to extract water from a stone.

Consider for a moment the material on which the shareholder has to work. The balance-sheet will show him whether or not the company has sufficient liquid assets, for one of the few valuable provisions of the new Companies Act has made it obligatory for companies to state their fixed assets separately. This is certainly a great advance on the bad old method of lumping fixed and liquid assets together. But if the values of the liquid assets are now clearly shown, that of the fixed assets still remains obscure. Since the fixed assets are usually taken ' at cost less depreciation,' the figure which appears on the balance-sheet may have no real relation to their current worth. It may be so inflated that it requires the whole of the general reserve, which looks so reassuring on the other side of the balance-sheet, to reduce it to reasonable proportions, while on the other hand it may be so heavily written down as to hide away a substantial reserve.

The treatment of fixed assets deserves, perhaps, some special comment. In the long run, their value depends almost entirely on the earning power of the company ; apart from it they have

little or no intrinsic worth. It is therefore sometimes said that the shareholder need only refer to the profit and loss account to determine for himself whether the value put on them in the balance-sheet is reasonable. But this is not really true. The profit and loss account does not necessarily reveal the trading profit for the year, and in any case the shareholder has no means of knowing if the present trading conditions are likely to be permanent. A strike, a trade depression, or some factory reorganisation, might reduce trading profits for a few years without permanently injuring the earning power of the fixed assets. Only the directors have the requisite information to say whether or not the earning power of the company has permanently contracted. If it has, then it is surely the duty of the directors to disclose the fact by using the reserves to write down the fixed assets. If no reserves exist, the facts should be put before the shareholders and a capital reorganisation recommended. To maintain a grossly inflated figure in the balance-sheet, as so many companies are doing to-day, is plainly misleading. If the shareholder abandons his inquiry into the capital values on the balance-sheet and tries to discover the current earning power of his shares, he is confronted with similar difficulties. For one thing, a credit balance on the profit and loss account does not necessarily represent the earned trading profit of the year at all. It might be unduly swollen by non-recurring credit items and transfers from hidden reserves. Conversely, it might be unduly contracted by the expenditure of income on capital improvements. In neither case would the shareholder have any real clue to the true position.

The case which we have taken is that of an ordinary independent trading company. If the shareholder tries to glean information from the accounts of a holding company his plight is often infinitely worse. Take but one instance from the balance-sheet. A holding company will show as its principal asset shares in subsidiary companies. But even the new Companies Act does not require it to give any indication of either the number and the nominal value of the shares, or of their present value. Since companies are now under an obligation to disclose the method of valuation of fixed assets, such shares will probably appear in the balance-sheet at 'Cost less Reserves,' but the shareholder will have no real clue to their intrinsic worth. In the same way, the main figure on the credit side of the revenue account will be dividends received from subsidiary companies. A holding company is still under no obligation to publish either a consolidated balance-sheet for the whole group or the separate accounts of each subsidiary. But unless the shareholder is given some such additional information he is quite unable to determine whether

the subsidiary companies were economically justified in paying the dividends they did. When the full accounts of the Royal Mail group were disclosed it was seen that big dividends had been paid out by the subsidiary companies in spite of heavy trading losses. It is true that the Companies Act of 1929 has laid down that a holding company must disclose how the aggregate profits and losses of its subsidiaries have been dealt with in its accounts, and whether the losses, if any, have been provided for by either the holding company or the subsidiary concerned. But, since it is specifically stated that the amount of the profits and losses need not be disclosed, the provision is of little real value.

When the shareholder complains of the ignorance in which he is usually kept he is told that the strain of competition makes secrecy necessary. A pathetic picture is drawn of harassed directors, torn between conflicting loyalties, eager to give the shareholders full and frank information about every side of the company's activities, but aware that in so doing they would arm their competitors and so inflict serious injury on the company's business. As when fairy-tales are told to adults, the story may bring tears to the eyes, but it is not likely to bring conviction to the mind. In the old days of small private businesses secrecy was perhaps necessary and effective. But times have changed. To-day efficiency is the sole key to success, and secrecy, like the passport regulations, penalises only the people whom it claims to protect. Any accountant who has had experience of arranging mergers between competing firms will testify that even where the closest secrecy has been practised by a company, its rivals almost invariably have an intimate knowledge of its competitive position. Secrecy where technical processes are concerned is, of course, an entirely different matter which does not enter into a question of accounts.

Generally speaking, secrecy is not defensible on the score of commercial competition. The plea that it protects the shareholders against their own weaknesses is more plausible. The argument is that, since most trading companies are subject to regular cycles of prosperity and depression, they should make provision in their fat years for their sustenance during the lean ones. But if in the good years the full profits were disclosed, the shareholders would demand bigger dividends and it would not be possible to accumulate the necessary reserves. And if in the bad years the full losses were disclosed, the shareholders would take panic and the prestige of the company would be seriously injured. The argument rests on a somewhat pessimistic view of the intelligence of shareholders. But in so far as a policy of secrecy is used to build up reasonable hidden reserves it does no harm. It may sometimes be desirable to have a greater reserve of

strength than either the world or the shareholders suspect. A distinguished judge once said that shareholders could not complain if the financial position of their company was better than the accounts showed it to be. But this is only true when the hidden reserves are kept within reasonable limits. There is no justification for giving the shareholders a wholly inadequate conception of their assets. As Mr. Justice Wright remarked in his summing-up in the Kylsant case, ' there may be very great evils if . . . very large portions of a company's assets are left in the secret disposition of the managing authority.'

The justification for secrecy in the use of hidden reserves is much more questionable. There can, indeed, be no real objection to their being used to write down depreciated assets, for such an action does not weaken the company, while it helps to make a cleaner and franker balance-sheet. But whether it is ever legitimate to transfer hidden reserves to the credit of the profit and loss account without disclosing the fact to the shareholders is another question. Though it may be wise to smooth out the most violent fluctuations from the accounts, shareholders have a right to know the general trend of trading conditions. There is certainly no justification for the using of hidden reserves to pay a dividend, unless the shareholders are informed of what is being done. If a dividend is paid without comment the natural assumption is that the company is earning profits. The suggestion that this form of misrepresentation is made necessary by the hysterical propensities of shareholders has no validity in either theory or fact. English law has never condoned the assumption that the end justifies the means. Nor were there any signs of panic among the shareholders of Furness, Withy & Co. when the chairman recently took the unprecedented step of revealing the extent to which the dividend had been paid out of hidden reserves.

It may, perhaps, be complained that the picture has been painted in unnecessarily dark colours, but that would be to misunderstand its purpose, which is to call attention to the weaknesses of the present law. It is not suggested that the accounts of most companies are as unsatisfactory as it has been shown possible for them to be. During the last few years there has been a considerable improvement in the amount of information given to shareholders through the published accounts and the directors' report, and there are several important companies which now publish very full information about their activities. But the fact remains that the law, as it stands at present, admits of considerable suppression of vital information, and there are still many companies which take advantage of its weakness. Their motive in doing so is probably perfectly honourable, but the principle is bad and the practice can cover up very grave

abuses. It is therefore the clear duty of Parliament to tighten up the requirements of the law, and so make sure that the shareholder receives from the directors an adequate statement of his company's position.

The directions in which the present law is deficient have, it is hoped, been clearly indicated. It only remains to refer briefly to some of the specific reforms that are necessary.

The first, and perhaps the most important, is that every holding company should be required to publish, in addition to its own individual accounts, an audited balance-sheet and profit and loss account, incorporating the accounts of all its subsidiaries. Consolidated accounts of this kind are almost invariably published by holding companies in the United States. Without them the shareholder cannot obtain a view of the group as a whole, and without such a view he cannot exercise any intelligent supervision over his investment. He is in the position of a man who is given a report on the roof of his house but none at all on the state of its supporting walls. As the rationalisation of industry progresses, holding companies are becoming increasingly common, and it is essential that their shareholders should be assured of an adequate set of accounts.

Secondly, all companies should be required to show on their balance-sheets the amount of depreciation allowed on their fixed assets, and the sum expended on capital improvements during the course of the year. This would enable the shareholder to keep a much closer check on both the value of the fixed assets and on the earning power of his company. He would be able to see whether the rate of depreciation allowed compared favourably or not with that of similar companies, and he would know whether profits were being utilised either for extensive capital expenditure or for a drastic writing down of the existing fixed assets.

Thirdly, the directors should be required to state whether, and to what extent, any dividends, paid or proposed, are in excess of the trading profit for the year. It is, indeed, questionable whether the shareholder has not a right to know the actual trading results of his company. But it is possible that a disclosure of the full fluctuations of trade might sometimes be undesirable, and, perhaps, even misleading. Reasons have already been given for thinking that hidden reserves have a legitimate place in the financial structure of a company. If a company is sufficiently strong to pay a dividend in spite of its having sustained a loss on the year's trading, there is no reason why it should not do so. But there is equally no reason, nor, indeed, any justification, for not informing the shareholders that the proposed dividend is being paid out of reserves. It is a very serious weakness in the law that hidden reserves can at present

be used to lull the shareholders into a false sense of security and prosperity. It would, however, probably be desirable to exempt banks from the necessity of disclosing the extent to which their dividends had not been earned in the preceding year. Banks, after all, have a duty to the community as well as to their shareholders, and the interests of the former are not necessarily those of the latter. Confidence is the very life-blood of banking, and profits will always tend to fall short when the need for confidence is greatest. It would be unwise to compel the banks to publish any information which might, perhaps, give the impression that the financial structure of the country was unstable.

Lastly, the directors should be required to issue a half-yearly report on trading conditions to the shareholders. This is already the practice of a few companies, and therefore it cannot be said that it is unpractical. Directors frequently forget that they are the agents as well as the trustees of the shareholders, and that—to quote Mr. Justice Wright—'they owe them full information, subject to reasonable commercial necessity.' It is hard to see how an annual report, however comprehensive it may be, can discharge this duty adequately. 'A year,' as Gibbon wrote, 'is no contemptible portion of mortal existence,' and the fortunes of a company can undergo drastic changes in a much shorter space of time. So long as the shareholder only receives an account of his company's affairs once in a year, it can scarcely be said that he is in a position to exercise a reasonable control over his investment.

H. A. McCLURE SMITH.

ANNUS MIRABILIS. 1831

FARADAY. CLERK MAXWELL. BRITISH ASSOCIATION

THE three centenaries which will be celebrated this month bring back to our memory events which have greatly advanced the civilisation of the world.

The first centenary commemorates the discovery by Michael Faraday of the induction of electric currents. This led directly to the invention of the dynamo and the motor, which have enabled mankind to use natural forces as a servant. And as their applications are ever extending, it is probable that they will soon be doing the great bulk of the monotonous labour and drudgery of the world and will thus bring a higher standard of living to future generations.

The second is that of James Clerk Maxwell, whose mathematical theories of the propagation of electric waves through space, afterwards verified experimentally by Heinrich Hertz, led directly to the invention of radio communication, which has developed with such amazing rapidity that it is difficult to imagine what strides it may not make in the future. A few years ago it would have sounded incredible that intelligible speech could be transmitted round the earth.

The third is that of the foundation of the British Association for the advancement of science. On September 27, 1831, its first meeting was held at York under the presidency of Viscount Milton, its main object being to give a stronger impulse and a more systematic direction to scientific inquiry. It has promoted intercourse between scientists, not only here, but between those who live in different parts of the Empire and in foreign countries. For a hundred years it has held meetings in the towns of the United Kingdom and in the Dominions, and practically every great scientist in this country and many eminent men from abroad have taken part in them. Many laws of primary importance in theory were first clearly enunciated at the British Association, and these theories led to practical applications; for example, the Bessemer process of making steel was first explained at a meeting of the Association. Dryden commemorated 1666

as *annus mirabilis*—a year of wonders—because of the great fire of London and the war with the Dutch. With vastly greater justification can we regard 1831 as a year of wonders.

It is always difficult to judge the amount of credit to be given to a pioneer. He may have forged the first link in a long chain of discoveries leading up to a process of immense value, or he may have supplied a fairly obvious link, or he may have forged the whole chain himself. The man who made the first boiler for producing high pressure steam can claim part of the credit given to the inventor of the steam engine, and the inventor of the engine in his turn can claim some of the credit due to converting steam power into electric power by means of a dynamo. In this way we see that the chain is unending, and that every inventor is largely indebted to the intellectual and physical labours of others.

The discovery by Michael Faraday of the induction of electric currents is unique in that he left a diary recording in full every step of his investigations. We are able to sympathise with his many disappointments and to be glad when his steady perseverance, patience, and intuitive physical insight are at last rewarded by success. This first discovery was made on August 29, 1831. He wound two coils of wire, which were completely insulated from one another, on to the opposite sides of a soft iron ring, the first coil being connected with a battery through a switch, the second permanently connected with a galvanometer. On closing the switch the galvanometer made a small swing to one side and then came back to its zero position, and similarly when he opened the switch so as to break the current in the first coil the needle made an excursion to the other side and then came back to the zero. What had happened was that there had been a momentary rush of current round the galvanometer coil when the switch was closed and a momentary rush in the reverse direction when it was opened, this simple physical experiment demonstrating for the first time the induction of electric currents. Faraday made further tests varying the conditions of the experiment, and ultimately he clearly states the law governing the induction of the driving electric force in a circuit. This law is the principle on which all dynamos are designed and is the foundation of the great electrical engineering industry of to-day. No other physical experiment has been so directly applied for the benefit of industry, and indirectly, also, it has greatly affected the progress of civilisation: August 29, 1831, was an eventful day in the history of mankind.

Another discovery made by Faraday was benzene, a hydrocarbon which exists in the liquid produced by the compression of the illuminating gas obtained by distilling oils and fats. This benzene is of exceptional importance commercially, many compounds of great value being derived from it. Chemically it is one of the most interesting substances known. Benzol, which contains about 80 per cent. benzene, is a cheaper product suitable for motor-car engines, and, as dynamos and magnetos are very largely used to operate the sparking plugs in cars and aeroplanes, it will be seen that Faraday's discoveries are directly used in modern methods of transport.

Michael Faraday was the first to discover a link between magnetism and light. He saw that when a beam of light which is plane polarised (that is, when the vibration of the waves which form it all take place in parallel lines) is passed through a piece of heavy glass it is found that superposing a magnetic field on the beam rotates the direction of the lines of vibration. If we apply the magnetic field in the reverse direction, the lines of vibration are rotated in the other direction. Amongst the uses made of this discovery is the determination by a saccharimeter of the amount of sugar in a liquid; and it has also been used for making optical ammeters and voltmeters.

If we place two plates of copper in a solution of sulphate of copper and pass an electric current between the plates and through the solution, the mass of the plate by which the current leaves the solution continually increases. Faraday discovered that, no matter how large the plates were, the mass of copper deposited on the leaving plate was exactly proportional to the quantity of electricity that had passed. Copper obtained in this way is found to be almost chemically pure, and hence electrolytically refined copper is very generally used for the conductors which have to carry electric currents.

In 1833 Faraday suggested that the passage of current through an electrolyte is due to the movement of positively and negatively charged particles called 'ions.' When a current is passed through a solution of salt, for example, the positively charged particles move towards the leaving plate and the negatively charged to the positive plate. Faraday's researches in electrolysis led him to foreshadow faintly in his writings the atomic nature of electricity and the modern theory of electrons, a theory which has proved of such great value in both pure and applied science.

James Clerk Maxwell was born in Edinburgh on June 13, 1831, and when only fifteen years of age contributed a mathematical paper to the Royal Society of Edinburgh. At Cambridge he attended Stokes' lectures and laid the foundation of those mathematical principles which he applied so successfully to the interpretation of Faraday's 'curved lines of force.' One of his most important papers, which deals with the dynamical theory of the electromagnetic field, was published in the *Transactions*

of the Royal Society in 1864. He makes the assumption that all the actions and reactions of electrified bodies, electromagnetic attractions and repulsions, and the induction of electric currents, are produced by actions in a medium surrounding the excited bodies due to electric and magnetic forces. In particular he studies the case of a magnetic disturbance being propagated through this medium, and proves that the disturbances must consist of vibrations perpendicular to the direction of propagation, and that the velocity of the propagation must equal the ratio of the electromagnetic to the electrostatic unit charge of electricity. He says :

> This velocity is so nearly equal to that of light that it seems we have strong reason to conclude that light itself—including radiant heat and other radiations, if any—is an electromagnetic disturbance in the form of waves propagated through the electromagnetic field according to electromagnetic laws. . . .

Twenty-four years afterwards Heinrich Hertz proved experimentally that these electromagnetic waves travelled with the velocity of light.

Maxwell perfected his theory in his *Electricity and Magnetism*, one of the most wonderful books ever written. His death at the early age of forty-eight was a severe loss to science and a great blow to his many friends. He is rightly considered by radio engineers as one of the great pioneers of the technique of communication, although personally he could have had but the vaguest ideas of the enormous developments which would be based on his theories in the future. We see from the lives of both Maxwell and Faraday—and, indeed, from many others—that discoveries which have enormously advanced the progress of civilisation usually spring from the search after knowledge for its own sake, and not from the lower idea of utilitarian value. Not that we should despise this value—very far from it—but we should give greater honour to those searchers after wisdom pure and simple.

Now let us glance at some of the differences between the life and ideas of a hundred years ago and the present day. In 1831 crowds would collect to gape at a steamboat or a steam locomotive ; on moonless nights men had to grope their way along narrow streets by the help of swinging lanterns and smoking torches, and there are still a few conical iron torch extinguishers to be seen in London in front of certain big Georgian mansions. It is true that William Murdoch had been awarded the Rumford medal by the Royal Society in 1808 for his discovery of gas lighting, but for many years afterwards its progress for domestic use was very slow. Westminster Bridge, which was the first bridge to be lighted by gas, was lighted by oil lamps as late as

1812. Travelling was then difficult and expensive, and in many places the roads were so bad that the stage coaches could go but slowly. Foreign travel was impossible except for the rich, and it took twenty-five days to get to Sicily. These were the days of the shilling post and the semaphore telegraph, and foreign news trickled through very tardily. The semaphore line connecting the Admiralty with Portsmouth was out of action one day out of every three owing to poor visibility, and the news was affected by the mistakes of the numerous operators and sometimes was falsified. And this was not always done for 'propaganda' purposes. It was not until 1837 that Cooke and Wheatstone published an account of a practical electric telegraph system. As late as 1840 the clocks in both Houses of Parliament, at the Horse Guards and at St. James's, were regulated by the carriage of a chronometer from the Queen's private observatory at Kew. The inns often took their time from the watches of the drivers of the stage coaches, and when railways were first introduced there was great confusion caused by the difference between railway time (Greenwich) and local. A little over fifty years ago mid-European time, one hour in front of Greenwich, was introduced into Germany, Italy, and other countries.

Before the British Association held its first meeting in 1831 there had been mechanics' institutes and other small lecture societies, but most of the knowledge of science was isolated in the universities, and ordinary people seemed to prefer authority to reason, being afraid, perhaps, to trust to the latter for fear of being led into unorthodox channels. At Cambridge teachers were still slavishly devoted to geometry and the fluxional notation of Newton, and regarded imaginary quantities with suspicion. They were puzzled as to what interpretation to give to the logarithm of a negative number. Everyone, however, was strongly interested in astronomy. She was the Queen of Science. Sir John Herschell, the great astronomer, was one of the earliest members of the British Association, and his admirable text-book on *Astronomy* was published in 1831. In the introduction he gives good advice as to the attitude of mind to be adopted when entering any scientific pursuit. He says that the student should loosen his hold on crude and hastily adopted notions about the science he wishes to study ; he must strengthen himself to adopt any conclusions to which he is led by careful observation and logical argument. 'Such an effort is, in fact, a commencement of that intellectual discipline which forms one of the most important ends of all science. . . . It is the " euphrasy and rue " with which we must " purge our sight " before we can receive and contemplate as they are the lineaments of truth and nature.'

It would take far too long to recount all the good work done

by the British Association ; as a record of voluntary service in the interests of science it stands unrivalled. During its existence it has expended about 100,000*l.* on grants for research. It took a leading part in acquiring Kew Observatory for the nation, and it actually participated in the movement for the establishment of the National Physical Laboratory, whose work has been of such great value to industry.

Let us now consider some of the results of the scientific discoveries and their engineering developments which have taken place during the last hundred years. It has happened occasionally that from mistaken humanitarian or financial reasons our Parliament has initiated legislation which seriously hampered the progress of certain branches of industry. For example, the 'red flag' law passed in 1831 required that a man should precede every horseless carriage carrying a flag by day and a lantern by night and walking at the rate of not more than 2½ miles an hour. This law and the heavy charges that had to be paid on the toll roads and bridges practically prevented the commercial development of this kind of vehicle in England. In Germany Daimler invented a high-speed internal combustion engine in 1885, and from that time the motor car industry began to develop. But it was not until 1896 that the restrictive law was repealed in this country and great and rapid development of the motor industry ensued. Since 1912 its growth has proceeded simultaneously with the making of good roads, the development of alloy steels, and the improvements in rubber. Motoring for recreation is popular all over the world, and in America there are thousands of lodges which accommodate tourists at 50 cents a night. About 20,000,000 motorists visit the national forests of the United States every year ; and the number of trippers by other means is only one-tenth as many.

The use of aeroplanes for rapid travelling is increasing, and air beacons are to be seen in many places to assist the pilots, much as lighthouses assist the sailors. The beams may be of 100,000 candle-power and indicate either by flashing or by their colour the route to the pilot. Aerial travel is one of the most spectacular features of the present age, though it is still not without its special dangers. But the possibilities of aviation in war are now so terrible that the evil which could be done easily in half an hour would more than counterbalance all the good that civil flying has done in a generation. We must hope that as, through radio communication and broadcasting and silent pictures, nations are kept in closer touch with one another so that the world is gradually becoming a commonwealth of nations, so it will have sufficient common sense—to say nothing of right and decent feelings—to make such prostitution of science impossible. And what advantage would it be to anyone to poison off the entire population—men, women and children—of any capital city ? It would seem an impossible crime.

In 1895 an event of great importance to the human race was the discovery of X-rays by W. C. Röntgen. These rays are of the greatest value in the diagnosis of disease, and the world owes a very heavy debt to their discoverer. The full secret of the nature of X-rays is still unknown, but when the key to the overshadowing problem of the mechanism of radiation in general is found their nature will doubtless be revealed and new developments are certain to follow.

International telephony made a most wonderful advance last year. At the beginning of 1929 radio telephony provided daily telephone service to twenty-six countries only, but in 1930 the total of international connections wholly or partly effected was increased to 177. The most important groups of connexions can be divided into three classes : the first connects the United States, Canada, Cuba and Mexico on one side with the Argentine, Chile and Uruguay on the other ; the second involves three new channels between Europe and South America which operate from Paris, Berlin and London to Buenos Aires. Land lines bring a total of twenty other countries into these circuits. The third group involves the London–Sydney circuit, a distance of 9192 miles. These connect most of the telephone users of the United States, Canada, Mexico, Great Britain, Hungary and Italy with Australia. Many more lines are being constructed, including one to connect the United States and Australia direct. A conversation was recently held from an aeroplane flying over the city of Buenos Aires, with points on the United States, with the steamship *Majestic* on the high seas and with Sydney, Australia, a distance of 14,000 miles ; and another was transmitted round the world from Schenectady and then broadcast—truly most wonderful performances. It will probably soon be possible to hold conversations between any two houses which are connected with local telephone exchanges, although they may be on opposite sides of the world. Last year the broadcasting of speeches across the Atlantic was a novelty—this year it has been quite a common occurrence ; and services for the sending of pictures and facsimiles of documents are given to the public in Great Britain, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Denmark, Canada and the United States. Some of the pictures transmitted are quite good reproductions.

In what way will the mechanisation which science has brought about during the last century affect the future of civilisation ? In the past history of mankind we have seen that mighty empires have risen to a high state of civilisation, with philosophy, music, painting and sculpture, law and science flourishing exceedingly,

and yet, in spite of all this, these empires have declined or disintegrated. One of the causes of their fall may have been the existence of slavery; another was certainly the low standard of living of the poor. Before civilisation can become a certainty the rights of the individual must be recognised and his immediate necessities must be satisfied. Moral and mental faculties cannot grow when the individual has to toil unceasingly without either relaxation or time to increase his knowledge. Now we can truly say that the development of applied science is relieving countless thousands from the necessity of excessive and monotonous manual labour and drudgery. By turning a switch an electric fire glows and gives pleasant heat; turn it again and the fire is extinguished. There is no dirt, no heavy fuel carrying, no removing of ashes, no cleaning up. And new automatic electrical servants, almost the equivalent of Karel Capek's 'Robots,' are continually being invented. Cooking no longer needs constant attention; a push-button, a temperature regulator and a thermometric alarum do a great part of the work. Lifts, vacuum cleaners, blowers and fans lighten household work and relieve us from much drudgery. All this we owe to science. And when we motor on a Sunday afternoon through east or south London and see the numerous aerials which are so common and which bring to the poor the blessing and pleasure of good music, a pleasure formerly only for the well-to-do, we thank science again. Or when we see the crowded queues outside the picture palaces, waiting so patiently often in bad weather for the anticipated treat inside, a treat which gives them warmth and comfort, and occasionally even information and instruction, we thank God for the broadcast and the pictures and the applied science which has made them possible. Life is easier and better now for the masses than it was ninety years ago in the hungry 'forties, and it seems reasonable to hope that we shall continue to progress and that the next centenary will show much more universal comfort and happiness. And as we try to end every kind of slavery and to give our less fortunate brothers a better chance in life, so may we trust to escape that decline and fall which slowly overwhelmed great nations in the past. May we do as we would be done by.

ALEXANDER RUSSELL.

ANOTHER UNPUBLISHED 'IMAGINARY CONVERSATION' BY WALTER SAVAGE LANDOR[1]

EMMA AND HER PARENTS

WHEN on July 15, 1858, Walter Savage Landor (then in his eighty-fourth year) left England for the last time, he went, after having crossed to France, directly to Genoa, where it was his intention to settle. Landor had left England hurriedly in order to avoid the consequences of an action for libel in which the damages against him were certain to be heavy. Whilst in Genoa Landor was unhappily persuaded by his loyal but misguided advisers in England to sign a deed of conveyance by which the whole of his property in England was made over to his eldest son, Arnold Landor. The object of this deed was to render the seizure of the property, that was legally no longer Landor's, impossible. Shortly afterwards damages to the extent of £1000 were awarded against Landor, and by an injunction granted by the Court of Chancery the deed of conveyance was practically defeated. Thus, without in any way fulfilling its purpose, the deed only served to make Landor less independent of his son and family, so that when he was invited to return once more to live with his family at Fiesole (from which he had parted some twenty-three years earlier) he accepted the proposal not too unwillingly. Unfortunately, it was not long before the troubles that had caused the original break with his family forced Landor once more to quit the family villa. On three occasions during the ten months of his stay at Fiesole he had departed for Florence, but on each occasion had been persuaded to return. Now, on July 2, 1859, following upon a more than usually violent quarrel with his wife, he was turned out of the villa by his wife and children. With nothing but the clothes he stood in and fifteen pauls in his pocket, the old man wandered down to Florence, where, walking aimlessly about the streets, he was encountered by Robert Browning in the vicinity of the Casa Guidi, on the left bank of the Arno. Browning, to whom Landor explained what had happened, realising how

[1] Three Unpublished "Imaginary Conversations" by Walter Savage Landor,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, June 1930.

matters stood, at once took charge of Landor and his affairs. He wrote without delay to John Forster, later Landor's biographer, informing him of the situation, and meanwhile saw to it that 'the old lion' should be made comfortable in a small hotel facing the Arno. During his stay here Landor wrote to his wife asking that his personal belongings and money should be sent on to him. His letters remained unanswered. Meanwhile he had also written the following letter to an old Bath friend then living at Siena:

DEAR MR. STORY,[2]—My friends the Brownings tell me that you are resident in Siena. This is a great inducement for me to take a house for a year in that city. My family are in the possession of the most charming villa and grounds within two miles of Florence, which I very imprudently gave entirely up to them, with a large income reserving for myself extremely little, so I am constrained to be economical. . . .

Landor confided his intention of going to live in Siena to Browning, whose hearty approbation it at once received. Browning immediately wrote to Story, who replied that he would be delighted to have Landor as his guest until some other accommodation could be secured for him. Soon after the receipt of this letter Browning set off together with Landor for the Villa Belvedere Marciana, the summer house at Siena of the Storys.

Browning [writes Story] brought him to me at Siena, and a more pitiable sight I never saw. It was the case of old Lear over again, and when he descended from his carriage, with his sparse white hair streaming out, and tottered into my house, dazed in intellect with all he had suffered, I felt as if he were really Lear come back again.[3]

Landor stayed with the Storys for little more than three weeks.

During the time he was with us [writes Mrs. Story] his courtesy and high breeding never failed him; he was touchingly pleased and happy with our life, and so delightful and amusing that we ourselves grieved when it came to an end.[4]

It was during this happy stay at the Villa Belvedere, or soon after, that Landor must have written the Imaginary Conversation which is now for the first time published here. The Emma of this conversation is Edith Story, the little daughter of the house, who afterwards became the Marchesa Peruzzi Di Medici. Of her recollections of Landor she writes:

Mr. Landor remained a guest at the villa for over a month. In the peaceful family life there he gained in strength and vigour, and his great extravagant mind recovered its youthful elasticity. No more agreeable guest could there have been found; not a word escaped him that would have revealed a violent temper. A very early riser, Mr. Landor devoted many hours to writing in his room Latin and English verse, and an occasional 'imaginary conversation.' These he would read to us, and with the utmost courtesy and a grand old-fashioned bow present the MS. to me the young daughter of the house, as he continued often to do in after years. He gave me my first lessons in Latin every morning, and after the lesson would repeat to me long passages from his favourite poets. . . . Nothing could exceed Mr. Landor's kindness to children; his generous impulses were never to let us go away empty-handed.[5]

[2] This was William Wetmore Story, the famous American sculptor, who died in Rome in 1895, whose *Conversations in a Studio* (Boston, 1890) is by many preferred to his sculpture.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 437.

[4] *William Wetmore Story and his Friends*, by Henry James (Boston, 1903), vol. ii., p. 16.

The Conversation is accompanied by an envelope in Landor's hand addressed to 'G. H. Holyoake Esq/Stella House/Newcastle on Tyne/England.' It bears a twenty and a forty centesimi stamp, the Siena postmark for July 1860, and the London postmark for August of the same year.

The Conversation, which occupies two sides of a quarto sheet, is closely written in the small, but unusually legible, Landor hand. From the fewness of the corrections and the legibility of the writing, it may be assumed that this manuscript represents the second draft, or, more probably, a copy made for a friend of an earlier one.

As it stands this Conversation may serve as Landor's own fitting memorial to his love for children.

For permission to publish this Conversation I have to thank Mr. James F. Drake, of New York City, in whose possession it now temporarily rests.

AN IMAGINARY CONVERSATION

Emma and her Parents

MAMA. Emma! Emma! you know very well you have been telling me a little fib.

EMMA. It was only a very little one, mama. I thought papa would have whipt Edwin for throwing a stone and breaking the window; and I knew he would not whip me; so I said I did it.

MAMA. Dear child the motive was good, but the story was wicked.

EMMA. Mama! what are *motives?*

MAMA. We will talk about them another time.

EMMA. I am curious. I once heard the word before. You seem puzzled. You told me, when I wanted to know anything, to ask you.

MAMA. At present I must remind you of what you surely have forgotten.

[5] 'Walter Savage Landor,' by the Marchesa Peruzzi Di Medici, the *Cornhill Magazine*, N.S., vol. xxxviii., 1915, pp. 489–498.

EMMA. I can repeat every word in the last page of my spelling-book.

MAMA. Yet you do not recollect so well what is infinitely more important. You have been taught that our God writes down in his book every falsehood, every idle word.

EMMA. What a vastly big copybook God must have! When did he begin ? [6]

MAMA. At the beginning of the world.

EMMA. O my! Cain told him a sad wicked fib (*two* I think) about his brother Abel, when he had shed his blood ; I do believe he had killed him outright. The papa and mama had not been a bad example, as far as fibbing. But there had been the Tempter at the ear of Eve, showing her such an apple! such an apple! And it must have been at the hottest season of the year, and when apples are ripe and juicy and better than lemonade.

MAMA. Child! Child! you are running on strangely. Nothing excuses falsehood. They were driven out of Paradise for it.

EMMA. Poor creatures! what became of them in winter ?

MAMA. We must none of us question what none of us can answer. We may be confident that the merciful Creator provided proper raiment.

EMMA. There are no figleaves in winter. There had been no sheepshearing ; and where was flannel ?

MAMA. I am quite ashamed you should talk so idly. Keep to the truth and think of that, without rambling a step from the subject of our conversation.

EMMA. Well then, dear mama, we can not do better than look into the Bible. Beside Adam and Eve and Cain, others, even saints . . .

MAMA. Chatterbox! hold your tongue.

EMMA. So I will : but you would be sorry if you thought I had forgotten the Scriptures, and all about Saint Peter and the Cock.

MAMA. Saint Peter repented after denying his Master.

EMMA. I never denied mine ; only once, when he would have kissed me for being a good girl, and writing without a blot in several pages, and making a flourish so exactly like his at the tail

[6] ' *You tell me fibs,*' a mother said,
' Ashamed you must be and afraid,
When you are told that every word
Untrue is written by your Lord.'
' My ! ' cried the child, ' I never thought
What a big book he must have bought.'

These lines are from a Landor manuscript now in the possession of Madame Elfrida Mangioni-Landor, of Florence ; another version of them was published in the *Heroic Idyls* (London : 1863, pp. 165 and 217).

of the letter *g*.[7] And then he told me he ought only to have patted me on the head, being now seven years old, too old for anybody to kiss me. I was ready to cry, for I thought of you and papa. As for Edwin, he fancies himself too much of a man for any such a thing now he is in breeches.

MAMA. Your writing-master is a judicious and worthy man.

EMMA. He thinks I am nearly of an age to learn drawing, and says he is sorry he has no cleverness in it. How modest ! only look at his flourishes in the beginning and end of every book ! Can any painter alive draw better ? And now, mama, tell me what are *motives*.

MAMA. Hark, Emma ! listen ! there are horses at the hall-door. Papa has returned from his ride.

EMMA. Yes, yes ; there stand old Gypsey and Black Jack : and now Simon is turning their heads towards the stable.

Ha ! here he comes. Just in time, papa, to tell me all about it.

PAPA. What has happened ?

EMMA. The motive ! the motive !

PAPA. Madcap ! motive of what ?

EMMA. Never mind what.

MAMA. She wishes to know the meaning of the word.

EMMA. When you were reading *The Times* on Wednesday, you laid the paper flat and stroked it along the table and said ' For the life of me I am utterly unable to guess at the man's *motive*. Lying runs in the blood. But why say at one moment in the face of the world, "*I am resolved on peace,*" and, at the next, sacrifice thirty thousand of his own men, and almost as many of his ally's, tying up hands and feet of those he pretended to deliver, and threatening them with something worse if they attempted to stir an inch beyond the ground he marked with his heel. They expressed a simple wish to remove the gag from the mouth of their next neighbour. *I am your next neighbour*, said he, *and you shall have no other*.'

PAPA. What a memory is thine, my Emma !

EMMA. Perhaps I might have remembered the greater part of all this, without running upstairs for my slate, of which it covered both sides, with the addition of your remarks. And now I begin to catch the meaning of them. ' What could be any rich man's *motive*,' said you, ' to rob a poor peasant of his bread and

[7] In a letter addressed to Edith Story Landor writes : ' . . . Now for a little *tiff*. Have you any such word in America ? No matter—at the end of your letter you add a *flourish* to the name of Story. It needs none ; it is flourishing enough already. Tho' you would not let me be your Latin master you see I take upon myself to be your writing master. You will laugh at this and say I am giving now a very indifferent specimen of my fitness for the office.' ' Walter Savage Landor,' by the Marchesa Peruzzi Di Medici, *loc. cit.*

cheese, barely a mouthful. There are more to flatter the spoiler than to help or to pity the despoiled.'

I am afraid, papa, you must have been very angry, for you spoke a very wicked word, which I hope God will not write in his book; I dared not on my slate. The angels will blush when they look over his shoulder, and see the account of so much wickedness. I know he has forgiven you, for I said my prayers twice on Wednesday night, and slept soundly.

. . . . . .

M. F. ASHLEY-MONTAGU.

THE PROBLEMS OF FRENCH POST-WAR LITERATURE

PERHAPS it will be thought arbitrary to consider, within the evolution of contemporary French literature, a period so sharply divided from the rest as my title implies, and it seems fitting first of all to justify this formula by showing to what extent the war closed one epoch of literary history and opened another. That, both in the preoccupations it evinces and in the modes of expression it uses, post-war literature has diverged most violently from pre-war standards is a fact which no candid observer of the times will deny; indeed, it must be admitted even by those whom this far-reaching change has affected most deeply and intimately. Of this transformation there is an obvious proof. Among all the noted writers of pre-war times not one has survived the turmoil of the war without experiencing a serious diminution of his reputation. Not one among the pre-war stars can be said really to have exercised an influence upon his juniors. Those whom the young began to regard as masters after 1918 were men of no great name before 1914: the group round André Gide was then composed of only a limited number of faithful disciples; Paul Valéry was only too pleased to live in retirement, a retirement from which, in fact, the richest fruits were destined to come; and when Marcel Proust, after many disappointments, published the first of his large number of volumes, it was to meet with nothing but sarcasm and scorn from the so-called *literati*.

Meanwhile, Anatole France, Maurice Barrès, and Paul Bourget reigned supreme. Their literary activities had reached a formalism perfectly attuned to a society more interested in expression than in reality. The day of peace proved fatal to those three writers who were abandoned by the younger generation. Anatole France, whose scepticism, clothed in a delicate style, was so entertaining to the men of 1913, has been cried down by a horde of wolf-cubs, who accused him of supplying nothing but unsubstantial food. The respect due to a great writer is still paid to Paul Bourget, but with him it is as with a master whom boys have been taught to respect at school: the problems for which he has offered solutions are no longer of any interest to the young, either

because they have solved them in their own artless manner, or because their scope is decidedly beyond their reach. Finally, even if Maurice Barrès did to a certain extent still exercise an influence after 1918 (for example, upon Henry de Montherlant), it was through his earliest books: *Le Culte du Moi* and *Un Homme Libre*, the authorship of which the contributor to the *Echo de Paris* had more or less disowned.

It should be noted that within the period immediately prior to the war a few personalities had already asserted in an emphatic manner their determination to drift away from the ways followed by their elders. Some of them in the field of psychology, others in that of expression, had called into existence a movement the importance of which became apparent for the most part after the war. Psichari (grandson of the sceptical Renan) in *L'Appel des Armes* and *Le Voyage du Centurion* and Péguy, a pupil of the undenominational school and a former 'Dreyfusard,' adhered to certain moral and religious preoccupations, of which the appeal to writers was but weak at the time. In a totally different field Guillaume Apollinaire, the poet of *Les Calligrammes*, was openly breaking away from the refined form then held in admiration. That these precursors should have sanctioned by their death the revival they had anticipated is certainly significant. Their lesson was not to be lost. Those preoccupations which in 1914 attracted none but a group of subtle, delicately sensitive minds were now to become general. The influence of the war tells heavily upon the present fate of French literature.[1]

The years which immediately followed the war might be called in France 'a time of turmoil and confusion.' A marked instability made itself felt in all departments owing to the deep moral and social troubles for which the war was responsible, the unanimous longing of the people to start life upon new lines, and a distinct and all but universal feeling that such a gigantic phenomenon was bound to open a new era in civilisation. To these influences should be added the natural play of instincts, which had been suppressed through the length of four years. It was in this atmosphere of uncertainty that the literature of the years 1918–1922 or thereabouts came into existence; it bears the mark of its day. It was the time when youth would only feel at ease with the extreme parties, either the Communists or the Action Française. It is therefore not surprising that a time stamped with such numerous contradictions should have welcomed with equal favour

[1] I do not think it necessary, in the course of the present study, to make a distinction between the various literary *genres*. Leaving apart the theatre, which, owing to its technique, calls forth (not in France alone) somewhat special problems, all the *genres* have contributed their share to the common task, which is the expression of the spirit of the period.

the strictly regular poems of M. Paul Valéry and the staccato experiments of the dadaïsts. But these contradictions, however apt they may be to render the task of the literary historian difficult, will provide, if rightly understood, a definition of a state of mind of which the manifestations described are but varied expressions. This state of mind the present writer has described elsewhere under the name of 'unrest.'

It is extremely interesting to realise that it was during the period under consideration that a writer particularly representative of this state of mind—namely, M. André Gide—attained an enduring reputation. Gide's pre-eminent intellect shows itself under the most varied forms, and his name will be mentioned repeatedly in the course of the present study. He may be called a typical writer of the present unrest, provided that it be understood that the word has in his case a special sense. André Gide shows unrest no doubt, but not in the way of Hamlet or of René; there is not much of a romantic note, or even of a Pascal-like metaphysical anxiety, about him. His unrest is that of a moralist, who is at the same time an æsthetician, a moralist with whom 'ethics are dependent on æsthetics.' It would be wrong to consider him as troubled; unrest is with him the state of an unsatisfied mind, or better still of a mind unwilling to be satisfied. Any goal he reaches at once loses its interest in his eyes. Gide's process is to see beyond things. He gave the first manifestations of this unsatisfied attitude in the field of sensations (*Les Nourritures Terrestres*): a thirst for realising one's nature to the full, a patient struggle against all the limitations that social conventions impose upon the individual (see *L'Immoraliste*), a tendency towards making all the possibilities of one's being effective, and a concomitant resolution never to be satisfied with anything, such are the fundamental elements of Gide's creative activity. But as, on the other hand, he knows very well how to keep a balance in his writings between method and anarchy, between regularity and disorder, he has grouped around him—often through a misunderstanding—the most different and the most contradictory sympathies. In the field of artistic creation, too, André Gide's complex personality has induced him to adopt the most varied forms: such poems as *Les Nourritures Terrestres*, such tales as *La Porte étroite* and *La Symphonie pastorale*, such accounts of travel as *Le Voyage au Tchad*, such a novel as *Les faux Monnayeurs* are all successful works. This versatility and his moral attitude have made Gide the most representative man of the years after 1918.[2]

[2] It is understood here that we have now reached a stage beyond those years, and to a certain extent beyond that of Gide's works too. But parts of those works are still very far from having exhausted their influence: the novel

This unrest of the times, to which Gide has given such a measured expression because he has known how to master it—being, in fact, by virtue of his age, on the top of the wave and not in the bubbling mass—has shown its existence in several other ways. That which caused the greatest sensation is the one that culminated in the creation of the *Dada* movement. People have pretended to consider that 'literary school,' if such a name may be used, as the mere practical joking of young men itching for notoriety. The judgment is curt enough. The movement which, using the meaningless syllables of a stammerer as a protest against literature, had taken *Dada* for its emblem is the final and hysterical stage reached by those who, as pointed out above, shrank from form altogether. *Dada* traces its origin to a small number of influences: it is the fruit of Guillaume Apollinaire's literary cubism (though a few genuine cubists such as Jean Cocteau, the author of *Les Mariés de la Tour Eiffel*, kept aloof from the movement) and principally of Rimbaud's and Lautréamont's poetry. Created in Zurich in 1917 by three foreigners, Tzara, Arp and Huelzenbeck, *Dada* was favoured with a brilliant success in France, when young men whose intellect and sensitiveness had been put on the rack by the war adopted the somewhat artless conceptions of the movement. These consisted in an absolute denial of any convention, whether literary, æsthetic, social—or even grammatical, logical, and alphabetical—on the ground that, poetry in its pure state being something utterly unspeakable, any means of expression must be a lie. Had they been consistent the dadaïsts should have kept silent (one of them did, and committed suicide); but the majority of them—for example, MM. André Breton, Louis Aragon, Tristan Tzara, Philippe Soupault, and Paul Eluard[3]—adopted a compromise and wrote literary works, in fact interesting literary works. To put it briefly, the dadaïsts had made a curious effort to introduce their unrest into the pale of literature while refusing, in their early days at least, to make that unrest an object of literature. Others came, however, more partial to expression who, in contrast to their predecessors, insisted on contributing their evidence on the state of mind of the years in which they were living. Thus arose a whole group of writers who, about the years 1923–26, with a candour often not devoid of a touch of despair, chose to give vent to the distress under which all young people were labouring at the close of the war. That state of mind has been compared with that of the romantics (with that of Musset in

Les faux Monnayeurs in particular seems to point to a new track which the French novel may choose to follow in the future.

[3] In course of time, instead of denying all reality, they were content with aiming at a higher reality; hence the school of the super-realists.

La Confession d'un Enfant du Siècle in particular), and one of the young writers of the group has spoken in this connexion of a new *mal du siècle*. The works that gave expression at the time to this state of mind are generally short and of a somewhat ill-defined character, as may be seen in M. Driou La Rochelle's *La Valise Vide*, in M. Marcel Arland's essays, or again in a variety of productions grouped into one collection, *Les Cahiers du Mois*, especially the number called *Examen de Conscience*. The whole of it amounts to very little; apparently, these young writers had been too much absorbed by the feelings they wanted to describe. It is only within the last year or two that, thanks to ripening age, they have been able to give, otherwise than under a didactic form, an expression to the preoccupations of those days.[4]

The overwhelming wave of unrest just described was the first and direct consequence of the war upon French literature. There is another, less direct than the first, which, though less visible, is none the less important. Literature is not born spontaneously out of a writer's head like Athena out of the brain of Zeus; it is the product of the society in which the artist lives. A poet may well, to a certain extent, keep aloof from contingencies—as is proved at least by the poems of a Valéry or a Léon-Paul Fargue; but the novelist, the essayist, and the dramatist need the support of society to be masters of their subject-matter. Now it is obvious that the war has simply turned French society topsy-turvy: the pre-war environment has been destroyed and environment adapted to the present times has not yet been born. Let us examine the consequence of this on the contemporary French novel. The novelist is pre-eminently the man who stands in need of society, either to describe it (Balzac) or to revolt against it (Zola). We have no novelist engaged in describing society, with the exception of M. René Behaine, whose productions, greatly to be esteemed as they are, have not reached the larger public—an exception that only proves the rule; and it is very significant to notice how indifferent in character the French novel has been until the last two or three years.[5] But now a new and far-

[4] Thus M. Marcel Arland, who about 1926 published such essays as *La Route obscure*, brought out last year a novel, *L'Ordre*, the hero of which is a type of unrest. The same applies to the present writer's essays, *Notre inquiétude* (1926), and novel, *L'Ame obscure* (1929). The latter has just been translated into English by Mr. Ralph H. Mottram under the title of *The Misled Mirror*, by Daniel Rops (Martin Secker).

[5] Other exceptions may be mentioned—for instance, M. Roger Martin du Gard and M. Edouard Estaunié. The case of M. Mauriac is to be kept apart, as his books can only be called novels on account of the extension the term has taken. The number of the exceptions at all events is poor when compared to the admirable galaxy of contemporary English novelists—Maurice Baring, Rosamond Lehmann, Clemence Dane, Mary Webb, Katherine Mansfield, etc., to limit ourselves to the youngest. Aldous Huxley, in *Point Counter-Point* seems

reaching consequence appears. Granting the novelist's subject-matter proceeds from the reaction on an active mind of a certain type of society, should society prove deficient, the psychological, fundamental interest of the writer will necessarily be transferred elsewhere. It is another field, the analysis of personality, that will supply him with literary matter.

The literature of the nineteenth century was marked by an advance in the observation of mankind in two respects, as is shown on the one hand by the success of the naturalist school, and on the other by that of the psychological school. The first made it its object to rescue the description of man from the stereotyped conventions in which romanticism had perished and to represent him as he can be observed from outside. A pseudo-scientific conception of literature had induced the naturalists to pursue the study of the social conditions of the various classes, and thus, under pretence of a search for truth, to consider all problems only from their most pragmatic angle (Zola). With equally great, indeed with somewhat similar, pretensions the psychological school endeavoured to show the mechanism of ethics of thought of action and to submit the work of the human mind to a narrow determinism (M. Paul Bourget). At the close of the war—the movement had begun a little before 1914, but it was only later that it reached its full development—both the naturalist and the psychological objectives were left behind. We have pointed out above the influences which had made a liking for social descriptions merely a passing fashion [6]; as to the psychological theses, they have been battered by a number of new systems as well as by assaults launched in an ironical vein—for example, the theory of gratuitous acts devised by André Gide.

It may be said that only two writers have kept true to the naturalist and psychological aims. One of them, M. R. Martin du Gard, traces his origin as much to Balzac and Tolstoi as to the naturalists; while the other, M. Duhamel, a product of naturalism, enjoys the benefit of a critical mind scientifically trained. Both, it should be added, endeavour not only to avoid the pitfalls of the system, but also to annex to their art all that is best in post-war doctrines. Once they had left behind the goal

to us the one of them all who has best described English society in its new post-war aspects. The example of Aldous Huxley is all the more significant, as, describing a society in the grip of forces that strive to tear it to pieces, his novel departs from the traditional formula of the English novel and strikes the same path as the newest among contemporary French novels, *Les faux Monnayeurs*.

[6] Only one naturalist's fame has undergone no eclipse—namely, that of Huysmans, to which recent years have brought nothing but gain. The liking referred to remained foreign to him throughout his life; he himself used to define his tendency as a psychological naturalism.

pursued by previous writers, the newcomers applied their minds to the finding of another. It may be said that the drama of contemporary French literature consists in its quest of an object. Unable to find it in the relations between the individual and society, religion, ethics, and the family (four buttresses which have proved very much the worse for the war), it looks for it in the only place where it can still exist—namely, inside the human mind—in an analysis of personality. The whole literature of the last few years might bear the title used by one of its best qualified representatives, M. H. R. Lenormand, *L'Homme et ses Fantômes*. The essential object of literature has turned out to be the conflict between what is and what seems to be, or the conflict within one being of opposite assumptions.[7]

Marcel Proust was the first to point in that direction. His gigantic series *À la Recherche du Temps perdu*, only the first volume of which, *Du Côté de chez Swann*, had been obscurely published before the war, has contributed an entirely new element to the French literary movement of the present day. It is not enough to say that Proust has made use of the unconscious or that, adapting Bergsonism to the novel, he has introduced the notion of time into the novelist's storehouse. It is not through these means that the influence of Proust on the evolution of French literature has been decisive; it is due much more to that process of minute analysis which is his own, to which composition, as formerly understood, is but indifferent as matter (whence it should by no means be inferred that there is no such thing as a Proustian composition). Proust's method may be compared to those slow-moving pictures with which the cinematograph has made us familiar. His analyses remind one of the slow-moving process by their undeniable interest, but also by their unreality. Resting as he does upon the admission that our present being is largely dependent upon our being in the past, which, though no longer coincident with it, suddenly reappears within it, Proust destroys that conception of the consistent individual which Cartesianism had enforced upon us for three centuries. His influence, moreover, has made itself felt far more as a method of analysis than as a process: only M. J. Sindral and M. Martin Chauffier (with the possible addition of M. Jules Romains in *Lucienne*) can be quoted as being directly dependent on him.[8]

It is more difficult to localise the action of Freudism in time

[7] A singular extension of the novel is noticeable at the same time. The term 'novel,' used without precision and without measure, has come to cover the most heterogeneous goods with one and the same flag. The true meaning of the word (as understood by Balzac or Zola) is all but lost sight of.

[8] A process similar to that of Proust, *The Inward Monologue*, is recommended by some under the influence of James Joyce's *Ulysses*, but, though the success of *Ulysses* in France has been great, his influence is extremely limited.

and space. It is only in post-war days that Freud's system appeared in France. Loudly praised at first and then violently opposed, it has exercised a rather insidious influence on our literature. A few authors, no doubt, have emphatically declared what they owed to Freud—for example, M. H. R. Lenormand, whose plays (chiefly *Le Mangeur de Rêves* and *L'Amour Magicien*) bear the mark of the Viennese principles. Among the novelists there are very many who have used Freudism in its crude shape —that is to say, who have handled psycho-analytical subjects (MM. Gil Robin, Gaument). But at the same time, the secret influence of Freudism has made itself felt upon our writers in a more discreet though equally compelling manner. Some notions of Freudian origin (*e.g.*, the Œdipus complex, which had long been in existence before, though it was Freud who laid such a heavy stress upon them) have become so familiar to contemporary French novelists that they now escape notice. Thus it would be difficult to believe that M. Julien Green (*Adrienne Mesurat*) or even M. André Gide (in one part of *Les faux Monnayeurs*) could have been what they are without Freud. Psycho-analysis, then, has helped to point the way to those fields of quasi-scientific research in which the artist seems to be ceaselessly in quest of an ever-flowing *ego*.

What really underlies these new tendencies is an actual breaking up of the *ego*. The problem of personality is one of those which occupy French intellectuals, and such technicians as M. Mentré, such writers as M. Ramon Fernandez and Jean Prévost, have devoted interesting studies to the matter. The problem is one of scientific far more than of literary research, and the fact is that, in the eyes of many, the literary process appears only as an instrument whose business it is to break open the *ego*—a sort of knife.[1]

The real peril is here apparent. By dint of analysing, of breaking up the *ego* you have no matter left except a dust-like heap of assumptions none of which is powerful enough to call forth a dramatic interest. Literature then becomes a game for mandarins doting on psychiatry, or else it has to find its way outside the immediate reality of the human being. That way many writers have looked for in various directions.

The new attempts might be called *metaphysical experiments*, provided that the word is given its precise, etymological meaning. Their tendency is to place the object of literature beyond the physical world, beyond reality pure and simple, on the ground that other methods have made it clear that the said reality is

[1] An extra proof of the distrust in which *literature* has so obviously been held in post-war productions is here apparent.

nothing but a mere delusion. What accounts for the success gained by these new departures is the disgust felt by a number of young men for a reality which had manifested itself to them in the most unpleasant forms. Hence a tendency towards evasion, a very distinct feature in literature since 1918. It has reached its highest water-mark with the super-realists' school, which has systematised it. It is a sequel to *Dadaism* in the sense that the chief representatives of that school are former dadaïsts—namely, André Breton and Louis Aragon. Still, there is a fundamental difference between the two ideas. *Dadaism* claimed to renounce all conventions, even the simplest, which consist in writing vowels and consonants, in assembling words; as its result was to abolish all expression, it came to abolish itself. Super-realism, on the other hand, aims at expressing a higher reality which, as it conceives it, must rule and determine physical reality. Super-realism is less radical than Dadaism, and it has produced interesting works, foremost of which should be ranked André Breton's very curious novel, *Nadja*. To reach that higher reality, or super-reality, the super-realists have to make use of new processes, entirely free from the old methods of psychology and introspection. Thus they have caused a person under the spell of hypnotic sleep to write poems. They have attempted to get hold of the unconscious that exists in each of us by writing haphazard whatever came into their heads, so as to escape logic—an experiment in automatic writing. The James Joyce-like monologue has seemed to them an encouragement to persevere in that direction. Yet such processes have nothing literary about them except their name; and the super-realists, who claim to have nothing in common with literature, as their methods are accessible to all and dangerously easy, have never succeeded in producing works of importance except when they were individually gifted with talent—a revenge for literature.

Still, the movement is of extreme interest as the symptom of a state of mind noticeable in almost the whole of French literature. If super-realism has hardly produced any masterpiece, the fact of its existence has told powerfully upon many a writer. The idea of inspiration in its naked form, with its violent opposition to those notions which prevail in the educational world and in official criticism, corresponds to something that is fully alive in contemporary French poetry. The super-realists have helped to bring a considerable portion of our post-war French literature under the ægis of poetry.

Poetry has literally come as a flood into all literary *genres*. What a number of poetical novels we saw between 1918 and 1925 in which a style artificially brilliant, a mere twinkling of comparisons, aimed at taking the place of composition, logic, and

thought! Under a pretence of inspiration almost anything has been indulged in. This does not at all mean that poetry, proceeding from an inspired conception, is bad and has come to nothing. When it consents to bow to the rule of a well-ordered intellect, it proves to be of an exalted, powerful kind; it is M. Léon-Paul Fargue's poetry, or M. Jules Supervielle's. And it is praiseworthy that poets, following in the wake of Rainer Maria Rilke (who has had some influence in France), should make it their task to give expression to the unspeakable. Two among the young poets who devoted themselves to this task, Odilon-Jean Périer and André Gaillard, died before reaching the age of thirty.

The introduction of poetry into other *genres*, which may be deprecated in the name of principle, has nevertheless produced valuable books. As far back as 1913 Alain Fournier published that *Grand Meaulnes*, in which many young men, soon after the war, were pleased to trace the faded features of their own earlier days. A few of them have resumed the theme he is now unable to work out himself, and many, M. Jean Cassou and M. Claude Aveline among others, keep true to his memory. What the wonderful success of the *Grand Meaulnes* witnessed was the possibility of calling up, in a perfectly balanced form, the strongest temptations that tend towards evasion. But then it takes a virtuoso almost gifted with genius thus to make use of poetical matter in a novel, and nobody seems to have succeeded so far except Alain Fournier. It is less difficult to use poetry in an indirect, oblique way, whether it be transformed into humour, or lent the disguise of the fantastic, or both.

An invasion into humour and into poetry as well—the formula seems a fit definition of one of our writers, M. Jean Cocteau. An outcome of the cubists' school, and a near neighbour to the super-realists (to whom he never belonged), equally keen on the rarest discoveries and strict formalism, M. Jean Cocteau's intellect is magnificently subtle. His very subtlety, which makes him fit to give expression to the slightest spiritual movements of the day, imparts to his works a somewhat zigzag-like motion that is disconcerting to some readers: he is the inventor both of *Plain Chant* and of a form of sensitiveness which finds its symbol in *Le Bœuf sur le Toit*. He is full of humour, and yet beneath his ironical jests you hear a crystalline undertone tolling the notes of a heart-reaching sensitiveness.[10]

It is, in fact, unquestionable that the tendency to evasion offers the worst of dangers. Poetry and the fantastic are poisons

[10] Poetry and humour might also serve as a definition of M. Jean Giraudoux, though the latter, more consistent than M. Cocteau, is chiefly a wonderful deviser of myths, and poetry with him is rather a matter of expression than of inspiration.

which the writer has only the right to use homœopathically. Hyper-analysis had as its effect the abolition of the solid substance literature is made of: ill-employed poetry eventually forgets it altogether. The one is no better than the other. Thus we see a young writer as admirably gifted as M. J. Delteil, through drifting more and more away from direct experience, reaching a stage in which his books are mere sleights of hand, juggling tricks sure to weary one before long.[11]

Side by side with the danger of dispersion another danger, that of unreality, also made itself felt in French literature. But the French have sound heads; they love a fact, a clear, simple fact—often enough they love it even to excess. It was obvious that a reaction would come, and it is in full swing at the present moment, when it can be said that the prevailing tendency in French literature is the search for truth, and method, and cohesion. The reaction is in fact no new thing. Gifted as it is with a fair amount of variety and flexibility, the French mind is in no risk of meeting with a notice of 'No thoroughfare.' When some of its representatives strike the wrong path others are sure to come and lead them back to the right way.

To prevent literature from slipping into the unreal or dissolving into Byzantine analysis an effort towards method and cohesion is necessary. 'Method' is the word M. Paul Valéry knows how to use so forcibly—the word that appears as a water-mark throughout all his works. In him the poet and the essayist are united in considering that the difficulty of the form goes hand in hand with the correctness of the thought, and that such obstacles as may interfere between inspiration and expression should not be shunned, but courted. To this doctrine, carried out with strict accuracy, the strictly regular poems of Charmes, the remarkably subtle prose pieces of Eupalinos, are indebted for that marmoreal beauty which seems able to defy Time. The highest art, in the eyes of M. Valéry, is architecture, an art composed of method, balance, and proportions, in which inspiration can only find its expression through technique. The poet should, in the same manner, be 'the goldsmith of his chains'—that is, be in conscious compliance with the laws of his art.

When M. Paul Valéry taught us the beauty of a strict method he was not alone. There is a large, and purely French, school of novelists which obeys equally imperious rules: it stands for the French tradition in the novel, as Mme. de la Fayette and Benjamin Constant have defined it in our literary history. An important group of writers took up that tradition after the war.

[11] The same applies to M. Claudel, but the basis of his art is the creation of myths; he never runs the risk of going out of his depth in the world of imagination.

Eager for analysis only to the extent in which the individual enables one to reach what is general and human, obedient to discipline and averse from any excess that sensitiveness, once let loose, may lead into, they have produced several important works. Even before 1914 André Gide had published *L'Immoraliste* and *La Porte étroite*, which are among the number; *La Symphonie pastorale* and chiefly *L'Ecole des Femmes* have, in the years since 1918, shown that the same author, while he was able, in another department, to write the broad, complex novel *Les faux Monnayeurs*, still kept true to kind. Several others, Raymond Radiguet (*Le Bal du Comte d'Orgel*), M. J. de Lacretelle (*Amour nuptial*), Jacques Rivière (*Aimée*), M. J. Chardonne (*Eva*) have inscribed their names by the side of his. Perhaps that French tradition is judged by some as rather narrow at times, especially when compared with the broad vistas of the English and Russian novels; still it appears as the healthiest of reactions at a time when measure, discretion, and tactfulness are not so widely spread.

The longing for cohesion is recommended at the present day practically by all writers who have a sense of their art. Amidst all *genres*, however, it is certainly in the novel that its need is most imperiously felt.

It may be considered that the vogue of biographies, which has been so brilliant in France within the last few years, is the sign of return to that cohesion, to that reality, which an excess of analysis and of poetry had made indispensable. M. André Maurois has found his way to the first rank in that department. His biographies of Shelley and Byron give an interpretation of the reality of those two great men not as modified by their fame or their genius—this would be the literary critic's work—but rather as true to their intimate reality, to the portion of humanity within them. It has been laid at the door of M. André Maurois that when studying a writer he showed too much neglect for his works, which implies an utter failure to comprehend his object. If he selects Byron or Shelley, it is simply because he hopes to find in them elements common to the rest of mankind in a better light. Thus conceived and practised by such writers as M. Maurois or M. Guy de Pourtalès in his lives of Chopin and Liszt, biography is a real contribution to the analysis of man.

A very great writer, M. Paul Claudel, had, in fact, shown that the historical myth alone makes an alliance between the drama and poetry possible. From his earliest plays, such as *L'Annonce faite à Marie*, to his recent works, *Christophe Colomb* and *Le Soulier de Satin*, the same principle has prevailed throughout. Allowing himself as he does a free hand with verisimilitude, M. Paul Claudel would undoubtedly arrive at the result of destroying any sense

of reality in his works if his genius did not enable him to transmute his historical imaginings into myths that are fully alive. Never does M. Claudel give us the impression that he is floating above reality, though it can be said that his works have nothing in common with it. One need only think of the historical dramas with which many acceptable versifiers have flooded us to measure at what height it behoves to place M. Claudel.

Among the historical themes which offered themselves to the writer and longed, so to speak, to be turned into myths there is an important group which owes its origin to the war. No doubt the wave of war-books has been called forth largely by the success of Remarque's book *All Quiet on the Western Front*, but it is obvious that the success was bound to come. The apparent facility with which the facts had been transmuted into a myth and the indisputable dramatic quality of the plot were enough to tempt many a writer; hence the recent deluge of war-books. The pity is that all these war-books are the work of combatants. This sounds like a paradox. In fact, none of those who have written about the war have been able to rise above the conception of a reporter's evidence pure and simple (M. André Foucault, the author of *Le Héros*, and possibly M. Gabriel Chevallier, the author of *La Peur*, should be set apart). They have reported what they had seen—better or worse, as M. Norton Cru has pointed out to them—but they have not been able to rise to the height of a synthesis, to the creation of a myth. No war-book—and this applies not to France alone, but to all countries—has reached the level of Tolstoi's *War and Peace*.

To sum up, French literature, after following within the last ten years a dangerous downhill road, has now been brought back on the way to indisputably noble ends. Leaving behind us the phase that might be called poetical, we are making towards a higher naturalism in which the conquests achieved within the said ten years find their synthesis. It seems necessary, however, that men should first become more distinctly conscious of the state of the world, and of that of man in the world. It is the task now attempted by several essayists, whose conclusions may be questioned sometimes, but of whose candour and good faith there is no doubt. M. Julien Benda and M. Jean Guéhenno are the most important on the left side, while M. Henri Massis stands with undeniable nobility for the thought of Catholic conservatism. Literary history, moreover, shows that when essayists and theorists come to take their bearings they are always followed by dramatists and novelists who handle ideas and make their creations impersonate them.

But those novelists will come, as everything shows. Among the men now forty years old several are already following the

direction we have mentioned—for example, M. Jacques Chardonne and M. Paul Morand.

Behind those men of forty a very important group of younger men, now reaching thirty years of age, have similar designs in view. The names of MM. Marcel Arland, Marc Chadourne, André Malraux, Emmanuel Bove, Claude Aveline are already on the roll of the artists of their generation, and their destiny bids fair to rise higher. It is no exaggerated optimism to look forward to a very fine expansion of French literature in the near future and to view the uncertainties of the last decade as one would the symptoms shown by a youth in the crisis of his adolescence.

H. Petiot.
(*Daniel Rops.*)

BULWER

Mr. Michael Sadleir, somewhat surprisingly, has chosen for his new and prolonged essay in biography the glittering and rather tinsel figure of Bulwer-Lytton. Surprising, because the subject in its biographical aspects has already received copious attention from the pens of Bulwer's son and grandson, and other writers, while the personality of Bulwer himself has never attracted the ordinary readers of biography; which is strange, for his is a dramatic record, flamboyant and picturesque, with a domestic drama enacted in his own home far more poignant than is usual even in the troubled annals of the matrimony of authors. The world never tires, apparently, of rehearing the domestic acerbities of Byron, Dickens, and Carlyle, but the violence and mutual vituperation of Bulwer and his wife have proved boring even in this age of delight in the scouring of unclean linen in the limelight and in the 'rough stuff' of moving pictures. Further, there exists still, to-day, the remains of that personal prejudice against Bulwer which was created in his lifetime by the barbed attacks of Maginn, Thackeray, R. H. Horne, and lesser men, printed attacks which passed from contemptuous literary criticism to the grossest personalities ridiculing his appearance, behaviour, clothes, and speech. It was an organised campaign, of political origin, which had no parallel in the literary history of the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century, though Ainsworth had his share of insolent personalities (but there was no political connexion in his case): little wonder that Lever wrote to Ainsworth in April 1844, apropos of Horne's *A New Spirit of the Age*, 'Thackeray's rascality first opened my eyes, but they are pretty much accustomed to the sight of such blackguardism now.' Let it be remembered, however, that Thackeray in later life regretted the *bêtises* of his affronts to Bulwer in *Fraser's Magazine* and wrote a handsome letter of apology for his 'youthful' spite.

This *vieux jeux des volants* is over, but the wind it made still murmurs. However, when Mr. Sadleir sets out to retell Bulwer's story, in three volumes, to appear at intervals, he has in view a wider prospect than the life of one man: he envisages a panorama[1]

[1] *Bulwer: A Panorama.* Edward and Rosina (1803–1836), by Michael Sadleir. (Constable, 16s. net.)

of the literary society of his subject's period, particularly glancing during his perlustration at the lesser figures of the time—the novelists of the 'Silver-fork' school, Mrs. Gore, Lady Blessington, Miss Landon, and the more animated *romans à clef* by Maginn, Grantley Berkeley, C. M. Westmacott, and the rest of the period novels of 1820–1840, the vanguard of the great fleet of 'three-deckers,' of which he has an unrivalled knowledge both in a reading and bibliographical sense. I am struck, now, by his skill in manipulating his vast material, for he uses Bulwer and the unhappy wife, Rosina, as pawns, moving them forwards and then backwards as they may be needed in his presentation of the literary battlefield on which they fight again with many of their contemporaries, or else making them serve as transport for bringing up his reserves of material; or if the vile phrases of the viler films will make my meaning clearer, Edward and Rosina frequently 'fade-out' while 'close-ups' of other and often unrelated figures are projected upon his panoramic screen: but the whole is a cohesive story, and each figure plays its part in the comprehensive scheme upon which the author is embarked.

And now to give some consideration to Bulwer himself. Never was there a more enigmatic personality, compact of so many irreconcilable qualities, a mass of contradictions. If we follow Thackeray's pretentious method of dissecting the unfortunate George IV., removing the silk stockings, the padding, the stays, the silk and scented handkerchiefs, the oiled hair, a set of teeth, the prodigious coats, and more and more waistcoats, and finding 'then nothing' (which proved Thackeray but an indifferent researcher, as he failed to find a rich personality ruined by luxurious circumstances and a patron of the arts): well, if this method be followed in a reconsideration of Bulwer, and the fine dandyish clothes and the curls and the stays are removed, the searcher will come upon two very separate and baffling entities of a personality: one the posing and self-conscious romancist, contemptuous in his outward bearing but inwardly shy and frightened of the world, and the other a sinister, almost half-mad being, capable of the grossest cruelty, even to physical violence, towards the wife he had once passionately loved. Little wonder that to many of his contemporaries he seemed inhuman, or, at the least, all artificial. Even Mr. Sadleir, who is, on the whole, Bulwer's apologist, admits that his protagonist 'at recurrent moments of his life was a deliberate sham.' And he goes on to advance cogent reasons for the mask Bulwer wore to the world. But I do not know that I am altogether convinced by the argument that the cause of Bulwer's spiritual malaise, and his consequent behaviour in certain relations of his life, was owing to the fact that in his private life he had 'no real refuge from the world,

no one to whom he could turn with a certainty of receiving, if not applause, at least a sympathetic understanding.' It is true that both his mother and his wife failed him in this *desideratum*, and the same argument could be advanced for the unhappiness and fret of the private lives of both Byron and Dickens; but, on the other hand, there have been many writers and poets—Charles Lamb and Coleridge, for example—who have attained both some measure of spiritual tranquillity and the finest literary expression without these human sympathies at home, men who have lost either by Fate or choice what Mr. Sadleir describes as 'some unselfish and sympathetic heart to which they could turn for consolation and encouragement': they have dreed their weird alone and won to abiding fame without domestic solaces.

To pass to conjecture: in the case of Bulwer, it could well be argued that if he had lost his unreasonable and difficult mother in his infancy and never married his brilliant, warm-tempered wife, whose highly strung nature was too akin to his own, his life would have been calmer and far happier. But it is useless to speculate on the workings of Fate in other circumstances which did not occur, and, in any case, if his temperament was one which craved for sympathy and encouragement at home he would have never secured this domestic anodyne by reason of his own warring qualities and a nature warped by being brought into play too early with the forces of life and the world. I think H. F. Chorley got very near the solution of the Bulwer enigma when he observed, after personal intercourse, 'It is a fine, energetic, inquisitive, romantic mind which if I mistake not has been blighted and opened too soon.' Mr. Sadleir, too, is entirely right in the importance he attaches to the consequences, the life-long effects to Bulwer's character, which followed his early and blighted love affair when a romantic, ardent boy—'his whole character was affected by an adventure which in retrospect became a memory of heaven first glimpsed, then barred against him.'

This precocious experiment in the acutely emotional had been the natural sequence of the romantic circumstances and surroundings of Bulwer's childhood working upon a naturally imaginative and super-sensitive mind. He was of ancient and chivalric races in his lines of ancestry, for, although those of an heraldic turn of mind are somewhat sarcastic about his lack of direct descent from the armigerous families of Bulwer and Lytton, it seems clear that he had a Bulwer for one of his great-grandmothers; but truth compels the admission that of the ancient Lytton blood he had not one drop in his physical composition, and that he should have attached so much importance to his connexion with this aforetime distinguished family is proof of his romantic mind where the 'boast of heraldry' found ever welcome lodgment. And for

certain he was the rightful heir of the ancient seat of the Lyttons, Knebworth, the veritable abode of romance as he first saw it in childhood—a great quadrangular Tudor mansion with communicating chambers arranged in the manner proper to Gothic novels, filled with family portraits and armour and all the storied belongings of a far-flung ancestral past. Here then was reared, from the age of eight, this impressionable son and heir destined to transmute into lasting literary form just such a message which an historic house like Knebworth would whisper into the receptive ear of an imaginative boy, for here were panelled closets, mysteriously swaying tapestries (behind which could lurk assassins), oriel windows, galleries and state chambers, with an authenticated ghost legend of its own, 'The Yellow Boy,' all set amid the circumjacent park and sylvan glades—yes, indeed, Knebworth was the very pivot and foundation-stone of Bulwer's romances; and even years later, when the house had been changed much, 'it seemed,' as Mrs. E. M. Ward truly observed, 'a fitting background to the strange and mystical mentality of its owner.'

At Knebworth, then, Bulwer developed early both mentally and bodily in his position of an 'only' child, for his two elder brothers had gone to the care of other branches of the family. He was good-looking and spoilt, for his father was dead, and he grew to boyhood entirely under the influence of his mother, a forceful and dominating yet ill-balanced and unwise character. Solitary boys who are dominated by matriarchy generally become somewhat effeminated and abnormal and decided in their inclination to art in some form or other. In Bulwer's case he had, further, wandered and read at will and without hindrance in the remarkable library of his grandfather, whereby he became steeped in the atmosphere of works of chivalry and romance, the whole armoury of Armadis of Gaul. Who could be surprised that, given his temperament and his early environment, Bulwer became the boy and writer we know. In the course of his young speculations he asked his mother, 'Pray, Mamma, are you not sometimes overcome by the sense of your own identity?'—whereupon that lady decided it was time for the boy to go to school. There, at first, at Fulham, being an unusual and abnormally sensitive child, crying lamentably for his mother, he had terrible experiences of bullying and persecution such as Cowper and Shelley also suffered at school. But this phase passed, and by the time he was sixteen, at school at Rottingdean, he had become a strong, assertive lad too much for the headmaster, Dr. Hooker, who advised his removal, for, as the worried pedagogue observed, 'Your son has exhausted all I can profess to teach him. No Boy can controul him. He has a vital power which demands a large field. He has it in him to become a very remarkable man.'

This lack of 'controul' was well exemplified at Bulwer's next seminary, presided over by the Rev. T. Burnett, D.D. (later rector of the City church of St. James's, Garlickhithe), where occurred an incident which confirms my idea that in the character and personal appearance of Bulwer, as a boy, Dickens found his conception of Steerforth in *David Copperfield*. Steerforth, like Bulwer, was a good-looking, haughty youth, the spoilt son of a widowed mother, and superior to the other pupils at a second-rate school; he gives himself airs and insults Mr. Mell, the humble usher, when the latter, in a vain effort to quell his turbulent class, requests Steerforth to refrain from whistling. Just so did whistling and an usher play their part in Bulwer's departure from the school at Homerton. Mr. Toms, the usher, was whistling while Bulwer was playing chess, and Bulwer called out in a very imperious tone, 'Keep that confounded whistling to yourself!' Mr. Toms, more spirited than poor Mr. Mell, fetched the headmaster, who boxed the ears of Bulwer, who retaliated with a blow on the sacrosanct body of the Doctor of Divinity. The rebellious pupil was thereupon locked up until the family carriage and horses arrived to remove him. It is quite likely that Bulwer related this adventure of his youth to Forster, who would have passed it on to Dickens.

This was the end of schools, and Bulwer was now sent to a private tutor at Ealing, the Rev. Charles Wallington, where a pupil some years earlier had been the celebrated sportsman, 'Squire' Osbaldeston, whose records of slaughtered birds and animals and hunting prowess would in no way have appealed to Bulwer, who, again to quote Mrs. E. M. Ward, 'rightly regarded hunting as barbarous, and all so called "sport" was abhorrent to his soul.' Mr. Wallington was a remarkable clergyman of military aspect possessed of a magnificent aquiline nose, which caused him to model himself upon the great hero of the time, Wellington, and mounted upon an old war-horse, the gift of one of his soldier sons, he paraded the highways of Ealing, where every stranger took him to be a general from the Peninsular War. He, as a martinet, did not get on with his wife, and the thing he loved best in the world was an old Scotch terrier who 'went regularly to church with him, paced up the aisle demurely, mounted into the reading-desk, and assisted afterwards in the pulpit.' With Mr. Wallington, Bulwer was very happy, for this amiable cleric understood his flamboyant nature and encouraged the boy to publish his juvenile verses, the now rare *Ismael, An Oriental Tale, and Other Poems* (1820). At this time commenced Bulwer's interesting correspondence with the famous Dr. Parr, who wrote, 'Really, when I think of your youth, my delight is mingled with astonishment at your intellectual powers,' added he

was 'truly your well-wisher and your admirer,' and concluded, in capital letters, 'BE AMBITIOUS!' There was scarcely need of the last piece of advice to the precocious boy of seventeen, who already believed the world to be at his feet in vassalage; and it was at Ealing, in 1820, that he had that early affair of the heart, previously alluded to, which completed vast emotional experiences too soon in his spiritual pilgrimage.

He had made the acquaintance of a girl a little older than himself, and they were accustomed to meet, in all innocence, near an old pollarded tree by the little river Brent, which in those days flowed placidly through sequestered meadows between Ealing and Harrow at Perivale, with its smallest of churches. The path to their rendezvous lay to the right of the lodge gates of Castle Bar Park, where had lived a few years earlier, not in all innocence, the Duke of Kent with Madame St. Laurent. Bulwer left a record of his idyll:

> That was the warmest and the brightest summer I ever knew in this country. The sky smiled and glowed on us as if it also were full of love. At the Duke's lodge the gardener used to sell fruit. So there, as I passed it, I made my purchases for our little feasts, and, as I was always first upon the spot, I spread them out upon the grass, where the stream grew darker, under the boughs of that old dwarf tree. . . . No one ever suspected our meetings, nor even, I believe, our acquaintanceship. . . .

Then one day she did not come, nor the next, and 'we never met again. Never, never.' Later he learned she was gone and had been forced by her father into a loveless marriage. And, so strangely did the story follow the lines of appropriate sad romance, in time the girl wrote to Bulwer a farewell letter begging him to visit her grave, for she died early. He made that piteous pilgrimage to Ullswater:

> There was a spot in which that wild and sorrowful romance of my boyhood, which had so influenced my youth, lay buried for evermore. And until I knelt alone, and at night, beneath the stars at her shrine, I felt that my life could never be exorcised from the ghost that haunted it —that my heart could never again admit the love of woman, nor my mind calmly participate in the active objects of men. I performed that pilgrimage. What I suffered, in one long solitary night, I will not say. At dawn I turned from the place, as if rebaptized or reborn.

As he said, he was 'changed for life . . . melancholy became an essential part of my being' as the result of this painful experience of blighted love. Allusions to it can be traced in many of his stories, even in one of the last, *Kenelm Chillingly*, written half a century later and not long before his death. So was forged the mould for the future writer of psychological romance.

Mr. Sadleir interprets well the novels and books which come within the scope of his present volume, including *Pelham*, *Falkland*, *The Disowned*, *Devereux*, *Paul Clifford*, *Eugene Aram*, *Godolphin*, *The Last Days of Pompeii*, with some apt comment on *England and the English*. In dealing with *Pelham* he does not state that among its topicalities was the notorious murder of Weare by Thurtell which had occurred five years previously. The brutal Thornton was a clear transcription of Thurtell even to the shocking details of that terrible night crime amid the peaceful countryside, which was finished by the same detail in each case—the cutting of the 'throat from ear to ear,' after a weapon had been jammed into a wound and forced backwards and forwards. Bulwer said (in his preface to the 1835 edition of *Pelham*) that 'Sir Reginald Glanville was drawn purposely of the Byron school as a foil to Pelham'; and it appears to me that in the hero of *Godolphin* he drew a figure of Byron himself much in the manner that Disraeli utilised Byron four years later in *Venetia* (1837). In *Godolphin*, one of the most characteristic of the author's novels in his baroque period, there are some reflections of Bulwer's experiences, such as the bout of fisticuffs between the schoolmaster, Dr. Shallowell, and his pupil, Percy Godolphin, which is an echo of the affair at the Homerton school I have already mentioned. But the description of Godolphin tallies with the appearance of Byron:

> His features were of that pure and severe Greek of which the only fault is that in the very perfection of the chiselling of the features there seems something hard and stern. The complexion was pale, even to wanness: and the whole cast and contour of the head were full of intellect, and betokening that absorption of mind which cannot be marked in any one without exciting a certain vague curiosity and interest.

And the picture of Godolphin Priory is an exact representation of Newstead Abbey except that the building is made more ruinous than the original, which was permissible romancer's licence:

> A wide and glassy lake lay stretched beneath them: on the opposite side stood the ruins. The large oriel window—the Gothic arch—the broken, yet still majestic, column, all embrowned and mossed with age, were still spared, and now mirrored themselves in the waveless and silent tide . . . the whole was backed by hills, covered with gloomy and thick woods of pine and fir.

Finally, the Byronic implication is completely established at the end of the book by the words supposed to be written by Constance to the author:

> You have done no justice to the noble character you meant to delineate under the name of Godolphin; you have drawn his likeness with a harsh and cruel pencil; you have enlarged on the few weaknesses he might have possessed, until you have made them the foreground of the portrait; and his vivid generosity, his high honour, his brilliant intellect, the extraordinary stores of his mind, you have left in shadow. Oh, God! that for

such a being such a destiny was reserved, and in the prime of life, just when his mind was awakened to a sense of its own powers and their legitimate objects! What a fatal system of things, that could for thirty-seven years have led away, by the pursuits and dissipations of a life suited but to the beings he despised, a genius of such an order!

Byron died in his thirty-seventh year.

Upon *Godolphin* in particular Mr. Sadleir bases, in a picturesque piece of prose, his claim that Bulwer was pre-eminently the greatest successor of Mrs. Radcliffe. He says:

> Of all Gothic novelists, none brought to greater perfection the fusion of historical or geographical detail with genteel emotion and wildly thrilling incident, than the arch-priestess of the whole Gothic romantic school, the most influential woman novelist there has ever been—Ann Radcliffe. The imitators of Ann Radcliffe were innumerable. Hardly a novelist or poet of the first three decades of the nineteenth century but to some extent looked at nature through her eyes, showed her shuddering delight in precipice and storm and forest gloom. But only in one writer did her spirit really live again. Bulwer, from the moment when he first made public appearance as a novelist, showed himself the true inheritor of the mantle of this famous writer of romance. He caused that once sombre garment to be sprigged with gold and lined with satin; he refashioned its cut to the taste of the exquisite of the 'thirties; but he so wore it that, for all the change in its style and texture, it hung with the same tremendous folds and made on all who beheld it a similar impression of wild magnificence. So completely indeed does the spirit of Radcliffean romance live again in those of Bulwer's novels which really express their writer's self, that he must not be regarded as a mere follower of the 'great enchantress.' Rather was he her ordained successor on the throne of a kingdom still lurid and romantic, but now into the bargain modernised and metropolitan.

I greatly like his stately and sartorial similes in the above passage, but I am not converted to the gospel that Bulwer was the literary first-born and heir of Ann Radcliffe. Bulwer shared with her a mutual delight in grand scenery, ruins, falling waters, and the awe-inspiring effects of storms and Nature: but he did not inherit any of her peculiar qualities of mystery and *suspense;* her uncanny gift for making portentous even faint, distant sounds and dimly glimmering, wavering lights; the art with which, in her hands, a sublime bit of landscape becomes an augur of massing Terrors. True, her dire and delicious mysteries recede evermore or resolve themselves into dull, sensible 'explanations' lacking the cruel humour of Nick Mason's awl in *The Ghost* of *The Ingoldsby Legends;* but pardon may be given her for these lapses from the artistic in memory of the skill with which she set her stage with castellated, conventual, or woodland mystery. Bulwer, when he essayed the supernatural at a much later period of his writing life, in *A Strange Story* (1861), for example, treated the subject

very seriously and offered no 'rational' explanations for the mysterious events of his tale. Further, Mrs. Radcliffe's calm, flowing, unemotional style is the antithesis of that of Bulwer, with his gasps and dashes and exclamative marks and remarks to his readers; at the very climacteric of her narrative in *The Mysteries of Udolpho*, Emily, when she unveils the frightful object hidden by the black curtain, merely 'gazes for a moment with an eager, phrensied eye,' and then, without uttering one word or cry, lets the lamp drop elegantly from her hand ere she falls 'senseless at the foot of the couch.' And when she pictures a death scene, how quiet are Mrs. Radcliffe's touches. Take the end of her most terrific creation, the monk Schedoni of *The Italian*, the progenitor of all the silent relentless villains of romantic prose and Byronic poetry. He dies from poison. At first he uttered a strange and horrible sound, 'unlike any human voice,' and was convulsed. Then:

> Life was now sinking apace; the gleam of spirit and of character that had returned to his eyes, was departed, and left them haggard and fixed, and presently a livid corse was all that remained of the once terrible Schedoni.

Compare this with a death scene in Bulwer's *Godolphin*, that of Lucilla:

> Lucilla relapsed into her former frantic paroxysms. Shriek followed shriek; she appeared to know none around her, not even Godolphin. With throes and agony the soul seemed to wrench itself from the frame. The hours swept on—midnight came—clear and distinct the voice of the clock below reached that chamber. 'Hush!' cried Lucilla, starting. 'Hush!' and just at that moment, through the window opposite, the huge clouds, breaking in one spot, discovered high and far above them a solitary star. 'Thine, thine, Godolphin!' she shrieked forth, pointing to the lonely orb; 'it summons thee; farewell, but not for long.'
>
> Down fell the black rain in torrents; and far from the mountains you might hear the rushing of the swollen streams, as they poured into the bosoms of the valleys. The sullen, continued mass of cloud was broken, and the vapours hurried fast and louring over the heavens, leaving now and then a star to glitter forth ere again 'the jaws of darkness did devour it up.' At the lower verge of the horizon, the lightning flashed fierce, but at lingering intervals; the trees rocked and groaned beneath the rain and storm; and immediately above the bowed head of a solitary horseman broke the thunder that, amidst the whirl of his own emotions, he scarcely heard.

That is a fine, melodramatic piece of writing, but it is not the writing of Mrs. Radcliffe. Yet further, there are other claimants to dispute the thesis that Bulwer was Mrs. Radcliffe's 'ordained successor.' Putting aside C. R. Maturin and 'Monk' Lewis, who were her contemporaries, there are Walter Scott, Mrs. Shelley, G. P. R. James, with Harrison Ainsworth, who wrote in

the preface to *Rookwood* that he had adopted the methods of Mrs. Radcliffe, with some substitutions, in this story. Mr. Sadleir says that Bulwer's *Paul Clifford* 'undoubtedly suggested first *Rookwood* and then *Jack Sheppard* to Ainsworth.' But in this connexion we must bear in mind that Ainsworth first conceived the idea of *Rookwood* during a visit to Cuckfield Place in the autumn of 1829, while *Paul Clifford* was not published until May 1830, and concerning Jack Sheppard that Ainsworth wrote of him, long before he commenced his own romance on the subject, 'One day I may present the world with his autobiography, which happened, singularly enough, to fall into my possession.' However, I think it is quite likely that the success of *Paul Clifford* caused Ainsworth to introduce his boyhood's hero, Dick Turpin, in *Rookwood* as Gentlemen of the Road were now in literary demand; and the gipsy scenes of that romance may have been suggested by those of a similar kind in *Godolphin*. Bulwer's claim to be one of the founders of the 'Newgate Novels' is acknowledged by Bon Gaultier in *The Faker's New Toast:*

> To them as makes the Crackman's life the subject of their story,
> To Ainsworth, and to Bulwer,[1] and to Reynolds be the glory.
> Jolly trumps!

It is amusing to read the letters Bulwer received from the remarkable prostitute, Harriette Wilson, who originally wrote to him in 1829 to express the pleasure she had found in the perusal of *Devereux*, which she also made the pretext for the suggestion that he should call upon her:

> I conceived as a sensible man, you might perhaps be amused with the novelty of a woman who is *always* true to nature, no matter how bizarre may be her thoughts, creed, or wishes. However, if you won't make friends with me, you *won't*. . . . I will tell you what would make a perfect novel—you write it all but the love scenes and send them for me to draw.

But Bulwer, though by no means a young man deterred by moral considerations, did not wish to be compromised and appear in any subsequent volume of the lively lady's unreliable 'Memoirs.' So, though he preserved her letters, he priggishly wrote on their wrapper in long-after years: 'These letters were written to me when I first came up to town after my marriage and in my second year of authorship. *Of course I never acceded to her wish to know me.*' As Mr. Sadleir truly observes, 'It is frankly disappointing to find sanctimony many years after the event, and permissible to regret the novel which he might have written, could he have accepted Harriette Wilson's suggestion to season his own talent with some of her amorous experience and racy irresponsibility.'

[1] Spelt 'Bullvig' in imitation of Thackeray's insolent references to Bulwer as Bulwig in his *Yellowplush* sketches.

Harriette Wilson's last letter to Bulwer, written in November 1832 from 69, Vauxhall Bridge Road, states that she is 'desperately ill and the mind wears out with body,' which reminds me of an interesting note about her by G. A. Sala, who saw her near the end of her life (she is supposed to have died in 1846)—'a wonderful old hag who lived on lucifer matches and gin in a little hovel at Chelsea, but with a bright eye and a skin as white as milk.'

The main theme of Mr. Sadleir's present volume is, of course, Bulwer's disastrous marriage in 1827, when he was twenty-four years of age, with Rosina Wheeler, a beautiful Irish girl, high-tempered, emotional, and precipitate, somewhat coarse in mind and wit, extravagant, and not adapted for domestic life and motherhood. She had been badly brought up and, altogether, was a most unsuitable wife for a young and equally highly strung writer who had to earn his living by his pen, for his unwise mother, disapproving strongly of his marriage, stopped the income she had hitherto assigned to him. But Bulwer was in honour bound to marry this girl for a reason he himself left on record: 'I married my wife against all my interests and prospects—not from passion, but from a sense of honour. She had given herself to me nearly a year before, and from that moment I considered myself bound to her.'

I am surprised that Mr. Sadleir makes no allusion to this statement and the salient fact it proves, for this seems to me to be the key to the whole painful problem of why love turned to hate. For, with passion long spent, this marriage, which had originated merely from physical desire, was just an act of reparation with conscience and honour as bedfellows. The woman's very presence was a constant reproach and a ceaseless reminder of a past wrong done to one who had given her all. Jaded nerves and over-work led to irritation and accusations of neglect (for Bulwer was an unfaithful husband) and recriminations and bitter quarrels, separations and reconciliations, and more separations and reconciliations, amid which turmoil the two children of this most unhappy marriage were born and reared without knowing the home life which was their due. Mr. Sadleir brings this first volume to a close with the final separation of the parents in 1836. But this is only the first act of the tragedy: there is a second to come bitter with the Dead Sea fruit of fury and hatred.

Mr. Sadleir is, on the whole, fair to Rosina, and on several occasions he gives her credit, in the early days, for trying to make a success of a hopeless marriage. But I can see he has but little sympathy for her, and he does not investigate (in this volume) the charges of physical cruelty—which involved even such gross implications as biting and kicking—she alleged against

her husband. It has been her posthumous fate to alienate nearly everyone who has read her tragic story by reason of her violent language and implacable hatred and abuse of Bulwer. Some years back, when I had occasion to delve fully into the facts of her life, it seemed to me that she was a deeply wronged woman, that her sorrows and the neglect and loneliness of her old age were grievous, and that her tears blotted out her faults and offences, for she was one who had suffered much.

But this is a matter for future reconsideration. For the present it only remains to congratulate Mr. Sadleir for the very successful accomplishment of the first stage of his panorama, a success won by his patience, his knowledge and complete immersion in his subject, his sympathy with the literary period he is reconstructing, and his entire command of his vast material. It is a fine thing both for Victorian and contemporary literature when an original writer, an established novelist and critic, devotes his intellect and time to the unremunerative and often thankless task of an intensive study and interpretation of a literary era combined with a biographical story compact of drama and sorrow.

S. M. Ellis.

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Letters as well as articles will be considered for publication, but letters should be confined to criticism or amplification of articles which have already appeared in the Review. No anonymous contribution is published.

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GOLD AND THE POUND

On Monday, September 21, a startled world awoke to the news that Great Britain had abandoned the Gold Standard. The same day a Bill was hurriedly passed through both Houses of Parliament, suspending temporarily section 1, subsection 2, of the Gold Standard Act, 1925, under which the Bank of England is obliged to sell gold on demand at a fixed price of £3 17*s.* 10½*d.* per ounce troy in minimum quantities of not less than 400 ounces. The effect of the Government's decision was immediately felt on the foreign exchange market, and by the end of the week sterling in Paris and New York was worth about 15*s.* 9*d.*

The reasons which induced the Government to take this momentous decision were set out in a carefully worded official document:

> Since the middle of July funds amounting to more than £200,000,000 have been withdrawn from the London market. The withdrawals have been met partly from gold and foreign currency held by the Bank of England, partly from the proceeds of a credit of £50,000,000, which shortly matures, secured by the Bank of England from New York and Paris, and

partly from the proceeds of the French and American credits, amounting to £80,000,000, recently obtained by the Government. During the last few days the withdrawals of foreign balances have accelerated so sharply that His Majesty's Government have felt bound to take the decision mentioned above.

. . . . . .

The gold holding of the Bank of England amounts to some £130,000,000, and, having regard to the contingencies which may have to be met, it is inadvisable to allow this reserve to be further reduced.

. . . . . .

His Majesty's Government have arrived at their decision with the greatest reluctance. But during the last few days the international financial markets have become demoralised, and have been liquidating their sterling assets regardless of their intrinsic worth. In the circumstances there was no alternative but to protect the financial position of this country by the only means at our disposal.

His Majesty's Government are securing a balanced Budget, and the internal position of the country is sound. This position must be maintained. It is one thing to go off the gold standard with an unbalanced Budget and uncontrolled inflation; it is quite another thing to take this measure, not because of internal financial difficulties, but because of excessive withdrawals of borrowed capital. The ultimate resources of this country are enormous, and there is no doubt that the present exchange difficulties will prove only temporary.

This statement was amplified by Mr. Snowden in his speech on the Gold Standard (Amendment) Bill in the House of Commons. The Chancellor of the Exchequer pointed out that the restoration of confidence brought about by the formation of the National Government and the balancing of the Budget had only provided a temporary relief to the exchanges. It appears that the lack of a united front at home—the attitude of the Trade Union Congress, hostile alike to the measures of economy undertaken by the Government, and to the policy of maintaining the pound at parity—and the uncertainty caused by persistent rumours of a General Election, had prompted a new attack of nervousness on the part of foreign holders of sterling, with the honourable exception of the French banks. This nervousness was greatly increased by the exaggerated reports circulated in the foreign Press of the unrest in the Navy caused by the proposed reductions in pay, with the result that between Wednesday, September 16, and Saturday, the 19th, withdrawals amounted to no less than £43,000,000, and the second credit of £80,000,000 which was raised to support the pound had almost been exhausted. As the United States and France were unable to provide further means of assistance, the Government was left with no alternative to the abandonment of the gold standard.

So much for recent history. To understand the real significance of the events of the last few weeks we must, however, probe much deeper into the origins of the present crisis. Why was it possible to undermine the foundations of our financial system in a couple of months, and dethrone what had previously been regarded as the strongest currency in the world? It is to world causes, in the first place, that we must look for an explanation. The chief factor is undoubtedly the phenomenal fall in gold prices which has taken place during the last few years. Ever since we returned to the gold standard in 1925 gold prices have been falling. At first the fall was comparatively gentle, but after the autumn of 1929 it assumed catastrophic dimensions. Within the last two years wholesale prices have declined by something like 40 per cent.—a prodigious lapse to which the whole world has found it intensely difficult to adapt itself—and the country which has found the greatest difficulties is Great Britain, where the rigidity of money wages, especially in the sheltered trades, has made it impossible to effect the adjustment in prices which might have enabled us to compete successfully with other manufacturing countries in the markets of the world. Hence the appalling increase in unemployment which unbalanced the Budget, and the gigantic falling off in our export trade, which has practically been halved since 1929, with the consequent reversal of our favourable balance of payments—the chief of the underlying causes of the collapse of the pound.

But before we deal with the particular circumstances in this country, we must first inquire into the reasons for this world-wide collapse in the prices of commodities. Those reasons, which have been admirably set out in the Macmillan Report, are exceedingly complicated, and most of them are connected with the working of the gold standard since the war. Now there is no inherent reason why the gold standard should work in such a way as to reduce prices. The amount of gold in the world is still amply sufficient to support a much higher price level than the present, whatever prospects of an actual shortage there may be for the future. It is the factors which have led to the maldistribution of gold which have been largely responsible for the world price fall. In the pre-war days the gold standard used to work more or less automatically, because gold movements were allowed to work their appropriate effects on the internal price level of the countries to and from which they took place. Since the war this easy automatic working has no longer been possible, largely owing to the change which has taken place in the economic status of the United States. Before the war the United States was predominantly a debtor nation importing capital from abroad. The war entirely reversed this position. When the Armistice was signed America had not only accumulated huge quantities of gold as the result of payments made by the Allied nations for war

material, but she also found herself a creditor on a large scale, being owed enormous sums of money by her allies on account of war debts. After the slump which followed the short-lived post-Armistice boom the monetary authorities of the United States, fearing another inflation, embarked on the policy of 'sterilising' gold. That is to say, they refused to permit their gold reserves to exercise their full effect on the price level, with the paradoxical result that instead of gold fixing, as it had done before the war, the price of the dollar, the dollar began to fix the price of gold. Moreover, instead of permitting, as is normal with creditor nations, the visible balance of trade to become adverse, the Americans continued by means of tariffs to shut out as many imports as they could, while at the same time insisting on collecting their debts. Now, debts can only be paid in two ways—by means of goods or by means of gold; and the United States deliberately preferred gold, with the result that streams of the precious metal began to flow across the Atlantic to swell the already useless hoard of 'dead' gold in the Federal Reserve vaults. For a time, it is true, this tendency towards gold imports was counteracted by a liberal policy of foreign loans, chiefly to Germany, Central Europe, Canada, and the South American countries. But the appetite of the American public for foreign bonds, always capricious and uncertain, proved the least reliable of passions, and when the enormous increase in production, commonly hailed by the newspapers as the era of Coolidge prosperity, set going the great boom on the New York Stock Exchange, which put up the price of 'short' money to fantastic rates and sucked in funds from all over the globe, the stream of loans to Europe and other countries began to dry up, and gold began to flow in increasing quantities across the Atlantic. Then came the great crash on Wall Street, which coincided, unfortunately, with a big glut in the wheat market and an over-supply of the base metals and many of the other primary commodities. This ill-starred conjunction ushered in a business depression of colossal proportions which spread rapidly throughout the world. The stream of foreign lending dried up entirely, while at the same time the precipitous fall in prices relentlessly increased the burdens of the impoverished debtor countries. Meanwhile the United States continued to maintain the desperate effort to sell without buying, and gold came pouring into the Federal Reserve vaults in a steady flow, till by the autumn of this year the United States had accumulated £1,000,000,000 of the precious metal—about half of the world's supply of monetary gold—most of which was kept 'sterile,' for it was not used to counteract the fall in prices.

Bad as this was, it might not have proved quite so disastrous

had not France pursued a similar policy of gold-hoarding. During the depreciation of the franc a large amount of French capital took refuge abroad and was held in the shape of liquid balances in London. After the franc was finally stabilised at the end of 1926 these funds began to find their way back to their country of origin. Like the United States, France, with her thrifty habit of saving augmented by large receipts on account of German Reparations, found herself accumulating a large surplus, and, like the United States, she too endeavoured as far as possible to sell without buying, and, mainly for political reasons, found it inadvisable to make long-term loans abroad. So she too started accumulating gold. By the end of this summer she had amassed a huge reserve approximating to £500,000,000—a quarter of the world's visible supply of monetary gold, of which more than half might be considered as 'dead.' The rest of the world has had somehow to manage with the remaining quarter, and London, with its immense volume of foreign obligations, was finally left with a reserve of about £130,000,000 before the gold standard was abandoned. Small wonder, therefore, that prices continued to fall.

Beside these monetary phenomena and the general impoverishment caused by excessive tariffs there was yet another factor which accentuated the depression by pushing down prices—namely, the policy pursued by the producers of a large number of primary commodities, the most important of which was wheat. As a result of the war enormous progress was made by non-European countries in wheat-growing, especially by Canada, Argentina and Australia. Five years of fighting had devastated the agricultural production of Europe, and the greatest wheat exporting country, Russia, had been thrown out of the market by revolution. It seemed only a few years ago as if there were a real danger of food shortage, and the non-European countries gallantly came to the rescue—much, as it has turned out, to their own cost. As European agriculture gradually recovered it was carefully nursed by high protection, masquerading under the euphemism of Agrarian Reform, and during the years immediately preceding the great slump a large world surplus of wheat had begun to accumulate. In order to prevent this surplus exercising its inevitable effect upon prices, concerted attempts were made to hold supplies off the market by means of Government and bank credit, notably by the Federal Farm Board in the United States, and by the Canadian wheat pool. In 1930 Russia, in a desperate attempt to push on the Five-Year Plan, re-entered the wheat market as an exporter, so adding to the existing glut. Finally, the attempt to hold up prices in this manner became too large an undertaking, and prices fell with

calamitous rapidity. Very similar attempts were made with cotton, coffee and sugar, and before the slump set in stocks had begun to accumulate in many other primary commodities, such as copper, lead, tin, rubber, etc. As the depression deepened and the business recession in the United States and elsewhere progressed apace, consumption fell off rapidly, and, though in some cases production was restricted, the restriction was not fast enough to catch up the lag, and prices continued to show a downward tendency.

The breaking point in Europe was reached early in the summer, when the whole financial structure began to collapse under the weight of the so-called 'political' debts—*i.e.*, war debts and Reparations. Ever since the Reichstag elections last September, which showed the enormous growth in the strength of the National-Socialist Party, foreign financiers interested in Germany had begun to show signs of nervousness. It was clear that the payment of Reparations under the Young Plan could not continue indefinitely: the fall in prices had already so increased the weight of the Young annuities that they were already more burdensome than those of the Dawes Plan, which they were intended to alleviate. As unemployment increased owing to the world-wide depression, the strength of the extremist revolutionary parties began to grow at an alarming rate, and foreign money began to leave the country in a steady but still moderate stream. Meanwhile, in other European countries the effects of the depression were beginning to create alarm. The difficulties created by the fall in prices were accentuated by the cutting off of the stream of foreign (chiefly American) capital, and the movement in a tariff-ridden continent became cumulative. At the end of May the losses of the Credit-Anstalt in Vienna gave the first definite shock to the creditor nations. The rot soon spread to Germany, which, deprived of long-term capital by the cessation of American loans, had been obliged to find some sort of substitute in short-term borrowings from various sources—the United States, Great Britain, Holland, and Switzerland. The exodus of funds from Central Europe was beginning to assume panic proportions, when President Hoover intervened with his proposal for a year's moratorium—too late, as it turned out, to work the required miracle. The delay caused by the French insistence on 'political' guarantees proved fatal to the success of his beneficent scheme, and the German banking system gave way under the strain, with the result that £70,000,000 of British and considerably larger sums of American money were 'frozen' in Germany, to say nothing of smaller Swiss, Dutch, and Swedish accounts. The banking structure of all Europe east of the Rhine was threatening to collapse, and in the ensuing scramble for liquidity the

demands on London started to assume the character of a 'run.' This run was caused partly by the domestic embarrassments of foreign banks, whose positions at home as well as abroad were beginning to create difficulties, and also by a growing nervousness based on the apprehension that the stability of British finance was so undermined as to imperil the safety of sterling.

It was plain that the finance of the Socialist Government was going rapidly from bad to worse. The safety limit of direct taxation had been reached in the last Budget, which was balanced only on paper by means of optimism, raids on the Sinking Fund, and a number of other questionable devices. Month by month the current expenditure on the 'dole'—already increased in spite of the fall in prices—was being met by undisguised borrowing. The inability or the unwillingness of the Government to deal with this problem, in spite of the recommendations of the interim Report of the Royal Commission which it had itself appointed, created a bad impression. Finally, the publication of the May Report revealing a prospective deficit of £120,000,000, which has since turned out to be £50,000,000 larger, gave a shock to foreign observers, who had hitherto regarded British Budgetary finance as unimpeachable. But the mere prospect of a Budgetary deficit would scarcely have alarmed financial opinion abroad, seeing that even the United States was showing a colossal gap between revenue and expenditure. What gave grounds for a much more justifiable anxiety was the well-grounded suspicion that our balance of payments had in fact become unfavourable, and that we were visibly living above our means. In a young country rich in unexploited resources this would have been regarded as a normal procedure, but in an old country which for years had shown unmistakable signs of industrial senility it was obviously a serious matter. French opinion in particular was disturbed also by the foreign credits locked up in Germany, and the Press asserted plausibly, but in a quite misleading manner, that we had been borrowing French money cheap in order to lend it at higher rates of interest to the untrustworthy and wickedly defaulting 'Boche.' The withdrawal of funds from London, chiefly by French and American banks, thereupon began to assume alarming proportions. And though after the formation of the National Government the drain to France ceased, the general panic had gone too far to enable the situation to be saved.

Looking back on the history of the last seven years, it is plain enough where the mischief lies. The 10 per cent. deflation which finally brought the pound to its original parity proved a severe blow to British trade. It cost us the losses of the General Strike and the coal stoppage, and still at the end of these misfortunes left

our costs unadjusted to the world price level, because the political power of our trade unions was so great as to be able to resist victoriously the necessary reduction in money wages. Even if the level of world prices had not subsequently fallen owing to the causes just described, the parity of the pound could have been maintained only at the cost of much unemployment on the strength of our invisible assets, such as income from foreign investment, shipping, insurance, and financial commissions. Up to the end of 1929 these were sufficiently large to leave a substantial margin of safety. Our surplus available for foreign lending during that year is estimated to have reached close on £140,000,000. But the monetary misbehaviour of the United States and France, the policy of primary producers in most quarters of the globe, and the ever-present incubus of war debts and Reparations conspired to compass the downfall of sterling. For the calamitous descent of world prices during the past two years rapidly diminished the yield of these invisible items of our balance of payments, just at the moment when the gap between imports and exports was widening owing to the continued rigidity of money wages. By the end of last year our real surplus had dwindled to less than £40,000,000, and the persistence of the trade depression, which has affected adversely the solvency of our debtors and the income derived from foreign loans as well as our other 'invisible' earnings, has not only destroyed our remaining surplus, but even left us on balance for the moment a debtor nation.

