




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FREE TRADE AND PEACE.

I REGARD this problem of national tariffs and world trade as one element in the general problem of world peace and international co-operation, and I believe that the attempt of individual nations to build up a separate national prosperity by destroying the trade of their neighbours is essentially futile and calculated to result in war. It is a world problem with which we have to deal, a problem due partly to the war, and the dislocations which have followed from it, but partly to the increased closeness and complication of the economic nexus between different parts of the world. Obstacles to trade which would have done comparatively little harm a hundred years ago may now be ruinous.

The direct damage of the war has been quickly repaired. Some ten million lives were lost, yet the population of Europe is already larger than before the war by more than one per cent. The effective working population, owing to the entry of women into industry and other causes, shows an even greater increase. The foodstuffs and raw materials of the world were destroyed on a gigantic scale by the war, yet they have increased, so the League of Nations figures tell us, by sixteen to eighteen per cent. the world over, and even in Europe by more than five per cent. Thus there is no shortage of food and raw material; quite the reverse. There is certainly no shortage of demand. On the contrary there is a remarkable rise in the standard of expectation of the masses in most industrial countries. There is no shortage of labour; there is more than can at the time be used. The world ought to be much richer than before; in fact it is suffering from every form of poverty. The people who want things cannot get them, the people who have made things cannot sell them. Demand and supply do not meet. To take one instance, given by Dr. Delisle Burns, in the *Times*. Last year in China two million people died from lack of food; this year it is expected to be over a million. Meantime, in Canada there has been more wheat than people could sell; in places, according to report, it has been burned for fuel. In Manchester there is cotton which cannot be sold, and consequent distress. If the wheat could have been got to the Chinese they would have lived; if they had lived they would have wanted clothes and Manchester could have sold her cotton.

The harm is due—so the World Economic Conference tells us, speaking with unanimous voice and unexampled authority—to dislocation; to a lack of co-ordination between producer and consumer, aggravated at every turn by tariffs and other artificial barriers. All over Europe people are artificially prevented from selling their produce; therefore they cannot buy; therefore, whole nations can-

not pay their way and are living on borrowed money which they can only repay by further borrowing. And the first and most obvious remedy, as economists of over fifty nations state in their Report, is to reduce tariffs throughout the world.

Meantime, most nations have been raising their tariffs. One finds in Europe, and to some extent in the rest of the world, two conflicting tendencies. There is a widespread struggling movement towards freedom of trade, notably strong even in the most protectionist nations. It is stronger than ever before in France, Germany, and Austria; it has come with something like a revolution of feeling in Czechoslovakia; it is strong in Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and the three Scandinavian countries. But it has the characteristic weaknesses of a movement based on knowledge and national conviction. It is strong among the intellectuals and among disinterested persons. It works and reasons to make the tariffs lower; but the rich groups whose trade is built on protective tariffs fight with all the passion of the struggle for life to keep them high.

The ways of the true Protectionist are strange. In the United States there has been distress for many years among the farmers of the West owing to the high prices caused by the industrial tariffs. It was generally agreed by all economists that the tariff must be lowered. The farmers were promised a lower tariff. A Commission sat to lower the tariff. It produced a project for a higher tariff coupled with certain special provisions for the benefit of the farmers. These provisions have now been struck out. The tariff now before Congress has been described by one of the coolest and most moderate of American journals as "a declaration of tariff war against the world" and the proceedings which led to it as "an orgy of greed." The *Times* now tells us that if the President dared to veto the tariff his action would be received with enthusiasm by public opinion, but that no one thinks such action possible. It has been much the same in Australia. Australia had fallen into very serious financial difficulties. A Commission, consisting almost entirely of believers in protection, was appointed to consider the situation, and recommended that a reduction of tariffs was essential to the recovery of the country. The Government struggled for a time between reason and the tug of interests, and then—increased the tariff! If we ask in bewilderment why governments act like this, first carefully finding out the right thing to do and then doing exactly the wrong thing, the answer is fairly plain. Protection is like addiction to drugs. It fills a country with unhealthy trades, living on artificial stimulants. Everyone knows that the dope is slowly poisoning them, but if you cut it off they will die.

Looking on at this strange conflict we have to realise that whatever may be the effect on other nations or groups it is for Great Britain an issue of life or death. If the world goes completely protectionist and the tariff walls are raised still higher, there is a possible future for the very large nations. None is really self-supporting; none can really flourish without foreign trade. Still, there may be some prosperity for the United States with its 120 millions, Russia with its 150, even for France, or at any rate for some large European unit. But for Great Britain there is no future at all. We shall be shut out from Europe, shut out from America, shut out from our own Dominions, and pretty certainly shut out by walls of at least equal height from India, China, and Japan. Even then, if Great Britain remains free trade, or rather returns to free trade, she will at least have an advantage over all protectionist countries in neutral markets, since she will have cheaper raw materials and a "most favoured nation clause"; but if Great Britain joins in the high tariff policy, one does not see how the population can be kept alive. It is thus a matter of life and death to us that the cause of free trade or freer trade should be victorious throughout the world. Only two things at present have prevented its success: one is the great difficulty in any protectionist country of the first step towards freedom; the suffering of the sickly trades that live by the tariffs or bounties; and the consequent increase of unemployment. The other is that the traditional champion of free trade throughout the world, Great Britain, has of late shown signs of betraying the cause.

Most people, including even Mr. Baldwin and Lord Beaverbrook, agree that tariffs throughout the world ought to be lowered, and that the larger the area open to free trade the better for everyone; but some people propose to pursue this desirable end by the paradoxical method of increasing our own tariffs. Mr. Baldwin wants tariffs as a "weapon" to bargain with, a threat to use against other nations to compel them to lower their walls. But neither the threat nor the weapon would be very formidable. In any war of tariffs we are bound to be beaten because we are so much less self-supporting than other nations, and so much more dependent on foreign trade. Every "weapon" which we used would hurt ourselves more than the enemy. Lord Beaverbrook proposes a scheme which he calls Empire Free Trade; but his only serious ally, Lord Melchett, admits that free trade between us and the Dominions is quite unattainable. It can only be a series of elaborate tariffs, rebates, export prohibitions, and preferences inside the Empire, combined with a general shutting off of trade outside. Neither of these plans can possibly lead to greater freedom in the movement of our own trade, much less to any general free movement through-

out the world. They could only lead to the isolation of certain national units—not economic units—from the rest of the world in the frail hope that, amid the general cessation of commerce, one might not be quite so miserable as the others.

What is the real solution? The solution, surely, is to think internationally and to act internationally? In one sense it is true that the traditional free trade policy of England, like the old Liberal policy of peace and non-intervention, was devised to meet a state of affairs that has passed away. Isolation is no longer possible. Peace remains the aim, free trade remains the aim; but as one cannot make sure of peace without the League of Nations, so one cannot set trade free from its trammels except by employing the full international machinery now at our disposal, for conference, for inquiry, and for agreement. This means following up the work of the Economic Conference, using the economic and financial committees of the League, and, in cases of sweating and unfair competition, the work of the International Labour Office. For any nation to attempt to solve its economic difficulties by merely shutting out the products of another is simply to reject the present machinery of negotiation and to fall back on the crude bludgeon-play of a past era. Protection not only diminishes trade when we all want trade increased. It makes the fatal error of transforming the competition between economic groups into a strife between nations. If there is not competition between two oil groups there may be some waste and some sharp practice, but there is little more. Companies are not armed. Bring the State in on one side or the other, and the strife becomes a strife between nations, with their national passions, their national newspapers, and at the back their guns.

Economic competition is becoming fiercer and harder. In the last few years more millions of human beings have died of famine than in any similar period of modern history. Some of the famines were due to dislocation; some, it is worth recalling, were due to the direct action of governments in prohibiting trade. When we talk of "economic competition" we should realise that we are near the bed-rock on which all civilisation rests, the struggle of the living creature to get food and not die.

In pure politics the nations have given up their absolute sovereignty and independence. We have agreed not to go to war; not to act as judges in our own cause; to bring our disputes before some mediatory or arbitral body. But in economics we are still in the state of international anarchy which led to the Great War. Any nation has the unchallenged right to do any injury to a neighbour's trade. It may prohibit, it may refuse necessary exports, it may play tricks with its commercial treaties so as to kill this trade and help that. It is all a "matter of domestic jurisdiction."

The foreigner has no right to protest. The League may not express any opinion. Yet such action may, in the future with the increasing tensivity of competition, easily become a direct cause of war. A tariff recently proposed in a certain country might well have been entitled "A Bill for Increasing Unemployment in Great Britain and elsewhere," but neither Great Britain nor any other nation has the right to say a word in criticism.

There is no obligation yet to consider other nations in our financial legislation; but there is at least the machinery at our disposal for doing so. The conventions drawn up in consequence of the Economic Conference have not so far been very drastic, and have had only a hesitating success. But the fact of the Conference is in itself of great importance. It means that civilised nations have begun to realise that their interests overlap and mingle; and that before passing legislation to impoverish its neighbours, every nation ought to hear what its neighbours have to say. The influence of such Conferences is great on those who take part in them, though slow to reach the great masses outside. I would say with some confidence that if the persons responsible for some of the recent high tariffs had been present at the Economic Conference they could not possibly have made such proposals.

As I look towards the future of our civilisation I see ahead only two causes that may bring it finally to ruin: one is another European War between Great Powers; the other is a general resort to Protection. And in essence these are not two causes, but one.

GILBERT MURRAY.

VOLUME VI OF THE BRITISH DOCUMENTS.

THE sixth and latest volume in the series of British Documents—so carefully and skilfully edited by Drs. Gooch and Temperley—takes us to the heart of the British-German contention before the war. It deals with the years 1908-12, and its main subjects are the naval competition and the now almost forgotten but interminable controversy about the Bagdad railway. The two things worked together in the brewing of mischief, but a little digression is necessary for the understanding of the part they played in the German scheme of policy and the British riposte to it.

I

The beginning was in 1890 when, shortly after the dismissal of Bismarck, the Emperor William II announced to the world that he was going on a "New Course." The expression caused much speculation at the time, but it meant, as the sequel proved, that he intended to break loose from the Bismarckian Continental Diplomacy and to make a bold bid for world possessions and sea-power. The "New Course" had two main branches, one the opening up to German influence and trade by railway construction of a continuous territory stretching through Austria and Turkey to the Persian Gulf, and the other the building of a great fleet which would ensure respect for German wishes and German policy in other parts of the world. To the German mind as to many other minds, commercial expansion was unthinkable without military and naval power behind it, and early in the day the young Emperor began to speak of having "the trident in his fist."

For the moment Europe smiled and thought it the indiscretion of rhetorical youth, but when presently it was followed up by gradually developing but evidently far-reaching schemes of naval construction, British statesmen began to think. They had watched the formation first of the Triple and then of the Dual Alliance, and, except for the temporary deviation of the Mediterranean understanding with the Triple Alliance in 1887, had held to the old policy of standing aloof, with perhaps a slight leaning to Germany. But in the last years of the century they were visibly shaken. They had come to the verge of war with France about Siam in 1894 and the Nile Valley in 1898; the Kruger telegram and the Boer War had inflamed their relations with Germany; the intentions of Russia in Asia and the Far East were a chronic enigma and anxiety. To be without a friend in this hostile world, and to live with the disturbing thought of a possible coalition against them

seemed less certainly the way of wisdom than in former years, and in 1898, if not earlier, Lord Salisbury, Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne, and Mr. Balfour seem to have reached the conclusion that they must make friends with one or other of the European combinations.

Their first thoughts were an understanding, or even an alliance with Germany, and as we look back, the rebuff in 1899 of Mr. Chamberlain's overtures, after they had seemingly been invited by the Germans, stands out as one of the decisive moments in pre-war history. The personal details of this affair are dark and complicated, but the short explanation of it seems to have been that the popular hostility to us on account of the Boer War scared Kaiser and Chancellor from pursuing the line which, left to themselves, they would probably have taken. But the choice was decisive, and having rejected the British overture, they now made the utmost use of anti-British feeling to prepare German opinion, and convert the Reichstag to the far-reaching scheme of naval construction which was launched in 1900. It was in these years that the German naval plans took on the positive anti-British complexion, which in spite of all the arguments—of which there are many examples in this volume—advanced by Germans to prove their innocence, they never lost, and never could lose.

Having been repulsed in Germany, and with the German plans now definitely before them, British statesmen next began to look to France, and in 1904 Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne concluded the Anglo-French Convention. But their thought was still—and it remained the thought of most British statesmen up to the outbreak of the Great War—that an arrangement with France settling amicably the various causes of quarrel—Egypt, Morocco, Siam, etc.—which had threatened the peace of the two countries was entirely different from the binding engagements which held the partners in the European alliances together, and that it ought not to be and could not be construed as hostile to Germany and the German group. In this they showed a certain *naïveté*, which though undoubtedly honest, was incredible to sophisticated Germans brought up in the school of Bismarck, and not easily understood by the French, who also thought in terms of continental politics. Gradually the legend spread in Germany that Great Britain, under this innocent guise, was, in an insidious and Machiavellian way, planning the "encirclement" of Germany; and, since the quarrel between King Edward and his nephew, the Kaiser, was notorious in Europe, and the conduct of the British Constitutional Sovereign was very imperfectly understood in other countries, the King was supposed to be the arch-plotter in this scheme.

That legend ought to be destroyed by this volume, which shows

the King to have been a brief, quiet, and infrequent commentator on the proceedings of his Ministers, in striking contrast to the rash, impulsive, and vehement interventions of the Kaiser and his claims to be the author of policy, shown in the German Documents. But in general it may be said that there were two parallel misunderstandings on the British and German sides respectively during these years. On the British side was the failure to understand that in German eyes (and indeed according to the accepted continental standards) the British-French Entente was not merely an innocent settlement of Colonial differences but a momentous change in the balance of European power; on the German side, the failure to understand that the building of a great German fleet, however legitimate or necessary it might seem from the German point of view, was bound to be regarded by the British as a threat to their safety, and even to their existence.

II

Volume VI of the British Documents shows British and German statesmen in the meshes of this double misunderstanding, the British trying in vain to induce the Germans to abate their naval programmes, and the Germans trying in vain to detach the British from the Franco-Russian group. By this time their mutual suspicions had become deeply embedded in the policies of both countries. The Germans had undertaken a series of testing operations in Morocco and elsewhere, which were extremely puzzling to the British, but well understood in Europe as moves in the game as it had hitherto been played between the leading continental groups. They wished to ascertain whether under pressure we would hold to our friends; they took advantage of every opportunity to drive wedges between us, and threw our Foreign Office into a state of alarm lest any gesture of friendship we might make to Germany should be used to suggest to the French that we were going back on our word to France. There could hardly have been a worse way of dealing with Sir Edward Grey, with whom loyalty to friends was a fixed principle, and his response was a firm adherence to both the letter and the spirit of the Anglo-French Convention. Again and again he repeats that he desires nothing so much as friendship with Germany, but that he cannot purchase it by concessions at the expense of France. Reading the comments to despatches of the expert staff of the Foreign Office, and especially those of Sir Eyre Crowe, Sir Charles Hardinge, and Sir Arthur Nicolson, I think it must be said that these shrewd and able men pushed their suspicions of German policy to rather extreme lengths. It is evident that they at all events did not regard their Chief as a Machiavelli. They thought of him rather as a too simple man, who needed constantly

to be warned against the traps and stratagems which he might unwarily walk into. Probably no harm would have been done if some of these admonitions had been disregarded, and the risk of civility being misinterpreted, which weighed so heavily with these advisers, been taken.

Whether any civility would have made any difference in the long run unless the Germans had been willing to forgo their naval programmes seems more than ever doubtful after reading the record in this volume. That strongly endorses the familiar conclusion that the naval competition was the one fatal obstacle to Anglo-German understanding. All else could be negotiated or explained away, but no diplomacy could get round the facts of German shipbuilding. At particular moments they might be in dispute, but taking them in the large, there could be no doubt of their formidable character. Count Metternich, the German Ambassador in London, while loyally backing his own Government in London, put the British case, as we now know from the German Documents, courageously and unceasingly in Berlin, but he was unable to move the Emperor and Tirpitz.

It is no doubt true that at certain moments when he thought Great Britain was becoming alarmed, Admiral Tirpitz slowed down the pace of German shipbuilding; and to the end he blamed civilian statesmen for forcing an issue before he was ready. But from 1906 onwards he was extraordinarily persistent in refusing to abate one jot of his programmes, and in the later years his belief that relations with England would actually be improved, if a wholesome dread of the big German navy could only be instilled into her, became almost an infatuation. This, he kept repeating, was the argument, and the only argument that England understood. Really to see Tirpitz at work we must turn to the German documents, and especially to the profoundly interesting Volume 28 of the *Grosse Politik* which the English student should read side by side with the British sixth volume. I would choose as specially characteristic the report* of the Conference which took place in Berlin in June 1909 after the German Navy Bill of 1908 had been countered by the eight-dreadnought programme of the British Parliament. It was convened by the Chancellor, Prince Bülow, who had brought Metternich from London, and among those present were Bethmann-Hollweg, the State Secretary for Home Affairs; Tirpitz; von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff; von Müller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet; and von Schön, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. In spite of the disapproval of the Emperor, which had been strongly conveyed to him, Metternich put his case firmly and courageously. He was greatly dejected by the news which had just reached him

* *Grosse Politik*. Vol. XXVIII, p. 168.

that a new Naval Bill was in contemplation for the year 1912, and pleaded that it was contrary to the assurances which the Emperor had instructed him to give the English that there was no intention of going beyond the existing programme. It was not, he insisted, the commercial rivalry of Germany (which was merely an inconvenience to the English), but the threat of the German fleet, that was at the root of the disagreement between the two Powers. Tirpitz knew better. He was sure it was the commercial rivalry and not the fleet which was the trouble; he was sure that, if they continued to build, they would actually improve the relations with England. He was ready for an understanding on a 3:4 basis (which he knew to be unacceptable) but for nothing else. In any case the approach should be from England, and there should be no concession without a military and political equivalent.

All the rest, Prince Bülow himself, Bethmann-Hollweg, even von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff, were for some sort of understanding, but in face of Tirpitz's opposition the Conference broke up without any conclusion being reached, and backed by the Emperor, he had his way. A fragment of dialogue in the course of this Conference has a curious poignancy in the light of after-events:

Admiral von Tirpitz: In my opinion the danger zone in our relations with England will be passed in from five to six years, say in 1915, after the widening of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal and the completion of the fortifications of Heligoland. Even in two years the danger will be considerably less.

The Chancellor (Prince Bülow): That is all very fine, but the question must be repeated, how are we to get through the present danger?

III

The "danger zone" was constantly moving forward. It had been 1904-6; it was now 1909-15. It is an infirmity of the naval mind, which we have seen at many Naval Conferences, that it is apparently unable to grasp the principle of the relativity of armaments. It never seemed to occur to Tirpitz that Britain would build as Germany built, and that whether in 1906, 1911, or 1915, the two countries, after enormous effort, expenditure, and friction, would be relatively to each other in the same position as before; and that in the meantime each demand for new expenditure with the attendant explanations and recriminations must drive them farther and farther apart, and throw the British more and more into the arms of the French. On these terms the "danger zone" could never pass; it was bound to become more and more dangerous. The Emperor keeps repeating that "the English are mad"—mad to be alarmed at the German fleet and to reject his assurances of its

purely defensive and innocent character. Unfortunately, in a competition of armaments intentions are of little consequence. Circumstances change, benevolence becomes hostility, and the force which may have been prepared for defence does equally well for offence. No one can tell. The preamble of the principal Navy Bill and the proclaimed intention of Kaiser and Admiral to build such a fleet as would make it too dangerous for the strongest fleet to attack it (and thereby induce Great Britain to adopt a respectful attitude to Germany) could only increase suspicion. Such a fleet, if Britain had no other friends in the world, might either strike in decisively at some moment when she was at grips with another Power, or in combination with other fleets encompass her downfall or humiliation. The insistence on British neutrality as the price of even the small relief of "retardation" gave a definite shape to these thoughts. The vision of Germany conquering France, possessing herself of Belgium and the Channel ports, and possibly the French fleet, while Britain was compelled to look on, became uncomfortably real. It seemed more than ever imperative for us to keep the friends we had and to pay the necessary price.

Criticism of British diplomacy in these years has generally taken the form of a simple dilemma. It is said that British Ministers should either have told the country that war was imminent and devoted themselves to raising a conscript army; or have cut loose from the French Entente and put themselves in the position of remaining spectators of the coming conflict. The critics have the advantage of knowing that war broke out on August 4th, 1914, no sooner and no later. There never was a moment when the situation could have presented itself in these simple terms to those in charge of affairs at the time. To Ministers at the time there was always a danger but never a certainty of war, and to treat the danger as a certainty was to make it certain. To add a conscript army to the British navy would, in their opinion, even if the British people could have been brought to consent to it, have been a sensational stroke which would almost certainly have precipitated a conflict, before the conscript army was ready. On the other hand to go back to the policy of isolation which Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Balfour had thought too dangerous in 1904 seemed unthinkable in the aggravated circumstances of the later years, and it would not in any case have provided for the invasion of Belgium, which was a highly probable incident of any European conflict. The alternative, and, as it seemed at the time, the only alternative, was to feel the way, to try all means of abating the naval competition, but to be prepared to the extent of maintaining the superiority of the navy and adding to it the expeditionary force with the Territorial Army behind it. This seemed the characteristic British

mean between standing aloof and plunging into continental militarism. But there were great difficulties. Each crisis in which co-operation with France on questions arising out of the Entente had to be contemplated, required "military conversations" which, in spite of all efforts to keep them secret, were apt to leak out and increase the friction with Germany. The Government might insist that they were hypothetical, but ardent soldiers, like the late Sir Henry Wilson, thought of all hypotheses as realities, and plans laid on the assumption that two forces would act together certainly increased the probability that they would so act, if the occasion arose. These are the inevitables of a system in which the play of forces governs policy, and no Government can stand clear of them while this system prevails.

These documents help us materially to get back into the atmosphere in which things actually happened before the war, and to correct the judgments which come after the event. All manner of opinions may be held about the handling of this or that event, but in this very devious and perplexing world British policy looks simple, continuous, and straightforward. It approaches the Germans again and again about their naval programme; the search for the formula which shall satisfy the Germans without betraying the French goes on continuously (except during the months of the Agadir crisis) from the time that Bethmann-Hollweg became Chancellor until its final failure after the Haldane Mission, which convinced British Ministers that nothing less than their secession from the French Entente would secure even the retardation of German shipbuilding. Even then, the effort to come to terms was renewed on colonial ground.

IV

A word remains to be said about the Bagdad Railway which is the other principal subject of this volume. It is one of the ironies of history that this vexed question proved capable of settlement at the end—in that brief Indian summer before the war when the hopeful were beginning to congratulate themselves that the atmosphere of suspicion between England and Germany was at last being dissipated. In the light of what has since happened, it all seems very far away, yet it has a real importance in any estimate of the forces at work during these years. The construction of a German-controlled route through Austrian and Turkish territory to the Persian Gulf—the parallel objective to the construction of the big navy in the Kaiser's "new course"—had far-reaching consequences in European policy. It frightened both Britain and Russia, required Germany to cultivate an ardent friendship with Turkey, and made her relations with Austria very near those of dependence

at critical moments. This in the end was one of the great fatalities, for with her course thus set Germany could never afford to keep the strong hand on Vienna which a sound policy required, and being pledged to Austrian policy in the Balkans, she was bound sooner or later to come into collision with Russia. On the "new course" Germany could no longer be the "honest broker."

Bismarck was an unscrupulous player at the game of real politics, but he had certain rules which made it relatively safe. One was to keep Austrian policy within bounds, so that the risk of a collision between Germany and Russia should be reduced to the minimum. Another was that England was to be cultivated in proportion as Russia became cool, and that never in any case should the hostility of both be risked at the same time. A third was that France should be encouraged to gratify her ambition for Colonial expansion, and so be tempted to divert her forces and energies from Europe to overseas regions. All three thoroughly sound maxims for a skilful manipulator of real politics. But William II and his advisers flouted each in turn, and very often all three at the same time. They had passionate arguments to prove that they were only doing what they had a right to do, and what their neighbours, especially Great Britain, had done before them. It was true enough, but the British position had been built up by centuries of effort, and Britain had no army which could threaten the homelands of her neighbours. The neighbours of Germany argued that with a great fleet added to her invincible army there would be no limit to her power in Europe, Asia, and Africa. It may be said that the fear was overwrought, or that it was not worth while to resist her at the immense cost and sacrifice of the Great War. But the fears were genuine, and in a fighting world a great Power can only submit after defeat in war. The hope for the future is not that statesmen will behave differently if these conditions are re-established, but that Europe will not again be organised as a fighting world.

J. A. SPENDER.

THE DISUNITED STATES OF EUROPE.

WHATEVER may be the fate of the project of a federation of the European States which M. Briand has now put forward in detail in the name of France, the personality of that statesman and his valuable services to the cause of international conciliation are certain to ensure for it a sympathetic reception at the hands of the Governments and nations concerned. The germinal idea, of course, originated neither with M. Briand nor with France. For many years prior to the war the formation of a Central European Customs Union, with Germany as its pivot, had been a leading article in the programme of the Pan-German League, and the proposal received increased prominence after the publication of the still-born London Resolutions. The issue of the war shattered that ambition and left the Pan-German movement itself discredited, and its organisation reduced to an enfeebled rump of die-hard obscurantists disowned and deserted by most of their earlier but now disillusioned associates.

Soon after the execution of the Treaty of Saint-Germain the Austrian publicist Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, concerned for the rehabilitation of his hardly-treated country, appropriated and expanded the idea. Convinced that neither dismembered Austria nor the succession States could hope to flourish except as integral parts of a great economic complex, he proposed that the States of Europe, exclusive of Great Britain and Russia, should be federated for economic and fiscal purposes, somewhat on the principle of the North German Customs Union of 1867-70. Incidentally, he hoped that by such combination the increasing pressure of American competition would be met more effectively. For some time Count Coudenhove carried on an active, and in Central Europe successful, agitation for his scheme; and in the interval a number of books for and against it appeared in Germany, the main point of disagreement being the proposed exclusion of Great Britain.

M. Briand came upon the scene in consequence of the practical failure of the International Economic Conference which met in Geneva in 1927 for the purpose of devising ways and means of extricating Europe from the morass of economic disorder in which extravagant nationalisms, rival industrial ambitions, and a series of insensate tariff wars had landed it. Although the conference frankly recognised that the only hope of recovery lay in the pursuance of a more enlightened fiscal policy, based on a reciprocal give-and-take principle, the difficulties in the way of translating this principle into practice proved insuperable, and the position continued to grow worse. It was in the hope of driving the Governments of Europe into action where they would not be led

that M. Briand last September convened the surprise conference of European delegates to the League of Nations then assembled in Geneva, at which he expounded in broad outlines a bold scheme of European federation, and received a formal commission to work out the necessary details and report in due course. That in brief is the origin of the "Memorandum on the organisation of a régime of federal union in Europe," which was issued on May 17th to the Governments of all European States affiliated to the League of Nations, and has since been communicated for information to the non-European members of that body.

Since M. Briand made his first overtures on this subject there have been changes of Government in France, with the result that while he was then Prime Minister he is now a member of M. Tardieu's Cabinet. It is, therefore, not difficult to believe that, as French newspapers assure us, the scheme now proposed is rather Tardieu's than his own; and on questions of international relations it is unfortunately true that Tardieu, who carries on the Clemenceau tradition, represents the dominant French spirit more faithfully than does his generous colleague, the Foreign Minister. There is certainly much in the Memorandum that needs elucidation, and even much that will have to undergo drastic revision if the project it embodies is to have any chance of realisation. Perhaps the best service which a friend of international conciliation can perform at this stage is to approach and frankly examine the project not from the standpoint of its French authors, but from that of our own country and the Empire, in so far as their interests may not coincide with those of France or of the Continent in general.

It would be a serious mistake to allow prejudice and an unreasoning preference for "splendid isolation" to deter us from international collaboration in economic and political matters, so long as it is of the right kind, pacific in purpose and free from disingenuous manoeuvring. Most of the ills from which the world is suffering at the present time are attributable to exaggerations of nationalism in one form or another, and in the abatement of these and the cultivation of wider and less egoistic outlooks lies the only hope of any permanent healing of the nations. Such collaboration as is indicated is perfectly consistent with the conviction that for Great Britain and the Empire the only policy of prudence and safety is one of resolute abstention for the future from European or other political engagements which might impose, even potentially, military liabilities of any kind upon ourselves or others.

The main principles of the Memorandum may be summarised in a few words. We are told—and many of us must have learned with a certain degree of surprise—that the twenty-seven European Governments represented on the League of Nations have shown "a

quite definite recognition of a common responsibility in face of the menace which exists to the peace of Europe, from the political as well as from the economic and social points of view, as a result of the unco-ordinated state of the general economic position of Europe." In order to give effect to this new-born consciousness of reciprocal obligation these Governments are now invited to organise their countries in a politico-economic union in virtue of a "symbolic pact" which shall "proclaim the principle of European moral unity and solemnly consecrate the solidarity established between European States." This federation of the nations is to be "realised upon the plane of their absolute sovereignty and complete independence." Like the League of Nations the federation is to be located at Geneva, and to function through organs analogous to those of the League, viz. a European Conference for legislation (answering to the League's Assembly), a Political Committee for executive purposes (answering to the Council), and a Secretariat. To details we shall come later.

The question of Great Britain's adhesion to an organisation of this character will necessarily be determined in the main by its probable effect upon the League of Nations and upon the Empire—particularly the relations between the home country and the Dominions. Take first the obvious and serious danger of rivalry with and possible injury to the League. The authors of the Memorandum admit the force of this objection by the pains which they take to meet it. They assure us that "there is no question of constituting a European group outside the League of Nations." Nevertheless, the federation is to be a perfectly self-contained and autonomous body, fully staffed on the model of the League, subject to no suggested limitations of its functions, and able to take on any question "separate action more immediate and direct than can be expected from the League." If an organisation so constituted were to be worth its salt it would have to assert itself vigorously, continuously seeking new opportunities of activity and influence; and who dare predict that in so doing it might not jeopardise the work and even the existence of the League?

The Memorandum appeals for justification to Article 21 of the Covenant, which affirms that "nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." Only by a violent exaggeration of the meaning of words, however, could this provision be held to cover the creation of a supplementary organisation whose activities would be bound to overlap, and might even conflict with, those of the larger and more authoritative body. Indeed, the very questions which are specified as suitable for early

action by the proposed European union, viz. those relating to tariffs, trusts, communications, labour, and hygiene, are questions which the League of Nations has already taken in hand, and with some of them it would have made greater progress if all the European Governments had been equally willing to give a helping hand. But we are told further that "a régime of continued solidarity"—another of the pretty phrases with which the Memorandum abounds—would facilitate "immediate contact between the peoples (i.e. the Governments) of Europe for the purpose of studying, discussing, and settling the problems which may concern them in common." But how many are the problems in which the nations of Europe have vital interests entirely different from those of the other States in the League? It is doubtful whether there is one of them which would not be dealt with more successfully with the League's assistance and authority than without it.

The idea of grouping the States and nations of the world on the continental or geographical principle is not only artificial and unscientific, but altogether obsolete in these days of rapid communication and growing world intercourse. We read in the Memorandum that it is a defect of the League of Nations that the ethnical complexity of its constitution continually makes difficult any real unity of sentiment and action. That statement can only be accepted subject to serious qualifications, and it is quite inconsistent with the fact that it has been the studied endeavour of the European Powers hitherto to interest the non-European countries as much as possible in the affairs of the League, even to the extent of giving some of them a prominence disproportionate to their political importance. Far from the interests of Europe having suffered from neglect, however, the League has done little else than confer and legislate upon European questions, and where the result has not been commensurate with the efforts made the responsibility has invariably lain with certain of the continental States themselves. And even if it has been difficult to obtain a working consensus on isolated subjects in the past, is there reason to suppose that it would necessarily be different with a miniature League of European nations? If the obstacle to such unity resides in ethnical incompatibilities and antagonisms, are not these almost more conspicuous in our own discordant and cantankerous continent than in any other part of the civilised world? If solidarity could be sought only on the ethnical principle Europe would need to organise itself not in one but in at least three federations, according as its peoples fall into the Teutonic, Latin, and Slavonic groups. Directly we begin to hunt for "ethnical affinities," profound cultural and ethical differentiations come also into view. Bearing the foregoing ethnical division in mind, let the reader ask himself which of the three

groups named stands on the whole more constantly for harmony, stability, legality, and orderly government, and which for restlessness, turbulence, and proneness to revolutionary changes. The truth is that in race, language, culture, religion, political organisation and maturity, and general social development there is in Europe less homogeneity, less unity and solidarity, consecrated or otherwise, than in any of the other continents.

The organisation of Governments and nations on the principle of continental incidence would mean for the League of Nations irretrievable moral impoverishment, and to that extent the cause of real and permanent world conciliation would be thrown back. It is no exaggeration to say that the very diversity of its constitution has been one of the secrets of the League's past success. Because the League is so comprehensive, and composed of so many different and countervailing elements, particularist sentiment and sectional interests, though never entirely absent, have passed more and more under control and been compelled to subordinate themselves to the general welfare. Those who doubt this have only to think back to the early years of the League's activity, and compare the arrogant pretensions advanced then by certain powerful European States with the more modest and reasonable attitude which they wisely maintain to-day.

Again, in the matter of administrative efficiency the fact that the two organisations would often be required to deal with the selfsame questions opens up awkward possibilities of confusion and conflict. Anyone who knows to what impossible situations the existence side by side of the late Imperial Diet of Germany and the Diet of Prussia, practically manned by the same Ministers, and the difficulties which continue even now under the Republic owing to the fact that Prussia continues to be an *imperium in imperio*, will easily appreciate the force of this objection. And if a brand-new European agglomeration of States were created, where would the principle stop? It would assuredly give a new lease of life to the languishing Pan-American and Pan-Asiatic movements, and not improbably it would set aboriginal Africa an example which would be too attractive to be disregarded. But the world is not safe for continental grouping of this kind: it comes either too soon or, which is likelier, too late. It might have been useful at one time as a first step to a broader synthesis of political thought, but we have already got beyond the parochial view of human relationships. The effect of the Great War has been to carry mankind forward by a single bound to the ideal of world organisation and collaboration, and the urgent task of our day is to develop and apply that ideal in practice, impelled by the logic of necessity and heedless of the logic of abstract theories. Nations have to learn

that only by getting out of themselves and cultivating the world mind, world conceptions, outlooks, sympathies, can they hope to live the more abundant life of reason which is within reach of all of them, small as well as great.

If we are to talk of "symbolical gestures," let us in so doing point to the League of Nations. That true symbol of a new "moral unity," that visible token of "consecrated solidarity," to borrow the flowery language of the Memorandum, is the one uncontentious legacy of the war. It is more—it is to-day the most important single guarantee of stability and peace in a still distracted world, a guarantee more potent and trustworthy than all the peace pacts which have been concluded since 1919, since it alone has made these possible. To do anything that could discredit and weaken the League would be to harm and wrong humanity at large.

Even if the organisation contemplated by the French Government were entirely innocuous, and involved no menace to the League of Nations, the difficulties in the way of Great Britain's adhesion to it would not be removed. Whatever the decision adopted, the home country and the Dominions would need to be of one mind, joining together or remaining outside together. While, however, it is improbable that the continental Powers would agree to recognise the entire Empire as a unit, it is equally improbable that the Dominions, with their strong antipathy to further European entanglements of any kind, would accept inclusion even if offered. In that event how far would Great Britain alone have liberty of choice? Unless some type of Customs Union could be devised which, while doing full justice to the special conditions and interests of the British Commonwealth, would satisfy the expectations of the continental States, that liberty would be non-existent. No doubt this country would be able to count on a cordial welcome in the proposed federation provided it were willing to enter unhampered by imperial preferences limiting its bargaining capacity, and agreed to forgo the special advantages which its exports now enjoy in the Dominion markets.

To make these renunciations, however, would be not merely impolitic but impossible; public opinion at home would rightly forbid it, and the very suggestion of it would send a shudder throughout the length and breadth of the Empire. The present is no time for making rash experiments into the tensile strength of either the economic or the sentimental ties which bind the Dominions to the old country and it to them. There has been much discussion of late regarding the limits of the Dominions' right of independent action. Perhaps the less that question is talked and argued about the better. Events will follow their own course, regardless of the theories of jurisconsults, and to dictate to the

Britains across the seas, or even to admonish them too pedagogically, would be the surest way of inviting them to leap the traces. Here, then, is for us the crux of the European federation problem. The fact that the Dominions would not be qualified to enter the union, and would be unwilling to enter even if they were able, implies that the home country could not do it even if it wished.

But the gravest defect of the project as it stands remains to be stated. Behind all the fine talk of "moral unity" and "consecrated solidarity," and all the professed concern for the settlement and material recovery of the Continent, is the old hankering of France for security. Let the proposed organisation be called what it may—union, federation, or "regional *entente*"—what France wants is a grand alliance of European States, which shall guarantee the integrity of the treaties of peace and the existing territorial status in Europe, though the arrangements to be so maintained are the main cause of the insecurity from which not only France but Europe and the whole world still suffer.

That this interpretation of the Memorandum is neither perverse nor fantastic is proved by the fact that it is the one which was accepted from the first, and as a matter of course, by leading French journalists, who may be assumed to know the minds of their statesmen better than we do. To leave the matter in no doubt it is implicit in the Memorandum itself, for this speaks of the necessity of "subordinating the economic problem to the political," and of giving to Europe that "political union upon which the all-important question of security depends." Of still greater significance is the fact that the Memorandum points to the Little Entente as an illustration of the union which the States of Europe as a whole are invited to join. Bismarck, who was no mean authority on alliances, saw the ideal alliance as a "*coalition à trois*." Never did his gigantic and fertile brain compass the ambition of a coalition comprehending twenty-seven European States. It is safe to say that a political project of such magnitude and with the purposes intended will long remain in its present documentary form.

If the present writer, who would not admit lack of sympathy with the principle of international co-operation to the fullest practicable extent, has accurately stated and diagnosed the issues which the French Memorandum raises, there can be little uncertainty as to the course which this country will be compelled to follow. A few days ago an influential Paris journal (the *Volonté*) which is accepted as the mouthpiece of M. Tardieu asserted that France is determined to press forward this project "with or without England," and as if to emphasise its indifference to this country's adherence, it added the remark—somewhat wanting in taste and tact, considering the great and manifold sacrifices for France made by this country—

"England is really the conquered nation of the war." If these words afford a true indication of French sentiment, they should make our decision all the easier, for no proud nation will be willing to descend to the level of the gate-crasher.

While, however, adhesion to the pact envisaged by the authors of the Memorandum is flatly impossible, that fact does not imply that the British attitude should be a purely negative one. In spite of the prevalence in our midst of much short-sighted prejudice against international organisation and collaboration, there undoubtedly exists a large body of intelligent public opinion which would gladly see this country co-operate in the conclusion of a comprehensive European agreement, designed simply to put an end to the present tariff warfare and the resultant economic chaos, to cheapen and otherwise facilitate transport, and to remove or abate other hindrances to freer commercial intercourse, subject to the clear understanding that no interference with our economic relations with the Dominions and the rest of the Empire could be tolerated. In the event of the continental States adopting a form of organisation unacceptable to this country, the British attitude to it might still be that of the United States in relation to the League of Nations—not membership or the assumption in advance of any definite commitments whatever, but a sympathetic independence allowing of voluntary active co-operation in matters of common interest, in so far as such co-operation could be shown to be in harmony with strict fidelity to the League of Nations and its purposes.

WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON.

the ring for her in the Russo-Japanese war. She came spontaneously to our assistance in 1914. British and Japanese interests do not clash in the Far East and there is no reason why they should in the future. Nor did the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921 increase the necessity for defensive measures in the Far East. The Quadruple Pacific Treaty of the same year, which solemnly bound Great Britain, Japan, the United States of America, and France to respect each other's insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific, eliminated the only possible cause of war, namely an attack on British possessions, and is a strong guarantee of peace. And independently of all these Pacts and Treaties, Japan's political and economic interests are centred in Korea, Manchuria, and North China, and there is no reason to suspect her of territorial ambitions to the southward.

We should certainly find it extremely difficult to protect places like Hong Kong and Borneo if Japan did attack them, but there is little likelihood of such an attack. The risk of it must be accepted. If we try to be strong everywhere, not only shall we ruin ourselves and be strong nowhere but we may provoke the very wars we wish to guard against. Our West Indian possessions are exposed to American attack, but we do not build a base at Bermuda or Jamaica. From the purely military point of view the American-Canadian frontier involves considerable risk, but its defence would not increase the security of the British Empire. The truth of the matter is that a section of naval opinion has been fostering the idea of war with Japan whilst the Government has been signing Peace Pacts and summoning conferences for the reduction of armaments. The lack of co-ordination between our defence and foreign policies was ingenuously admitted by Mr. Amery who said that "Singapore was a piece of pure strategy unconnected with policy."

The Singapore scheme is partly explained by the fact that it originated in 1919 at a time when England had hardly recovered her pre-war sanity. A huge machine was running. It could not stop. The old enemy had been destroyed. A new one had to be found. The Navy chose Japan without even consulting the Foreign Office or Imperial General Staff, which are the only Government Departments competent to advise on the tendencies of Japanese foreign policy. Singapore, like the French Plan XVII and the Dardanelles Campaign, was settled without thorough examination or discussion. The repressive and bureaucratic organisation which grew up during the war helped to stifle criticism and obscure the fundamental defects of the scheme.

According to Mr. Bridgeman "those who are against Singapore are against the Navy." But naval opinion is not infallible on the question of bases. In 1906 the Admiralty commenced the con-

struction of a great dockyard at Rosyth which was to serve as the fleet base for a blockade of the Heligoland Bight in the event of war with Germany. When the hour struck, Rosyth was found to be in the wrong place and the fleet proceeded to the unprotected harbour of Scapa Flow where it lay exposed to submarine attack. In the vast spaces of the Pacific Ocean there is more room for similar errors and they would not be so easily remedied.

Failure to differentiate between dockyard bases like Portsmouth and strategical anchorages such as Scapa Flow partly accounts for the Singapore muddle. There has been a great deal of loose talk about the "strategical" importance of Singapore. It has been advertised as an essential link in the chain of Imperial communications, the very centre and pivot of our scattered units of Empire, etc. Even if these catch-phrases were true, they do not constitute an argument for building a dockyard at Singapore. The principal requirements of a dockyard base are security from attack and industrial resources, whereas the decisive factor in a strategical anchorage is its position relatively to one's own or the enemy's object.

Another important factor is that the British Navy will probably always be in a position of numerical inferiority in the Pacific, where approximate equality can only be ensured by permanently stationing two-thirds of the British Navy in that sea. But in the event of war other European Powers would probably be involved and, even if they were not, the resultant tension would prevent the dispatch of the whole fleet to the Far East. Under modern conditions our natural spheres of control are the approaches to Europe, the Cape, Australian Waters and to a much lesser extent the Indian Ocean. We cannot openly challenge the control of the China Seas or Western Atlantic any more than we could the Baltic during the late war, though we could no doubt in those areas retain considerable power of attack. In these circumstances, the main factor governing the location of a British repair base in the Pacific is security from attack. The fact that Port Arthur, once the Russian base in the Far East, was not secure paralysed the Russian Navy and was directly responsible for the destruction of one Russian fleet and the capture of another. And yet Port Arthur was a natural fortress, while Singapore certainly is not. Port Arthur had a garrison of 45,000 men and 500 guns and was connected with Russia by rail. Singapore is separated by thousands of miles of sea from British centres of population and supply. Various anchorages in the vicinity of Singapore could be used by an attacking force and unless the new base were defended by a large garrison, probably about 40,000 first-class troops with the necessary

artillery and air defences, it would run grave risk of capture.

Question after question has been asked in the House of Commons as to the proposed strength of the garrison, but this crucial point is always evaded. After seven years' work it is still in the air. Of course our small voluntary army cannot provide the requisite force, and it looks as if the Government committed itself to the base before the General Staff had investigated the practicability of defence. The whole question will probably be shirked on the plea that aircraft can prevent the disembarkation of an attacking force, but aircraft can be countered by aircraft and the belligerent that is nearest Singapore can concentrate a superiority of aircraft in that area. Incidentally the climate and terrible monotony of a place like Singapore are quite unsuitable for a large white garrison.

Australia is the only place in the Pacific that can offer the necessary security and industrial resources for a dockyard base. Sydney in New South Wales is one of the finest natural harbours in the world. It has extensive docks, fuel supplies, and ship-building and repairing plant. It only requires a large floating dock to make it into a first-class repair and supply port. Fremantle in Western Australia is another excellent harbour which will eventually develop into a great commercial port. It could be made into a first-class repair base at a fraction of the cost of Singapore with the added advantage of being secure from attack.

The wasteful and extravagant policy of building purely naval dockyards in every possible theatre of operations instead of utilising existing commercial resources must be condemned as unwise. Rosyth which was constructed at enormous expense to meet the contingency of a war with Germany now lies derelict and deserted. We could perfectly well have done without it, just as we can do without Singapore. H.M.S. *Marlborough*, the only battleship in urgent need of docking after Jutland, made for the Tyne where she was repaired. Fremantle is nearer the probable scene of a fleet action than Singapore, because a battle is more likely to centre round the Colombo-Australian than the Singapore-China trade routes. Similarly Sydney is more conveniently situated if hostile operations took the form of raids on New Guinea or Australian territory.

Another objection to the Singapore base is the obsolescence of the monster battleship which it is primarily designed to accommodate. The probability is that no more will be built and that the majority of the existing ones will be scrapped within the next fifteen years. The Washington Treaty limited the size of the battleship to 35,000 tons. At Geneva the British delegates suggested a reduction to 30,000 tons and at the London Conference proposed a still further reduction to 25,000 tons. In the meantime all new construction

is stopped until 1935 when a further Conference will be called to consider the question. The existing docks at Singapore will take moderate-sized battleships and one may well ask whether it is necessary to construct new ones for a type of ship which may have disappeared in a few years' time. If the new docks are built they will not be kept empty. We shall probably maintain a squadron of battleships or battle-cruisers in the Far East in order to justify this naval white elephant. Not only would the division of our battle fleet be a serious strategical blunder, but it would still further reduce the work of the home dockyards and increase unemployment at home for the benefit of Chinese coolie labour at Singapore.

The next question for consideration is the strategical advantages and disadvantages of a base at Singapore. The power of surprise and evasion on which the success of a numerically weaker fleet depends is sacrificed by reliance on a fixed base. It would be dangerous to base such a fleet at Singapore where it would probably be blockaded or its fuel supplies cut off if it proceeded to sea. Faced with a similar situation in 1914, Von Spee wisely abandoned Tsingtao and fulfilled a more useful purpose by dispensing with the use of a fixed base.

Another serious objection to Singapore as a base of operation is that reinforcements from Europe would have to pass through the Malacca Straits, the narrow part of which is about 150 miles long with the navigable channel varying from six to twenty-five miles in width. There are easily-defended anchorages on the Sumatran side of the Straits capable of accommodating the whole Japanese fleet, which assisted with mines and submarines could make the passage to Singapore a very hazardous operation similar to that which prevented the British fleet entering the Baltic during the late war. At first sight Singapore appears to be well situated for the protection of British shipping bound to or from Hong Kong, the Philippines, China, and Japan. As, however, this trade would have to shut down almost entirely owing to the proximity of Japan to its Northern terminals, this advantage is more imaginary than real. There has been much talk of the value and volume of British shipping passing through Singapore, but it contains neither food-stuffs nor essential raw materials, and its cessation would not be a matter of crucial importance.

Nor could a fleet based on Singapore offer any protection to the really important trade passing through the Indian Ocean to or from Australia, India, Ceylon, etc. Singapore is about 2,500 miles from South Australia, 1,500 from Calcutta, 1,600 from Colombo, and 1,300 from the nearest point on the Colombo-Melbourne route. Raiding ships and squadrons could reach the Australian, Indian, and Ceylon focal areas via the Sunda Straits and other channels

without going near Singapore. In the event of an intensive attack on British trade in the Indian Ocean, all the Australian and New Zealand trade would probably be deflected via the Panama Canal, in which case it would not pass within 4,500 miles of Singapore.

There is always a tendency for armies and navies to prepare for the last war instead of the next one. In the last war the British and German fleets were more or less tied to their respective bases. They seldom proceeded to sea, but lay facing each other across a comparatively narrow strip of water. The Grand Fleet by virtue of its position controlled the exits to the oceanic routes. Special intelligence enabled it to forestall every movement of the High Seas Fleet. The conditions in the Pacific Ocean would be totally and entirely different. Fleets would have to remain at sea for long periods and the position of their bases might vary by thousands of miles with the nature and objects of the war. Those who are searching for a base of operations are looking for the key of a door that has no lock. It is the one thing that is not required. There are hundreds of anchorages in the Pacific where fleets or squadrons could lie for a considerable time without fear of discovery. The probable area of operations is so enormous that the mere idea of a fixed strategical base must be ruled out. Successful results will, in fact, largely depend on the efforts which are made to free the fleet from permanent bases and fixed sources of supply.

While the British, misled by the experience of the war, are wasting money on Singapore, other countries are developing and organising a train of fuel, supply, and repair ships so as to make their fleets independent of bases. The Americans have also trained and equipped a special marine expeditionary force for the capture and defence of temporary anchorages. The practice of fuelling their light craft at sea also gives the American fleet greater mobility and enables it to remain at sea for long periods. A British fleet with its oil supplies secured in Australia and a supply train organised on the American pattern would have a choice of numerous anchorages. It would be able to take the initiative and adjust its movements to changing conditions. The resultant flexibility of movement would present a most embarrassing problem to an opponent, compared with that presented by a fleet tied to Singapore or any other permanent base.

K. G. B. DEWAR.

FRANCE'S RHINELAND ADVENTURE.

"AT the moment when the German troops are leaving French territory," wrote President and Marshal MacMahon to General von Manteuffel on September 4th, 1873, "I feel it my duty to express to their commander-in-chief the sentiments I nourish for the justice and impartiality with which he has executed the difficult mission entrusted to him."

If no like compliment was expected to pass between President von Hindenburg and General Guillaumat on the occasion of the last French soldier leaving Mainz, it would be rash for Germans to argue on that account that they behaved much better as top dogs after the Franco-Prussian War than did the French when similarly placed on the Rhine in the years 1918-30. MacMahon's letter was largely a personal one. Manteuffel had shown himself an odd Prussian, gallant, charming even, to Thiers, and so, directly, to France. For over two years the French delegate, St. Vallier, messed at the German commander-in-chief's table at Compiègne. Bismarck, as we know, did not wish to be so nice at all, but rather hoped (having been rudely surprised by France's capacity to pay and regain her feet) to reknit trouble with the notion of extracting more cash and of keeping the new Republic down. Yet here was this Manteuffel fellow always bobbing up! Could not the Iron Chancellor remove him? No, the Iron Chancellor could not. For Manteuffel had long been the old Emperor William's white-headed boy.

Recurrently Manteuffel was pressed to display a harder hand; mostly, he was able to refrain. But not always. In rear of the line Dieppe-St. Denis-the Jura, sanctions and severities were also known, while on more than one occasion the occupying troops (as at Dijon, October 1871) had to be sternly rebuked by their own commanders for wanton aggression. Nevertheless, as we review affairs of that day and of this, it may seem that the Occupation of fifty-nine years ago presented one aspect commendable enough in its way. Exception made of Bismarck's undeveloped impulse, the Germans harboured no *arrière pensée* while in France—such as that of disintegrating the French frontier departments or of manœuvring these away from their parent body upon this or that pretext. They were where they were for the swag (satiated by Alsace, it is true). The Treaty of Frankfurt sanctioned their presence on no other ground, and they would not improve the shining hour by aggrandisement experiments but, as soon as the five milliards had been collected, go.

It may be difficult for French historians of future years to subscribe to the recent discovery made in Paris that France's sojourn

in occupation on the left bank of the Rhine was permeated and infused throughout solely by a desire to see a strict observance of the Treaty of Versailles. It may even be that posterity, when it comes to consider the chapter of history just terminated by the removal of the last tangible and outward reminder of Allied victory in the Great War, will choose to regard the span 1918-30 in the Rhineland mainly as that period during which the Third French Republic tried and failed to reconstitute western Germany as it had submissively been in the days of *l'Empereur*. "The Occupation," may determine the distant student, "was cast in two phases, the first five years during which the French adventure was in process of development, and the last six and a half years during which the victors were engaged in extracting the maximum amount possible from the Reich, before leaving."

The unified command was destined to influence the French Occupation profoundly. It raised to an eminence untenanted for a century a man set heart and soul on the Rhine as France's frontier. Foch the mystic visualised this barrier with all the fervour of his faith, and in him became crystallised the sentiments of countless Frenchmen. How little it was a case of security, cut and dried, may be guessed from the fact that our late Ally's plan to break off the left bank of the Rhine from the German State was already well under way at a time when there was every reason for supposing that France's safety had been indefinitely assured by the Anglo-American guarantee, the later repudiation of which few if any then foresaw. As early as January 1919, directly it became apparent that England and America would combat Rhenish annexation tooth and nail—Briand had, in 1917, undertaken that no such thing would occur—the word had gone forth from Paris that while battle was being done for the Rhine at the Peace Conference, the French Generals commanding in occupied territory were to inaugurate a régime aimed at the speedy rearing of a self-determination *façade* locally, in order that the protagonist of that idealistic condition might be confronted by Hesse, the Palatinate, the Saar, Birkenfeld, and the Rhine Province (the five forming "the left bank") voluntarily wishing themselves out of the crumbling Reich and into an independent buffer State. This latter, while perhaps continuing nominally within the German cadre, would be absorbed economically and industrially by the Republic, and eventually, politically. Such was the grandiose conception by which France would have dominated the Continent and become a potential pistol at the head of the traditional enemy. What transpired is of special interest in view of the wise Rathenau's subsequent affirmation to General Allen that, had the French showed themselves more conciliatory in these opening months, the

Ruhr magnates would have gone over—an achievement final and beyond the reverie even of a Foch.

That the French may not be such artists with white as with coloured human material is possible. Where others might have concentrated with craft and resource upon the magnates and let the demoralised multitude follow along or stay in the ditch, our late Allies engaged upon a characteristic seduction campaign in relation to the demoralised multitude. The reactionary Generals, Mangin and Gérard, commanding the 10th and 8th Armies at Mainz and Trier respectively, were its chosen instruments, Mangin to engineer a Rhenish Republic and Gérard a similar *façade* in the Palatinate. Policy was identical in the two camps. A nucleus of separatists must be formed in the first place, and then a leader found. Some response was obtained by playing the Napoleonic card: how prosperous and contented this very land had been from Hoche to Elba! *Poilus* were installed in schools to give free lessons in French and in French culture (N.C.O.'s and even officers were supplied for "toffs"). The troops were urged into an abnormal Mass attendance in this Catholic country. There was an exhibition of Gobelins. The *Garde Républicaine* went on tour; and Cécile Sorel was promised. The natives' attention was directed to the Spartacist land they were adhering to, yoked, too, for a century with reparations! A newspaper was started in German. Charities were subscribed to. The cupidity of some was fostered; others saw the waiving of restrictions dangled before them. The *Sûreté* went about collecting the weak, the disgruntled, the enemies of society, the ones the law had "got something on." From this spadework the desired nucleus materialised, yet none too soon, for it was May and the sacred Wilson was returning to his own country . . . quickly, up with that *façade*, Mangin! And you, Gérard! The one found Dorten the obscure lawyer, and the other Haas, a chemist, and on June 1st republics were declared at Wiesbaden and Landau, the two soldiers, Pilate-like in their detachment, merely mentioning, "hands off the separatists, mustn't touch them!" Within five days the two movements had fizzled out in farce. A vital part was played by the Americans. A Staff Colonel from Mangin woke up General Malin Craig at 2 a.m. and announced that fifty agents of the Rhenish Republic, to be declared on the morrow, wished facilities in the hub town of Coblenz. Craig said he would see about it in the morning and went to sleep again, leaving a wildly excited officer to be shown out. Hunter Liggett, the G.O.C., next day refused the demanded facilities, and was backed by Pershing and Wilson. That Mangin left such a crucial matter undetermined until the last moment was eloquent of the tilling in general. Weygand's summing-up was pithy. "One

cannot," he observed, "do these things at the gallop." Said Tardieu, "Dorten nearly lost us the Rhineland Occupation." Had they but known it, the hour had passed for ever for the French; for from that day the people of the left bank began to be something of their own selves again, to regain a measure of confidence, to wait definitely for the Fatherland. They had seen what was in the wind and would now be forearmed. It was not to be expected that this set-back would put a term to French dreams of expansion. It was the heyday of the *Bloc National*. The two soldiers would have to be sacrificed, and a process *à longue haleine* be undertaken methodically on the Rhine. For this two newcomers were substituted, Monsieur Tirard and General Degoutte. But it may be advisable here to break off for a while and to turn to other matters.

With the coming of official peace on January 10th, 1920, the fifteen years of occupation as laid down in the Treaty began to run; and France pulled off a master stroke, deeply fraught with consequences, in having her delegate, Monsieur Tirard, made chairman, doubly so, of the newly-formed supreme civil body, the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission. Although this organisation supplanting military dictatorship was an American stratagem, its U.S. representative was a voteless observer, while, in addition to being sure of the constant backing of the Belgian commissioner, Chairman Tirard possessed a casting vote. There being no Italian, and the subsequently admitted representative of the Reich having less than no say, the French chairman was able to rule outright and from the beginning. If we objected, as we frequently did, it was just one British vote against a certain and unchanging Franco-Belgian majority. It would be wrong to suggest that M. Tirard did not try his best to seek British support, as he also listened to the U.S. observer's commentaries; but the plain fact developed that this supreme authority of the Occupation became to all intents and purposes a French monopoly. It led to Tirard becoming the outstanding personality of the Occupation, the dominant influence from first to last. Tirard, an ex-colonial civil servant of the Lyautey school and a diplomat of remarkable resource and ability, evolved a system of district officers through which he ruled the Rhineland by means of an unending rain of ordinances, some agreed to by us, others not, and covering the whole field of what the population might and might not do. These restrictions and visitations varied with the ebb and flow of the permanent *feindselige Stimmung* that prevailed towards the conqueror; for if throughout the occupied territory the civilian attitude was never other, in the mass, than one of suppressed enmity, this manifestation was more marked in the French zone than in ours or the American. In

1871-3 the Prussians were wont to proceed against *franc-tireur* activity or native obstreperousness by quartering troops wherever the trouble signalled itself and by imposing a severer régime there. Rather was the Tirardian method that of regarding the area as a whole, when it came to meting out correction or safeguarding the victors' authority. His stand-bys, the *Kreis* officers, were obnoxious to the Americans and ourselves because it was realised that their *raison d'être* was for the work *à longue haleine*. They were mostly of the *Sûreté* or the *Service de Renseignement* (Intelligence). The former lent over a thousand officials, passing under the War Ministry. Policy was sedulously to sow the soil, one pregnant feature being the removal, where possible, of stubborn German functionaries and their replacement by purchased or otherwise beholden material. The psychological moment for a second and more thorough separatist push had been notably beckoned by the formation of a Poincaré Ministry after Cannes.

Yet it was a curiously uneven attitude that our Allies presented to the people they so coveted, during these months and years. One would have thought that they would have gone out of their way to avoid friction and cause for grievance. In some ways they did try this wooing, if clumsily. But then, undoing everything, even swelling German antipathy to double strength, would come such an affair as the coloured troops! The Germans called them black, and the official American investigation showed that at the height of the outcry about 15 per cent. of a total of 25,000 were, in effect, pure negroids; but whether they were *café-au-lait* or Aryan, Malgache or Annamite, the retention of these C3 mentality and excitable coloured men to police a highly civilised white race was as undesirable as it was foolish and unnecessary. They grew so bored in the sunless land that they drank, and two drinks sent many of them back to the jungle. They did not rape their way right and left, as alleged for U.S. consumption, and in the prevailing moral laxity local women were not averse to encouraging them; but this was only a further reason why the blacks and browns and yellows should have been moved on, for it lighted a rage in Rhenish hearts that generations will not quench. One knows the French answer in advance: "The coloured races are the same humans as ourselves. Their proximity causes us no discomfort." Still, it was rather a strange way of ingratiating oneself with the Rhinelanders. Nor has it been without a boomerang effect in the French Eastern dependencies.

Another barrier to the removal of that *feindselige Stimmung* was "sanctions." (It was a wonder that the *poilu* came so well personally out of the Occupation, for he was constantly having to fulfil unpopular duties.) As and when timber or gold or iron was not forthcoming from the bottomless recesses of Aladdin's cave,

such defaulting by the Reich led to tanks going to Düsseldorf and Moroccans going to Frankfurt, a customs cordon being established here and a Government monopoly collared there. The Germans showed themselves to be obstinate, artful dodgers, and to criticise their opponents is not to praise them. Yet it must be admitted that a regrettable warlike tinge coloured one or two of these sanctions—as when General Mordacq's Algerians found it necessary to machine-gun 150 casualties in Frankfurt, and when that distinguished lieutenant of the Tiger's seemed to be straining at the leash to advance up the Main and so begin the sundering of South from North Germany. Perhaps sanctions could be made to serve apart from the pressure they brought to bear on recalcitrants? Perhaps—who knew?—they could be directed and manipulated so as to help the big *coup* that was coming along? Thus, the more fluid and unsteady became the economic situation on the left bank, the more chance Separatism might stand of success, on the principle that the one way to salve and re-fashion Rhenish industry and commerce would be to seek shelter under the wing of rich and powerful France. The customs barrier between occupied and unoccupied Germany contributed to such an end, leading, as it did, to a first-class economic muddle in the Rhineland. As if the slipping mark were not enough, the Allies used the left bank as a dumping ground, while at the same time impeding Rhenish exports to the rest of Germany save under a notorious system of licences which brought much graft and abuse in its wake. An orgy of commercial greed set in—the French granting licences at one period, and within five weeks, for the importation from France of no less than 23,000,000 litres of spirits, enough for eight years! The Reich held a spirits monopoly and this torpedoed it. It was now, too, that the *Schieber* first showed above their fellows. Through the *Loch im Westen* (the customs barrier controlled chiefly by the French at Ems) German profiteers tugged through into the Fatherland masses of French products duty-free. The dawn of 1923, black year of a virtual return to war, displayed a left bank already in semi-chaos, ripe for the strong to operate upon.

What was Monsieur Poincaré's true objective in sending General Degoutte into the Ruhr at the head of an army of 60,000 men? Barthou had seized upon some missing telegraph poles as the excuse for this crowning sanction. The mark was 80,000 to £1 when Degoutte went in; it did not exist nine months later. Was this the goal? It is probable that Poincaré did imagine he could lay hands on much more than he actually managed to seize. It must be remembered that the Germans had themselves collaborated in the customs sanction. Nothing foretold the passive resistance that was to set in at Essen, transforming the whole project and marking up a notch in history. For never before had such a spec-

tacle been witnessed: that of the finest army in creation being defied by a hungry mob which refused to work for the invader, and in its attitude was sustained by a central Government churning out paper currency in cartloads and progressively wrecking itself in the process. Poincaré's plans were all upset; resort would have to be made to *la manière forte*. Now it was that the cock of Gaul crowed stridently indeed. The Americans might haul down "Old Glory" on Ehrenbreitstein; Lord Curzon might drive the French Premier a shade paler than usual by announcing that the Foreign Office regarded the whole Ruhr affair—forcibly commandeering what was private property—as illegal; *qu'importe!* French troops even crowded into the suburbs of Cologne, seeking to edge General Godley's force out by making things no less humiliating than difficult. "Collaborate or evacuate!" We stayed on, knowing that the little Lorrainer would have given his shirt for us to have moved on. For his major fling was yet to come, and with the *Britanniques* gone, its chance of success would be much enhanced.

Meanwhile the invaders performed prodigies of improvisation in the Ruhr Valley, where Degoutte dictated from hour to hour as fresh situations arose. They ran a comic railway, the *Régie*, which, from fear of sabotage and from patriotism combined, few would board; they took over additional pits and factories daily and worked them by imported labour; they deported into Germany over 100,000 men, women, and children; they indulged in a regular game of hide and seek trying to intercept the colossal dole emanating regularly from Berlin; they descended upon bank safes, the victor of Verdun now kneeling with an oxy-hydrogen blowpipe. And France steadily lost the sympathy of the wider world and Germany made the discovery that she actually had come through still a nation.

The last chapter of Phase One opened in October 1923 with a concerted big push for Separatism up and down the left bank—Dorten at Coblenz, Matthes in Cologne (directing only), Deckers at Aachen, Leidner, ex-Red, at Düsseldorf, Heinz in the Palatinate. Smeets, the Bonn leader, had died from wounds, and Tirard had compelled the Reich to pay damages to his family although the man was looked upon as an out-and-out traitor by that Reich. In September the new Chancellor, Stresemann, had called off the passive resistance. Another French triumph! Now was the time to cast off doomed Germany and join France! A feature of this ultimate bid was the transporting here and there of armed bands whose job it was to lead on the locals by igniting matters. Republics were proclaimed, but the uprising was to meet with the same fate as its forerunner and ended in a scene of minor massacre at Pirmasens where, in General de Metz's territory of the Palatinate, the hired bravos had been especially prominent. It was an Englishman, Consul Clive, of Munich, who gave Separatism its *coup-de-*

grace. One section of his famous report mentioned that 75 per cent. of those who had agitated in the Palatinate had been imported for the purpose. Of the leaders, Dorten remarried a Frenchwoman and retired to Nice. Heinz was killed. The others were given jobs in France or obscurely subsided.

For a few months Monsieur Poincaré lingered on, burning the midnight oil at the Quai d'Orsay making the Ruhr accounts look as pretty as possible. He did salve considerably more than at one time seemed likely. He was able in large measure to unite the mutually-attractive raw materials of the Ruhr and Lorraine, refusing to deal with the Reich in the matter, but insisting that Stinnes should arrange direct with the Micum. The sequel to this arrangement was the presentation of a bill to Berlin by Stinnes for 700,000,000 gold marks (of which he received 550,000,000) in payment of orders signed with the French and as compensation for hurt done by the invasion, hurt which was not confined to the Ruhr alone. On the other hand, viewed through Poincarist spectacles, the Ruhr was justified in that it re-interested America and led to the Dawes Plan and even to Locarno and finally to the Young Plan, the only fly in the ointment being: Did Poincaré go into the Ruhr in search of a Stresemann and a Dawes?

After the storm, calm. If I have devoted so much space to this first phase, it is because its successor was a tame and uneventful span by comparison. History should remember the French Occupation by its first five years, for then the drama was being played, and for the highest stakes. Although the last French soldier did not leave the Ruhr for 2½ years (autumn 1925), long ere then a pronounced *détente* had set in on the Rhine following Poincaré's defeat at the polls and the definite abandoning by Herriot and Briand of the notion of breaking off any part of Germany. Rather did Briand now proceed to use the Occupation as a means of obtaining security; but that is beyond our present scope. Degoutte was succeeded by Guillaumat. If Tirard remained, his district officers did not, while scores of restrictive ordinances were either withdrawn or lightened and the occupying French force was cut down to 67,000 men. Gradually things grew quieter on the Rhine, whose last effervescence had to do with the shooting of two German civilians in a café by Lieutenant Rouzier (1926). While Stresemann operated, the left bank awaited an accelerated withdrawal of the forces of occupation. Germany had signed the Dawes Plan and Locarno, and was in the League. What further right had these foreign soldiers here? Meanwhile, and nowhere more so than in the French zone, the inhabitants carried their *kein Verkehr* policy to the length of somewhat haughtily looking clean through these soldiers in the street without seeing them.

How happy must General Guillaumat have been these last few

years! It was really rather a perfect arrangement, militarily. He lived in the Grand Ducal Palace at Mainz—nay, slept in the bed of *l'Empereur* there! His was a compact force of all arms, the cream of the profession in officers and N.C.O.'s, and these were never touched. Conscripts—selected, too—streamed to the *Armée du Rhin* to do their year of service, but the Regular cadres remained on from year to year, for the same regiments were left all through. And one had but to press a button for new aerodromes, cantonments, target grounds, to arise . . . and be paid for by the Reich. Halcyon situation indeed for the professional in arms! And then there were such material advantages in being on the Rhine. Billets, light, heat, water, transport—all were supplied free. And one could purchase household requisites almost at cost price at French co-operative stores. No wonder that the *Armée du Rhin* was in no hurry to leave. Time did not drag with the French as it did with others. A highly agreeable form of colonial life had been evolved. Even messes were family affairs, clubs, for both sexes. Even if the Marseillaise must not be played so often on the Marktplatz now, what a fine life this was! Did it transpire from time to time that fresh grounds for staying on (the Germans had not blown up this or were mustering in forbidden societies) were transmitted to Paris? The great Marshal, while yet life remained, maintained that to leave would be *un crime contre la patrie*. As for the pleasures of the rank and file, no ban had ever been placed on fraternisation. The *poilus* could mix with German girls to the limit of their pockets, if the *Fräuleins* were willing, which was not often in the end. "I do not understand you Anglo-Saxons forbidding these things," a French colonel once observed to the writer at Coblenz; "the German women are to us like the German wine—there to enjoy!"

In their daily lives the French differed considerably from British or Americans. They did not concentrate on sport in the same degree, nor on exploring the country, but in liberty hours strolled incessantly, hands in pockets and cigarette to lip, or played cards or billiards in cafés or read newspapers and novels, or wrote copiously back to the *pays*. They were equipped with the best and they bore themselves well. Germans told the writer, in Mainz, that they had nothing against the private soldier as an individual; but they cordially disliked the prying police and the functionaries and non-commissioned officers and (if less so) the officers. They also could not understand these latter being allowed to pedal about on bicycles. (But German cities are so spread out.) The natives took pleasure in spiking the officers' relaxations where possible. They stopped their hunting. Yet the French officers could fall back upon other distractions. For one thing, the more or less open *liaison* with an *amie*, sometimes French, sometimes from the "rest" of Germany, was winked at.

The Germans never ceased totting up grievances against our late Allies, even when these were conducting themselves with a decorum of Manteuffel commendability. But it would be wise to stretch for the salt while listening to the litany, since the more the occupied territory piled it on the more compensation it drew from Berlin. In 1928, after Chancellor Luther had formally demanded the evacuation at Geneva, here was the hardship surviving in the Mainz bridgehead. Why should every citizen require identity papers to move about? Why should Germans continue to be hauled before French military courts whose sense of justice was a farce? Why should they also have to fill in a census form of motors, vehicles, horses, knowing full well to what purpose these would be put in an emergency? Why need three hours' notice of an intended aeroplane flight be given? The French presence was (a) hampering trade by spreading uncertainty, (b) ruining the tourist industry, (c) causing unemployment, (d) intensifying the housing shortage, (e) morally undermining the community.

Some of these complaints, it will be noted, were trivial. Others were not strictly founded upon fact. An impartial U.S. investigation showed that the area was not suffering economically as a direct result of the troops' presence, nor was unemployment as high, by three points, as in unoccupied Germany. To the plaint that tourists were holding off the French zone (100,000 visited Wiesbaden during our last summer), our neighbours retorted rather flippantly that the military constituted the best kind of tourists—those who stayed on—while it was further pointed out that other tourist centres were known once to have lost five seasons in succession. On the moral issue there was debate, the Germans holding that the French were leaving vast numbers of illegitimate children unprovided for, and the French putting the figure at 4,000 provable cases and mentioning that 500 marriages had occurred, in many instances to regularise Franco-German offspring. The overcrowding protest was well-founded—10,000 rooms and 2,000 flats in requisition in Mainz alone—and General Guillaumat met it by reorganising his force which in the closing period was distributed over twenty towns and townships. In the country at large horizon blue became invisible.

Well, it is all over now. The writer would only venture the obvious: that it was a pity that the French Occupation was vitiated by the bid for the Rhine as frontier, since if one clears aside the arrogance, unfairness, severity, violence, which sprang from that programme, our late Allies, as regards their bearing vis-à-vis the civil population, can have little to be ashamed of in retrospect to-day. But, alas, it is a biggish "if," since the attempted realisation of the Foch dream coloured the whole and left perhaps the only impress that will survive.

FERDINAND TUOHY.

AMERICA'S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS.

TO most Europeans and unfortunately to many Americans the title of this article will appear strange. The United States is the promised land; from afar flowing with milk and honey. Visitors from other countries seem to find little but wealth and prosperity. One from England, upon his return, writes of "America the Golden." Two others entitle their joint observations "The Secret of High Wages." An examination of the careful calculations of government officials and economists gives colour to the same views. It is estimated that the national wealth is \$400,000,000,000 or more and the aggregate national income is thought to have been about \$90,000,000,000 in 1929. Even when this is expressed in *per capita* terms we are faced with an average of \$750 or about £150 for each man, woman and child among the 120,000,000 inhabitants. There may be added a reference to the huge tax receipts not only of the federal government, but also of the State and local governments, and to the rapid reduction of the federal debt which for some years has been proceeding at the rate of about one billion dollars per year.

When some of the facts are examined more closely one's enthusiasm becomes a little sobered. Wealth and income are not equally divided. Prosperity is not evenly distributed. There are a few with much and many with little. The productivity of the United States as a whole may be huge, even on a *per capita* basis, but there are numerous industries in which depression has prevailed for years. Many textile mills, especially in New England, have long been operating on part time or at a heavy loss or not at all. The steel industry has frequently in recent years been working at only from 50 to 60 per cent. of capacity. The farmers have for nearly a decade been complaining bitterly of their misfortunes. Conditions in coal mining are bad. A long and bitter strike in the soft coal fields was some months ago ended with defeat for the employees. I have been told, by those who claim to know as I do not, that the condition of the workers in some of our soft coal fields is as bad as in Wales. No one knows how many unemployed there are in the country at any given time, but a number of intelligent observers were of the opinion in the winter of 1927-8 that there were about 3,000,000 or even 4,000,000, which is perhaps 7 or 8 per cent. of the employable number. This is a very high percentage and was properly a cause of serious concern.

These difficulties have prevailed for a number of years and, of course, have been intensified since the stock market crash last autumn. Trade has slackened, unemployment has grown, cor-

porate earnings have declined, both imports and exports have sharply fallen. All of the signs of a serious depression are present and there is as yet no indication of marked improvement. The usual maladjustments have been increased by an economic crisis of huge proportions that is affecting America as well as other parts of the world.

But it is not my intention to dwell on the immediate depression which will perhaps not last long. Nor shall I emphasise the continuing distress in many industries. There are many problems in the United States similar to those in Europe and to be remedied no more easily. Yet it would be wrong even to suggest that the general economic situation in the New World is bad as compared with that of the Old World. It is not, and there is no reason to suppose that it is apt to become so. The problems to which I wish to give attention are of a very different sort. They concern people on both sides of the ocean. Their solution is a matter for joint action and will be for the common welfare. The reason for emphasising them now is that so often they are stated in too simple terms and in such a way as to imply that America alone can easily find the answer. Such is not the case. More responsibility for solving the difficulty may rest on the people of the United States than on others, but little or nothing can be done without general co-operation.

The first of the two important financial problems is created by the fact that so much of the world's gold supply has concentrated in the United States. The United States is a gold-producing country and might be expected to export gold at least in moderate amounts, as she exports cotton or wheat. Yet for nearly fourteen years the movement has in general been the other way. Gold has gone *to*, not *from*, America, frequently at the rate of several hundred million dollars per year. It is probable that over 40 per cent. of the world supply is in this country. Europe has needed a part of this gold. The need has at times been exaggerated, but there has been a real need. At the same time so much gold has been an embarrassment if not a real danger to America. Large supplies of gold in the possession of the banks increase their lending power. Interest rates are kept low, loans expand, buying is stimulated. Prices tend to rise, and unless the movement is checked and some of the gold drained out of the country this rise of prices may proceed so far as to become inflation. Against this tendency financial leaders in America have struggled and with some success. But gold came flowing in and inflation has been harder and harder to check. It was to the interest both of Europe and America that the latter should export gold, not import more of it.

But how could the gold be sent out? None of us supposes that

either the government of the United States or some of the great banks or certain individuals would collect this gold in America and arbitrarily ship it abroad as a gift. But even if this had been done the relief would have been slight and temporary. Gold moves for very cold business reasons. Most international business is the buying and selling of commodities and services and securities. Only when this flow of commodities and services and securities is more strongly one way than another does gold move to make up the difference. So long as these business transactions leave a balance in favour of the United States just so long will there be a pull by the United States on the gold of Europe. And as the gold moves to America, increasing the supply in that country and decreasing the supply in Europe, the latter finds itself short of needed supplies of the yellow metal while the former suffers from an excess which may prove harmful there without any compensating advantages to the people of other countries.

This suggests that there is little or nothing to be gained by direct attempts to control this gold movement. It is not itself a primary matter but a secondary. To try diverting the gold flow without attention to the underlying causes is almost as futile as attempting to improve the weather by arbitrary adjustments of the thermometer and the barometer. Little is apt to result. That this is the case has been shown by several recent attempts—two of which may be mentioned—one in Germany, and one in the United States. Early in 1927 the official discount rate was lowered in Germany and other steps were taken to adjust financial matters there. But underlying conditions were not such as to justify such a move. Funds rushed rapidly out to the injury of Germany and of the rest of the world. The discount rate was then raised to a higher level than before and Germany recovered but slowly from the unfortunate effort to exercise too arbitrary a control.

A little later a very similar attempt was made in the United States, though for different reasons. In May 1927 a considerable amount of gold left England for France, a movement that created much alarm among the British. Heavy outward shipments of gold would have meant an increase of interest rates in England and higher costs for business there at a time when every effort was being made to lower costs in order that British goods might be sold at prices low enough to compete with the products of other countries in the world's markets. To meet this situation an arrangement was made by which discount rates in America were lowered. This was done in August 1927 and at once diverted the pull from London to New York. Those familiar with finance saw the foreign exchange quotations in New York promptly rise and

soon observed a flow of gold to Europe. The strain on London was relieved and gold left America. Temporarily there was an improvement. But soon certain bad effects appeared, much as they had in Germany. General economic conditions in America did not warrant the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. that had been put into effect, and two results followed. One was the stimulus to speculation on the stock exchanges which has caused so much concern. Funds were very abundant and the low interest rates helped create an atmosphere favourable to speculation. Finally in January 1928 the Federal Reserve Banks acted. In order to discourage speculation discount rates were raised by stages from $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to 6 per cent. and securities were sold in considerable volume on the market in an attempt at control. But the stock market scarcely halted in its upward movement. The situation in New York was not relieved and conditions elsewhere were made much worse. The higher interest rates in the United States pulled funds from all parts of the world and everywhere the great banks were compelled to raise their interest rates in order to prevent the loss of too much gold. The British rate went to 6 per cent., the German to $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., the Dutch to $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., the Italian to 6 per cent., and many much higher. When the crash came in October and November the tension was relieved. Rates declined in New York and then elsewhere. During November and December gold was exported, but during 1930 the net movement was again inward and as this is written, in May, there is no sign that the yellow metal will soon be exported. Instead imports will apparently continue.

The second of the two financial problems facing America is the huge debts due to her from other parts of the world. In the last fifteen years her status has rapidly changed to that of a creditor nation. These debts are of two sorts--public and private. The public debts are sums due to the government of the United States from certain foreign governments and arise out of the late war and the early post-war period. The private debts are the sums due to private American investors from foreign governments and corporations whose bonds these investors have purchased. The exact amount of these private debts is not easy to determine, but is perhaps \$15,000,000,000 and is increasing. The amount of the public debts is also not easy to state because of the form of the existing debt settlements, but the annual payments range from about \$225,000,000 per year at the outset to about twice that amount as a maximum many years in the future. That the public debts are a problem need hardly be stated. Newspaper discussions, magazine articles and even books on the subject have appeared on

both sides of the ocean. A little light and a vast amount of heat have been the leading but not the only results to date. The subject is of necessity a delicate one in international circles, but clarity and understanding may be furthered by a brief summary of fact.

First to be noticed is that some adjustments have been made. Six years ago the annual amounts due were nearly six hundred millions of dollars. By the settlements that have been arranged the payments per annum have been altered. The amount collected in 1928 was \$210,000,000 and in time this will be increased to a maximum of more than \$400,000,000 per annum. This is only a partial reduction, not cancellation, and is a recognition of little more than presumptive capacity to pay. Some of the arguments for complete cancellation are strong and it would be fortunate if this cancellation could be immediately effected. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that as a matter of practical politics little further seems possible at present in America.

A second point for emphasis is that the economic significance of the public debts is now overshadowed by that of the accumulated private obligations on which the annual interest payments amounted in 1928 to \$882,000,000 or over four times that on the public debts. Americans as a group are not yet collecting this interest, but are reinvesting it abroad along with additional sums, thus increasing the total. A "snowballing" process is going on, the size of the mass growing with each annual revolution. There are many issues raised by this situation, but we shall limit ourselves to the economic. The amounts involved are not so large as to be a reason for concern. Great Britain with a population of some 40,000,000 people had about £4,000,000,000 or \$20,000,000,000 invested abroad before the war. By comparison the holdings of American private investors are smaller in absolute amount and are much smaller *per capita*. Size is probably not of great importance except as it is considered in relation to other matters.

It must be remembered that these loans have been made within a very short period of time. British foreign investments accumulated over many decades, the American have been made since 1914. In fact most of the private loans have been made since 1918 or even 1919. There has been a huge supply of funds available in the United States and during most of the time interest rates there have consequently been low. In Europe there has been a reduced ability to make investments in other parts of the world and even to furnish all the capital for its own needs. When there is added to all this the aggressive rivalry of American bankers, some of whom have vied with each other for the privilege of underwriting foreign bond issues, the growth of American foreign investments is easy to understand. Yet in this haste to lend, and in this

eagerness to borrow, errors of judgment are apt to have occurred. Probably some loans have been unwise and defaults will in time appear. When they do occur Americans, not yet experienced as foreign investors, may prove timid. In fact, they have already shown this tendency on several occasions in the last few years. Any serious default would probably weaken the market and prove a serious check to the flotation of new issues.

Then, too, it must be remembered that a considerable part of the advances made by the United States have not been for purposes that are directly productive. The funds have not all been used by the borrowers in a manner that automatically provides funds with which to pay the charges on the debt. This is quite clearly true of the public debts, since the borrowed funds were used for purposes connected with war and were destructively employed rather than productively. A careful scrutiny of the private loans might show that some of them too would fail to meet an exacting test. But even if all of the borrowed funds had been used productively there might still be a question. The productivity of newly constructed properties often develops slowly. The railway investments in the United States one hundred years ago were of this sort and English owners of American railway stocks and bonds lost heavily in 1837. Another loss of the same sort came in 1873. Some properties may pay well in the long run yet fail to meet their obligations in the short run.

American foreign investments are then in a state of unstable equilibrium. There have been some unproductive advances and in certain directions loans have probably been so large and so rapidly placed that difficulties in making payments will in time arise. Certain countries whose borrowings in the United States have been large are as yet not showing favourable balances in their relations with the rest of the world and are continuing to borrow and to borrow heavily. In some cases their capacity to make payments other than out of new borrowings seems somewhat remote. If difficulties should develop in any area that is weak, the market for new loans might be checked even for strong enterprises that would otherwise find it easy to borrow.

Enough has been said to warrant asking ourselves what can be done about it. This does not mean that we share the extreme pessimism of certain observers. There has been a serious crisis affecting the entire world and recovery will doubtless be slow. But even if it is soon over there will remain the general difficulty I have pictured and it will persist. Defaults on a considerable scale may occur. Everything possible should be done to lessen the tension. One conceivable method would be to say that the loans are large enough, that for the present at least foreign obligations

to the government and people of the United States are as much as can be managed, that no new loans are to be made. Just how such a policy could be carried out is not clear, but if it should be proposed there would be intense resentment. A creditor is not apt to be popular, but a creditor who abruptly refuses to lend more when and where his debtors think there is a real need is bitterly hated. Moreover a refusal to continue lending would at once accentuate the difficulties we are trying to relieve. America cannot meet its problem by arbitrarily refusing to make new loans. Another possibility is to cancel some of the obligations already contracted. Voluntary surrender of these by private investors is scarcely to be considered, so discussions must centre on the public debts. It would be most fortunate if these could be eliminated at once, particularly if this cancellation could be accompanied by a similar disappearance of the debts between the various governments of Europe. But candour compels the statement that this is not now feasible in America for political and for sentimental reasons. The British Government has repeatedly stated its position as that of the Balfour Note of August 1922, but others have not gone so far. The terms of the Young Plan and the attitude of Americans have in any case settled the matter for some time to come.

But cancellation by America would not be adequate even if it should come. The private investments are now much more important. Their amount is so huge and the annual charges on them are so great that even by themselves they may create a problem. Some may have been made unwisely and others may be really productive only after many years have passed. In the meantime the "snow-ball" may become very large and unwieldy. It may even fall apart. Voluntary cancellation of these private investments is, of course, not among the possibilities. This leaves open only two main lines of development. The first is to face with as much equanimity as we can the possible losses and the temporary disorganisation that may accompany defaults. The second is to attack with all the energy of which we are capable the important business of increasing freedom of trade.

This does not necessarily mean "free trade" in the usual sense, although it might. It does mean the study of all existing trade restrictions and the speedy elimination of those that are particularly objectionable. In so far as barriers of all kinds can be lowered or removed the business of the world will attain a more certain equilibrium and the losses suggested will be minimised if not avoided. The more freely commerce flows from country to country the more readily can debtors meet their obligations. Then too, the gold movements mentioned earlier will gradually adjust themselves to

real monetary needs and that problem too will be relieved. This is no easy panacea and it is not a remedy for application by any country alone. It is a world task. What should be done by each country in Europe is not for an American to say. But there is much for the United States to do and an American may properly and with emphasis say so. Similar though not identical obligations rest on others, but in all countries there are countless spokesmen to analyse and present their own problems.

There are at least three things that we in America should do. First is to examine with critical care our whole tariff policy. As we do it let us hope outsiders will be patient. With many Americans the tariff is not a mere economic policy. It is a form of religion, not to be argued but to be accepted as one of life's fundamentals. For a hundred years it has affected our economic organisation and our habits of thought. We shall not easily and suddenly change and those who expect it will be disappointed. No rationalisation about our fallacies and our obtuseness will hurry us, but may instead have the opposite effect.

Yet the time has come when our tariff barriers should be lowered. The task is delicate and not to be undertaken rashly and in ignorance. On the surface there are few signs that we are ready, and the increases now before Congress certainly indicate the opposite. Here and there, however, there are reasons for hoping that a change is coming. Our own economic welfare and that of others will be furthered if this is true. Some observers have pointed out that more general freedom of trade within Europe would be a gain even though American tariffs remain high. But it must be remembered that existing treaties with their "most favoured nation" clauses permit the United States to demand any favours that one country in Europe grants to another. This fact will make for delay in adjustments even if it is ultimately eliminated.

A second step we in America should take is to consider further our policy towards our merchant marine. In the past the people of other countries paid us large amounts each year through the services of their vessels which carried many of our goods. Our fleet created during the war has added seriously to the demoralisation of the world's economic life ever since. The part America should play in this direction is one that we have not yet examined with the care it deserves.

Third is our attitude toward foreign investments. Some loans in the last few years have been hastily and unwisely made. Some are dubious. No kindness is performed to anybody by reckless investment. New loans should be made more cautiously.

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ENGLISH POLITICS THROUGH GERMAN EYES.

UNTIL well into the seventeenth century the Germans had taken scarcely any notice of the English. But afterwards they became inspired by pro-British or by anti-British feelings, the latter often running to a violent passion, and so it has remained to this day. About the middle of last century England was ruled by Victoria and Victoria by Albert, whilst Frederick of Prussia allowed himself to be kept in leading-strings by Victoria's daughter, and the government of Prussia seemed almost within the reach of both. It was then that German science served as an undisputed model for the English, whilst English politics played a similar rôle in Germany. In our days we have lived to see German "*Kultur*" mentioned by the English only in quotation marks, whilst the Germans hailed each other in the streets with "*Gott strafe England.*" Both pro-British and anti-British feelings have always existed in Germany to a certain extent. But their scope varied; they sometimes comprised the whole of the English national character, sometimes they referred only to single features of it, and then, of course, one and the same critic might harbour in his heart a friendly attitude to some traits and an inimical judgment of others. Both opinions number among their exponents the best names of the German people, and we may be allowed to summon some of them here, inasmuch as they have expressed their opinion on the spirit of English politics.

Among the Anglophiles we may distinguish a Conservative-aristocratic and a Liberal-democratic tendency, if such vague catchwords be permitted. To the former England is first of all the country of unbroken traditions, of a constitution developed on organic lines with due regard to historic rights, and of an independence that was gained after tough fighting and unwaveringly defended against every menace from without, and therefore a model for Germany's struggle and reconstruction. For such reasons England was held in affection by many German patriots of the Napoleonic era, such as Stein, Germany's most noble-minded statesman, Niebuhr, one of our greatest historians, who called England "the pride and the envy of the world," and, influenced by Stein, Ernst Moritz Arndt. It is true, the German Tyrtæus in *Geist der Zeit* (1807) had prophesied a gloomy future for England which seemed to him to be immersed in materialism; but her heroic fight against the hated Corsican tyrant incited him in 1813 to a hymn which has no equal in vigorous speech and passionate feeling, and, in spite of its extravagant rhetoric, contains many a truth too quickly forgotten:

"England is the soul of European freedom, and England has staked her soul for this freedom. . . . Thus thou appearest before us, proud and free Britannia, in this sublime character after the longest and hardest war a magnanimous and brave nation has ever gone through, saved and a saviour, resplendent with glory, honour, and justice. . . . Thou hast saved our freedom through thy arms. . . . That we may go on loving and hating, that we may still feel and think, nay, that we can again believe in God and worship Him—all this we owe to thy pride and constancy. . . . Many will mock at this praise, they will say, England has fought only for herself and her own interest. . . . We may agree with this impeachment of England without her losing any of her prestige. England has fought for her own advantage but at the same time for that of the world at large; for such is the order of human affairs that, whoever fights for honour and justice, promotes his own ends in so doing."

Goethe's affection turned to the English themselves rather than to their national institutions. He was wont to study these well-built specimens of the genus man with the relish of a connoisseur, whenever they paid him one of their frequent visits. He admired in them above all their natural lordly ways, "their courage to be what Nature had meant them to be." Later, with the beginning of the racial theory, a consciousness of superiority (*Herrentum*) developed in Germany also, and now people were attracted to their "Germanic cousins" with whom they hoped to share the leadership or dominion of Europe. To this group belong Friedrich von Raumer and Friedrich List; Raumer, the noted historian, was the first to give an elaborate description of modern England (1836). In his political testament of 1846, an imaginative and prophetic pamphlet, List, the unfortunate political economist who stands in such high repute to-day, called for an alliance between the two great nations of the "Germanic race" which have been sought out by Providence to conduct the "world's affairs."

A third group combines the ideas of the first and second; it finds in England's Germanic nature, in her respect for legitimacy and the law at large and her intense religious life, a "mediæval" feature that goes far to give her her value. In this connection we must name August Reichensperger (1803-95), the great leader of the (Catholic) Centre Party in its heroic beginnings, who frankly declared himself to be an "Anglomaniac" and who wished to find everlasting rest in England because she was "more Germanic" than Germany. To this group also belongs a man who is forgotten to-day, his Protestant and protesting friend, Langwerth von Simmern (1833-1913), who, as early as the days of the Crimean War, supported a "Germanic Alliance." He afterwards became a pro-Austrian politician and historian, was a Guelf mem-

ber of the Reichstag and an intrepid opponent of Bismarck. I dwell with a feeling of personal gratitude on the character of this entirely reactionary and militarist nobleman of the old German school, who in his work *Deutschtum und Anglophobie* (1903-4) opposed "Anglophobia" in the interests of *Deutschtum*, and who, in the book which he wrote still later (1906) on the *Englische Nationalcharakter*, expounded views very similar to those I have developed in my own book, *Der Geist der Englischen Politik und das Gespenst der Einkreisung Deutschlands*.*

The German Liberal-democratic group saw in England "the land of freedom," as it is so often called. At first, as early as the Napoleonic era, Germany's admiration and longing were applied to England's foreign policy, in so much as British public opinion and British statesmen gave their moral, military, and financial support to the nations of Europe and South America struggling for national independence against tyranny. In this connection it was especially Canning, the liberator of peoples, whose praise is sung by Goethe as well as by Schleiermacher, Prince Puckler, Dahlmann, Heine, Varnhagen v. Ense, and many others. To this conception were added the personal feelings of German refugees who had received protection and benevolent help from this powerful island-kingdom. This was the case with Freiligrath, the poet of democracy who, it is true, found much fault with England, but who eventually (in 1858) became a naturalised Englishman, and with Eduard Bernstein, the leader of a revised Socialism, i.e. a Socialism purified by the English sense of realism, who was driven across the Channel as the result of Bismarck's anti-Socialist Act.

Another and later group reveres and yearns for English freedom as revealed in internal politics, meaning the individual freedom of conscience and of the Press, protected by the inviolable decrees of the law and safeguarded against the arbitrariness of absolutist governments. This freedom, by the way, had already been alluded to by Leibniz in a letter in 1696, by Lichtenberg in an aphorism of 1779, and by Wilhelm von Humboldt in a sonnet *An Albion* in the thirties of last century. Then comes freedom in the form of democratic responsibility towards the State and the municipality as well as towards the law, the nation taking a lively interest in public affairs, considering them its own affairs. It is, however, admitted that the aristocratic and plutocratic character of the older English franchise has been often misjudged. Dahlmann's *History of the English Revolution* (1844) effectively prepared the ground in this direction. Four years later he was one of the leaders of the Frankfurt National Assembly. At that time St.

* An English translation of the complete work is in preparation and will be published by Allen & Unwin.

Paul's Church in Frankfurt resounded with appeals to the English constitution, with praise of the jury system and of the liberty of the Press, and with quotations from Burke, Junius, Macaulay, Cobden, and O'Connell. The Conservative wing of the Assembly, represented by its authoritative leader Freiherr v. Vincke and the clericals Lasaulx and Gfrörer, of course sympathised with England. The "Casino Party," the Conservative section of the moderate Centre Party, then the radical wing of the Centre Party, adopted the same attitude, although, on the whole, the latter party inclined more towards revolutionary France. The President of the first Imperial Ministry, Prince von Leiningen, in common with many others, desired an alliance with England. Later, especially in the fifties, these politicians were reinforced by the jurists, such as Mittermaier and above all Gneist. These influences were afterwards centred in the court of Crown Prince Frederick and his English consort.

The last but not least radiation of the English idea of freedom is seen in the idea of Free Trade. The whole German Free Trade Party of the sixties and seventies, men like Faucher, Braun-Wiesbaden, Max Wirth, and Ludwig Bamberger—not to speak of its leader, the Englishman Prince-Smith—were Anglophil and could not but praise England as the home of political wisdom, if they wanted in any way to represent its trade policy as a model for Germany. On this tradition is based the pro-British attitude of the Progressives and Radicals which went down only in the eddies of the naval propaganda. Theodor Barth's *Nation* (1883-1907) was the last resolute mouthpiece of this group, but the same pro-British tendency has time and again broken through in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, to whose London correspondents, Bernhard Guttman before the war and afterwards Rudolf Kircher, we owe the most judicious studies of English life that have been published in Germany within the last decades.

German reactionaries hated just what German Liberals liked in England. Gentz, during the period of his Liberal sympathies, had called the detractors of England "calumniators"; but after he had become the confidential friend and instrument of Metternich, he took the field against the "falsely idolised" Canning and his mother country as against "the source of rebellion." England went down still further in the estimation of European reactionaries when, in her struggles for Parliamentary Reform in 1831-2, she took a first timid step towards democracy. After that all reactionaries from Madrid to Vienna saw in England the future victor and enemy. Hegel's political testament is set forth in his essay on the English Reform Bill (1831). In it he censures the friendly attitude towards Great Britain on the Continent and,

adducing arguments of legal philosophy which he always had at his disposal to justify his political moods, he rejects on principle any extension of an existing franchise. He does not expect social reforms to be the outcome of political ones, whilst he sees the spectre of Revolution looming behind them. Here lie the roots of the Conservatives' dislike of England and, to use a later term, of the "Western democracies" in general, and this fact must never be lost sight of in reviewing the political actions of the German potentates and their publicity agents, no matter whether their policy was favourably or unfavourably disposed towards Great Britain. Bismarck especially could never be induced to entertain for the English constitutional monarchy (a sham monarchy to him) that benevolent feeling of common interest which attached him to the autocrats of St. Petersburg and perhaps also of Vienna.

But German Anglophobia does not concern itself with single deeds and features only, it attacks the whole and denies England the claim to any higher civilisation. One must not think that this is a late invention of the World War; it goes back to Germany's really great period, to the age of classical poetry, of German idealism and romanticism. Even then English thought was represented as being involved in materialism and utilitarianism, in thirst for pleasure and in selfishness, and this sufficed for that age to condemn England entirely. As early as 1758, Wieland finds fault with England's "base greed of gain," but he thinks that the "earlier and nobler spirit" was stifled only by her recent economic development. Forty years later this same materialism is depicted as emanating from her national character itself. Thus Schleiermacher, in his speeches "on Religion" (1799), one of the noblest manifestos of those days, declares:

"Those haughty islanders, unduly revered by many, have no other wish than for gain and enjoyment; their scientific zeal is a mere sport . . . and their sacred freedom itself waits upon selfishness for a low wage. They are never in earnest about anything that is not obviously within reach of utility. They have deprived the noble arts and sciences of their life, and now they use the dead timbers for masts and oars on their life's voyage to greed and gain. Nor do they know anything of religion, except that everyone preaches adherence to the old customs, and defends his own dogmas."

Thus spoke the cleverest German Protestant theologian, being partially influenced by his aversion to mechanistic philosophy and natural science. But he and the educated among his admirers must surely have known that since the Methodist Revival English religious life had been the most passionate in Europe; that unselfish philanthropy, as practised by such far-famed men as John Howard and Wilberforce, had a stronger influence than anywhere else; and

that the classical studies, raised by Bentley and afterwards by Gibbon to a height hitherto unattained, had spread the unprofitable knowledge of the classical languages and institutions farther than in any other country. Achim von Arnim, the only really sane and consistent character among the German romanticists of this generation, writing from England, where he stayed from 1803 to 1804, also jokingly complained that the individual was valued merely as a "gun," according to how many "pounds" he could discharge, and he remained "at heart hostile" to the English, although he afterwards changed his opinion, being impressed by their heroic struggle against the common enemy Napoleon.

The later romanticists are of the same opinion—the opinion of their idol Lord Byron—although one need not be a Romanticist to be repelled by many traits of pre-Victorian and early Victorian England. Among this group Heine had the greatest influence, especially on men of letters. It is true his political feelings for England, where he spent some summer months in 1827, were divided between his admiration for the "god-like" Canning and his abhorrence of Canning's successor Wellington, whom the English called the "Iron Duke" and Heine the "Wooden Duke"; but from the very beginning he adopted a hostile attitude towards English thought, and the more he came under French influence, the more his opinions became deprecatory and eventually venomous. It was, of course, an extenuating circumstance that England had once produced Shakespeare, but his disability was "that he remained an Englishman and belonged to the most odious nation that God had ever in his wrath created." Heine foretells that England will one day hang herself out of sheer boredom with a huge hawser. He recommends for the post of French Ambassador in London a "hawk-eyed man who knows how to spy out in due time the intrigues of '*Albion perfide*,' " perhaps the galley convict Vidocq, for with the English political "calculation is disturbed neither by the beating of the heart nor by the flight of magnanimous ideas." And he trembles especially for "the happy peace and tranquillity of the German fatherland," for "we cannot defend ourselves against the treacherous intrigues of those Carthaginians of the German Ocean."

We are justified in reckoning Richard Wagner among the last romanticists and so, in the mid-period of his development (1855), one finds the following verdict which might just as well have come from Heine: "I cannot imagine anything more hateful to me than the proper and genuine English type. They are altogether like sheep, and the practical instinct of the average Englishman is just as sure as the sheep's instinct for finding its food in the meadow."

The same result, though starting from quite different premises,

is reached by those who consider hatred of Christianity characteristic of cultured men. To these belongs especially Schopenhauer, although, quite in keeping with his ethics based on compassion, he did not fail to acknowledge and esteem the "magnanimity" and "good-heartedness" of the English character. He knew the English language and English customs from his youth, and even prized intercourse with Englishmen so highly that he preferred living in Frankfurt to living in Mannheim because there were "more Englishmen" there. But, nevertheless, in one of his paroxysms of invective, as un-English as it is un-Christian, he pronounces the following crushing verdict (1851):

Look at this nation favoured by nature and endowed above all others with understanding, wit, judgment, and constancy; look at them, degraded, nay, made even more despicable than all others, by their imbecile churchiness, which contrasted with their own faculties appears to be a fixed idea, a monomania. This they owe entirely to the fact that their education is in the hands of the clergy, who make them commit all articles of faith to memory even from their earliest youth, so that the result is a sort of partial cerebral paralysis which expresses itself in this idiotic bigotry throughout their lives. . . .

From Schopenhauer and Wagner it is but a step to Nietzsche. His idolising of power should have inspired him with admiration for this mighty island-people; but such considerations were over-ridden by his ostensible contempt for Utilitarianism as well as by his genuine hatred of Christianity, whose heroic ethics called forth the resentment of his undisciplined nature. One could fill pages with descriptions of his fits of wild rage against England, and the only consolation for his numerous English admirers must be found in the fact that at least one nation, the German, comes off still worse with him. One remark of his may suffice here: "More delicate nostrils will sense even in English Christianity a typically English whiff of spleen and alcoholic debauchery, against which it serves as a remedy for good reasons. . . . That herd of drunkards and debauchees which has learnt to emit moral grunts, first under the power of Methodism, and recently again in the guise of the Salvation Army."

A third group among those who hate England for her base materialism is formed—scarcely in harmony with this cool, sociological theory—by the founders of "Historical Materialism." Marx and Engels both knew England, where they had found refuge since the middle of the century and where they had lived until their death, as few Germans knew her. Their judgment, however, was determined by the terrible impressions they received, at the very outset, of the misery among the wage-earners during this

abhorrent period of English Industrial Capitalism. To this must be added their repugnance to the cruel and seemingly hypocritical justification for this misery; for the bourgeoisie of England upheld a pseudo-Christian code of ethics in business, against which these two revolutionaries, anti-Christian as they were, reacted with particular vehemence. The classic memorial of this attitude is Engels' early work, *Position of the Working Classes in England*, published in 1845, in which most carefully-made observations alternate with almost nonsensical outbursts of hate. Dealing with the English manufacturer, for instance, he says: "The very bond between him and his wife is in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred merely 'cash payment.'" Marx, too, makes most astonishing statements in the first volume of *Capital* (1867). Take his preface: "The High Church, for instance, would sooner pardon an attack on thirty-eight articles of faith of a total of thirty-nine, than on one-thirty-ninth part of her income." Two years after these words Gladstone, surely one of the most faithful sons of the Anglican Church (which Marx mistook for the High Church), abolished the Church-rate for non-Anglicans, and again a year later he forced the Church to forgo more than half of her huge income extorted from Ireland. But the orthodox section of the German Social Democrats and the Communists of to-day have clung fast to this conception, canonised by their two Fathers of the Church, of an England that has vanished long ago; and that is why their ranks could not furnish an opponent for the reactionaries who despise the England of to-day.

Of the various accusations levelled against English politics which have either arisen from this source or have been traced back to it later, the most famous is that of perfidy, i.e. not of ordinary faithlessness, but of a faithlessness that is committed with a cold calculation of the advantages to be gained. It will be readily seen how closely this is connected with the reproach of a materialistic frame of mind that is bereft of ideals, utilitarian and therefore without feeling. The slogan, "*Perfide Albion*," came, of course, from France; its first use (on good authority) dates back to 1793; but it merely expresses the opinion prevalent during the eighteenth century. Indeed, during that period politics were no less perfidious in England than in France or Prussia, and in German historical literature writers have since that time always returned to this period whenever there was occasion to illustrate the truth about "perfidious Albion," a phrase that had quickly become a familiar quotation. These men overlooked the far-reaching influence which the religious awakening and the all-pervading spirit of commerce had exerted upon English politics—factors that have raised England, in comparison with the Great Powers, to be the least

perfidious. None the less the reproach has become, and remains, so general that it is scarcely worth while illustrating the case.

Perfidy in deeds is counterbalanced by hypocrisy in words. Hypocrisy, too, is but an expression of general materialism and utilitarianism, for unscrupulously and with a set purpose selfish thoughts and motives are hidden behind expressions apparently unselfish. Whenever these expressions of hypocrisy have a moral and religious colouring and whenever they are especially associated with Christian ethics, we speak of sanctimoniousness. And so the reproach of hypocrisy and sanctimoniousness among Englishmen is spread far and wide, particularly among those who denounce Christian ethics and therefore do not take them for granted in others. Already Goethe, who displayed so just an appreciation of other sides of the Englishman's character, failed to show any love for English politics; but he obtained his information on politics mainly from French journals. In 1829 he said to Förster: "Nowhere are so many hypocrites and sanctimonious persons to be found as in England." Just a few days previously in a conversation with Eckermann he had given his reasons for this judgment by referring to what is claimed to be one of the finest achievements in English politics: "the hollow protests against the slave-trade." He traces these back to some "concrete object" "without which Englishmen, of course, undertake nothing"—in other words that the English needed the niggers in West Africa and produced them in America.

Before all others it was Bismarck who impressed upon the German people the axiom of English "hypocrisy" and "idle talk about humanitarianism." But Bismarck's attitude towards England is too complicated to be dealt with here.

With materialism as a base and perfidy and hypocrisy as artful means, English politicians—so opponents will have it—steer their course with unerring singleness of purpose towards world-dominion; indomitable national pride allows of no slackening on its course. This judgment, too, had gradually become dominant in Germany. Pride that knows no bounds is the oldest charge. Next came aspiration for world-dominion, a reproach that arose in the classical period of our literature; seen through cosmopolitan spectacles the national feature of this island-nation necessarily appeared uncanny and provocative. Klopstock, who at first was extravagantly enthusiastic about Milton's country, but who, as his confidence in his own powers grew, placed German verse (i.e. his own) and even contemporary German painting above the English, was the first German who hoped for "*der Tag*," though perhaps he did not actually drink to the toast. In his famous ode *We and They*, 1766, he writes:

They would flee before us! O that We saw them in that battle whom We alone understand! Close, one day, steel to steel. . . .

And for this reason :

They are very rich, and very proud!
We are not rich, and We are not proud!
That raises us above Them!
And we are righteous! They are not!
They stand on high, and dream of higher things!
We honour strangers' merits!

It should be mentioned that Klopstock shortly afterwards preferred making acquaintance with British gold to tasting British steel: he tried to secure assistance from there.

Kant was by no means a natural hater of Britain. He believed himself to be a descendant from a Scottish family named "Cant"—he was very probably wrong—and was proud to be a member of the nation of Hume. He loved to converse with English merchants who had come to Königsberg on business, and among these he discovered his dearest friend, Joseph Green. His political verdict, however, was altogether different. It is most severe in the well-known addition made to the *Anthropologie* of 1798:

The English nation (*gens*), considered as a nation (*populus*), is a most estimable group of human beings, when you consider them man to man; but as a state in relation to other states, the most destructive of all, most cruel, most domineering, and most likely to arouse war.

Kant's sympathies with the French Revolution can be clearly felt here, and some traveller's report may perhaps have been the original source of the following assertion of his: a foreigner in England could "perish on a dunghill for not being an Englishman, i.e. a human being." Kant's greatest disciple, Schiller, has said little on this topic and that of no special importance. In the period of *Sturm und Drang* he was, of course, favourably disposed towards the land of political freedom. But despite all the admiration in Ferdinand's declamations before Lady Milford, there is to be heard the subdued reproach against that national pride intensified to blindness: "The free-born daughter of heaven's freest race, that is too proud withal to burn incense before a stranger's virtue." With regard to his later period the poem dedicated "To the beginning of the new century" is most widely known: "Two giant nations struggling now for the sole dominion of the world, in order to devour freedom in all lands wield the trident and hurl lightning." Thus sang Schiller, the poet-prophet. Schiller, the professor of history, should have written: "'Twas but the trident that checked the lightning." Then follow those famous words, clearly reminis-

cent of the bygone days of the *Mare Clausum* theory and the Navigation Acts: "Greedily, as the polypus, does the Briton spread his merchant-fleet, and he would close the realm of Amphitrite the Free like his own house." That has been repeated innumerable times, and especially during the Great War. But much earlier than this there had been instilled into the German people a senseless apprehension of world dominion and world oppression based upon, or aiming at, world trade. (As though Britain's trade did not presuppose and create the wealth of her customers and suppliers!) First of all we must mention Treitschke. In his pre-Bismarckian period, it is true, many a Liberal trait was discernible in the Conservative character of this mighty man; and accordingly he praised the "land of freedom" often enough. But even in those days his admiration was centred upon an England that did not exist, or no longer existed: upon the religious militarism of Cromwell and Milton, upon the alleged power of the aristocratic House of Lords, upon the "courageous English saying": my country, right or wrong! On the other hand, "hypocrisy" even then appeared to him to be the basic weakness of the nation and its most hateful sin. We are thus prepared for the revulsion of feeling caused by Britain's neutrality (not always benevolent) during the wars for national unity. To this disappointment was added the hatred of the militarist and the man of letters for the commercial way of thinking which he imagined to be for ever that of the old Capitalism.

Treitschke exerted an immeasurable influence on the Germany of Bismarck and William, for he held the Chair of History in Berlin from 1874 until his death and brought the educated young men of Germany under his spell. When still attending a secondary school I stole into the crowded lecture theatre. Among the audience was a young Englishman who received indelible impressions: Austen Chamberlain. But most important of all, a young naval officer sat at his feet: Alfred Tirpitz. Tirpitz relates in his memoirs how he used to sit with the "glorious man" in Josty's Café and how he would "obtain advice" from the deaf historian by scribbling questions on bits of paper. During his one and only visit to England in 1895 he spoke to the German historian, who stood by his side on the terrace of Windsor, of the coming war with "flashing eyes," "and his voice sounded like the stroke of steel."

This article is an endeavour to give an explanation by showing the roots of distrust, and it will be perfectly futile to hope for Anglo-German conciliation and co-operation as long as these roots have not been dug out and destroyed.

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NEW LIGHT ON FRANZ FERDINAND.*

IT will soon be sixteen years since I published my first article in this Journal, and it concerned Franz Ferdinand, who had just then become the victim of Princip's bullet. At that time it was naturally impossible to draw a wholly objective portrait of the Archduke, not only because consideration for the dynasty forbade it, but also because material was still lacking. Since then the Memoirs of Conrad and the publications of the German and Austrian Archives have supplied many a valuable block for the statue of Franz Ferdinand, so that his features are already clearly recognisable. This monument can, of course, only be completed when his posthumous papers are available. However, this is not to happen till fifty years after his death, i.e. not before 1964, when none of the elders of the present-day generation will be alive.

Two books on Franz Ferdinand have recently appeared almost simultaneously: *Archduke Franz Ferdinand's Work and Intentions*, by Leopold Baron von Chlumetzky, the former editor of the *Oesterreichische Rundschau*, and *Franz Ferdinand*, by Dr. Viktor Eisenmenger, his former physician-in-ordinary. The books may compete with each other, but they differ considerably in their contents. Chlumetzky's work is highly political. Before the war its author played an important part among Austrian publicists, for his periodical (which no longer exists) was held to be the Archduke's mouthpiece; as it was, however, predominantly political, its acoustic properties were not great, for the number of subscribers and therefore its influence was not large. The chief bridge between him and the Archduke was Colonel Alexander von Brosch, who was also Chief of the Archduke's Military Secretariat. Brosch was as accomplished as he was ambitious; he knew how to combine strength of character with wise suppleness—a rare quality—he enjoyed an exceptional measure of his master's confidence, and hardly anyone had so great an influence upon the Archduke as he. It was he who set up the Archduke's Military Secretariat, and it was due to his ambition and abilities that in military and political questions it soon became one of the most influential factors in the Monarchy. It was there above all that the decisions regarding appointments to high military posts and ministerial office were made, and the influence of this centre of power grew with the influence Franz Ferdinand gained by untiring, tenacious fighting. It was the director of this influential institution who kept Chlumetzky constantly informed of the intentions of his eminent chief, and his

letters to Chlumetzky play an important part in this book. Moreover Chlumetzky had the great privilege of using those of Brosch's posthumous written papers which are not being preserved in the State Archives with the papers of his master. It is this correspondence of Brosch which gives to the work its particular value and makes it an important source for Franz Ferdinand's future biographer.

In his book Chlumetzky sets forth his view that the character and bearing of Franz Ferdinand can only be wholly understood if his relation to the Emperor Francis Joseph is known and his long reign recalled. In the introduction to his book he therefore reviews the sixty-eight years during which Francis Joseph's hands held the sceptre of the Habsburg Empire. He says in a few pages that for which other authors need stout volumes. However finely pointed the pencil with which the sketch was drawn, however much the hand that held it may have trembled with indignation, the sharply-edged portrait is a brilliant success.

Two of Francis Joseph's qualities made themselves very disadvantageously felt during his reign: his disinclination to listen to disagreeable things and his inclination to put off all decisions, a characteristic which became particularly bad in his old age. His majestic unapproachableness, which placed an insurmountable barrier between his person and even the nearest members of his family, and created between himself and the rest of the world a vacuum the icy atmosphere of which froze every attempt at an approach, helped to shape the evil course taken by events. Side by side with these faults he possessed excellent qualities for a ruler: exemplary diligence, faithfulness to duty, a phenomenal memory, a mastery of routine, a sober, clear intellect, a keen insight into human nature, truly majestic dignity and, not least, an astonishing self-control; yet all these great qualities could not counterbalance his few but serious faults. Thus it came about that all the important political problems of his Empire were shunted into a siding as there was no one to solve them, and there they accumulated in a dangerous manner, all the more menacing since each of these problems hid inflammable material. Here and there a faint flicker appeared, but the fire was always successfully put out in time and an explosion prevented. The extraordinary prestige of the old Emperor, the profound respect he inspired in all his peoples, and the mighty force of habit had produced within the Monarchy, and probably also abroad, the firm belief that as long as he lived revolution was out of the question and the Empire would continue to exist, though for years it had already been creaking in all its joints. But after his death?

Such was the political situation Franz Ferdinand had to face

* (1) Leopold von Chlumetzky: *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinands Wirken und Wollen*. Verlag für Kulturpolitik, Berlin 1929.
(2) Viktor Eisenmenger: *Franz Ferdinand*, Amalthea-Verlag, Zürich-Leipzig-Wien.

when, by the death of Crown Prince Rudolf, he became heir to the throne and began to think of the problems he would some day have to solve. Only to *think* of the problems, for as yet he dared not handle them; the Emperor's jealousy forbade that; he permitted no one to touch his rights as ruler and allowed him to interfere in politics as little as formerly his own son. With increasing ripeness of judgment Franz Ferdinand thoroughly entered into the difficult problems which, interwoven and closely adhering, formed together that conglomeration, so difficult of solution, described as "The Austrian Question." The more he concerned himself—purely theoretically—with all these questions, the better he understood them, the more clearly he recognised the enormous danger that threatened the empire and the necessity for removing and rendering harmless the inflammable material before there should be an explosion capable of destroying throne and empire. Clearly to recognise this danger, to be filled with passionate desire to avert it, and to be forced to look on inactively as the difficulties gathered round the Empire and gradually closed every exit: to be called upon to rule this unfortunate Empire, to have to bring order to this chaos: all this would have been much to ask of a cold-blooded, phlegmatic man. For a hot-blooded, passionate man, eager for achievement, as was Franz Ferdinand, it meant an almost insupportable test of patience and self-denial; a tragic burden, imposed by cruel fate. His ardent desires met with cold restraint, his clear vision was condemned to impotent observation. The suppression of his energies was nerve-wrecking, and he was ever pursued by the fear that he would come to the throne too late, when everything would have gone hopelessly wrong.

It was but natural that such a fate should leave deep traces on his character, that it should make him irritable, impatient, bitter, and sometimes cause violent explosions to relieve his constantly suppressed desire for action. It was the more natural since all these emotions found a receptive soil in his soul; for he had already suffered grievously. A few years after becoming heir to the throne the evil heritage of his mother who had died of tuberculosis made itself felt. His condition became gradually worse so that he was compelled to take serious steps to combat the baneful disease. Accompanied by his physician, Dr. Eisenmenger, he sought a cure in the Southern Tyrol and in the mild climate of the Mediterranean—in Lussin, Corsica, the French Riviera, Egypt. The knowledge of walking on the edge of a precipice, of having perhaps to give up his young life with the Imperial Crown in sight, the unaccustomed tutelage of his doctor, all this worried him and made him irritable, impatient, and a prey to deep depression. In this state of depression he was a very difficult

patient to treat, and much patience and energy were required to persuade him to carry out his doctor's orders. Dr. Eisenmenger has made this period the principal theme of his book, and he tells a tale of the struggle between him and his distinguished patient. He was warmly supported by Franz Ferdinand's stepmother, the Archduchess Maria Theresia (of Braganza)—a "grand woman," the doctor calls her, though he was by no means a flatterer. Franz Ferdinand felt great love and deep devotion for her. The letters he wrote her from Egypt at the time when his malady threatened to become worse, and he consequently felt particularly depressed, express an ardent, childlike longing for her which she stilled by visiting him there.*

During this difficult period Franz Ferdinand learned to know people from their least advantageous side. Believing him marked for death, men turned from him to his younger brother Otto without even trying to hide their change of front. This produced in the Archduke great bitterness and left a sting behind which was never extracted. Like a thorn that has deeply penetrated the flesh and settled there, this experience produced a certain hardness of heart which showed itself in an infinite contempt for men and a deep distrust that made him at first see in every one who approached him a cringer seeking only his own advantage. He once frankly confessed to Field-Marshal Conrad that he considered every man a knave till he had convinced himself of the contrary.

His strong constitution and the efforts of his doctor eventually mastered the malady and he recovered completely, which filled him with the grim satisfaction of having destroyed the hopes of those who had already reckoned with his death. He did not, however, long enjoy convalescence before a fresh sorrow, a new struggle awaited him. He loved a young lady who was indeed of a noble family but yet not his equal in birth and therefore unable to become Empress. The whole Court and the whole official world were against this marriage project, and at the head of this opposing phalanx stood no other than the Emperor Francis Joseph; yet he fought the hard fight successfully and married the lady of his choice, Countess Sophie Chotek, who was subsequently raised to the rank of a Princess and then to that of Duchess of Hohenberg. During this difficult time it was again Franz Ferdinand's stepmother, the Archduchess Maria Theresia, who took his part; it was principally due to her wise, conciliatory influence that the Emperor finally gave his consent to this marriage which was so unpleasing to him. Although Franz Ferdinand had carried his

* For my book on Franz Ferdinand and the Archduchess Maria Theresia very kindly placed at my disposal a wide selection of letters, a few of which I published; among these is one in which the Archduke's depression almost verges on despair, and the longing for his mother sounds like a cry of distress.

point, the inequality of his wife's birth was often painfully brought home to him, for his male and female opponents at Court missed no opportunity of causing her humiliation which he felt more deeply than she, and which caused him to avoid Court Society as far as possible. Yet this spitefulness was unable to mar the happiness of his married life, which remained untroubled right up to the end, and received its tragic consecration from the fact that these two people who loved each other so ardently and unflinchingly were united in death. His happiest time was spent with his wife and children—Princess Sophie and the Princes Max and Ernst—far from Vienna at one of his castles. Konopischt was his favourite residence; it has become famous from his meeting the Emperor William there shortly before his murder.

Although Franz Ferdinand kept aloof from the official world and indulged in his hobbies, collecting works of art, gardening, and particularly hunting—he was an almost fanatical hunter, and a surprisingly good shot—he never lost sight of political events, and pursued them with passionate interest. Here, too, he had to fight. Once again it was a hard struggle, for his chief adversary was again the Emperor. He could not for any length of time sit with folded hands and watch things in the Empire slide down an inclined plane that must inevitably lead to the abyss. He took up the cudgels against the Emperor—not his person, for he always showed him the greatest veneration, but against the system his statesmen had initiated and which he approved because it suited his convenience. It was a tough struggle between the two highest personages in the Empire. Very gradually, step by step, Franz Ferdinand succeeded in getting a footing and making progress. The Emperor's great age was in his favour; for though his strength was not yet exhausted, it had become worn and frayed, and he was no longer able to resist his younger, stronger-willed and persevering opponent with such energy as formerly. He began to retreat, but still defended his absolute power with great tenacity. Though Franz Ferdinand's influence in the Monarchy became more evident as time went on, he was yet far from acquiring the power he sought. It was only in military questions that he was allowed to lead; in the political field he was still far from his goal.

His chief aim was the solution of the national questions which threatened to ruin the Monarchy. As long as the Dualism which divided it into two differently governed parts persisted, no improvement could be expected. In Hungary the Magyars' mistaken nationalism would not admit that it was impossible to continue to govern, as hitherto, a country like Hungary, only half of which is populated by Magyars. For this system took from

the other peoples the right to feel themselves "Nations"; lowered them in the eyes of the governing Magyars to inferior "nationalities," one might say second-grade citizens; and wanted at all costs to Magyarise them. The logical consequence of this mistaken policy was that the non-Magyarised peoples of Hungary, finding in Vienna no redress for their complaints, sought help from kindred neighbours of the Monarchy, and that in this way in all the non-Magyar districts of Hungary—except in the German portion where the inhabitants were on the side of the Hungarians—irredentist currents gradually arose which became increasingly dangerous to the existence of the Monarchy.

Franz Ferdinand realised this danger and wanted to reconcile the discontented nations; each one was to find salvation in its own way within the frame of the Habsburg Empire. Through the *plurality of the nations* he sought the *unity of the Empire*. This was the much discussed and much maligned *Grossösterreichische Idee* (Great-Austria idea) forming the political ideal of the heir to the throne. He considered it his first and most urgent task as ruler to satisfy all races. As long as this remained unsolved the Monarchy could not, in his opinion, undertake a venturesome or aggressive foreign policy. First peace and security internally, then only might she think of playing a solo in the concert of the Powers. Franz Ferdinand was therefore not at all warlike; recognising the danger of strained relations between the Monarchy and Russia, he tried to restore the Three Emperors' League. Another motive was the thought of the danger of a social revolution which his keen vision, sharpened by suspicion, foresaw. Austria—no longer Austria-Hungary—Germany and Russia—the political ideal before his eyes—were to form a solid conservative block on which the revolutionary endeavours of the socialists and communists were to founder. Any war might bring about this dreaded danger of a revolution. That is why he did not want war! Franz Ferdinand's opponents continued to assert and still assert that he was head of the war-party; but this is a malicious lie, like the legend that he wished to restore Austrian rule in Italy and therefore planned to attack her. There is only one grain of truth in this rumour which attributed to him the rôle of Don Quixote, for which with his clear vision, his acute understanding and practical sense he was totally unsuited: he greatly disliked Italy because he recognised that this questionable "ally" of the Monarchy was its deadly foe and merely waited for a suitable moment when she could plunge her dagger into its back. He was convinced that the Monarchy would have to go to war with Italy; but he resisted all Conrad's representations, greatly though he

valued his advice. As long as Austria remained internally unconsolidated she must not think of war.

The *raison d'être* of Chlumetzky's book, which is not a biography but merely a presentation of his *Political Work and Intentions*, is to prove Franz Ferdinand's emphatic disinclination for a war-like policy. Only ill-intentioned people will, after reading it, continue to give credence to the legend of his war policy and to the lie, invented by Serbia, and spread by her protagonists in excuse of the murder, that the heir to the throne had arranged with the Emperor William in Konopischt, at their last meeting, in the middle of June 1914, to attack Serbia.

Though Chlumetzky's book exclusively concerns politics, some interesting side-light is thrown on the human side of Franz Ferdinand's personality, and shows him in a very favourable light. This is particularly true of the numerous letters it contains of the Archduke to Colonel Brosch, the chief of his Military Chancery. When political conditions in the Monarchy aroused his ire, which frequently happened, he was very outspoken and expressed his opinion in the strongest terms. With people dear to him, however, his tone was of the warmest and heartiest, free from court restraint, a tone never sounded from the mouth or the pen of Francis Joseph. Here is, for instance, a letter to Brosch, who was then no longer with him but was the Colonel of a Kaiserjäger-Regiment in the Tyrol; it was in reply to New Year's greetings:

Vienna,
Belvedere,
December 29th, 1912.

Dear Brosch,

My wife, the children and I thank you and your wife most heartily for your kind wishes which we reciprocate most warmly and fervently. May 1913 bring you only the happiness, joy, and blessing you so richly deserve. It gives me particular pleasure to see from the warm tone of your letter that you are happy in your fine regiment, and frequently think of us. Yes, we also speak of you and recall the time when, in joy and trouble, often under the most difficult conditions, you served me with unfailing loyalty and indescribable diligence, made all work easy for me, and supported me with rare tact and ability. I am deeply touched, dear Brosch, by your remembering that time with so much love and gratitude.

You may imagine the work I had to do during the weeks I had to stay here. The excitement continued day and night, and how often was the soldier forced to remain silent *contre cœur* and to practise the virtue of obedience.

Happily I get on very well with Berchtold, but the whole of his surroundings are still infected by the Aehrenthal poison. I hope when quieter times come I shall once again be able to go to Bozen and Meran, and I am already looking forward to seeing you again. In March we shall probably go to Miramar.

With our renewed thanks, and sending you once more our warmest wishes, I remain always with heartiest greetings,
Yours sincerely,
Fh. Franz.

The following extract from a letter to Brosch written at the time of the annexation crisis is a striking proof of Franz Ferdinand's love of peace and of the slanderous character of the accusation of being a war-monger.

"Please, do tame Conrad. He is to cease this war-mongering. It would, of course, be very tempting to punish these Serbs and Montenegrins, but what good are these cheap laurels if we saddle ourselves with a European entanglement and perhaps have to fight on two or three fronts? Conrad must not allow himself to be influenced, or want to mobilise a fresh corps at the war cry of every staff-captain. Let him work day and night at his preparations, but not stir up war. In the end Italy will attack us, and England will create difficulties for us, and we shall have to fight on two fronts! That will be the end of the story."

Colonel Brosch knew the heir to the throne as few people did; he had spent six years in constant official and personal intercourse with him; he had seen him angry and indignant, and happy and cheerful in his family circle. No one therefore was more competent than he to draw a character-sketch of this man. Chlumetzky was fortunate in being able to embody in his book a posthumous characteristic account of the Archduke written by Brosch and not intended for publication. Here are a few outstanding passages from this extensive document:

"The Archduke is magnanimous, never loses himself in detail, and after two words he knows what one is driving at; it is therefore a pleasure to make a report to him. He is charming to those around him; during the whole of the six years I never saw a cross face or heard a rough word. Once his confidence has been gained which, it is true, takes some time, it lasts and knows no bounds. Of course, one has to put up with the advice of officious persons and their antagonistic influence. . . . The Archduke knows men well and is hardly ever deceived in his choice. . . . Great energy is attributed to him, and with justice; unfortunately it is rather explosive than impulsive. He always interferes in fits and starts; he lacks steadiness, and one therefore gets the impression of something startling, unexpected, always harbouring some danger. . . . He clings to his ideas and views with enormous tenacity, one might say obstinacy; if one succeeds for a time in converting him, sooner or later he will return to his original intention, and one is astonished at having to begin all over again. . . . On the other hand he is open to suggestions and, unless he is prejudiced from the outset against the petitioner, it is really easy to convince him of a good thing; only one must find the proper form for it. He cannot under any circumstance

put up with direct contradiction, but he can stand, and indeed demands the unvarnished truth like hardly anybody else. If, therefore, one is able to clothe sincerity in an agreeable form, one can accomplish almost anything. Of course, it needs much patience, ability, and the choice of the right moment; it is troublesome. . . . He is often severe and hard in his judgment, and precipitate, and so it happens at times that he does someone an injustice; but when he sees that he is in the wrong he does not hesitate to make amends.

The Archduke shares with the German Emperor his great abilities and his impulsiveness. Like William II he would like to disregard constitutional institutions. He does not weigh his words much and frequently does not realise the full bearing of his often premature utterances. . . . But he differs agreeably from the German Emperor in that he does not think that he knows everything best, but gives weight to the opinions of others; he is more inclined to underestimate his abilities than to overrate them. In contradistinction to the German Emperor, he hates to take part in official functions and arrangements. He likes best to be with his family, leading the life of a simple citizen, where court ceremonies and show are banished. Although he is a good speaker and appeals to the heart without any false pathos, speaking is torture to him.

At home and on his travels he wears civilian clothes, but he is a thorough soldier. There is no doubt that he considers the military profession as the finest. . . . He is marvellously quick of comprehension and has a sure eye especially for military matters. His sense of the lie of the country and his memory are astonishing. One glance at the manoeuvre-map during breakfast suffices to keep him informed for the rest of the day without another glance. . . . His attachment to old regimental comrades is touching, and almost all of them owe their promotion to him. He cannot refuse a request even if formerly he was not very favourably inclined towards the person concerned. . . ."

This is a true character sketch of Franz Ferdinand, whom the malicious fame of the world represented as a hard, stern tyrant, always thinking of war, a modern Philip II of Spain.

THEODOR VON SOSNOSKY.

THE CRYSTAL PALACE: OUR LEGACY FROM THE PRINCE CONSORT.

From Chaucer's *House of Fame*: A Retrospect and Forecast.

"I dreamt I was
Within a temple made of glass,
In which there were more images
Of gold, standing in sundry stages, . . .
And with jewels more pinacles
And more curious portraitures
And quaint manner of figures
Of gold work than I ever saw.

Then there came entering in the Hall
A right great company withal,
And that of sundry regions
Of all kind of conditions
That dwell in earth under the moon,
Poor and rich; such a great congregation
Of folks as I saw roam about,
Some within and some without,
Was never seen; nor shall be no more."

THE Royal Society of Arts and the Royal Academy were the earliest bodies to move in this country in favour of a national exhibition. But France had anticipated us from that point of view, and there were French national exhibitions even before the Napoleonic War. The greatest of these was held in Paris in the year 1844. But this exhibition, as well as its predecessors, was concerned with French interests alone. No foreign nations could exhibit. It remained for this country to realise Chaucer's vision of a "right great company of sundry regions to roam within that temple made of glass." The Society of Arts, encouraged by French successes, now set to work to establish an exhibition of our own national industries, and after three years announced its intention publicly. The Prince Consort, as President of the Society, took the subject under his personal care and asked several of his fellow-members to visit the most important manufacturing cities in Great Britain in support of the exhibition project. Public meetings were held in these centres, local committees formed, and some 5,000 men of influence registered their names in support of the proposed exhibition. On the strength of this encouragement a Royal Commission for the organisation and protection of the exhibition was granted by Queen Victoria.

Next came the question of a site, and Prince Albert suggested the vacant space in Hyde Park on the south side, parallel with and between the Kensington Drive and Rotten Row, and this proved a most judicious choice. For this site was far enough from the busiest parts of London to prevent any interrup-

tion of its commerce, yet not so far as to be inconvenient or to cause unnecessary loss of time to the expected crowd of visitors.

Next came the question of ways and means. A public appeal for subscriptions was made by the Royal Commissioners, and the not very handsome Guarantee Fund of £230,000 was obtained. Then the Building Committee called upon the architects of any country who chose to compete to furnish plans, and had no less than 233 of these submitted to them by English, Scotch, Irish, French, Dutch, Neapolitan, and German competitors. All the foreign plans were politely turned down, in spite of "the great taste and learning they exhibited," and only at the eleventh hour Joseph Paxton's Crystal Palace plan was accepted.

But who was Paxton and what possessed him to project his palace of glass? A gardener's boy to begin with and then in charge of the Duke of Devonshire's gardens and conservatories, into which he had introduced level glass roofing. The idea of the Crystal Palace was suggested to him "by an attentive examination of the large unbroken leaf and the longitudinal and transverse girders and supporters at the back of the gigantic and magnificent water-lily, the Victoria Regia, imported into this country from South Africa and which flowered for the first time in our clime on November 9th, 1849, in a house expressly fitted up for it in the gardens at Chatsworth, where the water in which it was placed was kept in motion by a small water-wheel, invented for the purpose by Mr. Paxton."

Messrs. Fox and Henderson undertook to build the Exhibition on Paxton's design for £150,000, and the great iron-masters and glass manufacturers of the North came to terms with them over the cost of materials. Then, as it is well described in a contemporary record: "Up went the hoarding round the destined space and away went the greensward. Wooden walls arose, then columns, then girders spanned across, first at formal and naked distances, but rapidly thickening like a forest of masts. Then galleries spread around and staircases sprang up to meet them, and so the work proceeded; a fabric to be four times the size of St. Peter's and six times the size of St. Paul's."

As has been said, the exhibition of 1851 was the first national undertaking of its kind, and it is no wonder, therefore, that the admission of foreign exhibits within its walls was a difficult and delicate one. But the exhibition commissioners with wise generosity decided to use one-half of the Crystal Palace space—space equal to the entire area of the Paris exhibition of 1844-5—for foreign exhibits. Moreover, these exhibits were allowed to enter our ports free of examination and duties, and indeed everything was done to facilitate their introduction, in harmony with the views expressed by the Prince Consort at a banquet

given by the Lord Mayor of London to the chief magistrates of the leading cities, towns, and boroughs throughout the country.

Though uttered eighty years ago, some of these views hold good even more to-day than when the Prince pronounced them, as extracts from his speech will show:

Nobody will doubt that we are living at a period of most wonderful transition, which tends rapidly to accomplish that great end, the realisation of the unity of mankind. The distances which separated the different nations and parts of the globe are gradually vanishing before the achievements of modern invention and we can traverse them with incredible speed. The languages of all nations are known and their requirements placed within the reach of everybody; thought is communicated with the rapidity and even by the power of lightning. The division of labour and the publicity now given to inventions of every kind, while the produce of all quarters of the globe is placed at our disposal, have introduced a new era. Again science discovers the laws of power, motion and transformation, and industry applies them to the raw material which the earth yields us in abundance, but which become valuable only by knowledge. Finally art teaches us the immutable laws of beauty and symmetry and gives to our productions forms in accordance with them. The exhibition of 1851 is to give us a true test and living picture of the point of development at which the whole of mankind has arrived, and a new starting point from which all nations will be able to direct their future exertions.

But behind the scenes, in spite of the fact that the Prince was being supported by the best business brains in Great Britain, there was much opposition of a covert character to the Crystal Palace scheme. The following extract from one of the Prince's letters, to be found in Sir Theodore Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, shows very vividly how he was suffering from such opposition, for he writes:

Just at present I am more dead than alive from overwork. The opponents of the Exhibition work with might and main to throw all the old women into panic and to drive myself crazy. The strangers, they give out, are certain to commence a thorough revolution here, to murder Victoria and myself, and to proclaim the Red Republic in England; the plague is certain to ensue from the confluence of such vast multitudes, and to swallow up those whom the increased price of everything has not already swept away. For all this I am to be responsible, and against all this I have to make efficient provision.

Buckingham Palace, April 15th, 1851.

The project was also looked upon with coldness by several of the great continental Powers, apparently from an apprehension that contact with English institutions might open dangerous lines of opinion in the minds of their subjects, who were sure to be drawn in considerable numbers to this country by the attractions of such an exhibition. In the case of Prussia, the Government so alarmed the King with apprehensions of danger from Republican assassins

that, for a time, he prohibited the Prince and Princess of Prussia (afterwards Emperor and Empress of Germany) from accepting the invitation of our Queen that they should be present at the opening. This prohibition, it is stated in Bunsen's *Memoirs* (Vol II, p. 262), was finally withdrawn, "rather in consideration of the decided wish of the Prince to make the proposed visit, than in consequence of the arguments and the evidence which Bunsen forcibly brought before His Majesty to prove the tales of conspiracy to be wholly fictitious, which in continental Courts were received as credible." In Tallis' contemporary *History and Description of the Crystal Palace* there is this account of the great rush to the opening of the Exhibition :

The millions that thronged to the banks of Old Father Thames were unheard of, undreamt of. As it was, many a timorous old lady and old gentleman anticipated nothing but riot and disorder; some spoke of famine, others of Chartism, but to the wonder, almost consternation of all such evil-foreboders, the utmost tranquillity and harmony prevailed. Even the great Iron Duke, who sniffed mischief in the breeze and talked of cannon and encampments in the Park, was compelled to admit with astonishment that all such displays of force would be very much out of place. For a more peaceable gathering never mustered its forces and amity actuated not only those of a kindred tongue, but united all nations.

To this may be added an excerpt from a Press account, describing the opening :

Thursday the first of May, 1851, the day originally fixed for the opening, dawned brilliantly. It was indeed a Mayday deserving all the praises of our English poets, but never did it witness such a pageant as presented itself in Hyde Park at the opening of the Exhibition. In the immediate neighbourhood of the Palace every space was occupied where human foot could be planted. A sea of heads extended over the whole of St. James' Park, along Constitution Hill, through Knightsbridge and Rotten Row, whose owners were all intent to see the great opening. At a quarter to twelve the Royal procession reached the Northern entrance of the Crystal Palace and was greeted by the National Anthem from the band in attendance at the building. The scene at this moment became inexpressibly animated. The cannon on the banks of the Serpentine thundered out a welcome, emulated by the joyous shouts of the applauding multitude. "The merry bells rang round," the Union Jack was hoisted from every point of vantage, and the Royal standard was at the same time displayed, floating proudly above the one hundred and one flags of all nations with which the glittering Palace was decorated.

Much has been written of this wonderful ceremony by observers from without. With what feelings were they regarded where the plan of the exhibition had been conceived and matured by Prince Albert with the full knowledge of the devoted Queen? We quote from her own diary as follows :

May 1st. The great event has taken place—a complete and beautiful triumph—a glorious and touching sight, one which I shall ever be proud of for my beloved Albert and my country. . . . Yes! it is a day which makes my heart swell with pride and glory and thankfulness!

The glimpse of the transept through the iron gates, the waving palms, flowers, statues, myriads of people filling the galleries and seats around and the flourish of trumpets as we entered gave us a sensation which we can never forget, and I felt much moved. The sight was magical, so vast, so glorious, so touching. One felt as so many did whom I have since spoken to, filled with devotion, more so than at any service I have ever heard. The tremendous cheers, the joy expressed in every face . . . and my beloved husband, the author of this peace festival, which united the industry of all nations upon earth, standing beside me.

Right through the summer and autumn of 1851 the Exhibition Palace and grounds were crowded by visitors, native and foreign. So popular indeed had the Palace become that towards the end of the year public anxiety was being felt as to what was to become of the building which had done so much for national enterprise and national taste. It was felt that it could not be retained in Hyde Park, but a Crystal Palace Company was formed to transfer it to a more appropriate and extensive site at Sydenham, upon the summit of the hill with a splendid prospect on the one side across the counties of Surrey and Kent and on the other over the distant Metropolis. In its re-erection, the Crystal Palace was beautified. The roof was raised some fifty feet higher than in the Hyde Park structure, and the north and south transepts were added. Sir Joseph Paxton used the sloping character of the site to add a fresh storey to the building, and the extent of the Palace grounds which ran to 200 acres enabled them to be used for gardens, playgrounds, and to illustrate the geology of the antediluvian period and exhibit specimens of monsters of that period. In a word, to quote Mr. H. J. Buckland, the present General Manager, "it was possible to walk for three-quarters of a mile underneath a noble glass roof when the Palace was re-opened in state by Queen Victoria on June 10th, 1854."

In the *Times* of March 5th there appeared a letter explaining exactly what happened to the handsome surplus of £168,000, resulting from the exhibition of 1851. The Exhibition Commissioners in charge of that amount were at a loss how to spend it. Not so the Prince Consort. As early as August 1851, in a letter to Baron Stockmar on the subject, this proposal emerges :

I am asked what I would do with the surplus. I would propose the following scheme. I am assured that from twenty-five to thirty acres of ground nearly opposite the Crystal Palace, on the other side of the Kensington Road, called Kensington Gore . . . are to be purchased at this moment for about £50,000. I would buy that ground and place on it four institutions corresponding to the four great sections of the Exhibition—Raw

Materials, Machinery, Manufactures, and Plastic Art. I would devote these institutions to the furtherance of the industrial pursuits of all nations in these four divisions.

The Prince's fellow-Commissioners concurring, the site opposite the Hyde Park Crystal Palace was bought, and on it have been built in the course of three generations those institutions which so distinguish South Kensington. Amongst these are six museums, including the Victoria and Albert Museum and Art Library, the Science and Natural History Museums, and the India and Imperial War Museums. Eight great teaching establishments have been set up, connected with science and technology, mining, art, music, and needlework; whilst homes have been found for the devotees of meteorology, entomology, and optical and physical sciences, and finally we have the Royal Albert Hall and Queen Alexandra's House in this great congeries of buildings. The Commissioners' land, building and money endowments may be estimated at £1,500,000. An estate of £500,000 is left with an income of nearly £26,000. The Commissioners in charge of this great property are the successors of Prince Albert and his fellow-workers. King Edward VII was keenly interested in the work, King George has been Chairman of the Commission, and the Prince of Wales now presides over it. Perhaps the most remarkable of its recent achievements has been the education since 1891 of no less than 562 research scholars. Over 200 of these have risen to responsible posts in industry and in the public service, and nearly 300 are Principals, Professors, and Lecturers in Imperial and Foreign Universities and Colleges. "Such are the men of the record and such, faintly indicated, are the educational influences that have sprung from the Prince Consort's wisdom."

And here arises a crucial question: Might not a certain amount of the great sum that has originated from the Crystal Palace surplus be devoted to its higher development at Sydenham? Let me venture to suggest in what directions. Correspondence has been going on upon the subject of the Casts' exhibition at the Crystal Palace. The vast collection stored there has been renovated, but is still greatly in need of arrangement. Surely this is work that the South Kensington Art Authorities could best undertake, and South Kensington teachers would be the best qualified to give instruction upon the casts and the architectural features of the Crystal Palace. Prince Albert, whose taste for art, science, and music, no doubt greatly influenced and helped him in planning the Crystal Palace with its art galleries, great organ, and concert room, and its scientific opportunities would, if living, be the very first to advocate help coming back from South Kensington to the *Alma Mater* from which she has derived her own prosperity. The schools of art and music at South Ken-

sington could help greatly with advice and teaching if represented upon the Exhibition Committee, and the same holds true of the College of Science. Years ago, backed by Sir Laurence Gomme, then practically director of education to the London School Board, I put forward a scheme for the use of the Crystal Palace as a children's Palace of Education. Professor Meiklejohn, the eminent educationist, was also behind me. The scheme was printed by the *Spectator* on June 25th, 1900, and I thus quote from it: "We greatly need what I may term a Children's Palace of Education, in which, through the wisely extended liberties of our National Education system, scholars of primary and secondary schools might, during school hours, be provided with opportunities of seeing model picture galleries, museums (historical, geographical, scientific, and hygienic), hearing recitations by the best elocutionists, and instrumental and vocal music by the best performers and vocalists, and witnessing Shakespearian and other standard dramas.

"As matters now stand, some 400,000 children from primary schools, and perhaps 5,000 from secondary ones, are permitted by the Board of Education to attend places of educational and historic interest in London and the neighbourhood during school hours, and quite recently attendance at theatres, where Shakespearian and other standard dramas suitable for children are played, has been accepted as school attendance under Article 44 of the Education Code for elementary schools. As a consequence, frequent visits are paid by classes of scholars to the British Museum, the Tower, the National Gallery and the National Portrait Gallery, besides Kensington Museum, Horniman's Museum, Greenwich Hospital, Kew Gardens, and the Zoological Gardens, as well as to theatres at which the prescribed dramas are produced.

"But, except in the case of the plays, the National Portrait Gallery, and the Natural History section of the South Kensington Museum, there are serious difficulties in the way of such visits. An artistic or scientific expert is not always available on these occasions, the picture galleries and exhibitions are not specially arranged to satisfy the needs of school children, and the making of a suitable selection from amongst their bewildering array must give pause to the most enthusiastic conducting teacher.

"Yet, with all these disadvantages, Article 44 of the Education Code pours largely increasing numbers of school children into these places of historic and educative influence. How infinitely better if it could be so arranged that the Crystal Palace should focus within its precincts all, or nearly all, of the educational opportunities contained in the London museums, picture galleries, theatres and, we may add, concert rooms; besides giving facilities for viewing, by means of limelight illustrations, panoramic and cinematograph

views, not only the famous London sights, but those of Great Britain, Ireland, India, and the Colonies. Such a judiciously arranged combination of interior attractions could be easily supplemented outside the Palace buildings by the laying out of model school gardens and plots, specially planted for the purposes of instruction in botany and nature study. The large Palace grounds might also well accommodate a school camp and one of those open-air schools, which are beginning to find so much favour with our educational authorities.

"Sir Laurence Gomme suggested that the Palace and its grounds might also serve for the institution of an indoors and out-of-doors exhibition of folk and animal existence in the United Kingdom from the earliest times, as shown by models of lake dwellings and early villages, representations of sieges, forays, tournaments, hunting expeditions, and so forth. Such museums as those of Berne and Stockholm, to say nothing of the village museums of Scandinavia, show how easily this scheme of folk history and folk custom could be developed in a building and grounds as extensive as those of the Crystal Palace."

On July 21st, 1913, I wrote to the *Times*, pleading as before, for the use of the Crystal Palace as a children's Palace of Education, when I spoke of the patriotic appeal to the nation for the completion of the fund started by the Lord Mayor for the preservation of the Crystal Palace and its grounds, hoped for its success, and the inclusion within its proposals of my education scheme. But the Lord Mayor's appeal for making the Crystal Palace a national possession fell through, and my proposal fell with it. Then the Palace passed into the hands of the Earl of Plymouth, and from them into those of the present Trustees. The Great War followed soon after, and the Crystal Palace was used for the Air Force. But I never abandoned my scheme, and after the war it has been very heartily taken up by the Representative Managers of the L.C.C. Schools, over whom I have presided for more than eight years. Lord Haldane, who had succeeded me as their chairman, had passed on their resolution to the Carnegie Trust, of which he was a member, but he died before it could be entertained. In correspondence with his sister, however, I learn that if a practicable scheme of the kind were submitted to the Trust it would have careful consideration. Anyhow, the Carnegie Trust, out of the vast sum which they contribute towards the funds of the Playing Fields Association, might endow a portion of the 200 acres which adjoin the Crystal Palace as playing-fields. So far, the Education Committee of the L.C.C. differs from its predecessors, the London School Board, as well as the whole body of Representative Managers and I believe Elementary Teachers, to judge by two articles in the *Schoolmaster* and *Woman Teacher*, as supporters of my scheme. But I hope they may yet be persuaded to see

through our eyes. Their main objection is, I take it, one of expense, which would be met by help from the South Kensington Commissioners, or the Carnegie Trust, or by both. The L.C.C.'s minor objections are the position of the Crystal Palace, which they do not think sufficiently central for the easy working of the scheme, and their belief that the teachers who go round with the children to picture galleries, museums, and places of historic interest, are quite competent to give all the instruction necessary for their charges. To take the last objection first, this has been, to my mind, conclusively met by the teachers themselves, as twice expressed in their own organ. The other objection, that of the situation of the Crystal Palace, had been already carefully weighed by the whole body of London Representative Managers and set aside. The improved train service to the Palace is a further argument for its use in the way proposed. But above all the L.C.C. had itself started carrying children from congested school-areas by train or 'bus to play-fields at a far greater distance from their schools than the Palace at Sydenham, for one whole day a week, and there giving them a healthy games half-holiday before or after a half-day's school session in pavilions set up beside the play-grounds. Nor has the Committee realised that the Crystal Palace affords a unique opportunity of just the same kind of double school day, though one of a far more elevating character than that provided by them for children carried from congested town districts to suburban playing-fields. I have been in communication with the three great schools of music, the Royal College, the Royal Academy, and the Guildhall School of Music, and the heads of all three have promised every help possible in the event of classes for the practice of vocal and instrumental music being started at the Crystal Palace. The Slade School of Art has promised similar help, and also the British Drama League.

In conclusion, my very best thanks are due to Mr. H. J. Buckland, the General Director of the Crystal Palace, who has lent me many important books and Press cuttings relating to the Crystal Palace, including his excellent illustrated handbook. I have had the great advantage also of being shown over the Palace by him personally and having had a long talk with him in company with Mr. and Mrs. Geoffrey Whitworth on the prospects of the Palace. These are exceedingly satisfactory, showing that the building is out of debt, in spite of the great expenses that have had to be incurred in renewing the great organ and many of the Courts, and that there is an available balance of £55,102 10s. in hand. It should be a good omen that the Chairman of the Crystal Palace Commissioners, Sir David Burnett, the saviour of the Sydenham Palace, was born in August 1851, immediately after the triumphant success of the first Crystal Palace.

ALFRED PERCEVAL GRAVES.

PIERRE LOTI.

NO sooner has the naturalisation of Anatole France been secured than there is endeavour to effect that of Pierre Loti. The selection of these two writers for the rare tribute of a complete edition in English may well be attributed to tact and enterprise. But there is another consideration. Accepting Anatole France and Pierre Loti as representative of the French spirit, one cannot but notice their large divergence. Both, indeed, have an individual style. And both are highly personal, subjective, in their vision of the world. But Anatole France, turn by turn the disciple of Lucian and St. Francis, is double in character; or multiple, finding within himself material for the creation of various types. Whereas Pierre Loti is ever himself, occupying the scene throughout, or at most offering some slight and penetrable disguise. And, except for a while in the overflow of turbid youth, he has neither command nor need of wit, or humour, or irony. Using magical spells, he is essentially a lyrical poet, and not a whit the less because his medium is prose. Nature and Love and Death are his themes. The lyrical poet, he makes appeal to the sympathy of the like-minded, and enlarges this appeal till it become universal. By means that are at once simple and subtle and sincere, he evokes spectres that ever haunt the hearts and minds of men.

The child is father of the man. We rediscover ourselves in remembering early days. And, in the case of this Julien Viaud who was to become an officer in the French Navy and receive from Polynesians a flower name, there is special record in *Le Roman d'un Enfant* and *Prime Jeunesse*. He exhibits to us a child of faithful Huguenots, whose first sensations and images are of Rochefort and the Isle of Oléron. A late-born Benjamin, he is tenderly cherished and responsive. The loving elders about him seem remoted. The tales of their own childhood take on the hues of a dream. Isolated, imaginative, he is ill-prepared for life, and not at all against time and death. His attachment to places and persons is extreme. Already he aches with fear lest they should change and pass away. Later, he counts it strange that all his early memories are tinged with sadness; that his days of careless joy should have left no trace, perchance because they were habitual. What dwells with him are his hours of childish dismay and anguish, his furtive perceptions of the dread other-side of things, his chill intuitions of mutability and death. The grown man thought that the melancholy of the child was deeper, less fathomable, than his own. But, for the child, there was the sure refuge of his mother's

arms. And, withal, the cult of home, the mystery of its charm, had not these somewhat of the durability craved?

But the world is compact of contraries. Our words call up their contraries, and home itself suggests elsewhere. There came upon the boy a thirst for the unknown, an uneasy aspiration towards he knew not what of difference. The woodcuts evoking tropical forests, his access to a great-uncle's cabinet of natural objects, the thought of ancestors long ago exiled for their creed, the very mention of the colonies or Brazil, reverberated within him. It was as if he relived amid forgotten scenes. From his troublous confusion there emerged the full intuition of exotic and languorous splendour. And letters from his sailor-brother, bringing foreign treasure and the perfumed breath of Oceania, matured a barely conscious resolution to venture forth, and further, and every-whither. How should he wear out his days in one spot and a determined sphere? The tragic news, indeed, that his brother had died far away, gave pause. This other child at least must be kept. But poverty—the poverty that Loti blesses for the courage and nobility it brings—visited the home. The boy, with a passion for music, had also the turn for mathematics. And, the preliminaries of an engineering career proving too costly, no longer is objection made to his entering the naval school. Then, and during a further stage in Paris, he knows exile. The sense of exile, the desire of return, beset him even when all his vows were accomplished. Fulfilment is disenchantment. What was it, after all, to harbour dreams and fancies in many a clime; to disperse himself, leaving portions of his soul in this or that Eden or desolation? Here, at home, all else seems unreal, an idle shifting of scenes. To return is to recapture the freshness of childhood, of the days when sensations and images, dreams and mirages, were truly mysterious. But the quiet hearth may not shield from invasive melancholy, from the sense of the fugitive. To-morrow, and to-morrow! And in exile, wherever he may be! He is weary of home; weary of elsewhere. Those lines of Lamartine, read in childhood, would recur: "Shall we never, on the ocean of ages, cast anchor for a single day?" Was there escape from mutability? And, with that, the black dread of a possible, a final nothingness would seize upon him.

The child and the man were one. And, none the less, Loti the man had suffered a "sea-change." Childhood is recoverable only in the idealising retrospect. And the years of youth that follow may be hot and heavy. In the posthumously published notes and letters of the *Journal Intime*, he chronicles his ungracious period of ferment and disarray. Already, in *Prime Jeunesse*, marking his approach to pantheistic ecstasy and the mystic dread conceived in the woods of Limoise, one foreboded some visionary muse and

lover in one, a Sylphide like that of Chateaubriand. But, in her stead, we had the gipsy girl and sexual initiation. And now we have the young naval officer, flinging himself upon life, wholly emancipated, reckless. The delicious and deadly magic of vagrant passion holds him, and also spares no disenchantment. Youth and strength were of sole value; and yet thoughts of suicide beset. Love and youth alone are worth the having; and the desolate fragility of these is all too sure. Desperately he clings to love the more that all faith and all hope are gone. There is nothing left him but youth, with its bravado and blasphemy, its blasphemy and prayer. For he cannot bear to part with his "Christian illusion" and its sweetness. Nay, in very scorn of earth and its allurements, he brings fear to his beloved mother lest he turn Trappist monk and lead a living death.

French critics are given to deplore Romanticism as a passing malady of their national spirit. But the "*mal du siècle*," as it is also called, dates at least from the times of St. Augustine or of that Stagirus whom St. Chrysostom sought to comfort, and recurs whenever individualism erects itself and makes exorbitant claims. Pierre Loti averred himself no reader of his immediate predecessors, the masters of French Romanticism. And, of a truth, he needed no masters. A born Romantic, he had but to read within to take rank with them. One may notice, perchance, that he contributes a variation of the once-famous Romantic irony; famous rather in Germany than in France. In his early and crude *Fleurs d'Ennui* he creates an imaginary, or arranges an actual, friend with whom to bandy persiflage, self-mockery, cynicism, and much logical excess, along with sage and prosaic correction and counsel offered. And it should not elude us that he makes the return to nature and the primitive in a way unlike that of Rousseau. Dismayed at his own complexity, he loves, to the manifest advantage of his art, simplicity in others. Or, rather, he cherishes it within and without; and largely remains the child.

Thus equipped, using at frequent stations his abundant leisure and leave to sojourn in native fashion, and continuous in private record of images and impressions that so he might guard against their fading, he could proceed as author. Love-stories have the sure and wide appeal. And, for Loti, these must take the shape of tragic idylls. He discovers the eternal feminine in naïve and gentle figures, akin to those of Goethe, but still further removed from civilisation and modernity. Almost one could accept them as just so many poetical incarnations of this or that race and clime. These "little savage creatures," as he calls them, these children of nature, passive, barely detached from the soil, shall best express the soul of their surroundings. But what if the lively realisation

suggest actual flesh and blood behind the glamorous symbols? Loti speaks, in the *Journal Intime*, of types, composite figures, with truth respected only in the details. And critics decide that here we have but episodes of a wandering life, heightened, transfigured by a poet. Dismissing attempt to disentangle fact and fiction and poetical truth, one is nevertheless left with a sense of tenderness forsworn, and responsibility. Perchance, it is sufficiently clear that the tale of *Aziyadé*, the Circassian, remorsefully pursued in *Fantôme d'Orient* and elsewhere, alone may count as memoirs. While, for the rest of the heroines, they must even fare as the adoring and abandoned in a ballad. They receive their consecration in the tragically inevitable hour of parting. Their charm is not transferable. Sooner or later the abysmal difference of race would reveal itself. Surrender to nature may lead to captivity and degeneration. Duty calls the lover away. And the poignant Nevermore! borrows the voice of majestic and irrevocable Death.

A novelist who repeatedly steps forth as his own hero is liable to the charge of being a Narcissus, ravished by his own reflection, fatuous. But the lover of *Aziyadé* and *Rarahu* brought large bribes. He could enthral his readers; persuade them for the while that "there's nought in this life sweet" save melancholy. He won almost equal acceptance when, in his own person and no longer the English lieutenant, he wrote of *Mon frère Yves*. Here was the close bond of officer and man; the one relaxing no effort till the other might overcome the temptations of his calling. And here was the ascetic life of the ocean, the courage and resignation and peace that come to those who are disciplined in floating convents. Or, in *Matelot*, he might regard himself as the delicate and pathetic Jean Berny: himself should he have missed good fortune at the outset and, a common sailor, have drifted, increasingly careless and stupefied. Or, in *Le Roman d'un Spahi*, he might mingle his personal story with that of a common soldier known to him, and anticipate Joseph Conrad in a nightmare spectacle of the lapse into savagery. But he involves and embarrasses his case when, in *Les Désenchantées*, he offers a contemporary study of three Eastern women, Western in culture, and doomed to the misery of Turkish marriage. André Lhéry, the ageing novelist, who is also Pierre Loti, in Constantinople with his wife and son, and brooding once again upon the memory of the dead *Aziyadé*, is censured by Mélek as failing to die unto self and so live, while Djénane perishes for very love of André and his love for *Aziyadé*. However, in his two acknowledged masterpieces, *Pêcheur d'Islande* and *Ramuntcho*, he almost achieves self-alienation and objectivity. Gaud the whaler, like Yves before him, may draw refinement from contact with Pierre Loti, but Ramon of the Basque country is sufficiently independent

and explained. And *Madame Prune* should not be overlooked. His own hero again, he borders upon comedy. Accused of failing to take the Japanese people seriously, he persists in smiling offence, while offering in the idyllic figure of Inamoto a symbol of old Japan and its solemn dream.

Loti assures us that love alone could attach him in any lasting fashion to this or that spot, and also that the places in which one has not loved and suffered leave no traces in the memory. But then, he bore his burden of love and suffering everywhere, faithful and tireless in report and reproduction of the scene. There is a whole series of his books, characteristically devoid of moving incident or light humour or useful information; books in which Nature is at once protagonist and background. Complaint of their monotony is too facile, and might be brought against Nature itself. One would rather declare these books of travel a test of the reader's power fitly to respond. *Un Pèlerin d'Angkor; Japonneries d'Automne* and *Au Maroc; Le Désert* and *La Galilée; Vers Ispahan* and *L'Inde (sans les Anglais)*; these have their abundant thrill and evocation. His method is musical rather than picturesque. He offers us not so much the landscape itself as the emotion it provokes. But so finished is his art of transposition that feeling and vision are one. Here for us is the very truth, the very beauty, of the hour and place. Which is not to say that Loti is absent. His every landscape is signed not only at the corner but all over. Has not landscape been defined as an *état d'âme*, a state of soul? Whereupon there is question whether the given state is imposed from without or from within. "We receive but what we give, And in our life alone does nature live." Loti was in full accord with Coleridge. "Ours in her wedding-garment and her shroud." But Loti would have added: These are of the same web, gifts of Nature which we may not refuse. Love and Death are her other names. She compels our moods; uses us to express her song of joy and pain.

Behind the descriptions, indeed, as behind the figures and descriptions of the novels, there is a philosophy. Unsystematic, intuitive, an interconnected group of ideas and sentiments, this philosophy pervades the whole work of Pierre Loti. For him beauty is romance, and romance is of the infinite in space and time. It awakes desire that also is infinite. Such beauty, such desire, bring sadness. The here and now of civilisation is unlovely, but escape to distant lands and primitive traditions may not serve. Racial dreams vary and bewilder; and present felicity melts into tenderness and tears. For all things are subject to change and decay. The law of the Flux is universal. Impermanence alone is stable and sure. Vainly shall you strive against forgetfulness,

guarding relics. Loving memories fade, though you set them down in record. Life is a mirage, and death a revolting mystery. The veil of nature the creator and destroyer shall not be lifted. Till we lapse into the night, naught remains for the seer of the abyss and void but dolorous amaze and infinite desolation.

And, none the less, he never remitted his quest after Durability. A child in the solitude of the woods, he was near upon shaping for himself strange divinities of terror; or some Baal, lord of light and death. From the myriad impressions of his manhood, from the phantasmagoria of the ever-shifting scene, he came to conceive that the best in him was the feeling of universal fraternity in suffering; was the deep and sweet sadness of pity. In *Le Livre de la Pitié et de la Mort, Propos d'Exil, Figures et Choses qui passaient*, and *Reflets sur la sombre route*, there is multiform pathos, not seldom of searching quality, but reaching at times to morbid or horrible extremity. Here was a provisional religion. But how should religion consist with hopelessness? Buddhism was chill, devoid of all consolation. Obstinate he clung to his hereditary dream, the Christian dream of death overcome and glad meeting. If only, in Jerusalem, some vision, some intuition of certainty, might be vouchsafed him! But nothing, nothing. And deeper grew his dread of an absolute and eternal void. Yet never would he countenance the deniers of the Christian dream; or of aught that may bring comfort. And what if he won at least appeasement in the land of Allah? From his airy station the muezzin calls upon man to bow before Omnipotence. Removed from Occidental greed and frenzied apprehension of coming cataclysm, the sages dwell resigned, oblivious of time, content with the beauty of limpid morn and golden sunset. But if Allah be no more than an obstinate conception; and Islam show decrepit, moribund? Nevertheless he hears, rising from all shrines and throughout all time, the appeal of human anguish, various in expression, but ever the appeal against death.

Still about his quest, at times he yielded to cosmic reveries; to the shiver of the immense and remote. Those stars of the night-watchers, emblems of immortality, bring calm and disdain of human happenings; and themselves are in vertiginous process of formation and decay. Hard by the desert lie sweet valleys that evoke the days ere man could maim and mar, or breathe an Elysian peace as though all history were at an end. Or he vainly sounds the human depths, in marvel how some chance and sudden association should stir in him vague emotion; haply the reminiscence of past existence or presentiment of other to come. Then were it not well, on occasion, to consult Hindoo wisdom? But he made no study of monism, qualified or absolute. Nor did he trace that Negative Way, much alike for mystics of the East and the West, along

which a man gradually strips himself of attributes and limitations till he become one with that which, somehow, is All and Nothing and Bliss beyond consciousness or unconsciousness. In Benares he knocked at the gate of certain Hindoo-European sages who would have all creeds appear the variants of a Vedantism with an occult interpretation. Resigned in advance to such modicum of consolation as the primæval and restored doctrine might afford, he learnt that he was essentially God, and was promised almost endless re-birth and almost infinite duration till such time as all lovers, no longer themselves but free, should meet and merge in the ineffable soul of things. If he were consoled, one hears no more about it. Later, it was: "Oh! the supreme wisdom of leaving things as they are, of taking the days as they come, of following the traditions of our ancestors, of preparing ourselves long in advance for death by meditation and prayer." Which is the counsel offered in *Ramuntcho* before the Indian journey. And, at the close of *Un Pèlerin d'Angkor*, in valediction to his "brethren of dream and doubt and anguish," he holds that the Supreme Pity must needs be or become, to hear our distressful cry in the hour when loved ones leave us; or else creation were cruelty beyond excuse and admission.

It was an indeterminate quest, and pursued as the mood would have it. Loti wandered as in a maze, returning ever and again upon his steps. But there was nobility in the quest. He sought, in his own way, after that which is eternal. Whereas he might readily have furnished the course of a Don Juan, that legendary figure shaped by the Romantics into a symbol of aspiration, Don Juan and Faust in one. Think but of the assurance in *Madame Chrysanthème* that he should die regretting he knew not what countries unvisited and what loved ones not embraced; of the girl seen but a moment at Broussa, and closing his trilogy of the Holy Land by an ironical recall to earth; of the Hindoo woman of Benares whose sudden and passing vision seemed to express the whole doctrine that he and she and nature were all one and divine;—think of these and the known aberrations of sensual mysticism, or of M. Henri Lavedan's Don Juan, grown old in selfish pride and cruelty and all perversion.

But it should be added at once that Loti, matured and ageing, could shape himself in some sort to daily duties and pursue the business of life as well as the dream. He was the Academician, elected when far away and necessarily much of an absentee in the discharge of his function. He was the humanitarian, deprecating the horrors of sport; and one that outvied Ruskin in abomination of industrial ravage. He was the publicist who deplored French imperialism and its cost of suffering, and yet was alarmed at the

decay of French influence in the East, that East which should rightly slumber on safeguarded from all modernisation. He was the patriot in the hour of need, forgetting his denunciation of massacre by machinery, urgent to be employed or sent on whatever mission, pleading as Turkophile with Enver Pasha to withstand German promises and with the English that they should not condone Greek ambitions. But his devious logic, and the pardonable paroxysms of the war-pamphlets, are of their day, and transient. It is with them as with the form of whaling described in *Pêcheur d'Islande*, or the Eastern spoils which Loti gathered about him and left to be dispersed.

In regard to his more important work, one might hail Loti as the last of the Romantics, were it not that the title is claimed for many another, and shall be claimed. For Romanticism emerges as well upon turbulent and revolutionary periods as upon periods of settled common sense and conventionality. Men look backward or forward, desirous of escape from the present. Or one might reckon with him as the Mystic, belated or precursive in the France of his time. But humanity itself, in its whole course and its national periods, is subject to the rhythm of realism and idealism and scepticism and mysticism, each leading to the other and round again. And the individual, however personal and aloof in idiosyncrasy, can no more than combine the modes in various proportions and emphasis. Rather would one set Loti indisputably in the line, the great line, of the French masters of landscape in prose; Rousseau and Bernardin de St. Pierre, Chateaubriand, George Sand, Théophile Gautier, and Eugène Fromentin. The last of these is Loti. And it were pleasant enough, but too long, here and now to trace their affiliation in respect of Rousseau, their common master in Romanticism, and mark their several excellencies.

There is evidence, of whatever value, that it is possible to resist the charm of Loti. Something or much of beauty is inevitably lost in translation. Besides, you may not surely count how youth shall receive any proffered art or wisdom. On the one hand, it is apt to seek guidance at the hands of elder contemporaries. The chosen masters are a well of inspiration. Life and thought are best moulded after their authority. Or, on the other hand, it is in flat rebellion against all authority. The world dates from its own eager adolescence. The celebrities of yesterday deserve scornful dismissal. Nothing may serve but the newest motley. And the mature among us, how shall they receive this prolonged Hymn to Melancholy? Perchance they will instinctively reject the dulcet and lulling strain, the poppy and the mandragora; or of set purpose avoid whatsoever may bring depression. And, nevertheless, there are the good uses of melancholy. Tempered with aspiration,

it is the appanage of the thoughtful and delicate. Nor should the seeming failure of Loti's quest dismay. The quest is ever open. In Plato, Socrates would have a man "take the best and most irrefragable of human theories, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through life—not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely carry him." No human theories are irrefragable; but we shall not lack our "word of God" in the hour of insight. And, of a certainty, "no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death."

GARNET SMITH.

A NEW MARKET FOR GREAT BRITAIN: MANCHURIA.

MANCHURIA is *terra incognita* to my fellow-countrymen, even to those who have business interests in the East. My first task, therefore, is to make clear where the country is, what it is like, and then to show that this country, where I have lived for nearly a quarter of a century, offers a splendid market to British manufacturers and merchants.

Manchuria is an integral part of the Chinese Empire, north of China proper, consisting of the three provinces of Fengtien, Kirin, and Heilungkiang. It has Japan (Korea) on the south; Russia (Siberia) on the north and east; on the west Inner and Outer Mongolia. The whole territory in question lies between Latitude 38.43 and 53.30 north, and Longitude 117.50 and 125.20 east. It comprises some 400,000 square miles of territory—in other words is equal to France and Germany, and nearly five times as extensive as the United Kingdom. Mountainous on the south-east and the north, it possesses a great central plain, extremely fertile, well watered, and capable of profitable cultivation. It is estimated that, undeveloped as the country is to-day, there are over 70,000,000 acres ready for cultivation, and that already some 30,000,000 acres are being cultivated. An American agricultural expert, Mr. Parker, put on record 22 years ago that Manchuria would become the "granary of the world." The prophecy is now in process of being fulfilled. Climatic conditions are favourable. The rainfall is moderate but regular. The winter is long and cold, but the hot months, which are the rainy season, force luxuriant growths. I have seen certain crops and weeds grow a foot in twenty-four hours! The crops grown include wheat, rice, millet, flax, tobacco, and raw cotton. But chiefest is the world-famous soya bean grown in prodigious quantities—about 190,000,000 bushels in 1928, over 60 per cent. of the world's total production. Much is exported to Europe—in fact, it is expected that Europe this year will take more than Japan. In 1927 Japan bought 50 per cent.; 20 per cent. went to China proper, and about 30 per cent. came to Europe. Liverpool and Hull are the chief centres of the soya bean industry in this country. The growing, handling, and exportation of the soya bean is the chief source of Manchuria's increasing prosperity and wealth. The total growth of cereals of all kinds is about twenty million tons.

Manchuria's mineral wealth is very great. Gold, silver, iron-ore, and other minerals are found in rich profusion. But coal is the most important. Vast deposits are found all over the country. In the north the main deposits are being worked by the Chinese

Eastern Railway. There are smaller coal areas both south and north worked by individual owners. The most famous are the Fushun Mines which cover an area of some 16,500 acres, with seams varying from 78 feet to 470 feet in thickness, some of which are worked from open cuts. In 1930, so the President of the South Manchurian Railway—the owners of the coalfield—declared at a recent meeting, the output would be 20,000,000 tons per year. There are said to be some 1,700,000,000 tons in sight. In addition, according to a recent official statement, some 5,000,000,000 tons of oil shale are available, and steps are being taken to develop these immense deposits. There are also vast forest areas estimated at some 88,000,000 acres to yield 150,000,000,000 cubic feet of timber. The natural resources of Manchuria are enormous, and its potential wealth is illimitable.

Facilities for communication and transport leave much to be desired as yet. Roads can hardly be said to exist, save in the vicinity of urban districts. But development of the country's resources will demand the provision of adequate transport. This in turn will demand huge supplies of machinery and material. This need has operated, hitherto, in speeding up the construction of railways. Ten years ago the mileage was only some 2,200. The last four years have seen considerable extensions. To-day there are about 3,700 miles operating. By way of comparison, it may be stated that in the whole of China proper there are only about 5,000 miles. The South Manchurian Railway is really owned and administered by the Japanese Government. It runs from Darien north to Changchun—some 438½ miles. Carrying on from this point the Chinese Eastern Railway runs to Harbin, and a glance at the map shows this to be the main artery—the life-blood of the vast field of Northern Manchuria. The length of this line is 1,100 miles, and is the line in dispute between Soviet Russia and the Chinese Government. All recent construction is being carried on by the Chinese themselves with their own capital and experts. The lines constructed with the assistance of Japanese capital are completed. British capital found small employment in building these railways, for the simple reason that Russia prevented its use in the earlier stages and Japan in the later. But it is not to be forgotten that Russia played a great part in the opening up of this vast territory. They were the pioneers in the north even before the Chinese.

Glance at the population. Its growth is one of the romances of modern history. Forty years ago the vast areas of the north and north-east were uninhabited save by nomadic tribesmen, trappers, and hunters. To-day the population is estimated to be some 40,000,000, and emigrants continue to pour in at the rate of about

two millions a year from the south, especially from Shantung. It constitutes, I imagine, the most remarkable trek in human history. The most affecting features of this movement cannot be dealt with here, but it is important to point out that these emigrants are drawn from the most industrious of Eastern races. The Chinese coolie is proverbially industrious, sober, thrifty. My readers may be more interested in trade prospects than in figures dealing with railway mileage, crops, population, etc. But it is not to be forgotten that without population there can be no trade. It is only within the last five years that the prosperity of Manchuria has become so pronounced. That prosperity is in the greatest measure due to the swelling tide of production brought about by the indefatigable toil of these immigrants. It is to these workers that the world must look for customers if its trade is to grow. Their steadily rising standard of life guarantees not only the maintenance of the present volume of imports, but it also enables us to predict an ever-increasing demand for commodities of greater variety and of better quality. It is not easy to assign limits to the purchasing power of a population obviously marked by these signs of economic prosperity on the one hand, and of advancing civilisation on the other.

That the internal and external trade of Manchuria has grown rapidly during the last two decades is beyond question. The striking growth of its ports, for example, bears convincing witness to an ever-increasing tonnage of exports and imports. Darien, the great ice-free port, has grown during this period more rapidly than any port in the East—being only second to Shanghai in the number of ships arriving at and departing from the port, and in tonnage. In 1907-8 the number of steamers arriving was 1,143, and the tonnage of goods 599,188 imports and 329,764 exports; in 1927-8 the number of steamers arriving was 4,224, and tonnage of goods: imports 1,076,141, exports 7,299,912, or totals of 928,952 tons in 1907-8 and 8,376,053 tons in 1927-8! Traffic on its railway systems during the same period grew by leaps and bounds. Commercial statistics relating to Manchuria leave much to be desired. They do, however, afford ground for stating that in 1908 the total exports and imports were about £13,000,000; in 1927 they were not below £90,000,000. Exports are largely in excess of imports.

When we regard Great Britain's share in this growing trade it cannot be said to be commensurate with her commanding position in the East. The Chinese Maritime Customs in their quarterly trade returns give no indication of the country of origin of imports. Hence exact comparisons are impossible. But Japan occupies the leading place—her share of the total trade being about 60 per cent. The United States and Germany are ahead of us. This fact is worth the attention of our manufacturers and merchants. We

have a vast mass of unemployed workers, and according to statistics published recently in the Ministry of Labour's Gazette, the largest increases in unemployment are recorded in those trades and industries concerned largely with export trades, viz. the textile (woollen and cotton), iron and steel, and boot and shoe industries. How do we stand in these industries with regard to exports to Manchuria? It is significant to remember in this connection that cotton goods form the largest single class of Manchurian imports, i.e. 25 per cent. of the total imports. There was a time when the products of Lancashire mills formed a respectable proportion. But our share became small by degrees and beautifully less. Now it is a negligible quantity. Not a few in Lancashire speak as though Manchuria were a lost market. My own opinion is that by pushing the new fabrics which the much-maligned Lancashire manufacturer now produces considerable trade may be acquired in Manchuria for Lancashire. At the moment, however, our trade with Manchuria affords no help in solving the unemployment problem in Lancashire. But in my opinion it should to a considerable extent. The woollen textile industry is only second in importance to the cotton. What is more important is that imports of woollen cloths and yarns are increasing, and that British trade is sharing in the increased imports despite the fact that Japan is making great efforts to secure a larger part of the trade. Increased attention on the part of British firms would result in greatly increased volume of trade. The long and severe winters favour this industry, and ensure a steady growth in the demand from the growing population. Here Yorkshire could easily increase her hold on a market which would help to absorb her present surplus labour.

In the clothing and kindred trades exports to Manchuria play a very small part. Hats, caps, hosiery, boots and shoes, gloves, haberdashery—articles in universal use for which there must be an enormous demand—hardly find a place in our exports to Manchuria. Here factories are silent or working short time whilst in Manchuria there is a market which only needs to be studied in order to yield valuable results.

But it is when we turn to the heavy industries that the most striking facts emerge. Our metal products are hardly known in Manchuria. Thousands of new homesteads are rising every year in North Manchuria. In them British domestic hardware is utterly unknown. This is true also of building hardware. Germany supplies all the medium and lower qualities; America the superior qualities. No British are to be had. Locks of all sorts, knives, scissors, pincers, pliers, carpenters' tools, saws for the timber trade, screws, nails, etc., of British manufacture find no place in distributors' stores. That is equally true of all classes of machin-

ery—a vast category from locomotives down to knitting machines. Here again the United States and Germany seem to monopolise the market. The South Manchurian Railway say that during the past twenty years they have imported direct from the United States railway material to the value of over twelve and a half millions sterling. It would be interesting to discover how much during those two decades was purchased in Great Britain. We should find that about the same proportion was purchased in those years as obtains to-day in the proportions of American and British motors. There are no fewer than 6,000 motor vehicles in Manchuria. I doubt if there are twenty of British make! So far as machinery is concerned Great Britain is not in the picture. Surely here there ought to be a valuable market for our manufacturers? Agricultural implements, industrial machinery of all kinds, will be in demand in increasing quantities as the exploitation and development of the country proceed during the years ahead. What is to prevent our iron and steel industries from invading this market?

Are there any insurmountable obstacles confronting us in Manchuria? When I have discussed the possibility of increasing our export trade with Manchuria the remark has frequently been made, "Oh, the whole country is under the control of Japan." It is assumed quite gratuitously that in some way Japan effectively reserves Manchuria for her own industrial advantage, and by some form of discrimination minimises the severity of any competition. That fallacy must be exploded. So must the view that Japan now has a stranglehold on Manchuria, economic as well as political. The fact is that Japanese control is strictly limited to the Leased Territory which comprises 1,400 square miles out of 400,000! Actually it is a small strip of land in which there is very little trade. It is absurd to talk of a Japanese stranglehold when the entire Japanese population amounts to no more than 140,000 (excluding Koreans) including troops, Government officials, and employees of the South Manchurian Railway. I calculate that the Japanese commercial population is not greater than 60,000, industrious and progressive to be sure, but the great majority are far from being plutocrats; they are humble traders, shopkeepers, etc. It can be stated that they do not control the general trade of the country. That is under the control of the owners of the soil. On the other hand, even in Darien, the Chinese trader is rapidly driving the Japanese out of business. It may be taken for granted that the entire field is as open to the British trader as it is to the Japanese. It only remains for manufacturers and exporters in this country to be as enterprising, as adaptable, in meeting the needs of a new country as the Japanese are and have been in order to secure and retain an ever-increasing share of the trade of Manchuria.

What do we need to promote an expansion of British exports to Manchuria? Let me submit three suggestions:

(1) A radical alteration in our methods of selling. What is the present method? Mainly, if not entirely, such British goods as reach Manchuria are sold in Shanghai, i.e. 1,400 miles from Harbin. Our competitors, Japanese, American, and German, adopt the opposite method; *they sell on the spot*. Our merchants have no direct contact with distributors. That method may have been satisfactory when Great Britain had the markets of the Far East to herself, and the local merchant was glad to get goods on any terms. But the times have changed, and we have got to change with them. Competition is keen, and our cumbrous methods give to rivals advantages we cannot afford to concede. Shanghai is, as I have said, 1,400 miles from Harbin. It takes the mail four days to reach one place from the other, *and goods a full month*, besides involving handling in bulk at least three times, and it may be five times! The *comprador* must go. British manufacturers and merchants who want to do trade with Manchuria should get direct contact with its traders. The language difficulty may be a formidable one, but it is not insuperable. To establish the new method will demand co-operation on the part of the manufacturers and merchants at home. I am confident that this problem can be solved by overhauling our system of marketing in Manchuria and in every other market where our exports tend to diminish.

(2) A concerted and systematic publicity campaign in Manchuria on behalf of British products. Advertisement has its uses everywhere, even in areas where British goods are widely and favourably known. In Manchuria it is imperative if any expansion of our exports is to take place. It is the simple fact that British goods are not known in this market—their range, superior quality, competitive value. The explanation is simple. Whilst Manchuria was growing in population and economic wealth, we were engaged in a world war, and in a post-war effort to recover Japan had the entire field to herself, and used her advantage to the full both during and after the war. The United States entered the field later, and pushed her wares vigorously. Germany, under pressure of necessity, did likewise, and re-established herself in a market she had found profitable in pre-war years. Now we are shut out. We are under the necessity of beginning at the very beginning. We have got to introduce ourselves to a people who know us not, and to convince them that we can serve them as well and better than our rivals. I want to advocate a method which I am convinced will prove successful in this task of advertising our goods. Trade exhibitions open for a limited period are familiar features in this country. Held in London and Birmingham they have fully justified themselves by their results. I believe that what I call Trade

Museums for want of a better title, permanently established in the most important centres of population in Manchuria, would speedily and effectively demonstrate our supremacy in the manufacturing world, and our capacity to supply the domestic and industrial requirements of the people of Manchuria. Such an enterprise would require adequate funds and careful organisation. It would aim at establishing permanent collections of samples, well displayed and documented, with competent persons in charge who could give any and all information to visitors, whether traders or the general public. It would also put buyers into touch with agents on the spot. I am of opinion, and that opinion is based on long years of trading in the country, that a vast expansion of our exports would follow. In that opinion I am fortified by the action of the American Motor Corporation. Convinced that Manchuria was a field with immense possibilities Henry Ford and the General Motors both adopted this method of advertising their cars and transport wagons. They established showrooms, garages, and repair shops in most of the big towns, and placed adequate staffs of salesmen and mechanics in charge. In Moukden, the capital of Manchuria, two years ago there were about 200 motor vehicles. To-day there are at least 2,000. I doubt if there are more than two or three of British manufacture. That makes our task the harder. But if we want to secure this new market we must face the cost in effort and capital.

(3) There should be a revision and extension of our Consular Service. It has been and is inadequate both in numbers and efficiency. How far it was designed to be of assistance to British traders and trade I do not know. Personal experience has left me sceptical. In my 23 years' trading experience I have never been called upon by anyone representing the Service but once, and that was 22 years ago. There may have been commercial attachés, but I have never seen one, and certainly have never derived any benefit from the activity of any one of them. The Lord Privy Seal, Mr. J. H. Thomas, in an interview he gave me in November last, spoke of the employment of Trade Commissioners, and he held out hopes that one would be assigned to Manchuria. Well, I hope one will be sent out, and if he is experienced in Manchurian affairs and trade—and no other will be of any value—I hope the Government will be able to retain his services. But surely it is within the power of the Government to assist more directly and systematically than they do by appointing an official. A grant in aid of the plan I suggest above would encourage our manufacturers and merchants to embark on an enterprise which would do much in the near future to lessen the numbers of those who lack employment, and whose support presses so heavily upon industry.

GEORGE L. SHAW.

THE ANCIENT HOSPITALS OF THE CITY OF LONDON.

IN the early middle ages disease was regarded as due to the visitation of God rather than the remissness of man, and consequently the early hospitals, and their number was very large, were mostly founded for the amelioration of those ills which were clearly seen to be in the course of nature, such as old age, infirmity, and indigence. In fact such institutions, although known as hospitals, were in effect homes for the poor and aged, and the terms of admission were simply an undertaking to pray for the founder's soul. Of those still existing the only one which exhibits at the present day some of the characteristics of its ancient prototypes is the Charterhouse, although this, from its foundation in 1361, was never a home for the aged until Thomas Sutton bought it from the Earl of Suffolk in 1611.

Many of the monasteries and nunneries of the City maintained almsmen and almswomen among their inmates, but some wealthy citizens preferred, instead of leaving their money to existing institutions, to found new ones of their own. In this way Whittington College at the church of St. Michael Royal was founded by Richard Whittington, St. Mary Spital in 1197 by Walter Fitz Ealdred, St. Thomas of Acons in 1190 by the sister of Thomas Becket, St. Katherine's-by-the-Tower by Matilda, wife of King Stephen, and many others. Such foundations were less acts of benevolence than mutually satisfactory bargains between master and servants. Poverty-stricken men and women were glad of a comfortable home with security of living, while their employer required their constant daily prayers to ease the passage of his soul through Purgatory. And so he paid and they prayed, he helping them in this world and they helping him in the next.

Perhaps the purest act of charity ever recorded in ancient London was the establishment of Elsyng Spital in 1329 by William Elsyng, a prominent mercer, as a home for sufferers from one incurable malady—blindness. The premises had formerly been a nunnery and were situated in London Wall north and south of the present Aldermanbury Avenue. All such hospitals were in those days inevitably associated with religion, and so Elsyng started his house as a priory of Augustinian Canons, with himself as its first warden and accommodation for a hundred blind people. However he provided by his will that no one, ecclesiastic or secular, should be allowed to intermeddle with it, and appointed property in more than eight City parishes for its support. As with other houses of the kind it was appropriated by the Crown at the Reformation. Its church was given to the parish of St. Alphage in

place of their old church opposite which had become ruinous, and another part to Sir John Williams, Master of the King's jewels. Sir John's part was burned down in 1541, when many of the royal jewels were destroyed, and as Stow slyly observes, "more embezzled, as was thought." About 1623 Sion College arose on the site and was removed in 1886 to make room for offices and warehouses, but the old tower of Elsyng Spital still stands in London Wall, and its ancient porch is kept as a chapel for rest and prayer.

An incurable disease of another kind was more generously catered for by the citizens than any other ill to which flesh is heir, but less out of consideration for the sufferers than fear for their own safety. This was leprosy, which assailed persons of every class and was so prevalent that it required almost as many houses to cope with it as all other diseases together. The ancient theory of the means by which it was spread appears in 1472 when Edward IV, having occasion to order the Mayor, under a penalty of £500, to clear all lepers out of the City, went on to explain that the victims spread infection both by the air they breathed and the looks from their eyes. The danger apparently did not extend to their clothing, for if they were caught in London they were to be deprived of their gowns, not, as far as can be seen, in order to destroy them, but merely as a punishment. The fear of this dread malady on the part of the citizens is illustrated by the fact that all leper hospitals were outside the City—St. James at Charing Cross, St. Giles in the Fields, The Lock in Kent Street, Southwark, another at Hackney, and one at Highgate. The last mentioned was not established until 1468, but all the others were existing in the fourteenth century, and several much earlier. St. James, a house for leprous women, goes back at least to the time of Richard I. The "sisters" were pensioned off by Henry VIII, who built St. James's Palace on the site.

St. Giles in the Fields was founded in 1117 by Matilda, wife of Henry I, and endowed with sixty shillings a year out of the revenues of Queenhithe in Thames Street, to which the King added another sixty shillings out of the Exchequer and thirty shillings from his lands in Surrey. In course of time St. Giles's came to own much property in the City. The master of the hospital used to go round the City collecting his rents, and as a precaution took several followers with him. Even this was not always effective, as shown by an example in 1305 when he found it necessary to levy distraint on a fishmonger of Fish Street Hill who was two years in arrear with his rent. On picking up a fish from the fishmonger's slab, which he intended to appropriate by way of a pledge, the irate merchant threw him out of the shop and kicked his men after him. The Corporation of London devised lands worth a hundred

pounds for the support of St. Giles's and thereby acquired the right of appointing its two wardens. Edward I, however, gave the appointment to a nominee of his own, who, being a religious man, turned out the lepers and filled the house with brothers and sisters of his own order who were not diseased. This state of affairs continued until the reign of Edward III, when the warden was compelled to agree to the Corporation presenting fourteen lepers to the institution, a number to be increased in proportion as the City subscribed further funds. In later times this was the spot where felons on their way to execution at Tyburn were presented with a great bowl of ale, their last drink on earth.

It is interesting to note the subsequent development of those houses which were originally founded as refuges for the aged and infirm. All but one were suppressed at the Reformation on account of their religious affinities, and some were graciously returned to the City as secular institutions, Henry VIII thereby achieving the distinction of becoming their second founder. The exception was St. Katherine's-by-the-Tower, and the King's motives in sparing it may have been mixed. Before he thought of destroying the monasteries he himself, with his Queen Katherine, had founded there a fraternity dedicated to St. Barbara, which all the greatest in the land, including Cardinal Wolsey, rushed to join for an entrance fee of 10s. 4d. On the other hand he may have been influenced by the fact that each succeeding Queen of England was the hospital's patroness, with power to alter its rules at will, and having the sole right to appoint its master, privileges of which all these royal ladies appear to have been very tenacious. Curiously enough St. Katherine's was not destroyed until 1825, to make room for St. Katherine's Dock, at a time when there was no queen to defend it.

There were two hospitals of St. Thomas, both named after Thomas Becket, the Londoner's favourite saint. One was in Cheapside and was founded by his sister and her husband shortly after Becket's murder, next door to where is now the Mercers' Chapel. The high altar was erected on the very spot where Becket was supposed to have been born, and his life story was told in the stained glass windows. One of these represented Henry II kneeling naked at Becket's shrine, doing penance for his murder. St. Thomas of Acons was a house of the military order of St. Thomas of Acre, a branch of the Templars, and was given by the donors "in free, pure, and perpetual alms for evermore," and the fraternity of Mercers were constituted patrons. The master and brethren were twelve in number and were probably aged members of that trade. Henry III gave them more ground which he seized from a Jew, and in 1444 the master and brethren were made a body

corporate, with power to receive gifts. After this they became sufficiently wealthy to start a grammar school, "to teach all that will come," and this was the origin of Mercers' School. At the Dissolution the hospital extended along Cheapside from Ironmonger Lane to Old Jewry, and was redeemed from the King's hands for £969 17s. 6d.

In a sense St. Thomas of Acons may be said to have been the scene of the beginning and the end of the Marian persecutions. In condonation of the fires of Smithfield it has often been pointed out that the Protestants themselves started the quarrel by various acts of aggression, one of which was an outrage at St. Thomas's. Over its doorway had stood for ages an image of Becket, which, removed in Henry VIII's reign as being superstitious, was restored when Mary came to the throne. In February 1555 it was taken down during the night and smashed, and another set up in its place was treated in the same fashion a few nights later. When Mary died the end of Catholicism in England was celebrated outside St. Thomas's in the roadway of Cheapside, with a great bonfire fed with the images and other superstitious furniture brought out from the parish churches.

Although according to Stow the other St. Thomas's was originally built against the wall of Bermondsey Abbey about the year 1213, when we first heard of it it stood on the west side of Borough High Street and belonged to St. Mary Overy's, now St. Saviour's Cathedral. At that time it was a home for the poor and infirm and was shortly afterwards removed to the east side of the street. At least as early as the fifteenth century it was a regular hospital, for we read that Richard Whittington made there a chamber with eight beds for young women that had done amiss, and commanded that all things done in that chamber should be kept secret, "for he would not shame no young woman in no wise, for it might be cause of her letting of her marriage." After the Reformation, when the memory of Thomas Becket was held in high disfavour, the hospital's patron saint was changed to St. Thomas the Apostle. It remained on its old site until 1871, when to make room for the South Eastern Railway it was removed to the Albert Embankment.

Another hospital founded in similar circumstances was St. Anthony's in Threadneedle Street, opposite the church of St. Benet Fink and near the corner of Broad Street. It was a Jewish synagogue until 1254, when Henry III granted it to the brotherhood of St. Anthony of Vienna. Its inmates comprised a master, two priests, a schoolmaster, and twelve poor men. The presence of a schoolmaster indicates that it was one of the early schools of London, and later on it became the City's academy of music. In the sixteenth century its clerks used to be hired out to sing at ban-

quets and church celebrations. In 1529 the church of St. Mary at Hill engaged one of its singers, described as "Sir Symond the Base," and in 1510 they took the clerks of St. Anthony's with them to a foundry at Aldgate to test a new bell. In 1414, when Henry V turned all the alien priories out of the country, it became a royal free chapel, and at the Reformation the almsmen were turned out and the church was let to the French Protestants in London, after which the school rapidly declined. In the fourteenth century St. Anthony's was famous for what only the bucolic ear could associate with music—St. Anthony's pigs. In those days large numbers of the citizens kept pigs, and tempted by the garbage which littered the streets, used to let them roam and pick up a living where they could. This became such a nuisance that the Corporation employed men to catch them, who were privileged to keep a wandering pig for themselves unless the owner were willing to pay fourpence to redeem it. But St. Anthony's was exempt from this regulation, and their pigs were allowed to roam the streets at will with a bell round their necks to indicate their ownership. In 1311 the renter of the house was sworn not to avow wandering pigs as his own, or to put bells on any but those given to the house by way of charity.

There were two other alien hospitals for the poor in London, both French, and both suppressed in 1414. One was in Whitecross Street and one outside Aldersgate. The latter was given to the parish of St. Botolph Aldersgate and became a brotherhood of the Trinity, and the former was given to the brotherhood of St. Giles Cripplegate. Both continued to be devoted to the relief of the poor until the Reformation, when they were suppressed.

Another hospital was Whittington College, founded at the church of St. Michael Royal near Thames Street by Richard Whittington in 1422, for a master and thirteen poor men. One of these was to act as tutor and received sixteen pence a week, the others fourteen pence a week. Each was provided with food and lodging and a hutch or cupboard with three locks. The condition of receiving the charity was that they should pray for the souls of Richard Whittington and his wife. After the Reformation the college was turned into almshouses, which were removed to Highgate in 1808. Mercers' School was transferred to the site in 1832.

St. Augustine Papey, or Pappychurch, in Camomile Street, was originally a parish church known as St. Augustine on the Wall, but was annexed to Allhallows London Wall in 1428 because it was found that there were not ten inhabitants in the parish. In 1442 it was turned into a home for superannuated London clergy, who were given fourteen pence a week and provided with a barber, a washerwoman, and a cook. The inmates were regarded as parishioners

of Allhallows London Wall. It is recorded that in 1537 they had to be summoned to pay their share of a rate levied on the entire parish for the clerks' wages of Allhallows. This was a special rate levied at the time in every parish to pay the expenses of the choir. The place was pulled down at the Reformation, and all that remains to remind us of it is the little churchyard in Camomile Street, Bishopsgate. Even here the inquirer is likely to be misled by the name of St. Martin Outwich inscribed in iron over the entrance, but this is because at one time it was given to that church for an additional burial ground.

St. Mary Spital without Bishopsgate occupied the site of the present Spital Square and Spital Yard, and was founded by Walter Fitz Ealdred in 1197 as a hospital for poor brothers of the order of St. Augustine, with lay brothers and sisters to attend the sick. At the Dissolution it possessed 180 beds. It became chiefly notable for the Easter sermon preached from the pulpit cross in its churchyard in the presence of the Mayor and Aldermen, attended in after years by the children of Christ's Hospital. It is recorded that in 1553 the children were seated on a gallery of eight stages and were dressed in coats of plunket with red caps, showing the original uniform of what came to be known in later times as the "Bluecoat School." In those days they had a summary method of quelling dissensions in the Church. Three clergymen preached the Easter sermon at St. Mary Spital in 1540 and expressed such advanced views that they were taken without trial to Smithfield and burned.

There appear to have been only two houses of any pretension starting their careers as hospitals for the sick in the modern sense—St. Bartholomew's and the Savoy—though there is little doubt that at various periods obscure places of the kind existed the very names of which have perished. This is suggested by several entries in the churchwardens' accounts of St. Mary at Hill, in which a place called the "Freer" near Billingsgate is mentioned. It was obviously a small hospital, for at different times a priest, a man, and a child were brought from there for burial in the churchyard. The Savoy, indeed, was a late arrival. It was originally a royal palace, built in 1245 for Peter of Savoy, uncle of Henry III's queen, and so remained until 1509, when Henry VII turned it into a hospital. He was urged to do this, as his will informs us, by contemplating the seven works of mercy, and more particularly six of them. Its career was short, for in the reign of Edward VI it was confiscated and its furniture and bedding transferred to Bridewell. It was resuscitated in Mary's reign by the ladies of the Court who subscribed to refurnish it, and so it continued for some years longer. Even St. Bartholomew's was in

early times a home for the poor and for young women with illegitimate children, as well as for the ordinary sick. Its first patient to find mention is one Adwyn, who came up from Dunwich in Suffolk in the reign of Henry II, and it is satisfactory to note that he was discharged cured. Bart's also gives us what is perhaps the first example of a street casualty taken to hospital. This was Wat Tyler in 1381, who was taken in after being stabbed by Sir William Walworth. The doctors of the period, however, were given no opportunity of curing him, for Walworth returned later, dragged him out, and cut off his head in the middle of Smithfield.

In spite of the establishment of Bart's the public did not for hundreds of years take kindly to doctors. It was more customary in the middle ages for an invalid, if he were capable of movement, to betake him to a church and ensconce himself in the hollow lower part of the tomb of some ancient saint, or failing that, to sit in the niche of a tabernacle, passing the time in prayer for his recovery. By way of medicine the priest would often give him to drink water in which the bones of the saint had been soaked. In this way Canterbury water and Durham water became famous all over the country. So prevalent were these habits that in the sixteenth century Bart's had eight beadles going round the City to search out diseased persons and report them to the almoner of the hospital. It is to be feared that the patients did not always conduct themselves in a manner consistent with proper gratitude for the benefits they received. In 1552 it was necessary to make a rule that any found to be a "swearer, or an unreverent user of his mouth," or who refused to go to bed at the lawful hour appointed, should be put in the stocks. Some of them used to trade upon their infirmities by begging in the streets, and it was part of the duties of the beadles to arrest them when caught. In early times the hospital was governed by a master, eight brothers, and four sisters, under the prior of St. Bartholomew's Priory. After the Dissolution it was transferred from the prior to the Mayor and citizens, and Henry VIII re-endowed it by pulling down two churches and giving their sites to the hospital. At this period it cost twopence a day to feed each patient.

In contrast with Bart's, which although often rebuilt and extended, still occupies its original site, Bethlehem Hospital is now about to make its fourth migration. It was founded by Simon Fitz Mary, a sheriff of London, in the thirteenth century on ground extending from Bishopsgate to Moorfields. Its southern boundary was the City wall, except where the church of St. Botolph Bishopsgate occupied a corner, and comprised the whole extent of the present Liverpool Street and Broad Street stations. It seems doubtful if it started as a hospital either for the poor, the aged,

or the infirm, but quite early in the fourteenth century the canons turned their attention to the care of the insane, a change doubtless due to the fact that in 1346 the Priory was taken under the protection of the Corporation, who thereafter appointed the keeper of the hospital, generally supervised its administration, and received out of its revenues an annual fee of forty shillings for their trouble. "St. Mary of Bethlehem," as it was first called, soon became shortened in popular parlance to "Bedlam," a word which thereby came to signify, from the ravings of the lunatics, any sort of uproarious assembly.

As civilisation has progressed humanity and science have gone hand in hand to ameliorate the hard lot of those who suffer from the worst of all human ailments. But it was not always so. In the early period the best that could be done for the mentally afflicted was to chain them to the wall like wild beasts and subject them to a course of semi-starvation. In 1442 a madwoman who spoke too presumptuously to the King and when brought before a judge refused to say a word, was pressed to death, and in 1561 a harmless lunatic who believed himself to be Christ was, with his single disciple, whipped at a cart's tail all the way from the Marshalsea to Bethlem Hospital. After a period of detention the lunatics were allowed out to roam the country begging, and these became known popularly by the name of "Tom o' Bedlam." As Bethlem was still a religious house it was suppressed at the Reformation and given by the King to the City as a secular hospital. However the dispossessed priories, while losing their religious character, retained their ancient privilege of sanctuary, and freed from ecclesiastical control became the refuge of thieves, vagabonds, fugitive debtors, and makers of spurious goods. That Bethlem was no exception to this rule is shown by the report of the rector of St. Botolph's Church in 1545, who says: "And there is daily and continually evil, naughty, and abominable and vicious rule used and maintained by naughty pakkes which are suffered there to have their resort and abiding . . . and daily and commonly marriages had and solemnised which are contrary to God's laws and man's laws and detestable before God."

The church and chapel of the hospital were taken down in the reign of Elizabeth and houses built on the site, forming a street known for two centuries afterwards as "Old Bethlem." In 1568 the Mayor, Sir Thomas Roe, enclosed part of the garden as a cemetery for the use of those City parishes whose churchyards were too small. Late in the seventeenth century the whole establishment was removed to Moorfields, where a new hospital was built in imitation of the Tuileries. In the eighteenth century this became one of the show places of London, visitors being admitted to stare

at the lunatics in their cages on payment of a penny. The building was closed in 1814 and the hospital removed to St. George's Fields in Southwark, from where it is about to migrate once more to Shirley in Surrey. Bethlem possesses the distinction, which it shares only with Elsyng Spital out of all London's ancient hospitals, of being able to show one remaining vestige of its former grandeur. This is to be found in the White Hart Inn, commonly known as "199," on the corner of Bishopsgate and Liverpool Street. The inn occupies the site of the original guest-house of the monastery, and although the superstructure has been rebuilt, the ancient undercroft with its massive piers and walls six feet thick still remains, and is now used as a storage cellar for the purposes of the business.

CHARLES PENDRILL.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE CHANNEL TUNNEL.

FOR half a century men have argued the case for or against, mostly against, the desirability of boring a tunnel under the Channel whereby a non-maritime connection might be established between England and France. A periodically excited public opinion on this subject has waxed and waned, its satiety being registered from time to time by a Governmental verdict against the scheme. Now again the project has been driven to the bar of the Government's judgment, and again it has been rejected. Some people are pleased, some not, by that event.

Probably the reason why the Channel Tunnel cannot die is that on its merits it is always interesting, and always, like the Derby or the Test matches, though on a plane much below them, produces controversy without bitterness. In its international aspect, it is more attractive than the important subjects, such as disarmament, mandates, or minorities; everybody understands the point at issue, it is easy to form a view, for or against, and easy to defend or to combat, either view; it can never be proved which side is right; and there is a homely aspect to it in the minds of such people as find a sea passage nauseating. In short it is a good subject.

The latest phase of the matter was recognised by Mr. Baldwin's Government more than a year ago. In April 1929 Mr. Baldwin consulted Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Lloyd George, the leaders of the two other great national parties (for the Channel Tunnel is too good a thing to be circumscribed by party lines), and encouraged, of course, by them, he solemnly instituted an official inquiry. It was the fifth such inquiry to be made since the beginning of the present century. A Channel Tunnel Committee was formed. It issued its Report. In the meantime Mr. MacDonald displaced Mr. Baldwin in the Prime Ministership, but the continuity of a great national institution was not thereby affected. The only difference now was that before the scheme was again rejected, it was Mr. MacDonald who consulted Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Lloyd George, laying before them the views and material supplied by the Channel Tunnel Committee, the Committee of Imperial Defence, the Economic Advisory Council, by representative industrial concerns, the Southern Railway and other bodies or individuals. The Government, as was natural, had the last and final word on the subject, and in June issued a penny White Paper (The Channel Tunnel. Statement of Policy. Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. June 1930. Cmd. 3591). The statement was dated June 4th, 1930.