And now that the gold pound has been abandoned, what does the future hold in store? It is plain enough that the depreciation of the currency cannot be tolerated indefinitely. The pound must not be allowed to travel the way of the mark or even of the franc. In due course it must be returned to gold at a new parity; but how, and where and when? These are questions to which we must attempt to formulate some kind of answer. It seems clear that, wisely handled, the abandonment of our old gold parity may still prove of assistance, not only to us, but to the rest of the world. During the past decade our economic life has been hampered by two main impediments, namely, the increasing weight of the National Debt and of the debenture capital and overdrafts of industry, brought about automatically by the rise in the value of money, and the steadily increasing burden of money wages, especially in the sheltered trades—*e.g.*, transport, building, retail trades, public utility services, etc.—where the absence of foreign competition has enabled us to maintain hitherto an uneconomic level of wages and prices. The sheltered trades have in fact tended to become parasitic, their real hosts being the unfortunate exporting industries, where wages have relatively been maintained at a lower (though still too high)

level by foreign competition. The *rentier* and the trade unionists have thus proved a dual incubus, which can be removed by the depreciation of the currency, but only if certain conditions can be observed. The depreciation of the currency must be strictly limited, otherwise the *rentier* will be wiped out, and with him the whole circulating capital of the nation, including all investment income from foreign loans. If the pound were allowed to sink much below $3.50, at the present level of gold prices, the effect would be definitely destructive rather than constructive. At the same time, the adjustment of money wages to the inevitable rise in prices must be prevented, or else we shall be involved in a vicious circle, the results of which will produce absolute chaos, not only in this country, but all over the world, owing to the predominant *rôle* of the sterling bill in the financing of international trade. And above all, during the process of monetary adjustment the Budget must be kept really balanced, otherwise the 'dose' of inflation cannot be controlled. Is the National Government, or indeed any Government that we are likely to get, going to be sufficiently strong to guarantee that these conditions will be observed?

But supposing this achievement is possible, however unlikely it may appear to the pessimist, we shall have accomplished two important results. The deadweight of debt upon our industries will be lightened, our labour costs will have been reduced to a competitive level, imports will to some extent have been restricted, and exports fostered and encouraged. During the process of readjustment our exporting industries ought to enjoy a differential advantage over those countries who choose to follow the dollar rather than the pound, and, provided that stabilisation is not effected at too high a level, the shock of relinking the pound to gold should not prove too serious; but it is essential that stabilisation should take place at a point where the exchange rate of the pound is definitely lower than its purchasing-power parity would justify. Such a condition is not difficult to observe, as the stabilisation of the French and Belgian currencies has shown. It is, of course, quite possible that a large number of European, and perhaps some other, countries—*e.g.*, Germany—will decide to inflate *pari passu* with us. In that case our differential advantage to our exporting industries will be gone, but the general benefit of a simultaneous rise in prices in a number of different countries would be enormous. This course of action presents two dangers: first, the danger of uncontrolled inflation on our part, and, secondly, the danger that other countries will inflate faster—a state of things which might eventually bring about a disastrous scramble of competitive inflation. The first of these dangers ought not to be difficult to avoid.

It is very much in the interest both of the United States and of France to prevent the pound falling too far. The right policy must therefore be to determine the point where we want to peg sterling, to announce this publicly to the world, and to mobilise some of our foreign assets in order to provide us with sufficient resources to hold sterling at the desired level. Provided that the Government and the Bank of England have a definite plan in their mind and carry it out resolutely, this should not prove an impossible task.

In the meantime, in order to control the run on the exchanges, immediate steps will have to be taken to deal with the balance of payments. A paper currency is always vulnerable, and the mere process of depreciation probably will not right the balance of payments sufficiently rapidly. Imports should, of course, decrease and exports increase; but will they do so with sufficient rapidity to prevent too steep a fall in the exchange value of the pound? There remain, therefore, two other methods—temporary prohibitions and tariffs. The first of these would in theory be the more effective, but for political reasons it might be difficult if not impossible to apply. It *may* therefore be necessary to fall back on tariffs—indeed, there is every indication that the politicians will make a strong effort to secure a mandate for a tariff through an early General Election. Dangerous as it undoubtedly is, a tariff may well prove economically as well as politically an unpleasant necessity. The arguments against a tariff, though weakened, are still very strong; for a tariff tends to put up prices, and our chief difficulties in the past have been due precisely to the high level of prices in our exporting industries. Moreover, tariffs tend to diminish world trade, and it may well be argued that for us to erect still another tariff wall would be merely attempting to cast out devils by Beelzebub. Nevertheless, there is good reason to suppose that in the end political forces will compel us to have a tariff, so we may as well make the best of it. It can scarcely be denied that its psychological value at the moment would be enormous. But it must be a low tariff, and it must be accompanied by a thorough reorganisation of our staple industries—especially iron and steel, cotton and wool.

Finally, it is essential that an immediate world conference should be called to consider (*a*) war debts and Reparations; (*b*) the international gold standard. With regard to the former, it should by this time be perfectly plain that these impediments to world prosperity must by hook or by crook be cleared out of the way. This need not necessarily entail absolute cancellation, though that would be the best way of dealing with them; but it does mean, in the first place, a moratorium of not less than five years, and, secondly, an enormous scaling down which would practically

amount to annulment. Above all, agreement on the first of these points must be reached with all possible speed. There are only a few months left in which to effect a settlement, otherwise it may not be possible to avoid a complete breakdown in Central Europe—social, political, and economic. This may prove very difficult to avoid, since the temper of Congress, which will not meet till the winter, is uncertain, and a Franco-German *rapprochement* still seems very remote. And for the moment British prestige is so much under a cloud owing to our financial difficulties that we have completely lost all power of initiative. But with regard to gold we are much better placed. If a competitive orgy of inflation is avoided and the world splits up in a fairly orderly fashion into two monetary systems, the pound *versus* the dollar-franc, those who follow the latter standard may soon find themselves in a very awkward position, because their prices will be too high to enable them so sell their products to an impoverished world. Moreover, so much of the financing of American trade is based upon sterling that in their own interests the United States may be compelled to take active steps to prevent sterling slipping too far by inflating their own price level to meet it. If that is so, the consequence to the world in general will be enormously beneficial. As the Macmillan Report pointed out, what is chiefly needed is a rise in world prices which will once more restore industrial activity to a normal level. If this movement were once started, it would soon gather weight, and most of the surplus stocks of raw materials, if not of foodstuffs, would rapidly disappear. For the world during the past few years has suffered enormously from under-consumption owing to the dislocation of the machinery of exchange. But to cure the symptoms alone by a monetary manipulation is not sufficient—the prime causes must also be removed; and that means besides a general lowering of tariffs the virtual abolition of all war debts (including Reparations) and a definite reversal on the part of the United States of the policy of attempting to maintain an export surplus without lending abroad on a large scale. And until some guarantee has been given that the smooth working of the monetary machine will no longer be distorted by these disturbing factors, this country will be most unwise to relink the pound to gold.

Meanwhile, it is essential that our monetary authorities should not, either out of fear or from considerations of prestige, repeat the mistake made in 1925 and attempt to relink the pound to gold at too high parity before our own internal adjustments have been properly carried through; such action would be wholly disastrous, because it could not fail in the end to bring about a further collapse, which might well prove calami-

tous. At the same time, it is no less essential to keep a firm hold upon the exchanges to prevent them slipping out of control. The way is indeed narrow, and it will certainly not be an easy one. Above all, it is essential that no consideration of party politics or muddle-headed sentiment should be permitted to prevent the necessary adjustments in real wages in this country to be made. The time will eventually come when retail prices will begin to show a rise, but this need not of itself cause much alarm. The present margin between wholesale and retail prices is much wider than is healthy, and with the pound, say, at $3·50, the appropriate level of retail prices should not be very much higher than it is to-day. But some rise is inevitable, and it is essential that it should not be accompanied by a rise in money wages, except perhaps in a few industries where the full blast of foreign competition has already driven wages down to an economic level. That, indeed, is the real danger-point. If the trade unions, whose wages policy has been the main cause of the present *débâcle*, are permitted to force up money wages when the rise in prices comes, then the door to the vicious circle of inflation will be thrown open, and nothing can prevent the country going through the bitter experience of Germany after the Armistice. The National Government, or whatever Administration succeeds it, will have to be prepared to stand firm, even at the cost of another General Strike, if the country is to be saved. Compared with this cardinal issue, tariffs are altogether a minor question, and the sooner they are relegated to the background, the better. Let us have our tariff by all means if we must; we shall then be free to set about in real earnest to do the other much more important things which are necessary to set our house in order.

C. R. S. HARRIS.

THE LABOUR PARTY FROM WITHIN

MANY people are doubtless surprised that the Labour Party, in face of a sharp cleavage of opinion among its acknowledged leaders, has taken almost solidly the side of Mr. Arthur Henderson, and come through the recent crisis without any serious division in its ranks. Indeed, in some respects, the party is more united now than it was before the crisis arose; for the dissentients of the Left Wing, headed by Mr. James Maxton, are now closer again to the main body of Labour opinion, and committed for the time to a common task of defending the working-class standard of life against the exponents of 'economy' as a remedy for the depression of trade. Yet Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Mr. Snowden and Mr. Thomas, who have been so easily and so nearly with unanimity cast forth, were three of the four outstanding leaders of the political Labour movement. Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Snowden were among the founders of the Labour Party; and Mr. Thomas was generally regarded as one of the two or three ablest negotiators the trade union movement has ever possessed.

In any ordinary political party a fraction headed by three such leaders would have been bound to command a large measure of support. They would have taken with them a large section of the party's representatives in Parliament, and at least a considerable part of its following in the country. But in fact, though a very few Labour members of the House of Commons have given Mr. MacDonald their support, and a trade union branch here and there has expressed its confidence in him or in Mr. Thomas, the rejection of their leadership appears to be as nearly universal as any general expression of opinion ever is. The overwhelming mass of organised Labour seems to be with Mr. Henderson and the party machine, and decisively against Mr. MacDonald and his colleagues.

This is partly because of the nature of the issue over which the crisis has arisen. For the demand for drastic national 'economy' necessarily presents itself to every body of wage-earners as a threat of lower wages and less employment. The issue in the mind of the ordinary trade unionist is not merely the reduction of unemployment benefit or the establishment of a means test

administered by the Poor Law authorities—though he may have strong views on both these points—but also the effect of these measures and of the policy of wage-cutting in the public services on the general level of wages in private employment. The action taken by the new 'National' Government seems to the ordinary trade unionist a direct invitation to his own employer to embark on a policy of wage-cutting—as indeed it is; while the reduction of expenditure on roads and other public works threatens to cut down the volume of employment, and to reinforce the influence of the changed administration of unemployment insurance in making harder trade union resistance to employers' demands.

Of course, it is argued on the other side that, as wages fall, prices will come down as well, and that reduced costs of production will increase employment by stimulating exports, so that the workers will be better off in the end than they can be if wages and public expenditure are kept up. But this line of argument is generally rejected by the economists who are on the Labour side; and it is in any case not easy to state in a form simple enough to make it appeal to the mass of trade union opinion. It offers at best a distant and hypothetical recompense for an immediate and obvious disadvantage; and not nearly enough has been said to convince the trade unionist of the impossibility of maintaining the *status quo* to make him ready to consider it.[1]

The trade union hostility to Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Snowden is thus mainly instinctive; and it would have been surprising in the extreme if the Trades Union Congress or the General Council had adopted any other attitude. But there is more than this in the almost solid repudiation by the Labour Party of Mr. MacDonald's leadership; and this can be fully understood only in the light of the structure and organisation of the party.

Unlike most of the Socialist parties of continental Europe, the British Labour Party is the child of the trade union movement, and depends fundamentally on its support. This is true, not merely in the sense that the creation of the party, more than thirty years ago, was formally the act of the Trades Union Congress, or that the voting strength at the party conference remains overwhelmingly with the trade unions, but also in a far deeper sense. For the forces which went to the making of the Labour Party in the decade before its formal creation were also forces which worked in and through the trade union movement, arose out of trade union grievances, and expressed themselves in a new policy which set out to make primarily a trade union appeal.

It has often been said that the real creator of the Labour Party

[1] This was written before the suspension of the gold standard made prices far more likely to rise than to fall. There will clearly be even stronger opposition to lower wages paid in devaluated pounds.

was Keir Hardie; and, while this is not completely true, it is true enough to be highly significant. For a decade before the Labour Representation Committee came into being Keir Hardie and those associated with him had been striving to bring the trade unions round to a sense of the necessity for independent political action as a means of remedying economic grievances. Their instrument in this campaign was the Independent Labour Party, founded in 1893 by the fusion of a number of small local bodies which had come into being during the three or four previous years; but Hardie and his group realised from the first that their chance of building up speedily an independent party strong enough to count in parliamentary affairs depended on their ability to bring over the trade unions bodily to their support. Hence the policy of the 'Labour Alliance' which Hardie was preaching day in and day out all through the 'nineties—meaning by the 'Labour Alliance' a formal co-operation with the small body of convinced Socialists who had made the Independent Labour Party of the organised force of the great trade unions. The creation of the Labour Representation Committee, in which the trade unions were to contribute their numbers and their financial resources and the Socialists their enthusiasm and their skill as organisers and agitators, was the consummation of Hardie's policy of the 'Labour Alliance.'

But the roots of this policy lie still further back. In the 'eighties Hardie, and many of those who worked with him, had been Liberals in politics; and the agitation of Hyndman and the Marxists of the Social Democratic Federation had made little impression upon them. For Hardie and his friends were in those early days above all trade unionists. They became Socialists only when they came to believe that organised political action was indispensable as a means of realising their trade union aims. Hardie himself was secretary and leader of a Miners' Union; and the miners had found trade unionism alone too weak to protect their wages or improve their conditions. They wanted an eight hours day, and saw their only chance of enforcing it generally in the securing of an Eight Hours Act. They wanted higher wages, protection against the effects of price fluctuations on wage rates, security of income for the miner who found himself in an 'abnormal place,' when he could not earn a reasonable living wage; and they saw their best chance of getting these things through a Minimum Wage Act. The creation of the Miners' Federation in 1888 was the effective beginning of this new policy of trying to achieve industrial ends through legislation; and it pointed directly to the creation of an independent political party to forward this policy. It was indeed long before the Miners' Federation as a national body threw in its lot collectively with

the new party of Hardie and his friends; but it is none the less true that the urge to create that party came mainly from a sense of the inadequacy of the trade union by itself as an instrument of industrial policy.

The Socialism of Hardie and his friends was thus from the outset rather a gospel of State intervention in order to increase the income and improve the conditions of the wage-earner than either a Marxian policy of transforming the basis of society through class warfare or a Fabian policy of substituting collective for individual incentives and methods in the productive system. Doubtless Hardie and the Independent Labour Party did largely absorb and preach both Marxian and Fabian doctrine. Hardie was a convinced Socialist, and so were most of his fellow-workers. But while their objective was Socialism, the immediate policy of the party which they set out to create was to be State intervention in order to improve working-class incomes and conditions of life.

Their success in converting the trade unions so soon, and bringing the Labour Party into existence with a trade union basis, was largely due to the concentration of their propaganda on objectives possessing an immediate trade union appeal. And their strategy also gave the Labour Party, when it had been created, a very definite trade union twist. It was not a Socialist Party, though it gradually came to endorse the essential Socialist doctrines. It was, and is, primarily an interventionist party, which believes in using the State as a means of raising wages, improving conditions for the workers, and redistributing incomes through taxation and the development of the social services. The 'right to work,' or to maintenance in default of work, was its first and its most popular slogan; and the system of unemployment insurance, as it now exists, is valued as at any rate in part the realisation of this policy.

The attack on the 'dole' thus appeared to the stalwarts of the Labour Party as the first step towards a reversal of the policy which they had been gradually forcing upon the State for more than a quarter of a century. For, as long as serious economic inequalities continue to exist, it seems axiomatic to the adherents of this policy that there are still taxable resources which can be taken from the rich and applied to meet the necessities of the poor. The suggestion that the State should use its power to cut the incomes of the unemployed or to influence employers to reduce wages profoundly shocks the interventionist conscience. Let the rich pay, its slogan runs. Let the rich go on paying as long as economic inequality continues to exist.

The weakness of this policy lies, of course, in its negative character. It does not challenge directly the capitalist organisation of the economic system, or set out immediately to replace it

by something else. It therefore depends for its effectiveness on the ability of capitalism to adapt itself to a level of taxation sufficient to develop social services and bring about a progressive improvement in working-class conditions. This, on the whole, capitalism has so far been able to do, not only without serious embarrassment, but even, until quite lately, without any appreciable modification of economic inequalities. But since the war this policy has been subjecting the capitalist system to a steadily increasing strain; and the coming of the world depression has made it, if not impossible, at any rate very difficult, in the absence of positive doses of Socialism and a frontal attack on economic inequality. For capitalism depends fundamentally on the incentive of profit; and if for any reason the net profits of the capitalist *entrepreneur* fall too low to make it worth his while to expand production, the results are soon seen in under-investment and the growth of a vast body of unemployed whom the State is thus required to maintain.

This situation can arise while there are still plenty of rich people left, and high profits still being made in certain industries and services. It can coexist, and does coexist to-day, with an actual rise in the incomes of those who depend on salaries and fixed interest charges, and above all of the holders of the National Debt. It can therefore happen that, while the *entrepreneurs* are saying that wages must come down, or they will stop producing, the statesmen of the Labour Party are pointing an accusing finger at the *rentier*, and saying that it is monstrous to cut down unemployment benefits or wages as long as so much obvious economic surplus remains untaxed.

This is essentially the position to-day. The Labour Party, which consists chiefly of a large number of trade unions federated together with the cement of a small body of organised Labour politicians, is held solidly in opposition to the policy of national 'economy,' based on the preservation of existing class inequalities. The Trades Union Congress, seeing itself faced with the prospect of a disastrous series of fights against wage reductions, reinforces its instinctive hostility with the demand that the State shall side with the worker, and appeals to the familiar doctrine that taxation should fall ever increasingly upon the surpluses of the rich and be used even more drastically for improving the conditions of the poor. Instinct and traditional policy thus go together; and it would be astonishing if such allies could not command overwhelming support.

For the mass of the Labour Party's followers reflection hardly advances beyond this point. But the leaders at any rate are compelled to carry their thinking at least a stage further. For they are bound to be aware that the capitalist system can only

be made to work if the *entrepreneur* is allowed to retain a sufficient reward to induce him to remain at his post and employ labour, even if this reward takes the form of an economic surplus which the leaders of Labour regard as morally indefensible.

What then? One of two things, or rather of two policies, which have both their adherents in the ranks of the Opposition. Either means must be found of taxing the surpluses of the *rentiers*, while leaving a sufficient incentive to the profit-maker, or the capitalist system must be rapidly and decisively dismantled and replaced by something else. The predominant mood of the Trades Union Congress seemed to favour the former of these policies, and doubtless the same mood will preponderate at this month's Labour Party Conference. Special taxation of *rentier* incomes will be demanded, reinforced by changes in banking policy which will lower their real value while giving the *entrepreneur* a chance of widening his margin between costs and profits. Devaluation and currency expansion will be invoked as means of making the present economic system work, and of enabling the traditional interventionist policy to be carried on. And certainly, until these methods have been tried, advocacy of them is likely to command the largest measure by far of working-class support.

Criticism will come chiefly from Mr. Maxton and his associates of the Independent Labour Party. For they are the most vocal representatives of the school of thought which has come round to the view that capitalism cannot any longer be made to work in such a way as to yield an increasing surplus for distribution in higher wages and expanded social services, and that accordingly the efforts of the Labour Party and the trade unions should be directed to smashing capitalism rather than to bolstering it up. It is true that the propaganda of the Independent Labour Party consists largely in outbidding the official Labour Party in its demands for further doses of interventionism. It is always saying that wages ought to be raised, unemployment benefits raised, taxes graduated more steeply, and so on; and it is always determined to be a yard or two ahead of everyone else in its demands. But, of late years, the Independent Labour Party has almost admitted that it does not expect its claims to be granted, and that they cannot be granted without bringing capitalism to the ground. It has thus in reality passed beyond the traditional policy of interventionism to an advocacy of positive 'Socialism in our time.' But it has not succeeded either in making the nature of its positive Socialism at all clear, or in impressing its sense of the obsolescence of interventionism on the main body of the movement. It has chosen to ask for things it believes to be impossible because it believes that the surest way to destroy capitalism is to get the workers to demand things that capitalism

cannot grant. This may be sound destructive strategy, but it is hardly compatible with the working out and propaganda of a constructive Socialist policy. That is why the Independent Labour Party policy has tended to miss fire. It has angered the main body of official Labour opinion by appearing to be intent merely on outbidding it; and it has failed to make clear even to its own followers that its strategy is based on the assumption that capitalism is doomed to speedy death.

In voting strength within the Labour Party the Independent Labour Party counts for almost nothing. The great mass vote of the trade unions can ride over it, and indeed over the whole party, whenever it is itself tolerably united. But the Independent Labour Party still counts for something, in Scotland especially, in the formulation of policy and in the moulding of Labour opinion. It counts for less than it did—much less; but its members still do a good deal of the hard, unpaid work of the local Labour parties in the constituencies, and have a much higher level of political interest and activity than the general run of Labour Party members. They have, indeed, been gradually losing their pre-eminence in these respects in recent years. Up to 1918 the Labour Party itself, save in a few isolated constituencies, had no individual members; so that the individual who wanted to take an active part in Labour politics usually became almost automatically a member of the Independent Labour Party. In 1918, however, under Mr. Henderson's leadership, the Labour Party decided to admit individual members, to proclaim itself the party of the workers 'by hand and brain,' and to set up all over the country a network of local Labour parties, each with its individual members' section as well as its affiliated trade union branches and other bodies.

One very important result of this change was an immense increase in the activity of women in the Labour Party; for the women now had their own sections to balance the predominant masculinity of the trade unions. Another was to deprive the Independent Labour Party of its old position, as virtually the individual members' section, and to compel it to work out for itself a new status within the party. This has proved to be a painful and difficult process; for the Independent Labour Party has become under these conditions more and more a left wing opposition claiming the right of criticism and independent action on its own. Indeed, so strained had relations become as to render it at least possible that, if Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Snowden had not broken away on the right, the Independent Labour Party would have broken away by now on the left.

If they had done this, it is safe to say that they would have found themselves almost, though not quite, as isolated as Mr.

MacDonald and Mr. Snowden are to-day. For the trade unions, and the great bulk of Labour Party members, would have been no readier to follow Mr. Maxton than Mr. MacDonald. Mr. Maxton and Mr. MacDonald agree, I fancy, in holding that the capitalist orange has been sucked almost dry, though they draw quite different deductions from the belief. But the great mass of the Labour Party certainly does not yet hold this view. It is not prepared either to 'economise' with Mr. MacDonald, or to 'revolutionise' with Mr. Maxton.

My purpose in this article is not to discuss the rights or wrongs of the several policies that are contending for dominance, but simply to bring out their relationship to the history, structure, and organisation of the Labour Party itself. Still less am I attempting to appraise the personal merits of the different leaders, or their personal influence on the movement of opinion. It doubtless makes the solidarity of the opposition far easier to achieve that Mr. Arthur Henderson, with his incomparable knowledge of the Labour Party machine and his supreme tactical ability, placed himself at its head. But I think the result would have been the same in the long run, though it would not have been achieved so easily or so soon, if Mr. Henderson had been on the opposite side. In that case, certainly a few more Labour members of Parliament would have rallied to Mr. MacDonald. But the attitude of the Trades Union Congress would not have been altered; and the great bulk of Labour opinion in the country would have gone with the trade unions. Indeed, even if the entire Cabinet had supported Mr. MacDonald, and there had been an attempt by a Labour Government to carry through the policy which is now being pursued by the 'national' coalition, I believe the results would have been the speedy fall of the Labour Government from office through the withdrawal of its own followers' support, both in Parliament and in the country.

Personalities count for far less in the Labour Party than in the older parties. This is chiefly because the Labour Party has a far more closely knit and formal organisation, which makes the determination of policy much more a collective matter, and so leaves less scope for leadership; but it is also partly because the policy of Labour as a party is largely predetermined by its class basis. Some people regard this as its weakness, and hold that it prevents it from being a truly national party. But it is in reality the chief source of its strength, and its main protection against the faction fighting which has so often torn Continental Socialist parties asunder. For the trade unions on which the party is based know from sufficient experience the indispensable necessity of unity in fighting their industrial battles; and they are inclined to look at politics with the same eyes as industry,

and to regard as a potential blackleg any politician who threatens to push his political differences to the point of risking a split. Only in the very last resort would they be driven to divide their forces under rival leaders on account of a difference of opinion. The minority would, as a rule, far sooner give up its own opinion, and act with the majority, than sacrifice unity.

This, of course, could not hold the Labour Party together in face of a really fundamental cleavage on an issue covering a wide field of policy. If, for example, the issue between trying to make the capitalist system work and setting out definitely and immediately to break it up had to be faced in the most direct and naked form, and if opinion were fairly evenly divided, a split would doubtless become inevitable. But unless the division of opinion was fairly equal, the minority would probably acquiesce even on so fundamental a matter rather than break away. That is why Communism has so far counted for so little in Great Britain; for even theoretical believers in the Communist policy refuse in many cases to push their convictions to the length of a divorce from the main body of the organised working-class movement. And certainly the present crisis, so far from bringing a cleavage on this issue nearer, makes it for the time far more unlikely than before, by uniting both Right and Left in hostility to Mr. MacDonald and the 'National' Government. For the time, though Mr. Maxton and the Independent Labour Party will continue to criticise Mr. Henderson and the official party caucus for being far too moderate, they will be as careful not to push their differences too far as the Labour Party will be wary of pursuing disciplinary measures against the Independent Labour Party skirmishers.

In short, the Labour Party, while it extends its appeal to all, is fundamentally a trade union party because the cement that holds it together is its advocacy of a higher standard of income for the working classes. There are, of course, many poor people outside the trade unions; and the Labour Party is equally committed to working for the advancement of their standard of life. But when a big issue affecting the standard of living arises, the trade unions necessarily appear as the protagonists of the poorer classes; and the Labour Party is bound to be on their side, if it is not to lose its chief appeal and the greater part of its following. If to be this is to be a class party, then the Labour Party is a class party; and I for one am glad that it is so. But a class party in this sense is by no means of necessity a Socialist Party, in the sense of wishing practically and immediately for the supersession of capitalism by a Socialist system. In this sense the Labour Party, even in its new orientation, is certainly not yet Socialist. The next few years will show whether the enforcement of the policy of 'economy' and the growing difficulty of pursuing

the policy I have called 'interventionism' under adverse world conditions, and in face of growing resistance from the business world, will drive it solidly to Socialism as the only alternative, or in the end cause a split between the Socialist and the non-Socialist elements. I think and hope that the first of these two things will happen; for I put my trust in the capacity of the trade unions for holding together even when there are sharp differences of opinion. But my Socialist wish may be father to the thought; for certainly the bulk of the Labour rank and file is still a long way from Socialism in the constructive sense in which I am using the term. It is still interventionist; and it has still to realise the increasing difficulties in the way of the interventionist policy.

G. D. H. COLE.

THE SECOND ROUND

IN November 1926 the decline of the British Empire, which began in 1910, seemed at length to have been arrested. Six months earlier the Trade Union Congress had made its long-threatened attack upon democratic government and had failed ignominiously. Another political body, the Miners' Federation, had for the second time been prevented from forcing the workers in all other industries to pay a heavy tribute to the coal miners through the medium of statutory conditions of work involving a subsidy from the taxpayer. The attempts of the Press, the Socialist Party in Parliament, Mr. Lloyd George, and sundry bishops to save the Miners' Federation from defeat had all been countered. Even the efforts of Mr. Winston Churchill, during his momentary leader's absence in August, to restore the power and the prestige of that body had proved abortive. A great industry had been saved from what the Report of the Coal Commission truthfully termed 'collapse,' and political trade unionism seemed to have been finally broken. We had selected the most powerful political trade unions in the country, backed by the immense resources of ignorant emotionalism mobilised by the Press, and had deliberately set to work to bring to an economic level the hours and wages in the industry concerned. We had succeeded, and in the confusion of conflict had rolled in the dust, not only several other political trade unions, but even the Trade Union Congress itself. The total cost to the nation of this operation probably amounted to little less than £300,000,000 sterling. The cost to myself was a fortune and a political career. But the victory was so complete that the nation might well have experienced a satisfaction equal to that which made my loss seem negligible.

For the future, it seemed, every worker was free to enjoy the reward of his labour. No longer would any man be compelled to surrender part of each week's wages to workers in other industries who were fortunate enough to be able to use political influence to rob their weaker neighbours. Political trade unionism was dead, and we were free therefore to deal with the problem of political capitalism, to prevent the use of Parliament for the creation of transport monopolies, for the squandering of

immense sums of money on schemes which could apparently be of little advantage to anyone save the manufacturers of electrical machinery and cables, and for the imposition of import duties designed to render possible the reflotation of industrial derelicts with enormous gain to the promoters. There rose in us the great hope that England, alone among nations, was about to effect that purge of democracy which is essential if it is not to go down in putrefaction.

At the end of 1926 the Miners' Federation was broken and the Trade Union Congress reduced to impotence. Yet now, before five years have passed, we find the Miners' Federation powerful enough once more by political means to bring the coal industry to the verge of bankruptcy, and the Trade Union Congress reinvigorated to such a degree that it again threatens our system of representative government, and is perhaps about to use its power, not as before to ruin one industry, but to destroy all industries in a single cataclysm. There was no natural vitality in either of those bodies. Founded on puerile economic fallacies, and directed by persons whose talents seem to have sufficed only to establish their own material comfort while reducing to destitution their unhappy constituents, both those institutions were incapable of surviving their defeat, had they lacked prompt aid from without.

That aid was early at hand. The Mineowners' Association fell straight into a pitfall dug for it by the Socialist Government, and was made the actual agent of the revival of the Miners' Federation. As far as it was in its power to do so, and in spite of the most urgent warnings, the Association took steps which render almost inevitable a repetition of the events of 1926.

In the matter of the restoration of the Trade Union Congress it is well that the reader should know who are responsible for the fact that the nation is now confronted with the possibility of that repetition, and should appreciate a danger to our liberties against which I have been warning the public vainly for years, and which now constitutes an instant peril, not the less in that it is sedulously encouraged by the Press. The danger in question is that which arises from an unholy alliance between what may be termed political capitalism and the political trade unionism of which we have already experienced the enormous capacity for evil. This alliance has revivified the Trade Union Congress and has placed it once more in possession of the power to bring ruin on industry and misery on the workers.

Political capitalism came to birth in the manner following. The increasing impoverishment of those families which stood highest in the social life of the country, and the immense enrichment of many persons of humble origin and yet more lowly

reputation, had from the date of the 'People's Budget' rendered material wealth a far less effective social ladder than it was when large incomes and social standing were commonly found together. Hence those who, seizing the opportunity afforded by the agony of the world at war and shutting the gates of mercy on mankind, accumulated great fortunes and added titles to the sum of their shame found that they could not buy the possession which they desired above all others. Their money and their abnormal capacity for erecting a gigantic pyramid of share capital upon an apex of the most exiguous earning power failed to gain for them admission within the pale. Baffled in their ambitions and unable to enter the social heaven even to serve, they set about making an industrial hell wherein to reign.

Thus was political capitalism born, and its first task is the linking together of several concerns in one of our industries, with the consequent issue of vast numbers of shares. Any person who achieves this feat on a large scale, however rotten and top-heavy the resulting amalgamation may be, is now acclaimed as a national hero, and public opinion is loath to regard with aught but blind adulation the subsequent activities of such a benefactor. Hence, when over-capitalisation threatens collapse if monopoly be not attained, neither odium nor opposition obstructs the manœuvres of those who endeavour to secure monopoly by political influence. The Trade Union Congress, as is manifested by recent events, exercises complete domination over the Labour Party in Parliament. An alliance, therefore, with that body renders it possible for the promoters of any large industrial combine to gain the assistance of legislative or administrative action with a view to the creation of a monopoly so complete as to justify what would otherwise constitute very heavy over-capitalisation.

An attempt to effect this object some years ago was defeated in Parliament, perhaps because it was so crude and obvious that I was able to convince Conservative members that the danger existed. But another attempt, aided by a providential strike, was more successful, and a considerable area of the country is now subjected to an almost complete monopoly in an essential public service.

The advantage to the company promoter (now commonly termed a captain of industry) of such an alliance with political trade unionism is evident, since it gives him parliamentary support for legislation favouring his designs. But the benefit to the Trade Union Congress is less obvious to those who are unaware of the difficulty experienced by modern trade unionism in maintaining a membership large enough to provide the money and the votes which keep it alive. That difficulty was greatly

accentuated by Mr. Lloyd George's policy of taking from the trade unions practically all their beneficent functions and thus reducing them to the position of collecting societies for maintaining professional politicians in comfort. Labour exchanges, health and unemployment insurance, Minimum Wage Acts, and old age pensions testify to the usurpation of trade union functions by the State. The number of workers who join a trade union voluntarily becomes, therefore, less and less, and methods of compulsion have to be adopted in order to secure recruits for an institution which, no matter what its other merits be, cannot reasonably be termed beneficial to the workers. Free competition in an industry, particularly in the case of one which can be successfully conducted in small units, tends to weaken the domination of the trade union over the worker. The latter, in these instances, is frequently capitalist as well as wage-earner, and on that account anathema to such as compose the General Council of the Trade Union Congress. If these small concerns can be crushed by monopoly politically induced, it is easy to persuade the promoter of the combine to refuse employment to any non-unionist.

Again, if an industrial council, armed with statutory powers, is set up to govern an industry, and if a combine controls a considerable proportion of the capital in that industry, then an alliance of the combine with the appropriate trade union has a perpetual majority on that council. Thereafter, on the one hand, all competitors can be crushed and the monopoly rendered complete with the public at its mercy. On the other hand, the workers in that industry can be compelled by their employers to surrender every particle of their liberty to their trade union task-masters.

It would be possible, merely by quotations from the newspapers and from the official reports of parliamentary debates, to compile a mass of evidence which could hardly fail to convince the reader that in one instance the above method of enslaving the worker no less than the consumer has been triumphantly successful, and that the success has been attained only through legislation. In another case, as already stated, I was able to prevent the passage of the required legislation and the whole scheme failed. In a third the attempt has also for the moment been unsuccessful. But in the last instance the tactics adopted by the promoters unhappily involved a vast amount of propaganda which has largely neutralised the effect of what we achieved in 1926, thus restoring the Trade Union Congress to its former position of dominance over the worker and of importance in the eyes of the public and the Press. The keen observer of industrial and political history during the last five years will find it difficult indeed to disagree with my conclusion that reckless and ambitious

company promoters, in their desire to dominate where they cannot please, have rendered possible, even probable, a repetition of the unhappy events of 1926.

We have, therefore, to face the fact that the Trade Union Congress may again endeavour to override the decisions of Parliament by creating financial and industrial chaos. It is customary now to deny the possibility of another General Strike, and to ridicule the suggestion that the trade union 'bosses' would again be obeyed. Those of us who have long and intimate experience of industry know but too well that there is no folly or wickedness which the Trade Union Congress can order without the certainty of obedience from its unfortunate victims.

The strength of the position of the Trade Union Congress will be appreciated after an examination of its manifesto issued on the occasion of the formation of the present Coalition Government. It is evident that the writers thereof have grasped two of the main truths of the situation. They declare that the Socialist Government was broken up by the bankers, and that a reduction of benefit under the Unemployment Insurance Acts is the prelude to lower wage rates in industry. Thus far they are right, and it is only when they attempt to attribute motives to the active parties in the matter that their manifesto becomes in some degree ridiculous.

The Socialist Government, subserved by Mr. Lloyd George, had shown itself able to repel in the House of Commons the ineffective attacks of the Conservative Opposition, whose neglect of the opportunity afforded by the Coal Mines Bill displayed a lack of ability in tactics equalled only by its weakness in assault. An effective Opposition could undoubtedly have rendered untenable the position of a Government which had entered into an alliance with a section of the mineowners in order by legislation to create a corner in the house-coal market whereby to fleece the consumer. But the opportunity was missed and the rake's progress continued. It became manifest, therefore, that the Conservative Party was incapable by parliamentary action of rescuing the industries of Great Britain from the vampires of taxation and legislation which were rapidly draining their life-blood. The cotton industry was fast disappearing, the coal export trade was dwindling away, shipbuilding had almost ceased, the iron and steel industry was collapsing, and the only section of the engineering trade which prospered was that fed artificially by the taxpayer through the national electricity scheme. Had a Royal Commission been set up to report upon any one of those industries its verdict must inevitably have been the same as that of the Coal Commission of 1926: 'We come reluctantly but unhesitatingly to the conclusion that the costs of production,

with the present hours and wages, are greater than the industry will bear.' Yet the continuance of unemployment benefit at a high level ruled out the possibility of any appreciable reduction of those costs. In other words, the political power of the non-workers, organised by the Labour Party, had enabled them to impose upon the workers a burden which the latter could no longer sustain.

Even since the collapse of industry in 1920 the banks had been carrying the weight of innumerable moribund industrial concerns, unwilling by drastic though salutary action to precipitate a crisis of which it was impossible to estimate the ultimate extent. The German financial *débâcle* in the early summer of the present year placed a sudden and violent additional strain on their resources. This strain was temporarily alleviated by their success in persuading President Hoover at the eleventh hour to make his pronouncement regarding a moratorium for war debts. But the subsequent raising of the Bank rate failed to exercise its normal effect, and an extension of the fiduciary issue, together with the securing of French and American stabilisation credits, barely sufficed to avert a panic in August. Further devices to maintain the sterling exchange could not be avoided, but the necessary foreign credits were not available so long as their ultimate destination was the bottomless pit of the dole.

Once again, as in August 1926, the fate of the country was in the hands of a few private individuals, who were compelled to make decisions for a Government which had ceased to govern. We, whose business it is to provide work and wages for a number of our fellow-citizens, watched these affairs with the utmost anxiety, doubting that the Bank might be restrained by precedent and convention from doing what alone could save our men from destitution. Fortunately love of country overcame conventional propriety, and the heads of the two chief ostriches were forcibly dragged out of the sand. Disaster could be avoided only by an instant reversal of the policy to whose advocacy the Prime Minister and the Chancellor had devoted their lives, and which had at length been put into practice. Bombastic talk and fine gestures were now useless, for the talkers were confronted by determined men of action and were compelled to understand what measures must be taken to avert widespread starvation and civil strife. Again it appeared that the immediate danger was over, and that the reconstruction of prosperity might begin.

In the excitement of the moment, however, we had entirely forgotten that a Socialist Government must submit its proposals for the approval of the Trade Union Congress before it can ask Parliament to endorse them. This necessary step of procedure under our Constitution was, therefore, taken. Mr. Hayday and

his colleagues withheld their approval, decided that no financial crisis existed, and stated that in any event the Government must wait a few weeks so that the question could finally be settled at their annual meeting. Mr. Hayday, Mr. Tillett, Mr. Cook, and other experts would then review the financial situation and would issue their orders to the Cabinet. Almost all the members of the latter body acknowledged the propriety of these instructions, and left their leader in the ditch which he and they had digged.

It is unnecessary for our purpose further to recount the history of recent events, and it would be improper to relate by what agency the Prime Minister was (if metaphor be permitted) picked up, dusted, and put back on his perch. What concerns us is that the Trade Union Congress asserted its right to decide what a Socialist Prime Minister may or may not do, and that the right in question was rendered ineffective for harm to the nation by the fact that the statesman in question had received his first lesson in national finance from the Bank assisted by the Treasury. To that extent the writers of the Congress manifesto were not in error. For it is evident that, if the Bank had not taken very strong measures, the late Government would have allowed the situation to pass beyond human control.

Again, in its other main allegation, the manifesto is not seriously inaccurate, excepting in regard to the method of presentation, which was clearly designed to raise passion to the highest pitch possible. The words which immediately concern us are these: 'Unemployment benefit is attacked' (by the Coalition Government) 'on the ground that it strengthens resistance to wage reductions.' Now, manifestly it is unfair to credit the members of the present Government with the possession of enough foresight to enable them to see that a reduction of the dole will have any effect other than the saving of a few millions in the national expenditure. No sinister motive can, therefore, justly be attached to their policy. On the other hand, the statement cited would be entirely true if it were so amended as to read thus: 'Resistance to the reduction of money wage rates to an economic level cannot be overcome so long as unemployment benefit remains as at present.' That does not, indeed, describe the intention of the Government, but it most certainly indicates the condition essential to national recovery, and to this matter we may well address ourselves, distasteful though the truth may be.

Since we contrived to restore financial equilibrium by acquiring a few more debts, we have breathed an atmosphere uncongenial to unpleasant truths. The newspapers have invited the public to wallow in false sentiment, and the invitation has been accepted with enthusiasm. We are bidden to applaud the courage which enables three architects of disaster to exchange a life of service

to a discredited party for a position which is the antechamber to the House of Lords, and gives a claim to those posts of honour which are reserved for proved incompetence in office.

But to continue to catalogue the cant of the moment would induce uncontrollable nausea, so the reader will be spared further examples. Reference to the matter was made merely to remind him that the first stage to recovery is the freeing of our minds from cant so that we may face with courage the industrial situation of our country. The salient feature of that situation is the fact that, in most of our large industries, the economic wage is less than the dole. That is to say, if costs of production in any one of those industries were to be reduced to such a level that the whole of the personnel and plant now attached thereto could be fully utilised, then the corresponding money wage per family would be less than the total amount of dole receivable by the whole family when unemployed. Looking at the matter from another aspect, we may state the case thus: political trade unionism has been successful in its aim and has fixed money wages at amounts in excess of the value of the product of labour.

Thus simplified, the facts of economics appear forbidding. But there is a necessary corollary to be added in this form: if money wages in all industries were allowed to fall to an economic level, the consequent decline in retail prices would render it possible to maintain a standard of living not seriously lower than that which prevails at present. In such circumstances retail prices would rapidly acquire a just relation to wholesale prices, the existing wide discrepancy being due mainly to inflated wage rates and the artificially subsidised purchasing power of the unemployed.

The unemployment insurance system has thus not only created the present crisis, but also renders it impossible for us to emerge from it. For it is in reality nothing else than a device for preventing money wages from being reduced when wholesale prices fall. If, then, we reduce the amount of the benefit, to that extent we make it possible for wage rates to be brought to a lower level. The consequent effect, added to the reduced spending power of the unemployed, would be to bring down retail prices. Further reductions of the dole would then cause the cycle to be repeated, until ultimately everyone worth a wage would be in employment. When the Conservative Government passed legislation which, in effect, somewhat reduced the dole the numbers of the unemployed at once began steadily to decrease. When the Socialist Government reversed that policy and increased the dole the numbers at once began to rise. Cause and effect rarely exhibit so perfect and so swift a relation as they have done in this case, and everyone is well aware that further increases of unemployment benefit would result in further increases of the unemployed. Yet politicians of every party refuse to admit this. During the discussions in Parliament of innumerable Unemployment Insurance Bills I have repeatedly, but vainly, put forward the above simple and obvious facts, and even now the spokesmen of the Coalition are inclined to deny that a reduction of unemployment benefit must inevitably be followed by a fall in wage rates to a level nearer to that at which more employment becomes possible. The reduction of benefit effected by the present Government is of course almost useless, particularly as it is accompanied by an increase of premium, which adds a further burden to the load which is already too great for industry to bear. The stricter administration which is promised will undoubtedly have a much greater effect and may even reduce by as much as half a million the official figures of the unemployed. But the real problem has not been faced. The task which now confronts all industries is the same as that which was tackled by the coal-mining industry in 1926—the reduction of wage rates to an economic level—while the Trade Union Congress and the Labour Party threaten revolution if any effective steps are taken.

Having taken an active part in restoring the coal-mining industry to an economic level in 1926, and having by good fortune expressed neither in the House of Commons, nor on the platform, nor in the Press, anything but the strongest disapproval of those measures of extravagance which are now generally recognised as the direct cause of the present troubles, I am encouraged to think that I may without undue presumption submit suggestions touching the remedies to be applied. Moreover, I can justly claim that for many years I have been testing on a considerable scale in my own workshops the methods advocated.

The main problem, as I have already indicated, lies in the necessity for reducing wage rates to such a level that retail prices will have a reasonable relation to the wholesale prices of imported primary commodities. Then, and only then, shall we be able to bring down the numbers of men out of work to such a figure that it will be possible to repeal the whole of the Unemployment Insurance Acts. This, it must be noted, is to be accomplished without civil war and without a dictatorship, in face of the most desperate resistance by political trade unionism embodied in the Trade Union Congress.

As the solution of this problem which I am about to propound may, at first sight, appear to be wildly impracticable, I must remind the reader that I am no cloistered scholar or compiler of idealistic day-dreams, but have spent the whole of my life (if I may be allowed a colloquialism) in the closest possible contact with brass tacks. In the rough and tumble of politics, war,

industry, municipal work, and philosophy I have chosen to fight without allies, but with some measure of success, and have always dealt exclusively with the realities of men and things. Every fresh experience and experiment has but served to convince me that, when the daemon simply re-echoes voices from Kapilavastu, Nazareth, and Athens, it were folly not to give heed to him. What he now tells me is this—that 'equality of sacrifice' is a phrase embodying a great delusion, and that only a vast inequality of sacrifice can enable us to solve the problem stated above, together with the other problems of to-day.

The matter at this stage is not one for Parliament to handle, but must be taken in hand by us who direct industry. For the present let the politicians belabour one another with their little wooden swords, and play with their tariffs and other childish toys, until we are ready for them to sweep away the Augean dunghill of legislation which has accumulated since the rise of 'Lloyd Georgeism' in 1910. Meanwhile, we who give orders in industry must make it certain that our orders in industry will for the future be obeyed, so that the workers may be saved from the destitution and slavery which Socialism has prepared for them. Industrial strife arises from the fact that Jack proclaims himself as good as his master and is able to justify that claim because the master makes no attempt to be better than Jack.

Fortunately our workmen can be trusted to take all that they can get and to give as little as possible in return. Hence it is easy for the employer to establish that inequality of sacrifice which alone can give him a claim to be obeyed. The one thing needful is that men should have leaders, and the only real leader is he who claims the heaviest burden and the least reward.

I offer no Pharpar or Abana, but rather a lowly stream whose hydrotherapeutic qualities I happen to have proved by experiment. It may be that there are rivers of Damascus equally effective. I claim no monopoly for Jordan. But I do insist that we employers of labour must wash seven times in some river or other without further delay.

AUSTIN HOPKINSON.

PROSPECTS OF THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE

IN these troublous times it needs some audacity to discuss the future of any political negotiations. Every day some upheaval may shake new patterns in the kaleidoscope, and with home politics so uncertain the writer must be excused if he deals chiefly with the actions and interactions of the Indian groups attending the Conference. Travelling back from India with some of the leading delegates he was struck by their pessimism, especially amongst the Hindus. The first session had been unexpectedly successful. A constructive scheme was put forward and provisionally accepted for a Federal Government which would give Indians a new status in the world. The delegates were, however, haunted all the time by the idea that they were producing a paper Constitution which would never function, that their work would be ruined by the Congress Party, by communal disputes, by dissident Princes, or by a change of Government in England. When the first delegates left India for the Federal Structure Sub-committee on August 15 the Congress was still holding aloof, and they looked back on eight months marked by increasing tension between Hindus and Moslems, by the Maharajah of Patiala's declaration against the Federal proposals, and by much general criticism of their work in London. They saw themselves returning to controversies which had grown more bitter in the interval, and to negotiations with a British Government which they imagined would be preoccupied and less sympathetic than previously. It is easy to understand their depression, but although the immediate future is extremely complicated, and the first session left many dangerous problems unsettled, there would seem to be sufficient grounds for cautious optimism.

The presence of Mr. Gandhi is of great importance. For many reasons the participation of the Congress Party is valuable, apart from any contribution which its delegates will make. The other Hindu representatives are acutely conscious that they have no organised political following. Nearly all of them have spent many years in public life, but the party system is in a most rudimentary state in India, and apart from the Congress leaders and one or

two Moslems, like Maulana Shaukat Ali, very few Indians have made any real bid for popular support. This explains why men like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar, though far better qualified than any Congress leaders to carry on the Conference work, were so anxious for their attendance. Even if Mr. Gandhi decided to withdraw during the Conference because he feels that its decisions are outside the very vague 'mandate' which he has received from the Congress, it would mean that his objections to the work done at the Congress would be narrowed down to some definite issues, about which the Congress might or might not be united. In any case, the non-Congress delegates would be in a far stronger position when they returned to India, and they will now feel that the work they are doing is not of the same provisional nature as last year. This will also help to solve certain points in dispute between different sections of the Indian delegation. The Hindu and Moslem leaders, for example, are more likely to put all their cards on the table when they are sure that this will be the final session of the Conference.

Another factor which may help towards a settlement is that the last eight months have done much to impress upon the public in India that the first, and probably the hardest, task of the Conference is to produce a workable Constitution, and to ensure its stability during its early years. An idea has, of course, been sedulously put forward by the Congress Party that the main object of the Conference is to draw up a peace treaty between India and England, and that Mr. Gandhi is the plenipotentiary for India. Events of the last eight months should have been sufficient to dispel any illusion on this score. The points at issue between the British Government and the advocates of an Indian Federal Government are far simpler and easier to adjust than those which have already arisen between representatives of 'British India' and of the States, or between various religious groups. This fact is now recognised by every serious Indian politician. The two sub-committees, which are meeting before the plenary session and are universally considered the most important, deal with 'Federal Structure' and 'Minorities.' Both are primarily concerned with differences between sections of Indian opinion, and in neither case has the Congress Party a policy which is generally accepted even in British India. To anyone who has been in India during the last twelve months it has been evident that while the Congress Party does represent a widespread desire for a change of status and for the introduction of responsible government both in the Provinces and at Delhi, it certainly cannot speak either for the Moslems or for a considerable section of lower caste Hindus when it is a question of deciding the form which that government will take. Partly owing to internal dissensions, and

to Mr. Gandhi's mishandling of the communal question, the Congress Party has definitely lost ground since its Karachi meeting, and there is a growing tendency to take a more moderate and realistic view of the problems now facing the Conference.

The phrase, constantly used during the first session, about 'filling in the picture' was not altogether happy. It suggests that all the proposals made for a new Constitution were vague and sketchy. On some points the first Conference came to very definite conclusions, notably on the future of the Provisional Governments, which are to have fully responsible Cabinets answerable to directly elected Legislatures, and no Government *bloc*. Even with regard to the Central Government it would have been possible to draft a Government of India Bill on the findings of the first Conference, but it would have meant that the British Government would have had to make arbitrary decisions on four points—the terms under which the Indian States will come into the Federation, the representation and protection of certain religious groups, the emergency powers of the Viceroy and the Provincial Governors, and the prevention of discrimination against British trading interests. These are the main questions which have now to be faced, first in sub-committees and then in the plenary session, and they will probably arise in this order. Only on the last point is there likely to be a direct conflict between English and Indian interests, and on none can one hope for complete agreement, even amongst the delegates from British India. Owing to the absence of organised parties in Indian politics it is difficult to find moderate men with anything more than a local reputation, and the Conference is full of men who are identified with some extreme view. It is inevitable that certain questions will have to be settled by the British Government adopting a middle course, knowing that after the extremists have had their say the Constitution will have quite enough support to be workable and stable.

The terms of Federation may yet prove to be the most difficult of all the questions on which a compromise must be reached. Until recently Indian Nationalists have always thought in terms of British India only. They may have talked about the ultimate possibility of Federation, but, like the Simon Commission, they imagined that this could only materialise in the distant future. The more optimistic hoped to avoid the need of Federation altogether, believing that once they got responsible government for the Provinces they could establish a strong Central Government for British India and force the States to come under its control. They envisaged the gradual mediatising of the States and their merging into the Provinces. The declaration made last year by the Maharajah of Bikanir not only forced the hand of the British

Government by making them consider the immediate grant of responsibility in the Central Government, but it also upset the plans of the Congress Party. The latter could not deny the possibility of Federation after the Princes had made their offer, and after this had been accepted by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and the other Indian delegates. They have not, however, given up their idea of a strong Central Government controlling the Provinces, and if possible the States. The Princes are equally determined that as much sovereignty as possible shall be left with the federating units, whether Provinces or States, and that the Central Government will only undertake such work as is strictly necessary, such as defence, the control of currency, foreign relations, tariff policy, etc. They picture the Federal Government as the 'agent' of the various units, to which they would send their nominees, and the Provinces their representatives.

It must be confessed that in the first session the Princes had matters very much their own way. They were well organised, and had an able group of representatives, most of whom had had far more experience of actual administration than the British Indian delegates. These advantages, combined with the fact that they had taken the initiative in demanding a federal form of government, enabled the Princes to dictate their own terms, and the Conference provisionally agreed to what is a very loose form of Federation, and to a generous representation of the States in the Central Legislature, without imposing any conditions. The Congress representatives are bound to challenge this decision. Their party has always claimed many supporters amongst the subjects of the States, and to have their interests at heart. Congress newspapers have often conducted campaigns against the administration and sometimes against the private conduct of the Princes. It is probable that both Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Malaviya will demand that States coming into the Federation must adhere to certain elementary principles of good government, such as the separation of public and private revenues, an independent judiciary, and some form of democratically elected Legislature. The question of the representation of the States in the Federal Assembly may also cause friction. The Congress delegates will argue that States which will not allow any interference in their own administration should not have any voice in purely British Indian affairs. One of the State delegates, Sir Akbar Hydari, would meet this argument by insisting that all subjects must be either Federal or Provincial, and that there should be no central subjects for British India alone. This would prevent the anomaly of some future Indian Cabinet containing State representatives suffering a vote of no confidence upon some purely administrative question connected with the Provinces, or a

Cabinet, defeated on some British Indian measure, being saved by the votes of the Princes' nominees.

In this dispute the States are likely to receive considerable support from the Moslems, who are equally afraid of a strong central administration which may be continually interfering with the Provincial Governments. The Federal Legislature is bound to contain a large Hindu majority, but three Provinces—Bengal, the Punjab, and the North-West Frontier Province—will have a permanent Moslem majority, although in the first two cases a very small one. Sind, if separated from Bombay, will make another definitely Moslem Province. It is natural for the Moslems, in their present mood, to insist that 'Provincial Autonomy' should be combined with a large measure of freedom from interference, that 'law and order' in particular should be Provincial, and that 'residual powers' should remain with the Provincial Governments. If we consider that the latter are responsible for areas and population as large as those of the great European Powers there is clearly much to be said for decentralisation, but it is not likely to be acceptable to the Congress Party, which has always looked forward to establishing a strong unitary Government. On one point, however, the Hindu delegates can make out a very strong case. It would certainly be better to have the same criminal, and if possible the same civil, law throughout the Peninsula. Even if the Princes refuse to make criminal law a Federal subject, they might accept a convention by which they agreed to enact laws similar to those passed by the Central Legislature.

The Conference is not likely to break up on any question connected with the terms of Federation, but it is probable that some of the smaller States will refuse to come into the scheme. They object strongly to any indirect form of representation, but it is obviously absurd to give a seat even to each of the States which is represented in the Chamber of Princes, for it would unduly swell the numbers in the Assembly, and would be unfair to the larger States like Hyderabad, with its 12,000,000 inhabitants. Nearly all of the Maharajah of Patiala's supporters are to be found amongst these minor Princes, but so long as the eight major States are prepared to come into the Federation a few dissidents are of no great importance. The bulk of the Princes will follow the lead given by Hyderabad, Mysore, Baroda, and Bikanir. They may not quite know where they are going, but most of them dislike their present status, and some are keen Nationalists—a fact not always appreciated by Englishmen, who only know them as courteous hosts.

Moslem and Hindu differences, though they will be a factor in the discussions on the structure of the Federal Government, are

most likely to come to a head on the Minorities Sub-committee. Here the delegates will have to decide upon separate or joint electorates and the 'weightage' to be given to each group in the Provincial and Central Legislatures—questions which have been discussed *ad nauseam*, and about which many of the delegates have given pledges which would make a settlement impossible. Ultimately the matter will either have to go to arbitration, or the Government must take a line of its own, which, though it will be denounced by the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League, may be a good enough compromise to win some measure of support. Unfortunately communal tension has grown worse during the last year. The Irwin-Gandhi Pact was treated by the Congress as a Hindu victory, and celebrated by some of that wild talking and writing in which their leaders and journalists love to indulge. Then followed the Cawnpore riots and a number of other disturbances, while recent happenings in Kashmir have been far more serious than was generally appreciated in England. The importance ascribed to this last rising is interesting for the light it throws on Moslem feeling. Kashmir has a key position, for it has a Hindu ruler, though its inhabitants and those of the neighbouring Provinces are Moslems. To the Hindus the Kashmir ruling dynasty is the one foothold which they have in the north, and they believed that the rising was part of a scheme to make the whole of Northern India into a solid Moslem block, backed by Afghanistan. There has certainly been much talk about the Hindus in these northern Provinces being 'hostages' for the good behaviour of their co-religionists in the rest of India. It would be a mistake to take all this too seriously. The separate electorate system has certainly brought to the top a peculiarly irresponsible type of religious tub-thumper; but this talk, though 'froth,' is 'froth flecked with blood,' and nearly every decent politician, even of the most fanatic type, is longing for some compromise to be forced upon the country which he can noisily repudiate and then quietly accept.

There is one way in which it would be possible to 'shorten the odds' against a Moslem-Hindu settlement. The crux of the problem lies in the two Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab. In each the Moslems are poorer and less educated than the Hindus, but they have a slight numerical majority. In many districts the Hindus are moneylenders and landlords; the Moslems are peasants or village craftsmen. This inevitably leads to tension far more severe than in Provinces where there is a predominant religion, and the parties tend to form along ordinary social and economic lines; it also accounts for the Moslem's insistence upon separate electorates. A Moslem peasant might under pressure vote for a Hindu landlord or moneylender, but it is less likely that

a Hindu would vote for a Moslem. The position would be made easier if these two Provinces were divided. One proposal is the removal of the Ambala Division from the Punjab, leaving it a definitely Moslem Province. The United Provinces and this Division could then be made into two Provinces with capitals at Lucknow and Agra. The United Provinces, with a population nearly as large as Germany, is already unwieldy, and the separation would be an administrative boon. Similarly the Bengal Partition, which caused so much excitement a generation ago, was really a sound administrative scheme, and if now enforced would make two Provinces, the Western Hindu and the Eastern Moslem. Time has its revenges, and the effect of the successful Hindu anti-Partition agitation has been to place their religion in a permanent minority in Bengal. The division of Provinces and the alteration of boundaries always upset certain interests, but there is no reason why Federal India should be burdened with unnecessary problems due to the shape and size of Provinces which are really satrapies carved out of India with little regard to efficiency of administration. If the Conference is not a suitable body to deal with this question it might be possible to give the Boundaries Commission, which will probably be appointed next year, such powers that it could suggest really drastic changes.

The communal question is further complicated by the claims of other minorities, like the Sikhs in the Punjab, Indian Christians in the south, the Europeans and also the depressed classes everywhere. Each demands 'weightage' in their Provincial Legislatures, and makes it harder to adjust the proportion between Moslem and Hindu seats. Thus the Sikhs have asked for a 30 per cent. representation for their 11 per cent. of the population, while the Punjab Mohammadans, who are about 55 per cent., wish to be fully and permanently represented. This would leave the ordinary Hindus, the depressed classes, and the Europeans with about 15 per cent. of the seats to divide amongst themselves. It is most unfortunate that the Sikh claim to special treatment, based on their historical rulership of the Punjab, should have been taken seriously, for it encourages endless attempts to depart from the elementary principles of democracy. There is much more to be said for Dr. Ambekar's arguments on behalf of the depressed classes. He demands universal suffrage, and has the support of the two Labour representatives, Mr. Joshi and Mr. Shiva Rao. The adoption of this principle, which is working fairly well in Ceylon, would do much to solve the Hindu-Moslem question by introducing a large group of voters who are outside both systems. In most Provinces the depressed classes form at least a fifth of the population, and the introduction of this new element into Indian politics would help to get the

politicians away from the atmosphere engendered by such communal stalwarts as Dr. Moonjee and Maulana Shaukat Ali. The Ceylon experiment has produced some interesting results—a European in one constituency defeating a strong local candidate on a purely Singhalese vote. Probably some communal electorates must be retained, but it is to be hoped that many purely geographical constituencies will be formed, which will be open to candidates irrespective of creed or race.

Indian delegates will be very loath to let the Conference break up over some question between sections of their own countrymen. Nationalists are sensitive about foreign opinion, and they know that it would ruin their case in the eyes of the world if the failure is due to lack of agreement amongst Indians. One may expect, therefore, a compromise over the terms of Federation and the representation of religious groups, with perhaps certain questions left open pending the reports of Boundary and Franchise Commissions. If Mr. Gandhi walks out of the Conference it must be over some question about which he can justify himself upon purely Nationalist grounds, and a break is most likely to occur over the 'safeguards'—an unfortunate term which can be taken roughly to mean the limitations which will have to be placed upon the grant of full responsible government in the Centre and in the Provinces. Whether these cause a deadlock will depend on the manner in which the subject is handled by the British delegation, and upon the extent to which Mr. Gandhi allows himself to be influenced by Mr. Vallabhai Patel and other members of the Congress Party who opposed his coming to England. If we are to keep the support of the moderate element amongst the Nationalists, the basis of the discussion on safeguards must be the stability of the new Government. The one point in which the British are directly interested, the prevention of discrimination against European business interests, should be kept entirely separate.

The main object of the safeguards is to prevent the new Federal Government coming to grief during the early years of its existence. The abolition of 'dyarchy' in the Provinces and the institution of Cabinet government will be comparatively simple, and the only serious difficulty lies in the communal question. The formation of the Federal Government must be a far slower and more complicated business. There are difficult financial adjustments to be made with the States, and at best the new Central Government will be a cumbrous machine, slow to start and dilatory in action. There would seem to be three great dangers. The Government might be faced with some military emergency, either a frontier invasion or the rebellion of a group of Princes. Internal disorder may develop on a large scale, either

owing to an agrarian movement, such as now threatens in the United Provinces, or more probably to inter-communal quarrels. Lastly, the Government might come to financial disaster, for the first Indian Finance Minister will have to handle his untried craft in very squally weather. These dangers are interlinked. A financial breakdown would make it impossible to maintain the army, and a Hindu-Moslem outbreak on a large scale would certainly encourage frontier trouble.

Probably every Indian delegate at the Conference is willing to admit the need of some safeguards—at any rate, as a temporary measure. It would make the position easier if the British delegates also admitted that the need of safeguards was partly due to our own failure to prepare for the transference of responsibility, even during these later years when it was clear that some such change was imminent. A Federal Government obviously requires a national army drawn from all parts of India, even though a few pacifist castes must be excluded. It may take some years to build up such a force, but the implication that this delay is due to some weakness in the Indian character merely arouses the politicians' combative feelings. It is also quite unfair. Military policy is entirely in British hands, and for the last generation nothing has been done to return to the wide basis of recruitment which was the practice before the Mutiny, and very little progress made in organising an army which could function without British assistance. Similarly the Government of India has immensely complicated the inauguration of Federal government by delaying a full inquiry into the status of the Princes, and the clear enunciation of the principles of paramountcy. A frank appreciation on both sides that these early difficulties are partly due to natural causes, the immense size and diversity of India, and partly to our inability to look ahead, would remove most of the bitterness out of the discussion of safeguards. Anyone who enjoys the friendship of Indian Nationalists knows that they are seriously perturbed about India's political and economic future, and are prepared to compromise their most cherished theories in order to obtain a stable and peaceful government for the next few decades, but the idea that the safeguards are forced upon them from the British side immediately provokes their opposition.

The writer has assumed in this argument that the course of the Conference is not likely to be altered by a change in policy on the part of the British delegation. With the possibility of an immediate election this is perhaps too generous an assumption, but the new set of patterns which this might introduce into the tangled skein of Indian politics is too hypothetical to be considered at the present juncture. There has been, up till now, very little

interference from the British side, and in discussing the attitude of the Indian delegates towards the safeguards it is taken for granted that the general policy and attitude adopted by Lord Sankey and Mr. MacDonald will be continued. Under these conditions there is likely to be little objection to the reservation of Defence in the hands of the Viceroy, so long as it is understood that this is a temporary measure necessitated by the presence of the British Army, and that every effort will be made to build up a national army as speedily as possible. Closely bound up with the control of the army is the question of paramountcy. It is essential that there should be some supreme authority with emergency and dynastic powers over the several hundred Princes. Amongst the latter there are always some whose States are on the verge of bankruptcy or worse. Frequently there are disputes about the succession, or neighbouring States fall out. The right of interference is at present vested in the Governor-General, and the Princes will certainly not allow this to be transferred to a popularly elected Legislature. They have no love for the Indian Foreign and Political Department, and may try to have this right of interference entrusted to some body like the Chamber of Princes, but probably the present arrangement will be allowed to stand.

The crucial point in the Conference is likely to be the proposed financial safeguards, and the position is made much worse by the economic crisis through which we are passing, and our promise to support Indian credit. It must be remembered that our financial policy in India has been bitterly criticised, especially since the war, and the Government of India has been very widely accused of adopting a currency policy in England's interests. It is impossible to discuss the rights and wrongs of the 'one and sixpenny ratio'; all that is relevant here is that the Congress Party in their attack upon this has behind it not only the general belief in the British 'exploitation' of India, but also very large commercial vested interests. The British insistence on ensuring Indian financial stability may be chiefly altruistic, a real fear of chaos in India, but we are affected by the future Federal Government's ability to pay interest on its loans, and meet other liabilities which we have guaranteed. It can be imagined that any demand to give the Viceroy overriding powers with regard to finance will be gravely suspect. The Indian delegates will be almost united in insisting upon the Federal Government's complete freedom to control its currency and commercial policy. On the right to impose tariffs there is no real dispute, and an unfortunate legacy of the long Nationalist campaign is that India will almost certainly begin by a policy of high protection, justified by the most elementary arguments. This is inevitable, and the point in dispute is

really the control of currency policy and to some extent of expenditure, the prevention of rapid inflation or of an orgy of unproductive spending.

Since the last session of the Conference it would seem that there has been some change of opinion on this point. Both British and Indian leaders have come to see that financial safeguards in their original form were not likely to be effective. The same difficulty applies to them as to the emergency powers given to Viceroys and Provincial Governors to maintain order. They are of little value without some machinery to carry on an alternative government. The normal course of events would be that a Governor would object to the reduction of the police force below what he considers to be the margin of safety, or a Viceroy might remonstrate against State grants to industry which would make it impossible to balance the Budget. In most cases the Cabinet would support the Minister, and the immediate consequence of using the overriding powers would be to force a dissolution. Neither Governor nor Viceroy would have much opportunity of placing their case before the electorate, and if they decide to govern without using Ministers supported by the Legislature they will have no constitutional methods by which to carry on the administration. The safeguards therefore mean little more than short emergency powers, or the right of forcing a dissolution. If both sides accept the principle that the real value of the financial safeguards is to give the Viceroy power to prevent hasty measures, and as a last resource to insist upon reference to the electorate, then it should be possible to come to some arrangement which will achieve this result without infringing upon the independence of the future Federal Government. It is of the utmost importance to prevent Indian politicians from being tempted to raise the cry of British interference whenever they may wish to get support for some doubtful measure. Some kind of buffer is needed between the Viceroy and the Cabinet. One such device was approved at the first session. It is proposed to form a Reserve Bank under non-political directorship which will control currency and exchange. Most people are now agreed as to the advisability of such a bank, but it is extremely difficult, for technical reasons, to collect the necessary sterling reserve at this juncture, and it is undesirable to make the foundation of such a bank into a condition precedent to the transfer of financial responsibility unless the Government can give some definite date by which the necessary arrangements can be made. It is a remarkable fact that within India itself there could be found many times the amount of sterling needed for the bank, lying unproductive either in private hoards, in jewellery used for saving, or in the treasury of a ruling Prince. There is, unfortunately, little chance of luring

this gold from its owners, but the position at present is that the amassing of some £40,000,000 in gold has a direct connexion with the transfer of responsible government.

Another proposal which has been discussed privately since the first session is the appointment of an advisory committee on banking and currency which would have a permanent chairman. If the Viceroy is to have overriding powers on financial matters, he must have a financial adviser, but experience of similar appointments in the Near East suggests that it is difficult to find suitable men for such a post, and that their relation to the Finance Minister is anomalous, and likely to be unsatisfactory. In difficult times the adviser becomes half-counsellor and half-spy. A committee would avoid this, and, being chiefly Indian, would prevent criticism having a racial basis. The idea has not been worked out in detail, but the combination of a Reserve Bank and a permanent advisory committee might satisfy British requirements for financial stability.

The question of debt revision, though it has received much publicity, is not likely to cause a serious controversy, and it is generally agreed that the Congress manifesto was a political move. There are, however, certain points, such as the charges for the Burmese wars, which will need consideration. The prevention of discrimination against British manufacturers and traders in India raises much more difficult questions, but so long as it is made clear that the future Federal Government will be free to shape India's commercial policy the Indian delegates show little inclination to be unreasonable, and considerable progress has been made in private discussions towards reaching a compromise. This may possibly take the form of a convention on the lines of a commercial treaty; while it has also been suggested that British subjects trading in India should adopt Indian citizenship, a proposal supported by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, and foreshadowed in the Nehru Report. From the British side it is necessary to ensure that there shall be no expropriation without full compensation, and that the Government's freedom to adopt such measures as State monopolies, subsidies, or insistence on rupee capital or Indian directors shall not be used as a means of confiscation.

Ultimately the success of the Conference will depend chiefly upon our own consistency. Most Indian delegates, like all leaders who have been long in opposition, have very difficult 'constituencies' behind them. Mr. Gandhi has the worst of all. They are mostly reasonable men, but they cannot always talk very reasonably; and, above all, they cannot be expected to lay down all their cards until the British Government has done so first.

G. T. GARRATT.

THE AUSTRALIAN READJUSTMENT

WE are apt to regard modern democracy as drab, and public finance an even more dismal science than economics. But the combination of finance and democracy is apt to provide some dramatic interest, and democrats who are intelligent enough to understand finance, and financiers who are intelligent enough to understand the people, can see in the progress of politics in a democracy something as interesting as a battle, and far more significant. The past few weeks have witnessed a dramatic change in the Australian situation. The story of the last two years has been a chequered one; the great world depression struck Australia after a period of gross extravagance had made her finance radically unsound, and cut in half the prices of her great staples, wheat and wool. The first reaction of annoyed democracy was to turn out its Governments. This led to a Labour Government coming into power in the Commonwealth pledged to reverse the policy by which the previous Government proposed to face the storm. Then followed eighteen months of drift, in which every plan was tried but the plain but difficult one of reform. The news, therefore, that Australia has agreed on a plan of economy and readjustment which has no parallel in the world to-day for the severity of the sacrifice it demands comes with dramatic suddenness. In this the Australian people have acted according to their character. They have always been painfully irresponsible up to a point; but when this irresponsibility has produced a situation of extraordinary difficulty they have as a rule been able to look the worst full in the face and been prepared for the greatest sacrifices to retrieve themselves. Her sons have frequently set themselves on the battlefield or the cricket ground a task like that which they are facing to-day.

The plan which has been agreed to is complicated enough in itself, but it was presented as a simple problem—a grim financial situation and a solution which involved great sacrifices and raised some great moral issues. To understand the human elements in the matter it would be advisable to describe first the agreement, secondly the political story which led up to it, and lastly the issues which are involved.

The Copland plan was the work of a committee of experts presided over by Professor Copland, of Melbourne, and is contained in a report to the Australian Loan Council—an official body which was established under the financial agreement by which Australian borrowing is controlled. The Council was faced with a situation in which a long drift had resulted in imminent danger of default. After being flouted by politicians for months, and keeping Governments going in order to avoid national default, but in defiance of all banking principles, the Commonwealth Bank had placed a definite limit of £25,000,000 on the overdraft. Meanwhile the deficits for all the Australian Governments accruing on June 30 on the year's accounts were estimated at £33,000,000, and if the expenditure was not checked for another twelve months there would be an additional deficit of £40,000,000 in 1932.

The task the economists faced was to square the budget in the shortest possible time, and if it could not be done in one year, to reduce the amount to such proportions that it would be manageable. Such a reduction could only be achieved by extra taxation and reductions in expenditure. Some of the expenditure consisted of salaries which were controllable; other expenditure included pensions for old age or soldiers, which could be changed by legislation; others consisted of interest on loans, depending on the letter of the bond. Under the system of adjustment of wages according to the cost of living, and by a special reduction of the basic wage, the wages of the average unsheltered worker had suffered the large reduction of 23 per cent., and it was obvious that public service salaries should be reduced to a proportionate degree; the same standard should apply to pensions. Extra taxation was not advisable, for although Australian levies are not so heavy as British, yet they are crushing in a country where much new capital is required and cannot now be obtained from abroad. It was desirable to reduce interest burdens as well, but the interest on bonds could not be reduced without the consent of the bondholder; in the case of external loans it was highly undesirable that any reduction should be asked; in the case of internal loans it could only be done by conversion on to a lower rate of interest, unless the State took the extreme course of a forced reduction or a specific tax on bond interest.

At this point the economists took a step which went beyond the financial exigencies of the Government and made the plan part of a scheme for a wholesale readjustment of values. The Government was not the sole organisation faced with bankruptcy. Hundreds of farmers were crippled with debt and were unable to farm at current prices; there were nearly 500,000 unemployed, the insecurity of business was putting up interest rates, and thus making it more insecure. The usual remedy for this state of affairs

is inflation; but for many reasons inflation is undesirable in Australia, and, quite apart from the slump in values, Australian finance was so unsound that successful and controlled inflation was unlikely. The alternative was deflation, but its dangers were almost equally great; a slump in values and in wages, while fixed money claims remained constant or rose, would produce dislocation and disaster. What the committee recommended was proportionate, controlled deflation, using interest rates as a pivot. This involved agreements that bank interest should be reduced, which the bankers were willing and anxious to do; it involved some means of adjusting interest on mortgages where it was required; and lastly it meant that interest on internal Government loans should be reduced proportionately. To do this last without compulsion was extraordinarily difficult, for the total amount of the internal debt was £556,000,000, and it was held by 803,000 bondholders. The first suggestion was that there should be an appeal for voluntary conversion underwritten by the banks. The banks, however, pointed out that this might mean an immense sum left on their hands, and they refused. It was then suggested that as all the financial institutions, trustee companies, insurance companies and banks were behind the idea, it might be regarded as having national support, and the minority who might not convert might legitimately be coerced. For this purpose it was suggested that a tax should be levied on interest on Government loans to be remitted to those who converted. Any suggestion of compulsion, however, raised a storm of protest, and in the end it was agreed to make a national appeal for a voluntary conversion.

The agreement may be therefore summed up as follows:

(1) A cut of 20 per cent. in all the adjustable expenditure of Governments.

(2) A reduction of 22½ per cent. in the interest on internal debt by a gigantic conversion.

(3) Increased taxation to the extent of about £8,000,000.

By these economies £26,000,000 will be saved—£15,000,000 for the Commonwealth and £11,000,000 for the States; next year's deficit will be reduced to about £12,000,000.[1] The Conference regards this sum as manageable, and giving a prospect of budgetary equilibrium in a reasonable time.

The non-Government adjustments will include a reduction of interest by the banks, and some means of adjusting private interest by tribunals to which individuals can appeal. It must be admitted that this part of the plan was not worked out

[1] Early in September it was announced by the Premiers Conference that the aggregate deficit would be higher than was originally estimated, namely £18,000,000.—EDITOR.

in detail by the experts. But if it succeeds Australia will get on a new level of values, and while burdens will be reduced, and there will be individual dislocations, generally speaking everybody will be relatively in the same position.

The agreement we have described was almost entirely the work of a group of economic experts; politicians looked on, discussed and approved, and the agreement has yet to be implemented by a considerable amount of legislation. The experts have made up the mind of the Australian democracy for it after it had been through a process of painful cerebration for nearly two years without result. To understand the reception of the agreement, and the discussion it aroused, the story of this period should be described.

The first onset of the world financial storm of 1929–30 almost exactly synchronised with the fall of the Ministry of Mr. Bruce. There are not many people who foresaw the slump, but he did. He is now a national scapegoat for the sins of extravagance of the community in the boom between 1920 and 1929. It was certainly true that as the head of the Commonwealth Government between 1923 and 1929 he was responsible for a great deal of extravagance —he came in on a tide, and for a long time went with it; while he did so he was one of the most popular leaders Australia has had. His standing in history will, however, be determined by the resistance he made to the tidal trend, and by such means as the establishment of the Loan Council, the financial agreement of 1927, the visit of the Duckham delegation, the examination of the tariff by an expert committee, and the Committee of Scientific and Industrial Research, he was informed of the growing drift. The history of the Development and Migration Commission was particularly significant; appointed originally to guide development and promote immigration in a scientific way, it soon began to report that developmental projects were all failing, and developmental policy should be reversed.

Fortified by such advice, Mr. Bruce determined on a change of policy. How far he was prepared to go is not clear, but he stressed the financial situation, spoke of the tariff extravagances, and then challenged the Australian policy where the working man felt it most—that is, the policy of industrial arbitration; he proposed that the Commonwealth should retire from the arbitration field and leave it to the States. It was on this issue that a section of his party turned on him and defeated him, and he appealed to the country. The issue was an unfortunate one, however necessary, for it was not only a challenge to the greatest vested interest in the country—the organisation of trades unions—but in addition thousands of the salariate who do not normally vote Labour had their remuneration fixed by Federal courts; Bruce's talk of the

financial difficulties ahead convinced the public services that he intended to launch a campaign of economy, and his vague talk about the tariff induced manufacturers to organise against him. Having the three most powerful vested interests against him, the consumers and taxpayers being almost completely unorganised, the election was determined merely by the influence of these interests, and he suffered a crushing defeat.

Labour came into power on a refusal of the people to support economy, or make a proper reaction to the imminent financial situation; its influence on the new Government was, therefore, carefully directed in the reverse direction, and, having been placed in power by a combination between their covenanted followers, the trade unions, the powerful interests of the public servants and the manufacturers, it proceeded to serve these sections. It is a rule, not often understood, that opportunist political parties will give the highest rewards to casual supporters, and as manufacturers were quite unattached to the Labour Party, and capable of strongly opposing it on industrial policy, they were first squared by the immediate introduction of large increases in the already extravagant tariff; these were put into operation without parliamentary discussion. It is only fair to say that most Labour members honestly believed that increases in the tariff would increase employment, and there was some reason to shut out imports in order to redress the trade balance, yet exchange was kept at an artificially low level, and if the rank and file were ignorant, the leaders were under no illusion as to the nature of the bargain they were honouring. Unemployment, in fact, steadily increased. The interests of the public servants were served by a complete refusal to economise, or even to stop the routine salary increases. As the cost of living was falling rapidly, the public service was benefiting in the most signal way. But there are 250,000 public servants in Australia, and their votes at the election had been almost unanimous, and quite decisive in the result, and when the public service organisations required any renewal of the promises to protect their interests, they found the Prime Minister their obsequious servant.

The one supporting interest which the Government found it impossible to protect was their direct following. This was, of course, impossible; they were the workers in the private industries which were feeling the full brunt of the slump. Unsheltered workers were, of course, instinctively and naturally Labour supporters, and, as their support was practically assured, little consideration need be given to them. All that could be done to maintain their nominal standards was done—a fierce but quite ineffective resistance was made to any reduction of nominal wage rates; the fact that these rates were promoting unemployment,

and that the tariff policy and the refusal to economise was also penalising the outside worker, was, of course, ignored.

When the first Labour budget was produced in July 1930 there were no economies whatever except those due to a reduction of defence preparations; the prospective deficit of £14,000,000 was to be made up by increased taxation. This disturbed State Premiers, not only because it depleted the capacity to pay of their taxpayers, but because Labour Premiers anxious to do the right thing found the Federal chief of the party giving a contrary lead. It was the State Premiers who forced a reluctant consent to the economy agreement suggested at the Conference which Sir Otto Niemeyer addressed. This agreement, however, had to be approved by a caucus of the Federal Labour Party, and when it came before them Mr. Scullin was at the Imperial Conference, and the New South Wales elections were pending.

At this election Mr. Bavin, the Nationalist Premier, was opposed by Mr. Lang, the head of a most militant group at the Sydney Trades Hall, also ex-Premier and official leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party. At this stage the financial situation was clear to the meanest intelligence. Mr. Bavin, who suffered from the reputation of Aristides of being tiresomely honest, tried to tell the people the true state of the finances, but he was treated as Mr. Bruce had been treated, and Mr. Lang performed the remarkable feat of persuading the democracy of New South Wales that the story of the depression was a capitalist plot to reduce wages, that there was no need for the common people to restrict themselves in the matter of cakes and ale, and that he would see that they got them. At least, that is the way they voted. Patriotic New South Welshmen claim that they did not believe Mr. Lang, but that they regarded a financial slump as an unanswerable reason for a change of Government.

On this event the militant reds of the Federal caucus, who were waiting to see how the cat jumped in New South Wales, bravely took their cue and secured the rejection by the caucus of the economy agreement. But they could not stop the oncoming tide of deficits, and when Mr. Scullin got back he felt that something must be done. Mr. Theodore, the Federal Treasurer, had resigned owing to the adverse report of a Royal Commission on his honesty when Premier of Queensland; but he was brought back to launch an inflation scheme. Messrs. Lyons and Fenton, who had held the fort for Mr. Scullin in his absence with the assistance of cabled endorsements of the Prime Minister, thereupon resigned from the party in disgust. Mr. Theodore went round the Eastern States making speeches in favour of his inflation scheme, but the reply was a huge turnover of votes against Labour in the Tasmanian elections and in by-elections in Victoria.

The agreement that has been described, which is based on a principle the opposite of inflation, was the result.

The sudden adoption by Mr. Scullin of the agreement, and its subsequent endorsement by Parliamentary Labour parties in all States, cannot be regarded either as an intellectual decision or a moral conversion. A month before, Mr. Theodore had been advocating inflation, and Mr. Lang had been actually repudiating; the critical position had been caused by eighteen months of drift and refusal to meet perfectly plain facts, the people as a whole felt that they had been placed quite unnecessarily in a false position by almost criminal neglect, and the bondholders in particular considered that they were called upon to save the State by a sacrifice which had been forced upon them unnecessarily by such neglect. All this is true; the change in the Labour Party is due solely to political exigencies; the turnover of votes in Tasmania and every by-election throughout Australia shows clearly that it is of no use for either Mr. Scullin or Mr. Lang to appeal to the electors on any policy or with the most alluring promises; they are doomed, and the great flush of new Labour members, mainly for country districts, which came into these two Parliaments at the elections of 1929 and 1930 will go back into obscurity. It is undoubtedly this fact which determines the issue. There is nothing in the plan which affects adversely the outside workers who form the large majority of Labour supporters; they have suffered their cut of 23 per cent. through the normal operation of the machinery of the Arbitration Court; the agreement brings other expenses down to this level, and is thus an act of justice to them; if it succeeds it will assist in reducing unemployment. The classes which the agreements hit are public servants and pensioners, who have powerful political influence, and the bondholders, whose influence is negligible or negative. In placing the matter before the caucuses and conferences of the party, therefore, the Labour leaders were realistic and cynical; the agreement was forced on them—if it was not accomplished they could not pay creditors, including public servants, more than 12s. in the pound; Labour would certainly be defeated in an election—this was the only chance of remaining in power and retaining seats for the balance of Parliament. Unofficial talk went on about extending the life of Parliaments so that the great work of national readjustment could be completed.

The attitude of the rank and file Labour member is determined by appearances. Every step of his career depends on elections; he is elected as a union officer; his claims to stand for a safe Labour seat are decided at a pre-selection ballot; he submits to an election for Parliament, and another pre-

selection ballot is held at the end of each term for the next Parliament; for each of these elections he has rivals who watch each step, ready to denounce anything he does as treachery to the cause, or to undermine him in his relation to any strong vested interest, such as the public servants. Any change of the traditional Labour policy is, therefore, dangerous. The reduction of public service salaries and other economies, though an act of justice to the worker, could be represented as a reduction in wages. The scheme has thus been accepted by every parliamentary caucus, by the solid support of those who held precarious seats in the country; but every Labour member who could do so without imperilling the agreement voted against it, and, while the supporters of it respected the secrecy of caucus, the opponents felt it necessary to proclaim their dissidence aloud. The scheme is, therefore, accepted, and though the community has no faith in the Labour Governments of the Commonwealth and New South Wales, they are compelled to allow them to carry it into operation lest their powerful opposition should wreck it.

In this article we have given little praise and less credit to the Labour Party, because a true appreciation of their position is necessary if we are to understand the attitude of the Australian people to the agreement. In spite of his protestations, Mr. Scullin has shown little real concern for the good name of Australia where the pull of a powerful section of his supporters prevented it; the party have exhibited a complete lack of financial integrity; any conception that sound finance is necessary to make the State safe for democracy, that the penalties of unsound business are visited on the working man, and that it is the most prolific cause of unemployment, is absent. Labour leaders live on the suspicions of the average man; they vigorously denounce the unjust operation of economic and financial laws, but their criticism has been completely futile, and it is hard to ascertain a single respect in which the party has assisted the working man. If we ask why a noble cause is so misrepresented by leaders who are more powerful than in any other movement in the world, and why hard-headed, sensible citizens like the Australian worker tolerate the party, we must conclude that this is due to the creation of a powerful machine which through skilful organisation completely dominates the labour field, and ruthlessly eliminates every view or influence or personal factor which would compete with it. This machine is like the Megatherium which Mr. Bletchworthy saw in 'Rampole Island'; it is soulless and brainless, but immensely powerful. The machine is detested by every man of spirit, individuality and sense of freedom who is attracted by the movement, and is the natural weapon of narrow zealots and underground intriguers. It thus exists for the benefit of the officials who work it, from the vigilance committees at the head to the union officials who form the rank and file. It has no creed. It professes Marxian Socialism to attract the intellectual and retain the solid support of Labour, but its actual policy is distressingly opportunist. While it has rarely done anything to realise Socialism, and has whittled down the socialisation planks of its platform in order to retain outside support, its main preoccupation is to prevent any definite admission that it cannot give its supporters a new heaven and a new earth. This explains its absence of positive policy and its resistance to every nominal lowering of values. From the mere point of organisation its electoral power is immense; Labour representatives are governing Australia; though this is a barren satisfaction from the material point of view, the solidarity of the workers and their support to the party has never been shaken. The danger of such a machine to the State and to itself is the failure of intellectual reaction in case of a radical change in the economic system; a machine which has no means of reaction must eventually break, and the Labour machine in Australia has to-day broken into three pieces—the right wing under Mr. Lyons, which has united with the Nationalists for the purpose of attacking the Labour Party; the centre under Mr. Scullin, which is in power in the Commonwealth; and the left wing under Mr. Lang, which governs New South Wales. The Labour parties in power in Victoria and South Australia are centralists, though they lean to the right on financial policy, but in each case the local trades halls, who have no responsibility, are threatening their own Government.

The dramatic end to a long period of drift by an agreement which involved so fundamental a readjustment would have moved the Australian people if its terms had not been so provocative of controversy; the arrangement could hardly be regarded as a reconciliation of parties and a union of hearts. The temptation of the majority of the Australian people, therefore, was to say that the Governments which had been so faithless to Australia's good name should be thrown out rather than be entrusted with such a task. Only the imminence of default persuaded the non-Labour section to force the Labour Party to take the responsibility and carry it through, and, the political prospects of Labour being as they are, there is no doubt that constant pressure will succeed in achieving this. Resentment, however, has coloured all discussion on the agreement, and this turns on two questions—the moral issue of the conversion and the economic soundness of the scheme. Curiously enough, public

discussion has concentrated very largely on the former. Moral issues can, of course, be stated with perfect simplicity, and in such form give great satisfaction to their proponents. In practice they are extremely complex, and the unwillingness of the advocates of the simple moral life to appreciate the facts of real life gives rise to a good deal of cant. The moral issue raised in this case is whether a contract with a bondholder can ever be varied without his individual consent. The answer to such a question, when it fairly arises, is in the negative; the inviolability of contracts, especially public contracts, is a principle which is at the root of civil stability, and should not bow to any political exigency. But the simplicity of the moral issue is deceptive in this case, for there are two other complicating factors: in the first place, it was extremely doubtful whether the contract with the bondholders could, in fact, be carried out; in the second place, the scheme was intended to be a readjustment of all values, and if successful the bondholder would be in the same relative position, getting capital and interest at a level which would be no real injustice to him; if he insisted on the letter of his bond he might get nothing; if he did succeed in getting the face value of his bond he would get an advantage which was not contemplated—a fixed payment which is of far greater value in money than when the contract was framed. It is not suggested that this chance would have justified a variation of the contract by force, but there is strong moral ground for making an adjustment of interest part of a general arrangement which is just to all. Moreover, when the physical difficulties of getting consent from 803,000 bondholders are realised, the adjustment must be put in the category of those arrangements under the Companies and Bankruptcy Acts in which the consent of a majority is allowed to override the minority; such provisions were framed to fit precisely the conditions which exist in the case of Australian public finance—namely, a proposal which will bring about a constructive readjustment of the situation and benefit everyone if successful, and do injustice to nobody, but which might be wrecked by a minority who either through negligence or for the purpose of securing an advantage will not consent.

There were no opponents of the proposal for reduction of interest corresponding to the reduction of expenses. The first underwriting scheme would have been accepted unanimously. It was when underwriting was found impracticable that the proposal to put a penalty on those who refused to convert was brought forward; the leaders of the Opposition, Messrs. Latham and Lyons, denounced this as repudiation, and there was a widespread protest at the alleged breach of faith. It will be seen, however, that the first voluntary scheme involved a variation of

contracts, for the Government loans that had to be converted expired at various dates extending over ten years or more; the holders would either be compelled to convert or take their money back; a bondholder with a fixed term can object to such an alternative; in ordinary life he gets a penalty if money is paid back before the due date. Further, if such money be paid back on conversion, the bondholder, if he reinvests, must do so in a market which returns 4 per cent., so he does not benefit financially by the repayment; presumably, also, he is afraid of the financial situation, and steps must be taken to put an embargo on the export of capital. Compulsion of some kind is involved in every step.

The final decision to make an appeal for voluntary conversion was a natural reaction to this protest, and is very welcome. If the conversion is successful it will be a magnificent gesture, but those who have any experience of business know the extraordinary difficulty of securing unanimity in appeals of this kind. The arrangement is that those who do not dissent will be taken as converting; but if there is a substantial body of these, both the moral and the financial situation will be far more acute. The Conference as finally constituted affirmed in vague terms that a grave situation might arise which would require drastic action. The net result is that compulsion looms distinctly in the background, and from the point of view of ethics it might have been better to admit it frankly.[2] The opponents of the scheme were really promoting default in the interests of sanctity of contract. From the political point of view the only real justification for permitting the Scullin Government to remain in office was that it made adjustment easier. It was natural that people, exasperated by their conduct of affairs, should consider that the first duty was to remove them; but any delay involved in removing Governments would mean default. To this the one answer made by the critics of the scheme was that it would be the default of Scullin and Theodore, and not that of the Australian people, that temporary default could be remedied, or that we might get regeneration through default. Such answers were folly. Equally unfortunate were the ignorance of the average business man of the financial situation and his inability to interpret the facts. The accumulated deficits on June 30, 1931, were £63,000,000; the unfunded short-term debt amounts to about £60,000,000; nearly

[2] On September 4th it was announced that the Premiers' Conference had decided that those who refused to convert their holdings voluntary should be compelled to do so, and that 97 per cent. of the bondholders had made a voluntary sacrifice, the remaining dissentients then numbered 25,000, and their holdings amounted to £18,000,000. The total voluntary conversions amounted at that date to £487,000,000. *The Times*, Sept. 5.—EDITOR.

£40,000,000 of gold has been exported to pay outside creditors; the overdraft to the Commonwealth Bank is over £25,000,000 and the payments exceed receipts at the rate of £40,000,000 per annum. This means that Australia was living on credit artificially created by the Commonwealth Bank and inflating in the worst way; she was borrowing more to stop holes in bank accounts than she had been for reproductive enterprises; she was depleting her capacity to pay, and her condition was really one of default. If a private trader carried on as Australia has been carrying on, he would be punished for fraudulent trading. The bondholder was justified in saying that economy was the first duty, and that to make reduction of interest part of a bargain was unjust. On the other hand, the finances could not be rectified without many adjustments, and to leave the creditor and the recipient of fixed payments out of such adjustments would have been unfair, not to public servants, but to the classes of the community which have to carry on its economic activities. It is as part of a general scheme of proportionate deflation, with interest as the pivot, that the plan finds its economic justification.

This leads us to the consideration of the other question whether such a scheme of deliberate deflation is likely to be successful. The above facts show that some adjustment was absolutely unavoidable. The normal remedy is inflation, which is usually uncontrollable and ends in deflation; as a remedy for a sudden depression, or as an emergency measure providing against a collapse, it has its place. But Australia is affected by a world depression supervening on a long period of unsound finance which would have been acute in any case; it is submitted that inflation is peculiarly unsuitable. That being so, it must be admitted that deflation is more difficult than inflation; inflation is fatally easy it is widespread, automatic and proportionate; deflation consists in a series of deliberate acts taken in face often of opposition of the affected sections. The dangers are that it may not be universal—that some factors may be affected and others not, and that the pressure of one or another may cause dislocation. The process is one of lowering a large and complicated structure on to a lower level. If the lowering is uneven, the strains set up may be severe. In the present case the question is whether interest is a factor which is sufficiently crucial to be adequate as a key to a deflationary process. The truth is probably that the normal factors are producing deflation, and that the scheme is simply regulating a process which is occurring, and that by securing a reduction in interest and fixed payments it is giving just that assistance which enables the deflation to work without injustice. If this is so, there is every hope of a complete success.

For the scheme to succeed it is necessary that business should

be stimulated by a reduction of costs. But some advocates of inflation appear to think that only increases can stimulate, and reductions will produce an unfavourable atmosphere of gloom which will militate against a revival of confidence. There is no term used nowadays which is more misleading than the word 'confidence.' Confidence is of doubtful value if it means the disregard of facts and simple hope for better things. The matter is very largely one of temperament; many men work better in an exuberant mood, just as some soldiers fight better filled with rum. Others are stimulated by danger and fight better when they realise the full seriousness of their position. Australia has both sorts, but the inflationists have been dominant for ten years, and there is far more to be expected from the other type. There is nothing more likely to produce the best that is in Australians, or bring the best men to the top, than a period of straitened finance and real hardship.

F. W. EGGLESTON.

GERMANY'S CRISIS

IT is by no means easy to assign a precise starting-point for the German financial and economic crisis. The possibility of a collapse had been foreseen for years, and it is no exaggeration to say that since the danger was recognised it has remained a dominating factor in German politics. One of the first persons to point out the danger was the Agent-General for Reparation Payments, Mr. Parker Gilbert, who sounded a warning note in his reports. If the crisis had come during his term of office the responsibility would have fallen upon him and the Transfer Committee, so that it is scarcely surprising that he should have endeavoured to terminate his office, and, in his own words, 'to give Germany a definite task to perform on her own responsibility.' It is perhaps rather more surprising that the Germans should have agreed and should have allowed this 'definite task' to become incorporated in the Young Plan. An extremely competent observer of German politics, Professor Bonn, recently pointed out, however, that it was the same fear of crisis which induced the German Government to accept the Young Plan. Mr. Parker Gilbert, he added, was thus able to get away with his reputation, but Germany got her crisis after all. The influence which the fear of crisis played in the decision of the German Government to accept the Young Plan is evident, not only from the repeated declarations of the responsible statesmen, including Stresemann, to this effect, but also from the actual course of the Experts' Conference in Paris, during which Germany got her first foretaste of what was to come. One morning, when the negotiations had reached a deadlock, all German bankers received from their French correspondents notices cutting and terminating their credits, which were couched almost in identical terms. An attack on the mark and a run of foreign creditors on the banks then set in, which was only stopped when it became evident that the German experts were prepared to reach an agreement.

The vulnerability of Germany's position was due, as is well known, to the heavy short-term indebtedness incurred during the period of optimism which followed the putting into force of the Dawes Plan. During the seven years 1924–1930 inclusive,

Germany's foreign indebtedness grew faster than her foreign assets by £900,000,000. The total indebtedness increased to £1,250,000,000, but this is partly offset by Germany's own investments abroad. Of this total indebtedness £515,000,000 were on short-term at the end of 1930, against which Germany's short-term claims on foreign countries only amounted to £265,000,000, the net quick debit balance thus being about £250,000,000. It is thus fairly obvious that at any time during the last few years a foreign run would have produced temporary insolvency. The position was perfectly well known both to lenders and borrowers. It was analogous to that of a bank, which cannot be expected to meet a 100 per cent. or even a 50 per cent. run on its deposits. International short-term credits to a debtor country, like bank deposits, are only liquid as long as confidence can be maintained and the complicated mechanism kept working. The position of Germany was not even excessively illiquid, since quick assets abroad amounted to about half quick liabilities. The principal trouble was, however, the volume of indebtedness, and it was mainly this which made it unmanageable when the crash came.

What may perhaps be described as the second dress rehearsal of the crisis occurred last autumn, immediately after the Reichstag elections in September. These showed for the first time the strength of the opposition to the so-called 'policy of fulfilment,' and in particular to the Reparation payments as laid down by the Young Plan. Fearing political complications, foreign creditors again began to withdraw their credits. There was not this time a sudden organised attack on the mark as there had been in April 1929, but there was a steady run which lasted until the new year, well over £50,000,000 of foreign credits being withdrawn. For the first time the withdrawals extended to the so-called 'reimbursement' credit facilities as well as to cash advances, a movement which eventually, during the recent crisis, upset the calculations of the banks. The burden of meeting these credit withdrawals fell almost entirely on the banks. Their efforts correspondingly to reduce their advances to trade and industry were only moderately successful, so that their position was distinctly weakened. About the new year, however, the success of the Brüning Government in obtaining control of the political situation, coupled with the feeling that the National Socialist movement had reached its zenith, resulted in the cessation of foreign withdrawals and a revival of confidence. From January to April prices on the Stock Exchange rose. One or two large foreign issues were placed, in particular the issue of shares of the Berlin Light and Power Company, of which about £6,000,000 were placed abroad. This was looked upon as the beginning of a

new movement to consolidate the oppressive volume of short-term indebtedness, and the optimists began to look forward to a general improvement.

Within a few weeks the whole position had entirely changed. Three factors were responsible for this. First, the German Foreign Office, with the idea of throwing its weight about and thus impressing the ' national ' opposition, went in for the ill-fated adventure of the Austro-German Customs Union. Secondly, the news of a very heavy deficit in the public finances gradually filtered through. Thirdly, on May 13 the Austrian Credit-Anstalt made its heavy losses public. It is interesting that two of these factors concerned Austria. One evening in May a German friend of the writer's pointed out the fatal connexion of Austria with most of Germany's troubles. Austria, he said, always cracked first, but the Germans followed with a shattering collapse. It was indeed not long in coming. From that time everything went wrong. The difficulties of the Credit-Anstalt undoubtedly produced general uncertainty as to the safety of investments in Central Europe, an uncertainty which was enhanced by the strained political situation. From the date of the Credit-Anstalt collapse hardly any foreign fixed deposits were renewed, and withdrawals of reimbursement acceptance facilities steadily increased. The only financial centre which really kept its head was London, although the leading New York banks also showed a sense of responsibility.

The effect of the foreign run only made itself felt gradually, as maturing credits were not renewed. Early in June, however, it became obvious to the well informed that unless confidence could be restored an eventual collapse was inevitable. There is no doubt that Dr. Brüning made this clear at Chequers. At the time everything seemed to concentrate on the Reparation question. The German Government manifesto which accompanied the publication of the new emergency tax decree openly referred to the impossibility of continuing payments on the existing scale, and made it obvious that if no reduction was granted Germany would be forced to take steps on her own. The fear of a Reparation crisis and of a German ' moratorium,' in regard to which opinion was uncertain whether it would not also apply to private indebtedness, greatly increased the general nervousness. The gold and foreign exchange losses of the Reichsbank attained huge proportions. At the same time rumours regarding difficulties of large banking and other concerns began to spread fast. In the middle of all this came the news of the Hoover Plan, which for a few days completely changed the situation. When historians of the future deal with this crisis they will doubtless squabble as to whether the Plan would have

produced the desired effect had it gone through immediately. At any rate, the fact that the French were able to hold it up for nearly three weeks unfortunately caused it to have the opposite effect to what was intended. It caused those creditors of Germany who had previously not been excessively worried to realise the full seriousness of the situation, and also the fact that the French had no intention of pulling their weight in the efforts to save it. It made it obvious that the French intended to use their position to put through a sort of political blackmail on Germany, and it looks even as though they refused to accept the Hoover Plan until they were sure that the situation had got beyond control and that acceptance would not weaken their hold. It is thus not surprising that the run continued. Since it was obvious that complete repayment of her short-term indebtedness by Germany was out of the question, each individual creditor, although realising the inevitable effects of the run, was naturally obliged to protect his own position. He had, moreover, not only to fear the general collapse of Germany, but the individual collapses of his particular creditors, and it was undoubtedly a most unfortunate coincidence that precisely at this time the North German Wool Concern, which was heavily indebted abroad, was obliged to make public losses of over £10,000,000. At this time, too, a domestic run on the banks rumoured to be in difficulties was added to the foreign run.

In the face of the virtual certainty of collapse the leaders of German politics and business somewhat naturally lost their heads. They apparently hoped for a miracle in the shape of a huge foreign credit, but it was not until July 9, or four days before the Darmstädter und Nationalbank closed, that the President of the Reichsbank set off on a circular tour by aeroplane in search of one. He met Mr. Montagu Norman at Victoria and travelled with him to Paris, where he had a discussion with the President of the Banque de France. Looking back, it seems surprising that the authorities could have expected results from hasty action of the kind. Daily, even hourly, the amount of credit necessary to restore confidence grew larger, and just after Dr. Luther left a very prominent American told the writer that in his opinion something like £250,000,000 were required. Dr. Luther was doubtless less ambitious in his demands, but the Central Bankers, apart from other considerations, naturally did not see the fun of advancing a further sum beyond the £20,000,000 given in June merely in order to enable the run to continue a little longer and more people to get their money out of the country. When Dr. Luther returned he was faced with the declaration of the Darmstädter und Nationalbank, generally known as the ' Danatbank,' that unless assistance was forthcoming it would be obliged

to close. The history of the critical Saturday and Sunday will probably always be the subject of controversy. Banks, Reichsbank, Finance Ministry, and Cabinet had been in more or less permanent session for days. The position was neatly illustrated by a pun current at the time. 'Das Kabinett,' it was said, 'tagt nicht mehr, es wochet.' Sheer physical strain was probably responsible for many of the decisions which appear to us now completely idiotic. It is now generally recognised that the most fatal decision was that to let the Danatbank go, instead of arranging joint action by all the banks, or at any rate a series of bank holidays during which decisions could be taken in a calmer atmosphere. Apparently, however, the authorities still hoped for a foreign credit and did not wish to take action which might be interpreted as a default. Moreover, some of the banks were of the opinion that they could continue to pay out even if the Danatbank closed. Therefore, about three o'clock on the Monday morning it was arranged that the Danatbank should close, but that the Government should guarantee its deposits, and that all German stock exchanges should be shut for two days. On Monday morning a general run set in on all banks and saving banks, for which they were obviously (amazing as this may sound) quite unprepared. Instead of meeting demands in full they rationed payments. There was nothing for it but to close them all, which took place on Tuesday morning.

There followed a general muddle—a period, in the words of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, of half, quarter, and eighth bank holidays. Emergency decree succeeded emergency decree in quick succession. Nobody knew what to do. Some people paid, some did not. Cash was almost unobtainable. The whole machinery of business was disorganised, and even the payment of wages and salaries became a serious problem. Abroad runs set in on various countries, particularly on London. The authorities still went on hoping for a foreign credit. The Chancellor and Foreign Minister went first to Paris and then to London, where this hope was finally destroyed. The ill-prepared London Conference informed Germany in effect that while arrangements would be made to continue the existing credits, for the rest she must rely on her own resources.

Once the authorities realised this they set about tackling their problems with energy and with a certain measure of success. The most important thing was to get the banks functioning as normally as possible. In order to do this it was necessary to restrict their payments in foreign currencies (of which the supply was limited), but to enable unrestricted payments and transfers in marks. Regulations were therefore promulgated for the rationing of foreign exchange. At the same time a bank, the 'Acceptance

and Guarantee Bank,' was founded, with the joint support of the banks and the Government, with the avowed object of manufacturing finance paper. This paper could be discounted with the Reichsbank, thus enabling the banks to obtain the necessary currency (or balances with the Reichsbank) with which to meet their obligations. Arrangements were made for the Danatbank to obtain fresh funds by the sale of its own shares held in portfolio and placed gratis at its disposal by its partners and the members of its board, so that it also would be in a position to reopen. The Dresdner Bank, which had also been seriously attacked and expected a run, received Government support to the tune of £15,000,000 in exchange for preference shares. The Reichsbank raised its discount rate to 15 per cent. These preparations completed, everybody waited for the 'zero hour' of unrestricted payments and speculated anxiously as to what might happen. Many responsible economists seemed to expect a tremendous expansion in the note issue and feared inflation, not realising that even if bank currency was transformed into paper currency this would not increase the volume of purchasing power and would thus not mean inflation. Nothing of the sort happened. On August 5 the banks resumed payment, and on August 8 the savings banks, without seriously affecting the note circulation. On August 11, therefore, the Reichsbank reduced its rate to 10 per cent. There remained the question of the stock exchanges, which had been closed since the outbreak of the crisis. The authorities decided, probably wisely, to wait until the public had got over its nervousness. The Reichsbank rate was lowered once more to 8 per cent., and on September 3 the exchanges were reopened for cash dealings. This date marks the end of the internal banking crisis proper.

The problem of normalising the international banking relations of Germany is of course incomparably more difficult, and will take months, if not years. At the present time all foreign exchange holdings are strictly rationed, and no payments in foreign currencies can be made without the approval of the authorities. In addition to this, all residents in Germany who have balances abroad are obliged to notify them to the Reichsbank and may be called upon to deliver them against marks. All this has involved an extremely complicated system of regulations, of which the basic principle is that no capital should be withdrawn from the country, but that payments of income to foreign holders of German securities shall be allowed. The relations of foreign bank creditors to their German debtors is subject to another set of complicated regulations laid down in the Basle 'standstill' agreement, which provides for the prolongation of short-term credits for the period of six months. In actual practice this

agreement has given rise to a great number of difficulties in regard to points of detail, and at the time of writing negotiations are still proceeding with the various countries and banks involved. The complicated mechanism of international finance has, in fact, been dislocated, and it is a matter of the most extreme difficulty to set it going again.