The latter-day aspect of the controversy is not what it was in

the days when the late Lord Balfour could make this comment: "So long as the ocean remains our friend, do not let us deliberately destroy its power to help us." Nowadays the ocean is regarded more literally as a vast expanse of sea, not a narrow strip which aeroplanes hop over with little more ado than they hop over a river. The advanced people scoff at the alleged military danger that would result from the boring of a tunnel. They argue, some of them, that on the contrary it would not be a bad thing, from a military point of view, to have an invading army packed into twenty miles of narrow tunnel at the bottom of the sea. They argue further, to show that their first argument is a mere reduction to absurdity, that, of course, no invading army would be so silly as to think that by commanding the Kent end of the Tunnel it could safely shoot armies through it. Aeroplanes will probably, they submit, be able to drop instruments of a kind to sink to the bottom of the sea and puncture any tunnel, howsoever constructed: and submarines will probably be able to do comparable service. Those modern minds therefore who want to have the Tunnel dismiss the military argument as trifling, and they submit simply that it would be a practical convenience if passengers could enter a train at Victoria Station, or goods be put on a train at that station, and be carried to any part of the Continent without the nuisance of translating person, baggage, or goods from train to ship and from ship again to train. Such, however, is the hold of Conservatism over British minds that the present Labour Government feels and says about the matter exactly what its forerunners have always said, that the Tunnel would be a strategic menace to the country. The present Government makes a sound point when it declares:

"If this island is to be connected with the Continent by a tunnel, the Government's advisers on defence matters have always insisted, and still insist, that it shall be adequately protected, and, as will now be seen, this would cost a great deal of money. . . . It is estimated that the capital cost of the necessary defences would not be much less than from £1 million to £2 million, according to the site selected for the Tunnel and its exchange stations. In addition, there would be a heavy annual charge for upkeep and maintenance of the garrison, including additional Air Forces. Moreover, Governments would be pressed to keep the defences abreast of the march of military progress, and that would entail from time to time additional expenditure. One thing to which the Government's advisers strongly object is the acceptance of a new and expensive military commitment at a time when our imperial defence forces have been reduced to a level which leaves no margin beyond our existing commitments. So long as there are great military establishments in Europe, the Tunnel, if not adequately defended, be-

comes a potential danger; if it is properly defended, a military commitment is incurred, in which considerable forces would be locked up and immobilised."

Such was the argument presented by the Government to the Committee of Imperial Defence on May 29th, on which occasion, at Mr. MacDonald's request, Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Lloyd George were present. "The Committee of Imperial Defence were unable to discover a single advantage from a military point of view which would follow from the construction of a Channel Tunnel. On the contrary, it would result only in an increased military commitment, involving in certain happily remote contingencies an element of danger, to provide against which a heavy capital and annual expenditure would have to be incurred."

It was after that meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence that the Government made its final review, and on military, economic, and diplomatic grounds decided to withdraw its countenance from the scheme. Some of the reasons given in support of that decision will bear a close examination.

On the one hand, the economists have shown themselves to be far from unanimous about either the feasibility or the expediency of the scheme. While the five members of the Tunnel Committee, with one dissident, gave it as their opinion that "the construction of a Channel Tunnel, by creating new traffic and thus increasing trade, would be of economic advantage to the country," yet the evidence on which they based their opinion was at least two-edged. The three eminent firms of engineers who were consulted by the Tunnel Committee would not commit themselves to more than this, that "no definite opinion can be given until the ground has been proved by the construction of the pilot tunnel. Difficulties would no doubt be encountered, but we hesitate to say that they would be insurmountable." Even the Tunnel Committee, while thinking it "probable" that "the geological and engineering difficulties likely to be encountered could be successfully overcome" none the less make the reservation that there must "remain an element of doubt regarding the practicability of constructing the Tunnel until the proposed pilot tunnel, estimated to cost £5,600,000, has been successfully driven right across the Channel."

The Government comments thus on the Committee's remark (as the Government's White Paper is written in bad, and in places ungrammatical English, I add in square brackets the emendations necessary to make sense of the following passage): "If this operation were successfully accomplished—and it is estimated to take five years—the main tunnel could then be constructed at a further cost estimated at £25,000,000. Even this large figure, however, does not include the cost of the exchange stations, the open approaches

from the mouth of the Tunnel to the exchange stations, the electric locomotives, the necessary rolling stock, the electric generating stations and the land required. The total cost, therefore, would considerably exceed the £30,600,000 provided for in the Committee's Report for the pilot and main tunnels. In addition, a considerable amount of capital invested in the existing cross-Channel system would be rendered unproductive. Nothing can be done unless the Government licence the building of the Tunnel, and to that extent they [would] make themselves responsible for encouraging the public to subscribe to the funds required. If the completion of the work were delayed owing to a failure to get the public to provide the necessary sums, the Government, however careful they may be to warn the promoters that in no circumstances will public money be provided to complete the work, cannot [could not] escape some moral obligation to see the project through. What justification is there for the Government to incur such serious responsibility on such an uncertain report?"

One of the surprising results of the Committee's inquiry was the discovery that little enthusiasm could be discovered in favour of the Tunnel, and much against it. The farmers, especially those of the South and South-east of the country, were found by the Committee to be in a state bordering on alarm at the prospect of a Tunnel. Not content with expressing its alarm to the Committee, the National Farmers' Union sent a deputation to Downing Street appealing for the rejection of the scheme. Most of the other representatives of trade and industry who were consulted were shy of committing themselves to any definite view. The Chambers of Commerce paradoxically gave a majority opinion in favour of the Tunnel, but gave it "subject to a reservation on its possible adverse effect on trade." The formula seems an odd one, for in so far as it has any meaning at all, it can mean only that the Chambers of Commerce on the one hand are in favour of the scheme, and on the other hand are not in favour of it. The shipping companies, of course, who run a cross-Channel service over the water, see nothing attractive in being blacklegged by an amphibious railway train.

There is, however, a much more serious objection to increased facilities for pleasure-seekers who travel to and from the Continent. It is a well-known and hardly disputed fact that the vast majority of people who travel to and from the Continent are English people, or Americans escaping from England. It is only a small proportion of hardened tourists who come to England for pleasure: those people who, having experienced the easy freedom of Continental life, find a perverse pleasure in the excitement of spending a night in a London gaol for drinking a glass of beer at a minute past eleven o'clock or for walking through Hyde Park after dark. The

taste for such adventure is an acquired and rather decadent taste. For the most part American tourists, especially central and southern Americans, much prefer, when they travel to Europe for pleasure, to find themselves on a hot summer's evening in Continental resorts where they are not treated as children and made to go to bed at ten o'clock with a glass of hot milk. If at midnight they feel they would like a glass of iced pilsener, they would rather be in a country where some respect is felt for freedom, and where they are allowed to do what they like, drink what they like, eat what they like, when, and where they like. It is probably a similar motive that induces large numbers of English people to suffer the acute discomfort of travelling abroad in the hot summer in ugly Continental wastes rather than to enjoy the refreshing climate and scenic beauty of an English summer. It is the British Government that drives out the British people and keeps out the foreigner. The economic effect is that sterling is sold for francs, marks, lire, and crowns. The Bank of England, struggling against a French Exchange which holds the whip hand as a result of the British soft-headedness which allows France the bulk of German reparation payments while retaining for the British taxpayer the burden of paying for the Great War, finds itself still further handicapped by the selling of sterling in the silly season as a means of escape from the sumptuary persecution of the six hundred old women of Westminster. The Channel Tunnel would remove the last inducement for seasick persecuted English holidaymakers to stay at home and spend English money for the benefit of English people.

Even in the matter of unemployment the Channel Tunnel would not help. "From the point of view of relief to unemployment" submits the Government White Paper "the results of the inquiry are especially disappointing in comparison with the expenditure involved. During the five years required for the construction of the pilot tunnel only 250 men would be employed directly and 750 indirectly. In this phase the men engaged in the tunnel workings would, owing to the peculiar character of the work, consist mainly of specialists, and could not be drawn from the general ranks of the unemployed. During the following three years, 1,550 men would be employed directly and 4,500 indirectly. It has been calculated that the total labour, direct and indirect, to be employed annually for the first five years, on the English side, is only equivalent to that which could be provided by the expenditure of about £250,000 per annum on road construction in this country.

"Further, it seems probable that, from the start of the eight years of the construction period, and indeed, during the preliminary period of negotiation and preparation, which must be considerable, there is no company likely to be affected but will restrict to the

utmost expenditure on new steamers, landing facilities, and harbours and piers generally, and this is confirmed by a statement in the Report that one railway company is already understood to have deferred a decision in regard to a proposed extension until it is known whether or not the Channel Tunnel scheme is to go forward. Thus, the unemployment, direct and indirect, may go some way to counterbalance the employment created by the scheme."

The Government's policy was therefore formulated as a negative, the reasons being summarised in the last sentence of the White Paper: "Having regard to the element of doubt as to the feasibility of construction, the weakness of the economic case, the great cost, the long period before which the capital expended could fructify, and the small amount of employment provided, the Government have come to the conclusion that there is no justification for a reversal of the policy pursued by successive Governments for nearly fifty years in regard to the Channel Tunnel."

M. BRIAND'S MEMORANDUM.

On a personal criterion there is something sad in the way M. Briand launched his famous proposal of a European union and in the effect he produced. His "Memorandum sur l'organisation d'un Régime d'Union Fédérale Européenne" probably represents his life's dream, his supreme ambition. No living man has had as much experience of European diplomacy, of the terrifying weakness of European relationships, or appreciates as deeply the need of a steadying influence. So far, however, his work and his effect have been negative; that is to say, during the past decade he has used his great gift of appeasing passions and smoothing difficulties in order to minimise existing dangers and controversies. He probably recognises as clearly as any man, certainly more clearly than any other Frenchman, that the philosophic incompatibility of temper between the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental mind constitutes a problem that must be solved before settled tranquillity can descend upon Europe. As M. Briand saw it, the problem no doubt resolved itself into this issue: how can the Continental reliance on juridical and military sanction as the best safeguard of peace be reconciled with the Anglo-Saxon distrust of such sanction? Temperamentally, Anglo-Saxon thought is inclined to the view that military sanction defeats its object and produces the very thing it is designed to prevent, and on the other hand Continental thought is inclined to regard the alternative method of psychological security (as exemplified in the Kellogg Pact) as merely a pious aspiration lacking virtue and substance.

The League of Nations Covenant is based on the Continental rather than on the Anglo-Saxon conception, for while it embodies

a quasi-Kellogg renunciation of war it also stipulates a military and economic sanction in the alternative. If the United States had become a member of the League all would have been well, because the sanction would have been overwhelmingly powerful. Even Anglo-Saxon thought does not challenge the efficacy of a sanction that is powerful enough to crush any possible combination of opposition. It is when the sanction is doubtful that the danger emerges. In the case of the League of Nations the danger emerged because the United States was outside it. The classical illustration of the danger is Article 16, whereby in juridical theory the British Navy might be called on to prevent the United States from trading with an "aggressor" state; in other words whereby an Anglo-American war might be prescribed as a means of preventing war. That simple reduction to absurdity has never appealed to Continental minds with the same force as it appeals to British minds. The famous Geneva Protocol was a means of tightening the juridical, military sanction of the Covenant: and British opinion was driven away. When M. Briand started the train of diplomacy which led to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, he was aiming at something quite different from the pact that actually resulted. The "psychological" pact did, however, result; and what is more important, an attempt is now being made at Geneva to harmonise the Covenant with the Pact. That is clearly a move in the right direction.

In the meantime, there is a Briand, recognising the force of the Continental tradition and of the Anglo-Saxon, knowing that the welding of Pact with Covenant is probably a slow process of growth, and anxious to secure the peace if only by some *ad hoc* temporary expedient. For ten years he has used his gifts to stem the tide of dissension. He now sees his way to do something positive, something which is to be his own personal contribution to the great cause of world peace. The scheme he has launched has not been given the praise it deserves as an ingenious attempt to strike a mean between the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon conception. To British minds it fails because it would still rest ultimately for its sanction on the sanction clauses of the League of Nations Covenant, although *prima facie* it is bereft of sanction. It is a compromise that fails. The sad figure of M. Briand, an honest, hard-working idealist set in the midst of apparently insoluble difficulties, making his supreme effort and not even being thanked for his pains—he is probably a sadder man than ever; but those who know enough of him and of his problem derive from the contemplation of him that peculiar exaltation that is inspired by fine achievement finely attempted, whether successfully or not.

The text of his "Memorandum on the Organisation of a Federal

Union of Europe" was issued from the French Embassy in London on May 17th and concurrently by the French Embassies in other countries. It was a printed document of some 6,000 words, divided into an explanatory introduction, four chapters outlining the details of the proposal, and a final appeal to the Governments of Europe to act in sympathy with him. The document is dated May 1st.

In the introduction M. Briand recalls the meeting held at Geneva on September 9th last, at which he submitted his proposal in a tentative form to twenty-seven European States members of the League of Nations. He defines the object as "the institution among the European peoples as a sort of federal bond, establishing between them a régime of constant solidarity and permitting them, whenever necessary, to make immediate contact with a view to studying, discussing, and resolving all problems of common concern to them." M. Briand was on that occasion invited to specify his exact proposals. The resultant memorandum is submitted to the various Governments, who are asked to make comments on it, so that a report on the whole matter may be made to a European Conference to be held at Geneva at the time of the next League Assembly.

M. Briand submits that the existing lack of co-ordination among the peoples of Europe "gravely restricts the possibilities of economic expansion, the opportunities for increasing industrial production, and the safeguards against labour troubles, which are a source of political and social unrest." He further submits that a formula of European co-operation, such as he seeks, "in conformity with the League of Nations," should enhance the effectiveness of the League itself, and postulates that any steps taken in this direction should be reported to the League as a contributory element in the League's activity. The "European Association" might further help the League by preparing the ground for League decisions. While he restricts his proposal to the European members of the League, he emphasises his intention not to imply any opposition "to any national group, whether in Europe or in other Continents, which is not part of the League of Nations." He gives emphasis also to the axiom that the new organisation "shall not in the least affect the Sovereign rights of the State members"; in fact, prescribes that the "complete political independence" of the new constituent States be the basis on which the new Entente shall be built.

Chapter I suggests the form of a general commitment binding the member States to "the principle of moral union." The suggestion reads: "In a formula as liberal as possible, but one which indicates clearly the essential objective of this collective enterprise

in the organisation of European peace, the signatory Governments undertake to make contact with each other, by periodic or extraordinary meetings, to examine in common all questions of potential interest to the community of the European peoples.

Chapter II (a) outlines the institution of a regular body, "representative and responsible," to be known as "the European Conference." Every State member should be represented on it, and it should be the supreme directing body of the "European Union" in co-operation with the League of Nations. The powers and organisations of this conference should be determined at its first meeting. M. Briand emphasises the necessity of parliamentary ratification for any agreed recommendation, and suggests that the Presidency of the Conference be held in rotation for a period of one year. Section B of Chapter II suggests the establishment of a permanent political Committee, composed "only of a certain number" of representatives, to act as the executive body, as a sort of Cabinet. "The Conference" and the "Committee" would apparently correspond in quality to the "Assembly" and the "Council" of the League; indeed, M. Briand suggests that the meetings of the "Committee" be held at Geneva concurrently with the meetings of the League Council. Part C of Chapter II prescribes the necessity of a Secretariat, whose duties would be to carry out resolutions, correspond with the several Governments, file and record decisions, etc. In the first instance M. Briand suggests that the Secretariat be provided by the Government presiding in its rotation over the Conference, but reserves the possibility of a permanent Secretariat being set up later.

Chapter III, which is divided into three parts, A, B, and C, makes certain observations on the nature of the problems to be dealt with. M. Briand submits that as economic well-being is dependent on political well-being, the political aspect of the work should always hold precedence over the economic aspect. He further makes the distinction that it is "union" not "unity" that is aimed at; that is, a free association of independent States, not component parts of one super-State. He suggests that the Governments take the initiative in explaining precisely what their tariff policies are, so that the Conference may attempt to evolve an agreed policy.

Chapter IV outlines certain fields of European activity on which action by the Union may be reserved for future consideration, such as communications and transit, finance, labour, health, intellectual co-operation.

M. Briand's concluding appeal is in his best form. "The hour," he says, "has never been more propitious nor more urgent for constructive work in Europe. The settlement of the chief

problems, material and moral, resulting from the last war, will soon have relieved the new Europe of the burden which oppressed her both psychologically and economically. She is now ready for a positive effort tending towards a new order of things. A fateful hour, in which Europe may, if she will, decide her own destiny."

M. Briand asks that the comments and suggestions of the Governments be sent to him by July 15th.

Such the scheme. There are certain aspects of it which will strike his European colleagues as remarkable. In the first place it will inevitably be asked: What is the difference between M. Briand's "European Union" and the form of union already available to Europe, as to the rest of the world, in the League of Nations? He emphasises, not once, but many times during his memorandum that the European Union shall not supplant or compete with the League of Nations, but shall rather supplement it and shall at all times regard itself as subordinate to the League. He suggests Geneva as the headquarters of the Union, as it is of the League; even suggests that the European Committee meet at Geneva at the same time as the League Council. On the face of the matter M. Briand's plan has the appearance of a sort of localised European version of the League of Nations. On further examination it seems to suggest that for the first time since the war a leading Continental statesman has proposed a pacific organisation which depends for its efficacy, not on military "sanctions" or juridical instruments, but on simple common sense and good will. But does it so depend? In form there is no provision for sanction. In effect its co-ordination with the League Covenant borrows its sanction from the League.

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN BREAKDOWN.

The official record has now been published of the recent Anglo-Egyptian Conference (Egypt No. 1. 1930. Cmd. 3575). As the problem remains unsolved and cannot be left for an indefinite time unsolved, the next attempt at a solution must inevitably start from the point at which the negotiations were suspended on May 3th. There is, therefore, something of more than academic interest in the precise circumstances which induced Nahas Pasha to go home empty-handed.

Fourteen plenary meetings were held between March 31st and April 17th. The discussions started promisingly enough on the basis of the 1929 draft treaty. The promise had been illustrated by King Fuad, who at the opening of the Egyptian Parliament on January 11th referred to the draft treaty in these words: "His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has presented to the Egyptian Government proposals which are

inspired by a spirit of friendship and conciliation. Our Government will be happy to submit these proposals to you and hopes to undertake negotiations with the British Government in a spirit of conciliation and friendship with a view to a firm and honourable agreement between the two countries." Those proposals were summarised in last month's CONTEMPORARY. At an early stage of the Conference it was established that the discussions now starting would centre mainly round Articles 8 to 13 of the 1929 draft treaty. Articles 8 and 10 were considered first. Their substance was that in so far as the Egyptian Government might choose to employ foreign military instructors, such instructors should be chosen from among British subjects (Article 8), and that in so far as the Egyptian Government might choose to engage the services of foreign officials in a non-military capacity, such officials should "as a rule" be British subjects (Article 10). The only qualification asked for by Nahas Pasha on those two Articles was that they should never be construed to imply any fresh obligation upon Egypt. The British answer to that request was that whereas the British Government did not join issue with the Egyptian Government in its desire to Egyptianise its services, yet another issue did arise, and the British Government did demand an undertaking on the part of Cairo that in so far as British officials might be eliminated, they should not be replaced by other foreign officials; that is, that they should be replaced only if they were replaced by Egyptians.

Articles 11 and 12, dealing respectively with the abolition of capitulatory rights in Egypt and with the seniority of status to be accorded to the British Ambassador in Cairo were not by a long way the most difficult points of controversy, but were not settled till nearly the end of the Conference. It was agreed that the precedence of the first British Ambassador over other Ambassadors should be reserved to his successors by means of a provision to that effect to be incorporated in an annex to the treaty.

It was Articles 9 and 13 dealing respectively with the protection of the Suez Canal and with the independence of the Sudan that at an early stage of the Conference defined themselves as the probably cardinal issues. The Sudan was the more serious of the two, but the question of the Suez Canal was not settled without prolonged and tiresome discussion. Nahas Pasha had clearly adopted the tactic of fighting inch by inch in the hope that he would wear down Mr. Henderson's resistance. It had been agreed between Mahmoud Pasha and Mr. Henderson that British forces should be maintained to the east of longitude 32°E. It followed almost automatically from Nahas's method that he should begin by demanding that the British forces be confined to one point on the east bank of

the canal. He not only duly made that counter proposal, but specified first Port Fuad and next Kantara as the point proposed. Mr. Henderson resisted such arguments, and Nahas Pasha in the end accepted the concentration of British forces to the west of the Canal in the neighbourhood of Ismailia, receiving in compensation the concession that the period during which the treaty would be excluded from revision should be reduced from twenty-five to twenty years. No doubt Nahas Pasha had thereby achieved his purpose. He had no doubt aimed at the bigger thing in the sole expectation of obtaining the smaller: a not unfamiliar method of bargaining whether in the East or in the West.

It was on the ill-fated Article 13 that the conference was destined to break down, the Article namely that treated of the Sudan. It ran in the 1929 text: "While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in future modifying the conventions of 1899, the High Contracting Parties agree that the status of the Sudan shall be that resulting from the said conventions. Accordingly, the Governor-General shall continue to exercise on the joint behalf of the High Contracting Parties the powers conferred upon him by the said conventions."

In the new draft treaty as discussed by Nahas Pasha and Mr. Henderson before Easter of this year, an attempt was made to satisfy the Egyptian claims by two concessions. The old Article 13 (which in the new draft became Article 11) was modified by the insertion of the words "without prejudice to Egypt's rights and material interests," the full new article reading thus: "While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in future modifying the conventions of 1899, the High Contracting Parties agree that without prejudice to Egypt's rights and material interests the status of the Sudan shall be that resulting. . . ." That was the first concession. The second took the form of an inserted new sentence in the text of the "Draft Exchange of Notes" whereby it would be provided that there should be "no discrimination in the Sudan between British subjects and Egyptian nationals in matters of commerce and immigration or the possession of property." (Paragraph 14 of the Draft Note.) Nahas Pasha not being satisfied thereby a still further effort was made to appease him by the proposed addition of an entirely new and general provision to the effect that either party might within the next twelve months re-open the discussion of any point arising out of the working of the treaty. The new proposed Article (No. 15 of 1930 draft) ran thus: "Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 13 [which stipulated that differences about the application or interpretation of the treaty which could not be directly settled should be dealt with according to the provisions of the Covenant of the League of

Nations] the High Contracting Parties agree, if either of them should so request, to enter into friendly discussions within one year from the coming into force of the treaty with regard to any question arising out of the application of any article of the present treaty with respect to which any difficulty may have arisen."

It was at the stage produced by these new proposals that an agreed treaty seemed likely to result. Just before Easter indeed there appeared to be reason for the expectation that a full agreement would be reached both on the text of the proposed treaty of alliance and on the equally important text of the subsidiary note. A firm agreement had already been reached on that part of the Note which provided for the retention of the Financial and Judicial Advisers for the full period of their contracts; and a virtual agreement had been reached about that part of the Note which related to the European element in the City Police, for the British delegation had committed itself to accept the strongly pressed contention of the Egyptian delegation that the interests of public security would best be served by an arrangement whereby the reduction in number of the Europeans should be effected gradually over the whole period of five years during which they were to be retained. The passage on Capitulations had been drafted on the basis of the discussions that had taken place between the British experts and the Egyptian delegates and it was regarded as settled that the Egyptian delegation would accept it. Finally, an agreement "in principle" had been reached about the military provisions, that is about the numbers of the British military and air forces which were to be accommodated, about their location and the disposal of the properties they would vacate on being transferred to the neighbourhood of the Canal.

The cup, in fact, was near the lip. Suddenly, on the morning of April 17th Nahas Pasha informed Mr. Henderson that he could not accept the treaty because his claims in the Sudan had not been adequately met. He asked for a copy of the proposed treaty and notes in their latest form so that he could transmit them to Cairo for consultation. The conference was then adjourned till April 29th, when a further adjournment became necessary as a result of the pantomimic interlude of the lost messenger, as narrated in last month's CONTEMPORARY.

When the conference did again meet, namely on May 5th, Nahas Pasha presented a changed front. The existing draft treaty and notes were ignored by him and he submitted instead a new draft of his own making. Its main feature was the revival of two alternative proposals for the Sudan which had in fact already been made by Nahas and rejected by Mr. Henderson before April 17th. The technique of the conference became a little twisted, for the modifica-

tions introduced in the draft now put aside by Nahas had been made in the April 17th draft in collaboration with Nahas precisely because the new proposals now revived by him had been rejected. The two alternatives, rejected in April by Mr. Henderson and revived by Nahas in May, had the common object of shelving the question of the Sudan, whence it appeared that Nahas's object was to accept the treaty without committing himself to anything in regard to the Sudan. The formulæ of the two alternatives were (1) either that the question of the Sudan be reserved for future negotiation within one year from the ratification of the treaty or (2) that it be reserved without time limit for future negotiation and that in the meantime the *de facto* position of the Sudan as obtaining before 1924 should be restored. Mr. Henderson now for the first time showed signs of an impaired serenity. Nahas Pasha was informed without ceremony that his alternatives were neither of them more acceptable now than they had been before April 17th; that in his new draft he had omitted all reference to the new general article (No. 15) that had been inserted in the draft before Easter; and that he himself had now added a wholly new article providing that "any agreement or declaration or other bilateral or unilateral acts which are in opposition to the present treaty are null and devoid of effect."

The British delegation now adopted a clean-cut attitude. Nahas Pasha was informed that unless he agreed to restore the British draft of Article 11, the discussion must be broken off and the treaty abandoned. Egyptian delegations, however, find it hard to accept even the plainest speaking at its face value, for it is the Eastern style to say, and to expect others to say, much more than is meant. It was not surprising therefore that on the following day (May 6th) having slept no doubt unconcernedly on the matter, Nahas Pasha started what he probably expected would be a quiet process of nibbling at Mr. Henderson. He conceded that the Egyptian delegation would accept the Henderson draft with two "minor" amendments, and on condition that the British negotiators put into writing a certain statement of their view. The two "minor" emendations would have made Article 11 read as follows (the emendations are given here in italics): "While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in future modifying the conventions of 1899 and settling the question of the Sudan, the High Contracting Parties agree that without prejudice to Egypt's rights and material interests the status of the Sudan shall be that resulting from the said conventions. Accordingly, as one of the consequences, the Governor-General shall continue to exercise on the joint behalf of the High Contracting Parties the powers conferred upon him by the said conventions." The note which the Egyptian

delegation proposed should be written was to the effect that the Sudan article did not in any way affect Egypt's right to sovereignty over the Sudan and the joint administration thereof by the two High Contracting Parties. Diplomacy of such a kind is a severe test of an equable temper on the other side of the table. What in effect Nahas Pasha proposed was that he should accept Article 11 as it stood, on the condition that it be radically altered. Mr. Henderson's temper by all the reports is equable in kind. He contented himself with the intimation that the Nahas counter-draft and the note combined were unacceptable.

Nahas's withers however were still unwrung. Unperturbed, on the afternoon of May 6th he announced that he was now prepared to accept the original wording of the British draft article, with a new condition, namely that the High Contracting Parties agreed, if either of them should so request, to enter into friendly discussions within twelve months of the coming into force of the present treaty with regard to the application of the 1899 Conventions. He added, however, still another proposed modification of that passage of the note which provided that there should be no discrimination in the Sudan between British subjects and Egyptian nationals. What he now wanted was that it be made clear that no restriction would ever be placed on the immigration of Egyptians into the Sudan.

It is impossible for human beings to go on being angry over the same provocation indefinitely prolonged, especially when the provoking agency appears to be unaware that he is doing anything amiss. It appears, therefore, that Mr. Henderson decided to make one final patient attempt to explore whatever reasonableness might lie hidden in Nahas. The attempt was begun at the workmanlike hour of 8 a.m. on May 7th and was prolonged with short intervals till 3.30 a.m. on May 8th. It therefore lasted almost continuously for nineteen and a half hours. At the end of that time such progress had been made that the treaty was agreed, and the new difficulties about the notes almost all of them bridged, with the one vital exception that an agreement could not be reached about the Sudan. No formula that Mr. Henderson could offer would satisfy Nahas in his claim for the unrestricted immigration of Egyptians into the Sudan. When Mr. Henderson, for instance, suggested that the Governor-General should undertake not to exercise "unreasonably" the right which any Government must possess, namely to control immigration in the interests of its own nationals, Nahas grimly demanded the deletion of the word "unreasonably."

The time had therefore arisen for an ultimatum. The British delegation's ultimatum was that the treaty could now be saved only if the Egyptian delegation would accept the text of the Sudan

article as drafted by the British delegation on April 17th with the difference that the British delegation would accept the two minor amendments proposed by Nahas, namely the addition of the words "and settling the Sudan question" after "the Conventions of 1899," and the omission of the word "Accordingly" at the beginning of the second sentence, which would run "The Governor-General shall, as one of the consequences of the 1899 Conventions, continue. . . ."

That last offer was made early in the morning of May 8th. Nahas Pasha undertook to give his answer at eleven o'clock that same morning. He returned with his delegation at the hour arranged and announced that he could not continue the negotiations unless the British negotiators modified their position. Mr. Henderson thereupon brought the conference to an end by stating that the British negotiators could not modify the proposals they had made in the early hours.

There followed a formal ceremony at which Nahas Pasha and Mr. Henderson expressed their regret that the conference had failed, Mr. Henderson adding that if the Egyptian delegation on returning to Egypt and discussing the matter with their friends should change their view, the treaty remained open for acceptance by them.

June 15th, 1930.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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LAMBETH PALACE.*

Mrs. Dorothy Gardiner, the well-known scholar and antiquarian, and the author of the recently published history of English girlhood at school, was invited by Lord Davidson to tread afresh the well-trodden, but not wholly explored, path of the history of Lambeth Palace. The approach of the Lambeth Conference makes this publication very timely. A. C. Ducarel in 1785 collected much material and many writers of the nineteenth century added to it, but Lord Davidson declares that in this new attempt "many of the episodes of the last few hundred years will now be seen in a clearer setting than was possible when I myself, for example, in the intervals of more exacting work, began to study them on the spot more than half a century ago." The late Archbishop, in his fascinating preface, rightly says that the historian of the Palace must not yield to the temptation to become the biographer of the Archbishops or follow this or that side-track of history which touches the Palace. The History of the House was Mrs. Gardiner's task, "the rambling pile of what is, I suppose, with the exception of Buckingham Palace, the largest single dwelling-house in London," to quote again from Archbishop Davidson. How was it to be undertaken? It was necessary to trace the changes in the actual

* *The Story of Lambeth Palace: A Historic Survey.* By Dorothy Gardiner, with a Preface by Archbishop Lord Davidson of Lambeth. Constable and Co., Ltd. 15s. net.

structure from age to age during seven hundred years, and it was necessary to give episodic glimpses of the famous men—through some five centuries—who still glance at another age from those hallowed walls. Each historian has his own view as to the episodes. Lord Davidson mentions Chichele, Morton, Cranmer, More, Laud, Sancroft, and William White who in 1878 knelt in the Chapel for his Consecration “as the first American bishop on our long historic Roll at Lambeth.” These scenes, he adds,

One can multiply almost infinitely. Mrs. Gardiner has vividly presented to us great occasions in the Church’s history, and her pages will live. I like with her help to dwell too in thought upon the domestic side, and the incidents which the rooms suggest at every turn. And so one can placidly run on and on into the days which we who are now alive can recall, days which link the present and the future with the past. Every part of the historic house is to me so dear that I rejoice in the publication of Mrs. Gardiner’s book, which will increase the circle of those who know and care.

Mrs. Gardiner begins with some account of the Manor of St. Mary called Lambeth in the mid-eleventh century, and she derives the name Lambeth from the Saxon *Lam* (clay) and *hyth* a haven. It was owned by Goda, the sister of Edward the Confessor, was part of an ancient royal estate, and was conveyed by her to the monks of Rochester. In this Manor House the Bishops of Rochester lodged and successive Archbishops of Canterbury were entertained. After the turmoil of the Conquest William re-granted the Manor to the monks of Rochester, and that grant was confirmed by successive royal charters. In 1190 Archbishop Baldwin acquired a portion of the Manor for a London estate and dwelling-house for himself and his successors, but trouble followed and it was not until 1197 that Archbishop Hubert made an arrangement by which the whole Manor passed to the see of Canterbury in exchange for the Manor of Darenth, the Bishop of Rochester retaining a house on the estate known as La Place. Trouble was not over yet, and Hubert was forced to demolish, or pretend to demolish, his original chapel, to cease to patronise the secular canons, and to placate the turbulent monks of Canterbury. This was in 1200. The famous Langton succeeded to the see in 1207 and adopted the Manor House as an occasional residence. It may be that the treaty of 1217 which freed the child king Henry III from the French invaders was signed at Lambeth after Hubert de Burgh’s sea victory. The early history of the buildings of the Palace is in some doubt, since Cardinal Archbishop Kilwardby carried to Rome and left there, it seems, the early archiepiscopal registers. It may be that the chapel was the same that was ordered to be destroyed in the time of Hubert. A good deal of building can, however, be traced to

the first quarter of the thirteenth century. The Court Rolls at Lambeth are extant from 1234 and Mrs. Gardiner is able to give some details of the life in the Palace, and not least of the magnificent craft-work of Edward of Westminster, son of Odo Le Orfevre, the servant of Henry III. The chapel has the stamp of the work of Henry III as exhibited in the Temple Church and in his thoroughness at Westminster. It stands to-day “little altered in essentials.” The Great Hall that Archbishop Hubert Walter probably began was also completed about 1262. The chapter on the fourteenth century gives Mrs. Gardiner the opportunity to discuss the country manor-houses of this age, of which the Archbishops of Canterbury possessed many. In 1322, when Reynolds was Archbishop, Lambeth had become a principal residence with a fine hall and chapel and many public rooms such as the Magna Camera Domini constantly used for important gatherings. “The inner courtyard was entered by a great gate, probably on or adjacent to the site of Morton’s Tower.” Fourteenth-century life is well described in the magnificent hospitality of Robert de Winchelsey. The Black Death of 1349, to which Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, “Doctor Profundus,” fell a victim opened a new age, the age of William Langland the poet and reformer, and the age of Wiclif who was prosecuted in vain, since London loved him and sacked Lambeth when the trial was in progress.

A nobler age for the Church opened with the accession of the great Henry Chichele in 1414. He was “an indefatigable builder” and Mrs. Gardiner traces his handiwork. More clement than Thomas Arundel the heretic hunter, he was concerned with one great trial, that of William Tailour, a Lollard whom he vainly strove to save. Persecution was indeed rife until the trial in 1457 of Reginald Pecock, Bishop of Chichester, for heresy and the writing of books in English that still live. He died in prison, but not at Lambeth. The new age was opening and in that age Cardinal Morton built his famous tower, “a splendid and almost unique example of the early Tudor style of brick-building.” Thomas More was as a boy in Morton’s household, a reminder that the Renaissance had come to England. The Reformation, too, was in sight.

Morton died in 1500 and we come to the time of William Warham, the last Archbishop of the pre-Reformation days (1503-32), Erasmus, Colet, and stately Tudor scenes at Lambeth, though the records contain no reference to Wolsey. Henry VIII and Cromwell, “subtle, implacable, utterly passionless, so terrible a foil to the master he served—assumed autocratic power hitherto unimagined in England. The Act of Supremacy, declaring him the only head on earth of the Church of England, was forced through

Parliament without effective opposition." Sir Thomas More refused to swear the oath and was sent to the Tower on April 15th, 1534. So we come to the days of Cranmer and the effective Reformation, Lambeth under Mary and Elizabeth, the buildings undertaken by Cranmer and Pole, and the changes introduced by Parker, all fascinating reading. Yet the period from Whitgift to Laud was from the point of view of the see of Canterbury more important, and when Laud was translated to Canterbury in 1632 he determined, in the teeth of Puritan opposition, to make the Church of England "a reformed branch of the great Catholic Church throughout the world, with doctrines and usages based on those of the Christian communion in the centuries which preceded the Council of Nicea." The account of Laud and his works at Lambeth is valuable and interesting in the extreme. His imprisonment and death in 1643 introduce an apt chapter on "Prisoners at Lambeth House," in which it is said that the darkest records undoubtedly belong to the period of the Commonwealth. It is indeed a melancholy story, but one that was inevitable. And so the student comes to the Restoration, to the saintly Juxon who had ministered to the King on the scaffold, Sheldon, Sancroft, and the new eras of Tillotson, Tenison, Secker, and those who were princely rather than archiepiscopal. The visitors to the Lambeth Conference this year, who must perforce possess this work, will turn with avidity to the account of the great library and the pictures which begin as a sequence with Holbein's famous portrait of William Warham. The portrait of William Laud is by Van Dyck, Kneller painted Tillotson; Reynolds, Secker; Romney painted Moore; Sir Thomas Lawrence, Charles Manners-Sutton (the last of the prince-Archbishops); Sir William Richmond painted both Longley and Tait; Sir Hubert Herkomer, Temple and Benson, while Sargent painted Lord Davidson of Lambeth. There are other very interesting portraits, and not the least Penelope Devereux, Lady Rich, the heroine of Sidney's sonnets. The whole book is essentially readable, but it exhibits at every turn sound learning and courageous opinions.

J. E. G. de M.

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JEWISH LAW IN ROMAN EGYPT.*

Philo Judæus, the Alexandrian contemporary of Jesus Christ, is a famous figure in the history of philosophy. The begetter of Neo-Platonism, the spiritual forerunner, afar off, of Plotinus, Dr.

* *The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt: Legal Administration by the Jews under the Early Roman Empire as described by Philo Judæus.* By Erwin R. Goodenough. Oxford University Press. 13s. 6d. net.

Caird says of him that "he, more than any other writer, exhibits to us the process by which the two great streams of thought, from Greece and from Judæa, came to unite in one." The task that Philo set himself was "to translate Hebrew conceptions into their Greek equivalents, and to bring Greek conceptions into a form suited to the Hebrew mind," despite the fact that "in every formal respect, the Greek and the Hebrew ways of thinking are antagonistic, even where the matter or content of their thought is most similar." He saw that there must be a higher unity simply because he was master of both systems of thought.

Philo, if not a lawyer, was at any rate, as Professor Goodenough says, "a practical political administrator of some kind during most of his life," and in the four books of his work *de Specialibus Legibus* and other preceding works he asserts that the Torah is the Law of Nature, that is to say the Law of God. Now the Roman control of Alexandria in the time of Philo gave much freedom to both Jews and Greeks who had their own magistrates, who were apparently free, subject to the *jus gladii* and the right of appeal to Rome in the case of Jews who were also citizens. It was a great trading community—the second city in the Empire—with a huge trade in pearls and Indian and African goods, and must have built up a jurisprudence common to Greek, Jew, and Egyptian. The Jewish tribunals did not deal with crimes against society at large, but certainly dealt with offences against property between Jew and Jew. Professor Goodenough compares the situation with the judicial procedure revealed in the newly discovered Edicts of Augustus to local strategoi in Cyrene and Crete, and thinks that "the relations between Jews and Romans in Alexandria must have been fundamentally the same as those between the Greeks and Romans in Cyrene, so that the Jewish Law could have been kept in matters of petty crime, or in mere civil matters, but must have been discarded in treating more serious breaches of the peace." It all depends where the line is drawn.

The Romans alone had the *jus gladii*, and also in case of rebellion the Roman Law could have been applied, but the Jews were Roman citizens and their own customary law would be the subject of appeal and not the Roman Law which would have applied to the case if and so far as there had been no customary law. On the other hand it is practically certain that the Jews in Alexandria never had the power of life and death (the *jus gladii*), though Professor Goodenough considers that in crimes committed by a Jew against a Jew the practice of lynching was winked at by the Romans. This seems doubtful since the Jews had the right to ask the Romans to exercise the *jus gladii*. It is rather difficult to understand Professor Goodenough when he says, "a splendid case

of the Roman assent freely given to a Jewish death sentence is that of Jesus as the story appears in the Gospel of Mark." In fact, Pilate protested against the sentence, "Why, what evil hath he done?" and only yielded when he found that the Jews had corrupted the people. The phrase "a splendid case" under all the circumstances seems singularly indelicate.

In certain spheres of law, such as the law of divorce, the Egyptian Jew could remove his case to Jerusalem and there appear before the Sanhedrin, and if he failed to prove his case he could resort to the ordeal. The priest at Jerusalem would give the woman a mixture and tell her that if she is guilty it will curse her. Though this was a process that only wealthy Jews could use, it is quite evident that no Jew could take an alleged case of adultery before a Roman tribunal since in that tribunal it was a civil offence and normally not a specially serious one. Philo is arguing that according to the Law of Nature a man who is beyond doubt guilty is beyond formal law and the husband can exercise personal redress. There are traces of this in English Law to-day, the reason being that married life is the norm of society and must be protected. Certainly there were traces of this form of self-help in Roman Law. But that is not the same thing as going before a Roman tribunal. The value of Philo's treatise to the modern jurist is that in his elaborate analysis of the Decalogue he exhibits the operation of a Law of Nature common to all men. He, in fact, in pursuance of the new doctrine of Neo-Platonism, finds not as a matter of history but as a matter of philosophic inevitableness a law common to Jew and Gentile, whether Greek, Roman, or Egyptian. It is fitting that a thinker who brought the two great streams of Hellenic and Jewish thought into one channel should show as a practical fact that the new philosophy applied to law.

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THE FOURTEENTH-CENTURY SHERIFF.*

The work of the mediæval sheriff or vicecomes has hitherto been known only from scattered references, but a fortunate find in 1925 by Miss Henrietta Garbett, the librarian of the William Salt Library at Stafford, of a manuscript identified by Mr. Hilary Jenkinson as coming from the Sheriff's Office has placed one side of his work on a sure documentary basis. The manuscript is "a register of Writs received

* Published in conjunction with the Architectural and Archaeological Society for the County of Buckingham. *Quarto Memoirs of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society. Volume III. Rolls from the Office of the Sheriff of Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire. 1332-1334.* By G. Herbert Fowler. Published by the Society at the Old House in Aspley Guise. 30s.

from, and notes of the Returns made to, the King's Courts, by the Sheriff of Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire, in 1333 and 1334," and Mr. Herbert Fowler calls it "The Sheriff's Roll of Writs and Returns." It is a unique Roll of the highest historical importance, and the Trustees have allowed a transcript to be made of it. By a very curious coincidence in 1927 Miss Joan Wake, the secretary of the Northants Record Society, found at Drayton House, Northants, a Roll, only the third instance of its class "which records proceedings in the County Court at Bedford for seven sessions in 1332 and 1333"—the County Roll of Pleas for Bedfordshire. The Account of the Profits of the County of nearly the same date (1329-30) have most fortunately been found in the Public Record Office by Miss Mabel Wills, while the Subsidy Roll of Bedfordshire for 1332 has also, thanks to Mr. Sydenham Hervey, been printed, which "enables the smaller men of the county to be localised in many cases." Mr. Herbert Fowler draws upon Professor W. A. Morris' book, *The Mediæval English Sheriff*, which deals almost with the period of these Rolls, and prints the 1344 Dunstable Writ and Oath dealing with the appointment and oath of a sheriff.

The Sheriff of the County was often a man of great position, such as Prince Edward (King Edward I), and had to have a deputy appointed *pro hac vice*. That was a casual if necessary officer, but there was also an Under Sheriff, and the Roll of 1333-4 directs the Sheriff "or your Under Sheriff to be there in person." Sometimes the Sheriff, or even the Under Sheriff, is represented at the Exchequer by the Sheriff's Clerk. In the case before Mr. Fowler, Walter Powel, a clerk, appears five times at the Exchequer to make the county payments. Another clerk, William de Berkhamptstede, also appears at the Exchequer as a deputy. The Treasurer approved both as alternative Deputies: "Our forefathers were more concerned to make the daily machine work than to consider its theoretical principles." The Exchequer had to be supplied with money. The Sheriff was the King's Bailiff, but there were other and smaller bailiffs who were appointed by the Sheriff to account for certain areas, but who were also royal officers. There were nine Hundreds of Bedfordshire and six triple Hundreds of Buckinghamshire, each of which were worked by a single bailiff. There were many Liberties,

estates, often composed of widely scattered manors, to the holder of which a King had at some date granted—among other privileges—the "returnus brevium" the right to make returns to Writs. If the Sheriff in such case receive a precept to proceed (by summons, attachment, etc.) against a resident in the Liberty "he must deliver that writ to the bailiff of the Liberty who will execute the precept. Only in case the lord or his bailiff has been

guilty of default and a second writ comes to the sheriff containing the clause 'quod non omittas propter aliquam libertatem,' will he be justified in entering the privileged precinct." . . . The privilege of these Liberties made the delivery of writs and levying of moneys sufficiently troublesome; but the difficulty was increased by the existence of a Liberty within a Liberty . . . the Quency Earldom of Winchester was a Liberty, as much as the Borough of Bedford, within which a piece of it lay.

The Borough of Bedford as a Liberty accounted independently of the Sheriff at the Exchequer. In the case of Hundreds the Sheriff let the office of bailiff for a fixed yearly payment, and the bailiff might recoup himself as well as he could for his work in serving writs from those on whose behalf he worked. "The system was thoroughly bad." There was a considerable amount of work to do both in the Liberties and in the Hundreds in the way of making answer to the Orders of the Courts, whether Royal or County. Mr. Fowler considers, indeed, that these orders included Orders of the Hundred Court, but surely that was a separate business and not executed by the Bailiff as Bailiff of the Hundred. The Sheriff's Messengers and Supernumeraries show points of interest in relation to delivery of writs and to special writs, such as *elegit*, *habere facias visum*, and so forth. Indeed, the actual practice becomes clear in the light of the new documents

not made by Mr. Fowler) that there is some relationship between the Bill in Eyre and the County Court Bill. The process of plaint by Bill without writ which was still in vogue in the County Court in the time of Littleton in the fifteenth century was supplemented by the much rarer royal writ from the Chancery, and after the first stages the procedure seems to have been much the same. It was about this time—the first quarter of the fourteenth century—that the General Eyre (which for the time being supplanted all other Local Courts) was dying out, and it would be interesting if the equitable jurisdiction of the Eyre was adopted by the County Court, the Court which had to enforce many writs, including the Writ of Justicies, which ordered justice to be done by the Sheriff and definitely enlarged the jurisdiction of the County Court. Mr. Fowler draws attention to a curious case when an action of defamation and damages was brought in the County Court by Bill of Complaint for trespass, which might be looked upon almost as an early instance of trespass on the case. The fact was that there was no original writ in Chancery for defamation, and the plaintiff was thrown back upon a Bill. But that was what was done in the case of a Bill in Eyre which was specially devised to recover damages or other remedy for every imaginable form of tortious act. The great advantage of the Bill was that the Judge could amend

guilty of default and a second writ comes to the sheriff containing the clause 'quod non omittas propter aliquam libertatem,' will he be justified in entering the privileged precinct." . . . The privilege of these Liberties made the delivery of writs and levying of moneys sufficiently troublesome; but the difficulty was increased by the existence of a Liberty within a Liberty . . . the Quency Earldom of Winchester was a Liberty, as much as the Borough of Bedford, within which a piece of it lay.

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between a native of this country and a foreigner as to the inwardness of our system of government. The foreigner asks some very pointed questions: is England a democracy or a monarchy, and if it is both how does the House of Lords fit in to the scheme of things, and if a purpose or function can be indicated, how is it that the Radical Party does not reform the House of Lords in order to make it still more efficient? Many other questions are asked and answered in order to show that the Constitution is a thing of facts rather than of theories. "The permanent and stable thing in our Constitution is a certain temper in our national life, of which it is the outcome and not the cause. The Constitution is a state of mind." So the foreigner has to read this book and many natives should follow his example. The conclusion of the foreigner is that "Your Constitution is religion without dogma," but perhaps the better definition is "a state of mind based on precedent and like precedent capable of growth."

The Constitution, as Sir Maurice says, reconciles policy and law:

It was reserved for the English people, in the slow and chequered progress of conflict and experiment which made their political life, to work out the solution of the problem how so to conduct the affairs of the nation as to combine the benefits of a vigorous and purposeful administration with a diligent solicitude for principle and private right. The rules and institutions by which this balance is secured and expressed, taken altogether, make up our Constitution.

The spirit of law has been working all the while, and it is upon that spirit that we depend to-day in the conflicts and complexes of modern times. "The legal bent of the English political mind" is rightly dwelt upon since it is an historic heritage and the rule of law has come from it, while the legal profession has played an important part in its make-up. "The Bar has never lost close touch with the business of government." The ordinary form of any inquiry is stamped with a juridical as well as a judicial form. Precedent has played a leading part in the upgrowth of the Constitution, and is still playing it.

Sir Maurice lays before us the classical constitutional plan as exhibited in the processes of English history, and shows clearly enough that Montesquieu's idea of the "separation of powers"—executive, legislative, and judicial—does not in fact reveal the secret of the Constitution. The co-ordination of power is the ceaseless need, and it is only rendered possible by the creation of a system of Cabinet Government, the putting into commission, so to speak, of the powers of the Crown, a fact that is to-day rendered lasting by the control of the House of Commons over national

finance. This means party government, and Sir Maurice lays special stress upon the part played by His Majesty's Opposition. "In England we have come to regard the organised and responsible opposition, continually criticising the administrative, financial, and legislative measures of the ruling party, as an essential part of the system." The Constitution, in fact, is based upon an intimate union of the power of the Crown in commission and the power of Parliament. But the power of the electorate has also to be considered. "The real centre of political authority has moved from Parliament to the electorate." The Ministry holds over the House of Commons the threat of dissolution. But the House of Commons is strong, since it is an organic body, and since it can create ministers. Yet it depends for its life on an ever-watchful electorate.

What is the power of the King to-day, the King personally, not the Crown, the King as "the first and highest of the officials of his Crown"? His influence as an adviser of the Crown—that is to say, of the Crown in Commission—is immense, since he or she has continuous experience and has no party ties. Queen Victoria's amazing industry and experience made her the best adviser that the Prime Minister could have. Lord Salisbury said of her, "When I knew what the Queen thought I knew pretty certainly what view her subjects would take, and especially the middle classes of her subjects." Lord Kimberley recalled, on the occasion of the Queen's death, that Lord Clarendon said to him, after discussing a matter of importance, "Well, let us have the Queen's opinion. The Queen's opinion is always worth hearing, even if you don't agree with it." In form the Ministers advised the Queen, in fact the Queen advised the Ministers. Sir Maurice Amos says that "in its continuity the King's experience resembles that of the permanent Civil Service; in its variety it is unlike that of anyone else."

Sir Maurice goes on to discuss the powers of the Crown—Common Law and Statutory Powers—the machinery by which these powers are exercised—the Privy Council, the Cabinet, and the Civil Service—the powers of Parliament and the liberties of the subject. Every page is full of interest. It is not a critical point, but in a later edition it might be said that in the Parliamentary vote for "the support of his Crown and dignity" the King gets less than he gives up in the shape of the hereditary revenues of the Crown. These Crown lands are worth far more to-day than the annual grants to the Royal Family. The book, good as it is, has an additional value given to it by the Introduction from the skilled pen of the Lord Chief Justice, in which Lord Hewart, indeed, brings into small compass the main learning on the subject of the English Constitution.

PRIMITIVE BELIEFS IN SCOTLAND.*

The Rev. J. M. McPherson, of Stonehaven, has done good work in collecting material for the history of primitive beliefs in the North-east of Scotland. Such a book should encourage similar collections for other areas of Great Britain. The folk-lore of Exmoor, for instance, contains many signs of primitive belief, and there are many records of witches. But the North-east of Scotland has long been a hunting ground for strange phenomena. Nearly half a century ago Dr. Walter Gregor published *Notes on the Folk-Lore of the North-east of Scotland*, and since that date many records have appeared. Mr. McPherson's collection extends over three centuries :

in this twentieth century, we seem to stand at the parting of the ways. Till the close of the nineteenth, the witch was not unknown in the rural and maritime parts of the North-east. The clyack sheaf, "the maiden," was gathered and carried home at the end of the reaping, the meal and ale was celebrated with merriment and dance. Already we have entered upon an age when many know naught of these things. It is, therefore, of all the greater importance to assemble and record the testimonies of those still alive who can speak from their own experience of the old beliefs, the old ways, and the old traditions.

Mr. McPherson deals successively with Nature Worship and the Black Art, but he says :

the distinction cannot always be clearly drawn. Particularly in the ancient rites associated with birth, marriage, and death there are many practices and underlying conceptions that have more affinity with the witch cult than with the worship of a nature spirit. *Per contra*, in the second section will be found ceremonies originally identified with the worship of fire, water, or stone, but now absorbed in the magic art.

The May or Beltane bonfires Mr. McPherson parallels with the Lemurian rites in ancient Rome. In Perthshire the proceedings ended with the May-day Feast, and there can be no doubt that a sacrificial feast belonging to the Stone Age was associated with the fires. Beltane bannocks were prepared until the end of the last century. As late as 1874 in Shetland the children passed through the Beltane fires to Moloch. The Celtic year began with Halloweve and the Hallow fires were more important than the Beltane since it was "man's response to, and attack upon" the growing powers of darkness. Mr. McPherson thinks that these fires were Celtic. There is a great deal to be said for the view that these are much older and belong to the black-haired people of Scotland. The evidence as to Lares seems to confirm this view. The Midsummer and

* *Primitive Beliefs in the North-east of Scotland.* By J. M. McPherson. Longmans. 12s. 6d. net.

Yule festivals are admittedly universal and not specially Celtic. The "Needfire" was also very ancient, and we are told that it was "the mother of the fire festivals" produced by the friction of two sticks, and it was associated with animal sacrifice in both England and Scotland. In the middle of the nineteenth century a live ox was burned near Haltwhistle in Northumberland to stop a murrain. In Scotland the "Burry Man," a person chosen as a scape-goat, still appears in the same century, at least until 1883. Accounts are given of the holy wells, of water-spirits, of spirits of trees, stones, caves, corn, and last the fairies and the lares. The Brownie is a charming creature, the lares or health spirit of Roman days. It is curious that in the case of childbirth iron was regarded as a sure preservative. It seems as though the iron age brought in new methods to ensure the safety of the woman and child. On the other hand it was good to have two defences in life, and devil-worship and hell-fire clubs lasted into the nineteenth century.

The witch cult was no mean thing. The confessions of the Auldearn witches in the seventeenth century, coupled with other evidence, make clear that the cult was highly organised.

By the close of the seventeenth century the witch organisation was beginning to yield before the rigours of civil and ecclesiastical authority. Individual witches, or witches in bands of two or three, pursued their craft till well through the nineteenth century, but the glory and glamour of the cultus had largely departed. The witches had lost prestige. Advancing knowledge was slowly emancipating the peasantry from their thrall. In the beginning of this period, however, the witch organisation challenged the authority of Church and State, and for a century and a half it exercised a more powerful influence on the daily life of the common people than king or presbyter. Only later were the witch bands broken up, their sole representative a despised, if feared, aged crone who tenanted some lonely sheiling in a remote hillside.

The Devil was the Grand Master of the organisation and he might appear in the form of a woman. Under the Devil were local officers or rulers who were men. The Coven consisted of thirteen women, including the attractive Maiden of the Coven, who was the head of the women, while the Ruler was head of Warlocks or the men-witches. There was a regular and disgusting initiation at a Great Sabbat. In later times "the witch ritual was performed by some solitary survivor, who was thus handing the secrets of her art to another generation. The scene might be a churchyard, and then at the solemn midnight hour, one more made her compact with the devil and was initiated into the fellowship of the weird sisterhood." The same churchyard scene was witnessed on Exmoor where apparently the late nineteenth-century witches traced their organisation from Wales. On Exmoor the initiate had to recite the

Lord's Prayer backwards and apparently she took the shape of a hare.

Mr. McPherson gives a detailed account of the Sabbats or conventions. It is curious that the hare cult is also observed and has something in common with the Welsh cult. The Forfarshire witches met at Candlemas, Roodday, Lammas, and Hallowe'en, and these were the usual times everywhere, but in different districts "one season came to be more favoured than another." Hills were the usual *rendezvous*, but water and woodland glade also attracted the assemblies. Homage and disgusting ceremonies were offered to the Devil, and this was followed by dancing, a feast, and obscene rites. The meeting discussed the harm done in the interim, and Mr. McPherson details the means taken by witches for working woe or upon occasions working good, especially in the way of fertility rites, the control of the wind, and healing the sick, "unwarrantable healing" as the Church called it. The priesthood of the witches was a strange thing. Possibly Mr. McPherson could extend his references by using *Notes and Queries*, in the many volumes of which famous work there is collected much lore that is relevant to the cults which he illuminates in this admirable book.

J. E. G. de M.

LEIGH HUNT.*

Mr. Edmund Blunden has written, and at length published, as promised for several years past, a masterly book in one large volume on Leigh Hunt, that often neglected poet, who, by the present generation of poetry readers, is but little loved and less known. Mr. Blunden is well qualified for the work now produced, and he has striven to impart to others the love he bears, and after much research still bears to a poet whom he feels is insufficiently appreciated both in life and in letters. The author has found, by his patient research amongst manuscripts and newspapers, evidence concerning this man of letters and his countless friends which might well have been overlooked by anyone less familiar with a revolutionary period both in politics and letters, and one which gave to England, and to literature generally, some of the greatest of her poets—Byron, Keats, Shelley, Wordsworth, Lamb, and Landor, to name but a few outstanding personalities. A period plays its part in the making of a man: environment almost equals heredity, if heredity has supplied the correspondence. This book is not merely a life of Leigh Hunt the poet, but an echo of his time. No man or poet more appreciated or was more alive to the

* *Leigh Hunt: A Biography.* By Edmund Blunden. Colden-Sanderson. 21s. net.

genius of his contemporaries than Leigh Hunt. He wrote: "Write me as one that loves his fellow men."* This is not always the case since true criticism and generous appreciation are almost impossible between minds which view life from a different angle, and this gift is only given to those whose feet are set in a large room. Hunt's certainly were thus set, with a broadness of outlook and that happy *bonhomie* and salt of life which won all hearts even in his prison walls where he spent two years for insulting the Prince Regent. Mr. Blunden gives some amusing accounts of that strange imprisonment.

All students of Leigh Hunt's period should read Mr. H. S. Milford's edition of Hunt's *Poetical Works*, "The Oxford Poets" Edition, and especially the Editor's Preface in which he speaks of the eagerness with which Mr. Edmund Blunden's *Life of Hunt* is anticipated. That was some seven years ago, and that hope is now fully realised by the present volume, with all its research, which entailed not alone patience and years of work, but wisdom as to inclusion and exclusion. It is only the genius of editing that can accomplish this most difficult task.

Leigh Hunt was born on October 9th, 1784, and, like Percy Bysshe Shelley, came partly of American forbears. Isaac Hunt, the grandfather, was vicar of Bridgetown, Barbados, in the middle of the eighteenth century, and his son, again Isaac, was sent to College at Philadelphia in 1757 and took the degree of "M.A. of the Universities of Philadelphia and New York." In 1767 he married Mary Shewell and in England was born James Henry Leigh. His father, Isaac Hunt, had crossed the Atlantic, and decided to turn his dramatic sense to the service of the Church and was ordained. His wife and children having arrived from America they found refuge in the house of Benjamin West, R.A., himself from America. Isaac, at this time much impoverished in money affairs, whilst preaching in the village of Southgate attracted the attention of the Duke of Chandos (the grandson of Pope and Swift's Duke of Chandos), who appointed him tutor to his nephew, James Henry Leigh, and a son being born to him at that time, he received the names of his father's pupil. Isaac Hunt later, thanks to Benjamin West, was granted by George III a Loyalist Pension of £100. Leigh inherited from his mother a happy and sensitive nature which ever stood him in good stead, while his love of the pen and dramatic leanings came from his father.

Hunt's devotion to music, especially Mozart, was his first love, but literature, either in poetry or prose, possessed him throughout his long career. This work is a memorial of one who in the fullest sense was a pioneer of social, artistic, and religious independence.

* *About Ben Adhem.* First published 1838.

Quixotic he may have been, but brilliant, and at times greater than he knew, and at his best he had a power of fascination which drew men of all the talents to him, especially his latest biographer. He died in August 1859.

S. de M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

The Lectures of the late Professor Bury, *History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century*,* like everything else from his learned pen, are well worth reading. Delivered in 1908, they have been printed as he wrote them by his devoted friend and admirer, the Rev. Dr. R. H. Murray, whose editorial labours are beyond praise. The Memoir of fifty pages brings the great scholar to life and surveys his manifold contributions to history. "Few men can have lived more whole-heartedly for knowledge," comments the editor, and we are reminded that Bury was "one of the humblest and most unselfish of men." The seven lectures cover the crowded years 1864-70, two dealing with the Syllabus, four with the Vatican Council, and one with the fall of the Temporal Power. Readers of Bury's little volume *History of the Freedom of Thought* will not be surprised to find him a sharp critic of the Ultramontane revival under Pius IX, which frequently provokes his sarcasm and contempt. He quotes with approval Montalembert's reference to the "idol in the Vatican," and Gladstone's denunciation of the Jesuits as the "deadliest foes that mental and moral liberty have ever known." The Syllabus of 1864, which is analysed in detail, is regarded as a declaration of war against not only modern civilisation but Liberal Catholicism; and the proclamation of the Immaculate Conception in 1854 is declared to be an "unmistakable assertion of the infallibility and absolute sovereignty of the Pope," who "arrogated the right of making a new dogma an article of faith by his own authority." From 1854 to the Vatican Decrees of 1870 was but a step. Bury describes in detail the parties and debates of the Council where the opposition of Dollinger, Hefele, and other famous scholars was overborne by numbers. Perhaps the most valuable of the lectures is that on the Doctrine of Infallibility, which contains the text of a decree that delighted Manning, displeased Newman, infuriated Gladstone, and almost broke Acton's heart.

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The Dupe as Hero, by Logistes,† is a critical study of the war-debts of the Allies, with Great Britain as the principal sufferer. The author, a well-known publicist, writes with such clearness and incisive vigour that the reader is carried without fatigue through the two hundred pages of this little book, despite the mass of figures which adorn or disfigure it. For the sake of the weaker brethren the story is summarised in two pages comprising the first chapter, which reminds us how we obtained a thousand millions from America for France and Italy; how we funded the resultant debt; how France

* Macmillan. 10s.
† Jonathan Cape. 5s.

and Italy repudiated five-sixths of their debt to us; and how the Spa agreement gave France more than half and Great Britain less than a quarter of German reparations. Thus the hero became the dupe, and the author adopts Mr. Snowden's drastic description of the distribution of war costs as a swindle. "Great Britain did the conventionally honest thing and was made a universal victim. She has paid and still pays the worldly penalty for her sentimental and simple probity." In these sarcastic pages we may read of Mr. Baldwin's mission to Washington and of Mr. Churchill's settlements with France and Italy. The agreement with France receives the sharpest castigation, since she is declared to have become by 1929 the second richest nation after the United States. In the closing chapter the author ironically remarks that our tribute is likely to help the League of Nations to keep the peace, since so long as we are paying America we cannot finance another war in Europe. "No other nation in Europe is likely to go to war if Great Britain cannot be depended on to pay the expenses of both sides, during and after the war." It is a book for rueful meditation.

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The Future of the German Empire,* by General von Seeckt, contains the experience and reflections of one of the outstanding figures of the new Germany. The organiser of the Reichswehr, though temporarily a private citizen, may well have an important future, for he combines marked ability with personality and high culture. Unlike many officers who rose to fame under the old régime he is not a diehard but a thoughtful Conservative, accepting the new order and determined to make the best of it. He briefly surveys the economic foundations, the social and ethical problems, the constitutional machinery and foreign policy, and winds up with observations on the citizen and the head of the State. His views are temperately stated, and it is interesting to learn what he thinks of the burning questions of the time. Agriculture is placed in the foreground, and the necessity for an increased food-supply is reinforced by the terrible experiences of the blockade. Social service, not socialism, is recommended, and he warns his countrymen against bureaucracy and the indefinite increase of the duties of the State. In discussing the Kellogg Pact the right of self-defence remains unshaken, and adds that in spite of treaties every country must in the first instance rely for security on its own strength. He is convinced that the Treaty of Versailles, "a work of political psychosis," is too bad to last. "The assumption that it is possible to keep a nation like the German in a state of serfdom with impunity is wrong." He is frank enough, however, to confess that in the event of victory Germany would have made the same sort of peace. The exclusive war guilt attributed to Germany by her conquerors is rightly dismissed as an historic untruth. The volume ends with an analysis of the position of the President, whose first duty is declared to be "extreme readiness to assume responsibility." If General von Seeckt is ever called by the votes of his countrymen to the highest office in the State these revealing pages will be read and re-read not only in Germany but beyond her frontiers.

* Thornton Butterworth. 8s. 6d.

In *Calm Weather: a volume of essays** Mr. Gilbert Thomas gives to many readers, it may be hoped, another series of quite delightful essays, soothing and cheerful as the title indicates, but full of common sense set out by excellent and inspiring prose. They reflect a personality who, keenly observant, takes a scene or an event and makes it alive in all sorts of unexpected ways. The essay on "rejecting opportunities" is excellent. It is based upon the experiences of a taxi-man who seized instantly an opportunity and drove a party of Americans on a three-thousand mile tour in England, Scotland, and Wales. "The man," it is said, "without even showing surprise, pulled down his flag and opened the cab door." Not every man could do that. Practically all of us neglect our opportunities. Mr. Thomas moreover is all for truth. He does not believe that the real Christmas sense is dead and that we only keep it up for the children. We should be bold and buy toys for ourselves and keep young. Probably the best essay is "In Constable's country." That is a delightful unvisited region. Constable was what he is because he knew the Dedham valley by heart and by soul. "Through the centre of the picture the narrow Stour winds, a ribbon of flashing blue in the sunlight. On either side are the meadow-flats, with their pollard trees and grazing cattle, and beyond them, nestling here and there in the wooded and gently rising slopes, are farms or homesteads, each in itself a delight to the eye. Meadow and foliage are dappled with ever-changing light and shade, as the clouds ride through the great, over-arching sky. The whole scene is one of quintessential peace." The scene lives in these lines because there is not an unnecessary adjective. It is impossible to go through all these calm essays but "Cross Country Journeys," "A Luncheon Hour," "Sundays Long Ago," and "A Corner of Essex" are especially delightful. In one essay Mr. Thomas declares it nonsense to say that there will be soon no country left in England. It is true that we have to seek it, but so much the better, except for children.

* * *

The question of the desecration of the countryside and the peril of future slums caused by the inefficient and ill-planned town development of to-day is one of great importance. Recently the problem has received considerable attention, though little has been done. The Design and Industries Association have devoted their Year Book for 1929-30 to the stimulation of public interest in this ever-pressing problem which grows more difficult every year. The Year Book is called *The Face of the Land*† and its aim "has been to stimulate public interest in a very vital matter, namely the beauty of our country and the seemliness of our civilisation." All aspects of the subject are reviewed in photographs which show far better than words the damage caused by ruthless and uncontrolled development. To-day the roadside is littered with ugly signs and petrol pumps which destroy the beauty of the countryside. The book shows the dangers which beset the future of ribbon development in towns, and encourage the growth of slums. *The Face of the Land* does not merely condemn. Writing of garages which are so often corrugated sheds bristling with glaring signs, the writers

* Chapman & Hall.

† Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d. net.

say that "it is our aim to show how garages of every kind, from the large service station to the wayside pump house, can be as tidy and as pleasant to look at as any other building." The book depicts in photographs the atrocities of our civilisation, and at the same time shows how a remedy may be found. It should do very useful propaganda in the cause of beautiful surroundings.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

"In the Days of thy Youth"* is an interesting little book by Mr. R. Tootell, M.A., Headmaster of Surrey House, Northdown, Thanet, containing a number of Sunday talks to boys between the ages of nine and thirteen. A schoolmaster is largely concerned with the moral education of a boy, especially in a boarding school. Mr. Tootell, appreciating the importance of influencing and developing a boy's character along the best lines, has written this book so that it may be useful to others in his profession. "It has been well said that you should always talk to a child as if he were grown up. Boys are just as intelligent as grown-up people and can understand almost as much, provided one uses simple words." Thus in his preface does Mr. Tootell recognise the fact that children are far more ready to learn if they feel they are not treated like children, but are taught as equals by the master. This must be especially so in the case of religious and moral instruction. For if the master is to make any real impression, he must go straight to their common sense and reason with them as man to man. Talking to his boys on self-control, Mr. Tootell says: "If you can be persuaded to do wrong now because you are afraid of being laughed at and called a saint by other boys, you will be like that later on. Remember, a saint is only another name for a very good and brave man, and if you fear to do right because fools laugh at you, you are not brave but only an even bigger fool yourself." This is an example of the author's method of direct reasoning. The book is full of sound advice and instruction to schoolboys, and should be of great assistance to school masters in giving religious and moral instruction to their boys. Parents would also do well to peruse its contents.

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In "My Hopes and Fears for the Church"† the Dean of Canterbury has brought together a series of seventeen essays presenting the points of view of leading churchmen (including one layman) drawn from all parties in the Church. Dr. Sheppard says that the book "is in no way intended to make a bid for popular support for any particular policy for the Lambeth Conference in 1930. . . . Our common ground is a faith that the Anglican Communion is being called at this time to serve with new life and vigour, and a belief that every attempt to induce Church people to inform themselves on the grave problems that must arise at the next Lambeth Conference is well worth while." In his essay entitled "Some straightforward issues" Dr. Sheppard asks the Conference "to eschew the subtle language of compromise" and that "the leaders should reveal

* Skeffington & Son, Ltd. 2s. 6d. net

† John Murray. 7s. 6d. net.

their whole mind." He does not believe that the world is drifting towards materialism: "I rather fancy that the Bishops have confused an undoubted lack of enthusiasm for Churches and Church affairs with apostasy from religion." The Dean speaks very frankly about the divisions of Christendom. Indeed all the essays are very frank and not least in the Anglo-Catholic repudiation of Rome.

* * *

Mr. Fowler has recently republished a curious book entitled "If Wishes Were Horses,"* written and published anonymously twenty-two years ago, with the statement that he declines responsibility for the views of youth, now that he is over seventy. These cogitations are in fact more in keeping with age, but the author hopes that the reader will find some interest in them, and digest them with an indulgent smile. "If I had" is the theme of all these dozen or so essays which are full of humour and include all the attributes that one would wish to possess in theory. If is a big word; if Eve had not eaten the apple where should we all be? The confessions of Egomet are witty; and of a light and pleasing fancy, and the quotations are apt and well chosen. Yet the reader must be in touch with the writer, or he will fail utterly to disentangle the philosophic difference between "me and myself." The diagnosis of self is a difficult task since *me* is so often deceptive to *myself*. Introspection is dangerous at all times, whether in faith or folly, and is better avoided in both youth and age for it is a composite of *ifs*. "Follow the Gleam" is a better and safer guide. Mr. Fowler deals with many aspects of life, amongst them "If I had a Religion." It is an unsatisfactory chapter, with levity out of place, but the author says "the sensitive can always skip when they see irreverence looming ahead." This book, notwithstanding the clever self-portraiture, bears no fruit, "nothing but leaves," an example of style, but of little help to writer or reader. If wishes were horses, the riders, including Egomet, would soon be thrown. But Mr. Fowler declines to be responsible, fortunately, for his pre-war views.

* * *

"The Wolf's Bride,"† by Madame Aino Kallas, was published in Finnish in 1928 and has been translated into several languages. The author has never written anything better than this short tale of the superstitious peasantry of the Baltic lands she knows so well. As in her former books Madame Kallas uses the vehicle of fiction to embody the life and thought of the past; and her latest story may be read with equal pleasure by students of *Kulturgeschichte* and lovers of good literature. The notion of the werewolf arose naturally in districts where the wolf was an ever-present danger to life and property, and in times when the belief in witchcraft and the wiles of Satan was universal. No one who begins to read of the gentle Aalo, who was changed into a werewolf and fled from her husband into the forest, will lay it aside till the tragic end is reached. Madame Kallas possesses a remarkable power of creating atmosphere, and there is not a superfluous word in this realistic picture of superstition and suffering. The translation is admirable in its rude strength and archaic simplicity.

* George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 6s. net.

† Jonathan Cape. 5s.

INDIA AND THE SIMON REPORT.

FEW things in life seem to be more difficult than the long view. Our crowded days keep us jostling among the events of the moment, with never an hour to measure our horizons or a vista to see them. If this is our experience generally, it is particularly true of Britain's relations with India. Every incident of our trusteeship for that vast country has pressed upon the heels of its forerunner—or so it has seemed to us—with an insistence which has never allowed us, as a nation, to sit down and face the elemental facts of our responsibility, to take the long view instead of being flustered by the noisy alarms of the hour. Now, however, a situation has arisen which compels us to undertake the task; and certain of the elemental facts must be grasped in some of their fullness if the challenge is to be accepted worthily and with intelligence. Two of them are paramount, one political and the other ethical. On the one hand, let us clearly realise that no power on earth, no follies on India's part and no hesitations on ours, can deter India from developing in time an independent political life of her own. We may, if we are wise, retain her within our Commonwealth; we cannot indefinitely keep her as a mere dependency. On the other hand, let us realise equally clearly that the movement which is shaking India to-day is not, whatever the guise in which it may be dressed, a type of nationalism familiar to us in the West, but the demand for a social system widely at variance with our own ideals.

The outstanding value of the work of Sir John Simon and his colleagues is that they have lengthened their gaze to embrace both these dominant facts. That they have done this without saying much about it, is not the least of their wisdom; for the "longer view" which they claim in their peroration is mainly their refusal to be distracted by recent excesses. In ignoring the obstacles thrown in their way and the pitiful insults to which they were exposed, they have conducted their great inquiry with the dignity appropriate to their task. But their achievement goes far beyond this. The message they bring is that some form of government for India by Indians must be evolved, and that the only field for its peaceful evolution is the field of wide and generous experiment. At the same time they appreciate that the type of government which will ultimately emerge, with the consent of the Indian peoples, may bear little resemblance to our models; and they accordingly propose a constitution as little fettered as possible by law and rule, capable of following traditions other than ours, and of moving towards its own ideals. In both respects expert opinion will vary greatly. The risks to be taken are incalculable; and the

forces of unreason are powerful. What is required of thinking men and women in this country is that we also should take the long view and keep our heads (and our tempers) during the difficult times which lie before us.

On the first volume of the Commission's report, little comment is necessary. Twelve years ago, a classic survey of India was made by Lord Chelmsford and the late Mr. Edwin Montagu. Written during the anxieties of the Great War, their report had to take much for granted; but it described with insight and fidelity the relatively placid surface of the waters on which they were launching their King Log of democratic institutions. It is the operations of King Stork on a very troubled surface which have fallen to the lot of Sir John Simon and his colleagues to describe. They have told the truth, so far as it is immediately relevant to their task; they have told it in terms of sympathy and friendship with India's ambitions. Within "the strictly confined range" of political consciousness, they realise that "the political sentiment which is most widespread among all educated Indians is the expression of a demand for equality with Europeans and a resentment against any suspicion of differential treatment." They recognise the rapid unification, during the last twenty years, of what represents public opinion in India, and they properly appraise its demonstrations as falling within "the claim of the East for due recognition of status." At the same time, and with equal candour, they examine the obstacles to an immediate millennium. The Hindu-Moslem animosities, for example, they describe with impartiality as an evil which only a growing sense of common citizenship will mollify. The present machinery for educating an electorate is subjected to a telling analysis and condemned as affording "little promise for the future," but the Commission hasten to mitigate the failure of Ministers by castigating the educational methods which we bequeathed to them. In discussing the Army, they touch their high-water mark of practical sagacity and kindly reticence. The survey as a whole has met with deserved encomiums from almost every quarter except the Indian extremist, who condemns it while professing not to have read it, and who thus gives us a foretaste of the spirit in which he approaches its issues. The present writer would like to add a tribute to its accuracy; he has read analytically all its references to one particular province with which he is familiar and has detected only one small error, the substitution of "district" for "division" at page 342.

After their convincing statement of the conditions of the problem, the Commission's plan for solving it comes almost on the wings of the inevitable. For all the political and administrative difficulties of India, there can be, so far as our finite wisdom can foresee, but

one remedy, the ultimate federation of Greater India. In this design we have the only synthesis capable of reconciling the anomalies with which history has embarrassed the Indian constitution. We have the territories of British India interlaced with other territories (Indian India, let us call them), of which the rulers own no allegiance to British India. Apart from all considerations of a wider patriotism, the economics and the defence of the two Indias are so closely related that some agency is necessary to keep them in adjustment and harmony. That agency at present is external; the only alternative to it is joint action. But joint action postulates a common executive which both Indias will accept. So long as the machinery for such an executive is imposed from outside, as it is imposed to-day, self-government in British India must remain incomplete. When the British States are sufficiently masters of their own destiny to be able to entrust the relations *inter se* and between themselves and the Indian States to a joint authority, then—and only then—will their constitutional development be accomplished. Thus, by inexorable reasoning, do we find the key to self-government for British India in the establishment of a federal system for India as a whole.

To this conclusion the obvious objection is that it has the appearance of leaving the emancipation of British India at the mercy of the Princes, should they refuse or indefinitely delay to come in to the federal system. In theory this is, of course, possible: anything is possible in a situation which has no parallel in constitutional history. But, if the difficulty should arise, the remedy will no doubt be forthcoming. The number of States whose adhesion is essential is small; the pressure upon them will be too great to allow them to obstruct for sheer obstruction's sake; and when it is realised that the federal system is our definite objective, there will be no incentive to stand aloof. A greater danger is that insistence on the federal goal will be misinterpreted in India as an insidious device for obstruction on our part. Fortunately, however, federation has been for some time one of the catchwords in the nationalist camp, and now that it has become a practical issue, those who talked easily about it will have to think out its implications. Moreover, the unique experience of the British Empire in nursing successful systems of federation should be some earnest of our good faith in urging the principle upon India. We may face the world with a clear gaze in shaping the new constitution on this well-tryed model.

The approach to the federal goal must be along two lines. The central government must be left as elastic as possible, to admit of its easy conversion into the federal organ when the time is ripe. The provincial governments must be so framed as to qualify them

to become, without avoidable delay, self-contained units of the federation. Accordingly, the Commission's proposals under those two heads move on different courses. In dealing with the central government, they are handicapped by its present structure. To the impartial observer a baffling feature in the constitution of 1919 has always been the yoking together of an irremovable executive and an irresponsible legislature, at a time when the same combination was being discredited in the provinces. In theory the anomaly was justified by the assumption that in this way the central government would be drawn to rely less on support from Whitehall, and to rest more on its own legislature. In practice there has been no rest: the equivocal position at Delhi has seriously weakened the central government when it had most need to be strong, has encouraged the derisive antics of the extremists, and has thrown into shadow the much more useful work that has been quietly accomplished in the provinces. Many friends of India would gladly have seen an end to all this. The Commission have had to walk more warily. They leave the executive authority, the Viceroy and his Cabinet, virtually intact, except that the Commander-in-Chief will cease to be a member. They make no change of moment in the Council of State, that small second Chamber which "has been a steadying influence during a difficult transitional period"; but they do not conceal that it may become a superfluity when the federal organ develops.

With the Legislative Assembly the position is different. It will in future become the supreme authority of the federal organisation; and steps to prepare it for this destiny are at once to be taken. Its present electorate will disappear; its elected members will be chosen, under a system of proportional representation, by the legislative bodies of the various provinces, its strength being roughly one member for every million of population in the areas represented. This involves forthwith the doubling of its numbers; but room will still be left for representatives of the Indian States as they come in to the federal scheme and demand representation in the supreme legislative organ. The Federal Assembly, as it is now to be styled, will have much the same powers as at present, with one striking reservation; and side by side with it there will arise, it is suggested, a Council for Greater India, a consultative body advising on matters of common interest to the two Indias (Customs, railway, and postal policy, currency, and the League of Nations) and acting in liaison between the Indian legislature and the Chamber of Princes. To all this no exception can be taken.

Fierce controversy, however, must be expected over the reservation, by which the Army is to be removed from the purview of the Assembly. The arguments are far too weighty for summary; they

must be studied in detail by all who feel called upon for a judgment. In a nutshell, say the Commission, the reason for the proposal is that "all hopes of evolution in the central government towards the ultimate goal . . . are in danger if the attitude is maintained that any future change involves the putting of the administration of the Army under the authority of an elected Indian legislature." There will be no relaxation in the policy of training young Indians to officer their own regiments. There is no denying that, when India reaches self-government, its defence will be its first care and the maintenance of its own armaments its first responsibility. But in existing circumstances the Commission are persuaded (and most of those who have studied the problem will agree) that, whether for external protection or for internal order, an admixture of British troops will be necessary, and there can be no question of hiring them out as mercenaries to an Indian administration. The Commission cut the knot by advising that the Army should for the present be under the control of the Imperial Government, acting through the Viceroy and his Commander-in-Chief; that the Indian budget should bear a fixed non-votable contribution to its cost; and that, in quelling internal disturbances, British troops should be employed only on the express requisition of the Governor of a province. To some this will appear a drastic piece of surgery; but the stern discipline of the frontier and the lessons of Mesopotamia forbid any temporising, on grounds of sentiment or theory, with so vital an issue.

The second line of approach to the federal goal is the rapid equipment of the Indian provinces with machinery and experience to fit them as States of the future federation. To this end, as was generally anticipated, the Commission recommend that dyarchy must go. Few constitutional experiments have been treated more scurvily than "diarchy," as Mr. Edwyn Bevan tells us we should spell it. It has been derided as the invention of a doctrinaire: it was not, for it was designed by an experienced official who had been Governor of an Indian province and who held high rank in Whitehall before his untimely death. It has been condemned as a failure: it was not, for it was worked with creditable success by those Governors who were loyal to the idea. It has been described as the bane of the central government: it was not, for from the outset it was rigorously excluded from that sphere. By many it has been assailed in sheer ignorance; by others because they were hostile to the whole conception of advance. No apology is needed for dyarchy; it never claimed perfection; it was expressly put forward by its authors as a transitional device and an experiment in training Indian Ministers. In both respects it has served its purpose, and now its work is over. R.I.P. The provincial govern-

ment will now consist of the Governor with a Cabinet of Ministers jointly responsible for their policy in all matters not reserved for the central or federal authority. The Governor will choose his Ministers where he pleases, though he will ordinarily go to the dominant party or groups in the legislature; but the Commission expect that among his colleagues he will find it desirable to include one or more persons, official or otherwise, who are not members of the legislature. While usually acting with his Ministers, the Governor will have powers to override them when necessary to preserve the safety and tranquillity of the province, or to prevent serious prejudice to a minority community. He will also be specially charged with the protection of the public servants; and in cases of grave emergency he may suspend the constitution and take over the government himself, provided that Parliament is at once informed of the circumstances.

Two comments immediately suggest themselves. Criticism of the Report will be equally vigorous from those who consider that it does not go far enough in meeting the nationalist claims, and from those who consider that it goes too far. The latter school of critics are concentrating on the absence of special provisions for the maintenance of law and order. Is there, they ask, any guarantee that an Indian legislature will be sufficiently stern against magisterial incompetence or corruption, or sufficiently public-spirited to support the police in their discharge of an unpopular duty? With hypothetical questions of this sort, of course, the Commission have not dealt. They have buttressed their recommendations by powerful arguments of general policy, to which the utmost weight must be attached. But, however long may be our view, and however sympathetic our attitude to Indian progress, it is impossible to get the events of the last ten years out of men's minds. Unless the law is respected, political advance is illusory; and the grant of a unitary government is not going to eradicate in a day the ingrained hostility of the Indian politician to the police. It is not for a moment suggested that dyarchy should be retained for the sake of the police; but it is important to explore what was in the minds of the Commission when they wrote of "preserving the safeguards which common sense dictates" on this crucial question. The second comment on the provincial scheme is that it throws a very heavy burden on the provincial Governor of the future. He will be in a position of much isolation. He will have to be constantly available in the guidance of his Ministers and the adjusting of their differences. He will have no respite in his vigilance over the interests of the public servants and of minorities; and it may be that the enduring antagonism of a powerful section of Hinduism to the British connection will focus on him. The

qualities with which he will require to be armed are obvious. There are still plenty of Englishmen who possess them; but in plain words the selection of provincial rulers, so far as it is made in this country, must be more consistently careful than has been customary.

Few details of the future machinery have caused the Commission more anxiety than the suspicion and fear of majority government which permeates India, as an echo of the bad old days. In the forefront towers the claim of the Moslems for separate electoral rolls and representation. Many were the endeavours to bring the two communities together before Lord Irwin attempted it, and equally fruitless. Despite its incompatibility with our conceptions of popular government, their compartmental representation has dug itself into the constitution, and the Commission found themselves compelled to accept it. Having done this, they were unable to refuse similar privileges to Sikhs in the Punjab, or to Europeans and Anglo-Indians; while they advise the reservation of seats for the depressed classes and Indian Christians. All this may be unsound democracy; but it is plain practical sense so long as India is racked by racial jealousy. Similar merits, however, are hard to find in the Commission's further proposals that the franchise should be widely extended for both men and women. The present electorate has admittedly no influence on its representatives; it has little if any appreciation of political issues; its voting is largely haphazard or to order; and to treble its size, as is now proposed, will merely increase the cost of elections, without enriching political life. Otherwise it is harmless, and the best that can be said for it is that it may bear fruit hereafter.

When the United States of India come to be painted on the map, they will not include Burma. In this recommendation the Commission will have general support. In race, religion, language or traditions, Burma has nothing in common with India, and its partnership has always been unequal and restless. Its new constitution is left for future determination. Whether the rest of the British States should be identical with the British provinces, is a point on which the Commission hold strong but guarded views. The partition of Bengal, when it was undertaken by Lord Curzon, was an administrative necessity of the first urgency, though it was carried through in the wrong way. Several of the other provinces are becoming no less unwieldy than Bengal was. Five of them are each as large as Great Britain in area or population or both; and their size is exaggerated by the difficulties of communication and transport. Nor is it counterbalanced by any inherent unity. Nearly all the existing provinces have grown up by a series of chance accretions. None of them compose a homogeneous terri-

torial or racial area. Orissa and Behar have no kind of uniformity; Sindh and Bombay are equally disparate; Oudh is clearly separable from Agra; and so on. From the present arrangement the makings are absent of a healthy political life or of a genuine public opinion. A legislature where the members can talk a common language of their own is more likely to get down to business than one in which they compete in oratory in a foreign tongue, as is the case to-day. In small administrative areas, the people will know each other better; communal strife will be less encouraged; popular interest in the work of government will spread. The Commission "regard it as a matter of urgent importance" that a special inquiry into provincial readjustment should be set up, with a view to the establishment of real political entities as federal units of the future. The opposition of strong vested interests may be expected and discounted.

If any one administrative difficulty more than another has hampered the reforms of 1919, it has been finance. The reforms involved switching over from a highly centralised financial system to one in which the provinces became largely independent, subject only to certain payments to the central government for its conduct of the central services. To implement this change, an arrangement was made in 1920 by which the then available resources were distributed between the central and the provincial governments. Misfortune befell it; for it was followed by the grave financial stringency which succeeded the post-bellum boom, and for years there was insufficient money to go round. Neither the quart-pot of the central government nor the pint-pots of the various provinces were ever filled. This came at the time when the new Councils were anxious to push on cherished, but expensive, schemes of social betterment; and when they found their hopes frustrated by lack of funds, the arrangement of 1920 was turned upon and rent as the cause of all their disappointment. It had actually left all the provinces with larger budgets than they had ever before enjoyed; but the falling value of money and the growth of new needs had more than neutralised its benefits. The Commission were thus faced by a legacy of trouble which called for expert handling, and they co-opted for this special purpose Sir Walter Layton, who now contributes, as the result of his inquiry, one of the most instructive chapters in the report.

In a country where there is widespread poverty combined with the concentration of great wealth in a few hands, but generally in forms which are inaccessible to the tax-collector, the task of public finance is delicate. You cannot squeeze the poor, and the rich send you empty away. Furthermore, India hates and resists direct taxation; it loves high tariffs; and among the vocal classes there is

a tenderness for levies like tolls and octroi and terminal taxes which fall mainly on the necessities of the masses. On all this thin ice Sir Walter Layton has had to skate with care. His objective is to endow the provinces with resources which will enable them to develop worthily the "nation-building" services of education, sanitation, medical relief, and the like. He sets out to augment their normal revenues (for the eight major provinces) from the present figure of £59 millions to one of £86 millions ten years hence; and even this modest ambition he clearly finds some difficulty in fulfilling. The result is reached partly by raiding the central exchequer, partly by certain new forms of local taxation, and partly by increasing the burdens on the land. The scheme, though necessarily complex, is admirably worked out and lucidly presented. Like the project for sub-dividing provinces, it will have to run the gauntlet of fierce opposition from vested interests; but its broad lines are sound and convincing.

The central exchequer is to lose the salt revenue, which will now be distributed among the provinces in the ratio of their population—a proposal of eminent wisdom from every point of view. Moreover it will transfer to the provinces of origin a part of the taxation on private incomes, which the provinces have not unreasonably pressed for. To fill these gaps, it will have to economise, especially in military expenditure; and in spite of the impending disappearance of the opium revenue, Sir Walter estimates that its total income will in ten years have recovered almost to its present figure. Though it would be ungenerous to describe this as a leap in the dark, as Sir Walter stigmatises the arrangement of 1920, yet it does involve a number of hazardous assumptions. The central exchequer is responsible for the cost of war, and the peculiar frontier difficulties of India are not amenable to the League of Nations. It has also to bear the brunt of famines; and the happy but unusual immunity of recent years has blunted men's memory of famine's disastrous effects. It has also to carry the burden of exchange, which might easily become a grave incubus. Furthermore, there is no certainty that rising tariffs will continue (or are intended to be) remunerative, or that the popular control of railways will not mean a wholesale reduction of fares and freights.

Before the scheme takes statutory form, all these considerations will no doubt be weighed, and it is conceivable that prudence may suggest a wider margin of safety in the field of central taxation. So far as the provinces are concerned, their narrow means can be amplified, as Sir Walter suggests, by an excise on cigarettes and matches, by imposing terminal charges and adding cesses to the income tax. But a tax on incomes from land presents greater obstacles. It was levied once before and abandoned; the Bengal

landlords contend that it is an infringement of their solemn covenant known as the Permanent Settlement; and as the Councils have been engaged in cutting down the pitch of the land revenue generally, they may hesitate to raise it again by a side-wind. No scheme of national taxation, however, could escape criticism in detail; and Sir Walter Layton's proposals will give the new governments the wise and skilled assistance which they will badly require.

There is much else of consuming interest in the Report which a single review cannot embrace. There is also much that the Commission have left for further inquiry and later settlement. The design is not yet complete; but we see it in sufficient detail to be confident that the foundations are sure and the structure wisely planned. Sir John Simon and his colleagues have given us one of the most comprehensive constitutional projects of our generation, and a grave liability will rest on those who oppose it without offering an adequate and equally constructive alternative. Such opposition is being organised in India. For the most part, it was organised before a line of the Report was put on paper. It is an opposition which the ordinary Englishman finds hard to understand, for it takes an infinite variety of guises. But behind all its variety stands, firm and irreconcilable, a deep-seated antagonism to all that we are trying to graft upon India, through new constitutional forms, in the way of harmonious social relations on Western lines. Our offence is not this or that political formula, but our whole democratic conception of national life. Any project which promises to fasten that conception on India will be fought with every available weapon—reason, unreason, polished expostulation, revolutionary violence. For what faces us in India now is nothing less than orthodox Hinduism at bay. Its power and its ingenuity are equally formidable; and we have to make up our minds whether we are to yield or to join issue. There is no compromise, unless it be that phantom compromise which is employed as the starting-point for fresh claims and further concessions. We on our part have two plain duties to perform. We have to honour Queen Victoria's promise to administer the government of India for the benefit of all our fellow-subjects resident therein; and we have to pursue the policy solemnly adopted by Parliament in 1919 of guiding India steadily towards self-government within the British Empire. The scheme of the Simon Commission's report is consistent with both.

MESTON.

THE VILNA QUESTION TO-DAY.

ON the walls of the cathedral at Vilna are blazoned the arms of Poland and Lithuania, fit emblem for a city whose historic past is linked at every point with the destinies of Poles and Lithuanians alike. Yet to-day what should be a bond of union is a centre of relentless controversy. The Poles are in occupation of Vilna, an occupation the Lithuanians stigmatise as illegal with the same fierce indignation as ever, and as the only retaliation open to a State of two millions in conflict with a State of fifteen times that population they have closed the common frontier and prohibited intercourse of any kind for man or beast by rail or road or boat or post. The line that separates Lithuania from Poland (the Lithuanians refuse even to speak of it as frontier, since that term conveys the impression of permanence) is crossed by precisely the same amount of traffic as crossed the French and German trenches on the western front in, say, 1917. And this ten years and more after the creation of the League of Nations.

To confess the Vilna problem to be utterly insoluble would be to declare the bankruptcy of statesmanship and sanity at any rate in that region of Europe. It may have to be declared, but the problem is worth one more examination first. And such an examination is the more apposite at this moment in that the League of Nations, undeterred by the dismal record of the last ten years, is to attempt next month to throw at least one frail footbridge across the dividing gulf. There are good reasons for making that and any other like endeavour, for the Polish-Lithuanian situation keeps alive sufficient unrest in Eastern Europe to furnish just ground for disquiet. There are two Great Powers whose ends that condition might serve. Germany is anxious to redraw the map of Eastern Europe if she can—which does not mean that she proposes to do it by war—and any embarrassment of her natural antagonist Poland is likely to be congenial to her. Russia, desiring to upset the existing order generally, is much more satisfied to see Poles and Lithuanians at odds than to see them at one. The Lithuanians themselves are well aware of that, and their intransigence is due in no small measure to the conviction that something or other will happen that will be bad for Poland, and that Lithuania then will come into her own—in other words into Vilna.

To discuss the Vilna question adequately it is necessary to go back a little into history. The question is, how far back. That will have to be considered later. For the moment it is sufficient to trace the course of events in the last twelve years, a process particularly necessary in view of the misunderstandings widely prevalent on the circumstances attending Poland's acquisition of Vilna.

Down to 1914 the city, of course, was Russian, part of the loot of the iniquitous partitions of the eighteenth century. In the course of the war the Germans took it and they were there when the armistice was signed in 1918. Then they retired homeward, and as they went the Bolshevik troops, pressing on their heels, reoccupied the city. January 1919 found them in possession. Their stay, however, was short. Pilsudski launched his anti-Soviet offensive and one of its first results was that the Poles (April 1919) established themselves in Vilna. They remained there till July 1920, when the Russians, reacting with effect, drove the Polish armies before them, captured Vilna, and by the Treaty of Moscow, signed on July 12th, 1920, made it over to the Lithuanians. It was not till the end of August that the actual transfer took place, and the Lithuanian occupation lasted no more than six weeks, for on October 9th General Zeligowski's force, acting without the knowledge of the Polish Cabinet, but under the secret instructions of Marshal Pilsudski, captured Vilna, which its Lithuanian occupants were compelled to evacuate.

Into that dramatic stroke, round which controversy has raged unceasingly ever since, it is necessary to look more closely. The foregoing summary of events is sufficient to dispel the curiously persistent legend that Poland suddenly and without provocation seized the acknowledged capital of a peaceful neighbouring country. There could be no greater travesty of the facts. War had been washing to and fro for seven years across the unhappy city. The Russians had it. The Germans had it. The Russians (by this time Bolsheviks) had it again. The Poles had it. The Bolsheviks regained it. The Lithuanians acquired it by grace of the Bolsheviks. And last of all the Lithuanians were displaced by Zeligowski and his men under circumstances which have evoked the studied denunciations of statesmen like Lord Balfour and M. Léon Bourgeois at Geneva.

But an honest student of events, however much he may sympathise with Lithuania's claim to a city which she urgently needs and which Poland could quite well do without, must recognise that it is possible to carry the censure of Zeligowski too far. His action is unquestionably to be condemned, but examination of the facts is calculated to throw doubt on the appropriateness of some of the more violent of the adjectives that are frequently applied to his exploit. In the late summer of 1920 the Lithuanians were at war with the Poles (then struggling desperately to withstand the Bolshevik advance), and endeavouring to dislodge Polish troops from territory they claimed as Lithuanian west and south of Vilna. Pilsudski, surprisingly, appealed to the League of Nations, in spite of the fact that he had by this time beaten back the Bolsheviks

and had his hands sufficiently free to deal with Lithuania. The League, to all appearance, succeeded in reconciling the two countries and despatched an independent commission which early in October arranged the famous armistice of Suwalki.

That agreement is a curious document and by no means easy to interpret even now. It left ultimate territorial claims unsettled, being designed only to stop the immediate fighting, but the Lithuanians lay stress on the clause providing that the agreement should remain in force "till all territorial disputes between Poles and Lithuanians have been finally settled"—which they notoriously have not been yet. The essential provisions of the agreement, which was concluded on October 7th, were that along a line of demarcation running roughly east and west, the Polish troops being to the south and the Lithuanians (and Vilna) to the north, hostilities should cease completely; that on an eastward extension of the line they should cease when Poland had cleared that region of the Bolsheviks; and that regarding a still further extension eastward agreement should be reached later. The whole arrangement was to come into force at noon on October 10th. On October 9th General Zeligowski, crossing the third, and still undetermined, section of the line of demarcation, occupied Vilna—which the Polish Foreign Minister, Prince Sapieha, had assured the League of Nations Commission should be left in the hands of the Lithuanians.

Now it may be said of this, first of all that it is old history now, and secondly that there is nothing to be said for attempts to extenuate what was essentially a brigand act. To that it may be replied that the Zeligowski occupation has so vitally affected relations between Poland and Lithuania that it is necessary to go back into history at least that far; that subsequent discussion has been so much coloured by hastily accepted judgments on Zeligowski's action that it is well, if only in the interests of historical truth, to consider dispassionately what the degree of his culpability was; and that one not irrelevant feature of the Zeligowski affair is that it illustrates strikingly at the outset, like almost every other feature of the Vilna problem, the jungle of plausible contentions on either side through which the detached investigator has to pick his painful way. Those who decide, as I personally do, that on any broad view Zeligowski's enterprise is to be condemned must recognise that on technical grounds at any rate some sort of an apologia can be made for it.

But prominently as Zeligowski's action has figured in the controversy, the essential fact about it is that it affects the justice of the rival claims to Vilna not at all. The seizure of the city by the Poles under such conditions obviously gave them no title to it. But neither does the fact that they seized it wrongfully mean that

it belongs to Lithuania rightfully. The misfortune of the whole affair—and there the justice of the Lithuanian complaints is incontestable—is that the final decision (the demarcation of the frontier by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1923) was obviously so largely influenced by the *fait accompli*. It is an extraordinary fact that while this controversy has scandalised Europe now for just a decade never once has the Vilna question been dispassionately studied by any independent body in the light of justice—using that term to embrace all the relevant considerations that should properly be taken into account by any tribunal that might have the misfortune to find this intractable dispute remitted to it. The League of Nations has, of course, had the matter before it at intervals for ten years, but the League has been concerned throughout with evolving some *modus vivendi*, not with deciding which country is the rightful owner of the city. More remarkable still, and hardly less unfortunate, is the fact that the frontier between Poland and Lithuania laid down by the Conference of Ambassadors was never even discussed by that body in the light of ethnographical considerations. The League, in the course of its interventions, had succeeded in establishing a neutral zone between the contending armies (after Zeligowski's occupation of Vilna) and then, as a neutral zone may soon become a home of lawlessness and anarchy, it allowed each side to move up to a middle line for police and administrative purposes. It was this line, with its purely military origin, which the Ambassadors took for their final frontier.

This excursion into recent history provides no very encouraging basis for consideration of the Vilna question to-day. That question, moreover, has two separate aspects. It would be difficult enough to decide what should in equity have been done with Vilna in 1919, and even if a decision on that complex issue were reached it would have little bearing on the more practical and immediate problem, what can be done with Vilna, or about Vilna, to-day. Yet some connection between the two aspects must be recognised. Despite the existence of the *fait accompli*, conclusions reached on the rights and wrongs of what happened between 1918 and 1921 might be used to reinforce some proposal for an alleviation of the situation prevailing on the Polish-Lithuanian frontier to-day. But in fact no clear conclusions are likely to emerge at all. Argument and counter-argument can be adduced to infinity on either side. A balance must be struck between the weight to be given to history, to ethnography, the right of self-determination, and on no one of these three points is decisive guidance forthcoming. Poles, no doubt, can prove to their own satisfaction that Vilna has always been Polish and Lithuanians that it has always been Lithuanian, but the detached student of the records can discover no such clear-

cut white or black where all is grey and blurred. The truth is that Vilna is associated inseparably with the history of both countries, for the two States were linked by a personal union from 1386, and by a much closer bond from 1569, right down to the partitions of the last decade of the eighteenth century. The historical criterion may tilt the balance fractionally in Lithuania's favour, but hardly enough to count for anything after the lapse of 140 years.

Ethnographically a definite decision is quite as hard to reach. The Vilna region (for what the Lithuanians claim is, of course, much more than Vilna city, a little more even than the old Russian government of Vilna or the present Polish province of the same name) is primarily White Russian, but it is doubtful whether the average peasant has any clear idea about his actual nationality. He may habitually speak Polish, but that does not confer on him a Polish origin, and what is in question here is race, as distinct from political citizenship. There is, no doubt, some vague geographical line of division between Poles and Lithuanians, but intermarriage between the two peoples for generations in the past has made it indistinguishable. Ethnography, in short, will give relatively little help to investigators into the Vilna problem to-day. Moreover, whatever the city of Vilna was in 1920, there can be no doubt that it is predominantly Polish to-day, except in so far as it is Jewish, and the Jews have no preference for Lithuanian rule over Polish.

Theoretically, in short, everything points to one obvious conclusion, that as Vilna is historically the common heritage of Poles and Lithuanians, and as ethnographically each people can make an arguable claim to it (though taking the province as a whole the Lithuanians are not on strong ground here) some means should be devised whereby the association of Vilna with both countries should be maintained. That was the conclusion reached by the Belgian Foreign Minister, M. Paul Hymans, when he wrestled with the problem on behalf of the League of Nations in 1921. His plan, which cannot be examined in detail here, provided for the creation of a federal Lithuanian State consisting of a Kovno canton and a Vilna canton, both autonomous on the Swiss model, with a larger and looser federal union associating the Polish State and the Lithuanian State by means of a common action in foreign, in military, and to some extent in economic affairs. Rejected by both countries on various grounds, that plan is recognised privately by not a few men of weight in both countries as coming nearer than anything that has yet been devised to meeting the necessities of the situation. But few of them would admit that publicly, and it cannot be claimed that a revival of the Hymans plan at the present moment is practical politics.

Is there anything that can be called practical politics in this matter at all? The immediate goal is the establishment of normal relations between these two adjacent countries. The forces working against that are manifest enough. They are naturally enough exerted almost wholly from the Lithuanian side, for the Poles, being in firm possession of the territory Lithuania is claiming, have no incentive to be anything but pacific. *Beati possidentes*. In the Lithuanian camp a diversity of motives operates. First, and most generally, there is the conviction that to abandon the only public protest the country is capable of making would be tantamount to giving up all claim to Vilna once for all. Secondly, it is believed that the closed frontier hurts Poland more than it does Lithuania; and this may be true, for the city of Vilna depended on a large agricultural hinterland, which included territory now lying beyond the barred frontier, and Poland is further robbed of the market she would normally command in Lithuania for her coal and textiles and other commodities. Thirdly, there are the realists who believe that inevitable coming changes in the map of Eastern Europe will enable Lithuania to fish to her own advantage in troubled waters, and the idealists who believe with a sincerity beyond all question that the rape of Vilna is a crime crying so loud to heaven that it cannot go long unrequited unless all hope of justice has vanished from the earth. Both sections are impervious to the argument that since Vilna is now definitely Polish there is nothing for it but to make the best of a situation it is out of Lithuania's power to change.

The factors making the other way are meagre. The Poles, of course, are anxious to get the frontier opened on material grounds alone. But they are a little uneasy too about this perpetual hostility on the part of a small country where German influence is notoriously strong. Poland has problems enough to cope with, both internal and external, and if she could get on normal terms with the Lithuanians at the price of some small concessions it would pay her well. But it has to be recognised that few Poles are ready for any such concessions and that small concessions, falling short of the possession of Vilna, would not go far to satisfy the Lithuanians. The removal from active politics of the pertinacious personality of M. Voldemaras may be counted at first sight as an item on the asset side. So perhaps to a small extent it is. But little stress can be laid on it, for in the present temper of Lithuania no Foreign Minister who diverged substantially from M. Voldemaras' policy would survive a week. Some weight, further, must be attached to the pressure of world public opinion, which declares with unanimity at Geneva against the closed frontier policy. Lithuania has not so far shown itself markedly responsive to Geneva's views, but at least the admission is occasionally made by

Lithuanians in private conversation that a breach in the Chinese wall must be made sooner or later, and perhaps it might as well be sooner.

One of the worst effects, indeed, of the closing of the frontier is that reasonable men on both sides of it can establish no contact with one another. There is, of course, nothing to prevent them from meeting in some neutral centre, but the situation is far from ripe for any such formality as that. What is needed is personal contact between men associating primarily for business or professional purposes and seizing the occasion to discuss the practical realities of their countries' relationship. Unfortunately there is some ground for believing that one reason for the obduracy of the Lithuanians about the frontier is the conviction that Lithuania needs more time yet to build up, or perhaps more accurately to rebuild, her nationalism behind a barrier adequate to keep other influences at bay till that process is sufficiently advanced.

What alleviation, then, is possible as things stand? The idea of submitting the Vilna question as a whole to any form of arbitration may be dismissed at once. The ruling of the Conference of Ambassadors in 1923 may have been good or bad, but juridically it is unassailable and no tribunal would upset it, despite Lithuania's citation of legal opinions to the contrary. Poland holds the city of Vilna and a large rural area which Lithuania claims, and there is not the smallest prospect of her surrendering it. But frontier rectification is another question. So far from the Ambassadors' frontier being drawn on scientific ethnographical lines it never took ethnography into account at all, and there are to-day recognised Lithuanian pockets on the Polish side and recognised Polish pockets on the Lithuanian. Study of the frontier question by a League of Nations Commission, with the free consent of both the countries concerned, might at any rate result in modifications which would reduce the minority problem slightly in dimensions on both sides. That would, of course, not touch the Lithuanians' claim to Vilna, but if the Vilna question is ever to be taken up seriously at all it can only be by voluntary negotiation between Poland and Lithuania, and such negotiation is out of the question in the existing atmosphere. That is why even minor mitigations calculated to do something to change the atmosphere are worth attempting.

One minor mitigation is in fact to be attempted by the League of Nations next month. Realising through painful experience the hopelessness of approaching the dispute on its political side at present, the League is making a not very ambitious advance from another angle. Whereas Poland and Lithuania are pledged by various treaties, including the League Covenant, to maintain freedom of communications, Poland by closing the Niemen to timber

flotation from Russia and Lithuania by closing the Vilna-Kovno railway to any traffic at all, are alleged to be violating those undertakings. The League, working through its technical organ, the Communications and Transit Commission, is endeavouring to get the river and the railway opened. It is in fact aiming at very little, for Lithuania is being asked, not to permit traffic between Poland and herself, but merely to open the line for through traffic between Libau or Königsberg in the north-west and various Russian centres to the south-east and vice versa. The gain would be one of principle mainly, though it would mean restoring a traffic route which used to be and should be of some importance. Even so the omens have not been too propitious. M. Voldemaras refused to receive a sub-committee of the Transit Commission in Lithuania on the ground that the questions at issue were not technical at all, but political. Since his elimination, however, a rather less intractable attitude prevails.

Unhappily, even with the best will in the world on both sides injustice cannot be eliminated by any such mitigations as these. For four centuries Poland and Lithuania were first loosely and then much more closely united and Vilna was the common possession of both. If they are now to be separated, so that Vilna can belong to only one of them, there must of necessity be injustice to the other. To Poland, rich in the possession of cities like Cracow and Posnan and Warsaw and Lvoff, Vilna means far less, or at any rate is far less essential, than it is to a Lithuania bereft of a single township that in England or Germany would be ranked as high as third-rate. But Vilna to-day has nothing Lithuanian about it but tradition. The city is purely Polish and Jewish, and while a plebiscite of the whole province might turn in Lithuania's favour—though that is very unlikely—the town of Vilna itself would bitterly resist the results of any such decision. Polish administration has not been in operation for ten years in Vilna for nothing. More and more it is clear that M. Hymans was right in fundamentals if not necessarily in details when he evolved a plan that would once more as of old bring Vilna within the orbit of both countries. Since he laboured so hard and so honourably, though so unsuccessfully, nine years of hostility and bitterness have made the situation more difficult still. But even obduracy becomes weary-some in time, and it seems probable that a growing section of Lithuanians would welcome a solution that did not mean sheer capitulation on their part. But to win a genuine acceptance it would have to be a solution that gave them access as of right—along the Hymans lines or some others—to that city where the cathedral displays the Lithuanian arms linked with the Polish.

H. WILSON HARRIS.

FRANCO-ITALIAN RELATIONS.

EVER since the Great War friction between France and Italy has existed in varying degree, and has never had a chance really to subside, owing to unfortunate incidents which have continually dogged the footsteps of diplomatic negotiations between the two countries. Moreover, there is a vast difference between French and Italian psychology, and past events, both pre-war and post-war, have each contributed their share to building up an atmosphere of discord between the two Latin nations. Italy, it should be remembered, is the "cradle" of Latin culture, and the Italians have always taken a natural pride in their historic and romantic past. Until recent years rather unsatisfactory conditions existed in modern Italy, while the newer Latin Power, France, attained during that period a prestige greatly exceeding that of her neighbour. This naturally aroused in the Italians certain feelings of injured pride, and there grew up in France a tendency to despise Italy in her backwardness, which in its turn produced a sensitive national character. The Italians felt that their country, with all its Roman traditions, was now occupying a position inferior to that of the descendants of the ancient Gauls, and they deeply resented the scant consideration of a Power with a lineage which they considered to be inferior to their own.

In recent years, however, great changes have taken place in Italy; the Italians have built up a strong feeling of national consciousness; and they feel that their turn has come at last, with the consequence that they are inclined to welcome any pretext to "get their own back" on France. To-day they are a proud people with an increasing birth-rate, and with high hopes of making a place for themselves in the world; and they are inclined to make the serious mistake of looking upon the French as a degenerate nation with a low birth-rate and little vitality. In the matter of colonial expansion, a matter of the utmost importance to Italy owing to her increasing population, France is regarded as a constant obstacle in the way. The greater and best part of North Africa is in French hands, and Tunisia is still the cause of much resentment. Then there is the question of war claims. Italy considers that she has been badly treated and that her claims for ex-enemy territory were shelved at the Peace Conference. That she has reason for complaint on this score there is little doubt, but it is difficult to justify the charge against France in particular, although she was the rival Mediterranean Power involved in the deliberations that led to the shelving of Italy, and therefore came in for an undue proportion of the blame.

During the last decade there have been various causes of surface

friction consisting partly of unfortunate speeches, frontier incidents, and newspaper polemics, and a constant source of bad feeling has existed in the fact that Paris has been a centre of anti-Fascist activity and intrigue. Italian opponents of the Fascist régime, who dare not show their faces in Italy, have from time to time received the friendly sympathy of politicians of the Left in the French capital, and have been known to establish friendships of marked intimacy with members of the French Ministry. France has done everything in her power to maintain a correct attitude in these matters and to avoid unpleasant incidents, but with the best will in the world it is impossible for the French Government to control the personal friendships of Ministers and Deputies. Although most of the incidents that have occurred on the Franco-Italian and Franco-Spanish frontiers were matters of comparatively small importance in themselves, the Paris and Rome newspapers whipped them up into sensational affairs for the furtherance of their respective interests.

Yet these symptoms of a malignant growth in Franco-Italian relations were not without their significance. Italy's present mood is one of intense vitality, with a great national enthusiasm to do something in the world. The country is teeming with an ever-increasing population, and possesses a comparatively small area of cultivable land when the mountain ranges are taken out of account. In these circumstances it is only natural that Italians should cast an envious eye on the fertile lands of France, where one can sometimes travel for miles without seeing a human soul. It is, therefore, not surprising that things are said which would be better left unsaid, and that incidents occur which are the result of impulse rather than judgment. In the case of Italy full allowance has to be made for the unfortunate episodes connected with the tail-end of a great revolutionary movement, and France has shown great patience and understanding, sometimes under considerable provocation. She has preserved well the attitude necessary in dealing with the enthusiasm and impatience of youth; yet she has been wise enough to take precautions against any headstrong action on her frontiers.

The causes of mutual resentment and mistrust between France and Italy are much too deep-rooted to be removed by any superficial treatment, and various investigations which I have from time to time made in Paris and Rome have revealed the unpleasant fact that future developments may prove to be more serious than most people imagine. Bad feeling between the two Latin nations is the result of natural racial development and a long series of historical events which together have produced an *impasse* calling for the closest attention of all those who have at heart the future peace

of Europe. If the position which has now prevailed for a number of years could be attributed to the action of either or both Governments it would be a simpler matter, but unfortunately it is a case of a chronic situation developing in spite of Governments rather than because of them. There are few men in Europe to-day more bound to the interests of peace than M. Briand, and at the present state of Italy's development it is clearly in the interests of Signor Mussolini to pursue a pacific policy.

Yet the attitude of the two peoples towards one another is very different from that professed by their respective Ministers. Among the general public in Paris I have found a great want of understanding of Italy's difficulties and a strong tendency to despise the Italians as a race that is asserting itself in a preposterous way to the detriment of French rights in the Mediterranean. On more than one occasion, and in more than one section of the public, I have heard the retort, "Les Italiens, ils sont des sauvages." This expression of feeling goes a long way towards indicating the French attitude. The French make a great mistake in regarding the Italians as an inferior nation, in failing to take them seriously, and in shutting their eyes to the undeniable fact that Italy's power is growing with great rapidity. France, however, is still suffering from a sense of "fear," a legacy of 1914, which has an unfortunate influence on her relations with her neighbours; and when this characteristic in a wealthy and powerful nation clashes with the pride and vitality of a less powerful but progressive neighbour, the result is not conducive to peace and concord. In Rome, on the other hand, anti-French feeling is most noticeable among all classes of Italians, who regard France as a great obstacle to their national ambitions. Jealousy and the unsatisfied need for expansion are at the root of Italian irritation which, together with their enthusiasm and vitality, have produced in the people a strong sense of restlessness.

On broad lines, the chief points of difference between the two countries may be divided into those affecting North Africa and those arising in the Balkans, both of which underlay the continued friction which reached a serious stage during 1926 and 1927. Fortunately, towards the end of 1927, M. Briand made a statement in the French Chamber which opened the way for an improvement in Franco-Italian relations, and followed this up by the positive act of signing with the Italian Ambassador in Paris a *modus vivendi* to regulate at once the position of individuals and corporate bodies of either nationality on the territory of the other country—one of the questions which had for some time been a cause of tension. Fortunately also was the fact that Signor Mussolini responded to these two gestures of M. Briand, and expressed his belief that a broad,

cordial, and durable understanding with France was not only possible and desirable, but even necessary for Italy. M. Briand's overture and Signor Mussolini's response had an immediate effect upon public opinion in either country with regard to the other, thereby producing the psychological conditions for a settlement which had hitherto been conspicuously lacking.

Meanwhile, the French Government had appointed as their Ambassador to Rome M. de Beaumarchais, a diplomatist of great experience, particularly in North-West African affairs. Official conversations between M. de Beaumarchais and representatives of the Italian Government were duly opened at Rome on the 19th March, 1928, and were carried on along two lines—the first aiming at the conclusion of a political pact of friendship, and the second at a settlement of specific controversies in a series of protocols. The main points considered were the participation of Italy in the administration of the Tangier zone of Morocco; the juridical status of Italians in Tunisia; and a rectification of the frontier between Tunisia and Tripolitania in Italy's favour. The conclusion of the new four-Power agreement regarding Tangier may be regarded as the first fruits of these Franco-Italian discussions. On the other points, which exclusively concern France and Italy, no definite results have yet been achieved; and progress with these negotiations has always been rather "sticky," as a continual series of unfortunate obstacles has never ceased to hamper progress.

At the time of writing, the chief causes of trouble may be summarised as follows:

- (1) The general feeling in Italy that France stands in the way of Italian expansion, and intends to remain an obstacle to the nation's natural and legitimate aspirations.
- (2) The growth of the French Navy, and the large sums which the French Government are devoting to military armaments.
- (3) Anti-Fascist activities on French soil, already mentioned.
- (4) The unsettled status of Italian residents in Tunis, and the settlement of the frontier of Tripoli.
- (5) Tension in the Balkans, where the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the collapse of Russia have left the field open for France and Italy to compete for political hegemony.

The only one of these points of difference which has recently shown any important development is that of naval and military armaments, and it may safely be said that the competitive shipbuilding programmes now evident in the Mediterranean are the direct result of the Five-Power Naval Conference. Indeed, if competitive building between France and Italy should lead to a large collective increase of tonnage, the question will arise whether Great Britain, the United States, and Japan should make use of their right to exceed the Part III ratio of the London Naval Agreement.

The difference arises out of the question of parity, on which Italy insists, and which France regards as impossible owing to her greater naval needs. Naval competition has, therefore, become a further obstacle to Franco-Italian negotiations, and the recent speeches of Signor Mussolini have created an attitude in France that the resumption of these negotiations is not desirable in the atmosphere prevailing at the moment. Signor Grandi proposed a short time ago that, pending the naval discussions subsequent to the London Naval Conference, there should be "a naval holiday" between the two countries in 1930, but France replied that this was impossible in the present atmosphere of warlike speeches. Meanwhile, M. Tardieu has asked for a supplementary credit of £8,000,000 for the national defences of France, and Signor Mosconi has successfully requested the Italian Government to authorise supplementary expenditure of over £5,000,000 for the national defences of Italy; so that there is now a regular competition in piling up armaments by land and sea, which makes the progress of negotiations almost impossible.*

At the present moment it is difficult to see what will be the outcome of all these fiery speeches, naval and military competition, and frustrated negotiations; but it is one of these cases where the policy of "wait and see" is probably the wisest course to follow. The League of Nations, in the present stage of its development, can scarcely hope to improve matters, and any intervention on the part of Geneva in the affairs of two great Powers may easily make matters worse. Taking into consideration the mentality of the two Latin Powers in question, it is more than likely that things will shortly come to a head over some matter of dispute, and that this will precipitate an appreciation of the need for cool and sane judgment, together with a realisation of the grave risks to both countries of continuing in the dangerous path which they are at present following.

It now remains to consider the questions in dispute in the North African and Balkan areas, the former of which has been the principal issue in the suspended negotiations. Tunisia forms a bone of contention owing to the unsettled status of Italian settlers, who are still considerably more numerous than those of French origin. The Italian colony is in an exceptional position, owing partly to its numbers and organisation, partly to its proximity to the mother country, and partly to the policy of the Italian Government and the sentiment of the Italian people concerning the Mediterranean in general and Tunisia in particular. The Italians feel that Tunisia is a natural outlet for the Italian population, and that the flag ought to follow the immigrant. They have never become recon-

* It is satisfactory to note that M. Briand has now responded to Signor Grandi's proposal by agreeing not to proceed, during this year at any rate, with France's current shipbuilding programme.

ciled to the establishment of a French instead of an Italian protectorate over the country in 1881—an historic event which has doomed the Tunisian Italians to live under a foreign ascendancy, and which, by enabling France to create a naval base at Bizerta, caused France instead of Italy to share with the sovereign of Malta the naval command over the passage between the Western and Eastern Mediterranean. After the Great War the French Government looked forward to assimilating the status of Italians in Tunisia to that of other non-French European settlers, whereas Italy, with her particular grievance concerning Tunisia still unappeased and her self-assertion stimulated by the wave of national self-consciousness expressed in Fascism, was less inclined than ever to surrender any treaty rights by which her nationals in Tunisia were benefiting.

The Italo-Tunisian Treaty of 1868 did not expire till 1896, and up to that date Italy surrendered nothing except her consular jurisdiction over her nationals in Tunisia which she renounced in 1884 without prejudice to her other privileges under capitulations and treaties. In 1896 there were signed in Paris three Franco-Italian agreements, the second of which stipulated that "Persons who should have retained Italian or Tunisian nationality according to the laws of their country shall be regarded as Italian subjects in Tunisia and as Tunisian subjects in Italy," and an annexed protocol provided for the maintenance of the *status quo* in regard to Italian schools. This convention, by exempting Italian residents in Tunisia from the operation of French or Tunisian nationality laws, enabled them to retain their foreign nationality from generation to generation indefinitely. The three conventions of 1896 were to remain in force until the 1st October, 1905, unless denounced before that date, or otherwise until one year after their subsequent denunciation by either party. From 1905 till the close of the Great War the state of the Moroccan question in particular and the international situation in general deterred the French Government from opening up a controversy with Italy; and when, in 1918, France did denounce the first and second conventions (though not the third), she proposed and Italy agreed that, when the year's grace had elapsed, the conventions should continue to be renewed by tacit consent for periods of three months pending fresh negotiations.

This three months' arrangement still continues, but the present Italian Government consider it humiliating to be compelled to make periodical applications for a renewal of the rights of their citizens in Tunis, and it is asserted with some reason that the French have made every effort to induce Italians to adopt French citizenship for economic reasons. The French, on the other hand, think that the position of the Italians in Tunisia is all too favourable and that they are thereby enabled to form a "State within the State."

There is also a grave suspicion that the Italian schools and institutions, built for the benefit of the Italian community, form the foundation of a systematic increase of Italian influence. But perhaps the most unsatisfactory feature of the present position is the fact that the French have threatened to substantiate their denunciation of the second 1926 Convention and to give effect to a decree declaring that Italian children, born of parents who were themselves born in Tunisia, would be deemed to be of French nationality. Although France has not carried out this threat, the prolonged state of uncertainty on this nationality question has aroused Italian suspicion of all French measures in Tunisia, and has caused the Italians to read into the wording of all decrees something directed against themselves. The other question at issue is that of the frontier between French Tunisia and Italian Libya. In accordance with the Treaty of London, by which Italy entered the Great War in 1915, it was agreed that on its successful termination there would be a rectification of this Franco-Italian frontier on the same lines as the Jubaland settlement with Great Britain. France accordingly conceded to Italy certain frontier territory in 1919, but this concession was only accepted by Italy as a partial fulfilment of the Treaty of London, and Signor Mussolini upholds the views of his predecessors in this respect.

Whereas before the war Franco-Italian differences were chiefly confined to North Africa, one of the outcomes of the conflict of 1914-18 has been to extend the area of contention to the Balkans. France began to build up her political system in South-Eastern Europe immediately after the Armistice in 1918; and when Italy definitely followed her into this sphere of trouble in the spring of 1926, Franco-Italian relations took a turn for the worse. The most delicate moment came in November 1927, when a Franco-Yugoslav Treaty was signed at Paris and an Italo-Albanian Treaty at Tirana. Ever since then the French have suspected Italy of all manner of sinister designs against their *protégée* Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslavs have lived in constant fear of Italian designs on Albania. Italo-Yugoslav relations have, therefore, had a marked effect on those between Italy and France, and it is not surprising that the division of the Balkan area into two opposing combinations under the leadership of France and Italy respectively has helped to produce a state of affairs in which suspicion is the dominating feature. Indeed, I would go as far as to say that, were this dangerous situation in the Balkans removed once and for all, France and Italy would find little difficulty in settling their differences elsewhere. But, with all that is involved in the clash of interests and national aspirations in that semi-civilised region, it is difficult to see how a satisfactory agreement can be reached without a wholesale re-orientation of policies.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

THE BEST WAY TO JAPAN.

(A letter from Baghdad to America.)

September 7th, 1929.

HERE I am in Baghdad. The window at which I am writing looks straight out over the Tigris. At least, it would look out over the Tigris if the shutters were not closed; and they have to be closed because the temperature just now is 115 degrees Fahrenheit in the shade. I suppose this temperature would leave an inhabitant of Arizona or New Mexico cold; but it is quite a treat to the poor Englishman whose native land is hardly ever sunny or hardly ever dry. And this treat I owe to the enterprise of a group of American citizens several years ago, when they founded the Institute of Pacific Relations at Honolulu.

What is the connection between the Institute of Pacific Relations and my presence in Baghdad in September 1929? It is really very simple. The main activity of the Institute is to organise an international conference, every other year, at which various countries interested in the Pacific are represented by non-official groups of private people. Great Britain is one of these countries; I am to be a member of the British group; and this time the conference is to be held in Kyoto. Well, I am on my way.

"But what is your way?" you may ask. "The trans-American route we know. You can take it across the States or across Canada and end up at Yokohama. And the Suez route we know. You can go aboard a P. and O. boat in the Thames and step ashore at Kobe. But we never heard of a route from England to the Far East that ran through Baghdad."

Quite true, it does sound odd. And yet, if I am not mistaken, the first Englishman who set foot in India came overland like me—passing through Aleppo (where I picked up my water-jar) and pausing at Baghdad (as I am pausing) before he committed his wretched body to be burnt in the fiery furnace of the Persian Gulf. Later on, the route fell into oblivion, after the failure of Colonel Chesney's attempt, in the eighteen-thirties, to establish a service of British steamers on the Euphrates between the point where the river approaches nearest to the Mediterranean and the estuary through which it discharges into the Persian Gulf. Instead, they cut the Suez Canal; and nobody thought of the overland route any more until, in the course of the Great War, two brothers called Nairn came over from New Zealand to serve under General Allenby in Palestine.

The Nairns have an eye. The Nairns saw that motor-transport would be the crying need of the Middle East after the war. So,

when the armistice came, they elected not to go home with their companions-in-arms. (Next month, one of the brothers will be visiting New Zealand for the first time in fifteen years.) They stayed on the spot, and began to build up a motor business in Palestine. They extended their operations to Egypt, where cotton was booming. And then, in 1922, cotton broke and they had to look for openings elsewhere. Egypt was no longer propitious; Palestine and Syria offered too narrow a field; and on the other side of Palestine and Syria lay the desert. As the Nairns saw it, the obvious thing to do was to push out into the desert in a car and go on pushing until they found Baghdad; and sure enough, by 1923, Baghdad had been found and the trans-desert route established.

The Nairns, in their modesty, will talk to you about it as though finding a motor-route across four or five hundred miles of uncharted desert were the simplest thing in the world. All the same, they have made history; for they have opened a road which, so far as one knows, has never been used before, and in so doing they have achieved a conquest which the historic military conquerors never attempted.

I had set my heart on travelling this road, ever since the Nairns had opened it up. Several times, in London, I had listened to travellers' tales of the journey; and each time my desire had grown stronger. So when, one day last year, I was invited to be a member of the British group that was to attend the Kyoto Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations this coming October 1929, I called to my wife when I came home in the evening: "I am going to do the desert journey at last." "When?" she said. "In time to bring me to Kyoto before the end of October." "Just right," she said. "Then we can start at the beginning of the summer holidays, and I can drive you and the boys as far as Constantinople." "You must come on with me as far as Angora by train, for you haven't seen Angora at all, and I have not seen it since 1923, and that was before they laid the first stone of the new city." "And I want to see Vienna again, and to look across the Danube from Buda to Pest." "And I want to see the old German towns in Transylvania." And so, in a few minutes, our dates and itinerary were fixed.

And now the greater part of my journey from Calais to Basra overland is behind me. It only remains to take the south-bound mail-train from Baghdad—stopping off, if I can, for twenty-four hours to catch a glimpse of a Shiah Holy City on the way. After that, the tyranny of dates will compel me to take to the sea—with one last excursion inland between Karachi and Bombay (for I cannot bear to skirt India without a glimpse of Rajputana).

Already, I have finished all the stages that were to be done by road; the stage in the Ford car from Calais to Chorlu, and the stage in the Safeways Six-Wheeler from Damascus to Baghdad. I can hardly realise that these stages which I planned so far ahead and looked forward to so long, only half believing that they would ever really be accomplished, already belong to the past. I will taste the pleasure again by recalling how we went.

At 6.0 a.m., when the sixteen passengers with reservations for the desert-liner "Baalbek" assembled at Damascus in the breakfast-room of the Victoria Hotel, I realised that I was once more in Anglo-Saxondom. The creators of the route were New Zealanders; a majority of the company at table were Scottish mining engineers returning from leave to the Mosul or the South Persian oil-fields; there were a couple of Australian flying men; there was a Pennsylvanian railway engineer (the Safeways six-wheeler came from Pennsylvania, too); and there was at least one more Englishman besides the driver. Even the driver's Syrian mate, though he spoke no English, had acquired a convincingly Anglo-Saxon air.

The driving was an astonishing performance. The distance covered was between four and five hundred miles; and from the outskirts of the gardens of Damascus to the Iraq customs-house at Ramadi, which marked the further border between the desert and the sown, not a hand's turn of work had ever been done on the road. In fact, it was not a road at all. It was just a section of the surface of the desert on which one could discern the wheel-marks of other cars. And over this desert our driver brought us from the Victoria Hotel at Damascus to the Maude Hotel at Baghdad in twenty-seven hours, taking the wheel turn and turn about and keeping at it night and day.

Of course, this desert is not the soft sandy "Nafud"—a surface over which even a six-wheeler could scarcely make its way. It is the hard gravelly "Hamad." But, all the same, it is quite a good enough desert for me. Its desolation is emphasised by the fact that one rides out into it from the "Ghutah"—the oasis of Damascus, which is said to be the biggest garden in the world. It is a garden planted with every kind of fruit tree; and under the trees are vegetable crops; and everywhere there is the sound of rustling waters, as the irrigation channels twist this way and that, bringing life with them as far as they go. If there were water enough in Anti-Lebanon to flow all those four hundred miles into the Euphrates, would the Ghutah extend continuously from Damascus to Ramadi? The soil of the desert does not look as though it were made of different stuff from the soil of the Ghutah which yields so rich a harvest. It is the water that comes to an end, and trees and crops cease with it. Before we realised it,

the Ghutah was behind us and we were out on a gravelly expanse whose nakedness was not covered by the occasional tufts of thorn-bush that managed to find sustenance there. The outlying spur of Anti-Lebanon on our left was also bone-dry; but our eyes clung to it, for if it had not life, at least it had form, and we dreaded the formless landscape ahead. But now we turned due east; the bleached mountain faded away, and the desert swallowed us up.

Sometimes the desert was undulating; sometimes it was flat as far as the eye could see. Sometimes the thorn-tufts reappeared; sometimes the gravel was bare altogether. And so it went on for hours and hours and miles and miles. In the distance, the last swell of rising ground would detach itself from the solid earth and crumple up at each end as though the heat were frying it; and the hot air in the hollows would turn to opaque silver, like water unruffled by the wind; and the more distant thorn-tufts would become tree-tops—and, behold, a mirage. Once it was a Yorkshire lake, set about with lime-trees and beeches. Another time it was a vignette of the English Channel—seen between two headlands on the Island of Jersey. Another time again—but I am not going to be caught by your desert tricks; for this big pool, a stone's throw from our trail, is the real thing and no mistake. Did not the driver in that passing car from Baghdad tell us that last night it rained? It must have been a deluge to leave so large a body of water in that hollow; and yet our trail is dry, without a trace of mud. "Well, that," said our driver, grinning, "was the prettiest mirage of all."

The young railway-engineer from Pennsylvania lifted up his voice and wept. (He was going to build Riza Shah's trans-Persian Railway from Ahwaz northwards, and it was his first job in foreign parts.) "I come from the mountains," he lamented, "and my mountains are green." The Scots showed him no mercy. "This desert, Yank," they mocked, "is the spitten image of the country you are bound for." "Well, you will find a river there," I interposed, to comfort him. "Got sharks in it, the Karun," the Scots retorted.

I found myself automatically counting the birds, as in New York I used to count the horses. (I counted six horses in New York in three days, and fourteen birds in one day in the Syrian desert; so, for scarcity of fauna, New York has the desert beat.) And so the desert went on in a monotonous alternation—flat or rolling, thorn-speckled or bare, until the sun set and night fell suddenly.

As night fell, three lights glimmered out; two on the ground level and one high in the air. The high light was on the top of a wireless mast, and we were approaching the fortified caravan-serai which the Iraq Government has built, far out in the desert, round Rutbah Wells. Imagine a college quadrangle with loopholes

instead of windows on the outer walls and a sentry with fixed bayonet standing guard at the only gateway. Inside, there are buildings all round, opening onto the courtyard; bedrooms and dining-rooms and stables and garages; and, in the centre of all, the two precious wells that make the place what it is. The staple drink of Ruthbah Wells is light beer brewed in Glasgow (how much I wished that it had been brewed in Munich or Pilsen); but, lest the mere Englishman should fancy that he was getting less than due consideration, the table d'hôte dinner ended with plum-pudding. We paid for our beer in silver rupees—an intimation to me that, for the first time since landing at Calais six weeks before, I was in the orbit of the British Raj.

After two hours' rest at Ruthbah we pushed on into the night. (How our driver kept the trail in the dark is something that passes my understanding.) Fitfully we dozed in our seats until, towards five o'clock in the morning, a cluster of lights shone out again. This was Ramadi; and here the English definitely asserted their ascendancy over all their Anglo-Saxon brothers; for when we ordered breakfast at the New Babylon Hotel, we were regaled in the darkness with poached eggs and sausages and strong black tea. And so, at ten o'clock in the morning of this September 7th, 1929, the second morning of our journey from Damascus, we rumbled into Baghdad—and here I am. . . .

To-day I have been driving through Iraq and breakfasting at Ramadi. Six weeks ago I was driving through Kent and dining at Canterbury. How was Kent turned into Iraq and Canterbury into Baghdad in less than fifty days? That question raises the whole philosophic problem of change; and to raise it is the supreme delight of travelling by car instead of by steamer or train.

When you travel by train or steamer the problem does not arise; for then a great gulf is fixed between the beginning and the end of your journey. Liverpool and New York are sundered by a waste of empty ocean; New York and San Francisco by successive palls of darkness which blot out the view from the railway-carriage window. So the transition is abrupt, as when one slide is substituted for another in a magic lantern. But when you travel by car, and seldom travel except by daylight, the impression made on your mind, instead of being like a disjointed series of magic lantern slides, becomes like the continuous moving picture that is projected from a cinematograph film. And, as it happens, I have travelled by car and by daylight the greater part of the way to Baghdad from London.

So I must try to apprehend the transition from Kent to Iraq in some other way. Where did I encounter the first armed guard at a frontier? At the Austro-Hungarian frontier, on the Hungarian

side. Where did I first feel the heat? When we crossed the Carpathians by the Predeal Pass and dropped down into the Wallachian Plain from Transylvania (for Transylvania is a very England for perpetual rain). Where did I see my first mosque? In the Bulgarian country town of Biala, half-way between the Danube and the Shipka Pass. And my first camel? Out of a railway carriage window in Thrace. And my first palm-tree? This morning at Ramadi. Yet one does not change from Kent to Iraq by a steady progression; and there are moments when, if one had not the map to disprove it, one would have sworn that one was retracing one's steps.

For instance, that last passage of the Danube from Bulgaria to Rumania. At Rumanian Giurgiu we were unmistakably in the Balkans; but when we landed at Bulgarian Ruschuk, we felt as though we were re-crossing the threshold of Western Europe. Had we been dozing as we sat in the car on that barge? Had we really been sitting there, oblivious, for days instead of minutes, while the little steamer had been towing us—not just across the river—but far, far up stream to Austrian Passau or German Ulm? The illusion was not dispelled until our eyes fell upon those notices written up in the Cyrillic alphabet and those Turkish peasants coming into market in their red fezes (with the inevitable embroidered yellow handkerchiefs wound round them), their blue embroidered jackets, and their breeches cut like enormous bags. The Cyrillic alphabet! The Turkish national costume! After all, we had left the West behind in crossing the Rumano-Bulgarian frontier. But when we crossed the Bulgaro-Turkish frontier three days later, that judgment had to be revised. The moment we entered Turkey, all Turks dressed up to look like Turks disappeared as if by magic, and yielded the stage to individuals whose caps and coats would not have been peculiar in the Bowery or in Whitechapel. It was as if we had just left Turkey instead of having just entered it, and had strayed back into some rather down-at-heel back street in Anglo-Saxondom. Moreover, all the notices were written up again in the Latin alphabet (or "the Turkish alphabet," as your modern Turk prefers to call it). The outlandish Cyrillic had disappeared. Yet had we really re-entered the West? I can only say that Adrianople, the westernmost city in Turkey, is one of the most "Oriental" places in the modern world.

Yet you must not judge the Turkey of 1929 by this remnant of "Turkey-in-Europe." You must push on into the heart of Asia Minor and pay at least a flying visit to Angora in order to see the leaven of Western civilisation at work. For here, in Asia Minor, the Turk is engaged on a thoroughly European—or rather, American—enterprise. He is trying to transform himself from an

AUTOCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA.

ONE hears the most diverse and contradictory opinions about the success of the Yugoslav Dictatorship, both in Yugoslavia itself and in foreign countries. This is a natural result of the change from autocratic to democratic government. Each system has its own supporters, who approve and condemn according to the school of thought to which they belong. In Yugoslavia there is an additional reason for the diversity of verdict. The field for reform which presented itself to the Dictatorship was very wide. The old constitution had failed to provide a suitable political organisation for the heterogeneous elements out of which the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had been composed. The over-centralised administration worked slowly and inefficiently, and was practically only at the service of the friends of the governing parties. This injustice led to obstruction by the Opposition in Parliament with the result that the Skupstchina had become positively incoherent. Urgent legislation was far in arrear. The economic organisation of the country was being sadly neglected. Worst of all, this failure had produced a really serious misunderstanding between Serbia and Croatia which began to threaten the whole existence of the State.

When King Alexander, by a stroke of the pen, substituted personal for democratic government, he started to apply various remedies to the sick body before him. His first care was to improve the working of the administration and to purge it of slackness, graft, and corruption. As soon as possible he gave it a new organisation, which eased its working. He attacked the arrears of legislation with the weapon of decree-laws. At the same time he took steps which were intended to end the struggle between Serb and Croat by welding them into one nation, so that the harmonious working of the machinery of State should be facilitated by unity of sentiment among his subjects. This was an ambitious undertaking, for it involved the suppression not only of a strong party feeling but of an existing national consciousness on either side. He has had less success with this part of his task than with the more technical aspects. Accordingly, the praise which the Dictatorship has earned comes mostly from those who have in view the reforms which have been effected in the administration and the material organisation of the State, while the opposition comes from persons who object to seeing their individual sentiments and principles violently set aside.

There are at any rate certain things which have been achieved by King Alexander's decree-laws since January 6th, 1929, which alone would be sufficient to justify the Dictatorship. First and

foremost is the unification of laws for the whole of the Kingdom. The Skupstchina had been at work on this for eight years without being able to reach a conclusion. A similar reform of hardly less importance is the unification of the system of taxation. This was a source of constant grievance to the ex-Austro-Hungarian provinces, which suffered from being subject to a completer fiscal organisation than their neighbours in Serbia and Montenegro. The methods and personnel of the administration have been submitted to an overhaul in every respect, which has resulted in a much smoother and more efficient working of the machine. This is an improvement which everybody who has business with government offices is prepared to acknowledge. One of its results is that the taxes are collected more punctually now than in the days when deputies could be appealed to to obtain a remission or a postponement from the Ministry of Finance. It cannot be said that the abolition of parliament and political parties has altogether eliminated graft and protection, because, though their influence is much reduced, the political bosses still have their hangers-on and dependants; but it has helped to make the administration more straightforward and honest.

The most important individual piece of work which the Dictatorship can show is the law which divides the country for administrative purposes into nine *banovinas* (provinces), each governed by a *ban* with very wide powers. The *banovinas* supersede the forty or so *oblasts*, which had been too small to serve any practical purpose as units of administration, so that the country was governed far too much from Belgrade. The redistribution had produced the decentralisation of authority which was a necessity for a country with such a great diversity of local conditions. The provincial administrations are responsible in particular for organising the economic life of their provinces; they have their own budgets and their own technical staff. They are reported on all hands to be working well and to be giving a stimulus to local activities. The machinery has recently been completed by the constitution of provincial councils or senates (*banske vetches*). At present their members are nominated by the Minister of the Interior and their powers are insignificant, but if in due course they are made elective and given more latitude, as it is reasonable to hope will be the case, they will serve the same useful purpose as the *conseils généraux* of French Departments. The delimitation of the provinces calls in some glaring instances for modification, but the reform is a success in its main lines, and has certainly come to stay.

Since it has been freed from the trammels of party politics the administration has been much more vigorous in its treatment of economic problems. A great deal has been done to organise and

rationalise agricultural production and to foster trade. The Government has launched out boldly into schemes of land development, such as the draining of the water-logged country on the left bank of the Danube opposite Belgrade. These are being executed with the help of foreign capital. This policy incurs some criticism from the opponents of the régime on account of the burden which it will lay on the coming generation, but the developments will eventually pay for themselves, and the policy has at least the virtue of being progressive.

Generally speaking, the achievements here catalogued earn the approval of the business community more than anybody else, but it is interesting to note that they attract very appreciative comment in neighbouring countries, such as Rumania and Bulgaria, which have similar conditions to cope with and can estimate the progress marked at its proper value.

The opponents of the régime can be grouped roughly under two heads according to the original source of their discontent. In the first case it springs fundamentally from resentment at the abolition of democratic institutions; in the second from offended national sentiment. The first group are generally Serbs, to the second belong the Croats and the minorities. Attachment to democratic institutions is particularly strong among the Serbs of the old Kingdom, who during the nineteenth century had to fight continually for their constitutional rights against a series of princes with marked autocratic tendencies. The Croats are not such born democrats, but the instinct for representative government was roused in the Croat peasantry by Stephen Raditch, and it is precisely in the ranks of his creation, the Croat Peasants' Party, where nationalist and democratic sentiments are combined, that resistance to the Dictatorship has so far been most open.

The feeling against the abolition of elective institutions is easy to understand. It is not merely, as is sometimes pretended, the grumbling of disgruntled politicians. The Serbian peasant misses the contact which he used to have with the Government through his deputy, through whom he felt (and not without reason) that he exercised a control over its actions. The Croat peasant did not feel, like his Serbian brother, that the Government was his creation and his servant, but in the *Seletchka Stranka* (Peasants' Party) with its numerous organisations centred in the *Seletchki Dom* (Peasants' Home) at Zagreb, he had not only a means of self-expression but a social link with his fellows to which he was strongly attached. The Dictatorship has taken that from him.

But the chief grievance in Croatia is the abolition of the Croatian nationality. The national consciousness of the Croat has its roots far back in history, and it has been fortified by centuries of

struggling with the Magyars for political independence. The Croats cherish everything which marks them as distinct from other peoples, their historical frontiers, their national hymns and flag, even such slight particularities as distinguish their language from that of the Serbs and the Slovenes. They are now asked to sacrifice them for the sake of Yugoslav unity. King Alexander promptly decreed the dissolution of all associations and institutions, political or otherwise, which might help to preserve "tribal" sentiments and ideas. Some months later the official title of the State was changed to "Kingdom of Yugoslavia," and in re-dividing the country into provinces the King deliberately suppressed all the old frontiers and old territorial denominations. Quite recently he reminded his subjects that the old divisions were gone for ever, and that, though the old national emblems deserved to be piously cherished as relics of the past, for the future all the three branches must unite under the Yugoslav tricolour.

This idea is now being diligently fostered in the younger generation through the *Sokols*, which have been transformed into a compulsory State system of education, and by certain reforms in the school laws which have limited the scope of the Churches and the national minorities in matters of education, and given the Government further opportunities to mould the minds of the children of the kingdom to one standard Yugoslav pattern, be they Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Germans or Hungarians, of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic or Moslem faith.

The objection of the Croats to this tendency is that the official Yugoslav mould prescribed from Belgrade is in reality a Serbian mould; that the Serb can still remain a Serb, whereas the Croat must cease to be a Croat. This is not strictly true. In externals the Serb sacrifices no less than the Croat by the abolition of the old distinctions; when the law of the *banovinas* was promulgated Serbian peasants were heard to complain bitterly that they had "lost their country without a shot having been fired." Moreover, if Serbia has to give up the Cyrillic alphabet, which is one of the changes in prospect, she will be losing something of which no counterpart has yet been demanded of Croatia. Nevertheless it is true that, so far as sentiment is concerned, the merging of the old divisions in the new Yugoslavia means more to the Croats than to the Serbs owing to a livelier development of the sense of nationality among the former.

The task which King Alexander has set himself, of moulding the thought of his subjects so as to make a united nation out of the inhabitants of a number of provinces with widely different habits and traditions, is one which is worthy of a Napoleon or a Peter the Great. The way he is setting about it shows that he has in him

the instincts of an autocrat. It is not for nothing that he is the grandson of Nicholas of Montenegro, the last survivor in Europe of the race of purely personal monarchs. His education at the court of St. Petersburg familiarised him with the traditions of Imperial Russia, and the marked attention which he has recently shown to the Russian refugees of the old régime shows which way his sympathies lie. One can imagine that he is inspired by the example of the early Romanoffs and sees himself as the father of his people, working out their good according to his own lights, either with or against their will.

He has chosen as his chief instrument a man who is well fitted to be the servant of an autocrat. General Petar Jivkovitch is a bull-necked, bullet-headed soldier, with a brutal and direct way of getting things done. He has the complete confidence of the King, and his powers are unlimited. With little understanding for the working of Government departments, he judges by results and acts accordingly. In the mind of the people he figures as the Dictator far more than the King himself, for it is from him that come the curt orders which override all other decisions, bring promotion or disgrace to an official or a remission of taxes to a district. At first sight he gives the impression of being quite regardless either of forms or traditions or the rights and feelings of individuals, but a closer study of his methods shows that he is guided by an instinct which warns him when he is on dangerous ground. Frequently, when he seems on the point of brushing some obstacle aside, he draws back and avoids or circumvents it.

The other members of the Cabinet are mostly instruments of a lower order of importance. Dr. Marinkovitch, whose office of Minister for Foreign Affairs sets him in a class apart, and Dr. Sershkitch, the Minister of Justice, who has had a hand in preparing the King's most important decrees, are perhaps the chief exceptions. The rôle of the rest is to act, not so much as advisers and executors of the King's will, but as figure-heads and guides for the different sections of the nation which King Alexander wishes to unite behind him. How much the Cabinet as a whole is consulted on leading questions can be judged from the official communiqué promulgating the law of the *banovinas*, which announced that at a meeting of the Cabinet the Ministers had been "made acquainted" with the new law. In the ranks of the original Dictatorship Cabinet were representatives of the majority group in the Skupstchina which had formed the previous administration, one or two Radicals, one or two Democrats, and Father Koroshetz to represent the Slovenes. Croatia was represented by four men of standing in public life, but without political attachments. Since then it has been the King's constant endeavour to make his

Government more influential and more representative of the political thought of the nation. Although the political parties have officially ceased to exist, the King has appealed to their former members to join in helping him to draw the people together in one association for the fundamental reform of the State. He has put it to them that by joining his Government they will have an opportunity of taking their due share in shaping the organisation of the new Yugoslavia, but that, if they refuse, their places will be taken by others. This powerful argument has apparently been used somewhat discreetly with the old Serbian parties, more directly with those of the Opposition, which represent, for the most part, the ex-Austro-Hungarian provinces.

His success here has been more apparent than real. The Radicals and Democrats who entered the first Dictatorship Cabinet were representatives of a small minority of their respective parties. Cautious *pourparlers* with the old Central Committee of the Radical Party are now believed to have resulted in its declaring itself ready to follow the King's lead provided that due account is taken of the party's importance; in other words, the King is asked to admit that, although dissolved, the party still exists in practice as a political force and organisation. The main *cadres* of the Democratic Party still hold obstinately aloof. The same applies to the Croat Peasants' Party and to M. Pribitchevitch's Independent Democrats, who together formed the bulk of the Opposition in the old Skupstchina. M. Pribitchevitch showed himself from the first an opponent of the Dictatorship. Accordingly he has been cut off from contact with anybody except his own family, and is for practical purposes interned in the Belgrade hospital, where he is undergoing treatment. A small group of his supporters have, however, been won for the King's ends, and one of them, M. Denetrovitch, has been made Minister of Commerce. Repeated overtures have been made to Dr. Matchek, Raditch's successor as President of the Croat Peasants' Party. The last attempt to win him for the Government was made while he was under trial on a charge of conspiracy. He refused, but four other members of his party who had been convinced by the King's arguments were taken into the Cabinet, two of them superseding two of the original non-party Croats.

Thus the position at present is that the Government includes representatives of all the principal political parties which existed before the Dictatorship was established. In their persons they undoubtedly represent a considerable volume of political influence, on which the King can depend to guide opinion in the country. But, strictly speaking, they must be described as dissidents from their parties, since the acknowledged chiefs and probably the

majority of the *cadres* still hesitate, to say the least of it, to declare openly for the Dictatorship and its aims.

The circumstances of the Croat conspiracy trial, by means of which it was sought to drive Dr. Matchek into siding with the Dictatorship, are worth recording, since they give an idea of the crudity of the methods which are being employed to give effect to the King's desire to have all leaders of political thought united under his banner. Dr. Matchek was committed for trial at the beginning of the year, together with a number of the young members of his party, who had been detected in criminal offences against the Defence of the Realm Law (the chief weapon of the Dictatorship against those who disagree with it). The sole fact against him was that he had given a certain sum of money to be used for the relief of some of his younger partisans, who had been ordered on account of their political activities to live outside Zagreb and had consequently lost their jobs, and that several of these young men were implicated in the conspiracy. In the course of the trial it was revealed that most of the accused had been brutally tortured while in prison in order to make them admit that Matchek himself had been in the plot. The purpose of the police and public prosecutor was clearly to convict Matchek of conspiracy in order to force him to make a declaration of loyalty to the régime, failing which he would have to be sent to prison and thus eliminated, like M. Pribitchevitch, from public life. There is little doubt that the authorities acted on instructions from above. The whole case against Matchek was built up on statements thus extorted under duress. Their authors without exception retracted them in court; the case for the prosecution broke down, and the judges could hardly have found Matchek guilty without committing a flagrant perversion of justice. The real meaning of the trial was revealed by Matchek in his final speech to the court, when he declared that repeated attempts had been made both before and during it to induce him to declare for the Dictatorship. His speech was an uncompromising refusal to depart from his democratic principles and a provocative re-statement of the ideals of Croat nationalism.

When one studies the means which are being used under the Dictatorship to influence public opinion and to coerce prominent persons into working on the lines which the King has chosen, it seems hard to believe that much progress can be made by such methods. It would, however, be a mistake to dismiss the King's efforts to achieve Yugoslav unity by force as altogether vain. Both by direct and indirect intention that ideal is being brought gradually nearer realisation. Among the factors which have so far prevented it there has been nothing very fundamental; they have been of an accidental or a superficial character. Both among the

Serbs and the Croats there are plenty of men who were eager for an opportunity to overcome them. King Alexander's experiment has given them this opportunity, and although they may not all approve of his methods, they are willing to assist the experiment for the sake of what it may produce. This has enabled the King to induce a very diverse collection of personages to associate themselves with the new conception of the State which he has formulated. Though these men are not all of equal worth, each of them carries a certain following with him. Such a coalition of forces is not to be despised; it already implies a certain unity.

But possibly the most important result of the King's directorate is the impulse which it has given to the democratic elements in the country to agree amongst themselves. Among the remnants of the old political parties which still tacitly boycott the Dictatorship there have been during the last eighteen months far sincerer efforts to devise a workable constitution for this hybrid State than ever in the days of the ill-fated Skupstchina. Serb and Croat have come within measurable distance of agreement, and a foundation for the future relation of the two most important components of the kingdom to one another has probably been laid—on strictly democratic lines. Sooner or later, when the time comes for the personal régime to fade out, the ideas of the Governmental and of the Opposition group will have to meet, and the schemes which have been worked out under different inspiration will be superimposed one on the other. The result may not prove completely satisfactory, but at any rate a stage will have been completed in the evolution of the State towards unity.

BALCANICUS.

THE JULY DAYS: 1830.

THOSE who have followed the history of France from 1815 to 1830 with any degree of attention will be prepared for the statement of M. Malet that the Revolution of July 1830 was a "Révolution de surprise." There was no general and widespread discontent; no national movement that comprised men of every class. France was peaceful, rich, and prosperous. Her foreign policy had been successful, and under the Restoration an immense financial burden had been assumed and borne without apparent effort. Behind and beyond the Revolution of 1789, it is true, there lay a second movement far more difficult to accomplish, which was to lead to the equalisation of conditions, and which is referred to when we are told that the French Revolution drifted towards Communism from its birth, and that when Gracchus Babeuf appeared the Revolution killed him "pour avoir dit trop tôt son secret." But France in 1815 was far from wanting any such second Revolution, and though there had been theorists at work during the fifteen years that followed there is little that connects the Revolution of July in principle with that of February. Armand Carrel's testimony here is valuable. Writing in the *National* a couple of months after Louis Philippe became king he says: "If anyone sees in the recent events a social rather than a political revolution let him say so; if it seems to some of the friends of absolute equality that the time has come to put the principles of property to the question, let them not hide behind doubtful phrases; let us know who it is with whom we have to do."

No one can assert that the July Days witnessed a struggle of class against class. It was a political struggle. We must not, of course, press this statement too far, for the main reliance of the revolutionary leaders was on the masses in Paris and some of the leaders wished for something quite different from what was obtained. Still, the whole has been fairly described as "a conflict between ideas rather than classes, between conceptions of government rather than theories of social and economic relations, between political parties rather than between industrial groups." Polignac tried after the Revolution to weave a constitutional theory into the action of the Ministry, but without much success. His objection, however, to centralisation indicates more political insight than he has usually obtained credit for.

Those who are fond of a neat theory will find plenty of explanations of the July Revolution. Dunoyer was a clever man with a varied experience of life, and this is what he told Senior:

The government of the Restoration was besieged by all the Faubourg St. Germain, by all its emigrant friends, and by a whole army of the functionaries of the Republic and of the

Empire, driven back upon France from the territories which were relinquished. It strove to provide for them by recalling as many as it dared of the abuses of the old régime, by carefully maintaining, and where it could by increasing, those of the Revolution and of the Empire, by repressing every liberty through which its profligacy could be attacked, by interfering with the Elections, and when it was met for the second time by an irresistible majority, by abolishing the constitution. And it fell, because it had sacrificed things to persons, because instead of trying to benefit the whole community it had striven to purchase a part of it; and because it had nothing to oppose to the united attacks of the republicans and Buonapartists except an army which was Buonapartist and a set of favourites and officials debased by eighteen years of wealth, patronage, and power.

Mr. Senior may have been satisfied with this summary, but it will not convince most people. The Restoration was a grander business than the squalid struggle which the economist describes.

On the one hand there was certainly the Counter-Revolutionary tendency; the wish to undo the work of the Revolution, to go beyond the Restoration and to upset the state of things created by the Charter. On the other there was the spirit, or leaven, as it was termed, of the Revolution, the lessons that had been learned between 1789 and 1815. The Bourbons had promised to rule according to the Charter, and to this understanding they were to be kept by the Allies as well as by the French people. It had been granted, or *octroyée*, by Louis XVIII on June 4th, 1814, and it provided for equality before the law, individual liberty, inviolability of property, freedom of opinion, liberty of the Press. The responsibility of Ministers is stated, though few knew what it meant; and indeed it is difficult to understand it in an English sense in view of the article which defines the position of the King. On the whole one may say with Picavet that it expressed the extent to which one had to reckon with the ideas that had triumphed in 1789. Royalty is no longer a cult; it must rest on the advantages it confers. "You can get either a monarchy or a republic from the Charter," said Roger Collard in 1820, and Lermnier adds, "I am of his opinion, and circumstances have evoked a republic, that is to say, the principle of the sovereignty of the majority of the nation."

Philarete Chasles on returning to his native land notes the ferment that he found raging round the Charter and the whole system of government, and Rémusat has borne eloquent testimony to the influence and value of the intellectual warfare in which all the men of talent found themselves engaged; it was that, he says, which made them what they became. It was a noble struggle, this effort to reconcile Revolution and Counter-Revolution. The result, brilliant rather than lasting, in some ways was a failure, though not a failure as regards the greatest issue. But it must

not be forgotten that the statesmen of that day had had little training in the work which a representative government has to do, and this tended to make them, as Sainte-Beuve says, either Girondins or Doctrinaires. France had a "gouvernement de discussion," as Charles X called it; a long "guerre de mots," as Prévost-Paradol lamented. But there is one aspect of the work of these men whose value cannot be over-estimated. It is summed up by Salvandy in a phrase, "la passion de la légalité." "C'est lui (ce sentiment)," he proudly and with justice claims, "qui dans les journées de juillet, fit l'ordre au sein d'une révolution à main armée, et maintint le respect des lois quand il n'y avait plus de lois." Tocqueville, writing to Royer-Collard in, what seemed to his eye, the more sombre days of the July Monarchy, tells him regretfully, "Vous représentez, Monsieur, un autre temps que le nôtre, des sentiments plus hauts, des idées, une société plus grandes."

But it seems quite clear also that the July Days were not the result of an Orleanist conspiracy. Plots there had been in plenty under the Bourbons, but they were different in aim and sporadic in action; little had been heard of them in recent years. Indeed, everything points to the truth of Pasquier's statement that there was no great scheme for an Orleanist insurrection. The Duke was so obvious a William III that his name had been naturally before the country as a possible man if there was a thought of changing the dynasty. He had been thought of in 1815 and there was something of an Orleanist party under Charles X, rather however by way of opposition than construction. So that when the Revolution broke out there was an understanding. The Duke's name quickly became a refuge from disorder and it was in this sense that Madame de la Briche said: "What a good thing it is that the Duke of Orleans is here to save us from a Revolution."

Much more difficult to estimate is the strength of the Republicans at the moment. We have the statement of Barante that the party was mainly composed of students, but Bérard tells a different story and it seems that there was at least a possibility of a decision in their favour. On the night of July 29th the choice really lay between Orleans and the Republic, and the man who had to make the decision was La Fayette. Chiefly through the influence of Odilon Barot he decided for the Duke, and the famous phrase "Voilà le prince qu'il nous faut, c'est la meilleure des républiques," which he probably never uttered, is supposed to represent his views. He saw, no doubt, that the Orleans monarchy was the only possible way out of the difficulty, and herein represented more moderate men than himself. Their sentiments have been clearly expressed by Talleyrand, who says of this solution: "Je l'ai acceptée; je m'y suis rattaché comme à un ancre de salut, et je l'ai

tory answers to these questions can be found—and here I am speaking only for myself—I think the time has come when . . . we might well pursue our efforts to control crime, not exclusively by the method of the fixed sentence, but also by a further effort for the imprisonment and reformation of the criminal in the spirit which has animated those earnest and humane men who have advocated the principle of the Indeterminate Sentence.” Lord Cave made it clear that he was speaking only for himself, but Sir Ernest Wild, speaking during the discussion on the resolution adopted by the Congress, said: “It would be diabolical to put any human being under the power of another human being for the whole term of his natural life, and you will not find any judge in this country who will pass that sentence. This would be contrary to all the principles of humanity for which we have been fighting for the last fifty years.” No comment is offered on this expression of opinion except that of course judges do pass life sentences. With one more quotation from the proceedings of the Congress the subject must be left. A delegate quoted a great American jurist as having said, “the indeterminate sentence is destined to change and to enrich and ennoble the penal legislation of every State.”

The representatives of Great Britain at Prague will have some difficulty in explaining why, with the complete failure of our system of preventive detention, we have not begun to move in the direction in which world penal experience points.

They will have a much more agreeable task in reporting the progress which has been made in the classification of prisoners. The principle laid down at the London Congress was that “after the necessary divisions according to age and sex have been made and the mental status of the prisoner has been taken into account classification should be according to the character and reclaimability of the prisoner.” In this matter we are admittedly considerably ahead of other countries. To understand the principles of the English system it is necessary first to appreciate the difference between penal servitude and imprisonment. The distinction is largely historical, and the treatment of a convict sentenced to penal servitude and a prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment is practically the same. In the former case the minimum sentence is three years, in the latter the maximum two years. Convicts are divided into three classes according to degree of criminality, Star, Intermediate, and Recidivist, located at Maidstone, Parkhurst, and Dartmoor respectively. The convict prison in Maidstone has hitherto formed part of the local prison: this is shortly to be remedied and the “star” convicts will be accommodated in a prison of their own with ample facilities for the suitable treatment of this very hopeful class of

feeling rather picturesquely. “Il me semble que je suis invitée à un grand spectacle, que la toile est levée, et que les acteurs ne paraissent pas.” The Associations for resisting illegal taxation and the foundation of the *National*, a true “journal de combat” as Jules Simon calls it, were significant steps. Then we have the opening of Parliament in March with the famous debate on the address in which Berryer began his brilliant oratorical career by a speech of which Royer-Collard said: “C’est plus qu’un discours, c’est un événement; une nouvelle puissance s’élève.” The address, voted by the historic 221, was presented to the King, who had by this time resolved to dissolve the Chamber, and who made a reply which reads perhaps more stiffly than it sounded, if we may believe Guizot. The dissolution resulted in a sweeping majority against the Court and the question was, What was to be done?

There were various suggestions, all of which seem equally foolish now, but the procedure by *Ordonnance* was finally selected, possibly because some thought it might be brought under Article XIV of the Charter. These *Ordonnances* dissolved the new-elected Chamber, re-established the censorship of the Press, and altered the Law of Elections. The story goes that as the signatures were being affixed the Minister of the Marine, who had at first refused his consent, allowed his eyes to wander round the walls of the council chamber. “What are you looking for?” asked Polignac. “I am looking,” he answered, “for the portrait of Strafford.” The King signed on August 25th and on August 26th the famous *Ordonnances* appeared in the *Moniteur*, much to the distress of its editor.

The immediate results we need not trace in detail. The Press led the way on the 27th with a protest in the *National* and the *Temps*. The riots in the streets soon became a Revolution. Marmont was in command of the troops, but he had not a large force nor was he sure of his men. Personally he strongly objected to the *Ordonnances*. After a certain amount of fighting, sufficient to make it clear that Charles could not continue to reign, Paris was evacuated and the struggle from a military point of view was over. The deputies who were in Paris met at first in private houses, and their protest published on the 28th gave a kind of legality to the uprising of the people. Had Charles given way sooner, he might possibly have secured the crown for his grandson, but at each stage he was too late. And so first La Fayette was made head of the National Guard, then a Municipal Commission which was really a provisional Government was appointed by the Deputies, and then when Mortemart arrived in Paris on the 30th to arrange for a new Ministry he found that the journalists had put forward Orleans as the only possible leader. The Deputies invited the Duke to become Lieutenant-General of the kingdom. He accepted and

when he issued his proclamation on the 31st Charles had virtually ceased to be king. His abdication and that of the Dauphin were obviously the desperate efforts of ruined men. Specific guarantees were drawn up and accepted by the Duke, who in a speech on August 3rd clearly abandoned the theory of the Kingship held since 1815. All that remained was to draft the project of a constitution (it was partly the work of Bérard), to secure the consent of the Duke, and finally on August 9th by a simple but imposing ceremony to make Louis Philippe King of the French. Henceforward the Charter was to be a reality.

It is curious that Polignac's Government did not attach more importance to the possible action of Paris. Vaublanc, an old hand, thought that they would never publish the *Ordonnances* unless they had at least 40,000 troops ready. Tocqueville, writing as early as August 1829, saw clearly what was coming. The Ministers, he said, were launched upon "the plan of *Coups d'États* of laws by *Ordonnance*; that is, the question lies between the royal power and the popular power—a conflict in closed lists, a conflict in which, in my opinion, the popular power stakes its present, but the royal authority stakes both present and future." Palmerston was equally precise in his letter of December 15th, 1829. There is also the remarkable prophecy of Greville, and many similar observations were made and could be cited. On the other hand a clever man said, "Pour prendre une couronne il faut être un grand homme. . . . Il y a plus loin du Palais Royal aux Tuileries que d'Ajaccio aux Tuileries."

There is much in the Revolution itself to justify the phrase of Rémusat—"une révolution irréprochable." Never surely were such dangerous weapons handled with so much skill. There was comparatively little bloodshed, little violence, little loss of property. The people of Paris, said Chateaubriand, "ne s'est point soulevé contre la loi mais pour la loi."

The results were out of all proportion to the cause or the circumstances. In France they may be said for the moment to have been conservative, but to the world the Revolution seemed the triumph of a growing liberalism. To Metternich it appeared clear that the old state of things in Europe would soon end; he and his master would perish with it. Certainly in all countries where democracy was gaining ground men made the achievements of the French the hopes of their own parties. The seal seemed to be fixed upon the results of 1789, and Europe was obliged to consider if not to admit the right of a nation to arrange the mode of its own government. Absolutism must now fight for its life. The general movement may be said to have failed for the time in Germany, Italy, and Poland, and to have succeeded in England, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland.

Crabb Robinson heard the news in Florence on August 5th and at once wrote to Finch, the antiquary, who was then at Rome. The old man replied that Burke would have welcomed the news. Cavour resigned his commission. In England the Revolution was used by both sides for party purposes. Lord Eldon wrote on August 19th: "To get a thorough insight into the effects of the French Revolution here you have only to read the proceedings of meetings in London and all that is stated in them. It will require a master head such as Pitt had, and nobody now has in this country, to allay what is brewing, a storm for changes here, especially for Reform in Parliament." And again: "The Frenchmen are making what can't long exist, a Republican Government with the King at the head of it. They will soon find that such things can't coexist, and revolution has not yet done its work in that country I persuade myself. I fear that to a certain extent it will do work here." The *Edinburgh Review* in October said: "We take it to be abundantly manifest that the battle of English liberty has really been fought and won at Paris." The same use of the July Revolution can be traced in the speeches of Sir James Graham, notably at the Whitehaven dinner on August 7th, 1830. Indeed, Brougham said that the Liberal success in the autumn of the year, which brought Lord Grey into power and made the Reform Bill a Cabinet measure, was the result of the Three Days.

Mill has recorded in his *Autobiography* his impressions; the few words show the force of the impact: "It roused my utmost enthusiasm and gave me, as it were, a new existence." Russell analysed the feelings of the moment; there seems to be an echo of Tocqueville in his words: "A certain vague desire and a fear equally undefined seemed to possess all classes of men. The events of the three glorious days of Paris had filled the mind of England with a notion that the public good was to be sought by revolution, by barricades in the streets, and by force employed to obtain popular measures. But of what nature, to what extent to be carried, or what were the precise benefits to be attained by these measures, no one well knew."

Unfortunately for those concerned in them revolutions are never final. Danton, when he had secured a pleasant property, thought that he might well be allowed to forget all about September and to wash his bloodstained hands. Guizot's aims were on a higher plane. He gave sensible men what he thought was enough for them, and was amazed when people spoke about the great wheel going on turning and bringing nothing up. Yet he was just as wrong as Danton, and 1830 led to 1848; the Revolution of July prepared the way for that of February.

W. A. J. ARCHBOLD.

THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD.

THE purpose of this essay is to deal with the personal and ethical, rather than the purely theoretic, side of the Christian idea of God. Setting aside Creation, the doctrine of the Logos, and the development of the Trinitarian conception, I wish to concentrate attention on two points: first, the idea of God in the mind of Jesus Christ; and second, the question whether this idea has been rendered obsolete by the progress of human knowledge.

I

For the thought of God which Jesus held our main source of information is, of course, the Synoptic Gospels; though indirect evidence may be drawn from early Christian writings like the letters of Paul and the fourth Gospel, which were products of Christian experience and reflection initiated by Jesus. In using even the Synoptics it should be remembered that the thoughts of the Master come to us through other minds than his, and that not all the reports of his teaching can be treated as possessing equal authority. The oldest and most trustworthy sources, according to Canon Streeter, are three: (a) Mark; (b) the collection (or collections) of sayings known as "Q," on which both "Matthew" and Luke have largely drawn; and (c) the material collected, probably by Luke himself, for an early edition of his Gospel. A good deal of the teaching reported (only or mainly) in "Matthew" shows fairly clear signs of having been developed in the light of conceptions held by different sections of the early Church.

The outstanding feature of the teaching of Jesus about God is his almost constant use of the term "Father." That this usage was neither accidental nor merely conventional seems evident if we reflect how exactly another word—"King"—would have fitted his fundamental announcement of the "Kingdom of God." It was apparently with deliberation that he set aside "King" for the more intimate and endearing "Father." It is perfectly clear that, in all his teaching about God, Jesus assumes and builds upon the ethical monotheism reached by the Hebrew prophets at their best. God is the "Lord of heaven and earth," the One Almighty Creator and Sustainer of the world, who clothes the lilies and feeds the birds. He takes no delight in sacrificial worship, which is barely mentioned. The special privileges of the Jews are recognised, especially by "Matthew," but God's love and grace are not confined to them. He is more than a Lawgiver, offering His people a code of laws to keep as best they may. He is the Father of all, and desires that all men should be to Him as sons, living a care-free life of happy fellowship with Himself and with one another.

The philosophic problem of the existence and nature of God is untouched by Jesus. As a Jew his interests were not speculative but practical. He accepted the framework of ideas that had come to him as one brought up in a devout family where spiritual life was nourished on "the law, the prophets, and the psalms." What was new was his religious experience, which appears to have been unique. He seems to have rejoiced in an experience of filial communion that was not broken by self-will, or clouded by conscious sin. Such was the impression which his life made upon his immediate followers; such is the impression that the earliest records leave upon ourselves. These records are fragmentary and imperfect, but the impression they make is supported by the note of "authority" with which he speaks as knowing the mind of God. His view of the Fatherhood of God is unique, if it is a fact that he alone had perfectly experienced it. The note of personal experience, expressed in the often-repeated phrase "my heavenly Father," expands and deepens and enriches the loftiest conceptions of God reached by previous prophets.

In two respects, at any rate, an advance is clear. In the first place, even the most inspired of the prophets seem scarcely to have been able to rid their minds from the idea of God as an oriental despot, whose ways were past finding out, and who might be in some measure changeable and capricious. The very declaration (by a late prophet) "Thou art our Father," is inserted between two passages in one of which he complains that the Divine compassions are now restrained, while in the other he expostulates with God for hardening His people's hearts.* It is not too much to say that in Jesus' thought of God such suspicions are wholly transcended. God is to Jesus a Father of perfect love to all His creatures, unchangeable, absolutely free from all caprice, perfectly trustworthy.

In the second place, while Jesus quite clearly teaches, like most of the greater prophets, that God freely forgives all who turn to Him in true repentance of heart, he goes further than this. The father of the Prodigal in Luke xv is the most moving picture in all literature of God in His relation to human sinners—sinners of the sort typified by the elder son no less than by the younger. But the two other parables in this matchless chapter carry us beyond even that. *God suffers loss* while any of His children are alienated from Him, and goes out with active love to seek the lost and induce him to repent and rejoin the family of love. And, when He has found him, "there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth." Here is the outreaching love of God to each individual, and here is personal religion, expressed with a simplicity and beauty that the most inspired of previous prophets never attained. It is a new and authentic note in

* Isa. lxiii, 15-17.

the teaching about God, and is so recognised by a liberal Jew.*

But did Jesus teach that God is *love and nothing else*? In the teaching as we have it Jesus undoubtedly envisages a righteous *wrath* in God which will visit the finally unrepentant with the pains of Gehenna. There is, especially in "Matthew," much about the unquenchable fire and the worm that dieth not.† Is this reconcilable with the picture of the Prodigal's father? I do not think that this difficult question can be answered by saying what is often said, that the love of the Father is a stern and holy love with nothing namby-pamby about it, and that sin must always encounter the divine reprobation. This is true and important, but it does not meet the case. God's love must indeed show its abhorrence of sin. Jesus himself was terribly severe on sin in its more self-satisfied aspects of complacent hardness and blindness. True love will not shrink from inflicting pain if this is the only way by which the sinner can be brought to see himself as he is. The difficulty is that the divine judgments on sin spoken of in the Gospels are *not* thought of as intended to induce repentance. They are not loving chastisements but (apparently) simply a "just" retribution for persistent wrong-doing. God's *final* answer to wilful and persistent evil is to destroy the sinner in hell. In view of this fact it becomes difficult to say with confidence that Jesus thought of God as love and nothing else.

I see only two possible answers to this difficulty. Either Jesus was inconsistent, or he has been misreported. (1) A measure of the same difficulty meets us in the teaching of prophets like Hosea and Jeremiah, who show a deep insight into the forgiving and restoring love of God, and who (almost in the same breath) utter terrific warnings of judgment, apparently final, on the faithless and disobedient. It would seem that they discerned two realities of the spiritual life without feeling any need to reconcile them. Their position was not fully thought out. Such limitation does not lessen our sense of their essential inspiration. In the case of Jesus, however, any Christian who clings to an orthodox view of his Divinity will hesitate long before he accepts the belief that in such a vital matter the Master contradicted himself. He will only do so if this view appears to be the only one permitted

* "In this pity, this profound and yearning compassion, there lies probably a true and fundamental characteristic of the historic Jesus. So far as we can tell, this pity for the sinner was a new note in religious history." (C. G. Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels*, Second Edition, II, p. 131.)
 † There are about twenty-two passages in the first Gospel announcing doom to sinners, reckoning as one the woes to the Scribes and Pharisees in Matt. xxiii. There are about eleven in Luke, and only four in Mark. Luke rarely, "Matthew" frequently, represents Jesus as saying that it is *God* who punishes the wicked. Luke has most of the passages that suggest the absence of limits to the Divine love. Compare "until he find it," Luke xv, 4, with "if so be that he find it," Matt. xviii, 13.

by the facts. In that case he must, of course, adapt his theology to the truth as he sees it.

(2) The second alternative, that Jesus has been misrepresented by the evangelists, is also a theory that should not be too lightly adopted. It is easy to fashion a Jesus for ourselves according to our own ideas of what such a Teacher should have thought and said. Yet a true theory—or one in the direction of truth—can only be found in the light of all the available evidence. And there is much evidence to show: (a) that the reports of the teaching given by different evangelists were in part coloured by their pre-conceived ideas; (b) that their minds were full of the thought of Messianic judgment; (c) that two at least of the New Testament writers did in part free themselves from this obsession; and (d) that these and other followers of Jesus found in his own character a clue to his thought of God. These statements must be justified with all possible brevity.

(a) The footnote on the preceding page* shows that the evangelists differ from one another in the emphasis they give to the element of righteous wrath in the teaching of Jesus; from which it follows that (in the case of one or more) their reports were not uninfluenced by the ideas they held.

(b) Everyone who is at all familiar with the Apocalyptic writings of pious Jews, during the two centuries before and after the birth of Jesus, knows that their minds were obsessed with the idea that God was about to break into the established order of the world with a great cataclysm, in which the righteous nation would be vindicated while its enemies, and the unrighteous part of Israel itself, would be destroyed.† This idea had done much to mould the conception of the Kingdom of God and the work of the Messiah in the minds of the contemporaries of Jesus. Those who came to believe that he was himself the Messiah could only reconcile this with the obvious fact of the Cross by holding that he would shortly come again to do his Messianic work.

(c) Among the New Testament writers the Apostle Paul and the author of the fourth Gospel (to say nothing of others) did in large measure free their minds, at least before their work was done, of this idea of Messianic judgment. Paul, in his earlier epistles especially, has indeed much to say about "the wrath of God." But in his most carefully written work, the Epistle to the Romans, he seems to prefer to speak simply of "wrath" or "the wrath," as if he wished to guard against suggesting that it was a feeling of rage against sinners in the mind of God as personal. Rather, he appears to regard it as a self-acting and impersonal *process* of self-destruction that tends to work itself out in the soul that is given over to evil.‡ He has reached the thought of God as acting *through natural law*

* See above, p. 186.

† See *The Lord of Thought*, by Dongall and Emmet, Part I.

‡ See especially Rom. i, 28, etc.

and not only through the decisions we call personal. His conception of God as Law is summed up in a sentence written to the Galatians, that "whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap."* The world is a realm of natural law in which consequences are inevitable. The certain effect of sin, unforsaken and unrepented of, is to sear and finally to destroy man's spiritual life and capacity for God. The purpose of God as personal is to save him from this fate—from the consequences of sin which he can only escape by being changed himself. The work of God in Christ is to effect this change. Similarly, the author of the fourth Gospel, while not wholly abandoning the idea of a Messianic Judgment-to-come, tends in the main to think of Judgment as a process at work already in the lives of men: a process of separation (*κρίσις*) in which the Light of God divides good from evil as natural light shows up the difference between black and white.† A man is judged, not merely at some future day, but by the use he makes or does not make of the word of truth he hears; and Jesus has come not to judge the world, but to save it.‡

This is undoubtedly a truth of greater depth and more abiding validity than was present in contemporary Jewish ideas of Messianic judgment. Were these followers of Jesus men of larger spiritual range and deeper insight than he was himself? It would be rash to dogmatise; but to me this seems very unlikely. Is it not at least possible that they were anticipated by Jesus himself, and that they have penetrated more deeply into his meaning than the Synoptic evangelists were able to do? If so, we have here a clue that may dispel the dark cloud that hangs over the Synoptic teaching about God. We can take the unquenchable fire as a vivid metaphor for the inevitable consequences from which God in Jesus is seeking to rescue the sinner. Without any false optimism or minimising of sin, we are brought back to the Divine omnipotence of love which can and will overcome it. The father of the Prodigal, the Shepherd who seeks his sheep until he finds it, suggest the real character of the God of Jesus Christ. The Gospel becomes a harmony if we can believe that in his thoughts God was love and nothing else.

(d) There can be no doubt that many of the early followers of Jesus were led to discover a clue to the nature of God by reflection on the character of their Master. Their Jewish ethical monotheism was not superseded, but was enriched by the actual experience of God into which he had lifted them. Paul called it "the spirit of adoption," in which, like himself, they appealed to God as "Abba, Father."§ It is certain that they began to think of him as in a very special way the Revealer of God, even if we cannot with cer-

* Gal. vi, 7.

† John iii, 19.
§ Rom. viii, 15; Gal. iv, 6.

‡ John xii, 47 f.

PROGRESS IN PRISON ADMINISTRATION.

prisoner. The next step in advance will be the separation from the intermediate and recidivist classes of those men who by reason of their youth (under twenty-seven or twenty-eight) may be looked upon as more "reclaimable." These will be eventually located in a prison of their own and subjected to a régime not possible in an establishment holding men of all ages and degrees of mental and moral stability. The concentration of reformatory effort upon the most hopeful classes of the prison population has long been recognised universally as a sound principle. Only this country, however, seems to have made real progress in this direction.

Turning to the local prison population, at the time of the London Conference the experiment of locating at Wormwood Scrubs all those sentenced in London to their first term of imprisonment had only just been started and the experiment of concentrating at Wakefield from neighbouring prisons the more hopeful cases serving sentences of six months or more was still in its infancy. Not very much was therefore said about them at that time. It is now possible to report considerable progress. The policy of separating first offenders from recidivists in London has completely justified itself although the administration at Wormwood Scrubs is still gravely hampered by the very large number of short-sentence prisoners. Hampered, because time and effort which might more profitably be spent on the educational and industrial training of long-sentence men is necessarily absorbed in merely passing in and out of prison numbers who afford no opportunity for being influenced. There is no magic in imprisonment. Prison is merely an opportunity for bringing to bear influences of which delinquents may elsewhere have been deprived.

The success of the Wakefield experiment has justified not only its continuance but its extension. "First-timers" and the more hopeful of the recidivists (in both cases those sentenced to six months or longer) are now drafted from all prisons in the North of England either to Wakefield or Nottingham, the latter prison being reserved exclusively for the younger recidivists. It is now possible to say that as far as the North of England is concerned prisons and prisoners are so classified as to give the administration a very fair opportunity of stemming the tide of recidivism. Further developments will no doubt be necessary in the North if and when judicial authorities come to believe that a fairly long term of imprisonment can be turned to good account by the prison administration.

The position in the South, apart from the Star prison at Wormwood Scrubs, is not yet so satisfactory, but will be tackled as soon as the plans for the classification of convicts referred to above have been carried out. In every local prison, of course, Star prisoners

could come into personal relations of the deepest and most intimate sort—in prayer, love, and trust, and the sense of forgiveness and communion. That was in days when the world was small, and when one could perhaps conceive of a Mind that could order and sustain it all. Now, the world has grown so bewilderingly vast in its inter-stellar distances, and at the same time so inconceivably minute in its atomic structure, that the idea of an organising Personality seems stretched beyond breaking point. Moreover, in the days of Jesus experience of the world as an ordered whole had made little progress, and it was not difficult to think of God as breaking in upon its usual routine by miracle. Now, Science and Philosophy together have made the idea of a Divine Power outside the world, interfering now and then with its ordinary working, almost impossible for thoughtful minds.

When, however, it is said that the idea of God held and taught by Jesus contradicts our experience of the world, I think it is not always borne in mind that there are two streams of human experience, and not one only. There is an inner experience as well as an outer. Man's moral and religious experience is just as much a fact of history and of present life as is the experience which he gains by the use of his senses and his intellect. His religious creeds and observances are, indeed, largely outward matters in so far as they are products of environment and tradition; but it may be urged with much force that they could never have arisen and persisted as they have done had there not been behind them an awareness of the Divine, an experience felt as a real Presence with which man's life had to be brought into satisfactory relation. This is an important point made by Dr. Otto in his book *The Idea of the Holy*, and I do not think it has been successfully met by those who would deny all objective validity to man's religious experience. In prophetic souls, and most of all in Jesus Christ, this experience rose into an indubitable certitude of having personal relations with a personal God. This is a fact of history which must certainly take its place as part of the "experience" of the human race.

I am aware that the question of the validity of religious experience is contentious, and it cannot be explored in a paragraph. I do not wish to dogmatise or to dismiss it lightly. Dr. Otto has probed it more deeply than most writers on the subject; and his conclusion is that while the Object felt in religious experience is real, it can be very imperfectly rendered into intellectual concepts, and therefore very inadequately expressed in words. It needs constant intellectual criticism, without which it is apt to fall into mythology and superstition. Man's religious history is in part the story of his attempts to "rationalise" the conception he forms of God; and doubtless the idea of Personality is a stage in that

process of "rationalisation." It is, however, the highest concept within our reach; and though for certain purposes we may have to think of God as "super-personal," this term is one to which we can attach no clear meaning. Rejection of the idea of Personality usually means that we tend to think of God as *infra*-personal. An abstraction like Law or Unity may serve us for intellectual purposes, but cannot satisfy our need of religion.

The religious life of man must be nourished if he is to rise to his full manhood; and this can only be through "correspondence" with his spiritual environment, both in the unseen and in that which he partly sees—through what Jesus (in simpler language) called love to God and love to men. For the purposes of such life the conception of God which Jesus brought us appears to me to be valid and even final; for we are not likely to get beyond the ideal of perfect Love. But this is not to say that for other purposes the idea of God may not need supplementing. Jesus was not a philosopher, any more than he was a conscious artist; but man needs philosophy. When he has reached a certain stage of development he is driven by an inward compulsion to strive after the truest idea he can attain of the universe in which he lives, and which includes himself and the Source from which he comes. For the purpose of philosophy, as Professor W. E. Hocking has shown,* man needs an organising principle of Order and Unity, which the conception of Personality does not adequately provide.

It would seem, then, that for the present—until our powers of spiritual apprehension are greater than they are now—the ideas of God as Person and as Law must be held side by side, whatever difficulty we may have in fully reconciling them. It may be that they are destined to be resolved in some higher synthesis, at present unattainable, differing from either, but doing full justice to both. One of the functions of true "faith" is to hold on to what we know to be true, to refuse to be "rushed" by dilemmas, even if we cannot yet, out of the "broken arcs," fashion the "perfect round." And meanwhile it is perhaps specially needful that in the vigorous development of intellectual criticism the religious side should not be ignored and forgotten. We cannot believe in God to any purpose either on mere authority or as the result of intellectual processes. He will be doubtfully real to us unless our own religious experience answers in some measure to that of humanity's saints. "The evidence of the saints," writes Dean Inge, "seems to me absolutely trustworthy; and the dimness of my own vision would be disquieting only if I felt that I had deserved better."† "The dimness of our own vision": that is what mainly obstructs our sight of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

EDWARD GRUBB.

* *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, pp. 332-337.

† *Outspoken Essays*, Second Series, p. 15.

WITH DISRAELI IN ITALY.

IN 1826, Disraeli, who was then twenty-one years of age, was invited by his friends, Mr. and Mrs. Austen, to accompany them on a journey through Northern Italy. He had been ill from prolonged strain and excitement, telling on a constitution that was never really robust, and he received the invitation at an opportune moment. He readily accepted it, and thereby secured one of the most inspiring experiences of a romantic life. Haunted as he was all his days by a longing to escape from the sordid details of commonplace life into spacious historical atmospheres, he discovered in the famous and venerable cities which he visited a source of delight and inspiration. As one who finds a constant source of interest in the picturesque and romantic personality of Disraeli I have enjoyed a rare pleasure in following his footsteps in his Italian tour. A brief description of his experience is not without interest to-day.

When Disraeli went to Italy he was greatly under the influence of Byron, and was saturated with the romanticism that emanated from that poet. He shared to the full in the passionate homage which was lavished by the world on Byron's brilliant and splendid powers, and took him as a model and inspiration. He consciously imagined himself as a kind of re-incarnation of the poet. He gave vent to his enthusiasm by imitating the poet even in his eccentricities. Byron wore Eastern costume, so did Disraeli. Byron hung gold chains round his neck, so did Disraeli. Byron sought romantic adventures, so did Disraeli. Byron professed a longing for Eastern travel, so did Disraeli. To realise what Disraeli's pilgrimage in Italy meant to him, one has to remember that he thought of himself as playing the part of another "Childe Harold," the character in which Byron especially portrayed himself.

Wherever Disraeli went, he sought for information about his hero. When he was at Geneva he passed the greater part of his time indolently reclining in a boat, amid the beautiful scenery of the lake, and listening to stories told by Maurice, who had been Byron's boatman. The boatman told Disraeli that the poet never exchanged a word with him when they were together on the water, but sat gloomily and silently with a loaded pistol on each side of him. He related that the poet was once rowed in tempestuous weather to the Castle of Chillon, when the waves were so menacing that he stripped himself to the skin in order to swim for his life, if necessary, and that he descended into Bonivard's dungeon, always with his pistols, and remained there writing for hours. He described how, after taking tea with Madame de Staël, Byron had challenged his boatman to swim across the lake, and had beaten

him by five minutes, his courier keeping close to him in a boat and constantly giving him wine. The tales of Maurice were probably in part apocryphal and told for the benefit of credulous travellers, but they had much effect upon the youthful Disraeli's imagination and were treasured up in his mind.

In the course of his tour Disraeli visited Milan, Verona, Vicenza, Padua, Venice, Ferrara, Bologna, Florence, Pisa, Genoa, and Turin. The Italy he saw was the Italy depicted in the beautiful pictures of Bonington and Roberts. The busy, commercialised, noise-haunted life, which characterises Milan and Florence and Genoa in modern days, was then far in the future. In Milan Disraeli saw Leonardo's great picture of "The Last Supper," and explored the Cathedral, for which he had only qualified praise. He visited the splendid collection at the Brera, where one of the pictures that struck him most was Guercino's "Abraham dismissing Hagar." The picture had especially delighted Byron, who thought it the truest expression of profound grief that had ever been portrayed by the painter's brush. I confess I do not rate the picture as highly as Byron did.

Both Byron and Disraeli were pleased with the Ambrosian Library and its treasures. What most delighted Byron in the Library was a collection of love letters between Lucrezia Borgia and Cardinal Bembo, and a lock of Lucrezia's hair which Byron often inspected. What pleased Disraeli was an exquisite "Holy Family" by Luini, "a mannerist who for once is delicious." Disraeli, although he was keenly interested in pictures and had given a good deal of study to Italian art, passed by, with only a casual glance, the masterpieces of the early Northern Italian Schools, which are the real glory of the Brera. The exquisite work of Raphael's youth, "The Marriage of the Virgin," apparently left him cold. Disraeli understood pictures better than Byron, but he lived before the days of Ruskin and *Modern Painters*.

Verona, "gay," as Disraeli said, "amid the mingling relics of two thousand years," was a city which delighted both Byron and Disraeli. What pleased Byron most was the traditional Tomb of Juliet. "It is," he said, "a plain, open, and partly decayed sarcophagus, with withered leaves in it, in a wild and desolate conventual garden, once a cemetery, now ruined to the very graves." I have lingered by the Tomb of Juliet and thought it one of the most beautiful spots in the world. It now stands in a garden within a high wall. A bust of Shakespeare and a little bubbling spring, which sings a melodious song, add to the charm of the place. Disraeli thought that the beauty and quaintness of the city of Juliet were spoiled by the modern costumes of the passing citizens. "You look," he said, "for black velvets and gold chains, white

feathers and red stockings." The father of Disraeli's mother, Naphtali Basevi, had come from Verona to London in 1762, but in all probability Disraeli was unaware of this fact.

From Verona Disraeli went to Vicenza, and from thence to "pensive Padua," as he called it, "with its studious colonnades." From Padua he drove with his friends along the banks of the Brenta, and at last reached the sea-born city, "throned on her hundred isles." In Venice Disraeli was treading close on the footsteps of his hero and tarrying in a city which Byron had loved with devotion.

I loved her from my boyhood, she to me
Was as a fairy city of the heart.

Disraeli lived in a hotel that had once been the home of the Bernadini family, with marble floors and ceilings painted by Tintoretto and his scholars, full of Turkish triumphs and trophies. His stay in Venice was a period of intense enjoyment. The marvellous beauty of "this Aphrodite of cities," as he called it, appealed greatly to his imagination. His historic feeling and his innate love of the East made him delight in all that he saw. He glided in luxurious repose in a gondola along the Grand Canal on moonlight nights, past palaces the mere names of which, he said, "make the coldest heart thrill." He visited the art treasures, but in Venice as in Milan, his imperfect taste is again expressed. "Venice," he wrote later from Florence, "revealed to me the Venetian School, Titian, Giorgione, Tintoretto, Paul Veronese, Palma, etc." But then, he adds, "Bologna in its public gallery introduced me to perhaps a still more illustrious band, taken altogether, the finest school in Italy, the three Caracci and their four wonderful scholars, Domenichino, Guido, Albani, Guercino; the latter, perhaps the most wonderful, and who from his miraculous and enchanting use of chiaroscuro was called the *magician of art*."

One of the most notable places in Venice is the Armenian monastery, which was depicted by Disraeli in the novel, *Venetia*. The monastery, with its garden and cloister and church, is a beautiful spot. It occupies the whole of the little island of San Lazzaro between Venice and the Lido. The monastery played a large part in Byron's Venetian life. Finding, as he said, that his mind "wanted something craggy to break upon," he went to live in the monastery in order to undertake the study of Armenian. The language is a very difficult one, with no less than thirty-eight letters, but Byron acquired a sufficient knowledge of it to help one of the monks to publish two Armenian and English grammars.

In later life, Disraeli evolved a theory that his family was originally Spanish, and had migrated to Venice to escape persecu-

tion. From there, he said, his grandfather had come to England. This theory was very much in Disraeli's mind when he wrote *Contarini Fleming*, which appeared in 1832. He depicts his hero, who is an incarnation of himself, as the son of a Saxon nobleman in the service of a Northern Court, who had wedded the daughter of a great Venetian house. After strange and various experiences Contarini finds his way to Venice, where he meets, under romantic circumstances, a woman of great beauty, the last of the Contarini, his mother's famous house, and marries her. In spite of Disraeli's theory, there is no reason to believe that his ancestors had ever dwelt in Venice. The two sisters of Disraeli's grandfather, Rachel and Venturina, kept a girls' school in the Ghetto of Venice, but there is no evidence that any of his forefathers dwelt there. His family was probably of Levantine origin. His grandfather came to England not from Venice but from Cento, near Ferrara, the birthplace of the painter, Guercino. Disraeli seems to have known little of his family. When he passed from Ferrara to Bologna he was only a few miles from Cento, but apparently he never suspected that the town had a place in his own family history. It was not until later that he began to think of his lineage and then his notions about it were largely delusions.

From Venice Disraeli went to Arqua, where he visited the tomb of Petrarch, and then to Ferrara, where he made a pilgrimage to the cell of Tasso. In this cell, in the Hospital of Sant' Anna, Alfonso the Second imprisoned Tasso as a lunatic from 1579 to 1586. There Disraeli saw scratched with a great nail on the brick wall the name "Byron." The hospital is now in a neglected condition, but in spite of its decay it has that strange Italian beauty which is often-times found in the most unpromising surroundings. The cell is now locked and cannot be entered. One may look through the barred window, but the darkness is too great to allow of anyone seeing the name of Byron inscribed on the wall.

A pleasanter place to visit is the house where Ariosto died in 1533, a real "haunt of ancient peace." The imposing Castello, which dominates the centre of the city, is the scene of Byron's poem, *Parisina*. Within its walls in 1425, the Margrave, Nicholas the Third, ordered the execution of his wife, Parisina, and her lover, Hugo, the illegitimate son of the Margrave. I do not know whether Disraeli visited the dungeons where the unhappy pair were imprisoned before their execution, but I have done so. Advancing in the darkness with bowed head and following the custodian with his lamp as he passes through cell after cell and goes ever lower and lower, one is amazed at the cruelty of which the mediæval tyrants could be guilty. If these lovers drank of the cup of passion they had to pay the price. The dungeons were horrible.

It is rather curious that Disraeli did not visit Ravenna, as he could have done with no great expenditure of time or effort. That city is one of the most interesting in Italy. Mussolini has said that it was the sight of the remains in Ravenna that first made him realise the greatness of the past of Italy and roused his patriotic zeal. Byron preferred Ravenna to all the other towns of Italy, and lived there from June 1819 to October 1821. The house in which he first dwelt is close to the tomb of Dante, and is now the Caffè Byron. The poet used to love to ride through the pine forest, which lies between Ravenna and the sea.

Sweet hour of twilight!—in the solitude
Of the pine forest, and the silent shore
Which bounds Ravenna's immemorial wood,
Rooted where once the Adrian wave flow'd o'er
To where the last Cæsarean fortress stood,
Ever green forest! Which Boccaccio's lore
And Dryden's lay made haunted ground to me,
How have I loved the twilight hour and thee.

From Ferrara Disraeli went to Bologna, which Byron visited in 1819. The house in which the poet dwelt is now shut up and "to let." In Bologna Disraeli found his chief interest, as Byron did, in the pictures. They both greatly admired the paintings of Domenichino and Guido. The gem of the collection is the exquisite "St. Cecilia" of Raphael, but neither appears to have given it any attention. From Bologna Disraeli went to Florence, where he spent a fortnight. He visited the two great galleries, the Uffizi and the Pitti, from which Byron said that he had returned "drunk with beauty." Disraeli told his father that now, after seeing the pictures of the great Florentine masters, and "many of the finest works of Raphael and other painters of the Roman School" in the Uffizi and Pitti Palaces, he had acquired "a very tolerable idea of the comparative styles and merits of the great Italian schools." In his novel, *Contarini Fleming*, he refers to one picture that had specially interested him. "A portrait of Ippolyto de' Medici in the Pitti Palace, of whom I know nothing, haunted me like a ghost, and I could only lay the spectre by resolving in time to delineate the spirit of Italian Feudality." The portrait is one of Cardinal Ippolyto de' Medici in Hungarian costume, painted in 1532 by Titian, after the campaign against the Turks in which the Cardinal had taken part. The master of the Florentine School who seems to have principally excited Disraeli's admiration was Fra Bartolommeo. He was no great admirer of Michael Angelo and, like Byron, was disappointed with the great monuments of the Medici at San Lorenzo. As for the Venus de' Medici, he "gazed upon it without prejudice and left it with veneration."

In Florence Disraeli expressed indignation at the indifference shown in England to the acquisition of artistic treasures. He stated that he had seen enough in Italy to know that they were not setting about the right way in England to form a National Gallery. At a recent sale in Florence, he declared, the finest pictures were sold for a song. "Why," he asked, "had not the National Gallery an agent on the spot? What is Lord Burghersh paid for?" It is well known that Disraeli himself, when he was a Minister of the Crown and in a position to do so, lent a sympathetic ear to proposals for the purchase of great works of art for the nation. To him we owe "The Nativity" of Piero della Francesca, "The Return of Ulysses" of Pinturicchio, "The Mars and Venus" of Botticelli, and other masterpieces in the National Gallery.

Disraeli, after returning to England, expressed regret that he had not had the memoirs of Benvenuto Cellini with him when in Italy. In one of his letters to Mr. Austen he recommends those memoirs as "the most amusing book in any language," and says that he would have been "entranced with rapture," had he read it when in Italy. To artists the personality of Cellini, although in some way repellent, must be one of the most dominant in Florence. To me one of the most interesting spots in the city is the modest house in the Via della Pergola where, as the tablet states, Cellini cast his beautiful figure of Perseus, and where, in 1571, he died.

From Florence Disraeli went to Pisa, and then to Genoa, and from thence, through Turin, home. Byron had lived for a time in Pisa and it was there that Moore visited him and received those impressions which he afterwards imparted to Disraeli, who reproduced them in *Vivian Grey*. Moore is represented in the novel by Cleveland, and Disraeli by Vivian Grey. Both are depicted as having the highest opinion of Byron. "If one thing were more characteristic of Byron's mind than another," says Moore, speaking in the person of Cleveland, "it was his strong, shrewd common sense—his pure, unalloyed sagacity." Cleveland goes on to describe his meeting with Byron at Pisa:

I was then very much struck at the alteration in his appearance. . . . His face was very much swollen, and he was getting fat. His hair was grey, and his countenance had lost that spiritual expression which it once so eminently possessed. His teeth were decaying. . . . He was dressed in the most extraordinary manner. . . . in the most dandified style that you can conceive; but not that of an English dandy either. He had on a magnificent, foreign, foraging cap which he wore in the room, but his grey curls were quite perceptible; and a frogged surtout; and he had a large gold chain round his neck and pushed into his waistcoat pocket. . . . He had also another gold chain tight round his neck like a collar.

Vivian Grey ends the talk about Byron with ardent praises :

The loss of Byron, he says, can never be retrieved. He was indeed a man—a *real man*; and when I say this, I award him, in my opinion, the most splendid character which human nature need aspire to. . . . Byron's mind was like his own ocean, sublime in its yeasty madness, beautiful in its glittering summer brightness, mighty in the lone magnificence of its waste of waters gazed upon from the magic of its own nature, yet capable of representing, but as in a glass darkly, the natures of all others.

Reference has already been made to Disraeli's novel, *Venetia*, published in 1837. It was written to portray Byron and Shelley, who are represented by Cadurcis and Herbert respectively. In writing the romance Disraeli utilised not only what he had learnt about Byron in his travels, but what he had garnered from other sources. He studied *The Shelley Papers*, issued by Medwin in 1833, and Leigh Hunt's *Byron and His Contemporaries*. He received much valuable help from the Countess of Blessington and her circle. Lady Blessington, with whom Disraeli was friendly, had met Byron at Genoa and had published a book entitled *Conversations with Lord Byron*. Among her friends she included Trevelyan, who helped Byron to burn the body of Shelley on the shores of the Gulf of Spezzia. Disraeli corrected the proofs of *Venetia* while staying as a guest at her house, and he wrote to her with regard to the book : "I do not think that you will find any golden hint of our musing strolls has been thrown away upon me." Disraeli did all he could to give verisimilitude to the narrative in *Venetia*. He introduced the foolish mother through whom Byron was half a Scotsman. He introduced, under the name of Lady Monteagle, Lady Caroline Lamb, who, when she first saw Byron at a crowded gathering, exclaimed, "That pale face is my fate!" Literary details were employed to link the imaginary characters of the novel with their prototypes. Herbert, for example, says to Cadurcis : "What I admire in you, Cadurcis, is that your creative power is vigorous, prolific and complete; your creations rise fast and fair, like perfect worlds." The passage was suggested by the *Sonnet to Byron* published in an imperfect form by Medwin in *The Shelley Papers*,

My soul . . .
Marks his creations rise as fast and fair
As perfect worlds at the Creator's will.

One living link between Byron and Disraeli was supplied by Giovanni Battista Falcieri, or Tita, as he was familiarly called. Tita, who was a Venetian, was first the gondolier and then the chasseur of Byron, who died in his arms. He gave Disraeli a lock of Byron's hair, which he himself cut off the corpse at Missolonghi.

He entered the service of Disraeli's friend, Clay, and accompanied Disraeli and Clay in their wanderings in the Levant in 1830 and 1831. When Disraeli returned to England he sent Tita to Bradenham to act as his father's servant. Subsequently the erstwhile Venetian gondolier became a messenger first at the Board of Control and then at the India Office. He died in 1874. From Tita, who had been devoted to Byron, Disraeli was able to get many personal details about his famous master.

Disraeli's admiration for Byron and his curious identification of himself with the poet apparently lasted to the end. In his old age he described Byron to Sir Edward Clarke as "my moral me." The poet had many qualities which must have made a cogent appeal to Disraeli. Byron's force, his wit, his romance, his ambition, his energy of imagination, his hatred of Philistinism, his cosmopolitanism, his revolutionary mind, his lofty spaciousness of outlook, his interest in Venice and Venetian history, his union of poetic fancy with a keen feeling for the great course of human events, even his tendency to theoretical affectation and coxcombry, and his liking for gold chains, were all characteristics that Disraeli himself shared. In his later days he eagerly exerted himself to promote the erection of a monument to the poet. One of the principal objects of interest at Hughenden was a portrait of the poet by Westall, which hung on the landing. It had been the gift of the Harness family and was highly prized by its possessor, who never failed to point it out to his guests.

J. A. LOVAT-FRASER.

FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS IN PRISON ADMINISTRATION.

THE tenth international penitentiary congress will meet in Prague in the last week in August. The first of the series, held in London in 1872, was the outcome of the enterprise and initiative of American penologists notable among whom was Dr. E. C. Wines. The last congress met in London five years ago under the chairmanship of Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise. While the congress is purely consultative and has no power to effect anything in the nature of a convention, it serves the very useful purpose of ventilating opinion and of stimulating the administration of each country to greater efforts to achieve a better penal system. Periodic meetings give opportunities to the various countries taking part for comparing the efficiency of their several systems, pooling their experience, profiting by each other's mistakes and fighting out rival theories. One of the most able and determined figures of these debates, the late Professor Ferri of Italy, will be greatly missed at Prague. Under his leadership and inspired by great criminologists like Beccaria and Lombroso the Italians have for long taken a prominent part in these international gatherings.

The purpose of this article is to ask what contribution, in the light of the findings of the London Congress of 1925, Great Britain has to make at Prague from her experience in the last five years in prison administration. The first question at the London Congress under this head was as follows :

If a system of some special form of detention be adopted as a means of repression with respect to certain recidivists, by what authority should such detention be pronounced and in what manner should it be executed?

The resolution adopted was :

The special detention should be ordered by the judicial authority. While the object of the detention is primarily preventive, reformatory influence also should be exercised as far as possible. The conditions of such detention should be less rigorous than those of ordinary penal discipline. The length of the sentence should be indefinite; there should be a power of conditional discharge vested in a Secretary of State or other competent authority, who should be assisted by an Advisory Committee at each Institution, and who should be obliged to look into the matter periodically.

Great Britain will be unable at the Prague Congress to report any progress in the treatment of the recidivists contemplated in this resolution. The system of Preventive Detention established by the Prevention of Crimes Act of 1908 must, after the experience of some twenty years, be regarded frankly as a failure. It is a failure as a

measure for dealing with the habitual criminal for, rightly or wrongly, judicial authorities confronted with the minimum sentence of eight years (three years penal servitude and five years preventive detention) which can be given under the Act are unwilling to deal with any but the most flagrant examples of recidivism in this way, the average number sentenced to preventive detention in recent years being only thirty-one. It is also a failure as a means of reformation. The figures given in the last report (for 1928) of the Prison Commissioners are conclusive. They are taken out of the records up to December 31st, 1928, of the men released for the first time from preventive detention in the seven years from January 1st, 1920, to December 31st, 1926.

Year.	Released.	Died or certified insane.	Reconvicted or Licence Revoked	Remainder.
1920	23	2	19	2
1921	10	2	7	1
1922	5	—	5	—
1923	6	1	5	—
1924	5	—	5	—
1925	2	—	2	—
1926	4	—	4	—

These lamentable figures do not imply that the problem of the habitual offender is utterly hopeless, for, as the numbers show, they apply to only a very small proportion of the habitual offenders in this country, and only to the most hopeless proportion. What they do imply is that we are not tackling the problem of recidivism in a rational way.

M. Armand Massé, Inspector-General of the Administrative Services of the Home Office (France), writing of the indeterminate sentence thus sums up the history of the movement for its adoption :

This conception, which originated in the middle of the nineteenth century with certain German and American criminologists (David, Roeder, Wines, Brockway), has never been welcomed by French criminologists. M. Tarde and others have constantly ranged themselves against it in the name of the rights of man and in the fear of its arbitrary application. But it must be admitted that following discussions in international penal congresses it has gained more and more ground. It was rejected at Stockholm in 1878, at St. Petersburg in 1890, partially adopted at Brussels in 1901, accepted in principle at Washington in 1910 and appears at the London congress of 1925 to have definitely conquered international opinion.

Yet there has been in England during the last five years no sign of any legislation in this direction. Lord Cave, then Lord Chancellor, concluded a very judicious address to the London Congress on "The Indeterminate Sentence" with these words : "If satisfac-

tory answers to these questions can be found—and here I am speaking only for myself—I think the time has come when . . . we might well pursue our efforts to control crime, not exclusively by the method of the fixed sentence, but also by a further effort for the imprisonment and reformation of the criminal in the spirit which has animated those earnest and humane men who have advocated the principle of the Indeterminate Sentence.” Lord Cave made it clear that he was speaking only for himself, but Sir Ernest Wild, speaking during the discussion on the resolution adopted by the Congress, said: “It would be diabolical to put any human being under the power of another human being for the whole term of his natural life, and you will not find any judge in this country who will pass that sentence. This would be contrary to all the principles of humanity for which we have been fighting for the last fifty years.” No comment is offered on this expression of opinion except that of course judges do pass life sentences. With one more quotation from the proceedings of the Congress the subject must be left. A delegate quoted a great American jurist as having said, “the indeterminate sentence is destined to change and to enrich and ennoble the penal legislation of every State.”

The representatives of Great Britain at Prague will have some difficulty in explaining why, with the complete failure of our system of preventive detention, we have not begun to move in the direction in which world penal experience points.

They will have a much more agreeable task in reporting the progress which has been made in the classification of prisoners. The principle laid down at the London Congress was that “after the necessary divisions according to age and sex have been made and the mental status of the prisoner has been taken into account classification should be according to the character and reclaimability of the prisoner.” In this matter we are admittedly considerably ahead of other countries. To understand the principles of the English system it is necessary first to appreciate the difference between penal servitude and imprisonment. The distinction is largely historical, and the treatment of a convict sentenced to penal servitude and a prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment is practically the same. In the former case the minimum sentence is three years, in the latter the maximum two years. Convicts are divided into three classes according to degree of criminality, Star, Intermediate, and Recidivist, located at Maidstone, Parkhurst, and Dartmoor respectively. The convict prison in Maidstone has hitherto formed part of the local prison: this is shortly to be remedied and the “star” convicts will be accommodated in a prison of their own with ample facilities for the suitable treatment of this very hopeful class of

prisoner. The next step in advance will be the separation from the intermediate and recidivist classes of those men who by reason of their youth (under twenty-seven or twenty-eight) may be looked upon as more “reclaimable.” These will be eventually located in a prison of their own and subjected to a régime not possible in an establishment holding men of all ages and degrees of mental and moral stability. The concentration of reformatory effort upon the most hopeful classes of the prison population has long been recognised universally as a sound principle. Only this country, however, seems to have made real progress in this direction.

Turning to the local prison population, at the time of the London Conference the experiment of locating at Wormwood Scrubs all those sentenced in London to their first term of imprisonment had only just been started and the experiment of concentrating at Wakefield from neighbouring prisons the more hopeful cases serving sentences of six months or more was still in its infancy. Not very much was therefore said about them at that time. It is now possible to report considerable progress. The policy of separating first offenders from recidivists in London has completely justified itself although the administration at Wormwood Scrubs is still gravely hampered by the very large number of short-sentence prisoners. Hampered, because time and effort which might more profitably be spent on the educational and industrial training of long-sentence men is necessarily absorbed in merely passing in and out of prison numbers who afford no opportunity for being influenced. There is no magic in imprisonment. Prison is merely an opportunity for bringing to bear influences of which delinquents may elsewhere have been deprived.

The success of the Wakefield experiment has justified not only its continuance but its extension. “First-timers” and the more hopeful of the recidivists (in both cases those sentenced to six months or longer) are now drafted from all prisons in the North of England either to Wakefield or Nottingham, the latter prison being reserved exclusively for the younger recidivists. It is now possible to say that as far as the North of England is concerned prisons and prisoners are so classified as to give the administration a very fair opportunity of stemming the tide of recidivism. Further developments will no doubt be necessary in the North if and when judicial authorities come to believe that a fairly long term of imprisonment can be turned to good account by the prison administration.

The position in the South, apart from the Star prison at Wormwood Scrubs, is not yet so satisfactory, but will be tackled as soon as the plans for the classification of convicts referred to above have been carried out. In every local prison, of course, Star prisoners

("first-timers") form a class apart, as do the younger recidivists, but outside of London it has not yet been possible to set aside prisons for the special treatment of these classes. Nevertheless the progress made in the last five years has been very gratifying and this advance in a most important department of administration will undoubtedly interest and influence continental and American penologists.

In another respect Great Britain will have a report to make which will very much interest our continental friends. This is the question of the "pécule" or gratuity which is a noted feature of most continental systems. In France, for example, prisoners work for wages which are, except in cases of men like prison cooks who are paid at fixed rates, assessed on output. What a man earns is dealt with as follows: first, half is taken by the Government in payment of part of the cost of his detention, second, a sum is accumulated for him on his discharge, third, he is allowed to spend up to a certain amount daily in the prison canteen to supplement his meagre rations (the Government makes a large profit out of the canteen) and last, a portion is appropriated to pay the costs of his prosecution. In some of the larger institutions when men are serving long sentences the Government recovers very nearly as much as the institution costs to run. The stimulus to output is, of course, the opportunity to spend a fraction of his earnings at the canteen. As he may spend up to sixpence a day, or in some cases even more, this is a great incentive to the prisoner to work as hard and as long as he can. It is obviously not the profit which the Government makes from his work that prompts him, nor the satisfaction that he is paying for the costs of his prosecution, nor even the balance that is accumulating for him on discharge. The spur is the empty stomach which will follow a day's slackness and the glass of beer or bottle of wine which will crown a well-filled day. Of course, all his spent earnings do not go on wine and food, he has to provide himself from the canteen with soap, writing-paper, hair and toothbrushes, and many other things which in England form part of the prisoner's clothing and equipment, but the great thing is he has money to spend and choice in the matter of spending.

There used to be in English prisons a system of gratuities earned by hard work and good conduct. These gratuities were accumulated till a man's discharge and paid to him in a lump sum. In many cases, of course, this was immediately squandered and the practice was abandoned in favour of subsidising the different Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies, with much better results. There has also for some time been in existence a system of gratuities immediately payable and spendable for certain long-term convicts in the highest stage and for inmates of Borstal Institutions,

but the gratuity in these cases is not based on measured output and affords no real stimulus to extra hard work. In his address on this question to the London Congress Sir Maurice Waller, late Chairman of the Prison Commission, said: "Such an incentive does not yet exist in English prisons. Several methods have been tried, but none of them with success." . . . "The net result of all systems of incentive so far tried in this country . . . is the same. These incentives are sufficient as a rule to secure a certain continuity of work and to prevent misconduct, but they are not adequate to produce either the speed or the efficiency needed by a worker in free life."

It may seem to some readers extraordinary that men in prisons cannot be made to work hard. They will feel that the prison administration must be imbued with an entirely misplaced sentimentality when incentives to "hard labour" have to be sought. Even, however, if prison warders were supplied with knouts it is very doubtful if the doctrine that forced labour is poor labour would be disproved. In ordinary life men work hard either because they are keen on their job or because they are afraid of "getting the sack" and all that that entails. It is very seldom that a job can be found in prison of such interest to a man that he will work hard at it, but strangely enough the stimulus to hard work and exceptionally hard work in prison has been discovered just where it may be found outside in the fear of "getting the sack." That has been achieved by an original and ingenious method of organisation which has been made possible by generous private co-operation. A year ago an offer was made by people interested in prison affairs to place a sum of money at the disposal of the Prison Commissioners for the payment of prisoners on any method which might as an experiment be devised. A scheme was worked out and carried into effect with the group of young recidivists first at Wakefield and now at Nottingham.

The scheme is briefly as follows. The prison population is divided into two sections, the "employed" and the "unemployed," the latter forming some 20 per cent. of the whole. The employed are entitled to every social privilege in the prison such as meals and recreation in common, playing games, attending concerts. In particular, they are able to earn wages on the basis of output and to spend immediately all they earn. The unemployed enjoy no privileges at all, they have to work, of course, but not at "employed" work, and can earn nothing. Their period of unemployment lasts until there is a vacancy in the ranks of the employed when they get a job and are entitled to all privileges. If an "employed" man slacks or misbehaves he "gets the sack" and has to take his place in the unemployed queue. In this way conditions as

they obtain outside are reproduced in the prison. Employment becomes something eagerly coveted and very jealously guarded. Moreover, payment is not made as in France, and elsewhere, according to individual output, but is made according to the output of the shop or group and divided equally among all in the shop or group. It is therefore to the interest of each, not only to work hard himself, but to watch that his mates do likewise.

Payment is regulated in this way. The output of a certain industry was taken as the basis. The average over a long period under ordinary prison conditions was ascertained and 50 per cent. above that was laid down as the minimum output required before any payment would be made. Only what is produced above the minimum is paid for. The result has been that the output has, on occasion, been increased by 250 per cent. The money thus earned can be spent immediately. Diet in English prisons is liberal and no man needs to supplement his rations to fill his stomach, but naturally, jams, sweets, pickles, etc., greatly embellish prison fare. Cigarettes, however, absorb the greater part of the earnings. Lest any may fear that these lads are being pampered it may at once be said that the earnings have sometimes been nil, sometimes only one penny or twopence a week, and have never exceeded one shilling and threepence. An output increased over two and a half times for fifteen pence a week does not suggest pampering. It is too early yet to estimate the value of this experiment. What is most interesting is that it is a new and quite original method of tackling this question and seems to be particularly useful with young offenders in that it reproduces inside the prison as far as is possible conditions that are found outside. It has the very great advantage over the French and other continental systems that it does not involve solitary confinement and rigidly silent association, it does not depend on a starvation diet or the deprivation of all social intercourse. On the contrary, it fits in admirably with the social and educational features which have developed so successfully in the English system.

The agenda of the London Congress did not include any question of voluntary workers in prisons. In 1925 this was still a comparatively recent innovation. It figured, however, in many of the speeches and discussions. One of the questions which will undoubtedly be put to the British delegates at Prague will be as to how far this startling development in prison administration is a success. Our delegation, on the other hand, consisting as it will largely of voluntary prison workers, will be intensely interested to learn to what extent other countries are following our example. Few things excite the admiration of the thoughtful foreign student of English manners, especially if he comes from Latin Europe, so

much as our voluntary social effort. Prison social service is a natural development of the movement which has invested every corner of the social terrain, and has now captured this last stronghold. Voluntary work for discharged prisoners has a long and honourable history, but not until the closing years of the nineteenth century was the inside of a prison recognised as a suitable field for its activity. At first, and for some twenty-five years, it was confined to the female side of the prison, women visitors being permitted to visit women prisoners. It is not easy to explain why in 1921 the movement took a sudden expansion, and not only were male prisons opened to men visitors, but the services of both male and women teachers were invited and welcomed. It is probable that the work done for prisoners of war and the new enthusiasm for adult education prepared the way for a change which has been quite revolutionary in the administration of our prisons.

The voluntary work of prison visitors and teachers is now accepted as one of the most important features of the prison régime. Prison visiting is not everybody's job, but many who have approached it with trepidation and misgiving have found in it a remarkable fascination. The visitor is given a list of men who have been chosen as likely to interest him, and a cell key. He finds a man's cell, opens it, goes in and introduces himself. It is his task to win the man's confidence and eventually to get at and resolve the particular mental or moral difficulty which has caused his disaster. Very often the task requires a psycho-analyst and is beyond the powers of the layman, but many visitors, with no other equipment than an ordinary experience of life and a genuine interest in human nature, develop a wonderful aptitude for unravelling the tangles into which the minds and souls of the less fortunate have fallen. Much has been said in international congresses of the "individualisation of punishment": this is the individualisation of curative effort.

In his last novel *Many Captives*, John Owen, a prison visitor of long experience, gives an instance of the dramatic change in the mental outlook of an ex-convict when another ex-convict confesses that he had shared his experience. Something similar must often have happened in a prison cell when man to man or woman to woman the visitor has confessed to sharing the other's experience in temptation if not in deed. Naturally the interest of the visitor in his protégé does not cease at either the door of his cell or the gate of the prison, and there are few visitors who have not fascinating stories to tell of friendships which have started in a prison cell and proved wholly satisfactory.

The contribution of the voluntary teacher to the new spirit of the prison régime is perhaps easier to realise. Classes are, of course,

voluntary. No prisoner need attend unless he wishes, but if he does attend he must do the work of the class. The task of the teacher is to stimulate the mental and imaginative faculties of the group. Anyone can realise the difference between sitting alone in a cell in the evening performing some dull mechanical task in a poor light and taking part in a class that will read and perhaps act a play of Shakespeare or Drinkwater or will take one through a course of cookery with an efficiency certificate to be gained at the end. It will readily be understood that volunteers for the classes are not lacking; it will perhaps not quite so easily be understood why prison teachers should find classes of prisoners very often much more interesting and stimulating than classes outside. They share this experience with lecturers and artists who give musical and dramatic performances to prisoners. The reason probably is that the class is for the prisoner a real escape from the dreariness of his life. The ordinary pupil's mind is distracted by a thousand and one matters of his daily existence which tempt his attention away from the subject of instruction. The prisoner is only too glad to have his attention rivetted on something quite apart from his daily round. Whether this be so or not, the fact is that the quality of work done in prison classes is, considering the material, exceptionally good. The effect of these classes upon the "morale" of the prison population is remarkable. There are, of course, sentimentalists who will be distressed by the thought of "criminals" receiving free and for nothing educational benefits for which the "non-criminal" population has to pay. We live, however, in a pragmatic age. The educational experiment in prisons is proving its value in the struggle against recidivism, and it will go on doing so.

There are now working in our prisons nearly a thousand voluntary visitors and teachers. If we add to their numbers the many hundreds who give their services freely in connection with the work of the various Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies we record a volume of social service which will greatly impress the representatives of the fifty different countries which will meet at Prague. The fact alone that the public subscribe in this country £20,000 per annum to the funds of the Aid Societies impresses people from countries which have not the same traditions of liberality to uphold, but they will be more inclined perhaps to envy us for the invaluable asset we possess in tackling the problem of delinquency in this splendid band of voluntary workers.

G. D. TURNER.

MUSIC IN THE "TESTAMENT OF BEAUTY."

NO attempt to make clear the significance of the part played by music in Robert Bridges' *The Testament of Beauty* can hope to be fully successful. When the musical passages are abstracted and set out by themselves their character is seriously modified, for the reason that each of them is bound in very intimately with the general philosophy of the poem. Even if this thinning out of their nature could be avoided by a description of their background or bedding, much of their force must still be lost.

Moreover, the late Poet Laureate's conception of music is exceedingly profound. He does not rhapsodise: in all the 4,374 lines of *The Testament* is to be found no single conventionally flowery touch, and when his thought turns towards music he is as plain as a writer of poetry can well be; nor does he adopt any Teutonic "transcendental" view of this art. Yet he is so radically philosophical that what he has to say cannot easily be understood by the plain, straight, practical musician who, familiar with music as the everyday business of his life, has probably never given any thought to its mystery and ultimate purpose. Robert Bridges enters into its very Holy of Holies, and that is a strange place for the normal practising musician. On the other hand, everything he discovers and speaks about is thoroughly simple for musicians who have read carefully and meditated a little about their art. Those of us who know what is said about music in such works as Sir Thomas Browne's *Religio Medici*, Browning's *Abt Vogler*, Charles Avison, and Fife, Whitman's *Proud Music of the Storm*, Bacon's essays, Milton's prose writings, and the like, find in this new cyclopædic poem a joyous confirmation of our beliefs and ideas. And if we happen to know what the ancient Greeks thought about music (say through John Ruskin's various expositions of that theme), we are likely to feel that the musical portions of *The Testament* are an exquisite glossary to all that has been determined concerning the art during the past two thousand and more years.

All things considered, therefore, it seems worth while to try to set forth in connected form some of the late Poet Laureate's statements about music, its nature and significance, and how we should hold ourselves towards it to secure the best it has for us. Robert Bridges was himself a musician. For many years he acted as choirmaster of the church in the place where he lived. In 1899 he and H. Ellis Wooldridge produced the Yattendon Hymnal. He was associated on very friendly terms with the Parry and Stanford group of English musicians. All his life he was in touch with music of the highest type, and wrote several essays on rhythm

directly for the use of composers. He stands by the side of Browning a poet able to employ musical terms correctly, which alone should serve to introduce him favourably to musicians. Only once in *The Testament* is there a slight apparent obscurity in his musical language :

... so that whether it be starch, oil, sugar, or alcohol
'tis ever our old customers, carbon and hydrogen,
pirouetting with oxygen in their morris antics;
the chemist booketh all of them as C H O,
and his art is as mine, when I but figureate
the twin persistent semitones of my Grand Chant.

(III. 935-40.)

The "twin persistent semitones" are probably Reason and Spiritual Emotion, which alternate perpetually in the poem and often appear simultaneously. But it has been suggested that, as the semitones of certain ancient model scales have the same alternating and variable character,* the figure drawn here from music is not only not obscure, but actually precise and very illuminating.

Several passing touches exhibit Dr. Bridges' work as a church musician. This, for example, is delightfully human :

My little chorister, who never miss'd a note,—
I mark'd him how when prayers wer ended he would take
his Bible, and in his corner ensconced would sit and read
with unassumed devotion.

(II. 576-8.)

(The boy, dodging the sermon, reads about wars and heroes in the ancient books.) And in the following passage there is a splendid largeness of idea; the subject is the threshing-machine and its engine :

... and in the whirr of its multitudinous hurry
it hummeth like a bee, a warm industrious boom
that comforteth the farm, and spreadeth far afield
with throbbing power; as when in a great cathedral awhile
the great diapason speaketh, and the painted saints
feel their glass canopies flutter in the heav'nward prayer.

(III. 379-84.)

One of the key-words of Dr. Bridges' vocabulary is *timeless*—a word that gives something of a clue to the nature of music itself, the language that is universal in time as well as in space. He draws into his poem the spirit of timelessness, bringing the remote past and the immediate present to one point; and in the musical passages he does this with a special force. Thus, on the one hand we have, in the picture of the ancient tomb opened by the excavators, with its relics of the people chosen to accompany the dead king on his journey, such finely sketched realities as :

* See an article by A. H. Fox-Strangways on Chords and Scales, published in *The British Musician*, March 1930.

... and slaughter'd at their post
all the king's body-guard, each liegeman spear in hand,
in sepulchred attention; and, whereby lay the harp,
the arm-bones of the player, as there she had pluck'd her dirge,
lay mingled with its fragments. . . .

(IV. 326-30.)

And on the other we have (what in our day might have been thought impossible) radio or broadcast spoken of in language of a Miltonic elevation :

Science comforting man's animal poverty
and leisuring his toil, hath humanized manners
and social temper, and now above her globe-spredd net
of speeded intercourse hath outrun all magic,
and disclosing the secrecy of the reticent air
hath woven a seamless web of invisible strands
spiriting the dumb inane with the quick matter of life:
Now music's prison'd raptur and the drown'd voice of truth
mantled in light's velocity, over land and sea
are omnipresent, speaking aloud to every ear,
into every heart and home their unhinder'd message,
the body and soul of Universal Brotherhood. . . .

(I. 722-33.)

We have to understand the poet's idea of Beauty, and how other ideas are associated with it in his mind, before we can begin to take hold of his thoughts on music. Definitions of this quality or force which gives the title to the poem appear frequently; and they generally lead into further definitions of something else :

Beauty is the highest of all these occult influences,
the quality of appearances that thru' the sense
wakeneth spiritual emotion in the mind of man :

And Art, as it createth new forms of beauty,
awakeneth new ideas that advance the spirit
in the life of Reason to the wisdom of God.

(II. 842-7.)

Man's true wisdom is "a reason'd harmony and correlation" between "the dark workings of his animal instincts" and the powers that "influence the unconscious mind in its native function to inspire the Will" (II. 802-24) :

And between spiritual emotion and sensuous form
the same living compact maketh our Art, wherein
material appearances engage the soul's depth.

(II. 825-7.)

Again, as to art :

Art is the true and happy science of the soul,
exploring nature for spiritual influences,
as doth physical science for comforting powers,
advancing so to a sure knowledge with like progress.

(III. 1058-61.)

Therefore, as to man :

In truth " spiritual animal " wer a term for man
nearer than " rational " to define his genus ;
Faith being the humanizer of his brutal passions. . . .
(IV. 1132-4.)

We are a part of Nature, and our creative faculty is not at our command ; even though it be a truth Art demands of the artist a " devotion and diligence " as full as that which is demanded by Virtue. Ideas energise their own expression, says the poet. They enter the mind through the senses, and come thus " to mortal conscience." But they proceed " to work-out of themselves their right co-ordinations," drawing " their natural imagery from the same sensuous forms whereby they found entrance," and " thus linking up with all the long tradition of Art."

The manner of this magic is purest in musick,
but by the learner is seen more clearly in poetry,
wherein each verbal symbol exposeth its idea ;
so that 'tis manifest by what promptings of thought
the imaginativ landscape is built and composed,
and how horizon'd : And the secret of a poem
lieth in this intimat echo of the poet's life.

(IV. 987-93.)

This philosophy, he says, rebuts

That old dilemma of Art,
which would set man in lordly enmity against nature
for that his pensiv play transcendeth her beauty ;
—as when Sebastian preludeth, all her voices
that ever have reach'd our ears are crest-fal'n and abashed :
(IV. 958-62.)

The truth is otherwise. Not even when Bach (intimated here as the profoundest and most complete of musicians) makes music, is Nature put into second place. Art being spiritual, our contact with it must be spiritual likewise ; and that contact must begin early in life : for—

while the intellectual faculty is yet unborn,
spiritual things to children are even as Music is,
thatt firstborn pleasur of animal conscience that now
hath for its human honour its origin forgot ;
the which a child absorbeth readily and without thought,
tho' in after years, if thatt initiation hav lack'd,
scarce can a man by grammar come at the elements.

(IV. 674-80.)

Surely these lines might be read every morning with profit by every practising musician ! And no man or woman living could fail to see the virtue of :

in intellectual things
all errors are remediable ; but 'tis not so
in the spiritual life, nay ev'n the soul wash'd pure
of absorb'd taint, may take a strange gloss of the lye.
(IV. 718-21.)

taking heed thence that the children in his or her care shall, from the start, know only the music that is lastingly good. Side by side with the foregoing should be contemplated a passage that tells of the right experience of Art and of spiritual things :

Hence is the fascination of amateurs in art,
who renouncing accomplishment attain the prize
of their humbler devotion. . . .
arriving by short-coming, like to homely birds
of passage, nesting on the roofs of the workshops.

And tho' of secret knowledge man's art is compact,
yet not the loving study of any master-work,
nor longest familiarity can ever efface
its birthday of surprisal ; and great music to me
is glorify'd by memory of one timeless hour

when all thought fled scared from me in my bewilderment.
(IV. 26-38.)

Those " birthdays of surprisal " are the points of discovery in our lives, as when we meet with the man or woman we are to love throughout the rest of our days. All men and women have these " birthdays " stored in mind in respect of art ; climaxes of understanding when they first saw a picture, read a poem, or heard a piece of music—such as Berlioz's *Damnation of Faust*, or the setting by Delius of Whitman's *Sea-Drift*, or the *Andante Cantabile* from Tchaikowsky's first string quartet which moved Tolstoy to tears. If we could know the compositions that are thus glorified for Robert Bridges, we can be sure that chief among them are works by Bach and Mozart, and probably Brahms ; for his young manhood and early middle life were passed in the companionship of the English musicians who first laboured to make those composers properly known here. Robert Bridges was turned thirty when the Bach Mass in B Minor was first performed in England by the Bach Choir, formed for the special purpose of singing it (1875), and it may be that he was present at that first offering of this master-work to an English audience. " Man's Reason," he says, " is in such deep insolvency to sense " (I. 57) that she has no " miracle " but by alliance of the animal senses. We must love, nay marvel at, the song of the birds " in the blithe hour of April dawns," that develops

until the blisful revel grow
in wild profusion unfeign'd, to such a hymn as man
hath never in temple or grove pour'd to the Lord of heav'n.
(I. 63-73.)

The lesson to be learned of this thought of the birds and their singing is clear:

Now since the thoughtless birds not only act and enjoy this music,* but to their offspring teach it with care, handing on those small folk-songs from father to son in such faithful tradition that they are familiar unchanging to the changeful generations of men . . . with the same notes that woke poetic eloquence alike in Sophocles and the sick heart of Keats—see them how deeply seated is the urgency whereto Bach and Mozart obey'd, or those other minstrels who pioneer'd for us on the marches of heav'n and paid no heed to wars that swept the world around. . . . (I. 88-105.)

Music, that is to say, is born of spiritual emotion. It comes of a primitive instinct, as deep as that which makes the birds sing. We are accustomed to say that Art is the truer Philosophy. As a rule, we say this without having more than *faith* to support it; but now a poet gives us the support of an intellectual demonstration.

A subject that returns periodically for discussion in our ever-widening musical circles is the question, Does music progress, or merely change? *The Testament of Beauty* provides material for this matter also. Our powers do not alter; only they are differently applied according to our growing experiences, whence it follows that the outcome of their operation may be different, and in certain directions of greater importance. Browning has much to say on this point, with special reference to music, in *Charles Arison* and *Fifine*. There are, consequently, spheres of work wherein we go beyond the ancient Greeks:

And if the Greek Muses wer a graceful company
yet hav we two, that in maturity transcend
the promise of their baby-prattle in Time's cradle,
Musick and Mathematick: coud their wet-nurses
but see these foster-children upgrown in full stature,
Pythagoras would marvel and Athena rejoice. (I. 737-42.)

Hellas, "in love of fleshly prowess," held in too great esteem "the nobility of passion and of animal strength." Her "acclamation of the Olympic games outfaced spiritual combat" (I. 755). We of this later time have Jesus, who "came in his gentleness, with his divine compassion and great Gospel of Peace," and wandered "un-arm'd save by the Spirit's flame" (I. 771). Therefore:

See! ther is never dignity in a concourse of men,
save only as some spiritual gleam hearteneth the herd. (IV. 1187-8.)

* That is, the song with which they herald the day (I. 65).

Our English sport of football, with its "ugly embankment of gazing faces," is one of the interests of "harmless enthusiasm" that "breed disgrace" (IV. 1202), because no spiritual gleam heartens the crowd. So powerful is this "disord'd growth from physical communion of emotion and thought" (IV. 1192), that even the man who has gone knowingly to enjoy the sight of the game and the spectacle of the people will be carried away by it.

But if he join the folk, when at the cloze of Lent
they kneel in the vast dimness of a city church,
while on the dense silence the lector's chant treadeth
from cadence to cadence the long dolorous way
of the great passion of Christ,—or anon when they rise
to free their mortal craving in the exultant hymn
that ringeth with far promise of eternal peace. . . .

or if he should chance to watch Moslems at prayer,

Then at the full Amen
of their deep-throated respond he wil feel his spirit
drawn into kinship and their exaltation his own.

(IV. 1218-35.)

And of such, we are to understand, is the substance of music, as of all art, which is "the true and happy science of the soul, exploring nature for spiritual influences." The Greeks, with their "love of fleshly prowess" and superior joy in the Olympic games, excelled in the art of sculpture: this is Art—

but lovers who look thereto for expression of truth
hav great need to remember that no plastic Art,
tho' it create ideals noble as are the forms
that Pheidias wrought, can ever elude or wholly escape
its earthly medium; nor in its adumbrations
reach thatt detach'd suprasensuous vision, whereto
Poetry and Music soar, nor dive down in the mine
where cold philosophy diggeth her fiery jewels—
or only by rare magic may it sometimes escape.

(III. 1062-70.)

There is a portion of the poem where the matter dealt with is Pleasure in Food. In his treatment of this subject the poet makes use of music in a rather surprising way; indeed, in one of his musical passages here he attains to what is, in Coleridge's language, the "highest sublime." The Epicure is like the Tyger that has tasted human flesh, or like certain cannibals. Man's art of eating

is posited by folly as an end-in-itself;
till by sensuous refinement it usurpeth rank
beside his intellectual and spiritual joys.

(III. 30-2.)

He is most movingly inspired in the composition of a meal by the theme of what shall be drunk:

"Tis thus by the live firework of his wine allured
that the epicure thinketh he hath wherewithal to pave
thru' palate and gullet a right path for his soul,
each feast as a symphonic poem, prelude
to melodious Andante Scherzo and final Fugue—
a microcosm, as those musical paeans are
that perish not in the using, but persist
strengthening their immortality while millions feed
on their unquenchable loveliness evermore.

(III. 108-116.)

But his are "putrefying pleasures," and in time the epicure is
compelled to retire, with "stomach Emeritus." This "new
shame" of eating, the literature of which would stock a library,
aims to please eye and nostrils as well as palate:

may even the ear be fed, and on the gathered guests
a trifling music playeth, dispelling all thought,
that while they fill the belly, the empty mind may float
lightly in the full moonshine of o'erblown affluence.

(III. 52-5.)

Robert Bridges allows the glory of wine; and it is this that lifts
him to a most finely poetical, suggestive, and compact musical pass-
age wherein lies the richest thought concerning music of all
expressed in English poetry during the past half-century.

And here the Voluptuary may think his anchor
hath bitten on truth; for surely nothing in nature
fulfilleth more various expectancies of sense
than his wine doth; to the eye luminous as rich gems
engendering thru' long aeons in the bowels of earth;
to the nostrils reminiscent as subtle odours
of timorous wind-wavering flowers; to the taste
beyond all savours ravishing, insatiable,
yet wholesome as is the incense of forested pines,
when neath their scorching screens they fume the slumbrous air;
and to the mind exhilarating, expelling care,
even as those well-toned viols, matured by time, which once,
when the Muse visited Italy to prepare
a voice of beauty for the joy of her children,
wer fashion'd by Amati and Stradivari and still,
treasured in their mellow shapelinesses, fulfil
the genius of her omnipotent destiny,—
speaking with incantation of strange magic to charm
the dreams that yet undreamt lurk in the unfathom'd deep
of mind, unfeatured hopes and loves and dim desires,
uttermost forms of all things that shall be.

(III. 87-107.)

From these last lines we might gather the text for an essay on both
the history and the philosophy of music; and still there would be
more in the lines than we could work out in the essay.

Finally, the perfect character of man is naturally to be defined
side by side with the same of music, the latter elucidating the
former, and leading to a further supremely accurate and forceful

remark on music. But before this is copied here, I would quote
another very delicate explanation of Beauty as a spiritual property,
and an unanswerable demonstration of the truth that Reason is its
inferior. The poet is speaking of "the idealisation of love." He
refers to Shakespeare, who wrote:

*From fairest creatures we desire increase
That thereby Beauty's Rose might never die; wherein
he asserteth beauty to be of love the one motiv,
and thatt in double meaning of object and cause.*

(III. 268-71.)

And he continues:

and that the poet guarded this
showeth in his lyric, where of Sylvia 'tis enquired
why all the swains commend her, and he replyeth thereto
Holy, fair and wise is she, thus giving to Soul
first place, thereafter to Body and last of the trine
Intelligence; and thatt is their right order in Love.

(III. 275-80.)

Little did Schubert think along this line of thought when he set
the lyric to music, and little do the myriads who sing his song
think along it. In Schubert's melody the three words pass with
equal brevity, and the harmony has no special quality. But per-
haps if Brahms had set the verses, still more if Hugo Wolf had set
them, the three words might have been so pointed in the music that
their significance of Soul, Body, and Mind would have been enforced.

And with this I reach my last quotation of the passages in *The
Testament* that throw light on music:

Again we now may see—and 'tis pleasant to see—
how simple characters hav such extreme beauty,
for that the soul's nobility consisteth not
in riches of imagination or intellect
but in harmony of Essences, which hath full power
where a few fundamentals in purity attain
their self cōordination; as honest pots and pans
may for their unsophisticated beauty excell
a prize diploma-picture of our academy:
like as in music, when true voices blend in song,
the perfect intonation of the major triad
is sweetest of all sounds; its inviting embrace
resolveth all discords; and all the ambitious flights
of turbulent harmony come in the end to rest
with the fulfilment of its liquidating cloze.

(IV. 943-57.)

Modern music has banished that major triad. Then if Robert
Bridges' general philosophies are true (and the course of history
and the nature of the individual life suggest they are true), modern
music may be scientific, intellectual, a manifestation of Reason, and
the like, but not spiritual, and so not a thing of Beauty. It is
therefore to be estimated as no music at all.

EVA MARY GREW.

THE ECONOMIC PARADOX IN UZBEKISTAN.

IN trying to estimate the economic situation in Uzbekistan (that part of former Turkestan which contains most of the rich irrigated lands of Central Asia) one is met almost at once by a seeming paradox. There is in the air an undoubted sense of boom; a conviction that industry is progressing at a tremendous rate. One sees vast sums going into irrigation works; one hears of new textile factories, cotton-cleaning factories, cotton-seed oil factories; one observes a surprising number of new buildings in Samarkand and elsewhere. There is, in other words, an intoxication of economic progress. When one looks for statistics on which to ground this optimism one learns that the irrigated lands, basic source of wealth in Uzbekistan, are not yet up to the pre-war figure, in spite of the tens of millions spent for new dykes and canals; that cotton production, in spite of diversion of large areas from grain to cotton, only claims to have reached the pre-war standard; that production of silk cocoons, the second largest industry of Uzbekistan, is also just reaching pre-war; and that in general the Government economic organs can much more easily give statistics of what will be five years hence than they can of what exists to-day.

Is the continuing sense of economic advance a pure delusion? To answer this question I went not only into government bureaux but into factories and irrigation districts, interviewing engineers, directors, and trade union leaders. One immediately notes that accurate comparisons with pre-war years are quite impossible.

During the long world war, revolution, and civil war, the irrigated districts of Uzbekistan, being far more complexly organised than the simple grain farming of Russia, suffered much more in proportion, and sank from what was probably about 3,800,000 hectares before the war to 1,600,000 hectares in 1922, at which time they reached their nadir.* A rise from this figure to 3,300,000 hectares, the last year's figure, may well give a sense of progress. There has been furthermore a determined propaganda among the peasants on behalf of the higher-priced industrial crops, especially cotton, supplemented by experiment at a cotton station in Tashkent which claims to have the largest collections of cottons in the world. These factors have raised the cotton growing lands to what is apparently equal to if not above pre-war, and have brought about a cotton crop this year which is expected to meet, together with the crops from the Caucasus, nearly two-thirds of the entire cotton requirements of the Soviet Union.

* Figures from Economic Council of Central Asia

A third fact one notes is that distribution is by no means as enthusiastically described as is production. There are continual crises, so-called, in one product or another, due not to basic shortage but to bad organisation, aggravated by the long haul which all goods must make from the central parts of Russia. A brief "bread crisis" was succeeded, while I was in Samarkand, by a "kerosene crisis"; which meant, in concrete fact, lines of housewives waiting in the streets at all kerosene wagons, which rationed their supply. In a few days the kerosene crisis passed with the arrival of new supplies from Baku, but when I asked where I could buy typewriter paper I was told that there was a "typewriter paper crisis" in Samarkand, though not in Bokhara. The use of the word "crisis," as this incident indicates, is so common as to descend from the serious to the ridiculous. The fact is that the effective demand of the peasant market is growing with terrific rapidity, while the continuous discouragement of private trade on behalf of co-operatives not yet adequately financed or organised to meet such demand, results in frequent spasmodic shortages of various kinds of goods. Such shortages, however annoying to the householder, cannot be expected to lessen the optimism of either the producing factories or the distributing co-operatives, who find themselves in the position of selling everything they make, of whatever quality, or of distributing even badly assorted goods to a clamorous public. This brings me to the fourth fact: that the sense of exhilarating progress one finds is chiefly, if not entirely, among those state and co-operative organisations which are expanding at the expense of the private business man. Thus the head of the Village Credit Co-operatives of the Bokhara district is able to rejoice, as any business man might, that his turnover grew from 700,000 roubles to four millions and then to eight millions in the course of two years; but there are no figures to show how many private shops in the bazaars of Bokhara went out of business during this process, or whether the total exchange of goods was greater or less.

When all such allowances have been made, however, there seems no real reason to doubt that both production and consumption of goods in Central Asia have increased rapidly in the past few years of reconstruction, with whatever that implies of economic progress and improved standards of living. I go, for instance, into one small "okrug" or district containing seventy villages of 4,835 households, and learn from the buyer for the cotton industry, who has very clear figures of purchases, that in 1923 he bought in this district 24,000 poods of cotton, in 1924 48,000, in 1925 64,000, in 1926 67,000, and in 1927 78,000. Remembering always that this increase in cotton means a decrease in land planted with other

crops, it is none the less a gain, as cotton is the most profitable crop of the region. Besides, the farm expert for the Department of Agriculture in the same region reports 40,000 new fruit trees put out from his nurseries and 100,000 new grape vines—the other profitable crops of this region. All these facts bring one to the last important economic fact about Central Asia, that the central Government of the Soviet Union is steadily pouring large sums of money into this entire region, subsidising government budgets for health, schools, irrigation, new building, to the extent of well over one hundred million roubles in the past four years for the various central Asiatic republics. One is impressed with the large numbers of new buildings, banks, schools, hospitals, people's recreation centres, workmen's houses and new construction of all kinds, especially factories.

It should be remembered that a factory is to-day in the Soviet Union and to communists generally, not so much a mechanism for making profits as a political weapon for attaining socialism. I visited such a factory, for instance, in Old Bokhara, a silk filature mill, the first factory of any modern type ever established in this most ancient city. As I talked with its young enthusiastic director, and compared his plant with the terrible conditions I have seen in Shanghai in silk filature mills and elsewhere, it was impossible not to feel a thrill at the fine dream he expounded. To him this factory was civilisation come to Old Bokhara, and enlightenment for women, day nurseries, and schools, clubs, and recreation. All these things were contained in the actual buildings of his factory; they had been installed along with the rest of the equipment. He told me, for instance, how the workers had been selected, since it was designed to use this factory "not merely to enlighten the citizens of Old Bokhara, but to awaken the backward villages." To this end, when the factory was ready to open, word went out through all the co-operatives and other social organisations in the villages, and the Labour Exchange in Bokhara was flooded with women applying for work—the first women who had ever entered its portals in search of a job. The first thing they were told was that veiled women had no place in a factory; under this economic pressure they promptly removed their veils. Selections were made from the most needy, dividing them round among the various districts, so that all might learn equally what benefits the factory brings.

These women coming from villages, and often bringing their children, were so backward that they were panic-stricken by their first sight of electric light. They were given work in a modern well-lighted building, eight hours on the day shift, seven and a half on the evening shift, or five and a half

on the midnight shift: and their wages, even as learners, were fifty-four roubles a month, on which the factory was confessedly losing money. In addition to this, they had a day nursery of modern type for their babies, a large modern dining-hall, a theatre and cinema, classes for learning to read and write in either Uzbek or Tadjik, according to their nationality. In short, the factory was being used as a school of citizenship, and especially as a propaganda station advertising the benefits of modern industry—almost regardless of whether it would pay. I raised this practical question with the young director, and he replied that for the first few months it would not pay, as the girls were learners, but that it was their policy to train future silk workers for the growing silk industry of Uzbekistan. By the end of the year, judging from similar factories, it would be making from 10 to 15 per cent. profit, and would begin to supply trained workers to educate other factories still to be opened, as their girls now were being educated by women who had learned the trade last year in Fergana and Samarkand. More than 15 per cent. he did not expect to make, as the prices of his raw material and finished product are fixed by the Department of Internal Trade and permit no high profits. With the high prices and big demand for silk existing to-day in the Soviet Union, and with what almost amounts to a prohibition on import, it seems quite possible that, in spite of the lavish equipment with which this factory starts, it can meet costs in the near future.

While in Samarkand I spent a day in a side trip by automobile to Ravat Hodja, one of the many new irrigation constructions now going on in Central Asia. Something like forty kilometres from the city, a dyke more than two kilometres in length and costing four million roubles restrains the waters of the Zerafshan river and turns them into a channel of reinforced concrete, ten kilometres in length and also costing three million. The engineer informed me that the Zerafshan waters have been used from time immemorial for irrigation, according to the primitive native form of dykes. At high water these dykes often broke entirely; they always gave way in places, flooding some areas and leaving others dry. The new dyke and canal would stabilise irrigation on 400,000 hectares, and add 60,000 hectares of entirely new land to the irrigated district. This land would be given directly to the nearby peasants, without any cost except the usual land taxes. Nevertheless, he estimated that the government would recover the cost of the project in seven years' time, as a result of its increased purchases of cotton.

Ravat Hodja is typical of irrigation projects in many parts of Uzbekistan. Some of them are built entirely with government money; but an increasing number are built on the Meliorative Fund, which is government credits to local districts of peasants.

The peasantry at first evinced keen scepticism of the benefits of modern irrigation, but as soon as they saw the first canals they were converted, even before the water began to flow in them. Their centuries-old experience in irrigation made them appreciative of what these new canals and dykes would do. They flocked increasingly to the Department of Agriculture in Samarkand, asking for loans of machinery and engineers, themselves furnishing all common labour, and agreeing to repay all costs in three to five years. To meet government requirements the peasants organise by districts, elect their own directors and negotiate a loan on interest from the Meliorative Fund. There are now about fifty such districts, with an average of 3,000 to 6,000 hectares in each, improving their methods of irrigation in this manner. The Meliorative Fund is applied chiefly to the less expensive work of remodelling primitive systems, while the government construction is more and more directed towards opening entirely new lands.

My conversation with the engineer revealed other incidental reasons why Central Asia is experiencing an economic boom. He told me that increased mechanisation led to reduced cost of construction, adding: "It would cost still less were it not for the long haul on our materials. Our cement comes from Novorossisk by way of Moscow or Pensa. There is, it is true, a new State cement factory between Tashkent and Samarkand, which is adequate to supply all ordinary demands of Central Asia, but not for our large irrigation construction. However, this factory is now being expanded, and we hope soon to get cement there."

Turning to the general organisation of all this industry and the plan for its future, I visited the Economic Council of Central Asia in Tashkent. This is the highest government organ for directing economic policies; it is composed of about twenty members, equally divided among the various national republics of Central Asia which, while permitted independence in education, health, courts, and general legislation, are required in economic matters to act jointly. The members of the Economic Council consist of such persons as the ministers of finance, trade, agriculture, and industry of the separate national governments, under a chairman appointed by Moscow.

Under the direct control of this Economic Council come several large business organisations whose activities cover more than one republic: the Central Asiatic Cotton Committee; the Central Asiatic Water Department; the Asia Grain Company; the Silk Corporation, the Cotton-Seed Oil Directorate; the Central Asia Coal; the State River Steamships; the Central Asiatic Health Resorts; and, rather oddly, the Central Asiatic University. A special subdivision of the Economic Council is the State Plan-

ning Board, which employs a large corps of statisticians and other experts to make plans and recommendations for the future.

No one outside Russia will attach much importance to Soviet forecasts, but they are taken very seriously inside the country, and it is at least of interest to realise that the central government of Moscow has agreed to supply the enormous sum of 817 million roubles during five years for the economic expansion of Central Asia. Some of this will come from local taxes, but it is clearly recognised that these will be utterly inadequate for such an undertaking. It is at the expense of general Russian taxes, therefore, that Central Asia is to be industrialised as part of the policy of "equalising the backward sections." Of this vast sum 38 per cent. is to go for irrigation and agriculture, 26 per cent. for industry and electrification, 20 per cent. for municipal and housing needs, and 16 per cent. for transport. It is expected in that time to more than double the value of manufactured products of Central Asia, which at present are estimated as worth 426 million roubles for the past year. Handicraft products, now totalling 195 millions, are not expected to rise greatly; but cotton and cotton-seed oil are expected to expand from 186 to 402 million, while various heavy industries, such as coal, metal, etc., are authorised capital improvements expected to increase their output from 44 to 301 million. This sufficiently indicates the type of development which the central Moscow government has agreed to finance in this region.

Railways should also be noted. The Turkestan-Siberia railroad, begun in 1927 as a five-year project, is now expected to be finished one year sooner. It will connect Siberian wheat and lumber with Central Asiatic cotton. At the conclusion of this line, another major line is to be started running from Chardjui in Central Asia, via Khiva, into European Russia, a distance of 1,800 kilometres. Meantime, several shorter lines are being built from year to year, chiefly connections into the cotton regions from the main railroad, but including a rather important line Termez-Duschambe, near the northern border of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Government is taking the economic strengthening of Central Asia very seriously, and this partly from a political point of view. Confessedly based on the class struggle of the workers for power, and giving special privileges to workers over other classes, the Soviet Government seeks to create a class of specially trained and specially favoured industrial workers, the "proletarians," which are its chief source of strength. It desires this especially in those regions which, because of nearness to alien borders or liability to racial and national problems, might otherwise become centres of disaffection. For this reason, and not for

any economic reason alone, millions are being poured into Central Asia; factories are being provided with the latest attractions to enlighten village women and make even of these hitherto veiled and submerged creatures, the most backward in all the Soviet Union, active missionaries of trade unionism and socialist propaganda. With such a motive the subsidies for the five-year plan are likely to continue, barring general catastrophe to the entire Soviet Union. And if they continue, no amount of inefficiency or bureaucracy or extravagance (and these factors while very obvious are not even to-day universal) will prevent a tremendous economic expansion of Central Asia.

ANNA LOUISE STRONG.

Author's Note.—Since writing the above, the development of Uzbekistan has been noticeably speeded up by several factors, chief among which is the opening of the Turkestan-Siberian Railway on April 28th, 1930, a year and a half sooner than originally contemplated. A special train of Uzbek delegates, among whom were peasant representatives from every large district, attended the formal opening, and were part of the propaganda used by the Soviet Government to convince the Uzbek peasants that since wheat would now come cheaply into their country from Siberia, they had better plant cotton. The result was a spectacular increase in the area sown to cotton, which was 521,000 hectares before the war, 574,000 in 1929, and reached with a bound 930,000 in the spring of 1930, almost 80 per cent. above pre-war.

The production of silk cocoons, favoured by heavy tariff duties, rose from 5,750 tons pre-war to 8,000 in 1929. Ravat Hodja, the irrigation project above mentioned, opened May 1st, 1930; the Termes-Duschambe railway opened November 7th, 1929, and is now pushing beyond Duschambe.

The chief changes since January 1930, however, have been the increased sums poured by the State into agriculture in connection with the movement to collectivise farming. The credits in the Meliorative Fund doubled since this article was written; the funds allotted to agriculture increased 60 per cent. The whole Five-Year Plan is under reconsideration with the aim of increasing it. The irrigated area, which in Uzbekistan proper was 1,830,000 hectares pre-war, is still only 1,696,500 hectares, about 93 per cent. of the former area; but the non-irrigated area found possible to cultivate by improved methods has increased from 530,000 to 940,000 hectares, making a general increase in sown area from 2,360,000 pre-war to 2,636,000 to-day. Of this 27 per cent. is now in State-owned farms or State-aided peasant collectives, leaving 73 per cent. cultivated by individual peasants.

SEAMEN'S HOURS OF WORK.

THE Preparatory Commission, drafting Part XIII of the Peace Treaty, foresaw that seamen's conditions must be considered at special sessions of the International Labour Conference. The thirteenth conference held in Geneva last October was such a session—third of the maritime series. The first item on its agenda was "the regulation of hours on board ship."

To follow the history of the seamen's sustained effort to secure regulation of hours on board ship we must go back a long way. The subject of seamen's hours was discussed in 1920 by the Genoa Conference, but in a much more rigid form than that in which it was submitted to the 1929 session. Following closely on the Washington Conference of 1919 and in conformity with the statement in Article I of the Hours Convention—"the provisions relative to transport by sea and inland waterways shall be determined by a special conference"—the Genoa Draft proposed to limit actual hours of work for the whole crew in principle either to eight hours per day and forty-eight per week or to a number of hours representing an equivalent limitation calculated for a period other than a week. The British Government delegation put forward an alternative draft taking the eight-hour day or forty-eight-hour week as the standard to be aimed at, but not as a principle to be immediately and necessarily applied to all categories of staff and all classes of trade. The Draft Convention which emerged after long discussion consisted of a preamble, stating that the eight-hour day was the standard to be aimed at, and ten articles. The chief criticism of these articles by the British Government and several other important maritime States was directed to the proposed authorisation of overtime without any compulsion to grant a compensatory rest period. These States preferred an absolutely binding limit, which might in some cases be higher than eight hours, to eight hours with facilities for overtime with compensation only in the form of extra pay. The preamble was adopted by an overwhelming majority (65 votes to 5 with 8 abstentions), showing that the Genoa Conference was in no doubt as to the standard which should govern the regulation of seamen's hours. The Draft Convention as a whole failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority by one vote only.

After Genoa there were seven years of hope deferred for the seamen, but they kept within the constitutional framework of the International Labour Organisation in their efforts to bring the matter up again. Repeatedly their representatives on the Joint Maritime Commission (a joint body of shipowners and seamen elected by the Conference to advise the Governing Body on maritime

matters) endeavoured to induce the shipowners' representatives to agree to ask the Governing Body of the International Labour Office to place the question of hours on the agenda of a maritime Conference, but without success. It may be recalled that the French Government introduced an eight-hour day for its mercantile marine in August 1919, but under the pressure of international competition suspended the Act in 1922. In April 1925 France put the Act again into force, and although the French shipping industry has complained of the heavy charges it has to meet as against those of maritime countries which are not bound by similar legislation, it has not sought to maintain that the eight-hour system hinders the practical organisation of work on board ship. Plainly the French Government was interested in having limitation of hours discussed at Geneva, but failed to induce the Governing Body to put it on the 1926 Agenda. The 1926 or Ninth Conference (confined to maritime questions) adopted a resolution moved by the seamen requesting the Governing Body to place regulation of hours on board ship on the agenda of another maritime session; the Governing Body, with the consent of the Joint Maritime Commission, decided to deal with it in 1929.

This time the Conference ran no risk of being tied by too rigid formulæ. There was no question, as at Genoa, of the "application to seamen" of the Convention drafted at Washington. The approach was by means of a general exchange of views on the desirability of regulating hours on board ship. Under the double discussion procedure, the Conference had to record two votes on hours (as on each item on its agenda): (a) to accept or reject the report of the committee which recommended that the Governments should be consulted on certain points, (b) to decide whether the question should be placed on the agenda of the next maritime session, in other words whether a Convention should be drafted when the Governments have replied to the questionnaire which the International Labour Office will base on the lines laid down by the Conference.

All maritime countries sent delegates with the exception of Norway. The Norwegian Government has for two years running been unable to send a complete delegation to the General Conference as the workers in Norway are on the extreme left and refuse to participate in International Labour Conferences. In 1920 the Government failed to obtain a vote in the Storting for the expenses of a delegation to the maritime session, but sent an observer who was assisted by a high official of the Norwegian Ministry of Commerce and Shipping; the Norwegian Shipping Federation sent its Deputy-Director, Mr. Salvesen, as observer.

Thirty-four countries were represented; nine delegations were incomplete, including our own. The refusal of the British Ship-

ping Federation to accept nomination deprived the British Workers' delegate of his right to vote. Sixty Government delegates with 24 delegates representing the employers and 25 the workers made up the total of 109. Advisers to the Governments, employers, and workers numbered 158. Thursday, October 10th, was the opening day. On Friday the three sections of the Conference rapidly decided which of their members were to serve on the various committees that had been set up, and elected the officers of these. (Each committee has a Government delegate as chairman; the employers and workers nominate vice-chairmen from their respective groups). All was in running order, and the hours of meeting for the four committees were actually announced for Saturday.

Meanwhile it became known that certain members of the shipowners' group were proposing to "leave" the Conference on account of the British Shipping Federation not being represented. It may be remembered that when the Shipping Federation declined to send representatives, the reason given was that the National Union of Seamen (better known by its old name—Sailors' and Firemen's Union) had claimed to choose the workers' delegate for this session. The British Government had followed the usual procedure which is laid down very strictly in the Treaty in Article 389. This requires the Members of the International Labour Organisation to "undertake to nominate non-Government delegates and advisers chosen in agreement with the industrial organisations, if such organisations exist, which are most representative of employers and workpeople, as the case may be, in their respective countries." Preceding Governments have always asked the National Confederation of Employers and the Trades Union Congress, which are undoubtedly the "most representative organisation," to suggest delegates and advisers. The present Government followed the invariable rule. The Shipping Federation refused to nominate, and when a member of the Trades Union Congress was accepted by the Government as delegate, the Union of Seamen declined to provide the three advisers for which it was asked, and then "registered an emphatic protest" against the action of the Government which it considered had "ignored" the Union. This was the situation when the Conference opened.

During the greater part of the Conference, shipowners' group meetings were held in Geneva, in which the General Manager of the British Shipping Federation took part. Secretaries of the vocational groups in the Conference are entitled to go outside Conference representation in choosing their secretary, and the shipowners appointed one of the members of the staff of the British Shipping Federation to act as secretary to their Conference group. The shipowners' delegates, acting as a body, submitted a resolution on Friday which required

the Conference to declare that the appointment of non-Government delegates to maritime conferences should be made by "organisations which are most representative of shipowners and seamen," which in effect was a proposal to substitute these words for the text of the Treaty quoted above. It seemed hardly possible that men of affairs, many of them having long worked in close connection with the International Labour Organisation on the Joint Maritime Commission, should imagine that the Conference possessed the power to make such a declaration. Nor that the other points of their resolution, the request to the Governing Body to take steps to secure this result and the instruction to the Credentials Committee to take steps to ameliorate the position in the Conference actually in session, could be complied with. It was plain, however, that in themselves the demands made excited keen disapproval among the Government delegates as a whole, and the inclusion of a declaration that until they received an assurance on the above points the shipowners were "unable to enter upon a discussion of any item of the agenda" could hardly be interpreted otherwise than as a threat.

Saturday was devoted to the discussion of the resolution, committee work being postponed until Monday. Mgr. Nolens (Dutch Government) expressed the opinion of the Governments present when he said in the Plenary Session that instead of "declare that they are unable" the shipowners should have said "declare that they are not willing." He was of opinion that the British employers had exceeded their powers in basing their action on their grievance in regard to the British workers' representative. If the resolution did not amount to *sabotage* it gave the impression of an ultimatum. He could not accept a threat of that nature. Mr. Walter Smith (Parliamentary Secretary of the Board of Trade) asked why the British shipowners were not present to issue the challenge to their Government. He showed that the Government had acted in accordance with established procedure, and were not responsible for the absence of the British shipowners. As regards the workers' delegation, four of the five advisers represented organisations in daily negotiation with shipowners, and, had the views of the Government been observed, three other advisers of similar organisations would have been present. The hands of the Government were, therefore, clean, and he suggested that the employers should withdraw their resolution. Before the debate closed the Secretary-General, M. Albert Thomas, pointed out that the Conference could not possibly take any such decision as was requested, for it was entirely outside the scope of the Conference to interpret the Treaty of Peace.

After two adjournments for the shipowners to seek a compromise they failed to agree among themselves, and when the Conference re-assembled for the second time at 10 p.m. the original resolution was

at once put to the vote and rejected by 64 votes to 24. The whole body of shipowners present at Geneva held a group meeting in the Conference building immediately after the rejection of their resolution. When they issued from it they announced that they should withdraw from the Conference, and would make a declaration to this effect on Monday morning. The Press waited for this statement until late on Sunday at the hotel considered to be the headquarters of the general staff of the group. But a very few hours sufficed to dispel the comfortable conviction that the Conference must inevitably break up. The Government delegates, who kept in close touch with their national executives, lost no time in putting the matter in quite a different light. It was made clear that appointed delegates who had taken up their Conference duties were not in a position to "resign" *en bloc*. In each several case the individual shipowner could only obtain release from his own Government from which he had accepted nomination. Nor would the work of the Conference be held up. It would proceed on normal lines as had been foreshadowed by the Secretary-General. Monday morning came and no shipowners had left Geneva, nor had any statement been issued to the disappointed pressmen or to the officers of the Conference. The committees met and the names of the shipowners who had been elected members were called and their owners were simply marked as "absent." The only interruptions to the steady work of the four committees during Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, were the frequent meetings of the Government group which had to deal with an unprecedented situation which became yet more complicated when the shipowners began to seek a bridge by which they might return.

The Governments were unanimously determined to make it clear that the intentional absence of one of the two vocational groups should not be allowed to hinder the carrying through of the programme laid down for an International Labour Conference, and this attitude, which strangely enough appeared to be unexpected by the employers' section, made it clear that the shipowners' strike was bound to fail. Gradually it became a question of finding a formula which the Governments could accept and which would also enable the shipowners to resume their abandoned duties. Finally, after many drafts had been rejected, a "conciliation committee"—three of each group—sat through the night and a resolution which had gained Government approval was put to the Conference, *without discussion*, and adopted by 54 votes to 19, the workers abstaining. The shipowners were not in the Conference building, but in little more than half an hour after its close they filed into their places in the various committees which were sitting.

The committee dealing with hours based its work on the "Grey Report" on law and practice, and a summary of its conclusions was

prepared by the office for the convenience of the committee. Nothing comparable to the thorough investigations contained in this report was available at Genoa in 1920. The committee decided that the Governments should be consulted as to the definitions of the expressions: "normal hours of work," "hours of actual work," "hours on duty," "overtime," "compensation for overtime," "work required for safety."

The shipowners desired to ask the Governments to distinguish between "hours of effective work, hours of navigational duties, hours of stand-by," but withdrew their proposal when Government delegates strongly opposed any questions being framed which would ask for such distinctions to be made. Points specified to be included in the questionnaire are the scope of the Draft Convention as regards vessels, trades, and persons employed; a classification was suggested, also possible exceptions. The Governments are to be consulted with regard to methods of regulating working hours for different categories of the crew, in port or at sea, also as to non-limitation of overtime necessary for safety. All three groups agreed for the present to exclude the fishing industry.

To these recommendations the shipowners' group proposed to add an entirely new section asking the Governments to supply information as to the cost and economic effects of the introduction of the principle of the eight-hour day. The French Government delegate, speaking in the name of a number of other Government delegates, declared that it was impossible to ask Governments to make such an inquiry. The Conference accepted the committee's conclusions by 71 votes to 20. A record vote was taken as to whether the questions should be placed on the agenda of the next Maritime Conference and was carried by 76 to 17. In neither case did the whole shipowners' group vote against the proposals; those of France, Italy, and Bulgaria voted for further action at a subsequent Conference—i.e. in favour of a Convention the next year or later.*

In maritime circles it was known that the British Shipping Federation deprecated an international discussion of seamen's hours before their legal regulation had been considered here. Yet if the conditions voluntarily agreed between British shipowners and seamen are so eminently satisfactory to both sides our shipping industry could have rendered a real service in suggesting the lines for a wider application in the international sphere. It is hard to see why the Federation stood out of the Conference—officially.

E. HINTON SMITH.

* In spite of this decision it was suggested at the meeting of the Governing Body held in April 1930 that the questions should be referred not to a maritime but to a general Conference. This was negatived, but a proposal of the French Government was carried, viz. that a consultative commission of Maritime Powers shall meet to examine the 1929 conclusions, after which the Governing Body will decide whether the resulting Conventions and Recommendations shall be submitted to a general or special Conference.

THE ECONOMICS OF INSECTS.

IT is characteristic of leakages that they grow worse. The sea always gains in the end, on the bailers in a leaking boat, and bailing itself uses up man-power, needed to go forward rather than merely to keep afloat. Agriculture is to-day in the position of a ship with a leak—or, rather, with several leaks. So many of the crew have to man the pumps that she cannot move at all swiftly across the ocean of progress.

One of the most serious and rapidly growing leaks is that made by insects. Every year millions of lilliputian appetites take a steady toll of plant and animal life. Periodic and spectacular outbursts of insect plagues such as locusts, which kept much of the East in a turmoil last summer, and the Mediterranean fruit-fly, which swept Florida like a gale last spring, levy a direct tribute and leave in their wake a trail of ruined farmers. In addition there is a steady annual drain on the resources of land and farmer. Every year, in some regions, the stem sawfly and Hessian fly play havoc in the wheat-fields; nun and gipsy moths destroy vast areas of forest; the codling moth and woolly aphis ruin thousands of bushels of apples and the trees which bear them; the sheep blowfly and warble fly kill their hosts and ruin wool and hides. Huge areas of land, potentially as rich as any in the world, have been unconditionally given over to the tsetse fly throughout Central and East Africa; and the fly, which already owns a kingdom several times the size of our own, is making new conquests every day. In the United States alone it has been estimated by the American Cotton Association that the cotton boll weevil did £200,000,000 of damage in 1921 and 1922. And year after year the costs of routine control methods—spraying, dipping, grease-banding, trapping—add to every farmer's cost of production a varying sum which in the aggregate amounts to many millions. The magnitude of this loss is all the more remarkable when it is realised that there are estimated to be over 400,000,000 species of insects, divided into twenty-three orders, and only a few families belonging to seven or eight of the orders include injurious insects.

In spite of the widespread nature of the insect problem, lamentably inadequate efforts had, until recently, been made to solve it. The modern tendency towards imperial co-operation in agricultural science has brought economic entomology more into the limelight. Since the war scientific men in the oversea Empire countries, where these problems are particularly acute, have shown that they intend to present a more united front to the insect world, and that the old methods of guerilla warfare are to be superseded. The Dominions and Colonies are strengthening their entomological services.

Australia, for instance, has set up an ambitious central station at Canberra, under the direction of Professor Tillyard (formerly of the Cawthron Institute in New Zealand). Several Colonies have added more entomologists to their official staffs; and newly expanded research stations, such as the Amani Institute in Tanganyika, are planning organised attacks on insect pests.

One concrete result of this growing "insect-consciousness" is to be seen in a manor house at Farnham Royal, Buckinghamshire. Where once there were sofas and beds, there are now cages of insects, and microscopes. The house has been turned into an insect laboratory, set up by the Imperial Bureau of Entomology, under a grant from the Empire Marketing Board. Its object is the breeding and distributing of parasites which destroy injurious insects, and the broader one of research into this method of tackling the insect menace, known as "biological control."

There are few insects which are not preyed upon by others of their kind. Nature preserves a delicate balance of power between the different species, and between the insect and the plant worlds. It is vitally important to keep this balance, because of the remarkably rapid reproductive powers possessed by insects. With equally remarkable thoroughness an American professor has calculated that one aphid could, under the most favourable conditions, give rise to 564,087,257,509,154,652 progeny between April and August. Luckily, his ultra-prolific aphid is likely to remain purely hypothetical, but even so this reproductive power is the insects' most formidable weapon.

The balance of power has been disturbed by man in two ways. First, modern agriculture demands the growing, year after year, of large artificial areas of single crops. This has provided the insects which eat these crops with a heaven-sent opportunity to obtain unlimited food without effort, and so to increase with unprecedented speed. The cotton boll weevil was an obscure beetle living largely on wild hibiscus until the appearance of vast cotton fields relieved it from the necessity of searching and competing for food. The Colorado beetle was a harmless eater of wild plants in the Rocky Mountain regions until American pioneers laid a trail of cultivated potatoes for it to follow. And insects have by no means ceased to change their habits. The wheat-stem sawfly is a case in point. It is fairly widespread in Canada, but previously the grub tunneled in the stalks of certain grasses, and attacked those grasses only. It was kept in check largely by a parasite. This attacked the sawfly grub by thrusting its ovipositor through the grass stem and laying its eggs inside the tunnelling grubs. A few years ago the sawfly started to bore in wheat stems. The parasite then found that its ovipositor was not long or strong

enough to pierce the wheat stem, and the sawfly was able to multiply unchecked. It spread rapidly westwards through the Canadian wheat fields, and in 1926 did £2,400,000 worth of damage in the State of Saskatchewan alone.

The second way in which man has encouraged the spread of insects is by accidentally introducing them into new countries, minus their parasites. Insects, like most mammals and plants, have played a game of "General Post" round the world. The Hessian fly was introduced into North America in the horses' fodder of George III's Hessian troops during the Revolutionary War. The gipsy moth was imported into the United States in 1869 by a Harvard Professor who wished to study a silkworm disease to which the moth was also subject. A few accidentally disappeared from his laboratory and found a paradise in the New England forests. Exactly half a century later the State of Pennsylvania spent £6,000,000 on control measures alone in one year. Some of these introductions are, like the changes of habit, very recent—and many, in all probability, are yet to come. The European corn-borer only reached America in 1917. Eleven years later an appropriation of ten million dollars and the concentrated efforts of the biggest entomological control system in the world could not stop its advance. Until a few years ago Nyasaland was free from the cotton boll-worm, the dreaded pest of the American and Egyptian cotton fields; but the pink boll-worm was recently introduced into the Protectorate by a missionary who brought in an ornamental fern harbouring the insect. Now a rigorous plant inspection service has been established in Rhodesia to prevent, if possible, the introduction of the pest. A parasite for the pink boll-worm has been found in the Sudan, and efforts are now being made to convey it to Barbados. Dr. J. G. Meyers, of the Imperial Bureau of Entomology, is at present in the West Indies setting up a small parasite transmitting centre, with the Empire Marketing Board aid, to co-operate with Farnham Royal.

Biological control aims, then, at restoring at least to a limited extent the balance upset by man. Parasites which attack a large number of injurious insects are being studied by Dr. W. R. Thompson and his staff at Farnham Royal, reared, and (if prolonged experiments prove successful) exported to entomological stations in those Dominions and Colonies which have applied to receive the parasite. The apple codling moth, wheat-stem sawfly, lucerne flea, lecanium scale, pear-slug, pine tortrix moth, and sheep blowfly are among the insect pests for which parasites have been collected, bred, and exported. The greenhouse whitefly has been most successfully controlled by a small chalcid fly discovered and reared

however, be regarded as the final authority on her life and character. From him we gain certain descriptive phrases which help us to see the poet as woman, daughter, and sister:

In Christina's character there was great dignity tempered . . . by modesty; and to this her bearing corresponded faithfully. . . . She was replete with the spirit of self-postponement, which passed into self-sacrifice . . . and *noblesse oblige* might have been her motto. Though shy, and even somewhat nervous, she was of unshaken firmness, making up her mind pretty easily in any crisis of her life, and abiding immovable. The narrow path was the only one for her, and a lion in the same path made no difference. She never . . . imputed a bad motive to anyone; . . . none the less she had a large fund of discernment, and speedily fathomed defects in her acquaintances which she never announced . . . a soul as pure, duteous, concentrated, loving, and devoted, as ever uttered itself in either prose or verse.

No one could speak from more intimate observation; but W. M. Rossetti's Notes on the poems appear meticulous to-day, and his Memoir also suffers from being too circumstantial. The details of his sister's almost lifelong ill-health, the list of every sketch or photograph made of her, and, most of all, the history of the unhappy love affairs which had a vital share in what he calls her "hushed life-drama"—all these seem a concession to a curious public rather than necessary to an appreciation of her work. It is true that Christina Rossetti's most poignant and secret experiences passed into her poems; but she was innately loyal in the human relations of her life, and reticent about her own deepest concerns. Lady Burne-Jones made a thumb-nail sketch of Christina Rossetti as she appeared in 1865*—that is, at the time when the second of those affairs, and the one which had an enduring influence, was in progress. The scene was an evening party at the Madox Browns' house in Kentish Town:

Whistler was there, looking ten times more like a Frenchman than Legros did, his face working with vivacity, his thick black hair curling down to his eyebrows, with an angry eye-glass fixed beneath it. . . . Gabriel was there in a magnificent mood—no other word describes it when he passed through a room bringing pleasure to great and small by his beautiful urbanity, a prince amongst men . . . and Christina Rossetti, *gently caustic of tongue*.

That was the mask she kept "to face the world with." Beneath it lay her immense capacity for suffering and endurance, and also for scaling the far heights whence she caught a divine radiance. She was only twenty-eight when she wrote *From House to Home*, the poem which William Rossetti regarded as one of her "most manifest masterpieces," concluding with verses that have the ring

* *Memorials of Edward Burne-Jones*. 1904.

chewed to dust by this indefatigable pest. And there are numerous insects totally unknown to the public which do at least as much damage, and probably more.

Science is not yet ready to direct a campaign against these uninvited guests, because very little is as yet known about them, at least from the economic point of view. Their life-histories are still shrouded in mystery. For one volume on an insect's choice of food there are a hundred on the arrangement of its mouth parts. As Dr. Munro, the director of the Slough laboratories, has pointed out, a complete account of the cockroach's anatomy was published in 1820, but the entomologist is still waiting for an equally thorough description of its life-history. Until more facts about insect diet and behaviour are collected and tabulated, science is helpless to make final recommendations as to control measures. The first object of the work at Slough is, therefore, to build up a body of facts about the habits of such expensive feeders as the cocoa moth and the dried-fruit moth. This is linked up with surveys of actual conditions at the docks and in the warehouses.

Ignorance of life-histories is by no means the only hiatus in applied entomology. Science is largely in the dark as to how and what insects eat. It is not enough to know that they eat our crops and domestic animals; it is necessary to know the biochemical basis of their appetites. The nutrition and digestion of insects bears not only on fundamental biology but upon the question of why certain insects eat certain foods, and, in the long run, of what can be done to stop them. The chemistry of foods may even be the basis of insect appetites. Beeches, oaks, and chestnuts are, for instance, particularly favoured by tortrix moths on account of the flavour of tannin in their composition; cabbage butterflies focus their attentions on plants of the cruciferous tribe because they have a weakness for the mustard oils contained in them; and, conversely, the alcohols present in teak and cypress trees in the Philippines render them immune to attack from certain termites. An investigation was recently started by Dr. P. A. Buxton at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine which may throw light on problems such as these, and, perhaps, open up new fields of control. It seems probable, for instance, that acidity may influence an insect's choice of diet. An apple tree growing in an alkaline soil is more susceptible to attack from woolly aphis than one rooted in an acid soil. This fact has been exploited by applying acid fertilisers to the soil, and increased immunity has been obtained. Certain timber-boring insects, on the other hand, only flourish in an acid medium. In order to obtain their foods in the right state of acidity, they employ certain fungi partially to digest the timber by means of acids which they secrete. The wood-wasp *sirex*, a

troublesome timber pest, actually inoculates the timber with fungus spores. These have been found secreted in a gland near the ovipositor, and pass out of the insect by adhering to the egg. Fungus and egg grow up together in the timber. By the time the sirex grubs are old enough to need nourishment, the fungus has softened the wood and made it sufficiently acid to suit the grub's palate.

A solution to these and other equally baffling problems of the insect world would provide one of the basic needs of warfare—accurate, available, and pertinent information on the methods of attack used by the enemy, on the disposition of his forces, the potentialities of his troops, and the weight of his reserves. We must look to the applications of biological science for salvation, where we have hitherto pinned our faith exclusively to the applications of physical science. The problem is rapidly becoming one of urgency; and we have as yet a long way to go before our knowledge of the fundamentals of biological science, upon which all applications rest, reaches the level attained by physical science at, let us say, the beginning of the present century.

WALTER ELLIOT.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

•POLITICS AS AN INTERNATIONAL DISEASE.

THOSE whose business it is to be absorbed in politics either as practitioners or as commentators are for the most part too deeply engaged in the prevailing obsessions to be able to take a comprehensive, philosophic view of general tendencies. The wood is apt to be hidden by the trees. Yet it is at least arguable that an incidental part of the business of such people is to pause occasionally and take stock. The non-political people, that is the people who take a non-professional interest in politics, whether party politics at home or diplomatic politics on an international scale, are more inclined to generalise. There is no doubt that generalisations are being made by superficial observers who, not encumbered by the practical aspect of political problems, are able to look at the world from a detached angle.

Yet the professional politician would probably benefit from a little detached reflection. In politics, in economics, in finance, the world is passing through an extreme form of depression and unrest. There are those who think that something critical and relentless in the world's history is taking form, others who regard the present phase as a cyclical phenomenon, to which analogies can be found in past experience.

Whatever be the enlightened view or the sound interpretation, it is not easy for normal people to be cheerful in the contemplation of what is taking place. The world is spending more on armaments than it spent in 1913. Europe is still unsettled by fear and suspicion. The United States is as ignorant of European affairs as it ever was, but has a greater influence on Europe than it ever had, or than its prominent citizens are aware of. India is restless. Egypt is suffering from a form of shortsighted nationalism. China is approaching the twentieth year of intermittent civil war and seems to be as far from the end as she was at the beginning. Great Britain is driving nearer to national bankruptcy than the oldest, most experienced City men ever could have believed, and British party politics have ceased to serve the interests of the British people.

What is wrong with the world? Are we paying the penalty for the wanton folly of 1914-18? Is the issue between Christ and Cæsar, between human sympathy and national pride, being forced upon the minds of men? Or is it merely that we have fallen into a secondary depression (the first having overtaken us in 1920) in the process of recovery after the war?

It is a remarkable thing that men and women in large numbers are more interested now than they were five years ago in the ethical

problem of war, as typified by the war of 1914-18. War books are best sellers. People are thinking about elementals. Fewer people are now afraid of admitting themselves to be "pacifist" in the full Christian sense than was the case five years ago. The people who regard pacifists as mugwumps have a case to argue, but a smaller and less enthusiastic audience to listen to it. And, what is perhaps more remarkable and more cheerful, people on an increasing scale are beginning to recognise that politics, as an organised form of human activity, have ceased to be true to their theoretic purpose of safeguarding the common interest, and have themselves become a menace to that interest. Hence it is that certain otherwise logical and consistent persons have a tender spot for Signor Mussolini on the simple and exclusive ground that he has suppressed party politics in his country. When he goes on to brandish his shining sword (against France) his new-found apologists explain away the phenomenon as a harmless exhibit of the Italian temperament. The reaction goes full circle. Many serious students of affairs, whose blood normally boils at any threat to their own or to another's liberty, now begin to wonder whether liberty after all is so great a boon, or whether it is rather the cause of endless strife? The Manchu Dynasty was an incompetent instrument of government, and a bad servant to the Chinese people; but since the Manchu Dynasty was overthrown the Chinese people have been in worse case, the victims of a series of idiotic generals and their troops fighting endlessly for supremacy. The famine that stalks China is one of the results of political freedom. The Tsars of Russia regarded the people of Russia as born slaves, the proper instrument for their comfort, the whip. But the Russian people were better off under the Tsars than under Socialism. Those who argue that of all the evils that befall men as a result of politics, the worst is Socialism, have some historical background to their argument. Socialism is hypertrophied politics, the attempt to concentrate the maximum of a nation's affairs into the hands of politicians. Politicians in theory are responsible to the electorate at the next election. In practice they are irresponsible, for election issues are so elusive, and the motives of electors at the moment of casting their vote are so unaccountable, that an election is little better than a gamble. In the meantime the unfortunate individual is at the mercy of "the State," which under a Socialist administration becomes a worse (because a more stupid) tyrant than any old-time despot. The average healthy human being regards himself as fortunate in proportion as his individuality is given scope. By the time a nation has decayed to such a point that a Socialist Government can exercise power, it has reverted to the age of tyranny, and politics have stultified themselves.

In Great Britain the situation is made worse by the peculiar financial effect of the Great War. Owing to the circumstance that the politicians of Great Britain allowed themselves to be duped by the main belligerent countries, and as a result are burdened with a national debt the like of which could not have been regarded as a practical possibility before 1914, there is an ever-widening gap between national income and national expenditure and an ever-increasing roll of casualties in the form of men and women who cannot find work. The position of such unfortunate people being hopeless as well as distressing, they fall an easy prey to Socialist promises to rob the rich on their behalf, a device which in practice does not achieve its ostensible purpose, but the opposite. Money flees the country and the poor are left still poorer. Mr. Snowden, a man of iron will but of less robust intelligence, obstinately meets a national deficit, not by cutting down expenses (as he no doubt would in the case of his household budget), but by increasing income-tax. The immediate result is the prospect of a smaller return from income-tax than before, because incomes, owing to the economic law, immediately shrink. And what is more serious, the Stock Exchange is reduced to stagnation, and a vital source of revenue to the budget is thereby eliminated.

In the process Great Britain adds a second illustration to a curious paradox already illustrated in the case of Russia. By attempting to tax a small minority of so-called rich people for the benefit of an overwhelming majority of the other people, whose votes at the next election are expected to be decisive, the Socialists violate one of the original tenets of their own creed and revert to the old reactionary principle of taxation without representation.

The post-war history of Socialism, seen in the light of an international experience, well repays the attention of the political philosopher. In one sense it lies at the root of the major problem of international relations. Its real significance is best understood if one strips it of all but its crude essentials. Socialism being the subordination of the individual to the collective whim of a nation as expounded by an elected body of representatives, it follows that war, and the nationalisation of human life for the purpose of war, is of the essence of the Socialist creed. The Soviet Red Army is not an inconsistency, for war is pure politics pushed to an extreme. The fetish of the State, whether expressed in the sentimental slogan of "King and Country" or in the unsentimental robbery of the rich by a Socialist Government, remains true to type, and oddly ignores ordinary standards of right and wrong. The average Conservative would no doubt think it wrong to murder a fellow countryman in vindication of his political views. He presumably did not think it wrong to murder Germans in 1914-18 for the same

reason. To Mr. Baldwin's honour, however, be it remembered that he has put on record his sense of the politician's dilemma in one of its aspects. Speaking in the House of Commons on July 26th, 1929, he said: "If disaster comes, if bloodshed comes, as it often has in our history, the politicians always escape. The worst that can happen to the politician is loss of office; and the men who give their blood are generally those whose hands have had nothing to do with the laying of the train that led to the explosion." Mr. Snowden would probably think it wrong to waylay a rich man in the highway and rob him: his conscience would not console him with the reflection that it is right to rob a man merely because he is rich. Yet he clearly does not think it wrong to rob the rich so long as he does it in the name of "the State." The State as a cause covers a multitude of moral atrocities.

Since 1914 the world has had an overdose of politics. Politics have become a poison in the blood of men. It appears to be the case that men and women are happy and prosperous in proportion as the politicians are kept in their place and are denied the excessive prestige they are given, for instance in Great Britain. The Swedish politicians are little known outside Sweden and not much known in Sweden. They do the minimum of what is needed of the politician (and the minimum should be the politician's ideal), and one result is that the quiet prosperity of Sweden is allowed to develop without hindrance.

It would be a good thing for Europe and for the world if the politicians of Great Britain, France, Russia, could be one and all made to take an enforced holiday for twelve months and the machinery of politics and diplomacy closed down meanwhile. It seems too much to hope that the politicians of those countries will of their own accord keep quiet and stop doing damage.

GOLD TO FRANCE.

One of the curious aspects of international relations at the present time is the phenomenon of gold hoarding by the Bank of France. To some people, who know the power wielded by the Bank of France through the immense wealth that has accrued to France as a result of the war, the phenomenon is a source of anxiety. What is France's object? There appears to be no limit to the extent to which France can buy gold in the market and take gold from the Bank of England. Already the gold reserve of the Bank of France is more than twice as big as that of the Bank of England, yet the drain of gold from London to Paris goes on unceasingly, daily. It has been going on since the spring of 1929. What does France want to do with 50,000,000,000 francs in gold? Being enriched by the repudiation of the bulk of her debt to Great Britain

and by the receipt of the bulk of German reparation, she can afford to keep so vast a sum in idle, unremunerative storage. But it is not in human nature for rich nations or rich men to hoard gold instead of investing the equivalent money for profit, unless they have some definite object in view. What is that object in the case of France? The question is being asked on every side, but no French politician, financier or banker ever answers it. A mysterious and complete silence shrouds the persistent and active hoarding of gold in Paris. The Bank of England's decision to pay out bars of standard fineness only has put a limit to the amount that can be transferred within any given period from London to Paris, but Paris drives her transfers up to the limit thus imposed, and the franc does not react to the process. The franc is kept steadily above gold export point.

Those who in the autumn of last year, when France was using her huge sterling balances to depress sterling and to amass gold at the expense of London, gave it as their view that it might be just as well for France to make use of her balances in that way, so that, France being satisfied, we might revert to something more normal, now find that they were on the wrong boat. The French balances are being replenished at as great a rate as they are being used, owing to the circumstance that France receives most of the cash from Germany and at the same time leaves to the British taxpayer the burden of paying back to himself most of the money he lent to France during the war. The process of gold extraction from London to Paris can go on precisely as long as Paris chooses, and London, being an international market and biding loyally by the rules of the gold standard, must inevitably dance to the French tune. Those unofficial French apologists who allege that the gold is needed as a first step in the transformation of Paris into a world money market argue a case that is demonstrably absurd; for London, the greatest international money market, functions on less than a half of the gold that has so far been accumulated in Paris. The gold is not needed for any purpose of banking or of currency in France. In the hands of France it is a potential danger to the whole gold system and to the whole practice of international finance. When the Bank for International Settlements began to function, it was expected that one of its chief benefits to the world would be the regularisation of the distribution of gold. Sir Charles Addis, director of the Bank of England, who is one of the vice-chairmen of the Bank for International Settlements, in an address he gave this spring to the Institute of Bankers in London gave it as his opinion that one of the chief functions of the B.I.S. would be "to act as a centre of co-operation for Central Banks," and he went on to explain how exactly it could obviate the disturbance of gold

drains from one central bank to another. But France has not yet seen fit to welcome the opportunity for such an organisation of the common convenience, and mysteriously continues the process of amassing gold as quickly as the machinery of transfer will permit. It seems to be a matter of some international importance that the Bank of France or the French Government should state publicly what is the object of so remarkable a policy, if policy it be.

SOME BRIGHTER SPOTS IN EUROPE.

If one looks for something pleasanter in Europe than the Franco-Italian naval controversy or than British income-tax, one has to turn to Germany. At midnight on Monday, June 30th, the French and Belgian troops were withdrawn from the Rhineland and the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission ceased to be. The bunting that was kept flying during the following week was an inevitable and harmless reaction from sixteen years of war atmosphere. No doubt President von Hindenburg, who has proved that his influence in Germany is sedative and far-sighted, will begin to do something about it if the renewed watch on the Rhine becomes too deeply tinged with nonsense about Deutschland Über Alles, Über Alles. There is no need, however, to anticipate anything so absurd.

Germany, too, is the innocent centre of another pleasant event. The first instalment of the "German Government International 5½ per cent. Loan 1930" has been successfully issued, London having subscribed the allotted quota of £12,000,000 nominal within a few hours of the opening of the lists on Friday, June 13th. When the total loan has been issued it will be found that the United States and France have each taken 28 per cent. of the whole, Great Britain 17 per cent., Holland and Sweden 8½ per cent. each, the remaining 10 per cent. being distributed between Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, and Germany. Germany takes only 2.4 per cent.

Apart from the purely technical interest of the transactions as an investment, there are two aspects to it which distinguish it from the ordinary kind of international loan. In the first place it represents something new in the method of discharging Germany's reparation liability. Theoretically, Germany pays reparation to the victors of the Great War. Hitherto she has paid her annuities out of the proceeds of loans raised in the ordinary way abroad. It was the Dawes Plan of 1924 that first recognised the principle that Germany, not having the money herself, should pay the victors by means of loans borrowed from the victors, a principle not lacking in irony. But the Dawes Plan still insisted that Germany should pay part of her reparation liability out of her own pocket, or what the diplomatists call her "national resources." The Young Plan,

which produced the new loan just issued, went full circle, by arranging that Germany should discharge her liability wholly out of money borrowed in the main from the people to whom she was liable to make payment, and, in addition, increased the amount of the loan beyond what was needed for reparation payment, so that Germany could use a substantial amount, namely 100,000,000 dollars, out of the total of 300,000,000 dollars, for her own purposes at home. To such an expedient have the Allied creditors been driven after ten years of will o' the wisps; and the really impressive thing is that there is no better alternative; indeed, no alternative at all.

The other interesting aspect of the matter is its effect on the exchanges: a highly serious aspect, in view of the disturbances that have already been caused by other factors, especially by the post-war scramble for gold. It was important, for instance, that Great Britain, by accepting "reparation" from Germany, should not receive something that would be not only not useful, but harmful. Hence it was that in the protracted negotiations about the terms and conditions of the loan the British Government firmly insisted that the amount of the loan should not exceed the British share of the proceeds. The effect of that stipulation is that the £11,000,000 (net) now raised from the pockets of British investors goes to the British Treasury in satisfaction of the German debt, the capital liability and the annual service of the loan being Germany's responsibility. By that means the sterling subscribed to the loan will remain sterling: will not, that is, be translated into francs or marks to the consequent depreciation of the sterling exchange and the potentially consequent drain on the already depleted gold reserves of the Bank of England. If there is not much joy in it for the British taxpayer, there is at any rate no positive harm.

PROGRESS OF THE NAVAL TREATY.

The way to naval limitation and reduction is slow and difficult. The London Treaty was signed on April 22nd. Since that time some of the politicians and the professional naval men in the three countries primarily concerned have been exercising their timid minds and seeking reasons why it should be rejected. The best thing that emerges is that with the worst will in the world no effective reason has been found for rejecting it, and it is likely that the timid souls will fail.

(1) In Great Britain.

It was on May 15th that Mr. MacDonald opened the flood-gates at Westminster. He himself of course, on this particular subject, was full of wisdom, partly because he has always been a pacifist

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in international affairs, partly also no doubt because this was his own particular handiwork. On that day he explained the nature of the treaty to the House of Commons, to prepare the way for its acceptance. He presented it as an attempt to stem the bad effects of the 1927 failure, and to restart the work of peace and disarmament. He was careful to qualify the importance of what had been done by reminding his audience that this was a first step only, which would have to be followed by more effective steps in the reduction of armaments in all three spheres, on the sea, on land, and in the air. Partly to counter those critics across the floor who still worried about the "concession" of parity to the United States, he recalled that the principle of parity had already been accepted by the former Government, and he deduced that the main practical concern of the present Government was to stabilise parity on the existing basis and to prevent competition in building. He claimed that not only had that object been achieved in the treaty, so far as the three Powers were concerned, but that the existing basis of naval armaments, as between the three, had even been reduced. In the matter of cruisers he summarised the effect of the treaty on Great Britain, and took the occasion to answer an important point that had been raised by Lord Bridgeman in the House of Lords on May 8th. (See *THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, June 1930, pp. 789 *seqq.*). The point he made was that by the treaty the cruisers built during the war were to have a life of sixteen years, those built since, a life of twenty years. If all the existing cruisers were given a life of sixteen years, he calculated that it would be necessary to replace 153,000 tons before 1936, but that if twenty years were taken as the average life, the replacement would need to be not more than 80,000. He therefore claimed that the estimated figure of 91,000 was good enough. "On the cruisers," he said, "there has been a good deal of controversy in which the Admiralty has been blamed, that, instead of seventy, which has been the figure, up to now, regarded as the minimum for safety, we had fixed upon fifty, made up of fifteen 8-inch cruisers and thirty-five 6-inch cruisers. It has been said that that has been done by us under pressure by the United States. That is not the case. Before the United States gave any views at all upon the subject we were having this subject investigated by our experts. The Admiralty's position has been already declared, and I will declare it again so that there may be no misunderstanding in this matter. The Admiralty's position was that under international conditions such as they exist to-day the number of fifty cruisers could be accepted for a strictly limited period provided always that other Powers met our standard of fifty, and provided that in our number, that is in our fifty, there is a proper proportion of new construction suitable

for extended operations. The meaning of that is this—there is nothing terrible or horrible, nothing that could shock my pacifist friends—a good many of our 6-inch cruisers at the present time were built specially for war purposes, and during the war, and their operations are meant to cover only the North Sea and the immediately adjoining waters of our coast, and in replacing them the Admiralty said that they would require to have cruisers not of more tonnage, not of heavier metal or anything of that sort, but cruisers which would enable sailors to be comfortable inside them if they were farther removed from Great Britain than these special war-built vessels allowed them to be. The saving on the programmes of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines is estimated at a sum of about £13,000,000.

"Another point has given rise to a good deal of discussion, and if I have not been able to follow the seriousness of the discussion it is because I think our critics have discovered a very bad mare's nest. The House is now familiar with the controversy about the 91,000 tons limitation. It is an intricate sort of point and one which is not easy to explain, although it is exceedingly simple in itself. Let me see if I can get the House to understand the position. The London Naval Treaty provides that cruisers built before January 1st, 1920, that is war cruisers, really shall be valued for the purposes of the treaty at sixteen years. That is, when they have passed their sixteenth year they become over-age. Cruisers built after that year will be valued at the age of twenty years. Then it is provided that we shall build in replacement and in relation to our fifty cruisers which are to be on the sea in 1936—no more than fifty. We shall build new construction equal to, up to 1936, 91,000 tons. Does that allow us to have fifty cruisers? That is the point. The critics say, no. It works out in this way. If we take the sixteen year cruiser in the bulk and scrap it all and replace it before 1936 we should have to build 62,220 tons more than we now do. We retain, in other words, in our 91,000 tons or because of our limitation to 91,000 tons, 62,220 over-age tonnage taking over-age at sixteen years. None of the over-age tonnage is more than three years over sixteen. If we take twenty years as the life of the cruisers, in 1936 the 91,000 tons would satisfy all requirements and give us 11,820 tons over and above it."

He further claimed that the holiday in battleship building would save Great Britain some £50,000,000 between now and 1936, and would give time for negotiation about the reduction in the size of battleships.

On the same day (May 15th) a notice of motion was signed by more than eighty Conservative members to oppose the ratification of Part III, that is the Three Power Pact, of the treaty. On

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May 21st Mr. Baldwin handed in a notice of motion that a Select Committee of eleven members be appointed to consider the treaty and report on it. He was supported by Sir Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Churchill. The motion was defeated in the House on June 2nd. On June 18th the Government issued a White Paper (Cmd. 3597) giving the text of an exchange of Notes between the United States and British Governments about the interpretation of Article 19 of the treaty. The State Department had written on June 5th both to London and to Tokio submitting that Article 19 be interpreted to mean that 6-inch gun cruisers should be replaced only by 6-inch gun cruisers. Both Japan and Great Britain accepted that interpretation, but with the reservation on the part of Great Britain that by virtue of another section of the treaty she might in 1935 replace the 7.5-inch gun cruisers with cruisers of like guns. On June 25th Mr. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, announced the Government's programme of naval construction for 1930. Beginning in the last quarter of the financial year 1930-1, and spread over three years, it was to allow for the building of three 6-inch gun cruisers, nine destroyers, three submarines, four sloops, and one net layer, at a total cost of £9,000,000.

So far there had been no serious or sustained opposition was treaty at Westminster. The first determined opposition was staged in the House of Lords on July 1st, when Lord Jellicoe and Lord Beatty both had much to say on the subject. Their observations were interesting rather than important, and were comparable in value to the corresponding views concurrently expressed by American and Japanese admirals. Indeed, the three sets of admirals, if read side by side, had the delightful effect of cancelling each other. Lord Beatty's main point was that the treaty, if ratified, would be "a great and appalling blunder." He said that "we, the only nation to which sea-power means existence, are the only Power to make any disarmament or any reduction, and to such an extent as to render us impotent and incapable of protecting that which we have and maintaining control over the connecting links of our Empire." Lord Jellicoe spoke "in the fullest possible agreement" with Lord Beatty. Lord Parmoor and Lord Thomson answered on behalf of the Government, without, however, adding much to what was already known. In short, the controversy produced by the treaty in Great Britain was small by contrast with the reaction it produced in the United States and in Japan.

(2) In the United States.

Mr. Hoover transmitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification on May 1st. Five days later (May 6th) Mr. Frank Britten, Chair-

man of the Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, started the controversy by stating that it would be necessary for the United States, in order to achieve parity with Great Britain, to build 345,000 tons within the next ten years, at a cost of £200,000,000. It was he also who started a discussion in the House of Representatives (May 9th) on the construction to be undertaken during the current year. He introduced a Bill to authorise the President between now and July 1st, 1936, to build 73,500 tons of light cruisers (costing £26,500,000), 55,300 tons of destroyers (£30,000,000), 42,100 tons of submarines (£24,500,000), and 69,000 tons of aircraft carriers (£18,500,000); total, 239,900 tons, at a cost of £99,500,000.

On May 12th Mr. Stimson gave an admirable start to the campaign on behalf of the treaty in a statement he made before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. In a happy phrase he referred to the completion by the London Treaty of the cycle started by the Washington Treaty "from confidence to limitation and from limitation back to confidence." He paid a timely tribute to the good faith of Great Britain as manifested in her remarkable decision to reduce her minimum cruiser requirements from seventy to fifty, that is from 420,000 to 339,000 tons. He gave it as his conviction that Great Britain was neither building against the United States nor measuring her fleet by that of the United States. He continued his statement on the two following days, paying his tribute both to Japan and to Great Britain. After he had finished, the Foreign Relations Committee and the Naval Affairs Committee began a long public examination of the treaty by the method of hearing the opinion of various admirals and other public men. That examination was continued up to May 28th. On May 30th the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate announced that it would meet behind closed doors on June 2nd to consider certain statements that had passed between the three Powers. On June 6th the State Department published the text of the Notes to London and Tokio on the interpretation of Article 19 and the answers of the two Powers.

On June 8th Senator Johnson demanded that the whole dossier of the documents and correspondence relating to the London Conference be placed at the disposal of the Foreign Relations Committee. That demand was destined to take up much of the Senate's time in the following few weeks. The right thereby claimed for the Senate soon assumed the mischievous proportion of a matter of principle, and on June 10th the Foreign Relations Committee devoted a whole session to a discussion of a resolution introduced by Senator Black to the effect that the Senate had the right to receive and examine all documents or records relating to the

negotiation of treaties the Senate was asked to ratify. The resolution was passed by 10 votes to 7 on June 12th, and the President and Secretary of State were informed thereof. On the same day Mr. Stimson, in the course of a broadcast appeal, emphasised the danger of delay in the ratification of the treaty, the danger mainly of allowing suspicion and party politics to degrade the discussion. He combatted the "professional military viewpoint" and described the treaty as "not merely an attempt to establish the relationship for the time being between the three fleets of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan," but as "the culmination of a ten years' movement towards peace between the various naval Powers of the world, and also a step in the vitalisation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact." On the following day (June 13th) he published his answer to the Senate resolution about the right of access to documents. He argued that the Senate should decide whether or not in the last event it could ratify the treaty "from the language of the document itself and not from extraneous matter." Senator Johnson returned to the attack with a resolution (June 17th) that the Senate should postpone all consideration of the treaty until the Committee had been given the secret dossier that had been asked for. That resolution, however, was too much for the Committee, and it was rejected.

The upshot was that on June 23rd the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate approved the treaty and instructed Senator Borah to send it back to the Senate with a recommendation that it should be ratified. Senators Johnson, Robinson, Moses, and Shipstead voted against the Committee's decision. It was now taken for granted by all sections of American opinion, including the obstructionist opinion, that the treaty would be ratified. The Senate began a special session on July 7th to consider its action. Mr. Hoover, whose fight for the treaty, conducted in a wise, non-spectacular spirit, has been one of his finest achievements, sent a special message to the Senate, equally admirable in manner and in content. "The only alternative to the treaty," he wrote, "is competitive building of navies with all its flow of suspicion, hate, and ill-will, leading ultimately to disaster."

(3) In Japan.

In the case of Japan the fate of the treaty became involved in a constitutional issue of curious historical interest. Theoretically, Articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution give to the Emperor in Council the supreme command and control of the army and of the navy. Certain admirals and war lords took to challenging the Government and the London Treaty by virtue of the power vested

in them by old Japan. The constitutional issue lay between the old and the new order.

An extraordinary session of the Diet began on April 25th. The Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara, introduced the treaty in a speech of admirable restraint and reason. The value of the treaty, he said, was not confined to the material saving in national expenditure; it was bound to exert a moral influence on international relations; and no one, he submitted, but an extreme pessimist could argue that the naval strength allotted to Japan by the treaty in the period ending in 1936 would be inadequate to the country's needs. On May 29th the admirals reacted true to the type of their fellows in London and in Washington, for on that day the naval members of the Supreme War Council passed a resolution to put on record their view that the Government had committed an "irregularity" in signing the treaty. Thereafter the controversy heated the blood of some of the admirals. Admiral Kato, Chief of the Naval General Staff, took his conflict with the Government on the subject so seriously that he resigned on June 11th. Admiral Takarabe, meanwhile, the Minister of Marine, tried to counter Admiral Kato's effect by announcing that so far as he was concerned, he was determined to remain in office until the treaty had been ratified.

None of the three countries concerned in the important part of the London Treaty, that part which stipulated the limitation and reduction of armaments, had yet travelled the whole road to ratification at the time when this paper was written; but the end was in sight, and the treaty seemed safe.

France, who has stood aside from the important part of the treaty, and with her Italy, both continue to exert an influence on the more distant prospect of naval disarmament. After the London Treaty was signed the particular controversy which had developed between those two countries was pursued by other means, the main aspects of which need to be borne in mind by those who take a serious interest in the prevention of the next war.

(4) In France.

Conversations opened in Geneva on May 13th between M. Briand and Signor Grandi with the object of composing the diplomatic problem resulting from the French refusal of the Italian suggestion that the two countries should limit and reduce their navies on a basis of parity. The conversations did not go far, because M. Briand was hampered by a Press which grasped eagerly any stick wherewith to beat him for his pains. By the end of May M. Briand's public opinion at home had made it clear that there could be no immediate prospect of effective negotiation with Italy, quoting certain bellicose speeches of Signor Mussolini in defence of its

view. Certainly Signor Mussolini made some inopportune remarks from which it emerged that he did not bear France gladly. Those, however, who reminded us that he had been subject to some considerable provocation at the hands of France, and that it normally needs little provocation to drive an Italian temper to the point of explosion, did not lack substance in their argument. Moreover, on June 1st, M. Tardieu made a speech at Dijon. He spoke of the foreign policy of France. The form of what he said was strictly courteous, as is normally the form of French political thought: but his content was in essence as uncompromising as anything that Signor Mussolini had advanced. His theme simply was the "security" of France to the exclusion of all other considerations, and he contrived to express an incidental congratulation to himself for the "strong" attitude he had adopted at the London Conference. Which is worse: a boiling temper which subsides, or a cold, persistent ill-will? Such incidents as took place on June 3rd, when the Prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes induced the Minister of the Interior to order the Marchese de Notari Stefani, the head of the local Fascist organisation at Nice, to leave France within eight days, are of less permanent importance in international relations than the studied, deliberate self-centredness of the Quai d'Orsay. In the course of a statement made before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate on June 25th M. Briand could say nothing more substantial about the Franco-Italian problem than that his Government wanted to reach "a complete and cordial understanding" with Italy as soon as possible. If the problem were left to M. Briand's personal and unfettered treatment it would be solved in a week. Alas!

Neither unanimity nor consistency are qualities that distinguish human beings as political agents. M. Léon Blum, for instance, has done perverse things, as when in 1924 he threatened to withdraw Socialist support from M. Herriot if the Ruhr were evacuated without financial compensation to France. He has also done admirable things, as he is doing now. His recent articles in the *Populaire* are a remarkable exposition of the doctrine that French security is best achieved through disarmament, and not through military "sanction." In this matter France has the same problem as the rest of the world, but a greater responsibility. It is within the power of France to set an example of disarmament (as M. Blum urges her to) or to make general disarmament impossible.

(5) In Italy.

Logically and quickly Rome lost no time in applying the results of the London Conference so far as she exclusively was concerned.

At the conference Italy had claimed parity with France, and on that basis had offered to accept any low level of armament whatsoever, at the discretion of France. France having refused that offer, Italy at once decided to start building. The world is entitled to regret such an event, but French tears on that subject are dry at the source for the reason aforementioned. Nor need one excuse Italian building as a mere diplomatic pawn in a controversy. The same argument that would condemn Italy for building, would condemn France for having built, a fleet of the same size, especially as Italy has offered parity downwards. Within a week of the signing of the treaty the Italian Cabinet decided (April 30th) to add 42,900 tons to its navy, and decided moreover to lay down at once (1930-1) one 10,000 cruiser, two scout cruisers, four destroyers, and twenty-two submarines, the latter being represented as replacements of existing submarines falling obsolete during the year. On May 9th Signor Grandi made a remarkable statement in Parliament. Ostensibly his purpose was to justify Italy's naval policy resulting from the French refusal of parity; but he cast his statement on a high level of thought. The demand for parity, when made at the conference, had for its motive, he said, not a mere mathematical equation of rival warlike forces; it rested on a new international morality, of which the essence was mutual trust between the nations, the subduing of suspicion, and the promotion of the genuine pacific reduction of armaments. What Italy wanted was not parity as an end in itself, but as the indispensable first means to the reduction of armaments. The reason therefore why Italy had refused to reduce on the basis of the *status quo* was that the spirit which on the other side claimed a continuing superiority in strength was precisely the spirit that killed confidence and provoked competition in building. It was an interesting essay in political philosophy, wholly undisturbed by "the Italian temperament." On the other hand, Signor Mussolini swells with that temperament, and his language tends to be robust as well as turgid. He made a speech, for instance, at Florence on May 17th, only a week later than Signor Grandi's statesmanlike exposition. He did not speak of mutual trust between the nations. He threatened that Italy's naval programme would be carried out "ton by ton." He made a vigorous appeal to the emotions of his audience in praise of Fascismo, and then referred to France, not courteously, but with oratorical bluntness. "There are," he said, "on the other side of the frontier, sects, groups, parties of men who, being now organised in a co-operative society for the exploitation of the immortal principles of the French revolution, that is to say, for the exploitation of the most immense and refined scandal which is being accomplished to-day to the detriment of the people—these people think

they can isolate Fascist Italy. Never." Exactly a week later (May 24th) he spoke with similar verve at Milan. He certainly makes a brave and resounding use of words. On that occasion he frankly explained that the object of his recent speeches was to rouse Italy to an ever-alert sense of the realities, to save Italy, as he put it in his dramatic manner, from being lulled to sleep by the bleating of lambs, which in reality were natural wolves. The wolf in sheep's bleating is a hard variant of the fairy tale, but perhaps wolves are good actors. Certainly French opinion never mistook Signor Mussolini for a lamb. There is evidence, however, that it is unnecessary to take his speeches at their face value. When on a recent occasion he declared: "Words are beautiful things; rifles, machine guns, ships, aeroplanes, and cannon are still more beautiful," he was no doubt contradicting himself, for his own words are much more "beautiful" to himself than any other instrument of his policy.

While it is true that Italian policy has remained loyal to the substance of the offer to France, its exponents have presented a mixed front on the subject. Not only has Signor Mussolini differed in tone from Signor Grandi, but Italy has suffered from what may perhaps be called the admiral's complex in a somewhat peculiar way. It happens that the Minister of Marine in Italy, as in Japan, is an admiral: Admiral Sirianni. On May 28th he introduced the naval estimates to the Chamber, amounting as they did to some £2,600,000 more than in the previous year. He took the occasion to expound his view of what Italy's motive was in asking for parity with France. Perhaps he forgot what Signor Grandi had said on the same subject less than three weeks before. Or perhaps he did not forget. In either case he said the flat opposite to Signor Grandi. "The principle," he said, "of parity (which is nothing else but the concrete realisation of the conception of the relativity of forces) with regard to the most strongly armed continental nation is the only formula which in our opinion gives reciprocal guarantees and security." Whereas Signor Grandi had vindicated the psychological over the mathematical purpose of parity, Admiral Sirianni appeared to vindicate the mathematical over the psychological. Probably mathematics mean more to an admiral than moral confidence between the nations, especially when he thinks of the relative strength of navies. Signor Grandi, unperturbed, made another speech to the Senate on June 3rd in which he again spoke of the principle of "equivalence and reduction" as being Signor Mussolini's policy. Signor Mussolini has never interpreted his own policy as attractively as Signor Grandi has interpreted it for him.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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BEYOND PHYSICS.*

The latest of the voluminous writings of Sir Oliver Lodge—an author who is a household word not only on his own subject of physics, but in the realm of education, and in later years on the subject of personal immortality—is marked by his characteristic lucidity of thought and power of concrete reasoning. He says, in opening this particular thesis, that

Many times it must have been urged that physics and psychics were interlocked, at least to the extent that probably every psychic event had a physical concomitant, but hitherto no attempt has been made to imagine a mechanism or physical process for this interaction. The ether of space has not been a medium much attended to in philosophy; and if the ether contains the key to the connection between mind and matter, that key has been effectively hidden. Groping among the intricacies of modern physics I have found something that feels like a key; it has a handle at one end; what it has at the other end is still rather speculative. A good deal of cleaning up and brightening is needed before we can seriously try if it will fit the lock; and there is always the possibility that the handle may give way. But if we were too elaborately cautious about trying things, we should not make progress except in easily verifiable directions. The enterprise is worth some risk.

* *Beyond Physics, or the Idealisation of Mechanism: Being a survey and attempted extension of Modern Physics in a philosophical and psychological direction.* By Sir Oliver Lodge. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 5s. net.

It will be seen in this preparatory word that the existence of "psychic events" and "the ether of space" are taken for granted. It may be said on this first point that great bodies of Christian people deny the existence of "psychic events," yet they affirm events that are the most psychic of all, the Resurrection of the dead Christ and a world beyond the grave where the so-called dead know each other. The greater contains the lesser, and though there is certainly a great deal of fraud in many occult experiments, that does not exclude, at any rate from the point of the Christian, the possibility of truth. Sir Oliver also assumes the existence of what is called "the ether of space." This assumption will have scientific support, and indeed accounts for much that once was inexplicable, though it is an assumption. But the only alternative is action at a distance, another assumption which, to be frank, is repellent to the human mind. Yet it is an alternative.

Sir Oliver's first aim is "the rational interpretation and understanding" of the machinery of the Universe. He very properly emphasises the fact that in machines made by man the machine "is saturated with design and purpose." Is this not true also of the vast machinery which we are beginning to understand that makes up the material universe? "The great Natural Philosophers have always tried to look at the world, not only in minute and separate detail, but as a whole." Sir Oliver Lodge himself makes "an incipient attempt to unify physics and psychics; and towards this unification I wish to emphasise the importance of the universal connecting medium, the ether of space." It is "the only physical entity with perfect properties known to us." Matter, as well as ether, seems only a form of energy,

so that the whole physical universe is being resolved into ether and energy. . . . Matter itself is an inference. The whole external world is an inference, based on our sensations. . . . Matter is an instrument in which thought can be incarnated and manifested. . . . A close examination of the brain will not explain thought, though it will show us the mechanism by which thought is reproduced in perceptible material form. . . . It is easy enough to interfere with and destroy vitality, that is to say the manifestation of life; we can assist it to flourish, or we can retard it; but we have no other control over it, and no real understanding. The essence of life is beyond us: we know not whence it comes, nor whither it goes. . . . vitality must be due to the interaction of something which is not matter, but which utilises matter for its manifestation.

Sir Oliver does not deny at all that we may discover material combinations that involve life: "Something of the kind must have occurred in the past; and what has happened in the past may be going on in the present, and may possibly be understood and con-

trolled and humanly managed in the future." It is not a matter of fear, since the chemist or the physicist who achieves the feat is himself alive. "Rather it might be welcomed, even by religious people, as showing what an amount of thought was necessary to produce any imitation of what actually now is. If we are wise we would never be afraid of any progress of knowledge, we would never oppose or obstruct the achievements of science."

To this thinker "Life seems to be something pre-existing in the ether, which is able to enter into relation with matter when matter has attained a certain complexity; something which can endure that connection for a time, and then depart whence it came." Matter, Sir Oliver strictly insists, does not exhaust even the physical universe, "and that the ether, or whatever is equivalent to it, must be taken into account" and is "the seat of enormous energy." He conceives that this boundless ether is impregnated throughout with Life and Mind *in excelsis*, that "it is the home of the ideal and the supernal, and that all the life and mind we are conscious of is but an infinitesimal or residual fraction of this majestic reality." We must conceive that individualised life begins and, slowly, life becomes the seat of individual consciousness and that Personality, including Character and Memory, "is certainly a persistent reality." On this point Sir Oliver Lodge asserts that "it is an elementary deduction from experience" providing personality in fact exists. It seems like Mr. Gladstone's theory of conditional immortality.

Sir Oliver Lodge then enters into a highly technical but clear argument. The very basis of matter is now the subject of disputes, but Sir Oliver considers that the partial resolution of the electron into waves "is one of the most hopeful signs of the resolution of matter into some form of ether vibration or circulation, some form of constitutional periodicity in space." Life and mind can guide energy and can therefore interfere with what may be called the running down of the clock. "In so far as life acts at all, it is an organising and directing or guiding power. Well, I want to recognise that on a cosmic scale." Sir Oliver seeks for something in the physical world which is not energy but is capable of guiding or directing energy. Now "Life is a guiding and directing principle. It controls matter and energy, with a certain element of spontaneity, and yet it differs from both." What is the physical basis of this activity? Sir Oliver finds it in the ether, "in these constituent waves of excessively high frequency, far higher than anything we have yet apprehended." Ether is full of them, and the suggestion is made that these may be the physical basis of life and mind.

I suggest that they form the physical basis, though not in the least a material basis, for an idealistic interpretation of the universe, in which life and mind are supreme. They are a concomitant of the slow-moving group waves which constitute matter, and they can travel at a nearly infinite pace; one is tempted to say like thought.

It is a theory, or the beginnings of a theory, of the noblest kind. It goes far to explain certain parts of the machinery of the physical or supra-physical universe which are at present unexplainable. Even on the present showing there are elements of physical reality that look like the intervention of a Personality. Sir Oliver Lodge boldly premises such a Personality in his doctrine of ether, and shows that thought itself may be a phenomenon in the pageant of immortal things.

The major part of this fascinating book is a tentative exploration of the possible extension of the present doctrine of the higher physics. It is a logical development of that doctrine in so far as there is unity of thought among the great specialists. Sir Oliver thinks that the exploration appears to coincide with certain alleged phenomena which are not at present within the range of either a mathematical or a philosophical doctrine of physics. These, however, can wait and must be put aside in respect of the main argument, the position, it may be the dominant position, of group waves in the interplay of things. Sir Oliver suggests that Life itself must be taken into account in this interplay, that mathematical results cannot explain the system completely unless a directing force called Life is introduced. Whatever may be thought of this explanation it does seem to give a new aspect of the old conception—an inherent conception in humanity—of the orderliness and nobility of a Universe governed by a self-conscious God and pervaded by self-conscious beings, a conception that modern physical investigations into the nature of matter seemed to have lost.

J. E. G. de M.

* * *

THE GAME'S AFOOT.*

Since the end of the war, the world has taken to sport to a far greater extent than ever before. In the early years of this century the foreigner often regarded the Englishman's love of sport as something eccentric and rather foolish. But now all is changed. England has taught the world to play, and she now finds herself rivalled, if not assailed, by her erstwhile pupils.

But there is still one great national pastime which has remained peculiarly British and is not likely, for the present, to be adopted

by any other race. In a little book, recently written by Mr. Neville Cardus, the well-known critic of the game, this aspect is strongly presented: "Other games can be played in different parts of the world. Cricket is a game which must always be less than its true self if it is taken out of England and out of the weather of our English summer . . . wherever cricket is taken, England and the flavours of an English summer go with it." The reason must be that cricket is a very accurate reflection of the English character. The Latin races cannot play this game because their mental attitude cannot appreciate the characteristics of a game which reproduces the Anglo-Saxon outlook. "The laws of cricket tell of the English love of compromise between a particular freedom and a general orderliness, or legality." Mr. Cardus compares cricket to the English Constitution, which, because a growth and not a code, so largely represents English aspirations. "If everything else in this nation of ours were lost but cricket—her Constitution and the laws of England of Lord Halsbury—it would be possible to reconstruct from the theory and practice of cricket all the eternal Englishness which has gone to the establishment of that Constitution and the laws aforesaid." Cricket is therefore much more than a game, it is a great institution of national consciousness which we must ever strive to preserve.

To writers on cricket, especially those of great experience and knowledge of the game, as in the case of Mr. Cardus, post-war cricket is often compared unfavourably with the golden age of W. G. Grace in the early years of the century. Modern cricket is accused of becoming a dull, unenterprising game falling into the throes of professionalism. In the Introduction to *Cricket*, Mr. J. C. Squire writes, "the weightiest reason is probably the great diminution in the proportion of amateurs playing. It stands to reason that cricket dominated by amateurs must be livelier than cricket in which professionals set the tone." This is a general lament, and there is much truth in it. But a plea in mitigation may be made. The real professionals in cricket are amateurs in the true sense. When A. E. Knight caught Clem Hill at Sydney he thanked his Maker for the splendid deed. Moreover, after all, first-class cricket is only a part of cricket. It is made a national game by the thousands of local cricketers who play, the country over, every Saturday afternoon in the summer months. Though first-class cricket may be affected by too much professionalism and not enough life, local cricket will retain its spirit and *joie de vivre* because it is inherent in the Englishman's character which is hard to destroy. Moreover, professionalism does not necessarily mean merely to play for money. It can hardly be said of Woolley and Hobbs, or any of the great professionals, that their salaries are

* *Cricket*, by Neville Cardus. Longmans. 3s. 6d. net.

their first concern. In a sense it is their last. In cricket it is possible, more probable than in any other game, to retain all the benefits of professionalism without its defects.

For in cricket it is not the player who makes the largest score or takes most wickets who plays best: it is rather the cricketer who plays in the spirit of the game, careless of his place in the average list, spurred on by the thought of victory for his side. It will be a good day for cricket when the draw is penalised. It is wrong always to judge modern cricket in the light of past days. Like its Constitution, England possesses a game which has evolved, is growing, and will continue to grow while the game is played. Mr. Cardus quotes the earliest known rules of the game, written in 1744, and makes the comment: "The logic of necessity is to be felt in its every clause; long experience not 'high priori' thinking must have achieved the drafting." Cricket was not made; it grew as a spontaneous feature in the English life. Problems arise, and are overcome. The so-called golden age of cricket has passed, but another golden age must follow.

Mr. Roy Kilner once said to Mr. Cardus, "what's the matter with cricket is that we're gotten stuck for bobbins." A new technique is needed: all the possible dodges seemed to have been framed and faced. Mr. Kilner thought that the new departure will have "to be in the bowling." Mr. Cardus says on this point that Mr. Kilner was probably right,

for the history of the game shows that when the lob gave way to round-arm attack, and when the round-arm was succeeded by over-arm—then it was that cricket entered on a renewal of energy and began to reveal strange and delightful facets of its genius. Is it within the wit of mortal modern cricketers to think of a mode of attack that has not already been countered by means of a trick long since absorbed into the workaday technique of batsmanship? Perhaps, by going back to nature—in the form of a turf of honest English growth—cricket will live again through the dangerous and incalculable days of its youth. A good "shooter" now and again all along the grass, hissing like a snake, would take years of sophisticated mastery from cricket.

But, after all, the development of cricket is with the real masters. E. M. Grace and W. G. Grace, by their attack on fast bowling, put a new complexion on cricket. When Jessop faced the Australians in a famous match in 1902 he showed that he could conquer "great bowling on a vicious turf." It may be that Mr. Kilner is wrong and the new departure is to be in batting and not in bowling. But it will be a matter of growth and a succession of great cricketers. Mr. Cardus rightly says, "even had Grace never lived at all cricket would have grown out of its Hambledon cradle and have

marched over the English-speaking world." It is the attraction that cricket has for great-minded, great-hearted men of British stock that is the guarantee for the advancement into another golden age. "To play cricket" has grown into a proverb for national right-mindedness, and the game that gave rise to the proverb will still increase in worthiness and splendid skill and still dominate in one form or another the playing-fields of the British race.

* * *

PETERHOUSE.*

Dr. T. A. Walker, now Rector of Witlesham in Suffolk and sometime Senior Bursar of Peterhouse, is well known to the legal and international world since he is the author of the best history of the earlier phases of international law, and long ago at Cambridge was regarded as a lawyer of great promise. The attraction that the law of nations has for the clergy has another modern instance—Dr. Lawrence—and many other instances in the past. But all the while that Dr. Walker was apparently absorbed by legal studies and collegiate business he was in fact piling up—there is no other word—his history of Peterhouse. In 1912 he issued a mighty tome containing details of all the admissions to the oldest college at Cambridge from 1615 to 1911. But that was a mere drop in the ocean of his labours, since this material was more or less available though it had never been used. In 1924 he issued a Peterhouse Bibliography containing a host of books and manuscripts by or concerning Peterhouse men, a vast extension of a hand-list that he had made on the subject before the War (1912). But his most intense labours were to come. Already before 1911 he had contemplated going behind the Admission Books and dealing with the period from the foundation of the college in 1284 to 1616. The first volume of this remarkable piece of detailed research, issued in 1927, was carried to 1574; this year the work is finished with the result that probably Peterhouse is the only college in Oxford and Cambridge that has something like a list of its members from the very first.

A history of the eldest college leads the mind to the date of the university to which it belongs. The legends about the foundations of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge are very delightful and, strangely enough, though often laughed at, are not at all laughable. Certainly Oxford began to emerge from some germ

* *A Biographical Register of Peterhouse Men and some of their Neighbours from the Earliest Days (1286) to the commencement (1616) of the First Admission Book of the College.* Part I, 1284-1574 (1927); Part II, 1574-1616 (1930). By T. A. Walker. Cambridge University Press. 42s. net each volume.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

of scholarship with Thibaut d'Estampes about 1120, and certainly Cambridge goes back far earlier than 1209 when there was a migration from Oxford. They were both twelfth-century institutions. If Cambridge was only founded in 1209 it would have been hard for King Henry III to draw attention in 1231 to its multitude of students and also to refer to the unwillingness of the clerks "to suffer justice at the hands of the chancellor and masters of the schools according to the customs of scholars." It is necessary to assume that both universities are creations of the twelfth century. How then did they each claim to go back to the dim beginnings of things, not only to King Alfred in the case of Oxford, but to a maze of British or Welsh kings in the case of Cambridge? The seventeenth century saw many forgeries of ancient documents, but these legends have nothing to do with that interesting period. Alfred is already the founder of University Hall, Oxford, in the year 1378, and the fourteenth-century *Book of Hyde* sets forth the early origin of both universities. The present writer had a shot at the explanation of the problem some years ago and apparently the solution is easy. The first volume of Haddon and Stubbs* gives full information as to the great adult schools founded in the fifth century in the diocese of Llandaff by Illutus and others. These schools lasted till the year 1162 when "Henry, son of Arthen, the supreme teacher in general of all the scholars" died. A dispersion in fact followed and the two new schools at Oxford and Cambridge were the obvious goals, and thither the Welsh scholars carried their six centuries of history and tradition.

It may be that the rebellious and incorrigible clerks of whom the King complained in 1231 owed their source to the drift from Wales, but it was certainly the fact that the housing and moral conditions of Oxford and Cambridge in 1231-4 were very bad and tended to drive away foreign scholars. The creation of halls was much needed and a volume published in 1796 declares that Hugh de Balsham, then sub-prior of Ely, in 1257 purchased two hostels for this purpose from the Friars of the Sack near Trumpington Gate and the Church of St. Peter which he, then Bishop of Ely, in 1284 endowed as a college. There is no extant evidence to confirm the date 1257, but there is no doubt about the date 1284. In the meantime Oxford was rather busier in the matter of halls than Cambridge. The Statutes of Merton were drafted in 1264 and took final form in 1270 and 1274; and the Bishop of Ely on December 24th, 1280, adopted this Rule of Merton in his scheme for introducing a body of secular scholars into the ancient Hospital of St. John of Regular Canons. These scholars were removed to

* Haddon and Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents Relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, pp. 1, 158, 289, 298, 361, 462.

the Church of St. Peter Without Trumpington Gate in 1284, and Peterhouse drew breath on March 31st, 1284.

Dr. Walker deals with the Peterhouse records from this date. He had at his disposal a number of records in the College Treasury: the Old Register—from which he has been able to draw up a complete succession in Fellowships from about the year 1400—the Computus Rolls of audited college accounts dating from 1374, and Computus Rolls of special foundations (such as the chantry priests), title deeds, leases, miscellaneous documents, and the invaluable Bakehouse and Buttery Books, beginning in 1542, which contain "Weekly lists of the entire college resident personnel (Masters, Fellows, ex-Fellows, Fellow-Commoners, Bible-Clerks, Pensioners, Poor Scholars and Sizars, with college servants)." Dr. Walker has checked the weekly lists for some seventy years "with such care as to ensure the noting of the fresh arrival of a freshman." This deciphering of names was indeed an arduous task. The supplying of christian names was made practically possible by the various well-known publications of Dr. Venn and his son. The material gathered in this way opened the door to other and innumerable records, with the result that "the editor has found himself able to claim as belonging to the Peterhouse orbit a galaxy of stars in Church, State, and Letters, some of whom had not hitherto been assigned even to Cambridge," and among them Thomas Campion the poet. Dr. Walker rightly says, in dealing with the records of Religious Reform, that Peterhouse men "may feel that a society whose personal records bring under review Hugh Latimer, Rowland Taylor, John Whitgift and Peter Baro, not to mention such names as John Bridges, Dudley Fenner, Nicholas Bownd, Matthew Sutcliffe, Andrew Willet, Robert Sayer, and many another, did not fail in time of great testing to fulfil the end of its Founder." Indeed, the period of the Reformation shows this small college in a blaze of light. All classes of opinions were fully represented there: puritans, Jesuits, prelates, controversialists, diplomatists, lawyers, courtiers, adventurers by sea and land, poets, teachers, the company indeed of men who made the English Reformation and the Elizabethan Renaissance. The men in these pages are "together telling the tale of the growth of Society and of what men call Opinion, of the making of an imperial People, and of the way in which a small college can serve God greatly in Church and State."

The first volume of the Register of 1284 to 1574 is, and especially in its earlier fifteenth-century part, of singular fascination. It is often said that the two English Universities in the second half of the fifteenth century were at a very low ebb. These Peterhouse records show no sign of this. Thomas Lane was master from

of scholarship with Thibaut d'Estampes about 1120, and certainly Cambridge goes back far earlier than 1209 when there was a migration from Oxford. They were both twelfth-century institutions. If Cambridge was only founded in 1209 it would have been hard for King Henry III to draw attention in 1231 to its multitude of students and also to refer to the unwillingness of the clerks "to suffer justice at the hands of the chancellor and masters of the schools according to the customs of scholars." It is necessary to assume that both universities are creations of the twelfth century. How then did they each claim to go back to the dim beginnings of things, not only to King Alfred in the case of Oxford, but to a maze of British or Welsh kings in the case of Cambridge? The seventeenth century saw many forgeries of ancient documents, but these legends have nothing to do with that interesting period. Alfred is already the founder of University Hall, Oxford, in the year 1378, and the fourteenth-century *Book of Hyde* sets forth the early origin of both universities. The present writer had a shot at the explanation of the problem some years ago and apparently the solution is easy. The first volume of Haddon and Stubbs* gives full information as to the great adult schools founded in the fifth century in the diocese of Ilandaff by Ilutut and others. These schools lasted till the year 1162 when "Henry, son of Arthen, the supreme teacher in general of all the scholars" died. A dispersion in fact followed and the two new schools at Oxford and Cambridge were the obvious goals, and thither the Welsh scholars carried their six centuries of history and tradition.

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* Haddon and Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents Relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, pp. 1, 158, 289, 298, 361, 462.

the Church of St. Peter Without Trumpington Gate in 1284, and Peterhouse drew breath on March 31st, 1284.

Dr. Walker deals with the Peterhouse records from this date. He had at his disposal a number of records in the College Treasury: the Old Register—from which he has been able to draw up a complete succession in Fellowships from about the year 1400—the Computus Rolls of audited college accounts dating from 1374, and Computus Rolls of special foundations (such as the chantry priests), title deeds, leases, miscellaneous documents, and the invaluable Bakehouse and Buttery Books, beginning in 1542, which contain "Weekly lists of the entire college resident personnel (Masters, Fellows, ex-Fellows, Fellow-Commoners, Bible-Clerks, Pensioners, Poor Scholars and Sizars, with college servants)." Dr. Walker has checked the weekly lists for some seventy years "with such care as to ensure the noting of the fresh arrival of a freshman." This deciphering of names was indeed an arduous task. The supplying of christian names was made practically possible by the various well-known publications of Dr. Vehn and his son. The material gathered in this way opened the door to other and innumerable records, with the result that "the editor has found himself able to claim as belonging to the Peterhouse orbit a galaxy of stars in Church, State, and Letters, some of whom had not hitherto been assigned even to Cambridge," and among them Thomas Campion the poet. Dr. Walker rightly says, in dealing with the records of Religious Reform, that Peterhouse men "may feel that a society whose personal records bring under review Hugh Latimer, Rowland Taylor, John Whitgift and Peter Baro, not to mention such names as John Bridges, Dudley Fenner, Nicholas Bownd, Matthew Sutcliffe, Andrew Willet, Robert Sayer, and many another, did not fail in time of great testing to fulfil the end of its Founder." Indeed, the period of the Reformation shows this small college in a blaze of light. All classes of opinions were fully represented there: puritans, Jesuits, prelates, controversialists, diplomatists, lawyers, courtiers, adventurers by sea and land, poets, teachers, the company indeed of men who made the English Reformation and the Elizabethan Renaissance. The men in these pages are "together telling the tale of the growth of Society and of what men call Opinion, of the making of an imperial People, and of the way in which a small college can serve God greatly in Church and State."

The first volume of the Register of 1284 to 1574 is, and especially in its earlier fifteenth-century part, of singular fascination. It is often said that the two English Universities in the second half of the fifteenth century were at a very low ebb. These Peterhouse records show no sign of this. Thomas Lane was master from

about 1436 to 1473, and he was a most generous benefactor of the college. He gave books, manuscripts, vestments, ornaments, plate, and extensive lands. Under his rule of nearly forty years the college flourished in every way, and on his death in 1473 there were two candidates for the Mastership, both distinguished men, Dr. John Rowcliffe the Canonist, and Canon John Warkworth, who was elected. He was apparently an Oxford man of distinction and a Fellow of Merton, the author of a chronicle of the first thirteen years of the reign of Edward IV which was edited for the Camden Society in 1839 by J. O. Halliwell. Canon Warkworth presented to the Peterhouse library in 1481 fifty-five manuscripts (forty-five volumes of his gift are still in the library) and endowed the college with lands under his will. His death carries us up to the date of the coming of Greek to Cambridge and the end of the Middle Ages, but it cannot be said that Cambridge in the previous seventy years had fallen in estate. In 1501 Dr. John Watson, the Humanist and the valued friend of Erasmus, was elected Fellow. The outstanding figure of the age of Elizabeth was Master Andrew Perne, Dean of Ely, and his memory is green to-day, more than 340 years after his death. His benefactions of books, of a library, of money and lands did not exhaust his works, since he also enlisted many benefactions from others and stamped with his personality many generations of students. He was a man of the type of Benjamin Jowett and drew to the college men who were destined to be "distinguished in every walk of life." Dr. Walker is to be congratulated on the completion of his stern and detailed task which synchronises with the recent *rapprochement* between Merton and Peterhouse. The work is fittingly dedicated to the memory of Adolphus William Ward, Master of Peterhouse for the first quarter of the twentieth century, and in the line of the great Masters of Peterhouse whose lives are written in these admirable books.

J. E. G. de M.

* * *

GRUB STREET AND GENTLEMEN.*

It is hard to interpret the spirit of another century, but Mr. S. C. Roberts, the author of this excellent book, has greatly helped us to understand the eighteenth. The reader is driven backward, and finds himself very much at home with Samuel Johnson and his contemporaries. The first Lord Littleton makes an interesting picture of an eighteenth-century gentleman: Eton and Christ Church, a love of literature and facility in versification, the Grand Tour, which gave him opportunity to study political conditions

* *An Eighteenth-century Gentleman and other Essays.* By S. C. Roberts. Cambridge University Press. 6s. net.

abroad, Parliament and marriage, and a strong sense of duty, all went to the making of an eighteenth-century gentleman who was a sturdy Whig. His politics compelled him to reform abuses and to strive to leave the world a little better than he found it. Mr. Roberts sums up this good person of over two centuries ago.

Add to this picture of the idealised Whig a real enthusiasm for literature, a certain power of oratory, and a genuine piety, and you have the Good Lord Littleton. Awkward, angular and—it is to be feared—lacking a sense of humour, he fell short of greatness and became perilously near to being a prig.

Such is one verdict of the twentieth century.

Following upon this essay we come upon a character centuries apart, though of the same period and of the same goodness: Samuel Johnson, not alone the lexicographer, but the man. We must always be thankful to Boswell, his biographer, for the human being he presents. Mr. Roberts, in this volume, depicts the "Grub Street" of Johnson's day in a very vivid manner, and we wonder at the courage of the needy scholar who could face the ordeal of ill-health in such a metropolis. But the call of London, even the underworld of London, was such that nothing daunted that determined spirit. When he first arrived in London "with twopence-halfpenny and a half-written tragedy in his pocket, Johnson was almost without a friend." He had, indeed, "an introduction to Mr. Colson, a mathematical schoolmaster." At that early time of Johnson's career there was no James Boswell to chronicle events, for they did not meet till eight years after the publication of the *Dictionary*. It was through *The Gentleman's Magazine* that Johnson first became acquainted with Grub Street. Edward Cave was the Editor, and in November 1734 Johnson wrote to him suggesting that short literary dissertations in Latin or English would appeal to the public, and offered "to undertake on reasonable terms sometimes to fill a column." He, however, does not appear in the pages of *The Gentleman's Magazine* until 1738, the year after his arrival in London.

Johnson had to face the daily routine of journalism for his daily bread; he had failed as a schoolmaster, and not having a degree or money, he could not enter any of the learned professions. So without more ado he set himself to please the editor and the bookseller without whom the public would never hear of him, and Grub Street was the only way. The cant, as he felt it, of "Literature for Literature's sake" did not appeal to him, and the only genuine motive for writing (he said) was *necessity*. Whether he meant the necessity of imparting knowledge, or of keeping the wolf from the door, remains his secret. Fortunately for succeeding centuries his necessity knew no law. Johnson's knowledge of all sorts and

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conditions of men was gained in Grub Street, and it was there that his charity never failed. As Mr. Roberts so truly says, "Broken-down hacks, broken-down doctors, broken-down women—nothing mattered save that they were broken-down. It was in Grub Street that Johnson became the great apostle of the undeserving poor."

We pass from Samuel Johnson to Samuel Johnson; his books, in the next Essay, and a valuable one it is. The library, consisting of 662 lots, was sold by auction by Mr. Christie "at his Great Room in Pall Mall" on February 16th, 1785. These lots represented at the least 3,000 volumes, ranging from classical literature, theology, and philosophy, to history, law, and medicine. "Read any of them," he told Boswell, "they are all good." This essay specially marks the value of the work now under consideration.

The chapter on "The focus of the Lichfield Lamps" is more personal, since Johnson, though a Londoner of Londoners, never forgot his first twenty-six years of life, which were spent at Lichfield. His interest in his birthplace grew with the years. Changes, too, came with the years. The death of his mother in 1759 he felt most keenly. In the winter of 1761-2 he revisited his native city after an absence of twenty-four years, but he found the place of his imagination no longer existed, and after five days' wanderings he made a hasty retreat to more convivial and congenial surroundings in Grub Street. Notwithstanding the rude awakening of this first revisiting, "The Lichfield Lamps" drew him yearly within their radius. He was proud of his city, but as Mr. Roberts says, "ever a Londoner on a visit." An interesting essay on Lord Macaulay closes this small volume and affords some interesting aspects of the life and career of a man to whom England owes a debt of gratitude in his work as a man of letters, an educationist, and a statesman. The absence of an index is the only blot on a very happy excursion into the eighteenth and the earlier nineteenth centuries.

S. DE M.

* * *

AUSTRALIAN LITERATURE.*

This stimulating book on Australian Literature—which it is interesting to learn was wholly set up and printed in Australia—is by the Librarian of the University of Sydney, and is designed as a forerunner of a far more substantial book, and one to be desired, "A Short History of Australian Literature." It is certain that the literature produced in Australia, at any rate from the middle of the nineteenth century, has not only a note of its own but something that has the making of a new phase of litera-

* *An Outline of Australian Literature.* By H. M. Green. Whitcombe & Tombs Ltd., Sydney and Melbourne, New Zealand and London. 5s. net.

ture. Mr. Green defines Australian literature as "Everything written in Australia or as a result of personal experience of Australia." He includes also "work done by an Australian writer even after he has become permanently resident in another country, provided it is Australian in subject or attitude." On this ground are included, for instance, those of Mrs. Praed's novels in which the stories are Australian though they were written in England.

The Australian beginnings in any form of any literature cannot be pushed further back than the publication of a Government document in New South Wales on a creaky wooden press in 1795, by George Hughes. William Charles Wentworth, the founder of the University of Sydney, in 1819 published his *Statistical, Historical, and Political Description of New South Wales*, which Mr. Green describes as "the first book of any importance to be written by a native-born Australian." A work entitled *The Present State of Australia*, by Robert Dawson (after whom Dawson Point is named), and published by Smith, Elder and Co., in Cornhill, in 1830, has considerable literary value, but Mr. Dawson, though the chief agent of the Australian Agricultural Company, was not an Australian, yet he should have been mentioned since his book seems to have come within Mr. Green's limits.

The earlier poetry by Michael Massey Robinson, Barron Field, W. C. Wentworth, are eighteenth-century imitations, for the most part, and the most important writer of the first period was Charles Tompson, who survived to 1883. The second period from 1845-62 contains Charles Harpur, a genuine poet, William Forster, Robert Lowe (who was to become a leading light in English politics and English education and is known to fame as Viscount Sherbrooke), Henry Kingsley (the brother of Charles Kingsley) the author of *Geoffrey Hamlyn*, Rolf Boldrewood and Mrs. Campbell Praed, still happily with us, Catherine Helen Spence (who survived till 1910). It is when we come to the third period that we come to purely Australian poetry. Henry Kendall (1839-82) was greatly admired by Palgrave and Tennyson, and was undoubtedly a true though unequal poet. Almost contemporary was the still famous Adam Lindsay Gordon (1833-70), a poet of the first rank in his best poems, the poet of youth. He is indeed much more than "a mere rhyming Centaur" as Australia, who is forgetting him in the mass of inferior modern work, will presently remember. Marcus Andrew Hislop Clarke (1846-81) wrote a positively great novel in *For the Term of His Natural Life*. Indeed, Mr. Green calls it "one of the most powerfully written novels in English" despite the strained and over-coloured nature of the story. Rolf Boldrewood (Thomas Alexander Browne, 1826-1915) the romantic novelist who wrote *Robbery Under Arms*, Ada Cambridge (Mrs. George

Frederick Cross, 1844-1926), Mrs. Campbell Praed, daughter of the well-known Australian statesman, Mr. Murray-Prior, and "Tasma" (Jessie Catherine Couvreur, 1852-97) complete a group which will have to be recalled when the modernism of new Australia is somewhat forgotten. It is possible that William Henry Ogilvie, born in 1869, Barcroft Thomas Henry Boake (1866-92), and Henry Lawson, "the most representative figure in Australian creative literature," belong to this great period.

We find a transition period of merit in the verse of Arthur Henry Adams, born in 1872, Dowell Philip O'Reilly, of Ada Cambridge, James Hebblethwaite (1857-1921), and in the invention of the *Bulletin* short story, primitive, grim, like an early Scandinavian ballad in prose, in the prose of Dowell Philip O'Reilly (1865-1923) and the ecstatic poetry of John Shaw Neilson, who was born in 1872. He is for some reason classed as a modern. Mr. Green will induce the booklover to study the true moderns: Hugh Raymond McCrae, born in 1876, Jack Lindsay, born in 1900, Kenneth Slessor, born in 1901, Alexander Gordon Stephen, the new balladist, born in 1881, Henry Handel Richardson (a woman who is a married woman), Patricia Eldershaw and Marjorie Faith Barnard (the joint authors of *The Quartermaster*), and William Gosse Hay, a remarkable author who belongs to an earlier stage and has little new about him except his style, which is apparently neo-Meredithian. Nothing that Mr. Green says persuades the present writer to abandon the great period for the modernists. It is easy to be a modernist, but it is not easy to be a writer of such merit as Lindsay Gordon, Henry Lawson, and Mrs. Campbell Praed.

J. E. G. DE M.

EARLY LONDON.*

These two valuable books give us as much as we can expect at present on the early history of London, while the prehistoric ages, palæolithic and neolithic, in Middlesex are described in a wonderful way by Mr. C. E. Vulliamy. His method is truly scientific. We first learn the salient facts as to the topography and geology of the county and then are enabled to watch the mind of palæolithic man from the excellently described flint implements.

Within the last sixty or seventy years, many thousands of palæolithic implements and flakes have been found in the river deposits of Middlesex, generally in the gravels, but also in the low-lying brick-earths. Of these, by far the greater number are of Taplow age—that is they are definitely associated with the

* (1) *The Archaeology of Middlesex and London*. By C. E. Vulliamy. [The County Archaeologies: General Editor, T. D. Kendrick.] Methuen. 10s. 6d. net.

(2) *London Museum Catalogues: No. 3 London in Roman Times*. Lancaster House, St. James's, S.W. Paper Covers 2d. net; Bound 2s. 6d. net.

Middle Terrace of the Thames. The archaeological periods which they represent are those of Acheul and Le Moustier, with a marked predominance of the later of these two periods. In two separate places—Acton and Stoke Newington—the existence of "working floors" of Le Moustier date [some 50,000 years ago] has been proved, and flints of this date appear to be everywhere present in the Taplow gravels.

The Moustierian man was certainly at work, and his abilities as well as his belief seem to be certain. A skeleton of this remarkable ape-like type of man has not yet been found. The last phase of the palæolithic period—the period of La Madeleine—appears to be represented in the Thames refuse before the neolithic period emerges some 8,000 years before our era. The new Stone Age is plentifully illustrated by flints and also by notable pottery. By 1800 B.C. the Beaker folk, named from their pottery, brought in bronze and presumably copper. Mr. Vulliamy illustrates in a most admirable fashion the weapons, ornaments, tools, and pottery of the Bronze Age and of the Iron Age that entered Britain with the second incursions of Celtic tribes about 450 B.C. These Brythonic tribes were superimposed upon an earlier Celtic race, the Goidelic, which in fact can be seen *in situ*, as it were, both in Wales and Ireland and even in Kent and London. But these questions are not for Mr. Vulliamy. His task is Middlesex and London proper, and he performs that task, in the archaeological sense, admirably.

Mr. Vulliamy does not take a sentimental view of Roman London, nor indeed does he take a high view. He thinks rightly that it was a mercantile centre. No legion was ever quartered in London. "On the other hand, the instruments and appliances of a peaceful and civilised life have been found in prodigious quantities."

The works of sculpture and the examples of bronze casting found in London are seldom of real excellence, and cannot be compared with the fine specimens found in the provincial towns or on the sites of elegant villas. But there are a few exceptions. . . . None of the architectural fragments of Londinium is at all impressive: the mouldings of such fragments are coarse, and the decoration entirely devoid of artistic worth.

Mr. Vulliamy deprecates "restorations" of Londinium and pictures of Romano-British life. He regards the practice of trying to re-create the past, in this case, as absurd: "We possess neither documents nor materials for anything like a complete idea of Romano-British life, still less for complete architectural reconstructions of Romano-British towns." He adds, severely, "Judgment is too often seduced by fancy, and learning too often the accomplice of fiction."

Such severity it is necessary to deplore in the face of the collection of material for the reconstruction of Roman life in the third of the London Museum catalogues. It is possible to disagree with both these authors on certain points, especially relating to pre-Roman and post-Roman London, and to build an entirely different view on entirely different material. These problems are now being set for new solutions. The difficulty at the present point of time is the differences of Mr. G. F. Lawrence and Mr. R. E. M. Wheeler on the one hand, and Mr. Vulliamy on the other. The marvellous collections revealed in the latest catalogue seem to make it quite possible to reconstruct on purely scientific lines the life of Roman London and indeed to reconstruct the city itself, with its low-built, well-ventilated, and well-drained houses and broad streets, the very antithesis of the Mediæval London. There are signs of high art, good taste. It is a merchant's city, but a noble city, and possibly a city of merchant princes. That is the impression that the latest catalogue gives us, and it is somewhat surprising to find such discrepancies among these authorities. It is plain, however, that Londinium has still some surprises to give us.

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THE OLD EMPIRE AND THE NEW.*

To-day, when Imperial relations are seeking definition and expansion, it is profitable to consider those elements which built up the first British Empire, and then in part led to its destruction. In a little book of some eighty pages, Sir Charles Lucas has picked out "what were the main driving forces in the old Empire as compared with later times." In the early days of Imperial foundation, love of adventure and lust for gold played their part, but it was religion which really led to expansion. "Religion was an immense force in favour of making a British Empire; but it was a force which, in the case of the English in the sixteenth century, and to a large extent later also, operated more by repulsion than attraction." Conversion of the heathen was often put forward as the true motive of Empire. But in fact the British settler never sought new lands to save, but to be saved therein. The great religious impulse which drove the *Mayflower* across the ocean was designed to free the conscience of the persecuted, not to Christianise a heathen land.

In the seventeenth century trade became the great factor in English life, and the English colony assumed a new aspect and a fresh importance in the eyes of the Englishman. The English dependence was not allowed to pursue a natural growth, but was

* S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d. net.

regarded ruthlessly as a tool in the expansion of English trade. It was not till the nineteenth century, in the era of free trade, that this selfish economic policy was stopped. As Sir Charles Lucas says: "Trade killed the old Empire, but it has been given no chance of killing the new." Dependence has given way to interdependence. Sir Charles refers to Mr. Gladstone's conception of Empire which is accepted to-day, and which is in striking contrast to the motives behind the structure of the first Empire. "Perfect freedom and perfect self-government he desired to be associated with British colonisation; not the acquisition of dependencies, but the founding of peoples on the English pattern, the multiplying of happy Englands beyond the seas." This little book is well worth reading, written as it is by an expert, if only to show the motives of early colonisation by the British in their true perspective.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

The Germans at Versailles, 1919,* by Victor Schiff, forms a welcome supplement to Nowak's *Versailles*, which for the first time took us behind the scenes of the German Delegation, though the author himself was not an eye-witness. The Editor of *Vorwärts*, on the other hand, travelled in the first train, and stayed till the end. The humane and conciliatory character of the writer is revealed in the preface to the first German edition, dated May 1929, in which he disclaims any desire to re-open wounds that are healed, and reminds his readers "what astonishing progress in thought and action men have made within ten short years along the road to genuine peace." Herr Schiff is true to his word. Like other Germans, he laments the severity of the Treaty, the ferocity of Clemenceau, and the fanaticism of the Parisian Press; but he has more understanding than most of his countrymen for the agonising sufferings which dictated the spirit and form of the settlement, and he never for a moment suggests that Germany was blameless either in her diplomacy or in her conduct of the war. The hero of the story is Brockdorff-Rantzau. Erzberger, we are told, blamed the notes of the German Delegation as too sharply worded, and his criticism provoked the profound dislike of the Foreign Secretary who, in the author's opinion, played a very difficult part with skill, courage, and dignity. Few readers of these poignant pages will forget the picture of the delegates in the Hôtel des Reservoirs, penned in and stared at like wild animals in a cage, to whom each day brought fresh evidence of the devastating hatred by which they were surrounded. The Delegation was unanimously against acceptance, and the author at that time shared its views. But on looking back after ten years he sees that the pessimism of the stunned and despairing Fatherland was exaggerated, and that even the Treaty of Versailles has been unable to prevent the recovery of his nation.

* Williams & Norgate 1930. 7s. 6d.

Sir Alfred Hopkinson's *Penultima** is a volume of recollections rather than an autobiography, which the author is too modest to write. The tone of the book is singularly mellow, for he has seen much of the world during his fourscore years, and reflected deeply on what he has seen. He might, with equal justice, be called a Conservative-Liberal or a Liberal-Conservative, never standing very far from the middle of the road, and thus representing the tendency to good-natured compromise which, more than any other quality, has made England what it is. Though of Puritan stock, he can sympathise with the High Churchman, and having voted at different times Liberal and Conservative, he realises how much each of the great historic parties has contributed to the service of the nation. As a practising lawyer, a Professor of Law, head of Manchester University, Member of Parliament in the last decade of the Victorian era and again after the war, he has had a varied experience of life and of men which leaves him unsoured and not unhopeful. We come nearest to his real mind in the Epilogue, which is at once a confession of faith and a lay sermon. The lesson of the story is that we live in a changing world, and that our duty is to adjust the old to the new, to keep our hearts free from bitterness, to believe in human nature, and to find happiness in unwearying service. In these unpretentious pages we find the portrait of a good citizen.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

"Polish Romantic Literature,"† by Dr. Julian Krzyzanowski, is a learned and interesting study of some of the greatest of Polish writers. By far the most celebrated is Mickiewicz, "the first great personality in Polish literature," equally distinguished as a poet and a patriot. In sixty pages we are informed about his early life in Lithuania, his imprisonment by the Russians, his long years in exile, his revealing lectures in hospitable Paris, and his many writings, culminating in *Master Thaddeus*, "with its Homeric dignity and perfect beauty." Though no poem can be properly judged in a translation, readers of the epic can at any rate sense the atmosphere of Poland, which still existed in the hearts of her children though she no longer appeared on the map of Europe. Like Sienkiewicz, who is so much better known in the West, Mickiewicz helped to keep alive the soul of his people, in the certain hope of national resurrection. The studies of the less-known Slowacki and Krasinski are equally detailed. Dr. Krzyzanowski is a sympathetic interpreter, and he skilfully relates Polish Romanticism to the general movement in European literature and history.

The Baroness Sophie Buxhoeveden gives a wonderful account in her book "Left Behind; Fourteen months in Siberia during the Revolution, December 1917-February 1919"‡ of her experiences in reaching and being with the Imperial Family in their exile and imprisonment, and, after their disappearance, the difficult, hazardous

* Martin Hopkinson, Ltd., 23, Soho Square. 18s.

† Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.

‡ Longmans. 12s. 6d. net.

life she led before finally travelling to safety across Siberia to Vladivostok in a British military train. She at last reached Denmark by way of Japan, the United States, and England, in time to greet the Dowager Empress Marie of Russia on her return in 1919, an exile, to her own country. The writer tells the story of those tragic two years with a straightforward simplicity that appeals to the reader's interest in a way which no exaggeration could do; she has not trusted to her memory alone, but has had recourse to her own contemporary notes.

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"The School for Wives" by M. André Gide, translated from the French by Miss Dorothy Bussy, is an excellent study of many characters in the shortest possible space. M. Gide gives very little explanation of the plot, yet the diary (which is the form the tale takes) makes the whole situation perfectly clear. The novel reader who does not like brevity, will not like this short story; it is too obvious, too matter-of-fact; but the reader who loves sketches of life will find many living folk, and will enjoy a tale of characters rather than of events. The husband and wife, the hero and heroine of the book, are particularly alive; the former a self-satisfied humbug, remains the same for twenty years; but the revelation of his character changes his impressionable, hero-worshipping fiancée into a critical but anxious wife.

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The translation by Mr. Hamish Miles of M. Paul Morand's novel, "Black Magic,"‡ will bring this remarkable book within the range of numbers of English readers who either will not or cannot cope with the French language, but who do wish to enjoy the work of this well-known French writer. The book consists of a collection of stories dealing with negro life and white civilisation as it affects the negro in his relation to the white man. M. Morand depicts the negro as a curious blending of primitive superstition, together with shrewd ability and a great ambition to be on terms of equality with white civilisation. A knowledge (however slight) of the history of the American negro and his efforts to educate himself to the white standard of life in general will greatly add to the interest of the book. M. Morand, however, evidently does not consider that the negro can keep to the white standard even if he attains it, for in most of his stories the negro falls from the height of his ambition through either mental or physical weakness.

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"A Wayfarer on the Rhine,"† by Mr. Malcolm Letts, is a delightful addition to a deservedly popular series, and can be read with equal pleasure by those who know and those who have still to visit that land of beauty and romance. No living Englishman knows so much of the literature of travel as the author, who enriches his pages with many quotations from travellers both celebrated and relatively obscure, English and foreign. The chapter on Weinsberg, a citizen of Cologne who kept a voluminous diary during the sixteenth century, will be new to most readers, and the account of

* Knopf. 6s.

† Heinemann Ltd. 8s. 6d. net.

‡ Methuen. 7s. 6d.

the opening of the imperial and royal tombs at Speyer in 1900 is of dramatic interest. Starting with the glorious Minster of Charlemagne at Aachen, Mr. Letts takes us at a leisurely pace up the Rhine from Cologne, and follows its tributaries to Frankfurt, Heidelberg, and other places of historic renown. The illustrations are worthy of the text, and it is impossible to imagine a more inspiring guide through the regions of the middle Rhine.

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In "The Story of St. Christopher's College, Blackheath,"* we have a record of a movement for certificated women teachers just twenty-one years old. On February 3rd, 1886, the late Lord Davidson, then Archbishop of Canterbury, opened an unpretentious house in Montpelier Road, Blackheath, and declared it open as "St. Christopher's College for training of leaders in religious education." The new College was the fruit of the efforts of the Rev. William Hume Campbell, a specialist in the practice, philosophy, and history of education, who realised that Sunday school as well as weekday education needed scientific thinking out. In 1913 a Building Fund was started after five years' earnest work and despite the turmoil of the war-years the fund grew and the Queen took a personal interest in the College. In 1916 the College was completed and the students were at work in their permanent home. In December 1919 Mr. Campbell, the Principal, could write: "The College has entered a new lease of life." Eighty students were present at the Annual Reunion. In June 1925 Mr. Campbell died, a victim of overwork, but the College with its duty of supplying trained teachers at home and abroad went on under the Rev. A. R. Browne-Wilkinson. The training of women in theology and the theory and practice of education by certificate courses (the College is also recognised as a training centre by the Cambridge Teachers' Syndicate) has been most successful in supplying workers to act as organisers in dioceses or parishes and to supervise the religious training of children out of day-school hours, and also workers for the Canadian Caravan Mission and kindred undertakings in the Dominions. The work of Mr. Campbell has met a real need and his successor, with the help of the Sunday School Institute, has made it as permanent as it was necessary.

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In "Church School Problems, 1920-30"† Canon W. J. Brown, Director of Religious Education in the Diocese of Wakefield, reprints articles which appeared in *The Guardian* and *The Church Times*. The little book is intended primarily for Church school managers who are in need of guidance. Canon Brown believes that the Government will give fair play to Church schools and may be even more generous than its predecessors. He advises that all the schools in a reorganisation should be regarded as one group, thereby securing that a village should not be left without a Church school. He thinks that the Cowper Temple clause should be applied to all types of advanced schools. This, he believes, would provide a way out of the present impasse. The reprinted articles give the history of the education controversy up to May 30th, 1930, from the point of one who, though a High Churchman, sees that the problem is not only a Church matter.

* The College. 18.

† The Rev. Canon Brown, 5, South Parade, Wakefield. 64

PARLIAMENTARY RETROSPECT.

A natural difficulty exists in all new dominions, because men change masters willingly, hoping to better themselves . . . in which they are deceived, as experience shows them that they have gone from bad to worse. . . . Thus you (the new rulers) find enemies in all those whom you have injured by occupying that dominion; and you cannot maintain the friendship of those who have helped you to obtain that possession, as you will not be able to fulfil their expectations; nor can you use strong measures with them, being under an obligation to them.—*The Prince*, Chapter III.

A LITTLE more than a year ago I was writing here on Parliamentary prospects, and found them fair enough. Now I come to deal with the retrospect, and there is a somewhat heavy change. For a time the early promise was well fulfilled. After a King's Speech which contained in outline much that was attractive, Mr. MacDonald in America and Mr. Snowden on the Continent worthily represented the nation and stood high in its esteem, while at home there seemed to be a reasonable prospect of a Council of State in which Labour and Liberal at least would be able to co-operate harmoniously. The outlook was threatened indeed by the persistence of the deep depression in employment, but even here all eyes were fixed on Mr. J. H. Thomas and his lieutenants with considerable hope. Now the esteem is clouded with impatience and the hope is giving way to despair. All Governments disappoint their supporters, but the disillusionment in this case has been abnormally swift and severe.

Various causes have contributed to the change. Failures of individual Ministers, an obstructive Opposition, a factious rebel group within the ranks, a trade collapse that is by no means confined to this country; all these have played their part. But the key to the position can best be found in the words of Machiavelli which stand at the head of this article. They are quoted from the chapter which deals with "new dominions" and were written of the Sforzas and Borgias who won a temporary predominance out of the distractions of the Italy of their day, but they apply with equal force to the elective princes of our own time. In one sense, of course, any General Election which results in a change of Government gives birth to a "new dominion," but there are degrees of newness. And, generally speaking, Conservative administrations suffer less from this cause than any others, for they have succeeded in retaining, at least in rural areas, a certain glamour of hereditary right. They put up a magnificent pretence that their period of Opposition is always an interregnum and their return to Power a restoration. They are there because of what they are or of what their grandfathers were and not of what they do, and their

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function is to preserve a tradition rather than to solve a problem. So that if, as sometimes happens, they do nothing, they are only fulfilling the desire of most of their friends and the expectation of all their enemies. Of a Liberal Government more is expected because more has been obtained in the past. And consequently even a Ministry so brilliant as that of 1906, with a record of legislative achievements upon which all its successors have built and which have preserved the social order in post-war days, could not survive two General Elections without serious loss of strength. But a Labour Government is a "new dominion" in the completest sense and experiences the full burden of Machiavelli's words. It is the new broom, and has promised to sweep all clean. In Opposition it has encouraged all discontents, focused all vague aspirations, and held its predecessors responsible for every unemployed worker and every hungry child. And the passions which it has roused in its path to power turn readily against it in the days of office, so that it stands between fears that will not be allayed and desires that cannot be satisfied.

And so it is that Mr. Snowden, however cautious and even conservative his policy may be, is prejudged by vested interests as a robber of hen-roosts, and his increases of taxation to which any other Chancellor would probably have been forced, and which any other Socialist Chancellor would almost certainly have doubled, are taken down and used in evidence against him. On the other hand "the hungry sheep look up" and conceive themselves most indifferently fed. They speak in the accents of the Clyde and can quote the very phrases of *Labour and the Nation*, official resolutions of Conference and Congress, and the speeches of Right Honourable Gentlemen on the Front Bench. Soon exhortation gives place to recrimination, the "ginger group" becomes a rebel faction, Mr. Brockway gets himself suspended, Mr. Cocks insults the considered decision of the Cabinet, Mr. Beckett carries off the Mace, Mr. Sandham brings charges of corruption and intemperance against his colleagues, and Mr. McGovern disowns as a thing "imposed upon me" the blessing of the Prime Minister on his candidature. And "you cannot use strong measures against them because you are under an obligation to them"—or, at least, to those whom they represent.

A Government can only escape from such difficulties if it can appeal to an exceptional administrative and legislative record or command a personal loyalty deep enough to silence doubt and disappointment. In administration it is in the sphere of Foreign Affairs that the greatest cause for satisfaction is to be found, and the credit here is due not only to Mr. Henderson, but to the Prime Minister and to the Government as a whole. The London Naval

Treaty was, it is true, only a partial success, but no fair-minded critic would lay any blame for that incompleteness upon our own Ministers. The achievements performed in this field are such as no Liberal would depreciate, but naturally and inevitably the Labour Exchange looms larger in the public eye than all the Chancelleries of the world, and the stark fact of two million unemployed has distracted attention from more distant successes. Explanations may be given, but the man in the street has been taught by the present Ministers themselves to use such statistics without discrimination against those in power.

On the legislative side there are Acts dealing with Pensions, Coal, and Slum Clearance, each one of which is at least a partial performance of election pledges. There is an Unemployment Insurance Act representing the second and extremely reluctant thoughts of the Minister of Labour, and there are measures dealing with Road Traffic and Land Drainage which are valuable if unexciting. On the other hand the Education, Hours of Employment, and Consumers' Council Bills have been postponed, and other promised measures have not yet seen the light of day. Due allowance must be made for the time wasted by deliberate Tory obstruction, particularly on the Finance Bill (though Mr. Snowden must bear his share of responsibility for provoking that). After all allowances have been made it is a fair record, but it still leaves some leeway for leadership to make up.

On the personal side it is probable that Mr. MacDonald still commands large reserves of affection and loyalty among his followers in Parliament and in the country. But inside at least he has not succeeded in mobilising those reserves at will. He speaks as though he found it distasteful to explain himself to the House and sometimes even as though he were unprepared to do so. He wraps simple matters in complicated phrases, and gives the impression of a man defending himself with a feather-bed.

Mr. Snowden, on the other hand, is like a man attacking with a club. With him there is no lack of clarity or definition. As far as Parliament is concerned he has seemed to be the real leader, the man who makes the final decision. Yet one would not say so much that he has increased his reputation as that, for good or ill, he has accentuated it. He was known as strong and has become masterful; he was reputed tactless and has grown almost unbearable. He has pitted himself in turn against the Opposition, the Liberals, and the Rebels, and so far has emerged almost invariably victorious. But these victories have been won at a price; they have widened cracks, and stimulated animosities, and may ultimately shorten the life of the Government. Mr. Henderson and Mr. Alexander have done good work, but it has been mainly outside

Parliament. Mr. Graham, on the contrary, has been constantly before the eyes of the House, and has grown steadily in political stature. In the conduct of the Coal Bill he had a task second only in difficulty to that of Mr. Thomas, but by his lucidity, patience, and intellectual grip he has been the most outstanding success of all the Cabinet. Mr. Morrison is rising to the front rank, and the Attorney-General is already there and has proved an invaluable assistant to every Minister in turn. Miss Bondfield perhaps deserves a consolation prize for a certain cold courage in the discharge of her most unpopular office. There is no lack of ability on the back-benches, but it is neutralised by the fact that so much of it finds expression only in revolt. Mr. Noel Baker and Mrs. Hamilton have been most conspicuous among the "reliables," but the rebels, though they have lost in Mr. Wheatley their most subtle brain, still include every variety of those whom Victor Hugo described as "les mineurs." There is the ascetic Maxton, the calculating Wise, and the volcanic Kirkwood. "Tel pioche avec l'idée, tel pioche avec le chiffre, tel pioche avec la colère."

When all the personal forces have been weighed and balanced there would seem to be enough to maintain a Government in normal times. But the situation is far from normal, and it was clear from the first that it was Mr. J. H. Thomas and his associates who occupied the key position. And their failure is virtually admitted by their removal. Mr. Thomas has returned to the office which he enjoys and understands: Sir Oswald Mosley has resigned in disgust and formed a group of two of his own: and Mr. Lansbury, though still Commissioner for Works in the plural, is no longer specially responsible for work in the singular.

And in face of that failure at the critical point the Government could scarcely have survived if it had been faced by a coherent, determined, and forceful Opposition. But Fate, which has sent him so many trials, has been kind to Mr. MacDonald in that vital respect. For the Conservatives are shaken by a dissension that recalls the Balfour-Chamberlain dispute of former days. At the General Election they tried to bring a policy to their leader, but he preferred "Safety First," failed, and has never been allowed to forget it. Now the Protectionist Die-hards are trying to drag the leader inch by inch to a policy, a perfect target of a policy, with Food-Taxes as the conspicuous bull's-eye. Mr. Baldwin thought apparently that he could combine it with "Safety First" by ruling the bull's-eye out of bounds for the next election. But on so vital a matter the electors will not be satisfied with a series of "ifs": they will vote for food-taxes or against them. And, though Mr. Baldwin is personally popular and received considerable general sympathy in his struggle against outside interference,

still he must face the issue, and if he desires to avoid the unpopularity of food-taxation must pledge himself plainly against it. Failure to do that has played into the hands of his enemies, crippled his authority, and, on the occasion of the Vote of Censure towards the end of the Session, exposed him to actual ridicule.

With its leader virtually out of action and its ranks divided by this issue, the official Opposition has been far from impressive. It has been capable of mustering in full strength for a special "stunt," but in general even its attendance has been lamentable. On several occasions on the Finance Bill, which had been declared by Tory spokesmen to be of vital importance, only a mere fraction of the total voting strength passed the tellers. There has been a faithful nucleus of industrious politicians, but their energies have been devoted in the main to mere obstruction. And if the duty of an Opposition amounts to no more than this, that being unable themselves to legislate, they will as far as they can prevent any legislation whatever, certainly Sir Basil Peto and Captain Crookshank are masters of the art. But for opposition in the vital sense, opposition that provokes, defies, and challenges, Mr. Winston Churchill has stood almost alone. Sir Laming Worthington Evans has had his good days, and Sir Kingsley Wood and Mr. Oliver Stanley have done their share, but generally speaking it has been a one-man show. And the word "show" has here a peculiar appropriateness. For it has been a singularly detached effort, and, though Conservatives have applauded, it has been as spectators watching a performance rather than as soldiers joining in a charge. One feels that Winston has no roots in the Tory Party, or perhaps anywhere. He recalls Carlyle's description of Dumouriez: "Elastic, unwearied man . . . scheming and struggling from the very birth of him . . . how irrepressible! . . . we will name him on the whole one of Heaven's Swiss; without faith; wanting above all things work, work on any side." No work that he has ever done has been more brilliant than that of this session, and none has earned less gratitude from those whom it served. And while he has been fighting their battles, they are plotting to prevent his return to the Exchequer.

The Liberal Party, so far as the performance of its individual members is concerned, has well maintained the bright promise of the early months of the session. Mr. Lloyd George whenever he intervenes in debate is, for as long as he speaks, undisputed master of the House, and his unique range of experience and his unabated natural force give him a personal importance greater than that of any other living statesman. Sir John Simon has been necessarily pre-occupied with India, and Mr. Runciman with business cares of national importance, but Sir Herbert Samuel has

done three men's work, and his Parliamentary gifts are universally recognised. Sir Tudor Walters and Mr. E. D. Simon on Housing, and Dr. Burgin on Foreign Affairs are listened to as acknowledged experts, Mr. Leif Jones deserves the gratitude of the party for his constant attention and sound guidance through the dreary wastes of the Finance Bill, and Mr. Ernest Brown's industry and vigour are inexhaustible. Mr. Graham White is winning an assured position, and Mr. Isaac Foot is one of the finest natural orators in Parliament.

With all this talent (and more) the Party was and is capable of exercising an influence corresponding to its support in the country rather than to its numbers at Westminster. It must be admitted that it has so far not fully risen to the height of its capacity. The impression of clear purpose which prevailed before Christmas has been somewhat blurred, and strength has been sometimes dissipated. It must however be remembered that Liberal decisions in the division-lobby are far less simply determined than those of the other parties. Self-preservation keeps Ministerialists together, and even the rebel group obey that instinct to the extent of only voting against the Government when it is reasonably certain that no one else will do so. And Conservatives, however much they may quarrel outside, can generally unite in an anti-Government vote, guiding themselves by the simple creed of Mr. Charles Williams: "I have been sent here by my constituents to make myself objectionable to the Government, and I am doing so." But Liberals have not been sent to support or to defeat a particular administration, but to promote certain principles which can only be fully realised by a Liberal Government. The present Ministers are very far from satisfying these principles, but they would assuredly be set back still farther by a Conservative restoration. In spite of all disappointments and irritations of the past year the Gangway of the House is still morally wider than the Floor. This is particularly evident with regard to Foreign Affairs, the League of Nations, Disarmament, and Fiscal Policy. There is often, therefore, a long-range as well as a short-range view to be taken of a particular vote. The control of a balancing force imposes a great responsibility, and that responsibility is not discharged merely by maintaining a state of equilibrium. The power needs to be exercised definitely, intelligibly, and unitedly. Occasional failures to achieve this result have naturally been magnified by enemies of the party. They are not due to any permanent division of forces or cleavage of principle, but to the hypertrophied conscience of individual members which occasionally causes them to charge off in unexpected directions. They are none the less to be regretted, and the measure of influence of the party, and its ultimate electoral

success, depend upon the realisation of a collective duty to the whole body of Liberal opinion in the country besides the several duties of individual members.

Certainly this is a time when all Liberal forces in Parliament and without must be consolidated and inspired for a supreme effort. For Liberalism has now to meet once more the old challenge on the vital issue of Free Trade. It is a challenge that need not be feared if it is strenuously taken up. Neither essential economic principles nor their application to our national needs have been changed by the panic defeatism of a few bankers. And the inclusion of food-taxes (whether immediately or remotely) presents the Tariff campaign in its most vulnerable form. But if it is not fought energetically and promptly it will become formidable; not from any inherent strength or brilliant advocacy, but because people in acute distress are easily tempted by any widely advertised remedy. And there will certainly be no lack of advertisement. Lords Beaverbrook and Rothermere may not have much that is new to say, but at least they have the power to say it twice a day to millions of people. Further, the promises of Protection are addressed directly to well-organised bodies of producers, while its threats are diffused over the whole scattered mass of the consuming population. It must be the task of Liberalism to rally, concentrate and lead a great national defence of the standard of living. If there is any failure in that task we shall be faced with rising prices, strikes to secure a corresponding advance in wages, growing costs of production, and then demands for yet higher tariffs in a vicious circle.

When the final conflict will come is still uncertain. The disorganised state of the Conservative Party prevents it from being anxious to precipitate the crisis, and there seems to be a general disposition to leave the present Ministers to deal with the coming Round Table Conference on India. After that only their own strenuous efforts in dealing with unemployment can prolong their tenure of office. If they fail they cannot share the responsibility. There is no question here of being "in office but not in power." They have been granted an accelerated Parliamentary procedure by the vote of the House, and Liberals have not only treated them with unexampled patience, but have offered active co-operation at the risk of being compromised by their failure. And that in spite of the fact that in the matter of electoral reform the most elementary measure of justice has been refused to Liberal demands. But such patience cannot last for ever. The tide is still rising against the Government, and if they can find no means to stem it a point will be reached when by its very weight and volume it will sweep them from their place.

F. KINGSLEY GRIFFITH.

THE PROTECTIONIST ILLUSION.

THE latest revival of the Protectionist theory that Governments by interfering with trade can tax nations into prosperity, has in it some elements of panic as well as some elements of farce. There is much, it is true, which is disquieting in the position of British trade to-day. The taxes and charges weighing on our industry are perilously high. Saving and enterprise are inevitably discouraged. Economy is completely out of fashion. Mr. Snowden's present Budget shows an increase of some eighty millions over his last. The cost of government is estimated to be five times what it was before the War. It was significant to see the President of the Bankers' Association reminding the Chancellor of the Exchequer last May that cheap production and the creation of reserves were of the essence of successful business, and that only the careful spending of public money could reduce "the mountain of debt." The figures of unemployment, to some extent fictitious, and swelled by the reluctance of all recent Governments to examine and check the misuse of the dole, continue to rise higher and higher: and the palliatives suggested for them are sometimes even worse than the disease. The costs of production have risen to a point which makes it difficult for our traders to retain their markets. *The Times*, indeed, regards this as "the root cause of the change of fiscal opinion in the City," though no one has explained how the costs of production are to be lessened by imposing taxes upon raw materials and food. Commercial men of standing, thoroughly alarmed, seem willing to grasp at any scheme, even though it be confused and short-sighted, which may help certain embarrassed British industries to realise a profit, and perhaps to reduce their commitments to the banks. And even clear-sighted Conservatives who, like Lord Salisbury, remember that our industrial difficulties are too deep-seated to be removed by any erection of tariffs, are for the moment swept into the singular adventure, called to begin with Empire Free Trade, which undertakes somehow or other—none of its leaders have yet shown how—to restore commercial prosperity to this country.

There are therefore real grounds for uneasiness, though not for panic. But it is when studying the arguments of the Crusaders that one becomes, if one may say so respectfully, more conscious of the elements of farce. The appearance of Lord Beaverbrook in the rôle of Mr. Chamberlain, with Lord Rothermere in the background as an inconsequent ally, the alarm which descended on Conservative headquarters, and Mr. Baldwin's attempts, so like Mr. Balfour's in the old days, to draw his followers together, and to give coherence and plausibility to widely-divergent views, have

added to the gaiety of politics, if they show little prospect of relieving the depression of trade. Of Lord Beaverbrook's original programme it is not necessary to say much, because it has already been modified past recognition, and every day convinces its more serious supporters how wholly remote from practical politics it is. It never had much to do with Free Trade or much concern for the interests of Great Britain. It never faced—nor indeed seemed to be aware of—the facts to be considered or the difficulties to be overcome. It was designed to give to certain Colonial producers—Lord Beaverbrook, a patriotic Canadian, may well have had the interests of the Canadian wheat-pool in his mind—a protected market and larger profits, profits of which there is no ground whatever for supposing that the British farmer could secure a share. To attain this end it required the Dominions to sacrifice their revenue and their protective system, which they had never shown the least inclination to do, and it required us to tax our bread and meat and raw materials, and to impose duties which must inevitably injure and decrease our foreign trade. We refuse to believe that even Lord Beaverbrook's followers conceive it possible to levy these new duties without prejudicing our foreign customers and raising the price of our supplies. Protection which did not raise prices would be of no use. The scheme when produced was condemned with rapid unanimity by every man qualified to speak for the Dominions: it would seem difficult indeed to have propounded a bargain more unpopular with our Dominions and more unfair to us. The odd thing is that any plan so crude and ill-digested should have alarmed the managers of the Conservative Party as it did.

Mr. Baldwin at first would have nothing to do with the new Crusade. His reluctance to accept it was as evident as it was sincere. In April 1929, not long ago, he had explicitly stated:

"We are pledged, and shall continue to be pledged, not to introduce Protection. We are pledged, and shall continue to be pledged, not to impose any taxes on food."

In February of this year he declared that Empire Free Trade was impossible, that no responsible statesman would introduce it, and that no Dominion would accept it if he did. But the demand that he should say something to satisfy the Crusaders and to unite his followers became so insistent that his good nature could no longer resist. The country has had to pay already—it may yet have to pay more dearly—for Mr. Baldwin's willingness to yield, in the supposed interests of his party, to politicians of less sound judgment than his own. In March he announced that he would accept the idea of a Referendum on food taxes. They were so unpopular that he would not propose them, but if the electorate would accept

them he had no objections of his own. It did not seem to occur to the Conservative leaders that they might have been expected to form an opinion as to whether a change so important and far-reaching was good or bad for the British people. Lord Beaverbrook at first hailed the promise of a Referendum with delight. Indeed he claimed that it was his own suggestion. He called off his Crusade, quelled his revolt, and ceased to collect funds for a separate party. The Conservative Whips breathed more freely. But within a few weeks Lord Beaverbrook seems to have had misgivings as to whether his rejoicings were not premature. And in that state of nervous and divided uncertainty the Protectionist Party still appears to remain.

Why did Colonial opinion reject with such unmistakable vigour the proposals for Empire Free Trade? Because the whole financial and commercial system of the Dominions is founded on Protection, in the interests of the trade unions and the manufacturers in the towns, and to the sacrifice of the great agricultural interests in the country. Sixty-two per cent. of the Australian population live in urban districts, and we all know that "minorities must suffer." That rigid Protective system the Dominions are at present determined to maintain, although its consequences are already very serious in Australia, where the subservience of politicians to the narrow economic views of the town voters is becoming more dangerous to the prosperity of the Commonwealth every day. The Dominions want to establish their own manufactures. They do not intend to buy more British goods than they can help. And they do not intend, for any supposed interests of ours, to diminish their trade with foreign nations. It is really misleading to say, as Mr. Neville Chamberlain allowed himself to say last July, that it is only within the British Empire that we can find the "friendly reception," the "invitation to come and trade," which we require. Few statements indeed could be further from the facts. Let us consider what this friendly invitation, for which we are to prejudice our foreign trade, is worth. Australia is the best example. The Australian Prime Minister has been the most emphatic of Colonial statesmen in condemning Lord Beaverbrook's designs. And there is no doubt that the blunt statement of the Melbourne *Australasian* represents the dominant opinion there.

"The optimism of the authors of this project is more apparent than their knowledge of commercial and political conditions in the countries for which they so gaily devise policies. But whether they are fathering something which is either possible or desirable they have not proved."

Our Protectionists never seem to have noticed the movement of the Australian tariff in recent years. For all the talk about Prefer-

ence, that movement has been steadily against British goods. Seven years ago the Report of the Australian Tariff Board for 1923 showed that 818 out of 894 items were subject to duties, duties largely directed against British imports. Those levied on British manufactures went up to 30, 40, 50, even 60 per cent. One duty of 70 per cent. was promised on British hoop iron, with a duty of 95 per cent. on foreign hoop iron, just to show how valuable preferences are to us. Since then the rates have been carried still higher. Last November a new Australian tariff came into operation containing very considerable increases in the duties against British goods: they worked out in some cases at well over 100 per cent. And the process of raising them goes on.

"Until her own industries are developed," said the Minister of Commerce lately, "Australia cannot afford to extend help either to Great Britain or to the other Dominions."

To talk of this attitude as a friendly invitation to come and trade is surely a misuse of terms.

It is worth while, we have been lately reminded, to set beside the attitude of Australia the attitude of the Argentine Republic towards British trade. We have hundreds of millions of capital invested there, on which we expect to receive dividends, dividends which Argentina can only pay by sending us her products. We have a favourable tariff, much better than the tariff which Australia offers us. We are interested in thousands of miles of railways, built by British capital and managed by British staffs, railways which are constantly sending over large orders for British goods. We have an immense and profitable shipping trade with Argentine ports. We have immense business interests, both public and private, in the Republic. We look to her to send us yearly immense supplies of food. Yet it is seriously proposed to jeopardise and discourage all this prosperous commerce for the precarious chance of increasing by one-sided bargains our Australian and Canadian trade. The proposal has never been thought out. Canada, like Australia, is full of good feeling towards us, so long as we leave her to develop on the lines which she prefers. But she has clearly no desire to welcome any British manufactures which compete with hers. And in South Africa the Tariff of 1925 swept away many of the preferences which we had previously enjoyed. We do not blame the Dominions for pursuing the policy which they believe to suit their interests, though as friendly observers we may think those interests could be better served. And their statesmen ought not to be blamed for the extreme and unwise statements sometimes indulged in by injudicious Imperialists in this country. But it is not fair to British interests to refuse to recognise the facts we have recalled.

It is clear then that the Dominions have no intention of pulling down their tariffs for the sake of any new bargain with us. But it is equally clear, and this is not always remembered, that they have now a large trade with foreign nations, and that they are not prepared to sacrifice that either at our demand. How could we possibly ask Canada, for example, to endanger her great trade with the United States? It is from the States that Canada now draws most of her imported manufactures. She bought last year from this country less than forty millions worth of goods. She sold to the United States more than a hundred millions worth of produce. Australia last year sent us produce worth some fifty-two millions sterling. But her sales to foreign customers were worth sixty-eight. Are we at this stage of history to be seriously asked to repeat the folly of interfering with the growing trade of our Dominions in order to suit some tariff bargain made with us? And what would be the consequences to Imperial unity of interference such as that? Lord Beaverbrook, when he found his first scheme rejected by the Dominions, fell back with great resourcefulness upon a second project. He would begin "with what may most conveniently be called the Colonial Empire," that is the Crown Colonies and Dependencies—excluding India and Egypt—all over the world. "All these lands shall be formed into a Free Trade Empire as soon as maybe." Perish any unimaginative obstacles like treaties or self-governing regulations which stand in the way! But Lord Beaverbrook, though the leader of "an economic party," has "never consulted economists" about it, and he does not realise how serious and substantial the obstacles to this new edition of the Free Trade Empire are. Mr. Ormsby-Gore, a prominent follower of Mr. Baldwin, has summed them up.

"In Ceylon, Fiji, Rhodesia, Cyprus, Malta, Bermuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana, British Honduras, and Mauritius, the determination of fiscal policy rests with the unofficial members of the local Legislatures; but even in the most directly controlled Colonies there would be the most dire results and reactions if by Government at home we overrode the wishes of the local inhabitants.

"Free Trade within the Empire in the new party's sense of the term would destroy the free port of Singapore within a year. Such a policy is impossible for British Malaya, whose trade is in rubber and tin, which could produce no food for itself, and must trade with all the world. The same consideration applies to the Gold Coast, which provides half the world's supply of cocoa, and therefore requires foreign markets wherever chocolate is consumed. In the whole of the British West African Colonies an Empire free trade policy would do infinite damage to one of the most valuable and increasing markets for British manufactures."

Mr. Ormsby-Gore is forced to the conclusion, from which we see no ground to dissent, that "the fundamental fallacy of the new policy" is that it neglects "patent economic facts."

One last chapter calls for notice in the curious history of this economic crusade. Lord Beaverbrook's arguments have so impressed certain distinguished men of business in the City, that they have brought themselves to sign a Resolution in favour of reciprocal trade agreements with the Dominions and of duties on all imports from all other countries. The Resolution, a little loose in statement, roused surprise, not only by the arguments contained in it but by the names it bore. Four years ago some of the signatories attached their names to another well-known document condemning in the strongest terms the policy they now espouse, on the ground that it would raise prices, diminish production, create artificial dearth, and lead to the impoverishment of Europe. What reasons do they offer for this change of front? First they plead that "bitter experience" has disappointed the hopes of the removal of restrictions upon European trade which they expressed four years ago. Some disappointment is not unnatural at the slow progress made in extending "the area of free trade throughout the world," which the Bankers still profess to regard as an ultimate ideal. Yet no one except extravagant optimists could have expected that the very difficult task of bringing down European tariffs to reasonable levels would be attained within four years. And, reviewing those tariffs and the action taken since the World Economic Conference, it is only fair to recognise that, though there have been some increases, there have also been some decreases of tariffs, that the upward movement has apparently been checked, and that commercial treaties have helped to mitigate the effects of some of the tariffs imposed. It cannot be urged with much plausibility that the movement of European tariffs in the last four years offers adequate grounds for throwing over the policy of Free Trade in Great Britain. It is not in Europe but in Australia and in the United States that the worst increase in recent tariffs will be found. Not long since the Balfour Committee reminded us that the main increases in the rates imposed of late on British exports have been within the Empire itself.

More cryptic and equally unconvincing is the allegation that, in the four years since the Bankers signed a very different declaration, the sale of "surplus foreign products in the British market" has steadily grown. What exactly is meant by "surplus" foreign products perhaps not even the authors of the Resolution could say. To us no products can be surplus which we buy because we want to have them. If the word is vaguely intended to suggest that we have suffered of late from a policy of dumping, the suggestion

should not be made without producing some evidence in its support. The Bankers offer none. What again exactly is meant by the term "British market" is uncertain. It is reasonable to suppose that the Bankers intended to refer to the market of the United Kingdom. But if so their allegation would seem to be impossible of proof. So far from Europe flooding us with surplus products lately, the fact is that our purchases from Europe increased by only seven millions sterling between 1927 and 1929, and that in the same period our exports to Europe increased by thirteen millions. It is clear that there is no ground for disquiet here, much less for suddenly turning our backs on the policy on which our bankers and merchants have for long relied, and which has brought undeniable prosperity to the City of London.

The Bankers in their Resolution have refrained from indicating what agreements they propose to make with our Dominions, or what likelihood there is of the Dominions welcoming the attempt. But it would be interesting to know how many London merchants are really in favour of taxing the products of foreign countries, and what one great merchant house in particular thinks of the proposal to discriminate against Argentine trade. How this policy is to "extend" the market for British products abroad, admittedly one of the consequences hoped for, is left to the imagination. Something, no doubt, Protection might do to assist certain depressed industries in this country, to revive their dividends and even to increase their staffs. But the question never faced is whether any local stimulus so afforded could possibly compensate a nation which depends on its international trade for the loss and shrinkage which protective tariffs must inflict elsewhere. The Bankers seem to entertain the hope that some kind of retaliation might help us. The form of retaliation recommended, and the best method of applying it, are wisely left unspecified. When details will not bear examination it is better to be vague. But unhappily there is no justification for this theory to be found in the experience of other nations or in the history of any tariff war. Many Governments all over the world have in their day attempted to bring down hostile tariffs by raising their own. The result has been, we believe invariably, to raise the rates all round. It is now the better part of a century since Sir Robert Peel, a statesman nurtured in Protection and a man of wide experience and understanding where the interests of British commerce were concerned, convinced himself and his fellow-countrymen that the only paying policy for Great Britain was to fight hostile tariffs by free imports. His advice, which has led to remarkable successes, is even more to the point to-day. A country which, after sixty years of open ports, suddenly reverses its policy and begins to set up tariffs

against its neighbours, is not in a strong position to convince other people that tariffs do not pay. We fear that the Bankers have in store a still more bitter experience, if they imagine that such action on our part is likely to persuade Protectionist nations to bring their tariffs down.

There is of course nothing fresh in these considerations. Political economy is terribly familiar outside the ranks of the "economic party." But the worst of it is that we cannot get on without it, and that politicians who are tempted to banish it to Saturn generally end by misleading their friends. Its laws are monotonously regular, as inevitable as trade itself. They cannot be readjusted when we become impatient of their working, or because they do not suit the convenience of industries that are suffering from bad times. There is no getting over the economic fact that we buy goods abroad because we need them, and that we pay for them by selling our goods in return. Natural as the desire is to protect ourselves, it is not possible to limit imports into this country without limiting our export trade. It is not possible to build up the market which we need in Europe unless we are willing to purchase the goods which European nations provide. It is not possible to strengthen or unite our Empire by tying it up in commercial agreements which may well lead to friction and to discontent. It cannot possibly be wise for us to rely on our home market alone. Again, there is no reason to suppose that the adoption of a general tariff by Great Britain would do anything but add another obstacle to the free flow of commerce which is the first requirement of the world to-day. There is no reason to suppose that the substitution of Canadian for Argentine wheat would help the British farmer, or that the taxation of raw materials would benefit British industries handicapped already by the high costs of production in a competitive age. The expansion of our trade will not be aided by levying new duties upon foreigners long accustomed to an open market here. The total volume of employment in this country cannot be increased by taxes which diminish the purchasing power of the consumer and place fresh restrictions on the process of exchange. And lastly, if human experience teaches anything, it teaches that little but loss and mischief in the long run follows from the attempts of politicians everywhere to interfere with the natural course and operations of trade.

CHARLES MALLET.

THE REPORT OF THE SIMON COMMISSION.

A GREAT change has come over public opinion in this country with regard to India; nothing could show that more clearly than the reception accorded to the Report of the Statutory Commission. A quarter of a century ago that Report would have created consternation and would have been repudiated with indignation; it has in fact been received with widespread commendation and general approval. This is evidence that the people in this country are prepared to deal generously with the Indians who will demand to be masters in their own house at the forthcoming Conference in October. The proposals of the Commissioners are nothing less than momentous. With scrupulous moderation of language and a frank recognition of the difficulties and dangers involved, Sir John Simon and his colleagues recommend that England should begin to withdraw from India. The Report is in fact a scheme for the evacuation of the country. That evacuation must obviously take time; it must be carried out by stages; but the Commissioners with a full sense of the gravity of their proposals recommend that the first stage of the operation should be initiated immediately. The Parliament and people of this country ought to realise clearly all that is implicit in the findings of the Statutory Commission; for the decision to be taken now is crucial. If the experiment of the first stage succeeds, the second and third must inevitably follow. Great Britain will have lost the power to call a halt and it will then be for Indians and for Indians only to say how far the separation between the two countries should be carried.

What Parliament will have to consider, within the next twelve months, is the detailed scheme which the Commissioners propose for carrying out the first stage of this momentous operation. Sir John Simon and his colleagues base their recommendations upon the axiom that the art of self-government can only be learnt by the practice of it. Ministers, Members of the Legislature, and the electorate must acquire a sense of responsibility by bearing responsibility. This was of course the conception which lay at the root of Dyarchy. By this system responsibility over some matters of first-class importance was transferred to elected representatives of the people while the power over others was reserved to members of the Government. As an instrument of political education Dyarchy failed because it is not, in practice, possible to divide the functions of government into water-tight compartments; authority is a seamless garment for which men may cast lots but which they cannot divide among them. The claims of one department may

be so urgent as to override the just and reasonable demands of another. The paramount necessity of maintaining law and order may compel the Government to suspend the progress of the "nation building" services. But if, for example, the extension of Rural Sanitation is arrested, who is to blame? The Minister of Health or the member in charge of the Home Department? The demarcation of responsibility in the eyes of the legislature, the electorate and the people is hopelessly blurred and the objective of Dyarchy is not attained. In future there is to be no division of responsibility. The Commissioners take the logical course of recommending that the whole field of Provincial government should be placed under the control of a Cabinet, or body of Ministers, jointly responsible to a popular Chamber. This is self-government without reserve, and it is self-government on a gigantic scale. The nine Provinces in which this experiment is to be tried constitute almost the whole of British India, and contain in all a population of approximately 200 millions; three of them have the area and population of a first-class European Power, and all of them would in the West rank as important States. Over this enormous area and over these millions of people the immediate authority is in future to be a Cabinet responsible to an elected Chamber. The subjects over which this Cabinet exercises independent control include most of the matters which affect, intimately and continuously, the daily life of the people. Not only do they include education, public health, agriculture, industry, irrigation, etc., but also that transcendently important group of subjects which is popularly known as "Law and Order." Here we touch the nerve-centre of all government. If a Provincial Cabinet fails to maintain law and order it fails in the primary duty of government. Disorder, which in India spreads with the rapidity of a conflagration, may arrest the whole economic life of a Province and bring civilised life to a standstill.

Will an Indian Cabinet responsible to a popular Chamber be equal to this task? I do not question that a body of Indian Ministers could be found equal to the task of governing a Province; they are actually doing exactly similar duties in the service of Indian Princes; but will it be possible for them to bear the same burden when they are responsible to a popular Chamber? The Statutory Commission realise the seriousness of this question. Let us examine a test case. Communal feeling runs high in the town of Ramnagar; it becomes known that certain Musalmans propose to sacrifice a cow at the festival of Bakr-Id; a Hindu crowd attempts to rescue the cow, and a riot ensues. The Superintendent of Police, who happens to be a Musalman, goes to the scene of disorder, and having failed to persuade the crowd to dis-

perse, orders his men to fire with the result that several Hindu rioters are killed. Next day the Minister in charge of the Home Department is interpellated in the Chamber and asked (1) whether he has authorised the massacre of so many peace-loving Hindus, and (2) whether he proposes to retain in the service of Government an officer who has shown himself more ruthless than Nadir Shah. The Minister finds himself in a position in which his previous political experience affords him no guidance; he cannot, as in the past, represent the agents of authority as the minions of an alien bureaucracy. The Police are under his orders and he must brave the unpopularity which always attends the defence of the Police in India, or he must "let down" his subordinates and inflict permanent damage to the discipline and moral of the Force. He takes the course dictated by public interest and defends the action of the Superintendent of Police. This is not the end but the beginning of his difficulties. Communal feeling runs high in the Chamber, where the Hindus command a considerable majority. Will they support the Minister when he declares that he will consider a vote against the Superintendent of Police to be a vote of no confidence in the Government? The responsibility for the efficiency of the administration is now thrown upon the Chamber itself. I confess to being more dubious about the behaviour of the Chamber than of the Minister. The Provincial Councils have not yet given proof of a sense of collective responsibility; nor, except for a short period in Madras, have they been divided into parties obedient to a discipline which is a substitute for a sense of collective responsibility. The Councils up to now have been, in the main, composed of various groups, small in number and fluid in composition; a combination of groups forms a very unstable basis for a Government during a crisis. The experience of France and Germany during the last twelve months shows that groups the most diverse will unite to overthrow a Ministry, but that they cannot be trusted to maintain a government in power even when national interests are at stake. One of the possibilities that must be envisaged under the future constitution of India is that upon a question which arouses strong feeling a Provincial Chamber may refuse to support a Minister in the discharge of his clear duty.

The constitutional remedy for this state of things, according to English precedent, is for the Cabinet to appeal to the electors; but here we come to what is admittedly the weakest link in the chain. The electors do not pay much attention to the behaviour of their representatives. They do not appear to be interested in questions of policy. "Elections in Britain," say the Commissioners, "derive most of their interest and vitality from the fact that they are the arena for the real contest between a party in

power and a party or parties aspiring to power, a contest for which all political activity is more or less a preparation. With the exception of the Justice Party in Madras there has never been in India a government party which appealed to the electorate on its record. The personal appeal, whether based on a zeal for service or on any other ambition, can be no substitute in the minds of the general population for the party contest or the political programme. . . . The first requisite, therefore, if any permanent contact is ever to be obtained between voter and member, is the introduction of real political responsibility. The candidate at present best uses his scanty resources and sufficiently serves his ends if he concentrates his energies on a short electoral campaign before polling takes place. Often his activities are confined to the period between nomination and election. Once elected he has no inducement, even if he had the means, to nurse his constituency for the next contest, or to explain the course of events and the view he takes in regard to it. If he has put forward any political programme at the elections he may ignore it in the confidence that he will not be called to account. Not for three years need he remember his dependence on popular favour; and meanwhile the political education of his constituents has stood exactly where it was." Clearly, it is not to the electors that we must look, for a long while to come, to save the State.

Here then is the point at which the experiment in self-government is likely to break down. I do not anticipate a want of courageous and public-spirited Ministers who will brave unpopularity for the sake of the permanent good of their country. Diwans and Wazirs have often shown courage and public spirit in the service of Indian Princes, and there are in British India many retired public servants who have the experience and character needed for the conduct of government. The material out of which Cabinets could be made exists already. But it will require, I fear, a long time before Indian Legislatures, and much longer time before Indian electors, realise the responsibilities which are thrown upon them by a Parliamentary system. But of one thing I am confident; if the experiment in self-government is to be of any value at all, it must be tried out to the end. The "curative effects of self-government" cannot come into operation unless the Legislatures and the electors are allowed to blunder; they must be permitted to make mistakes and to suffer from them. If they beget a condition of misgovernment which would horrify the civilians of the last generation the electors are the more likely to bestir themselves to find a remedy. Rioting and disorder are evils of which every elector will quickly be aware; they are the punishment which follows neglect of his democratic duties; and

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may perhaps be considered summary lessons in self-government. The Statutory Commissioners are under no illusions regarding the extreme gravity of a breakdown of the administration. They say with truth: "The danger of disorder in India is ever present. There are inflammable elements in the population and jealousy and ill-feeling between important communities which from time to time cause riots and disturbances. The history of communal disturbances during the past few years shows how slight an incident may cause trouble which if not checked at an early stage may easily spread from district to district. Nowhere in the world is there such frequent need for courageous and prompt action as in India, and nowhere is the penalty for hesitation and weakness greater. The problem involved in internal security is not, however, a matter only of the preservation of law and order. During British rule the population of the peninsula has enormously increased, but its very existence depends on the efficiency of the administrative machine. There are great communities living on land which owes its fertility entirely to an elaborate system of irrigation. A still larger section of the population is dependent for its existence on a precarious rainfall. If the monsoon fails millions will die of famine unless there is an efficient railway system to bring food from the areas where the crops have not failed. The spread of epidemics, such as plague, is only prevented by constant vigilance on the part of the authorities. The life of millions in India depends literally on the existence of a thoroughly efficient administrative system. While we are prepared to admit a considerable advance towards self-government, and while we believe that a sense of responsibility can only be taught by making men responsible for the effects of their actions, we desire to secure that that experience is not bought too dearly. There must be in India a power which can step in and save the situation before it is too late."

The remedy which the Commissioners propose for a breakdown of the administration is to arm the Governor with emergency powers. They recommend "that the Governor (subject, as in other matters, to the superintendence, direction, and control of the Governor-General) should be given statutory powers to declare that a state of affairs has arisen under which the government of the province cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Statute, and thereupon there should vest in the Governor all the powers normally possessed by the Governor and his Cabinet. . . . The Governor would have further powers to quetore rejected demands for grants and to certify legislation if in his opinion it is essential for any interest in the province." I do not like this proposal. It means that if self-

government fails, or if the Governor thinks it is failing, autocracy may be restored. If a Province is to be exposed to alternations of popular government and autocracy it will make no progress in the art of self-government. I notice that Indian opinion, in so far as it is yet manifest, is critical of these emergency powers, and not, I think, without good reason. In a majority of the Provinces the Governors for some time to come are likely to be members of the Indian Civil Service; it must be to such men intensely painful to see the scientific administration which they have so carefully elaborated go to rack and ruin; a Governor confronted with the deterioration of the Services will be sorely tempted to persuade the Governor-General to make use of these emergency powers and autocracy will be re-established, with the result that the electors will learn to look to the Government of India rather than to themselves to correct Provincial maladministration. Self-government cannot be learnt on a principle of limited liability, and given present and antecedent conditions, India's experience must be bought dear.

I do not, of course, deny that there must be somewhere in India a power in reserve, but that power, in my opinion, should not be in the Provinces, but in the Central Government. While the Provinces are experimenting, the Central Government must stand by, patient and watchful, but ready in the last resort, possibly at the request of the people themselves, to step in and re-establish order in a distracted Province. Under the scheme proposed by the Commissioners, ultimate power remains in the hands of the Central Government, which retains sole control of the Army, Foreign Affairs, and the making of Civil and Criminal Law together with such All India services as Customs, the Post Office, currency, etc. There is to be no weakening of this power. The Statutory Commissioners "lay down without hesitation the proposition that Dyarchy at the centre, or any system of divided responsibility resembling Dyarchy, is impossible. Unity in the central executive must be preserved at all costs." This is unquestionably sound. While the experiment of self-government is being tried in the Provinces the Government at Simla must remain unimpaired. Any weakening there would be criminal levity. Proposals for a fundamental modification of the Central Government belong to the second stage of evacuation and cannot be discussed until the Provinces give evidence that they can from indigenous materials provide efficient governments.

For the present the constitutional changes proposed offer opportunities for work, for responsibility, and probably for danger, which will fully occupy the best manhood of India for more than one generation. That there is in India an *élite* which has the ability

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and courage to discharge the most important functions of government nobody who has worked with Indians will, I think, deny. Had the alterations in government consequent upon the declaration of 1917 taken the form of the gradual substitution of Indian for English agency in the existing administration India might by now have been on the way to boast of a purely Indian, and therefore national, government. Indians make very good public servants; historical circumstances have developed in Indian officials a very high conception of duty towards the State; it would have been a comparatively easy and safe task to substitute, little by little, an Indian for an English bureaucracy. But this path was not followed, and we are committed to the far more difficult and dangerous course of transferring power from an autocracy to the people. Here we cannot depend mainly on the *élite*; we must go to the rank and file and create a new spirit in them. We have to make them realise that they must look for improvement in their lot not to a paternal Sirkar but to themselves. They must give up the mental habits of the generations that preceded them and think and act in an unfamiliar way. This is a far more lengthy and difficult task than the "Indianisation of the Services." Our main reason for hoping for a happy issue is our belief in the "curative power of self-government." Bad administration may create, even in the uncomplaining villager, a determination to improve it. New opportunities may bring to the front new men with unsuspected qualities. The Agricultural Credit Banks have brought to light a surprising supply of public spirit in the villages of India. The extended field of usefulness and power thrown open by the new constitution may kindle a similar spirit in the higher walks of life. None the less there is a serious risk to run; this is very clearly foreseen by the Statutory Commissioners; it ought to be recognised with equal clearness by the people of England and India.

If the risks are so serious, why, it may be asked, should they be run at all? To that question one answer is enough. Because England has passed her word. The declared object of British policy is the development of self-governing institutions in India. That was explicitly stated in the declaration of 1917, and it was implicit in the historic pronouncements of 1833 and 1857. When Local Self-Government was introduced in 1882 it was with the avowed intention of "developing and if need be of creating a capacity for self-help" among the people. The successive enlargements of the Councils in 1861, 1892, and 1909 have no meaning except as steps in the direction of full self-government. It is not possible for any government to go on repeating assurances such as these and yet to postpone action on the ground that the time is

not ripe. Such a proceeding inevitably creates a suspicion of bad faith. But even if no promises had ever been made, if no official declarations had mortgaged the future, I do not believe that the position now would be materially different. There is that in English history which makes it impossible for us to hold another people in subjection against their will. We cannot go back on our past; we cannot disown the best of English thought and the most significant contribution that England has made to civilisation. Because the Simon Report combines a love of liberty with a realisation of practical difficulties it is in the best tradition of English statesmanship.

THEODORE MORISON.

ever been shaken) his personal ascendancy in the School. But he withdrew nothing and qualified nothing. He merely reasserted his original position. The result was the reference of the whole question by consent to an inquiry. Mr. Simon's first speech had made this inevitable in any case. It is not at all a bad result, but perhaps it might have been achieved more cheaply. We have not burnt our house down to roast this pig; but we have lighted far too large a fire for the purpose and certainly singed the curtains. It will be some time before we can get the smell of burning quite out of the kitchen.

The India debates were extraordinarily interesting. I do not know that they added anything of great importance to the knowledge of the expert student of Indian affairs—unless indeed Mr. Sastri's hint that India would be willing to wait a generation if given self-government now before claiming absolute control of her own army is to be accounted new knowledge. What made these debates so interesting to the onlooker was the ocular evidence they afforded of one at least of the main difficulties of the Indian problem. If it had been deliberately desired to exhibit the two Indias—Hindu India and Moslem India—before the eyes of the School, no more typical examples of the dramatic contrast could possibly have been chosen than Mr. Sastri and Mr. Ameer Ali. Mr. Sastri, white turbaned, dreamy-eyed, soft voiced, and venerable, had something of the air of a very benevolent wizard. There was real eloquence in the beautifully phrased appeal on which he ended—an appeal to Englishmen to dare to be true to their own Liberal tradition in India. Yet his voice rose no tone, and not a muscle of his face moved in answer to the storm of applause with which he was greeted. Mr. Ameer Ali, broad shouldered, forthright, practical almost to truculence (he came within an ace of defending Amritsar before the slightly horrified Liberal audience), looked, on the other hand, rather like a bull. When, to deal with an unhappy Indian interrupter, he left the rostrum and came stamping to the front of the platform, he looked quite astonishingly like a bull entering defiantly the arena. "If the question is," he said, "whether my people will ever consent to be ruled by the Hindus whom they once conquered, the answer is in the negative." And you had but to look at Mr. Ameer Ali to realise that so long as he and his people exist it will remain in the negative for ever.

The Nationalist night was a little spoilt by Mr. Ramsay Muir's hitherto unsuspected devotion to the Heptarchy. He said he was quite serious; but nobody would take his word for it. Why the Heptarchy should be funny, it is rather hard to say. There is nothing particularly humorous about its component parts. Mercia is a rather meaningless name now, but it is not particularly ridicu-

lous. Northumbria is a burly fact, and East Anglia for some odd reason has become, at any rate to those who do not live there, a journalistic *cliché*. Wessex the greatest of its sons has made a living spirit: no one but a fool would think of laughing now at Wessex. The sad fact remains that almost everybody laughs at the Heptarchy, and the mere mention of it seriously impaired the effect of Miss Lloyd George's appeal for Wales and Mr. David Keir's earnest but too prolonged recitation of the wrongs of Scotland. Miss Lloyd George's address was sincere, witty and admirable in form and delivery; and it was vigorously seconded with fiery Welsh eloquence by Mr. Moelwyn Hughes and his brother. But it was no good. Glendower again called spirits from the vasty deep, and they did not come; and it would have been no good if they had come, for another spirit was in possession of the field—a spirit of mockery—and it could not be dispossessed.

One remarkable feature of the school was the way in which the famous translation in "Alice" was continually being reversed. Subjects that looked at first sight like pigs were continually changing in the event into rather interesting and attractive babies. Rationalisation is a case in point. It is an ugly word for what is to most people a dim and dreary subject. But the charm of Mr. W. L. Hichens' personality, and the delight of hearing a very able man talking familiarly and easily of a subject which he knows thoroughly held the school spell-bound. It was a thousand pities that he could not stop to answer his critic. Mr. Angus Watson's address suffered a little by contrast with its brilliant predecessor because he read it; but he did not stick to his brief. He said really not very much about "the human factor in rationalisation": his theme was a slightly contemptuous and at times rather cantankerous denunciation of rationalisation generally. He may be right: rationalisation may be the pompous sham which he seemed to suggest. But whatever it may mean (and on this point we never arrived at any very definite conclusion) it undoubtedly exists as a formidable fact in modern industrial life. It is not possible really to despise it, and it is no good being cross about it. What the audience were really waiting to hear was said, not by Mr. Watson, but by a sturdy old gentleman from Leeds. Deploring with great anger the intrusion into the control of industrial concerns of financial interests which really knew nothing at all about the crafts concerned, he passed on, almost weeping, to describe the ruin, the unemployment and the suicides which have in certain cases at any rate undoubtedly accompanied "amalgamations" and "mergers." "If this is rationalisation," he cried, "then I say 'To hell with rationalisation.'" The audience, moved, seemed disposed on the whole to support the recommendation, and undoubtedly the weakest

point in Mr. Hitchens' address had been a certain cool fatalism, or what seemed cool fatalism, in regard to the effect of his rationalising on the employee. It is not really a sufficient answer to say that in the long run rationalising provides more and not less employment (even if that were much more certain than it appears to be). It does not satisfy the unfortunates who in the interval are left to starve.

Another pig which turned unexpectedly into a baby, if rather a cross one, was the lecture on Imports Boards. It was the nearest approach to an angry discussion that I have ever seen in these normally good-humoured and friendly assemblies. The fault, bluntly, rested almost entirely with the lecturer. Normally, the Liberal Summer School is something more than merely courteous to the stranger within its gates. It positively embraced Mr. Tom Johnston when he maintained against Mr. Keynes a couple of years ago the cause of Socialism: and it chuckled delightedly over Mr. P. J. Hannon when he bobbed up with imperturbable self-complacency after Mr. Guedalla had dialectically floored him again and again. But Mr. E. F. Wise had not come to waste compliments on the political heathen: he was there to instruct us, and he did it with a lofty thoroughness which would have goaded to much greater excesses a less good-tempered audience. As it was, he had nothing to complain of, except perhaps two or three rather unfair interruptions. And he was really so very provocative that he estranged sympathy. "Radicals or Progressives or whatever you call yourselves," he said scornfully; and seemed quite surprised when his auditors murmured angrily. His address was of some importance, for it seems to indicate a definite change of view on the part of the champions of import boards. Hitherto it has been supposed that the import board would sell at the prices at which it bought. It now appears that it is to claim the liberty to sell at any price which it likes. It is really wonderful how much these bureaucratic sons of Levi are prepared to take upon themselves nowadays. The appetite presumably comes in eating. Mr. Holgate's reply was devastating; and would have been far more effective still but for its enormous length, which exhausted the patience of the very elect. Subsequently, the lecturer fell a victim to a characteristically impish trick on the part of Sir Francis Acland. Mr. Wise had intimated that the price of food—or was it merely wheat?—had oscillated violently during the five years after the war, and had been relatively stable during the five years before. Thereupon Sir Francis produced a chart on which was a graph of the two curves in question, and required the lecturer to say which was which. As, on his own showing, there had been violent oscillations in the one and relatively none in the other, the task,

he suavely explained, could present no difficulty. Mr. Wise angrily refused this trial by ordeal. "I came here to give a lecture, not to enter a guessing competition," he snapped; and the audience rather unkindly, but surely very naturally, laughed aloud. It is but justice to the School to say that a courageous young lady who at the end of the discussion rose up to announce in impeccable English that she had still an open mind on import boards was cheered. The Summer School likes an open mind. It would rather have it, as they said of Mr. Balfour's in the old Tariff "Reform" days, "open at both ends" than entirely shut.