The question of responsibility for the crisis has been much canvassed. The Germans attribute it, with considerable justification, mainly to the ill effects of Reparation payments. In France, on the other hand, the theory is often advanced that the whole affair was a put-up job to get out of paying Reparations. Germany, so runs the argument, could have continued to meet her obligations if there had been no financial crisis, and the financial crisis in turn was primarily caused by Germany's declaration that she was unable to pay. Few countries, it is said, have done more to ruin their own credit than Germany. There may perhaps be at least some truth in this latter contention. For years two souls have dwelt in the breast of every German politician and business man, particularly when talking to foreigners. On the one hand, he wished to convince his hearer that Germany was sound, a good credit risk. On the other hand, he wished to emphasise that Reparation payments were beyond Germany's capacity. It was a most unfortunate dilemma, but the responsibility for it can scarcely be laid on Germany. The truth probably is that while Reparation payments on the scale of the Young Plan may have been theoretically possible provided Germany was willing to screw down her standard of living to the bare subsistence minimum, it was impossible politically to induce the Germans to accept these sacrifices in order to pay a debt not regarded as a debt of honour, but as 'tribute' to the foreigner. As soon as the fall in prices, the cessation of foreign lending to Germany, and the general depression increased the burden of Reparation payments to an extent regarded as intolerable, the political opposition to these payments very naturally grew. Revolution became a serious possibility, and this, by undermining confidence in Germany, created a position in which the payments themselves became impossible.

Another factor in regard to which the Germans are much blamed is the extent of their foreign borrowing. The boom years after the putting into force of the Dawes Plan were undoubtedly marked by considerable extravagance with borrowed money. This does not mean that the money itself was borrowed for wasteful purposes. Except in the case of a few municipalities practically all the borrowing was utilised for productive purposes, or at least purposes which were assumed to be productive at the time. Industry was modernised and re-equipped, electrical supply and

public utility systems developed; trading organisations were built up and foreign trade financed. But the borrowing naturally had its effect on the general state of trade and produced boom conditions in which incomes increased and a great deal of extravagance took place. Germany's boom in fact, like that of the oversea debtor countries, was largely financed on borrowed money. The borrowing itself developed quite naturally out of the depletion of liquid resources due to inflation and the pressure of heavy Reparation payments on the capital markets. The effect of this was to keep the rates of interest in Germany high, and thus to make investments in Germany attractive to foreigners. During the boom period the German desire to borrow was more than matched by the anxiety of foreign bankers and investors to lend. For years the principal German hotels were literally crowded with representatives of foreign banks and investment houses anxious to find employment for their surplus funds. The time of German bankers, business men, and municipal politicians was largely taken up in talking to people who were trying to lend them money. It may have been unwise to take it, but theirs was certainly not the sole responsibility.

In any case, however, the question of responsibility is merely of academic interest. The important questions are, first, whether Germany can get through the winter without a catastrophe, and, secondly, what are the ultimate prospects of recovery. During the crisis it was often emphasised that German trade and industry were fundamentally sound. Indeed, it is remarkable how well the industrial situation has stood the strain of the crisis. There have, of course, been a few sensational collapses, and the structure is showing signs of cracking in places, but provided that there is not a further catastrophic decline in the volume of business there seems no reason why the country should not pull through. The export trade has so far been particularly well maintained. The problem of reorganisation, of adaptation to present conditions, is being energetically taken in hand. The process may perhaps take years, and there is certainly a great deal that wants reform. In particular, there has been a general lack of proper auditing and efficient financial control, but in this department German business has learnt its lesson. Another problem of paramount importance which is being thoroughly tackled is that of readjusting wages and salaries. A beginning was made last autumn, when wage and salary cuts ranged from 5 to about 20 per cent. The process is now being continued with great energy. It would probably be no exaggeration to say that cuts of 50 per cent. and more in the total emoluments of highly paid men are the rule rather than the exception. The reductions are graded down to about 5 to 10 per cent. for the lowest incomes

In estimating the effective sacrifice of the individuals it should be remembered that the cost of living in Germany, owing to high protection, particularly for agricultural produce, has been considerably slower in falling than is the case, say, in England. Yet these sacrifices have been accepted with resignation, in many cases even with cheerful resignation. Labour, in so far as it is incorporated in the Social Democratic and Christian Socialist trade unions, has continued to give tacit support to the Government. If recovery from the depression is a question of adjusting wage and salary costs Germany is certainly applying the doctrine of self-help.

The crisis has been particularly severe on the Government and municipal finances, which were previously the source of much extravagance. Here again the pressure of necessity has imposed the most rigid economy. Owing to the suspension of Reparation payments and the drastic tax increases introduced in June the Reich is in a relatively favourable position. But the municipalities, which have to spend huge sums on poor relief (since unemployment insurance and 'crisis relief' benefit is only given for a limited period), are in a parlous state and do not know from month to month whether they will even be able to pay their salaries. In all fairness it must be admitted that the day of municipal extravagance is over and that the municipalities are making every effort to balance their budgets by economy. Even so it is extremely unlikely that they will be able to carry on without assistance from the Reich. It is now generally realised that mere economy under the present system will not be sufficient, but that a complete reorganisation of the administration, the so-called Reich Reform, is essential. Dr. Brüning is credited with the intention of carrying this out in the near future and obtaining the assent of the people by means of a referendum. It would involve the amalgamation of the Prussian and Federal administrations and the abolition, or at least restriction, of the independence of the smaller States.

Probably the most urgent problem, however, which the business of the country has to face is that of credit and currency. It is upon the solution of this problem that the situation in the coming winter mainly depends. The reason why the industrial situation has not yet felt the real effects of the credit crisis is that the banks paid their foreign creditors out of their own liquid resources and those of the Reichsbank, refraining from squeezing their customers to an excessive extent. Having thus borne the brunt of the crisis, the banks are now in a position of extreme illiquidity. If they endeavour to restore the soundness of their position by calling advances and using the funds thus obtained to replenish their liquidity, the result will inevitably be a deflation

crisis of unparalleled proportions, the end of which no one can foresee. The control of policy does not, however, lie with the banks, but with the Reichsbank, which is, now that foreign credits are no longer obtainable, the sole source of credit in the country. The Reichsbank can indeed without the least danger of inflation substitute to a large extent inland credit for the foreign credit which has been withdrawn. In present circumstances it need not pay excessive attention to the question of gold and foreign exchange cover. There is no need here to enter into a digression on monetary theory, but it is generally recognised that the purpose of gold reserves is to maintain the free interchangeability of the currency into other currencies. When, as is the case in Germany, the free interchangeability is in abeyance and foreign exchange is strictly rationed the Reichsbank is obviously free to guide its credit policy by the necessities of the situation and not by formal cover requirements. There are signs that the Reichsbank has realised this seemingly obvious fact. It recently declared its willingness to discount trade bills without restriction, and at the same time urged that a greater use should be made of these bills in domestic trade. If the banks can convert cash advances into bills rediscountable at the Reichsbank, they thus increase their liquidity and are able to pursue a more liberal credit policy. This does not mean that they will completely refrain from calling in credits. It should result, however, in credit being available for legitimate purposes, thus avoiding an undue contraction in the business of those concerns which are still sound. In this way it should be possible to maintain the volume of business at a level which would prevent the unemployment figure rising above 6,000,000 or so during the winter.

If unemployment can be kept within reasonable bounds and as long as the unemployed can be fed and housed, there seems little likelihood of a political catastrophe this winter. The German people have shown amazing patience, not to say docility, during the crisis. For weeks on end the banks and savings banks were unable to pay out more than a few marks for the bare necessities of life, and yet when unrestricted payments were resumed there was practically no sign of a run. Moreover, although the political situation is somewhat obscure at present, it does not look as though the extreme parties were gaining much ground. The Right has even adopted a somewhat more subdued tone. The cessation of Reparation payments has taken the wind out of its sails to some extent, since it is no longer able to point to the continuation of 'tribute' as the root of the evil. The tone of Hugenberg's speech at the recent meeting of the German Nationalist Party in Stettin was one of studied moderation, and was obviously intended to prove that the Right, including the

National Socialists, was capable of governing. Even if a Right Government comes into power there is no particular reason to fear wild measures. There is even a growing feeling in some quarters that it would be easier for the Right than for Brüning to bring about a *rapprochement* with France.

The so-called 'Layton Report' issued by the committee appointed on the recommendation of the London Conference laid great stress on the necessity of long-term financial assistance for Germany. It is indeed obvious that this is the only way of re-establishing normal conditions in the long run. The present situation, in spite of the remarkably speedy re-establishment of comparatively normal conditions within Germany, is merely a lull in the storm. What will happen when the 'standstill agreements' for short-term credits expire in February and when the Hoover Plan expires in June next year? The arbitrary restrictions on foreign exchange payments cannot be continued indefinitely. Germany's capital requirements, however, are not excessive. The Layton Report gives Germany's net short-term indebtedness to-day as £225,000,000, and only a part of this would need to be funded given a return of confidence. Moreover, in contrast to most of the oversea debtor countries, Germany has a strongly active balance of trade (the estimated excess of exports over imports for 1931 is about £150,000,000), and is able to make considerable repayments of capital out of this surplus. Germany may thus be likened to a solvent concern making reasonable profits but heavily overdrawn at the banks. The banks have agreed to 'stay put' till February. If they then try to foreclose almost anything may happen. And they will probably try to foreclose (as the Layton Report sufficiently clearly indicates) unless the politicians get busy, abolish or drastically reduce Reparation payments, and arrive at some kind of working political agreement in Europe, particularly between France and Germany. If this is done the German position should present a simple problem; if it is not done the Germans will have no choice but to declare a moratorium, the results of which would probably put into the shade anything experienced hitherto, and perhaps even involve the end of our present economic system.

H. Powys Greenwood.

CIVIL SERVICE OR BUREAUCRACY?

The English are justly famous for and proud of the efficiency and integrity of their Civil Service; and it is neither distrust of the purity of its motives nor dislike of the objects for which it is working that inspires the revolt against what is called the new despotism. No one would seriously suggest that education, good houses and provision against sickness, old age, widowhood, and unemployment are undesirable objects of human endeavour; on the contrary, there is hardly anyone who is unwilling to exert himself to secure them, or to encourage his less enlightened fellows to do the same. But what the man in the street is beginning to doubt is whether it is really good that these and other services should more and more fall under the control of the State; his reason may be convinced by the plausible arguments which can be used in favour of each individual item, but his instinct revolts against the total. Although his ancestors may sometimes have paid a high price for their privilege of muddling through and bequeathed to him a number of debts still to be paid, he begins, perhaps, to wonder vaguely whether there may not, after all, be something to be said for muddles, which have at any rate the merit of not engendering in the minds of their originators pride, affection, or any other motive for perpetuating them.

Many causes have combined to produce the great increase in the activities of the State during the last generation, and not the least has been its obvious success in organising the national resources during the war. If, it was asked, the State can organise itself for war, why can it not also organise itself for peace? The answer is that in the war victory was the goal which all knew and desired, and to which only one path led. In the peace, no doubt, our aim is human welfare, but the trouble is that no one has yet devised even an accepted definition of it, let alone the means to achieve it. And so we must perforce return as a nation to the task of groping our way to an unknown end by the ignominious process of trial and error. In this process the errors may be expensive and the succession of trials protracted, but success when it comes is complete. In private business the road to success is paved with good intentions which never come off;

risks are taken, but projects which do not pay are quickly abandoned with no more public disturbance perhaps than the addition of one name to the list of receiving orders in the *London Gazette*. Twigg and Dersingham fail; and though the consequences of their failure may, to Mr. Smeeth and Turgis, be more serious than a major political convulsion, by the general public it is unnoticed, and to their trade competitors it is only one more valuable example, paid for by someone else, of what to avoid.

The weakness of Government departments in so many of the enterprises on which they have embarked in recent years is that while they, too, must navigate without either chart or compass, they cannot easily abandon a course which has once been set. Anyone can imagine what would be the fate of a Minister who announced to the House of Commons that the Act he got passed last year had turned out to be a complete failure, the large sums of money spent under it had been a dead loss, and he had decided to cut his losses and give up his project. With occasional striking exceptions of which the lesson does not seem to be well appreciated, what is actually more often seen is Ministers vehemently defending in office measures which they have strenuously denounced in opposition. That this can happen is in a sense a testimony to the efficiency of the Civil Service. But the dangers of that very efficiency specially emerge in years like those which preceded the formation of the National Government. At such, more even than at other, times politicians are liable to be carried away by the real or supposed need '*to do something*.' It stands to reason that most of the things they want to do will be foolish and ought never to be undertaken or, if undertaken at all, should be immediately dropped; but the civil servant is so efficient that he will always produce a scheme which, in spite of innumerable flaws in the principle to which it is devised to give effect, does work; and he will always produce convincing arguments to prove even to its former opponents that it is right. When in spite of all his arguments and efficiency it breaks down, as everyone is by then committed to it, he is armed with powers to keep it going a little longer. In business the method sometimes adopted to deal with a similar situation is to raise a little more capital to carry on for another few months, when, it is said, improved organisation or some new process will restore prosperity. Mr. Micawber used to work on this plan. In politics it is much the same—a new Act of Parliament is passed which, it is said, will set right just what was wrong in its predecessor and as often as not a little more money goes with the Act of Parliament. In July 1919 the Housing, Town Planning, etc., Act was going to provide every hero with a home to live in. In December the heroes were still living in barns and pigsties, and a further Act providing new subsidies was passed. Since then there have been more and yet more Housing Acts, and, although there are now houses for most of the heroes, it is only with the help of subsidies from public funds towards their rents that they can live in them. Unquestionably emergency measures, and even subsidies, were necessary to help the country over the crisis caused by the war; but it is a fair assumption that thirteen years after the war the subsidies ought to be diminishing instead of, as they are, increasing. The tragedy is that the last Conservative Government was gradually withdrawing them from new houses and concentrating them on the urgent and temporary problem of the slums. The Socialist Government reversed the process, and with such efficiency in the handling of it that the change of policy was for a time almost unnoticed.

To proceed on lines like this is, as everyone knows, likely to be a somewhat expensive business; but apart from the sort of rake's progress into which any department is always liable to fall, a Government department is, in the most favourable circumstances, almost sure to spend more in doing or controlling any given job than private enterprise would. The reasons for this appear to be many, but only three really count; and those three are question time and the Estimates debates in the House of Commons, and the common responsibility of the Government of the day for all departments. No private business could be run at a profit if it could be compelled, as a Government department can be, to publish to the world at large the answers to questions put by opponents of its projects about its most intimate proceedings; or if it were compelled to keep complete statistics and records of no conceivable use to itself, merely in order to be able to answer questions; or if its directors had constantly to be making costly concessions to pacify people who were determined and had the power to turn them out in the end anyhow; or if it were prevented from doing its own work in the way that was best for itself for fear of embarrassing some quite different concern on the other side of the road. Yet anyone who has the least knowledge of the actual working of a Government department knows that all these, and other, obstacles to economical administration are encountered daily; and though they are all formidable, perhaps the last mentioned is the worst. Suppose that a railway company saw a chance of greatly reducing its overheads and increasing its profits by lowering its freight charges, but was prevented from taking it because a motor transport company working over the same area was on the point of ordering a large number of new lorries which would be useless if the railway freights were reduced, and so unemployment in the motor manufacturing industry would be increased; it is easy to see

that the railway company would not make very handsome profits.

In theory, of course, that sort of thing ought not to happen in Government departments, which are supposed to be all guided by a common policy; and the efforts to prevent it are potent causes of delay and expense in public business on account of the amount of cross-referencing involved. But in practice the field covered is so vast that the supposed common policy often leads to contradictory results or, at the best, to unsatisfactory compromises. And the worst of it is that the departments often do know better than anyone else, because they draw their knowledge from more sources than private concerns do, what is the best way of doing a job, but are compelled to adopt a worse. This suggests that in many spheres the function of departments ought not to be executive at all, but advisory. They might disseminate information and lay down principles but leave it to private initiative to apply them. In many branches of local government, the force of circumstances is already compelling the central departments in their relations with local authorities to take this line. The old statutory enactments which give complete control to the central departments remain in force, but the actual control has had to be relinquished. If there is further progress in the same direction, a great reduction in the size of the staffs of the central departments will follow, though it is possible that the smaller staff remaining will have to be of higher quality and better paid.

If, then, it is true that a Government department, at any rate when using the methods now customary, cannot proceed by trial and error or work as economically as other agencies, it will be a strong *primâ facie* objection to putting any service under State control that it has not yet passed the test of actual practice. The only irrefutable case for putting it in a place from which it will be next to impossible to dislodge it will be that the object aimed at is not in doubt, that the way to achieve that object is ascertained and that no other agency than the State can pursue it better or even as well. Judged by that austere standard, much of the work now done by Government departments needs to be reviewed. Public education costs the taxpayer £56,767,000 per annum. While it is perhaps generally agreed that everyone ought to be able to read, write and do simple arithmetic, can it be said that beyond that point there is any general agreement about what the finished product of public education ought to be? And if the goal is not known there can obviously be no certain way of getting to it; nor can it be certain that the State is more likely to find it than some other agency. Housing, again, costs the taxpayer £14,543,000 a year, and all that twelve years' experience has shown beyond doubt is that the policy which worked best and at

least cost was the one which involved least interference by the State. It would be easy to multiply examples, but even if after full examination each individual service were found to satisfy the preliminary tests suggested it would still be necessary to show that their cost did not, either severally or jointly, prevent the achievement of other even more desirable objects. Municipal expenditure, most of which is either directly or indirectly under State control, has, while fostering the social services, become an intolerable burden upon industry, and measures to lighten it have for years been a constant pre-occupation of Parliament, which has shown itself curiously blind to the most obvious remedies.

To suggest that no Government department should ever do anything except under the rigid conditions set out above would, of course, be absurd. There may from time to time be needs so pressing, or abuses so flagrant, that almost any action taken by Government would be better than none. But when action is taken it must be borne in mind that taxation is, as it was once described, 'adhesive,' and that unless means are provided to bring the remedy to an end when the evil is cured it will perpetuate itself, but not as did the landlady's dress described by O. W. Holmes which began as a bit of mourning and perpetuated itself as a bit of economy. It is possible, for instance, that the scandals associated with factories in the nineteenth century would never have been brought to an end without the Factory Acts and the appointment of inspectors by the Home Office. It is also possible that if the inspectorate were now abolished good employers would observe the law willingly and that trade unions or private efforts would enforce its observance on those who wished to infringe it. Whether it would, all things considered, be desirable to abolish the factory inspectorate is not here the point, but only that with the factory or any other inspectorate, however necessary its establishment may have been, it should never be taken for granted that a time will never come when it cannot safely be abolished. The only sound motto in dealing with State activities is therefore *Principiis obsta*.

How little it is that direct action by Government departments can do anyhow as compared with what has been done by public opinion and bargaining between competing interests, leading up it may be to simple alterations of the law enforceable by the ordinary machinery of the courts, can be roughly gauged by facts which are common knowledge though incapable of statistical proof. Anyone who has read *Mary Barton* and *Sybil* knows pretty well what were the social conditions in the first half of the nineteenth century. The sanitary conditions of big towns, though less well known, were as late as 1850 no less barbarous. In the third quarter of the century, while there was very little direct

interference, such as the present generation is accustomed to, by Government departments—in those halcyon days six seems to have constituted a 'horde' of officials—there was an immense improvement: the descriptions of social conditions in *Mary Barton* and *Sybil* ceased to have much more than an historical interest; and in many towns the sanitary conditions were so good by the early 'seventies that they have stayed almost unaltered until the present day without becoming a positive eyesore even judged by the most up-to-date standards. It was only about the 'seventies that what was described in the debates on the Local Government Board Bill as 'that extraordinary mania of bringing everything to London' really started, and Government departments began to gather momentum in their intrusions into the life of the community. When it is remembered that the same forces as, without the active help of Government departments, brought about the rapid improvement between 1850 and 1875 were still operating after 1875, can it really be said that the rate of improvement has been quickened in the last fifty-six years in anything like proportion to the cost? And it must be remembered that extra expenditure means extra taxation, which in turn, though it may give to the masses more than it takes away from them, does take something away and lessens their ability to help themselves. Statistics which fall short of covering every aspect of civic life can *prove* or disprove nothing of all this, but they may illustrate it. Pulmonary tuberculosis is generally regarded as a disease specially suitable to be treated under a national scheme. Between 1847 (the earliest year for which figures are available) and 1875 the death rate from this disease per million persons living fell from 3189 to 2313—*i.e.*, it fell by 876 per million in twenty-nine years; between 1875 and 1904 it fell from 2313 to 1228—*i.e.*, 1085 in twenty-nine years; between 1904 and 1929 it fell from 1228 to 738—*i.e.*, 490 in twenty-five years. It is from 1901—the year of the appointment of the Royal Commission on Tuberculosis—that the serious interest of the State in this problem really dates, and it was in 1912 that central control of the tuberculosis service really began; but it does not appear that either of these years marked the beginning of any specially rapid decline in the death rate. Here, again, it is not suggested that the activities of Government departments do nothing to improve the well-being of the community, but only that in assessing the value of their work *propter hoc* must not be confused with *post hoc*, and one must compare the conditions following their activities, not with the conditions as they were formerly, but as they might have been to-day if the State had continued to do nothing.

One rather paradoxical conclusion seems to emerge from what

is set out in the preceding paragraphs. The efficiency of the Civil Service, though a legitimate subject of pride, may under certain conditions be also a national danger. In the hurly-burly of party politics it is madness for a Minister who does not wish to commit political suicide to allow it to become apparent that his policy is wrong, and he is so well served by his permanent officials that its defects, however serious, can be almost indefinitely concealed. It is the smooth working rather than the intrinsic merits of any policy which induce public support of it, and so the public is constantly lulled into a fatal acquiescence in schemes to which, often against their better judgment, civil servants impart a specious appearance of merit. The blame for this unfortunate result must fall chiefly on Parliament, from which the civil servant gets his orders, but he himself cannot escape scot-free. He is the expert who is mainly responsible for advising Parliament through his political chief, and he must carry the expert's responsibility to give the right advice in so convincing a way that it is taken. A doctor whose patients all died because they did not take his advice would find his practice languish as rapidly as his whose patients all died because they did. If, then, the Civil Service is to continue to be the expert adviser of Parliament it becomes important to consider whether the Service gets the right type of man and gives him the right sort of organisation to work with.

However far Governments may be innocent or guilty of the charge of bringing the country to its present predicament, it is quite clear that the 445,500 civil servants now employed in helping them do it should be efficient and, particularly in the upper branches, should include the right type of man and (presumably it must be added) woman, and that the cost of providing them should be reduced as drastically as is possible. No one who realises that the working hours of the majority of them are from ten to five with an official break of forty-five minutes for lunch, and an unofficial break of unspecified length for tea with ordinarily a half-day on Saturday, can doubt that what works out at about a thirty-three-hour working week with fairly liberal annual leave is not, when all allowances have been made, a very exacting occupation. The Royal Commission on the Civil Service appointed by the Government in October 1928 has just reported, and the public will look with interest to its recommendations.

According to the Report of the Royal Commission (p. 31) there are about 1100 officers in the administrative class in the Civil Service, whose duties are defined as 'work concerned with the formation of policy, with the revision of existing practice or

current regulations and decisions, and with the organisation and direction of the business of government.' The number of all the other clerical and executive classes whose functions are defined (p. 12) as being 'all such work as either is of a simple and mechanical kind or consists in the application of well-defined regulations, decisions and practice to particular cases' is about 220,000. There is thus one of the administrative class to every 200 of the lower classes, or, if the 290 assistant principals, who are supposed to be the young men and women learning their job, are omitted from the administrative class, one to every 270. It is clear from these figures how much of the work of the Civil Service must consist at its best in applying 'well-defined regulations, decisions and practice' to particular cases.

It is probably inevitable that a large part of the work now done by the Central Government, such as social insurance, the administration of war pensions, and the collection of revenue, should consist mainly in applying rigid rules to cases in which there is no doubt of the facts. An applicant for a contributory old age pension either is or is not of the pensionable age and an insured person within the meaning of the Acts, and either can or cannot produce indisputable evidence of those facts. To check the facts and award the pension is generally, therefore, a mechanical operation of the simplest kind; but when ample allowance is made for the large number of the lower grades employed upon this sort of work the fact remains that a considerable number of them must be employed on work similar to that of the administrative officers.

It is possible that this distribution of the work between administrative and lower-grade officers is significant. A recent Committee — the Greene Committee — appointed to consider whether changes were needed in the company law insisted in their Report upon 'the need of elasticity' and deplored 'any imposition of statutory regulations and prohibitions calculated not merely to put a stop to the activities of the wrongdoer but to place intolerable fetters upon honest business.' It seems likely that in the work of many Government departments too much emphasis is laid in two ways upon putting a stop to the activities of the wrongdoer, at any rate, if Plato was correct in considering that making mistakes is the most incurable form of wrongdoing. In the first place, the head of any department is faced with a difficult problem in organising his staff. He is open to severe criticism if he increases his estimates for salaries, which already amount altogether, according to p. 11 of the Commission's Report, to £49,000,000, excluding the Post Office. He is particularly open to criticism of a somewhat vulgar kind if he demands a large proportion of highly paid posts the creation of which does little

to 'alleviate unemployment.' Moreover, in any large organisation it is always easier to exercise the rigid control appropriate to a low-grade staff than to allow initiative. The French Minister of Education who boasted that at any minute of the school day he could tell what every child in France was doing has become notorious. The head of a department, who cannot possibly supervise personally everything that is done, may well feel more secure both against criticism of his estimates and against mistakes being made by his subordinates if as much work as possible is reduced to pattern and made to consist in the application of 'well-defined regulations, decisions and practice to particular cases.' But, in the second place, before this is possible the cases themselves as they are presented to the department must be made to conform to pattern; and the desire for this conformity is reinforced by the same fear of mistakes being made by outside bodies as starts the process of reducing as much as possible of the internal work of the department to pattern. In other words, it is simpler to avoid glaring errors from day to day by controlling everything without exception than by selecting subjects for interference on some principle other than 'well-defined regulations,' though it may be doubted whether in the long run error can be eliminated merely by canalising it.

It is a fair conclusion that the growing interference with the liberty of the subject is only in part the cause of the growth of the Civil Service. It is also in part a consequence of the way in which the Civil Service itself is organised. With this aspect of the question the Royal Commission has not thought fit to deal, no doubt correctly interpreting its inspiring terms of reference which were 'to enquire into and report on (*a*) the structure and organisation of the Civil Service, including methods of recruitment; (*b*) conditions of service in the Civil Service with special reference to (i.) the general standard of remuneration of civil servants, and the existing differentiation between the rates and scales of remuneration payable respectively to men and women civil servants; (ii.) the machinery for the discussion and settlement of questions relating to the conditions of service; and (iii.) the position of ex-service civil servants in unestablished employment; (*c*) conditions of retirement from the Civil Service, including the retirement of women civil servants on marriage.' It was no part of its function to suggest that the work of much of the Civil Service should be made more difficult though less pervasive and that fewer people might be employed though on a higher scale of salary. The salaries and prospects, no less than the character of the work itself, cannot now attract enough first-class men and women for it to be possible to entrust to them the hard task of selecting what shall be dealt with within their

range of activities, rather than the easier task of dealing with everything. A far different type of mind is required for getting other people to do things properly than for doing them properly yourself. The Civil Service now works mainly on the second principle. Its numbers and cost can only be reduced and its relations with the public improved if the system of administration is so altered that wherever possible it works on the first.

It may seem like an idle dream to hope, in these days, that the hands of the clock will ever be put back so far that the ordinary citizen will once again be allowed to manage his own affairs in his own way. 'Look,' the town-planner says, 'at the haphazard way in which towns have been developed in the past, and at the cost of undoing now what never ought to have been done.' 'Look,' the educationist protests, 'at the sort of education given to the poor in the days before the creation of school boards,' and so on through all the range of the public services. The reason, however, why those things happened is not original sin but original ignorance. No one attributes the comparative slowness of communications in the sixteenth century either to the rapacity of landlords or to the absence of a Ministry of Transport, rather than to ignorance of the principles of the steam and the internal combustion engine. And it was the growth of knowledge not only of what is healthy, but even of what is merely pleasant, that transformed domestic architecture. If the public cannot be trusted to recognise what is good for them when it is held up before their eyes they will never learn to recognise it when it is rammed down their throats at the point of an Order in Council. As Sir Thomas Browne so wisely said, no one has ever yet been scared into heaven. And it is unlikely that the corporate wisdom of Parliament and the Civil Service combined will ever be far in advance of the corporate wisdom of the general public.

There is still at least one department of Government in which this principle is recognised. The Treasury has never tried to control that part of the national finances which falls outside the limits of what may be called public finance. But its influence on the City is well known to be great. It would certainly be less if the principle of compulsion were ever introduced into the relations between them, or merely if the advice of the Treasury were constantly obtruded upon the City. It is upon the judicious selection of the occasions when its advice shall be offered, and the intrinsic value of the advice when it is offered, that the influence of the Treasury depends. And in the Treasury the normal proportion of high to low paid posts is rightly large.

Other departments of Government may not deal, like the Treasury, mainly as experts with experts. Their influence has often to be brought to bear upon great masses of an unenlightened

public. But after all, as the Press has shown, it is only a matter of technique; and if the Press has evolved one way of doing it, the Civil Service may perhaps evolve another and, may be, a better way.

To consider whether the underlying principles of most of the central administration of the State should be altered was no part of the duty of the Royal Commission. It had to consider whether the organisation for carrying on the work that now has to be done, in the way in which it is done, is sound. To know that it found so little that needed altering within that limited range of inquiry will cheer, without intoxicating, the public. It is true that the method of recruiting the typist class leaves room for improvement, that the problem of the marriage bar for women has not yet been solved, and that here and there trifling adjustments of pay or conditions of service are found to be desirable; but on the whole the Service has emerged with credit from a scrutiny extending over sixty-two public and twenty-five private sessions of the Commission. Some day, perhaps, another Commission will be appointed to consider whether some of the work now done by the Civil Service had better not be done at all.

DOUGLAS VEALE.

HUMANISM IN AMERICA

DR. ABRAHAM FLEXNER[1] has written a book which is extremely entertaining, besides being an important contribution to a great subject. The title of his opening chapter, 'The Idea of a Modern University,' deliberately challenges comparison with Cardinal Newman's famous lectures; and the comparison enables one to define his position very clearly. Newman viewed a university exclusively as a place of *education*, where an *élite* could receive a liberal training which should fit them to be 'good members of society.' He was concerned only with the effect of the university on the minds of its students, the ultimate aim being to 'raise the intellectual tone of society.' Dr. Flexner considers that a university has 'four major concerns: the conservation of knowledge and ideas; the interpretation of knowledge and ideas; the search for truth; the training of students who will practise and 'carry on.' It is obvious, therefore, that, in his view, truth and knowledge come first, and the students are of importance only in so far as they can serve the cause of truth and knowledge. Moreover, when he speaks of the search for truth, he introduces an altogether new element, and one which, as he develops his conception, proves to be the most important of all. In fact it would scarcely be too much to say that, according to him, a university exists ultimately for the sake of research, and is only not given up to the prosecution of research, because that purpose is better served by specialised institutes; which need, however, a constant supply of workers who have received a university training. In other words, the proper function of a university is to foster and develop, and provide adequate scope for, the kind of intellectual ability which issues in research or productive scholarship.

At the same time it must be emphasised that this research is to be entirely disinterested. Dr. Flexner protests strongly and repeatedly against the notion that it is the business of the university to seek truth with a view to any practical end whatever. 'In the social as in the physical sciences the university is, in so far as

[1] *Universities: American, English, German* (Abraham Flexner: Oxford University Press).

scientific effort to understand phenomena is concerned, indifferent to the effect and use of truth.' Yet a chief reason why a modern university must be different from the old is that the modern world is in urgent need of intellectual guidance, if it is to deal successfully with the countless new problems, social, economic, educational and political, with which it is confronted.

> As long as evolution proceeded slowly over centuries, men could feel their way and make adjustments imperceptibly on an empirical basis. But the restraints which for centuries slowed down or limited adjustments have been largely removed. Societies have to act—intelligently, if possible—if not, then unintelligently, blindly, selfishly, impulsively. The weight and prestige of the university must be thrown on the side of intelligence.

That is finely and, so far as it goes, truly said; but one cannot well refrain from asking whether, after all, the scientific intellect is the agent best fitted to solve the problems for which it is itself, as Dr. Flexner admits, chiefly responsible. He speaks eloquently and justly of the need for maintaining intellectual standards: his whole book is a plea for a severe and noble intellectual ideal; but at the end it is impossible not to feel that something—perhaps the most important thing of all—has been left out. He concedes that the ancient English universities are incomparably successful in producing 'knowledge, culture, the power of expression, character, manners,' but he regards these qualities as of altogether secondary importance. He speaks from time to time of the necessity for a humanistic attitude even in the exact sciences; but he nowhere explains what he means by humanism or what are the real duties of the university towards it.

Now it is precisely the things for which humanism stands (culture, character, manners—all the immemorial virtues and graces of civilisation) that are in danger of perishing amid the rapid and violent changes of modern life. 'There are,' as a Cambridge man suggested to Dr. Flexner, 'two kinds of knowledge—exact knowledge and the knowledge of values. Cambridge stands mainly for the former, Oxford for the latter.' The remark is profound, and the distinction between the two universities eminently just; nor can there be any serious question which knowledge is of most worth in an age of political and social disintegration like the present. The most urgent of modern problems, beyond comparison, is how to preserve and transmit to posterity the values—the moral and spiritual treasures—which mankind has accumulated in its secular progress.

The future of exact knowledge is assured. It was never more highly esteemed than it is to-day; and the agencies for its preservation and extension are constantly increasing both in number and efficiency. Most of its needs could be adequately supplied by

libraries and special institutes if the universities were swept away to-morrow. It is not dependent on the university for its existence; though it may be, as Dr. Flexner thinks, for its *bene esse*. But the knowledge of values, at a time when organised religion is admittedly losing its hold on Western society, can scarcely be maintained except at a university; for nowhere else shall we find the leisure, the living tradition, and the personal contacts that are necessary to its transmission. Nowhere, if not there, can young men and women learn to be 'lovers of beauty without extravagance, and lovers of wisdom without unmanliness.'

Dr. Flexner reviews the universities of America, England, and Germany. He has most admiration for the last; and he is hardest, doubtless with justice, on those of his own country. Indeed it is his exposure of the vulgarities and fantastic absurdities of certain American developments which makes his book such amusing reading. Yet it is in American universities that, in the last few years, a group [2] of vigorous thinkers and writers has appeared, who, perceiving where the real danger to modern civilisation lies, have set themselves deliberately to the vitally important task of reasserting, on a critical instead of a merely traditional basis, those ethical and humane values in accordance with which the life of man, in the future as in the past, must be lived, if it is to be, in any real sense of the words, worth living. The most exact and comprehensive knowledge of Nature and her laws will avail us nothing if we are ignorant or neglectful of the law for man. The social, political, and economic problems which Dr. Flexner attributes to the increased rate of evolution are mainly due, as Aristotle saw long ago, 'to a very different cause—the wickedness of human nature.' The restraints of traditional religion and morality having been in great part removed, while human nature remains what it always was, the supreme problem for modern man is to find some modern substitute for those restraints. We need, as Benedetto Croce has surprisingly said, a new Christianity or a new humanism, if we are to escape 'from intellectual anarchy, from unbridled individualism, from sensualism, from scepticism, from pessimism, from every aberration which for a century and a half has been harassing the soul of man and the society of mankind.'

Because these American thinkers believe that our first need is

[2] A masterly review of the movement will be found in *Le Mouvement Humaniste aux États-Unis*, by Louis J.-A. Mercier (Hachette, 1928). Last year a kind of manifesto was issued, in the form of a symposium by fifteen contributors (including Mr. T. S. Eliot), entitled *Humanism and America* (Farrar and Rinehart). This book roused a lively controversy in certain American magazines. Humanism has incurred the disapproval of Mr. Middleton Murry: and has been powerfully attacked in this country by Mr. Hugh l'Anson Fausset in a very interesting book, *The Proving of Psyche*.

a new humanism, even as a preliminary to a new Christianity, they have elected to call themselves Humanists; and they can advance at least two sound arguments in support of their claim to the title. In the first place, they start from the same basis as the Renaissance humanists. They believe, that is to say, that the study of man, especially as revealed in great literature, not only affords the best intellectual discipline, but also opens the door to the knowledge that is of most worth to man; and all, or nearly all, of them would agree that the classics of Greece and Rome perform these two functions of great literature in a pre-eminent degree. And, secondly, the study of literature has led them to adopt and apply certain critical and philosophical principles, which may be summed up in the proposition that man is a unique being, different in kind from all the other animals, and superior to them. They hold that the specifically human qualities raise man above the purely natural order, and that there is in man 'a principle which is not natural and which cannot be explained as we explain the facts of Nature.' Thus for them the crux of philosophical controversy is the status of humanity in the kingdom of Nature; and they call themselves Humanists because they believe that status to be unique and autonomous.

It is obvious that, on both these counts, they must find themselves in opposition to powerful tendencies in the intellectual life of their time. They issue a direct challenge to the dominant mode of thought, which is appropriately called Naturalism; and to science, in so far as science claims the whole of reality, including even the spiritual life of man, for her province. In America they have roused a still more powerful, though less intelligent, foe in the established religion, as one might call it, of Democracy. For humanism is fundamentally an aristocratic doctrine, being true in this to its scholarly ancestry. The quintessential spirit of Renaissance humanism is condensed by Sir Thomas Browne in his description of the multitude as 'that great enemy of reason, virtue and religion'; and his judgment would be endorsed at least by the protagonists of the American movement. Indeed it would not be untrue to say that the movement started in a reaction, on the part of two or three fine intelligences, against the universal lowering of intellectual and artistic standards in the United States under pressure from below—from the enormous masses of half-educated people who, towards the close of the nineteenth century, formed the 'public' in America as elsewhere. In England the general level was doubtless no higher, but, besides the 'public' properly so called, there did exist an *élite*, securely entrenched at the universities and in a few other strongholds, whose intellectual and artistic ideals were practically unaffected by the need or the

desire to be popular. In America, however, the democratic spirit had invaded even the universities, and had actually ascended the intellectual throne, in the person of Charles W. Eliot, the famous president of Harvard. He had solemnly declared that 'a well-instructed youth of eighteen can select for himself a better course of study than any college faculty, or any wise man . . . can possibly select for him.' That is surely an uplifting thought for the three-quarters of a million students who are now enrolled at American universities and colleges.

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? is usually taken as a purely rhetorical question, but in this instance it found an answer. Irving Babbitt, Professor of French Literature at Harvard, and then in his forty-fourth year, published in 1908 his first book, *Literature and the American College*, with the significant sub-title of 'Essays in Defense of the Humanities.' To defend the Humanities is inevitably to attack the democratic principle in education, for the Humanities, especially in the narrower sense of the Greek and Roman classics, have always been at once the types and the instruments of an aristocratic culture—if only because they have always seemed as 'useless' to the vulgar herd as they do to the fashionable education-mongers of the present day. And Babbitt was at pains to 'oppose the democratic inclusiveness of our modern sympathies to the aristocratic aloofness of the ancient humanist and his disdain of the profane vulgar.' In the course of these essays, several of which dealt with purely national problems, he developed in their main outlines the doctrines, which he has preached consistently ever since, of man's 'superiority of essence' to the natural world, and of the irreconcilable discrepancy between the Law for Man and Law for Thing, to which Emerson had already given epigrammatic expression.

In the meanwhile a college friend of Babbitt's, Paul Elmer More, had been making a unique position for himself in the literary journalism of America. The first volume of his Shelburne Essays (named from a secluded New England village, to which he retired in the intervals of an exceedingly strenuous life) had appeared in 1904; and ten more were to appear before 1921. Mr. T. S. Eliot has pleasantly observed that 'Mr. More perhaps hopes to break the record of mass established by the complete works of Sainte-Beuve.' Be that as it may, these essays, which are all of the length that we associate with a serious monthly review, maintain an astonishingly high level, both of thought and of literary accomplishment; and they had a great and growing influence in the same direction as Babbitt's work—an influence which was reinforced, from 1901 to 1914, by their author's position as literary editor, or editor, of important New York papers.

His style has always been more graceful and insinuating, if less trenchant, than Babbitt's. His philosophy was originally more negative and less clearly formulated, though marked by a sure apprehension of spiritual values and a deep sense of the illusoriness of life—qualities which by themselves were enough to lend distinction to an American writer in those days. From the first he protested, on the one hand, against the facile optimism of Emerson and the Emersonians, the progenitors of 'uplift,' and, on the other, against the equally facile pessimism of the latest Romantics. He was obviously in quest of a theory of life which should steadily envisage both the greatness and the littleness of man, without seeking to resolve either element prematurely into its opposite. He found this theory, after a long journey, where Pascal also found it, in Catholic Christianity; and on the way he had learnt, and preached with increasing conviction and authority, the value of tradition in every department of human life and thought. Like Babbitt, he showed an ever-growing distrust of romanticism; and this is an aspect of their work which must be taken into account, because it has been perhaps a little too undiscriminating, and tends to alienate many who on general grounds would be in sympathy with the main doctrine of humanism. He also developed that resistance to the encroachments of science on the territory of philosophy, which is characteristic of the movement in its latest manifestations.

In any historical survey, however brief, of the Humanist movement some mention must be made of Stuart P. Sherman, who died in 1926 at the age of forty-five. His recently published *Life* by two of his friends contains a good deal of illuminating correspondence with the two older men, and reveals something of the forces against which a true humanism has to contend in America, not only in public and social life, but in the breast of the individual citizen. Sherman, after a brilliant career at school and college, became a successful and hard-worked Professor of Literature in the State University of Illinois at Urbana. He gradually made a name as a literary critic, thanks, chiefly, to the encouragement of Mr. More as editor of the *Nation*. He published two or three books of critical studies, and was finally lured to New York in 1925 to be literary editor of the *Herald Tribune*. For some years before taking this step he had completely broken away from the influence of Babbitt and More, and at the time of his early death he was expressing a warm appreciation of writers like D. H. Lawrence, Sherwood Anderson and Theodore Dreiser, whom he had previously condemned in unmeasured terms, and who were certainly as far removed as possible from any sort of humane moderation or 'decorum.' He was, in fact, to quote one of his biographers, 'actuated primarily by a desire to understand, and by

a willingness to applaud, a sincere and individual outlook on life.' That is a perfect description of the critic's function, as it is commonly understood to-day ; but it implies a total renunciation of any objective standard of truth or beauty, and is, in fact, a negation of the very meaning of criticism.

The history of this *volte-face* is interesting, because it is so purely American, and enables one to understand a certain side of American humanism which is otherwise perplexing to the English student—its bitter antipathy to humanitarianism. We in England also have the humanitarians always with us ; we can share Professor Babbitt's disgust at their ' unselective sympathy,' and we can realise, when it is pointed out to us, how dangerously their propaganda is sapping the fundamental ideas of discipline and justice. But we are not disposed to treat humanitarianism as ' the enemy ' *par excellence*, or to rank it, along with naturalism, as one of the great disintegrating forces which are responsible for the moral and intellectual chaos into which Western civilisation seems at times to be on the point of dissolving. The Americans, as it happens, are right ; and their timely warning may well turn out to be the most valuable part of their special contribution to the controversy of the day.

The turning-point in Sherman's intellectual life was the war. Up to 1914 he had advanced steadily in the direction of a classical humanism. But in 1915 he wrote to Mr. More that he ' seemed to be looking out on a reeling universe.' Mr. More replied that ' any scholar who finds himself suddenly made dizzy by looking out on a reeling universe is in a sad way. . . . The universe always has been reeling : was reeling long before the Prussians began their promenade through Belgium.' Sherman found this cold comfort. He thought that the universe ought not to be reeling, and would not reel, if only Governments would trust the average man. In brief, he was carried away by the Wilsonian idealism. He wrote enthusiastically of the ' democratic individualism ' of Emerson, as against the claims of centralised authority, and of the ' real heaven-descended greatness ' of Walt Whitman, whom, by 1920, he had learnt to rank with the Bible and Shakespeare.

Thus for faith in the leadership of the disciplined and cultivated few he had substituted belief in the brotherhood of man and the goodness of the human heart ; and this substitution entails, however one may seek to gloss the truth, a lowering, if not a total abandonment, of standards. It really is not possible to ' applaud the sincere and individual outlook on life ' of a Theodore Dreiser, to be sympathetic towards his estimate of average humanity (to say nothing of his literary style), and still to preach or practise a disinterested love of perfection. The attitude of most genuine humanists towards humanity, taken in the gross, is exactly hit off

by a remark of Mr. Birrell's about Dr. Johnson—' he pitied the poor devils, but he did not believe in them.' Such, at any rate, is the attitude of Messrs. Babbitt and More ; and it can be abundantly justified from the testimony of countless writers of the naturalist schools, especially those of the passing hour. When these gentlemen are not protesting against the bondage of law and convention which cramps the spontaneous development of human nature, they are engaged in demonstrating that human differs from animal nature only in being more cunning and more lustful.

If we ask why Sherman was such an imperfect humanist, the answer is not far to seek : it was because he had never drunk deep of the true fountain-head of humanism. His knowledge of Latin, and still more of Greek, was slight and superficial. To speak broadly, he read the Greeks only in translation. A classical scholar who is also a humanitarian enthusiast is a phenomenon so rare that it might almost be described as a ' sport,' a freak, a *lusus naturæ*. Professor Gilbert Murray is one instance ; Mr. A. E. Zimmern is possibly another ; but it would be hard to mention a third of anything like the same eminence. Probably no one can read Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle in the original tongue, and thereafter be greatly impressed either by the humanitarian illusions about human nature or by the naturalistic nightmare, except, as Plato himself might have said, by some ' divine chance,' by some queer accident of temperament or circumstance. The later humanism of a Shakespeare or a Scott is doubtless a ' true development ' of the classical humanism ; but even a true development must be brought to the test of congruity with the original revelation. Emerson, for instance, is sound when he agrees with Plato : he may be sound when he goes beyond Plato, but only when he is congruous with Plato. The literature of Greece and Rome, as interpreted by sound scholarship, is to humanism what the Bible, as interpreted by tradition, has been to the Catholic religion.

The mention of Emerson recalls another weakness of the movement, not unconnected with the last. It cannot reasonably be questioned that Emerson, with all his faults, is the one American of recognised œcumenical stature who has yet appeared. He is to the United States what Shakespeare is to England, or Goethe to Germany. He is far more, because his country can show no figure as near the throne as Milton's is in England, or Schiller's in Germany. Hence even More and Babbitt, though they profoundly distrust at least one half of his influence, recur to him again and again. They are bound to do so, for he is the best that America has done. The situation is, in truth, somewhat paradoxical. Emerson assuredly claimed to be, and in intention

always was, on the side of the angels. He was the author of the famous distinction between law for man and law for thing; and he propounded the theory of man's dual nature, and of God as the Inner Check, which figures so largely in the writings of More and Babbitt. And yet he was at heart a Monist, with a strong bent to Pantheism; he preached the doctrine of Romantic irresponsibility with unequalled gravity and persuasiveness; he is the ancestor, in the direct line, of Uplift and New Thought, and even, it may be argued, of Christian Science. But the American humanists cannot do without him. Their philosophy is based, in the last resort, on the witness of Literature to the universal and unchanging elements in human nature; and in their country to say 'Literature' is to say, in the first instance, 'Emerson,' however you may afterwards modify your original utterance. For all his greatness, or rather because of his greatness, it may be questioned whether he is not more of a liability than an asset to the new movement.

The only way to deal with such a man is to pass the whole of his work through the crucible of a searching criticism, and separate the gold clearly from the dross. This is what Professor Norman Foerster has done with great ability in his book on *American Criticism*, where he maintains that Emerson was at bottom a true humanist; and that the Self on which he taught men to place reliance was the ethical or universal self, the Standard Man, not the phenomenal self with its appetites and its egoism. If this is true, one is compelled to ask why the total impression left by his work is so unsatisfactory from the humanist point of view, and why the seed of his influence, except when it falls on a soil carefully weeded by the culture of which he thought so little, produces so rank a crop of cant and fatuity. Once more the reason is to be found in the scrappiness of his knowledge of the Greeks, whom he admired so devotedly and praised so eloquently. His Hellenism was, as Professor Foerster has said, to some extent a pseudo-Hellenism, 'an enthusiasm for the Greeks as they were not.' After all, the obvious defect of Emerson's teaching (from any point of view) is that it is incomplete and inconsistent; it has never been thought out. He himself often expressed a lofty scorn for consistency, and we may concede that a petty and defensive consistency is the mark of a little mind but the principles of a great mind, if logically extended, should meet somewhere, were it only in infinity. Emerson's would never meet at all, except for a combat *à outrance*; and that combat is in fact taking place on the battlefield of modern thought, where the Emerson who taught us to 'trust in the private self-supplied powers of the individual' is arrayed against that other and less vocal Emerson who knew that 'the weakness of the will begin

when the individual would be something of himself.' Unhappily the big battalions of the day are on the side of the self-assertive Yankee against the Sage of Concord.

In his analysis of the English genius Emerson found that 'there is a necessity on them to be logical,' and in his account of our universities he revealed the organ through which this psychological necessity gets itself satisfied:

> The atmosphere is loaded with Greek learning; the whole river has reached a certain height, and kills all that growth of weeds, which this Castalian water kills. . . . The great silent crowd of thorough-bred Grecians always known to be around him, the English writer cannot ignore. . . . The men have learnt accuracy and comprehension, logic and pace, or speed of working.

If Emerson had learnt the same things he would not, perhaps, have been a greater man, but he would have been a sounder and more systematic thinker; and it is not fantastic to say that the course of the nineteenth century might have been altered. When so sober a critic as Brownell says that 'Emerson's essays are the inspired scriptures of modern literature,' he may be writing only for Americans; but the influence of America during the last fifty years has not been negligible. It has become a common-place to deplore the Americanisation of Europe; and if Emerson counts for so much in America, it is something of a calamity for Europe that he did not learn 'accuracy, comprehension and logic' in the school where he himself recognised that they can best be learnt.

A return to the classical tradition, merely because it is classical and a tradition, would be futile if it were not impossible. We must go back to the Greeks and Romans, because they supply the only effective antidote to the poison of naturalism, which is attacking the religious and ethical and social life of Western civilisation at its roots. A year or two ago a Conservative English review gave a column and a half of commendation to a study in sexology by an American doctor. The book in question embodied the results of a questionnaire, on their personal sexual experiences, addressed to a hundred Americans of both sexes, belonging to what we should call the upper middle classes. The reviewer remarked that the sex-life of human beings, as distinguished from that of animals, is poisoned and perverted by the intrusion of 'irrational tabus,' by which he clearly meant such conceptions as chastity and modesty; and in the course of his eulogium he emphasised that the author of the book was specially qualified to deal with his subject, because he had devoted several years to the study of the sex-life of the higher apes. It reads like a fantasy by G. K. Chesterton, but it actually happened; and, stripped of the accidents of time and place, it is happening

all over the Western world at this present moment. The romantic cult of nature and the Darwinian study of origins have combined to lead us to a situation where man is invited, in all seriousness, to remodel his sexual behaviour, not 'after the pattern shewed to him in the mount,' but after the pattern exhibited in the forests of the Congo, or wherever the higher apes do most indulge their amorous propensities.

It is the boast of modernists and naturalists—of the sort of people who propose to reconstruct human life on the principles just adumbrated—that they view the problems of man's life and conduct with minds freed from theological prejudice and untenable assumptions; but it is obvious that here the Greeks and Romans beat them at their own game, because they had no theological prejudice to fight against. Of the moderns it may be said (and they are always saying it for themselves) that they have obtained their freedom at a great cost; but the Greeks and Romans were born free. And the results of this difference are manifest in the attitude of the ancients and moderns respectively to questions of sexual morality. The former approach the subject dispassionately, with real candour and openness of mind; the latter become intense and fanatical at the least mention of sex. Their reaction against centuries of 'repression' has made them as fierce in their attacks on the idea of chastity as ever the Puritans were in their denunciations of the stage. They are obsessed with sex, as their novels and pamphlets show: the Greeks were obsessed with nothing but a desire for truth, and for a life in accordance with reason. It is greatly to be feared that Dr. Flexner's ideal university would turn out very few Grecians, and an innumerable army of modernists.

It may be argued that the Greeks were deficient in knowledge; that, however open-minded they may have been, they lacked the data requisite for forming a valid judgment, since the vast stores of exact information accumulated by scientific research were closed to them. This argument might be answered by an appeal to the facts. It is hard to suppose that anyone who has read Aristotle would judge him inferior to any modern in his knowledge of normal human nature. But the question in dispute goes back to first principles, and the position of the humanist is precisely that the methods of science are inapplicable within the sphere of conscious purpose, which is the sphere of properly human activity. Let us grant that human behaviour is amenable *ex post facto* to the methods of the laboratory—that statisticians and psychologists are able to formulate the 'laws' which govern the reactions of mankind in the mass. Still they are unable to predict with certainty the behaviour of any individual in any circumstances whatsoever. Apart altogether from the

validity of scientific results, the humanist contends that human life presents itself to human beings as a system of conscious ends, and that to study it from the outside, making abstraction of the idea of purpose, as science necessarily does, is to mutilate the facts *ab initio*. The scientist contemplates, not the living reality, but an artificial construction of his own making. To seek to explain human conduct by the principles of physics or mechanics is hardly more rational than it would be to import the methods of ethics into the study of the atom. And, after all, those methods were once employed, with a measure of success, in the divine science of astrology.

It is not prejudice or prescription which has caused the classics of Greece and Rome to be regarded as more 'humane' than any other body of literature. The inhabitants of the city-states of the ancient world, thanks to a happy combination of circumstances, were peculiarly qualified to envisage the life of man as a separate and independent realm. There are three periods of civilisation and culture which intimately and vitally concern us as Europeans—the classical, the mediæval, and the modern. Of these the second was dominated by theology, and man was viewed only in his relation to God and the scheme of salvation. In the last he is seen against the background of Nature; and more and more the background threatens to absorb his figure, or his figure tends to melt into the background. In the first alone he was the one supremely real object of contemplation; and the world of his making, the domain of human effort and achievement, maintained itself, on the whole, inviolate—secure from the intrusion of religious or of merely natural forces. That this isolation was false and artificial may be argued either from the religious or the naturalistic side. It was certainly precarious, and in the end it broke down completely. But it actually existed, and it can never exist again. That is why any humanistic movement, any deliberate effort to establish the validity of human ideals, any attempt to discover and enunciate the essential and enduring laws of human nature, must go back to the classics.

We are prone to forget that the very idea of a specifically human perfection, of a right development of human nature as such, was a creation of classical thought; and we are so occupied, in practice, with 'solving problems' or 'improving conditions' that the existence or even the possibility of such an ideal is almost lost sight of. Yet without it all our efforts must be a mere groping in the dark. How can we hope to solve human problems or improve human conditions, unless we have a clear knowledge of the end to be attained, of the sort of life that human beings ought to live, and the standards by which they ought to

regulate their behaviour? Scientific research can perhaps make human life healthier and more comfortable, but there its competence ceases. It can do nothing towards 'purifying the national taste, or supplying true principles to popular enthusiasm and fixed aims to popular aspiration.' This, according to Cardinal Newman, is the great but ordinary end to which a university training is the great ordinary means; and because the American humanists also believe that this is the proper function of a university, as, in its measure, of all liberal education, it must be said that they have a truer conception than Dr. Flexner of the part which a modern university is called upon to play 'in shaping society towards rational ends.'

The phrase is Dr. Flexner's, and it may serve to define the issue between him and the humanists of all time, including the American humanists of to-day. The latter, whatever their faults, at least recognise that it is idle to dream of shaping society towards rational ends by any other means than the discipline of the individual. The modern heresy, of which Socialism is a typical form, is to suppose that somehow, by legislation, by committees, by economic theories, by research or by machinery, you can do for society, which after all consists of individuals, what the individual cannot or will not do for himself. Hence the exponent of *The Idea of a Modern University* is concerned, not with the effect of the university on its *alumni*, but with the impersonal interests of truth and knowledge. He admits ingenuously that he finds the human products of Oxford and Cambridge more attractive than those of any other place of learning; but he does not seem to realise—nor would he care, if he did—that the reason for this phenomenon is the very simple one that in those universities, in spite of all their concessions to the modernity that he loves, the intellectual atmosphere is more saturated with humanism than anywhere else.

'The ultimate product,' he says, 'is admirable—cultivated gentlemen who can think and write and act.' Which does modern society need most—this sort of man, or an increase of truth and knowledge, of which, to judge by recent history, it is by no means certain to make an edifying use? The right answer to this question is surely not doubtful; and yet modern society as a whole would probably give the wrong answer—not through ignorance, but through a kind of secret jealousy, because it is possessed by that spirit of equalitarian and humanitarian democracy, against which American humanism has uttered, and is still uttering, so noble a protest. For the old humanistic discipline was, as I have said, essentially aristocratic. It involved a recognition of the fact that what the world needs, in every age, is not more knowledge, but leadership; and it set itself to develop, in

a select few, 'that perfection of the Intellect, which is the result of Education, and its *beau ideal*, to be imparted to individuals in their respective measures . . . the clear, calm, accurate vision and comprehension of all things, as far as the mind can embrace them, each in its place, and with its own characteristics upon it.' Such was the mission of a university, as Newman conceived it—not to enlarge the borders of knowledge, but to breed an intellectual aristocracy. We may well be thankful for Dr. Flexner's brilliant and challenging book; but we should be more thankful that the old idea of a university is still powerful in England; and not least that there is in America a vigorous and growing body of opinion which is on the side of Newman and the angels.

PHILIP S. RICHARDS.

HORACE'S JOURNEY TO BRUNDISIUM

I HAVE read so much and talked so often for a quarter of a century about the journey which Horace records in the fifth satire of his first book, that I have had an irresistible desire to travel as far as I could by the same route from Rome to Brindisi. When the opportunity came in April 1930 I did not feel myself bound to adopt the poet's methods of locomotion; I travelled in no canal boat, I did not ride on any mule, and, when I had to leave the railway for the road, I hired a comfortable F.I.A.T. in preference to a *raeda*. Nor could I conscientiously follow the route exactly at every point, but had to content myself once or twice with a view from some miles' distance of points on Horace's road.

Horace started with a companion whom he calls Heliodorus; it has been suggested that the name was a jesting alteration of his real name, Apollodorus. If I followed this example, I could name my comrade Hilarodorus (*quem versu dicere non est*). I will not say that he is 'by far the most learned of Greeks,' but, at any rate, as he was a candidate for Classical Honour Moderations, he read a good deal of Homer on his journey.

We had seen Ariccia on a day's excursion from Rome, but we sampled no 'middling tavern' in that small town. Our real journey began when we set out, from the terminus at Rome, for Sesse as the station from which we meant to view Appi Forum. Apparently there cannot be a great number of travellers who go there, for the porter who took charge of our luggage, after some hesitation as to which was the proper *sportello* at which to obtain our tickets, put us into the wrong train, from which we were promptly ousted by its conductor, who with more accurate knowledge directed us to another. From Sesse it was rather more than three miles' walk to the site of Appi Forum; when we reached it we could see no remains except a stone on the road bearing a Roman inscription. However, we obtained the proper local colour, for a few frogs in the canal croaked for our benefit, though it was not an hour when they could be sufficiently vociferous to make sleep impossible, and mercifully there were no 'plaguy mosquitoes' to second their efforts. Sesse had an animal fair going on, and, when we returned, the business of buying and

selling was concluded, and a noisy throng filled to overflowing the restaurant of the station inn, replacing for us the bustling scene experienced by Horace when he spent his evening at Appi Forum.

A slow train brought us in an hour and a half to Terracina; it was already dark when we drove through the town to the Hotel Marina. Soon after dinner, when we went out for a stroll, we were quickly driven back by the first of the storms of rain that accompanied us from this point as far as Benevento. A boisterous night followed, and all through the following morning there were big waves dashing against the breakwater of the port, close to which the hotel stands. It was afternoon before we could go out and see Terracina; I had been there before, but retained only a general impression. The new town lies between the sea and high cliffs—Horace says that they gleam afar, and this is true, for, though their general colours are ochre and grey, they look bright where the sun falls on the parts that are quarried. It owes its chief charm to the orange trees, which not only abound in its gardens, but are planted along the main street, with sometimes a neighbouring wistaria climbing over a wall to give a splash of contrasted colour, a most beautiful combination. From the new town a short ascent leads to the old town, with its fine cathedral, full of delightful things, standing in a piazza which represents the old forum of Anxur. We climbed much higher to the ruined temple (not of Jupiter, but, according to the guide-books, of Venus Obsequens) on the top of the hill; as we climbed we could see three miles to the north the hill on which was the shrine of Feronia, at which Horace performed his ablutions after his voyage on the canal.

The next day gave us somewhat better weather, and, after lunch, the local motor omnibus took us through Fondi to Formia. In Horace's time travellers had to climb over the hill on which Anxur stood, but later Romans cut a way for the road through the cliffs that avoids the ascent. In our drive we were able to realise the difference between the Italian word *vietato* and the German word *verboten*. In Prussia people are careful not to do what is *verboten* for fear of the consequences; but we were confronted with two notices, one forbidding smoking and the other forbidding conversation with the conductor: in a short time everybody in the omnibus was smoking, and sitting on the bench with the chauffeur was a passenger engaged in animated talk with him. Soon after leaving Terracina we crossed the boundary of the old Papal States, not without a sense of relief that at any rate till Benevento we should not see the self-laudatory inscriptions of the Popes, even though they might be couched in such elegant Latin as that in the church at Terracina which announces in

Tacitean idiom that Pius VI. *lapidem posuit nisi acerbitas temporum frustrasset*. As far as Fondi the journey was over level country through oranges and lemons; it looked as though the crop of 1930 would be particularly good; I never remember seeing the trees more heavily laden with fruit. At Fondi we thought what gratification would be felt by the self-important official, Aufidius Luscus, who met Horace and his friends, had he known that part of the main street of the town would be called Via Aufidio. After Fondi the character of the scenery soon changed abruptly. We began to mount through a rocky ravine into a hilly country of grey limestone with no other vegetation except olives, that harmonised in colour with their surroundings. Near us across the valley we could see a portion of the old substructure of the Appian Way, and more was visible in the sinister-looking little town of Itri, associated with the fame of the brigand Fra Diavolo.

As we entered Formia we had a wonderful view of the beautiful bay that stretches from Gaeta to the northern promontory of the Bay of Naples, but almost at once there came up a heavy storm, and before the omnibus reached its stopping-place the whole scene was blotted out from sight. We reached our hotel in a deluge. As it rained most of that evening, we were grateful on finding that the hotel (the Grand Hotel Formia) was comfortable and commanded a grand view of the sea and coast, whenever there was a break in the downpour. The sights of Formia are soon exhausted; it would take longer to exhaust its smells: it has little claim on the traveller's interest except for its fine position and memories. The death of two people in ancient times could be called to mind; at Caieta Æneas lost his nurse, whose memory is still perpetuated in the name of *Gaeta*: the mortality among that hero's nurses in this region was very remarkable, for ancient etymologists derived the name of *Baiæ* from another of his nurses, *Boia*, and *Prochyta* from yet another nurse of that name. It was at Formiæ that Cicero was murdered, and a small round tower near the railway is still pointed out as his tomb. We found nothing here to perpetuate the memory of Mamurra, the *decoctor Formianus*, as Aufidius is commemorated in Fondi.

It rained heavily during the next morning. We had to make a slight deviation from Horace's route at this point, for my motoring map suggested that we could only reach Sinuessa by circuitous and rather indifferent roads. Between it and us lay the Massic mount, once famous for its vines, and we could see where the site of the town would have been just beyond the projecting spur. So we went by the train to Sparanise, crossing in the course of our journey the Savo, a very brown, narrow stream, which Horace crossed by the Pons Campanus several miles lower down

its course. From Sparanise we took the train on the main line from Rome to Naples for Capua Vetere, now called Santa Maria. Like Horace, we seemed likely to reach it *tempore;* but for some inscrutable reason we spent nearly an hour in or near the station of modern Capua, which is on the site of ancient Casilinum, and we should have reached our destination earlier if we had done the last stage on foot.

There is little in Capua Vetere to suggest the luxury that demoralised Hannibal's army when it stayed there; so far as we saw it, it seemed to be a mean, poverty-stricken place, and we resisted the appeal of the keeper of the hotel where we lunched that we should spend the night there. The coffee alone, which was considerably the worst we tasted in Italy, would have been enough to make us move elsewhere. One recollection of classical Capua came to my mind during the meal, when there entered an amazing personage with long crimped hair on which a peaked cap uneasily sat; I thought of Gabinius, whom Cicero describes, with his *coma calamistrata*, as though he had removed the whole street of Seplasia from Capua. Our sightseeing there was confined to a visit to the amphitheatre, of which the arena and the subterranean passages are in some ways better preserved than those of the Colosseum. But the allurements of Capua, especially when seen in a drizzle, were not sufficient to make us want to stay more than a couple of hours. So we moved on four miles to Caserta. Here we found a bit of the eighteenth century amid mediæval surroundings. At the west of the town stands the great palace of the Kings of Naples, and beyond it is a large garden or park, laid out in the manner of the period with statues, cascades and fountains, and with 'vistas' carefully made to command views of the pyramidal mountains that stand above it. One of these views shows Maddelona, the picturesque height with three castles, of which I had several times had a rapid but admiring glimpse on the railway journey to Naples, and which I was very glad to look at more leisurely. The streets of the town are laid out in the form of a cross with a round piazza full of cafés at the point of intersection. A certain degree of liveliness is given to Caserta by the number of military uniforms seen in its streets; but, as in most of the towns of southern Italy, a large proportion of the population had ample time for lounging, and nobody ever seemed to have occasion for brisk walking.

We postponed the sights of Caserta, apart from the royal gardens, till the next day; but the morning was so wet that we were twice driven back by downpours to our hotel, a place that would have been more comfortable if repairs had not been going on, and if a larger proportion of the staff had not been almost children. We had contemplated putting the last touches to our

packing after lunch, but the meal was too leisurely, and to give us time for catching the train a battalion of these juveniles, without asking us, carried to the station not only our luggage, but every loose article in the room, including a matchbox and my companion's cigarette-case, of which toll was taken on the way. Our journey was to be through the Caudine Forks to Benevento, and I had very great difficulty in persuading the man at the ticket office that I really wanted to go that way; he kept on repeating the fact, of which I was fully aware, that there was a later train by another route that would bring me to Benevento an hour earlier. But at last he realised that he was dealing with a perfectly unreasonable man, who was prepared to spend more than three hours in travelling to a place which he could have reached in little more than an hour. We changed at Cancello, whence we could see a puff of smoke from Vesuvius mingling with a ridge of clouds that lay horizontally above it; then by a very picturesque journey we went through the Caudine Forks (this seems the more probable of the two sites proposed), and passed close by the place where Horace spent the night when the two clowns bandied abuse at one another. Caudium is now represented by Montesarchio, behind which rise such abrupt slopes that for the first time I felt that there was something to be said for the view that *super cauponas* may mean that the villa at which Horace stayed was further along the road instead of being situated above the town.

At Benevento we spent two nights. There is a good deal to see, and the town has a more prosperous appearance than most of those which we had visited. The main street, which descends from the mediæval castle past the cathedral to the bridge over the Calore, is flanked with good buildings. The chief monument in the town is Trajan's Arch, which is finer than any of the three famous arches in Rome. The cathedral has been too much modernised inside, but it retains two splendid ambones, and its front, decorated with much carving of the Lombard period, is most interesting, having as its crowning glory the great bronze doors with scenes from the New Testament, much older than those of the baptistery at Florence, and more like those at Pisa and Augsburg.

When Horace stayed at Beneventum his *sedulus hospes* nearly set the inn on fire. There was little opportunity for us to suffer a similar catastrophe; the dining-room of the hotel was being repaired and we had to go to the station restaurant for all our meals (and very excellent they were), and the hot water was cut off from our rooms! The sedulousness of our landlord was shown in sending back before our arrival all the letters that had been forwarded to us, although I had written to the hotel to order beds

some days before the letters could have come. When they at length reached me they bore the inscription 'No longer here.' Some disciple of Einstein must explain.

For a considerable distance from Benevento the railway would be of no use to us; so I hired a car to take us to Ruvo. The terms were not cheap, but at any rate the car was comfortable. The chauffeur was accompanied by a depressed-looking urchin, whom he employed to mount guard over the car when we lunched or visited a building, and who was only roused once to reasonable animation when there was a puncture, on which occasion he showed the most commendable agility in bringing out the spare wheel and unscrewing the nuts. I do not know when he had any food; I never saw him eat, and my only evidence that he had any meals was that I was always charged for them in the hotel bills and insisted that the chauffeur should pay, as I had not bargained for the company of the *piccolo*.

There was little chance of forgetting that one was in old Samnium in or near Benevento. Banks and company offices constantly bore the inscription '*di Sannio*,' and it was a frequent addition to the designation of villages. The drive of the first day was over very hilly country—Horace is quite clear about that—and about seven miles from Benevento we caught a distant view of mountain country, where 'Apulia showed her familiar heights.' At a village of incredible dirtiness called Grottalambarda we turned into side-roads, and after going through picturesque hill scenery we wound our way up to Trevico, perched on a very high elevation with a most extensive view. As we approached it, we passed a great number of oak trees with last year's leaves on them, such as the bough with the leaves upon it which made Horace's eyes water owing to the smoke it caused. Those commentators who say that Horace made his journey in autumn because the bough in question had leaves on it forget that in March and April many trees still retain the leaves of the past year. It was so cold when we dismounted for a few minutes at Trevico that we should have welcomed a fire even under those conditions. Trevico had little to show us, but just outside the village there were remains of some ancient building, but we were not near enough to judge its date.

Horace tells us that his next stopping-place was twenty-four miles distant, but he could not give us its name because it did not scan. I chose as our halting-place Melfi, not because it was just about twenty-four miles as the crow flies, but because it was the only place in the neighbourhood that had a hotel worthy of mention in my handbook to the hotels of Italy. Until I took this journey I used to say that the unscannable place was either Asculum (though Horace was ingenious enough to have made

that name scan, had he wanted to) or some place whose ancient name is lost to us: after all, we should never have heard of Trivicum in the classics but for this one allusion. Now I definitely have to adopt the latter alternative. We caught a distant view of Ascoli perched on a high hill, and, as Horace says that he and his friends *bowled along* for twenty-four miles to their destination, he is hardly likely to have forgotten the steep climb that they would have had at the end of the day; he is careful to mention the much more moderate ascent to Anxur. Besides, why should travellers to Canusium climb over the ridge on which Asculum is set, avoiding the valley of the Aufidus, and only after traversing difficult country, descending to it? I put in no claim for Melfi, as it would have taken them up a side valley. The suggestion that it was Venusia is doubly unhappy, for it is incredible that the poet should have described his native place merely as having an unscannable name, foul water and good bread, and, further, it is off the route. But what I did notice was that for almost exactly twenty-four miles from Trevico we were going generally down hill till we reached the valley of the Ofanto (Aufidus). Somewhere near Ponte S. Venere, I believe, stood this *oppidulum*, whose name is for ever lost, and from there it would have been possible to travel along the river valley to Canusium.

After a long morning's drive we halted for lunch at Lacedonia. The name of this unprepossessing village is more generally known now, as it was almost entirely destroyed in the disastrous earthquake which took place a few weeks after our visit to those parts, and which shattered also a great part of Melfi. It is sad to think of the possible fate of those who showed us courtesy and attention. We stopped for an hour at an unpretending *osteria*, where we climbed to a large stone-floored room, on a table in which lay a violin and a copy of *Cæsar's Gallic War*. The former certainly, the latter probably, belonged to the lad who waited on us, for in the intervals of service he picked up the violin and favoured a guest who sat at another table with a few notes on the instrument; I hope he survived the earthquake and will reach a greater degree of proficiency. After lunch we were gradually descending for a long time with great views of Ascoli and the country beyond on the north, and on the other side the deep valley of the Ofanto. This we eventually crossed, and immediately were hung up for an interminable time at a level crossing; the Italian railways seem to be afraid that a train may suddenly take it into its head to go at an unprecedented speed, and so every precaution has to be taken against such a contingency. From here to Melfi the country is better timbered, and the very end of the drive was among the pleasantest and most picturesque parts of the day's journey.

Melfi, of which a great part was soon in ruins, lies in the very heart of Horace's country. It is at the foot of Mount Vulture, the scene of an interesting, if fabulous, episode of his childhood's days. A few miles away, but out of sight from Melfi, is his birthplace, Venusia; closer are Acerenza, Banzi and Forenza, which Horace knew as the nest of high Acheruntia, the Bantine groves and low-lying Forentum. It is a picturesquely situated city, dominated by the fine Castello Doria, which the earthquake, I see, has sadly damaged. The special treasure of Melfi is a fine sarcophagus, in the cortile of the Municipio. The cathedral, like nearly all that we visited in the south, is hopelessly 'baroqued,' and contains an episcopal throne, a fantastic composition in the most elaborate casino style. Our hostelry enjoyed the euphonious name of 'della Bella Panella'; on the whole it was as good as we had a right to expect; at least, unlike our last two hotels, it had no workmen in it executing repairs. Its chief drawback was that the hotel servants were constantly invading our room or accosting us in the passage to solicit tips for services either rendered or not rendered, for some of which it was difficult to see the reason. One boy, who had his fingers constantly to his lips, possibly as a signal to keep silence about his extortions, but more probably as an invitation to give him cigarettes, demanded and obtained sixty centesimi because we were going to have coffee at breakfast the next morning; I failed entirely to understand what were the intermediate stages in the transaction. Every time that we left our room we found seated just outside it the chauffeur's urchin, wearing a countenance of the most unutterable gloom. The chauffeur himself was at pains to show us that it would be difficult for him to deposit us at Ruvo and get back to Benevento the same night, so that it would be necessary for him to spend a second night at Melfi (for which, needless to say, I should have to pay). However, I said that we would start the next morning as soon as he chose, and, if needs were, he could deposit us at Andria, short of Ruvo, whence we could get a train. Then, on reflection, he decided that it was not so difficult after all, and would be satisfied if we left Melfi at 9 a.m.

So at 9 a.m. we started. The first few miles were through picturesque country among hills, but after Lavallo we had a flat, straight road to Canosa (Canusium). Here we stopped for a short time to see the cathedral, in which San Sabino is buried. A man came up to invite us to see the tomb of Boemund, the son of Robert Guiscard, which is in a court adjoining the church. We agreed to this; whereupon, as service was proceeding in the choir, he went up to one of the church dignitaries and took him away from the service to open the door for us. The reverend gentleman did the honours of the tomb, and then, when we had

seen it, rejoined his brethren in the choir and continued the service.

I should have liked to turn aside six miles to see the battle-field of Cannæ, but time was pressing, and we had to get on to Andria and Ruvo. The whole route was through olive-groves, more than I had ever before seen in Italy. Andria, a quite big town, did not keep us long. Its cathedral has suffered terribly from baroque incrustation. The sacristan there was especially eager that we should see the crypt in which two queens are buried. So we descended, furnished with small wisps of taper, like those provided for visitors to the catacombs. There they lie, these two poor queens; what remains of their bones is to be seen in two open coffins, but nobody knows which is Iolanda and which is Isabella of England, and the casual traveller is invited to scrutinise them closely, and drops his candle wax on the relics of those two wives of Frederic II., emperor and wonder of the world.

A few more miles brought us to Ruvo, where we were to part company with the car. But before the departure of the chauffeur and the *piccolo* there had to be a meal. Inquiry proved that the best place for this was the Ristorante Roma, but it gave no outward sign, not even the typical bush, of its function, and we had to pick up a small boy to guide us. Though too modest to give any indication of being a restaurant, it supplied an excellent meal, which would have been prolonged, had we not been anxious to speed our driver on his way back to Benevento and he anxious to set out; so he and we alike refused further courses. It was at Canusium that Varius sadly took leave of his sorrowing friends; at Ruvo we shed no tears at the parting owing to the exorbitant demands of the chauffeur; he insisted, quite untruly, that we had covenanted for *una, settanta* (1 lira 70 centesimi) a kilometre, whereas the agreed terms had been *una, sessanta* (1 lira 60 centesimi). He further said that in his district travellers always paid for the petrol. I had also agreed to pay his expenses; he usually had his meals with us, but at Melfi, where he had arranged for his own meal, he had a more expensive repast than either of us. But apart from the Italian's love of scoring in a bargain, he was a pleasant enough fellow, and he showed great interest in the buildings we visited; he had been up to see the Castello at Melfi before breakfast, and he always came with us into every church, and entered in a notebook its features of interest. He had obviously not been further on the road than Lacedonia, but up to that point he had been an efficient guide, and could tell us the names of the distant towns and villages that we saw.

From Ruvo we were taken to Bari by a slow steam tram. The way was still through olive-groves, but now they were frequently interspersed with almond trees, whose vivid green made a

beautiful contrast with the silver-grey of the olives. It was in this part of the journey that Horace's weather began to improve, and we shared his good fortune in this respect, for we had a hot sun and cloudless sky, and when we reached Bari the sea was of the orthodox ultramarine hue that one anticipates in Italy and so often fails to find. Bari is an attractive town, and was not rendered the less so by its contrast with the meaner places that we had recently passed through, and the comfort of the Grand Hotel d'Oriente was very welcome after the somewhat primitive hospitality of the Hotel della Bella Panella. The town is marked off into two very clearly defined sections. The old town is built on a promontory between the old and new harbours; it contains the castle of Frederic II. and two great churches (the cathedral and Saint Nicóla); it has a bewildering network of little streets, complicated even for an Italian town, but made extremely pleasant to the eye by the bright colours with which some of the houses are painted. Without the least transition one passes from it to the modern town, which is laid out in good rectangular streets after the manner of Turin or Mannheim, the best of which is planted with an avenue of clipped ilex. The two churches have both suffered from the usual baroque treatment, but are being judiciously restored, and the old twelfth-century work, with the characteristic Apulian architecture, has been stripped of its meretricious coverings. Would that Melfi, Canosa and Andria could be dealt with in the same way! Horace speaks of *piscosi mœnia Bari*, and a walk past the fish market teaches the wayfarer through the sense of smell how applicable the epithet is, and he can be still further convinced if he walks along the quay of the old harbour and sees a catch of squids and other equally objectionable sea creatures being landed and then beaten flat by small wooden boards.

Twenty-four hours were all too short a time for Bari, and very reluctantly we started by train for the final stage of our journey. Once more we travelled through endless olives and almonds, but yet a third colour was added by the blue of the Adriatic, from which we were never far away. After Monopoli, the whitest town I have ever seen, we soon passed near what we knew to be the site of Egnatia, but we did not leave the train to visit it, for its buildings have long since been destroyed and it has been the quarry of the neighbouring cottages. The credulous Apella could not any longer have a miracle there to attract his too facile belief; he would have to go back a stage on the journey to Bari, where a miraculous fluid, the Manna di San Nicóla, is said to exude on occasion from the vault which contains the body of the great saint, Nicholas of Myra.

It was dark when we entered the station of Brindisi, the end, as Horace says, of his long journey and screed. What was the

course of his return journey is not recorded. Our own way back was by the Lloyd Triestino steamer to Venice, after a night at the Hotel Internazionale, and that hotel's luggage label on my suit-case is a reminder of the last thing I saw on my journey, the column overlooking the quay, which marks the end of the Appian Way, over so much of which Horace and his companions had travelled.

I do not know that I acquired much fresh knowledge of Horace's journey by travelling along the same route. But I was fortified in the opinion which I already strongly held, that he travelled in the spring and not the autumn. Where he heard frogs, I heard them at the same season; like him, I experienced heavy rains; I was cold at the place where he had a fire, and at that very place there were plenty of boughs with last year's leaves on them. I can only say that, though my views are unchanged, my interest is still greater in a work which has always attracted readers of Horace.

A. S. OWEN.

IN PRAISE OF CRABBE

Why should we abuse Crabbe! He has never done us any harm: we have none of us read him.—SIR WALTER RALEIGH.

GEORGE CRABBE was born in Aldeburgh, in Suffolk, in 1754, the eldest of six children. His father, soured by misfortune, was of a harsh and tyrannical cast of mind, which increased as he grew older, but Crabbe's mother was of strong personality and good understanding, an exceptional woman in every sense of the word. After an arduous childhood, Crabbe left school in his fourteenth year, and went to a surgeon-farmer at Wickham Brook. Here he endured three years' pseudo-medical drudgery, then left Wickham Brook and removed to Woodbridge, where he worked under Mr. Page, another surgeon. It was at Woodbridge that Crabbe first met Miss Sarah Elmy, the Mira of the early poems, whom at a much later date he married.

In 1777, after a short period in London, he set up as a surgeon in his native place, but, owing to local jealousy and other causes, was only moderately successful. In April 1780, feeling that he would never succeed as a surgeon, he left for London to embark on a literary life, with a box of clothes, a case of surgical instruments, a collection of poems, and three pounds in cash. Here for a year Crabbe suffered much hardship, until at length, on the verge of despair, in the spring of 1781, he wrote a letter of appeal to Edmund Burke, a letter as celebrated in its way as that written by Johnson to Chesterfield. The effects of this letter were immediate and satisfactory. The instant response to his appeal and Burke's wise kindness changed the whole course of Crabbe's life. He had thought of entering the Church. By the aid of Burke he was enabled to take orders, accepting a curacy at Aldeburgh. Later he became chaplain to the Duke of Rutland at Belvoir Castle, a situation in which he was not entirely at ease, as several remarkable autobiographical passages in his poems show. After periods at Muston and other places Crabbe became Vicar of Trowbridge, where he died in 1832, leaving behind him a record of eighteen years' unobtrusive yet faithful service.

Crabbe's first important poem, *The Village*, appeared in May

1783. The poem, which is in two books, is written with great vigour and contains many striking examples of realistic description of the darker side of rural life. It marked Crabbe off from his contemporaries. It established beyond a peradventure the arrival of a new poet in English Letters. Taken all in all, *The Village* is a faithful picture. All his poetic life Crabbe preferred the golden mean and sought to avoid 'the falsehood of extremes.' At times he is relentless in his abandonment of romance. In *The Village* especially, Crabbe is a poet of disillusion. Other poets had sung of dance and song on the village green, of the happy rustics who, after the pleasant labours of the day in green places, spent their leisure in idyllic ease or in rural sports. Crabbe was to describe the sad reality of their lot, their unrelieved monotonous drudgery, the pain and disease which racked their bodies, the miserable hovels in which they lived; indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that Crabbe's *Village* is a satire on much of the bucolic poetry of his century.

At bottom Crabbe's realism springs out of a profound disillusion with life. Other eighteenth-century poets might continue to live in their rococo palace of artificial conceits. Crabbe would tell what he knew of the lives of the poor in tones as vivid and real as those of the peasants of Millet and Van Gogh.

> Go then! and see them rising with the sun,
> Through a long course of daily toil to run;
> See them beneath the dog-star's raging heat,
> When the knees tremble and the temples beat:
> Behold them, leaning on their scythes, look o'er
> The labour past, and toils to come explore:
> See them alternate suns and showers engage,
> And hoard up aches and anguish for their age. . .
>
> Ye gentle souls, who dream of rural ease,
> Whom the smooth stream and smoother sonnet please;
> Go! if the peaceful cot your praises share,
> Go look within, and ask if peace be there:
> If peace be his—that drooping weary sire,
> Or theirs, that offspring round their feeble fire;
> Or hers, that matron pale, whose trembling hand
> Turns on the wretched hearth th' expiring brand!

Crabbe's work, in this connexion at least, speaks for itself, and needs little defence, or special pleading. The modern mind should be able to understand and appreciate Crabbe's point of view in a much more vital way than his own century. It is not the least of his services to poetry to show that Nature was not always kind and placid, that with all her charm and sweetness she had terrors too, and since that discovery has become one of the most potent factors in our modern intellectual outlook, the discoverer does not deserve to be overlooked or left wholly without praise.

Crabbe did not publish anything between the ages of thirty-one to fifty-two, although he wrote quantities of verse which he afterwards destroyed. In the autumn of 1807, at the age of fifty-three, he published *Poems*. The principal poem in this volume was *The Parish Register*, a long narrative poem in three parts, the first on 'Baptisms,' the second on 'Marriages,' and the last on 'Burials.' *The Birth of Flattery*, *The Library*, and *The Newspaper*, which appear in the same volume, are frigid in diction and of little importance, but *Sir Eustace Grey* is a powerful poem of an original cast, romantic in temper and alien to Crabbe's general manner, while *The Hall of Justice*, also included, has an almost Wordsworthian ring.

The Parish Register is on the same theme Crabbe used as the subject-matter of *The Village*, but painted on a much larger canvas. Crabbe begins by repudiating in his introduction the genial picture of village life which had been offered by the correct pastoral poets of the past and of his own time:

> Vain search for scenes like these, no view appears,
> By sighs unruffled, or unstained by tears;
> Since vice the world subdued and waters drown'd,
> Auburn and Eden can no more be found.

Under 'Marriages' appears one of the most successful poems Crabbe ever wrote: the story of *Phœbe Dawson*, which was read and admired by the dying statesman Charles James Fox during the last stages of his painful illness. Here matter and manner are perfectly fused, which is not always the case in Crabbe's writings. But *The Parish Register* is not to be appreciated for its striking isolated passages or occasional felicities of diction, but for its true and vigorous depiction of village life and manners. Its effects, as so often happens in Crabbe, are cumulative.

In 1810 appeared *The Borough*, a description of the town and its various inmates and activities, which many good judges have held to be Crabbe's best work. In *The Borough* Crabbe again paints relentlessly the tragedies of human life. He is the stern moralist looking on the darker side of human nature and describing what he saw. Crabbe never ran away from the bad in human nature when he met it, or pretended that it was not there. Hence there is a profound sense of reality in his best poetry.

It is a varied world that passes in review and finds its chronicle in the pages of Crabbe. At times his descriptions of Nature have the clear fidelity of a Dutch landscape, painted by a master's brush. In the same way his characteristics stamp themselves upon the mind and are not forgotten. Because at long last

Nature is for Crabbe a reflex for man's feelings and 'a background to his life.' In *The Borough* he piles detail on detail in the description of the dwellings, and achieves a cumulative effect in his pictures by the use of an authentic descriptive power, which is, of this kind, rare in our literature.

The Borough is the work of a poet who preferred, as he said himself on one occasion, walking in the streets watching the faces of the passers-by to the finest natural scenery. For Crabbe man is essential, and Nature only a background. Life, Crabbe seems to suggest, is a medley of tortured purposes and cross-currents. Happiness comes only, if at all, to those who expect little, who are content with a modest return from life. Any other view can only lead to disillusion.

The subject of *The Borough* is Crabbe's native place. The poem is divided into twenty-four letters, written to a correspondent who had asked the writer to describe the borough; each letter deals with a different topic—sects in religion, law, trades, clubs and social meetings, almshouses, prisons, the poor and their dwellings, and so forth. Here and there are inserted narratives of the lives of certain of the inhabitants—the vicar, a parish clerk, a prisoner in the borough gaol, or the story of a fisherman, *Peter Grimes*. These narratives are among the best things Crabbe ever wrote, both on account of their workmanship, so much more finished than is his custom, and because of the intensity of the emotion felt and conveyed. This may be specially studied in the story of *Peter Grimes*, the haunted fisherman. But it should be noted that Peter's fear brings him to his end; there is no moral reformation in his character—it is fear, not remorse, that works powerfully upon him. This is a sign of strength. Crabbe is too great a realist, too good an artist, to spoil his story by the introduction of a happy moral ending.

Two years after the publication of *The Borough* appeared *Tales in Verse*. The collection is of varying merit, but the general level is high. One or two of the tales exhibit a form of humour which had hitherto been alien to the poet's work. Such are *The Dumb Orators*, *The Lover's Journey*, and *The Frank Courtship*. Several are narratives of deep and tragic interest, among these may be noted *The Parting Hour*, *Edmund Shore*, and *Resentment*.

The Frank Courtship is the lightest narrative that Crabbe has written. It is full of a slightly ironic yet sprightly humour, which is all Crabbe's own. It is a picture of a rigid Puritan father who wishes his young and lovely daughter to marry the austere son of a neighbouring rich widow. Josiah and Sybil meet at length. Then follows a very amusing dialogue in which the maiden gets decidedly the better of the exchange, but Sybil has really fallen in love with the solid and yet attractive qualities of

the austere Josiah, the match is concluded and all is well. This story is delightfully told and finished in diction. It includes several very characteristic passages, of which the following is one:

> . . . thou I find,
> Hast the true tokens of a noble mind:
> But the world wins thee, Sybil, and thy joys
> Are placed in trifles, fashions, follies, toys;
> Thou hast sought pleasure in the world around,
> That in thine own pure bosom should be found:
> Did all that world admire thee, praise and love,
> Could it the least of Nature's pains remove?
> Could it for errors, follies, sins, atone,
> Or give thee comfort, thoughtful and alone?
> It has, believe me, maid, no power to charm
> Thy soul from sorrow, or thy flesh from harm:
> Turn then, fair creature, from a world of sin,
> And seek the jewel happiness within.

The Parting Hour is a narrative which may have suggested the theme of Tennyson's *Enoch Arden*, but Crabbe's poem is more realistic. Crabbe is not vapid, and, unlike Tennyson, not a Romantic-sentimentalist. His poetry in this tale has a movement and a fidelity which the Victorian poet does not achieve.

The last work published by Crabbe during his own lifetime was *Tales of the Hall*, which appeared in 1819 in two volumes. The poet has grown a little more mellow, a little less harsh in outlook. The moral of his point of view may be summed up in the wise words of the poet Juvenal[1]:

> Orandum est ut sit mens sana en corpore sano,
> Fortem posce animum, mortis terrore carentem,
> Qui spatium vitae extremum inter munera ponat
> Naturae, qui ferre queat quoscumque labores,
> Nesciat irasci, cupiat nihil . . .
>
> SAT. X. 356–60.

Crabbe shares with Wordsworth the power of appealing to older readers. It has been said with some measure of truth that neither of these poets is usually a favourite with young people. I feel sure that mature dislike of Wordsworth, where it is present in otherwise cultivated persons, is often due to the compulsory teaching of his poetry in youth. Youth's dislike of Crabbe, on the other hand, is partly due to his apparently commonplace manner, which masks his real strength, whereas youth is attracted by surface charm of manner, both in people and poets, and to the

[1] You should pray for a healthy mind dwelling in a healthy body; ask for a fearless heart, free from the fear of death, which will count length of days last among the gifts of nature, will be able to bear every kind of toil, knowing not anger, nor lusting after anything.

fact that it needs maturity to appreciate both his knowledge of the human heart and his sombre realistic outlook.

Familiarity breeds great affection for Crabbe; this is one of the outstanding things about his poetry. The permanent delight which discerning readers come to find in Crabbe—even readers who have been nourished on the great Romantic poets feel it in time—is the result of his gradual and patient investigation of motive, the development of conscience, and the growth of character. These things are at the root of his charm. Crabbe's poetry is always a criticism of life, and especially of conduct. Conduct, as Matthew Arnold said rather pompously, is three-fourths of life. The discussion of conduct and its analysis is largely the business of the novelist. It is the method of Crabbe in his narratives. This is where he joins hands across a century with the modern writers of serious prose fiction. Thus Crabbe was a pioneer in his poetic realism and hatred of shams, joining hands with the moderns in his fine nervous verse describing the joys and sorrows of common people. His influence is deeply impressed, not only upon the work of one or two of our best modern poets, of whom John Masefield is perhaps the chief, but also upon much prose fiction written since his time.

Tales of the Hall, which took Crabbe four years to write, consists of a series of narratives loosely strung together and supposed to be told by two half-brothers and a clergyman friend. The brothers have met but once since their early youth. George, the elder, has made money in trade and retired to a hall in his native village, a property which he often looked at with envious eyes in his poor boyhood. Now in his old age he is able to make the dream of his youth a reality:

> George yet had will and power a place to choose
> Where Hope might sleep and terminate her views,
> He chose his native village, and the hill
> He climb'd a boy had its attraction still;
> With that small brook beneath, where he would stand,
> And stooping fill the hollow of his hand
> To quench the impatient thirst—then stop awhile
> To see the sun upon the waters smile,
> In that sweet weariness, when long denied,
> We drink and view the fountain that supplied
> The sparkling bliss—and feel, if not express,
> Our perfect ease in that sweet weariness.
>
> . . . . .
>
> The Hall at Binning! how he loves the gloom
> That sun-excluding window gives the room;
> Those broad brown stairs on which he loves to tread:
> Those beams within; without, that length of lead—
> On which the names of wanton boys appear,
> Who died old men, and left memorials here.

Richard, the younger brother, has led a more wandering and adventurous life. The series of tales, which appeared in two volumes, begins by a description of the meeting of the two brothers. This takes up the first two books. Book iii. describes the boys at school; book iv. begins the story of Richard, which, after an interlude for *The Story of Ruth* in book v., is concluded in book vi. Then in book vii. the elder brother, George, tells the story of his early life and love. These first seven books contain much good writing. The versification is smooth and easy, the emotion rings true and unforced. Not infrequently it reaches a simple but effective eloquence—for instance, in the narration of the adventures of Richard, which was greatly admired both in youth and age by Newman:

> It was a fair and mild autumnal sky,
> And earth's ripe treasures met th' admiring eye,
> As a rich beauty, when her bloom is lost,
> Appears with more magnificence and cost;
> The wet and heavy grass, where feet had stray'd,
> Not yet erect, the wanderer's way betray'd;
> Showers of the night had swell'd the deep'ning rill,
> The morning breeze had urged the quick'ning mill;
> Assembled rooks had wing'd their sea-ward flight,
> By the same passage to return at night,
> While proudly o'er them hung the steady kite,
> Then turned him back, and left the noisy throng,
> Nor deign'd to know them as he sailed along.
> Long yellow leaves, from oziers, strew'd around,
> Choked the small stream, and hush'd the feeble sound;
> While the dead foliage dropt from loftier trees
> Our Squire beheld not with his wonted ease,
> But to his own reflections made reply,
> And said aloud, 'Yes! doubtless we must die';
> 'We must:' said Richard, 'and we would not live
> To feel what dotage and decay will give;
> But yet we taste whatever we behold,
> The morn is lovely, though the air is cold;
> There is delicious quiet in this scene,
> At once so rich, so varied, so serene;
> Sounds too delight us, each discordant tone
> Thus mingled please, that fail to please alone!
> This hollow wind, this rustling of the brook,
> The farmyard noise, the woodman at yon oak—
> See, the axe falls!—now listen to the stroke!
> That gun itself, that murders all this peace,
> Adds to the charm, because it soon must cease.'

In *Tales of the Hall* Crabbe has lost to a great extent his eighteenth-century manner. The most successful of the series of tales that follows the adventures of Richard (apart from the

moving story of *Ruth*, related during the recital of the adventures of Richard) are *Delay has Danger* and *Smugglers and Poachers*.

The first of these contains what some critics have thought Crabbe's finest passage :

> Early he rose and looked with many a sigh
> On the red light that fill'd the eastern sky ;
> Oft had he stood before, alert and gay,
> To hail the glories of the new-born day :
> But now dejected, languid, listless, low,
> He saw the wind upon the water blow,
> And the cold stream curl'd onward as the gale
> From the pine-hill blew harshly down the dale :
> On the right side the youth a wood survey'd,
> With all its dark intensity of shade ;
> Where the rough wind alone was heard to move
> In this, the pause of nature and of love,
> When now the young are rear'd, and when the old,
> Lost to the tie, grow negligent and cold—
> Far to the left he saw the huts of men,
> Half hid in mist, that hung upon the fen ;
> Before him swallows, gathering for the sea,
> Took their short flights, and twitter'd on the lea ;
> And near the bean-sheaf stood, the harvest done,
> And slowly blacken'd in the sickly sun ;
> All these were sad in nature, or they took
> Sadness from him, the likeness of his look.

This fine descriptive passage was especially praised by Tennyson and much loved by Fitzgerald.

Smugglers and Poachers, which is the last story in the second volume, is a narrative the incidents of which are based on a story told to Crabbe at Hampstead by Sir Samuel Romilly, a few weeks before his tragic death. The whole of the conclusion of the narrative is as fine as anything of its kind in English verse and much better than the modern imitators of Crabbe's method. The reader follows the *dénouement* of the unfortunate fate of the two brothers and Rachel, lover of the one and wife of the other, with breathless interest. I hope I may be allowed the indulgence of quoting one more passage :

> 'Twas past the dead of night, when every sound
> That nature mingles might be heard around ;
> But none from man—man's feeble voice was hush'd
> Where river's swelling roar'd, and woods were crush'd :
> Hurried by these, the wife could sit no more,
> But must the terrors of the night explore.
>
> Softly she left her door, her garden gate,
> And seem'd as then committed to her fate ;
> To every horrid thought and doubt a prey,
> She hurried on, already lost her way ;

> Oft as she glided on in that sad night,
> She stopp'd to listen, and she look'd for light,
> An hour she wander'd, and was still to learn
> Aught of her husband's safety or return ;
> As sudden break of heavy clouds could show
> A place she knew not, but she strove to know :
> Still further on she crept with trembling feet,
> With hope a friend, with fear a foe to meet ;
> And there was something fearful in the sight,
> And in the sound of what appear'd to-night,
> For now of night and nervous terror bred
> Arose a strong and superstitious dread ;
> She heard strange noises, and the shapes she saw—
> Of fancied beings bound her soul in awe.
> The moon was risen,and she sometimes shone
> Through thick white clouds, that flew tumultuous on,
> Passing beneath her with an eagle's speed,
> That her soft light imprison'd and then freed ;
> The fitful glimmering through the hedgerow green
> Gave a strange beauty to the changing scene ;
> And roaring winds and rushing waters lent
> Their mingled voice that to the spirit went.

Crabbe died in 1832. Two years later appeared his *Life and Letters* in eight volumes, carefully edited with notes and an admirable biographical sketch in the first volume, by his son.

Among the poet's manuscripts a collection of tales, partly prepared for the press, was found, and included by the editor in the 1834 edition under the title *Posthumous Tales*. It is difficult to understand the remark of Canon Ainger in his rather inadequate study of Crabbe that the publication of these tales ' has certainly not added to Crabbe's reputation.' For there are at least four narratives—*Rachel, The Farewell and Return, The Ancient Mansion*, and *The Boat-Race*—that are the equal of anything of the kind in Crabbe's work elsewhere.

This is recognised by at least one critic, T. E. Kebbel, who, in his able *Life of Crabbe*, remarks on page 133 :

> The *Posthumous Tales* contain much that all the admirers of Crabbe will read with pleasure. In the *Boat-Race*, a story of wreck and sudden death, he is still the master of all that raises horror, anguish, and despair. The very pretty tale of *The Ancient Mansion* is full of a melancholy pathos.

Crabbe's personal character is clear and plain. It may be studied with the greatest ease in his letters and the fragments of his diaries which remain. It is sketched with loving care in the memoir by his son. His character, like his verse, was simple and sincere from the cradle to the grave. With Carlyle he held that ' our main business is not to see that which lies dimly at a

distance but to do what lies clearly at hand.' There is a delightful passage in the Life where Crabbe's son describes his home life:

> The summer evenings especially, at this place, dwell on my memory like a delightful dream. When we had finished our lessons, if we did not adjourn with my father to the garden to work in our own plats, we generally took a family walk through the green lanes round Glenham; where, at every turn, stands a cottage or a farm, and not collected into a street, as in some parts of the kingdom, leaving the land naked and forlorn. Along these we wandered sometimes till the moon had risen, my mother leading a favourite little niece who lived with us, my father reading some novel aloud, while my brother and I caught moths or other insects to add to his collection. . . . When it was too dark to see, he would take a battledore and join us in the pursuit of the moths, or carry his little favourite if she were tired, and so we proceeded homeward. . . .
>
> Always visibly happy in the presence of others, especially of children, our father entered into all our pleasures, and soothed and cheered us in all our little griefs with such overflowing tenderness, that it was no wonder we almost worshipped him.
>
> My first recollection of him is of his carrying me up to his private room for prayers, in the summer evenings, about sunset, and rewarding my silence and attention afterwards with a view of the flower garden through his prism. . . . In the eye of memory I can still see him as he was at that period of his life—his fatherly countenance, unmixed with any of the less lovable expressions that, in too many faces, obscure that character—but pre-eminently fatherly; conveying the idea of kindness, intellect and purity; his manner grave, manly and cheerful, in unison with his high open forehead: his very attitudes, whether as he sat absorbed in the arrangement of his minerals, shells and insects—or as he laboured in his garden until his naturally pale complexion acquired a tinge of fresh healthy red; or as, coming lightly towards us with some unexpected present, his smile of indescribable benevolence spoke exultation in the foretaste of our raptures.

Crabbe was to some extent a child of his century, as shown by his lifelong devotion to the heroic couplet. It is easy to mock at his verse, which is at times pedestrian. But the likeness to the other writers of his century was merely superficial. At bottom and in temper he was a modern. His poems are as a whole in narrative form, partly satirical and partly pathetic, of the lives of working and lower middle-class people. His method of working was largely analytical. Mr. George Saintsbury has remarked with truth that 'Crabbe, our chief realistic poet, has an astonishing likeness to the chief prose realist of France, Gustave Flaubert.'

Yet from another point of view Crabbe was not out of place in the eighteenth century. His work is of such extreme value because his was a modern mind set in an artificial age: an acute investigating mind, constantly taking notes, observing contemporary life and laying up stores of knowledge for use later on in his poems. This attitude towards life is seen in another medium

at its best in the realistic art of Hogarth, who was to painting what Crabbe is to poetry; and Hogarth is no second-rate painter.

Crabbe's poetry at its best, and for that matter at its worst, is far more literal than the prose fiction of his realist immediate predecessors or his contemporaries. In this connexion one may compare the complicated plots of the novelists with the simple straightforward narratives of Crabbe.

Amid the tinkling cymbals and false sentiment of the pseudo-pastoral poets Crabbe struck a clear fresh note, stern at times, like the ringing of iron on stone, but often limpid and delightful like the music of water over woodland pebbles. It must be remembered that Crabbe wrote in rhymed iambic metre, a dangerous medium for any poet, because it lends itself with ease to the facile treatment of any subject, however trivial or foolish. But in the hands of Crabbe this facile and dangerous thing became a potent and efficient instrument for his use.

Crabbe is seldom, if ever, thrilled, as the great lyric poet is thrilled, by the remembrance of past joys or griefs, but wishes to describe the world around him. His muse is coloured, sometimes over-coloured, by the desolate atmosphere of his native landscape. He possessed strength, but not breadth. He is a close observer of men and manners; a naturalist rather than an artist. His method is really akin to that of a man of science, and as such he has a scientific love of truth and fidelity of observation. His poetry springs out of no inner necessity, no passion of the soul. Unlike many English poets, he lacks a musical ear. His ear indeed is often harsh and remains oblivious to the finer shades and nuances of expression. His power of self-criticism is sometimes at fault, and this in a poet of Crabbe's temperament is at once a strength and a weakness.

Crabbe's real strength lay all the time in the region of psychology—the description and discussion of character in its reactions to other characters and to environment. He has little use for what may be called the high lights of poetry. His tints are subdued to the colour of the materials he works in. His method has very great advantages mixed up with one or two serious disadvantages. In the first place, Crabbe's apparent unconsciousness of his occasional descents into bathos enables him to deal with difficult subjects and situations in a perfectly straightforward and unemotional way, whereas these situations handled by other poets, of a romantic temper, would result in chaos.

Surely it is not too high a price to pay a few inane commonplace lines in Crabbe in exchange for the great bulk of sound work. As a whole, as a result of Crabbe's absence of self-con-

sciousness, the reader feels a general impression of powerful realism. Crabbe's critics and the satirists, for whom Crabbe is easy prey, have been more than a little unfair to him in this connexion. Moreover, Crabbe, by and large, is a very even poet, and this adds to his attractiveness—an attraction not felt at all times when reading such a poet as Shelley, too often pinnacled dim in the intense inane.

Mr. Saintsbury, in an essay written many years ago, made this a point of criticism against Crabbe's poetry, echoing William Hazlitt before him, that

> as far as mere treatment, the fault of Crabbe is that he is pictorial rather than poetic, and photographic rather than pictorial. He sees his subject steadily and even in a way he sees it whole; but he does not see it in the poetical way. You are bound in the shallows and the miseries of the individual; never do you reach the large freedom of the poet who looks at the universal. . . .

The reply to this searching and on the surface plausible indictment is that it is precisely this way of looking at things and at life generally that makes Crabbe's poetry so refreshing and so powerful. Because he does *not* lose in the contemplation of the universal a large-hearted sympathy and understanding of the personal and individual, his work occupies a special niche of its own in English poetry, and he moves in a fascinating but real world of his own.

Mr. Saintsbury in the same essay also reproaches Crabbe for his lack of music:

> 'There is no wing in Crabbe, there is no transport, because I hold (and this is where I go beyond Hazlitt) there is no music.'

Musical tastes differ. Crabbe is no nightingale, and his greatest admirers would not claim that he is. But when even the nightingale 'says jug jug to dirty ears,' is it not possible that the music of Crabbe may be sometimes lost in the confusion of common tongues? To be sure, again and again in his poetry may be heard the notes of a true melody. Few who are really conversant with it would be found to deny this. Moreover, there is a 'transport' to be found in Crabbe that is more surely based upon intense feeling than the febrile 'transports' of a Swinburne or a Thompson. The music of a loved poet sounds sweetly in the mind of his lover. It is as difficult for such a one to believe that for the casual reader there may be no music as for an ardent young man in love to realise that to the world outside his paradise his divinity may appear plain and fat.

Examples of music in Crabbe may be easily found. There is 'transport,' and music too, in *Lady Barbara: Or, The Ghost,*

when the lover avows his love for the widow, so much older than himself:

> O! tell me not of years,—can she be old?
> Those eyes, those lips, can man unmoved behold?
> Has time that bosom chill'd? are cheeks so rosy cold?
> No, she is young, or I her love t'engage—
> Will grow discreet, and that will seem like age;
> But speak it not: Death's equalizing arm
> Levels not surer than Love's stronger charm,
> That bids all inequalities be gone,
> That laughs at rank, that mocks comparison,
> There is not young or old if Love decrees,
> He levels orders, he confounds degrees,
> There is not fair, or dark, or short, or tall,
> Or grave or sprightly—Love reduces all;
> From each abundant good a portion takes,
> And for each want a compensation makes;
> Then tell me not of years—Love, power divine,
> Takes, as he will from hers and gives to mine.