Sir Francis Acland incidentally contributed one of those constructive proposals which have so often emanated from the Summer School. The problem of unemployment among agricultural labourers is neither so great nor so serious a matter as the parallel problem in the towns. But it is a reproach to our national organisation that the largest single body of workers in the country should remain utterly outside it. And if Sir Francis' ingenious sliding scale proposal overcomes, as it appears to do, the difficulties of the case—the chief being the large volume of casual labour—the Tenth Liberal Summer School will have yet another little feather to stick in its cap. The Session concluded with the customary Saturnalia—the play in which the younger members divert themselves and their elders at the latter's expense. "Malice in Blunderland" lacked the brilliant lyrics which Mr. Herbert Phillips contributed to one such performance. But the dialogue was extremely witty: Mr. Aubrey Herbert's production, considering the circumstances, was extraordinarily good; and some of the scenes—notably the Mad Breakfast Party at Churt—were extremely well observed. Some—perhaps all—of the actors in it clearly knew all about a breakfast table at Churt. Miss Margaret Deas was an adorable Alice: and the acting was good throughout. Only the audience—which includes on these occasions a large section of the outside world—was oddly irresponsible. Perhaps the political allusions—some of them rather recondite—were beyond them: or perhaps—sadder still—they did not know their Alice. The play closed on an audaciously impudent picture of the Liberal Party resolving unanimously to support Mr. E. D. Simon's ten per cent. tax: and then all abstaining except two, one of whom voted for the proposal and one against. Probably no other party would dare thus publicly to ridicule itself. But it is only the true believer who can afford to laugh openly at his own mysteries.

This concluding note suggests a melancholy reflection. What will happen to the Summer School if the Liberal Party passes out of its present chaos only to disappear altogether? Its able leaders—Mr. Simon, Sir Walter Layton, Mr. Keynes, Mr. Ramsay Muir

—have been the greatest driving force in public life in recent years so far as constructive policy is concerned. Many of the young men and women who have gathered round them—the names of Mr. “Dick” Acland, Mr. Dingle Foot, Mr. Aubrey Herbert, and Mr. Bernays leap already to the lips—will certainly be heard of in the future. It is hard to think that all this bubbling energy, this zeal for social betterment and reform, this real knowledge and sparkling wit is nothing but a Midsummer Night’s interlude in the rather dull frowsy drama of modern politics. No one can enter the atmosphere of the school without feeling something of its curious attraction. An American lady in the audience this year, having attended an earlier School, cancelled the passage home she had taken in order to attend this year’s. And yet—to vary the Executioner’s problem—can a head really continue to exist which has no body at all?

STUART HODGSON.

THE THREE-PARTY SYSTEM.

IT is becoming the fashion with writers who are disturbed by the existence of three political parties to argue that a two-party system is essential to democratic government and to the rule of the majority, and to predict an early return to that system by the disappearance of the Liberal Party. The prediction is advanced as a corollary to the main thesis. The three-party system, they urge, is a deadly menace to the British system of government; therefore the electorate will not reduce itself to fatuity by allowing it to continue. If the assumptions on which the argument rests are unfounded, the argument falls to the ground.

The plain fact is that under present-day conditions a two-party system is inconsistent with democracy, and is far more likely to produce minority government than a three-party system; and that it is rapidly becoming extinct over the whole civilised world. There is no country in Europe to-day which has not at least three parties. Even the single member system of election, which is popularly supposed to prevent the formation of third parties, has not availed to hinder the rise of three and even four parties in the self-governing Dominions. Canada has Liberals, Conservatives, Progressives, and the Farmers’ Party. Australia has Labour, Nationalist, and the Country Party. South Africa has the Nationalist Party under General Hertzog, the South African Party under General Smuts, and the two wings of a divided Labour Party. New Zealand has the Reform Party, the United or Liberal Party, and the Labour Party. A similar state of things exists in India. The United States, in spite of the existence of a considerable Progressive Party under Senator La Follette, is an apparent exception; but the power of the party machine in the United States is so great, and so unhealthy, that political affiliations are largely a matter of habit and tradition, and there has ceased to be any clear dividing line between Republican and Democrat.

What warrant is there for supposing that Great Britain will return to a party system which is already obsolete not only in Europe but in the entire British Empire? Taking into account the present violent cleavage of opinion in the Labour Party, it is more reasonable to predict, with Viscount Grey of Fallodon, that the number of British parties is more likely to be increased to four than reduced to two. It is not unusual to find the Liberal Party described as a “microscopic” or a “dwindling” party. These are unfortunate adjectives to use of a party which can poll 23 per cent. of the electorate, and which is larger now than it was six years ago; but if the Liberal Party were to disappear it would not be long before we should have the right and left wings of the Socialist

Party fighting under separate organisations, and putting candidates into the field against each other.

The failure of the Ullswater Conference leaves matters exactly where they were before. That failure had been largely discounted in advance by public opinion. No one really expected the Conference to achieve anything, and few people believed that it was seriously intended to do so. The evils of our electoral system are patent to every eye, but they cannot be remedied by men whose horizon is bounded by the next general election and whose attitude to every proposal is determined by its immediate effect on the fortunes of their own party. The Conservatives objected to the alternative vote because they calculated, probably correctly, that they would be the only losers by it. The fairness of Proportional Representation is undeniable, and it has strong support inside the Labour Party, but the Labour representatives were instructed to oppose it because it would cut down the excessive representation which that party at present enjoys. Equally, no doubt, the views of the Liberals were coloured by the fact that either proposal would give them a larger representation than they now have. No conference could function successfully under such conditions. For our present purpose the chief bearing of Electoral Reform on the evolution of party government is that the difficulty of co-operation between parties is enormously increased so long as they are fighting in every constituency for the possession of a single seat which only one of them can get, and which they may both lose.

As the three-party system is likely to be a permanent feature of our political life, it is worth while considering whether it really is a menace to democracy, or whether it is not rather a step in the evolution of representative government in the modern world. In discussing this question it is well to bear in mind that majority government does not mean merely government by a majority of the House of Commons; it means government in accordance with the wishes of a majority of the nation. We have since last June a minority administration in office, but we have not minority government. The Parliamentary history of the last few months shows quite clearly that the administration cannot hope to carry any measure to which the majority of the nation is opposed. But from 1924 to 1929 we had genuine minority government. In the safeguarding of industries and in its opposition to the signing of the optional clause of the Permanent Court of Justice at the Hague, to give only two examples, Mr. Baldwin's administration, by virtue of its majority in the House of Commons, was able to carry through policies to which the majority of the nation had declared itself opposed. Whether those policies were right or wrong is beside the question. If the majority of the nation is unable to make its will

effective, representative government breaks down. To such a pass has an unreformed electoral system brought us, even with three parties in the field.

With only two parties the position would be infinitely worse. For it is seldom the case in modern times that elections are fought on a single issue. Our problems are too many and our national life is too complex to admit of any such easy simplification. At the next election, as at the last, it is almost a certainty that there will be two great issues before the minds of the electors, the policy of tariffs and the policy of Socialism. If the only parties in existence were the Conservatives and the Socialists, what would be the position of those millions of electors who now constitute the Liberal Party, who object equally to both? Suppose the Socialist Party goes to the country with a programme of two hundred million pounds additional taxation for social services. Are these five million and odd electors to accept that policy, ruinous as they may think it, for the sake of averting a return to Protection, which in their view would destroy the commercial supremacy of this country; or are they to accept Protection in order to save our domestic industry from a burden which they believe it cannot bear? Whatever might be the result of the election it would be impossible to tell what was the real mind of the country on either of these two vital issues. That way lies chaos. Only by three parties with a proportional system of representation can democratic government be made a reality. If the Conservatives gain a clear majority it will then be manifest that they have converted the nation to the merits of Protection. If the Socialists get a clear majority they will be in a position to claim a mandate for the full Socialist policy. If the Liberals get a majority, or if no party has a majority, it will be equally clear that neither policy has succeeded in winning the adhesion of the nation.

The three-party system necessarily involves important modifications in our constitutional practice, and many of the difficulties of the last few months are due to the fact that its implications have not yet been fully realised even by party leaders. Mr. MacDonald expressed a fruitful idea when he suggested that Parliament should constitute itself a Council of State instead of the Government and the Opposition regarding themselves as hostile battalions arrayed against each other. Unfortunately, he has so far made little attempt to carry out the idea in formulating his legislative programme. The essential condition for the successful functioning of a minority administration is that its legislation should be confined to an agreed programme representing those measures which are advocated in common by the Government and by one of the Opposition parties. For such measures it can claim both a Parliamentary

majority and a national mandate. At the very lowest it implies previous consultation on the details of any important measure between the Government and the leaders of that opposition party whose support is essential to its passage into law. Such an arrangement has been tried successfully both in Belgium and in the Dominions, and there is no reason why it should not be adopted here. For years the government of Canada and of Australia has been carried on smoothly by administrations relying on the support of more than one party. In South Africa a similar arrangement was less successful, because there was less common ground between the Nationalist and the Labour Parties than between the Nationalists and the County Party in Australia, or between the Liberals and the Progressives in Canada, but Cecil Rhodes in his great days proved that it was perfectly feasible there also. There is enough common ground between the Labour and Liberal programmes to occupy three years—probably more—of Parliamentary time, and this without any sacrifice of principle on either side.

The history of the Coal Bill shows, however, that a further modification is necessary. The Government brought many of its troubles on itself by not consulting the leaders of the Opposition on the main lines of the Bill before introducing it. But its defeat on the proposed levy to subsidise export and its narrow escape on the quota provisions show that it was bent on forcing through the House some provisions which neither opposition party was prepared to support. Moreover, the pre-election declarations of the Liberal leaders should have made it clear to the Government that on these issues the sense of the House was against it. If a minority administration tries to force such provisions through Parliament by the threat of a dissolution it puts the members of both the opposition parties in an almost intolerable dilemma. They know, as everybody knows, that the country does not want a fresh election within a few months of the last. A dissolution means a fatiguing campaign, heavy expenditure, and possible loss of the coveted position of M.P. to themselves personally. Yet they must either face all this or acquiesce in the passing of a provision which they know to be mischievous. This dilemma is in no way inherent in the three-party system. It is a direct result of the convention which permits a Prime Minister to treat any proposal as a question of confidence and to demand a dissolution if defeated upon it. The difficulty would disappear if it were recognised that a Premier representing a minority was not entitled to demand a dissolution within two years of the commencement of a Parliament except on a direct vote of no confidence.

The stock argument against the three-party system is that it leads to dishonest compromises between parties and in this way

exercises a corrupting influence on political life. The fallacy of this view lies in assuming that co-operation between parties must necessarily be dishonest. Compromises there must be under any system. All political action—indeed, all corporate action whatsoever—implies a willingness on the part of individuals to give up some things which they regard as desirable for the sake of other things which they consider essential. Professor Pollock, of the University of Michigan, comparing the working of the party system in America with what he observed on this side of the Atlantic, has summed up the difference as being that under a two-party system the compromise is made *within the party before the election*, while under a multi-party system the compromise is made between the parties after the election.

It is manifest that whenever there are three parties their programmes must to some extent overlap. There must always be a number of reforms as to which two of the parties are in agreement, and for which they can legitimately, and indeed advantageously, combine. It may be conceded that under the new conditions there will be considerable periods without a one-party majority. That indeed is the main ground of attack by critics such as, for instance, Professor Hearnshaw. They would prefer what Lewis Carroll called the glorious British theory of political dichotomy. Readers of *Sylvia and Bruno* will remember the account brought to the mysterious country of "Mein Herr" by "one of our most eminent statesmen, who had stayed some time in England":

It was a political necessity (so he assured us, and we believed him, though we had never discovered it till that moment) that there should be *two* parties, in every affair and on every subject. . . . These two parties, which were in chronic hostility to each other, took turns in conducting the Government; and the party that happened *not* to be in power was called the Opposition. . . .

Well, the function of the "Ins" (if I may so call them) was to do the best they could for the national welfare, and the function of the "Outs" was (so our traveller assured us, though we were very incredulous at first) to prevent the "Ins" from doing any of these things.

"I can assure you," he writes, "that, unpatriotic as you may think it, the recognised function of the Opposition is to hinder, in every manner not forbidden by the law, the action of the Government." This process is called "legitimate obstruction": and the greatest triumph the Opposition can ever enjoy is when they are able to point out that, owing to their obstruction, the Government have failed in everything they have tried to do for the good of the nation.

But when once the necessary adaptations of constitutional practice have been made, these periods when Government is carried on, not by a series of dishonest compromises, but by the agreement of

parties whose policies are up to a point identical, may prove to be among the most fruitful periods of Parliamentary history. They offer the best opportunity for the passage of urgently needed legislation which is non-controversial, or as to which the division of opinion is not on party lines. The Government's Road Traffic Bill is an instance in point, and the codification of many branches of our law is another. Above all they give promise of a restoration of the tarnished prestige of Parliament, and offer new opportunities of usefulness to the private member. It is a commonplace of politics that the prestige of Parliament has enormously declined during the last thirty years. Whatever view may be taken of the causes of this decline, part of it is certainly due to a sense of the unreality of debates and to the ever-increasing power of the executive. Parliament has ceased to exercise any real control over expenditure. It has ceased to control the details of legislation. Lord Hewart has drawn public attention in a characteristically vigorous way to the great mass of administrative rules which are given the force of law without any Parliamentary criticism whatever. No Private Member's Bill has any chance of becoming law unless the Government gives special facilities for its passage. The bitter cry has been heard more than once of members who imagined that they had been elected to Parliament to do useful work, but who find when they get there that they are mere voting machines, or, to use another metaphor, sheep to be herded into one lobby or the other at the crack of the Party Whip. Lord Brentford said recently that there was one respect in which he was not sure that we had really advanced in the last hundred years, and that was in respect of the independence of members. Miss Ellen Wilkinson, M.P., has voiced in the *New Leader* the complaint of the newly-elected Labour member when she says:

Men who came to Parliament in June ready to give all they could for the movement are only required to walk through the division lobbies.

A minority administration imposes a sharp check on these dangerous tendencies. It is, or will be when the realities of the position have had time to sink in, compelled to take Parliament into its confidence, and to submit the details of its measures to the free criticism of the House. There is less chance of hasty legislation which a subsequent Parliament will have to undo. From time to time particular proposals will be left to a free vote, and it is only necessary to recall the debate on the Prayer Book measure to realise what an access of public interest occurs when this can be done. Even newspapers which as a rule pay scant attention to the proceedings of the House of Commons, were compelled to treat that debate as "news," and to give their readers full details of it. An

extension of the system of standing committees comprised of members of all parties would suffice to re-establish Parliamentary control over that mass of detailed legislation which emanates every year from the Government departments at Whitehall, and which in the present congested state of Parliamentary business can be worked out by no other agency.

The two-party system has gone for good, and the attempt to revive it has about as much chance of success as an attempt to restore Latin as the *lingua franca* of Europe. Everywhere it has been found inadequate to express the complexity of the modern political outlook. The political life of the twentieth century cannot be compressed into the mould of the nineteenth. Instead of sighing for the return of a vanished past it is the business of statesmen to mould our Parliamentary practice and our constitutional theory into conformity with the facts of a new age. The three-party system brings with it its own problems, but they are not insoluble, and there is no reason to doubt that the political instinct of our people will be found equal to the task of solving them.

S. R. DANIELS
(late Judge of the Allahabad High Court).

A PROTESTANT VIEW OF TOLERATION.

WHEN Dr. Vernon Bartlet, in *The Times*, recently raised the question how far a Roman Catholic State could grant to non-Romanist schools privileges which the Roman Catholics are now demanding, in the name of justice and of liberty, for their own Church, a correspondent attempted to close the debate by quoting, as conclusive, a few sentences from Leo XIII's *Encyclical Immortale Dei* (*Times*, Nov. 8th, 1929):

Nor is there any reason why anyone should accuse the Church of being wanting in gentleness of action or largeness of view, or of being opposed to real and lawful liberty. The Church, indeed, deems it unlawful to place the various forms of divine worship on the same footing as the true religion, but does not, on that account, condemn those rulers who, for the sake of securing some great good, or of hindering some great evil, patiently allow custom or usage to be a kind of sanction for each kind of religion having its place in the State. And, in fact, the Church is wont to take earnest heed that no one shall be forced to embrace the Catholic faith against his will: for as St. Augustine wisely reminds us: "Man cannot believe otherwise than of his own free will."

While freely admitting that this advocate had chosen the most plausible quotation which could be found in favour of his case, let us see what it amounts to.

In the first place, it is not relevant; for the tolerance there proclaimed is strictly conditional. Rulers may grant liberty to other religions only "for the sake of securing some great good, or hindering some great evil," good and evil being here used, of course, in the moral and religious sense, of which the Pope and his advisers alone are final judges. The Edict of Nantes was revoked for the sake of "some great good." What is more, the great Bossuet proclaimed to the world that our Civil War of 1642, with its bloodshed and its thousands of Protestant souls sent to their place, was a wonderful working of Divine Providence; since, but for this, Charles I's daughter, Henrietta, would never have gone into exile and been brought to the true faith.* But, even though this *Encyclical* had been more relevant, it bases itself upon two very extraordinary errors, one in patristic theology and one in historical fact.

These may best be exposed by referring to St. Thomas Aquinas, whom Leo XIII himself commended solemnly to the whole Christian world as the prince of philosophers, writing in his bull: "Reason, raised on St. Thomas's wings to the pinnacle of human

* "Les merveilles que Dieu a faites pour le salut éternel d'Henriette d'Angleterre! Pour la donner à l'église, il a fallu renverser tout un grand royaume." *Oraison Funèbre*, 1670.

greatness, can scarcely soar higher than this." Among the best-known sections of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica* are those two in which he deals with unbelievers (2a, 2ae, qq. X, XI). He there concludes (I quote from the authorised Dominican version): "I answer that there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates: such should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil what they have promised, and hold what they, at one time, received.

"*Reply obj. 1.* Some have understood the authority quoted to forbid, not the excommunication, but the slaying of heretics, as appears from the words of Chrysostom. Augustine, too, says (*Ep. ad Vincentian.*, xciii) of himself: *It was once my opinion that none should be compelled to union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight with arguments. However, this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law was so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our chains asunder.*"

It will be seen that Pope and Saint alike quote Augustine, each to his own purpose, yet to diametrically opposite conclusions. Which, then, is right? It is, as we might expect, the almost impeccable philosopher. Augustine's *Epistle to Vincentianus* is one of his best-known letters. In it he elaborately retracts, not once only, but repeatedly, what he had written at earlier dates about tolerance: therefore the extract upon which Aquinas builds is Augustine's final and reflective judgment, confirmed (he believes) by long experience. In so far as this riper Augustine still held that "a man cannot believe otherwise than of his own free will," he was none the less convinced that corporal penalties might stimulate the will to believe. It is very difficult to understand how Leo XIII and his advisers cannot have known this; yet it is even more difficult to suppose that they knew it when they based so solemn a document upon what amounts, in effect, to a misquotation. That same section of Aquinas, again, even if it were not supported by a mass of other historical evidence as to mediæval theories and mediæval practice, is enough to belie Leo's claim of "earnest heed that no one shall be forced to embrace the Catholic faith against his will." (Italics mine.) That claim is true (as Aquinas warns us) only if we confine ourselves to Jews and Pagans; nor, even in their case, can we fail to see that the Church was often less tolerant in practice than in theory. But for baptised Christians the Church has never ceased, for seven centuries, to claim the right of compulsion. At the present moment, it will shortly be seen, Rome claims the right (as apart from the expediency) of compel-

ling me to fulfil what she reads into my baptismal vows, i.e. obedience to the Pope and acceptance of the "one true faith." She has never disavowed what was so clearly formulated by St. Thomas and his compeers, the legal and moral right to compel me to "fulfil what I have promised, and hold what I at one time received." If I ask: "When?" she answers: "At your baptism." If I plead birth and nurture among heretics, she answers that this indeed may excuse me for the moment on the plea of invincible ignorance. But the point at which invincible ignorance ceases—the point at which the hierarchy has a right to say: "You have heard the truth often enough, you are not mentally deficient, your repudiation of the one true faith can no longer be excused from the vice of pertinacity in error"—that point is for the hierarchy alone to judge; neither I myself, nor all the officials of any State in the world, have any voice whatever in that judgment. And the hierarchy which adjudges me to have been baptised into Catholicity, on the ground that all valid baptism is Catholic, and which argues thence that I accepted at that moment, if only for a moment and if only vicariously, the true faith, so that I am henceforward marked with the indelible character of a subject of the Pope—that hierarchy (I say) could, with far less stretch of ordinary justice, send half a dozen missionaries to convert me, and could then decide, after a few days' discussion, that I was no longer invincibly ignorant but culpably obstinate. All this, of course, is at present academic; the strict fulfilment of these theories is a physical impossibility. But, in the first place, it is dangerous to neglect political theories altogether, however remote they may seem from practical statesmanship; we never know what spark may suddenly kindle a dormant theory into very active practice. It is a special weakness of the British mind to neglect logic in politics and to regard nothing but practice; therefore, only in the last few days, a distinguished Professor of Law has defended the episcopal action in Malta on that very ground, writing: "Our extremely hazy political conceptions may well have caused some perplexity to clear Latin minds" (*Times*, July 1st, 1930). The Italians have an excellent proverb: "Clear understandings mean long friendships"; let Protestants, therefore, clearly grasp the conceptions of tolerance which cleave a gulf between the Roman mind and our own. I will take five crucial epochs, covering the last eight centuries, and cite no evidence but from orthodox Roman sources.

In proof of Roman Catholic tolerance, the commonest documentary quotation is a sentence from St. Bernard: "Faith should be a matter of persuasion, not of coercion"—*fides suadenda est, non imponenda*. It is astounding that author after author should copy

this from each other, without even looking at the sentence which immediately follows it, let alone the general context—i.e. the 64th, 65th, and 66th of his *Sermons on the Canticles*, together with the letter from Erwin, provost of Steinfeld near Cologne, on which those sermons were based and which is always, therefore, printed with them.

Erwin is sorely embarrassed by a group of heretics in his own Rhineland. Their doctrines are marked by an absurdly exaggerated asceticism; they would practically do away with the priesthood and the sacraments, but the difficulty is that, in their actions, these heretics rather show the faithful a moral example than a moral warning. Moreover "they besought us to appoint a day whenever they would bring men learned in their own faith, promising that they themselves would join the Church if they found their masters to fail in argument; otherwise, they would rather die than turn aside from their belief. When they had said this, and had been admonished for three days, and refused to amend, they were seized by the populace moved with excess of zeal and, against our will, they were cast into the flames and burned; moreover (what is more marvellous) they bore this torment of fire not only patiently, but even they entered joyfully and endured it gladly."

St. Bernard is not impressed by the heretics' apparent morality, which he judges to cover secret vice; "they do indeed abstain, but heretically." As to lynch-law, he agrees with Erwin in reprobating it—"we approve the zeal [of the populace], but we praise not the deed; for faith should be a matter of persuasion, not of coercion. Yet beyond all question it is better that [these heretics] should be coerced with the sword, that is, with his 'who beareth not the sword in vain,' than that they should be permitted to bring many over to their own error: 'for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.'" (Rom. xiii, 4.) These words are clear enough; they show that those modern authors who quote only half a dozen words are false to St. Bernard's real sense. This becomes even clearer if we read sermons 64, §8, 65, §1, 66, §14, where St. Bernard approves of banishment or imprisonment for these heretics; or again, the well-known Epistle (No. 195) in which he expresses his horror that any Christian ruler should suffer the impenitent heretic Arnold of Brescia to live in his territory.

Indeed, the men who were most concerned to bring this out two centuries ago were the two great Roman Catholic editors of St. Bernard, Horst and Mabillon, who, in their notes, warn us explicitly against understanding *fides suadenda*, etc., in a sense too near to modern ideas of tolerance. They point out the significance of this word *sword*; they add that, in another place, St. Bernard's

words clearly imply imprisonment. It is plain, therefore, that his idea of toleration was that of Augustine's later days; let us do all we can to persuade the heretics "so long as they restrain themselves, and make no attempt to subvert others. But, in default [of such self-restraint], it is better, beyond all question, that they should be coerced with the sword than that they should be permitted to bring many over to their own error." Thus it is that the orthodox editors summarise St. Bernard's teaching; and it is important to notice that this describes exactly the policy of Elizabeth four and a half centuries later. She, too, never appealed to the sword but against those who, not restraining themselves, sought to pervert members of her own Church.

Yet she had greater provocation; for St. Bernard's heretics did not, at least, belong to a society which, numbering half the population of Europe, was pledged in religion to obey a chief who had proclaimed deposition and war against St. Bernard's sovereign. The attempt to justify mediæval intolerance by political necessity is exaggerated at the best, and in some points clearly false; I have given the evidence briefly in my *Inquisition*. They were not Bolsheviks. Their few extremists, no doubt, were socially impossible, but so also had a similar proportion been among the early anchorites and monks. Magistrates and princes, who desired nothing less than a rupture of all social and political ties, not only often ignored the heretics, but sometimes actively protected them. Finally, the best even among their prosecutors bear witness to their comparative regularity of life, at least in appearance, and to their incomparably greater familiarity with the Bible. Here, then, is the first of my epochs. A little before St. Bernard, Wazo, Bishop of Liège, had indeed pleaded for a toleration rather wider than St. Bernard's. But the Saint's Elizabethan ideal (as we may truly call it on this point), was the high-water-mark of the twelfth century. Before 1200, a pope, a king, and an emperor had committed themselves far more deeply to persecution—Lucius III, Peter of Aragon, and Frederick II.

In 1231 the Papal Inquisition was set up; and from that time forward it was the duty of every Christian believer to inform against, and do all in his power to bring to justice and punishment, any fellow-Christian whose belief differed from that of the official Church. "Justice" meant a trial in which ecclesiastics were judges in their own cause, in which the State could not even ask to see the evidence, and witnesses' names were concealed, and torture was freely threatened or applied. "Punishment," for the convicted and impenitent or relapsed heretic, was to be handed over to the State, on the clear understanding that any magistrate who refused to burn a victim thus "relaxed to the secular arm" might him-

self be tried and burned for heresy. This was the law and the procedure which St. Thomas Aquinas justified with all that philosophical acumen which enabled him to soar to the highest human pinnacle. This Inquisition, which marks our second epoch, reigned practically undisputed throughout the rest of the Middle Ages. When the Templars were destroyed—as practically all historians confess, on evidence of which the greater part would be worthless in any modern court—the difficulty arose in England that our law forbade torture. But the Pope broke down Edward II's opposition with a threat and a bribe; and for a few months our law was thus debased for the first and last time until Mary's reign.

But the Inquisition was powerless, in the long run, against growing education; and this brings us to our third epoch. The Inquisition itself had borne witness to growing education, just as the Jesuits bore witness to the Reformation. St. Bernard, in about 1130, could despise the heretics as "a vile and rustic race, unlettered and utterly unwarlike"; they were merely the little foxes that pillaged the Lord's vineyard. But, before 1230, classical learning had gone through a remarkable revival and, more important still, the universities had grown up, and Aristotle had been rediscovered, at first through Arabic versions. St. Thomas, therefore, finds the University of Paris, the greatest theological school in Western Christendom, swarming with scholars who hold the most subversive heresies, yet lurk in corners and decline to come out for the burning. And, earlier in the century, southern France had very nearly fallen to the heretics by ordeal of battle. That is why the Church, having once committed herself to the death penalty, was compelled to organise this system with the theoretical completeness which we find in Aquinas and his fellow-schoolmen, and with the practical completeness of a machine which could pulverise one of the strongest institutions in Europe, the Templars.

But, though the Inquisition could drive heresy underground, it could not destroy it; and gradually it lost ground itself. Financially, it had depended on wholesale confiscations; and, now that rich and powerful heretics were all converted or burned and expropriated, an orthodox inquisitor confesses himself that the enthusiasm for the Inquisition is waning fast. Again, human kindliness is far more distressed by the tragedy of many small people than of a few great men; and thinking folk began to ask themselves whether this sort of engine need be used against tailors and ploughmen; and thence, by a natural transition, whether the tailors and ploughmen might not be in the right, to some extent at least. There is strong evidence as to the unpopularity of the clergy, in all centres of busy life and thought, towards the end of the Middle

Ages. And then we get the fourth epoch, the reaction, the dawn of modern ideas of tolerance, in Sir Thomas More.

The best that has been written on this subject, I think, is in a paper read by Professor R. W. Chambers before the British Academy in 1926, and published in their *Transactions*. He proves conclusively that the Utopian ideas of tolerance do not go beyond St. Bernard's; or, as I have already put it in other words, beyond Elizabeth's. The question how far Utopian policy represents More's own mind is too complicated for discussion here; but Professor Chambers's paper lends no countenance to those partisan writers of to-day who attempt to dismiss the whole book as a mere *jeu d'esprit*. To say the least, *Utopia* certainly represents what More thinks would be wise if, for any reason, several diverse religions were to be found in a State. The main religion is non-Christian, but Christianity exists there also. For myself, I cannot believe that More was willing to suggest things alien to his own deepest beliefs on a matter of such supreme importance to him; and if, as was perfectly natural in the circumstances, he ends the book by warning his readers that some Utopian ideas and practices seem to him "very absurd," yet he proceeds to modify that retraction by saying that these people had "many things which in our cities I may rather wish for than hope after." Is it not probable that, on the most serious of subjects, he sketches nothing but what, *if it would work*, he would be glad to see in the England of his day? The words italicised are, of course, crucial, and may explain the difference between More's *Utopia* and More as Chancellor, obliged to work the English laws.

But then came the religious revolution, which More dreaded above all things, and More was one of its first victims. This brings us to our fifth epoch, the modern world, in which tolerance or intolerance run in double currents, the Roman and the non-Roman. In practice, both parties have learned a tolerance resembling that of *Utopia*. The Christian world has been divided for 400 years, roughly in half. It has always been the aim of thorough intolerance to make the existence of the contradictory belief impossible. But a succession of bitter wars, and other hard experiences, have shown the Romanist that he has no longer any chance of exterminating his adversaries by force, and the non-Romanist that he never had any such chance. But, though the death penalty is now out of favour on both sides, there often emerge other serious questions of tolerance; and here it is that the different ideals exert their influence. At this point we need to bear in mind what William James reports from the lips of a shrewd working-man: "There's very little difference between one man and another; but it's just that difference that counts."

In an essay attributed to Lord Acton, but, I believe, wrongly,* it is argued that "the Reformers approved the Catholic practice of intolerance; and even encouraged it, although their own principles of persecution were destitute, not only of connection, but even of analogy." The writer insists that the lamentable intolerance so often shown by non-Romanists is far less defensible than the intolerance of the Roman Church. And from the writer's simple point of view this is unanswerable; he rehearses, both from the theories enunciated by some of the greatest Reformers, and from their practice, things which ought to warn all true Protestants against Pharisaism.

But the writer seems to confine himself to the question of moral guilt, and to ignore the relevance of his historical instances to the quite different question of influence on civilisation. We may grant, for the sake of argument, that at God's judgment-seat Torquemada may find readier forgiveness than Luther or Æcolampadius, though many of us would not grant this quite so completely as the writer claims. But, on the other hand, what great Romanist could ever have answered his old mother, *mutatis mutandis*, as Melanchthon did? This pious old peasant woman was torn between belief in her great son and belief in her ancestral creed. Melanchthon bade her go on always in her old path; and then (he said) you and I need never part, either on earth or in heaven. Therein lies the fundamental and insuperable barrier between the two creeds. Though Protestants have sometimes been foolish enough to argue and act as though they were infallible, yet this was not in virtue of Protestantism, but in spite of it. Again, no organised and authoritative Protestant opinion has ever granted to the Romanist so small a chance of salvation as he granted to other Churches, at least until quite modern times. Nay, if we follow logically the full implications of that creed, we may go farther, and say not only until modern times, but to the present day. Cardinal Perrone was a man before whom Newman humbled himself in the dust; his words represented the official Roman mind more completely than the Archbishop of Canterbury can speak for Protestantism. Yet, in his *Catechism* he wrote: "It is a contradiction and an impossibility that any Catholic should turn Protestant through honest motives; we might as well talk of committing a grievous and heinous sin through honest motives. . . . I say, with the certainty of faith, that all Catholics who turn to Protestantism are damned, except those cases where a man repents sincerely before death and abjures the errors he has professed." And he goes on to claim that this is an article of faith in his Church. Only one

* Acton himself seems quite clearly to speak of it as Simpson's, and I am glad to find myself here in agreement with the late Cardinal Gasquet. (*Lord Acton and His Circle*, p. 258.) The article is printed among Acton's in *The History of Freedom*, p. 150.

more Cardinal need be quoted, out of many. Father Lépicié, in 1910, was Professor of Theology at the College de Propaganda Fide in Rome. He published his *De Stabilitate et Progressu Dogmatis* with a warm letter of approval from Pius X, not only for his person but explicitly for this particular book. Since then he has become Cardinal, and has gone on from strength to strength in Papal favour; there would be nothing surprising in his final election to the tiara. He not only formulates the claim of many centuries that all baptised Christians are subjects of the Pope, and that the question whether they should be punished corporally (as well as spiritually) for nonconformity is a question not of right, but of power and of expediency, but he comes also explicitly to the international political claims of the Papacy (p. 211). He does not see how any orthodox Roman Catholic can rightly contend (like some moderns whom he confutes) that the Pope has not really the right of deposing "apostate" princes and absolving all subjects from their allegiance. He clinches his demonstrations from history with these words of Boniface VIII which are generally conceded to have been *ex cathedra* and therefore infallible: "We declare that all human beings are subject to the Pontiff of Rome; and we assert, define, and pronounce this tenet to be essential and necessary to salvation." No Protestant could write like this without exposing himself to the ridicule of the civilised world. If it is not ridiculous at Rome, this is because the world has long been accustomed to respect the Roman Catholic for the much that is respectable in him, and to treat his exclusionist theories as negligible, simply because he has obviously no longer power to enforce them in anything approaching their theoretical fullness. Yet, here and there, they may crop up, as at the present moment in Malta, sharply enough to cause a real conflict between Church and State.

However morally bad the Protestant may be supposed to be, he has never been able to organise anything even approaching the elaborate intolerant machinery of the Inquisition, for the simple reason that the main distinction between Protestantism and Romanism is Private Judgment, and therefore it has always been impossible to organise Protestant thought with that military discipline in which Rome has long excelled. One of those distinguished Quakers who fought in the Great War defended himself on the unanswerable plea that there was only one absolute rule in the Society of Friends: "Each man thinks and acts according to his own conscience." Thus, after Geneva had burned Servetus, later Geneva could erect a monument in his memory, engraved with an explicit apology for the crime. To turn from the particular to the general, Protestantism has never driven the Freemasons into

irreligion; Lord Petre, one of the main Emancipation champions, living in Protestant England, was able to be Grand Master without scandal to his Roman Catholic brethren. In no Protestant country, again, has there ever been anything like the anti-clericalism which has devastated every land where Rome has once ruled supreme. As one of the ablest among modern French Catholics puts it, anti-clericalism is among the most widespread and mischievous of French vices, and it is strongest to-day precisely in those districts where clericalism was rampant a century ago: "the anti-clerical is simply a clerical turned inside out."*

Lord Macaulay, at an election meeting, was once struck in the face by a dead cat. The flinger came and apologised afterwards; he had meant it for the candidate, Mr. Adair. Macaulay suggested that, next time, this too enthusiastic politician had better aim at him, and hit Mr. Adair. Have we not here an allegory of Protestant and Roman intolerance? The most ill-intentioned Protestant society cannot, in the nature of the case, aim steadily and successfully at intolerance. The Romanist, on the other hand, may aim at tolerance; yet sometimes, at least, the last thousand years of tradition and teaching in his Church will fatally deflect his arm into some intolerance which shocks the modern mind. Without appealing to inner motives, which no human penetration can exactly judge, we can see a quite plain and undeniable contrast in the actual results. Whether Veuillot or Ozanam ever actually said it, or whether it is only put as *ben trovato* into both those men's mouths, it is certainly true that "We Catholics demand toleration from you Protestants, because that is part of your creed; we deny you toleration, because that is inconsistent with our own."

G. G. COULTON.

* Émile Faguet, *L'Anticléricalisme*, pp. 1, 369.

PRINCES, SWARAJISTS AND PERSPECTIVE.

I.

IT might be a distinct advantage to the discussion of the Indian problem here if our literary critics in the Press were occasionally assigned the task of writing on policy. They have warmly welcomed at least two books which throw a flood of light on racial mentality in India, books which should soften our acerbities when we feel the clash with Indians, and help us to comprehend sympathetically those who may be giving us trouble. One was Mr. E. M. Forster's *Passage to India*; the other, more recent, Major Yeats-Brown's *Bengal Lancer*. After reading hot denunciations, and stern counsels, to say nothing of jeremiads, it is like a breath of fresh air to hear the Bengal Lancer saying: "We Europeans are always giving something to somebody. Christianity, for instance. Then education. Now we are giving our ideas of democracy. All this is alien to the Hindu mind." And alien, also, to Muslim, Buddhist, or aboriginal.

If we are to try to get a better perspective in our political discussion of the problem, there is one thing we ought to acknowledge in this country on which a discreet silence has been observed in most of what has appeared since the issue of the Simon Report. The form of government in British India—apart from the powers of the Viceroy and the Imperial Government—is the hotchpot of absurdity known as Dyarchy, imposed by the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. When it was instituted, in official circles in India it was known as "the Diarchical Pantomime." We complain that Indians have no respect for government, but we should at least be prepared to admit that British Indian government has recently been a fiasco, and that we cannot rid ourselves of the responsibility. Dyarchy is denounced by the Simon Commissioners in veiled terms out of respect to their predecessors. But the veiling is rather diaphanous in such passages as this:

Rigid Dyarchy is a standing challenge which either ranges Ministers against the reserved half of government, or exposes them to the charge of being the subservient tools of the bureaucracy. And all the time the growth of real responsibility (which was the object of the adoption of the system) is being hindered.

The fact is that, although we have the responsibility, this country never really considered the Dyarchy scheme when it was adopted in 1917-19 by harried Coalition Ministers, who took what Lord Chelmsford and Mr. Montagu offered them. The country was absorbed in the anxieties of the worst year of the war, and had no

time, and less inclination, to think of abstruse constitutional problems. Lord Chelmsford was throughout under the influence of Mr. Lionel Curtis, the Round Table missionary, whose head was packed with visionary constitutional schemes. These had more relation to a Commonwealth Cabinet which none of the Dominions wanted, than to India, which Mr. Curtis had not visited when he first excogitated Dyarchy with the help of Sir William Duke. It is an amazing story, but I have given chapter and verse for it.* Fortunately, perhaps, for us, at the present juncture Mr. Curtis seems to have received a Heaven-sent mission to frame a constitution for the unhappy Chinese.

Every Liberal, it seems to me, as well as every Conservative, has the mental right to consider Parliamentary institutions unsuited for India and the East. That was the view of Lord Morley and other sound Liberals in the past. However, on the top of the Morley-Minto scheme we have grafted Parliamentary institutions of a quaint hybrid character in India; and in the governance of men, when such changes are begun, you cannot move backwards without a rising or revolution. Time and events impel authority, indeed, to widen their scope, especially when they are found to be unsatisfactory. And one thing which has comforted the Swarajist parties during the ten-year fiasco of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms has been, first, the promise, unwisely given, that in ten years' time further blessings might be vouchsafed; and, secondly, the belief that the change heralded was Dominion status for British India. The Swarajist parties are a very small fraction of the population of British India, and have nothing to do with the Indian States, although they sometimes affect to speak for a section of State subjects. British India is largely a land of villages where, in general, apathy reigns. But the Swarajists are the political fraction who stir up agitation and movements, and being that fraction to which we have paid special court by our changes in government, they constitute a serious political problem for us. Incidentally, we may be considered to have created the Swarajists by our foolish and illogical system of education, enforced through the sin of Macaulay in 1835. We divorced thinking Indians from their own culture, and for several generations have tried to turn them into Europeans with Western modes of thought, an experiment which never could have succeeded.

The fact that Swarajist parties clung to the vague and nebulous comfort of Dominion status, and were afraid of being disappointed, was doubtless why Lord Irwin twice tried to cheer them up by speaking hopefully of Dominion status. After the attempt of the extremists to boycott the Simon Commission—a foolish outbreak,

but when were extremists ever wise?—it was natural that Swarajist anxiety about the result should increase. And the Home Government were at fault in putting as severe a ban as they dared on any kind of forecast of the Simon Report, or of the trend of thought in the Commission. English journalists are accustomed to the petulance of Cabinets at intelligent anticipation of their decisions, and are generally able to evade it. But in this case, although no Cabinet decisions were involved, the Ministry invoked all the legal threats they could command to ban forecasts in the Press here and in India.* The result was that nervousness among Swarajists increased.

Why, and how did the phrase Dominion status come into the story? Lord Irwin stated that it was implicit in the declaration of 1917, and for saying so he has been blamed by some. The various responsible utterances on the subject since 1917 have been set forth in a useful catalogue in *The Times*. Two of the significant citations were from the Governor-General's Instrument of Instructions at the end of 1919, and the message of the King-Emperor read by the Duke of Connaught in February of the following year. These state that the declaration of 1917 was made "to the end that British India may attain its due place among Our Dominions"; and that what was intended was the "widest scope and ample opportunity for progress to the liberty which My other Dominions enjoy." After that we have various Viceregal and Ministerial pronouncements; but whatever our politics, we have to reckon with the declaration of the King-Emperor, that eventual Dominion status of some sort or other is envisaged. It is a practical exercise, therefore, to see whether we can devise some form of Dominion status for India which does not sacrifice either the lives of our people, or the very considerable stake which we have got, and earned, in the continent. And this is just what the Simon Commission have done, though they have avoided the use of the phrase Dominion status.

Lord Rothermere, in protesting against Dominion status for British India, has expressed the feelings of a great body of people in this country when he has urged (1) that it would place the Indian army under command of anti-British politicians, involving the withdrawal of British soldiers; and (2) that it would bar the entry of British goods into India by prohibitive tariffs. These are

* In *Scraps of Paper*, published three months before the Simon Report, the following partial forecast appeared, without apparently any ill effects: Dyarchy to be abolished. Provincial Legislatures to be given powers not only over transferred but reserved services. Retention for the present of the British Civil Service and Police. In case of failure to govern, the British organisation to take over administration in a Province, until its powers can be restored. A great enlargement of the electorate. Effective British control at the centre "for some time to come."

elementary and vital objections. No effort has been made to meet them by the little band of retired Indian Governors or members of Council, who in our Press are fain to instruct British opinion. It should be put on record that the ex-Governors who were in office in 1917-19 knew then that Dyarchy was a theoretical absurdity which would not work, but gave it lip-service, not liking to incur the possible odium of standing out against a bemused Imperial Government. With full knowledge they acquiesced in the muddle then made. If this were not a topsy-turvy world, instead of posing now as enlightened authorities, certain ex-Governors and retired officials would be clad in white sheets on their way to some shrine, preferably at Delhi, to make suitable penance. They know the truth now, that we are responsible for some of the existing confusion, but continue to lend themselves to the tradition that we never make mistakes; and it requires so much application to understand the Indian problem that the public are content to take views at second hand, and listen to them with a respect which is not always their due.

II.

The Simon Commissioners have discovered for themselves how the vital objections to Dominion status can be met. The truth is that Dominion status is and always has been impossible for British India, but is not necessarily impossible for India as a whole. The Governor-General's Instrument of Instructions in 1919, declaring that the goal of the reforms was "that British India may attain its due place among our Dominions," spoke a vain thing. The King-Emperor was misled by his Coalitionist advisers. Dominion status for British India means that Swarajists might control the army; that prohibitive tariffs could be imposed at the ports not only against Britain, but also against land-locked Indian States; that these huge inland States whom we have guaranteed to protect would be shut in by a Dominion which could arrest their communications; and that all the Treaties by which the Crown has undertaken to uphold these States with its army would be broken.

Dominion status for all-India is a very different matter, and it has not been torpedoed. It is apparent, now that the Simon Commissioners have reported, that it may be reached by growth to a Federal system. If that system is to be realised it can only be when the States have agreed to join in it. There is no all-India unless the States co-operate with British India. Thus, in the course of their inquiry the Simon Commission discovered that the States were a pivotal factor in any future form of government which could be aligned with the various pledges given, from the King-Emperor's downwards. It must have been disconcerting when,

towards the close of their inquiry, it was evident that another fiasco had been made, almost as grave, in view of the ultimate goal, as the fiasco of 1917-19. This was the failure of the Harcourt Butler Committee to discharge their duty towards the States, or to give them any satisfaction on their primary grievances. Fortunately, it was not altogether too late for a remedy. In part this was provided when the Simon Commission asked for an extension of their terms of reference so that they might consider relations between British India and the Indian States; and it was further arranged that the States are to be represented at the preliminary Round Table Conference this autumn. The ambit of this Conference has since been extended beyond the original intention.

Before analysing the position of the States, it is important to note that in envisaging responsible government for all-India, as for British India, a cardinal difficulty is the position of the army. Responsible government under any conditions conceivable at present cannot be acquiesced in by Britain if it involves handing over our army, or withdrawing it, because, in the first place, Indian defence and security are matters of Imperial concern. In the second place, we are bound by Treaties to guard the Indian States with our army. The Simon Commission have consequently reported that there must be a very considerable British element in the army for "a very long time to come,"—"very many years." That must mean at least half a century, and probably more. And, of course, there cannot be this British element without British control. Our soldiers would not serve as mercenaries under an Indian Government. So the Simon Commission picked out the whole question of the army from the problem of responsible self-government, and proposed that the army should be a separate Imperial concern. By this recommendation, not only have they advanced the possibility of satisfying Indian Nationalist aspirations, and the ideal of a Federal India, but they have met the important objection of Lord Rothermere and the many who think with him, that Dominion status would mean handing over our army to anti-British politicians. Whether the tariff point has been met is another matter. In regard to hostile tariffs, which injure Britain as well as the Indian States, neither the Committee proposed in the Harcourt Butler Report, nor the Simon Commission's Council for Greater India, promise adequate safeguards. The protection of the States against crippling tariffs should be part of the written constitution.

The Ruling Princes and the States were treated in perfunctory fashion by the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, whose chief aim was to project an impossible Dominion for British India. They were remembered—one might almost say patronised—at the last moment by the setting up of a Chamber of Princes, but without any powers.

The business and actual agenda of this body were given into the hands of the Political Department of the Government of India. This Department, in almost complete secrecy, has "supervised" the Treaties we have made with the States for sixty years. The supervision in practice has meant that our Officers, with successive Political Secretaries at their head, have driven a coach and four through many of the Crown's Treaties, or twisted them out of recognition, this being done sometimes out of misguided zeal, sometimes in the interests of uniformity with British India. The Princes wanted an Advisory Council and a Court of Arbitration to settle the long-standing matters in dispute. The Chamber which they were given instead could not even raise the questions at issue, save with the consent of the Department arraigned, which was withheld in all salient matters. Therefore, said the Princes to the Viceroy, in 1927, if the Imperial Government are now going to write a new constitution for India, please give us an impartial tribunal to settle these matters first. We want our own constitution under the Treaties definitely determined so that it can no longer be varied by a Political Department; and we want the encroachments which have been made on our Treaty powers adjudged, and, if we prove our case, adjusted. Only thus can we with a free mind consider any future arrangements with which we may be asked to co-operate.

To explain to the British public the extraordinary sequel, it should be said that the official attitude towards the Ruling Princes of India in the past has often been analogous to the attitude of Liberal Prime Ministers in this country towards the Liberal Press. The Ruling Princes in India are on our side. So was the Liberal Press here on the side of Liberal Governments. But the attitude of a Liberal Premier towards his Press for many years, interpreted colloquially, was: "We have got those fellows, anyhow, never mind them; let us pay a little court to the opposition." The Princes were given a tribunal, consisting of a retired Governor, a financier, and a professor of English law. The first was the Chairman, Sir Harcourt Butler, recently Governor of Burma, and once the Political Secretary presiding over the Department whose conduct is in question. The Princes gathered together their voluminous and really sensational evidence, and hoped it would arouse sympathy in Britain. But that was stopped at the outset, for the Committee decided that it must be heard *in camera*. The Princes supposed that it would at any rate be dealt with in the Report. Not a bit of it; the whole of the evidence was swept aside in the Report on the plea of the Committee that they were not a judicial body. For that matter, neither is the Political Department, which has made its own laws; nor the Simon Commission, which examined

the British Indian problem; and the Harcourt Butler Committee were fully charged in their terms of reference with the duty of reporting on the Treaty rights and obligations. It was owing to the mystery surrounding this tribunal and its proceedings that I asked to be allowed as a matter of public interest to examine and interpret the Princes' evidence in the book *Scraps of Paper: India's broken Treaties*.

It is supposed by some that the Harcourt Butler Committee made a present to the Princes in reporting that the relationship of the States with the Crown cannot be transferred without their consent to any Government responsible to an Indian Legislature, and that the Viceroy should be the Crown's agent. But on this count what else could they have said? There was never any doubt on the subject until British Indian politicians tried to persuade the British public that the present Government in India is the Paramount Power over the States. The latest missionary attempt of this kind is an interesting and ingenious book by Professor Gurmukh Singh on the States and British India, to which Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru has contributed a non-committal foreword. The facts are, however, that before the Mutiny the Treaties were, in constitutional law, Treaties concluded between the Crown and the States, in which the East India Company was only an agent. Historically, these Treaty relations began before there was any British India. The British are not the Paramount Power over the States in right of their position as rulers of British India; indeed, it would be more accurate to say the contrary was the case. It does not do to force the Irish analogy, which breaks down, but if we did apply it to all-India then we should compare the Swarajists trying to rope in the States with the Irish Nationalists once on a time trying to rope in Ulster.

For the rest, the Harcourt Butler Committee adopt all the old clichés of the Political Department implying that the Treaties may be twisted to any meaning by "usage," or the exigencies of the Department, doctrines advanced by Departmental spokesmen like Tupper and Lee-Warner. They even appeal for confirmation of the divine right of Paramountcy to Sir Robert Holland, who, in 1921, was the chief agent in pushing a famous Prince off his throne. The Simon Report comes to the rescue, whilst of course observing diplomatic politeness, by admitting that the States are in a definite position to say no to the Paramount Power on two cardinal points, namely, whether they will join a Federation, and whether our army should ever be withdrawn. The Harcourt Butler Report assumed the attitude of a schoolmaster towards the States, and ridiculed the idea of Federation; the Simon Report shows that on the free-will of the States depends an all-India Federation, which is

the path to any possible Dominion status. The Harcourt Butler Report does not contemplate any permanent machinery to enable the States to be heard in all-India matters; the Simon Report says the time has come when it must be established. The schedule of matters of common concern to all-India in the Simon Report contains a number of important services that were brushed aside in this connection by the Harcourt Butler Committee. The latter admitted half-heartedly the right of the States to financial adjustment; the Simon Report says they have the right to be consulted in financial policy, which goes much further.

As to the relation of the States to a future Indian constitution—a relation which is conditioned by their Treaty position—the Simon Report says that "dogmatic conclusions" are improper before the States have been heard at the Conference. This was the more necessary since the hearing given them had been stultified. Finally, although in discussing the form of any future Federation the Simon Commission do so interrogatively, they include in their suggestions every salient contention of the Princes, most of which would have been barred by the Harcourt Butler Report. Thus it will be seen that the legal opinion of Sir Leslie Scott and his colleagues, with the greater part of which the Harcourt Butler Committee disagreed, is upheld by the Simon Commission.

In the controversy waged in Britain one argument is that Dominion status cannot exist if the army is made an Imperial concern, as the Simon Report suggests. But Dominion status may be defined anew, for a particular Dominion, all-India. As a matter of fact, the definition of the Imperial Conference of 1926 has not been formally approved by any Dominion Parliament save that of South Africa. If and when the time came an Act might constitute federated India a Dominion, though the army remained under our control. In this country a recent Act constituted the office of Prime Minister, which before then was legally fictitious. And if at some early date India were linked with the Dominions Office, it might agreeably influence Swarajist sentiment.

A. P. NICHOLSON.

GENERAL CARMONA: DICTATORSHIP WITHOUT A DICTATOR IN PORTUGAL.

GENERAL Antonio Oscar de Fragosa Carmona, President of Portugal, is the least known dictator in Europe. Slight of stature, reticent, suave, and silent, he seizes every opportunity of retiring behind the army which he represents. Under his régime there has now been no revolution in Republican Portugal for two whole years. The country, for the first time since the war, is tranquil and productive. Outside the army, among the people, General Carmona is neither loved nor hated, simply because no contact exists between him and them. He has built up no great popular creed, like Fascism or Communism. He has never made a speech from a balcony. He has never given his proclamations a personal ring. In a government as arbitrary as that of the Pretorian guard over Imperial Rome, he represents the military man turned statesman, the strategist learning a new strategy, the guardian of an army's honour attempting to restore that of his shaken country.

The General, in his very first statement, showed how widely his dictatorship was going to differ from all the others flourishing on the Continent. A series of successful revolutions and the dissolution of a military triumvirate had brought him to the supreme command. The army controlled the country. Parliament had been dissolved. Certain persons were in exile. Strict censorship closed every organ of expression. When, now, he called together the representatives of the Press, those assembled came rather fearfully. At Belem one enters the dictator's palace between terraced walls. Spaced sentry-boxes stand in front, while behind, in the courtyard, a row of uniformed men is always at attention. From a deep portico broad stairs lead up directly into a most imposing audience chamber, where the ceiling rises away from one like the interior of a mansard, till, in its centre, it is nearly twice as high as the already lofty walls, which are massive and built of squared gray stone. Against them hang great black tapestries, in each of which, like some rare, exotic blossom bursting out of a tropical night, glows the golden orange crest of Portugal. The ensemble forms the inevitable setting for a *pronunciamento*. The dictator, however, spoke simply. He outlined the *fait accompli*, which they already recognised, and startled them by concluding: "Gentlemen, Portugal at this moment is under a dictatorship without a dictator."

Uma dictadura sem dictador is the secret of the Carmona régime. The phrase has become a classic throughout the Iberian Peninsula. It expresses so perfectly the peculiar atmosphere which President

Carmona has created about his office. It explains so well why political assassination, which until his advent in 1926 had been the universal reward of Portuguese statesmen, has not been provoked. He has consolidated a system based first upon unity within the army and then upon unity within the nation, first upon a coherent and conservative programme, and then upon realisation and solvency. His system is personified by the man Carmona. It is made possible by the modesty and other non-military virtues of this officer. With his quiet wit and tactfulness he has held together the most turbulent army outside the Balkans, and imposed upon a people more individualistic than the Irish a régime of benevolent but absolute despotism. "I was at Evora, my military post," he said to me in explaining how he came to be head of the government. "Officers came and told me that there had been a revolution and that there was need of me. I went at once to Lisbon, and formed with General Gomes de Costa and Commandante Mendes Cabçadas, a new government. I was a soldier. The army had been my unique interest. Indeed, I am here because the army had to take control of the country. I stand for the army . . . that is all."

From the first President Carmona has done everything that he could to make his *Dictadura sem dictador* appear the expression of a fact. Never has dictator so laboured to sweeten the bitter pill of autocracy. It has not been a mere question of the plébiscite by which his *de facto* presidency was confirmed. With astuteness he has surrounded himself with dominant figures, experts like Dr. Salazar, the economist. Every member of his Cabinet President Carmona has exalted as if the man represented parliamentary choice and a constituency. And he himself has kept behind. This retirement which one reads in the General's public actions is discernible also in his carriage. Although well-proportioned, he appears almost fragile. He is inclined to stoop slightly forward, with a polished deference which is misleading. Yet the face, small, pinched, and shrewd, and the eyes, never at rest, belie their owner's self-effacement. They reveal a something imperious, a power of calculation and action.

There can be no doubt that in the present state of affairs in Portugal President Carmona has adopted the only policy which may succeed. Since the assassination of Dom Carlos in 1908, the revolution against his son, and the subsequent, abortive attempt to create a republic, there had been no rest in the land. Democracy became demagoguery. Demagogues ruled the country and terrorism soon was their weapon. Presidents were elected and deposed, dictators rose and were killed, with callous regularity. Secret societies, like the *Carbonarios*, were maintained. During the war

Sidonio Pais, who had assumed absolute power in the name of the army, was shot down in spite of the country's danger, and during his imposing funeral bombs were exploded throughout the city as a warning against future dictatorships. When General Carmona came into power his first task was to break the professional politician. "These men," he explained, "formed a little oligarchy within the body politic. They were like feudal chieftains. In its decision to take over dictatorial power and restore Portugal to its former estate, the army moved primarily against them."

"In Africa you will find a type of cannibal known as the Kassai. Within our ranks we call these white savages of politics after them, 'Kassais' of the Tagus instead of the Congo. In the name of liberty the 'Kassai' was able to do anything. He filled his own pockets with gold, gave his supporters rich positions in the administration, and ruined the country." To-day the "Kassais," if they exist at all, lead a hidden life. The secret police call them the *formigas brancas* or "white ants," because, like the famous termites of Angola, they never come out into the light, but work concealed until the edifice which they are devouring crumbles and falls. Their conquest and probable ultimate disappearance has been the greatest achievement of General Carmona's career.

A far older danger than the political parasite is the revolutionary parasite. Portugal in 1920 resembled an Italian city state at the time of the Renaissance. "Revolution," Carmona said, "had become a career like any other. There were certain groups in the city who could provide at any time, for a round sum, any number of resolute scoundrels ready to be armed and sent out against any opponent. Most vicious of all, revolution had become to such an extent an institution that many civilians, who were so numerous that in the end one had to invent a name for them and call them the *Revolucionarios Civies*—Lay Revolutionaries—joined themselves to the armed forces . . . or pretended to join themselves to the armed forces . . . whenever there was a *coup d'état*. These adventurers were unfortunately recognised by the first republic, after it had driven out Dom Manuel II, and they received a more than adequate compensation 'for their services.' Since then, of course, there has always been a vast number of *Revolucionarios Civies* to assert that they had participated in every successful revolt . . . and to claim their recompense. By refusing to recognise them in 1926 I hope that we have now rid ourselves of them. They were a symptom of the political illness which we are trying to cure."

General Carmona always says "We" instead of "I." He is the one executive in Europe who abhors the exploitation of his own

individuality. His is the modesty of the constitutional monarch and not that of the dictator. To obtain the unity of the country General Carmona has had first to obtain the unity of the army which controlled the country. By invoking his Cabinet, by retiring behind any one of the appointees who collaborate with him, and by speaking of "we" upon every occasion, he stresses an accord. The Portuguese army is not easy to unify. There are too many high-spirited individualists champing for power and position in a corps in which opportunity is limited. There was a time before General Carmona's rise to power when the army was not at all one in its purpose. "The movement of the 28th of May was a surprise," he says, "because nobody was prepared for concerted movement from the soldiers. Was it really possible to unite the army? None of the politicians believed that such a move could succeed. However, union was and is a fact."

In making his statement President Carmona overlooks the dissolution of the triumvirate of which he was one member, and the exiling of numerous obstreperous officers, who later were allowed to return. The President prefers to maintain a strategic silence about such matters. "We have had," he nevertheless admitted upon another occasion, "*des choses désagréables*. There were persons who, having sown the wind, have had to reap the tempest. In the precarious state of the nation it has been necessary to act swiftly and decisively. There were certain persons in our path. We put them aside." General Carmona's voice is never raised. It flows on evenly, placidly, serenely. "When we have had to send a man out of the country for any reason of state," he continued, "we do not do it vilely, in the night. Our man leaves in a blaze of elegance. The best cabin on the ship has been reserved for him. He arrives at the quay to find a line of soldiery drawn up and presenting arms, so that he embarks with the fullest honours of the army. Furthermore, those individuals who do not go into voluntary exile in Italy or France or England are not sent away to a St. Helena or certain of the Cape Verdes, but instead to our most prosperous colonies, to Angola, to São Thomé or to Madeira." General Carmona's strategy is his forte. His primary ambition has been not to exile or imprison but to conciliate. He prefers to win over his enemies rather than to crush them. It must be remembered that in the army he first won fame by publishing a book on strategy. At headquarters he was always the strategist. In the courtroom, where as an officer on one celebrated occasion he was employed to prosecute several brother officers who were being tried for rebellion, he won fame as the man who pleaded for both sides of the case . . . since personally he appreciated both. Even when discussing the most serious problems General Carmona often smiles:

"One of the great foreign dailies said some years ago that I was satisfied only when I was plunging my hands into human blood. I'm afraid the report was exaggerated. The practice would hardly be strategic. When we have sent a man away for a time, and feel that he is no longer a danger, we invite him to return. Usually he gives his word that he will support the army in its efforts to establish order. The unity of the corps is reinforced." Among his fellow officers, who have studied his military treatises at the Staff College and worked under him at the Cavalry School, President Carmona enjoys prestige. Some even speak of him with real affection. They remember a certain occasion when, as chief of the 4th Army Division, he rose at three in the morning to sign the immediate release of a group of imprisoned colleagues whom a court martial had just acquitted of treason.

From the creation of a unified army to the creation of a unified country has been but a step. Without the tremendous spiritual aid of some such force as *Fascismo*, General Carmona and his associates none the less have won over the majority of the country to agree that their rule is salutary. In a plébiscite or appeal to the people—the time-honoured expedient of successful *coups d'état* since Napoleon III—the Carmona régime was supported at the polls. It had earned the confidence of the people in two years. What Portugal most needed was confidence. Since the expulsion of the monarchy Portuguese capitalists had not felt secure to invest their money within the country. Deprived of their support, the government and the national industry declined. Self-seeking politicians completed the *débâcle*. Yearly deficits began to assume the proportions of small war debts. All production, commerce, and transportation stagnated. "The roads were so bad," President Carmona told me, "that automobilism was nearly an impossibility and never a pleasure. I remember that about 1926 I was still stationed at Evora, and some time before the *coup d'état* I received an automobile, delivered to me there. I invited a friend to come for a drive. We went off together, and in all, although we were a long time on the road, I believe that we covered no more than thirty kilometres. After that I used my car only in the city. I could not trust it to the infelicities of the national roads."

The first necessity for the rebuilding of the roads, for commerce and the basic industries, the first necessity for the re-establishment of confidence, was the organisation of an efficient military. As soon as the army had been sufficiently solidified to support the introduction of qualified civilians, this preliminary expedient was modified. Experts from the life of the nation were sought. The outstanding member of the present Cabinet—proof again that both General Carmona and his associates are willing to step aside before

a man so qualified and devoted as to win their respect—is Oliveira Salazar, the Minister of Finance. He has reorganised the income tax and brought about in one year economic reforms so as to balance the national budget which a committee of experts from the League of Nations calculated would take three years in even the most concentrated effort. How is it that General Carmona found such a man when the politicians who had preceded him did not? Salazar had been occupying the chair of economics at the university all the time, coming down to Lisbon on special investigations, and lecturing. He was the first technician in his field. But the demagogues were not interested in technicians. General Carmona was. Since selecting Salazar, he has retained him through several successive Cabinets. He has even gone so far as to exile the author of a recent pamphlet attacking his policies. He has won thus the confidence of conservative business.

But it is not deportations which really consolidate the military régime. It is Carmona's choice of gifted collaborators, his loyal support of them, and his solid, recognised, bourgeois honesty. His first act in taking office under the standard of *uma dictadura sem dictador* was to refuse any salary other than that of his ordinary military rank. He and his fellows were to build up a government, and not—like the "Kassais"—to rob! They set an example of Spartan simplicity. They inspired, throughout Portugal, a feeling of safety. In the summer palace at Cascaes, the rooms—although the building is a fortress—have a homely and comfortable air. A warm, unconscious intimacy pervades the place. Surrounded by his numerous family, the General is the centre of a group such as some mid-Victorian artist might have drawn for the ideal republican. Beyond a sort of battlement which shuts us off from the town there is uncertain music, Portuguese airs, a provincial band . . . singing. "Come! It is the fête day of a local saint and we can see them!" We clamber up an incline solidly constructed of thick masonry, grown over everywhere with ferns and thick mosses. At one side flows the Tagus, framed by a beach where fishing craft are drawn up past the tide line and where great black nets, drying, spread out across the sand like spiders' webs. A tiny hamlet, pink and yellow and blue and white, straggles along behind the nets to the foot of our wall, where a gay procession has been formed whose cheery holiday sounds are borne up to us on the breeze. Peace has come again to Portugal: its prophet, this silent, smiling man at my elbow; its ironic symbol, this gray little gunboat standing off and on under our lea toward Belem—whence, more than four centuries ago, Vasco da Gama set sail to conquer Adamastor and to reach the Indies.

WILLIAM LEON SMYSER.

CAN RUSSIA PAY?

IT seems a strange question to ask. Is it not accepted by all the economists who studied the resources of Russia that she is one of the richest countries, considering her natural wealth, her extent of territory, her mines, forests, rivers, and, what is more, her abundance of people only waiting for a chance to apply their labour, their great mental and physical abilities, to some productive industry?

Did not Mendelyev—who was not only one of the greatest chemists, but also an eminent student of economic questions and industries of Russia—tell us in his book, *On the Knowledge of Russia* (published in 1906, a year before his death):

Russia has immense natural riches, hardly yet touched, and even at present when we use them in a most primitive way our country became a world-wide power. . . . Having visited the Ural in 1899 with three assistant specialists I have personally become convinced that we can supply the whole world with the most cheap iron and steel. . . . Even such products as wine we can supply cheaper than anyone else because we possess all the natural conditions for the production of the best sorts, and we already have proof of this not only on the Czar's farms, but also in the vineyards of the Gollitsuins, Trubetskoi's, and other advanced enterprisers. We can produce manufactures from our own cheap raw materials, and this produce has received highest praise in world exhibitions. And so in everything else.

It is true that in many respects Mendelyev was too much of an optimist concerning his country, and his prognoses have been of much more value in science and in his periodical system of chemical elements than in social questions. Yet no one can deny the great importance of the opinion on Russia's natural riches expressed by such an authority on Russian economics as was this eminent Professor of Chemistry and Head of the Department of weights and measures in Imperial Russia. But one must not forget that he spoke of *natural riches*, that is, of those resources that are yet hidden in the ground, and require an enormous amount of capital and qualified labour. It was not on the iron industry, not even on the gold industry, and very little on her textile industry (although this last began largely to penetrate Central Asian markets and the East) that Russia formerly relied for paying her trade-balances and debts abroad. It was her agricultural produce—wheat and rye, and her forest industries—timber and furs—that constituted her principal articles of export.

In trying to answer the question: Can Russia Pay? one must, therefore, take into consideration the fact that development of natural riches in an industrially backward country—even in a

country with full political liberties, and with complete freedom of economic enterprise, with security and inviolability of personal rights, and with a literate population—requires scores of years to enable the country to become a great exporter of manufactured goods. Even the export of raw materials, the simple extraction of ore, cannot increase very much in a few years. Besides difficulties of production and transport, sometimes from remote and wild places, there is the still greater difficulty of finding a great foreign market which is not already occupied by a powerful competitor. The export of Russian petroleum, for instance, required more than thirty years and tens of millions of pounds before it developed as a really valuable asset. In 1881 the export of petroleum and its products from Russia amounted to 1,104,000 *poods*, in 1891, it was 54,224,000 and in 1901, 95,079,000. In 1904 it reached 112,063,000, after which, on account of various circumstances of which the chief was the great expansion of the internal market, especially the demands of the Volga and Caspian fleets for liquid fuel, it diminished essentially. In speaking, therefore, of Russia's capacity for paying foreign debts we must, at least for the next fifteen or twenty years, leave out altogether Russian underground natural riches. They may bring dividends and profits much earlier in the form of concessions to some foreign enterprising capitalist, but these dividends or profits will be derived not so much from export abroad as from supplying first the home market of Russia herself. And any economist will tell us that paying debts abroad means in reality exporting goods or supplying services to other nations.

Before the war, Russia paid her debts abroad chiefly by the produce of her agriculture, including sugar, spirits, and animal products. In the year 1893 it formed 81.12 per cent. of the whole Russian export. In course of time, with the development of other industries, the percentage became less, but even as recently as the year 1906 it still amounted to 75.37 per cent. and for the year 1911, the last of the pre-war years for which I could obtain a printed report of the Russian Department of Customs, it was still 63.9 per cent. Since then, as everyone knows, first on account of the war, then on account of Bolshevik rule, Russia has not progressed in industrial matters, either in extraction and manufacture of mineral wealth or in textile trades or agriculture.

On the contrary, the last, which had been the mainstay of export for paying debts abroad, has become so much reduced that at present it does not suffice even for internal demands, and the Bolshevik Government is compelled to import wheat and other grain from abroad. Moreover, there is no hope at all that agriculture in Russia will ever again be able to constitute a considerable volume

of export. A most remarkable article on that question was recently published by a Berlin Professor, Dr. Vladimir von Poletika (a Russian by birth) in the *Zeitschrift für Politik* (1929, Heft 2). Relying on previous writers and on his own observations and investigations in Russia, he came to the conclusion that, with her present population, she can in no way be counted as an agricultural exporting country. Neither by the extent of her land-suitable for agriculture, nor by her climate or geographical position (in respect of the distances separating her from the consuming countries), can she have any chance of continuing to export her wheat or rye or any other grain for men and cattle. If surplus of population means that part of it for which the country's soil cannot produce enough food, then, according to Dr. Poletika, Russia is a very much over-populated country. It may sound paradoxical, considering the vast stretches of land in Russia and Siberia; but the fact is that only about 5 per cent. of this vastness is now cultivated. Not only is the percentage of arable land small, but also the yield per hectare in comparison with other countries is very low. Thus the yield for wheat in the year 1927 amounted in Russia to 6.6 quintals: in Belgium it was 28, in Great Britain 20, in Germany 18, in France 14.5, in Canada 13, in the United States of America 10.

This backwardness of agriculture in Russia is ascribed by Dr. Poletika to three causes: first, to bad politics and bad legislation in the Czar's time, and still worse under the Bolsheviks; second, to the low degree of cultivation and, third, to natural causes, i.e. climate and soil: he points out that these natural causes outweigh all the rest. According to climatic and soil conditions in so far as they concern plants and systems of agriculture, Dr. Poletika divides Russia into five parts:

1. The *tundra*-lands where agriculture is altogether impossible.
2. The *taiga* (a marshy land bordering on the *tundra*, especially between the river Ob and Irtysh) in the western part of which agriculture is possible, but corn can be sown in a limited area only and the profits would be trifling.
3. The leafy forest zone, favourable to intensive culture, situated on the left side of the Volga to North East.
4. The steppe area, which is the granary of Russia, and in its western part, by climate and soil (black earth) is favourable for intensive culture. (But, according to Poletika, even for this area the word "granary" is a misnomer, as, like the eastern part of the steppes, it is very liable to dry seasons and there is no guarantee for a constant rate of crops or against the exhaustion of the soil. The repetition of famines in future amongst the peasantry is very likely.)
5. The Transcaspian and Turkestan deserts, where the climate

makes agriculture impossible without an artificial system of irrigation, which, however, local natural conditions make it very difficult to carry into effect.

One must remember that the Russian climate is a continental climate, that is, very little influenced by sea currents and sea exhalations, and the further East you go the more continental it becomes. Besides, as Russia (excluding the Caucasus or Crimea) is on the whole practically a flat country, her vast stretches of land have no defence worth speaking of against the cold wind from the North or the dry, devastating winds from the East and South-east. Russia, therefore, suffers from cold much more than places in Western European countries of the same latitude. The Russian winter is not only more severe, but also longer than in the West of Europe. The number of days with a temperature below zero in the North of European Russia is 230, in the North of Siberia in the same latitude it is 280. To the South this number is much smaller, but is never less (on the coast of the Black Sea) than 120. The minimum of cold days below zero in Southern Siberia is 180. Then the period of melting of the snow-cover, which is usually very thick, is, with the exception of the Far East and the Southern part of European Russia, a long one. The vegetation period is therefore too short for prosperous agriculture. Taking a few places along the neighbourhood of 50° N.L., which is approximately the agricultural zone of Russia, and moving to the East, the following duration of the vegetation period is given by Dr. Poletika: for Kiev 203 days, Kharkov 201, Saratov 190, Orenburg 178, and in Siberia, for Akmolinsk 160, Irkutsk 150, Nerehinsk 143, while in the West of Europe—for instance, for the town of Erfurt in Germany which is almost on the same latitude—the vegetation period lasts for 218 days. In the South, the vegetation period (I am speaking in the meteorological sense, taking the mean day's temperature not lower than 5° C.) lasts longer, but here enters into consideration the devastating effect of the dry winds.

The difference in climate and its consequent effects on the progress of agriculture is well illustrated by Professor Poletika by the data concerning the freezing of the rivers in the neighbourhood of 53° N.L. The Weser near Bremen is covered with ice 29 days, the Vistula 64, the Volga 130, the Ob 168, the Amur 192. North of this zone, the number of days during which the rivers are frozen increases rapidly the higher the latitude. As the Russian soil, especially in the zone of the steppes, suffers very much from lack of moisture, the risk of rainless seasons is very great, and when rain falls it is often in torrents that bring more harm than good.

Anyone acquainted with farming well knows the impossibility, under such conditions of short vegetation periods, dry soil and lack

of rain, of taking up feeding-grass culture, without which no proper system of crop rotation is really possible. The three-field system prevailing in Russia is after all as much a result of climatic conditions as of outside causes which are more easy to remove.

Dr. Poletika, after considering some possibilities still existing for purposes of colonisation in Siberia, believes that :

under favourable conditions there may yet be left a colonisation area for some tens of millions of settlers. But before this theoretical reckoning can be realised extensive land-improvement works and preparations for the settlement of emigrants are necessary; and these works and preparations require in their turn great technical and agricultural knowledge, much organising ability and immense capital. Such a problem cannot be solved by present-day Russia for a very long time to come.

Considering that Dr. Poletika and other authorities express the conviction that (besides climatic and soil conditions) a very important part in the progress of this industry must be taken by social-political conditions which are now lacking in Russia, it is evident that under Bolshevik rule no progress in Russian agriculture is in any way possible, and no expectations can be built on any increase of the export of grain and, generally, of agricultural produce in the future. And if there is no prospect for increase of agricultural export, if there can be any export, then by what other export will the Soviet Government be able to cover the big credits which it requires and the debts which are due for the loans of former Russia?

One sometimes hears people who evidently have a very faint conception of the past or present Russia arguing that there is no reason why we should not trust the promises and signature of Bolshevik Russia when such a trust was put in Imperial Russia. Leaving out altogether the moral side of the question, and concerning ourselves only with realities and facts, one must remember two important points. In matters of commerce and trade in past Russia, the foreign importer, the foreign merchant and manufacturer, had to deal not with the Government of Russia but with private Russian citizens and firms. Credit was allowed to those Russian firms which had proved to be of substantial standing, and even then no very long credit, none longer than three months and in exceptional cases six months, was allowed. And if a Russian firm refused to pay there was a court of law, and the Russian courts of law, especially in trade and commercial cases, were no less impartial and honest than any other European law-court. The decision of the law-court, whatever it was, was backed by the authority of the Government. One could cite hundreds of cases where Russian judges have given their verdict for the foreign claimant against the Russian. And, in the last resort, if a Russian firm was declared

insolvent, the loss to the foreign importer was only the loss of that single importer who credited a single insolvent firm. Other Russian firms with which he dealt may by their business have covered his losses. In any case the sufferers from his insolvency must have been a few private persons only.

At present the case is quite different. The only trader in Russia is her Government. It is the only importer and exporter. In case of quarrel or dispute the foreign seller or buyer is helpless. There is at present in Russia no impartial law-court, and by the essence of the Bolshevik rule there can be no impartial court, either in criminal, political, or commercial cases; and, if such a court by some unimaginable freak of nature were to be possible, its verdict would mean nothing if it went against the Government. And if the Bolshevik Government becomes insolvent, as by the nature of things it must become, and practically already is, then not only individual foreign creditors will suffer, but all the traders and creditors dealing with this Government.

The other point to keep in mind is that in Imperial Russia there existed a strong dividing line between commercial credit and State credit. The Government was comparatively a small trader, as the whole bulk of commerce and trade belonged to private initiative. Government loans concluded abroad had nothing to do directly with imports and exports on a mercantile basis. They were State financial loans used to provide for certain State necessities. They were covered by taxes and customs collected from private persons, citizens of Russia. They were what is called budgetary loans, which do not include railway and war obligations. But where are now the Russian citizens who can yield such a sum as to cover enormous State loans? Except the peasants, all the citizens are State employees or workers in State factories. Theoretically, their income in Russia is measured by the value of the necessities of life, and wages are the limit of the cost of living. Some get higher wages, some lower, but no one can have a large enough income to yield a high tax. Practically, almost all the manual workers and a great number of officials are exempt from income-tax, though this is usually disguised under the name of "voluntary" subscription or State loans that are compulsory amongst all citizens of Russia, wage-earners and peasants not excepted.

Theoretically, there ought to be profits on trade, and the most farcical publication ever issued in London, *The Soviet Union Year Book*, in its issue for 1928, tells us that "out of the accumulated resources and internal savings, more than 2,000 million roubles have been earmarked as additional capital to be invested in the development of the national economy." The same tale is repeated in the 1929 issue of their precious *Year Book*, so the accumulations have

not grown for the year 1928. I should like to see the bank or warehouses where these 2,000 millions of roubles (presumably it means more than 200 million pounds) are accumulated in cash or merchandise. But the simple economic fact is that where prices, wholesale and retail, as well as wages, are fixed as they are now in Russia by decree, and not by a free market, the profits and "accumulations" can only be illusory, having no real substance in marketable commodities. The moment these commodities, if they really exist, appear on a free market under a free system of costs and wages, they may assume quite a different value and instead of profit may prove a loss.

I have thus far shown that the Soviet Government cannot pay and never will be able to pay its foreign obligations, except in a very small way, either as a trader or as a State debtor. And, to be just even to the Bolsheviks, one must add that the Imperial Government of Russia was no better off as a State debtor. It never could pay, and its coming bankruptcy was fast approaching, if not stemmed in time by some change of policy which would encourage industrial enterprise. The Imperial Government, however, did go on for a very long time regularly paying interest and parts of debts by the simple device used by all insolvent debtors of borrowing new money to cover part of the previous debts and payment of interest.

If this system of credit is to continue in dealing with the Bolshevik Government then, indeed, Russia can pay, only with this essential difference that, whereas the investor and banker can wait, being meanwhile satisfied with the interest and amortisation percentages, the manufacturer, the shipper, the exporter can hardly wait. He will have to be paid in full, and the banker and taxpayer who will supposedly guarantee these long credits will have to pay increasingly as years go on.

SEMION RAPOPORT.

GEORG BRANDES IN 1913.

WHEN at the end of 1913 Brandes paid his last visit to England, he came to us as by common consent the first literary critic of his age. He had started his career as a poet, and then turned to philosophy, but he found his true vocation in a third domain. "The gift for abstract philosophical thought which I had possessed as a youth was never developed, but like my earlier tendency to verse-making was superseded by an historico-critical faculty."* He had come to say of himself: "My special gift is a certain creative spirit which makes of me something more than a critic. I am called a critic, that term is too small for me; I am called a philosopher, that term is too big. I am a poet, an artist, not a philosopher. I have the reward of helping to make an epoch, in my turn I have inspired poets."

To be something of a poet and more of a philosopher was no bad start in life—it gave a man wings to fly from his surroundings. And to a young Jew like Brandes, born in a little Scandinavian land, his surroundings as he grew to manhood were far from exhilarating. "There was a sense," he says, "of being shut out from the cultured life of Europe. Political hostility had cut the intellectual ties between Denmark and Germany; French culture was shunned as frivolous; English culture, owing to ignorance of the language, was but rarely understood. Danes still believed they were the salt of Europe and did not realise that the nations they had dreamed of rejuvenating through their faith and idealism had gained a great start on them, especially in literary culture. Denmark still spoke of David Strauss and Feuerbach as the most narrow-minded circles of Germany spoke of them twenty years before: Stuart Mill, Darwin, and Herbert Spencer were scarcely known by name, and there was not the slightest conception of the development of English poetry from Shelley to Swinburne. Modern French literature was condemned without any conception of the significance of the fact that French dramatists and writers of romance had long since forsaken historical and legendary material and had turned to those subjects of the present world which are the only ones that a poet can really observe and study."† And so Brandes found his life's work, to interpret the most significant thought of Germany, France, Russia, and England to Scandinavia and to each other. In doing so, he became himself a moving force in the history of his time.

He did not neglect his own country. One of his earliest works was a sympathetic study of Hans Christian Andersen, then an old man; he wrote of Danish poets such as Paludan-Müller, he pub-

* *Recollections*, p. 277.

† *Creative Spirits*, p. 336 (compressed).

lished a book on Holberg, and though in another work he attacked Kierkegaard, he declared later that Kierkegaard was a profounder psychologist than his book had revealed. But Brandes was more than a Dane. He spent years abroad at Paris (with visits to London), at Rome, and at Berlin. He shook off the stifling atmosphere of his early days and came to breathe a world-spirit in which every great man was seen from the point of view of the whole. And wherever he went his vivacity, force, and charm brought him into intimate relation with some master-spirit, it might be Ibsen or Björnson (though here after some aloofness), it might be Mill or Taine or Renan. Even before he met Mill in 1870 he had translated into Danish his *Liberty* and *Enfranchisement of Women*, but his intimacy with Mill in that last year of his life gave new depth to all that he wrote of him afterwards.

Brandes undoubtedly assisted Ibsen at several points of his life to obtain recognition. For Nietzsche he did still more. Nietzsche was little known, even in Germany, when Brandes in 1887 opened a correspondence with him and next year lectured upon him at Copenhagen to audiences of three hundred students. It was a gleam of hope and joy cast upon the last year of Nietzsche's active life: in a few months he sank into that insanity from which he never recovered. The letters that passed between the philosopher and his critic are important for our understanding of both: in particular we may admire Brandes' independence and refusal to accept the new doctrine *en bloc*. He felt that Nietzsche's "aristocratic radicalism" was akin to his own (he had come to distrust the judgment of democracies); he was at one with him in his condemnation of Benthamism: "Why happiness for the greatest number, and not for the best, the noblest, the most gifted? We may even ask whether moderate prosperity is preferable to the inequality of lot which acts as a goad, forcing culture ever upward."* Like Nietzsche he disliked the ascetic ideal; he thought that established institutions, the Church, monarchy, marriage, property, all called for reform "from the foundation"†; he was for Cæsar against Brutus, he hated all pedantry, especially moral pedantry. But he could still complain that Nietzsche was at a loss where delicate shades of truth are concerned, he could demur to Nietzsche's treatment of the Socialist movement ("the anarchism of Prince Kropotkin is no stupidity")‡, to his attitude to women, and his ruthless ridicule of the "morality of pity." He could see that Nietzsche was a fighter and that he himself had ceased to be one: "I divine in your writings the practised soldier. It would be worse than a cloudy day to me to make myself angry over things that do not concern me." But he could say: "Though

* Nietzsche, p. 24.

† Ibid., p. 75.

‡ Ibid., p. 67.

no longer young, I am still one of the most inquisitive of men and one of the most eager to learn; I am often stupid, but never narrow."* And when reproached later for having sacrificed to Nietzsche his early humanitarianism, as he had thrown over Mill for Taine (which he denied), he could retort: "I rejoice in Nietzsche as I rejoice in every powerful and uncommon personality. We are not children in search of instruction, but sceptics in search of a man, and we rejoice when we have found a man, the rarest thing there is."

Brandes' inquisitive interest in the movements of his age led him into many fields. Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, Zola and Maupassant, Sudermann and Hauptmann, J. P. Jacobsen and Strindberg, are but a few of them. But this interest did not interrupt his concern with the great imaginative writers of the past. From 1872 onwards he published his series of *Main Currents of Nineteenth-century Literature*, in which, with an undisguised sympathy for the champions of new thought, he traced the literary history of France, Germany, and England in the period that followed the French Revolution. But he grew to be still more detached. In 1895 appeared his great work on Shakespeare, the greatest, as has been said, ever written by a foreigner, in which characteristically he tried to trace the man in his works. A similar work on Goethe appeared in 1914. He had perhaps tired a little of following the currents of his time; and found peace and relief in the men whose reputations were unassailable by serious students.

Something of this may perhaps be seen in the conversation that follows. We may also remember that when he spoke in 1913, with the Great War looming before him, he had been in Paris in August 1870 and had seen the consternation which the disappointment of their hopes had then wrought in the French population. He quotes Renan as saying: "I knew how badly we were prepared."† He was slow to believe that in a war to come things would turn out very differently, though as a veteran friend of Greeks and Armenians and Poles he had given practical aid to the new movements in Europe. His conversation shows how much of the future an intelligent student may foresee, and how much is hidden from him.

The mordant touches of his tongue recall those of his pen. Can one find a more delightful irony than in what he says of a Danish bishop? "He had made my acquaintance when he was a Free-thinker; but fortunately he recognised his errors only a very few years later. There is hardly anyone in Denmark who persists in

* Nietzsche, p. 63.

† *Creative Spirits*, p. 219.

error; people recognise their mistakes in time, before they have taken harm to their souls; sometimes, indeed, so much betimes that they are not a hindrance to their worldly career! ”*

To pass to my immediate subject. Brandes, as I said, made a lecturing tour in England in the winter of 1913-14. His first lecture—the first that he had ever given in English—was on Shakespeare, and was delivered in the large hall of the University of Sheffield, on the 24th November, at 5.30, with Dr. W. M. Hicks, the acting Vice-Chancellor, in the chair. It fell to me to meet him at the station, and to put him up for the night. One could not imagine a more delightful guest. I found him of middle height, with white hair brushed up from the forehead, a small beard and moustache, small eyes, a long shapeless nose. His face was mobile, and his voice beautiful and full of expression, the tones now vehement and now caressing. His manners were most gracious and charming. On being introduced to his hostess, he stooped and kissed her hand. He walked slowly, occasionally stopping, but talking hard all the time. He sometimes took me by the arm or the shoulder. His walking-stick, which had been given him by his publisher, was a copy of Holberg’s. His lecture was brilliantly composed, but unfortunately, owing to his very strong foreign accent and mispronunciation of words, was to a great extent lost upon his audience. I believe that he took special pains to improve things in subsequent lectures.

Now that Brandes has passed away, the following fragments of his conversation based on notes taken the following day may be of general interest, if only as showing with what passionless quizzical eyes the disillusioned revolutionist now looked on life. He spoke in French. When some reference was made to his age, he said: “With a little change of the figures, I am 17, a very fine age. (He was 71.) The heart is young.” The last phrase, he told us, he had taken from Hans Andersen, who at one time visited him weekly, was much concerned about any little ailment and thought he was going to die—“But the heart is young.” “Yes,” I used to think, “and that is the only thing that is invisible. And now I am older than Andersen ever was, and I must seem to others as he then seemed to me. . . . Andersen was always eager for praise, and put out by the least qualification of it. Once a week he used to dine at a house and stay till he had been toasted: ‘We have with us one who is the glory of Denmark.’ He received the honour with constant surprise, though he was uneasy till it came, and much put out if it was forgotten.”

“When I first visited England I was much with John Stuart Mill, with whom I spoke French. Mill’s views of women were

* *Recollections*, p. 138.

coloured by his admiration for his wife. He said he had corresponded with Indian Rajahs and Ranees, and the latter were the more intelligent.

“Taine said to me, ‘I wonder you admire Goethe so much.’ I asked why. He said, ‘*Ce n’est pas original*,’ and then quoted four lines of Goethe, pronouncing every word as French, and asked, ‘*Est-ce que c’est beau, ça?*’ ”*

“Daudet wrote to seek my acquaintance, and for some time I saw him daily. I went with a prejudice against him, owing to a story I had been told about him by one who had been his secretary. For a long time I thought ‘Daudet is charming—*mais il est faux*.’ At last the story seemed impossible to believe, and I quoted it and found it all fiction. Daudet at last wrote to me as ‘brother.’ He was paralysed at the time.

“King Haakon of Norway has to beg pardon every day for being a Dane. His handkerchief flew away, and he was so grateful for its recovery that surprise was expressed. ‘Oh,’ he said, ‘you don’t know how I value that handkerchief. It is the only place in Norway where I am allowed to poke my nose.’ . . . I regret the anti-Danish movement in Norway. The three Scandinavian countries can only have weight by closer union, and the tendency is to wider separation.’ . . . That was the spirit among Armenians. Many visited me in Paris, and no one would willingly meet another. When one was with me and another was announced, I used to say ‘You can get away by the side staircase if you wish.’ A deputation of ten came to see me, and they represented ten parties, religious and political. With other people if you have two or three points in common that is enough. With them one point of difference means hatred. One of those whom I knew best was assassinated for having hired murderers to kill two others—just as in Shakespeare.

“The most dangerous man in Europe is the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, whose wife is in the hands of the priests and wishes to make war on Italy and restore his dominions to the Pope.

“There is a strong war feeling among young Frenchmen. Renan’s daughter has written to me about her son who is enthusiastic for *la guerre sainte* to recover Alsace and Lorraine, and she says ‘*Il ressemble à mon père*.’ Why, Renan would have been exactly the opposite. . . .† French administration is rotten. If

* Cp. *Recollections*, p. 242.

† Cp. *Recollections* (1906), p. 247: (Renan and his wife . . . had) “a daughter, Noëmi (Madame Psichari) who faithfully preserving the intellectual heritage she has received from her great father, has become one of the centres of highest Paris, a soul of fire, who fights for Justice and Truth and social ideas with burning enthusiasm.”

It was announced in March 1915 that Ernest Psichari, the grandson of Renan, a brave soldier and a delicate poet, had died on the battlefield.

there is a war, probably there will be no shoes for the soldiers. They made a Prime Minister of Briand who some years before had told soldiers to fire on their officers. A friend of mine with French sympathies passed from Germany into France, and said that the change from good administration to confusion destroyed all his hopes. Everything in a French newspaper is paid for. Editors make fortunes by what they suppress, i.e. blackmail.

"The greatest organisations in the world are the Roman Church and the German Army. . . . Do you know that the Germans are building warships night and day? Against whom, do you think? England has lost its opportunity. If it ever wished to destroy the German fleet, as it destroyed those of Denmark and France, it should have acted ten years ago. . . . But I think the fear of a German invasion of England is childish. Moltke said that if there were an invasion of England, the German soldiers must take their baptismal certificates with them so that their bodies could be identified. However, I think the mass of the people will prevent war.

"Is not Bernard Shaw a *poseur*? The French laughed at his telling them that he would conquer Paris as he had conquered Berlin. Prince Kropotkin's daughter went to him a year or two ago for a subscription to some charitable object. He saw the names of Kropotkin and other Socialists in the list, and said, 'Oh, these men are not extreme enough for me. I cannot join with them.*' She replied, 'Mr. Shaw, you are a *poseur*.'

"I dislike Bergson's intuitional philosophy—'*Je vois la vérité. Mais quelle vérité?*' What is truth, except as built up of fragments? . . . I can see little in Walt Whitman or Oscar Wilde (I associate them together), and am surprised at Wilde's vogue in Germany. A Dane mentioned him in an article as a 'criminal,' on which the Berlin publisher insisted that he should withdraw the word and speak of him, if possible, with reverence, or Young Germany would scout the critic as an old fogey.

"The Nobel Prize was given to the Indian Tagore on the recommendation of the British Academy, probably made for political reasons to please Bengal. I have read translations of Tagore in a French paper. It is poor stuff. He won the prize on account of one metaphor, where man's leaving this life for a richer one is compared to a mother putting her child from the left breast to the right. . . . Nobel wrote his will in pencil on a scrap of paper, and said he wished to reward *idealistic* literature. He meant revolutionary and anti-clerical literature. The Academy of Stockholm, Archbishops and old professors, interpreted the word in the oppo-

* The humour of the speech seems to have escaped Brandes as it escaped Miss Kropotkin.

site sense. They gave Roosevelt the Peace Prize to make him kind to Scandinavians in America.

"*Jean-Christophe* is a fine book, but very long. I divide books into books shorter than the Bible and books longer, and put the latter aside. But I read the first volume of *Jean-Christophe* before I knew it would be so long. . . . I often read two hundred pages of a book before seeing that it is stupid and not worth reading. Everyone wastes time, especially in youth when one is uncritical, on books not worth reading."

"I think that nothing much is to be got from the study of dreams. I have twice dreamed that I was a woman. . . . As for female suffrage, I would sooner take away votes from men than give them to women. Women could not use them more stupidly. I will sell my own vote for a song."

"I have written in Danish three volumes of autobiography, one of which is translated into English. The third was a failure. I shall write no more of this. I want to put together my essays on Goethe before I die, or the Copenhagen Academy will do it for me.* My books have not been selling well in England lately. The royalty on all is only about 300 kroner a year.

"A German: Is it not strange that the French call bread *pain*?

Another: And *we* call it *Brod*.

The first: Yes, but then it is *Brod*."

(At parting): "When I am off your hands you will say 'Ouf,' as Napoleon told his officers they would say when they lost him.† It is almost the only sign of humour in Napoleon."

Brandes died on February 20th, 1927, having just completed his 85th year.

G. C. MOORE-SMITH.

* Brandes' *Life of Goethe* in two volumes appeared in 1914.

† Bismarck seems to have had this story in his mind. Cp. E. Ludwig. *Bismarck Trilogy*, III, *Dismissal*, p. 346, Act 2: Bismarck to his son Bill: "The rogues would all be delighted and would cry 'Ouf!' if I [resigned]." The same speech is given as historical in Ludwig's Bismarck biography.

GUSTAV MAHLER.

IT is a matter of particular interest that Mahler's Fourth Symphony should have been performed at Queen's Hall on March 7th last, followed by a production of the Eighth Symphony on April 11th. The music of this composer has attracted, for many years, considerable attention and some respect abroad. In England opportunities to judge his more significant compositions have hitherto been negligible. It has been presumed widely that the work of Mahler, together with the music of Reger, Bruckner, and Pfitzner, is essentially local in its address. This criticism, as a final verdict, does less than justice to Mahler's talent.

To secure an unbiased perspective of the composer's worth two preliminary factors demand recognition. The first is concerned with the partisan influence which has tended to impede a fair critical assessment of his music. The second relates to circumstances of the artist's career affecting fundamentally his attitude towards the whole process of composition.

With regard to the former point the issue has been seriously obscured by the injudicious zeal of Mahler's disciples no less than through the immoderate antagonism of his opponents. Scriabin was the victim of a similar disadvantage. Although, musically, he has little in common with Mahler, both composers were obsessed with the idea of giving practical interpretation to grandiose and lofty schemes. In addition to these uncertain qualities the music of each involves a strong romantic element, not easily defined, which seems curiously to paralyse the critical faculties of those by whom it is encountered. This element is in great measure responsible for the infrequency with which one discovers an estimate of Mahler or Scriabin properly balanced between the extremes of unthinking admiration and intense loathing. By admirers exaggerated emphasis is laid upon the importance of Mahler's aims. Antagonists concentrate overmuch upon his defects as a craftsman. In neither case is it realised that, though the man was greater than his music, in his finest work the handicap of more formal shortcomings is reduced to insignificance by the value of the content.

In the second place Mahler, throughout his life, was acutely responsive to conditions of environment. He possessed little of that power of detachment which promotes the exquisite contemplative writing of another romantic composer, Frederick Delius. Mahler was born on July 7th, 1860, at Kalischt in Czecho-Slovakia. From his Jewish descent he derived the passionate nature and occasional eloquence visible in the whole course of his music. A similar feeling very differently expressed is discernible in the fine

Israel Symphony of Ernest Bloch. After some education at the grammar school of Iglau Mahler began his studies, in 1875, at the Vienna Conservatoire. As a student his career was distinguished, but the event of that period which most closely concerned his development as a composer was his meeting, in 1878, with Anton Bruckner.

Apart from the value attached to the mystical features visible in his best music, Bruckner's attempts to enlarge the principles of Beethoven through an expression of symphonic form possess historical significance. It was these formal endeavours which chiefly attracted Mahler and became subsequently the chosen foundation of his own symphonic writings. In 1880 he acquired a temporary appointment as *Kapellmeister* at Hall in Austria. This post marked the beginning of a career during the course of which Mahler, aided by remarkable enthusiasm and an unflagging capacity for hard work, made his way as a conductor of opera to the head of his profession.

The years from 1880-5 were occupied in a series of minor posts which, however valuable as a means to first-hand experience, proved irksome to an artist of Mahler's individuality. In 1885 he received an appointment at Prague which, through fortunate circumstances, resulted in his assuming almost entire control of the musical direction. Here he attracted considerable attention by a profound interpretation of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, and by productions of Mozart and Wagner outstanding for their artistic and intellectual excellence. After twelve months he went as second *Kapellmeister* to Leipzig. At the end of two years he won promotion, which should have been valuable, to the director's post at Budapest.

Mahler took up his new work with the utmost enthusiasm, being desirous of establishing many urgent reforms. But controversial elements which manifested themselves in the respective claims of the old and new schools of opera patrons proved insuperable. By 1890 he was seeking employment elsewhere. Mahler's activities in Budapest were not altogether barren. His production of *Don Giovanni* earned warm praise from Brahms, and he overcame local opposition to the extent of securing admirable performances of the *Rheingold* and *Die Walküre*.

In many ways it was fortunate that the next post made less serious demands upon his energy. The position of first *Kapellmeister* in the municipal theatre at Hamburg, which Mahler occupied from 1891-7, did not entail the prestige implied in the previous appointment at Budapest, but at last he was able to command the leisure and repose necessary for serious composition. This peaceful interval was broken only by a brief though successful visit to London during Augustus Harris's season in 1892. When,

in 1897, he returned to Vienna to take up the most important work of his life as conductor Mahler had already completed the first three of his symphonies.

During his ten years as Director of the *Hofoper* in Vienna Mahler's achievements were prodigious. The ideal which he set before himself was the production of opera perfect to a degree hitherto unknown. By means of exceptional energy and care of detail in each department this vision was very considerably realised. A heavy legacy of debt encumbering the *Hofoper* was quickly demolished. The operas selected for performance were of varied and excellent quality. For the most part the productions were impeccable. Mahler was entirely without desire to win personal glory. His one concern was the creditable fulfilment of the appointed task. At this time his creative powers were particularly active. Within these years he completed the Fourth Symphony, and wrote four others. Yet, though Mahler secured by the breadth of his aims a staunch following, his arbitrary methods in dealing with people proved the means of begetting disputes. In course of time these troubles assumed such serious proportions that the only solution of the problem lay in his retirement. Quick to perceive the situation he accordingly withdrew from the *Hofoper*.

This new liberty allowed him to consider engagements further afield. The success which attended his journey to America late in 1907 encouraged him to repeat the experience during the following year, at which time he was composing *Das Lied von der Erde*. As conductor of the Philharmonic Society of New York he greatly distinguished himself, achieving equal fame with his performances at the Metropolitan Opera House. The next twelve months were occupied mainly with the completion of the Ninth Symphony. After a further visit to America in 1910, he enjoyed the satisfaction of hearing his own music played at special concerts given in Paris, Amsterdam, and Munich, and sketched the opening of the Tenth Symphony, the remainder of which was never written. Mahler's health had been failing for some years; now it appeared more completely to desert him. Shortly after his return to Austria he died in Vienna on May 18th, 1911.

It has been suggested that Mahler's connection with the operatic stage may help to account for certain unsatisfactory features—notably looseness of structure—in his compositions. It is consistent with his idealism respecting production that he himself should have written no mature operas. What is less easily comprehensible is that his capacity for working to completion every detail which fell within his province as Director did not extend equally to the writing of music. As a composer Mahler was prodigal of exalted ideas ambitiously conceived, but he had not the

patience to effect their final evolution. His symphonies are designed for the most part upon an immense and unwieldy scale. It may be said with some accuracy that his music admits of division into three periods. The first contains the four early symphonies characterised by an insistence upon objective features; the second period includes the next four symphonies which reflect profound spiritual conflict; and the third period embraces the Ninth Symphony together with *Das Lied von der Erde*. The works of these respective periods may, without injustice to Mahler, be considered representatively.

The Fourth Symphony (1900) is strong in indications of the more outstanding features of the composer's art. When listening to it one is conscious, to some extent, of the heritage which Mahler accepted from Berlioz and Liszt and, above all, from Wagner. The features of inheritance are apparent more in the manner of treatment than in the essential substance of the work. It is clear that to Mahler melody is quite literally song. Again and again in this symphony he concentrates upon writing of a kind which, although instrumentally conceived, retains an unmistakably vocal feeling.

The Eighth Symphony (1907) is set forth in the most elaborate terms for large orchestra, chorus, and boys' chorus, and eight solo voices. It is arranged in two sections, the first of which is built upon words taken from the Latin hymn *Veni, Creator Spiritus*, while in the second part Mahler goes for his text to the latter half of Goethe's *Faust*. The vocal feeling which is never completely absent even from his purely instrumental works is here his great strength. Verbal usage appears to supply just that reinforcement necessary to ensure continuous elevation of style. In consequence the element which elsewhere in Mahler's music seems grandiose is turned to excellent account. For a task of the magnitude which the Eighth Symphony involves nothing less than his profound emotional capacity could have served. His technical equipment acquires a new certainty and grace, leaving him free to concentrate upon the expression of sincere and powerful thought. From another angle Mahler's tendency towards theatrical qualities, occasionally resulting in triviality, is revealed in the Eighth Symphony as a calculated appreciation of dramatic fitness. A sense of continuity is established in some measure by the employment, in the second part, of themes which have occurred in the first; and the spiritual affinity existing between the composition of both sections confirms the aim towards homogeneous writing. Although the ease of inspiration is occasionally checked by structural exigencies, such shortcomings are at no point gross enough to be accounted serious defects. The assembly of these manifold details in

Mahler's favour entitle one to regard this work as the foremost of his nine complete symphonies.

However sharp critical dispute may be concerning the ultimate worth of the symphonies viewed collectively, it is at least widely agreed that *Das Lied von der Erde* (1908) represents Mahler's highest achievement in composition. This remarkable cycle of six songs has recently been heard again in London after an interval of sixteen years. It consists of poems taken from the *Chinesische Flöte* of Hans Bethge, three being set for tenor voice and three for alto or baritone. *Das Lied von der Erde* is scored for a large orchestra, but this array is employed with considerable economy. The proportions of the work are symphonic; the design includes substantial orchestral interludes between the songs. In some fashion the poetry has stimulated Mahler to a degree unequalled throughout the range of his other music. His less attractive mannerisms are cast aside. The vocal treatment is of exquisite beauty while the instrumental scoring exhibits an intimate delicacy of touch as enchanting as it is unusual. The mental attitude indicated by *Das Lied von der Erde* admits roughly of a Shakespearian parallel. After concentrating upon more obvious externals in his early symphonies, followed by a period of tragedy which culminates in the Eighth Symphony, Mahler exhibits, in these songs, something of the uncanny peace and final calm discernible in the poet's Romantic Comedies. The deep spiritual experience which preceded the cycle brings him, through every shade of emotion, to a state of reflection and strange tranquillity. Professor Weissmann has described *Das Lied von der Erde* as the composer's most perfect work, and the tribute is just.

Mahler's complex personality does not simplify the task of indicating the extent to which his music may aspire to permanent worth. In fairness to him it is as well to admit, on the negative side, that certain grave faults in his utterances are beyond concealment. He was frequently torn between a desire to imitate and an aspiration to originality. His ethics regarding the sources from which he selected thematic material were by no means impeccable. Other shortcomings have been touched upon during the course of the present essay. Yet there are works to his credit in which great art is truly exemplified; and among these one would place the Eighth Symphony and *Das Lied von der Erde*. The former provides a happy illustration of a magnificent gesture which has secured full effect; the latter reveals a rare sensibility to the meaning of beauty. In the bulk of the symphonies exalted moments are occasional; here they are constant. If, in the future, these two works secure the attention they deserve it may be said that the best in Mahler will be honoured.

ROBERT H. HULL.

AN OBERAMMERGAU IN SPAIN.

HOW few of those thousands of international sightseers flocking during this summer to the Bayreuth of Passion plays, the little village of Oberammergau, are aware of the fact that there exists in Alicante, the sun-kissed coast province of South-east Spain, a small town named Elche, where an uninterrupted tradition of a genuine mediæval miracle-play is still kept alive by a community imbued with a strange mixture of pagan ritual instincts and unquestioning reverence for the tenets of the Roman Catholic religion?

Better than any matter-of-fact quotation from Baedeker will the description by Felipe Pedrell, the eminent Catalan musicologist of that Earthly Paradise, convey an idea of the stage-setting it provides for the performance of a mystery-play:

The nearer we approached Elche, the more luxuriant became the vegetation, until a dense grove, extending in almost unlimited verdure, surrounded us. Thousands of tall palms, surmounted by splendid crowns of dates, were rising above a background of pomegranate trees and their glittering scarlet-hued fruit—a picturesque landscape of truly oriental aspect. Low houses with terraces dotted the countryside, framed by these innumerable palm trees in a phantastic aureole of purple and gold. This picture in its simple solemnity and marvellous beauty—does it not conjure up to the traveller the vision of Jerusalem, Damascus, or the suburbs of Alexandria?

In the midst of this enchanted garden is enacted yearly during the month of August the miracle-play of the Death, the Assumption, and Coronation of the Virgin Mary. Its form is that of the music-drama, in fact it is the oldest serious play in existence in which *all the words are set to music*; shorn of its theatrical surroundings it might be styled an oratorio or sacred cantata. The play was inaugurated in the fourteenth century as a votive-offering for the victory of King Jaime of Asturia over the Moors, from whom he wrenched the important strategic place, Elche, in 1238. Like the Passion-play of Oberammergau in 1870, it suffered an interruption in 1568, when Philip II, owing to the death of his son Don Carlos, stopped its performance. Towards the end of the sixteenth century the inhabitants of Elche, frightened by the destruction of their crops through floods, vowed to restore the festival, and in 1603 decided that "nothing in the world, not even the death of the Sovereign, should hinder the celebration of the drama," a decision which a few years later received its practical confirmation by the passing of a law that all the expenses connected with the performance should be borne by the community.

The subject-matter of the mystery-play is, as already mentioned, the Death and Assumption of the Holy Virgin in the form of an

auto lirico-religioso which might be translated as a sacred musical festival, corresponding in character to Wagner's *Parsifal*, but fundamentally distinct from the *auto-sacramental*, an allegorical play dealing with the mysteries of the Eucharist and made famous by Calderón. The cult of the Virgin amongst Spaniards has its root not in dogmatic considerations alone, but in far deeper emotional reasons of a partly sensuous, partly mystical nature, fostered by a wealth of folklore and literature. Dramatic representations of the Passion of Christ and the life of His Mother can be traced back to the thirteenth century, when Alfonso X, the author of the *Loores á Madona Santa Maria*, found it necessary to codify in his *Siete Partidas*, that remarkable collection of laws, the rules under which sacred performances were allowed to take place. Reverential treatment of the subject and exclusion of all farcical elements and monetary gain were the chief points on which Alfonso's code insisted.*

The annual performance of the mystery-play takes place in the Iglesia Parroquial de Santa Maria on August 14th and 15th—the Festival of the Assumption. And here we meet with a point of ritual importance: the 13th of August was once dedicated to Diana of Nemi, the protectress of crops of fruit. The Roman Church therefore shifted the date one day ahead, tactfully preserving the ancient meaning of the Festival by allowing the new patroness to be called "Mother of God for the vines," and also permitting the pagan goddess's symbol, the silver crescent, to be used as pedestal for Elche's famous sculpture of the Virgin Mary carried in the procession on August 15th.† The play itself is enacted within the Cathedral on a specially erected platform, all the sacred furniture, altars, etc., being removed so as to allow sufficient space for the crowded audiences witnessing the performance. The part of the Virgin is played by a carefully trained choir-boy. Gorgeous costumes are worn by all the protagonists, but the members of the orchestra and the conductor appear in evening-dress, an incongruous detail which, together with the vigorous fanning of the Virgin by the assistants (the heat sometimes reaches 120 degrees), makes up for the lack of entertaining fun otherwise indispensable in mediæval mystery-plays. The play falls into two parts: the Death of the Virgin and her Burial, on August 14th, her Assumption and Coronation on the following afternoon. Between the two performances a solemn procession in the streets provides the purely religious element.

The play is divided into *solis* (the Virgin and the Angel), and concerted music in which the Apostles take part. When the Angel descends to bring Mary the message that her assumption into

* *Siete Partidas*, I, tit. VI, ley. 3.

† For a more detailed account of the whole question, see Frazer's *Golden Bough*, I, p. 1,559.

Heaven has been granted by her Son, he steps out of an *arca coeli* in the shape of a pomegranate and hands her a palm branch, both again emblems of an ancient ritual character (the palm tree and the pomegranate being the chief means of subsistence for the inhabitants of Elche and therefore in need of divine protection). Two episodes, added after 1492, call for special attention: the so-called "Judiada," a scene in which the Jews try to steal the body of the Virgin to prevent the miracle of her Assumption being performed, an attempt which is frustrated by the Apostles, ending with the Jews' conversion to Christianity, and the arrival of St. Thomas, the Apostle of the "Indies"; both these details show how historical events—the expulsion of the Jews and the discovery of America—reacted upon popular drama. The "Judiada" is now extensively curtailed, as the struggle between the Jews and the Apostles often led to bloodshed, rival parties of the town utilising the occasion to wreak vengeance upon each other!

The style of the poem shows in every line the great germinal force of folk-poetry, the total absence of any straining after emphasis, a complete consonance between thought and expression. The beginning of the play (the Virgin's complaint) will give a sufficient idea of its general texture:

Ay triste vida corporal!
O mon cruel tan desigual!
Trista de mi! yo que faré?
Lo meu car Fill cuan lo veuré?
(Alas! How sad this earthly life!
Oh cruel world's unequal strife!
What shall I do? Ah, woe is me!
My dear Son, when shall I see Thee?)

But, fascinating as is the study of the text, the unique feature of our mystery-play is to be sought in the perfect fusion of its poetical purpose and closely-fitting musical tissue. Its form is the contrapuntal style of the sixteenth century, as represented by Spain's greatest composers of sacred music, Victoria and Morales. Three composers, Juan Gínez Pérez, Ribera and Lluís Vich, contributed to the music of the play. The chorus of the Apostles and the scene of the "Judiada," the latter foreshadowing the Quintet of the Pharisees in Richard Strauss's *Salomé*, are outstanding examples of the grand period of polyphonic music in Spain. The folk-lore will also find numerous interesting details to engage his attention. The first two *solis*, e.g. those of the Virgin Mary, delivered in a highly florid style reminiscent of Arabic influence and the Mozarabic liturgy, are derived from folk-songs still sung to-day by the children in the streets of Elche. And the fandango rhythm in some parts, dignified for the occasion by "slow motion," testifies to the innate love of dance-forms in the South of Spain,

already alluded to by Juvenal when speaking of the "canorus chorus" of the Andalusian dancers. The Elche mystery-play, evolved out of the ritual elements and coloured by the flourishing religious poetry of mediæval Spain, will always—let us hope—remain a purely local festival, untainted by commercial considerations or fluctuations of international fashions.

Its drawbacks are obvious. Lack of funds prevents the community from organising it according to the standard of richly endowed musical institutions; the temperamental co-operation of the audience, clapping and shouting, jars on the standardised taste of European art-lovers; the ever-present conductor and the singers with the score in hand tend to obscure the purity of the style we are used to in a dramatic performance. Yet, despite all those drawbacks, the production must leave upon any unprejudiced audience a deep impression of spontaneous sincerity, touching the primitive instincts of man by its spiritual appeal.

Felipe Pedrell, the enthusiastic scholar and artist to whom modern Spanish music owes its astounding Renaissance, makes this quite clear in the final paragraph of his study on Elche:

It may be that the performance of the drama I am discussing will be criticised and looked down upon by those who only see it with the eyes of modern spectators, instead of applying to it the historical vision necessary for the reconstruction of past events, social conditions different from ours, men and women whose thoughts and actions were guided by other factors, their lives being constantly engaged in the defence of their country and community. . . . The liturgic drama of Elche might easily recover its primitive hieratic purity. If, under the present slipshod conditions, it produces such a profound artistic impression, how much more deeply might it not react upon our modern sensibilities if purged of its actual faults! It would then become a festival of an unique kind, annually attracting international devotees to Elche, that enchanted town of palm trees and pomegranates, unparalleled not only in Spain, but in the whole of Europe.

A comparison between the Elche music-drama and the Passion-play of Oberammergau will emphasise the differences between the two. Common to both plays is their ritual background: the inhabitants of Oberammergau had also made a vow to establish a Passion-play in order to stop the ravages caused by a pestilence in 1633. Both plays are derived from older versions: that of Oberammergau from two texts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, also containing farcical elements, expurgated in the modern setting: the Devil kills Judas, cuts him into pieces, the little Devils greedily devouring strings of sausages hidden in Judas's lay-figure!*

* Those interested in the history of the Oberammergau play will find a well-documented study of the vicissitudes of the text in A. Hartmann's *Das Oberammergauner Passionspiel in seiner ältesten Gestalt*. (Breitkopf und Haertel 1880.)

The difference between the two plays consists in the first instance in the much earlier date of the Elche drama. Secondly, while the mystery-play of Elche is performed annually (thus intensifying the ritual element), the performance in Oberammergau takes place every ten years only. The Elche play is enacted in the Cathedral (again its ritual significance), while Oberammergau for obvious reasons erected a large theatre for the production. The month fixed for the performance of the Elche drama is August (once more ritual reasons are a decisive factor), making the attendance almost impossible for ordinary mortals not wishing to be frizzled alive. The Oberammergau season opens in May, lasting till September, the most propitious time for an international gathering. The music of the Elche drama is polyphonic and continuous, that of the Oberammergau play incidental and homophonic, the chorales reminding the hearer forcibly of the inspiring style of Moody and Sankey hymns, the *solis* bearing a strong resemblance to a diluted Mendelssohn. The orchestra is hidden—Oberammergau is living in the shadow of Bayreuth!

But the greatest difference lies in the text. Whilst the Elche play represents a perfect poetical unit in idea and form, the Bavarian Passion-play is built up on the principle of *tableaux vivants*—resulting in a frequently diffuse medley of styles, endless prose sections alternating with lyrical outbursts. Daisenberger, who is responsible for the new version, connects the story of the Passion with scenes from the Old Testament, prefiguring the event following in a symbolic presentation. The plotting of the Sanhedrim, for instance, is prefaced by a tableau showing Jacob's sons conspiring to kill Joseph, and Judas's despair is foreshadowed by Cain's remorse after the murder of Abel. The intervals between the different scenes are filled up with choric singing. We are reminded of Klopstock by the style of the lyric sections, and unfortunately also by the use of classical metres completely out of keeping with the atmosphere of the subject. It requires a good deal of *naïveté* to relish the pseudo-sapphic metre of the chorus describing Isaac's sacrifice, Hebrews acted by Bavarian peasants declaiming the Lesbian lines:

Once did Isaac bear to the mountain's summit
Sacrificial wood, himself the victim
Singled out to test his father's obedience
By the Almighty.

(Or the attempt at an Alcaic stanza in the final Prologue:

Our faith rests firmly rooted in steadfast knowledge
That Jesus' death and pledge of Redemption brings
Hope of our joyful Resurrection.
People exultingly shout "Alleluja!"

Yet none of these stylistic blemishes, inseparable from a home-made literature, not based on an age-long artistic tradition, can detract from the bewildering impression of discipline and technical efficiency produced by the performances. Not only does the individual acting sometimes reach the high-water mark of unsophisticated artistry, but the masterful handling of the big masses and the general absence of dilettante experimenting with stage problems makes the Oberammergau festival tower above that of its Spanish sister. Constant technical improvements, experience in acting during the ten years' interval between the festivals, the nearness of Munich with its artistic models, all this brings the Bavarian performance within the range of customary European standards of acting and stage-management. That this constantly rising excellence of presentation is bound to result in the gradual loss of its initial purpose, is unavoidable. Just as the rude spring festival of the primitive Greek dithyrambos gradually evolved into a magnificent art-drama whose ritual elements only the practised eye of the scholar can detect, so the original features of the mediæval mystery-play became merged in the sum-total of artistic exigencies, experiences and material considerations, the result of which is the present-day Passion-play.

And for this reason the attention of the good European ought to be directed to that last remnant of mystic popular consciousness, artistically formulated and presented in Elehe.

The curious blend of spiritual aloofness and crude materialism so characteristic of the Spanish race is tersely expressed by Gabriel Miró: "How sweet it is to feel that we are near Heaven and yet on Earth!" This oneness of religious depth and exuberant joy of life can nowhere be witnessed so completely as in the Elehe festival. Like so many *cosas de España*, Elehe will always remain a precious local possession. Whether it will ever need to envy the international fame and material prosperity of its Teuton competitor is a question the solution of which depends on our personal attitude towards art and its esoteric meaning. Elehe remains for ever linked up with the primitive instincts of self-preservation and spiritual awe before the problems of the Beyond. Oberammergau is fast approaching the stage of worldly maturity and self-consciousness which centuries ago led from the festival of Dionysus through the sophisticated psychology of a Euripides to the preciousness of the Alexandrian school. A valuable lesson in evolution!

M. JOUBERT.

TOYOHICO KAGAWA.

A LITTLE man, typically Japanese, invariably clothed like a workman; weak-sighted and delicate; a pedagogue and pastor; a politician and trade unionist; a poet, novelist, and sociologist; an evangelist and lecturer; a leader in political economy, and, to sum him up, one of the best-known figures in Japan, whether among the Christian community or in Government circles. Such is Toyohiko Kagawa.

He was born in 1888. Upon the death of his father, the child was placed in the care of an uncle, and in order to learn English was sent to a Bible class where the principles of Christianity made, from the very beginning, a deep impression upon his young mind. As time went on the boy avowed himself a Christian, and became a teacher in the missionary Sunday School, and later, in spite of the opposition of his guardian, who cut off his allowance, he entered his name as student in theology. So ardent was he at work, and so insatiable in learning, that his zeal was considered out of place, and his professors went so far as to lament his excessive industry and his thirst for knowledge. Undeterred by their remonstrances Toyohiko Kagawa continued to lap up learning as a dog laps water, only with the unfortunate difference that a dog knows when he has had enough, and the young Japanese student did not. Overwork revealed the latent weakness in his constitution, tuberculosis was discovered in his lungs, and he was sent to recuperate in a little fishing-village not far from Kobe.

During his stay in this village he came into daily contact with its inhabitants, wrote letters for the elders, played with the children, drew pictures for the umbrellas of the community, and took an indefatigable interest in their conditions of living. So impressed was he by the poverty and misery revealed to him, that on his return to the Theology School he announced his intention of giving up his studies in order to go and live and work among the poor in the slums of the city. Protests were in vain, and in 1908 Toyohiko Kagawa took two rooms in Shinkawa, the worst quarter in Kobe, where some 11,000 souls are crowded together, by half-dozens, in tiny rooms hardly big enough for one person. He toiled unweariedly among these poor wretches. His room was theirs, his mat, his bed-covering, his very clothes, were shared with his companions in misery. He denied himself food so as to feed someone hungrier than himself; he preached in the streets in the evening; he opened classes for the children whose affection and confidence were speedily won, so that he was rarely seen without five or six hanging to his kimono. In order to combat the sickness so prevalent in the overcrowded slums, he started a dispensary, and per-

The Abbot warned them of the perils of disobedience and the monks reluctantly yielded.

The townsmen at once hastened to enjoy their new liberties. Abbot Hugh did not long survive his humiliation, and his successor, Richard of Wallingford, left the townsmen for some years to follow the devices and desires of their own hearts, while he was meditating all the time a stern revenge.

This Abbot was a man of extraordinary parts. He was a scholar, a mathematician, and a scientist. To these endowments he added a power of will which nothing, not even the leprosy from which he suffered, could daunt. Though he was of humble birth and might have been expected to sympathise with struggling people, he none the less set before himself as the principal aim of his life the complete subjection of the townsmen of St. Alban's to the domination of the Abbey.

The townsmen were taking every precaution to retain the liberties which they had gained. They made a seal as the outward and visible sign of the position of their community as a "borough." They had a chest with three keys for the custody of the public funds. They taxed the town at their discretion and with the money thus raised they paid the officers responsible for the management of their business and formed a fund for the payment of the members whom they meant to send to Parliament. The popular enthusiasm ran so high that the chronicler declares "that they accounted their trades, handicrafts, and personal advantage as nothing if only they could gratify their malice, trample on their father, prelate, and lord, and wound their mother, the Church."

Now that they had won a victory in things temporal, they resolved to defy the Abbot in things spiritual, and to ignore his excommunications and ecclesiastical censures.

It was this question of discipline that the Abbot selected as the opening for his attack on the liberties of the townsmen. He, therefore, sent his marshal and two of his "clerks" to summon before him a townsman called Tavender who had been guilty of adultery. The townsmen and their wives immediately assembled and, armed with swords, pitchforks, clubs, and stones, rushed to attack the marshal. A fierce fight followed in which both he and Tavender were killed. The townsmen then indicted the Abbot, the two clerks and others before the coroner for causing the death of the marshal and that of Tavender. Convicted by the coroner, they were lodged in prison by the Justices of the Peace for the County of Hertford and there for some time they remained. Legal proceedings culminated in the Assize held before three "Justices of Trailbaston" at Hertford, in September 1331. The Abbot spared neither trouble nor expense to win over the judges when they visited

Hertford. They lodged at the Priory, a "cell" or subject-convent, which he possessed in the town. A cask of wine awaited them and every other provision was made to give them the best entertainment. The result of the Assize was a foregone conclusion. The enemies of the Abbey bit the dust. Most of those charged with offences were convicted and imprisoned: others were bailed for future trial. At a later Assize the use of hand-mills was forbidden, and the millstones were subsequently placed in the pavement of the Abbey parlour. The townsmen, harried and wearied out, with all the powers of the Crown, the Justiciary, and the Abbot against them, surrendered their Charter of Liberties, the Indenture, and the seal of the borough, the chest with its three keys, and the claim to use hand-mills. Yet, though forced to make this complete submission, they continued to cherish and to hand down as a legacy to their children an intense hatred of the spiritual and temporal domination of the Abbey.

In 1381, half a century after the events that have just been described, there took place the great uprising which is known as the "Peasants' Revolt." Among the rebels were many secular clergy and friars, who regarded the monasteries as parasites on the Church. Two of the leaders, John Ball and Jack Straw, were hack priests, not of any great character, but bold and resolute men. The former was master of an impassioned and rugged eloquence, which stirred his hearers, who promised to make him Archbishop of Canterbury. Wat Tyler, described by Walsingham as "the idol of the peasants," was an uncompromising opponent of all privilege and, as the captain of the motley army, showed himself a brave and skilful leader.

There seems little doubt that the outbreak had for long been secretly nursed and prepared, and that there was a central organisation in London in direct communication with many parts of the country. On the eve of the revolt, messengers were sent, wherever possible, to warn sympathisers that the day of release was at hand and the knell rung and to bid them "stand together in God's name and chastise Hob the robber." The poll-tax was the occasion and the signal for the outbreak, but by no means its cause. Kent was soon in the fires of tribulation. Houses were plundered, murders committed, and oaths of fealty to "King and Commons" exacted.

By June 12th the camp at Blackheath was formed and on that day John Ball addressed a vast multitude in truculent language. A clean sweep, he urged, must be made of the privileged classes. His audience applauded these sentiments, which coincided with their wishes and intentions. On the following day, the army of the "Great Society" was advancing into London. The attack on the Savoy, the magnificent palace of John of Gaunt, followed their

entry; it was sacked, plundered, and burnt to the ground. The house of the Knights Hospitallers at Clerkenwell shared the same fate. The Temple was destroyed and the documents which it housed burnt. Lawyers who fell into the hands of the multitude had short shrift and were dragged to the block.

The young King, Richard II, and his Ministers were in the Tower, looking down on a city given over to murder, fire, and loot. They realised that all was lost unless they could make terms with the rebels. That was the only possible course and that they resolved to do. The monks of St. Alban's were singing the service of Nocturns late on the night of that tragic day when they were startled by the arrival of certain inhabitants of the town in great haste and in a state of much excitement. They hurriedly informed the Abbot of the events of the day, and also stated that the Commons had ordered that the men of St. Alban's and Barnet should hasten to help them. Unless they came, twenty thousand men would be told off from London by the captain and destroy the two towns. Thomas de la Mare, the aged Abbot, who, fortunately for the Abbey, was respected by many of the townsmen, replied that he would send a deputation to London and endeavour to prevent so dread a visitation. In the meantime, however, "the villains and bondmen" had settled things for themselves. Within an hour or two they roused one another, made rapid preparations for departure, armed themselves with old bows and arrows or rusty swords, snatched a hasty meal, and amidst the prayers and tears of their wives went off to join the army of the Great Society in London.

When the recruits neared Highbury, they saw immense volumes of flame and smoke rising to the sky, and soon discovered that they proceeded from houses belonging to Hales, Master of the Knights Hospitallers, the unpopular Lord Treasurer. When they came up they found a large body of peasants and "common people" who were doing all they could to help on the work of destruction. They were at once noticed by Jack Straw, the leader in command, were summoned before him and compelled to profess allegiance to "King Richard and the Commons."

The King, accompanied by many nobles, had left the Tower early in the morning and ridden to Mile End, where many of the rebels were encamped. The Government had decided to make every concession rather than deliver over the country to anarchy and ruin. To Mile End, therefore, the townsmen of St. Alban's hastened. They hoped to obtain privileges from the King and to win the support of Tyler himself. Among them was William Gryndcobbe, a man of commanding influence, and the bitter enemy of the Abbey. Some years before he had been compelled to do penance naked in the presence of the monks for resistance to an investigation into an

alleged encroachment on Abbey buildings by the townsmen. This gross indignity was deeply felt and deeply resented. Henceforward Gryndcobbe's life was devoted to the task of shaking off the fetters which riveted the town to the Abbey. The quarrel was one of life and death. Gryndcobbe and the Abbey could not breathe the same air and one of them must fall.

The townsmen, on arriving at Mile End, found the King, a young and beautiful figure, sitting in the midst of an immense multitude and granting petitions to all who brought them. Gryndcobbe was chosen to force his way through the throng as the bearer of a petition for a new charter to St. Alban's. He knelt before Richard and his request was instantly granted. Gryndcobbe and his friends then sought out Tyler. They were heartily welcomed by the captain, who promised to send twenty thousand men "to shave the beards of the Abbot, the Prior, and the monks" unless the townsmen's demands were promptly granted. Tyler did not suffer the townsmen to leave him without an exhortation faithfully to observe his commands and teaching.

The fatal tidings of disaster and impending ruin reached the Abbot through a member of his household who rode hard from London, changing horses on his way for greater speed. The lives of the Prior and other monks depended on his reaching St. Alban's before the arrival of Gryndcobbe. The messenger told the Abbot that the "Commons" were pitiless, and that the Prior would certainly be beheaded, while certain other monks might be similarly treated, if they were found in the Abbey by the townsmen.

Those who were thus threatened were filled with alarm and terror. Not a moment was to be lost. They left St. Alban's almost at once and made the long and toilsome journey to St. Mary's Priory, Tynemouth, a cell belonging to the Abbey. They had a very narrow escape from the vengeance of the townsmen, who must have had grave personal reasons for their hostility.

It was late that night when Gryndcobbe and some of his friends came back to St. Alban's. They were received with frantic joy. They declared that all had gone well, that they were no longer to be slaves but masters, and that they had already accomplished wonders against the Abbey. They proceeded that very night to show the Abbey what it might have to expect, and invoked the assistance of the other townsmen. The light of the June night was sufficient for the destruction of gates and enclosures. A house in the street near the fish-market occupied by the sub-cellarer of the Abbey was pulled down because it blocked the view of the new "burgesses." The blushes of the dawn must have been already visible on the face of the sky ere the men and women of St. Alban's, intoxicated with success, snatched a short and fevered rest.

On the following day, June 15th, the townsmen assembled to the number of two thousand, more full of eager resolve than ever and apparently with an inexhaustible reserve of physical strength. They congratulated one another on what had been already achieved and agreed to carry out the instructions of Walter Tyler, their lord and master. They gave "seisin" of the woods and warren of Sopwell Priory, a cell of nuns under the control of the Abbot, and then placed a rabbit on the pillory of St. Alban's in token of the acquirement of their new rights. They afterwards went to the Abbot's prison in his new Gatehouse and released all the prisoners with the exception of one man who, for some unexplained reason, had incurred their enmity. He was hurried to execution and his head carried on a pole to the pillory amidst "diabolical shouting" and set up as a warning to all their opponents. At three o'clock Richard Wallingford, a prominent townsman, galloped into the town bearing the royal missive containing the privileges granted to the townsmen. The Abbot was respectfully told by him that only one choice remained. Either he must yield to the demands of the townsmen, or the monastery and the monks would vanish from the earth. The crowd insisted on the immediate production of court-rolls and other documents which implied the subservience of the town to the Abbey. They were at once surrendered, taken to the market-place and burnt to ashes.

Incessant demands were made from the Abbot for an ancient charter with capital letters of gold and azure, said to be in his possession. The Abbot denied that he had ever seen it and could not produce it. In the meantime, the millstones confiscated by Abbot Richard were being wrenched away from the pavement of the parlour where they had been placed. They were then smashed into pieces and handed round, just as "the blessed bread is distributed in the parish churches."

The townsmen compelled the Abbot to send his own "clerk" with ink and parchment to take down the words of a new charter which some of them composed. Even that was not enough. The townsmen must and would have the ancient charter with letters in azure and gold, or they would fire the Abbey. Amidst all the din, threats, uproars, shouts, and confusion the Abbot remained calm and again said that the impossible was demanded. The threat was repeated and, but for the firmness of a single townsman who called across the storm and protested against such barbarism, the Abbey would have been in flames. The crowd then proceeded to issue proclamations and promised to pay all debts due from the Abbey. A large sum was at once extracted from the Abbot by a single individual.

The news which arrived the next day was a cruel blow to the

townsmen. Tyler had been struck down and killed. His army had melted away. The country was rallying to the Government, which would certainly be able to crush the rebellion. The rumour soon ran that the King would come to St. Alban's with an army to punish the inhabitants who had given themselves over to riot and excess. Sir Walter Lee, a man of great influence who lived in the district and who knew what this royal visit would mean to his neighbours, resolved to go to St. Alban's and endeavour to procure a quiet submission which might prevent the advent of the King. Unfortunately for the townsmen, they listened to Gryndcobbe, who was determined to pursue the quarrel to the bitter end. "Friends," he said, "be of good cheer, we have plenty of money and eight towns will help us. Let us mount our horses and meet Sir Walter and drive him from our town if his errand is not one of peace."

In due course Sir Walter arrived with a company of archers. Standing in the midst of his guard he addressed the townsmen and besought them to restore the Abbey charters and surrender the principal offenders. His requests were evaded and, in consequence, after making arrangement for the quiet arrest of Gryndcobbe and two other prominent leaders of the revolt, he departed. The prisoners were at once taken to Hertford gaol, but when his fellow-townsmen offered bail in the enormous sum of three hundred pounds, Gryndcobbe was released for a week. He would be compelled to return to Hertford unless peace were made with the Abbey within that time. It was no doubt considered that with the King's visit in store unless the townsmen yielded, he would spend the interval in trying to pacify them and thus perhaps earn his own pardon. But Gryndcobbe was the last man in the world to take a submissive course. On the contrary, he spent the week in the most urgent and moving exhortations to the townsmen to brave their opponents. "Fellow-citizens," he said, "stand fast in the liberty wherein you have been made free. For myself, I will gladly die in the cause of liberty and should account myself fortunate in ending my days by such a martyrdom. Act as you would have acted had I been beheaded yesterday at Hertford."

Gryndcobbe was taken back to prison, but his influence remained. Threats were constantly uttered, the spirit of hostility to the Abbey pervaded the town. The news reached the ears of the King, who said with an oath that nothing should now prevent him from visiting St. Alban's. The Abbot attempted to alter his decision, but Richard was obdurate. The townsmen hastened to make terms with the Abbot. They surrendered the charters, agreed to pay the Abbot two hundred pounds for the damages which had been committed and even brought millstones to take the place of those which had been broken up. By this belated action they hoped in

some degree to mitigate the royal displeasure. The King's arrival took place two days after his final decision. He came accompanied by a thousand bowmen and men-at-arms. The presence at his side of the new Lord Chief Justice, Robert Tresillian, "a learned man of much courage and with the guile of a serpent" was ominous for the townsmen of St. Alban's. "When Vespers were over," says Walsingham, "the King was met at the Western Gate of the monastery by the Abbot and Convent in solemn procession, while the bells of the Abbey Church pealed and a loyal anthem was sung."

On the morrow the Chief Justice took his seat on the bench at the Moot Hall and ordered that Gryndcobbe and two other leaders of the revolt should be brought over from Hertford. By the exercise of considerable art the judge obtained convicting juries. Gryndcobbe and fourteen of the other principal leaders were executed. Eighty of the rebels were imprisoned, but were soon released.

It is impossible not to sympathise with the townsmen of St. Alban's in this last desperate struggle. Undoubtedly they showed themselves rough and violent, but their grievances were age-long and the iron had entered into their souls. Gryndcobbe stands forth among them as a brave, commanding and almost apostolic figure, the type of man who is "ready to be offered" for the cause which he has espoused and which is dearer to him than life. Neither he nor his fellow-sufferers fought and died in vain. They failed in their immediate object—but it is through their efforts and those of others like them that the liberties which they claimed are now regarded as the inalienable right of all men.

H. P. PALMER.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

•THE LEAGUE, DISARMAMENT, AND SECURITY.

THIS year's September meeting of the League of Nations, the eleventh of the series, has before it a programme of work of so important a kind that it illustrates the cardinal function the League now performs in the world's affairs. It happens as the result of a series of events that the next decisive step towards the goal of security and disarmament must be taken at Geneva. It may be that the practical result of this year's Assembly will not amount to much that can be chronicled as finished achievement: but no one who takes the world's problems seriously ever imagines that the solution can be reached except by slow stages spread over many years. The important thing is that there should be a machinery at work, and that the brains and energy of the men of goodwill throughout the world should know where to contribute their bit to the work in hand. Geneva is now established as the rallying point for such men.

It further happens by the force of circumstances that have arisen during the past twelve months that a large part of the complicated network of diplomatic enterprise directed to solving the problem of war is now centred on Geneva. The immediate practical duty that falls to the League as a result thereof is the examination of the report of the Committee which met to recommend the emendation of the Covenant in the sense of harmonising it with the Peace Pact: but no sooner is that examination begun than it leads to a fuller and more general investigation of the problem in all its many aspects. Certain of those other aspects, for instance the effect of the London naval treaty on the League's work for disarmament and the practical value of the Briand memorandum on the purely European element in the general problem, by a fortunate coincidence are also due to be considered at Geneva this year.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENEVA SANCTIONS.

By far the biggest single element in the general problem is the consideration how far the proposed amendments to the Covenant may be expected to go towards the closing of the gap between the United States and Europe. Little is lost by considering this question in its crude outline, bereft of detail: for the essence of the problem is as simple of definition as it is difficult of solution. Broadly expressed, this is the problem. By the Covenant of the League, framed in 1919, a machinery was set up whereby the peace of the world should be safeguarded by the threat of collective punishment against an aggressor. When that idea was first con-

ceived, it was assumed that the United States would be a member of the League. If that assumption had been substantiated all would have been well: for a sanction collectively contributed by the whole world must have been effective. But the United States did not become a member of the League. The League sanction therefore became a sectional sanction, which, by the practice of Article 16 of the Covenant, might involve the members of the League in war with the United States: or would so involve them if they faithfully carried out their obligation to boycott an aggressor State and to prevent its trading with any other State, for instance, with the United States.

The Covenant sanction is therefore a broken instrument: broken by the refusal of the United States to contribute to it. That refusal is rooted in a traditional American distrust of the whole conception of international sanction by military force. It therefore follows that little progress can be made in the creation of a spirit of security—the indispensable condition of ultimate disarmament—until some instrument is discovered which suits both the European and the American temperament. The willingness of the United States to take part in such a joint enterprise was illustrated by the “Kellogg” Pact.

The two pacts, however, are inconsistent. The League of Nations, well aware of the importance of taking full advantage of America’s offered collaboration, decided to explore the possibility of an emendation of the Covenant such as might bring it into conformity with the Peace Pact. The committee’s report on that point will come before the Assembly in September this year. The exact text of the recommendations was given in this section of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for May, pp. 658-60.

To the minds of those, however, who have thought much about this matter, the particular amendments suggested by the Council expose themselves to certain serious criticism. The main amendment suggested is the infusion into Article 12 of an obligation not to resort to war, such as shall be as categorical a prohibition of war as that contained in the Peace Pact. By such means the Covenant’s proscription of war could certainly be made to harmonise with the Peace Pact. But there would still remain the sanction clauses of the Covenant, which *ex hypothesi* do not, and could not be made to, harmonise with the Peace Pact. The delicate part of the resultant problem is that if the Assembly of the League of Nations were to adopt the Committee’s recommendations and amend the Covenant accordingly, it would court the danger of appearing in American eyes to be suffering from the delusion that it had succeeded in harmonising the Covenant with the Peace Pact, that in short the two pacts had been amalgamated into a virtual unit. If such an

idea were to take root, many Americans would probably think they had been trapped into participating in an attempt to secure the peace of the world by the method of sanction, for in effect the Covenant’s sanction would be ranged behind the Peace Pact. The difficulty could no doubt be overcome if the United States could be consulted by the Assembly of the League before action were taken on the Committee of Eleven’s recommendations; but by the misfortune of the old vicious circle the United States is not a member of the League. Many experienced persons think that this is a case where a point should be stretched, and that the Assembly, before taking action on the Committee’s representations, should invite the United States to express a view on them with specific reference to the Peace Pact. If the United States accepted such an invitation and endorsed the recommendations, all would be well; if it refused the invitation or, having accepted the invitation gave an adverse opinion on the recommendations, then the League could emend the Covenant with a good conscience so far as the United States was concerned. The problem would not be solved: but it probably never will be solved unless and until the United States joins the League of Nations.

THE BRIAND MEMORANDUM.

Although July 15th was the date by which M. Briand asked that the twenty-seven European States, members of the League of Nations, should answer his proposals for a European Union, it was made clear at the beginning of July that M. Briand need not have waited till that date to know what impression he had made. It was made clear at the same time, both that the detailed discussion of the Memorandum would have to be postponed till the September meeting in Geneva, and that there would be little chance even then of its being considered separately from the general problems already being dealt with in other ways.

Rome, Berlin, and London were inevitably the key positions so far as M. Briand’s prospects were concerned. As long ago as June 25th, Herr Curtius, speaking in the Reichstag on certain chief aspects of German foreign policy, revealed the fact that while the Wilhelmstrasse sympathised with M. Briand’s object, there were many difficulties against the particular method advocated for its accomplishment.

The Italian answer was still more disconcerting. Italy roundly joined issue with M. Briand’s method by submitting that the first step towards the achievement of the security aimed at by his memorandum should be a reduction in existing armaments, and further that in the event of the conditions being propitious for the further discussion of M. Briand’s plan, an invitation should be

issued both to Russia and to Turkey to take part in it. Inasmuch as Franco-Italian relations were already exercised by the difficulty felt by France in accepting an Italian suggestion for mutual reduction, the Briand Memorandum appeared to be shelved so far as Italy was concerned.

The British answer to the Memorandum was published on July 18th. As had been generally expected, it consisted in effect of an expression of sympathy with M. Briand's object, but of an inability to support the particular method advocated. It began by postulating "careful and prolonged consideration" and "consultation with all His Majesty's Governments in the British Commonwealth," and by explaining that in the present Note "the comments and suggestions which it contains are of a preliminary and tentative kind." (Paragraphs 1 and 2.) The next four paragraphs (3 to 6) were taken up in an expression of the British Government's agreement with M. Briand's diagnosis that Europe needs closer collaboration, especially in economic affairs. "In respect, however, of the methods proposed by the French Government for the realisation of their purpose, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feel more difficulty. They are not confident that mature examination will show that the establishment of new and independent international institutions is either necessary or desirable." (Paragraph 7.)

The precise nature of the difficulty felt by the British Government was explained in paragraphs 8 to 11, which are here quoted in full: "8. If they have rightly understood the proposals contained in the Memorandum, the French Government suggest the creation of a new European Conference and Executive Committee, and perhaps also of a new European Secretariat. These bodies would in no way derive their authority from the Covenant or from part 13 of the Treaty of Versailles; they would in no way be controlled by the rules and safeguards which those instruments provide; they would be in no way organically connected with the League of Nations; they would only correlate their work with that of the organs of the League in so far as they decided by specific and spontaneous decisions to do so in any given case that might arise. Since the organs of the League have already begun to work on virtually the whole of the programme of practical action which the Memorandum puts forward, it is difficult to see how these new European institutions could operate without causing confusion, and perhaps also a rivalry, which, however little it might be intended or desired by the European Governments, could hardly fail to diminish both the efficiency and the authority of the organs of the League.

"9. Apart from this very difficult problem of co-ordination His

Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom think it possible that an exclusive and independent European Union of the kind proposed might emphasise or create tendencies to inter-Continental rivalries and hostilities which it is important in the general interest to diminish and avoid. It is in their view essential that the measures taken for closer European co-operation should not cause anxiety or resentment in any other Continent. Unless this object is kept continually in view, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are satisfied that even wider interests, both of Europe and the world, may be seriously endangered. It will be plain to the French Government that in this connection there are special considerations of which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, must take account.

"10. Moreover, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are inclined to believe that the purpose which the French Government have in view can be effectively secured by so adapting the proposals put forward in the Memorandum as to bring them fully within the framework of the League of Nations. They are impressed by the fact that the Warsaw Health Conference of 1922 and the reconstruction of Hungary and Austria—to name only a few of many examples that might be taken—were matters of European interest and concern, and yet were effectively dealt with by the existing machinery of the League. They are therefore convinced that it would be possible, perhaps by establishing European committees of the Assembly, of the Council, and of the technical organisations of the League, or perhaps in other ways, to create whatever machinery is required for promoting closer European co-operation without incurring the risks and difficulties which a system of new and independent institutions might involve.

"11. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom believe, however, that these are questions which can only be adequately dealt with in open discussion among the Governments concerned, after each Government has had time to examine fully and in all their aspects the proposals which have been made. Since, for the reasons above suggested, these proposals affect intimately not only the Governments of Europe but the Governments of all the members of the League, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom hope that the French Government may think it desirable that their Memorandum should be placed upon the Agenda of the next Assembly."

A YEAR'S WORK AT GENEVA.

September is the time when Geneva renders an account of its annual stewardship. In advance of the Assembly meetings the

Secretary-General distributes to the Council, the members of the League, and the delegates to the Assembly a report on the work done by the League since the last session. The report submitted this year chronicles the events of the League's eleventh year of action. It is a substantial document of 115 printed foolscap pages. It is the sort of document that is easily taken for granted, but which is intrinsically interesting and remarkable enough to deserve a detached study, as a criterion of the function now performed by the League in high diplomacy.

The limitations imposed upon the League's competence, partly by the shortness of its career, partly by the truncation of its scope as a result of America's non-participation, too often lead, in the minds of impatient people, to confused criticism of a destructive kind against the League itself and against the cause for which it stands. Yet it is doubtful if Lord Cecil, Mr. Wilson, or General Smuts in 1919 could confidently have predicted that after so short a period as ten years' work, the League would have woven itself into the fabric of international diplomacy as largely as it has. The phenomenon of the League and its activity is the more, not the less, remarkable by reason of the limitations imposed upon it.

There are few aspects of the world's major problems in the political sphere that are not touched upon in the eighteen chapters of the Secretary-General's new report. During the period reviewed an important conference on concerted economic action was held under the direct instructions of the Assembly; conferences on the treatment of foreigners in various countries and on the progressive codification of international law carried on work that had been in progress for several years; certain other conferences, such as that on the abolition of import and export prohibitions and restrictions, met in order to complete or to carry into practice international engagements approved at former conferences; and the work of the London Naval Conference, although not a League achievement, was a matter of concern to the League because of the League's own work, carried on by a continuing process of research.

A short conspectus of the various subjects that came within the League's orbit during the year will serve to illustrate the magnitude of what the League is now doing.

(1) *Legal Questions.*

Perhaps the most important juridical subject that came before the League's technical machinery during the year was that of amending the Covenant in order to bring it into conformity with the provisions of the Peace Pact. As a result of an Assembly resolution of September 24th, 1929, the Council appointed a Committee of eleven persons which met at Geneva from February 25th

to March 5th, 1930, under the chairmanship of Signor Scialoja. In addition, a conference for the codification of International Law was held at The Hague from March 13th to April 12th, 1930, at which no fewer than forty-seven States were represented, and at which conventions and protocols were drafted and signed on such subjects as nationality, territorial waters, inland waters, the protection of fisheries, and the responsibility of States for damage done in their territory to the persons or property of foreigners. Such work, lacking perhaps in thrill as a subject of light reading, nevertheless lays the foundation of a more healthy condition of international relations in the perhaps distant, perhaps near, future.

(2) *Political Questions.*

One of the political disputes of the year which threatened to disturb the peace of South America illustrates one of the pacific functions that may conceivably in the future become a regular attribute of the League: the dispute, namely, that broke out at the beginning of the year between Bolivia and Paraguay. The particular interest of that event lies in the fact that the dispute was not formally submitted to the League's treatment, but was merely reported to the League by one of the parties. By promptly making suggestions to the two parties the League Council had the effect of making those parties justify themselves publicly in the course they were taking. Normally, such a dispute would probably lead to war: for the preliminary movement of troops had actually taken place. Owing, however, to what may perhaps be called the benevolent anxiety of the League of Nations the parties to the dispute had to defend their attitude, which in practice meant (as would normally happen) that each of them concentrated on proving that its purpose was pacific and, in the alternative, self-defensive. Now, when two people or two nations publicly assert that they are acting in a pacific spirit, and that their only concern is that of self-defence, we are presented with the opposite phenomenon to that of the Kilkenny cats: for if both are on the defensive and neither is aggressive, then there's no fight. If it had not been for the prestige of the League of Nations and the consequent opportunity given to the quarrelling parties to exchange suppressed suspicion for an open expression of what was in their minds, it is probable that the usual cause of war, namely a stupid fear, would have produced the usual result.

The case of Bolivia and Paraguay, therefore, adds a valuable variant to the precedent of the Greco-Bulgarian affair of 1925, of which the full facts were given in this section of THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for January, 1926 (pp. 108-115). In the case of Greece and Bulgaria, as the League Commission's subsequent

report established, the war spirit spread from small beginnings because of "lack of confidence on both sides in the honest intentions of the adversary." Reinforcements were rushed up, machine-guns mobilised, civilians armed. On the morning of October 24th, 1925, a telegram from the Acting President of the League of Nations ordering a cessation of war did in fact achieve its object, only two hours before the time fixed for a big offensive. If that offensive had actually been launched, no power could have stopped the usual course, war on an ever-expanding scale, fed by atrocity-mongering on both sides and by increasing hatred as the war took its brutal toll. In that case one of the parties to the dispute (Bulgaria) formally appealed to the League under Articles X and XI of the Covenant, and the Covenant worked admirably.

What happened in the 1930 case was that Paraguay, through its Minister in Paris, informed the Secretary-General of the League by letter dated January 21st, 1930, that a Bolivian patrol had on January 16th attacked a Paraguayan detachment at Isla-Poi in the Chaco Boreal and killed a Paraguayan soldier. The letter expressed the opinion that the Bolivian Government was deliberately trying by sanguinary incidents to precipitate war with the object of inducing the American nations to settle the Bolivian-Paraguayan frontier dispute. Paraguay, by contrast, naïvely and expressly put on record its pacific intent.

Now suppose there had been no League of Nations to which Paraguay could write in order to show that she (by contrast with Bolivia) was peacefully minded? The competition in the protestation of peaceful intent could never have started. What the Secretary-General did was at once to communicate the Paraguayan letter to the delegate for Bolivia accredited to the League "for his information." Paraguay pursued her tactic by telegraphing to the League her discovery, made through the Paraguayan wireless station, that the Chief of the Bolivian General Staff had issued an order to the fourth division of the Bolivian army for an immediate general offensive, and quoted the actual words of the order. The Secretary-General telegraphed the contents of that new communication direct to the Bolivian Government and to the members of the League Council. The President of the Council thereupon requested the Secretary-General to convey both to Bolivia and to Paraguay "our confidence that no serious incident will compromise success of pacific procedure in due course."

So far Bolivia had remained silent. Now, however, her delegate (January 24th) formally protested to the League against the "false information" whereby Paraguay had attempted to saddle Bolivia with responsibility for an incident provoked by a Paraguayan. The matter thereupon entered the highly gratifying stage where

each side was accusing the other of having struck first: that event again illustrating the value of the League even in a negative way, for if there had been no League of Nations before which the two disputants could have accused each other, they could not have been led thus subtly to substitute telegrams and letters for machine-guns and tanks in the prosecution of their quarrel.

After January 24th, by an art that concealed art, an intensive campaign of telegrams was waged with Geneva as its headquarters. Messages passed in parallel streams from Bolivia and from Paraguay to Geneva, from Geneva to Bolivia and Paraguay, from Geneva to the countries constituting the Council of the League and back again from those countries to the League. Little would be gained by quoting the substance of those messages, although they revealed the initial excitement of the two disputants and its gradual deflation. The upshot was that on May 12th, when the Council was adopting the agenda for its fifty-ninth session, the President was in a position merely to remind his colleagues that as the Bolivian-Paraguayan dispute had been settled, there was no need to retain it on their agenda. It was on that very day that the Paraguayan Government informed the Council that diplomatic relations had been resumed with Bolivia; and Bolivia, again on the same day, thanked the Council for the interest it had taken in the matter.

It is clear that with good luck the League of Nations may become an established shock-absorber between the quarrelsome nations of the world. Small nations have already been saved from war. Big nations, whose salvation ironically enough is a much more difficult matter, may similarly be saved in the future.

There is another, more depressing, stroke of irony to be observed. The President of the Council who handled the Bolivian-Paraguayan dispute with such remarkable skill was none other than the Polish representative at Geneva, Mr. Zaleski. It is easier, it seems, to be remarkably skilful in using the League to settle others' disputes than one's own. The Polish dispute with Lithuania, originating in 1920 in a Polish defiance of the League of Nations and in a Polish annexation of Lithuanian territory, is still unsettled. Perhaps, however, the irony of that footnote is not as grim as it appears to be at first sight: for does it not provide a true exception that proves the rule? The rule is that it is easier for a disinterested body such as the League, enjoying the necessary prestige, to prevent two parties from going to war than it is for those parties to compose their own dispute. In 1920 Poland, backed by France, commanded a large influence in the League itself: the League was at the very threshold of its career, lacking both prestige and experience, and the League's own principles

were violated from within, with bad results from which Geneva has not yet recovered. The cheerful reflection is that Poland could not do now what she did with French help in 1920: a reflection that shows how much the League has grown, even though it may give little comfort in Kovno.

During the year, the so-called Hungarian Optants question, which has been before the League since the summer of 1922, was also settled, not however at Geneva. It was settled as part of the Hague reparation agreements, whereby the League is relieved of a tiresome responsibility.

(3) *Armaments and Security.*

The value of the work so far done by the League of Nations in the field of security and disarmament has necessarily in the main been documentary. The vast labour that has been expended on it has consisted mainly of research into the facts of the existing position and into the views of governments and organisations on the means of progress. As an executive instrument of disarmament the League has been crippled because the United States, although taking an interest in the work, stands apart from the obligations of League membership. Yet the groundwork that is steadily pursued at Geneva will one day be appreciated at its true value. It had been the object of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference to finish during the year its draft convention for the reduction of naval, land, and air armaments. Mr. MacDonald's journey to the United States and the subsequent London naval conference necessitated a suspension of the Commission's work, for the palpable reason that a definite agreement on reduction, if reached in London by the chief naval Powers, would substantially modify the problem in hand, and would enable the Commission to take a big step forward. It was recognised by all the five Powers represented in London that the work done on naval limitation would have to be co-ordinated with the comprehensive work on limitation in the three spheres that was in progress at Geneva. A copy of the London Treaty, together with the records of the Conference, was sent by the President of the Conference to the Secretary-General, who was asked to circulate them to the Chairman and members of the Preparatory Commission. The Commission has been convened to meet at the beginning of November. It will be necessary for the Preparatory Commission to finish its work before the Special Commission charged with the drafting of a "Convention on the Private Manufacture and the Publicity in regard to the Manufacture of Arms and Ammunition and of Implements of War" can complete its draft.

The League's work on arbitration and security is perhaps the

most controversial of its activities, mainly for the reason that a sharp conflict of view separates the Continental from the Anglo-Saxon approach to the problem. In its crude essential the conflict is between the Continental thesis of discouraging war by the threat of military sanction against an aggressor and the Anglo-Saxon thesis that sanction by itself is a useless instrument, and that the better method is the "Kellogg" method of fostering the assumption that an aggression will not be made. To Continental minds the latter assumption is a form of ostrich-like self-deception: yet the history of Europe, if it proves anything, proves that preparation for war, whether as an international sanction or as a form of national insurance, has a way of defeating its object. The trite instance quoted by the advocates of French military security, namely, that France has been invaded twice within living memory, surely proves that security by military means is ineffective. If before 1870 France and Germany had signed a "Kellogg" Pact, and then Germany had twice invaded France, the militarists would no doubt have pointed their finger and said: "I told you so"; but in the converse case the same people do not, as they logically should, deduce that there is something wrong with the traditional method that has failed.

None the less the work of the League's Committee of Arbitration and Security does immense good by keeping men's minds exercised with the problem, and by compiling a valuable dossier of facts and views. It met from April 28th to May 9th, 1930, to examine three important questions submitted to it by the 1929 Assembly: first, the possibility of establishing a draft general convention to strengthen the means of preventing war, on the lines of the model treaty approved by the Assembly in 1928; secondly, the question of communications affecting the work of the League in times of crisis; thirdly, the draft Convention on Financial Assistance to State Members of the League Victims of Aggression.

On the first two subjects the League continues its necessarily slow but solid and valuable work. The third is alarmingly controversial, and there are many people who profoundly regret that the League ever touched it. Such people regret still more that the League should persist in an adventure which in the long run can have no other effect than to damage the world's confidence in the soundness of Geneva's judgment. It is never too late to abandon bad projects, but in this case it happens that the biggest financial responsibility under the scheme is assigned to Great Britain, a circumstance which tends to lessen non-British criticism.

The potential effects of the League's action in this matter are so big that one wishes it were possible for all the delegates to the September Assembly to study the scheme with solemn care before

the Assembly opens. It appears to be the case that the League committee has formulated its scheme with insufficient care and without an adequate sense of caution.

The case is fairly clear. The idea underlying the scheme is that financial assistance be organised on behalf of States victimised by aggression. The proposal to that effect was first made by Finland. In September, 1928, the Assembly and Council requested that the proposal be elaborated; the Financial Committee of the League drafted a convention; the Council approved and adopted the draft and even regarded it as "highly important"; the draft was submitted to the several Governments; it came up again before the Assembly in 1929. On September 6th, 1929, Mr. Henderson announced that the British Government would support the scheme, on two conditions, namely: (1) that the benefits of the agreement should be open only to those States which had accepted and ratified the General Treaty of Disarmament projected by the League, and (2) that there should be reciprocity among the signatories. The British attitude was decisive, inasmuch as most of the cash needed would, according to the promoters of the plan, be extracted from the pockets of the British taxpayer. The 1929 Assembly, therefore, adopted a resolution which reviewed the suggested amendments and "requests the Council to take steps to ensure the early establishment of a complete text capable of being submitted to States for signature at the earliest possible date. It accordingly suggests that the Council should instruct the Committee on Arbitration and Security to draw up this text in co-operation with the Financial Committee. The text would, after it had been communicated to the Governments, be submitted for the approval either of a special conference or at the latest for that of the next Assembly."

That resolution was duly obeyed. The final draft text was written, and on May 15th, 1930, the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit the report with its annexes to this year's Assembly, and at the same time drew the attention of the Governments "to the desirability of giving their delegates to the Assembly the necessary powers to sign the proposed Convention."

We, therefore, face the imminent danger that the Convention may become an established fact at this year's Assembly. If that danger materialises, a serious blunder will (in the view of many competent people) have been committed.

The diagnosis is easily made. It is true that the final draft convention duly incorporates provisions which concede the two conditions stipulated by Mr. Henderson on September 6th, 1929. What, however, do those conditions effect in practice? The conception of "reciprocity" in international financial obligations may,

for the sake of common sense, be dismissed without further ado. One need only remember the £1,000,000,000 of French and Italian Treasury Bills deposited at the British Treasury during the war to form the clear and drastic opinion that international obligations are not necessarily met. There can be no more categorical a promise to pay than that made in the form of a Treasury Bill. Yet the French and Italian Treasury Bills given to the British Government in return for money lent proved to be worth less than one-fifth of their face value. The second condition at first blush appears to be more businesslike. It will have the effect of postponing the operation of the convention until the League's Treaty of Disarmament has also come into operation. Now it will probably be conceded that no disarmament treaty will ever be signed by any great Power unless it is signed also by every other great Power; and if the great Powers sign, every other Power will sign. When Mr. Henderson's condition is fulfilled, therefore, the position will be that all the nations that matter will have signed the treaty of disarmament, and there will be no occasion for moral discrimination in the application of the financial plan. That is to say that Mr. Henderson's condition merely has the effect of postponing the operation of the plan, but makes no difference to the plan itself.

There are certain serious objections to the principle on which the plan is based. There is the general objection that in the minds of many people the notion of organising war in the interests of peace is a highly inflammable notion. It reduces sanction to absurdity. Human affairs being mostly a muddle, and organised justice the battleground of unscrupulous people, what man would be confident enough to believe in the undeviating wisdom of any organisation whose purpose it was to decide in an emergency which party is the aggressor and which the aggrieved, and to hand out large sums of money to the party that succeeded in proving itself the aggrieved? Speculation about what might happen in such a situation is enough to turn the dullest simpleton into a cynic.

The League of Nations itself perpetrated a flat injustice against Lithuania in the matter of Vilna, merely because French and Polish influence combined to browbeat the innocent party. The League of Nations would be as capable as any other institution, especially a political institution, of confusing the innocent with the guilty, the culprit with the victim. Supposing the plan of financial assistance had been in operation in 1920. Poland did annex the capital of Lithuania, and owing to French support at Geneva did succeed in obtaining the League's blessing for its action; she might, into the bargain, and by the same token (for the case is proved), have been given financial assistance to help her the more thoroughly to invade Lithuanian territory. The gross-

ness of such an hypothesis, combined with the actual historical background which proves it to be a practical possibility, ought to make men hesitate before they plunge into the shifty and treacherous ground of financing one party in a war. But even assuming that Geneva, unlike any other human institution, were fool-proof, is it likely that the financial scheme would conduce to peace? There is overwhelming historical proof that nearly every nation that has ever gone to war has believed, or (which is the same thing) has deceived itself into believing, that it did so in self-defence. If, therefore, every nation that contemplated a war of self-defence, that is, *ex hypothesi*, every single nation on earth in any war on earth, were encouraged to expect that its war expenses would be financed by Geneva, would it really be less inclined to go to war? Has not the subtle ingenuity of the Geneva jurists overleapt itself and committed a "gaffe"? Would it not be more practical to offer financial assistance to States that *refused* to go to war, even in self-defence?

In addition to the general weakness of the plan in principle there are incidental technical defects which leap to the eye. It is one of the provisions of the draft convention that a unanimous decision of the Council is necessary before financial assistance can be awarded to any State attacked, but subsidiary decisions would be reached by a majority vote. The advocates of the plan, especially the British advocates, who will incur the heaviest financial responsibility, attach much importance to the potential veto thus given them. But the practical value of such a veto will not bear a moment's examination. In a given case either the Council would establish an aggression or not. If not, the question of the veto would not arise, for the plan itself would not arise. If an aggression were proved, the vote would then be put as to whether financial assistance should be granted to the victim. Theoretically, Great Britain could impose her veto. Practically, she could not. Her position would be that she had signed an obligation to lend money to an aggressed State. If, therefore, the case were established that a State had qualified for such assistance, it would be impossible for her then to refuse her assistance. It would be dishonest. The grant having been thus unanimously passed, the next step would be to decide the amount of the grant. That decision would be reached by a majority vote, and the bulk of the amount would have to be contributed by Great Britain.

Next, the practicability of limiting the League's liability under the scheme is at least doubtful. A maximum contingent cost could be voted, for instance, by the British Parliament, but who is to foresee the course of a war? It might be that at a moment when the fund was exhausted, the aggressed State found itself at the

crisis of the war, or even in danger of defeat. In such an event the beneficiary would have to be abandoned to her fate, and the League's action would assume the complexion not only of something useless, but of something silly. In practice wars are seldom localised, their magnitude seldom foreseen. As a practical measure of help to an attacked State, the financial plan would probably fail.

The argument that Great Britain and the other guarantors would not "pay the war costs" of a belligerent, but would merely guarantee the service of loans raised on the market by the aggressed country, whose own revenue would be the security, is not a formidable argument. If the borrowing country defaulted, Great Britain would be in exactly the same position as if she had herself directly incurred the debt, for she would have to provide its service. The history of our time goes to show that every government which borrows for war purposes, with the single exception of the British Government, defaults on its bond. The history of the Great War is comprehensive and clear on that point.

There is the final, ecstatic absurdity that Great Britain might be called on to finance her own enemy. If the war spread and drew in Great Britain, she would still have to go on paying financial assistance to the country at war against herself. Article 3 of the convention stipulates that the calls made by the Trustees upon the guarantor governments "shall be paid immediately, notwithstanding that they may be at war with the borrowing government or with any country or countries in which a part of the loan has been issued."

With the exception of the Security Commission's misguided attempt to encourage peace by paying for war, the year's record of what has been done at Geneva makes attractive reading. Most people will judge the value of the League of Nations, not by the amount of work it does, but by its effect in making the next war less likely to take place. There is, indeed, the danger that it may do too much, and may thus fall a victim to the disease of government. The busybody motive, for instance, which induced the League to try and suppress the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs is probably a mistake, as probably also are the projected inquiry by the Economic Committee into the means of preventing the smuggling of alcohol, and the humanitarian adventures of the Traffic in Women and Children Committee and the Child Welfare Committee. Just as national government begins to stultify itself when it tries to do more than organise the common convenience in material affairs by infusing into policy a moral or philosophic motive, such as the spoliation of the rich or the imposition of taste in matters of food or drink, so an international body founded for the specific purpose of saving the nations from the disaster of war

will begin to stultify itself if it tries to set itself up as a sort of universal governess, propounding what men and women the world over may or may not do in matters affecting their individual conscience only.

By contrast, the work of the League's Economic Committee in such matters as the promotion of concerted economic action, the verification of customs nomenclature, the suggestion of a customs truce, falls clearly within the League's proper province, for economic forces, if not controlled by international agreement, do tend to produce strain, unnecessary rivalry, and ultimate war between nations. The Conference with a view to Concerted Economic Action, which met at Geneva from February 17th to March 24th, 1930, did eminently good work in that sense. Even the third conference on Hides, Skins, and Bones (August 29th to September 11th, 1929) was relevant to the League's purpose.

The Financial Committee has been occupied during the year with its familiar business of helping lame Governments, such as the Greek, the Bulgarian, the Hungarian, over financial stiles, and in that sphere, as sharply distinguished from the sphere of financial assistance to future belligerents, continues to serve the interests of a peaceful Europe. The first sessions of the Gold Delegation of the Financial Committee met during the year. It would be a highly pertinent thing for the League of Nations to study the problem of the disturbance of the world's money by the inordinate greed of gold now characteristic of France.

For the rest the year's report consists of the dull, but essential, routine connected with mandates, the protection of minorities, refugee questions, intellectual co-operation, and the like; and during the year the League has completed its plans for the construction of an Assembly Hall, a new building for the Secretariat, and a Library. It is a year's record which shows that the League is a living and growing force. If its growth is severely trained into the appropriate channels, and not allowed to run riot into more dangerous channels (as aforementioned), it may indeed help to save the world from war.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

August 3rd, 1930.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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CANADA AND NEWFOUNDLAND.*

The unveiling last June in Greenwich Park of a statue of General James Wolfe, by the Marquis de Montcalm, the descendant of Wolfe's great opponent in the autumn of 1759, shows how ancient conflicts can be merged in a higher unity, a unity which this volume of the Cambridge History of the British Empire proclaims. The French at that date had been in touch with Newfoundland and Canada for about two hundred and fifty years, and on July 24th, 1534, Jacques Cartier, the famous Breton navigator, officially annexed Eastern Canada in the name of King Francis I. Cartier in 1535 sailed up the St. Lawrence and reached the sites of Quebec and Montreal. In 1544 François de la Rocque, seigneur of Roberval, carried a fleet of colonists to the new land, but after a year the expedition returned and no further effort was made until 1584, when the expedition led by the Marquis de la Roche also failed. Trading monopolies were granted to French subjects, and in the period 1604-24 efforts to found Acadia met little success, but the great Champlain saw that the St. Lawrence controlled the area that mattered, and in September 1608 he had founded Quebec and made friends of the Huron and Algonkin tribes, and made enemies, by sheer misadventure, of the powerful, well-organised Iroquois Confederation. After many struggles, with not only the Indians but the English and Scottish fur traders, during which almost all was lost, the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, in March 1632, restored Quebec and Port Royal to France, and by the date

* (1) *The Cambridge History of the British Empire: Volume VI, Canada and Newfoundland*. General editors: J. Holland Rose, A. P. Newton, and E. A. Benians. Adviser for the Dominion of Canada: W. P. M. Kennedy. Cambridge: at the University Press. 35s. net. (2) *Statutes, Treaties and Documents of the Canadian Constitution, 1713-1929*. Edited by W. P. M. Kennedy. Second Edition; revised and enlarged. Oxford University Press. 26s. net.

of Samuel Champlain's death on Christmas Day, 1635, Quebec had become "the cradle of New France." Dr. G. Lanctot says of Champlain:

a bold explorer and faithful writer, religious propagandist, and the Indians' best friend, the man with a vision who forced on France the founding of New France and left her the prospective heir to a continent, he is perhaps the greatest figure of all Canadian history. . . . If France was indifferent to emigration, she was not to evangelisation. . . . From the day they landed in Canada with Cartier the French befriended the Indian, made alliance with him, and treated him on the footing of human equality. They tried to educate and convert him, and even offered him the full privileges of French citizenship. But the main purpose was to make him a Christian. With the money devoted to missions, France could have taken out to Canada enough people to increase her population to several thousands. In carrying out this fine programme of humanity and civilisation the best agents France had were the Jesuits.

The Jesuits came to Canada in 1625; they opened schools, they attached themselves to the tribes, armed only with a cross and a breviary, and suffered all the discomforts of Indian life in addition to the perpetual shadow of death. The educational zeal of the Jesuits has never been in doubt, but in wildest Canada they acted up to the full ideals of St. Paul. They saved Canada for France by their perpetual propaganda, a propaganda that founded "nearly all the public institutions of the colony." The story of New France is told fully by Dr. Lanctot: the definite mark of French organisation and of land tenure was stamped on the land and "Canada became a royal province under the King's care and administration." The colonists under the direct régime of Louis XIV were drawn for the most part from Normandy, Perche, Anjou, and Poitou, a healthy, hardy stock.

Carefully selected, they lived under strong moral discipline and reared a numerous progeny of sons and daughters. Though few in numbers, they possessed in the colony all the elements of a future nation—religion, education, administration, trade, agriculture, and craftsmanship. From Cartier to d'Avaugour France had planted in Canada the seeds of a new people. Still dreaming of Indian evangelisation and a way to the Western Sea, New France was now about to become, under royal guidance, a self-supporting country.

It is not possible to understand the history of Canada unless full account is taken of the French beginnings, the French influence which still dominates in no mean measure the outlook of the Canadian nation. For practically a century that régime survived until with the fortune of war the colony passed in 1760 under British control. The account of the struggle between the English and French, controlled by the great mind of the elder Pitt, will be

read with interest, though the real mystery of Wolfe's decision to attack by way of the Anse du Foulon and establish himself on the Heights of Abraham is not solved. It is a singular fact that all the documents, both French and English, which might explain Wolfe's secret decision, disappeared. Dr. Temperley (in the *In Memoriam* volume to Sir Adolphus Ward, 1924) shows that on the 9th and 10th of September, 1759, boat reconnaissances were conducted by Wolfe off the shore opposite to the Anse du Foulon, and on September 12th a final reconnaissance took place, probably in the afternoon, in the course of which the incident of the recitation of part of Gray's *Elegy* took place. The new history apparently does not mention this incident (which has given rise to much literary controversy) and certainly does not clear up the facts that preceded the Battle on the Heights of Abraham. It was probably on September 10th or 11th that Wolfe changed his mind and resolved, on information secretly received, to make the surprise attack.

The early history of Newfoundland is the history of a struggle between various nations and ultimately between the French and the English for the control of the fishing-banks. The Peace of Utrecht of 1713 acknowledged British sovereignty, but reserved to France certain fishing rights, and rights, if they could prove them, were also given to Spain. It was not until 1762 that Captain James Cook, the last of the navigators and a "master" in one of the frigates in Wolfe's campaign, mapped (the work lasted five years) the whole island coasts and the Straits of Belle Isle. By 1774 the inhabitants of Newfoundland numbered 15,000, and the fishermen only 9,000. In fact "a true colony had grown up, and henceforward its development became more normal, its peculiar amphibious character passing away." Meantime, in Canada, Lord Amherst's famous "placard" that the old laws would be retained, that the army was to pay its own way, and that trade would be free was, as Professor A. L. Burt, of the University of Alberta, says,

a veritable charter of liberties to the conquered . . . the military conquest was followed by a moral conquest which makes this régime unique in the history of military occupations. It was well that the wounds of battle should be cleansed by those who had inflicted them, and not by civilians who might have troublesome notions about English laws supplanting French laws. These years deserve more attention than they have usually received. They were of untold importance in the history of Canada, for then were laid the foundations of French-Canadian trust in the justice of British rule, a trust which is vital to Canada with her dual nationality. These years were also important in the history of the Empire, for the French of Canada were the first great body of another race to enjoy that liberty which is the secret of the British Empire.

The question of the headship of the Catholic Church in Canada was deftly settled. Neither the French nor the English King could nominate a Bishop, and the three Vicars-General who had been elected by the Chapter to govern the diocese after the death of Bishop Pontbriand (just before the surrender of Quebec) were none of them Bishops. Fortunately, the Vicar-General Briand of Quebec was *persona grata* with Governor Murray, and he went to Europe and was quietly consecrated with the consent of the British Government in the spring of 1766, though he returned, so far as British Government was concerned, as the Superintendent of the Canadian Roman Church. A great crisis was quietly avoided, and was permanently solved by Carleton, who secured in 1772 an additional Canadian-born Bishop of Quebec. The new Governor appointed in 1766, Guy Carleton, helped the good work, since he (who had served under Wolfe) had great sympathy with the Canadians, and he initiated the policy that "the Canadians must be attracted into the service of the Crown, their old laws and customs assured to them, and every just grievance removed." He had his eye on the south, and particularly on New York. He had an inkling of what was coming. In 1770 Carleton went to England, and there remained till 1774. He returned with the famous Quebec Act in his pocket, an Act that established Roman Catholicism in fact side by side with the Church of England with appropriate payments of tithe, revived the old French Civil Law, and replaced the Assembly with a Government by Governor and Council closely controlled by the Crown. There was no effort to assimilate the two races. Carleton saw that "it would have driven Canada into the American Revolution," and as Professor Burt also says, "created a new Ireland on the banks of the St. Lawrence."

The revolting colonies after Bunker's Hill determined to invade Canada, but, thanks to the energy and dogged determination of Carleton and Cramahé, the invasion, so nearly successful, utterly failed, and was not attempted again. After the Declaration of Independence of July 1776, a stream of Loyalists crossed the Canadian border. Sir Guy Carleton, now in command of the British forces, did not evacuate New York until November 25th, 1783, so as to make certain that every Loyalist who wished could remain under the British Crown. Nova Scotia received some 35,000 immigrants, Prince Edward Island a quota. Many of these eventually settled on the upper St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario. Others crossed to Canada direct, at least 3,000 by the autumn of 1778, and sought settlement in the same area. The American Revolution helped to people Canada, and townships sprang up in

all directions. The Home Ministry in 1783 gave ample compensation to those who had lost their lands in the new United States. The immigration became a fact of the greatest political importance and was followed by the first Constitution of 1791 which introduced the principle of representative government.

The war with America of 1812 found Canada taking an active part. The United States had hoped to conquer Canada, and the stoutness of the defence must have surprised the Americans, counting as they did on England's fierce share in the Napoleonic Wars. In 1814 it became clear that the United States could not annex Canada. The Treaty of Ghent of December 1814 established the *status quo ante bellum*, and the Canadians were thoroughly purged of Americanisms and American ideals. "The war also demonstrated the possibility of successful co-operation among all Canadians regardless of their origin, and thus brought the Canadian people into more intimate association." The war of 1812-14, indeed, made the Canadians a people.

The study of Canadian politics, economics, and problems of all sorts that followed the war of 1812-14 for a whole century is given by various historians in this volume with a detail which will be very valuable to all students, including the students of politics and economics. The story of the opening of the West is related with vigour by Mr. L. J. Burpee, the secretary to the International Joint Commission at Ottawa. The story of the British North America Act, which became law on March 28th, 1867, is adequately told, and in July 1867 the Dominion of Canada was founded, an event in the history of nations. There remained the task of stretching the Dominion from "sea to sea," and it was only by an Imperial Order in Council of July 31st, 1880, that there was annexed to the Dominion all British possessions in North America with the exception of Newfoundland and its dependencies, though the expansion had taken place "from sea to sea" in the years 1867 to 1873. The chapters dealing with railway policy and economic development are of particular value, coming as they do from Canadian experts. The part played by Canada in the World War is worthily told by Colonel William Wood, while the beginnings of post-war policy and cultural developments are indicated by many writers. It is a valuable book, and perhaps its chief note is a marked national spirit coupled with entire loyalty to the British Empire. Professor Kennedy, the Adviser for the Dominion of Canada in relation to this history, has re-edited a second edition of his notable volume, published in 1918, on Canadian Constitutional Documents, a work that illustrates at every turn the new volume of the Cambridge History. J. E. G. DE M.

ANCIENT AND MODERN EGYPT.*

This admirably illustrated book of nineteen chapters, by a Swedish authoress, throwing in contrast the Egypt of the Kings and the Egypt of to-day, was well worth translation by the competent hand of Mr. A. Barwell. Dr. Rydh does not share the views of Wordsworth as to second visits. Her first visit to Egypt gave her the impression of "great backwardness, of indolence on the authorities' part as regarded the conditions of the people, and finally of that general desire to fleece the foreign traveller." But a second visit made it easier "to set a higher value on the efforts that were being made, rather than on their first visible results." Dr. Rydh feels that Egypt is and always has been the land of the Sun-God. Sun-worship, indeed, goes back into the remote past: "Amenophis IV, with a purer and more beautiful vision of the divinity than any had had before him, worshipped the sun's disc, *Aten*, in an impersonal monotheistic form," and took the name of Akh-en-aten, pious to *Aten*. Dr. Rydh first visited a tribe of the Bedouins of the desert with which a Swedish connection had been set up some years before by a young scientist. The brother of a former sheikh was anxious to keep up the connection, and so a party of four Swedes and three other Europeans were made welcome in the desert. This prosperous tribe dwelt in huts made of Nile mud and not in the usual tents which are protected by a fence of tall maize stems. The party had coffee as a sort of cocktail, and then dinner was announced and the party applied themselves to

the business of eating with our fingers and the help of good home-made maize bread out of the common bowl in the middle of the table a mixture of meat, roots, and onions covered with some fat sauce. Next comes roast mutton and the inevitable rice—less easy of finger manipulation—and finally we all simultaneously put our tin spoons into the bowl of apricot soup. Anyone who is thought to have eaten too little is pressed to help himself again and again, and the only effect of refusal is that one of our kindly hosts tears off a bit of meat with his own fingers and hands it over for consumption by the reluctant guest.

Meantime the ladies of the harem were more than desirous to see the guests and were kept calm

by some watchful male creature. I cannot imagine any lot so little to be envied as that of a Mohammedan woman. As soon as we have made one another's acquaintance and the Bedouin women have carefully inquired if we are really women, notwithstanding our sports knickers and shingled hair, their good will knows no bounds. They cover our hands with kisses, feel the

material of our clothing, let us admire their children, pull aside their thick veils and proudly show us their long plaits, their silver ornaments, and tattooing.

The Bedouin women describe their domestic life: the baking in a clay oven, the stores of maize, the making of butter by filling an inflated hide quite full of buffalo milk and swaying it to and fro on a pole fixed in the mud wall. Coffee in the evening, after the blind muezzin has proclaimed the day's last hour of prayer, concludes the day. The Bedouin tribes are almost in the Stone Age, but they have "natural, dignified pride, magnificent hospitality, and unusual cleanliness in a land with a bad reputation for dirt and notorious for its beggars."

That then, in a sense, is ancient Egypt, more ancient than those Pyramids which roused Dr. Rydh's enthusiasm, Cheops and the rest, designed to ensure that a King's wandering soul must have a *piéd à terre*. The Cheops pyramid controls the dead king's kingdom. From the ten square metres of the summit can be seen

to the north the minarets of Cairo; to the south the life-giving waters of the Nile, with its border of luxuriant green; in the distance we see the chain of the Mokattam mountains, that once provided a good many of the pyramid stones; and finally in the immediate west, the great stretch of the Libyan desert. We look down on the Chephren pyramid, with its ruins of a cult-temple, such as all great tombs once possessed. From our standpoint, even the Sphinx seems insignificant, although at other times, when one has a close view, it looks so imposing, especially since it has been entirely excavated from the desert sand and the gigantic forefeet enclosing the Roman sacrificial altar have been fully exposed.

The account of the Fayum, the largest of all the oases in the Libyan desert, is of real interest, especially for the ethnologist, the trip up the Nile through the villages to Abydos, with the marvellous sculptures, to Dendera, with its memories of Cleopatra and her son Ptolemy XIV, Luxor, Edfu, and Assuan by the first cataract, is delightful. Dr. Rydh gives a full chapter to the cataract country, including Elephantine, where are reliefs which are connected with the names of Alexander and of Trajan. The account of Luxor, of modern Karnak (which "borders on immortal Thebes"), "of the land of Hatsheput, the famous daughter of Tekmosis and Ahmosi and of her temple in Deir el Bahri, of the Valley of Tombs of Kings," all call for admiration. The travellers returned duly instructed with actual sight-seeing to the wonderful Egyptian museum at Cairo. An attractive book ends with modern social and educational efforts in Cairo and with some other Egyptian sketches. The photographs are so good that they add a sense of reality to the whole book.

* *The Land of the Sun-God: Description of Ancient and Modern Egypt.* By Hanna Rydh. Translated from the Swedish by A. Barwell. George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 12s. 6d. net.

THE ART OF PASTEL.*

Miss Anna Airy has done a good deed in writing this book both to the beginner in Pastel Art, and also to those already conversant with the medium; a medium that should be "delicate and evasive, very charming." Words of advice from such an accomplished artist as Miss Airy must of necessity carry weight. With great truth she states that pastel is better suited to express form by means of mass, rather than by line. One of the pitfalls into which the beginner stumbles is loss of drawing, which is so difficult to recover without overloading the canvas, or rather the paper. Miss Airy knows well the beauty of line, it is a pleasure at all times to study her delightful representations of bee or flower, but at the same time she is fully alive to the fact that form can be equally expressed by light, and shade, and colour.

All mediums are not the same medium, and the author points out the mistake of striving to give to pastel the effect, say, of an oil painting, or of a water-colour; each should have its separate beauty, unallied to the other, both in technique and subject. Strong colour, or brightly lit, and gaily clad figures, with deep contrasting shadows, are the more suitable to pastel. The choice of a subject applicable to the medium is all important. Moreover, the training of the eye to observe *en masse*, to avoid detail, as much as possible, to indicate line by its high lights and casting of shadow, needs cultivating, for upon it hangs the success or disaster of pastel. The high tone and bright colour lends itself to reproduction, but the exceeding fragility of paper and the delicacy of chalk cause difficulty in handling which the printers dislike.

The author's advice to the beginner is good: be sparing of a multiplication of colours, decide what are the necessities of the subject chosen. Then add as required (as the cookery book would say), but do not be led away by the rainbow box which only confuses both mind and eye. The novice will soon find that the truest effect is best obtained by impressionism, that is to say the impression that a first glance conveys to the eye. Pastel loses all freshness when over-worked; the finger or thumb is a very useful tool, but, even so, it must be used sparingly. The old French pastels are smooth in texture, but, to the present writer, the play of light is cleaner and more vivid when the pastel is applied in separate touches; but it is quite impossible to lay down rules. The genius of the artist in the use of any medium must be personal, as he advances in the technique of his art. In this sense all arts are common. Literature has words for its medium with which it plays, but the alphabet and grammar must be its base. Funda-

* *The Art of Pastel*. By Anna Airy. Windsor and Newton Ltd. 4s.

mentals can be learnt, and Miss Airy's book is most helpful, especially to the student studying a new medium, but, always there is that which passeth knowledge. "The art which you say adds to nature, is an art that nature gives," and genius is master of his medium, whatever it may be.

This little book is full of warnings to the student of pastel, but the author is anxious not to dissuade, knowing, as she does, the charm of pastel, and that all difficulties overcome are stepping stones to higher achievement. She feels that "practical effort will soon show that no medium is easier of treatment, quick and facile, or gives scope for more individuality than pastel." Miss Airy gives some delightful illustrations in colour, which should be most helpful: "Working studies for part of a picture," "Spring in the garden," and "Autumn in a London garden," both charming examples of pastel work, in figure and landscape. Illustrations Nos. 18 and 20 show how studies in simple tone express what pastel can do with the smallest amount of colour—they are void of the detail which would detract from the quietness of the scene in half light.

In the working of pastel the fear is always that fine draughtsmanship may be obscured, if not partially lost, by the exuberance of colour in which both nature and art rejoice; but, as our author states, "Colour and a true sense of tone are exquisite qualities, and there is no reason against their alliance with beautiful draughtsmanship—each is a great gift, and the latter is the rarest. A fine sense of colour seems to be an innate gift, fine draughtsmanship and tone can, to a very unexpected extent, be acquired." Miss Anna Airy has without doubt accomplished the purpose which both herself and her publishers had in mind, and all pastellists, whether beginners, or the more advanced in the art, cannot fail to be grateful for the hints and helps which this work sets forth. She closes with: "Be direct, be truthful, never yearn towards 'softness,' and pastel will do a lot for you." "Good sentences and well pronounced, they would be better if well followed."

S. DE M.

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EDWARD JOHN TRELAWNY.*

Edward John Trelawny was born in November 1792. He met Shelley on January 14th, 1822, and, on July 8th, 1822 Shelley was drowned in the Gulf of Spezia after a casual acquaintanceship of less than six months. He met Lord Byron on January 15th, 1822, and was much with him, and after the poet's death on April 19th, 1824, he came to Missolonghi to see the embalmed body with a

* *The Friend of Shelley: a Memoir of Edward John Trelawny*. By H. J. Massingham. Cobden-Sanderson. 21s. net.

horrible curiosity. The whole public interest in Trelawny's very disreputable life turns on the information that he can give the historian about Shelley and about Byron. He died in 1882, a sinister survival of the age of Revolution in which he was born.

Trelawny had a reputation as a liar as well as a very unpleasant man, but Mr. Massingham accepts the *Recollections of the last Days of Shelley and Byron*. Trelawny apparently was not a liar in the ordinary use of that term, but he was totally regardless of truth. He gave, for instance, two descriptions of the embalmed body of Lord Byron as he saw it which are totally at variance. He knew Shelley for odd bits of less than six months. There is no sign of any especial affection for him on the part of Shelley. On May 16th the poet wrote with some formality to Trelawny, who was at Leghorn looking after Lord Byron's boat, the *Bolivar*:

We are very impatient to see you and although we cannot hope that you will stay long on your first visit, we count upon you for the latter part of the summer, as soon as the novelty of Leghorn is blunted. Mary desires her best regards to you, and unites with me in a sincere wish to renew an intimacy from which we have already experienced so much pleasure.

Mr. Massingham quotes a second letter on June 18th asking Trelawny to procure a small quantity of prussic acid, and adding, "I need not tell you I have no intention of suicide at present, but I confess it would be a comfort to me to hold in my possession that golden key to the chamber of perpetual rest." It almost seems that he was joking, since in a letter written to John Gisborne on the same day he says, "how long the fiery spirit of our pirate will accommodate itself to the caprice of the poet remains to be seen," and in a letter to Leigh Hunt on June 19th he describes Trelawny as "a wild but kind-hearted seaman." Shelley seems on the occasion when "Trelawny dined and passed the evening" with the Shelleys on April 10th, 1822, to have thought of a play incorporating the adventures (alleged or real) of the wild seaman. Trelawny saw Shelley on the fatal day of July 8th. "I went with Shelley to his bankers and then to a store. It was past one p.m. when we went on board our respective boats." Shelley and Williams were not going to wait for Trelawny in his trouble with the quarantine officers, but sailed and apparently were run down by a felucca in the height of a storm. There was clearly no such intimate contact between the poet and Trelawny as to justify Mr. Massingham's statement that

it was Trelawny alone, in essence a most simple-minded man, who saw and drew him as he really was. That simplicity that belongs to Desdemona, Marty South, Cordelia, and to love itself, makes such women of Shelley's company as the sophisticated Mary could never have been—and Trelawny his true Boswell.

Apart from the really very small knowledge that Trelawny had of Shelley—a few meetings in less than six months—Mr. Massingham makes clear that

The differences between them are both obvious and superficial. Trelawny was an illiterate man—he could not even spell; Shelley was a passionate scholar. In refinement and subtlety of mind they could not meet each other and Trelawny had little or no imagination . . . and so I might go on collecting dissimilarities. . . . We forget the secondary differences of temperament, idiosyncrasy and character in that they met as romantics, elemental spirits, seceders from the world's way, the one as a secular saint, the other, if you will, as a sinner pure in heart. They loved and understood each other, being of the rare company of the pure in heart.

Considering everything, it is impossible to approve of this conclusion. Excuses may be made for Shelley, despite Lord Eldon's inevitable decision to deprive the poet of parental guardianship. He was a unique person of overpowering genius, and possibly Lord Byron was the only person really to understand him. But to link him with Trelawny as "being of the rare company of the pure in heart" is to wrong the poet gravely. He was a casual, self-introduced acquaintance who amused the poet with his stories of adventure. Mrs. Shelley, writing on September 10th, 1822, said: "I have of course mentioned him to you as one who wishes to be considered eccentric, but who was noble and generous at bottom. I always thought so when no fact proved it, and Shelley agreed with me as he always did, or rather I with him." When on March 11th, 1829, he offered to write the life of Shelley Mrs. Shelley at once and rightly refused the offer, and refused also and promptly an offer of marriage. In 1831 Trelawny had already been married three times, and shortly found a fourth wife, who was not Mrs. Shelley. He did not forgive, and the relationship between them ended in a letter of January 27th, 1837, when she asked (probably with the purpose of breaking off correspondence) for a loan of £20. At any rate it had that effect. Mrs. Shelley died in 1851, and in 1878 Trelawny took the opportunity of attacking her, almost the last effort of a bad old man.

What right had Trelawny at all to write about his ephemeral relationships with Byron or Shelley? Byron detected almost from the first him as the man that he was. If Shelley had given him the cold shoulder it is probable that we should have had no panegyrics of that poet. Somewhere about the late thirties, after Mrs. Shelley's rejection, he married Lady Goring, who had already had an experience of one bad husband, and retired in 1847 to Wales, where he wrote the *Recollections of the Last Days of Shelley and Byron*. As soon as they were published the old man broke out

again and introduced a concubine into the household circle which the fourth Mrs. Trelawny speedily broke up. Mr. Massingham is obviously shocked, but he takes comfort in the fact that the intrusion of the concubine was not "clandestine." On the other hand it might have been the beginning of a harem. In 1824 Trelawny was actually charged with having bought a harem in Greece. Mr. Massingham, by a lucky chance, is able "to scotch this harem scandal." Trelawny bought some slave-girls in Athens simply to rescue them from their harsh conditions "as years later he rescued a negro slave in the Southern States of America." Mr. Massingham feels that "Trelawny's moral liquidation in 1858 was due rather to the forgery of his own signature." In fact it was part and parcel of the man's whole life as recited in this book.

But again it is necessary to ask by what right Trelawny gave his book to the world? He was an illiterate man, and had little imagination. It was towards the end of his fourth marriage, thirty-six years after Shelley's death, that he put pen to paper. Presumably someone helped him to put the *Recollections* into literary form, it may be the fourth wife. In all the circumstances of the case the *Recollections* are valueless unless they have the evidence of another person or persons behind them. On many points there is that evidence. But it must be borne in mind that the *Recollections* and the book of 1878 are not contemporary evidence; they are at the best the fading memories of an old man who had no respect for truth, no respect for the common decencies of life, no respect for his home or his native land.

Mr. Massingham declines to play the Recording Angel in respect to Edward Trelawny. "That method of characterisation is happily *vieux jeu*. A real man is more than an account book." But he gives a description of what he calls a "real man" which confirms the worst that could be said of him. Mr. Massingham, in his brilliantly written romance about a phase of early nineteenth-century romanticism, a piece of work meticulously careful as to facts, never fails to point out in perfect detail all that is to be known about Trelawny. He makes excuses, but the excuses are not of a flabby sort, since he was concerned to paint the man. It is a dreadful picture when stripped of all discrepancies. It is the picture of a Falstaff with everything known about him, that dreadful Falstaff who underlay the Falstaff whom the groundlings watched with joy. The best fate for Trelawny is to be utterly forgotten: but Mr. Massingham's passionately written book, with its excellent prose and its terrific belief in this histrionic quasi-Byronic Falstaff, makes it doubtful whether Trelawny will be forgotten just yet.

ROMAN LAW.*

The study of Roman Law in England is perhaps to-day in a more active state than it has been for many years past, and Mr. C. H. Ziegler's enlarged and corrected edition of Mr. R. W. Leage's excellent elementary work on Roman Private Law as exemplified in the *Institutes* of Gaius and Justinian (published in 1906) is but a sign of this new activity. Blackstone, in the middle of the eighteenth century, was "convinced of its Use as well as Ornament to the Scholar, the Divine, the Statesman, and even the Common Lawyer," and his argument, though dimmed by time and the growth of other studies, is as effective to-day as it was nearly two centuries ago. It was no new theme, however, in the eighteenth century. John Cowell, Regius Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge in the last years of Queen Elizabeth, in his work *Institutiones Juris Anglicani*, deliberately based his treatise on English Law on the model of Justinian. Dr. Harris, about Blackstone's time, published an edition of Justinian's *Institutes* with an English translation, and this was made use of to some extent in a work that should be somewhat famous in the bibliography of Roman Law in England.

Samuel Hallifax was a Cambridge scholar of high repute, and became Fellow of Jesus in 1756 and Fellow of Trinity Hall in 1760. He was Professor of Arabic from 1768 to 1770, and Regius Professor of Civil Law from 1770 to 1782. He became eventually and successively Bishop of Gloucester and Bishop of St. Asaph. He died in 1790. During his occupancy of the Regius Chair he delivered a course of lectures on Roman Law, with some comparisons between the English and the Civil Law. The lectures were apparently very well attended, perhaps as well attended as the lectures of Blackstone at Oxford, at which Bentham was present. Perhaps the success of the Oxford lectures inspired the Cambridge lectures. That they were popular is plain from the facts that he published them at the end of 1774, and a third edition was called for in 1779 during the period that he still held the Chair, and a fourth edition in 1794, four years after his death. The title of the work is *An analysis of the Roman Civil Law; in which a comparison is occasionally made between the Roman Laws and those of England*. The book was printed by the Printer to the University, J. Archdeacon, and was on sale in Cambridge and in London. The Preface to the book is a very remarkable document.

Dr. Hallifax justifies the utility of the Roman Law to the scholar, and commends "the purity of the language, in which the

* *Roman Private Law*. By R. W. Leage. Second Edition by C. H. Ziegler. Macmillan. 15s. net.

Pandects in particular are composed; which are held to be so perfect and elegant in point of style, that the Latin tongue might be retrieved from them, were all other Latin authors lost." He further declares that Roman Law is "still more eminently serviceable" in academic circles.

It is admirably calculated to furnish the minds of youth with universal and leading notions, relating to Natural and Positive, to Written and Unwritten Law . . . that it is written in a learned language, and bears an intimate relation with the Roman History and Antiquities, are circumstances which recommend this science in a particular manner to young students; as they serve to place it in a middle way between the classical erudition they have gained at school, and the laws of their own country, to the study of which it is the best preparation.

Dr. Hallifax still harps on the educational uses of Latinity, and scolds those who are "barely capable of rendering into English a Latin word; which is the utmost perfection of knowledge in modern sciolists, and that too derived from no purer source, than the muddy current of a dictionary." He dwells on the uses of the Roman Law to the Divines and to the Statesmen, and especially urges the latter "to acquaint themselves betimes with this great medium of national intercourse." In dealing with practical law he says, after an interesting excursion on the historical influence of Roman on English Law, that

the student, who confines himself to the institutions of his own country, without joining to them any acquaintance with those of Imperial Rome, will never arrive at any considerable skill in the grounds and theory of his profession: though he may perhaps attain to a certain mechanical readiness in the forms and practical parts of the law, he will not be able to comprehend that enlarged and general idea of it, by which it is connected with the great system of Universal Jurisprudence; by the knowledge of which alone he will be qualified to become a Master in this art, and capable of applying it, as an honourable means of subsistence for himself and of credit to his country.

This was written 156 years ago, and nothing better since has been written upon the professional aspects of the subject. The need of a knowledge of Roman Law has indeed increased since Lord Mansfield, in the very days when Dr. Hallifax was writing, was applying Roman Law to the solution of English mercantile problems, and was fitting the Law Merchant into the English Common Law. To-day modern Roman Law and English Law are meeting every hour in the complex manipulations of private and public jurisprudence. In every continent these two phases of law are facing each other, and indeed in South Africa are tending to amalgamate. At least an elementary knowledge of Roman Law has become a necessary part of the equipment of many professions, and it is in that

sense that the teaching public may welcome Mr. Ziegler's very competent new edition of a book written at the beginning of this century. It is a book that might even form part of the curriculum of the highest forms in public schools, since it shadows forth the universality of law in an age that wants, above all things, standards of life.

Continental thinkers have always seen in the revision of the Roman Law texts an international hope. Irnerius and the school of the Glossators ending with Franciscus Accursius in the thirteenth century, laid the base upon which the scholars, such as Cujas, of the Renaissance worked and whose intolerable textual labours were completed by Mommsen, Krüger, and Rudolf Schöll in order to give the world the complete body of Justinian law, while during the present century Roby, Mitteis, and Riccobono have striven to reconstruct the law of the classical period. The humanistic Renaissance took on perhaps its noblest aspect in the ceaseless search for the undefiled principles of Roman Law.

But, in England, despite the efforts of Blackstone and Hallifax and Bentham, despite the willingness of students to learn Roman Law, the great theme suffered eclipse in the unwillingness of Oxford and Cambridge, and the Inns of Court, to supply teachers in the *fin de siècle* and romantic periods, the very age when the First Consul was giving France its Code Napoléon. The awakening came from the new University of London with the advent of John Austin. T. C. Sanders, a young Fellow of Oriel, in 1853 published his introduction to and translation of the *Institutes* of Justinian. W. A. Hunter, of University College, London, gave, in his admirable work on Roman Law, a unity to the study of the subject. At the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century E. C. Clark at Cambridge, and the vastly learned Edward Poste, respectively, dived into the dark places of early Roman Law and placed in a new light the *Institutes* of Gaius. From that time onwards the study of Roman Law in England was assured, and there is no possibility of backsliding, since the new universities are competing with the old in the training of specialised scholars who can carry on the labours of the last six centuries. There are plenty of fields for the specialist, but for the moment there is the urgent need of making Roman Law a popular theme as well as a necessary subject of research. The need of thorough grounding in general jurisprudence as a part of a liberal education is quite obvious, and law should not be a goal only for professional purposes. Law should be a subject for all university students, and that involves a thorough if elementary knowledge of Roman Law. For this, among other grounds, it is necessary to welcome the new edition of Mr. Leage's work.

J. E. G. DE M.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA.*

Our Government, by Mr. James M. Cain, is an American book, purporting to give a true picture of the actual working of government in the United States. Many volumes have been published on the American Constitution, but all, according to Mr. Cain, have been devoted to the theoretical side and not everyday practice. "There is no book, so far as I know, which sets out to paint a portrait of our government; to depict, without bias or comment, the machine which passes our laws, educates our children, and polices our streets; to show the kind of men who man it, the matters that occupy them, and the nature of their deliberations. It was to fill this hiatus that I set to work." The reader will find that the book is composed mainly of dialogue between politicians, administrators, and other persons in public life, in the course of their public duties. The author's method "has been to select some typical problem of a particular branch of government, usually on the basis of newspaper clippings, and then reconstruct the manner in which it would be dealt with by the typical agents of that branch of government."

It is very questionable whether reconstruction from newspaper clippings is the best way "to retrieve complete verisimilitude, which after all was the main desideratum." Newspapers fall roughly into two classes. The one exalts rumour and sensation out of all proportion to their true influence on affairs. The other confines itself to plain events, caring more for facts than the notoriety and gossip which often clothe them. It must then be very doubtful whether newspaper reports are alone sufficient to describe the inside practice of public officials. Corroboration from another source would make Mr. Cain's disclosures far more convincing. In a chapter devoted to State government the author introduces the Governor in these terms. "In a moment a lovely aroma begins to perfume the air. It is such an aroma as pervades a bonded distillery, and unmistakably it comes from the head of the table, where the Governor has taken his seat." Throughout the chapter the reader is made to feel that the Governor is drunk. It may be that there are some such Governors in the United States, but Mr. Cain wishes us to take his illustration as typical; based as it is only on newspaper reports, it is impossible to accept it. Another chapter is devoted to an interview between the Principal of a County School and a parent. They are arguing on a trivial point:

The Principal: You'll leave my office on a stretcher if I have to throw you out, ha, ha, ha! As the fellow says, it's not always the loudest voices that go with hardest fists.

* *Our Government*. Alfred A. Knopf Ltd. 7s. 6d. net.

The enchanted princess in her tower
Slept, died, behind the grate;
Her heart was starving all this while
You made it wait."

This was the poem of which Edmund Gosse said that "every claim which criticism has to make for the singular merit of Miss Rossetti might be substantiated from this little-known romance." He was astonished that "the general public, that strange and unaccountable entity, has chosen to prefer *Goblin Market* . . . to *The Prince's Progress*."

To prove still further that her "metre and melodies" challenge comparison with Swinburne's, there are the sweet measures of such poems as *Autumn Violets*, *At Last*, and *An After-Thought*. The series of sonnets under the title of *Monna Inominata* may be set side by side with Mrs. Browning's *Sonnets from the Portuguese* for their exceeding human tenderness; but they have a quality which is Christina's own—a mystical exaltation that makes each seem like a flower springing from its Dantesque root:

This say I, having counted up the cost,
This, though I be the feeblest of God's host,
The sorriest sheep Christ shepherds with His crook. . . .

and again in the fourteenth sonnet:

. . . Leave youth his roses, who can bear a thorn,—
I will not seek for blossoms anywhere,
Except such common flowers as blow with corn.
Youth gone and beauty gone, what doth remain?
The longing of a heart pent up forlorn,
A silent heart whose silence loves and longs;
The silence of a heart which sang its songs
While youth and beauty made a summer morn,
Silence of love that cannot sing again.

But a nearer affinity than one of rare lyrical quality made Swinburne and Christina Rossetti each hold the other's art in reverence—though her knowledge of his poems was apparently limited to *Atalanta in Calydon* and a few others. Both were by nature ardent, passionate; but Swinburne's passion was to him like a fiery banner to be waved for an individual or a cause; or the source of a verbal torrent to sweep all Young Europe under the guidance of "one red star." Passion in Christina Rossetti was the strong still current of her inner life. With her family history she may well have had something of the rebel in her composition, but her nature was always controlled by that ultimate law which is itself "like unto a fire," until passion became fused with her patience and aspiration and spiritual energy. These successive phases of her being are nowhere reflected more completely than in her sonnet sequence, *Later Life*. If Christina Rossetti found in Swinburne's supreme music a spell which she could not resist, he responded to

blasphemies. Our cause will conquer." Meanwhile, as the translator's note reminds us, a slight improvement has followed the visit to Rome of Dr. Schober, the Austrian Chancellor. Readers of this volume, filled with details of unmerited servitude, will realise more fully than ever that the problem of minorities has not been solved by the World War or by the dictated settlements of 1919.

* * *

Professor Laski's *Liberty in the Modern State*,* containing lectures written for delivery in America, is in the best tradition of English political thinking. Like the average Englishman, he has no servile or superstitious awe of the State, and eloquently champions the right of the individual citizen to live his own life. Liberty for him is self-realisation, power to expand, "elbow-room for the continuous expression of personality." Each of us, he truly declares, is unique, and the happiest community is that in which most citizens have the privilege of being themselves. That there are necessary limits to complete self-determination is recognised by him, as it was recognised by Mill; but these limitations, he argues, should be as few as possible. In a striking phrase he frankly admits that liberty is a doctrine of contingent anarchy; but the history of modern England at any rate shows us that the risk is very small, and that a much more actual danger is that of dwarfing and stunting our citizens by needless restrictions. Like Mill and all other thinkers who really believe in liberty, he has a high opinion of "adult and mature" men and women, and he passes in review the various factors which tend to hinder and to foster the flowering of personality. Democracy, he maintains, is a condition of liberty; but democracy requires an independent and watchful judiciary not less than a freely elected Parliament. With equal conviction he argues that economic inequality is the enemy of liberty, since "the good life" to which every citizen has an equal spiritual claim is unattainable below a certain level of material well-being. Property, like power, should be diffused, lest "justice becomes the rule of the stronger, and liberty the law which the stronger allow." But when everything possible has been done to secure the conditions of liberty, the full measure of its attainment depends on the use which we make of our rights and opportunities. "Liberty means being true to oneself." This striking little book, packed with thought and written with high literary distinction, should find many readers.

* * *

Touring London with W. Teignmouth Shore: A little book of friendly guidance for those who visit London and those who dwell in London† is all that its title and sub-title state. The author starts with an Introduction of some twelve pages, in which he gives all kinds of useful suggestions, including methods of transport for pedestrians of varying wealth, shopping districts, amusements, restaurants, and suggestions for tours outside London. There is one point, however, which makes doubtful advice: he says, "at swagger restaurants you must tip the waiter to the tune of two shillings and sixpence per head of your party, as a minimum; at humbler places sixpence

* Faber & Faber. 7s. 6d. net.