Let it be admitted that there is in Crabbe little of enchantment or of lines that thrill the heart, such as one finds in abundance in Coleridge, Keats and Shelley, and not seldom in Wordsworth. Or little of glamour such as one meets at every turn in the sonnets of Shakespeare. But while there are no lines of audacious beauty, no glamorous language, verbal dexterities, or quaint conceits in the manner of the older poets, there are other qualities which compensate for their absence. There is enough and to spare of that authentic descriptive power and gift of close and loving observation which makes a lasting impression on the mind of the reader. And all the time in the poetry of Crabbe, which is often so harsh, so rugged, and occasionally so banal, there is the indication of a warm human heart that feels for and with its kind.

But it should also be remembered that although the general cast of Crabbe's mind was sombre and relentless in outlook, much of his work bears evidence of a charming and delightful humour. At times he might almost be said to be a sort of Jane Austen in verse; and Jane Austen herself remarked that she might have married him. And there is something of spring and more of calm in his poetry than is generally recognised. No consideration of his achievement would be worth while which ignored this side of his nature.

Strange has been the fate of this original yet almost forgotten poet. A popular writer in his own day, adored and praised, then and since, by such fine judges as Scott, Byron, Jeffrey, Newman, Fitzgerald, Tennyson and Hardy, Crabbe sank into unmerited neglect, as the stars of the Romantic revival rose into favour. He had begun to write just before the beginning of this revival in

romantic poetry, which, so beneficent in many ways, yet had an unfair reaction for a time on the reputations of the really great eighteenth-century poets—a reaction which in the case of Crabbe has not yet ceased to operate. He continued to write when the current of the time was against him, when the fashion had turned from his method. A generation arose that knew not Joseph. Idols began to be worshipped that were alien from the shrine of the stern old moralist.

The naturalistic poet was neglected and almost forgotten, or, if remembered at all, dismissed with a sneer as some 'Pope in worsted stockings,' who contented himself with low and disgusting representations of village life. It is a hard thing to say, but not unjust in the circumstances, that several of Crabbe's hostile critics read as if they had not studied his poetry with any deep attention. Hazlitt is an outstanding example in his *The Spirit of the Age*, in which he says that he has read the Tales and that 'they turn, one and all, upon the same sort of teazing, helpless, mechanical, unimaginative distress.' An opinion which is so unreasonable and so wide of the mark that it can be explained by no other supposition than that so acute a critic as Hazlitt usually shows himself to be, in this case has not read his author with any great care. It is probable that the great weight of Hazlitt's name has unduly affected the appreciation of the poet.

The often quoted lines of Byron, 'Nature's sternest painter and her best,' have done Crabbe no good service. Crabbe *is* a fine and scrupulously accurate poet of Nature, but he is so much more than that. He is seldom a poet of spring and sunshine, but stern almost to the point of austerity. Yet the true appreciation of his poetry is not founded entirely on his work in this Nature genre, but upon a careful view of his profound knowledge of human character and his mastery and understanding of the tragi-comedy of life in a wide sense.

Appreciated by a large circle of readers in his own generation, it is to be regretted that, outside a few enthusiastic and loyal admirers, he is not justly valued to-day. Not Wordsworth himself can bring to us in so vital a way the very smell of the earth, the magic of the wild heath, or the mysterious noises of the wood and the eternal music of the sea as Crabbe succeeds in doing over and over again. Those readers are to be pitied who have not yet felt the power and the appeal of so great a poet—one who above all other poets of our tongue knew human nature and put down on his page in an unforgettable way the results of an observant and richly endowed mind.

SAMUEL J. LOOKER.

LIGHT IN DARKNESS

ONE autumn evening it so chanced that I was fishing pollack with some lobster fishermen around a lonely reef set far into the Minch between Skye and Harris. The day had been one of unusual beauty, and as the last of the sunset waned and the sea lay pale in the dusk the stars one by one shone dimly through the light cloud canopy that hung above the Minch. It was night when we finished our fishing, hauled aboard the last copper-coloured lythe, and hoisted our small brown sail. A full five miles distant lay our destination—Duntulm, in Skye. The hills of Skye rose black against the horizon, but upon the sea where we sailed darkness did not rest, for in fine weather from dusk to dawn twilight broods upon the ocean. Through this mysterious twilight we sailed, the water lapping softly against our bows, the lights of passing ships showing golden as setting planets around us. In the eastern sky Trodday light was green; Scalpay showed its powerful beams across the sleeping Minch.

All of a sudden a bright, glowing light appeared on the north-eastern horizon. Swiftly it seemed to approach us. One of my companions cried out that a steamer was upon us. Barely had he spoken when it seemed to us that the vessel had taken fire, and in suspense we watched. A few seconds we remained in doubt, then slowly—so slowly that she seemed scarce to move—the waning moon climbed from the sea. There was a warm, glowing *nimbus* about her orange disk. Minutes passed, and at last she had shaken herself free of the waters. Now the moon was unmistakable; she had already cast a pathway of subdued light upon the ocean. The breeze dropped light. Idly the sail hung. We took to the oars. At each stroke pale fires were kindled in the sea. Globules of glowing light drifted away astern as the phosphorescent *plankton* signalled with tiny rays to the stars. Thus in our passage across the Minch we were cheered by the lights of the land, of the heavens, and of the ocean herself.

To us the moon is the greatest of the lights that rule the night. She may be pale and cold; at times she may appear to be warm—to have retained some heat from the sun, of whom in olden times she was a part. A few nights ago I looked out upon the sea

after midnight. The rain clouds of the evening had drifted south before the wind, and high in the heavens rode the Hunter's moon. Where she shone upon a granite-covered height near me the hill was bathed in a flood of warm light—a light that the last of the sunset might well have cast upon it.

The moon is the more mysterious, since she is seen in darkness. The sun greets us each day, and is looked upon by most people as a pleasant companion for their holidays. We might exist were the moon no longer in the heavens, but upon the light of the sun, who fifty millions of years ago had his birth from a spiral nebula, we on earth are dependent for our very being. We are not perhaps sufficiently grateful for that great ball of fire which gave birth to our planet, and which each morning climbs pulsating above the horizon to warm and cheer the earth and all its creatures. The beauty of sunflood on land and on sea is supreme. It is seen at sunrise, in noontide warmth, at sunset when the west is aflame. In winter the sun's light is more beautiful than at midsummer, for then the sun, even at noon, is low in the heavens, and his rays are mellowed by the atmosphere through which they pass.

The play of light and darkness, of sun and shade, upon a mountain is always inspiring, especially if that mountain be near the sea. One winter's morning I stood on one of the knife-like ridges of the Cuillin of Skye. During the climb a keen north wind had crept about the lonely Fionn Choire where no voice of bird was heard. The upper reaches of the hill were lightly snow-bound. Each rock was the resting-place of delicate fog crystals, formed when icy mist crossed the range on the breath of the polar breeze. From the ridge of Bruach na Frithe one looked upon all the Cuillin. A dark company of peaks rose in crowded grandeur to the dappled sky. A white snow shower, herded on the north wind, hid the glen beneath, and as it approached the hill the wind increased, and little whirlwinds of snow rotated coldly above the icy ledges. A great cloud came with the shower. Dark brown and menacing, it glided in upon the Cuillin. Now it was shrouding the Inaccessible Pinnacle of Sgurr Dearg, which rose needle-like against the sky; now it had reached the airy spire of Sgurr Alasdair, and floated around it. Here the mist lifted awhile, then dropped lower and more densely upon the hill. Through a narrow gap amid the high tops of the Cuillin the Atlantic gleamed as a molten bar. A thin grey cloud now drifted in upon me. Darkness had succeeded the light; a curtain had been drawn across the hill. It was a mysterious world where I now stood, and the view was restricted to a few yards. Flurries of hail were borne on the cloud. They dropped noiselessly on the white ground. The wind lessened. The mists streamed by in an unending company. Had I stood upon some polar peak I had been no more alone. Then the curtain was drawn aside. Where had been impenetrable cloud was now revealed a land of hills and glens, with the blue smiling ocean beyond. The cone of Sgurr nan Gillean was smoking as the laggard rearguard of the clouds rose from it. On the southern Cuillin the mist remained, but the lower slopes of the hills were now extraordinarily clear, and of a blue so intense that it almost merged into black. Then the cloud drifted away from Sgurr Alasdair, from Sgurr na Banachdich, from Sgurr Dearg, and showed a glowing sea from which distant isles rose. Southward Coll and Tiree formed the horizon. The hills of Mull were blue. From Lewis to Barra Head the Long Island lay beneath the winter's sky and, close on 100 miles to the west, St. Kilda rose on the horizon with the blue haze of great distance upon it. The wind had died away. In the clear sunlight there was pleasant warmth where I stood, more than 3000 feet above the Atlantic. And when, late that afternoon, I was on lower ground and had passed below the snow level, the sky was cloudless and the sun shone with warmth on the faded heather bloom and the golden hill grasses. The hills were sharp-cut, and the setting sun caught their snowy spires and lighted cold fires upon them, until the full moon rose and shone with warm glow upon hill crest and sleeping glen, and upon the ocean which never sleeps.

In the Western Isles the sunsets are so beautiful that the mind becomes tuned to a nightly pageant of grandeur. One evening in late summer I recall when hill and sea were held beneath a spell of fairy beauty for a few immortal minutes. The heavens that evening were overspread by a uniform pall of cloud from east to west, from north to south. Only on the western horizon was the sky clear. A few minutes before he set behind the bens of Harris the sun reached that clear and narrow space, and his rays, shining with a mysterious lemon-coloured light, transformed the sombre land and the grey ocean. It was as if a curtain had been drawn aside and the spirit world of Nature lay outspread to mortal gaze. The green grassy slopes that climbed from the sea were green no longer, but of burnished gold. The dark rocks were afire. Across the Minch a flame of light passed swiftly, and the ocean at once was aglow. There was no wind stirring on the shore; no air to ruffle the plains of the sea; no breeze to herd the clouds on their journey from horizon to horizon. All Nature was at rest, and, as it were, breathless at the exceeding beauty of the scene. In the track of the sun, where he had laid down a burning pathway on the ocean's surface, two drifters rode idly at their nets, rolling slightly on the gentle swell. Their nets were being lifted, and it could be seen that they held innumerable

silvery herring which gleamed and glistened. Then the sun set behind Beinn Rodil, and at his setting land and ocean sank to rest, as though weary of all that glory.

Is it to be wondered that the Celtic dreamer of olden times, living as he did in a country where the inner spirit of Nature is never far removed from him, should have sighted on the verge of ocean the Isles of the Spirit? Tir nan Og (the Land of Youth) is the name of the greater isle; Eilean Uaine (the Green Isle) is the name of the lesser. The following curious tale was told me by a very old man, an accomplished *sgeulaiche* in the Isle of Skye. A sailing-ship from Erin was on the Atlantic west of Barra, when a pall of mist drifted up and enveloped her. Through fog the vessel groped her way blindly, hour after hour. There was no sound of wind and sea. The rigging dripped moisture. No life was visible save when a pearly grey fulmar petrel glided ghostly past on long stiff wings, and in a moment was gone. At last an eddy wind shook the fog, and those on board the vessel saw an uncharted island ahead of them. Boats put off from the isle. They asked the crew of the ship what cargo they were carrying, and the crew answered that they had herrings for a cargo. The islesmen offered to buy some, but the canny skipper, mistrustful of his strange visitors, asked them how much they were prepared to pay. When they offered him from £2 to £3 the barrel he agreed to sell them some of his cargo. When it was time for the ship to be leaving there came on board the vessel six men. They wore clean white aprons. They began to clean the anchor chain with care. The crew of the vessel asked the men why they were cleaning the chain. 'Because,' they made answer, 'if one single grain of sand from the Green Island were taken away our island would no longer be able to disappear.' (Here is an old tale of the early Celts with a blend of the mortal and the immortal in it—a blending of the material and the spiritual which perhaps symbolises a deep truth.) Through darkness into the light the ship and her crew made their way, and beyond the fog of mortal sense they viewed the land of the spirit. So that the parable should not be over the heads of simple folk, the first tellers of the tale brought in the delightful touch of the buying and selling of the herring, and, partly no doubt because of this, the story has been handed down from generation to generation.

Of a starlit night in winter—as the Gaelic saying has it, 'Oidche runagach, reulagach, gu'n turadh, gu'n ghaoith, gu'n uisge' ('A bright night of stars, neither dry, nor windy, nor wet')—the sky is full of light that is arriving at our earth from stars and planets through the darkness of space. The planets, being nearer to us, appear to be greater than the stars and to shine more brightly. The ruddy light of Mars, which may be the home of beings having affinity with ourselves, falls warmly upon land and sea. These rays reach us from a world of cold and tenuous air. Youthful Venus, abounding in water, may upon occasion burn brightly enough to cast a shadow. But even Neptune, our most distant planet, is but a stone's throw from us compared with those immense suns—Betelgueux, who could contain our own sun 28,000,000 times, or Mira of the Whale, with a diameter of 150,000,000 miles—who sing so tremendous a song as they hurl themselves exulting through the infinite depths of space. How lordly do they ride upon their appointed courses—Sirius of the violet light, Arcturus, red Antares of vast size!

I recall a winter's evening of intense frost when I was walking beneath the scintillating stars up a lonely glen with ancient pines and a river that was almost silenced by the frost. The heavens that night appeared unusually full of light. In the south-eastern heavens Sirius twinkled as coldly as a snow diamond; the North Star flashed his message to mariners upon a windless sea; the Pleiades shone down upon the dark pines and the snowy hills that guarded the glen. There is a Gaelic saying concerning the six brightest stars of the Pleiades that they are 'Nighean Righ Meangan, 'sa gille, 'sa cu, 'sa triur leannan.' ('the daughter of King Meangan, her man servant, her dog, and her three lovers.')

None of the stars appear comparable with our own sun in the light they give, yet astronomers have calculated that certain remote stars have a luminosity no less than 10,000 times greater than our sun. These great suns are distant indeed. Light travels at a speed of 186,000 miles a second. How incredibly distant must a star be which is distant from the earth 100,000,000 light-years.

Our planet is bombarded ceaselessly by cosmic rays from these stars, and from still more distant spiral nebulæ. She is not alone in space, but is in direct and intimate communion with the universe of which she is an integral part. The tides of spiritual advancement which periodically surge over mankind may have their source far beyond the confines of our globe. The Milky Way, that innumerable army of suns which floats on the boundless sea of ether, is so vast that it is greater than our earth to the extent that the earth is greater than one single atom. The mind of man is unable to grasp the immensity of the universe, where, in the atom as in the greatest of all the stars, the same law and order prevails.

To our limited senses it is a relief to pass from the cold light of the stars to the lesser beacons, fashioned by human hands, which light the darkness of our seas. There is power and warmth

in these guiding beacons where men lead lonely lives tending the steady flame that means the very life's breath to those who go down to the sea in ships. The lighthouse-keepers are a fine body of men, deserving of our admiration. They are silent, and we hear too little of their hardships and of their lonely vigils. Picture the life of a lighthouse-keeper upon some far-flung Atlantic skerry. There is none more lonely than Dubh Hirteach (the black, deadly one), that in clear weather is seen on the southern horizon from Iona's sacred hill. Even on a fine summer's day a landing is rarely possible on Dubh Hirteach, and the relief keeper is swung in a derrick from the lighthouse steamer to the rock while his comrade, due for a spell of shore leave, is taken off in the same way. Visualise that lonely crew in dark times of winter, when day after day, week after week, mountainous seas roll in, to throw their spray high above the lighthouse tower. One huge sea, a number of years ago, actually smashed the glass of the lantern light. Weeks may pass without a relief. Months may drag wearily by, and still the men are held prisoners, for even the daring skipper of the steamship *Hesperus* cannot approach the rock in such heavy weather. Anxiously the men scan the horizon. Their water supply is running low; they are weary of the roar of the surf and the rush of the gale. Then at last one morning the wind veers north, and they see, away beyond the shore station of Erraid, the cone of Ben More rise snow-clad from the steel-blue of the sky. Now the men have hope that the term of their imprisonment is nearing its close, for the north wind lays its icy breath upon the fierce swell so that the ocean is soothed, and the relief ship, pitching and rolling in the subsiding seas, steers south from her anchorage in the Sound of Iona to carry food, water, and news of home to weary men.

From where I write in northern Skye my friend of the sea is the lighthouse of Eilean Glas upon Scalpay of Harris. Each evening at sunset its orange beams greet me. As I now look seaward a northerly gale urges white-maned waves southward through the tidal streams that flow always in the Minch. Like the peaks of some arctic land rise the hills of Harris, white to the tide. Above the green waterways fly the clan of the barnacle geese. Curlews and rock-pigeons search for food beside the shore, and a pair of grey crows are playing pranks upon a collie pup, who believes if he runs *very* fast he may catch at least one of the rascals. At four o'clock this afternoon the three stabs of light from Eilean Glas will fall upon the wintry ocean and the snow-covered lands of Skye across the Minch. They will guide the small mail boat on her reeling course. They will guide the Fleetwood trawler as she steams south to her home port. They will guide tramp steamers that ply from the Clyde to Scandinavia,

and ships that sail north-about to eastern ports through the dreaded waters of the Pentland Firth.

North-west of Harris is perhaps the most lonely lighthouse of them all. It stands on the Flannans, or Seven Hunters, 35 miles west of Lewis, and here, not so many years ago, the sea mysteriously claimed the three men who tended the light. One dark and stormy winter night a vessel passing west of the Hebrides found no welcoming ray of the Flannan Light to guide her. She may well have narrowly escaped disaster—at all events, the first thing her skipper did on reaching the nearest port was to warn shipping. The *Pole Star* (the vessel of the Northern Lighthouse Commissioners which at that time made the Flannan Isles reliefs) fought her way against wind and sea to the distant island group. On approaching the island on which the lighthouse is built she hoisted a signal, but to her surprise received no reply. With difficulty a boat was launched, and with still greater difficulty a landing was made upon the island. No figures appeared on shore to welcome the boat. The lighthouse was deserted. The tea was set in the small living-room; the log was written up to a few days before. All appeared in order. The landing party searched the length and breadth of the isle. The barnacle geese called to them, grey seals thrust their heads through the surf, but no human voice made answer to the men who hailed their comrades so eagerly. The three light-keepers had vanished as completely as though they had been spirited away by the *daoine sith*, and from that day to this their fate has been conjecture.

One April evening at sunset a small steamer might have been seen to clear Stornoway harbour and set her course southward for Oban, thirteen hours of steaming distant below the horizon. The sea was choppy, and, being an indifferent sailor, I decided to remain on deck throughout the night. Scarcely had the last of the sunset faded, when the northern sky was lighted by the flickering rays of the aurora, and the beauty of those pale streamers, and of the successive lighthouses which we passed, rendered the night a memorable one to me. None who has sailed the Minch at night can fail to be impressed by the care with which that ocean waterway is lighted. One lighthouse after another greets the passing ship with friendliness: she is never for a moment out of sight of their rays. That night I remember being impressed by the power and brilliance of the light upon Rudha Reidh. When this Ross-shire headland had been hidden by the hills of Skye the ship sailed in the guidance of the Glas Eilean light, which still showed on the northern horizon when we had left it many leagues astern. As we steamed, with a following wind, through the Little Minch the great beacon on Neist Point turned night into day on our port bow, while on our starboard

quarter the warm glow of Uisinish ryhthmically waxed and waned. Through the night we steered south, and at dawn saw Hyskeir light and the steady orange glow on Ardnamurchan, that shone like some great planet low on the horizon. This light retained its brilliance even when the first of the sunrise had set the eastern sky afire.

Once before I had watched, not without anxiety, the light of Ardnamurchan. It was in the first winter of the Great War, and my duty was to patrol the outlying isles lest an enemy submarine should use them as a base. After sunset one February day I was on the most outlying of the lonely Treshnish Isles, and in a small boat set sail for Port Haunn, in Mull, six miles distant, on as perfect a winter's evening as could be wished for. The hills were clear. The sea was so calm that we had to help the sail with the oars. Darkness found us on the sea, but Ardnamurchan light was a cheerful beacon, and we had no thought of danger. Then with almost inconceivable suddenness the weather changed. A bitter wind sprang out of the south-east, mist dropped on Beinn Mhor, dry snow flurries swept the sea. The wind freshened. More densely did the snow drift across from the invisible land. The light of Ardnamurchan became dim, then was entirely obscured. Quickly the sea rose ; our small boat began to roll and pitch. Through the gloom grey-tipped waves rushed, menacing, upon us. We could not see one another in the boat, so intense was the darkness. We steered blindly by the wind, hoping that it had not changed, and at last with thankfulness saw the high cliffs of Treshnish loom up close above our heads.

The lights of ships, passing on their lawful occasions across the face of ocean, have an abiding charm. They shine mysterious through the darkness, and mystery heightens the interest and stimulates the imagination. The masthead light of a swaying trawler seems to bid defiance to the gale that whips up the spindrift on its impetuous course. See how it forges steadily ahead through the waves that shake their manes in the darkness of a winter's night. The light of the mailboat arriving in midnight storm at some Hebridean port sets the whole place in a stir, and almost turns night into day. The lights of vessels sometimes attract that small wanderer of ocean the stormy petrel, and he is found, dazed and incapable of flight, on the ship's deck.

Of an autumn evening the distant green lights of a fleet of herring drifters at their nets shine like remote stars. A solitary drifter burns usually a bright flare to warn passing vessels to give her and her buoyed nets a wide berth. One night I was crossing from Lochmaddy, in the Outer Isles, to Dunvegan, in Skye, on the mailboat. On our port bow we saw, some distance ahead of us, a herring drifter burning her flare. The officer of the watch was

uncertain if our course would take us clear of the drifter's nets. Tense and alert he stood beside the engine telegraph, sweeping the grey seas with his marine glasses. Then with a sudden movement he put the helm hard over, and I saw tossing on the crowded waves the buoys that held the long drift net in position. A few more seconds on our earlier course, and we should have forced our way through that sunken net and torn it beyond repair.

Along the coast of Northumbria ships pass more frequently than through Hebridean seas. Throughout the long winter night their lights twinkle like stars, or shine like planets. One night I recall when an increasing gale rendered sleep difficult, and when, some hours before dawn, I looked out from my window across the wastes of the North Sea upon which the Coquet light shone. The roar of the waves upon the low shore mingled with the wind over the land. Out to sea, beyond the swaying lights of lesser vessels, I saw the brilliantly illuminated portholes of a great liner. She was steering almost into the teeth of the storm, yet her size enabled her to cut through the North Sea waves on an even keel. I recall the impression made upon me by the contrast of that vessel's rapid and steady progress, when all else, both on land and at sea, was in violent agitation from the might of the storm.

I have written of the lights of the ocean and the light of the stars. Another light is from the aurora, that is rarely altogether absent from the northern horizon of a clear winter's night, and which may be so bright as to dim the light of the moon herself. In old Gaelic lore the shafts of the aurora or northern lights are aerial armies of spirits engaged in hot battle. The red-brown lichens that grow upon the rocks on the shores and glens of the Hebrides are dyed red with the blood of these spirit combatants. The Gaels know these pale beams by the name Na Fir Clis (the Nimble Men), and they are well named, for there is none swifter than they. From horizon to zenith they dart in splendour. Their colours are green, violet, a deep rose. Their searchlights burn in the icy depths of space. It is not the least of their charm that they spring to life of an instant, and that they usually fade away before the hour of midnight. One October night when a low and quickly falling glass gave warning of an approaching storm I happened to glance out of my window. The sky from west to east was spanned by a vast arc of glowing light. The arc was specially brilliant near the eastern horizon. From the west sped glowing clouds and shafts of light. These pools of light streamed eastward, swift as the storm wrack that is driven across a mountain on an autumn gale. Even as I looked the arch broke up, and where it had spanned the heavens two islands of light were formed. They took on the shape of spiral nebulæ,

flowing and twisting as though on fire. The shafts of light ever became more brilliant. Purple, green, rose-tinted, they glowed in the cloudless vault of the sky through which stars, their light dimmed by the Merry Dancers,[1] shone wanly. At the height of the display a meteor shot, glowing through the eastern sky. At the zenith the Nimble Men moved more sedately, forming intricate patterns of extreme beauty. They seemed here at a vast height. In their light the sea glowed pale. Even the flurries of wind that swept the Minch were plain. Gradually the lights waned. On the northern horizon a lesser arch, misty and less bright, took the place of the immense arc which had held spellbound all who beheld it.[2]

How small and delicate a light is the Will o' the Wisp beside the contending clans of the Nimble Men! This tiny light, fugitive and dim, may at times be seen to flit in careless abandon above some peat bog or desolate stretch of marshy ground. There is a Gaelic legend that the first Will o' the Wisp was a comely maiden who, unmindful of a strict injunction laid upon her, went out on the moor one Sabbath evening to gather the leaves of *roid*, or bog myrtle. She was never again seen in mortal guise, but her restless spirit darts, lamp-like, across damp moors in the still darkness of a starless night. This curious story, with slight variations, I have heard in Skye, and in the Outer Hebrides also.

There is another lesser light of the night, and that is the fungus glow. Not long since a friend and I made our way with difficulty after dark through a thick wood beside a sea loch. On the woodland track ahead of us we saw beside a bridge over a burn what we supposed to be a lantern burning. We approached with care, for we imagined that the light was set there to warn us of some danger. But when we reached the place we found that our lamp was a fungus, gleaming phosphorescent where it had been cast by a great spate which had followed a thunderstorm of the previous day.

Thus everywhere light shines through darkness, and triumphs over it, just as in human hearts faith triumphs over doubt, and love over fear.

[1] One of the Gaelic names for these Northern Lights is the Merry Dancers.

[2] It was afterwards calculated by the Meteorological Office that the brilliant arc lay some 70 kilometres to the northward of where I watched, and at a height of some 260 kilometres above the earth's surface.

SETON GORDON.

THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
AND AFTER



No. DCLVII—NOVEMBER 1931

A FRENCH VIEW OF THE WORLD CRISIS

ABOUT September 15 the French Press published under different headings particulars concerning an English customs tariff. The first item of news was the proposal of Mr. Runciman in favour of a general prohibition of certain imports. Astonishment was also aroused by the declaration of Lord Peel in the House of Lords. Lord Peel objected to prohibitions on the ground that they were not a practical form of procedure, but he was of the opinion that it was possible to raise tariff duties up to 100 per cent. These protectionist sentiments, though they were a natural consequence of the general situation in Great Britain, none the less aroused considerable emotions in France. French publicists in their articles enlarged on the following theme: How is it, they asked, that, although in the critical days when the pound was threatened we consented to grant very large credits to Great Britain, England's first reaction is to forbid the entry of our established imports?

England on her part seems to have been captured by an

unprecedented phobia of the foreigner. The ingratitude of nations is supposed to be at the bottom of her difficulties. If there is unemployment and business is depressed, the fault must be attributed to Europe, which has industrialised herself, or to Asia, which has turned nationalistic. If the financier's craft has become a ruinous luxury, it is because Germany and Austria dissipate the presents they are given, and so on. The English have the impression that the part they are playing in the world is that of dupes, and the notion irritates them. Discontent lies at the basis of all human psychology, and one always bears a grudge against one's neighbour before one has examined one's own case. For jealousy has the advantage of affording some satisfaction to one's sense of personal infallibility.

Let us, therefore, examine the political conditions of the last few months. French policy has been particularly carefully weighed. The experience of an eventful past has taught us the untoward effects of hazardous adventures. The countries which used to make such a song about their dynamics are to-day singing very small—so small, indeed, that when we balance the account we begin to appreciate people of moderate views who rely above all on their common sense in the conduct of public affairs.

We are in the grip of problems which surpass our understanding, since some even consider that we are witnessing the death agony of a world-system. The United States are beginning to make their acquaintance with the social problem and are fighting for their currency, which is being attacked by distrust. Germany persists in giving us examples of extravagance. England is affording us the spectacle of some very surprising events. All the big nations have several million unemployed. In the face of these facts, no Government can afford to change its maxims in the manner of Richelieu, or obey principles after the fashion of Talleyrand: its business is to resist as best it may a storm under which it is difficult to keep smiling. M. Pierre Laval is a solid child of Auvergne who leads his Cabinet, as he does his political career, with the slow and cautious step of the mountaineer. His speeches do not bear the impression of delicately formulated theory. He speaks little, and it is chiefly from his bench in the Chamber that he rallies his supporters. M. André Tardieu, his predecessor, had brought to his task certain economic conceptions which he put into practice with his marvellous gift of assimilation. M. Pierre Laval has reckoned with the danger of ideas, at a time when crisis takes perfidious pleasure in upsetting preconceived notions.

Events, it must be admitted, have sometimes taken French diplomacy by surprise. The Anschluss came upon us without

our being warned of it beforehand. I think, indeed, that I might add that the Cabinet in London felt the same surprise when they learned of the reconstitution of Mittel-Europa under the cloak of a regional tariff agreement. Mr. Hoover's proposal also reached us from over the waves of the Atlantic without any previous warning. Technical experts in the Cabinet, like M. Flandin in financial and M. François Poncet in economic matters, have played a preponderating part: both of them are strong-minded men of character and little given to sudden enthusiasms.

We must recognise that we are witnessing a momentary eclipse of what is called European policy. Not that Europe can even be thought to have had its day, but because public opinion in the different countries seems to be tired of speeches and compromises. Geneva lets itself be overwhelmed with papers and reports. The simple man in the street is merely astonished that no remedy for the present crisis has been discovered by a collection of such learned and clever men. *Rapprochements*, co-operation, *ententes* all seem to be like the side-shows between the acts. The real drama of our generation is being acted upon a stage crowded with manifestations of which Germany, with rare generosity, is withholding the secret.

Above all it is the recent monetary upsets which have made us prudent. Germany was the first to give signs of distress. She thought she could solve her difficulties by displaying her poverty to the civilised world. All this publicity about her misfortune was produced on the screen with a sense of stage-craft which should be envied. Mr. Hoover, with the authority which belongs only to the President of the great American Republic, was moved by these S.O.S.'s and obtained from the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles a moratorium for one year. The German Ministers went on their journeys: the Governor of the Reichsbank flew from capital to capital. But on the other side of the Rhine the necessity for taking measures to put one's own house in order and rescuing oneself from one's own distresses was very quickly recognised.

Monetary diseases bring in their train budgetary disorders. The falling off of revenue in consequence of the crisis leads inevitably to a deficit in the Budget. The cutting down of expenditure, unemployment, the dismissing of officials, all the factors which affect the domestic budget by reducing purchasing power, are the precursors of social disorder. We can now understand why France persisted in keeping her attention fixed on the budgetary repercussions of Mr. Hoover's proposal, which had an immediate bearing upon the French Budget. Could we have deliberately sacrificed the money we lost through the Hoover Plan without securing the adoption of perfectly legitimate

reservations? Could we have pledged the future, when the disturbance of our financial equilibrium, which was the immediate consequence of the Hoover Plan, was entailing a deficit in our Budget? Are we, in short, going benevolently to allow Right to be transgressed? France, as a result of the war, has suffered damages for which she has only obtained a very poor restitution. The moratorium therefore could not be anything but an act of suspension which presupposed the offer on the part of Germany of sureties for her good faith. Yet from the evacuation of the Rhineland to the recent conspiracy of Bad Harzburg we can recount action after action, which is symbolic of Germany's real attitude. The effort of the German parties of the Right is continuous. The elections of September last year have betrayed the violent passions of a people which is in a state of psychological effervescence.

We were reproached last June with being once more the stormy petrels of Europe. Yet have not events justified us? It would be ungracious of me to insist on this point. The foreign credits granted to the Reich have not succeeded in helping Germany, and they have only harmed England. The money frozen up on the other side of the Rhine has not restored economic health to Germany, but in the country from which it came the organs of finance have been progressively compelled to curb their activities because of its absence. Moreover, the acts of generosity thus performed have neither appeased the Press nor the public opinion of Germany, where agitators have expressed their gratitude to their creditors by letting loose such a campaign of violence that the German Cabinet has had to manifest an increasing tendency towards the Right.

Side by side with the question of the reservations attached by France to the Hoover Plan there is the problem of gold. The metal buried in the vaults of our Central Bank has been sufficiently abused. The gold which came to France did not arrive there by virtue of a decision of the Government. There is no force in the world which can prevent it from entering. In this sphere laws have no invalidating power. Gold came to France for the reason that it was put in trust there, and for no other. The most curious thing about the matter is that there simply has not been a gold policy. The Bank of France has merely carried out its statutory obligations, in particular those which determine its purchase of the precious metal. It does not regard its gold reserve as an end or object in itself. The great majority of Frenchmen have raised no doubts about the influx of the metal. But to-day, when safety is a rare thing, France regards herself as the guardian of a great responsibility. She has no right to squander the funds that have thus been entrusted to her safe

keeping. If she is one of the pillars of world security she must in this manner keep herself from entering upon adventures.

Does the ordinary citizen count on the profits that he will make out of the reserves of the Bank of France? Certainly not. Ask any of the French peasants: they will complain of bad harvests, restrictions, the high cost of living; not one of them will understand that he is a fit object for envy or jealousy. The housewife has no knowledge of any good that the voyages of gold across the Atlantic can bring her. Some will immediately exclaim, 'This precious metal is sterilised. It is shut up in vaults; it ought to be used.' But gold goes even quicker than it comes. The example of the United States has proved to us that even the most magnificent gold reserves leave their domicile freely enough without asking any permission. Moreover, as soon as the Bank of England made known to us the inconvenience caused by their gold shipments we called a Franco-British Conference, and the Bank of France did all that lay in its power to place obstacles in the way of gold movements which were the act of the foreigner, and not of France. Gold is an international instrument. Its presence has not as direct repercussions on the internal economy of a country as one might believe. Not everybody who travels in France and Germany, for example, sees any difference in the prosperity of these two countries. Indeed, the advantage would seem rather to rest with Germany. The money of the inhabitants is readier and they think less about saving.

Politics are determined by psychology. The Frenchman is convinced that England is driving a wedge between France and Germany—in fact, between France and the continent of Europe—in order to rule more easily herself. Moreover, I have often had proof of this when on my return from meetings of Franco-German committees. I have each time been bombarded with questions about my intentions by my English friends. Lord Cecil and M. Briand therefore had good reason to try and appease European opinion on a subject which touches even the most humble individuals. England on her part is rightly proud of her superiority, and seems to find it difficult to admit that there is any advantage to be gained by learning from the example of her neighbours. European discussions appear to her to be like the dispute about 'motives.' She would like to put a stop to them once and for all. These are the truisms which dictate mistrust between nations. On the other hand, we understand what fair play means. We know that England will loyally discuss and understand differences of opinion which may lead to some result like a sporting match. We have too much experience of Franco-German relations not to be able to guess that the same misunderstandings will not dominate our relations with England. We should like a balance-

sheet to be made out regularly of the assets and liabilities of the two nations, so that we could communicate to each other every month an account of our reciprocal wrongdoings.

France has reactions to Continental problems which England cannot have. How can one expect France, who has lived through so many wars and invasions, to bear light-heartedly the demonstrations of the German National-Socialists, their banners unfurled to the sound of pipes in the presence of court dignitaries and general officers with a rigmarole of rather archaic oaths? I particularly appreciated the attitude of Mr. Henderson at Geneva on May 18 last. English precision has a singular power of persuasion. I can still see him declaring with authority, 'I ask Herr Schober to be so good as to declare that he will wait before taking decisive steps concerning the Anschluss before the Court at the Hague has discussed the question, and that he will be so good as to repeat my phrase.' Such a dotting of the i's does not leave room for further ambiguity.

Some people were astonished at our unanimous reaction the day after the announcement of the Anschluss. In spite of the confused explanations of Dr. Curtius and Herr Schober, the very secrecy with which the negotiations had been conducted give an initial proof of bad faith. The whole course of history is there to prove that no good for the cause of peace has ever appeared on the horizon when the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin have been too closely leagued together. We shall no doubt be told that history does not dominate the present. We were often told just after the war that we were entering upon a new and exceptional era. But afterwards we were forced to recognise that nations let themselves be guided by deeply-hidden forces, so that man is very often the plaything of the old Adam. Moreover, the Anschluss is at the bottom of Austria's new misfortunes. Instead of negotiating an alliance with Germany the young republic ought to have voted six months earlier the law for cleaning up its finances which has just been promulgated. The collapse of the Credit-Anstalt and the performances of the Viennese Treasury have ultimately had important repercussions on English finance. It appears to us, therefore, that we have some reason, as the course of events has proved, for drawing the attention of our English friends to the mistakes of German and Austrian diplomats.

It has now been established that a country should find a solution for its troubles in remedies applied to its own internal constitution. Foreign credits are only an excuse for fresh negligence. They disappear and they retard the use of precautions and aggravate the evil. Certainly English opinion takes much less heed of the inconveniences created by the Anschluss.

England has a maritime, not a territorial or European, historical perspective. But because we have been made vigilant by experience we know the traps to be avoided. Truly, we are seduced by Utopian ideas, but we also know whither nations are led by extravagances.

I remember that when I was passing through Berlin a few days after Mr. Hoover's proposals were announced, I had some startling conversations with influential people. 'Poor France,' they said to me; 'I am sorry for her; she is completely isolated. She could play such a big part, but to-day her moral isolation is complete. Germany has the whole of world opinion with her.' At the present moment everyone laughs at this diplomatic claim. The applause of the gallery is given above all to those who steer their barque strictly according to the rules.

Nobody, I say, in France can understand the German notion, according to which we are credited with the design of putting our neighbour in bondage and making her undergo a period of servitude. When we read of these designs—and we only quote the more friendly German Press—we cannot help laughing at such naïve statements. The French elector has a sense of equality and of right. But there is more to it than that. When Germany wants to borrow money from us, and we impose certain conditions and claim certain guarantees, she rises in revolt and fills the world with her screams. The would-be lender is insulted. But savings are not obedient to the commands of princes; they are not given by order: they will only lend themselves in so far as security of investment is assured to them. Banks cannot give orders to their clients. Has anyone, finally, seen an investment made without any inducement other than gratuitous insult? What do we ask for? Tranquillity. On the expression of this desire Germany counters us with constant agitation. Since the evacuation of the Rhineland there has been nothing but the most untimely demonstrations. We find it difficult to understand why, after the vociferations of the Hitlerites, the parades of the Stahlhelm, and the economic Anschluss, we are reproached for not coming to the assistance of those who announce *urbi et orbi* that they are going to set our house on fire.

England has long believed that she could isolate herself from Europe. Events have proved to her that she must henceforward attach more importance to the bonds of interdependence which unite her to the Continent. She has often regarded the Franco-German problem as a case of intolerable rivalry, an interminable domestic quarrel. The lessons of these past months show, however, that the difficulties of the present crisis have their origin in the bad management of German finances, public and private. It may be hoped that this experience may henceforth prove

salutary. In this connexion the last visit of Lord Reading to Paris has been particularly fortunate. It has wiped out the feeling of distrust which the visit of the French Ministers to Berlin might have aroused on the other side of the Channel. Lord Reading's visit has enabled the French and the British Governments to get a better mutual understanding of their domestic situation. But if politicians ought to exchange courtesies from time to time public opinion in the two countries deserves the same consideration.

It is French public opinion which has required M. Briand to be its spokesman and to work for peace and against war; which has always advertised the idea of progressive disarmament to avoid the recurrence of a world conflict; which has imposed upon French politicians the duty of working for international reconciliation. Because our conduct in the stress of the storm has been dictated by prudence and caution people have exclaimed 'Down with the little bourgeois!' We think, rather, that every nation ought during the present crisis to contribute an effort at mutual understanding. Wireless telegraphy and the radio have brought us very close to one another, but each misunderstanding only shows us that, nevertheless, public opinion in the different countries tends to keep them apart. France, at any rate, considers that the obligation of such a better understanding lies at the base of the *Entente Cordiale*. France has witnessed England's monetary difficulties in a spirit of fraternal sympathy. From the very beginning she has been animated by the sincerity of mutual friendliness, and she has lent her support to the Treasury. England and France are at the present moment the two great centres of attraction in the world. Their collaboration is essential to the success of mankind. Talleyrand in his old age, before he paid his call on death with such disdainful irony, accepted at the hands of his king a last mission. He had decided to retire for good and all to Valençay. But he thought that before his time had come to go into his grave he had still one task to fulfil—the task of representing his country in London. After the rivalries of the Empire and the Continental *bloc* he was one of the great designers of the *Entente Cordiale*. This example of the great diplomatist is prophetic. In these days of monetary war the peace of the world depends upon an understanding between the Governments in London and Paris.

PIERRE LYAUTEY.

PROBLEMS AND PERILS

THE outstanding world fact to-day is the lack of balance between production and consumption. Some people call it over-production; others under-consumption. Both conditions are, in fact, operating. On the one hand, we have the immense increase in the output of primary products, especially wheat and cotton, in the newer countries of the world, mainly as the result of the increased effectiveness of agricultural machinery. There has also been a marked over-production of many manufactured articles, due partly to the effects of the war, and partly to the eagerness of each separate nation to stimulate by means of tariffs and bounties the development of manufacturing industries within its own boundaries.

Even in a rich world these factors would have produced an embarrassing effect on the movements of trade. But when we turn to the other side of the picture, we find that a very considerable part of the world is far from rich, and has consequently a very limited power of consumption. A large proportion of the inhabitants of China and India are living in conditions of poverty of which the Western world has little conception. In both these huge areas much of the poverty is of very long standing; people living upon what they can extract by their own labour from a small plot of land are seldom rich. Of recent years, however, the poverty of China has been greatly increased by internal warfare, and millions of Chinese are now on the verge of starvation. Meanwhile the United States and Canada have had huge surpluses of wheat for which they could find no market. In much the same way the political disturbances in South America have diminished the purchasing power of countries that not long ago provided big markets for the manufactures of Western Europe and the United States.

These causes have necessarily affected the industrial activities of manufacturing countries, and especially of Great Britain. At the same time our special difficulties have been aggravated by the rapid development of manufacturing industries in countries that can command cheap labour. The result has been a severe setback to our export industries, and it is on their prosperity that the life

of Great Britain must depend, as long as she contains a population vastly in excess of the possibility of maintenance off her own soil.

This lack of balance between production and consumption is the most serious of the causes of the present world disorganisation, because it is the least easy to cure. But there are other very awkward factors. In particular there is the maldistribution of the world's stock of gold. This is largely a consequence of the war. Before the war most of the gold dug out of the ground flowed to London, and London bankers took care that it did not remain too long in the vaults of the Bank of England. Under the splendid system of international finance, which Great Britain had built up, our bankers and investors were constantly engaged in supplying capital to foreign countries, and the capital was dispatched either in the form of goods or in the form of gold.

To-day the position is different. Partly as the result of the payment of reparations and war debts, and partly as the result of trade policies, the larger part of the world's stock of gold is now being hoarded in Paris and New York. Both the Americans and the French have virtually insisted that reparations and the war debt payments due to them should be made in gold. They have declined to take goods to any appreciable extent on the ground that the free entrance of foreign goods would injure their domestic industries. At the same time neither France nor the United States seems to have made any effort to utilise the gold by lending it to other countries for their industrial development, as Great Britain used to do with her surplus capital. The result is that this huge volume of gold has become useless. It lies buried in bankers' vaults in New York and Paris; it might as well have remained under the soil.

This hoarding of gold by France and the United States was one of the causes of the gold crisis in Great Britain. It meant that extra pressure was placed upon London to provide gold for the use of the other countries of the world. But the final and imperative cause of our gold crisis was the publication of the Report of the Committee on National Expenditure, now generally referred to as the May Committee. This Report revealed to the world the fact—of which Mr. Snowden had already warned the House of Commons—that the British Budget was not balanced, that we were over-spending and living on capital. At once our foreign creditors took alarm and began to withdraw their deposits from London banks. The then existing Labour Government, realising that the situation was extremely grave, set to work to prepare schemes of public economy based upon the recommendations of the May Committee. Many drastic economies, it is now known, were agreed upon by the Labour Government; but when the question of reducing the dole was reached the extreme

Socialists in the Cabinet revolted against the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and a National Government was formed.

Its primary purpose was to carry out the necessary economies so as to save the gold standard, but an unfortunate accident rendered that impossible. That accident was the outbreak of disturbances in the Navy by way of protest against the proposed reductions in naval pay. How far these disturbances were really serious is not publicly known; but to foreign countries they had the appearance of a naval mutiny, and foreigners not unreasonably felt that if the British Navy was going to mutiny a crash must be coming. There was consequently a further rush to withdraw money from London, and the only way of preventing a complete exhaustion of our gold reserves was to abandon the gold standard, *i.e.*, to relieve the Bank of England of its statutory obligation to sell gold in exchange for notes. This was done, and for a few days the gravest anxiety was felt by all patriotic citizens and by the friends of England throughout the world.

Happily the results proved less serious than had been anticipated. The value of the pound inevitably fell, because it could no longer be converted into gold on demand; but it only fell in most foreign markets to about the equivalent of 15s., and very soon began slightly to rise. The reason for this welcome escape from the risks of inflation was that we had in power a National Government that was resolutely determined to balance the Budget by honest finance. Economies were made and taxes were increased. Whether the economies were sufficient for the needs of the situation is doubtful. But the fact that the National Government was pledged to a policy of sound finance created a spirit of confidence which prevented the pound from falling further.

If, on the other hand, we had had a Ministry representative of the Labour extremists who broke away from Mr. MacDonald a totally different situation would have emerged. No serious economies would have been made; indeed, there might have been an actual increase in the cost of the dole, and possibly also in the cost of some of the other social services. The Labour Ministry would have tried to get more money by still higher taxation of the rich, and would at the same time certainly have inflated the currency in order to provide money for immediate needs.

That inflation is part of the programme of the left wing Labourites has been made clear by their demand for control of the Bank of England and of the banking system generally. They deny that they wish to inflate, but they say that they propose to establish a monetary system which will make the resources of civilisation available for peoples 'who to-day, in the New World

as in the Old, are starving in the midst of plenty.' This rhetoric means nothing except inflation. The only way in which a Government, by jockeying with the currency, can make poor people seem—temporarily—rich is by the lavish issue of paper money; in other words, by inflation. The temptation under present conditions to a Labour Government to inflate would indeed be as irresistible as it was to the hard-pressed Governments of Germany and Austria a few years after the war. With a Labour Government we should have an outpouring of paper money, which would necessarily lead to a collapse in the value of the pound sterling, and that would mean financial disaster to Great Britain. We should lose the proud position we have so long held as the banking and mercantile centre of the world, and we should lose the income earned by our banking and mercantile services. We *should gain nothing*, except the temporary pretence that we were paying our way—paying it with paper money ever declining in real value.

This is the prospect before us if the mass of the electorate should be carried away by Socialist promises either now or in the near future. The risks of this happening are all the greater because of past political records. For several years past all our politicians have been engaged in extending the charitable functions of the State at the cost of taxpayers and ratepayers. All parties have accepted this policy because they saw that it was the easiest way to win votes. The majority of the voters are neither direct taxpayers nor direct ratepayers. Income tax only hits about one-tenth of the electorate, and the local rates levied upon working-class houses are generally paid by the landlord, so that the tenants seldom realise that the rents they pay include the charge for rates. As long as we maintain a franchise system which thus prevents the majority of electors from acquiring any sense of financial responsibility for their votes, it is hopeless to expect a permanent abandonment of the political attitude which has led to the present grave financial situation. Indeed, it is worth noting that even the present National Government, called into being for the express purpose of cutting down expenditure, failed in its Budget proposals to go nearly as far in the direction of economy as the May Committee recommended, especially in the matter of the unemployment allowances, where the economies proposed by the Government amount to only about £36,000,000 as compared with £66,000,000 recommended by the Committee. Of necessity this failure to carry economies far enough involved a further increase in taxation, and among other increases the rate of the income tax was raised from 4*s.* 6*d.* to 5*s.* in the pound. Yet perhaps the most urgent of our national needs at the present time is a drastic reduction in the scale of taxation.

How far we have moved in the past forty years in the direction of the Socialist policy of confiscation by means of taxation can be realised when we recall that Mr. Gladstone considered that an income tax of even 3*d.* in the pound was excessive. We have now reached a point where—with the addition of surtax to income tax—considerably more than half a rich man's income is taken from him by means of direct taxation. At the same time if he wishes to make any provision for his heirs he must insure against the terrific burden of death duties, and the insurance charges, added to the charges for income tax and surtax, produce a total which, in the case of people who once were very wealthy, actually exceeds the whole annual income. Thus we have already reached the point of complete confiscation by taxation.

Apart from the personal injustice of such a practice, there is the loss to the nation which follows when a rich man is compelled to break up his estate in order to reduce the scale of his taxation. Many estates now being broken up have for generations been placed by their owners at the service of the public. Beautiful private parks have long been kept open for anybody who likes to wander in them at his or her pleasure; they can be as freely used as a public park. Often, too, the private mansion with its well-kept gardens is thrown open to visitors at regular intervals. These great private properties may indeed be reckoned among our national assets; they are part of the glories of our country. If they are to be broken up and converted into allotments, or used as sites for bungalows, England will lose treasures which can never be recovered.

From the industrial point of view the great evil of excessive taxation is the effect it has on the accumulation of capital. What the tax collector takes away is no longer available for investment, and if capital ceases to grow in amount it ceases to be cheap, and industry has to bear a greater cost for the capital that every modern industry requires. The high scale of taxation to which we have been subjected since the war is one of the causes of our failure to meet the growing competition of foreign countries. But reduction of taxation, if we are to balance our Budgets, is impossible unless preceded by reduction of expenditure. In that direction we have not yet moved nearly far enough. The economies authorised in the recent special Budget only touch the fringe of the problem. If we are to put our finances on a sound economic basis we must abandon altogether the false theory that it is the business of the State to shoulder the obligations of individual citizens and to act towards them as a universal providence. It is the citizens who have to support the State, not the State the citizens. The primary and obvious duty of every individual is to maintain himself by his own efforts, and if through misfortune

he fails to do so he must be left by the State in a worse position than those individuals who do maintain themselves. Whenever this principle is ignored we begin to tread the path to financial disaster.

How rapidly we are moving downwards is shown by the figures of the cost of 'social services.' Thirty years ago there were only two services recorded under this title which involved any serious charge—namely, Education and Poor Law relief. To-day the list includes Unemployment Insurance, Health Insurance, Widows', Orphans', and old Age Contributory Pensions, Old Age Pensions (non-contributory), and the Housing of the Working Classes. While these new services have been brought into being, some of the minor items which were in existence, though relatively insignificant in 1901, have now gone up in cost to very substantial figures. For England, Wales, and Scotland the total cost of the social services in the year ending March 31, 1901, was just over £36,000,000; in 1929 the corresponding figure, after deducting war pensions, was roughly £342,000,000. The latter figure includes the contributions made by the recipients of benefits and by their employers. The total of these personal contributions in 1928-29 reached nearly £128,000,000, and it must be realised that the payments made by employers represent a distinct burden upon industry. The rest of the cost, namely, £214,000,000, was met by the taxpayers and ratepayers of Great Britain. What that figure means as compared with our scale of expenditure before the modern orgy of extravagance began can be realised from the fact that in the year ending March 31, 1901, the total expenditure out of the national Exchequer for all purposes —debt services, defence services, and civil services—was less than £184,000,000, or £30,000,000 a year less than the present charge on taxes and rates for social services alone.

The imperative task before the country to-day is to reverse the policy and the mentality which have led to the ever-progressive piling up of public expenditure. Happily there are now hopeful signs in this direction, for local authorities are in most parts of the country scrapping schemes of expenditure light-heartedly embarked upon only a few months ago. But we are still dominated by the difficulty that the majority of the electors, who pay no direct taxation, bring pressure to bear upon parliamentary candidates to vote in favour of extravagant expenditure. As long as this political situation exists the attainment of real economy is impossible.

Therefore the first step we have to take is to revise our parliamentary franchise so as to secure a more responsible electorate. One obvious reform is to raise the age at which the right to the franchise should begin. It is absurd that young people of twenty-

one should be allowed to have a voice in deciding problems which their few years of approximately adult life have given them little chance of understanding. The voting age should be raised for both sexes to at least twenty-five. The second point is to insist on financial responsibility. This can only be done by making the income tax universal, and at the same time, as regards local elections, by insisting that every householder should be personally responsible for the rates on the house or rooms that he or she occupies. If these reforms were carried out we should at once obtain from the electorate a totally different outlook on problems of local and national finance.

The next reform which should be made is definitely to abandon the principle of gratuitous State services. In particular it is time to revise the policy of free education pressed upon the country by the late Mr. Joseph Chamberlain in 1891. Many people have the idea that free education was the necessary consequence of the establishment of compulsory education, but that is chronologically inaccurate. Education was made compulsory in England in 1871; it was not made free until 1891. Even after it was made generally free several local authorities were able to continue charging small fees in some of the schools they maintained. These fee-paying schools proved to be immensely popular; they were nearly always full up to the lid, while the free schools were only partly filled. Even very poor parents preferred to send their children to fee-paying schools—partly, no doubt, out of a legitimate feeling of social pride. This practice got on the nerves of the Socialists, whose maxim is 'Equality for All,' and during the war pressure was put upon the Coalition Ministry by the Labour Party to abolish fee-paying schools. This was done and fee-paying was forbidden in any elementary schools receiving a State grant. Except for the probable continued opposition of the Socialists there is no reason why this blunder should not now be abandoned. A reversion to the sane principle that parents should pay something towards the cost of educating their own children would at once appreciably reduce the charge upon the public. The charge borne by rates and taxes for education in Great Britain in the year ending March 31, 1901, was £19,544,000; by 1929 this figure had risen to £97,028,000.

In many other directions economies are possible if our Ministers will concentrate on the policy of requiring every citizen to pay for services that he and his family receive. As a minor example, reference may be made to public libraries and museums, and similar institutions. The Government has already taken the step of restoring the penny charge for admission to Kew Gardens on popular days; the sixpenny charge on student days continues. There is no reason whatever why a small admission fee should not

be charged in all public institutions where the private citizen is seeking entertainment for himself. Even a charge of a penny provides an appreciable contribution to the cost of maintenance.

An example of greater financial importance is furnished by the Post Office. At present the Post Office is daily carrying at a loss large numbers of packets containing what is officially known as 'printed matter.' The charge made for each packet is a halfpenny; but the average cost of carriage per packet is estimated by the Post Office authorities at three farthings. It is altogether unfair that business firms sending out circulars should be allowed to make the taxpayers of the kingdom pay part of the cost of their advertisement. Nor is there any reason why a shopkeeper, who has received a stamped cheque for his account in a fully stamped envelope, should be allowed to send a receipt on a halfpenny postcard or in an envelope with only a halfpenny stamp upon it. Quite a substantial addition would be made to the public revenue if halfpenny postcards and halfpenny packets were abolished. In every direction where opportunities offer we must cut down expenditure if we are to reduce taxation to a reasonable limit and thus facilitate the expansion of industry.

It may, however, still happen under the conditions that have sprung up since the war that Great Britain may find a difficulty in balancing her trade so as to secure what is known as a favourable balance—*i.e.*, an excess of visible and invisible exports over visible and invisible imports—so as to have money available for investment abroad. This is particularly important at the present time when a good many of our previous investments overseas are failing to pay dividends. Every prudent person realises the necessity of striving to make new investments when old investments are failing. From the national point of view the failure of many of our foreign investments means that we are receiving less income from abroad; consequently it has become more difficult to pay for imported goods. Therefore it is worth while considering whether it might not be wise, as several prominent Free Traders have suggested, forcibly to check, at any rate for a time, the importation of foreign goods by means of tariffs. To some extent the depreciation of the pound sterling has itself served both as a check on imports and also as a stimulus to exports. It has made foreign goods priced in foreign currencies more expensive for us to buy, and it has cheapened the cost to foreigners of British goods priced in pounds sterling. Within a very few days of our abandonment of the gold standard merchants and manufacturers abroad began to complain that they were badly hit. Many of them found it difficult to sell their products in Great Britain; others complained that their local markets were being flooded with British goods. To meet the situation several foreign

countries have followed our example and abandoned the gold standard, so that in dealing with them we have lost the temporary advantage which the drop in the pound sterling gave to our trade. Canada, while partly remaining on the gold standard, made new customs regulations to prevent British goods entering the Dominion at lowered prices. There are no present signs that either the Dominions or foreign countries are in the least degree inclined to help our export trade.

In this connexion the question arises whether in our present time of stress it is worth while trying to force other countries to open their doors to British goods by threatening them with a hostile tariff if they fail to do so. This is a policy that is constantly advocated with enthusiasm by Protectionists, and on the principle of mutual fair play there is much to be said for it. But, like most tariff policies, it involves serious practical difficulties. A careful examination of the difficulties connected with tariffs is to be found in a pamphlet recently issued by the Federation of British Industries with the title *Industry and the Nation.*

The Federation of British Industries has long been in favour of the policy of protection, and this pamphlet opens with paragraphs strongly insisting on the importance of tariffs. It advocates both an emergency tariff and a permanent tariff; but its authors courageously state the difficulties that have to be faced in giving effect to either of these proposals. They point out as regards the emergency tariff, which they ask should be introduced at once, that blunders might easily be made which would result in 'serious dislocation or inconvenience to some branch of industry.' They therefore propose that 'some suitably constituted tribunal should be vested with power to hear and decide appeals.'

As regards the permanent tariff, the Federation of British Industries proposes to leave the consideration of this to a Tariff Board which 'should be composed of men of the highest standing and ability.' The members of this Board are to devote their whole time to their duties, and their position 'should approximate as closely as possible to that of His Majesty's judges.' This recognition of the practical difficulties in the way of tariffs by such a body as the Federation of British Industries is very valuable at the present time, when so many people are jumping to the conclusion that every problem can be perfectly solved if Parliament is entrusted with power to impose protective tariffs. It has to be noted that the device of Tariff Boards has been tried in the United States and also in Australia, but the recorded results are not particularly satisfactory.

The tariff issue is further complicated by the question of Imperial preferences. Some people continue to write and talk

as if they thought it possible to establish Empire Free Trade by means of tariffs on foreign goods. But the Dominions have again and again made it clear that they will have nothing to do with any such scheme. Their policy is to protect their own domestic industries against outside competition, whether from the Mother Country or from foreign countries. They are quite willing to put a higher duty on foreign goods than on British goods, but they have no intention of giving free entry to British goods, although we give free entry to their goods. At the same time the Dominions are engaged in doing what in the case of foreign countries we denounce as dumping—namely, giving a bounty on exports. Some of these bounty-fed exports from the Dominions come to Great Britain and undercut our own products. Are we to accept this dumping from the Dominions while denouncing it when done by foreign countries ?

Another awkward problem arises in connexion with the South American States. These countries owe their railways and other capital developments very largely to money borrowed from Great Britain. Owing to the world depression they have already ceased to pay dividends on some of their loans. But, if we are to exclude their agricultural produce from the British market by tariffs imposed to give a preference to British Dominions and Colonies, the prosperity of these South American States will further decline and we shall lose still more of the income we have been drawing from our investments there—an income that has helped us to pay for the food and raw materials which we must obtain from abroad.

These are difficulties that cannot be solved by talking about Empire unity. It is beyond question highly important that the great Empire we have built up should continue to hold together, but the idea that the Empire can become economically self-contained and self-sufficing is a delusion that can only survive as long as facts are ignored. Great Britain's exports to foreign countries appreciably exceed her exports to countries within the Empire, including in that phrase Mandated Territories, and, as it happens, in the last year or two our exports to Empire countries have declined rather more than our exports to foreign countries. One can hardly picture an enthusiast for Empire trade going to a British manufacturer who is doing a good business with foreign countries and telling him ' You must close down that business and take the chance of getting a bigger business within the Empire.'

We get back to the point that the main cause of our present troubles is the failure of our industries to maintain their old pre-eminence in the world. To some extent it must be admitted that this is the inevitable result of the growing industrial activities

of other countries. We cannot possibly hope to go back to the conditions existing a hundred years ago or more, when England stood almost alone as the owner and user of power-driven machinery. But there is no reason why we should sit down and confess ourselves beaten. A very large part of the success of our rivals is due to the fact that they are able to produce more cheaply than under present conditions we can do, largely as the result of lower labour costs. Sooner or later our workpeople will have to face this fact. It is a choice between the discomfort of lower wages and the misery of unemployment. To some extent the same issue affects all classes. Our industries need cheaper capital as well as cheaper labour, and it has become for everybody a patriotic duty to replace extravagant expenditure by prudent investment. Until the tide has turned we must all face the necessity for harder work and less play.

HAROLD COX.

MANCHURIA AGAIN

To the world at large the Sino-Japanese clash at Mukden came as a thunderclap from the blue. Yet for two years tension had been growing between the two countries. For two years Japan had felt that Japanese life and property in Manchuria were becoming increasingly insecure. Not a week passed but that the vernacular Press reported untoward incidents of one sort or another happening in different parts of that territory. But for the fact that the Foreign Office at Tokyo was headed by Baron Shidehara, whose conciliatory policy towards China was well known, the collision would have taken place much sooner.

To view the present trouble in the proper perspective we must go back to the inception of the Nationalist Government, for the anti-Japanese agitation in China and Manchuria is but a changed aspect of the great anti-foreign agitation, upon the crest of which the Nationalists rode into power. But for the exploitation of foreign 'imperialism' for domestic purposes, they would never have attained even the semblance of national unity that they have. In the years 1925–27 that agitation, fostered by the Red masters of the Kremlin, was directed chiefly, almost exclusively, against Great Britain, for the Nationalist strategy *vis-à-vis* the foreign Powers was 'divide and rule.' 'Down with the British' was the slogan with which the Nationalists placarded the country from Canton to Hankow and from Hankow to Shanghai. They harangued the ignorant masses, declaring that once the British were driven out all would be well with China and the Chinese. The British, unable, for one reason or another, to cope with this virulent assault, surrendered their concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang, thus hoping to mollify the Chinese. They could, I presume, do this because the abandonment of such concessions was not a matter which would seriously affect their national existence. Then the Nationalists, thinking that they had twisted the lion's tail as much as they could with safety, decided to leave the larger questions of Hongkong and Kowloon to a later reckoning, and turned abruptly upon the Soviet, so lately their own master in the strategy of anti-foreignism, and tried to hustle it out of North Manchuria. To their sorrow, the Soviet proved a much harder nut to crack than they had expected, for the Kremlin, unlike Downing Street, spoke in the language of gun and bombing plane, whose meaning even the Nationalists and their Manchurian allies could not afford to misunderstand. And, of course, the Soviet had in the Chinese Eastern Railway a much greater stake than the British in their concessions on the Yangtse.

After that it was Japan's turn to face the brunt of Nationalist onslaughts. It is the irony of fate that this anti-Japanese drive should occur when the portfolio of Foreign Minister at Tokyo is occupied by Baron Shidehara, who has consistently been conciliatory towards China. For the proper appreciation of his Chinese policy we must go back to the years 1925–27, when he was Foreign Minister in a previous Cabinet. Those were turbulent years, when the anti-foreign agitation swept through the Yangtse valley, when the Japanese in China were urging their home Government to send troops to Shanghai to co-operate with the British and American forces. Not only did Shidehara turn a deaf ear to this clamour, but he forbade Japanese gunboats to join with the British and American ships which fired upon Nanking in order to protect the foreigners fleeing from that city before the Nationalist hordes—the infamous Nanking incident of March 1927, in which foreign consulates and residences were looted by Nationalist soldiers, and foreigners, both men and women, were unspeakably maltreated. When, in the wake of this outrage, a certain Power proposed a punitive measure, involving the temporary international occupation of Nanking and a few other places on the Yangtse, Shidehara flatly refused to consider it, which, of course, doomed the proposal.

This hands-off policy in the face of grave danger to foreign life and property in China naturally caused a furore among certain members of the Privy Council. It was reported in the Press that Count Miyoji Ito, an influential councillor, vehemently denounced Shidehara before the Emperor at a Council meeting, pointing out that the Japanese Consulate at Nanking was sacked and the Japanese consular officials, and even their wives, were subjected to unspeakable insults while the Foreign Minister sat with folded arms. The fall of the Wakatsuki Cabinet in the spring of 1927, though primarily caused by the financial crisis, was partly due to the Privy Council's dissatisfaction with Shidehara's Chinese policy. Yet the Press and the public, on the whole, upheld that policy, largely because the anti-foreign agitation on the Yangtse did not vitally affect Japan's security or existence.

When the Tanaka Cabinet succeeded the Wakatsuki Ministry and inaugurated the so-called 'positive policy,' implying the reversal of Shidehara's 'negative policy,' the Press looked

askance at it and counselled caution. As time passed the Press became more and more critical and condemned the positive policy as ineffectual, unwise, and provocative. When Shidehara again became Foreign Minister in the present Cabinet the Press welcomed him, hoping and expecting that his liberal policy would set aright Sino-Japanese relations, which had been disturbed by Tanaka's policy. Unfortunately, Shidehara, as Foreign Minister for the second time, had to face a new situation in China. The anti-foreign agitation, which had formerly been directed largely against the British in the Yangtse valley and then against the Soviet in North Manchuria, was now directed against the Japanese in South Manchuria. The so-called Foreign Policy Association, organised two years ago with the official support and encouragement of Nanking and Mukden, has been spreading virulent anti-Japanese propaganda in South Manchuria. Its headquarters are in Mukden and its branch offices are located in cities and towns throughout the territory. The manifest purpose of this semi-official organisation is to drive out all Japanese enterprise from Manchuria. Its relation to the Nanking and Mukden Governments is much like the relation of the Third International to the Soviet Government. If Japan protests to the Chinese Governments against the inflammatory agitation of the Foreign Policy Association, the reply is that the Association is a private organisation over which the authorities have no control. As the Japanese Press and Japanese public see Japan's enterprise and Japan's general position steadily being undermined they have become restive. Even such big papers as the *Mainichi* and the *Asahi*, which formerly supported Shidehara's policy, have long since begun to doubt the wisdom of applying the same policy to the changed conditions in Manchuria.

Whether or not the Japanese attitude and Japanese sentiment in regard to Manchuria are right is a question which cannot easily be determined. It is enough to say that no Japanese, whether liberal or reactionary, can persuade himself of the wisdom of giving up our railway and our enterprises in Manchuria. The idea has become Japan's national creed, perhaps a fetish, that once she is driven out from Manchuria, once she is denied unobstructed access to its resources, her national existence will be jeopardised. She does not regard that territory as an outlet for her surplus population, but she does regard it as an indispensable source of supply which, as she looks at it, can be utilised only if the *status quo* in its essential features is maintained. Ask any Japanese, who professes to be a liberal, if he would consider surrendering the Japanese position in Manchuria, and he instantly becomes a conservative. Compromise he will consider, but he is also convinced that no compromise based upon the principle of

live and let live will satisfy the Chinese. The Chinese do not wish to let Japan live in Manchuria. Between such parties there can be no agreement. And that is the real trouble.

What is the Manchurian position which Japan is so determined to protect? In terms of money it represents an investment of 1,880,000,000 yen. The South Manchuria Railway alone has an investment of 1,035,000,000 yen. Then there are the Japanese Government's loans to the Manchurian Government, 98,731,000 yen; Japanese corporations' loans to the Chinese Government and individuals, 22,300,000 yen; private Japanese corporations' capital funds, 95,000,000 yen; and Japanese individuals' capital funds, 95,000,000 yen—all invested in Manchuria. Again, in terms of population, there are in Manchuria 200,000 Japanese and almost 1,000,000 Koreans, who are Japanese subjects and ask for Japanese protection. But over and above these material interests is the historical sentiment ever fresh in the popular mind that Japan's position in Manchuria is a result of wars foisted upon her, involving a sacrifice of unnumbered lives and untold treasure. Whenever that position is challenged the Japanese cannot help but recall their harrowing experiences of those wars. By the treaty which ended the Sino-Japanese war China ceded to Japan the southern tip of Manchuria, the Liaotung peninsula. At once Russia, Germany, and France intervened and advised Japan to give back the territory within fifteen days, ordering at the same time all their warships then in the Far East to proceed to Japanese waters as a demonstration of their determination to back up their 'advice' by force. The Russian note said that 'the possession of the peninsula of Liaotung by Japan would be a constant menace to the capital of China, and at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual menace to the peace of the Far East.' The German note (written, curiously enough, in 'pidgin' Japanese) was frankly insulting, stating in effect that Germany was so powerful that it would be foolish for Japan not to heed her admonition. Indeed, Japan was in no position to face three great Powers at once in the arena, and saw no alternative but to permit herself to be bullied out of the ceded territory. Russia then persuaded China to enter into a secret alliance binding the two nations to 'support each other reciprocally by all land and sea forces against any aggression directed by Japan against Russian territory in Eastern Asia, China, and Korea.' In addition China bound herself to 'open all Chinese ports to Russian vessels during military operations' and to allow Russia 'free use of the railway for the transport and provisioning of Russian troops' in time both of war and of peace. The history of that eventful period in the Far East leaves no room for doubt that

Russia's intention was to annex the whole of Manchuria to her own empire. Japan's war against Russia in 1904–5 was, therefore, fought as much to preserve Manchuria for China as to safeguard her own existence. In view of that secret alliance Japan at the Peace Conference at Portsmouth would have been fully justified in demanding much greater concessions than she did. But she contented herself with the modest acquisition of Port Arthur and Dairen and a small area adjacent to them, as well as what is now the South Manchuria Railway. And it is these properties of which China has been scheming to deprive Japan. The construction by China of parallel lines to the South Manchuria Railway; her demand that the Japanese railway guards be withdrawn, that Japan relinquish administration of the railway zone, and that Port Arthur and Dairen be returned to her; a hundred and one obstacles put by her in the way of Japanese enterprise—all these are an unmistakable indication of that scheme. Chinese assaults upon Japanese civilians, the wholesale ejection of Koreans, the murder of Japanese officers, and like incidents which have been increasingly frequent in Manchuria, are but a part of the same scheme.

Between about 1924 and 1927 the Manchurian Government built several railways with money borrowed from Japanese sources. The loans thus raised total some 143,000,000 yen. All these lines have been in operation, some making a fair profit. Yet the Manchurian Government has not paid a cent either on principal or for interest. Instead it has been using the proceeds from them in constructing a number of lines all parallel to the South Manchuria Railway for the purpose of embarrassing this Japanese system. Already more than 400 miles of such competitive lines have been built. To understand the seriousness of this matter we must remember that these parallel lines operate in a totally different manner from the way such lines operate in other countries. Often the choice between the Japanese railway and the Chinese parallel lines is not left to the discretion of the shippers and passengers, but is dictated by the authorities in favour of the latter. There is no fair competition based upon efficient operation. It is not even a matter of cut-throat competition, but is something infinitely worse, a scheme deliberately conceived by the authorities themselves to harass the Japanese railway by compelling the natives to patronise their own railways. Only by sheer efficiency has the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway been able to make the best of the unhappy situation. In order to meet the unfair competition it has effected a retrenchment, cutting 30,000,000 yen from its administrative expenditure and dismissing some 2500 officials, thus hoping to strengthen its financial position against any emergency.

Japan's right to veto the construction of parallel lines is based upon the following provision in a protocol annexed to the 1905 convention between China and Japan:

> The Chinese Government engages, for the purpose of protecting the interests of the South Manchuria Railway, not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of the said railway, any branch line in the neighbourhood of and parallel to that railway, or any branch line which would be prejudicial to the interests of the above-mentioned railway.


In securing a right to veto the construction of parallel lines to the South Manchuria Railway Japan simply followed examples set by other Powers. Long before the Sino-Japanese Convention of 1905 the Western nations interested in railway enterprise in China had imposed much the same obligation upon the Chinese Government. For instance, the 1900 agreement between China and the American China Development Company, an American concern, for building a railway between Hankow and Canton had this provision:

> Without the express consent in writing of the Director-General and the American Company, no other rival railway detrimental to the business of the same is to be permitted, and no parallel roads to the injury of the latter's interest, within the area served by the Canton-Hankow main line or branch lines.

The important question is whether the parallel lines built and planned by China are of a nature to jeopardise the interest of the Japanese system. This question cannot be determined by merely considering the distance between the parallels. More essential are considerations of topography, population, and produce of the territory through which they run. In a country like Manchuria, yet sparsely settled, with cities and towns far apart, and with its produce comparatively small, parallel lines, even many tens of miles apart, come in direct competition. Add to this natural competition such official interference as we have noted, and the predicament of the South Manchuria system is obvious.

Japan, of course, protested against the building of these parallel lines. Seeing that the protest was in vain, she changed her strategy and apparently adopted the policy of permitting the parallel lines provided China would agree to extend the Kirin-Changchun line to Huinin (called Kainei by the Japanese), on the Korean border, on the one hand, and on the other to a point, possibly Talai, in the interior of Manchuria. Japan had long been desirous of building these proposed extensions as Chinese-owned, Chinese-operated lines for the reason that these new railways, if built, would give the forest and agricultural products of the Manchurian interior a new outlet to the sea at the north

Korean port of Seishin, thus reducing the distance between Japan and the Manchurian interior by a few hundred miles. Strategically, too, the projected extensions are of no small importance, for they are no doubt conceived with an eye on the Soviet position in the maritime province of Siberia and in North Manchuria. Of these desired extensions, that from Kirin to Hoinin had been



agreed upon between Japan and China by the treaty of 1909 reinforced by an agreement of 1917 whereby the interested Japanese banks advanced 10,000,000 yen on the project on the understanding that the line would be completed within a reasonable time. But it took Japan almost ten years of constant persuasion to get work started by China on the project, and even then, after the first 130 miles between Kirin and Tunhua were built, China refused to go further, thus leaving the project up in

the air. Japan, of course, was and is eager to finance China to complete the line, for if left in its unfinished condition it would benefit neither country, but would entail a great loss to Japan in the form of the large sum so far advanced. The parallel lines against which Japan protested have long since become a *fait accompli*. For a *quid pro quo* Japan will insist upon the completion of the Kirin-Korean line and upon the extension of the same line to the interior of Manchuria, as was agreed upon by the late Marshal Chang Tso-lin and the South Manchuria Railway in 1927.

Then there is the question of administration of the lands belonging to the South Manchuria Railway. These lands, some 100 square miles in all, were acquired by purchase by the railway at the more important stations for the purpose of providing its employees as well as others, Japanese, Chinese, and foreigners, with safe and sanitary quarters in which to live and conduct business in connexion with the railway. Over these small areas the Japanese authorities exercise police power, while the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway undertakes public works, maintains schools for the Chinese and Japanese, looks after public health, and so forth. Materially, this arrangement works to the benefit of the Chinese as well as the Japanese. But China, for reasons of 'face,' has been making ado about it. Japan, on the contrary, relies upon the treaty provisions which concede to the railway the 'absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands' and 'confides' to it the 'preservation of law and order' on the said lands. Japan, moreover, argues her case on the ground of necessity, for the railway, as she looks at it, cannot properly function if the railway zone is permitted to sink into the mire of maladministration.

Nevertheless, there is here room for concession. Japan, particularly the present Cabinet, might hand over to the Chinese authorities some of the administrative functions heretofore performed by the Japanese, if she could persuade herself that such conciliatory measures would not be utilised by the Chinese only as a means to handicap, and if possible cripple, the South Manchuria Railway. Not only is Japan unable to persuade herself of this, but she is convinced, from the Soviet's experience in North Manchuria and her own in South Manchuria, that any concession she might make in the administration of the railway zone would not merely be taken by the Chinese as a sign of weakening on her part, but would at once be seized upon to frustrate all Japanese efforts to maintain the railway as an efficient and modern means of transportation, an important section in the great railway system linking Europe and the Far East. Japan knows full well the plight of the Russians, White

or Red, in the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway since Chang Tso-lin, the late war lord of Manchuria, taking advantage of the chaos which prevailed in the railway zone in the wake of the Bolshevist revolution, forcibly disarmed the Russian guards and replaced them with his own soldiers in March 1930. The Soviet, regretting the outbursts of altruism in which it had for a time indulged, has, since 1929, been negotiating to recover its lost right of placing its own railway guards along the Chinese Eastern Railway, at least to the extent of 50 per cent. of the entire force.

China's demand that Japan should withdraw railway guards might receive due consideration were Japan convinced that the withdrawal would not result in the same disappointment as was experienced by the Soviet. She knows, on the contrary, that once these guards are withdrawn peace and order in the railway zone will become so precarious that the operation of the railway will be seriously handicapped. She knows, further, that the Chinese soldiers, if permitted to replace the Japanese guards, can be relied upon to make it so unpleasant and exasperating to the railway officials and passengers that the efficiency of traffic will be severely curtailed. This, in fact, is what has happened to the Chinese Eastern Railway since its Russian guards were replaced by Chinese in 1920.

Japan's right to place guards along the lines of the South Manchuria Railway is based upon the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty with Russia, as well as upon the 1905 Peking Agreement with China, which entitles her to maintain her own railway guards until 'China shall have become herself capable of affording full protection of the lives and property of foreigners.' The number of guards thus maintained shall not exceed fifteen per kilometre. On this basis Japan may keep 15,000 soldiers in the railway zone. But the actual number stationed has for some years been only 7000 until the recent clash increased it to some 13,000. Nor is Japan the only nation which maintains such guards in China. Under the Peking Protocol of 1900, signed in the wake of the Boxer disturbances, the signatory Powers still exercise the right to guard the railway between Peking and Tientsin with their own soldiers. The Washington Conference of 1921–22 adopted a resolution permitting the continued stay of foreign troops in China who were stationed there by treaty. Japan, of course, does not mean to maintain her guards permanently, but before deciding to withdraw them she wants to be sure that the railway will be reasonably free from the attacks of banditry for which the territory is noted. What is more important, she must be convinced of the good faith of the Chinese authorities and the integrity of the Chinese officers of the law.

For much the same reason Japan does not think it practicable to relinquish the small leased territory of and around Port Arthur and Dairen, which is essential to the South Manchuria Railway as the base of operation. If China were a law-governed, treaty-observing, orderly nation, Japan might look at it in a different light. But, in view of China's existing condition and her attitude towards foreign obligations, Japan does not feel safe or wise in relinquishing the lease now or in the near future. She knows, indeed, that the Chinese demand in this respect has been conceived in a desire to cripple the railway.

In the increasing Chinese persecution of the Koreans in Manchuria Japan has another problem which is far more serious than is apparent, for if Japan fails to protect them her prestige will suffer not only in Manchuria but in Korea as well. The Koreans, never genuinely loyal to Japan, will scornfully ask, 'If Japan is powerless in the face of the Chinese mobs and Chinese official rapacity, what is the use of our being Japanese subjects?' Such a loss of Korean confidence in Japan will surely be exploited by the Korean independents whose agitation is always smouldering. This is a condition which Japan cannot permit to develop.

And yet what can Japan do to protect the lives and property of the Koreans? She is not the mistress of Manchuria. She has no police power outside the very narrow strips of land along the 690-mile lines of the South Manchuria Railway. The Koreans in the interior are entirely at the mercy of the Chinese authorities. They cannot be protected by Japan except through diplomatic channels. But where lie the diplomatic channels of China? In Nanking or in Mukden? If Japan protests to Mukden, she is told to go to Nanking. If she protests to Nanking, Nanking tells her to talk to Mukden. The fact is that China has no desire to co-operate with Japan for the protection of the Koreans. Indeed, one may reasonably presume that one of the motives at the back of the anti-Korean pogrom is to embarrass Japan and to belittle her in the eyes alike of the Manchurians and of the Koreans.

The solution may seem to lie in the Koreans in Manchuria severing allegiance to Japan and becoming Chinese subjects in accordance with China's naturalisation law. But the fact is that the Koreans do not want to be naturalised, and for good reason. They know the rapacity and extortion constantly perpetrated by Chinese officials upon the Chinese. They know, too, that organised bandits, not infrequently hand-in-glove with the officials, prey upon innocent people all too often. They have themselves been the victims of this maladministration and lawlessness. But as long as they remain Japanese subjects they can, or at least they think they can, invoke Japanese protection when the persecution and oppression have become unbearable. If Japan's response to

their appeal for protection be a *non possumus*, her prestige in Korean eyes will suffer incalculably.

Under the Sino-Japanese Agreement of 1915 the Koreans and Japanese have a legal right to lease land for agricultural purposes. As a matter of fact, this right has never been fully exercised, because the Manchurian Government issued secret orders to the local governors forbidding the landowners from leasing land to Japanese subjects, thus converting the 1915 Agreement into a dead letter. Japan's repeated protests in this case, as on numerous other occasions, have never been heeded.

Needless to say, Japan's intentions in Manchuria are economic. She cherishes the vision of a vast economic empire there for the benefit of both China and herself. Insurmountable as their difficulties may appear, the Japanese in Manchuria are forging ahead with their fixed plans of economic development, and they have no intention of retreating, for their struggle, as they look at it, is one of life or death. This is the only possible conclusion one can deduce from an intimate observation of the undertakings the Japanese have launched and are launching. Nor can we deny that this Japanese system has been enormously beneficial to the natives. Before its advent the Manchurians barely eked out a living by taking in each other's washing. Their principal products, beans and millet, had no market outside of Manchuria. To-day the exports of beans and bean products alone amount to 255,000,000 haiwan taels, or about $198,900,000, a year. In 1907 the total trade of Manchuria was only 52,000,000 haiwan taels in value. In 1929 this increased to 755,000,000 haiwan taels, an increase of more than sixteen times in twenty-three years. Because of the peace, progress, and prosperity thus ushered in, Manchuria has become a haven of refuge for Chinese immigrants from the war-torn, famine-ridden provinces south of the Great Wall. In the last decade some 5,000,000 Chinese have immigrated into Manchuria. Will this happy condition continue to prevail once Japan is forced out of this territory? The answer is plainly written in China's own book of contemporary history.

K. K. KAWAKAMI.

THE FACE OF MOSCOW

IT should be self-evident that a form of government which has already lasted longer than the half-democracy which was Russia's before the war has something of the nature of a permanent institution. Yet such is the psychological force of Russian expatriates' wishes—as great in its way as the contrary force exerted by Moscow on the European discontented—that it is almost with a shock that one realises not only that a Soviet Government exists, but that its capital is outwardly not unlike the capitals of other lands.

Moscow lacks, of course, the metropolitan smartness of Paris or New York. There is no height of fashion, few elegant cars, and still fewer self-consciously elegant people. Scarcity and Communist religion together weigh more heavily than all the sumptuary laws of previous civilisations. Faces are uniformly set, and in crossing the long stretch of the town from the Leningrad to the White Russian stations I saw only one person smile. After an English winter, however, that was no great surprise. And with the suburbs of London seen from the train as a last memory of daylight England, Moscow's drabness, relieved by the towers of the churches at every street corner, seemed in no way unusual. Even the food, bad as it was, was better than German excess. At the foreigners' hotels there was meat of a kind in plenty, butter, and any amount of gritty black bread. In the restaurants it was different. There there was no meat, only some very stale vegetables and the same comparatively generous quantities of black bread. But there was sugar, and tea; no lemon for the tea, but lemon powder in its stead; and cakes which would be refused by the poorest of English workmen, but which outwardly had the normal appearance of cakes. The people in the streets were not well clothed, but were covered, and as the early summer was hot the women were able to economise their small store of clothing by going without stockings. In the centre of Moscow the shops seemed scarcely fewer than in London, and of great variety—food shops, book shops, tobacco kiosks, tea shops, restaurants, wine shops, photographers' stores. It was only later that it became apparent for what long periods they were closed,

and how many of the cartons in the windows were no more than cartons. For the moment the queues outside many of them gave an illusion of supply, and an unquestionable certainty of demand. There were cinemas everywhere, theatres conspicuous in Sverdloff Square and Bolshaya Sadovaya, men selling newspapers at the street corners, even a big advertisement of a proletarian dog show. Tramcars and motor omnibuses rattled all day long across the Dzerzhinski Square. Policemen in commonplace uniform directed the thin streams of lorries and motor cars which moved constantly down and across Tverskaya. The crowds in the streets moved about their business quickly, for everyone seemed to have business to do.

Next to the book shops the wine shops and cafés were most numerous. The wine shops seemed to do a steady though small business all day long. The cafés were full every night. As we sat drinking beer in one—at a price which made us wonder how the workers around us could afford it on wages of from 80 to 150 roubles a month—two men, attracted by the sound of English, came up to our table and sat with us. One was a Tartar from Kazan, the other a Russian. Both were slightly drunk, as so many seemed to be in Moscow at night, and, being drunk, garrulous. They were full of complaints of the hardships of their lives. They earned only 100 roubles a month, and, being shop assistants, were not in the most privileged class of workmen. What white bread and meat and milk they wanted they must buy outside the co-operative store, and at the fantastic prices demanded by the peasant in the market, who is distrustful of money whose value fluctuates and unwilling to exchange for small amounts of it goods which have a more definite worth. For days they had had no cigarettes—the tobacco kiosks had, indeed, been closed, and cigarettes could be had only from the furtive street vendors who disappeared when the militiamen came in sight—and, not caring for cinemas and theatres or for the society of the small and dirty rooms which they shared with others in what were once the Neglinnaya baths, they had come to forget it all in the easily obtainable solace of drink.

Their complaint was justified: half an hour in one of Moscow's many tenements, with their elementary sanitation, vermin, and listless unwashed crowds, is sufficient demonstration of the desirability of going almost anywhere else. But it was not, among workmen, a general complaint. New workmen's dwellings are to be seen everywhere in Moscow. The flats in them are small; newcomers bring with them their old vermin, and the bathrooms—as in the old libel on English miners—are not always used for the purpose for which they were intended. But they are housing an ever-increasing number of the favoured workmen,

who are favoured in other things besides. There are indubitably workman audiences at the opera and ballet, brought there by the cheap and free tickets they get from trade unions and clubs. There are cheap books and magazines for the workman if he wants them, though, in fact, the clients in the book shops are mostly of a more official class. For the workman who is lucky enough to work in one of the new factories in the suburbs there are light and air all day long, cheap though bad meals in the factory kitchen, and the stimulus that comes from work with others and in pleasant surroundings. In addition—and perhaps most important—he has the psychological security of insurance against sickness. Admittedly such conditions are not general, and even the favoured 'shock-worker' may have to wait six months before he can find the suit or shoes for which his union has given him the necessary permit. Admittedly, too, there are within less than a hundred miles of Moscow villages where the peasants are in rags, hunted down by Communist-Collectivist enthusiasts, with little food to eat, and for drink raspberry water in place of the traditional tea. In Moscow itself, however, and to a lesser degree in Leningrad, the conditions of a sufficient number of workers are sufficiently good for the rest to be able to persuade themselves without great difficulty that a day will come when their conditions also will be as good, and, so persuaded, to suffer hunger and hardship in no too great discontent.

In the meantime they have as recompense the proletarian culture created from the big legacy left by the old *régime* and the scraps added by the new. Its immediate evidences are, unfortunately, for the most part of a purely destructive kind, and thus have alienated the sympathies of many who saw something more than symbols of a *régime* in Simonovsky and the Cathedral of the Saviour. Churches are destroyed every month; the Iberian Virgin has gone; and in the Monastery of Novo-Dyevichi gravestones are torn up to make a barrage in the river. Much of the destruction is wantonly impious. The inhabitants of one small street in Moscow were recently startled by the ringing of church bells, an offence forbidden under severe penalties. Some Young Communists, it later appeared, were removing the bells from the disused church at the end of the street, to have them melted down for their metal. It may be better, as Soviet apologists say, that churches should be used as clubs than remain empty, and that the metal of their bells should be used to help the Five-Year Plan than hang unused to rust. In the Bolshevist philosophy, indeed, such arguments are of unquestionable logic. The fact still remains that Young Communist energy, though not then so easily mobilised, could be used as productively without destruction of the old, and that, if many churches for months

stand empty, as they do, the principal reason is that the local soviet has boarded them up and terrorised their congregations.

In these matters, however, it is only too easy to lose perspective. The Soviet Government has turned St. Basil's into an anti-religious museum: Napoleon's army before them turned it into a stable. They are pulling down the Cathedral of the Saviour, a historic as well as a religious monument; and churchmen in England supported a proposal to pull down Wren's City churches. And when we see the students of the University for the Peoples of the East quartered in the Strastnoi Monastery—one of the loveliest of Russian monuments—we must remember that not only do all Bolsheviks profess, but a great number of them really believe in the equality of all men of all races. It is, in fact, one of the severest shocks of Moscow to find accepted as first principles—at any rate to outward appearance—ideals to which we pay lip-service and which in social custom we flout every day. And of well-grounded complaints against the expressions of proletarian culture the majority are questions of taste, in which the uncultivated Russian seems to be completely lacking. Panait Istrati has told the story of the negro Communist whom his comrades photographed on the Tsar's throne. It seemed incredibly childish and incredibly crude. But for proof the photograph is there, hanging in a shop half-way up the Tverskaya hill. Or was. For all their bravado the Bolshevists are sensitive about criticisms suggesting a lack of culture, and since Istrati's comments visitors to this particular shop are warned to disguise their real interest in it.

Nor is that, incidentally, one of the sights shown by the charming guides of the Intourist Agency. So many tourists now go to Russia each year that what they are shown, and the effect on them of what they are shown, cannot be neglected. It need not, however, be feared. For the most part such tourists are men well acquainted with social work in their own countries, usually well advanced in that respect. When, therefore, they are shown what Moscow has done in the way of housing its workers they can compare what they see there with what they have seen in Austria or Holland or Germany, and (one hopes) realise that Russia is still not much nearer heaven than they. Inevitably the tourists vary with nationality. The Germans, if a May Day Communist party is a sample, seem inclined to write down as evidence everything they are told by their guides, and each day fill a big note-book. But to offset them there are the Frenchmen who relate everything to first principles, and make witticisms even about the sacred theories of Moscow's many sacred cranks. Two of them went with a party of tourists to the model prison of Lefortovo. The warden of the prison explained in detail how humanely the prisoners were treated—a not impossible thing, since in the case of non-political prisoners Russians were always inclined to leniency—and gave as an example the case of a woman discharged that day. She had been sentenced to four years' imprisonment for pouring kerosene over her husband and setting fire to him, but, having behaved well in prison, had been released after two years. '*Pour qu'elle fasse le bonheur d'un autre mari*,' said one of the Frenchmen. His companion, having encountered a whole-hearted terrorist-Communist warder in the prison yard, was engaged with him in a loud discussion on the meaning and value of political liberty!

The cranks apart—they infest the Soviet Union, and offer as novelties educational and social theories which were old before the war—there are many really new and pleasant features about the life of Soviet citizens, as seen by a visitor to Moscow. Rarely are they in the obvious. Lenin worship and Stalin worship, though real to a great many, seem for the most part as falsely pretentious as the screaming slogans plastered up all over Moscow. The new Lenin Mausoleum, before which a long queue stands every evening, is architecturally to be compared only with a Lyons' Corner House, and the newest Bolshevist sculpture of stupidly 'massive' German type. Moscow's theatres are better than London's, but the best of them no better than they were before the Revolution. Moscow's cinemas are, like London's, for the most part pure American. But in every-day intercourse there are many things which seem strange (though, in fact, they may be no more than a persistence of old national traits). Strangers casually met are civil, but never with that servility which makes equality with the English workman seem such a distant prospect. Communists and Young Communists, both fairly numerous in Moscow, sometimes abuse new-found freedom: a professor in the Second University told me that after inquiry among his students it was discovered that 70 per cent. of them had had sexual diseases. But for the most part freedom has given them only a respectful self-respect. In face of the many distressing incidents which occur every day in Moscow, it is idle for Communists to claim that women have as yet achieved complete equality. But there seems little doubt that they are moving towards it. In many industries they work alongside men for equal wages, and in one factory—visited at hazard and without a guide—a young woman was found in charge of the social work, and to all appearance doing it very well. The necessity of using women in industry has brought with it the necessity of some provision for children. With the natural result that nursery schools are common, and the curious one, for a Communist society, that domestic servants are even more common. The

necessity of distributing food as cheaply as possible is multiplying the number of communal dining-rooms, and the imagined necessity of economising in manufactured goods is leading to standardisation. The number of styles of shoes has been reduced from 150 to 35, and of assortments in cotton textiles from 3500 to 400. Standardised food and standardised clothing result in a diminution of interest in the material adornment of life, only partly counteracted by the insistence of such Communist leaders as Yaroslavsky on the need of style. Scarcity of living space and scarcity of commodities have together reduced the acquisitive instinct to a minimum. With ten people, often unrelated, living together in a room there is little urge to collect things for individual pleasure. Memories of the famine years, moreover, remain to show the exact nature of the value of anything which cannot be used for warmth or nourishment. 'What is the use of rings?' said a woman of the old intelligentsia to whom I had shown a topaze bought in the Sukharevka Market. 'I sold mine for a pound of flour.'

Energies are turned to other ends, and find innumerable outlets in the committees and meetings and conferences which the Soviet system fosters. If the multitude of book shops, magazines, and newspapers is any true guide, reading, too, occupies a big place in Soviet leisure pursuits; and, as is natural with a people which, so to speak, has just learned to read, what is printed is often taken as literal truth, no matter how fantastic it be. The quality of the books published varies: it is highest in the children's stories and lowest in the political clap-trap which seems to form half of the book shops' stores. Of 'light' reading there is little or none. Karl Marx and Lenin are the 'best-sellers,' and possibly as stimulating to thought as most of the novelists who are 'best-sellers' in England. The artistic treasures which the Soviet *régime* inherited have already been to some extent despoiled. Despite Lunacharsky's protestations, there can be little doubt that they will again be despoiled should urgent need of money arise. For the moment they are open to the enjoyment of the workers, parties of whom are to be seen daily in the Hermitage, the Tretiakoff Gallery, or the Palaces of Tsarskoe Selo. Again, the approach of the Soviet guides is crudely and rather stupidly political. No picture of a king is passed by without its moral, and if you are shown the church in the Kremlin where Tsars were crowned you must be shown as well a diagram comparing the cost of coronation with a peasant's yearly income. But undoubtedly Russia's museums, along with Russia's books and newspapers and system of education, achieve a purpose. And if such other institutions as the less popular museum of the Revolution seem like chambers of horrors, the fault is less with the Soviet Government, which has made use of the horrors for a political purpose, than with those who provided such horrors for its use.

It is the fault of the Soviet's enemies, too, if the picture of oppression and cruelty which they offer daily as a picture of the life of 160,000,000 seems, on a first glance at Moscow, fantastic exaggeration. On its surface Moscow is normal and ordered, its drabness compensated by the absence of some of those social stupidities which mar English society. It is only when Soviet guides have been discarded and exploration is carried out in a different environment that another side appears. A Soviet official complained to me that the stories of Soviet oppression and injustice were always either of outside origin or so vague as to be worthless as legal evidence. That is true. But the reason is that, while many visitors to Russia could be specific about such cases, for the sake of those inside they dare not. Some day, perhaps, the Soviet Government will realise that its barbarous system of hostages works both ways. While it undoubtedly makes it impossible for more than half the truth to be told, it also, and for the same reason, favours belief in every story that leaks out of Russia, even the demonstrably false.

An apparently endless stream of conflicting statements has made all but propagandists chary of generalisations about the Soviet secret police. I could not, however, help noting that, although all the Communists with whom I talked in Moscow were ready to defend the necessity of the G.P.U., there was none who was not apologetic about it. It is only foreigners like Henri Barbusse, favoured and flattered on their visits, who can grotesquely say that the Russian people 'loves' the G.P.U. Some of its manifestations are pathetically humorous, and some of its agents pathetically ashamed. Many foreign engineers in Moscow have, or had, G.P.U. agents attached to them—sometimes on the pretence of various services, sometimes with no pretence at all; and at every large party I attended there was at least one G.P.U. agent present. Invariably he was known to everyone, and usually the occasion was seized by foreigners who had no cause to fear reprisals to stuff him with tales of imaginary plots on the part of Soviet employees. When so many agents are employed, their quality and zeal naturally vary. In Moscow there is a former soldier, bearing an honoured name and well known in England for his work during the war, who is attached to a German engineer. The engineer reports that this man does his work unobtrusively and well. On the other hand, there is in Leningrad a spy attached to a certain American who is manifestly ashamed of his job. He does his work perfunctorily; like the spies of the old *régime*, he is quite willing to perform in addition such little services as calling cabs, and in return he is content to accept little gifts of the things

which only the foreigner can buy. To many Russians the G.P.U. is a source of pride as well as of hatred. On my second day in Moscow I happened to miss from my room a letter which later turned up. I mentioned this to a Russian friend, who shook his head sorrowfully. 'Yes,' he said, 'I'm afraid they're employing too many new men. They should keep only the best people for the foreigners.'

Such pride at first makes a visitor chary of believing all the tales he hears (even though there is the example of Azeff to make all things possible). But, as accidental instance follows accidental instance, the conviction grows that the G.P.U. does indeed carry its work into every corner of Soviet life. It is as impossible to believe that all the evidence of one's eyes is fabricated by anti-Soviet agents as it is to believe that the Soviet Government puts up its factories and houses solely in order to impress foreign tourists. From Warsaw to Moscow I had travelled with an American returning to work. Before he left he had sold a big winter overcoat to a Russian engineer who sadly needed it. Returning, he found the coat still hanging where he had left it to be collected. He at once telephoned to the Russian's flat to ask why. The day he left the Russian had been deported to a timber camp. The reason? None that his wife and mother could even imagine. Again, from Leningrad I went with a non-Communist official and his wife to an outlaying village in search of a *datcha*, or summer cottage. We arrived to find *datchas* in plenty. Many new ones had been built, in rows as in an English suburb, and the wife, seeing this, would have turned back at once. She was living in Leningrad in a big house turned into flats. Every day she had to use a communal kitchen with twelve others, every day she was plagued by unwanted visitors or house committees come to measure her floor space or to protest that she was using too much gas. Brought up to a different style, she had come after ten years of this to hate the human race with an intensity I have rarely seen equalled.

Her husband prevailed upon her, however, and we tramped from door to door. It was useless. All the *datchas* which were still empty had been reserved by the G.P.U. Finally, in desperation, the husband, safe in the protection of those high in power, tried to bribe a peasant woman to let her *datcha* to him over the heads of the G.P.U. That, too, was useless. In her cottage the peasant had three ikons, a portrait of Lenin, a portrait of Kalinin, and a portrait of Stalin. She was safe against problematic future changes of *régime*. She intended to be safe, too, against immediate risks. The day before some G.P.U. men had been out to see her, and had offered to provide her with rope to stop crevices in her hut if only she would let her *datcha* to them.

Taking his revolver out of the holster and fingering it, their leader had pointed out to her the obvious advantages of such a transaction. She had agreed. Such instances in themselves seem trivial. Multiplied, they give an impression of a society weighed down by fear, an impression which is increased a thousandfold when one moves out of workman or official society into that of the non-Communist intelligentsia. In the first bourgeois household into which I was introduced there was another man as guest. He was a professor, and spoke freely about the difficulties of his work. He was warmed to his subject and talking loudly, when suddenly he stopped, as one who had remembered something, and asked our hostess who were her neighbours. He was assured that they knew no French, but thereafter he talked no more.

These are the minor evidences of G.P.U.-surveyed life. The major become known only by more devious ways, but do become known by degrees, so delighted are the persecuted to find someone to whom, perhaps for the first time in years, they can tell the whole bitterness of their souls. Such was a family met in Tsarskoye Selo. They had been rich, and Liberals. After the Revolution the younger son had become a Communist, had gone to Moscow to study engineering, and had been put in charge of a motor car factory. He was highly thought of, and seemed sure of a career, when suddenly the G.P.U. discovered that he had been on friendly terms with some French Communists who were suspected of 'opposition' views. His own orthodoxy was beyond suspicion. Nevertheless, he was taken and put, first, in Butyrka, where he shared one room with sixty others, the only sanitation an open drain; next, in the Lubyanka, clean and efficient, where, sincere Communist that he was, he went insane from persecution mania. Not content with its one victim, the G.P.U. began to take others of his family, one by one. Those of it remaining outside applied to a distant relative, highly placed in the Kremlin, to obtain redress. He dared not do anything, because, despite his orthodoxy and his position, the G.P.U. is only waiting for the day when it can 'get' him. Those outside do not know whether those 'sitting' are dead or alive, for the G.P.U., true to its Cheka traditions, prefers to keep them in suspense. And so they can but wait for the night—by another Cheka tradition it is still always at night—when a high-powered motor car will drive up their street, and they too will disappear from human knowledge. That night may never come. Some new diversion may in the meantime have been found. But whether it comes or not, the memory of such torment will remain.

It is cases like this—they are all too frequent and all too well attested—which explain the intensity of hatred against the

régime among certain classes and the intensity of the Kremlin's fear that one day it, too, may suffer the same fate. Outwardly the political structure of Moscow seems safe and complete. None but Communist organisations are allowed, and they are controlled by a discipline of whose force the exile of Trotsky is sufficient demonstration. The Communist Party numbers over two millions. Its purity is ensured by regular 'chistkas,' while its privileges ensure that the places of those 'cleaned up' shall be taken by others more zealous. Similar 'chistkas' ensure, so far as such things can be ensured, the purity of those who hold office under the *régime*: a 'chistka' of Government departments which began last December continued until this month. On every street, at every hour of the day and night, are to be seen the Government's forces—Red soldiers, militia, G.P.U. troops. In every factory are the black and red lists: the black of the slackers, the red of the 'shock-workers,' or blacklegs, the certain continuance of whose privileges is bound up with the continuance of the present *régime*. On their fifth-day holiday groups of volunteers are given military training on public squares. On May Day there passes through the Red Square a military pageant such as few nations now could, and still fewer, in an anti-militaristic age, would dare show. From nine o'clock in the morning until past noon infantry and cavalry, artillery and tanks, G.P.U. troops and workmen's battalions, Young Communists and Pioneers, file past the Lenin Mausoleum. Aeroplanes, manœuvring in reckless fashion overhead, scatter leaflets on the crowds. Stalin and his supporters stand on the Mausoleum to take the salute, and below them stand the diplomatists, whose presence is witness of the importance which other countries, much as they may detest it, attach to the Soviet *régime*. In the afternoon, when the diplomatists have diplomatically retired, come the long processions of workers with banners proclaiming the necessity of completing the Five-Year Plan in four years, threatening and insulting the bourgeois and declaring allegiance to Stalinism and Leninism.

Yet May Day itself might be taken as a sign of another kind. Voroshiloff, whose duty it is as Commissar for War to administer the Red oath to the soldiers, coughs and splutters into the microphone in his haste, as though he would gladly have done with a distasteful business—Moscow is full of rumours of his disagreements with the Politbureau. Among the little group on the mausoleum the Georgians talk good-humouredly; Molotoff, a newcomer and the only pure Russian in the Government, looks obediently at Stalin; Kalinin, once the figurehead of the Revolution, looks hunted and ill—it is said that only by the most drastic measures was he recently brought back to the general line. The dejected appearance of the processions outside the Red Square

belies the boasts on their banners, and in the square the cheers they raise are small for their number. If only because such statements are not susceptible of proof, one would hesitate to say that they were doing all this under compulsion. But one could safely say that the first fire of the Revolution has gone from them.

It seems to have gone from other things, too—its place taken by other and unfortunately more naturally human passions. Rivalries in the Kremlin are acute and extend beyond its boundaries. Voroshiloff, following in the footsteps of Trotsky and Frumkin, has frequently expressed his objection to political control of the army, and his officers are not always on the best of terms with the Communists attached to them. The rank and file of the Red army distrusts the G.P.U. troops because it fears, not perhaps without reason, that in the event of war these last would be 'shock troops in the rear.' The peasants in the army object to maltreatment of their families by city Communists, and it was their restlessness which caused Stalin to halt the collectivisation campaign last year. People who were in Moscow at the time of the trial of specialists last December say that there was no counter-revolutionary organisation then—it would be surprising, in a city policed like Moscow, if there had been—but that, so bitter had internecine quarrels become, many men were privately beginning to think seriously about what would come after the overthrow of Stalin—a thought which would never have occurred three years before. What happens in the provinces it is impossible to tell from the Moscow newspapers. But men who were in the Caucasus and the Ukraine at the height of the collectivisation campaign say that the campaign there amounted to civil war, with large bodies of troops in action.

Something near civil war, indeed, seems natural: first, because this is Russia, where such political feeling as there has been has always been intense; secondly, because the Five-Year Plan is subjecting everyone to an intense strain. 'We must have a Bolshevist *tempo* in industry,' shout the posters at every street corner. And the lesson is taken up by books, lectures, wireless, newspapers. 'When we have finished our Five-Year Plan . . .' is the Communist's habitual answer to a question why he is neglecting this or that. For the Plan, consciously whether willingly or not, he sacrifices himself. His butter is exported to England while he eats English margarine. He must wear shoddy clothes while better ones are sold abroad for machines. And he will sacrifice one-third of his country's cattle in the effort to drive the well-to-do peasants into collective farms. Much of his enthusiasm—whether of natural growth or not, there is much genuine enthusiasm—is pure *folie de grandeur*. There was a Tsar who ordered his Minister of the Interior to build a railway line

direct from St. Petersburg to Moscow, not because such a direct line would have much economic purpose, but because he would have such a line. To-day the Communists in Moscow are proposing to build an underground railway system. It would be enormously expensive, and even at Moscow's present rate of growth the city's streets will be able easily to bear all its traffic for another fifty years to come. But they would have such an underground. And precisely because it is a kind of madness it is useless to argue with the Communist's conception of his Five-Year Plan. You may tell him that there are regions in the Ukraine where the horse is a more easily supported and more efficient machine than the tractor, that when Nizhni Novgorod has produced its motor cars there will be no roads for them to run on. You may suggest to him that some tribes of the Caucasus are psychologically more suited to intensive individual than to extensive collective cultivation. It will be useless. He knows. His god is in the machine, and to that god he is willing to sacrifice present comfort in return for future industrial prosperity.

Not all his schemes are wild. In theory at least Moscow has learnt the lessons of the civil war, and does not intend again to be caught. But about practice the Soviet statistics, facts, and foreign specialists working in Russia tell three different tales. It is a commonly accepted axiom that for Russian production you must take Soviet statistics because there are no others. And the increasing protests of wheat-growers, timber merchants, confectioners the world over are sufficient evidence that Russia has already found her way back into world markets. Furthermore, if there are general laws in economics, her competition in world markets may be expected to become more acute, since it is a common experience that countries just embarked on an industrial revolution increase their production at an abnormal rate. There is as yet, however, no need for our own industrialists to take Soviet figures of production so seriously and dismally as they have been doing of late. The so-called 'dumping' of the last eighteen months was largely accident, due to the fact that the prices of staple Russian exports collapsed while the prices of the imports needed for the Five-Year Plan fell only slightly in comparison, and made possible in part by the 'freak' wheat crop in 1930. Plans for the future may well be related to the results of plans for the past. Until a few months ago the official Soviet newspapers invariably spoke enthusiastically of the Stalingrad tractor factory. Now they admit, what inside Russia was generally known before, that the factory has been a complete failure. It is, indeed, a common criticism among foreign specialists in Russia that plans exist only on paper, and that when there seems some small chance

of their being realised their figures are immediately increased to a point at which serious work becomes impossible. Conditions of work, they say, are likewise chaotic. The G.P.U. arrests their Russian engineers, and lets them out of prison on hire, as Professor Ramzin, of Moscow Trial fame, is let out of prison every day to lecture at the Thermo-Dynamics Institute, and, his lectures done, escorted back. If a particularly good director is found by one trust the chances are that another trust, fearful lest it should fall behind, will have him arrested so that it can take him off to work for it.

Rather than increase production in the Donetz coal basin by the simple process of rationalising existing mines, the Russians will sink new mines requiring tremendous capital expenditure. With all the planning there goes so much stimulation of industry against industry and enterprise against enterprise that co-ordination is difficult. At Dnieprostroi a big power dam is being built at enormous cost. It was originally intended to supply a ring of new factory towns to be built around it. Dnieprostroi is nearing completion, and the towns have not been built. The new plants built in the Urals and Siberia are often unable to work because, with the old Russian problem of transport still unsolved, they cannot get supplies. The Russian mechanic, but yesterday a primitive peasant, has, American engineers say, an entirely different relation to his machine from that of the English or American mechanic. Seeing it perform many miracles, he expects it to do and stand all things. 'You must come,' said one Russian foreman to the foreign specialist in charge, 'and see our new threshing-machine. It's so strong it can take bricks and not break.' To demonstrate which he threw bricks into the threshing-machine, which broke. Although the Five-Year Plan has now run half its course, the real test is yet to come. Having built their factories and plants—some indubitably good—the Russians must now prove that they can work them. Five-Year Plan, so widely advertised, has become a fetish, and Five-Year Plans are introduced where they are quite irrelevant. A surgeon in Leningrad told me that a Five-Year Plan had been imposed on his hospital. No patient, well or ill, alive or dead, was to stay there more than twelve days. Politics interfere with economics even more than under capitalism: while transport is the most urgent need of industry, roads and railways are built and kept in repair according to their strategic rather than to their industrial value.

Some of their stories the specialists may exaggerate. Essentially they agree with every manifestation of Russian temperament, which seems to have undergone little change, and with the fact that even in factories shown to tourists half the machinery

is often not working. Even so, however, the specialists' criticisms no more deserve to be taken at face value than do the Soviet statistics. No one in Moscow—Communist or Capitalist, native or foreigner—can be relied upon, for no one in the atmosphere of Russia can be dispassionate. Foreigners in Russia before the war were liable to be drawn into party politics. In Moscow to-day they wisely keep out of politics. But they are divided among themselves by the bitterest political divisions. Whether or no its class war is taken seriously by the Russians, the Soviet Government may claim to have created a class war among its foreign visitors. Never, in England at any rate, were there such arguments, and rarely such disillusionment. English Liberals go to Moscow for a week, and are impressed by Soviet achievements. They stay longer and are vicariously tortured by its tyranny. One of the saddest sights of Moscow is the foreign libertarian—labelled Communist, Socialist, or Liberal—who has cut himself adrift from everything to live in this land of a new freedom. Freedom he cannot find, and, unable to adapt himself to life without it, he is thrust out penniless and homeless by the Communist International, which treats foreign 'oppositionists' in exactly the same way as the All-Union Communist Party treats the native 'oppositionist.' American Congressmen come to see what they have read and thought about as 'the great Russian experiment,' and, finding the experiment still unfinished, go away disgusted. One such got out of the train at the frontier station of Negoreloye. He glanced around him. 'Well,' he said slowly. 'Before I came here I thought these people might have something to show us. But I look at them, I look at their station, and I look at the food they're eating —and I think I'll go back home.'

The conclusion was at once natural and unjustified; as natural and unjustified as the hasty conclusions arrived at abroad after each shift in Soviet policy. Stalin recently made a speech in which he advocated a change in the official attitude towards non-Communist specialists. It was followed by some real concessions to the specialists, of which the most significant was their 'equalisation' with industrial workmen so far as food, housing, and education were concerned. It was therefore concluded that the Soviet Government had at last realised the error of its former ways. In the light of Soviet history the conclusion was rash. There have been serious changes in Soviet economic policy, N.E.P. and the adoption of the Five-Year Plan the most outstanding. There have been changes in foreign policy too. Since the Five-Year Plan necessitated concentration on industry at home and credits abroad, there has been a sensible diminution in the activity of the Communist International. But in fundamental policy there has been no serious change. Planning for the unification of economic

life began before, and went on under N.E.P. The Communist International is for the moment in the background, but is still there. The Five-Year Plan may be modified to suit changing conditions, or the conditions of technicians whose services are urgently needed be modified to assist the Five-Year Plan. But the fundamental aim of creating a Socialist State remains, temporary changes in the means indicating the strength rather than the weakness of Soviet organisation. The Russian people suffers from moral and material privation—the latter strangely in contrast with the highly materialistic aim of Soviet construction—but when its suffering becomes too great the Soviet Government, well informed by a multitude of G.P.U. agents, Communists, and correspondents, can put food on to the private market or release a few men from prison. 'We cannot expect the foreigner in Russia to live as we do,' said a Communist in a Leningrad café when I asked him how he liked to see foreigners living on the best of the land while he was near starvation. Which may be a reflection on the mentality of the Russian people, and is certainly an indication that, for one class at any rate, the limit of endurance has not yet been reached.

It would therefore seem idle to hope for any fundamental change in the policy of Russia's present leaders. At the moment it seems likewise idle to hope for their overthrow. Russia is a country of surprises, mostly unpleasant. In 1917 few men in the Russian Government had any notion of the Bolshevist organisation: they were still thinking in terms of the Social Revolutionaries. To-day there may be a Russian counter-revolutionary organisation inside Russia, for there are many outside. But if such an organisation exists, it gives no present sign of life. In the meantime Stalin and his supporters are guarded as no Tsar ever was. In the Communists, Young Communists, and Pioneers they have a solid cadre of supporters, bound by a rigid discipline, such as no 'White' organisation divided by internal squabbles could hope to muster. If Russia were to go to war, and the Russian army were again to be concentrated, as in 1917, the danger of revolution might be greater. Such a contingency is not impossible. War scares have been persistent in Russia for ten years, and should the Five-Year Plan prove such an utter failure as its enemies hope, there would be a strong temptation to find an outlet in war for the rage of a people kept on the margin of existence for five years by false hopes. That result, however, would be the last to be desired. Only chaos worse than that of 1917 could follow it. For in Russia to-day there is a new society, detestable in certain aspects, but ordered and growing. If an abrupt return to private property were to be made, millions of its most active members would be displaced; millions more would

see altered the whole system of thought to which ten years of pure Communist education have accustomed them, and another civil war would be the inevitable consequence. It is much better to wait for the evolution of a system which shall ensure liberty as well as equality. That is not to say that the grossest tyranny should be passed over in silence. There is every human reason for condemning it, and every reason to believe that condemnation is not without effect. It will be all the more effective if divorced from political aims in this country and accompanied by a more settled policy towards Russia than we have had since the Revolution. There is no apparent reason to fear danger in settled relations—if their conditions are thoroughly understood and enforced—because, for the moment at any rate, the Soviet Government is too preoccupied with its own problems to pay much attention to other countries. While solving those problems it is evolving slowly, and by the time it has solved them Russian Communism and Western Capitalism may be much nearer to each other than we yet suspect.

W. H. HINDLE.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND THE CRISIS

THE present financial crisis calls for close consideration of the expenditure of our local authorities, but, quite apart from that compulsion, the approach of the centenary of the passing into law of the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 has invited attention to the great advance in local government administration which has taken place during the last hundred years. The Act put an end to the powers of various close corporations and inefficient administrations and created new authorities on one uniform plan, thus laying the foundation of what has proved to be an efficient system of local administration that has grown beyond all conception of the parliamentarians who promoted it. The local government system thus inaugurated has been adapted by subsequent legislation to every part of the country, as the activities of our county councils and county districts testify, while the extent of its jurisdiction has been so greatly developed that every citizen, with every member of his family, is from birth to burial affected daily by the services and requirements of the local authority. While we exercise our immemorial privilege of grumbling at the activity or inaction, as the case may be, of our local rulers, we are nevertheless aware that our local government organisation is probably the most efficient in the world. It is gratifying to know that we have never lacked local administrators who have not only shown ability in discharging duties which various statutes have imposed upon them, but, as local needs have grown and new social services have clamoured for adoption, have urged Parliament to confer extended powers to enable these needs and services to be met and provided.

And Parliament has responded willingly to such appeals, and indeed has gone beyond them by passing legislation not demanded by the local authorities. During the present century, quite apart from private Bill legislation promoted by the authorities for their own local requirements, the output of local government legislation has been unprecedented and goes on at an accelerated pace. In the three years 1928, 1929 and 1930 Acts of Parliament of first-class importance affecting the duties and responsibilities of local

authorities have been passed relating to the extension of the franchise, rating and valuation of hereditaments, mental treatment, road traffic, bridges, land drainage, housing, and the amendment of our system of local government. These and other Acts impose new financial obligations upon the local authorities, though it must be stated that the Local Government Act of 1929 varies and improves the system of grants in aid to the authorities. The Acts also add considerably to the responsibilities of the public bodies who have to administer them. Nor must it be forgotten that the local authorities have been called upon in recent years to undertake costly and extensive works for the relief of the unemployed.

In these circumstances it has for some time past been urged that the expenditure of local authorities is excessive having regard to the state of trade and the serious amount of unemployment now prevalent. Although industry has received substantial relief by the derating of industrial hereditaments, this plea has been pressed by the chambers of commerce and others representing trading interests, who have alleged that the revival of trade is delayed, in part, by the incidence of local rates. Generally, it may be said that this criticism is only to a comparatively small extent based on any allegation of extravagant expenditure by the local authorities, but the plea is urged that expenditure which would be unobjectionable in normal times should be dropped, or at least seriously curtailed, in the present exceptional times.

Apart from the question of the effect on industry of the expenditure of local authorities, a plea for the temporary cessation of local government legislation has recently been put forward as from the local authorities themselves.

At a recent Conference on Public Assistance Sir James Hinchliffe, chairman of the West Riding County Council, made a direct appeal to the late Minister of Health for what he called a 'moratorium from legislation' for a period of three years. This proposal was considered by many who take a keen interest in local government activities to be of sufficient urgency to merit careful investigation.

The fact that Parliament always looks to the public authorities to undertake new statutory obligations speaks favourably of their general efficiency. Indeed, it may be claimed that Parliament has no alternative but to utilise local authorities and their organisations for the multitudinous new duties which a growingly complex civilisation demands. These duties cannot possibly be discharged by Parliament itself or by the central Government. Public opinion to-day would not tolerate the transfer to private interests of such responsibilities as those, for instance, relating to public health, or even of some of the trading undertakings by which

public monopolies are controlled. And it is indubitable that the social conscience is becoming more exacting as the standards of living and of social observance are growing more stringent practically year by year. The spread of education, the cheapening of travel, the discoveries of science have all helped towards the realisation of the opportunities for the enrichment of life which are now available for all, with a determination that these opportunities shall be grasped as fully as possible.

The powers granted to many of the local authorities to establish and manage large business undertakings such as those relating to gas, water, and electricity have been profitably exercised, but, as in all successful businesses, there is a constant demand for fresh expenditure, while it is at the same time insisted that these services shall be made more and more efficient and up to date. In every direction, therefore, expenditure on a large scale has been looked upon as essential and in the best sense remunerative, and at the same time the varied interests in which the members of local bodies are concerned have been making increased claims upon their time and attention.

It is unlikely, however, that drastic action would have been taken by or against the local authorities to reduce substantially their expenditure, and possibly economies of a minor character would have been deemed adequate to meet all proper criticism. But the question of local government expenditure has suddenly become acute by reason of the publication of the Report of the May Committee on National Expenditure and subsequent parliamentary action, and an entirely different set of circumstances has to be faced. It may therefore be useful to view the question in its present setting. Although the May Committee had no mandate from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to make direct recommendations with respect to the expenditure of local authorities, the question of the liability of the State under the scheme of grants in aid to the local authorities came directly under their notice, and it is in this connexion that the Committee offered their recommendations affecting local expenditure. They set out the amounts of the net revenue expenditure of local authorities in England and Wales for recent years charged on rates and Exchequer grants, which are now approximately £250,000,000 per annum, while the total capital indebtedness of the same local authorities, after deducting amounts standing to the credit of sinking funds, which was £595,500,000 in 1921, had risen to £1,051,500,000 in 1928, an increase of £456,000,000, or an average of £65,000,000 per year. The actual amount spent on capital account in 1927 was £120,000,000. The debt of local authorities was admittedly offset by valuable assets. One-fifth of the increase of £456,000,000 was in respect of trading services; expenditure on housing accounted

for well over half the increase, and the gross indebtedness of local authorities under this head alone (including £39,400,000 advanced to other parties) stood at £383,000,000 on March 31, 1928.

The May Committee viewed with grave concern the rapid rise of expenditure of local authorities, both on the capital and the revenue side, during a period of falling prices and small growth of the population. They recognised that in certain areas the movements of the population had caused heavy demands on the local authorities for increased expenditure on municipal services, and they did not question the necessity for the increased expenditure in such cases. They also admitted the pressure that had been put upon local authorities in recent years by the central Government to increase their expenditure on certain services. Nevertheless, taking the country as a whole, they were satisfied that in the local as in the national field we have been piling up public burdens, and they accordingly recommended the appointment of committees of local authorities to survey their own expenditure and recommend reductions where possible. If local authorities would undertake such a careful review of their expenditure the net result would, in the opinion of the Committee, be a substantial relief to the ratepayers, 'with beneficial reactions in the national Exchequer.'

Early in September of this year Circular 1222 was issued by the Ministry of Health to local authorities, drawing attention to the fact that by reason of the necessities of the financial situation the Government have been compelled to impose on the community additional taxation for national services and at the same time to make large reductions in national expenditure, and it was considered of the first importance that care should be exercised in settling the charges to be imposed on the community by way of local rates. The Ministry of Health obviously found it impracticable to give detailed directions to local authorities as to the extent and nature of economies which ought to be effected by them. The result was that the recommendations were of a very general nature. The authorities were warned against embarking on a wholesale and ill-considered course of cutting down expenditure, and it was suggested that in each case a committee, not necessarily wholly composed of members of the authority, should at once be required to scrutinise the whole field of the authorities' expenditure. In this survey consideration should be given to examination whether value is being obtained for money spent, whether savings can be effected, and whether development of any service can be wisely slowed down. Especial regard should be paid to such questions as whether a service is or is not likely to be remunerative, whether it is required on urgent public grounds, and whether it is justifiable on the grounds of the

contribution which it makes for the provision of employment for local workers, and consideration should be given to the propriety of rationing the spending committees of the local authorities. Finally, the question of reducing the remuneration of employees of local authorities would need consideration.

The problem, therefore, for each local authority is to consider in detail what economies can usefully be effected without dislocating the municipal machine.

Quite apart from legal questions and the impracticability of direct control in this matter of reduced expenditure being assumed by the Government, it is all to the good that the search for practicable economies should be left to the members of the various local authorities. They are the representatives of the ratepayers, and are, or should be, the best qualified to ascertain in what ways reductions can be effected, and already surveys of expenditure are under consideration by, one presumes, all the local authorities. A few points which will require attention may be named.

The trading services, including transport services, are in almost every case profit-earning. The only exception that can be named is the tramways undertaking, which has become less remunerative than formerly, and may soon, as has already occurred in the smaller towns, have to be scrapped. Expert opinion considers that in congested areas tramways will continue to be needed and will be profit-earning. It is remarkable that where tramways have been discontinued there has been comparatively small loss. The other trading services are generally remunerative, and it is not now the general practice, as it was formerly, to transfer large sums from their profits to the assistance of the rates. The statutory prohibition against transferring profits of electricity undertakings to the rates except to the extent of a small percentage has had some influence upon the disposal of profits of other municipal trading departments, with the result that the profits are usually applied to the development of the undertaking itself. It would be unfortunate unduly to restrict the operations of these trading services. They are in the nature of monopolies and supply essential needs, and all due extension of their activity at the expense of further capital expenditure should be permitted. Committees and their trading managers will no doubt delay expenditure which will not be remunerative within a reasonable time, and will also bear in mind that capital expenditure for the development of their own undertaking cannot be considered apart from the necessity of curtailing the expenditure of the authority as a whole. If trading authorities are borrowing in large amounts at the same time that money has to be raised also for non-trading purposes, the rate of interest which has to be paid for the total

amount may be raised, to the great disadvantage of the authority. It is not generally realised how detrimentally a comparatively slight rise in the rate of interest affects the finances of a local authority. Generally, with respect to trading undertakings, it may be pointed out that unwise restrictions of expenditure may not only be hurtful to local industries, but may also deprive private residents of amenities to which they are entitled and for which they are able to pay. All the traditions of business call for extension and development when a remunerative return for capital expended can be foreseen and restriction is generally hurtful. Yet too much care cannot be exercised at this time in watching every item of proposed expenditure and considering in relation to its allowance or rejection whether it is expenditure which in the national interest can or should not be postponed.

Few questions will give rise to greater concern in some of our larger municipalities than the decision they must make with respect to housing policy. Under the Housing Act of 1924 contributions are payable by the State towards the cost of houses built to meet the prevailing shortage of housing accommodation, and an increasing burden year by year is being placed both on the State and the municipality as the housing activities of the authority proceed. The May Committee criticised the amount of the subsidy as being too high and, in their opinion, tending to keep up the cost of house building, but the need for a continued housing policy still exists.

The Housing Act of 1930 deals with the question of slums and represents an endeavour on the part of Parliament to rid the country of slums and slumdom. The municipal corporations which are chiefly concerned in this effort had urged the Government to promote the legislation, and had suggested that a strenuous effort should be made to remove slums and slum conditions within a period of ten years. It was felt that this objective was within the bounds of possibility, and that it could be achieved if Parliament would pass the requisite legislation and give adequate financial assistance. The Act represented an agreed working arrangement, the subsidy to the local authority being normally at the rate of £2 5s. for each person displaced from a slum house so far as suitable accommodation in new houses is provided. Local authorities having a population of over 20,000 were required forthwith to submit a programme of the steps proposed to be taken during the ensuing five years for dealing with housing conditions in the areas, and a similar programme is to be furnished every fifth year. The need for the legislation embodied in this Housing Act of 1930 was emphasised in a circular issued by the Ministry of Health a few days after the passing of the Act, which stated:

> It is within the knowledge of local authorities that many of the working classes of the country live in sordid and degrading housing conditions, the continuance of which is nothing less than a social menace. These conditions are due to many causes, poverty, indifference, lack of better accommodation. The new Act is an earnest of the determination of the Government and the Legislature to do everything possible to put an end to conditions of this kind. For its successful operation it demands the full and hearty co-operation of all local agencies in the acquisition and spreading of knowledge as to bad conditions, and in forming a sound public opinion to assist the Government and Parliament in putting an end to them. In this work the local authorities must themselves take the leading part, and the Minister is confident that they will rise to the full measure of their responsibility.

Houses built by a local authority, whether under the Act of 1924 to meet the existing shortage of houses, or under the Act of 1930 in connexion with slum clearance, impose on the local authority a deficiency charge which will continue to be payable annually for a period of forty years. In this way the annual charge for housing mounts up year by year and will continue to be payable for more than a generation. It is therefore an anxious problem for the local authorities to determine whether and to what extent they are called upon to diminish their housing programmes by reason of the national crisis. Their medical officers of health advise them that unsatisfactory housing conditions are a fruitful cause of disease and should be remedied if we are effectively to improve the public health.

It is true that remedial measures are available by way of reconditioning houses that are in danger of slipping into slum conditions, and it may be that some authorities will for the present largely confine their efforts to this form of amelioration of housing difficulties. The problem, however, is one of extraordinary difficulty, and in its broadest aspect may be set forth as the question, How far are we justified in saying that financial stringency prevents us from taking steps to remove our fellow-creatures from insanitary and unwholesome dwellings and surroundings? Or, put in another way, cannot we let the residents in slums and slum areas continue to live in their present and unsatisfactory dwellings until financial conditions improve, the authority in the meantime exercising its powers of requiring sanitary improvements to be effected so as to mitigate the evils of living in houses unfit for human habitation? These are questions for determination by our local rulers in the interests of the ratepayers (including slum dwellers) whom they represent, and after consideration of their relation to the problem of the national crisis.

It is unlikely that the usual health services, such as the maintenance of hospitals and the varied duties of the department

of the medical officer of health and the work of the sanitary inspectors, can be drastically cut down. They are so intimately connected with modern essentials of public health that all that can be asked is that minor economies may as far as possible be effected.

The local authorities will be able to reduce expenditure considerably upon what have been known as relief works for the unemployed. Since 1920, when the problem of unemployment first became acute, grants have been made to local authorities by the State, on the recommendation of the Unemployment Grants Committee, towards the cost of works of public utility. The schemes approved by the Committee since 1920 are estimated at a cost of £187,000,000. The grants have been based on a stipulated percentage of the cost of the works, and it is a principle of the scheme that the works so aided have been accelerated in order that employment for men out of work might be provided. In the earlier years works of a special character were put in hand and large numbers of men were given temporary employment in connexion with schemes which showed a high percentage of wages in proportion to total cost. Before long it was found impossible to repeat those special works, and grants were made towards the cost of works not immediately required, but which were being accelerated by some years. Naturally as time went on it was found difficult to find further works of acceleration. The Government still required works of construction to be carried out for the employment of men on the unemployed register and put pressure on the local authorities to meet their wishes, but the authorities were finding it increasingly difficult to face the financial position, although the Government offered, as they were compelled to offer, higher percentages of grant. It will probably come as a relief to the local authorities that they are now to be enabled to dispense with or lessen considerably the construction of works of this class. It is not good finance to undertake so many constructional works in advance of requirements. In these later years the proportion of wages to total cost is much reduced, and although it is argued that, for example, the purchase of bricks and machinery induces employment in other places, it is obvious that construction in advance of needs is unsound policy. It could only be justified on the assumption that unemployment on a large scale is of a temporary character. That assumption has unfortunately been proved not to be well founded, and it is well that the grants system is to be amended and local authorities will not be pressed by the State or enticed by generous grants to undertake substantial works of construction in advance of their requirements. The generous nature of the grants heretofore made has not been nearly so helpful to the local authorities as

would appear, and, inasmuch as the taxpayer who provides the grant and the ratepayer who provides the balance of the cost of the works are the same person, continued heavy expenditure of this class would appear to be undesirable.

I have given illustrations of expenditure on a large scale. It is impossible to go through all classes of expenditure of a local authority, but one illustration of a different character may be offered. One of the most popular duties of the authority is the provision of parks and recreation grounds. These spaces are enjoyed by old and young, and in recent years they have been much beautified, and the recreational side has been improved by the provision of football and cricket pitches, tennis-courts and bowling-greens, which are much used and enjoyed. It is doubtful whether any department of the authority's activities gives so much pleasure to so large a number of people as their parks and pleasure spaces. I put the question, Is it the duty of the authority to cut down a large part of the expenditure on this admirable object? It would appear from the circular of the Minister of Health that dismissals of park-keepers and other workpeople should be discouraged unless really found necessary. It would be a cause of sincere regret to large numbers of worthy citizens if the enjoyment of their parks and open spaces were to be seriously curtailed as a result of the enforcement of economy requirements. Expense could, of course, be reduced by withdrawing band performances and entertainments, by limiting opportunities for sport, and by spending much less on flower-beds and floral adornment, as well as by reducing the number of workpeople. The local authorities will have to decide on the action to be taken. I give this instance as one of a class in which proposals for reduction in expenditure raise unexpected problems.

There is one respect in which rigid economy may be effected, and that is in regard to new capital expenditure. I have already mentioned a proposal that for a stated period Parliament should not pass legislation likely to involve local authorities in new expenditure, and it would seem from the attitude of Parliament and the State departments that there will be no eagerness on their part to introduce any such legislation. It is also unlikely that the local authorities will wish to promote private Bill legislation which will involve avoidable expense. Quite apart from the effects of the present crisis, local authorities will do well to have a time of rest from legislative activity in order that they may regulate their duties and learn to exercise their powers under recent important Acts of Parliament, and this view enforces the desirability that new capital expenditure of every kind shall be postponed unless overriding necessity calls for its instant provision. The system of deferred payments for capital works which is

afforded by means of sanctions given by the appropriate Government departments has many advantages, and indeed the local authorities could not carry on their financial business without it or some effective equivalent. It would be impossible, for instance, to pay the cost of a new town-hall out of the rate of one year or the cost of a new electricity station out of the profits of the undertaking for a single year. But the system has the defects of its qualities, and there is a temptation sometimes to undertake capital schemes which might well be postponed because the payments will be spread over a long term of years. No doubt so long as the present crisis continues the Government departments will discourage avoidable spending, and in case of need will refuse sanctions for schemes they think should be postponed. But there is great need that local authorities should learn to spend more money out of revenue and less out of capital. The ideal condition is that enjoyed by a Government department like the Post Office, which has not any capital account, but all expenditure is paid out of annual vote. I am aware that there are drawbacks even to this system, and I have admitted that it can only be partially applied to local authorities, but to the extent that it is practicable it is desirable. What I would emphasise is that all projected new capital expenditure should be subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny and only allowed in case of actual necessity. Schemes in hand and all the thousand duties of a public authority cannot be suddenly stopped without causing dislocation and upset that will outweigh any temporary saving. It is not easy, and it is not wise, to put a sudden stop to a machine which is going at full speed. It is easily possible, however, to refuse to undertake new schemes, and in this way the financial position as a whole will be distinctly eased. The Annual Report of the Ministry of Health recently issued states that that department alone in the year 1930 issued sanctions for the borrowing of £47,365,434 by local authorities for the provision of works (exclusive of housing) of a capital nature. This gives some idea of the large reduction in capital expenditure that may be ensured if new schemes are held up or withdrawn.

The system of rationing expenditure so that the total rate for the year shall not exceed a fixed poundage has been adopted in some of our large cities and has been found effective in checking expenditure. If the finance committee know that they will have the support of the council as a whole they can check a committee's ambitious schemes more effectively than they could if it were not recognised that the agreed rate in the pound should not be exceeded. It is also to the advantage of the ratepayer that he should know that his rate payments will be based on a rate poundage that is regular and not fluctuating.

The position may be summed up by saying that wise spending, which includes the avoidance of unnecessary spending, should be aimed at by the local authority when reviewing its financial position, that there is no cause for panic and equally no justification for indifference or delay, and that the national crisis calls for more vigilance and watchful care than even the vigilant and careful have yet exercised.

WILLIAM E. HART.

THE NAVY AND THE AIR

SINCE the reliability and endurance of aircraft now make it possible for aeroplanes operating from the Continent to drop bombs and to distribute lethal gas in any portion of the British Isles, it has sometimes been stated that the Royal Air Force has superseded the Royal Navy as what is popularly called our 'First Line of Defence.' This term is vague and indeterminate, but is generally taken to mean the defence which is *first* in order of importance to the Empire.

In the unhappy event of war with any Western European Power, we may agree that Great Britain, and particularly London, may be liable to incessant and unpleasant attention which the Navy cannot prevent. Whether the defence against such attacks is carried on by the Royal Air Force, or by the Army in conjunction with the Royal Air Force, in no way affects the prime duty of the Navy.

But I would refer in passing to Lord Trenchard's dictum that 'aeroplanes are the worst possible means of defence against other aeroplanes,' a truth that seems to have led the Air Ministry to build three bombing aeroplanes for every fighter. 'Defence,' then, as understood by the Air Ministry, and so far as the Royal Air Force is concerned, consists not in fighting the attacking aeroplanes in the air, but in using our bombing aeroplanes for retaliatory purposes.

The *cliché* 'Offence is the best Defence' is a perfectly sound doctrine of war. As interpreted above, however, it should read 'Retaliation is the best Defence,' which is as unsound as it is illogical. It need hardly be said that the truth of the statement 'Offence is the best Defence' lies in the purely military phenomenon that if by attacking the enemy *you force him to employ those forces by which he can attack you*, you retain the initiative and he must dance to your piping.

If an enemy with a superiority in the air attacks this country by bombing, do aerial enthusiasts honestly consider that we can force its discontinuance by retaliatory bombing? Retaliation is a tricky weapon which often recoils against the user, as evidence of which consider our measures against German submarine

prisoners captured in the war, and the German reprisals against ours.[1]

But, putting aside this particular aspect of the case, what happens if we bomb the capital, the manufacturing towns, the fortresses, or aerodromes of an enemy with a superiority in the air? Does it cause him to cease his offensive against us? It seems more likely to cause him to increase his bombing. It will not make him withdraw his bombers for defence, for which purpose bombing aeroplanes, or any other aeroplanes for that matter, if we accept Lord Trenchard's view, are comparatively useless.

Herein lies the difference between armies and fleets on the one hand and aircraft on the other. The former are instruments capable alike of offence and defence against the armies and navies of the enemy. Aircraft are not. Bombing aeroplanes are purely offensive, so the claim that by attacking the enemy you force him back to the defensive has no substance whatever. If fighting aeroplanes 'are the worst possible means of defence against other aeroplanes,' then some means of protection must be looked for other than mere retaliation. It may be possible, however, that the bogey of intensive aerial attack upon the London area in the event of war is treated with more respect than it really deserves. The uninitiated are frightened by tales of bombs raining down from the skies, and of other aerial attacks by means of poison gas, poison acids, and disease germs. Even if gas, acids, and disease germs can be liberated from aircraft, their indiscriminate use against the enemy civilian population is extremely improbable on the part of any nation which has neutral Powers to consider and still wishes to be considered civilised. As regards simple bombing, I would point out one lesson of the late war.

The little French town of Dunkirk was about 15 miles from the German lines. During the war its inhabitants suffered a total of 214 bombardments from air, land and sea, as many as five air raids sometimes occurring in the course of a single night. A map of the town marking the spots where the 7514 projectiles dropped resembles the body of a child suffering from violent nettlerash. Yet from 1914 to 1918 only 233 persons were killed in Dunkirk and 336 wounded, while the civil population stuck to their posts and the unloading of ships with provisions for the Army continued. In short, the casualties inflicted on the town were out of all proportion to the enemy aerial effort against it.

One great thing which is often forgotten is that Imperial Defence is not, so to speak, parochial. It involves the defence

[1] When hospital ships were being sunk by submarines, the French adopted the plan of carrying German officers in such vessels. The Germans retaliated by exposing triple the number of French officers in the firing line.

of numerous and widely scattered territories divided by oceans, not merely of Great Britain. Moreover, Imperial Defence cannot be confined to considering a war against any one particular Power. 'War,' so far as air enthusiasts are concerned, seems to resolve itself into hostilities with our nearest neighbour, which is the most improbable war that is likely to take place.

It is not my province to discuss the probability or possibility of war with other more distant Powers. I would point out, however, that the further away an enemy may be, the more difficult and dangerous it is for him to maintain an aerial offensive against Great Britain. I would say, further, that isolation and starvation are still the most potent weapons that can be used against us, and that the functions of the Royal and merchant navies in maintaining the sea communications have in no way been altered by the advent of the air arm, except in so far that a certain amount of assistance can now be provided within reasonable distance of the shore by flying-boats manned by the Royal Air Force.

No country can be brought to terms or subjugated by aerial attacks alone. It can only be forced to capitulate by starvation, the defeat of its armed forces, or by invasion. Invading troops must still come by sea in ships, and invasion and starvation it has ever been the duty of the Navy to prevent.

At the present time about 13 ounces of every pound of wheat consumed as bread comes from oversea. So it is in varying proportion with other foodstuffs—meat, cheese, butter, eggs, sugar, rice, cocoa, tea, tinned foods innumerable. Cotton, wool, oil, timber, iron ore, rubber, copper—a thousand and one staple commodities—are also imported in their raw state, manufactured into finished articles, and re-exported. If left to their own resources the people of Great Britain would be brought to starvation in a few weeks, and her workers would be workless.

The economic life and defensive organisation of each nation and community of that great oceanic confederation which now represents the British Empire has grown up and is based to-day upon the presupposition that the sea routes shall be free and open for mutual co-operation in peaceful development and trade, and for mutual assistance in the event of war. The control of the sea routes or maritime lines of communication by a hostile Power would involve the Empire in economic disaster, and leave its several nations individually isolated in the face of oversea attack or invasion. These communications are neither ensured nor, to any great extent, carried on by aircraft. On the contrary, at the present time, millions of tons of cargo, and, in time of war, also of men and munitions and stores, are carried in ships, ordinary merchantmen which have to be protected.

The function of the Navy has not changed. It still exists to safeguard our maritime communications by destroying or immobilising any force which may threaten them. Unless we are prepared to pin our faith to the honesty and goodwill of mankind in general, and, in particular, to pacts and treaties and agreements which may one day be broken, we must still possess a Navy which must include ships more powerfully armed and better protected than the cruisers which act as a sort of police force upon the trade routes. 'The sea,' said Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, 'is us.'

No naval officer of any experience will minimise the utility of aircraft as an adjunct to the work of the Fleet. They are of value for long-distance reconnaissance and for artillery observation, as well as for attacking with bombs and torpedoes. No modern naval commander-in-chief would willingly be bereft of aerial co-operation in these respects. But aircraft are more fallible than ships, and the time has not yet come when they can be said to have superseded cruisers for the all-important work of scouting. They are supplementary, a means whereby, *in fine weather*, the commander-in-chief's range of vision can be extended to 100 or 150 miles, instead of the 20, 30, or 50 miles made possible by a line of cruisers spread on look-out duty.

Bombing, torpedo, and gas attacks carried out in peace conditions by aircraft upon a fleet at sea, together with machine-gun attacks upon its exposed personnel, are highly spectacular and interesting to watch. But the many exercises which have taken place since the war all tend to show that an exaggerated view may be taken by the uninitiated of their probable effect in war.

It is alarming—and I speak from personal experience—to see coveys of aircraft swooping down from the sky to drop shoals of torpedoes within 1000 yards of a battle fleet and score 40 or 50 per cent. of hits; frightening to see the fighters roaring close overhead with their machine-guns supposed to be playing upon the crews of anti-aircraft guns and other men in the open. Neither is it pleasant to consider bombs raining down from the heavens and clouds of lethal gas laid from the sky.

Peace exercises with aircraft, however, cannot be made to approximate to the real thing. In most cases the fleet offers itself as a purely passive target to give experience and practice to the aircraft concerned. No retaliatory or evasive measures are taken, nor has there ever been any intention of demonstrating the efficacy of aircraft *versus* ships, or *vice versâ*. Slow speed has generally been used by the ships, while as often as not there have been no defending aircraft, and, of course, no anti-aircraft gunfire. In short, the conditions have been highly artificial, utterly dissimilar to anything that would be likely to occur in war.

During hostilities no fleet within striking distance of aircraft from the shore or from an enemy fleet would be caught moving at slow speed in daylight without some form of aerial defence. Even if bomb-dropping from aircraft is a form of attack to be reckoned with, the heaviest bomb is unlikely to inflict more damage than a shell fired at long range, a form of attack against which the modern battleship is already protected.

Gas laid by aircraft is no more dangerous than gas-shells, which are already guarded against. Moreover, judging from the experience of the war on the Western Front, low flying attacks with machine-guns are useless except against troops already demoralised, so the same may be said, presumably, of similar attacks afloat. In any case, assaults of this nature carried out in the face of an aerial defence and anti-aircraft gunfire would involve a sacrifice out of all proportion to the results obtained. Simultaneous torpedo attacks by many aeroplanes at close range may be alarming to behold, but have never been carried out in the face of a rapid and accurate fire from the secondary armaments of ships.

No naval officer will deny that surprise attacks may be successful, and that aircraft can be an annoyance to a fleet, particularly to a fleet which may have already been severely handled in action. But it cannot be said that their bombs, torpedoes, or machine-gun bullets are a 'menace' to the safety of ships, any more than one can apply the same terms to the 16-inch gun with its one-ton shell, to the modern long-range torpedo fired from a destroyer, or to the latest form of mine. Time and time again history has shown that every new weapon, and each new form of attack, has eventually been met and countered by its antidote.

The leisurely bombardment of shore positions protected by powerful artillery is unlikely to commend itself to any modern admiral unless the enemy fleet has first been destroyed or immobilised and unless his ships can operate outside the range of any heavy guns that may be mounted ashore, for, compared with land guns, ships' artillery is always at a disadvantage. But it is highly improbable that a naval commander-in-chief would be deterred from bombarding, if he wished to do so, a shore position defended only by aircraft. It is a fallacy to believe that aircraft have superseded, or will supersede in the near future, land artillery for the defence of naval bases in certain vital strategic areas against attack from the sea.

During an exercise last autumn sixty aircraft from Gosport attacked the Atlantic Fleet off the Isle of Wight with torpedoes, together with mythical bombs, gas clouds, and machine-gun fire on exposed personnel. Forty per cent. of the torpedoes fired were

stated to have found their targets from a range of about 1000 yards; but the Fleet had no aerial defence, steamed at slow speed throughout the operation, and took no evasionary or retaliatory measures whatever. Indeed, it offered itself as an easy target to give practice to the aircraft concerned. The operation was not planned to demonstrate the superiority of one arm or the other.

This particular exercise was to have been witnessed from the flagship by the Chief of the Air Staff, who was flying down from London to Portsmouth for the occasion. It is significant that, owing to the weather conditions, he failed to arrive, from which we may infer that any aerial reinforcements despatched to the scene from inland might not have reached their objective. This merely shows that even if aircraft bombs were more potent and accurate than projectiles from heavy guns, it is possible that the aeroplanes carrying them might be unable to put in an appearance in bad weather or low visibility.

With reconnaissance aeroplanes the 'eye' of the commander-in-chief is transferred 100 or 150 miles further afield, while in artillery-observation aircraft the man spotting the fall of shot is transferred to a better position in the air. Torpedo-planes, similarly, transport the torpedo-firing apparatus to a point only 1000 yards or so from their targets at considerable, but unknown, risk to themselves, while, if aircraft bombs be regarded in the same light as projectiles from a gun, bomb-droppers merely transfer the discharging apparatus to within point-blank range of the target, or something like it. Fighting aeroplanes likewise, when used against ships, transport their machine-guns to within easy range of the exposed personnel, though their effect in war can by no means be judged by what happens during exercises in peace.

We may summarise, then, by saying that, though aircraft have certain functions in sea warfare, and can be of utility in a variety of ways, they have neither usurped the functions of any classes of ships now afloat, nor do they threaten their existence. Moreover, their advent has not changed the functions of any weapons now used at sea, and has added no fresh ones. All that can be said is that, *in fine weather*, they have extended the range of weapons already in existence.

We cannot tell what the future may bring; but until aircraft have the reliability and endurance of ships, they can never be anything but useful ancillaries to the work of a Fleet whose function is world-wide and oceanic.

For the important task of trade propection or convoy work the utility of aircraft is more doubtful still. They may have a certain limited use in coastal waters in conjunction with surface vessels; but they are wholly unsuitable for the protection of

convoys in the wide ocean spaces. A comparison of their trifling endurance compared with that of small surface craft which can keep the sea for days on end, and in all weathers, is all to the disadvantage of the aircraft. Moreover, though large numbers of aeroplanes were used in the later stages of the war for coastal patrol work and off-shore scouting for submarines, they achieved less against enemy submarines than almost any other arm.

It may be taken as true that aeroplanes from shore stations cannot at present operate for more than from 250 to 300 miles out at sea, and then only for short periods and in the most favourable conditions of weather. Flying-boats, which can rise from and come down on the sea, though again only in good weather, would seem to be the best type of aircraft for what one may term coastal patrol work. They suffer, however, from the disability of all aircraft, lack of endurance, or the time they can remain in the air, and have only one advantage—mobility. It would take many flying-boats to do the work of even one surface patrol vessel, which can work in all weathers and keep the sea for extended periods.

Moreover—and here perhaps I am again treading upon dangerous ground—the present flying-boats, unlike the aeroplanes carried in aircraft-carriers, which have 70 per cent. of naval personnel and 30 per cent. from the Royal Air Force, are not even partially manned by seamen. In short, though designed in war partly to operate over the sea in conjunction with surface vessels, they are officered by men in whom a knowledge of navigation, ships, and things nautical has not been a primary consideration. One might as well expect sailors to conduct a campaign on the Indian Frontier!

Aircraft, if they are to be used systematically in the wide ocean spaces, must be carried thither in ships. I am not here concerned with the important task of convoy protection, a function which it is manifestly impossible for aircraft to perform by themselves, but to the aircraft required to co-operate with a fleet of surface ships in the broad oceans.

Aircraft-carriers now form a component part of all modern fleets, the *Courageous*, *Glorious*, *Furious* and *Eagle*, of the British Navy, all displacing over 22,000 tons; the *Lexington* and *Saratoga*, of the United States Navy, about 33,000 tons; and the Japanese *Kaga* and *Akagi*, 26,900 tons.

These huge vessels, which are very costly to maintain and to operate, are at present the only means whereby aeroplanes can function with a fleet far out at sea. But the number of aeroplanes which each carrier can operate is limited by the small endurance of the aeroplanes themselves, for, supposing them all to be returning at about the same time, their 'landing-on' presents

certain practical difficulties. The huge *Lexington* and *Saratoga* are definitely regarded by their possessors as too large and unwieldy. It is easy to see why. Allowing two minutes for each machine to be flown on and transported in the lift to her hangar below, it would take about five hours to land the 150 machines reputed to be carried.

There is also the danger of having too many eggs in one basket. If one of these enormous vessels is hit by a lucky shell, bomb, or torpedo, away might go 150 aircraft. Even if not vitally damaged, injuries which might not seriously inconvenience any ordinary vessel-of-war might place an aircraft-carrier out of action so far as using her aircraft is concerned. It is because of these disabilities that naval opinion in most countries now favours aircraft-carriers of more moderate dimensions.

All aircraft-carriers, however, suffer from the same grave disadvantage, in that they must steam head to wind to fly off and fly on their aircraft. At a crucial stage of a fleet action, therefore, one can imagine conditions in which a fleet and its aircraft-carrier will be parting company at something like 50 knots—no very pleasant prospect for the carrier if the enemy fleet is to windward. It is thus possible that an admiral might feel himself tied to fighting an action while steaming more or less head to wind merely for the sake of aerial co-operation. Such a thing may sound absurd, but it is none the less possible. So in certain circumstances aircraft-carriers, instead of a help, may prove merely to be an encumbrance and an added responsibility to the naval commander-in-chief. It is even possible that he might dispense altogether with aerial co-operation.

The solution of the difficulty outlined may eventually lie in the men-of-war themselves carrying their own aircraft, which would be flying-boats, thus obviating any need of a flying-deck for landing-on purposes. These flying-boats might be launched in the first instance from catapults as fitted to various of our modern vessels. One naval writer[2] has recently suggested that seaplanes might be carried at specially designed davits, or hoisted out of ships with stump derricks, in much the same way as boats. Both flying-boats and seaplanes could land on the water in good weather. In bad, they could not be used. Recent experience with the seaplanes carried in men-of-war has shown that they cannot land with safety in a heavy swell or even a moderate breaking sea. Their landing speed is 70 miles an hour, so it may safely be said that they cannot alight upon the water in a sea in which the smallest of small boats could not ride in safety. During a recent cruise to the West Indies there

[2] Captain Bernard Acworth, D.S.O., R.N., in *Navies of Today and Tomorrow* (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 8*s.* 6*d.*)

were only three days out of thirty or more when seaplanes could have landed on the water without probable loss.

Certain clauses of the London Naval Treaty, which remain in force until December 31, 1936, affect aircraft-carriers, which are defined, in so many words, as vessels-of-war of any displacement designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon.

No aircraft-carrier of 10,000 tons or less mounting a heavier gun than a 6·1 inch may be acquired by or built for any of the Powers concerned, nor can any such vessel be constructed within their jurisdiction. The fitting of a landing-on or flying-off platform to any capital ship or cruiser not designed or adapted exclusively for use as an aircraft-carrier does not cause such capital ship or cruiser to be classified as an aircraft-carrier, though under the next paragraph no capital ship in existence on April 1, 1930, may be fitted with a *landing-on* platform or deck. Great Britain, the United States, and Japan agreed, moreover, that not more than 25 per cent. of the total tonnage in the cruiser category shall be fitted with a *landing-on* platform or deck for aircraft.

The Washington Treaty also laid down certain restrictions as to the size and armament of aircraft-carriers, and rationed the total tonnage in such vessels allotted to each Power. The details need not be entered into here. The end of 1936, however, sees the termination of both the Washington and the London Naval Treaties.

I have recently been sent a cutting of an article called 'Air Fleet and the Next War' which appeared in the *Rhodesia Herald* of December 5, 1930. The author is General Miller Mitchell, formerly Commander of the American Air Force.

'A surface fleet,' he writes, 'is no longer vital to defence. If all our surface battleships and attendant craft attempted to sail across the Pacific Ocean and attack Japan, Japanese aircraft would have no difficulty whatever in locating and sinking them, hundreds and even thousands of miles away from the shores of their island empire.'

This statement is a wild exaggeration. It is utterly impossible, in present conditions, for aircraft to do what the General suggests. And, though such a statement may find favour in certain quarters in the United States, it is sheer folly that such a belief should ever be prevalent in this country. I need hardly reiterate that a fleet is not a luxury to the British Empire. It is a necessity. Without it we starve.

'Among the weapons used,' the General goes on to say, would be water torpedoes fired at a distance of two or three

miles from the fleet. These torpedoes have a magnetic attachment which, when they near a ship, draws them into the bottom of the vessel where it is weakest.' He goes on to mention air torpedoes that may be dropped 10, 15, 20, or even 100 miles away and guided into the fleet by radio, also gliding bombs with wings designed to fall straight until they gather sufficient speed to be held up, and then to be guided towards their objective by a gyroscopic control on their rudders. Perhaps his most fearsome picture, however, is the imaginary spectacle of a detachment of aeroplanes flying at any height desired up to 35,000 feet, and launching bombs each weighing between one and three tons. Exploding under water at a depth of 80 or 90 feet, these, according to General Mitchell, would probably put a battleship out of commission at a distance of 100 or 200 yards!

It is pitiable that statements of this irresponsible kind should receive any credence in a country or an Empire like our own which depends upon the sea for its very existence.

To repeat, the prime function of the British Navy is to maintain the integrity of the sea communications by destroying or immobilising the forces which threaten their safety. The communications themselves are carried on by merchant vessels, which, in time of war, must be protected. These communications can neither be carried on, nor to any great extent be protected, by aircraft. Aircraft, in short, are ancillary to the work of a surface fleet, auxiliaries capable only of useful work when the weather permits it. Their weapons are no more potent than others already in existence, their bombs, torpedoes, and poison gas being no more dangerous than similar forms of attack used from surface ships.

History is merely repeating itself. Upon the advent of the heavy gun and the automobile torpedo, enthusiasts for those weapons insisted upon the uselessness of modern fleets. Their opinion has not been borne out by facts. Aerial enthusiasts of to-day are merely following in their footsteps by predicting the uselessness of present navies because of the advent of the air arm.

What is the truth?

The truth is that the aeroplane is merely an instrument in precisely the same way that the destroyer or the submarine afloat, or the tank ashore, is an instrument and an added danger to those whose safety it threatens. The fact remains, however, that no weapon that has yet been evolved has not in course of time been met by its suitable antidote. The air arm of to-day is neither invincible nor omnipotent.

TAPRELL DORLING.
('*Taffrail*.')

RELIGION IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE

WE obviously live in a world dominated by scientific thought, or rather, not by scientific thought itself, but by a popular version of the state of mind natural to the scientific thinker. A great organised form of experience such as science carries with it a mass of subsidiary ideas, feelings, beliefs, and conventions, which one can easily strip off from it when one begins reducing it to its essence, its minimum claims. Thus it is not necessary for a scientific worker to hold absolute determinism, namely, the opinion that everything that happens had to happen just so and not otherwise, going back by an endless chain of causes to the original first cause, which may, of course, have a purely naturalistic and non-theological explanation. It is not necessary for him to hold that, no matter how chaotic a realm of things may seem, patient searching and experimentation will one day triumphantly arrive at general laws covering the whole of its operations. He may get on well enough without such beliefs, but nevertheless we find, taking a wide view of the history of science and examining the intellectual atmosphere of present-day laboratories, that they tend to be universal, and that we have to reckon, not only with science in the usual sense—with the contents, that is, of the books which summarise the knowledge that has been won—but also with the typical state of mind of the scientific worker. It is as if the minimum claims of science were surrounded by a wide fringe which one cannot get away from, as it seems to be required for the functioning of the essential units of progress, the scientific workers themselves. And the acceptance of a somewhat distorted version of this fringe as their basic assumption by the vast majority of men in every occupation at the present day is the kernel of the situation which we have to consider.

On all sides we see the domination of the scientific way of thought. It is indeed a banal commonplace to say that we live 'in a scientific age,' but how deep-reaching this statement is may very often not be realised, and it is worth while to make some effort to do so. The most obvious characteristic of our time is the extraordinary power over natural processes which

has been put into our hands by advances in scientific technique. It would be superfluous to enumerate instances of this, for we are constantly being reminded of it, not only in a practical way wherever we go, whether in our homes or out of them, but also by the great company of writers who provide what is called 'popular science' and try, often vainly, to explain the working of pieces of apparatus which many of us use every day, and which we should hardly know how to do without. In this way the roots of mankind, which in earlier times went deep down into the earth, are now insulated, as it were, by layers of steel, glass, and concrete from any living contact with it. And let us not deceive ourselves into supposing that this process has already come nearly to its conclusion—far from it; the future probably holds out nothing but a long succession of further pseudo-triumphs, further acquisitions of power over Nature, further temptations to sever all living connexion with her. I will only give one instance of this, an instance which concerns me particularly as a biologist—namely this, that we are as yet only at the very threshold of an undreamed-of control over living things, including ourselves. It is already clear that what we might call a biological engineering will grow up. Who would have thought a century ago that man would be able to set a thief to catch a thief in the animal world, and, by liberating one kind of insect from captivity, to destroy myriads of another kind? Yet economic entomology is now one of the most flourishing branches of applied science, and the growth of the prickly pear, a kind of cactus, which some years ago threatened to make vast areas of Australia absolutely unfit for cultivation, has been completely checked by the liberation of a little insect from another country, which is known to prey upon it and in the end to kill it. The most obvious instance of biological engineering applied to ourselves is, of course, birth control, and the position of those who oppose it on theological grounds is precisely similar to those country parsons who in the middle of the last century protested loudly against the use of anæsthetics in childbirth on the ground of quotations from the Old Testament.

But, as is so often said, the scientific age which gives us these powers gives us no corresponding indication of how we are to use them. The land is only redeemed from the prickly pear in order to become immediately the source of a bitter quarrel between Australian and Japanese; the control of the number of persons entering the world leads at once to differences between racial, national, and religious groups, so that the general outcome is disharmony and inequality. Other religious bodies, with that worldly wisdom in which the English Church has always been so lacking, find any argument good enough so long as it prevents

birth control among their adherents, and so continually increases their numbers.

No doubt the greatest effect which applied science has, however, is in filling the sails of that frame of mind which is sometimes called Millenarianism, or, in other words, the belief that there is a good time coming, actually here on earth, and at no distant date. This is indeed a characteristic concomitant of scientific progress. In classical antiquity the world was by no means a pleasant place to live in, and if we were transplanted forthwith to the eighth century in the West, or even the Western Middle Ages at the height of their glory, we should be acutely miserable. The Hellenistic philosophers described the world as παιδευτήριον τῆς θεογνωσίας ψυχῶν λογικῶν διδασκαλίον—a 'school for rational souls to learn the knowledge of God'—and the quality of life was such that later thinkers saw no reason for modifying the phrase. As late as the nineteenth century the mediævalist poet J. M. Neale could write of earthly pains and sorrows

> What are they but the ladder,
> Set up to Heaven on Earth?

But with the rapid increase in human comfort brought about as a result of scientific knowledge this mystical attitude towards the problem of evil faded into the background, and the more active efforts of the social improver took its place. His fundamental postulate was and is that by human effort evil may be caused to play a constantly diminishing part in human life. It is here that we come upon a fundamental source of antagonism between science and religion, for millenarianism and mysticism are nothing but the mirror images of these two great forms of experience. Hence the sort of person with whom we are all familiar, whose religion is a mixture of kindness to animals and vague hopes for 'social betterment,' is not a religious person at all, but a muddle-headed well-wisher, oscillating in a vacuum between two poles of spiritual energy, the meaning of neither of which is known to him. Hence the legitimate contempt in which we may hold 'egg services' and other boneless manifestations of a dying religiousness; for a virile mysticism will know how to estimate the golden promises of the scientific millennium at their true worth. Beauty is transient, Death inevitable, and escape will never be possible from the essential tragedy of life.

It is possible, of course, for millenarianism to be virile too, and the place where it can be studied best to-day seems to be in the camp of militant Communism. Can we be surprised that a collision with traditional religion has occurred in Russia? The more interested you are in the other world, the less so you will be in this; and as the Communist is very interested indeed

in this world, can we be surprised that he does not agree with the mystic? If we take off the outer wrappings of the Communist we find inside the nineteenth-century scientist, detesting mystery and determined to control the material world in the interests of man. As for opium, there are several sorts.

Power over external Nature is a crude attribute of science, and it is not difficult to find other attributes of a more subtle kind, which yet exercise a tremendous influence throughout the modern world. The principle of abstraction is one of these. Anyone who is at all intimate with the method of pure science realises that its fundamental procedure of classification and indexing is the assertion of the abstract, the assertion of the group or class, and the absolute disregard at the same time of the individual instances which have gone into the class. Nothing can be more profoundly characteristic of the scientific method than its stern overlooking of the individual. Science is through and through statistical. In some cases even its individual instances are statistical wholes, in that they are compounded, as we believe, of vast swarms of units, such as the particles of a gas, no one of which can ever be isolated and studied as such; but even where the units do form unbreakable wholes their individuality quickly disappears as they go through the mill of scientific treatment, issuing out as the sausage-like general law.

'There can never be,' as D. H. Lawrence says somewhere quite rightly, 'an exact science dealing with individual life.' For the very fact of its being exact and a science would mean that it had gone far beyond the realm of the individual. It is quite thinkable that we should have statistical sociological laws from which we can read off how many people are going to be killed in railway accidents in England during the next six months, and the statistics which we have practically permit us to do it, but unfortunately we have no means of knowing which of us are going to be involved therein, chosen, as it were, like the tribute of young men and maidens which the Athenians in the legend had to send every year to King Minos in Crete. Questions which are of the highest importance to the individual, then, may not be of the slightest scientific importance. And conversely, for all we know, molecules and atoms may possess a high degree of individuality, an individuality which we never see, because we are forced to treat them in immensely large congregations and can never isolate them for close inspection. With this idea in mind we see in a new light the common description of factory workers as 'hands,' clocking in and clocking out with soulless precision, sinking their human individuality in the productive whole of which they form a part. Communism is in this respect just as deeply influenced by science as Capitalism, for the Com-

munist ideal seems to be a social condition resembling that of the communal insects, such as bees and ants, in which each individual is utterly subservient to the requirements of the State as a whole, even to the extent of profound physical modifications adapting the worker for his particular job. Admirers of H. G. Wells' earlier manner will recall in this connexion his account of the inhabitants of the moon, who combined human intelligence with insect form and an ant-like community of highly specialised creatures. Certain modern biologists, such as W. H. Wheeler, openly advocate an approximation to this way of life for man.

But all I want to insist upon in this connexion is that we can trace a powerful influence of scientific abstraction on everyday life, an influence which is not likely to diminish, but rather to increase, and which yet is fundamentally and bitterly opposed to the characteristic view-point of the religious spirit. Just as the interference of science with the course of Nature weakens the appeal of the mystical attitude towards life, so the habit of abstraction, common to all scientific procedure, weakens that attention to the individual and unique which always was and probably always will be an essential part of religion.

Next we may say something of what is called the ethical neutrality of science. The one thing the experimentalist is anxious to do is to 'let Nature speak for herself,' and he is very suspicious of any appearance of dictating answers to Nature. Theoretically the scientific worker should be absolutely indifferent to the result of any experiment; it should be all one to him whether the litmus turns red or blue, whether the rabbit is born with black hair or white, whether the moulds grow on the prepared medium or whether they do not. In practice, of course, he cannot help a certain bias one way or the other, because he is usually in the middle of a long series of experiments, and the result of one trial may easily mean that he has been completely wasting his time for the previous three weeks. Indeed, no small part of the training of a research worker consists in accustoming himself to such disappointments. It is impossible for an outside onlooker to conceive how careful the scientific worker has to be to prevent himself unconsciously giving an experiment a tip in the right direction, and so obtaining the result which he would prefer.

But this is not the only aspect of the ethical neutrality of science. We expect the scientific worker not to be deterred by his subject-matter, however unpleasant it may become; the anatomist must deal with the dead body, the pathologist with gruesome and disgusting materials, the chemist with all kinds of dangerous compounds. In itself this detachment from the normal likes and dislikes of men is an excellent and indeed an extremely noble thing, but it has the effect of letting loose on the

world certain things that the world would be better without. In the course of chemical investigations on the di-chlor-ethyl compounds somebody stumbled on the substance we now know as 'mustard gas,' and, in spite of the properties of this substance, no doubt felt it both his duty and his pleasure to go on investigating it, and even to prepare a number of compounds very similar to it or even worse. At this point the men of evil will stepped in, the military intelligence came into operation, and the forces of disunion, envy, hatred, and malice, which are always walking up and down the world, found a little corner admirably adapted for them to lay their eggs in.

In short, for the scientific worker ethical neutrality is an indispensable aim, and he must at all costs strive to attain it, but for the whole man it is by no means an unmixed good. It is as if the house of the spirit, which was previously inhabited by the genius of religion, always preoccupied about God, Man, the Good, the Holy, the Right, were thoroughly spring-cleaned, swept, and garnished, leaving nothing but the empty rooms and bare walls of scientific ethical neutrality, whereupon seven other demons, all worse than the first, including war and pestilence, enter in and take up a permanent residence there. It is evident that the scientific worker, *as such*, cannot possibly claim any right to administrate human societies, for the basis of any administration must be a set of ethical judgments, a set of views about what is wrong and what is right; and one of the most refreshing things about the scientific worker is that he thinks nothing wrong and nothing right, save only the perpetual accumulation of verifiable knowledge, and the progressive formulation of scientific truth. It is not his fault if poison gases, explosives, etc., come into being to oppress mankind; these things were thrown out by him, it is true, from Nature's guard's-van, along with a lot of other miscellaneous luggage, and if evilly disposed persons come past and carry them off he cannot be held responsible, and is usually much too busy to notice that anything has happened. But the point is that his ethical neutrality is diametrically opposed to the point of view of the religious man, who is vitally concerned with the problems involved in an association of souls. And just as the abstraction inherent in the scientific method tends to weaken the respect for and interest in the individual, which is so marked a characteristic of religious feeling, so the ethical neutrality natural to a large, influential, and continually growing section of the community tends to abolish the distinction between good and evil, and to weaken the homage paid to the traditional conception of the good by the religious mind. Not only does it do this, but it leaves the way open for evil applications of scientific knowledge, applications

which, as is so often said, stand a very good chance of destroying the whole of our civilisation and ourselves with it, unless somebody awakes from this enchanted sleep in time.

Another outstanding characteristic of science which imprints itself everywhere around us is its preoccupation with the quantitative—that is to say, with sets of figures. The scientific worker is not interested in mere facts or mere phenomena ; he is interested in precisely defined facts and exactly described phenomena. But precision is impossible without sets of numbers or symbols, and logic tends more and more to become mathematical logic. In various ways this preoccupation with the measurable and the numerable, admirable and necessary though it is in its own place, filters through to the affairs of everyday life, where it is neither admirable nor necessary. It accounts, perhaps, to some degreee for the extraordinary ideas which some people entertain about happiness, assuming as they do, to judge by their actions, that it can be purchased with money. When science, under the name of Economics, applies itself to the study of human societies, it has to adopt some form of measurement, and several eminent economists speak of the 'measuring-rod of money.' Lawrence Hyde has vigorously attacked the use of this idea. 'It is,' he writes, 'like saying that the classification of pictures by area or of statues by weight would introduce a satisfying element of accuracy into the obscure subject of æsthetics.' Qualitative non-numerable values are supremely important in life as we have to live it, and just as the ethical neutrality proper to the scientific worker's attitude tends to weaken the ethical certainty on which religion must insist, so the scientific emphasis on the numerical, the quantitative, weakens the interest which we ought to take in the more impalpable, intangible qualities important for religion.

When Elmer Rice, in his play *The Subway*, wishes to indicate the most dreary and hopeless element in the atmosphere of our time he introduces a man sitting at home in the evening after his day's work reading monotonously pieces out of the newspaper: '3762 cases of divorce were tried in the State court during the past year, Judge Smith stated in an interview to-day'; '22,345 bathers made use of the city swimming-bath between 12 p.m. last Monday and this morning, it is computed.' This continual appearance of arbitrary facts expressed in quantitative form and absolutely devoid of living interest can be seen everywhere around us. It is as if the human mind were fascinated by the coils of accurate nonsense which it is for ever spinning. And as commerce becomes more and more 'scientific,' so this atmosphere of meaningless precision will more and more overspread the world. In view of the fact that the overwhelming majority of men are

and always will be engaged in some form of commerce, it is obvious that the future is extremely gloomy. For the old prestige of Church, aristocracy, classical learning, etc., has gone and can never return ; it has, in fact, transferred itself to the 'captain of industry' and the controller of the movements of money. Through these channels the scientific spirit imposes itself upon the mass of mankind, which, although quite unconscious of the direction in which it is being pushed, continually throws up to the surface indications of the opposite tendency—Nature-cults, Youth-movements, Folk-revivals.

But if the scientific mind exercises a domination over our life in this way, there are other ways in which it is no less operative. As I pointed out at the beginning of this paper, the principle of determinism can theoretically be dispensed with by the scientific worker, but in practice it never is. Some form of determinism must, for his purpose, hold good everywhere, and it is an obvious commonplace that this conflicts with the subjective impression of free-will which the religious man is particularly concerned to retain. There are, it is true, philosophic methods whereby this opposition may be explained away ; but logic is not psychology and the spirit refuses to accept the pacifications of the intellect. It is clear that when determinism is the indispensable daily tool of a body of men whose mental outlook is setting the style, as it were, of the whole period, it will inevitably colour the whole period, even apart from the fact that there are always a certain number of scientific workers who think that their axioms and postulates are finally and ultimately true, and are prepared to impose these on the rest of mankind. In this way we see how the sense of sin, which at any rate used to be thought of as an essential ingredient in the relation of man to God, is bound to suffer a subtle decay. The concept of sin has no scientific meaning, for the words 'right' and 'wrong' have no scientific meaning, and actions can only be scientifically judged on the biological basis of material injury or benefit done to the society of individuals within which the action takes place. Sin has to be regarded as an inferior term for an anti-social action, and the person who sins cannot be regarded as responsible, for his action is the joint product of his genetic constitution and the environment of his developing years.

Moreover, the scientific outlook, pressing further than this, involves also the notion of legal responsibility, and it is difficult to see with what justice any man can be condemned to punishment for whatever action, if we regard all his deeds as irrevocably determined, and dependent, in the last resort, on the chain of causes going back without a break to the creation of the world. Scientifically speaking, there can be no such thing as personal

responsibility, and all that can be done is to disembarrass society from its undesirable elements by killing them off. Let us note that this is the course adopted both by Russian Communism and by the French Revolution, and let us note that both these upheavals were distinctly under the influence of the scientific view of the world.

On the other hand, it is a curious fact that, when scientific determinism is not dictating a wholesale abolition of one group of persons by another more powerful group, it throws its influence wholly on the side of mercy, mitigating the rigours of a justice based on theology or idealistic philosophy. When scientific determinism saps the strength of legal responsibility, it gives the criminal the benefit of all the doubts, and in the United States, where these tendencies have gone further than in Europe, it often affects the decisions of the courts.

> The tribunal that condemns to death once in seven years is a murderous tribunal. Rabbi Eliezer ben Azaria said, ' If it condemn once in seventy years.' Rabbi Akiba and Rabbi Tarfon said, ' If we were members of the court no man would ever be condemned to death.'

This quotation from the Jewish Talmud (first century A.D.) embodies what is often the attitude of the scientific worker to justice. Once again the influence of the scientific mind, spreading imperceptibly throughout our time, finds itself in opposition to religion, and here we may perhaps be glad that it is so. ' It must needs be that offences come,' but the scientific spirit does not always add ' woe to him by whom the offence cometh.'

In this light we see the scientific mind as particularly beneficent and merciful, and it is most interesting to remember that in its origin science was regarded as specifically conferring *peace of mind*. Early Greek science, about the fourth or fifth century B.C., differed from later Western science in that it was not experimental, but contented itself with speculations of a scientific character concerning natural things. These speculations were recommended to men on the ground that they conferred ' peace of mind,' rescuing them from the belief in gods or demons, ranging from the divine and splendid beings who rode upon the planets in their celestial journeys, to the small deities of wayside spring or forest tree, benevolent enough for the most part, but liable to spring out and kill you if you forgot to propitiate them with the customary rites. Thus Epicurus, writing a summary of his scientific opinions to a friend, said, ' Some of those on the way to being perfected can obtain from this summary a hasty view of the most important matters without personal instruction *so as to secure peace of mind*.' Epicurus was far from denying that the gods existed, but he maintained that they were removed

from human affairs, far above the concerns of men. This comes out delightfully in another passage, where he says :

> The regularity of the periods of the heavenly bodies must be understood in the same way as such regularity is seen in some of the events that happen on earth. And do not on any account allow the divine nature to be introduced at any point into these discussions, but let it be preserved free from burdensome duties, and in entire blessedness. For if this principle is not observed the whole discussion of causes in celestial phenomena is vain.

This polite but very definite statement shows how even at that early time Epicurus realised that the provinces of science and religion cannot be mixed, but must be kept most sharply separate. Peace of mind was to be attained by reflecting on the natural construction of the world, the ceaseless interplay of atoms, and by realising the through-and-through naturalness of all that goes on around us. I care nothing, the Epicurean might have said, if I am killed to-morrow in some catastrophe. I thank the gods from afar for the pleasures I have enjoyed in my life, for the love of my friends, and for the work that I have been permitted to do ; and I snap my fingers at the brutish forces of the world, for I understand their inner nature, and, by knowing what the world is made of and what the atoms do, I am superior to it, and the despiser of them. This peace of mind is essentially congenial to the scientific consciousness, and has genuinely upheld an untold multitude of persons from the time of Epicurus onwards.

Very little insight is required, however, to see that it is not the same thing as the ' peace that passeth all understanding.' It is, indeed, neither better nor worse, but profoundly different. For the Epicurean or scientific attitude implies a position of defiance towards the universe, a total lack of reverence, a complete absence of awe, although these are precisely the qualities which are indispensable for the religious position. The religious position, as Schleiermacher said, is one in which the individual is conscious of, and fully recognises his dependence upon, a superhuman Power, which may be an impersonal force as in emergent evolutionism, a personal will as in Christian theology, or the universe as a whole, the One, as in Neo-Platonism. Such a subjection of the individual person, without which there can be no sense of the holy, is obviously quite inconsistent with the scientific state of mind. ' Religion without awe,' as Kohnstamm says, ' is a contradiction in terms.' Yet if it was possible for Epicurus and his followers to stand in no awe of the universe, how much more possible is it for the scientific worker of our own time, with a vast succession of practical and theoretical triumphs behind him. In Kohnstamm's words :

The more the conviction prevails that human power can control the universe, or even a small part of it, the more we get an attitude in which awe and reverence would be absurd, as the materialistic systems of the past two centuries illustrate. And it is of course impossible to change this attitude by pure theoretical reasoning, for it is considered as a truth *a priori* that no argumentation is valid which would undermine this subjective conviction.

It was all very well for Goethe to say in his *Wilhelm Meister* that social and moral conduct finds its root in a threefold reverence for that which is below man (the infra-human organic and inorganic world), that which is on the same level as man (our neighbour), and that which is above man (the spiritual world). But the very fibre of the scientific mind runs in a direction contrary to reverence. In the pursuit of that abstraction which we call scientific truth we have to be prepared to subject anything to accurate investigation according to the rules of the game, and each generation in turn is shocked by the savage violence of the scientific mind, dragging out into the light one hidden thing after another. In the Middle Ages the investigation of inorganic nature was invested continually with an unholy glamour, and even as late as the dissolution of the monasteries by Henry VIII. acquaintance with alchemy was likely to be an added indictment against some unlucky prior. In the last century biology in general occupied the same position, and at the present time psychology comes in for a great deal of suspicion.

Here perhaps we have the most striking of the ways in which the scientific outlook exercises an influence throughout our time, antagonistic to that of religion. It must be frankly admitted that the sense of the holy cannot flourish in the atmosphere of defiance, power, irreverence, and impiety, which science quite legitimately has to cultivate. Those who have in any degree experienced both the Epicurean peace and the Christian peace are well aware that, in passing from the laboratory to the holy place, or *vice versâ*, a spiritual transformation has to occur, even sometimes to a painful extent, as if a skin had to be thrown off and a new one grown. And just as scientific determinism inevitably leads to the decay of the sense of personal responsibility, so the Epicurean or scientific attitude of independence of divine power makes the cultivation of the sense of the holy more and more difficult in our time. Epicurus was not misjudged by subsequent centuries when they set him down as an atheist, for his gods, in spite of his insistence on their reality, are no more than words, lingering on in the empyrean for ornamental reasons.

What can religion do in the midst of all this? In what has gone before I have tried to describe the seven sharpest swords with which a civilisation dominated by science attacks the life

of religion. I am not deceived by the interest in religion which has marked the opening years of the present century, for I believe it to be a wholly temporary and minor phenomenon. The 'emptiness of the churches,' about which we hear so much, is attributed by some to the antiquated formulæ which persist in the liturgy, and by others to the widespread ugliness which the naturally conservative religious mind permits to envelop its houses. But, though all this may be true, there are deeper reasons for the decline of religion, and the lowest depth has not yet by any means been reached. The emptiness will probably go on getting emptier.

It seems that the present dominance of science over our lives is a phenomenon, something very like which has occurred before—namely, in the Hellenistic age, the period from about 200 B.C. to 300 A.D. That was the time when the great scientific schools of the ancient world, such as Alexandria, were in their prime, and if the science of classical antiquity did not issue out in the command of Nature which we have to-day it was only because of its incurably speculative character, and because certain special factors, such as the prevalence of slavery, discouraged that desire to save labour which is the mother of invention. By the time that Alexandrian science was at its height what we might call the classical 'middle ages' were quite over, the great religious period had gone, and the gods of Olympus had faded into the purely honorary position to which Epicureanism and Stoicism alike consigned them. So it is with us. Our religious period has gone, and gone for good. The Christian Middle Ages can never return, and we may as well make up our minds to admit it. To build cathedrals is not the fundamental urge of modern men; but why should the religious mind complain? It had its high summer, when it decided what the very aspect of European towns and cities should be like; it had its heyday, when it dominated the thoughts and actions of Western men, just as science dominates them now. It dictated the forms of their function to philosopher and scientific man alike, it crushed without remorse every opposing factor, it saw to it that the Epicureans held their tongues. It moulded into its own kind of beauty nearly all the poetic upspringing of the time, and knew how to use for its own ends every grain of artistic genius that the age produced. How precious to us now are those scraps of secular feeling that have come through to us from the Middle Ages, the 'Summer is i-cumen in' of Brother John Fornsete of Reading Abbey, the song about Henry of Agincourt, the poems of the wandering scholars, the aubades of the Provençal troubadours. I am not undervaluing the magnificent treasures of poetry and art which the mediæval Church has left us, I am simply remembering

the domination which it then exercised, and which it will never exercise again. For the religious age of Western man will not recur.

Why then, one may say, not slide with the current of history, why not abandon ourselves entirely to the domination of the scientific consciousness and give up our efforts, so hard and costing, to maintain religion in an irreligious age? There are two reasons why not—one concerning the group and the other concerning the individual. The tyranny of one form of experience over the others in any given age can only be softened by the unyielding witness of those few persons who are not overborne by the prevalent spirit. In most cases these persons, perhaps fundamentally of more value to their age than the greater men who swim with the tide, never leave any memory behind them, but sometimes they gain a perpetual prominence, and then we say of them, as of Leonardo da Vinci, that they were born 'out of due time' or 'in the wrong century.' But this is not so.

If now as individuals we give up religion, we hand ourselves over like passive logs to the flood-waters of history, and transform ourselves into fundamentally one-sided creatures. And our deepest self realises that man was not born to throw away his several powers, man was not born to be hypertrophied in one special direction. In the Middle Ages men 'made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake,' and in the future the same invitation will be extended to us to suppress our sense of the holy, to stamp it out, and to confront defiantly a world denuded of awe and of mystery. Such a deicide will be a homicide too. The best man is the man who is friendly to, even if he himself cannot enter into, each one of the great forms of human experience, and the worst man is the man who is willing and desirous of throwing all but one form of experience on to the scrap-heap. But it is not as if fanatical men of religion were the danger in the Middle Ages, it is not as if fanatical men of science were the danger now; it is rather that in any given period the dominant form of experience subtly interpenetrates the whole of life, insinuating itself into logic, introducing its own concepts into practical affairs, and colouring the whole situation with its own particular tint. This is why it seems to me that it is now more necessary than ever before to participate actively in religious rites, and to maintain firmly the fundamental validity of the religious experience as a characteristic activity of the human spirit.

Probably religion as a whole, and certainly the Christian religion, is in for a bad time during the next four or five centuries. We are still in a transitional period, so that science is not so dominant over our lives now as was religion in the Middle Ages,

but a kind of inverted Middle Ages is almost certain to come. These things are rooted in the constitution of the world, and we cannot escape them, but we can keep before ourselves continually the conception of the harmonious man, the man to whom science and religion, though always antagonistic, are equally necessary methods of attaining contact with the reality which lies at the core of the world. To such a man history has no terrors, but he will always have to run counter to the age in which he lives—if not in one respect, then in another. He may not be honoured in his generation, but, having seen and considered the parts of human nature, he stands as the only guardian of its wholeness.

JOSEPH NEEDHAM.

THE GANDHI APOCRYPHA

'WHAT does the undergraduate say of me?' Jowett would ask in the Oxford of 1890–92; and the fresher from Somerville to whom he spoke would for his amusement give him the latest addition to his apocrypha. Great men are like that—able to enjoy a laugh at themselves in their hours of relaxation. We can imagine Gautama Buddha uncrossing his toes, or Manu throwing his roll of papyrus at a peeping tiger, or Krishna—especially Krishna—flinging his reed pipe to one of his satellite maidens, in the precincts of the Monkey Temple at Bindraban, to rush at the book-stall boy delivering *Punch* on a Wednesday.

So now that Gandhi is really in England we should all be busy in preparing relaxation for him, poor great man! And for me—I have thought of giving now to the public the earlier chapters of the apocrypha which I have been studiously collecting, in the flesh, so to speak, since 1917. This is my tribute to one of the great ones of my country and age and generation, compelled to a reluctant voyage and inclement shores, by his strong sense of duty, and his devotion to *Ahunisa*, *Satya*, *Bramacharia*—that is to say, Innocence, Truth, Bachelordom. I do hope that Gandhi will be pleased! The apocrypha of C. F. Andrews talks of his sense of humour as infectious, and C. F. Andrews is an honourable man. But even if Gandhi should not be amused by every entry in this apocrypha—and indeed he could not be, seeing that he has a heart of pity as well as a sense of fun—'it is indicated,' as British official bureaucrats say, that both he and the public should share the version of Gandhi which is handed by his disciples to the majority of such peasants as have heard of Gandhi in India.

In 1917 Gandhi had not long returned from South Africa when he did a truly noble work (this is gospel, not apocrypha), freeing the oppressed; and his hand as a saviour was still 'in.' But, as it happened, India was otherwise occupied just then, and had not staged occasion for a rescue. So his disciples (and surely someone should write a saga of discipleship about the disciples of Gandhi, for the entire history of the world has never known, nor could know, a more devoted brand)—yes, his faithful disciples, though numbered then only by tens and twenties—grinned like dogs, and

ran about the chief cities of India with quivering nostrils in search of smells.

It was the disciple who went to the villages of Behar, however, who found the most enticing smell. He had helped to make it, but of himself was powerless to go further, so he pursued Gandhi from geographical point to point, from Bombay to Bengal, to the United Provinces, heading him back to Behar. Behar had long been a country of planters. Indigo was among the earliest crops sown, and English planter and Indian peasant had together cultivated it to their common advantage. But German synthetic indigo had pushed the Indian-grown article out of the market, and the vats were red with rust, as I saw for myself when, on tour, I took a short cut in my palanquin across the remote open spaces of the Champaran districts. The Great War made a difference to this situation; synthetic indigo was unobtainable, and vegetable indigo was again in demand. So the planters asked their tenants to substitute indigo for the cheap rice crops upon which they had been forced to decline through the years of leanness. 'We will buy of you all you can grow,' said they. And the peasants responded, getting good value for their deliveries at the factory windows, as I myself have seen.

The Ghandi disciple to whom I have alluded watched their transactions and—who shall say with what motive, whether to create a situation worthy of salvation or no?—entered into conversation with the peasants.

'Do you eat indigo?'

'No, we eat rice.'

'But you are now growing indigo instead of rice?'

'Yes, the sahibs have asked it.'

'That is because the sahibs eat indigo. They make you grow what they eat, in order that you may starve, in order that they may grow fat.'

The Behari peasant is a slow-minded creature. He cannot argue. A few said:

'We do not know whether the sahibs eat indigo, but we get more money growing indigo than growing rice; we can now buy and store rice.'

But the many said stubbornly:

'That is a true word. We do not eat indigo, and our fields are unable now to yield us the rice which we do eat.'

From this beginning the perfect disciple went further, till the Champaran area was, as he thought, ripe for the reception of the master. The master came on a week-end visit, but decided that the disease was not yet ready for operation. He left instructions for more intensive treatment. This, in the interpretation of the zealots, included opening the eyes of the peasantry to the

oppression of the landlord and to the good news of a mahatma who would come to save them from tyranny. This was, I believe, the occasion of the birth of the term 'Mahatma' as applied to Gandhi.

'A *mahatma?*' said the peasants.

Ah! that was a word they could understand. They would hear about him. They would go a pilgrimage to his shrine.

'No,' said the disciples, 'that is now impossible.'

'Then tell us about him.'

And the disciples told. The Mahatma could not only deliver from tyranny, he could work miracles; he could kill and he could make alive, yes, even the latter; he could curse and he could bless; he could turn men into beasts, and beasts into men.

'Could he, indeed, do that?'

Yes, this should be demonstrated. A tiny village on the estate of a Maharani of Behar, a village *en route* to Nepal, and as remote as possible from the civilisation of the towns of British India proper, was chosen for the experiment. Everyone living in Calcutta or Bombay has seen the monkey-man with his travelling circus of monkeys and goats and bears. Have we not as children delighted in him? Did we not give him our pet monkeys when our mothers said they were too big to retain? And did he not in gratitude bring them back to us *prima donnas* in the most wonderful dramas—*Romeo and Juliet*, *The Sulky Wife and the Complaisant Husband*, *The English Family Robinson* (as conceived by the monkey-man)? What not? And the second number of the show was always a dance, *pas seul* by goat or bear, to the accompaniment of the monkey-man's little thumb-and-finger drum.

The innocent village on the road to Nepal had never seen a monkey-man, and thither the faithful sent him. Demonstration of the Mahatma's miracles was efficiently advertised, and the monkey-man appeared, according to schedule, on the maidan just outside the collection of huts near the bazaar. It was market day, and the crowd included men and women from neighbouring hamlets. Mrs. Monkey, dressed in English clothes and trying on a bonnet before a mirror, filled the simple audience with awe.

'The Mahatma has turned a monkey into a mem-sahib!'

And almost more awe-compelling was the dancing goat.

'The Mahatma has turned monkeys and goats into men and women. He has power to turn men and women into whatever form he chooses,' said the disciples. 'Yes, into *rakshas* and *bhuts*, into giants and demons also. There is no limit to his power.'

So the legend grew.

When the disciples collected a poll-tax of two annas from the peasants in the name of the Mahatma, willingly they gave, not only out of fear, but of reverence, for the holy one whom they could not see. During this time the Mahatma did indeed come himself to Behar, but unrecognised by the peasants. He was walking with his disciples past a field of young onions. 'I always loved the tender spring onion,' said the Mahatma. 'It is a thing pure to eat, conducive to meditation and spiritual growth, and the impulse to segregate one's self.' The disciples as one man rushed into the field, trampling down whatever came in their way, and the entire crop was garnered.

This apocryphal incident will be found in its gospel version in Gandhi's own reminiscences. It led immediately to a law-suit, wherein Gandhi exhibited the Mahatma's beloved trade mark of vicarious sin-bearer; and it was one of the items in a series of negotiations with British officials, described in a Blue-book labelled *Agrarian Riots*. So enticingly does memory press upon memory that selection in these tales of wonder and mystery is pain to the recorder. But let me pass on to the tea gardens of Assam in May 1921.

Here, again, the faithful had been active. These were after-war days, and the economic situation was strained. But tea had done well in war-time, and the managers, as I know myself from visits to certain of these tea estates, though they could not compel the bumper harvests which had in 1915–1918 given the coolies extra wages for extra-time plucking, did what they could to lessen the hardship of high prices. They sold rice and all necessary commodities at their own tea-garden markets at pre-war prices, such concessions amounting in some cases to the debit of a lakh of rupees on the year's budget. But after all, as they said, it was only fair that tea should make some acknowledgment of the enormous profits made while others were compelled to sacrifice; and to whom better than to their own coolies could they make such acknowledgment?

I saw the little homesteads of the coolies, gay with flower-beds and, in some cases, opulent with cow-byre and chicken-run. I remember one evening when the women came back from the fair, laughing and chattering as they compared their purchases, their babies peacefully asleep in the baskets slung at their backs, the older children running sturdily by their sides: the pretty picture light-heartedness incarnate. I saw them about a month later, with thousands of garden coolies, dying of cholera on the banks of the river to which they had been lured by the disciples—lured on the promise of repatriation, with the tale that they were being oppressed by their employers.

'You do not get as much money as you did last year and last?'

'No, we did extra time then. This year there is not so much tea to pick.'

'That is not the reason. The sahibs are cheating you. We can take you back to your own districts whence you came, where wages are as they were last year and last, and where rice is twice as many *maunds* to the rupee as is given you by the sahibs.'

None of this was true. Prices were very high, and these people had depended on the money sent them by their tea-garden relations. The milch-cows were sold to the disciples at eight annas a cow. The little houses were emptied, and through the fierce heat of a Bengal summer the confiding coolies trudged to the river, which must be crossed before they could reach their villages in Central India. But the disciples had also induced a steamer strike, so they camped, without provision for sanitation or else, on the river's bank, and died, as I say, like flies, of cholera. The Mahatma was in Bombay at the time conducting a campaign for funds to help the Congress cause. Rich Parsee and other Indian women were falling weeping at his feet, pouring out their jewels as if they were water, to lave the holy feet which had trodden the dust in the service of the motherland. Was it because he had not heard of this apocrypha, of the distress in Assam, that he could not come to correct the mistakes of his disciples? But the gospel on these incidents, also, you will find in the autobiography of the Mahatma, and in a Blue-book issued by the Assam Government.

Oh! we had cause, we who lived in India, to remember the year 1921, whether in town or countryside.

In the winter of 1921 the Prince of Wales came to India. Everyone has heard of the *hartals* ordered by the Mahatma and organised by his disciples at places to be visited by the Prince. There was violence and bloodshed at Bombay. The Mahatma had not realised that his disciples would go so far; and, as he tells us, he fasted and adjusted accounts with his Maker, and with his principles of non-violence. But up in the north, in the region of Gwalior, there occurred one dramatic happening which I do not find in the gospel, either according to the Mahatma or to Saint C. F. Andrews. And I chance to have personal knowledge of this. A certain Moslem landlord decided to use a holiday to visit his estate where rents were not being paid as faithfully as his roll demanded. He found the villagers keeping a *hartal*.

'Mahatma Gandhi orders,' said they.

'But why? The Prince is not coming here.'

'No, but did not the Mahatma's disciples tell you? To-day is fixed for the great contest between the Badshah Bahadhar in the vilayet and Mahatma Gandhi. There is a lake of fire before the *rajgarh* of the Badshah, and the Mahatma, by the spiritual power that is his, has taken himself there to-day. He said to the Badshah Bahadhar: "We will swim across this lake of fire, and whoever gets to the other side, let him be King of Hindustan." And the Badshah Bahadhar, the *Pancham* George, said: "Let him be king."

'So this they do to-day; and we fast and pray that the right Badshah may win, even as we fast and pray when the Giant of Darkness is trying to swallow the sun.' (In an eclipse.)

The next day the landlord went to see them again.

'So the Badshah-Bahadhar has won. His flag still flies from the Lat Sahib's house.'

'Oh! Did you not hear?'

'No; what is there to hear?'

'Late at night the disciples came to tell us that, though the Mahatma said he would swim the lake twice to the once swimming of the Badshah Bahadhar, the Badshah Bahadhar was afraid, and the contest did not take place.'

Crass credulity. But they were villagers. The towns would be safe from such crude inducements to the 'sympathetic *hartals*' of which the Congress papers were boasting as universal throughout the length and breadth of India.

Well, what of the towns? Did they understand, then, the Mahatma's high philosophy? I had a chance of investigation at Christmas-time in Calcutta. The Prince was coming, and the order went forth, in the name of the Mahatma, a *hartal* in all shops and markets, and a strike, to include taxis, hackney carriages, and even drivers of private cars. Owner-drivers were asked by the Automobile Association to put their cars as far as possible at the disposal of the public. I took down my car to the works to be vetted on the eve of the *hartal* and assured myself that everything was in order. I had a Sikh driver and believed him loyal; but I knew what he might have to face, and was not surprised when he came to me at night and begged me not to go out the next day.

'Why?'

'*Maharaja* Gandhi's orders.'

'That happens not to be the name of my maharaja,' I said. 'I do not obey his orders. If you are afraid of your *bradari* [caste-folk] you need not drive. I wish the car at the usual hour to-morrow, and will fetch it myself from the garage if you have fear. But you will be on duty.'

'I have no fear,' he said, 'except for the ruin of my car, and for the life of my Miss Sahib. I have spoken. I have warned.'

'You have spoken and warned, Gurdit Singh. Sleep in peace.'

The next morning the car was at my door, but there were about fifty of the strikers barring my way to it.

'*Hut*' (move), said I. And, the habit of obedience being strong, they *hut*-ed. When I was in the car I questioned the leaders, and their right to obstruct and annoy. It was amazing what those town-dwelling Sikhs had been told, and what they believed. When I assured them otherwise—

'Can it indeed be so?' they asked, wavering.

They had slashed my spare wheel and cut all my electric connexions over-night; but in the end I got away on the laugh raised against one of their strikers by some silly pun in the vernacular which arose out of our conversation. I drove to the market. Every shop was shut and owners sitting disconsolate before the shutters. Some of us had planned deliberate shopping, to ease a situation which we knew was hard on the small Indian trader of the new market and bazaars.

'Why is your shop closed?'

'Mahatma Gandhi's orders. Does the Miss Sahib think we wish to forego the Big Day [Christmas-time] profits? Sahibs and mem-sahibs and the Bengali *bhadralog* spend much money at this time, and by putting up our shutters we are losing much.'

'What do you fear? Open and sell to me. There is a sergeant in the market. Protection can be given you.'

'Yes, Miss Sahiba, now or always in the market maybe. But look, these are Gandhi's spies. Some day as we walk down a quiet lane, this day forgotten, there will be a stab in the back. . . . Better lose money than life.'

'But what is the reason for the order?'

'God knows!'

Later that same day I was walking across Dalhousie Square and heard an up-country man singing a Hindi song about the new Raj.

'What do you sing, brother?'

'Oh! about the new Maharaja.'

'Who is that?'

'Well, some call him Mahatma, some to-day call him Maharaja. But I sing because he got me a rise in my pay.'

'You? You look like the deirwan of a sahib in one of the big offices over there,' I said, nodding towards Clive Street.

'That, indeed, I am, but the Mahatma's disciples brought me word that it was the Mahatma who induced my sahibs to raise my pay. My own prayer had been unheard these many days; they said the Raj was going into his hands, and I promised my services when the fight came.'

Miracles and curses in the villages. Threats and rewards or tales of rescue from oppression in the towns—the method consistent in its play on credulity, subtle in its knowledge of the right appeal. Oh! the many and many stories in the apocrypha. Over some, such as the tale of the woman cursed in the name of the Mahatma, cursed with leprosy, because she wore a cheap Manchester-woven saree, and killing herself because she believed in curses—over such the gentle and tender-hearted Gandhi will surely allow himself to be angry. But this was to be a 'relaxing' recital, and must return to its intention. There is that delicate little vignette of one of the women picketers outside an examination hall lying prostrate before the door. An ardent Bengali candidate rides up on his bicycle.

'I sit here for an examination. Let me pass.'

'Not except over my dead body. We object to the education given by the British.'

The candidate considered her a moment, and then, parking his bicycle, lay down close beside the pretty picketer. She rose furious, insulted, and he walked into the hall!

Or there is the tale of Mrs. Gandhi, *loquitur*, about her husband. 'Why Bapu make poor young men fast? Why Bapu not let poor young men enjoy. When Bapu young, Bapu much enjoy. Bapu now no digest. Young men much digest. Why Bapu not let young men enjoy?'

The story of Gandhi's almonds and raisins at the Yerowda Gaol has been told to him, and tickled him enormously.

'I hope your food is to your liking?' asked the officer responsible for diet as he visited Gandhi in prison.

'Well, my almonds and raisins are not satisfactory.'

'Not satisfactory! I told them to get the best that could be had from the Army and Navy Stores in Bombay.'

'I,' said the Mahatma, with a toss of his head—'I am accustomed to get mine direct from Fortnum and Mason's.'

CORNELIA SORABJI.

CINEMA TECHNIQUE AND THE THEATRE

AFTER seeing Mr. Raymond Massey's multiple-scene production *Late Night Final*, lately running at the Phœnix Theatre, one begins to wonder how far the new stage technique will take us away from the old beaten path of dramatic construction. So far there is still a kind of modern unity of place. The telephone calls are not yet trunk calls or inter-continental beam wireless. They are local calls. But it cannot be long before someone sees the stuff of sensational drama, and of five-figure box-office profits, in showing us a scene in which Scotland Yard (left lower stage) instructs the New York Police (left upper stage) while the Berlin Police actually receives in the right lower stage a wireless message which we see transmitted to them in the right upper stage and sends out its prize officer to arrest the international crook whom we see amusing himself unsuspectingly with a not unwilling blonde in the centre stage.

Until the talking films came to turn the whole entertainment world topsy-turvey, no one had seriously regarded the screen as an artistic rival of the stage. A box-office rival it certainly was, for the cinema was the easiest and cheapest escape to a world of make-believe. Whether it might or might not be something more than merely that never troubled the studio accountant. But the films filled more and more cinemas every day, and every man who went to the pictures was potentially a man lost to the theatre: not entirely, of course. A few insisted on having both, and so the death of the travelling theatrical troupe has become slow instead of the rapid one it might otherwise have been. A few provincial towns still have their weekly change of West End successes by indifferent players, but it is no longer true that the few who persist in seeing both plays and pictures do not see in the film a real artistic rival to the play. When talking pictures became popular the play rose, or fell, to the position of a delicacy, for films could be seen anywhere and at any time, but plays could be seen usually only in one theatre, and not at all in most towns of 50,000 inhabitants or under. The two things were entirely different. A play was one thing; it stood still and talked. A film was another; it moved about the world and was silent.

Each could do something that the other could not. You could take your choice, following your taste, your pocket, and your proximity to a show. The cinema had a walk-over in villages and small towns, and won easily in all but the most important centres, where there was room for all—even for plays. But the two things remained artistically quite distinct, and were more than ever distinct at the moment when talk entered the cinema, for the Russians, by exploiting cutting, angle, and movement, were doing something as different from the stage as could be imagined.

Then talking pictures came, and, while the box-office fight went on as fiercely as ever, a new fight began. For the first time an artistic rivalry arose between the two kinds of entertainment. The latest developments in film technique stopped dead. The microphone was unable to move easily and had to stand square before the player. This struck at the very base of the latest artistic (many called it the merely 'arty') technique of the screen. Films, instead of rushing about like Douglas Fairbanks or Tom Mix's horse, stood stock still while they bellowed forth their lines. The theatre and the cinema were artistic rivals for the first time; both staked on similar claims—the amusement of the people by a story of make-believe, with players that moved and spoke. The tools were slightly different. The stage had real live actors, which is better than shadows, but the cinema had the advantage of universal accessibility. Both arts laboured under almost equal limitations of time and space. The stage could be changed only a few times each evening, but had the advantage of three dimensions. The camera could be moved any number of times, but had to stand still while operating, in order not to lose the voice, and it had to work in two dimensions.

This stage of the rivalry lasted only a moment, during which the film industry took stock of its position and looked round for a way to make better use of its new medium. Then the films forged ahead. The bellowing became reduced to a pleasant speaking voice. The camera began to move independently of the microphone and returned, although only slightly, to its old habit of wandering. This brought back the possibility of angle work, which is the cinema's somewhat weak answer, until stereoscopy comes in, to the three dimensions of the stage. Then came the discovery that talking pictures could be made in the open air. This was an enormous advantage to the cinema, although the advantage was reduced by the fact that it could be used only within moderate limits of distance. When that point was reached the cinema once more freed itself from the necessity of playing only indoor scenes like the stage. The ideal came to be the combination of the best use of talk and sound with the

best use of free movement indoors and out of doors. When this double perfection is attained the screen needs no artificial limitation of the choice of subjects and of their treatment. The cinema is still far enough from this point. Most talking pictures are still played indoors, like stage plays, and a few still use ordinary stage technique. Already, however, the screen has at its disposal a wealth of means by which it can undertake a vastly greater variety of subjects than the stage, which is still bound by the same old limitations—the unchanging scene, the traditional double-decker sandwich form of three acts and two long intervals, a *cadre* that has never been of any use except for indoor discussion. That it has been possible to produce entertaining and even intensely intellectual drama within such sad limitations is a tribute to the ingenuity of man. The dramatic genius of Ibsen, Strindberg, de Curel, and all the other masters of indoor discussion consists of a combination of intellectual power with an extraordinary ingenuity in twisting and torturing a tale, which in ordinary life would need plenty of room to move indoors and out of doors, into this weird one-room business of the traditional theatre. It is a pity that these writers ever had to tie up their plots into knots in order to fit them into this absurd frame. What is more, for every story which they succeeded in so twisting there may have been a hundred others that occurred to their minds, but which they rejected as impossible to torture into anything like a reasonable indoor play. The intellectual genius of these men would not have suffered had they been spared the necessity of being plot contortionists as well. With more room to move they might have produced finer work than they did.

The cinema, after competing with the theatre on its own ground for a time, suddenly found itself in possession of ways and means of spreading far more widely than its handcuffed neighbour. There was a chance for a clever director to do something far better than the stage could ever do. This is not the place to discuss how far the cinema has done justice to its opportunity, or to estimate how far the physical imperfections of its medium still handicap it. The point is that a generation of stage dramatists and directors saw what an enormous advantage a little room to move would bring them in the theatre, if it were possible to get it. The will to change was there, and it seemed that the way must soon be discovered. The attempts now being made to achieve this greater freedom in dramatic technique have all the interest of contemporary developments.

One must be careful not to overrate the effect of the cinema on stage technique. Yet it seems hardly likely that the special changes we are about to notice would have taken place but for the existence of talking films. For generations there has been no

appreciable change, apart from details, either in the method of putting a story into the dramatic mould which we have come to regard as the normal play form, or in the method of staging a play. There has been a tendency at one time to stress the realistic side of the setting and speech, at another time a desire to emphasise the poetry and the symbolism of life. But on the whole a play never varied much from the traditional method of grouping a number of people together in a scene and keeping them there for about forty minutes, and repeating the process with intervals later in the evening. The fact that some spoke slang about sex and others spoke poetry about auras and ideals made little difference to the inevitable contortion of the story necessitated by the traditional form. Some change in the direction of recording a story in a more natural sequence of place and scene was clearly desirable.

The task was intensely difficult. It is true we saw some departure from the old form in art productions like M. André Obey's *Le Viol de Lucrèce*, performed recently by the Compagnie des Quinze at the New Theatre, and in the revival of *Prunella* at the Everyman Theatre last summer. But these instances are really irrelevant, because the dramatist is striving to cast a poetic or symbolic veil over earthly ideas, and for this expressionism, with gauze curtains and stylised *décor* reduced to a few pieces and changed in a moment, is quite suitable. That, however, is not what the ordinary dramatist wishes to do. He wishes to write realistic plays in realistic settings about life as it is, and for this art-production will not do. Consequently he is faced with the necessity of using the usual kind of scenery, which in turn confronts him with the usual impossibility of frequent intervals and laborious scene-shifting. It was not for nothing that the old simplified play form arose. M. Georges Pitoëff's staging of M. H.-R. Lenormand's plays is interesting in this connexion. He produced *Le Temps est un Songe* and *Les Ratés* by dividing the stage into several compartments and using ordinary stage property simplified almost to vanishing point. The intention was to produce a feeling of movement to assist the dialogue. It seems significant that when, two years later, in 1922, M. Pitoëff produced M. Lenormand's next play, *Le Mangeur de Rêves*, consisting of nine scenes and a prologue, he adopted his now familiar velvet frame with coloured strips and transverse changing lines of light.

The need for more freedom in stage narrative became more than ever insistent. Occasional outstanding successes on the screen served to whet the appetite of the stage dramatist. As far back as August 1926 Mr. Galsworthy's play *Escape* was produced by Mr. Leon M. Lion at the Ambassadors Theatre. It has been claimed by some with knowledge of the author that the particular

form of this play owes nothing to film technique, and that the subject lent itself inevitably to episodic treatment in the form of a sequence of nine scenes. It is necessary to be clear as to what we mean by influence. Artistic influence may be direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious. When, in the early 'nineties in France, a school of dramatists arose who used a vigorously realistic technique as a medium for their psychological or social studies the cry at once went up, 'Ibsen!'; only to be opposed by the cry, 'Nonsense! We always had psychological discussions in France. Look at Ninon de l'Enclos! Look at Balzac! Or Stendhal: as for technique, we already had Scribe, and our Zola did the rest.' The protest was false, and there is little or no doubt that the realistic school of psychological and social drama would never have appeared as suddenly and in such force as it did but for the magnificent urge given by Ibsen. In all probability the influence was unconscious in many cases, and by to-day it has come to be recognised that in France at least the influence of Ibsen was felt not so much in direct imitation of his technique as in the choice of a particular kind of subject. Slavish or conscious imitation of Ibsen, if it ever existed, probably ceased very early. Ibsenism, a dramatic state of mind, was an infinitely stronger factor in the rise of the French school of social drama than ever Ibsen, the author of a set of rules, had been. Writers like François de Curel were Ibsenian without being aware of it, and without knowing much of Ibsen.

Mr. Galsworthy had shown himself an expert in the novel and the drama. When the idea occurred to him that the subject of a good man escaping from justice would be a suitable basis for an examination of the attitude of different classes of society to such a man, he could have chosen whichever medium he pleased. He might have made a novel out of it. Possibly he thought that the plot was rather thin for a novel: in the form in which we have it in the play it would have been. There remained the play. Mr. Galsworthy had long enjoyed a well-deserved reputation for clever and easy technique. William Archer once said that Mr. Galsworthy's dramatic work gave him the impression of having been produced with much more ease than that of either Mr. Shaw or Mr. Granville Barker. Mr. Galsworthy decided to dramatise his story. It is nonsense to say that he had to use the episodic form. There is no doubt that such an expert as he is could have preserved the character of the story and brought out the point of it all in a series of scenes falling into the more conventional dramatic form. The truth probably is that his mind was unconsciously influenced by the episodic form used in films, and that, instead of rejecting this plot as unsuitable for a play and making it into a novel or a short story, he was irresistibly

drawn to record it in the episodic form it eventually took. He himself would possibly be most astonished to hear the cinema had anything to do with it, but that seems to be the most reasonable explanation of his choice. It is this desire to express drama in a less artificial, less rigid form that is the clearest sign of the changed attitude to the unnatural limitations imposed by the traditional drama form.

Mélo, by M. Henri Bernstein, produced at the Gymnase Theatre in Paris in March 1929, is another instance of a successful dramatist using a new technique. In *Mélo* we have another case of a person, tortured by certain doubts, who comes face to face with a number of different people. We see a sequence of short scenes almost completely detached from each other except for the main figure that passes through them. M. Bernstein, like Mr. Galsworthy, is a man who could easily have adopted the more restricted mould, but he preferred to string these scenes together and so produce the illusion of a person wandering on and on. There is a surface resemblance in form between *Escape* and *Mélo*, but in the case of the French author it is more reasonable to attribute the adoption of the episodic form to a deliberate exploitation of film sequences on the stage.

How far was the attempt successful in each case? To be frank, let us admit that it was not so good as might be. The scenes on the stage are detached one from the other. The connexion between them has to be supplied by the spectator during the few minutes of scene-shifting in the frequent intervals. The old stage trick of lifting the curtain on a story at three chosen moments of special stress was frankly arbitrary and artificial. There was no pretence about it. Everyone was used to it. Continuity in the story, though an admirable object to strive for, was almost impossible to realise in fact. The rise and fall of the curtain is a nuisance that destroys the illusion of continuity, especially if it happens frequently. Connecting links deliberately inserted into the dialogue mitigate slightly the abruptness of these breaks, but they cannot eliminate their effect entirely. Now the cinema does this much better. It can actually follow the movement of a person from place to place. It may also crowd together incidents and crises in a way that is not likely in actual life, but the valuable illusion of continuity is fairly easily produced on the screen.

It may be questioned whether any attempt to eliminate breaks in the action on the stage is not in fact a renunciation of something that is really part of the very nature of the theatre. The cinema is one thing and the theatre another. The camera can photograph a real ship on real waves. The stage cannot. Even when a film is taken in artificial sets there is usually a spaciousness

and a wealth of detail about them that make it far easier for us to nurse the illusion of reality. This is enough. The best films are never made in artificial sets. *Dirigible*, a film recently shown at the Tivoli, had none of the magnificent reality of parts of *Piz Palü*. The rigging up of artificial sets in a film studio is a betrayal of the function of the camera. The stage cannot go to the actual scene. The camera can and should. When the film producer photographs an outdoor scene in an artificial indoor set he is definitely reverting to stage technique, which is unjustifiable except on the score of expense. These things are rarely good cinema, and it may be that it is in precisely this sense that the attempt to produce the illusion of movement and continuity on the stage is not true theatre. Both arts are encroaching on each other, and this encroachment has been most evident since the introduction of talking into the cinema put them together for a while on common ground. There is, however, no need to object to overlapping. To insist on rigid delimitation of the two arts seems puerile, unless the results of encroaching prove that this tendency is artistically wrong. The scrappy continuity in *Mélo* and *Escape* rather made one doubt the ability of the new technique to treat such subjects successfully on the stage. The purely material difficulty of accomplishing so much scene-shifting was enormous. In London and Paris, with a wealth of scenery at hand and a staff of expert scene-shifters with every mechanical contrivance to help them, the frequent waits, short as they were, proved disastrous enough to artistic continuity. Anywhere outside a first-class theatre the task would be almost impossible.

There seems to be a subtle difference between the effect of scene-changing in a few moments of darkness in the course of an act and the frank cessation of all play-acting in a long interval between acts. In the latter the mind ceases to function. The play ceases to exist for that period. A period of darkness in the middle of an act, on the other hand, really destroys continuity. One's eyes are fixed on the black square of the stage, one's mind is on the play and the players, one is waiting in a state of suspense for the action to resume. A modern film can, by clever direction, so connect together a sequence of scenes that one is aware only of a continuous unbroken narrative. Even if all inter-scene waits are eliminated from a play, it still presents something like a staccato sequence. In a film there is not a moment's wait between scenes which are connected in the narrative. Time continuity and space continuity thus combine to produce an unbroken progression. It seems that the stage can never approach the film in this suggestion of continuous action. The old stage technique recognised the fact and did not begin what it could not hope to finish. Continuity, therefore, is the rock on which the new stage technique seems likely to be wrecked.

In February of this year a play called *Three Flats*, by Mr. Malcolm Muggeridge, was staged by the Three Hundred Club in conjunction with the Stage Society at the Prince of Wales Theatre. In this play there is a deliberate attempt to stage a story which demands simultaneous action in three different parts of a house converted into flats. No amount of old-style contortion could have reduced this situation to the usual *cadre*, and but for the author's bold notion of showing three flats on the stage at once the story must have been laid aside as suitable for some other literary form, but not for the stage. Cinema technique is more clearly seen in this play than in anything so far produced on the stage. It would be still better done on the screen. The camera would take us from one flat to the other as the action demanded. There would be no need of such an artificial trick as that of making the whole of the front wall of the building rise. In staging this kind of situation there is necessarily a tendency to squeeze the action in each flat into a tiny space at the sacrifice of some realism. There is also a good deal of cheap juggling to prevent long stretches of unnatural stillness in the two flats where the main action is not for the moment taking place. Still, *Three Flats* was until recently the most vigorous attempt to produce with the ordinary mechanism of the stage an illusion of multiple action hitherto obtainable only on the screen.

Already the cinema was teaching the stage to strive, not always very successfully, to obtain effects which the dramatist had hitherto considered impossible. One can say that already a new stage technique had come into existence, and with it the possibility of its exploitation. A new technique must always, it seems, be exploited for cheap sensations and self-advertisement. It took a long time for the talking film to get over its tendency to overdo the cheap noises and stunt effects of its first years. A story was deliberately halted in order to pull in a wholly irrelevant scene or episode which showed how wonderful the new medium could be. In a French film, *La Nuit est à Nous*, a man poured himself a drink. There was nothing wrong in this, as he was entitled to a thirst. The camera was suddenly put on the table close to the glass, and we were treated to a close-up sound effect of a liquid gurgling out of a bottle into the glass. This sort of cheap exploitation is usual in the early stages of a new discovery. In the case of the stage it took the form of exaggerating the continuity by using scenelets that were more or less irrelevant to the main theme and, in any case, entirely unnecessary. Fortunately there was little chance of catching the public imagination by this trick, because the ordinary resources of the

stage did not permit them to do so. Let us imagine that in *Escape* it had been possible to show Dennant running away, not only at the moments when he met the people who mattered in the development of the theme, but also at other times when he was assailed by fatigue, fear, doubt, and other sensations. A stupid producer might have been tempted to try out a series of connecting scenes showing these stages of the escape, very much as poor films still do, instead of leaving something to our imagination.[1] We may assume, therefore, that as soon as this sort of thing becomes possible some stupid fellow will immediately exploit it and produce absurd inartistic effects by doing so. Had *Three Flats* been produced in a succession of quick scenes moving from room to room, instead of in three flats which are all open before us on the stage the whole time, there might have been a danger of overdoing the interplay of simultaneous action by introducing unnecessary link scenes which would be better left to the imagination.