† Batsford. 4s. net.

will do. But much depends upon the total of the bill and the amount of service asked for and received." Surely the golden rule is 10 per cent. of the bill, and less difficult for the traveller of small means. The four tours laid down have been very well planned, and can be made smaller or larger as desired; in any case the routes are packed so full of historical and other interests that to "take each of them leisurely, . . . will mean devoting more than a day to each, re-planning with the aid of your map to suit your convenience, your tastes, and your pocket-book." The last chapter is devoted to roaming about the river banks, or as the chapter heading picturesquely says, "Roving and Rivering." The Port of London; Old Swan Stairs; London Bridge; Jacob's Island; Cherry Garden Stairs; Wapping; Limehouse; Greenwich; what more romantic spots could rovers find if they would; the past, the present, and the future all come to the thoughts of those who visit them in a sense which places that have not known both prosperity and poverty can never do. Mr. Teignmouth Shore is to be congratulated on a delightful little book which has been well finished off with margins and pages for notes, a clear map, and many illustrations; while his literary and historical allusions during the tours give a desire for more knowledge, and will inevitably turn his travellers towards the literature and history of London.

* * *

In *Chapter the Last** Mr. Knut Hamsun, the winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1920, makes a picture, in some parts a ghastly picture, of remote Norwegian peasant and farming life. It is a tragic story, a story of the loneliness and of the satisfaction that Nature can give and of the sorrow and even madness that the reaction from loneliness can also give. The hero, if that term can be used, is Daniel, the son of a disreputable farmer who, when he died, left not the great farm that he inherited, but a deserted mountain top, a *Saeter* belonging to the farm. There the young man worked with a will to restore the property, living the while in a little house or hut with an elderly domestic servant to tend him. After two years of work the *Saeter* became a farm on a small scale. Its name was Torahus, the House of Thunder, as it was destined to become. The boy, for he was little more, was happy and went once to the village and renewed acquaintance with his old friends and with the girl Helena whom he wanted to marry. She played fast and loose with him and eventually married the Sheriff. Meantime, a great sanatorium was built on a neighbouring height and it is in the interactions between the village, the sanatorium, and the House of Thunder that the story is woven, a story of character, of strange nobilities and strange and indeed horrible happenings that in part turn on the placid and strange outlook of Helena who really loved Daniel. The book is realistic to the last line, the characters live though in a fashion that itself is strange. In a sense it is a notable novel, with all the horribleness and part of the power of *Wuthering Heights*, but it is more self-conscious than that great book. The author knows his countrymen, their weaknesses and littlenesses, and their strength, while the intrusion of the dreadful inmates of the sanatorium stands out in contrast to the country-folk in a somewhat artificial manner.

* Alfred A. Knopf. 10s. 6d.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Mr. Hugh Walpole's novel "*Rogue Herries*"* is, as is to be expected, a fine piece of work, but at the same time it is disappointing. Character studies of eighteenth-century gentlemen cannot avoid a trend of coarseness in their natures, it was the mode; but it is possible to dwell more lightly on the lusts of the flesh than Mr. Walpole has done. The result is that the book is too long; the social and historical details, the rough living of the villagers of the Lake District in the eighteenth century make excellent reading, but the studies of Herries and his son are too drawn-out. It would be difficult for an author to know his chief characters more intimately, and it is the desire of imparting to others all he knows about them that makes the book a little wearisome. Yet the descriptions are excellent; the old woman believed to be a witch could not be more living; the book is full of cameos, and as a descriptive novel "*Rogue Herries*" must stand out among Mr. Walpole's books.

* * *

The autobiography of Dr. A. P. Graves entitled, "*To Return to All That*"† (which is, in fact, a reply to the autobiography of his son, Robert Graves, "*Goodbye to All That*"), makes interesting reading and is full of anecdotes of many people and of many places. His happy home and college life in Ireland, then later the English Civil Service, his literary and musical interests, his introduction to the Pre-Raphaelites, and finally his important education work at Manchester and Huddersfield, at Taunton, and in London, all show a great activity of mind, a desire to be up and doing. Dr. Graves need not apologise for writing an autobiography so full of good matter, or suggest that "modern critics, who encourage youngsters to write off their lives at thirty-three, may even think me fifty years too late."

* * *

Dame Henrietta Barnett in a volume entitled "*Matters that Matter*"‡ in a sense supplements her notable work *Canon Barnett, His Life Work and Friends*. The Bishop of London writes the Preface, in which he says, "I first met Canon and Mrs. Barnett when I went to East London to take charge of the University Settlement at Oxford House in January 1889, and I have been in touch with her and her labours ever since. As Mr. Northcote says, she has worked unceasingly all these years for the sake of her fellow-citizens, and the splendid creation of the Hampstead Garden Suburb, and all it means to the life of so many thousands, has been one of the grand achievements of her life." Mr. John Northcote in his Introduction to this selection of the articles and speeches on all manner of acute social issues by Mrs. Barnett, declares that for forty years (from 1873 to 1913) "Mrs. Barnett and her husband were foremost amongst the apostles of practical Christianity in modern England" while since the apparent separation made by death Mrs. Barnett still dwells with us, "with her hands still full, her heart fresh, her soul aspiring." She has seen, moreover, great changes due to the seed sown before 1913, and in a sense Mrs. Barnett is a harvester.

* Macmillan. 10s. 6d. net.

† Cape. 7s. 6d. net.

‡ John Murray. 7s. 6d. net.

THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK.*

THE first session of the new Parliament is ending. It is the moment to take stock of the situation. Particularly we need to consider the present position of the Liberal Party, as the exponent and the instrument of the declared Liberal policies, and the relation in which it now stands to the other two Parties in the State.

Let me begin with a brief retrospect. Before the gulf which was cut in our history by the Great War, Liberalism was predominant in the country and in Parliament. The main cause of its decline has been, of course, the rise of the Labour Party. The effects of the great Reform Bill are only now, after a century, becoming fully apparent. They were foreseen; and they were intended. It was the purpose of the reformers of a hundred years ago gradually to transfer political power from the monarchy and the aristocracy to the whole body of the nation. And not merely in order that each citizen should enjoy the satisfaction of feeling that he was politically free, but also in order that the power should be used; and used as the means of remedying the monstrous abuses under which the masses of the people were then suffering. Step by step the transfer of political power continued. Through the agency mainly of the Liberal Party the franchise was extended, till it now includes every class and both sexes; open voting was abolished; plural voting was reduced to small proportions; the payment of members was established; the powers of the House of Lords were cut down—though still retaining elements of danger. With some qualifications here and there a really effective democracy has been created.

At the same time many of the more acute grievances of a century ago have been remedied. Anyone who compares the accounts of the condition of the working-classes in those days with the condition of to-day, even in this moment of severe trade depression, must agree that there has been a vast improvement, almost a transformation. That is chiefly due, without doubt, to the growth of the democratic power, and, with it, of the democratic spirit. But serious grievances still remain. There are still strata of acute poverty. There is still grave irregularity of employment. The workman, as a rule, is still a subject in the realm of industry and seldom a full citizen. The laws regulating the ownership and use of land are little changed since the Middle Ages. Our Society still tolerates flagrant luxury in the presence of grinding penury. There is still, looming over us, the threatening shadow of possible war. That a profound discontent with these conditions should con-

* The Inaugural Address to the Liberal Summer School, Oxford, July 31st, 1930.
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the "mourning inward Dove" whose voice is so clearly heard in her poems.

Swinburne, too, was not a poet of a single mood. Someone has recalled him as a young man, at the time when he was reading modern history with William Stubbs (1859) and used to sit at the feet of his shocked and reluctant hostess, in the vicarage garden, while he read aloud to her his early poems. It is an unforgettable glimpse. But Johannes Jørgensen, the Danish poet, quotes in his *Autobiography* a passage which suggests a very different Swinburne fifty years later. By chance Jørgensen read an English review called *The Bibelot*, in which Swinburne, "in a kind of interview," spoke of the point of view expressed by certain of his poems; in particular, *Dolores*—a poem which presents a striking instance of the wide divergence between his outlook and Christina Rossetti's. This was his comment:

Not all at once, not for ever, is the past slain and buried; the huntress pursues her fleeing prey which is still wounded and weak, just escaped from the claws of passion. The cruel hands, the passionate eyes are still bright and alluring—*qui a bu, boira*—the feet are still drawn back to the old paths. Only by flight all through life, flight side by side with the goddess that redeems, can the long thralldom be broken and the slave escape from the goddess that devours. . . .

Jørgensen, who for many years before his own conversion to Catholicism had been a fervent disciple of Swinburne, discovered under the pagan imagery of those words a new mood and a deeper significance.

If Christina Rossetti's life, viewed from outside, seems not only uneventful but narrow in its interests, it was neither self-centred nor isolated from humanity. A French writer has said that "only the saints know how to love"; her poems show that she had attained to the highest branches of that learning. W. M. Rossetti declares that "along with religion, affection was the motive power of Christina's life." This force was lavished on her family and friends, and flowed out to the wider circle of her charity. Like an earlier saint, Mechthild of Magdeburg, she would have asked, "Of what use is it to love God if we are grim and forbidding to our neighbours?" For more than twenty years after W. M. Rossetti reached manhood, he made a home in London for his mother and younger sister; Maria also lived with them till 1873, when she entered a community. As the last surviving member of the family, he was frequently consulted by his friend, Mr. Mackenzie Bell, who, soon after Christina Rossetti's death, undertook to write a biographical and critical study of her. His own *Memoir*, prefixed to the complete edition of her poems,* must,

* *The Poetical Works of Christina Georgina Rossetti*. Macmillans. 1906.
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distribution of wealth; in reforms of the land system both in town and country, together with the State ownership of minerals; in large policies of national development—there is a vast field which is common to both parties. And the Labour Party, in spite of great pressure from powerful interests in particular localities, will not accept the taxation of imports. It resists the temptation, very strong in a time of depression, to acquiesce, for the sake of some partial and temporary relief, in a policy which a wider and longer view must see would be harmful to the nation. As a body, and by the voice of its representative authorities, the Labour Party remains hostile to a policy of tariffs.

With regard to its attitude, again, to the vital issues of arbitration and disarmament, Liberals have little criticism to offer. The present Government has won its chief success in this sphere. The reconciliation of feeling between Great Britain and the United States, the conclusion of the London Naval Treaty, the signature of the Optional Clause, the course pursued generally at Geneva—these have been very welcome to Liberal opinion. "Every man," said Seneca, "is born into two communities, the Cosmopolis and his native city." Every man owes a loyalty to both. A love of country and a love of peace should not conflict with one another. Nationalism and internationalism are not opposites but complementary. These are beliefs which Liberalism and Labour fully share, principles which in common they seek to apply.

There is yet another province of immense importance, in which the aims that both parties have in view fairly closely coincide. Through the long past, history was mainly concerned with the relation between States. In the present era it has largely to do with the relation between classes. There are signs, not a few, that in the future it may be the relation between races that will bulk the largest in the course of human affairs. What will be the attitude, in general, of the coloured peoples towards the white? What will be the inter-action between Asia and Africa on the one hand, Europe and America on the other? The leaders of the coloured peoples nowadays, keen, educated, intelligent, are no longer merely dazzled by the achievements of western civilisation. Many of them see it clearly, its weaknesses as well as its strength. They are likely to seek, in a greater degree than hitherto, their own characteristic lines of development. At this very moment this vast issue has come to a head within our own Empire—in India. These years are a testing time. Before passing on to draw a conclusion with regard to the matters with which I have been dealing, I would ask leave to detain you for a little while to consider the Indian situation.

Not that I would wish, at the present time, to offer any

torial or racial area. Orissa and Behar have no kind of uniformity; Sindh and Bombay are equally disparate; Oudh is clearly separable from Agra; and so on. From the present arrangement the makings are absent of a healthy political life or of a genuine public opinion. A legislature where the members can talk a common language of their own is more likely to get down to business than one in which they compete in oratory in a foreign tongue, as is the case to-day. In small administrative areas, the people will know each other better; communal strife will be less encouraged; popular interest in the work of government will spread. The Commission "regard it as a matter of urgent importance" that a special inquiry into provincial readjustment should be set up, with a view to the establishment of real political entities as federal units of the future. The opposition of strong vested interests may be expected and discounted.

If any one administrative difficulty more than another has hampered the reforms of 1919, it has been finance. The reforms involved switching over from a highly centralised financial system to one in which the provinces became largely independent, subject only to certain payments to the central government for its conduct of the central services. To implement this change, an arrangement was made in 1920 by which the then available resources were distributed between the central and the provincial governments. Misfortune befell it; for it was followed by the grave financial stringency which succeeded the post-bellum boom, and for years there was insufficient money to go round. Neither the quart-pot of the central government nor the pint-pots of the various provinces were ever filled. This came at the time when the new Councils were anxious to push on cherished, but expensive, schemes of social betterment; and when they found their hopes frustrated by lack of funds, the arrangement of 1920 was turned upon and rent as the cause of all their disappointment. It had actually left all the provinces with larger budgets than they had ever before enjoyed; but the falling value of money and the growth of new needs had more than neutralised its benefits. The Commission were thus faced by a legacy of trouble which called for expert handling, and they co-opted for this special purpose Sir Walter Layton, who now contributes, as the result of his inquiry, one of the most instructive chapters in the report.

In a country where there is widespread poverty combined with the concentration of great wealth in a few hands, but generally in forms which are inaccessible to the tax-collector, the task of public finance is delicate. You cannot squeeze the poor, and the rich send you empty away. Furthermore, India hates and resists direct taxation; it loves high tariffs; and among the vocal classes there is

are often the consequences; the misuse of alcohol; and, by no means unimportant, the comparative roughness of manners. If there are elements in western civilisation which it would be wise for him to adopt, he wishes to be free to adopt them of his own will, conscious of what he is doing, and not in obedience to a foreign decree. The spinning-wheel is the symbol of all this. A just, impartial and uncorrupt government is a great boon, no doubt; but the saying is a false one, "Where justice rules 'tis freedom to obey." Justice is one thing, liberty is another, and the two do not necessarily coincide.

Now this general attitude which I have been describing, if I have rightly apprehended it, should not arouse any antagonism, it should rather command the sympathy of the British people. Self-respecting ourselves, we will not fail to honour the spirit of self-respect in others. To foster it in every out-lying part of the Empire will not diminish, it will exalt the dignity of the centre. It has been said by someone—"There is a great man who makes every man feel small; but the real great man is he who makes every man feel great." It is the same with Empires. There have been types of Empire which have sought greatness through the power and majesty and splendour of a ruling State; but the only Empire which achieves a real greatness is that in which every province is enabled to feel itself not less august than the central State itself.

It is, of course, true that the status of any people must depend in the long run upon its own character and achievements, and upon nothing else. Yet to enable its character to develop and achievements to be won, it must have scope. It must have liberty to grow according to its own genius. I believe that this is what politically-minded India is thinking about now. And when the practical Englishman says, "But what is it that you really propose? Do you think that the Viceroy should be deprived straight away of all his powers, and his functions reduced to the personal influence and the ceremonial duties of a constitutional sovereign? Do you suggest that the British army should be withdrawn, or else should be placed under the uncontrolled orders of Indian ministers? Do you propose that the treaties with the Indian States should be torn up, and that they should be coerced to accept a new regime of which they may disapprove? Do you intend that Muslims should be subjected to Hindus in some places, and Hindus subjected to Muslims in others? And who, in those circumstances, is to keep the peace?" When those questions are asked, responsible Indians are, it seems, disposed to answer, "No, we do not necessarily propose any of those things. These are all points to be discussed and to be settled one by one. But everything depends upon the standpoint from which you approach them. Do you approach

a tenderness for levies like tolls and octroi and terminal taxes which fall mainly on the necessities of the masses. On all this thin ice Sir Walter Layton has had to skate with care. His objective is to endow the provinces with resources which will enable them to develop worthily the "nation-building" services of education, sanitation, medical relief, and the like. He sets out to augment their normal revenues (for the eight major provinces) from the present figure of £59 millions to one of £86 millions ten years hence; and even this modest ambition he clearly finds some difficulty in fulfilling. The result is reached partly by raiding the central exchequer, partly by certain new forms of local taxation, and partly by increasing the burdens on the land. The scheme, though necessarily complex, is admirably worked out and lucidly presented. Like the project for sub-dividing provinces, it will have to run the gauntlet of fierce opposition from vested interests; but its broad lines are sound and convincing.

The central exchequer is to lose the salt revenue, which will now be distributed among the provinces in the ratio of their population—a proposal of eminent wisdom from every point of view. Moreover it will transfer to the provinces of origin a part of the taxation on private incomes, which the provinces have not unreasonably pressed for. To fill these gaps, it will have to economise, especially in military expenditure; and in spite of the impending disappearance of the opium revenue, Sir Walter estimates that its total income will in ten years have recovered almost to its present figure. Though it would be ungenerous to describe this as a leap in the dark, as Sir Walter stigmatises the arrangement of 1920, yet it does involve a number of hazardous assumptions. The central exchequer is responsible for the cost of war, and the peculiar frontier difficulties of India are not amenable to the League of Nations. It has also to bear the brunt of famines; and the happy but unusual immunity of recent years has blunted men's memory of famine's disastrous effects. It has also to carry the burden of exchange, which might easily become a grave incubus. Furthermore, there is no certainty that rising tariffs will continue (or are intended to be) remunerative, or that the popular control of railways will not mean a wholesale reduction of fares and freights.

Before the scheme takes statutory form, all these considerations will no doubt be weighed, and it is conceivable that prudence may suggest a wider margin of safety in the field of central taxation. So far as the provinces are concerned, their narrow means can be amplified, as Sir Walter suggests, by an excise on cigarettes and matches, by imposing terminal charges and adding cesses to the income tax. But a tax on incomes from land presents greater obstacles. It was levied once before and abandoned; the Bengal

strong opposition. It was the object of their criticism and attack in Parliament and in the country. We take satisfaction in the fact that we contributed largely to its overthrow. We should regard with dismay the return to power of another Conservative administration similar to the last. The country might expect a slackening in the efforts for international peace and disarmament, and repercussions throughout the world from a weakening of British influence in that sphere of policy. With Mr. Churchill's militarist spirit predominant in the Cabinet, we might anticipate a time of alarms and excursions—perhaps worse—within the Empire and outside it. Quite certainly a system of Protection would be fastened upon the country; and once established, the vested interests which it would create would render its abolition a matter of extreme difficulty. Nor is there any reason to think that another five years of Conservative government would be any more successful than the last in dealing with the problems of industry and agriculture, of currency and trade. All these are considerations which we have to take fully into account.

In this situation, Liberalism is in duty bound to maintain its independence. We are convinced that in the main and in the long run, in spite of its smaller measure of electoral success in recent years, the Liberal Party represents more than either of its opponents the real wishes of this nation. The people want social progress, but not Socialism; they want stability, but not Toryism. When the present world-wide depression ends, they will see clearly once again that a policy of Protection is not in the interest of an island such as this, which can only live by its exports. We have the clear duty to offer our own policy to the electorate. If the Liberal Party did not exist it would be necessary to invent it.

The question, then, at the present juncture is how to make a three-party system work efficiently in Parliament. It is by no means a new question. More often than not in recent time we have had three Parties in the House of Commons, sometimes four. The notion that there is a simple, English two-party system, under which the Government of the day has always been accustomed to rely for its Parliamentary strength upon a homogeneous body of its own supporters, is a delusion. It is not in accordance with historical fact. Since the Irish Party became an effective force in the House of Commons fifty years ago, followed by the formation of the Liberal Unionist group, and later by the establishment of the Labour Party and then of the Coalition, there has seldom been any such simple dichotomy in the House of Commons. Between 1885 and the present time there have been thirteen Parliaments. In only five of them has the Government of the day had a clear majority of supporters of its own, belonging to a single Party.

of labour and capital; transport is very difficult owing to the immense mountain ranges and inhospitable forests; to traverse the country from east to west is almost impossible. Development and good government are needed.

So far we have had in review disturbances that were comparatively trifling and only slightly dangerous to life and property. But the commotions in Brazil were far more serious and undoubtedly exceeded anything that has occurred in South America during the present century. This Portuguese-speaking Republic is larger than the United States minus Alaska. As it is one of the largest States in the world, so it is one of the richest in natural resources, but the country is very imperfectly developed and large tracts are unexplored. It is a federation of a number of heterogeneous States and the task of ruling them is extremely arduous. One element of unrest is the State of São Paulo, which is devoted to coffee, the staple industry of Brazil. The exports of coffee greatly exceed in value the sum total of all the other exports. The inhabitants of this State, largely Italian, are more energetic and wealthy than the other Brazilians, and are chronically dissatisfied with the Federal Government at Rio, because they consider that the taxes, to which they contribute so largely, are expended wastefully and without regard to their interests. São Paulo is to Brazil what Catalonia is to the rest of Spain.

There had been disturbances in Brazil in 1922, but two years later they recurred in São Paulo on a much more serious scale. The revolt was led by General Isidoro Dias Lopes, and the insurgents put forward the usual São Paulo grievances. Among them was a considerable section of the Army, which resented the severity meted out to the rebels of 1922 by the President, Dr. Arthur Bernardes. For more than a week the city of São Paulo was in the hands of the insurgents, who were at last driven out by the threat of bombardment. In 1926 Dr. Washington Luiz became President, and quiet prevailed for some years, but discontent remained, and the State of Rio Grande do Sul has long been disaffected. This year the retiring President caused further resentment by procuring the election of Dr. Jules Prestes, who was about to assume office at the commencement of the disturbances. The claim of South American Presidents to nominate their successor is a fruitful cause of discontent.

In September of this year the disorders came to a head, and from Para to Rio Grande there was armed rebellion in half a dozen quarters. The leaders claimed that their object was to suppress the clique that has dominated Brazil for forty years. This formula is much in vogue among Latin nations; here and elsewhere it is asserted that elections are "made," that they do not represent

the situation is eased. Common action can be taken in certain measures while retaining independence in general. This makes it all the more unfortunate that the recent Conference on Electoral Reform should have arrived at no result. It became clear, in the course of the prolonged discussions in that Conference, that the Conservative Party might possibly agree to a measure of Proportional Representation, although it would not commit itself to the desirability of any change at all; in no circumstances would it consent to the establishment of the Alternative Vote. It became equally clear that the Labour Party might possibly agree to the Alternative Vote, as part of a general measure embracing a number of political reforms, but would not consent, at all events at the present time, to any scheme of Proportional Representation. When the Conference turned to the secondary measures proposed by the Labour Party, dealing with election expenses, the publication of the accounts of political parties, the use of motor-cars at elections and other matters, it was soon apparent that none of them, of any importance, would command the consent of the Conservative representatives. The Conference did not come to an end, as I have seen suggested, because it lost itself in a wilderness of talk. It came to an end because no three-party agreement was found possible on any point of substance; and it was felt by the Chairman, Lord Ullswater, and by many of the members, that resolutions carried by majority votes would not serve the purpose in view when the Conference was appointed. The Liberal Party, at the meetings of its own Federation, has declared itself for Proportional Representation. That was, therefore, the substantive proposal which was put forward by its representatives at the Ullswater Conference and was strongly pressed. It is now for the Party to consider whether, in present circumstances, it will adhere to that attitude, or whether it will be ready to accept the Alternative Vote, if it can be obtained, as better than the maintenance unchanged of the existing electoral system.

There is one other important matter in which the two progressive parties have a common interest—the reform of the Parliamentary system itself. The present Government and its supporters, like all eager reformers in every generation, find themselves bogged in the swamp of Parliamentary procedure. There has been, it is true, a considerable relief compared with the pre-war period, through the devolution from Westminster of Irish affairs; but the pressure of work accumulates again, and the arrears of legislation pile up. The House of Commons always reminds one of the description of the Duke of Newcastle, the Prime Minister in the latter part of the eighteenth century, of whom it was said that his manner gave the impression that he had lost half-an-hour at the beginning of

—that of the Vatican and that of Signor Mussolini, the Austrian Clerical Party (dominated, despite his resignation of the nominal leadership, by the coldly brilliant intellect and political agility of Monsignor Seipel) has become an ally of the Italian doctrine of forcible revision of the peace treaties in favour of those States which have destroyed democracy and modelled their system of government on fascism.

In Signor Mussolini, Monsignor Seipel sees the most powerful supporter of those ambitions which form the mainspring of his policy—the creation under a restored Habsburg dynasty of a "Black" (Clerical) Central European block of States, to be formed at the expense of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Roumania. Monsignor Seipel visited Geneva while Dr. Schober was there. He found the Austrian Chancellor well advanced on the road towards making Austria a link between France and Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and Germany on the other. Schober had established contact with Dr. Curtius and Dr. Benes, and had obtained from them the undertaking to open negotiations with the object of arriving at important commercial and industrial agreements which would eventually have joined together Austria, Germany and Czechoslovakia in an industrial block, a useful counterpart of the East European agrarian block, the foundations for which were recently laid by Yugoslavia and Roumania.

Dr. Schober utilised M. Briand's raising of the Pan-Europe question to urge that the first step should be an attempt to build up a "United Europe" from below, by means of the grouping together of two or three States at a time in industrial-commercial blocks, with preferential customs arrangements. Even an attempt to create such a block, with Austria as a link between Germany and France's *protégé*, Czechoslovakia, would have definitely committed Austria to the support of the Briand-Stresemann policy of peaceable revision. The approving speeches of Dr. Curtius and of Freiherr von Rheinbaben, as well as the decision of France to examine the possibilities of the export of East-European grain to Central Europe, showed how successful Dr. Schober had been. Any advance along the path which Dr. Schober had chosen for Austria would have made impossible the realisation of the ideal cherished by Dr. Seipel of guiding Austria towards Italy. As soon as Dr. Seipel had started on one of those political absences from Austria which have more than once established an *alibi* for him while trouble began at home for his opponents, Herr Vaugoin pushed the Straffella question to extremes in a way which, but for the underlying necessity from Monsignor Seipel's standpoint of stopping Dr. Schober's foreign political course, would be inexplicable. Monsignor Seipel himself in a *Matin* interview with M. Jules

THE GOVERNMENT'S AGRICULTURAL POLICY.

THE Government had so often been asked to produce their policy for agriculture, and had replied so often that it was receiving careful consideration, that it came almost as a shock when Mr. Snowden announced it on the last day of the Session. It was amplified the next day by the Minister of Agriculture, in a talk to reporters, and has since been further explained in his speeches.

It is not easy to describe in a phrase either the policy or its reception. Perhaps this will serve for the policy: marketing, small (and other) holdings, research and demonstration; with bigger things to come—perhaps; and for its reception—by the minority who realise the necessary limits of Government action—goodwill mingled with doubt; and by farmers, disappointment because it is not protection, hope because it may be subsidies, and otherwise indifference. It may be discussed under the headings: What it does not do, What it proposes to do, and What it may do.

What it does not do concerns the contrast between pledge and performance, and is as little edifying as is the same contrast in most other departments of the Government's policy, which is so old a story now that it may only confirm the cynic in his cynicism. But there are some who believe that many rural constituencies would be more usefully represented by their late Liberal candidates than by their present Conservative members, and who know that Liberals would have won provided that fewer voters had believed what Labour candidates said. And they may speculate as to what would have happened had Labour leaders been suddenly smitten shortly before polling day with a truth-telling impulse, and had therefore issued the manifesto: "Do not believe our Candidates' promises! We have undertaken, as a most urgent matter, to nationalise the land, and, more gradually, to nationalise the industry of agriculture. We have promised to abolish the protection which the Game Laws give to a landowner's game, and to make vital alterations in the law affecting tied cottages, to give a Central Authority power to overrule the County Committees as regards rates of wages. Do not believe it! If we get in we shall produce no agricultural policy for fifteen months, and then our only definite proposals will follow along well-established lines—mainly laid down by Liberals." Perhaps it leads only to vexation of spirit to pursue this matter further. . . . And it should, in fairness, be recognised that no discredit in the matter of abandoned pledges applies to Dr. Addison, the new Minister of Agriculture, who was not responsible for the Government's pre-election programme, and

while keeping food at world prices for the home consumer. His personal plan was Import Boards—but it is obvious that unless Import Boards raise prices (and if they do they will not be tolerated) a sufficient price from the farmers' point of view can be provided only by subsidies. We find indeed that the bolder spirits of Dr. Addison's party hold out already a definite prospect of heavy wheat subsidies. And if wheat, why not other cereals, and if cereals, why not meat and bacon? And if food, why not coal and cotton and steel and shipping? It all opens up a splendid prospect for political pressure and agitation, but offers very little inducement to work out difficult schemes for improving marketing structure and method. And the only way in which it can be checked is by the ultimate rebellion of the taxpayer, if by that time the taxpayer has any power of rebellion left in him. And it was such a taxpayers' revolt which abruptly closed down the building of Dr. Addison's houses. Surely, therefore, he may well be warned by the fate of that scheme not to aim at building too great an edifice in his new department. He will have deserved well of agriculture if he does all he can in the sphere of demonstration, research, small holdings, and marketing. He will perform a great service to the country if he can ease the pinch of unemployment by a wide extension of small cultivation round our towns. If he attempts to do more he may in fact do less.

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somewhere about a £1 a week for the pleasure of having more or less provided for him. The existence of this type of difficulty is apparent in the slow progress in the provision of smallholdings. Though only a quarter of the loss on new holding schemes falls on the rates, the number of statutory holdings increases but very slowly in the best-disposed countries, and hardly at all in most. And another point affecting finance arises from Dr. Addison's schemes. He wisely does not want to supersede but to supplement County Council effort. But he contemplates independent action by the Ministry in acquiring and equipping holdings. Though he may have the best will in the world, this will automatically dry up the little work which County Councils are now doing, for people hate rates even more than they hate taxes, and on any local body, as soon as the Government are in the field, the argument will be irresistible that action should be left to them. And there will be a larger loss on state holdings, be they bought and equipped never so wisely, than on County Council holdings.

Again, as regards the large-scale farms which are contemplated, there can be little doubt that with every department under expert direction, and equipped throughout with labour-saving buildings and machinery, and with fields and roads fashioned anew, it should be possible, even in these times, to make several sorts of farming pay fairly well. And such farms would undoubtedly, as Dr. Addison has argued, give chances to the college-trained but practical young men who now find it difficult to get jobs. But such a unit, say of 5,000 acres, might cost first and last £150,000 to buy and remodel, and if the profit on this was only 3 per cent, which might well happen, there would be an annual loss of £5,000 or so, which would be a costly way of finding employment for say a dozen young men. Demonstrations of improved methods of cultivation and stock-feeding which, as the Minister suggests, certainly need multiplying in many districts, can be arranged for without incurring such expensive risks, and many of us would like to know more of the exact finances of the super-farms which, he tells us, have been established by private owners, before duplicating their work on any large scale out of public funds.

If we are to have any regard to the financial difficulties of these grievous times it would seem wise at any rate to go very slow with those parts of Dr. Addison's holdings programme in which even considerable expenditure may produce small results, and to concentrate what money we can spare where it is likely to do most good. Of all the proposals which he puts forward that of trying to provide plots of land of the size of an allotment, or a little bigger, for townsmen at present unemployed, and to help them to

But though the scheme of the Minister and that worked out by the Liberal Committee largely follow identical lines, there is a point of apparent difference which should be mentioned. Dr. Addison seems to offer to the farmers credit, and the power to make their schemes effective, and for the rest to tell them to get busy. The Liberal scheme also contemplates that the farmers must themselves be the driving force, and that the State's financial assistance should be limited to credit, "as anything in the nature of State grants once the initial period of organisation is over, or of State guarantees against loss, would involve State control on the one hand, and on the other a tendency for the farmers to lean and depend upon State help, and we do not know which of these would be the worse" (*The Farmer and His Market*, pp. 74-5). But here is the difference: the Liberal scheme, as the following quotations show, contemplated that something more would have to be done than wait for the farmers to act:

The new movement must, however, from the start, have unity of direction and energetic administration. There must be a central driving force, administered by the best commercial brains available. Marketing is a commercial undertaking, not a branch of farming technique. . . . There are few more intricate problems than that of organising our food supply through a thousand different channels. To standardise, collect, control, distribute, and advertise the multifarious products of our soil is a task not only for the best men the Nation can produce, but for men with certain special gifts and training. It is with no disrespect to farmers that we say that these men might at first not normally be farmers or ex-farmers. For one thing, production needs one type of mind, distribution another. . . . Farmers' Marketing Organisations must employ the best marketing heads and pay them well. . . . There would have to be at first a Central Board of not more than five persons who must be business administrators of a high type . . . upon this Central Board collectively will fall the task of devising and supervising the complete organisation of the movement, they would map out the country for each commodity, in areas of production, choosing the best centres for whatever organisation seemed necessary. . . . They would be expected to keep in touch with every centre, provide expert help to any that found itself in difficulties, and find fresh economies in working, fresh markets, and fresh means of advertising on behalf of the producers.*

Dr. Addison may, no doubt, have been encouraged by some change in the outlook of the National Farmers' Union which he may have observed since the above was written, or he may have received recent assurances that farmers' organisations are now prepared to tackle the business side of their industry really seriously—and if this is so it is a most favourable omen for

* *The Farmer and His Market* (pp. 53-4).

success. But on the whole it seems safer to assume that the Union, in the future as in the past, will let caution prevail over its other virtues, and that therefore the source from which the devising and planning of the country-wide schemes which are now required, will have to be provided by the State on some such lines as the Liberal Committee suggested.

Dr. Addison may indeed find that in a rather curious way his remoter policy will be an enemy to that which he has definitely put forward—and here we pass to that part of his schemes which is as yet but sketched and hinted. He has suggested that farmers' produce falls into two classes: (1) That which includes potatoes and milk in which instability of prices is mainly the result of the farmers' unorganised methods of production and distribution, and these are to fall within the scope of his marketing proposals; and (2) that in which instability and insufficiency of price is the result of unregulated imports, and here it is suggested that Government monopoly of import with possibly a higher price for the home produced article may be resorted to. The second class, of course, mainly touches cereals, and here we have hints of Import Boards, and the promise that as soon as the conclusions of the Imperial Conference are known the Government will undertake whatever practical steps can be devised to put cereal growing upon an economic foundation. The point of difficulty is obvious. Dr. Addison will be trying to run the (mainly) self-help proposals of the Marketing Bill, and proposals for Import Boards and possible bounties side by side, and will have no doubt a very clear idea which commodities fall into each scheme. But the farmer's idea will be very different, for he has always been taught to think that the bad price he gets for potatoes, and fruit, and cheese, and butter, and bacon and meat is in no way the fault of bad organisation, but wholly that of cheap imports. As soon as the prospect of limiting or controlling imports, with a possible bounty for the home grower, opens up with regard to anything, he will do all he can to have it applied to everything; and will not be in the least inclined to settle down to work out any better marketing scheme. And, in these circumstances, the farmers' collective policy of political pressure rather than self-help will be as great a drag on real progress as it has constantly been hitherto. For, as we should remember, the official, and fatal, attitude of the National Farmers' Union is that the nation can have whatever style and standard of farming it chooses to pay for.

Dr. Addison has already used language which may tend to harden out farming opinion on this line. At Swindon he stated that the Government were facing a great task and raising a vital issue, namely how to ensure a sufficient price for the home producer

while keeping food at world prices for the home consumer. His personal plan was Import Boards—but it is obvious that unless Import Boards raise prices (and if they do they will not be tolerated) a sufficient price from the farmers' point of view can be provided only by subsidies. We find indeed that the bolder spirits of Dr. Addison's party hold out already a definite prospect of heavy wheat subsidies. And if wheat, why not other cereals, and if cereals, why not meat and bacon? And if food, why not coal and cotton and steel and shipping? It all opens up a splendid prospect for political pressure and agitation, but offers very little inducement to work out difficult schemes for improving marketing structure and method. And the only way in which it can be checked is by the ultimate rebellion of the taxpayer, if by that time the taxpayer has any power of rebellion left in him. And it was such a taxpayers' revolt which abruptly closed down the building of Dr. Addison's houses. Surely, therefore, he may well be warned by the fate of that scheme not to aim at building too great an edifice in his new department. He will have deserved well of agriculture if he does all he can in the sphere of demonstration, research, small holdings, and marketing. He will perform a great service to the country if he can ease the pinch of unemployment by a wide extension of small cultivation round our towns. If he attempts to do more he may in fact do less.

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THE SIMON COMMISSION'S REPORT.

THE Simon Commission, which had no Indian Member, were boycotted throughout India as it was believed that they would not recommend any substantial reform and would nullify, so far as lay in their power, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. Indian opinion, Hindu or Muhammadan, as to necessary reforms was not put forward before the Simon Commission. The Congress Party stood aloof as they thought the Simon Commission were not likely to recommend the reforms that were in their opinion indispensable. The Liberal or the Moderate Party also stood aloof for the same reason, though the reforms which they regarded as essential were not so advanced as those advocated by the Congress Party.

Besides these parties there were others quite competent from education, experience gained in Government service or political life, and from their position and interests at stake, to speak on the questions raised, who did not, however, appear before the Commission. No attempt was made to secure their attendance, the conditions laid down for the examination of witnesses having practically the effect of shutting out such evidence. No retired public servants—and they form a large class—very few of the great zemindars, scarcely any representative ryots, no heads of religious institutions, were examined. There were, it is true, the committees of the Provincial Legislative Councils and of the Central Indian Legislature. But there was no discussion between them and the Simon Commission of the important questions dealt with in the Report. The discussion in the Legislative Assembly on this point is illuminating :

A member after drawing attention to the statement in Sir John's letter that the method of Joint Free Conference provides the opportunity for "that free exchange of views and mutual influence which are best calculated to promote the largest measure of agreement that is possible," continued: "In view of the fact that the Report of the Indian Central Committee is hardly referred to in the Report of the Commission, and that the two Reports are diametrically opposed to each other, and also of the known fact that there was nothing in the nature of joint consultation at the crucial stage when conclusions were reached, I wonder what value is to be attached to this statement. We have heard a good deal of the value of the clash of mind upon mind. So far as the Indian Central Committee and the Simon Commission are concerned, the clash of mind upon mind seems to have produced very few sparks. . . ."

Mr. M. A. Jinnah: It did not take place at all.

Sir Hari Singh Gour: I can inform the Honourable Member that it never took place.

Mr. H. P. Mody : Then I would like to ask the Honourable Member why he continued to be a member of the Central Committee.

Sir Hari Singh Gour : It was too late to withdraw, and we published our Report eight months before the Simon Commission published their Report so as to influence their judgment.

It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that the Simon Commission did not arrive at their conclusions after consultation with the Indian Committees. On the other hand, officials were examined to prove Indian incompetence and the necessity of English recruitment for various services including the Civil Service and the Police. Rebutting evidence which was available was not taken. Official and communal evidence to prove Indian inability to cope with communal difficulties and Englishmen's competence to deal with them were received without any attempt to procure rebutting evidence.

I do not ignore the evidence of English witnesses. But that in no way reflects Indian opinion. However, on this unsatisfactory evidence the Indian Central Committee with their intimate and direct knowledge of Indian conditions submitted their Report, which was an agreeable surprise to the Indian politicians who had expected a very different kind of Report from a body which was considered by them and with good reason a very reactionary Committee. The Indian Press accordingly, while not prepared to accept the Central Committee's Report on account of the attitude it had already taken up, evidently felt that the Report was a great advance. The Anglo-Indian papers gave a fair reception to it. The Press in England practically ignored it on the pretext that a domestic incident in India claimed their attention and that it should really be reviewed, though they never did it, along with the forthcoming Simon Report. That Report which differed from the Indian Central Committee's Report in every important particular was published eight months later, heralded with great flourish of trumpets. It was very favourably received by the English public. When they learned its contemptuous rejection by India, we were, however, told that the Simon Commission was not the last word on the subject but we were bound to produce an alternative scheme; those gentlemen evidently forgetting that there was a scheme submitted by the Central Committee already before them which they wanted to keep away from the English public. Yet they complain of the attitude of India towards the Simon Report, an attitude, they say, of criticism and rejection without a real knowledge of the arguments put forward. The questions dealt with by Sir John Simon's Commission had been discussed in India from every point of view for the last ten years, and it is ludicrous to ask the Indian politicians to go through the Commission's Report for the facts and arguments

gathered under conditions and circumstances above set forth. Not one of them is put in a new light. For many it was enough that those recommendations were very much worse than the recommendations of such an admittedly reactionary body as the Indian Central Committee. The Indian Report was not reviewed, no grounds were given for accepting the other; it was quietly ignored for obvious reasons. A brief examination of the recommendations on some of the important questions will now be made.

HINDU-MUHAMMADAN CONFLICT.

Admittedly one of the burning questions of the day is the settlement of the disputes between the Hindus and Muhammadans with reference to their place in the coming Reforms. The scheme of representation in the Councils and in the Services of the minority communities and classes, including the Muslims, has admittedly failed and would no longer be tolerated. Under that scheme there was great misgovernment in the country. Both the Hindu and Muhammadan political leaders are agreed that a new scheme should be devised. The Hindu Maha Sabha and a considerable section of the politicians, Hindus and Muhammadans, were agreed that separate electorates for minorities, Hindu or Moslem, should disappear in favour of the territorial electorates as in England and elsewhere, as separate electorates stand in the way of the growth of Nationalism and are conducive to disunion and hostility between the communities. The Moslem Association and a considerable section of the politicians were equally satisfied that separate electorates were necessary for the protection of the interests of the minorities and that they alone would eventually bring harmony between the classes and thus lead to Nationalism. The majority of the Central Committee took a middle course. They recommended common territorial electorates with seats reserved for the minority classes according to their population or voting strength, whichever was the more favourable to them. If there was any question on which there was plenty of evidence put before the Commission it was this, and the conclusion of the Central Committee which they thought would commend itself to the moderate section in India was based upon such evidence and upon the experience gained during the last ten years. The Simon Commission offered no solution. They said that the present arrangement should continue until set aside in favour of an agreed scheme between the Hindus and Muhammadans. This is rather a lame conclusion. They were appointed to formulate a scheme themselves, a scheme that would work in the interests of Indian political progress. They knew or must have known that the scheme agreed upon between the Hindus and the Muslims known as the Lucknow Pact, which has been tried

for the last ten years, has been found to be not in the interests of political progress. They knew or must have known that an agreement was difficult if not impossible under a foreign Government which goes out of its way ostentatiously to proclaim that the *raison d'être* of its existence as an autocratic Government is the necessity for the protection of the minorities, Hindus, Muslims, etc., who were assured by them that they would receive short shrift from the majority communities. Secure in Government support no minority community, Hindu or Muhammadan or Anglo-Indian, would be willing to come to any reasonable agreement with a majority community. The Central Indian Committee may be right or wrong, but they had the courage to face the problem. The real truth apparently was that there was disagreement among the members of the Simon Commission and they preferred rather to shirk the question than to face it. The alleged unanimity of the members of the Commission is thus really a myth. They had been adopting such expedients apparently in order to conceal their real differences. The majority of the Indian Central Committee hoped or rather expected that in a few years' time conditions would induce the Hindus and Muslims to come to an agreement themselves, and it is for that purpose that while putting forward this scheme of representation they recommended a form of Provincial autonomous Government which would work in that direction. That recommendation should be considered along with this scheme of the Hindu-Muhammadan representation.

DYARCHY. PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY.

Under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms certain departments, like Education and Local Government, were administered by Indian Ministers under the control of the popular Legislature, the Governor having the right in certain cases to interfere with the Ministers or even to take the administration of these branches into his own hands. The other departments were administered by officials not under the control of the popular Legislature. This was termed Dyarchy, and this kind of administration was intended only for the period of transition to complete popular control. It is admitted by almost all Provincial Governments and by all politicians, English and Indian, that this transitional period must now come to a close. The Congress or the Nationalist party want the entire Provincial administration in all the Provinces without any distinction to be under popular control, the Governor or the Viceroy only occupying the position of a constitutional ruler. The Indian Central Committee found that the Provincial Governments were not uniform in their recommendations nor were the Provincial Committees agreed as to the principles to be followed. While some

Provinces desired practically popular control, i.e. administration controlled by a Legislative Council of elected members, many of the Provincial Governments and also many Provincial Committees wanted various safeguards to prevent a deadlock or breakdown or failure in the administration. These decisions generally turned on the Hindu-Moslem conflict; the absence of communal hostility in any province led to recommendations of full Provincial Autonomy under the control of the Indian Legislative Council. In the face of these divergent views the Indian Central Committee recommended that, where the conditions according to the Local Provincial Governments, the Provincial Committees, and the Provincial evidence justified such a course, there should be complete Provincial Autonomy, i.e. a ministry without officials appointed by the Governor on the advice of a chief minister, and jointly responsible to a Legislature elected on a wide franchise; the Governor alone having the right of interference in matters affecting peace or order, with power to veto any legislation, and a right to refer to the Governor-General for final decision questions relating to religion. The Central Committee did not accept the extreme Nationalist view of relegating the Governor to the position of a constitutional ruler. On the other hand, in such Provinces they did not propose to allow any official interference with the ordinary administration by giving a place to any member of the Civil Service in the Cabinet. They expected that as the Governor would be advised by an Indian ministry his interference would be very exceptional and only in circumstances which justified it. On the other hand, in these Provinces where conditions did not justify such complete popular control, the Indian Committee recommended a Provincial administration where popular control was diluted with official influence by placing Civilian Members in the Cabinet itself with reservation of law and order, and by certain other expedients. There were restrictions proposed by various members.

What the Simon Commission did was to recommend practically this kind of administration with Civil Service officials in the Cabinet—recommended by the Indian Committee for the very backward Provinces—as administration for all the Provinces, with liberty to the Governor or the Viceroy, if experience justified it, to adopt the more popular kind of administration in any particular Province. The Governor may, according to the Simon Commission, interfere with his Cabinet in the interests of safety and tranquillity, in the interests of any one community against the others, in order to carry out any Government liability in respect of any non-votable expenditure, to protect the services, or in favour of the backward tracts, i.e. tracts inhabited by communities who are unable to protect themselves. He need not follow the chief

minister's advice in appointing ministers. These powers, if not exercised under strict limitations, will widen the gulf between the communities, remove the services from the control of the Legislative Councils and Indian ministers, and hand over the backward tracts to officials, with the result that these communities will invariably, as experience has shown, be deprived of their proprietary communal rights. The Governor has also the power to restore any grants refused by the popular chamber and to certify legislation for the benefit of "any interest in the Province." The Governor may preside at every meeting and naturally exercise great influence. The Indian Committee would not allow the Governor to be a member of the Cabinet or preside. They would allow the Governor, no doubt, to interfere in a few matters, i.e. in questions relating to peace and order or religion, but as all the ministers would be Indians such interference would be exceptional. Under the Simon scheme the Governor may dominate the entire administration and compel the ministry to carry out his own views in every department. There is no guarantee of an Indian or popular policy as may be determined upon by the Legislative Councils in any department. Hitherto such important matters as Education and Local Government were entirely administered by Indian ministers under popular control. They might now be allotted to the Officials whom the Governor might appoint as members of the Cabinet, who would not be under the control of or removable by the Legislative Councils. These Official members would have under the Simon scheme practically complete control in the administration of their departments, and even if they refused to follow the policy of the rest of the Cabinet they might not be separately removed and the Governor might uphold them against the rest. Even in respect of the other matters under the control of the Indian members, the Governor might interfere with their administration on the advice of those official members whom he himself had appointed and in whom he would place more confidence than the representatives of the Legislative Councils. There is scarcely any order of a minister in any department which he could not set aside under one or other of the provisions above set forth. He could enact any law on any subject according to his wishes. A Governor who is advised solely by Indian popular ministers is in a very different position from a Governor acting on the advice of irresponsible officials.

Thus it will appear that the official or Civil Service influence would permeate every department. Dyarchy is thus abolished not to substitute popular control, but to enhance bureaucratic control. If the recommendations of the Indian Committee on complete Provincial autonomy and Provincial control are conceded to one Province, say Madras, where the Provincial Government recom-

mended it, and provisions are laid down by Parliament itself for the grant of such popular control to the other Provinces, it is probable that the other Provinces will be able to claim with justice popular control within a reasonable period. The reason for denying thorough popular control to some of the Provinces is the Hindu Muhammadan tension which paralyses the administration in those Provinces. The Indian Committee were practically unanimous that proof of the absence of that feeling and of harmony between the classes, which can be furnished by an agreed common electoral roll for both the Hindus and Muhammadans without any class or communal distinction, would justify concession of full Provincial popular autonomy. Such a condition, if laid down by Parliament, would be a great inducement to the elimination of communal feeling. But under the Simon scheme the minor communities would be disinclined to accept any reasonable terms from the major communities, as they would feel that they have got members of the Civil Service or Officials in the Cabinet on whose assistance they can rely.

The existing gulf between the classes and communities would certainly continue and would probably be widened. It is indispensable therefore that at the start there must be some Provinces where there is really no serious Hindu-Moslem problem, where full Provincial autonomy with absolute popular control should be granted, in which case it is almost certain that the other Provinces will work up to it, whereas, if it is not conceded to any Province, it may be fairly certain that it will be long before Provincial autonomy is obtained, and only after a fierce and bitter agitation. The main reason alleged by the Simon Commission for not accepting the recommendation of the Indian Committee or of the Provincial Governments of the more advanced Provinces was the "jealousy and heart-burning" that, according to the Commission, would be experienced in the Provinces which did not obtain popular control. It may be doubted whether this is the real reason; because, according to the scheme which they recommend, they contemplate differences in the degree of popular control, as the Governors of more advanced Provinces may recommend, and such Provinces may obtain popular progressive administration in advance of other Provinces. In fact, different stages which may arise within a few years are necessarily postulated in any scheme and certainly in the Simon Commission Scheme. The Commission are not warranted in assuming such hostility in the Provinces, as the kind of administration would depend generally upon provincial opinion.

One fails to understand the logic of the reasoning which denies full local self-government to those Provinces which have proved their title to it, on account of the hostile attitude assumed by other

ARMY.

In accordance with this view, the Commission would remove the British Army entirely from the influence of the Federal Assembly, proposing that military defence and the task of keeping internal peace in India should be the function of the British Army for which, they say, the Indians will not be fit for many years to come.

Thus, so far as the army is concerned there is no common basis for any discussion. Almost every material fact stated by the Simon Commission is denied and the contrary affirmed by Indian officers and leaders. The Commission "are assured" that the Indian army is not intended to be used for Imperial as distinct from Indian purposes. Experience and facts prove the contrary. It is assumed that British troops and British officers are indispensable for the defence of the North West frontier. Those who say so forget the lessons of Indian history. Indians deny it. And the Simon Commission are not justified in saying it when opportunities are denied to Indians to support their statements. The Indian Central Committee point out that such opportunities may be provided without any danger whatever to the Empire. The Commission say that British troops are necessary to keep internal peace. This is untrue, as will be testified to by every Indian Minister or Member who has had anything to do with keeping the peace during the last ten years, and by almost all, if not all, Indian police officers and magistrates. Finally they propose certain changes from the point of view of a Federal India of a distant future, of which the Indian States will form a part, and which admittedly will stand in the constitutional evolution of India towards Dominion Status.

I do not think it would serve any useful purpose to pursue the matter further. The Commission have not realised the significance of their boycott. India spurned thereby the proffered co-operation between master and servant; ruler and subject. They have not understood the significance of the civil disobedience movement. It is that the Indian political leaders will not delegate their responsibility for framing the future constitution to Englishmen. The destiny of India is in Indian hands, not in the hands of Englishmen. Failure to realise this may lead to a conflagration which will involve untold misery to India, England, and the World. India has to face it some time or other and therefore says: the sooner the better. The Simon Commission seem to share the same view. It is now for England to decide. It is the heartfelt prayer of India that England may be led to right conclusions.

SANKARAN NAIR.

ANGLICANISM IN EVOLUTION: A CRITICAL RETROSPECT OF THE SEVENTH LAMBETH CONFERENCE.*

TO be a member—still more, to be a responsible official—of the Anglican Communion at the present time is at once a thrilling and an almost heart-breaking thing.

It is thrilling to catch glimpses of what, to thoughtful Anglicans, must always seem the providential character of our Church, despite its anomalous characteristics. On this point English Church-people tend to feel about their Church what, rightly or wrongly, British folk generally feel about their race and empire. It is thrilling to see how, time and again, after seeming to tie herself up into knots innumerable, the old Church straightens herself out again and, however cautiously and self-critically, goes ahead: even though the process be suspiciously like what, in the life of the nation, is known as "muddling through." It is thrilling to note how from the insularity and conservatism of the Church of the Provinces of Canterbury and York a hundred years ago we have moved out to the adventurous catholicity, as well geographical as ecclesiastical, of the present day, a revolution which the number and variety of the Bishops assembled at Lambeth this summer has helped to bring home to the world. Never before have so many Bishops assembled on English soil. Our Church, like our race, is to-day ecumenical and imperial. In what, for convenience, one may still call Anglican Christianity, there is a principle of spiritual unity which holds together in a real, though loosely organised, fellowship much more than the British Commonwealth of Nations or even the (so-called) English-speaking world. Anglicanism, in other words, is a real world power.

But with the thrill there is also the element of heart-break. With each new glimpse of our providential opportunity there comes some ironical reminder of the defects of our most vital qualities, the weakness intertwined with our very strength. Anglicanism is an embodied compromise, so that movement in any direction sets up a tension by which the movement itself is forthwith checked. Analyse any of the more crucial of the Lambeth Resolutions, and the practised eye will see this process at work. In part, of course, it is just the traditional conservatism of any ancient organisation, accentuated in a National Church which once, perhaps, deserved the *soubriquet* of "The Conservative Party at Prayer."

* For the sake of brevity "Lambeth" is often used in this article for "The Lambeth Conference," and "Lambeth 1920 (or 1930)" for the Conferences held in these years.

All our fathers have been Churchmen,
Nineteen hundred years or so,
And to every new suggestion
They have always answered "No."

But that is not the crux of the problem. It is the clash of two contrasted ideas of progress, based on what might almost seem contradictory visions of the goal ahead, that makes the evolution of Anglicanism such an anxious and embarrassed process. And the problem of leadership is gravely complicated by the fact that, quite apart from any differences among the clergy, you have, roughly speaking, the clergy and the laity facing different ways. To this point I shall return at the end. But enough has been said to suggest why, in such a situation, leadership too easily becomes a genius for discovering ways of escape from impasses, or of preserving a united front by eloquently marking time. In effect, there is a constant underlying struggle between the need for unity and the demands of truth. And sometimes we seem to miss both—and "the bus" as well.

When the official photographer was marshalling the serried ranks of Bishops outside Lambeth Palace, in the first days of the Conference, and had at last got them fitly disposed, he gave a *mot d'ordre* which sounded almost like a prophecy: "Any movement spoils the group." The group, as such, may be impressive: but it is for movement that the Church is there. Truth is more important even than unity: and the fulfilment of one's mission most important of all. The special irony of the Anglican problem is that the difficulty of movement is itself the upshot of claiming liberty to move. The tension within the fellowship follows from our very regard for truth. It is our freedom which, indirectly, ties us up: our comprehensiveness which, instead of emancipating, cripples us. In a word, the British genius for pacification by compromise is always getting across the equally British genius for adventure and respect for facts. It would be strange if there were not times when even the most passionate believer in the Church of England, while he cries (with Cowper) "with all thy faults, I love thee still," longs (according to his temperament and tradition) either for the untrammelled freedom of the sectary, or for the drilled and blinkered irresponsibility of the loyal follower of the Pope.

THE LAMBETH TECHNIQUE.

All this, the thrill and the misgiving alike, is involved in merely being a convinced yet thoughtful Anglican. But few experiences, I imagine, can so force such feelings to the surface as that which the Bishops at a Lambeth Conference go through. The very

privacy of it intensifies the characteristic sensations. It is a tradition of the Conference that its proceedings remain the secret of those participating. The outside student of the printed results must try to bring to them a sympathetic historical imagination, and envisage the peculiar process out of which they came. One may describe it as a quest for the maximum available unanimity through the freest clash of conflicting (not to say contradictory) opinions in a confined space and in a limited time.

Whether the traditional technique of the Lambeth Conference is calculated to give the best results, and whether the quest of unanimity is not pushed too far, are questions that may profitably be asked. An addition of twenty per cent. to the membership of such a Conference may well suffice to change its character.* The fears expressed by some of the English Episcopate in 1867, before the first Conference, lest the Overseas Bishops should drown the voice of those at home, were certainly reasonable in the light of this year. True, the ability of certain leading members of the Home Bench secured for the Mother Church a very definite ascendancy. But the discussions sometimes seemed to be little influenced by thought of the situation in England, where the last ten years have left both memories and scars. Yet it is in England that the Reports will be most seriously and widely canvassed, while opinions formed upon them here will, through the home Press, do much to influence the judgment of the world.

Above all, in spite of the growth of mutual toleration and kindness, the theological distance between the extreme Right and the extreme Left also tends to grow. If this were coupled with a growing appreciation of the principle of comprehensiveness, it would not matter. It may be argued that Anglicanism does not of necessity exclude anything except "exclusiveness on principle"—the proud prerogative of Rome. But the extremist, at either end of the scale, is, as a rule, only "comprehensive" *malgré lui*, and lives for the day when he shall reign alone. The future depends on whether our Church can convert her own extremists, since they are not likely to convert her.

In much of the criticism of the South India Scheme, before the Conference and during it, there was implicit the claim that the Church of England is committed to the Anglo-Catholic doctrine of Episcopacy, and that therefore such proposals, and still more the effort to legitimise occasional intercommunion with non-episcopal Christians, represented a new departure and a betrayal of the past. It was easy for historians to point to instance after instance of perfectly orthodox and even "high" Anglicans communicating *on principle* with the reformed Churches of the Con-

* The number attending in 1920 was 252; in 1930, 307.

tinent and defending their practice, and to show that, whatever the much-quoted Preface to the English Ordinal (inserted in 1662) involves for our own Clergy and Communicants, it proves nothing about the supposed necessity of Episcopal Orders for valid Sacraments. But the opposition remained plainly unconvinced, and will presumably go on advancing their claims by the simple method of assuming them proved. Much the same might be said of the extreme Protestant minority, save that it is seldom taken seriously nowadays. And this, frankly, means sooner or later a battle royal for the soul of Anglicanism. The more liberal view is as vital to the conscience of many Anglicans as it is to any non-episcopalian Christian. On this point we are quite ready to let our Anglo-Catholic fellow-Churchmen differ from us. What we cannot do is to agree with them.

If this be so, safety lies only in *agreeing to differ*; and the quest of unanimity at Lambeth, however edifying for the Bishops themselves, is going to become not only more and more difficult, but a dangerous and misleading aim. At present minority reports are unknown. When there is a serious cleavage of opinion, the reports are referred back, and draft after draft comes up for discussion. The patience and resourcefulness shown are admirable; but what finally secures acceptance may satisfy no one within the Conference and convey no clear meaning to anyone outside. A more really "representative" result might surely be reached by accepting minority reports as a necessary evil, and letting the will of the majority prevail. An Athanasius would still retain his right of trying to convert his "world," and secure a reversal of judgment later.

For, after all, the Lambeth Conference makes no claim to be a General Council; and, according to our 21st Article, even General Councils "may err and sometimes have erred." All of us probably mean to seek different decisions on certain points in 1940, if we live so long. If the limitations of the Conference and the temporary nature of its findings were more clearly recognised, a ten-yearly appearance of unanimity might not seem so necessary in a Church which, by its very nature, must always make room for different "proportions of faith." And, with the fetish of unanimity discarded, the Conference could really do much more both for the Anglican Communion and for the would-be Christian world.

Yet, when all this has been urged against the present method of the Conference, it may be questioned whether, apart from that method, it would be the wonderful thing it has hitherto been. I am not myself given to easy transports, and felt no such thrill at any point as the men of 1920 spoke of. I still wonder whether the very feature of the South India Scheme which made unanimity possible may not prove as deceptive as the corresponding proposal in 1920

has since been generally admitted to be.* And yet, looking back, the memory remains of exceeding friendliness and comradeship; of the quiet triumph of responsible leadership, in spite of sometimes terrible tests; of the miracle that we had our Reports complete and passed before we separated, without any undue rush at the end; and of the unexpectedness of some of the principal results.

THE "SOUTH INDIAN" REORIENTATION.

Of these the form given to the South India Scheme, and the new light thrown upon it in the course of discussion, represent perhaps the most notable achievement of the Conference: notable because unanimity supervened where even disruption had been prophesied, but still more because of the new bias given to the evolution of Anglicanism itself.

With the Report of Committee III, on Unity, should be coupled that of Committee IV, on the Ideal and Organisation of the Anglican Communion. The heart of the latter is a definition of that term which marks a step onward in self-knowledge and self-expression. And this definition is perhaps the more notable because it was hardly won, and won in the traditional Lambeth manner, at a stage when (ridiculous as it may sound) we had almost given up the effort to define the Anglican Communion at all. At the cost of seriously misrepresenting the scope and character of the Conference by omitting all direct reference to its other Reports, and even to the general subject itself,† in relation to which its work in every department must be judged, I must here narrow down my purview to certain parts of these two.‡

* The panacea for problems of Order in 1920 was to be the giving and receiving of mutual "commissions" by the Ministries of uniting Churches: in effect, reciprocal re-ordination all round. But, whereas an Anglican Bishop ordaining a Congregationalist Minister, or a Roman Bishop an Anglican Priest, would regard himself as conferring "Catholic Orders" for the first time—imparting a "character" in the technical sense—the Laying on of Hands in the opposite direction could only mean the local extension of a Commission already recognised as real and valid. The effect in one case is qualitative, in the other quantitative only. No progress could be made along such lines, though the 1920 Lambeth Conference seems to have quite genuinely pinned its faith to this proposal. And it was here that the subsequent discussions between Anglican and Free Church leaders at Lambeth reached "a pause."

† "The faith and witness of the Church in this generation" (*italics mine*).

‡ Perhaps in passing I may direct the reader who desires a more general introduction to certain outstanding Resolutions, which, taken with the corresponding parts of the Reports, represent the most notable and characteristic achievements of the Conference in other fields. The Report on the Christian Doctrine of God should be studied by all, and, with it, the crucial Resolutions 3 and 8. These might be described as "a modern view of Holy Scripture" and "a modern plea for Public Worship." All the Resolutions on Sex must be read together, with No. 9 to strike the keynote; and only against this background should No. 15 (on Contraceptives) be judged. Of the Resolutions on "Race" and "Peace and War," Nos. 21 and 23 in the one case and Nos. 25 and 27 in the other outline a practical Christian policy in definite relation to the present phase of political development; and No. 27 especially raises the crucial question of Christian duty in face of an outbreak of war. "Conscien-

What all the world now knows as "the South India Scheme" was not itself a response to the Lambeth "Appeal" of 1920, but the outcome of a spontaneous gathering of native Indian clergy and ministers, belonging to the Churches now contemplating union, in 1919. Indian initiative has played a decisive part throughout; and this is recognised in the new phase reached at Lambeth this year. Enough was done even at that early stage to secure the interested attention of "Lambeth 1920"; and the Report and Appeal then issued provided both a background and a further incentive for this local adventure in bridging gulfs. The proposals have passed through many stages since then, and they came before "Lambeth 1930" as a result of their entirely sympathetic reception by the General Council of the Anglican Province of India, Burma and Ceylon last spring. What the Anglican Church in that Province (which attained autonomy on March 1st, 1930) did was to refer certain specific questions to Lambeth for advice, and, broadly, to give the Conference an opportunity of criticising any of the steps contemplated, if it so desired.

The interesting thing about the sequel is the new situation created for the Anglican Communion itself by the fact that "Lambeth 1930" undertook the duty of generally advising on a scheme "not submitted for acceptance or rejection."* The fate of the South India Scheme depends now mainly on forces outside our Communion altogether—the existing "South India United Church" (representing a fusion of Presbyterian and Congregationalist elements) and the Wesleyan Methodist Church in South India, itself very closely tied to the Wesleyan Conference in England. But whatever henceforth happens in South India, South India has probably left a permanent mark upon the Anglican Communion, by focusing attention upon a particular problem—how to bring together in a single ecclesiastical organism, on a "Catholic" basis, episcopal and non-episcopal Churches—and by eliciting from "Lambeth" the particular reply which has just been given.

Briefly, the solution which commanded unanimous support turns on the fact that the new and united Church of South India, if and when it comes, will not form part of the Anglican Communion. Its Anglican constituent parts will from the first be in full communion with Canterbury, and such full communion will also be attained by the whole South Indian Church so soon as its Ministry

tious objection," in view of post-war treaty obligations, appears in a new and different light. The Resolutions on the Church's Ministry are not, perhaps, of special interest outside Church circles, save where they touch on the Ministry of Women and definitely refuse admission of women to the Priesthood. The only at all striking innovation is the permission suggested for Lay Readers, in certain circumstances, to assist in the Holy Communion by administering the Cup.

* *Report*, p. 123.

is homogeneously episcopal, as it is intended that it shall in course of time become. But even then it will stand outside our Communion, forming "a distinct province of the Universal Church, with a rule and character of its own."*

The Report hints at the sacrifice involved for the four Anglican Dioceses in South India which, if the Scheme goes through, will "go forth from the Anglican Communion in order to make their own distinctive contribution to the faith and order of the united Church."† Their Bishops, two of whom were leading figures in this year's Lambeth Conference, will thus have no right to be invited to the next. Worse still, from their own point of view, they will be severed from the close fellowship of the Province of India, Burma and Ceylon, and retain no closer relation to Calcutta than to Canterbury. At the same time, it is the avowed hope and intention of the rest of that Province that a North Indian equivalent of the South India Scheme may bring them also to the point now reached by their brethren: whereupon they too would "go forth from the Anglican Communion" to coalesce once more with the South in a reborn and reunited Indian Church.‡ Such a Church would owe much of its tradition and character to the Anglican Communion; but it would not be formally a part of it. At the same time the result would not have been reached by what has been described as "a friendly schism." The *Encyclical* is emphatic on that point, assuring those who go out that "they will never be disowned nor deserted by the Anglican Communion," which will "preserve for them unimpaired their welcome . . . to its altars and its pulpits."§ But the Church of India, and any other Churches formed by the application elsewhere of the South India Scheme, will not form part of one stellar system with ourselves but be, for the time being, "island universes" in ecclesiastical space.

Plainly the process thus initiated may carry the Anglican Communion very far—or possibly leave it "in the air." The South Indian adventure will stultify itself unless it is repeated elsewhere. And other countries, which desire no more than India to have the Churches founded in them by Anglican missionary enterprise permanently labelled "Made in England," are already intensely interested spectators. The first Chinese Bishop to appear at Lambeth, Dr. Lindel Tsen, spoke with a mixture of humour and pathos of the delight with which "the younger sister" in the home hears the plans for her elder sister's wedding discussed. Wherever nationalism is at work, a passionate desire for real union with fellow-Christians of their own race coincides with a growing dislike of even the semblance of foreign tutelage. The situation in Persia

* *Report*, p. 123.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Cf. *Encyclical*, p. 27.

§ *Ibid.*

was another subject before the Lambeth Conference which, though overshadowed by South India, has certain even more revolutionary aspects.* Few if any mission-fields will fail to react in the same way: and for all a chief attraction may well be the opportunity of shedding the (already inappropriate) Anglican name.

So, in effect, the Anglican Communion has embarked on a process of "dying to live," which may, in the course of the next century, reverse the whole process of missionary expansion which has characterised the last, and leave us once more severely and restrictedly "Anglican" instead of the truly oecumenical Church we have come to be. This is a prospect which few if any of us can have envisaged clearly before we met. The new orientation represents a characteristically Anglican recognition of the logic of facts: the fact that, as a "national" Church herself, the Church of England cannot discourage the formation of other national Churches, and the still more obvious fact that, if she tries to, she will fail. It is also not without a touch of equally characteristic compromise. Anglo-Catholic criticism is forestalled by the fact that what may follow the union, if achieved, will not compromise the Anglican Communion, as it will happen "in another place"; though (in justice to the Conference) the clinching argument for this provision was the way in which the non-episcopal Churches sharing in the scheme deprecated "absorption" in any form. But if the new orientation is, in some ways, characteristically Anglican, the unanimous acceptance of it, with all its possible consequences for our own Communion, is surely also a very Christian and courageous thing. At least it is in the spirit of John the Baptist's self-renunciation: "He must increase, but I must decrease." The question which remains to be asked is whether the new line of development is in the best interests of the whole Christian Church. Is Anglicanism justified as yet in curtailing its own sphere of immediate influence? Is there not a distinctive religious witness of Anglicanism, quite apart from its heritage of "Catholic Order"? Is it more important to launch new Churches—"distinct Provinces of the Universal Church"—equipped by us with the Historic Ministry than to give our distinctive religious witness as forcibly as we can? Is continuity of Order any guarantee of continuity of faith? And is the progressive lopping off of branches of the Anglican tree the surest way of increasing the output of that distinctively Anglican "fruit of the Spirit" for which there still seems to be great need, if not an obviously large demand?

Here we must bring into view two other elements in the Report. One is the definition of the Anglican Communion already referred to, to be taken in connection with the Report of Committee IV. The

* Cf. *Report*, pp. 122-3.

other is the rest of the reunion programme set forth this year. In both we shall see Anglicanism in evolution. It will depend chiefly on our various prepossessions whether we regard the process with hope or with fear; and perhaps it will make for clearness if I do not try to conceal my own.

THE PRESERVATION OF THE ANGLICAN IDEAL.

The Report very candidly regards the Anglican Communion as "in some sense an incident in the history of the Church Universal," which "in its present character . . . is transitional." "We forecast the day when the racial and historical connections which at present characterise it will be transcended, and the life of our Communion will be merged in a larger fellowship in the Catholic Church"—the latter, however, viewed in its primitive or "federal" aspect.† Meanwhile "the bond which holds together" the various Anglican Churches "is spiritual," and the term "Anglican" is now to be construed in an "ecclesiastical and doctrinal," not a racial or merely historical sense.‡ Then follows a fine description of what I have called above the distinctively Anglican "fruit of the Spirit," as well as a clear statement of the Anglican doctrinal standard. All this, together with the ensuing discussion of the powers and limitations of "local Churches," lies behind the crucial definition, in Resolution 49:

"The Anglican Communion is a fellowship, within the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, of those duly constituted Dioceses, Provinces or Regional Churches in communion with the See of Canterbury, which have the following characteristics in common:

"(a) they uphold and propagate the Catholic and Apostolic faith and order as they are generally set forth in the Book of Common Prayer as authorised in their several Churches;

"(b) they are particular or national Churches, and, as such, promote within each of their territories a national expression of Christian faith, life and worship; and

"(c) they are bound together not by a central legislative and executive authority, but by mutual loyalty sustained through the common counsel of the Bishops in conference."

Two points emerge as crucial: the unimpaired allegiance to the Book of Common Prayer as "generally setting forth" the Anglican version of "the Catholic and Apostolic faith and order"; and the emphasis on the duty of a national Church to "promote within" its "territories a national expression of Christian faith, life, and worship." Under the second head, as we have seen, we

* *Report*, p. 153.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Report*, p. 154.

are bound to give freedom to daughter Churches to develop, if they so desire, on "national" lines. Under the first, we are bound to make what provision we can that, under their new conditions, they will still, in their own way, preserve the same "proportion of faith." Can both these aims be realised together? The ideals of Anglicanism specified in the Report (p. 154) are "an open Bible, a pastoral Priesthood, a common worship, a standard of conduct consistent with that worship, and a fearless love of truth." Unless these at least can become stable features of Churches claiming descent from us, we shall have given them, first life, and then autonomy in vain. Some of them, emerging into their novel isolation—the new united Church of South India not least—will find themselves in juxtaposition with other Churches which at any rate do not seem to share those ideals. What will happen to the ideals themselves? One may point out the danger without being guilty of un-Christian doubt.

But for us in the home country a still more interesting and urgent question is the bearing of this new orientation of Anglicanism, and this definition of the Anglican ideal, on the prospects of Christian reunion at home and on the problem of making our own country Christian—the main thing for which the Church of England, as such, exists.

A large part of the Unity Report bears upon our relations with Churches which neither geographically nor ecclesiastically can be called our neighbours. In particular the 1930 Conference was distinguished by an imposing delegation from the Orthodox Churches and by an influential, though much smaller, one from the Old Catholics of Europe. And in each case notable progress was made. In the long perspectives which characterised this Conference we may rejoice in signs of real *rapprochement* with these, at the moment, somewhat distant and irrelevant Churches; especially so if by such association we and they can help each other to fulfil our several Christian destinies. But would even the establishment of full intercommunion between us make any practical difference to the religious situation either in England or in most parts of the English-speaking world? And that we are still a long way from intercommunion, so far as the Orthodox are concerned, appears sufficiently in the Report. It is, for instance, chilling to be told, at this time of day, that "in its forthcoming Pro-Synod the Orthodox Church would probably not object to recognising the Baptism of children and their instruction *from Orthodox books* by Anglican clergy."* (Note the quaint implications of the words I have italicised.)

But have we not been so obsessed by our long perspectives, and by

* Report, p. 140 (No. 16 of *Résumé*).

the new orientation already dwelt on, as to become short-sighted with regard to more directly relevant and urgent matters? Will it be easier, for instance, to "enter into free and unrestricted conference" with "the now happily reunited Church of Scotland,"* and emerge with a formula satisfactory to both sides, when we have seemed ready to go all lengths to meet otherwise remote Churches just because they are episcopal, but to be aloof and exacting everywhere else? Will it be easier to explain to our separated brethren in England itself why we have not dared in 1930 to endorse the classic declaration of the Joint Committee of Anglican and Free Church theologians at Lambeth in July 1923?

That declaration, to which even the present Bishop of Truro was a party, spoke of the ministries of non-episcopal Churches which satisfied certain conditions as being "within their several spheres, real ministries of Christ's Word and Sacraments in the Universal Church."† There was every reason to expect that "Lambeth 1930" would take some note of these words; and some of us hoped that it would open a door to the sort of action which alone could prove them genuine—viz. some degree of even occasional and duly safeguarded intercommunion. But the declaration itself is significantly ignored; and in the "Special Areas" (i.e. Intercommunion) Resolution‡ we have merely a barbed-wire loophole, not a door ajar. Is all this such as to encourage the reunion movement where it is not least needed—here at home? The laboriously optimistic language of Resolution 44, on "The Evangelical Free Churches of England," does little to conceal the consciousness that here our reasonable grounds for optimism are slight.

And why? The main cause has been already referred to, in the growing attempt of the Anglo-Catholic party to fasten on the Anglican Communion as such its own conception of episcopacy, with all that flows from it in the matter of "valid sacraments" and the like. It boots little that both the Lausanne Conference and the joint conference of Anglicans and Free Churchmen after 1920 could reach unanimity on the Gospel Message. A difference of sacramental theory must still suffice to keep us rigorously apart, though precisely the same difference exists within the Anglican Church itself. Indeed, even the really liberal and (in its potentialities) almost revolutionary Resolution (No. 46) on "Co-operation in Evangelism" indirectly points this moral. It "urges the desirability of organising and participating in efforts of Evangelism in co-operation with Christians of other Communions . . . as a means of expressing and strengthening that sense of unity in the Gospel which binds together in spiritual fellowship those who own allegiance to different

* Report, p. 53 (Resolution No. 43).

† Bell, *Documents on Christian Unity*, p. 156.

‡ No. 42, p. 52.

THE SITUATION IN TURKEY.

THE decision of Ali Fethy Bey, the Turkish Ambassador in Paris, to re-enter political life opens up a new vista in the domestic affairs of the young Republic. Before proceeding to Paris in 1925 Fethy Bey was Prime Minister for a short period. He was obliged to resign because of the Kurdish rebellion and was succeeded by Ismet Pasha.

Ismet Pasha has been Prime Minister for the last five years and in the 1927 elections the Popular Party, of which he is vice-President, obtained all the seats in the Grand National Assembly. Ismet has thus governed without opposition, and although the experiment may have been successful at the outset, many drawbacks and inconveniences have manifested themselves during the last year. Party discipline has become slack through lack of opposition, some of the Deputies have become discontented with their lot, while others have secretly criticised the Prime Minister, being unable to voice their misgivings publicly. A serious economic and financial crisis has made even the warmest supporters of Ismet sometimes wonder whether his policy is the right one.

Ismet Pasha is a soldier who distinguished himself in the Turkish-Greek war in Anatolia and afterwards negotiated the Treaty of Lausanne. He has applied military dogmas to political life. Unquestionably patriotic, hard-working, and tenacious, he has governed the country with a rod of iron. He created the dreaded Tribunals of Independence which condemned thousands of Kurds to death in 1925-6 and hanged many members of the former Committee of Union and Progress, including Javid Bey, the ex-Minister of Finance. Ismet's policy has been "Turkey for the Turks" and he has disdained taking foreign advice and has been chary of accepting financial and technical assistance from abroad. His relations with Ghazi Mustapha Kemal Pasha have been cordial and the two men between them have made Turkey what she is. The Ghazi is the Honorary President of the Popular Party, but in recent years he has allowed Ismet more or less of a free hand in governing the country.

In the spring of this year the resentment felt in certain quarters against Ismet Pasha made itself articulate. A newspaper called the *Yarin* (*The To-morrow*) was started in Constantinople by Ismet's enemies and violent attacks were made on the Government. The latter retaliated by suspending the paper and arresting its editor. A lawsuit followed and the editor escaped with a trivial sentence. A few weeks later Haidar Rifat Bey, a well-known Constantinople lawyer, became involved in a legal dispute with Mahmoud Essad Bey, the Minister of Justice, who is one of Ismet's closest supporters. Haidar Rifat Bey wrote a series of letters to

the Ghazi wherein he accused the Minister of Justice of all kinds of misdemeanours and alleged that Turkey's judicial system was being ruined. The Minister brought an action against Haidar Rifat Bey who was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment for defamation of character. Meanwhile negotiations had been proceeding in Angora between the Government and representatives of the Council of the Ottoman Debt. In February the Government had let it be known that they might be obliged to suspend payment on the Ottoman Debt on account of financial stringency. As a result of these negotiations the Government invited M. Charles Rist, the eminent French financial expert, to visit Turkey and make a thorough examination of the financial situation. At the same time, pending the completion of M. Rist's report, a temporary arrangement was entered into whereby Turkey obtained a reduction of two-thirds of the sum she was due to pay during 1930.

There are reasons to believe that if the Government had not made such a favourable arrangement with the representatives of the Council of the Ottoman Debt, a political crisis would immediately have arisen. As it was, Ismet Pasha gained a few months' respite during which he devised an economic programme which, in some respects, resembles the Russian five-year plan. Economy is to be exercised in all directions (except in that of National Defence) and a State Bank, which will have as its primary object the stabilisation of the Turkish exchange, is to be founded forthwith. The National Assembly, after approving unanimously all of Ismet's plans, rose until November 1st and there did not appear any likelihood of any important political developments occurring before the autumn. In Turkey, however, it is always the unexpected that happens.

During July Fethy Bey returned to Turkey on leave and saw the Ghazi several times at Yalova, the new Turkish spa on the Gulf of Ismid. On August 7th at a ball given in Yalova, Fethy Bey declared his intention of founding a new party. The Ghazi and Ismet Pasha were also at the ball and the former gave Fethy every encouragement. Ismet Pasha—who was genuinely astonished at Fethy's action—took up a reserved attitude, but when Fethy began to criticise the Government's policy the Prime Minister said he would reply in the National Assembly. Next day the party was officially formed and the Ghazi's sister, Makboulé Hanem, became the first woman member. The Ghazi then announced that he would remain President of the Popular Party, but would maintain an impartial attitude towards political affairs.

It will be asked why the Ghazi has encouraged Fethy to re-enter politics. There are many opinions about this matter, and here it will suffice to give the two principal ones. First, it is alleged that the Ghazi had become disconcerted, and indeed apprehensive,

at the growing power of Ismet Pasha and decided that it was necessary to have a new Prime Minister. People who hold this opinion maintain that the Ghazi has come to favour a more liberal economic and financial policy and recognises that a new man is needed if new methods are to be followed. The second opinion is that Fethy Bey has returned to Turkey of his own accord. It is said that he has become alarmed at the Government's financial policy. In this connection, it must be remembered that Fethy Bey was the principal artisan of the 1928 Paris agreement between the Turkish Government and the Council of the Ottoman Debt. It is believed that he advised the Government to settle the Ottoman Debt question, and held out hopes that it would afterwards be possible to obtain a foreign loan on easy terms. No loan has been forthcoming, although this was not Fethy's fault. He may have thus found himself in a rather delicate position when the Government tried to obtain a modification of the Paris agreement.

Whichever of these two opinions is correct, it is certain that Fethy Bey aspires to turn out Ismet Pasha and assume power himself. He has christened his party "Liberal Republicans" and has issued a programme defining his principal aims. The basis of his party, like that of the Popular Party, is Republican, nationalist, and laic. Although the programme does not differ greatly from that of the Popular Party, it seems clear that if Fethy Bey obtained power he would at any rate seek to favour private at the expense of State enterprise, adopt a more tolerant attitude towards foreign capital, and bring Turkey closer to the League of Nations.

Ismet Pasha has welcomed the advent of the new party and he may be sincere in so doing. Thirteen of the Popular Party Deputies have so far gone over to the new party and Ismet will soon know who are his friends and who are his enemies. The Prime Minister shows no signs of wanting to relinquish office and he has even said that his party can remain in power for another five years. There is thus every prospect of an interesting struggle between Ismet and Fethy. The latter has had considerable political experience and was at one time a prominent member of the Committee of Union and Progress. He is a skilful diplomatist and has many friends among the Turkish "Intelligentsia." He is not, however, reputed to be as energetic and forceful as Ismet Pasha.

At the risk of offending Turkish susceptibilities it must be pointed out that there are two dominating factors in Turkey to-day, one, or both, of which are capable of driving Ismet Pasha from power or, conversely, preventing Fethy Bey from obtaining power. The first of these factors is the Ghazi and the second is the Army. It is most difficult to know what the Ghazi is really thinking as he conceals his personality and masks his intentions. Ninety-nine per

cent. of the ideas and intentions which are attributed to him by Turks and foreigners are false. The writer does not pretend to possess the 1 per cent. of correct information, but it does appear that the Ghazi is anxious to introduce the two-party system into Turkey. He knows that he is not eternal and he is exercised as to what will happen when he is gone. He has studied history very closely during the past few years and it is possible that he has come to the conclusion that Democracy cannot flourish in Turkey unless there are two groups holding different ideas and opinions. In other words, he has rejected the theory that Government by dictatorship is best suited for a country like Turkey. It must not, however, be imagined that the Ghazi intends that party Government shall entirely supplant his own influence. He wishes to remain the supreme arbiter of Turkey's existence as long as he is alive, but he also wants to create a situation which will permit of his work being successfully continued after his death. To put it another way, he wants to do all that he can in order that the Republican régime may be perpetuated.

If the above theory is true the Ghazi has taken a big risk, as the two-party system has never been a success in Turkey. Personal passions and ambitions play so large a rôle that the main issues are soon submerged. But the Ghazi is essentially courageous and he has never hesitated to adopt a bold course. The many and far-reaching reforms that he has instituted have not been popular, but by sheer driving force he has managed to impose them on the Turkish nation. It is felt that he would not have encouraged Fethy to found a new party unless he had carefully weighed all the advantages and disadvantages beforehand.

The second factor in the situation is the Army. There is, of course, no question that the Army, both officers and men, are absolutely loyal to the present régime. The Ghazi, Ismet, and Fethy are all ex-officers and they have the Army's interests thoroughly at heart. Since Turkey became a Republic, the Army, Navy, and Air Force have received special consideration from the Government. According to the recently-published report of Herren Schacht and Muller of the German Reichsbank, approximately 45 per cent. of the Turkish budget is spent on National Defence. Huge as this percentage may seem to foreigners, Turkey cannot at present afford to spend much less on her fighting forces. Her total budget is only about £20 million and it was necessary to re-equip and reorganise the Army after the Anatolian War of 1922. In addition, Turkey has a long land frontier in Asia which has required, and still requires, careful watching. Finally, there are the Kurds to consider. They revolted in 1925 under Sheik Said and at the time of writing are again giving serious trouble of which further mention will be made later on. National Defence is, there-

fore, a sacred thing and woe betide anyone who attempts to reduce the expenditure devoted to it. On the other hand, Turkey cannot fulfil her foreign obligations and become prosperous unless more money is spent on productive matters. Fethy Bey is said to realise this and he may conceivably contemplate making economies on National Defence. If he does, he will inevitably find himself involved in a serious conflict with the General Staff.

To revert to the actual political situation. The Grand National Assembly in Angora is closed and does not re-open until November 1st. Between then and now Ismet Pasha and Fethy Bey will be busily engaged in marshalling their respective forces and preparing for the Parliamentary fray. Unless anything unforeseen occurs, Ismet Pasha should possess a comfortable majority over his rival when the Assembly meets. The Popular Party is at present engaged in ascertaining from its followers what their intentions are. Those that are suspected of leanings towards the new party are being excluded from the Popular Party; those that remain are being warned that it will be made difficult for them to leave the party later on. It is impossible to say how many Deputies will desert the Popular Party for the Liberal Republicans, but no one anticipates that Fethy Bey will be able to count on the support of more than 25 per cent. of the Assembly. The organs of the Popular Party state that he will have far less. General Elections are not due to be held before the summer of 1931, so Fethy Bey will have to wait a year before he can try his strength in the country. This is providing Ismet Pasha does not resign of his own accord. By the terms of the Turkish Constitution a change of Government can take place without there being recourse to general elections and, of course, it is always possible that this will happen. Public opinion—a rather negligible factor in Turkey—would appear to be on Fethy's side, and the inhabitants of the large towns such as Constantinople and Smyrna will probably give him their support. The Press is divided and Ismet Pasha is starting a new organ, to be known as *Revolution*. Incidentally, Fethy Bey has declared himself to be in favour of freedom of the Press, and violent polemics have already broken out between his supporters and those of Ismet Pasha.

In foreign affairs Ismet Pasha, and his Foreign Minister, Dr. Tewfik Rushdi Bey, have been moderately successful. Good, if not warm, relations have been established with Great Britain and France, and there are no important questions in abeyance between ourselves and Turkey. A noticeable *rapprochement* has taken place with Italy, and Fascist diplomacy has been instrumental in bringing about a settlement between Greece and Turkey relative to questions arising out of the exchange of populations after the Anatolian War. Russia—the hereditary enemy of the Ottoman

Empire—has become the ally and friend of Republican Turkey and Turkish foreign policy is often subordinated to the wishes of Moscow. Relations with the Balkan States are good and M. Venizelos is due to pay an official visit to Angora in October, when a Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression will be signed between Greece and Turkey. It is with Persia that Turkey's relations are strained.

At the end of June Kurds from Persia raided Turkish territory near Bayazid and some sharp fighting took place between the raiders and the Turkish frontier guards. The raiders were reinforced by Kurds from Persia and, in some cases, the local population lent them aid. The situation was judged to be serious and General Salih Pasha was placed in command of the Turkish forces. Large numbers of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and aeroplanes were dispatched from Diarbekir to Northern Kurdistan and fighting became general in the neighbourhood of Lake Van. Eventually the Kurds were driven out of Erdish, a town to the North of Lake Van, and they were forced to retreat towards Mount Ararat. There they have entrenched themselves and for the last six weeks desultory warfare has gone on in that region.

Many absurd accusations have been levelled against Great Britain and France who were, it is said, encouraging the rebellion and inciting the Kurds in Iraq and Syria to make common cause with the Kurds in Persia and Turkey. It has, however, become evident that Persia is the only foreign Power to blame for the Kurdish movement, and a lengthy exchange of Notes has taken place between the Foreign Offices of Angora and Teheran. The Turks accused the Persians of arming and victualling the Kurds and insisted that the Persian Government should take military measures against them. At first, the Persians protested their innocence but they afterwards advanced the plea that their army was insufficient to deal with the Kurdish tribes. The Turks then began to talk about a rectification of the frontier in order that the territory in North-east Persia, inhabited by the Kurds, might be brought under Turkish sovereignty. Turkey also suggested joint military measures. This suggestion would have involved Turkish troops crossing into Persia and the Teheran Government refused to agree. Last week the Turks made a concrete proposal to Persia, namely that she should cede Mount Ararat to Turkey in exchange for a slice of Turkish territory further south. The Persians have not yet replied to this proposal, but it is unlikely that they will agree to handing over Mount Ararat as it is a valuable strategic position. Meanwhile, Husrev Bey, one of Turkey's most able diplomats, and a close friend of the Ghazi Pasha, has been appointed Ambassador in Teheran in the place of Memduh Shevker Bey. The new Ambassador will point out to

the Persians how prejudicial the present situation is to Turko-Persian relations and will try to persuade them to come to a working arrangement with Turkey whereby the Kurds may be quelled once for all. The actual causes of the revolt are somewhat obscure, but the Kurds have always been a thorn in the side of Turkey, and the reactionary elements composing the various tribes do not approve of the Westernising reforms carried out by the Ghazi.

Soviet Russia has attempted to act as a mediator between Turkey and Persia, but very little success has attended her efforts. In Angora the Russian Envoy, Suritch, has an excellent position and enjoys the confidence of the leading Turkish statesmen. In Persia, however, the Soviet are regarded with distrust especially since Bolshevik troops flagrantly violated the Persian frontier a few weeks ago. Chiefly because of her friendship with Soviet Russia, Turkey has never become a member of the League of Nations. The Russians have, indeed, always been successful in persuading the Turks that they will be better off if they remain outside the League. Another reason which has hindered Turkey from entering the League is that the Angora Government considers itself entitled to a permanent seat on the Council. This is a demand which can hardly be met. In the programme of the Liberal Republican Party, Fethy Bey has stated that, if returned to power, he will advocate closer collaboration with the League. In actual fact, Fethy Bey is known to favour Turkey's entry into the League, but it is not certain whether the Ghazi is of the same opinion. In any case, Turkey would require to be given a semi-permanent seat on the Council, and it is more than possible that certain great Powers would support such a claim. After all, with the exception of Japan, Turkey is by far the most modern and go-ahead Asiatic State and as such she has special claims to consideration.

Another intention credited to Fethy Bey is that of contracting a foreign loan which would be raised in Paris. Fethy considers that Turkey urgently requires foreign capital for the stabilisation of the exchange, the reconstruction of Anatolia and other purposes. Ismet Pasha, as has already been pointed out, wants Turkey to develop with her own resources as he fears that a loan may entail foreign control and may undermine the nationalistic spirit. Whose policy will prevail is a question which only the future—and the Ghazi—can decide. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the Ghazi is Turkey. There are plenty of Turks who will criticise Ismet Pasha and Fethy Bey, but it is seldom that one hears a word against the President of the Republic. Turkey has not forgotten that it was Mustapha Kemal who drove the Greeks out of Anatolia, caused the Capitulations to be abolished, and generally rid Turkey of foreign control.

J. WALTER COLLINS.

EAST AFRICA: POLITICS AND NATIVE QUESTIONS.

WHAT is wanted in East Africa at the moment is an agreed formulation of the principles which are to govern native policy. The difficulty, of course, with decisions of principle is to keep them elastic of application without leaving them so vague in interpretation that they can be stretched to the degree of meaninglessness. We need a golden mean between detailed prescription and mere general sentiments. For example, the assertion that "native interests must be paramount," which was first used, I believe, in the White Paper of 1923, and has figured prominently in all subsequent discussions on East Africa, or the statement embodied in the League of Nations Covenant whereby the Powers agree that the "well-being and development" of the population in Mandated Territories "form a sacred trust of civilisation"—these are principles of the utmost importance, and yet so vague as to be of little more than negative value. Direct enslavement, exploitation, and massacre are ruled out. And something positive is implied—some attempt at peaceful and orderly administration, some provision for improved public health, some sort of education. But beyond this, individual interpretation can have full play.

The Hilton Young Commission (pages 39-41 of their Report) seized upon this phrase and saw that it needed defining.

"It might perhaps be argued," they write, "that the phrase attempts no more than to indicate the general spirit in which policy is to be applied, and that it is a mistake to endeavour to define too closely what it means. It appears to us, however, that nothing is more important than that there should be a clear idea now and at each stage of development what British Policy both as regards natives and immigrants is to be, and that this policy should be affirmed not merely as that of one political party but with the concurrence of all."

This is a weighty pronouncement, and I have tried to follow out its implications in my own way.

It is on this account that further and more detailed principles are needed.* We have one of them already to hand in the League Covenant, which expressly envisages the Mandatory Powers exerting their authority until, and indeed in order that, the native population shall become capable of self-government. I am perfectly

* These pages were written before the publication of the recent Colonial Office White Paper on Native Policy in Africa, which sets forth to define the detailed principles of policy—precisely as here suggested. The subject is of such importance, however, and the White Paper's treatment of the question in many ways so different, that I make no apologies for the appearance of the present article.

aware of the fact that a great many people regard this as "mere eye-wash." But we have put our national signature to the Treaty which embodies the promises and it lies upon us as a solemn obligation. Those on the spot, especially those unconnected with Government, are indeed preponderantly against the idea, and against the possibility of its realisation. The usual shift for avoiding the obligation is a simple and natural one. It is to assert that it will be an extremely long time before native peoples are even approximately ready for self-government (somewhere about the Greek Kalends, it is often hoped and hinted), and that meanwhile the best thing is merely to go on governing them by the methods that have been found effective in the past for keeping subject races in their place.

It is precisely here, however, that we need to make our vague general principles more precise—to work out their consequences and set them down in official black-and-white. Throughout we can and indeed must make the assumption that the language of the Covenant about Mandated Territories expresses the best opinion of the nations upon the treatment and the future of native populations under white control, and that accordingly we should endeavour to apply it to all other similar territories that happen not to be mandated. The points on which dispute is now most violent and practice most divergent, and on which guiding principles are therefore most urgently needed, seem to me to be as follows.

First, which is more important—the profitable investment of outside capital, or the development of a prosperous native population with its own economic basis and its own stable social system? Wherever capital has been poured into an African territory, it naturally, though often unconsciously and automatically, seeks to answer this question in its own interests. It is a commonplace of electioneering for the Legislative Council in Kenya, for instance, for candidates to ask what would happen to the millions sunk in European estates if natives were to be allowed to plant coffee, or encouraged by Government to grow cotton. The question is made even more pressing when chartered companies administer large areas, as in parts of Portuguese Territory, or when, as in the Belgian Congo, special bodies are organised, under a certain degree of government control, but primarily as instruments of private capital, to exploit the resources of particular areas.

The second point is this: Should native production for export be discouraged or encouraged? This is often bound up with our first question, but there are many remote areas where it needs to be answered on its own merits.

The third concerns the destination of money derived from direct native taxation. When the appropriate deduction has been made

for general administrative services, should any of the proceeds of native taxes be devoted to any purpose save the direct advancement of native interests?

The fourth is education. Are we to aim at widespread or universal education for the native peoples? If so, are they to be given a mainly technical education, or are all the resources of Western knowledge, thought and skill to be thrown open to them, for those to profit who can? This, too, is by no means an idle question. We might expect the bulk of settlers to want native education to be merely technical and useful; this has almost always been the attitude of property-owners in bulk to an uneducated labouring class, irrespective of all differences of colour or race. But even the Phelps-Stokes Commission which was sent across to look at African education through American eyes, in spite of its disinterestedness and of all the benefit and the raising of standards which it secured, did not escape the prevalent idea. Its recommendations have in some quarters been criticised as recalling the methods of Mr. Squeers; and even if this be unjust, it remains true that its constant stressing of the need for "community adaptation" and the rather elusive "character training" can, unless these terms are properly defined and amplified, be interpreted as meaning that native education should recall the brands of education so familiar in Europe in the early and middle nineteenth century, disguised to "fit the labouring classes to their station in life," to "train them in habits of industry and piety" as Hannah More put it, and in fact to increase their docility and their output in the God-appointed *status quo*.

The fifth point is political and administrative. In a country with a great numerical preponderance of natives, should questions involving native interests ever be decided by the votes of an elected assembly on which natives are not adequately represented?

The sixth also concerns administration, but primarily native administration. Should native chiefs and councils be given a generous degree of responsibility and freedom in regard to local administration; or should they be kept as far as possible in leading-strings, with very little power to act save as cogs in a prescribed train of Government machinery, and with the minimum of financial, moral, and intellectual responsibility?

The seventh concerns land. Should there be some principle irrevocably reserving certain areas or amounts of land for native occupation; or should it be in the power of Governors or of the Crown to alter the amount or the boundaries as they think fit?

The eighth also concerns land. Should the system of native land tenure be such as to make it possible for an individual cultivator to profit himself and his descendants by the improvements he

has made? At present most tribal systems of tenure make this impossible; while mere grants of freehold land, even if safeguarded against transfer to men of other races, may produce a system of native landlordism under which the tenant gets all the worst of the bargain.

And the ninth concerns labour. Is it justifiable to employ any form of forced labour? and if so, is it justifiable to employ such labour on private estates, or solely for governmental or communal purposes?

A native policy, to be a policy and not a pious sentiment, should make some definite pronouncement of principle on each of these points. My own reactions to these questions (which are here volunteered simply as the logical consequence to my mind of the facts and impressions which came my way during four months spent in East Africa) are somewhat as follows:

(1) The first question, as to the possible conflict between the claims of native development and of white private interests, I should answer as follows: In tropical areas where there is a large preponderance of natives over whites the development of a stable and prosperous native social system is the prime duty of colonial powers. This implies that the recruitment of labour to satisfy immigrant settlers or outside capital should never be permitted to dislocate the social life of the native areas, by withdrawing too great a proportion of the able-bodied men, as the demands of the settlers' farms have admittedly done in parts of Kenya, or as the demands of the mines appear to be doing in parts of Rhodesia. Attempts are being made to put this principle into practice in the Belgian Congo by laying down that in each village or district a certain proportion of able-bodied men shall always be left behind to get on with their own work. I do not know to what extent it has proved possible to carry out the regulation in practice.

Another way of ensuring the continuity of native social life is to transplant whole villages, men, women, and children, to the neighbourhood where labour is required. This, too, is being attempted in parts of the Congo; the Dutch have adopted the principle in order to colonise under-populated Sumatra from overcrowded Java; the squatter system in Kenya, whereby natives can occupy and cultivate parts of settlers' estates on condition of giving at least six months' labour in each year to their white landlords, is a move in the same direction, and could be developed so as to give a full realisation of our principle.

(2) Both as corollary of this, and as an answer to my second question, I would have it laid down that every encouragement should be given to natives to raise their agricultural production, including production for export. There are a few crops which

for some time to come at least will be unsuitable for native production, chiefly on account of the need for great capital outlay, long years of waiting for returns, and large-scale organisation. Such, for instance, are sisal and tea. The level of skill and foresight needed to grow certain crops may also be above native reach. This is the plea put forward in Kenya to prevent coffee-growing by natives. It may thus be necessary to discourage or prohibit the growing of certain crops by natives; but no body of local opinion, liable to pressure from all kinds of vested and speculative interests should induce the Secretary of State to abstain from exercising his powers of control in these matters, since no native policy can be adequate which does not take full account of native production.

The growing of produce for export by natives is desirable for one thing, since with most crops the experience of Uganda and the West Coast shows that this is the quickest way of utilising the country's agricultural possibilities to supply the needs of the world, and also the way involving least overhead charges, and least waste of energy and capital. In Nigeria, for instance, most natives grow food crops for their own use, and in addition some crops for sale. Even should the market slump, they are self-supporting, unlike the European planter who in like case is ruined. It is also desirable since increase of general native prosperity is essential for the development of any proper social system for Africa, any permanent rise in the natives' standards of health and housing, education, and general living. It should thus be encouraged as a general factor in social improvement, as well as for purely economic reasons.

(3) My third question related to the allocation of native tax. In regard to this point, I believe that financial statements should always be so framed that not only the amount of money raised by direct native taxation should be immediately ascertainable, not only the total amounts spent on different services, but also the amounts, within each service or department, spent in native areas and for specifically native purposes. In the second place, the system in force in Tanganyika and Nigeria should always be adopted, of returning to the local native authorities a certain considerable proportion of the tax collected, to be spent by them (after paying the salaries of the chief and other members of the native administration) for such purposes—schools, roads, agriculture, water-supply, or what not—as they think fit. This is far better than the plan usually adopted in Kenya of having local cesses for special purposes like native education.

Thirdly, the principle should be laid down that the proceeds of direct native taxation should not be employed for any purposes save administrative expenses and the direct advancement of native interests. At the moment, for instance, in Kenya direct native taxation

is in the form of a hut-tax of 12s. per hut (i.e. 12s. for each adult man *and* for each of his wives), or for detribalised natives, a poll-tax of 12s. Europeans pay a poll-tax of 30s. and an education tax of 30s.—£3 in all. The government's expenditure on native education in 1925 is stated to have worked out at about 2¼d. per head of white population; while that on white education was over £2 per head of white population. This is a disproportion of 200 to 1, which is raised to over 400 to 1 if we take the cost per child of school age. It seems obvious that the natives are being made to contribute to the education of settlers' children. While it is, of course, true that many settlers find it to their interest to establish native schools on their estates, this contribution of theirs to native education is not compulsory. If the figures were available, we should undoubtedly find that the natives were also contributing one-sidedly to the superior medical facilities and agricultural research and advice available to the Europeans in the colony.

(4) My fourth question concerned native education. To it I can see only one answer. It should be laid down as a fixed principle that the development of native education should rank with the development of native health and material prosperity as the prime charges on the Colonial Powers; and equally definitely that all educational facilities, general and liberal as well as technical and utilitarian, should, in due proportion, be provided for natives. A general all-round education should thus be the basis, and both specialised vocational training and a higher liberal education should be available for those who can profit by them.

(5) The fifth question to be answered concerned the control of native interests by local bodies of other race. On this it should be laid down that native interests should never be at the mercy of the majority vote of an elected body composed wholly or mainly of non-natives. The only difficulty that is likely to occur in applying this principle in its straightforward form would be if "self-government," in its proper sense of responsible government, should be granted to Kenya Colony, or to its "white" highland area. This is the aim which the bulk of the white settlers have in mind, and it is the natural end-point towards which all extensions of parliamentary institution—*via* the stages of unofficial majority and representative assembly—must inevitably tend. In Southern Rhodesia there has been an attempt to combine incompatibilities by granting what is virtually responsible government by the white settlers on the ordinary elective parliamentary plan, but superposing upon it the check of a representative of the Crown with powers of veto on certain subjects. It may safely be prophesied that within a few decades these powers of veto will have lapsed into desuetude. Responsible government by a white electorate in fact means the

handing over of native interests out of the care of Whitehall into the hands of the local white settlers. (When, as in Kenya, an Indian electorate exists too, the question is complicated, but not essentially altered.) There remains as palliative of this the granting of the franchise to educated Africans as well—equal rights for all men of equal civilisation. But this, if we penetrate far enough into the future, will eventually mean a large majority of native voters and presumably of native members of the assembly: and a parliament of whites, browns, and blacks is not calculated to promote peaceful interracial development.

The Hilton Young Commission, recognising these difficulties, and concluding definitely that "there can be no question of responsible government in these territories until the natives themselves can share in the responsibility," throw out suggestions in a different direction. They first point out that parliamentary systems are really alien to the native mind, and that advisory councils are much more likely to be representative of native opinion than the men of professional politician type whom an ordinary electoral system would bring to the front; this suggests that political institutions for natives should be developed along lines of their own.

Secondly, they remind us (page 84) that "responsible government as understood in the light of British experience, depends on representative institutions which are founded on the basis of a single homogeneous community." And since it is exceedingly unlikely that European, Indian, and African will, within the next few centuries at least, blend into a homogeneous community, they do not envisage the granting to the immigrant population of responsible government with the consequent lifting of the Secretary of State's control over native policy. This would mean that the white settlers must be content to see in any unofficial majority, without representative executive institutions and without full self-government, the utmost goal of their hopes. And it may well be that it is along lines quite other than those of traditional British parliamentarism that there will be found the best solution for the problems confronting white settlers in those exceptional areas like Kenya where they must always be in a marked minority.

At the moment, however, the real difficulties crop up where a Legislative Council exists whose powers are nominally only advisory to the Governor, but on which the elected unofficial members can actually exert a strong influence. The tendency in such a case has been twofold. There has been a tendency towards losing sight of the advisory function of the assembly, in which most subjects are debated on party lines between official "Government" and unofficial "Opposition." And there has been a tendency for the unofficial members, as the interests which they represent become

more powerful, to influence the administration on important questions of policy almost as definitely as if they possessed a voting majority. A striking instance of this was the holding-up of the Kenya Native Lands Trust Bill in deference to the hostility of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council. It seems clear that this Bill, so essential to the allaying of native unrest and suspicion, would never have found its way on to the Statute Book unless the overruling powers possessed by the Colonial Office had been looming in the background. The remedy for such *de facto* changes in the function of advisory bodies would seem to be not only to retain the salutary powers of final decision now enjoyed by the home authorities, but to increase on the Legislative Councils the number of members representative of native interests, and perhaps in due course of time to give elective representation to natives themselves.

(6) The sixth question concerns the responsibility of native chiefs and councils. Here liberal opinion at least is unanimous. The local native bodies should be given as much responsibility as they can stand. They should be made to feel that they are truly responsible for law, for order, for the details of local administration; and they should be encouraged, though never forced, to embark on progressive schemes for improving the health and prosperity of the community, such as hospitals, roads, experimental farms, seed stores, etc. But for the time being at least there must be careful if tactful inspection by the European administrator, and the fullest possible machinery for allowing appeals from native courts to the district officer or to white courts. The principle is not the principle of dyarchy, with its two sharply separated categories of "transferred" and "reserved" subjects. It is the principle of allowing to native councils the maximum possible amount of responsibility over all subjects, but reserving a certain degree of control over all of them in the persons of the European administrators. It is the principle of learning through your own experience and efforts, even at the cost of making mistakes.

(7) The seventh question concerns the delimitation of white and native areas. In most parts of Africa we are irrevocably committed to the dual policy of encouraging some degree of white settlement *pari passu* with native development. The universal experience wherever any land is alienated to the private ownership of Europeans or other immigrants, is that suspicion and unrest are eventually engendered among the natives unless the area reserved for native occupation is definitely fixed in some way, either by delimiting boundaries once and for all, or by making a proviso that not more than a certain total amount of land may be alienated. This principle, too, should be formally asserted. In regard both

to this question of land, however, and to the preceding question of white self-government, Kenya provides a special problem, by virtue of the comparatively large numbers of private white settlers and the compact area of the colony's land which they occupy. On general principles it is inevitable that this area will come to enjoy an increasing measure of self-government. Indeed, there is always the possibility that the territory may be split into two parts—a native Protectorate, organised and administered after the fashion of Uganda or Tanganyika; and a Colony consisting of the alienated lands and some of the unalienated Crown Land, in whose affairs the white settlers would have a preponderant say.

The problem of natives within this "white" area, whether it become officially separated or no, will of necessity be a special one. It seems to me impossible to envisage a whole territory or special area of Government where natives would have no rights in land, and it would be in the interests of the settlers as well as of the natives to regularise and extend some type of squatter system. Accordingly for this and any other similar exceptional areas of white preponderance—or, I should say, predominance, for natives even here would still be in a great numerical majority—some such exceptional principle as regularised squatting should be enunciated.

(8) The next question concerns the method of land tenure. It would seem quite impossible, as Lugard points out at some length, to find any single method which would be universally applicable in theory, or could be universally enforced in practice. However, there appear to be three principles which could justifiably be laid down, and the adoption of which would materially help towards solving the problem. The first would limit change at one end. It is the general and obvious principle that any change should, as far as possible, take existing native customs as its basis, and grow naturally out of them. The second limits it at the other end. It is that absolute freehold is undesirable. In the first place no system should permit natives to sell land to Europeans or Indians, or to any natives not subject to the local native jurisdiction; and in the second place, we should make it impossible for land speculation and unrestricted landlordism to arise in Africa after we have experienced in our own civilisation the evils that are inherent in them. The third principle prescribes the general direction in which development should move. It is that we should aim at reasonable security of tenure to the cultivator, and at securing to him and his heirs the advantage of any improvements which he may make. Only so can we discourage the wasteful system of shifting cultivation, while at the same time encouraging individual enterprise and preventing exploitation by the owners of land rights

with the resultant growth of a class of landless labourers. Systems of this kind have already been introduced with marked success in various parts of Africa, such as the Transkei.

(9) Finally we come to the question of labour. All are agreed in principle that slavery and forced labour are wrong and must be prohibited. The difficulty arises in applying the principle. To recruit men at the point of the bayonet and make them work whether for wages or for nothing, is clearly intolerable. But what of imposing a native tax in money, when conditions are such that the money can only be earned by natives leaving their own villages and crops to work for hire under Government or private employers? Is this not a method of forcing labour, none the less efficient for being indirect? Sir Harry Johnston, in imposing a tax in Uganda, frankly recognised this fact. And in Kenya it has in the past been repeatedly underlined by those in authority. This "moral suasion" exerted by Government officials to secure black labour for white farms has now been abandoned by explicit command of the Secretary of State; but the demand for labour is still a crying one and still exerts its pressure in one way or another throughout the Colony. As a matter of fact, in many parts of Uganda the old tribal custom was that men should engage on communal work for one month in the year; and in various districts it is still in force. Settlers in Kenya are wont to remark ironically on the fact that this system arouses no comment, whereas anything of the sort in Kenya would, they say, at once provoke a storm of questions in Parliament.

The question is a difficult one; but here again it would seem possible to lay down principles which will safeguard all interests. There is no fundamental objection to labour being demanded in place of money as a form of taxation. But if so, there must be some moderate maximum fixed, say one or at most two months in the year; and labour must not be called out during the "rush" seasons of native agriculture—planting and harvest. Further, the system should be applied all round, and no discrimination made, as was done in the Compulsory Labour Regulations in Kenya, which only decreed compulsory work for Government as the lot of those who had not worked for private employers during at least three months of the preceding year. Either compulsory work should be entirely for Government; or else a choice should be possible between work for Government and work for private employers, on the same scale of wages. The complete failure of the compulsory labour sections of the Glen Grey Act in South Africa should be a useful warning to other territories.

Secondly, there is work on special undertakings of benefit to the native community. As instances of these may be cited the clearing of bush in tsetse areas in Tanganyika; or the work on the exten-

sion of the Uganda Railway from Jinja to Entebbe. It would seem that whenever exceptional schemes which are urgently necessary for native development can only be carried through by the aid of an exceptionally large labour supply, and the native authorities are so convinced of their utility as to volunteer to make themselves responsible for getting the men, we shall not be infringing any sacred principle of liberty in embarking upon them.

There remains the subtler problem inherent in the indirect forcing of labour by means of taxation. Here the remedy against possible injustice is to lay down as principle that, so long as the tax is paid, there shall be no one-sided pressure on men to earn it as wage-earners on white estates rather than as producers on their own lands (a point stressed by Lord Lugard); and, as corollary of this, that adequate facilities shall be given to natives to earn money by their own efforts on their own lands. There seems no reason why principles of this degree of detail should not be laid down by Parliament or by the Colonial Office. If they could be, they would ensure that native policy in our different African territories would always be moving in the same general direction. At the moment it is trending in one direction in one territory, in a quite different direction in another. This may not seem serious at the moment, but it has two grave disadvantages. Federation may be desirable; and it makes federation difficult. Much more serious, it means that one day, sooner or later, as education spreads and political self-consciousness grows, the natives will begin to ask themselves and to ask us, their white trustees or masters, why within a single region of the Empire there exist such differences in the status and the treatment of native Africans. And we shall not be able to give any satisfactory answer.

JULIAN HUXLEY.

SIBYL AND SPHINX: NEWMAN AND MANNING IN THE '80s.*

THE Sibyl was an important but difficult person. Apollo had hard work to make her talk intelligibly: her books were esteemed rather than quoted. Then she suffered eclipse. Scholars said she never existed. Then at least her oracles reappeared. Not a treatise on the proper period but discusses them. As for the Sphinx, it impressed my boyhood. Why did Herodotus not mention it? Too frightened, I used to think. When I saw it, I was not impressed! Perhaps neither was he. "Just a very large Sphinx. . . ." But when my revolting guide showed me how the Government had begun to mend its wig, but had stopped, and added, with a genuine shudder, "It is not good to touch it," I believed again. The Sphinx must have thrilled a thousand generations. This tawdry conceit is due to "Sibyl" and "Sphinx" having honestly appeared in my mind when I began to think once more of Newman and of Manning. Newman, oracular, allusive, often scattered his thoughts like the Sibyl so annoyingly throwing her leaves over the windy cave; he, like her, said some things so devastatingly to the point that the recurrent Æneas, worshipping or defying, stood paralysed. Then he experienced a relative eclipse. Then he shone out on a wider world; first a French one, then a German one; even England, that loves not ideas, is now, I fancy, better prepared for him. But Manning is still a puzzle. His funeral rivalled Wellington's: but his star at once went wan; and Purcell's book suggested that well might it do so. A superficial, unscrupulous, posthumously negligible man. As he sat there very old, a mere skeleton, by the roaring fire, of what was he really thinking? At least he was not like the Sphinx in so far as it squats and smiles at the augustly sailing sun, providing a puzzle only so long as you forget that it is not thinking at all. Manning had a mind: what were his real thoughts? Still, perhaps, a mystery.

Do these men belong to the 'eighties at all? Yes, for it is as "Cardinal" that one remembers them, and their Hats came in 1879 and 1875, and thenceforward their influence developed apart from their activities. What was happening in the Sibylline cave at Edgbaston? Dean Church (vol. ii of his *Occasional Papers*) writes of "Newman's Naturalness" and is said so to have supplemented Wilfrid Ward's *Life of Newman* as to leave nothing over. An old friend of Newman's, who forbids me to mention his name, agrees:

* Abbreviated from a paper read to the Royal Society of Literature, April 30th.

Newman carried the art of being natural to perfection. He was singular in nothing. He took his food, his recreation, went about his ordinary duties, conversed without any mannerisms whatsoever. He had no foibles, no crotchets. The best proof of this is the absence of good stories about him such as there are about Manning and Ullathorne, for a good story often implies some effort on the part of its subject to make his personality felt. What surprises me . . . is Newman's patience under annoyances that try old people, such as noise, being kept waiting, forwardness on the part of young people, and the absence of any demand for small attentions to his comfort. As he was, I believe, naturally quick-tempered, he must have disciplined himself to an unusual degree to be so habitually courteous and gentle in all circumstances. As his strength failed, he was never peevish or querulous. He was spared any great physical pain but not the deprivations of old age. He could not say Mass, and spent long in trying to learn by heart the Mass 'for the blind,' for he could no more read; he lost even his sense of touch and could not use his rosary."

I rejoice to quote what suffices wholly to efface the Gummidge-caricature of Newman, moping his last years out, twitching with nerves, wincing beneath criticism, lamenting life-long failure. Newman, sensitive of course, even petulant and tart enough on paper, never collapsed like that. On the contrary—he knew himself a Cardinal, and as such officially, justifiably, able to act as a force within the Church. Newman, now Cardinal, could, at least technically, become Pope. In gentle banter they asked what, as Pope, he would attempt—one Pope had been elected at 93, and had achieved much! He said he would appoint commissions, historical and scriptural, which should prepare more work for his successor. This was true to himself. All his life he had freely suggested to other people work he thought they could do, but also generously assisted them to do it. Newman's "Oxford-complex" may irritate one: but a fine feature of the best Oxford is the self-effacing readiness of its scholars to put their treasures at the disposal of those who possibly may profit by them. Newman wrote letters, read manuscripts, added tiny touches that vitalised dead pages, lifted the mediocre into excellence, for all of which he could obtain, not glory, but gratitude and affection. During this time he did, indeed, a little patristic work, and published an article on inspiration less fortunate in its formulas than in its principles, and even had parts of his own works translated into Latin so as to spread their ideas with no risk of mistranslation into foreign languages that he could not control, for he knew them slightly or not at all. But all this was "apostolic." Always realist, he visualised those many minds gravitating towards the Catholic Fact, and then rebuffed by some departmental misunderstanding or ignorance. He guessed, too, the strain on many a Catholic mind when new know-

ledge seemed to set away from, or against, the Faith. He wished to feed more human facts and thoughts into the Church's Mind, so that her own eternal Thought might work on them, and that she might hand back her supernatural, universal Truth without anyone's being able to allege that she lacked understanding or even sympathy. Newman had always been luminously conscious of God and of Self. But the two interacted. Infallible as was God's revelation given through Christ, authoritatively proclaimed by the Church, God, Christ, or Church did not profess to do the whole work instead of man, albeit they acted on behalf of man. The whole process of enlightening, sanctifying, saving was co-operative, vital, and so developmental.

He was then like a man who could live in a beloved country, describe it, and make maps of it. He did make many a working picture of the Church; but that was second-best. He could, to make maps, theologically correct, yet two-dimensional. So, too, man, he could provide a chart anatomically accurate. But he preferred the harder task of communicating life by means of his own life, and of portraying the half-fluid, never-the-same actually-living man, and, indeed, not a floating, evanescent God, for God is immovable, but man's mysterious knowledge of God in which the finite and the enduring co-exist. Hence, both the *Essay on Development* and the *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (note the words "Essay" in both cases, rarely quoted in the latter). He exposed himself thus to every shaft. In the *Grammar* he wished to describe the way in which a living man—not a discarnate mind—assents. He valued psychological textbooks, but was working at something different. Compare ethics. Textbooks necessarily deal with the "four-square" man, minus heredity, environment, temperament, crystallised mentality, unknown yet ever-operative habits of will and emotion. The confessor, dealing with one man, will never weaken as to principle, but will be imaginative; gentle without softness, flexible yet not invertebrate; firm, not rigid; comforting, not commonplace. What the confessor would fain do for the individual—suffering, straining, vibrant will, Newman was doing for the mind—no loose-floating angel-mind, but engaged in trying to know with ever better certainty, both helped and hindered by the data of concrete things: for these both hold the truth and hide it; are its vehicle and veil.

The unaccustomed therefore called him fanatic and sceptic; géométricien, impressionist; Kantian, Cartesian, scholastic; intellectualist, voluntarist, though the last word was not then (I think) accessible. But later, when lop-sided philosophies of will came into being, especially about twenty years ago in France, they tried to capture Newman, and their opponents sought to have him con-

demned in Rome. How wise was Rome not to do so! Such modernisms are, really, sceptic: but in the 'eighties, Newman, in sympathetic discussion with Mr. Wilfrid Ward, was in sharp dispute with Principal Fairbairn, who held that Newman had become Catholic as a *refuge* from scepticism. He reopened thus the topic at the back of the *Grammar*.

As for "Development," remember that Newman came before Darwin. "Development" in doctrine was familiar to Catholic thinkers: the Fathers, especially certain Greek-Oriental ones, were full of it. But since the fifteenth-century religious revolutions (immutability of doctrine has been more heavily emphasised. Development implies an *identity* that changes.) Yet in all men

irks the hope-against-hope that things are getting better . . . that the world is not haphazard, but rationalisable. Catholics would not have worried about "evolution" had not atheists in a hurry fastened on it to deny the existence of God and soul, and had not others scuttled on too fast and too far. They transported Darwin's "evolution" into every part of human history. Rigid laws of progress were formulated, all of which have had to be revised. Meanwhile, anyone who talked of Development was suspected. Those who said that Newman, in the *Grammar*, was trying to show how you could think you were believing when you were not, here said that he was trying to show how contemporary Christianity was identical with primitive Christianity when it obviously wasn't. Despite Newman's careful rules for discriminating between what developed yet remained the same, and what changed into something specifically different, French Modernism, while it still troubled his grimace as orthodox, insanely coupled Newman's name with that of Loisy. But just as he loved to watch the vague perception, surmise, even the clear "notional" assent, becoming the "real" assent of the whole man, without dreaming that the Intellect was not specific in essence and underivable from matter, so, watching history, he delighted in the interplay of forces, pagan, Jewish, Christian, and to see the solid yet exquisitely iridescent growing thing: but he would have shrunk appalled—his whole life, anti-liberalist in fibre, would have quivered back in pain—from the suggestion that *therefore* no separate, super-natural influx entered the world in the Mosaic and in the Christian Revelation.

Here, then, is Newman, not Sibylline merely, but prophetic, as the Hebrew prophets were, who saw in contemporary events a future, proximate and remote, and to it spoke. Ours is the remoter future to which Newman spoke. During these years a vision was forming itself—a vision of scarlet and silver, of fragility and force, of spirituality almost fantastically emphasised by the proximity of Edgbaston to the city even then heading towards the word and

idea of "Brummagem." Not the anxious or exhilarated Newman of the Tracts; nor the restless, ever-defeated Newman of the Dublin University or the Oxford Oratory; nor the dazzling Newman of the *Apologia*—none of these had the tacit yet pervasive influence of the Edgbaston Newman of the 'eighties. If (as I hold) science itself now helps us to distinguish between the carnal, and the discarnate, and the incarnate: between what is cosmically natural, and the super-natural, and yet would have us detect a harmony between these, harmony in process of construction—why, perhaps no one can now help us so well as Newman both to perceive it and construct it.

Who but looks forward to a philosophical survey including Ionian thought, Platonic, Aristotelian, later Alexandrian philosophy, Thomistic and post-Kantian, yes, and Indian, Persian, Hebrew, Arabian thought? From none of this can the nineteenth century be disconnected. In so vital a series Newman must have his place—“vital,” because he would not be defying, nor even juxtaposing merely, to it, but born of it, re-vivifying it, vitalising us. Perhaps the work of Fr. Przywara contains for the first time an orderly display of material, patristic, mediæval, and Newmanic, sufficient to inspire the comprehensive genius whom we need.*

Mr. J. L. May, in his *Cardinal Newman* (1929), says that Manning was a man of his own day, and died with it. And Mr. Denig Gwynn has recently suggested that after all Wiseman was the greatest of those three Cardinals. Who can estimate such things? At least Wiseman would have agreed that without Manning he would have been defrauded of half the fruits of his labour; and again, without Manning Cardinal Vaughan, who followed him, would have been in a thousand ways crippled or enchained. Newman was Vaughan a mere follower. His connection with his predecessor was organic, nor was he degenerate. I venerate Vaughan. When my daily Breviary bids me invoke “all holy and humble men of heart,” of Vaughan and Challoner do I think. Still, had Vaughan

* See his *J. H. Cardinal Newman: Christentum: Ein Aufbau aus seinen Werken: 8 Bändchen*; Herder, Freiburg, 1922. A patristic scholar; ardent admirer of Newman. His German is said to be such as to puzzle his compatriots and acute critics. His ideal is visible in the peroration of a chapter called: *Kant-Newman-Thomas: in Dringen der Gegenwart*, Augsburg 1922. “By his unifying conception of God’s relation with the world (*Gott-Welt-Verhältnis*) the great Aquinas not only first created a Polarity of Thought, which thereby inspired all subsequent polarities, and therewith, Newman’s organic polarisation of intellect and will, but this polarity of Newman’s is, taken as item in the history of thought, nothing save the fresh renaissance of the scholastic polarity of intellect and will. In this personal union of the great thought of the Middle Ages and the great thought of modern times, in this organic union of St. Thomas and Newman, as opposed to the suicidal alternatives—St. Thomas or Newman—proper to the Modernist-Integralist disease . . . is expressed, in a personal symbol, the Mission of Catholicism to Philosophy—*Tibi Dicere*—I say unto thee, Arise!”

followed Errington, not Manning, heaven knows what he could have done, despite the humility and even holiness of Errington. When Newman heard of Manning’s election, he saw in it a proof that Rome did not fear converts as such, and recognised Manning’s power of winning men when he chooses—“witness the election of himself!”—“but whether he will care to win inferiors . . . I do not know.” Newman added that he personally always got on better with inferiors than superiors. This was not due to a need of flattery or homage; but I think it witnessed to a need of love, and that implied that he was able to love. Part of Manning’s sphinxish-ness issued into the dogma that love had been left out of him. The adequate symbol of this was the complete obliteration of his wife’s memory. The late Baron F. von Hügel gave publicity to what finished off that myth—Manning kept her letters, and took them nightly out of their shrine. But Manning’s method of control of self and of other men created the impression of unlovingness. Yet certainly he had pity. Read Canon E. St. John’s *Manning’s Work for the Children* (1929); recall his speeches against the Slave Traffic; remember that he solved the Dock Strike of 1889 by an appeal to decent emotions rather than by any very accurate knowledge of conditions. But could Manning have played with the baby (or the baby with him)? What would have been the effect of his arrival in a sailors’ club or sergeants’ mess when no crisis was on, and no speech required? Well, when someone said to him that “only” seventy children had been rescued, he exclaimed: “Only? But think! Seventy little children’s tears dried; seventy little children’s pains stopped; it is glorious!” And one day he had a Nonconformist minister, walking together, met a little boy. What is your father?” Manning asked. “A carpenter.” Manning was shaken to the soul. “I had met a carpenter’s son. My father was once a little servant like that boy. Oh,” he exclaimed, “most in tears, ‘what depths of love there were in Christ!’” So perhaps Manning possessed, but as a public personage could not show himself to show, the power of loving affectionately (different from love born just of pity or of will); and I think, even, that his seeming unlovingness towards Catholics really arose from his having been too bruised by what his acceptance of the Faith entailed. For the *Res Catholica* he would have made any sacrifice, and gladly; but as for the representatives of the Universal Thing, in his land, at his date, the sacrifice had cost too much for him to love them. He could not bring himself quite to love the poor little Catholic world into which he came, nor allow himself to love the cultured Anglican one that he had left. Hence he became, perhaps, less resentful (even afraid) of Oxford than Newman was hypno-

tised by it; no less deluded by his notion of a London Catholic University than Newman was by the chances of an Oxford Orator. War the lucid-minded Benedict XV wrote his Peace Note. We—in one point they *both* made the *same* mistake: the appetite for higher education. Manning remained as out-of-love with the hereditary Catholics as Newman learned to love them; yet you would have thought that Manning, the diplomat, though now the nations have acknowledged its justice, while they would have courted and won them, while Newman, delicate and cannot or will not apply it logically. Again, during the General Strike, Cardinal Bourne's statement on its injustice undoubtedly saved us from much tragedy especially in the North and in Wales: he forthwith balanced it by a sermon on the miners which those who fond of and loved by these sons of sober, patient, unassuming men control publicity were careful not to quote. Both documents, however, made themselves felt through the Catholic world, and would it were better realised what a difference that makes! Manning's influence in this department—less visible than Newman's because more co-operative—has been insufficiently studied or allowed for.

Yet the flow of Catholic life was continuous: Manning was not mere man of the moment, though perhaps we speak rather snobbishly of such an one. If the man fails his moment, there is gap and dislocation. No certainty of a substitute. The whole future may be affected by his failure. Manning took over the torch from one hereditary Catholic and handed it on to another, and small an incident, however, one might urge, affecting only England and England *then*! Newman is still alive, and internally suggest that Manning's indirect influence endures, and that the gravitation of his mind towards social problems and the mis-called "socialist" is well-known. Now Leo XIII began a series of social encyclicals in 1878 and wrote the last of them in 1901; but the supremely important one, *Rerum Novarum*, "of the condition of the working-classes," appeared in 1891. The Pope wrote to tell Manning that it was to arrive: he wrote again, anxiously about its translation. I am not sure how far Manning was in touch with Cardinal Mermillod, who, with his associates, prepared much of the material for Leo's letters; or with Ketteler or Albin de Mun. His correspondence went more towards Ireland and the United States, especially during the period of Henry George. St. Leo said that his 1880 encyclical was really Manning's. "It was he who gave me the idea of doing something for the slaves. It is a man of vast views, and his talk is full of suggestion. I have written this encyclical because of my conversations with him."

An American archbishop said that Manning's mind was an image of Leo's: not resplendent like Leo's, yet like it. Neither Pope nor Cardinal merely "sensed" the decline of privilege and authority, and tried to anticipate the debacle by "getting democracy on the side of the Church." Leo wrote what even English socialists hated; and who will accuse Manning of under-valuing authority? Even human? Each used eternal principles, balancing partial truths with supreme impartiality. Somewhat similarly, during the War the lucid-minded Benedict XV wrote his Peace Note. We said it was imposed by Berlin: Germany, Austria, and Turkey, that it was fabricated in Paris and Whitehall. Everywhere else the scales were too loaded for its perfect balance to be appreciated, though now the nations have acknowledged its justice, while they cannot or will not apply it logically. Again, during the General Strike, Cardinal Bourne's statement on its injustice undoubtedly saved us from much tragedy especially in the North and in Wales: he forthwith balanced it by a sermon on the miners which those who fond of and loved by these sons of sober, patient, unassuming men control publicity were careful not to quote. Both documents, however, made themselves felt through the Catholic world, and would it were better realised what a difference that makes! Manning's influence in this department—less visible than Newman's because more co-operative—has been insufficiently studied or allowed for. Ideas always underlie movements. Russia, for long unprolific in ideas, is now pumping more ideas into contemporary brains than any other country. Anyone who resents them will reflect that they must be countered by mind; crude as were the social ideas of the 'eighties, imperfect as was Manning's acquaintance with sheer facts, his mind, and Pope Leo's, can help to form a very useful mind to-day.

Manning did not publish much during the 'eighties. His *Pastime Papers* appeared posthumously in 1893. I confess to finding his ecclesiastical output dull. He was both conscientious and convinced; he taught his clergy and their flock. It is not here that you detect the "fire in his bones" rendering him incapable of keeping silent. The Sphinx, during the intolerable tedium of the centuries, must have said many a sound conventionality to its devotees. If towards his clergy Manning showed himself at once a humble servant and a very stern master, so that many an one found, like Francis Thompson, that his shoulder was "too high to lean thereby," yet his spiritual notes, and one category of writings, reveal what really was within him. He wrote on the Holy Spirit, and on the Heart of Christ. A Spirit, and a Heart. Here is the "fire"! Not the bland Eminence not really believing much in anything. No merely academic Authority, unsuffering, and not understanding pain. Why, the very immobility of the Sphinx suggests that it has pounced and is apt to do so again; and behind its suave smile there are teeth. Behind Manning's grim mask was plenty of passion. As for his letters, he wrote as he talked, vivaciously. "You ladies are torpedoes!" "Don't do that," said he, when someone picked up a pen he had dropped when writing (as usual) on his knee. "Life is too short to be

spent in picking up pens!" And he took another from a bundle by him. As for the letters, when written, he threw them on the floor. "Samuel Wilberforce," someone said, "when travelling by train, threw them into an open umbrella." "Ah—if he'd never done anything worse than that . . ." He liked Gregorian chant. "But think," they urged, "of the Roman churches!" "Yes; and look at the result! Victor Emmanuel in the Quirinal!" Neither in vivacity nor in tenderness, I think, did he fall short of Newman. But Newman, though needing to suppress many a poignant thing, did not occupy a place in which he had to suppress so much as Manning. Manning could not have let himself write the covering letters to the *Apologia*. Hence Manning, I feel, was irritated by Newman's self-expressiveness. "What is wrong with Newman," said Manning, "is temper, Temper, *Temper*!" His voice rose shrill and shriller. Newman had his violin: he had been wine-taster for his college. The memory will have amused him. Would Manning have frozen it away? I fear so. Yet in style each was lucid, dignified; yet each used at times deliberately a superfine "journalese." Newman, so English, yet so French-wise clear that you asked whether sentences so limpid could secrete any special meaning—Manning, English, too, yet so would-be Roman that at times you might think him Latin-minded . . . but—but—though when speaking Latin he chirped his *c*'s and so forth, the assembled Fathers smiled genially when he rose to orate in Rome. Each was irrevocably English.

Remember, then, that Manning, the organiser, the diplomat, wrote on the "Temporal" and on the "Interior" Mission of the Holy Ghost. About 1841 he learned that he hardly ever spoke of Him. Thenceforward he did so continually. "From that time I have never passed a day without acts of reparation to the Holy Ghost. . . . He has been the chief thought and devotion of my life . . . to Him I owe almost palpably everything." He was sure that this Spirit energised not only in the current of exterior events, but through human instruments! "It has been decided by the Holy Spirit and by Us." . . . Man is not animal merely, nor angel merely. Christ was not God spectrally disguised as man; nor man exceptionally like to God. True God; true man; one Person. Hence, too, the Church is truly Body-of-Christ. Manning's Notes and Diaries, then, show how well he saw—not, as Newman said of himself, God and his self alone, but God, his Self, and the World. With that world he had to deal—but divinely. If at times he saw Newman as eiderdowned in Edgbaston, volatilised in literature, mummified in patristics, exhaled into compromises, hints, adjustments, he saw himself as "fated" to be ever in the limelight, on the platform, defending the unpopular cause, concerned with tac-

tics, strategies, the map, because he perceived so clearly that Christ was walking not only on Gennesareth, let alone Indus and Nile, but Thames. I can imagine nothing more "Sphinx-like" to the average observer than a man who *really* believes in God, in His Spirit, in Eternity, and *really* is cognisant of limited, material events, and undertakes to cope with the latter by means of and in view of the former. He will be thought visionary, or hypocrite. Manning was neither. Newman sat there, then, "attenuated and frail, yet magical, magnetic, electrical . . . elusive and subtle," yet "to the very end the almost savage foe of cant, humbug, and untruth; a man of silvery whispers, swift glances, birdlike exquisiteness of touch and presence, yet human, homely, playful; majestic, too, quelling and imperial." We can find him best, perhaps, in the rhetoric and ecstasy, colloquial even, and sublime, of the *Dream of Gerontius*, written so long before the august approach of Death called him to his own last cleansing. I was a child when Manning and the Duke of Clarence, heir to the throne, died on the same day: yet I am sure I felt how Manning's principedom was that of the never-failing dynasty, and at Harrow I was to spend hours reading his essays together with the *Apologia*. I met with imperishable ideas: also with what seemed to me even then to be queer, stiffly-jointed, waste of time. This I forget: but not the ideas, nor the men. Indeed, I was attracted to Manning, yet for long made the customary mistakes about the two massive Cardinals between whom Manning stalked so aquiline and ascetic. Who but thought that the florid Wiseman—sensitive as a child, warm-hearted and self-sacrificing in the midst of much physical pain, had, indeed, plenty of the "Blougram" in him? Vaughan looked magnificent and "haughty": no one, till his *Life* was written, had the faintest conception of his spirit of interior humility, penance, and prayer. No one (they say) ever heard Manning laugh—certainly no hearty laugh such as would send Wiseman rocking. But perhaps too few guessed into how tender a smile those rectilinear lips could shape themselves. I must then think that he was really a great man, deserving none of the *petty* words that have been spoken of him; but a great man, maybe, who had not fully learnt to manage his own self quite perfectly. For where the Spirit is, where there is a Heart, there will be ease even in anguish, sweetness even in majesty. The clashings must be now resolved; but during his preface-to-life we cannot catch, because he had not made, the full harmonisation.

C. C. MARTINDALE, S.J.

THE AGRICULTURAL SHOW.

IN our part of the world there is an agricultural show every summer. It is a great event, perhaps the chiefest of the year, for it is made the excuse for many delights quite extraneous to the main purpose, such as love-making, gambling, and social intercourse. It is discussed for months beforehand, and for weeks afterwards every feature of it is recalled. All classes of the community are interested—the farmer and the squire, the caterer, the gardener, the dairyman and baker, the nurseryman and seedsman, the cattleman and shepherd, the dealers in agricultural machinery and garden requisites, the horticulturist and florist, the cheese-monger, the bee-keeper, the hunting-man and dog-fancier, the poultryman, the swineherd. But it is useless to try to make a list, for it is endless. The shops of the neighbouring town close early, and every car and charabanc for miles round is requisitioned. It sometimes pelts with rain, but this year it was exceptionally fine. Indeed, it was a lovely summer's day, and the stretch of English country, where the show was held, was looking its best. The scene was laid in a vast amphitheatre surrounded by hills clothed in wood, the pheasant preserves of that great nobleman and Lord Lieutenant of the County, the Duke of Garth. There must have been twenty thousand people gathered there, pushing, sweating, gesticulating, gazing, drinking, chatting, shouting, pondering, courting, laughing, swearing, or resting.

The agricultural show is the homage of man to the harvest of the Earth. The heroine of the day is the bountiful English soil, the rich loam, brown and red, that has given birth to and nourished every plant and fruit and flower to be seen, that has fattened with its crops every beast and bird on view. What a patient, wonderful mother she is, this fecund English soil, deep and fragrant with her thick turf and wealth of many grasses! How old she is, but untiring, the mother and sustainer of all the men and women collected there to do her honour. Just as the calf or kid seizes upon the udder of its dam, or a child the breast of its parent, so do men pounce upon this golden earth and wrench their living from it, their very sustenance and nutriment. No wonder they take pride in the fruits of their labours. Many of these are beautiful, some indispensable, nearly all of them valuable, giving pleasure or special service to the community at large.

Every village for miles round had sent its human contingent that afternoon, for each had its exhibitor and every exhibitor his champions and his friends. The police had all they could do to keep the narrow roads clear for the traffic and the traffic from impeding the streams of pedestrians. The Railway Company had

arranged special trains for excursionists at a distance, and hundreds of motor vehicles carried the rest. Eagerness was depicted on every countenance. Some hoped to sell goods, others to buy, while not a few expected to reap honour. Many had come for the sheer joy of the holiday or to suck other people's brains, while a small section of the crowd were there to relieve the rest of any spare cash they might happen to be carrying. One man was standing by a tall weighing-machine, inviting the passers-by to try their luck. You paid twopence and the owner of the mechanism guessed your weight. You then stepped on, and if he were within four pounds of the correct figure, you received a souvenir—a gilt ring of incredibly base metal. He was a quaint character and his method highly diverting. If his victim were a woman, he would place his hand on her shoulder in paternal fashion to guide her into the proper position facing the machine, and then, with an atrocious leer at the rest of the crowd, would, as it were casually and almost accidentally, let his hand drop behind and sweep swiftly over the more fundamental portions of her anatomy. The woman herself was unconscious of the manoeuvre, but not so the onlookers who were always delighted. It gave his reckoning a solid foundation to build upon, for the chief mass of the human body is centred in those regions, and from their ascertained size the approximate load could be worked out. In the case of a man, the method was singular and original. The exponent of this exact science, facing the candidate, would place his hand behind the fellow's legs and rapidly feel one of his calves. The result was astonishing. In eight cases out of ten he would guess within two or three pounds, in several would hit the exact weight, and the only considerable margin of error he was guilty of was when a small child came forward. Whenever I happen now to pass a weighing-machine, I seem to feel the pressure of a hand on the calf of my leg and to hear a voice singing out—"Try your luck with breezy Joe!"

In different parts of the ground other adventurers were essaying to pluck these country pigeons. Some were entertaining in their rascality, others merely barefaced. I shall not readily forget one of them who had chosen a pitch a little removed from the main streams of circulation. He was a tall, lantern-jawed, sallow-faced fellow in a black frock-coat, with a small consumptive-looking boy as assistant. A large bag was in front of him, packed with slender, shining rods of bent metal, identical in shape and size, wrapped each of them in tissue-paper. There was also a smaller case containing pill-boxes. For a long while it was impossible to discover what he was driving at. He spoke in general terms of the ills that man was subject to in later life, of the pain he suffered, of the necessity there was for him to seek advice in time, of the

danger of procrastination, of the risks of premature death. Occasionally, but without referring to it in words, he would unwrap one of the parcels of tissue-paper, as it were absent-mindedly, and, talking all the time, turn the bent tube over in his hands, and then wrap it up once more, replacing it in the bag. He invited those about him to have confidence in him. The value of his advice had been vouched for by the highest medical authorities. He was no humbug; he had seen too much. His heart melted when he thought of some of the poor victims he had known; and it was his duty to keep nothing back that his studies had revealed to him. For half-a-crown he would help them to easier days and better health; and as he said this, he unwrapped another parcel and gave its contents to the boy to hold. Never once did he describe the affliction he was offering to alleviate nor did he specifically mention the articles he wished to sell. But his business was now clear, and his wares, for those likely to be interested, recognisable. One or two elderly people had gone close up to him, others stood further off, but were drinking in every word. Some were gazing at him wistfully, with sad, serious faces, anxious faces, one with an expression of dread and hopelessness upon it. The sallow-faced man got many half-crowns that day. There was a large heap of them on a newspaper in front of him, before I left. Presumably it was from a show of delicacy that he refrained from particularising his wares, and partly, maybe, from the fear of prosecution for selling under false pretences. He was a blot upon the joy of the day in that corner of the ground, preying upon troubles that, but for him, on this festive afternoon, might have been forgotten for a little while.

What marvels of growth could be seen in the tents!—giant cauliflowers in tightly-packed rows, with faces of whitest wax; leeks as big as horses' tails; onions as heavy as bowls; great round beet; garden turnips with firm flesh and smooth, white skins; monstrous carrots the same size to half-an-inch; toothsome beans, peas, and marrows; red and yellow tomatoes, bursting with juicy seed; mammoth potatoes, ruddy, buff, and creamy white; cucumbers as thick as a lad's arm—the whole vegetable kingdom. And outside were the meats they were to garnish, the mutton, pork, and lordly beef. There was the Berkshire pig, the large white, and the middle-white. One huge black hog had won a first prize. He was stretched at full length and filled the whole of his pen from side to side. So vast was he, so mountainous a heap of rolling fat, it seemed as though he would never be able to get up again upon those puny little legs. His body had been oiled until it shone like polished ebony and he lay and panted beneath the wondering stare of a hundred eyes. What plates of pork he represented with

crisp, delicious crackling; what sizzling rashers of bacon; what immense slices of ham of whitest fat and pinkest lean! You feasted your senses upon him and your mouth watered as you gazed upon his bulk. The sheep, too, made you hungry as you looked at them. They were of every size and almost every colour. Their wool glistened with grease. Deep and compact it grew upon their backs, broad as tables, as they stood patiently, some of them dyed a bright orange, crowded between the hurdles. What mutton was there, legs and saddles, generous slices that would make the joint gape and gape again, running over with red gravy, on noble dishes, with floury potatoes and chunks of home-made bread!

But the best of all was the prime beef of England. There they waited, the great cattle, with their stupendous shoulders and silken flanks. There was one huge fellow weighing well over a ton. With a single butt of his granite brow, he could have carried away the flimsy post and stakes that penned him in. Luckily he was ignorant of his power. His depth of rib was prodigious, his breadth of chest enormous, the solid mass of him almost terrifying. Yet with all this mighty strength he was beautiful, with a hide like satin, the muscles rippling beneath it in liquid waves. He stood almost still, chewing the cud, sometimes lashing his tail, while the flies settled upon his face, many hundred-weights of solid beef, in the prime, enough to feed a thousand households—sirloins, ribs, succulent steaks and fillets, to be eaten between deep draughts of English ale. No wonder men stood about him, this monarch of the board, reflectively and with profound admiration in their eyes.

Then there were the cheeses, first, second, and third prizes, tunnelled where the judges had tested their quality; platters of yellow butter fresh from the churn; new-laid eggs, brown, cream, and white; rows of home-made wheaten bread; pots of honey, clear and granulated, from the lime-tree and the heather, from cottage gardens and scores of little homesteads. To every part of the country would this food go, and so fine was it, so pure and rich and wholesome, that further orders would follow, bringing money into the district and employing the labour of countless families. This had been pointed out earlier in the day at the farmers' luncheon held in a large marquee at one end of the ground. Colonel Tom Goswell, Chairman of the Agricultural Society, voiced the opinion of all present. "He had not missed a show, as they knew, for the last fifteen years, since he had had the honour of being their Chairman (hear, hear). From small beginnings they had grown to what they now were—one of the most progressive agricultural bodies in the Kingdom (cheers). The attendance this year, if the evening gate came up to expectations, promised to surpass all

previous records. He would be failing in his duty if he omitted to mention that a large part of their success was due to the interest shown by His Grace, who this year had won the first prize for a middle-white sow (cheers). With goodwill and mutual help there was no limit to what might be attained in the future. The pig entries had been rather backward in the past, but with cheaper feeding-stuffs he hoped that this would be remedied, and he was authorised to say that Mrs. Goswell would be very pleased to present a cup next year for the best Berkshire litter (loud cheers and a voice 'Bravo, Mrs. Tom'). He must not detain them any longer (Go on, sir). The bantams had still to be judged. But they might take it from him that he would use every effort to make the yearly show a success, for it would not only attract money to the district and lead to additional employment, but confer considerable prestige upon them all" (prolonged cheering, the whole company rising and singing "For he's a jolly good fellow").

It was now the middle of the afternoon and the sports were taking place opposite a grandstand packed with ticket-holders. A regimental band was marching past and His Grace was watching it with tired eyes. He had had a worrying morning with his agent. Repairs had been extra heavy and rents were in arrear. His son had just married a penniless girl and for some years he had been living on his capital. Most of the timber ready for felling had already been sold, also all the land ripe for building, his best pictures, and the cream of his plate and library. His town house had gone too, and the place in Scotland. As he looked round at the circling woods, his woods, he wondered how long they would so remain. The social system, as he had known it, was crumbling fast. He could feel it giving way under him. He knew that it was only a matter of time when this great domain that he had inherited would shrink to a mere fraction of itself. He remembered the days of his father's magnificence and compared them with his own. What would his son's be like? There was a cattleman, one of his tenants, said to be worth a million. Was it after all impossible that one of these days that fellow's descendants might be sitting in the castle on the other side of the hill? No estate, no fortune, however splendid, could stand such taxation. The House of Peers too was impotent and might be abolished at any moment. His dukedom was nothing but a responsibility and burden from the rising of the sun to its going down; his life a succession of exacting and boring duties. How he longed to be a small man for a space, free of his time, unobserved, at peace! This band was overdoing it; would it never stop marching? How badly he wanted to go home and, alone in his study, to sit with his head in his hand and rest!

Meanwhile the crowds were getting thicker, for the entrance fee had now dropped to a shilling. The poultry and dog exhibits seemed to be the chief attractions now. The dogs had been there all day and were tired out. Their owners, many of them women, were dead beat too, for they had sat, perched on the edges of the little stalls, watching over their charges, like mothers over their children, all the time. Dogs there were of every common kind and size for the protection and companionship of man. A pungent smell pervaded the tent and hung like a blanket round it for several yards. There seemed to be a concentration of purpose in the faces of the guardians of these animals, a suspicious, jealous look, as they sat alongside one another, sharing their sandwiches with their pets. Many of the women looked like spinsters with no offspring of their own, lonely women, unattractive, soured, with flat chests and large bony hands, lavishing all the affection they had to give upon these dumb creatures, who in return, no doubt, adored the lineaments and worshipped the touch of these ministering angels.

A whole side of the show-ground was devoted to farming and garden implements, novel contraptions, the results of many hours of thought and experiment, examples of the patient ingenuity of man—weed-extractors, lawn-mowers, fountains, sprayers, iron and wooden gates, fencing, forcing-frames, incubators, fowl-houses, churns, separators, mangles, hay-sweeps, binders, chaff-cutters, labour-saving devices of every kind. And nearby were the forges, where horse-shoe and welding competitions were in full swing, the sharp ringing of the hammers on the anvils dominating all other noises near them.

There was still much to see, but I had had enough and turned to leave. Outside the ground there were cripples waiting to waylay you; men with one leg only; men with no legs; a man with his face half eaten away, playing a flute; a death's-head of a fellow with a metal plate let into his skull strumming on a harmonium; hunchbacks selling balloons, blind men, verminous gipsies, twisted shapes, all the riff-raff and misery that hang upon the skirts of a great festival. As I moved off in a car, the regimental band was playing with a will "I want to be happy all the time"—and I thought of the Duke sitting alone in his study.

GODFREY LOCKER LAMPSON.

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH.

ONE of the gravest of Imperial matters is the revival of the question of secession in South Africa. The Dutch of South Africa are one people not essentially divided in heart by political boundaries. The annexation of the Republics in 1902 meant that, while the white population of South Africa is possessed of practically all the power—there is apparently only one constituency in which the native vote is the deciding factor—the large majority of the white population felt aggrieved and unsettled. The feeling died down when self-government was given to the late Republics, but when General Hertzog was ejected from the Ministry in 1912 and the Government went on as if nothing had happened, though more than half the Ministerial Party in the country sided with him, as was evident at the time and as the subsequent elections definitely proved, doubt of British institutions was instilled into the Dutch mind. In these circumstances we slipped into a sort of policy in regard to the war, which, however spectacular, contributed next to nothing to the cause of the Allies and further needlessly antagonised the Boers.

The question of secession was first raised by Mr. T. Roos, leader of the National Party in the Transvaal, in 1917. Secession was fought, largely on juridical grounds, by General Smuts and his followers, who gained a decisive victory at the elections of 1921 after General Hertzog had for the time being capitulated to the secessionists and signed a manifesto declaring that national freedom and membership of the Commonwealth were incompatible, and the National Party had announced that secession was its first principle. Within three years General Smuts had lost his hold on the country, partly owing to financial difficulties not of his making, but not well handled, and partly because General Hertzog had so far reasserted himself as to insist that secession was not to be thought of unless the consent of the English as well as the Dutch in South Africa were obtained. Since then General Smuts has steadily and rapidly lost ground in South Africa, particularly among the Dutch, until his following among them is coming to be almost negligible. Certainly there is not one constituency in which he has enough supporters of the old party which won the elections of 1910 under Botha to give him a majority; and the resentment of the Dutch against him is largely due to this, and may be explained by saying that it is much what the feeling of the Labour Party would be towards Mr. MacDonald if he left his followers in a crisis, were joined by the Conservatives, became their Prime Minister, still calling himself a Labour man, and were then defeated with all the Conservatives behind him, but only a handful of Labour men.

After General Hertzog's assent to the unanimous report of the Imperial Conference of 1926, worded at least largely by Lord Balfour and embodying the old Liberal policy of self-government fully developed, the question of secession ceased to burn, though it has never ceased to smoulder. There are very many secessionists who from time to time seize an opportunity of making their voices heard, but with things going comfortably and an absence of grievances, secession was slowly sinking out of sight and even out of mind. But it was buried in a very shallow grave in the hearts of the Dutch people, and the reality of the question has always been much greater than is understood by English people in South Africa and elsewhere who are not in constant touch with our Dutch people and their Press. As this necessary contact cannot be attained without mastering Afrikaans, and as practically all our English leaders in Parliament and the Press are unilingual (though some of them are now gallantly attempting to become bilingual in their old age), English South Africa is not well informed, and England itself is probably worse informed about the heart of the majority of white South Africa than about the people of any other country in the world.

What happened the other day is that we bungled into another explosion about secession. This will certainly call for some sort of action at the coming Imperial Conference. It seems extremely desirable that Britain should wake up to the realities of this matter, which lie not in formulas or law of any kind, but in the heart of a gallant and stubborn race, worthy of brotherhood with our English people. What happened is this. Last year there was a minor Imperial Conference to draw up resolutions as to the steps to be taken to carry out the policy of the 1926 Conference, which laid down the principle that the Empire is, in fact, an *entente très cordiale* between states juridically equal, all owing allegiance to the King. Very wisely, knowing himself liable to be attacked at any moment from two sides—those who dislike equality and those who dislike union with the British Commonwealth—General Hertzog brought these resolutions before Parliament. General Smuts followed with an able juridical exposition of the Report, which was followed somewhat languidly by a comatose House. Not that there was not much of interest both in the Report and in the speech. But both appeared somewhat academic. Some time ago one of our Ministers discovered that certain Free Staters who had been married about a generation back were not properly married because they had not received the permission of the President, which was necessary when Free Staters married outside the Republic. He brought in a Bill to legalise the marriages. Nobody was excited. Everybody knew that the people were married both before the Bill and after the Bill. It was well to get the law straightened out, but

there was no question about it, and in Parliament unanimity is seldom interesting. So with the King's veto of Dominion legislation at the instigation of his British Ministers. Everybody knows that there is no such thing, whatever the law says. So with Westminster legislation overriding ours. It does not happen. So General Smuts' speech was cutting no ice, excellent as it was as a display of juridical acuteness. Suddenly there was a crash and a roar. Everybody was excited. A crisis had been precipitated. Why? Because of the clause in this unanimous report saying that the law of succession to the British Crown cannot be altered without the consent of each and all of the Dominions as well as Britain. Who on earth would have expected an explosion in South Africa of all places on the subject of the law of succession to the British Crown? Who wants a change? What change is wanted? Nobody knows. Do the Boers want the Stuarts back at Windsor? It appears that nobody has thought about any change. But some time ago some rather obscure Nationalists, ravenous for a grievance, concocted the idea that the clause implied that no Dominion can secede, even if all its people desire to do so. On the face of it this is absurd. If it is the rule that the name of a club cannot be altered without the consent of the members, it does not follow that members are precluded from resigning. Moreover, the Union was represented entirely by lawyers wholly opposed to tightening the bonds of Empire. The leader, Mr. F. W. Beyers, is a K.C., and has earned the name of a shrewd lawyer. Such mark as he has made in politics he has made as the spokesman of secession. He could not knowingly have agreed to a clause making secession forever impossible legally. He could not have been indifferent to the possibility of such an interpretation. It is in the last degree improbable that he would have been mistaken about the interpretation of the words. The suggestion therefore made no way.

The eruption caused by General Smuts' speech was owing to the fact that he suddenly gave his support to this very curious interpretation. This at once alters the case. Between General Smuts and Mr. Beyers as lawyers no cautious person in South Africa would care to decide off-hand. On a matter so heavily charged with strong feeling no prudent statesman would care to risk much on the chance that either of them is right and the other wrong in the interpretation of words. The clause ought obviously to be redrafted so that there is general consent as to what it does and what it does not mean.

Later in the debate General Smuts stated that he was merely pointing out what he believed the words under discussion to mean and that he agreed with General Hertzog in principle. An amendment asking for a declaration to this effect, moved by Colonel Creswell, was carried by a party vote, General Smuts and his

friends voting against it. In the Senate his friends accepted the same amendment without opposition, their leader declaring that he was certainly not prepared to admit the Union's right of secession, but that what he did say was that the Union should have perfect freedom to decide its own destiny. On the whole General Smuts has left his position in regard to this matter anything but clear.

The real rub is not so much the question of interpretation as the fact that we are not agreed as to what we want to say. General Smuts raised the question, but finally, in his anxiety not to offend, he said nothing. Of the rest, some want to say that retirement from the British Empire is impossible under any circumstances. The majority do not. Why should anyone? In the first place the clause has nothing whatever to do with the question, dealing as it does with the totally different question of the succession to the throne. In the second place all that it would mean, if you did drag in some words or interpretations making retirement from the Empire illegal, is that you could only get out by a revolution. But what is a revolution? How many revolutions were involved and carried through with the London Declaration of 1926? Anyhow you cannot stop secession by paper. The issue is one of national sentiment, to which all rubrics and protocols must conform or be brushed aside, and to deal with deep-seated national discontent by building juridical ramparts against it is worse than vain, because the ramparts are powerless and the concentration of attention upon them diverts attention from the real task, which is to understand, undermine and remove the discontent.

There are indeed two totally different questions involved in this matter—that of law and that of fact. The former by itself matters very little. It is quite legal to pass a law in South Africa providing for the slaughter of all English babies, but in fact it cannot be done. It may or may not be legal to secede by a bare majority with the whole of the minority determined and exasperated, and to do so without giving Britain any special rights at Simonstown, but in fact it could not be done. It may or may not be illegal to secede with the unanimous and eager assent of every man, woman and child, European and non-European, in the country. In either case, as Mr. Bonar Law and others have said, secession would go through, and, if necessary, the law would be adjusted later.

In the last resort only the will of the people really matters. Unfortunately this is the root cause of the trouble the other day. General Smuts has always argued this matter as a lawyer, and the real reason of his most regrettable decline in South Africa is that he has lost touch with the heart of his own people. The other day he led up to his argument about the great human question of our national right to leave the Commonwealth by saying that with the equalisation of the Dominions with Britain and with each other no

tie was left but the Crown, but that the clause dealing with the succession to the Crown prohibited the secession of any of the Dominions. Fantastic as the conclusion appears to be, it is not so wrong as the premise certainly is. The Crown is not, as a fact, a means of securing union. It is a great symbol of union. But where, as in South Africa, you have to deal with a conquered and reluctant population, it has no effect whatever in the direction of convincing the unconvinced of the desirability of union with the rest of the Commonwealth. No one who knows our country people will sincerely question this.

The Commonwealth rests not on law, but on the strong psychical foundation of the mind for union, and on nothing else whatever. That mind for union may be due to various advantages, military, naval, commercial, financial, cultural, or other, attaching to union or to a sense of communal unity, as with the English race as a whole, or to the patriotic desire of meeting the sentiment of the local section of the British race, as in South Africa, or to all of these things. The mind for union is represented by various institutions, of which the Monarchy is the most conspicuous, and each of these, as long as it is not practically injurious, tends to reinforce the mind for union by giving expression to it. But nations are held together not by any institution, but by the sense of union, of which national institutions are the offspring and from which alone they derive their continued vitality.

In South Africa the mind to union has to be created in the majority of the European population. The mind of our Dutch people is a rock, very slowly affected by intellectualist argument, but compact of national history as expounded not by us, but by them, and with their version of the Boer War, and not Lord Milner's, imbedded in it. English politicians have not envisaged the necessity of studying our Dutch people and so detecting the means of infusing into them the mind to union with the Commonwealth, which is the birthright of British subjects of English speech. This is natural enough, because English people naturally assume that Generals Botha and Smuts represent the Dutch. Moreover, in many ways they do. But General Botha was a realist, as General Smuts is, and the former got separated from his people by impatience due to his superabundant common sense—perhaps, too, to that presentiment of approaching death which so greatly accounts for the breakdown in the statesmanship of Rhodes—and the latter has lost touch with his people by his excessive intellectualism. Both originally shared to the full the prejudices which still haunt the hearts of their compatriots. Both quickly saw light in our Commonwealth. Both were exasperated because their people were slower than they to see what they had seen so quickly. As a result both lost grip on their people and

ceased to represent them essentially; and inevitably, though unintentionally, darkened counsel among the English in dealing with the Dutch. But this gives rise to hope. The Dutch will accept the Commonwealth as Botha and Smuts did when they see it as they did. The whole trouble is that the eyes of a whole people do not open so quickly to new conceptions as those of these princes of common sense and intellect. In fact what is needed is just that patience for the lack of which Moses was rebuked when he smote the rock.

The two things needed to secure the cordial assent of the Dutch to our membership of the Commonwealth are assurance of perfect national freedom and assurance that the policy of the Commonwealth is not subservient to any selfish interest of Britain. On both points doubt is widely spread in South Africa and is breeding danger. For eradicating doubt on both points the right of secession and its acknowledgment are essential. Immense assistance to the growth of the mind for union, or at least acquiescence in our membership of the Commonwealth, was given by Mr. Bonar Law's assurance that membership of the Commonwealth was voluntary, and that secession was open to any member which really desired it. Immense damage to the growth of the mind for union among our Dutch has been and is being done by politicians and theorists who are everlastingly calling this right in question. Both are unwittingly doing the work of England's enemies in South Africa by making a manly people feel that national freedom and membership of the British Commonwealth are incompatible.

As regards freedom the same argument applies in matters of detail. Two years ago South Africa agreed to a trade treaty with Germany granting to Germany all tariff favours which may in future be granted to Britain or the Dominions, that is, apparently all but those already in operation. This was very properly resisted by General Smuts, but without effect. Mr. Amery was Secretary for the Dominions. No one cares more than he for the economic union of the Commonwealth. But he signed the agreement officially. He could not have taken a step more powerfully tending to stop a secession movement or to promote a movement for the economic unity of the Empire among our Dutch people than this notable act assuring our people that their national freedom is a reality.

As regards policy our reluctant Dutch may one day prove to be the best friends of the Commonwealth. All nations are apt to be stampeded from time to time, and the English, as Lord Asquith observed, are no exception to this rule. He told us how many times they went mad in the eighteenth century. What of the nineteenth and the twentieth? An Empire economic policy might easily be carried through in one of our mad fits which would make it im-

possible for Britain to remain in the Commonwealth and live. The same applies to each of the Dominions. Mad external policies might certainly wreck the Commonwealth, and there are plenty of madmen in the Parliaments of the Empire. The right of secession is the most powerful weapon possible to save the Commonwealth from adventurous policies tending, however well meant, to disruption. England might rush on some dubious economic policy, but must first ask, What will the Dominions say? She might attack Ruritania, but must count the cost. The conquest of Ruritania is doubtful, the secession of this and that Dominion as a result of the attempt is certain. The knowledge of this is a potent factor for drawing the teeth of Dutch discontent. Moreover, the Dominions, naturally looking at the world from a non-European standpoint much like that of the United States, though the British connection must always tend to cure them of undue detachment, have a precious service to perform to Britain and to mankind by towing Britain some leagues further out into the Atlantic when she tends to become unduly entangled in the homicidal lunacies of Europe.

On the other hand, as things are we are being led by Britain into the larger Commonwealth of the League of Nations. As that comes to represent the conscience and intelligence of mankind, the Empire may naturally cease to function politically. In that case its disruption would be pointless and unattractive to all. The Commonwealth is therefore as things stand in line with the real desire and judgment of the Dutch in their international outlook, which is essentially cosmopolitan, they themselves being a mixed race. The Commonwealth in the League tends powerfully in the direction which commends itself to our Dutch, and the League gives us an influence altogether disproportionate to our resources, which we may exercise in the direction of peace and national liberty through our colleagues of the Commonwealth on mankind as a whole.

Even more potent is the claim of the Commonwealth, and of its foundation in perfect national freedom and consent, on South African nationalism. Great wrong has been done the Empire in South Africa by representing it as forced on at least half our white people. Sensitive consideration for each others' traditions, prejudices and sentiments is essential if there is to be a South African nation. This is General Hertzog's doctrine of the two streams as expounded by himself from the first. On the one hand perfect security from the long nightmare of domination and of being chained to the chariot wheels of British policy however wild or wicked; and on the other equal security from any tearing of the living flesh of the soul by declaring that our people overseas, flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone, are strangers—both these are essential, and without either the whole of the slowly rising national

edifice of South Africa must crash in ruins. Nor is it enough that one section should insist on the one point of security and the other section on the other point, but the whole people, each section instinctively feeling that it is its brother's keeper, must, because it is South African, insist as a matter of self-defence on both.

The real bar to secession therefore is not some cunningly-drawn scrap of paper, but the propagation of a proper sense of nationalism and mutual understanding and sympathy among the different sections of our people, and the right determination of the direction in which the whole Commonwealth is to move. For both purposes a free acknowledgment that the Commonwealth is based on the consent of its members and that secession, if really desired by any of its members, will not be contested except by doing everything possible to change the will to secede, is requisite. This view may be contested, especially by those who are without experience of the work of convincing unconvinced groups of the claims of the Commonwealth on their devotion. But no greater service can be done the Commonwealth than by those who do its missionary work among our own people, nor can any of its children be prouder of their relations than those who base its existence and durability on the needs of national union in the Dominions and on the precious service which the Commonwealth is rendering mankind as the great forerunner of a universal law of right, founded in perfect freedom and absolute conviction.

If there is any doubt that the Commonwealth is founded on the free consent of its members, opponents of disruption must unite in seeing that this is made plain and all grounds for doubt cleared away. Only thus can the question of secession be laid to rest, not only on the platforms, but in the hearts of our people. There is no other way. No legal subtlety and no astute phraseology will help. In these great matters of the national heart and destiny wisdom, often hid from the wise, lies open to the simple.

In replying to the debate General Hertzog noted that a previous speaker hoped that we will be perpetually within the Empire. He adds, "let us all hope that, but it will only depend on how well we can co-operate." This was said by the Prime Minister of South Africa, who is also the leader of the National Party and has, incomparably more than any other living man, the confidence of the great bulk of the Dutch-speaking people. It would be enlightening to ask when the British Commonwealth had a greater triumph than lies behind these words. Let us not despair. But let the jurists cease from troubling us by arguing away, in their zeal to strengthen the Commonwealth, the assurance of perfect national freedom, on which alone, particularly in South Africa, its strength and continuance absolutely depend.

H. E. S. FREMANTLE.

A DUTCH PEPYS AT THE WARS WITH WILLIAM OF ORANGE.

LET no one mistake the intention of the title of this paper. In the *Journal* of Constantine Huygens, lord of Zuylichem, on which it is founded, there is none of the joyful sensuality, the innate poetry, of Samuel Pepys. Instead there is a prosaic baldness which we English feel to be as characteristically Dutch as Pepys' "veined humanity" is genuinely English. But there are great resemblances. Apart from externals they were contemporaries, the one military secretary to the nephew, William of Orange, as the other was naval secretary to the uncle, Charles II. They are both thorough-going egoists and both full of intellectual curiosity. In their diaries these two capable officials noted down *memorabilia* and eased themselves of their inhibitions, the Englishman artistically and delightfully, the Dutchman disjointedly and by inference; and equally would they have been horrified if these diaries had been made public in their lifetime. Many pleasant hours have most of us spent with the communicative Samuel. Let us see whether there is not half an hour's entertainment in the dry Constantine.

In birth and education Huygens was as much above Pepys as in vitality, interest, and the joy of living he is below him. For three generations the Huygens family were confidential servants to the famous House of Orange, the great Stadtholders of Holland, which began with William the Silent and expired in our William III. Constantine the elder, our diarist's father, had been secretary to the Stadtholders Henry and William II, and on the latter's early death had done his best to defend his posthumous heir, William III, from the innumerable evils of his minority. But it was in the world of learning and culture that the name of Huygens was best known. Constantine the elder is "the most brilliant figure in Dutch literary history, . . . the *grand seigneur* of the republic,"—poet, musician, painter, mathematician, athlete: while his son Christian, our diarist's younger brother, was perhaps the greatest mathematician of the age, the discoverer of epoch-marking inventions in the telescope and timepiece. Their fame was European: the father being one of the first Fellows of our Royal Society, as the son was the first foreigner invited by Louis XIV to join his new *Académie des Sciences*.

Coming of such a family our diarist had every chance of making a great figure, and was expected to do so. Not improbably this expectation poisoned his life. There is such a thing as being educated above one's character as well as above one's abilities. Huygens was expected to be great and there was no greatness in

him: he had neither his father's loyalty and unwearying pursuit after knowledge, nor his brother's genius and simplicity. Outwardly his life was prosperous. A first-rate education enabled him to give very useful help to his brother in his experiments: while William III's first action on recovering the offices of his ancestors in 1672 was to make his old servant's son his military secretary, a post which our hero held till his death in 1697. He was respectable too, this diarist: an admiring son, a good husband to an unhelpful wife, a useful brother. Yet when his journal was printed it proved as disconcerting to the reader as that of Pepys, though in quite a different way. There is here no trace of the insatiable delight in mere living, of the picturesque use of detail, which made Pepys' first editor modestly bowdlerise his diary. Instead, the reader of the Dutch Pepys is disappointed by his baldness and want of imagination. Though he lived in the service of the greatest statesman of his time, accompanied him through wars and revolutions, and met interesting people of all kinds and countries, he either passes them over or comments on them with about as much feeling as a stolid schoolboy. On the other hand he noted down carefully every piece of scandal that came his way. He did not enjoy life: but he was passionately interested in himself, his illnesses with their physical phenomena, and his physical and moral misfortunes. The only emotion which the two diarists have in common is their intellectual curiosity. At bottom it is the contrast between comparative failure and success. For, though prosperous, Huygens could not but feel that he owed his prosperity to family influence, that in real success, in the noble joys of service and learning, he had fallen far behind father and brother. Our Samuel, on the other hand, had no need for envy or suspicion: he was the architect of his own fortune, and a good one at that. Huygens, however, tried to restore his self-respect by dwelling on other people's failings, and at the same time gratified that curious passion for scandal so often felt by the highly respectable, who enjoy the pleasures of sin by deputy. Any unkind gossip found in him its natural bourn. No sooner did the future Duke of Marlborough, "a well-made young man," appear in the Dutch camp than all the details of his murky past were poured into Huygens' interested ears. When he lodged in a country house he had never seen before he immediately scented a mystery round its faded mistress; and, sure enough, the master had married his cook. For, unfortunately, Huygens was not only a scandalmonger but a snob, and records with pleasure that the sisters of the Grand Pensionary (the Dutch equivalent to Prime Minister) had formerly supported themselves by lace-making.

Huygens wrote his diary pretty constantly during his official

life, but it is with the war of 1673-8, following on the French invasion of Holland, that we have to do here. It was a war in which the English took little part. But we are in the old "cockpit of Flanders," and on every page visit places familiarised to us later by Marlborough, Wellington and Haig. It was a long-drawn-out, indecisive war: in which the French gained little real advantage by their spectacular victories over a self-taught young general with a raw and divided army. It was, too, a polite and leisurely war. No one dreamed of trench warfare. Armies retired into winter quarters when the nights turned cold, and were seldom so uncivil as to disturb each other until the weather became more genial. After the bloody battle of St. Denis the Dutch officers hurried across to the French camp to inquire after the welfare of their friends; and the *Grand Monarque* himself obtained fresh supplies of ice for his wine from William of Orange.

The *Journal* is a disappointing account of a disappointing war by a disappointed man. Huygens hardly ever tells us what we want to know and what we feel he ought to want to tell us—the political and military history of his time. He gives us no descriptions, physical or moral, of the interesting people he meets; not even of his master. It is only by the fascinated awe of his references to the latter that we can judge of him. Of his own emotions we hear little save complaints of the horrible discomfort of war. There are, sad to say, no moral reflections on its barbarities or lamentations for the sufferings of soldiers and civilians: for Huygens is solidly selfish. His journal is merely a daily register of personal doings and feelings. When he does occasionally relate some thrilling event it is with a stolid unimaginativeness which freezes romance. And yet to the thirster after knowledge there is real fascination in his matter-of-factness. It is so delightfully free from the moralisings and set descriptions, composed at a later date and inserted to show the perspicuity of the writer, which adorn the diaries of Evelyn and Greville. We know where we are with him, and are at liberty to clothe the dry bones with flesh and blood if we have the imagination.

It is one of the oddities of fate which made this cultured, comfort-loving official personage literally a secretary at war. Through all his long and generally unsuccessful wars William III dragged in his train an obsequious and competent secretary who was inwardly seething with discontent against war, especially unsuccessful war, and all its circumstances—its dirt, its discomfort, its irregular hours. Huygens was a bad horseman in an age and profession when good horsemanship was essential. He was a valetudinarian, taking the tenderest interest in his internal arrangements, and was always being upset by the hardships of the campaign or the bad water. He suffered, simultaneously or at differ-

ent times, from dysentery, fever, headaches, bilious attacks, coughs, colds, and lumbago, and whenever he had procured from some friend a new medicine, such as rhubarb or the Queen of Hungary's water, and had settled down to dose himself in comfort, he was sure to hear that his master had set off again and had to follow him as best he could. As for horses, he and they seemed antipathetic; and when they were not throwing him they were throwing the friends to whom he had succeeded in selling them. In a typical passage in the *Journal* he describes himself as following the Prince at a "*feu de joie*" on a spirited English horse which played him every possible trick and nearly threw him thirty times: "I was very embarrassed in the darkness," he concludes morosely.

Then, too, the material discomforts and irregular hours vexed him to the soul. His life was much easier than his master's, who in the *Journal* seems to be almost the only person who does any work and to have done little else. While the Prince is at councils of war or from dawn to dusk with the troops without food or rest, the secretary is making sketches or microscopic slides, polishing lenses, or, best of all, sipping chocolate in dressing-gown and slippers in his bedroom and entertaining relays of visitors bringing him the latest scandal. But he is never quite free: one morning the Prince routs him out of bed at half-past seven to write a letter; or he works to midnight "and made me work," as the secretary bitterly remarks; or he sleeps in his clothes and sends for Huygens in the small hours. When the master lodges in dirty inns or even passes the night by the camp fire the most sybaritic servant cannot hope for real comfort. At one time Huygens sleeps in a little chandler's shop and is repeatedly roused by customers coming for a ha'porth of candles; for shopping must be done even in wartime. Again he shares the floor of the Prince's antechamber with as many of the *élite* as can crowd in, all higgledy-piggledy; or, more sensibly, stops in his coach and waits till the Prince is in bed before he risks undressing. For his stomach he had a deep respect, and proportionately resented being billeted on people who could offer him two eggs for his dinner. Yet even in this respect he was sometimes luckier than his master, and records with modest satisfaction how he enjoyed a really handsome meal while the Prince had almost nothing.

In his relations with his master there is the same incongruity of character. For master he had a born soldier and mighty hunter, too much of a soldier maybe to be a successful general, as spartan in his military life as Charles XII of Sweden, and brave to rashness. Over his secretary William had a complete ascendancy, very remarkable when we consider that the secretary was old enough to be his father and had known him from infancy. Though the

Prince was disposed to be friendly and kind to his retainer, the latter was too self-centred and fond of comfort to make his mark as a courtier. Timid and middle-aged of soul, Huygens must have found himself as alien among the hard-fighting, hard-drinking, hard-riding officers who were the Prince's companions as that stern young general would have felt at the chocolate-and-scandal parties in which his secretary delighted. Nor did Huygens ever attain the confidential position enjoyed by his father; a failure perhaps partly due to the unsatisfactory conduct of his brothers, of whom the scientist was a pensioner of France and the other reflected no credit on the Prince's government. Though he did what he could by squinting over his master's shoulder when he was writing letters or taking a peep at private papers when he was supposed to be sealing documents, he never found out much of political importance; and was reduced to picking up news from the Prince's valets. The fact is his master soon discovered that he was a dull dog; though he was too shrewd not to know that a dull dog might be a useful secretary. In his gayer moods he chaffed him about his impeccable propriety, his aged parent's friskiness, and his grey hat, which in the day of battle he saw flitting about at a very safe distance, like the white plume of Navarre in the wrong position. It is a curious picture that one sees across the centuries of these two men—in dirty Flemish inns, stuffy tents, the huts of peasants, the bare rooms of convents: the younger absorbed in work, sometimes gloomy and reserved, sometimes kindly and familiar; the elder watching him with a peering curiosity which took unwinking note of his down-sittings and uprisings, his meals, moods, and sayings, but which was equally devoid of the joy of devotion or the heat of criticism. It was not an atmosphere favourable to confidence, and it is not surprising that when he died at the end of a quarter of a century's service the servant was further off from the master than at the beginning. It was not only Huygens' unresponsiveness that was so chilling: he was suspicious, too. At the least hint of criticism or of a rival he fell a prey to melancholy, convinced that he was the victim of secret enemies.

Of "set" war pictures there are few in Huygens, yet he does describe in detail for us a sack, a retreat, and a battle. In them we seem to feel again the atmosphere of the Great War: the sense of unreality, of civilised people playing at being savages. What possible pleasure or profit could Huygens, a respectable middle-aged gentleman with an inquisitive wife, find in assisting at the pillaging of a town? And so when he entered Remmick in the wake of the allies in 1673 he refused to "encumber himself" with two pretty girls who appealed to him to save them from the soldiery. It is but just to add that when he found the same girls still struggling with the same soldiers some hours later he placed them in safety; for

though selfish he was not cruel. He records without comment the sight of dead bodies in the church; a dead woman and her wailing infant in the general's kitchen; a soldier cutting off the head of a peasant as he was stripping off his shirt at the command of another soldier. Along with the senseless brutality of war goes many a kindly act. For instance, a Dutch general, meeting a boy groom, "dressed in green and weeping bitterly" and staggering under the weight of a heavy baby girl whom he was carrying to safety in Cologne, sent the queer little couple by coach to their city of refuge.

In the retreat from Charleroi and the battle of St. Denis the incongruity between Huygens' character and war shows itself clearly. On the one hand we see the hesitating reluctance of William of Orange to admit defeat; his desperate resolution in covering the retreat of his panic-stricken soldiers; his arrival at an empty house after dark, without food or baggage until the small hours, and his awakening next morning by the enemy cannon. In the midst of all this panic and disappointment the secretary turns aside to an abbey and feasts on "excellent apricots and wine"! It is the same thing at the battle of St. Denis, more glorious to the Dutch arms. Here indeed he followed his master at a respectful distance while the latter was dashing about trying unsuccessfully to get reinforcements and escaping death by a miracle. But after a few hours of the hurly-burly Huygens got hot and tired, and prudently retired to his tent, leaving earthly wrongs to right themselves. In readiness for a retreat he slept in his clothes in his chariot with his horses ready, while all around lay the wounded and dying, many of them his old friends. In the morning, however, it was discovered that the French had retired, and gloom turned to joy.

Nor was everything quiet on the front when there was no actual fighting going on. Discipline was difficult in every rank of this polyglot army. Tipsy colonels stumbled across the path of the Prince and his retinue; generals refused to obey his personal appeals in battle; one ensign avenged his dismissal from the army by thrashing his superior officer; and Huygens himself was almost as fearful of the soldiers of the Spanish allies as of the French. At a military execution for cowardice the colonel's improving discourse to his men on the duty of courage was spoilt by a female camp-follower, who thumped him on the shoulders, crying out, "Mr. Colonel, don't speak so boldly, you don't know what you would do yourself." There were, too, queer characters among the generals. The Prince was highly amused by the piety and medical zeal of one, a German duke, who when he found he was holding a review on Whit Sunday was so horrified that he dismissed his men to quarters on the spot, and afterwards made them all take a dose of physic. There were also many "evil-disposed persons" in the

camp, more ingenious than virtuous. How two rogues of this kidney robbed a Spanish officer of all his wealth, although he always carried it about with him, is the theme of one of Huygens' happiest stories. At night they cut holes at the head and foot of his tent. Then one tickled the victim's bare toes and, when he started up, the other snatched his breeches from under his pillow and made off with them.

One difficulty in the way of discipline was that armies had not yet adopted distinctive uniforms. With a general so reckless of his person as William III this led to many narrow escapes. Once on the march he came on a covey of partridges, and was just organising a shoot when his escort found to their amazement that they were mixed up with a squadron of French cavalry which had been marching parallel with them for miles. There was a sharp skirmish; the French were taken prisoners; and sport was resumed. More serious was an incident at St. Denis. In the heat of the battle the Prince and his staff were arguing as to whether one advancing squadron belonged to their army or to the French when its captain settled their doubts by riding up and presenting his pistol at the Prince's head, who was saved only by the promptitude of one of his officers in knocking the Frenchman off his horse. Few things show better Huygens' blindness to romance than the prosaicism with which he transcribes from the mouth of its hero a feat of gallantry which changed the course of history.

In the seventeenth century a camp was also a court, and even William of Orange had his moments of relaxation. Their mutual love of art in its widest sense, including architecture and gardening, was the chief bond between the Prince and his secretary. Like his father, Huygens was a good amateur artist, spending much of his time making sketches, often for the Prince, while the latter could dash off in the morning to see a fine house, after a night in the saddle reconnoitring. Hunting, hawking, and shooting were, however, his chief delights, and there Huygens, on account of his propensity for falling off his horse, did not shine. With the advent of a large English contingent, led by Ossory and Monmouth, in 1677 and 1678 the courtly side of camp life grew much livelier. In honour of their arrival William III sent to the Hague for billiard balls, and joined heartily in the subsequent gaming. Such frivolity did not suit Huygens, for it made his hours of attendance more uncertain than ever. One night he waited from eleven till two the next morning while the Prince was playing, and it must have been with some pleasure that he learned next day that his master was ill. It is amusing to hear that the magic lantern, now considered dull even by a Sunday-school, was then in the height of fashion, all the Prince's intimates going off to Brussels to see the "spectres."

Meanwhile, even in the rough and noisy life of the camp our diarist continued to show that intense, insatiable interest in the freaks, sports, and curiosities of the natural world which is so marked in Pepys and Evelyn. Unscientific as some of these tales seem to be, they are really a token of the notable awakening of the scientific spirit in the seventeenth century: the collecting of phenomena for investigation. Like Pepys and Evelyn, Huygens revelled in tales of human agility: of Turkish jugglers who rivalled the feats of Houdini or the Indian rope-climbing trick; and of Venetian quacks who rolled themselves up in a bag full of vipers, emerged with the snakes hanging on to them, and cured themselves by the use of their own electuaries. Mr. Selfridge himself must bow his head in admiration before such vigorous methods of advertisement. There are wonderful stories of a wonderful tooth of iron and copper covered with marble which grew naturally in a boy's head; of a little tailor of Maastricht who discovered how to perform miracles; and of strange freaks in the vegetable world, to which the Prince himself, who was aware of his secretary's weakness, contributed a particularly fine specimen.

There is, too, an excellent ghost story of an officer who died of wounds, "unhouselled, unanointed, unannealed," and at the moment of his death appeared in his grave clothes, with parti-coloured face and carrying a candle, at the bedside of a bosom friend, who little appreciated this attention. Like all true ghost-stories this has no end and no moral. Perhaps after all there was a touch of romance or at least of the love of the grotesque in Huygens, for he records a grim picture of the death-bed of a wealthy and debauched young Dutch officer. In his last hours the dying man declared that he was haunted day and night by the figures of the girl whom he had ruined and her brother standing by his bed: as the *béguine* appeared to the Black Mousquetaire of the *Ingoldsby Legends*.

It is only too possible that the baldness of Huygens has invaded this paper. But at least what it tells us is new to English readers (Huygens was always infuriated when anyone, from the Prince downwards, told a story twice over), and was not written for publication. We may find in it military manners of 250 years ago, sidelights on the last of our great kings as he was in his youth; the study of a most unmilitary nature trying to make a nest for itself in Bellona's very arms; or the unconscious self-revelation of a man who never got quite right with life because his intellect outweighed his character. At the end one feels sorry for Huygens in spite of his meannesses, his coldness, his pussy-cattish self-love; so obviously has he lost the vision splendid. And, after all, he has amused us.

MARGERV LANE.

camp, more ingenious than virtuous. How two rogues of this kidney robbed a Spanish officer of all his wealth, although he always carried it about with him, is the theme of one of Huygens' happiest stories. At night they cut holes at the head and foot of his tent. Then one tickled the victim's bare toes and, when he started up, the other snatched his breeches from under his pillow and made off with them.

One difficulty in the way of discipline was that armies had not yet adopted distinctive uniforms. With a general so reckless of his person as William III this led to many narrow escapes. Once on the march he came on a covey of partridges, and was just organising a shoot when his escort found to their amazement that they were mixed up with a squadron of French cavalry which had been marching parallel with them for miles. There was a sharp skirmish; the French were taken prisoners; and sport was resumed. More serious was an incident at St. Denis. In the heat of the battle the Prince and his staff were arguing as to whether one advancing squadron belonged to their army or to the French when its captain settled their doubts by riding up and presenting his pistol at the Prince's head, who was saved only by the promptitude of one of his officers in knocking the Frenchman off his horse. Few things show better Huygens' blindness to romance than the prosaicism with which he transcribes from the mouth of its hero a feat of gallantry which changed the course of history.

In the seventeenth century a camp was also a court, and even William of Orange had his moments of relaxation. Their mutual love of art in its widest sense, including architecture and gardening, was the chief bond between the Prince and his secretary. Like his father, Huygens was a good amateur artist, spending much of his time making sketches, often for the Prince, while the latter could dash off in the morning to see a fine house, after a night in the saddle reconnoitring. Hunting, hawking, and shooting were, however, his chief delights, and there Huygens, on account of his propensity for falling off his horse, did not shine. With the advent of a large English contingent, led by Ossory and Monmouth, in 1677 and 1678 the courtly side of camp life grew much livelier. In honour of their arrival William III sent to the Hague for billiard balls, and joined heartily in the subsequent gaming. Such frivolity did not suit Huygens, for it made his hours of attendance more uncertain than ever. One night he waited from eleven till two the next morning while the Prince was playing, and it must have been with some pleasure that he learned next day that his master was ill. It is amusing to hear that the magic lantern, now considered dull even by a Sunday-school, was then in the height of fashion, all the Prince's intimates going off to Brussels to see the "spectres."

Meanwhile, even in the rough and noisy life of the camp our diarist continued to show that intense, insatiable interest in the freaks, sports, and curiosities of the natural world which is so marked in Pepys and Evelyn. Unscientific as some of these tales seem to be, they are really a token of the notable awakening of the scientific spirit in the seventeenth century: the collecting of phenomena for investigation. Like Pepys and Evelyn, Huygens revelled in tales of human agility: of Turkish jugglers who rivalled the feats of Houdini or the Indian rope-climbing trick; and of Venetian quacks who rolled themselves up in a bag full of vipers, emerged with the snakes hanging on to them, and cured themselves by the use of their own electuaries. Mr. Selfridge himself must bow his head in admiration before such vigorous methods of advertisement. There are wonderful stories of a wonderful tooth of iron and copper covered with marble which grew naturally in a boy's head; of a little tailor of Maastricht who discovered how to perform miracles; and of strange freaks in the vegetable world, to which the Prince himself, who was aware of his secretary's weakness, contributed a particularly fine specimen.

There is, too, an excellent ghost story of an officer who died of wounds, "unhouselled, unanointed, unannealed," and at the moment of his death appeared in his grave clothes, with parti-coloured face and carrying a candle, at the bedside of a bosom friend, who little appreciated this attention. Like all true ghost-stories this has no end and no moral. Perhaps after all there was a touch of romance or at least of the love of the grotesque in Huygens, for he records a grim picture of the death-bed of a wealthy and debauched young Dutch officer. In his last hours the dying man declared that he was haunted day and night by the figures of the girl whom he had ruined and her brother standing by her bed: as the *béguine* appeared to the Black *Mousquetaire* of the *Ingoldsby Legends*.

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MARGERY LANE.

THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF FINLAND.

THERE is something very suggestive about the National Arms of Finland, "a golden, crowned lion surrounded by nine roses on a background of red, in the mailed right forepaw of which is a silver sword, and which treads underfoot a Russian scimitar." The nine roses represent the nine provinces of Finland. The Russian scimitar is the symbol of the dominion of Russian Czardom which Finland has now trodden underfoot, but she still has her "background of red." In the decade that has passed since Finland gained her independence, she has set her house in order and is now in a position to play her part, if a modest one, in international politics. In what way is her influence likely to make itself felt in the conditions that now obtain in Europe?

To estimate this, account must first be taken of her geographical position and of her neighbours. There are three countries co-terminous with Finland. Two of these are Scandinavian countries, Norway and Sweden. The third is Soviet Russia, her "background of red," which still looms darkly. Though the boundary of Norway runs with that of Finland for some distance, the influence of that country is small compared with Sweden. Sweden has played in the past an important part in shaping the destinies of Finland. It would seem natural that Finland should turn her eyes in the direction of Sweden in her political orientation. The dispute regarding the Åland Islands which was for some time a source of friction between Sweden and Finland has now happily been settled, thanks to the mediation of the League of Nations. The influences, however, which decide whether Finland should draw closer to the Scandinavian group of nations encounter curious cross-currents in connection with Finland's internal affairs. I refer to the complicated situation which has arisen regarding the relative rights of the Fennoman and the Svecoman, the Finnish Finn, and the Swedish Finn. The former outnumber the latter by nine to one. It cannot be too strongly affirmed that the Swedish Finn is a Finn and not a Swede, and has no political relations with the country which was that of his ancestors maybe some centuries ago. The Swedish Finn is as good a patriot as the Finnish Finn, and played a most honourable part in the war against the Reds. Nevertheless he represents Swedish culture, and so long as a jealous rivalry exists between the Fennoman and the Svecoman, it obviously must have a bearing on the problem of political orientation, however certain it may be that Scandinavia is Finland's natural bridge to the west of Europe. At present

Finland is divided according to the predominance of the Finnish and Swedish elements into Finnish, Swedish and bilingual districts. Helsingfors, the capital, and the principal sea-ports are bilingual.

Turning to her eastern neighbour, what is the attitude of Finland towards Soviet Russia, now that she has won her independence? Under the Czaristic régime the hatred which Finland bore towards Russia was the key to her foreign policy. Now the conditions are totally and radically changed. Finland has shaken herself free from Russian oppression, and as she has fortified herself internally against a recurrence of a Red rebellion, she can afford to regard her eastern neighbour, if not with very friendly feelings, at least without fear. She is conscious of her position as the extreme northern bastion of the line of States which are designed to check the incursion of Bolshevist arms and the more subtle infiltration of Bolshevist propaganda into Western Europe, and as such she is ready and willing to fill her part. This being taken for granted, and so far as she can do so without contravening a principle, she desires to maintain relations of amity with Soviet Russia. In pursuance of this policy she concluded the Peace of Dorpat with Soviet Russia, as one of the conditions of which she obtained the fulfilment of her long-cherished wish to have an outlet of her own on to the Arctic Ocean. The cession of Pechenga by Russia to Finland gave her a coveted northern port. As regards trade with Russia, the situation is interesting. One of the principal arguments brought by the Russians against the granting of independence to Finland, before she attained it, was that economically Finland was so tied to Russia that she would be unable to exist independently without her. Notwithstanding, Finland became independent, and in a very short time, though deprived almost entirely of her Russian market which previously absorbed a third of her exports, succeeded in finding fresh outlets for her exports which more than counterbalanced the loss she had suffered. Yet as Russia happens to be one of her nearest neighbours and the country with which her boundary runs for the longest distance, she is naturally open to such trade as offers in that direction. In the matter of her principal industry, the lumber business, Russia has now entered the market as a serious competitor. However, Finnish business men are of opinion that Finland can continue to hold her own commercially.

The accepted view in Finland seems to be that there is a reasonable prospect of the present phase of government in Russia continuing for a considerable number of years, perhaps even for half a century. The present rulers of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics are wise enough to realise the danger of wars of aggres-

sion. They have before them the historical example of the French Revolution, where the end came through the victories of the French Revolutionary Army. Even should the Powers that be in Russia be minded to go to war, the Red Army is not equipped, and the finances of the country would not be able to meet the call. A defeat in the field would inevitably bring about the fall of the Bolshevik régime. Even a victory might be as disastrous to it.

Though the frontier of Finland marches with that of Russia for some seven hundred miles, the actual contact between the two countries is not really so great as such a condition suggests. The narrow isthmus of land between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland through which runs the railway from Leningrad to the Finnish port of Viborg is the corridor through which Finland actually makes contact with Soviet Russia. But it must here be remembered that though under the Czaristic régime this corridor was of the greatest importance not only politically but also commercially, as Finland was then in close juxtaposition to the capital of Russia, and a large volume of Russian trade found its way westward through this avenue, the case is altered. Now the centre of gravity in Russia has definitely moved to the south-east and Moscow has become the capital. It is not to Finland but to Latvia that Moscow looks as her most direct gateway to the Baltic Sea. Riga, the capital of Latvia, is five hundred miles due west from Moscow. The broad gauge railway runs from Moscow to Riga and is Russia's most convenient means of communication with western Europe, and Latvia is in a strong position for competing for the transit of Russian trade for the very reason that her own railway is broad gauge, while the Lithuanian railway on the contrary leading through Lithuania to Western Europe, the route of the famous Nord Express, is normal gauge. Russian goods can thus reach the Baltic Sea at Riga from Moscow and can be put on board ship at that port without once breaking bulk.

It may here be observed that the situation has been completely changed as regards the Baltic Sea as the result of the re-partition of territory following on the Great War. In the past the dominant Powers in the Baltic have been Sweden and Russia. To-day it is no longer a case of one Power dominating or struggling for domination with another Power. The Baltic Sea with its arms the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia extending east and north now washes the shores of no less than nine independent States, namely, Sweden, Finland, Soviet Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Free Port of Danzig, Poland, and Germany, not including the island of Bornholm which lies in mid-channel athwart the western entrance of the sea, an outpost of Denmark. The direct contact of Soviet Russia with the Baltic is now very restricted, extending

only along the coast-line from Leningrad in a north-westerly direction to the Finnish frontier at Terijoki and westwards a distance of a little over a hundred miles along the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland, by way of Oranienbaum opposite the naval base of Kronstadt, to the frontier of Estonia.

I have hitherto dealt only with the States with which Finland is actually coterminous in the consideration of her political bias, but there are other States which are in close juxtaposition to her separated only by the narrow belt of water known as the Gulf of Finland. These States enumerated in the order of their adjacency to Finland are Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, generally grouped together as the Baltic States. They are, indeed, linked together not only by a common sea frontage, but also as being traversed by the great military highroad, the Leningrad *Chaussée*, five hundred miles in length, which runs from the river Neva to the river Niemen. Though thus linked up, they none the less have their own marked characteristics and political leanings. To deal first with Estonia, this country may be regarded as almost a first cousin to Finland. The people of Estonia are racially akin to the Finns and their language has a close resemblance. Finland has always been a well-wisher of this State, carved out of the wreck of Czaristic Russia. Estonia is obviously in a very vulnerable position, should Russia regain her former strength, and would be in imminent risk of absorption, situated as she is, a State far smaller than Finland, on the very confines of Soviet Russia, close to Leningrad and almost under the guns of Kronstadt. So far Soviet Russia has confined herself to intrigue with the Reds in that country, and it was a striking fact as illustrating the friendly attitude of Finland towards Estonia that when a Red revolution threatened Estonia, several thousands of Finns applied at the Estonian Legation at Helsingfors to enlist in the service of the Estonian Government. With Latvia and Lithuania also Finland maintains good relations, though perhaps not of the same cordiality as in the case of Estonia. Latvia, as has already been indicated, is largely overshadowed by the influence of Soviet Russia, and on the grounds of commercial expediency it is natural she should wish to keep in close touch with the group of Soviet Republics. In proportion as she becomes more intimate with Soviet Russia, she would probably tend to grow less so with Finland. The case of Finland's relations with Lithuania is a complicated one. Lithuania's commercial interests clearly point to the advisability of close connection with Poland, but unfortunately her relations with that country since the Great War have been anything but smooth. The Lithuanians bear a grudge against Poland for the *coup de main* which deprived them of what they consider their rightful capital, Vilna.

The Polish point of view is that in years gone by, when Poland and Lithuania formed a single State, Vilna became a centre of Polish culture and that, therefore, their raid was justified by the fact that it may be regarded as virtually a Polish city. Though Lithuania has since compensated herself in a measure for the loss of Vilna by the annexation of Memel, relations between the two countries are still strained, and though naturally their interests lie together, the open sore keeps them apart. As a neutral in this dispute, Finland has a somewhat delicate task in maintaining friendly relations with both parties.

It is clear that the interests of Finland and the two Baltic States and Poland and Rumania, which are actually limitrophe with Soviet Russia, as well as the third Baltic State, Lithuania, which is adjacent to Soviet Russia, though not contiguous, coincide in that they desire to keep at bay the disintegrating influences which threaten from that direction. Co-operation between the Border States does exist for the purpose of suppressing Bolshevik espionage and propaganda. Though recognising the community of interests in principle, Finland shrinks from being classed as middle European, still hesitates to take the step of allying herself with these States for mutual protection, and seems to prefer for the present at any rate a policy of isolation, which does not however mean that she withholds her good will. The fact is that the mercurial temperament of the Pole, the dominant partner in the group of States across the Gulf of Finland, is hardly such as to appeal to the more hard-headed and unemotional character of the Finn. The Finns never allow sentiment to override the promptings of common sense. They have a lurking suspicion that the Poles, if too closely associated with themselves, might, trusting partly to their *rapprochement* with France, land them in situations from which they would find it hard to escape and which might involve unpleasant consequences. They therefore prefer to adopt a non-committal attitude, and are none the less prepared to deal with each situation as it arises on its own merits. It is certain that in the event of a strong Russia desiring to enlarge her points of direct contact with the Baltic Sea, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are more vulnerable than Finland. The independence of Finland is not so much a source of annoyance to Soviet Russia, as the former does not stand so directly in the way of the latter's access to Western Europe as do the other Baltic States, Latvia and Estonia especially. Moreover, it seems probable that should it ever come to a fight for her dearly-won independence, a contingency which happily for the present need hardly be considered within the bounds of practical politics, Finland would be able to

offer a more stubborn and lasting resistance than the other small Baltic States.

There remains to be examined the relations of Finland with some of the world Powers, with which her destiny is inevitably linked up, though geographically they are at a greater or lesser distance. During the Great War Germany played an important part in Finnish politics. When the Germans, whose military organisation served as a model not only for neutral Sweden but also for Finland, saw an opportunity of gaining a foothold in Finland by offering to land a force to help in the suppression of the Red rising, the Finnish Whites, being then by reason of the successes of the Reds in the position of a drowning man who clutches at a straw, accepted the German intervention. For the time being German influence became paramount in Finland. Then came the German *débâcle*, and with it the enthusiasm for Germany suffered a sudden extinction. After the peace Germany again endeavoured to recover her lost influence, and a second German invasion ensued, that of the German bagmen, which resulted in Germany capturing a large share of the import trade. Though the Germans are at present not particularly popular with the Finns, their thorough business methods and their comparative propinquity with Finland have obtained for them an important status in the country. The German-trained army officers still form a nucleus for the fostering of German *Kultur*.

But the change of sentiment which came over Finland as the result of Germany's downfall has steadily redounded to the improvement of the relations of Finland with Great Britain and to a lesser degree with the United States of America. Finland looks to us as her principal export market both for her timber and for her dairy produce. Britain absorbs forty per cent. of the total Finnish exports, three times more than the share of any other nation. The Anglophile policy has become so popular in Finland, that the Finns are making it their aim to encourage in every way the study of English in their schools. This development is partly fathered by the ambition of the militant Fennomans to oust the Swedish language from the schools by the substitution of English and so deprive the Svecoman of one of his chief means of propagating his culture. There is, however, apart from such internal political considerations a genuine desire on the part of the Finns to establish close relations with this country. The orientation of Finland, whatever other direction it may take, will certainly not be eastward. All their outlook is westward, and they see in this country their high ideal of western civilisation and have an honest admiration for our institutions and customs.

To the wisdom of those who framed the Treaties after the Great

War it seemed good to build a rampart as it were of States extending from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea bordering on the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and checking the incursion of Bolshevik influence into Western Europe from the various Soviet States that run with the rampart. How far the rampart will stand the test of time remains to be seen, but it is certain that Finland will not prove the weak spot in the lines of defence. Her previous knowledge of self-government has stood her in good stead, and as a Republic she now enjoys a stable government. Her economic position is sound, and she seems destined to make her weight felt as a stabilising influence in the north of Europe. She has a small army of 30,000 regular troops, the material of which is acknowledged to be of the highest quality, and she has moreover a "Defence Corps," a volunteer organisation about 80,000 strong recruited entirely from White elements, which guarantees her future security from internal trouble. The nation is imbued with a high sense of patriotism. Indeed, to give an inverted turn to the famous political diagnosis of the officer Marcellus anent a neighbouring northern kingdom, one may confidently affirm,

"Nothing is rotten in the state of Finland."

WILMOT P. M. RUSSELL.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE SCHEME OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.

IT would be curious but probably depressing if one knew how many people in Great Britain, when reading their newspapers on the morning of Friday, September 12th, 1930, took the trouble to read the report of what Mr. Henderson had said in the speech he delivered to the Assembly of the League of Nations the day before; and it would be still more interesting to know how many of those who did read it took fright when they discovered that in their name he had promised to support the "Convention on Financial Assistance to State Members of the League Victims of Aggression."

It is one of the surprising aspects of political experience that the lessons of experience, no matter how pointed they may be, or from what suffering they may emerge, are seldom taken to heart. In the present instance, the people of Great Britain have had the experience of the Great War and its financial consequences. It is the fact, recorded, documented, and gross, that the British Government mortgaged the future of the British people for two, perhaps three, generations ahead to pay for that war; and that the war loans made by Great Britain to her allies have not and never will be repaid. A British income-tax of 4s. 6d. in the £, with no prospect in the time of any living person of a substantial reduction, is the standing object lesson of what that means in practice. Yet the British Government, within twelve years of the end of that war, solemnly undertakes to pay the greater part of the cost of other people's hypothetical wars in the future. Throughout history it has been one of the saving graces of the British character that we do not know when we are beaten, and we pay the price grimly without knowing it. The low standard of life characteristic of Great Britain to-day, its concomitants of overwhelming taxation and unemployment, are the practical consequences of the defeat of Great Britain in the Great War—defeated by the perfidy of her allies and by her own gullibility. The people of Great Britain do not know that they were beaten. They are not interested in the real causes that have devastated British trade and reduced the industrial population to something like misery. And out of a large and grotesque persistence in folly a British Government so far forgets its duty as trustee of the nation's interests as to promise in advance of unseen contingencies to be the universal dupe again. Nor do the people who are thus betrayed take the slightest notice or even the slightest interest in their betrayal.

A detailed analysis of the scheme of "financial assistance" was given in this section of THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for October

1929 (pp. 514-24) and September 1930 (pp. 383-7). Its nature is not unfairly suggested by the short crude summary that it proposes to grant financial assistance to a state judged by Geneva to be the "aggrieved" party in a war; and that Great Britain shall pay most of the assistance. The motive is as good as it is obvious: but the angels must weep at the poverty of its intelligence. "What is truth?" said jesting Pilate. "Judge not lest ye be judged," said another voice, not jesting. Can any sober person feel any assurance that the mountains-old question of war guilt in any given war can be confidently, dogmatically, unerringly judged? Even a judicial system based on long tradition and on firm principles of right and wrong as between individuals in clear-cut acts, such as murder or fraud, is not infallible; how then can the machinery of international diplomacy, which has no tradition whatsoever of honest dealing, and only an incipient judicial principle of right and wrong: how can so shifty an instrument, even if used at Geneva, create any confidence in its wisdom? It is even arguable that the sporting chance of having a war paid for (in advance) by the British taxpayer might encourage a strong Power, strong enough or clever enough to force the convenient verdict at Geneva, to plunge into war where otherwise it might pause. The scheme does not present a clear, uncontroversial probability that it will prevent or even discourage war. It does present the certainty that if it became operative the unfortunate British taxpayer would be the dupe-in-chief. The exact defects and dangers of the scheme have before been argued in these pages: but the textual draft is too long to quote. One section, however, demands to be quoted in all its sinister precision:

"ARTICLE 18.

"1. In the event of a default by the borrowing Government in providing funds to pay the annual service of an authorised loan, the Trustees shall draw on the reserve constituted by application of Article 15, paragraph 4(b), until that reserve is exhausted. They shall at once notify the default to the Governments whose ordinary or special guarantees attach to the loan. They shall likewise notify any payments into the reserve.

"2. If, thirty days before the date at which a payment for interest or amortisation falls due, the Trustees have neither received from the borrowing Government nor possess in the reserve sufficient funds to make the payment, they shall inform each guarantor Government of the amount for which it will be liable if the deficiency is not made good. If, twenty days before the due date of the payment, the Trustees still are unable to make it in full, they shall present for payment those coupons of the ordinary guarantee

bonds which cover the service payment in question. If the deficiency is not total, the Trustees shall reduce *pro rata* the amounts which they call upon the guarantor Government to pay on the said coupons, and the coupons shall be endorsed accordingly. If a guarantor Government has not yet deposited its bonds as required by Article 16, the Trustees shall nevertheless call upon it and it shall be liable to make the payment due from it.

"3. The calls which are made by the Trustees upon the ordinary guarantor and special guarantor Governments shall be paid immediately by the said Governments to the Trustees notwithstanding that they may be at war with the borrowing Government or with any country or countries in which a part of the loan has been issued, and notwithstanding that the holders of any or all of the bonds of the series of the loan in the service of which the default has occurred may be subjects of, or resident in, a country or countries with which they are at war.

"4. The Trustees shall meet the service of the loan out of the yield of the calls made upon the Governments and shall apply the balance, and their receipts from any calls which are paid at a later date, to reimbursing *pro rata* to the special guarantor Governments the amounts paid by them in excess of their liabilities as ordinary guarantors."