This is not the place to discuss the artistic effect of such link scenes. It is enough for our purpose to note that the mind of the present-day dramatist is beginning to move in the direction of attempting a full picture, complete with connecting scenes. Let us record at the same time the tendency to exploit it unnecessarily. We see that something better than this must be forthcoming if we are to justify the stage for forsaking its old tradition in favour of a new cinema technique.

At this point painful breaks in the action of a play, for the purpose of building many scenes, still presented an apparently insuperable obstacle. Some such breaks there had to be, fairly short ones if the scenes presented were shabbily furnished, or were shown in absurd little boxes which strained our credulity, or they were intolerably long if carefully-built, full-sized scenes were insisted on. Mr. Raymond Massey probably saw all this. In searching for a way of getting over the difficulty he fell upon the brilliant notion of using revolving stages.[2] In *Late Night Final*,

[1] In the film version of *Escape*, a British film, there was some restraint in the use of such connecting scenes in the flight, but that is because British film producers have an apparently incurable stage-complex, which keeps them from a number of excesses, and from a far greater number of successes.

[2] That is to say, the notion of using revolving stages for a *modern realistic play*. Mr. Max Reinhardt used a revolving stage before the war, notably for his famous production of Goethe's *Faust*. The many scenes of Goethe's play, of course, written under the inspiration of Shakespeare, have nothing to do with the realistic multiple-scene play of to-day. The difficulty of staging it had long made it a hard bone on which every ambitious producer tried his teeth. In using revolving stage for it Mr. Reinhardt was tackling a poetic play written in disregard or ignorance of the problems of realistic staging. Thus Mr. Reinhardt's experiment stands quite apart from the present use of the revolving stage for the production of works written by realistic dramatists who take account of modern staging conditions and work more or less in conjunction with the producer.

[3] A new production by Mr. Massey is *Grand Hotel*, adapted from the German of Vicki Baum. It is played at the Adelphi Theatre, with a special new stage. Stress is laid in the programme on the fact that the *mechanical* stage is here used

by Louis Weitzenkorn, we saw a stage production which is the nearest thing to a film that the theatre has given us yet. A scene is played in the chief editor's room in the centre stage. When a message is sent out, we see it being delivered in another smaller scene at the side of the stage. When the action shifts to the side, the revolving centre stage brings on a new scene. When a telephone call is put through, we see both ends of the wire at once and hear the conversation in the same way as we do on the films. We even see the connexion being made by the telephone operator in the exchange, and this is where Mr. Massey has fallen a victim to the temptation of cheap exploitation. It is obviously not in the least necessary for us to see how a call, however important it may be in the action, is put through.

Let us say at once that the multiple stage is used with extraordinary effect in this play. The ingenious arrangement of scenes enables the action to be so distributed among the various stages that there is never a moment's waiting. It seems that the problem of frequent intervals is here solved at last, and that nothing remains but to forge ahead and develop on the stage what is an almost exact cinema technique. The days of the old plot contortionist are over. Yet the success of *Late Night Final* does not blind us to the very real danger of showing artistically unnecessary link scenes. It will be interesting to watch Mr. Massey's use of the new technique.[3]

For a time the new method will probably present us with all sorts of crudities. Dramatists will rush to stage plots which have hitherto been barred from the stage. Producers and authors working together will show us the most amazing feats of high-speed stage action, in an attempt to beat the cinema at its own game. The opportunities for mere sensationalism will be enormous. A special type of producer will exploit the new medium. The sooner this is done, the better for the theatre. The discovery of a new artistic ideal in terms of the new technique will be brought about all the more quickly for the unrestrained exploitation of its cheaper side now. Possibly we shall be spared all this. Even if we are not, there will be the consolation that someone will arise who has discovered a set of modern unities for the new medium. We may even have a revival of the theatre.

This development will carry the cinema *v.* stage battle a further round or two. The fight may by then become three-

cornered—on the one hand a box-office war between the cinema and the multiple-stage play, and on the other hand an artistic war between both these and the old-fashioned three-act single-scene play of intellectual discussion. Then, just as we are wondering if the concentration of all theatrical activity in the capital is not bound to kill the theatre after all, some new invention, like television, may be perfected and put on the market, and the whole system of entertainment will be turned topsy-turvy once again. Or possibly, even before the time that stage is reached, the cinema, encouraged by the box-office success of its indoor tales of over-refined females with a tarnished past and hearts of gold, will have renounced for ever the glorious gallops in the great out-of-doors that made its reputation. We shall then have the strange spectacle of the theatre turning cinema in three dimensions, and the cinema becoming to all intents and purposes a two-dimension stage.

DAVID P. WILLIAMS.

for the first time in any theatre. The play is in nineteen scenes. Only one scene is shown at a time, and it occupies the whole stage. This play seems to stand somewhere between the old three-act play and the newest non-stop narrative represented by *Late Night Final*. It avoids the excesses of both and introduces a new one of its own. The scenes follow each other naturally in the way we have already seen possible only to the new technique. As, however, every scene is a wonder of spaciousness and realistic detail, a certain economy is necessary in ringing the changes, especially as each inter-scene wait is long enough to enable the hall to be partially lighted and filled with soft music from somewhere behind or under the stage. There is, therefore, considerably less speed than in *Late Night Final* and consequently less exploitation of continuity in the form of useless link scenes. The play combines some of the dignity of the old with some of the speed of the new. It is at once more cinema than the old three-act play, and more theatre than *Late Night Final*. It falls a victim, however—let us concede, somewhat excusably for a first attempt—to the temptation of showing off what the new stage can do in the way of gorgeously realistic scenery and acting. The action of the play sometimes slows into mere time-killing dialogue, while our attention is directed to what are admittedly triumphs of scene-building and equally brilliant management of background action, notably in the hotel entrance-hall scenes. It is an excess of which the cinema has long been guilty. As in the cinema, too, the theme of the play is almost entirely obscured by mere lavishness of production.

THACKERAY AND THE ARMY

THE gentleman who had the privilege of enjoying a ride on Mr. H. G. Wells's Time Machine has left us for ever disappointed. Surely it ought to have occurred to him that here was an unique opportunity, by some synchronisation and adjustment of the ponderous embowelments of the apparatus, to bring together and engage in conversation famous persons whose dogmatic and divergent views would have lent themselves to interesting argument. Suppose Dr. Johnson had revisited Versailles in order to overhear the meditations of Thackeray at 'those miles of canvas representing all the revolutionary battles of Valmy to Waterloo—all the triumphs of Louis XIV. and all the great men who flourished since the French empire began.' In his *Paris Sketch Book* Thackeray tells us that military heroes were most of these: 'Fierce constables in shining steel, marshals in voluminous wigs and brave grenadiers in bearskin caps; some dozens of whom gained crowns, principalities, dukedoms; some hundreds plunder and epaulets; some millions death in African sands, or on icy Russian plains under the guidance, and for the good, of that arch-hero Napoleon.'

As the Time Machine rider has failed us we must construct the conservation from material already extant and available: 'Sir,' said Dr. Johnson, 'the character of a soldier is high. They who stand forth the foremost in danger, for the community, have the respect of mankind. The profession of soldiers and sailors has the dignity of danger. Every man thinks meanly of himself for not having been a soldier or not having been at sea.' The peculiar respect paid to the military character in France would naturally be mentioned, and Boswell would remark, as he remarked in 1776, 'I should think that where military men were so numerous they would be less valued as not being rare.' Johnson: 'Nay, Sir, wherever a particular character or profession is high in the estimation of a people, those who are of it will be valued above other men.' To which Thackeray would of course have replied, in his words of the *Paris Sketch Book*: 'By far the greater part of "all the glories" of France (as of most other countries) is made up of these military men: and a fine satire it

is on the cowardice of mankind that they pay such an extraordinary homage to the virtue called courage, filling their history books with tales about it, and nothing but it.' He might then have quoted from his *Chronicle of the Drum*:

> Tell me what find we to admire
> In epaulets and scarlet coats,
> In men because they load and fire
> And know the art of cutting throats?

We would, indeed, give many history books and ballads to hear Dr. Johnson's reply to *that*.

We can scarcely doubt that Thackeray would have been silenced by the Doctor; indeed, he would have been convicted by the evidence of his own writings. It is true, indeed, that again and again Thackeray pokes fun at military men and things and more than once submits them to the *horribile flagellum* of his satire. There is a story of Thackeray, when an elderly man, accompanied by a friend, passing some palace or barracks at the gate of which was a sentry of the 11th Hussars. The sight of the head-dress, the yellow braiding, and the cherry-coloured pantaloons of that distinguished regiment (it was incidentally 'Prince Albert's Own,' and anything connected with the Prince Consort was as a red rag to Thackeray) so infuriated the satirist that he broke out into a torrent of criticism which his scandalised friend had great difficulty in silencing. But in spite of incidents such as this, and of scores of jests and jibes at the expense of military men and matters, it is clear that at heart Thackeray took a real interest in old, forgotten far-off things of war and in battles long ago.

Was there ever a novelist who relied to such an extent upon military men and military incidents for the characters and setting of his works? His greatest novel of all, *Henry Esmond*, is frankly a military romance. The characterisation and atmosphere of its sequel, *The Virginians*, are, too, chiefly military throughout. Even in the three masterpieces of which the plot is on civil rather than military lines the latter element is very strong. What would *Pendennis* be without its Major?—not to mention poor Cos, whom Pen once tactlessly described to his infuriated uncle as 'like yourself a military man'—or *The Newcomes* without its Colonel? As well ask what would *Hamlet* be without the Prince of Denmark. *Vanity Fair* is described by the author himself as A Novel without a Hero. But it is primarily a study in contrast between the characters of three young officers of the army—Rawdon Crawley, George Osborne, and William Dobbin. And if there is no hero there is certainly a 'heroine' in the sense of a predominating female character. But Becky Sharp became

a soldier's wife, and the whole turning-point of the story, the alienation of George Osborne's affection, is set in one of the most well-known military scenes of English history—Brussels on the eve of Waterloo.

Thackeray, indeed, revelled in war, and he must clearly have made a close study of military history. 'Have not these eyes,' he declares in the sixty-fourth chapter of *The Virginians*, 'have not these eyes beheld the battle grounds of Leipzig, Jena, Dresden, Waterloo, Blenheim, Bunker's Hill and New Orleans?' These were no chance visits, but pilgrimages deliberately undertaken by Thackeray when he happened to be in the theatre of war where each of those great episodes of the Marlburian and Napoleonic wars, and of the two contests between England and America, took place. The results of his study on the ground and in his library are patent in his books. Blenheim itself and the campaign which culminated in it are described with clearness and accuracy. The story of Ramillies, though briefer, is hardly less effective. Oudenarde, indeed, is merely a thumb-nail sketch, and Malplaquet is remarkable more for the exaggerated account of the casualties suffered than for accurate delineation. The losses were used to Marlborough's detriment by his political opponents, and it is clear that Thackeray must have got his information from *ex parte* narratives rather than from official sources. He makes Esmond say, 'Every village and family in England was deploring the death of beloved sons and fathers. We dared not speak to each other, even at table, of Malplaquet, so fearful were the gaps left in our army by the cannon of that bloody action.' Actually the British losses were comparatively light; they were but a fraction of those suffered by our allies the Dutch; and the average loss per battalion was little over 50 per cent. of that incurred at Blenheim.

The terrible disaster to Braddock on the Monongahela in 1755 is not only clearly told in *The Virginians*, but the circumstances which led up to it are accurately summarised. The French owned not only Canada but the 'valley' of the Mississippi as well, and collision between the French descending southwards and the British colonies expanding westwards was of course but a matter of time. The question came to an issue on the Ohio River in the year 1753 when French and British settlers met. To be sure, as Thackeray rightly remarks, there existed other people besides French and British who thought they had a title to the territory about which the children of the White Father were battling—namely, the native Indians; 'but theologians of St. James's and Versailles wisely chose to consider the matter in dispute as a European and not a Red Man's question, eliminating him from the argument but employing his tomahawk as it might serve the

turn of either litigant.' The tomahawk and the bullet, too (for the Indian was handy with a gun, and firearms were in Indian hands more than a century before 1755), were too much for poor Ned Braddock and his two raw red-coat regiments (not 'veteran' regiments, as Thackeray puts it) newly arrived from England, and incidentally very nearly cut short the career of young George Warrington. Thackeray had clearly read up the most authoritative accounts of the action, although he hardly stresses the fact that the victory achieved by the enemy was largely an Indian rather than a French one, for in the action the red men outnumbered their French regular allies by just nine to one. Braddock himself is well drawn—a soldier of what was even then the 'old school,' a martinet of old-fashioned views but not without ability, a good judge of men, of great driving power, inclined to despise everything 'colonial,' but brave himself as a lion.

It was hardly likely that a writer with such an interest in military events, as was Thackeray, would pass over the Seven Years' War as a background to be employed. It serves, indeed, for the stage on which *Barry Lyndon* is presented, and through the mouth of that young gentleman Thackeray gives us his views of the war itself. Very wisely he declares that it would require a greater historian and philosopher than himself to explain its causes and origins; 'and indeed its origin has always appeared to me to be so complicated and the books written about it so amazingly hard to understand, that I have seldom been much wiser at the end of a chapter than at the beginning.' Unfortunately for Thackeray his informant has quite obviously confused the War of the Austrian Succession with the Seven Years' War, which did not occur until eight years later. Barry provides quite a useful account of the battle of Minden, but he has betrayed his author into the customary *bêtise* about 'my Lord George Sackville' when Thackeray says that 'orders were brought to Lord George to charge with the cavalry and finish the rout of the Frenchmen, when he refused to do so and thereby spoiled the great victory.' As a matter of fact, Lord George was in the very act of ordering a charge on his own account when confused orders reached him to suspend his advance and to move his squadrons behind the infantry, in the centre. It can be said for Thackeray that he erred in good company; even Carlyle, who quotes the court-martial proceedings, makes a curious hash of the evidence, owing to his ignorance of military technique. In *Lovel the Widower*, chapter v., Thackeray declares that Lord George Sackville's inaction was not due to want of courage, and that he was 'a brave man and as cool as a cucumber under fire'; but the context shows that this statement is altogether ironical. We

can well imagine Dr. Johnson, in the interview we have suggested, repeating to Thackeray the wise remark he once made to Boswell: 'Many things which are false are transmitted from book to book and gain credit in the world.'

The other great theatre of the Seven Years' War—that in North America, where was played the drama of Quebec—affords Thackeray further opportunity of revealing his grasp of military history. The campaign by Wolfe is admirably described in *The Virginians*; the failures below the city are graphically told; and the extraordinary solution devised by Wolfe is analysed with a dispassionate criticism which shows that Thackeray had gone far beyond mere popular accounts of the campaign. Indeed, his contempt for such travesties on truth is very clearly marked in two significant ways. He makes Harry Warrington state in his letter that Wolfe never uttered a word after receiving his death wound, a circumstance which led George Warrington to declare that 'the phrase which has been put into the mouth of the dying hero may be considered as no more authentic than an oration of Livy or Thucydides.' Possibly Thackeray is here in the wrong—at least, the weight of evidence is against him. But he deserves the thanks of all reasoning beings for deliberately omitting the preposterous myth of the recitation by Wolfe of Gray's *Elegy* in a hazardous night operation in which strict silence had, by Wolfe's own orders, been imposed under penalty of death.[1] A curious error in Thackeray's account is his phrase about 'the army marshalled in darkness and carried silently up the midnight river.' The voyage was of course *down* stream, for the greater part of the troops had, some time previously, been brought several miles above Quebec. Again, like almost every English writer, Thackeray appears to be in sublime ignorance of the predominant part played by Amherst, the British commander-in-chief, in the conquest of Canada. Sir John Fortescue, in his *History of the British Army*, does that great soldier justice; but his is but a voice crying in the wilderness, for within the last four years a well-known English military writer has blandly conferred the title of 'Conqueror of Canada' upon Wolfe. Nothing will make the average Englishman comprehend that Wolfe's capture of Quebec was not permanent. It was quickly challenged, and the city was rescued only in the nick of time by a British fleet. The surrender of Canada took place, not in 1759, but in 1760; not to James Wolfe, but to Jeffery Amherst; not at Quebec, but at Montreal. So ignorant, indeed, was Thackeray of the achievements of Amherst that he confers upon Wolfe the credit for the capture of Louisburg in 1758, an injustice as profound as would

[1] For an exposure of the myth see 'Wolfe and Gray's *Elegy*,' *The Fighting Forces*, October 1930.

be the conferring on Picton or Ponsonby, to the exclusion of Wellington, the credit for Waterloo.

Thackeray's close study of the American War of Independence is revealed also in *The Virginians*. Thirteen years earlier in *Barry Lyndon* he had quoted some extracts from a letter of young Lord Bullingdon from America, but these reveal a very sketchy knowledge on the part of Thackeray. But for the sequel to *Esmond* he had quite clearly read up the war very carefully. His accuracy is displayed by his use of the term Breed's Hill—which is correct for the more usually accepted Bunker's Hill, the real fact being that it was upon the former hill that the Americans erected their main work in their attempt to seize and hold the Charlestown peninsula during the siege of Boston. Thackeray's interest in the military aspect of the American Revolution is indeed so marked that he surveys the whole struggle, giving details of the various phases and adding to them criticisms which are by no means without value. These occur in *The Virginians* in the ninetieth and ninety-first chapters, and there are few important tactical incidents omitted from the whole long six years' struggle. There is the siege of Boston and the battle known as that of Bunker's Hill; the first and unsuccessful attempt to exploit the South; the battle of Brooklyn; the fighting north of New York; a summary of Burgoyne's disastrous expedition; the inactivity of Howe at Philadelphia; some reference to Cornwallis's exploits in the Carolinas, and a short narrative of his surrender at Yorktown. The story is told, indeed, in a rambling and disconnected way, inevitable, however, as a result of the literary artifice by which the war is looked at through the eyes of the Warrington boys fighting on different sides, and not always present at the same engagements. It is curious that, although a fervid admirer of Washington, Thackeray makes but the vaguest allusion to the lightning strokes on Trenton and Princeton; and it is a little unjust to Howe to omit altogether the great tactical stroke on the Brandywine. There are errors of commission, as well, in Thackeray's account, but not of a very serious nature. It is, however, a 'howler' to say that Clinton led the final charge on Breed's Hill; and why Thackeray should describe Long Island (nearly 120 miles in length) as a 'small' island is difficult to understand. The chief interest, however, in Thackeray's account of the War of Independence lies not in actual tactical narrative so much as in his views on the struggle as a whole which he puts into the mouth of his spokesman George Warrington. 'I take or rather took the English side of the disputes. They say the colonies were tried and tyrannised over; I say the home Government was tried and tyrannised over.' Thackeray clearly thought that we should have won, and he blames Howe for his unwillingness to storm the entrenchments at Brooklyn, and for his luxurious ease at Philadelphia while Washington's army, in its sufferings at Valley Forge, but a score of miles away, ought to have suggested a policy of attack. Reviewing the war, after its inglorious termination to England, Thackeray says again with the voice of George Warrington, 'I wonder at the curious chances which lost it: and, putting aside any idle talk of the respective bravery of the two nations, can't but see that we had the best cards and that we lost the game.'

Eleven years before the appearance of *The Virginians* Thackeray had, in *Vanity Fair*, presented the public with a story of which the outstanding scene is the campaign of Waterloo. The actual battles which occurred in it—those of Ligny, Quatre-Bras, and Waterloo itself—are merely mentioned; but the allusions are exact and reveal an accurate knowledge of the course of events. Further, Thackeray had been at pains to study the whole military situation in Europe when the Congress of Vienna broke up and the Great Powers declared that Napoleon as an enemy and disturber of the world must be delivered up to public justice. This time Thackeray's mouthpiece is Jos Sedley, of all people, encouraging poor Emmy:

> There are three hundred thousand Rooshians, I tell you, now entering France by Mayence and the Rhine—three hundred thousand under Wittgenstein and Barclay de Tolly, my poor love. You don't know military affairs my dear, I do, and I tell you there's no infantry in France can stand against Rooshian infantry, then there are the Austrians, they are five hundred thousand if a man, and they are under Schwartzenberg and Prince Charles. Then there are the Prooshians under the gallant Prince Marshal. Show me a chief like him now that Murat is gone. Hey, Mrs. O'Dowd? Do you think our little girl here need be afraid?

And the gallant Jos bade Isidor fetch more beer. His figures, indeed, have an error of nearly 100 per cent., but through him Thackeray gives his readers a very fair presentment of the whole strategical situation which is often overlooked even by writers of to-day.

It is tantalising that Thackeray shows us so little of Wellington himself during those days at Brussels. The commander-in-chief was apparently one of the little troop of horsemen of the 'very greatest personages in Brussels among whom could be seen Rebecca in the prettiest and tightest of riding habits on her beautiful little Arab'; but although Mrs. O'Dowd cried out 'Sure it's the Juke himself' (at which Jos began to blush violently), unfortunately she would not dream of 'introjuicing' herself unless and until his Grace should think proper to remember the family tie between the Wellesleys and the Malonys, which, unfortunately, his Grace never did. In *Pendennis* we have indeed a

'close-up' of the Duke when, years later, he offered two fingers to the major and said gravely, 'How do Pendennis? Fine day.' But we should have liked more than that. Of Marlborough we have not even so much. Thackeray does not make John Churchill speak; although Henry Esmond tells us that he was always cold, calm and resolute, whether at a carouse of drunken German lords, or at a monarch's court, or a cottage table where his plans were laid, or in front of an enemy's battery vomiting flame and death; and even the disgruntled Webb acknowledges his courage: 'I don't say he's not brave. Curse him! he's brave enough. But we'll wait for the *Gazette*, gentlemen.' Wolfe is shown both at the Wells in time of peace and on the Heights of Abraham in his hour of death. The physical attributes of the young colonel are accurately described—the tall, thin, plain soldier; but Thackeray, in making him grave and solemn, has been misled. Wolfe was shy and awkward at times, but he was impetuous with tongue and pen. Of all his military characters with none are we brought face to face so frequently as with George Washington. Thackeray, however, gives us the Washington of American convention, and not the Washington of one of his most recent American biographers, Mr. Rupert Hughes, where the father of his country is seen to be much more ordinary clay than his eulogists have been prepared to admit.

The extent to which Thackeray relied upon war for his literary effects reveals also the fact that he had a deep pride in the military history of his country. If he was not actually a true John Bull to the extent of holding that 'one Englishman is as good as three Frenchmen,' nevertheless his insularity may have been responsible for the deplorable bad taste, not to say the sheer vulgarity, of his long narrative of the Second Funeral of Napoleon in the guise of an eye-witness's account by the egregious Mr. Titmarsh. Yet Thackeray could be unkind to the British Army. Even when, at Boulogne, he makes merry at the expense of the little French soldiers, 'four-feet high, red breeched and with huge pom-poms in their caps,' he compares them favourably with 'the heavy louts one has seen swaggering about the garrison towns in England.' Amongst the dubious British characters—poor Rawdon Crawley and Mr. Deuceace amongst them—who used to haunt French watering-places 'officers of dragoon regiments' have their place. Most of his dragoon officers were rickety little captains with high-heeled boots, and Captain Clarence Baker was such a little black sheep that he had little feet and little hands, a little moustache, and a little chest from which came 'a cough surprisingly loud and dismal.' Or, if they belong to heavy dragoons, they are sulky and dense like Sir Derby Oaks (in spite of Cos's eulogy, 'A young man of refoined manners, polite affabilitee and princely fortune. His table is sumptuous; he's adawred in the regiment: and he rides sixteen stone'), or like Captain Grig in 'Mrs. Perkins's Ball'—'faultless on parade; excellent across country: aimable when drunk; rather slow when sober. He has not two ideas, and is a most good-natured, irreproachable, gallant and stupid young officer.' Most of the officers and their womenfolk in George Osborne's regiment are uneducated, vulgar and uncouth.

In his *Military Snobs* Thackeray is at the parting of the ways. Is the British Army a noble institution or an abomination? He faces the issue and frankly says, in the opening paragraph, that, although nothing can be more insufferable than a military snob, so no society in the world is more agreeable than that of well-bred and well-informed military gentlemen. We can therefore smile at the Grigs, the Rags, and the Famishes and the other 'vacuous, good-natured, gentleman-like, rickety little lieutenants sauntering along Pall Mall in high-heeled little boots or rallying round the standard of their regiment in the Palace Court.' We can smile, too, over the heavy dragoon, 'with his great stupid pink face and yellow moustachios—a vacuous, solemn, foolish but brave and honourable Snob.' Even Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir George Tufto—'selfish, brutal, passionate and a glutton; a greater ass at sixty-eight than when he first entered the Army at fifteen'—leaves our withers unwrung, for Thackeray closes his *Military Snobs* with an exhortation to civilians not to sneer at the acquirements of the army, but to study the noble deeds and brilliant valour that marked Aliwal and Ferozeshah.

There were, however, certain aspects of the military profession which Thackeray loathed. He had the greatest contempt for the outward trappings and adornment of the army. The tailor's bill for young Wellesley Ponto's kit as a subaltern in the 120th Queen's Own Pyebald Hussars makes him call upon all parents and guardians, all men and women of sense in England, all legislators about to meet in Parliament, to read over 'that absurd catalogue of insane gimcracks and madman's tomfoolery.' Thackeray, however, was quite incapable of realising what uniform means to a soldier and of understanding what we call 'regimental spirit' and tradition. The sanctity of the colours was quite beyond his ken. The salute rendered to the colours at guard mounting at St. James's Palace appeared to him merely as 'a magnificent piece of tomfoolery.' Here, again, a record of what Dr. Johnson would have said would be of priceless interest. Probably he would have shown how the Romans valued their eagles of old. How to lose the colours was a terrible disgrace—*magnum perdere crimen erat.* How Regulus, nobly urging the Senate to decline the Carthaginian offer of peace, and a mutual

ransoming of prisoners, used as his most powerful argument those words '*Signa ego Punicis adfixa vidi.*' And how the standard-bearer of the Tenth Legion leaped into the waters crying out, 'I at least will go in duty to Rome and to Cæsar.'

Thackeray, too, was ever the foe of privilege, whether it was in the form of extra opportunities for advancement conceded to certain officers, or the inequality which must necessarily exist in any army between the officers and other ranks. The first question was simply that of purchase, the anomalies and evils of which seem almost incredible to us to-day. To Thackeray the system was an abomination.

> When I read in the *Gazette* such announcements as 'Lieutenant and Captain Grig from the Bombardier Guards to be Captain *vice* Grizzle who retires' I know what becomes of the Peninsular Grizzle: I follow him in spirit to the humble country town where he takes up his quarters and occupies himself with the most desperate attempts to live like a gentleman, on half the stipend of a tailor's foreman; and I picture to myself little Grig rising from rank to rank skipping from one regiment to another with an increased grade in each, avoiding disagreeable foreign service and ranking as a colonel at thirty—all because he has money, and Lord Grigsby is his father, who had the same luck before him.

There had been, indeed, some curious features of purchase. In 1795 Hew Dalrymple wrote home from the Low Countries that:

> There is not a young man in the army that cares one farthing whether his commanding officer, his brigadier or the commander-in-chief approves his conduct or not. His promotion depends not on their smiles and frowns. His friends can give him a thousand pounds with which he goes to the auction room in Charles Street and becomes a captain. Out of fifteen regiments of cavalry and twenty-six of infantry here twenty-one are commanded by boys or idiots.

Things had improved somewhat in Thackeray's day. Nevertheless, some years before his death it was reported by a Royal Commission that in one regiment the commanding officer had joined the service two years later than the senior subaltern. In another there was a captain of forty-seven years' service who had fought at Waterloo, at which time not a single officer of the regiment, except the commanding officer, had even been born. There was, however, the other side of the shield. Thackeray does not tell us that his white-haired boy James Wolfe had bought himself into the command of the 20th when scarcely out of his legal infancy; and when Thackeray was a child the leading English soldier was an aristocrat who had purchased the command of a regiment in his twenties. This was 'the Juke himself.' Even Thackeray himself vouches for the value of the products of

purchase. 'Let us concede that the high-born Grig rode into the entrenchments at Sobraon as gallantly as Corporal Wallop the ex-ploughboy.' He might have extended the concession to the other great battles narrated in his works—to Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde and Malplaquet; to Minden and Quebec; to Bunker's Hill, and to Waterloo.

The year 1846 was an outstanding one in Thackeray's career. In it he established his reputation by the *Snob Papers*, now better known as *The Book of Snobs;* his great works *Vanity Fair, Pendennis, Esmond, The Newcomes*, and *The Virginians* are subsequent to that date. The whole aspect of Thackeray towards the army and military life was undoubtedly coloured by a distressing incident which occurred in the year in question. In 1846 a private named John White, of the 7th Hussars, died in the military hospital at Hounslow as the result of a flogging administered for insubordinate conduct. There was immediate outcry throughout the country. The Duke of Wellington himself on learning of the unfortunate occurrence declared 'This must not occur again,' adding, however, the curious condition that he would agree only to the punishment being administered so as 'not to lead to loss of life or limb.' The harrowing details brought out at the coroner's inquest strongly affected the public mind, and the nation, which had for years taken little real interest in the army, was shocked to learn from a return issued that in a period of five years 3355 soldiers had undergone corporal punishment; in other words, that, omitting Sundays, two floggings at least occurred every day in the British Army. The maximum number of lashes, often inflicted, was 300; and, frightful though this punishment appeared, many people were horrified to realise for the first time that not so very far back soldiers had been flayed alive by the administration of 1000 lashes or more. The generous heart of Thackeray was fired with indignation at the atrocities revealed. With biting irony he penned a scathing article against the whole army system, angrily denouncing the state of affairs by which there was as much social difference between the officer and his men as between a warder and a convict gang in the hulks. He appealed to the Prince Consort to use his influence to abolish the infernal torture of the 'cat.' 'Rather let us lose a battle than flog a soldier.' Something was indeed done. The maximum number of lashes was reduced to fifty. But the abominable, inhuman, and degrading punishment continued for many years. Three thousand floggings were administered in the Crimean War. Here and there old officers and soldiers still survive who have witnessed a flogging parade. Men were scourged in the field as late as the Zulu War of 1879. It was left to an Irishman to protest with such vigorous scorn against this degradation of a

noble profession as to induce England to remove the blot from her 'scutcheon. That man was Charles Stewart Parnell.[1]

Students of Thackeray will have no difficulty in attributing the occasional tirades against the British Army, in his later works, to this tragedy of 1846. Apart from that, it must be admitted that during Thackeray's life the army was not at its best. He was born in 1811 and died in 1863, so that his years of understanding began with the long peace and closed not long after the Crimea and the Indian Mutiny, two wars in which—certainly in one of them—the military system of England clearly showed that much was to be desired. That Thackeray could yield a generous meed of praise to skilful commanders is shown by his *obiter dicta* concerning the Sikh War of 1845–1849, some of which have been quoted in this article; but the social life of the officers in garrison at home was unpleasing to him. A survey of it would extend this article to inordinate length, but those who have studied contemporary letters, memoirs, and magazines will probably agree that there was much to which a satirist like Thackeray might not unreasonably take exception. The famous trial by his peers of Lord Cardigan in 1841 raised the curtain upon an unpleasant state of affairs in one of the crack cavalry regiments of the Army, caused by the tyrannical and overbearing conduct of its commanding officer. In 1845 the *Quarterly Review*, in an article upon 'The Moral Discipline of the Army,' had some severe things to say about its officers and their idleness, their extravagance, their partiality for dog-fights and badger-baiting, and 'as for adultery, fornication and all uncleanliness—these are trifles not worth considering.' A dozen years earlier, when Thackeray was just entering manhood, a curious sidelight is thrown upon mess life by an article in the *United Service Magazine* where officers ('I cannot call them *gentlemen*') are revealed reading the newspapers 'in dressing-gowns, without braces, in slippers and unwashed,' actually in the mess-room. 'Swearing by uncouth oaths, telling brutal stories, and talking indecently and improperly before servants' was the manner in which these *fainéants* apparently passed their time. These things are of course but straws, but they show how the wind blew in Thackeray's time. No wonder when the death of poor Private White shocked the nation that Thackeray could well believe that the whole military system called for revision, and that he prayed for the time 'when epaulets should not be sold; when corporal

[1] It is characteristic of the cruel humour of W. S. Gilbert that in *H.M.S. Pinafore*, first produced in 1878, he has a comic song about the 'cat,' and a cat-o'-nine-tails was a stage property. Whether that degrading instrument of torture is still exhibited the present writer does not know. But he has seen it brandished during a performance of *H.M.S. Pinafore*.

punishments should be abolished; and when Corporal Smith should have a chance to have his gallantry awarded as well as that of Lieutenant Grig.'

Yet deep in his heart Thackeray had a warm corner for the British officer. During his tour in Ireland he was shown over the Incorporated Society's school at Dundalk and was loud in its praises. 'I never saw in any public school in England, sixty cleaner, smarter, more gentleman-like boys.' The fees were but £13 a year. Instantly Thackeray's thoughts turned to the old Grizzles. 'What a place,' he wrote, 'to know of would this be for many a poor half-pay officer where he may put his children in all confidence that they will be soundly educated.' It is significant, too, that in forecasting the future of young George Champion, the Admirable Crichton of Dr. Birch's academy, Thackeray says of him that 'he does his work in a sound downright way, and he is made to be the bravest of soldiers, the best of country parsons, an honest gentleman wherever he may go.' The army, after all, was not officered entirely by Rawdon Crawleys and MacMurdos, by Famishes and by Grigs.

F. E. WHITTON.

POST-WAR FRANCE AND GERMAN CULTURE

In view of the considerable attention devoted to-day to problems of international relations, it is remarkable to what extent the internal problems of Western culture are, if not neglected, left to a few national experts. Most would admit the importance of free interchange, the prime advantage of access to neighbouring cultures, unhindered by tariff walls of national prejudice and limited outlook, but the corollaries of this truism many of us refuse to draw. Consider, for example, the efforts made towards the understanding of international politics, compared with the disregard of intellectual and literary movements which lie behind and surely often condition them. We endow professorships for international relations, and construe them almost entirely in terms of diplomacy. To take a particular case, our criticism of French foreign policy too frequently shows ignorance or disregard of the workings of the French mind.

There is evidence, of course, to warrant the optimism of those who assume no problem here. Such publicity is given to the interchange of ideas and to foreign matter in general that no well-informed person need fear national isolation of the old type. Our review columns are cosmopolitan in their attentions; we read the opinions of Dibelius and Maurois on ourselves, and abroad we find that our hosts know Conrad, Galsworthy, and Shaw better than we do. But for those not satisfied with superficial gleanings it is in the first place evident that a host of difficulties arise from the main fact of the situation, which is surely this—that the various national sections of European culture are all recovering with more or less doubtful success from the blasting effect of war. To imply, as most of us tend to do, that recovery means reconciliation, an almost natural abandonment of hostility, is, I fear, a gratuitous assumption. My present purpose is to examine somewhat closely a limited section of the evidence.

Is there anything to show that thirteen years of outward peace have effected a definite change in intellectual relations? Visible antagonism has to a certain extent disappeared, but what has taken its place? May I quote some words written by Paul Valéry in 1919?

> The military crisis is perhaps at an end; the economic crisis is seen to be at its height, but the intellectual crisis is more subtle and is forced by its very nature to appear in most deceptive forms, since its sphere of action is the domain of dissimulation; it is difficult to apprehend and to delimit.

The severest consequences of this state of things are by no means liquidated, and it should therefore be of interest to examine how the chief Continental antagonists now stand. Such a task would daunt the most practised observer, and I wish only to put before you an impression of the one side of the question, certain features of the present French attitude to things German.

Let us first recognise the efforts towards *rapprochement* visible to any careful observer of French life. There are various signs of cordiality in the sphere of ideas and of letters. There is free and wide interchange of books; literary reviews give lists and devote articles to all important new publications from Germany. Reviews other than literary which seem definitely to pursue international understanding are conspicuous and well-edited. Besides the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, invaluable for contemporary psychology, the most active are perhaps the *Revue des Vivants* and the *Revue Européenne*. As if these were not enough, intellectual relations with Germany have boasted since 1927 a separate organ in the *Revue d'Allemagne*, which has boldly sought co-operation in all branches of science and letters upon which amicable discussion is deemed possible. Apart from such enterprise, and in many ways more important, is the teaching and study of German in the universities and some, though not very much, opportunity of travel and study in Germany.

Such, we would fain believe, are straws showing the way of the wind. But their extent and value is hard to control. They may be a minimum, since the total interruption of intellectual relations would be in these days unthinkable. We may say that they prove German culture to be within the horizon of the student, but how far does it attract the thinking Frenchman? Here the bulk of the evidence shows rather repulsion, irritation, resulting in criticism that tends to be harsh and (though often not with intent) unsympathetic. When such an attitude appears in leaders of thought—journalists, critics, professors—it calls for serious and patient investigation. It is well to give instances before considering possible motives behind them. It may be objected that the testimonies cited are too close to the war to form a basis for conclusions, and it is just here that we touch one of the strangest aspects of the problem. Many of the most up-to-date and frequently commended judgments on German culture at the disposal of Frenchmen to-day are patently either an effect or an echo of war propaganda. This term denotes something

different from what most Englishmen understand by it. In this country propaganda was largely practical and ceased with the cessation of military danger; it was anonymous and undistinguished. But in France, where so many more of the national liberties were threatened than in our case, the issue was immediately carried on to the intellectual and literary plane and kept there by the chief men of the time. Not only was the civilisation of France assailed in 1914, but the deep trend of the national mind towards literature, of which Lord D'Abernon has recently reminded us, would push such attack into the literary arena with much more insistence than we in England imagine. Read the war numbers of such periodicals as the *Revue Bleue*, the *Revue de Paris*, the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, even the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, and you find them full of passionate defence of French culture as opposed to that of Germany. Further, many of the most lucid of these articles have since been published in book form, with little annotation except in the direction of confirming the views originally expressed, have been well received, and are to-day pointed out as authoritative. This state of things conditions the trend of our inquiry.

What is one to say, for example, when directed to Jacques Rivière's *L'Allemand* as the most able summary available of present German psychology? It is not the whole truth, we are told, but is essential to an understanding of the German people. There is evidence that the book is read and approved by thinking Frenchmen; it is one of those which a student of German culture in France will read most carefully, for its sincerity is as remarkable as the brilliance of its writing. Yet this essay in psychology is none other, as the sub-title states, than 'souvenirs et réflexions d'un prisonnier de guerre.' The author, who died prematurely in 1924, was certainly one of the keenest of the present generation of French critics. Apart from the editorship of the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, he had time to publish comparatively little, and his best thought is to be found in the volumes of correspondence with Fournier and Claudel (indispensable to the student of the spiritual and intellectual background of French literature), a volume of studies, a novel, and these war souvenirs of over three years' captivity, published in 1918. They contain nothing exceptional in the way of incident, and are really a pitiless moral judgment on the mentality of the various gaolers with whom Rivière came in contact. They seem for the most part to have been ignorant, careless, and brutal men, not essentially different from the soldiery of all nations, but one can imagine the reaction of a keen French mind whose every movement and impulse is limited and subjected for years to such restriction. The book makes stern reading, and there is no call to repeat here its

analysis. Rivière was especially struck by the indifference of the German, his patience and stolidity, almost entire lack of moral sense that allows his actions to be determined by 'la morale du possible,' the strength of will that works miracles of discipline, order and endurance, and hand in hand with this the constant inability to react individually to circumstance which makes him, in a telling phrase, 'monstrueusement éducable.' The reputation and influence of this important document leave no uncertainty as to the issues of our problem. From one point of view it is just that, in a state of civilisation which allows in time of war the intellectuals of one people to be at the mercy of inferior and hostile types of another, oppression should evoke passionate opposition which in its turn will be the biggest obstacle to the resumption of normal cultural relations; that principle affects all nations alike, and justifies, if you will, such books as *L'Allemand*. But I submit, on the other hand, that such testimony, if taken as authoritative by a succeeding generation, is so misleading as to be fraught with the gravest consequence. Can we wonder that co-operation, intellectual and otherwise, is impossible if such be the preparation?

It is characteristic of this sensitive critic that he debates in a preface the dilemma into which the prospect of making his notes public had drawn him. 'Had I the right,' he says, 'to contribute to the increase of hate and pain in the world?' After reflection he replies to himself thus:

> I found that really I had misjudged the depth of my antagonism to the Germans. There was between us an incompatibility of temper so fundamental and so absolute . . . that in sparing them what I had to say about them I was condemning myself to death. . . . I purge myself of the German, as France has been doing with such dramatic patience for more than four years.

When allowance has been made for war sentiment, this incompatibility of temper remains as a present fact of the situation. Indeed, a later testimony from the same pen shows that *L'Allemand* dealt in larger issues than the mere resentment of a prisoner. Commenting in his own review on the failure of the London Reparations Conference in 1921, Rivière used words remarkable for their sense of the gravity of continued misunderstanding:

> It is almost terrifying to realise to what extent the two worlds of thought represented by France and Germany have continued since the coming of peace to gravitate away from reconciliation. To anyone interested in psychology it is a spectacle at once enticing and full of despair. The two mentalities seem caught in a movement preventing them either from uniting or separating; in everything they continue to keep their distance. Any and every event or problem show up the same divergence of estimate.

The article tends to seek the proof of this estrangement in the respective place of memory in the French and the German outlook. The latter, both by intent and inclination, neglect the past. When the present is there with new problems it is useless to remember: *es hat kein en Zweck.* (Rivière makes play with their untranslatable *Sachlichkeit.*) The French, on the other hand, have a constant and active memory of things past; for them there is no liquidation in view of present necessity: 'Nous sommes le peuple le moins pardonnant de la terre, celui chez qui il y a le moins de chance que le cœur jamais déblaie l'esprit . . . il n'y a pas de Loslösung pour nous.' Proof of the soundness of this psychology is afforded by the remarks of Fritz Neumann, writing in the first number of the *Revue d'Allemagne*, on the impression of certain French pieces played in Germany. Commenting on Raynal's *Tombeau sous l'arc de Triomphe*, he is amazed at the continuance of old methods of thought and technique in France. The war seems there to have made no difference; while the Germans have had to discard all their old forms of expression, the French still think along the old grooves.

We may take as second witness a greater than Rivière, one of the most delicately French and at the same time most cosmopolitan of literary artists, André Gide. As soon as *L'Allemand* became known, he reinforced its impression by his *Reflexions sur l'Allemagne* in the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, republished in 1925 in the volume *Incidences*, and quoted the other day by a critic as the most suggestive matter on our subject. Gide applies to German culture the usual distinction of weakness in individual and power in concerted action, and notes that Germans lack the sense of outline and profile, hence are without really convincing dramatists or novelists. Under-estimating single personalities, they influence other literatures but cannot create figures in their own. Further, Gide supports his friend's dictum that 'les Allemands ne sont jamais distraits,' so intent on the matter in hand that they can only think of one thing at a time, whereas the Frenchman has in mind a hundred beside his work. These, of course, are controversial points which we must not now discuss, except as they show the manner of reaction which the most alert of post-war critics show to Germany. It seems that years of antagonism have given a decided twist, so to say, to the French estimate of German psychology, a sharpness the more elusive because unintended. The main interest of Gide's views, however, lies, not in his criticisms of Germany, but of France: 'La France est perdue par la rhétorique,' he writes, 'peuple oratoire habile à se payer de mots . . . pour averti que je sois, je n'échappe pas à cela et reste, encore que le dénonçant, oratoire.' Hence it would be folly to shut out German influence, indispensable for the advance

of French culture. This is no isolated view, and there is no need to emphasise its importance: it intensifies the interest of the issues at stake. No one has put it more convincingly than Gide himself; commenting in 1921 on the fact that many are considering afresh the question of renewed intercourse with German culture, he declares roundly that in the three years since the war France has lost ground, morally and intellectually; movements of thought and expression in Germany, instead of as heretofore looking to France for inspiration, are beginning to renounce contact with Western Europe and seek instead that of their Eastern neighbours. Gide quotes Curtius, the German of all others whose studies of modern France have been most widely noted by French critics, and the point of view throws fresh light on the problem: 'Germany has ceased to look towards France with any expectation. To attract her gaze some outstanding personality must arise to prove that the ancient traditions of France and her unquenchable vitality have still something that will nourish the world, that she can provide other than tempting variations of psychological analysis and literary niceties, and that she is capable of crossing the barriers of artistic auto-dissection and conservative nationalism to bear a word of spiritual life into the broken concert of Europe.'

These bypaths of comment serve at least to show the publicity given to the difficulties which beset renewed understanding, and which become increasingly apparent if we examine further cases in which articles of the war period are reprinted in volumes read by to-day's public. M. René Gillouin, for example, whose *Trois Crises* caused much comment two years ago, published in 1919 a volume of excellent critical essays, the first of which was 'La formation du germanisme,' reprinted from the *Revue de Paris* of 1915. The conclusion is that against the Prussian will to power must be upheld the French will to truth, goodness and beauty, a thesis which, however justified in time of war, and perhaps also as a historical document, can only clog the wheels of peace by evoking passionate opposition.

In 1922 the French Academy bestowed the Grand Prix de Littérature on Pierre Lasserre 'pour l'ensemble de ses œuvres,' the latest of which had just appeared, being a collection of essays called after the opening one: *Cinquante Ans de Pensée Française.* Lasserre, who died quite recently, was the foremost of the nationalist critics in the full classical tradition, a temperament quite opposed to that of either Rivière or Gide. We shall refer later to his theory of German culture, but for the moment we must notice three essays on German thought, the most important in the 1922 volume under the title 'Le germanisme et l'esprit humain.' German philosophy, apart from a few men of genius whom

Lasserre calls 'les allemands européens et lisibles,' he shows to have been dangerous from the days of Fichte. Even in the Categorical Imperative there is a fatal lack of psychology, and German thought in Europe has not been, as often claimed, a fertilising stream, but a ravaging, smoke-ridden blast; the whole demonstration leads, of course, to the desired charge of materialism. The conclusions are those of war-time, but the spirit of the essay is a part of a certain French way of thinking that condemns German thought as misty and delusive, a perilous departure from the clarity and serenity of the ancient philosophers inherited by France. You will notice that the terms of such reasoning are not unwarranted; they describe obvious and important differences of national temper, but the issues are tense and sharpened by enmity—qualities that in time of peaceful relations would appear complementary are viewed as mutually exclusive. In another essay this critic rails even at the word 'idéalisme': 'un mauvais mot, plein d'équivoque et de vague, plutôt germanique que français.' His hostility is not due to the war. In *Mes Routes*, published in 1924, we find another essay on 'L'esprit germanique,' dating from 1901, followed by one composed twenty years later not materially different in outlook. As an example of fundamentally wrong approach I quote the concluding sentences of the latter, an answer to the question 'Faut-il apprendre l'allemand?' Lasserre counsels a larger handling of the problem than the mere banishment of German from school time-tables: 'When it is a question of military security, of economic guarantees and of reparations, let us turn the screw. In the realm of ideas and letters, let us play a free hand without petty precaution. That is the only way to win.' And yet this writer is but a moderate among the extremists; this very essay is a reply to an article of Maurice Legendre insisting that any and all German influence is bad for the young French mind. In the preface to his most famous book, *Les Chapelles Littéraires*, Lasserre tells how he has been accused of surrendering a great author to the Germans because he had drawn attention to parallels between Claudel and the German Romantics.

Rivière may by some be thought youthful and Lasserre termed reactionary, but in the *Mélanges Charles Andler*, published in 1924 in honour of the biographer of Nietzsche, who has been for so long professor at the Sorbonne, there is an important contribution from one of the most brilliant of French professors of German, Edmond Vermeil, author of the only comprehensive work yet published on the Weimar Constitution. Writing under the title of 'Réforme luthérienne et civilisation allemande,' Vermeil traces the consequences of Luther's indifference to secular organisation in the later history of Germany. His full and able

analysis of Luther's affinity to the greatest of his countrymen—Goethe, Schiller, Kant, Fichte, Wagner, Nietzsche—merits close attention as the only thorough French attempt since the war to interpret the function and destiny of the German race. The sincerity of the author seems as undoubted as his insight into German history, but from the main conclusions of the essay there appears to be no escape. The Lutheran Reformation, considered as the first manifestation of Germanism in Europe, 'explains why, within the nation it so mercilessly divided, great political and social revolutions not only have been, but always will be possible.' From a demonstration that rigorously applies this argument to the genesis of the World War many Englishmen would dissent; it may be imagined how ruthlessly such demonstration violates the Germans' conception of their country's mission and history. We cannot wonder that such a challenging verdict was immediately taken up, nor that a protracted polemic with E. R. Curtius in the *Revue de Genève* (lasting until 1927) brought no agreement, and indeed only laid bare fundamental differences of approach to the question. Any argument implying that the best of German culture was in part responsible for the catastrophe of 1914 is reasonably enough anathema to German thinkers, and the fact that such argument is put forward in France is in itself proof of a perhaps inevitable bar to intellectual agreement.

It is not impertinent to remark here the reception which two or three of the documents analysed above have met with in Germany, notably in Curtius' first reply to Vermeil, which dealt also with Lasserre and the general question of the picture of present-day Germany held by the majority of Frenchmen. No apology is needed for quoting this authority, the one scholar of the day who has devoted time and great gifts of exposition to investigation of the possibilities, drawbacks and advantages of intellectual co-operation between France and Germany. The essay just mentioned, 'Zivilisation und Germanismus,' is one of a series of contributions of allied interest which make up his recent volume *Französischer Geist im Neuen Europa*. He reacts, of course, violently to the substance of both Lasserre and Vermeil, still more to the spirit of their argument. Particularly the word 'germanisme' does he find intolerable, standing for a reading of history alien to all sympathetic consideration of German thought, and in effect a relic of war-time propaganda. Most of us would go some way to meet him here. To examine the development of such a force as Germany has been in the modern world simply with a view to explaining the explosion of militarism and aggression that for many is still the main fact of 1914—such a procedure seems to us not only practically unjust, but philosophically un-

sound. And we have only to consider the scorn and presumption that lie behind such a phrase as 'les allemands européens et lisibles' to feel how narrowness may often hurt more than it can ever heal, and overreach itself beyond its intention.

We can understand, therefore, the indignation which the views I have outlined have evoked on the other side of the Rhine. They form a severe indictment against the trend of French thought of to-day (the indictment could, as a matter of fact, have been still longer), but it would be foolish, as well as ungenerous, to leave so ominous a concert of opinion without fair and sympathetic explanation. The worst thing we can do is to refuse to look such evidence in the face, for it allows of two extreme positions, that of ignoring it on the one hand and considering it too hastily on the other, and both are dangerous. There must be many who view Germany with a still more clouded gaze than a Lasserre; but is their error more to be deplored than that of people indifferent to the obstacles in the way of Franco-German understanding, or of those who infer from a few periodicals that all is well and normal?

Let us, then, be sure that we rightly appraise what there is on the other side of the account in the way of responsible views to be set against these anathemas. There is more than the superficial signs of cordiality noted at the beginning of this paper. Numbers of Frenchmen, of course, have studied Germany, and several have put fine critical intelligence at the service of her most difficult authors—have, moreover, explained them to their countrymen, conscious that the French spirit had everything to gain by the study of writers at almost opposite poles of sentiment and expression. One thinks of the criticism of Bernard Groethuysen, still more perhaps of that of Charles du Bos, whose latest volume published this year contains essays on such themes as Pater, Tolstoi, Hardy, Baring, and two remarkable studies of German poets, Stefan George and Hofmannstal, both of them not merely among the most difficult for a foreigner to appreciate, but passing through an eclipse of popularity among their countrymen, for which the critic sets out courageously and delicately to account. Du Bos confesses himself to have been helped by Pontigny, and this single word contains for some sufficient import to enable them to dissent from all that I have so far advanced. The summer conferences of intellectuals started by Paul Desjardins before the war and continued several times since are indeed the most hopeful sign of *rapprochement* visible to-day. Although they influence directly only a few, the cordiality and freedom of discussion have already laid a thousand ghosts of national prejudice, and for a German tribute one may again refer to the volume of essays by E. R. Curtius.

Such facts as these are welcome and they assist our perspective, but they are neither more exceptional nor more widespread than the opposing set. They do nothing to invalidate the conclusions prompted by a reading of Lasserre and other spirits of like mind, which claim our attention if we wish to realise the gravity of the situation. A paragraph in the *Cahiers du Mois* for November 1924 thus authoritatively sums up the position:

> Many Frenchmen rest content, where German culture is concerned, with a certain number of ready-made ideas, a system built up on the evidence of indirect knowledge, or rather, alas, of that too direct and limited knowledge which the armies of the Kaiser flung at us. The repulsion inspired by the so-called virtues of war has crystallised minds and hearts. A sort of fear prevents certain minds from studying German thought, and they will not see what a danger is created by ignorance of one's neighbour, whatever be the relations, good or bad, which one must maintain—and we must of necessity have some relations with our neighbour.

I have said little so far about the literary issues involved, but they are important, since the spirit of sharp criticism of the essential German contribution to European civilisation has penetrated literary inquiry, and the interpretation of French literary history. Lasserre admitted that one of his essays was intended to show (I translate his words) 'by virtue of what illusion a mind of the quality of Renan, so superior to all these *germains*, could allow himself to be imposed upon by that German Christianity which he lauded as the eighth wonder of the world.' Equally tendencious have been the attempts made by Professor Reynaud of Clermont-Ferrand to rewrite the history of Franco-German literary relations. By patient investigation and critical method he has thrown much new light on the influence of German literature in France during the last two centuries, but this is all the time regarded, or tends to be so, as an unhealthy invasion, which on most counts France would have been better without. The enormous and admittedly unjustified reputation of second-rate German literature in France during the latter half of the eighteenth century he construes as deliberate propaganda organised by the Germans with a view to imposing their culture on the leading nation of Europe. Brunetière remarked that Mme. de Stael's book on Germany, which determined French approach for over a century, was if one-sided at least written in good faith; this is dismissed by our critic as not worth discussion; his own view is that the work was a piece of systematic disparagement of the French genius, presenting a picture that was not only, as most students recognise, out of date before it was discarded, but which was at no time true and in every respect tendencious.

One could multiply examples of this spirit in scholarship and criticism, but one case of philosophical writing seems especially

unfortunate. There is in some circles no more respected name than that of Jacques Maritain, one of the band of Christian idealists to which Péguy belonged, and foremost among Catholic philosophers of France to-day. A volume published in 1925, and well received in English translation under the title *Three Reformers*, contains studies on Luther, Descartes and Rousseau, forming really a single inquiry as to whether their great influence on modern thought be justified. From such a biographer one expects severity in the case of each heretic, but the essay on Luther is an example of the worst type of Catholic history. The perversity of its judgments might admit of discussion, but its show of scholarship conceals deplorably inadequate and truncated quotation, a most cheerful ignorance of recent research, presented with persuasion and in such a way as to stimulate thought upon important issues. All this enhances the influence of the book which has penetrated into circles untouched by Lasserre or Reynaud. The more pernicious then, surely, is its presentation of Luther as the typical German, 'l'homme allemand,' the first and greatest of the many examples in German history of a fatal confusion between two orders of greatness, mental and moral. This in Maritain's opinion is 'au fond du germanisme'; one was expecting the word, and it conveniently suggests associations which dispense with further argument.

But a final and, for some, convincing instance of this state of mind as it affects literary issues is the conflict of opinion centring upon the well-known writer Romain Rolland. One is so apt to be rebuffed in conversing about him that it is difficult to define the real points at issue; put bluntly, the case is one of a great author ostracised by his countrymen for pacifist and partly also for pro-German views. It is no accident that his 'above the battle' attitude during war-time has prejudiced opinion against all his work, particularly *Jean Christophe*, the only great work of our century perhaps in which a Frenchman sets out to be fair to German culture. This enormous novel telling of the life of a German artist in Paris is often wrongly interpreted as an attempt to reconcile France and Germany; it is rather a criticism of French civilisation of the 'nineties, and of the policy of national isolation generally. The work has admittedly been better received in translation than in the original, but it was when war came that criticism grew savage. It is astonishing to find the critical appreciation of such a mind as Gide so influenced as to declare in 1917: 'He has nothing to lose by the war . . . his book indeed can only gain by the final disaster of France.' Rivière was no less vindictive concerning Rolland's later action: 'Can one imagine,' he writes in the preface to *L'Allemand*, 'anything more incoherent, sentimental and pathetic than the considerations by which he has thought to mount above the battle?' Thus in an outstanding example are illustrated those differences of opinion that constitute the real and present problem of Franco-German intellectual relations.

It is not easy to disentangle the factors which make up such differences, but we are indebted to one of the protagonists, Reynaud, for some of the most important. The previous history of German culture in France affords something of a clue to present estrangement. It is the story of a penetration almost without parallel in modern literature, for we are confronted from the middle of the eighteenth century onwards—that is, for over 150 years—with a constant influx of German writings and ideas into France and a marked influence, not merely upon the public generally, but upon the leading spirits of the age. We consider Mme. de Stael as an outstanding figure, but the same enthusiasm affected Diderot, Rousseau, Mirabeau, and later the Romantics, the historians and the chief thinkers of the nineteenth century—Michelet, Renan, and Taine in particular. In the history of this movement of thought two things are of import for our inquiry. In the first place, the literature that influenced France was chiefly of an idealist and of a sentimental type. Reynaud has recorded some astonishing instances of this. Robespierre and Diderot raved about the *Idyls* of Gessner, considered poor stuff to-day, especially in Germany, but which called forth extraordinary admiration from generations of Frenchmen. Florian, who was no fool, could write thus: 'On forme son goût en lisant Virgile, on nourrit son âme en lisant Gessner.' Such active minds as Turgot and others were transported by the reading of Schmidt's *Empfindungen aus der Heiligen Schrift*, a work of which many specialists would not care to give an account. At the turn of the century the vogue of Werther and Faust exceeded that of Gessner. Mme. de Stael wrote to Goethe that the reading of Werther had been as important an event in her life as if its tragedy had occurred in her own family circle. Hegel and Herder had an influence almost equally remarkable in the central years of the century, and perhaps Nietzsche at its end. German literature seems, indeed, to have been hailed as a medicine of rejuvenation by prominent Frenchmen, and the ingredients were perhaps less important than the state of the patient. It struck France at the most receptive period of her history, at the close of a prolonged era of creation and leadership, when new elements were needed to refresh the national culture. We must allow for this fact, and not wonder at historians who write, as Reynaud, of the 'enormous pressure of the Germanic world, itself in full activity, upon a France tired and worn by two centuries of intense intellectual production.'

At so critical a juncture and over so long a period—and it is the latter fact which makes the German more important than the English or Russian influence on French literature—the influx of ideas presented to France qualities and moods which were radically opposed to those upon which she had hitherto built up her civilisation. It is striking to note how works like *Faust* and the *Robbers* combined with German philosophy to produce one and the same effect, food for the heart instead of the mind, sentiment rather than logic, enthusiastically welcomed because it counteracted the hard and dry positivism which is the price a nation pays for a Voltaire. But, nearer our own day, imagine this enthusiasm intensified by a passion for Wagner. Is it any wonder that for Frenchmen Germany became and remained for decades the land of poetry, ideals, sentiment, that it stood for something vague and delicious, strong and primitive, the home and source of poetry and religion. Modern scholars do not romance when they refer to 'les fantômes poétiques d'outre-Rhin' or to 'les brumes de l'âme allemande.' That is what Germany meant to their grandfathers.

Contrast with all this the terrible awakening. Readers of Hegel and Heine found themselves face to face with armies instead of dreamers, a new and vigorous industrialism in place of sentimental enthusiasts. In judging the present French temper we forget that our impression of German militarism goes back to about 1910, theirs to before 1870. In a recent lecture in this university a Paris professor described the associations in the French mind attaching to the one word '*Invasion*,' especially to those brought up like Poincaré in the neighbourhood of the north-east frontier. Much popular writing seems to forget what 1870 and the surrounding years mean in the composition of present-day France. The cultural consequences have been and are as serious as any. Such an experience as the *élite* of the nation's writers and thinkers then went through, brutally repeated as it was less than fifty years later, would surely be sufficient to poison all the springs of appreciation and harmony in intellectual relations.

And as a final element of disintegration one must remember that state of the national mind often referred to as '*fin de siècle*' or decadence, which I should tentatively define as a narrowing of outlook, accompanied often by multiplicity of interests and resulting in dilettantism, *raffinement*, lack of conviction, and sometimes hopelessness. The intellectual bankruptcy produced by the scientific advance and positive philosophy of the nineteenth century was felt less in this country, because unaccompanied by political revolution and national defeat. Despite the passionate recovery of independence and idealism, heralded by Bergson and

similar minds working in other fields, *décadence* has left an inheritance still active, particularly in literary criticism. Lasserre may be said to be one of its special products, so also Henri Massis and even Léon Daudet. All insist on a return to the essential qualities of the race—to classicism, in a word. They deplore the eclecticism and complexity of inspiration in the writings of some of their countrymen and recall the artistic purity, unity, simplicity that made the *grand siècle*. They tend to draw their net so tight and to insist so strongly upon the Latin qualities of the French spirit that they are obliged to condemn as alien to the national genius such modern forces as those represented by Renan (even Michelet), Gide, Rolland, and Claudel. As expected, they accuse such writers of introducing foreign standards, and regard as unhealthy any importation of outside ideas, most of all from Germany.[1]

It is primarily this way of thinking that combined with political events to bring about a definite reaction against German culture many years before the war. We have seen that one of Lasserre's essays is dated 1901, and in his preface of 1924 he writes thus: 'Il y a eu chez nous, dans les vingt années qui ont précédé la guerre, une réaction anti-germanique très réfléchie et étudiée, autant que vigoureuse.' One of the most pungent documents of this reaction is an essay by André Suarès called 'Une Barrière,' in which the onus of the whole argument is cleverly and passionately turned on Germany. She has always refused to study with sympathy any culture other than her own, and has in particular never been just to that of France. Even Goethe considered Molière as a 'European' and Voltaire as the typical Frenchman. This passionate outburst is typical of the whole movement, which is too close to us to be as yet definitely assessed. It is difficult to decide, for example, to what extent the nationalistic spirit in literature conditioned or was identical with this reaction, but it seems clear that certain stories of Maupassant and one whole phase of the career of Maurice Barrès must be counted among the forces working against German culture in France. The Barrès propaganda was effective from the beginning of the century right up to the war; its main dates show an almost exasperating regularity: *Scènes et Doctrines du Nationalisme*, 1902; *Au Service de l'Allemagne*, 1905; *Colette Baudoche*, 1909.

Such seem to be the main historical forces which condition the present situation. The excuse, if any be needed, for setting

[1] Aspects of this new nationalism as revealed in the discussions called forth by the Romantic centenary in 1927 are interestingly, though rather summarily, related by P. Mansell Jones in *Tradition and Barbarism, A summary of Anti-Romanticism in France*. (Faber & Faber, 1930.)

them out in as unvarnished a guise as possible is surely that direct knowledge of the evidence, especially in dealing with complicated international relations, is the only way to understanding and sympathy. What at first sight appears a needless prolongation of the war spirit should rather be viewed as a result of over half a century of irritation under critical circumstances; it is their jealous care and fear for their own culture which induces many Frenchmen to-day to disparage that of Germany.[1] And yet, if the estrangement be sympathetically explained, it is none the less to be deplored. Curtius and those with him refuse to recognise that Germany has on any fair and long reckoning none but herself to blame for French harshness, but they are surely right in pointing the urgent need for improved relations. The tasks of the present are so heavy that the new Germany will not be saddled with the sins of the old, and fortunately the same is true in less degree of France and other nations. One factor often lost sight of is that in the diplomatic world France is in intimate contact with a form of German culture in her recovered provinces. Alsace and Lorraine present so difficult a problem of government that they have not unfairly been called the French India. What comes to public notice, especially in this country, is a very superficial part of the real issue; it is more fundamental than the pacification of clericals and the suppression of Communists. Now, as many times before, in the cockpit of the Rhine valley the types of civilisation developed by France and by Germany come into almost daily contact and collision. As long as suspicion of autonomist plots and secret canvassing continues, the provinces which might prove the most effective starting-point for Franco-German understanding will remain by misgovernment, which is only one result of misunderstanding, a potential cause of future hostility.

W. G. MOORE.

[1] This statement has received recent and striking corroboration in the 'Réflexions sur les Mémoires de Bülow' which Paul Bourget contributed to the *Illustration* of February 14, 1931. Cf., for the political outcome of similar fear, Lord Dickinson's article in *The Nineteenth Century* of September last on 'The Healing of Europe.'

THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
AND AFTER



No. DCLVIII—DECEMBER 1931

LABOUR AFTER THE DELUGE

THE exuberant rejoicings on the morrow of the great National Election were, with the exception of those, relatively few, which dwelt upon the embarrassments and perils of a huge majority, concerned with the crashing moral of the event for the Labour Party, and for that party alone. I am to consider that moral from the standpoint of a member of the Left Centre whose work keeps him necessarily in a somewhat detached position. But before coming to the main theme of this article, I wish to call attention to certain glaring facts of the political situation, as revealed by the election results. They are facts altogether beyond dispute; and they are, or should be, of vital interest to every citizen of a country which, according to Mr. Baldwin and Viscount Snowden among others, gave the world on October 27 a triumphant justification of democracy. I will mention, as especially significant, five of these.

The first is that the mass judgment of an electorate, based on universal suffrage with the single non-transferable vote, destroys the representative system. The present result in Parliament is

grotesque. Taking the figures of the contested seats, we find that Labour votes amounting to a third of the total poll yielded less than one-tenth of the House, while the votes of two-thirds of the electorate returned more than nine-tenths. We have all professed a full belief in the basic English tenet that representation in Parliament is our strongest national safeguard. The election of 1931 has almost disfranchised the Labour Party, a great constitutional division of the British public; and the most eminent of Liberal elder statesmen, Lord Grey of Fallodon, is confessedly disappointed because the representation of that party was not entirely wiped out.

Secondly, the election has made an end, for the time being, of the historic House of Commons. The virtual disappearance of the Opposition means precisely that. The most renowned debating chamber of the modern age has become a loose assembly of politicians, pledged in bulk to support a nominally national Government, whose members—comprising three or four groups, divided on nearly all urgent matters of policy—were obliged on the eve of the contest to announce their inability to shape even a minimum programme of essentials. Such an assembly is not the House of Commons as known to the world. It cannot be the instrument of parliamentary government.

Thirdly, we have one more overpowering demonstration of the fact that a mass electorate, on the British plan or the American, votes in an unhealthy atmosphere of fear and suspicion, and always *against* something. That something may be serious: it is usually unreal; it is always irrational. In the United States the Presidential elections of 1920 and 1928 offered striking examples. In England, omitting 1918 as *sui generis*, we have had 1924 and 1931. Such elections have a resounding force as declarations of the popular will. They have little relation, or none, to the needs and tasks of a democratic people.

Fourth, this is the first occasion in our political experience when a Government has been returned to power without a statement of policy. The method is American rather than British. A Presidential candidate in the United States is expected, and often enjoined, to keep silence upon all vital issues. In England it has always been taken for granted that a statesman must declare himself. Mr. MacDonald, the head of a strangely discordant team, could ask only for 'a doctor's mandate,' a 'free hand.' And, speaking in the Guildhall on November 9, he thus summed up the emergency and the event which he characterised as unique:

> We made a national appeal. We are a national Government. . . . ***My colleagues do not know what I am going to say.***

The non-realism of this attitude on the part of British statesmen

and the political public is staggering. There has been nothing like it in our annals. Dr. Gilbert Murray is only the first of a long line of prominent Englishmen shortly to be heard condemning themselves for having voted in the 'weeping murk.'

And, fifthly, there is the new fact that the entire business of electioneering has been transformed, through adult suffrage and the wireless. A multitudinous electorate cannot be reached by circulars, canvassers, and meetings; even the election poster tends to disappear. Until recently the megaphone Press could, in a General Election, be combated by the platform; but to-day, we may safely guess, hardly 5 per cent. of the voters have ever attended a political meeting. The special power of the wireless has since the poll been discussed in many articles. The writers point out that the carrying of the national leaders' speeches to the fireside has not only made their voices known over the land, but incidentally has destroyed the local public meeting and made the candidate, as orator, of almost no account. A broadcast speech has to be brief, and it has to attain a level of technical excellence not demanded by the platform. This is an important point, but it does not imply, as some have contended, that the listeners are removed from the spell of oratory. True, the element of mob passion has been done away with. But the broadcast speech can be so composed and delivered as to achieve a special rhetorical effect. The principal performers have come to understand this and are learning to make the most of it. Mr. Baldwin, for instance, whose reiterated jibe at oratory comes quaintly from a man who not seldom shows what skilful speech can do, is a master of microphone technique. Mr. MacDonald, whose platform style is bad for broadcasting, has at length found the pitch and pace for the studio. Lord Snowden has had no need to modify his style. As his audiences have always known, his speech is the utterance of the whole man, at the time; its quality is the same, whether he is visible or not. This election was the first British campaign in which the resources of the radio were employed in any degree worth considering. Henceforward elections will belong to the sphere of aerial warfare.

So much for the five points of general interest in so far as I can touch upon them here. I turn now to the Labour Party in defeat and distress; and since my fifth point has a particular application to the present plight of Labour, I will begin by following it out a little further.

Under the older conditions of electioneering, as I have remarked, the megaphone Press could be countered by the platform. Lord Northcliffe's political influence was negligible. Lord Rothermere's, taken alone, is hardly discernible. Except in times of war-fever, the Northcliffe papers were commonly on the

losing side. But since Lord Northcliffe's day the conditions have changed. Newspaper consolidations have overborne the critical and radical Press. It is an astounding fact that in the recent campaign the Opposition was represented, among dailies, by the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Daily Herald* alone—the former great journal performing a service which, as all fair-minded opponents will surely agree, was magnificent alike in the presentation of news and correspondence and in editorial ability and temper. The daily Press, therefore, was almost wholly united in support of the National Government. It could not fail to wield an influence greater than at any other time. But—and here is the crucial point—it had in the wireless a new and all-powerful ally. Given the circumstances—the MacDonald-Snowden transfer, the National Government, and the Press-radio alliance—the smashing of Labour was a foregone conclusion. One inference at least can be drawn. The power of swaying a mass electorate—a power never within the compass of the newspaper trusts acting alone—now belongs decisively to whatever Government, or group of governing interests, may in a given crisis be able to command the combined great circulations and to move the popular mind through the marvellously selective and ingratiating waves of the air. Labour, in a word, stands no chance at all, unless or until it can find the means of educating the voters and then getting directly at them during all the stages of an election campaign.

Labour was under no illusion before the polling day as to the fact of its defeat. Every tolerably instructed member of the party knew that a calamity was impending. Apart from all other considerations, there was the warning experience of 1924 and the knowledge that, as Mr. Lees-Smith puts it, unemployment brings down every Government in the end. But foreknowledge of defeat need not mean an advance estimate of disaster, and there can have been few who did not believe that Labour would be able to hold the 150 seats which were saved in the Red Letter election seven years ago.

The realisation, of course, was terrific; but it should be noted that reports from the country speak of the general body as being in good heart and the active workers of the party as being like unto them. And the strange thing is that the facts are so. Outsiders have thought that no party could sustain such a loss as that of Mr. MacDonald and his two colleagues, who together made a trio of leaders standing before the world as the chief representatives of British Labour. But this is not the view of the Labour rank and file. Their view, indeed, is exactly the opposite. They are asserting, and they are entirely convinced, that it was urgently necessary for the Labour Party to shake itself free from those

three leaders first of all; and in their present mood they are prepared to add that the price of liberation could not be too high. Even a parliamentary group reduced to 52 is, in the hotter or sterner tabernacles of Labour, looked upon without dismay.

Now it is clearly essential that the public outside the Labour movement should have a reasonable understanding of the facts concerning the MacDonald-Snowden problem, as those facts present themselves to the great majority of the Prime Minister's former followers. I will endeavour to state them in objective terms, avoiding as far as may be the expression of personal judgment or feeling. And we may leave Mr. J. H. Thomas out of account; for he, although once an important member of the I.L.P., has for many years stood wholly upon his record as a trade union leader, perhaps the most successful of his time. He has not latterly been a representative figure in the political Labour movement.

As leader of the Labour Party the Prime Minister was, to use his own favourite adjective, unique. It would be accurate to say that he has not properly belonged to any one of the divisions and groups composing the Labour Party of the past quarter of a century. By natural bent and by culture he is a Victorian radical, but his romantic temperament found its spiritual home in the Independent Labour Party created and inspired by his Scottish antithesis, Keir Hardie. The militant stage of the I.L.P. provided Mr. MacDonald with a satisfying field for his oratory and evangelistic fervour down to 1906, when he entered the House of Commons, and until the searching trials of the war period. But he had done with the I.L.P. long before it dropped to the level of an impossibilist remnant. He has had no status in the trade union world, and as a consequence was conspicuously out of the inner counsels during the crises of the great strikes, between the syndicalist outbreaks of 1910–11 and the General Strike of 1926. For some years he sat in with the Fabian elect; but he was not of them, and emphatically was not of the Webbs' school. Nor, rather curiously, has he been near to the younger intelligentsia of the party—R. H. Tawney, G. D. H. Cole, and the rest. The *Daily Herald*, in all its varying stages, has been antipathetic to him, while the antagonism of the *New Leader* during its one brilliant time was an awkward snag. With a position in the country far surpassing all others ('There's only one Mac!' it was always said), and a popularity on Labour platforms unapproached for twenty years, Mr. MacDonald nevertheless has been a lone and problematic figure.

The short Premiership of 1924 was a test period for him. As head of a Government representing less than one-third of the House, he accepted the logic of the minority position. No

domestic legislation was possible. But as Foreign Secretary he opened a new chapter of post-war diplomacy and enjoyed a dazzling half-year. And at the end of eight months he threw away his position at home by a series of tactical blunders which would have cost him the party leadership if there had been anyone to take his place. Returning to the Premiership in 1929, Mr. MacDonald seemed to occupy an enviable position. His Cabinet team contained men who had learned the business of administration. Right as usual in his instinct as regards Imperial and international affairs, the Prime Minister grasped the opportunities afforded by Mr. Hoover's inauguration as President, by the modified attitude of Soviet Russia, by world opinion in favour of disarmament, and the crowning mercy of Lord Irwin's Viceroyalty in India. Aided by Mr. Arthur Henderson's sagacity and straight dealing at the Foreign Office, the Labour Government achieved a noteworthy foreign record; and it cannot with any decency be denied that, until the Snowden Budget of April, the repute of Britain among the Powers stood high.

But Mr. MacDonald was Prime Minister of a Labour Government, and as such he could not maintain his hold by means of international successes, however striking they might be. The Labour Government had the very worst of ill-fortune in striking against the world collapse of prices and the unprecedented trade slump before it had been in office four months. The Cabinet's industrial programme was insignificant or worse, and its failure in the face of unemployment figures steadily mounting towards three millions was altogether distressing. The sending of Mr. J. H. Thomas, as special Minister for Employment, on a summer tour to Canada was a fantastic evasion. The holder of that office, the country felt, should have stayed at home and tackled with impartial courage the trade unions and the great employers. The evasion, however, had its tell-tale significance. It implied that Mr. MacDonald and his colleagues had no realistic policy for unemployment. Their survival was dependent upon the Liberals, who, until 1930 at all events, would have given cordial support to a constructive unemployment policy. But the Cabine could not pool resources with the Liberals in pursuit of such a policy, for reasons understood on all sides. And consequently, in respect of all the questions that are vital for a Labour Party, the Labour Cabinet was unable to function. Its supporters were forced to learn the disagreeable truth that their own Government in office was compelled, or thought itself compelled, to follow a line of conservative legislation and timid departmental activity.

In the meantime, they had before them the personal problem of their leader. It is not to be doubted that the second Premier-

ship completed a change in the man himself. In private feeling, in association, and in convictions he was ceasing to be of the Labour Party. And he knew, as we cannot doubt, two decisive things about the politics of his side: first, that a Labour Prime Minister of his generation could not accomplish anything in domestic affairs; and, secondly, that he himself could not, as leader of the Labour Party, hold the first place again. When Mr. Henderson said that the Prime Minister had had in mind for some months the project of a National Government, Mr. MacDonald denied it with emphasis. We cannot doubt his word; but that word does not mean that, in the gathering storm which began with the Chancellor of the Exchequer's alarm in February, Mr. MacDonald was not increasingly occupied with expectations of a crisis which might bring for him a sensational challenge and opportunity. I add, in this connexion, one word on another aspect of the Cabinet difficulty which is certainly not unimportant. Writing with the experience of four or five Liberal Governments, John Morley said that Cabinets were apt to break up from the sheer force of mutual dislike. 'Aggerawation is so aggrawatin' in a *wan*,' says one of Dickens's roadside caravanners. For 'van' read Cabinet room! I will venture the assertion that for some time before August 20 Mr. MacDonald was looking, not for a way of escape from the burdens of office, but for a means of exchanging his Labour colleagues for a different company.

With almost complete unanimity Labour takes the view that Mr. MacDonald, having led the Cabinet to the hour of acute crisis, should have followed the strict constitutional road and resigned with his colleagues. And this of course would have been his road, the only possible one, but for Mr. Snowden, the pivotal figure of politics in this year of destiny. He is at once the architect of the National Government and the destroyer in chief of the old Labour Party. Since the fateful August Sunday he has been the object of intense hatred from the movement to which the devotion of his political life was given, and it will be admitted that he has responded in kind and in ample measure. Here is an extraordinarily painful spectacle, and I for one find it hard to understand how anyone with knowledge of the man and his work could wish to add a touch to the bitter feeling. Philip Snowden's career has been a miracle, his life an heroic adventure in the service of the people. But that career and service he has himself repudiated, with a thoroughness and passion hardly to be excelled; and we cannot wonder that thousands of men and women in the Labour movement should have felt, after his closing speeches in the Commons and the hammer-blows of his broadcast, that for them the foundations of all trust in political leaders had been swept away. The record of Lord Snowden's second term of office will

be nearly the most astonishing contemporary chapter in the chronicles of Westminster. The Labour Government of 1929 had a Chancellor of the Exchequer who was hostile to the domestic programme on which it had come in ; he could not do other than oppose it at every step. The Chancellor who uttered the frigid warning of February was the same who presented the Budget of April, and thereafter awaited the crash of August :

> Disdained the humbler fruit to gather free,
> And lent the crowd his arm to shake the tree !

And the action of Lord Snowden did more than bring down the Labour Government. It helped to complete the ruin of the Liberals, driving them towards that uneasy union with the Right, from which, by general assent, there can be no return.

It is recognised on all sides that the Labour Party has an inherent difficulty or weakness of structure. It is a working-class party. The widening of the basis at the end of the war, to make eligible all workers by hand and brain, opened the door to large numbers of middle-class recruits but could not materially alter the texture of the movement. The firm core is and must be the body of trade-union membership, estimated within the past twelve months at roughly 3¾ millions. That is not a very large percentage of the wage-earners, and current tendencies do not indicate any considerable addition in the near future to the trade union total. Women workers continue to be in the main unorganised, and the huge National majorities in the industrial districts provide overwhelming proof that the women and girl voters of the working class cannot be counted with the Labour Party. This fact, obviously, is of great importance, and its implications need to be considered in relation to certain social facts which have been most suggestively brought out by Sir Norman Angell.

Nothing is more striking in our emerging national community, that valuable social analyst points out, than the changing character of the wage-earning population. The development of modern industry does not mean an increase of manual workers. The rationalisation of industry implies a steady decrease in their numbers, while there is going on continuously an expansion of all other departments and their personnel. Thirty years ago a factory was a factory, with its managerial office probably confined to the counting-house in a corner. Advanced accounting and management, with the organisation of publicity and sales, involve a change in the balance of an industrial concern which may easily result in the departmental employees being more numerous than the men at the bench and the machine. A modern industrial or commercial company is a highly diversified affair, with the manual

and neo-technical workers coming to be recognised as superior to those of older white-collar grades. Secondary education, again, with all its implications, operates as a rapid solvent of the old working class. The sons of the miner, the boiler-maker, or the railway porter go into the new technical field ; the daughters become teachers, stenographers, shop assistants, and enter the municipal and State services. And meanwhile there has been throughout the country a vast organisation of thrift and purchase which has resulted in the creation of a very large new class of small property owners. The low-paid workers of England are still a propertyless horde ; the superior grades have holdings in one form or another—savings bank, building or benefit society, savings certificates. The spokesmen of the National Government gave full weight to this fact when they made their appeal over the air, and they rightly estimated the effect of the anxiety aroused by their deliberate utterances. As a successful (Liberal) candidate put it to me : ' Every man who had a little put away in his society, every woman who had as much as a 16*s.* 0*d.* national savings certificate, ran to the poll intent upon protecting it.'

Now it will hardly be disputed that, in general, the Labour Party has held to the conception of the working class that was accurate until the end of the nineteenth century. That conception has no relevance to the social facts of to-day. The artisans and unskilled labourers together can no longer be called the Workers of England. The workers have become an immensely larger and more varied body of men and women, a body which within the next ten years will take on a character still further unlike that of the static working folk of the first industrial century.

This greatly altered community brings into being a new and searching problem for the Labour Party. Shortly after the loss of the three leaders Mr. David Kirkwood and others affirmed that the first necessity, now that the party had shed its ' middle-class careerists,' was the building up from the foundations of a genuine working-class Labour Party. That belief, we cannot doubt, is strong and general among the rank and file. Let us see how it is dealt with in the post-campaign reflections of three intellectual leaders of the party.

Let me take first Mr. Herbert Morrison. In an article on the future of Labour[1] he assures us that the party will not weaken in its Socialist principles, although, he concedes, nationalisation has already given place to the idea of the public corporation, with planning and full co-ordination understood. The former Minister of Transport sees that those nations having Governments with a grasp of economic realities will be the first to get on their feet, and that the public has the right to demand

[1] *Week-End Review*, November 7.

competent executive control. The Labour Party, he says, stands for the extension of expert non-political management, covering such institutions as the Bank of England; and, this being its policy, it should expect to gather increasing favour with the intelligent middle classes. The old anti-bourgeois prejudice will have to be abandoned. Labour must set itself to secure the support of the manager, the technician, the professional man and woman of every sort. These ought to be with Labour; they must be won for the Cause.

A second front-bench authority is Mr. H. B. Lees-Smith. Writing from his experience as Postmaster-General and Minister of Education,[2] he emphasises the fact that Labour, besides polling nearly one-third of the total vote, has retained its organisation intact. Not a single local body broke away because of the MacDonald-Snowden decision. The party to-day has a solidity not attained by any other, and its strength in the country rests (as, by the bye, Mr. Baldwin has more than once reminded Conservatives) upon the devoted and enthusiastic service of a host of voluntary workers. Labour is the only organised Opposition force, the only possible alternative Government. But, Mr. Lees-Smith adds, it represents a movement which has grown up through protest and popular agitation; its evangelists have practised the art of homely appeal. It now has to descend from the platform, reshape its programme, and base itself afresh upon knowledge and modern experience.

Mr. G. D. H. Cole, as we should expect, has his own approach to the problem of the immediate future.[3] No party, he notes, can hope to advance much further along the line of improving the social services out of increased taxation while leaving the control of industry, commerce, and finance in private hands. As for the policy of Labour in office, 'it was never within a thousand miles of being Socialism at all.' Mr. Cole has no fear of the alleged trade-union dictatorship; the unions are right in resisting cuts in wages. Nor does he want Labour to become a classless party. It ought to be 'a party which bases itself solidly on the defence of the working class, and seeks to represent the aspirations of that class towards a different, non-capitalist society.' As a matter of fact, he argues, Labour was becoming a national classless party, and largely for that reason it had to go down to defeat:

> We shall have to get back to straight Socialist propaganda, restated and reinterpreted in relation to the problems of to-day and to-morrow. And we shall come back to power, I hope and believe, . . . determined to institute at once a large instalment of positive socialisation of the vital industries and services, and ready to do battle with whatever stands in the way.

[2] *Spectator*, November 14. [3] *New Statesman and Nation*, November 14.

I have room only for the briefest comment on these differing analyses and proposals. To Mr. Cole I would say that, since England chose the method of a Labour Party instead of a drive towards revolution, and since, as Mr. Lees-Smith points out, the Left Wing of the Clyde and South Wales has been so decisively routed, the preaching of straight Socialism could bring no considerable results within any period we can forecast; and in this connexion I may be permitted to bring up in opposition to Mr. Cole his own brilliant argument in *The Next Ten Years*. Mr. Lees-Smith recognises the stiffness of the task of rethinking the principles and remoulding the methods of a party built up by forty years of evangelism. Mr. Morrison's hortatory forecast is in effect a cry from the heart of a capable administrator who has learned through his struggles over the London Traffic Bill the means by which a powerful capitalist interest can be won over to co-operate with a Labour Government, and the terms—including security for a huge investment and stimulus in the great game of executive management—upon which such co-operation may be obtained. But Mr. Morrison and Mr. Lees-Smith do not need to be reminded that, in considering the future of the party from the standpoint of Ministers who know the importance of administration and realise the supremacy of economic realities, they are moving in a world which continues to be hardly less strange to Labour in the country than it was before the surprising revelation, eight years ago, that a Labour Government was about to be formed.

We come here to a matter of indubitable importance. The Labour Party, I should say, has taken pride in its two short terms of office, and in the record of certain Ministers whose success has been demonstrated and acknowledged: Mr. Henderson and Mr. Morrison, Mr. Graham, Mr. Greenwood, Dr. Dalton, Miss Lawrence, and even, rather ironically, Mr. A. V. Alexander. Labour people can see that as public servants these and others are superior (putting it mildly) to the average Conservative Minister, and that they enjoy a further advantage in being accustomed to a hard working day. But Labour as a whole is not yet interested in government. It will need much more hard experience before it comes to understand that a Minister in office cannot be what he was as a platform speaker in the wilderness. And, moreover, Labour in relation to actual work done at home has hardly been heard of. It is one of the major paradoxes of politics that the only achievements of the two Labour Governments which have stirred the imagination of the world have been in the sphere of international affairs.

Here, indeed, we come within sight of the heaviest part of

the enormous task which lies before Labour in overthrow. The statement is being continually repeated that the political leaders of the party have never made up their minds on the central question whether they want to abolish the capitalist system or to co-operate for its redemption. To many among us, within the Labour Party or actively friendly towards it, the evidences furnished by the whole country since 1926, and particularly the electoral blizzard of October, proclaim a consolidation of realities admitting of no scepticism and but little argument. The capitalist system is clearly destroying itself, or is undergoing a transformation so rapid and bewildering that the lines of its structure are being redrawn from month to month. There are now no frontiers between private and corporate activity on the one hand and Government authority and control on the other. The Hoover Administration, founded by its head upon the 'rugged individualism' of an America long since vanished, has undertaken collective enterprises upon a colossal scale, and will be driven into others more spacious still. The National Government of Britain will within the next half-year be taking risks in government interference and direction of a kind and scope that would make a Labour Cabinet of yesterday turn pale. And Britain is given to piling up proofs that it is a deeply non-revolutionary country, with an unshakable belief in the forces of its traditional government. The British people are now preparing to accept measures of administrative despotism which will make the familiar nonsense about Socialism and anti-Socialism sound more than ever like the economics of Cloud-cuckoo-Land. And meanwhile, the Labour Party, stimulated towards revival by growing public resentment against a National Government without cohesion, and forced into reorganisation by the inescapable logic of the Alternative Government, will be learning to shape its thinking and readjust its action under the compulsive force of the knowledge that the structure of government must be upheld and the day-to-day labour of administration carried on. England, so far, is unimaginable as a land of violent revolution—although, to be sure, there is no great difficulty in conceiving a British form of Fascism. Equally is England unimaginable as a miniature America, content to worry along in the negation and inertia of a single political party. Our radicals and progressives must at the very least have somewhere to go.

I need hardly make confession that this article contains rough statements that call for qualification and omits things necessary to any tolerable summary. It is, indeed, nothing more than a very sketchy note on certain features of an unexampled situation. I will venture to end it with five dogmatic statements, each one

of which could be indefinitely amplified: (1) The day of the elder leaders is over. The Labour movement has not been for the young. Obviously it must be theirs or remain in the desert. (2) A very noteworthy contradiction: the Labour Party was born of industrial England and has been nurtured by the industrial workers, but so far it has not produced a group of industrial statesmen, or even one. Such men it must find. (3) British trade unionism is still in the nineteenth-century stage and has learned little from scientific unionism in other countries—*e.g.*, the achievement of Sidney Hillman and the Amalgamated Garment Workers of America. England is the field for a new technique of unionism under the leadership of realists, who will be as different as possible from the late devoted A. J. Cook. (4) The failure of British Labour to create a Press of its own is a strange and humiliating fact. The making of an organ expressing the mind of Labour and capable of winning its way into the homes of the nation is an imperative need. (5) The new Labour Party will have to confront the central questions of the modern community in respect of rank and titles, money and personal standards. Soviet Russia has laid its foundations in a religious order. The Communist Party admits of no compromise with the older social hierarchy. Nothing is more indisputable than that the whole range of public life in advanced countries, whatever their modes of economic organisation or political rule, must be brought into conformity with a practical ideal of moderation, restraint, and democratic simplicity.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

THE DOCTORS' DILEMMAS

THE National Government has got its blank cheque. John Bull has been generous, beyond all expectation and precedent, and has put himself unreservedly in the hands of his doctors, for them to treat him as they judge best. No finer expression of loyalty and confidence has ever been bestowed upon any set of public men in all our political history.

But this noble national decision does not mean that the National Government, or any section of it, can forthwith proceed to do as it pleases, neglect its patient and forget his condition. The blank cheque has to be honoured in the same spirit in which it was bestowed. The doctors of the National Government have undertaken the treatment of a dangerously sick person whose health has been neglected for years, and cannot be restored in the twinkling of an eye, or by the mere administration of patent medicines. No doubt it is true that, thanks in large measure to his common-sense and grit, he has come through his first crisis magnificently. He was tottering on the brink of destruction, and if he had lost his head he would have fallen into irretrievable perdition. He was actually in far greater peril than his doctors told him, even in their most outspoken warnings. He was suffering from a world-wide loss of confidence which might easily have proved fatal, and he was offered a poison draft, which would speedily have put an end to him, by the egregious quacks who had done most to bring him to this pass. It will be salutary for the future to dwell a little on the danger we have escaped by the skin of our teeth.

If at the last election the British people had voted for the Labour Party standing on its professed programme of nationalising (or 'socialising') the banks, what would have been the course of events, so soon as the trend of the polls had become known?—that is, on the morning of Wednesday, October 28, 1931. It is humanly speaking certain that there would have been an instantaneous and complete loss of confidence in the financial structure of society. All foreign moneys in the country would have fled instantly. A catastrophic fall in the value of the pound would have followed. All depositors in banks would have endeavoured

to withdraw their deposits or to transfer them into foreign banks, at home or abroad, and all British banks would have had to close their doors within a couple of days. There would also have been an irresistible run on the banking institutions conducted by the Government. Depositors in the Post Office savings banks would have tried to withdraw their savings, owners of savings certificates would have tried to cash them. Nor would their action have been panic and folly, so much as intelligent anticipation of the inevitable consequences of the coming into power of a Government pledged to the policy proclaimed by the Labour Party. It would have been a gallant, though possibly vain, attempt to escape from the immediate consequences of universal bankruptcy. The paper money withdrawn would not have been worth much, and its value would rapidly have sunk, but it would have been better than nothing at all; and this was the prospect with which everyone was faced by the closing of all the banks.

For it follows from the very nature of banking that no bank in the world can withstand a resolute run inspired by a complete loss of confidence; nor can any Government do anything but one thing in order to check the complete paralysis of trade, industry, and food supply which would ensue when all discovered that no one could any longer draw any money from the banks. The only thing a Government can do in such a situation is to print vast masses of paper money. In other words, whatever its professions and intentions, it *has* to inflate, and the inflation goes on till it is stopped, by a miracle, after unspeakable suffering of the whole people, as in Germany in 1923.

It is beside the point for the Labour politicians, whose incredible fatuity advocated a programme that would assuredly have brought about this calamity, that their intentions were honourable, that they did not mean to inflate, that they wished to keep the Budget balanced. They could not have helped themselves, or have helped the country by the means they proposed: they could not have balanced the Budget by any sort of taxation and with the best will in the world. For universal bankruptcy would have overtaken us at once, and long before they could have taken office, much less have passed any legislation. It is equally vain for them to confess, even if they were now willing to do so, that their whole banking programme was essentially 'eyewash,' inherently impossible, and a silly playing to the gallery, and that they had had no real intention of carrying out their threats. For the threats had been made, and had terrified all who had anything to lose. The depositors in the banks would have taken no chances, and their action would have left the Government no chance of taking over the banks. There would have been no banks to take over when the Labour Government

took office. They would all have been smashed by the mere anticipation of that sinister event. The only choice for the Labour Government would have been between rapid and constant inflation and a death-bed repentance.

Such *was* the deadly peril from which we have escaped. Such *is* the deadly peril against which the nation desires its present Government to insure it, that it may never again become practical politics. Insurance against a repetition of this danger must therefore be regarded as the first duty of the National Government. But to effect it will not be easy. It will mean a pretty radical reconstruction of our politics, and an intelligent use by the Conservative Party of the Heaven-sent opportunity which has now for the second time in recent years fallen to its lot. There must be no repetition of the timidity, feebleness, and futility which marked the record of the Conservative Government of 1924–1929, if either Conservatism or the nation is to survive.

The first and most effective step which the situation demands is the reform of the grotesque system of misrepresentation which deprives minorities and moderate opinions of their representation and produces violent ' swings of the pendulum ' from one extreme to another. The present system is alike unfair, absurd, and dangerous. It is unfair, because large bodies of opinion, intermediate between the extremes which control the big party machines, are unable to obtain expression at all. It is absurd, because a voter who wishes to turn out a Government which has made a bad record is unable to do so, except by voting for extremists on the other side, who may be equally deserving of distrust. It is both unfair and absurd that the politicians, who have been put in power by the nation's grim determination to rid itself of their predecessors, should flatter themselves as the people's choice, entrusted with a national mandate. An electoral law which fosters such results discredits democracy, and bids fair to wreck it. But, above all, it is *dangerous* to retain in the present crisis. For it deprives us of the power to guard against a recurrence of the crisis. For the moment we feel safe. The National Government has swept the country. But it may fall to pieces long before it has accomplished its task, and in two or three years' time, or perhaps sooner, there may have to be another General Election. And then the swing of the pendulum may put the Socialists in a position to realise their most pernicious schemes, and to ruin the country in the manner described above.

Yet this danger can be easily avoided by the familiar and well-tried expedient known as Proportional Representation. It is known that this will mirror the actual opinion in the country with any degree of accuracy desired. It is known that it produces a political stability impossible under our system. It is known that

it has saved a number of European States from revolution and disaster. But the politicians do not like it, because they dislike moderate opinion, and like sweeping the country. Yet they invariably flirt with Proportional Representation when they are (temporarily) chastened by defeat. They then invariably point out that their party has been grossly under-represented, and that the victors (like the Conservatives in 1924) did not really poll a majority of the votes. When they win, they mention it no more. Nor do they consider its beneficent working elsewhere. In Ireland it has enabled the moderate Cosgrave Government to hold on for nearly ten years, and to thwart all Republican attempts to upset the Constitution. In Switzerland it has so slowed down the growth of Socialism that it has completely allayed all *bourgeois* fears of a social revolution. In Germany it has preserved the Republic against extremist hysteria in the most trying circumstances, and it is not too much to say that but for the inclusion of Proportional Representation in the Weimar Constitution Germany would have been swept and ruined by successive waves of Communism and Hitlerism.

In this country, if it adopted Proportional Representation, it would be the exception rather than the rule for any of the main parties to obtain a majority of the seats in the House of Commons. The Socialists in particular would never do so, any more than in Germany or Switzerland, whereas at present they might quite well elect a majority of the House of Commons at the next election. There would then be nothing to stop the wildest measures. For, to the lasting shame of the Conservative leaders for the last twenty years, they have never ventured to reform the House of Lords, though they have been fully pledged to do so, and the party congress annually passes a resolution in favour of such a measure. Reform of the House of Lords is not, however, favoured, either by the Liberals or by the Labour Party. For they know that any reform would strengthen the House of Lords, and that any adequate reform might make it a real bulwark against revolution.

A Redistribution Bill, then, which introduced Proportional Representation (with transferable votes, and at least five-member constituencies) is what the country really needs. It might advantageously cut down also the numbers of the Commons and the pay of its members; for the derisory 10 per cent. cut they underwent was a positive reward for their mismanagement of public affairs. As regards numbers—is the actual work of the House of Commons a whole-time, or even a half-time, job for 615 able-brained legislators? A House of 300, drawing not more than £200 a year, would be not only more economical but also more efficient. I remember that when just after the war an

academic friend who was in the House advocated a doubling of his pay, I objected on the ground of expense and pointed out that it would be much better to halve the members of the House. He replied: 'No, for then the House of Commons would cease to be a mob!' It may be doubted whether the country is still so enamoured of mob rule, and the members of Parliament themselves would certainly be more comfortable in a House which could seat them all!

There is one further little reform which is so slight in itself, and so advantageous to all parties, that it should be passed by acclamation. Why on earth should not Ministers have a right which they possess all the world over, and be able to address either House, whether they sit in it or not? To abolish this taboo would help the Liberals and the Socialists by relieving them from the irksome necessity of elevating to the Lords a number of their adherents who are often very imperfectly fitted to adorn that House and to sustain their cause. It would help the Conservatives by enabling them to utilise the surplus of ability which they possess in the Lords, and cannot employ, because they must have spokesmen in the Commons for certain important posts. And it would raise the level of political life and administration, because a Ministry which demanded a good deal of attention might then safely be given to a peer, who would be available to intervene in the Commons, without wasting so much of his time in representing his department.

In connexion with the much-needed reform of the dole system it would perhaps be trying the National Government too high to expect it at once to effect a legal separation of the two functions which have been craftily compounded in it—namely, the *insurance* of those who have duly provided against unemployment by their contributions and the *maintenance* of those who have not. The latter should be treated like the recipients of benefits under the Poor Law. That is, they should be disfranchised, not in order to put any sort of slur or stigma upon them, but simply to protect the public purse, and in order to relieve the politicians of all parties from what experience has shown to be the irresistible temptation of bribing the unemployed by increasing the dole. One is glad to see that the politicians have underrated the honesty and patriotism of the unemployed; for the figures indicate that many of them must have voted against the party that had been most assiduous in bribing them.

Political legislation, important as it would be, is not, however, the most pressing task of the National Government. Its first business, which is the nation's universal hope and expectation, is to restore our industrial position. To achieve this, the (somewhat problematic) balancing of the Budget and the struggle to save

the pound were subsidiary preliminaries. But the revival of our exports and the recovery of a favourable balance of trade are literally a matter of life and death. For, seeing that anything between three-fifths and three-fourths of our food has to be imported from abroad, it is clear that a similar proportion of our population must starve, unless we can sell abroad goods to buy our food, at prices which the foreigner will pay. We must therefore be enabled to sell at such prices, and to reduce our costs accordingly. Now this obviously cannot be done by rigidly and simultaneously fixing the gold value of our currency and the money value of wages. That policy has irretrievably collapsed with the late Labour Government, and was in fact (though not in name) abandoned also by the Labour Opposition when they advocated a policy which would have entailed inflation. But neither does it follow that mere wage-cutting can restore prosperity to the export trade. Prosperity and depression are no longer merely national affairs, but are becoming more and more international: the National Government, therefore, will rightly be expected to co-operate with the forces that are endeavouring to restore prosperity to the whole world.

What steps can be taken for this purpose, and what will prove effective, can as yet hardly be foreseen. The matter is very complicated, and demands much more international agreement than looks probable at present. But there will certainly have to be negotiations about the gold standard, which has been manipulated thoughtlessly and very stupidly. Speaking generally, the bankers have overplayed the good hand they held. It was true that, abstractly, gold was the best standard of value. But they should have reflected that if you persuade more people to use gold you increase the demand for it and force down the level of prices. It is true that if you lower the price level you benefit creditors, and get more goods from your debtors. But if you carry this process too far you merely bankrupt your debtors, get paid nothing, get your assets 'frozen,' and finally go bankrupt yourself. It is true, lastly, that if most of the stock of gold is accumulated in one or two hands and hoarded, the gold standard becomes unworkable. The Socialist alternative of a 'managed' currency is probably unworkable too, because no Government can be trusted to resist the temptation to inflate: but a remonetisation of silver is well within the bounds of possibility. It would greatly help trade with India and China, and if adopted by a number of strong trading nations would speedily bring the gold hoarders to their senses. For it would automatically reduce the purchasing power of the hoarded gold.

Meanwhile, what about tariffs? the impatient Tory cries. An excellent election cry in the circumstances; but not an easy

panacea. The abstract merits of Free Trade and Protection hardly need discussion at the moment; for it is clear that some sort of a tariff has become unavoidable. But much will depend on what sort of tariff is imposed. Anything like agreement about the tariff seems impracticable; for the ideal tariff which helps all interests, and hurts none, is unthinkable. The interests of importers, re-exporters and bankers naturally incline them to free trade; those of the manufacturers are hostile to the protection of agriculture, and even they are not solid for any particular form of protection. For what is a competing product for one industry is raw material for another. In some cases perhaps nothing short of an embargo on luxury imports will serve the national need; but both embargoes and tariffs may lead to such international complications that it would be unwise to impose them.

Inevitably, therefore, any actual tariff will disappoint hopes and alienate support. It will lose votes, many votes in many places, and weaken the National Government. It may even break it up. It will create discords even in the camp of the protectionists, and will demand numerous and perhaps difficult readjustments in our industries. Nor is it at all certain, in view of the reactions our tariffs may provoke in the Empire and abroad, that it will be as effective in restoring prosperity as is hoped. It remains to be seen whether it will be possible to conclude the favourable commercial treaties with the Dominions and the foreigner which tariffs are supposed to facilitate. In short, the National Government had better be very cautious about the tariff it proposes. It should beware of wrecking itself over its tariff.

If it does, what hope is there of getting the rest of our affairs in order, of getting proper attention paid to our other urgent problems? We have been so completely absorbed of late in our domestic crisis that we have had to let the rest of our interests go by default. Yet our industrial problem is but one of three great problems, on the solution of which the survival of the British Empire depends. Some years ago, in 1926, when I ventured to assume the *rôle* of a prophet and embodied my warnings in a little book called *Cassandra, or the Future of the British Empire*, I enumerated these problems as the Labour Problem, the European Entanglement, and the Preservation of the Empire. Little, or less than nothing, was done about any of them. Accordingly, since then, the unsolved Labour Problem has brought upon us the existing crisis.

The Empire Problem has grown rapidly in gravity, and the most ominous symptoms of disintegration are multiplying everywhere. Legally, it has become impossible to say wherein the unity of the Empire now consists; even the unity of the flag has gone. Financially, Imperial trade is hampered by three or more

sorts of pound and several sorts of dollars, while the Dominion tariff walls against the 'mother' country are rising steadily. Politically, Egypt and India seem determined to break away from all connexion with Britain, and to claim the right to maintain their independence *à la Chinoise*. The very much Promised Land has become one in which the British Government finds it more and more difficult to keep the promises it rashly made to the Arabs and the Jews. In Burmah overt rebellion has now been lingering on for over a year. An insane nationalism has not only taken possession of the Dominions, but of every little dependency. Already Cypriots and Maltese assert their nationality by force, and anon every Pacific atoll will become a hotbed of home rule.

The source of these troubles would appear to be, not so much the lack of a firm hand and of intelligent understanding on the part of the central power as a growing suspicion that John Bull is being worn out by his domestic distress and piecemeal revolution, and is relaxing his grip upon the Empire. The National Government, therefore, has before it an enormous task in reconsolidating the Empire and arresting its further decay. The Empire Problem alone will tax its statesmanship for many years to come.

For the next six months or more, however, its attention will have to be very earnestly given to the international complexities of the European Entanglement. The present tangle of foreign affairs is at one and the same time monetary, military, and political. In the first place, something has plainly to be done pretty soon about the gold standard, especially if we have recourse to a tariff. Next, something has to be done, or at any rate to be said, about armaments: for a Disarmament Conference has been summoned for next February, the presidency of which Mr. Arthur Henderson can now safely resign. Lastly, something will certainly have to be done about the War Debts-*cum*-Reparations incubus, which President Hoover so gallantly lifted—for a year. It is now hovering in the air and poisoning the economic atmosphere, but it will descend upon the world again in full force, and with augmented violence, next July.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to see anything that can be done about this. That Germany will not pay her War Debts it is safe to prophesy. She has always protested against the (very optimistic) estimates by which their imposition was justified, and has never paid any sums that she had not previously borrowed from her creditors. Moreover, the whole ground for these very optimistic estimates has now been destroyed by the world-wide slump in gold prices. So it is quite certain that she will not, and cannot, pay next July. She must go bankrupt, unless she is let off her debts. But to bankrupt Germany would

help no one. It is quite likely to lead to universal bankruptcy and widespread revolution. But if Germany is granted a drastic scaling down or cancellation of Reparations plus a moratorium, her creditors will hardly be disposed, or able, to pay their debts to America.

The one consideration that could move American 'idealism' to assent to a cancellation of debts would be a generous measure of disarmament. To this, however, it is clear that the French will never consent, except at the price of a very explicit and ironclad guarantee from America, to be added to the many guarantees they have already obtained under the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaty, and the Kellogg Pact.

It would seem that M. Laval went to Washington to ask Mr. Hoover for such a guarantee, but failed to get it. No wonder, for he was putting Mr. Hoover and the whole Republican Party in an impossible position. He was asking them to go to the country in a Presidential election year with recommendations for a total remission of War Debts and the assumption of an onerous guarantee which the country had already repudiated once. And that at a time when the whole country was plunged in deep distress, and the budget showed a deficit of £200,000,000! Such a demand was a request for political suicide, a suicide, moreover, which would have been futile. It would merely have ensured the sweeping victory of the Democrats next year, and no treaty Mr. Hoover had made would have been ratified by the Senate. Thus the international situation seems to be a complete deadlock.

The only possibility of finding a way out of this deadlock would appear to lie in the direction of a general willingness of all parties to accept the good offices of England. Even so it will be anything but easy to find such a way; but if Sir John Simon can find it, he is assured of the greatest diplomatic reputation in English history.

To what conclusion do all these considerations point? Surely to this, that the National Government is *not* to be regarded as an ephemeral expedient, presently to be superseded by a good old Tory *régime*. It will long be needed, if it is to do its duty, and if its patient is to be cured. John Bull's doctors, if they are true doctors, and no quacks, must nurse him through a long convalescence. They must not disagree more than they can help. No doubt they are involved in the most serious difficulties and dilemmas of various kinds, but they must patiently face them. They must not run away from their responsibilities, as did most of the members of the late Labour Cabinet. And they will need steady support from an intelligent public opinion to achieve their task.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

INDIA—THE LONGER VIEW

THE Indian Round Table Conference is drawing to a close. The delegates disperse; the captains and the kings depart—the captains unhappily still at issue, the kings with broken ranks. Every effort at adjustment and accommodation has failed to ease the tension between Muslim and Hindu, while the intricate problems which surround federation between the Indian States and British India have been further complicated by the doubts which have assailed not only the leader of the Princes in the Conference of 1930, but many other members of his Order. It would be idle to pretend that these setbacks have not caused great disappointment, in England as well as India. Words such as 'deadlock,' '*impasse*,' even 'retrogression,' are being freely employed by shorter-sighted critics. But in dealing with Indian problems it is wise always to take the longer view; and those who maintain this standpoint do not as yet see any reason for undue depression, still less for despair. They will have foreseen the probability of a check, such as has occurred; they may even have anticipated that the Conference of 1930, with its hope of an early solution of the age-long rivalry between Hindu and Muslim and its sudden espousal of the cause of All-India Federation, till then considered almost Utopian, held out a glittering prospect that was almost too good to be true—at least, too good to be straightway true; they will feel that the Conference of 1931, with all its apparent ineffectiveness, has still accomplished a necessary and useful work in bringing the vision back to earth again, in stripping it of its excessive glamour and in exposing the hidden danger and the underlying snags of its earthly contacts. Just as the Conference of 1930 was of great value in establishing, through the mouth of the Prime Minister and his supporters of all parties, the sincerity of England in her desire to advance India along the path of self-government, in bringing into the foreground the hitherto nebulous but magnificent idea of a Federal Government for All-India and in opening the door for the entry of opponents, previously implacable, so the Conference of 1931 has contributed a valuable aid by defining and crystallising the major problems demanding solution before any real progress can be made.

We are all, in fact, nearer to the heart of the matter than we were a year ago. This very fact may incline many both in India and in England to dread the unpleasant and possibly dangerous reactions that any check, such as we are now experiencing, is bound to encourage in India and to lean, for that reason, to swifter action. This again will not be the feeling of those who take the longer view; on the contrary, the lesson they read in the two Conferences, in the intractability of the 'minorities' question and in the revelation of new and serious differences of view regarding federation, is that more than ever it is necessary to proceed with caution and to avoid haste in taking any forward step.

To the impartial observer—my friend Mr. Garvin, for instance—the key to the Hindu-Muslim puzzle is obvious. The Muslims have been recognised already by the framers of the scheme as entitled to separate electorates. Why should not the Hindus recognise this, too, and consent to the continuance of the system? But the puzzle is by no means so simple as it looks. Briefly put, it is, on the part of the Hindus, the desire to avoid a cleavage which may easily become permanent; on the part of the Muslims, the fear of being swamped, or at any rate dominated; and on the part of both, the difficulty of making concessions which are not *a priori* acceptable to their communities. Agreement, as Sir Robert Holland has said in his illuminating article in *The Nineteenth Century*,[1] can only be obtained by comprehensive and completely harmonious co-operation between the leaders of all sections of either party.

As regards All-India Federation, the second Conference has produced, through its Federal Structure Committee, some valuable schemes for the future, but these must remain merely paper proposals until the previous and fundamental question of Hindu-Muslim combination has been settled. And, apart from this, the differences which at present split the representatives of the Indian States themselves must also be composed. This alone will prove no easy task. An increasing number of the Chiefs have begun to realise that the implications of federation with British India are more serious than they imagined, and that these may involve an inroad on their powers greater than they had foreseen or than they are prepared to concede. Moreover, the fusion of a democratic with a monarchical system, in a country where constitutional monarchy is as yet more of a name than a reality, obviously presents special difficulties, which need far more examination and thought than they have yet received. There are many among the Chiefs who believe, and indeed with good reason, that before tackling the large question of All-India Federation they should secure efficient combination among themselves in some form or other, so as to

[1] 'The Prospects of Indian Federation,' September 1931.

meet British India on fairly equal terms and with a united front. This, they argue, is an obvious first step in any case, whether it leads to All-India Federation or not—perhaps even more necessary in the latter case than in the former. But when one considers the great variety of the Indian States—in area, in population, in internal resources, in influence and power—it is evident that even this preliminary business of union *inter se* bristles with difficulties of no little magnitude. Here, again, there is further proof of the distance yet to be traversed before reaching the goal, and of the need of moving forward with the utmost care and precaution.

Indeed, the cardinal error of Britain's policy since her declaration of 1917, like that of the over-keen golfer, has probably been 'pressing.' And there has been no need for it. The promise given in that year has become the Magna Charta of India's aspirations; it is a solemn and binding obligation which, whatever individual Englishmen may think or feel, their country is bound, with India's help, to honour. But in the matter of pace and method ample discretionary powers were reserved. Mr. Edwin Montagu, in his anxiety to implement the terms of the promise, wrote a marvellous Report and presided over a Royal Commission which eventually proposed, as a first instalment, measures of advance that seemed rashly progressive to many men well acquainted with India. They could not help thinking that Mr. Montagu, like an expert rider on a strange horse, was inclined to rush his fences, not through want of skill, but owing to want of intimacy with his mount. The elective system in a country so huge and heterogeneous and illiterate was bound to be defective in any case; and the difficulties of designing for the enormous mass of non-voters some form of corresponding weightage were insuperable. There were many Indians of great attainments, and many of wide influence in their own provinces, who might have been of real help; but these were noticeably lacking in the majority, which, while in fact only representative of a small section of the population, controlled the Legislative Assembly; they were found in larger numbers in the Council of State, but their weight and influence would have been more valuable in the other body, which was erroneously supposed to be the interpreter of the voice of the people. In other words, at that early stage, selection might well have had a larger say than election, and would have secured equally good representation of popular wishes. Similarly, it seems very probable that Mr. Montagu underrated the depth and intensity of racial feeling between the two most numerous and most powerful sections of the population. Less 'rushing of fences' would moreover have been useful in another way. The feelings which were aroused and the agitation which was engineered at the time of the Rowlatt Bill and of the repression of the Ambala outbreak might have

calmed down or even passed away before the new organisation came into being ; as it was, the ill wind of these unhappy influences was still blowing a very considerable gale when the experiment was launched, and went far to ruin its prospects. What was more serious, these influences went far to destroy not only the hopes of the experiment, but its entire object, by making some men, especially the extremists of the Congress Party, not only quite unreasonable, not only indifferent to its success, but even eager for its failure. The Non-Co-operators have indeed done their country a great disservice : although it is notorious that they only represent a section of the people, they have tried to set their authority against that of the Government of India ; any success they may have met with has only served to split the nation more, to sow discord and division when harmony and union were essential ; their tragi-comic changes of front, first ostracising the new councils and then entering them in the hope of undermining them from within, their tortuous methods of opposition and their general spirit of intransigence, resulted in shaking confidence, not only in their own wisdom and statesmanship, but in those of their compatriots as a whole. When later on they dismissed the Simon Commission's Report, almost without reading it, because, forsooth, no Indian had been appointed thereon, though hundreds of Indians had been consulted and many formally associated with it in every province and at the centre, the earlier impression was confirmed and strengthened. Yet they knew that the rate of progress along the prescribed path was to depend on the co-operation received and on the aptitude shown by Indian leaders for their new responsibilities. 'Aptitude' in this connexion must include, among other things, the power to coalesce with sections of different creed and outlook into a united nation, but to that aspect the Non-Co-operators seem to have been wilfully blind. It is to be regretted that Mr. Gandhi, who, if not very practical, is at any rate a genuine patriot with little race bias, should have thrown in his lot with the Congress Party, who have led this opposition, even going so far, against his earlier and better judgment, as to associate himself with them, when at the end of 1929 they set the crown on all their previous indiscretions by declaring for complete independence, thus deliberately flouting the express terms of the promise of 1917. This incident, we may well hope, has faded out of the picture since the conversations between Lord Irwin and Mr. Gandhi, the pact to which they led, its adoption by the Congress, and finally the appearances at the Round Table Conference of Mr. Gandhi himself as the sole representative of that body. The wide respect and the great influence which Mr. Gandhi enjoys, among Hindus especially, is beyond all question ; yet his position in the Conference as Congress representative must have tied his hands sadly and rendered his presence and his aid much less effective than it might have been had he come as a representative of the whole body of his followers and not merely an extreme section of them. In view of his previous associations, this of course was not possible ; but his dealings in respect of 'minorities,' and especially his negotiations with the Muslim community, must have been much hampered by the instructions under which he was appointed. The conflict between their narrow limits and his own broad views must have been pathetic to those who witnessed them, and is possibly responsible for the rumours of his recall.

So now we see the second Conference likely to break up without any nearer approach to a settlement of this most fundamental preliminary question, and all the 'minorities,' excepting only the Sikhs, thrown into a solid *bloc* against the Hindu majority—a result which has been acclaimed as an advance by some writers, but is in effect an advance towards party action rather than towards national union.

The outstanding fact which seems to emerge from the above consideration of the various checks and obstacles towards progress is that, although India has been unified by British aid for the purposes of administration, she has not attained national union—that is, the union of hearts which ordinarily brings all the people of one country together, whatever their creed or denomination, when ruin or disruption threatens. In other words, and to sum up the matter, it simply is not possible for a long time yet, much as we may regret it, to satisfy the natural eagerness of many sections in India to arrive at self-government almost at a bound. The Congress leaders honestly seem to believe that they could carry on the government of the country to-morrow, were they given the chance ; they are constantly urging a quickening of the pace, and there are clear indications that they are prepared to adopt, in the hope of achieving this object, methods which every reasonable man must deplore, while scarcely laying aside, even after the signing of the Irwin–Gandhi pact, other forms of pressure by which they hope to terrorise the Government and bend it to their will. These symptoms show that any slackening of the pace is likely to be met by a loud outcry from this class, certainly by fresh acts of terrorism, possibly by an organised programme of civil disobedience and the fomentation of disturbance on a wide scale. But is it not wiser to face this than to go on encouraging the impression that there is any real hope of granting self-government to India at an early date ? Is there not reason to fear that the disappointments which must ensue from the adoption of the latter policy will lead to far greater disaster in the end ? Already the Congress leaders have been allowed a licence which is not

consistent with good administration by the ruling power, and which, even at this stage, has been carried to such lengths that it threatens to undermine Britain's whole position in India. Those who doubt the fact are invited to study Sir Robert Holland's careful analysis of the process in his article already cited. England, in her anxiety to promote the new policy, in her sincere efforts to open up a path to self-government for India, has herself been losing day by day, in order to facilitate that object, a larger share of her own authority; she has been met by these leaders with opposition, obloquy and abuse, elaborate propaganda to belittle and traduce all that she has done in the past for the prosperity and for the unification of India, and organised schemes for rendering her administration of the country more difficult: all this she has patiently put up with, though, without the wide and far-flung means of communication which she has provided and the freedom of speech which she has taught, it would not have been possible. It is common knowledge that many minorities in India, and great numbers of the less educated classes, are now asking themselves whether Great Britain is no longer going to govern and has in effect handed over the reins already. This is a fatal impression in a country like India. It has become necessary to show beyond all possibility of doubt that Great Britain still governs, and means to govern, until the country is really able to take over the administration from her and keep it running on safe and assured lines. The Hindu-Muslim tension is likely to be relieved simultaneously by such a course, for the frequency of clashes and riots between the followers of the two creeds can be shown to vary directly with the weakness or firmness of the control of Government. During recent years, as control weakened, the riots of this nature increased, until they culminated in the Cawnpore tragedy of March last. Could anything be more illuminating in this connexion, and also in respect of the other major problem, than the recent events on the Punjab-Kashmir border? Muslims from British India threatened to invade a Native State in order to support their co-religionists, whom they believed to have been oppressed by the Hindu rulers of the State. Incidentally, such a situation would have been almost inconceivable twenty years ago. A catastrophe of very serious dimensions seemed imminent. The Punjab Government was firm. British troops were moved to the scene of the trouble. Their presence gradually allayed the excitement, and the immediate danger passed without their having to fire a shot. British officers of ripe experience in military, judicial, and administrative matters in India were summoned by the Maharaja to aid him in pacifying the discontented population, and were appointed to responsible posts in the State. What means could a self-governing India, composed of Hindu and Muslim

only, have employed to stop the trouble, without a solid British terrain to fall back on? What would have been the effect on the Kashmir Raj in such a case? Truly, Mr. Gandhi and the Congress will perhaps forgive in this instance those who believe that there is still something to be said for the *Pax Britannica*.

The Government now in power in England, composed as it is of members from all three parties, is in a specially strong position for adopting a policy of caution. It is not suggested that there should be any change of course, only a definite grasp of the helm. It should be made very clear that the direction remains the same along the route prescribed, and that nothing is altered, only a slackening of the pace, occasioned, not by any want of will to make more rapid headway, but by the force of adverse circumstances and by the need to examine once again the narrow channels through which the ship is passing, in order to gain the open sea beyond. Above all, it is necessary to stress the fact that the captain has no intention of abdicating any of his functions until less troubled waters are reached.

Any announcement of this nature would, of course, be met by the Congress leaders with the cry of 'Broken pledges'—that is only to be expected. It would, however, be nothing of the sort. The refutation of such an outcry has been clearly given in Sir Harcourt Butler's recent luminous little volume *India Insistent*, and it is well known to any student of modern Indian politics. The promise of progressive realisation of responsible government in India was accompanied by the definite statement that the policy was to be achieved by successive stages, the time and manner of each advance being determined only by Parliament, who would be guided by the co-operation received and by the aptitude shown by the leaders for these new responsibilities. Much individual aptitude perhaps exists; but no one can argue, in face of recent events in London and in India, that the leaders have shown a remarkable spirit of co-operation or a striking aptitude for combination and fusion.

Constitution-making for a nation which has only lately found itself and is not quite sure of its component elements is a serious matter. Mistakes of legislation in a country that has been fused into a single unit by the processes of history and of time can be rectified without an upheaval; but in a country which has been recently unified, especially where racial feeling is apt to run more strongly than national feeling, initial errors in the constitution, unless controllable by a strong hand at the centre, are apt to end in the reign of war, not law. Everything therefore seems to point at present to moving forward to the next step in advance slowly and with great caution.

It would appear from the document recently presented to

the Prime Minister by Mr. Gandhi, Pandit Malaviya, and other members of the Conference that the Hindus, on the whole, appear to be against any advance whatever until the whole journey can be accomplished in one stride ; they ask for federation and responsibility at the centre before provincial autonomy, proposing, however, at the same time to fix a definite date for the first and last step. But how is it possible for the British Government to agree to any date ? It must depend absolutely on the progress made with the solution of the two great problems dealt with in this article—the Hindu-Muslim difference and Federation ; and both depend entirely on the Indians themselves. Do these gentlemen seriously think that the government of India can be handed over with these two fundamental issues still unsettled ? They should know, they must know, that, while absolutely sincere in desiring to see Indians governing their own country, England is not lightly going to risk all that she has done in the past for that continent, and that she will only entrust the government to a power, or a combination of powers, strong enough and stable enough to give a reasonable hope for the maintenance in the country of the spirit of union, peace and harmony that prevailed during the half-century before the war. What course Parliament will adopt it is impossible to say ; but if it should decide to proceed with provincial autonomy, preparing at the same time a spirit of national union and federation, it is obvious that the Government at the centre must be both strong and unafraid, giving each province scope for individuality, yet maintaining throughout India the necessary degree of uniformity.

So, let us hope, in the long run, perhaps after many trials, checks and disappointments, success may be looked for. The provinces will be gradually brought to the point which will render India really and truly ready for the next step forward ; and in time England will crown her long, laborious work in India by handing over the government to the representatives of the whole people, their ancient quarrels healed, their future set on solid bases, leading to harmony and unity throughout the continent, and their leaders exerting the influence which is their due, not only throughout the Empire, but throughout the world. This is the long view ; this the bright though yet distant vision—a glorious hope for a great nation. If into the heart of Hindu and Muslim alike could come the belief that for some time to come England's help is still necessary to them ; if this should in time create a truly national feeling, a brotherly love for India first ; if England to herself be true, and continue to labour meanwhile for the common good, we shall perhaps see at last the accomplishment of the greatest and noblest task ever undertaken by any nation, or, rather, by two nations in sympathy.

E. G. COLVIN.

GERMANY AND THE CORRIDOR

How many of us whom the call of memory or the impulse of natural piety sends year by year to Armistice commemorations reflect that it is an armistice and not a true peace that is commemorated each recurring November, and that in many parts of the Continent a condition still prevails which is but little distinguishable from a state of war. This thought came home to me with new force during recent journeyings along and behind the new frontiers of Germany as fixed under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. My object was the single one of seeing for myself actual facts, studying political and economic conditions, consulting expert opinion, and, on the basis of knowledge so acquired at first hand, endeavouring to form conclusions as to how those provisions might be advantageously revised, remembering that the cause of revision cannot be advanced by merely talking about it in general phrases. My travels took me to Eupen and Malmedy on the Belgian frontier and the Saar region adjoining France ; to Danzig and the Polish Corridor in the north-east, including the frontier provinces on both sides ; to Upper and Lower Silesia and the Czecho-Slovakian frontier in the south-east ; and to distant Memel Land, formerly bordering Russia, and now part of Lithuania. The most important frontier change of all could happily be disregarded, since the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France is not likely to be questioned if only just and tolerable settlements can be arrived at elsewhere, as with French influence and assistance I am convinced they could be.

It was a singularly enlightening journey, though strenuous, for the days and the distances to be travelled, for the most part by motor car, were long, the conferences and conversations numberless ; but at times, in spite of marked courtesy and kindness experienced everywhere, the impressions formed were very depressing. Not only did I come to close quarters with populations struggling under the double burden of material care and enfeebled *morale*, and apparently on the verge of a breakdown (the Hoover relief measures subsequently acted as a temporary tonic, though no more), but also confronting my problem in

concrete form I found that its magnitude and perplexity were at first appalling. It is one thing to read through the Treaty of Versailles at your desk or in your armchair ; it is quite another to see that Treaty in actual operation.

It is no exaggeration to say that dejection and distress hang like a pall upon all the territories whose life has been violently dislocated, whose immemorial attachments and traditions have been ruptured, and whose prosperity has been checked and often destroyed by the frontier changes stipulated by, or consequential upon, the Peace Treaty of 1920. Let me recall the extent and some of the effects of the changes enforced in the six eastern provinces of Prussia alone, since the gravamen of the problem of revision will be found there rather than in the west. By the annexations one-fourth of their area, or 19,700 square miles, with 4,375,000 inhabitants, forming a somewhat larger proportion of the whole, passed under the sovereignty of the three neighbouring States of Poland, Lithuania, and Czecho-Slovakia. The province of Posen went almost entirely, and the province of West Prussia to the extent of two-thirds. The natural resentment created by the denationalisation of this largely German population was deepened by the manner in which it was done, for most of the cessions were enforced either without consulting or even ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants or in disregard of the *plébiscite* decisions where these were obtained.

Europe has witnessed in the past many far-reaching dislocations of national and racial frontiers, but, happening in times when political conditions were still fluid, and cultural institutions more or less embryonic, such changes, even when the result of wars, often proved steps on the path of progress. The annexations enforced under the Treaty of Versailles, on the other hand, meant the disintegration of old, highly civilised, and thriving communities, the shattering of the economic unity and cohesion of large and compact territories, the disturbance everywhere of the happy balance between the 'triple *entente*' of industry, agriculture, and commerce, ruining landowners, farmers, traders, and labourers equally, and plunging both town and countryside into confusion and misery.

By the Polish annexations hundreds of towns and rural parishes, estates and farms have been cut in two, one part remaining in Germany while the other is in Poland ; scores of railway lines have been blocked at the boundary posts, the track on both sides being no longer used and undiscernible beneath the growth of grass and weed, while the rails, where not relaid elsewhere, are rusted beyond recognition ; many hundreds of highways and secondary roads have been similarly cut off ; fine bridges spanning main roads and navigable rivers have been

torn down ; and public buildings, churches, hospitals, and other philanthropic institutions without number have been taken from the communities which built and needed them. I visited town after town and village after village whose economic life had been dislocated beyond hope of recovery by the fixing of arbitrary and senseless boundaries which paid no regard whatever to local and administrative conditions and century-old traditions and usages.

The greatest centre of danger in Germany is not Posen, though that Prussian province has been annexed almost bodily, nor yet Upper Silesia, though the situation there is extremely disquieting, but the Corridor, including the Free City of Danzig. Of that disturbed area I would now speak more particularly, because convinced that any attempt to solve the German frontier problems must begin there. As this is a question which primarily interests Poland, it is right that I should make it clear that I approach it with no prejudice against the Polish nationalist movement in so far as its adherents are prepared to be fair to other nationalist movements. Far from that, in books first published so long as thirty-seven and twenty-three years ago, I warmly espoused the cause of the Polish minority in the east of Prussia, then contending against Bismarck's policy of repression.

In coming to the heart of my subject it is best to speak plainly and waste no time on the discussion of peddling measures. So long as the Corridor continues neither Germany nor Danzig, which stands at its head, nor Poland herself, will be able to settle down. The Corridor is a tract of now foreign territory, carved out of the province of West Prussia, running inland for 45 miles, with a width of 20 miles at the coast, 60 miles in the centre, and 140 miles in the south. It cuts Germany into two parts, and converts the cradle of the old Prussian kingdom into an enclave, locked in on its land frontiers by foreign States. According to the grouping of its population by language at the time of the annexation, 66 per cent. spoke German and 33 per cent. Polish. The humiliation as well as the injury inflicted on Germany by this cruel and, as I hope to show, unnecessary act of mutilation has put iron into the soul of her people. Let an Englishman imagine a great slice of our country similarly in alien occupation—say, a wedge running through to the opposite coast from Hull or Newcastle on the east or from Liverpool or Bristol on the west—and he will better understand the feeling of embitterment which exists in Germany and deepens and hardens with the flux of time.

Since the Polish occupation in 1920 a large number of the most capable German inhabitants of the Corridor have left, driven away either by harsh treatment or by the impossibility

of adjusting themselves to social conditions and a political *régime* which discourage enterprise and offer no prospect for their families. Signs of the old prosperity are still, of course, visible in abundance under the new dispensation, just as the coinage of a country may continue unaltered though its value and the credit behind it may have declined. But the prosperity is departing; the Polish administration is living on the economic and cultural capital created largely by generations of Germans whose descendants have either been denationalised against their will or have sought new homes in more congenial surroundings, and no one who knows the Corridor to-day doubts that this capital is being steadily exhausted.

When based on the civilising work which she has done in and for the Corridor Germany's claim to its return becomes, in my opinion, invulnerable. A title to possession which rests only on force, on prior entry at some remote date, or on dynastic arrangements made when a ruler's subjects were steeped in the degradation of serfdom, is not the most adequate and convincing. It is an accepted principle of international law that to sovereignty over a territory belongs 'effectual occupation.' Tried by that criterion the Polish claim to the Corridor cannot be compared in strength to that of Germany, which in this case means Prussia. Whatever that region became in course of ages, whatever it is to-day, is due to German rule, German settlement, German enterprise, skill and sacrifice. It was Germans who settled the land when it was empty and waste, brought it into cultivation, organised it in orderly communities, and gave it civilisation and prosperity. In that work Poles and members of other races in large numbers bore a share, first on dependent and later on equal terms. Of the Poles in particular it may be said that, unsympathetic as their treatment may have been at times, they owe their position and influence in that part of Germany very largely, and until a comparatively recent period altogether, to German direction, assistance, and tutelage.

What has been said about the economic disturbances caused in the German eastern provinces generally applies *pari passu* to the Corridor and the adjacent frontier districts. Purposely I refrain from giving details of the many galling grievances of a more personal kind of which the Germans living in these territories complain. Although these grievances are directly attributable to the new political status, many of them are not necessarily inseparable from it, but are due for the most part to intolerance and the absence of common prudence and tact, for which reason they do not rank amongst the strongest arguments against the Corridor. On this subject I will only say that the provisions of the minority treaty are not being fulfilled; a systematic and harsh campaign of 'polonisation' is being carried on in the schools and in the Government service; there is unfair discrimination against Germans in the matter of granting certain trade licences; German teachers allowed to remain in Polish service are sent from the Corridor to Galicia, there to be 'polonised,' while Galician teachers are put in their places, with the result that the children of German parents are only half taught, since the teachers do not properly understand their language and the scholars cannot follow Polish; German Protestant churches have been taken and given to the Roman Catholics; and German charitable institutions, long carried on by sisters and deaconesses of the Evangelical faith, are perverted to other purposes, or put under Polish management and staffed by Poles; in the creation of small agricultural holdings the German landowners are expropriated to a far greater extent than the Polish, which is contrary to the law; all sorts of difficulties are put in the way of the German peasants and other inhabitants on the Vistula, so that, as a memorial shown to me states, life is made a burden to them; and the passport and frontier control services generally are harassing to a degree that is almost unbelievable, decent people being constantly arrested, dragged off to the courts and promptly sentenced to imprisonment for the most trivial disregard of the regulations. It is impossible to understand the object of all this pin-pricking and chicanery; but if it is intended to rub in the fact that the Poles are now top dogs, that purpose is served very effectually.

The position of Danzig in the Corridor is intensely difficult and indeed tragic, and merits profound sympathy. The events and negotiations which led to its restoration to the status of a free city deserve brief mention for one reason in order to illustrate the haphazard way in which the happiness and destinies of millions of human beings were determined at Versailles. In some cases the decision to annex was taken before the Allied Powers had any clear ideas as to how the territory seized should be disposed of. Another reason is that Danzig has a personal interest for Englishmen and Scotsmen, since, as the city archives and the monuments in the late mediæval church of St. Mary and its crypt attest, families of both races (including a branch of the late Lord Balfour's family) settled there from the sixteenth century forward. There are English street names in Danzig, like Gibson Street and the English Damm or Embankment, and there is also a beautiful old mansion known as the English House.

Up to the date of the Versailles Conference meeting it was no part of the design of a Polish State, as conceived by the Entente Powers, that its sovereignty should extend to the Baltic. Before

he came to Europe President Wilson had outlined the new Poland as he envisaged it in the second of his Fourteen Points of January 8, 1918, afterwards formally accepted by the belligerents on both sides as the basis of peace, though not so treated. Poland was to be an independent sovereign State, to include 'the territories inhabited by an indisputably Polish population,' it was to be assured 'a free and secure access to the sea,' and 'its political and economic independence and political integrity' were to be guaranteed by international covenants.

Wilson's biographers record that he experienced a great shock when the Polish agents who fluttered round him and his colleagues in Paris, and seemed obsessed by the idea that the Conference had been convened primarily for the satisfaction of Polish demands, made all sorts of extravagant claims to German territory. They demanded the whole of West Prussia, with Danzig, and also East Prussia, and all this territory was to be taken without consulting its inhabitants. So well had the Polish imperialists laid their plans, and so confident were they of success, that M. Paderewski declared in Danzig in December 1918 that 'Danzig must be a Polish city as once before,' and that 'a Polish army flying Polish colours would be there before long.' When these demands were first put before him Wilson rejected them as immoderate, but, pressed by France and by one of his own advisers, who for some reason seemed to be almost more Polish than the Poles, he gave way step by step, until it was left to Mr. Lloyd George to appeal for, and at last to insist on, the adoption of a saner and safer policy. Compelled to give way on the Corridor question, Mr. Lloyd George refused to allow Danzig to go to the Poles, but accepted its conversion into an independent State 'under the guarantee of the League of Nations.' He also agreed—no doubt against his sentiment of justice—that the Corridor populations should be 'conveyed' without a *plébiscite*.

In April, while the crisis which the fate of Danzig occasioned was still tense, a letter on the subject addressed by me to the *Manchester Guardian* led to my being asked to go over to Paris, and this I did, stating my views at length both to Mr. Lloyd George and to President Wilson. It was clear to me that Mr. Lloyd George did not like the Corridor arrangement at all, and that he regarded President Wilson's first reasonable concessions to Poland as sufficient. His last words to me were, 'I can carry Wilson with me as to Danzig' (*i.e.*, its independence), 'but not as to the Corridor' (*i.e.*, its abandonment). Of Wilson, greatly as I respect his good intentions and his memory, I am compelled to say that he made during our conversation several statements which betrayed a very inadequate knowledge of German conditions and history. When these inaccuracies were pointed out

he replied, 'I can only say what my advisers tell me'—words that tell their own tale.

The Poles have never taken kindly to an autonomous Danzig, which is to them as a thorn in the flesh. It is a fact of which, if space allowed, proof in abundance could be given that, although in international law Danzig is a sovereign State, Poland has from the beginning done her best to make that status ineffectual and illusory. Her Government has called its independence in question in many ways; it has deliberately overridden its indefeasible rights; and it has repeatedly violated the provisions both of the Treaty of Versailles and the convention of November 9, 1920, which defines more particularly the relations of the two States. Not only so, but the economic policy which Poland is pursuing is steadily making for the Free City's decline. This, however, is part of a well-devised plan. Danzig is being squeezed in the hope that it will surrender its independence and become part of Poland. Here, again, if proofs are not advanced it is only for lack of space. Yet the words of the Polish Minister who said publicly several years ago, 'The grass must grow in the streets of Danzig, and then it will give in,' far from intimidating the people of that ancient German city, only strengthened their determination to hold out.

To come, however, to practical suggestions. Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provides for the 'reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.' To the existence of this safety valve M. Clemenceau, in his Note to the protests of the German delegation, expressly called attention. The creation of the Corridor was a blunder of the first order, as some if not most of its sponsors knew from the first. It is to-day a standing menace to peace, and as it is bound to go sooner or later Poland could not better serve her own interests or perform a greater service to Europe than by agreeing to retrocession while an amicable adjustment is still possible, subject to the retention of the southern area, and to the adoption of such measures for the protection of her commerce and shipping as may be required.

I go further and contend that neither the Corridor nor Danzig is any longer needed by Poland. Since the Corridor was created for the purpose of assuring to the new State 'full use' of both the Vistula and the harbour at its mouth, a quite new situation has arisen owing to the construction by the Poles of a harbour of their own at Gdingen (Gdynia), with a railway from the Upper Silesian coal basin to the coast. I spent some time at Gdingen, which is some ten miles west of Danzig, inspecting its shipping facilities and the lay-out and proportions of the town,

which is fast becoming the centre of a large population and a busy trade. The harbour complex as planned is a great commercial undertaking, but also a great national act of faith, and to pretend to belittle it would be pointless as well as ungenerous folly. Begun in 1924, it has been brought to its present stage of development mainly by Dutch, French, and Belgian engineers and contractors and by French financiers, while Polish labourers from Pomerellia and Galicia have done most of the excavational and structural work. Behind the project, however, are Polish spirit and self-confidence, without which Gdingen would still be to-day the sleepy little fishing village which it was a decade ago. The conception, indeed, is grandiose, and one can only admire and wonder at the courage and enterprise which are attested by its execution. The spectacle of that vast expanse of water, largely enclosed within a natural basin, of the long and well-equipped quays and docks, the rice and oil mills, the cold storage plant, the bacon and herring curing factories, and the great warehouses which are either completed or in course of construction, with near by the brand-new town, that has sprung up, as it were, mushroom-like in a night, is not merely impressive but overwhelming. Already Gdingen is a big seaport town with (I was told) between 30,000 and 40,000 inhabitants, not all as yet adequately housed by any means, with fine municipal buildings, churches, schools, meeting and concert halls, hotels, theatre and cinema, banks and offices, an ample provision of shops and stores, and most of the amenities of an up-to-date and, judging by appearances, thriving community. A statue of Liberty—that Liberty which, Campbell tells us, 'shrieked as Kosciuszko fell'—a copy of the one overlooking the harbour of New York, is yet to come.

Other features of Gdingen, which cannot be viewed without anxious questioning as to what they might mean at some future time, are a naval harbour, the beginnings of a naval dockyard, and a small fleet of cruisers, torpedo-boats and destroyers, mostly, I was told, bought from France. There exist already a training-ship for a future marine and a seamen's school on shore. A Pole of former German nationality is at the head of the naval department, and many old German-Polish naval officers have taken service under it. Assuming that Germany's naval power has been permanently broken, Poland is bent on establishing a *dominium maris Baltici* which it claims, with no justification in fact, to have possessed in remote ages. In Polish schools to-day the children are systematically taught that the Baltic is a Polish sea. This aspect of the Corridor question is one of the utmost gravity, particularly when viewed in conjunction with the Franco-Polish military alliance. The convention which defines the purposes of that alliance is not known as well as it should be.

Although Danzig is supposed to be an independent sovereign State, under the direct protection of the League of Nations, yet France by that convention undertakes to occupy its harbour in the event of war breaking out between Poland and Germany, and Poland undertakes to transfer the harbour into French hands. Such is the position in which Danzig is situated to-day; such is the fate which threatens it, and against which it has apparently no protection, for its sponsor, the League of Nations, though acquainted with this treaty, has never protested against it. In 1919 the mere suggestion that Poland, as soon as she had been established upon the Baltic coast, would proceed to build a great harbour which should serve as a naval base and an arsenal—to replace, forsooth, those which Germany had been required to close down in the interest of peace, and as an earnest of measures of disarmament to be adopted by the Allied Powers themselves—would have shocked public opinion throughout the world.

But Danzig is equally concerned for the future of its commerce owing to the competition of the new port. Its trade in sugar, rice, 'colonial' produce, artificial manures, even scrap iron, has been captured by Gdingen, and while formerly there were large coal imports from England, Polish (Upper Silesian) coal now dominates the market. A considerable number of vessels use the port, but most of them arrive empty and take away cargoes of Polish coal—the coal which has supplanted British coal in Scandinavia and several Baltic countries. In discussing the Danzig question with President Wilson in Paris, while he was still disposed to let the Poles have that city, one of my arguments elicited the remark, 'Oh, but in the past Germany has neglected Danzig, and the Poles intend to give it new life and prosperity.' It is not the fact that Germany had obstructed Danzig's progress, as I showed, but it is the fact that Poland is to-day trying to strangle the old city. The Poles themselves speak of 'the sword of Gdingen' and what it will do. Only a day or two ago a private letter from Danzig was shown me which ended with the words, 'We are suffering more and more from the Polish rivalry, and we contemplate the winter with great anxiety.' The Poles are constantly saying that Danzig cannot hope to continue permanently as a self-contained unit, and that as such it would eventually die. Whether that be so or not, I am convinced that the people of that ancient and noble city would rather see it decline and succumb in proud and honourable independence than survive and prosper as a Polish satrapy.

One other danger remains to be mentioned. It was part of the Polish plan to obtain not only West Prussia but East Prussia, and thus to efface Germany entirely from the map of Eastern Europe. That audacious design was frustrated, but it is not

dead. The militant imperialists who overran Upper Silesia and other German regions before the *plébiscites* were held, who invaded Lithuania and after occupying Vilna defied the Great Powers to eject them, and who form the lawless body known as the Insurgents, are behind the agitation for the seizure of East Prussia, and there are few Germans in that province who doubt that at the merest sign from Warsaw they would not hesitate to make the plunge. No representative of Polish imperialism carries higher authority or is held in greater esteem than Roman Dmowski, and he wrote before the annexations were carried out, 'If East Prussia should remain a German territory Germany must also keep West Prussia, the Corridor. The Corridor is of no value to Poland unless she possesses East Prussia.' As it is as certain as anything human can be that as long as a Germany exists East Prussia will form part of it, the conclusion to which M. Dmowski's premises point is obvious.

Apart from the injustice and danger of the entire Corridor incongruity, however, I maintain that Poland, by the building of her own harbour and of a railway to the coast, has demonstrated to the world, whether consciously or not, that neither Danzig nor the Corridor is necessary to her. With the execution of these great projects the one and only object for which the Allied Powers created the Corridor is now served without it. That object was to give to Poland a direct outlet on the Baltic for purely commercial purposes, and such only was the professed aim of Poland at the time. The Poles never pleaded, and the authors of the Treaty of Versailles (with the exception of France) never dreamt of, any other justification. So true is this that a historian of the Versailles Conference says that it was because 'the building of another harbour on the Polish' (*i.e.*, the then German) 'coast was seriously examined by experts and found to be impracticable' (wise experts !) that the unhappy Corridor device was resorted to. Neither the Treaty of Versailles nor the convention of 1920 between Danzig and Poland contains an article or a sentence admitting of a wider interpretation. There is mention only of commerce and commercial facilities, though the Polish Government now puts forward the suggestion that the word 'goods' in that relation includes munitions of war.

In consideration of the restoration of most of the ceded parts of West Prussia Germany should be required to make over to Poland, with or without sovereignty, both Gdingen and an area behind and about it sufficiently large to enable her to cope with all the trade that is ever likely to go that way either to or from the Polish State, but for no naval or military purposes whatever, together with the freehold of the railway track in so far as it passes through Prussian territory. Poland would also retain her

existing guaranteed right to the 'full use' of the harbour of Danzig and the Vistula. Of that once important river I can only say here that under Polish control it has been so neglected and allowed to silt up that it can hardly be regarded to-day as a navigable trade-way. This it will never be again until its administration returns to the Prussian Government, which exercised it with laudable efficiency in the past and should be required to do so in the future under a formal Vistula Navigation Act. The internationalisation of both railway and river would, of course, be a better alternative, and the treatment of the Oder in that way, in the special interest of Czecho-Slovakia, offers an encouraging precedent. Not only so, but Germany should concede to Poland, again with guarantees, free harbours in the other Baltic ports of Königsberg, Pillau, Elbing and Stettin, and perhaps in Hamburg, on the North Sea. Shipping and trading facilities so extensive, and exceeding any that Poland could hope to possess so long as the present unnatural situation continues, should satisfy all reasonable expectations. Further, Poland would be left with one-half of the East German territory now in her possession.

Anticipating the more tranquil days which will come when reason replaces passion, one can picture Poland, Danzig and Germany as no longer political and commercial rivals but harmonious partners, and the Polish railway from the Silesian coalfield branching out to Danzig, so feeding two harbours instead of one. Such a partnership, by reopening the great markets of the eastern hinterland, would bring increased trade and prosperity to all the Baltic ports.

To do justice to the population of the Corridor would, in my opinion, be the least difficult part of such a settlement, given only large views and a generous spirit on both sides. As the German inhabitants would be unaffected, only the interests of the Poles and the Cashubians would need to be considered. The Cashubians are not likely to give trouble. They belong to the Slavic family, but they are not Poles, as the Dutch are not Germans or the Walloons French. They are a simple, quiet, docile, adaptable people, whose attentions are concentrated upon their agricultural holdings, and, as a most competent authority assured me, 'All they want is to be left alone; give them fair treatment and they are happy.'

To the Poles, whether old inhabitants or newcomers, the option should be given of staying or going, and if staying of formally accepting German sovereignty. If they stayed and became German nationals, it would be by their deliberate preference and they would have no grievance. If they declined to change nationality, there should be no question of obligatory expatriation or banishment within twelve months in the old way,

but it should be possible for them to remain as a community within the pale, while not in all respects of it. Here is an opportunity for bringing to the treatment of racial minorities, both those displanted by frontier changes and those who remain, a little more toleration, generosity—in effect, simple common sense, for the question crystallises in that. Germany might offer minority rights going far beyond those stipulated for Germans by the convention which Poland has signed, but has never yet faithfully observed. It would be an advance in civilisation if a clear departure were made from existing principles and practice, due to the hardening influence of our egoistic nationalisms, in such matters as the retention of nationality, exemption from military service permanently or for long periods, and scrupulous regard and protection for the language, religion, and customs of minorities. Subject to due safeguards, why should not the inhabitants of territories which for any reasons change sovereignty be allowed both to retain their nationality, just like people in general who settle in countries not their own, and even to exercise a certain measure of autonomy where their numbers are sufficiently large and concentrated to ensure efficiency? They would be expected to give ample pledges of good citizenship, and they might have to forfeit certain civil rights, but in return they would continue to be themselves and be able to live the life of their choice. Who can doubt that minorities treated with generosity and confidence would be more loyal because more contented?

On the other hand, the Poles who opted for removal should not be left, as the German optants everywhere have been, to sell their properties, where not sequestrated, for whatever forced sales to hostile buyers might yield, and find homes and start life again as best they could. Not only should the German Government take over the properties of such optants at a fair value, where not disposed of voluntarily by the owners, but those without resources, or otherwise unable to make their own arrangements, should be settled in Poland, as far as possible in conditions not less favourable than those to which they may have been accustomed hitherto, this being done at the expense of the German, Prussian, and Polish Governments in equitable proportions. In particular, Polish peasants wishing to leave their holdings in the Corridor should be provided with corresponding farms across the frontier, exchanges with Germans now similarly domiciled in Poland being effected wherever possible. Measures would be necessary in order to prevent abuse, but it would not be a matter of difficulty for the Governments of the three countries to agree as to the circumstances which would entitle would-be migrants to 'assisted passages' on these lines.

Such an exchange of population is perfectly feasible, for it has already taken place elsewhere since and in consequence of the war on a far larger scale and in far more difficult circumstances. It would involve a large outlay, but a settlement of the Corridor dispute which, while assuring to Poland full security for her trade and commerce and protecting the interests of her nationals, would require from her no concessions which could be regarded by impartial international opinion as unreasonable and humiliating, would be cheap at any cost in money.

It must be admitted that the difficulties in the way of abolishing the Corridor are greater now than a decade ago, yet after fairly facing them I am convinced that they would not baffle the wisdom and will of statesmanship when once the paramount importance of settlement and peace for Europe and the world at large received generally the serious recognition which it deserves. And, after all, even if restitution should involve undoing many of the superficial changes of the last few years, of what account are these in comparison with the ordered system and stability of centuries? Meanwhile, it is a great gain that the question of revision is more and more being regarded as an international question. It is no longer viewed as a question of Germany against France, Poland, Belgium, Denmark, Czecho-Slovakia, the countries whose territory was enlarged at her expense, but one of the rest of Europe against all of them. The issue, in fact, is now the Peace of Europe against the Peace of Versailles. If after the lapse of twelve years the disputant States cannot or will not agree upon conditions which will give a hope of freeing the Continent from the present disquiet and apprehension, then, failing action by the League of Nations, the other European States, great and small, with America if her co-operation can again be obtained in a cause hardly less vital to her economic interests than to ours, must claim the right to intervene with all the pressure within the limits of friendly diplomatic intercourse.

Who can doubt that the adjustment of the Corridor grievance alone would open a new era in the relations of both Poland and France with Germany? Notwithstanding the present alienation between Germans and Poles, I am convinced that the German nation, and most of all its statesmen and leaders of public opinion, no longer grudge to the Poles their nationhood, would not have the province of Posen back as a gift, and are not only willing but sincerely anxious to live on terms of amity with their new neighbours. Such a relationship is even more to the interest of Poland. Although Germany now specially suffers from the existing tension, it is Poland who stands to lose most in the end were it to continue. For, as Bismarck once said of himself,

Germany can be to Poland 'either a good friend or a good enemy.' With nearly one-third of her population consisting of unreconciled and in larger part unreconcilable racial minorities, and with an uncertain Power of enormous strength on her eastern frontier, why should Poland needlessly multiply her risks? Let her believe that her best friends are not those who have egged her into imperialistic ambitions, but those who see the danger of carrying the follies of the old European political system, which collapsed under the strain of war, into the new and still unstable order.

The solution of this problem would still leave other frontier grievances to be adjusted, but it would be a hopeful starting-point for a complete cleaning of the slate with all the States which have gained by the annexations. In visiting the other centres of discontent I found the universal grievance to be either that their populations had been transferred contrary to the results of the *plébiscites* where these took place, or that, owing to the unfair methods and coercion employed, the voting entirely misrepresented the preponderant sentiment, or that the people who have been denationalised were not consulted at all. 'Let us have even yet honest decisions based on honest voting, we ask no more,' is the general demand of those who protest as strongly as ever against a forced change of nationality and transference to a rule which they will never cease to regard as foreign. With such a demand it is impossible not to sympathise. How far compliance with it would still be practicable raises questions too numerous for present discussion.

WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON.

THE RIOTS IN CYPRUS

IN 1878 Great Britain instructed her representative at Constantinople to give the Sultan forty-eight hours in which to agree to our occupying Cyprus, as the price of our good offices in standing off from other Powers who sought to dismember the Imperial Ottoman Empire. The Sultan agreed, and in due season this country was privileged to initiate the process of dismemberment by annexing the island in November 1915. Thanks to these events it became necessary that, at any rate, two departments of State, the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, should be able to locate Cyprus. To the rest of mankind it probably represented 'a place in Asia Minor,' that safe refuge beloved of the schoolboy in geographical difficulties.

Not so long ago the influence of a distinguished peer was sought on behalf of one of the many deputations from Cyprus which had come to recite the grievances of their compatriots. After listening attentively to a statement of their case he said: 'There are two questions I should like to ask. Firstly, where *is* Cyprus? And secondly, what are we there for?' Now that the residence of the King's representative has been given to the flames, and British warships, troops, and aircraft have been called in to prevent further disorder, the island has found a belated place on the map. The second question may give rise to some searchings of heart.

The rioting in October for which the destruction of Government House by the Nicosia mob, ostensibly a demonstration in favour of union with Greece, was the signal, marks the culmination of a long campaign of legislative obstruction and open sedition carried on by a small section of Greek Cypriotes whose leaders included past and present members of the Legislative Council, who had duly taken the oath of allegiance. With one or two exceptions it appears to be taken for granted, judging from public comment in this country, that the present situation is the outcome of a popular movement, a nation struggling to be free. The explanation is not so simple, however, and recent events have to be interpreted in the light of several factors necessarily ignored by those who are not acquainted with local conditions.

The island is 140 by 40 miles at its longest and broadest, traversed lengthwise by two parallel mountain ranges, the southern range rising to a height of 6400 feet at Mount Troödos, where the winter snow often lies in deep gulleys through the summer. Except for the Mesaoria, the central plain, and the southern seaboard, it is a land of wild ravines and precipitous slopes on which the villages of the hillfolk perch precariously, cut off from their nearest neighbours by many hours of rough travel over stony trackways. Of the total inhabitants, roughly 350,000, one-fifth are Moslems and four-fifths Greek Christians. The rural population, some 280,000, or 82 per cent. of the whole, is distributed among 641 villages; there are no isolated dwellings excepting on a few *chiftliks*, or large estates, for long experience has taught them that safety from marauders lay only in numbers. The remaining 70,000 are concentrated in the six district towns, five on the coast and the capital, Nicosia, in the Mesaoria.

Apart from two mining concerns (asbestos and copper)—which incidentally last year distributed £210,000 in wages among 3300 peasant labourers—a silk filature and a tannery, agriculture is the only occupation. The rural population consists of peasant proprietors and cultivators, clinging to the soil with Gallic tenacity, their small holdings of arable land, vineyard or irrigated garden so fragmented that a two hours' journey may sometimes separate one tiny plot from another. The average peasant, ignorant of affairs, his horizon bounded by the life of his village, is either illiterate or just able to sign his name. His social life centres at the village café, where he drinks and gambles; other relaxations he has none. He and his family share one room, often with his oxen; his weekly budget for a family of five averages under £1 in cash and in kind.

The backward state of society is shown by the court records. In 1928 the number of criminal cases reported was 7088, including 2585 offences against the person, of which twenty-five were cases of murder or manslaughter. The minor offences numbered 37,816. The significance of the combined total of nearly 45,000 cases can be better expressed by saying that one in every seven persons was charged with an offence during the year. It is fair to add that an extremely efficient police force is steadily bringing down the tale of serious offences year by year.

Since the Mycenæan age Phœnician and Egyptian, Roman and Frank, Persian and Genoese, and half a dozen more have held the land for a space and passed on, leaving it the richer only by their tombs and ruins or fragments of their speech, and since that day the Cypriote has remained what he was, a tiller of the soil, unlettered and accustomed to be ruled.

The genesis of the present discontents may be dated from

1882, four years after the occupation, when it pleased Her Majesty's Government to confer upon this primitive and untutored community a Constitution so ultra-liberal in character that after half a century has gone by a Kenya settler may not aspire to its like, a Legislature with an unofficial majority of elected members, three Moslems and nine Greek-Christians, and six *ex-officio* or nominated officials. In 1925 the membership was increased to twelve Greeks and three Moslems and nine officials, leaving the Government still in a minority of six. The Crown reserved the power to legislate by Order in Council, a precaution that was more than once to rescue the Administration from a complete *impasse*.

At the outset the system of proportional representation and an elected majority was as pleasing to the Greeks as it was displeasing to the Turks. The former, as the strongest party in the Council, not unnaturally reckoned on exercising a preponderating influence in public affairs. The Moslems, seeing themselves so greatly outnumbered in the Council by their former subjects, feared—as they fear to-day—the domination of Greek interests. It was inevitable in the circumstances that the three Moslem members should give their support to the Government. On all material matters they have consistently done so ever since, excepting on two or three occasions.

With the support of the three Moslem votes the official minority of six became a parity which the Governor's casting vote converted into a bare majority over the Greek *bloc*. If this development was desired by those who framed the Constitution, it says little for their common sense that they should have failed to foresee its certain outcome. So far as the actual passage of Government measures through the Council was concerned, the Government had no reason to quarrel with a discompensation which enabled the administration to be carried on without constant recourse to legislation by Royal Order in Council.

From every other standpoint the results have been definitely bad. It is contrary to public policy that any one party in the Legislature, irrespective of its honest convictions as to the merits of the proposals laid before it, should year in and year out give its support to the Executive for racial reasons. Still more is it undesirable that the Government should be placed in the position of having to depend upon the support given in such circumstances. The Turks expected special consideration as a reward for their assistance, while the Greeks became increasingly embittered at their impotence to exercise the influence on Government policy to which their position appeared to entitle them. Last but not least, the perpetual opposition of Turk to Greek in the Legislature

created a political cleavage between the two races for which there was and is no *raison d'être* under an impartial Government.

So much for the defects of the machinery. It remains to examine the working results. With a communal roll and manhood suffrage the Moslems elect three and the non-Moslems twelve members of the Council. The character of the electorate has already been described. It is on the face of it asking too much of any community of untutored peasants suddenly to acquire the political and civic sense peculiar to Western democracy, particularly in a semi-Oriental country which immediately prior to the occupation had undergone three centuries of the intensive stagnation connoted by Ottoman rule. A mental outlook, born not only of previous isolation from contact with progressive ideas, but of immemorial subjection to the personal rule of alien conquerors, does not produce the material out of which representative institutions can be fashioned in a day, still less the 'spirit within that nourisheth' them. Nor do the disabilities of the peasant end there. In countries blessed with arbitrary climates, uncertain water supply, and a plethora of insect pests agriculture, primitive and unscientific and on a small scale (the average holding in Cyprus is less than 1¼ acres of arable land or 1 acre of vineyard), is at best a hazardous business with little margin of safety. Crop failure means ruin unless funds can be raised to fill the gap until the following season. In the absence of ordinary opportunities for investment in the island the only means of earning interest on spare cash is to lend it. Moneylending and usury are the salient features of Cypriote existence, and the peasant is the victim. It is credibly reported that one usurer has remitted for investment abroad over £200,000 wrung from the peasantry.

Recent official inquiry has shown that 82 per cent. of the rural proprietors are in debt to a total extent of £1,800,000 sterling, equivalent to £37 per head, a striking parallel to the Punjab, where the corresponding figures were 83 per cent. and £31. Loans are now usually secured by mortgage on real estate. As a result, the peasant is being forced off the land and from a proprietor becomes a tenant or a labourer. Already in 1928 in the Limassol district over 6½ and in the whole Colony nearly 4½ per cent. of the arable and vineyard land had fallen into the hands of the town moneylenders. Civil suits in a single year included over 9400 for the recovery of debt, greatly to the profit of the advocates, of whom there is an excessive number, so much so that they employ touts to stir up litigation in the villages and bring in business. The advocate picks up the crumbs that fall from the usurer's table, and these two allies play a decisive *rôle* in the economy of the rural population.

The relevance of these facts to the working of the electoral

system will be apparent from the occupations of the twelve Greek members of Council in 1930:

Five moneylenders (three advocates, one merchant, one estate-owner);
Five advocates;
One bishop;
One peasant-farmer;

and the peasant-farmer, as it happens, originally owed his seat to a temporary boycott of the election by the politicians for tactical reasons, otherwise agriculture, the basis of the whole social fabric, would not have had a single genuine representative.

The reason is not far to seek. The big moneylender, generally the political boss of his district, is in a position to compel his debtors to vote for himself or his nominee upon pain of being sold up. A peasant who is free from debt at the moment may be won over by bribery, for the elections are attended by wholesale corruption. The peasantry in Cyprus, as in the Punjab, are the hosts and the usurer and his jackals the parasites. The peasant produces and represents the real wealth of the island. The interests represented in the Council, however, are not his, but those of the parasites who fatten upon him. One of these gentry actually urged in Council that Government should buy out all the moneylenders in the interest of their debtors. It is not the least of the defects inherent in the present, or rather the late, Constitution that through ignorance of local conditions it contained no provision which would have ensured to the peasant the representation to which he is entitled.

These non-representative parasites and their predecessors on the Council are responsible for the present state of affairs. Under the British *régime* and representative institutions they suddenly found themselves raised from the obscurity of private citizens to a position which entitled them as the elected of the people to a voice in the government of the island. Assuming the mantle of leadership, they soon realised that if the garment was to remain on their shoulders a policy was required. Their new status had solid advantages, and the pockets of schoolmasters, *mukhtars* and others who sought or obtained preferment through their good offices could be counted on or induced to yield an appropriate return. The policy was not hard to find. That their votes in the Legislature counted for nothing, in spite of their being in an absolute majority, because the Turks invariably sided with the Government was unquestionably one of the factors which prompted the choice of a racial and national slogan—union with Greece. Other and more material considerations also influenced them. As the island developed, population doubled and revenue quadrupled; the cadre of the British staff and the scale of

salaries, far superior to those of the Cypriote subordinates, perforce expanded also. The constant and avowed desire of the Greek members has been to gain control of the island finances and to eliminate the British officials and replace them by Cypriotes, a consummation promising fresh opportunities for nepotism and graft. When Mr. Churchill visited the island in 1907 the Greek members presented a memorial in which, *inter alia*, they demanded a Legislative Council consisting entirely of elected members with full control of public affairs, plus three British officials, who, however, werenot to have a vote.

An incident which occurred while I happened to be acting as Governor during an interregnum in 1926 illustrates the mentality of these individuals. One of the Greek members, an editor, wrote to me confidentially, observing that he had been favourably impressed by my conduct of affairs and earnestly wished that I might be appointed to succeed the retiring Governor. If I so desired, he would be prepared, he said (he omitted to say in return for what consideration), to launch a Press campaign with that object. With a nice perception of the difficulties incidental to my anticipated acceptance of his proposal he added that, should I prefer not to send a reply in writing, he would be glad to wait upon me at any convenient hour. He never screwed up courage to inquire whether the letter had ever reached me.

The true function of the Greek members under the Constitution has been vitiated by their declared policy of union with Greece, a policy which, from the nature of the case, precluded any possibility of honest co-operation on their part and substituted in its place the single desire to obstruct and embarrass the Administration to a point where His Majesty's Government should be forced to concede their demands. In this endeavour they found a useful ally in the hierarchy of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus.

The priest-politician, to English ears a contradiction in terms, is a sad come-down from the priest-kings of ancient Hellas. '*Quelle chute!*' as M. Clemenceau is said to have exclaimed on learning that Paderewski the pianist and the President of Poland were one and the same. It has, however, been customary for the sentiments of non-Moslem communities subject to Ottoman rule to be voiced by their respective religious heads, and the Archbishop in Cyprus, as ethnarch, has always claimed to speak on behalf of the Greek Christian population.

The Archbishop, nevertheless, has not been the chief protagonist in the anti-British movement, but the Bishop of Kition, a nephew of the late ethnarch, who by virtue of that relationship obtained his see before he was thirty. An able and ambitious man, he aimed at the succession to the archiepiscopal throne and

quickly appreciated the advantages to be derived from the *rôle* of a popular leader with a seat in the Legislature as well as the Holy Synod.

There was room for leadership, as the prestige of the Church had markedly diminished in recent years, although as the largest landowner in the Colony, holding some 115 square miles with a considerable tenantry, it is still able to exert a certain influence. Its too numerous priesthood is composed mainly of ignorant peasants with a precarious stipend of a few shillings a month, and there are probably not a dozen of them in any grade who could be called well-educated. Owing no doubt in great part to the belief of its leaders that a national agitation resulting, as they hoped, in union with Greece would tend to restore its influence and increase its wealth, the Church has of late identified itself more closely with the activities of the elected members of Council, of whom the Bishop of Kition became the acknowledged leader.

The Cyprus embroglio is susceptible of interpretation in two ways. In the modern world, where recognised channels for the expression of public opinion are part and parcel of the social organism, any attempted disturbance of the life of the community is instinctively ascribed to the work of agitators and deemed, therefore, not to reflect a spontaneous popular desire for change. The conditions prevailing in Cyprus lend themselves to this conclusion. The agitation comes from above, not below. The Church and the politicians, mostly moneylenders and advocates, and the dozen or so Greek newspapers which they control, are the motive force, and the present riots, so far as I am aware, are the first indication of any popular response to their incitements and propaganda. There is, on the other hand, the hard fact that, although the island has never belonged to Greece, common ancestry, language, and traditions constitute a natural bond of the strongest kind, which has gained an added significance since the day when Cyprus in her turn was free from the Turkish yoke and may well be held to justify the desire for political union.

The principal person affected is the peasant. Competent observers have questioned whether the effect of the extremist propaganda in the rural districts is not more apparent than real. The peasant is shrewd enough to discriminate between words and deeds. So long as he is not over-taxed, which is certainly not the case—he probably escapes more lightly than his opposite number in Greece—his chief concern is to get his produce to market as quickly and cheaply as possible, and his perpetual cry has been for roads.

In 1878 only 26 miles of road were fit for wheeled transport. between Nicosia and Larnaca. There are now over 1000 miles of motor roads, and 540 out of the 641 villages can be reached by

motor car or lorry. Only those who know the island can realise the immense saving in time, labour, and cost which this transformation has effected. To roads have been added hospitals and dispensaries, demonstration plots and stud farms, speedy and even-handed justice, and, what touches the farmer more nearly than all, an Agricultural Bank, financing a network of co-operative credit societies, twenty-nine in number to begin with and five years later 326, which have distributed among their members some £300,000, most of which has gone to free their lands from the usurers' mortgages.

These tangible benefits of British administration give the lie to the allegations of inefficiency and disregard of popular interests which are the stock-in-trade of the anti-Government orators. The headman of a village once explained to a British official that he had shouted for Enosis at a local meeting because the political boss of his district, a moneylender, had ordered him to do so and he dared not refuse. He added, however, that he and his village earnestly hoped that the island would *not* be handed over to Greece, as they were quite contented with their lot, but begged that his words should not be repeated, otherwise he would be a 'lost man.'

The telegram published in *The Times* of November 20 shows that the peasants who allowed themselves to be led away by the extremist section into pillage and arson are already regretting the fact. The explanation of these events probably lies between the two views which I have stated. Any Greek who was the subject of an alien Power would naturally reply, if he were asked, that he desired to be united to his own kin. That is not to say, however, that he is dissatisfied with his lot to the point of backing up his wishes by force of arms, or even that he has any real ground for dissatisfaction. If the cry of Enosis represented a genuine national aspiration the Cypriote would hardly have allowed half a century to elapse without manifesting his wishes in unmistakable fashion.

One of the leading Greek Cypriotes once said to a Government official: 'What we want is to be ruled'; and therein lies the real explanation of the present unrest. Bad markets and trade depression and the necessity for retrenchment and increased though very moderate taxation have combined to play into the hands of the political firebrands in Cyprus as elsewhere. The fact remains that in no other country has any Government shown such tolerance and forbearance towards seditionist agitation as in Cyprus. The Government's policy was to ignore inflammatory speeches and the display of Greek flags and to trust to the people's common sense to judge between its performance and the windy orations of the extremists. In spite of recent happenings, for which the

riff-raff of the towns are mainly responsible, I think it will be found that the mass of the population did not identify itself with the movement or desire to do so.

The experience of the past fifty years has shown the unwisdom of pouring Western wine into Eastern bottles, and it is well that the Secretary of State has realised the necessity for devising a form of Constitution more suited to the general interests of the Cypriote people. Purely from the standpoint of administrative efficiency, a nominated Council with advisory functions would best meet the case at the present stage as a transitional measure. From the wider standpoint of the progressive development of popular institutions it would be better to retain the Legislative Council with its functions unimpaired, restricting the unofficial members to a minority of the whole and providing for their *selection* by the Governor from among a panel of persons elected either *ad hoc*, or from those already elected to the district councils (*medjlis idaré*) under the former Turkish system still in force. In either case, however, it is essential that the relative number of urban and rural members thus chosen should be so regulated as to ensure to town and country a representation proportionate to their respective inhabitants. Failing such a provision, the peasant interest will still run the risk of being swamped by the middleman and the moneylender.

REGINALD NICHOLSON.

RUSSIA INDUSTRIALISED?

IT is difficult to convey an accurate impression of Russia as a whole, because almost anything which can be written about Russia is true at least for some part of the Soviet dominion, for some structure of its society, for some one of its different nations, or for some aspect of its life. So that quite true things written by one person are often contradicted by quite true things written by another. Only by deliberately taking a long-range view is it possible to get the Russian scene into perspective.

The difficulty of conveying an accurate impression of Russia is increased by the relative isolation of the historical development of the country from Western Europe. The social history of Russia during the last 500 years has been very different from that of the rest of Europe, and her history during the last fifty years has been markedly different from that of Great Britain. To compare Great Britain with Russia at the beginning of this century we have to imagine Queen Victoria ruling as an autocrat over a very poor and almost entirely illiterate peasantry, no system of public education, trade unions and co-operative societies forbidden, industry very primitive, the Church a mass of almost Voodoo superstitions, a feudal aristocracy in power, a small intelligentsia in active terrorist revolt against the Government (the Prime Minister being assassinated in 1904), and finally a peaceful deputation led by, let us say, the Rev. Dick Sheppard being shot down outside the gates of Buckingham Palace in 1905. Russia is many hundreds of years behind Great Britain in social, quite apart from industrial, development. The only local government for centuries was the peasant village organisation, a social structure understood more easily by comparison with an Indian or an African village rather than with one in England, France, or Germany. Only in 1861 was serfdom abolished in Russia—a period in Great Britain of great development of trade unions, of co-operative societies, of benefit societies, of the system of national education, and of rapid advance in social and economic organisation generally. And only after serfdom was abolished in Russia was the foundation of real local government laid, and such elementary reforms accomplished as the abolition of secret

trials and the institution of trial by jury. To attempt a comparison between the events of recent history in Russia and in Great Britain shows that no close comparison can be made, and that the epoch 1931 in Russia has a quite different significance from the epoch 1931 in Great Britain.

Another way of looking at the differences between Russia and Great Britain is to consider the racial differences of the people concerned. But indeed the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the Soviet dominion, cannot properly be compared with Great Britain at all. The Russian dominion embraces one-sixth of the land surface of the globe, and it is encompassed by one land frontier. Such an empire can only be compared with the continent of North America or with the British Empire itself. Russia is a league of nations in herself. Many of Russia's internal questions are of practically international significance—such questions, for example, as the relation of Russia proper and Georgia or Russia in Europe and Russia in Central Asia.

Considering the question of race differences in its most general sense, the Russian has a very definite individuality of his own. Apart from the 'Russians' who are ethnically Tatars, the ordinary Russian peasant of the Don or Volga regions has an Oriental stamp upon him. The passivity of the Russians is probably Oriental and certainly characteristic. Submission to oppression, to brutality, to death has an attraction in itself for the Russian soul. Some years ago a party of Tsarist officers escaping from Petrograd had commandeered a train and were steaming northwards to reach the 'White' forces who were still on Russian soil. On the way north the line was cut by Bolshevist troops, the train was surrounded, and the passengers were ordered to get down. There were some hundreds of these men; they were officers and they were armed, but they did not resist, and they submitted to be herded together into a flock like sheep and to be shot down with machine-guns. When I related this story to an aristocrat of the old *régime* of Russia—herself deprived of her property and living with difficulty in Moscow—as an example of what appeared to me to be an 'impossible' passivity, her only comment was, 'How beautiful!' And it would be the comment of many more Russians. This passivity is one of the main characteristics of the Russian. It is because of this passivity that the recent rapid revolutionary progress of Russia has been possible. One gigantic experiment after another has been tried in Russia led by the active-minded revolutionary majority, and the people have acquiesced.

The Russian needs to be masterfully led. Peter the Great, turning Russia's face deliberately to the west, was the true precursor of Lenin and his industrialism. Lenin is the true

successor of Peter the Great. One of my most illuminating experiences in Russia was being conducted over Peter the Great's tomb with other members of the British Labour Delegation of 1920 and having this succession pointed out by some of the Bolshevist leaders. It was a reflection which, I confess, I had not expected to hear from Bolshevist lips.

Russia's social and economic history and her national characteristics would make that country very different from any Western European country in 1931, whatever the form of government might be. And Russia under the Bolsheviks preserves these national characteristics, but also brings new social and economic factors into operation. But these new factors do not all make for difference. The industrialisation of Russia and the large-scale collective and State farming approximate the country to the conditions of Western Europe in some respects, and in most respects to the conditions of the United States of America and Canada.

The revolutionary changes in Russia are essentially a modernising of a backward continent. The council system of village, regional, provincial, and national soviets gives the Union a thoroughly workable system of local and national government. Newspapers are published in editions of millions and read by millions, and the illiterates of the country will soon be a small minority. Education is being rapidly generalised in fact as well as in decree, and educational cramming establishments for giving every kind of technical instruction exist in considerable numbers all over the Union. Cities are taking on a modern appearance and acquiring modern conveniences of lighting, tramway service, water supply, and so on. The country, and especially the life of the peasant village, is being changed by scientific farming and new collective social organisation. The veil of the superficial similarities of civilisation is being drawn over the rugged individualisms of the Russian character, and the radio and the cinema flourish in Russia as elsewhere. But the greatest modernising force is the industrialisation of Russia, which is a power uniting the forces of 160,000,000 people and commanding the economic resources of one-sixth of the earth's surface in a part of the world almost incredibly rich in minerals, in timber resources, in animal resources, in fisheries and in agriculture. At the present time the industrialisation of Russia is by no means completed; in one sense the industrialisation has only well begun. But with the laying down of the basic heavy industries—the essential element of the Five-Year Plan—Russia is making herself largely independent of the Western European nations and of the United States.

During my recent visit to Russia I learned something of the new large-scale industries, such as that of the 300 acres of clanging machine-shops for making agricultural machinery at Selmashtroy, Rostov-on-Don, and the new giant tractor works at Stalingrad, with its plan of production fighting a veritable 'war' against disorganisation, stupidity, and deliberate luddite sabotage by aggrieved peasants. Then there are the big works at Magnet Mountain, in the Urals, with the largest construction camp in the world. Then the chain of electric power stations already in operation, culminating in the giant works at Dnieperprostroy, in the Ukraine, which is to be completed by next year. Electric works, radio works, textile works, including a whole chain of linen textile factories down the Baltic border of Russia, saw mills, cement mills, brick works, iron works, clothing factories, boot factories, coal mines, iron, platinum, manganese, gold, lead, tin and rare earths—only a jumbled list like this can convey a sense of the immense pell-mell activity of Russia at the present time. The transport system groans under the strain of carrying materials for the Five-Year Plan. The rationing system of food, clothing, cigarettes and other little luxuries, and indeed of practically everything, exists because of the needs of the Five-Year Plan. And the people of Russia, instructed by the Press, and by the radio, shouted at from red banners printed with slogans across the streets, shouted at from red banners in shops, in meeting places, in recreation parks and in factories, work hard to bring the Five-Year Plan to realisation.

What will be the result of this new industrialisation of Russia? What effect will the impact of these new ideas, new actions, and new constructions have on a society and on a national character so different from that of Western Europe? What is already clear is that new creative human forces have been released in Russia. And an intense struggle for existence, in the biological sense, among ideas and among individuals is now taking place. It was Sir Arthur Keith who pointed out some time ago—I believe in *The Antiquity of Man*—that the evolutionary process never ceases, and that in the environment of the modern city, as in that of the primeval forest, the law of natural selection is ceaselessly at work. And nowhere perhaps in the world are the forces on which natural selection depends so actively at work as in Soviet Russia at the present time. For what is the present condition of the country?

The whole of the nations of Soviet Russia are mobilised for the carrying out of the Five-Year Plan. Food is rationed, boots and clothing are rationed, even cigarettes are rationed. And, what is quite as important as the rationing, there are practically no little luxuries obtainable: for example, tinned sardines or salmon, tinned fruits or jams—these are almost

absent. Cakes or biscuits are great luxuries. Tea is a ration, but is measured in ounces per month. Coffee is a great luxury. Cocoa may exist, but I never saw it. Fruit and vegetables exist none too plentifully, and only when in season in Russia. Tinned meats, potted meats, prepared soups, jellies, etc., are all practically non-existent. The simplest way to put it is perhaps to say that in any little village grocery shop in Great Britain there are more varieties of things to eat than in any of the largest co-operative stores in Russia. The result of this absence of the little luxuries of life which are taken for granted in Great Britain is probably not physically disadvantageous to adults, but it is very probably disadvantageous to children who need variety. And what is certainly disadvantageous to children is the shortage of milk—in Leningrad one-third of a litre a day was the ration, and that was not always obtainable even in summer—and of butter. The whole Russian people is living at present on the plainest of plain fare. On occasion the food is inadequate in amount for adults, and it is certainly frequently inadequate as regards its vitamin and fat contents for children. Here at once is a selection factor of first-class importance. These conditions are very hard on all but the most robust and on children. In places where children's diet can be safeguarded, as in schools in large towns, holiday homes or camps, and in special restaurants, children are healthy and grow normally. And it must be emphasised that the Bolsheviks make every effort to secure good conditions for the children. But in country districts, on large wheat farms, and in general in those parts of Russia away from the centres of population, the food of children is often unsuitable and the death-rate of young children high. The forces of selection here would seem to be acting in the direction of preserving alive and of increasing the vitality of children in the best socially organised town centres—that is, the chief centres of Bolshevist influence. But the conditions of life in Russia at present are producing selective effects of a more profoundly searching nature than anything which can be achieved by food supply alone.

It has already been pointed out that the Russian people is severely rationed at present as regards the ordinary necessities of life. And the wages of the ordinary worker do not allow him to purchase very much outside the range of rationed articles at fixed rationed prices. But however many roubles you have in your pocket in Russia—and if you are a skilled worker your wage may be very high—you cannot buy much, because there is not much to buy, except perhaps a little extra food. But when extra butter, milk, fruit or what not, has been purchased, what else can be done? Kino and theatre tickets are rationed to a

large extent and issued through trade unions, but tickets outside this system are very highly priced, and in any case kino and theatre accommodation is much more limited in Moscow or Leningrad than in any large Western European town. Apart from these recreations there are limited workers' club facilities. Both Moscow and Leningrad are overcrowded, and indeed all towns in Russia are tending to become overcrowded, so that the attraction of 'home' is diminished in direct relation to the smallness of the space available. There is, as in all large towns, the life of the streets in Russia—the promenading, the shop-window gazing (whenever anything is shown); there are games for those who are young and active; and a great deal of time is occupied by queuing up for food, for clothes, for boots, for kino tickets, or, indeed, for anything that requires to be bought. It is said that a large part of the Russian's 'rest day' in the five-day week now universal is taken up by standing in various queues.

It may be fairly said that the life of the Russian worker out of working hours is duller than that of the worker in Western Europe. The friendly British 'pub.' or the Continental café hardly exists. What are called cafés are very few in number, and are essentially teashops. But there are vodka shops; and there are many drunken people to be seen on the streets of Russian towns, some of them insensible with drink in a way very rarely seen in Great Britain at present. Vodka is cheaper than beer, and is stronger in alcohol content and in effect than whisky or brandy. For some Russians the dulness of life finds its compensations in drunkenness. They are a minority, but they exist. For the majority the dulness is accepted and endured without too much comment. But there is an open road of escape from the dulness and narrowness of life for any or all workers in Russia if they will tread on it—the road of the Five-Year Plan.

The worker who is best off is the man or woman who throws himself into the spirit of this plan, who tries to understand his own individual job, and that of his factory in relation to the national work, and who tries to increase his technical efficiency or general standard of education. Such workers it is who form he 'shock-brigades,' who set the pace of work in the factories nd challenge competition of factory with factory in production. To these men or women opportunities of technical or general ducation come abundantly. There are *rabfac* colleges—that is, actory workers' colleges—to enable the manual but uneducated orker to train himself to the possibility of a higher educational ourse. There are classes for learning foreign languages—chiefly nglish and German. There are glittering prospects of big jobs be done—of foreign travel even.

There are few of the soft things of life in Russia, and ordinary

life is hard, but for those who choose there are prospects of very great promotion. Beyond the things already mentioned there is the prospect of membership of the Communist Party itself—a membership open to the worker if he is convinced of the truth of the Marxist philosophy, and if he is prepared to accept the hard obligations of membership. For although membership of the Communist Party undoubtedly carries great privileges with it, it also involves the acceptance of standards of life which are hard and not soft. The maximum income of a member of the Communist Party is limited to a figure below that which a really skilled foreign working engineer can earn. And above all, the Communist Party member must obey orders. It is he or she who is called on to do the difficult or dangerous work. And every member of the party must do voluntary work of some kind in addition to carrying on his ordinary occupation. For the physically and mentally active individual the road of strenuous work, of intensive self-education, of increase of general and technical efficiency, of increase of responsibility, and finally of social and political study leading to membership of the Communist Party, is a road on which he may choose to go if he wills; and an increasing number of workers go on this road every year. The number of 'shock-brigaders' increases; the number of members of the Communist Party increases. In a way just as significant, and perhaps in some ways more significant, the ranks of the organisations of Pioneers and Communist Youth increase. Young children are encouraged to become 'pioneers'—the Communist equivalent of Boy Scout and Girl Guide. From the Pioneers they graduate to the Communist Youth organisation, the Komsomol, and from that to the Communist Party. On what one may call this line or direction of Communist development there are certainly privileges for the individual, but they are privileges linked with and inseparable from heavy responsibilities. The Communist keeps constantly before him the idea that he is one of a party which is the 'advance guard of the proletariat'; he feels himself to be a leader, not only of the workers in Russia, but of the workers in the world as a whole.

As the Communists in Russia are in complete control of the system of education, of libraries, of the Press, and of all public discussion, and as they exercise a rigid censorship of all avenues of information, all discussions, social, economic and political, centre upon the Marxist and Leninist theories, and the Communist Party inevitably attracts towards itself a very large proportion of the most active-minded young men and women in the country. The way of the active worker, man or woman, in a factory or on a farm, to the 'shock-brigade,' to the night school or technical college, to the university, and finally on to the

Communist Party, is a way of active 'natural' selection of a large group of persons among the Russian nations which is bound to have the most profound effects on Russia's future history; for the Communist Party and those officially or unofficially on probation for admission to the party are a real organically united ruling class. And here another factor enters in. It has already been noticed in Russia that the most beautiful girls join up with the Komsomol because they want the most active and best-looking husbands. Sexual selection is added to natural selection.

What will be the effect on this process of natural and sexual selection of the use of birth control in Russia by means of contraception, but also by means of legalised abortion? Legal abortion is practised very largely all over Russia at the present time. Last year the number of births in Moscow was equalled by the number of abortion operations performed legally by doctors and illegally by unqualified persons. The net result appears to be that among the leading section of the population, the Communist Party and those moving towards it, the normal family will consist of two children, and that the tendency to family limitation will spread over the general population very rapidly. The population of Russia is still increasing, but unless present tendencies are checked, of which there seems to be no likelihood, this increase will diminish until it becomes very small or stationary. This limitation of population in Russia may occur more rapidly than in Western Europe, because the teaching of methods of birth control is actively encouraged instead of opposed.

The 'selection' of a ruling class of some millions of Russians out of the 160,000,000 of the population of the country along the lines already indicated offers the possibility of a wide range of speculations. That this selection is at present proceeding is certain. But as to what its final results will be it is impossible to dogmatise. It is not even possible to say, in the absence of statistics, whether this ruling class will reproduce itself from its own ranks, or whether it will prefer not to have children and rely on influxes from the general mass of the population. Nor is it possible to say how long the Marxist orthodoxy of Russia will continue, nor what will be the effect of the increasing contacts of Russia and the outside world which are inevitable during the years to come. What is certain is that Russia has produced a form of civilisation which is new. There are the beginnings of new movements in literature, in painting, in sculpture, in architecture, and in music. There are new movements in thought. There is a new form of social organisation which allows free play to the forces of natural and sexual selection to range over the whole of a population of 160,000,000 of people of different mental types. Out of the people living in many

different climates, and spread over a land area of one-sixth of the earth's surface, there is being selected a ruling group numbered in millions who accept the philosophy of Materialism and the ethic of Communism. And this ruling group of men and women is building Russia up into one of the great industrial powers of the world. What will be done with that power yet remains to be seen. But the power is there. And Russia industrialised is rising out of the steppe like some new skyscraper city of New York out of the rock of Manhattan Island.

L. HADEN GUEST.

WAGES

THE outcome of the General Election, while not a mandate for any positive remedy for our troubles, may be set down as an expression of faith in the converted poacher as a good game-keeper—even Headkeeper—for practical purposes, though he cling to his theoretical conviction that game ought to be confined to national parks, and a definite though negative order to abandon the brand of parasitic socialism by competition in which all parties have helped to bring about our sorry plight. *Parasitic*, because the ignoble belief of ' practical politicians ' that the road to office lies through wholesale bribery of the voters with public money, in multiplying forms of public assistance, has dissipated the capital inherited from Victorian thrift, without facing the central problem of how, when private capital has disappeared, these so-called ' benefits ' and the proper functions of capital in industry are to be provided for. At last the host is visibly failing under the exactions of the parasite and the fate of Herod threatens the State. The country has chosen, with remarkable emphasis, to return to what the Macmillan Report describes as ' the principles on which modern economic society is founded, namely, the dependence of the productive process on the expectation of normal profit to individual concerns, and the sanctity of contract.' Unwelcome as that choice may be to idealists in a hurry, the fact that (*teste* Sir Josiah Stamp) those principles have made us all four times as well off as our forefathers of a century ago, while Socialism has nowhere accomplished anything at all comparable, leaves no doubt as to where the substance lies and where the shadow; and the un-disputed fact that the machine is not yet perfect, but admits of further improvement, is no reason for scrapping it. Let us then for once abandon the national habit of muddling through by an incoherent series of compromises, and govern action in this crisis by logical adherence to the fundamental principles we have chosen, refusing to waste any more of our substance in attempts to graft the fruitful tree of capitalism on the barren stock of the Socialist thistle. The object of this article is to explore what sort of action is called for, on these lines, in the all-important sphere of wages and salaries, the share of the individual in the wealth he actively helps to create.

We reached our present position by three stages. First, slow wasting, industrial and financial, marked by failure to regain our position in the export markets, by rising Government expenditure and unemployment steadily mounting to the million level. Second, the acute stage, started by the American slump of 1929 and marked by a sudden drop of our trade balance to 39 millions for 1930 (in 1913, at a much lower price-level, it had been 181) and to a large sum on the wrong side for the first half of 1931; by still higher expenditure and taxation; and by unemployment rising to the 3 million level—a deadly cancer which we only treated with the opiate of endowment at higher rates to increasing numbers, out of borrowed money; and even then the Budget of last spring was balanced only on paper, by appropriating the last nest-eggs. Third, in this weakened condition, paying our way neither as a Government nor as a nation in trade, we were caught by the credit and currency crisis spreading from Austria, and overstrained our banking system in an attempt to stop the rot. The first National Government, to strengthen our credit, had balanced the Budgets of this year and next; but it was too late, and within a fortnight afterwards we were swept off the gold standard. Many tributaries swelled the flood, but which was the main stream is not in doubt. The disease of which unemployment is a symptom, already established in the first stage and greatly aggravated in the second, had robbed us of the strength to pull through the third. Our principal concern in this article is not with world-slump or monetary crisis, the remedies for which, as the Prime Minister has clearly expounded, are largely international, but with our own peculiar permanent evil disclosed in the first stage; because, unless the steps now to be taken are directed to curing that, the passing of the crisis will leave us, greatly weakened, still exposed to the same dangers.

Balancing a Budget is a domestic problem which a Government can solve by enforcing its orders to its own people, though the solution may be better or worse. The first National Government bridged budgetary gaps of 75 millions this year and 170 millions next, partly by putting through some of the economies proposed by the May Committee, variously watered down to meet supposed political exigencies, and partly by still further increasing the load of taxation, mainly direct; and it is greatly to be hoped that by next April further study will have revealed better ways of bringing together income and expenditure in 1932. But the trade balance is a different story, the concern, indeed, of Government, but the business of individual traders on both sides of the water, who cannot be ordered to trade together but must be induced. Their bargains with one another, so far as Governments do not hinder them by tariffs, quotas or other obstructions, are

mainly motived by costs, and on the average perhaps nine-tenths of costs represent wages (and salaries); and this brings us to our main subject: the levels of wages paid in our industry and commerce.

This is a much wider question than that of the remuneration of Government servants of different kinds with which the May Committee dealt in its admirable Report; but it laid down one very definite principle of general importance: that before any burden the nation as a whole might have to shoulder could be equitably distributed by any simple plan of equal sacrifice, the cuts they recommended were necessary to re-establish fair basic relativities between different classes; and any all-round cut should be in addition. As we shall see, this principle of rectifying past handicapping urgently needs extension to our general wage-levels; but unfortunately, in the rough-and-tumble of a political crisis, the action finally taken on the May Report has obscured it.

Growing industrialisation in every country and modern communications of all kinds have made the whole world one market for everything transportable; and our exports, on which we literally depend for our daily bread, have to be sold in this market at competitive prices which no action of ours can peg. Merchants existed long ago before factories, and in the ordinary run of business these prices are realised, not by the manufacturer, but by the merchant who by study of markets, intelligent anticipation, or creative advertising, foresees the course of the consumer's vagrant fancy and takes the risk of giving the manufacturer an order for goods of a defined pattern, quality and quantity; that is, the merchant, having decided what he can sell, employs the manufacturer to make it, instead of the latter deciding what he will make and employing the former to sell it. The whole chain of expenses—factory (prime) cost, manufacturer's 'overhead' charges, railway or road transport, warehousing, sales organisation, dock charges, sea freight and merchanting organisation overseas—must be covered by what the consumer pays to the final retailer; and thus the priority of the different charges counts from that end of the chain, and what the manufacturer gets from the merchant who gave him the order is logically (though not in order of time) a residuum determined by deducting all the intermediate charges from the consumer's price; and if this residuum is insufficient for the manufacturer, no business results. Apart from the sea freight, which is internationally and fiercely competitive, the trades intervening between consumer and manufacturer are 'sheltered'—*i.e.*, they represent, not transportable goods, but services which from their nature are not exposed to international competition and can preserve their own level

of costs; so that, after they have taken their several tolls, the full blast of the world competition falls on the manufacturer's residuum.

The farmer or mine-owner has little or no choice of products and goes ahead producing 'on his own,' with no merchant to prescribe his output. On such unregulated production the world competition falls directly, with (as recent experience shows) even deadlier severity than on the manufacturer. His prices fall, but, owing to the sheltered charges added to make the retail price, that price cannot fall in the same proportion. The capitalist distributors may or may not profiteer; their employees certainly do, and the higher their wages are, the more must the percentage fall in retail prices lag behind the wholesale. And the total of these distributive wages and salaries is very large; even before the war it cost more to sell most manufactured articles than to make them, and transport and other wages have risen disproportionately since. Whether the chain of prices works from one end or the other, *medio tutissimus ibis*: 'the middleman is surest to come out ahead'; though, of course, his business has risks of its own. Makers of specialities have tried to cut him out by organising their own sales departments; but it is said that, in America at all events, they have found what a costly business selling is.

But, further, the manufacturer's price has to cover, first, wages paid weekly long before that price is received, then salaries, materials, etc., paid at frequent intervals, then the periodical interest on any portion of the capital that has been borrowed at fixed rates of interest (debentures, etc.), and last of all, when the year's profit and loss account has been made up, there may (or may not) be a dividend to the holders of the 'equity' shares, not mere interest on a loan of money, but profits in a more or less speculative venture. These shareholders, the *entrepreneurs* or 'adventurers,' whose willingness to take risks is the mainspring of the whole trade machine, rank last in the distribution. In short, productive wages are a first charge on the residuum of a selling price fixed in the world market, while the profits of the industrial adventurer are the residuum of that residuum and may vary from nothing, or less than nothing (loss of capital), to a 'bumper.'

So far, we are looking simply at money, but that distorts the picture. In the words of Adam Smith, 'the *real wages* of labour may be said to consist in the quantity of the necessaries and conveniences of life that are given for it; its *nominal wages* is the quantity of money. . . . The labourer is rich or poor, is well or ill rewarded, in proportion to the real, not the nominal, price of his labour'; and of course the same is true of other forms of income. In other words, money wages must be corrected for the price-level before valid comparisons can be made. This is done

by the official cost-of-living index, indicating monthly the retail purchasing power of wages as compared with 1914. That insistence on the necessity of this correction is not vain repetition is shown by the habit, still almost universal, of talking as if maintaining the standard of living meant keeping money wages fixed—the root of a very large part of our trouble.

With a number of men in mess, on a limited total ration, each is in a sense in conflict with each, because the more one gets, the less there is for others. That is inevitable, but its full realisation should produce a feeling of solidarity, limiting each man's demand to a fair share and concentrating united effort on increasing the total. But if they go singly to the cook-house and each in turn fills his mess-tin without knowing or caring what he leaves for the rest, the cook-house squad coming last and the cook himself, the indispensable man who provides the meal, coming last of all, the cook is likely to find his residuum of a residuum vanish, and chuck the job. Dropping parable, let us see what is actually happening in the division of the proceeds of industry between the producers and the distributive trades. Official figures show large percentage additions (see Table, p. 708) between August 1914 and December 1930 to time-rates of wages, per hour and per normal working week, in typical sheltered and unsheltered trades. The lower percentages of weekly increase arise from the shortening of the working week, substantial in every case but not uniform in different trades.

The general average for all trades showed an addition of 90–100 per cent. to hourly and 70–74 per cent. to weekly rates. Correcting for cost of living (53 per cent. above 1914 at end of December 1930), average real wages advanced some 25–30 per cent. per hour and about 13 per cent. per week. The table shows that in both sheltered and unsheltered trades unskilled men gained relatively far more than skilled men; that both skilled and unskilled men gained far more in sheltered than in unsheltered trades; and that while a large reduction of working hours did not prevent average real wages from rising substantially, some very important trades had lost in real wages even apart from the shorter hours. Between last December and our fall off the gold standard (which is now raising sterling prices of food and other things) cost of living had sunk from 53 per cent. above 1914 to 45 above, and so further raised real wages; but these monetary changes affect sheltered and unsheltered trades alike and in no way alter the fact that the former are depriving the latter of their fair standard.

The relative levels of wages in different trades in 1914 were still mainly the results of the action of supply and demand over many years, the total advantages and disadvantages of any trade, as estimated by the worker himself (including such factors as the

Trade.	Percentage added to wage rates.	
	Hourly.	Weekly.
Sheltered		
Bakers	134	111
Building trades: craftsmen	93–98	74–79
,, ,, labourers	116	95
Electric installation: wiremen	113	91
,, supply: labourers	139	109
Local authorities, non-trading branches: labourers	117	96
Printing: compositors	119	107
Railways: lower-paid grades	?	130
,, higher-paid grades	?	100
Tramways: drivers	129	94
,, conductors	143	106
Unsheltered		
Engineer trades: fitters and turners, etc.	70	52
,, ,, labourers	105	84
Iron and steel: heavy trades (S. Wales)	35	20
,, ,, tinplate	50–67	35–45
Seamen (monthly rates)	—	65–70
Shipwrights	65–70	45
Shipyard labourers	105	80
Textiles: cotton	74	50
,, wool	96–100	72

cost to parents of bringing up their children to it) and the price employers would pay mutually determining one another; so that a trade requiring longer or more expensive training or high natural capacity would have to pay better wages than one which any lad of average physical and mental standard could quickly pick up. These natural parities, as the above table shows, have been swamped; the factors that count now are the size and political weight of great combinations of unions, and the legacy of short-sighted Government action in the war period.

No economic machinery could carry the wages of labour above the market value of the products of any industry for long periods; but parasitic socialism asserts an inherent right of every inhabitant of this favoured isle to be maintained by the community at an arbitrary standard of living irrespective of the value of his output, if any—work or maintenance at trade union rates—and has so far 'got away with it' that for years coal-

miners' wages have been partly provided by inroads on the Exchequer or the mine-owners' capital. Official figures gave the comparative general levels of *real* wages in different European countries for 1929–30 as: Great Britain, 100; Germany, 74; France, 59; Belgium, 50; Italy, 45. We may well be proud of having achieved this pre-eminence under our system of unilateral free trade; but it shows that, if belts have to be tightened, we have a hole or two in hand.

We have seen that the relatively excessive wages of the sheltered trades rob both the producer by cutting his share of the selling price of his products too low, and the consumer by preventing retail prices from following the fall in wholesale prices as they should. In fact, while the wholesale fall (*Economist* index) between 1926 and September last was 38 per cent., the retail (cost-of-living) fall was only 15 per cent. Not all this discrepancy can be attributed to sheltered wages, but they make an important contribution and by keeping up the cost of living greatly increase the resistance to the reductions of money wages which, under economic forces, would now be operating to start a recovery in industry. A reduction of the sheltered–unsheltered dislocation is urgently wanted, and to effect it by letting the sheltered mark time while the unsheltered wages in export trades double, is economically impossible.

Two kinds of sliding scale, linking wages to prices, are already in use: (*a*) based on cost of living, the prices of the things on which wages are spent, and (*b*) based on the selling prices of the products of the industry concerned, the things on which wages are earned. Each has its *pros* and *cons*: (*a*) is more stable and equitable between different industries, steadying real wages, but it involves central regulation of the index and in its present form is inapplicable to any but the working-class incomes for which exclusively it was designed; while (*b*) is more equitable as between employer and employed in its own industry and can be regulated entirely within it, but may operate too severely, as in Iron and Steel to-day. Some hybrid might perhaps be better than either; but nothing could possibly be worse than the only other way (except Trade Boards) we have of linking wages and prices: that of *ad hoc* negotiations between employers and trade unions in each industry, as the spirit may move. These negotiations, which one side or the other always seeks to protract through numerous stages designed for the purpose, consume endless time during which markets may be lost beyond recovery and commonly end in some sort of arbitrator's award motived, not (as under sliding scales) by real and relevant facts, but as a compromise after all the arts of combination, propaganda, and pressure exercised or threatened have been exhausted. The necessity of

continuously linking wages and prices has been clearly grasped in Germany, where a new Economic Advisory Council has lately been set up to find means of rendering the wage and cartel-price system more elastic, so that more rapid adjustments may be made to meet changes in the world economic situation (*The Times*, October 30, 1931). With pegged money wages and falling prices, the share of the national dividend (the total net product of the nation's activities, measured not in money but in goods and services) taken by fixed incomes of any kind grows, and unless there is increased production, which is impossible with a heavy unemployed percentage, the residual share of the adventurer must shrink to balance the growth; and as the residual share is, with us, less than a fifth of the whole in normal conditions, the percentage contraction is much higher than the percentage price-fall. We have long ago reached the point at which dividends are passed, capital is lost, and unemployment rises further—a most vicious spiral.

A French economist (M. Jacques Rueff) has shown that the movements of our unemployment percentage and of the ratio of our wage-level to the wholesale price index for the years 1919–30 correspond with uncanny perfection, and concludes that 'permanent unemployment can only be avoided by allowing wages to adapt themselves as freely as possible to the economic conditions prevailing. . . . There is only one way to reduce to a minimum the suffering caused by unemployment, and that is by giving complete freedom to wages.' Other economists have pointed out that his curves are open to criticism in various respects, if claimed to *prove* this proposition, but they clearly afford strong support to the conclusion reached on other lines that pegged wages on a falling price-level are a principal cause of unemployment. Why, then, do our wages stay pegged? In part, because it is the prevailing fashion to resist 'old-fashioned' economic laws instead of giving them free play to generate their own antidotes—utilising the recoil of the gun to run it up for the next round, by letting cheapness of capital and lower *money* wages generate confidence and enterprise for the upward swing of the trade pendulum. Labour is following the example of the business men and Governments all over the world who have lost millions of money in combinations to maintain prices of rubber, wheat, coffee and other commodities, and have only intensified the evils they would cure. But the dole (meaning, not unemployment insurance, but its extension into a pension for anybody who had ever done a small amount of work in an insured trade) has also contributed, because it has encouraged trade unions to stiffen their attitude and prolong the deplorable manœuvres and negotiations on wage questions already referred to, by freeing

them from the former necessity to leave the employer a reasonable profit unless they were prepared to risk throwing their members on to their own union funds or to charity.

For simplicity, reduction of 'wages' has been spoken of as necessary; but, as the argument has indicated, the necessity can be avoided by increased productivity. Lower cost per unit can be got by larger output for the same wages as well as by lower wages for the same output—or better, for larger output reduces also the machinery costs per unit. Here there are many possibilities: somewhat longer hours; willing acceptance of new machinery and methods; abandonment of the 'delimitation' squabbles between unions, which impede work, and of the deliberate restriction of output, rooted in the fallacy that to give high output is to rob a fellow-workman of his job, which is carried to such a point in some trades that a British workman in his first few months in the United States is said[1] to improve his working pace up to something like five times what it had been. The faults are not all on one side, and employers also have shown rigidity and slowness in 'rationalising'; but at least they may point to their heavy losses as some evidence that the remedy does not lie entirely with them; that profitable kinds of rationalisation, such as increased use of improved machinery (*cf.* 'more looms to a weaver') or other means of increasing output, require the willing co-operation of the unions, which is generally withheld, and that as long as this is so neither the banks nor the public can be expected to find new money for re-equipment. The central fact in the whole situation is that for years, while the employers have been making losses instead of profits, the wage-earners have been pocketing unearned increment, owing to the price-fall, on an enormous scale; and all the sob-stuff that is even now daily talked and written about the suffering inflicted on men, women and children by a slight reduction of money wages is misconceived. Taking such very rough figures as are available, to show the size of the sums in question, it is calculated that the wage-earners are now collectively enjoying goods and services at the annual rate of some 300 millions more than in 1924 (Sir Josiah Stamp has given the gain in 1930 alone as 'of the order of 100 millions'), to say nothing of at least 200 millions more (not including the workers' own contributions) added since 1913 to social services, which are in fact an addition to real wages. Apart from the depressed trades, like Iron and Steel, where not only is unemployment high but the sliding scale has brought down heavily the wages of those still in full work, the only infliction of suffering on women and children is that caused by the obstinate refusal of the unions

[1] Mr. Hartley Withers in *Everybody's Business*.

to be content with keeping real wages steady, which refusal has led to so many families being driven off full wages on to short time or the dole.

It is true that the *rentier*, during the same period, also received large sums in unearned increment, and natural enough that the wage-earner should say 'Let him show the way.' But, for reasons which cannot be expounded here for lack of space, the equities of the *rentier's* case are entirely different and, so far as he or she is well off (and she, in particular, is often far from it), rising income tax and surtax have done all the robinhooding necessary to abstract the whole gain. There is, no doubt, a case for further consideration of the very difficult questions that anything tantamount to a compulsory reduction of interest on the National Debt would raise; but all that is no reason for further postponing action on wages. Salaries have also gained by the price-fall, but much less than wages, because they are largely spent on things (like wages themselves) which have not fallen. There are no published statistics, but cuts in them have been far more common of late than wage cuts. It is essential that the two chief partners in industry, the wage-earner and the adventurer, should balance their joint budget before any attempt is made to borrow fresh capital on a large scale for a new start.

Two other objections to any reduction of money wages require brief notice. It is said that we only intensify our troubles by reducing purchasing power. But does anyone believe that we should cure them by doubling all wages to-morrow? Alterations of money wages do but transfer purchasing power between the wage-earner and the employer, and no more reduce it in total than you can increase it by working the printing presses overtime, as in the great German inflation. The national output of goods and services is at once the dividend to be shared and the basis of the claims upon it; and, provided real wages are maintained, there is not even a diminution of the domestic demand for the accustomed articles. It is further said that such a reduction would set a bad example and start an international Marathon of price-cutting, until industry everywhere sinks under the burden of money debts. But our Continental competitors made all-round cuts a year ago, without any lead from us, and we have seen how much we then had to spare in comparative levels of real wages. In the world of to-day, what natural advantages do we hold that justify us in maintaining such a pretension, or exempt us from the nemesis that overtakes the spendthrift?

A year ago the position, then less acute, seemed to me to indicate, as an initial impulse to recovery, a simultaneous cut of all money wages (except those already linked to prices by some

form of sliding scale) calculated to bring real wages back to the level of a few years earlier, on the grounds that this could not inflict real hardship on anybody, that there was no time to tackle directly the thorny question of the sheltered trades and that (as the story of the May cuts has since confirmed) the wage-earners care less for logic than for an appearance, however superficial, of 'share and share alike.' Nothing was done, and to-day, with the position critical, the whole wages question forced to the front, and evidence that the nation has the courage to face unpleasant realities, it seems possible that, under good and strong leadership, all classes might be brought to accept the elementary truths that the standard of living means the level of *real* wages, and that the gains of the sheltered trades have been largely made at the expense of the unsheltered; and might be prepared to take part in arranging a new and fair deal all round, provided that Government would undertake to see that, in this new system, rises of wages should follow as promptly and automatically as cuts, when the growth of production justified them; that retail prices should be made to conform to wholesale movements to the full extent of equity; and that the *rentier* problem should be fully and sympathetically examined. Holding, as I do, that the less Government intervenes in wages questions the better, I am nevertheless convinced that in this crisis the only hope lies in Government initiative and arbitration, because the fresh start must be made simultaneously in all occupations. In the framing of a new covenant the key of the situation seems to lie in the unexhausted possibility of higher productivity in industry. So far as the wage-earners would consent to draw on that, the iron law of the fixed total ration disappears, the necessity of wage cuts is obviated, and it might be found that the sheltered–unsheltered dislocation would prove amenable to treatment.

But now come in two new questions. Can tariffs, as is claimed, restore due parities between wages and profits without raising these awkward difficulties? Or is it true, on the contrary, that the protectionist case is more than ever dead, because all that tariffs could do has already been done by devaluation of sterling, though at first sight that remedy bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the good old device of clipping the coinage? Both propositions need examination. Devaluation is already producing its well-known results, stimulating exports and checking imports, reviving some of our industries and raising the wholesale prices here of the food and raw materials we must buy from gold standard countries. It is thus beginning to right our balance of trade and will continue to do so as long as wages do not, by following the rise of food prices, make our costs again too high for the world market. Logically, those who have throughout the price-fall

insisted that *money* wages are what matters can hardly now change leg to real wages. Practically, it should be difficult to secure a general rise in the wage-level till prices are back to the point at which present wages were fixed (say 1926), which gives cost of living a good way to climb. Strategically, it is something that a claim for higher wages shifts the onus of the initiative from employer to employed. Politically, the question may test the cohesion of the Government, some members of which have countenanced the view that 'if prices rise' (without saying how far) the cuts already made in Government service should be reconsidered. And devaluation of course can do nothing to restore due parities between the wages of different trades, unless it be held possible to grant rises to some *on that ground* and withhold them from others—the old difficulty in another form.

The help devaluation is giving to our trade balance is temporary, just because it is automatic. When the daily rate of exchange has been steadied at or near the predetermined point at which we shall some day stabilise sterling, devaluation will have done its work unless, repeating the omission of 1925, we again fail to harmonise our internal price and wage levels with the future parity of sterling, whatever it be. Devaluation, then, does no more than provide a breathing space in which we may recover lost ground instead of losing more; and though it may change the 'strategic' presentation of the sheltered wage difficulty, it cannot remove it.

With the £ worth 4 dollars instead of 5, a devaluation of 20 per cent., the British importer would pay, for 5 dollars' worth of goods, 25 shillings. Had sterling remained gold, that is what he would have paid under a 25 per cent. tariff, which measures the protective effect. The British exporter would sell goods worth £1 for 4 dollars. To do so before, he would have wanted an export bonus of 4 shillings in every £—*i.e.*, the bonus effect is 20 per cent. Such rates are not nearly high enough to satisfy a real hot-gospeller; but it will be simpler to consider the effects of tariffs apart from devaluation, the latter being temporary in its effects, while tariffs (as their opponents strongly urge) if they come, come to stay.

Protection is protean. It is claimed to have the merit (in these days) of raising prices; yet its advocates have been busy of late proving (if the 'overheads' line is proof) that it will reduce them. A general tariff, dividing all imports into a very few classes for simple *ad valorem* rates, is advocated by some and has the advantage of minimising the 'lobbying' inseparable from practical tariff making; but it is easily shown that no general tariff can work well that is not highly complicated and nicely adjusted by commissioners, as remote and independent as judges,

to an infinite variety of conditions. The objects to be attained by the tariff must be laid down in advance as Cabinet policy. One pictures Mr. MacDonald, like his predecessor a century ago, winding up the discussion with: 'Well, now, is the tariff to raise prices or not? It doesn't much matter which we say, but we must all say the same thing.'

These mysteries are beyond our limits, but something may be said as to the influence which import duties may exert on wages, either indirectly through the cost of living or directly by creating profits and so obviating wage cuts. Duties on things like tea, tobacco and sugar, with negligible home production and entering into cost of living, reduce real, not money, wages and so do not help the home employer to reduce his costs; indeed, they threaten to raise them. In fact, they are not protection, and the money they take from the wage-earner goes to the Exchequer and not the employer; but they are an admirable source of revenue and might be utilised to benefit the adventure indirectly by providing funds for such long needed reforms as the exemption from income tax of profits not distributed. Duties on cost-of-living items in which imports compete with home production, such as wheat and meat, textiles, ironmongery, etc., would similarly reduce real wages and (unless prohibitive) produce some revenue which also might be used to relieve industry. In addition, by raising the producers' selling prices for these articles or alternatively (on the overheads line) by increasing output, they might increase the profits of agriculture and the other industries producing them for home consumption. Duties on competitive products not entering into cost of living operate directly on wages only in the latter of these two ways; but in the body of industry there are very few bulkheads which are watertight against rising prices, and they may have an indirect effect. As the finished product of one industry is the raw material of another, there is room for infinitely ingenious combinations of duties and rebates.

It is universally admitted that, if attention is confined to a particular industry, 'safeguarding,' *i.e.*, selective protection, can and does protect; but the free trader holds that the hope that all industries can be protected in this way is an *ignis fatuus* the pursuit of which can only end in wet feet if not worse, and that under any general tariff our industry as a whole must lose more on the export swings than it can make up on the home roundabouts. After a century of controversy, the majority opinion seems to be that it is at least an open question whether the changes of the last fifty years have not to some extent disturbed the body of doctrine that was deduced by practical men from the conditions obtaining so long ago. On such a

question, the majority view is perhaps rather more likely to be wrong than right ; but on the other hand the faith of free traders in the *vis medicatrix naturæ* may be no better founded than the pathetic belief of the sick man looking at a chemist's window, that somewhere in that array of bottles is a medicine which would cure him, if 'scientifically' compounded at the right strengths.

Perhaps both parties may in the end agree that, as on both sides the question has become one of 'Faith, the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen,' it will have to be tried out by experiment, notwithstanding the special danger of the treatment to a patient like John Bull who has lost the elasticity of youth. But it does not seem to me that there is any reasonable expectation that tariffs, any more than devaluation, will restore prosperity to us, until the wage problem has been directly and squarely faced. However active world-business may again become, however we may manage our currency and control our imports, we shall always get as much unemployment as we ask for by trying to take out of industry more than the current value of the work we put into it. For Political Economy has come back from Saturn.

C. HARRIS.

THE FAITH OF A MAN OF SCIENCE

THERE comes a time in every thinking man's life when he has to define to himself his view of the universe and to find some sort of a faith by which to live. Most men of my generation were taught to regard the one or other form of Christianity, in which they happened to be brought up, as an unchallengeable verity, yet in their later school or university years began to ask themselves to what extent they could continue to hold the faith of their fathers. Given some natural reverence, some instinctive conviction of the beauty of holiness, some emotional response to the ordered ritual of the Church, an effort to believe was inevitable. But the reading boy soon learnt that many of the men to whom he accorded intellectual leadership had failed to keep their traditional beliefs, after a struggle that had cost them bitter years. The Oxford Movement had not yet become ancient history, and one read abundantly of the agonies of spirit endured by the older men as they parted with or finally accepted revealed religion. Yet, of that conflict I think the men of my time experienced little. The idea of service rather than that of saving one's own soul had begun to grow, and men either acquiesced in a vague agnosticism or joined the ranks of one of the Churches to whose charge they entrusted their personal salvation. In my own case I can associate emancipation from the dogmas in which I had been educated with the reading of two books—Herbert Spencer's *First Principles* and Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*. The first of these books has perhaps done its work, and to-day offends by its complacent acceptance of a mechanical conception of the universe, but its logic is merciless against the equally mechanical systems of the Churches. *Sartor Resartus* remains as an emotional encouragement to stand fast by one's own soul ; better a bare room than one rich in hangings which only hide cobwebs but are left unlifted because an unknown terror may lurk behind.

This easy sloughing-off of the traditional faith was facilitated by some miscellaneous reading of anthropological books like Tylor's *Primitive Man*, which threw systems of religion into historical perspective as incidents of the growth of the mind of the race. If anything more was wanted to complete my

scepticism it was provided by Newman's *Apologia*. In Newman I saw a man who started from my own evangelical standpoint, who by sheer logic confronted himself with the alternatives of scepticism or Rome, but then, out of terror at the austere prospect of self-dependence, grasped at the safety promised by authority. That, to me, was the sin against the Holy Ghost, a denial of what is fundamental in religion—the respect due to one's inner conviction. Again, when in Pascal, another essential sceptic, I met the argument that the greater chance of safety lies in belief, I was equally repelled.