Mr. Henderson having made his commitment, the last word still remains with the House of Commons. He who buoys his hope in reliance on the intelligence of the House of Commons will be able to reflect, should his hope fall sick, that a country has the House of Commons and the Government it deserves.

THE DICTATORS.

The world's dictators have fallen upon bad times. They have not escaped the misfortune that has been the common lot of men of affairs during the past two years. It is probably not an empty coincidence that has removed Dr. Siles from La Paz; President Leguia from Lima; President Hipolito Irigoyen from Buenos Aires; that is embarrassing Marshal Pilsudski in Warsaw and Mustapha Kemal Pasha in Angora. For two years the world has been sunk in the second cyclical depression of the post-war period, a worse depression than that of 1920. Everything has gone wrong at the same time, with an even greater precision and completeness than usually characterises the bad patches in human affairs. The normal deflation of an inflated financial condition of the world's stock markets has been made more serious than it intrinsically was by an unusually severe fall in commodity values, by unnecessarily and more than usually stupid politics in Europe, especially in Great

Britain, by a mischievous scramble for gold on the part of the world's money markets, a scramble directly caused by the inordinate and surprising greed of gold indulged by the Bank of France, and by other cognate causes. Now a dictator has no worse an enemy than an adversity which afflicts his country after his usurpation of power, whether that adversity be due to his own shortcomings or to extraneous causes wholly unrelated to him. Just as by-elections often go against a government in power for no other reason than that the average man must needs take any means to his hand of expressing his discontent, whether private or public, so, but more so, a dictator reaps the full whirlwind of passing discontent. Nor can he plead for mercy, for a general responsibility is his, of his own hypothesis.

The South American countries have been hit hard by the commodity slump. Bolivia depends for her livelihood on her export of tin, silver, lead, and copper; Peru on her sugar, petrol, and wool; the Argentine on grain and beef. The three President-dictators, Dr. Siles of Bolivia, Señor Leguía of Peru, Señor Irigoyen of the Argentine, had no special responsibility (beyond the normal responsibility of politicians for their lack of wisdom) for the fall in prices. Yet those South American countries, finding their prosperity turned to sudden privation, rose and rid themselves of the men who, perhaps foolishly, had committed themselves to both sides of the dictator's medal. Signor Mussolini stands so far as the majestic exception. His power and grip seem to increase through bad and good times alike: wherein is reflected a beneficent aspect of his rule.

Analogy, however, between the Latin American and the European countries may be deceptive. Four-fifths of the population of Bolivia consist of Indians and half-breeds who cannot read or write and who therefore are spared political irritation. Europe, by contrast, is the politician's paradise and the ordinary citizen's misfortune. The quick revolution whereby Bolivia or Peru in bad times send their President about his business is not as unsettling or as debasing as the slow slavery of the European peoples which culminates periodically in such holocausts as the Great War of 1914 to 1918. Marshal Pilsudski deserves what he gets in a truer sense than President Irigoyen deserves what he gets.

I. IN BOLIVIA.

The case of Bolivia illustrates the modern coincidence of economic with political fortune. During the war period, when the mad politicians of Europe wanted Bolivia's metals and were prepared to pay, with the approval of the unintelligent British politicians, an unlimited amount of British money, Bolivia was prosperous and

devoid of political interest. As soon as the war finished, and the insane demand ceased, prices slumped, and Bolivia adopted the revolutionary method of ridding herself of President Guerra (July 1920). The world-wide slump of 1920, however, catastrophic as it was, soon spent itself, and by the rule of the pendulum, as true a principle in economics and finance as in a grandfather's clock, it connoted the beginning of a period of inflation. Dr. Bautista Saavedra, who in 1920 was elected to succeed Señor Guerra as President, therefore had no difficulty in presiding over a prosperous and contented country.

Bolivian presidents are elected for a period of four years and are not eligible for re-election in the immediately following term. In 1926 Dr. Saavedra, finding no doubt that the Presidency of Bolivia was an agreeable experience, thought to ensure that he would renew that experience at the earliest possible moment, which would fall in 1930. His projected expedient was to nominate a friend, Dr. José Villanueva, a physician who held the portfolio of public instruction and agriculture in his Ministry, to be interim President for the period 1926-30, and his own brother, Dr. Abdon Saavedra, to be Vice-President in the same period. The two were duly elected on May 2nd, 1926, but the best laid schemes gang aft agley. The Senate refused to ratify the election on the technical ground that Dr. Villanueva had omitted to resign his current office six months before the election, such resignation by such a margin being prescribed by the constitution. The May election was declared by the Senate to be null and void. The new election, held in December, produced as the new President one Dr. Hernando Siles, likewise a nominee, but not the choicest nominee, of Dr. Saavedra. Dr. Abdon Saavedra, however, successfully became Vice-President, although the course of the Vice-President was destined not to prove a smooth one.

It happened that Dr. Siles was not a model President. His conception of himself was that of a dictator, his methods harsh and intolerant of original thought outside himself. He proceeded to act on his principle in the grim manner, reduced the country to a "state of siege," suspended every liberty that was guaranteed by the constitution (wherein he violated the said constitution), imposed the blindest censorship, flattened the incipient wonder of his Vice-President by banishing Dr. Saavedra from the country (1928) and in general thoroughly enjoyed himself according to his lights. The interesting thing is that during the first two years of such a régime all was well with the Bolivian people. The world-wide wave of prosperity and rising stock markets was gathering strength towards its highest crest, and the Bolivian people were in a mood hardly to notice the waywardness of a President, cave-man

though he thought himself to be. But the tide in the affairs of Bolivia, as of other countries, turned, and with it the mood of the Bolivian people hardened. The new Presidential elections were due to be held on May 4th, 1930. Dr. Siles decided that Bolivia need not have any election, and he circularised the Prefects to inform them that in view of the serious economic crisis produced by the inactivity of the mining industry, the elections would be, and were thereby, postponed *sine die*.

He had presumably been so happy in his cave that he had not noticed the change in the public temper, and had not even suspected the chance that his edict might be challenged. So pointedly was it challenged, however, that he himself found it healthy to resign the Presidency after three weeks of the storm he had excited. He resigned on May 28th. He was now taught that the country was not prepared to accept his unconstitutional conduct, although in better times such identical conduct had passed without comment.

Dr. Saavedra, the exiled Vice-President, now saw an opportunity of advancing his brother's cause. He telegraphed from Buenos Aires his intention by virtue of the Constitution of himself assuming the Presidency. The Cabinet, holding other views, issued a decree ordaining an election to be held on June 29th of delegates to a National Assembly. Neither the Cabinet nor the exiled Vice-President, however, made much impression on a populace now roused to action on their own account. Unrestrained and unco-ordinated revolutions broke out in various places. On June 25th the Cabinet was forced to resign by a rising of students of the Military College in league with the Engineering Corps. The decisive moment in that particular rising was reached when the Cabinet called upon the Flying Corps to suppress it and found instead that the Flying Corps was on the other side. On the following day the army, nominally controlled by a Central Committee of Officers, but in the main directed by General Carlos Blanco Galindo, announced, with some pretension to fact, that it was in charge of the country, the Departments of Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosi and Santa Cruz being already fully subjected to the Army's control. General Galindo was a firm and particular enemy of Dr. Siles, his main ambition being to drive him from the country. Dr. Siles, whose outlook and temper had suffered a drastic emendation, promptly fled for asylum to the Brazilian Legation, and his German henchman, General Hans Kundt, for his part took refuge in the German Legation.

Military committees were set up throughout the country, a Military Council was substituted for the Cabinet in La Paz, and immediately took steps to discourage any further extension of the

revolutionary movement, which now would logically be directed against the military directorate itself. La Paz itself, for instance, was being painted red by mobs of students and "workers of the world" who had all the air of triumphant revolutionaries. General Galindo dealt with that situation by dispatching some of his picked troops to teach the mob in the name of law and order that revolutionary tendencies could not be tolerated. General Galindo moved fast. He formally constituted himself and five colonels as the *de facto* government, and issued a statement to the paradoxical effect that the revolution had had for its object the vindication of the Constitution by the abolition of the virtual dictatorship exercised by Dr. Siles and General Kundt. He made a successful bid for patriotic support by expressing the opinion that the very presence of General Kundt in high office had been an affront to Bolivia. The new régime was calmly approved on all sides, and on August 22nd a new President in the person of Señor Daniel Salamanca was elected by a mass meeting of all the political parties. Thus passed Dr. Siles, a dictator who in effect had been enabled to play at being a dictator merely because his countrymen were too profitably engaged in other ways to take any notice of him, and who was given short shrift when they were disengaged from profitable pursuits and wanted by contrast to hit somebody.

2. IN PERU.

The story of the Peruvian revolution is as different from that of the Bolivian revolution as one Edgar Wallace thriller from another. The scenes and the names are different; the technique and the action are close of kin, although, oddly enough, they do not suffer in excitement thereby.

Peru, like Bolivia, is peopled mainly by Indians (the vast majority), half-breeds (*mestizos*), negroes, and Asiatics, some five million all told, ruled by half a million Spaniards. They are primitive souls, careless of politics except when the world demand for sugar, cotton, wool, petrol and copper falls to so low an ebb that they begin to feel the pinch of life's necessities. In such an event they take to revolution and dismiss their President. In the case of Peru there had been no need for Don Augusto B. Leguía to arrogate to himself any dictatorial power. It was already his constitutionally. The President need only be 35 years old, a Peruvian by birth, and a resident of ten years' standing, to qualify for election to the Presidency. Having been elected, there is no limit to his power. He is the chief executive, working through a Council of Ministers, simply nominated by himself. In practice his Ministers are his friends, his friends are his slaves or they cease to be his friends and are promptly disqualified for office. The diagnosis

of the August revolution is a simple matter. The hard times produced by the 1929 and 1930 slump—an adversity harder to bear by contrast with the affluence brought to Peru by the European spendthrifts aforementioned—bred discontent; and the only target for discontent was the President. No sooner had Bolivia polished off Dr. Siles than the Peruvians, close and sympathetic neighbours as they are, proceeded to act in the like manner. The successor to Dr. Siles was installed on August 22nd. On the very next day Peru started her own revolution, with precisely the like object, adopting precisely the like means and manner.

A soldier, Lieutenant-Colonel Sanchez Cerro, marched his garrison at Arequipa, the chief city of the south, into rebel operations, and organised a complete control of the city before Señor Leguía in Peru had had any warning of the projected coup. Fired by the simple spectacle of the military revolt at Arequipa, which was so easy and quick that it did not cost anything in bloodshed, the students and naval cadets of Callao tried their hand against the Government troops of that town. They too found it easy work, and within two days President Leguía, who according to the Bolivian pattern had sought immediate shelter in the Venezuelan Legation at Lima, resigned his office and escaped the country on a warship. A revolutionary committee was organised; it issued a statement to announce its intention of forming a "Government junta appointed by the army institutions"; General Manuel Ponce was appointed the new President, and the portfolio of foreign affairs was given to a naval officer, Captain Goicochea. Señor Leguía had made the tactical mistake of attempting his escape in a warship instead of an unofficial craft: for warships are the property of whatever government there may be at any moment. General Ponce, on the morrow of his appointment to the Presidency, ordered the warship to return to port, and the unhappy Leguía was there arrested. Colonel Cerro's *amour propre* was with reason wounded when he found that the revolution he had so successfully started had passed him by and given the plums to another. He indignantly refused to recognise the authority of General Ponce; but his refusal was of academic interest only. Thus passed President Leguía, a victim of circumstance.

3. IN THE ARGENTINE.

Most of the beef eaten in Great Britain comes from the Argentine. Mutton, wool, hides and petrol are also exported. Next to Canada the Argentine is the world's greatest exporter of wheat. Those facts give the key to the 1930 disturbance in the Argentine, as the corresponding facts give the key to the Bolivian and Peruvian disturbances. But the Argentine is hit harder by bad times,

as it prospers more in good times, than the other two, for it is the naturally most fortunate country of South America. Oddly enough the original misnomer of 400 years ago has been justified and invested with a prophetic value. The River Plate is not a river, nor is there any silver in or near the estuary it denotes; but the Provincias Unidas del Rio de la Plata, the United Provinces of the Silver River—the notion of silver arising from Sebastian Cabot's collection of silver ornaments given him by the Indians—could not have been more aptly named. Probably no two words in any language suggest greater natural wealth than the words River Plate.

The aged President, Dr. Hipolito Irigoyen, was singularly unlucky in starting his second Presidency in the spring of 1928. The four preceding years, which fell in the Presidency of Dr. Marcelo T. de Alvear, had been years of such prosperity as had never been known in the history of the country, for cattle values had been steadily rising. The general fall in values began in the early months of 1929, and the bill had to be footed, reasonably or not, by Dr. Irigoyen in the following summer. The President of the Argentine is constitutionally a dictator. He is the main-spring of the executive power, being merely assisted by a Ministry of eight, who are appointed by him. He is commander-in-chief of the army and the navy, and appoints not only all naval and military officers, but all civil and judicial officers as well.

Dr. Irigoyen had had a versatile past in his country's politics. His first rôle was that of revolutionary during the Baring crisis (for then as now financial crises brought revolution). He was exiled from the Argentine for his association with Leandro N. Alem in the 1893 revolution, and thereafter was not heard of politically for a generation. He retained his Radical sympathies, and came back to power as the Radical candidate at the first "free" election held under the system of secret voting that had been introduced by President Peña. The result of the voting caused widespread surprise, for the Radicals had been in the wilderness for thirty years, and Dr. Irigoyen himself was almost unknown to the younger generation. That was in 1916. The new President at once had an opportunity of showing that he was a man of originality and common sense, for in 1917, being appealed to by President Wilson, in common with the other Latin American States, to follow the example of the United States by declaring war on Germany, he resolutely rose above the emotional temptation and refused to abandon his policy of neutrality. Therein he served the interests of his country, as any politician serves his country's interests if he keeps it out of war.

The Argentine reaped its full share of the reflex prosperity dis-

pensed by a suicidal Europe, and by the same token lost the abnormal market when the war spent itself. Dr. Irigoyen showed his wisdom also in the measures he took in the years of prosperity to benefit the working people. He inspired his Cabinet to pass a series of acts for social improvements, such as provided for compensation for workers injured or made permanently unfit by accidents or disease incurred in their work, for the cheap housing of workers, for the control of sweated industries, early closing, the restriction of Sunday hours of work, employers' liability and the like. It was due also to Dr. Irigoyen's progressive outlook that the Argentine promptly (July 16th, 1919) joined the League of Nations, being the first Latin American State to do so. He therein in his turn gave a hint to the United States, which, also in its turn, was not accepted.

Ironically, however, the advanced views that prevailed in Buenos Aires were not only too advanced for Geneva in those early days, but were the cause of the Argentine's precipitate withdrawal from the League of Nations. At the first Assembly (1920) the Argentine representative demanded the immediate inclusion of Germany in the League. The demand was rejected, and the Argentine, not understanding an organisation which theoretically aimed at international peace and understanding, but which retained the war-time division between "enemies" and "allies," shook off the dust from her feet. It often happens that the evil men do is reaped in recurrent harvests for ever after. The Geneva League of Nations has not succeeded in establishing any greater prestige in South America than, for instance, in Asia. Who shall say that so unfortunate a circumstance has not resulted from the cowardice of the European members of the League in 1920?

Dr. Irigoyen's first office as President ended in October 1922. He began his second in October 1928. Owing to the circumstances above alluded to, his popularity began to wane in 1929. In the spring of 1930 a measure of what he had lost in favour was given in the figures of the voting for the biennial renewal of one half of the Chamber of Deputies. Although the number of Irigoyenist deputies was as a result increased from 86 to 100, out of a total Chamber of 158, there was a marked decrease in the number of Irigoyenist votes that were cast. When he was elected President in 1928 he polled 827,000 votes against 468,000 cast by the combined Opposition parties. In 1930 the Irigoyenist vote dropped to 610,000 and the Opposition vote increased to 733,000. Judged by votes alone therefore it was obvious that the world depression had already robbed him of his personal prestige, so far as the majority of his countrymen were concerned. As the summer advanced and no improvement was experienced in the condition of trade, the dis-

content increased and the temptation to follow the example of Bolivia and of Peru proved to be overwhelming.

The revolution not only followed the exact pattern of its Latin American forerunners, but on the first whiff, the result being regarded as a foregone conclusion, the citizens of Buenos Aires prepared to enjoy it as a spectacle, and occupied the best positions on roof tops and balconies. Dr. Irigoyen, who probably felt what was coming before he saw it, tried to sandbag it by voluntarily abandoning the Presidency. The stratagem was useless. In Latin America revolutions are effected in conformity with a regular technique, in which the first step is recognised as the prerogative of the students. On the evening of September 4th 3,000 students marched the streets of Buenos Aires shouting loud for the resignation of the President, who was old enough to be their grandfather. They brought their carnival to a climax before Government House in the Plaza de Mayo, where in their exuberance they ignored the warnings of the police. The police in the end fired upon them, wounding several of the students, one fatally. On the next day, September 5th, the students "cut" their lectures and prepared for further fray. It was at that point that Dr. Irigoyen decided to attempt the strategy of delegating his Presidency to the Vice-President, Señor Martinez, whose first act in his new capacity was to declare martial law (September 6th).

That declaration drove the matter to a sudden decision, for everything would now depend on the loyalty of the naval and military forces. Probably nobody expected loyalty from those quarters. From an early hour of that same morning some thirty army aeroplanes flew low over the city dropping circulars urging the civilians to join with the army and the navy in overthrowing the Government. The Cadets of the Military College and armed civilians joined issue with the police; shops and business offices were closed, and the roof tops filled with spectators; the army proper, swollen by civilians, began to march on the capital from Campo de Mayo; General Uriburu telegraphed to President Irigoyen and to Señor Martinez to demand their resignations: and the revolution was over. The white flag was flown from Government House in the afternoon of the same day (September 6th). To encourage the Government to make up its mind quickly a fleet of sixteen army aeroplanes flew over Government House firing machine guns with blank cartridges. A provisional junta was formed by General Uriburu on September 7th, when he, as provisional President, issued a spirited manifesto in these terms:

"Responding to the desires of the people and supported by the Army and Navy, we have taken the reins of government in order to avert a definite national débâcle. The country could no longer

put up with the inertia, administrative corruption, anarchy, economic waste, and international discredit. Our action is inspired by a high ideal, the country's welfare, not by any desire for vengeance or any political interest, for we are not tied to any political party.

"The Provisional Government intends to respect the Constitution, and desires the resumption of normal conditions and free elections. The members of the Provisional Government undertake not to accept candidature for the Presidency of the Republic. The present Parliament will be dissolved, its servile majority having paralysed legislative action and debased the dignity of Parliament.

"We invoke the country's name and the memory of the heroes of independence."

The case of the Argentine is differentiated from those of Bolivia and of Peru by the paucity of evidence that Dr. Irigoyen acted unconstitutionally. There seems to be little justification for the vigorous indictment contained in General Uriburu's proclamation. It is true that President Irigoyen made of the Argentine Government something of a "one-man show," but such a phenomenon is of the very essence of the constitution. It is also true that the President's mind—he was close on 80—was not as elastic or active as it was eight years ago, and that the fair criticism could be made that he had suffered in efficiency: but there seems to have been no intrinsic reason for removing him by revolutionary means. The conclusion seems clear that the President was made the scapegoat for the prevailing economic distress.

4. IN POLAND.

The European aspect of contemporary dictatorship is more exciting than the South American. In particular the recent history of Marshal Pilsudski's gymnastic attempt to rule dictatorially but to cover his dictatorship with a veneer of constitutionalism by the method of browbeating his parliament into doing only what he wishes it to do, has been prolific of dramatic and occasionally of entertaining situations. In so far as the Sejm has lacked docility he has lost his temper, and he has a highly coloured, if not always beautiful, vocabulary in which to interpret his thought. On such a recent occasion, for instance (August 27th), he spoke in these words, which were published in the form of an interview with the editor of the Government organ, *Gazeta Warszawska*: "The Constitution . . . at present is like a piece of rotting meat mixed with foul bacon and putrid cabbage, and as much unwashed as the spirit of the Deputies who in Poland are an infamous band. The entire work of the Parliament stinks so that the air is poisoned."

Marshal Pilsudski's difficulties increase as the days. It seems unlikely that the condition of tension that he has produced between

himself and his parliament can last long. Something must break soon or late. The misfortunes of this rugged, violent man, his unpractical temper, his bitterness, are probably explained by the peculiar circumstances of his youth. To have been born, as Pilsudski was born, in the east of Europe in the second half of the last century would be a hard lot for any man. For a man of Pilsudski's impulsive emotion it was disastrous. He was born of an old, noble and wealthy family on the family estate of Zulov, near Vilna. The irony of his being in origin a Lithuanian and of being born near Vilna is not the only ironical feature of his muddled life. Knowing from his experience the hopeless misery of oppression, his indignation drove him, as it has driven others whose feelings have mastered their intelligence, into the ranks of extreme Socialism: but his resentment against Russian domination implanted in his youthful mind a militarist fever which he has never shaken off. He spent his youth trying to organise a military revolt against Russia. Fear was his motive, and it is probably that attribute which explains the paradox whereby, after living to see Poland a free country, he has not thought it proper to treat the weaker nations which came into his path—for instance, Lithuania—in any other spirit than that of an oppressor. His megalomania is perhaps also a complex of his original sense of fear.

During the course of 1930 his temper and his difficulties have alike increased. His tactic of appointing puppet Prime Ministers to do his bidding on their own ostensible responsibility has led to constant changes of personnel and to constant conflict with the Sejm. Mr. Bartel, the new puppet who had been sworn on New Year's Eve, faced the Sejm on January 10th, but was submitted to what his supporters called "orgies of irresponsibility" on the part of the Opposition. It is a difficult rôle that a Pilsudski Prime Minister has to play, for he cannot command a majority in parliament, yet has to pretend that he is submitting himself to the verdict of parliament. He and his audience know that the form of parliamentary government will be maintained only in so far as parliament expresses no views of its own. The Poles being an ebullient people, the Sejm has from time to time found its repression intolerable, has exploded into violent forms of recrimination and defiance, and voted down the puppet. Mr. Bartel suffered such a fate on March 15th, when the Opposition parties could not refrain from voting him out of office though they knew that no constructive purpose would be served thereby. Marshal Pilsudski had hoped ten weeks earlier that Mr. Bartel might exert a sedative influence on the Sejm and coax the deputies into passing the budget. But Mr. Bartel, himself a Pole, found himself unable under provocation to refrain from the most violent denunciation of the

Seym, wherefrom it resulted that his effect on the Sejm was other than sedative. The fall of Mr. Bartel before the budget could be passed was a matter of concern to Marshal Pilsudski.

His solution of the dilemma threw a vivid light on the irony and the humour of a situation in which he tried at one and the same time to dispense with parliament and yet technically not to violate its rights. His opportunity consisted in preventing the Sejm from meeting between the day of Mr. Bartel's resignation and April 1st, for on the latter date the budget could be legally promulgated by decree. How was he to span those eighteen days? Only by postponing the appointment of Mr. Bartel's successor, for it is the unwritten law in Warsaw that neither House shall sit between the resignation of one Prime Minister and the appointment of his successor. Boldly therefore Marshal Pilsudski's supporters announced that they would insist, if necessary by force, on the vindication of that law, and the whole responsibility would rest on the Opposition, which, they said, had wantonly precipitated a crisis instead of passing the budget.

None the less Marshal Pilsudski decided that a little finesse would be better than a wholly blank period of eighteen days. He proposed in succession two phantom candidates for the Prime Ministership, neither of whom had any intention, of their own or his, of assuming that office. They merely wasted time, or gained time for the Marshal by holding conferences with the various party leaders. The two candidates were Mr. Szymanski, the Marshal of the Senate, and Mr. Jan Pilsudski, the Marshal's younger brother and a Governmental deputy. The Sejm members were divided in opinion whether to accept fight. The pugnacious element won, and the Speaker was induced to summon a meeting of parliament for March 29th, the last available day before April 1st. There arose the danger of boiling blood and physical violence. The Government *bloc* even threatened to prevent the sitting by force and assembled in the central lobby for the fray. Happily the battle was averted a few minutes before the session was due to begin by means of a compromise reached behind the scenes by the contending parties, the Opposition undertaking to let the budget pass in return for the empty victory of being allowed to hold their session. After the session the parliament was prorogued, and a new Pilsudski puppet, Colonel Valerian Slavek, Chairman of the Governmental *bloc*, at once formed another Government.

The choice of Colonel Slavek seemed to suggest that Marshal Pilsudski was losing patience with the Sejm. Colonel Slavek had been one of the Marshal's revolutionary friends, he seldom attempted to conceal his contempt of the political parties and of the whole political system, believed in violence and in the strong hand

as the simplest and most effective means of government. He was in no hurry to convoke the Sejm, and when the parties began to demand an extraordinary session, Colonel Slavek made a laconic announcement—the only statement of policy that came from his lips—in one single sentence, thus: "The logic of events virtually permits only one conclusion, which is that the present Sejm shall not exercise its right of speech again, and that we are nearing an appeal to public opinion at new elections."

It looked as if the long threatened conflict between the Sejm and the Dictator was being brought to a head. The parties succeeded in obtaining the necessary number of deputies to sign a petition for the convocation of an extraordinary session of parliament. Article 25 of the Constitution stipulates that the President must convene such a session within a fortnight of being asked to do so by not fewer than one-third of the deputies. That petition, signed by 149 out of the total Chamber of 444, was handed to the President on May 9th. On the following day he issued an edict that the Sejm should meet in extraordinary session on May 23rd. The promptness with which the President granted the request was probably explained by the fact that by the terms of the same Constitution he still retained the power of adjourning an extraordinary session for not more than thirty days as soon as it was due to meet. On the morning of May 23rd, therefore, one hour before the Diet was due to meet, the President prorogued it for thirty days. Colonel Slavek thereafter explained in a statement to the Press that as the Constitution did not enforce the summoning of both Houses on the request of only one of them, he had recommended to the President the summoning of only the Lower House; and that he had further advised the President to prorogue the Diet before the debate could begin because he was convinced that co-operation between the existing parliament and the Government was impossible. He added that, in his belief, the Opposition was trying to exploit the prevailing economic distress by carrying on a propaganda against the Government, his own view being by contrast that the economic crisis demanded intensive work of the Government, undisturbed by friction in the Diet. The event had not been unexpected, but the Radical and Centre Deputies met to pass a resolution of protest against the prorogation.

Nor was any surprise excited when after the expiry of the thirty days the President (June 22nd) finally closed the Extraordinary Session (which had never begun) by the issue of a simple edict to that effect: for Marshal Pilsudski had already explained that he would not allow parliament to meet again before the autumn. Thereafter, during the remainder of the summer, both sides were quietly preparing for the trial of strength that could no longer be

evaded. A joint congress of the Centrolew (the Centre and the Left Oppositions) was held at Cracow on June 29th, and passed a resolution demanding the resignation of President Moscicki, who was described as a man who had forgotten his oath and had given heed to a "Cabinet of Colonels." The significance of that demonstration was that it seemed to crystallise the Dictatorship as a definite issue for the next election. Legal proceedings were taken against the leaders of the demonstration by the Civil Governor of Cracow on the ground of *lèse majesté*. Probably in anticipation of the struggle, Pilsudski's Prime Minister, Colonel Slavek, resigned on August 23rd and the Marshal himself assumed the office. He promptly started a propaganda of which the burden was that the Constitution had been proved defective and must be revised, and that the Sejm, of whom at least 100 were "absolute knaves," could not be allowed to rule the country. Marshal Pilsudski, in effect, had tried and had failed to combine a dictatorial substance with a constitutional form and therefore came to the grim conclusion that he must evolve another constitution such as might lend itself to the peculiar function he demanded of it.

It appeared, however, that the crudity of his tactic was not yet abandoned. By maintaining his respect for the Constitution to the extent of authorising a general election for a new Diet to be held on November 16th and for a new Senate on November 23rd, he gave rise to the belief that he would make one final attempt to combine the semblance of parliamentary form with the substance of his personal dictatorship. It remained doubtful how he could achieve such an end in view of the virtual impossibility of his obtaining a majority at the election, for it would follow that his Sejm would be as hostile as ever. He then showed his hand by arresting nine of the chief Opposition leaders. It looked as if his policy was to ensure a majority at the election by the method of muzzling his opponents. His is not an easy life.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

September 15th, 1930.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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JOHN KEATS THROUGH JAPANESE EYES.*

Dr. Takeshi Saito, Assistant Professor in the Imperial University of Tokyo, in this remarkable work on Keats and his outlook on Poetry, shows that new light can be thrown on the poetry of the farthest West by critics of the farthest East, that the delicate humanism of Japan can understand not merely the delicacy of line that some English critics have called sensuous, but can rebut this implication in almost burning words.

Professor Saito writes delightful English, an achievement indeed since there are perhaps no languages so dissimilar as Professor Saito's native tongue and English. Professor Edmund Blunden, who held a chair at Tokyo from 1924 to 1927, in his introduction to this book tells us that, despite several points of resemblance, Japan became acquainted with the literature of England within living memory and "even now the Japanese scholar of English literature who lives in his rural town between factory-chimney and cherry-tree is frequently gruelled for lack of some book or authority, not to be had there for love or money." Professor Blunden pleads for those Japanese travellers who visit England and seek the

* *Keats' View of Poetry*. By Takeshi Saito, to which is prefixed an essay on *English Literature in Japan*, by Edmund Blunden. Cobden-Sanderson, Montague Street, London. 6s. net.

fountain heads of modern English. They come with real knowledge of modern English literature, and yet "in the end they perhaps return to Japan without having had half a dozen conversations in literary circles, and without more than a passing glimpse of men of letters here. . . . Could not England do better for her friends?" That is a matter of organisation. The Japanese Embassy could give these travellers a letter of introduction to the Secretary of the British Academy who could arrange these desired meetings.

The cult of English in Japan has grown with an amazing rapidity. Shelley and Keats have won the heart of literary Japan, despite the inrush of the influence of the Russian realists. Moreover, Dr. Tsubouchi has lived to complete his translation of Shakespeare "and to see the event crowned by the establishment of a Shakespearean Museum in Waseda University, where he founded the English department." There are a number of great linguists at work on English, of whom the leaders are Professor Sanki Ichikawa of Tokyo, Professor Doi and Professor Toyoda (the authority on George Eliot and her times). "They send out through their country a series of young teachers rich in the learning, the security and the light of our great writers," and the enterprising publishers, the Kenkyūsha, "have a surprising catalogue of our standard authors introduced and annotated by those scholars." Professor Saito has translated many of our famous poems, including Browning's *Saul*, and in his *Historical Survey of English Literature, with Special Reference to the Spirit of the Times*, published in Japanese in 1927, has shown a firm grasp of a singularly difficult theme.

But Professor Saito's great linguistic and humanistic gifts could not be seen to better purpose than in this series of essays on the work of John Keats. In the first he discusses the Keatsian theme of "Beauty and Truth," and at once classes Keats as a romanticist who is an optimist discerning "an 'unseen power' amidst 'this dim, vast vale of tears, vacant and desolate,'" and hoping "to bring to the world a better state of society in which everybody can enjoy liberty and take delight in what nature and life supply him." In a word Keats watched the outward world and "saw there the slow, but steady forward movement of humanity as a whole." The Japanese critic adds: "this belief in human progress was a rare gift among contemporary poets and thinkers." In fact Lord Byron had that gift, but rather as a statesman than as a poet, and Sir Walter Scott had it also in his universal historical visions.

But Professor Saito is frankly surprised to find it as a dominant quality in Keats. He is not misled by the phrase, "O for a life of Sensations rather than of Thoughts," into thinking that Keats was a mere worshipper of earthly beauty. He realises that the

phrase means, as Sir Sidney Colvin says, "direct intuitions of imagination as opposed to deliberate process of the understanding," and contrasts Wordsworth and Keats:

the elder poet was first essentially a humanitarian idealist and then a poet of "intellectual beauty," whereas the younger, remaining from first to last a poet-lover chiefly of sensuous beauty, was in his last years an idealist-poet, endeavouring to grasp the reality of things in nature and life.

Yet Professor Saito rightly emphasises the fact that Keats was never trained in philosophy and suffered "much from his lack of sustained reasoning." Shelley had had an education that gave him both philosophy and reasoning power, but that was not so with Keats:

If he had had greater reasoning and critical faculties, he could have avoided such defects as the confusion of symbolical meanings, resulting in disjointedness and his not infrequent indulgence in sensuous, almost sensual, delights, which is in striking contrast with the idealist aspiration of the hero. If his mind had been philosophically trained, *Endymion* might have been "a deed accomplished" instead of "a feverish attempt."

The fact is grasped by the poet in the Preface to *Endymion* and "he seems to have prepared himself for the study of philosophy." Yet what Keats was looking for was "personal and not logical exercise." He was preparing "never to take anything for granted." On this point and the attack on philosophy in *Lamia* (II, 229-38), Professor Saito boldly crosses swords with Sir Sidney Colvin and declares that it is to Wordsworth, and not Lamb, that the poet should be compared. Keats is not criticising philosophy as such in *Lamia*, but

A reasoning, self-sufficing thing,
An intellectual All-in-all.

The famous lines

Beauty is truth, truth beauty—that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know

are explained by the key that the word "truth" is used in the sense of reality and "in Keats' opinion, though it is not clearly stated, a thing of absolute beauty is at the same time a thing of reality." This critic apparently agrees with Matthew Arnold that it is "not all," but Professor Saito adds:

still it is all-in-all that artists know, and the most important thing of all that they should know. . . . If the word "truth" is used in a sense of scientific law, we cannot, as a matter of fact, say truth is always beauty. But what is absolutely beautiful must be essential and real, and what is essential and real must

be beautiful if adequately expressed. This interpretation is confirmed by Keats himself. . . . It is true that Keats loved sensuous beauty and cared for art more than any other earlier Romantic poet. But this is not sufficient ground for calling him an art-for-art's-sake writer. No poet of that school can declare that his beauty is "a power strong in beauty." Keats' humanitarian conception of beauty, art, and poetry is at variance with the æsthete's hedonistic notion of them. The æsthete is evidently classed as the dreamer by the author of *The Fall of Hyperion*.

The poet and the dreamer are distinct,
Diverse, sheer opposite, antipodes.

Keats' view is art for life's sake, and, it may be truly said, he practised what he preached.

This is a bold, true criticism, and yet it is not from an English, but a Japanese critic, by one trained in subtler distinctions in art than most English critics. But Professor Saito's method is simple since he lets Keats explain himself and his meanings by his letters, and from that source illuminates misunderstandings due to the poet's weakness in philosophy and sustained logical thought.

The essential humanitarianism of Keats is indeed at one with his admiration of beauty. The world cannot be beautiful if men have not the opportunities of becoming beautiful and the poet cannot be a poet of beauty and truth unless he is utterly unselfish. "In short," Keats says, "a great poet is selfless, because in his intense imaginative power and ardent desire for reality, he loses himself in the object of his thinking and lives the life of that object." Professor Saito adds, with the deepest insight, "this idea of reality and objectivity is . . . a thing rarely found in Romantic and subjective poets, and it makes Keats unique among them . . . it may not be an exaggeration to say that, of all modern poets of the United Kingdom Keats is the most akin to Shakespeare in his flexible and receptive selflessness." He had the ambition to produce great drama—"a few fine plays"—but it was not to be. The hand of death was upon him at the very time that he confessed to that ambition, but, as this Japanese critic says, in his narrative poems he shed for us some of his dramatic action, and he was indeed a dramatist in promise.

Professor Saito throws much light on the poet and his infinite possibilities in those great five years of production. The reader is forced to re-appreciate a man and a poet who is in some sense not altogether appreciated by English readers and even by critics, though it is true that some English critics have pronounced Keats to be the greatest pure poet of the nineteenth century. The Japanese critic fully appreciates what he calls, with justice, "this deeply introspective and subtle mind." Keats did not realise

his own powers when he wrote to Haydon "I am three and twenty with little knowledge and muddling intellect," but he slowly realised his vast intuitive powers and was frightened at them: "there is no greater Sin after the seven deadly than to flatter oneself into an idea of being a great Poet." This very fear made the poet strive to formulate for himself the function of poetry, and

at last in the *Fall of Hyperion* we hear the most articulate utterance of Keats' final view of the aim and end of great poetry . . . "of seizing the reality of things and singing of it with a selfless spirit. . . ." He might have thought that a poet is great in proportion to what he does for the world. Keats was so fully conscious of the value of a life devoted to doing practical good, that, even when the public was bitterly denouncing his *Endymion*, he said, "I would jump down Ætna for any great public good," and again, "I find there is no worthy pursuit but the idea of doing some good to the world." To be a poet was, for him, to do good for others in his own way. "Although I take Poetry to be chief, yet there is something else wanting to one who passes his life among Books and thoughts on Books"—is not this a remarkable protestation in a writer who has, for generations, been stigmatised as a sensuous poet? "I am ambitious of doing the world some good; if I should be spared, that may be of maturer years—in the interval I will assay to reach to as high a summit in poetry as the nerve bestowed upon me suffer." . . . Keats believed that pure poetry should be written in spontaneous and inevitable words, and a true poet must observe the native quality of the mother tongue, that is, prefer the natural English way to the foreign manner of expression.

He was afraid of Milton, and became so "worried about Miltonisms in his poems that he left them unfinished." He preferred Chatterton "the most English of poets, except Shakespeare." Professor Saito—the comment shows the vast range of his knowledge—says that "Chatterton's diction is not so pure as Keats thought. But as for its spontaneity and inevitability of diction, with the peculiar musical movement, Keats is quite right to call him characteristically English." But, strangely enough, Milton, as well as Keats, was looking for the well of English undefiled.

Professor Saito's essays will be read with singular pleasure by all who are looking for new light on the nineteenth-century renaissance of English poetry, and English critics will have much pride in drawing him into their ranks with his new outlook and a new humanism that gives to John Keats his place as a man who loved his fellowmen as well as a poet who laid down new principles of the poetic art. Professor Saito should give us, in English, some Japanese poet who is akin to Keats, since there must be such: a poet who has been by the Japanese critic's side and has incited him to write these entrancing studies.

J. E. G. DE M.

NAPOLEON AND TILSIT.*

Mr. Butterfield's excellent and very original essay on the peace tactics of Napoleon in the height of his career is written

with special reference to the personalities engaged in the work of diplomacy, so that it might become apparent how much in these Napoleonic times the course of events could be deflected by the characters and the idiosyncrasies of ambassadors and ministers who were far from home.

Mr. Butterfield starts with the victories of Jena and Auerstädt, which crowned only one week of war, and we are plunged at once, while Napoleon was sweeping the country and occupying Berlin, into the negotiations for peace that Luchesi entered into with Duroc, Napoleon's mirror. Terrible terms resulted, but they were accepted and yet they led to nothing.

The Prussians found themselves helpless and bewildered before one of those long inauspicious silences of Napoleon—silences of a man who was brooding new terrors for the world. The Emperor had decided to change his plans. . . . The whole history of the year 1806 proves that the real antagonism in Europe at this time had been between France and Russia. Throughout the year both Powers had turned their attention to the Adriatic and the Near East, and had seen there the next, the most immediate, conflict of their interests.

Napoleon reduced Prussia, by actual fighting and by the armistice of November 11th, 1806, into a puppet Power, but he refused to make a separate peace and occupied the country till a general peace emerged. Prussia rejected the armistice and joined her lot with Russia and the Coalition, though not with enthusiasm, and the war in Poland began, each Power seeking from the war some definite diplomatic advantage. The drawn battle of Eylau, on February 8th, 1807, the turning-point of the winter campaign in Poland, made Napoleon almost eager for something like peace. Mr. Butterfield rightly says that "After Eylau, Napoleon knew the strength of the enemy he had to fight in a region where even the elements were against him." The Czar, too, was sick of this fighting for position in subsequent negotiation, and Prussia was losing faith in Russia. Meanwhile, in the early spring, Austria offered mediation between the conflicting Powers.

With the spring all Napoleon's energy revived, while the arrival of the Czar at Memel gave new hope to the Coalition, who were in no mood for Austrian mediation. Napoleon had learned long before that the mediation was merely a cover for belligerent intentions, but he accepted "for himself and his allies" "the friendly

* *The Peace Tactics of Napoleon, 1806-8.* By H. Butterfield. Cambridge: at the University Press. 16s. net.

intervention of Austria." That intervention, not without its uses to Austria, faded away after the victory of Friedland. Direct negotiations suited the Powers, and "on the very eve of Friedland, therefore, Europe is on the point of seeing the assembly of a congress that is to comprise Austria and all the powers at war." But it was to be an armed Congress, everything in reality turned on fighting, and Mr. Butterfield thinks that "the congress, even if it had met, would not have prevented Friedland." The almost desperate position of Napoleon in the spring of 1807 was relieved in late May by the capture of Danzig and by the complete defeat of the Russians at Friedland on June 15th, the anniversary of Marengo. The Czar and the French Emperor made an armistice on June 21st and met on the Niemen on June 25th. Alexander felt that Austria and Great Britain had abandoned him, and he determined not only to make peace with but become the friend and ally of Napoleon. Mr. Butterfield says, perhaps rightly, that there is

a temptation to find a too-facile continuity in history, and see after the battle of Friedland a simple ascending ladder to Tilsit; in reality the issue is the result of a conflict of forces and a collision of wills. There is an interplay of personalities who themselves are not always unities, but, repeating the conflict within their own spirits, are torn with irreconcilable moods and purposes, divided against themselves. The decision of Alexander to become the ally and friend of Napoleon is like the gradual emergence of a green shining film on a surface of a boiling cauldron in which a score of ingredients have been in perplexing effervescence. An account of that decision would be oversimplified if it were not written with a sort of counterpoint, to show the undercurrents that sometimes ran against it.

The description of the psychology of the two Emperors, the two autocrats who were not responsible to any superiors, is the crowning part of Mr. Butterfield's very able book. When the two men met on a raft in the middle of the river Niemen, they met in moods that were on both sides hopeful, though it was Napoleon who was the hope-giver. Who was in fact behind Alexander it is difficult to tell, but the Prussian influence is at first apparent, and yet Alexander abandoned Prussia in the interview. It was the magnetism of Napoleon that made the change, but it was also his magnetism which had inspired Alexander after the wretched days that followed Friedland.

He made in fact a more complete surrender to Napoleon than he had intended or imagined on the eve of the meeting. This was the real achievement of Napoleon in the conversations that took place. It was the proud consummation of Tilsit. For it left the two Emperors alone, arm in arm on a mountain of their own, in close mysterious intimacy and picturesque alliance; it enabled them to strike the imagination of the world with the vision of a magnificent empire dividing the east and the west.

Yet the fact that Napoleon gained his chief victory—a victory of peace that reminds the onlooker of other victories of peace, such as the Code Napoléon and the earlier reorganisation of France after the Revolution—on the Nieman raft partly discounts the subtle psychological study which Mr. Butterfield gives the reader. Napoleon overwhelmed with the essential reasonableness of his great mind the Prussian and German influences that seemed to have controlled the Russian Czar up to that moment. It was not the result of the battle of Friedland but the direct influence of one mind upon another, a mind receptive and noble, and one that recognised the truth of projects that had not occurred to a European since the days of another Alexander, son of Philip II of Macedon. When the two Emperors met the result was not in doubt. Chancellor Budberg had many explanations for the change of Russian policy, but the real cause was the personal impact with Napoleon. Mr. Butterfield says that Alexander's "gullibility while in the actual presence of his old enemy, can scarcely be doubted." Perhaps that is not the term to use. Alexander was converted to a great system of world politics. He was sincere, he, as Mr. Butterfield says, "became inwardly reconciled, like a man who has found his true home." When Napoleon and Alexander parted on June 25th, 1807, the Napoleonic Empire grew to its height and the Continental System was assured.

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THE TRAGEDY OF KIRK O' FIELD.*

There is probably no figure in history that has attracted more attention and less unanimity from historians than Mary, Queen of Scots. History and sentiment have enshrined her with a glamour and mystery which have never been completely dissipated. She has been attacked for craft and cunning. She has been pitied as an innocent plaything of relentless faction and intrigue. Every historian is partial about Mary Stuart, for her personality strikes the historian of each age and makes him a partisan. The late Major-General R. H. Mahon, in his new work entitled *The Tragedy of Kirk o' Field** is such a partisan, and he writes enthralled by the view that the queen's life and character have been maligned and deserve to be cleared. General Mahon has written a remarkable book, for in it he seeks to find a new interpretation of the murder of Darnley in February 1567 and the events which led up to it. He exonerates Mary from any intention to kill her husband. He shows the converse. Darnley had laid plans to kill Mary.

* Cambridge University Press. 16s. net.

Through Bothwell, she learnt of the plot. It miscarried, and Darnley became the victim instead of the murderer.

The value of a theory which runs so directly counter to much that is accepted to-day as true by historians must depend on the evidence brought to its support. General Mahon realised this and started his own line of research. His book is divided into two parts. In the first he reconstructs the tragedy, just as in any modern criminal trial, and finds, with the help of a scale model of the precincts of St. Mary-in-the-Fields and all relevant evidence, that the accepted narratives of the murder are physically impossible. In the early morning of February 10th, 1567, the house at Kirk o' Field where Darnley had been convalescing from a serious illness was blown up, and Darnley himself was found murdered in a garden not many yards away. According to the theories accepted at the time, Bothwell, with the connivance and support of Mary, planned the murder of Darnley with a view to marrying the Queen and assuming the kingship himself. During the evening before the tragedy occurred Mary, accompanied by a number of her court, visited the King and celebrated the end of his convalescence prior to his return to Holyrood on the following day. Immediately below the king's bedroom was the queen's chamber, and it is alleged that in this room, during the revels above, a pile of gunpowder was heaped on the floor and preparations were made to blow up the king. Mary and her entourage returned to Edinburgh at eleven o'clock and the explosion occurred in the early hours of the following morning.

According to the official narrative Darnley was killed by force of the explosion and hurled over the town wall into the south garden. The fact that the body was not found mangled and also the fact that beside the body of Darnley's servant, who was discovered lying by his master, were found several articles of wear, go to disprove this theory. Another theory largely accepted was that the murder took place before the explosion. Most of the contemporary accounts were made to fit in with the allegation that Mary and Bothwell were the murderers. But if this presumption is laid aside and evidence is not sorted to support a theory but simply to find one, a totally different conclusion must be reached. With his expert knowledge of gunpowder and firearms, General Mahon plays havoc with the old theory. He shows fairly conclusively that no gunpowder could have been heaped on the floor in the queen's chamber without a premature explosion or detection: moreover the amount of powder in the chamber was insufficient to account for the extent of the explosion. He compares it to the gunpowder plot of 1605, when Guy Fawkes thought it necessary to use 4,000 pounds of gunpowder. "A floor supported on wooden beams, as

in our case, separated the upper from the lower storey. So that, to accomplish much about the same effect, something like eighteen times as much explosive was provided." As is hinted in certain sources, General Mahon has no doubt in declaring that the basement of the house was charged with powder, not the queen's bedroom.

The question as to whether Mary intended to return to Kirk o' Field for the night, after leaving Darnley at eleven o'clock, is very important. Though nothing can be proved, there is plenty of documentary evidence to that effect. According to the Lennox narrative: it "seemed that she would have tarried all night with him." In a letter addressed to the Archbishop of Glasgow Mary is said to have written: "And of very chance tarried not all night by reason of some masque in the Abbey." General Mahon does not think that the promise to attend the masque was the real cause of her not returning. "There would be no very decisive reason why the Queen should not attend the masque and *return thereafter to Kirk o' Field.*"

It is in the notorious midnight meeting with Bothwell that General Mahon finds the true reason. Bothwell had suspicions of the plot against the Queen and for this reason dissuaded her from returning. Moreover, Bothwell is not to be regarded at this time as seeking the crown. He had not as yet sufficient support and influence to plot against Darnley with the support of Mary, who was seeking a *rapprochement* with her husband. However, there would be no love lost between the two men and one would be glad to be rid of the other.

Those who condemn the Queen lay some stress on this midnight conversation, and look on it as the last infamy of a woman sending her lover hot foot to the murder of her husband. But, in taking this view, it seems to me that they overlook the essential continuity of their own story. At Kirk o' Field everything is ready. . . . Surely a guilty Mary would have sent her assassin off immediately to get the business over, if, that is, his presence was requisite—and I wonder why it was.

General Mahon holds that the length of the conversation was due to Bothwell's difficulty in persuading Mary to test his suspicions. At length she grants him a warrant, and he proceeds to Kirk o' Field. Darnley mistakes the approach of Bothwell for the return of Mary, escapes from the house over the town wall, and has the train fired. He is caught in the garden and killed by Bothwell's men. This theory as to the latter's conversation with the Queen and its outcome

would fit all the known facts as to the otherwise inexplicable delay in firing the mine, or the equally obscure question as to why, the king being already dead outside, the explosion should

have been given effect to at all, if we suppose that the conspirators were awaiting the Queen's return and were deceived by the approach of a party which had been delayed by Bothwell's difficulty in obtaining the Queen's warrant to test his allegation.

This allegation may be tested largely by discovering how and why Darnley left the house. General Mahon has no doubt that "Darnley left the house of his own motion." But "did he leave at a moment chosen by himself or did he leave under the compulsion of some sudden emergency?" The former alternative seems to fit in with the evidence and facts and forms a cornerstone of General Mahon's theory.

In the second part of his work General Mahon discusses the cause; for no reconstruction can be good, unless we can find a *raison d'être* to support it. The full blast of the Reformation was passing and the Counter Reformation was growing. The reformed religion had swept over Scotland, and now the Pope was trying to restore his authority. Mary Stuart, a Catholic, was on the throne, and should be an instrument of papal policy. But according to General Mahon, who enters deeply into the whole question, the Catholic Powers were losing confidence in the Queen, who was suspected of "infidelity to Holy Religion," and by Philip II of Spain in particular of "interference with his regality of the Netherlands." Darnley, who aspired to be ruling king of Scotland and not merely Mary's consort, was in alliance with Philip. He plotted to overthrow the Queen and her Protestant ministers, and seize the throne with Spanish support. In return Darnley was to restore Roman Catholicism. General Mahon sums up the position:

The Counter-Reformation movement, aimed against the Protestant lords and the Queen, was the basis of the intended tragedy of Kirk o' Field; and Darnley, Lennox, and Balfour were the moving spirits, encouraged by the foreign envoys who came over to represent Philip of Spain and the Nuncio. . . . Unfortunately for Darnley the plans failed, and he himself was the totally unexpected victim of those nobles whom he had insulted, and who were determined to prevent his attaining the throne of Scotland.

General Mahon's work is a remarkable effort. Though occasionally he may draw a conclusion not entirely justified, his book is full of argument and vigour and compels at least thought from all and from many conviction. Moreover it is free from that sentimentalism which so often makes the story of Mary, Queen of Scots, into myth devoid of historical merit.

W. L. COURTNEY.*

This book is a labour of love, as well as a most interesting and absorbing account of the art of editorship, and should prove a valuable lesson to all who aspire to the higher journalism. Mrs. Courtney writes this memoir of her husband with a full pen, and her detailed memories have been aided by others who were anxious to bring his life and labours before the public which he had so faithfully served for so many years.

Mrs. Courtney begins with his early life and his career at Oxford, where she was his pupil. She became his reader and literary assistant, and later in 1911 his wife, a fact which brought her into even closer association with the daily work and trials of an editor. Mr. Courtney in 1889 decided to leave Oxford—New College—for Fleet Street and the *Daily Telegraph*. The call of London possessed him, although he had long before been initiated into journalism by writing in a lighter vein for the *World*, from 1884 onwards serious philosophical reviews for the *Edinburgh*, and literary essays for the *Fortnightly*, besides being one of the *Saturday's* reviewers. Nothing seemed to come amiss to his fluent pen. As he laughingly said, he was a literary Jekyll and Hyde man. His love of the stage (which held him at Oxford) made him a good critic, and his criticisms were full of insight. His connection with the stage was close and intimate, and he did much to bring the art of acting into touch with other arts and artists. All the leading actors of the late nineteenth century were his friends, and he always found, or rather made time for this recreation and criticism. Notwithstanding the lighter side of his genius, Mr. Courtney came into intimate touch with all the thinkers of the day, and his reviews of their works, excerpts from which Mrs. Courtney often gives, are extremely interesting, and the reader is made to feel that the nineteenth century is the begotter of the twentieth and especially in the relation of science and religion.

Mr. Courtney's Fleet Street experience led him on to his first editorship, that of *Murray's Magazine* in 1890, an organ which did not long survive even under Mr. Courtney's ministration. The History of the *Fortnightly* follows, under five editors, Lewes, Morley, Escott, Harris, and lastly Mr. Courtney, who was selected to fill the vacant chair at short notice in 1895. Mrs. Courtney writes: "He appointed me his reader, and when necessary sub-editor. 'I must have your help,' he wrote to me, 'I won't take it unless you will come.' We set to work at the beginning of November to get ready our first number. Our collaboration continued unbroken for exactly thirty-four years." It is out of the question in this short

space to give any idea what the making of an editor such as Mr. Courtney means. The reader must get that for himself from the study of Mrs. Courtney's book. It is a long apprenticeship even in the case of genius: untiring energy, a far vision, a knowledge of men and matters in many countries, the assimilation of ideas, perhaps foreign ideas, courtesy and tact in dealing with contributors, a knowledge of the needs of the time without pandering to its foibles, and an appreciation of and insight into the thoughts and aspirations of a younger generation.

All these attributes Mr. Courtney strove after, and the latter half of his editorship was carried on in difficult times, the war and its aftermath. He felt strongly that the youth of to-day had been deprived of the *middle* generation, and that, in a sense, they stood alone. A great gulf was fixed, owing to the war, which he strove to span. His tributes to his predecessors are always generous. In his connection with the *Fortnightly* he had seen many changes of Government with Labour at the close, and he strove to steer a middle course and interpret the true spirit of the opening years of the twentieth century. Mrs. Courtney has attempted much in this volume which is in itself an *obit* of great names in all departments, philosophical, literary, artistic and social, the personalities with whom an editor such as Mr. Courtney would naturally come into contact.

* * *

POLITICAL SCIENCE.*

. Professor Barker, in issuing this volume of his collected essays, will please and re-instruct old students from three universities, Oxford, London, and Cambridge. It contains a body of consecutive thought on the history or theory of society, and it is adorned with a prose style that carries easily a rare burden of classical and political learning. That there are changes of thought detectable in the course of the essays is only to say that Professor Barker has been influenced by as much as he has influenced thought on the subject of political science and its history during the last twenty years. He held, in his Burge Memorial Lecture for the year 1927, that nationality "germinated within the Christian Commonwealth: it sprang from the ashes of tribal society." Yet he also held in 1923 that the first two hundred years of the Roman Empire were years "in which the civilian power was the master of the State" and in 1915 he insisted on the unity of European

* *Church, State and Society: Essays.* By Ernest Barker. Methuen. 10s. 6d. net.

* *The Making of an Editor: W. L. Courtney, 1850-1928.* Macmillan. 6s. net.

civilisation from the middle of the eleventh to the end of the thirteenth century.

These are different points of view derived from differing premises. They can be all contained in one formula if the growth and operation of law according to certain principles of growth and operation be applied but taken separately there are distinctions of outlook in these essays of a fundamental kind. The structure of society follows certain laws, whether we are dealing with the beginnings of the Roman Empire, with the mediæval, social, and political pressure of the Church, with the evolution of nationalism, but these are capable of and mostly meet with separate treatment.

Professor Barker presents a unity of subject-matter in all twelve of these papers :

The first four essays deal with Church and State in history; the fifth is a bridge of transition to the theory and politics of the modern State, which are treated in the three subsequent essays; the ninth is another bridge of transition, from history and politics to education; and the last three are concerned with different phases of that subject, in the University, the School, and the area of Adult Education. All the essays may be said, in a word, to deal with the history or the theory of society.

Professor Barker has specially interesting passages about the curious political ideas of contract and trusteeship, the latter being revived to-day in the political conception of Mandate. The idea of the political contract is old indeed, "as old as St. Thomas, and even older," one may venture to say much, much older if the word contract is taken in a practical political sense. In the European feudal complex which made up the feudal State the King was merely part of the complex and the complex itself was the ultimate sovereign body, the parts of which were related by ties which were customary, but which, in a sense, were also contractual. Professor Barker says that both Locke and Burke "believed in a contract of the sort which constitutes the people a body politic, and both of them regarded political power as a delegation or trust proceeding from that body politic." But, in fact, Filmer and Locke were both striving, in a sense perhaps that Burke was not striving, to find an historical basis for their respective theories. The same is true of Selden when he talked of "The Master of the House." Selden's phrase approaches the idea of trusteeship. Professor Barker says that he cannot see that "the King can be at one and the same time a separate and independent contractor and a delegate or trustee." That is the Huguenot theory formulated in the *Vindiciæ* of 1579. The error of that theory is that there is an effort to differentiate the parts of the complex. There can be no differentiation until one of

the parts is disloyal to the other parts, until, in fact, the complex is on the point of dissolution. The contractual relationship is not conscious, not more conscious than the relationship of the parts of (say) the solar system. But in fact from one angle the King, or the Executive, performs services regulated by law, and from another angle is a trustee of popular rights, a trustee whose duties are regulated by law. When the intuitive law is replaced by a man-made doctrine of social contract the complex is about to dissolve. It has become unreal. Professor Barker would, however, be unwilling to admit, it may be assumed, this theory.

But stability of Government is largely dependent on what may be called unconsciousness of Governments. The yoke must not be felt in any uneasy fashion. The virtue of the Middle Ages at their best was that neither the feudal yoke nor the spiritual yoke was repugnant to the ideals of the people. With the Black Death of 1349 in England stability began to disappear both in respect to State and Church and for almost six centuries the world has been striving for a new stability. Professor Barker asks whether the nation itself—the principle and passion of nationality—can really "be fitted into the Christian conception of the world and the purpose of history." His answer is not unhopeful: "If the nation can be regarded as part of the purpose and plan of the world, it is for Christian faith to wrap itself round the nation, and for Christian doctrine to enfold the nation in its scope." That is undoubtedly true and the Christian faith must work by the methods of education. Here come in the essays on education which Professor Barker has included in this remarkable volume. He realises to the full what education means to England and the world. "If the education of a community is wider than schools, it is deepest in schools. They are the pivot of everything else." He believes in the "State Educational," believes in it, despite the manifold dangers of dogmatism. But, in fact, dogmatism has a smaller chance with an educated than with an uneducated people. The passion for knowledge, for knowledge that takes account of faith; for knowledge that appreciates the rapid convergence of science and faith, will protect the community from the dogmatism of science more surely than in mediæval times the same passion protected the community from the dogmatism of the Mediæval Church. It is possible once again for "Christian faith to wrap itself round the nation, and for Christian doctrine to enfold the nation in its scope." That the task is hard ought to inspire the workers, and sweep away the discontents that at present are assailing organised religion.

J. E. G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Mr. William Harbutt Dawson's *The Future of Empire and the World Price of Peace*,* like the author's other writings, is full of thought, information, and plain speaking. "To my mind," he writes in the Preface, "no object of human pursuit is to-day comparable in importance and urgency with this of peace." The nations, he adds, are given "palliatives and makeshifts, much-belauded treaties and pacts, which, however useful in assuring tranquillity for the moment, yet altogether ignore the deep-seated and permanent causes of international friction and strife." At this critical time he believes that the British Empire and the United States together "hold the golden masterkey to the world's peace." Like other good citizens he is thankful for the League of Nations, and regards it, "defective though it is in many ways, as the greatest single existing source of hope for the future of the world." He is not one of those who argue that during its experimental stage it must walk warily and avoid overtaxing its strength, for he summons it to stand up manfully for what is right. The dangers of our Empire, as described in these pages, are as great as our opportunities. Mr. Dawson, who hates "the spirit of ascendancy," urges us to limit our liabilities, concentrate on the inspiring task of consolidating our white Dominions, gradually relax our hold on India and Egypt, and internationalise the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar. The Mandates undertaken by the victorious Powers after the war are described as "a Pandora's casket of future mischief." Germany, as Mr. Dawson reminds us, refuses to recognise the forced cession of her colonies, and he believes that in this matter right is on her side. "Just as I firmly believe that no act of conciliation open to this country would do so much to allay German resentment against us as a nation, and to improve our reputation with the world at large, as a declaration of readiness to co-operate in restoring to Germany her suspended colonial status, so I am equally convinced that in default of such restitution, and in spite of all our peace pacts and arbitral machinery, the question will eventually become one of War." This is no sudden alarm, for Mr. Dawson has long urged the restoration of some portion of her African possessions. Though weak and fettered to-day she will once again become strong, and a Russo-German alliance, which is not inconceivable, would prove a formidable partnership. In this and other directions our author implores us to use the breathing-time provided by exhaustion to remove some of the dangers which threaten the world with another overwhelming catastrophe. In one of the most suggestive chapters of this striking book Mr. Dawson explains "how the Dominions can help," above all by insisting on the reduction of our liabilities and commitments in Europe, "so as to make it humanly impossible that either they or Great Britain shall again be embroiled in a Continental war."

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Little Known England: Rambles in the Welsh Borderland, The Cotswolds, The Chalk Hills and the Eastern Counties,† by Mr. H. D. Eberlein, will appeal particularly to those travellers who wish to see

* Allen and Unwin. 12s. 6d.

† Batsford. 12s. 6d.

rural England as apart from tourist England, and yet the book is more a suggestive handbook than a guide. Perhaps, however, it is this quality that shows its value, for the traveller who enjoys country life wants to explore with the help of suggestions rather than be sent across the tourist-beaten track. There must be a considerable portion of rural England, full of beauty and of historical associations, which is unknown to those who live in other counties; so although Mr. Eberlein has endeavoured to cover a large area, "which, curiously enough, forms approximately a V-shaped strip across the face of the country," he must have had some difficulty in choosing his ground. His suggestive tours cover a widely varied scene of places and of people; Shropshire and Herefordshire, the Cotswolds in Gloucestershire and Oxfordshire, the Berkshire Downs and the Chilterns in Buckinghamshire, then in the Eastern counties, Norfolk, Suffolk, and Essex. Yet such is the accessibility of even rural England, that it is possible to enjoy many of these tours from definite centres instead of travelling from place to place which does not appeal to all holiday-makers. Mr. Eberlein has not been satisfied with producing a book of prose maps, but has also filled his pages with local history and anecdotes, not too much, but sufficient to make his readers wish for more. The whole work is, in fact, a background which the reader can fill in as he likes, the one objection being (if it is one), that it cannot be a short task. The book is full of beautiful photographs and figures, and has, in addition, five clear maps.

* * *

The Greeks and Romans are renowned for their love of sport, yet this aspect of classical times has been sadly neglected by classical scholars. It is to fill this gap that Dr. A. J. Butler has written his new book on *Sport in Classic Times*.* "It endeavours to open out for the English reader a whole province of the classical world which has been left almost entirely unsurveyed." The value of this book lies especially in the stimulus it will give to those learning Latin and Greek. It will help to bridge the passage of time and make the dead languages alive by giving to the pupil a new interest in his work. Dr. Butler says in his preface, "Scenes like these may even freshen the schoolboy's imagination and enable him to think of Greeks and Romans, not as phantoms or dullards who moved long ago in a dim world of shadows, but as men who lived in sunshine, who loved field and mountain and river, and who were masters of every form of sport, as they were masters of every form of art and literature." Oppian wrote on field sports and it is on his classification into hunting, fishing, and fowling that Dr. Butler bases his book. The three sports are dealt with in order and the author has much to say about each. He searches the writers of Greece and Rome for information and illustrates them by classical sculpture and decoration. The book is full of such illustrations. Half the work is devoted to hunting in its different forms. It was this sport which the ancients regarded as especially manly and beneficial to the race. Xenophon expressed the opinion of his age when he wrote, "I counsel young men not to look down on hunting or other forms of training which fit them for war and for divers situations where quick thought and word and action are required." Plato sees true manhood represented in the

* Ernest Benn. 16s. net.

chase. "Alone, and surpassing all, stands the pursuit of wild animals with horse and hound by the hunter in person. By racing, fighting, slinging, and chasing, in personal encounter, those prevail who have at heart the ideal of manhood." Fishing was for older men. It was purely a hobby, while hunting and such violent exercise promoted physical fitness. Dr. Butler's book is very welcome both for the gap it fills and the way in which it is written. Only a fine scholar would have compiled and selected the data and then marshalled them in so agreeable and engrossing a manner.

* * *

Two further volumes have been added recently to the Lonsdale Library of Sports, Games, and Pastimes. *Fine Angling for Coarse Fish** covers the ground omitted by an earlier volume on fishing namely *Trout Fishing From All Angles*. This last volume was excellent in its way, but probably the new book will be more appreciated for it will appeal to the ordinary angler who has not the time or opportunity to indulge often in the more refined sport of trout fishing. In a Foreword Mr. Eric Parker, who with Lord Lonsdale is general editor of the series, compares the two branches of the sport. In Scotland and Ireland and the other centres of trout fishing, no doubt, only salmon are fish. And to Sandy with his salmon-rod and "Hout tout! That's no fish ava," "I suppose that coarse fishing, in his day or to-day, would in the same way not be fishing at all." Sandy only knowing the best may perhaps despise other forms of fishing. But, as Mr. Parker says, "there are other noble fish besides the migrant visitors to Dee and Don and Tweed, or the three- and four-pounders that suck down the may-fly of Kennet and Test." The book is written by a number of contributors. Mr. Edward Ensom, known to many as "Faddist," has contributed a number of chapters on the roach, the dace, the perch, and several other objects of the angler's art. Among other contributors, Dr. W. J. Turrell has written on pike-fishing; Mr. Parker an interesting chapter on the ways of the eel; and Mr. Stephen E. Hill on the carp. At the end of the volume there are several chapters on match-fishing, fishery management, and the legal aspect of fishing. *Fine Angling for Coarse Fish* may be described as a concise and compact textbook of the sport which should prove of great use to the mass of ordinary anglers who do not regard angling for trout as the only true fishing.

* * *

The Game of Cricket† is the other volume in this series and must be remarkable for the number of well-known cricketers who have contributed articles. It is a book which deals with the game both in a general manner and in definite categories. In his Foreword, Mr. Parker comments on the change which has taken place in first-class cricket. "County cricket is more of a business." Mr. H. D. G. Leveson-Gower, who is Chairman of the Test Match Selection Committee, and who contributes an article on "Umpiring," echoes Mr. Parker's observation. "We cannot deceive ourselves that first-class cricket under contemporary conditions is becoming more and more a gate-money concern. It is as dependent on the subscription of members and the shillings at the turnstiles as theatres

* Seeley, Service & Co. Ltd. 12s. 6d. net.

† Seeley, Service & Co. Ltd. 15s. net.

are on the patronage of audiences." When we remember that the value of cricket as a national game lies in local and club games, and that first-class cricket provides the necessary incentive and example, the idea of country cricket being run on a profit-making basis is a deplorable. But it is another thing for the game to be run on an economic basis. The change that has come since the war is due to the fact that there are to-day fewer people rich enough to play cricket throughout the summer without some pecuniary reward. The professional element grows stronger, and for other reasons, too, the financial strain on the county club is far greater than before. There is no danger that this larger commercial element will ruin first-class cricket, provided the spirit of the game and of its players are not contaminated. All is safe if the spirit which guided cricket in Grace's time remains with us to-day. Chapters in this book are written by Mr. D. R. Jardine on batsmanship; by Mr. Fender on captaincy; by Mr. A. P. F. Chapman on fielding. Mr. D. J. Knight, who is games master at Westminster School, has written two important chapters on cricket coaching. Other well-known cricketers have contributed valuable articles. The text is illustrated by numerous plates and sketches which carefully illustrate the text. It is a book which can be very well recommended, and especially to boys at public and secondary schools.

* * *

All lovers of Shakespeare, and their name is legion, will welcome *Twelfth Night**, the latest of "The New Shakespeare Edition," which Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch and John Dover Wilson are editing. It is a most attractive volume, and of real service to the general reader. Sir Arthur writes the introduction, which will bear reading and re-reading. Its lucid understanding of the play, and especially of Feste the clown, and in fact of all the characters, come as a boon after the many learned expositions that appear from time to time, which often merely puzzle the reader. He is not so dense that he is unable to grasp the meaning of the action of the play, and to him the source of the play, which is a hide-and-seek game to many learned Shakespeareans, matters little. "The play's the thing," which, passing through the fire of Shakespeare's genius for adopting and adapting, remains the priceless possession of its inheritors. "Q" does not consider that Malvolio is the chief character. "Still, with all respect to Malvolio, to his hold upon 'star' actors, to all his claim, not disputed, upon Shakespeare's sole begetting, we must hold and insist on holding Feste, Master of the Revels, to be the master-mind and controller of *Twelfth Night*, its comic spirit and president, even as Puck is comic spirit and president of *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. . . . But while the play lasts, and his business, Feste has it in charge." The notes are full and ample, and "The Stage History of *Twelfth Night*" by Mr. Harold Child is very interesting. "The Glossary" is most complete and will prove a great help to those who are unable to grasp the meaning of Shakespeare's language. This edition, good and scholarly, contributing much to the study and understanding of the play, has one fault: the uncut leaves which must often lead to skipping the contents or the tearing and soiling of the pages.

* *The New Shakespeare: Twelfth Night or What You Will*. Edited by Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch and John Dover Wilson. Cambridge University Press. 6s. net.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Max Weber's "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism"* well deserved translation, for no more stimulating essays have appeared in the present century. The translator's Preface and Mr. Tawney's illuminating Foreword tell the reader something of the famous Heidelberg Professor whose early death in 1920 was an irreparable loss to scholarship, and of the main lines of his argument. His task is to discover the psychological conditions which made possible the development of capitalist civilisation; and, as the title indicates, he finds the chief factor in Protestantism, or rather in a special brand of Protestantism. Capitalism, as Mr. Tawney sums it up, was the social counterpart of Calvinist theology. While mediæval economies were (at any rate in theory) ascetic, the Calvinist believed energy and thrift to be moral duties and the gospel of work a defence against temptation. The resultant prosperity appeared as God's blessing on the pious *bourgeois*. The thesis is worked out with a wealth of learning, and the main illustrations are drawn not from the early Calvinists, but from the English Puritans of the second half of the seventeenth century, with Baxter at their head. Mr. Tawney, himself the leading English authority on the relation of religion to capitalism, suggests one or two criticisms of Weber's celebrated generalisation. But whatever allowance may have to be made for the zeal of a pioneer, these essays deserve to be read and re-read by all who wish to understand the atmospheric contrast between the mediæval and the modern world.

* * *

In "The English Investment Trust Companies"† Mr. George Glasgow, so well known to the readers of THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, appears in a new rôle. The features and statistical records of the seventy-six trusts described in this volume will interest the expert rather than the general reader: but the brief introductory chapters are well within the grasp of the intelligent layman. The upshot of his researches is most satisfactory. The companies are successful, and they succeed because they are built on the foundation of honest finance. The Baring crisis of forty years ago taught a bitter lesson which was badly needed and has been thoroughly learned. The governing consideration is not big dividends, but security of capital; the building up of reserves, not the distribution to the uttermost farthing; the spreading of investments, not their concentration in a tempting concern. "The secret of the success of the English Trust Companies," writes Mr. Glasgow, "may be ascribed epigrammatically, but fairly, to the practice of constructive pessimism persisted in over a long series of years." In more homely language we may say that they do not count their chickens before they are hatched. Mr. Glasgow moves with sure tread in this little-known world, and his labours will be welcomed by the investor, the statistician, and the economic historian.

* Allen and Unwin 10s. 6d.

† Eyre & Spottiswoode. 50s.

GENEVA AND THE WORLD.

AN Assembly of the League of Nations must by the nature of things be very much a mirror of the world it represents, and the atmosphere inside the Assembly Hall is not likely to differ very conspicuously from the atmosphere without. That explains quite sufficiently a tendency to look on the Assembly of 1930 as disappointing. In a sense it was disappointing. But the world in 1930 is disappointing. It is a world that in some aspects inspires the profoundest pessimism. It is in a desperate way economically, and in every quarter of the globe revolutions within and alarms without create more serious misgivings about the preservation of peace than have been justified for some time past. If in face of that situation the League Assembly had met and carried through its business in a spirit of lighthearted optimism it would have been hard to refute the charge sometimes brought against it of being an idealistic body out of touch with all realities.

The Assembly in actual fact gathered in no such mood. There had been, as more than one speaker pointed out, good reason to hope that the path would have been made unusually smooth for the League this year. The Hague discussions had disposed of the reparation difficulty, as it was thought, for ever, and the London Naval Treaty had removed one of the most formidable obstacles to the progress of disarmament. But expectations founded on those events had failed conspicuously to find fulfilment, and the *malaise* that lay upon the world in general and Europe in particular was manifestly oppressing the minds of Assembly delegates as they faced one another at Geneva at the beginning of September. And if it oppressed them then it oppressed them much more when after six days of the Assembly had run the results of the German elections, revealing the startling triumph of Hitlerism, were announced, and a little more again when the Franco-Italian naval conversations, which at one moment looked like succeeding, were definitely broken off, or, in the approved diplomatic euphemism, suspended.

These factors have to be taken into account when the Assembly of 1930 is assessed. Their effect on its deliberations was marked and on the whole the reaction to it was salutary. There was no disposition to regard the League as capable of setting a rocking world on a firm foundation in three weeks, but neither was there any tendency merely to despair of the republic. There was a full recognition of the gravity of the outlook. There was an earnest and anxious search for solutions, so far as the League could provide them, to the problems of the moment. And there was at the end a general consciousness that they had not been found. That

is no confession of failure. A League Assembly can often do more harm by attempting too much in its three or four weeks of sittings than by attempting too little. Its function is not so much to achieve as to explore. The League is well supplied with competent committees to work out any plan the Assembly or the Council puts before it in outline, and if they do not exist they can be improvised. The Assembly's task is to decide that the problem shall be attacked, and to generate the goodwill, and register the pledge of co-operation, without which the most brilliant scheme ever elaborated by the world's foremost experts will never get beyond the stage of ink and paper, because the Governments with whom it lies to apply it prefer to go on as they have gone before. The real test of the Eleventh Assembly will be the economic discussions of the present month, the meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference at the same moment and the Disarmament Conference itself, whose convocation is looked for in the course of next year or in the early months of 1932.

The dominant note, then, of the Eleventh Assembly was a consciousness that the world was going wrong and that it lay with the League to endeavour to set it right, for if the League could not do that then nothing could. That consciousness lay undoubtedly at the root of the Briand proposals for a European union, even though that rather nebulous plan was launched a year before when conditions generally were less depressing. The very vagueness of M. Briand's ideas, indeed—for they made no advance in definition or clarity as the discussions advanced—was one more reflection of the general ability to diagnose without the ability to prescribe. Even the diagnosis was not very searching. It went little beyond a demonstration of symptoms which in any case stared every observer in the face. But at least M. Briand persuaded his European colleagues to agree that they could not sit and face ruin with folded hands, and though they did not know, and know little better to-day, how the situation should be coped with, there is no doubt something to be gained by studying it seriously on a continental scale. The Secretariat of the League, an able and resourceful body, has been charged with surveying the ground against a further meeting of the European delegates in January, and though all initiative is banned in those who serve the League as its permanent staff there are methods of conveying suggestion and stimulus unobtrusively, and if the European conference finds itself suddenly and a little perplexingly launched on a plan of constructive action, that will not be the first time such a phenomenon, deriving from similar causes, has been observed.

Altogether there applies to this last Assembly more than to most a remark made by Miss Susan Lawrence in the course of a report

on the League's Health work presented by her to the Assembly on behalf of that body's Second Commission. The Health Organisation's programme, she observed, fell regularly into three phases. The first^o consisted in acquiring all available information, the second in deriving conclusions from the information, the third in action based on the conclusions. That is, or should be, equally the procedure followed by the League as a whole. But not infrequently there are departures from it. Only once a year, and then only for four weeks or less, do the delegates of all the States in the League assemble, and the temptation to reach concrete results at any cost is strong. Sometimes, no doubt, they are reached, and reached satisfactorily. But more and more it is becoming clear that the Assembly's proper function is to discuss frankly and explore fearlessly and leave it then to some specially qualified committee to work out at leisure the details of the action it may be desired to take. That fact was emphasised this year both positively and negatively. The Assembly's most definite achievement was the final adoption, and the signature on the spot by some thirty States, of the Convention on Financial Assistance to States Victims of Aggression. Whatever the merits or demerits of that instrument—and that is a question which demands an article to itself—it had stood the most searching scrutiny the League has ever given to any convention of the kind. Originating in a suggestion made by the Finnish Government five years before, it had been considered first of all in principle and then in detail by the League Council, the Financial Committee (enjoying in the former the approval of Sir Austen Chamberlain and in the latter the championship of Sir Otto Niemeyer and Sir Henry Strakosch), the Committee of Arbitration and Security, and then, in two successive sessions, by the Assembly itself, finally obtaining the unanimous approval of that body. Even now the convention will not enter into force till a general disarmament convention has been signed, for on the strong insistence of the British Government, which would otherwise have made such a reservation on its own account, a provision to that effect has been inserted in the actual body of the convention.

With that history of prolonged and patient study may be compared the fate of the proposal to amend the League Covenant so as to bring it into harmony with the Kellogg Pact, by eliminating the so-called loophole for war in Article XV and ruling out war as an instrument of national policy in any circumstances whatsoever. In 1928 a quite premature proposal that such action should be taken emanated from a source that secured it no exaggerated respect, the lips of M. Voldemaras, the Lithuanian dictator. In 1929 the situation had considerably changed. The Kellogg Pact, on which the signatures had been hardly dry a year earlier, had

been ratified by the principal nations of the world and become a part of international law. It was the British Government this time which, with the approval of all the chief members of the Assembly, proposed the harmonisation of the two great instruments against war, and thanks to the skill and ability of Sir Cecil Hurst amendments to the Covenant designed to achieve that end were almost carried through on the spot. In the end other, and no doubt wiser, counsels (for the amendment of the Covenant is not an adventure to be undertaken lightly) prevailed and a committee was charged with bringing in proposals to the Assembly of 1930. That body, of which Lord Cecil was a leading member, laid its proposals before the delegates in September and again it looked at first as if they would go through with little opposition. But objections began to rain in from different quarters. The Japanese appeared to be obsessed with the sanctity of the Covenant generally. The Scandinavians feared the prohibition of all war would lead to an extension of the principle of sanctions, since to the always non-permissible wars, whose outbreak would necessarily bring sanctions into operation, would now be added the hitherto permissible ones. The Rumanian Foreign Minister was concerned, a little unintelligibly, about the reservations to the Kellogg Pact. And one or two jurists were uncertain what effect the proposed amendments would have on the Locarno and certain other treaties. It was in vain that Lord Cecil and Mr. Noel Baker, with great ability, combatted these objections. They might be unreasonable and unfounded, but there they were, and the First Commission had no alternative but to agree that the question was not yet ripe for final decision. It will accordingly be placed on the agenda of next year's Assembly, the Governments being thus enabled to bring the matter further under consideration. The principle of the amendment of the Covenant has been reaffirmed. Only the question of details remains open. The delay is in some respects to be regretted, for delegates were so near agreement that they might well have composed their outstanding differences. But if, as is likely, the Twelfth Assembly carries the amendments through, little time, if any, will have been lost, for the British Government had announced that in any case it would not ratify the amendments till after the Disarmament Conference. As it is, the Governments, and all who concern themselves with the fortunes of the League, will have leisure to reflect on Lord Cecil's forcible words about the necessity of paying a certain price for peace if peace is held to be a consummation worth attaining.

If the doctrine that full discussion should precede action is sound then the Eleventh Assembly can claim at any rate to have laid foundations with some diligence. Not for many years, if ever, has

Geneva known more valuable debates than took place this year regarding disarmament, minorities and the economic condition of the world. The minorities discussion stands rather by itself. It took place not in the full Assembly but in the Sixth Commission, and whereas it is a practically unbroken rule that the principal Foreign Ministers do not burden themselves with committee work during the Assembly, M. Briand sat through every minute of the three or four sessions of the Sixth Commission devoted to minorities and Dr. Curtius through almost the whole of it. The division of opinion between the States containing minorities within their borders and bound by treaty to concede them certain rights, those containing minorities but bound by no treaties, and those championing the rights of minorities of kindred race to themselves under alien rule, was clear-cut. Germany and Hungary represented the latter class, and if their delegates spoke with moderation about the rights of minorities they spoke with firmness, and with the evident intention of making a full-dress debate on the question an annual feature of the Assembly. If it be asked what came of the discussion the answer is that nothing concrete could. Supervision of the working of the minority treaties is in the hands of the Council, not the Assembly, and the reforms advocated in certain quarters, such as the extension of minority treaty obligations to all States containing minorities and the creation of a Permanent Minorities Commission at Geneva, are unattainable without a degree of general assent which notoriously does not exist at present. Moreover even the Germans were agreed that a longer trial should be given to the reforms in minority procedure (such as they were) adopted at the Madrid Council meeting last year. But meanwhile the full ventilation of all opinions on the minority problem is undoubtedly salutary, though it inspired some delegates with serious apprehensions lest the minorities should be encouraged to new intransigence by the belief that for the future their cause would always find champions at the Assembly. The most significant feature of the discussion was the vehemence of M. Briand's protest against any attempt to raise seriously the question of that universalisation of minority obligations which his friends of Poland and the Little Entente are ceaselessly urging. Here France and Italy found themselves for once on common ground.

The disarmament discussions were disturbing, the economic discussions on the whole encouraging. Over the former hung the shadow of the German elections, and when Dr. Curtius announced that he would not vote for the resolution before the Assembly because it did not definitely fix a date for the disarmament conference M. Briand, in an unexpected incursion into the debate, put the case of France with a clarity and force which inspires slender

hope in the prospect of any considerable measure of land disarmament being achieved when the conference is held. The figures he adduced to demonstrate the reduction of the French army since the war ignored altogether the great increase in efficiency achieved by the semi-professionalisation of the army, but the definite assertion that just when there were falling from his own lips words of concord and conciliation there had arisen from the ballot-boxes across the frontier cries of hatred, cries of death, was a piece of plain speaking which Dr. Curtius, personally as anxious for an accord as his French colleague, could neither counter nor resent. As to the contention that France, and every other nation, would hasten to cut her military expenses down if only she could be sure of the fulfilment of the implied pledges of the Covenant that the disarmed nation would receive immediate support from its fellows if attacked, that was simply the reaffirmation of a doctrine which most members of the League recognise in theory but hesitate to implement. The amendment of the Covenant so as to exclude war altogether would have gone some way to meet France's views, but that, as stated, was deferred for another year. Political conditions often change swiftly, but the circumstances affecting disarmament, notably the new temper in Germany and the failure of the Franco-Italian conversations to produce results, do not encourage great optimism regarding the impending meeting of the Preparatory Commission.

The economic discussions were conducted in a more hopeful atmosphere. On the gravity of the situation facing the world there could be no illusions. Even before the Assembly met certain local attempts to reach solutions by joint action attracted attention, most important of them the August conference of agrarian States at Warsaw. Throughout the Assembly debates indeed there was a certain oscillation of opinion between the regional and the continental solution. If the latter were to be attempted it would naturally be in some sort of connection with the Briand plan, but that plan was still entirely vague, and the Assembly's own discussions had to proceed on other lines. Those discussions were marked by considerable agreement in the field of diagnosis, but a good deal less in the field of remedy. It had to be recognised that the so-called Tariff Truce Conference held early in the year had been embarked on without adequate preparation, and all that had emerged from it was the promise of further negotiations aiming at a general reduction of tariffs. A conviction of the soundness of the verdict of the Economic Conference of 1927 that tariffs in Europe had been raised too high and the time had come to move in the opposite direction was still widely held, but economic nationalism is strong, and the Ministers of Commerce attending the Assembly

(who were distinctly more numerous than usual) had to ask themselves first not what policy was intrinsically the soundest, but what policy they could carry through at home. Mr. Graham, in a penetrating analysis of the condition of the world, refrained from committing himself to the acceptance of any particular theory as to the causes of the depression, but urged that whatever the right cure might be it could not be tariffs. In this realm at any rate the League confessed an ignorance which it shares with every other organisation and institution in the world, and proceeding on the approved Geneva theory that investigation must precede action delegates unanimously and without hesitation approved an Indian proposal that an inquiry should be immediately undertaken into the causes of the depression and any steps that might be taken to prevent its recurrence.

But certain States were pressing for immediate action. The Warsaw Conference had adopted in the interests of agricultural producers various resolutions on such questions as agricultural credits, veterinary and sanitary restrictions and like matters, all of which fell within the competence of the contracting States either individually or collectively. But the most controversial suggestion, on which the Warsaw negotiators were unanimous and enthusiastic, was for the granting of a preference on European cereals (not, of course, including Russia's, concerning whose dumping there were bitter complaints) by every European importing State. At the instance of the States concerned the Warsaw resolutions were placed on the Assembly agenda and most of the discussions in the Second Commission revolved round them, a sharp difference of opinion revealing itself between the suppliants for the preference on European cereals and the grain-exporting British Dominions, primarily Canada, who protested with some reason against any idea of the League's giving its patronage to proposals which involved privileged treatment for the products of certain member States to the detriment of others. The justice of that attitude was recognised, and all that was said in the resolution adopted on the subject was that it was a proper question to raise in the course of the negotiations to be opened this month at Geneva as sequel to the Tariff Truce Conference of the spring. It was to those negotiations that all the economic discussions at the Assembly pointed forward. The one conclusion universally accepted was that the problems before the world cannot be solved on the basis of national egotisms, but how far the States of Europe are prepared to carry that wholesome doctrine into practice is uncertain. Neither is it certain whether the regional or the continental solution will gain the greater favour. Apart from the Warsaw movement there are incipient signs of economic coalescence everywhere. Jugoslavia

and Rumania, the Little Entente States as a whole with or without the association of Austria and Hungary, Estonia and Latvia, the Scandinavian States and Holland, are all entering on tentative explorations of one another's attitude with a view to some form of economic collaboration. Meanwhile it so happens that all the European States, and none that were not European, signed the Protocol opening the way to the negotiations on closer economic relations which begin at Geneva this month under the chairmanship of M. Colijn, of Holland. The possibilities of European action will be discussed then and the part regional understandings can play within the larger framework examined. But that is only if the larger framework takes shape at all. Whether it could was the question the Assembly delegates discussed from every angle without reaching definite conclusions. If hopes should be realised and the November discussions produce definite results in the economic sphere, then the meeting of M. Briand's European delegates in January may be able to do useful work by considering the political aspect of any economic understandings contemplated. For economic and political considerations are closely associated.

Various non-European States were sufficiently prominent at the Eleventh Assembly—notably China and India, Japan and the British Dominions—to check any tendency to look on the League as concerned with European affairs alone. The services the Health Organisation is rendering to the Governments of countries like China and Bolivia, the Opium Smoking and the Women and Children Inquiries in the Far East, are all reminders that the sphere of action of the League is the world and nothing less. But the European States are likely to be stimulated to separate action in proportion as they are irritated by the deportment of the Latin-Americans at Geneva, and this year they were irritated constantly. The absence of Brazil and the Argentine Republic destroys any justification for the tradition, now unfortunately established, that Latin America shall always have three seats on the League Council, and the traffic, or attempted traffic, in votes at Council elections, with a certain delegate from almost the least important of the Latin-American republics as huckster-in-chief, is one of the least edifying features of Geneva politics. Nicaragua, Cuba, Guatemala and the rest of the Central and South American Republics members of the League can command (apart from the Argentine, which is always absent) fifteen votes on the rare occasions on which votes are cast at all at Geneva. This year they thought fit to address an altogether improper letter to the League Council expressing the view that there should be three Latin-American judges on the bench of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Cuba, alone and unsupported, and for quite discreditable reasons, prevented the

adoption of a revised statute for the Court by declaring its intention of opposing a measure which required unanimity for its adoption. A sudden Latin-American drive upset a considered decision taken the year previously regarding the composition of a coming Opium Conference. And the Assembly was subjected one crowded morning to a succession of prolix speeches in praise of Simon Bolívar, whose responsibility for giving independent existence to this galaxy of pocket-republics was calculated to stir delegates from other continents to anything but exhilaration. But the vagaries of the Latin delegates are only a minor annoyance after all, and the elimination of one or two of the principal string-pullers would dispose of it altogether.

A final judgment on the Eleventh Assembly will be favourable or the reverse according to the conception entertained of the Assembly's proper function. Those who look for some definite achievement every year, dramatic if possible but at any rate concrete, will be disappointed with the Assembly of 1930. It took certain quite specific decisions, no doubt. It approved the reorganisation of the Secretariat—a highly important piece of work, involving a decisive assertion of that body's international character, as response to certain inadmissible national claims—it ordered an inquiry into the causes of trade depression, it adopted the Convention on Financial Assistance, it elected the bench of the Permanent Court of International Justice for the next nine years. All that, and other decisions that could be mentioned, are well worth while. But to those who have followed the Assembly over a term of years more importance will seem to attach to the fact that for the first time the major Foreign Ministers like M. Briand and Dr. Curtius stayed at Geneva till practically the closing sitting of the Assembly (Mr. Henderson left earlier only to attend the Imperial Conference), that instead of contenting themselves with one set speech they threw themselves repeatedly into debate, both in plenary sessions and in commission, that the discussions to which unusual significance was thus imparted were marked by a striking combination of plain-speaking and goodwill, and that in consequence the Assembly surveyed the ground and probed the difficulties before it with unaccustomed thoroughness. That is a necessary preparation for action and too little attention is sometimes paid to it. Taken as a whole the Assembly made unmistakably for cohesion at a time when that process was very necessary, and without setting any outstanding achievement to its credit it must be held to have taken the place a normally successful Assembly should take in the natural evolution of the League.

H. WILSON HARRIS.

SOME REAL CAUSES OF THE SLUMP.

SOME people seem to think that economics, so far from being a science based upon reasoning and experience, evolved by the genius of Hume, Turgot, Adam Smith, and their successors, is a sort of political art without any fixed principles or general truths, whereby candidates may humbug their constituencies or Ministers the House of Commons, with the help, it may be, of economic advisers selected and paid for this purpose. If we look at finance and trade and employment from this angle, we can better understand how it is that governments all over the world have adopted (for the ostensible purpose of benefiting business and employment) measures of the most ruinous character, and why fallacies which have been refuted and exposed again and again by logic and experience are as rife and even as fashionable as they were in Spain under Philip the Second or in France under Colbert. A single example will suffice before I turn to the real causes of the depression. Among the alleged causes of our domestic troubles, to judge from most London newspapers, the chief one is that Great Britain is still, comparatively speaking, a Free Trade country and does not enjoy, like Russia, Poland, Germany, the United States, Australia, Brazil, or Canada the benefits of high or complete protection from the competition of the outside world. This is perhaps the commonest and the silliest of all current fallacies. You find a house with bow windows, and you find also that there has been illness in the house during the last year, though not before; and you say the illness must be due to the bow windows. Then you go to another house, where there has been illness and where there are no bow windows; and you say the illness is due to the want of bow windows. If the recent spell of bad trade in Great Britain is due to our lack of a protective tariff, why is trade so much worse in Russia and Poland, which have almost complete protection; and why is it equally bad, or worse, in Germany, which has a high protective tariff and in the United States which has now an almost prohibitive tariff?

Then again it is admitted that from 1853 to 1913, under practically complete Free Trade all the time (under complete Free Trade if we start from 1860, the year of the Cobden Treaty with France), Great Britain prospered so marvellously that her accumulated wealth and her immense trade became the wonder and envy of the whole world. Clearly, if you are examining causes and effects, opposite effects cannot be traced to the same causes in the same country in the years preceding 1913 and in the years following 1920. I would suggest for consideration that a calamity intervened between these two periods—the greatest and most disastrous

War in the history of the world. There, indeed, you have a real cause which has produced devastating effects upon the capital and credit and trade of all the European belligerents, and indirectly upon countries which were neutral, and even upon the United States which for more than half the war made prodigious profits, mainly at the expense of this country.

It is now twelve years since the War ended; but War Debts and Reparations still hang heavily over Europe and with crushing weight upon Germany. Of the Allies, Great Britain bears in her trade and taxation the brunt of what Mr. Gladstone used to call a dead-weight debt. For War Debts and Reparations were not incurred like railway loans for productive purposes. They represent irreparable destruction wrought upon the lives and property of nations. Paying interest on a War Debt is like paying interest on losses. It is a tragedy that twelve years after the War these enormous reparations and inequitable War Debts are keeping alive animosities between enemies and creating new quarrels between friends. Their economic effect is to dislocate trade and upset the exchanges. They are forcing unprofitable exports of goods from Germany and unprofitable exports of gold from the Allies to the United States, which country is excluding all our manufactured goods as far as possible by an almost prohibitive tariff, at the same time claiming repayment of loans which should have been treated as subsidies. It is, indeed, a misfortune that Great Britain was the first to offer to settle the War Debt, and a still greater misfortune that Mr. Baldwin undertook the job. We ought to have insisted that a fair and general settlement should be made by all the Allies simultaneously. In any case, he ought obviously to have demanded a most-favoured-nation clause, on being assured at Washington that he was receiving "rock-bottom terms" and that no other nation would get better treatment. Another clause might well have provided that the United States accept payment in goods and that those goods should not be taxed. Finally, after our experiences of gold fluctuations, we ought surely to have arranged in the Treaty that the gold value of the debt should be checked and regulated annually by an index number of wholesale prices. For the negligence of Mr. Baldwin and his advisers we have been paying heavily. The dead-weight burden must have been nearly doubled by the fall in prices, and it is a poor consolation to reflect that business conditions in the United States after several years of War Debt payment may deter governments in the future from lending War materials to their allies.

Another alleged clause, which has much plausibility and some substance, requires closer analysis—I mean the fall in wholesale prices and especially the recent collapse in many important foods.

and raw materials of industry, such as coffee, sugar, wheat, cotton, wool, jute, hemp, copper, tin, and silver. The fall in silver reminds me of one of the most curious contradictions of our time. While some over-clever economists and fallacy-mongers are telling us that this decline in prices is the fault of our gold currency and should be corrected by a return to a managed paper currency by means of which government experts could gently inflate our money and gently raise prices, exactly the opposite complaint has been raised by Chinese merchants, who argue with more reason that their silver currency has been raising prices and has brought disaster upon the business community. If it were possible to have a sound automatic currency free from government interference, which was absolutely stable, we should, of course, welcome it; but in the meantime let us be thankful that the credit of this country has not been shattered and the people fleeced and swindled by the paper currencies which have wrought such havoc and injustice in Russia, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and so many other countries of the Old and New Worlds. I readily admit, following thus far my distinguished friend, Dr. Gustav Cassel, who has recently been supported by Sir H. Strakosch in a most instructive supplement to the *Economist*, that the decline in the average price level of commodities during the last three years must be due *in part* to a reduction in the operative stock of monetary gold. I say *in part* because the decline in the stock of gold during the last three years is only 3 or 4 per cent., while the fall in wholesale prices amounts to 25 per cent. But if the United States and France had been content with a fair and reasonable share of the world's gold, similar, let us say (allowing for difference in population), to that of Great Britain, I can well believe that at least half the decline would not have taken place.

On the other hand, I agree with another friend Mr. Heldring, President of the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce, and with other distinguished authorities, that the slump in some commodities of 50 per cent. this year must be mainly due to an increase in production combined with a decrease in consumption; and this leads me to what I believe to be one of the principal causes of the general depression in trade.

Let me begin the analysis of this cause by asking a question. How is it that a great fall in prices has not been accompanied, as it naturally would be, by a corresponding, or at least a considerable, increase in consumption? If a confectioner reduces the price of a favourite cake, his customers are sure to buy more; and *vice versa* if he raises the price, he will find that he is not able to dispose of so many. That retail prices should lag behind wholesale in a decline is natural enough, as there are stocks to dispose

of, and there are also costs of wages and distribution, which enter into the price of manufactured articles before they reach the consumer. Thus the cost of wool or silk which enters into the price of a tailor-made suit is small in comparison with that of the skilled labour which has been employed, and possibly small even in comparison with the cost of keeping the shop. But the price of the cloth itself, whether wool, silk, or cotton, ought, I think, to have fallen more rapidly than it has done, and the same is surely true of the price of bread. I am told that, with wheat at its present low price, the quartern loaf before the War would have sold for sixpence instead of sevenpence-halfpenny. A very glaring instance is that of sisal hemp and of the binding twine for harvesters which is manufactured therefrom and is indeed the principal use of the plant. During the last twelve months the price of sisal hemp has fallen from about £40 to about £20 per ton. Twelve months ago the ring of producers charged £60 per ton to British farmers for their binding twine, and only a few weeks ago I was told by a keen and indignant farmer friend of mine that in spite of his protests he was still being charged £60. In cases like this, who can wonder that consumption has not extended and that the losses of the sisal hemp growers have not been compensated by the gains of arable farmers? Until a fall in prices reaches the consumer there is no basis or ground for expecting a recovery.

Similar reasoning might be applied to all cases where attempts have been made by restrictive schemes or corners and government loans to bolster up the price of foods and raw materials in different parts of the world. The coffee valorisation scheme in Brazil, the buying and storing of cotton by the Egyptian Government, the loans to cotton growers and wheat growers in the United States, the similar policy pursued by the provincial governments and banks of Canada, the rubber restriction scheme in the Malay States, the American copper combine and the various attempts to grow an unprofitable crop of sugar in Great Britain and on the continent with the help of tariffs and bounties, are all flagrant examples and illustrations of the folly of attempting to resist the laws of demand and supply at the expense of consumers. "Look after the consumer and the producer will take care of himself" is an old and sound adage of the Cobden Club. The plight of our rubber planters and of coffee growers in Brazil and of corn growers all over the world has obviously been aggravated by the schemes which were promoted by governments for their benefit; and the large stocks of cotton, coffee, and wheat which overhang the markets are obvious causes of the present depression which can only be removed by low and tempting prices so that they may enter more freely and readily into consumption. It is true that there are cases—like that of the

sudden fall in jute which has had such disastrous effects this year upon the prosperity and revenue of Bengal—not clearly referable to any cause except a temporary excess of production over consumption. Let me illustrate this point by citing an article from the *Commercial* of September 25th by "Lancastrian." In the course of one of his able and critical reviews of the cotton market he remarked :

There has been much propaganda in the Southern newspapers advising farmers to hold their cotton for better prices, and the present course of the market suggests that the holding movement is in operation.

This damming of the natural flow of cotton is causing nervousness among buyers. The knowledge that an unusual quantity is overhanging the trade and that each advancing step in price means the liquidation of it, is killing speculative purchases at a time when the consuming end of the trade requires every assistance and encouragement. It is, indeed, remarkable that in spite of the past results of this policy there should be yet another attempt to hold up prices artificially. Even as recently as last season the Federal Farm Board's operations illustrated the boomerang effect on the American cotton farmer. They failed to hold up prices; they resulted in an insignificant change of acreage, and the holding of over 1,250,000 bales of actual cotton at six cents a pound above current rates; and finally, they drove the consumer to other growths, resulting in a loss in consumption of American cotton of 2,000,000 bales, whereas the consumption of all growths declined by only 600,000 bales. No wonder the cotton trader refuses to be intimidated by such measures.

But this does not affect the main argument or conflict in any way with the ordinary processes of economic reasoning.

A still more important cause of the crisis which is affecting both industry and agriculture must be found, I think, in the multiplication of tariff barriers since the War, especially in the Russian and Austrian empires. Free Traders and Protectionists alike admit that the raising of a foreign or colonial tariff is bad for British trade. The difference between them is that, while the Protectionist finds in such an event an argument for a retaliatory tariff against the foreigner and for concessions in favour of the imperial delinquent, the Free Trader believes that it would be suicidal folly to "hit back." The reason is quite simple. By maintaining Free Trade he knows that his own people, whether manufacturers or consumers, will enjoy the inestimable advantages of cheapness and plenty with a choice of all the best that the world can offer in food, raw materials, tools, machinery, dyestuffs, and other manufactured articles. This gives us a differential advantage in every neutral market over our protected competitors; for the competing country

can protect itself against British goods at home but not abroad.*

During a political campaign in Yorkshire last year I was met by the argument that Yorkshire woollen and worsted goods needed safeguarding from French and other continental competition. I looked into the figures and saw that we had only five serious competitors in this department : France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Czecho-Slovakia. Taking the Board of Trade's statistics for the last few years, I found that the value of British woollen and worsted exports was equal to the value of the woollen and worsted exports of all these five competitors put together. In reply to the further Protectionist argument that wages in Germany were only two-thirds of wages in Yorkshire and in the other four countries only about half, I asked what better testimony could be desired to the blessings which a long course of Free Trade has bestowed upon our working classes. It is true that, in the case of the cotton trade, protected Japan has made a large inroad upon Lancashire trade in Far Eastern markets, and that the wages of Japanese weavers are only from a third to a half of those paid in Lancashire; but even in 1929, according to Sir Ernest Thompson, Chairman of the Cotton Trade Statistical Bureau, Great Britain exported cotton piece goods to the value of 99 millions sterling against 39 millions exported by Japan, and about 88 millions exported by all the other cotton manufacturing countries in the world. The exports of the next three countries : France, the United States, and Italy, were valued at 16, 15, and 13 millions respectively, while those of British India were under 4 millions.

Mention of British India recalls the unpleasant fact that the sharp depression of British trade, especially of our textile exports since the War and notably in the last year, is mainly due to the protective policy of India and Australia, supported by boycotts and embargoes. The Australian scheme of Protectionist Socialism combined with heavy borrowings in London has brought about the present collapse and the frantic effort to bolster up the exchanges by shutting out imports. The policy adopted by the present Viceroy of India with his Finance Minister, Sir George Schuster, and Sir George Rainy, Minister of Commerce, is to my mind utterly indefensible. It has done the gravest injury to British trade with India and irretrievable damage to Lancashire at the expense

* Great Britain inevitably stands to gain or lose more by a boom or slump in the world's trade than any other country, because its commerce is so much greater. In the House of Commons on July 8th, in reply to a question, the President of the Board of Trade gave the following figures for the four leading countries :

The value of Great Britain's exports in 1929 per head of population was £12 15s. 1d. The value of Germany's was £7 10s. 6d., of France's £6 3s. 2d., and of the United States £5 10s. 5d. These figures represent "the values of the domestic exports of goods classed as wholly or partly manufactured," the total value of these goods in the case of Great Britain being 583 millions.

of three hundred millions of Indian agriculturalists for the supposed benefit of a powerful, noisy, and apparently disloyal group of manufacturers in Bombay and Calcutta, both of which great cities are now repenting the heavy losses sustained during the boycott. I notice, by the way, that in his Budget Speech Sir George Schuster expressed a mild regret that he was unable to give protection to Indian agriculture! Surely it is deplorable that our government has not seen fit to prevent this most unjust exploitation of the great majority of our Indian fellow subjects. The last Budget should have been vetoed at its inception by the Secretary of State for India, who, as an ex-secretary of the Cobden Club, must have perceived at once how disastrous this mixture of favouritism, injustice, and corruption must certainly prove to the great Empire for whose prosperity and security Great Britain is still responsible.

Among the causes particularly affecting this country in the world depression of trade I would give a high place to excessive expenditure and taxation, including the extravagant legislation and unsatisfactory administration of the unemployment dole which is tending to demoralise the working classes and in many thousands of cases to make unemployment a profession. I have written at some length recently (in the September number of *Lloyd's Bank Review*) on the urgent need for public economy both in the national budget and in those of the local authorities. I showed that from 200 millions before the War, the total national expenditure has risen to 884 millions, and that in the last six years, in spite of a fall of about 28 per cent. in the level of wholesale prices since 1924, in spite of a saving of 20 millions on War pensions, and in spite of some 250 millions applied to Debt redemption, nearly 100 millions have been added to the Budget. I came to the conclusion that, if a reasonable spirit of economy had prevailed, some 90 millions of this additional expenditure would have been avoided; and I maintain that an economical government in the course of the next two or three years could not only effect these reductions but also save a very large annual sum by successful conversions of the national debt to lower rates of interest. Can anyone who has examined the facts and figures relating to national and local expenditure deny that there has been extravagance, or that the burden weighs heavily on taxpayers and ratepayers? If the facts are undeniable, the remedy is obvious. But it is only by drastic economies that the mischief can be cured. The attempt to shift the burden of taxation from death duties to income-tax, or from income-tax to supertax, is futile; nor can trade benefit by transferring a few millions from direct to indirect taxation, in other words from the rich, or comparatively rich, to the mass of consumers, who are poor. Besides,

taxes on consumption are direct taxes on trade and reduce the purchasing power of the home market; and if they are protective the real burden on the people is much greater than the revenue which customs duties yield to the exchequer.

One more obstacle to the restoration of our trade prosperity remains to be noticed. I mean the incompetence of our boards of directors in the case of so many public companies. Millions of capital have been lost in the last few years. Sometimes a clever swindler humbugs a stupid board. Sometimes a city financier amalgamates a number of concerns, calls the process "rationalisation" and floats a doomed undertaking upon a credulous public. British investors have been caught over and over again. No wonder that capital is shy of new ventures and no wonder that many old and once prosperous businesses have come to grief since the War. I cannot help thinking that, to bring about reform, we need a more independent, a more disinterested, and a more enlightened Press. But I must be content with having tried in these few pages to diagnose some of the real evils from which we are suffering and to have drawn a line between true and false remedies.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

THE FIRST BALKAN CONFERENCE.

FOR more than a century the federation of the Balkan peoples has been the dream of poets and the despair of politicians. For a moment in 1912, at the time of the first Balkan war, it was the ideal of Mr. Venizelos—an ideal shattered by the second Balkan war of 1913. But last month the first step towards the collaboration of the nationalities of South-Eastern Europe was successfully taken by the meeting in Athens of the first Balkan Conference ever held. The representatives of six states, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Roumania and Turkey, sat for seven days in the Parliament-house in Athens and for an eighth in the seats of the Amphiktyons at Delphi, the classical ancestors of the League of Nations. The delegates were no mere academic theorists, but men of wide experience, in some cases ex-Ministers and ex-diplomatists, and the Chairman of the Conference, to whose tact and geniality great credit was due, was Mr. Papanastasiou, first Prime Minister of the Greek Republic, who happily combines political habits with a tendency towards idealism. Whenever difficulties arose, he smoothed them over and worked unceasingly for the cause of Balkan union.

The mere fact of such a meeting being possible was in itself a triumph. A few years ago who could have imagined that the former masters of the Balkan Peninsula would have sat in the same chamber as their various successors to discuss calmly—and all the discussions were calm—the common interests of the six nationalities which people it? Throughout the present writer, who attended all the sittings, noticed a happy inclination to dwell upon the interests which unite, rather than those which divide, the various Balkan peoples. All the delegations entered the Chamber with a sincere goodwill and a desire to be conciliatory, and the fear that the Bulgarians might not come, because of the question of minorities, fortunately proved to be groundless. There were one or two difficult moments, chiefly due to that question, but they were transitory, and, as a Yugoslav delegate remarked, he found that he could understand a Bulgarian colleague, when the one spoke Serbian and the other Bulgarian. The proverbial Greek hospitality enabled the delegates to fraternise and informally exchange views at numerous social functions, and Balkan collaboration was promoted round the tables of the garden of the *Boulevard* as well as in the Chamber and the Committee-rooms.

The Conference was divided into six committees dealing respectively with the organisation of the gathering, political, economic and social questions, intellectual co-operation and the improvement of communications between the various states. At

the present stage of Balkan relations political questions are of less practical importance and far more likely to cause disunion than the less spectacular but far more useful problems of everyday life. Political discussions on external and also internal questions have been the bane of the Balkans ever since the Balkan states came into existence. The decline of interest in politics, which is noticeable at both Athens and Belgrade, is a hopeful sign that people find it more beneficial to improve the material and hygienic conditions of these countries than to continue ploughing the sands of the fruitless political desert.

It was generally admitted that a better knowledge of each other would greatly conduce to the collaboration of these various peoples. The first step towards this is the improvement of communications by land, sea and air. Only since 1916 has Greece been connected with the rest of Europe by rail; and, although the railway timetable between Athens and Belgrade has been much improved by the reduction of long stops on the way, the railway service between Athens and Sofia still leaves much to desire. Especially useful would be the prolongation of the present Bulgarian line, unfortunately a narrow-gauge, from Petrich to Demir Hissar, which, if converted into the standard gauge, would link up Salonika with Sofia by through trains. A bridge over the Danube is needed to connect Sofia with Bucharest. There is no railway communication between Albania and anywhere, and on the route between Athens and Belgrade there is disparity of treatment for luggage. Thus, if luggage be registered direct from Athens to Belgrade, its owner enjoys the privilege of thirty kilos of free baggage over the Greek portion of the line, but if the same luggage be registered from Belgrade direct to Athens, he must pay for every kilo of it all the way to its destination! The only way to obtain the free thirty kilos is to register only as far as the Yugoslav frontier and then re-book the luggage at the charming hour of two a.m.! The introduction of motor-cars has revolutionised travel in the Balkans; but better roads are needed. There is an air-service between Zagreb and Salonika *via* Belgrade, and another will soon unite Athens and Joannina, which might be continued to Albania, as was suggested at the Conference, together with an aeroplane service uniting Athens with Sofia and Bucharest. Reduced postal rates for the Balkans and new inter-Balkan telephones and telegraph lines were proposed. A motion advocating the suppression of transit visas for the Balkan states was adopted, and much was said on the subject of inter-Balkan tourist-traffic.

Intimately connected with the question of communications is that of inter-Balkan trade. The climate and soil of South-Eastern Europe are so varied that nature seems to have created the

Balkan states for the purpose of supplying one another's wants. It is true that they are all mainly agricultural, although industries are making progress. But the superabundant agricultural produce of one should supply the needs of another, and a Yugoslav delegate advocated the extension of the recent agreement, made at Sinaia between his country and Roumania, to all the Balkan states. Yugoslavia, for example, possesses a large supply of meat which would be useful to Greece, and, with the object of facilitating commercial transactions, Mr. Loverdos proposed the foundation of a permanent inter-Balkan Economic Institute. The Economic Committee of the Conference finally passed a resolution advocating the creation in each state of an office for the study of Balkan commercial questions, representatives of which would compose a central Balkan Commercial Institute, and would themselves be elected by the various Balkan Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture and banks. This motion further urged the abolition of the present obstacles to the transit of merchandise, the unification of the nomenclature and classification of the various Balkan tariffs, the adoption of a common Balkan policy for the protection of Balkan products, especially tobacco, the encouragement of the co-operative movement, the study of the measures necessary for a Balkan monetary union, and the collaboration of the Balkan banks with a view to facilitate economic and financial relations, partially by the extension of a system of credit.

The importance of this is all the greater when it is remembered that the natural resources of the Balkans have not yet been fully exploited, and that it is much wiser from a political point of view that they should be exploited by native rather than foreign capital. For more than one small state has realised the dangers of allowing a powerful foreign company to obtain a practical monopoly of some article which it produces; there have been occasions when the Consul has followed the capitalist, and the gun-boat the Consul.

It was pleasant to find so much effort directed towards social and especially working-class questions, which have hitherto occupied so small a portion of the articles and telegrams published by the "European" press about the Balkans. At the sittings of the Committee for Social Questions the various delegates asked their colleagues what was the social legislation existing in their respective countries, and a great amount of information was thus acquired. It had before it a valuable report, drawn up by Dr. Calitsounakis, on "The uniform regulation of Balkan working-class questions," which contained a summary of Balkan legislation about them, and passed a resolution appealing to the Balkan Governments to improve labour legislation in each country, to

regulate social legislation, as far as possible, by a uniform standard, and to facilitate relations between the working-class associations of the Balkan states.

Special stress was laid upon the improvement of the conditions of labour for women and young people, the prohibition of child labour, the abolition of state-recognised prostitution and the suppression of the white slave traffic. It was naturally discovered that social legislation was much less advanced in some states than in others, but no desire was shown to impose the legislation of one upon another. Mr. Sakazoff, who presided over this committee, stated for example that in Bulgaria the working-classes take as yet no part in economic organisation. One grievance of Balkan workmen is the difficulty facing them when they go to another Balkan state to work, such as the questions of visas, permissions of residence and the lack of facilities for the remittance of their wages to their families at home. The question of Balkan co-operation against such diseases as malaria and tuberculosis was raised, while simultaneously athletic teams from five of the six states demonstrated before immense crowds in the Stadium that the cult of a healthy body by outdoor sports has made marked progress in South-Eastern Europe. A few years ago athletic circles would have learned with surprise that two Turks had won the gentlemen's doubles at tennis and that a Roumanian had been first in the Marathon race.

No branch of the Conference's work was more interesting than the sittings of the Committee for Intellectual Co-operation, which unanimously adopted a resolution, pointing out that hitherto such co-operation has not existed, that the Balkan peoples have little or no knowledge of each other, and that this intellectual isolation has engendered prejudices and mistakes, ending in sanguinary conflicts and national hatreds. The motion, therefore, recommended the adoption of the following measures without delay:

- (1) The regular exchange of professors and students of the Balkan universities;
- (2) Balkan exhibitions, such as that of Balkan popular art held in Athens during the Conference;
- (3) The organisation of popular lectures to explain to the Balkan peoples the points of contact with their Balkan neighbours, supplemented by Pan-Balkan clubs of their students in "foreign" universities;
- (4) The exchange of children during their holidays;
- (5) The encouragement of relations between Balkan societies for physical and intellectual education;
- (6) The teaching of one of the Balkan languages and literature

in the universities of each state and the foundations of chairs of Comparative Balkan Jurisprudence; and

(7) The improvement of the teaching of history in particular. Great stress was laid, and with great reason, upon this last point.

Everyone knows how lasting are the prejudices derived from the drum-and-trumpet history-books of his schooldays, in which the historians' compatriots are always in the right and patriotism degenerates into Chauvinism to the exclusion of any but a meagre account of social and economic progress. Nowhere have historical traditions been more fatal than in the Balkans, where they have been used as political arguments by practical statesmen, fond of citing the rival Balkan national heroes of the fourteenth, or even earlier centuries, as if they had lived yesterday. The Greek authorities took a step in the right direction when they lately erased the epithet "Bulgar-slayer" from the name of the street at Salonika called after the Emperor Basil II. One Greek delegate thought that a Commission should follow in each country the historical text-books and that general instead of exclusively national history should be taught. The resolution of this committee further recommended regular exchanges between Balkan museums of copies and photographs of works of art, popular translations of Balkan folklore and modern Balkan plays, travel facilities for Balkan intellectuals, a "Balkan week" at a fixed date in each state, and the foundation of an Institute of Balkan Intellectual Co-operation with its permanent seat in a Balkan city and with a female section.

Women, indeed, played a considerable part in this Conference, especially on the Social and Intellectual Committees. Mme. Theodoropoulou, President of the Greek League for Women's Rights, laid before it a valuable memorandum on "the part of women in Balkan co-operation," in which she reminded it that as far back as the Feminist Congress at Rome in 1923 a group of Feminist Organisations was formed, comprising Greece, Yugoslavia and Roumania, and the work was continued in five annual conferences held in the five countries composing this group. Her impression, as the result of these experiences, was that Balkan women desire peace, that they naturally had much in common, such as customs, traditions and folklore, that they had expressed a desire for a customs union and common ports, and for a supervision of historical text-books. She, therefore, advocated the organisation of women's clubs in all the Balkan capitals and several large provincial cities, propaganda among Balkan mothers, and other measures.

Finally, the important question of the Balkan press occupied the attention of this committee. A very experienced Greek journalist, Mr. Vekiarelles, pointed out the valuable services ren-

dered to Balkan co-operation by the visits of newspaper correspondents to other Balkan capitals, and there was a general disposition to recognise the importance of the press as a factor in bringing the Balkan nations together. Unfortunately, the exigencies of modern journalism tend towards the selection of sensational news. In the "European" press the Balkans rarely appear except when they are the theatre of some act of violence; their peaceful progress is neglected by editors with a "nose for news," and a largely false conception of their real condition is thus formed. The Greek press, to its credit be it said, has lately published long and informing articles about Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslavs have very competent correspondents in Athens, while parties of Greek business men have visited Belgrade and Bled and their hosts last month paid them a return visit in Greece. Serbian is to be taught at Salonika University, where Professor Laskaris, who studied at Belgrade and has performed the rare feat of writing a book in Serbian, lectures upon Balkan history. Yet at the present time there is not a single English correspondent of an English newspaper resident in Belgrade—so I was informed there a fortnight ago. Yet Yugoslavia is nowadays a very important country politically and news about it should come direct, not through a foreign capital.

It remains to consider the political results of the Conference. It has approved the idea of an annual meeting of the Balkan Ministers of Foreign Affairs in some Balkan city for exchange of views. A rider might have been added to this that the Ministers of each Balkan state accredited to the capital of another might also meet annually. A second resolution advocated the study of a Balkan pact on the basis of the illegality of war, the settlement of all Balkan differences by pacific means, and the mutual assistance of the Balkan states in case any of them violate its pledge not to make war. A third resolution charged a special committee with the examination of a draft Balkan pact and with the study of the difficulties in the way of Balkan co-operation; this committee is to report to the next Conference on all these questions. To those sanguine optimists who expected a new heaven and a new earth to be created at Athens, these results may seem small; but to those who have had long experience of Balkan politics they will have seemed to be satisfactory. Most of the delegates were thoroughly satisfied with this first meeting; and, as two of them remarked in conversation, the hostile criticisms of certain newspapers proved that the foes of Balkan union were alarmed at what had been accomplished.

For Balkan history shows that the quarrels between the Balkan peoples have not been wholly due to themselves but to instigation

from interested parties outside the peninsula. During the Conference, the chief Albanian delegate, Mehmed Konitza, who is well-known in London political circles, truly remarked that "the Balkans have always been considered by certain leaders of the Great Powers as the powder-magazine of Europe: those gentlemen knew what they were talking about, for it was they who provided the powder." Before the great war the jealousies and conflicting ambitions of Austria-Hungary and Russia converted certain Balkan states into pawns in the great game which those rival Powers played for the predominant position in the peninsula. The diabolical tactics of sowing discord between the Balkan Allies were successful in dividing them in 1913, and the late King Nicholas of Montenegro vainly put into the mouth of one of the characters of his historico-political drama, *The Empress of the Balkans*, the remark that "the States of the Balkans should not be the coin with which their big neighbours pay off their mutual debts." But, as the Albanian delegate went on to say, "the times fortunately are beginning to change." The Balkan peoples have grown up; they resent tutelage, even if tendered without ulterior motives, and while no races are more grateful to individuals—witness the gratitude of the Albanians to Miss Durham and Lady Carnarvon, of the Serbs to Dr. Seton-Watson, of the Greeks to Byron and Hastings, of the Bulgarians to Lord Buxton and Bouchier—none are more suspicious of the interference of foreign states.

Freed from entangling foreign alliances, and left to their own devices, the Balkan states are less likely to be a "powder-magazine" and more likely to remain peaceful members of the family of nations. A Balkan Confederation will not be yet; for, as the most experienced statesman of South-Eastern Europe, Mr. Venizelos, told the Conference, "none fails to recognise the difficulties of realising such a union; we all acknowledge that it could be accomplished only by degrees. But if you begin by the points on which agreement is easier, you will create an atmosphere which will render possible the successive settlement of the most difficult questions, about which the divergences of opinion are at present more profound." That was the spirit which characterised the discussions of the Conference—a spirit akin to our British love of compromises and gradual progress.

Before separating, the Conference drew up the statutes of the organisation of the same name which is intended to be permanent. The constitution of this body consists of twenty-six Articles. The first defines the objects of "the Balkan Conference"—"to contribute to the closer ties and collaboration of the Balkan peoples in their economic, social, cultural and political relations, in order finally to direct this movement towards the union of the six Balkan

states." The Conference will meet in each of them by turn, and will consist of a General Assembly, a Council and a Secretariat. Each national group forming the Conference must be in contact with the Government of its country and with the representatives of the other Balkan states accredited thereto. The General Assembly will meet in October; each delegation will consist of thirty delegates, chosen from the political, official, municipal and intellectual world, the press, and pacifist, professional and feminist organisations, all nominated by a committee in each country, constituted by each national group after agreement with the Government. Each Balkan Government may send to the Assembly observers with the right of speaking, and a similar privilege is accorded to the League of Nations (which was represented at the Athens Conference) and may be extended to other international organisations. Six Committees, with the same functions as those at the recent Conference, will be formed, on which each delegation will be represented by at least two members. French is declared the official language, but delegates may speak (as one Roumanian delegate at Athens) in their own language, provided it be interpreted. It may be remarked that a memorial in favour of Esperanto was presented to the Athens Conference. The Council will consist of the chiefs of each delegation and of two members who took part in the previous Assembly, and it will be renewed annually. It will represent the Conference whenever the Assembly is not sitting and controls the budget. The Secretariat will consist of six members appointed by each delegation; it will publish a periodical bulletin in French, to which all the national groups will be invited to contribute, and one of the two sections of the Secretariat will occupy itself with intellectual questions. As regards finance, the quota of each national group for the present year will be fixed by the Council.

Finally, the emblem of the Conference will be a parallelogram with the six Balkan national colours, white, blue, green, yellow, red and white again, bearing in the centre a white sphere encircled by six yellow stars. For the first time in history the Balkan flag was hoisted on October 12th at Delphi—not the least memorable event in the long history of that sacred spot. All friends of the Balkan peoples—and they have many in Great Britain—may re-echo the words with which Mr. Papanastasiou closed the first Balkan Conference: "It only depends upon ourselves to be really independent." Balkan collaboration is a far better guarantee for peace and unity than the patronage of Great Powers.

WILLIAM MILLER.

EGYPT.

IN order fully to appreciate the present position in Egypt, it is necessary to consider three main features of the situation, all of which are far too little known in this country and have to a considerable extent been misinterpreted: first, the actual facts of the development of the constitutional crisis; secondly, the history and evolution of Egyptian parliamentary life; and thirdly, the relationship between Egyptian politics and Anglo-Egyptian relations. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the solution of Egypt's present difficulties lies entirely in her own hands, as His Majesty's Government have no right to interfere in a question which is essentially an internal affair of that country, unless there should arise a situation affecting the Four Reserved Points.

When Nahas Pasha resigned, the reasons given were that he had failed to obtain the King's signature* to certain draft Bills for the protection of the Constitution, whereas in point of fact measures had also been submitted for the creation of a Supreme Court of Justice (Court of Cassation) giving full powers to the then Minister of Justice to appoint judges practically for life, and for the appointment of a High Controller of Finance with the right to control the Budget and to report to Parliament on the financial situation with the status of a Minister immune from dismissal. In other words, Nahas aimed at securing the position of the Wafd in Parliament, and at ensuring that finance and justice should be permanently under Wafd control. The King, however, refused to sign on the ground that the time available in the remainder of the session was inadequate for the consideration of such important questions, and suggested their postponement. It was further alleged that the failure of Nahas to conclude an Anglo-Egyptian settlement, together with the bad economic situation in Egypt, had contributed to his decision. It now transpires that Nahas did not take the Treaty negotiations seriously, and only used them as a means of increasing his power in Egypt by posing as a patriot who had rejected the British conditions owing to the Sudan; and that he treated the economic situation lightly owing to the large reserve fund at his disposal. The economic crisis was due partly to world depression, partly to the fact that Nahas bought up £E13,000,000 worth of cotton at \$2 over market price, when the cotton was not in the hands of the fellahin but under the control of speculators, and partly to the extravagance of his Government. The real reason for the resignation of Nahas was that he

* All Bills introduced by the Government are presented in the form of decrees, and therefore have to be signed by the King before presentation to Parliament; but this must not be confused with the royal assent, which is given or withheld in the ordinary way after a measure has passed both Chambers.

returned to Egypt on good terms with His Majesty's Government, with the impression prevailing that the conclusion of a Treaty was merely a matter of months, and he wanted to exploit this position with a view to obtaining King Fuad's signature to his draft Bills by means of British intervention. The fact that he started his revolutionary movement immediately after the acceptance of his resignation proves that he did not want to resign. Indeed, he asked Parliament for a vote of confidence in order to make impossible the formation of a new constitutional Cabinet, and Parliament decided, with his permission, to send a deputation of senators and deputies to urge the King not to accept his resignation. The Executive Committee of the Wafd then decided that no other Wafdist should accept an invitation to form a new Cabinet, thereby compelling the King to fall back on Nahas if he wanted a Constitutional Cabinet with a majority. In these circumstances there was no other course open to the King than to form an extra-Parliamentary Cabinet.

The King's success in forming the Sidky Cabinet came as a shock to Nahas and the Wafd, who expected the intervention of the High Commissioner. Sir Percy Loraine had, however, declared the neutrality of the British Government. The next shock came in the entire absence of any spontaneous movement against the new Government during its first week in office, which led to Nahas's tour of the provinces to arouse the feelings of the people. All deputies were sent out to start anti-Government movements in their constituencies and to arrange visits of Nahas for the delivery of violent speeches. Nahas's tour produced trouble in Zagazig, Bilbeis, Mansourah, and Tantah, ending with the riots in Alexandria; but in these disturbances, which were confined to the mob of the cities and towns, it was significant that the Egyptian masses took no part, and that order was restored by Egyptian troops and police. Not only did the Sidky Government refrain from proclaiming martial law, but circumstances were such that it was found unnecessary to pass any emergency laws or to set up any special tribunals.

On assuming power, Sidky Pasha's first step was to grapple with the economic crisis and the results of the misguided cotton policy of his predecessor. Steps were immediately taken to stop all Government purchases of cotton, and to sell as much as possible of the vast quantities stored at Alexandria. A policy of national economy was at once instituted, which has already resulted in cutting £E8,000,000 out of the Budget without interfering with any projects of national importance. Irrigation, railway and road construction have not been curtailed, while the education, public health, housing and land projects were resumed. On the political

side, the present Government set itself out to strengthen the Administration, which had been seriously weakened during the Nahas régime by the interference of senators and deputies in the work of officials of the central administration and provinces, thereby incurring much loss of prestige. Also, Sidky Pasha clearly stated that, although a constitutionalist, he would govern only with a constitution representative of the people of Egypt, and that he would, therefore, have to make some changes in the Electoral Law, and in the Constitution itself, which would make it impossible in future for any party to have such control of the Chamber as to amount to a dictatorship. He maintained that constitutional government without an opposition was a farce, and that Egypt had never enjoyed constitutional government in the true sense of the term since the Declaration of 1922. A Wafd Government without a strong opposition is merely the dictatorship of an oligarchy, consisting of three or four men, and no one else has any say in the government of the country, not even members of the Wafd itself. The Wafd, as a party, have come in for a great deal of adverse criticism both in this country and in Egypt, and I must admit that I have contributed my share to this criticism; but it should at the same time be realised that, although the Wafd have committed grave errors and have secured their position by methods contrary to the true interests of Egypt, that party possesses men of political ability who have always lacked the necessary courage to force their opinions and ideas, with the result that the Wafd has always been in the hands of an extremist but energetic minority. If I have attacked this political party in Egypt, it has been solely because its policy and methods have been, in my opinion, contrary to the interests of the four principles which should guide every Egyptian Government—peace and good government, moral and material progress, Egypt for the Egyptians, and Anglo-Egyptian collaboration. There is no question of British observers taking sides in party politics in Egypt—and any attempt to do so is strongly to be deprecated—but criticism of policy and methods, irrespective of party, is healthy and in the interests of a better understanding.

As it is more than obvious that important changes are necessary before the Egyptians can hope to enjoy the real benefits of modern representative government, let us now consider the short history of Egyptian parliamentary life together with the reasons why constitutional government has hitherto failed. In 1882, after the British Occupation, Lord Dufferin was sent to Egypt to draw up a scheme for the restoration of the country, which would conform to a policy of withdrawing the British garrison at an early date; and the parliamentary régime, which prevailed from 1882 to 1912 was based on Lord Dufferin's

proposals for a Legislative Council and Assembly, partly nominated by the Government and partly elected by the people. The Government were not obliged to adopt the opinions of either of these bodies, but no new direct tax could be imposed without the approval of the Assembly which also had to be consulted concerning public loans and certain other economic matters. Both the Council and Assembly were consultative bodies with little real power, but they gave the Egyptian people a chance of having some voice in the affairs of their country without binding the Government to carry out measures which might be the outcome of immature political thought.

* The foregoing régime worked with some success until 1912 when Lord Kitchener, wishing to give the Egyptians a greater share in the conduct of affairs, fused the two existing Councils into one body under the name of the Legislative Assembly, which was given the powers of both the former bodies with certain important additions. This new body consisted of a much larger proportion of elected members, and of a much smaller one of members nominated by the Government. It remained, however, essentially a consultative body, with no power over the executive except that of checking any increase of direct taxation, but ministers had to be present at its meetings and could be questioned, while the public were admitted to the Chamber. The Assembly continued to be a useful legislative body, whose opinion was always seriously considered and in most cases adopted, until the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 when it was adjourned never to meet again.

The Declaration of 1922 marked the next stage in Egyptian constitutional history. Egypt was then free to have the constitution she wanted, and Sarwat Pasha, then Prime Minister, formed a commission to elaborate the new Constitution and Electoral Law. As Sarwat wished this commission to be representative of all parties, he insisted that the Zaghlulists should be included, but they refused. The new Constitution was based on all the most modern European constitutions, and was decreed in 1923 along with the new Electoral Law; but the sudden change from a purely consultative body, partly nominated by the Government, to an advanced constitution with universal suffrage was a radical step for which Egypt was not yet politically prepared, and this is now admitted by many thinking Egyptians. Indeed, in many ways the powers of the Egyptian Parliament exceed those of our own parliamentary system, for while it is contrary to the standing orders of the House of Commons for a private member to introduce a Bill of a financial nature, this is a common occurrence in Egyptian parliamentary procedure. It is also necessary to realise that the vast majority of the electors who enjoy this universal suffrage

can neither read nor write; are very credulous and therefore susceptible to political insincerity; and are only interested in politics in so far as the cultivation of their own land is concerned, and when stirred up by the violent propaganda of professional politicians.

When it is considered that parliamentary government in Egypt has been brought to a complete standstill on no less than three occasions in its short life of nine years—in 1924, after the murder of the Sirdar, in 1928, after the death of Zaghlul and only three months after the election of Nahas as Prime Minister, and in 1930, when Sidky formed the present Government—it is not surprising that it has not succeeded. Its longest period of life was from 1925 to 1928, and this was only due to the presence in Parliament at that time of a good number of non-Zaghlulists and the formation of a coalition Government under Adly Pasha, and later under Sarwat Pasha, the Cabinet being composed partly of Zaghlulists and partly of Liberal-Constitutionalists, the latter of which formed the most competent element. But the actual reason for the failure of the constitutional system in Egypt lies in the fact that one political party has always emerged from the elections with a very large majority; and that this party has been entirely free from parliamentary criticism, although it has made the greatest blunders imaginable. These blunders were fully appreciated by all true patriots and thinking politicians who had the interests of the country at heart, but they never came to the knowledge of the vast and ignorant electorate which put this party in power and thereafter enjoyed complete political oblivion. The best elements in Egypt did not want the Wafd to continue either the policy they were pursuing or the system which kept them in power, as they took advantage of the fact that the great majority of their constituents did not understand the shortcomings of their policy and relied for their information solely on Wafdist propaganda. The ignorant masses concentrated their attention on the futile promises of complete independence, complete withdrawal of the British Army, and the inclusion of the Sudan as an integral part of Egypt, and were raised to a high pitch of national enthusiasm on this foreign issue, at a time when Egyptian policy should have been concentrated on domestic affairs. This has been responsible for the large Wafd majorities and has been the result of granting a Constitution to Egypt before the final Anglo-Egyptian settlement has been concluded.

Obviously, it is useless to continue a parliamentary system which has definitely failed, and defects must be rectified if it is intended that constitutional government should continue in Egypt. This, however, is a task, not for the British Government, but for the Egyptian Government; and Sidky Pasha, as a constitutionalist,

as a leading member of the Commission which drew up the present Constitution, and as a member of the Ministry which secured constitutional Government for Egypt in 1922 can be trusted only to introduce such changes as will not infringe constitutional principles.

Since 1920 His Majesty's Governments have negotiated with the Egyptian Government on no less than six occasions in their endeavour to reach an understanding as the basis of a treaty between the two countries, and on each occasion their efforts have been unsuccessful. In June 1920 Zaghlul Pasha and the original Wafd negotiated with the Milner Mission in London, and in the following summer Adly Pasha had important conversations with Lord Curzon, the failure of which eventually led to the 1922 Declaration. Then, in September 1924, Mr. MacDonald raised the matter again with Zaghlul Pasha in negotiations which only lasted until the beginning of the following month, and in 1928 Sir Austen Chamberlain negotiated with Sarwat Pasha, whose Ministry was a coalition government practically under the control of Zaghlul. More recently still, Mr. Henderson met Mahmoud Pasha in 1929, and this year continued negotiations much on the same basis with Nahas Pasha, who like all his predecessors had to return to Egypt without a treaty. It will be noticed that out of these six attempts to reach a settlement Egypt was represented by the Wafd on three occasions, and on two other occasions non-Wafdist negotiations were wrecked in Cairo by the Wafd (in 1928 and 1929). In the Chamberlain-Sarwat negotiations the Egyptian Prime Minister was practically in the hands of that political organisation. Also, an examination of the nature of these negotiations brings out one very conspicuous fact, i.e. that in their attempts to compromise with Egypt the British Government have always been late in coming forward with their concessions, and, when these concessions were finally made, the Egyptians were not any longer prepared to accept them, but had their minds set on something more far-reaching.

The Milner negotiations failed because the Egyptians insisted on an official declaration by His Majesty's Government that the Protectorate was at an end, and Great Britain refused to make this concession. Yet, six months later, when Adly Pasha agreed to come to London to negotiate with Lord Curzon, he made this declaration a condition of his acceptance and it was granted. If only this concession had been made six months earlier, on the occasion of the Milner-Zaghlul negotiations, there is scarcely any doubt that these negotiations would have been successful. Then the Curzon-Adly negotiations failed mainly because Lord Curzon took the view that all communications in Egypt, railways, roads, and canals, constituted imperial communications of vital importance

to the British Empire, and therefore insisted that the British troops should be free to be stationed anywhere in Egypt, and especially in Cairo and Alexandria. In other words, he went back on what Lord Milner had accepted a year before, i.e. that the term "imperial communications" only applied to the Suez Canal, and that the British troops should be confined to the vicinity of that waterway for its protection. Then, seven years later, Sir Austen Chamberlain and Sarwat Pasha came to terms on practically the same conditions as those approved by Lord Milner with some reservations; and in 1929, in negotiating with Mahmoud Pasha, Mr. Henderson shared the view of Lord Milner that imperial communications only consisted of the Suez Canal, and consequently that the British troops should be confined to that area. The Henderson-Mahmoud Treaty was a great advance in liberality and it held out great hopes of acceptance by the Egyptian people. It is noteworthy that, while Zaghlul would probably have gladly accepted the Milner proposals in 1920, if he could have obtained the assurance of His Majesty's Government that the Protectorate was at an end, Nahas Pasha rejected Mr. Henderson's far more liberal terms nine years later.

These various Anglo-Egyptian negotiations have had their effect, which has been to create in Egypt an atmosphere of competition for power, based on the terms which each party was willing to offer or accept, and it was only natural that the party which made the greatest demands of His Majesty's Government should make the greatest appeal to the Egyptian electors. Indeed, things came to such a pass that the Wafd, in order to gain and secure the confidence of the ignorant majority, embarked on a policy of savage attacks on Great Britain combined with exaggerated demands; while those who adhered to the original demands formulated by Zaghlul Pasha in 1920, and believed in cultivating friendship and confidence in Great Britain in order to obtain a peaceful settlement, were violently attacked by the Wafd and found it difficult to compete with that Party's dishonest policy. They were subjected to bodily attack as non-patriotic Egyptians and in some cases were even killed in the streets. Yet the strange sequel of this was that at the very moment when Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were the great *question du jour*, and the Wafd continuously held a majority in the country, Egypt was granted a modern Constitution with universal suffrage; whereas the Constitution ought to have been granted as a natural result of a settlement and not in anticipation of the event. The consequence of this is that if His Majesty's Government insist on negotiating only with an Egyptian Government with a majority, they are practically compelled to confine their negotiations to the Wafd, at the expense of the more

moderate elements in Egypt who have at heart the conclusion of a just and lasting agreement, and lost their majority in the country on account of this very policy. Moreover, as a result of a policy of making promises which they could not fulfil, the Wafd now find themselves in an impossible position if they wish to compromise. It was this fact that led to the breakdown of the Nahas-Henderson negotiations, and it looks as if for this reason the Wafd will never be able to sign an Anglo-Egyptian agreement.

In conclusion, it seems as if there were two courses open to Great Britain and Egypt in their effort to find a way of reaching a settlement, (a) either Egypt should be provided with a more adaptable Constitution and Electoral Law, whereby the saner elements of the population would be represented, and no negotiations should be conducted until this new experiment has proved a success, or (b) there should be an agreement between the leaders of all parties in Great Britain that the terms offered by Mr. Henderson to Nahas Pasha last spring will stand in future as the absolute limit to which Great Britain is prepared to go, and that His Majesty's Government will sign an agreement on this basis with whatever Egyptian Government can in future obtain the sanction of the representatives of the Egyptian people to these proposals. This would eliminate all future negotiations as well as all further political competition between parties in Egypt on the Treaty issue. It is for Egyptian politicians to fight out the matter between themselves on this definite issue of acceptance or refusal, and it is essential that the Egyptian question should be excluded once and for all from party politics both here and in Egypt.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

THE CONTACT OF COLOURS AND CIVILISATIONS.*

I HAVE been reading lately the *San Min Chu I*—the Three Principles of the People—of Sun Yat Sen, a course of lectures delivered in 1924. The writer of the *San Min Chu I* has much to say of colour, race, and nationality. He is not very clear about their relation to one another or their distinction from one another. In one passage, for instance, he speaks of the five main races—white, black, red, yellow, and brown—as if colour and race were the same thing. Only two pages before, he has spoken of “race or nationality,” as if they were identical. But what he really means is fairly simple. The yellow people of China form a nation, sympathetic indeed with other nations of Asia on the common ground of Asiatic continentalism—or of Asiatic colour, whichever you may prefer to say—but none the less a nation, with a nationality of its own; and the essential thing in this people’s life, and in all other peoples’ lives, is this fact of nationality, and not the fact of the State. Nationality is made by *wang-tao*, the royal way, or way of right, which follows nature; and it is thus a natural fact, based on the five natural factors of common blood, common livelihood, common language, common religion, and common customs and habits. The State is made by *pa-tao*, or the way of might, or artificial force; and this is the basis of England’s action in India and England’s establishment in Hong Kong.

Nationality being the vital essence of a people, “to preserve the Chinese race we must certainly preserve nationalism.” Nationality, again, being a principle or essence which is equally valuable wherever it appears, and in whatever casket it is kept, we must also cherish the idea of the equality of nations. It is, therefore, the duty of China both to preserve nationalism, and to cherish the idea of her equality as a nation among other nations. In the past China has been a suffering nation like Judæa, like India, like Poland. For centuries she endured the artificial force of the Manchu State; but even during those centuries the vital essence was preserved, as it were in a battered casket, among the roughest and lowest classes of society, by means of their nationalist secret societies. To-day, the Manchu State is gone: China is purely a nation through its breadth and its depth; but it has still to reckon with and to suffer from the intruding States on its territory. In this position it must avert its face from any idea of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism in the past, under the guise of imperialism, and basing itself on the conception that the Chinese Emperor was a

world-Emperor ruling by right the round world, was the destruction of China. Cosmopolitanism in the present, under the guise of a seductive internationalism, whatever may be its appeal to the modern young advocates of new culture, is the danger of China. The Chinese nation, like other nations, must take its stand firmly in the ground of nationalism: it must set its face against intruding imperialist States, against cosmopolitanism, against all the enemies of its fundamental principle and essence of nationality.

If Sun Yat Sen had stopped at this point, his teaching would have been consistent. But when he delivered his lectures in 1924, he was under the glamour of Bolshevik Russia. Russia, he felt, was engaged in a war against imperialism, a war against the capitalism which underlies imperialism, a war against the false mask of internationalism which imperialism and capitalism wear. Was not Russia, therefore, the friend of an anti-cosmopolitan nationalism? He answered the question in the affirmative. He ignored the fact that Russia was neither based upon nationalism herself, nor the friend of nationalism elsewhere: that Russia was the apostle of a cosmopolitan doctrine of world-socialism, and the would-be nucleus of a World-State of workers. In this frame of mind he left the plain ground of nationalism, and advanced to a curious sort of internationalism. Russia, he felt, was the defender of *wang-tao*, or the way of right. So were the small and weak nations of Asia (excepting Japan), who were all subject to bitter oppression from the States that followed the way of might. Russia and the small and weak nations of Asia must therefore unite against the States, white or yellow, that sought to be oppressive. “Throughout the world white and yellow defenders of right will unite against white and yellow defenders of might.” The white division of mankind, with its four races of Teuton, Slav, Latin, and Anglo-Saxon, will put into the field on the side of right the Slav, and possibly also the Teuton, for “Germany is the oppressed nation of Europe”: it will put into the field on the side of might the Anglo-Saxon and Latin. There will be a similar split in the yellow division; but numbers will be on the side of right. Only two hundred and fifty millions are left to tyrannical races: the other twelve hundred and fifty millions of mankind are the enemies of oppression. The issue of the world-war, towards which the signs of the time are pointing, and which cannot be avoided, is thus already decided in advance.

I have gone at some length into Sun Yat Sen’s views, because it seemed to me worth while to see how an Asiatic thinker, followed by many millions of his fellow countrymen, looked at the world. I should say that he was too simple in his solution. He reduces everything to the plain issue of might and right, over-riding all distinctions of colour, civilisation, and culture. I should also say

* Part of an address delivered before the University of Aberdeen in March 1930.

that he was inconsistent. He rejects cosmopolitanism in favour of nationalism, and yet he arrays a cosmopolitan battle royal, with two international opposing sides. But this is not the conclusion of the whole matter. We in this island have to look at the world also, from our far angle in the North-West of Europe; and what shall we say of the signs of the times? We may refuse to admit that they portend a universal battle of nations, but we can hardly refuse to see that there is a great issue hanging before us. "This is the issue" (I quote from the opening words of the second of the Rhodes Memorial Lectures which General Smuts recently delivered in Oxford) "of the contact of colours and civilisations, which seems destined to become a dominant issue of the twentieth century." It is, as General Smuts has remarked, a double issue. On the one hand, it is the issue of contact between the whole European tradition of the centuries and the vast immemorial Asiatic tradition of Southern and Eastern Asia. Here antiquity meets antiquity: here one magnitude, if we reckon in terms of population, meets an even greater magnitude. On the other hand, it is an issue of contact between the European System, with all its antiquity and magnitude, and an African continent whose scattered indigenous peoples are still, as it were, in their cradle. Here old and mature peoples meet "a child type, with a child psychology and outlook"; and here we of Europe have our part to play, now that we have entered and settled in this continent, as the guardians and almost the parents of a dispersed population of one hundred million of Africans, simple in joys, simple in sorrows, whom we can make or mar according as we determine the nature and influence of our contact.

The two issues of contact—the Asiatic and the African—differ; indeed, they differ enormously. But for the British people they are linked and joined by one simple fact. We, the British people—one people, and that not very numerous as numbers go—have a unique responsibility for dealing with this issue of contact alike in Asia and Africa. Our wandering ways, with the errant adventurous Scotsman as vanguard and pioneer of all our wanderings, have fixed us among the hundreds of millions of India, and among the tens of millions of those parts of Africa in which Livingstone roamed and explored. Our responsibility is heavy before the world. More and more in this century we shall have to decide on the part we shall play in this issue of contact. "Multitudes, multitudes in the valley of decision; for the day of the Lord is near in the valley of decision."

I can deal here only with one of the issues—the issue of contact between Europe and Asia; and even with that I can deal only in one of its phases—the great phase which we see before us in India. But

before we study the nature and results of any contact, we must look first, however summarily, at the two sides. On the Western side of the contact of Europe and Asia we may notice three things—three things, and also a fourth which should transcend and control the three. The first is a system of political thought and action. The basis of that system is the homogeneous nation, externally independent; internally self-moved and self-controlling; and on this basis there has been built the practice of representative government, under which the nation determines its motion and controls its life by its own elected representatives. The homogeneous nation has been slowly built in the West during the four centuries of modern history which have followed the Reformation: the practice of representative government has arisen more recently, in the century and a half since the French Revolution. The second thing in our Western life is an economic system of production, transport, and marketing. The basis of that system is capital: on that basis has been built the great industrial society of mine and factory, railway and steamship, bank and market; and this form of society, which began to grow in England with the Industrial Revolution, one hundred and fifty years ago, spread over all Western Europe in the course of the nineteenth century. The third thing on the side of the West is a system of culture—of great literature, of organised thought, of ascertained science. This culture has its pedigree and its antiquity: it goes back, through what we call our middle ages, to Græco-Roman civilisation; and that goes back, as we more and more discover, to the dim past of the Minoan civilisation of Crete and Mycenæ, and even beyond. Our culture can challenge the antiquity of that of Asia; but we may notice two novelties in its present shape. One is the novelty of scientific method, applied alike in history and in chemistry, in things human and in things material—a method which colours our general thinking, and gives us the solid basis of a steady body of ascertained truth resting on a method of observation and experiment. The other is the novelty of national education, which seeks to make the system of culture a possession not only of savants and literati, but also of the general body of the general people. Finally, above the politics, above the economics, above the culture, there is the last and greatest thing—the system of religion and ethics which we call by the name of Christianity. Once, in the Middle Ages, and through the agency of the Mediæval Church, this system sought to control all other systems—all politics, all economics, all culture. To-day, with the growth in dimensions, and the growth in independence, of these other systems, the Christian system sometimes seems to be almost a system apart. But we acknowledge, if only with our lips, its supremacy. Shall we be Utopian if we make that system our canon

—the canon at once of our other Western systems, and of the contact of our whole Western life and all its systems with the life and systems of India?

I will not attempt even the most summary picture of the life and the general system of India as it stood before, or apart from, its contact with Occidentalism. I will say nothing of its religion and its castes; its economy and its thought; its indigenous methods of government or its original social customs. I will say only that, coming upon an ancient country, as an impinging, a transforming, or at least a modifying force, we have carried our Occidentalism, willy-nilly—in part willy, but almost in a larger part nilly—into the India to which we came. In the first place we have introduced our system and our methods of production and transportation. India to-day has cotton factories and iron and steel works: India to-day has irrigations and what the eighteenth century called “navigations”: India to-day has railways and roads. Western Industrialism has flowed—not everywhere, for India is too vast for that—into a country of mediæval village-agriculture and mediæval urban crafts. In the second place we have carried into India our political ideas—our idea of nationality, our idea of self-government through representative institutions, our idea of party organisation and action. Partly, and more recently, this has been a matter of conscious and voluntary introduction. The Indian Councils Act of 1892, for instance, provided for the election (disguised under the name of recommendation) of a certain number of Indian Members to seats on provincial councils: the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 provided for an increase of the Indian members, now definitely elected—an increase which, in the province of Bengal, was enough to secure a clear elected majority: the Government of India Act of 1919 not only increased the number of elected Indian members in provincial councils to at least 70 per cent. of the whole, but also, adding the further element of responsible government to that of representative institutions, it introduced into the provinces a modified form of a cabinet system. We need not speak of the parallel but less sweeping changes made in 1892, in 1909, and in 1919, in the central Indian legislature: the provincial reforms which have just been mentioned are sufficient to attest the conscious and voluntary introduction of our Western and British political ideas and practice. But almost more important than such introduction is the process of unconscious and involuntary dissemination. A wind blows as it lists, and as it blows it carries, easily and unknowingly, a multitude of light, floating seeds. When we took ourselves into India, we took what was in ourselves, and not only in ourselves, but in our general Western life—our idea of the Nation, our idea of the Voluntary Society (party, club, or union), our idea of the free human Personality and

its burden of self-responsibility. They could not but germinate in the minds of a quick and acute and ingenious people; and we, on our side, cannot but reap according as we have sown—whether or no our right hand knew what it was doing.

We have not only carried to India our economics: we have not only carried our political ideas: we have also carried our general culture, and our ideas and methods of education: we have also carried our Christianity—partly, and for ourselves, in the form of a State Church, now transforming itself into a voluntary Church: partly, again, for the native peoples of India, in the form of voluntary missions and missionary societies. Neither our culture nor our Christianity has been imposed—least of all our Christianity: it has simply been offered, to take or to leave. We have sedulously respected Indian forms of religion and religious practices—unless, as with Suttee and Thuggee, those practices were contrary to the fundamental right of human life which we felt bound to guarantee: we have sedulously respected Indian culture, the Indian *Lebensanschauung*, the fundamental Indian principle and practice of caste, which colours, controls, and consolidates Hindu religion and morality. Indeed, we may almost be said to have accepted caste so thoroughly that we have made ourselves a caste in India—a caste side by side with, or, as an Indian might say, above the rest.

The result of all this is the wonderful and amazing mixture you find in India to-day. There is a mixture of Western Industrialism with an Indian economy of village-agriculture and town crafts; there is a mixture of ideas of the nation, the parliament, the party with a system of caste, and a mixture of this mixture with British control; there is a mixture, even if we only look at our own side and at ourselves, between the missionary going on the basis of human equality, and following the royal way of nature and free persuasion, and on the other hand a political system of British control which has hitherto not proceeded on the basis of equality, and which, if it seems to us a trust, and has been actually administered by us (as I honestly believe) in the spirit of a trust, is none the less a trust of whose proper execution we regard ourselves as the proper judges. For even if you argue that our position in India is a trust (and Burke was preaching that doctrine as long ago as 1783) there is still this rub in the running of the argument—who is to judge of the working of the trust, of the need for its modification, of the time for its modification, and, above all, of the need and the time for its final determination? I honour the doctrine and the practice of trust; but it raises its own grave questions.

What is the problem of India to-day, if we regard that problem in the light of Christianity, so far as we can attain to any vision in that light? I do not think that it is a problem of colour. I do

not see any necessary clash of the colour of India, if you take that *per se*, with the colour of Britain. It is true that the sense of colour may forbid intermarriage; it is true that the sense of colour may limit the area, or diminish the ease, of ordinary social intercourse. But it need not prevent the co-operation of a British and an Indian nation. Complexion is a poor and irrelevant ground for misliking a man; and old civilisations, built by the majestic efforts of men's minds, may respect one another in spite of differences of colour, rising triumphantly above the physical into the higher world of the mind, where like may freely greet like. Nor again, do I feel that the problem is a problem of race. I am not clear about the meaning of race; but I know that, in any meaning of the term, India is a country of many races and not of one only, and that some of those races go back in history to a time when their forefathers lived with ours, so that they are not, after all, in any fundamental way, entirely remote from our British stock. What divides us from India is perhaps neither colour nor race, but two other things—an old culture, different from ours, and a new nationalism, fermenting because it is new, and in its fermentation heady and insurgent against us.

Of the cultural difference I cannot here speak. I will only say that, recognising as I do the deep differences of our two cultures and the systems of social morality with which they are intertwined, I do not believe that one old culture is in its nature the enemy of another. It is nationalism of which I wish to speak—the sense of Indian nationality: the feeling that India is a nation: the conviction that, as a nation, it has the right and the duty of determining its life. Now we may doubt, on our side, the existence of Indian national unity. We may point, in the first place, to the heterogeneity of India—the division of Hindu and Muslim, of caste and caste, of stock and stock. The heterogeneity is there; but nationalism, if once it grips the mind, has a way, in the long run, of transcending and blending differences. We may point, in the second place, to the vast silent masses of India, untouched (we feel) by the ideas of the literati and the intelligentsia; we may say that in British India only 7,500,000 vote in a population of 250,000,000, or 1 in 33; we may urge that Indian nationalism is the nationalism of a section. I can only reflect that in the lifetime of many of us, the electorate in this island was no more than 1 in 22: I can only recognise that, after all, it is always a section—the thinking and active section—which makes and manages nations and States.

What is the logic of Christian duty in the face of Indian nationality and nationalism? To recognise it, I should say, and to help it—so far as it will consent, or can be persuaded, to receive help;

to help it in developing and organising its life. I am not suggesting any political programme: I am only suggesting an attitude of mind—an attitude of respect for this new growth in India. There are two things which lead me to this way of thinking. The first is that nationality is our gift to India. It is the little seed which we carried there without knowing it—the little seed which has grown into a mighty tree. There is a logic which constrains us to respect what we have given. The second thing which I have in my mind is something deeper. The nation, I feel, is part of the Christian order of the world. A world arranged in self-respecting and other-respecting nations is a world arranged on what I should call a Christian pattern. This was long ago the teaching of the Italian prophet Mazzini. There is a simple and elementary argument which may be advanced in favour of such teaching. A fundamental Christian principle is that of the worth of persons—of the value of individual personality—of the equality of men, as persons, in the Kingdom of God, who is the ultimate Person. Now the argument for nationality, and for the sense of nationality, is that it makes a man feel himself equal to others. Bare individual equality—equality unclothed by an enveloping group: equality unsustained by a sense of encompassing companionship—equals—is not enough. To be an equal indeed you must be upheld by the sense—the proud and yet not over-proud sense—that you are a member of a nation which is equal to other nations.

The day may come when it will be enough for all men to feel themselves equal in virtue of being equally members of a single society of the human race. I have no longing to see that day, because I cling to a world richly patterned and variegated by national differences. So long as such a world of nations exists, the existence of nations everywhere (not in our Western world only, but everywhere), and the equality of nations everywhere among themselves—these are essential conditions of that worth of persons, and that equality of persons, which in turn are fundamental principles of Christianity. The more, therefore, we recognise India as a nation, and China as a nation, and the more we associate with Indians and Chinese on the basis of recognition of their nationality, the more we make them equals, and the more we all stand on a common Christian basis of equality.

I am suggesting, as I said, an attitude of mind, and not a political programme. But the attitude of mind will necessarily affect our political action. I suppose that all of us here are agreed in thinking that India must move towards self-government (have we not given our pledge?), and that it would be best for India, and best for us, if a self-governing India remained in the circle of our Commonwealth, for the simple reason that both of us stand

to gain from the free interconnection of our two nations and cultures within that circle. Now the attitude of mind I have suggested may affect and may aid both that movement and that remaining. In the first place it will lead to consultation of India, as equally concerned with us—at least equally concerned with us—about the pace of movement and the price of remaining. We have to modify our old and honourable idea of trust, in so far as it makes us unilateral judges of the execution and modification of our trust: we have somehow to follow the way of bilateralism, and to settle the future of India in a consultation, as formally equal as possible with India itself.

In the second place the attitude of mind of which I have spoken will lead us to watch with patience, with sympathy, with hope, the early attempts of the people of India to operate such a system of self-government as they may, in the course of this century and the circle of this Commonwealth, attain. A self-governing India may be rent by divisions. A self-governing India may muddle, or warp, the working of representative institutions. But we only learn to swim by swimming. And the end of government is not the efficiency of its results, but the education of its own process. I need only quote some words of General Smuts, in a lecture on Democracy to which I listened at Cambridge some months ago:

The end of government is not merely good government, but the education of the people in good government, its self-education in running its own affairs. Even at the price of less efficient government let the people by all means gain its own experience and develop its own capacity for self-government.

We should be false to ourselves if we applied to India the test of efficiency only, at a time when, as our whole system of democracy shows, we are applying to ourselves the other test of self-development of capacity.

Upon these words I might conclude. But I would not be misunderstood; and if I concluded here I might be misunderstood. I am not a glad, confident optimist about the future; and I can see difficulties ahead. I have pleaded for the attitude of mind which realises the potential value of Indian nationality. But I recognise also the potential, or actual, problems of an Indian nation attempting the way of self-government. A nation which is to develop self-government properly must be a homogeneous nation, with a common tradition which enables its members "to agree to differ," as members of contending and yet not irreconcilable parties, and to let their differences be decided amicably by the decision of the majority. Indian differences are, as yet, deeper than that agreement to differ which is the basis of a true party system; and until the different sections—Hindu and Muslim, Brahmin and untouchable, stock and

stock—attain the idea and practice of an agreement to differ, India will still fall short of that national homogeneity which is a necessary preliminary basis of real self-government. Moreover, self-government requires not only national homogeneity, but also individual disinterestedness—a willingness of representatives to serve the nation freely for the nation's sake, and not for the sake of locality, or connections, or family, or self. Such disinterestedness is not an easy acquisition. I am not thinking of the disinterestedness—absolute, ardent, unswerving—which the tense martyr can show as a testimony to a struggling and militant cause. I am thinking of the disinterestedness—steady, daily, prosaic—which the citizen must show, in every office in which he "bears the person" of the community, when the heroic days of struggle, the Garibaldian days, are over, and the long trial of the ordinary days succeeds.

Here then are two things—national homogeneity and individual disinterestedness—which are as much a necessity to be faced by India as the attitude of mind which recognises Indian nationality is a necessity to be faced by us. And because we can, I believe, help India towards this national homogeneity and civil self-discipline—because we have still gifts to give from the treasure-house of an old experience in national fellowship and the ethics of self-government—I should long earnestly that we might have the time, and retain the connection, which are necessary for their giving. Not that giving will be on our side only. India can also give to us, and give richly, if India remains in connection with us. Our feverish activity—the active and creative energy of the Western mind, particularly in its British variety—may be tempered by the deep calm spirit of contemplation; and a new type of Christian experience—new and yet old, for have we not also known our mystics of the contemplative life?—might thus arise in the life of a great Christian Church in India (if such a thing might be), and so add a new and great mansion to the house of the kingdom of heaven.

ERNEST BARKER.

THE FOUNDATION OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM.*

THE Simon Commission, which had no Indian Member, were boycotted throughout India as it was believed that they would not recommend any substantial reform and would nullify, so far as lay in their power, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. Indian opinion, Hindu or Muhammadan, as to necessary reforms was not put forward before the Simon Commission. The Congress Party stood aloof as they thought the Simon Commission were not likely to recommend the reforms that were in their opinion indispensable. The Liberal or the Moderate Party also stood aloof for the same reason, though the reforms which they regarded as essential were not so advanced as those advocated by the Congress Party.

Besides these parties there were others quite competent from education, experience gained in Government service or political life, and from their position and interests at stake, to speak on the questions raised, who did not, however, appear before the Commission. No attempt was made to secure their attendance, the conditions laid down for the examination of witnesses having practically the effect of shutting out such evidence. No retired public servants—and they form a large class—very few of the great zemindars, scarcely any representative ryots, no heads of religious institutions, were examined. There were, it is true, the committees of the Provincial Legislative Councils and of the Central Indian Legislature. But there was no discussion between them and the Simon Commission of the important questions dealt with in the Report. The discussion in the Legislative Assembly on this point is illuminating :

A member after drawing attention to the statement in Sir John's letter that the method of Joint Free Conference provides the opportunity for "that free exchange of views and mutual influence which are best calculated to promote the largest measure of agreement that is possible," continued: "In view of the fact that the Report of the Indian Central Committee is hardly referred to in the Report of the Commission, and that the two Reports are diametrically opposed to each other, and also of the known fact that there was nothing in the nature of joint consultation at the crucial stage when conclusions were reached, I wonder what value is to be attached to this statement. We have heard a good deal of the value of the clash of mind upon mind. So far as the Indian Central Committee and the Simon Commission are concerned, the clash of mind upon mind seems to have produced very few sparks. . . ."

Mr. M. A. Jinnah : It did not take place at all.

Sir Hari Singh Gour : I can inform the Honourable Member that it never took place.

while keeping food at world prices for the home consumer. His personal plan was Import Boards—but it is obvious that unless Import Boards raise prices (and if they do they will not be tolerated) a sufficient price from the farmers' point of view can be provided only by subsidies. We find indeed that the bolder spirits of Dr. Addison's party hold out already a definite prospect of heavy wheat subsidies. And if wheat, why not other cereals, and if cereals, why not meat and bacon? And if food, why not coal and cotton and steel and shipping? It all opens up a splendid prospect for political pressure and agitation, but offers very little inducement to work out difficult schemes for improving marketing structure and method. And the only way in which it can be checked is by the ultimate rebellion of the taxpayer, if by that time the taxpayer has any power of rebellion left in him. And it was such a taxpayers' revolt which abruptly closed down the building of Dr. Addison's houses. Surely, therefore, he may well be warned by the fate of that scheme not to aim at building too great an edifice in his new department. He will have deserved well of agriculture if he does all he can in the sphere of demonstration, research, small holdings, and marketing. He will perform a great service to the country if he can ease the pinch of unemployment by a wide extension of small cultivation round our towns. If he attempts to do more he may in fact do less.

FRANCIS D. ACLAND.

gians, or at least the Flemings, were no less inclined to Protestantism than the Dutch, but were forcibly reconquered, and at the same time re-Catholicised, by Spain, while the Calvinist minority were able to maintain themselves in the Northern Netherlands, thanks to the strong strategical position of that country—the rivers—and so in course of time, strengthened by Flemish Protestant refugees, could protestantise the majority of the Northern Netherlands people.

How little the severance of North and South was in accordance with the natural development of the Netherlands people appears as soon as one looks to the results for Flanders and Brabant. After their glorious mediæval history, after their immense contributions to Netherlands civilisation, those provinces sank into dependence and misery and into a distressing intellectual torpor. When immediately after 1648 they became the object of the expansionist ambitions of France, they never stirred a finger in their own defence—how could they, since they did not govern themselves?—but their passivity could not but have a depressing effect on the tone of their civilisation. It was the Dutch Republic, not moved by any feelings of kinship but anxious for its own safety, which now looked upon the Southern Netherlands as its “barrier” against France, which stood up against Louis XIV and roused Europe to save them from becoming French. After a while England became no less keen on this. But all the while intellectual life in the Southern Netherlands—political life there was none—continued to slumber, and society was more and more subjected to French influences. The nobility had adopted French for their language, the upper middle class began to imitate them. This process accompanied a general intellectual decay and sterility. At last the French Revolution came along and took the Austrian Netherlands in its first onrush. For twenty years, under the French Republic and Empire, the Southern Netherlands formed merely so many *départements* of France. There was at first much resentment, especially in Flanders, at the anti-Catholic spirit of French government; with the advent of Bonaparte that grievance became less strong. Of any fierce resentment of foreign domination the Southern Netherlands, accustomed to nothing else for centuries, were incapable. The Walloon provinces felt absolutely at home in France. In the Flemish provinces the leading classes had no national sentiment to oppose to the conqueror and allowed themselves to be gallicised without a murmur. No other language but French was admitted in the administration, in the law courts, in the schools. As the bulk of the population remained, of course, entirely ignorant of the language, their lot was not a happy one. But the very injury that was being done to them weakened their powers of resistance:

none but French education in Flanders meant no education for the people at all, and the Flemish people became the most backward community in Northern Europe.

But although the Northern Netherlands could most of the time keep their civilisation intact, they too suffered a great deal under French domination: they were economically ruined and in the end, in 1810, they too were annexed by Napoleon. The fears of generations were suddenly realised. The division of the Netherlands put it out of their power to withstand France, and for both halves, North and South, these twenty years of French hegemony on the continent were a dark time indeed. On the morrow of Napoleon's defeat it was decided between the Powers (especially England) and William of Orange as spokesman for a resuscitated Holland, that the Southern Netherlands were to be united with the Northern country into a strong kingdom on France's northern frontier. We are in a position now to appreciate the significance of this attempt. It was intended as a safeguard against the repetition of the calamities to which the Netherlands and Europe had been exposed. Neither in Holland nor in Belgium (for this name was now generally used to indicate the Southern Netherlands) was there any popular enthusiasm for the reunion. The two peoples had become very much estranged. Holland, in spite of its strong Catholic minority, was still a strongly Protestant country. The Flemings were greatly attached to their Catholic religion. The gallicisation of the upper class in Flanders, and the woeful lack of culture characteristic of the people, who only spoke their local *patois*, obscured the close relationship between North and South. The Dutchman accepted the upper-class Fleming with whom he came into contact in political bodies, in the magistrature, in the army, as truly representative of the Flemish people—and indeed, the days of democracy were still distant and politically speaking only this upper class counted. Finding it completely gallicised and failing to look through the veneer to discover the Netherlands people underneath, the Dutchman made no distinction between Flemings and Walloons and looked upon the two as a homogeneous nation, the Belgians, distinct from the Dutch. This view, however common even now, really is one of those simplifications that falsify.

The Dutch in 1813 and 1814 were a distinct people, a nation. When they saw the oppressive weight of French power lifted, they knew exactly what they wanted: they wanted to form an independent State, as of old, and under the sovereignty of the House of Orange. But the Belgians had no such tradition to fall back upon, and they were sharply divided among themselves as to what was to be done with them. There was a party who wanted to stay French. There was another party who wanted as much as possible

Nor is it imaginable that the gallicised leading class of Flanders could have maintained its anti-Dutch prejudices for so long, had they not been so closely associated with the Walloons.

In fact when the revolution did break out, it was as a repercussion of the July revolution in France. The leading part was played by the professional and intellectual class of Brussels, entirely gallicised, very strongly intermixed with Walloon and even with French elements, for Brussels was full of French refugees. The first idea of the revolutionaries was not to found an independent Belgium, but to rejoin France, and for a considerable time the Flemish provinces, not at all enamoured of that prospect, hesitated, until the withdrawal of the Dutch troops from Brussels precipitated events and they allowed themselves to be dragged along by the Walloons. There was one thing that certainly did not predispose the Flemish people in favour of the government of the Protestant king, and that was their Catholicism. It was not (as is too often said) that William was a Calvinist, it is that he was what in the political language of the time was called a Liberal. He was, like Joseph II, like Napoleon, a strict upholder of the claims of the secular power. Amongst the most zealous advocates of this policy were the two Belgian noblemen who successively served in the government as ministers of Catholic worship. Those were the men who most deeply offended bishops and archbishops. Before 1830 in any case the worst grievances were out of the way: William had come to an agreement with the Vatican. It is nevertheless a fact that the clergy had no love for William, but when one hears arguments as if the Catholicism of Flanders made any other solution but the disruption impossible, it is well to remember that the Southern provinces of the present Kingdom of Holland were—and are—as solidly Catholic as Flanders: one-third of the population of Holland is Catholic, and their position is to-day one of considerable political power.

The secession of 1830 did not lead to re-annexation to France, because England interposed an absolute veto and Louis Philippe in France, to the disgust of numbers of patriotic Frenchmen, wanted to preserve peace. But the new kingdom was entirely in the hands of the pro-French party and the Walloons. The use of Dutch (or Flemish) in the administration, the army, the law courts, was immediately proscribed. The Kingdom of Belgium started its career a century ago as a French-administered State, and it must have looked to contemporaries as if the Dutch language, still universally spoken north of the linguistic boundary, and indeed by a clear majority of Belgium's inhabitants, was doomed to disappear. The curious fact is, however, that this did not happen. On the contrary, Flemish still proved able to react to

insult and oppression. It really was the elementary school system founded by the Dutch and the generation of intellectuals formed at the universities under their régime that had galvanised the Flemish civilisation of Northern Belgium into new life and that produced, very early in the history of the new State, the Flemish movement. The Flemings set about re-conquering those rights which William I had granted them but which had been snatched from them again in 1830. Some of the most essential civic rights they obtained in the seventies, but not until the advent of parliamentary democracy did they develop considerable power, and it is only quite recently that their insistence on reforms has begun to shake the state of affairs established in 1830 to its very foundations.

The sketch which I here present of the events leading up to the foundation of the Belgian Kingdom and of the significance of the event itself is no doubt a very unorthodox one. The Belgian revolution has been generally accepted by English historians as a rather perfect example of a well-known and popular type, the liberal, democratic, national revolution, a victory of self-determination over despotism. Then there is what one might call the official Belgian view of the matter, which has been most ably presented by Professor Pirenne, one of the great modern masters of historical construction. His principal contribution to the interpretation of 1830 is that in his imposing *Histoire de Belgique* he has constructed a sequence of Netherlands history in which the foundation of an independent Belgium appears quite naturally as a culmination, as an inevitable conclusion. When M. Pirenne published his first volume in 1900 his object, as stated in his Preface, was "to bring out the character of unity" presented by the mediæval history of those regions which later on were to become Belgium. So he shows us a mutual attraction working between those various principalities, in spite of their difference of race and language, and the political union brought about by the Burgundian Dukes, which I represented as the unnatural subjection of Dutch-speaking lands to French influence, to him is the first definite stage in a perfectly natural and acceptable organic process. That the Northern Netherlands, too, were drawn into the Burgundian orbit, that there were very special ties between them and Flanders and Brabant, are facts which get slurred over in Pirenne's work: he consistently limits his view to the Belgium which nevertheless in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was still a purely imaginary conception, and he seems to discern this natural tendency at work only between Flanders and Brabant and the Walloon region. When the split occurs in the revolt against Spain, and the Southern Netherlands remain, as I have sketched them, a truncated dependency of Spain, M. Pirenne

is still concerned to trace the development of unity. Unity more and more—as I pointed out, but this is an aspect which does not frighten M. Pirenne in the least—under the hegemony of French language and civilisation. Even the drastic gallicisation to which the Flemish provinces were subjected during the twenty years' annexation to France to M. Pirenne seems only the hastening of a natural process, and when the Dutch and the Belgians are united in 1814 he simply states that they have no longer anything in common. The disputes and difficulties that shook the kingdom are all described as occurring on Dutch versus Belgian lines; the great work done by the government for the intellectual revival of Flanders is left in the dark and so are the profound differences between Belgians, especially between Flemings and Walloons. When the revolution breaks out in 1830, and at last a fully-fledged independent Belgium appears, it is to M. Pirenne the fulfilment for which the centuries have been working, it is the achievement, the solution, it is final.

I think that it can be stated quite generally that the historian's conceptions and constructions lack absolute value especially because they are so largely dependent on—in fact they have no possible other foundation than—the historian's own time, his present, or the idea he has formed of it: the *outcome*, as it seems to him, and he cannot help seeing the past in the light of that outcome. But however securely we may be entrenched in our circumstances, our habits of thought, it is after all undeniable that the present is continually slipping away into the past and that a new present is ever in course of formation which the moment before is the incalculable, the mysterious future. Moreover, one man's present is not that of his neighbour. In the case of M. Pirenne's history of Belgium all this is strikingly exemplified. M. Pirenne is a Walloon, teaching in French at the University of Ghent, in the Flemish country therefore—and this year at that university, long a storm centre of Belgian politics, Dutch is to be substituted for French as the medium of instruction. But until recently Belgium to a Walloon in M. Pirenne's position must have been an entirely satisfactory arrangement, and it is not at all surprising that he should have planned his great history as an attempt to justify the present by showing how naturally, how inevitably, it had sprung from the past. And no more surprising is it that the great work was hailed with delight by all the partisans of the Brussels gallicising régime, who never tired of quoting it against the Flemings as proving that the true affinity of Flanders was not with Holland, in spite of community of language, but with Wallonia, and that the preponderant position of French in Flanders was an age-old, natural, and beneficent phenomenon.

The Flamings have of course always taken a different view of the country of which they were citizens, and there is a continuous tradition differing from the Belgicist system represented by Pirenne and directly inspiring quite another attitude to the events of 1830. When one takes the opinion of the Flemings into account, the solution of 1830 is not perhaps so absolute nor so final as one is apt to assume. I do not mean that a break-up of the Kingdom of Belgium is either likely or desirable, but the conception of a Belgian nation, merging the Flemings with the Walloons and denying their kinship with the Dutch, has had its day; and with its passing the whole Pirenist view of Netherlands history, which sought to prove it but at the same time was itself built upon it, appears as a most debatable thesis in which the normal dependence of the historian on the present becomes from an historical point of view a thousand times more open to question, as the conception which this particular historian has projected back into the past is so purely modern a thing, recent, transient, a thing, one might almost say, of a day.

Personally I see the revolution of 1830 as an episode in the struggle between French expansion and Netherlands resistance. That is why I have mentioned the constitutional aspects only, to explain that some measure of autocracy was inevitable if the State was to fulfil its European function, and the religious question only, to point out its transitory and accidental character. As for the emergence of a Belgian nation, I have tried to show how largely this was an illusion. So instead of showing the principle of Liberalism wrestling with the principle of Reaction, or a subject nation rising against its foreign oppressor, I have constantly spoken in terms of a struggle between French and Netherlands forces of nationality, and in my argument the break-up of the Kingdom of William and the emergence of the Kingdom of Leopold appear as a victory of the French and a setback of the Dutch principle, as the relapse of Flanders and Brabant, just precariously regained by their Northern kinsmen, under the sway of French language and civilisation. In fact, that seems to me to be the true significance of the event, and if it is possible for a Dutchman to remember it without bitterness, it is because the wheel has turned almost full circle. The Netherlands spirit of Flanders and Brabant has revived, and Belgium, founded in 1830 as an engine of gallicisation, seems in the year of its centenary to be beginning to recognise that it can ensure its own peaceful existence only if it leaves free play to the national forces contending on its soil.

P. GEYL.

THE CHALLENGE OF KENYA.

"... if he (the Briton) has no other message than one of perpetual and inborn dominance over those he pretends to help, he might as well leave them at the very outset to their own sanguinary and internecine devices. It is only half the toil of life to teach man to obey. The other complementary half is to teach him, in Heaven's good time, to govern."—(*Natal Advertiser*, on Lord Delamere's challenge.)

KENYA now connotes to most Colonial minds a challenging Empire Policy rather than a semi-tropical Colony. The "Kenya" demand is as simple as it is amazing, namely that whatever change is made in the constitution of East Africa, the 2,500 permanent British settlers must be given a clear and dominant majority over all other British subjects, who number to-day at least 2,500,000. Was ever a more extraordinary challenge issued? Think what this means: that no matter how high in the scale of civilisation any subjects of His Majesty, other than white, may rise, they must never have any effective voice in the legislative activity of their own country: this must remain with the "dominant voices" of the 2,500 permanent settlers. Second only in importance is the consequential demand, namely, that the Crown shall tear to tatters the most explicit and solemn contractual obligations which have been given in Great Britain's name, and that 2,500,000 of these loyal British subjects shall at the vociferous behest of 2,500 other British subjects be declared political and economic outcasts in their own country. The Editor of the *Natal Advertiser*, an African paper of deservedly high reputation, rightly sees in this challenge a grave menace to the structure of the British Empire:

"This is not a new issue. It is a very old one, and it is the one on which the British Empire is more likely to be shipwrecked than on any other."

Lord Passfield has announced the intention of the Government to submit the grave problem of East Africa to a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament:

"His Majesty's Government have decided to ask both Houses of Parliament to approve of the appointment of a Joint Committee to consider and recommend what immediate changes in the constitution of the three most northerly of the East African territories (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika) are practicable and desirable, and the proposals which His Majesty's Government have formulated for submission to the Joint Committee are set out in the foregoing Memorandum."*

The submission of the East African situation to a Select Committee follows the appointment of three previous Commissions—the

* Cmd. 3574.

Ormsby-Gore Commission of 1924-5, the Hilton Young Commission of 1929 and the Visit and Report of Sir Samuel Wilson of 1929. The territories primarily concerned are Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, primarily because it is recognised that the decision reached by the Joint Committee must vitally affect every other territory under the British Crown. The status, area, and population* of these territories are as follows:

	Status.	Area.	African.	Population.	
				Asiatic.	European.
Kenya	Colony	245,060 sq. m.	2,495,000	23,470	10,295
				(Permanent Settlers 2,500 approx.)	
Uganda	Protectorate	94,000 sq. m.	3,000,000	5,600	1,269
Tanganyika	Mandated	365,000 sq. m.	4,107,000	15,000	2,447

The Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament will have before it the whole question of "Closer Union" as it is called, customs, railways, principles of taxation, expenditure. But transcending all these in importance is the question of constitutional reform. An essential feature to remember in the Kenya situation is that the inhabitants of that country did not come under the British Crown by conquest, but by goodwill, and secondly, that throughout the Empire His Majesty the King has no more peaceful and law-abiding people than his Kenya subjects. In what form and within what limitations the position of the native inhabitants will be considered by the Joint Committee, will only become clear when the Terms of Reference are announced by the Government. To these people we have given the most clearly expressed promises, foremost amongst which is the famous "Trusteeship" promise of the Duke of Devonshire:

"... in the administration of Kenya His Majesty's Government regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population."†

That this declaration was not a pious political ejaculation is shown by the fact that the Duke of Devonshire incorporated in the same Despatch a definition of what this Trusteeship should mean in practice:

"... His Majesty's (Conservative) Government think it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if and when those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail."‡

The present Government has left no doubt in the mind of anybody that its attitude upon these fundamentals is no less sound than the Duke of Devonshire's. Lord Passfield, in his Despatch of June last, says:

* Ormsby-Gore Report. Cmd. 2387.

† Cmd. 1922.

‡ Ibid.

"... His Majesty's (Labour) Government accept no less wholeheartedly the Duke of Devonshire's declaration in the White Paper of 1923 that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if and when those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail."*

But the Despatch of the Duke of Devonshire was issued seven years ago, and the 2,500 settlers of Kenya have never ceased to agitate for a "dominant" political voice, so that they could, in practice, sabotage the principle laid down by Mr. Baldwin's Government of 1923. As the political issue has been raised, it became necessary for the British Government to declare the logical development of the position laid down by the Duke of Devonshire. Again, Lord Passfield has spoken with no uncertain voice:

"... it must be the aim of the administration of every territory with regard to all the inhabitants, irrespective of race or religion, to maintain order, to administer justice, to promote health and education, to provide means of communication and transport, and generally to promote the industrial and commercial development of the country. In all this range of work persons of every race and of every religion, coloured no less than white, have a right to equal treatment in accordance with their several needs."

"The African native thus being trained, by methods and forms of organisation which have a traditional appeal for him, may gradually develop a political consciousness and a desire to take an increasing share first in his tribal affairs and the land reserved for tribal use, and ultimately also in the governance of the territory in which he lives."†

The settlers' deputation, headed by Lord Delamere, has been sent to Europe first to present a case to the Select Committee, and secondly to educate public opinion in Great Britain. The following declarations will give some idea of the wide gulf which at present exists between the settled policy of British Governments and public opinion of all parties, and the attitude of the Kenya settlers. It may well be hoped that wiser counsels will yet prevail, that the settlers' deputation will realise that British public opinion loves to see fair play, with justice even for the under-dog, and above all, that this same public opinion will not easily abandon Colonial principles which have behind them the sanction and practice of generations, which have stood the test of centuries, and repose to-day upon the solid support of all parties—Conservative, Liberal, Labour, and Socialist. For the moment, however, the settlers' case must be judged by their own published declarations. Lord Delamere, the head of the Kenya delegation, has, with the emphatic

* Cmd. 3573.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Italics mine—J. H. H.

approval of the Convention of Associations, laid down the following as the first essential for which to strive:

"... we stand where we were—on the straight road of a British Colony advancing to self-government in the future... we shall get a further step on that road by getting an elected or influential or whatever majority we think fit to accept* at the time the offer is made."†

The first demand, then, is for "Dominance"—a majority must be given, so it is declared, to the minority of 2,500 permanent British white subjects to "dominate" the 2,500,000 British African subjects and the 24,000 British Asiatic subjects.

The second fundamental claim is that British African subjects shall at no time take any share in the legislative work of the country. This contention has been advanced in scores of speeches made in Kenya, but again finds its most authoritative expression in a declaration by Lord Delamere:

"As to the political future of the natives, Lord Delamere said there was ample scope for such development within the boundaries of the reserves without bringing the native within the field of the white man's politics."‡

"If that last safeguard is undermined there will go with it in its fall the right of British people to claim that with their race and their race alone, whether as settlers or as officials, must lie the responsibility for the government of primitive peoples and the development of the Empire in Africa."§

Now the "white man's politics" includes native legislation. Nor is this all, for the Hilton Young Commission emphasised the fact that almost every piece of legislation in the Colony affects the natives. They seem to be unaware of the fact that other British African Colonies not merely experience no inconvenience, but derive inestimable advantages from associating together with British Africans in the legislative work of the Colonies. Nor do the protagonists of this policy realise that it would be unthinkable to propose such a policy in most of the British West Indian, South Seas, and Asiatic Colonies—thus the Kenya settlers are asking that alone among the millions of His Majesty's loyal subjects, those of Kenya at least shall apparently for all time be declared political and economic outcasts.

The position, then, which confronts the Joint Committee, is as follows:

(a) *The British Government:*

- (1) Adheres to the policy laid down by the Duke of Devonshire.

* Italics mine—J. H. H.

† *East African Standard*, July 12th, 1930.

‡ *Times*, September 6th, 1930.

§ *East African Standard*, July 12th, 1930.

- (2) Holds fast to the policy of a common citizenship, regardless of race, religion or colour, as laid down by British statesmen of all parties during the last 200 years.
- (b) *The 2,500 permanent settlers of Kenya demand:*
- (1) "Domination" in the Legislative Council, leading to complete self-government.*
 - (2) That the 2,500,000 British African subjects be kept in reserves and denied the right to full citizenship by assisting in framing legislation affecting themselves. They shall be taxed, but they shall not have any representation.†
 - (3) That the African British subjects shall be prevented from occupying sufficient land to sustain themselves without recourse to labour for the white man.‡
 - (4) That the 2,500 settlers shall decide what economic crops the natives may cultivate (they are not allowed to grow coffee in Kenya to-day).

The issue in Kenya and East Africa is, then, primarily one of citizenship. This, in practice, means (a) ultimate enfranchisement and (b) *immediately*, land, taxation, labour. First in order come the qualifications of citizenship or, in the phrase used by the Hilton Young Commission, the Civilisation Test. It has not been found difficult hitherto to define the terms of this test in British Colonies, which, though it must vary in the different Dependencies, demands that all races, English, Belgian, Dutch, German, Indian, and Native—shall be required in each Dependency to satisfy a common standard of civilisation prior to the exercise of the franchise. Thus, all legal distinctions or disabilities resting solely upon race, creed, or colour, are barred, and there is then open to all law-abiding residents (a) common citizenship for civilised British subjects, (b) a common test for this civilisation.

But it is merely burying our heads in the sand to ignore the fact that proposals for the East African settlement must affect the whole Empire, and the demand for "Dominance" by Kenya settlers is in fact an attempt to import into East Africa the alien product of the Transvaal Grondwet. It was doubtless this fact which led to the extraordinary outburst of Mr. Piet Grobler in support of the Kenya settlers. This outburst is the more extraordinary because hitherto it has been a cardinal point of Union native policy that no matter how unjustly natives in South Africa might be treated, representations from the Mother Country have always been regarded as unwarranted interference. The Transvaal Grondwet: "there can be no equality in Church or State between white and

black" is really enshrined in Grobler's statement: "We refuse to consider equality of Europeans and natives," and the menace is found in the words: "We extend the hand of friendship and offer our heartiest co-operation" (to the Kenya settlers). The Union statesmen in South Africa must now recognise that criticism of their policy for natives in South Africa can no longer be regarded as impertinent interference, more particularly when the question of the native territories comes forward, as it must do soon, for political consideration.

As the Imperial Conference is sitting, it may be well to re-call the formal declaration to the Imperial Conference of 1921, made by Mr. Winston Churchill on behalf of the British Government of that day:

"There is only one ideal that the British Empire can set before itself in this regard, and that is that there should be no barrier of race, colour or creed which should prevent any man by merit from reaching any station if he is fitted for it."

Equally important at the present time because of the authoritative nature of the signatures, is the recent declaration of responsible white men in South Africa. In this Manifesto issued last year, appear the signatures, amongst others, of the Right Hon. Henry Burton, K.C., Sir Clarkson Tredgold, K.C., Sir J. Rose-Innes, K.C., and they declare that "no greater question confronts mankind" than the right solution of Native Policy. They continue:

"Equality before the law, freedom for any man to perform any work for which he is competent, and equality in the exercise of electoral powers by all who have satisfied a uniform standard—these have been the birthright of all men. Behind this stands the recognition of the basic fact that all sections of the population are integral parts of the whole, with common interests, that the welfare of the whole country, and not that of any single race or colour, is the true concern of all the people. . . .

"If they (the natives) develop and full citizenship is denied them, there is bound in the end to be a clash. It would, no doubt, be possible for a time to keep them down by force, but force has never proved to be a lasting remedy, least of all in South Africa."

Not merely do the opposing sections in South Africa demand that there is and can be no association between White and Black, but the British-African subjects have actually been declared untouchable by no less a person than the Minister of Justice (Mr. Tielman Roos)—"I should regard it as a most enormous insult if a native apologised to me!"*

The British public, therefore, are clearly asked to decide whether or not they will surrender their principles for those of the Trans-

* *Caliban in Africa*. By Leonard Barnes.

* Convention of Associations, July 1930. † *Times*, September 6th, 1930.
‡ "If the policy was to be continued that every native was to be a landholder of a sufficient area on which to establish himself, then the question of obtaining a satisfactory labour supply would never be settled."—Lord Delamere's evidence before Native Labour Commission, 1913.

vaal Grondwet, which declares against any equality in Church or State for any other than persons with white blood. They are asked to throw overboard the successful policy of generations, to cast aside the leadership of statesmen from the time of Chatham to Cecil Rhodes, who declared for "equal citizenship for all civilised persons," and, indeed, they are asked to repudiate the doctrine that "God hath created of one blood all nations of men to dwell upon the face of the earth."

But British people are happily still dominated by the Christian belief that in the sight of God the coloured races are no less capable than the white race of rising in the scale of ethical and spiritual citizenship. To do other would be in fact to reject the foundations of our theological belief. In the remarkable book just issued, *Caliban in Africa*, Mr. Leonard Barnes tells a story which is appropriate to this grave issue. The scene was in a Cape Town Club. Sitting at the table were three or four Dutchmen and one Englishman, and they fell to discussing the native question, South African legislation, and so forth. At one moment the Englishman happened to ask the Dutchmen if they had realised that their laws and attitude would debar Jesus Christ from entering South Africa. "The Dutchmen were so electrified at the remark that they nearly fell off their chairs, for neither of these obvious facts had ever before occurred to them." Yes, if by "Dominance" the Kenya and South African settlers mean that for all time there is to be "no equality in Church or State between White and Black" then indeed there is no room in the Inns of South and East Africa for the Christ of Bethlehem.

To ask British people of the Mother Country to agree to a policy of this nature is to ask them to begin the disruption of the Empire, for that Empire has been built upon the foundations of liberty of person, equality of opportunity and above all, a profound belief in the Fatherhood of God. To ask the British people to sacrifice these articles of Statecraft and Faith as the Kenya settlers are doing in order to give 2,500 British subjects "dominance" over 2,500,000 British subjects is surely asking more than the nation can give.

*"Dominance will not slip from him (the white man) until he becomes false to himself, or until other races, now his pupils, develop to a higher power the very traits which are his present distinctive excellences. He is likely to prove false to himself in proportion as he takes to leaning back on cushions of arbitrary racial privilege."**

JOHN H. HARRIS.

* *Caliban in Africa*, p. 103

+ Italics mine—J. H. H.

THEISM: ITS REALM AND FRONTIERS.*

THE task of Theism—as concerned with the reasoned doctrine of God—is to give intellectual precision and consistency, as well as to find reasonable support for, the Idea of God, which is furnished by Religion as held by faith. This Idea has sprung from and is nourished by Religion. It represents the Object of faith, and presents this Object to faith. While, therefore, an intellectual element is always involved in it, the religious Idea of God has been fashioned by and seeks to satisfy emotions and practical needs that are not intellectual. Yet, when men reach the reflective stage, this Idea is handed over by Religion to be formulated, criticised and supported by philosophical Theology, in order that it may be handed back to religious faith clarified, made internally consistent, and adjusted to man's experience of Reality as a whole. The necessity of this procedure is obvious if Religion be treated as concerned, not only with reality, but with the Supreme Reality by which the world and man are explained.

Neither the religious Idea of God, nor its formulation by Theism, can, as such, claim finality or resist change. For not only is the transcendent Nature of God involved, but His relations and His methods in dealing with the cosmos. All these must needs be conceived in the light of enlarging experience of all kinds, of reflection upon that experience, and of comparison of the results, carried out in fellowship by seekers after the highest truth.

As a matter of plain fact, the religious Idea of God has grown out of obscure and lowly origins and has assumed a variety of forms. It has been fed by and has sought to evoke, organise and satisfy every activity and interest of awakening human personalities, in fellowship with one another and in contact with the world of Nature and the concerns of life. It has shown power to cast off and rise above its more inadequate and unworthy forms, until it has reached sublimity in the great historical religions. It may be claimed in addition that, as the result of the influence of Christ and of the ever-widening fellowship of men, there is slowly but surely coming into existence, for Religion as well as for reflection, an universal Idea of God, so that men may eventually come to agree that in its main features the Idea of God is either This or Nothing. In short the religious Idea of God represents man's reaction to the whole of his experience, as his personality grows up and expands in contact with the Universe and in the responsive

* (1) *The Reality of the Idea of God*. By W. Tudor Jones, M.A., Ph.D. Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 6s. net.

(2) *Philosophical Theology*, Vol. II, *The World, the Soul and God*. By F. R. Tennant, D.D., etc. Cambridge University Press. 15s. net.

activity of all the faculties that spring from his personality seeking unity and satisfaction within it.

The religious Idea of God has been borne in upon Man. It has often been manipulated, but never manufactured. It has supplied the *Datum*, held by communities and individuals, by which human life has been supported, organised, and eventually both uplifted and explained. It has been profoundly concerned with the whole range of human emotions—with fear and reverence, with trust and affection, with desire and aspiration; yet it has not been merely emotional. It has been intuitive, imaginative, and in the largest sense of the word poetic. Yet all these have been manifestations of a nascent reason. It has been held as revealed, has been assumed as true and has carried such immediate conviction, as to afford practical direction in all the affairs of life. It has been handed on by tradition; yet it has been enriched and transformed by prophetic personalities and has held its ground by a personal faith, which has verified it. The truest definition of Man is not that he is rational, but that he is religious. The most influential, as well as the noblest, product of his history is his Idea of God.

Yet something more precise must be said of the Idea of God, even as intuitively or traditionally held. In so far as Religious faith has taken form in an Idea, it has sought to answer the following questions, which have arisen progressively in an order corresponding to human evolution. Under what control are men? To what will, or wills, is this or that particular change due, and what does it signify? What is the causative, or at all events governing, explanation of the Whole in which particular changes arise? What is the *Meaning* of the Whole? How and why is that Meaning ordered and upheld? Above all, how can men stand in right relations to the Supreme Reality that governs and gives meaning to the Whole? The quest of Fellowship grows with the sense of Meaning and Purpose. The answer at every stage of this questioning must supply support and direction, stimulus to co-operative effort, satisfaction—emotional, moral, intellectual—both in the process and in the anticipated result. It follows that no account of the Idea of God can be satisfactory that does not lay stress upon the prominence of Will, and of Will as eventually found to be holy, reasonable, friendly, and in every sense good. Religion seeks fellowship with its Divine Object and it is only on this basis that fellowship can eventually be either constituted or maintained.

It is at this point that dissatisfaction is aroused and that the services of philosophical Theism are invoked. Not only must Thought claim its place as against Emotion and must Reason deal with Imagination, but also the material supplied from any one

source comes to appear internally inconsistent or indefinite, various renderings of the Idea are conflicting, the hard facts of life appear antagonistic, and the advance of departmental sciences encroaches upon the territory hitherto claimed by intuitive faith that has been hardened into dogma. Hence the task of Theism is to furnish a Theology that shall not only be true to religious experience and satisfying to religious demands, but shall reconcile, include and give a reasonable explanation of all the manifold, and to some extent conflicting, material of which men have become aware. Religion as prophetism and poetry has supplied a bird's-eye view of Reality, as Divinely conditioned. Philosophic Theology must proceed to make an ordnance-survey of the prospect so presented. In attempting this immense task Theism must take account of, yet criticise, all the elements that have become included in the Idea of God—for example, His Eternity and yet His manifestation in Time, His Perfection and yet His Purpose, His creative Sovereignty and yet the apparent autonomy of His Creation, and so forth. It must make an adequate survey of Man, in the baffling complexity of his nature, and must face the problem of the Universe, with its apparently conflicting features of universal Order and Contingency, of purposiveness and yet discontinuity, of beneficence and yet insensibility and hostility. All these must be dealt with, not as separate provinces but as parts of a Whole, which is to be explained as a System, and which can only be so explained, as Religion insists, by the Idea of God as the Sufficient Reason, the transcendent and immanent Principle of the Whole. In view of all this can it be wisely disputed on the one hand that Theism, or philosophic Theology, must needs be progressive as the *Scientia Scientiarum*, or rightly disparaged on the other hand by the incompleteness, the inadequacy, or even the conflicting nature of its provisional results? The certitude of faith is one thing, the certainty of Reason another. Nor can the facts of faith be set aside because of the incomplete efforts of Reason. Could human reason be adequate to the facts, man would be as God. Yet his approach to God must be dependent upon his quest of Truth, as the rendering and vindication in human consciousness of Reality as a whole.

It is from this standpoint that certain recent contributions to the subject are to be reviewed. Professor Tudor Jones has recently published a book on *The Reality of the Idea of God*, which is marked by deep insight into spiritual experience and by large suggestiveness. His object, he states, is "to show the rational and the non-rational 'grounds' for the belief in the Reality of the Idea of God" (p. 11). "The Idea," he says, "lives in a world of its own" which is "mental in its nature." It "leads upward from physical, objective levels to levels of pure inwardness" (p. 16).

Yet the argument is that its Reality is thereby established and not destroyed. For on every level of human experience there is manifested in man "a power to transform physical into mental existence," since "the object in its last resort is what it *Means*" (pp. 18, 19). Accordingly the Idea as existent has "roots" of its own nature. "In Feeling a consciousness of the Whole, of the Ultimate, is present in a form of immediacy" (p. 26). There is a sense of "oneness with the Universe" (p. 28). The fact of life, which is irreducible to lower terms, "exhibits some kind of Teleology" and suggests "that there is a power of reality actually existing in the world which is psychical in its nature" (p. 31). The Cosmos outside Man "has distilled some essential ingredients of its own being into him" and he therefore "feels a very real and a very powerful backing from the Cosmos" (p. 42). This welling-up of the Cosmic in Man enriches his thought and makes him "conscious in an over-intellectual way of something like the Eternal being present in all the transactions of his life" (p. 45). Yet Man's development is dependent upon his facing contradictions and difficulties. Thereby "he creates a second kind of world within himself" (p. 46), and this inner world supplies "a norm and standard for the valuation" of his physical experience. This "transmutation" to inwardness "is no less than a real break in the order of existence" (p. 55). Yet it is a normal feature of man's evolution, and it is the Universe itself that has brought it about. Hence "Religion in its very deepest aspects is not a speculation or a theory of the Universe: it is an experimental thing, possessing the elements which constitute the way in which man may pass beyond himself" (p. 60), and thereby, it is argued, may find the Reality, with which he becomes one. Existence is raised to Meaning and Meaning to Values. At every stage "a new kind of reality" breaks forth. The Idea is both within and beyond us, and Man must press on "to a personal relation to it." This involves "a terrific plunge" from which Man's timidity shrinks. Yet if it be made, spiritual reality pours its content into a man, by which even his ordinary experience is deepened and enriched. Thus Religion carries forward what is involved in every province of Knowledge to its consummation. Death "cannot touch this realm of Eternal Values" (pp. 80-8). Hence the conclusion is reached, which was proposed at the outset of the argument, that the true explanation "of all appearances on this earth is to be found by taking into account the existence of a Logos, and that all the qualities and potencies which appear on the whole scale of life are manifestations or incarnations of such a Logos" (p. 34).

The impression created by this argument is that, while it

April 30th Yen Hsi-shan conceived the notion of appropriating to his own purposes the Tientsin customs revenue, a project that came to a head six weeks later. On May 1st, in pursuance of the prestige he had already imposed upon himself, he reopened the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Peking, and on the following day his representative in Peking informed the press that a second national congress of the Kuomintang was to be convened to institute the new Chinese Government, of which Yen was to be the head and Feng the commander-in-chief of the forces.

Desultory fighting was renewed at the beginning of May, but the summer did not produce any action definite enough to make a military chronicle worth while. During May, June, and July the Northern forces made some headway, but they lost it in August as a result of certain Nanking successes. Militarily the situation seemed to be approaching that of a stalemate.

The most remarkable features of the Chinese summer were the interference by Yen Hsi-shan with the customs revenue, the rapid boom in brigandage, and the emergence into the scene of Chang Hsueh-liang, Chairman of the Manchurian Government.

At the end of April Yen had declared his intention of seizing the Tientsin customs revenue, the salt revenue in Shansi, and the salt funds in Chihli. On June 16th the Tientsin office of the Maritime Customs Administration was duly taken over by the Shansi authorities, who appointed Mr. Lennox Simpson as Commissioner in the place of the Nanking nominee. The change of control was effected without much local disturbance of commerce. Yen Hsi-shan announced that the service of the loans would continue to be met, and that the surplus would be kept on deposit in Tientsin. So far the civil war has not touched the old Chinese reputation for financial and commercial orthodoxy and honesty. It is one of the odd phenomena of the world that the Chinese genius should touch at one extreme a standard of public finance such as no Continental European country except perhaps Czechoslovakia and Germany have ever attained and at the other extreme a form of political savagery that expresses itself in an interminable civil war. Yen Hsi-shan has done his country a greater disservice than any other of the warring generals by thus wantonly violating one of the most majestic of her traditions. The Chinese customs have been a superpolitical institution that it has always been regarded as safe to take for granted. The immediate practical result of Yen's brigandage was that shippers during the summer had to pay double duties, for the Shanghai authorities would not recognise the duties paid at Tientsin as having been paid at all.

The other important development was the evolution of a technique of brigandage and communist robbery of so effective a kind

The world exhibits a conformity to law which mechanism is incompetent to explain. After detailed and searching criticism of other views, Dr. Tennant declares that no other explanation than a Teleological one "is forthcoming of the harmonious relation of causes, whatever they be, in virtue of which Nature and Man form a Cosmos and a realm of Values." "Theism, regarded as a reasonable belief and as a philosophical world-theory, is based on the empirical facts which seem to ask for a sufficient reason in the postulation of one integrating and directive Mind" (p. 73). There is "a conspiracy of innumerable causes to produce by their united and reciprocal action, and to maintain a general order of Nature" (p. 79). The world possesses "Knowability" or "intelligibility." In addition to the "internal adaptedness of organic beings" there is "teleology on a grander scale" shown in the fitness of the inorganic to minister to life, in the æsthetic value of Nature which is universally and inseparably present in it, in its instrumentality in the realisation of moral ends, and in the progressiveness in the evolutionary process culminating in the emergence of man with his rational and moral status (p. 81). This *terminus ad quem* of cosmic evolution points to a Designer "Who is also the World's Creator" (p. 123); creation being "conceived as idea and deed together, and the divine transcendence as not temporal priority, but as consisting in the difference between God and His utterance—which Pantheism identifies" (p. 129). Following upon this conclusion an exhaustive examination is made of the Idea of God, in order to determine in what sense Eternity, Infinity, and Perfection are to be ascribed to Him. His Personality and the self-limitation which is involved, above all, in the creation of moral beings are discussed. The Problem of Evil is boldly treated and leads to the declaration that "Theism requires that the world be an imperfect or mixed world, in that it takes the purpose of the world to consist in the realisation of the highest Values by finite and developing creatures, with which an omnipotent establishment of non-moral or static perfection would have nothing in common" (p. 191). The Divine transcendence and the creation of a moral world are held to limit the immanence of God and "the notion of inherence is not needed by theism" (p. 219). Nor is there "more need to invoke immanent inspiration, over and above transcendent utterance, in order to account for mankind's progressive discovery of the nature of God than to explain man's acquisition of any other kind of knowledge" (p. 225). Theism may regard Christ "as a manifestation of God in the flesh, and as the unique revealer of God" (p. 240). "Christianity may be said to be the climax of the historical development of natural religion, and the crown of natural theology" (p. 240). Religion is not "a morbid

excrecence." It "is but the practice of belief formulated in theology: no further demand on faith and no additional kind of faith are involved in it" (p. 241). "God is known last, in that knowledge as to the world-ground is only attainable by way of explaining the world and man" (p. 252), and "belief in God becomes reasonable if the Idea of God be found as indispensable for explanation of the totality of our scientific knowledge about the world and man as is the idea of the Soul for explanation of the totality of our knowledge about the individual Mind" (p. 254).

To sum up the argument. Empirical inquiry leads to the discovery of a continuous, co-operant, and consistent world, which culminates in free ethical personalities. This complex fact is best explained by treating the whole as the creation of an ethical Being, God, Who, in order to the fulfilment of His ethical purpose, limits Himself, in Power, Foreknowledge, and even Love, by conferring autonomy upon His creatures, as a universal method leading up to the free-will of man with its attendant risks. The nature of this end determines the means by which it is reached—the self-limitation of God, the autonomy of man, and the imperfection of the world all being involved in and indispensable to the ethical end of God.

Scant justice can be done within the limits of this article to the thoroughness of treatment, both expository and critical, which marks every stage of Dr. Tennant's argument. It is obvious that his work is one of the most important contributions to philosophic Theism that has been made in recent years. Yet, as is natural and inevitable in considering so great a subject, his point of view raises certain questions and his conclusions are, at points, open to criticism from the standpoint of Theistic belief itself, and even more from that of religious experience.

To begin with, is it so certain, as Dr. Tennant believes, that his argument is purely empirical and *à posteriori*? Leibnitz had to remind those who treated all knowledge as derived from sensation, "*Nisi intellectus ipse.*" Just as what a man sees is dependent upon his eye, so what a man sees, even with his intellectual vision, is determined, to a large degree, by the spiritual instrument with which he regards it. In the case of Dr. Tennant, this instrument appears to have been fashioned by his Christian inheritance to a much greater degree than he supposes. Nor is this a ground of objection, except from his own point of view. For if Man be "organic to the world," his interpretation of the world must be made in terms of his own highest development. This may be checked and substantiated, but cannot be transcended, by his reasoning. By reasoning he simply clarifies and validates his beliefs as consistent with and explanatory of the whole.

In the next place, can the inferences as to God from man's experience of the World and the Soul, in their co-operant relationship with one another, be adequately drawn, without taking account *ab initio* of the full content of the religious experience and aspirations by which man has attained to his manhood? If the Soul be "the only ontal thing" that we know, and if this "ontal thing" be the creation of what may be termed Supreme Ontal Reality, must not the Spiritual Consciousness, which, to use Professor Tudor Jones' expression, has welled-up in man, be treated as of more primary importance than Dr. Tennant assigns to it? Is this religious consciousness entirely due to man's desire to *explain* the universe, of which he is part, and to make his beliefs and conduct conformable to his explanation? Is man sufficiently described even as having Ethical Status and, therefore, as accounted for by ethical conditions? What of his aspiration after fellowship with God, for which his ethical character is a means rather than an end? If this quest and experience of fellowship be recognised, then must Divine grace, revelation—even in respect of ordinary knowledge—, influence, in a word, immanence be more fully acknowledged, though the term "inherence" be an inapt expression for it? Can the "standing-off" of a transcendent God for the constitution of autonomous ethical beings be the last and highest account of God, Who has been worshipped as "our Father," and of Whom it can be truly said, "His Nature and His Name is Love?" All this is expressed in Christ, Who, as Dr. Tennant says, may be treated "as a manifestation of God in the flesh, and as the unique revealer of God." In short, can the place, the authoritative persistence, and the meaning of Spiritual Values be accounted for save by the continuous self-giving, as well as by the self-limitation of God; a self-giving which the concept of His Creatorship must not be allowed to shut out? Nor should the exercise of Divine influence be deemed incompatible with moral freedom, for if human influence is not incompatible with it, and when rightly exercised is even conducive to it, much more would this seem to be true of the Divine.

The conclusion that results from the surveys that have been examined is that the task of Theism is to attempt to do justice and adjust to one another what may, perhaps, be called the Human and the Non-human elements that must be combined in the Idea of God, if it is to be satisfying to thought that takes account alike of the deliverances of religious experience and of the system of the world. From the standpoint of reasonable explanation, Man is at once the great problem and also the only means of its solution. The organic evolution of the Cosmos, so far as we know it, has culminated in the advent of Personality in Man. His Personality

unfolds itself and becomes effective in Will, Intellect, and Feeling, to which it seeks to give unity and through the unity of which it seeks to find satisfaction. Neither Personality, nor its activity as thus unfolded, exists as self-enclosed, but only in vital relationship with the Cosmos. The explanation of Personality and of its world must therefore go together. Explanation of either must be explanation of both in terms of an explanation of the Whole that does justice to each part in its organic relations with the other. Man is the highest product of evolution, is dependent upon and nourished by the Cosmos. Yet he seeks mastery over it and gains such mastery by fellowship with it. At the same time he applies his own standards of valuation to it, and reaches out to what is Beyond both the Cosmos on which he is dependent and even the standards by which—as a spiritual, intellectual, and moral being—he values it. He cannot have proceeded from a source that is inferior to himself. His advance in all directions must be attributable to this source, and this source must span both Man and the Cosmos as the Sufficient Reason of their organic unity in evolving towards an end, which is becoming explicit in Man. To account for this is the problem for constructive thought. And Man, while the problem, contains within himself the only means of its solution. He may select from within himself, as in contact with his world, what according to his own valuation is higher or lower as being determinant of the Reality to which he owes his being. But whether he chooses the higher or the lower, either will be anthropic in its origin and nature. He cannot escape from himself, nor legitimately treat his world as though it were complete in itself, or himself as a merely external spectator. His explanation, while consistent with the Whole, must be adequate to the Highest, and to the Highest as revealing itself within him as supremely real and authoritative: yet as imperfectly realised in him and incompletely manifested to him. His thought bears out what his spiritual apprehension has affirmed, that the Source of his being, the director, transcendent and immanent, of his becoming, must in every way be more than himself; not less than Personal, the consummate realisation of all that He constrains and enables Man to apprehend and appreciate, to aspire after and pursue. In short God must be showed forth, must be interpreted and expressed in Man, as the highest product of His temporal and evolutionary activity.

Yet this interpretation in terms of Manhood, however inevitable and trustworthy, must needs be inadequate. God is the object of worship, and the worshipful, while revealed to and in Man, affirms both its Otherness and its transcendence. Crude anthropomorphism has often sought to clothe the Idea of God in concepts—

constructional, governmental, juridical—which are comparatively external and subordinate even in human relationships, and, if pressed, ignore and offend against the difference between the Creator and His creatures, between the transcendent immanence of God and the mere externality of uncriticised individualism.

So far from the Idea of God being dependent upon such crude humanism, both Religion and Theism join in repudiating it. It may indeed be said that Religion, like Poetry, rejoices in what perplexes Philosophy. A God entirely conceived in terms of human Nature would not be the God of the highest and truest Religion. His "Otherness" must be recognised, though this is not the foreground, but is the mysterious and majestic background of the Christian religion. The Beyond of God nourishes instead of starving Religion, provided that this Beyondness does not stultify the Mind, and is not hopelessly inconsistent with the dictates and demands of enlightened Conscience. Both these proceed from God and cannot be negated by Him.

If Religion were not sensible of the Beyondness of God, Theism would discover and insist upon it, in its endeavour to give a reasoned account of the Idea of God, in the light both of religious faith and of the facts of the Cosmos. It follows from all this that Theism has both its Realm and its Frontiers. It insists upon what may be termed the over-humanity of God, in the sense that He is the Ground and Source, the Author and Giver of the Supreme Spiritual Values by which Man comes to himself, and that human experience is as trustworthy in its highest spiritual affirmations as in its lower, if it be trustworthy at all. It may confidently, though cautiously, use such human analogies as the Thinker and his thought, the Artist and his masterpiece, the Designer and his purposeful work, in setting forth the relations of God to His World. Above all, Theism will do justice to the supreme analogy of human Personality, which selects, organises, and appropriates its materials for the expression, fulfilment, and satisfaction of itself. It will find its most trustworthy guide and its fullest content in the "Our Father, which art in heaven" presented to it by Religion: its supreme task in working out and justifying this highest deliverance of Faith. Yet equally Theism will recognise and insist that Man is not the measure of God, nor can human experience be adequate to the eternal consciousness of God. Understood in the deepest and widest sense, it will take as its watchword, "No man hath seen God at any time: the only-begotten Son Who is in the bosom of the Father"—facing, as the Greek suggests, towards the inmost secret of the Father—"He hath interpreted Him."

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

THE END OF THE GRECO-TURKISH FEUD.

BY the Agreement between Greece and Turkey signed at Angora last June, the disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the Lausanne Convention of 1923 concerning the Exchange of Populations which, for the last seven years, have been a source of constant friction between the two countries, have been finally liquidated. The event is of more than ordinary interest, not so much on account of the actual importance of the questions which constitute the immediate object of the settlement, as because of its wider significance as marking the end—it is sincerely to be hoped—of the long-protracted feud between the Greek and Turkish peoples which has lasted almost uninterruptedly for over six centuries. Of the many struggles between nations recorded by history, few indeed have been so persistent as that between Greeks and Turks for the possession of the territories bordering upon the Ægean.

Starting with the earlier establishment of the Osmanli Turks in Western Anatolia at the end of the thirteenth century, its first phase closes with the fall of Constantinople and the extinction of the Greek Empire, together with the last vestige of Greek national independence, in 1453. Its second phase starts in 1821, with the insurrection which led to the liberation of the Morea and part of Continental Greece and the Islands. Throughout the nineteenth century and during the first quarter of the twentieth, the tide of Turkish conquest steadily recedes. The Greeks successively recover Macedonia, Epirus, Crete, and the Ægean Islands, until in 1919 they are once more at the gates of Constantinople and re-occupy their ancient homelands in Eastern Thrace and Ionia. This is the high-water mark of Greek expansion. The final phase is that of Turkish recovery. The Turks, threatened in their turn with national extinction, succeed, under their great leader Mustafa Kemal, in repelling the Greek invasion and re-establish themselves, thanks to their victory in 1922, in Western Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace.

The Convention for the Exchange of Populations, signed under the auspices of the Entente Powers at Lausanne in January 1923, by providing for the mutual expulsion (an odious principle camouflaged under the euphemistic name of "exchange") of the Greek and Turkish minorities and the expropriation of their estates, aimed at removing the physical justification for a possible future war of liberation or *revanche*. Greeks and Turks, after having lived for centuries inextricably intermixed throughout all the territories stretching from the Adriatic to the Caucasus, were henceforward to live apart in homogeneous national states. The pro-

perty of the churches, monasteries, and mosques was included in the general expropriation, so as to make the separation complete. The Lausanne Convention made only two exceptions to this root-and-branch solution of the Greco-Turkish imbroglio. On the insistence of Lord Curzon as chief of the British Delegation at the Conference of Lausanne, the Greek population of the city of Constantinople was specially exempted from the "exchange." As a counterpoise to the above concession a similar exemption was granted in favour of the Turkish population of the Greek province of Western Thrace.

The questions a solution of which has been arrived at by the recently concluded Agreement, affect firstly the interpretation of the above-mentioned exemption-clause, and secondly the provisions for the valuation of the properties abandoned by the emigrants as well as for the compensation to be paid for other property seized by either of the Governments. According to the stipulations of the Lausanne Convention, the persons to benefit by the exemption were defined as those established ("*établis*" in the French text) respectively at Constantinople and in Western Thrace before October 30th, 1918 (the date of the Armistice of Mudros). The interpretation of this clause of the Convention, from the very start, gave rise to dispute between the two Governments. By a simple and straightforward application of the Convention not only the hundred thousand odd Greeks still resident at Constantinople would have been free to remain there, but another forty thousand, who had taken refuge in Greece at the time of the Greco-Turkish hostilities in 1922, would have been entitled to return. The Turkish Government, however, wishing to limit the Greek minority in Constantinople to the lowest possible figure, insisted on an individual examination of every single Greek inhabitant, in order to ascertain whether he was in fact resident at Constantinople at the date in question. This would have involved a long and vexatious procedure and offered opportunities for endless quibbling and investigations on the part of the police and other local authorities. Further, Turkey flatly refused to admit the return of the forty thousand refugees, on the ground that these had been guilty of high treason in leaving the country without the legal passports and had thereby forfeited the right to return.

Although the debates over this question had continued for over six years, the Mixed Commission entrusted with the task of applying the Convention had found it impossible to arrive at a solution. In the meantime the whole Greek population of Constantinople was placed under a sort of embargo. No Greek was allowed to travel outside the boundaries of the city, transfer real property or even contract a marriage. By the new Agreement, this vexed

question has been solved by a compromise. On the one hand Turkey has agreed to recognise as "*établis*," without further examination, all the Greeks at present resident at Constantinople. On the other Greece renounces her right to demand the repatriation of the forty thousand refugees from Constantinople at present domiciled on her territory.

The second most important question which has been solved by the Agreement is the one concerning the valuation of the abandoned properties. The original Convention provided for a detailed valuation of all property, whether abandoned by Greek, Turkish, or neutral delegates. Every emigrant was to receive a certificate showing the value of his property, thus entitling him to receive property of corresponding value in the country in which he had settled. Each Government undertook to compensate its immigrants out of the proceeds of the estates left by the emigrants. As there was bound to be a balance at the end of the valuation in favour of one or other of the two countries, it was stipulated that the debtor country should pay the difference in cash to the creditor country which would in turn pass on the money, as compensation, to its immigrants.

It is to be doubted whether those who were responsible for drafting this particular provision of the Lausanne Convention ever envisaged the vastness of the task thus imposed on the Mixed Commission. Even under normal conditions the detailed valuation of the properties of some one million and a half of people (1,100,000 Greeks and 400,000 Turks) scattered over an area stretching from the Adriatic to the Euphrates would have meant an enormous expenditure both of time and money. But, under the special circumstances involved, with the owners of these properties already removed to another country, with no reliable records to fall back on and with both Governments determined to dispute every single claim as liable to increase their own indebtedness, it was obvious to anybody possessing the smallest technical knowledge of the subject that the scheme was nothing short of chimerical. It would have required a whole army of lawyers, surveyors, and Mixed Sub-Commissions to examine and assess the claims.

A few figures will suffice to show the scale of the operations which a complete valuation of the properties abandoned on both sides would have entailed. The claims filed by the Greek "*échangeables*," as the emigrants under the Convention are officially termed, for property left in Turkey, amount to £217,000,000. The claims of the 400,000 Turkish "*échangeables*" are proportionately as high, if not higher. Obviously nobody was going to feel any scruples about the amounts he claimed from the Government of an ex-enemy country. The returns made were, in many cases, en-

tirely fanciful. For instance, the writer of the present article was told of the case of a Turkish peasant from Macedonia who returned the value of his cottage in some little village in the neighbourhood of Salonica at twenty thousand (*sic*) gold Turkish pounds. When the clerk filling in the form objected that such a figure was ridiculous, the peasant retorted that his home was worth that and more to him and insisted on the figure being put down. There was nothing to choose, however, as between the two parties. Every figure was exaggerated ten- if not a hundred-fold. The Neutral Members of the Mixed Commission set up under the Lausanne Convention to administer the scheme, after wrestling with the problem for seven years, finally reached the conclusion that it was utterly impracticable to carry out the valuation, as provided for in the Convention, and advised the two Governments to call quits and mutually cancel their claims. This recommendation has now been accepted; by the new Agreement Turkey and Greece mutually renounce their claims for compensation.

A third question, which has likewise been settled by the Agreement, is that concerning the fate of estates belonging to persons not liable to be "exchanged" under the Lausanne Convention, but whose properties had notwithstanding been confiscated by one or other of the Governments as a measure of reprisal or for some other reason. Thus in Western Thrace, for example, the Greek Government, faced with the urgent problem of housing and settling over a million refugees, had laid hands on property, both urban and agricultural, belonging to the local Turkish population which, as we have seen, is not liable to be "exchanged" under the Convention. This violation of the treaty, however much justified in fact by the necessity of obtaining land immediately for building or agricultural purposes, nevertheless furnished Turkey with an excuse for reprisals at the expense of the Greeks of Constantinople. Property belonging to the latter was also sequestered and distributed to Turkish emigrants from Greece. The new Agreement confirms these confiscations—the contrary would have entailed the forcible eviction of the refugees settled on the properties, a measure which public opinion in neither country would have tolerated—and provides for the compensation of the owners in cash by the country which has been the principal one to benefit by those seizures—in this case Greece. The amount so to be paid by Greece is fixed at £440,000.

Each Government is left free to deal as best it can with the question of compensating its own immigrants, this being an internal matter which does not affect the relations of the two countries. In Greece, where the immigrants from Turkey number about 1,100,000, the business of settling and compensating the refugee

population has been both a practical and a political problem of the first magnitude, which has taxed to the utmost the resources of the country.* In the case of the agricultural population the solution has been a comparatively simple matter. The land abandoned by the Turkish emigrants—whether in the form of village areas or of estates formerly the property of large landowners—has been distributed among the refugees in smallholdings of from fourteen to sixteen acres, while the money needed to provide cattle, houses, seed, implements, and other working capital has been supplied by means of foreign loans. This class of immigrants may therefore be said to be fairly satisfied, as they have received land of a market value of about £10,000,000 and assistance in money and kind to the extent of another £10,000,000.

More difficulty has been experienced, however, in dealing with the claims of the urban immigrants who represent about 65 per cent. of the total refugee population of Greece, as these could not be compensated in the same way, that is, by direct grants of land. All ex-Turkish property not wanted for settling the agricultural population has, therefore, been turned over to the National Bank of Greece to be sold for the benefit of these refugees (the former inhabitants of Smyrna, Trebizond, Adrianople, and other towns in Turkey). The value of this property, which includes thousands of houses in Salonica, Cavalla and elsewhere, as well as large areas of olive plantations and pastures scattered all over Greece, has been roughly estimated at £12,000,000. The main difficulty here has been that the liquidation of so large a number of properties is an operation requiring several years to carry through. It would obviously not have been feasible to put up all these properties for sale simultaneously, for there would not have been sufficient purchasers in a country only just recovering from the effects of a disastrous war and where capital is scarce. The Greek Government, in order to meet the clamour of these refugees for immediate compensation, has, therefore, been compelled to issue interest-bearing bonds, guaranteed by the State, for a nominal amount of 6 milliards of drachmæ (about £16,100,000). These have been distributed among the urban refugees in proportion to their claims. The bonds will be gradually redeemed by the sale of the ex-Turkish properties; any sum left unredeemed after the final liquidation will be redeemed by the Government out of its ordinary revenue.

Turkey has had a somewhat simpler task than that which has fallen to Greece. The number of her immigrants barely reaches 400,000. The estates abandoned by the Greeks and Armenians who emigrated or disappeared during the European and succeeding Greco-Turkish wars, have been more than sufficient to supply the wants of the immigrants. According to reports from persons

having recently visited the interior of Turkey, both in Eastern Thrace and the Eastern Vilayets of Anatolia there are large tracts of land still lying idle. As for the urban class, which is not very numerous, these have been compensated either by the gift of houses in towns like Smyrna, Samsoun, Trebizond, and Adrianople, or else by a share in the rents of former Greek house-property at Constantinople.

Both Greek and Turkish refugees had, for the last six years, been fed on the hope that the valuation of their abandoned properties, as provided for in the Lausanne Convention, would result in a large credit-balance in favour of their own country, to be paid in cash. The new Agreement, by cancelling the claims on either side, naturally puts an end to these expectations and so has caused much disappointment and heartburning among the emigrants. Both M. Venizelos and Ismet Pasha, the two statesmen who have been responsible for the conclusion of the Agreement, are all the more to be congratulated for their courage in imposing the settlement on their respective countries, in spite of considerable opposition, instead of allowing the long and dreary wrangle to drag on indefinitely. M. Venizelos, in particular, has had to face a violent agitation among the refugees who, to-day, form one-sixth of the population of Greece, and whose natural rancour against Turkey, dating from the events of 1922, made them, in general, hostile to the very idea of an Agreement, let alone concessions which they regarded as being made at their expense. It is to the credit of M. Venizelos and due to his strong personality that he has succeeded in imposing silence on this opposition, which was strongest among his own followers, and that, when the Bill for the ratification of the Agreement was submitted to the Chamber, only one refugee deputy spoke against it.

Ismet Pasha too, in his defence of the Agreement before the Turkish Assembly, replying to a bellicose anti-Greek speech by an Anatolian deputy, declared openly for the policy of burying the hatchet. Underlining the necessity for closer economic relations between Greece and Turkey, he disclaimed all suggestions of an irredentist nature and stated that Turkey had no territorial aspirations as regards either West Thrace or the Aegean Islands off the coast of Anatolia.

Is it the end of the feud? Although history teaches us how difficult it is for nations to renounce their dreams, the actual physical conditions have so changed since the Turkish Republic succeeded the old Ottoman Empire, that circumstances to-day are more favourable than they have ever been before to a better understanding between the two nations.

A. A. PALLIS.

SOME HAUNTS OF CLIO IN AMERICA.

ON the low bank of an estuary in Virginia, the estuary of the James River, among pink-tufted acacias and other trees, stand the exiguous ruins of Jamestown. They are guarded from the encroachments of the tidal stream by a concrete embankment; for Americans, it appears, set store by them. Named after James I, Jamestown was the first enduring settlement of Englishmen in America, Raleigh's settlement further south having been wiped out by the Indians. Inside the old, roofless church may still be read on a mural tablet the epitaph of Captain John Smith. That remarkable man, after fighting against the Turks in Hungary, further satisfied his love of adventure by coming to Virginia, where he was saved, according to his own story, from instant execution by the entreaties of Pocahontas, the daughter of his Indian captor, and lived to save the struggling agricultural settlement by his courage and energy from perishing of disillusionment and inertia. The inscription recites how in Hungary he did

"divide three Pagans from their Heads and Lives,"

and receive armorial bearings from the King of Hungary, to wit, three turbaned heads, which duly appear in the coat-of-arms at the head of the tablet; and how he conquered "this land" from its inhabitants and took it for "our nation" and for the worship of God, for which, it continues, he now

"with Angels hath in Heaven his Recompense."

Indian comments on the latter statement are unfortunately lacking.

We may recall, before leaving the church, that within these walls and on this now broken floor Pocahontas was undoubtedly married, in 1614, to one John Rolfe. What did she wear on that occasion? one wonders. An open stand-up ruff and a farthingale, perhaps. At least something English, one may guess. Did she thirst to be taken to England? If so, her wish was granted. And having arrived there, was she homesick for these wooded banks of the Powhattan (as the James River was called, after the chief her father)? She never saw them again. She died at Gravesend on the return voyage, in 1617.

Outside the church are a few graves, one of them inscribed in memory of a Drummond, who died in 1744. A few Scotchmen have been traced in the colony at still earlier dates, but not many. Here, as in the factories of the East India Company, the Scots begin to trickle in at a late stage to take advantage of what the English have discovered and put in working order. Grassy earth-works, too, are here, erected by the settlers to protect themselves from Indian raids, just as, on Manhattan Island away to the north,

the Dutch built but half a century later, and for a similar purpose, the wall from which Wall Street took its name. For the Indians seem to have foreseen little good to themselves from the settlements of white people in their country.

But of greater interest to Americans than church, tombs, or earthworks, are the foundations and a few remains of the walls of the old State House, in which the local legislative body, partly nominated, it is true, but partly elected, used to meet. Here, Virginians point out with pride, Americans were working representative government for years before the like was done in Massachusetts. Almost they begin to date the existence of their Republic from 1607.

All this tongue of land between the James and the York Rivers breathes history. At Williamsburg, a former capital of Virginia, only a few miles from Jamestown, is a church founded in 1678, in which the Governor's pew, with the royal arms on its red curtains, has been restored. The whole of this little township, in which there are several other old buildings, is, in fact, to be drastically restored by a well-known millionaire in a short time. In the College of William and Mary, on the outskirts of the town, stands the Dean's house as it was rebuilt by George III at his own expense at the conclusion of the War of Independence, in the course of which it had been destroyed by his forces. At Yorktown, a small place a few miles from Williamsburg, may be seen, dented by little cannon-balls, the old red-brick house which Cornwallis made his headquarters till, outnumbered by three to two, and with his supplies cut off, he was forced to that capitulation which sealed the great secession. Near the extremity of the peninsula are Hampton Roads, the great harbour in which the *Merrimac* sank two Northern frigates, but was herself put to flight on the following day by the turreted *Monitor*. In the opposite direction, between Williamsburg and Richmond, traces of the lines and camps both of the War of Independence and of the Civil War meet one at every mile in the fields and among the woods of this low-lying tract. Earthworks and conflicts, the building of State House, churches and college, and twice again more fighting. *Tantæ molis erat.* . . .

A little old two-storeyed timber house among the narrow streets of the old quarter of Boston. In front of it stands a "hitching-post," a slender post topped with something resembling a small elongated pineapple of wood, round the neck of which men hitched their horses' reins when they went to Paul Revere to buy jewelry or get a watch engraved or a tooth pulled out, or to have a look at some of the rather crude engravings which he used to draw

on copper. The son of a goldsmith, Revere is famous in the United States mainly because his ride to Concord by night was celebrated by Longfellow in a somewhat inaccurate poem. It was in 1775. Massachusetts had organised armed forces of volunteers to resist the King's forces in case of need. "Minutemen," the volunteers were called, because they were expected to turn out under arms at a minute's notice. On the 19th April a British force of 800 men was sent out from Boston to seize the military stores and cannon which the colonists had collected, in case of need, at Concord, some twenty miles inland. Paul Revere got wind of this expedition overnight, and rode out and alarmed the countryside. It was by no accident that it fell to him to execute this task. He was a man of forty, already experienced in war, and among the keenest patriot leaders in Boston. On his return journey the next day, he, with several others, was arrested by the British troops, and it would have gone hard with him, for his character was known to them; but his captors were themselves threatened with capture later in the day, and in the confusion he escaped, to live to a ripe old age.

Let us follow the route of the British detachment from Boston. We cross the bridge over the wide Charles River, and are in Cambridge. Bunker Hill, or the hill generally referred to as such, lies at some distance to our right. The sanguinary engagement there took place two months later than the expedition with which we are now concerned. We pass, as the expedition must have passed, by the old red-brick buildings of Harvard, dating, some of them, from 1720. We pass on our left the house of James Russell Lowell, the author of the *Biglow Papers*, and on our right, standing a little back from the road, in its own garden, that of Longfellow. We come out into open country, low, rough hills and inequalities, interspersed with arable land, a country of elms and pinewoods. At Lexington we find a triangular grassy space in the angle between two open highroads. It was here that a party of minutemen, refusing to disperse, were fired upon by the British and returned the fire, but, being greatly outnumbered, took to flight, leaving some of their number on the ground. It is noticeable by what small degrees this war broke out: drilling, collection of stores, an expedition to seize them, a petty exchange of shots, skirmishes and guerrilla warfare, and then Bunker Hill. Each side was reluctant to commence hostilities; but events moved inevitably towards war, for both sides had had years within which to come to a decision, and the mind of each was fully made up.

The British force proceeded towards Concord, a few miles further on. In approaching the township the road runs between the meadows of the Concord Rivers on the left and a partly wooded

slope rising from them on the right. In the meadows, near the highroad, is the little bridge over a meandering stream where the "embattled farmers" "fired the shot heard round the world" (Emerson). The minutemen, being outnumbered at first, abandoned Concord to the troops, the more readily in that they had been able to bury the guns and much of the stores in secret places. They retreated across the bridge, and were followed across it by three companies of British infantry detached for the purpose. The minutemen, however, were being reinforced rapidly from the countryside, and the British were obliged, in the face of superior numbers, to retreat on the bridge, the planks of which they began to tear up. The minutemen advanced rapidly, however. They were fired on, but returned the fire, and forced the troops to retire on their main body in Concord. They had fired upon troops of the army which had been victorious at Blenheim, at Dettingen, and at the Heights of Abraham, and forced them to retreat. During the return march of the British force to Boston, which was continued until after dark, the minutemen swarmed round it and inflicted no less than 300 casualties on it. No monument commemorates the men who fell on the British side; but if these men resembled at all their comrades of the Boston garrison who made those continued and finally successful frontal attacks at Bunker Hill a few weeks later, they were brave fellows.*

Shortly before reaching the point where the lane leading down to the Concord bridge branches off, and between the woods and the highroad, are the houses of Hawthorne and Emerson. Thoreau's lake, a miniature Nemi, is sunk among the pinewoods a few miles away. These great writers, Longfellow, Lowell, Hawthorne, Emerson, and Thoreau, than whom no Americans, perhaps, have ever turned more often or more willingly to the Old World for inspiration, lived in the very scenes of the first outbreak of rebellion, the culmination of a long-continued movement towards separation from England, which involved and meant estrangement from European tradition; for the alliance with the French led to practically no cultural results. Emerson and Longfellow were right in applauding the courage shown by their countrymen, and in prizing the results of independent life for their country. But did they fully reckon the cost? Professor Harper, a professor of literature in Princeton University, dealing with the cultural history of his country, writes: "Separation from the mother country resulted, during a period of thirty or forty years, in mental malnutrition."† New England, in which there was great zeal for education, recovered in the nineteenth century. But why did the

* For the details generally, see in particular *The Siege of Boston*, by Allen French. The Macmillan Co., 1911.

† *Scribner's Magazine*, December 1929.

distinguished group of writers and thinkers whom we have named have practically no intellectual heirs? The backwash of the physical conquest of a continent and the growth of industrialism combined with the growth of New York as a centre of journalism to silence the voice of Boston. In Virginia Jefferson and his friends had no intellectual successors. No Ruskin, no Matthew Arnold, arose in America in the late nineteenth century to combat the effects of merely material success. The roots of tradition had received too many wounds in an earlier period throughout America; and not least from the events of April 1775. Our own countrymen must bear the responsibility for hastening, but by no means for causing, the breach with Europe, the signs of which, as is now well known, appeared long before there was any question of dispute over taxation.

For almost a generation past the leading American historians, Woodrow Wilson among them, have taken a juster view than their predecessors of the causes and merits of the quarrel. The persistence of the old sore in the minds of many Americans was, however, amusingly illustrated during the present writer's visit to the above scenes. He found himself by chance in the company of a pleasant-mannered young American railway official from Pennsylvania or thereabouts, who somehow failed to detect the writer as an Englishman. Somewhere on the outskirts of Cambridge the conductor announced that here the British had caught seven minutemen and four civilians and shot them in cold blood. The young railway official turned in wrath to the writer, confident of his sympathy, and observed, "The British did that, and then they come and try to be nice to us!" No Irishman could have felt more clearly the present responsibility of another nation for its conduct in a past century.

Pines and oaks, rocky hillsides, and a leaping reddish stream: the Greenbrier River, whose waters flow down from the Appalachians into the Ohio basin. We are back in Virginia, but not in the State of Virginia. We are in the separate State of West Virginia, the transmontane part, which, always hostile to the planter society, secured admission as a separate State on the outbreak of the Civil War. We are near its eastern boundary, in a mountain valley separated from Virginia by the main chain of the Appalachians, and from the great plains by the Alleghanies.

Among these dark pine-slopes but few extensive views are to be had. Here one can well visualise the frontiersman of early days, not the pioneer of the plains, but the backwoodsman with axe and rifle, his face fallow from the forest shade, selling every clearing

that he made, and moving on to escape from advancing civilisation.* An inscription commemorates the existence of an important Indian trail of former days. A strange setting, this, for one of the more important social centres of the Old South in the nineteenth century; for such was White Sulphur Springs, alias the Greenbrier Springs, the "Virginia Springs," evidently, of Winston Churchill's novel of the Civil War, *The Crisis*. In a vast clearing in the woods stands a great grey, Georgian-looking mansion, now a palatial and tastefully furnished hotel, with a thermal establishment beside it, both surrounded by stately trees and vast sweeps of lawn. Hard by the main building are cottages bearing the names of the various southern States for whose citizens they used to be respectively reserved, so many for Georgia, so many for South Carolina, and so on.

This was at once the Bath (but a smaller and later Bath than that of Beau Nash) and the principal hill station of the South, from early in the nineteenth century.† Aristocratic Charleston, the capital of South Carolina, was naturally a social centre of greater importance, especially about the month of February; but the Greenbrier Springs were the special resort of fashion in the summer heats. These buildings, these lawns and paths, may have been altered in the progress of time, but substantially this is the scene which witnessed much that was most typical of the old Southern life, a life distinguished by insistence on form in manners, in dress and in buildings, and on personal dignity and honour. It was a curiously distinctive type of society. Contact with, and dominion over, the negro had brought to life unexpectedly strong aristocratic tendencies in the descendants of English squires and of Ulstermen of Scotch descent. Family and cousinship counted for much in a region in which race was all-important. Woman was a charmer, an angel; but the angel must not be permitted to be flighty—not, at least, if she belonged to one's own family. As for the negroes, slavery had been started, for good or ill, by a past generation. The question of its discontinuance, if it was to be entertained at all, might be considered preferably by a future one.

It was not the South of George Washington, but the South of the prime of Colonel Starbottle and Colonel Carvell, that was represented here. Virginia no longer held so distinctly the primacy of the South. The cotton States had developed an immense prosperity. Of the early fifties of the nineteenth century we read: "Kentucky backwoodsmen, who in the early thirties

* *Social and Economic Forces in American History*, edited by Albert Bushnell Hart, Harper, 1913, p. 267.

† A glimpse of the fashionable life at White Sulphur Springs is given in the *Diary in America* of Captain Marryat, the novelist, 1839.

had taken up land in the black belts, were now gentlemen planters, who mingled on equal terms with the First Families of Virginia in the thermal stations of the mountains."* But can we really see the First Families meeting them with open arms on these lawns? More, even, than most communities of planters were the Southerners as a whole separated from the mass of their fellow-countrymen by differences of outlook. It is easy to smile at their weaknesses. It is difficult, on the other hand, to refuse admiration to the courage with which they took up arms for their freedom against North and West combined, or the staunchness with which they fought the war to the end.

Their descendants do not forget them. Chance once took the writer to a village named Orange, in the county of that name, presumably named in compliment to William III, in the northern part of Virginia State. Lying in the midst of arable land, far from any city, it has good houses standing in fenced gardens, a row of smart little shops, and—a court-house. A square court-room, with law commentaries and stray volumes of the Virginia Law Reports on the tables. And on the walls? The arms of the State? Portraits of George Washington, Chief Justice Marshall, and the other conscript fathers of Virginia? No. All round the walls are groups of officers and men of the Confederate army. How modern and how near to us they seem! The men who fought for the freedom of the South were men in képis, with little side-whiskers and moustaches, who could call in a photographer just as we can to-day. Outside, in the strip of ground between the court-house and the street, stands a monument to the Confederate dead. Below the coat-of-arms are carved the not very apposite words, *Sic semper tyrannis*! This motto, adopted by Virginia in the Romanising days of 1775, was retained by her in the day of her captivity. The Northerner and his carpetbagger were, alas! difficult tyrants to slay.

Flooded by the brilliant light of the Californian coast, Santa Barbara city is shut in between the Coast Range and the Pacific. The newer part of the town stretches down to the shore, with neatly-shaved lawns and sub-tropical gardens on every side, irrigated from the hills behind. Higher up, off State Street, are a few old Spanish houses. In the school playgrounds the large proportion of dusky-skinned boys and girls are a reminder of the Mexican-Spanish period. Up behind the town, in the commencement of the somewhat arid foothills, is the old Franciscan mission, founded in 1786 for the conversion of the Indians, with

* *The Oxford History of the United States*. By S. E. Morrison, II, 106.

buildings in the Spanish style; low-pitched roofs, yellow-washed walls, and large, round arches, a chapel, a garden, and numerous small rooms full of treasured relics of the life formerly lived in these buildings.

This was one of the numerous missions founded by Spanish Franciscans in Upper (Alta) California, now the State of California, under the leadership of Fray Junípero Serra, a man whose burning enthusiasm was almost equalled by his administrative ability. He did not survive actually to inaugurate this mission, but he said mass and sang an *alabado*, or hymn in praise of the sacrament, at the formal establishment of the garrison post for its protection.* He suffered, we are told, from asthma and from a running sore on his chest, both which ailments were attributed to the following peculiar cause. When still in New Spain he used, when preaching on hell or eternity, to bare his breast and apply a burning torch to his flesh, in order that the people might picture to themselves the condition of a soul condemned for sin.

The aims of this saintly believer in object-lessons were purely spiritual. He was, none the less, a pawn in a game of international colonial rivalry. Spain was apprehensive of Russian and British enterprise on the Pacific coast. Lower or peninsular California, now a part of the Mexican Republic, was in Spanish hands. Russia, having conquered Siberia, had crossed the straits and occupied the Aleutian Islands, and was granting privileges in Alaska. The Spanish Government heard from its Ambassador at Petersburg in 1764 that fresh Russian activities on the coast of America were contemplated. The British were also vaguely feared. It was, however, upon Catherine the Great and her subjects that the attention of the Spanish Government was almost entirely fixed, when it determined in 1768 to commence the occupation of Upper California. Missionaries were sent with the expedition as a matter of course. For a government which could not afford large garrisons, missionaries were an economy. For missions were a protection to garrisons. The results of this politic use of ecclesiastics were, curiously enough, more satisfactory from the religious than from the secular point of view. Lower California had been missionised by the Jesuit order. In 1767, however, that order had been expelled from all the Spains as having too much political influence. When the occupation of Alta California was planned, it was clearly laid down that the missions were to be subject to the civil governors of the province. But the very success of the missions defeated this intention. Indians were converted in large numbers, and were settled round the missions under the tutelage of the Franciscans. The latter became practically the

* H. H. Bancroft, *Hist. of the Pacific States*, XIII, 377.

kings of large agricultural settlements, whose inhabitants were accustomed to look to them alone for orders. In passing, it may be observed that it was this system of settlements round missions that obviated the gradual driving out of the Indians from their ancestral lands by the settler which took place in Anglo-America. It gave the Indians a place in the Spanish economy of life. To the Government of Mexico, freed from Spanish rule, however, this system appeared too much in the nature of an *imperium in imperio*. They turned the friars, now a dwindling body, into parish priests, and sold the home lands of the Santa Barbara mission.

If the design of the Spanish Government to keep the influence of the religious in check proved unsuccessful, no less were their primary aims in occupying the province mocked by fate. Less than eighty years from the commencement of the occupation, Alta California was seized neither by the Russians nor by the British, but by a third Power, whose advance had not been foreseen. The lost home lands were then restored to the Franciscan order, which still occupies the Santa Barbara mission. The latter, however, no longer fulfils the curious and important double function which once belonged to it.

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FRÉDÉRIC MISTRAL (1830-1914).

THESE is something magical about Provence. The skein of its history stretches back so far that Mistral could say truly,

We are the heirs of immortal Greece,
We are thy children, Orpheus, god-like man,
For we are thy sons, O courtly Provence,
And our capital
Is Marseilles who watches the dolphins leap in the sea.

Even the sculpture of the Middle Ages, indeed, reveals at times a strangely Hellenic inspiration. Rome left a more tangible legacy; amphitheatres and triumphal arches and great aqueducts like the famous Pont du Gard. Feudal days scattered the hills with castles, where love-sick troubadours sang for ladies with flower-like names. Arles, with its famous cemetery, holiest of all burial places, was once capital of a kingdom. Golden Avignon, where Petrarch sighed for Laura, seems still exultant with the splendour of papal days. One day, say the Provençaux, the Pope will return to Avignon, and then the millennium will begin, for in the traditions of the people dim memories of history are interwoven with the gold of legend—a people at once exuberant and grave, gay and melancholy, sceptical and believing, who in the last century found their supreme singer.

Frédéric Mistral was born at Maillane, a little village in a rich plain, looking southward to the blue crests of the Alpilles, sheltered on the north by long dark rows of cypresses from the onrush of the great wind of which the poet so appropriately bore the name. His father, Maître François, a yeoman farmer, who had fought in the wars of the Revolution and who owned broad acres of cornland and pasture, olive and vine, was fifty-five and a widower when among the gleaners in his field he saw a beautiful girl, hanging timidly behind the rest.

"Mignonne, what is your name?"

"I am the daughter of Etienne Poulinet, the Mayor of Maillane," she told him, "my name is Delaïde."

"What? The Mayor's daughter a gleaner?"

"Master, we are a large family, six girls and two boys. And our father, though he has enough to go on with, when we ask him for new clothes tells us, 'My children, if you want finery, you must earn it.'"

Six months after this meeting, which, as the poet their son points out in his *Souvenirs*, recalls the ancient scene of Ruth and Boaz, the farmer had asked Delaïde's hand in marriage.

It was in this atmosphere of antique simplicity that Mistral passed his childhood, having for companions the labourers, the harvesters, the shepherds—a life that was itself poetry, with its rhythmic procession of ploughing and sowing, shearing and hay-making, harvest and vintage and olive gathering. At Christmas he would go with his father to fetch the Yule Log, to be carried in with traditional ceremony and song. At Epiphany he ran with the other children at dusk along the road of Arles, till "the bell-tower of Maillane vanished behind the tall black spear-points of the cypresses, the country stretched vast and bare into the distance," and the sunset flamed purple and gold like a crown. Then "The Kings!" the children cried, "See their crowns, see their mantles, and banners, and the horsemen and camels following!" His mother would regale him with songs and tales of how the Three Mariés with Martha and Lazarus and Sara the gypsies' patron came in a mysterious ship to Marseilles, of fairy-guarded treasure beneath the Roman ruins, of the ghosts and pixies that sported in the deserted castle high up among the rocks and lavender of the hills, once the proud seat of the Counts of Baux who claimed descent from the Magi. "Not only with the milk of her breast did she feed me," he would write thereafter in his *Souvenirs*, "but with the honey of traditions and of God." In the same book he speaks of his father, "the last of the patriarchs of Provence, custodian of tradition and custom," who kept open table for all comers, and in the winter evenings would read the Gospels to his household, gathered round the great hearth. He was over eighty when he died.

"My friends," he said, "I am going now, and I thank God for all I owe to him, my long life and my labour, which has been blessed." Then he asked, "Frédéric, what is the weather?" "It is raining, father." "Good weather for the seed." Just such a death as his son had by then already described in his poem, *The Death of the Reaper*:

My kinsmen, friends, my star would have it so,
Or maybe that the Master, the one above us all,
Seeing the corn was ripe, would harvest it.
Ah then! In God's hands be it! I go my way quietly,
Then when you carry the corn, children, upon the cart,
Carry your chief away upon the sheaves. . . .

Maître François had read but two books besides the Gospels: *Don Quixote* and *The Imitation of Christ*, but in his wisdom he willed that his son should become an educated man. Providence must have directed his choice of schools, the little school of Frigoulet, where the children ran wild over the thyme-covered hills, and where the good master cared so little for pecuniary reward that at

last he was forced to tell them "I have nothing more for you to eat. You must go home"—the school at Avignon, where the bourgeois boys jeered at Mistral's Provençal speech, but where he made the friendship of Roumanille, the young professor who had himself published Provençal verse, and whose example and encouragement caused him to cry, "Here is the dawn my soul awaited." When at last, Licentiate in Law, he returned from the University of Aix, and his father told him, "I have done my part. It is for you to choose the way that suits you. I leave you free," that way lay clear before him.

"I was then twenty-one. My foot on the threshold of the paternal farm, my eyes turned to the Alpilles, to myself and of myself I formed the resolve: firstly, to renew, to revive the racial sentiment in Provence, disappearing before the false and anti-natural education of all the schools; secondly, to promote that resurrection by restoring the natural and historic language of the country, against which the schools wage a war to the death; thirdly, to bring back the vogue of Provençal by the influx and flame of divine poetry." Meanwhile, under his father's guidance, he took over the direction of the farm.

Not in France alone, but all over Europe, as the progress of democracy and the widening circle of education brought the people into the orbit of national and literary life, two tides were meeting: on the one hand increasing uniformity and centralisation, with the advance of the dominant language into regions that had hitherto held fast to a speech and custom of their own; on the other, the development of nationalist and regionalist movements seeking to preserve the traditional variant as a precious heritage, symbol of a fruitful diversity. "A language," Mistral would declare, in the full maturity of his thought, "is an immense monument to which every family has carted its stone, where every city has built its pedestal, whereat a whole race has laboured with body and soul through hundreds and thousands of years. A language in a word is the revelation of living life, the manifestation of human thought, the most holy instrument of civilisation, and the speaking testament of society living or dead." In Norway and Flanders, in Wales and Ireland and Brittany, in Catalonia, and the southern provinces of France, the same battle was waging; languages that had long forgotten their ancient title of nobility and were disappearing from common use were being born anew. And everywhere this was the poets' doing.

"It was written in Heaven," says Mistral, "that one flowery Sunday, May 21st, 1854, in full spring-time of life and of the year, seven poets arranged to meet at the castle of Font Ségugné." These seven, chief among them Mistral, Roumanille, and Aubanel,

founded then the famous *Félibrige*, of which the name comes from an old poem in which the Virgin Mary in the Temple was greeted by "the seven *félibres* of the Law"—though what exactly "*félibre*" signified no one knows. A gay fraternity dedicated to the "Gay Science" of the Troubadours, and to the revival of the spirit of old Provence, their special object was the labour necessary to transform a spoken dialect, differing from parish to parish, into a literary language, purged of corrupt forms, uniform in spelling, and adequate in vocabulary—to effect in short for Provençal what Dante effected for the formless Italian of his day. To propagate their ideas they started then the publication of their *Provençal Almanach*, in which several of Alphonse Daudet's most famous *Lettres de mon Moulin* would make their first appearance—a true farmers' almanac, in which tale and poem alternated with recommendations agricultural, domestic, astrological (the *Félibres* had a weakness for astrology; for all Provence the Provençal Nostradamus was a revered authority, and but for the opposition of both mayor and curé Mistral would most appropriately have received his name). To gain the material which made of the *Almanach* a mine of Provençal lore and custom, they would journey continually over the length and breadth of Provence, gleanings all-but-forgotten terms from shepherds and fishermen, witch-wives and herbalists, joining in the popular pilgrimages, stirring up the people to old songs, old tales, sleeping on occasion in barns, more than once arrested for vagrants, everywhere gathering up fragments of vanishing tradition and the older uncorrupted speech. After twenty years Mistral would garner the results of their labours in his *Trésor*, a great dictionary, etymological, technical, biographical, proverbial, historical—an encyclopedia of the whole South, of which Gaston Paris would write that "it is one of the most magnificent gifts the love of a language and of a country has ever made to science."

Meanwhile Mistral had been working on his Provençal epic, *Mireille*, which was finally printed on Aubanel's press at Avignon in 1859. The stars were propitious. The passing of the great Romantics, the collapse of their utopian dreams with the collapse of the Second Republic, had been followed by a period of disillusionment in which Mistral's voice seemed a voice from the Golden Age. The lingering influence of Rousseau still bore fruit in a vogue for worker poets, peasant poets, an Arcadian aspiration towards the sanity of the soil. Lamartine, old now, writing for a living, had himself dreamed of a peasant epic, and it was he who now announced with generous joy "A great epic poet is born." At the same time a revival of classicism had begun, which could not but favour a poet who had found his vocation when as a boy he

"recognised in Virgil and Homer living pictures of the labours, ideas, and customs of the Maillane country."

It is these living pictures that make the greatness of *Mireille*. The story is a simple one. Mireille in the freshness of her fifteen years, loves Vincent a penniless boy who mends the baskets on her father's farm; before her father's anger she flees in anguish, over the blazing wilderness of the Crau, to implore the intercession of the Three Maries in their salt-marsh sanctuary, and dies there of sunstroke and exhaustion, before her eyes a vision of the Saints coming to fetch her in their mysterious ship, though the weeping company who have pursued her see only the white line joining the sky to the bitter waters, the sun about to sink in the reddening sea. The whole spirit of the land is there, and the labours of the land, the gathering of the mulberry leaves for the silk worms, when the trees are full of laughing singing girls, swarming "like the yellow bees that rob the honey from the rosemary of the stony plains," the return of the great flocks from their Alpine pasturage; the hush of the starry night when the shepherds are already milking the ewes, their white dogs beside them asleep upon the thyme—Mireille flees past them like a spirit; the reapers advancing in a line of battle on the tawny wheat, the varied company of the hay-makers, the ploughmen plodding behind their sleek mules, all are there, described in swift, vivid stanzas of richly woven rhythms and chiming rhymes.

The plain of Crau lay mute and still,
Into the distance stretching till
It lost itself in sea, the sea in the blue air.
And swans, and lustrous water-game,
Flamingoes with their wings of flame,
Over the stagnant waters came,
Seeking the lingering gleams of daylight there.

No translation can render the magic of the original, with its delicate diminutives and sonorous diphthongs, and that close, evocative union between word and object that is found only in languages not yet full-blown and still bound up with what Thomas Macdonagh in his *Literature in Ireland* calls the common furniture of life. (A quality that places it outside schools, and finds a resonance in the modern striving to attain things in their essences.)

Turned into opera by Gounod, translated into every language, the success of *Mireille* was immense and immediate. Seven years later came *Calendal*, a tapestry of scene and legend and history, revealing yet other aspects of the face of Provence, the high solitudes of the mountains, the precipices where the wild bees nest, the vivacious life of the little towns, the labours and pageantry of the men of the sea. More fantastic, inspired more directly by the

troubadours, it tells of how Calendal, a fisher lad, by Herculean feats won the love of the fairy lady Esterelle, setting her free from the bandit Count who had wedded her by force and guile—in part an allegory, for Esterelle is Provence herself, and Calendal the young *félibrige*, her deliverer. Partly in consequence it had no great success North of the Loire; many mistook Mistral's passionate regionalism for a desire for separation and resented his proud reminder that "only in 1448" Provence annexed itself to France, "not as an accessory to an accessory, but as a principal to a principal," his indignant outbursts against the French who by the Albigensian Crusade had quenched the fine civilisation of the troubadour Courts ("O Flowers, you came too soon! Nation in flower, the sword cut short Your blossoming. . ."), his threats to defend his "golden speech" with red bullets (much as Dante declared that those who objected to the literary use of Italian should be answered not with reasons, but with a knife!). There were times indeed when his Provence seemed to him a Dark Rosaleen, a sorrowful Countess, as in his famous poem so entitled, who once laughed and sang all day in her fair garden, but now weeps,

For her half-sister,
To have her inheritance,
Has shut her in a cloister,
In a convent cloister.
There young and old
Must all wear the same,
A veil of white wool,
And a habit of black.
There too the same bell
Orders everything in the same manner.

Who waits—"Ah would they but hear me! Would they but follow!"—for the lover who will hang her gaoler and set her free.

For a moment—we are in 1867—Mistral seems to have dreamed of a political coup, in co-operation with his friend the Catalan autonomist Victor Balaguer. For a moment only. But on the plane of ideas the federal resurrection of his province was the "Cause" to which he dedicated his whole life. The France against which he rebelled was a France become the symbol of materialism and irreligion, that France for whom he pleaded in 1870 in his magnificent "Penitential Psalm":

Lord, at last Thine anger sends its thunders on our heads,
and in the night our galleon strikes its prow upon the rocks. . . .

Lord we had left the austerity of the old laws and ways.

Lord, leaving behind us Thy Sacraments and commandments,
brutally we sought to believe only in interest and progress. . . .

Lord, we have blown upon Thy Bible with the wind of false
knowledge, and raising ourselves up like the poplars, miserable
wretches we have declared ourselves gods. . . .

In the name of the brave men fallen . . . of the mothers . . .
of the women who wet their sheets with tears . . . of the poor,
of the strong, of the dead who died for country, for duty, and
for faith,

Disarm Thy justice.

A deep social and political vision inspires his whole action. If he would teach his people their past, it is because "the trees the deepest-rooted rise most tall." In place of the dead uniformity of the centralised State he would have the organic unity of harmonised diversity. He saw how "unitarism leads to despotism," the single head being a perpetual invitation to the tyrant. He saw the danger of a proletariat without roots, and fighting to make the provinces living entities he was fighting for that reinforcement of local ties which alone could prevent the depopulation of the countryside, the attraction of the great urban centres; fighting always in defence of simpler and saner tradition. "If we would restore our poor fatherland," he declared in 1875, "let us restore what produces patriots: religion, tradition, national memory, the ancient speech; city by city, province by province, let us compete in zeal, labour, and honour, to honour diversely the name of France."

Ten years later the same organic, dynamic principle, in its wider implications, led him to an almost prophetic view of the international community to come. "It is my conviction that the *Félibrige* bears in itself the solution of the great political and social questions agitating humanity—the federation of peoples, a Latin confederation, the renaissance of the provinces in free and natural fraternity." Adding, no less aptly, that "before devoting ourselves openly to this supreme task, we must await the outbreak of the formidable war . . . between Germanism and Latinity."

Meanwhile he had published his collected poems in *Lis Isclos d'Or*, the Golden Isles, in which pieces of grave beauty and vigorous *sirventes* alternate with chanting ballads that have the authentic note of those mellowed by the centuries. Then in 1884 came *Nerto*, a gay legend in Ariosto's vein of papal Avignon; like *Mireille*, it was crowned by the Académie Française. Then *La Reine Jeanne*, a lyrical drama of Queen Joan of Provence. Then, in 1897, a last great masterpiece, *The Poem of the Rhône*. "O *tems di vici, tems gai, tems di simplessa*. . . ." It is of the vanished Rhône of his childhood he would write, swarming with life and traffic, when the men of Condrieu passed proudly in their fleets of barges. In the steadily-flowing unrhymed verse the whole journey grows visible—the start from Lyons in the white morning mist, which gradually lifts, revealing the steaming valley and green hills; the town of Vienne, with the grey-blue teeth of Mont Pilatus against the sky; the naked boys leaping beside the wharf of Con-

drieu, where women have assembled to greet their husbands as they pass; the changing light, the deepening sun, the water still blue with the turquoises gathered in Geneva's lake, on which the white tented barges seem a flight of swans. Down they go, taking on passengers at Valence—a company of Venetian ladies—loading twenty sacks of violets at Ancône, on under the Pont Saint Esprit, the gate of the South, to where olives and pomegranates grow in the widening valley and the air is hot and sweet with myrtle and lavender, past Avignon with its clustering towers, and so to the clamorous Beaucaire fair, their goal. Then back again, with forty horses tugging against the stream. Interwoven is a fairy tale of a young prince seeking the mystic Rhône flower, and l'Anglore, the little fisher girl, who sees in him the *Drac*, the spirit of the river, who has filled her dreams. After the final disaster they are seen no more, for a steam-boat, the first steam-boat on the river, crashes into the fleet. And the boatmen trudge away saying only, "He is dead of us all, to-day, the mighty Rhône."

To-day all that is dead, silent, and vast . . .
Of all that busy life, all that remains
Is the worn tracing and the furrowed line
The fretting cable cut upon the stone.

There is a vein of stoical melancholy in *The Poem of the Rhône* which shows itself—though tempered with moods as gay and exuberant as any of his youth—in Mistral's last poems, *Les Olivades*, published in 1912 in his eighty-second year:

I, before the rising deluge,
Anti-Christian, mad, world-wide,
I have cabined my faith, which stands unconquerable,
To save it from the scourge, the shame,
Up in the watch-tower of a Provençal castle.
My faith is but a dream, that I know well,
But the dream has seemed to me of beaten gold. . . .
It seemed to me a rock, whence I, her lover bore,
Away in my two arms, the Sleeping Beauty. . . .

In the clear-sightedness of age, Platonic-wise, outward events seem to him of less account than vision and ideal, "the life of the living . . . beside the myth, is but reflected light," even his "Cause" the vesture of an archetypal reality:

Enough. For me upon the sea of story,
You were for me, O Provence, a pure symbol,
A mirage of victory and of glory,
Which in the shadow of the centuries transitory,
Revealed us a lightning glimpse of the Beautiful.

With serene expectation, the expectation of the farmer used to watching the weather, knowing the permanence underlying change,

he looked to the future—"If not to-day, why then to-morrow." With the triumphant assertion, "The builders are dead, but the temple is builded."

The fame of the *Félibrige* had spread over the world, and now a new generation of ardent youth clustered round him. Awarded half the Nobel Prize in 1905, he used it to form his Arlesian Museum, to keep before the eyes of the people the smallest details of their tradition—costume, crockery, furniture, history. In 1875 he had founded the Floral Games—the counterpart of the Welsh Eisteddfod—at first for Provence and Catalonia only (always there was close fellowship between *Félibres* and Catalans, both memorable of how they shared a common past, when the Count of Barcelona had sailed up the Rhône to wed Doucinella of Arles); then extended to all the South; then to all the Latin world, "The Empire of the Sun." (In 1885 the prize poem was written by a Roumanian.) Each time they were celebrated with increasing splendour. In 1909, when Mistral's monument was unveiled at Arles, 20,000 people assembled, crying in delirious hyperbole "Mistral! You are our King! You are our God!" In 1913 M. Poincaré, as President of the Republic, opened the Floral Games at Aix; in his presence Mistral appealed anew, surely with reason, for "that regionalism in which France will renew her youth."

A year later he was dead. On his tomb in Maillane there is no name, only the seven-pointed star of the *Félibres*, and the epitaph that sums up his life, "*Non nobis Domine, sed nomine tuo et Provinciæ nostræ sit gloria.*"

BARBARA BARCLAY CARTER.

ABYSSINIA AND THE ROYAL VISIT.

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS the Duke of Gloucester's visit to Abyssinia for the coronation as Emperor of King Taffari will be interesting as the first official function of its kind carried out by a member of our Royal family to a country whose relations with Great Britain are now by way of being ancient history. Incidentally, it should afford the Duke some relaxation in the way of big-game shooting in a region where the elephant, rhinoceros, lion, leopard, and panther are still hunted. There is a well-worn legend that the Abyssinian people can trace their monarchs back to Menelik, son of King Solomon by the Queen of Sheba; it is established that Christianity was introduced in the fourth century, when Frumentius became Bishop of Abyssinia. Portuguese influence in the country was followed by more than one revolution; but it was not until 1769 that King Joas was done to death by the ruler of Tigré province. The notorious Theodore (Lis Kâsa) is first heard of about the middle of the nineteenth century. He was crowned Negus Negusti or "King of Kings" in 1855, and ruled judiciously until the loss of his two English advisers, Messrs. Plowden and Bell, who were killed in a local insurrection. After this Theodore rapidly degenerated. He quarrelled with both England and France, imprisoned H.B.M. Consul, Captain Cameron, and other British envoys in his fortress of Magdala, and refused all redress. It was not until 1867 that a British expeditionary force of 16,000 landed at Annesley Bay under Sir Charles Napier's command. They speedily stormed Magdala, and Theodore, refusing to capitulate, shot himself dead. The British troops were at once withdrawn—after a campaign then regarded as very costly—at "nearly nine millions sterling"—and Sir C. Napier was raised to the peerage.

Some five years subsequently, the Prince of Tigré succeeded in getting himself crowned Emperor of Abyssinia as Johannes II, and was thereafter constantly at war with Egypt until, in 1885, an Italian expedition seized and occupied Massowah on the Red Sea—Italy, under the ambitious régime of Crispi, having decided upon an African expedition of her own. Johannes died in 1889. In 1894 Kassala was taken by General Baratieri, viceroy of the Italian Red Sea Protectorate, who actively engineered an alliance with that remarkable personality Menelik, the ruler of Shoa. He ceded the coastal area to Italy and was proclaimed "Emperor of Ethiopia"; but, annoyed by the occupation of Kassala and objecting to the terms of the Protectorate, he paid off an Italian loan of £4,000,000 from French financial sources and also procured

much war material through French traders. Thus equipped, Menelik went to war with Italy.

One of his lieutenants was repulsed with loss at Coatit, but by this time the Emperor had collected a huge army, and on December 7th, 1895, its vanguard won a victory at Amba Alagi and followed this up by capturing Makalla and its garrison. Menelik would now have made peace, and even proposed terms; but Signor Crispi sternly notified Baratieri that there could be no question of peace until recent reverses had been avenged. Indeed, General Baldissera was actually dispatched from Italy to supersede Baratieri; but the latter got wind of this and the news tempted him to his doom. For his available fighting force had dwindled to less than 20,000, of whom little more than half were European; whilst Menelik could dispose of a vast host numbering some 120,000 warriors, most of them armed with breech-loading rifles and including 10,000 cavalry. The Italians had the advantage in artillery, an arm in which neither side was particularly rich. Baratieri bravely (rashly?) marched to meet the dusky foe on the night before March 1st, 1896, and the decisive battle of Adowa opened at dawn. The demeanour of the Abyssinian army has been thus picturesquely described by a British historian of the campaign, Mr. G. F. H. Berkeley:

A hundred and twenty thousand men thrown up from the unknown depths of Africa were preparing to rush against the Europeans. The chiefs were issuing their commands, but each warrior knew the general plan of the battle and was accustomed to take his own course in a moment of difficulty. How extraordinary must the scene have appeared during those grey hours before dawn amongst the irregular and crowded tents! Thousands of lean, fierce-looking Ethiopians, in the cloak of brilliant colours that they wear in the day of battle; riflemen; spearmen from the hills; swordsmen buckling the crooked blade on their right side so as to give free play to the shield arm; wild riders from the plains; priests giving absolution; women and children even; and here and there some great feudal chief with black leopard or lion skin, on his horse, with gold embossed shield, silver bracelets, and all the magnificence of barbarian war. The sun had not yet risen when they moved out across the fertile plain of Adowa.*

The overmatched Italians fought splendidly for several hours, but were slowly but surely outflanked. One of Baratieri's brigadiers, Albertone, was wounded and captured. A worse fate overtook Colonel Galliano, commanding one of the native battalions. He was "wounded in the face, knocked down, and made prisoner. His captors were leading him to the rear when he became faint from loss of blood and sat down on the ground to rest. Then one

* *The Campaign of Adowa.*

of the Shoans blew his brains out." This was only one among many barbarous episodes of that sanguinary day.

Gradually, and fighting desperately, the Italian army broke up into three fragments. General Arimondi was killed sword in hand, and the veteran Airaghi, severely wounded, said to his officers before he died, "I am old, you are young; save yourselves and leave me." General Dabormida's corpse was found stripped of his sword and decorations, and an aged native woman spoke of "a great chief wearing spectacles and golden stars," who asked her for water and then died. General Baratieri himself escaped after a six miles' pursuit during which his remaining fragment degenerated into a mere mob. "The stragglers were ruthlessly massacred." The victors' own losses in this, "the greatest disaster that had ever befallen a civilised army in Africa in modern times,"* were reckoned at 7,000 dead and 10,000 wounded. On the losing side no fewer than 6,678 were killed or wounded and nearly 3,000 captured out of some 17,000 that had marched to battle. The prisoners were ruthlessly ill-treated, and in the case of the native ones several hundreds were, as rebels, deprived of a foot and a hand and cast adrift. Italy made no effort to reverse the defeat of Adowa, and Menelik remained an independent ruler, the disaster having shocked public opinion in Italy.

Incidentally, and however indirectly, this campaign of Adowa led to Great Britain's reconquest of the Sudan under Kitchener, the Italian *débâcle* in Africa having encouraged a revival of the Mahdist movement in Egypt. I am here reminded that Mr. Winston Churchill's personal impression of the Dervish advance at Omdurman deserves to be read side by side with Mr. Berkeley's aforequoted description of the Abyssinian onslaught at Adowa: "Four miles from end to end, and as it seemed in five great divisions, this mighty army advanced swiftly. The whole side of the hill seemed to move. It was perhaps the impression of a lifetime."†

Some six months after Adowa, on October 26th, 1896, Italy concluded a treaty with Menelik which formally acknowledged the independence of Abyssinia; and a decade later (December 13th, 1906), Great Britain, France, and Italy arrived at a definite agreement with that country. By this instrument the three Powers in question undertook to observe Abyssinia's integrity and refrain from interfering in her internal arrangements or policy, to act unitedly in the matter of concessions, etc., and to proceed in the matter of railway construction and development of commerce. Menelik, who survived until the close of 1913, received the honours of G.C.B. and G.C.M.G. from the government of Great Britain.

* Hilliard Atteridge, *Famous Modern Battles.*

† *The River War.*

Incidentally, he gave his name to the "Menelik dollar," a coin of the value of about two shillings, which together with the "Maria Theresa dollar" provides the staple coinage of the community.

Affairs did not progress favourably with the dynasty after the death of Menelik. His immediate successor, Lis Yasu, the son of his second daughter, was only seventeen years of age, and after less than three years as nominal Emperor he was deposed by "public proclamation." This youth was succeeded on the throne by Menelik's daughter, Waizeru Zaudita, whose coronation as Empress was carried out in the capital, Addis Ababa, in February 1917. It was generally understood, however, that the real power was wielded by the Regent Ras Tafari, Menelik's great-nephew and son of Ras Makonnen. During 1919, the step was taken of introducing an experiment by way of government by Cabinet. This sounds enlightened enough; but domestic slavery remains an established thing in Abyssinia, albeit slave-trading is rigidly forbidden.

The area of this interesting country may be roughly estimated at 350,000 square miles, with a population of perhaps ten million souls, of whom the Christian Abyssinians number probably 3,500,000. The power of religion is very great, and something like one-fourth of the grown-up males are priests or deacons. Other than Abyssinian, the main dominant race are the Gallas, who constitute half of the population and are partly Christian, partly Mohammedan, and partly of no belief at all. There is naturally much illiteracy. After Addis Ababa (70,000 inhabitants), Harar (40,000), and Dirre Daoua (30,000), the country contains no towns worthy of consideration as such. Gambela on the western frontier is leased to the Sudan Government for commercial purposes, and between June and November it keeps up a steamer service with Khartum. Other trade routes are maintained with British East Africa, British Somaliland, and with Italian Somaliland and Eritrea, but the great bulk of commerce is carried on by means of the French Ethiopian Railway. A quaint item of comparatively recent "progressive" information is to the effect that in 1929 Abyssinia boasted motor-car accommodation to the extent of one machine per every 91,743 of the population!

During 1926 Great Britain and Italy came to an understanding, subject to the approval of the League of Nations, on the important question of their neutral interests in Abyssinia. To quote Mr. G. Ward Price on the point, "British cotton-growing interests in the Sudan had long been urging our Government to secure additional water-supplies for them from Lake Tana in Abyssinian territory. In return for an understanding with the Italians that they would not obstruct our negotiations to this end with the Abyssinian

Government, we agreed not to support any British commercial competition with Italian interests in Western Abyssinia, and, furthermore, to use our influence with the Abyssinian Government to obtain permission for the Italians to build a railway across Abyssinian territory, connecting their colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland." Some twenty years previously, soon after the campaign of Adowa, the Franco-Ethiopian Railway Company had been organised for the purpose of a line from Djibuti (French Somaliland) into Abyssinia: this took some nine years to reach the capital, is of a length of five hundred miles, and is a French financial enterprise. The country now boasts some two thousand miles of telegraph wire and several lines of telephone.

Great Britain maintains a Minister at Addis Ababa (in this connection Mr. Claud Russell did particularly notable work) and Consuls at half-a-dozen other points. Although it has necessarily fluctuated, commerce between England and Abyssinia has, on the whole, steadily increased, and imports into this country exceeded £100,000 for the first time in 1925. The Bank of Abyssinia, with an authorised capital of half a million sterling, has for its President the Governor of the National Bank of Egypt. Abyssinia is undoubtedly a land of vast undeveloped potentialities: rubber is abundant, while valuable woods, iron, coal, sulphur, and even gold are among the products only very imperfectly exploited.*

With the retirement of the Empress Waizeru some months ago—she had long ceased to take active part in public affairs, but is most religious and charitable and a good friend to the Catholic Mission in her country—Ras Tafari became automatically ruler of the country. He was married to the Princess Waizeru Menen in 1912, and has a family of two sons and three daughters. Incidentally, Abyssinia was admitted to membership of the League of Nations on September 28th, 1923. With the exception of the numerous priests, military service may be said to be obligatory upon every male inhabitant of Abyssinia. That is to say, the regular or standing army may be reckoned at a strength of about 100,000, supplemented by a militia numbering another 200,000; but all secular males are liable for service with "the colours" on the outbreak of war. Organisation and equipment are by no means on a basis comparable to European standards; transport still remains in a notably backward condition, but each man is armed

* Leading works on this country include Sir G. H. Portal's *My Mission to Abyssinia*, Roux's *Ménélik et Nous*, Powell-Cotton's *A Trip through Abyssinia*, Count Gleichen's *Mission to Menelik*, Lauribar's *Douze Ans en Abyssinie*, M. S. Wellby's *Twixt Sirdar and Menelik*, A. B. Wyld's *Modern Abyssinia*, Captain Stigaud's *To Abyssinia through an Unknown Land*, and F. Kulmer's *Im Reiche Kaiser Meneliks*. Of more recent date are Rathjens' *Die Juden in Abessinien* and C. F. Rey's *Unconquered Abyssinia*, while Sir Wallis Budge's work on Ethiopia is of course a classic.

with rifle, sword, and buckler, while the horses of the cavalry are small but wiry.

I had omitted to mention the visits to Abyssinia, during the first half of the nineteenth century, of three different Englishmen—Mr. Salt in 1810, Major Harris in 1841, and Mr. Walter Plowden in 1843. Of these, Mr. Salt's excursion was "an isolated act and led to nothing"; he, however, was authorised to present to the then ruler of Tigré a gift of two three-pounder field-guns. Major Harris' mission to the King of Shoa, authorised by the Bombay Government to provide for a treaty of commerce, resulted at all events in a valuable contribution to the literature of the subject, the work entitled *The Highlands of Abyssinia*. As a critic of the period wrote: "Let the reader turn to the first chapter of Major Harris' interesting account of his embassy to Shoa, and he will see what difficulties, rogueries, and iniquitous exactions even an embassy, clothed with the dignity and armed with the prestige of a great nation, had to contend with before it could escape from the Mohammedan tribes on the sultry and barren coast, and ascend to the beautiful green highlands of Christian Abyssinia." Thirdly, Mr. Plowden's non-official visit extended over nearly four years. He returned home with offerings from Ras Ali to Queen Victoria, and Lord Palmerston was so much impressed by the clarity of Plowden's memoranda on Abyssinia that he induced him to go back there as H.B.M. Consul. Sequel: Plowden's subsequent friendship with the Emperor Theodore and his mortal wounding in fight with the rebel chief Negussyi, who was put to death by Theodore's orders. It was Disraeli in the House of Commons who, in moving a vote of thanks after the final conquest of Theodore in 1868, referred with characteristic grandiloquence to "the standard of St. George having been hoisted upon the mountains of Rasselas."

There is no doubt that, in representing his country at the coronation of Abyssinia's new ruler, the Duke of Gloucester will play a big part in consolidating British relations with this remarkable Ethiopian civilisation. The results should be incalculable, particularly from the point of view of cultural and commercial interchange with one of the most interesting and progressive States boasting allegiance to the League of Nations.*

PERCY CROSS STANDING.

* Abyssinia has recently been making strides in aviation, and the chief of her Air Force is a negro, Colonel Julian. The country's aerial strength already amounts to ten planes, one of them of British origin.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE GERMAN CRISIS.

THE recent history of German politics illustrates the perversity that sometimes confounds the normal play of cause and effect in international affairs; for the evacuation of the Rhineland, far from proving the salutary event for Germany and for Germany's relations with France that might naturally have been expected, had an immediately unfortunate effect in both those respects. French opinion had expected some show of gratitude from German opinion for the evacuation at a time earlier than that originally prescribed by the treaty, although it is not easy to understand why Germany should be grateful for what in effect was a several years' overdue redemption of a virtual undertaking made in the Locarno treaties. But the absence of German gratitude did upset French opinion and prepared the ground for what was to follow. In Germany the evacuation of the Rhineland had the effect of loosening what may perhaps be called the Stresemann solidarity and released the flow of domestic controversy. The Brüning Ministry had been generally supported so long as it had in its care the national cause of the Rhineland. No sooner was that object achieved than the Social Democrats, for instance, reverted to their distinctive views on home questions. The Brüning Ministry never had a majority and was now doomed. It quickly fell. The new election gave an opportunity to those many young people whose background consisted of post-war difficulty and the new complication of world depression to turn blindly against the old politicians and to vote for the new force which lightly promised what they wanted. The resultant emergence of Herr Hitler had the effect of galvanising an already peevish French opinion into definite hostility. The prestige of M. Briand began at once to wane; M. Poincaré stole from his shell to find a popular opinion ready again to listen to his egregious views about French security. Thus did the wheel turn and mock.

It was on June 30th that the last detachment of French troops left Mainz and Wiesbaden, the three High Commissioners of the occupying Powers having left Wiesbaden the day before. It happened that the ceremonial end of "Allied" financial control over Germany coincided with the end of military control, for Mr. Parker Gilbert, the Agent-General for Reparation Payments, evacuated Germany early in the same month. The "Young" plan held sway. The "Versailles" and "Dawes" controls were now wholly lifted. German opinion was relieved of that sense of national grievance which had united the German political forces and dimmed the seriousness of the purely internal financial prob-

lem. Yet that problem was one of the main reasons why the Brüning Ministry had been called into being last March.

The first open sign that the budget was causing anxiety appeared when on March 7th Herr Schacht resigned the Presidency of the Reichsbank on the technical ground that in his view the Hague agreements had imposed upon Germany a greater burden than the "Young" plan implied. He was succeeded by Dr. Luther on March 11th. On March 27th the Müller Government resigned because the party leaders would not support its proposals for meeting a budget deficit caused by the insolvency of the Unemployment Insurance Fund. The Social Democrats agreed that the contributions from insured persons should be raised to $3\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. of their wages, but the insuperable difficulty arose when there still remained a deficit of 100,000,000 Marks. The Cabinet agreed to meet that deficit by an increase in super-tax and by an emergency tax on fixed incomes above a certain level. The Volkspartei, being in a substantial degree representative of the employers' interests, thereupon repudiated their leaders in the Cabinet, and resolved that the party's support would be given to the budget only if the deficit were met by decreasing the unemployment insurance benefits. Thereupon the Social Democrats in their turn became the obstacle. On that occasion, after the manner of Socialists, they clung to the notion that the State must pay whatever might be necessary for social benefits, and that such benefits, though they might be increased, must never be decreased. As the unemployment insurance benefits paid by the State were a conspicuous drag on the budget, Herr Müller was placed in an impossible position. Both the Volkspartei and the Social Democratic party maintained their mutually incompatible principles, the Müller Ministry fell on March 27th, and President Hindenburg invited Dr. Brüning, the leader of the Centre party, to form a Government. Herr Müller thereupon resumed his leadership of the Social Democratic party. Dr. Brüning consented to make the necessary experiment, and completed his Cabinet on March 30th. He himself was hardly known except as a party man. He was young (b. 1885), was a lawyer by profession, and had been a member of the Reichstag only since 1924, although he made a quick name for competence and hard work. He had led the Centre party in the Reichstag for only a few months before he was called on to become Chancellor at the exceptionally young age of forty-five. Professor Moldenhauer (Volkspartei) was given the portfolio of finance.

The first test of the Brüning Cabinet's stability was made on April 3rd, when the Socialists proposed a vote of no confidence, their own confidence in the result resting upon the expressed inten-

tion of the Nationalists to vote against the Government. Herr Hugenberg, however, was deserted by the majority of his party, and the Socialist motion was defeated by 253 votes to 187.

The new Government's financial proposals were similar to those of the old. Dr. Brüning hinted the first time he met the Reichstag, at the beginning of April, that the proposals would have to be carried if an immediate dissolution and a general election were to be avoided; that, further, he was not disposed to accept defeat; and that, in the event of defeat, he would administer the country without parliament and by virtue of Article 48 of the Constitution. That threat was destined to play a major part in the later developments of the summer. Article 48 reads thus:

"Should any State fail to fulfil the obligations imposed on it by the national constitution or the national laws, the President of the Realm may hold it to such obligations by means of armed force.

"Should public order and safety be seriously disturbed or threatened within the national frontiers, the President of the Realm may take the necessary measures to restore public order and safety; in case of need he may use armed force. For this purpose he may, for the time being, declare the fundamental rights (of the citizens) detailed in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 wholly or partly in abeyance.

"The President of the Realm is bound without any delay whatsoever to communicate to the Reichstag all measures taken by him in virtue of Clause 1 or Clause 2 of this Article. The Reichstag may require such measures to be abrogated.

"A State Government may take temporary measures of the nature indicated in Clause 2, should delay threaten to be dangerous. The President of the Realm or the Reichstag may require such measures to be abrogated."

Although the precise scope of Clause 2 of Article 48 had been a matter of some dispute, it was clearly the view of Dr. Brüning, and, as it appeared later, of President Hindenburg, that it justified them in taking supra-parliamentary methods of balancing the budget. They were no doubt fortified in that view by the fact that Mr. Parker Gilbert in his last, as in former reports, criticised the financial policy of Germany on the score of excessive spending and of excessive borrowing, especially as the prevailing budget problem illustrated the justice of the criticism in certain respects. No sooner had the 1930 budget been balanced on paper than a new deficit took form of no less an amount than £40,000,000. Professor Moldenhauer was at once asked to draw up new proposals to meet the deficit. One of his proposals was that a special levy of 4 per cent. be made on all incomes derived from private employment of more than £400 a year and on all incomes from public ser-

vice or funds whatsoever: those of civil servants, the armed forces, pensioners, all public servants from messenger boys to the President of the Reich. It was the sort of ingenious expedient that defeated itself by its own cleverness. The calculation was that the even distribution of the burden would appeal to the Volkspartei on the one hand (because the humble were to be taxed) and to the Socialists on the other (because the exalted were to be taxed). But "the bowsprit got mixed with the rudder." The Volkspartei rejected the scheme because it taxed the exalted and the Socialists rejected it because it taxed the humble. Professor Moldenhauer resigned. He was succeeded by Dr. Dietrich (Democrat) who before had held the portfolio of economic affairs. He revised the proposals by exempting the lowest paid officials, hoping no doubt thereby to win the support of the Social Democrats. The new proposals were destined, however, not to have a smooth passage, nor any passage through the Reichstag. The Volkspartei wanted to limit the Treasury's contribution to the unemployment insurance fund, the Nationalist party objected to the proposed increase in income tax, and the Social Democrats objected to the proposed increase in the same tax, but for the obverse reason that it was not big enough.

The climax developed on July 15th, when the second reading of the finance bill took place in the Reichstag. Dr. Brüning, with truly German grimness, delivered a virtual ultimatum to the Reichstag, stipulating in advance what he would do if his financial measures were not passed. The first clause was passed on that day. On the next day the second clause, which provided for the special levy on fixed incomes, was rejected by the combined opposition of the Social Democrats, the National Socialists, the Communists and a large section of the Nationalists. In accordance with what he had indicated the day before, Dr. Brüning thereupon announced that he took no further interest in the matter. During the course of that evening an official statement was issued to the effect that the Government's financial measures had been put into operation by Presidential decree, as authorised by Article 48 of the Constitution. By virtue of the same Article (Clause 3) the President at once reported to the Reichstag the decrees he had issued.

Thereafter the emergency worked itself out according to the strict letter of the Constitution. The Social Democrats exercised the right constitutionally given them by at once moving that the decrees be abrogated. That motion being carried by fifteen votes, there arose the second phase of the emergency. The new situation was equally provided for by the Constitution, for Article 25 gives to the Government in such circumstances the choice either

of resigning at once or of dissolving the Reichstag and carrying on its programme. The second of the alternatives is designed to obviate a deadlock in the political machinery: but the buffer period given to a Government which thus elects to dispense with the authority of the Reichstag is strictly limited, again by Article 25, to sixty days, for it is stipulated that an election be held within that time limit. As German elections are always held on a Sunday, the Brüning Ministry, when it decided on the dissolution of the Reichstag on July 16th, announced that September 14th would be the date of the resultant election.

In the meantime the financial programme was put into operation. On July 26th a complete set of decrees was issued, giving the details of the full budget provision for taxation, for unemployment and health insurance reform, for agricultural relief in Eastern Germany, and for certain new Governmental powers to control price-fixing by trusts and cartels. The taxation proposals, with one exception in the case of big incomes, now decreed by ordinance, were the same as those that had been rejected by the Reichstag. In the matter of unemployment insurance the contribution was increased from $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of wages, and the benefits in certain cases and in certain contingencies were reduced. In the matter of health insurance the number of panel doctors was reduced, and patients were made liable to contribute to the cost of each prescription issued. By such means did Dr. Brüning hope to span a serious financial deficit.

It was inevitable that public controversy should arise on the use made by Dr. Brüning of Article 48 of the Constitution. The parties of the Right were temperamentally inclined to be indulgent. Their indulgence would probably not have been strained even if that Article had been made an excuse for the establishment of a dictatorship. The quarter from which the adverse criticism was most naturally, and in normal circumstances, to be expected was silenced by the ironic circumstance that when, in 1923, the Mark was stabilised by decrees, which rested precisely upon the validity of Article 48, it was the Social Democratic President, Dr. Ebert, who signed them.

On the face of the matter it seemed arguable that the wisdom of the Weimar Constitution had been vindicated. In the present emergency the parliamentary machine had virtually ceased to function. Two successive Chancellors had tried, and had failed, to harmonise the parties to an extent sufficient to create a majority in the Reichstag and thus to pass financial legislation of urgent importance. Article 48 of the Constitution certainly piloted the country through the resultant emergency.

During August and the first fortnight of September political

emotion in Germany was trained on the impending election. The Government's solicitude for the agricultural population had a disastrous effect on the personal prestige of Herr Hugenberg, shaken as it already was. The farmers were effectively relieved by the temporary protection afforded them against bankruptcy and against compulsory sale, and by the replacement of short term agricultural credits at high rates of interest by long term mortgages at lower rates. But Herr Hugenberg, whose strong point is not his sensitiveness to atmosphere or his diagnosis of tendencies, plunged clumsily into a campaign against the Government. He did a good deal of damage, not to the Government, but to himself. He split his own party. All his chief men deserted him, and the rank and file began to secede in large numbers. The dissenters formed themselves into a new party which they called the "Conservative People's Party."

The uncertain factor of the election was recognised to be Herr Hitler, and his National Socialists, known colloquially as Nazis (Sozialists = Sozis for short; National-Sozialists = Natsozis = Nazis). In times of national uneasiness the fanatic extremist has his day. When the hungry sheep look up and are not fed, they are inclined to follow any facile alternative on the strength of promise or of hope alone. Herr Hitler exploited the lean times through which Germany is passing, just as the Communists exploited it, but with different slogans. He put on his brown shirt, reviled the constructive, patient statesmanship associated with the honoured name of Herr Stresemann, and clamoured instead for such loud and empty things as pan-Germanism, anti-Semitism, anti-Republicanism, anti-everything that was. He refrained from specifying what exactly should take its place. He roundly asked that a noisy band of men wearing brown shirts should be given *carte blanche*. Their noise had started earlier in the year, when the financial difficulties began to take ominous shape. On May 28th a conference of the Prime Ministers of the Federal States took the German edition of fascism so seriously as to decide that no appointment of National Socialists or of Fascists to high State offices should be legal, their reason being that the Nazi programme was openly unconstitutional.

It happened that the Nazis a few months before had obtained a footing in the State of Thuringia. A Coalition Government had been constituted in that State wherein, for the first time in German history, the Nazis were represented. One Dr. Frick, who belonged to the National Socialist party, was assigned the portfolio of the Interior. Dr. Frick at once began to advertise the stuff he was made of. He reorganised the police force, dismissed its members in large numbers and filled their places with Nazis. Berlin

took an immediately serious view of that action. The Minister of the Interior for the Reich, Herr Severing, a Social Democrat, promptly suspended the police grant payable by the Central Government, and ordered an inquiry into the affairs of the Thuringian police before the grant could be renewed. The Government of Thuringia defied the Reich and refused to allow the police inquiry. As the crisis was developing, the Müller Cabinet, and with it Herr Severing, fell from office. The new Minister of the Interior was Dr. Wirth, of the Central party, who by quiet tact succeeded in deflating Thuringian exuberance. The Thuringian Prime Minister went to see him, and a compromise was reached whereby the police inquiry was to be held, but Dr. Frick was to be retained in his office. In other words, the retention of Dr. Frick was the unfortunate price that Dr. Wirth had to pay for his apparent firmness in insisting on the police inquiry. A still further illustration of Nazi strength was given at the end of June, when the elections were held in Saxony. The result showed that the Nazi had trebled their vote at the expense of the Nationalists and the Volkspartei, the Social Democrats and the Communists remaining much as they had been.

It was therefore expected that on September 14th the Nazis would cut a greatly different figure than in the 1928 election, when they returned only twelve members to the Reichstag. As general conditions worsened, Nazism became more extreme in its pretensions. Its followers relied more on wildness of manner than on any kind of substance. They said they were Fascists, so far as the method of government was concerned. They said they were Socialists so far as economics and finance were concerned. In foreign policy their only idea was vaguely to smash the Treaty of Versailles. They also wanted to smash the Jews. They were smashers. The Reichstag, the Constitution, the capital wealth of the country, the Treaty of Versailles, the Jews all were to be smashed. The fact that large numbers of Germans listened to so senseless a programme illustrates the demoralisation produced by the hard fight of a nation against adversity. Discontent feeds upon itself. In the minds of many Germans, young and middle-aged, but mostly young, the old political parties were discredited, because they had not relieved the people of its oppressive burden. Such discontent turned to any alternative that offered, and as bad luck would have it, Herr Hitler was that alternative. It is one of the attributes of adversity that the luck is uniformly bad, for to him that hath shall be added, and from him that hath not shall be taken even that which he hath. Yet the worst cynic was hardly prepared for the size of the landslide that was caused by the Nazis. Instead of twelve, they obtained 107, seats. The Communists, a comparably

bankrupt gang, increased their seats from 54 to 76. The Social Democrats, in whom rests the main hope of Germany, and perhaps, in some degree, of Europe, bravely withstood the demoralisation, lost only ten seats, and remain the strongest single party with 143 members. The main figures of the September election are these:

Party.	Reichstag Members.	
	1928	1930
Social Democrats	153	143
Centre	62	68
German People's	45	29
Bavarian People's	16	19
Communist	54	79
German Nationalist	75	41
National Socialist	12	107
Other Parties	70	92
Total	491	575

The electorate had grown by some 5,000,000 voters since 1928, and it was made clear that most of the new votes went to the Nazis and the Communists. The two personalities thrown into prominence by the result of the election were Herr Hitler and Herr Braun, the Socialist Prime Minister of Prussia. It was probable that the Nazis and the Communists would no more mix than fire and water. The continuance of the Brüning Ministry therefore depended upon the support either of the Socialists or of the Nazis. Herr Hitler promptly offered his support on the fortunate condition that the Nazis were given the Ministries of Defence and of the Interior and the post of Chief of Police in Berlin—fortunate because it saved Dr. Brüning from the temptation, if any, of even considering the offer. What was more important was that Herr Braun was understood to be willing to collaborate with Dr. Brüning. On the following day (September 16th) Dr. Wirth, the Minister of the Interior, in a broadcast address on the political situation, disclosed something of the Cabinet's attitude. He categorically rejected the possibility of collaboration with the National Socialists, and hinted that the only thing that would save the Government would be the active support of the Socialists. Socialist neutrality, he said, would not be enough. He took the occasion to appeal for international sympathy. "The conditions essential to peaceful co-operation can be created in the German nation only with the collaboration of all nations." He submitted with palpable good reason that the present was an opportunity for a new examination

of Germany's financial burden, such examination to be conducted in its relation to the present world-wide state of economic depression. He stated that Germany had reached the end of her tether in the payment of reparations. Benjamin Franklin's famous epigram about hanging together or hanging separately is famous because it expresses a simple, obvious truth felt impartially by everybody, except by the prevailing fool of the moment. The lack of elementary wisdom in the affairs of men is one of the sad things. Most people have said or thought in their own way what Franklin said. Herr Stresemann said it in the Reception Room of the London Foreign Office on December 1st, 1925, when the Locarno treaties were signed: "A community of fate binds us to one another. If we go under, we go under together; if we would rise, we cannot do so in conflict with each other, but only by working together." The Locarno treaties themselves were merely a practical application of that commonplace sentiment. Commonplace as it is, it is seldom translated into practice by the politicians of the world, who by some perversity of dispensation seem to be the chosen channel for cheating the human race of its birthright. The Great War: can one even begin to understand it? France, the victor, buoyed on the deceptive fortunes of victory: she could save Europe, but chooses instead to follow M. Poincaré. Edmund Burke's experience of politics produced in him "a good deal more than doubt whether the Creator did ever really intend man for a state of happiness."

Hitlerism in Germany, the product (as many must believe) of Poincaréism in France, in its turn accentuated Poincaréism in France. The recognition of the badness of Hitlerism and of its strength had the natural, if deplorable, effect of magnifying its seriousness. Within a week of the declaration of the election results Germany resounded with fears of a Fascist putsch; the stock markets collapsed; capital fled the country. Alarmist rumours being themselves a danger, the Berlin Ministry of the Interior and the Prussian Government at one and the same time (September 20th) issued official statements to reassure the population both that the Fascist alarms ought not to be taken seriously, and that in any event the forces of law and order would be more than equal to any disturbance, if the need arose. The stock collapse and the outflow of capital was not arrested, and by September 22nd the Reichsbank began what developed into a heavy export of gold, mainly to Paris, to bolster the Mark. On September 23rd the President inspired an official statement, expressing his personal view, not directly, but in a formula which left no doubt that it was his view, that Fascism was an unsubstantial bogey and that he agreed with the Government's view of the matter. On Septem-

ber 24th Lord Rothermere sent from Munich, the home of the Nazis, to his *Daily Mail* a glowing account of the new force in Germany, the effect of which was to make the task of the other people in Germany harder than before. On the next day Herr Hitler gave evidence at the Leipzig trial of three officers of the Reichswehr on charges of treason, and took the occasion to announce to the world the cave-man stuff that was in him: item, that when the Nazis achieved power, as, he said, they would, they would delete by every means the post-war treaties, would repudiate the charge of German war guilt, would punish the criminals of November 1918. Inasmuch as the nations of Europe spent four and a half years in killing the best brains and the best spirits at their disposal, it is not to be wondered at that such scannell pipes as Herr Hitler's now have their day. The "lean and flashy songs" we hear are a fair effect of their cause.

The estimated budget deficit in the current year was nearly the equivalent of £40,000,000. The Brüning Ministry decided to take a long view and to attempt a financial scheme that would ensure the balancing of four successive budgets, a three-years' sinking fund being established to spread as well as to sink the deficit. The full measures in their final form were published on September 30th. It was then disclosed that the Cabinet had decided on the most drastic expedients. The Unemployment Insurance Fund was to be made self-supporting and wholly eliminated as a budget liability. To achieve that end the contributions from insured persons were to be raised from 4½ per cent. to 6½ per cent. of wages, to be paid in equal parts by employer and employed; the salaries of the President, Chancellor, all Ministers and Deputies, both in the Reich and in the federal states, were to be cut by 20 per cent., and of all officials of more than £75 a year by 6 per cent.; the administrative machinery, including that of taxation, was to be overhauled and simplified with a view to reducing its existing cost of some £25,000,000 a year. The new estimates gave the figure of a milliard Marks (£50,000,000) as the anticipated reduction of expenditure during 1931. In the Government statement the budget difficulties were partly attributed to the "formidable paralysis" that "has stayed the economic advance of the world and led to a serious economic crisis," but the fullest and frankest recognition was made of the particular defects of the German financial system which, as Mr. Parker Gilbert has more than once pointed out, were a contributory cause. One of the best features of the Government's proposals was the attempt honestly and effectively to eradicate those defects both in the Reich and in the states.

It was after the Government's "economic and financial plan"

was made known that the Socialist party decided (October 3rd) to co-operate with the Brüning Cabinet, its motive being the defence of the parliamentary and democratic system. Thence it appeared that Herr Hitler's effect was not wholly bad.

The sentence on October 4th of the three subalterns of the Reichswehr to eighteen months' detention in a fortress for their treasonable attempt to ensure the passivity of the Reichswehr in the event of a Nazi putsch had the timely effect of warning the wilder spirits that the land was not yet theirs, but such exaltation as is theirs needs many shocks before it feels anything deeply. On October 3rd Herr Hitler's chief henchman, Dr. Göbbels, had addressed a fascist demonstration in Berlin and outlined certain elaborate aspirations of his party's for obtaining control of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and the Presidency of the Berlin police. He had been reading the Prussian Constitution, which, he naïvely stated, he had always attacked, but never before had read. His discovery was that 4,800,000 signatories could demand a referendum, enforce the dissolution of the Diet, and the rest would be easy. He badly misread the Constitution, his figures were wrong, and there were other obstacles he had not noticed: but his speech was interesting as a symptom of Nazi feeling. Herr Hitler himself addressed an audience of some 30,000 people in Frankfurt on October 4th and incontinently proclaimed that he was the embodiment of a new German soul and national spirit and invited all "Germans of good will" to join the good fight. He further submitted that the choice for Germany lay between Bolshevism and himself.

The first practical effect of the new Hitler soul and spirit took form on October 9th, when the Reichsbank increased its rediscount rate by 1 per cent. (from 4 per cent. to 5 per cent.). Since the election, less than a month before, the Reichsbank had been forced to release no less an amount than 140,000,000 Marks (£7,000,000) in gold for export and a total export of gold and foreign currency estimated at 600,000,000 Marks (£30,000,000). Yet the exchange effect of the flight of capital was not thereby counterbalanced, and the further step had to be taken by the Reichsbank, a step which in its turn further upset the stock markets. Whatever may be said in derogation of Herr Hitler's other qualities, his pride, at any rate, was strong enough to withstand the realisation that his name had made the financial credit of the Fatherland rock and tumble. His pride did not rock or tumble.

The new Reichstag was convened for October 13th. As the day approached it became more than ever certain that the Socialists, and they alone, were in a position to save Germany from serious confusion. Among the Socialists the personal position of Herr

Braun, the Prime Minister of Prussia, became increasingly distinctive. He went to see Dr. Brüning in the evening of October 11th, and then gave an illuminating interview to *Vorwärts*, which was published on the following day. In it he strongly appealed to his party to co-operate with the Government to safeguard democracy and the Constitution, although he conceded that such a course demanded courage. It would be possible for the Socialists to propose amendments to the financial plan in committee, but clearly no substantial amendment was compatible with support of the Government. What, in effect, Herr Braun demanded of his party was the virtual suspension of its purely party policy on the higher patriotic ground. It is fortunate that a country which in its adversity can throw up such a phenomenon as Herr Hitler can also throw up a man of Herr Braun's calibre to redress, and more than redress, the balance.

The fifth Reichstag of the Republic was duly opened on October 13th, and the Nazis and the Communists duly vied with each other in making themselves ridiculous. At one moment a sort of professional jealousy developed between the two, who took to shouting at each other instead of at the Constitution, reparations, the Republic, etc. Both Nazis and Communists are lovers of ritual and of rhetoric, the Nazis having slightly more of the ritual and the Communists much more of talk. Where a Communist, consciously or unconsciously, intoxicates himself and his audience by rolling phrases, deep-voiced sentiment and brave impulses, a Nazi taste for the dramatic turns more to the concerted jerking of agitated human beings, such as the stiff-armed salute, repeated with every wave of emotion, and the strutting about in distinctive shirts and semi-military uniform. Everybody expected on October 13th that the Communists would let off much steam vocally and the Nazis much energy dramatically. The expectation was fulfilled. The Communists jeered and shouted from beginning to end, and their fiercest orator, one Herr Torgler, was first on the tribune after the roll call, demanding no more reparation payments and communism in our time. The spectacular effect featured by the Nazis consisted in the manner of their entry. At three o'clock, when the Session was opened by the "Father" of the Reichstag (Herr Herold, the eighty-three years' old Centre man) the 107 seats of the mighty Nazis were empty. They had been having luncheon with Herr Hitler at a restaurant in the Potsdamerplatz. A few minutes after the session had started the Nazi filed in, heads erect, in full uniform (nearly uniform, the only defect being that they had not been able to get the same stuff, or stuff that matched, for their brown shirts, with the result that some were light brown, some dark, some yellow). They were led by Dr. Frick, the Thürin-

gian Minister of the Interior. Herr Frick succeeded in mounting the tribune next after the Communist aforesaid, and his supporters made a jerky demonstration in his honour. Not a word of his speech, however, was heard, for the Communists, having spoken their fill, turned to fighting the Nazis, and the hubbub of hate and gesticulation that passed between the two rival saviours of Germany drowned all else.

Outside the Reichstag some minor unpleasantness occurred, especially in the *Leipzigerstrasse*, the main shopping street, where the windows of Jewish shops (e.g. Wertheim's) were smashed. Many of the smashers arrested proved to be Nazis.

THE CHINESE SUMMER.

* There are those who surmise that the twenty years of civil war in China are at least partly accounted for by the hopelessness of any attempt to impose a single government upon a country which counts 400,000,000 souls. Even the British Government would be weakened if the number of its victims were multiplied by ten. The unending struggle between Nanking and the Northern Coalition, with Manchuria potentially holding the balance of power at any given moment, certainly appears to afford no hope of any definite issue, unless it be that in the course of the weary years the combatants agree to cut up China into its component federal parts, and, instead of trying to exterminate each other, agree at last to tolerate each other.

In the May CONTEMPORARY (pp. 654-8) the record of the Chinese Civil War was carried through the winter up to the beginning of April. By that time Yen Hsi-shan, inflated with the successes of the Kuominchun, gaily announced to the world that he henceforth was to be regarded as the Generalissimo of the Chinese "national forces," and he proceeded to give formal assurances to the legations in Peking that he would assume the fullest protection for foreign life and property. He appealed to the foreign Powers not to grant any further support, moral or material, to Chiang Kai-shek, against whom indeed, he, Yen Hsi-shan, proposed to issue a punitive mandate. Chiang Kai-shek, however, scored a dialectical point by first issuing a punitive mandate against Yen. The month of April passed without active warfare. The Northern Coalition of Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang, with whom Wang Ching-wei, the leader of the Left wing of the Kuomintang was now closely allied, were engaged in making elaborate preparations for active warfare and the Nanking Government's forces were waiting for the offensive that did not begin. Banditry, brigandage, and famine however raged increasingly in all the eighteen provinces. On

April 30th Yen Hsi-shan conceived the notion of appropriating to his own purposes the Tientsin customs revenue, a project that came to a head six weeks later. On May 1st, in pursuance of the prestige he had already imposed upon himself, he reopened the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Peking, and on the following day his representative in Peking informed the press that a second national congress of the Kuomintang was to be convened to institute the new Chinese Government, of which Yen was to be the head and Feng the commander-in-chief of the forces.

Desultory fighting was renewed at the beginning of May, but the summer did not produce any action definite enough to make a military chronicle worth while. During May, June, and July the Northern forces made some headway, but they lost it in August as a result of certain Nanking successes. Militarily the situation seemed to be approaching that of a stalemate.

The most remarkable features of the Chinese summer were the interference by Yen Hsi-shan with the customs revenue, the rapid boom in brigandage, and the emergence into the scene of Chang Hsueh-liang, Chairman of the Manchurian Government.

At the end of April Yen had declared his intention of seizing the Tientsin customs revenue, the salt revenue in Shansi, and the salt funds in Chihli. On June 16th the Tientsin office of the Maritime Customs Administration was duly taken over by the Shansi authorities, who appointed Mr. Lennox Simpson as Commissioner in the place of the Nanking nominee. The change of control was effected without much local disturbance of commerce. Yen Hsi-shan announced that the service of the loans would continue to be met, and that the surplus would be kept on deposit in Tientsin. So far the civil war has not touched the old Chinese reputation for financial and commercial orthodoxy and honesty. It is one of the odd phenomena of the world that the Chinese genius should touch at one extreme a standard of public finance such as no Continental European country except perhaps Czechoslovakia and Germany have ever attained and at the other extreme a form of political savagery that expresses itself in an interminable civil war. Yen Hsi-shan has done his country a greater disservice than any other of the warring generals by thus wantonly violating one of the most majestic of her traditions. The Chinese customs have been a superpolitical institution that it has always been regarded as safe to take for granted. The immediate practical result of Yen's brigandage was that shippers during the summer had to pay double duties, for the Shanghai authorities would not recognise the duties paid at Tientsin as having been paid at all.

The other important development was the evolution of a technique of brigandage and communist robbery of so effective a kind

that immense numbers of gangs were intensively organised. The story of this aspect of contemporary China must be reserved for separate treatment another time.

One of the lamentable aspects of contemporary China is that by a fantastic perversity there are those in China who have developed a sort of pride in the more expert conception of military efficiency that is resulting from the practice gained in twenty years of civil war. In the past the peculiarities of Chinese warfare, the aversion of the troops from the logical purpose of war, which is wholesale murder, their simple, human and unashamed cowardice under fire—these things have constituted a partial saving grace in the monstrosity of Chinese politics. Battles had a way of ending soon after they began by the wholesale desertion of the troops of one side to the other, merely because the other had scored an initial advantage. The cost in bloodshed was kept at a minimum. There was something Gilbertian and attractive about it. One therefore deplores the sort of new mentality that is developing in China and that is manifested, for instance, in a leading article that appeared in the *Ta Kung Pao* of June 14th.* The writer of that article had been stung to indignation—the more's the pity—by a foreigner's gibe that China's civil wars were comparable to army manœuvres carried out at scheduled times. The writer of the article reacted in a defence of China's good name in a form of which he appeared not to be conscious of the irony. Referring to the gibe aforementioned he wrote:

"If this is so, then they are the most expensive army manœuvres in the world. Hundreds of millions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives in a short space of time are converted into smoke and ashes. No state in the world, however warlike, incurs such extravagant expenditure as this.

"The experience of recent years, however, shows that China has made some real progress in military matters: the extent of the operations, the bravery displayed in attack and defence, the numbers of dead and wounded, the heroic sacrifices made, all have increased with successive wars. . . . From a national point of view this is to be regretted; but from a military standpoint it marks a distinct advance. The pity of it is that the price is too heavy.

"To sum up then: In this war the Chinese soldier has shown more readiness to sacrifice himself and his powers of endurance both in attack and defence have increased; he is no whit behind the men of any nation in bravery and daring, and he is well versed in the art of soldiering; where he surpasses the foreign soldier is in

* Translation taken from *Summaries of Leading Articles in the Chinese Press*, issued by The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

his contentment with meagre fare, his readiness to undergo hardship, and his implicit obedience."

It was on June 15th that Chang Hsueh-liang made his move. On that day, according to information given out in Nanking, he telegraphed to Chiang Kai-shek to inform him that he was mobilising his army to support Nanking against the Northern "rebels." Among those commentators who hardly understood the decisive nature of Chang's power (and his determination to use it for his own exclusive purpose) the news created a premature expectation that Nanking would now quickly re-establish its position as the government of China. Nanking itself made several overtures to Chang, including the offer of the post of second in command of the "Nationalist" forces, but he rejected them one and all. On June 22nd he himself announced that he had refused the offer of the second highest rank in the Nanking forces because he disapproved of the civil war, and was disposed at all costs to maintain the neutrality of Manchuria. Within a week of the refusal to Nanking, rumour ascribed to Chang an attempt to negotiate with the Northern Coalition. True or not in actual fact, the rumour was true enough in its tendency. On September 1st the Northern leaders in their turn were making overtures to Chang. When on that date they decided, not for the first time, to set up a new Government for China—the whole of China—the name of Chang Hsueh-liang appeared in the list of "shadow" ministers, but no one could say whether he had accepted such office or not. Yen Hsi-shan offered him Peking and Tientsin as *quid pro quo*, but still the oracle was silent. Yen next attempted to force Chang's hand by a threat of unpleasantness, but Chang with sublime irony merely reported the matter to Nanking. On September 10th Chang impartially ordered the cessation of fighting on both sides, and was reported to be moving troops on Peking and Tientsin to impose his will and to garrison Northern China. The Manchurian forces formally occupied Tientsin on September 22nd and Peking on September 23rd, where a proclamation was issued announcing that Chang's intention was to maintain law and order and to abolish excessive taxation. His next move was to enter a compact with Nanking whereby he at last agreed to accept the post of second in command of the National Forces, but on the condition that he had a free hand and full power in Northern China. The danger that emerged was that Chang might merely replace the Northern Coalition as one side in a civil war: but the possibility emerged that he might be strong enough to impose a peaceful settlement on federal lines.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

October 15th, 1930.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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LOCARNO.*

Finis coronat opus. There is a rounded completeness in Lord D'Abernon's narrative of his memorable six years at Berlin. Entering on his duties in 1920 when the fighting was over but peace had not yet come, he lived through the political storms and economic crises of the young Republic, and helped by sympathetic counsel to bring it into the comity of nations. The first two volumes of the Diary aroused world-wide interest by their literary distinction, their brilliant portraits, and their mellow wisdom, and the third maintains the high standard of its predecessors. Its title is *The Years of Recovery*, and were he less modest the author could say with truth *quorum pars magna fui*.

Once again the story is prefaced by a series of the character-studies in which Lord D'Abernon excels. The place of honour is occupied by Stresemann, the hero of the volume. Since his lamented death a year ago several biographies have appeared; but none of them brings us so close as these pages to the statesman who had the courage to terminate the hopeless resistance of the Ruhr and to propose to London and Paris the only practicable scheme for the stabilisation of Western Europe. He shares with Briand the distinction of being the outstanding diplomatist of the

* *Lord D'Abernon's Diary.* Vol. III. *The Years of Recovery.* Hodder & Stoughton. 21s.

last decade, for Benes, despite his skill, operated in a narrower field. But he was also a brilliant, full-blooded human being, who won not only the admiration but the affection of the British Ambassador. "A first impression was that he might have been Winston Churchill's brother. . . . Both brilliant, daring and bold. In both, more than a dash of recklessness. . . . No half-tones; no blurred outlines. . . . I hold that Germany has never had a wiser or a more courageous adviser." The shorter study of Sir Austen Chamberlain, while doing full justice to "his extreme honesty and uprightness," and to his share in the making of the Locarno Pact, gently suggests that his loudly-expressed partiality for France limited his usefulness in the later years of his tenure of office. The vignette of Carl von Schubert, the head of the German Foreign Office, introduces the reader to a man who combines "a heavy cavalry physique" with "the political sagacity of an old Roman"; and the portrait of Ramsay MacDonald emphasises his intellectual distinction and the almost excessive subtlety of his mind.

It is impossible in a brief notice to call attention to the wealth of interest in the chapters which carry us from January 1924 to the author's departure from Berlin in October 1926. We meet a crowd of personages, Ebert, Kühlmann, Maltzan, General Hoffmann, Count Kessler, Luther, Wirth, Eckardstein, Bülow, and many more. Of all the conversations here summarised none is more interesting than that of September 1926, in which Prince Bülow declared that the war would not have occurred if he had remained in power; for he would have vetoed the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, accepted Sir E. Grey's proposal for a Conference, and prevented the invasion of Belgium.

The main theme of the diary is of course the launching and triumph of the Locarno agreement, on which Lord D'Abernon's evidence is of first-class importance. All the world knows that it was proposed by Stresemann and accepted by Briand and Chamberlain; but we learn from these pages how large a part in the drama was played by Schubert and the British Ambassador. It stamps Lord D'Abernon as a far-seeing statesman that, while diplomatists in London and Paris were fumbling with the plan of a unilateral British guarantee to France against German aggression, he realised at the outset that only a bilateral guarantee could prevent the continuance of a Western Europe divided into a French and a German camp, with Great Britain tied helplessly to the former. It is true enough that our obligation to defend the new frontiers on the west against attack from either side constitutes an almost terrifying responsibility on paper. But it is also true that in this way alone could we banish the spectre of once again being

dragged into a Franco-German conflict. Most people now believe that if the Central Powers had known for a certainty in 1914 that Great Britain would defend France against attack, they would have accepted a compromise; and to-day every French and German firebrand is aware that an aggressor will find us in his path. In these serene pages we may read how "the child," as its Berlin parents affectionately named their project, was born; how its chilly reception in London almost provoked Stresemann to withdraw his offer; how Lord D'Abernon implored his chief to believe in the sincerity of the Wilhelmstrasse; how Briand and Chamberlain were converted; and how the pact initialled at Locarno on October 16th, 1925—"a negotiated, not a dictated treaty"—bridged the gulf between victors and vanquished and "restored the necessary balance of power." Thus to have helped in the reconciliation of Germany with the two Great Powers of the West is an achievement of the first magnitude, a service not only to Europe but to mankind.

G. P. G.

* * *

PHILOSOPHIC CERTAINTY.*

Professor Dewey, the *doyen* of American Pragmatism, in his Gifford Lectures, entitled *The Quest for Certainty*, claims to have effected the true "Copernican revolution" in philosophy, as the result of his study of the relations of Knowledge and Action. The old philosophies, following the lead of Religion, sought to escape from "the world of vicissitude and uncertainty" into "the realm of ultimate reality"—"the world of perfect and unchanging Being" (pp. 277, 278). This false ideal was set up and the long process dictated by the pursuit of "safety first," by the desire to escape from peril of all kinds and to find security. "Philosophy inherited the realm with which religion had been concerned" (p. 17), and treated Philosophy as "the disclosure of the Real in itself" (p. 20). The Known was treated as "antecedent to the mental act of observation" and as unaffected by it, "otherwise it would not be fixed and unchangeable" (p. 26). So "a spectator theory of Knowledge" was set up, and Knowledge established a precedence over action which has persisted down to the present day. In truth, as is shown by the progress of the practical Arts and Sciences, Knowledge has to do with "'events' not substances"; "the validity of the object of thought depends upon the consequences of the operations which define the object of thought"; "experimental inquiry or thinking signifies *directed activity*"; it is concerned with relationships, and not with antece-

* *The Quest for Certainty*. By John Dewey. Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d. net.

dent realities, and seeks, not the immutable, but beneficial changes (p. 119). This is the true end of human activities and knowledge is not an end in itself, but the indispensable means of directing these activities towards the practical, but ever receding, goal of achieving the security that comes from controlling the events by which life is either threatened or advanced. "Ideas are anticipating plans and designs which take effect in concrete reconstructing of antecedent conditions of existence" (p. 160). This conclusion is laboriously and lucidly argued in criticism of the older philosophies and as marking out the way which, for the future, philosophy ought to pursue.

What is to be said of all this? The criticism of past philosophies is important in so far as they have been predominantly intellectualist, have belittled the importance of will and, it may be added, of emotion, and so have isolated abstract thinking from growing experience and from the practical aims which are prescribed by the necessities of man's relations with his environment. The importance of activity, advancing from conation to volition, must be amply recognised, as the conception of Evolution and the progress of psychology have shown. Yet it is a large assumption which concludes that the whole course of human thought has been misdirected, for it has had as vital springs in human nature as the practical necessities and desires of man. The whole argument, while proceeding with conclusive logic from its fundamental presupposition, is vitiated by the inadequacy of that presupposition. Man has undoubtedly sought "escape from peril," security, certainty. Without command of the situation in which he finds himself his development could not proceed and his satisfaction could not be attained. But, while this is an essential factor, it is, even if primary, only ancillary and subordinate. What of curiosity and wonder, of reverence and of the desire of satisfying fellowship with the Reality of which Man is part? Just as the sense of permanent selfhood is essential to growing experience and enlarging power, so the concept of underlying Reality accompanies the flux of continual change. Just as man's activities are inevitably treated as proceeding from and explained by his selfhood, so the activities of the Universe are naturally explained as manifestations—phenomena—of the underlying Reality from which they issue, and the meaning of which they express. Security is not satisfaction, but only its safeguarding condition. The fruition of inward Becoming is even more important than the sense of external command. Life, in all its spiritual meaning, is more important than the building in which it is housed or the weapons and instruments by which it is protected and served.

J. S. L.

BRITISH NATIONALITY.*

Dr. Gey Van Pittius, the Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Pretoria, has done useful work in this critical analysis of "British nationality in all its phases." The whole question of British nationality has entered a series of new phases since the passing of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, and the various amending Acts down to 1922. It is clear that a natural-born British subject, wherever born, is recognised as a British subject throughout the Empire. The Act of 1914 is an Imperial Act, and it was passed after full consultation with the Dominions. So far as concerns natural-born British subjects there was entire unanimity, but with respect to the Imperial Scheme of naturalisation there were differences of opinion and, as Dr. Gey Van Pittius says, this question was left to the several discretions of the Dominions.

Yet there are various classes of natural-born British subjects, and nothing in the Act of 1914 and its amendments takes away the right of differential treatment vested in any Legislature or Government of any British possession. "Each part of the British Commonwealth has so far followed its own inclinations as regards the extension or refusal of rights to persons within its jurisdiction." The author, moreover, points out that "the question of British subjecthood has hardly been taken into consideration at all in the process of discrimination." Yet it is not a question of "two kinds of citizenship in the same Empire, a higher and a lower" as Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru thought at the Imperial Conference of 1923. There is an irreducible minimum of rights to which the natural-born British subject is entitled throughout the Empire, but these do not necessarily include local political rights. As Dr. Van Pittius says: "Is it, after all, so strange that in South Africa, under the same Government, a coloured person enjoys the franchise in the Cape Province but not in the other three Provinces. Or that a woman may vote in the United Kingdom, but not in South Africa?† Political rights are to be regarded more as privileges." It is not a case of a higher and a lower class of citizenship at all.

A Frenchman who has spent all his life in the United Kingdom and owes local allegiance to the King of England has no political rights, but he does not suffer in social status from that fact, and he has the full protection of all our laws. Before the year 1888 natural-born British women had in the United Kingdom no political

* *Nationality within the British Commonwealth of Nations.* By E. F. W. Gey Van Pittius. P. S. King & Sons, Ltd. 10s.

† Until this year.—ED. C.R.

rights and were in an inferior position to an Indian born in South Africa.

The main point of being a British subject is that they are, in foreign lands, under theegis of the Imperial Government. "When a British subject enters a foreign country, he does so merely as a British subject and, for the moment, he loses that part of his personality which appertains to the territory in which he is resident or domiciled. Consequently, when such persons seek the protection of the Crown, it is only to be expected that they should all be treated on the same lines." Professor Keith says that "the Imperial Government remains ultimately responsible for every wrong done to foreigners by British subjects which under international law gives rise to an international claim"; and it is clear also that rights which accrue to British subjects under treaties apply to all British subjects unless there is a reservation in the treaty.

The very large extent of the term "natural-born British subject" gives rise to possible difficulties. The Committee on Naturalisation, which sat in 1901, declared that, "to the Common Law belongs the fundamental principle that any person who is born within His Majesty's dominions is from the moment of his birth a British subject, whatever may be the nationality of either or both his parents, and however temporary and casual the circumstances determining the locality of his birth may have been." There are some exceptions which turn on the phrase "born within His Majesty's dominion and allegiance" used in the Act of 1914: the children of ambassadors, the children of an alien enemy born in the British dominions, a person born on a foreign ship by reason only that the ship was in British territorial waters at the time of birth. It seems clear that the child of a British subject born on a foreign ship is in the same position as a child of British parents born abroad, but Dr. Van Pittius says that "children born in British territorial waters on foreign public vessels have always been deemed not to be British subjects," and the converse case holds that "all persons born on British public vessels have always been deemed to be British subjects, if such vessels are under the jurisdiction of the Crown only." Any person born on board a British ship, whether in foreign territorial waters or not, is a natural-born British subject.

The question of natural-born British subjects born outside the British Dominions involves some complex problems, but the general position is that a child of British parents of the first generation born outside the British dominions is a British subject, while a child of the second and subsequent generations born abroad after August 4th, 1922, can retain British nationality if the birth is

registered at a British Consulate within one year (or two years in special circumstances) after the birth. There are exceptional circumstances for persons born between January 1st, 1915, and August 4th, 1922. But for all others British nationality can be perpetuated for all generations if the successive parents wish to do so. There seems some technical doubt whether the children of British subjects born in Mandated Territories are British, and that doubt should be swept away. The Common Law rule that British nationality, in the case of birth outside the Empire, can only be acquired through the father rules out not only illegitimate children, but all posthumous children, though, in the latter case, the Secretary of State can issue a certificate of naturalisation. It is possible that in the case of South Africa a posthumous child born abroad will be regarded as a British subject as a result of the general operation of Roman-Dutch Law, and the same advantage may probably adhere to an adopted child. Exceptions of this type and other exceptions dealing with the position adopted by New Zealand makes one of the difficulties that inevitably arise in an Empire comprising not only different systems of law, but areas that have special problems to solve. One of the great uses of the Imperial Conferences is to set out these special problems, often associated with special systems of law, for full discussion and solution.

The question of Naturalisation is the most pressing. The Dominions feel very properly that the process of naturalisation should have universal validity, and as far back as 1907 the Colonial Conference of that year discussed the possibility of uniformity. The Imperial Government, as well as most of the Dominions, are inclined to hold the view that a certificate of naturalisation issued under the Act of 1870 is valid not only in the United Kingdom but throughout the Dominions. But, in fact, the certificate can only be issued after five years' residence, and with Dominions wanting immigrants the time is too long. Indeed local legislation solved the problem for the various Dominions, but was such naturalisation valid for the whole Empire? The Act of 1914 was drafted to meet these difficulties, but the ideal only of uniformity was created. There was discussion on this important subject, but friendly Imperial Conferences have had their effect, and at last (except in the case of New Zealand) the Imperial scheme is on foot though in a rather clumsy and by no means final form. It was, in fact, however slow and clumsy the method, a great achievement, since it allowed the growth of the population of the Empire to go on without friction at a time when that growth is essential. In Canada the yearly influx of Americans who desired naturalisation as British subjects has been immense throughout the whole of the twentieth

century. The force of circumstances will presumably induce New Zealand to join the Imperial Scheme, and will be more efficacious than the mere force of argument. It is necessary for all the parts of the Empire, as well as for the whole Empire, to receive the benefit of a fixed standard of citizenship. Yet, as we shall see, uniformity may be pressed too far.

Among the many interesting problems discussed by Dr. Van Pittius is the position of married women in the Empire. The Marriage Laws of the Empire vary in many ways in different areas, but there is little doubt that the working rule is the voluntary consent of the woman and the monogamous character of the union. It is true that for certain tribes polygamous unions are recognised, and the issue of these unions are British, but Dr. Van Pittius says that there can be very little doubt that in the case of a British-born subject belonging to a polygamous tribe marrying two alien women such marriage would not confer British nationality. In other words the polygamy recognised is tribal, and the moment the man seeks to extend it, recognition is withheld so far as wifehood is concerned. That is one difficulty. Another is a wider one: the position on marriage of a woman who is a British subject and marries an alien. The present law is to the effect that a British woman loses her nationality on marriage with an alien and that an alien woman acquires British nationality by marriage with a British subject. It is a law that creates great hardships, as the famous Ogden Case showed, and sturdy efforts are being made to change it. At the end of the last session of the Imperial Parliament a Bill to alter the law was dropped by effluxion of time. No less than 239 Members of the House of Commons have memorialised the Prime Minister to make the change before the end of the current year. In *The Times* newspaper of August 30th last a letter pleading for the change of the law was inserted signed by all sorts and conditions of men and women. This letter declares that the Imperial Government should propose that each Dominion should promote the necessary legislation and should undertake to do the same itself. If all the Dominions are not prepared to act together then uniformity must give place to justice and the United Kingdom should promote legislation for itself. The plea is certainly just. It will give rise to justice in the realm of both private and public law, and will show that imperial uniformity in questions of nationality must not be made an excuse for a state of the law that has long given rise to gross injustice. Dr. Van Pittius does not mention the Ogden Case, but the enormity of injustice created by that case would persuade the most stern anti-feminist that a woman has a right to a nationality of her own.

J. E. G. DE M.

CALIBAN IN AFRICA.*

Described as "An Impression of Colour-Madness," this book is a strong attack on the Dutch-speaking South African, especially in his attitude to the native. And with him, under the general name of "Afrikaner," is included the British colonist who shares his tremendous, blind colour-prejudice. This impenetrable mental attitude is attributed mainly to fear, fear of black domination, of the increasing millions of natives who might some day overwhelm, out-vote, out-rival the one and three-quarter million whites if they give them the least chance of owning land, being educated, voting, moving freely about, sharing in the good things of civilisation. They even begrudge them the teaching the clergyman might give them. Supposing they came to hear of the Sermon on the Mount!

The Dutchman's history is traced with his propensity for moving up country, "trekking away from order and good government. He moved not in search of a liberty which he proposed to put to some positive use, but merely because he resented being interfered with." He is described as being capable of considerable kindness within the boundaries of the household. "It does not follow that because the Dutch always oppress natives politically, they always maltreat them in their homes and on their farms. Natives are habitually maltreated in outrageous ways all over South Africa, but the Dutch are probably not much worse offenders than the British."

The whole case of the native is put in bitter, vivid, and trenchant language. The long injustice is increasing, so that in addition to the disabilities added during the last twenty years, there is now the threat to take away even the small voting power possessed by the natives of Cape Province. Mr. Barnes, the author, himself on the editorial staff of the *Johannesburg Star*, speaks of the "incessant racial dog-fight which goes on in the columns of the Press, one of the most discreditable features of South African life," and of the certainty that "racialism in its virulent forms would quite quickly become extinct if politicians and the Press would allow the people a chance to forget it." A very interesting chapter on *The Native* gives an informative picture such as the public in England greatly need at the present time. The few lurid stories which are used to frighten English relations and friends at home, and especially women, are here balanced by some delightful pages describing the character of the Bantu, his ways, his thoughts. His grievances are also recounted, followed by the story of the I.C.U., as the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union is popularly

* *Caliban in Africa*. By Leonard Barnes. Victor Gollancz. 10s. 6d. net.

known, "the native's first attempt at a trades union of his own." The political situation leading up to the present moment when the whole question of the native's political status is under consideration and his welfare is hanging in the balance is dealt with carefully but with some strong condemnation all through of the "Afrikaner." "Logical disputation makes him angry; moral appeals make him laugh." Mr. Barnes takes a gloomy view of the future, and fears an eventual serious outbreak, perhaps in the next couple of decades, but he qualifies it by some faint hope in the general influence of civilised opinion which through the League of Nations "makes itself audible and more and more compelling in every corner of the earth."

This is a very readable book and not too long for the student of public questions who runs.

E. M. B.

THE LAND OF PROMISE.*

Mr. Holmes' visit to Palestine last year has resulted in a very vivid impression, as given in this book, of both the Holy Land and its people, which will greatly help his readers to comprehend, not alone the country and the Zionist movement, but the Arab population who have been in possession for over a thousand years. Mr. Holmes had partly written this book before the riots, or, as he more truly says, the war of August 1929. At first he naturally felt that after such an upheaval the writing and publishing of this book would be out of date, and that under fresh conditions much would need to be revised, if not re-written, but on second reading he found that what had happened had merely confirmed his conclusions, not in any way altered or confounded them. Therefore without loss of time he continued his writing, and this book is the outcome, which he published "as a fitting introduction to, and interpretation of, events which hold such enormous significance for the Jews and also for the world."

The author's national and political sympathy is strongly on the side of the Arab, whose land was being invaded by the Jews as the result of Lord Balfour's Declaration of 1917. The occupation by the Allies after the defeat and overthrow of the Turkish rule upset the established order of society. The Arabs felt themselves betrayed, their power dissipated, and their nationalistic ambition frustrated and defied. The Mandate of the League of Nations established the British Empire in Palestine, and committed to the Empire the task of "placing the country under such political,

administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home." Thenceforth the Jews felt that Palestine at last had again become their home, and the Zionist leaders were exultant. The alarm of the Arab led to uprisings and rioting which, had it not been for the English troops, would have brought Palestinian Jewry to the point of extermination. Order was at length restored, but the tension even to-day continues, since the two races are determined to hold their own.

Nationalism on either side is the dream or vision which enthralled them both. Whether, as the author of this book fears, the English conquest of Palestine is "the greatest tragedy that could befall the Zionist movement" remains to be seen. "There is some soul of goodness in things evil would men observingly distil it out," and time is a great healer. The Jew is never in a hurry; he waits the tide, and as Mr. Holmes relates later in his book, the hope for the future is not by the sword, but by the spirit, for already the Jew and the Arab are working side by side. Each race owes to the other the almost miraculous change that has come over the land which holds such an enduring claim on the affection and loyalty of both occupiers. Fifty years of achievement, and new conditions—agricultural, social, educational, and hygienic—have changed the outlook, and, wonder of wonders, the ancient Hebrew language of the Prophets is being restored, a renaissance which will give to the Jew a hold such as none other could: not alone a local habitation and a name, but a national speech.

In reading Mr. Holmes' survey of the Palestine of to-day, one feels that the outstanding feature of the Zionist movement is the recovery of the Land of Promise, not in any way—at least at present—the restoration of their religion or worship of the one God, which was the foremost tenet or principle of their faith. The Temple with all its rites and ceremonies is of the past; it is merged in the one predominant claim for rehabilitation in the Land of Promise. The observance of the fourth commandment is outwardly the only remnant left, and that is only as far as rest and recreation are concerned. It is the weekly holiday, and little else. Worship is almost eliminated. Patriotism and loyalty to the promise of the Prophets, faith in the Palestine of to-morrow for which the Jew has sacrificed so much, not for the milk and honey of to-day is the present note. It is out of the evil of the dispersion, and the tortures suffered by his race that the Jew may seek and find the soul of goodness.

The Palestine of yesterday; what was it?

A dead land, parched with sun, poisoned with rain, blasted with all the lusts which curse men's souls! Where did the Jew find courage to reclaim this waste? What but the tortures of their

* *Palestine To-day and To-morrow. A Gentle Survey of Zionism.* By John Haynes Holmes. Allen & Unwin. 10s. net.

tribe, and the besetting dream of Zion, could bring them hence? And they have come! In what must seem to them like a single tick upon the dial of their racial history they have reared secure and firm, leaping sheer from foundation to pinnacle, the structure of civilisation.

What will be the to-morrow? The answer comes, they must wait, as they have waited in the past, "until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in, and so all Israel shall be saved: as it is written. There shall come out of Zion the Deliverer." For this end they must strive, not by bloodshed and the sword, but by the fulfilment of the Law and the Prophets. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God . . . and thy neighbour as thyself not by might nor by power but by my spirit, saith the Lord." Mr. Holmes is to be thanked for the fulness of his exposition of the Zionist movement, and the great difficulties which he recognises of adjustment between two races both striving for the same end from different angles.

S. DE M.

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THE AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL.*

It is estimated that a century and a half ago the Aboriginal inhabitants of Australia numbered about a million while the present estimate is 50,000 souls. The fact makes it imperative that some steps should be taken to save and civilise in a suitable fashion the remnant, and Mr. M. M. Bennett pleads for an "honourable settlement with the natives in the Federal Territories of the Commonwealth," the area in which the greater part of the survivors live. It is really not a State but a Federal question.

There is a growing number of enlightened humane Australians who feel that the present position of the Aborigines is unworthy of a great nation. They recognise that the whole culture and social organisation of the Aborigines, as well as their material welfare, are based on landownership, and they ask that sanctuaries shall be reserved for them, that land, taking the Aboriginal boundaries, shall be allotted in perpetuity to the surviving tribes. But this will not be done unless the majority of Australians desire it, and, unhappily, many people are indifferent or hold the injurious view that the Aborigines are bound to "die out." The founding of a just relation of the white and the dark races is not our problem alone. It is a world problem. It is described as the most important business of this century.

These points made by Mr. Bennett are reinforced by the fact that the Aborigines belong to a pacific race and the fine Australian

Aboriginal as a Human Being. By M. M. Bennett. Alston

* *The Australian*.
Rivers Ltd. 2s. 6d.

ideals of their social order in its purest state show that they are worthy of preservation with ample opportunities to develop with new facilities that social order. Canon C. E. C. Lefroy has said that "there is abundant evidence that the wild Australian Aboriginal could show himself not only gentle and pacific but indeed a noble-hearted creature." He belongs to the white stock and there is no vestige of negroid descent in him. In a sense this gives him an additional claim to the kindly offices of the white race who opened his sanctuary not two centuries ago.

To those who have studied in detail the structure of his civilisation—for it is a civilisation and a remarkable one in view of the extraordinary limitations of his opportunities—the subtlety of the thought that constructed a social system which had the power of withstanding drought, flood and famine for unnumbered generations is astounding. The most complex ideas lie enshrined in Australian customary law. These Aborigines belong to one race; war is unknown to them and they had developed economic facilities and trade routes and markets thousands of years ago. Their art, their music and their dances; their mastery of grammar—with delicately inflected verbs and dual and plural numbers—their sense of humour and virility, their religious sense, their innate kindness show that they belong to a race that is well worth developing. Unfortunately Europeans judge the race by specimens that have become degraded by contact with Europeans. The vices of an old civilisation, and especially the one of alcohol, destroy aboriginal peoples. But there is time to save and to multiply in their aboriginal state the substantial remnant of a people which Dr. Ramsay Smith vividly described in the *Commonwealth Year Book* for 1909. He said:

The problem of what to do with the race, the most interesting at present on earth, and the least deserving to be exterminated by us, and the most wronged at our hands, is not a difficult one to solve, were a solution really desired.

More than twenty years have passed since these words were written and at last "a solution is really desired." The best Australian Press has taken up the subject and it should not be doubted that the Federal Government will without delay create the sanctuaries for which Mr. Bennett in his able book insistently asks. The question should be raised at the present Imperial Conference in London and Mr. Bleakley's Report to the Federal Government on the conditions obtaining in North and Central Australia should be distributed to the members of the Conference. It is a world problem, affecting other races, and the Conference should without doubt discuss it and report upon it.

VOL. CXXXVIII

CENSORSHIP.*

The position of a censorship in a democratic country is extremely difficult. It is at one and same time attacked by the advocates of *laissez-faire* in all forms of expression and on the other side by those demanding a tighter control. Two supporters of the former school have written a little book entitled *Keeping it Dark* which deals with all the forms and variations of censorship in force in England. The authors, Mr. Bernard Causton and Mr. G. Gordon Young, plead the old theory that censorship defeats its own object, because keeping something bad in the dark arouses greater dangers by way of secrecy and curiosity than showing its inherent evil by exhibiting it in the light. Yet it is not the censor's aim to promote ignorance of certain subjects. It is his duty to prevent them from being exploited. Some little time ago a Blasphemy Bill was brought into the House of Commons with the intention of abolishing criminal proceedings for schism, heresy, blasphemy, blasphemous libel, or atheism. It was rejected on a very simple ground: the distinction between quite sincere academic discussions on such questions as atheism and distorted offensive propaganda which only appals and never convinces. If a person cannot express himself on these subjects in the former spirit, he is not allowed to discuss them. This is perfectly just. However the authors of *Keeping it Dark* regret the rejection of the Bill and in doing so show a singular lack of insight. They base their opinion, apparently, on the general ground that "there is nothing more stultifying to the expression of people's true characteristics than to have to live, as many still do, in an atmosphere of revolt and protest. There is nothing more disabling to people's sincerity than to be prevented from saying things in their natural tone of voice."

So long as there are writers who show their true characteristics in exploiting sex problems and narrating obscenities, the community does well to impose a censorship. They endeavour to poison society in order to make a living, and their efforts must be suppressed. The free expression of thought in this country is not restricted if presented in a sincere, straightforward, educative manner; but it is censored if distorted in a novel or a play written by an author who has little opportunity of making a living by writing clean literature. Few, if any, of our great literary figures have relied on obscenities for their fame. This is the last resort of poor ignoble minds.

The authors of *Keeping it Dark* attack the law of libel since it is, in effect, censorship because it restricts the free expression of opinion. They enter into the intricacies of the law of defamation

with light hearts. They do not dwell on the distinction between civil and criminal libel and the fact that in the former the defence of justification may always be pleaded. The statement that "there must be adequate ground in the public interest for the publication of statements, even if true," is misleading. In practice, the technical defence of justification is often avoided because the law demands a very high standard of proof. The technical defence of fair comment is much more usual. In a passage on seditious intent they write, "More recently it has been held that words are only capable of bearing a seditious intent if the reasonable direct result of their publication is, or would be, an outbreak of violence. But as the law at present stands it is quite possible that a reactionary-minded judge might not put forward this interpretation at all." It is clear that the authors know nothing of judicial precedent or the standard of our judges. Such a statement misleads the ignorant and misrepresents the facts. It would have been wiser had this chapter been written by a practising lawyer of standing.

The censorship, in its various forms, is certainly not perfect. *Keeping it Dark* exposes a number of its abuses. But the mass of English people, though they may resent this or that decision or practice, are satisfied with the system of censorship as a whole. They realise that the nation benefits more from its presence than it would benefit from its disappearance. They know that it keeps at bay an injurious form of vile propaganda of subjects which are perfectly legitimate if dealt with by specialists in the interests of scientific thought. If the censorship is ever abolished it will not be due to the agitation of persons who clamour for absolute license of expression, but to the extinction of such a class. The English nation has always stood for freedom, has always opposed licence.

* * *

THE TUDORS IN VENETIAN EYES.*

Dr. Gurney Salter's charming book, "compiled from the Reports (*Relazioni*) and correspondence of the Venetian diplomatic and commercial agents in England mainly between 1496 and 1558," is much more than a compilation. She not only enables English people of today to see their ancestors as others—some of the keenest observers in Europe—saw them, but enables us to realise the truth of the diagnosis and the unchangeable nature of the British people. The material, as Dr. Salter says, is not new to historians, but many of the comments upon the relation of the material to English history are both new and true and are stated with judicial force. Moreover it

* *Tudor England Through Venetian Eyes.* By Emma Gurney Salter, Litt.D. Williams and Norgate. 7s. 6d. net.

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is not a mere compilation but a fascinating record that carries the reader, page from page, with delight and never-failing interest, and gives a living picture of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century England drawn in secret (as it were) by men who had no reason to hide the truth about England from the *C. Reali* at Venice. The *Relazioni* are very valuable since they contain a secret picture of the land and its people.

The Ambassador's Despatches are, in their way, perhaps even more interesting than the Reports. In them there is no sense of formal preparation; they are spontaneous, colloquial, recording conversations or the latest events, great or small; often following closely on one another, in confirmation, amplification or correction; often bearing the marks of haste. As one reads them, one has the feeling of assisting at the making of history, of living through it, as it were, from day to day, behind the scenes, of seeing the times in a mirror; for every rumour, state of public opinion or new strand woven into the web of international diplomacy is noted.

These Reports and Despatches were and are of peculiar moment in the Tudor age of transition. They throw light everywhere.

The writers are at once chroniclers and interpreters. England was now to take her place among the Continental Powers, to whom hitherto she had remained almost a sealed book. The Venetians were among the first to turn its pages with sympathy and understanding, and to make them known abroad. Ambassadors to England, they thus proved themselves Ambassadors of England also.

Dr. Salter begins by describing the sea-life of Mediæval Venice since the earliest relations between England and Venice were commercial, and we find their fleets visiting our shores before the fourth quarter of the thirteenth century. The Venetian galleys took a great while in making the voyage to "Camber before Rye," some seven months, with intermediate stopping places it may be assumed, since the voyage took two months for English sailing ships. The Republic of Venice from the earliest times had made a profession of diplomacy. "Her young nobles took part in State affairs, and also in commerce, in a way that was not practised elsewhere." There was none of the English nonsense—which is slowly dying now—of trade not being good enough for gentlemen. In the Tudor age the nobility lived out of London—except for purposes of Court service—to avoid the touch of trade. The patricians of Venice knew better. Ambassadors were sent to England as occasions arose, but from 1497 to 1557 there was a permanent Embassy, though from 1535 to 1547 Secretaries took the place of formal Ambassadors. There was a gap from 1557 till the last year, 1603, of Queen Elizabeth, when Scaramelli arrived and the

aged Queen, magnificently attired, talked with him in Italian and made "a dignified remonstrance about her long neglect by the Republic." He, in turn, complained of the English Corsairs, a matter which the Queen promised to inquire into, and then they drifted into pleasanter waters. Ambassadors and envoys were sent from England to Venice at various times by Edward III, Richard II, Henry IV and Henry VII. Henry VIII sent the famous Richard Pace, Cassalis, Croke and others. Elizabeth sent no ambassadors to Venice, though Scotland sent several. The position of the two countries explains the fact.

The ambassadorial accounts of some famous Englishmen are a footnote to history and throw in certain cases a new light on character. Querini says that Henry VII was "wise and prudent, not hated, nor much loved either by his peoples." Falier describes him as avaricious but "most prudent, most just and most astute." Giustinian reports that he left ten millions of gold ducats to his son. The references to Henry VIII are not only complimentary but full of praise for his beauty of person, his great accomplishments in music and languages, his marvellous powers as an athlete, even at the age of forty (when he tired out eight or ten horses in a day). He fascinated the Ambassadors: he was "kind and affable, full of graciousness and courtesy, and liberal." These estimates were only to be recorded in the annals of Venice and they may be taken as absolutely true. The papal Nuncio Chieregato declared that Henry surpassed "all who ever wore a crown." The Venetians also realised that Henry's matrimonial ventures were designed to secure a legitimate male succession. Dr. Salter regards him as "sensual," but the evidence for that is by no means clear at any rate in his earlier days. For Edward VI there is great praise, with respect both to his unusual intellectual and physical powers. "He makes the nation hopeful." Mary, slight, spare and good looking, skilled in languages, dancing and music, pious, resolute, abstemious and hard-working, was also clement despite all opinions to the contrary, and a lover of finery. Elizabeth was a curious contrast to her half-sister. She shared Mary's love of languages and excelled her. At the age of twenty-three, according to Michiel, she was tall, beautiful in mind and body, but "rather *graziosa* than *bella*," sagacious, dignified and modest, yet proud and haughty. She resembled her father, who had loved her for the fact. Even in 1588 the Pope, the famous Sixtus V, declared that she was "a great woman; were she only Catholic, she would be without her match; . . . she omits nothing in the government of her Kingdom. . . . A great Queen, look how well she governs." Philip II is seen in a rather new light. From the Venetian evidence Dr. Salter thinks that he might have been popular in Eng-

that immense numbers of gangs were intensively organised. The story of this aspect of contemporary China must be reserved for separate treatment another time.

One of the lamentable aspects of contemporary China is that by a fantastic perversity there are those in China who have developed a sort of pride in the more expert conception of military efficiency that is resulting from the practice gained in twenty years of civil war. In the past the peculiarities of Chinese warfare, the aversion of the troops from the logical purpose of war, which is wholesale murder, their simple, human and unashamed cowardice under fire—these things have constituted a partial saving grace in the monstrosity of Chinese politics. Battles had a way of ending soon after they began by the wholesale desertion of the troops of one side to the other, merely because the other had scored an initial advantage. The cost in bloodshed was kept at a minimum. There was something Gilbertian and attractive about it. One therefore deplores the sort of new mentality that is developing in China and that is manifested, for instance, in a leading article that appeared in the *Ta Kung Pao* of June 14th.* The writer of that article had been stung to indignation—the more's the pity—by a foreigner's gibe that China's civil wars were comparable to army manœuvres carried out at scheduled times. The writer of the article reacted in a defence of China's good name in a form of which he appeared not to be conscious of the irony. Referring to the gibe aforementioned he wrote :

"If this is so, then they are the most expensive army manœuvres in the world. Hundreds of millions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives in a short space of time are converted into smoke and ashes. No state in the world, however warlike, incurs such extravagant expenditure as this.

"The experience of recent years, however, shows that China has made some real progress in military matters: the extent of the operations, the bravery displayed in attack and defence, the numbers of dead and wounded, the heroic sacrifices made, all have increased with successive wars. . . . From a national point of view this is to be regretted; but from a military standpoint it marks a distinct advance. The pity of it is that the price is too heavy.

"To sum up then: In this war the Chinese soldier has shown more readiness to sacrifice himself and his powers of endurance both in attack and defence have increased; he is no whit behind the men of any nation in bravery and daring, and he is well versed in the art of soldiering; where he surpasses the foreign soldier is in

* Translation taken from *Summaries of Leading Articles in the Chinese Press*, issued by The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Conversations of Dr. Johnson.* This is prefaced by an Introduction which gives some details of the earlier life of Dr. Johnson (who was born on September 18th, 1709) until the period when the famous lexicographer retired upon a pension of £300 bestowed upon him by Lord Bute at the instance of the newly-crowned King George III. In 1763 Dr. Johnson met Boswell and the "Conversations" last from May 16th, 1763, to Dr. Johnson's death on December 13th, 1784. Burke was with him in the last month of his life and Johnson said: "I must be in a wretched state, indeed, when your company could not be a delight to me." The "Conversations" include much of the best of Boswell's "Life" and are full, of course, of the most excellent stories. Dr. Johnson's views about ghosts and evidence is not to be despised to-day: "if a form should appear at a particular place, and a particular hour, a fact which I had no apprehension of, nor any means of knowing, and the fact, with all its circumstances, should afterwards be unquestionably proved, I should, in that case, be persuaded that I had supernatural intelligence imparted to me." That was a case of probing the evidence to the bottom. His bitterness against the Whigs included all politicians. "Politicks (said he) are now nothing more than means of rising in the world." He believed in distraction of mind as the sole means of conquering constitutional melancholy. You cannot think down distressing thoughts. He recognised that economics were the root of social change: "No son now depends upon his father, as in former times." Every page of the "Conversations" gives instruction and pleasure.

* * *

It is so difficult to find out the truth about conditions in Soviet Russia that any account which claims to be unbiased and dispassionate must be seriously considered. Such an account is *The Experiment of Bolshevism*† by a German, Mr. Arthur Feiler, and translated by Mr. H. J. Stenning. Mr. Feiler spent several months in Russia in the early part of last year, making a tour of investigation, and studying the whole trend of Soviet policy and its outcome. In his book he has written a comprehensive though concise picture of the whole problem of Russian Bolshevism. The dominating feature in Russian policy is the famous Five-Year Plan, the fulfilment of which is intended to "enable the Soviet Union to overtake and outstrip the technically and economically most advanced capitalist countries" in industry and agriculture. It is hardly possible that this colossal scheme will be so successful as it is on paper. But on the other hand, at the present rate of progress, it seems that absolute failure will be averted. The Soviet Government is meeting with tremendous difficulties (as is shown in the series of articles published in *The Times* in the middle of last month), perhaps the greatest of which is lack of money. It knows that failure will entail its own ruin and is making desperate efforts to obtain foreign credit. As we know to our cost Russia has been dumping her wheat in England and elsewhere, while allowing her own people to starve from lack of bread. The Russians are a patient people and the issue largely turns upon "the degree of privation which can deliberately be im-

* Alfred Knopf. 8s. 6d.

† George Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d. net.

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NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Miss Redstone, in her book on "Suffolk,"* gives to the reader a remarkable account of this county, told in such a bright and interesting manner that the idea of a "Text-book" is wiped from the student's mind. The author begins with Prehistoric Suffolk, showing the coastal changes by means of maps, and supplying many suitable illustrations of weapons used at that time. The chapters continue with Roman Suffolk, Suffolk under the Anglo-Danes, Norman, Mediæval, Tudor, Stuart, Suffolk, the period of industrial changes and modern Suffolk. The illustrations deal with subjects outside those of the ordinary commonplace type.

Casimir Smorgewski's little book, "Poland, Germany, and the Corridor,"† is an excellent statement of the Polish case in regard to one of the most controversial problems of post-war Europe. Readers of Sir Robert Donald's well-known work on the same subject will be interested to see the author's reply to the charges against the makers of the Treaty of Versailles and against the nation which they called into being. He argues that the Corridor contains a large Polish majority; that the separation of East Prussia from the Fatherland is a sentimental, not a practical grievance; that Danzig is flourishing, and that even when Gdynia is complete there will be ample trade for both ports. He rejects the suggestion that the German-Polish tension should be ended by the return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, while Poland should be compensated by Memel and Lithuania. The book is full of up-to-date information, and though the author writes as a patriotic Pole, he presents his case with courtesy and moderation.

* Alfred A. Knopf. 2s.

† Williams & Norgate. 6s.

1926—1930—1931?

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE.

THE Conference of the Dominion Premiers has taken place in an atmosphere of crisis. Dangerous speeches have been made outside its doors. These have been burdened with prophecies of disaster and cries of "Now or never." The series of articles and speeches written and delivered by the supporters of Imperial Preference have contained denunciations of the representatives of the Home Country and charges of dilly-dally. In order to see how unfounded these charges are it is necessary to recall 1926. In that year the Protectionists were in complete power in Great Britain with a majority of over two hundred in the House of Commons. Mr. Amery was in charge of Dominion affairs and Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister was at the Board of Trade. The Conference lasted seven weeks. There were a number of sub-committees. There was no offer of a substantial preference. Neither was there any heated talk of "Now's the day and now's the hour," because the Conservative Government of the day was pledged not to impose taxes on foodstuffs and raw materials. That Conference discussed Empire marketing and films, and its members went their several ways without a drum fire from the Protectionist Press. This year everything has taken place in a different atmosphere. From the first day of the Conference, although it was known that Mr. MacDonald's Government, like the 1926 Ministry, was pledged not to impose tariffs, there have been continuous cries of "The Empire in danger," "Shilly-shally," and such-like slogans. I give a comparative list of the committees set up in both years, together with the topics of discussion. This list will, I think, place these ridiculous assertions in their proper perspective. In 1926 the principal sub-committees were concerned with discussions on communications, nationality, British policy in the Antarctic, Anglo-French condominium in the New Hebrides, economic questions of a technical character, overseas settlement, workmen's compensation, Imperial air communications, research, forestry.

In 1930 sub-committees have been discussing inter-Imperial relations, mandates, arbitration and disarmament, war graves, defence, civil aviation, cables, forestry, overseas settlement, general economic questions.

Yet in 1926 there was no charge of time-wasting and no talk of a crisis in Imperial affairs unless the Home Government at once agreed to impose a tariff against foreign imports. Mr. Bennett, the Prime Minister of Canada, has been frank to the point of brutality. Mr. Bruce in 1926, although as keen a Protectionist as Mr. Bennett, understood the difficulties of the British Government

and urged consideration of "closer settlement products." He said "These industries only cover three things, dairy produce, fruit, and pig products. . . . I would stress that as far as I am concerned I only put this suggestion forward for the consideration of the British Government. I have never suggested the general taxation of foodstuffs, and I have always recognised the tremendous importance to Britain of having adequate supplies of cheap food and raw materials." This attitude on the part of the Australian Premier made the course of Mr. Baldwin's Government easy and since the Oppositions were free traders there was no attempt outside Parliament to raise the political temperature by talk of the "crucial Conference." So quiet was the atmosphere that on November 18th, 1926, the Conference passed the following resolution:

The Imperial Economic Committee shall continue on its present *ad hoc* basis with the following general reference:

1. To complete a series of investigations into the marketing of Empire foodstuffs in Great Britain and while this work is proceeding,
2. To put forward for the consideration of the various Governments concerned (a) a list of raw materials for possible further marketing inquiries, and (b) suggestions for the preparation and circulation of brief preliminary surveys as suggested by the Economic Committee of the Conference, on any branch of Empire trade or marketing. Such preliminary surveys, if the Governments concerned so desire, to be followed up by fuller inquiries.

There was no open denunciation of Mr. Baldwin by outside Protectionists for "dilly-dallying," and the various representatives went home recognising that the widely scattered parts of the British Empire have very different characteristics, very different histories, and are at very different stages of evolution. And the Premiers of the various Dominions agreed that Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Conference of 1930 met under conditions which were similar in so far as the British Government was pledged against taxes on foodstuffs and raw materials, but vastly different as regards atmosphere. The principal Opposition had been engaged in a varying but vigorous campaign for the imposition of Protectionist tariffs. This campaign had been supplemented by a great agitation for some form of Empire customs union. This proposal was called "Empire Free Trade" by Lord Beaverbrook and "Imperial Economic Unity" by Lord Melchett and his friends. As presented to the British public

by the "Empire Free Traders" it involved a definite demand for the taxation of foreign foodstuffs together with a preferential tariff. This campaign was in the nature of a fanaticism, and it is impossible to argue with fanatics. As presented by Lord Melchett it was rather more subtle, for he defined his main purpose in a little book entitled *Imperial Economic Unity* in the following terms, "The ideal of the policy in its broadest aspects implies the minimum amount of tariff barriers within the Empire and the greatest measure therefore of free exchange of goods, and necessarily Protection against competition from sources outside the Empire." It was evident from the first sitting of the Imperial Conference in 1930 that there was to be a concerted Protectionist drive on the part of the Dominion representatives. A note of comedy, however, was at once introduced into its proceedings by the unanimity and vigour of the opposition of the Premiers to "Imperial Economic Unity" or "Empire Free Trade." It seems impossible for the latter slogan to survive the blunt declaration of Mr. Bennett, the Canadian Premier, "The proposed Preference should not be considered as a step towards 'Empire Free Trade.' In our opinion Empire Free Trade is neither desirable nor possible, for it would defeat the very purpose we are striving to achieve. All that is helpful in Empire Free Trade may be secured by Empire Preferences. All that is harmful may in this way be avoided." Mr. Havenga, on behalf of the Union of South Africa, was even more blunt. He declared, "Empire Free Trade has been preached as the panacea for our economic ills, but South Africa cannot afford, and is not prepared to subscribe to, such a policy." These sweeping statements have swept "Empire Free Trade" out of the practical politics of our time.

It is constantly claimed for the Dominion representatives that they do not give any consideration to theoretical points of high policy or to any abstruse economic theses. This claim was borne out by the demand made by Messrs. Bennett and Scullin at the Conference. Both Prime Ministers made it clear that their policy was naturally "Me First!" and that the consuming power of our population of forty-seven millions was the object of their marketing demands. The issue thus raised is of great importance to Great Britain. She is dependent for her existence and prosperity upon imported foodstuffs and raw materials. Before considering Mr. Bennett's offer and demand it should be remembered that Mr. Snowden has made it quite clear that it remains the policy of the Government to refuse support to any proposal which involves the taxation of food or raw materials. It should not be overlooked, also, that Sir Geoffrey Corbett has declared that India is not prepared to depart from her present policy of Protection or to commit herself to any general scheme of tariff Preference within the Empire. . . .

On October 8th, 1930, the Prime Minister of Canada made a vigorous speech to the Conference in the course of which he made what is now, popularly, known as his "offer," viz.

I propose that we of the British Empire, in our joint and several interests do subscribe to the principle of an Empire preference, and that we take, without delay, the steps necessary to put it into effective operation. . . . I offer to the Mother Country, and to all the other parts of the Empire, a preference in the Canadian market in exchange for a like preference in theirs, based upon the addition of a 10 per cent. increase in prevailing tariffs or upon tariffs yet to be created. In the universal acceptance of this offer, and in like proposals and acceptances by all the other parts of the Empire, we attain to the ideal of Empire preference.

Mr. Scullin, Prime Minister of Australia, followed and said :

I entirely agree with Mr. Bennett that we must come to some decision on that principle. Already that principle has been conceded. Already there is a measure of preference in operation reciprocally between the Dominions and the United Kingdom.

Already there are treaties in existence between certain Dominion Governments. We have accepted, to a large extent, the principle of preference, but it is our duty at this Conference, first of all, to affirm the maintenance of that principle and the extension of its operation.

Mr. Forbes, New Zealand, Mr. Havenga, South Africa, and Sir R. Squires, spoke in a similar strain, but one sentence from the Premier of New Zealand is worthy of reproduction :

I feel that a tariff preference in this country in favour of Empire products (including foodstuffs) accompanied by increased preference in favour of British goods in the oversea Empire would be the greatest single factor in increasingly inter-Imperial trade.

And the following words from the frank Mr. Bennett should have close attention :

If this opportunity for closer Empire economic relations is not seized it may not come again, and he added, we must all have regard for the basic changes in conditions of world trade, and realise that in this age of great industrialisation and fierce competition the old rules which in their time were very good rules may very well be now, if they are followed, the signposts to commercial disaster.

It is also noteworthy that Mr. Baldwin, who was involved in a grave internal party crisis on the issue of food taxes, at once made a pronouncement in the following terms :

* I take this to mean 10 per cent. of the existing general rates, i.e. if the present general tariff on a commodity is 30 per cent., Mr. Bennett is prepared to raise it to 33 per cent.

The striking offer made by the Prime Minister of Canada cannot fail to create a profound impression throughout this country and the Empire, and, speaking on behalf of the Conservative Party, I say, without hesitation, that the great principle of Imperial preference embodied in that offer is one to which we must and do subscribe, and I heartily endorse Mr. Scullin's statement that it is our duty to affirm not only the maintenance of that principle but also the extension of its operation.

Mr. Graham, on the other hand, at Geneva, has stated : " The British Government definitely accepted the principle that where tariffs exist in this country preferences will be given."

It is difficult to write with accuracy of the proceedings of the Conference since the greatest portions of its discussions have taken place in secrecy. It is, however, understood that the British Government have refused to agree to the imposition of a tariff system in these islands. This refusal has been vividly described by Mr. Amery as " Nailing the flag of folly to the mast of disaster." This description would, of course, equally apply to the proceedings in 1926 and is so much dangerous nonsense. The Government, on the other hand, asked the Committee on Economic Co-operation to draft a report covering among other economic suggestions the idea of a quota of imported wheat from the Dominions. The committee's instructions were to consider whether such a system is feasible if the Conference should decide in favour of it. At the moment of writing it seems the view of the committee is that the introduction of a quota system for wheat would present no insuperable difficulties if it were designed to secure that a guaranteed, and if possible, increasing, proportion of wheat milled in the United Kingdom is from within the Empire. It is assumed that a quota would be based on world prices, irrespective of what may be arranged with regard to wheat grown in this country. It is known that the Dominion Premiers are not enthusiastic about this proposal and the policy to be adopted will be decided by the Heads of Delegations.

It is calculated that the quantity of wheat milled in this country is about 120 million cwts. a year, of which 13 per cent. is grown in this country. From other parts of the Empire we receive about 48 per cent. of the whole of wheat milled. It is probable that the committee has found the practical application of the quota idea much more complicated than it appeared on first examination. Since this was written the Conference has held its final plenary session and the decision to hold an economic meeting in Ottawa has been announced. It appears that the idea of a quota for wheat has been used to keep a door half open. The advocates of the quota system desire to enact that British mills shall in future grind a specified proportion of home-grown and Empire-grown wheat.

The balance to be ground would be obtained from foreign sources. The Government's proposals to the Imperial Conference are not, as yet, disclosed, but those of the Conservative Party have been discussed in general outline. They would arrange, as soon as the harvest were known, for a Statutory Commission to fix the quota for home-grown wheat. This would either be monthly, as in Germany, or for longer periods. The price would also be fixed and could either be varied annually with the cost of production, or fixed for a period of years by the Government. The millers would pay the farmers the guaranteed price and would take a receipt from them. These receipts the millers would present to the Government, by whom they would be reimbursed the difference between the guaranteed price and the comparable value of home-grown wheat fixed in relation to the world price of wheat delivered to our ports. It has been made clear that the present Government does not agree with the guaranteed price. The first quota for home-grown wheat is suggested as 15 per cent., which would allow for an increase.

The proposal of the Conservatives, and it is understood that of the Government is similar, is different for Empire-grown wheat. It is proposed that an Empire quota shall be fixed after consultation with the Dominions. The quota should cover the whole Empire and not relate to particular Dominions. The Dominions would therefore continue to compete for their share of our market, but their share would be increased at the expense of foreign competitors. This combined home-grown and Empire quota is reckoned to cover about 85 per cent. of our total requirements, leaving a margin open to the free competition of foreign competitors. The report issued after the final plenary session of the Conference shows that agreement has not been reached either on this suggestion for the extension of inter-Imperial trade or on such schemes as import boards and the bulk purchase of foodstuffs. It is also announced that the British Government declared its opposition to any policy involving duties on foodstuffs and raw materials. It should be remembered that all three political parties in Great Britain were pledged not to impose food duties at the last General Election. This fact should cool the heated feelings of our Conservative statesmen, for the remembrance that this was Mr. Baldwin's election flag equally with the other parties should send their minds back to 1926.

Free Traders will watch with growing interest the preparations made for the adjourned Conference at Ottawa next year and meantime will eagerly await the publication of the reports of this Conference in order to discover the precise nature of the various plans for the operation of the quota scheme for wheat. The Dominion

representatives having secured the Ottawa Conference will probably disagree with those who have conducted a campaign of such extreme assertiveness outside the Conference. Free Traders will feel that the Government has been more than generous in declaring that the existing preferential margins now accorded will not be reduced for a period of three years, or pending the outcome of the further Conference, subject to the right of the United Kingdom Parliament to fix the Budget from year to year. The comments of Mr. J. H. Thomas on that point will raise a good many fears. It is, however, too early to judge until the full implications of the Government's commitments have been examined and their meaning explained to Parliament. No one can say that the Government has not worked assiduously to meet the point of view of the Dominions. The use of the Imperial Conferences as huckstering rooms for the arrangement of tariff bargains which are subject to the changes of political fortune in half a dozen countries is a warning against all those who would turn the mutual helpfulness of friends into a series of wrangles over questions of commercial advantage.

In the heated discussions over economic questions the discussions of the Constitutional Committees have been almost neglected. From the statements at the final session it seems that there is a good chance of a new Statute of Westminster being passed before the end of 1931 which will embody satisfactory solutions of most of the difficult and subtle problems which have arisen in a Commonwealth of independent nations sharing common interests and yet zealously maintaining their national independence. To have reached agreement about most of the subjects discussed is no small achievement. It seems that the only failure has been over the question of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, on this the Irish and British interpretations of the treaty are still apart, but discussions are to continue.

Once more free debate has shown the uniqueness of the British Empire, and especially the wonder of the fact that six equal partners, differing in a marked degree in history, in geographical situation, in internal organisation, in industrial and agrarian development, and in economic orientation, can maintain a common loyalty to the Crown and a common respect for each other based upon a spirit of goodwill. This Empire survived the war because it had in it a principle of vitality which the other Empires lacked. And that principle, that seed of continuing life, is the spirit of liberty. This is not a dead possession, but an active power, a developing power and in times like the present a transforming power. "Our Commonwealth," said Sir Robert Borden, the Conservative Canadian statesman,

"may be regarded as a League of Nations owing a single allegiance and possessing international relations that are still in a state of development." There is a paradox in that statement which the advocate of rigid tariff ties would do well to ponder. The premiers evidently do not share the pessimism of the Protectionist Press over the results of the Conference. General Hertzog made the most remarkable of the concluding speeches, in the course of which he said :

I should, perhaps, be insincere to pretend that the Conference has borne the fruit which we and the other Dominions had hoped for. I think, however, it would be very unfair and even ungenerous if we were to leave England and say that we are disappointed in not having achieved what we hoped for because we know the circumstances in which your government has been labouring . . . and for that very reason may I say here that I and my colleagues came here with the knowledge that we should have to see that our expectations did not run too high, and our expectations not having run too high we have no great disappointments to carry away with us.

It is this spirit of understanding which is vital to the British Empire, which "defies classification, and bears no real resemblance to any other political organisation which now exists or has ever been tried." Liberals and Free Traders understand that it is not an Empire "founded upon negations, for free institutions are its life-blood; free co-operation is its instrument." This has been the policy pursued, sometimes unconsciously, by England since her adventurers first went overseas to found new homes. Even in those early days she saw, with untroubled gaze, "houses of burgesses breaking out and the new settlers claiming as great a share of liberty and control over their own affairs as they had in England itself." Ottawa 1931 will be a ? We can only hope that the coming economic discussions will do nothing to impair our policy of trust and confidence, which as Elgin said, "When it is sincere is always catching."

ERNEST BROWN.

PRESIDENT HOOVER AND THE REPUBLICAN DEFEAT.

THE comment most generally made on the results of the American elections last month was that the extent of the Democratic gains had not been foreseen. This is not by any means true. Accurate forecasts were made, both in the United States and in England. The certainty that the Republicans would lose their majority in both Houses was stated in many quarters, and the deciding factors in the polling were clearly indicated in advance. As a matter of fact, no recent national election in any country has presented so few difficulties of interpretation as this one. The main issues were not in doubt. The strength of the antagonism to the Hoover Administration had been made evident from the spring of this year, by which time the fact that the Administration was unable to cope with depression and unemployment had become unmistakable. Many observers, however, found it difficult to believe that a political party which had been routed as the Democrats were routed in 1928 could recover in so short a time, especially without national leaders and a programme, while it is not seldom forgotten that under universal suffrage three things are fairly established. They are these : (1) That no popularly elected government can stand against hard times; (2) that very large electorates mean a sweeping poll; and (3) that masses of men and women, driven or cajoled as they are to-day, by politicians and the Press, usually vote *against* something—against an Administration, a statesman, a condition, a policy with which they are disgusted or one of which they are afraid. In the United States to-day business conditions make a terrifying contrast to those of the seven fat years. This meant doom for the Republicans.

At the time when this article is being written the figures for the House of Representatives are still not quite complete, but the few outstanding results can make no material difference. Even though the Republicans may have a few votes to spare, the Administration is deprived, during the latter part of Mr. Hoover's term, of all power to influence legislation. The Senate figures are : Republicans 48, Democrats 47, Farmer-Labour 1. A formal majority of one is important in determining the composition of committees, but actually the sides are as near to an exact balance as they could well be. And this balance, in both Houses, is the most remarkable electoral result of the present century. Since the revulsion against Woodrow Wilson twelve years ago the Republicans have held their majority, although during a considerable part of the time their power was limited by the so-called Progressive bloc, made by insurgent Republicans of the West voting with the Demo-

cratic opposition. This famous combination forced the exposure of the oil and other scandals of the Harding régime, and went far to make the seemingly powerful Mr. Coolidge of little account in the rôle of what President Wilson called a legislative leader. Mr. Hoover had the dubious advantage of beginning with a very large majority. His forces are now reduced to nothing. The Congress just elected, it is true, will not be convened before December 1931—that is to say, seven months only before the choice of the next presidential candidates. But a new Congress casts a long shadow before and we may take it for granted that Mr. Hoover, who is not greatly interested in legislation, has accepted the situation. There is a settled belief among the American people that the party which is defeated in the mid-term elections cannot hold or win the Presidency two years later. The records of the past half-century support this view, and it will bear hardly upon Mr. Hoover in the interval before 1932. But on the other hand it should be remembered that the President's influence in the matter of his own re-nomination is very great. All predictions therefore as to the effect of the 1930 election upon the Presidency in 1932 are premature.

In estimating the results of the November polling the first thing to be noted is that the relatively few outstanding men in Congress have held their seats. From the standpoint of the outside world these are all Senators. Three principal Western politicians are among them—William E. Borah of Idaho, George W. Norris of Nebraska, and Thomas J. Walsh of Montana. Their continued presence in the Senate means the maintenance of the Progressive group, which takes no account of party ties. National questions were dominant to an extent unusual in a mid-term contest, but local and regional matters had much to do with the results. It would, for example, need no little explanation to make clear why an historic Republican State such as Illinois should elect as Senator a Wet Democrat—James Hamilton Lewis—while Pennsylvania, rock-ribbed in Republicanism of the strict machine sort, and in the great cities ruled by the graft-bootleg gangs, should once again have elected Gifford Pinchot as Governor. Mr. Pinchot is the most eminent survivor of the Roosevelt progressive movement of 1912. He is a Dry who during an energetic first governorship made a rigorous attempt at law enforcement. He is a champion of the national ownership and control of hydro-electric power, although in his State the political bosses and Big Business are mobilised to keep all such resources in the hands of the private corporations. Mr. Franklin Roosevelt, who is confirmed in his post of Governor of New York State by an immense majority, stands generally with Governor Pinchot on this question. It is to-day, and will be far more in the near future, a governing issue

of American public life. In several of the mountain States it is already more important than all other political questions and is fought with the utmost fierceness. This was especially true of Colorado, where the Democrats won largely on the power question. Mr. Hoover is against government control of power resources. The point is interesting in connection with the one man of our generation who, above all others, is associated in the public memory with great tasks of administration by disinterested authority, in wartime and afterwards.

With very few exceptions the personality and record of the State Governors do not as a rule count for much in national affairs. But we may note two other successes of this year which are of particular interest. The first is the election as Governor of Wisconsin of Mr. Philip La Follette, son of the aggressive old semi-radical leader, who closed his stormy public life with the forlorn enterprise of a Progressive-Labour third party in the Coolidge election of 1924. Another son, Robert, sits already in Washington as Senator from Wisconsin, so that in this distinctive State of the Middle West we have the unusual example of a reformer's work being carried on by younger men in the direct line of succession. The second example is that of Connecticut, which, despite its reputation for stiff Republican conservatism, has chosen as Governor Dr. Wilbur L. Cross, the biographer of Fielding and Sterne, distinguished as the editor under whom the *Yale Review* has been raised to a front place among the quarterlies of the English-speaking world. For many years past Dr. Cross has combined with his editorship the important post of Dean of the Graduate School in Yale University. In politics he is a Democrat, and a Wet; but quite apart from politics his election to the governorship of his State is an event both interesting and heartening.

Let us turn now to the larger issues of the 1930 election, which may prove in the long run to be of greater importance than many presidential conflicts. The heavy blow to the Hoover Administration was undoubtedly delivered by the masses of voters who are suffering severely from the hard times. In any circumstances the Republican majorities were certain to be reduced. Not only does that happen as a matter of political routine, but it can always be assumed that an impressive victory at the polls in the presidential year is followed two years later by exceptionally heavy losses for the party in power. The Republicans in 1930 would have been punished, though perhaps not too harshly, on account of two or three measures for which they are wholly responsible—measures dictated by foolish and outworn political notions having no relation to the economic realities of present-day America. They have as a matter of fact been mercilessly hammered because of, over-

whelming industrial and financial disasters for which no government and no political party can justly be called to account. But, of course, the Republicans had taken their stand, as no other party has ever done, upon prosperity as a fact and purpose—indeed, to an extent so outrageous that prosperity had come to be treated as a monopoly of the Grand Old Party. And from the hour of his emergence as a candidate for the Presidency, Mr. Hoover had identified himself with this singular form of party orthodoxy.

It might be interesting to reflect upon what would have happened to himself and his party if the President had resolutely stood outside the popular delusion and, acting as a scientifically trained business man, had kept a straight realistic course on all matters of economic theory and practice. Certainly he had justification enough. Even at the time of his election there were ominous signs of a break in prosperity, while the fever of speculation was already spreading over the country. Mr. Hoover spoke no word of warning. On the contrary, he gave the most whole-hearted utterance to the philosophy of *Babbitt*. His glorification of American well-being was all materialist. The American people, he argued, were leading the world, and were happy, by virtue of the full dinner-pail and the full garage; because of their modern equipment in office and home, their investments, their gramophones and radio sets. That was in 1928, but the burden of the speeches delivered during the campaign of this autumn was not different. Remember that within the year the American public had suffered from the worst collapse in the stock market ever known; and that this calamity, coupled with the business depression, had brought a fall in national income which cannot be tolerably stated in figures. It would seem to be almost unimaginable that in these circumstances the Chief Executive of the Republic could refuse to confront the crisis. And yet this is what Mr. Hoover did. In the four set speeches which made his contribution to the Republican campaign, speaking with a careful avoidance of the terrifying facts of the present situation, he strove to maintain his character as the prosperity President. These speeches were intended to embody the political faith in which, clearly, he is resolved to trust although it slay him. Its essence is an affirmation that the historic development of the United States must be conceived as progress in a right line. Misfortunes are accidental: American problems are always the problems of growth, never of decay:

The fundamental assets of the nation—the education, intelligence, virility, and the spiritual strength of our 120,000,000 people—have been unimpaired. . . . We know in fact that we have opened the door of a new social and economic system by which within our own borders we shall create the conquest of poverty. . . . I remain an unquenchable believer in the resist-

less dynamic power of American enterprise. . . . We have known a thousand temporary setbacks, but the spirit of this people will never brook defeat.

It is hardly necessary to point out that faith in the American system and method, thus confidently reasserted by the President, is still the habit of nearly all American citizens. The full tide of belief in it will return in due course. But when Mr. Hoover recited the creed during the campaign, as though American conditions to-day are substantially as they were at his inauguration, he provided his opponents with their most damaging weapon. Political leadership of the older kind was never expected from Mr. Hoover; but this way of evading a condition of affairs that had become the grim concern of the whole country seemed to prove that the President must finally disappoint the large expectation which had been based upon his character and special experience—namely, that he would be the first President of a new order, a master of national organisation and of economic statesmanship. The two economic measures of his first year had in truth already reduced that expectation to small dimensions. The Farm Relief Act, with which in the main Mr. Hoover agreed, had done little for the farmer, but had greatly intensified the problem of marketing farm produce. The Tariff Act, with which the President certainly did not agree, may turn out to be as injurious to American business as it has been to the foreign relations of the United States. At no time has Mr. Hoover attempted to exert his authority with Congress, in the manner of Roosevelt or Wilson. In the matter of the Tariff he might and could have done this, since the knowledge of the country's business which he gained as Secretary of Commerce had given him a standing such as no other President has had. The explanation of his excessive caution, which involved his missing a series of striking opportunities throughout the present year, is doubtless political. The four-years' presidential term involves a temptation for the incumbent which only a man of the strongest mind can resist. From his earliest months in the White House the President is thinking of a second term. Mr. Hoover indubitably was. On no other hypothesis can we account for the timidity of his attitude towards Congress, his anxiety to avoid making enemies among the powerful interests, and his persistence in the habit of delivering speeches made up of vague generalisation and optimistic phrases of the kind that is tolerable only amid circumstances of general well-being. The danger of these tactics is now plain enough. We can hardly doubt that Mr. Hoover would have been in a much stronger position in approaching his third year if he had not played so hard and so continuously for safety.

festly there are times when a President who would save his executive life must be ready to lose it.

There is no serious controversy as to the most prominent and disturbing issue of the November election after business depression and unemployment. It was Prohibition, now for the first time since the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment a decisive factor in many parts of the country. No fewer than eleven States have placed themselves in the Wet column; and three of these—Illinois, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island—carried referenda against the Dry Law. The eleven States are all industrial. Several of them gave up some years ago the pretence of co-operating with the Federal authority in enforcing the Volstead Act, and it is now to be assumed that, one after another, all will lapse so far as State enforcement is concerned. The combined population of the States in question is approximately one-half of the population of the Republic. These are grave facts, and it is fully expected that their serious and explosive character will be completely revealed in the immediate future by the report of the President's Committee on crime and the violation of law. The Commission is presided over by Mr. G. W. Wickersham, a New York lawyer of high standing, and the report is overdue. It was held back for public reasons until after the Congressional elections.

The successes of the Wet candidates—most of them Democrats, since the Republicans are the drier party—are both important and ominous. But it should be noted that in England, as so often before, the inferences drawn from them have gone somewhat astray. The existing Congress is professedly as dry as any that has gone before, and the Congress just elected will contain a large Dry majority. There is, accordingly, not the smallest chance that during Mr. Hoover's term the Volstead Act can be touched, or Washington see even the beginning of a legislative movement against the Eighteenth Amendment. The problem of that Amendment remains where it was, because—and this is a crucial point which angry or contemptuous opponents of Prohibition, in England and elsewhere, find it hard to apprehend—the persistence of only thirteen States out of the forty-eight means that the national Dry Law cannot be got rid of. And the immovably Dry States are chiefly rural. Some of them contain fewer inhabitants than a city of medium size; and yet in constitutional weight all the States are free and equal.

The new and portentous fact is the rapid advance of the Wet-and-Dry conflict to the forefront of politics. When Mr. Coolidge triumphed six years ago it seemed virtually impossible that Prohibition could become an issue in a presidential contest. Both parties, however unreal, stood upon the assumption that the

question had been settled once for all: the American people had made up their minds. In 1928 the Democrats of the North, under Al Smith, went as near as they dared to a programme of modification, in the face of their insuperable party obstacle that the South is Democratic and politically Dry. The change in the outlook during the past two years throughout the more populous States is most remarkable. President Hoover, in his inaugural address, placed in the centre of his appeal to the American people a plea for obedience to the law. It fell upon the ears of tens of millions as a counsel of perfection. The law-breakers constitute probably a majority of the nation. If the plea were repeated to-day it would have the sound of mockery, for since March 1929, when Mr. Hoover's speech was delivered, the apocalypse of lawlessness has swollen to appalling proportions. The transformation has been very rapid, and it is recognised as portentous by the Drys themselves. The first startling surprise came at the beginning of the year in the shape of a storm in Congress. The Wets made an aggressive move, and were astonished at the response they obtained. This was followed by a senatorial investigation, which revealed to the general public for the first time something of the morass of intrigue and corruption in which the business of enforcement was embedded. Then came the cumulative disclosures of gang rule in the great cities and the indescribable system of racketeering, together with the unfolding of the universal alliance between the great bootleggers, the gang chiefs, and the police—an epic of Hades surpassing the maddest dreams of Europe.

The election of 1930 is the first genuine attempt to force Prohibition as a straight issue into national affairs. The results do not furnish proof that the political leaders can now be driven to confront the problem and to take sides, but they undoubtedly provide a good deal of evidence in favour of the view that in the presidential election of 1932 Prohibition may be the central question. The example of Canada, with its system of public monopoly and government depots, is said to be having an influence in the United States, and opinion is believed by some to be growing in favour of State control and the restricted sale of liquor. This may be so; but it would certainly be an amazing development if the American people were turning towards such a solution of the drink problem, for the one thing certain in the past has been that they could not be induced to look at any scheme which would involve the Government's touching and handling the unclean stuff. In attempting to estimate the prospects of Prohibition, let us say within the period of the next two Administrations, it is important to remember three things which, in varying degrees, seem likely to influence the ultimate American decision: (1) That the impossibility of enforcement

is now everywhere acknowledged; (2) that the employing classes, which were at one time strong for the Dry Law, are coming to understand that the dual standard of conduct cannot be maintained; they may not seek to impose upon the wage-earners a law which they themselves refuse to recognise; and (3) that the churches and social-welfare agencies are being compelled to revise their attitude towards the method of compulsion and to adopt a realist policy of reform in the presence of the wholesale defiance of law, the shocking demoralisation of public life, and the unlimited tyranny of Liquor and Crime. It follows, of course, that the President who hitherto has been associated with the idea of Prohibition as "a noble experiment" will be obliged, if he should remain in national politics, to declare either for the Eighteenth Amendment or against it.

It is not, I think, possible for anyone amid the present confusion of all national affairs in America to make a forecast with reference either to Mr. Hoover himself or to the political trend. The two parties have been bankrupt for a generation; their organised continuance belongs to the staggering phenomena of modern democracy. But it would seem that through the disruptive force of either economic reality or social conflict, their systems will need to be rebuilt. Industrially and financially the country is now in the trough of the wave. There is a possibility—many observers would put it more strongly—that the coming year may exhibit conditions of distress more disastrous than those of 1930. But on the other hand, it is possible that the powers of recovery, which have been retarded by the world depression, will assert themselves early. In any case one very unsatisfactory feature has to be noted. The American public is collectively the victim of a Coué philosophy, a form of Christian Science which refuses to admit the existence of the miserable and the unpleasant. The facts of our epoch must sooner or later correct this obstinate folly, which may be described as a trust in the future hardly less destructive of the national fibre than England's fatal reliance on the past. And, as a matter of simple fact, it provides the President with a superb opportunity. It is vexatious for those who have admired him on the ground of his earlier achievements, and especially for those who believed that in his great office he would show a capacity for constructive leadership, to confess, as they must, that since entering the White House, Mr. Hoover has done nothing to liberate his fellow citizens from the prison of their superstition. The mid-term election has given him a severe shock. It is possible that with his back to the wall, without a Congress to fall back upon, he may at last give proof of those qualities which many among us have believed him to possess.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

THE PALESTINE PROBLEM.

THE dual purpose of this article is to refer to some of the complications of the Palestine Problem and to discuss certain events which have occurred since the publication of my last paper on the same subject.* At the risk of entering into details already familiar to those who have visited and studied the situation on the spot, it seems advisable to say that the inherent difficulty in the Palestinian question is twofold. There is the necessity to administer a small, poor, and backward country in a way befitting British reputation and prestige. Equally there is the obligation to carry out our national and international duties dependent upon the terms of the Mandate and upon the presence of the two distinct and rival races. Thus, whereas before the war Palestine and Syria together formed merely a part of the then vast Turkish Empire, to-day the former country has an area of only about 10,000 square miles (about once and a quarter the size of Wales) and a revenue of rather over two and a quarter millions. With such prevailing conditions, the Government has been called upon to obliterate the chaos existing at the time of the British occupation, to establish a modern régime and to build up and pay a Civil Service, composed either of British officials, or of Arab and Jewish functionaries for the most part closely supervised by Englishmen.

Since 1921 the British Government has provided a sum amounting to more than nine million pounds sterling and has guaranteed the Palestine Loan of £4,500,000 raised in 1927. But this British expenditure includes the defence of the country, in the years immediately preceding the disturbances of 1929 the local budget had supplied the difference between the cost of the British forces in Palestine and the expense of such forces if stationed at home and, in 1929, the Grant-in-Aid towards the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force had been so reduced as only to amount to £24,000. Furthermore, I believe that Palestine is the one section of the former Turkish Empire which has discharged its share of the Ottoman Public Debt and that she alone has paid something to the Home Government for the amenities such as railways, which remained as an outcome of the war. With the above-mentioned exception, the expenses of the Government, including the salaries of the British officials, are met by Palestine herself, generally speaking the budget balances, and, at the end of last year, there was a total surplus of £733,000. In spite of British assistance, therefore, the population has a heavy burden to bear, and naturally taxation has risen since the war. Consequently it is legitimate for all sections of the community to argue that expenditure should be curtailed, that certain Depart-

* See the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for May 1930.

ments should either have their budgets revised or be abolished and that the total number of officials should be greatly reduced.* But it is not reasonable to suggest that the Arab section of the population is put to unfair expense in order to carry out improvements for and to maintain the Jews in Palestine. Such suggestions are controverted by the facts that, in addition to the huge Zionist outlay for the creation of the National Home, the Jews defray almost the entire expense of their excellent educational system, they maintain an efficient health service and the incidence of taxation falls much more heavily upon them than upon the majority of the inhabitants.†

For imperial reasons and because we have accepted a moral as well as a legal duty, there can be no question of our withdrawal from Palestine or of changing the terms under which we are there. After the publication of the Shaw Report, the Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons on April 3rd that "His Majesty's Government will continue to administer Palestine in accordance with the terms of the Mandate as approved by the Council of the League of Nations" and that this is "an international obligation from which there can be no question of receding." Consequently, whilst Mr. W. H. Stoker, K.C., the Leading Counsel for the Arab Executive before the Shaw Commission, has raised the question as to whether the terms of the Mandate are contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations, this matter forms no part of my present subject and no attempt will here be made to go beyond the duty imposed by the Mandate itself. That particularly delicate and difficult task is at one and the same time to secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home, and the development of self-governing institutions and also to safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants irrespective of race and religion.

Out of a total population of about 626,000 souls, roughly 692,000 are Moslems, 102,000 are Jews, and 62,000 are Christians and others. The Arabs, particularly the Moslems, are, for the most part, poor and disorganised, whilst the Jews are highly intelligent, politically minded, and often extremely up to date. The result is that for the last twelve years the *Riflemen*, denuded of their privileged position enjoyed in Turkish times, the Arab Executive and

* Sir John Hope Simpson states, in his recent Report, that the total budget for agriculture and forests is £22,000, and that of this £45,000 are spent upon personal emoluments. In the Fisheries Service £180,000 go in salaries, leaving only £30,000 for the maintenance of a launch and £40,000 for investigations. In the stock-breeding department salaries account for £2,000, while other expenditure amounts to £2,000.

† In the Report of the Shaw Commission it is stated that the Jews are estimated to contribute £3 8s. 11d. per head and the Arabs £1 9s. 11d. per head per annum to the public revenue. The same document affirms that very material benefits have resulted to large sections of the Arab people from the introduction of Jewish capital.

the Supreme Moslem Council have represented their often uneducated supporters in agitating for the abrogation of the Balfour Declaration, a change in the terms of the Mandate and the establishment of constitutionalism, destined to enable them to control the country. The Zionists consider that insufficient support has been given towards the establishment of the National Home and some of their less moderate representatives have made claims, the granting of which would not have been justified in the circumstances. But the Jews have spent many millions of money for the benefit of their cause and upon the improvement of Palestine, they have almost trebled their numbers as existing at the time of the armistice, and their official leaders, particularly Dr. Weizmann, the world-famous President or ex-President of the Zionist Organisation, have supported the Mandate and a Policy of Co-operation with the Colonial Office. Owing to lack of money, the Mandatory Power has not done enough to develop the country, especially its agricultural resources. But the Government is incomparably better than in Ottoman times, there are excellent communications throughout the country and Arabic is recognised as one of the three languages in official use. Finally, whereas, in 1922 and 1923, three attempts were made to induce the Arabs to take a direct share in the government,* early in 1927 the Municipal Councils were established on an elective basis.

It is difficult even to refer to all the documents and events of the last few months. The Report† of the Shaw Commission was sympathetic to the Jews as to the immediate meaning of the events of August 1929, but it supported the Arab case, especially in regard to questions of land and immigration, and it suggested that the Government should issue an early and full statement of policy. Mr. Snell, the Labour representative on the Commission, concurred with and signed the general Report, but he added a Note of Reservations, in which he was more favourable to the Zionists than were his colleagues. Before, concurrently with, and after the publication of this Report, the Arabs, the Jews, and the Government were actively interesting themselves in the situation. On March 30th, the day before the publication of the Report, an Arab Delegation,

* In August 1922 an Order in Council provided for the creation of a Legislative Council, which was to be partly elective. The Arabs failed to co-operate and consequently the proceedings were nullified by an amending Order in Council. Subsequently the then High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, proposed the restoration of the Advisory Council, composed in the same proportions as had been intended for the Legislative Council. This suggestion did not meet with favour among the extremist Arabs, and it lapsed. In July 1923 the formation of an Arab Agency, corresponding to the Jewish Agency, was suggested. This again failed to find favour with the Arabs, it was not proceeded with and, up to now, the country has continued to be governed by an Advisory Council consisting entirely of appointed official members.

† Cmd. 3530. Price 4s. net.

us first of all consider Sir William Beveridge's argument that if wages could fall by 10 per cent. or 15 per cent. a large proportion of the unemployed would be absorbed. He argues quite logically that industry has not adjusted itself to a lower prices level and that at a time when elasticity was more needed than ever. As to his figures there can be no question. The *wholesale* prices of commodities have fallen 25 per cent. and wages have only fallen $1\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. Meanwhile the cost of social services has increased, and rates of benefit and pensions have not been reduced in proportion to the cost of living. Wages remain very much the same and the burden on the Exchequer is enormous. All this is true, and it is also true to say that if wages could be reduced, say by 10 per cent. all round, there would probably be an immediate increase in employment because it would prove a stimulus to production. At the same time we must remember first of all that retail prices have fallen much less than wholesale, and in some respects the cost of living to the workman has not decreased. Further, rates of wages are not always earnings. Even high wages with short time may mean smaller wages on the average, and periods of unemployment may still further reduce the average wage. This is not the case, of course, with the sheltered trades, but these are the very trades that can hold out against any attempt to reduce wages; nor are they subject to the pressure of foreign competition, at least to the same extent. It is the unsheltered trades that would suffer reduction first of all, and these are the trades in which wages are relatively low. Finally, any downward movement in wages, for a time at all events, does mean a general reduction in purchasing power, and if Mr. Hobson is right in his general argument that what is wanted is a better distribution of income, then a reduction in wages might have the effect of creating as much unemployment as it cured. He argues that too much income passes to the rich who use their savings for fresh capital investment instead of spending it on consumable goods. Thus the surplus capital so invested in his opinion creates still more unemployment because there is no demand for the goods thus produced and over-production necessarily follows. He would aim at keeping saving and spending in equilibrium and the only way in which this can be done in his opinion would be by taxation designed to transfer more consuming power from the relatively rich to the people of moderate means. He focuses much attention on the problem of under-consumption and the whole tenor of his book is an attempt to prove that there is no natural balance between productive and consuming power and that the only way in which that balance can be obtained is by the action of the State through taxation. Up to a certain point Mr. Hobson's analysis of the situation is convincing and his remedy

up and forwarded to the Commission. Thus matters stood in a somewhat strained position until the Meeting of the Council early in September. The Report was then considered, a statement was made that the Commission had no desire to supplant the Mandatory Power in the exercise of its duties, and Mr. Henderson, representing the British Government, expressed his appreciation of the recognition of the difficulties, and of the fact that our obligations to the two sections of the community are of equal weight and in no sense irreconcilable.

The contents of the Hope Simpson Report and of the White Paper are in some ways similar and in others dissimilar. Both documents deal with questions of immigration, land settlement, and development, but their tone and sometimes their general attitudes differ materially. The Hope Simpson Report clearly favours the Arab standpoint, directly and indirectly it condemns a good deal which the Zionists have done, and it makes a number of suggestions to the Government. The author appears to be somewhat optimistic in regard to the matter of recovering the cost of his suggested land-purchase and development schemes and at times he seems to have ignored the deeper spirit of Zionism. But he obviously endeavoured to discover the truth and, above all, he has said nothing which closes the door to Jewish aspirations or which stands in the way of the fair and unbiased carrying out of the terms of the Mandate. Indeed, if Sir John confidently states that, with the present methods of Arab cultivation, there is no margin of land for agricultural settlement by new immigrants, with the exception of such undeveloped land as the various Jewish Agencies hold in reserve, he also contends that with the thorough development of the country there will be room for not less than 20,000 families of settlers from outside. Such a figure suggests a very real and distinct hope, for it infers that sooner or later perhaps 100,000 more Zionists can be placed upon or supported by land not yet theirs, and that consequently a further 200,000 immigrants might be admitted in connection with the work which these Colonists would provide. A real expectation of such a kind would facilitate the collection of further funds for the improvement of the reserve land now in Jewish hands and for other purposes—a collection certainly to be rendered most difficult unless the terms of the White Paper are materially modified or officially explained.

Space forbids further comment upon more than a very few of Sir John Hope Simpson's detailed opinions. He is no doubt right in saying that no definite policy for the improvement of land held by Arabs has been adopted, that the Government should acquire the areas needed for that purpose, and that a Development Commission should be charged with the duty of preparing and provid-

ing land for Arabs and Jews alike. He is equally correct in affirming that more should be spent upon agriculture and education and that the present burden of the commuted tithe is unfair to the agricultural population. But, if tithe is reduced or abolished, it is difficult to see whence the money is to come for current needs, still less for improvements, unless a heavy subsidy is to be provided by the British Exchequer. Coming more closely to the Jewish question, the author has every right to say that the older Colonies, financed by the Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association, have done more for the native population than the Zionist settlements and that, in the latter, land must be held and worked only by Jews. But it should be remembered that the money which provides this land comes, not from official but from private sources, and that it was subscribed for the express object of helping Jews and Jews alone. Equally, whilst it is difficult from the Report to work out the average general cost of settling a family, the necessary funds are derived exclusively from non-Governmental quarters, and, as their expenditure must tend to enrich Palestine, there seems little cause for official complaint however high that cost may be. Finally no reasonable or fair-minded person should or can advocate the immigration of a larger number of Jews than the country can absorb, there is certainly great poverty among the Arabs, and no doubt a great many fellah families always have been and are landless. But there will be differences of opinion as to whether the situation will be improved by attempting to arrange co-operation among people, often still unfit to understand such a system, by giving occupancy rights to tenants who already have considerable legal protection, and by placing such restrictions upon the sale of land as very seriously to reduce its present somewhat exaggerated value.

In its general contents and phraseology, the White Paper is an indictment of the Jews quite as much as, if not more than, a pronouncement of British policy. Stated to have been framed after very careful consideration of the Hope Simpson Report and of other information recently received, this all-important document certainly goes much further than that Report, particularly in the way that it practically disregards the constructive suggestions there made. For instance, whilst Sir John Hope Simpson regrets that certain lands, which could have been used for settlement and which were owned by the Government, have passed into other hands, the White Paper ignores this criticism. Again, whereas Sir John Hope Simpson says that, even if the Zionist policy in regard to the tenure and working of the land is contrary to Article Six of the Mandate, he admits that this policy is logical and has a basis in fact, the White Paper, on the other hand, contents

itself with a general condemnation of the present-day Jewish arguments, and by saying they are "unconvincing, if not fallacious." Furthermore, it may or may not be true that too many immigrants have been admitted to Palestine, that travellers who have entered the country for a limited time have remained, and that a number of persons have evaded the frontier control. But it seems unfair to couple some of these remarks with references to the preparation of the (Jewish) Labour Schedule, especially as Sir John Hope Simpson, in mentioning the frontier question, speaks of an illicit immigration through Syria and of the arrival of immigrants from Trans-Jordan, in neither of which areas is there any large number of Jews. Finally, widespread Zionist hostility was naturally aroused by the statement in the White Paper that "if immigration of Jews results in preventing the Arab population from obtaining the work necessary for its maintenance or if Jewish unemployment unfavourably affects the general labour position" it is the duty of the Mandatory Power to reduce or to suspend such immigration until the unemployed portion of the "other section" has obtained work. Lord Passfield's explanations, the recent sanctioning of about 1,500 Jewish immigrants and the important Parliamentary Debate upon Palestine have done a good deal to allay anxiety in regard to the above-mentioned and other matters. Otherwise the contents of the White Paper would indeed have created a serious situation.

Whilst neither is highly controversial from the broader standpoint, the Government's proposed measures for security and for constitutional reform are worthy of brief mention. Notwithstanding any pressure or threats, order is to be maintained, and, including the forces stationed in Trans-Jordan, two battalions of infantry, two squadrons of aircraft, and four sections of armoured cars, are to be maintained for the present. The British section of the Palestine Police has also been increased, I believe to a strength of about six hundred men. These, and other precautions, should prevent or localise any further trouble. With regard to the development of self-governing institutions, real constitutionalism, based upon a freely and entirely elected Council, is out of the question, because the large Arab majority would certainly vote against any further Jewish immigration and against everything favourable to the National Home. For that reason the proposed Legislative Council and the proposed newly constituted Advisory Council of eight years ago were to be made up partly of official and partly of unofficial members. According to the present suggestion corresponding measures are to be taken, and the new Legislative Council is to be composed of the High Commissioner, ten official nominated members and twelve elected representatives. If, as

before, the twelve elected members are to be sub-divided so that eight are Moslems, two Jews and two Christians, then, in addition to the actual veto, retained in the hands of the High Commissioner or of Downing Street, the Administration will be able to secure a majority in almost any conceivable combination of circumstances.

It would be of no value or interest for a student, with no technical legal knowledge, to express an opinion as to whether the policy set out in the White Paper does or does not constitute a breach of our moral and judicial undertaking, or whether it (such a policy) would be contrary to the terms of the Mandate and of the Balfour Declaration. Lord Balfour is dead; Mr. Baldwin, Sir Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Amery, who represent a Party which has been in power for about half the Mandatory period, consider that His Majesty's Government would appear to have abandoned the policy pursued by every British Cabinet since the institution of the present régime and that the new programme would seem to be in conflict "with the whole spirit of the Balfour Declaration and with the statements made by successive Governments in the last twelve years." Mr. Lloyd George, himself Prime Minister at the time of the original declaration and of the acceptance of the Mandate, has associated himself with these views and said that after much consideration, not merely of its policy but of its wording, the Balfour Declaration was prepared by the Representatives of all the Allied Countries and of the Dominions and that, without consulting them, the British Government has issued a Statement which, in substance, is a revocation of a solemn pledge given at a most solemn moment. General Smuts, a Member of the War Cabinet when the Balfour Declaration was made in 1917, has telegraphed to the Prime Minister* that the present reported policy makes a retreat from that Declaration, which cannot now be varied unilaterally. To this Mr. MacDonald replied promptly and fully, but clearly not to the entire satisfaction of the great South African politician, for in his answer he (General Smuts) says that "some misconceptions" have been removed by the Premier, but that his (General Smuts') impression remains that "both as regards land purchase and immigration the Government's statement does not correspond to the active obligation for a National Home." Finally Lord Hailsham and Sir John Simon, of opposite political opinions, but perhaps our two leading legal authorities of the day, consider that† in certain important respects, the White Paper appears to them "to involve a departure from the terms of the Mandate."

However this may be, the early results of recent events have been marked and widespread. Dr. Weizmann at once decided to resign

his Presidency of the Zionist Organisation and of the Jewish Agency because he considers that the White Paper creates no common ground for co-operation with the Government.* Lord Melchett, taking a corresponding view† has resigned his joint Chairmanship of the Council and his Chairmanship of the Political Committee of the Jewish Agency. There have been Jewish or Pro-Jewish meetings of protest in the United States, in South Africa, and in various other parts of the world. To these developments Lord Passfield has replied in a long letter to Dr. Weizmann‡ and in one addressed to *The Times*.§ A little later on (November 14th) it was officially announced that the Government had invited representatives of the Jewish Agency to confer with them about various misunderstandings, and it is believed that this invitation has been or will be accepted. Finally, although Dr. Shiels stated that the White Paper, as amplified and explained in Parliament on November 17th, still stands, it is clear that the more conciliatory attitude then shown by the Government will materially ease the situation. Rightly or wrongly we are to guarantee a loan of £2,500,000 for development and the National Home is not to be crystallised at its present stage. Such statements, coupled with the acceptance of renewed Jewish immigration, do in fact constitute a fundamental change in the tone of the White Paper. It is to be hoped that they will be accepted in a conciliatory spirit by the two great races concerned.

H. CHARLES WOODS.

* See letter to Lord Passfield in *The Times* for October 21st.
 † See letter to Dr. Weizmann in *The Times* for October 22nd.
 ‡ See *The Times*, October 31st.
 § See *The Times*, November 6th.

* See *The Times*, October 27th.
 † See *The Times*, November 4th.

LORD IRWIN'S DISPATCH.

IT is unwise to buy a pig in a poke: but it is not very much wiser to advertise one. There were doubtless reasons which prompted Lord Irwin's Government to allow it to be suggested that their report would be "an advance" on the Simon Report. Some of these reasons are obvious even at this distance. But it was dangerous, and the immediate results have been unfortunate. Nationalist India, after gazing at the emerging pig in silence for a few hours, has cried almost with one voice that it is a poor specimen and will not do—while the fanatics in this country who have persuaded themselves that it is possible to rule 300,000,000 people, with a little judicious killing, against their will, cry quite as loudly that it is monstrously fat and should never have been surrendered at all.

Lord Irwin has been accused of "selling the pass" in this dispatch. The fact is that the pass of which his accusers are thinking cannot be held by the methods which they have in mind. There are few wiser and no graver words in the Viceroy's dispatch than those which record the Government of India's conviction that "the time has passed when it was safe to assume the passive consent of the governed" in India. What they mean the speeches at the Round Table Conference—not least that of the Maharajah of Bikaner—illustrate almost grimly. What we could not do in Ireland we certainly cannot do in India. The age of government by pure force is past.

The advertisement was in reality perfectly true. Lord Irwin's dispatch does represent "an advance" on the proposals of the Simon Report. In one most important respect it represents a great advance. It was clear from the beginning that Indian opinion would never accept patiently the suggestion of Sir John Simon and his colleagues that the Indian Central Government should be left with the virtually unchecked authority which it wields at present. This was so clear that it was always a little mysterious why the Commission should ever have believed otherwise. Perhaps they did not in their hearts: perhaps they merely found that they could not agree among themselves on this vital question, and so decided to leave it on the other side and to pass on merely muttering "Unity."

Too near to the realities of Indian life and thought to adopt this course, the Viceroy and his advisers sat down very honestly to the forlorn task of inventing a Government which should be at one and the same time representative and autocratic, indissolubly one while yet truly reflecting the myriad facets of Indian feeling. Their answer to the riddle seems at first sight a mere jumble of

strange and, for the most part, ugly words. They reject "dyarchy" but they propose "dualism." They find representative government in any full sense impossible. But they suggest "responsive" government. A malicious foreigner, glancing over their recommendations, might declare them a typical example of characteristic British hypocrisy. They are not in the least hypocritical. They are the very honest attempt of extremely industrious Civil Servants to devise expedients to meet a series of difficulties which experience has taught them to regard as formidable. If Indians could but be brought to believe it, it was exactly thus (though not, of course, so self-consciously nor in such fiery haste) that the English Constitution was made. It, too, in origin is a jumble of expedients to meet practical difficulties, thrown together almost anyhow, and growing marvellously into an organic whole. The task of the hard-thinking lawyers and Churchmen of Plantagenet days and later was not altogether unlike in kind the task to which the Indian Government has been addressing itself, it is true in a wholly different spirit.

It must be admitted that the result is not at first sight attractive. Lord Irwin's "responsive" Government is to contain certain party leaders nominated by the Viceroy himself as Ministers from his new Legislative Assembly. They are to assure that the Government shall be really "responsive" to Indian public opinion. Let it be assumed, as perhaps it may be, that the Viceroy selects in practice the most influential and not merely the most amenable party leaders. Will their influence survive the choice? The Simon Commission found that in the provinces under "dyarchy" Ministers thus nominated by the Government lost at once their influence in their parties and became in their erstwhile followers' eyes mere officials. Why should it be different at the Centre?

But if there is this doubt whether there will be any real response to "responsive" government, will it at any rate govern? A wide field of subjects (including some of the most important functions of government) is to be retained in fact under the control of the British Parliament: and the functions to be so retained are to be determined arbitrarily by Parliament itself. In another wide field the new Indian Government is still to be liable to interference from Whitehall and Westminster: only in the field of domestic administration is it to be really unquestioned master in its own house. This, to be sure, is an advance. This also is a wide field. Even so, one reads with a slight shock of surprise the proud boast with which the framers of the dispatch conclude their labours.

"The Government of India would then be a distinct entity, capable of acting in domestic matters on its own initiative and

within the ambit of its uncontrolled powers free to pursue its own policy."

But would it be "a distinct entity"? One is reminded of the poor lady in Sir James Barrie's play. "X plus Y little two equals X little two plus two XY plus Y little two! I can't believe it." Would the new government work at all? Its authors themselves are assailed in the end with horrid doubts on the subject. And well they may be.

On another important point the Irwin Dispatch marks the advertised "advance" on the Simon Report. Indian opinion has shown itself resolutely opposed to the suggestion of the Simon Commission that the Central Assembly shall be indirectly elected. This is a pity, for the Commission's proposal that the Central Assembly should consist of delegates indirectly elected from the Provincial Councils seemed to the onlooker a very workmanlike piece of constitution building, admirably suited to a federal Commonwealth. But if it is a pity, it is a fact. Articulate India will have none of this suggestion. It insists that its Central Assembly must be directly elected: and the dispatch meets this demand with its experimental body of 200, 150 directly elected, 12 officials and 38 members at present to be nominated in order to secure some representation for the depressed classes and other rather helpless minorities. The objections to direct election, of course, remain. A gentleman returned by 80,000 or 90,000 electors (themselves a small minority of a district perhaps larger than an English county) may succeed in "representing" them in a Legislative Assembly possibly hundreds of miles away from his colossal constituency. But how will he perform this miracle? To the dispassionate onlooker such a system seems a mere mockery of real "representation." But India does not think so; and perhaps she may be right. Perhaps in a wide sense this "representation" may be more real than we think. If it be indeed as shadowy as it seems, the argument cuts both ways. For if India wants a shadow, why should we deny it her? The only answer is that the Assembly of shadows will be inefficient: and that argument misstates the issue. For the basis of democracy is justice and a square deal, not efficiency, except the efficiency which is the ultimate by-product of these things. In the conditions at present prevailing in India it would certainly be a wild assumption that a public body is necessarily inefficient because it is not really representative: as wild as the opposite assumption that if it be but truly representative it will necessarily be efficient.

A prudent layman will only intervene with extreme caution in the long tirade against Sir Walter Layton's financial proposals which fills so large a part of the Indian Government's Dispatch. How is he to estimate what is the probable yield of the salt duty under

circumstances still to be determined: or what are the real needs in order of precedence of the various provinces: or how far and by what sacrifices the Central Government can afford to meet them? But one question he may without impertinence ask. Sir Walter Layton's figures are challenged line upon line with a certain acid solemnity. They are said to be almost wholly wrong. Where then did he get these figures? For he must have got them from somewhere. An economist of world-wide repute does not invent out of his own head the statistics on which he works. Naïvely, the dispatch reveals this important fact. He got most of them apparently from the Indian Government's Director of Commercial Intelligence: all of them from the Indian Government. The spectacle presented by this part of the dispatch in other words is that of the head of the Indian Government biting fiercely its own tail. It may be an unedifying spectacle (though it would seem that there should be an allegory concealed in it somewhere): but it is not unamusing: and it does not really matter so much as might be supposed. For though railing at his figures, the Indian Government (even that part of it which rails) accepts practically all Sir Walter's constitutional proposals. The admirably ingenious scheme which converts the financial needs of the provinces into links binding them firmly to the Federal Government is endorsed. Vowing she would ne'er consent Lord Byron's lady consented: muttering and grumbling over his figures, the Indian Government accepts Sir Walter Layton's plan.

But the great fact which has overclouded both the Irwin Dispatch and the Simon Report is the emergence at the Round Table Conference of Indian Federation as an apparently imminent reality. At the time at which this article is written the result of the Round Table Conference is still in doubt. What is no longer in doubt even after its first sitting is the fact that the Indian Princes stand side by side with the spokesmen of British India in the demand for a Federated Commonwealth of India. To the authors of the Dispatch, buried necessarily in the detail of their administrative routine, such a consummation seemed last September a remote ideal "not likely to realise itself, save in its own due time." The Simon Commission, less concerned with the intricate details of the immediate problems of British India, envisaged the ideal a little more clearly and steadily. But neither foresaw the rapid changes which, as a result of the Round Table Conference, have brought it to the very front of Indian politics. Perhaps it would be rash to say that the hastening of All India Federation makes the problem really simpler. There may be new difficulties which will reveal themselves in the new order, possibly in the course of the Conference itself. But some of the old difficulties it certainly smooths

away; and it alters the whole perspective of the problem. If they had foreseen what was about to happen it seems certain that neither the Report nor the Dispatch would have taken the shape they did take. The perspective, above all, is radically altered. The delegates of the Indian States sitting in an All India Central Assembly will not only give it an authority which it has never possessed before: they may provide precisely the balance which the Indian Government has been seeking artificially to create. On the other hand, it will scarcely be possible to treat such an assembly with quite the paternal condescension which has been shown to the Central Assembly in the past and which accounts in some measure for its irritable irresponsibility. With the States included, the new Assembly must be in germ at any rate the Parliament of India: and will have to be so regarded by all concerned.

Whatever may be the upshot, the Irwin dispatch marks at least three important steps forward on the road to that "Dominion status" which Indian nationalism demands immediately. The Simon Report, while it recommended certain changes, did not very greatly alter the positions of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. Under "responsive government" a drastic change is proposed at once with the prospect of further still more drastic changes to come. It is not clear that the hand of the Secretary of State has been heavy on India in recent years. It is perhaps significant that the dispatch has to go back to Lord Morley's time to find examples of any stringent interpretation of the "doctrine of agency." But the British elector, who probably has almost forgotten the fact that the Viceroy is still required constitutionally to be subject to the orders of the Secretary of State for India, is now reminded of it dramatically by the demand that over a wide field of administration this subordination shall be ended. The demand is made quite clearly and it can be neither permanently resisted nor successfully withdrawn.

Again, though "responsive government" itself will probably prove a transient and embarrassed phantom, its invention marks a very important stage in the history of Indian constitutionalism. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms gave semi-responsible government to the Indian provinces, or some of them. The Simon Report sweeps this away and gives them full responsible government: while refusing for the time being to reform the Central Government in any way. The Irwin Dispatch involves the grant of semi-responsibility at the centre. This concession also marks a step from which there can be no going back.

But, finally, the dispatch points to the failure of the attempt to insist on indirect election for the Central Legislative Assembly. Perhaps some day, when India is mistress in her own house, she

may reverse this decision of her own accord; but she will not accept indirect election upon dictation.

Not very well arranged, the Simon Commission Report was finely written throughout and in places very beautifully written. Far worse arranged still, the Irwin Dispatch rises only here and there in a lucid dignified phrase out of the morass of commonplace official jargon in which it is couched. But the importance of the Irwin Dispatch, whatever may happen, cannot be disregarded. It may be true, as *The Times* said in an admirable leading article, that the authors of the dispatch "had their ears too near to the ground" and "could not see the horizon." It has been well for England and well for India that during these last critical years some in India have had their ears to the ground and have not lacked either the honesty to report what they heard, the intelligence and sympathy to interpret it aright, or the pertinacity and courage to keep on repeating their warnings to rather unwilling ears. Both India and this country are, in fact, under a profound debt to Lord Irwin and his advisers. How much of their recommendations will in the end be found acceptable and realised in fact, no one at the present moment can say. It may be much: it may be little: it may be almost nothing. But even if it be nothing, that will not diminish the real value of their conspicuous services. They will still have played a part of quite vital importance in the rapidly moving dangerous drama of Indian politics during the past few years. But for their diligence and sympathy, it is hard to see how a catastrophe could have been averted; and their service will not have been the less remarkable, because it is possible that it will neither be very widely recognised nor very generously rewarded.

STUART HODGSON.

THE FASCIST THRUST IN AUSTRIA.

THE Austrian elections have resulted in a sharp rebuke by the voters to the Chancellor, Herr Karl Vaugoin, for his action in overthrowing the Government of Doctor Schober. The representation of the Clerical (Christian-Socialist) Party has dropped from 73 to 66, with a loss of 250,000 votes, although in Vienna and Lower Austria they had the support of the Clerical Wing of the *Heimwehr*. The remainder of the *Heimwehr*, standing as the *Heimatblock*, on principles closely resembling those of Hitler, won eight mandates mostly at the expense of the Clericals, who will probably also have to present four of their own sixty-six mandates to their allies, the Clerical *Heimwehr*. Doctor Schober, who with the slogan of "peace and order" sought an expression of disapproval from the country of his treatment by Herr Vaugoin, was rewarded with nineteen seats, a valuable tribute to the average Austrian's dislike of the extreme reactionary course. The Socialists secured an extra mandate, although their total poll fell by two per cent., and became, with seventy-two mandates, the strongest individual party, faced by three mutually hostile yet anti-Socialist groups—Clericals, Schober Block and *Heimatblock*—disposing of ninety-three mandates. The normal course would naturally be for Herr Vaugoin to resign, for the Socialists then to be invited to take office and to decline after failing to form a coalition with Dr. Schober, and for the Clericals, after shedding Herr Vaugoin in favour of a less extreme leader such as Herr Kunschak, to form a moderate anti-Socialist coalition government with Dr. Schober, leaving the *Heimatblock* as an extreme Right Opposition. The abnormal in politics has so long been accepted without effective protest by the Austrian people, however, that at the moment of writing—two days after the elections—it is impossible to predict how—if at all—the will of the electors will be allowed to prevail.