I was sufficiently a man of science to discount the argument that even in science doctrines change with the times, and that, since no certainty is attainable, one may accept revealed religion as just as likely to be true as any other theory. A scientific theory, even when abandoned, is not so much repudiated as embraced within some wider generalisation; the scientific man may hold lightly to his theory, but he gives it up only when the new theory accounts for all the old facts and the something more that is unexplained by the earlier hypothesis. But the dogmatic structure of Christianity refused to fit with what else of system I had arrived at in my thinking; its contradictions with observation still stuck out, hard and unconformable; it led to consequences my mind rejected. And if real truth is unattainable by the human mind it remains unattainable; I cannot be told it by any authority. Nor could I accept as more than an evasion the idea of two kinds of truth—one proximate and human, dependent upon evidence, the other absolute and revealed.

Thus easily, without pain but rather with a feeling of deliverance, I cast off the old faiths. I did not regard myself as a sceptic; that was the label I assigned to the men who fell back on Christianity as a refuge among the shifting uncertainties of modern thought. But agnosticism is not enough; the mind continues to demand some framework for the universe, some working hypothesis that promises to reconcile the spiritual and the mechanical facts of observation.

There can be no satisfaction in mere agnosticism, though I never found that Bishop Blougram's objection—

> All we've gained is that belief
> As unbelief before, shakes us by fits.

was ever more than magnificent rhetoric. I could not cease from questioning, but it never turned me back towards the old paths.

My first step towards construction came from reading Berkeley. Earlier desultory readings of philosophy had yielded nothing my mind would bite on. In the Oxford of my day Hegel was the

mode, but I got no satisfaction out of transcendentalism and reconciliation in the absolute. But Berkeley's argument for the non-existence of material things outside the mind procured my immediate acceptance and provided a means of escape from the difficulties I found in a mechanical conception of the universe. I could conceive of matter neither as atomic nor as ultimately divisible, of space neither as finite nor endlessly extensible. These familiar antinomies are repeated in the spiritual scheme, Free-will and determinism are alike necessary modes of thought and are self-contradictory; neither altruism nor self-preservation affords an explanation of the conduct of life. You can escape from neither as prime motives dictating men's actions, yet they are manifestly in opposition. Jowett once took as his text for a sermon in college chapel, 'Yet have I not seen the righteous forsaken nor his seed begging bread,' and began his discourse: 'This easy generalisation of the early world which every one of you knows to be untrue.'

All these difficulties disappeared when I accepted Berkeley's position that all we know resides in our own mind, that our spiritual as well as our scientific conceptions are modes of thought, and that the contradictions our logic arrives at are limitations residing within our minds, since our thought is unable to fit reality. For some time, I think I still adumbrated a reality outside the mind to which thought could only approximate as a sheet of paper can only approximate to the shape of a solid. But gradually I escaped from even this 'copy' theory of knowledge and reached a more whole-hearted acceptation of Berkeley's doctrine that reality is mind and mind only, not a substratum our partial minds imperfectly apprehend. Such a point of view at times passes over into a kind of pantheism, an acceptance of the material world as the garment of the spirit, as one of the manifestations of the immanent Deity. But this is an emotional rather than an intellectual rendering of the doctrine of Mind as the only reality.

Naturally enough, a man who is busy about his profession does not think out his philosophy all at once. It remains as a kind of background in his mind; every now and then some reading or discussion rekindles the train of thought, and he is confronted with an objection to answer or a new conception to place in his system. Rarely does one find leisure enough for sustained abstract thinking. 'I have often tried to be a philosopher,' said Dr. Johnson's old school-fellow, 'but cheerfulness will keep breaking in.' Alas, it is not mere cheerfulness that destroys the philosopher, the poet, or the investigator in us; it is the constant interruption of affairs that break up the brooding habit by which we fix a train of thought and capture our intuitions.

The details of administration and the play of personalities are too exciting; we cannot wash our minds of them.

I attained some further coherence in my ideas through the discussions which are always arising among men of science as to the nature of life. Vitalism *versus* mechanism is a perennial question with biologists and chemists. From one point of view the living organism works so much like a machine, and is so entirely subject to the ordinary laws of energy and chemical control, that one is tempted to regard it as no more than a machine. Every time the chemist succeeds in effecting a complex synthesis hitherto associated only with a plant, every time the biologist reproduces in the laboratory the sequence of a vital action, it seems easy to expect the eventual realisation of the crucial step from inorganic material to a unit carrying life. And yet there is always something about life, even on this matter-of-fact plain-man way of thinking, that eludes our analysis. Let us compare a living organism with a self-contained mechanism like an electric generating station. Both operate according to the familiar mechanical laws: so much energy is put in; under the direction of the engineer an equal amount emerges as light, as power, as heat, as chemical energy; neither the organism nor the factory can escape from these limitations. You can kill the organism and its processes cease; you can remove the engineer and the machinery runs to a standstill. Both systems postulate life as exercising the direction; moreover, in the living organism, even though there be a brain and ultimately an assemblage of chromosomes in which the control resides, life is inherent in all parts of the system—one cannot isolate the engineer from the machinery. So life and matter remain incommensurable. From the philosophic point of view, if matter only exists in the mind, if the mechanical laws of the universe are only modes of thought along which the human mind must work, then the mind itself, which is if not identical with life yet inextricably associated with it, cannot arise out of its own perceptions. Life and matter both exist, and both are real in the secondary sense that they are constant perceptions of the human mind; it does not trouble me to find that they cannot be reconciled in a common category. I accept this with the other antinomies as one of the necessary limitations of our thought, as one of the inevitable ways of thinking.

So I came to some sort of a coherent system, however tenuous and evasive its structure. The one ultimate reality is mind; the proximate realities of the material world are perceptions; the laws according to which they operate are modes of thought inherent in our minds. These modes of thought are only consistent up to a point because our minds are only fragments of the whole mind; they are aspects of reality, not reality itself.

Meantime we must live and move and have our being, and this we do by using our modes of thought as working hypotheses, to which we hold just as long as they are fruitful and will work, knowing all the time that they are not finally tenable but will land us in logical impasses. There is no inconsistency in accepting two irreconcilable theories of light; we can advance knowledge by using sometimes one, sometimes the other. Such contradictions equally exist in the spiritual world. At different times in the world's history, in different parts of the existing social organism, it has been useful to work on the hypothesis that man is free to will his own conduct, or *per contra* on the deterministic hypothesis that he is the creature of his breeding and his environment. An acceptance of non-reality of the material world is yet consistent with the utmost respect for facts. Our perceptions are real enough in the sense that we have to live by means of them, and our observations of the spiritual side of life are just as real as our records of the material universe. We cannot explain or justify our belief in truth and righteousness, but none the less they are facts of observation which have to be accepted as actuating the human race, even as nest-building has to be noted as a habit of chaffinches. Men do not suffer for their convictions, spend themselves in a cause or walk out into the snow like Oates, because such actions are justified on some reasoned basis of happiness or reward, individual or collective; they do these things because they must. Disinterestedness is a fact in human conduct, even as is self-preservation. Righteousness (if I may use one word to sum up all the virtues of pure religion and undefiled) is just as much a quality of the human mind as intelligence. Both are fitful in their operations, irregular in their distribution, and unequal in their intensity. I hold that both are growing in the human race from generation to generation, and this again I maintain to be a fact of observation, dependent upon no assumptions of how or why.

Thus I accept an ever-imperfect but ever-developing universe, grim enough in most of its aspects, but not without encouragement in that we can continue to find the personal satisfaction that comes from self-expression in ranging ourselves on what we conceive to be the path of perfection. As William James says in one of, perhaps, the noblest passages written in my time:

> I confess that I do not see why the very existence of an invisible world may not in part depend on the personal response which any one of us may make to the religious appeal. God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity. For my part I do not know what the sweat and blood and tragedy of this life mean, if they mean anything short of this. If this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a

game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will. But it *feels* like a real fight—as if there were something wild in the universe which we, with our idealities and faithfulnesses, are needed to redeem; and first of all to redeem our own hearts from atheisms and fears. In such a half-wild half-saved universe our nature is adapted.

If I am told my beliefs do not solve the riddles of the universe, nor lead to any answer to the questions of judgment to come and personal immortality, I am not perturbed. Faith is not faith, but becomes a contract if all the conditions of the future have to be defined beforehand.

Righteousness is part of the content of my own mind, the only reality I know, and in that faith I am content.

I am in deep woods
Between the two twilights.
I have made my choice to proceed
By the light I have within.
Whatsoever I am and may be
Write it down to the light in me;
I am I, and it is my deed;
For I know that paths are dark
Between the two twilights.

A. DANIEL HALL.

ERASMUS DARWIN, 1731-1802

ON December 12, 1731, when Samuel Johnson was tramping the streets of Lichfield looking for work, having just been forced by poverty to leave Oxford without a degree, the third son of Robert Darwin was born at Elston Hall, Nottinghamshire, and called Erasmus. Though their careers were widely dissimilar and their mental outlooks violently opposed—they met and disliked one another intensely—Samuel Johnson and Erasmus Darwin were the two most remarkable 'characters' of the eighteenth century. Each of them was the centre and dominant personality of a group of men, all of whom were in the forefront of their several professions. Johnson's club was composed chiefly of writers and artists, Darwin's society of philosophers and scientists—the pioneers of the industrial age, the founders of the nineteenth century.

Erasmus as a child was happy though solitary. His father was a collector of fossils and lived in the past, his brothers were fond of sport and lived in the present, while he experimented with electricity and lived in the future. At the age of ten he went to Chesterfield School, where he became a temperance reformer at sixteen and was encouraged by his masters to develop a possibly unfortunate taste for poetry. In 1750 he accompanied his two brothers to St. John's College, Cambridge, where he had to economise so strictly that he was forced to mend his own clothes. He won a scholarship, studied medicine, took his B.A. degree, and wrote a deal of poetry, which rhymed perfectly, scanned accurately and was forgotten quickly. In 1754 he went to Edinburgh, continued his study of medicine, and formed a life-long friendship with James Keir, afterwards a famous chemist. Keir says that Darwin's wit and poetical talents quickly gave him an ascendency over his fellow-students. While he was at Edinburgh, a generation before the publication of his *Zoonomia*, he first began to formulate his ideas on evolution.

In the autumn of 1756 he started practice as a physician at Nottingham, but most of his patients were too poor to pay their bills, and in November of that year, armed with letters of introduction to several influential residents, he descended upon the

city of Lichfield. Let us try to picture him as he stood on the threshold of his professional career. Rather above the medium height, his limbs were heavy and his body was unsymmetrical. Already, at the age of twenty-five, there were signs of corpulence, though he was healthy, strong, and extremely active. A severe attack of small-pox had left its traces on his face, about which there was little refinement. His gait was clumsy, and he sometimes walked with his tongue hanging out of his mouth. He dressed carelessly, and the large full-bottomed wig he then wore made him look twice his age. On entering a room or accosting his friends his smile was winning and sunny, though the general expression of his features, when not animated by conversation, was 'rather saturnine than sprightly.'

He stammered excessively, a habit which he later attributed to 'a too great diffidence or bashfulness, joined with an ambition of shining in conversation.' On the strength of that statement one wonders whether his own trick of speech was not carefully cultivated for conversational purposes. A young man once asked him, in a possibly offensive manner, whether he did not find stammering rather inconvenient. 'No, sir,' he replied, 'it gives me time for reflection, and saves me from answering impertinent questions.'

Shortly after his arrival in Lichfield he scored his first success as a doctor. A gentleman of some note in Staffordshire named Mr. Inge (an ancestor, by the way, of Dean Inge) was dangerously ill. The leading doctor of the neighbourhood, after trying everything he could think of, at length pronounced the disease incurable and told Mr. Inge to prepare for an early death. As it was now a case of kill or cure, the dying man's mother sent for the newly arrived and untried Dr. Darwin, who, by an entirely novel course of treatment, cured him completely. Thus the young physician's fame was spread abroad in the land. From that moment he had no rival in Lichfield or its neighbourhood; and, as his professional competitors henceforth described his methods as rash, dangerously experimental and theoretic, we may be sure that he cured his patients at a shamefully unfashionable rate.

He had not been in Lichfield a year before he fell in love with Miss Mary Howard, aged eighteen. They were married in December 1757, and Erasmus took a house, still standing, in the grounds of the cathedral vicarage, which he enlarged and beautified. They had five children, two of whom died in infancy. Their third son, Robert, married the daughter of Josiah Wedgwood and was the father of Charles Darwin.

It is a little difficult to estimate his achievements as a physician. That he was the greatest English doctor of his time seems

to be proved, not only by the large annual increase of his practice and reputation, but by the fact that George III. wanted him to be his own physician and that the leading London doctors came to him for advice in what appeared to be hopeless cases. His methods were experimental and often risky. ('A fool,' he once said, 'is a man who never tried an experiment in his life.') He inoculated two of his own children against measles—killed one and nearly killed the other. At a time when doctors believed that babies could be cured of convulsions by drinking the blood of a raven and eating its raw entrails, he prescribed electric shocks, which, by making them jump, frightened them into tranquillity. He realised that a large number of ailments were imaginary, and by treating them in an unorthodox manner he induced a condition of excitement, wonder or terror in the breast of the invalid which had a most beneficial effect. He also perceived that individual temperament was an important factor in the treatment of disease, that the same disease in different people must be treated differently, and that there was no universal panacea for anything. He was not popular among the fashionable physicians of his time because he dismissed most of their nostrums as worthless; by many he was called a charlatan and a quack, which he considered equivalent to a certificate of efficiency. Two or three examples of his unorthodox methods may be noted.

A friend of his married, for the second time, a certain lady of rank. All went well at first, but after a few months the lady began to show symptoms of jealousy whenever her husband mentioned his former wife. The symptoms increased, and one day, in a furious rage, she stamped on and slashed the portrait of her predecessor. The unfortunate husband thought his wife was going mad and hurriedly sent for Dr. Darwin. The doctor came, talked to her for a while, discovered she was quite sane except on the subject of her husband's first wife, and tried a little experiment. He told her that he had known the lady whose portrait she had spoiled, that she had been a perfectly charming person and extraordinarily beautiful. Not unnaturally his patient became a trifle restive. So the doctor went further. He said that in character, in disposition, in manners and in beauty, the lady of the portrait far surpassed the lady he was talking to. This completely crushed the wretched woman. She fled to her room and locked herself in. The doctor left his friend with these words: 'If you have any more trouble with your wife tell her that you will send for me.' The treatment was highly successful. For the rest of their married life the barest mention of the doctor's name was quite sufficient to keep her in order.

One of the doctor's habits, the moment he arrived at the house

of a patient, was to sit down to a large meal before going upstairs to the bedroom. He did this for several reasons. To begin with, it brightened him up after the journey, and he always believed in feeling and looking his best on such occasions—it had an exhilarating effect on the patient. Then, too, the sight of the doctor polishing off half a dozen generous courses had a reassuring effect on the anxious relatives of the sick person, and set them a good example of tranquillity in the face of danger. Finally—the reason he would have given had he been asked—he was exceedingly fond of good food. It is of course possible that he occasionally carried his principles too far. Once he was called in to see a surgeon, Mr. James Cade, of Spondon, near Derby, who was seriously ill and unable to speak. Mr. Cade was, however, quite conscious, and heard the apothecary ask Dr. Darwin, before the latter settled down to his six-course meal, whether he had better bleed the patient again. 'Yes,' said the doctor, 'bleed him again; he may as well die of exhaustion as fever.' This must have had the desired effect on Mr. Cade, who shortly recovered.

Darwin was a pioneer of temperance reform—not, it must be added, for the dear sake of temperance, which is usually advocated by people who have drunk too much or by people who cannot drink at all. He favoured it solely on the ground of health. Here again he was blessed with that most uncommon of human qualities—common sense. No one was ever less of a crank than he. One has to remember that in his day a man who could see straight after dinner was not considered a gentleman. The result was that the majority of his rich patients suffered from inflammatory diseases, and a good deal of his time was spent in ordering them to be bled and in prescribing giant purges. The amount of blood that was peacefully spilled during the eighteenth century in order to make the world safe for delirium tremens was probably equivalent to the amount shed in the Napoleonic campaigns that brought the century to a close.

One more example of his heterodox treatment, taken from his Commonplace Book. A lady named Mrs. Stubs complained that her throat was sore. He noticed that all her teeth were decayed. 'I have advised her teeth to be drawn,' he notes, 'and ten or twenty electric shocks from a pint or quart phial to be passed through the sore part twice a day for a month.' Then follows this terrifying phrase: 'All these patients die in the common ways of treatment, whether with mercury or not.' The lady survived the shocks, and it would be interesting to know what could have killed her when, in the ordinary course of nature, she passed away.

Perhaps the best evidence of Darwin's success as a doctor is supplied by the fact that, after he had been in practice several years, even Tories and Churchmen began to seek his professional advice. The significance of this will be appreciated when it is added that he was a notorious Radical and Freethinker. He sang the praises of the French revolutionists and the American colonists in the War of Independence, while his attitude towards orthodox religion was expressed in these terms:

> Man is an eating animal, a drinking animal, and a sleeping animal, and one placed in a material world, which alone furnishes all the human animal can desire. He is gifted besides with knowing faculties, practically to explore and to apply the resources of this world to his use. These are realities. All else is nothing; conscience and sentiment are mere figments of the imagination. Man has but five gates of knowledge, the five senses; he can know nothing but through them; all else is a vain fancy, and as for the being of a God, the existence of a soul, or a world to come, who can know anything about them? Depend upon it, my dear madam, these are only the bugbears by which men of sense govern fools; nothing is real that is not an object of sense.

Nevertheless, he was such a good doctor that the nobility and clergy preferred his prescriptions to those of other doctors whose faith was so fervent that they despatched their patients to the next world with a zeal that can only be called religious; and if he had not spent most of his time among the poor, giving them his services and sending them food without charging them a penny, he would have died a very wealthy man.

So much for the physician. Let us now turn to the philosopher and poet. His formation of the Lunar Society was epoch-making. It consisted of certain gentlemen, drawn together by a common interest in progress, in science and the arts. They called themselves the Lunar Society because the time of their meeting was near the full moon, so that they might have the benefit of its light in returning home. The meetings took place at one another's houses and lasted from two in the afternoon till about eight in the evening. It was, in many respects, the most remarkable society or group of men in modern history. By its works, not its words, it is remembered. Its meetings were productive of experiments, inventions and discoveries that have changed the face of civilisation. Some of the Society's more notable members may be mentioned.[1]

Samuel Galton, F.R.S. (1753–1832), a Quaker, who was disowned by the Society of Friends for fabricating and selling instruments of war. He defended himself with the phrase: 'Men are not responsible for the abuse of what they manufacture,' which applies equally to all the great inventions of the Lunar

[1] For a full account of the Lunar Society and its members, see the present writer's *Doctor Darwin* (Dent, 1930).

Society. Galton was interested in optics, made many colour-mixing experiments, and hit on the idea of three primary colours before the supposed originator.

Captain James Keir (1735–1820), Darwin's eldest friend. He began life in the army, resigned his commission, helped Darwin to start the Lunar Society, and translated Macquer's *Dictionary of Chemistry*, which proved invaluable to his fellow-members. He managed for a time Boulton's works at Soho, Birmingham, and was described by Sir Humphry Davy as 'an amiable and a great man.' He shrank from celebrity, and when some of his discoveries in chemistry were attributed to others he refused to claim them, saying to such friends as pressed him to do so: 'Knowledge is important, but whether the discovery is made by one man or another is not deserving of consideration.'

Richard Lovell Edgeworth, F.R.S. (1744–1817), father of Maria Edgeworth. A great experimentalist, and the inventor of a new kind of carriage, a wagon, a turnip-cutter, a perambulator, and many other things, receiving the gold and silver medals of the Society for the Encouragement of Arts, etc. His *Memoirs* are entertaining and valuable.

Josiah Wedgwood, F.R.S. (1730–95), the great potter. Though not a regular member of the Lunar Society, he was a constant guest at their meetings. Darwin was one of his closest friends, saved his life and his wife's on several occasions, and was always giving him practical help in the creation of 'the potteries.'

Matthew Boulton, F.R.S. (1728–1809), the first great metal manufacturer of England, whose works at Soho, near Birmingham, became one of the wonders of the Empire. He took James Watt into partnership, believed in his genius, and backed him to the verge of bankruptcy. He undertook the production of the new copper coinage for Great Britain and supplied the machinery for the new Mint on Tower Hill. He had every quality that Watt lacked—self-assurance, ambition, enthusiasm, and a boundless opinion of himself. Boswell, who calls him an Iron Chieftain, reports him as saying: 'I sell here, sir, what all the world desires to have—Power.' And he said it in such a way as to impress even Boswell.

James Watt, F.R.S. (1736–1819), the famous engineer, whose improvement of the steam engine revolutionised the world. Darwin was the first person to whom he imparted the secret of his separate condenser. 'The plan of your steam improvements I have religiously kept secret,' wrote the doctor, 'but begin myself to see some difficulties in your execution which did not strike me when you were here.' Further talks, and the difficulties were overcome.

Dr. Joseph Priestley, F.R.S. (1733–1804), the discoverer of

oxygen, the possibilities of which Darwin was quick to seize: 'Since Dr. Priestley's discovery of the production of pure air in such abundance, it is probable in another half-century that it may be safer to travel under the ocean than over it.' He then put the idea into poetry and foretold the submarine, just as he had previously foreseen the aeroplane from Watt's discovery:

> Led by the Sage, Lo! Britain's sons shall guide
> Huge sea-balloons beneath the tossing tide;
> The diving castles, roof'd with spheric glass,
> Ribb'd with strong oak, and barr'd with bolts of brass,
> Buoy'd with pure air shall endless tracks pursue,
> And Priestley's hand the vital flood renew.

Dr. William Withering, F.R.S. (1741–99), a well-known botanist and physician, who prolonged his frail existence by living his last years in his library with a uniform temperature of 65 degrees Fahrenheit.

John Whitehurst, F.R.S. (1713–88), the horologer, who ventilated St. Thomas's Hospital, made a clock for the town-hall of Derby, and wrote an *Enquiry into the Original State and Formation of the Earth*, pursuing his researches beneath the earth's surface with such ardour that his health was impaired by the constant exposure.

John Baskerville (1706–75), inventor of superior type and printing, and publisher of standard works.

William Murdock (1754–1839), a mechanical engineer and superintendent of the works of Boulton and Watt. He was the inventor of coal-gas lighting, of many improvements in steam machinery, and of the first locomotive road engine.

Besides helping his friends to expand and perfect their ideas and inventions, Erasmus Darwin was constantly occupied with his own. He constructed a novel carriage, a speaking machine, an artesian well, a horizontal windmill for grinding flints, lamps, water-closets, candlesticks with telescope stands, knitting looms, weighing and surveying machines, ploughs, and a manifold-writer (which gave Watt the idea of his copying machine). He planned a canal lock, the principle of which was acted on many years later. He designed a rotary pump, which was afterwards extensively used. He was the first to perceive that the spokes of carriage wheels could be made to act as springs. And it was he who made a shrewd guess concerning the composition of water which first put Watt on the track of his great discovery. He never tired of speculating on the weather and the direction of the winds, noting each change and variation as it occurred; for which purpose he connected a wind-vane on the top of his house with a

dial on the ceiling of his study. He thought it possible that the winds might be governed by human agency, and he suggested a method whereby man could improve the climatic conditions of his planet by navigating 'the immense masses of ice in the polar regions into the more southern oceans.' He noted down that 'a machine to measure the quantity of air passing from north to south or from south to north is not impossible to construct'—and he promptly drew a diagram. His fancy played round the subject of visible or luminous music; fogs and frosts engaged his keen attention; his mind jumped from electricity to wooden chessmen, from a double-furrow plough to an artificial bird, from perpetual motion to diving-bells, from vegetation to evaporation.

The seasons came and went, and Dr. Darwin's carriage pitched and swayed along the country roads, through winter and summer, by day and night. And as he travelled from patient to patient his pen recorded his reflections and transcribed his verse. The slave trade, witches, lunacy, priests, eugenics, aeroplanes, submarines, hygiene, the habits of animals, the action of flowers, modern novels, Christian ethics, the drink question, microscopic researches, the theory and structure of language, will o' the wisps, moss drainage, anemology, evolution—he had ideas on everything and jotted them down between the jolts of his carriage.

His poetry found a ready audience. When *The Botanic Garden* was published Horace Walpole pronounced him the greatest poet that had ever lived, and William Cowper wrote an unqualified eulogy. Though his age took him seriously as a poet, it is clear that he wrote a lot of it with the laudable medical object of cheering his patients up and making them laugh. In one of the interludes to *The Botanic Garden* he begged his readers to 'make good humour one of their party, and thus theirselves supply the defects of the representation.' Yet much of it has a humanitarian tinge and undoubtedly expressed his own feelings. He also revelled in grandiosity, as these lines, which Walpole thought 'the most sublime in any author,' show:

> 'Let there be light!' proclaim'd the Almighty Lord,
> Astonished Chaos heard the potent word;—
> Through all his realms the kindling Ether runs,
> And the mass starts into a million suns;
> Earths round each sun with quick explosions burst,
> And second planets issue from the first;
> Bend, as they journey with projectile force,
> In bright ellipses their reluctant course;
> Orbs wheel in orbs, round centres centres roll,
> And form, self-balanced, one revolving Whole.
> Onward they move amid their bright abode,
> Space without bound, the Bosom of their God!

But his poetry is now out of fashion, and the present age is chiefly interested in his theory of evolution. 'He was the first who proposed and persistently carried out a well-rounded theory of evolution,' said Dr. Krause, and Samuel Butler echoed him. Erasmus believed in a Great First Cause, which for purposes of abbreviation he called God, and he says: 'There is more dignity in our idea of the supreme Author of all things when we conceive him to be the cause of causes than the cause simply of the events, which we see; if there can be any difference in infinity of power!' Thus he believed in design, in a Mind and a Purpose in creation. His grandson Charles did not really concern himself with such things, and merely worked out his system of evolution as an impartial observer, eventually reaching a conclusion known as the Survival of the Fittest. But Erasmus had seen that, too, though he would have been horrified by the conclusions of Charles's disciples, who did not see beyond it. This is how Erasmus saw the Survival of the Fittest:

> Air, earth and ocean, to astonish'd day
> One scene of blood, one mighty tomb display!
> From Hunger's arm the shafts of Death are hurl'd,
> And one great Slaughter-house the warring world!

After thirteen years of married life, and a long and painful illness, Darwin's first wife died. They were very happy together, and she was tenderly nursed by her husband throughout her rather delicate life, which was probably shortened by what Anna Seward called 'the frequency of her maternal situation during the first five years of her marriage.' For ten years Erasmus remained unmarried, though two illegitimate daughters were born to him during that period. Then he met, professionally, the wife of Colonel Chandos Pole and fell desperately in love with her. Colonel Pole obligingly died in 1780, and his widow was immediately besieged by all the eligible young men in the neighbourhood. But Darwin, though fifty years of age and, as Miss Seward said, 'of no elegant external,' carried away the prize, and another happy marriage ensued. He left Lichfield and settled in Derby, eventually moving to Breadsall Priory, a few miles out of the town. Seven children were born in quick succession; one of them, Violetta, became the wife of Samuel Galton's son, Tertius, and the mother of Sir Francis Galton, whose science of eugenics had been foreseen by his versatile grandfather, Erasmus.

His removal from the neighbourhood of Birmingham prevented the doctor from attending most of the Lunar meetings. He felt this keenly, but his domestic happiness more than made up for the loss, and his labours did not decrease. In anticipation

of a small-pox epidemic among the poor of Derby he planned a dispensary. In 1784 he was elected an honorary member of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Manchester, and in July of that year he founded the Philosophical Society of Derby. He paid several visits to London, where he was a Fellow of the Royal Society and a member of the Medical Society, but he only went to please his wife, always preferring hard work in the country to social life in the capital.

His works now began to make their appearance, though he had been writing them at intervals throughout the greater part of his professional life. In 1789 he published the second part of *The Botanic Garden* ('It is well to put the best foot foremost,' he explained), which was followed by the first part in 1791. It had a great success, and he received a thousand guineas in advance for the second instalment of the poem. *Zoonomia* came out in 1794. It contains a mass of information on a hundred subjects, the fruit of a lifetime's observation and thought. Many of the theories contained in it were regarded as ludicrous, except by the Pope, who placed it on the Index Expurgatorius, until Samuel Butler came along and gave Darwin his due. The doctor himself had foreseen the line of attack on his theoretical work, and had explained that 'extravagant theories, in those parts of philosophy where our knowledge is yet imperfect, are not without their use; as they encourage the execution of laborious experiments, or the investigation of ingenious deductions, to confirm or refute them.' Though the book chiefly dealt with medical matters, it contained the first complete view of evolution. To quote Dr. Dowson, Erasmus was 'the first to give a series of plausible reasons, and the best that have yet been advanced, for believing the Origin of Species by transmutation possible.' In 1797 he published *A Plan for the Conduct of Female Education in Boarding Schools.* This was written specially for his two natural daughters, for whom he had opened a school at Ashbourne, sending his daughters by his second wife thereto and influencing many of his friends to do the same. The Misses Parker, as they were called, constantly stayed with him, were treated as members of his family, and became very popular in Derby, one of them marrying Mr. Hadley, the leading surgeon there. *Phytologia* appeared in 1800. The subjects range from flower buds to bone dust, from phosphorus to ploughs. And in 1803, a year after his death, his only other work of importance was issued: *The Temple of Nature, or the Origin of Society*, a poem with notes.

During these later years he kept in touch with his old Birmingham friends, either by correspondence or by paying and receiving visits. The Wedgwood and Darwin families stayed with one another constantly, and it was a great loss to Erasmus

when Josiah died in 1795. 'When I think of dying,' he wrote to Edgeworth immediately after the event, 'it is always without pain or fear.' Edgeworth brought his family over from Ireland to stay with the Darwins, and his daughter Maria was delighted with the doctor. Dances and card parties were arranged for the younger members of the two families, while Edgeworth and Darwin discussed electricity, oxygen, manure, and such-like exciting topics, with the ingenious philosophers of the neighbourhood.

He never relaxed his labours, though he suffered greatly from fatigue, telling his son Robert, who had urged him to cease professional work:

> Thus I reason, one must do something (so country squires fox-hunt), otherwise one grows weary of life, and becomes a prey to ennui. Therefore one may as well do something advantageous to oneself and friends or to mankind, as employ oneself in cards or other things equally insignificant.

The gratitude of his poor patients was sometimes expressed in peculiar ways. On one occasion he stopped for the night at Newmarket, where the races were in full swing. He was wakened in the early hours by the rider of the 'favourite' in the big race the following day, who had received instructions not to let it win. He gave the name of the horse that was going to win, adding that this was the only way in which he could repay the doctor for attending his wife in a long illness without a fee. The doctor did not take advantage of the tip, but discovered later that the horse which the man had advised him to back had won the race. On another occasion he was riding late at night along the road to Nottingham, when another horseman overtook him and was greeted by the doctor with 'A fine night.' The stranger peered at him through the darkness and went ahead without speaking. Later a traveller was held up and robbed at the same spot, the robber was captured, and Darwin, struck by the coincidence of the locality, visited him in prison. The highwayman admitted that he was the same man who had allowed Darwin to pass unmolested, giving as his reason that the doctor had saved his mother's life, kept her in food while she was ill, and never charged her a penny.

In the spring of 1801 Darwin received an urgent summons to visit a patient. Though not in the best of health, he went, caught a bad cold, and became seriously ill. After copious bleeding, he recovered, but his system was permanently weakened. A year later he had an attack of inflammation, was bled freely, again recovered, and felt extraordinarily well. Talking with his wife one evening, she remarked on his good health. 'I always appear particularly well immediately before I become ill,' he said. The

next morning, Sunday, April 17, 1802, he rose early, went to his library and began a letter to Edgeworth. Half way through he stopped, rang the bell, and asked whether some instructions he had given to ensure the comfort of his horses had been carried out. They had not. Few things annoyed him more than inattention to the needs of animals, and he lost his temper. This brought on a cold shivering fit. He looked so ill that the servant, against his instructions, fetched Mrs. Darwin, in whose arms the doctor died a little before nine o'clock.

Rather over a century later Breadsall Church, where he was buried, was burnt to the ground by a number of ladies who hoped that Utopia would be realised if they had the vote. Though the doctor might have approved their hygienic ardour, it is doubtful whether he would have shared their political optimism.

HESKETH PEARSON.

KING PANTOMIME AND HIS COURT

SOME REMINISCENCES OF A DYING DYNASTY

THE age of monarchy is all but ended; and in a world where so many a sceptre and crown are tumbling down, it may well seem an excess of wasted sympathy to lay a wreath upon the pasteboard and tinsel regalia of the King Pantomime of our own long-since faded youth. Still, for the middle-aged (and older), the Christmas season can never return without its train of memories of that most characteristic of all Christmas celebrations; the pomp and circumstance, the mirth, music, sentiment, and goodwill of that exuberant Monarch of Misrule. He was a jolly king; and his dynasty was of high degree. His family-tree cast its roots deep into the traditional soil of the mystery play, while its head was crowned with the stars of fairyland. Round its gnarled feet peered and gambolled the fantastic gnomes and elves of Mr. Arthur Rackham; in its branches Wendy and Peter Pan built their little eyrie home of refuge. The old king, to be sure, is not yet utterly dethroned; but the courtiers, who remember the heyday of his prosperity, are not to be put off by the maimed rites and broken liturgy of these sophisticated winters. They remember better things—in an age when their own childhood was more easily persuaded to accept conventions that may have been absurd, caricatures undeniably grotesque, and witticisms that had begun to grow threadbare before the oldest of us was out of the schoolroom. And it was precisely the old customs, devices, and jests that made the old court of Pantomime the children's palace of enchantment. The nursery is always the shrine of conservatism; and, in tribute to that age-old loyalty, I venture to offer a few memories of the Christmas revels of half a century and more ago, for such entertainment as they may afford to a much cleverer, much more critical, but not, perhaps, much happier or more imaginative generation.

It is fifty-seven years since I saw my first pantomime, in the little theatre in Bath that was once the home of Beau Nash;

but my father had already told me of earlier triumphs at the old Theatre Royal at Bristol, when he was a medical student. He could recall the vision of a slim slip of a girl, shot up into the limelight through a star-trap, and proclaiming as clearly as a dreadful cold in the head could permit : ' By Dabe is Padtobibe.'

The child appeared on the play-bills as Madge Robertson, and has long since earned the title of Mother of the British Stage, under the honoured name of Dame Madge Kendal. Those were the days of the old stock company ; and the Robertsons, having lost their money in a ' burst of speculation,' had to abandon their theatrical circuit in Lincolnshire, and had found a home with that benevolent old manager Mr. Chute, of Bristol. The stock company was a splendid school for acting. Every good provincial theatre had its own entourage, and every actor his little crowd of local admirers. During the season the company presented a motley variety of drama, comedy, farce, and burlesque, ranging from Shakespeare to H. J. Byron ; and when Christmas came the librettist attached to the theatre fashioned his book to the material in the green-room, and saw to it that every popular favourite had a fair chance. I am just old enough to have seen the last of the old Bristol stock company, in three or four characteristic pantomimes at what was then called the New Theatre, in Park Row. Of course, I was too young to be a judge ; but I cannot believe that I should have remembered them so vividly if they had not put up an uncommonly good performance.

To begin with, Bristol was fortunate in having a writer of quite uncommon ability to provide the book of the words. That I can assert with confidence, for the texts have survived, and are here to speak for themselves. The name of this author was William Muskerry, and his pantomime books are by far the best I have ever encountered. After Muskerry died, or ceased to write, the Bristol librettos sank to the usual tiresome type—a string of verses, halting in metre, and tortured by puns, a sort of dialectical tight-rope, with a song for support at each end, and the principal comedian skipping through his gags and wheezes in the middle. It is true that, in Muskerry's time, there was plenty of gagging, and, of course, the songs were the special relish of the gallery. But the verse he wrote was good verse ; the story of *The Babes in the Wood* or *Cinderella* was well and clearly told, and the songs were most ingeniously woven into the fabric of the book, with something of the skill of an accomplished light opera. Above all, Muskerry knew the company he was writing for, and he fitted the best of them like a West End tailor.

I have lingered thus long over his memory, because there is a spirit of magic hidden in these faded play-books. To reopen them, after all these years, is to be transported back into the

atmosphere of breathless excitement in which they were opened for the first time. The annual expedition to the Bristol pantomime was the great event of the Christmas holidays. We always booked the front row of the dress-circle—for a matinée, of course ; the journey into Bristol and the hurried luncheon at Nattriss's restaurant were absorbed in voluble anticipation, and we were all in our seats, staring at the great dusty green curtain, within five minutes of the doors being opened. Then it was that the ' Book of the Words ' became so entrancing, with its foretaste of joys to come. We turned it over with fluttering fingers, hunting to discover which of our favourite songs had found a place ; we pounced like a hawk upon a topical allusion ; we wondered how the roc would be made to fly, or whether we should see, or only hear, the cat of Richard Whittington killing the black king's rats. Then, at last, the footlights went up, making the dusty curtain look dustier than ever ; the drums rolled, the violins sang, and the overture burst into a medley of music-hall balladry. For the next three hours and more, without a moment's break, we were free of an enchanted realm ; and I can recall no enchantment of later years that will compare with that first fine, childish rapture.

Looking back across the years, it seems difficult to understand how the children of our generation, so unsophisticated and simple as we were, accepted at first glance, assimilated, and absorbed the preposterously artificial and unnatural conventions of Victorian pantomime. Of course, we belonged to an age that accepted nearly everything it was told ; it was part of the day's discipline neither to make reply, nor reason why, to the unintelligible laws under which we shivered. But this was not a matter of discipline, but of sheer light-hearted enjoyment. We fell in with the convention instinctively, and would have been bitterly disappointed if it had been upset. The show presented to us upon the stage bore no relation to any sort of life we would ever know, and we did not ask that it should. We did not believe in fairies, demons, or magic lamps ; but, unlike Lord Arthur Pomeroy in another *Pantomime Rehearsal*, we did not exclaim ' What rot ! ' when the curtain rose upon the ' dark scene ' with which every self-respecting pantomime led off. Perhaps the psycho-analyst would diagnose the influence of heredity at work here ; for the dark scene certainly derives from the miracle play, with its symbolic conflict of good and evil spirits, and its promise of vice vanquished and virtue victorious in the end. At any rate, we swallowed the dark scene whole, and never challenged its incongruity when the demon and fairy, having just declared ' War to the knife ! War to the forks and spoons ! ' turned their faces full upon the audience, burst forth into a cheerful duet, and

ended with a graceful dance. They were always the principal singers in the pantomime—this Demon King and Fairy Queen—and about half-way through the piece, when the plot was growing a little complicated, they had another 'scena' together, another duet, and another dance. Perhaps it was on the top of Highgate Hill, and the Demon Rat, having escaped from the tower of Bow Church, had led Dick Whittington to his key-cold milestone, and sent him to sleep to dream of the miseries of to-morrow. Then, just as he was bending over the recumbent hero, with a gleam of orange light upon his head, behold, the Fairy Blue-bell, propelled through a trap in a silver haze, waving her wand, and waking the bells of Bow to a carillon of hope.

Turn again, Whittington, Lord Mayor of London;

and the Demon Rat crouched behind the milestone and disappeared; and the fairy waved her wand again, and the stage was full of fairy bluebells, pirouetting, mincing, mopping, and mowing. This was the 'half-time' ballet; and we sat back in our seats to recover our breath. 'But, I say, why fairies?' asked Lord Arthur Pomeroy. 'Why, because it's a pantomime,' replied the author testily. But we did not add 'What rot!' We were enthralled in the pantomime convention, and we knew it was all right.

Then there was the convention of the hero. I wonder sometimes how the nursery swallowed that. He was not the least like the hero of our picture-books, but a fine, strapping young woman, whose femininity was blazoned in corset and trunk-hose; one year, indeed, the same lady was hero and the next year heroine, her companion changing sex and skirt to keep her company. But she was our hero undisputed, indisputable; and the work she put into her heroism merited our confidence right well. She always had the same sort of entrance. The heroine's mother (played by the principal comedian with a red nose and stays outside his bodice) was being sold up. The bailiff's men were handing out the mangle and the canary's cage. The heroine wept to see the canary go. She had loved that canary from her cradle. Then the bailiff's man leered and made a whispered suggestion. Oh, shame! If she gave him a kiss she might keep the canary. No, never! Then he would take one for himself. The heroine flies behind the gate. The bailiff is in pursuit. Pizzicato movement from the band. She is driven to bay; the bailiff's man has seized her in his arms. Bang go the cymbals. The hero is in the centre of the stage. The bailiff's man is on his back. The heroine is in the hero's arms. The gallery is one loud shout. The hero slaps his thigh with one hand and encircles the lady's waist with the other.

Sweethearts and wives,
Sweethearts and wives,
Girls are the joy of all our lives!
When pretty lips kiss,
Kiss, kiss, kiss, kiss,
Who can resist the darlings?

What an entrance! What a prelude to adventure! No wonder we were carried off our feet.

And they did work hard, those principal boys. They did 'get over' to the very last row in the gallery. There was no namby-pamby romance about their love-making. They were the pantomimic harbinger of the sheik. What is more, they had to execute almost as many capers as a film actress. Miss Maggie Duggan in *Jack and the Beanstalk* would climb a rope ladder as high as the proscenium—a ladder which kept swinging round and revealing its mechanism to the audience—while all the time she sang, with a glorious crescendo of thrills, some song of valour and defiance to the elements. Miss Nellie Bouverie, the most gallant little Sindbad imaginable, had the same task of singing on a raft that swung from one side of the stage to the other; and how she managed to avoid sea sickness only she and her medicine-chest could tell. They were a splendid company of workers, these principal boys—Miss Amy Grundy, Miss Julia Warden, Miss Ada Blanche, Miss Grace Huntley and the rest; they drew money into the box-office by sheer virtue of their vitality, and their acting had its touches of real feeling too. To hear Julia Warden sing 'The Little Street Arab' was to be transported from the security of a sheltered country home into the grim fraternity of the kerb. There was more than pantomime in this. There was drama, sincere and poignant.

The convention of the leading boy was crowned at the end of the play by yet another convention—the panoply of his wedding entertainment. When at last the long conflict between demon and fairy, villain and hero had worn to an end, and the lovers had sung their last duet, clasped in one another's arms, they retired to a lofty throne at the back of the stage, relinquished all further interest in the proceedings, and abandoned their palace to a nuptial orgy, which began with a procession, blossomed into a ballet, and ended in an uncompromising music-hall show, in which tumblers tumbled, trapezists flew, low comedians gave a slap-stick turn, and the entire company cheered the audience on by starting the applause themselves. I fancy that this inconsequent feast of variety began at Drury Lane, when Sir Augustus Harris was straining himself from year to year to make each new pantomime beat the record of the last. But it had certainly penetrated to the provinces by the end of the eighties of the last

century, where it was still followed by that elaborate confection of tinsel and coloured fire, rounded limbs and feathered tiaras, known as the transformation scene—a sort of living apotheosis of the laced and ribanded Valentine with which young lovers bore witness to the fervour of their emotions through the ebullient badness of their verse. By the time that the clown was shouting 'Here we are again,' with that glittering background of pinchbeck jewellery behind him, not even the most disgruntled old curmudgeon in the audience could deny that he had had good value for his money. As for us children, we followed the example of Mrs. Browning's tired infants, who 'watch through tears the mummers leap.' Those were days when a treat was a rarity; and we should have to wait a whole long year before we passed under the pillared portico of the theatre again.

The youthful critics of our rapidly ageing generation are apt to protest that we were incorrigibly theatrical in our tastes, utterly remote from life in our standards of popular art; and if that criticism is true, our unreality was, no doubt, largely due to the dominating influence of these early pantomimes. The artificial sentiment, the taste for insipid songs, the still stronger relish for the vulgar 'wheeze,' and the ripe and rollicking ditty of drink, twins, mother-in-law, and quarter-day—all these elementary enjoyments were bred and fostered by our favourite Christmas show. If the principal boy had a good deal to answer for, the low comedian had more; for he was the friend of everybody from the gallery to the stalls, and his songs were whistled in the street by errand boy and 'la-di-da' alike.

The last survivor of the old stock company at Bristol was a comedian named Fosbrooke, who had been the delight of an entire generation, a bond of humorous appreciation between father and son. He must have been well past middle age when I first saw him, yet he would dress in the petticoat and socks of a nursery child, and romp through a breathless afternoon, with skipping-rope and hoop, song, dance and mischief-making; his spirits inexhaustible, his relish in the business clean and infectious. Next year he would appear as Mother Hubbard, and then again as a pirate king; he was a thorough-going, versatile actor, not a mere exploiter of his own personality, and his first entrance in every fresh pantomime was the signal for a roar of applause, which held up the action for several thunderous minutes. I suppose the low comedian of those days was, in his way, reprehensibly 'low'; his appeal was directed straight to the small householder, the mean establishment, the ramshackle wife, the fight for existence in the back street.

You 'ave to 'ave 'em,
Whether you want 'em or not;

You 'ave to 'ave 'em,—
That's what touches the spot.
Pluck up! Buck up!
Troubles will end or mend you,
Open your mouth, and shut your eyes,
And see what someone'll send you.

So Harry Randall would shout to a perspiring, orange-sucking crowd at the Grand, Islington—with, of course, a special reference to the annually recurring baby; and the audience would swell the chorus till the rafters cracked. Wilkie Bard, years later, woke a more genteel audience out of its self-consciousness by wheedling the Drury Lane dress circle to simper after him—'She sells sea-shells on the seashore'; but the gallery at Islington needed no wheedling. It knew the song by heart, and it demanded its right to acclaim it:

You 'ave to 'ave 'em . . .

Who knew that, if not they? Some twenty years later, in the winter after the war, I heard the same class of audience clamouring with a principal boy at Kilburn:

Go to bed early! Save the coal!

And the old vision returned to memory, awaking the old response of penury. The man who yearns to write a people's songs must have the secret of the people's heart. For one man who responds vaguely to 'Land of Hope and Glory' there will be a hundred to palpitate with emotion as they listen to the familiar, plaintive plea,

A boy's best friend is his mother.

It was the comedian who led us by these homely ways; and, if we are still 'incorrigibly theatrical,' let us at least acknowledge that we learnt something more than mere sentiment from his over-soulful and emotional example.

Across the mist of years there floats the memory of a vigorous attack upon the Drury Lane pantomime made in the pages of the *World* by its editor, Edmund Yates, an attack which raised a cloud of dust at the time. Yates protested, in effect, that the latest banquet provided by Sir Augustus Harris was harmfully indigestible for children, and that the humour was of the commonest music-hall description. The leading comedians of the 'Lane' were Harry Nicholls and Herbert Campbell, and Nicholls at once got in a telling return shot by declaring that he had never appeared on a music-hall stage in his life. It was a purely verbal score, however, for his wit, quick and incisive though it might be, was indisputably of the back-chat order. As for Herbert Campbell, his humour expressed the last word of the old tradition

—broad, mellow, domestically intimate. These two 'hardy annuals' preserved at Drury Lane something of the spirit of the stock company, which had been long kept alive by the Vokes Family. One Christmas-tide Nicholls played the man's part and Campbell the woman's; next year the *rôles* were reversed; but whichever wore the petticoats, the fun was genuine, if plebeian, and Yates was quite wrong in pretending that children did not enjoy it. As a matter of fact, they revelled in it, even if Nicholls's innuendoes about supper at Rule's went over their heads, or Campbell's reference to a double perambulator fell a little short at their feet. And there was no reason why they should not enjoy it. It had a flavour and a tang. Nicholls was the man or woman about town; Campbell was the frank vulgarian. If Nicholls was the King, it was clear that he had married beneath him; when it was his turn to be Baroness, he showed good cause why the lady should be ashamed of being seen in public with her husband. They bickered and back-bit, snapped and slapped; their married life held up a mirror to half the uncomfortable households in suburbia. The vintage of their wit was Bass and Guinness rather than Corton and Veuve Clicquot; but it was the public's daily beverage, and the public knew it for its own. For my part, I doubt if it was a bit worse for children than the sentimentality and crime of to-day's American films. And, at any rate, it was a home product, in the direct line of descent from the farces of Madison Morton and the historic horseplay of Richardson's booth.

In the process of change, of course, it fell out of fashion; and in the last days of Drury Lane pantomime, under Mr. Arthur Collins, the fun, if neither so fast, nor so furious, was certainly more refined. George Graves and Will Evans, resting, like the young lady of the spider, upon a friendly tuffet, and vying, one against the other, in recollection of 'happy days,' kept certainly a little closer to the wind under reefed sails, but were subtler in suggestion than in fact. And, after many days of gross and gin-soaked womanhood, there appeared in the person of Mr. Neil Kenyon a Scottish comedian, who could represent a middle-aged female whose fun was innocent of vulgarity—an innovation so quickly and so eagerly accepted by the audience that even the most conservative of managers must have realised that the knell was sounded at last of twins and mothers-in-law, dress-improvers, brickbats, and flannelette underwear. In fact, the old 'lion comique' was no more, and Miss Nellie Wallace, a woman among women, was soon to reign triumphantly in his stead.

There remain the animals—a full, companionable menagerie; to the children, perhaps, the crowning glory of King Pantomime's Court. No pantomime was complete without its dog or cat;

and, if the story was *Dick Whittington* or *Puss in Boots*, the cat was the real hero, and got the longest round of applause when, in the final procession, he marched in, all by himself, with a gigantic bow of pink ribbon round his neck. I cannot count how many of Whittington's cats I have heard mewing in hunger by the milestone on Highgate Hill, but I think they must have run the gamut of the fur-market—tabby and tortoise-shell, black, white, and a nondescript brindle—and for natural skill and ingenuity they were the best-played parts in the cast. There was a real art in animal-acting, and the supply of artists equalled the demand. I came to London too late to see the Conquests in the old Surrey Theatre across the river; but I do not doubt that they were the champions of their time. Indeed, their passion for theatrical gymnastic was so strong that it could not be confined to the Christmas season, but overflowed into the spring and autumn programme of melodrama. There was one lurid nightmare, called *Forever*, in which George Conquest played a man-monkey, which climbed to the flies, dived into the scene-dock, and filled the imagination with I know not what of horrible and visionary revenge.

But the best animal-actor that ever I saw was Charles Lauri, and the most lovable creature he ever acted was a collie, called Tatters. That was a masterpiece of interpretation, and made the fortune of one of the prettiest Christmas shows that ever stirred a childish audience to laughter and to tears. It was at the Lyceum, thirty-seven or thirty-eight years ago, and the pantomime, called *Santa Claus*, was a simple, unaffected retelling of the legend of the *Babes in the Wood*, with all the music-hall and conventionally pantomimic elements swept away. Kitty Loftus was the boy babe—I have forgotten the name of the girl; and they both played the children like children, mischievous, happy, and sentimental. Tatters, the collie, was their favourite dog; he followed them everywhere, and slept in their room at night. On Christmas Eve they hung up their stockings for Santa Claus to fill; and Tatters, having no stockings, made shift with his pillow-case. Father Christmas came down the chimney with his sack of toys, and of course he had not forgotten Tatters. There was a parcel of dog-biscuits as big as a trunk; but when it came to opening the presents in the morning Tatters was observed to be brooding over his with tail between his legs. Dog-biscuits were not much of a Christmas treat, and the babes had more than one huge box of chocolates. 'What d'you say, Tatters?' asked the boy babe; 'change your biscuits for my chocolates? No; certainly not!' But when the dog began to whine, the children's hearts relented, and soon Tatters had eaten so many chocolates that he was rolling on the floor, and the sharp, cross

governess (Mr. Victor Stevens) administered medicine from a gallon bottle.

Then there was a Noah's ark, with a live procession of animals; and when Tatters saw the conventional wooden dog, with his brown and black splotches of paint and curled tail, he went growling for him on the spot, broke off the tail, and laid it in triumph at his master's feet. Of course, he accompanied the children into the wood when the wicked robbers carried them off; and then came the crucial scene of the play. The robbers approached the babes, and Tatters emitted a long, low growl. The children in the dress-circle sat forward breathless, their eyes popping out of their heads. One of the robbers seized the boy babe, the other seized the girl. Tatters was at the throat of the ugliest and lustiest at once. There was a tremendous fight, gurgles, barks, falls among the reeds, the flash of steel, and faithful Tatters rolled over dead. It was too much for the children in the auditorium—half of them were in tears; and the box-office received so many letters of protest from distracted parents that a change had perforce to be made forthwith. Lauri could not abandon his fight, or even his heroic sacrifice, but at the end the susceptibilities of his young admirers were soothed. There was a gorgeous transformation scene, after the approved fashion; and, high above the glimmering steps that led to the heart of fairyland, a rosy bower, in which the babes were revealed, one on either side of Tatters, their arms around his neck, and his tail wagging once more, as it had not been known to wag since he suffered from that greedy surfeit of chocolates. Once more loyalty had its full reward; and young idealists who hoped, like Whyte Melville, to meet their dumb friends at the gate of heaven were comfortably reassured that the choicest place in fairy-land had been reserved for the dog who was ready to die for his master.

Well, these are childish imaginations. I cannot tell whether they would appeal to the nursery to-day; though I suspect that childhood is much the same from generation to generation, and that the old tales have still their ancient power, told in the mystic twilight of a winter's evening, or translated into terms of vision under the changing influence of limelight and lampblack. Much, of course, of the old machinery of pantomime has long since been packed away into the lumber-room of the past; even the least sophisticated schoolgirl would be unmoved to-day by the glamour of the dark scene, having once drunk deep of the enchanted waters of the cinema. The film has made an end for ever of transformation scenes and star-traps, of stolen sausages and pursuing policemen, of revolving doors and roaring rallies. Any village child can get a more exciting entertainment every Saturday afternoon in the year, and need not pay more than fourpence for the treat. But I have long believed that a season of full houses is awaiting the manager who has the courage to stage a version of one of the simplest and most human fairy stories, with all the traditional impedimenta of pantomime left out, and the story told, in the spirit of *Peter Pan*, for the story's sake, as it first appeals to the fancy of childhood. There is an infinity of romance in the Odyssey of *Dick Whittington;* and if a popular novelist, like Charles Garvice, could make a fortune by telling the tale of *Cinderella* over and over again in different settings, why should not the original setting, faithfully and artistically interpreted, hold its own with interest in the three hours' traffic of the stage? For the old stories are always new—just because their sentiment is eternal; and sentiment, of one sort or another, can never be rooted out of human nature. The Court of King Pantomime is almost dissolved; yet even this broken bundle of recollections has set one old courtier wondering whether the spirit of his reign may not yet linger, like the Sleeping Beauty awaiting her Fairy Prince, perhaps even in the least charted and most impenetrable wilderness. Meanwhile, we of the old order may rest content to cherish the symbols of a fond and tarnished loyalty. A king of shreds and patches, of pasteboard, tinsel, and the jester's bauble, our merry monarch led us on a merry road; and still in the kingdom of memories and dreams the tradition of his phantom rule will come fluttering back at Christmastide, and the lights will burn a little brighter for the sprinklings of his genial torch.

ARTHUR WAUGH.

THREE CENTENARIES

'OWEN MEREDITH.' 'MARK RUTHERFORD.' C. S. CALVERLEY

THE pleasant custom of marking what we term 'centenaries' provides an opportunity of recalling the lives and work of once notable people now in the state of being forgotten except by the few students who preserve an interest in 'period' books. The great stars of literature are, of course, in no danger of obscurity; but with writers of the second or third rank eclipse, partial or total, has often occurred during the twenty, or more or less, years that have elapsed since their deaths. Of the seven Pleiades born in 1831, three only are destined, I think, for some measure of enduring fame, though it is futile to prophesy, for who can foresee the verdicts of posterity? These three are 'Owen Meredith' (Robert, first Earl of Lytton), 'Mark Rutherford,' and C. S. Calverley. The remaining four of my stellular group—John Wise, George Manville Fenn, Amelia Edwards, and Edmund Yates—have but little hope of ultimate survival, though they all accomplished good and valuable work scarcely seventy years ago.

Edward Robert Bulwer Lytton, born on November 8 at 36, Hertford Street, Mayfair, was the only son of Bulwer-Lytton, the novelist, by his marriage with Rosina Wheeler; their daughter, Emily, was more than three years older, and both children were brought up amid the discordance and warfare of their parents and never knew aught of the normal life of happy childhood. Mrs. Bulwer did not nurse either of her children, and for the first six months of his life Robert Lytton was relegated to vicarious nourishment provided on the top floor of his 'home.' Indeed, his very arrival seems to have been an accident, since his father had declared that one baby was enough and that 'nothing is so ludicrously uninteresting as an author with a large family, at least of legitimates.' But born, and quite legitimately, the future poet was, and, though all the omens were antagonistic in his upbringing, the boy was destined to become one of the most remarkable and versatile men of his generation. Few have touched life at so many points, have

enjoyed such variety of interesting experiences. Obviously, it is impossible to present in a short article all the ramifications of such a full and eventful career, and I must confine myself to Robert Lytton's aspect as an author.

In the first place, all the melancholy of 'Owen Meredith's' early but best poems, as exemplified in the volumes entitled *Clytemnestra, The Earl's Return, and Other Poems* (1855), and *The Wanderer* (1857), verse composed when still in his teens and early twenties, was a reflection of the sad and lonely circumstances of his boyhood, though his naturally bright and brilliant intellect at the same time expressed itself in irony and a somewhat mordant sense of humour—so evident in *The Portrait* and *Resurrection* and *Last Words of a Sensitive, Second-rate Poet.*

It is, of course, the prerogative of youthful poets to be melancholy and pessimistic, but seldom can one of the mournful band have expressed his melancholia so completely, and finely, as Robert Lytton did in *Earth's Havings*:

> Weary the cloud falleth out of the sky,
> Dreary the leaf lieth low.
> All things must come to the earth by-and-by,
> Out of which all things grow.
> Let the wild wind laugh and whistle
> Aloof in the lonesome wood:
> In our garden let the thistle
> Start where the rose-tree stood:
> Let the rotting mass fall rotten
> With the rain-drops from the eaves:
> Let the dead past lie forgotten
> In his grave with the yellow leaves. . . .
>
> And again the hawthorn pale
> Shall blossom sweet i' the Spring:
> And again the nightingale
> In the deep blue nights shall sing:
> And seas of the wind shall wave
> In the light of the golden grain:
> But the love that is gone to his grave
> Shall never return again. . . .

Mrs. Bulwer had finally separated from her husband in 1836, nd for the next two years she lived in Ireland with her children. They were removed from her charge in 1838, when Robert was ix years old. Mother and son did not meet again until twenty ad years had gone by, for he was forbidden by his father from ommunicating with his mother. She sent to him, when he was boy of fifteen, a watch and chain with a miniature of herself ttached, but the parcel was returned to her by the father's gent with the order that nothing of the kind was desired.

Bulwer-Lytton was as implacable in his domestic relations with those who had offended him as Edward Moulton-Barrett. His daughter, as a child, when she heard her father's voice would run and hide herself, and if she was compelled to meet him addressed him as 'Mr. Bulwer,' and her mother lavished her affections on her pet dogs. Poor Emily Lytton died of typhus fever, at the age of twenty, in a lodging-house at Pelham Terrace, Brompton, and her tragic death, amid conditions of neglect, caused fresh recriminations between the parents, each blaming the other. To Robert Lytton her untimely end was the crowning sorrow of his sad boyhood—he was now but sixteen. He had lost the only relative whom he had loved and who had loved him, the companion of his few happy days as a child, before he was sent to school at the age of eight. Her gentle memory he recalled more than once in his poems:

A little longer in the light, love, let me be. The air is warm.
I hear the cuckoo's last good-night float from the copse below the Farm.
A little longer, Sister sweet,—your hand in mine—on this old seat.

In yon red gable, which the rose creeps round and o'er, your casement shines
Against the yellow west, o'er those few sinuous, melancholy pines.
The long, loud day is nearly done. How silent all the place is grown. . . .

God bless you for the tender thought which only upon tears could rise.
God bless you for the love that sought to hide them in those drooping eyes,
Whose lids I kiss . . . poor lids so red, but let my kiss fall there instead. . . .

'Tis eight years since (do you forget?) we set those lilies near the wall:
A blue-eyed infant, you! Even yet I seem to see the ringlets fall—
The golden ringlets, blown behind your shoulders in the merry wind.

. . . . . .

Robert Lytton was educated at Harrow and Bonn, and he began his career in the world of diplomacy early, for he was scarcely eighteen when he went to Washington to act as private secretary to his uncle, Lord Dalling, the British Ambassador. After work in Florence and at The Hague, he was appointed first attaché at Vienna in 1860, and he held higher diplomatic office at the Courts, successively, of Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and again in Austria, until he was secretary to the Embassy in Paris, 1872. He married, in 1864, Edith,[1] daughter of the Hon. Edward Villiers, and in 1873 he succeeded to the barony of his father. In 1858, when he was twenty-six, he had a brief reunion with his sad mother. Unhappily, the reunion was not a success, the two were incompatible, and it would seem that Lady Bulwer-Lytton, contrary to an undertaking, attempted to undermine her

[1] The Countess of Lytton is still living, and the children of the marriage were the present Earl of Lytton, the Hon. Neville Lytton, Lady 'Betty' Balfour, Lady Constance Lytton (the Suffragist), and Lady Emily Lutyens.

son's friendly relations with his father. Whatever the cause, Robert Lytton suddenly left his mother at Luchon. She saw him in Paris on her way home, and after that they never met again for the remaining twenty-four years of her lonely life: but he made her an allowance of £200 a year during the last septenary. So, in 1858, 'Owen Meredith' returned also to a lonely life, and his sad poems.

In 1860 appeared *Lucille*, the curious but picturesque attempt to render a novel in the form of rhyming anapæstic couplets. The story told was interesting and its detail elaborate, but Lucille was not Don Juan and Lytton not a Byron when he essayed to tell a long story in rhyme. In 1861 the young poet issued, with Chapman and Hall, a volume entitled *Serbski Pesme, or National Songs of Servia*. The origin of the poems was left rather obscure by the author in his introduction. He intimated they were not translations or paraphrases from original native songs, but simply a

rude medium through which to convey to other minds something of the impression made upon my own by the poetry of a people amongst whom literature is yet unborn. . . . I will only add of the contents of this little volume that, whether they be weeds or wild flowers, I have at least gathered them on their native soil, amidst the solitudes of the Carpathians, and along the shores of the Danube.

The little book, in its magenta covers, and its author received a terrible trouncing in the *Saturday Review* (March 23, 1861), when some very learned critic suggested that 'Owen Meredith' had never been to Servia and did not even understand the language of that country, and that both the poems and the erudite introduction were copiously borrowed from a recent book published in Paris, *Poésies Populaires Serbes*, translated from the original by Auguste Dozon (1859).

It was quite wrong, however, to think that 'Owen Meredith' had not been in Servia, for he twice visited the country in 1860, first as acting Consul-General and again when upon a special mission to prevent the renewal of hostilities between the Servians and the Turks. He replied to this hostile review very humbly and courteously in the edition of *Serbski Pesme* which appeared in 1869.[2]

There was an interval of eight years before the appearance, in 1869, of his next works of importance, *Chronicles and Characters* and *Orval, or the Fool of Time*, the latter claiming to be the sole presentation in English literature of the spirit of the great Polish

[2] Osgood's American edition, 1877, of *Serbski Pesme* was entitled '*The National Songs of Servia*, Translated by Owen Meredith: Omne meum: Nihil meum.' It is catalogued under 'Dozon' at the British Museum.

school of mystical poetry inspired by the destruction of Polish independence. The particular theme paraphrased was that of *Nieboska Komedya* (*The Infernal Comedy*) of Count Sigismund Krasinski, but Lytton's ambitions in this work were far wider, as may be read in the long and weighty preface of fifty-eight pages. In a way he foreran the great achievement of Thomas Hardy in *The Dynasts*, for Lytton utilised supernatural machinery, and presented the historical continuity of events by means of two vast panoramic visions ; Spirits and ' Voices ' enact Chorus :

' By the rights that from wrongs we have wrung,
By the power that on pain hath been nurtured,
We, who were strangled and hung,
We,—who were fettered and tortured,
Limbs that were galled by the gyve,
Flesh that was burned in the fire,
Bodies once buried alive
In the midnight and mire,
We arise in the fulness of time :
And, for robes, in our wrongs we array us,
Who are judges at last of the crime
Which the sons for the fathers must pay us.
For the guilty too late is repentance
Now that we, who were victims, are fates :
And Satan our terrible sentence
To execute waits.'

Lytton's next book, *Fables in Song* (1874), contains many charming things in his most characteristic style, for he was at his best in narrative little poems rather than in the formidable epics he at times essayed. Quite lovely is *The Thistle* in this volume, a Hans Andersen-like tale in rhyme ; *The Blue Mountains*, a glimpse of the mirage of Life, and *Only a Shaving* are also worthy of remembrance. In 1885, ' Owen Meredith ' returned to the big epic, this time of modern life, *Glenaveril*, which in ' six books,' or rather two closely-printed volumes, did not meet with success, for the time had gone by for political satire on this large scale. The short songs of *After Paradise* (1887) were far more welcome, for here once more sang the poet's early lyrical grace of sadness and passion :

Far in the southern night she sleeps ;
And there the heavens are husht, and there
Low murmuring from the moonlit deeps,
Faint music lulls the dreamful air.
No tears on her soft lashes hang,
On her calm lips no kisses glow,
The throb, the passion, and the pang
Are over now.

But I ? From this full-peopled north,
Whose midnight roar around me stirs,
How wildly still my heart goes forth
To haunt that silent home of hers.
There night by night, with no release,
These sleepless eyes the vision see,
But all its visionary peace
But maddens me.

His final volumes of poetry were entitled *King Poppy* (which had been begun as far back as 1875), marked by lively, ironic humour, and his own favourite work, and *Marah*, both being published posthumously in 1892. Apart from his poetry, Lytton was an admirable writer of prose. His diplomatic despatches are said to be models of their genre. His unfinished biography of his father, *The Life, Letters, and Literary Remains of Edward Bulwer, Lord Lytton* (1883), was in the grand manner, full of picturesque detail, as all biography worthy of the name. But it is as a poet that Robert Lytton will be remembered, even though he cannot clear his poetry from the oft-repeated charges of unoriginality and that he borrowed too freely from the ideas and the phraseology of his great predecessors and contemporaries. Certainly it would be easy to draw up a remarkable list of his echoes from other poets. There would be his *Tannhäuser* from Tennyson, his *Desire* from Shelley's *To Night ;* his ' Farewell, and yet again farewell, and yet Never farewell ' from Byron's *Fare Thee Well*, and most undeniably Poe's *Haunted Palace* was next-door neighbour to Lytton's *Deserted Palace*. The rugged, turgid splendour of Longfellow's *King Robert of Sicily* was also assimilated, and given forth some six years after in Lytton's *Genseric*.

His dramatic lyrics in the manner of Browning sometimes seem like parodies. Thus *Two Out of the Crowd* certainly provides irony :

Your scissors and thimble, and work laid away,
With its silks, in the scented rose-wood box ;
The journals, that tell truth every day,
And that novel of Paul de Kock's.

The flowers in the vase, with their bells shut close
In a dream of the far green fields where they grew
The cards of the visiting people and shows
In that bowl with the sea-green hue.

Your shawl, with a queenly droop of its own,
Hanging over the arm of the crimson chair :
And, last—yourself, as silent as stone,
In a glow of the fire-light there.

And what can be said of that introduction of the gibus ?

At Paris it was, at the Opera there ;—
And she look'd like a Queen of old time that night,
With the wreathèd pearls in her raven hair,
And her breast with the diamond bright.

Side by side in our box we sat,
Together, my bride betroth'd and I :
My gaze was fix'd on my opera-hat,
And hers on the stage hard by.

Putting aside these semi-parodical verses, I do not think that 'Owen Meredith' deliberately culled the flowers of greater poets : that would have been too absurd and jejune for a man of his literary standing who had given his own memorable lines, original and true, to the world :

Genius is master of man,
Genius does what it must, and Talent does what it can.

Ay, there are some good things in life, that fall not away with the rest,
And of all best things upon earth, I hold that a faithful friend is the best.

The poet who wrote those words of life and death :

The strife is over now. . . . And we fought bravely . . .
And we be all dead men. And those tall towers
We built are fallen, all our banners torn,
All our swords broken, all our strong watch-fires
Quench, and in death have we been left forlorn. . . .
The dead forever are the dead, I know.
And this my harp—I know not when, alas !
But all its strings were broken long ago,
Save one, which time makes tough. The others were
Of sweeter tone, but this sounds more intense.
And for my name, some say it is Despair,
And others say it is Experience.

And, in simple contrast, a sad little romaunt such as this :

This heart, you would not have,
I laid up in a grave
Of song : with love enwound it,
And set wild fancies blowing round it.
Then I to others gave it :
Because you would not have it.

Resemblances to other poets there are in the work of Lytton ; as a lover of the beautiful he held unconsciously in his mind beautiful phrases and cadences he had heard or read, in the same way as the mind's eye retains the vision of beautiful scenery. Sounds and scenes remain alike in the poets' armoury, and are taken out and used when the mood calls.

Side by side with his withdrawn poetical life Lytton pursued his great public career. He was Viceroy of India, 1876–1880, proclaimed Queen Victoria as Empress of India at Delhi in 1877,

and was created Earl of Lytton in 1880. Distinguished in all aspects of manhood, and handsome, in the lighter chronicles of his life one may recall the passion he inspired in the unruly and flamboyant bosom of Ouida.

Poetry occupied his mind to the last. He died very suddenly, in Paris, from an aneurism of the aorta, on November 24, 1891, at the age of sixty. He had been writing poetry all that last day and was so occupied when the end came, thinking perhaps of

the dead and gone, bright-eyed Desires
Whose beauty lights no more my dwindled day,
Here, sitting lone beside forsaken fires. . . .'

A priori it would suggest an extreme contrast to pass from the romantic personality of Robert Earl of Lytton and the splendours of European courts and Gothic Knebworth to the sombre, self-analytical temperament of William Hale White and the somewhat drab annals of provincial dissenting communities in Bedfordshire. Yet there are points of contact apart from the topographical facts that Knebworth and Bedford are in the same district of England and that the same calm scenery was familiar to both writers. Both Lytton and Hale White were unhappy in adolescence, with the result that the mind of each was tinged at the outset with that melancholy and spiritual unrest which found expression in their literary work. Lytton, of course, tended more to the Pleasures of Melancholy—romantic regrets for what was lost or unobtainable and the beauty that was often but the poet's dream : Hale White, a prose poet despite his assertion that he could not write poetry, voiced resentment and protest against the miserable experiences of his young manhood which the imaginative pessimism of his mind coloured more darkly than the actual circumstances warranted. But the poet in him often rose finely above the blackness of his mental cloud-land, and no other writer has presented with more beautiful pictorial language the charm and quiet loveliness of his native district.

White's paternal ancestors had lived in Bedfordshire for many generations. His mother, a Chigwell, came from Colchester, and her mother had been born a Hale and was also a native of that town of antiquity and oysters. Here is the source of the future author's second name, Hale ; and, personally, I think that the town depicted as 'C——' in *The Autobiography of Mark Rutherford* (chapter iii.) was Colchester, for the geographical description of the place as some ten miles distant from the sea tallies there but would not be correct for Bedford, which is generally assumed to be 'Cowfold.' In the same connexion, the scene of Mark Rutherford's later pastorate 'in the large, straggling half-village,

half-town of D——, within about ten miles of me,' was undoubtedly Dedham.

But it does not follow from these identifications that Hale White was himself a pastor in Colchester and Dedham chapels. Commentators of the author's work have made the mistake of taking *The Autobiography of Mark Rutherford* as the actual autobiography of Hale White: it is not so, of course. He introduced many of his own experiences, and even more of his thoughts and sensitive temperament and mental disturbance, of that time in his early life; but this book is only the autobiography of Hale White to the extent that *David Copperfield* and *Jane Eyre*, respectively, are the autobiographies of Dickens and Charlotte Brontë.

The father of Hale White was William White (1807–82), a remarkable man. At the time of his son's birth he was a bookseller in Bedford, carrying on his business and living likewise in an old house by the bridge across the Ouse; and one of the joys of 'Mark Rutherford's' boyhood was every morning, at eight o'clock, to see and hear the Bedford 'Times' coach, with its four prancing cream-coloured horses, come dashing and jingling over the bridge. The elder White specialised in old and theological works in his shop; he was very well read himself, and would declaim from memory long passages from Milton and Byron; a great admirer of Cobbett, as a speaker he was termed 'Cobbett without the vulgarity.' He was more of a reader than a vendor of books, which accounts for his serious failure in business in 1854, when he left Bedford: he fully paid his creditors in time. Through the help of Lord Charles Russell, he was appointed doorkeeper at the Houses of Parliament. His son, Hale White, was very happy as a schoolboy. He was at Bedford Modern School, 1841–2. In those halcyon days he could purchase twenty fine English apples for one penny, to take with him on the rambles he loved by the banks of the river, where was fishing and bathing, followed by lying naked in the sun to get dry, while in the winter the river and long reaches of the marshlands provided wonderful skating. And at home there was to tend his comfort a faithful old nurse, Jane, of the school of Peggotty: weekdays were delightful, but not so Sundays. For his parents belonged to the strict sect of Independent Calvinists, and Sunday was 'a season of unmixed gloom.' The self-pitying accounts he draws in *The Autobiography of Mark Rutherford* of the Sabbath observances in Bedford of the 'forties, with family prayers at home and three services in chapel, and no secular reading or diversions of any kind, and only cold meat to eat, have been taken by some students of his work as a picture of darkest England in the Barbaric Age of early Victorianism, and they believe that all such cruelties were

swept away by the flood of twentieth century culture and 'flapper' freedom. But Hale White's catalogue of Sabbath grievances leaves me quite unmoved, for I remember exactly similar rules and ordinances in force fifty years after the date he was describing—that is to say, I experienced them in the early 'nineties and in a Church of England environment; and I have no doubt that many young Wesleyans and Baptists endure the same 'tortures' even unto the present day. *The Autobiography of Mark Rutherford* is, of course, a record of spiritual travail of one who is supersensitive and with his ego too prominent: otherwise, how would he remember, what no doubt was an actual experience at Dedham, and retell thirty years later, that he had been asked at dinner if he would take 'potatoes *or* cabbage'? It is true that, in a few beautiful words, he indicates the 'wettish' walk home had its consolations:

> Just before I reached home the clouds rolled off with the south-west wind into detached, fleecy masses, separated by liquid blue gulfs, in which were sowed the stars, and the effect upon me was what that sight, thank God, always has been—a sense of the infinite, extinguishing all mean cares.

But the fact remains that he had been unduly affected and depressed by trifles in the experiences of his young manhood. It is indeed indicated that Mark was at times the victim of monomania. Perhaps his most poignant experience was that frequent tragedy of youth—the never realised dream to find the ideal friend to whom could be freely offered the overflowing chalice of the love and sympathy of a lonely heart. How sadly he expressed his longings:

> The desire for something like sympathy and love absolutely devoured me. God knows that I would have stood against a wall and have been shot for any man or woman whom I loved . . . but nobody seemed to wish for such a love, or to know what to do with it. Oh! the humiliations under which this weakness has bent me. Often and often I have thought that I have discovered somebody who could really comprehend the value of a passion which could tell everything and venture everything. I have overstepped all bounds of etiquette in obtruding myself on him, and have opened my heart even to shame. I have then found that it was all on my side. . . . If I had been born a hundred years earlier, I should have transferred this burning longing to the unseen God and have become a devotee. . . . If anybody who reads these words of mine should be offered by any young dreamer such a devotion as I once had to offer, and had to take back again refused so often, let him in the name of all that is sacred accept it. It is simply the most precious thing in existence. Had I found anybody who would have thought so, my life would have been redeemed into something which I have often imagined, but now shall never know.

There, without doubt, Hale White speaks of himself; and though, as I have already indicated, the *Autobiography* must not be

taken as a literal recital of his own life, I think that work faithfully reflects his experiences of the time when, at the age of seventeen, he entered the Countess of Huntingdon's Training College for Independent Ministers at Cheshunt, for his parents had decided that he should become a pastor of their faith, though he inclined to the calling of art, like his brother, who had been a painter and aroused the interest of Rossetti and Ruskin in his work, before his early death quenched his gifts. It was at Cheshunt that Hale White discovered Wordsworth and a philosophy of life and Nature which paved the way for his expulsion from the later training college he had passed to, New College, St. John's Wood. There followed the years as a minister, and then the episode at Stoke Newington, in 1852, when Hale White had obtained a post as master in a second-rate school for boys, where on his first night panic fear overcame him as he gazed upon the ruined fields and hedges, which had just at that date become the prey of the suburban builder, the dreary landscape lit by Tennyson's distant 'light of London flaring like a dreary dawn.'

He was given his discharge from the school-ushership as he wished, and after a time obtained employment with Dr. John Chapman, that curious physician and publisher who owned and edited the *Westminster Review*. Hale White resided in Chapman's house and combined place of business at 142, Strand, where the former had a quiet little room looking over the river to the Surrey hills. At this date there was also living in the house, as assistant editor of the *Westminster Review*, Mary Ann Evans, the future George Eliot. She was twelve years older than White; she was kind to the shy and sensitive youth, and would encourage him to talk about books and his own aspirations. He has related of her at that time: 'I did not know what she was. I knew that she was not only endowed with extraordinary genius, but with human qualities even more precious.' Owing to his constitutional diffidence he let her go out of his life, and he did not renew the friendship in after years. She died in 1880, the year before the publication of *The Autobiography of Mark Rutherford*, wherein George Eliot figures as Theresa, and where are some authentic echoes of her conversation. John Chapman is the Wollaston of that book. White had the offer of a partnership in Chapman's business, but he declined it and accepted instead a clerkship in the office of the Registrar-General at Somerset House. This was in 1854, and two years later he married, at the age of twenty-four, Harriet, daughter of Samuel Arthur, described as a maker of dress-trimmings. Mrs. White was very musical, a pupil of Sir Charles Hallé. The eldest of her five sons became Sir William Hale White, the physician of Wimpole Street, and there was one daughter.

In 1858 Hale White was transferred to the Admiralty, where he later attained the post of director of contracts. Thus over twenty years of life in the Civil Service passed away, and then when he was just on fifty years of age he wrote *The Autobiography of Mark Rutherford* (1881); *Mark Rutherford's Deliverance* followed in 1885 and *The Revolution in Tanner's Lane* in 1887. In this trilogy he achieved the most remarkable and verisimilous presentation of non-conformist life in England during the middle of the nineteenth century that is ever likely to be attempted; for he combined with his finely written narrative a moving study of spiritual unrest and travail and an intimate, piteous self-confession and reprobation which rank it with the greatest works of self-revelation: his is a Discipline rather than an Apologia. It would not be correct to say he wrote these books when his mind was under a cloud, but his mind was in a state of tremendous excitement and disturbance, and in 1887, when his triple task was completed, he told a friend how he had suffered 'eleven months of terrible depression taking the form of all kinds of distressing forebodings and delusions.' Like his great fellow-countyman, Bunyan, before him, he had to pay the price for creation. But he found some anodyne, it would seem, in work and love for others: 'Somehow, after many errors, I had once more gained a road, a religion in fact, and one which essentially was not new but old, the religion of the Reconciliation, the reconciliation of man with God.'

The Autobiography of Mark Rutherford has won enduring fame[3]: Hale White's later novels are not nearly so well known —*Miriam's Schooling* (1890), *Catherine Furze* (1893), and *Clara Hopwood* (1896)—though they merit praise for their clever studies of varying types of womanhood and delightful scenic glimpses of Bedfordshire and the home counties.

Hale White retired from the Civil Service at the age of sixty, and at this time, 1891, his first wife died. He married, in 1911, Dorothy Vernon, daughter of Horace Smith, the well-known London police magistrate. His last years were spent at The Cottage, Groombridge, in Kent, where he died on March 14, 1913, at the age of eighty-one.

Charles Stuart Calverley, who was born on the same day as William Hale White, presents a mind, life, and literary achievement vastly different from the aspects we have been regarding in the author of 'Mark Rutherford,' and, indeed, from those of

[3] There have been twenty-five editions or impressions of this work, I am told by Mr. Simon Nowell Smith, to whom I express my thanks for his *Bibliography of the Works of William Hale White.*

'Owen Meredith' also, for the only link between Lytton and Calverley is that both were at Harrow. Calverley experienced none of the sorrow and melancholy of these, his two near, contemporaries. His was a happy life, with no anxieties, either of the mind or of money, and so he exemplifies the truth that only those who have suffered much can reach the higher range of art and transmute their experiences into song and lovely prose. For though C. S. Calverley is supreme in parody, that is not one of the highest expressions of literature, and all his friends and critics are agreed that he never realised or fully exercised his great natural gifts. His life was singularly uneventful even for a literary man. Born at Martley, in Worcestershire, on December 22, 1831, he was the son of the Rev. Henry Blayds, and Blayds remained his surname until he was just twenty-one, for it was not until 1852 that his family resumed their original cognomen of Calverley, an ancient Yorkshire stock, one of whose members was that lurid Walter Calverley who murdered his two young sons, was pressed to death at York in 1605, and three years later had his sanguinary career presented in *The Yorkshire Tragedy*, a play at one time attributed to Shakespeare. The mother of the future parodist was a Meade of Chatley, in Somerset. At Harrow, where Blayds entered at the age of fourteen, he is described as a curly-haired, bright-eyed boy, smiling and of a most happy disposition, a favourite of all, though he rather kept aloof from his school-fellows. He was a blend of mental brilliance and daring; he was a finished Latin versifier, and in Greek he displayed a most retentive memory, for on one occasion an imposition of the first book of *The Iliad* was learned by heart in the course of a night, though a week had been given for the expiation of the task. All through his youth he had the most amazing predilection for jumping. At Harrow he jumped the stone steps of the Old School, an oblique distance of 21 feet, and at Cambridge, in Green Street, he successfully emulated Dick Turpin, who leapt over a horse and cart when impeded by them on his flight. The highwayman was mounted on a magnificent horse, of course; but Calverley, 'with his cap and gown on, and his hands in his pockets, and with a very short run, cleared the astonished steed, and alighted smiling on the other side.'

Blayds had first gone to Oxford as a Balliol scholar; but at this period he suffered from an inordinate sense of humour and was known as 'Unsanctified Intellect.' He was in constant conflict with the authorities on points of discipline; he was too 'redolent of the weed' in chapel, and kept dogs in spite of a strict prohibition.

During his second year at Oxford he was abruptly asked to leave. He had just won the Chancellor's Prize for Latin

Hexameters in 1851, and as these prize poems are printed the ebullient young author sent his manuscript to the press headed, 'Carolus Stuart Blayds, e coll Balliol, prope ejectus.' He proceeded in October 1852 to Christ's College, Cambridge, where the more sober atmosphere brought about an entire change of behaviour. He was now docile and never embroiled with masters and dons, and with this passing of his wild phase and energy there commenced that indolence already noted. But he worked well, mainly at his favourite exercise of Latin and Greek composition, and displayed marvellous polyglot powers. He translated *Lycidas* into Latin hexameters and all the pathos of the old Scotch ballad, *John Anderson, My Jo, John*, into Greek anacreontics. Of his personal appearance at this time there is a glimpse from the pen of Sir Walter Sendall:

> Short of stature, with a powerful head of the Greek type, covered thickly with crisp, curling masses of dark brown hair, and closely set upon a frame whose supple joints and well-built proportions betokened both speed and endurance—he presented a picture of health, strength, and activity. In disposition he was unselfish, and generous to a fault; without a trace of vanity or self-esteem.

He was already at this period giving rein to his gift of ironic humour and banter in rhyme which was to bring him fame in the course of a few years. *Beer* was composed at Cambridge in the stately cadences of Byron's *Don Juan*:

> O Beer! O Hodgson, Guinness, Allsopp, Bass!
> Names that should be on every infant's tongue.
> Shall days and months and years and centuries pass,
> And still your merits be unrecked, unsung?
> Oh! I have gazed into my foaming glass,
> And wished that lyre could yet again be strung
> Which once rang prophet-like through Greece, and taught her
> Misguided sons that the best drink was water. . . .
>
> But hark! a sound is stealing on my ear—
> A soft and silvery sound—I know it well.
> Its tinkling tells me that a time is near
> Precious to me—it is the Dinner Bell!
>
> O blessed Bell! Thou bringest beef and beer,
> Thou bringest good things more than tongue may tell:
> Seared is, of course, my heart—but unsubdued
> Is, and shall be, my appetite for food. . . .
> Such power hath Beer. The heart which Grief hath cankered
> Hath one unfailing remedy—the Tankard.

Calverley was an elfin jester, a Puck who made fun of the self-important and ostentatious. Even his laughter had this ring of elvish mockery. In his rhymes he would commence with

some beautiful symbol of Nature and in two lines pass to a picture of the super-dignified in an undignified condition :

The dew is on the roses,
  The owl has spread her wing ;
And vocal are the noses
  Of peasant and of king :
' Nature in short reposes ' ;
  But I do no such thing.

Pent in my lonely study
  Here I must sit and muse ;
Sit till the morn grows ruddy,
  Till, rising with the dews,
' Jeameses ' remove the muddy
  Spots from their masters' shoes.

Or in the dire fate of the Poet at the persecution of the Fly we find self-complacency routed by humblest medium :

Round the Poet, ere he slumbered,
Sang the Fly thro' hours unnumbered ;
Sauntered if he seemed to doze,
O'er the arch that was his nose,
Darting thence to re-appear
In his subtly-chambered ear :
When at last he slept right soundly,
It transfixed him so profoundly,
Caused him agony so horrid,
That he woke and smote his forehead
(It's the course that poets take
When they're trifled with) and spake. . . .

Like Thackeray and Meredith, he had his own particular Spirit of Comedy, a sort of comic philosophy of life, though he did not moralise in the style of Thackeray or provide such involved comic retributions as Meredith envisaged for his Willoughby Patterne and Countess de Saldar. But of course his canvas was smaller, and his touch infinitely lighter when he smote his victims with his jester's bladder—even in that extreme exposition of the absurd, his invocation to the beadles of the Burlington Arcade :

Yes, ye are beautiful . . .
And O ! forgive me, Beadles, if I paid
  Scant tribute to your worth, when first ye stood
Before me robed in broad-cloth and brocade
And all the nameless grace of Beadlehood.
I would not smile at thee—if smile I could
Now as erewhile, ere I had learn'd to sigh :
  Ah, no, I know ye beautiful and good. . . .

It was only occasionally that he flicked more sharply, as in

that most brilliant of all his parodies, *The Cock and the Bull*, for he did not like the pretentiousness and intentional obscurity of Browning's *The Ring and the Book* and its tiresome Latin tags ; and Jean Ingelow's simple use of Nature and scenic symbols was not to his taste :

In moss-prankt dells which the sunbeams flatter
  (And Heaven it knoweth what that may mean—
Meaning, however, is no great matter)
  Where woods are a-tremble, with rifts atween.

Many of Calverley's parodies were written in the favourite metre of Bon Gaultier, who, of course, burlesqued the rhythms of *Locksley Hall*. So, too, does the Cat in Calverley's inimitable retrospect sing :

They call me cruel. Do I know if mouse or song-bird feels ?
I only know they make me light and salutary meals.

And in that most amusing of all the author's lines, to the Italian organ-grinder, the metre is diversified with that peculiar blend of the humorous with the solemn which is Calverley's most delightful characteristic :

Grinder, who serenely grindest
  At my door the Hundredth Psalm,
Till thou ultimately findest
  Pence in thy unwashen palm.

He had an immense facility of rhyme. He offered forty-six words or sounds rhyming with ' trees,' and thirty-three with ' play.' His parodies, with examples of his other work, were published in two little volumes entitled respectively *Verses and Translations* (1862) and *Fly Leaves* (1872). They had, and still have, an immense circulation. His translation of Theocritus appeared in 1869. Calverley became fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge, in 1858, and a barrister of the Inner Temple seven years later, after his marriage with his first cousin, Ellen Calverley, of Oulton, Yorkshire. It was at Oulton that he had a dangerous fall on the head when skating, which caused concussion and the failure of his health. In course of time Bright's disease supervened, and he died on February 17, 1884, at 17, Devonshire Terrace, Paddington. He was buried in Folkestone Cemetery.

Calverley was but fifty-two, so the gay and merriest, and once the only athletic, of the three contemporaries died long before the melancholy ' Mark Rutherford ' and the romantic ' Owen Meredith.'

S. M. Ellis.

ON A PARTY OF RUNAWAYS

(WITH APOLOGIES TO MR. A. E. HOUSMAN)

THESE, in the hour the pound was falling,
(Their legs, the nation noticed, black)
Heard the trade-union caucus calling
And took their orders—and the sack.

Their speeches round the issue skirted;
They 'stood,' but England stood them not.
When Snowden snorted, these deserted
And lost their grip of things—for what?

C. W. BRODRIBB.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, *10 & 12, Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.*

Letters as well as articles will be considered for publication, but letters should be confined to criticism or amplification of articles which have already appeared in the Review. No anonymous contribution is published.

INDEX TO VOL. CX

The titles of articles are printed in italics

ACA

ACADÉMIE Française, The First Member of the, 101–112
Africa, wild life of, desirability of protecting many species of, 94–95
Aircraft, gas laid by, not more dangerous than gas-shells, 574
American broadcasting, 204 *et seq.*
American poet more enterprising than the British, 245
Amery (Right Hon. L. S.), *National Policy and the Monetary Crisis,* 272–284
Annus Mirabilis, 1831: *Faraday, Clerk Maxwell, British Association,* 345–352
Ashley-Montagu (Dr. M. F.), *Another Unpublished 'Imaginary Conversation' by Walter Savage Landor,* 353–358
Australia, position in, with regard to vanishing wild fauna, relatively more serious than in other continents, 97–98
Australian Labour Party, its worthlessness to the working man, 436–437
Australian Readjustment, The, 429–441

BEET Sugar and the British Taxpayer, 153–163
Benn (Sir Ernest), *Unemployment and the Report,* 1–7
Biography, Bulwer-Lytton not an attraction to ordinary readers of, 373
Birds, wild, public opinion in most countries in favour of protecting, 98
Bombay, humiliation of British mercantile managing agents in as a result of boycott of cotton cloth, etc., 34
Bradbury (Lord) on Great Britain's economic troubles, 147
British arable farmer, hasty conclusions about lack of enterprise of, unfair, 324
British Army, Thackeray and the, 613 *et seq.*

COL

British Association, its unrivalled record of voluntary service in the interests of science, 349–350
British financial policy, what it has cost a year since 1920...274
British India Steam Navigation Company and Indian coastal trade, 36–37
British less closely affected by trouble in Europe than Continental peoples, 291
British Trade and the New Indian Constitution, 31–40
British vital statistics, Registrar-General's quarterly return virtually a 'Report on a Declining People,' 213
Broadcasting in America, 204–212
Broadcasting, The Decentralisation of, 82–89
Brodribb (C. W.), *On a Party of Runaways,* 762
Bulgaria, difficulties of since the Peace Treaty of 1919...287
Bulwer, 373–384
Burdett (Osbert), *Maarten Maartens' Novels,* 113–128

CANTONESE a vital part of the Kuomintang, 179
Capital, dependence of on the incentive to profit, 401
Capital, life-blood of industry and fountain of employment, 263
China and the Feetham Report, 179–193
Christian religion, bad time said to be coming for, 592
Cinema Technique and the Theatre, 602–612
Civil Service or Bureaucracy?, 453–463
Clemenceau and General Pershing's 'disobedience' to Allied generals, 230–231
Cole (G. D. H.), *The Labour Party from Within,* 397–406
Colonial sugar industry, harmful effects of sugar subsidy on, 161
Colvin (Sir Elliot), *India—the Longer View,* 663–670

COM
Communists, estimated number of people murdered and value of property destroyed by in two Chinese provinces, 183
Company Accounts, The Public and, 337–344
Conversion a proper cure for high rates of interest, 264
Corn farming, mechanised, claim that it would increase employment on the land, 326–327
Countryfolk, readiness of to cultivate long-disused arts a sign of vitality, 72
Countryside, choral singing, etc., in the, 69
County courts, litigants and the upkeep of, 81
Cox (Harold), *Problems and Perils*, 521–531
Crabbe, In Praise of, 489–502
Credits, foreign, an excuse for fresh negligence, 518
Crowther (J. G.), *Technical Education in Soviet Russia*, 41–55
Custance (Admiral Sir Reginald), *On Changes in Naval Thought*, 315–320
Cyprus, The Riots in, 685–693

DARWIN (*Erasmus*), 1731–1802, 723–734
Dawson (William Harbutt), *Germany and the Corridor*, 671–684
Declining People, A, 213–221
Denominational and anti-denominational controversy, local authorities impatient of, 19
Denominational schools 'an integral and indispensable part of our national system,' 16
Dickinson (Right Hon. Lord), *The Healing of Europe*, 285–296
Digby (Bassett), *The World's Dwindling Wild Life*, 90–100
Doctors' Dilemmas, The, 654–662
Dole and wages, reduction of, 'will decrease unemployment and bring down retail prices,' 414
Domestic tariff in Britain, advantages to be derived from, 279–280
Dorling (Captain Taprell), *The Navy and the Air*, 570–579
Dragons, Of the Hunting of, 248–256
Drama, return of village, an element of interest and delight, 69

EASTERBROOK (L. F.), *The Possibilities of Mechanised Farming*, 321–336

FRE
Economy, a Gladstonian plan of, 149
Economy Report, The, 257–271
Education, liberal, definition of, 41
Educational institutions in Russia, number of students attending and estimated present and future cost of maintenance of, 54
Educational, technical, in Soviet Russia, 41 *et seq.*
Eggleston (Hon. F. W.), *The Australian Readjustment*, 429–441
Egypt: a New Phase, 21–30
Ellis (S. M.), *Bulwer*, 373–384; *Three Centenaries* (*'Owen Meredith,' 'Mark Rutherford,' C. S. Calverley*), 746–761
England and France, collaboration of necessary to the success of mankind, 520
England and Wales, birth-rate of lower than any country except Sweden, 216
Europe, difficulties presented by mixed races of, 288
Europe, need for preserving the remaining wild animals in, 90–92
European community in India and equality of treatment, 38–39
European policy, momentary eclipse of, 515
Europeans in the Great War, General Pershing's unreasonable reflections on, 228

FAMINE in India, aid of railways in banishing, 34
Faraday (Michael), his discovery of the induction of electricity, of benzene, of a link between magnetism and light, etc., 346–347
Farming, mechanised, in England, 321 *et seq.*
Fascismo and the Vatican, 194 *et seq.*
Fascist catechism, what it teaches, 196
France and the Hoover Plan, reasons for raising objections to, 134 *et seq.*
France, birth-control in, millions of English boys despatched to that country during the Great War owing to, 220
France, disastrous effect of gold-hoarding by on Britain, 388–389
France, Post-War, and German Culture, 626–640
French policy largely due to British and American default, 292–293

FRE
French Post-War Literature, The Problems of, 359–372
French View, A, of the World Crisis, 513–520
Fuller (Maj.-Gen. J. F. C.), *Gandhi—Saint or Sinner?*, 164–178

GANDHI Apocrypha, The, 594–601
Gandhi, effect of Tolstoy's philosophy on, 165; services during the South African War, 166; 'democracy a snare and a delusion,' 169; economic doctrine of, 173; and medical science, 177; and Rousseau, 178.
Gandhi—Saint or Sinner?, 164–178
Garratt (G. T.), *Prospects of the Round Table Conference*, 417–428
German culture, post-war France and, 626–640
Germany and the Corridor, 671–684
Germany, problem of normalising the international banking relations of, 447
Germany's Crisis, 442–452
Godeau (Antoine), Richelieu, and the Académie Française, 101 *et seq.*
Gold and the Pound, 385–396
Gold standard, reasons of the Government for abandoning, 385–386
Gordon (Seton), *Light in Darkness*, 503–512
Government departments, some reasons for weakness, etc., of, 455 *et seq.*
Gray's *Elegy*, myth of recitation of by Wolfe, 617
Great Britain, population of, table giving figures of four censal periods, 214
Great Britain's sacrifice under the Hoover Plan, 133
Green (O. M.), *China and the Feetham Report*, 179–193
Greenwood (H. Powys), *Germany's Crisis*, 442–452
Guest (Dr. L. Haden), *Russia Industrialised?*, 694–702
Gwynn (Denis), *The Vatican and Fascismo*, 194–203

HALL (Sir Daniel), *The Faith of a Man of Science*, 717–722
Harris (Dr. C. R. S.), *Gold and the Pound*, 385–396

INS
Harris (Sir Charles), *The Economy Report*, 257–271; *Wages*, 703–716
Hart (Sir William), *Local Government Expenditure and the Crisis*, 559–569
Healing, The, of Europe, 285–296
Hindle (W. H.), *The Face of Moscow*, 543–558
Hindu-Moslem unity, Gandhi's doubts as to, 177
Hindus and Muslims two nationalities, 305
Hirst (F. W.), *Reflections of an Independent Liberal*, 142–152
Hodson (H. V.), *The Hoover Plan*, 129–141
Holland (Sir Robert), *The Prospects of Indian Federation*, 297–314
Holmested (C. D.), *New Era in London Transport*, 56–67
Home-grown sugar industry, cost of concession in duty and subsidy to, 157
Hoover Plan, The, 129–141
Hopkinson (Austin), *Of the Hunting of Dragons*, 248–256; *The Second Round*, 407–416
Horace's Journey to Brundisium, 478–488
Humanism in America, 464–477

ICH Dien, Lord Lymington's, criticised, 248 *et seq.*
Independent Labour Party, voting strength of within the Labour Party barely counts, 403
Independent Liberal, Reflections of an, 142–152
India, British capital invested in, 33
India, England trying to govern by cajolery and compromise instead of by firmness and impartiality, 312
India—the Longer View, 663–670
India, wilful destruction of rare animals in, 93–94
Indian Federation, The Prospects of, 297–314
Indian Princes, some of the conundrums to be faced by, 308 *et seq.*
Inge (Dean) on a shrinking population as a trend of social evolution, 218
Institutions, educational, in Russia, number of students attending and cost of, 54

JAP

JAPANESE policy in Manchuria, 532 *et seq.*; map showing railways in operation, etc., 538
Justice, Jeremy Bentham and taxes on, 78–79

KAWAKAMI (K. K.), *Manchuria Again*, 532–542
Khilafat, Hindu-Moslem communal animosities revived through abolition of, 300
King Pantomime and his Court, 735–745

LABOUR After the Deluge, 641–653
Labour Party, The, from Within, 397–406
Landor (Walter Savage), Another Unpublished 'Imaginary Conversation' by, 353–358
Landscape Architecture, 232–237
Law and the Poor Man, 75–81
Light in Darkness, 503–512
Literature, French post-war, 359 *et seq.*
Lizards, poisonous snake-eating, of Bengal, demand of skin of for novel type of women's shoes slowly wiping out, 93
Local Government Expenditure and the Crisis, 559–569
London County Council Tramways, financial affairs of, 65–67
London Transport, New Era in, 56–67
Looker (Samuel J.), *In Praise of Crabbe*, 489–502
Lyautey (Pierre), *A French View of the World Crisis*, 513–520
Lytton (Robert, first Earl of), his romantic personality, 746 *et seq.*

MAARTEN Maartens' Novels, 113–128
MacDonald and Snowden (Messrs.), trade union hostility to mainly instinctive, 398
Machinery, unique attitude in Russia toward, 43
Macmillan Report, no reference to British Empire or Imperial co-operation in, 280
Manchuria Again, 532–542
Maurice (Maj.-Gen. Sir Frederick), *General Pershing and the American Expeditionary Force*, 222–231

OWE

Maxwell (James Clerk), his application of mathematical principles to the interpretation of Faraday's 'lines of force,' 347
Mechanised Farming, The Possibilities of, 321–336
Molson (Hugh), *British Trade and the New Indian Constitution*, 31–40
Money (Sir Leo Chiozza), *A Declining People*, 213–221
Money wages, rigidity of, difficulty of Britain competing with foreign manufacturers owing to, 387
Moore (W. G.), *Post-War France and German Culture*, 626–640
Moscow, The Face of, 543–558
Muslims the political and intellectual power in India under Moghul rule, 299
Mussolini (Signor), moral world prestige gained among Catholics on settlement of Roman question by, 195

NASH (Vaughan), *The Revival of Village Life*, 68–74
National Policy and the Monetary Crisis, 272–284
Nature, forces of, life a struggle for existence against, 5
Naval Thought, On Changes in, 315–320
Navies, Royal and merchant, functions of not altered by advent of air arm, 572
Navy, The, and the Air, 570–579
Navy, unrest caused in by the proposed reductions in pay—effect on foreign holders of sterling, 386
Needham (Joseph), *Religion in a Scientific Age*, 580–593
Newman (Major E. W. Polson), *Egypt: a New Phase*, 21–30
Nicholson (Reginald), *The Riots in Cyprus*, 685–693
North America, ruthless destruction of native fauna of during the past century, 95–97

ONE-MEMBER constituencies, electoral system of, does not work, 143
Over-production, general, very little evidence of, 276
Owen (A. S.), *Horace's Journey to Brundisium*, 478–488

OWE

'Owen Meredith,' 'Mark Rutherford,' and C. S. Calverley, centenaries of the births and characteristics of, 746 *et seq*

PARKS and recreation grounds, problems of reducing expenditure on, 567
Parliamentary franchise, need for a revision of, 526–527
Patiala (Maharaja of), preference of for a union of the Indian States alone in relationship with the Crown, 307–308
Paull (H. M.), *The First Member of the Académie Française*, 101–112
Pearson (Hesketh), *Erasmus Darwin*, 1731–1802, 723–734
People's Convention in China and rights of individuals, 185
Pershing (General) and the American Expeditionary Force, 222–231
Petiot (H.), *The Problems of French Post-War Literature*, 359–372
Polish Corridor, present arrangement cannot be permanent, 286
Political capitalism and political trade unionism, danger of the alliance between, 408
Polytechnics in Russia, dissolution and reorganisation of into monotechnics, 42 *et seq.*
Prices, fall in, attributed to a maldistribution of gold, 273
Problems and Perils, 521–531
Protection and Imperial Preference, main object of to restore our competitive power, etc., 283
Protectionism and Socialism, combined results of, the cause of Australia's plight, 150
Public life, lamentable fall of standards of, since the war, 145
Public, the, and company accounts, 337 *et seq.*

RATCLIFFE (S. K.), *Labour After the Deluge*, 641–653
Rates, local, May Committee on excessive charges by way of, 562
Raven-Hart (Major R.), *The Decentralisation of Broadcasting*, 82–89
Recreation, home-made village, something distinct from jazz, etc., 70
Reith (Sir John), *Broadcasting in America*, 204–212
Religion in a Scientific Age, 580–593

SOV

Richards (Philip S.), *Humanism in America*, 464–477
Round Table Conference, Prospects of the, 417–428
Runaways, On a Party of, 762
Russell (Dr. Alexander), *Annus Mirabilis*, 1831: *Faraday, Clerk Maxwell, British Association*, 345–352
Russia, economic and other conditions in, 543–558
Russia Industrialised?, 694–702

SAMUEL (Right Hon. Sir Herbert), *Beet Sugar and the British Taxpayer*, 153–163
Schiller (Dr. F. C. S.), *The Doctors' Dilemmas*, 654–662
School buildings, voluntary, difficulties of local authorities in regard to, 10
Schools, fee-paying, plea for a reversion to the principle of, 527
Science and religion, Epicurus on the provinces of, 589
Science, The Faith of a Man of, 717–722
Scientific worker, ethical neutrality for the, an indispensable aim, 585
Scotland, voluntary and other schools in, methods of solving the denominational question described, 13–14
Sea-borne trade, problem of providing security for, 317
Second Round, The, 407–416
Selby-Bigge (Sir Amherst), *Voluntary Schools* 8–20
Shanghai, complicated problem of, 186 *et seq.*
Shipbuilding policy of last twenty-five years: has it been based upon wrong principles? 319
Silver mines, post-war production of never equal to demand, 281
Smith (H. A. McClure), *The Public and Company Accounts*, 337–344
Socialism of Keir Hardie and others a gospel of State intervention, 400
Socialist Government, disastrous effects of finance of, 391
Sorabji (Cornelia), *The Gandhi Apocrypha*, 594–601
South American States, some economic effects of exclusion of their agricultural produce from British market by tariffs, 530
Soviet Russia, Technical Education in, 41–55

STE
Steel, British, Indian imports of, effect of payment of lower duty on than foreign, 32
Strong (L. A. G.), *Verse as Social History*, 238–247
Students in Russia, wages and hours of labour of, 46
Subject, liberty of the, interference with only in part the cause of growth of the Civil Service, 461
Sugar beet, cost of average journey of a ton of in Great Britain and other countries compared, 155
Sugar subsidy, the, Conservative and Labour Parties responsible for the extravagance of, 148
Swinton (Capt. George S. C.), *Landscape Architecture*, 232–237

TARIFF extravagances in Australia, Mr. Bruce and, 432
Tariff factor, vague references to in the Macmillan Report, 278
Tariffs, Federation of British Industries on the importance and difficulties of, 529
Taxation, evil results of excessive, 525
Thackeray and the Army, 613–625
Theatre, the, and the cinema, 602 *et seq.*
Three Centenaries (' *Owen Meredith*,' ' *Mark Rutherford*,' *C. S. Calverley*), 746–761
Tolstoy, effect of his philosophy on Gandhi, 165
Trade unions, wages policy of, the main cause of our present difficulties, 396

WRI
Trench warfare, training of American troops under French or British ' of little value except for details of,' 223

UNEMPLOYMENT and the Report, 1-7
United States, amount invested in long-term foreign securities by in the four years 1925–28...275

VATICAN, The, and Fascismo, 194–203
Veale (Douglas), *Civil Service or Bureaucracy?*, 453–463
Verse as Social History, 238–247
Village Life, The Revival of, 68–74
Voluntary Schools, 8–20

WAFD, the, in Egypt, misrule of and deception of democracy by, 22 *et seq.*
Wages, 703–716
Wages, pegged rates of, a cause of loss of markets and rising unemployment, 262
Waugh (Arthur), *King Pantomime and his Court*, 735–745
Whitton (Lieut.-Col. F. E.), *Thackeray and the Army*, 613–625
Wild Life, The World's Dwindling, 90–100
Williams (David P.), *Cinema Technique and the Theatre*, 602–612
Woman, sterile, ' a benefactor of society,' 213
World crisis primarily a monetary crisis, 273
Wright (Dr. E. Blackwood), *Law and the Poor Man*, 75–81



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