From the moment that the Clerical-Fascist Cabinet of Herr Vaugoin took office on October 31st, it was clear that Austria had entered, at the very least for the period which must elapse between then and November 9th, the date fixed for the elections, on a very critical stage. Very soon doubts began to be universally expressed whether elections would ever be held. Wild speeches of Prince Starhemberg, the *Heimwehr* Minister of Interior, and of Herr Vaugoin, the militant and militarist Chancellor, made it seem likely that the Clericals and the *Heimwehr* would at the last moment shrink from the test of the ballot-boxes and proclaim a dictatorship. These expectations were not realised. Democracy was nominally allowed to remain the guiding spirit, but actually

the country was controlled by a veiled dictatorship of the Right which has gagged Democracy by destroying the freedom of the Press and handcuffed her by disarming the Republican Defence Corps, while leaving the anti-democratic *Heimwehr* irregulars in possession of their far heavier armament.

- Even those causes known to the public for the Cabinet crisis which brought about the fall of Doctor Schober (twelve months to within a day after he had taken office) suggested that Austria was faced with a period of extreme reaction. Those causes make strange reading for Western Europe. Dr. Schober's Vice-Chancellor and Minister of War, Herr Karl Vaugoin, had succeeded in the nine years during which he had held the latter office in changing the character of the Austrian Army from a revolutionary, republican and largely Socialist force into a well-disciplined body of men recruited through the recommendation of the local Roman Catholic priest, officered by former servants of the Habsburgs, most of whom retain to-day their sentiment of loyalty to the deposed and exiled House. This process he had determined to repeat in the administration of the Federal Railways. For the purpose of breaking the power of the Socialist organisations amongst the railwaymen he had selected, on the recommendation of Dr. Rintelen, the *Heimwehr* Governor of Styria, a young *Heimwehr* commander called Strafella, who, as manager of the little provincial tramway service in Graz, had successfully broken a tramway strike. Dr. Strafella, Herr Vaugoin decided, must be made general manager of Austria's most valuable State property, the Federal Railways, although the President of the railways and other experts declared that he was lacking in the necessary technical qualifications. When the Socialist *Arbeiterzeitung* attacked this political appointment to a great State industrial undertaking, alleging that Dr. Strafella wished to obtain the control of secret funds of the Federal Railways in order to spend them on the *Heimwehr*, Dr. Strafella brought an action for libel.

He won his case on many points. It was proved that he had no knowledge of the existence of the funds built up by secret commissions from contractors for the railways, the scandal of the origin and employment of which was dragged to light (to the detriment of Austria's interests) in court. The judge, however, found that in respect of Dr. Strafella's speculations in houses and of certain options deals, his conduct had been "*unsauber und inkorrekt*"—that he had unclean hands and had behaved incorrectly—and further that he had been correctly described as "a political protégé of Dr. Rintelen."

Immediately following the verdict of the court, Herr Vaugoin headed a revolt of the Clerical (Christian-Social) members of Dr.

Schober's Cabinet and declared that Schober must have Strafella immediately appointed general manager of the Federal Railways. Dr. Schober did not even go so far as to say that after such a verdict the appointment was impossible, but merely declared that he could not agree to the appointment of Strafella unless the Court of Appeal cleared his character, and that on no account would he attempt to influence that Court by appointing Strafella in advance of its decision. Hereupon the Vice-Chancellor, Herr Vaugoin, and the Clericals resigned. Dr. Schober tendered his resignation to President Miklas.

Under the new Constitution, very wide powers belong to the President of the Republic. It was open to Herr Miklas (who was formerly a member of the Clerical Party) either to accept the resignation of Herr Vaugoin and invite Dr. Schober to find a new Minister of War, or to drop the pilot who had guided Austria through the most critical year of her existence, avoiding by his wise moderation and firmness the threatening counter-revolution and civil war, and invite Herr Vaugoin to draw up a list of Ministers for his approval. Herr Miklas, as is known, chose the latter course, and approved the list submitted by Herr Vaugoin, which included two open adherents of a Fascist dictatorship—the newly-elected Commander-in-Chief of the *Heimwehr*, Prince Ernst Ruediger von Starhemberg, as Minister of the Interior, and Dr. Hueber, Commander of the Salzburger *Heimwehr*, as Minister of Justice. How little the overthrow of Dr. Schober was desired in Austria was shown next day by the fact that of all the Vienna newspapers, only the extremist Clerical *Reichspost* approved. The remainder of the Press of all shades agreed in regretting that extreme Clericalism should have overthrown the man who had rendered such magnificent service to Austria, and on such a pretext. What lay behind this pretext is probably little known to the British public, which unfortunately has little idea of how much greater and more dangerous the powder magazine of Europe, confined before the war to two or three small States in the Balkan peninsula, has become to-day now that the Great Powers are able to intrigue and manœuvre among the new "Balkans"—seven or eight important States stretching from the Balkans to the Baltic.

The overthrow of Dr. Schober is closely connected with the underground struggle between France and Italy, between the democratic and the fascist state-form, between the policy of adjustment and that of forcible alteration of the peace-treaty frontiers of which Central Europe and the Balkans form the battle-ground to-day. Dr. Schober was overthrown almost immediately on his return from Geneva, and it was his international success there which determined his fate. Since the reconciliation between the two Romes

—that of the Vatican and that of Signor Mussolini, the Austrian Clerical Party (dominated, despite his resignation of the nominal leadership, by the coldly brilliant intellect and political agility of Monsignor Seipel) has become an ally of the Italian doctrine of forcible revision of the peace treaties in favour of those States which have destroyed democracy and modelled their system of government on fascism.

In Signor Mussolini, Monsignor Seipel sees the most powerful supporter of those ambitions which form the mainspring of his policy—the creation under a restored Habsburg dynasty of a "Black" (Clerical) Central European block of States, to be formed at the expense of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Roumania. Monsignor Seipel visited Geneva while Dr. Schober was there. He found the Austrian Chancellor well advanced on the road towards making Austria a link between France and Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and Germany on the other. Schober had established contact with Dr. Curtius and Dr. Benes, and had obtained from them the undertaking to open negotiations with the object of arriving at important commercial and industrial agreements which would eventually have joined together Austria, Germany and Czechoslovakia in an industrial block, a useful counterpart of the East European agrarian block, the foundations for which were recently laid by Yugoslavia and Roumania.

Dr. Schober utilised M. Briand's raising of the Pan-European question to urge that the first step should be an attempt to build up a "United Europe" from below, by means of the grouping together of two or three States at a time in industrial-commercial blocks, with preferential customs arrangements. Even an attempt to create such a block, with Austria as a link between Germany and France's protégé, Czechoslovakia, would have definitely committed Austria to the support of the Briand-Stresemann policy of peaceable revision. The approving speeches of Dr. Curtius and of Freiherr von Rheinbaben, as well as the decision of France to examine the possibilities of the export of East-European grain to Central Europe, showed how successful Dr. Schober had been. Any advance along the path which Dr. Schober had chosen for Austria would have made impossible the realisation of the ideal cherished by Dr. Seipel of guiding Austria towards Italy. As soon as Dr. Seipel had started on one of those political absences from Austria which have more than once established an *alibi* for him while trouble began at home for his opponents, Herr Vaugoin pushed the Strafella question to extremes in a way which, but for the underlying necessity from Monsignor Seipel's standpoint of stopping Dr. Schober's foreign political course, would be inexplicable. Monsignor Seipel himself in a *Matin* interview with M. Jules

advanced from two to five, very much can be done. We can, in the first place, offer a welcome to her students in every one of our schools and universities. It is true that there are some few hundreds of Chinese students scattered throughout Great Britain, but their numbers might easily be doubled or trebled under capable organisation. There is scope for a central institution, with the combined attributes of an information bureau and a hostel, where Chinese students could obtain guidance as to their course of study. By this means touch would be maintained between the educational authorities in China, and such English and Scottish colleges as would be ready to receive Chinese students in greatly increased numbers. We can also do much to extend and develop the teaching of western learning in and around the open ports in China. Primary schools, on the lines of those already established in Shanghai, are perhaps China's greatest need, for her supply of technically trained men is apt to become greater annually than she is able to absorb. But it is far from my purpose to prescribe how best our effort to assist in Chinese education may be made. The work was well and thoroughly done by the Advisory Committee appointed under the China Indemnity (Application) Act of 1925. And to the question "What can we do?" the two hundred closely-reasoned pages of that Report furnish an ample and adequate answer.

To revert to my main theme, the abolition of extraterritorial jurisdiction, I suggest that our interests and trade in China have not suffered in the past in any appreciable measure from the lack of proper civil courts, and that they may even have gained by the compensating tendency for disputes to be settled by arbitration. In the future, although the spirit of mutual accommodation may not prevail to anything like the same extent, yet during the period in which law reform is in progress, however protracted that period may be, the volume of our trade is unlikely to be affected. We can only trade in China with the goodwill of the Chinese people. Without that goodwill our trade must inevitably suffer from the pin-pricks of interference, from the hardships of delay in procedure, and, probably, from grievous injustices. But with it, and there is every reason to think that under our present policy it is on the road to being secured, we ought to find in China the widest remaining field on the Planet for trade expansion.

W. E. LEVISON.

then on the other. Although at the moment she seems to dread the *Anschluss* solution more than the other, she will probably conclude eventually that the greatest peril to peace lies in strengthening the militant Fascist forces in Europe, and accept—if it be not too late—the lesser evil of the union of a democratic Germany and Austria.

Six months ago it still seemed impossible that elections in Austria could do much to alter the balance of parties. At the last election the Clericals secured seventy-three seats and the Socialists seventy-one, the Clericals obtaining, however, an effective majority by the alliance with the *Landbund*—nine seats—and the Pan-Germans, whose twelve seats were really a gift to them from the Clericals. The whole situation was changed by the decision of the unknown quantity, the *Heimwehr*, to stand for Parliament (without ceasing to call for its abolition) and by the secession of the *Landbund* and Pan-Germans under ex-Chancellor Schober with his motto of "Peace, Order and Legality" as a middle-party to oppose both Clerical-Fascism and Socialism. If the real voice of the naturally law-abiding, conservative and reasonable Austrian people could have been heard, Schober would undoubtedly have swept the country. Under the rigid party system with its strict internal discipline which obtains in Austria, it was obvious from the start that Dr. Schober could not hope to win at the best more than a few seats from his opponents. The religious man and woman believe the priest who tells them that they will burn in hell-fire to eternity if they read opposition newspapers or vote against the Clerical Party. The non-Catholic workman believes the Socialist leaders, who put him through hell in this world as a traitor to his class if he joins the local Catholic instead of the local Socialist football club, stamp-collecting club, or canary breeders' association. In these circumstances Dr. Schober's nineteen mandates are an important achievement.

Both the Schober Block and the Social-Democrats were hampered throughout the electoral campaign by the high-handed action of the minority Government which had not even complied with the constitutional provision that it should present itself to Parliament for approval; instead, Parliament was dissolved as soon as the Ministers had taken the oath. "It was left to Austria," wrote a leading newspaper, "to furnish the spectacle of a Government without parliamentary support, without a majority in the country and without any mandate from Parliament, acting as though it had been elected for all eternity." From the moment of its taking office, the Government set up a system of rigid political censorship, or rather, something far worse than censorship—wholesale confiscations. Day after day opposition newspapers were seized after

publication and destroyed, a procedure involving each of the always hard-pressed Viennese newspapers affected in a loss of several hundred pounds on each occasion. The special effectiveness of this as compared with pre-publication censorship is that eventually the newspapers, not being able to ascertain in advance what the censor will and will not allow, adopt a policy of extreme caution to escape heavy financial loss. Newspapers, including highly respected Liberal and Conservative organs, were swept up in bulk within an hour of issue and re-appeared later with tell-tale blanks. With some of these victims it is difficult to feel much sympathy, for by their coquetting with the *Heimwehr* in the past at a time when foreign correspondents were attacked for insisting on the Fascist character of *Heimwehrism* while its leaders did not admit it as openly as they do to-day, such newspapers dug their own graves. There was a certain *Schadenfreude* for its enemies to be derived from the complete consternation of one strongly Fascist but Jewish-owned newspaper when the militant anti-semitism, which for those who could read the signs had always been a powerful hidden factor in the *Heimwehr* movement, was suddenly openly confessed by the election of Herr Hitler's friend, Prince Starhemberg, to the supreme command. The panic-stricken attempt which followed to form a "Jewish *Heimwehr*" had about as much prospect of success as a "Battalion of Capitalist Bolsheviks" might have in Moscow to-day.

In addition to confiscations of newspapers under the paragraph of the criminal code forbidding the spreading of alarmist rumours, opposition election posters were seized and destroyed in great quantity—the Socialists in at least one case, however, succeeded in getting an order of the courts for the destruction as blasphemous of a Clerical poster depicting Socialist youths stoning Christ on the Cross. The pastoral letter of the Cardinal Archbishop of Vienna made it a Christian duty to vote against Socialists as the enemies of Christ; this, of course, strikes the keynote of the struggle in Austria, which was one between Clericalism and Socialism long before the Fascist moment occurred. The slogan of the Clericals was "Remember July 15th, 1927," and their many posters repeating the legend that the Socialist Party planned the burning down of the Palace of Justice on this day (despite the fact that the Socialist leaders vainly risked their lives to prevent it) were untouched by the censor. All the pictorial attempts of the Socialists, however, to show the armed *Heimwehr* as a threat to peace and to the workers were confiscated under the paragraph referred to. So also were newspapers for publishing secret documents of the *Heimwehr*, admittedly a year old, showing their preparations for a *Putsch* at that time and their detailed plans for

a dictatorship. One newspaper was seized for publishing official stock-exchange statistics showing a fall in securities since the Vaugoin Cabinet had taken office—another for reprinting, without comment, an article by M. Léon Blum on the *Heimwehr* peril, and yet another merely for reproducing a photograph of a *Heimwehr* machine-gun detachment at machine-gun practice, inscribed "Remember the dead." When, however, a *Heimwehr* organ published a special edition with a concocted story that the Socialists were planning a *Putsch*, no action was taken. The actual details of the *Putsch* really prepared by the Styrian *Heimwehr* under the Monarchist General Ellissen as an "extra turn" for October 18th-19th, which was averted by Dr. Schober going to Herr Vaugoin, telling him the facts, and informing him that the police were prepared to defend the Constitution, were suppressed, and Dr. Schober's principal organ which published them was confiscated.

What alarmed the population both in Austria and abroad far more than any newspaper article were, of course, the speeches of Prince Starhemberg and other members of the Government calling for Jewish "heads to roll in the sand," declaring that the *Heimwehr* would retain power irrespective of the decision of the electorate and heralding the abolition of all parliamentary institutions. Nothing, again, could have aroused more concern everywhere than the news that the skilled and ruthless counter-revolutionary, Major Waldemar Pabst, whom Chancellor Schober had found it necessary to arrest and expel from Austria at a few hours' notice for treason and attempting to infect the troops and gendarmerie with counter-revolutionary ideas, had been recalled to Austria through the influence of the Minister of the Interior, Prince Starhemberg. Although disarmament had been pressed for by foreign influences so strongly that Dr. Schober only secured the flotation of the first *tranche* of the Austrian loan this spring by the promise of a Disarmament Bill, the reverse of confidence abroad was inspired by the spectacle of Prince Starhemberg using Dr. Schober's Bill to render the Republican Defence Corps incapable of offering any resistance to a Fascist coup. The Socialists, warned in advance, were wise enough not to offer the resistance which their opponents hoped for to provide the excuse for a coup, and Prince Starhemberg secured only the arms which had all along been deposited with the consent of Herr Vaugoin for arming the Republican Defence Corps in the event of an Italian or Hungarian invasion.

While Prince Starhemberg utilised his presence in the minority Government to disarm his opponents, *Heimwehr* companies were openly parading with rifles and bayonets in the streets of Inns-

bruck and using their possession of hundreds of machine-guns and two batteries of field artillery to impress the electors, and in Vienna the Chancellor himself was parading this irregular body in uniform, ignoring the prohibition by the Governor of Vienna of all such uniformed marches.

The future is difficult to read, but the steady progress of the Austrian counter-revolution in laying violent hands on one democratic and Republican privilege after another suggests that it will be dark for the Austrian people, unless they are prepared to follow up their condemnation of *Heimwehr* at the polls by insisting on disarmament. The period of peace and security guaranteed by the reputation, character and ability of Dr. Schober came to all too abrupt an end. Though no Austrian newspaper has dared to allude to it, what characterises the present situation most strongly is the suffering inflicted on trade, finance and manufacture by this endless blood-feud between Austrian Catholics and Austrian Socialists, as the never-ceasing flow of bankruptcies and compositions demonstrates. As for Austria's tourist traffic, the one unique property left her by the peace treaties, which should by now have become a gold-mine to her, the eternal threats to peaceful progress offered by the *Heimwehr* have succeeded for the last two years in warning off the greater part of those potential visitors who had not already been deterred by the knowledge of the way in which the Socialists had taxed gaiety into dreariness and music into silence in the one-time capital of laughter and song—Vienna.

G. E. R. GEDYE.

POST-WAR UNEMPLOYMENT.

RECENT literature on the subject of unemployment emphasises once more not only the importance but also the difficulty of this problem. The measure of its importance may be gauged by the fact that party chiefs base their prospects at the next election on their ability to find remedies. These remedies are often of so political and controversial a nature that we are apt to forget that unemployment is no new difficulty in our industrial life and is to be found in all countries, even those with high tariffs. The difference between unemployment in past years and what is called post-war unemployment is largely one of degree, for the amount of unemployment has been intensified, but not altered in character, by the great increase in productive power as a result of the war. It was not so long ago that we were told by our statesmen and industrialists that the real remedy for unemployment was to increase production, but this increased productivity is obviously no solution unless markets both at home and abroad can be discovered for the products. Three distinguished economists have during the last few months published books dealing with unemployment.* It is proposed in this article to deal briefly with the causes of the problem as they state them, and then to examine the remedies that have been suggested with a view to ascertaining whether one or more of the solutions will meet the needs of the case.

Doubtless we are all agreed that the investigations which have been made for the last twenty years have proved conclusively that the main cause of unemployment is maladjustment of our industrial organisation. It is true that personal defects whether physical or moral have a bearing on the problem, but no one now contends that it will account for more than a very small percentage of the 2,200,000 unemployed. For all those who are unemployed owing to some personal defect there are thousands whose unemployment is due to other causes and who are in every way fitted for some industry. It has been contended that the Insurance Act has had a demoralising effect upon large numbers of men who are idle because the assistance received from Insurance Funds has made it unnecessary for them to work. It is also stated that although they were willing to find work in the first instance, yet failing to find it they have now lost all desire for useful occupation. It is impossible, however, to say at present what percentage of those receiving unemployed benefit ought not to receive it. For the moment, therefore, we may leave these men out of account. Before the war

* *Post-War Unemployment.* By Henry Clay, M.A. *Unemployment.* By Sir William Beveridge. *Rationalisation and Unemployment.* By J. A. Hobson.

we had our cyclical fluctuations in employment, but industry gradually did absorb most of the unemployed and even with an increasing population the average percentage of those who failed to find work was not great. As certain industries declined new industries sprang up and the unemployed in those days could, in most cases, have been dealt with by an efficient system of insurance in which outgoings were balanced by contributions. Many of those who were unemployed in pre-war times were idle owing to seasonal fluctuations in special industries. We were able to measure these fluctuations and to suggest certain remedies. In some cases men could be transferred to other industries, for example the unskilled men in the building industry could often find work elsewhere, unless the winter was especially severe. There was, of course, a large amount of casual labour and this reserve of labour was seldom or never exhausted. It is one of Sir William Beveridge's criticisms that even to-day we have made no sufficient attempt to check the spreading of work over an excessive number of unemployed workers. The lack of adequate statistics made it difficult to determine how far the movement of labour from one place to another and from one job to another was reflected in unemployment. This, however, is no new phenomenon, it is as old as industry itself, but the difficulty is intensified when industries are in process of transition, when one industry is declining in the north and another springing up in the south. The change over from one industry to another and from one district to another has been markedly noticeable in late years. The north has witnessed the decline of many staple industries and the south, on the contrary, has seen new industries developed and old industries expanded with the result that to-day the south suffers far less than the north from unemployment. These causes of unemployment, however, do not explain the cyclical fluctuations of industry which we can now follow by means of statistics both of prices and employment.

We know these trade fluctuations to be periodic, but owing to the large number engaged in production and to the fact that processes of production are so complex, they cannot be foreseen with certainty. Thousands of manufacturers and traders are competing one against another endeavouring to estimate the demand for the goods which they produce. They have to take into account not only the demand in their own country but a world demand which is still more perplexing depending as it does on changing conditions in various countries over which the Governments have no control, or to definite action on the parts of Governments such as the imposition of tariffs. We can easily understand how over-production may and does take place in scores of industries, over-

production meaning in this case the production of more commodities than can be sold at a price which will give a profit. The question as to whether it is over-production or under-consumption from which we suffer is only important in so far as we are able to make the consumers' demand more effective. It is not the case, of course, that there is any lack of desire to consume the goods that are being produced. It is merely that effective demand is absent and therefore it is upon this question of how demand can be made effective that economists are concentrating their attention. The manufacturer or the farmer has no doubt done his best to anticipate what will be the real demand, but he cannot avoid mistakes. The demand falls off when he expects an increase and thus he can only sell at a loss instead of a profit. Accordingly he cuts his losses, reduces his staff of workers and this in turn affects other industries. Additional credit granted by the banks may delay this movement, but only delay it. In the end we get stagnation of trade and unemployment.

When we ask what is the cause of the present excessive unemployment Sir William Beveridge answers that one main cause is due to the wage level being unduly high from an economic standpoint. Using the statistics supplied by Professor Bowley he points out that real wages have risen between 1914-1930 as rapidly as they rose during the most prosperous nineteenth-century period. His contention is that the rise in wages was then justified by the great advance in productivity, but suggests that to-day productivity *per capita* has not risen sufficiently to enable both hours to be reduced and wages to be continued at the present level. Wage rates from his point of view are too static with the result that the worker is apt to lose in regularity of employment what he gains in the amount of the wage he earns. This is no new argument and indeed nearly all employers of labour contend to-day that it is an important cause of the increase in unemployment. It is certainly true that if wages remain high and other costs of industry tend to lag behind prices, this must tend to curtail production. If prices rise the margin of profit is greater and output is increased. When prices fall as they have to-day costs remain at a relatively high level and lead to losses and eventually to unemployment. In times of prosperity, therefore, production increases in certain industries but does not necessarily flow into new industries. When, however, demand ceases and saturation point has been reached because consumers now have all they can afford to buy and prices tend to fall further, production is checked and more people are thrown out of employment.

There is one noticeable difference between pre-war and post-war unemployment. It is the much higher average of unemployment.

in recent years. Apart from ordinary fluctuations which have occurred from time to time for many years past we have an increase of unemployment in the insured population of the country which represents something like 6 per cent. more than in pre-war depressions. This is due, as we have shown, to the conditions following the war. It is true that we were able to absorb a large number of munition workers in the artificial boom which followed the cessation of hostilities, but meanwhile during the war other industrial nations had been either creating new industries or expanding industries already in existence and making production much more efficient. The war interrupted nearly all trade relations. A new situation was developed to which we had not had time to adjust ourselves. Markets that in the natural way would have expanded had been entirely closed to us for a long period, and when this embargo was removed it was found to be extremely difficult to revive and to re-establish previous industrial and trading conditions. British exports declined in many countries where we had been accustomed to find a profitable market and, added to that difficulty, the industries in those countries had so developed that they not only declined to import our goods, but competed with us in other markets throughout the world. Nationalist feeling ran high after the war and it led to a raising of tariff barriers in order to protect these new industries which had been created. Unfortunately much of this decline was not sufficiently anticipated and attempts were made by increasing production to regain the markets that had been lost with the result that the situation gradually became worse and as the process of contraction began to take place the psychological element came into play. Credit which had been enormously inflated by the war and the post-war boom suffered a severe reverse which is still being felt. The process of re-adjustment is therefore not yet completed and may not be completed for some time.

Although this is a true picture of what has happened some economists lay a good deal of stress on the fact that in their opinion it has been intensified by the return to the gold standard in 1925 which has prolonged the depression and intensified the fall in the world price level of commodities. The Treasury had decided that in the interests of the country's gold reserve it was necessary to restrict credit. There seemed to be an inadequate supply of gold due to various causes such as the amount of gold which was absorbed by India in the shape of ornaments or accumulated by America and France in the shape of reserves. If all the gold that had been produced since 1925, it is argued, had been allowed to fertilise industry, it would undoubtedly have caused credit to expand and through credit would have had an immediate

effect upon prices. It may be added that unwise speculation in New York played a large part in this process, for the money which was transferred to New York for speculative purposes and the expansion of credit, then led to high bank rates in Great Britain and other countries and in the end was a serious factor in Stock Exchange depression. Thus, on the top of over-production not only in manufactures but in such articles as wheat, rubber, coal, coffee, and tin there was this fall in credit followed by a fall in commodity prices which has hardly yet reached the bottom.

One of the remedies suggested is that of the creation of credit for production. Mr. Maynard Keynes has referred frequently of late to the almost revolutionary improvement of our understanding of the mechanism of money and credit and of the analysis of the trade cycle. He thinks that there is a very close connection between monetary causes, the credit cycle, and unemployment. There is no doubt at all about the connection, but opinions differ widely as to the effect of increased credit. Sir William Beveridge in referring to this question said, "The relations of industry and finance have become a battle-ground of specialised study as dangerous to the outsider and sometimes to the expert as any of the whole field of learning." It is stated that at the base of cyclical fluctuations in employment is this inherent instability of credit. In our banking system money is represented by currency or common money and credit or bank money. Common money is made by the State or by banks under State control. Bank money or credit is made by the banks in response to the demand of persons who wish to use it. Bank money in all big industrial countries is in much greater proportion than common money. The banks advance money to those who have bank accounts on certain kinds of security. The bank on the promise of the business man to pay in the future makes a loan, but demands certain terms as to security and interest. The bank anticipates that the loan so created will be repaid and thus "destroyed," to use the term of Mr. McKenna. The bank, although it does not demand a deposit of common money by the firm, at the same time does not give credit without regard to the total of common money deposited by all his customers. This does not, however, result in an addition to the total of common money, and its tendency if pushed to the limit is to lower the value of money and therefore to raise prices. Whenever debts to the banks are paid off the value of money is raised and prices are lowered. What has happened in America recently is that the credits were made very much faster than they were being destroyed. The flow of gold to the United States enabled a large increase of credit to be made. The Federal Bank Reserve caused another large increase

in credit. Speculation and the instalment system on a large scale increased the demand for credit. In a few years it grew from £4,000,000,000 to £12,000,000,000. As soon as it was felt that the amount which had been granted was greatly in excess of common money the collapse of credit began. Loans were called in and everyone began to sell their securities. The crisis which followed, together with subsequent heavy falls, resulted in an enormous depreciation in stocks and shares in land and goods. The final result was a big drop in the nation's income, and over 5,000,000 of unemployed, a number which will certainly be exceeded this winter. These then are the facts. The interpretation of them would require an article in itself, but it seems clear that the continued expansion of credit unless carefully controlled must in the end lead to a collapse and consequent industrial depression.

Labour Exchanges after a hopeful start have been sunk in a flood of war tasks and post-war doles and although they are now reviving as employment agencies their most needed service of decentralisation has gone by the board. Further, Unemployment Insurance with all its devices for reducing claims to benefit has been transformed into unemployment relief. The two main conclusions of Sir William Beveridge are, first that a separation must be made between insurance and relief. That Unemployment Insurance must be put upon a sound actuarial footing and relief for those excluded given as required by the State. The Fund is now in debt to the extent of £50,000,000 and this debt is increasing at the rate of £600,000 a week. The total benefits paid out in one year amount to £90,000,000—and of this about £60,000,000 would be paid by the State. The analysis made by the Ministry of Labour of "transitional" unemployment benefit showed that nearly half the men and a third of the women during the period under review had no regular work for more than two years, while more than two-thirds of both men and women had none for more than a year. At the same time there is a distinct falling off in the number of those claiming Public Assistance. The whole question is now to be considered by a Royal Commission. In the second place wages must be reduced in accordance with the reduction in the cost of living. Failing this, he says, the higher standard of life of those who are in regular work must be to some extent won at the cost of employment of those who are not. Even, however, if we change our policy and adjust production to standards of living or standards of living to production we still have the problem of unemployment which he styles "a problem of industry and not an act of God." Nothing but labour market organisation can deal with this residual problem.

Turning to the remedies for this increasing unemployment, let

us first of all consider Sir William Beveridge's argument that if wages could fall by 10 per cent. or 15 per cent. a large proportion of the unemployed would be absorbed. He argues quite logically that industry has not adjusted itself to a lower prices level and that at a time when elasticity was more needed than ever. As to his figures there can be no question. The wholesale prices of commodities have fallen 25 per cent. and wages have only fallen $1\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. Meanwhile the cost of social services has increased, and rates of benefit and pensions have not been reduced in proportion to the cost of living. Wages remain very much the same and the burden on the Exchequer is enormous. All this is true, and it is also true to say that if wages could be reduced, say by 10 per cent. all round, there would probably be an immediate increase in employment because it would prove a stimulus to production. At the same time we must remember first of all that retail prices have fallen much less than wholesale, and in some respects the cost of living to the workman has not decreased. Further, rates of wages are not always earnings. Even high wages with short time may mean smaller wages on the average, and periods of unemployment may still further reduce the average wage. This is not the case, of course, with the sheltered trades, but these are the very trades that can hold out against any attempt to reduce wages; nor are they subject to the pressure of foreign competition, at least to the same extent. It is the unsheltered trades that would suffer reduction first of all, and these are the trades in which wages are relatively low. Finally, any downward movement in wages, for a time at all events, does mean a general reduction in purchasing power, and if Mr. Hobson is right in his general argument that what is wanted is a better distribution of income, then a reduction in wages might have the effect of creating as much unemployment as it cured. He argues that too much income passes to the rich who use their savings for fresh capital investment instead of spending it on consumable goods. Thus the surplus capital so invested in his opinion creates still more unemployment because there is no demand for the goods thus produced and over-production necessarily follows. He would aim at keeping saving and spending in equilibrium and the only way in which this can be done in his opinion would be by taxation designed to transfer more consuming power from the relatively rich to the people of moderate means. He focuses much attention on the problem of under-consumption and the whole tenor of his book is an attempt to prove that there is no natural balance between productive and consuming power and that the only way in which that balance can be obtained is by the action of the State through taxation. Up to a certain point Mr. Hobson's analysis of the situation is convincing and his remedy

Paul's Church in Frankfurt resounded with appeals to the English constitution, with praise of the jury system and of the liberty of the Press, and with quotations from Burke, Junius, Macaulay, Cobden, and O'Connell. The Conservative wing of the Assembly, represented by its authoritative leader Freiherr v. Vincke and the clericals Lasaulx and Gfrörer, of course sympathised with England. The "Casino Party," the Conservative section of the moderate Centre Party, then the radical wing of the Centre Party, adopted the same attitude, although, on the whole, the latter party inclined more towards revolutionary France. The President of the first Imperial Ministry, Prince von Leiningen, in common with many others, desired an alliance with England. Later, especially in the fifties, these politicians were reinforced by the jurists, such as Mittermaier and above all Gneist. These influences were afterwards centred in the court of Crown Prince Frederick and his English consort.

The last but not least radiation of the English idea of freedom is seen in the idea of Free Trade. The whole German Free Trade Party of the sixties and seventies, men like Faucher, Braun-Wiesbaden, Max Wirth, and Ludwig Bammerger—not to speak of its leader, the Englishman Prince-Smith—were Anglophil and could not but praise England as the home of political wisdom, if they wanted in any way to represent its trade policy as a model for Germany. On this tradition is based the pro-British attitude of the Progressives and Radicals which went down only in the eddies of the naval propaganda. Theodor Barth's *Nation* (1883-1907) was the last resolute mouthpiece of this group, but the same pro-British tendency has time and again broken through in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, to whose London correspondents, Bernhard Guttman before the war and afterwards Rudolf Kircher, we owe the most judicious studies of English life that have been published in Germany within the last decades.

German reactionaries hated just what German Liberals liked in England. Gentz, during the period of his Liberal sympathies, had called the detractors of England "calumniators"; but after he had become the confidential friend and instrument of Metternich, he took the field against the "falsely idolised" Canning and his mother country as against "the source of rebellion." England went down still further in the estimation of European reactionaries when, in her struggles for Parliamentary Reform in 1831-2, she took a first timid step towards democracy. After that all reactionaries from Madrid to Vienna saw in England the future victor and enemy. Hegel's political testament is set forth in his essay on the English Reform Bill (1831). In it he censures the friendly attitude towards Great Britain on the Continent and,

to undersell other competing businesses and by successfully competing both at home and abroad to expand its output and thus employ as many as or more workers than before. The policy would be to reduce costs and prices. If, however, the policy of the business organisers were to secure by their economies and partial monopoly high profits, the result would be a reduction in employment and no doubt a reduction in wages in total amount. The use of automatic machinery would probably mean the employment of semi-skilled men instead of the highly skilled worker. Rationalisation would mean a control of production, the regulation and possibly at times a restriction of output, as Lord Melchett says, "Basically, rationalisation is simply the rational control of industry to insure as far as possible that you do not produce more than your market can absorb." When we are regarding it as a remedy for unemployment we ought not to forget the foreign market. It is very doubtful whether so far as the home market is concerned unemployment would not be increased and the total amount of wages reduced. If, however, rationalisation did enable us to increase our exports it would undoubtedly be a gain. The important point, however, is that rationalisation is bound to come, as it has come in Germany, and that what we have to consider is how to avoid the evil effects which for the time being are manifest in Germany and how best to profit by the advantages which will result.

If we leave out of account the question of tariffs and the almost equally controversial money and credit problem we are driven back to the point raised at the outset of the article, viz., the maladjustment of our industry in relation to supply and demand, and the lack of organisation due to the multiplicity of competing forces. Clearly there is no real remedy save by better adjustment and more careful organisation; to be effective it must be both national and international. We might do much to mitigate the evil by means of a permanent financial and economic advisory council whose business it would be to watch closely trade both at home and abroad and give warning when credit bid fair to expand too rapidly and encourage such expansion when trade conditions made it advisable. We might still further improve our methods of production and marketing. Finally, some further mitigation of unemployment could certainly be secured by the putting in hand more rapidly of useful and productive works by local authorities such as have already been sanctioned to the extent of £150,000,000. This programme is for the most part entirely non-controversial and would materially help the country to tide over the present severe crisis.

PERCY ALDEN.

PRINCE BÜLOW'S MEMOIRS.

is reached by those who consider hatred of Christianity characteristic of cultured men. To these belongs especially Schopenhauer, although, quite in keeping with his ethics based on compassion, he did not fail to acknowledge and esteem the "magnanimity" and "good-heartedness" of the English character. He knew the English language and English customs from his youth, and even prized intercourse with Englishmen so highly that he preferred living in Frankfurt to living in Mannheim because there were "more Englishmen" there. But, nevertheless, in one of his paroxysms of invective, as un-English as it is un-Christian, he pronounces the following crushing verdict (1851):

Look at this nation favoured by nature and endowed above all others with understanding, wit, judgment, and constancy; look at them, degraded, nay, made even more despicable than all others, by their imbecile churchiness, which contrasted with their own faculties appears to be a fixed idea, a monomania. This they owe entirely to the fact that their education is in the hands of the clergy, who make them commit all articles of faith to memory even from their earliest youth, so that the result is a sort of partial cerebral paralysis which expresses itself in this idiotic bigotry throughout their lives. . . .

From Schopenhauer and Wagner it is but a step to Nietzsche. His idolising of power should have inspired him with admiration for this mighty island-people; but such considerations were over-ridden by his ostensible contempt for Utilitarianism as well as by his genuine hatred of Christianity, whose heroic ethics called forth the resentment of his undisciplined nature. One could fill pages with descriptions of his fits of wild rage against England, and the only consolation for his numerous English admirers must be found in the fact that at least one nation, the German, comes off still worse with him. One remark of his may suffice here: "More delicate nostrils will sense even in English Christianity a typically English whiff of spleen and alcoholic debauchery, against which it serves as a remedy for good reasons. . . . That herd of drunkards and debauchees which has learnt to emit moral grunts, first under the power of Methodism, and recently again in the guise of the Salvation Army."

A third group among those who hate England for her base materialism is formed—scarcely in harmony with this cool, sociological theory—by the founders of "Historical Materialism." Marx and Engels both knew England, where they had found refuge since the middle of the century and where they had lived until their death, as few Germans knew her. Their judgment, however, was determined by the terrible impressions they received, at the very outset, of the misery among the wage-earners during this

and importance—so far as Germany is concerned—to the oracular *Reflections and Recollections of Bismarck* alone.

Most readers will turn with special eagerness to what he has to say of his old master, and they will find their curiosity amply rewarded. The figure of the Kaiser, full of life and colour, is continually on the stage, and every chapter contains incidents and reflections which help us to visualise him as he appeared to the most brilliant of his Ministers. The abiding impression which we carry away is that William II never grew up. It reads—and is obviously meant to read—like the story of a wise and elderly tutor struggling to educate and to curb a gifted, high-spirited, and impulsive pupil. On his fall the Prince handed back the hundreds of letters which he had received from the last of the Hohenzollerns; but we hardly seem to miss them, so abundant is the material provided by the author and other intimates of the *enfant terrible*. His complicated nature could only be understood by those who knew him well, and for that reason the picture drawn in such a well-known book as Count Zedlitz's *Twelve Years at the Kaiser's Court* is unconvincing because incomplete. Until now the best approach has been through Johannes Haller's fascinating life of Eulenburg, recently translated into English; and the picture drawn in the biography of the Kaiser's best friend is confirmed by the pen of the fallen Chancellor.

When Bülow was summoned in 1897 to succeed Marschall von Bieberstein as Foreign Secretary, the sun was shining brightly on his fortunes. He belonged to one of the oldest of Prussian families; his father had been Foreign Minister in the seventies; unlike Marschall he had never quarrelled with the Bismarcks; during twenty years at Paris and Petrograd, Bucharest and Rome, he had learned the arts and crafts of diplomacy; his ready wit, wide culture, and personal charm were known to all; his gifted and delightful wife was connected with Minghetti and other leading Italian families; he was only forty-eight, and in excellent health; he was the friend of Eulenburg, who at that time alone possessed the Kaiser's ear and who had helped to secure his appointment; he was a *persona grata* to Hohenlohe, the veteran Chancellor, to Holstein, the uncrowned King of the Foreign Office, and above all to the Kaiser himself. The political situation was not without its difficulties, but there were no black clouds in the sky. Three bad mistakes in the field of foreign policy had been made since Bismarck's guiding hand had been withdrawn. The refusal to renew the secret treaty of reinsurance with Russia when its term ended in 1890 was a costly error, for it accelerated and rendered inevitable the drift of Russia towards France. The intervention with Russia and France to rob Japan of some of the fruits of victory over China

tacle been witnessed: that of the finest army in creation being defied by a hungry mob which refused to work for the invader, and in its attitude was sustained by a central Government churning out paper currency in cartloads and progressively wrecking itself in the process. Poincaré's plans were all upset; resort would have to be made to *la manière forte*. Now it was that the cock of Gaul crowed stridently indeed. The Americans might haul down "Old Glory" on Ehrenbreitstein; Lord Curzon might drive the French Premier a shade paler than usual by announcing that the Foreign Office regarded the whole Ruhr affair—forcibly commandeering what was private property—as illegal; *qu'importe!* French troops even crowded into the suburbs of Cologne, seeking to edge General Godley's force out by making things no less humiliating than difficult. "Collaborate or evacuate!" We stayed on, knowing that the little Lorrainer would have given his shirt for us to have moved on. For his major fling was yet to come, and with the *Britanniques* gone, its chance of success would be much enhanced.

Meanwhile the invaders performed prodigies of improvisation in the Ruhr Valley, where Degoutte dictated from hour to hour as fresh situations arose. They ran a comic railway, the *Régie*, which, from fear of sabotage and from patriotism combined, few would board; they took over additional pits and factories daily and worked them by imported labour; they deported into Germany over 100,000 men, women, and children; they indulged in a regular game of hide and seek trying to intercept the colossal dole emanating regularly from Berlin; they descended upon bank safes, the victor of Verdun now kneeling with an oxy-hydrogen blowpipe. And France steadily lost the sympathy of the wider world and Germany made the discovery that she actually had come through still a nation.

The last chapter of Phase One opened in October 1923 with a concerted big push for Separatism up and down the left bank—Dorten at Coblenz, Matthes in Cologne (directing only), Deckers at Aachen, Leidner, ex-Red, at Düsseldorf, Heinz in the Palatinate. Smeets, the Bonn leader, had died from wounds, and Tirard had compelled the Reich to pay damages to his family although the man was looked upon as an out-and-out traitor by that Reich. In September the new Chancellor, Stresemann, had called off the passive resistance. Another French triumph! Now was the time to cast off doomed Germany and join France! A feature of this ultimate bid was the transporting here and there of armed bands whose job it was to lead on the locals by igniting matters. Republics were proclaimed, but the uprising was to meet with the same fate as its forerunner and ended in a scene of minor massacre at Pirmasens where, in General de Metz's territory of the Palatinate, the hired bravos had been especially prominent. It was an Englishman, Consul Clive, of Munich, who gave Separatism its *coup-de-*

Wilhelmstrasse in 1897 Hohenlohe was seventy-eight, and, though still vigorous in mind, was feeling the strain of years. Thus the first professional diplomatist since the fall of Bismarck to hold the rudder became the main director of foreign policy from the outset, and when he succeeded Hohenlohe as Chancellor in 1900 there was no one to say him nay save the Kaiser himself. That the supreme responsibility for the course of the German ship between 1897 and 1909 is shared by these two men is known to us all. What is not yet fully determined is the exact degree of responsibility attaching to each in the great decisions of the time. A flood of light has been thrown on the problem by the publication of *Die Grosse Politik*, and Bülow's Memoirs are a precious addition to our knowledge. Like other statesmen who write their apologia he naturally makes the best case he can for himself; but even making allowance for this normal human infirmity it is clear that he has a right to remind the reader of the colossal difficulties of his position. His welcome at Kiel, he tells us, was delightful in its cordiality and frank simplicity; and he adds that it was only by degrees that he learned of the reefs that lurked beneath the shining surface of the sea.

In these glittering pages we see a ruler of unusual gifts, lofty ideals, and not a few attractive qualities. Over and over again we read of his friendliness, his goodness of heart, his naturalness when alone with a friend, his willingness to listen to "curtain lectures" from a trusted adviser, his capacity for enjoyment, his brightness and charm. His intellectual powers were considerable, his knowledge wide if not deep, his quickness of apprehension phenomenal, while his eloquence never ceased to impress such an accomplished rival and such a critical judge as Bülow himself. In the latter respect indeed nature had been too lavish in her generosity, for William II thirsted to make use of the gift of speech which he knew himself to possess. On accompanying his master to Vienna shortly after his appointment, the new Foreign Secretary urged him to adapt his Toast to the prosaic temperament of Francis Joseph. "My dear Bernard," replied the Kaiser in the friendliest tone, "you are, of course, much cleverer than I, but I know more about speaking than you. I believe you have never made a public speech. I have made plenty, and I can say without vanity that they were not bad. So let me speak in my own way." He proceeded to deliver a dithyrambic harangue which obviously displeased the host, to whom over-emphasis or gush were anathema. Worse was to follow, and it was one of Bülow's constant cares to avert or conceal or explain away the rhetorical lapses which echoed round the world.

"Perhaps the most detrimental speech he ever made" is the

author's comment on the "Hunnenrede" of 1900. The Kaiser's equilibrium was always disturbed when his vivid imagination turned to the problems of the Far East. His famous picture of the Yellow Peril, with the inscription "Peoples of Europe, preserve your holiest possessions," was a nightmare to his Ministers, and is rightly described by Bülow as grotesque; yet reproductions were hung by his orders in the ships of the Hamburg-America and the Norddeutscher Lloyd bound for the East, "to the delight of the English who sucked no small advantage from this offence to Japanese feeling." His aversion to the Japanese as a race extended to individuals, and we are assured that he treated their diplomats and officers badly, despite the remonstrances of his advisers. If the Japanese were not to his taste, how much greater was his horror of the Chinese! Never did Bülow find him in a state of such excitement as during the opening phases of the Boxer revolt, and the overstrained nerves found expression in the historic words to the departing troops at Bremerhafen on June 27th, 1900. "Pardon will not be granted, prisoners will not be made. As a thousand years ago the Huns under Attila made themselves a name which lives in story and legend, so let the German name be impressed on China by you in such a way that no Chinaman ever again dares to look askance at a German." Before the speech was finished the agitated Foreign Secretary issued instructions that it was not to be published till it had been corrected by himself. The journalists loyally obeyed, but the reporter of a local paper, perched on a neighbouring roof, had caught the fatal words and given them to a listening world. The Kaiser was delighted to learn that his speech had appeared in its original form, but his mood quickly changed when Bülow pointed out that it would produce a devastating effect on the reputation of a Christian country. The two men sat up talking till midnight, and on parting the Kaiser shook hands, remarking "I know you wish me well, but I am what I am and I cannot change." "You must deal with this in the Reichstag," whispered Hohenlohe to Bülow as he heard the fatal words, "for I cannot." The Foreign Minister did his best with the inevitable interpellations; but he could not prevent the foes of Germany in the great war from describing as Huns "the good and noble German people, the most truly humane in the world."

Next in unhappy celebrity among the Imperial utterances was the declaration at Damascus to the three hundred million Mohammedans throughout the world that the German Emperor would at all times be their friend. When the meal was over Bülow instructed the official reporter who accompanied the party to Palestine and Syria that the speech must not be published till he had corrected it. The reporter replied that it had already gone,

and quoted the orders of the Kaiser himself. A third phrase destined to immortality was the farewell signal "from the Admiral of the Atlantic to the Admiral of the Pacific" after a meeting with the Tsar at Reval. The Tsar's cool reply was "Good-bye," and the Captain of the *Hohenzollern* promptly gave orders not to divulge the exchange of signals. The Russians had no reason to be discreet, and the story soon appeared in an English paper. The incident was particularly annoying to Bülow who, despite his outspoken criticisms of his master, repeatedly declares that he never at any moment indulged in Napoleonic dreams. Such extravagances were merely the expression of temperamental irresponsibility; but foreigners could not be expected to understand that the last of the Hohenzollerns was an actor, not a man of action, an artist in phrases, not a ruthless megalomaniac. Despite reiterated protests and promises of amendment, he never learned to bridle his tongue or his pen.

In addition to the above-mentioned slips, and others only a little less known, we learn for the first time in these pages of a letter to Roosevelt filled with strident vituperation of the Japanese and heated exhortations to his American friend to be on his guard against the Yellow Peril. Not till after its despatch did the writer confess what he had done; and when the Chancellor convinced him that the letter must on no account reach Roosevelt's hands he was permitted to telegraph to New York to return it unopened to Berlin. The Kaiser, he suggests, must have been glad when the war broke out that such a high explosive was not in the possession of the Transatlantic admirer who had turned into his most unpromising foe. On another occasion Bülow also narrowly succeeded in averting a costly blunder. "I shall, of course, take no notice of the wife of Franz Ferdinand," remarked William II as they journeyed to Vienna in 1903. Wedel, the German Ambassador in Vienna, who was also travelling in the Imperial saloon, protested in vain. The Chancellor motioned to Wedel to leave him alone with his master, knowing full well that he would never climb down in the presence of a third party. The impetuous monarch was still protesting when they reached the terminus. "You have now the choice of making the future Emperor of Austria a friend or a foe for ever," whispered Bülow, shooting his final bolt as the train pulled up. A moment later the Kaiser was greeting Franz Ferdinand in the friendliest manner and saying, "When may I have the honour of paying my homage to your wife?" The Archduke, blushing with delight, bowed and kissed the Kaiser's hand, and the friendship began which lasted unbroken till the shots rang out at Serajevo. We find in these pages more than one discussion whether William II could be described as normal.

TO most Europeans and unfortunately to many Americans the title of this article will appear strange. The United States is the promised land; from afar flowing with milk and honey. Visitors from other countries seem to find little but wealth and prosperity. One from England, upon his return, writes of "America the Golden." Two others entitle their joint observations "The Secret of High Wages." An examination of the careful calculations of government officials and economists gives colour to the same views. It is estimated that the national wealth is \$400,000,000,000 or more and the aggregate national income is thought to have been about \$90,000,000,000 in 1929. Even when this is expressed in *per capita* terms we are faced with an average of \$750 or about £150 for each man, woman and child among the 120,000,000 inhabitants. There may be added a reference to the huge tax receipts not only of the federal government, but also of the State and local governments, and to the rapid reduction of the federal debt which for some years has been proceeding at the rate of about one billion dollars per year.

When some of the facts are examined more closely one's enthusiasm becomes a little sobered. Wealth and income are not equally divided. Prosperity is not evenly distributed. There are a few with much and many with little. The productivity of the United States as a whole may be huge, even on a *per capita* basis, but there are numerous industries in which depression has prevailed for years. Many textile mills, especially in New England, have long been operating on part time or at a heavy loss or not at all. The steel industry has frequently in recent years been working at only from 50 to 60 per cent. of capacity. The farmers have for nearly a decade been complaining bitterly of their misfortunes. Conditions in coal mining are bad. A long and bitter strike in the soft coal fields was some months ago ended with defeat for the employees. I have been told, by those who claim to know as I do not, that the condition of the workers in some of our soft coal fields is as bad as in Wales. No one knows how many unemployed there are in the country at any given time, but a number of intelligent observers were of the opinion in the winter of 1927-8 that there were about 3,000,000 or even 4,000,000, which is perhaps 7 or 8 per cent. of the employable number. This is a very high percentage and was properly a cause of serious concern.

These difficulties have prevailed for a number of years and, of course, have been intensified since the stock market crash last autumn. Trade has slackened, unemployment has grown, cor-

mention of the name of Bethmann Hollweg is the signal for expressions of measureless contempt. In his own apologia Bethmann hinted pretty plainly that the fourth Chancellor had left him a bad pack of cards. Bülow at once retaliated in an open letter to the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, and he now throws reserve to the winds. Bethmann is denounced as the Minister who with the ultimatum to Serbia and blundering diplomacy committed the most terrible error in the history of Germany, and one of the greatest errors in the history of the world. Signing a blank cheque to Vienna was a crazy act, and the unhappy phrase "a scrap of paper," like Olivier's *cœur léger* in 1870, was the equivalent of a lost battle. The war ended as badly as it was begun, for the Kaiser should have sought and found an honourable death on the battle-field when all was lost. Of the Emperor Karl, Erzberger, and the Weimar Constitution he writes with passionate disdain; but we must wait for the third volume for a critical survey of the titanic struggle and the catastrophic defeat.

Amid a throng of bunglers and mediocrities stands Germany's fourth Chancellor as drawn by himself, steering the ship of State, so far as his impetuous master allowed, with effortless superiority. The six years covered in this volume are tranquil enough, compared with the six that were to follow—the years of the first Morocco crisis, the naval race with England, the *Daily Telegraph* incident, and the annexation of Bosnia, of which we shall hear in the next volume. The most controversial aspect of his activities between 1897 and 1903 was his handling of Anglo-German relations; and although no irreparable breach occurred during these years, the opening of a new century saw the Governments and peoples drifting steadily away from one another. Two important decisions were made which were to affect and in a large measure to govern the coming years. The first was the creation of a large fleet, which, though its real sponsor was William II, was welcomed by Bülow at the time and is stoutly defended in retrospect. Repeating the arguments adduced in *Imperial Germany*, he maintains that a Great Power with strongly armed neighbours, overseas possessions, and a world-wide trade, required a navy big enough for defence against any attack, though, of course, a "danger-zone" period, while the ships were building, demanded a particularly skilful hand at the helm if a conflict with England was to be avoided. The policy, he believes, was wise and inevitable, and he is confident that only the substitution of Bethmann for himself deprived Germany of the peace with honour which the *Flottenpolitik* was intended to guarantee.

The second important decision in the field of Anglo-German relations in these years was the chilly response to Chamberlain's

that the classical studies, raised by Bentley and afterwards by Gibbon to a height hitherto unattained, had spread the unprofitable knowledge of the classical languages and institutions farther than in any other country. Achim von Arnim, the only really sane and consistent character among the German romanticists of this generation, writing from England, where he stayed from 1803 to 1804, also jokingly complained that the individual was valued merely as a "gun," according to how many "pounds" he could discharge, and he remained "at heart hostile" to the English, although he afterwards changed his opinion, being impressed by their heroic struggle against the common enemy Napoleon.

The later romanticists are of the same opinion—the opinion of their idol Lord Byron—although one need not be a Romanticist to be repelled by many traits of pre-Victorian and early Victorian England. Among this group Heine had the greatest influence, especially on men of letters. It is true his political feelings for England, where he spent some summer months in 1827, were divided between his admiration for the "god-like" Canning and his abhorrence of Canning's successor Wellington, whom the English called the "Iron Duke" and Heine the "Wooden Duke"; but from the very beginning he adopted a hostile attitude towards English thought, and the more he came under French influence, the more his opinions became deprecatory and eventually venomous. It was, of course, an extenuating circumstance that England had once produced Shakespeare, but his disability was "that he remained an Englishman and belonged to the most odious nation that God had ever in his wrath created." Heine foretells that England will one day hang herself out of sheer boredom with a huge hawser. He recommends for the post of French Ambassador in London a "hawk-eyed man who knows how to spy out in due time the intrigues of '*Albion perfide*,' " perhaps the galley convict Vidocq, for with the English political "calculation is disturbed neither by the beating of the heart nor by the flight of magnanimous ideas." And he trembles especially for "the happy peace and tranquillity of the German fatherland," for "we cannot defend ourselves against the treacherous intrigues of those Carthaginians of the German Ocean."

We are justified in reckoning Richard Wagner among the last romanticists and so, in the mid-period of his development (1855), one finds the following verdict which might just as well have come from Heine: "I cannot imagine anything more hateful to me than the proper and genuine English type. They are altogether like sheep, and the practical instinct of the average Englishman is just as sure as the sheep's instinct for finding its food in the meadow."

The same result, though starting from quite different premises,

SAINT AUGUSTINE (430-1930).*

THE modern tourist in Algeria, if he travels eastward from the capital through Constantine and then turns slightly north of east to reach the sea, will come to the little town of Bona at the head of a bay sheltered from the N.W. by the promontory of Cape de Garde. On or near the site of the little French town of to-day once stood the Roman city of Hippo Regius. A millennium and a half ago there lay dying in that city the man who more than any other gave to Western Christianity the distinctive characteristics of both structure and belief which it retains to this day.

It is the miracle of that achievement that we must now try to evoke as only sufficient commemoration of him who wrought it. I call it a miracle because there was nothing in the outer circumstance of St. Augustine's life to prepare for his influence beforehand or to account for it afterwards. He was born and lived nearly all his life in a province which if not geographically remote had yet preserved its own culture in jealous aloofness from that of Rome. And it was not even at the centre of the great African province, in haughty and powerful Carthage, that his lot was cast, but in the distant and troubled region of Numidia. In his long life of seventy-six years we can see reflected every phase of the turbulence of civil and religious faction which wasted Africa till it fell an easy prey to the invading Vandal hordes.

When he was born in November 354 African Christianity had already an existence of two centuries behind it. In Tertullian and Cyprian it had produced the first two Christian theologians to use the Latin tongue, and had revealed in them a new intellectual quality of legal exactness combined with an almost fierce emotional fervour which was henceforth pledged to the service of the Christian faith. In Africa again as nowhere else throughout the Empire the Decian persecution had found the invincible spirit of endurance which goaded it into ever more atrocious cruelties before it died down limp and exhausted in the consciousness of an ignoble futility. But the same spirit which had overcome the pagan Empire had speedily turned into a rage of suicidal mania. In the frenzied strength which the African Church had acquired through its endurance of martyrdom it proceeded to tear itself to pieces. Natural human weakness became for it the one unforgivable sin, and those who were ready to extend forgiveness to that sin were by the very fact convicted of the treachery of Judas. For a century the Church of Africa had been given over to the strife of innumerable factions,

* A Commemoration of the Saint's Life and Work spoken on the Eve of the Fifteenth Hundredth Anniversary of his death, September 27th, 1930.

such defaulting by the Reich led to tanks going to Düsseldorf and Moroccans going to Frankfurt, a customs cordon being established here and a Government monopoly collared there. The Germans showed themselves to be obstinate, artful dodgers, and to criticise their opponents is not to praise them. Yet it must be admitted that a regrettable warlike tinge coloured one or two of these sanctions—as when General Mordacq's Algerians found it necessary to machine-gun 150 casualties in Frankfurt, and when that distinguished lieutenant of the Tiger's seemed to be straining at the leash to advance up the Main and so begin the sundering of South from North Germany. Perhaps sanctions could be made to serve apart from the pressure they brought to bear on recalcitrants? Perhaps—who knew?—they could be directed and manipulated so as to help the big *coup* that was coming along? Thus, the more fluid and unsteady became the economic situation on the left bank, the more chance Separatism might stand of success, on the principle that the one way to salve and re-fashion Rhenish industry and commerce would be to seek shelter under the wing of rich and powerful France. The customs barrier between occupied and unoccupied Germany contributed to such an end, leading, as it did, to a first-class economic muddle in the Rhineland. As if the slipping mark were not enough, the Allies used the left bank as a dumping ground, while at the same time impeding Rhenish exports to the rest of Germany save under a notorious system of licences which brought much graft and abuse in its wake. An orgy of commercial greed set in—the French granting licences at one period, and within five weeks, for the importation from France of no less than 23,000,000 litres of spirits, enough for eight years! The Reich held a spirits monopoly and this torpedoed it. It was now, too, that the *Schieber* first showed above their fellows. Through the *Loch im Westen* (the customs barrier controlled chiefly by the French at Ems) German profiteers tugged through into the Fatherland masses of French products duty-free. The dawn of 1923, black year of a virtual return to war, displayed a left bank already in semi-chaos, ripe for the strong to operate upon.

What was Monsieur Poincaré's true objective in sending General Degoutte into the Ruhr at the head of an army of 60,000 men? Barthou had seized upon some missing telegraph poles as the excuse for this crowning sanction. The mark was 80,000 to £1 when Degoutte went in; it did not exist nine months later. Was this the goal? It is probable that Poincaré did imagine he could lay hands on much more than he actually managed to seize. It must be remembered that the Germans had themselves collaborated in the customs sanction. Nothing foretold the passive resistance that was to set in at Essen, transforming the whole project and marking up a notch in history. For never before had such a spec-

things else to win through it to some assurance as to the true meaning of life and some discipline by which they might make that meaning their own.

It was in the doctrine of the Manichæans that Augustine first found some satisfaction of his quest, and it took him nine years to exhaust that satisfaction. I sometimes wonder if he ever exhausted it. There are some who would place the great Western Doctor without any hesitation among the mystics, and his own account of his conversion seems at any rate to place him among those whom William James has taught us to call the "twice-born." But if the mystic is one in whom the distinctively religious experience consciously transcends the moral and intellectual levels and occupies those levels only as it were with its unconscious overflow, then Augustine was far indeed from being a mystic. In all his religious experience moral and intellectual problems are consciously pressing forward to find their solution. His religion is indeed most authentically religion, an immediate and intimate dependence upon and ascent towards God. But it is always a dependence upon, an ascent towards, God as the Good and the True, as the Supreme Goodness, the Perfect Truth. And in his quest of God the quest of the good was even more fundamental than the quest of the true. He held that ultimately the search for truth depends upon the purity of the will. And therefore it was that he could outgrow and discard as monstrous the Manichæan theory of evil, that Neoplatonism seemed to him the light of noonday after the gross darkness of Manichæism, and yet that he retained to the end something of the Manichæan horror of the flesh as the source of the spirit's darkness and error. But it was characteristically by way of the intellect that the joy of religion first came to Augustine. Twelve years after his conversion, when he had been now three years a Christian bishop, he could still hymn the Platonic doctrine as the revelation in whose light he had first come to understand the doctrine of St. Paul. And the Soliloquies and Dialogues, written at Cassiciacum just after his conversion, might well be the record of a Platonic symposium with just the slightest flavouring of distinctively Christian sentiment and expression.

Let us return to the outward events of Augustine's career, strangely unimportant and almost incidental as they must sometimes seem in what is throughout the history of a soul. After his breach with Manichæism he felt that he must leave Carthage and all its memories of wasted spiritual effort definitely behind. And so in his twenty-ninth year he set out for Rome to continue there with what contentment he might what seemed now to be his life's work as a teacher of rhetoric. But Rome wearied him, body and soul, and so after less than a year he welcomed an opening of the

same kind at Milan. There, as all the world knows, he came under the influence of Ambrose, its great bishop, and for the first time faced seriously the message of Catholic Christianity. It was in the autumn of 386 in his thirty-second year that his conversion took place, and in the spring of the following year, April 24th, 387, he received baptism at the hands of Ambrose. The summer of the Lombard plain, trying to delicate chests (and Augustine suffered from such a delicacy) was approaching. His friend Verecundus the grammarian placed at his disposal for the summer months a villa which he owned in the foothills of the Alps, the Cassiciacum made for ever famous by that brief sojourn of Augustine and his friends.

With autumn Augustine prepared with his mother to return to his home at Tagaste in far-off Numidia. They journeyed as far as Rome and then on to Ostia to take ship at last for home. But he returned alone. The most beautiful relationship between mother and son of which the world has had full vision had come to its appointed end. For three years Augustine and that little group of faithful friends who had so long shared his bodily and spiritual pilgrimage lived the monastic life of work and prayer on his little estate at Tagaste. Then he sold it and transferred his monastic home to Hippo Regius. There the Bishop Valerius ordained him priest in 391, his thirty-seventh year. Four years later Valerius, who was a Greek and could hardly speak Latin, bethought himself that it would be well to associate the learned and saintly Augustine with himself in charge of his flock. So in the year 395 Augustine was consecrated Bishop of Hippo, in spite of the decree of the Council of Nicaea which seventy years earlier had forbidden the consecration of a bishop to any see during the lifetime of another occupant of it. Fortunately neither Valerius nor Augustine nor the metropolitan who consecrated knew anything about the decree of the sacred Council. And so for thirty-five years longer he will be chief pastor of that little flock, the people of a small Numidian city by the Mediterranean sea, a people whom he had to win back by the persuasion which apparently no man could long resist from the turbulent fanaticism of the Donatists to the bosom of the Catholic peace. For thirty-five years he will preach in his Cathedral Church, simply and beautifully called the *Basilica Pacis*, the Basilica of Peace, that wonderful series of sermons which have come down to us, and so many more which have not, in which all the witchery of the Latin tongue acquired in the pagan schools of rhetoric is now applied to the exposition of the mysteries of the Christian Gospel. And during these thirty-five years he will find time also to contend earnestly for the faith against his own old Manichæan error, to expose every subtle wile of the Donatist

schism strong and prevailing still through its Puritanical rigour with the stark sincerity of that African populace, and finally to prophesy to the death against the facile Pelagian rationalism which would explain away the inscrutable mystery of Divine grace.

• Into the midst of these Herculean labours of the spirit there has obtruded once more the hard brute fact of secular history. For a whole year now past the terrible Vandal King Genseric with his army of Arian heretics has been stamping out the Roman peace in the heart of Augustine's beloved Africa. Mauritania, his own Numidia, has been overrun, and the conquering Arian host lies encamped now before the walls of Hippo itself, slowly strangling it to death in the grip of famine. It is the month of August, that month of torrid heat and parching fevers which had always been so trying to Augustine's delicate constitution, which forty-seven years ago had almost carried him off during his first days in Rome. For four months he has been spending himself more recklessly than ever, comforting and encouraging his people, daily in the great Basilica praying with them and exhorting them to faith in the Divine purpose and submission to the Divine will. But now the famine fever has caught him and he lies down to die. He asks his friend and biographer, Possidius, Bishop of Guelma, to see to it that no one enters his room except the doctor and the attendant who brings his food, so that every moment may be free for his last acts of penitence and faith. He had had the penitential Psalms written out in strips which were pasted on the wall opposite his bed, and through them and in their spirit he held continual converse with God throughout the last ten days of his life—a converse which surely was needed, but was also all-sufficient, to atone for the apparent ruin of all his hopes and labours, the apparent triumph of all the forces of evil, which now pressed in upon his fading consciousness.

"On the fifth day before the Kalends of September," I here quote the words of Possidius, "sound in every limb, his sight and hearing unimpaired, in our presence who stood around his bed and prayed with him, he slept with his fathers, as it is written, in a good old age. And to commit his body to the earth we offered the sacrifice of God, and so he was buried." Only one word more from the faithful Possidius and we have done with Augustine, the man of a brief moment in time. "He made no will because the poor man of God had nothing to leave, but he had given orders that his library should be given to the Church and that all his manuscripts should be preserved for posterity."

The poor man of God, God's pauper, had had a true instinct as to the nature of his own immortal riches. Those manuscripts, which he left to posterity, were nearly all occasional writings, sermons, let-

AMONG the many popular delusions that are always with us there is none more persistent than the current misapprehension about Africa. To a large part of the public the Africa of Stanley and Livingstone exists to-day. It still seems to be believed that considerable areas of the once dark continent remain practically unknown to whites, that it is difficult, even dangerous, to "penetrate" into the remote interior, that one still blazes trails and visits places and peoples hitherto unknown. Returning travellers from Central Africa are hailed as explorers! And yet this is a delusion which could so easily be dispelled. One glance at a collection of modern colonial maps would show the heart of darkest Africa as it is to-day—a rapidly developing commercial frontier perfectly well known, thoroughly explored, occupied and everywhere open to transportation. One glance at a work so easily available as the *Encyclopædia Britannica* would make it quite clear when the last shadows of geographic uncertainty were banished.

We are inclined, I think, to forget what an ancient rôle Africa has played in European affairs and to look upon it as a newcomer on our scene. But, leaving North Africa out of it entirely—where white men began colonising six hundred years before Christ—it is well to remember that Europeans have traded and occupied settlements at points along the West Coast of Africa since before Columbus discovered America. And it is not likely that these by no means timid adventurers after gold, ivory, and slaves, should never have dared see more of this rich land than just the harbours. In fact we have evidence of the presence of French commercial gentlemen from Rouen and Dieppe in Sierra Leone and upper Guinea in 1364-5.

During the sixteenth century many parts of the interior of Senegambia were reached, the lower Congo was Christianised, and there were Jesuit priests at that early period in the remotest interior of Abyssinia. In the following century the sources of the Blue Nile were attained in Lake Victoria; the Portuguese pushed far up the Zambesi valley; the Dutch began moving northward from the Cape. A century later—in 1788—a society was formed in London for the express purpose of African exploration. From that time trips into the interior were continuous and far reaching. As early as 1802-11 we have a recorded journey across Central Africa from the West Coast to the East. Englishmen reached Lake Tchad in 1823; the Soudan was explored; Timbuctou and the country between Timbuctou and Lake Tchad became well known to Europeans by 1855; the Niger and its affluents were traced during the following years. Missionaries looked on Kilimanjaro in the in-

clared only through the miracle of grace. Only an immediate action of the Divine power could liberate the perverted will, set it free to recognise and desire and become one with the good. So Augustine had but one concern, to assert that sovereignty of God on which he had felt, and knew, that his whole being hinged. But in trying to give an account of that certainty of his he made of man on the intellectual plane something near an angel of light, on the moral a creature of the nethermost darkness.

The theology of the West has in its soberer moments modified the rigour of both positions, but it has recognised in both truths which religion can never let go. May I attempt to express those truths thus? The only knowledge and the only goodness which are ultimately worthy of man, in which he can ever hope to find an ultimate satisfaction, are a knowledge and a goodness which are God's absolutely free gift, which with whatever agony and whatever ardour they may have been pursued seem in the end just to have come from the Beyond. The one therefore we call Revelation, the other Grace. "Inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in Te"; and our heart which seeks rest is both mind and will, that in us which needs truth and that which needs goodness. St. Augustine, like Elijah, had spoken many wild and whirling words in his jealousy for the Lord God of Hosts. But he has left us all that was at once most agonising and most consoling in his own religious experience in that unforgettable phrase.

A. C. LILLEY.

THE DISTURBANCES IN SOUTH AMERICA.

adducing arguments of legal philosophy which he always had at his disposal to justify his political moods, he rejects on principle any extension of an existing franchise. He does not expect social reforms to be the outcome of political ones, whilst he sees the spectre of Revolution looming behind them. Here lie the roots of the Conservatives' dislike of England and, to use a later term, of the "Western democracies" in general, and this fact must never be lost sight of in reviewing the political actions of the German potentates and their publicity agents, no matter whether their policy was favourably or unfavourably disposed towards Great Britain. Bismarck especially could never be induced to entertain for the English constitutional monarchy (a sham monarchy to him) that benevolent feeling of common interest which attached him to the autocrats of St. Petersburg and perhaps also of Vienna.

But German Anglophobia does not concern itself with single deeds and features only, it attacks the whole and denies England the claim to any higher civilisation. One must not think that this is a late invention of the World War; it goes back to Germany's really great period, to the age of classical poetry, of German idealism and romanticism. Even then English thought was represented as being involved in materialism and utilitarianism, in thirst for pleasure and in selfishness, and this sufficed for that age to condemn England entirely. As early as 1758, Wieland finds fault with England's "base greed of gain," but he thinks that the "earlier and nobler spirit" was stifled only by her recent economic development. Forty years later this same materialism is depicted as emanating from her national character itself. Thus Schleiermacher, in his speeches "on Religion" (1799), one of the noblest manifestos of those days, declares:

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who, they believed, had been the cause of their troubles by making the English Parliament subservient to his will. So they provided that neither the President nor any member of the Cabinet should have seats in Congress; thus they believed that Congress would be independent and a potent check upon the President. From time to time in the United States this opposition of the two powers has produced great inconvenience. In South America this principle was the direct cause of autocracy in the President. Latin peoples are already sufficiently prone to accepting Dictators, and the result of making the representative chambers independent of the President was that the President became independent of the chambers and snapped his fingers at them. Latin American history is full of Dictators who, favoured by the provisions of the constitution, established themselves in power, sometimes for periods as long as twenty years. Seldom were they dislodged without a stiff tussle.

A further cause of these tumults is another Latin characteristic, which used to be very noticeable in Spain. The party in office makes every use of influence, manipulation of constituencies, and a score of other devices, and thus digs itself in, and cannot easily be ejected. The opposing party, desiring what Bright called "the honours and emoluments of office," finds itself left out in the cold. In Spain the difficulty used to be got over by management—most hated method of all—by which the ins agreed to let in the outs for a term, and thus politics was reduced to a sham fight. In South America, when a well-established gang becomes unpopular, a *coup d'état* or small "revolution" is not uncommon, but usually the show of superior force on one side or the other settles the dispute without much disturbance.

One potent cause for the greater stability of the Republics is the immense amount of capital invested in them. English capital in Argentina is estimated at five hundred and sixty millions sterling; in Brazil there is more than half that amount, and in Chile there is a very considerable investment. In some of the smaller Republics doubtless the United States have larger commitments than ourselves. Disturbances are unwelcome to investors, and few South American rulers have been unintelligent enough to interfere with the fertilising stream of gold upon which the prosperity of their country is largely dependent. Thus the great Republics, at least, avoid disturbances as far as possible.

Argentina has lately passed through a trying period. Although that Republic has for forty years been prosperous and orderly, there are in Buenos Aires certain elements that make for unrest. Like nearly all its neighbours, the financial policy of Argentina is wasteful and unskilful. Last August *La Nación*, one of the two great newspapers published in that city, complained bitterly of the mis-

grace. One section of his famous report mentioned that 75 per cent. of those who had agitated in the Palatinate had been imported for the purpose. Of the leaders, Dorten remarried a Frenchwoman and retired to Nice. Heinz was killed. The others were given jobs in France or obscurely subsided.

For a few months Monsieur Poincaré lingered on, burning the midnight oil at the Quai d'Orsay making the Ruhr accounts look as pretty as possible. He did salve considerably more than at one time seemed likely. He was able in large measure to unite the mutually-attractive raw materials of the Ruhr and Lorraine, refusing to deal with the Reich in the matter, but insisting that Stinnes should arrange direct with the Micum. The sequel to this arrangement was the presentation of a bill to Berlin by Stinnes for 700,000,000 gold marks (of which he received 550,000,000) in payment of orders signed with the French and as compensation for hurt done by the invasion, hurt which was not confined to the Ruhr alone. On the other hand, viewed through Poincarist spectacles, the Ruhr was justified in that it re-interested America and led to the Dawes Plan and even to Locarno and finally to the Young Plan, the only fly in the ointment being: Did Poincaré go into the Ruhr in search of a Stresemann and a Dawes?

After the storm, calm. If I have devoted so much space to this first phase, it is because its successor was a tame and uneventful span by comparison. History should remember the French Occupation by its first five years, for then the drama was being played, and for the highest stakes. Although the last French soldier did not leave the Ruhr for 2½ years (autumn 1925), long ere then a pronounced *détente* had set in on the Rhine following Poincaré's defeat at the polls and the definite abandoning by Herriot and Briand of the notion of breaking off any part of Germany. Rather did Briand now proceed to use the Occupation as a means of obtaining security; but that is beyond our present scope. Degoutte was succeeded by Guillaumat. If Tirard remained, his district officers did not, while scores of restrictive ordinances were either withdrawn or lightened and the occupying French force was cut down to 67,000 men. Gradually things grew quieter on the Rhine, whose last effervescence had to do with the shooting of two German civilians in a café by Lieutenant Rouzier (1926). While Stresemann operated, the left bank awaited an accelerated withdrawal of the forces of occupation. Germany had signed the Dawes Plan and Locarno, and was in the League. What further right had these foreign soldiers here? Meanwhile, and nowhere more so than in the French zone, the inhabitants carried their *kein Verkehr* policy to the length of somewhat haughtily looking clean through these soldiers in the street without seeing them.

How happy must General Guillaumat have been these last few

has been elected and an administration formed which will be more in harmony with popular opinion. It could be wished that it were as easy to effect real reforms, but there are not the right type of men to carry on the Government efficiently and economically; financial mismanagement and waste will continue. In new countries this is even more common than in old; traditions and capable men are lacking. But at least it has been demonstrated that it is possible to make a complete change of Government without serious disturbance. An absurd suggestion has been made that this incident may affect the Anglo-Argentine Exhibition and prevent the visit of the Prince of Wales. That a surface disturbance of this kind, which will have left no trace in six months' time, could have any such effect is inconceivable to anyone who knows Argentina. The changes will make for tranquillity rather than otherwise.

Bolivia is a backward Republic, but rich in mineral wealth and forest products. In the present year the President, Dr. Hernando Siles, displayed the usual autocratic tendencies, and, becoming unpopular, was deposed. The discontent was, it would appear, justified. In 1928 there was a serious boundary dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay which was happily settled by arbitration. During the war scare President Siles took advantage of the excitement to assume dictatorial power and also to crush or banish his political opponents. Such episodes are common and not alarming, as Lord Bryce pointed out long ago; they are the result of trying to work parliamentary systems by an unparliamentary people. Bolivia, like Peru, suffered a severe blow from the war of 1879-83, when she lost her nitrate provinces and access to the sea-coast. Attempts have been made to interest the League of Nations in her grievances, but that body has always affirmed want of jurisdiction. There is no doubt that the settlement of the Arica-Tacna dispute between Chile and Peru was unfair to Bolivia, seeing that it debarred her from access to the sea.

In Peru Señor Augusto B. Leguía established himself in the Presidency as long ago as 1919 by a *coup d'état*, and was re-elected in 1924 and 1929. This is a long term of dictatorship for Peru. On the whole the President governed well, but an unconstitutional tenure is of necessity insecure, and he was recently deposed by force. That he had given Peru a long term of rest from political disturbances and a chance to recuperate, ought to be set down to his credit. The country is one which urgently needs fostering care, for it has long been in a depressed condition. The people are polite and highly cultured; the amenities of Lima are at least equal to those of any other city in South America, and the country has abundant wealth of all kinds—mineral, sugar, cotton, and wool. Yet Peru has never realised its possibilities. There is great lack

of labour and capital; transport is very difficult owing to the immense mountain ranges and inhospitable forests; to traverse the country from east to west is almost impossible. Development and good government are needed.

So far we have had in review disturbances that were comparatively trifling and only slightly dangerous to life and property. But the commotions in Brazil were far more serious and undoubtedly exceeded anything that has occurred in South America during the present century. This Portuguese-speaking Republic is larger than the United States minus Alaska. As it is one of the largest States in the world, so it is one of the richest in natural resources, but the country is very imperfectly developed and large tracts are unexplored. It is a federation of a number of heterogeneous States and the task of ruling them is extremely arduous. One element of unrest is the State of São Paulo, which is devoted to coffee, the staple industry of Brazil. The exports of coffee greatly exceed in value the sum total of all the other exports. The inhabitants of this State, largely Italian, are more energetic and wealthy than the other Brazilians, and are chronically dissatisfied with the Federal Government at Rio, because they consider that the taxes, to which they contribute so largely, are expended wastefully and without regard to their interests. São Paulo is to Brazil what Catalonia is to the rest of Spain.

There had been disturbances in Brazil in 1922, but two years later they recurred in São Paulo on a much more serious scale. The revolt was led by General Isidoro Dias Lopes, and the insurgents put forward the usual São Paulo grievances. Among them was a considerable section of the Army, which resented the severity meted out to the rebels of 1922 by the President, Dr. Arthur Bernardes. For more than a week the city of São Paulo was in the hands of the insurgents, who were at last driven out by the threat of bombardment. In 1926 Dr. Washington Luiz became President, and quiet prevailed for some years, but discontent remained, and the State of Rio Grande do Sul has long been disaffected. This year the retiring President caused further resentment by procuring the election of Dr. Jules Prestes, who was about to assume office at the commencement of the disturbances. The claim of South American Presidents to nominate their successor is a fruitful cause of discontent.

In September of this year the disorders came to a head, and from Para to Rio Grande there was armed rebellion in half a dozen quarters. The leaders claimed that their object was to suppress the clique that has dominated Brazil for forty years. This formula is much in vogue among Latin nations; here and elsewhere it is asserted that elections are "made," that they do not represent

the honest choice of the electors, but are the result of more or less corrupt manipulation. As long as the Government could depend on the Army, there was every prospect of the defeat of the rebel forces, who were widely dispersed, and the benevolent attitude of the United States was a factor in favour of Dr. Luiz. However, when the insurgents towards the end of October drew near the capital, the Federal army suddenly went over to the enemy, and Dr. Luiz and the President Elect were powerless. Fortunately the various generals made an amicable arrangement among themselves and agreed to appoint Dr. Vargas from Rio Grande do Sul to the Presidency. The Junta stated that they would call a National Council which should elect a President, and promised a revision of the Constitution with a formidable list of reforms. This fair prospect may possibly be realised; it depends on the elimination of personal and local jealousies.

The causes of discontent have already been set forth and the disaffection was aggravated by the world-wide industrial depression which is felt by Brazil as strongly as any other country. It should be remembered that, towards the end of 1920, Brazil led the slump which followed the post-war boom. The milreis suddenly fell from about one and fourpence to sixpence, and the Republic has experienced ten lean years. If the government is improved, there will be a better prospect of recovery. Great natural advantages are numerous. São Paulo, when visited by the present writer, was a fine city situated on a cool plateau with an excellent climate, and it has since been greatly improved. The population is about 600,000. Santos, its port, has been changed out of all recognition, and is now a handsome and attractive town. If the taste for politics and graft diminishes, and education is improved, the future of Brazil is very bright.

The conclusion that may be drawn is that the South American peoples are still suffering from refractory matter; they were not and are not adapted to parliamentary institutions. Almost everywhere a dismal procession of civil broils and perpetual warfare between neighbours has passed along the stage. The amendment which the last half-century has shown is not due to any virtue of their institutions, but in part to the work of strong dictatorial Presidents, and in part to the influx of capital and the diversion of the energies of the people into commercial and industrial channels. Everywhere we have incompetent legislative bodies which have no conception of the most elementary principles of finance, which can never construct budgets on any system of economy or equity. The material for effecting reforms is not there. The Republics have shown statesmanlike qualities in their foreign policy; they have brought to an end their domestic wars, and they

maintain peace with the outside world. It is in their home politics that they fail. The remedy would appear to be a better education, which would promote public spirit and a sense of responsibility. The hard school of experience has taught them some lessons, and the Republics are still young.

If the British Empire Trade Exhibition were made not merely a means of bartering commodities, but also an encouragement for a traffic in ideas, if we could study and appreciate the fine literature which has sprung up wherever the Spanish language is spoken, if we could give them a like understanding of ours—which is much neglected—and if we could show them that we understand their difficulties, and also help them by financial advice and training in the best traditions, then a great service would be done on both sides, and not only trade but sympathy and understanding would be fostered. The independent history of South America is little more than a hundred years old, and there is plenty of time for development and improvement. In that Great Britain has played a conspicuous part, and there is no reason why the material benefits which we have helped to confer should not be supplemented by the still more beneficent intellectual stimulus and training which it is in our power to bestow, and which would be of the utmost value both to ourselves and to South America.

W. A. HIRST.

A RELIGIOUS CENSUS.

MOST of us feel the fascination of statistics, of records numerically tabulated, whether this takes the form of studying trade returns, cricket averages or records of speed. The decennial census of this or other countries is, therefore, a matter not only of scientific and administrative importance but of widespread general interest, and the ordinary citizen may be justified in examining with a not impertinent curiosity the lines on which this rare and exciting investigation is to be conducted. The broad outlines of the proposed *questionnaire* to be answered by every householder next April have lately been announced in the Press. They follow the normal rules of requiring information on the age, sex, occupation, status and ordinary residence of every inhabitant of the United Kingdom on the 26th April next. They appear models of thoroughness in every respect but one: most illogically there is again no provision for recording numerically the religious allegiances of the population.

This curious omission will presumably be defended by reference to precedent, for it is the fact that no religious census of Great Britain has been taken since 1851. But it is nevertheless singular and from many points of view regrettable. At a time when the newspapers are full of discussions on the position of religion to-day, on the activity or passiveness of the Churches, on the growth of new faiths, on the spread of indifference and infidelity, it would be of great interest both to professing Christians and to their critics, both to the student of sociology and to the average citizen, to see clearly tabulated the numbers of those who, however superficially, however disdainfully, profess themselves (and their children) adherents of the Church of England, of the Roman Catholic Church, or of one of the many bodies, both Christian and non-Christian, which are organised for religious objects in this country; even more illuminating might be the enumeration of those who profess themselves agnostics, atheists, or of no religion, or who "object to state" or, quite permissibly, leave this particular inquiry unanswered. On all these questions the wildest conjectures and the most inaccurate statements are boldly advanced both in conversation and in print, and what should be a matter of easily ascertainable fact becomes a controversial issue on which no certainty is obtainable. That most valuable of guides on most matters, *Whitaker's Almanack*, has no further information to furnish on this subject than that 2,518,674 persons made their Easter Communion in the Church of England (apart from Wales) in 1925, and that the Roman Catholic Church claimed 2,055,060 "members" (men, women and children, presumably) in England and

Wales in the same year. A brilliant German critic, Karl Dibelius, can actually venture, in the absence of statistics, the wildly inaccurate guess that "something like a half of the professing Christians in England belong to the Free Churches." Still wilder conjectures appear constantly in the Press and are instantly countered by equally wild denials and counter-assertions.

This uncertainty is unscientific and unsatisfactory, and is in curious contrast with the impartial and thorough census-making of most other parts of the world. Nearly every civilised country takes a religious census. The most important exception is the United States of America, where there has been a certain official shyness, based on an inherited Puritan prejudice, of such a proceeding—a shyness which is shared neither by religious denominations themselves, which nearly all advertise their numbers and growth, nor by the newspapers, which conduct from time to time a census of their own. Of European countries only France, Belgium, and Spain take no religious census: in all these countries practically the whole population (apart from the few Jews and, in France, about a million Protestants) are either professing Roman Catholics or of no religion at all, so that the census would have little really fresh information to give. Everywhere else in Europe a religious census is taken as a matter of course without exciting any opposition or encountering any political or technical difficulties and with most interesting results.

The religious census is not only almost universal in Europe; it is taken everywhere in the British Dominions overseas. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the Irish Free State, Newfoundland, all include religious profession in their census *questionnaire* and obtain, without the slightest opposition or difficulty, complete and most illuminating answers. Even in one part of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, a religious census is actually held, and the denominational figures thus obtained are valuable material in the study of the educational and social problem there.

There is, therefore, every reason of science, of common-sense and of uniform practice why a religious census should be revived—and without delay, in 1931—in Great Britain. Before another census-year comes round, problems of importance may be before us, of Church disestablishment, of provided and non-provided schools, of religious and secular standpoints, on which, as a starting-point, some facts about the religious distribution of the population are essential. It is hard to see how there can be any valid objection to such a course. The returns are for the confidential information of the census officials alone, and the fact that a man professes himself a Buddhist or a Mormon could not possibly be

disclosed to his prejudice. Moreover, those who either wish to keep their faith a secret or, like Gallio, care for none of these things, would be under no compulsion to make any entry beyond "no religion" or "object to state" or merely leave a blank! Finally, it may be added that it can surely not be "out of consideration for the Anglican Church," as Herr Dibelius alleges in his *England*, that anyone could refuse to revive the religious census: no opposition certainly is threatened from any such quarter.

What would be the result of such an inquiry? It is an interesting topic, and it is possible to formulate a provisional answer, though of course not with any accuracy. Let us take first the Church of England and apply various methods to determining the approximate number of its professing, or nominal, adherents.

(1) In the year 1924, 729,933 babies were born in England and Wales. In the same year 490,647 baptisms were celebrated in the Church of England in England alone (without Monmouthshire). Wales, together with Monmouthshire, had a population in 1921 of 2,657,412 out of a total for England and Wales of 37,885,242—that is one-fourteenth of the whole. Reducing, therefore, the number of births by one-fourteenth we find that in the area of the Provinces of Canterbury and York there were in 1924 approximately 678,000 births and 490,000 Anglican baptisms. Allowing 10,000, probably an over-allowance, for older baptisms, the result is to show that in England (minus Monmouthshire) 70.7 per cent. of the population are baptised members of the Church of England.

(2) In two of the Overseas Dominions the population is overwhelmingly, 98 per cent., of British origin. What do religious statistics there show? In 1911, the Church of England comprised in Australia 38.3 per cent., in 1916 in New Zealand 41.75 per cent. of the population; in 1921 the Anglican percentage had increased in Australia to 43.6 per cent., in 1926 in New Zealand it had dropped (slightly) to 41.21 per cent. But in these two countries the proportion of (Scottish) Presbyterians and (Irish) Roman Catholics is enormously in excess of their proportion in England. In England (including Wales) the Roman Catholic Church only claims 2,055,060 members, that is 5.3 per cent.; in Australia Roman Catholics in 1911 were 20.6 per cent., in 1921 20.8 per cent. (a slight increase), in New Zealand in 1916 13.79 per cent., in 1926 12.8 per cent. (a slight decline). The Presbyterian Church of England has less than 100,000 (84,590) "members" or all told, including babies, less than 1 per cent. of the population, and even if Scottish Presbyterians temporarily resident in England

(? 300,000) be added they would only reach 1.5 per cent.; but in Australia Presbyterians were in 1911 12.8 per cent., and in 1921 11.7 per cent. of the population, and in New Zealand in 1916 and 1926 23.71 per cent. and 24.60 respectively. (Incidentally these figures dispose clearly enough of the allegation often made that the New Zealanders are mainly *Scottish* by descent; clearly only about a quarter of the population is Scottish in origin.) If then in the case of England proper allowance is made on the Australian figures for the greater proportion of Irish and Scotch (even not allowing for Welsh and foreigners) in that country, it would seem necessary to increase the Australian percentages for Anglicans of 43.6 per cent. by the Roman Catholic difference of 15.5 per cent. and the Presbyterian difference of at least 10 per cent. (Methodists and certain other Protestants, not Congregationalists, are of approximately the same strength in Australia and New Zealand as in England.) This would bring the Anglican percentage in England up to about 69 per cent.

Other tests would show the nominal Anglican percentage higher. For instance, the Army figures bring Anglicans up to 75 per cent. But such tests are incomplete and unsatisfactory, and I would ignore them. It is, however, interesting to note that in 1851, when a religious census was held in England—which covered only church attendance—Anglicans were recorded as 3,773,474; Roman Catholics as 305,393; Methodists as 1,565,705; Independents as 793,142; Baptists as 587,978; Presbyterians as 60,131; Unitarians as 37,156; Quakers as 18,172—that is to say, at the date Anglicans were 51.9 per cent. of habitual church-goers.

To sum up, according to the above tests nominal Anglicans number between 51 per cent. and 70 per cent. of the population. Between this and the actual number of practising Churchmen there is, of course, a large (and, to anyone who takes this fact to heart, a remarkable) difference. In 1924 only 2,444,500 persons obeyed the instruction of their Church to receive Holy Communion at Easter; in 1927 the number had risen to a bare 2,528,391. To take another test, only 3,686,422 persons above the age of eighteen had in 1927 registered themselves as Parochial Electors under the Enabling Act. If this number be doubled to include persons under the age of eighteen it only brings the total number of Anglicans to about $7\frac{1}{4}$ millions: yet nearly 70 per cent. of the 35 million inhabitants of England—that is, something between 21 and $24\frac{1}{2}$ millions—would, it seems, describe themselves, or be described by their parents, as "Church of England." This discrepancy may well justify the Bishop of Durham's forceful plea for Disestablish-

ment; in any case it calls for serious consideration by every member of the Church of England. But it does not, of course, affect the present argument.

Let us suppose then that between 21 and 24 millions of the population of England (without Wales) are nominally Anglican. The Roman Catholics *claim* less than two millions (excluding Wales). What of the rest? To begin with, there are the Jews. *Whitaker* calculates them at about 300,000, a proportion which, now that foreign immigration has stopped, may well remain fairly constant. Buddhists (including British Buddhists) and Moslems are so few as not to enter into the discussion. Theosophists and Spiritualists claim some thousands, and in the latter case some tens of thousands (? 70,000). Christian Science is on the increase. In Canada the numbers of its adherents rose from 5,073 in 1911 to 13,826 in 1921, but even so they were far less than 1 per cent. of the population. (In the United States in 1925 they numbered 317,937—0.25 per cent.) Their proportion in England can scarcely be higher—200,000 at the very outside.

There remains for consideration the large and important "Non-conformist" section of the population, the "Free Churches." Let us take them in turn. First in importance come the various Methodist and Wesleyan Churches. In 1929 the ministers, lay preachers and members of these various bodies in the British Isles amounted to 980,979, their Sunday Scholars to 1,483,134. Adding in proportion to the number of Sunday Scholars (though this is probably too much) for young children and others, there would be 4,800,000 Methodists and Wesleyans of various kinds in Great Britain, or about four and a quarter million in England alone—that is, 11.9 per cent. of the population, a number which finds striking confirmation in the 11.6 per cent. of the 1921 Australian census. Congregationalist Churches in England and Wales contain 1,727,442 sittings; doubling the number for young children and others but subtracting Wales, we arrive at an approximate figure of three millions—probably an overstatement. Baptist members and teachers numbered in 1928 in the British Isles 471,470, Sunday Scholars 500,080—nearly 1,000,000 in all; adding young children and others (as for the Methodists) we have 2,000,000, but Scotland, Wales and Ireland must be subtracted. If the Presbyterians be allowed 200,000 (to which perhaps resident Scottish Presbyterians—? 300,000—should be added), the Society of Friends 40,000, the Unitarians 60,000, the "Brethren" 80,000 or 100,000, and other Protestants, including the Salvation Army, another 400,000, the 35 millions of England may be thus accounted for as a probable conjecture:—

Anglicans	...	...	...	...	21,400,000
Roman Catholics	...	...	...	...	1,950,000
Methodists and Wesleyans	...	...	...	...	4,250,000
Congregationalists	...	...	...	...	2,250,000
Baptists	...	...	...	...	1,758,000
Presbyterians	...	...	...	...	500,000
Other Protestants (Church of Christ, Brethren, Salvation Army, etc.)	...	...	...	...	800,000
Unitarians and Society of Friends	...	...	...	...	100,000
Irvingites, Swedenborgians, etc.	...	...	...	...	50,000
Christian Scientists	...	...	...	...	200,000
Spiritualists	...	...	...	...	70,000
Theosophists, Buddhists, Moslems and others	...	...	...	...	50,000
Jews	...	...	...	...	300,000
"Of no religion"	...	...	...	...	2,000,000
					35,678,000

Possibly two millions is far too high a figure for those who would describe themselves as "of no religion" or refuse to answer; possibly it is far too low. Similarly 21,400,000 may be far too high, or rather too low, for "Anglicans." Between these two categories there must be a considerable number of persons to account for. About this we can only guess. But our ignorance shows, once more, how urgently we need a religious census.

ALLEN LEEPER.

CHRISTINA ROSSETTI: A RECONSIDERATION.

IT is remarkable that those from whom Christina Rossetti received the most discerning praise were usually men—and they of various shades of unorthodoxy. Swinburne led the way of appreciation, and William Michael Rossetti dedicated the volume called *New Poems*, which he edited after his sister's death, to Swinburne as her "generous eulogist" and his own "old and constant friend." A letter written by Sir Walter Raleigh in 1902 quotes Swinburne's judgment on a single poem, and adds another tribute from an unexpected source.

I have been reading Christina Rossetti. I think she is the best poet alive (*sic*). . . . The only thing Christina makes me want to do is cry, not lecture. Swinburne says that *Passing away, saith the world, passing away* is so much the noblest of sacred poems in English that none is second. . . . I am very glad I have not to lecture on her, for it is too pure poetry.

"Mark Rutherford's" estimate of her work was expressed in his own vigorous, and rather combative, way. He wrote in his old age (1908):

I was so provoked a little while ago by a criticism on Christina Rossetti. . . . The author assumed that because much of her poetry was religious it was worthless. I say religion has nothing to do with the value of poetry. The question is whether it is a noble expression of a particular faith, and not whether the faith is true according to the standard of truth set up in Church, Chapel, or Hall of Science to-day. I also say that nobody can judge properly the poetry of a religion unless he is inside it. Christina, to my mind and to my ear, is wonderful. The matter is great; she often reaches the purely universal, and her metre and melodies are as musical as Swinburne's.*

In support of that last assertion we have Christina Rossetti's familiar songs, *A Birthday*, *When I am dead, my dearest*, and *Dream Land*; or the dirge that greets the tardy Bridegroom in *The Prince's Progress*, when at last he reaches the end of his journey:

Veiled figures carrying her
Sweep by yet make no stir;
There is a smell of spice and myrrh,
A bride-chant burdened with one name;
The bride-song rises steadier
Than the torches' flame:—
"Too late for love, too late for joy,
Too late, too late!
You loitered on the road too long,
You trifled at the gate:
The enchanted dove upon her branch
Died without a mate;

* *Letters to Three Friends*. By W. Hale White. 1924.

The enchanted princess in her tower
Slept, died, behind the grate;
Her heart was starving all this while
You made it wait."

This was the poem of which Edmund Gosse said that "every claim which criticism has to make for the singular merit of Miss Rossetti might be substantiated from this little-known romance." He was astonished that "the general public, that strange and unaccountable entity, has chosen to prefer *Goblin Market* . . . to *The Prince's Progress*."

To prove still further that her "metre and melodies" challenge comparison with Swinburne's, there are the sweet measures of such poems as *Autumn Violets*, *At Last*, and *An After-Thought*. The series of sonnets under the title of *Monna Inominata* may be set side by side with Mrs. Browning's *Sonnets from the Portuguese* for their exceeding human tenderness; but they have a quality which is Christina's own—a mystical exaltation that makes each seem like a flower springing from its Dantesque root:

This say I, having counted up the cost,
This, though I be the feeblest of God's host,
The sorriest sheep Christ shepherds with His crook. . . .

and again in the fourteenth sonnet:

. . . Leave youth his roses, who can bear a thorn,—
I will not seek for blossoms anywhere,
Except such common flowers as blow with corn.
Youth gone and beauty gone, what doth remain?
The longing of a heart pent up forlorn,
A silent heart whose silence loves and longs;
The silence of a heart which sang its songs
While youth and beauty made a summer morn,
Silence of love that cannot sing again.

But a nearer affinity than one of rare lyrical quality made Swinburne and Christina Rossetti each hold the other's art in reverence—though her knowledge of his poems was apparently limited to *Atalanta in Calydon* and a few others. Both were by nature ardent, passionate; but Swinburne's passion was to him like a fiery banner to be waved for an individual or a cause; or the source of a verbal torrent to sweep all Young Europe under the guidance of "one red star." Passion in Christina Rossetti was the strong still current of her inner life. With her family history she may well have had something of the rebel in her composition, but her nature was always controlled by that ultimate law which is itself "like unto a fire," until passion became fused with her patience and aspiration and spiritual energy. These successive phases of her being are nowhere reflected more completely than in her sonnet sequence, *Later Life*. If Christina Rossetti found in Swinburne's supreme music a spell which she could not resist, he responded to

the "mourning inward Dove" whose voice is so clearly heard in her poems.

Swinburne, too, was not a poet of a single mood. Someone has recalled him as a young man, at the time when he was reading modern history with William Stubbs (1859) and used to sit at the feet of his shocked and reluctant hostess, in the vicarage garden, while he read aloud to her his early poems. It is an unforgettable glimpse. But Johannes Jørgensen, the Danish poet, quotes in his *Autobiography* a passage which suggests a very different Swinburne fifty years later. By chance Jørgensen read an English review called *The Bibelot*, in which Swinburne, "in a kind of interview," spoke of the point of view expressed by certain of his poems; in particular, *Dolores*—a poem which presents a striking instance of the wide divergence between his outlook and Christina Rossetti's. This was his comment:

Not all at once, not for ever, is the past slain and buried; the huntress pursues her fleeing prey which is still wounded and weak, just escaped from the claws of passion. The cruel hands, the passionate eyes are still bright and alluring—*qui a bu, boira*—the feet are still drawn back to the old paths. Only by flight all through life, flight side by side with the goddess that redeems, can the long thralldom be broken and the slave escape from the goddess that devours. . . .

Jørgensen, who for many years before his own conversion to Catholicism had been a fervent disciple of Swinburne, discovered under the pagan imagery of those words a new mood and a deeper significance.

If Christina Rossetti's life, viewed from outside, seems not only uneventful but narrow in its interests, it was neither self-centred nor isolated from humanity. A French writer has said that "only the saints know how to love"; her poems show that she had attained to the highest branches of that learning. W. M. Rossetti declares that "along with religion, affection was the motive power of Christina's life." This force was lavished on her family and friends, and flowed out to the wider circle of her charity. Like an earlier saint, Mechthild of Magdeburg, she would have asked, "Of what use is it to love God if we are grim and forbidding to our neighbours?" For more than twenty years after W. M. Rossetti reached manhood, he made a home in London for his mother and younger sister; Maria also lived with them till 1873, when she entered a community. As the last surviving member of the family, he was frequently consulted by his friend, Mr. Mackenzie Bell, who, soon after Christina Rossetti's death, undertook to write a biographical and critical study of her. His own *Memoir*, prefixed to the complete edition of her poems,* must,

* *The Poetical Works of Christina Georgina Rossetti*. Macmillans. 1906.
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however, be regarded as the final authority on her life and character. From him we gain certain descriptive phrases which help us to see the poet as woman, daughter, and sister :

In Christina's character there was great dignity tempered . . . by modesty; and to this her bearing corresponded faithfully. . . . She was replete with the spirit of self-postponement, which passed into self-sacrifice . . . and *noblesse oblige* might have been her motto. Though shy, and even somewhat nervous, she was of unshaken firmness, making up her mind pretty easily in any crisis of her life, and abiding immovable. The narrow path was the only one for her, and a lion in the same path made no difference. She never . . . imputed a bad motive to anyone; . . . none the less she had a large fund of discernment, and speedily fathomed defects in her acquaintances which she never announced . . . a soul as pure, duteous, concentrated, loving, and devoted, as ever uttered itself in either prose or verse.

No one could speak from more intimate observation; but W. M. Rossetti's Notes on the poems appear meticulous to-day, and his Memoir also suffers from being too circumstantial. The details of his sister's almost lifelong ill-health, the list of every sketch or photograph made of her, and, most of all, the history of the unhappy love affairs which had a vital share in what he calls her "hushed life-drama"—all these seem a concession to a curious public rather than necessary to an appreciation of her work. It is true that Christina Rossetti's most poignant and secret experiences passed into her poems; but she was innately loyal in the human relations of her life, and reticent about her own deepest concerns. Lady Burne-Jones made a thumb-nail sketch of Christina Rossetti as she appeared in 1865*—that is, at the time when the second of those affairs, and the one which had an enduring influence, was in progress. The scene was an evening party at the Madox Browns' house in Kentish Town :

Whistler was there, looking ten times more like a Frenchman than Legros did, his face working with vivacity, his thick black hair curling down to his eyebrows, with an angry eye-glass fixed beneath it. . . . Gabriel was there in a magnificent mood—no other word describes it when he passed through a room bringing pleasure to great and small by his beautiful urbanity, a prince amongst men . . . and Christina Rossetti, *gently caustic of tongue*.

That was the mask she kept "to face the world with." Beneath it lay her immense capacity for suffering and endurance, and also for scaling the far heights whence she caught a divine radiance. She was only twenty-eight when she wrote *From House to Home*, the poem which William Rossetti regarded as one of her "most manifest masterpieces," concluding with verses that have the ring

* *Memorials of Edward Burne-Jones*. 1904.

of inspiration. Here, and always, it is not so much the penetration of a spiritualised intellect—like Alice Meynell's—as the direct vision of a pure heart.

Sappho wrote: "The Greeks turn their faces from those who wear no garlands"; and some of Christina Rossetti's critics, as we have seen, regretted that she lacked the Hellenic spirit. They thought her gifts were stultified by their dedication, and therefore undervalued that larger part of her work which is definitely sacred in character. In effect, they ruled that a poet may express every longing—except a thirst for God. A modern writer, Mr. Osbert Burdett, in *The Beardsley Period*, took a juster view when he said: "The life and poetry of Christina Rossetti were the fit reflection of each other. . . . Her seclusion was proper to a contemplative mystic. She was a poet and a saint, one of those whom the Church of England has placed its soul in peril by neglecting." After all, it is in her *Songs for Strangers and Pilgrims*, and the other poems woven from the tissue of her faith, that some of her most exquisite and varied forms are to be found. Her fullest powers are exercised as she touches one theme after another with her genius—at once tender and stately. Hardly anyone save Christina Rossetti could have rendered this parable of Maundy Thursday in words that make us both hear the tumultuous sound among the cedars and pines, and realise the royalty of sacrifice.

The great Vine left its glory to reign as Forest King.

"Nay," quoth the lofty forest trees, "we will not have this thing; We will not have this supple one enring us with its ring. Lo, from immemorial time our might towers shadowing: Not we were born to curve and droop, not we to climb and cling:

I a king, and thou a king, and what king shall be our king?"

Nevertheless the great Vine stooped to be the Forest King,
While the forest swayed and murmured like seas that are tempesting:
Stooped and drooped with thousand tendrils in thirsty languishing;
Bowed to earth and lay on earth for earth's replenishing;
Put off sweetness, tasted bitterness, endured time's fashioning;
Put off life and put on death: and lo! it was all to bring
All its fellows down to a death which hath lost the sting,
All its fellows up to a life in endless triumphing,—
I a king, and thou a king, and this King to be our King.

Christina Rossetti was born and bred a Londoner, but she could not have been more sensitive to all the influences of nature if she had spent her life in the country. Nor, in spite of her Italian parentage, could she be more English in her interpretation of beauty. As Katharine Mansfield declared, "Delicate perception is not enough; one must find the exact way in which to convey the delicate perception"; Christina Rossetti's art fulfils this further need alike in her presentation of natural and of spiritual

values. She is especially skilful in drawing "still life" effects. Her poem *The Dead City*, written in 1847, is an early instance of her predilection for rich colours massed in flowers or fruit, forecasting the tempting wares of *Goblin Market*. That poem, among others, proves that she did not lack a sense of the dramatic; and many of the verses included in *Sing-Song* have a gay or wistful charm which must have given her the freedom of the nursery world for which they were primarily written. Christina Rossetti's temperament inclined her to find symbols everywhere; but she saw them with her own eyes, and was little influenced by "schools" of symbolists, whether French or English, of the period. She could have said, like Blake, "I question not my corporeal eye, any more than I would question a window concerning a sight. I look through it, and not with it." For she discerned to a rare degree the half-disclosures and underlying promises in the outward world. For example, her poem *An Old-world Thicket* opens with a subjective "vision of sin," expressing anguish and self-loathing; but the dark mood passes as she sees earth transfigured in the evening light, and receives—as Gray or Wordsworth might have received from such a scene—an assurance of reconciliation and tranquillity.

Then I looked up. The wood lay in a glow
From golden sunset and from ruddy sky;

Warm dying loveliness brought near and low.
And filing peacefully between the trees,
Having the moon behind them, and the sun
Full in their meek mild faces, walked at ease
A homeward flock, at peace
With one another and with every one.

And bleating, one or other, many or few,
Journeying together toward the sunlit west;
Mild face by face, and woolly breast by breast,
Patient, sun-brightened too,
Still journeying toward the sunset and their rest.

This double consciousness, and her own deep sense of responsibility, mingle in almost all that Christina Rossetti wrote. Her words,

I, rated to the full amount,
Must render my account,

were not the expression of a passing mood, but her abiding conviction. For she was an extremist in her ideals and aims, and, as her brother pointed out, a consistent one. Her "passionate heart" was never stilled by any moral compromise; nor did her lifelong conflict issue in a conclusive victory. To the end she was subject to those alternations of darkness and illumination, of self-distrust

and tenacious faith, which are the very gist of her poems, and the itinerary of her own pilgrimage.

.. We are of those who tremble at Thy word;
Who faltering walk in darkness toward our close
Of mortal life, by terrors curbed and spurred:
We are of those.

We journey to that land which no man knows
Who any more can make his voice be heard
Above the clamour of our wants and woes.

Not ours the hearts Thy loftiest love hath stirred,
Not such as we Thy lily and Thy rose:
Yet, Hope of those who hope with hope deferred,
We are of those.

Christina Rossetti had the defects of that virtue which her brother named "concentration." Her introspective habit was increased by physical weakness, and the limitations imposed by poverty during many years of her life. Worldliness had no hold upon her, and all her demands were made on her own will and courage. The lowest room in earth or heaven was the only place she could ever conceive as due to her. But, sternly as she judged herself, she was full of mercy for her beloved Gabriel's failings, and of sympathy with his sorrows. Although he moved in a world remote from hers, a strange resemblance can be traced in their work; in certain poems each seems to have invoked the other's spirit, speaking the same language and idiom. This likeness—an almost ironical one when we consider Gabriel's deflexions and Christina's disciplined ways—becomes apparent if we set side by side his sonnets, *Lost Days* and *A Superscription*, with her lines quoted above, or with *Who shall deliver me?*

God strengthen me to bear myself;
That heaviest weight of all to bear,
Inalienable weight of care.

God harden me against myself,
This coward with pathetic voice
Who craves for ease, and rest, and joys:
Myself, arch-traitor to myself;
My hollowest friend, my deadliest foe,
My clog whatever road I go. . . .

In the sphere of their art, in their attitude to all forms of beauty, the bond between brother and sister is more obvious; both had a tendency to look at life in "the penumbra of that decorative world where nothing is quite real"—as John Butler Yeats called it. To the younger generation to-day Christina Rossetti's name may only suggest a vague remembrance of the pre-Raphaelites, or a little-known Victorian group of poets which included Mrs. Browning and other less distinguished women. But Sir

Edmund Gosse, whose verdict is not yet disregarded, did not hesitate to call her

One of the most perfect poets of the age—not one of the most powerful, of course, nor one of the most epoch-making, but . . . a writer toward whom we may not unreasonably expect that students of English literature in the twenty-fourth century may look back as the critics of Alexandria did toward Sappho and toward Erinna.*

His essay on Christina Rossetti, one of those delicately discriminating studies in which he excelled, was first published in 1893, but was written earlier, and nearer the date when he saw her for the last time. This was in 1876, eighteen years before her death, for during that latter period she was nearly as much secluded from the world as a nun. They occasionally exchanged letters, and he always retained for the woman and the poet a deep admiration and reverence. He recognised that some of her songs were “not unworthy to be classed with the melodies of Shakespeare, of Burns, of Shelley”; he rated her sonnets above Gabriel Rossetti’s (though her own modesty made a quite different estimate); and he points out the “brilliant simplicity” of her visions, the “sort of Tuscan candour” of the words in which she clothed them.

Alice Meynell, with whom it seems natural to compare Christina Rossetti to-day—rather than with Herbert, Vaughan, or Newman—has won a more eclectic fame. She was rightly called a “cloistered” spirit, but the critic who announced, “She was the saint of our poetry. Therefore she has no counterpart among English poets,” was forgetful of Christina Rossetti—to go back no further. While Alice Meynell is pre-eminently a poet for other poets, and is revered by scholars, Catholic theologians, and mystics, her concentrated thought—and perhaps her miraculous technique—tends to make her inaccessible to many who find in the poems of Christina Rossetti both “an awakening to lost simplicities” and the cry of their own hearts. Equally they are poets of the inner life, and the work of each has the property of illumination; one with the pale radiance of altar candles burning high and clear in a dim cathedral, and the other with a warmer glow, as of a lantern carried through wind and darkness by a human hand. Alice Meynell, with her intent gaze on things that lie beyond the ordinary range of vision, was surely the sister in art of Christina Rossetti. Both, too, were acquainted with “the interior grief of poetry or of a devout life”—as Mrs. Meynell calls that mysterious sense in one of her essays. Outwardly her own life held almost all the essentials of human happiness; a cherished childhood spent between England and Italy; rare gifts which were recognised by adoring friends; a husband who not only satisfied her heart, but

* *Selected Essays* (First Series). By Sir Edmund Gosse. 1928.

was the comrade of her spirit and her working partner in literature. Yet it was her wayfaring experience, and Christina Rossetti’s, and that of many other pilgrim souls, that she summed up under the title of *Via, et Veritas, et Vita*:

“You never attained to Him?” “If to attain

Be to abide, then that maybe.”

“Endless the way, followed with how much pain!”

“The way was He.”

For Christina Rossetti there could be no early travelling for pleasure, no freedom from the cares of poverty in her youth. The modest degree of success and honour which came to her was long delayed. She had friends, indeed, among men and women of letters, and they included two who were also Mrs. Meynell’s devoted admirers, Ruskin and Coventry Patmore. She shared the joy of creative work in association with her brother and the other pre-Raphaelites, during the brief course of *The Germ*; and a critic has lately pronounced that “the clearest eye and hand in all the circle belonged to Christina Rossetti, but, because she was a woman, her influence was merely negative.” Perhaps her “defeat” (as the same critic calls her failure to save the movement from extravagance) was due not so much to her sex as to her temperamental choice of renunciation, and the fact that her own cultivation was intensive, not wide. Her mind was steeped in the literature of the Bible, of Dante, and Homer—in translations, for she knew no Greek; *The Dialogues* of Plato, the *Confessions* of St. Augustine, and the *Imitation* were among the books she read repeatedly; of the modern English poets, Shelley in his lyrics, Coleridge and Tennyson appealed to her above the rest. But the “professional” side of reading and authorship, still more the actual daily task of journalism which Alice Meynell undertook—transforming it into literature with a masterly touch—these lay outside the range of Christina Rossetti’s consideration; even if illness had not withdrawn her altogether from ordinary life in her later years.

The barriers of circumstance availed to hold apart the two poets who might so easily have met and loved one another; but now that both have kept their “incalculable tryst,” their affinity in the spiritual plane is clearer. This kinship may be traced especially in their prose work—Christina Rossetti’s meditations and prayers having the same quality of grave beauty that belongs to Alice Meynell’s reflective writing. But, closer than by any likeness in achievement, they are linked together by their allegiance to that law of which Christina wrote:

Love is alone the worthy law of love:

All other laws have presupposed a taint:

Love is the law from kindled saint to saint. . . .

MURIEL KENT.

CHINA: A PLEA FOR GOODWILL.

IN considering the probable results of abolition of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, writers and speakers customarily address themselves to the subject of the effects upon personal liberty and the administration of criminal law. It may not be amiss therefore to examine the question from the standpoint of *civil* law, and the probable effect upon British trade. There is to be said, at the outset, that the prevailing foreign estimate of the probity of Chinese magistrates and courts of law is so low that it has been the practice of British traders, firms, public companies, banks, as well as private individuals, to avoid, almost to dispense with civil litigation before a Chinese magistrate. Ultimate recourse to law for the settlement of a dispute is not, nor ever has been, at the base of commercial dealings with the Chinese. This distrust of their own courts is also shared by the Chinese commercial classes. To it is due the growth of the elaborate system of guarantee which prevails. Sponsorship for an individual, endorsement of a contract, surety for a deal of any kind, by trusted outsiders of means or credit, are indispensable parts of purely Chinese as well as Sino-foreign commercial transactions. The system does not take the place of law, but it effectually minimises the number of cases where legal action would be involved.

In the heyday of foreign ascendancy in the Shanghai Mixed Court, when the Foreign Assessor was virtually the Judge and the Chinese Magistrate little more than a subscribing colleague, there was a marked increase in the number of Chinese civil suits, a fact which illustrated Chinese reaction to fair and just administration. With the resumption of purely Chinese jurisdiction this growing trust noticeably disappeared. Were a questionnaire addressed to leading British firms doing business in China as to the number of civil suits against Chinese in which they have appeared during the last twenty-five years, whether as plaintiffs or defendants, it would probably be found that the total number of cases is insignificant, and that the total amount involved would not be appreciable when considered in relation to British trade as a whole. The question then arises, would the number of suits against foreigners increase when jurisdiction is transferred to Chinese Courts, and, assuming that there would be an increase, what would be the effect? The answer must depend upon the competence of the new Courts.

The hopes entertained after the Washington Conference that the Chinese Government would be able to reform its judicial system and bring it into accord with that of Western nations have not been fulfilled. Nevertheless, in spite of the continuous state of turmoil in which the country remains, and in spite of the drain upon the

national finances due to ceaseless quasi-military operations, some progress has been made. The work of codification of the law is virtually completed, and the number of lawyers qualified by modern standards is ever increasing. When therefore a settled form of government is attained, the framework of a judicial system is in sight. There remains the formation of a body of judges.

It is frequently held that venality and nepotism are so deep-seated in the Chinese race as to render the conception of the judicial mind unachievable. Furthermore, it is maintained that dependence upon political support and liability to political interference must continue to prevent the formation of an independent judiciary. A growing body of western opinion meets these views with profound dissent. The Chinese Renaissance, that dream of a handful of reformers at the end of the last century, has arrived "in our time." In language, literature, and educational method, in race consciousness and diplomatic relations, in applied science and domestic amenities, and in countless other phases of national life, there is evidence of a restless striving after better things which it is sheer folly to ignore. No taunt as to high-brow eclecticism, or prating of the leopard and his spots, can stand against the overwhelming mass of evidence which is furnished from every city and province of China. It is improbable that Law Reform will lag behind. The Chinese have both the ability and the industry to become sound lawyers, and it is but a short step from the appreciation of sound law to its practice.

The question which confronts us is thus what, if anything, can we do as a friendly neighbour to assist in the formation of a body of competent Chinese judges. A latter-day Rhodes might endow ten post-graduate law studentships at each of the Inns of Court. Such an endowment might be made a charge upon the returned Boxer indemnity. But, with all respect to the majestic traditions of our Supreme Court of Judicature, I could wish for China swifter efficiency and more continuous application to business than is to be found in the leisurely pomp of our law sittings and circuits. It would appear that neither at the Inner Temple, nor at Sheffield and Leeds, nor at the University of Hongkong, can we do more than widen the field from which Chinese judges are to be selected. Just judges are not produced by the mere study of law; they are the fruits of the appreciation of the philosophic truth that, alike in autocracies and democracies, a state can only thrive if its basis is justice. Behind China's ancient oriental civilisation is a background of philosophic tradition, and it would therefore seem that she will breed judges as well without as with foreign assistance.

We then can do nothing? Assuredly that is not so. For a country with a percentage of illiterates lately estimated as having

advanced from two to five, very much can be done. We can, in the first place, offer a welcome to her students in every one of our schools and universities. It is true that there are some few hundreds of Chinese students scattered throughout Great Britain, but their numbers might easily be doubled or trebled under capable organisation. There is scope for a central institution, with the combined attributes of an information bureau and a hostel, where Chinese students could obtain guidance as to their course of study. By this means touch would be maintained between the educational authorities in China, and such English and Scottish colleges as would be ready to receive Chinese students in greatly increased numbers. We can also do much to extend and develop the teaching of western learning in and around the open ports in China. Primary schools, on the lines of those already established in Shanghai, are perhaps China's greatest need, for her supply of technically trained men is apt to become greater annually than she is able to absorb. But it is far from my purpose to prescribe how best our effort to assist in Chinese education may be made. The work was well and thoroughly done by the Advisory Committee appointed under the China Indemnity (Application) Act of 1925. And to the question "What can we do?" the two hundred closely-reasoned pages of that Report furnish an ample and adequate answer.

To revert to my main theme, the abolition of extraterritorial jurisdiction, I suggest that our interests and trade in China have not suffered in the past in any appreciable measure from the lack of proper civil courts, and that they may even have gained by the compensating tendency for disputes to be settled by arbitration. In the future, although the spirit of mutual accommodation may not prevail to anything like the same extent, yet during the period in which law reform is in progress, however protracted that period may be, the volume of our trade is unlikely to be affected. We can only trade in China with the goodwill of the Chinese people. Without that goodwill our trade must inevitably suffer from the pin-pricks of interference, from the hardships of delay in procedure, and, probably, from grievous injustices. But with it, and there is every reason to think that under our present policy it is on the road to being secured, we ought to find in China the widest remaining field on the Planet for trade expansion.

W. E. LEVESON.

WHAT AFRICA IS NOT.

AMONG the many popular delusions that are always with us there is none more persistent than the current misapprehension about Africa. To a large part of the public the Africa of Stanley and Livingstone exists to-day. It still seems to be believed that considerable areas of the once dark continent remain practically unknown to whites, that it is difficult, even dangerous, to "penetrate" into the remote interior, that one still blazes trails and visits places and peoples hitherto unknown. Returning travellers from Central Africa are hailed as explorers! And yet this is a delusion which could so easily be dispelled. One glance at a collection of modern colonial maps would show the heart of darkest Africa as it is to-day—a rapidly developing commercial frontier perfectly well known, thoroughly explored, occupied and everywhere open to transportation. One glance at a work so easily available as the *Encyclopædia Britannica* would make it quite clear when the last shadows of geographic uncertainty were banished.

We are inclined, I think, to forget what an ancient rôle Africa has played in European affairs and to look upon it as a newcomer on our scene. But, leaving North Africa out of it entirely—where white men began colonising six hundred years before Christ—it is well to remember that Europeans have traded and occupied settlements at points along the West Coast of Africa since before Columbus discovered America. And it is not likely that these by no means timid adventurers after gold, ivory, and slaves, should never have dared see more of this rich land than just the harbours. In fact we have evidence of the presence of French commercial gentlemen from Rouen and Dieppe in Sierra Leone and upper Guinea in 1364-5.

During the sixteenth century many parts of the interior of Senegambia were reached, the lower Congo was Christianised, and there were Jesuit priests at that early period in the remotest interior of Abyssinia. In the following century the sources of the Blue Nile were attained in Lake Victoria; the Portuguese pushed far up the Zambesi valley; the Dutch began moving northward from the Cape. A century later—in 1788—a society was formed in London for the express purpose of African exploration. From that time trips into the interior were continuous and far reaching. As early as 1802-11 we have a recorded journey across Central Africa from the West Coast to the East. Englishmen reached Lake Tchad in 1823; the Soudan was explored; Timbuctou and the country between Timbuctou and Lake Tchad became well known to Europeans by 1855; the Niger and its affluents were traced during the following years. Missionaries looked on Kilimanjaro in the in-

terior of Tanganyika at the not very recent date of 1848. The following year Livingstone began his magnificent journeyings through the heart of the continent. Soon De Chaillu appears among Pygmies and gorilla in West Africa; Burton and Speke are on Tanganyika and the other great central lakes. Speke descends the Blue Nile from Victoria; the source of the White Nile in Lake Albert is found. Between 1860-80 those great travellers Rohlfs, Schweinfurth, Nactigal, Junker are making the Equatorial forests of West Africa well known to the world.

By 1877 Stanley had descended the entire Congo, and the *Encyclopædia* states that after 1875 (and that is a long time ago) the numbers of travellers across Central Africa from coast to coast at varying latitudes "were so great that that once marvellous feat of crossing" became too common to be worth mentioning. Then came King Leopold to draw the political attention of the world to Africa. In all parts of Africa occupied by Europeans exploration, surveying, map making began in earnest. Stanley traversed the entire Ituri forest by way of the Ituri river from its confluence with the Congo to its headwaters in the centre of the continent. This forest became Leopold's famous or notorious hunting ground for ivory and was everywhere opened up to the traffic. The boundaries of all the colonies were defined. Exploration too, went on in Somaliland and Abyssinia. Lake Kivu, one of the important central lakes just north of Tanganyika Lake, is often spoken of as being little known and in an almost unexplored part of Africa, whereas its entire shoreline was not only explored but surveyed in the years 1902-3. It has a regular government steamboat service, there are towns, government and trading posts and missions on its shores, and motor roads connect it with Lake Edward above and Lake Tanganyika below, all—as well as the great Lake Victoria—links in much-travelled continental highways. Moreover, beside the regular scheduled steamboats traversing Lake Victoria, a tourist agency in Kenya advertises monthly automobile and steamboat excursions around its shores.

We are frequently told of the almost unknown "Mountains of the Moon," otherwise the Ruenzoris. And yet twenty-seven years ago the Ruenzoris were being explored, mapped, charted, their peaks measured. In the years 1904-5 there were no less than six exploring and surveying parties in the Mountains of the Moon. It is beside our point to speak of the Arab penetration of Equatorial Africa as we are dealing with European discovery. Nevertheless, hundreds of years ago Moslemism was established in many parts of the interior and negro potentates even journeyed to Mecca taking a knowledge of Africa to the outside world. Certainly any estimate of the primitive condition—in its technical sense—of the Afri-

can native cannot disregard the effect of the centuries' old contact of many of the native races with Arab culture and Moslemism.

And now as to the Central Africa of to-day. At present the attention of the self-appointed explorers is directed for the most part to the Western half of Central Africa. Even the most hardened can scarcely claim to have found previously unknown places in any part of East Africa. Too many people are beginning to know that Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, are now about as wild as the Riviera in the tourist season. There are throughout this territory thousands of miles of railroad and marine routes, motor roads and trails. Everywhere are government posts, ranches, coffee and cotton plantations; there are fine cities, clubs, golf links; hordes of incoming settlers. In the less agriculturally developed localities every game pocket and crater has been explored and exploited by hunters for years. The pamphlets on these colonies and protectorates sent me by the Crown Agents for the Colonies read like railroad booklets on California.

So now it is to the Belgian Congo, more particularly the Ituri forest, and to the French and British possessions of West Africa that the trail breakers set forth on their perilous adventures.* Not longer than a few weeks ago the newspapers of both England and America had a good deal to say about an expedition that would penetrate to "hitherto unknown" portions of the Ituri forest. Two years ago I travelled extensively throughout this forest. We made use for hundreds of miles of motor trucks over excellent roads. For other hundreds of miles we travelled by safari and by dug-out canoes. Since that time the mileage of motor roads has been so extended that treks by canoes and bearers are becoming increasingly unnecessary. But even when the method of travel is primitive the trails are not. They are part of a well-organised government system, known and travelled by officials for years. Porters are secured through these ubiquitous officials. If it is

* It might be well to state very briefly of what West Africa consists. The French possessions are by far the largest. They include the French Sudan, Senegal, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, French Congo, and the French zones of the mandated colonies taken from the Germans—Cameroons and Togoland.

The British dependencies are Nigeria, Gold Coast with Ashanti, Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and the British zones of the late German possessions.

*Belgium is mistress of the vast Belgian Congo.

The Spanish domain is negligible, including only small Spanish Guinea and the island of Fernando Po.

Portugal is represented by Angola, Portuguese Guinea, the Cape Verde Islands, and the Islands of St. Thomas and Principe. These observations, although they equally apply to them, do not include a discussion of the Spanish and Portuguese dependencies because of the insignificance of the former and because the long-occupied and thoroughly known colony of Angola has not attracted the attention of the travel fakire.

There remains only the small Negro republic of Liberia, not subject to any European power, which will be touched upon in concluding.

canoe travel you buy a ticket from one of them and he arranges for canoes and paddlers. Besides the government posts which, as a glance at any recent map will show you, are everywhere, there are trading posts, Catholic and Protestant missions and dispensary stations. Trained nurses and doctors travel constantly between the native villages. In clearings and along the open fringes of the forest are white settlers growing cotton, coffee, palm nuts, and the natives are now raising cotton in great quantities for the European market. When we asked resident officials to direct us to unexplored parts of the Ituri they laughed heartily and said we should have come out with Stanley fifty years ago.

Needless to say these same conditions obtain throughout all the Belgian Congo. There is a continuous rail and steamboat service from the mouth of the Congo river on the Atlantic, clear to the shores of Tanganyika Lake in the centre of the continent and also along its headwaters to the Rhodesian border. There one meets the *de luxe* express service to South Africa. (In Tanganyika, you connect with steamboat and railroad which takes you across Africa to the Indian Ocean, or with regular steam and motor service northward to the Sudan and Egypt.) There are thousands of miles of motor roads and trails reaching to every corner of the Belgian colony. There is a bi-weekly mail and passenger air service clear from Boma on the Atlantic to the important mining and commercial city of Elizabethville on the remote upper Congo, and two other air services as well. Everywhere the vast riches of the colony are being exploited—copper, tin, gold, diamond mines are in operation.

But what about the rest of West Africa, those colonies with glamorous names: Ivory Coast, Gold Coast, Nigeria, Dahomey and all the rest. How often do we read of "intrepid travellers" who are perilously about to penetrate the fastnesses of one of these old Slave Coast countries! So let us hear what the voice of authority has to say about them. At 17 rue d'Anjou, Paris, are the headquarters of the *Union Coloniale Française* and the General Secretary is probably the foremost authority on Colonial Affairs in France.

Our African colonies and protectorates unexplored in any part? Difficult to penetrate? But I can hardly believe you can ask such a question. All of our territory—every bit of it—colonies and mandates—have been explored and occupied by whites for years. There is no corner where we have not been. There are government posts, missions, banks, schools, hospitals, dispensaries, steamboats, telephone and telegraph service, railroads, motor roads, official trails, law courts, judges—everything. We take a census almost as accurate as the Paris census; we levy taxes, we recruit soldiers. We are in intimate relationship

with every tribe. Many of the big chiefs live in houses costing one hundred, two hundred thousand francs, built by French architects. They send to the *Bon Marché* for pink underwear for their wives. Everywhere the natives not only use currency but they understand the use of cheques as well. We have a school for midwives at Dakar from which women are sent to all parts of the colonies. I am now organising a vast baby welfare service and social work which we shall extend as our means allow throughout the West African possessions.

We have over three thousand kilometres of railroad in operation and hundreds more in construction. There are some seven thousand kilometres of motor roads in French West Africa alone—and that does not include, of course, the French Congo. In the latter colony in one district alone, the Oubangi-Chari, we have over two thousand kilometres of motor roads available for traffic in all seasons. But the length of motor routes and railroads is not the significant thing as regards what you are interested in. To realise how thoroughly the country is opened you would have to know the far greater mileage of the official trails which reach into every part of the colonies.

And what of the British possessions? Let me quote verbatim from a letter sent me by the Crown Agents for the Colonies, of 4, Millbank, Westminster, London:

Madam: In reply to your letter of November 28th we have to state that there is no part of the British possessions in West Africa which has not been explored, which remains unknown to government, which is not under government supervision, where the natives are unknown to the whites and to whom white men are unknown.

Accompanying this brief but satisfactorily complete statement were handbooks on Nigeria, including the British zone of the Cameroons, on the colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone, first colonised by the English at about the time of the American revolution, on the Gold Coast, Ashanti, British Togo. From them interesting facts are to be gleaned. The up-and-doing colony of Nigeria began building railroads at the somewhat early date of 1893 and there are now over fifteen hundred miles of railroad, including both standard and narrow gauge, in Nigeria alone and more building. Motor roads were begun in Nigeria in 1905 and except for the war period they have been building them pretty nearly ever since. You can now, among many other routes, motor from the coast clear to Lake Tchad on the extreme south-eastern border of the Colony. You can also step into your car at the Nigerian port of Lagos on the Atlantic and motor to Khartoum, Egypt, if you care to. And if you do not care for travel by motor or rail, the handbook offers several pages of data on river travel in Nigeria. There are, incidentally, fourteen thousand miles of telegraph wire operating along these various routes in Nigeria alone.

In the Gold Coast one reads of five thousand miles of motorable roads, five hundred of rail and, of course, the usual ubiquitous trails. About these trails the Sierra Leone handbook, under its lists of motor roads, says: "In addition to the road mileage given above, the whole country is netted by bush paths connecting all the small towns and *fakias*." Although it is a little out of our territory we may add that in the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan besides the *de luxe* trains and steamboats there is year round service with the headwaters of the White Nile in the Belgian Congo and the Blue Nile in Uganda, and therefore connection by steamboat, train, or motor service with all the rest of Central and South Africa. But to return to these West Coast blue books. In them one reads monotonously of schools, missions, banks, courts of law, trading stations, of postal service, medical service, motor transport service. One finds well-developed Boy and Girl Scout movements among the Blacks of the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone!

But why multiply facts and figures? These are available to any person sufficiently interested to confront the official blue books. There remains, however, something to be noted. I must cite one possible exception to what I have said. There is one not very large region in Equatorial Africa which perhaps—although this is by no means certain—is not entirely well known to whites in all parts, and not yet entirely opened to commerce and civilisation. It is not a European colony but the Negro republic of Liberia. And characteristically, it is the one place the Sunday Magazine explorers never under any circumstances visit. Not by any chance does their perilous adventuring take them into the interior of Liberia because there they might have to endure some of the hardships as well as reaping some of the rewards of honest exploration.

GRACE FLANDRAU.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE CASE OF THE FRENCH RENTES.

TO third parties, not interested in the issues at stake, there is no doubt something attractive in the frankness with which the French Government is wont to reveal its mind on the subject of war finance. From that point of view the latest disclosure makes as good reading as any of its forerunners. On October 28th last the French Government handed to Lord Tyrrell in Paris its answer to certain representations that had been made by Mr. Snowden. Although the Snowden Note had been received in Paris at the end of July, the fact was not made known till September 22nd. The text of the Snowden Note has not been published, but it is understood to have lodged a formal protest against the injustice of a French discharge of the Rentes liability in paper francs. The answer received by Lord Tyrrell on October 28th was understood to constitute, as most people had expected it would constitute, a firm refusal to repay the obligation in gold or in sterling; but the really attractive thing, from the point of view above alluded to, was the clarity of the reason understood to be propounded for it. The reason was that the Rentes were war-loans, that they were therefore of a non-financial quality; moreover that there had been no expressed obligation in the contract to repay in any other medium than paper francs, and that the position of the British holders of Rentes was no worse than that of French holders.

Each of those contentions exposes itself to a ready rejoinder. The broadly interesting addition, however, to the curiosities of international diplomacy is the undisguised submission that war finance is not finance at all. Many sad people outside of France will now agree with that submission, if their experience of France be their sole criterion. The new thesis deserves a place beside a certain other historic observation made in official Paris on a kindred subject. In the summer of 1926, the French Chamber was still hesitating to ratify the debt funding agreement that had been reached by M. Caillaux and Mr. Churchill the summer before. Delay had been a progressive feature of the French tactic, for the debt had been contracted eleven years still earlier. M. Briand, however, with unconscious humour, speaking in the debate on the agreement, said: "It is the duty of a great country to look clearly ahead when it subscribes to such solemn engagements [i.e. debt fundings] because it intends to be punctual in their execution." As if still further to embellish the jest, the funding agreement was destined not to be ratified by the Chamber for another three years.

The apparent thesis that war finance need not be taken seriously, provided one happens to be the debtor, deserves some detached

attention, not so much as a matter of morality, as of business. The evidence is both complete and simple. The story of what France borrowed during the war, and of what happened to those who lent it, is one that cannot fail to impress even those whose experience of human affairs in their international aspect has discouraged all inclination to be surprised at anything that may happen. Moreover the lessons that emerge from the curious case of French war-borrowing are nearly inexhaustible, although they will probably do little good to the victims.

The people who mainly lent the money that France borrowed during the war were, of course, British people. The fact that British people do such things is one of the abiding oddities of world affairs, and one of the standard axioms of French public life. There is what may perhaps be called a French complex in the British mind. Frenchmen, who are an intelligent, lively people, possessed of an alert flair for judging the mentality of others in relation to themselves, have become so accustomed to the ease with which they can "sweeten" British public opinion that they by now take us for granted. They borrow from us, and do not repay, nor are they in the least thereby perturbed, because they believe, with adequate historical justification, that they and we will behave in exactly the same way another time. The British Government fights a Great War until the French Government decrees that it shall stop, and British troops are placed under the supreme command of a French Marshal. Throughout the war the people of Great Britain stand, as it were, with their hats off to France, and forget to replace them when the war is over. The British Government, having paid the major cost of the war, allows the French Government's claim to the major cash reparation from the defeated, sees France grow into the second richest nation in the world, and in full view of that spectacle allows France to repudiate her debts to Great Britain. Every Frenchman believes that in comparable circumstances the same sort of thing will happen again. And every Frenchman is probably right.

Not one in a million Englishmen, not one in a hundred Scotsmen, sees the irony of what has emerged as a result of the French Government's decision to repudiate its liability to the holders of French Rentes. Something like an outcry has arisen in this country as a result of the dramatic realisation that the French bonds held by individual Englishmen and Scotsmen are nearly valueless: but the repudiation by the same French Government of ten times as great a liability to the same Englishmen and Scotsmen passes almost unnoticed, merely because the effect of the greater repudiation falls indirectly, in the form of income tax. Yet both effects are a matter of cash.

We all know specific cases. I know the case of a man who bought £1,000 of four per cent. French Rentes on the advice of his bank. It was his life's savings. The expected yield of £40 per annum was earmarked in his mind for the help of an only daughter when he died. He now finds the yield to be not £40, but £8, per annum, the capital to be worth not £1,000, but £200. He is thereby embittered, and writes letters to his local paper about it. Now it happens that his assessable income ("earned") amounts to £500 per annum. Of the tax paid by him each year, a certain amount is directly due to the fact that the French Government has not paid back the British Government's war loan, that the borrowed capital is thereby transferred as a liability to the British Government and the interest on it has to be found by that Government in the form of income tax. In the particular case here alluded to the amount paid each year in tax on account of the French repudiation is roughly £10. The net result is that he receives £8 (instead of £40) in interest from his direct loan to France, and in addition loses £10 a year as a result of his indirect, that is his Government's, loan to France. But not a word has he breathed about that annual £10. He pays it, as it were, ignorantly: but in effect he is paying it straight to France, for the corresponding burden is lifted from the shoulders of the French taxpayer, where it properly belongs. And not only that particular man, but every taxpaying man and woman in this country pays tribute year by year in this way to the French Government. Yet in 1925, when Mr. Churchill accepted the Caillaux "funding" offer, no popular voice was heard in protest, although the loss to this country was ten times as great as the total loss involved in the case of the French Rentes.

The facts that have now excited public concern are clear. In 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918, the French Government raised from British investors a sum of approximately £50,000,000. The exact amounts of the four loans were:

- (1) November 1915.—Five per cent. Rentes, 602,426,400f., issued at £3 4s. per 100f.
- (2) October 1916.—Five per cent. Rentes, 450,709,800f., issued at £3 4s. 6d. per 100f.
- (3) November 1917.—Four per cent. Rentes, 67,972,900f., issued at £2 10s. 6d. per 100f.
- (4) November 1918.—Four per cent. Rentes, 520,000,000f., issued at £13 12s. 4d. per 500f.

Further issues of Rentes were made after the war, at six per cent. interest, but as the fate they suffered was exactly analogous, the war issues may be taken as typical. Mr. Snowden's Note of last July was understood to refer only to the war issues.

The money raised was paid in sterling and translated into francs at about the par rate of exchange. The French Government received that amount (some £50,000,000) of sterling as a loan, used it for the repayment of its own debts and for other purposes exclusively its own. The prospectus in each case was widely and repeatedly advertised in the British Press, and each advertisement contained these words: "The Governor and Company of the Bank of England, with the consent and approval of His Majesty's Government, are authorised by the Government of the French Republic to receive applications for this issue." An investor, looking first to the security of his capital, was given this offer: a French Government loan, issued through the channel and therefore with the reflected halo of the Bank of England and with the expressed approval of the British Government. To the man in the British street it looked gilt-edged.

As if to heighten that impression the prospectus further contained this sentence: "Both Capital and Interest, which will be exempt from all French taxes, present or future, will be a charge upon the general revenues of the Government of the French Republic." And again: "For the purpose of providing against depreciation in the market prices of the National Defence Loans [the official title of the loans in question] the French Government undertakes to set aside monthly, until otherwise decreed by law, a sum of Fcs. 60,000,000 to form a Fund to be used for the purchase of Bonds of these loans in the market." The French Government, therefore, as an inducement to lenders, gave an elaborate promise of security, based upon the name of France. The window-dressing of the loan had for its main object the emphasising of its capital security. It was the resultant conviction that induced the British people to lend £50,000,000 to France. *The Times* of December 1st, 1915, for instance, commented thus: "The terms of the 'London issue' of the French loan are undoubtedly very attractive as an investment. The security is of the finest."

It is true that it was a franc, not a sterling, loan, and that the older City men expressed a doubt whether the French franc was as good as the English sterling (cp. *The Times*, November 30th, 1915: "In some quarters of the City it is doubted whether the temptation to ordinary investors will suffice to remove their usual prejudice against an issue in a foreign currency"); but the point is that the franc was stabilised by the French Government at a time subsequent to the contract at a level four-fifths below the level at which the contract was made.

The contractual question, therefore, is: can a borrower of his own sweet will, and without consulting his debtors, divide his

liability by five and then maintain that he is meeting his liability? When the French Government funded its war debt to the British Government, it did not literally "repudiate" five-sixths of it, but begged *in forma pauperis* (although France was the second richest nation in the world after the United States) to be relieved, and was with consent relieved, of that amount. But the holders of French Rentes were not consulted when four-fifths of their money was annexed in France by the devaluation of the franc. That is pure repudiation.

When the Russian Government repudiated one hundred per cent. of its liability, and the chief holders of Russian bonds happened to be French investors, a cry went up from one end of France to the other such as was humanly to be expected. Yet France proposes to go four-fifths of that same road of repudiation.

Technically, France can argue that the bond contained no contractual obligation to repay in sterling: that is merely to argue that France is content with the knowledge that an investor who took France at her face value has reason to regret it, and knows that his loss is the result of deliberate bankruptcy on the part of a rich debtor. Nor is there much analogy between the French and the British holders of Rentes. The French Government, if it wishes, and if its electors permit, is competent to confiscate French capital: but to confiscate British capital lent in good faith and in the expectation of good faith, falls within a different category.

At the Lausanne Conference in 1923, Ismet Pasha offered to repay the French Government its loans in paper francs. The French Government refused such payment because the French exchange was below par. The French Government rejected the ironic compliment of being paid in its own currency for a good reason: for the same reason, intensified several times over, the British creditors of that Government now demand, as a point of elementary honesty, that they be not repaid in tokens that in effect are a sham, having been made a sham through the deliberate devaluation made by that Government itself.

The demand has been rejected. In one sense the British investor who bought French Rentes has no legitimate grievance, for investment is a fair risk. He who lends his money must face the risk. The difference between the wise and the unwise investor is that the former is wise. Some of the best investment trust companies in London have invested capital in China, and in spite of twenty years of civil war, have not yet regretted it: but it would be a long search to discover a good English investment trust company which has ever invested capital in France. From the French point of view, however, the matter of the French Rentes and of the non-payment of the Government debt to Great Britain is of

little concern except moral. France is nearly self-supporting, and the external credit of her public finance is of little practical concern to her. The penalty for being unbusinesslike in the matter of national debt—one need not emotionally call it national honour—has a way of passing her by. That is probably not good for France.

WORLD DEPRESSION AND WAR DEBTS.

The devil was ill. . . . One of the salutary effects of world-wide depression in economics and in finance is that even the politicians are almost persuaded to think about the consequences of the network of debt: war debt, reparation debt, debt funded and honoured, debt unfunded and unhonoured. It is not only a muddle, but a stupid muddle. The two main countries that are paying their debts, Germany and Great Britain, feel the strain themselves, but the effects of that strain are felt indirectly by the main recipient countries, the United States and France. The effect on France is small, for the reason that she is above the battle, as it were, and can witness world dislocation without much direct sensation. Yet even in the case of France, the consequences cannot wholly be kept outside. Though economic distress throughout the world has no great repercussion in France, yet financial depression has a way of penetrating every frontier. The slump on the Paris Bourse, the failure of a few minor French banks are a warning to the parochial French mind that vast liquid richness and the hoarding of a vast quantity of gold, although they can be used to damage British interests, do not necessarily serve French interests.

The first voices that dared repeat the bad moral of the present artificiality in international indebtedness were raised in Berlin. It was not a matter of courage or of originality, but of elementary necessity. Immediately after the September election Dr. Wirth, the Minister of the Interior in the Brüning Cabinet, broadcast an address in which he submitted that "the conditions essential to peaceful co-operation can be created in the German nation only with the collaboration of all nations," and that therefore the occasion had arisen for a new examination of Germany's financial burden, to be cast in the context of the prevailing world crisis in economics and finance. He boldly stated that Germany had come to the end of her capacity for the payment of reparation. Next, when the Government's measures for balancing the Budget were published in their final form on September 30th, the Government statement attributed the financial difficulties, partly and frankly to the defects of the German financial system which had been pointed out by Mr. Parker Gilbert, but partly at least to the "formidable paralysis" that "has stayed the economic advance

of the world and led to a serious economic crisis." Dr. Schacht, who though no longer President of the Reichsbank, is generally regarded as the most experienced authority on Germany's financial position, visited London and New York and spoke in the like strain. On October 20th, for instance, he addressed the Foreign Policy Association in New York and committed himself to the view that Germany would not be able to continue her payment of reparation unless measures were taken by other countries to help the expansion of Germany's foreign trade to the necessary extent. He estimated that such trade would have to be increased by something between forty and fifty per cent. if Germany was to continue to meet her reparation liability. He then referred to the possibility that had already been mentioned in the Reichstag that Germany might be forced to exercise her right to postpone payments under the "Young" plan. He gave it as his opinion that Germany would take such a course only if no alternative were left to her for the discharge of her foreign commercial loans owed to private individuals, for in his view such obligations were a moral prior charge before obligations "to politicians."

It was on October 16th that the Reichstag debate took place in which the Chancellor hinted at a possibility of postponement of the reparation payments. Dr. Brüning was reading a statement of the Government's policy. In it he recalled that since the "Young" experts had drawn up their plan, the general economic situation in Germany and throughout the world had gone from bad to worse, month by month; unemployment in all the leading industrial countries had reached an extent hitherto undreamed of; commodity prices had slumped to an extent never experienced by the present generation. He then read the sentence: "The ratio of value between gold and goods has changed to the disadvantage of the countries which have international duties to discharge." That sentence was regarded in Germany and elsewhere as giving the key to what was in the Government's mind. He went on to quote the views that had been expressed by the experts when they formulated their plan: item, that Germany's capacity to pay was dependent on expanding world trade and international stability; item, that the solution of the reparation problem was not exclusively Germany's affair, but depended on international co-operation. He complained that no response had been made by the other nations to that line of argument. He next explained that the present world crisis had fallen upon a Germany unfortified by economic or financial reserves, and propounded the principle that "the immediate task of the German people is to do everything in its power to put its own house in order. The execution of the Government's economic and financial plan is therefore an elemen-

tary requirement of German foreign policy and it depends upon success in that object, whether in consequence of the crisis we resort to the measures which are placed at Germany's disposal by treaty for the purpose of averting danger to her economic system and her currency."

It was at once recognised in the creditor countries that Dr. Brüning had raised in a tentative way no smaller a question than that of postponement. It happens that a comprehensive machinery is available in the "Young" plan itself for precisely such an emergency. It should be clearly distinguished that two separate submissions were made in the Reichstag: (1) that the present world depression and the changed ratio between the value of gold and of goods automatically increases the reparation liability signed by Germany at the Hague Conference, and that reasonably therefore the basic conception of Germany's "capacity to pay" needs a corresponding adjustment, permanent or temporary; (2) that circumstances have arisen which may justify the operation of the "postponable" part of the Young annuities.

The second submission raises no technical difficulty, although its effect might be deplorable. The wording of the "Young" plan is complete and unmistakable. It is provided (annex III, Part V, Clause 3) that "The German Government, by giving at least ninety days' previous notice, shall have the right to suspend for a maximum period of two years from its due date all or part of the transfer of the postponable part of the annuity." Article VIII of the Act itself expressly states that Germany by herself is wholly competent to declare a postponement: "With a view to facilitating the successful working of the New Plan the German Government declares spontaneously that it is firmly determined to make every possible effort to avoid a declaration of postponement, and not to have recourse thereto until it has come to the conclusion in good faith that Germany's exchange and economic life may be seriously endangered by the transfer in part or in full of the postponable portion of the annuities. It remains understood that Germany alone has authority to decide whether occasion has arisen for declaring a postponement as provided by the New Plan."

In the event of Germany's declaring a postponement, and of her good faith being challenged by any creditor Power, it is provided (Annex I) that the decision be given absolutely by the World Court: "... if one or more of the Creditor Powers refer to the Permanent Court of International Justice the question whether acts originating with the German Government reveal its determination to destroy the New Plan, the German Government, in agreement with the Creditor Governments, accepts the proposal that the Permanent Court should decide the question. . . ."

We are thus forced by the irresistible logic of events to a new pass in the tortuous history of war reparation payments. The mere recital of the main stages in that history throws a light on the eternal ways of politicians and their handiwork: (1) In 1919 Germany, theoretically defeated in the Great War, was forced to promise "reparation" to the victors, reparation of a vast and fantastic amount; (2) whatever Germany paid in reparation was borrowed in the ordinary way of business from the United States and from Great Britain; (3) in 1924 the Dawes plan drastically reduced the liability, and with unconscious irony arranged for a part of the reduced liability to be paid out of the proceeds of a loan, raised, of course, mainly from the creditors; (4) in 1929 and 1930 the "Young" plan went full circle by arranging for the whole debt to be paid out of the proceeds of a loan (to be raised, of course, mainly from the creditors), and not content with the full circle, went on to arrange for an additional loan to be made to Germany simply for her own private benefit; wherefrom it followed that the victors of the Great War were now anxious to lend to Germany all the money she was to pay back to them, and in addition gave her a gratuitous loan to encourage her; (5) the "Young" plan came into operation on May 9th, 1930; on October 16th, 1930, the German Chancellor raised the immediate and practical question of a postponement of payment within the terms of the plan and the more distant, and as yet perhaps unpractical, question of a new total revision of the whole plan.

Of course, the plan will be revised. The process of escaping from the mess decreed by the egregious politicians of Versailles has advanced through successive stages to the end that is inevitable, though it is not yet reached, and though the politicians of the world have not yet recognised it. One would think that the tendency of the ten years' evolution above summarised would be clear, even to the minds of politicians. It is not so. The world must drink its cup to the dregs before the politicians will understand what it is that is drunk. In fairness, however, to the British politicians it should be recalled that they alone have seen the obvious thing, and saw it long ago. By the famous Balfour Note of August 1st, 1922, the British Government enunciated the principle that the colossal burden of international debt was a standing menace to the world's trade recovery, and that a general cancellation of debts, even though the incidental sacrifice would fall most heavily on Great Britain, offered the only solution. The practical question now is how much longer will it take the rest of the world to travel to the point reached by the British Government as long ago as the middle of 1922?

BRITISH POLICY IN PALESTINE.

The publication on October 21st of a White Paper (Cmd. 3692) explaining the Government's policy in Palestine excited a somewhat complicated controversy. The controversy is perhaps most readily understood if its separate aspects be disentangled and stripped of all but their simple essentials. The chief aspects are: (1) the precise meaning of the original mandate granted to Great Britain by the League of Nations; (2) the present British Government's interpretation of it; (3) the effect of No. 2 on the Jews and Arabs respectively in Palestine; and (4) the criticisms of certain prominent British Jews, British Jewish organisations, and leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties on No. 2.

There is no serious divergence of view about the original nature of the British mandate, or about the moral circumstances which gave rise to it. Great Britain never acted on her own exclusive initiative, even though as long ago as 1910 Dr. Chaim Weizmann enlisted Mr. Balfour's sympathy for the Zionist cause and though Sir Herbert Samuel in 1915 drew up a memorandum on the subject on behalf of the Government. Before the Balfour declaration of November 2nd, 1917, was issued, it was agreed to by both France and Italy, both of whom had to be consulted as allies, and as Powers interested in Palestine. The United States, through President Wilson, subsequently endorsed it. The declaration was simply a British pledge to help the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish national home. When, in July 1922, the Council of the League entrusted the Palestine mandate to Great Britain, the dual responsibility, on the one hand, of establishing the Jewish national home in Palestine, on the other hand of safeguarding Arab interests in Palestine, was clearly postulated. In practice the attempt to please both Jews and Arabs has had the perhaps natural effect of displeasing both.

The present Government's White Paper was in some degree the answer to a cumulative process of discontent on the part of both Jews and Arabs. It was a statement, or a restatement, of British policy, not unfairly summarised as containing a decision to set up a Legislative Assembly consisting of a High Commissioner and a twenty-two members, twelve of whom are to be the choice of the Palestine electorate, to take economic measures designed to check excessive Jewish immigration such as might defeat the British Government's obligation to protect the legitimate interests of the Arabs, and to retain a military force and a strengthened police force in Palestine and in Transjordan to deal with any future emergency.

Before drafting its statement, the Government sent an investi-

gator, Sir John Hope Simpson, to report on land settlement, immigration and development. The Government's main conclusion from Sir John's report was that the margin of uncultivated land was not enough for unrestricted Jewish immigration, and that, Arab interests being taken for granted, the main scope for Jewish economic expansion lay in the intensive cultivation of the land already available to the Jews. The Government's virtual submission in the resultant controversy is (1) that it has faithfully tried to carry out its twofold responsibility by holding the scales even between Jews and Arabs; (2) that there is no departure whatever from British policy as laid down in the original Balfour declaration of 1917 and as reaffirmed in the "Churchill" White Paper of 1922.

Collateral evidence of the fairness of the Government's contention was afforded by a letter from the Bishop of Hereford, published in *The Times* of October 22nd, 1930. The Bishop quoted a high Zionist authority for the revelation that when the Balfour declaration promised "to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people" the Zionist leaders urged the substitution of the phrase "the reconstitution of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people"; and that in spite of repeated requests the British Government refused to accept the emendation. The present Government's apologists therefore contend that it respects the essential difference between providing a Jewish home in Palestine and handing over Palestine to the Jews, and that, the Jews being in a minority in Palestine, the present proposals go as far as reason permits consistently with respect for Arab interests.

The resignation of Dr. Weizmann from the Presidency of the Zionist Organisation and the Jewish Agency in Palestine, which posts he had held for twelve years, was announced simultaneously with the publication of the Government's White Paper. It constituted the formal intimation that British policy did not satisfy Zionist aspirations. In his letter of resignation, addressed to Lord Passfield, Dr. Weizmann alleged that the Government's policy, in his judgment "effects a profound change in the policy of 1922 as expressed in eight years' practice, and on some material points differs from Sir John Hope Simpson's report. . . . It goes a long way towards denying the rights and sterilising the hopes of the Jewish people in regard to the National Home in Palestine, so far as it is in the power of His Majesty's Government to do so." He quotes in his support the League Council's warning to Great Britain against "crystallising the development of the Jewish National Home at the present stage of development," which warning was accepted by the British representative. The comment of

those who sympathise with the Government's policy is mainly concentrated on two observations: that the Arabs are equally dissatisfied; and that the criterion of the Government's conduct is not the absolute length to which Zionism is capable of developing its capacity for government, but the relative commitment to balance Jewish with Arab interests, a balance which can be equally achieved at any stage of either Jewish or Arab development. The hostile reception of the Government's policy by Arabs and Jews alike seemed to suggest that the Government had succeeded at least in being impartial.

The British critics of the Government's policy are of three kinds: the Jews, exemplified by Lord Melchett, who complain that the better Jewish than Arab claim upon British goodwill, as established by the circumstances of the war, has not been honoured by the present Government; British Conservatives (exemplified by a statement in a letter to *The Times* of October 23rd by Mr. Baldwin, Sir Austen Chamberlain, and Mr. Amery), and British Liberals (exemplified by a speech of Mr. Lloyd George delivered at Cowbridge on October 24th), who allege that the Government has broken the continuity of former British policy; and others who criticise the Government's lack of tact in not consulting Jews or Arabs before issuing its statement.

The answer of those who are in close touch with the Government is something like this. A Round Table Conference might have helped, but the matter was urgent, and the despatch of Sir John Hope Simpson to Palestine gave a full opportunity for the expression of Jewish and of Arab opinion. The Melchett criticism is regarded as unfair, because the Government's competence was strictly limited by the terms of the mandate, and the only field of fair criticism lies within the discrepancy, if any, between mandate and fulfilment. The third criticism, that of the Conservatives and Liberals, is answered by an appeal to the documentary evidence. Any person is competent to decide whether the criticism is justified, because the three relevant documents, the Balfour Letter to Lord Rothschild (November 2nd, 1917), the Churchill Memorandum (June 3rd, 1922), and the new White Paper are all public property. Each of those documents, it is claimed, reveals the same cardinal principle, that while Zionism was promised a home in Palestine, the rights of the Arabs were to be effectively respected.

The Palestine mandate has been a thankless adventure. Probably the storm that arose over the new White Paper was due more to its manner than to its matter. There appeared to be a tone of slight anti-Jewish feeling, which in its turn was probably due to nothing more than bad drafting, i.e. was due to a defensive spirit in regard to the Jews interpreted by a somewhat unpolished pen.

The probability that the trouble was a matter of general effect rather than of particular content seems to be illustrated if one collates certain typical statements from the various documents. They seem to show substantial agreement:

(1) The Balfour declaration (given in a letter written by Mr. Balfour to Lord Rothschild on November 2nd, 1917): "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

(2) Dr. Wiczmann (1922, after receiving the 1922 White Paper): "The Zionist organisation has, at all time, been sincerely desirous of proceeding in harmonious co-operation with all sections of the people of Palestine. It has repeatedly made it clear, both in word and deed, that nothing is further from its purpose than to prejudice in the smallest degree the civil or religious rights, or the material interests of the non-Jewish population."

(3) White Paper of June, 1922 (Cmd. 1700): "When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. . . . This, then, is the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the Declaration of 1917, and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of opinion that it does not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews."

(4) White Paper, 1930: "His Majesty's Government desire to reaffirm generally the policy outlined in the 1922 statement. . . . What is required is that both races should consent to live together and to respect each other's needs and claims. To the Arabs His Majesty's Government would appeal for a recognition of the facts of the situation, and for a sustained effort at co-operation in obtaining that prosperity for the country as a whole by which all will benefit. From the Jewish leaders, His Majesty's Government ask a recognition of the necessity for making some concessions on their side in regard to the independent and separatist ideals which have been developed in some quarters in connection with the Jewish National Home, and for accepting it as an active factor in the

orientation of their policy that the general development of the country shall be carried out in such a way that the interests of the Arabs and Jews may each receive adequate consideration, with the object of developing prosperity throughout the country under conditions which will give no grounds for charges of partiality upon the one side or upon the other, but will permit of the Arab and Jewish communities developing in harmony and contentment."

It would be difficult to write worse English than that of the last quotation. It would be difficult to put it more tactlessly in the eyes of the Jews. There seems, however, to be little substantial ground for Jewish grievance.

DEMORALISATION IN CHINA.

An incidental interest of what takes place in China is the effect produced on the daily lives of the Chinese people by a civil war that seems almost to be taken for granted. Brigandage has become an expert business, although it entails an increasing number of cold-blooded murders. It was stated in the Shanghai press that fourteen separate Red armies were ravaging Central and Southern China with impunity, their main objective being loot. One Communist gang established itself at Hanchwan, only thirty miles from Hankow, and effectively levied tribute on the surrounding country. One newspaper in the summer published a current estimate that as a result of civil war and brigandage one half of the population of China, two hundred million Chinese, were in need of food and clothing. The figure is fantastic and need not be taken mathematically, but the fact that such an estimate did appear in a serious paper and was taken seriously, does illumine a general condition. Moreover, the Nanking Ministry of Agriculture issued an estimate that the number of unemployed in China did amount to the figure of 200,000,000. That, too, was probably a picturesque guess, for no reliable statistics are, or could be, available in the present condition of China. The technique evolved by the brigands and Communists is largely based on blackmail. Two English C.M.S. missionaries, Miss Nettleton and Miss Harrison, were captured at Chungan in Fukien, and the bandits demanded a ransom of 50,000 dollars, using as a lever the threat (which everybody knew would be carried out, and was in fact later carried out, in the twinkling of an eye) that they would be shot unless it was paid. On July 30th a Communist gang held up Changsha and demanded a ransom of a million dollars under the threat of burning it to the ground. As a form of preliminary encouragement the gang looted the town and executed many of the local officials. On August 1st Changsha was

evacuated by the gang. The Ministry of Marine announced that it had been recaptured by the Gunboat "Yungcheng": but the more realistic belief was that the Communists did not leave it until they had been paid the million dollars. The gang moved on towards Hankow, naming \$100,000 as the price. There was ground for the belief that many gangs were detachments of a single organisation. Their methods were remarkably consistent. They took care to put a keen edge on their blackmail by earning the reputation of a desperate disposition. On May 12th, for instance, one of the gangs, three thousand strong, captured the town of Yungyang on the Honan-Hupeh border, and proceeded to murder 15,000 of the inhabitants as a preliminary to carrying off 500 for ransom. In one fortnight fifty towns were captured, raided or looted by Communist gangs. On May 30th a gang of pirates penetrated the Shanghai harbour, killed a Chinese and wounded four others, one of whom, a British Australian, by name Mr. Harder, died of his wounds. Missionaries, male and female, were murdered *passim*.

A more human sidelight on the demoralisation produced by the civil wars on the younger generation was given in the *Ta Kung Pao* (Tientsin) of May 26th. The occasion of that paper's commentary was a recent Far Eastern Athletic meeting that had been held in Tokio. The result of the competition was that China scored one point, Japan 131, and the Philippines 32. Be it remembered that the civil war has lasted intermittently for nearly twenty years. The present athletic youth of China will therefore have spent their entire lives in the condition of privation and restlessness necessarily resulting from politics of so destructive a kind. The comment of the *Ta Kung Pao* (translation taken from *Summaries of Leading Articles in the Chinese Press* issued by The Royal Institute of International Affairs) ran thus: "... the path of athletes is the same as that of knowledge and rectitude; if we have failed in the first of these, how have we fared in the others? Chinese students cannot compete with other nations in athletics; have they nothing at all to boast of? Have our specialists in the universities made any progress? Have our scholars who have completed their course increased their ability? The answer is emphatically no, without the slightest hesitation. They certainly cannot compete with the youth of other nations in keenness and application; besides issuing manifestoes, holding conferences, and getting rid of their professors is there any one thing in which they excel? There may be, but we are certainly unaware of it.

"The failure of our students to make any progress is due partly to their environment and partly to themselves. For some years

past political unrest and the impoverishment of the community have seriously militated against the progress of the younger generation, but at least at their age character is not formed; they are deficient in the spirit of enterprise as well as arrogant and idle; on the whole they are not equal to first year's students at the close of the Manchu régime. Those with ability become overbearing, while the less gifted become lazy; their outstanding characteristic is listlessness. Of whatever branch of study they take up they only acquire a very superficial knowledge. Their one idea is to take their degree with the minimum of exertion and go, without any definite plans for the future. In this atmosphere, with low general standards, it is idle to expect any great proficiency in athletics. To-day there is not a college or school without its athletic meeting; but the same spirit of superficiality prevails here, and success only leads to self-satisfaction; there is no grasp of the fact that by hard work alone can a high standard be maintained. This was clearly shown at the international meeting, where the pick of China's leading schools could only score one solitary success; as far as preliminary work is concerned they were not in the same street with other nations. This is a bitter lesson for us. The failure of China's athletes to hold their own in an international meeting is a defeat for the whole youth of the nation; and our weakness in athletics is symptomatic of our all-round inferiority. We do not specially blame this handful of competitors; but we do desire to arouse the young men of China to the fact that we alone of all the nations are not advancing, which bodes ill for the future of the country."

Is it the young men or the older men, the generals and the politicians, of China who need to be "lectured"?

GEORGE GLASGOW.

November 15th, 1930.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE FALL OF BISMARCK.*

Karl Friedrich Nowak's four works on the World War and the settlement are known to all students of the great catastrophe, and two of them—*The Collapse of the Central Powers* and *Versailles*—have appeared in English dress. Packed with information derived from many leading actors in the drama, and written with rare dramatic power, they have found many readers in the author's country and abroad.

The present volume forms the first instalment of the most ambitious task to which Herr Nowak has set his hand. The loss of the war focused attention on the strength and weakness of the short-lived German Empire, and a fierce light beats on the throne of William II. Whose was the fault? Could disaster have been avoided? Was it that Bismarck's successors, like Alexander's Generals, did not know how to maintain their mighty heritage? Or was it that Bismarck's shadow brooded heavily over the land which he made the strongest Power in the world, but which he never trained to govern itself? Such are the questions which have been asked by a thousand tongues and answered in dozens of different ways.

Some excellent narratives and monographs have been published in Germany during the last decade, and many of the protagonists

* *Kaiser and Chancellor. The Opening Years of the Reign of William II.* By Karl Friedrich Nowak. Translated by E. W. Dickes. London. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1930. 21s.

have described their own part in the play. But there has been hitherto no attempt to paint a large-scale picture of an eventful era with the aid of material supplied by the Kaiser himself. It is this gap which Herr Nowak has set out to fill, and there can be no question as to the importance of his achievement. The preface to the English edition explains the relations between the author and the fallen Monarch. Herr Nowak gratefully acknowledges the assistance he has received, but he is solely responsible for the use he has made of it. His attitude is one of discriminating sympathy, not of discipleship or adulation.

The present volume only covers the first two years of the reign of William II, but no reader is likely to complain that the pages are overloaded with detail. If we are to understand the ruler and his policy we must visualise the stage on which he was called to play his difficult part and the influences which moulded his impressionable years. Herr Nowak's style is full of colour and movement, and his portraits glow with vigorous life. The Emperor emerges as a gifted and attractive young man, handicapped by certain temperamental failings but motivated by lofty ideals. Bismarck is depicted as drunk with power and past his prime, passionately representing the substitution of a spirited and self-confident Hohenzollern for the modest old ruler who was acutely aware of his intellectual limitations and could always be brought to heel by threats of resignation. "Dropping the pilot," as it was phrased in Tenniel's celebrated cartoon, is an incident of such dramatic intensity that interest in it is likely to endure for centuries. History rarely pronounces an unchallenged verdict on any great controversial issue, for in such cases there is always right on both sides; but the case against the Iron Chancellor has never been more powerfully or more authoritatively presented than in these brilliant pages. It was more than a scramble for power; it was a conflict not only of temperaments and wills, but of generations. If Bismarck was right in wishing to renew the secret agreement with Russia, the Kaiser was right in refusing to play tricks with the Constitution or to shoot down strikers and socialists.

The stage is dominated by the Colossus and his young master; but Herr Nowak has much to say about the minor actors, two of whom in particular stand out in bold relief. Waldersee, the successor of Moltke as Chief of the Staff, appears once again as an arch-intriguer, busily playing for his own hand behind a semi-transparent mask of evangelical piety; and Holstein, the Mystery Man of the Wilhelmstrasse, looms more sinister than ever, stealthily pulling the strings to which his puppets and victims danced. In comparison with these complicated personalities Herbert Bismarck is simplicity itself—a miniature edition and an

unquestioning disciple of his adored but despotic father. The double tragedy of the story unfolded in these pages is that Bismarck was no longer fit to guide the footsteps of the Empire he had created, and that his successors, while avoiding his worst mistakes in domestic policy, lacked the piercing vision in the field of foreign affairs which rendered him the greatest master of diplomacy the world has ever seen. Every reader of Herr Nowak's book—and it should find many readers—will look forward to further instalments of a story which he tells so well, and on which he is enabled to throw new and welcome light from a source hitherto inaccessible to historians.

G. P. G.

* * *

LORD BIRKENHEAD'S HISTORICAL ESSAYS.*

There is a sense of sadness in reading these incisive historical essays since the many-sided author, brilliant as a diamond in every facet, has been taken from us in the prime of life, at a time when his ripest work might be thought to be before him. Lord Birkenhead might have been a great historian. He chose, instead, to be a great lawyer, a great Lord Chancellor, an eminent politician and statesman. During his time on the Woolsack he made possible the speedy passing of the vast group of statutes that formed a turning point in the history of English law. He had the historical sense highly developed and he displayed that sense in many great judgments. He had an extraordinary facility of mind that enabled him to take up work entirely foreign to his legal training and deliver judgments on subjects such as Scottish law teeming with historical problems, which his Scottish colleagues in the House of Lords declared to be without flaw. He was an example of a really fine mind that had received at Manchester and Oxford a grounding in the thoroughness and logical efficiency displayed with ease in all his best work.

In these essays, which he has entitled *Turning Points of History*, Lord Birkenhead displays exactly the same care that is reflected in his judgments on great causes. Whether the student agrees or not with his conclusions there is a certain inevitability about his arguments and his conclusions apparent in all his carefully prepared speeches and judgments. He, as an essayist, is the very reverse of Lord Macaulay. Lord Macaulay was an advocate pure and simple and not really a historian at all. He

* *Turning Points of History*. By the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Birkenhead. With thirty-two pages of illustrations. Hutchinson and Co. Ltd. 21s. net.

relied on his great but very faulty knowledge, derived from indiscriminate reading swallowed without digestion by his voracious memory, to make out a case for or against some unfortunate person or cause. His clear and brilliant Biblical prose style—the origin of modern newspaper prose—he often used with brutal vigour to condemn a cause or castigate a person without any adequate historical research. In controversy Lord Birkenhead could be as bitter as Lord Macaulay and more incisive, but his mind was too well grounded to approach a theme unless material for a definite judgment on it existed. In the present series of essays, some of them very controversial, Lord Birkenhead has an assured ease of style that seems to make the most difficult problems simple, but he never takes a side without intimating that he is taking a side, and his historical opinions from the days of Salamis to the days of Jutland cannot be criticised on the ground that he is an advocate rather than a judge. Writing of the discussions before the battle of Salamis in September 480 B.C., Lord Birkenhead is as careful to mention the historical doubt which leaves Themistocles' policy in question as if the event only happened yesterday, while in his triumphant defence of General Gough and the Fifth Army in the events of March 1918, he is deadly in the earnestness of his argument, and yet as detached as if he had been writing of the victory of Pausanias at Platæa in August 479 B.C. after the glorious defeat of Thermopylæ. In both cases the non-cohesion of the allies might have involved lasting and historic defeat.

The essay on "The Conversion of St. Paul" is singularly attractive. Lord Birkenhead makes the judicial point that it is not impossible that St. Paul escaped execution: "the judges at Rome may have been as fair in their view of his alleged offence as their colleagues in Judæa." In fact, St. Paul was acquitted in the first trial. Lord Birkenhead makes the point that St. Paul from the outset saw that the Roman Empire formed a *locus* for a world-wide faith.

We see in him a man beside whose achievement even a colossus like Napoleon seems a pigmy, and Alexander the Great the creature of an instant.

I cannot look out from the windows of my house without my eye resting on the dome of the cathedral which Wren raised above the busy capital of an Empire greater and more powerful than any which Paul could contemplate on this earth; the cathedral bears the name of that earnest, clumsy, epileptic "tent-maker" of Tarsus—that Roman citizen who, by his teachings, transformed the Roman Empire and altered the whole face of the world.

In his essay on the "Fall of Jerusalem," Lord Birkenhead holds that the consequent dispersion of the Jews was an unmitigated bless-

ing. He is not an anti-Semite in any sense, but he regards the dispersion almost as a providential mercy.

For the Jews the fall of the city was more than a military disaster: it was the end of the Jewish Kingdom. Thenceforward they had no nationality, no country, no common centre of worship. Scattered over the world, it seemed that they would in the course of time disappear and be left as a mere memory of a race that once had made history, like to many nations that have flourished in those parts for a time and then ceased to be. But time reserved for them another destiny . . . their destiny was changed, but not their existence. Prophets, priests, and kings had ceased to lead them, but they still clung to the worship of the Most High. . . . In spite of the immense sufferings inflicted upon the Jews in their exile by their persecuting and reluctant hosts, we may say that both they and the world have gained by the destruction as a unit of the Jewish State. Had it survived they would have been a small Levantine power, unstable and divided by fierce internal disputes. As it is, they have spread throughout the world so that there is no country which has not gained by the achievements of the Jews in commerce and in all the arts and sciences. Rightly received and given proper opportunities for developing their peculiar gifts, they are a source of material and intellectual power. And their faults, which are many, may be forgiven them for their manifold sufferings, tribulations, and endurances.

This is a noble and just utterance and it may have some repercussions in countries that still delight in ransacking the ghettos of the Jews. They may perhaps remember that Heine, the great German-Jewish poet, declared that every country has the Jews that it deserves.

It is impossible to go through all these twenty essays in detail, but some brief comment may be made. Lord Birkenhead regards the chief importance of the Battle of Hastings that it linked England "to the great feudal tradition of Latin Christendom." That view may not be acceptable in its entirety since the feudal tradition had already in some form arrived. The views of the essayist on *Magna Carta* hardly bring out the importance of the subject, though no doubt certain nineteenth-century historians made too much of it as an isolated fact. The truth about *Magna Carta* is that the treaty of 1215 abolished the conception—foreign to true feudalism—of unlimited monarchy. The essay on the "Reformation" is important, since Lord Birkenhead takes the clear-cut view that the Reformation was the inevitable fruit of the Renaissance and that it is untrue that "this mighty movement represented the affirmation of the rights of the individual conscience against the intellectual claims of Rome." That is a possible point of view, but if we strive for a formula at all it might be equally true to say (as the present writer holds) that both the Renaissance

and the Reformation were the fruits of the unrest that followed the Black Death of 1348-9 and the disappearance of the perfected mediæval feudal system. But Lord Birkenhead's view is a broad one and disagrees utterly with the narrowness and bigotry which have disgraced various historical writers on both sides of a great theme.

Other essays bring England on to the stage both in respect of the rigid Protestantism that the unwisdom of James II forced upon the country, and with respect to the English struggle to found an Indian Empire. We see the establishment of the Napoleonic régime and fifty years later the foundation of a real Republic in America with the abolition of slavery. Lastly we get some pointed essays on the late war and some thoughts, very pregnant, on post-war anxieties. The whole work forms delightful reading, though it might not have reflected wholly Lord Birkenhead's final opinions in some cases since, as Lady Birkenhead warns the reader, the final proofs of some chapters were not able to be corrected by the author.

J. E. G. DE M.

* * *

CANONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.*

Dr. Thomas Baty, an English authority on International Law, and at present in the employment of the Japanese Government in an advisory capacity, in this learned work just published which unfolds the leading canons or principles of international law, tells the student that his object is "to ascertain and to reinforce certain guiding principles, the recognition of which appears to be necessary if the Law of Nations is not to degenerate into a morass of conflicting opinions, or of ukases dictated from Geneva." It is a goal of very great importance. Dr. Baty begins with an appreciation of what may be called the man-power of the independent sovereign states of the world. The Republic of China comes first with 445,000,000; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland second with 377,000,000, to which must be added the Dominions (which he classifies as doubtfully sovereign states) with a total population of about 32,000,000, making in all some 400,000,000; the United States of North America, 140,000,000; the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, 140,000,000; the Republic of France, 110,000,000; the Empire of Japan, 84,000,000; the Republic of Germany about 124,000,000; the Kingdom of Holland, 56,000,000; the Kingdom of Italy, 45,000,000; the Republic of Brazil, 31,000,000; the Republic of Poland, 27,000,000; the Kingdom of Spain, 24,000,000. The list goes on in decreasing

* *The Canons of International Law.* By T. Baty. John Murray. 21s. net.

numbers until we reach the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg with 275,000, persons, and the Principality of Liechtenstein with 10,000 persons. The mere question of man-power is very significant. It is more than interesting to grasp the fact that the British Empire and the United States of America together exceed the teeming millions of China by over a hundred millions.

Dr. Baty, in his estimate of the nature of a State, feels that "it might be better to lay stress on the element of subjection of the people to an ascertainable will, than on the existence among the people, or the bulk of the people, of a certain mutual reliance, not participated in by the outside world." The point is very doubtful since, when it comes to those struggles that are called war, "mutual reliance" may be very much more important than the forms of government which Dr. Baty neatly sums up in the phrase "sovereignty is . . . primarily a matter of Constitutional Law," though it also involves international independence. This sovereignty may exist in the form of Federalism which the author regards as "the real conciliation of Freedom with Security." What is the real relationship between independent sovereignties? It is the sense of binding obligations:

International Law has gone straight to the heart of the matter. It has established beneficent common understandings: and trusted to their existence to secure their observance. It is, indeed, often said that "the litigation of Nations is War"—but it is surprising how few wars have been waged for the assertion of a legal right. . . . International Law overrides the policeman, and can do very well without him. Equally is it able to do without a Legislature—and not only able, but exultant. Legislatures are not so popular to-day that one need labour the point. They are, at the best, as likely to contradict the deep sense of justice in the minds of the people as to formulate it. If they are not obedient scribes of bureaucracies, they are the battlegrounds of faction. . . . Thus they are the irreconcilable enemies of International Law, which rests on common consent. . . . International Law is, therefore, in the peculiar position of having no legislator: and the longer that it does without one the better, for otherwise it would no longer be order, but orders. . . . It bows to no sovereign set of managers. It rests upon the universal conviction of what is right. It is a necessary corollary that its rules must of necessity be simple, certain and objective, while nevertheless elastic. These four requirements are the Canons of International Law.

The Canon of Simplicity includes the treatment of the subject of the machinery of inter-State relationship by means of ambassadors and consuls, the doctrine of extraterritoriality in various regions and a discussion of the nature of straits, isthmuses, bays, gulfs, and lakes in the matter of territoriality. Dr. Baty says that

the assertion of a right of way through straits and across isthmuses is, in the circumstances of a congested modern world, becoming a matter of more and more importance. . . . There is no doctrine of public utility which can force a Power whose territory lies across the channels of trade to permit its passage. Why should it be called upon to make other Powers richer at the cost of its own privacy and homogeneity? It is not improbable that an attempt will be made, in the name of enlightenment and progress, to assert such rights of transit—probably in the shape of the right to construct, or to require the construction of, railways and canals. It cannot be too firmly resisted, because it implies an essential exaltation of riches above freedom. In order that one State may be the richer, another is to have its self-determination impaired . . . the general material interests of the world may be retarded by its selfishness: but there is a higher and more important interest than the general material welfare of the world; and that is the right of states to live their own life in their own way.

This doctrine is capable of being answered on grounds other than "general material welfare." It assumes that all States are persons with one will, whereas in fact the interests of minorities in the States in question have to be looked at. Moreover if it is to the interest of the world at large that communications should be expedited and that the only way to do it is to create a carefully safeguarded right of way, a State that blocks the way from pure selfishness in the supposed interest of a majority of its voters might rightly be compelled by economic pressure to give a right of way. It is then not a question of liberty against riches, but the liberty of the world against local liberty selfishly pursued. The Canon of Simplicity or preferably the Canon of Reasonableness seems to favour this view rather than the view taken by Dr. Baty.

The Canon of Certainty deals with matters "settled by an accepted solution, which ought, in the best interest of good relations, to remain undisturbed." Dr. Baty includes in such matters "Sovereignty and the Inviolability of Territory," the strict control of landing parties sent by a government to protect its nationals or prevent certain types of action, the suppression of "Pacific" blockade; the right of self-determination on the part of a State, however humble. "Each State is invested with a free hand in its own territories, and the simplicity of this principle cannot be impaired with impunity. Interference on behalf of aliens can only create an increasing body of resentment which will in the end prove cancerous." Dr. Baty qualifies this by the very proper statement that "we need not go so far as to set up a mathematically infinite liberty for it within its borders. There is a limit to what it may do. It must not scandalise its neighbours by horrible barbarity. But, short of that a nation is not really a nation unless it is free from external dictation and control." But it is important to stress the fact

of neighbourliness. Self-determination may take such a form, short of "horrible brutality," as to set up a strain on neighbourliness and make the States not on calling terms. The discussion on the status of aliens is very interesting and forceful and especially with respect to alien companies and companies comprised of aliens. The decision in the House of Lords in 1916 in the *Daimler case* is treated with the respect that it deserves, while the difficult theme of criminal jurisdiction over foreigners (as illustrated by the *Lotus case* at The Hague) is dealt with broadly, though Dr. Baty does not like the phrase "crime is territorial." The three-mile limit of jurisdiction is stoutly defended, and the suggestion that it really is the distance of visibility and not the former range of cannon shot is not dismissed. "The three-mile limit is by far the best rule possible, and it can be extended conventionally to any desired area for the protection of fishing and revenue or for the extension of the responsibilities of neutrality." Turning to war, Dr. Baty is of opinion that "Allegiance is still one, and that the primary, criterion of enemy character."

Objectivity is Dr. Baty's third Canon of International Law. By that he means plain fact in such regions as the continuity of State life, the Recognition of States and Governments by the principle of *de facto* control, the Prohibition of Neutral Trade, Contraband, Visit and Search, and Blockade. His point of view in the matter of the Recognition of States is that "a government remains a government until it is reduced to impotence." Recent events in Brazil illustrate this point. On the subject of the prohibition of enemy's trade, Dr. Baty makes the well-known point that a Prize Court is a world court not to be altered by any local legislature. Professor Oppenheim held the reverse view. In the case of contraband, Dr. Baty holds that "the test of predominant military character is not only historical, but is dictated by reason. Contraband so defined is limited, certain and tolerable." That may be so, but what is "reason"? Dr. Baty thinks that the Allied Prize Courts during the late war "avowedly set principles aside." Military character may include apparently harmless cargoes, but Dr. Baty does not seem to see that all these matters are relative and not absolute, and that *dicta* from Lord Stowell, though very important, hardly apply universally to a War when conditions were wholly different from the Napoleonic Wars. Dr. Baty thinks that "Blockade should be restored to its proper place as a known and substantive institution of the Law of Nations." It is too soon to condemn the practice of the Allies in the late War in respect to contraband, and it may be said that the blockade of neutral ports could be defended if those ports were in fact supplying the enemy with the necessities of modern warfare. We have to take time to see all these

things in perspective and Dr. Baty perhaps judges too swiftly of Great Britain's part in a life and death struggle. The last Canon, Elasticity, deals with questions of nationality, regional understandings, modern protectorates, the force of treaties, neutral duties, war rules, exemption of private property from maritime capture, and modes of pacific settlement. Dr. Baty thinks that "wide extensions of Contraband and the doctrine of Continuous Voyage between them make the exemption from capture of private property a myth." But might it not be said that the private property shipped during the late War was also a myth? It was shipped with a definite purpose of aiding the enemies. The subject is too difficult to discuss until it is in perspective. Private property in the real sense ought to be protected from capture, but the Courts of Prize are surely justified in making sure that the property is in fact private.

J. E. G. DE M.

* * *

TENNYSON, THE VICTORIAN.*

The author of this well-wrought essay, Mr. C. H. O. Scaife, calls this critical study of the poetry of Alfred Tennyson *An Essay in Appreciation*, not in the ordinary sense of the term, but rather as a valuation. He feels that the only true method of criticism is by divorcing the poet from his period, a difficult operation, since the period often produces the poet. At least it produces his output—since poetic force must be inherent—and his period gives him his material and is also his steering wheel. Thus, if his poetry be objective, then the mechanised world acts naturally on the poetry produced. There is poetry in science, it may be perhaps called applied poetry, in opposition to that which Mr. Scaife calls *pure* poetry, which one takes to mean subjective or imaginative. The symbolism of the Psalms of David or the Book of Job constitutes pure poetry. "The morning stars sang together, and the sons of God shouted for joy" is a finding of the spiritual in the natural, an exultation which emanates from the innermost soul of the poet, seeking expression in humanistic form.

Mr. Scaife's suggestion that Tennyson foresaw the separation that would naturally ensue between poetry and everyday life due to a mechanised world is far from true. Mr. Kipling could find poetry in the rhythm of the steam engine, while the mystery of the wireless, to which the present generation is only opening the door, is but a symbol of the omnipresence of the Creator with whom time and space are as nought. "A thousand years in thy sight are but as

* *The Poetry of Alfred Tennyson: An Essay in Appreciation.* By C. H. O. Scaife. Cobden-Sanderson Ltd. 5s. net.

yesterday." The poetic quality of mechanism is its ever-growing power, the apparent miracle of yesterday being the ordinary phenomenon of to-day, and "the vision that will be" awaits the to-morrow. The twentieth century which Tennyson the poet foresaw, holds in its grasp marvels of science which should capture the imagination and bring forth a poetry of motion hitherto unwritten, by means of which races are knit together in thought and action, the making into one of the nations of the earth. Instead of poetry being severed from daily life it is finding a new life in every direction and in every new discovery.

The Victorian age, despite Mr. Scaife's sarcasm, was a great age, and the precursor, it is to be hoped, of a greater. The sciologists of every age belittle the thoughts, ideas, customs, and manners of the preceding generation, and with a growing impatience of the past, see only the accretions which have perhaps, for the time being, enveloped the period. Indeed Mr. Scaife recognises and fully appreciates the greatness of many of Tennyson's poems and idyls, while he brushes aside the Victorian *Verses* which met the sentimental and emotional demand of Tennyson's time, and cannot be weighed in the same balance.

In Memoriam and *Maud*, are, therefore, of great importance historically, because they show the beginnings of the transformation of English poetry which is in process of development by the mechanisation of society . . . it is, nevertheless, the same light as that which shines upon the massive and serene proportions of *Paradise Lost* and on the intricate glories of the *Faerie Queene*. It is fruitless to ask if *In Memoriam* and *Maud* are great poems, for we are so strange to the world in which we live that we possess means of measuring only the world which has preceded it; but that which is vital in them is of our own time—the spirit which creates their beauty is new, unstable, and unhappy.

Is this true? *In Memoriam* loses much of its spontaneity when it is known as a labour of love spread over many years, it is an echo of past grief and loss, not the outburst of present sorrow as faces us in Shelley's *Adonais*. Its long drawn-out sadness and its diversions from the central theme itself weary the reader and lack sincerity. The thought that Shakespeare fuses into language never stales, but like Cleopatra, holds the lover for all time; Shakespeare's is "unpremeditated art," and so with all pure poetry emanating from the soul. Mr. Scaife's summing up of the whole matter is, that Tennyson must be read in drastic selection, "but the considerable residue gives him claims to the first order in the hierarchy of English poets." The truth is that Tennyson wrote too much and was so self-conscious that he could not bring himself to burn his many inferior works. That error was not com-

mitted by Browning. In the case of Wordsworth the huge mountain of his writings makes a philosophic whole and has a value even when the poetry is poor. Mr. Scaife has greatly helped in the revival of interest in the poetry of Tennyson, which for some time has been flagging, by this scholarly and critical treatise.

S. DE M.

STATE TRIALS.*

The work known as *State Trials*, published in 1811 and succeeding years in thirty-two volumes, has generally been regarded as a reliable work which historians could use with advantage. It is the fifth and last edition of a book which was originally published in 1719, and Mr. J. G. Muddiman, the author of the definitive volume on the Bloody Assizes published last year, for the first time has compiled a brief history of this work with the most disquieting results. The successive editors in 1730-5, 1742-66, 1776-81 and 1811 never "thought of checking and revising the work of his predecessors. Each in turn added additional documents and notes, but was most intent upon bringing the trials up to date." The result of this process, slovenly and in the earlier editions apparently deliberate, is that "the trials in the reigns of the Stuarts have come down to us exactly as they were printed in 1719 and 1730, unaltered and unchecked." This fact and the fact that many historians have relied implicitly upon these documents have given rise to sad and extraordinary mistakes about the Stuart period. Even Sir James Stephen in his *History of Criminal Law* was grossly deceived by reports in *State Trials* printed a generation after the alleged facts happened. It is in these reports that Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys is pictured "as a swearing or railing bully." The history of the work which Mr. Muddiman with characteristic industry has revealed shows that the *State Trials* of the Stuart period are unreliable documents written with the purpose of decrediting the House of Stuart. It was after the Jacobite rising of 1715 that the plan was carried out.

Who was the real author of the plan to create such documents? Mr. Muddiman makes it clear that it was a certain John Darby the younger, a printer of Bartholomew Close. The elder John Darby was described by Roger L'Estrange to Sir Leoline Jenkins in 1683 to be "as dangerous and desperate an Anabaptist as lives." The son was also a political dissenter of the same type. Their surreptitious publications were numerous, and for publishing the alleged "Speech" on the scaffold of Lord William Russell in 1683

* *State Trials; the need for a new and revised edition of "State Trials."* By J. G. Muddiman. William Hodge and Co. Ltd. 1s. net.

the elder John Darby was fined and imprisoned. He died in 1707 and the son carried on the business, which became profitable after the Revolution of 1688 since "Whig libels could be printed with impunity." The younger Darby issued in 1705, 1706 and 1707 "a collection of State Tracts" which were, in fact, Whig Tracts. No publisher's name was given, probably for fear of eventualities. In 1716 Darby and others announced in the *London Gazette* "proposals for printing a complete collection of State Trials, proceedings upon impeachments for High Treason and other crimes and misdemeanours, from the beginning of the reign of King James I to the end of the reign of Queen Anne." These proposals for some reason fell through and in 1717 another and extended list of proposals was advertised in the *London Gazette*, and this time the proposals in a fashion were carried out. It was a costly business and for the purpose of editing one Thomas Salmon was employed by Darby.

It was not Salmon's first exploit in the nefarious practice of mutilating historical documents, for, in 1708, when Rushworth's "Historical Collections" were out of print, he had edited them for Darby, and cut down the original eight volumes to six. Accordingly, Salmon now deprived all the printed *State Trials* transcribed by him of their title pages, prefaces, and conclusions, not infrequently mutilating also their texts, and thus was able to crowd into the four volumes of the first edition not only trials from the earliest times, the value of which is more than doubtful (for these are mere compilations from chronicles), but also most of the printed trials of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, down to the trial of Dr. Sacheverell in 1709. The modern writer who does not refer to the original documents transcribed, therefore incurs a serious risk of coming to erroneous conclusions, and even of being wholly mistaken about the facts of certain cases.

The work, however, was a success in days when books were rare, and a second edition was called for in ten years. The new edition which carried the trials down to 1725 was entrusted to a barrister named Sollum Emlyn, the son of a Presbyterian clergyman, a Cambridge University graduate, Thomas Emlyn, who later styled himself a Unitarian and was fined and imprisoned for his work entitled *An Humble Inquiry into the Scripture Account of Jesus Christ*. He died in 1741 and must have been acquainted with the new edition. Sollum appears to have had a son Thomas, who was also a Cambridge man, joined Lincoln's Inn and practised at the Chancery Bar. He died in 1796. However, there is some doubt whether this Thomas Emlyn was the son of the editor of the second edition of *State Trials* which was issued in 1730. "Volumes 7 and 8 added to this second edition, were published in 1735, two years after Darby's death, and it is quite clear that Darby had nothing

to do with them." Sollum Emlyn died on June 30th, 1754. He is described at the date of his death as a "Commissioner of Bankrupts and the Lead Office" and also as "an eminent Chamber Counsel and editor of *State Trials*." Neither Salmon nor Emlyn collected the trials that they edited. Many of the controversial trials had never been printed and were reported apparently by one Robert Blaney, a Herefordshire or Montgomeryshire man who married the second daughter of the famous John Rushworth, and "followed Rushworth as a reporter of Parliamentary and other proceedings for which a knowledge of shorthand was necessary." This was about the year 1678, in which year Blaney was called to the Bar at the Inner Temple and was qualified to do law reporting. "He reported all the Popish Plot Trials, and was called upon by Oates to testify in his favour the facts of these trials at his own trial for perjury in 1685." Mr. Muddiman considers that "the effect of the revision by Oates and his fellow-perjurers of their evidence places the whole series of 'Popish Plot' trials under suspicion," and gives one instance in which the printed report differs materially from the evidence as cited in a pamphlet of 1679, written by one of the priests who were tried in January 1680. On the evidence given by Mr. Muddiman Robert Blaney was a friend of Oates and a very unscrupulous man. Certainly a case has been made out for the need for a new and revised edition of *State Trials*. Perhaps it would be better for them to be published as official reports of these and other State Trials vouched for by historical specialists. But Mr. Muddiman has done good work in drawing attention to the undoubted fact that the English *State Trials* are full of political prejudice and are not to be trusted as evidence.

J. E. G. DE M.

* * *

CULTURAL HISTORY.*

Dr. Friedell has some strange ideas about the possibility of writing history. He even puts aside Von Ranke's ideal, "to tell the story as it really happened," since his importance as an historian "he owed entirely to being a great thinker." Dr. Friedell thinks that "however numerous the new sources one opens out, there is never a living one among them." He therefore attempts to tell what he calls "to-day's legend of modern history." Incompleteness is his aim: "We can never see the world other than incompletely: *deliberately* to see it incomplete is to create an

* *A Cultural History of the Modern Age from the Black Death to the World War. Volume One. Introduction, Renaissance, and Reformation.* By Egon Friedell; translated from the German by Charles Francis Atkinson. Alfred A. Knopf. 21s.

artistic aspect. Art is the subjective, preferential treatment of certain elements of reality." Attention might be drawn to the fact that science has drawn from material phenomena laws, and the hope of some thinkers is that the same will happen with history. But it would be useless to argue with Dr. Friedell, since he has made up his mind and is writing his treatise on world-history on this plan.

The aim of this book is to sketch an intellectual and moral picture-page, a spiritual costume-history of the last six centuries, showing at the same time the Platonic Idea of each age and the thought which inwardly inspired it and was its soul. This Thought of the Age is the organising, the creative, the *only truth* in each age, although in actuality it is seldom seen in the pure state; for what happens is that the prism of the age breaks it up into a many-coloured rainbow of symbols. Only now and then is the age so fortunate as to produce the one great philosopher who reassembles the rays in the focus of the intellect.

Dr. Friedell thinks that the year of the Black Death, 1348, "was the year in which modern man was conceived." There is this truth in this statement that in 1348-9 the feudal system and its accompanying definite arts began to dissolve and the Western World has been in a state of ferment ever since. But the modern man, if such a creature exists, was distinctly visible in the feudal age. "The new age," the author argues, "entered the world at the opening of the sixteenth century, but . . . it came into being in the fourteenth and fifteenth." He dwells on the fact that the alleged new age was a function of disease and that is because "wherever something new is being formed, there is weakness, sickness, and decadence." That is a curious statement, since in fact new thought is not a product of decadence but a product of intellectual power at its highest range. Dr. Friedell mixes up the insanitary conditions that enabled the Black Death to take hold of the people with decadence. If that were so, what can we say of the Yellow Death five centuries earlier, or the plagues that have haunted the earth from time immemorial simply because men will not or cannot wash? The Black Death of 1349 is important because it attacked unexpectedly the homes of very healthy peoples and destroyed the social structure. But Dr. Friedell is certain that in the mid-fourteenth century new germs were at work which the actual germ of the Black Death whipped into life with the aid of local geniuses. He says plainly that "genius is never healthy," though it is "never sick."

He regards the Middle Ages as the age of puberty for mid-European humanity, "the thousand-year psychosis of adolescence in the form of disguised sexuality." Thus he disposes of the

beautiful things, the music, the architecture, the poetry of the Middle Ages. The mysticism of the Middle Ages he regards, indeed, as a wonderful phenomenon, "the will to find the way back to God," and in this mysticism "we discover a striking resemblance to our own age. . . . The Plague corresponds to the World War." He sees the Renaissance as the product of the Plague, the Renaissance with its new life and new standard of living, and probably that is true in some sense since men generally realised that a physically cleaner world is a more beautiful world. The description of the Italian Renaissance, and especially in its later stages, is the best part of a very long-drawn-out book. After the Renaissance "Reason takes charge," and the Reformation follows. The whole book is interesting, shows wide reading, and is fascinating in its persistent development of a conception of history which few historians would care to follow, but which is in fact realistic though it pretends to be subjective.

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THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MR. GANDHI.*

The Round Table Conference on the future of India is conspicuous for the absence of the Indian Swarajist Party. The dominating force behind the extremist agitation is Mr. Gandhi, without whose inspiration the movement would fall to pieces. All reasonable men must deplore his attempt to jeopardise the success of the Conference, but any book which leads to an understanding of Mr. Gandhi's character and aims deserves close examination. Mr. C. F. Andrews is a well-known supporter and disciple of the Mahatma and has undertaken the task of editing his autobiography. During the troubles of 1922 Mr. Gandhi was imprisoned for a considerable time and began writing his own life story while in prison. He continued the work after his release and it was published in serial form in his native tongue. From these writings and a book entitled *Satyagraha (Soul-Force) in South Africa*, Mr. Andrews has gathered together lengthy extracts in chronological order and has presented a concise life of Gandhi by himself. This book, which is called *Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story*, is cut short in 1921, omitting the turmoil of 1922-4 and the present troubles. It is mainly concerned with Mr. Gandhi's life in South Africa.

Mr. Gandhi, on his own showing, is a philosopher whose whole life has been guided by the search after "Truth, Loving Kindness and Inner Purity."

* *Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story*. Edited by C. F. Andrews. Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d. net.

I am simply a humble aspirant for perfection. . . . My national service is part of the training I undergo for freeing my soul from the bondage of the flesh. Thus considered, my service may be regarded as purely selfish. I have no desire for the perishable kingdom of earth. I am striving for the kingdom of Heaven which is spiritual deliverance. . . . So my patriotism is for me a stage in my journey to the land of eternal freedom and peace.

Thus Mr. Gandhi describes the purpose of his life and this is the constant refrain throughout his book. He judges himself by these precepts, and by them we must judge him too. It is idle to pretend that Mr. Gandhi has not done great service to India. In South Africa he maintained the rights of Indian immigrants and put a stop by his energy and agitation to the system of indentured labour for Indians. In India itself he has aroused a new energy and a new life which if properly directed might even now lead to a permanent constitutional settlement.

It is true that even in Western eyes there may have been justification in some of Mr. Gandhi's political aims, yet in his method he has been singularly provocative and irresponsible. It was in South Africa that Gandhi first developed his policy of *Satyagraha*, which, he claims, must not be confused with the Western notion of passive resistance. "When in a meeting of Europeans," he writes,

I found that the term "passive resistance" was too narrowly construed; that it was supposed to be a weapon of the weak; that it could be characterised by hatred, and that it could finally manifest itself as violence, I had to demur to all these statements and explain the real nature of the Indian movement.

Satyagraha is a compound word meaning truth (sat) and firmness (agraha) and is a rather nebulous doctrine. Man's duty is to seek after truth. He must withstand all aggressions which may stay his progress to perfection; and when perfection is attained, and with it self-realisation, the evils of the world will succumb. To use Mr. Gandhi's own words, "When that fineness and rarity of spirit which I long for have become perfectly natural to me; when I have become incapable of any evil; when nothing harsh or haughty occupies, be it momentarily, my thought-world; then and not till then, will my non-violence move the hearts of all the world." In this search after truth, he is preaching the expulsion of the British and the attainment of an Indian Swaraj. In 1921 he wrote what applies still more to-day that "my principal experiments with Truth during the past seven years have all been made through the Congress." This is the Congress which refuses to co-operate with the Round Table Conference and so jeopardises the chance of a successful and lasting solution. It is curious how his search after Truth, Loving-Kindness

and Inner Purity has brought about this result. Yet for all this we need not doubt his sincerity. The fact seems to be that, with all his aloofness and spirituality, he remains bound by the more doubtful dogmas of his own creed. As one should expect, Mr. Gandhi has no belief in "untouchability." It revolts his inner consciousness, but his undoubted force of power and influence has not led to its extinction.

Again Mr. Gandhi disapproves intensely of child marriage. He was himself a victim. Betrothed for the third time at the age of seven, he was married at thirteen. "I can see," he writes, "no moral argument in support of such a preposterously early marriage as mine." Mr. Gandhi has been hailed a prophet and is called Mahatma. Why then does he not preach a great crusade against these crying evils? If there is any Hindu who could rid his race of the clash of caste and the mockery of marriage it is surely Mr. Gandhi. And yet he has done little or nothing towards reform.

"It is well nigh universally admitted," says Mr. Andrews in his preface, "that his influence remains one of the paramount factors in Indian affairs." This is no doubt true. But it is also certain that his actual power over his followers grows less with the growing intensity of disorder. His conception of *Satyagraha*, or the non-violence of the non-co-operation campaign is lost in the violence of his most ardent supporters. He has started a movement which is running a course that he finds hard to control. Let him assert himself before it may be too late, before India is plunged into greater distress and discord. On the shoulders of Mr. Gandhi rests a great measure of responsibility for peace and progress. If he fails to discharge it, he will contradict the essence of all his spiritual pretensions.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Professor Trevelyan's *England under Queen Anne: Blenheim** has already received the enthusiastic welcome it deserves, and his many readers will look forward with eager anticipation to the further instalments. The first hundred pages describe the stage on which the drama was played; and if the picture is a shade less brilliant than the famous third chapter of Macaulay's *History of England*, it is equally full and less open to attack. The two most striking chapters of a book which carries the reader lightly along its flowing stream are viii and xviii, the former of which describes the characters of the Queen and Marlborough. Anne appears as a fat and unsightly invalid, with-

* Longmans. 21s.

out charm of conversation, yet in no way contemptible. "In order to do what she thought right in Church and State, she slaved at many details of government. And the ideas that inspired her were those of moderation, good sense and humanity, for which the Stuart line had not always been conspicuous." Marlborough was not Macaulay's villain of genius, but a man who, despite some ugly episodes in his earlier life, possessed many shining qualities—patriotism, courtesy, patience, and humanity. If he remains in some degree a mystery it is owing to his reserve. Unlike Nelson, "he never gave himself away, to friends in love or foes in anger." Professor Trevelyan is grateful to the man who checked the domination of Louis XIV, and he commends him to us as "one of the first born of the Age of Reason, the armed champion of toleration and good sense." His adored wife, Sarah, appears as "the cleverest woman in England," and of useful Godolphin we are told in a revealing phrase that Newmarket was his spiritual home. Over this brilliant story of victory and renown hovers the great spirit of William III. "The large successes of the reign of Anne, which laid the foundations of British power and prosperity in the eighteenth century, had all been foreseen and advised by the Dutch King." The policy of co-operative resistance to a French dictatorship over Europe was carried out by the great soldier whom he had done his best to train for the supreme purpose. Of the chapter on Blenheim it is enough to say that even readers who usually slip battles will enjoy every word. Rarely was so decisive a result achieved with so small a sacrifice of blood and treasure.

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Mr. L. St. Clare Grondona has published an excellent volume of statistics on Empire trade, entitled *Empire Stock Taking*.* It is entirely without political bias or propaganda and is intended to provide authoritative information on a question which is most prominently before the British public. "Of the countless protagonists," writes the author in his Preface, "of Empire development and of those who oppose the schemes they put forward from time to time, very few appear to be aware of the facts, a knowledge of which is essential to those who wish to play an intelligent part in what all will agree is a momentous movement." Mr. Grondona has set himself to meet this want by collecting together a great mass of Imperial trade figures which are well classified and accompanied by adequate comments and coloured diagrams. The author deals mainly with the needs of Britain in the shape of foodstuffs and raw materials, and the extent to which the Empire satisfies these needs; and conversely with the demand of the Overseas Empire for manufactured goods and the extent to which they can be supplied by this country. "My aim in this book is to set down clearly the outstanding facts of Imperial production and of Imperial demand." Business men, politicians of all parties, and everyone interested in Imperial economic development will find this book extremely useful. Mr. Grondona intends to make "Empire Stock Taking" an annual publication and so make available all the latest and most authoritative statistical information on this subject.

* Simpkin Marshall Ltd. 10s. 6d. net.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

This small volume on "Wiltshire,"* by Mr. R. Weldon Finn, certainly is more than a mere guide book. In nine short chapters the author tells how from prehistoric times to the present day the county of Wiltshire has always been one of great importance. Mr. Finn divides his periods into "Physical Features and Geology, Pre-Roman and Roman, Saxon, Mediæval, Tudor, Stuart, and Modern Wiltshire"; and he deals also with the Industrial and Agrarian Revolutions. In his conclusion the author points out that Wiltshire is a "Microcosm of England, a tiny part of all that the name of our country conveys to us." She is not spoilt by the smoke of factories, nor are her roads broken by charabancs or lorries; in fact she retains the unspoilt glories of "England's green and pleasant land." The illustrations are many, including plates and maps showing the different periods of country life. An interesting glossary of place-names is to be found at the end of this excellent book.

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In "Her Father's House"† Miss Hilda Vaughan writes a novel of merit. Nell and Bell Trelower are the daughters of a wild Welsh squire and an uneducated farmer's daughter of strong Puritan stock. The mother deserts her husband and takes the children to live with her brother, a bigoted farmer. From the first Nell is at variance with her mother, and, meeting her father by accident, pays many secret visits to him. When this is discovered a violent scene occurs and Nell leaves home and goes to London to make her fortune. There she marries a countryman and goes through many vicissitudes and before the birth of her second child she is consumed with the desire that it should be born in her father's house. She makes the long journey from London to Wales on foot, and goes through many perils and privations, but her wish is accomplished; she arrives in time to see her dying father, and her son is born in the ancestral home. The book is full of vigour and the various characters are alive, and throughout the reader traces the author's devotion to her country and countrymen.

* * *

In spite of the fact that many people object to literary anthologies on the grounds that snippets of an author's works are of no use for either critical purposes or for enjoyable reading, yet these collections continue to appear and to find readers. Mr. V. H. Collins has compiled "A Book of Narrative Verse,"‡ which covers practically the whole ground of English and some Scotch verse starting with examples from Chaucer and the Old Ballads down to the twentieth century. The anthology is an interesting one, and (although Spenser is the only given author of the sixteenth century), it shows better than any criticism the variations of method and thought as expressed in narrative verse through the centuries. That perhaps is the value of anthologies, if well compiled, to give a bird's-eye view of certain aspects of literature as depicted down the ages.

* Alfred A. Knopf. 2s.

† W. Heinemann. 7s. 6d.

‡ Oxford University Press. ("The World's Classics" Series.) 2s. net.

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